UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN
FACULTY OF EDUCATION

CONTEST AND CO-OPTION: THE STRUGGLE FOR SCHOOLING IN THE
AFRICAN INDEPENDENT CHURCHES OF THE CAPE COLONY,
c1895 - 1920.

BY

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ABSTRACT:

The establishment of schools by independent African churches reflected changes in the complex amalgam of forces that constituted the social fabric of ordinary black people in the Cape Colony between 1895 and 1920. These churches and schools were in part a creative response to discriminatory mission church politics, a general decline in black economic fortunes, and changes in the nature of black political mobilisation. However, the advent of independent church schools did not merely reflect an ideological preoccupation with colonial dominance. They were initiated to meet a range of educational needs articulated by numbers of urban and rural blacks. This demand for educational opportunities signalled the progressive incorporation of formal western education within the social lives of many black people in the Cape. Moreover, in this crucial period, schooling in the Cape Colony was being segregated as the principal element in a programme introduced by the Education Department to curtail spending on black education and to boost subsidies to white education. Blacks were therefore limited to mission schools which were inadequate and characterised by a lack of community control. Consequently, independent church communities were preoccupied with the politics of access and control in the schools. Within the gradually unfolding Cape education 'system', missionary control was tenuous in the uncoordinated rural mission outstation schools. There, independent school communities seized the opportunity to pursue their own objectives. However, each group of independent church schools was in some way conditioned by the ability of colonial representatives to dictate the political, financial and administrative terms of their existence. In this respect, the independent school communities negotiated the ambiguous terrain between the poles of contest and co-option. The more successful initiatives managed to solicit Education Department funding while minimising interference from white intermediaries, school inspectors and mission church agents. Nevertheless, government recognition and funding mechanisms facilitated the eventual capture of the independent schools within the colonial education system. Thus, this work reflects as much on the emergence of the Cape education system, as on the question of resistance to mission control. The independent church schools were not solely characterised by contest with missionaries or the government education authorities. African Christian school communities in rural locations in the Eastern Cape were divided internally by school, ethnic and church allegiances which affected their access to scarce commodities such as education and land. Competition over access to schooling therefore gave rise to serious conflict between African independent church adherents, and groups that remained loyal to the mission churches. In contrast, independent school initiatives in the rural Western Cape were characterised less by intra-community conflicts, than by bureaucratic engagement with the Education Department hierarchy, and the utilisation of supra-ethnic and supra-denominational political conduits such as the African Political Organisation.
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ABBREVIATIONS:

Abbreviations for Archival Sources:

AB  - Material from archives of the Church of the Province of South Africa, University of Witwatersrand.
CA  - Cape Archives Depot.
CMT - Chief Magistrate of Transkeian Territories, Cape Archives Depot.
MS  - Archival manuscripts, Cory Library, Grahamstown.
NA  - Native Affairs Department, Cape Archives Depot.
NTS - Naturelle Sake, Transvaal Archives Depot.
PR  - Printed Matter, Cory Library, Grahamstown.
SGE - Superintendent General of Education, Cape Archive Depot.
TAB - Transvaal Archives Depot.

Other Abbreviations:

ABp  - Archbishop
Ag   - Acting
AME  - African Methodist Episcopal Church
APC  - African Presbyterian Church
Bp   - Bishop
CC   - Civil Commissioner
CPSA - Church of the Province of South Africa
DRC  - Dutch Reformed Church
Fr   - Father
GMC  - General Missionary Conference
INL  - Inspector of Native Locations
MLA  - Member of the Legislative Assembly
NAD  - Native Affairs Department
Order - Order of Ethiopia
RM   - Resident Magistrate
SANAC - South African Native Affairs Commission 1903-1905
SNA  - Secretary or Superintendent of Native Affairs
UFC  - United Free Church of Scotland
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CHAPTER ONE

THE AFRICAN INDEPENDENT CHURCH SCHOOLS: LITERATURE REVIEW, SCOPE AND APPROACH

1. Introduction

The history of black education in South Africa before apartheid has not been extensively explored. In particular, little is known about the contradictory role that schooling played in the attempt to consolidate colonial hegemony, or about contestation between the missions, the colonial government departments and black communities over the control of schools. An area of even greater neglect is the history of schools launched by African independent churches autonomous from the mission churches.

The establishment of independent church schools grew out of a mounting critique of mission schooling which African and Coloured communities considered to be inadequate or inappropriate. This situation was aggravated by policies of the Cape government which were aimed at implementing segregation and curtailing subsidies for black education. At the same time, the changing colonial economy generated great demand for education from rural and urban black populations. Their deteriorating political and economic fortunes led ever increasing numbers of blacks to apportion more and more time, money and energy in the pursuit of education. The severity of conflicts over schooling described in this study therefore attest to the growing politicisation of education among African and Coloured people between 1890 and 1920.

By means of case-studies, this thesis examines the attempts by three churches to operate schools free of white missionary control. The African Presbyterian Church was established in the magistracy of Victoria East in the vicinity of Lovedale, the celebrated Presbyterian mission institution. The African-American originated African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) set up schools in the rural Western Cape which had been dominated by the Dutch Reformed Church. The Order of Ethiopia was a body of independent African Christians which seceded from the AME and affiliated with the Church of the Province of South Africa as a semi-autonomous body. Its main centre of growth was in the Grahamstown Diocese of the Church of the Province of South Africa.

The primary focus is on the independent church schools as sites of contestation over physical, administrative and financial control. They were opposed by African Christians who remained loyal to the missions, by the missionaries, and by officials of the colonial government departments. Particular consideration will be given to the process whereby the church leaders were able to negotiate the survival of their schools and to manipulate administrative procedures in the interests of their communities. Nevertheless, these benefits were not achieved without cost. Under financial pressure to secure grants-in-aid from the Education Department, the schools were obliged to depend on white mediation with the government, which militated against their autonomy. In this way, these schools were gradually incorporated within the framework of the emerging territorial education ‘system’. Thus, although this work deals principally with the historical question of educational resistance, it will reflect on the emergence of a ‘system’ of education.

The communities within which the independent church schools were located, provided another locus of conflict. This study will also examine how polarisation on ethnic and denominational lines in the Eastern Cape, affected struggles
MAP 1. LOCATION OF INDEPENDENT CHURCH CASE STUDIES, 1895-1920

- African Methodist Episcopal Church
- Western Cape Boland
- Order of Ethiopia - Grahamstown Diocese of CPSA
- African Presbyterian Church - Magistracy of Victoria East
for schooling opportunities. It will show that in the Western Cape, involvement in educational struggles was conducted less in the turmoil of community conflict than through supra-denominational political conduits such as the African Political Organisation.

Chapter One will provide an interdisciplinary review of the origins and development of the independent church movement. It will then focus on the independent churches and schools as they evolved in South Africa. Through a review of the literature on independent church schools, themes to be taken up in the case-studies will be identified. The theoretical underpinning of this study will be defined with reference to work on resistance in education and to the historical literature on resistance and collaboration, neither of which are found to be entirely appropriate. Finally, a broad overview of independent church development in Southern Africa and the response of colonial authorities is briefly presented as background to the case-studies based in the Cape Colony.

2. The Establishment of the African Independent Churches

Within African Christianity, the African independent churches became a widespread phenomenon particularly in the Sub-Saharan region. According to Barrett's encyclopaedic 1968 survey of African church independency, there were about 5000 independent church movements identified in 290 tribal units in 34 African

2. 'Independent Church' is taken to mean a church entirely under African control. It has been argued that the word 'independent' has negative connotations in that it implies that the independent churches were simply a reaction to white control. Furthermore, the view of African Church independency as 'abnormal' has persisted over a long period. This stance has been discredited through reference to the 'separatist' origins of European Protestantism. Most African independent church adherents call themselves 'African' rather than 'independent'. However, as the term 'Independent' is used in the literature, it will be employed in this work to avoid confusion. It is not intended to convey any negative connotations. West M., Bishops and Prophets in a Black City: African Independent Churches in Soweto, Johannesburg (Cape Town, David Philip, 1975)p.3.
states. In South Africa which has been an important centre of independent church growth, about 3000 of these institutions had been established by 1970.

The preconditions for African church independency in Southern Africa were set before the twentieth century when the number of African Christians in the mission churches had grown substantially. By this stage, there was a strong tradition of African participation especially in the lower echelons of the churches and schools. Africans were becoming more conscious that they were not being accorded equal treatment in the church hierarchies. This eventually led to the establishment of independent churches through voluntary secessions usually led by former African mission elites.

Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, however, the development of independent churches can be explained with reference to the teachings of Christianity itself. Africans perceived disparities between missionary tenets of brotherhood and their discriminatory actions. Paternalism, ignorance, racism, chauvinism and missionary curtailment of traditional practices were cited as primary causes for antagonism. The impetus for


5. "Mission churches" refer to those congregations, groups, churches or parishes, which were under white ecclesiastical jurisdiction. To call them 'established' or 'historical' would be to suggest that these could not be attributes of independent churches. To call them 'white' churches would ignore the fact that these churches were multiracial even though they were discriminatory. West, M.(1975)p.3. Missionaries have received attention as an anthropological category in their own right from Beidelman, T.O., Colonial Evangelism (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982).

the first generation of independent churches therefore came out of African Christian dissatisfaction with mission Christianity.\(^7\)

Other independent churches were started by those Africans who had been expelled or excommunicated from the mission churches for "immoral" practices such as polygamy, circumcision and for consulting traditional healers.\(^8\) A 'foreign' source of independent church development was the evangelistic work of Afro-Americans in Africa.\(^9\) Gradually, the independent church population became more complex. New independent churches emerged through successive secessions from within the movement itself. Others grew independently as unique and creative responses to the interaction between the colonial religious milieu and traditional religious forms. Whatever the origins of the independent churches were, they did not remain static in any phase of their existence.

The independent church movement did not develop as a simple reactive phenomenon. These churches gave expression to the frustration of those who felt trapped and restricted in mission church structures.\(^10\) Their independent organisational

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8. Anderson argues that the real issue was not only the protection of customs, but the right to control them. Anderson, J.E. (1970)p.117.


structures offered opportunities for involvement at all levels that had hitherto been closed to Africans in the mission churches. Furthermore, independent church growth has also been ascribed to the "decline of secular opportunities" for blacks in trade, the purchase of land, and participation in colonial public affairs. The experience of taking initiative and responsibility on their own was also not new to independent church adherents, many of whom had served in the mission churches as catechists and teachers at outstations operated without regular supervision or support.

As growing organisations responding to social change, the independent churches offered opportunities for participation, and facilitated the melding of western and traditional social practices in a creative framework. Religious mores,

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11. Sundkler, B.G.M. (1961) pp. 54, 100-179. African men in particular had the prospect of career-building and gaining rank through their churches. Many independent churches had a proportionally larger number of official positions in their structures than the mission churches. Johnson, W. (1979a) pp. 94-100. Although the independent churches provided real options for leadership, the relationship between independent church leadership hierarchies and adherents need not necessarily have been less elitist than the relationship between white priests and African Christians in the mission churches. The "struggle for authority" with the missionaries by progressive individual Africans may in fact have been replicated in the independent churches. Ranger, T.O. (1972) p. 10.


educational needs and indigenous customs were simultaneously met within a single social form. As a bridging mechanism, the African independent churches played a historical role in the retention of indigenous customs and culture that had been dogmatically eschewed by the missions, while simultaneously facilitating western practices in the form of education. Thus the establishment of independent schools served to integrate 'traditional' and 'modern' routines free of mission interference, and to "select apparent benefits and reject less acceptable implications" of formal western education.

3. The Literature on the African Independent Churches

African independent church movements have been studied from within the disciplines of religion, sociology, anthropology and political studies. Researchers have attempted to classify and categorise them according to various criteria.


The different typologies generated have in general not proven useful, and global definitions of church independency are problematic because of the complexity of the phenomenon.\textsuperscript{18} Several methodologies have been employed to investigate the independent churches including 'cross-cultural' studies which depend on the construct of tribe as the unit of analysis, but this approach has recently fallen into some disfavour.\textsuperscript{19} Other studies have employed a qualitative ethnographic methodology\textsuperscript{20}, or have charted the development of African

\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{19} While researchers have commonly used the construct of 'tribe' as a basis for comparative studies, recent historical studies have examined the origins of tribal identity and questioned the validity of the concept of 'tribe' itself. The 'construction' of ethnicity by colonial agents as well as African self-definition in ethnic terms has become subject to scrutiny. See: Vail, L. (ed.), \textit{The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa} (London, James Currey, 1989); Ranger, T.O. and Murray, C., "Introduction: Special Issue on Anthropology and History" \textit{Journal of Southern African Studies} 8(1), (1981) p. 11.

\end{footnotesize}
independent churches in relation to western Christianity and traditional forms of worship. A significant body of work has focussed on the role of the independent churches in the rise of nationalism, pan-Africanism and the development of secular politics. The history of the educational endeavours in the African independent churches has received little attention.

3.1 Ethiopian Churches, Zionist Churches and Education

Apart from their Eurocentrism, most contemporary typologies are a-historical in that they fail to show how different independent churches have emerged, and how the ethos of particular independent churches changed over time. In addition, most studies give little attention to the educational endeavours and aspirations of independent church people. However, the typology developed by Sundkler in Southern Africa is useful in that it does to some extent incorporate a historical sense of the development of the independent churches, and suggests attitudes to education that are characteristic of certain types of independent church.

Sundkler distinguishes between two main categories; the Ethiopian and the Zionist independent churches. According to him, the Ethiopian category comprises those independent churches which first seceded from white mission Churches to become known as "Ethiopian" together with the next generation which broke away from the original Ethiopian independent


churches. Because of their immediate and direct lineage links to the mission churches, the "Ethiopian" group attempted to replicate the mission bodies in respect to religious interpretation, observation of church ritual and church organisational structures such as schools. Sundkler's typology is therefore useful in explaining the educational approach of the early group of Ethiopian churches. The provision of schooling was a crucial dimension in which the Ethiopian churches attempted to reproduce the model provided by the parent mission churches. In order to establish themselves as 'legitimate' churches in the mission mould, they recreated similar structures and facilities, including schools. As with their missionary counterparts, the Ethiopian leaders knew that education was important too in gaining conversions and attracting converts. This thesis will concentrate on the first generation of Ethiopian churches which was heavily influenced by western models of Christianity and education.

Sundkler's "Zionist" category is a larger and more heterogeneous group of independent churches which grew over time through several generations of secession, or through the independent establishment of churches by charismatic leaders. The Zionist churches which have sometimes been pejoratively described as messianic, millennial or syncretist, independently developed a high degree of diversity in rites and practices as well as idiosyncratic interpretations of the Bible.23 To a greater or lesser degree, traditional African religious forms were integrated either unchanged or newly interpreted into Zionist Christian practices.

The case studies which constitute the main body of this thesis are located between 1895 and 1920, just before the mushrooming of Zionist independent church expansion. Statistics on independent churches show how they increased rapidly in number from the 1920's onwards. In 1918, the number of independent churches in South Africa was estimated to be barely 76, but

this figure rose from 320 in 1930 to about 800 in 1945. As the movement grew after the 1920's, independent church adherents exercised their freedom to infuse indigenous and charismatic aspects in their churches to a greater extent, while education was apparently given less attention. Why the Zionist-type churches concentrated less on reproducing mission church and school structures will not be considered here. Even though later cross-fertilisation of ideas, currents of influence and new tendencies led to considerable shifts within both Zionist and Ethiopian categories, these developments fall outside the period and the parameters of this study.

Important factors in the successful establishment of schools by the early Ethiopian churches were the size of the seceding group, the distribution of its adherents and the links between its different congregations. Because many of the early Ethiopian churches were brought about by large-scale secessions from the mission churches in a specific local area, the high concentration of adherents provided the critical mass which enabled them to maintain schools. The developed organisations they inherited from the missions further facilitated such endeavours. This was an important consideration in the successful establishment of schools by the African Presbyterian Church which was initially highly concentrated in the magistracy of Victoria East.

3.2 African Independent Church Schooling
There is a dearth of studies which specifically focus on the


25. In 1961, Sundkler observed that certain Zionist Churches were becoming "more and more 'Ethiopian' in ideology and behaviour". It is important to stress that although the latter period is problematic for the Sundkler typology, it does not have bearing on this study. Sundkler, B.G.M. (1961) p. 55; Kruss, G.E. "Religion, Class and Culture: Indigenous Churches in South Africa with Special Reference to Zionist-Apostolics", M.A thesis, University of Cape Town, (1985).
internal dynamics and processes of independent church schooling in South Africa. Historical studies on independent churches in this period seldom make more than passing reference to the existence of schools. Of the independent churches in South Africa, the African-American based African Methodist Episcopal Church has received the most scholarly attention, but its educational projects have not been a vital focus of scholarly interest. Edgar's studies of the Wellington Schools movement led by the charismatic Wellington Buthelezi in the Transkei emphasise political and protest dimensions in education, but the Wellington movement was millennial rather than Ethiopian in style and appeared after the period under investigation. Consequently, it does not bear directly on the concerns of this thesis.

A survey of the literature on independent church schools in Africa reveals that the rise of an Africanist tradition in historical research encouraged scholarly attention on schools in East and Central Africa, particularly Kenya, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, even though independent church schools were also


established in Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Tanganyika and other territories.29

Church independency has been primarily construed to be of religious, political or anthropological interest and has to a lesser extent been conceived as an educational phenomenon.30 Consequently, the tendency in the literature has been to refer only obliquely to schools set up by the independent churches. For example, the 1958 study by Shepperson and Price on the Nyasaland uprising of 1915 led by John Chilembwe, provides some insight into the setting up of independent educational work at the Providence Industrial Mission, but coverage of these educational activities was not the primary focus of the authors.31 The most densely researched independent African school initiatives are the KISA (Kenya Independent Schools Association) and Karing’a independent schools associations of Kenya which developed between the World Wars, but the emphasis in most of the studies also tends to be on the political and

29. The independent churches were not only a colonial phenomenon. Independent church and school growth persisted into the post-colonial period, sometimes bearing the brunt of repression from neo-colonial elites.

30. It is important to note that although they were more numerous, independent church schools were not the only independent African educational initiatives. Researchers have also touched on independent African schooling initiatives that were not directly allied to independent churches or to any religious activity. The most prominent of these were Mojala Agbebi’s Agbowa Industrial Mission School in Nigeria (1895), Eyo Ita’s independent school in Nigeria (1920) and Ernest Kalibala’s Aggrey Memorial School in Uganda (1935). Abernethy, D., The Political Dilemma of Popular Education - An African Case (Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, 1969). King, K.J., Pan-Africanism and Education: A study of Race, Philanthropy and Education in the Southern States of America and East Africa (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971) pp.177-201.

ideological implications of the schools for the anti-colonial struggle, rather than on their educational significance.32

More recently, two studies have attempted to draw together the salient issues in independent church schooling in review form. In 1975, Turner published the most recent general survey of African independent church involvement in education by drawing on examples from throughout Africa over a broad time period.33 Also in the mid-1970's, E.H.Berman briefly reviewed the independent church schools as one possible African response to Christian mission control over education.34 The level of generality in these reviews inhibits them from addressing the concerns of this thesis in sufficient depth.

Perhaps the earliest works concentrating specifically on the link between education, church independency and African politics were Ranger's "African Attempts to Control Education in East and Central Africa" and "The Ethiopian Episode in Barotseland 1900 - 1905". These two papers provide an important insight into the dynamics of church independency and educational modernisation within the Lozi social structure, and how this activity nurtured later African nationalist politics.


mobilisation. The studies by Ranger on the Lozi were later complemented by Parson’s work on the Bamangwato. These studies are given more detailed attention because they are instructive for this research.35

Ranger has shown how education was recognised as a valuable tool in state-building and in the consolidation of the status of royal strata in African society. He recounts how in Barotseland King Lewanika and his indunas invited the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) into the territory to set up schools in 1900. This manoeuvre was not motivated by religious sentiments, but was based on the desire for western schooling which the Paris Evangelical Mission Society was not providing to the satisfaction of Lewanika and his aristocracy. In recounting the initial success of the schools, Ranger points out; "the victory was not of an independent church, but of a school independent at least from missionary control".36

By 1906, the AME schools among the Lozi had collapsed. This was partly due to anti-Ethiopian pressure brought to bear by the British South Africa Company. However, in Ranger’s interpretation, a more important factor in the closure of the AME schools was the opening of the Barotse National School which was administered by the colonial government.37 The strength of the AME schools was sapped as the Lozi aristocracy transferred their support to the government’s school. In addition to this, the Lozi elite had further distanced


37. The Barotse National School was founded as a result of an agreement between the British South Africa Company and Lewanika and funded from taxes collected from the Lozi. Mortimer,M.C., "History of the Barotse National School - 1907 to 1957" Northern Rhodesia Journal 3,(1956-59),pp.303-310.
themselves from church influence of any kind, thus their acceptance of the Barotse National School completed a process of secularisation.

Ranger claims that over and above Lewanika’s political aims for schooling, the chief was anxious that his schools should bear a “national” character. The question in this instance was whether the benefits of schooling would be distributed among the entire Lozi ‘nation’ or only to an exclusive group within the Lozi polity. Ranger argues in fact that this tussle for control over education and modernisation was fought largely on behalf of the Lozi aristocracy, for it was they who attended the AME schools, and subsequently the Barotse National School. Thus the “Christian Revolution” of Barotseland held selective educational benefits, and provided opportunities only for Lozi royalty. In later years, this seriously weakened the unity of Lozi society, leading to further attempts to establish independent schools. This time Lozi commoners established independent churches with the aim of gaining access to education because they were effectively barred from the Barotse National School which was monopolised by the Lozi aristocracy. Ranger argues that “later independent church and independent school movements in Barotseland were partly a protest against the privileged political educational position of the Lozi elite.”

Among modernising Tswana aristocrats, education was also recognised as an important factor in the maintenance of privilege and political power. Khama III courted AME missionaries after being disappointed by the schools provided by the London Missionary Society at the turn of the century.

41. The ‘tribal’ divisions which occurred as a result of this tension are documented by Parsons. Parsons, Q.N. (1973) pp.195, 230-299.
The stratification of Tswana society continued to be upheld through an educational mechanism. Parsons observes that once elementary schooling was extended to Tswana commoners, the Ngwato royalty then began to seek the acquisition of higher primary education to maintain their superior position. 42

It seems clear from the accounts of Ranger and Parsons that among the Lozi and the Ngwato the recruitment of independent churches was based on strategies adopted to achieve political agendas. This more often than not included the playing off of the AME Church against the local missions, or against the territorial administration to make educational gains. Recruitment of independent churches did not necessarily imply any acceptance of their political ideas or religious doctrines. 43 It is evident that Africans sometimes encouraged independent church activity for educational rather than religious motives.

In the Cape Colony, by the turn of the century, coherent large-scale African polities had been disrupted or administratively dismantled. Power and authority were mediated through the local headmen within geographically and politically small units such as the 'native locations'. It was at this level, through conflict within divided local communities, that the fate of independent church schools in the Cape Colony was decided. Neither the work of Ranger nor

42. Parsons, Q.N. (1973) pp. 236-238.

that of Parsons suggests how independent church education could be analysed within the fluid and heterogeneous social context of the Cape Colony.44

Nevertheless four important themes identifiable in these accounts are instructive for this research. Firstly, there was obvious African disenchantment with inadequate levels of missionary schooling which will be pursued in detail in Chapter 2. Secondly, it seems clear that among the Lozi and Ngwato elites the recruitment of independent churches for educational purposes reflected a clear understanding of the link between access to education and political and economic advantage. In the case-studies that will be presented, conflict between African Christian communities over the schools revealed precisely the same understanding. Thirdly, dissident Africans plainly preferred to interact with secular colonial schooling agents than with the missionaries who were distrusted.45

Fourth, Ranger has shown how Africans were able to play the missions and colonial government off against each other in order to boost the overall provision of education by both agents.46 The process whereby African protagonists negotiated agreements with the Cape colonial Education Department in order to undercut missionary jurisdiction will be given attention in the case studies. From the work of Ranger and Parsons, it is clear that the importance of the independent churches should not be measured only in terms of their direct provision of schooling. Ranger and Caplan suggest that the influence of independent church activity on the government and missions can be inferred from the extent to which the

latter were compelled in 'self-defence' to improve or increase access to education. This aspect will also be given consideration.

None of the studies reviewed above provided an in-depth analysis of independent church educational projects. The purpose of this research is to explore this lacuna through concentrating on the schooling endeavours of specific independent churches. This recapitulation of the literature now turns to other themes and motifs which are relevant to this thesis. The following sections will deal with the Afro-American diaspora and the links between the independent churches and African nationalism.

3.3 The Afro-American Influence

It is clear that the Afro-American connection was a powerful one in the history of independent church growth and especially independent schooling initiatives. Furthermore, the Afro-American experience usefully highlights a particularly difficult element in the analysis of the independent churches, namely the connections between education and class formation in the changing political economies of the colonial territories.

The American influence was widespread and far from homogeneous. A considerable variety of African-American evangelists worked amongst Africans in Southern Africa, as representatives of the "Watch Tower" Bible and Tract Society, "Jehovah's Witness", American Baptists and the African Orthodox Church. The African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME)

is of particular importance as its activities in the Cape are the focus of Chapter 5.

Contradictory tendencies in the policy and practice of representatives of the AME were evident. On the one hand, the AME was an "international organisation with a multi-national and multi-ethnic membership and clergy" which embodied a strongly modernising ethos and a progressive desire for education. 50 As an international church, the AME had status comparable with the colonial mission churches in the eyes of Africans. Consequently it was instrumental in enhancing the self-concept of indigenous African adherents. On the other hand, Afro-American preachers were sometimes ill-informed and expressed paternalistic attitudes towards their African congregations. In certain respects, Afro-Americans were ironically not dissimilar to white missionaries and feared secession as much as their white counterparts did. 51

The AME church brought within its ranks evangelists of widely differing philosophies, from millennial rejection of worldly politics, to accommodative passivity, to militant pan-Africanism. 52 Bishop H.M. Turner, who was a potent early influence on AME work in South Africa, was similarly imbued with a keen sense of pride and African assertion. 53


53. Langley, J. A. Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900 - 1945 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973). The ties between 'Ethiopianism', the Afro-American influence and African nationalism have been examined by Shepperson, Ball and others,
However not all AME teachers and preachers were quite as radical in their pan-Africanist or nationalist sentiments, nor in their approach to achieving access to political power in the colonial context. Some AME leaders followed in the mould of W.E.B Du Bois who argued for co-operation with liberal whites. He assumed that integration would eventually ensue from the acceptance of a trustee system based on the gradual extension of political autonomy to Africans. Yet even his educational ideas were more radical than those developed in the American South, at the Tuskegee and Hampton institutes of Alabama and Virginia by the accommodationist politician, Booker T. Washington. Through the efforts of missionary statesman J.H.Oldham and the Phelps-Stokes representatives, the agricultural-technical model pioneered by Washington at Hampton-Tuskegee was imported to Africa. It was presented as a curriculum ideally 'adapted' to African 'needs', but many Africans were suspicious that the protagonists of this model were passing off an inferior education on them and rejected it. Disputes about the educational and political status of


56. Metropolitan concern over the sort of education that was "suitable and useful" for colonial Africans led to the convening of the Phelps-Stokes Education Commissions. Adapted education was directed towards the creation of a rural community-oriented, basic, elementary educational form for Africans. Lackner,H., "Colonial Administration and Social Anthropology: Eastern Nigeria 1920 - 1940" In: Asad,T.(ed.)
black American ideas were thus rekindled in the African context. This motif will be examined in Chapter 2 which introduces the educational debates in the Cape Colony and later in the case study of AME schools in the Western Cape.

3.4 The African Independent Churches and Nationalism

The history of independent church activity suggests that their leaders expressed both accommodationist and aggressive nationalist approaches, but most writers are divided on how and why this was so. Some of the debate has centered on the Natal churchman, politician and founder of the Ohlange Institute, John Dube. It has been argued by Marable that Dube's approach was based on faith in "the bourgeois state and in biracial democracy" and that his main struggle was to attain bourgeois goals. Although he does fleetingly acknowledge that Dube's politics and educational programmes were dictated by the "material realities of South Africa and Natal" Marable fails to elaborate on this crucial point.


The problem of understanding why particular strategies were adopted by Africans in promoting their own educational agendas even while they remained 'dependent' on colonial largesse, has been addressed by Marks in her analysis of John L Dube's work at Ohlange. She specifically points to the ambiguous quality of Dube's strategy, explaining it in terms of his dependence on white goodwill. She concludes that the actions of Dube and other leading African Christians cannot be declared accommodationist in quite such a categorical manner as Marable asserts, and that there is a need to be sensitive to the particular constraints under which independent African school leaders operated. 60 She argues further that because "ambiguity was the essence of survival", it is sometimes difficult to establish the "authentic voice" of the protagonists. Moreover for Marks it is often "unnecessary to decide" on the political line of many Africans like John Dube who "held contradictory beliefs and values" themselves. 61 The limitations and deficiencies of categories such as accommodation or collaboration for this work will be discussed later with reference to the theoretical underpinning of this work.

The connections between the independent churches and the development of African nationalism have been a focus of interest for historians and political scientists since the 1960's. 62 The question of links between the independent

60. Marks shows that it was "good tactics for Dube to proclaim he was following in the Master's footsteps" and that ambiguities make it difficult to pinpoint which voice or role that Dube played was the authentic one. Marks, S., "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal" Journal of Southern African Studies 1(2), (1975) p.168,180.


churches and the rise of African nationalist politics is relevant to this work because colonial authorities were to varying degrees suspicious of the motives of the independent churches and sometimes adopted ruthless methods to control them. By the very fact of their existence as an expression of independent church initiative, it was inevitable that the schools themselves would be politicised. Yet as much as they became politically notorious in white colonial society owing to their independent church links, the schools in their own right represented the politicisation of colonial education which is described in Chapter 2.

The issue of politics in the independent churches must be probed first with respect to whether any political teaching took place in the schools, and second, in respect to the level of political involvement of independent church leaders.

On the first problem, the literature is at best only speculative. In his work on Nehemiah Tile and the independent Thembu Church in the Eastern Cape in the late nineteenth century, Saunders suggests that "the political and religious activity in which Tile engaged may have played some part in creating a milieu conducive to later participation in African nationalist politics". He observes that "in a largely non-literate society ... the pulpit could be an extremely effective means of politicisation". By the same token, the school room could have been an equally effective site for attempts to politicise independent church adherents. However, to make overtly political statements would have spelled suicide for the independent churches for any such open indiscretion would have invited repressive action. Consequently, the task of assessing the level of political

63. Repressive measures taken against the churches are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

consciousness among the independent churches in this period is likely to be dogged by lack of unequivocal evidence.

In the period under study independent church links to political activity can be inferred from the fact that certain independent church leaders shared common membership of political associations, such as the early South African Native National Congress. It would appear that the potential for the independent churches to generate a common African nationalist bond was not significant because of religious, ethnic and other divisive factors. This is not really surprising in that the independent church movement literally grew out of division. Furthermore, it is essential to recognise that not all African clergy did secede from the mission churches. For example, although they did participate in politics, Kholwa involvement in independent church activity in Natal was not as significant as African Christian involvement in the independent churches of the Eastern Cape. Furthermore, a significant number of Africans who were active in Cape representative politics such as the Reverend J. Rubusana were members of the same political groups as the independent church churchmen, but remained loyal to their mission church denominations. It is therefore important for this thesis to consider in what ways independent church

65. The connections between independent church leaders and African nationalist political activity have been demonstrated by Odendaal and others in Southern Africa. In South Africa the "Ethiopian" leaders were politically active; the Rev. Mzimba of the African Presbyterian Church in electoral politics in the Cape, the Rev. E Tsewu was a founder member of the African National Congress, the Rev. F. Gow of the African Methodist Episcopal Church was chairman of the African Political Organisation. Odendaal, A. (1984) Vukani Bantu: The Beginnings of Black Protest Politics to 1912 Cape Town, David Philip pp. 79ff; Parsons, Q.N. (1973) pp. 207-210; Saunders, C.C. (1969-70) p. 45, 55.

adherents were different from their mission-loyal counterparts in terms of their political allegiances.

In the late 1960's, Lonsdale addressed the problem of African nationalism in East Africa. His paper is instructive because it anticipates the concerns of this thesis in three respects. First he argued that historians need to distinguish between the political activities of elites and of other Africans before any sense can be made of the multiplicity of ways that political consciousness could be expressed in African society. Second, he drew attention to the need to investigate rural contexts because the political activities of modernizing urban Africans have tended to receive undue attention. Third, he showed how political activity developed through leadership struggles within African society and not solely in broad anti-colonial politics.67

Similarly, Saunders has warned that in the context of the Eastern Cape Colony, local allegiances and loyalties were called upon which had no necessary link to broader nationalist politics.68 Members of the African educated elite who as independent church leaders were involved directly or indirectly in Cape colonial representative politics.69


It has been argued that the class awareness of the labouring poor was often embodied in and expressed through religious movements but that these religions of the common people subverted the possibility of class consciousness and reinforced the diffuse awareness of a tenuously shared social allegiance among Africans. Bond, G.C., "A Prophecy that Failed: The Lumpa Church of Nyombe Zambia" In: Bond, G., Johnson, W. and Walker, S. (eds.) African Christianity: Patterns of Religious Continuity (New York, Academic Press, 1979)p.139.

developed their support - and political power - through calling on ethnic and denominational allegiances which at times subverted the development of popular consciousness among the rural peasantry. By focusing on factional tensions between independent church and mission loyal Christians, this work will investigate the extent to which ethnic, and religious dissonances generated more intense involvement in local educational and political issues than in broader national political matters. It will also reflect, where possible, on the relationship between the independent church leaders and their rural constituencies.

4. Theoretical Underpinnings

4.1 Resistance in Education

Since the 1970's the arena of schooling in South Africa has become politicised as never before. This process has irrevocably transformed educational debates which are increasingly steeped in the discourse of power and political and economic interests. Consequently, the South African schooling system has been described in the recent literature as a contested terrain, or as a site of struggle, and a corpus of work has developed that explores resistance in education.

The literature on resistance in South African education is however not directly useful to this study for two reasons. First, it attempts in general to address the question of resistance in the context of apartheid education rather than colonial education. Under colonial education, an entirely different set of educational conditions influenced the nature of educational resistance. It will be demonstrated that in the colonial period the organising concept of resistance is too

insensitive to account for the complex conditions that pertained. Second, South African writing on resistance has been influenced by the European and North American literature, which has concentrated on current manifestations of resistance within developed mass education systems. It will be argued that as it is currently employed, the concept of resistance cannot simply be transposed to the history of independent schools established at the end of the 19th century.

The literature on resistance in education in Europe and America has chiefly concentrated on: contemporary ethnographic studies of instances of resistance among working class students, analyses of the relative autonomy of education structures within the State, and on the possibilities of generating a critical contemporary pedagogy. Most of this literature which is written in first world contexts takes for granted the existence of overarching national education systems with legislated de facto compulsory schooling for the entire school-age population. In contrast, this study will attempt to analyse educational 'resistance' in the context of an undeveloped education system, during the process of African class formation within an economy and society in the throes of early industrial transformation.

Although incidents of resistance to schooling in South Africa may be traced back to the slave schools set up by the Dutch

East India Company in 1658 and thereafter, the bulk of attention has been given to resistance in the period following the implementation of Bantu Education in 1953. The focus by scholars on the recent history of education intensified after 1976 when South African black schools were plunged into turmoil. This corpus of work enriches our conception of the problem of resistance in education in South Africa in several ways. Studies have analysed the changing nature of recent resistance with regard to student strategies, student-worker links, community solidarity and the critiques of schooling articulated by increasingly conscientised students. Others have provided a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between state education policy and the reproduction of the African working class. Consequently, our understanding of how resistance has influenced policy and has affected reformist restructuring of the South African educational order since the 1970's is clearer.


However, the contemporary literature on resistance in South African schools is limited in its relevance to this particular study. First, as a result of the major sociological focus on educational struggles after 1953, very little is known of the nature and extent of earlier struggles in relation to the imposition of mission and colonial education. More specifically, unrecognised schools independent of government or mission control run by Africans have by and large been ignored in the literature. 75

Second, most current studies focus on resistance in the context of mass education systems which did not prevail in the period under study. Even the word 'system' is used here with some reservation, for it carries modern associations of large scale uniformity, and systemic control which did not pertain in the Cape in the period 1890 to 1920.

Third, contemporary resistance in education has been mobilised increasingly at regional or national levels. The literature has shown how resistance has focused on pressurising the state to reform the entire education system. Much resistance in the 1980's has also been conceived as part of a broad political strategy to remove the South African apartheid government. The literature on the current period, based as it is on studies of increasingly large-scale politicised resistance does not shed light on earlier forms of resistance in the schools which have tended to be sporadic and quite localised. 76 Resistance in the period under study was not characterised by contestation over


76. For an overview see Molteno,F.(1984)pp.52-81.
the control of the state or even the nature of the state. It did not materialize in popular struggles over extensive geographical areas. Nor was it necessarily expressed against a modern 'education system'. Instead, the case-studies will demonstrate how local factors activated and swayed school rivalries.

The complex texture of African society in this transitional period which permitted multiple identifications and shifts in allegiance, directly affected the educational fortunes of contending school groups. The concept of resistance in the contemporary literature which is preoccupied with challenges to the state education system cannot convey how the independent church schools were not only characterised by resistance against government-backed mission schools, but were also characterised by struggles over access to schools between contending African social groups.

The presence of independent church schools inevitably embroiled competing factions in African communities within "Native locations" in bitter disputes. Most commonly independent church school people were pitted against African Christians who were loyal to the missions. Schools conflicts were thus also inherently religious conflicts. The waxing and waning of struggles over schooling depended on the relative strengths of local factions, and the ability of both independent church and mission loyal leaders to call on a variety of parochial allegiances. The levels of support the leaders were able to muster depended on the intensity of religious, ethnic, class or lineage identity that they were able to elicit among their followers, and on their ability to accrue power through dispensing patronage.

Fourth, the contemporary usage of resistance does not illuminate the reactions to education of African people who at the time were not fully integrated in the labour market of an industrialising economy and who were not yet subject to the strictures of a compulsory mass education system. The
contemporary notion of 'resistance' cannot adequately evoke the complex set of possible African reactions which included; the rejection of schooling, attempts to gain access to schooling in whatever guise, or tactically replacing mission jurisdiction with African control.

The adoption of schooling could be attributed different political meanings in different contexts. Acceptance of mission schooling among mission-loyal Africans could be cited as evidence of acquiescence in colonial hegemony, and of willingness to seek 'collaborative' incorporation into colonial social structures. Alternatively, the influx of Africans into mission schools could be interpreted as evidence of the decision to absorb the European socio-political and economic universe in order to defend African interests and to resist further inroads against their autonomy.

Correspondingly, the independent church schools movement could on the one hand be interpreted as a sign of educational 'resistance', an indication that Africans were willing to act on their discontent with mission education by going independent. On the other hand, the independent church schools could be taken to reflect a 'collaborative' desire for modernisation and co-option in settler-dominated society.

If the latter were true, then there could have been no clear difference between independent church adherents and Africans who were loyal to the mission churches in terms of their attitude to colonial education. This implies that both independent church adherents and mission loyal Africans wished to achieve the same aim of maximising their schooling chances, but differed only in regard to the conduit chosen to achieve these aims.

It is evident that the bipolar construction of the collaboration versus resistance model cannot adequately reconcile ambiguous situations where outright rejection of mission schools and the establishment of schools - even if
outside of mission control - could both be conceived as resistance. In terms of this model, when compared with Africans who persisted in rejecting colonial schooling, all strategies that involved taking up schooling could only have been conceived as collaboration. This approach is clearly inadequate for the development of a sensitive analysis of the apparently contradictory role played by education in the colonial context.

To complicate matters further, 'traditional' resistance to education did not automatically imply wholesale rejection of the notion of western formal schooling. Africans who were opposed to Christianity, were not necessarily opposed to education. Thus resistance to schooling could not always be distinguished from opposition to the missions, especially where virtually no other schooling opportunities were available. Consequently those Africans opposed to Christian values but enthusiastic about the potential of education were caught in a cleft stick. The concept of resistance as

77. For example, Welbourne refers to a school at Kangema in Kenya which was "outside the orbit of the independent churches. It was started by parents, under the leadership of a chief, with the aim of helping children who failed to qualify for admission to Government or Mission schools. It refused a Government grant-in-aid in order to avoid Government control of admissions; and it was not affiliated to any church. Welbourne, F.B. (1961) p.155.

78. Africans who wished to maintain indigenous customs but gain access to schooling and modernisation did not fit the School - Red categorisation of Philip Mayer. In his "Townsmen and Tribesmen" which traced Red and School strategies in coping with labour migration, Mayer associated 'Red' people with militant conservatism and 'School' people with modernising characteristics. His work is not particularly useful for this study as it focuses on the cultural - which is inadequately defined - rather than the political. His categories do not adequately capture the complexity of the social fabric in the period under investigation where the construction of identity was not static and where allegiance was often contradictory. Mayer, P., Townsmen or Tribesmen (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1961); Mayer, P., "The origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance Ideologies" In: Mayer, P. (ed.) Black Villagers in an Industrial Society (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1980) pp.1-67; Beinart, W. and Bundy, C., Hidden Struggles in South Africa: Popular movements
employed in the contemporary context cannot do justice to such complexity. In seeking to redefine or supplant resistance and collaboration as the organising concepts in this thesis, it is necessary to probe the historical literature.

4.2 Historical Studies of Resistance and Collaboration

The concepts of resistance and collaboration as they have been employed in the historical literature have limited value for this thesis. Although resistance studies have been refined over the years and the more hidden forms of social protest, withdrawal and day-to-day resistance, have been given attention, in general, Africanist historians have consistently ignored education as one important arena in which resistance to colonial dominance could be manifested.

Attempting to locate educational resistance within the


81. In addition, they charge that this work focuses virtually solely on the elites; that "historians have failed to recognise the decision to fight, to remain neutral, or to collaborate did not rest exclusively with the aristocracy". Isaacman, A. and Isaacman, B. (1977)pp.34, 41.
historical debates on secondary resistance is therefore a difficult task.

First, the complexity of possible African responses to western educational forms is not adequately captured by the limited concepts of resistance and collaboration. These categories are not sensitive enough for analysing the contradictory role of education in colonial African society. It has been demonstrated that there was a whole range of possible reactions to colonial education.

Historians of resistance have also tended to neglect the African Christian school communities which are the core focus of this thesis. Resistance studies were for some time linked to African nationalism, leading to a perfunctory analysis of 'collaborators'. Negative connotations of collaboration contributed to the dismissive disregard by historians of the contradictory reality lived by those Africans who were so labelled. Hogan argues that this has been particularly true of the study of African Christian elites of the Eastern Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century:

Because the ideology of nineteenth and early twentieth-century politicians like Tengo Jabavu 'falls outside the context of African nationalism', it is deserving only

82. Attitudes to colonial education cannot be 'read' directly from the kinds of resistance offered to colonial intervention. For example, Ranger observes that there was a strong "desire for modernisation after the first bitter resistance was over," yet "in terms of their eagerness for Western education, there was little to choose between the Nyasaland Tonga, who did not resist, and the Kikuyu who did". Ranger, T.O. (1970) p. 76.


of 'retrospective comment'. The historiography of nationalism has been subject to a widespread ex post facto prejudice against what is labelled 'collaboration', and if there is a commonly held idea of nineteenth-century African politicians at the Cape, it is that they were collaborators in helpless thrall of their white associates. 85

Perspectives on former 'collaborators' have changed with the recognition that Africans employed a variety of strategies for survival, for opposing colonial domination and for self-improvement. 86 Furthermore, historians have realised that "the entire attempt to divide 'resistors' from 'collaborators' as if they were mutually exclusive categories, was in many instances a meaningless exercise". 87

A further refinement has been to avoid attributing collaborative motives to Africans based on superficial assessments of their words and deeds. Without suggesting that colonial structures totally determined the actions of Africans, this thesis will show that independent church schools were to a greater or lesser extent dependent on colonial government sanction. Given this balance of forces, Shula Marks has referred to the ambiguities of dependence as the "price of survival in a contradictory world". 88 For example, in order to receive funds from the Cape Education


Department, independent church leaders had to convince government authorities that they were not engaged in politics and were therefore not a threat to the colonial order, irrespective of whether this was true or not. Conciliatory statements made by independent church leaders in order to secure government recognition if taken at face-value, could have been cited as evidence of collaborative motives, whereas they may have been prompted simply by the desire to do or say what was necessary in order to make anticipated gains. Thus, from their subordinate position within colonial society, the independent school leaders were compelled to maintain a peculiarly difficult balance between discreet assertion and public acquiescence - "ambiguity was the essence of survival".89 Through the case-studies, this thesis will illuminate the "complex interplay between the poles of rejection and cooperation" that delimited the actions of Africans in schooling issues.90

A further problem with the resistance and collaboration categories is that they do not adequately account for calculative involvement in the schooling arena. To assert that Africans taking up schooling were simply seeking co-option in the colonial society without reserve would be to ignore a variety of motives. Initial African participation in mission schools was often a limited and calculated manoeuvre based on an assessment of what material gains could be made.91 Although African chiefs restricted general access to education in order to avoid what they believed to be the potentially corrosive effects of western ideas among their people, it was not uncommon for them to educate a few of their subjects in order to counteract colonial political influences.92 Western

92. Later, the independent churches were themselves also able to offer their services in supplying secretaries, agents, or
education was also strategically employed to preserve the old order. It has been observed how Lozi and Ngwato chiefs who recognised the potential of education attempted to secure schooling for their elites while denying commoners access, thereby maintaining traditional social divisions through the mechanism of modern formal schooling. These responses to education in the colonial period do not conform easily to the historical categories of collaboration and resistance.

Quite clearly a more sensitive analysis is required to make sense of the motives and actions of both the independent church adherents and Africans who were loyal to the missionary churches. The notion of calculative involvement described above is suggestive of a more nuanced approach. It will be shown that the process whereby the independent church leaders advanced the interests of their communities was through negotiating the terms of their relationships with missionary, government and African loyalist Christians. The process whereby the survival of the independent schools was negotiated was unique in each case, for it depended on the shifting constellation of forces and influences that from time to time favoured the strategies and tactics of the major players in different ways.

The case-studies will show how the transactions and agreements realised between the different groups were conditioned by the power of each party to enforce terms agreeable to itself. Nevertheless, while Mark's notion of "ambiguities of dependence" is important to this research because power often lay in the hands of colonial representatives, an overemphasis

on the structures of colonial dominance and the compliance of independent church people will be avoided.\textsuperscript{93} The history of the independent church schools was the outcome of negotiation rather than imposition. Anderson has also cogently argued the importance of recognising African influence on the development of colonial education:

\begin{quote}
The pivotal and controversial position which schools assumed in the latter days of African colonial history reflects the extent to which Africans were able to understand the dynamics of the formal education process and also the intensity of their desire to ensure that it was used to achieve ends of their own choice rather than those of the colonial authorities.\textsuperscript{94}
\end{quote}

This thesis will therefore assess the extent to which the independent church school supporters were able to negotiate levels of autonomy in spite of the constraints, and probe the motives, strategies and counter strategies employed by the protagonists in each school struggle.

\section*{4.3 Rural Social History}

Although resistance studies have contributed to our understanding of conflict between Africans and colonial structures, they have not revealed quite so clearly the internal dynamics of social groups engaged in forms of anti-colonial struggle. In addressing this problem, the tradition of social history is valuable because it problematises conflicts and cross-cutting allegiances evident within African communities.

In the South African historiography, the body of research on rural struggles and rural resistance is growing. Of special relevance to this thesis is the growing literature on rural social history characterised by the work of Bundy, Beinart,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{93} Marks, S. (1975).
\item \textsuperscript{94} Anderson, J. E. (1970) p. 104.
\end{itemize}
Trapido, Marks, Keegan and others. They show that rural African communities in the period under review were significantly differentiated, with diverse groups expressing conflicting interests that changed over time. A central concern of this thesis is to study the ways in which attitudes to education reflected social cleavages, and how competition over educational resources opened new divisions within communities.

In the context of the Eastern Cape at the end of the 19th century, resource scarcity, especially land shortages and restricted schooling access, aggravated divisions in communities. The manipulation of allegiances and the articulation of common symbols by leaders in order to win popular support and greater access to resources is a strong theme in this research. In mobilising and maintaining backing, independent church leaders were invariably drawn into local competition with other members of the African schooled elite who were loyal to the missions. The studies that follow will show how intensely focused such local struggles in the schools were and how they were energised by ethnic, church and other loyalties.

In this regard, the work by Beinart and Bundy; Hidden Struggles in South Africa: Popular movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape is influential. In their valuable text they explore - through case studies of rural popular movements - how Africans responded to incorporation into colonial society and the emerging capitalist economy. In doing so, they highlight the rich diversity of the social fabric of the rural

Transkei, the cultural dimensions of rural differentiation, the evolution of temporary alliances and the connections between more or less ephemeral oppositional forms. In particular, Beinart’s observations on “the flexibility of self-perception, and the situational nature of ‘ethnic’ boundaries and divisions” among Transkei Africans resonate with the case-studies in this work.96 However, for all the insights that Bundy, Beinart and others in the same genre have endowed the literature, they tend to underplay the significance of education in this period.97

As a history of schooling per se, this study adds to our understanding of an important dimension; the growing institutionalisation of schooling in Cape African society. Education was becoming a significant part of the every day life of rural people. Parents were becoming more preoccupied with getting access to schooling for their children and in accumulating funds to pay for education, youths were spending more time in the mission schools, and communities were increasingly engaged in struggles in and around schools. This study will also point to the ineluctable links between education and the social context. While pressure on the land was intensifying, education was to an increasing extent perceived as a potential source of stability and of protection in a harsh economic environment.

Relatively little is known about the history of black women’s education in the colonial context. Chapter 5 on the AME offers a glimpse into the experience and contribution by women in


97. Although Beinart has uncovered some evidence of independent church educational activity in the Transkei divisions of Herschel and Qumbu, this aspect of rural social life is not pursued. Moreover, the geographical case studies chosen by him and Bundy do not overlap with this thesis. Thus it will not be possible to link the educational struggles examined in this study to other sites of resistance over dipping, the Council system and other issues as detailed by Beinart and Bundy. See Beinart’s chapters on Qumbu and Herschel in: Beinart, W. and Bundy, C. (1987) pp. 114-117, 250-255.
this church. Most of the actors in the case-studies that follow are men, thus the account in Chapter 5, of Mrs Sarah Bell's, efforts to win independence for the African Methodist Episcopal Church School at Piquetberg in the Western Cape is noteworthy. Even though this account focuses more on Mrs Bell's tactical battle with Dutch Reformed Church opposition than on the question of gender in the independent churches, it seeks to contribute to the growing corpus of work which focuses on the educational experience of black South African women.98

In pursuing the history of rural African independent church schools, this thesis sets out to correct a bias in the educational historiography, namely its narrow concentration on the premier mission institutions such as Lovedale, Tigerkloof, Healdtown and Blytheswood. As a consequence of this tendency, the dominant vision of mission education has been constructed from histories of these premier "native institutions" which were far outnumbered by thousands of ordinary outstation mission schools. They were small and fragile undertakings, were typically poor in accommodation, facilities, trained teachers, and prone to closure.

An exaggerated impression of the hegemonic power exercised by missionaries over black children in the mission schools has been produced from histories of the major mission institutions. This research will show that African and Coloured school managers, principals and teachers did enjoy relatively high levels of autonomy in the many outstation schools. Especially in less accessible areas where the Cape government Education Department's jurisdiction was brittle, or where mission school supervision was ineffective, black people seized opportunities to pursue their own objectives. Through

examining the interactions between actors in some of the myriad small outstation schools, this research seeks to uncover the rich texture of rural African schooling.

The history of education has by tradition been separate from the formal discipline of history, yet this research adopts a framework which is closer to the historical than the educational historiography. This is because the theoretical base of this study could not be found in the parent discipline of history of education. Interdisciplinary work is currently advocated with some enthusiasm, and the traditional disciplinary boundaries upheld for so long by academics and researchers have been less well guarded in the last decades. However, those who pursue interdisciplinary research are not as safe as those working within a well-defined genre or tradition of research. The strength of most research in the social sciences has depended precisely on such traditions within which research questions, theoretical frameworks and methodologies are shared. Those executing research which combines areas that have hitherto remained discrete face a difficult task because there are no precedents in the literature which offer comparative points of reference. This thesis attempts to merge the traditions of history of education and social history, in that it seeks to avoid a narrowly institutional interpretation of the independent schools or of their educational practices, while emphasising the complex texture of interactions over educational matters and the politics of black community control in the schools.

5. Overview of the Development of African Independent Church Schooling in the Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State and the Transvaal

A short overview of the broader development of independent church schools in the South African territories is presented here to situate the case-studies. Although the availability of secondary sources on the educational activities of the independent churches in the Southern African region is
minimal, a limited survey of primary sources indicates that independent church schools were widespread in Southern Africa.

In the decade before Union, the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) established itself as the independent church with the most extensive network of schools. In the Transvaal, by October 1904, the AME had established 18 government recognised schools in the Pretoria, Zoutpansberg and Potchefstroom districts, while a further 30 night and day schools were in existence without any grants in aid. The AME had also established the Wilberforce Industrial School at Evaton in the Transvaal with 10 classrooms which drew students from as far afield as the Cape. 99 In the Orange River Colony in 1904, where the government had recently halved educational expenditure to £1000, the Director of Education, H. Gunn stated that there was a "considerable number" of AME schools. A deputation of the AME claimed that the attendance at these schools was between two to three thousand people. 100 In the Cape, the AME had also built up a system of about ten day-schools, some of which were funded by the government by 1908. The Cape AME opened a number of schools in the urban areas of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth in the period under analysis, but the fate of these urban schools was not explored. In keeping with the other two case-studies of rural based independent church school initiatives, only the AME schools located in the rural Western Cape are explored in Chapter 5.


100. Evidence of H. Gunn, Director of Education in the Orange Free State, SANAC, Vol. 4, p. 296, [38066-38074].
Although other South African independent churches such as the African Presbyterian Church also established churches and schools in more than one colonial territory, the AME had developed pan-African links between Southern Africa, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Swaziland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Evidence from the South African Native Affairs Commission indicates that in the Transvaal and Orange Free State Republics and the Natal Colony, the AME was the most successful in establishing schools.

The number of independent churches other than the AME successfully running schools that were government subsidised was larger in the Cape than in the other territories. This may be due to a number of factors including the earlier appearance of indigenous independent churches in the Cape, the older system of educational provision and a less aggressive policy stance by the Cape Government. A full analysis of independent church schooling in all the territories referred to above was not within the scope of this investigation, so selected case-studies based in rural areas of the Cape Colony were embarked upon.

By 1917, a total of 20 independent African church schools was being funded by the Cape Department of Public Education. These belonged mostly to the African Methodist Episcopal Church, the African Presbyterian Church and the African Orthodox Church had strong linkages principally between South Africa, Kenya and Uganda.


102. In Natal especially after the Bambatha Rebellion, repressive measures ensured that few independent church schools existed. The Natal education authorities had received applications for grants from independent church representatives. All were refused. Evidence of Superintendent of Education, P.A. Barnett and Schools Inspector, R. Plant. SANAC, Vol. 3 pp. 236[21064], 250[21250].
National Church. The African Presbyterian Church (APC) of the Reverend Pambani Mzimba, which split from Lovedale, set up a number of schools in the Victoria East division as well as in Natal, Transvaal and Rhodesia. The APC schools in the Victoria East division which received government aid are the focus of Chapter 3.

The Order of Ethiopia was a body of African Christians which seceded from the AME and sought to return to the mission church fold through affiliation with the Church of the Province of South Africa. By 1902, this former independent church group had established three government-funded schools. Although the Order of Ethiopia which is investigated in Chapter 4 was no longer an independent church, its unique semi-autonomous position within the Church of the Province of South Africa and its dependent schools make it an important study.

The African Methodist Episcopal Church, the Order of Ethiopia and the African Presbyterian Church were selected for investigation because primary documentation revealed that they had the most developed school networks. Moreover, they were the first to gain Education Department funding and initially bore the brunt of colonial antagonism. Thus the geographical focus of this work was dictated by the location of each church, namely the rural Western Cape, the dominantly rural magistracy of Victoria East and the rural hinterland of Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape colony.

The only other church which achieved comparable success was the African National Church led by Jonas Goduka which had established three government-funded schools in the Herschel

103. The African National Church schools were at Hillside, Nojiki and Stonehill in the Eastern Cape. They received a total grant in aid of £146. CA PAE 239 E252 Acting SGE to Provincial Secretary 10/5/1917.

district by 1920. However, the schools of the African National Church were not probed in depth because they were not dogged by the political conflicts which characterised the Cape case-studies. Conditions in the Transkeian Territories under the Glen Grey Act were different from those in the Cape Colony proper. Colonial authorities were less antagonistic, and conflict within communities over schools was less evident. This can be ascribed to a less overbearing mission presence and larger numbers of rural Africans who refrained from participating in mission activities thereby keeping the demand on available schooling low. In addition, Chapter 2 will show that in the period under study, provision of school places increased faster in the Transkei than in the Cape, thus producing lower levels of demand than in the Cape Colony proper.

6. Action Taken by the Colonial Governments Against the African Independent Churches and Schools

The independent churches were established in an extremely hostile environment, as the reactions of colonial authorities

105. Education Gazette Quarterly Statistics for the fourth quarter 1920. CA CMT 3/681 178 J. Goduka and D. Dalamba to CC and RM Herschel 1/12/07; CMT Stanford to SNAD 7/2/06; CA SGE 2/98 Informal Visit of Inspector 17/6/07 Nqamakwe Unaided; CA SGE 2/1/2 Inspector’s reports, Nqamakwe 16/4/03, Herschel 4/9/03; CA SGE 2/1/5 Inspectors Reports St Marks. 9/2/09, 14/5/09, 16/5/09; CA SGE 8/5 Letters Dispatched re Grants in Aid SGE to J. Goduka 4/1/97. For the origins of the church see: Saunders, C.C. (1970) pp. 553-570.

106. Between 1903 and 1917, the SGE correspondence files were full of bureaucratic formalities that concerned the gradual consolidation of Goduka’s schools at Hillside, Njiki and Stonehill in Herschel. In contrast, the records of African National Church schools in the districts of Glen Grey (Qogodala, Zwartwater and Ngonyama) and St. Marks (Mhlobo and Pine Grove) indicated that Goduka’s deputy, the Rev. T. Mtshula had neglected his responsibilities there in favour of pursuing personal interests in a trading-store miles away in Queenstown. See: CA SGE 1/374 Herschel 1904 to SGE 1/1730 Herschel 1917; SGE 1/1130 St. Marks 1912 to SGE 1/1664 St. Marks 1917; SGE 1/980 Glen Grey 1911 to SGE 1/1742 Glen Grey 1918.

107. CA SGE 1/430 Herschel Rev. Edney to SGE 30/1/1904; SGE 1/1170 Herschel Sec. School Board Herschel to SGE 19/2/1913.
were generally adverse. In order to construct a clear perspective on the general politico-administrative environment of the independent churches, it is necessary to address the question of colonial antagonism.

The attitude and policy of colonial authorities throughout Sub-Saharan Africa towards the independent churches was strongly influenced by their fears of African insurrection. Such trepidation was reinforced at intervals by the eruption of anti-colonial struggles in various regions; the Rhodesian Rebellions in the 1890's, the Herero and Nama Revolts in German South West Africa in 1904, the Maji-Maji Rebellion of 1905 in Tanganyika, the so-called Bambatha Rebellion in Natal 1906, disturbances in Rwanda in 1912, and the Nyasaland Uprising in 1915.108

These outbreaks of defiance were to some extent associated with the development of popular indigenous religious movements and millennial insurrection. Consequently in the colonial mind, any independent African religious initiative was considered a potentially dangerous threat to the social order. The early Ethiopian-type churches were treated with utmost suspicion. The very word "Ethiopian" had pejorative connections with nationalism, and associations with religious fanaticism, irrationality and rebellion in the eyes of colonial officials. Missionary interests were directly threatened by the independent churches, but it was not always clear whether their claims of subversion were genuine or

whether the allegations were exaggerated in order to goad Government officials into repressive action.\textsuperscript{109}

Fears of millennial revolt sparked a number of dramatic novels written between 1910 and 1928 by John Buchan, Heaton Nicholls and Sarah Gertrude Millin, but evidence suggests that the influence of Ethiopian churches in anti-colonial rebellion was exaggerated.\textsuperscript{110} Nevertheless, colonial misconceptions served to justify indiscriminate and harsh repression of the early independent churches and their leadership. The extent of colonial paranoia can be seen in the attempts by various territorial administrations to monitor the independent churches and to devise a unified policy on the matter.

After 1910, the territories comprising South Africa - most notably Natal - attempted to forge a common policy on the independent churches.\textsuperscript{111} In 1915, in the wake of the Chilembwe incident, the Governor of Zomba requested information from the High Commissioner in Cape Town, on legislation and regulations enforced by the Union Government on the independent churches.\textsuperscript{112} Uniform policy was never properly implemented

\textsuperscript{109} Ranger refers to the confusion over the meaning of 'Ethiopian' and to erroneous connotations of rebellion. He argues that the Ethiopian church activity as it was manifest in Barotseland, could not be written off as a confused prophet movement. Ranger, T.O. (1972) p. 27. Similarly, Marks has argued that Ethiopian influence in the Bambatha rebellion was exaggerated. Marks, S. (1970).


\textsuperscript{111} CA GH 35/84 Milner to Hely-Hutchinson 8/11/1902, "Report on Ethiopian Movement" S.O. Samuelson, U.SNA 19/11/1902; TA NTS 132 "Despatch from Governor of Natal on the subject of the Native Ecclesiastical organisations conducted independently of South African control" to Governor General 5/2/1908.

\textsuperscript{112} TA NTS 133 Governor, Zomba to High Commissioner, Cape Town 9/2/1915. TA GG 1544 50/508 G.G.Ministers to Governor, Zomba 6/4/1915.
largely because local colonial administrators tended to take their own initiative. The policy of the Cape Colony was less oppressive in comparison with the other territories, while it was most severe in Natal. Cape policy was based on the belief that stronger measures would inflame rather than dampen independent church activity. The Chief Magistrate of the Transkei, Walter Stanford, argued that "martyrdom has ever been an effective way to strengthen a religious cause".113

After Union, the laissez faire policy of the Cape was taken up by the Union Government which "deemed it unwise to adopt any policy of repression, having greater faith in the influence for good of sympathetic treatment".114 Even though a cautious 'wait and see' attitude was adopted in principle by senior colonial administrators in the Cape Colony, this did not prevent local authorities from acting strongly against the independent churches. Nor did it exclude more subtle controls which will be detailed below.

In terms of direct intervention, colonial officials jailed "offending" independent church adherents who were perceived to be "seditious".115 Alternatively, administrators banished them to remote places or simply deported undesirable elements. These strategies were however, counter-productive as they more often than not spread independent church influence instead of curbing it.116 Another control was exercised by preventing

113. In 1902, Stanford, CMT advised against "active measures" in 1902. CA NA 497 CMT to SNAD 23/10/1902. This approach is confirmed later. See: TA NTS 132 E. Dower to Hely-Hutchinson, GM of Cape Colony 1/4/1900.

114. TA NTS 133 U.SNA to Sec. for Interior 22/3/1915.


116. Deportation seldom quenched the zeal of the African Christian enthusiasts. Dumping dissidents in neighbouring territories probably contributed to the spread of independency. For example, Ranger relates how Hanoc Suidano and five other Watch Tower leaders from the Tanganyika District of Zambia, after being deported from Rhodesia, "set
"suspect" individuals from entering colonies such as in Natal. Local authorities prohibited independent church ministers from taking up residence in African locations. This occurred in the Orange Free State town of Bethlehem, and in the Divisions of Herschel and Somerset East in the Cape Colony.

It was not uncommon for independent church leaders to be placed under surveillance by police spies, and to be subject to harassment and detention for questioning. Covert observation was engaged in the Cape Colony by the Native Affairs Department which commissioned "unobtrusive" reports from the Civil Commissioners and Resident Magistrates on independent church activity after the turn of the century.


120. CA NA 497 On 21/8/1902. The Chief Magistrate of Transkei sent a letter requesting the submission of comprehensive statistics on the independent churches in their divisions, as well as reports on the "tendency of teaching" in the schools. Much of the information collected may be found in file CA NA 497. The concern of colonial authorities did not diminish until the 1920's. In 1918, another circular letter was dispatched by the Chief Magistrate in the Transkei. 1/MFE 8/11 16/151/18 CMT to "Missionary societies in the Transkeian Territories" 7/2/1918. See also Page, C.A., "Black America in White South Africa: Church and State Reaction to the AME
These repressive actions were combined with strict adherence to bureaucratic and legal requirements for recognition which seemed to be effective in slowing down independent church growth. For example, in 1905, the South African Native Affairs Commission recommended that the "judicious exercise" of the right to withhold recognition would prove a convenient and effective means of controlling religious organisations not working in the "general public interests".\textsuperscript{121} These conditions were stringent enough to ensure that few churches met with success in fulfilling government regulations. The colonial authorities were in a position to use their influence by withholding other privileges. By restricting the licensing of marriage officers, they could diminish independent church credibility.\textsuperscript{122} Letters of exemption from pass laws and railway concessions which were usually issued to African churchmen allied to the mission churches were denied to independent church ministers.\textsuperscript{123}

Lastly, strict control of land grants for church and school sites was also effectively employed as a strategy in the Cape Colony. The debilitating effect of tussles over land and buildings is reflected strongly in Chapter 3 where the newly

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{121} SANAC, Vol.1 pp.63-64[320].
\item \textsuperscript{122} There is a considerable correspondence on the licensing of marriage officers and the question of government recognition in the Cape. The four most exhaustive files are; CA NA 496; CA NA 497; CA GH 35/84 1901-1904, CA GH 35/85 1904-1910; and for the Transvaal, TA NTS 132 and 133. The persistence of the independent churches brought various colonial departments into the debate. See also CA JUS 20470/09 Ethiopian Church Application for recognition by Government in respect of performance of marriages. CC Port Elizabeth to Dower 12/5/09.
\end{footnotes}
formed African Presbyterian Church in the Victoria East division of the Cape came into conflict with representatives of the Lovedale Presbytery.\textsuperscript{124} The Order of Ethiopia also struggled to find access to sites where it could establish permanent schooling facilities, as will be shown in Chapter 4.\textsuperscript{125} The use of bureaucratic devices and red-tape in respect to schooling will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2.

7. Outline of the Research

The colonial educational milieu which begat the independent church schools in the Cape Colony is comprehensively reviewed in Chapter 2.\textsuperscript{126}

Chapter 3 deals with the educational activities of the African Presbyterian Church (APC) in the Victoria East Division of the Eastern Cape between 1898 and 1911. The recruitment of an Inspector of Native Locations to act as correspondent for the APC schools proved crucial for the APC schools. The struggle in the schools is also linked to ethnic, religious and economic cleavages occurring among the rural peasantry.

Chapter 4 traces the history of educational consequences arising from the amalgamation of the Order of Ethiopia with

\textsuperscript{124} In the Victoria East division, independent church communities attempted to establish whether they legally possessed titles to land on which their churches were erected, or whether, the land was the property of the mission church. CA SGE 1/664 Victoria East Inspector Rein to SGE. Evidence of Garstin, F.C. R.M. SANAC Vol.2. p.859[11943-53].

\textsuperscript{125} In 1905, even the mission Anglican Church (Church of the Province of South Africa) had trouble gaining more land in the Cathcart area. The Surveyor General considered the grants of land which the CPSA had applied for to be so close to the "European town" as to be "undesirable". CA LND 1/924 L17784 Surveyor General to Under Secretary for Agriculture 2/5/05.

the Church of the Province of South Africa (CPSA) between 1900 and 1908. Central to the narrative was the ability of the CPSA to employ secular education and religious training as a gatekeeping mechanism thereby controlling access of adherents and priests of the Order of Ethiopia to positions of authority over church affairs.

Chapter 5 focuses on the struggle by the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) to establish schools in the rural areas of the Western Cape between 1896 and 1920. The conflict over schools between Dutch Reformed Church and AME groups was influenced by the indomitable spirit of AME stalwart and teacher Mrs. Sarah Bell, and the political and administrative skills of AME leaders in their transactions with the Education Department headquarters. A controversial land purchase scheme linked to industrial education which was opened by the Rev. Henry Attaway will form the third focus of this chapter. Thereafter follows the Conclusion.
CHAPTER TWO

BLACK EDUCATION IN THE CAPE COLONY 1890 - 1920: SEGREGATION, UNEQUAL FUNDING, SECULARISATION OF AUTHORITY AND LOCAL CONTEST FOR CONTROL

1. Introduction

It is important to provide a clear understanding of both the development of the schooling system in the Cape Colony, and of the nature of colonial control over African schooling which the independent church schools challenged. During the period under review, significant changes were being wrought in the South African political economy which had implications for education in the Cape Colony. Trends in the education arena of importance to the case studies include the implementation of segregation in education, significant differences in funding between black and white schools and curriculum changes which reduced black access to educational opportunities. These factors suggest that the independent church schools were established in response to the dearth of educational opportunities open to blacks, as well as for political reasons.

This chapter has two main objectives. The first is to delineate the specific educational context within which the three independent church case studies were embedded. It is important to establish whether the range of problems which the independent church schools experienced was characteristic of independent church schools only, or whether it was common to the whole 'system' of mission schooling at the time. Second, the nature of educational and administrative processes in the mission schools needs to be examined in order to understand the pressures on teachers, students and school communities. In order to analyse the way the independent church school leaders negotiated for the survival of their schools, and to interpret the strategies they adopted, it is vital to appreciate the strengths and limitations of the Education
Department, and its ability to enforce its authority in the rural mission schools at this time.

Although Africans had little or no control over the development of mission education at the regional level, they did shape schooling at the local level. The independent church schools were established in the period when, under pressure from the Cape Department of Education, the mission churches began to relinquish their domination over schooling. In this period of transition, administrative and control structures of the Education Department had not fully embraced the outstation mission schools. This presented opportunities for independent church school communities to negotiate their independence and to challenge mission authority.

This chapter will first describe the general context of black education between 1890 and 1920. It will consider the following factors: access to schools, segregation, curtailed expenditure, fluctuating attendance patterns, high drop-out rates, shortages of trained teachers, financial insecurity of teachers, poor classroom conditions, authoritarian pedagogical styles, curriculum limitations, and the diverse educational desires articulated by black communities.

Thereafter, changes in the financing and administration of the mission schools, the response of the mission churches to rising government influence, competition over grants-in-aid and disputes over management will be revealed. These will then form the backdrop to a discussion on the ways in which independent school challenges were manifested. This chapter section then leads directly to the first case-study of the schools of the African Presbyterian Church in Victoria East.

2. Literature Review: History of Education in the Cape Colony from 1890 to 1920

The secondary literature on the history of education in the Cape in the period under study contains very little material
that reveals the texture of educational processes in colonial African society. Few educational historians have challenged the hypotheses that support generalised interpretations of broad sweeps of the educational past. Educational histories such as those by Pells, Coetzee and Malherbe cover extensive time periods and as a consequence, cannot provide sufficiently detailed accounts of particular historical periods. Similarly, the overview by Molteno which concentrates solely on black education opens up the field but cannot illuminate the fine grain and complexity of educational change. This means that although outlines may be perceived, the texture of African schooling is not revealed, a problem that becomes progressively worse in the period before the 1950's.

The shallow understanding of schooling as it impacted on black communities is also the result of the preoccupation of much original research on educational policy makers. Several studies focus on individual educational reformers or innovators like the Superintendents General of Education Dale and Muir, missionary leaders like James Stewart, and African Christian leaders like John Tengo Jabavu. Through


concentrating on educational reformers, administrators and legislators in South Africa, educational historians have produced a top-down, albocentric history which does not account for the influence of blacks on the process of educational change.

Much of the research work on the history of education between 1890 and 1920 has judged the progressive growth of schooling provision as a 'good thing'. As a consequence, studies lack critical analysis of the provision of schooling and its links to political and economic processes. This is generally true of many institutional histories which focus on mission institutions such as St.Matthews, Healdtown, and Lovedale, or on the contributions to education by missionary societies, orders and churches such as the London Missionary Society, the Anglican Church, the Dominican Order and the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk. The same criticism is valid in regard to


theses on technical and bureaucratic aspects of educational history, ranging from the growth of the inspectorate to the administration of schools. In this genre there are many area studies which are located particularly in the Kimberley/North-Western Cape, Griqualand West area and the Tulbagh, Caledon, Namaqualand, South-Western Cape regions. These works usually devote a small section to black education which is invariably relegated to a chapter on its own. No attempt is made to integrate black and white histories or to construct an organic understanding of the broad social and political context of education.

Perhaps the most valuable contribution in the period under review is the thesis by Hunt-Davis. While his work is


empirically valuable, it has two limitations. Firstly, Hunt-Davis did not explore archival correspondence files in the Superintendent General of Education (SGE) Series of the Cape Archives, with the result that his thesis lacks a sense of the complexity of schooling processes. Secondly, his work does not sustain its analysis or empirical detail in the 1890’s, and as a result provides inadequate coverage of segregation, discriminatory funding, increases in student numbers, and curriculum changes.

The literature on the history of schooling of blacks in the Cape colony between 1890 and 1920 lacks the substance to provide a coherent background for this study. The following sections aim to outline trends in black education leading up to the turn of the century and then account for the changing relationship between black and white education.

3. Black Education before 1890

Formal schooling for blacks began with the schooling of slaves in the Cape Peninsula in 1658. The first school for Africans was established at King William’s Town (1835) in the Cape in 1799. With few exceptions, the missionary societies established themselves as the providers of schooling for Africans. The first step towards government control and the creation of an 'education system' was taken with the establishment of a Department of Education and the appointment of the first Superintendent General of Education, Rose-Innes, in 1839. Two years later, the first financial grants to

9. Until the 1920’s, black and Coloured people were referred to as "coloured" from time to time in SGE and Department of Education correspondence and in newspapers and periodicals. At other times they were discussed separately as "Native" and "Coloured". It was not clear in all cases whether authors were referring to both 'groups' or not. In 1910 although the Acting Under-Secretary for Education stated that the "word coloured includes all non-Europeans", this was not always consistently applied. PAE 227 Ell Acting Under-Secretary for Education to Secretary of the Administrator, Cape Town 8/11/1910.
mission schools were made, but the real impetus in African education came from the colonial government only after 1854.

Governor Sir George Grey held education to be an important instrument for the "subjugation of the indigenous population," as part of a two-pronged military and educational scheme to enforce peace on the 'frontier'.\(^{10}\) Between 1855 and 1863, £55,046 was spent on funding African education under the Grey Plan. This phase did not last long. The Plan was suddenly curtailed in 1863. Following the Education Commission of 1861-63, and Superintendent General of Education Langham Dale’s recommendation for a revised schedule of grants to mission schools, there was a major reduction in colonial treasury funding.\(^{11}\) Hunt-Davis identifies this period as an important turning point for a number of reasons:

... the era represented a high point, as a temporary equilibrium developed between government aid to African and European education. This disappeared for ever at the end of 1863 when the Cape Government began to concentrate on white education to the exclusion of that for Africans ... Despite their cutback, government funds, henceforth were the key to financing African education, since neither missionaries nor Africans possessed the resources to support more than a limited system. With colonial funds came colonial control.\(^{12}\)

After this setback, there was a long period of recovery according to Hunt-Davis. He notes that government spending on African schools dropped after 1863 and did not surpass that level until 1875. In the interim the Colony had increased its boundaries to include the Ciskei, so that per capita, funding was effectively still smaller than the 1863 appropriation. Moreover, it could not have escaped the attention of colonial


politicians that the Cape's expanded borders would swell the numbers of black voters if the latter obtained the required minimum education qualification.

Growth in schooling received another setback during the economic depression of the mid-1880's, when education cut-backs were enforced in correspondence with reduced Colonial income. Furthermore, increasing numbers of educated white immigrants after 1886 reduced the need for educated blacks. A decisive point was reached at the end of the recession in 1888. While other appropriations for education rose, the African education allocation was pegged at the 1887 level. From this point onwards, the total education budget always increased faster than the appropriation for African education. This chapter will show that drastic differentials in spending developed from the 1890's onwards.

In the 1880's, great changes were discernible in the economy of Southern Africa. The discovery of diamonds and then gold fueled industrialisation which in turn wrought massive transformation of the entire social fabric. Features of this period were urbanisation, intensification of the migrant labour system, and African class formation. In this process, education became important; for some in moulding useful labourers, for others in the search for work; for some in the


construction of race and class barriers, for others in the struggle to overcome these restrictions on their lives.

In the Cape, a number of factors spurred the increasing demand for education by blacks. Education became a means of acquiring work, or of securing work with the promise of a greater economic return. Owing to land appropriation, drought and the rinderpest epidemic after 1896, the numbers of blacks able to maintain themselves on the land was falling. An increased tax burden designed to force Africans into wage labour swelled the numbers seeking work or education. Furthermore, because agricultural wages lagged behind those in other sectors of the economy, education represented a possibility of escape from agricultural labour.

The general quickening of the economy as a result of mineral discoveries created the market for a variety of skills. The

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18. This was obviously an uneven process, as many peasant farmers in the Eastern Cape were able to survive these pressures for a number of years. Maylam, P., A History of the African People of South Africa: From the Early Iron Age to the 1970's (Cape Town, David Philip, 1986) pp. 106-108, 142-143.

19. According to Bundy, there developed "increased demands by white employers for black labour, and an increased attempt by Africans to find alternative forms of income than low-paid wage labour". Bundy, C., The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (Cape Town, David Philip, 1988) pp. 78-79. See also Beinart, W., The Political Economy of Pondoland 1860-1930 (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1982) p. 42. Witnesses before SANAC claimed that there was a shortage of labour in the Cape at the turn of the century, but this could be attributed to the reluctance of Africans to work on farms for the wages offered. Question by SNAD Stanford, SANAC, Vol. 2, p. 1089[14922]; Evidence of Stewart, Dr. J., SANAC, Vol. 2, p. 908[44959]. See also periodicals "Rev. John Tom Brown and the Natives" Northern News 27/6/1911; "Native Education in the Cape Colony" Blythswood Review September(1903)p. 22.
final destruction of independent African polities,\(^{20}\) and the ending of the phase of primary resistance also contributed to the new found importance of education. These factors were recognised by the executive of the South African Native Congress in 1903:

> The Natives have much to learn and unlearn, and the power of resistance to the will of the ruling caste having been effectually broken down, they are now applying themselves to the newer conditions imposed on them by Christianity and civilisation...\(^{21}\)

Furthermore, blacks were confronted with an array of restrictive Acts from the 1870’s onwards, including the Disarmament Act, the Pass Act, the Franchise and Ballot Act, and the Glen Grey Act.\(^{22}\) In the light of such legislation they saw the need to acquire educational qualifications specifically to qualify for the vote, and generally to be better able to defend African political rights.\(^{23}\) Senior officials in the Colonial bureaucracy were beginning to appreciate, how education was generating political problems.


In 1902 the Chief Magistrate for Transkei, Walter Stanford, observed that education was freeing Africans from chiefly authority and obedience to the government:

Education has brought into existence a class of Natives distinct from the Red or Heathen Native and who have not the strong feeling of loyalty towards the hereditary Chiefs to be found in the former, nor the ready obedience to the wishes of the Government, to be found in the older...24

According to Hunt-Davis, settlers showed a renewed interest in blacks as a potential source of labour in the context of increasing economic activity.25 He argued that "... Europeans began to seek ways of making Africans 'useful' rather than making them safe neighbours". At the same time, among whites he observed "... hardened racist attitudes heightened by fears of being overwhelmed by the Colony's black majority".26 The educational interests and expectations of whites and blacks were increasingly coming into conflict.


The main thrust of this section will be to show how segregation was implemented in the schools of the Cape Colony, and how the consolidation of segregated educational facilities was a necessary prelude to massive disparities in the allocation of funding and resources between white and black institutions. Consequently, stark differences in the qualitative and quantitative growth of white and black schooling developed. It will be argued that the deliberate

24. CA NA 497 CMT to Native Affairs Office 13/10/1902.


favouring of white education, with the concomitant underdevelopment of black education, was a response to changing political and economic circumstances. These included demands in the labour market for unskilled black labour, the threat of educated African labour, and the need to find a mechanism for the upliftment of whites who were perceived to be in danger of transgressing increasingly important racial boundaries.  

The deliberate attempts by colonial education authorities to formulate educational policy were recognised in 1906 by the Reverend S. Steinmann, who observed at the Second General Missionary Conference that hitherto "neither the Government nor the Missionary Societies had yet attempted to deal earnestly with the question of the proper educational policy to pursue".  

4.1 Access to Schooling

The level of African access to schooling was much higher in the Cape Colony than in neighbouring territories. The greater incidence of education among blacks in the Cape could be due to greater allocations of funding. For example, in 1903

27. A survey by the Minister of Agriculture in 1915 suggested that 8-10% of the white population or 100 000 to 150 000 whites were "poor white" and therefore considered to be below the "level of civilised standard of economic efficiency". Malherbe, E.H., "Education and the Poor White" South African Journal of Science 26,(1929)p.894.


29. In figures presented to the SANAC in 1905, it was estimated that by 1903, out of a total population of 4 652 662 Africans, there were 100 606 scholars in the territories which were to become South Africa. In the Cape Colony with a resident population of 1 424 787 Africans, 60 451 were attending schools. This meant that although only 30.6% of the entire African population resided in the Cape Colony, 60% of all African scholars in South Africa were at school in the Cape Colony. SANAC, Vol.1, Annexure.7,p.27.
the expenditure on African education in the Cape Colony was £47,657 as compared with £7,265, £5,000, and £1,800 in Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State respectively. Other factors which also contributed to higher levels of education in the Cape Colony were a longer history of missionary activity, an earlier introduction of western education, longer incorporation in a cash economy and military subjugation at an earlier juncture.

Although blacks in the Cape Colony fared better than those in the other territories, in comparison with white Cape enrolment patterns between 1890 and 1920, they lagged further and further behind. By 1911, 17.8% of the white population and only 4.1% of the black population were at school. While these figures describe inequality of access, they do not show how white enrolment figures grew at a far greater pace than black enrolment figures in the crucial three decades under study. The numbers of students at school between 1890 and 1920 increased from 38,294 to 128,061 for whites and from 58,814 to 154,422 for blacks. This represented an overall gain of 234.41% for whites and 162.56% for blacks (See Graph 1). Clearly, the locus of most growth was among the white population.

A more complete understanding of these shifts is gained by separating the statistics for the divisions of the Cape Colony.

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31. According to Pells, white attendance rose from 18,000 to 58,000 between 1820 and 1900, while black attendance rose from 22,000 to 66,000 in the same period. Pells, E.G., European, Coloured and Native Education in South Africa 1658 to 1938 (Cape Town, Juta, 1938)p.43.


33. The Census for 1911 gave the total population of the Cape as 2,564,965; 582,337 whites and 1,982,588 blacks. [UG32b-1912] Union Government Census of 1911, pp.24-25.
**Graph 1:**

School Attendance
Cape Colony: 1890 - 1920

- Black students
- White students

**Graph 2:**

Mission Schools: Student Attendance
Cape Colony and Transkei: 1901-1920

- Cape Colony
- T'xkelan Territories
proper from the Magistracies of the Transkeian territories. In the Cape Colony from 1901 to 1910, the white school population increased from 51,792 to 79,456 or by 53.41%, while black enrolment increased from 51,752 to 54,656, an increase of only 2,894 or 5.61%. In the Transkeian Territories, black enrolment in the same period increased by a substantial 15,989 students (See Graph 2). Thus, in this decade, the expansion of black schooling in the Cape took place almost entirely in the Transkeian territories. Black educational expansion in the Cape Colony proper was virtually negligible for the decade 1900 to 1910. This fuelled demands for education, placing greater pressure on existing mission provision and raising conflict within communities over access to school places.

The reason for the reduced growth of black schooling in the Cape Colony to negligible proportions between 1900 and 1910 can be ascribed to political factors. First, there was the problem of white opposition to increases in black schooling access. Second, there was a need to garner support for the Glen Grey Act and the Transkeian Territories that could be achieved through shifting expansion of mission education to that area.

In the Cape Colony, the relatively large white population was fearful of black competition. In contrast, the Transkeian territories held a small and sparsely distributed white population consisting mostly of missionaries, colonial administrators and traders. Very few white children attended school there. The number of white pupils in schools in the Transkeian territories was 1,519 in 1901 and never represented more than 2.9% of the total white school-going population of the Cape Colony, in the entire period under review.

The dispersed white parent population in the Transkei, with its small number of students, did not express levels of sensitivity to black school expansion comparable with white antipathy in the Cape Colony. Perhaps, the proportion of whites in the Transkei had not reached the critical point at which race consciousness and the desire to exclude blacks could develop and be mobilised. Therefore, increasing antagonism to black education among the large white population in the Colony could be mollified by diverting enrolment increases in black schools to the Transkeian Territories. As a result, the demand for schooling from blacks in the Colony was ignored while significant schooling expansion was permitted in the Transkeian Territories only. This strategy was likely to bolster the implementation of the Glen Grey Act, and enhance African acceptance of the Transkeian Territories as a separate administrative unit. Furthermore, significant increases in education in terms of the Glen Grey Act were likely to lend credence to the District Councils.

In the early twentieth-century African and Coloured communities in the Cape Colony proper, who sought access to schooling came under pressure. The reduction of access to schooling in the decade before Union must therefore be understood as a contributory factor to the growth of independent church schooling. The data presented suggest strongly that the independent church schools were a response to an effective reduction in black access to schooling.

4.2 Differential Expenditure on Black and White Schooling

In terms of expenditure, white schools received much greater increases than black schools. The figures for average government expenditure per pupil in the earlier period from 1895 to 1905 show a general downward trend in the funding of Mission and Aborigines schools - attended mostly by blacks - and an upward trend in the Public Undenominational schools of
all classes - attended mostly by whites.\(^\text{35}\) Although the funds allocated to white education were already increasing faster than the black education appropriation from the 1890's onwards, **massive** disparities in expenditure are most obvious after 1910 (See Graph 3).\(^\text{36}\) This was because the Cape government's segregationist policy in schools had finally been implemented. Segregation of education was the necessary preliminary to vastly different funding schedules.

\(^\text{35}\) The figures used in the early period are not entirely accurate because there were a number of racially mixed schools. However, this would not have affected the overall trends.

After 1910, there is a great contrast between the two curves, with white educational spending recovering quickly from the depression and soaring upwards. White allocation was £50 131 in 1895, rising to £652 110 in 1915. In the same period the allocation to black education was £34 972 rising to only £144 738. Clearly, from a roughly similar base in the late 1800's, the order of funding for black and white schooling drastically changed from the beginning of the twentieth century.37

Within the overall trends outlined above, there were changes in the funding of specific types of education between blacks and whites, such as in industrial education. This aspect will be discussed later.

4.3 The Implementation of Segregation in Schools of the Cape Colony

An active programme of segregation in Cape Colonial education was embarked upon from 1891 onwards, although elements of racist thinking are evident much earlier. For example, in 1879, the Superintendent General of Education made it clear in a report to Parliament that education would be used as a means of maintaining distinctions between "European" inhabitants and "Native and mixed races" in the Cape Colony. The principles of segregation in education and differential treatment were more powerfully advocated after revelations by the Ross Report of 1882 that only one-sixth of all white children attended school with "beneficial regularity". Findings of the Education Commission of 1891 that 58 243 white

37. In 1910 the Education Department was not yet calculating costs of black education separately. In order to calculate the differences in expenditure, it was necessary to add the amounts allocated to "Native Industrial Institutions" and "Mission Schools". This did not include expenditure on pupil teachers, boarders and good service allowances. PAE 227 B11 Acting Under-Secretary of Education to Secretary of the Administrator 2/11/1910.
children were not in school, also had a strong effect on policy. 38

The Superintendent General of Education, Thomas Muir, was himself totally unapologetic about favouring white education. 39 In 1906, at the formal opening of Alice Public School, he made it clear that white education was the priority. Muir was quoted in the Alice Times saying:

He had the very strongest belief that the white people of this country should be best educated (applause). They did not deny education to other people, but their first duty was to their own children (applause). They never could forget that duty. 40

A significant proportion of white students were dependent on the mission schools where mixed classes were common. In 1891, there were 10 654 white children in mission schools in the Cape Colony, almost a third of the total number of white students accommodated in government aided and largely segregated schools known as "Undenominational Schools". 41 In 1901, there were still 19 900 students attending multi-racial schools (See Table 1).


41. According to Pells, in 1882 there were 6 000 white students in the mission schools and 32 000 black students. Pells, E.G. (1938) p. 49.
### TABLE 1

**Numbers of Black and White Students at Multi-Racial Schools: Cape Colony 1901 - 1920**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>4,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>1,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**GRAPH 4**

**Multi-racial Schools**
**Cape Colony: 1901 - 1920**

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42. Quarterly Statistical Number, Fourth Quarter *Education Gazette* 1901, 1910, 1920.
Mixed attendance was more apparent in older urban centers like Cape Town. The situation disturbed Muir who observed that, the "... evil was specially great in the Cape Peninsula". By 1894, in greater Cape Town the number of white children receiving instruction alongside "Coloured" children was 4,155 which exceeded the entire white school-going population of 3,240 at Public Undenominational schools in Cape Town.\(^{43}\)

The vigour with which Muir acted to abolish mixed schooling brought rapid changes. By 1909, he was able to report that of the 13,187 white scholars in the Cape Peninsula, only 295 attended mission schools with Coloured children.\(^{44}\) The next year, the total number of white school children in the mission schools of the entire Colony was under 550.\(^{45}\) In 1901, there were 214 schools under the control of the Department of Education with mixed race attendance; in 1910, there were 75 and in 1920 there were only three left (See Graph 4).\(^{46}\) Thus, by 1920, the extension of school segregation was all but accomplished.

Feeble resistance to the process of segregation was offered by some clergymen in the mission schools. Giving evidence before the 1896 Education Commission, an Anglican minister, the Rev.

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46. Of the last three schools, one was the Deaf and Dumb Institute in Cape Town, with 17 white and 8 Coloured pupils; and the other two schools, Lovedale Girl’s Mission School, and Buntingville Practising School, had 4 and 2 white students with 35 and 242 Coloured students respectively. Source: Quarterly Statistical Number, Fourth Quarter Education Gazette 1901, 1910, 1920. In 1908, there were still few whites at Lovedale. Whites were told that mission schools were for “native education unless there was a good reason otherwise”. [A.l-1908] Report of the Select Committee on Native Education,1908. Evidence of SGE Muir, p.7[36].
Osborne, considered it unwise to segregate schools in Cape Town on the grounds that so many families were "intermixed". Yet it would seem that the mission churches, dependent as they were on government funds, were not willing to seriously oppose the new policy. Moreover, many clergymen were themselves proponents of new racist philosophies. Objections to segregation from the clergy focussed less on the moral issue than on practical difficulties in identifying who was or was not white. The awkward responsibility for making distinctions between 'white' and 'Coloured', given the "notorious permeability of the colour line" was not relished by mission school superintendents. No proof of white parental objections to the segregation process could be found. Presumably, the increased government grants to special segregated Undenominational Public Fourth Class "Poor" School facilities mollified white parents whose children were relocated from the mission schools.

Parallel to the physical process of separation outlined above, came a change in the format of reports from the Education Department. Separate sets of statistics based on race categories began to appear. In 1894, school statistics for "White" and "Coloured" children were given separately for the first time. In 1920, "Native" and "Coloured" education were discussed separately, and in 1930, were entirely independent in the statistical returns.


The segregation of education was paralleled in greater Cape Town by residential segregation which severely truncated the city's "special tradition of multi-racialism" by the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{50} The Coloured community in Cape Town was severely affected because multi-racial schooling was most strongly developed there. Consequently, Coloured people in the Western Cape region were actively engaged in contesting segregation. Opposition peaked against the School Board Act of 1905 which entrenched preferential treatment for the children of whites in the statute books of the Colony. The bill enabled school boards to enforce compulsory schooling up to Standard 4 for "children of European parentage or extraction between the ages of 6 and 14". In addition it made provision for aid to children of indigent white parents.\textsuperscript{51} Coloured political mobilisation, in the shape of the African Political Organisation (APO), identified education as one of its key campaign areas. Although the APO failed in its campaign to force changes in the 1905 Act, the struggle against its provisions aroused political awareness, especially among educated coloured elites. The ever contracting access of black people to education was underscored in the 1911 test case, Moller vs Keimoes School Committee in the Cape Supreme Court. The judgement handed down confirmed discrimination in educational provision in the Cape even though the APO demonstrated the court's definition of "European" to be absurd. After this defeat, the APO continued to campaign bitterly, though in vain, for free and compulsory schooling to be extended to all races.\textsuperscript{52}


\textsuperscript{51} For their part the parents of black children could, in theory, petition the appropriate local school board to institute the compulsory clause. However this was subject to the approval of the Department of Education and the local rate payers and the existence of suitable accommodation. No provision for automatic compulsory schooling or for the subsidy of poor coloured or African children existed.

\textsuperscript{52} Lewis, G., \textit{Between the Wire and the Wall} (Cape Town, David Philip, 1987) pp. 20-27, 29-34, 67-69.
In the period under study, several strategies were adopted in order to increase white access to education. These all had financial implications. The trend of increased white spending which has already been identified, was felt especially in the countryside, where the number of white farm schools trebled in 1906 resulting in a 67% increase in attendance in these schools. As a consequence of the 1905 School Board Act, by 1911 91 out of 119 school boards had opted to implement the compulsion clause bringing another 12 000 white children into school.

The chief mechanism whereby Superintendent General of Education, Dr. Muir, proposed to segregate the schools was through creating the Fourth Class Undenominational Public School or "Poor school". These schools were to be established especially in towns and villages where a large enough population of the "poorer classes of the white population" existed that was unable to set up or maintain a public school and had therefore enrolled their children in mission schools. The "coloured races" were to remain as they were in the Mission schools where the average government expenditure was £0.15.0 per pupil per annum. The newly constituted Fourth Class of Undenominational "Poor Schools" to which poor whites were removed, received an average government expenditure of £2.16.8 per pupil per annum in 1895. In 1894 there were only 1


54. In 1911 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held that the existence of racially exclusive schools was lawful in terms of the "policy of the Cape School Board Act of 1905 to establish separate public ... schools for different races" (Moller vs Keimoes School Committee[1911], A.D.644). Cited in Welsh, D. "The Growth of the Towns" In: OHSAP, p.222.


024 children in these schools, but by 1909 the numbers had risen to 7 896.57

The removal of this "class" of white from the mission schools should be viewed in conjunction with the implementation of markedly unequal expenditure between black and white schools. Institutionalisation of separate facilities by the Education Department permitted the application of funds to poor whites without directly alerting black parents to such discrimination. This highlights the strategic relationship between segregation and disparate financing. The former was a necessary precondition for the latter. Under conditions of discriminatory allocation, the establishment of separate schooling was less a defensive move of separation, and more a positive strategy of upliftment aimed at poor whites.58

The process of segregation and differential funding intensified after Union, when primary and secondary education were made the preserve of the Provincial Councils. Because the chief activity of the Councils was education, and financial control was removed from the Superintendent General of Education to the Provincial Accounting Officer, the Department of Education fell effectively under the control of the Administrator of the Cape and his Executive Council. The first Administrator of the Cape, Frederick De Waal, and the new Superintendent of Education, Dr. W.J. Viljoen, who succeeded Muir in 1915, had the power to widen the gap. Although changes in Cape education spending may be tentatively linked to the collapse of liberal Cape school policy and to conservative national policy driven by the other provinces, this issue cannot be pursued here.


The introduction of the School Board Act of 1905 was not the only measure available to the policy-makers intent on 'rescuing' poor whites in the Colony. After 1910, a system of indigent boarding houses was established under the regime of De Waal, with the co-operation of the Dutch Reformed Church. After the passing of Ordinance No.11 of 1917, the erection of hostels in the platteland was rapid. By 1923, 170 hostels housed 7,145 indigent white children. During this period, access to agricultural and industrial education for whites was also increased. The advantages of white children were further extended with the introduction of free education to Std.6 in the Cape Colony in 1920.

The pattern of segregation had implications for blacks seeking access to schooling. It ensured that they could only seek admission at mission schools where facilities were poor because of minimal government financial aid. The rise of independent church schools must be seen as an attempt to expand access as well as to assert black control over the schools. The data analysed demonstrates that the establishment of independent church schools was not simply a political expression. Their development was a response to restrictive and discriminatory educational policy formulated by the Education Department and consolidated by the Provincial Council of the Cape.

5. The Nature of Education in the Mission Schools of the Cape Colony

5.1 Kraal or Outstation Schools and the "Native Mission Institutions."

Historians of colonial education have tended to focus on the premier "native mission institutions" such as Lovedale, Healdtown and Tigerkloof because these places have been


considered to be more important in the creation of an African educated elite, or simply because primary data in the mission archives has been readily available. The problem with this bias is that the history of mission education is considered synonymous with the history of the "native mission institutions", and the experience of African students in those elite institutions has too easily been assumed to be representative of the mission education experience in general. Yet those who attended the premier "native mission institutions" were a small minority. The number of elite institutions which never exceeded twenty-five, was far outnumbered by thousands of ordinary mission schools which averaged about 70 students on the roll, lacked adequate financial backing and were prone to closure. In 1910, approximately 2 388 students - of which 950 were boarders - attended the "native mission institutions" while 103 936 students were on the roll in over 1 500 ordinary "Mission" and "Aborigine" schools in the Colony and Transkeian Territories.

Different roles for the two categories of school were plainly envisaged by the Superintendent General of Education, Dr. Dale, who conceived of the ordinary outstation schools - or

61. Even before the end of the phase of primary resistance, the Cape Colonial colonial governments wished to 'capture' African elites in colonial schools. The motivation for attempting to mould the sons and daughters of indigenous chiefs in the image of western culture, and to convert them to the metropolitan world view was to create an echelon of African leaders in the colonial social hierarchy who would be both compliant and retain some authority over African society. See Hodgson on Zonnebloem College. Hodgson, J., "Mission and Empire: A Case Study of Convergent Ideologies in 19th Century Southern Africa" Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 38(Mar),(1982)pp.34-49.

62. To give some indication, in 1902 the total number of boarding students at these institutions was 653. "Native Education in the Cape Colony" Blythwood Review September 1903 pp.26-27.

"Kraal" schools - as feeders for the "native mission institutions":

It was hoped that the Kraal schools as the basis of the system of schools in Fingoland, would yield a periodical supply of their most promising boys to enter the local institution at Blythswood, for the purpose of being brought under the direct influence of home life...\(^{64}\)

In many ways the "native mission institutions" did dominate the lives of their African scholars. These large and stable establishments were replete with traditions and infused with a colonial ethos under an encompassing missionary regime. They were financially well-supported by the home churches, staffed and controlled in the majority by white missionaries, and usually endowed with extensive teaching facilities and boarding accommodation.\(^{65}\) The varied curriculum at these institutions was usually planned over six days per week, on weekdays from 6.45am to 7.30pm - with an additional three hours on Saturday morning.

In contrast, the ordinary mission school infrequently operated for the full statutory five hours per day, and was seldom geared to more than a meagre introduction to the "three r's".\(^{66}\) Moreover, adequate equipment and qualified teachers were not the norm, and missionary supervision was usually

\(^{64}\) Stewart Papers, BC 106 C51.1 Dale to Stewart, 11/10/1878.

\(^{65}\) In 1903 they were the Methodist institutions, Aliwal North, Bensonvale, Clarkebury, Healdtown, and Peddie, the Anglican institutions Engcobo, St.Matthews and St.Johns, the Presbyterian institutions, Blythswood, Lovedale and Emgwalli and Zonnebloem College. "Native Education in the Cape Colony" Blythswood Review September 1903,pp.25-29.

\(^{66}\) The rudimentary schooling experience of the majority of rural Africans persisted well beyond the period under study. This is clear from the description of a typical African "village school" by Murray in 1929. Murray, A.V., The School in the Bush: A Critical Study of Native Education in Africa (London, Longmans, 1929)pp.79ff.
sporadic. It will become clear in the course of this chapter that by and large, in both the teaching and administrative contexts, the school managers, teachers, and students in ordinary mission schools exercised greater autonomy than those in the "native mission institutions". The common outstation mission school was therefore not as powerful in imposing a colonial mindset on students as the major institutions such as Lovedale and Blythswood. It is vital that this chapter gives a valid and reliable impression of the kind of missionary schooling that was provided between 1890 and 1920 for comparison with the independent church schools. The latter were not set up as Quixotic challenges to the major institutions.

5.2 Fragile Schools and Fluctuating Attendance Patterns

This section argues that schools in the Cape Colony, especially mission schools, were fragile both in terms of their long term survival and in terms of their ability to hold students, who frequently left school for short periods, or were forced to abandon their scholastic careers entirely. Schools opened and closed in large numbers, causing widespread disruption, as a result of vicissitudes in regional and local economic conditions, seasonal and climatic changes, war, illness, and the influence of traditional customs.

Black teachers faced high levels of absenteeism in their schools. The total number of students on the roll was seldom equalled by the number of students actually in attendance. Consequently, the average daily attendance was used as a more realistic approximation of how many students were consistently in the classroom. These figures were indicators of the holding capacity of schools and conveyed how tenuous school attendance was at the time. In 1895, the average daily attendance for all schools in the Colony and the Transkeian Territories was 74,2% while the figure for the Transkeian Territories, Glen Grey and Herschel was 73,2%. This meant that on a daily basis, only seven out of ten students on the roll were at school. In
1915, the figures had improved to 86.8% and 81.4% respectively. The student population in the "mission institutions" was much more stable than the general student population, yielding a high average daily attendance of 94.4% in 1906.67

Of the factors that inhibited the attendance of children at school, perhaps the greatest was the widespread use of child labour. Frequent calls were made to shift the school timetable into line with the agricultural rhythm of the region. For example, in 1913, a deputation of farmers from Hopefield, Malmesbury and Piquethberg met the Superintendent General of Education to request that the school holidays be made to coincide with the ploughing season.68 Contagious illnesses which often laid low large proportions of students in local communities, sometimes closing schools, also contributed at times to diminishing average daily attendance.69 Traditional practices disrupted attendance at schools. For example, Inspector Rein complained to the Superintendent General of Education in 1907 about the removal of youths from school for circumcision rites in Gcalekaland and the regions bordering Basutoland.70

68. SGE 1/1224 Qumbu Ngqubusini men to Rev. Mears 28/11/1912. For further observations on use of child labour, see: SGE 1/1183 Malmesbury Memo SGE to General Correspondence Branch 27/11/1913; SGE 2/96 Taungs Brice to Education Department 12/2/1901; SGE 2/90 Glen Grey Bennie Informal Visit 12/3/1901; SGE 2/89 East London School Inspection Report, Braakfontein school 11/12/1901.
69. Sicknesses like smallpox and influenza were common. At the larger institutions they sometimes caused "panic" amongst students. SGE 1/887 Blikana E. Mavumengwana to SGE 20/9/1910; SGE 1/800 Herschel Weaver to SGE 31/8/1909; SGE 2/96 Victoria East Inspectors Report, Auckland School 18/6/1901; Stewart Papers, BC 106 D22 Report on the Health of Boarders at Lovedale During the Year 1893, n.d., Dr. MacVicar.
70. He considered the circumcised youth to be a bad influence for on their return they reduced the teacher's authority; "The teachers cannot punish them, as they are his equals: men". SGE Letters Received, Inspectors 1/663 Rein to SGE 2/1/1907.
The mission schools were from time to time troubled by ethnic, religious, and other communal conflicts. For example, in 1903, fighting broke out at Umhlanga School, Wodehouse, after the nephew of a Mfengu headman had been circumcised and was subsequently refused re-admission to the school by the school committee, which was allegedly Tembu-dominated. In this dispute the Wesleyan missionary was completely ignored. In incidents such as this indicate that the conflicts between independent church followers and mission church loyalists were not unique in the period. Sporadic incidents of student rebellion were also documented in the established "mission institutions" such as Lovedale and Bensonvale.

In the period under review, school enrolments were deeply affected by war and depression. In 1903, Coloured enrolments dropped by 1,961, but the most significant losses were sustained by Coloureds with the onset of the economic depression in 1907-8. The fall in black enrolments owing to poverty began in 1906 with a cumulative loss of 2,470 pupils over two years. These statistics suggest that declining attendance was partly a consequence of the fragile financial resources of the black communities.

The high turnover among schools was another indicator of the fragile nature of black schooling. During this period large numbers of schools were opened and closed. In 1903, 492 schools were opened and 348 closed, which left an overall gain of 144 new schools. This gain in the number of schools was

71. CA NA 589 S. Kakaza to J.N.Cock INL 3/12/1902, CC and RM Wodehouse to SNA 9/2/1903; SGE 10/5 Wodehouse SGE to RM Wodehouse 13/3/1903.

72. SGE 1/1077 Herschel Weaver to SGE 11/5/1912; Cape Times 7/5/1912, 10/5/1912.

73. White pupil enrolment was adversely affected by the South African War, incurring a cumulative loss in enrolment of 2,645 between 1900 and 1902. "White and Coloured Enrolment; Comparative Statistics" Education Gazette 8(6), (1908)p.130-131.
viewed in a positive light by the Superintendent General of Education because it implied an increase in the number of students on the roll. However, the statistics conceal the dislocation and disruption among the pupils affected by closures. In 1903, in the mission schools category, 53 openings and 38 closures were recorded. In this period, the average number of children attending each mission school was about 60. Therefore, the numbers of students affected by closures alone was in the order of 2,280.74

5.3 Limited Schooling Opportunities and High Drop-out Rates

Having briefly outlined how susceptible to disruption the education of black children was, it is now necessary to examine the quality of mission schooling. First, most black scholars were destined never to pass beyond Std 4. In 1907, only 2.6% of the entire school-going population in the Transkeian Territories was in Std 5.75 This was essentially due to two factors; the level to which black elementary schools offered tuition, and the drop out rate.76 Although there was no rule which limited the extension of black schooling into the higher standards, the explicit understanding was pervasive among the administrators and inspectors of the Education Department that African schools as a rule would not offer schooling beyond Std 4. In evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission in 1903, the Superintendent General of Education, Muir, stated that secondary education beyond Std 6 had "never been considered

74. "Supply of Schools" Education Gazette 3(30),(1904)p.504.
76. In addition, complaints were voiced about expenditure on schools, "in which a number of the scholars are adults". This is an indication of the pressure to exclude older students from school. Written replies to Circular Questions. Respondent Leary,W.P. R.M.Mt.Frere SANAC,Vol.5, Appendix D,p.47.
part of Native education". Any schooling above this was assumed to be solely for the preparation of prospective teachers. Thus in 1913, additional grants were paid to Transkeian Council schools offering Stds. 5 and 6, but with the explicit understanding that graduating pupils would automatically enter a teacher’s Training School. Under these circumstances, calls for 'higher' education from Africans simply reflected the desire for access to educational opportunities that were higher than Std. 5 and outside of teacher training.

5.4 Shortage of Teachers

Several factors contributed to a shortage of trained teachers throughout the period under review. This hindrance was partly due to a moderate expansion of black schooling that was not accompanied by concomitant increases in facilities for black teacher training. There was also a constant drain of trained teachers seeking higher remuneration in other government departments and in the private sector. The Reverend


79. In the Transkei Council schools, grants actually diminished when Stds. 5 and 6 were taught. See: "Standards 5 and 6 in Transkeian Council Schools" Education Gazette 12(11),(1912)p.385; "Standards 5 and 6 in Transkeian Council Schools" Education Gazette 12(16),(1913)p.609.


81. A.E. Le Roy found that out of 353 Africans trained at the Amanzimtoti Institute as teachers between 1912 and 1916, only 153 had remained in the service. Of the total, 103 had found work in the city mostly as tradesmen, office clerks and store shop-assistants. Although a comparable study is not available for the Cape, it does give some indication of the loss of
Mdolomba, representative of the Ndabeni Location near Cape Town, observed before the South African Native Affairs Commission, that many teachers left teaching because "there was no good living out of it". In 1910, the maximum annual government grants payable to principals and assistant teachers in large mission schools of over 100 students were £75 and £45 respectively, while their counterparts in the white Third Class schools received £150 and £90. In contrast, ordinary teachers in mission outstation schools received only £15 per annum. Numbers of mission trained teachers thus sought alternative employment elsewhere as clerks, interpreters, policemen, and in other positions demanding educated labour. Because virtually no other forms of post-school training other than teacher training existed, the employment of trained teachers even in Government offices was a practical necessity.

Severe teacher shortages were aggravated by high drop-out rates among student teachers before they reached the third year of their teacher's training courses. Desperate missionaries devised schemes in the vain hope of circumventing the problem. In 1907, there were complaints that certain trained teachers into other fields. Le Roy, A.E., "Does it Pay to Educate the Native?" South African Journal of Science Jan/Feb, 1919, pp. 4-5.


83. These figures indicate the maximum authorised payment. They could have been less depending on the assessment of the Inspectors. Kipps, G.B., Handbook of the Report of the Education Commission (Cape Town, Juta, 1912) pp. 5-6.


mission institutions were promoting even those student teachers who had failed in order to swell their output of 'trained' teachers.\textsuperscript{87} In a number of instances, missionaries actually bribed pupil teachers to abandon their studies and to take up teaching.\textsuperscript{88} A massive expansion of teacher training including Vacation Courses and Pupil Teacher Courses was embarked upon soon after the turn of the century. Nevertheless the deficit could not be made good.\textsuperscript{89} Consequently, the number of uncertificated teachers remained high in the mission schools. In 1914, 67.77\% of teachers in black schools had no formal teaching qualification, as opposed to 30.62\% in white schools.\textsuperscript{90}

Apart from the loss of trained teachers into other sectors of the job market, those remaining were prone to change schools frequently.\textsuperscript{91} The tendency of teachers to migrate in search of better salaries and conditions caused further deterioration in the education process and in the quality of teaching.\textsuperscript{92}


\textsuperscript{88} [A.1-1908] Report of the Select Committee on Native Education, 1908. Evidence of SGE Muir p.11.

\textsuperscript{89} For the proposed structure of pupil teacher courses, see; "Pupil Teacher Course" \textit{Education Gazette} 9(24),(1910)p.630. Vacation courses were segregated in 1907. "Vacation Course of Training" \textit{Education Gazette} 6(21),(1907)p.501.

\textsuperscript{90} In 1914, the percentage of uncertificated teachers was still 58.4\%. \textit{Education Gazette} 13(18),(1914)p.820. In 1895 only 37.8\% of all teachers, white and black were certificated. By 1922, 10.5\% of white teachers and 26.4\% of African teachers were still uncertificated. Malherbe, E.G.(1925)p.158. See: Petition from Baralong chiefs for English speaking teachers. SGE 10/4 SGE to SNAD 30/1/1903.

\textsuperscript{91} For complaints about the movement of teachers, see: SGE 1/658 Tsolo Headman Andries Mpako and four others to SGE 9/2/07; SGE 1/497 Vryburg Chief and councillors, Manthe to RM, RM to SGE 11/5/1903.

\textsuperscript{92} D.D.T.Jabavu while a lecturer at the South African Native College of Fort Hare read a paper at the Natal Native Teachers Conference in 1918 which gives some indication of the difficult environment that African teachers had to face.
Continuity of schooling was often broken when on the departure of the teacher, there was no replacement available. Moreover, the inability to fill vacant teaching posts put many small mission schools in danger of losing their Departmental grants. The upshot of this was that even unqualified teachers were quickly hired, while fraudulent claims to qualifications became relatively common.

The debilitating effects of employing untrained teachers in the lower rungs of the schooling hierarchy at "grade" or "sub-standard" level were felt in the higher standards where students had not yet developed the desired competencies. This problem was commented on in the Education Gazette:

The unsatisfactory state of many Mission schools may be directly attributed to the inefficient teaching of the sub-standards. In charge of these classes is frequently to be found a young girl who has had little training and often no experience. Pupils devote weary hours daily to gazing at a tattered alphabet card or scrawling illegibly with pencil stumps.

Shortages of teachers also forced the missions to employ non-Christian teachers and teachers from competing denominations. Missionaries distrusted those who were recruited from outside their own church, believing that without exception "when the teachers are not Christians their influence is not good". Nevertheless, by the 1920's a significant proportion of teachers were employed whose denomination differed from the one presiding over school affairs. This was also true of the


94. "Neglect of Sub-standards in Native Schools" Education Gazette 7(24), (1907) p.578.

independent church schools which eventually accepted teachers who were from competing religious denominations.

5.5 Mission School Teachers: Limited Remuneration and Access to Land

Teachers in outlying mission schools had to rely on the communities within which they taught for their economic survival. They were dependent on local provision of land for accommodation and cultivation,96 and for the proportion of their wage due to them locally from the parents. The economic insecurity of teachers was most evident in the rural areas. Dr. Roberts of Lovedale observed in 1904 that there was "no teacher poorer paid in the present day than the village teacher".97

African mission teachers for their part began to seek greater security through fledgling teacher organisations. For example the Eastern Native Teacher’s Association from the Middledrift area believed that the interests of its membership would be better protected under the educational provisions of the Glen Grey Act. Representatives implored the local Resident Magistrate to implement the relevant clauses from the Act which regularised school fees.98 Unfortunately the chief and headmen of the district viewed other provisions of the Act

96. Difficulty in collecting the contribution was common. SGE 1/1800 Worcester Edney to SGE 17/11/1910; SGE 1/612 Herschel Weaver to SGE 2/11/1907.


98. The much lauded Glen Grey system was considered by the Education Department and Magistrates in those districts to have resolved the problem of exacting the local contribution which was paid directly in tax to the local Council. The effect of this was that the Colony proper lost teachers to the Territories because they were at least assured of receiving pay there. In the Transkeian Territories, those teachers who worked outside government schools were not eligible for good service allowances. Those who chose to work in unrecognised independent church schools did not qualify for any pension. SGE 1/564 Victoria West M.N.Galela to SGE 1/8/06, SGE to Galela 10/8/06.
with particular suspicion, while the Native Affairs Department decreed that the Act should be implemented in toto or not at all. As a result of this impasse, the status quo remained.  

This was not an isolated instance of the lack of success of African teacher organisations in attempting to gain greater security for their members. Eventually, the financial straits of mission school teachers even caused a number of small African teachers associations which were campaigning against low wages to approach the white South African Teacher's Association for support.

The Government subsidised the salaries of teachers through grants-in-aid on a pound for pound basis, which meant that for every pound paid by the government, the local parent community was expected to make an equivalent contribution. This was not always forthcoming. On occasion, teachers were in the extremely uncomfortable situation of having to attempt to extract the local contribution themselves. This caused friction with the parents who sometimes threatened to withdraw their children. Such threats were taken seriously, for schools with too few pupils were closed by the Education Department, leaving the teacher without a job. In many instances, teachers adopted the only option open to them - to remain short of income.

99. CA NA 706 J.D.Gulwa and T.Mjodi (Committee) to J.H.Bright, ARM, Middledrift 25/10/1905, ARM to CC King Williams Town 13/2/1906, E.Dower NAD to "Sir" 21/3/1906.


101. Section 1 of Act 13 of 1865 set the local contribution at ten shillings for every pound paid by the government as Grants in Aid. CA NA 692 "Amended and additional school regulations, Proclamation". Grants-in-Aid to schools gradually increased from £2-to-£1, and then became to £3-to-£1 in 1918 in accordance with the Coloured Educational Institutions Ordinance of 1918. SGE 1/1768 P.S. Duffett for SGE to Rev. A. W. Phigeland 2/11/1918.

102. SGE 1/612 Herschel Baltzer to SGE 27/5/1907, Weaver to SGE 22/11/1907; SGE 1/800 Worcester Edney to SGE 17/11/1909. In one case, where the local contribution was insufficient,
The inability of African communities to pay their contribution was frequently the result of poverty. Lineage, ethnic and religious conflicts which divided communities also reduced their joint ability to maintain a school and to pay the teacher. Thus inter-denominational rivalry prevented divided communities from opening schools which, ironically, they would have been able to do collectively. It was invariably in this context that the independent church schools were set up. Anti-mission school sentiments were also a factor. Although many rural dwellers still rejected schools, pro-school Africans in locations would offer free education to traditionalist children as an inducement to raise school attendance numbers to meet the qualifications for a Government grant. Thus under certain conditions, pro-school Africans effectively subsidised the children of parents who were indifferent or opposed to western schooling.

The financial vulnerability of the teacher was aggravated by the nature of the local parent contributions which were sometimes paid in kind. Such payments - usually grain or livestock - were not accepted readily, for teachers preferred cash. To add to this confusion, lack of clarity existed in respect to land as a form of remuneration. Some teachers were allocated a garden plot over and above the local parent contribution to their salary. In other cases, the value of the land was deducted as rental from the parent contribution. Arrangements varied from place to place, sometimes causing

the headteacher simply did not pay the assistant teacher. SGE 1/374 Herschel Weaver to SGE 7/10/1902.


confusion and recrimination amongst teachers, headmen, and school managers.105

The tradition of allocating land in the form of a garden lot to teachers contributed to increasing pressure on lands. The opening of new mission schools necessitated the employment of more teachers. This caused the missions to increase their applications to the government for land, because they did not wish to incur the cost of hiring privately owned land for new teachers. Giving evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission, Resident Magistrate Garstin confirmed that many missions were applying for pieces of ground larger than that required for actual church or school buildings, in order to obtain a garden for teachers. He was concerned that increased land allocations to the missions was seriously reducing commonage in the locations of his magistracy.106

5.6 Land Access, Patronage and the Headman

In places where teachers could not be accommodated on mission land they were dependent on the patronage of the headman, which could not always be relied upon, especially if he was ill-disposed towards western education or was opposed to the denominational affiliation of the school in his location. The orientation of the local headman had consequences not only for

105. CA NA 636 B2209 Employment of Native Teacher on farm "Glen Avon" Somerset East; SGE 1/283 Herschel Ellenberger to SGE 26/8/1901; SGE 1/612 Herschel Weaver to SGE 7/10/1902.

106. The complex question of land ownership in the locations and reserves and the administration and policy of the Native Affairs Department, the Agricultural Department and the Surveyor General cannot be pursued here. See: CA NA 692 2700 For correspondence on Glen Grey Act and sites on commonage; CA NA 521 "Mission Land Act, 1901" pamphlet n.d. In the Victoria East division, independent church communities attempted to establish whether they legally possessed titles to land on which their churches were erected, or whether the land was the property of the mission church. SGE 1/664 Victoria East Rein to SGE. Evidence of Garstin,F.C. R.M., SANAC,Vol.2,p.859[11943-53].
the teacher and the school, but for all Christians who were affiliated to churches that he opposed.

The power of the headmen was not based solely on their relationship with the colonial government but "rested on the control they exercised in the allocation of land". By 1880, there were at least 214 headmen in the employ of the Native Affairs Department, most of them linked through lineage to the old Xhosa and Mfengu elites of Cape Nguni society. While they were prepared to co-operate with colonial government departments as long as their control over the land was not threatened, "they did their best to promote their own agricultural interests and those of their friends" (emphasis added).107

Clearly, the headman could wield his power over the land in order to further the financial, religious and educational interests of his wards. The unequal distribution of land in the locations directly affected the opportunity of access to schooling. For example, Africans who were allocated smaller plots or less arable land would be poorer and therefore less able to bear the costs of sending their children to school. Citing the example of a feud between Xhosa Baptists and Mfengu members of the Church of England in Middledrift, where land allocation was used as a weapon to disadvantage opposition ethnic and church factions, Lewis observes; "Where there was a church presence in a location, the disputes often took the

form of clashes between rival church groupings. These conflicts could become particularly intense when church allegiance coincided with Xhosa and Mfengu splits.\textsuperscript{108} 

Where he wished, the headman could also extend patronage by permitting encroachment on commonage, thereby building a powerful support base for the school, church or ethnic group to which he gave allegiance.\textsuperscript{109} It is precisely this process which was so important for the successful diffusion of independent church school activity in the regions under investigation, and contributed to polarisation in the rural locations that will be examined in the case studies.

In addition to his indirect power over the affairs of the school through the allotment of land, the headman could apply his authority to educational matters directly. As far as the Superintendent General of Education was concerned, the headmen were expected to "interest themselves in the support of the schools" and to "use their influence in securing the attendance of children, fair treatment of teachers and payment of fees or contributions".\textsuperscript{110} However, these were not part of the formal duties of headmen as government officers, nor did headmen have the power to compel children to attend school.\textsuperscript{111}

Although certain headmen made no attempt to encourage educational activities in their locations, others operated schools merely to maintain favour with local authorities, as

\textsuperscript{108} Lewis,J.(1985)p.44.

\textsuperscript{109} The headman ruled on access to land for newcomers. If the new mission school teacher fell in this category, and this was often the case, his claim as a foreigner would be less likely to receive as much sympathy as a local claimant. Lewis,J.(1985)pp.42,45; Bundy,C.(1988)pp.79-80,117.

\textsuperscript{110} No instructions were formally issued. SGE 10/8 SGE to Acting U.SNA 15/12/1910.

\textsuperscript{111} SGE 10/5 SGE to CC East London 20/1/1904.
is suggested in a report from the Reverend D. Doig Young of St. Marks:

... one can only conclude that the chief reason for the headman's activity is to be sought for, not in any real desire to have his children educated, but in a hope that by having a school he may find more favour with government, and have a better status in the eyes of the people in general.112

On the other hand, Education Department representatives were on occasion forced to request local government officials such as Resident Magistrates to "bring a little further pressure to bear" on recalcitrant headmen who for their own reasons, operated in opposition to the guidelines of the Education Department or in opposition to recognised mission schools.113

It will become clear in this thesis that school work of both independent churches and mission churches was deeply influenced by the power of the headman, especially in the chapters on the African Presbyterian Church and the Order of Ethiopia schools in Victoria East.

5.7 Mission School Classrooms

The large majority of mission school teachers and students worked under squalid conditions, because the bare essentials were generally all that African communities could muster. Many schools failed to qualify for a grant because the minimum equipment required by the Department was beyond the financial resources of the parents.


113. SGE 1/482 Herschel Acting SGE to RM 13/11/1905. In East London, the local magistrate went so far as to require all headmen to visit all schools in their jurisdiction and report the names of residents who refused to sent their children to school. SGE 10/5 SGE to CC East London 20/1/1903.
School buildings were normally small single-roomed structures made of wattle and daub and sometimes tin sheeting. Larger buildings doubled as classroom and church, although the Department endeavoured to stop this practice. In the Transkei, teachers were permitted to teach in huts rather than square classrooms as a concession to encourage the opening of schools. The Department expected seating accommodation to be supplied for all pupils with desk accommodation for at least half of the class, but it was common for pupils to be seated at an odd assortment of tables while desks were at a premium.

At least one blackboard and easel, one chair, a lock-fast cupboard, a lock-fast box for needlework, a clock and a teacher's table were required for each classroom. Teaching apparatus specified by the Department included "a set of reading sheets corresponding to the primers in use, a ball-frame, a map of the magistracy and Nelson's Wall Atlases Nos. 1 and 2, a modulator and a dozen good school pictures". Very few of the outstation mission schools were able to meet the equipment requirements. Inspector's reports frequently referred to shortfalls in this regard.  

Dr. Roberts of Lovedale remarked on the poor state of so many schools:

In some districts the schools are mere hovels; battered, tattered and creaking shelters, in which are forms without backs, desks without seats, and walls without a single map to hide their dirty monotony. That children play truant from such places I do not wonder. They are better under the blue joyous vault of heaven...

114. In 1900 the SGE gave permission for Chiefs in the Port St. Johns district to erect huts instead of square western structures for school purposes. SGE 10/3 SGE to SNA 1/5/1900; "Equipment of Aborigines Schools" Education Gazette 4(2),(1904)p.13.

There were other problems. Even basic materials were in short supply. Inspectors "not infrequently" referred to the absence of chalk, ink, pens and blotting paper. The inadequate supply of textbooks for which the Department undertook partial subsidies was also a problem. Texts or readers were costly and seldom available in the vernacular. For example, the first approved "Kaffir Grammar" for schools was written by Inspector McLaren only in 1906.

The depressing poverty of educational provision described above was coupled with a powerfully authoritarian pedagogical approach. The method of teaching approved of by inspectors seemed to rely heavily on repetition, rote learning and recitation in the statutory five hours of schooling. Articles in the Education Gazette exhorted teachers to maintain "good discipline" by employing "desk drill", and "marshalling into line" before school. Ensuring order in the

116. "Neglect of Sub-Standards in Native Schools" Education Gazette 7(24),(1907)p.578.

117. The production of textbooks, such as the primers introduced in 1907 especially "suitable for Native schools", was slow. "Sale of Text-Books in Aided Schools" Education Gazette 9(8),(1909)p.169; "Readers for Native Schools" Education Gazette 7(2),(1907)p.22. See also Hunt-Davis, R. (1969) p.265.

118. The previous year, a select Committee suggested a prize to encourage the writing textbook on Agriculture in "Kaffir". [A.1-1908] Report of the Select Committee on Native Education, 1908. Evidence of SGE Muir p.64[361-3].

119. Kelly questions whether "colonial schools were reproductions of metropolitan institutions both in structure and content". Others such as Carnoy argue that colonial schools were simply poorer versions, and that the difference lay in the quality and not in the substance of education. Kelly, G.P., "The Relation Between Colonial and Metropolitan Schools: a Structural Analysis" Comparative Education 15(2),(1979)p.210; Carnoy, M., Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York, McKay, 1974); Wardle, D., English Popular Education 1870-1975 (London, Cambridge University Press, 1976).

120. "Reading and Composition in Native Schools" Education Gazette 16(9),(1916)p.318; "Hours of Instruction in Schools" South African News 15/1/1901.
classroom and "punctuality" were also stressed. That discipline and control were paramount objectives in the Cape Elementary syllabus was recognised by Dr. Roberts of Lovedale:

The code is too mechanical; it turns the teacher into a drill sergeant; it divides the school year into two portions, days when pupils are instructed, days when pupils are inspected. There are few days when pupils are being educated.

A significant amount of time was used in the school day for activities other than those delineated in the syllabus. As it was not uncommon for buildings to be used as church and school, hours were shortened and the pupils were employed in cleaning and preparing the facility for its devotional role. Students also became a source of labour for teachers. They would carry water or perform other menial tasks at school and on the teacher’s private garden lot. The Reverend M. Jameson Letcher of Herschel observed:

It is custom (as I am told) of Native teachers using their scholars during school hours for the purpose of hoeing the teacher’s lands. I find the parents while passively consenting, nevertheless are averse to the practice, and needless to say, I have strongly protested against it.

Although certain teachers came to view the use of student labour as their prerogative, and often justified this practice

121. "Orderly Entrance to School" Education Gazette 6(10),(1906)p.200. Inspector's reports were frequently expressed in the language of rules, routines and regulations.

122. Roberts, Dr.(1904)p.206.

123. Education Gazette 16(7),(1916)p.253. If the church and school were held in the same building, the Department refused to subsidise upkeep or repairs. SGE 1/564 Victoria East Headman Makalima and others to SGE 27/1/1906, Inspector Rein to Secretary Education Department 26/6/1906.

124. SGE 1/283 Herschel Rev. M.J. Letcher to SGE 12/12/1901.
as part of a process of conditioning the children, it was not accepted by all parents. 125

This short section has demonstrated that the pedagogical styles adopted in mission schools tended to be uniformly authoritarian and conservative. It will become evident that this model was also adopted in the independent church schools.

6. Colonial Policy and Popular Demand for Education

Even though the number of students in the mission schools rose from 58,814 to 154,422, and government aid rose from £28,135 to £144,738 between 1890 and 1920, educational provision could not keep up with demand. The school was rapidly becoming part of everyday social life in black communities where more and more resources were being used in the pursuit of education at several levels.

This burgeoning demand was matched by quickening interest in black education among missionaries, settlers, and colonial officials, which produced vigorous debate and divergences of opinion among them on policy for the mission schools. Three distinct areas are of relevance here: higher education, the curriculum and industrial education, and increasing secularisation of control over schooling as the government Education Department began to extended its jurisdiction over syllabi and curricula. 126

6.1 Higher Education

African demand for higher education was a strong feature of this period in which the independent church schools were established. It must be noted that the meaning of "higher

125. SGE 1/995 Malmesbury J. Jawaka to Secretary for Education 16/5/1911

126. These issues feature prominently in the SANAC and the Report of the Select Committee on Native Education, 1908, [A.1-1908].
education" in the period was not always clearly defined. For some Africans with a poor elementary education, it implied some meaningful form of post-elementary education for a trade or for teaching. For others, especially the graduates of institutions like Lovedale "higher education" meant matriculation or university education.

In general, education beyond elementary school was an arena which had long been beyond the reach of African scholars. Few facilities existed to cater for their needs. In the first decade of the twentieth century, only Zonnebloem College and Lovedale offered schooling to the matriculation level for black students. Consequently, the Superintendent General of Education received numbers of applications for permission to introduce schooling at the Std.5 level in the ordinary mission schools.

In the absence of local higher education opportunities, African students had no choice but to enrol for a teacher training course or to seek further education overseas. Between one hundred and four hundred Africans went abroad to higher education institutions, especially in the southern United States, in the decade before Union. It is precisely this fact that worried Cape colonial educators, for they had no control over what sort of education Africans received overseas. As a direct consequence of this concern, the South African Native Affairs Commission recommended a central


128. For example, Revs. I.G. Shishuba and P. Mazwi petitioned desperately, and ultimately unsuccessfully, to be allowed to set up a "Queenstown Higher Mission School" that could offer Std.5. SGE 1/1303 Queenstown Murray to Logie 15/4/1914 and following correspondence. See also; SGE 1/1077 Herschel Secretary of Greves Wesleyan School to SGE 14/8/1912.

institution of higher education which became known as the Inter-State Native College.\textsuperscript{130}

Meanwhile, African aspirations gave impetus to the "Queen Victoria Memorial Scheme", which aimed to set up an independent college of higher education that was conceived under the leadership of Dr. W.B. Rubusana and with the backing of the independent churches.\textsuperscript{131} Pressure from the African-controlled Queen Victoria project finally led to the constitution of the Executive Board of the joint missionary and government sponsored Inter-state College in 1907. The proposed Inter-State Native College aroused much comment - some adverse - from missionaries such as Dr. Henderson of Lovedale, who expressed "surprise" at the demand for higher education.\textsuperscript{132} Resistance among whites to higher education for Africans was often justified by reference to the performance of Africans in higher standards at school. The very low number of Matriculation passes among blacks was cited as a good cause to concentrate only on basic education for Africans:

\begin{quote}
The plain truth is that what the natives have got to give serious attention to is common school education....\textsuperscript{133}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{130} "The Native in Relation to Higher Education" Eastern Province Herald 14/1/1909, "A College for Natives" Cape Times 22/12/1905.

\textsuperscript{131} In 1901 in Kimberley an enthusiastic meeting at the "Native Hall Malay Camp" decided to start a shilling fund for the "Victoria Industrial College". "Well Done Kimberley" South African Spectator 1/6/1901; "The Higher Education of Natives" Christian Express 7/11/1901


\textsuperscript{133} "Proposed Inter-State Native College" Education Gazette 6(19), (1907)p.409; "An Inter-State Native College" Education Gazette 5(17), (1905)p.358.
Despite the opposition of Superintendent General of Education, to the institution, and with meagre support from a grudging Union government, the South African Native College - later Fort Hare - was finally opened in 1915.\textsuperscript{134}

The independent church schools were established just at the time when African desires for higher education were widely expressed. Higher education was a core concern among independent church people, as will become clear in the chapters on the Order of Ethiopia and the African Methodist Episcopal Church.

6.2 Industrial Education

The question of industrial education became important in the period under study, because crucial changes were surfacing in colonial conceptions about what kind of schooling was ‘good’ for blacks.\textsuperscript{135} The provision of a bookish, literary mode of education by the missionaries was overtaken by a new emphasis on “industrial education” for Africans.\textsuperscript{136} According to this


\textsuperscript{135} The problem of industrial education has been little researched. There is a sparse secondary literature on the issue in South Africa. See A.D.Dodd’s 1935 work on “Native” vocational training as an example of thinking in the inter-war years. Kenneth King has drawn the connections with the pan-Africanist movement in East Africa. Dodd, A.D., Native Vocational Training: A Study of Conditions in South Africa, 1652-1936 (Lovedale, Lovedale Press, 1938) King,K.J., Pan Africanism and Education: A Study of Race Philanthropy and Education in the Southern States of America and East Africa (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971)pp.150ff. For a more complete review of mission attitudes, see Paterson,A.N.M., “State and Missions: Contest over Education Policy in the Cape Colony 1890 - 1920”, Education Faculty Seminar, University of Cape Town,(1990).

\textsuperscript{136} The idea of providing industrial education to Africans was mooted in the mid 1800s. Under Cape Governor Sir George Grey, the notion of a prosperous Christian peasantry was actively pursued. A memorandum by a leading metropolitan proponent of industrial education, Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth, had considerable influence on Governor Grey’s implementation
approach, Africans would be taught the manual skills appropriate to their rural agricultural context. Such training was calculated to improve the 'industriousness' or work capacity of Africans, rather than to give them access to appropriate technical skills. In this period, many colonial employers were opposed to the education of Africans because they believed that schooling reduced their willingness and capacity for labour or industry. "Does education diminish industry?" was asked in *Christian Express*.

The strictly labour-orientated nature of vocational training for blacks was unlikely to equip them with the appropriate repertoire of skills to compete with whites as trained tradesmen or artisans. White employers of black labour, in particular farmers and industrialists, thus envisaged a division of skill training which would allow whites to monopolise positions in the labour market which required properly skilled tradesmen, while blacks met needs for cheap unskilled labour.

Many missionaries also subscribed to "industrial" education because they believed that it would be less likely than the former bookish or literary curriculum to break Africans' ties with their 'traditional' context. It was also held to be more suited to African intellectual capabilities and needs, defined in terms of a static conception of an unprogressive traditional society bounded by a white western cultural universe. This vision also had ramifications for agricultural education as it came to be practised in the context of land of industrial education under the Grey Plan at Salem and four other Wesleyan missions, and Lovedale in the 1850's. The aim was to create a settled and industrious peasantry that would work its own land or the land of white farmers and also contribute to social order. This plan was eventually abandoned. Hunt-Davis, R. (1969) pp. 220-224.

segregation. Whites were perceived as progressive, scientific land users and blacks as small scale traditional farmers making marginal use of basic innovations. This justified proposals for an extremely rudimentary agricultural education syllabus. 138 Hunt-Davis observes that the philosophy of industrial education for Africans with its emphasis on "self-help" was comfortably interpreted by influential segregationists such as education policy maker C.T. Loram as "self-segregation, which was thus compatible with their own advocacy of segregation for Africans". 139

As far as many missions were concerned, the new 'industrial' form of education would still conform to their aim of using education to attract blacks to Christianity. The Bishop of Lebombo, in 1904, was unconcerned about the nature of the curriculum. He bluntly expressed the aim of schools as follows:

We have schools simply as baits in order that, if possible, we may turn out Christians ... The primary object of the Christian Church is not to make men carpenters. We must have industries in order to make men Christians... 140

The change in strategy towards "industrial education" in the Cape Colony, which ran concurrently with the new emphasis on vocational education in British working class schools, brought


changes to the content and activities of mission schooling for blacks. The moral value of work, and the intellectual rewards of labour, were both emphasised. For the missionaries, the themes of Christian spiritual, moral and intellectual development were linked through the unifying concept of industrial labour:

A new physical and material environment seems to be required before there is room for the mental life and Christian character to expand and grow. Industrial training, with its lessons of obedience to rule and steady continuance of labour, its gradual demand for mental wakefulness and application of the mind to its tasks, and its reward in the provision for a larger civilisation and more varied and abundant supply for growing desires and needs, becomes in such cases a most valuable instrument and channel of Christian progress, and of the development of a self-respecting and progressive life.

However enthusiastically industrial education policy was espoused in missionary circles, many Africans still desired the classic academic or literary curriculum. For example, Kallaway has demonstrated how resistance by Africans was partly responsible for the foundering of a government

141. Acting Superintendent of Lovedale, Dr. Roberts, expressed himself as follows on the question of manual labour; "We insist on it simply because of the moral value of work." SANAC, Vol. 1, p. 798 [10974-76].


industrial school in Natal between 1886 and 1892. Nevertheless, African reactions to industrial curricula were divided. Certain progressive African Christians embraced the concept of industrial education, for in their eyes industrial education held out the possibility of self-improvement through hard work, and internalising the modern characteristics of European Christian life.

Chapter 5 will show how the African Methodist Episcopal Church members in particular, espoused an education based on principles of industry and manual training that had its origins in the American South. However, it should be emphasised that this vision did not quite accord with the missionary concept of industrial education in respect to skills. Clearly, the independent church school people envisioned genuine skills training as opposed to the mission 'industrial curriculum' which was impoverished in skills and emphasised manual labour.

6.3 Diverse Educational Needs

As the Cape Colonial economy grew and the society became more complex, a variety of educational needs became apparent in African communities. As has been demonstrated, basic elementary schooling, teacher training, secondary education, vocational education and especially higher education were all to varying degrees in short supply. Initially, the only institutions that were able to respond to the multifaceted educational needs of the African population, were the major mission institutions such as Tigerkloof and Lovedale - but only along the lines that missionaries would allow.

Independent church communities began their own independent attempts to meet the multiplicity of black educational needs. For example, at the 1911 Conference of the Ethiopian Church in

South Africa, separate committees met to discuss a variety of educational topics including "Education and Minister's Theological Studies", "Sunday and Day schools", "Public Native Newspapers" and "Theological and General Students (going) to Canada Universities". The larger independent churches began to plan ambitious educational projects and to expand the functions of their elementary institutions. The African Methodist Episcopal Church institutions, Wilberforce in the Transvaal and Bethel in the Cape, were designed to supply a broader spectrum of skills. The crucial difference between the white mission institutions and those of the independent churches was that the former had a firmer financial platform to operate from. In reality the ability of the independent churches to operate large educational institutions was limited. The optimistic plans of the Reverend James Dwane for a large scale educational project in the Eastern Cape will be explored in Chapter 4.

7. Mission Churches and Schools: Control, Segregation and Finance

In the period under review, changes in the governance of the mission churches were becoming apparent, which had direct and indirect consequences for mission schools. Absolute white control in the mission churches was being threatened. As the numbers of African converts swelled the ranks of the mission churches, African priests began to put pressure on the church hierarchies for access to the ministry at higher levels. The key issue to emerge was; how could the churches accommodate African aspirations without endangering white jurisdiction?

The fast growing mission churches faced financial problems as revenues from the metropolitan headquarters were gradually dwindling. The churches also had to contemplate their ever-

diminishing control over the mission schools as the Department of Education intervened more powerfully in educational matters. Outright antagonism to mission education from whites was growing. All these factors influenced policy on the financing, administration and control of mission schools.

7 Mission Church Response to African Christian Constituencies

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the mission churches began to come under settler control, and a colonial ministry slowly developed. This increasingly placed the colonial clergy in control of local mission church policy where, without metropolitan church interference, they were able to implement discriminatory measures in the church, partly in response to racial antagonism from among settler congregations. The gradual surrender of control over South African districts by the metropolitan churches, paralleled the growth of secular colonial self government. The implementation of segregation by the Education Department in the same period suggests that in the late nineteenth century, the Cape Government and the mission Churches were working tacitly towards a racial ordering of Cape society.

The prospect of greater African representation in church structures was a matter of primary political concern to the missionaries. The African threat to white control over the churches led to the many kinds of discriminatory practices which have been referred to in Chapter 1. Such policies contributed directly to the formation of the independent churches and the rise of independent church schools. It is important to observe here that if both the independent churches and their schools were established as a largely political response to missionary discrimination, the independent church schools must also be understood separately as a specific response to mission education policy.

7.2 Mission Policy on African Responsibility in Church and School

As has been noted, the problem of 'race relations' or how white and black Christians would be accommodated in the churches, constituted a major financial and administrative problem. The separation of financial and clerical responsibility was strategic to resolving the crisis. Restrictions on African participation in church and school administration were justified by racist arguments that were gaining status in the missionary discourse. Racist theories justified the exclusion of Africans from decision-making on matters of policy, and from access to positions of responsibility in the churches and the schools. Visible evidence of the maintenance of white control in the mission churches could be found at church conferences where African representation was minimal. An African Methodist minister, the Reverend Kakaza, reflected bitterly on this issue after the Methodist conference in 1902:

The Conference possesses both legislative and executive powers over the Church. In this Church the Africans are the majority and the Europeans the minority. But at Conference the tables are overturned. The Europeans form an overwhelming majority and the Africans an insignificant minority. We almost see the spectacle of taxation without adequate representation.

The racial divide in the mission churches was also revealed through the creation of "missions" for black congregations and "parishes" where the congregation was white. The impossibility of equality between the races was powerfully


expressed by Anglican Bishop Baynes in 1905. "Equality!" wrote Baynes:

What equality can there be when the Native is just emerging from barbarism and the Englishman is the heir of a thousand years of Christian civilisation. They are not and they cannot be equals ... Not equality, as it seems to me, but brotherhood, is the Christian ideal. 151

The hierarchical ordering of Christendom assumed in this statement had implications for the ways in which missionaries treated blacks in the church. 152 Restricting blacks to subordinate positions was justified by the Reverend Dieterlen on the basis of race at the Second General Missionary Conference in 1905:

We therefore do not speak of a sort of compromise between the European missionary and the Native catechist, nor of a non-commissioned officer mixing with common soldiers and not with commissioned officers ... Again we say: a Native minister who is and will remain a Native, a black man; not a copy or an imitation of the white minister, but a true Native, one proud of his colour, his nationality and his race, and enjoying the privileges of being a Native who understands the Natives... 153

Social Darwinists influences in the missionary discourse are revealed in references to the "child races" which conveniently


legitimated paternalistic white control in the churches. Ultimately African teachers in the mission schools were no less affected than African priests, although conflict over authority in the Church has received more attention than conflict for control over the mission schools.

7.3 Finance of Colonial Mission Schooling

The mission churches were becoming more dependent on local funding and grants because metropolitan revenues were diminishing. Reduced funding from the European head quarters of the church and mission societies was noted as early as 1879 by the Reverend C. Taberer of Keiskamma Hoek. In response to the Education Commission of that year he cited "the tendency in missionary societies at home for the past few years to withdraw their grants from the older mission stations in favour of new work in more distant regions (of the world)" as a reason for lower mission spending on education. By far the largest capital drain on mission resources was education. Consequently, the churches began to compete more fiercely for Grants-in-Aid from the Education Department. They also sought other ways to relieve the financial pressures.

The most obvious solution for budgetary difficulties was to split the financial affairs of the mission churches along racial grounds. Such an alternative was justified on the grounds that Africans should learn self sufficiency. The Anglican Reverend Father Fuller presented this argument before the Second Missionary Conference in 1906:

I am committed that no Native salary ought to be paid with European money ... to do so is to undermine the strength and sense


of responsibility which are needed in the development of any human character. There must be some definite relation between the payments of a congregation and the salary of their native teacher or evangelist. 156 The implication of such a policy was that African teachers at mission church schools would have to depend on the local African community for their wages. In addition, it was argued that Africans should be paid less than white churchmen and that "native" salaries should be paid on a "native" scale. 157

Separating the finances of black and white congregations was to have an unavoidably retrogressive effect on the schooling of African children. Although the government was committed to paying a proportion of teachers' salaries through grants-in-aid, the mission churches had effectively shifted the local financial burden onto African communities themselves.

8. Mission Schooling: Secularisation and Local Contest for Control

By the turn of the century, the government began to intervene directly in the affairs of the mission schools. Increased financial commitments provided the base from which the Education Department could dictate policy. Mission schools were in effect being brought under secular control. The process of secularisation in black schools of the Cape Colony was slow, 158 not only because of the entrenched authority of the missionaries in schools but also because the administrative and bureaucratic network of the Education Department unfolded gradually.


158. The process was not strictly complete until total government control was enforced with Bantu Education in 1953.
In order to clarify this context, the following sections will first recount how the missions responded to increasing government intervention. Then the difficulties faced by the Department of Education in imposing its authority will be examined with respect to severe competition over government grants which developed in the unplanned mission school system between neighbouring schools of different denominations. Thereafter the largely recognised tradition of African leadership in the schools will be discussed in relation to non-denominational or independent African schools.

8.1 The Colonial Government and the Mission Schools: Changing Patterns of Authority

Essentially, the secularisation of the mission school system occurred simultaneously on two levels, namely the secularisation of control over the schools and the secularisation of the content of mission schooling. The secularisation of control will be briefly described.

The gradual shift from mission to government control was paralleled by a movement from autonomous local mission control towards centralised bureaucratic control over schools. However, the shift from church to government authority was a slow and uneven process because the mission school system was remarkably diverse and uncoordinated, and the Education Department's hierarchy was particularly insubstantial at the level of the inspectorate. On the edges of the slowly

159. The missionaries' concern with religious education is reflected in reports such as one on "Religious Education in South Africa" to the International Missionary Council. MS 7513b "The Aims and Difficulties Encountered by Missionaries in Native Education" n.d.

160. Beidelman has observed that many writers portray the missionaries in one homogeneous category. This chapter does not suggest that the missions were strictly uniform in their attitudes to educating Africans or in their response to the government involvement in education. Beidelman, T.O., Colonial Evangelism (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982)p.11.
developing Cape 'system' of education, opportunities were left open for African school teachers, principals, parents and managers to exploit. It is precisely in this context that the independent church schools were able to survive and grow.

8.1.1 Mission Response to Increased Government Control in the Schools

Through the simultaneous development of financial, administrative, bureaucratic and inspection processes, the Education Department was extending its authority in practice over mission schools which had hitherto been relatively autonomous. The Cape Education Department was more powerfully asserting its policy over a system of schools which previously had operated loosely within a Christian mission ethos. For their part, the missionaries were forced to deal with the dilution of their influence in a number of ways.

Many missionaries were ambivalent about their changing status. They had perceived themselves as sympathetic 'friends of the natives', protecting Africans from the depredations of the colonial authorities. Now they were being forced into an uneasy alliance with government, and the arrival of government inspectors at the mission schools was considered a tangible irritation and infringement on their independence.

At the local level, missionaries were experiencing some trouble exercising what they believed to be their legitimate rights to decision making in the affairs of the schools. The loyalties of the mission teachers towards their religious orders began to wane, because they were being paid partly by the Education Department and partly by the mission churches. Gradually the teachers began to perceive themselves as government servants, and to resent the incursion of missionary

superintendents of the schools. 162 This was no more strongly felt than in the Catholic schools:

> It is said that native Government-paid teachers are beginning to resent the entrance of Clergy into their schools. This, if true, should be stamped on. Our teachers should remember that they are, first of all Catholic Churchmen who have received a free and expensive education on purpose that God may be glorified in all their works. 163

In response to what they felt to be intrusive action in their schools on the part of Education Department personnel, a group of Wesleyan representatives petitioned the Colonial Secretary in 1907 to intercede on behalf of the mission churches, but to no avail. 164

Others actively called for co-operation, having recognised that mission schooling was badly affected by inefficiency and lack of co-ordination. In 1911, closer co-operation was urged in the *South African Church Quarterly Review*. "Every opportunity should be taken of State aid and supervision," wrote Anglican the Reverend W.M. Mercer:

> Our teachers should be impressed with the fact that we are working together and not in opposition. We should view the State as Christian, quite as intent as we ourselves are in its duty of raising the degraded and ignorant to higher things.... We should also welcome Government supervision as an aid to efficiency." 165

Certain missionaries understood the strategic need to engage in a partnership with the government Education Department before their influence in the schools was extinguished. At


164. "Educational Dilemma" *Cape Mercury* 13/6/1907.

165. Mercer, W.M. (1911)p.94.
the Second South African General Missionary Conference, Berlin Missionary, Reverend O. Krause, argued that the tasks of the government and of the missions could only be achieved jointly:

The State must get the nation subject to the King, the Mission must get the nations subject not only to earthly kings, but to the King of Kings. The one does not exclude the other. We must work together. 166

Mindful of their diminishing executive influence, some missionaries began to offer their services as advisors to the Education Department. Many believed themselves to be uniquely qualified due to their "rich fund of experience" in the educational field. This view is clearly expressed in a resolution of the Second General Missionary Conference in 1906, which read:

That considering the existing systems of Native Education have grown up in the hands of the Missionaries, and considering the intimacy of the Missionaries with Native life and thought, the Conference bring before the Governments of the Colonies the desirability of forming an advisory Board on Native Education with Missionary representation. 167

The idea behind this motion was clearly to institutionalise missionary influence in formally established Education Departmental structures. 168 In this way the missions hoped


168. Although the missions could not afford to offer funds, it was proposed that they should have representation on the Governing Council of the proposed Inter-State College. The Rev. Steinmann argued that a joint board of the missions and
to continue to influence the direction of black education without further cost to themselves.

Meanwhile, government involvement in the schools increased slowly because the mission school system was extremely diverse and geographically dispersed as a consequence of years of growth virtually without coordination.

8.1.2 Development of Department of Education Structures

Essentially, the Superintendent General of Education, Muir, was able to extend his influence over the mission schools in two ways, by building up his bureaucratic infrastructure in the Cape Town headquarters and by establishing a greater presence in the schools through an expanded inspectorate. The growth of Education Department infrastructures is evident in its development from two branches in 1892, to ten branches in 1905. Expenditures on establishing Departmental jurisdiction in the schools rose dramatically. Allocation of funds to central office administration rose from just below £5,000 in 1895 to £15,000 in 1920, while inspection costs climbed from £12,500 in 1895 to about £45,000 in 1920.169

Although Muir knew that the inspectorate was the primary instrument in asserting the will of the Education Department he was unable to increase the ratio of inspectors to schools. While the number of inspectors increased from 14 in 1892 to 38 in 1915, the number of schools had also increased from 1,871 to 4,598 over the same period. Consequently the greater size of the inspectorate had only marginally reduced the average workload of schools per inspector from 133 to 121. In a school year of about 200 days, this left inspectors approximately one and one half days per school including travelling time.170

churches be appointed to draw up a new curriculum for "Native schools". Steinmann, Rev.S.,(1906)pp.79-91.

The officers in the Cape Colony were overworked, sometimes covering huge areas on horseback or cart. In the North West Cape circuit, one inspector lost three horses which died through "over pressure" in a single tour of duty.\textsuperscript{171} Visits were infrequent, cursory and brief. In 1908, the Reverend S.P. Sihlali, Congregational minister and superintendent of schools in Engcobo and St.Marks, heavily criticised the annual visits observing that pupils in the schools were oriented to do work at the time of inspection "in order to meet the eye of the inspector, instead of doing their regular work".\textsuperscript{172} Serious discontent was expressed over the inspector's sole right to promote the students, but the Superintendent General of Education would not allow teachers to control promotions.\textsuperscript{173}

In the absence of regular contact with representatives of the Department, various attempts were made to standardise practices in the mission schools. The production of a handbook for the "guidance of managers and teachers of schools" was the first step in this direction.\textsuperscript{174} Regular publication of the Education Gazette from 1901 onwards was eventually followed by the distribution of this journal to all teachers in "Native Mission Schools" for their information.\textsuperscript{175} The Department also


\textsuperscript{174} Cape Colony, Public Education, Department of, \textit{Education Manual for the Guidance of Managers and Teachers of Schools} (Cape Town, Richards, 1892).

\textsuperscript{175} Even so, by 1913 inspectors were finding regularly that teachers were not receiving the \textit{Gazette}. "Native Mission Schools" \textit{Education Gazette} 13(30),(1913)p.144.
depended heavily on missionary management for regularising procedures. For example, when the Department requested greater accuracy in the quarterly returns of attendance, "Missionary Superintendents" were urged to insist on the regular maintenance of registers by teachers.176

8.1.3 Disputes over Mission School Management

In the absence of regular and frequent visits from Departmental representatives, the authority vested in the missionary managers caused problems. Frequent clashes between teachers and management eventually came to the attention of the Superintendent General of Education, who underestimated the severity of the conflicts. Assuming that frictions had arisen "merely through misunderstanding as to the sphere of duty belonging to each", he drafted some "suggestions" regarding school management in 1900. The Department was however forced to admit that a set of simple regulations could not condense the complex variety of duties, functions and situations that confronted teachers and managers. The only recourse was to exhort mission school personnel to loyally serve the welfare of their institutions:

It is of course impossible to lay down definite and full instructions on such a matter; for the thoughtful man, be he manager or teacher, one general rule may be ample - Work together loyally for the school's welfare.177

In the event of any controversy, the lack of a clear set of instructions placed the advantage in the favour of white mission correspondents. Yet, there is evidence - to be discussed later - that the administration of mission schools

was far more open to contestation by Africans than has been recognised in the literature.

Another significant consequence of the lack of direct departmental supervision was that in the smaller outstation schools the teacher enjoyed considerable autonomy. Although the large mission institutions like Lovedale or Healdtown had between 300 and 600 students on their roll in 1910, the average mission school size was 56 students, with perhaps two teachers. The small school size suggests that the mission school pattern entailed the multiplication of many little schools. The size and relative isolation of these schools placed a greater emphasis on the teacher. For reasons that were not always apparent from the evidence, teachers took advantage of the lack of supervision by changing the timetable, choosing not to teach subjects in the curriculum such as religious instruction, drill, singing, and needlework, and even curtailed school hours.

8.2 Development of Mission Schooling and Competition for Grants-in-Aid

The geographical spread of schooling was directly conditioned by the original patterns of mission society expansion in the Cape, which began independent of centralised government or unified mission jurisdiction. The establishment of ‘parent’ mission stations of various denominations was followed by the diffusion of outstations and outstation schools into surrounding regions. Patterns of school placement by missionaries appeared to be less a function of planning, than a matter of haphazardly locating schools within a reasonable

travelling distance from the 'parent' mission station. Over and above this, African lay preachers and teachers created new schools on their own initiative. Pells describes the situation as follows:

At outstations unqualified native assistants were in charge of so-called schools with the nearest missionary some days' journey away. Nobody, except perhaps the missionary, had any idea of what they did. 181

This period of uncoordinated expansion led to an uneven pattern of school establishment. As a result, different denominations could set up in close proximity to each other's schools. Serious rivalry began with the inception of the system of government grants because schools that were close together ended up competing for the same grant. 182 The mission schools depended on these grants especially for teacher salaries. Losing a grant often meant the closure of the school. The core problem was that grants were made on the basis of student numbers. If two opposing schools were too near to each other, they were effectively competing for the same group of potential students. Allegations of unfair practices such as undercutting of fees and poaching of pupils were common.

Such severe infighting was symptomatic of the shortage of money in the mission system in general. Eventually the situation became so serious that a deputation of representatives from various denominations met with the Colonial Secretary T.L. Graham over the shortage of funds for mission schools in 1901, without real success. 183

181. Pells, E.G. (1938) p. 76.

182. At Uitvlugt Location, there were at one stage eight contending applications for grants. SGE 10/4 Muir to SNA 4/9/1901. See also: SGE 1/1224 Qumbu Mears to Dr. Muir 11/11/1913; SGE 1/818 Port Elizabeth Inspector Milne to SGE 8/5/1909; SGE 7/5 SGE to Inspector Spurway 17/11/1904; SGE 1/450 Wodehouse Rev. J. Jolobe to SGE 15/6/1904.

Certain missionaries tried to 'cheat' the system of teacher grants by requiring teachers to act as preachers and carry out other religious duties in addition to their educational ones. The Superintendent General of Education spoke of the "fighting churches". In regard to the issue of grants he observed that:

... mission schools for natives often owe their origin more to ecclesiastical rivalry than to educational zeal. Some of the missions are more zealous in starting schools and securing the government grants than in superintending the work of the native teachers and attending to the wants of the school generally.

Department inspectors and administrators were frustrated by the uneven system that had developed, and the language of conservation of resources, rational planning, and organisational logic was used increasingly by officials. Many solutions to the problem were proposed. Soon after Union, the Department was encouraging managers of schools - where two or more were operating in one centre - to negotiate agreements in regard to fees; "for the better management and control of school attendance and school fees". Inspector Bond who seemed to be articulating the views of a number of his colleagues, wanted "ill-placed" schools to be phased out, and proposed the creation of a planned system of larger, better organised central schools supported by a series of carefully


positioned smaller schools. This proposal did not go far towards solving the problem.

The only measure implemented with any conviction or success was the 'rule' that no new mission school was allowed to be set up within a radius of three miles of an existing one. According to this rule, black Christian communities wishing to set up new schools were told to do so in places where there were no other schools. This rule appeared to be technically simple and easy to implement, yet it posed several problems. It obviously favoured pre-existing schools, which automatically advantaged the older white mission churches since they had long established schools in most heavily populated areas. Because the rule effectively consolidated mission church jurisdiction over students, there were increased calls for non-denominational schools to avoid Christian mission dominance.

The 'three mile rule' was considered by the Department to be an effective and unbiased defence against African demands for more schools when others already existed. Any efforts to open new schools in opposition to those already established were considered to be motivated by irrelevant local quarrels and traditional rivalries. In 1905, the situation was described by Inspector Bond as follows:

Hitherto no definite plan of expansion seems to have been pursued, with the result that small and ill-controlled schools are often to be found within less than three miles of one another, having no better reason for existence than the rivalry of adjacent locations, or the

188. "Native Schools and Education" Education Gazette 6(31),(1907)p.792. This approach was favoured by other Inspectors.

189. This 'rule' was not included in official education statutes. SGE 2/95 Inspector McLaren to SGE 19/11/1901.

It is interesting that Inspector Bond should dismissively attribute the clashes over schools to squabbles between adjoining locations or to irrational "native" religious ambition. As early as 1869, the Superintendent General of Education Langham Dale had observed that rivalries between African mission congregations gave rise "especially in smaller towns and villages to a constant struggle between the dominant section and the minority". Neither of these men considered that such disputes were symptomatic of a scarcity of resources, or that they were a response to the lack of access to schooling. In effect, the rule contributed to competition and denominational cleavages in African communities.

The 'three mile rule' also ignored any assumption that Africans should have a choice over which school they wished their children to attend. It implied that whatever education was provided for Africans was good enough, irrespective of which mission denomination was offering it. This denied the fact that African communities were divided along denominational lines, and ignored the motives of the African independent churches which were specifically established to escape white mission control. In practice this meant that if, for instance, the nearest school was Presbyterian, independent church parents would be forced to send their children to that school.

There was one loophole in the provision; the rule could not prevent the establishment of an unaided school. If the unaided school were to enrol students in sufficient numbers it could eventually qualify for a grant. This usually involved drawing off the students from the roll of the pre-existing school in

191. "Native Schools and Education" Education Gazette 6(31),(1907)p.792.
large enough numbers so that its attendance dropped below the level permitted by the Department to qualify for a grant.\textsuperscript{193} The Superintendent General of Education sharply attacked the independent churches for using this ploy, arguing that they deliberately encouraged schism in order to achieve their own ends. He did not realise that the structure of the regulations made this the only strategy open to independent church school people.

It is against this background of denominational in-fighting over access to funds that the independent church schools had to survive. The case studies will show that certain independent church groups were able to manipulate this system to their own benefit.

8.3 The Challenge to Missionary Dominance in the Schools

In this section, the common but erroneous supposition that missionaries totally dominated the education of Africans in the Cape Colony will be challenged. It is clear from Education Department policy that the responsible white missionary was supposed to maintain direct supervisory control over his schools and that the community should have little or no voice in its operation.\textsuperscript{194} Most missionaries appeared to subscribe to this position, as did the Reverend E. Jacottet of the Paris Evangelical Mission, Morija, who urged at the First General Missionary Conference in 1904, that African churchmen should not be given positions of administrative authority such as superintendencies of schools:

\begin{quote}
The native ministers should have all the ministerial rights of the European missionaries. But their administrative
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{193} The minimum attendance that qualified a school for a grant was 20. Below this number the school lost its grant. SGE 1/644 Victoria East SGE to Rev. H. Mama 14/4/06; Evidence of Muir,T. SGE, \textit{SANAC},Vol.2,p.151[1832].

position needs not to be the same in the transition stage we are in now.195

In reality however, the situation was often quite different. The missionaries were often chronically over-committed because they usually had a number of schools spread over a wide area to administer, in addition to other duties. Seldom was it physically possible for the missionary to fulfill all his responsibilities adequately. On this issue, Dr. Muir, admitted with masterly understatement that "it was a little difficult to see sometimes" how the missionary superintendent managed.196 Consequently, the actual running of outstation schools often devolved unofficially onto senior teachers, the headmaster or even a manager.

There was also a small but substantial tradition of government recognised African control in the mission schools of the Methodist, Congregational and Presbyterian churches. By the turn of the century, eminent black mission Christians such as the Reverends. W.Rubusana (East London), E.Makiwane (Fort Beaufort), S.P.Sihlali (Engcobo), and others were installed as African mission school superintendents in the Cape Colony and Transkei. In 1911, a Reverend P. Mpinda controlled 34 schools with a student population of 2,029 in the Mount Currie and Umzimkulu districts of the Transkeian Territories. By 1913, there were 28 African missionary superintendents controlling nearly 200 mission schools in the Transkeian Territories.197

195. The rest of the "proposition" referred obliquely to the eventual removal of the missionary from the 'native' church. "The essential difference between the missionary which is the transient element in the church, and the native minister, which is a permanent element in it, ought to be fully recognised". Jacottet,Rev.E., "Native Churches and their Organisation" In: Missionary Conference, First General, Report of the proceedings (Johannesburg, Argus Printing Co, 1904)p.133.

196. [A.1-1908] Evidence of Muir, T. SGE, pp.21[133],66[375].

197. The Methodist church used the most African school superintendents, followed by the Presbyterians. [A.1-1908] Evidence of Rev.S.P.Sihlali pp.113-162, Evidence of Rev.W.B.Rubusana pp.219-246; "Missionary Superintendents" Education Gazette 11(13),(1911)pp.608-609. There is also some
It was not uncommon for African Christians who had formerly been given positions in the mission churches and schools to break away and use the very skills that they had learned against their former church.\textsuperscript{198}

Besides the limited concessions made in favour of African control of schools by the colonial government departments, there is evidence that Africans were asserting themselves in decision-making on school issues in other ways. This occurred at different levels in the chain of authority of mission schools. The missionary was usually "correspondent" - the term used to describe the person in communication with the department. It was usually assumed that the correspondent was also the "superintendent" or manager of the school, but in small schools, the head teacher or even ordinary teachers were sometimes delegated the work or assumed the responsibility by default.

The Department was unwilling to specify the relationship between management and mission school teachers, as long as the required hours of secular instruction were given.\textsuperscript{199} Such a policy which left decision-making to the discretion of the missionary superintendent or correspondent naturally consolidated much power in his hands. The power of the correspondent to hire and fire teachers was a major tool of control until the Consolidated Education Ordinance protected African teachers in mission schools from arbitrary dismissal in 1921.\textsuperscript{200}


\textsuperscript{199} SGE 1/374 Herschel H.L.Phooko to SGE 9/9/1903.

\textsuperscript{200} Pells,E.G.(1938)p.131.
Nevertheless the entrance of Africans to positions of influence over the affairs of the school could be made at several points. Briefly these were: as an ordained African minister of a white mission church acting as correspondent of the school, as an African missionary, or as a teacher who had received the responsibility by default; or as a committee of parents contesting for access to decision making. The idea that parents should be involved in making decisions about the mission schools was gaining currency. Before Union, African school committees were operating in a number of areas of the Cape. A teachers' convention at Debe Nek, near King William's Town, resolved that committees should be elected to run African schools "in conjunction with the missionary".201 There was one other option - to set up an independent school.

8.4 Independent Schools

The monopoly that the missions exercised over black education was strongly resented by Africans, and there were frequent calls for public undenominational schools. Blacks wanted to know why the tax revenues were being used to sponsor mission schools over which they had no control.202 Government funded Undenominational Public Schools - like those for whites - were desired because this involved the statutory establishment of a committee which would enable local communities to take control of the general administration of the school and circumvent missionary jurisdiction.203

201. [A.1-1908] Report of the Select Committee on Native Education, 1908. Evidence of Muir,T., SGE, p.21[133]; SGE 1/497 Vryburg Chief, headmen, church deacons and councillors, Manthe to SGE 14/4/1903; SGE 1/658 Tsolo Andries Mpako (Headman) and others to SGE 9/2/1907.


203. The strategy of undenominationalism was to get management away from the missionary. Such calls were resisted by the mission churches. SGE 1/818 Port Elizabeth Milne to SGE 1/5/1909, Milne to SGE 8/5/1909; "Undenominational Schools Among Natives" Christian Express 1/11/1900, "Equal Facilities
Although he considered African controlled schools on a non-denominational basis "quite reasonable from the point of view of abstract justice", the Superintendent General of Education was sceptical about the capabilities of Africans, and expressed doubts about each school having "a body of natives knowing really sufficient about the management of a school to take up the required duty". He believed that such committees were not feasible, "in the present state of advancement of the native"; a statement which clearly reflected his racist mindset.\textsuperscript{204} Evidence suggests that most if not all attempts to establish Public Undenominational Schools by black communities failed to gain the approval of the Superintendent General of Education.\textsuperscript{205}

The three classes of Undenominational Public schools - A1, A2 and A3 - received the most generous government funding, but they required levels of financial support which were beyond the means of black communities in the Colony and therefore

\textsuperscript{204} [A.1-1908] Report of the Select Committee on Native Education, 1908. Evidence of Rev. Sihlali, p.149[1001].

\textsuperscript{205} From limited regional surveys of correspondence in the SGE series, evidence seems to point to a substantial number unsuccessful attempts to set up Public Undenominational Schools. SGE 1/1170 Kimberley Satchel to SGE 10/3/1913, Murray to Mohapanele 21/3/1913. In Victoria West for example, M.N.Galela attempted to qualify for a grant for "The South African Undenominational Public Native Enterprise Reforming School" in 1904-5. Concurrently, his competitors, Charles Kosi, Joseph Jantjes and others formed a school committee and held meetings of the sub-guarantors for the establishment of a Third Class Public Undenominational School in the Victoria West Native Location. These applications were made despite the fact that there was already a DRC mission school in the same location. Inspector Russell presented unsympathetic reports on the applications, arguing that access to school was "more urgently required for the 'Poor White' class than for the Natives". SGE 1/448 Victoria West "Report on the School in the Kaffir Location Conducted by Mr. Solomon Makunga" Deputy Inspector Russell to SGE 5/5/1904; SGE 1/448 Victoria West General Correspondence.
became the exclusive preserve of white school boards. The only other option was for black school communities to establish "Class B", or "Mission Schools", with less stringent requirements and accordingly lower government subsidies.

At the turn of the century, the establishment of "private" mission schools by Africans in the Cape Colony became a matter of concern to missionaries and the school inspectors, while the committee of the South African Native Affairs Commission showed interest in "independent schools supported entirely by natives in the Colony".206 But the Education Department was powerless to "interfere with the course adopted by such teachers in setting up private schools on their own account".207 The costs to African communities of maintaining a private school on a long-term basis were prohibitive. The Superintendent General of Education knew that such schools would have to apply for a grant from the Department as a mission school or fail.

The Cape Education Department’s requirements for setting up mission schools were often too stringent for such enterprises to succeed. First, although government recognition of the church was not a prerequisite for funding, there had to be a "guarantee otherwise of efficient management".208 Second, the three mile 'rule' was usually invoked. Third, school facilities had to conform to certain standards. Although the Inspectors often lowered their requirements, even providing acceptable classroom accommodation was a hurdle for black communities because the Education Department did not fund the

206. SGE 1/430 Douglas S.H. Mbualiwa to SGE 13/12/1904; SGE 10/3 No.113 SGE to Bennie n.d.; Question put to Sauer, Hon. H.W., SANAC, Vol. 4, p. 918[45048].

207. SGE 1/430 Herbert SGE to Mbulewa 29/12/1904.

208. SGE 7/6 SGE to Satchel 14/6/1907. A few attempts were made to set up Undenominational Public Schools, but this was even more of a financial drain on the community as such schools demanded a heavier financial commitment than Mission schools.
construction of classrooms in the mission school category. Fourth, independent schools were obliged to find 'acceptable' lay persons to act as their correspondents and superintendents.

There was no "rule for general acceptance" and the Superintendent General of Education stated that each case would be treated "on its own merits". However, the Education Department invariably communicated with local mission school correspondents in order to gain information on independent school applications and on the characters of the independent church leaders. The Departmental officials regularly took the evidence of missionaries at face value. The reports on independent church schools were seldom favourable as missionaries were generally perturbed by the incursion of any school into what they considered their exclusive arena.

A common pattern among new independent church schools was to establish in close proximity to the mission schools from which they had recently seceded. Under such circumstances mission reports were less than complimentary. Independent church candidates for school correspondent or superintendent simply did not receive the necessary good references from alienated white missionaries. In such a hostile environment, independent church leaders made every possible use of their resources to gain recognition. As the case studies will show, this included soliciting support from local politicians.


210. SGE 7/5 SGE to Inspector Hofmeyr 20/7/1904.

211. Dr. Rubusana who was an MPC in 1911 supported the Reverend S. Vuso of the Ethiopian Church. Although Rubusana approached the Superintendent General of Education on behalf of the Church school, his intercession was insufficient for the Ethiopian church and schools to be granted recognition. SGE 1/980 Glen Grey SGE to Logie 10/4/1911.
For the independent churches the selection of school correspondent or superintendent was a major problem. The Reverend P. Mzimba who founded the independent African Presbyterian Church was a former Lovedale Minister and mission school superintendent with recognition from the Superintendent General of Education before he seceded. Yet after the secession in 1898 he was no longer considered acceptable. The Reverend Rubusana's observation that "(Black) people can't start public schools because they are dependent on missionaries" was clearly demonstrated. Chapters 3 and 4 will trace the African Presbyterian Church and Order of Ethiopia's struggle to find intermediaries acceptable to the Department in order to gain acceptance and funding.

This chapter has shown that black school communities had little or no control over the development of mission education at the territorial level. Nevertheless it has demonstrated that conditions pertaining in the Cape Colony between 1890 and 1920 provided the opportunity for black people to shape schooling at the local level. The uneven development of Education Department structures and the steady secularisation of educational decision-making provided independent church representatives with some room to manoeuvre. Sometimes conditions advantaged those exploiting their freedom at the periphery, and at other times they favoured those seeking to incorporate mission and independent schools in the expanding government 'system'.

In the period under review, a disparate and uncoordinated set of schools controlled by a number of competing agencies was slowly metamorphosing into a centralised education system, through processes of 'negotiation, conciliation, concession

and coercion". 213 This work will therefore indirectly reflect as much on the emergence of a 'system' of education as on the historical question of educational 'resistance'. Through identifying the links between micro educational processes in the case studies and macro system development, it should contribute to our understanding of the dialectical interplay between volition at the periphery and imposition from the centre. The case-studies that follow will trace how in the process of negotiating the terms of their schools' survival, the independent church school communities contested missionary ascendency, but were in the long run inexorably compelled to surrender to incorporation. 214


CHAPTER THREE

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGE: THE INDEPENDENT AFRICAN PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH SCHOOLS IN VICTORIA EAST, 1898-1912

1. Introduction

In 1898, the Reverend Pambani Mzimba, a prominent African minister in the Presbyterian Free Church of Scotland (UFC) seceded to form the breakaway African Presbyterian Church (APC). This presented a major challenge to the Lovedale Congregation which was Mzimba's former parish. The new APC contested UFC dominance over the mission schools in the magisterial division of Victoria East which were all controlled from the Lovedale Mission Institution, situated at Alice. By early 1906, control of schools in the district was almost even; the UFC had command over eight and the APC seven schools. A gruelling struggle for power ensued over the next decade. This chapter seeks to analyse the impetus of APC resistance to mission hegemony in the schools.

In the effort to establish and maintain control over its own schools in Victoria East, Mzimba's APC had much to contend with. First, the missionary who controlled the UFC schools, the Reverend D.D. Stormont, was determined to destroy the APC educational initiatives because they directly threatened his own schools and church. Second, the Education Department's local Inspector of Schools for the division, T.W. Rein, was vehemently opposed to dissident schools which he denounced as politically dangerous. The structures of control in the mission education system which have been sketched in Chapter 2 permitted both Rein and Stormont to exercise considerable influence over the decisions that were made by the Superintendent General of Education, Dr. Muir, in respect to the APC schools. After negotiating with colonial representatives, the APC leadership entered into agreements which brought both positive and negative outcomes for its dissident schools.
Third, the APC communities could not afford to maintain schools independently so government grants were eventually obtained, but this entailed acceptance of secular white supervision. Having overthrown white mission control, the APC was obliged to nominate the Inspector of Native Locations, Mr J.B. Liefeldt, as manager and correspondent. This relationship proved problematic because Liefeldt was bent on exerting his own brand of authority over the schools. Finally, Mzimba's people had to contend with UFC loyalist churchmen such as the Reverends Elijah Makiwane and Holford Mama, whose tactics enabled them to regain control over certain of the contested schools. The contrasting careers of Makiwane and Mzimba, and their differing actions and attitudes towards the church and education, disclosed a cleavage within the educated African elite in the crucial years between 1890 and 1920.

An important theme in this account of the APC schooling initiative is the interpenetration of economic, political and educational interests in the rural locations. The Reverend Mzimba's schools were animated by tensions which arose not only from educational concerns, but from the deteriorating economic fortunes of the African peasantry who became susceptible to mobilisation along ethnic and religious lines by the educated elite. Prominent local headmen and allies of Mzimba were able to sustain the development of the APC and its schools because of their support base in the locations. In the initial stages, rivalry between the two camps was so fierce that violence seemed imminent. Open animosity between the APC and UFC factions lead to the burning of a UFC manse and to significant increases in applications for gun licences.

It is necessary to place this history of the APC schools in its social and political context. Accordingly, the first section will describe the pattern of economic decline in the region which sorely affected households and split communities, bringing them into competition with each other over resources such as land and education. Then, changes in African political life in the Eastern Cape which involved the independent
churches will be delineated. The rise of the independent churches created a schism in African religious and political life that was exemplified in the divergent careers of the Revs. Mzimba and Makiwane.

Events precipitating the secession, and the early development of the APC in and beyond the magistracy of Victoria East are briefly presented before turning to the schools. This history of the APC schools then unfolds in four phases. The first phase begins in 1898 by depicting Mzimba’s early work while he was still affiliated to the UFC, and ends with the secession in 1899. The next phase between 1900 and 1903 reveals the growing spread of APC dissident schooling without grants-in-aid, and the first unsuccessful applications for recognition from the Education Department. In this period, strenuous attempts were made by the UFC to sabotage the Mzimba-ite schools. The year 1904 heralded a new phase, when the APC managed to negotiate an agreement with the Department of Education over supervision of their schools by the local Inspector of Native Locations, Liefeldt, and were accorded recognition and funding. Shortly thereafter, problems were experienced with Liefeldt, whose control began to erode. Another blow to the independence of the APC endeavour came midway through this period when a number of APC and UFC schools were amalgamated under the management of mission-loyal Reverends Makiwane and Mama. In the last phase between 1910 and 1911, Reverend Mzimba took over direct responsibility for the schools until his death in 1911. By this stage, competition between the UFC and the APC over schooling had declined significantly.

2. Economic Decline in Victoria East

Iliffe has observed that by the mid-1800’s “deliberate missionary schemes to create Christian communities of African yeoman farmers” had been implemented in the Cape Colony, but these were overshadowed by the emergence of “substantial African capitalist farmers in several areas of nineteenth
The process which began when Africans employed agricultural innovations such as the ox-plough, and irrigation techniques, culminated in the late 1800's when mineral discoveries "expanded the market for agricultural products". Other factors stimulating the development of a peasantry in the Cape Colony were the effects of the Cattle Killing of 1857, the annexation of the Ciskei, greater colonial control over parts of the Transkei and the willingness of white landowners to profit from accommodating black tenant farmers on their land.

From the 1840's, peasant activity was markedly stronger among the Mfengu of the Ciskei than other groups. Their advantage was entrenched in the wars of 1846-7 and 1850-3, which also contributed to the emergence of recognisable stratification among the Ciskei African population. As Bundy observes:

Most vividly, one might compare the fortunes of collaborators with those of defeated 'rebels'. The latter were deprived of their fertile lands, were forced to give up the bulk of their cattle, and were moved into inferior and more crowded areas. At the other extreme, the 'loyal Fingoes' were the chief gainers (amongst Africans) from both wars. They were granted new locations, and were swift.


to turn to advantage the economic exigencies of war... 4

By the mid-1860's in the Mfengu settlement at Tyume, near Alice, 900 farmers out of a population of 4 600 produced cereals and vegetables and exported 5 000 bags of grain each year. This region was so productive that the Christian Mfengu gave £1 660 in cash towards a new Lovedale church building. Elsewhere, Thembu farmers in the Queenstown district were enjoying similar successes in agricultural production. 5

Even in these regions, the spread of peasant activity was uneven, revealing divisions in southern Nguni society. Many Ciskei Africans worked lands that were too small and too infertile even to provide for subsistence farming. By the 1880's, a "process of incipient class stratification developed with the growth of what may be called a 'rural petty bourgeoisie'" and concomitant proletarianisation. 6 During this decade, in several districts including Victoria East and Middledrift, there were "accounts of congestion, of the landlessness of younger men, and of the annual migrations in search of work. Some reports specifically mentioned the disparity in wealth that characterised the Ciskei population at the time". 7

Victoria East, which according to Bundy was in many ways an archetypal Ciskei district, had a large African population with a well established peasant agricultural sector that produced animal and grain products worth £19 000 in 1875. In the same period, successful Ngqika and Ndlambe peasants on land abutting the district sold their produce to Alice storekeepers. Nevertheless, by this stage, many peasants in

MAP 2. SOME MAGISTERIAL DISTRICTS AND MAJOR SETTLEMENTS IN THE EASTERN CAPE AND TRANSKEI, 1895

Victoria East were already unable to maintain self sufficiency and were forced into farm or other wage labour.

The transformation of the countryside intensified in the Cape in the "crucial years", 1890 to 1913. Intermittent drought, rinderpest in the late 1890's, and East Coast Fever further contributed to the decline of agricultural production and deepening social cleavages in the Ciskei. Rising poverty, low rainfall figures for 1898-9 and an increased propensity for the young men to seek their fortunes in the towns are noted in missionary reports for Victoria East. The dimensions of this transformation were spelled out in a survey of Victoria East undertaken by Dr. James Henderson of Lovedale, who compared statistics on African consumption and production in 1875 with those for 1925. In the intervening period, peasant agricultural production had plummeted by nearly fifty percent, while the population had more than doubled. Wilson cites evidence that the Victoria East African population had in fact doubled by as early as 1911 and thereafter began to decline as hunger drove people to the towns.


9. Other negative factors included; locust plagues and flash floods, taxation, indebtedness and land insecurity in Victoria East. In 1891, of the total African population of 3 394, nearly 1 000 young men had left to seek work on railway construction or sheep shearing. Lewis,J., "Rural Contradictions and Class Consciousness: Migrant Labour in Historical Perspective" In: Spiegel,A.(ed.), Africa Seminar Collected Papers Vol.5 (Cape Town, University of Cape Town, Centre for African Studies, 1985)pp.52. Rev. Gaqa notes how migrancy spread the influence of the church. Interview, Rev.L.L. Gaqa 9/5/1991. In 1899, the second year of the APC's existence low rainfall was experienced, with only 12.75 inches falling by October. MS 7495 Stormont Papers 13/10/1899. MS 7512b Reports on Lovedale Native Congregation.

10. By 1925, local agricultural production had failed to meet subsistence needs, causing 60% of income to be spent on food. Bundy,C.(1988)pp.222,223,Table.5.

11. By 1927-8, in the nearby Middledrift area, the proportion of adult male tax payers away seeking work had risen to 71.7%. Wilson,M., "Growth of Peasant Communities" In: Wilson,M. and Thompson,L.(eds.), The Oxford History of South Africa Vol.II:
As the landless "rural proletariat" grew steadily larger in the 1890's, demand for land increased with the result that areas hitherto considered unworkable were ploughed and cultivated, while commonage was encroached upon. This economic insecurity heightened conflict between richer and poorer households. All residents of the locations hoped for a reasonable harvest of sorghum and mealies from their allotments but the better off owners of stock came increasingly into competition with "poor households demanding arable land".

It is of significance to this study that the declining economic conditions and rising population pressure in Victoria East peaked in the same decade that the APC - UFC church and schools conflict erupted. Under these conditions of land hunger, education came to be perceived as an alternative source of security while land, school, church and ethnic conflicts overlapped.

3. Pambani Mzimba and Elijah Makiwane: Diverging Paths to African Social and Political Advancement in the Cape Colonial Order

The economic transformation of the rural Eastern Cape countryside outlined above, contributed to the political mobilisation of Africans in an increasingly complex matrix of political allegiances. African independent churches functioned as one conduit of mobilisation which effectively split the African Christian community.

At the time that the APC seceded from the UFC, the new mission-educated elites were aware of the futility of resisting white expansion by force of arms. Moreover, many no


Group photograph of the Reverend Elijah Makiwane, the Reverend Pambani Mzimba, John Knox Bokwe, and their families with Doctor Jane Waterston. 

C.1870.
Portrait of the Reverend Pambani Mzimba
1873.
longer wished to assert African independence but wanted to be assimilated into European culture and ultimately hoped to share political power with whites. Theirs was a vision of "evolutionary change through constitutional means". The constitutional tradition of the Cape Colony within which provision was made for Africans to be enfranchised was recognised as a medium for safeguarding and even extending their interests. Although Africans were active in the Cape political system much earlier, their increasing electoral importance was felt especially in the "frontier constituencies" such as Victoria East. For example, over four years ending in 1886, the number of African voters increased by over 500% to 6,045 while the number of white voters reached 8,077; an increase of just over one percent.

The incipient cleavage among schooled Africans was revealed in the relationship between the dissident Reverend Pambani Mzimba and the Reverend Elijah Makiwane who was a loyal UFC church minister and school correspondent in Victoria East. Although they clearly shared many similar experiences as schooled African Christians, Mzimba and Makiwane had responded to the political dilemmas of their time in ways that brought them into conflict.

It is important for this account of the APC schools to investigate African politics more closely, because the major protagonists in the schooling disputes in Victoria East, Reverend Mzimba, Reverend Makiwane and Chief Bovane Mabandla, were all involved in emergent African political


associations. The question of education featured prominently in the debates and programmes of action of many such associations.

The careers of Makiwane and Mzimba run parallel over a substantial period of time. The Reverend Mzimba was born in 1848, to educated parents, his father being an elder in the church. After irregularly attending schools at Sheshugu and Burnhill, he arrived at Lovedale in 1860, where he began as an apprentice printer but later switched to theology. Makiwane was born two years later in Sheshugu in the Victoria East division, of heathen parents who converted soon thereafter. He arrived at Lovedale in 1869 after being at Healdtown and while still a theological student, he taught in the First Year Class. He became assistant editor of the Lovedale newspaper Isigidimi SamaXhosa from 1870 to 1875 and took charge of the telegraph office when it opened in 1872. In 1875, he was licensed as a preacher and ordained two years later to the pastorate of Macfarlan Church in the Tyumie valley. Makiwane and his contemporary and friend, Mzimba, who was ordained to the pastorate of Lovedale, were the first two Africans to complete the inaugural Lovedale theological course.

One of the earliest known African associations was the Native Education Association (NEA), founded in 1879. Membership of the NEA, which comprised many important names associated with


African politics in the Eastern Cape included both Makiwane and Mzimba. Besides being the first African ministers to graduate from Lovedale, they were also both among the first five presidents of the NEA during the early years of the association's existence. Its stated aims were:

... to take a special interest in all educational matters, in schools, in teachers and all others engaged in similar work, the aims of which is the improvement and elevation of the native races; to promote social morality and the general welfare of the natives.

The political tone of the NEA was moderate to the point where it has been described as only "semi-political". Whites were invited to address meetings, and it would seem that most Africans in the NEA had internalised Victorian ideas of civilisation, industry and progress, and accepted their dependence on the paternal responsibility of whites. For example, in a speech to the NEA, Makiwane bluntly stated; "The rising generation forgets that the natives are an inferior race".

In Cape representational politics, Makiwane and Mzimba together with Jabavu backed the liberal 'friends of the Natives' by supporting Rose Innes in Alice. But their interests and activities were not all identical. Mzimba showed interest in the co-operative efforts of African traders and entrepreneurs of the African Trading Association, which was set up in 1895 with the aim of financing land and business


ventures from a central fund. Makiwane, in his turn, was a member of a temperance association, the Eastern Grand Temple of the True Templars which was opposed to the rising consumption of liquor among Africans. As a committee member of the Eastern Grand Temple, he had as his contemporaries prominent political names such as the Reverend Walter Rubusana, Isaac Wauchope and John Knox Bokwe. Mzimba's interest in temperance activities had faded after the turn of the century.

Both men were similar in the range of their involvement, and in their Presbyterian background, education and organisational loyalties. Yet these erstwhile friends and colleagues at Lovedale became adversaries who espoused differing political approaches and educational strategies by the turn of the century. The main difference between them was the independent church movement which presented a new axis of potential division among all educated African communities in the Eastern Cape. One group associated with Jabavu and his mouthpiece, Imvo Zabantsundu, was strongly opposed to the 'Ethiopian' movement, believing it to be confrontational and "incompatible with loyalty and peace because it preached that Africans should have nothing to do with whites in church, state and everything else". Moreover, the defensively accommodationist Jabavu-Imvo group felt that such rash and deluded actions disrupted, even endangered, their vision of evolutionary political gains through collaboration and compromise. This group was "prepared to link constitutional..."

involvement in Cape Politics with appeals to the Crown, the House of Commons and to the British people". Protagonists of this strategy believed that Mzimba "the black man disgraced his nation and white friends by trying to pull to pieces that which was entrusted to him" or lamented the folly of the dissident churchman for "carrying on this religious 'Nongqause' among his own people". However, men such as Mzimba who had lost faith and taken the path of African Church independence, were not making a straightforward religious decision. It was reflective of a deeper shift in the political consciousness of African Christians in the Eastern Cape.

Mzimba and other African churchmen were attracted to a fledgling grouping called the South African Native Congress (SANC) which was more assertive and less accommodatory towards colonial authority. Formed in 1898, partly as a result of an initiative to revive vigilance associations known as Illiso Lomzi, it expressed a forceful Africanism and desire for self-determination, which was frequently expressed through the newspaper Izwi Labantu (Voice of the People). Furthermore, the SANC staunchly defended the development of independent churches as "healthy symptoms of independence and progress on the part of Africans". In 1902, the Reverends W.B. Rubusana and A.K. Soga, leading spokesmen of the Congress complained to Cape Prime Minister Sprigg about the "manifestly unfair treatment" that the independent Churches and particularly Mzimba's APC had been subjected to.

Although the independent churchmen endeavoured to pursue their aims legitimately and constitutionally, they differed from

28. Stewart Papers, BC 106 C68.1 Finl to Stewart, 9/10/1901.
their mission-loyal counterparts because they boldly affirmed black assertion and pursued self-reliance. Makiwane withdrew from such a forthright approach, perceiving greater benefits in remaining within the white mission church, a platform from which he considered he could "best pursue his basic objectives of evangelisation". Hunt-Davis suggests that the path chosen by Makiwane, whose outlook was that of a missionary, reveals that he and others like him were not fully in tune with their communities. Nevertheless Makiwane's choice did not necessarily imply that he slavishly and uncritically deferred to white missionary leadership.

This split in the African educated elite between the Congress and the Jabavu-Imvo tendencies, was refracted in educational matters such as higher education, where they adopted different tactics. In 1902, Congress initiated the Queen Victoria Memorial Scheme to solicit contributions that would be used to finance either a university, a 'higher' college or provide scholarships in memory of Queen Victoria. In response to recommendations made by the South African Native Affairs Commission, the Cape Government sponsored Inter-State Native College Scheme was launched in 1905. Reverend Mzimba and his supporter Chief Bovane Mabandla were opposed to the proposed links between Lovedale and the Interstate College on the grounds that "Lovedale was intended for the people in the vicinity of the Institution and in effect belonged to them". As indicated in Chapter 2, the Queen Victoria Memorial project faded and the government sponsored Inter-State scheme led to the creation of the SA Native College. In the period under investigation, higher education was the subject of a tussle.

between Congress and an alliance of more moderate African interests and their white backers:

It became a battlefield on yet another level between the Africanists represented by the SANC and the separatist churches, and the moderate assimilationists represented most conspicuously by Jabavu and the old guard of Makiwane, Wauchope, Sihlali and Bokwe.  

The cleavage in the educated African elite brought possibilities for alliance between independent churchmen and traditional leaders as developed between Mzimba and Chief Mabandla of the Victoria East magistracy.

Chief Mabandla was an influential man and he brought with him into the APC fold, his counsellors Headmen Melani Vella and Nicholas Bovula. Melani Vella was a day-pupil for three years at Lovedale from 1850 before joining the Cape Mounted Police. He served the Mounted Police for a long period which included duty on the diggings at Barkley West before he became headman in the 1880's. Nicholas Bovula studied at Lovedale in the 1870's with independent churchmen Edward Tsewu and Isaiah Sishuba and Congress politician the Reverend Rubusana. He passed the elementary teacher's exam, but chose instead to apprentice himself to a waggon-maker before returning to teach at Gillton school and join the NEA in the mid-1880's. By the time Mzimba led the secession from the UFC, Chief Mabandla had long been involved in politics in the Eastern Cape, having been temporarily dismissed from his post as headman in 1885 on account of his political activities.  

37. Mabandla organised well attended meetings to discuss the possible formation of an African branch of the Empire League which had been set up by Rhodes with the intention of supporting British intervention in the SA Republic, a move which many Africans supported in the hope that Britain would take over responsibility for "native" affairs. Odendaal,A.(1984)p.11.
counsellors were all instrumental in setting up schools under the banner of the APC in their respective locations, thereby considerably bolstering the impetus of the 'Mzimba schools' in the Victoria East division.

Like Mzimba, they were involved in Congress activities. As well as attending ordinary SANC and Iliso meetings they supported special SANC conferences on higher education and on the question of federation in 1906-7. Although the Congress leadership was drawn from the educated elite, they acknowledged the status of traditional leaders such as chiefs, their councillors and headmen, and made attempts to draw them into SANC activities. From the outset, the APC also incorporated traditional elites, as shown by the notice of the secession in a local newspaper which began, "We are authorised by the Elders, Deacons, Members, Chiefs and adherents ... (emphasis added)."

This section has demonstrated how the political interests of leaders in the rural APC communities led them to align themselves with the Reverend Mzimba in opposition to other mission-loyal men such as the Reverend Makiwane. In doing so, it has also emphasised the links between church independence, the APC leadership and African political activity.

4. The Secession of the African Presbyterian Church and its Early Development

In September 1898, the African Presbyterian Church (APC) was formed through a breakaway from the United Free Church of

40. Alice Times 27/10/98.
41. Early references in archival material from the period under study are to the African Presbyterian Church (APC), which emphasises African origins. The church soon became known as the Presbyterian Church of Africa (PCA), thus emphasising its
Scotland (UFC) mission at Lovedale. The founder, the Reverend Mzimba, drew off two thirds of the congregation, or about 1,000 people. His church grew rapidly, to claim 6,500 members and 20,000 adherents, by 1903. The local white community was profoundly shocked by this unexpected event. James Stewart, Rector of Lovedale, warned that "the Dwane-Mzimba movement might be described, not unjustly or inaccurately, in one word, Anti-White or Anti-European". The Alice Times immediately attacked the new church which was taken to be part of a new 'movement' with deep-seated racial motivations:

> These missions are at present passing through an ordeal for which the Race Movement referred to in former articles cannot be free from blame. It is helping to fan the present rage for race exclusiveness of a people as yet quite incompetent of managing their own affairs without the sympathetic help and nurture of their white friends.

The reasons for the secession were more complex than the Alice Times correspondent admitted. Mzimba had travelled to Scotland in 1892 for the Jubilee Assembly of the UFC, where he collected "considerable sums of money" for church work. He claimed the right to use these funds to build a church without denominational origins. The former designation will be adhered to in this Chapter. Interview, Rev. L.L. Gqa 9/5/1991.

42. This was announced in the Alice Times, by A. Gulwa (Chairman) and D. Sihau (Secretary) of the newly formed denomination. Alice Times 27/10/98.


44. CA GH 35/84 Stewart to Colonel Hutchinson, King William's Town 19/9/1901.

interference from the Lovedale Presbytery. Although the disputed control over this money was cited as the immediate reason for the schism, it was fuelled by dissatisfaction over the control of land, properties, and African representation in the church, and schools. 46 Also critical in the dispute was the manner and methods employed by Reverend Lennox, then Secretary of the Presbytery of Lovedale which alienated Mzimba. 47 On seceding, APC people kept possession of the buildings and property that they had built as former UFC members. A protracted court case ensued which the APC lost. The court ordered that properties and £388 should be given back to the UFC. 48

From 1898, despite the increasing tensions developing between the APC and UFC mission church Africans, Mzimba's church continued to expand in its operations, albeit unevenly and not


47. Rev. E. Makiwane who remained loyal to the UFC observed that although Lennox was "technically correct" in his handling of the disputed monies, he had gone about the matter in the wrong way and that his methods were "worthy of criticism". MS 7513d Stormont.

without setbacks. Mzimba campaigned assiduously for government recognition, and for the licensing of his ministers as marriage officers. He corresponded with government departments, led deputations to meet politicians,\(^4^9\) and travelled extensively.\(^5^0\) In his efforts he was anxious to allay suspicions of political tendencies in the church, emphasising that the APC people were loyal to the colonial government and the British Empire.\(^5^1\) With a view to outflanking the local UFC, Mzimba indicated his willingness to pledge loyalty to the metropolitan arm of the church, and at the turn of the century he went so far as to seek recognition there, but he was not successful.\(^5^2\)

The metropolitan UFC was troubled in the first few years of the century when a merger between the Free Church of Scotland

\(^4^9\) CA NA 497 Mzimba to SNAD 14/11/00, ARM Uitvlugt Location to Sec.NAD 22/12/02, SNAD Memorandum. "Application by the Presbyterian Church of Africa for a site for Church and School purposes in the Ndabeni Location" 23/4/03, Mzimba and Mazwi to Prime Minister 4/5/04; CA NA 754 F243 Mzimba to Jameson 14/12/06, RM Willowvale to Asst.Chief Magistrate 23/1/07, RM Qumbu to Asst.Chief Magistrate, Umtata 26/2/07, Mzimba and Damane to SNAD 4/2/08, Dower to Prime Minister "Memorandum relating to: Application by the Native Presbyterian Church for Recognition" 19/02/08, Mzimba to Sec.NAD 2/3/10, Mzimba to Prime Minister 20/4/10, Mzimba to Dower 6/5/10.

\(^5^0\) In 1905, Mzimba undertook a journey to Durban aboard the royal mail steamer. Under Act 30 of 1893, he was classified "undesirable" and placed under police supervision. He was not allowed to disembark. Mzimba took legal opinion but nothing came of the incident from which he incurred considerable expenses. CA NA 497 J.Charlton (Law Agent) to Prime Minister 14/8/05, Stanford to Charlton 14/8/05, Stanford to Charlton 1/9/05.

\(^5^1\) He emphasised that APC members and adherents took up arms against Boer forces in the South African War, "And at Mafeking the Fingoes who were killed by the Boers fighting in defence of Mafeking were chiefly members of our church". CA NA 497 Mzimba to SNAD 28/12/02; CA NA 754 F243 Mzimba to PM 14/12/06.

\(^5^2\) This stratagem of circumventing local control failed. Mzimba attempted to gain local recognition in 1904. Perhaps he hoped to achieve a similar relationship to Rev.Dwane's with the CPSA. Howard Pim, Minutes of the Foreign Missions Committee of the Free Church of Scotland 8th Meeting, 20/12/1904.
and the United Presbyterian Church was shrouded in controversy. A section of the former Free Church which refused to participate in the union remained separate to became known as the "Wee Frees" or the "Legal Free Church of Scotland". The Legal Free Church successfully sued for the entire UFC church heritage in 1904, but the decision was reversed the following year. Nevertheless, Mzimba saw the resemblance between his situation and that of the "Wee Frees". In this period, some disaffected Africans moved into Mzimba's church as a result of the split, while others joined the local "Wee Frees".53

The establishment of schools independent of UFC control though initially without funding from the government was not merely a consequence of the split. First, in the political act of separation from the white mission institution, the extension of schooling facilities was essential to establish as a viable church in the eyes of the community. Second, the establishment of APC schools reflected a demand for schooling in the Victoria East region that the mission schools could not accommodate.

At the outset, an APC schools network was begun, which soon extended far beyond the district of Victoria East.54 As early

53. In 1908, the UFC group at Gqumahashe was opposed by the new Legal Free Church of Scotland. As before the flashpoint of trouble was the school, with the Legal Free Church group withdrawing their children preparatory to starting their own school. Responsibility for continued conflict in the Gqumahashe school was to some extent due to the unpopular teacher Fini who it seems was an abrasive character who featured in a number of lawsuits. In the middle of 1908 a case was brought against him for defamation. SGE 1/740 Robert Fini to SGE 1/2/08; Holford Mama to SGE 16/10/08; Rein to SGE 26/10/08; SGE 1/834 Mama to SGE 18/2/09; Hunt Davis, R. (1979) p. 24-25; Howard Pim, Minutes of the Foreign Missions Committee of the Free Church of Scotland Chirenje, J. M. (1987) p. 155, 156.

54. Although the major antagonists in schools of the Victoria East division were undoubtedly the PCA and UFC, there were other mission and independent church school groups surfacing throughout the period under scrutiny, but they were smaller and less successful than the APC and therefore received less colonial attention. Gqumahashe Location was troubled in early 1900 when American Baptists began drawing children from the
as January 1903, it was reported at the Synod of the APC, that
the church controlled 40 schools with 2024 students and 51
teachers mostly in the Eastern Cape, but also in the
Transvaal, Natal, and Bechuanaland.55 The Reverend Damane, one
of Mzimba's chief lieutenants worked with some success in the
Transkei from his base in Qumbu.56

The APC was also interested in providing higher education for
its adherents, and supported scholars in this regard through
American connections which Mzimba fostered. By 1902 there were
about twenty five APC students in the United States at
institutions which included Lincoln University where they
studied for degrees in the ministry, medicine and law.57

55. Total financial outlay on these institutions was £3963.19.10. CA NA 497 "Synod ye Bandla Lama Afrika" printed pamphlet p.4. appended to RM to Dower n.d.. Evidence of Rev.P.Mzimba to the South African Native Affairs Commission 1903-1905 (Cape Town, 1905)pp.794-795 (Hereafter SANAC). According to evidence put to the Commission on Native Separatist Churches, there were no APC schools in the Transvaal. MS 14787(f) Roberts Papers, Evidence to the Commission on Native Separatist Churches 1921, Presbyterian Church of Africa No.54.


57. Mzimba and Damane accompanied their students on one
journey to America in 1902. CA GH 35/84 G.B.Carr, Prof. of
Rhetoric Lincoln University to J.Chamberlain Sec. of State 29/10/1901; CA NA 498 INL to CC Victoria East 5/9/02, Typed
Mzimba himself visited America where he met Booker T. Washington with whom he had corresponded.58

5. The Impact of African Presbyterian Church Schools on Educational Provision in Victoria East

In 1899, just before the APC secession, there were thirteen mission schools in the division, twelve controlled by the UFC and one by the Wesleyan church.59 That year, the total schoolgoing population of Africans in Victoria East, according to the average attendance figures from the quarterly Education Gazette, was 777 (See Table 2).60 By 1907, there were 1088 students in nineteen schools.61 The statistics therefore indicate a substantial increase in total attendance figures in the outstation schools of Victoria East between 1899 and 1907. Although a slight drop in attendance is apparent between 1907 and 1912, the schools conflict brought increased access to


59. It is not strictly necessary to justify the importance of independent schools generated by the independent churches by reference to quantative data, because the qualitative importance of the independent church schooling lies in its general significance in the process of African political mobilisation. Also, the importance of the independent church educational projects should not be measured against the established mission system with its colonial backing, but rather in terms of their own limitations.

60. This figure includes the Lovedale Boys', Girls' and Elementary schools but does not reflect the numbers at the Lovedale Training and Industrial Institutions as these were mainly post-elementary. Nor does it account for the boarding students as a precaution against the numbers of students from distant places inflating mission school figures.

61. In 1912, 1030 students attended eighteen schools.
schooling for local children in general. This is partly attributable to the additional schools provided by the APC.62

### TABLE 2

**Average Attendance in Mission Schools in Victoria East, Showing Responsible Denominations: 1899-1912**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Calderwood</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Gaga</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1907 | | 31
| | AMAL | 101
| 1912 | | AMAL |
| 1899 | Ganda | 29 |
| 1907 | | 37 |
| 1912 | | AMAL |
| 1899 | Gillton | 106 |
| 1907 | | 72 |
| 1912 | | 40 |
| 1899 | Gqumahashe | 66 |
| 1907 | | 57 |
| 1912 | | 54 |
| 1899 | Kwezana | 92 |
| 1907 | | 121
| | AMAL | 86
| 1912 | | AMAL |
| 1899 | Macfarlan | 99 |
| 1907 | | 51 |
| 1912 | | 49 |
| 1899 | Sompondos | 45 |
| 1907 | | 30 |
| 1912 | | 24 |
| 1899 | Yamala | 46 |
| 1907 | | 40 |
| 1912 | | 42 |
| 1899 | Ncera | 53 |
| 1907 | | 25
| | WES | 53 |
| 1912 | | WES |
| 1899 | Auckland | - |
| 1907 | | 50
| | APC | 62 |
| 1912 | | AMAL |
| 1899 | Ely | - |
| 1907 | | 108
| | APC | 100 |
| 1912 | | AMAL |
| 1899 | Roxeni | - |
| 1907 | | 64
| | APC | 49 |
| 1912 | | APC |
| 1899 | Sheshugu | - |
| 1907 | | 189
| | APC | 91 |
| 1912 | | APC |
| 1899 | Gcato | - |
| 1907 | | 17
| | APC | - |
| 1912 | | APC |
| 1899 | Balwa | - |
| 1907 | | 33
| | WES | 56 |
| 1912 | | WES |

Outstation Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17-19. Lovedale (Boys, Girls, Elementary)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Boarding Scholars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>(243)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>(235)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>(183)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mission Day Scholars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>1030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: [ ] APC = under APC control.
[ ] WES = under Wesleyan control.
[ ] AMAL = former APC run schools which amalgamated under joint APC/UFC control.

All unmarked schools were under UFC control.

* Boarding scholars at the Lovedale Institution are indicated, but not included in the calculations of attendance because the majority were not from the local area.

62. The mission figures were remarkably constant. Unfortunately, there is no information that could indicate how many students were lost from the UFC to the schools of the AFC or vice-versa.

63. Quarterly Statistics: SCE 15/2(1899), 15/3(1907), 15/4(1912); Quarterly Statistical Number, Fourth Quarter Education Gazette, 1908, 1913.
MAP 3 VICTORIA EAST DIVISION INDICATING APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF MISSIONS STATIONS/SCHOOLS AND LOCATIONS, 1900

KEY

- White Farmlands
- Free Church of Scotland land
- Grazing land common to Mabanda's Matoe's and Matama's location.

- African Locations, Communal and Garden Lots

- Divisional Boundary
- Roads
- Rivers
- Church Sites
- Town

Source: Divisional Map of Victoria East (A 12-2130 & M3/3341 Govt. Printer, 1926)
Unfortunately Education Department statistics reflected only those schools which were recognised and receiving grants-in-aid. Consequently, there is no indication of how many students were being accommodated in unaided private schools belonging to either the APC, the UFC or other agents. However, some indication of the extent of this unofficial invisible sector may be gleaned from occasional references in the Departmental correspondence. In a report in 1903, the local Inspector of Native Locations stated that there were 26 African schools, of which only twelve were government aided mission schools. This meant that fourteen unaided schools were in existence at that stage which were most probably APC supported.

The figures above may also be usefully compared with the number of school-age Africans in Victoria East, as an indicator of the demand for education in the division. The total African population in the district was approximately 15,000, a figure which remained relatively constant through the period of study, because migration was equalled by influx (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>17120</td>
<td>15088 (14023)*</td>
<td>1574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>16275</td>
<td>14339 (13102)*</td>
<td>1439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rural population.

64. According to an APC pamphlet in January 1903 nine schools were in operation with 582 students. CA NA 497 "Synod ye Bandla Lama Afrika" printed pamphlet p.4, appended to RM to Dower n.d.

### TABLE 4

**Breakdown of Population in Selected Age Categories in Victoria East: 1904 - 1911**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Categories</th>
<th>10 - 14</th>
<th>15 - 19</th>
<th>20 - 24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B W</td>
<td>452 4292</td>
<td>144 2000</td>
<td>139 1278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W B</td>
<td>161 2033</td>
<td>146 1911</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B = Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W = White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1904, the number of Africans between ages five and nineteen, was 6,292, with the majority of 4,292 falling in the five to fourteen category (See Table 4). The number of people of schoolgoing age in comparison with the total of 1,088 students in mission schools for 1907, shows a large discrepancy. In effect, only one in six children was going to school. The census, of 1904, showed that 3,503, or about 23% of the African population in Victoria East could read and write. If it can be assumed that the majority of this group of Africans with some education wanted their children to go to school, then demand would have exceeded supply.

This chapter has described the onset of economic decline and diverging tendencies in African politics in the Eastern Cape region at the turn of the century. It has also sketched the secession and early growth of the APC, and outlined the impact of its schools on schooling provision in the Victoria East region. This history of the APC schools will now briefly refer to Mzimba’s involvement in the schools until he seceded in 1899. Next, the establishment of APC schools without grants-in-aid against strenuous UFC missionary opposition, and the first unsuccessful applications for recognition from the Education Department will be reviewed. The chapter will then

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disclose how in 1904, the APC leaders managed to negotiate an agreement with the Department of Education which brought their school communities into an uncomfortable alliance with J.B. Liefeldt, the Inspector of Locations. The problems encountered with Liefeldt coincided with the unforeseen amalgamation of formerly opposed APC and UFC schools. In recounting how the amalgamations were brought about, this chapter will refer to the role of mission-loyal Reverends Makiwane and Mama in securing UFC control over the reunited schools. The following passage will reveal how conflicts in the locations involving ethnic, denominational and other allegiances animated the schools struggle. Finally, the last phase between 1910 and 1911, when competition between the UFC and the APC over schooling had declined significantly, will briefly be assessed.

6. Mzimba's Church and Lovedale: The Struggle for Independent Schools

6.1 The Prelude to Secession

In his career as a minister in the UFC before leading the secession, the Reverend Mzimba had accumulated considerable experience as manager and correspondent for several UFC schools in the Victoria East division. In 1898 he administered the affairs of location schools at Gaga, Ely and Roxeni, where he strove to maintain attendance levels and to upgrade facilities. He also had to contend with an uncompromisingly critical schools circuit Inspector, T.W.Rein.68 This was good experience for him and served as preparation for his future role as an independent church schools leader.

Mzimba was not content with only fulfilling his administrative duties in respect of the Gaga, Ely and Roxeni UFC schools in his jurisdiction. He also had in mind the establishment of more schools - in spite of Education Department policy which was orientated towards the physical consolidation of school resources rather than the proliferation of small schools. Furthermore, the Department had adopted the three mile rule, aimed at protecting mission churches of different denominations from encroaching on each others' territories, a point which has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Thus the Superintendent General of Education, Muir, saw fit to support additional staff appointments at the existing schools, but he was clearly unhappy about Mzimba's efforts to "set up a fresh school within ten minutes ride" of Gaga.69 Undeterred, Mzimba gave notice that he intended to apply for grants at two schools; Ganda school near Gaga UFC Mission school and another one near the Sheshugu UFC Mission school.70 Muir was suspicious of this move and warned Inspector Rein that Mzimba's applications should be "carefully scrutinised".71 What the Department saw as an irrational attempt to set up additional schools of the same denomination in close proximity to each other may also be interpreted as an indication of the growing division in the UFC school community and as evidence that Mzimba was planning ahead and preparing for the secession.

6.2 Secession and United Free Church Reaction in the Schools: 1898-1902

In June 1898 the Superintendent General of Education received the first hint of trouble brewing in Victoria East, when Robert Fini, head teacher at Gqumahashe School warned:

Our missionary ... I mean the Revd. P.J. Mzimba our missionary Superintendent who

69. SGE 1/223 Clarke to Murray 11/2/98.

70. SGE 1/223 Mzimba to SGE 4/4/98.

71. SGE 1/223 Murray to Rein 13/4/98.
resigned from being our minister any longer ... since their (sic) dispute with the Presbytery went away last month to up country [Mafeking] without leaving or saying a word to us teachers about the schools; so we have to ask Dr Stewart of Lovedale to help us get things for our schools. 72

At first, the UFC attempted to downplay the magnitude of the secession and its effects on the schools. Four months afterwards, the Reverend D.D. Stormont, missionary in charge of Lovedale mission schools, had not yet informed the Education Department of any disruptions. In an official report in October 1898, he indicated that the following outstation schools were still UFC controlled; Sheshugu, Gaga, Ely, Roxeni, Calderwood, Stewart, Gqumahashe and a school near Gaga run without government aid. 73

Stormont, who was born in 1862, became a teacher at Albert Road Public School, Glasgow, but according to his biographer, he chose the "obscurity of mission life". In 1899, aged 28, he arrived at Lovedale as an "educational missionary" and was shortly thereafter ordained in the ministry. Within two years, he became Principal Teacher and tutor in Theology and Chemistry at the Lovedale Training School. Stormont took on the role of sub-editor and then editor of the Christian Express between 1895 and 1901 and remained a prolific writer throughout his career on social, educational and economic issues. As a result, he developed a reputation as an expert on the 'Ethiopian' question. He also confronted the 'Mzimba crisis' in two capacities, as acting minister of the Lovedale Native Congregation between 1898 and 1900, and also as Clerk of the Synod of Kaffraria between 1895 and 1904. An energetic and autocratic man, with strong paternalistic views on

72. SGE 1/223 Fini to SGE 4/6/98.

73. The last mentioned school, with 66 on the roll was the one which Mzimba had managed before the secession and for which he had recently requested a grant without success. SGE 1/223 Stormont to SGE 3/10/98.
"raising the native people", Stormont proved a powerful opponent of the early APC initiatives.74

It seems that Stormont was hoping that the crisis precipitated by Mzimba and his followers would blow over in the December school holidays, but he was to be disappointed. In a period of simmering tension, APC people refused to allow him access to church buildings that they commandeered, claiming, "we sold our cattle to build these churches".75 On a visit to Sheshugu, Stormont was confronted by Mzimba's supporters and threatened with a beating after his escort of UFC companions deserted him.76 Shortly thereafter, the United Free Church was forced to sue for the control of several school properties in court. Owing to an interdict issued by the High Court of the Colony the church and school buildings at the outstations of Ely, Sheshugu, Kwezana and Gaga were closed. Meanwhile, UFC teachers and students were obliged to meet "in huts or such places as (they were) able to obtain".77 Mzimba's people had temporarily forced the Presbyterians into a position where they could not use their own school premises. Stormont was finally left with no choice other than to inform the Superintendent General of Education of the events that had overtaken the UFC.


75. Interview, Rev.L.L. Gaqa 9/5/1991. It was claimed by the APC that the properties rightfully belonged to them. They argued that since they had built the churches as former UFC members, ownership was theirs. MS 7516 Buildings of Lovedale Native Church of the Free Church of Scotland, Sheshugu.

76. MS 7516 "Report on incident at Sheshugu. An outlying church of the Native congregation of Lovedale" Stormont and others 9/10/1898, "Re. Gaqa Station Church" Stormont and others 25/7/1898.

77. MS 7512a "Reports on Lovedale Native Location" pp.3,10; SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 19/1/99.
As a tactical manoeuvre that would provide a hiatus and dissipate tension, Stormont requested that the holidays at affected schools be extended one week. His request for a delayed opening was sanctioned only as a temporary measure, because the longer his schools remained closed or out of his control, the sooner would come the time when grants would be withdrawn by the Department. 78

The court tussle between the Mzimba-ites and the UFC eventually ended on 28 February 1899 when the latter was awarded the right to retain control over the church and school buildings at all four troubled outstations. 79 However, the UFC was prevented from immediately occupying the buildings because APC adherents delayed the surrender of keys. 80 Consequently, Stormont decided it would be prudent to wait for the next school quarter before he announced a return to the schools in question. So as to forestall any organised resistance, he elected to announce the reopening of these schools as late as possible on the first day of the school term.

On the appointed day, it became evident that the affected communities had sided with Mzimba because no students appeared

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78. MS 7512 Stormont to Dr. Smith and others 20/4/1899. The UFC Gaqa school had lost students to the APC school which was only five yards away. Inspector Logie recommended that the Education Department go against its policy of withdrawing grants from schools where student numbers had drastically declined, so that the Gaqa school could survive. He considered that this strategy was important to prevent further growth of the APC school. However, the SGE could not sanction indefinite subsidising the UFC schools. SGE 2/96 Report of T. Logie on Gaqa UFC school Victoria East 12/8/1901.

79. MS 7516 Buildings of Lovedale Native Church of the Free Church of Scotland, Sheshugu. The court case ruled that they were legally still the property of the UFC. The outcome in respect to other properties was less conclusive when the UFC discovered that they did not have title deeds for the buildings or the lots on which they were erected. Howard Pim, Presbytery of Kaffraria Minutes. Narrative of affairs connected with Lovedale Native Church 27/7/1898.

80. The outstations were; Ely, Sheshugu, Kwezana, and Gaqa. SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 19/1/99.
at Sheshugu, Ely and Roxeni UFC schools. A few children arrived at Kwezana school but were withdrawn at the direction of the headman Bizidumi of Gaga, and at Gaga school itself, only eleven pupils were in attendance. This brought the number of schools troubled by dissidence to five.81

The next few days proved to be crucial. Stormont again ordered his teachers to absent themselves for a few days to see what would happen. He may have hoped that the enforced closure would allow tensions to slacken and return to normal. Alternatively, he may have assumed that closing the schools would break the resolve of the dissidents and that their desire for education would eventually force them to return to school. He did not reckon with more people opting to go independent. Opposition Mzimba-ite schools were established, springing up in huts or any other convenient place at Ely, Gaga and Roxeni.

Stormont began touring the district and made a series of desperate attempts to negotiate with the dissidents. All his efforts were rebuffed. Exasperated at every turn, he was met with calculated evasion at Ely where people refused to negotiate with him until they had conferred with fellow Mzimba-ites in other centres. At Gaga, APC adherents simply denied their involvement, and when Stormont confronted them, accusing them of lying, they responded with derisive "laughter at their being found out".82 It should have been evident to Stormont that at this stage, attempting to initiate communications with the seceders would be fruitless because they were committed to the course of action they had chosen. "Come what may," the leaders told Stormont, they would "not give way".83

81. SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 12/4/99.
82. SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 12/4/99.
83. SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 12/4/99.
Yet Stormont was unwilling to admit defeat and determined to try other ploys. On 13 April, he circulated two thousand pamphlets throughout the UFC mission field, stating that all his schools would meet in the church buildings to avoid conflict in the classrooms. This had no effect on the status quo. To make matters worse, a number of his former UFC school managers refused to reassume their positions and crossed over to the APC. In mid-1899, he specially appointed twenty UFC elders to work amongst the seceders in groups of three for protection. By this stage, Stormont could not even contemplate effectively running his own schools in the recusant zones. Furthermore, the loss of membership placed financial pressures on the Lovedale congregation. Reduced revenues from a shrinking parish were aggravated by drought conditions which had further impoverished UFC members. In response to this problem, Stormont established committees "for getting people who do not subscribe to do so" which would have had the effect of alienating even those Africans who still remained loyal to the UFC.84

Despite his experience, Stormont found it difficult to offer a coherent explanation for these events. Consuming anger and outrage are reflected in the following quote from his journal; "Lying, duplicity, insolence, race-hatred, and especially duplicity, duplicity, duplicity!! have been the leading factors in these movements."85 In correspondence with the UFC headquarters in Scotland and with the Superintendent General of Education, he made frequent references to the "lack of education", "ignorance" unreasonableness and thriftlessness of the APC adherents who had "morally gone to pieces". He also railed against the "enormous conceit (of Mzimba's people),


85. MS 7512c "Copies of letters to the Foreign mission Committee of the Free Church of Scotland about Dwane Mzimba and the Order of Ethiopia movement". Private Journal, p.3.
nurtured by ignorance and expressing itself in insolence". Such subjective statements - rather than explanations - were calculated to absolve the mission Church from blame, and to justify paternal Christian action on the APC backsliders. At the same time, his judgements had the effect of rendering further analysis redundant. It is ironic that Stormont had by this stage achieved the reputation of an expert on the independent churches, and his views were sought by the Secretary of the Native Affairs Department, and the Cape Prime Minister.

The quality of schooling provided in the APC schools was strongly criticised by Stormont who claimed that their teachers were unqualified even though this problem was as common in most other mission schools. He was even more scathing about the APC school’s managers, arguing vociferously that the men managing Gaga school had “not the slightest education” and had “misled the people for over a year”. Ntshona Galelo at Gaga, was singled out by Stormont as a dangerous influence:

He is an inveterate anti-white patriot and is the mainstay of all discontented folks in the Gaga district. He is a most ignorant man of no wealth or influence. save what his stubbornness and his ‘eldership’ in the new Church of Mzimba gave him. He is bent on mischief - and has always been.

86. SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 12/4/99. MS 7512 Stormont to Stevenson 15/8/1899; MS 7512c “Copies of letters to the Foreign mission Committee of the Free Church of Scotland about Dwane Mzimba and the Order of Ethiopia movement”. Private Journal, p.3.

87. MS 7536 A.CMT to Stormont 22/10/1902; MS 10697 “The Ethiopian Movement among the Native Churches of South Africa” D.D.Stormont c.1902. A version of this article was translated for the Allgemeine Mission Zeitschrift.

88. SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 12/4/99.

89. SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 12/4/99.
Meanwhile, the Education Department was powerless to intervene because Mzimba had not yet applied for grants-in-aid.

By July 1899, the wave of school independence had reached MacFarlan Mission, an outstation of Lovedale in the Ncera district. Loyalist Reverend Elijah Makiwane reported that he was unable to reopen Gillton school there, mostly for reasons of what he termed the "unrest". He added:

... the unfortunate wave of the spirit of unrest and separation from old churches ... is now passing over the whole of Macfarlan Mission and has given a severe check to our work in almost all directions. I am afraid that it will affect all our schools, though I hope it will not be to the same extent as in the Lovedale district.90

The Mzimba-ite community continued to enjoy majority support in the areas where their opposition schools were established. Not all their support was from Christian elements. The APC was encouraged by backing from traditionalist sections of the locations that had hitherto chosen to remain aloof from Christian and school influences.91 After APC headman Bizidumi of Gaga had written a letter of appeal to the headman of Kwezana, this "heathen village" gave support to the seceders. For his part, Stormont alleged that the stayaway by Kwezana people was enforced through the tyranny of certain APC adherents. He argued that the "heathen" at Kwezana did not "care whether their children are at school or not". In this

90. SGE 1/239 Makiwane to SGE 14/7/99.

91. Sheshugu, was the centre of school disaffection. This was the home of Kala and Sihawu, who were primary figures in the court case where the possession of church buildings was contested. Sihawu was a former school teacher who had been dismissed by Dr Clarke the previous inspector in the district. The reasons for this dismissal are unknown. However, he subsequently turned his back on the cause of the seceders and urged children to return to school. SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 12/4/99.
case, their support for the APC seems likely to have been motivated by anti-mission sentiments.\textsuperscript{92}

While the dissident wave continued to spread outwards from Lovedale into outlying missions, events took a new turn. Stormont heard that Mzimba was applying for grants to the APC schools, and immediately wrote to the Superintendent General of Education in a determined attempt to preempt Mzimba's efforts.\textsuperscript{93} The struggle for the schools had now reached a new phase in which a third agency, the government Education Department, was introduced. A new balance of power was to emerge in a triangular relationship between independent church dissidents, government and the mission church. The last, in the person of Stormont, was intent on securing the support of the Department of Education.

Two months after Stormont sent his preemptive letter to the Education Department, the Superintendent General of Education received an application for grants to APC schools at Gaga and Sheshugu from Mzimba. By this stage, the APC had already built two large school houses costing £220, and had budgeted a further £40 for the fitting of ceilings, floor boards and seats. The magnitude of this investment clearly indicated the serious intent of the APC community and also their motivation to demonstrate respectability vis-a-vis mission schooling. For the APC people, acquiring land was not an insurmountable problem at this stage, because adherents could give to the church, freehold residential or even arable lots which they owned in their private capacity.\textsuperscript{94} However, this did not resolve the major issue of gaining legal recognition from the government.

\textsuperscript{92} SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 12/4/99.
\textsuperscript{93} SGE 1/239 Stormont to SGE 12/7/99.
\textsuperscript{94} Interview, Rev.L.L. Gqa 9/5/1991.
The decision to seek grants-in-aid from the Education Department could not have been taken lightly by the Mzimba-ites. Their schools had been running independently for almost a year and if links with the Department had not been a problem, the school leaders would have applied soon after they went independent. In addition, the building of schools as evidence of permanence was also an important factor contributing to the eventual decision to solicit grants-in-aid. In Mzimba's words, it was an "absolute necessity and serious needs have compelled us to solicit this aid".95

Such applications threatened the privileged access to grants formerly accorded only to white-controlled mission schools. In all negotiations for such privileges, the local inspector of schools enjoyed a powerful and privileged position as the Department's local representative. The division's School Inspector, T.W. Rein, aimed to protect this situation against any encroachment by independent African-controlled schools in his circuits which included Cathcart, Fort Beaufort, Queenstown, Stockenstrom and Victoria East. Consequently, his response to Mzimba's application was as bombastic as it was antagonistic. He wrote:

"(I)... Consider the present application a piece of unprecedented impertinence on the part of Mzimba. The Mzimba case, which is only one phase of the Ethiopian movement in general, is so notorious that it is hardly necessary for me to enter into details."96

Rein's emotive communication was of no practical use to the Superintendent General of Education who needed to justify his decision on this extremely sensitive issue. In reply to Mzimba, the Department stated that it was not able to support

95. SGE 1/239 Mzimba to SGE 19/8/99.

96. SGE 1/239 Rein to SGE 2/9/99. "The whole Ethiopian movement is in reality less a religious one than a political agitation on distinctly racial lines". CA GH 35/84 Memorandum. T.W.Rein on "Ethiopian Movement" 20/3/1899
his schools. The Superintendent General of Education invoked the three mile rule as justification for his decision, and alleged that the APC school children were poached from pre-existing aided schools run by the UFC. While this was undoubtedly true of the other school, Gaga, it was not so in the case of Sheshugu which was not located near enough existing UFC schools to be in their catchment areas. In reply, Mzimba pointed out that "at Sheshugu (at any rate) there are no existing aided schools from which the children could be drawn", and requested that the matter be reconsidered.97 His plea was ignored and there is no evidence of further communications on this matter. Having received a rebuff, the APC schools had to survive on whatever resources their communities could offer. This stalemate eventually lasted about three years, during which time the UFC schools were able to make a limited recovery.

In the last school quarter of 1900, Reverend Stormont renewed his attempts to negotiate with the Mzimba-ites. Significantly, his attempts to woo the dissidents came after Mzimba's failed attempt to gain government recognition and schools grants-in-aid. Stormont evidently expected that with the advantage of government backing he could bring the APC to the negotiating table. His visits were met by "insolence and insult," and only two letters to fourteen headmen received replies.98

Stormont had offered the Mzimba-ites an opportunity to sit with him and a committee of UFC parents to decide the affairs of the schools. Being aware of the political sensitivity of the issue, he was specially careful to establish that he was "treating only school affairs". He also stressed that the church dispute was a separate issue, and that the troubled schools could be operated "in the interests of both parties".99 But his offer to sit with a committee even if it

97. SGE 1/239 Mzimba to SGE 19/9/99.
98. SGE 1/263 Stormont to SGE 4/9/00.
99. SGE 1/263 Stormont to SGE 4/9/00.
did include a group of Mzimba's people clearly presented an unbalanced structuring of power because while the APC remained unrecognised by the government, it would be dependent on Stormont as convener of the committee and intermediary with the Department. The proposal was rejected. As a last resort, he appealed - without success - directly to the Superintendent General of Education to sponsor another committee scheme with the aim of ensuring that the interests of both APC and UFC parties would be preserved. This last venture was tantamount to an admission of helplessness in the face of the dissident group's progress in the schools, and their refusal to negotiate with UFC mission representatives.

This impasse prompted Stormont to observe that the Mzimba-ites wished to have "complete control of their own schools ... without European supervision of any sort". Stormont was convinced that the APC communities were even prepared to let schools remain closed "unless they could get them entirely in their own hands". Whether this option was seriously considered in the ranks of the Mzimba-ites is not apparent but they certainly wished at least to qualify for government grants in order to bypass missionary control. Thus Stormont eventually realised the hopelessness of his attempts to negotiate any settlement.

In the last school quarter of 1900, the missions of the UFC seemed unable to control the situation. The atmosphere of dissent perturbed Acting Principal of Lovedale, A.W. Roberts, who reported that during the secession there had "been a strong undercurrent of restlessness running through the upper classes of the institution".

100. SGE 1/263 Stormont to SGE 4/9/00.
101. SGE 1/263 Stormont to SGE 4/9/00.
102. SGE 1/263 Stormont to SGE 4/9/00.
103. SGE 1/263 Roberts to SGE 3/11/00: Four students in the Normal College, first, second and third years; David Ntombeni, Simon Njikelana, Samuel Ntshona and McDonald Seqishe were
By this stage, Gaga and Ganda UFC schools were further reduced in numbers by the withdrawal of Mzimba-ite children, which caused the Gaga UFC school to lose its government grant. Former UFC school committee members at Ganda joined the dissidents. At Calderwood, both APC and UFC students were receiving instruction from an APC teacher because the UFC group was too small to maintain a school on its own. The overall situation was, that the Sheshugu, Ely, Roxeni UFC schools were abandoned, Kwezana was shut, Gaga and Ganda were weakened by APC schools, while at Calderwood, UFC children were attending school headed by a Mzimba-ite teacher. In effect, half of the UFC schools in Victoria East were closed or disrupted by APC ventures.

6.3 Expanding Influence and Growing Financial Difficulties

The advances made by his church in Victoria East must have encouraged Mzimba, who remained aware that he could not consolidate his advantages in the schooling arena until his schools qualified for grants-in-aid.

Meanwhile, Mzimba’s redoubtable opponent, Stormont, had returned to Scotland on furlough in 1902 where he was requested by the UFC Foreign Missions Committee to take over the principalship of Blytheswood Institution on his return. His absence significantly reduced the balance of missionary forces arrayed against the APC. The death of Dr. Stewart in late 1905 also contributed to the easing of tensions, for Stewart had been greatly hurt by Mzimba’s secession. Dr. Henderson, who succeeded Stewart, was less personally involved in the controversy and gave much more attention to

identified as the leading trouble makers, and dismissed. Only three weeks after this strong disciplinary action, Roberts again wrote informing the SGE of trouble about food at Lovedale. A further five students were expelled. SGE 1/263 Roberts to SGE 22/11/00.

104. SGE 1/263 Stormont to SGE 4/9/00.
the administrative side of the Lovedale Institution than to the politics of the independent church movement.105

Mzimba took the opportunity to renew his campaign for recognition.105 Having failed in his previous bid to elicit a favourable response from the Department after a protracted correspondence, Mzimba sought a personal interview with the Superintendent General of Education, Muir. At this meeting, the leader of the APC laid emphasis on the organisational stability and geographical extent of his church, and reiterated his plea for grants at Sheshugu, Ely and Roxeni schools.107 The Education Department duly requested a report on the Victoria East schools from Inspector Rein, who merely recapitulated his account of the "the facts" regarding the "Ethiopian" schools. Rein was distinctly uninterested in reviewing the actual schooling situation, because in his opinion, it was irrelevant to the major issue, namely the political implications of APC activity.108 In his mind, nothing had changed:

I am still of opinion that such schools as those referred to, which were established (not) because of an educational need, but solely because of an ulterior motive,


107. The APC comprised three Presbyteries in Transkei, the Cape Colony and Natal. The synod of fifteen ministers and lay representatives with Mzimba as moderator, was due to meet in June 1903. The SGE was promised a report from this Synod. SGE 1/396 SGE Memo to Records 30/12/02.

108. The Secretary of the Education Department was forced to write again, indicating that the SGE being "well aware of the facts" wanted to be informed as regards any changes in the state of affairs in Victoria East. SGE 1/396 Secretary to Rein 30/12/02, Rein to SGE 5/1/03, Secretary, Education Department to Rein 13/1/03.
which should not be subsidised by the
Department.109

Yet despite his denial of educational motives in the APC
schools110, and opposed as he was to grants-in-aid for the
disidents, he admitted to being troubled by the "educational
chaos" that prevailed in Victoria East. Accordingly, in March
1903, he proposed the creation of A3 (Third Class
Undenominational) schools in the centres of Ely, Roxeni and
Sheshugu, with school committees giving equal representation
to UFC and the Mzimba-ites.111 Such an arrangement would have
facilitated indirect UFC mission influence in the affairs of
schools attended by APC adherents. Both Rein's suggestion for
an undenominational school and Stormont's proposal in 1900 for
a joint committee, shared a similar aim which was to maintain
white mission presence that would counterbalance the Mzimba
faction. Reliance on missionary supervision or control over
African schooling was a structural necessity, since the small
inspectorate of the Education Department was not capable of
properly administering the growing system.

The colonial Education Department minimally funded mission
schools, and lacked the administrative and supervisory
infrastructure to control them. Missionaries therefore became
unofficial local agents of the Department and their services
were recognised as a means of maintaining day to day
ideological control in the schools. Yet the Superintendent
General of Education seemed reluctant to accept the proposals
of Rein and Stormont because of the costs involved in
establishing an undenominational public school. Clearly
reluctant to make a decisive judgement on the schools at this

109. SGE 1/396 Rein to SGE 24/1/03.

110. Rein's assertions were corroborated by a Report filed by
Inspector Logie in 1901. CA GH 35/84 "Memorandum on the
Ethiopian Movement in the Divisions of Queenstown and Victoria
East" Logie, T. 26/10/1901.

111. SGE 1/396 Rein to SGE 24/3/03.
stage, Dr. Muir was "content to leave the matter" in Rein's hands for "a little while longer".112

6.4 New Alliance Negotiated: New Dependency? 1903 - 1907

The events between 1898 and 1905 had culminated in an impasse. Even with Stormont absent, the APC was unable to make headway with respect to gaining grants-in-aid. Inspector Rein had managed to foil further exchanges aimed at winning Departmental recognition while the APC schools and student numbers continued to grow. Some kind of resolution was imperative.

The pivotal problem arising out of five years of struggle in the Victoria East schools was a total breakdown in the relationship between the APC and the UFC's white mission representatives. Various committee proposals suggested by Stormont and Rein were rejected as thinly camouflaged attempts to retain some level of mission control. However, the Mzimba-ites faced their own funding crisis and desperately needed to qualify for government grants, but wished to do so direct with the Education Department, thereby cutting out the missionary factor. This meant that APC leaders and teachers would have comparative autonomy in their schools between the quarterly scheduled visits by the schools inspector. To what extent their willingness to work with the Education Department reflected a belief in the integrity and impartiality of a government department, or a desperate need for financial support, or a desire to dissociate themselves from any connections with the UFC, was not apparent.

Meanwhile, the Superintendent General of Education seemed content to wait out the crisis because he knew that cutting out the mission churches and negotiating directly with the independent churches would create a precedent that could cause future difficulties for the Department of Education.

112. SGE 1/396 SGE to Rein 22/4/03.
It was at this point that Mzimba attempted a new strategy which involved having white intermediaries intervene on his behalf through their personal contacts with the Superintendent General of Education. To white politicians who endorsed his schools, Mzimba offered to orchestrate the voting support of his followers as a quid pro quo. In a letter he wrote in 1903 to the Reverend Dewdney Drew in Cape Town, Mzimba made the following proposition:

Now if you could get Dr. Muir to include in giving the grant (to) the Ely and Roxeni schools, it would be a grand success for your party ... the Sheshugu Voters are the key ... (to) success.\textsuperscript{113}

Mzimba also managed to persuade a Mr. Silberbauer, member of the Legislative Assembly for Tembuland, to canvas for the APC with government officials.\textsuperscript{114} The APC leader's endeavours to make educational gains through the agency of white parliamentary candidates in exchange for support at the polls eventually did pay off.

In the same year, he approached Messrs. Slater and King, members of the Legislative Assembly for Victoria East, about the state of education in the division. They in turn interviewed the Superintendent General of Education on Mzimba's behalf, and stressed the lack of educational provision for Africans while downplaying the problem of white control in the schools. The Superintendent General of Education, who appeared to be susceptible to personal representations, relented.\textsuperscript{115} After some negotiation, Muir


\textsuperscript{114} Merriman Papers MSC 15 No.156 P. Mzimba to Drew 1/9/1903.

\textsuperscript{115} Liefeldt was also able to lobby successfully for a grant by emphasising that it would be a "great pity" if the
suggested that as a "temporary measure ... in view of the neglected state of education in Sheshugu, the (APC) school should, if possible, be opened under the Department with a Mr Smith as correspondent". Smith was a storekeeper who appeared to have a good reputation among Africans in the locality.

On the same day that Mzimba's intermediaries, Slater and King, received the Superintendent General of Education's assent, they cabled an urgent telegram to one Edwin Lock in Alice, proclaiming: "This is a great concession from the Department. You should therefore see Rev. Mzimba and get him and Smith to agree. Reply unlimited prepaid".

The offer represented a strategic breakthrough for the Presbyterian Church of Africa for it indicated that the Education Department was prepared to bypass mission church influence. But this did not alter the basic problem of control because the Superintendent General of Education was still determined to maintain white supervision, although now in secular rather than religious form. If Muir was concerned as to the soundness of his decision, the Mzimba-ites, for their part, must have pondered the extent to which they could accrue benefits from the arrangement.

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116. SGE 1/396 SGE to General Correspondence 14/7/03; Merriman Papers, MSC 15 No.156 P. Mzimba to Drew 1/9/1903.

117. SGE 1/396 Members, Victoria East to Lock 14/7/03.

118. During this period, the UFC schools were suffering further setbacks because of APC activity. Rev Holford Mama of the UFC, reported that attendance at Gillton school was seriously affected by the new opening of two "Ethiopian Movement" schools which had "drawn some good numbers of children to themselves". In addition, the UFC seemed to be losing ground to another mission church. At Calderwood school, Mama feared that a new Wesleyan school opened nearby would "totally ruin the (UFC) attendance" figures. SGE 1/396 Mama to SGE 9/6/03, Mama to SGE 21/9/03.
The APC's response to the cable was revealing. It showed that the Mzimba-ites knew the choice of correspondent was a strategic one, because they preferred J.B. Liefeldt, the Inspector of Native Locations in Victoria East, to Smith the storekeeper. The reason for their decision may be found partly in Liefeldt's status as a part of the hierarchy of Native Affairs Department administration. It is likely that Liefeldt was favoured purely because he, as a public servant, provided greater legitimacy than a private storekeeper. Although the APC had exercised their opportunity to chose the man to represent them, they could not foresee all the possible consequences - both positive and negative - that could arise from their decision.

In terms of the APC relationship with Liefeldt, mission control had been exchanged for indirect government control because the APC was more under the eye of the Native Affairs Department than UFC mission agents. Whether this arrangement worked towards the consolidation of colonial control over the APC schools, or whether it actually allowed them more autonomy will become apparent in the course of this account. Joseph Benjamin Liefeldt was the eighth child of Ludwig Liefeldt, a King William's Town based clergyman of the Berlin Missionary society, and his wife Henriette, who originated from Berlin in the Eastern Cape. He was the youngest brother of the well known Martin William Liefeldt, a magistrate who did service in the Transkei. The Civil Service Lists of the Cape Colony indicate that Liefeldt was appointed to a position in the Civil Service in 1878. No information on his early career is noted until he became Inspector of Native Locations(INL) in Alexandria in 1885, a post which he held until 1888. In that year, he became INL in Victoria East, and held the position until 1910.

119. SGE 1/396 Lock to Members, Victoria East 31/8/03.
120. CCP 11/4/5 to 1/4/26 Civil Service List 1878-1910.
When Muir finally accepted Liefeldt as correspondent for the African Presbyterian Church in the fourth quarter of 1903, a grant for Sheshugu APC school was confirmed. He knew that the application for Sheshugu APC school could not be refused on the grounds of proximity to any UFC school or for lack of appropriate supervision. Muir was also aware that the arrangement with Liefeldt to enable Sheshugu to operate was only the thin end of the wedge, and that soon Mzimba would attempt to have more of his APC schools recognised under Liefeldt's supervision.

The Superintendent General of Education had done what he could to secure white control over the affairs of the Sheshugu APC school, and was keenly interested in its progress. Sheshugu APC school was in effect a crucial test case for educational control in which an African independent church and a representative of the Native Affairs Department worked together without the influence of the missions. Consequently, Muir requested Inspector Rein to draw up "a Report on the Sheshugu school with special reference to its present management and success or otherwise" as well as a short general report on the conditions at other UFC school-centres (See Table 5).

The report was interesting less for what it revealed about Sheshugu than for the information it provided about eight other APC schools in the Victoria East Division. Two schools at Roxeni and Ely were in APC communities where the UFC had, in Rein's words, been "entirely ousted". Because UFC schools no longer existed at these sites, there was "nothing to debar" the existing APC schools from qualifying for grants as they

121. Hayston Kiwit was headteacher with three others including Marianne Mzimba and Sarah Ann Mzimba, presumably Mzimba's family. SGE 1/396 Lock to SGE 15/9/03.

122. SGE 1/448 Secretary, Department of Education to Rein 8/3/04.
were literally outside the radius of operations of any other mission school.\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{TABLE 5}

\textbf{Summary of Conditions in African Presbyterian Church Schools: 1904\textsuperscript{124}}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APC Schools</th>
<th>Staff Numbers</th>
<th>Closest Mission School and Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheshugu</td>
<td></td>
<td>No mission school nearby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxeni</td>
<td></td>
<td>No mission school nearby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ely</td>
<td></td>
<td>No mission school nearby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaga</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Gaga(UFC) 10 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganda(Ngobe)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Ganda(UFC) 50 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dikeni(Lovedale)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Lovedale(UFC) 800 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwarwa</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Ncera(WES) 2 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwezana</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Kwezana(UFC) 250 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gillton</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Gillton(UFC) 0.75 mile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{UFC} = United Free Church School  
\textit{WES} = Wesleyan Church School

The evidence provided in Rein's report suggests how intense the competition between the APC and UFC schools groups must have been. The extreme closeness of the buildings to each other depicts how the school communities were divided from within over the issue of school and church allegiance.\textsuperscript{125} That most of the eight APC schools identified by Rein had existed over a number of years without government funding, gives some measure of the tenacity of the APC school groups.

Within one school term of registering Sheshugu with the Education Department, Liefeldt in his capacity as treasurer and correspondent indicated that he was "willing to undertake the same duties in connection with the other (APC) schools

\textsuperscript{123. SGE 1/448 Rein to SGE 6/4/04.}

\textsuperscript{124. SGE 1/448 Rein to SGE 6/4/04.}

\textsuperscript{125. Also significant is that the Wesleyan school at Ncera was threatened, indicating that the conflict in the schools was not necessarily a simple denominational one.}
should they come under the Department".126 By this stage, the
Ely and Roxeni UFC schools could not be disqualified from
receiving grants on the basis of their proximity to another
school. This was not because there was no UFC mission school
in the immediate vicinity, but because Mzimba-ite schools had
drawn students away from the former UFC schools which were
then forced to close down. In his despatches, Rein expressed
apprehensions that unrestrained allocation of grants, would
encourage independent schools and that Mzimba's followers
would plot the dissolution of other UFC mission schools in
order to qualify for grants:

If a grant were given unconditionally, I
am afraid that this would be regarded by
Mzimba's followers and others as a premium
for the encouragement of further agitation
in those centres where hitherto the
Ethiopian movement has not met with the
same measure of success.127

But before Rein could reiterate his objections, the APC
schools were plunged into crisis. Liefeldt resigned his post
in July 1904, thereby fundamentally threatening the future of
the schools.128

Liefeldt claimed that he had resigned "owing to the lack of
(want of) interest" on the part of the Sheshugu school
committee. He alleged that he had experienced great difficulty
in convening meetings of the managers and parents, who had
failed to conduct school business to his satisfaction.129 On

126. SGE 1/448 Secretary, Department of Education to Rein
8/3/04.

127. The key principle of further negotiations for Rein was
that some agreement should be made to prevent this from
happening, such as by issuing of grants conditional on APC
'non-aggression'. Such a restriction if implemented, could
have severely curtailed the PCA's schooling. SGE 1/448 Rein
to SGE 6/4/04.

128. SGE 1/448 Liefeldt to SGE 16/7/04.

129. SGE 1/448 Liefeldt to SGE 16/7/04. The APC schools had
operating committees, which had obviously troubled Liefeldt.
According to Mzimba's evidence before the South African Native
the basis of Liefeldt's letter, the Department of Education promptly suspended the grant to Sheshugu. This time the Superintendent General of Education was determined that the "whole question as to the position of these (APC) schools" would "have to be thoroughly dealt with". The outlook seemed bleak. The APC stood to lose Education Department support for Sheshugu and fall out of favour with the Department entirely. If this happened, the APC schools would never be favoured with grants again. The controversy over Liefeldt's resignation deepened when the school committee of Sheshugu stoutly defended the parents. In a strongly worded rebuttal, the committee claimed that as far as they could see, "the parents have taken and are taking a great interest in the education of their children". Moreover, the committee members countered Liefeldt's criticism with their own, alleging that he "never visited" the school nor "properly summoned" them to meetings. Accordingly, they accepted Liefeldt's resignation and proposed a Mr. Ballantyne - "whom we think will have better interest" - as the new correspondent.

However, Inspector Rein was implacably opposed to the proposal, basing his argument on the assumption that

Affairs Commission, the APC schools which received government funding had committees elected from the parents. At other schools not receiving aid, the committee consisted of the minister and a deacon's court. Evidence of Rev. P. Mzimba SANAC p.794[10916-10926].

130. SGE 1/448 SGE to Rein 20/7/04.

131. SGE 1/448 J.B. van Reenen to SGE 4/7/04, P.J.Mzimba, Elijah Mzimban, Jas.N.Kula, K.Mgijima, K.Madubedube to SGE 30/7/04.

132. The committee also appointed Edwin Mpinda as principal of Sheshugu in the place of the less qualified E.Mzimba. The school gained in credibility because Mpinda, formerly an APC minister in Sheshugu, possessed a third class teacher's certificate. This was a deliberate move by the Sheshugu community to bolster the image of the school in preparation for defending their right to a grant. SGE 1/448 Liefeldt to SGE 18/7/04, P.J.Mzimba, Elijah Mzimban, Jas.N.Kula, K.Mgijima, K.Madubedube to SGE 30/7/04.
Ballantyne, a trader, would be less able than a government official to manage the school successfully. Although Ballantyne indicated his willingness to act as correspondent, the Civil Commissioner at Alice corroborated Rein's negative prognosis for the scheme under a new correspondent. The future of Sheshugu, and of all the APC schools began to look more precarious. Yet oddly, subsequent to his resignation Liefeldt was still corresponding for the school. On 15 September 1904, two months after his 'departure', Liefeldt cabled the Department as follows; "Sheshugu school special request made to me to reconsider ... I have decided to withdraw it".

Most probably, Liefeldt had experienced some difficulty in working with the Sheshugu school committee. There may have been a dispute over his power vis a vis that of the committee's, or he might have felt that his authority had been questioned. His aim then was to impress upon the Sheshugu community that they were dependent on him, by resigning. The fact that he never gave up correspondence with the Education Department lends credence to an interpretation of his actions as being a stratagem to secure his position. By neatly exploiting his privileged position as broker between the APC and the Education Department, Liefeldt had confirmed his authority.

The crisis that Liefeldt's resignation precipitated, had important negative effects in the APC schools. Although he managed to consolidate his position of power over the Sheshugu parents, this victory was achieved at the expense of the

133. SGE 1/448 Rein to Murray 8/8/04.

134. SGE 1/448 CC Alice to Secretary, Department of Education 29/8/04, Ballantyne to SGE 30/7/04.

135. Significantly, it was not long after the grant was withdrawn at Sheshugu that the school committee made this "special request". SGE 1/448 Liefeldt to SGE 15/9/04; SGE 1/448 Liefeldt to SGE 18/7/04, SGE to Liefeldt 26/7/04, Liefeldt to SGE 20/8/04.
school itself. The Education Department would no longer recognise or fund it. While the Secretary for the Department expressed "gratification" that Liefeldt had resumed as correspondent, owing to alleged "unsatisfactory management and want of proper support" at Sheshugu, the matter was referred to the local inspector. This meant that the school had to struggle with financial shortfalls while it attempted to regain Departmental funding.136

Conditions deteriorated rapidly at Sheshugu, when in October, two teachers resigned their posts because they had received no salary and Liefeldt could offer no remuneration to applicants for teaching posts that he advertised. In late November, Liefeldt anxiously cabled the Department to enquire about teachers' salaries, but the Secretary of the Department of Education was adamant that he had not yet received "full assurance of the local support and management of this school," and he gave no promise of a grant.137 The position of the Department was endorsed by Inspector Rein who refused to recommend the re-issue of a grant, and urged that "some satisfactory modus vivendi be arrived at with Mr Mzimba and his followers with respect to the school centres in Victoria East".138 Fortunately for Sheshugu school, the Education Department Secretary, Charles Murray, chose to override Rein's objections in December 1904, and grants were issued retrospectively from July.139 Thus, Inspector Rein had temporarily lost the regional battle to restrict Mzimba's schools, while Liefeldt had won his battle for control over the Sheshugu parent community.

136. SGE 1/448 Secretary, Department of Education to Liefeldt 19/9/04.
137. SGE 1/448 Liefeldt to SGE 29/9/04, Liefeldt to Education Department 23/11/04, Liefeldt to SGE 24/11/04, Coley to Liefeldt 26/11/04.
138. SGE 1/448 Rein to Coley 24/11/04.
139. SGE 1/448 Liefeldt to SGE 3/12/04, Murray to Rein 6/12/04.
The restoration of grants-in-aid at Sheshugu proved to be a fillip to Liefeldt. In 1905, he began his campaign for government support of other APC schools, proposing to Muir that the APC be permitted to hire the former schoolhouses where UFC schooling had collapsed from the Lovedale Presbytery. His goal was to operate them as "public schools", thereby avoiding denominational rivalry. The plan was quashed by Lovedale's Dr. Stewart who was unwilling to allow the APC to use UFC facilities.

During this period, Liefeldt was approached by the headman and leaders of the Ely location with a request for salaries for three teachers at the Ely APC school which had been in independent operation since 1899 and boasted a daily enrollment of 150 children. Referring to Sheshugu as a precedent, Liefeldt motivated strongly for a government grant at Ely and promised that he would have "sole management" of the schools both in terms of financial control and in the selection and payment of teachers. Under these terms, the Superintendent General of Education accepted the proposition to bring Ely school under the financial patronage of the government.

The APC in the meantime, made further gains. Liefeldt personally visited the Education Department headquarters in December and requested government aid for Gillton, Rwarwa and Roxeni which recorded attendance figures of 80, 60 and between

140. SGE 1/498 Muir to General Correspondence 31/1/05.
141. SGE 1/498 Liefeldt to SGE 6/4/05.
142. SGE 1/498 Liefeldt to SGE 23/1/05.
143. The general correspondence of the quarterly reports of the SGE recorded the group of schools run by Liefeldt simply as 'B' schools, giving no indication of their denominational derivation. This suggests that the Department of Education officials wished to avoid formally acknowledging the schools. SGE 1/498 Liefeldt to SGE 10/3/05.
The applications for grants at Gillton and Kwarwa were unsuccessful on the grounds of their proximity to the UFC school at Gillton and the Wesleyan school at Ncera respectively, but a grant was given to Roxeni in early 1906. This proved to be Liefeldt's last success.

In the ensuing years Liefeldt made no more applications, and became increasingly careless and inefficient in administering the schools. As a result of his negligence, the salary of the Roxeni school principal was reduced, and another teacher received no salary for several months. Similar problems surfaced at Sheshugu school which led to the resignation of the principal, while the lowly first assistant teacher worked for four years without pay. Throughout this period, the schools were subject to rapid staff turnover, and Liefeldt was either unable to fill vacancies at all, or was forced to employ uncertificated teachers.

Liefeldt's maladministration of the schools may have been caused by overwork. In mid-1907 he was away interpreting for the Eastern Circuit Court in the Cape Colony and the Transkei. In mid-1909 he was absent from the district, and again in November on "special duty" in the Transvaal. These activities added to his workload as Inspector of Native Locations in Victoria East, and as correspondent of the APC schools. Why he

144. SGE 1/564 Murray to Rein 19/12/05.
145. SGE 1/564 Rein to SGE 26/12/05, SGE to Liefeldt 12/1/06.
146. SGE 1/834 N.A. Mahlutshana to SGE 8/5/09, N.A.Mahlutshana to SGE 7/6/09, Liefeldt to SGE 23/8/09; SGE 1/644 Liefeldt to SGE 4/7/07.
took on the additional responsibilities is not clear. He may have volunteered for "special duties" for which he received additional remuneration because he was short of money.149 Perhaps his ambition simply exceeded his work capacity. Whatever the cause, his maladministration had unpredictable consequences for the APC schools.

The complex relationship that Liefeldt developed with the APC held both advantages and disadvantages. That Liefeldt did contribute to the development of the APC's educational activities is undeniable, for the schools could not have achieved what they did without his mediation. Moreover, in pursuing the interests of the APC he was even prepared to defy the missions and the government. He consistently applied for grants to set up APC schools in opposition to the Presbyterian and Wesleyan missions schools, in full knowledge that the applications were in contravention of the three mile rule. In at least one instance, Liefeldt defied the instructions of the Agricultural Department in order to keep the chance alive for a grant at Gillton APC school. Inspector Rein could not fathom why this was so:

I am surprised that Mr Liefeldt, a government official, should ask for a grant for Gillton, in as much as the Civil Commissioner of Victoria East was on the 30th October 1902 instructed by the Under Secretary for Agriculture to have the erections removed that had been put up on lot 234 at Gillton. Why these instructions have not been carried out is a mystery to me.150

An explanation for this side to Liefeldt's handling of the schools lay perhaps in his conviction that the APC students could be better controlled in the schools than outside of

149. SGE 1/644 Liefeldt to SGE 14/5/07; SGE 1/834 N.A. Mahlutshana to SGE 8/5/09, Liefeldt to SGE 20/11/09.

150. SGE 1/564 Rein to SGE 26/12/05.
them. In 1902, Liefeldt had expressed his mind as follows in respect to the Ethiopian movement:

There is no doubt in my mind (if I may be allowed to express it) that in time to come these churches will cause serious and endless troubles and a stop should be put to them without delay. 151

In the light of the reservations that he expressed, Liefeldt must have believed that he was best qualified to control the APC communities through gaining further influence over their schools, in his capacity as Inspector of Native Locations. He certainly reacted in an authoritarian manner against any threat to his personal control over the schools which led to frequent clashes with APC personnel. 152 For example, in 1906, when the Reverend E. Mpinda, who had served Sheshugu school as Principal tended his resignation on the orders of Mzimba to fulfil "ministerial functions" Liefeldt would not accept his transfer. The Reverend Mpinda was convinced that the Inspector of Locations considered Mzimba's call an implicit challenge to his authority and accused Liefeldt of "challenging church authorities". 153 He argued that Liefeldt's decision had less to do with school administration than with autocratically enforcing his own will:

If it were a matter of scarcity of obtaining a teacher, I could serve the school with one ... But I don't think it is so with the manager save bullying. 154

This incident indicates clearly the line of cleavage between Liefeldt as manager of APC schools and Mzimba as church leader, the former placing secular matters before the interests of the church, and his own authority above that of

151. CA NA 498 Liefeldt to CC Victoria East 5/9/02.
152. He was also at one time, the Secretary for a white school in Alice.
153. SGE 1/644 E.G. Mpinda to SGE 27/10/06.
154. SGE 1/644 E.G. Mpinda to SGE 27/10/06.
Mzimba's. Thus the alliance that the APC sealed with Liefeldt was renegotiated in a number of incidents that seemed to further entrench his authority. It has been demonstrated that the APC's subordinate partnership in a relationship dominated by a colonial intermediary brought contradictory results. A crucial characteristic of this dependent relationship was that the APC could not escape it without abandoning its school operations.

6.5 Strategic Struggles: Amalgamation of Opposing School Communities

In 1905, seven years after the secession, tensions between APC and mission-loyal people in Victoria East showed no sign of abating. More centres of Mzimba-ite schooling opposition had been established at Gwali, Ncera and Yamala. Despite constant problems with fading attendance figures, and consequent loss of grants in their schools, loyal UFC members, the Reverends Elijah Makiwane of Macfarlan and Holford Mama of Gaga, determinedly responded to the disruption of their UFC schools.

They adopted a number of strategies to staunch the flow of APC away from their schools. Midway through the decade of conflict between the churches, Makiwane employed a successful device to combat losses in student attendance. The Education Department routinely terminated grants in aid to mission schools where attendance dropped below a given level of student attendance. Because the UFC schools were losing students to the APC schools, they were in danger of losing grants. Makiwane had to maintain attendance totals as high as possible, either by winning APC adherents, or by inflating student totals in some other way. He could do little about the losses to the APC, but by raising the tuition offered at Kwezana school to higher levels - such as from Standard 3 to Standard 5 - Makiwane could keep students at school for a longer period. This

155. SGE 1/498 Lennox to SGE 5/8/05.
effectively raised the total attendance figures so that they exceeded the number below which grants were withdrawn.156

By offering Standard 5, the school stood to gain student numbers because it could register children who had left other schools with a lower final grade such as Standard 3 and who were looking for higher schooling opportunities.157 In this way, Kwezana could even succeed in drawing students from Mzimba's schools, none of which offered tuition to Standard 5. Kwezana also had the opportunity to register children of other denominations or those who could not afford to go to the premier mission institution, Lovedale.158 Makiwane and Mama were forced to develop such strategies in the struggle to revitalise their crisis-ridden schools and to recapture the schoolgoing population of Victoria East.

Makiwane and Mama were able to pull off a coup in the later phase of the conflict by amalgamating the hitherto antagonistic APC and UFC factions in certain schools. One of the most significant events in the short and embattled existence of the APC schools was announced by Inspector Rein when in August 1906, he wrote to inform the Superintendent General of Education that at Ganda Location the rival UFC and APC schools had been "amalgamated".159 This surprising rapprochement between the competing church factions soon occurred in other schools. In the same month, the government aided UFC mission, and APC "opposition" schools at Kwezana were amalgamated. An agreement was struck which allowed for

156. In mid 1905 Rev. Mama explained that the low attendance figures at Gaga school were caused by losses to the APC. The low standard offered at the school - in this case Standard 3 - was cited as a contributory factor. SGE 1/498 Mama to SGE 16/5/05.

157. In 1907, Makiwane was still advocating Kwezana as the school to which "the upper classes of the neighbouring schools can be sent". SGE 1/544 Makiwane to SGE 6/9/07.

158. SGE 1/498 Makiwane to SGE 24/7/05.

159. SGE 1/564 Rein to SGE 25/8/06.
the establishment of a committee of eight representatives from both parties under the jurisdiction of the minister of Macfarlan Mission, Makiwane, as Chairman and Correspondent. Less than eighteen months later, former rival schools of the APC and UFC were united at Gaga, with UFC Reverend Holford Mama as the manager.

Although the amalgamation of the schools seemed to contradict the separatist political agenda of the APC community, both sides clearly stood to accrue educational benefits. Whereas, individually, two competing schools could not qualify for grants-in-aid because their respective attendance figures were too low, with consolidation, total student numbers enabled enrollment figures to exceed the sub-minimum above which grants-in-aid were awarded. The amalgamated schools were also able to make best possible use of their most precious and scarce resource, the teachers and the unified schools could save funds by avoiding unnecessary duplication of materials and equipment.

According to attendance figures filed by Mama and Makiwane, student numbers continued to grow after the initial amalgamation of the schools. Such information was clear evidence for the success of the joint operations. Nevertheless, despite such benefits, the amalgamated institutions were an uncomfortable compromise because the matter of control was as volatile as ever. APC and UFC adherents were determined as a matter of denominational pride to claim responsibility for and authority in the schools. The right to declare dominion over the amalgamated schools was a matter of prestige to both church communities. It was even more important for each church group to be fairly represented in the committees. Fears were expressed that such bodies would

160. SGE 1/564 Makiwane to SGE 6/8/06.
161. SGE 1/740 Mama to SGE 23/1/08.
162. SGE 1/564 Makiwane to SGE 6/8/06, Mama to SGE 28/7/06.
not be able to ensure that the benefits accrued through amalgamation were distributed evenly amongst pupils of both churches. In addition, friction persisted between management and school staff where they were from formerly opposed church groups.

It would appear that the management of these schools was seldom conducted fairly, and that the amalgamations invariably worked to the advantage of the UFC. The Reverend Makiwane knew that he could count on the sympathies of the Education Department against the APC in the event of any difficulties. At Kwezana school, he provisionally appointed one Hector Ningi, a former teacher at Mzimba's school, making it clear to the Superintendent General of Education that the appointment was "in the interest of the amalgamation and to tide over the difficulties which still remain(ed)". Makiwane was careful to distance himself from the decision by emphasising that it was done "in the name of the Committee" at Kwezana. He went out of his way to show that he did not consider Ningi a competent teacher, and to convince the Superintendent General of Education that this was a necessary political appointment. In doing so, he was carefully insuring himself in advance against any trouble that could arise.

Underlying tensions in the newly combined schools eventually drew Makiwane into open conflict with Mzimba-ite staff. In the second year of amalgamation at Gaga school, the Principal Petros Mafu, who was an APC supporter, and had served four years in schools under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education, was threatened with demotion. Inspector Rein had determined with Mama's agreement that Mafu was an "absolute

163. SGE 1/564 Makiwane to SGE 6/8/06.

164. Similarly, at the Gaga school, Holford Mama also applied for the "provisional" appointment of uncertificated Nancy Grace Nzube who was a former APC school teacher. However, Mama camouflaged her previous connections by stating that she had taught at a "Private School". SGE 1/564 Mama to SGE 28/7/08.
failure" and "wholly unfitted" for the responsible position. Mafu presented an entirely different version. He pointed out that as a result of the amalgamation, children had been allocated to standards higher than their capabilities. This was condoned to avoid confrontation between the two school groups, but Mafu had not been afforded sufficient time to make progress with these students before the inspection by T.W. Rein. Mafu bore the brunt of the blame for the poor results that were achieved:

The teacher was to do nothing against this awkward arrangement for if he does anything against, that will mean another separation. So I was obliged to let these children remain in the classes they are said to be in. As for myself I had only two full Quarters, I mean before the Inspector came.

In this case, Mafu was an innocent victim. In the interests of a trouble-free amalgamation, he had allowed students into standards above their capabilities. While under attack from the Inspector, he received no support from Mama who clearly wanted him out. Initially, Mafu appeared to survive the expulsion attempt, but was shortly afterwards transferred to another school in the division. This incident illustrates how the tenuous position of Mafu at Gaga school was clearly a consequence of unresolved conflicts between the two school factions. Mafu’s statement that "... this amalgamation is not a fair one" was corroborated by the fact that there was not one APC manager-correspondent. All three amalgamated schools were administered by UFC correspondents, the Revs. Makiwane and Mama.

Despite the fact that they had representation on the committees of Gaga, Ganda and Kwezana, the APC people had

165. SGE 1/840 Rein to Long 10/7/08.
166. SGE 1/840 Petros Mafu to SGE 28/6/08.
167. SGE 1/840 Petros Mafu to SGE 28/6/08.
effectively ceded control to UFC churchmen through the committee structures. Furthermore, the amalgamated schools were registered with the Department of Education under the banner of the UFC.\textsuperscript{168} This account suggests that Makiwane and Mama were extremely successful in thwarting the impetus of the APC schools through their ability to wrest the advantage in the amalgamated schools. Although there is no unequivocal evidence which confirms that the decision of APC parents to amalgamate was based on the conviction that the rationalisation of facilities, money and energy would be for the benefit of the schools, this was probably the major consideration. Thus the once-opposed APC and UFC schools factions in certain locations called an uneasy truce in which essential educational preoccupations and desires transcended religious, ethnic and political divisions.

7. Social Cleavage and the Schools Struggle in the Locations: 1900-1909

This study has observed that the declining economic conditions and rising population pressure in the Ciskei peaked in the same decade that the APC - UFC church and schools conflict erupted. In the light of grim economic realities, it is unsurprising that heightened tensions and the lingering prospect of violence were evident in the locations and schools of Victoria East. In this context land, school, church and ethnic conflicts overlapped. In the struggle over access to land and school benefits, ethnic and church allegiances were of paramount importance because numerically or economically dominant factions were able to secure privileged access to scarce resources.

Citing the example of a feud between Xhosa Baptists and Mfengu members of the Church of England in Middledrift, where land allocation was used as a weapon to disadvantage opposing ethnic and church factions, Lewis observes; "Where there was a

\textsuperscript{168} SGE 1/564 Makiwane to SGE 5/8/06, SGE 1/740 Mama to SGE 28/7/08; SGE 1/834 Makiwane to SGE 19/6/09."
church presence in a location, the disputes often took the form of a clash between rival church groupings. These conflicts could become particularly intense when church allegiance coincided with Xhosa and Mfengu splits. The same dynamics were observable in conflicts between APC adherents and UFC loyalists in Victoria East.

The Reverends Pambani Mzimba, Elijah Makiwane, Chief Bovane Mabandla and other influential headmen in Victoria East each exploited the rhetoric of ethnicity, of church allegiance, of education or modernity, and traditionalism in order to rally support in their favour. As members of the school elite, they were able to mobilise support from the rural-based petty bourgeoisie and from the far more numerous and less prosperous rural dwellers many of whom were being extruded from the land in the process of proletarianisation. In 1904, only 1,523 Africans were urban residents of Victoria East in town at Alice - over half of them students - while 14,023 lived in the rural locations. The APC was gaining considerable support from the largely rural African population of Victoria East where links between headmen, the Christian educated elites, and peasant farmers were being forged in the locations.

Of crucial importance was the orientation of local headmen in Victoria East. It has been shown in Chapter 2 that the headman could extend patronage by permitting encroachment on commonage in order to build a support base for the school, church or ethnic group to which he gave allegiance. Reverend Makiwane himself declared "... if the headmen were not taking such an active part as headmen, there would not have been so many"

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followers (of the APC). It is precisely this factor that was so important to the growth of APC school activity in Victoria East.

The leading APC actor in the battle for ascendency over location schools was Chief Mabandla because Mzimba was frequently occupied with ecclesiastical responsibilities. As a result of his ability to mobilise large proportions of the rural population of Victoria East in his favour, Chief Mabandla could intervene directly in the schools. The strong local support that he received led to the success of the Rwarwa APC school which was built on a plot he owned within three miles of Yamala, Sampondo and Ncera UFC mission schools. Mabandla used all channels at his disposal to gain recognition. In 1905 he attempted to bring pressure to bear on local white politicians including Messrs. G. Whitaker and F. Ginsberg, both members of the legislative Assembly for King William's Town, and Colonel Crewe of the Colonial Office.


173. The relationships between African clergy and chiefs are discussed by Mills, W.G. (1975) pp.190-244.


175. SGE 1/564 Makiwane to SGE 2/3/05.

176. Over three months after the meeting with Colonel Crewe, and over eighteen months after the original request had been submitted to the SGE, another letter was sent to the Colonial Office, in July 1906. In August 1907, the ever persistent Mabandla and 12 residents again requested a grant from the SGE. SGE 1/564 Mabandla and six others to Colonel Crewe 23/6/06, SGE 1/644 Residents of Mabandla's location to SGE 24/8/06. The SGE also replied to enquiries made by G. Whitaker, MLA under pressure from Mabandla. The member for King Williams Town was made aware by the SGE that 1907 was "an unfortunate year to ask for increased expenditure on new schools. SGE 1/644 Millard to Whitaker 2/9/07, SGE to Mabandla for self and others 14/9/07. Liefeldt informed the Colonial Secretary's office that a grant of £15 per school per annum would satisfy Mabandla's people. SGE 1/644 P. Hunter to Muir 9/5/05.
Other headmen, some of whom were councillors of Mabandla, set up schools in the locations in conjunction with APC communities although none of these actually succeeded in gaining government grants. In one instance, headman Nicholas Bovula attempted to obtain a site for an APC school at Gillton School, the very institution that he himself had attended, first as a schoolboy, and then as a UFC teacher. Perceiving his dissident church connection to be the main obstacle in the path of getting ground for a school, Bovula made a private application for a school site through a Mr. J. Charlton, Law Agent of Alice. Bovula and his supporters made further attempts to avoid having to apply for recognition from the Department of Education by claiming directly to the Agricultural Department for an allotment of land. Interdepartmental communications put paid to this ruse.

School affairs were conducted in an atmosphere of simmering tension that gripped the division. In 1904 the destruction by fire of Reverend Makiwane’s mission house at Macfarlan was attributed to APC supporters. Inspector Liefeldt, who was

177. Headmen of the APC strongholds, Ely, Gaga, Roxeni and Kwezana were making enquiries in 1898, being anxious to secure titles in the name of the people rather the UFC church. CA 1/ALC D2/1 INL to CC 7/5/1898. People of Yantolo’s Location under headman Mqualo were running a school without government aid in 1904. CA 1/ALC D2/1 INL to Mcapukiso Mqalo 5/11/02, INL to CC 25/1/04. In 1909, at Sompondo’s UFC school, reduced attendance was due largely to the withdrawal of children to an ‘opposition’ school run by ‘seceders’. In 1909, at Sompondo’s UFC school, reduced attendance was due largely to the withdrawal of children to an opposition school run by “seceders”. SGE 1/834 Makiwane to SGE 1/3/09; Interview, Chief Mabandla, 23/5/1991.


179. SGE 7/5 SGE to Rein Letter No.91 n.d.; CA NA 577/B1455 Memorandum. Dower to CC Victoria East 8/10/04; SGE 10/5 SGE to Agricultural Department 23/4/1903.

180. SGE 1/498 Makiwane to SGE 20/7/05; PR 1139 Lennox, Rev. J., "Notable Native Pioneers. 1. A Loyal South African Pastor" p.173
"not at all surprised" at the incident of arson felt "quite safe in saying this (was) not to be the end" of hostilities.\textsuperscript{181} Threats of violence were made against the UFC missionaries, teachers in UFC schools, parents and the children who attended them.\textsuperscript{182} Another indication of rising tensions was the repeated applications in 1904 by Reverend Makiwane and others and then by Chief Mabandla and six others, to purchase double-barrel shotguns for "shooting vermin and birds".\textsuperscript{183} Vermin was a sporadic problem, but Liefeldt argued that the applications had less to do with pests and more with the desire for firepower. "The main idea of the natives", he said, "is to have a gun".\textsuperscript{184} Animosities were so intense that Liefeldt became concerned not to appear partisan and wrote, "I cannot be too careful with the different dissidents. They keep a vigilant watch over me to see if I side with any particular party". Liefeldt, and the Civil Commissioner were further hampered because Mzimba's brother had for some time been the Assistant Clerk and Interpreter in the Magistrate's office. Consequently, both men had to gather information privately and avoid using Mzimba's services in order to preserve confidentiality.\textsuperscript{185}

Church allegiance was a crucial determinant in Mabandla's allocation of resources in the rural locations he controlled,

\textsuperscript{181} Special care was taken lest any correspondence on the volatile issue be allowed into the hands of Africans employed in the NAD and local CC and RM's offices. CA NA 428 1/780 INL to RM Victoria East 6/9/04.

\textsuperscript{182} CA GH 35/84 "Memorandum on the Ethiopian Movement in the Divisions of Queenstown and Victoria East" Logie, T. 26/10/1901; MS 7516 "Report on incident at Sheshugu. An outlying church of the Native congregation of Lovedale" Stormont and others 9/10/1898, "Re. Gaqa Station Church" Stormont and others. 25/7/1898.

\textsuperscript{183} CA 1/ALC D2/1 INL to RM 6/1/04, INL to CC 14/6/04, INL to RM 22/8/04.

\textsuperscript{184} CA 1/ALC D2/1 INL to RM 22/8/04.

\textsuperscript{185} TA NTS 132 Liefeldt to CC 6/8/1908; NA 498 CC to S.NAD 6/9/1902.
where he sought to increase his support base through selectively dispensing patronage. Thus APC and UFC-loyal factions were locked in a struggle over commodities other than education. The African locations of Victoria East were surveyed in the late 1880's and quitrent title deeds issued to a number of residents in respect of residential land and arable garden lots. Through this process, Mabandla himself acquired two pieces of residential land of 108 square feet in dimension and five morgen of arable land for a garden in 1888. Mabandla had no direct control over land legally issued in this manner, but the location lands were not all comprehensively surveyed, nor fully occupied until later. In respect to these lands, he was able to exercise influence through manipulating access to commonage.

The proximity of Macfarlan mission, the base of Reverend Makiwane, to Mabandla's location made confrontation between these two men inevitable. Mabandla had in fact been a former deacon in the Macfarlan Church and took half the congregation with him into Mzimba's APC. In 1900, Makiwane made persistent claims that Mabandla was favouring APC adherents in the allocation of garden lots. In 1908, he complained to the Inspector of Native Locations that Mabandla was planning to

186. During the same period, the people of Mabandla's location were also under pressure from a Hlubi faction over grazing land. Faction fights in 1904 and 1905 ensued after this group from Seven Kloofs encroached on Mabandla's land, resulting in several deaths. CA NA 703 B2852 F. Gillwald to Commissioner Commanding Cape Mounted Police 29/12/04, J.B. Liefeldt INL to Office of Inspector of Natives 30/1/1905.

187. TA NTS 132 Makiwane to Liefeldt 8/7/1908; TA NTS 132 Makiwane to Liefeldt 9/7/1908. Mabandla's grandson claims that his forebear could not have allocated commonage as this would not have been allowed by the resident community. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that, given his support base, it was within Mabandla's power to manipulate access to commonage. Headmen like Mabandla were less powerful than those on Crown land in the Transkei where they could pace out land for clients of their own accord. Interview, Chief Mabandla 23/5/1991. Rev. L.L. Gaqa 9/5/1991.

survey a portion of the Yamala commonage and to give this out as garden lots.

Makiwane also claimed that many people had joined the APC for fear of being subjected to "petty persecution in various ways," and that Mabandla had "used strong threats against all those who declined to follow him" into Mzimba's church.\footnote{189} Apparently, Chief Mabandla also acted as a broker for agents recruiting labour in the district, in the process favouring APC supporters who wanted to earn cash by giving them the best job opportunities.\footnote{190} In APC dominated locations, the independent church members harassed members of the UFC by spoiling their lands and disturbing their stock:

The latter impound the cattle of the former on every opportunity, members of their denomination are exempt. They are not allowed to water their stock at certain private holdings, nor are they invited to any festivities. Many other trifling matters have occurred that cannot altogether be proved, such as driving stock by night into the lands of the members of the Free Church.\footnote{191}

At the Gqunahase location, access to firewood on the commonage was disputed, causing Robert Fini to complain, that APC "men are seceders from our church and they are unlawfully mixing commonage and religion".\footnote{192} From the evidence it is clear that

\footnote{189} SGE 1/564 Makiwane to G.W. Whitaker MLA 20/2/05; Similar accusations were contained in letters of complaint that Makiwane sent to the SNA, W.E.M. Stanford. CA NA 414 Makiwane to Stanford 1/9/99.

\footnote{190} Mabandla for his part countered that Makiwane's statements were "false and misleading". CA 1/ALC D2/1 INL to Headman Bovane Mabandla 10/5/1900, INL to Headman Bovane Mabandla 7/5/1900; CA NA 428 1/780 Makiwane and nine others to SNA 15/6/04; CA GH 35/84 "Notes on the Ethiopian Movement by the Rev.E.Makiwane" 12/11/1901 p.4; Stewart Papers, EC 106 C167.38 Makiwane's Statement re Macfarlan, 1899.

\footnote{191} CA NA 498 INL to CC Victoria East 5/9/02. TA NTS 132 "Verbatim Report of Mr.J.B.Liefeldt, Inspector of Native Locations". Attached to Memorandum, W.G.Cumming S.NAD n.d.

\footnote{192} TA NTS 132 Fini to Liefeldt 5/8/1908.
measures taken against UFC members involved restricting vital access to water, land and fuel, and spoiling productive agricultural activity.

Tensions ran high in the locations for the best part of the decade. A series of verbal clashes between Mabandla and Makiwane revealed that the basic church and school disputes were cross-cut by a set of other possible allegiances. Elements of the "traditional" - modern, Christian - "heathen", school - blanket\textsuperscript{193}, and ethnic cleavages were evident in their interactions. Depending on circumstances, both men attempted to draw on a variety of possible identifications in order to mobilise local residents in their favour.

The Xhosa - Mfengu division was a frequent motif in the disputes between UFC and APC groups. For example, in 1904, Chief Mabandla accused the Reverend Makiwane, who was Mfengu, for his duplicity towards the Xhosa people of the location.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{193} Hunt-Davis refers to "school - blanket", while Mayer uses the terms "school - red" to indicate different responses in African society to colonial contact. In his book "Townsmen and Tribesmen," which traced Red and School strategies in coping with labour migration, Mayer associated Red people with militant conservatism and School people with modernising characteristics. More recently, Mayer has addressed some of the imbalances and dichotomous conceptual rigidity of his earlier work. He admits that the process of proletarianisation affected Red and School groups equally, both having proportions of poor landless, and of prosperous. His work is not particularly useful for this study as it focuses on the cultural - which is inadequately defined - rather than the political. His categories do not adequately capture the complexity of the social fabric in the period under investigation where the construction of identity was not static and where allegiance was often apparently contradictory. Hunt-Davis, R. (1979) pp. 12-31; Mayer, P., Townsmen or Tribesmen (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1961); Mayer, P., "The Origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance Ideologies" In: Mayer, P. (ed.) Black Villagers in an Industrial Society (Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1980)pp.1-67; Beinart, W. and Bundy, C. (1987) p.26

\textsuperscript{194} CA NA 428 1/780 Makiwane and nine others to SNA 15/6/04. According to Sundkler, Mziima and his adherents were largely Mfengu, while those who remained loyal to the UFC were mainly Xhosa. Sundkler, B.G.M. (1961) p.43; Wells, J. (1909) p.295.
Makiwane and his supporters were called "white men or Britains(sic)" because they refused to join the APC, and were accused of not being "true to their nation, because the (APC) movement (was) regarded as the building up of the Africans as a people". For his part, Mabandla complained that the intention of Makiwane's supporters was to undermine his position as headman and to prejudice the government against him. He warned his followers against listening to "the advice of parties who boasted of being educated", and caricatured Mzimba as one "who thought himself somebody because he was said to be a minister" and "who wanted to be a chief". These phrases highlight the key points of difference between the two men; Mabandla the chief, determined to preserve his accustomed authority against Makiwane, whose authority and power derived from his position as an educated African Christian within the structure of the UFC mission church.

The Reverend Stormont was convinced that ethnic allegiance was important in drawing people to Mzimba who as a Mfengu, had attracted most, though not all, of the UFC Mfengu congregations. Accordingly Stormont argued that the "spirit of anti-tribal bitterness has shown itself in various ways. Fingo and Kafir have taken sides". Similarly, Lovedale missionary W.G.Bennie asserted "long before 1907 ... a Xhosa

Currently Xhosa - Mfengu rivalry is not clearly recalled in the ward of Chief Mabandla. Interview, Chief Mabandla 23/5/1991.


196. CA NA 428 1/780 Bovane Mabandla to SNA 20/05/04.

197. CA NA 428 1/780 Makiwane and nine others to SNA 15/6/04.

198. MS 10697 "The Ethiopian movement among the Native churches" D.D.Stormont; Just after the APC seceded from the UFC, Stormont was convinced that the dissidents would destroy themselves. He remarked; "The Kafirs stand aside, and look with pleasure upon the 'political destruction' of the Fingoes by themselves". MS 7512 Stormont to Stevenson 15/8/1899.
among Fingoes or vice versa had a thin time and feeling was very pronounced. Although ethnic explanations for the conflict enjoyed great currency among UFC missionaries and Native Affairs Department officials, they also identified what they believed were other causes.

Inspector Rein declared that "the whole Ethiopian movement (was) in reality less a religious one than a political agitation on distinctly racial lines". Stormont too, was preoccupied with political and religious causes:

Of course you will see a connection between church restlessness and the political for the two are entwined in South Africa in a strange way.... These are not coincidents - they are incidents of the same spirit that manifests itself in politics and religion. Truly we live in momentous times.

These examples demonstrate how Education Department, Native Affairs Department officials and missionaries understood conflicts within the Victoria East communities to be manifestations of religious, ethnic and ‘political’ differences rather than as evidence of competition at another level for increasingly scarce resources such as schooling and land. For example, the Inspector of Locations Liefeldt averred that the APC - UFC disputes were "not a land question at all, but a pure and religious question". This was but a partial insight into the problem. For it did not recognise that

199. MS 16321c W.G.Bennie to Shepherd 20/4/1933. Mquayi the biographer of Rev. Makiwane gives the ethnic division greater explanatory value. Jabavu considers that Mfengu - Xhosa conflict is exaggerated before the "Xhosa-Fingo holiday affair". MS 16321c Jabavu to Shepherd 8/2/1933; Interview, Mr. Makalima 21/1/1991.


201. MS 7512a "Report on Lovedale Native Congregation" Stormont to Mr. Stevenson 7/10/1899.

ethnic, political and religious identities were also catalysts for the mobilisation of African communities, in the struggle to maximise access to resources such as land and education.

This account of the schools struggle in the rural locations has demonstrated how residents were mobilised according to a wide range of possible identifications. This suggests that the rivalry between African Presbyterian Church and United Free Church supporters was not located solely amongst the Christian educated elite, but percolated through the entire Victoria East magistracy. It also involved those who, though not directly involved in school affairs, nevertheless gave their allegiance to either APC or UFC. It is therefore probable that the APC support-base was bolstered by backing from "less fortunate school people who had succumbed to economic pressures ... to cling onto the lower strata of the peasantry".

8. The Phase of Rapprochement: 1909 - 1912

What was dominantly a conflict between UFC and APC schooling initiatives between 1898 and 1906, developed into a vastly more complex affair in the following years. Between 1904 and 1910, the unity of the Mzimba schools was broken, with the amalgamation of UFC and APC school communities at Gaga, Ganda and Kwezana. This change in the dynamics of community conflict around the Victoria East schools, from a simple UFC - APC conflict to greater diversity does not admit a simple explanation. Although it has been suggested that the desire

203. This is corroborated by Mills. He cites an upsurge of Xhosa-Mfengu ethnic antagonism - which he calls "factionalism" - in the neighbouring magistracy of King William's Town among Congregational Church people. Mills,W.G., "The Rift Within the Lute: Conflict and Factionalism in the 'School' Community in the Cape Colony, 1890-1915" Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Vol.15 (London, Institute of Contemporary Studies, University of London,1990)p.29.

for education superseded denominational antagonism, the amalgamations may also have reflected a weakening of Mzimba’s support in the affected schools. At other school sites, namely Ely, Roxeni and Sheshugu, the APC still held sway, but under the management of the Inspector of Native Locations, Liefeldt. This compromise reduced the potential for conflict between the UFC and the APC by the removal of the mission church from direct interaction with Mzimba’s people. Meanwhile, the APC’s relationship with government departments steadily improved. A major breakthrough occurred in 1907 when the Native Affairs Department granted recognition to APC ministers as marriage officers in the Cape Colony.205

In this final phase, while the schools conflict was lapsing into quietude, sometime during 1909, Mzimba’s signature began to appear on correspondence with the Education Department regarding the schools of Ely, Sheshugu and Roxeni. Mzimba continued acting as correspondent unofficially until March 1910, when Liefeldt on his departure from the magistracy finally arranged for Mzimba to take over as Manager and Correspondent.206 Communications between the Education Department, APC and UFC schools groups which hitherto had been charged with tension were focused on day to day problems, bureaucratic procedures and the functional administration of schools.

In its relationship with the UFC, the APC became increasingly conciliatory. Reverend Henderson of Lovedale arranged an ‘open day’ at the Institution in 1911. Mzimba accepted an invitation along with his erstwhile missionary school opponents Makiwane and Mama.207 His acceptance seemed to indicate that the APC


206. SGE 1/923 Mzimba to SGE 5/8/10, SGE to Mzimba 20/8/10, Mzimba to SGE 23/12/10, SGE to Mzimba 30/12/10; SGE 1/924 Liefeldt to SGE 18/3/10.

207. SGE 1/1020 Henderson to SGE 10/2/11.
was willing to be accepted as part of the Victoria East school network.

However, it soon became clear that the UFC had not entirely come to terms with the loss of its schools. Not long after Mzimba took over from Liefeldt, Lovedale began "making overtures" to him. In late 1910, the Reverend Henderson presented Mzimba with a proposal regarding the four schools Ely, Roxeni, Sheshugu and Kwezana which were still APC controlled. Henderson's proposal was to establish an education board with equal UFC and APC representation that would administer the four schools, school buildings and lands in question on condition that a Lovedale minister would act as Convener and correspondent. This was clearly a gambit by the UFC to regain control over the disputed properties which the APC held.

A committee of the Synod of the APC examined the proposed basis of agreement drafted by the Kaffrarian Synod. The crux of the proposal, that their schools at Ely, Roxeni, Sheshugu and Kwezana should come under 'joint' control was rejected out of hand. A counter proposal by the APC was in turn also spurned. Henderson's abortive attempt at a diplomatic coup, and the APC response are instructive for they reveal that the school rivalry, though not as fierce, still lingered.

208. SGE 1/1020 SGE, Memorandum to Correspondence Branch 13/3/11.

209. SGE 1/1020 "Proposed Basis of Agreement between the Kaffrarian Synod of the United Free Church of Scotland and the Presbyterian Church organisation". n.d.

210. The APC made a counter proposal that UFC supervised schools where APC students were in the majority should be ceded to the UFC. Elsewhere, schools at Lovedale Station, Dyamala, Macfarlan, Kwezana, Gillton and Klofini – also controlled by UFC – should be controlled by committees with equal representation. The minister from whose congregation the majority of students came would be correspondent and convenor. SGE 1/1020 "The Committee of the Presbyterian Church of Africa". Minutes of meeting, 12/11/10.
Not long after repulsing the obviously inequitable proposition from Lovedale, and affirming the desire of his church to maintain independent schools, Mzimba died on 25 June 1911. He was succeeded by his American-educated son, L.N. Mzimba, as Manager and correspondent.

9. Conclusion

This chapter has uncovered the texture of relationships between African Christians, government officials and mission agents in the school communities of Victoria East at the turn of the century. It has highlighted the strategies and gambits employed by competing church and school leaders in order to gain access to schooling. In doing so, it has identified some of the constraints and restrictions within which the APC operated. The development of APC schooling was conditioned by a number of influences. The missionary controlling the UFC schools, Reverend Stormont, was determined to destroy any APC initiatives and to secure white mission influence. The Inspector of Schools in the division, Inspector Rein was adamantly opposed to dissident schools which he denounced as dangerously political. Through their correspondence, with the Department of Education, both Rein and Stormont influenced the decisions of the Superintendent General of Education, Dr. Muir and succeeded in delaying the eventual issue of grants to the APC.

Various factors contributed to the APC's eventual success in gaining Education Department recognition and grants-in-aid. Changes in the Lovedale leadership were important. When the Reverend Stormont accepted a post at Hlytheswood Institution in 1902, the APC's arch mission opponent in the schools was removed. The death of Dr. Stewart in 1905 also contributed to

211. SGE 1/1020 CC to SGE 29/7/11; SGE 1/1113 L.N.Mzimba to SGE 17/12/12. L.X.Mzimba, Rev Pambani Mzimba's grandson died a year after his father in the 1950's, there ending the Mzimba family leadership of the church. Interview, Rev. L. L. Gaqa 9/5/1991.
the easing of tensions. Perhaps the most crucial decision in the history of the APC schools was made by the Superintendent General of Education, who conceded the distribution of grants-in-aid to APC schools. The Superintendent General of Education appeared to be particularly susceptible to the pleas of white intermediaries whom Mzimba had recruited to make personal representations on behalf of the APC.\footnote{212} Reverend Mzimba had astutely calculated that he could make educational gains through the agency of white parliamentary candidates in exchange for support at the polls. At the turn of the century, he was reported to have counselled; "... let us be content to be ruled by the colonists. Let us have to do with politics in order to encourage those white men who desire to give us schools and books,"\footnote{213}

Whereas the APC was privileged to receive grants-in-aid, and had strategically overthrown direct white mission control in the schools, it was obliged to acquiesce to another form of white supervision. Nevertheless, even in this matter the church was able to exercise its preferences and the man selected was the Inspector of Native Locations, Mr J.B.Liefeldt. At one level, these transactions which led to government recognition seemed to convey success in the struggle of the APC. However, dependence on the mediation of Liefeldt necessitated compromises which in the long run reaped ambiguous rewards. Notwithstanding noticeable growth in their schools, the APC leadership was palpably subdued under the authority of Liefeldt. Furthermore, the APC could not afford to alienate their custodian for to do so would be to risk hard won educational advantages. This relationship highlighted the ambiguities inherent in relationships that Africans entered into with colonial representatives as the weaker party.

\footnote{212}{Liefeldt was also able to lobby successfully for a grant by emphasising that it would be a "great pity" if the children's education "was neglected for the want of Government Support". SGE 1/498 Muir to General Correspondence 31/1/05, Liefeldt to SGE 6/4/05.}

\footnote{213}{Chirenje,J.M.(1987)p.32.}
The competition between mission loyal and African independent church communities appreciably conditioned the performance of the schools. Mzimba’s people had to contend with UFC loyalist churchmen, Revs. Makiwane and Mama, who were able to regain control over contested schools through amalgamations. It is of significance that certain APC communities took the decision to cede their independence in the interests of gaining schooling access. Even though the schools did survive, the joint APC and UFC committees manifested high levels of discord which suggests that the amalgamated schools were an uncomfortable compromise which was accepted only for educational motives. This account of the amalgamated schools demonstrates how African independent church communities adjusted their tactics and compromised on their independence to maintain access to schools. In doing so, it discloses the precarious terrain between the poles of contest and co-option that independent church school communities were compelled to negotiate, and uncovers the counter-strategies that mission-loyal leaders employed to further their own interests.

This chapter has demonstrated that Mzimba’s independent church benefited from its links with traditional chiefs and headmen. The headmen, many of whom studied at Lovedale, were able to mobilise school oriented Africans in support of Mzimba’s church by virtue of their social positions and their educational background. Particularly important was Chief Bovane Mabandla whose active participation in APC schooling affairs secured Mzimba’s support base among the dominantly rural African population of Victoria East. The links between a small educated elite, headmen, chiefs and rural dwellers that were being forged in the churches and schools have been identified.

The school and church divisions described in this chapter were linked to the problem of acquisition of land and other scarce resources. Within the locations of Victoria East, various loyalties or allegiances were manipulated by headmen,
chiefs and church leaders to rally sufficient support that would expedite control over the allocation of resources. The shifting nature of local allegiances, and changes in rural political consciousness that have been identified by Beinart and Bundy were clearly evident in this account of the APC schools. It was precisely the parochial nature of this form of mobilisation, which focussed political energies in the rural locations on local conflicts in the Eastern Cape districts in this period.

Chapter 5, which focuses on the African Methodist Episcopal Church in the Western Cape, will demonstrate that its schools emerged within a different political environment. While the Reverend Mzimba's APC schools were conceived in the cauldron of community conflict, the African Methodist Episcopal Church school endeavours were characterised by politically intricate negotiations with the Education Department's bureaucracy. In this process, supra-ethnic and supra-denominational political conduits such as the African Political Organisation played a role.

214. Beinart has shown that members of the same African Presbyterian Church in Qumbu under the leadership of Rev. Mzimba's chief lieutenant in the Transkei, Reuben Damane, sought a "popular base and a new political constituency amongst the mass of rural people whatever the constituency" in resisting the Council system. However, once the African Presbyterian Church populist leadership faded, ethnic politics returned. This comparison shows how adherents of the same church mobilised on distinctly different lines, and demonstrates "the flexibility of self perception, and the situational nature of 'ethnic' boundaries and divisions". Beinart, W. (1987) pp. 107, 117, 120.
CHAPTER FOUR:

"LIKE A BIRD BEATING AGAINST THE BARS OF A CAGE": EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS CONTROL IN THE ORDER OF ETHIOPIA, 1900-1908

1. Introduction

This chapter examines education in the Order of Ethiopia, a distinct body of African Christians which was created within the Anglican Church of the Province of South Africa (CPSA) in 1900. The Order of Ethiopia (hereafter Order) consisted of former members of the independent African Methodist Episcopal Church who had seceded under the leadership of the Reverend James Mata Dwane. After 1900, the Order was strictly speaking no longer an independent church as it was linked to the CPSA from that time. Nevertheless, the development of the Order and its educational projects are investigated because they shared many characteristics with the independent church schools. First, the members of the Order came from the African independent church movement, and were not fully incorporated into their adoptive mission church. Second, in its relationship with the CPSA, the Order struggled to assert its autonomy from paternal mission control. Third, whites and colonial government officials who could not clearly distinguish the Order from the African independent churches, treated it with distrust.

Fourth, even though the Order relinquished its status as an African independent church, its schooling projects were motivated by educational desires and needs that had been articulated in the period when its members were still part of the independent African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME). Indeed, a major reason for the secession of Dwane and his supporters was their frustration with the inability of the AME to fulfil its educational promises. Educational motives were therefore central to the incorporation of the Order into the CPSA. It will become evident that educational mechanisms were

1. AB Aa 1.2 Sp Cornish to ABp West-Jones n.d.
also instrumental in the structuring of relationships between the two bodies. In this chapter, the education of the Order of Ethiopia's ordinary members and of its priests is critically analysed for its contribution to the development of a dependent relationship between it and the dominant CPSA.

The CPSA leaders believed that they could garner political kudos by bringing former independent church adherents under the command of the Anglican Church. They resolved the problem of what to do with a large number of African converts who posed a long-term threat to white control in the Church by maintaining the Order as a separate body though under CPSA jurisdiction. Dwane and his followers also calculated this arrangement to be advantageous to themselves. They expected that affiliation with the CPSA would bring instant legitimacy, and enhance access to a range of educational opportunities, while some level of autonomy would be guaranteed. However, this compromise brought unforeseen problems for both groups. The Anglican Bishops who struck the agreement with Dwane did not appreciate how much conflict would ensue in parishes which

contained African members of the CPSA and the Order. Furthermore, the Bishop of Grahamstown, within whose Diocese the Order was most powerful, felt threatened and utilised all the means at his disposal to curb both Dwane's power and the growth of the Order. This he achieved by insisting on his political authority as the highest officer of the church in the Grahamstown Diocese. In addition, the CPSA Bishops stipulated that the Order's members should not be allowed into the church as a body. The ex-AME separatists could only become full members of the Order and of the Anglican Church after each had individually undergone the Catechism.

One aim of this chapter will therefore be to interrogate the links between church politics and education. The role of education in the process of inducting converts into the Christian church and in the process of preparing candidates for the priesthood will be highlighted. Even though both secular and religious teaching involve the same processes of instruction, assimilation of knowledge, and assessment, the latter has not been recognised as a proper arena of analysis by South African historians of education, who tend to focus on secular educational activities. In the same way that secular education has been shown to be a mechanism for excluding people from privilege in society, this chapter will demonstrate that religious education was equally a mechanism of gatekeeping in the Church. First, the Order's members were obliged to complete the rite of Catechism - which involves an intrinsically educational component - or were excluded from affiliation to the CPSA. Second, the Order's candidates to its Theological College received such a diluted type of training, that they would have no access to positions of authority in the Anglican church.

A year after the Order was constituted as a separate adjunct of the CPSA in 1900, a Theological College for training deacons was opened. The Reverend Dwane proposed to build a self-supporting village settlement which would incorporate the College and offer a number of other educational opportunities
MAP 4

DIOCESES OF THE CHURCH OF THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH AFRICA (IN 1910) GIVING YEAR OF CONSTITUTION


KEY

--- Divisional Boundary
at the same time. He expected that the students and other inhabitants of the village would sustain themselves through collective involvement in agricultural production. His ambitious plan was a response to the wide range of educational needs that were being articulated by blacks in the Cape, which included training for the ministry, post-elementary schooling, sound industrial training, teacher training and university education. Although the plan was never fulfilled, it is given attention in this Chapter, because it conveyed the educational aspirations of many rural dwellers and revealed important elements of Dwane's educational philosophy.

This account will then show how a series of problems disrupted the Theological College and the Order's secular schools. Economic decline in the rural Ciskei countryside has been outlined in detail with particular reference to Victoria East in Chapter 3. Broadly similar processes occurred in the Ciskei regions surrounding Victoria East, which included Grahamstown and Middledrift, the centre of the Order's activity. Landlessness, falling agricultural productivity and population increases in the region, contributed to the dislocation of rural society and proletarianisation. Increased competition for land and deepening poverty reduced the ability of the Order's adherents to bring its educational projects to fruition.

A major hindrance was opposition from Africans of other denominations in the region of Grahamstown, the centre of Dwane's support-base. In contrast to the previous chapter which described how, with concerted support from Chief Mbovane Mabandla, the Reverend Mzimba's African Presbyterian Church was able to extend its control over a number of schools, it will become apparent that Dwane's backer, Chief Ngangeliswe Kama, was not influential enough. He was unable to prevent rival church groups from interfering with the Theological

College and the educational settlement. Consequently, Dwane was forced several times to abandon the College and seek a new site. Factional conflicts involving ethnic and religious allegiances crucially affected the Order's educational fortunes and ultimately prevented Dwane from implementing his plan for a self-sufficient educational settlement.

There were also problems arising from the uneasy partnership between the Order and the CPSA. Dwane's relationship with CPSA personnel in the Grahamstown Diocese, especially the Bishop of Grahamstown and the priests that were seconded to the work with the Order, began to sour badly from 1904 onwards. Dwane argued that the Church had not honoured its obligations to the Order as laid down in an agreement, or Compact which was signed in 1900. Eventually in 1906, there was a period of complete breakdown between the CPSA and the Order during which the Order's congregations refused to acknowledge any form of CPSA authority. It seemed possible that Dwane could again lead his people in secession. While tensions ran high between supporters of the Order and Africans who sided with the CPSA, the Theological College and the Order's secular schools were disrupted.

Before the end of 1906, Dwane capitulated and accepted the restoration of the Order's union with the mission church. Nevertheless, unresolved tensions marred the relationship between the Order and the CPSA for some time thereafter. Splits appeared in the Order of Ethiopia, and a number of catechists and their followers sided with the CPSA. Dwane was also stripped of his title as Provincial of the Order of Ethiopia, and a CPSA priest was installed in his place. The Order was therefore forced to rely on white missionary mediation with government departments, especially the Cape Department of Education, which enabled the CPSA to control the secular education of its members. Thus, the status of the Order that was negotiated by Reverend Dwane and his supporters ultimately bore ambiguous results in terms of their
aspirations for increased access to education and their hopes for maintaining independence.

This chapter will begin with a brief introductory review of the origins of the Order, and the Reverend Dwane's early career. Then, the motivations for, and the outcome of, the union between the CPSA and the Order, is analysed in some detail. This is because the nature of this relationship affected the quality of education that was made available to members of the Order. Thereafter, Dwane's education settlement scheme will be introduced. Then, this chapter will turn to present an in depth case study of the Theological College. This will be followed by a review of the Order's secular schools.

2. The Reverend James Dwane and the Origins of the Order of Ethiopia

James Mata Dwane's leadership was a dominant influence on the history of the Order and his educational experiences as a youth had an influence his decisions as church leader. Dwane was born in 1848 at Debe Nek, in the King William's Town district of the Eastern Cape, and spent his formative years in the Middledrift area. In the 1860's, as a young boy he came under the influence of the Reverend Robert Lamplough at the Annshaw Mission Station. Dwane recounted how in the space of six months he learned to write and read his Sixhosa Bible. Soon thereafter, he taught "heathen" children at Mxumbu, four miles from Annshaw, while he himself was not yet unbaptised. Later, after asking his mother to release him into the permanent care of the Reverend Lamplough, Dwane continued his primary education and was christened in 1867. When Lamplough moved to Fort Beaufort as vice principal of the teacher training institution, Healdtown, Dwane followed. He subsequently spent two and a half years at Healdtown qualifying as a teacher, and then took up a teaching post at Wezo. Heart disease intermittently interrupted his teaching activities which were based between Alice and Port Elizabeth.
MAP NO. 5

GRAHAMSTOWN CIRCA 1900

Source: Map 1659 Grahamstown Diocese (1900)

KEY

Roads

Railway

Victoria East Magistracy

Source: Map 1659 Grahamstown Diocese (1900)
After being ordained in 1881, he ministered widely to Wesleyan congregations in Kimberley, East London and other smaller centers, from his Healdtown base. It was roughly in this period that Dwane began to entertain the possibility of providing an education for his congregation that was more comprehensive than the elementary schooling provided by the missionaries. Money was a major problem, so he applied to the local Wesleyan Methodist church for permission to raise funds in Great Britain, where he travelled extensively through England, Wales and Ireland in 1892. Through the offices of church treasurers in Britain, statements and monies amounting to at least £300 were cabled direct to the Reverend Lamplough in South Africa. On his return, Dwane was refused land for a college he proposed to build, the monies he collected were allocated to a common church fund over which he had no jurisdiction, and accusations of dishonesty were levelled against him. Bitterly disappointed with the outcome of his efforts, he left the Wesleyan church to join J.T. Jabavu as co-editor of *Imvo-Zabantsundu.* It was in this period that Dwane, with his increasing involvement in African politics, also became aware of Ethiopianism. According to Ncamashe:


6. Dwane was one of a number of prominent Africans who were active in the *Imbumba Yama Nyama* formed in response to the rise of the Afrikaner Bond in 1882 as a political organisation to forge African unity. Later, Dwane took part in activities of the South African Native Congress as did other leaders in the African independent church movement. Odendaal, A., *Vukani Bantu! The Beginnings of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912* (Cape Town, David Philip, 1984) pp.8-9, 84.
In it (Ethiopianism) he saw an effective instrument for translating his educational dreams into reality, if only financial power and property rights could be attained by the rising Ethiopian community.  

Dwane swiftly rose to prominence in the independent church movement. When the Ethiopian Church elected to seek amalgamation with the AME, Dwane, who had been especially recruited into the Ethiopian ranks, was one of those delegated to travel to America to formalise links in 1896. He was well received after his trans-Atlantic journey. The Ethiopians were accepted in principle by the AME, and Dwane was made General Superintendent of the Church in South Africa until an accredited AME Bishop could be stationed there. This meant that he had eclipsed the founder and erstwhile head of the Ethiopian Church in South Africa, the Reverend Mangena Mokone. 

In 1898, the leading Afro-American Bishop, H.M. Turner, took a triumphal five-week tour of the country. He succeeded in bringing together the disparate elements of the Ethiopian Church, and in swelling the ranks of AME followers through mass conversions. Major AME conferences were subsequently held at Queenstown and Pretoria, and land was bought for a proposed AME college of higher education at Queenstown. However, the funds for this project were not forthcoming. In addition, the legitimacy of Dwane’s consecration as Bishop in South Africa was disputed by certain AME Bishops in America. This placed his position in the South African AME in jeopardy. In 1899, he made an unsuccessful visit to the United States during which

8. Sundkler, B.G.M. (1961) pp.38-42. Dwane was considered by certain AME followers to be a usurper of a position which was rightfully Mokone’s. It is likely that the decision to appoint him over Mokone was influenced by his educational qualifications. While Dwane had received thorough grounding, Mokone’s minimal educational qualifications could not compare, although he was by all accounts a charismatic and powerful preacher. Odendaal, A. (1984) pp.26-27.
he attempted to confirm his consecration, and to gather funds. Further tensions developed between Dwane and AME leaders in South Africa on his return. All these conditions contributed to his decision to secede from the AME. 

Following the overtures made to him by the Anglican Rector of Queenstown, Julius Gordon, in late 1899, Dwane seceded, taking with him approximately 10,000 AME Church members. This left the AME Church in the Cape in disarray. Restrictions on movement and communications on account of the South African War ensured that the Transvaal and Orange Free State sections were unaffected, but powerless to prevent the Eastern Cape secession. In terms of an agreement or Compact signed in 1900, the Order of Ethiopia was taken into the CPSA subject to certain conditions that would inevitably affect both the form of the Order, and the nature of its struggle for education.

Dwane constantly endeavoured to gain greater educational access for his people in the first decade of the Order's existence. His endeavours were focused on three distinct targets. First, he had conceived of a self-sufficient rural village settlement with substantial education facilities including an elementary school, a secular college for higher education and a theological section. Second, he wished to provide independent training for the priests of his Order who were in short supply, so that his people could be properly inducted into the Anglican Church. Third, Dwane was steadfastly engaged in efforts that he began while he was still in the AME, to expand a system of secular schools, under


the control of his denomination, but officially recognised and funded by the Department of Education.

3. The Role of Education in the Creation of the Order of Ethiopia by the Church of the Province of South Africa (CPSA)

3.1 Segregationist Ideas in the English-Speaking Churches

One aim of this chapter is to show how segregationist motivations were reflected in the establishment of the Order of Ethiopia at the turn of the century. By this stage, the Church of the Province of South Africa had won a long battle for independence from the metropolitan Church of England. The formation of this autonomous Province within the Anglican Church union, was well established when Bishop Grey died in 1872.12

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the churches of British origin faced the challenge of adapting to the colonial context. A key problem facing each church was how its settler section should relate to the mission section. By the last quarter of the century, in the CPSA there were still few white South African-born priests and the church lagged behind the Methodists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists in incorporating black priests on its synods. Moreover, De Gruchy points out that in general "few if any black Christians were consulted on the subject (and) paternalism was rife".13

In his recent critical study of the role of the 'English' churches in South Africa between 1903 and 1930, Cochrane observes that Church policy, which was not static, altered in


accordance with transformations in the broader political economy. One important area of change which he identified was 'race relations' where there was a "growing acceptance among the previously 'integrationist' English speaking churches of segregationist policies". For Cochrane, the real weakness of the Churches lay in their internal life:

They were white-dominated on the one hand, and whites in the Church at all levels kept themselves at a considerable distance from blacks. Thus despite its large black membership, its sometimes liberal clergy, and a handful of educated blacks who were respected, the Church did not have within itself structures suitable for effectively hearing, let alone understanding, the multiple voices of the oppressed.

Cochrane analyses a wealth of primary material in respect to the evolution of Church policy, but he only alludes to the ways in which segregationist attitudes were represented in Church structures. Within the CPSA, at the Provincial Missionary Conferences from 1906 to 1940, there was a growing preoccupation with issues such as; separate church organisation for black and white members, clerical structures, mission financing, and the Order of Ethiopia. Bishops in the CPSA began advocating segregation as a means of controlling African Christians, and as a principle for rationalising Church work on a racial lines. Clear evidence for this change


may be found in the following statement of Coadjutor Bishop Gibson in Cape Town:

A location, well managed and efficiently superintended, would give (to the Kaffirs) within its own limits, far more of the freedom ... than they can possibly have in lodgings scattered about in town ... and would minimise the differences of Christian ministrations and instruction, by concentrating the people into certain defined areas. For that is the real meaning of a native location: concentration, supervision and discipline.18

By the turn of the century, high-placed CPSA churchmen had become noticeably less tolerant of social intercourse between blacks and whites. CPSA Archbishop Carter asserted in 1909 that "citizenship is one thing, if men are qualified to exercise the rights of citizenship, but social intercourse is another thing".19

Furthermore, CPSA leaders were beginning to regard blacks as a separate constituency in the Church, with different needs appropriate to their lower social status in the Anglican hierarchy. Church policy therefore "had the effect of creating 'missions' where the congregation was black and 'parishes' where the congregation was white".20 In 1903, Bishop Gibson had overwhelming support from the Provincial Board of Missions for his argument that the Church should not "Force them (blacks) upwards, she only desires that they should have the


19 Cochrane, J. (1987) p.66. Cochrane argues further that in "general it may be seen that the Church paid little attention to the most fundamental structures of exploitation and control, usually indicating if anything an uncritical, favourable attitude to contemporary practices". Cochrane, J. (1987) p.85.

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gospel and a fair field". From this conception of the role of blacks in the Church, it is clear that a more than rudimentary education was considered inappropriate.

This chapter therefore seeks to show that while the discourse of segregation was gathering acceptance in white Cape society, the decline of policy based on Christian liberal convictions in the CPSA, led to the separate creation of the Order of Ethiopia. It will also demonstrate how educational provision was a crucial mechanism in controlling the admission of former Ethiopians, and in ensuring the adherence of Order members to CPSA tenets and authority.

3.2 The Incorporation of the Order of Ethiopia and the Problem of Dual Authorities

While the discourse of segregation was gathering in power among the upper echelons of the CPSA at the turn of the century, the Order of Ethiopia came into existence. The amalgamation held possible advantages for the CPSA and the Order respectively. This section will first explore the motives for the merger. Then, the consequences of the relationship between Order and mother church will be investigated. Neither the CPSA nor the Order’s leaders fully appreciated the unfavorable consequences that could arise from tandem church structures. The creation of dual authorities of the CPSA and the Order in the Grahamstown Diocese generated bitter disputes over jurisdiction and fueled distrust. In the long-run these conditions severely affected the Order’s educational prospects.

For Dwane and the Order, the link with the CPSA was important for a number of reasons. It assured access to a church with assured legitimacy of episcopal succession, and it secured affiliation to the structure of a global church with a rich

Portrait of Reverend James Dwane. c.1900 - 1911.
Members of the CPSA and Order of Ethiopia. Including Bishop Cameron, Reverend Dwane, Bishop Cornish, Father West and Canon Wyche.
c.1909 - c.1915.
Members of the Diocese of Grahamstown, including Father West, Father Grant and Bishop Cornish.

c.1909 - c.1915.
Portrait of Bishop C. E. Cornish.
c. 1896.
tradition and heritage. Most important, it offered the prospect of access to educational opportunities. Dwane believed that education was an important foundation on which a secure church was founded. As has been observed, a major factor in the secession from the AME had been dissatisfaction over the Afro-American's inability to meet the educational expectations of Dwane and his supporters. In particular, the AME's failure to establish the promised College of Higher Education was frequently cited by Dwane as an important lapse.

Dwane anticipated that amalgamation with the CPSA would increase access to education in several ways. First, he hoped to gain teaching staff and material support from the CPSA. Second, through association with the CPSA, he expected to enhance the legitimacy of the Order in the eyes of Education Department officials. Thereby he hoped to bring to an end the discrimination and distrust which had characterised dealings of the Department with African independent churches.

22. Dwane was told that the AME "could not hand on Episcopal Orders because they had never received them". Lewis, C. and Edwards, G. E. (1934) p. 214; Sundkler, B. G. M. (1961) pp. 299-300; Wood, M. H. M. (1913) p. 323. Dwane could not have been unaware that association with the CPSA would reflect positively on his personal status as leader of the Order. At the same time, it would be unfair to suggest that Dwane initiated this move simply in order to gain episcopal succession for himself. He could not afterall have made the move without the support of his followers. Dwane was never made Bishop. The first Bishop of the Order of Ethiopia was Dwane's grandson, Bp. Siggibo Dwane, consecrated in 1982. Dwane, Bp. S. (1989) p. 3.

23. The Compact of 1900 which defined the relationship between the Order and the CPSA was a purely constitutional document. It gave no details of financial or other agreements which may have been made between the Order and the CPSA. As African education was a major area of mission church expenditure, this would have been a reasonable expectation on Dwane's part but it is held that he refused an offer of assistance for the remuneration of his clergy. Dwane, Bp. S. (1989) p. 90. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that the CPSA and the USPG both contributed by paying salaries of personnel seconded to the Order.

24. Abundant evidence for this may be found in Chapter 5 on the AME schools in the Western Cape and in Chapter 3 on the schools of the African Presbyterian Church.
he counted on affiliation with the CPSA to safeguard the Order of Ethiopia from future attacks by anxious whites because the Order would appear to be under white control.

In addition to these gains, the semi-independent status of the Order vis-a-vis the main body of the CPSA was important for Dwane. He expected to accrue all the benefits deriving from CPSA links, while still maintaining an intact church organisation that appeared to be outside of direct CPSA jurisdiction or control. In this way, the 'independent' Order of Ethiopia, would be using its connections with the CPSA to gain legitimacy and educational provision, without having to surrender its identity or self-determination.25

If the Order stood to gain from this arrangement, so too did the CPSA Bishops who negotiated the merger. It offered them the opportunity to extend their 'empire.'26 The church could add the entire seceding group that Dwane brought with him to its total number of African converts. The capture of what missionaries considered to be dangerous a group of former dissident Ethiopians would secure considerable prestige for the CPSA. For example, Dudley Kidd in The Essential Kaffir reflected with satisfaction on the prospect of the CPSA enveloping a former independent church within its ecclesiastical structures:

No one who has watched the erratic development of the Ethiopian Church movement could take these people seriously. This strange sect started out with but little in common with the Church of South Africa, and after a short and flickering life has come to rest in the bosom of that church. A ship will run into any port in a storm, and it is probably a good thing that these unstable people are


now under the strong control of rigid ecclesiastical authorities. 27

Furthermore, the construction of a separate 'Order' provided a unique opportunity for the CPSA to establish a "Native" section which would be separate from, and yet securely subject to, mission church auspices. This essentially segregationist strategy was aimed at protecting white control in the long term. By virtue of their increasing numbers, black Christians threatened to upset the status quo in church government over which white missionary and settler interests had hitherto enjoyed hegemonic power. The creation of a separate Order provided Africans with a semblance of 'control', and disguised the fact that neither the locus of dominance nor the distribution of power in the CPSA had changed.

Sundkler observed that independent church adherents would "be attracted to Mission Churches with ... a liberal attitude in racial questions, as was the case ... when Dwane founded the Order of Ethiopia". 28 The evidence presented thusfar contradicts Sundkler's depiction of the mission church CPSA as liberal in race relations. This chapter will show that the relationship between the Order and the CPSA was illiberal, segregationist, and exacerbated conflict between the two church groups. The following section will explore the conflicts which arose in the crucial formative years of the Order, before 1906.

In the Grahamstown Diocese, the CPSA was forced to confront the implications of the Order's separate existence at all levels of church operation, from missionary outpost to the diocesan synod. The incorporation of 5 000 African members of the Order within the geographical boundaries of the Grahamstown Diocese had effects on both episcopal authority and on the local jurisdiction of parish priests.


Although it was the Diocesan Bishops who negotiated the Compact with the Order in 1900, the parish priests held opposing ideas on the viability of creating the Order of Ethiopia as a 'church within a church'. A substantial lobby of white parish priests was convinced that all African Anglicans should be part of the parent church and subject to direct white control, for such an institutional arrangement would have safely lodged all local authority in their hands. They feared that while the Order's members within the area of their parishes were outside of their jurisdiction, conflict between the Order and the CPSA would be inevitable. In 1907, the Bishop of Grahamstown was aware that the clergy in his diocese were unhappy about the parallel structure of the Order as designated in the Compact:

They are distressed and disturbed in their minds at the result of our deliberations at Bishops Court. They feel and I think are justified in feeling aggrieved that the Bishops are proposing to intrude into their defined sphere of work ... 29

Canon Wood recorded that as late as 1909, at the seventh Provincial Synod, that "there was still a strong opinion amongst members of the Synod, that somehow the Church as a whole had not yet had sufficient opportunity of expressing its mind" on the Order of Ethiopia. 30

The dual administration of parishes that held members of the Order and African Anglicans soon proved troublesome, thus bearing out an observation made by Bishop Cornish in 1902, that "the main difficulties that are likely to arise will be the outcome of rivalry between ... the Native congregations themselves". 31 Tensions surfaced in 1903, when a number of

29. MS 16621 Bishop to Provincial 23/3/1907.
31. AB 867 Aa 1.3 Cornish to West-Jones 5/4/02.
catechists of the Order were accused of proselytising among the African congregations of the CPSA in the Eastern Cape.\textsuperscript{32} For the Order to poach adherents from its 'mother' church was considered to be taking poaching of adherents or 'sheep-stealing' to its limits.\textsuperscript{33}

It was mainly the parish priests in the Diocese of Grahamstown and to a lesser extent, the Diocese of St. John's, who had to deal with the discord, as this was where the Order's membership was mainly concentrated. Both the Bishop of St. John's and the Bishop of Grahamstown treated all mission work within the boundaries of their dioceses as subject to their jurisdiction. They were wary of allowing stations of the Order to be established in close proximity to their own missions, and emphasised that the Order's people should preferably evangelise among "the heathen". The Bishop of Grahamstown attempted where possible to prevent members of the Order from working in close proximity to the CPSA missions through manipulating his control over lands which he could allocate to new Anglican missions.\textsuperscript{34} He tried to obtain more land so that he could separate the African congregations belonging to the Order and CPSA. However, additional land to provide separate allotments was hard to come by because the Native Affairs Department and other government departments did not appreciate the tensions surrounding the relationship between the Order and the CPSA. The Secretary for Agriculture began to consider the Anglican's applications unreasonable, and stated flatly that he considered the lands already granted were "large enough for the purposes of several Orders embraced within the

\textsuperscript{32} This was also occurring far afield in the Transvaal. Tuckey, C. E. (1977) p. 53.

\textsuperscript{33} Tuckey, C. E. (1977) p. 54. This atmosphere of friction was not an invariable condition. Cordial relations were conducted in certain areas, perhaps where there was more scope for work. Positive interaction resulted in the amalgamation of the two groups.

\textsuperscript{34} MS 16621 Bp. Grahamstown to Provincial 23/3/1907.
church. The measures taken by the Bishops were insufficient to forestall the eventual outbreak of hostilities. As it turned out, the Bishop of Grahamstown was also responsible for contributing to the tensions in other ways.

Although the likelihood of local conflict between congregations and parish priests of the CPSA and Order was anticipated, the CPSA Bishops who signed the Compact did not foresee that the Order would severely threaten one of their Diocesan colleagues. Even though in theory, the Bishops retained effective jurisdiction over both Anglican and Order missions within the boundaries of their Dioceses, in practice, Grahamstown’s Bishop Cornish felt vulnerable. The Order appeared to be attracting CPSA members which was giving Dwane more power vis a vis his counterpart, Cornish.

In a letter to the Anglican Archbishop West-Jones, Cornish complained about the threat to his Diocesan authority “where the Church Order of Ethiopia has up to now been in full work”. He vehemently protested against any increase in Dwane’s power as Provincial of the Order of Ethiopia on the grounds that it would be a “fatal step to put him in ... a position of responsibility, power, influence and independence”. Cornish’s insecurity which bordered on paranoia, led him to believe any vague and unsubstantiated references to political unrest among the Order’s members which were communicated to him by the priests he had sent to work with the Reverend Dwane. He lobbied persistently for maintaining white control in the church and argued that “until there is a body of Native Priests, who can be trusted, the people must be shepherded”.

35. CA LND 1/924 L17784 Bishop to SNA 16/1/1905, Surveyor General to U.Sec. for Agriculture 2/5/1905, SNAD to U.Sec. for Agriculture 30/5/1905.
36. AB Aa 1.2 Cornish to West-Jones 6/9/06.
37. AB Aa 1.4 Ellison to West 7/6/06. AB Aa 1.4 Cornish to Archbishop 14/3/06. AB Aa 1.4 Williams to Archbishop 12/5/06.
38. AB Aa 1.4 Cornish to West-Jones 27/1/06.
Over and above these gambits, in violation of the Order’s independence, Cornish made repeated attempts to reunite African congregations of the CPSA and the Order so as to bring Dwane’s people back under his control.

As the highest Anglican authority in the Grahamstown Diocese, Cornish was prepared to use the iron fist in order to defend his power and to "rein in" the Reverend Dwane. He began by making decisions on behalf of the Order without consulting Dwane. Bishop Williams of St. John’s correctly argued that this deliberate omission would engender suspicion and distort relations with Dwane:

> It would inevitably result in calling out a native’s reserve and distrust, with the result that their action might appear to have become crooked and underhand ... while it is only fair to add our action being unexplained and therefore unintelligible to them, would probably be the colour.

Cornish was able to take such action because the Compact of 1900 which was designed by the CPSA Bishops who did not confer with Dwane, accorded the Order little autonomy. The Order’s lack of control over its own affairs was criticised in 1902 by the Reverend Cameron, who was seconded to teach with Dwane at the Theological College:

> If I may criticise the concordat, it seems to me a weak point in it, that the general body of Ethiopians, whether clergy or

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40. AB Aa 1.4 Williams to West 11/5/06.

41. It appears that at the time, Dwane had no choice in the matter. Interview, Bishop S. Dwane 7/5/1991.
laity, have no voice in the Government of the Order...42

In 1905, Cornish precipitated the crisis by licensing four Catechists and three newly ordained deacons of the Order to white parish or missionary priests who were in turn directly responsible to him.43 In effect, this placed the Order’s newly licensed deacons and catechists squarely under the control of the CPSA. Dwane’s dissatisfaction mounted when in October 1905, again without any consultation, Bishop Cornish appointed the Reverend W.Y. Stead to St. Philip’s Mission Grahamstown, where the parish was dominantly Ethiopian.44 According to Dwane, this was in contravention of his right as Provincial of the Order to recommend personnel in his parishes as laid down in Section Thirteen of the Compact.45 Moreover, he had observed that the CPSA was not acting according to the terms of the Compact, and expressed his misgivings to the Archbishop in November, 1905:

42. MS 16621 Cameron to Archbishop 19/11/1902. Cameron who was sympathetic towards the Order and had shown that he was willing to criticise CPSA policy and differ with his Bishop. For his part Cornish was critical of Cameron’s approach which he felt was too forgiving. In 1906 he wrote, “Where I have control I cannot sanction such methods which in my judgement must have disastrous effects”. MS 16621 Cornish to Provincial Cameron 6/4/1907.

43. MS 16621 Bp. of St.Johns to E.C.West 8/11/1904; Bp. of Grahamstown to Provincial 23/3/1907; AB Aa 1.2 Cornish to West-Jones 18/12/05.


45. The Bishop in turn justified his action by reference to another Section (Section.17). Section. 13 reads as follows, "The Provincial shall recommend clergymen for the charge of vacant Missions of the Order to the Diocesan Bishop with whom the final appointment shall rest," while Section.17 reads, "With regard to Missions already in existence, difficulties arising from proximity shall be dealt with by the Diocesan Bishop before he issues a new license. AB484f Verryn.T.D.(1962)p.72.
... we have noticed that things have taken a sharp turn, and an altogether noval (sic) and as we believe, unfair construction is being put upon the Compact. Certain things have been said and done of late which in our humble opinion, are in direct conflict with the letter, and at hopeless variance with the spirit of that compact.46

Although Dwane was desperate to resolve the crisis, his efforts to negotiate a compromise with Cornish were to no avail. In an acrimonious interview with the Bishop of Grahamstown in 1906, Dwane threatened that he and his people were no longer prepared to passively endure the conduct of the CPSA:

The natives are not today in the same position as they were fifty years ago. Fifty years ago if a European kicked a Native he thanked him for it.47

Despite its subordinate status in the Anglican Church, the leaders of the Order could still act at variance with the policies and wishes of the CPSA Bishops. The Order's semi-autonomy did provide some degree of leverage which Dwane could manipulate. By not fully incorporating the Order in the main body of the CPSA, the Church leaders had created an area of uncertainty. First, the CPSA hierarchy could never be entirely sure that Dwane who had already led two secessions from other church bodies, would not do so again. Second, the CPSA had taken a calculated risk with respect to Dwane's willingness, to subject himself to the ecclesiastical authority of the Anglican Church. As Bishop Cornish observed; "... I do think that he finds himself very much hampered by church custom and is like a bird beating against the bars of a cage."48

46. AB Aa 1.2 Dwane to Archbishop 29/11/05.
47. AB Aa 1.4 Cornish to West-Jones 1/4/06.
48. AB Aa 1.2 Cornish to West-Jones n.d.
Dwane’s central importance as the only person capable of leading the Order was confirmed by Father Puller who taught at the Order’s Theological College in 1901. Puller was a member of the Cowley Fathers of the Society for St. John the Evangelist, a high Anglican Order. He volunteered to work on secondment from the Anglican church and travelled out fresh from England to take up the post of Theological Tutor. In correspondence with the Archbishop in Cape Town, Puller observed:

Dwane may turn out to be an impossible person; but he seems to me to be at present the only man at all capable of holding the Order together. If he does turn out to be impossible, the it would seem that the continued existence of the Order is also impossible.

Eventually, the tensions between the Order and the CPSA erupted at Easter 1906. All communications were severed, Dwane’s people held services without authorisation and actively disobeyed or ignored CPSA personnel sent to intervene. A more detailed account of the events as they affected the Theological College and the secular schools of the Order will be provided later.

After a protracted period of alienation, the Order returned into the fold, but not without having extracted some concessions. Most important was the decision by the CPSA Bishops to remove Bishop Cornish’s formal authority over the

50. AB Aa 1.2 Puller to West-Jones 11/9/06.
51. The rebellion elicited reactions from within the CPSA and from prominent lay members. In 1907, magistrates R.J.Dick and F.Howe-Ely who believed that the draft constitution was weak and loosely framed which allowed the Order too much latitude, urged the Bishops to amend it. This awaited the next meeting of the Synod while a Bishop of the Province temporarily took over the leadership of the Order. MS 16621 Typescript R.J.Dick and F.Howe Ely to Reverend Fathers in God 25/2/1907; Typescript Bp.Cameron and M.H.M.Wood to R.J.Dick and F.Howe Ely 28/2/1907.
Order. Henceforth, the Order of Ethiopia was to be extraparochial. Although this effectively freed the Order from Cornish's authority, the CPSA still held control because Dwane was stripped of his title as Provincial of the Order and was replaced by the CPSA's Reverend Cameron.

These decisions Cornish submitted to unwillingly because he knew that once freed from the supervision of his priests, the licensed catechists of the Order would enjoy greater freedom than his own African catechists. Cornish consoled himself by demanding that those who had sided with Reverend Dwane should not be granted re-admission into the CPSA without "some public acknowledgement of the(error) and sin in rebellion". The uneasy peace that settled after 1906 seemed to suggest that a new balance of power had been negotiated between the Order and the CPSA. The following section will show that the CPSA still held certain crucial advantages which enabled it to draw dissident energies out of the Order's membership.

3.3 Controlled Initiation Through Education

Thusfar, this chapter has shown that the CPSA leaders were deeply concerned about the stability of the Order. Of crucial importance to them was the need to exert control over the admission of members of the Order into the Anglican Church. Contrary to what Dwane supposed, the CPSA did not automatically receive his congregations into the Church en masse. Education became a crucial mechanism in the process of controlled transition envisaged by the CPSA leadership,

52. MS 16621 Cornish to Provincial Cameron 28/3/1907; Cornish to Provincial Cameron 28/3/1907.

53. MS 16621 Cornish to Provincial Cameron 28/3/1907. Cornish also wished to impose controls on the ordination of catechists. MS 16621 Cornish to Provincial Cameron 26/4/1907.

54. The bishops determined that there should be "no reception in the mass" but individuals would be accepted "as they shall give proof of real conviction and apprehension of truth". Wood, M.H.M. (1913) p.325.
whereby former ‘Ethiopians’ became members of the Anglican church.

The CPSA demanded that all potential Anglicans from the Ethiopian group should be baptised and confirmed according to Anglican ritual. This stipulation had two important consequences. First, it was aimed at ensuring that those who wished to enter the church would perform the catechism - an intrinsically educational rite-de-passage. Second, in accordance with the wishes of Bishop Cornish of Grahamstown, it served to slow down the process of incorporation of the former Ethiopians.55 It was reasoned that those who were too impatient to endure the confirmation and deserted the Ethiopian ranks, were not worth having in the Church. The delays in this process of incorporation thus served as a test of motivation and as a selection mechanism.56 Moreover, during this time, Dwane’s former Ethiopian deacons were forbidden to take services or communion until they too had fulfilled the Anglican’s requirements. As a result, Dwane’s congregations suffered losses especially amongst the most volatile elements who were most likely to resist Anglican discipline.

The Anglican church accordingly began slowly initiating the former Ethiopians under controlled conditions. The process was made even slower because there were simply not enough people who could minister to Dwane’s people, perform baptisms or prepare candidates for confirmation. In leaving the AME, Dwane

55. MS 16621 Cornish to Provincial Cameron 28/3/1907.

56. Other mission churches developed guidelines on how the church should treat African Christians who shifted their allegiance to or from the independent churches. It was stipulated that those returning into the Wesleyan fold should "inavoidably be placed on trial for such period as may be considered necessary". These regulations only addressed individual conversion, while the Order of Ethiopia represented an entirely different problem, namely that of mass entry into the Anglican Church which required special control. MS 15655 "Transfer of members to or from AME Church and Ethiopian Associations" E.Nuttall (Sec. of Conference) Cape Town 30/6/1903. Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Africa. Private circular.
had left behind the bulk of the ministers because they feared that being untrained, they would not be accepted into the CPSA. Furthermore, the Anglican Bishops would not allow the Order to receive 'foreign' African churchmen into its ranks.

The urgent need to train leaders and teachers in the Order was recognised by Father Puller who was acting tutor at the Order’s Theological College. He pointed out to the Archbishop that it was almost impossible to get suitable personnel for the Order from any source. According to Puller, local training institutions were inadequate and could not supply what was required, "that is to say - Priests, Deacons, Catechists and schoolmasters". Dwane strenuously advocated the urgent establishment of formal educational facilities for his own deacons.

Dwane’s desire for a Theological College was duly met in 1901, but it will be shown that the CPSA was able to define the educational agenda and curriculum for the Order’s candidate priests at the College. The CPSA’s white priests who did most of the teaching were able to ensure the acceptance of Anglican doctrine among the students. They also stressed the superordinate status of the CPSA vis-à-vis the Order. CPSA influence over the Order’s candidates at the College was all the more powerful because the majority of those taken into training had minimal secular educational experience. Nor were they taught basic elementary educational skills in the


58. This and other possible loopholes in the Constitution were recognised by Cornish. See MS 16621 26/4/1907 “The Constitution of the Church Order of Ethiopia” Annotated by Cornish.

59. AB 867 Aa 1.3 Puller to ABp. 8/1/02.

60. How the selection of these original candidates was made is not clear. Dwane himself may have chosen them. If this was so, then Dwane himself was responsible for selecting candidates with poor educational backgrounds. Alternately, it is possible that there were no candidates available with better schooling qualifications. Interview, Bishop S. Dwane 7/5/1991.
College to make up for their disadvantage. In effect, they were being introduced directly into the Anglican theological and ritual 'universe' without a broader educational base. The predominantly religious base of their training was a limiting factor. They could not develop secular skills sufficiently to claim that they were educated to the same level as African ministers who were products of the theological training courses at Lovedale or Healdtown. Worse still, their training did not enhance their power within the greater Anglican church, let alone the broader Cape polity. Their training was of short duration, focused on a specific set of tasks, presented exclusively in Xhosa, and devoid of any skill training on the lines of administration and accounts keeping which were essential to the running of a congregation. This meant that these men were not qualified to contest for positions in the main body of the Anglican church or for representation on any of its executive bodies.

4. The Education of the Members of the Order of Ethiopia

Thusfar, the somewhat ambiguous relationship between the Order and the CPSA has been outlined, and the process whereby members were to be inducted into the CPSA has been delineated. It has been argued that the balance of these factors favoured the CPSA. Next, the Reverend Dwane's plan for a self-sufficient settlement will be outlined. Thereafter, the history of the Theological College and the Order's secular schools will be recounted.

61. The numbers of catechists and deacons that were licensed or ordained in this period was small. This automatically distinguished this group from the mass of Order members. Dwane was concerned that the training of priests for the Order should not alienate them from their congregations. The fact that Bishop Cornish was determined to licence Order catechists to white Parish priests indicates that he feared the power of these men over congregations without white supervision.
4.1 James Dwane's Education Settlement Scheme: A Vision Unfulfilled

In 1902, Father Puller enthused about an ambitious plan that Dwane had proposed, to establish a training institution for catechists and deacons. He was dismissive of Dwane's "other plans for villages, and schools for boys and girls". However, in doing so, he was ignoring a visionary scheme for secular and religious schooling in the Order that Dwane had nurtured for a long time. Although the scheme never materialised, it was suggestive of a man seeking to respond to the growing diversity of educational needs in black communities which have been identified in Chapter 2.

The vision that Dwane nurtured revealed a new development in the educational aspirations of black people in the Cape Colony. His concept of a model community bore some affinity to the ideas of progressive educators like Charles Fourier and Robert Owen, but a more probable influence on his ideas was Booker T. Washington. The latter had stressed the need for black people to transcend their situation through hard work, industry and self help. Dwane encountered Washington's ideas during a three-month stay at Wilberforce on one of his visits to the United States between 1896 and 1898. These ideas also resonated with other large-scale institutions that were planned and established by independent churches, such as the AME's Bethel Institute which is briefly described in Chapter 5. This section seeks to analyse the Reverend Dwane's ideas...

62. AB 867 Aa 1.3 Puller to ABp. 8/1/02.
before showing why he failed to bring them to fruition in difficult terrain near the Keiskamma River in the Ciskei.

Dwane’s scheme involved the establishment of a self-contained community that supported several forms of educational activity. The settlement was to provide for the training of church workers on whom the Order depended to enlarge its membership. Dwane announced that he would have “over a thousand persons taught so that we may have a sufficient number of properly trained Christian workers ... for the evangelisation of the heathen tribes”. The scheme was also designed to provide elementary schooling for as many children in the region of the settlement as possible, irrespective of their sectarian background. In this way, he hoped that the Order would attract adherents of other denominations. Finally, Dwane had long desired to establish a place of higher learning in the Eastern Cape. As has been observed, his decision to withdraw from the AME was prompted by the failure of the AME’s Queenstown College plans. Earlier, in a speech to AME congregations in America, in 1899, he had urged:

The school is an absolute necessity - not a mission but a university, training preachers, business and professional men, able to cope with the best. The Kaffir College is the great keystone of the future mission work in Africa.

Ultimately, he hoped to open “the great African national college of his boyhood dreams with all the African chiefs in the Cape Colony as its patrons”.

66. AB 867 Aa 1.3 Dwane to ABp. 2/11/01.


In the blue-print detailing the physical dimensions of the proposed settlement which he revealed to the Archbishop in 1901, Dwane had placed the Theological Department at the centre of the settlement. This Department comprised ten huts, three of which would house about fifty divinity students. Two other huts would house the teaching staff of three, and serve as a "private chapel for the fathers and candidates for holy orders". There would also be a dining room, library, kitchen and pantry.

Around this nucleus, Dwane planned to locate dormitory accommodation that would house a considerable number of school-going children. Two "villages" comprising twenty-five huts each would be placed opposite each other, the one village for boys, and the other for girls. According to these specifications, some five hundred boarding-students were to be accommodated, in addition to local day-scholars.70

Dwane was concerned about the self-sufficiency of this venture and emphasised the need to find suitable land. He believed that to cover the costs of establishing the village, all residents would have to be involved in its upkeep. He foresaw that the development of such a model village might attract a landless adult population of about one thousand people. Accordingly, he persuaded the Order’s patron, Chief Kama71, to increase the size of the piece of land that he had offered for the scheme, so that sufficient grazing would be available. Once these people had settled in the village, Dwane

70. Dwane predicted that 300 pupils would attend the school when it opened. Burns-Ncamashe, S.M. (1954) p.103.

71. Chief Kama of the Ggunukhwebe, son of Chungwa(d1882) and younger brother of Phato was Dwane’s Chief. In this capacity he acted as supporter and patron of the Order. He was however a Wesleyan convert and did not personally become a member of the Order. Peires, J.B. The House of Phalo (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1981) pp.55-7,131-2; Interview, Bishop S. Dwane 7/5/1991.
planned to charge them rent which would serve as an additional source of income.

The rental so exacted would in turn be used to pay teachers at the elementary school and to meet other expenses. He calculated that the cost of building the settlement would be six hundred pounds for sixty huts. He proposed to borrow the funds needed for constructing the settlement from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG). This loan would be recouped by charging parents for the accommodation of their children at the school, at a rate of £2 per year, which yielded a projected annual income of £100 per hut. Dwane hoped that low day-school fees and boarding fees would encourage more children to attend the school. He calculated that the repayment schedule on the SPG loan would operate over six years at £100 per annum. Once this debt was paid, the monies would service other needs in the settlement.

The willingness of participants in the settlement to contribute to its upkeep was crucial to the success of the venture. Dwane stressed that the Order would accept the responsibility for educating the students and for their accommodation, but not for their food. Both students and their parents would have to produce their own food, which required a level of commitment to agricultural labour from all who lived on the site. To this end, a garden was allocated to each dormitory hut, which the student occupants would be obliged to cultivate.

For Dwane, work in the fields was more than an end in itself. Such labour had meaning beyond the promotion of self-sufficiency and cost reduction, because he believed that

75. AB 867 Aa 1.3 Dwane to ABp. 2/11/01.
experience of manual work was vital. His language was derivative of the so-called "dignity of labour" approach prevalent in missionary thinking at the time. In accordance with this emphasis, he explained that "sufficient bodily training (was) absolutely necessary for future usefulness" of African Christians. Dwane himself was to supervise the manual work of his own priests in training at the Theological College, which indicated the importance which he accorded labour as part of their education. In this regard, he had voiced concern that the training of African ministers in "easy and comfortable surroundings and filled with western ideas and aspirations" estranged them from 'traditional' communities:

We do not want to Europeanise our men and send to the heathen, men who will not feel at home with their countrymen.77

In Dwane's view, regular work was a healthy antidote to any incipient feelings of superiority, or "westernisation" in candidates aspiring to priesthood in the Order.78 In this, he received enthusiastic support from CPSA churchmen such as Father Cameron who taught at the College. Cameron believed that the education of African priests should be specially adapted to their role, which he strictly envisaged as meeting the particular needs of "African" Christians as opposed to "white" Christians. Father Cameron, wrote to the Bishop of St.

76. AB 867 Aa 1.5 Dwane to Bp. St.Johns 9/3/12.

77. AB 867 Aa 1.3 Dwane to AEp. 2/11/01. Puller recognises the preservation of traditional modes very simply: "He (Dwane) proposes to house them in Kaffir huts and feed them Kaffir food". Dwane also states: "Such unfortunate foreign elements as these are the causes of weakness in the Native Ministry in this country. Some of these men like myself, Alas in consequence of the manner of living to which they had accustomed themselves, never feel at home with their people and the people never feel at home with them". AB 867 Aa 1.5 Dwane to Bp. St.Johns 9/3/12.

78. The problem of "westernisation" he felt, curtailed his ministers effectiveness in converting traditionalists, consequently he opposed sending his students to America. Evidence of Rev.J.M.Dwane SANAC p.716.
Johns expressing his full agreement with Dwane's critique of the curricula in other missionary institutions for their western bias:

His (Dwane's) criticisms on existing Theological colleges for natives are ... just. They would be much more efficient in training future Catechists, Deacons and Priests, not only to pass examinations, but for the whole life which they will have to live...79

Initially, Dwane planned that the theological students should be exempt from such daily tasks to speed up their training. However, the settlement never became large enough to allow them to forego their responsibilities in the fields. Accordingly, he revised his plan and proposed that the theological students should bring their wives and children with them, to live as family units, supporting themselves from crops raised on the lands they were to be allocated. Dwane hoped that the establishment of family units in the settlement would benefit not only the men "but (also) their wives and children on whom so much of their (men's) usefulness necessarily depend".80

Ultimately, Dwane's grand project did not materialise in a form remotely similar to his original conception. The location of the Theological College was changed three times before a permanent site could be found at a place called Zalaze nearby the Keiskamma River. There, he attempted to integrate various educational facilities within a self-sufficient settlement but on a smaller scale. A secular

79. AB 867 Aa 1.5 Cameron to Bp. St.Johns 29/3/2.

80. Dwane's idea for theological training of an African priesthood was finally recognised by the CPSA in 1918. "Report of a Conference on the Training for the Native ministry" CPSA Constitution, canons and acts Vol.6, pp.1-4. He was reacting to a shortage in the African ministry that was observed in Christian Express in 1911. Cited in "A Striking Confession" Native Opinion 26/12/1911; AB 867 Aa 1.5 Dwane to Bp. St.Johns 9/3/12.
elementary school was eventually established at Zalaze at the site of the Theological College, but it accommodated far smaller numbers than the six hundred that Dwane originally envisaged.

4.2 Education of the Leaders of the Order of Ethiopia: The Theological College

The theological education of the leaders of the Order of Ethiopia was undertaken under trying circumstances between the years 1901 and 1907. Particular difficulty was experienced in finding sites for the College due to disputes over land ownership. It will be argued that the education the candidates received in the Theological College had the effect of increasing the dependency of the Order on the mission CPSA. The chief factors to be discussed in this regard will be CPSA control over curricula and examinations, and the poor secular educational background of the candidates.

4.2.1 Early Beginnings: Father Puller and a House in Queenstown

In May 1901, the Theological College was eventually opened for the first time at Queenstown, when Father Puller began work in his capacity as "Divinity professor and head of a house" with assistance from Reverend John Xaba from St. John's.81 Fourteen students, all former Ethiopian ministers joined Puller. The majority lived with him in a house in the Queenstown location.

The timetable devised by Puller for the College provides valuable clues as to the kind of education that the candidates received (See Table 6):

The daily routine structured almost all of the students' waking hours, during which they were in close contact with each other and with their teachers. They also engaged in preaching in the streets of the Queenstown location on Tuesday and Saturday evenings. There is not a great deal of evidence on the content of the curriculum itself. Lectures were presented by Puller in the faith, the Gospel according to St Luke, the book of Genesis and the book of Common Prayer. On Monday and Thursday, it was planned that the Reverend Xaba should give a course of lectures on Old Testament history to the students. They were also familiarised in the execution of services on a daily basis, such as taking or attending Mattins, Evensong, Holy Eucharist and Family Prayers.

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83. Puller often presented his lectures extempore, or as he put it "De Deo". Burns-Ncamashe, S.M. (1954) p.64.

There was a major practical component allied to Puller's course in which each student was allocated an area of the location to carry out house meetings. Once every two weeks, a report back on progress would be held which included the discussion of "difficult cases". Over and above this fairly intensive programme, some of the students would get up as early as 4.30am to "preach to the heathen" before the work of the day began. An intriguing aspect of the daily programme was the "open-air exercise" timetabled after lunch. It may be assumed that at least part of this generous chunk of time was allocated to some form of manual work. As has been shown, manual work was important to Dwane who wished to ensure that the students would not become estranged from their African origins.

Although he personally found some compensation in the candidates' enthusiasm, Puller recognised that the educational programme suffered from certain intractable problems. First, the majority of students lacked sufficient grounding in formal schooling. In extreme cases, candidates even had trouble reading and writing. There was no evidence indicating that time was spent on remedial teaching in elementary educational skills. Consequently, candidates were simply being equipped with the necessary knowledge to perform certain religious functions, or to conduct forms of communal worship. Their utilitarian training, based as it was on an insubstantial formal educational foundation, was unlikely to enable them to study further.

The second problem was the language of instruction. Puller depended on the Reverend Xaba to interpret his lectures. Although it is not possible to establish what effect the constant need for translation had on the students, this


process inexorably slowed the pace of their work. The issue of language arose again in respect to examinations, where Puller was forced to depend on an interpreter's version of his students' examination papers. To compound this problem, the sudden departure of Reverend Xaba, left Puller dependent on one of his students as interpreter.87

Puller observed that because his students were not sufficiently experienced in formal schooling, they were prone to committing the classic errors in examination writing and lacked study skills. He regretted that it was "not possible to practise the men in the art of answering questions in an examination paper".88 It was the exams that highlighted another dilemma over which Puller agonised. He had to consider the emphasis he would give to examination results as opposed to the experience of the students in deciding whether to pass or fail them. This problem was crystallised in one man who had been an excellent Deacon in the AME, but seemed destined to fail the exam on account of his lack of education. Puller wrote:

I doubt if there is anyone who would make a better Deacon. He has been working as an evangelist, and afterwards as a 'Deacon, and finally as an 'Elder', since 1877, so that he has had nearly a quarter of a century of quasi-ministerial experience ... He is, I am told, an eloquent and very practical preacher. But whether he would do well in an examination is more than I can say.89

The eventual exclusion of such men from ordination, was indicative of the gatekeeping function of education at the Theological College. Furthermore, Father Puller, as the CPSA representative was alone vested with the power to control


access of the candidates to positions in the Order. This demonstrates the kind of control that CPSA priests wielded over candidates to the Order. At the end of nine months, Puller’s twelve students who were expected to join Dwane as the cornerstones of the new Order were examined. Only two men were found to be “unsuitable”. After the course, the Theological College in Queenstown was closed in February 1902, because Dwane wanted to locate it closer to his support-base in the Middledrift region.

4.2.2 From Iquibica to Zalaze: A Struggle for Survival

After leaving Queenstown, Dwane needed to find land on which to permanently establish his settlement scheme and reopen the College. He made unsuccessful attempts to root the projects at Debe Marela, and subsequently at Guba Hoek and Macubeni location in the Glen Grey district. Thereafter, he focused his energies on Chief Ngangeliswe Kama’s offer of some land near Middledrift in the Gqunukwebe Reserve.

Chief Ngangeliswe Kama was the son and successor of Chief William Shaw Kama, one of the first four Africans to be ordained in the Wesleyan Church. After he assumed the chieftaincy of the Gqunukwebe in the 1870’s, the elder Kama maintained his links with the Wesleyans, but only as a lay-preacher. His main preoccupation was to secure titles for tribal lands in Middledrift against threatened confiscation by the government. In the process, William Shaw Kama became alienated from the missionary churches and his sympathies swayed towards the African independent church movement. His


son, Ngangeliswe, who took over as Chief in 1900, became a staunch supporter of Dwane. Ties between the families were also close because Dwane’s father had been one of William Shaw’s councillors, and his sister had married the Chief’s brother. 92 This guaranteed Gqunukwebe backing of the Order of Ethiopia in its early troubled years.

The support of Chief Kama was not as substantial as Dwane might have wished. In contrast to the fortunes of the Reverend Mzimba, of the African Presbyterian Church, who was backed by Chief Mhovane Mabandla, Dwane’s sponsor, Chief Kama was not able to successfully control land allocation to the advantage of the Order. The heightened competition between different factions for land in the region, intermittently disrupted the Theological College programme over several years.

The Order immediately encountered opposition from local Gqunukwebe headman and Wesleyan adherent, Dzaga, at Middledrift. He argued that he was safeguarding his grazing rights from encroachment by the Order’s members and quickly dispersed the labourers that Dwane had sent to begin building at the new College site. 93 Dzaga and his supporters then “lodged a protest against any alienation of the tribal land on the ground that such would be contrary to the terms of the deed granted to the tribe by Sir George Grey” in the late 1850’s. 94 The Native Affairs Department wished to avoid setting a precedent on the controversy. Its officers therefore declined to commit themselves to any decision at that stage.

The Order’s application to the Department of Agriculture for


94. AB 867 Aa 1.3 SNA to Cameron 27/5/03.
the disputed land which Dzaga claimed to belong to his section, was left in abeyance by that Department.

Meanwhile, Dzaga was supported by the local Resident Magistrate, Verity, a Wesleyan and staunch opponent of the Order. Verity convened a meeting of the Ggunukwebe where he called for the establishment of an undenominational school because he feared that the Order's members, who appeared to outnumber the Wesleyans, would monopolise the school. His proposal for a public undenominational school effectively blocked the Order because this category of school was supposed to be communally controlled. Such an arrangement precluded Dwane's plans to set up his settlement solely under the auspices of the Order. Consequently, he did not test this deadlock and sought an alternative site outside of Dzaga's jurisdiction.

This incident demonstrates how, as in the case of the African Presbyterian Church in Victoria East, communities were mobilised along denominational lines to protect their access to scarce resources such as land. In this instance, mission church adherents were favoured by colonial administrators in frustrating the Order's attempts to expand its operations.

95. A different version of the dispute is represented by Cameron. According to him, Dzaga and two other headmen shared joint control over the common land. Kama suggested that the Magistrate should fairly divide the land so that each faction could have sole control over its own portion. In that way the Order would at least gain access to the lands controlled by the favourable headmen. This suggestion was not successful. AB 867 Aa 1.2 Cameron to ABp. 18/9/02. Burns-Ncemashe, S.M. (1954) p. 85.

96. The new site was selected by Ngangalizwe Kama, with the consent of his councillors and the people of Ngcabasa's Location. AB 867 Aa 1.3 Cameron to SNA 10/6/03, Cameron to SNA 14/5/03, SNA to Cameron 27/5/03.

97. In addition, church allegiances sometimes had a fragmentary effect on family structures. These matters were to touch Dwane in a very personal way. In 1901, he himself was involved in a situation where his Wesleyan father-in-law disinherited his wife and sister-in-law because they were Order members. Tuckey, C.E. (1977) p. 51.
Furthermore, it is evident that local government officials, like Verity, were still mistrustful and antagonistic to the Order, despite its connections with the CPSA.98

The College was eventually reopened in October 1902, on Kama’s land at Iquibica. Father W.M. Cameron was appointed new Principal of the Theological College with Father G.C. Fletcher as itinerant priest. The staff also included the Reverend Dwane and J. Gquamana as catechist.99 Thirty students, were housed in four huts on the site. The iron-roofed school-chapel of the Order’s local private elementary school was taken over to serve as a lecture hall, while the school was removed to a hut.100

Even though the staffing at Iquibica was more generous in comparison to Queenstown, the quality of instruction and general circumstances were essentially similar. Only Cameron, and to a much lesser degree Dwane, were really involved in teaching. The latter also shouldered the onerous burden of administering the College. Cameron was undoubtedly a better qualified instructor than Father Puller, by virtue of his experience. He had been warden and theological tutor to candidates for the ministry in other CPSA dioceses and was reputed to have a "remarkable knowledge" of African people.101 Cameron certainly needed to bring his experience to bear, because he had to teach a student group that had even less formal educational experience than the original Queenstown class. Cameron observed that "most of them (are) local


99. Cameron was formerly Vicar at Holy Trinity, Ryde, before working in the St. John’s diocese in the Cape between 1879 and 1889. Fletcher was formerly Vicar of All Saints, Clapton, England. Wood, M.H.M. (1913) p. 327.


preachers, inferior in ability to the Catechists trained by Father Puller - some of them very illiterate indeed". One unfortunate student was "too illiterate to take notes", and elected to leave the course of his own accord.

The curriculum at Iquibica appeared to share the same problems as Puller's Queenstown course. Language was again an issue. This time, Dwane assisted in translating, a task in which he excelled according to Cameron. Although the lecture method was the dominant mode of teaching, there was extensive note taking, or rather copying of Cameron's lectures from the chalkboard. The chalkboard proved to be a crucial piece of apparatus because the students seemed largely incapable of making notes themselves. There was also no text book available. Consequently, the notes that the students transcribed from the chalkboard were to serve as the only handbook available for them in the execution of their duties. The beginning of lectures had to be delayed for a full three weeks before a suitable chalkboard could be manufactured.

Cameron spent time after his lectures in question and answer sessions on the topics of the day, and seemed to devote more time than Puller in preparing the subject matter for the lectures. The programme on weekdays at Iquibica was far


less comprehensive than that at Queenstown because the College could not depend on urban amenities. The rural placement of Iquibica meant that the students were forced to involve themselves in daily chores (Table 7):

TABLE 7
The Theological College Timetable at Iquibica, 1902-3

Mornings

6.30 Matins.
7.15 - 8.15 The Catholic Faith.
11.30 The Litany (Wednesday and Friday only).

Afternoons

14.00 - 16.00 Manual work under Dwane.
16.30 - 18.30 The Prayer Book.
18.30 Evensong.

There was one significant addition to the weekly programme - manual work, which Dwane personally supervised. A lot of time was spent in improving and repairing buildings and working in the fields at Iquibica. Facilities were extremely rudimentary, and the housing and subsistence requirements of the settlement were never adequately met. The need for more advanced skills among the student workforce was observed by Cameron and Fletcher who remarked that there was "no 'manual


109. Another change was the introduction of singing practice at 7 a.m. on a Saturday morning. Cameron was "by no means anxious to displace the tunes to which the Ethiopians are accustomed, many of which are very fine and grand, if sometimes quaint, but simply to increase their stock". Cameron, W.M., "The Order of Ethiopia" Grahamstown Occasional Papers Vol.4, No.61, 1903, pp.361-362.
training centre' near, and carpentry is at a very elementary stage".110

In the intervening period, Dwane continued in his quest for an appropriate site for his village settlement, but met with further setbacks. The Order of Ethiopia became embroiled in factional conflict over access to land at a new site called Zalaze. Again, the outcome of this tussle had negative repercussions for the Order and Dwane's educational aims. A long standing feud between Chief Ngangeliswe Kama's section of the Gqunukwebe tribe, and a Wesleyan group that was allied to a headman named Songo erupted in 1903. The violent clash between members of the two parties, occurred after a ruling in the Eastern Districts Court that Songo was Kama's half-brother. Six of Kama's councillors erroneously assumed that the court decision in favour of Songo's legitimacy also carried with it a claim to the chieftainship. They challenged the Songo faction to a fight in the hope of reversing the court decision by force of arms.111 After a group of Kama's sympathisers attacked Songo early in January, Songo's party laid a number of charges. These included a charge of attempted murder against Kama, his councillors and Dwane, who was implicated in the skirmish on the basis of his close relationship with Chief Kama.

In a case marked by the volume of unreliable evidence presented, eight of the 85 charged were found guilty on charges of public violence and assault. Kama was found to be an accessory before the fact. Dwane was exonerated of all charges, but the whole affair had attracted considerable negative publicity for the Order, between the outbreak of the 'riot' and the trials in May and September of 1903. Dwane and Cameron - who was supportive in this troubled period - feared


111. In the incident, George Kama was "seriously assaulted". AB 867 Aa 1.3 Cameron to ABp. 15/10/03, Cameron to ABp. 27/7/03; AB 867 Aa 1.2 Puller to ABp. 17/11/03.
that in response to the incident, the Cape government would depose Chief Kama on the grounds of "mismanagement or weakness". Fortunately, this action was not taken, and the Order did not lose its backer. Meanwhile, Songo was determined not to relent in his campaign "to oppose the application (for land at Zalaze) tooth and nail". By all accounts Songo's strategy was successful, as the government refused to grant the Order a title to the land for fear of risking a lawsuit from the Songo group. Consequently, the College was set up at Zalaze without security of land ownership. Yet again, denominational conflict reduced the ability of the Order to pursue its goals.

This was not the end of the adversity that plagued the Order. After the College was reopened on the 26 February 1903, educational progress was interrupted by food shortages. Students spent many hours in clearing the bush and in ploughing, planting and tending crops. Cameron was forced to reduce his lecturing time by one third. By the time he left, he had taught for only six out of his fifteen months as Theological Tutor at Iquibica and Zalaze. When Father West, who succeeded Cameron, arrived in November of 1903, the necessity for students to spend time working for their day-to-day survival increased. This worsening situation is reflected in West's simple timetable (Table 8):

112. AB 867 Aa 1.3 Cameron to ABp 22/3/03; CA GH 35/84 RM King Williamstown to Sec. Law Department 3/3/1903, Cameron to Governor 19/3/1903, Cameron to Governor 14/5/1903; Cape Mercury 11/5/1903.

113. AB 867 Aa 1.3 Cameron to ABp. 14/5/03.

114. AB 867 Aa 1.5 Cameron to ABp. 2/9/03. In 1912, despite positive reception from Chief Bokleni in Western Pondoland, the Wesleyans again opposed mission work by the Order in that territory. AB 867 Aa 1.5 Dwane to Bp. St. John's 9/3/12.

115. MS 16621 Cornish to Provincial Cameron 26/4/1907.

The exigencies of self-support, clearing fields, making bricks and building shelters, inexorably eroded the real purpose of the Zalaze settlement. West's claim that "the Order is self-supporting, and they have to earn their living as well as study" entirely obscured the reality. The aims of the Theological College were no longer being fulfilled, while the students struggled to subsist, let alone study.

Thusfar, this account has highlighted the Order's struggle to build the Theological College against a backdrop of opposition from other denominations, and difficulties in day-to-day subsistence. A new source of conflict began to emerge within the College. Even though Dwane was the highest officer of the Order of Ethiopia, he had to defer to the authority of Bishop Cornish of Grahamstown. Their controversial relationship has been alluded to earlier in this chapter. Similar antagonisms began to surface at Zalaze as well, between Dwane and the CPSA teachers who were seconded to the Theological College by Bishop Cornish.


4.2.3 Rival Authorities in the Theological College, and Open Conflict between the Order and the CPSA

From late 1903 onwards, Dwane's relationship with the CPSA began to deteriorate. This change coincided with the departure of Father Cameron and the arrival, fresh from England, of the Reverend West, formerly Chaplain of Cuddleston Theological College. West unfortunately lacked the sensitivity of Father Puller, and the tact and experience of Cameron. His intellectual baggage included an ethnocentric and disparaging attitude to African customs and social practices. He also held strong convictions about the intellectual inferiority of his students. Consequently, he explained to Bishop Cornish that his teaching was conducted in moderate doses because "they assimilate very slowly. He emphasised manual work "for the sake of both their bodies and their character". "Manual labour" West wrote, "is part of the method of testing the earnestness and humility of these men". West and his co-worker, Father Grant, who came strongly under his influence, were totally unfamiliar with local conditions. Their ignorance was combined with an arrogant and authoritarian demeanour, which led the Bishop of St. John's to observe that they tried "to rule the Ethiopians in too masterful a way".


120. West to Cornish 16/7/07 in Burns-Ncamashe, S.M. (1954) p.128.


122. AB Aa 1.4 Williams to West-Jones 12/5/06. The Rev. Ellison recalled West as saying on his arrival that "the only thing he knows about these natives is that he doesn't understand them at all or words to that effect". AB Aa 1.4 Ellison to West-Jones Whitsunday 1906; AB Aa 1.4 Williams to West-Jones 12/5/06; Wood, M.H.M. (1913) p.327.

123. AB Aa 1.4 Puller to West-Jones 31/5/06, Williams to West-Jones 11/5/06, Ellison to West-Jones 20/6/06. The antagonism between West and Dwane could have been explained as a "clash of personalities" with each seeking to dominate the proceedings at Zalaze. The problem with this explanation
The steady estrangement of West and Dwane was a key factor which contributed to the rupture of relationships between the Order and the CPSA, in 1906.

West adopted a peremptory and imperious attitude to Dwane and his congregations. At the Order's conferences in 1904 and 1905, he undiplomatically criticised Dwane in very blunt terms for his "inefficient" methods of keeping financial records, and accused the Order's congregations of moral laxity. In mid 1904, when crop failures resulted in a food shortage and lectures were suspended, West was released from his teaching commitments, and began itinerating in the Zalaze district among members of the Order. Dwane was offended by this action because he believed that West was encroaching on his duties and undermining his authority as priest-in-Charge of the Order's Zalaze mission circuit.

At the College, the way Dwane defended his autonomy and constantly emphasised the importance of the Order over the Church to the candidates, was a constant irritation to West. He complained to Bishop Cornish that his co-worker, Dwane, was getting out of hand:

... the dual control was becoming impossible ... He told the students I taught too much about the Church and too little about the Order. Of course I lectured about the Church and not the Order.... He does not realise that the Church has a rule and discipline and government. He imagines that the Order has unlimited autonomy, and teaches the people so.

offered by Ellison is that it obscures political and other issues by focusing on the personal dimensions of the conflict.

124. West was most probably referring to the practice of forbidden traditional observances including the bride price and circumcision.

125. AB 1290 Grant, A.C. Papers, 1892-1933. West to Bishop Cornish. n.d.
West also confided in his correspondence with Bishop Cornish of Grahamstown, that he and his colleague, Grant, were "convinced that the political Ethiopian spirit was present, manifesting itself in many ways" at Zalaze. Yet he was an unreliable informant, guilty of abusing his privileged relationship with Bishop Cornish in order to put Dwane in the wrong. Father Ellison, one of West's contemporaries who maintained some detachment from the mounting controversy, referred to the "simple injustice" of certain allegations made by West that were at times "ludicrously wide of the actual facts".

In a letter to the Anglican Archbishop in Cape Town, Bishop Cornish hypothesized that Dwane's frustration with the dictates of CPSA church custom and order was the main problem:

> He quite forgets that he is an ordained minister of the church and as such, owes his full allegiance to Church order.

Bishop Cornish was only partially correct. What he did not acknowledge was that much of Dwane's frustration was caused by the attitudes of his CPSA colleagues and their manner of dealing with the Order.

The persistent undercutting of both Dwane's powers, and the autonomy of the Order, culminated in Bishop Cornish's decision to license Order catechists to his own white parish priests, thus effectively removing them from Dwane's jurisdiction. Early in 1905, Dwane responded by boycotting the ordination of his clergy by Cornish and steadily isolated himself from West at Zalaze. Deeply concerned about the rift,

126. AB Aa 1.4 Cornish to Archbishop 14/3/06. AB Aa 1.4 Williams to Archbishop 12/5/06.

127. AB Aa 1.4 Ellison to West 7/6/06.

128. AB Aa 1.2 Cornish to West-Jones n.d.

129. AB Aa 1.2 Cornish to West-Jones 18/12/05.
Dwane “begged ... the Archbishop (to) meet the members of the Order as soon as possible”, but the Archbishop was to prove ‘unavailable’ for eleven months. In March 1906, at the Order’s Conference held at Iquibica, a vote of no confidence was passed against the Chaplains, West and Grant. This motion triggered a phase of open rebellion which affected congregations in Glen Grey, Adelaide, Port Elizabeth and other districts.

A tactical phase of resistance ensued for several months during which CPSA priests were refused hospitality, and interpreters were withdrawn. Church services were held by Dwane’s loyal members without CPSA permission. Dwane gave further proof of his power by effectively withdrawing many hundreds of his followers from the 1906 Easter Communion services given by CPSA chaplains who had been especially commissioned by Bishop Cornish. Then, Dwane convened an independent conference at Lesseyton in defiance of a CPSA order prohibiting the gathering. Furthermore, no representatives of the Order attended a conference summoned by Archbishop West-Jones of Cape Town in June 1906 to discuss a new Constitution for the Order. Dwane’s distrust and hostility towards Bishop Cornish, and his representatives West...
and Grant remained unabated. He remained incommunicado for several months, refusing to respond to communications from any CPSA authority.137

In mid-1906, the Reverend Ellison, a special representative of the Archbishop, secured a couple of strategic meetings with Dwane. Ellison, who scrupulously maintained both his neutrality and a sympathetic approach to the plight of the Order, was able to coax Dwane to contact the Archbishop.138 Once he resumed communications with Archbishop West-Jones, Dwane adopted an altogether conciliatory approach.139 He agreed to recall his dissenting preachers, and summoned a special conference of the Order in August, which the Archbishop finally attended. Dwane’s capitulation was not sufficient to unilaterally extinguish antagonisms that lingered between the CPSA and Order congregations.140 Dwane’s followers could not easily reconcile themselves with some catechists and deacons who had sided with the CPSA at the time of the dispute.141 Furthermore, the events of 1906 triggered off secessions from the Order by Africans who sought direct affiliation with the CPSA.142 Eventually, as a gesture of contrition made at its Annual Conference in February 1908, the Order passed a unanimous resolution expressing its regret.


138. AB Aa 1.4 Ellison to West-Jones 20/6/06; Ellison to West-Jones Whitsunday 1906.

139. AB Aa 1.4 Dwane to West-Jones Whitsunday 1906, Dwane to West-Jones 3/7/06, Dwane to West-Jones 4/7/06.

140. Three years later, the Commission of Inquiry of 1909 stated that in certain districts, difficulties were not yet satisfactorily settled. AB 1290 Grant, A.C. Papers, 1892-1933. Commission; Tuckey, C.E. (1977) p. 41.

141. AB Aa 1.3 Cameron to West-Jones 24/8/07; AB Aa 1.4 Dwane to West-Jones 3/7/06, West to West-Jones 28/8/06, From Archbishops Records Dwane to West-Jones 28/8/06; Tuckey, C.E. (1977) p. 42.

over the conduct of its members during the period of rebellion.143

These events had a profoundly damaging effect on the Theological College at Zalaze. During the height of the crisis, Zalaze was closed. Thereafter, it continued in fits and starts over a few years. The last time the College functioned officially was for a three-month period from October to December in 1907, under the management of Cameron who had been appointed to act as Provincial of the Order in the place of the Reverend Dwane.

After open hostilities between the Order and the Church ended in late 1906, Cameron assiduously sought funding and personnel for Zalaze because he understood the importance of theological training for the organisational strength of the Order and for its prestige in the eyes of its congregations. Although he recognised that Zalaze was "the cornerstone of the work of the Order", he also realised that if he could reopen the College, it would "give confidence to the Order in the stability of the new regime" under himself as Acting Provincial.144

He was eventually able to secure the services of the Reverend Goodwin who had conducted mission work at St. John’s, Umtata, Pietermaritzburg and Pretoria where he also taught candidates for Holy Orders.145 Goodwin was made responsible for teaching a new class of seventeen men, eleven of whom were personally selected by Cameron. The fact that Cameron, as Provincial, personally selected them, indicates how direct CPSA control had become after the rebellion of 1906. Goodwin’s short course was the only one, after Queenstown, to proceed without


144. AB 652 Letterbooks No.6 Cameron to West-Jones 2/9/07.

145. AB 652 Letterbooks No.6 Cameron to West-Jones 2/9/07.
interruption. Thereafter, Cameron was unable to reopen Zalaze again. Together with Dwane, he made two attempts to establish Zalaze along the lines of a self-contained settlement at Komati Farm in Natal in 1908, and at Embaliswenu in 1912. Neither attempt got beyond the planning phase. 146

4.2.4 Religious Training in the Order of Ethiopia: Reinforcing Dependence

This section assumes that religious education may be analysed in the same way as secular education can be interrogated. It will be argued that the theological education of the leaders of the Order at the Theological College was dominated by the CPSA and that contrary to guaranteeing the independence of the Order, the training they received operated to safeguard CPSA hegemony.

A brief recapitulation of the problems that plagued the Theological College's curriculum is necessary. The medium of instruction was an important issue, because the need for translation acted as a barrier to progress. Special difficulties were encountered in the translation of Christian theological concepts into a Nguni language whose speakers were socialised within a different religio-cultural universe. 147 The candidates were disadvantaged by their minimal educational grounding. Their studies were disrupted by drought, lack of food and the disturbances between the Order and the CPSA. Classroom relationships accentuated the religious and secular

146. They were examined in "the four Gospels, Acts i-xv, Prayer Book (certain parts) and Diocesan Catechism, which were the subjects set in the Grahamstown Diocese for catechist's licence". AB 652 Letterbooks No.9 Cameron to Bp. Pretoria 27/12/07, Cameron to Cornish 23/12/07. Burns-Ncamashe, S.M. (1954), p.112. The only subject that the candidates were not tested in was "class teaching". There is evidence that "class teaching" was an important part of the students training from the first course at Queenstown. There, written and practical exams were set, although the subject matter taught for practical examination was all theological. AB 652 Letterbooks No.9 Cameron to Cornish 23/12/07.

authority of the CPSA teachers which disempowered the
learners. Many of these problems were by no means unique to
the education of the Order's catechists, but were
characteristic of general educational conditions in mission
education.148

Perhaps the single most important feature of the teaching
programme at the College was the total absence of formal
secular educational instruction. Whatever elementary academic
skills that students picked up were clearly incidental to the
main purpose of the courses. For example, under Cameron, the
only writing that the students did was when they copied down
notes:

It was a defect of Cameron's school that
the only writing was that involved in the
copying of notes; the only counting that
involved in finding pages in hymn books,
the Bible or the Prayer Book, while the
only reading was that of the daily lessons
at matins and evensong which the students
did by turns.149

The CPSA was simply not motivated to provide a proper secular
education for the Theological College students. As far as the
mother Church was concerned, these men were to service the
religious needs of the Order exclusively. Without a thorough
basic educational grounding, it was considered sufficient for
them to be merely bearers of the tenets of the Anglican faith.
This situation was eminently agreeable to the CPSA, concerned
as it was with dissipating dissenting "Ethiopian" religious
traditions among members of the of the Order. In addition, the
mission church was anxious that any oppositional religious
doctrines fostered by the candidates should be extinguished in
the process of their training. Despite having observed a lack
of secular educational background among candidates at the

148. See Chapter 2 on mission schools in the period.
Theological College, Cameron reaffirmed the CPSA's exclusive religious focus in 1907:

The men have had very little education, and want instruction in sound theology and the Church system, whatever teaching they have had previously having of a dissenting character.150

The mode of training in the Theological College based as it was on shaky secular educational foundations, had several implications. First, it meant that the students could not properly minister to their people's 'educational' needs except in respect to spiritual 'teaching'. Second, as evangelists with little secular education, these graduates of the College were unlikely to present any challenge to the white Anglican hierarchy, staffed as it was with people who were better educated.151

In addition, the candidates were given no training in the management of church affairs at the Theological College. Although Dwane expected that the graduates of the College at Zalaze would become school superintendents, they were not prepared for this role.152 Nor were they familiarised with the control of mission finances. This was a glaring shortcoming in the training of African priests of all denominations.153 Missionaries such as the Reverend Stormont of Lovedale asserted that "natives are not able to be treasurers - even the best are all at sea over money".154 This

150. AB 652 Letterbooks No.7 Cameron to Rev.G.S. Hall 19/11/07.


153. BC 106 C.230.1/2 Wauchope to Stewart 7/1/1899.

154. MS 7512a Report on Lovedale Native congregation Stormont to Mr.Stevenson 7/10/1899.
had more to do with the lack of training for African priests than with their purported lack of ability, but it legitimised continued missionary supervision over the financial affairs of African congregations.

Similarly, CPSA representatives referred to the "weakness" of "intellectual equipment" among candidates at the College, rather than to their lack of educational experience. Bishop Cornish considered this "weakness" to be sufficient to justify continued control by the CPSA over the Order's priests. Cameron also argued that the levels of independence that Dwane's new catechists desired were unreasonable:

... to demand, as they are doing, that untrained and uneducated men should be ordained, that ignorant Catechists should be put in positions of responsibility for which they are unfit, being, to an extent hitherto unknown in our Missions, free from the control of the Priest ... is preposterous.

Consequently, even after the Order's candidates completed their courses, they were supervised by the Grahamstown Bishop's Chaplains. There was a political motive for this. Although CPSA priests were supposed to help the Order's catechists with difficulties in their pastoral work, the aim was also to "check on heretical and political teaching". In addition, it has been observed that at another level, control was exercised through the selective admission of candidates to the Theological courses. Clearly, the CPSA

155. AB Aa 1.3 Cameron 25/3/01.

156. MS 16621 Cornish to Provincial Cameron 26/4/1907.

157. AB Aa 1.2 Cameron to West-Jones 14/11/06.


159. On Bishop Cornish's instructions, the students were not admitted to the College without reference from West. MS 16621 Cornish to Provincial Cameron 28/3/1907.
was as anxious to ensure political obedience to the Church as it was to inculcate obedience to its religious tenets.

The authority of the CPSA was not only imposed through the conduit of the Theological College. It was also able to exert its influence through the financing of the Order. At first, Dwane was determined that the Order should achieve economic independence, and in pursuing that goal, he initially refused assistance offered by the Anglican Bishops.\textsuperscript{160} However, when the self-sufficient settlement failed to materialise, the Order began to accept external financial aid. The salaries of the seconded tutors were paid by the CPSA, and after that, through grants from the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.\textsuperscript{161} At a later stage, Dwane even referred to the "right" of the Order to receive assistance from the CPSA:

\begin{quote}
As an order and youngest child we have a right to look for help from the Church. I therefore appeal through your Lordship for help. It is not much we are asking for. We ask for the stipend of the Principal (of Zalaze).\textsuperscript{162}
\end{quote}

The payment of stipends to the tutors, though significant, did not mean that the CPSA financially guaranteed the entire project. It has been demonstrated that day-to-day costs in the Theological College were born largely by the students themselves. Accommodation and maintenance overheads at the Zalaze site and the schools were absorbed by students who were prepared to endure near starvation to attend lectures. In this way it would seem that the Order was partially subsidising CPSA hegemony in the Theological College.

Overall, the Theological College for the schooling of the Order of Ethiopia's catechists failed to guarantee the Order's

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{160} Dwane, Bp. S. (1989) p. 90.
\item \textsuperscript{161} According to Cochrane the finances of the Order were controlled by missionaries. Cochrane, J. (1987) p. 161.
\item \textsuperscript{162} AB 867 Aa 1.5 Dwane to Bp. St. Johns 9/3/12.
\end{itemize}
Independence. Save for enhancing the Order's potential for converting and gaining adherents, the new catechists were not further empowered by their CPSA controlled, and exclusively religious curriculum. It is beyond the scope of this research to compare the programmes outlined above with those offered to African candidates for the priesthood within the CPSA proper, or in any other mission church. A complete historical analysis of the training provided for the African ministry from an educational perspective is needed. 163

5. Secular Schooling in the Order of Ethiopia

The Reverend Dwane accorded secular education great importance from an early stage in his career with the Order. Yet despite Chief Khama's evident enthusiasm for providing elementary education in the Middledrift region, the gains he and Dwane expected to make, were not realised. This was partly because the affairs of the Theological College absorbed most of Dwane's attention. After 1906 the appointment of the Reverend Cameron as acting Provincial of the Order formalised Anglican control, and diminished Dwane's influence in the Order's secular schools. Cameron was more concerned with religious training and thus largely ignored the secular educational desires of the Order's community in favour of the ill-fated Theological College. Lastly, colonial authorities continued to discriminate against the Order, which necessitated constant reliance on CPSA mediation, in the person of Cameron.

This section will provide a short overview of the secular educational initiatives in the Order of Ethiopia, briefly

indicating institutional growth and elaborating on the key problems as outlined above. Finally, a more detailed analysis of the elementary school at the Zalaze site will be presented.

5.1 Origins and Growth

When he was still Vicar-Bishop of the AME, James Dwane had demonstrated his interest in establishing secular schools. In 1898, he made an application for government aid to a school at Upper Macubeni in the Glen Grey division. Although Upper Macubeni School was struggling financially, it did receive government grants-in-aid from the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{164} Thus, when Dwane and his congregation were constituted as the Order in 1900, they brought with them one functioning, government-aided school. This position soon changed. By the end of 1902, the Order had three schools registered and receiving grants; "Upper Macubeni" in Glen Grey, "Toise Kraal" in Queenstown, and "Port Alfred West" in Bathurst. The total attendance of the three schools was about 170 students. Fragmentary evidence indicates that the Order was also operating a number of unaided schools. For example, according to a communication received by the Superintendent General of Education from Chief Ngangeliswe Kama and G. Kaba, an unaided Order school at Iquibica was forced to close because of a "triangular dispute between the Anglican, Wesleyan and

\textsuperscript{164} Dwane was informed that grants of £24 and £10 would be authorised as soon as he was able to report that "another desk, a second blackboard and easels and a cupboard (had) been supplied to the school", and that he could assure the SGE that the school building would be improved. In 1901, the school had an average attendance of 55 students from Substandard A to Standard 4. Benjamin Kumalo began as manager with a staff of headmaster and two teachers, but the school was troubled by rapid staff turnover. Consequently, results were poor. Out of 29 candidates for promotion to higher standards, only 9 passed. At one point, the school was almost entirely staffed by the Dwane family. In December 1901 Dwane was manager, his wife Mrs Emma Dwane headteacher, Theophilus Dwane teacher and Annie Mtila assistant-teacher. Other teachers were: Stanley Gontshi, Pagan Ntlangani and Johanne Matsolo. SGE 2/90 Inspectors Report. Upper Macubeni B 1/2/01, Inspector's Report Upper Macubeni B 4/12/01; SGE 8/5 848 SGE to Rev.J Dwane 7/10/98.
Ethiopian bodies. Another unaided school which was in operation at the Port Elizabeth "Native Location", later received government recognition. 165

Despite problems with staffing, with finding adequate accommodation and equipment, with small budgets, and with competition from hostile denominational factions, the Order managed to extend its secular schools. Ten schools were established in seven divisions by 1912 with a total school-going population of 470 pupils. In 1922 this became fifteen schools in nine districts with an average attendance of 645 students. 166

5.2 The Order of Ethiopia's Secular Schools and Dependence on CPSA Mediation

This section will show that the ability of the Order to expand its schooling system depended on its relationship with the Education Department on one hand, and with the CPSA on the other. Chapter 2 has demonstrated that the Education Department and local School Inspectors were particularly sensitive to two issues, the question of independent black control over schools, and the problem of interference or poaching of students from schools of other denominations. Apart from the damaging effects of government antipathy, it

165. CA NA 508 /238 "Closing of Iquibica School" A.SNAD to PM 21/11/1901. In 1903-4 the Order was granted permission to establish a school in the Native Location at Port Elizabeth. CA SGE 7/4 SGE to F.Howe-Ely 4/12/03. CA NA 609 B1694 Establishment of Schools in Native Location Port Elizabeth.

166. In 1912, there were 550 students on the roll with an average attendance of 470 students from Bathurst, Glen Grey, Queenstown, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Kentani and St Marks. In 1922, there were 807 students on the roll with an average attendance of 645 students from Albany, Alexandria, Glen Grey, Port Elizabeth, Queenstown, Uitenhage, Wodehouse, Kentani, St Marks. In the early period up to 1912, most growth appeared in Glen Grey with four schools, while in the next decade after 1922, Uitenhage experienced the largest growth with the opening of four schools. From Burns-Ncamashe, S.M. (1954) p.213 Appendix C Summary of Order of Ethiopia schools.
will be revealed that even though they were of the same denomination, there was also rivalry between the Order and the CPSA to be officially credited with the schools.

Despite having returned into the white mission fold under the auspices of the CPSA, the Order of Ethiopia was subject to suspicion and distrust because of the "Ethiopian" connotations of its name. At one stage, Native Affairs Department officials even failed to distinguish between Dwane and Mzimba or between the Order and the African Presbyterian Church. This led Dwane to write in consternation to the Anglican Archbishop in Cape Town, to assure him that rumours which connected the Order with the African Presbyterian Church were "utterly untrue".167

CPSA personnel seconded to the Order were very sensitive about this issue and endeavoured to convince civil authorities that the Order was truly an Anglican adjunct, quite distinct from other "Ethiopian" church groups. The Archbishop of the CPSA himself was compelled to correspond with the Native Affairs Department in an attempt to get access to land for Zalaze in 1903. He also made a special visit to Sir Gordon Sprigg to explain the unique status of the Order.168 These measures probably had the effect of forestalling obstructive action on the Order of Ethiopia from the upper echelons of the Native Affairs Department, but members of the white population and local administrators such as Inspectors of Native Locations, Schools Inspectors and Magistrates were far less able - or willing - to make the distinction between the Order and independent "Ethiopian" groups. Skepticism was clearly expressed by a number of magistrates. In 1902, the Resident Magistrate of Elliot lamented, "I very deeply regret that the

167. C.P.Crewe, M.P. for Griqualand East invited them to Cape Town at his expense to discuss "several matters". The assumption implied in his letter is that the the two men were linked to the same church. CA GH 35/84 C.P.Crewe to Mr.Mzimba 22/8/1900, Mzimba to Dwane 27/8/1900, Dwane to ABp. 2/11/1901.

168. AB 867 Aa 1.3 Cameron to West-Jones 2/9/03.
Anglican Church ever mixed itself up with this movement. On the basis of this experience, certain CPSA members were keen to change the name of the Order, but Dwane quashed this gambit.

Once the Department of Education began issuing grants-in-aid to schools of the Order, the problem of white supervision was raised, a theme which has received detailed attention in Chapter 3 on the African Presbyterian Church schools in Victoria East. In 1901, a distrustful Thomas Logie, Acting Inspector of Schools for Queenstown and Victoria East, considered white control to be imperative. He argued that as Dwane had been "so chameleon-like in the past" he could hardly be expected to honour his agreement with the Anglicans. Accordingly, Logie stated:

If he starts such schools, and Government aid is granted to them, they should, in every case, be under white superintendence.

In the light of such suspicion, Dwane was cautious about disclosing his aims when he was leading evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission on the control that "European ministers" were permitted to exercise over the Order's schools. While conceding that white mission jurisdiction was in effect, Dwane expressed the hope that the graduates of the Theological College at Zalaze would become school superintendents:

169. CA NA 497 RM Elliot to CMT 29/8/1902; Registrar, General Registry Office to A.SNAD 21/3/1902.

170. Rumours of this proposal circulated in the Order, but at the Annual Conference in 1904 Dwane staunchly defended the title, saying, "We could not use another name". AB 867 Aa 1.3 "Minutes of the Ethiopian Conference held in the College Chapel (Hut) at Zalaze April 24-29 1904"

171. CA GH 35/84 "Memorandum on the Ethiopian Movement in the divisions of Queenstown and Victoria East" Thomas Logie. Acting Inspector of Schools n.d.

The missionary at present is a Church of England clergyman; they act as Superintendents of the schools, but as soon as our men return to their work they will resume superintendentship, as I do in my district. 173

It has been argued that there was little in the training of the graduates of the Theological College that would adequately prepare them for the position of school superintendent, as was envisaged by Dwane. Nonetheless it demonstrates his early faith in the eventual devolution of greater self determination to the Order.

On the volatile issue of interference in the schools of other mission church denominations, Dwane made an effort to appease the Education Department. He personally ruled that Order communities should "support existing schools, and if they want to start a school of their own, they must start it away from any other mission schools". 174 Despite such pronouncements by Dwane, the issue of control was so politicised as to make even the labelling or designation of schools a matter of sensitivity. 175 For example, schools of the Order of Ethiopia were recorded in the Department of Education records as "E.C." schools. The initials "E.C." stood for English Church, the designation officially accorded to CPSA controlled mission schools under the control of white missionaries. Where African superintendents were in control, the Department commonly entered only the name of the Superintendent at the school. In this way, the labelling of schools as 'Ethiopian' was

175. The Order was commonly confused with other independent church denominations, such as the Ethiopian Catholic Church. See CA 3/KWT J2/2 4/4/143 K.Rasimeni and G Maneli to INL 6/9/1909, Rasimeni to Town Clerk 23/12/1909. Evidence of Rev.J.M.Dwane. SANAC Vol.3 p.716[9775]
avoided. Nonetheless, confusion abounded in the records. Some Order schools were "described as 'Church of England', with no mention of the Order of Ethiopia and some quite erroneously as "AME".177

The designation of government-aided schools by denomination was both a source of pride and a matter of prestige for all missionaries. Consequently, the CPSA and the Order both wanted to be credited with the schools of the Order. Eventually, the description, "English Church school of the Order of Ethiopia" or "E.C.O.E." was devised by Cameron to replace "Order of Ethiopia" or "Ethiopian" so as to dispel confusion with other independent church schools. Cameron felt that the title should include the "E.C." prefix to establish the Order's mission church connections and thereby avoid any untoward discrimination or confusion with other denominations.178 This stratagem also conveniently gave the CPSA credit for schools run by the Order.179

Confusion existed even among African Christians over the status of certain Order schools. In 1904, Quti school in the Glen Grey district which was under the jurisdiction of the

176. This was common in the Quarterly Statistics published by the Department of Education in the period under study. The practise clearly originated in the Department of Education, but whether this was the result of deliberate instructions issued is not evident. A school manager for the Order had to request that the designation "Order of Ethiopia, English Church Mission School" be used instead of his own name. SGE 1/909 Port Elizabeth B.G.Kaba to SGE 23/9/1910.

177. AB 652 Letterbook No.11 Bp Cameron to SGE 12/3/08. AB 652 Letterbook No.13 Cameron to SGE 13/4/08. Cameron sent a list detailing the schools under management of the Order of Ethiopia.

178. For example see: AB 652 Letterbook No.11 Cameron to SGE 19/3/08; SGE 1/1197 Port Elizabeth W.Kxes to SGE 8/2/1913.

179. Confusion existed over these names well into the 1950's. There were schools credited as E.C. schools in the 1940's that Ncamashe lists as belonging to the Order. Burns-Ncamashe,S.M.(1954) Appendix C Summary of Order of Ethiopia Schools, p.213.
CPSA, was closed as a consequence of disturbances which arose out of an application by the CPSA congregation to join the Order of Ethiopia. They mistakenly believed that the Order was entirely independent of mission church control. Canon Wyche, who presided over the parish, refused to accede to their application, because he did not want to lose African members of his flock to the Order. The dissidents, led by Samuel Fini, believed that Wyche was lying about the Order being under "European supervision" and took the matter into their own hands by seizing the school buildings. For some months, Fini and his supporters were able to prevent the CPSA from gaining access to the school. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to unseat them, and they physically prevented surveyors from measuring the land on which the school stood, so that the CPSA could not formally stake its claim to the property. Although the CPSA eventually reasserted its control over Quiti School, Wyche was to comment; “It is an instructive instance of managing natives and how easily they can manage us”.\(^{180}\)

The anomalies cited above, reveal that in the case of many schools it was not clear whether the Order was running its own schools with its own personnel, independent of CPSA input, or not. Furthermore, throughout the period under study, the Order’s schools were to a greater or lesser extent subject to the influence of CPSA personnel. The man to exert the most power was Cameron who, after his appointment as Acting Provincial to the Order in 1907, was directly involved in the administration of it’s educational projects. The Order was frequently dependent on Cameron for its legitimacy in the eyes of white officialdom, which enabled him to exert his power in a number of ways. He consolidated his power over the schools by assuming the role of trustee over lands allocated to the Order for educational purposes, because certain local government officials would only allow white churchmen to hold mission church land in trust. Thus, in regard to a church and

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school site in Headman Ngila's location, Cofimvaba, the Resident Magistrate would only allow the application to be made out in the name of Cameron, in trust for the Order. His position as a white CPSA churchman was such that white local authorities would usually consult with him, and not Dwane, about the secular school activities of the Order. For example, the Civil Commissioner at King William's Town referred to Cameron for advice in regard to Dwane's applications for school sites in the area. Finally, as Acting Provincial, Cameron was empowered to appoint and direct correspondents for the schools. He allocated these positions only to people that he considered to be suitable for the responsibility. This procedure effectively denied the autonomy of both Dwane and his school superintendents in the Order's outstation schools.

Apart from Cameron's influence, the development of the Order's schools suffered at the behest of Bishop Cornish. In 1907, Cornish decided that he would not sanction any buildings in Grahamstown or Queenstown even though the Order had no facilities in those places. In Glen Grey, the Order was conducting school and church work on unauthorised sites. The Secretary of the Native Affairs Department offered Cornish the opportunity to finance the survey of the land in question so that the Order could legally operate there, but he refused. These instance show how through their mastery of land access the CPSA representatives could apply leverage over the Order.

181. AB 652 Letterbook No.14 Cameron to CC KWT 20/4/08. AB 552 Letterbook No.6 Cameron to A. Bain Esq HM Inspector of Schools 23/9/07.

182. AB 652 Letterbook No.12 Cameron to SGE 19/3/08. Sometimes Cameron himself acted as correspondent. This was so in the case of Ntlonge School, St Marks. AB 652 Letterbook No.14 Cameron to SGE 23/4/08 and 29/4/08. When Dwane or his lieutenants applied on their own they were likely to be rebuffed. See TA NTS 133 F243 Dwane to Magte Cathcart 11/8/1914 and following correspondence.
of Ethiopia's schools which they could curtail the Order's secular schools where necessary.\textsuperscript{183}

However, the involvement of Cameron and Cornish did bring some advantages to the Order's congregations. Although their interventions were calculated to increase CPSA control, in certain circumstances the outcome of their efforts was to extend the Order's schools network. For example, Cameron was able to reverse a decision made against an application by the Order's own Reverend W.M. Gcule for a Government grant at Nkapusi School in Glen Grey.\textsuperscript{184} In another incident, Bishop Cornish indicated that he was willing to allow the Order to acquire land from the East London Town Council so that he could gain control over the schools.\textsuperscript{185}

Having demonstrated the mechanisms of control that CPSA authorities were able to exercise over the Order, this chapter now turns to examine in more detail the development of the elementary school at Zalaze, the site of Dwane's proposed settlement.

5.3 Zalaze Elementary School: A Mission School Vignette

Very little evidence is available that throws light on the processes of mission schooling. The following description gleaned from missionary journals provides us with enough


\textsuperscript{184} The local schools inspector, had refused the application on the grounds that another school was "not required" even though it was demonstrated that the population in the area was large enough to justify another school. AB 652 Letterbook No.9 Cameron to SGE 28/12/07.

\textsuperscript{185} MS 16621 Cornish to Provincial Cameron 6/4/1907; AB 652 Letterbook No.1 Cameron to Goodwin 27/3/07. AB 652 Letterbook No.8 Cameron to Resident Magistrate Cofimvaba 30/11/07.
information to conclude that in the Order of Ethiopia's Zalaze school classroom, missionary practices dominated.

An elementary school was eventually opened at Zalaze in April 1904, over a year after the opening of the Theological College. By early 1905, a white catechist, Mr Davis, who acted as schoolmaster was holding classes in the tin-roofed church building. There was a regular attendance of some 70 pupils - only three of them girls - some of whom came from twenty miles away to attend the school. The pupils, aged from five to twenty-three, were placed in standards ranging up to Standard Five. The curriculum of the school embraced the following: Arithmetic, Writing, Reading, Dictation, Grammar, Drill and Singing. The 'subjects' were presented Monday to Friday in the mornings only. The timetable which was organised so as to dovetail with the Theological College, ran as follows (Table 9):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>Morning Prayer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>Mr West Lectures to the three Catechists who are to be ordained as Deacon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>Breakfast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>School (in Church) We teach the children in religious knowledge for the first hour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00 to 13.00</td>
<td>Reading etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>Second Lecture by E.C.West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>Evensong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>Confirmation Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>Supper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

187. AB 1967 Journals A.C. Grant No. 3 30/1/05; AB 1967 Journals A.C. Grant No. 5 8/3/05.
188. AB 1967 Journals A.C. Grant No. 5 8/3/05.
The Reverend Grant, West’s associate at Zalaze recalled the difficulty of teaching through an interpreter. His lack of knowledge of both the culture and the language of his pupils was soon evident. His first lesson could not have been a more unfortunate choice, for it was on the Christian name, and Grant only discovered later that there was no corresponding linguistic construction in the students vernacular, Xhosa.\textsuperscript{189} Grant betrayed amusement at his pupils in their attempts to master the strange and uncomfortable rituals that entailed "drill":

Their physical drill greatly interests me, they were very quaint in their contortions, as it is quite new to them. Moreover, no native could walk straight; he always waddles with a corkscrew gait.\textsuperscript{190}

The arrogance which infused Grant’s teaching was also reflected in his attitude to secular education authorities. He naturally assumed that the education provided by CPSA personnel would be superior to that provided by the Education Department’s educators:

We are not under Government and receive no aid grant, so are free to give the best education available without let, hindrance or any interference by good and well meaning inspectors.\textsuperscript{191}

It is also noticeable from the timetable that West and Grant’s first priority in the school was to instruct the children in religious knowledge, which was in contravention of the Cape Education Department’s policy to reduce religious teaching.

After the disturbances of 1905-6 the Zalaze Elementary School struggled for survival. As was the case with so many mission schools, the major problems were lack of funds and a shortage

\textsuperscript{189} Ab 1967 Journals A.C.Grant No.5 8/3/05.

\textsuperscript{190} AB 1967 Journals A.C.Grant No.3 30/1/05.

\textsuperscript{191} AB 1967 Journals A.C.Grant No.3 30/1/05.
of qualified teachers. Late in 1907, a CPSA priest was invited to supervise and manage the school without actually having to teach, but this plan was never implemented, because Cameron was more concerned with reopening the Theological College.

The patron of the Order, Chief Ngangelizwe Kama, disagreed with this emphasis. Throughout the period under investigation, Kama demonstrated his personal commitment to the establishment of a secular school at Zalaze. Cameron was aware that Kama's section of the Gqunukwebe had given higher priority to the elementary school than to the Theological College, but as far as he was concerned, religious education in the Order was of paramount importance:

A day school is being carried on in the church hut, which the people are very anxious to have continued. In fact, the Amagqunykwebe tribe are very keen about this school, and want to have a first rate one, - a sort of high school. This was in their minds much more than the Theological College, when they gave the land, nearly five years ago; but I have always said that the school must be an annexe of the College and dependent on it.

Cameron’s statement shows clearly that the CPSA was concerned more with the extension of the church’s ranks and with the consolidation of the Order, than with the educational desires of Dwane’s followers. Yet, he always endeavoured to favour the development of the Theological College over the Zalaze Elementary School.

192. AB 652 Letterbooks No.7 Cameron to Goodwin 7/11/07.

193. The strategy was to present the priest’s teaching qualifications in order to gain a grant, and then employ an unqualified person to teach in his place. AB 652 Letterbooks No.7 Cameron to Rev.G.S.Hall 19/11/07; AB 652 Letterbooks No.7 Cameron to Goodwin 12/11/07.

194. AB 652 Letterbooks No.1 Cameron to Goodwin 27/3/07.

195. AB 652 Letterbooks No.5 Cameron to Goodwin 22/6/07.
Sparse outgoing correspondence from Cameron's pen indicates that Zalaze continued to function intermittently. In August 1907 he noted that the school was being run temporarily by "a girl on the place".196 In June 1908, amid references to the failure of crops, Cameron asked the Reverend Grant; "What has become of all the Zalaze children? Have any families left?"197 These cryptic fragments imply yet another breakdown in the episodic story of Zalaze elementary school. The pattern continued until the Cape Department of Education accorded Government recognition to the school at Zalaze's Location, in 1933.198

6. Conclusion

This chapter has shown how education was a crucial element in the process whereby the Order of Ethiopia split from the AME and sought affiliation to the CPSA. Although the provision of both secular and religious education, was an integral mechanism in the structuring of the relationship between the Order and the CPSA, the two parties conceived the role of education in this process in very different ways.

The leaders of the Order believed that the connection with the CPSA would enhance their access to formal secular schooling and religious education. Both forms were important to enhance the economic security and mobility of the Order's followers within the church and in the broader society, and to promote the prestige of the church in the community. The CPSA leaders however, saw the provision of limited education strictly as a device for the preparation of members of the Order for admission into the religious ethos of the Anglican Church. In this way, the CPSA was able to control the intake of new

196. AB 652 Letterbooks No.5 Cameron to Goodwin 22/8/07.
197. AB 652 Letterbooks No.15 Cameron to Grant 11/6/08.
members, and ensure that they were conversant with Anglican tenets.

CPSA personnel seconded to work in the Order established their authority over the educational processes in both the Theological College and the Zalaze Elementary School. Moreover, the secular schooling of the Order was hampered by white colonial antagonism and dependency on CPSA mediation, in ways that were similar to the African Presbyterian Church’s early dependence on white proctorship. A crucial difference between the fortunes of Dwane and Mzimba lay in the nature of support they were able to enlist from traditional authorities. Dwane’s patron, Chief Ngangeliswe Kama provided less forceful backing than he might have hoped. Chief Kama was not able to successfully control land allocation to the advantage of the Order or mobilise support to the extent that Chief Mbovane Mabandla did for the Reverend Mzimba’s African Presbyterian Church. Consequently, the Order’s educational programmes were intermittently disrupted for several years.

The curriculum at the Theological College in no way contributed to the Order’s independence. Save for enhancing their potential for converting and introducing members into the Anglican church, the new catechists were not empowered by their CPSA controlled, and exclusively religious oriented education. The overall process of inducting members of the Order either asdeacons, catechists or as ordinary members, therefore consolidated the hegemony of the mission church CPSA. The structuring of the Order separate from the main CPSA body further ensured that Africans could not threaten white ecclesiastical control.

This chapter has therefore sought to contribute to both educational and Church history by opening up the education of African priests for scrutiny. Throughout the 1800’s, Africans seeking education further than the elementary phase usually had to choose between teaching and the ministry. Considering the large numbers of Africans who were educated in the
ministry, and the significant proportion of African political leaders who were churchmen, further investigation of how these people were educated for the priesthood by the mission churches is necessary.

A persistent theme in this thesis has been the way strategies adopted by African church leaders in order to gain access to education, brought unforeseen consequences. The Reverend Mzimba could have only vaguely prefigured the deleterious effects that Inspector Liefeldt brought on his schools. Similarly, the Reverend Dwane could not have predicted the ambiguities that inhered in his negotiations with the missionary CPSA. For Dwane in particular, the consequences were serious because in signing the Compact of 1900 he constitutionally bound his Order to the CPSA, while the African Presbyterian Church at least emerged at the end of the decade free of direct mission authority and in command of its own schools.

It is evident that increasing numbers of black people began taking steps to secure access to schooling in the period under study. This broad trend has been generally acknowledged by historians, but its characteristics have not been analysed. In particular, historians have been content merely to observe the increase in demand without investigating what forms this demand took. The value of Chapter 2 in this thesis lies in its depiction of the rising black demand for schooling in the Cape Colony. The value of this chapter on the Order of Ethiopia is that it illuminates the features of educational demand in African Christian communities. It has shown that African desires were not simply focussed on secular elementary education. A wide range of educational aspirations, were reflected in the efforts of the Order of Ethiopia to develop its schools, and especially in the Reverend Dwane's plan for a self-supporting settlement.
CHAPTER FIVE

"THE GREATEST NEED IN AND OUT OF OUR CHURCH IS EDUCATION"¹:
AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH SCHOOLING IN THE SOUTH
WESTERN CAPE, 1896-1920

1. Introduction

The small but growing literature which concerns the influence
of black American ideas on the political and economic
aspirations and activities of black South Africans has begun
to throw light on the African Methodist Episcopal Church
(AME).² As yet, comparatively little research has been
focused directly on the AME's educational initiatives. Even
less is known of AME schools in the rural Western Cape which
were engaged in strenuous campaigns for self determination in
the face of concerted Dutch Reformed Church opposition (DRC).
Although the patterns of Education Department and missionary
control over AME school activity were similar to those
exercised against the African Presbyterian Church and the
Order of Ethiopia schools in the eastern districts of the Cape
Colony, this case study will show that the AME schools
developed under more advantageous local conditions.

The AME school enterprises were different in two important
respects. First, the school leaders were able to benefit from
their location closer to the operational centre of the
Education Department and from links with the church's

¹. Reverend A.W. Phijeland at Cape District Conference. Gordon
Papers, African Methodist Episcopal Church Archive, University
of the Western Cape, File No.8, AME Cape District Conference
1904-1914, 4/11/1908.

². A number of independent black "churches" and "societies"
mostly Methodist in doctrine formed an independent black
church in Philadelphia, USA, called the African Methodist
Episcopal Church in 1816, with Richard Allen as its first
Bishop. Hughes,H., "Black Mission in South Africa: Religion
and Education in the African Methodist Episcopal Church in
South Africa, 1892-1953", B.A.Hons thesis, University of the
Witwatersrand, (1976)pp.33-36; Coan,J.R., "Expansion of
Missions of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in South
headquarters in Cape Town. There, AME representatives could interact on a personal basis with senior officers in the Education Department hierarchy. In addition, Afro-American AME leaders and local AME representatives who had trained in the United States brought with them a political sophistication which they employed to the advantage of church schools in the Cape Colony.

Second, the large Coloured population in the Western Cape from which AME congregations were drawn, displayed a different political consciousness to African independent church adherents in the Eastern Cape. In this AME case-study, the ethnic and religious allegiances which generated severe conflict within Eastern Cape school communities were not apparent. AME school activities were fuelled by the growth of political organisations such as the African Political Organisation which championed the rights of black people and politicised education issues. In essence, the contest over schools in this chapter was conducted in the realm of the politics of negotiation with the Education Department bureaucracy rather than in cauldron of local community conflicts.

The AME schools leaders employed the rhetoric of improvement, discipline and non-involvement in politics, but were nonetheless imbued with race pride and a concern for upholding black rights. The ideas they articulated strongly influenced the way the AME schools campaigns were conducted. The ethos that the church implanted in Southern Africa was taken up enthusiastically by many 'improving' Coloureds and Africans in the Western Cape in the first decades of the century.

In this account of the AME schools, an important change in mission school power relations will be demonstrated. The sole authority of the missionary over school affairs was being curtailed as the Education Department’s influence became stronger. In effect, bureaucratic management forms were beginning to supersede autocratic mission jurisdiction. At
Piquetberg, the school principal, Mrs Sarah Bell, was able to force the DRC's Reverend Enslin to comply with departmental procedures and to retract decisions that he had made without consultation with the school committee. Thereafter, Mrs Bell seceded and successfully guided a new AME school to full independence. At Morris Brown AME School near Malmesbury, Inspector Golightly manipulated procedures and employed the 'three mile rule' in order to restrict the AME. In spite of his efforts, the AME's representatives were also in a position to deploy the departmental regulations to their advantage, and secure recognition for their school.

This research has thus far investigated incidents of opposition to missionary control in schools which were broadly speaking, motivated by the political principle of self-determination and by the basic need to improve access to education. Without eulogising each initiative, the aim has been to show how the plans of each church brought foreseen and unforeseen successes and failures. Further insight into this complex phenomenon is provided through an account in this chapter of the efforts of the Reverend A.H. Attaway to set up an industrial school and land syndicate near Malmesbury. This project was taken over by a private company as a profit-making venture. The failure of Reverend Attaway's scheme usefully demonstrates that not all independent church school projects were triumphant incidents of resistance to mission schooling.

In this chapter, a brief introduction to the early history of the AME in Southern Africa will be followed by a review of some key facets of the educational ethos of the church. The scope of AME work in the Western Cape will be surveyed in order to place the rural schools in perspective. Then, the efforts of school teacher Mrs. Sarah Bell, and the Reverend F.M. Gow, to maintain an AME schooling presence in the Piquetberg and Malmesbury regions, will be examined. They survived strenuous attempts by DRC churchmen and Schools Inspector Golightly to oust them. Lastly, the Reverend
Attaway's controversial industrial school project will be investigated.

2. The Arrival and Consolidation of the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) in South Africa

2.1 The American Diaspora

The Afro-American fascination with Africa has a long history going back to the formation of the American Colonisation Society in 1817, which aimed to resettle freed slaves in Liberia. Bishop H.M. Turner of the AME who toured South Africa in 1898 was a strong proponent of the back-to-Africa movement which, as successor to the Colonisation Society also emphasised emigration to Africa. The Southern African members of the AME found inspiration in the Pan-Africanist philosophy of Turner and other black Americans, who rallied them behind a vision of black nationalism and unity on the African continent.

African contacts with black American educational ideas and practices were established in several ways. Early links were made by black South Africans who travelled to the United States as students. Interaction was also fostered through the


activities of representatives of black American churches such as the African Methodist Episcopal and Baptist Churches who established local schools and churches. Ideas about black American education associated with individuals like Booker T. Washington and institutions like Tuskegee, were disseminated through the distribution of pamphlets and newspapers such as the AME organ, the Voice of the Missions. By 1896, as many as thirty leading Cape Africans including Chief Kama of Alice, James and Meshak Pelem, Paul Xiniwe and James Dwane subscribed to this paper. 5

Afro-American influences were evident in black schools in various parts of the country from the 1890’s onwards. Edgar has highlighted the "American School" movement in the Transkei of the 1920’s which was lead by the Garveyite disciple, "Dr Wellington" Buthelezi. His schools enjoyed enthusiastic though short-lived popular support. 6 However, Chapter 1 indicates that Edgar’s work does not fall within the period or the parameters of this study. Around the turn of the century, the most important single agency in the diffusion of American ideas was the AME. 7


7. The AME was not the only black American denomination to move into central and southern African mission fields in the late nineteenth century. The National Baptist Convention also commissioned missionary work there. In addition, white American denominations, the Southern Presbyterians, Southern Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, and Southern Methodists were also developing their African missions. They recruited black Americans for their work in the belief that freed black men were more resistant to the diseases that plagued white missionaries and more likely to develop closer ties to Africans on the basis of their racial affinity. Johnson, W. R., "The Afro-American Presence in Central and Southern Africa, 1880 - 1905" Journal of Southern African Affairs 4(1), (1979) pp. 30, 42; Hunt-Davis, R. (1978) p. 59.
The AME was introduced to Southern Africa through the medium of the Ethiopian Church which was founded by the Reverend Mangena M. Mokone in the Transvaal in 1892. Mokone was impressed by what he heard about the AME and initiated correspondence with AME Bishop Henry McNeal Turner in the United States. As a result of this correspondence, an amalgamation of the local Ethiopians with the AME was mooted. In 1896, the Ethiopian Reverends Dwane and Xaba were appointed as representatives to the Annual Conference of the AME in the United States. Union was effected in 1896, and the South African region became the 14th District of the AME Church.

2.2 Expansion, Secession and Colonial Repression

From the beginning, the fledgling AME 14th District had much to contend with. Difficulties were encountered in organising its rapidly growing congregations, and in assimilating the variety of religious, linguistic and ethnic characteristics of its members into a single religious structure. In 1899, the

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8. He had broken away from the Wesleyan Church. Fluornoy, B.M. (1975/6) pp. 529-530.

9. In 1895, Mokone read the letters of Charlotte Manye, who had gone from the Transvaal to the United States as a member of an ill-fated choir tour. The choir ran out of money and was forced to disband in Cleveland, Ohio. There, Bishop W.D. Derrick, Secretary of the Missionary Department of the AME, organised a scholarship for Charlotte Manye to study at Wilberforce University. The letters that Charlotte Manye wrote home, were shown to the Rev. Mokone who was impressed by what he read and initiated contact. Berry, L.L., A Century of Missions of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, 1896-1940 (New York, Gutenberg Press, 1942) p. 158; Chirenje, J.M. (1976) pp. 254-257; Coan, J.R. (1961) pp. 440-442.

10. Rev. J. Dwane subsequently seceded from the AME and joined the Anglican Church as leader of the Order of Ethiopia. See Chapter 4.

Church suffered setbacks when the government of the Cape Colony became aware of a dispute over the legality of James Dwane's appointment as its local leader or "Vicar-Bishop". Correspondence from a Bishop Hartzell of the predominantly white Methodist Episcopal Church of America, addressed to Colonial Secretary, Sir Gordon Sprigg, in 1902 deepened the controversy. In seeking to distance his church from the AME, Hartzell referred critically to the AME's preoccupation with race and their "antagonism" to churches organised by whites.

To compound its problems, white mission clergy in the Cape Colony accused the AME of engaging in political sedition and poaching converts. These incidents led to the launch of a comprehensive government enquiry into all independent church activity in the Colony in late 1902. The AME was to suffer a further blow.

Vicar-Bishop James Dwane called a special conference of the 14th District in October of 1899 at Queenstown. There he criticized the AME for its failure to provide financial support that was promised for the construction of a church in Cape Town and a college of higher education in Queenstown.

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15. The Queenstown college project which was to be named the "Turner Normal School", aroused much enthusiasm in the AME in the United States but little material support. Coan gives much attention to fruitless endeavours of the home church to accumulate the funds then considered necessary for the establishment of the college. This caused the home church some embarrassment. Nevertheless, Coan argues that Dwane's claim that $10,000 was promised for the college was a distortion, for there was no definite offer. Coan, J.R. (1961) pp.195,214-219,240,310; Chirenje, J.M. (1981) pp.31-33.
Dwane was also unhappy with the AME's failure to secure government recognition, and with his own uncertain standing as its local leader. He proposed a motion to secede from the AME which was carried by a large majority.16 Dwane's secession was possible because no AME adherents from north of the Orange River were present at the conference. Representatives of the church in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were prevented from travelling to Queenstown because of restrictions on the movement of Africans imposed during the South African War. After the loss of Dwane and his supporters, the impetus of AME expansion in the Cape, especially in the eastern districts, was curtailed. To make matters worse, the laissez-faire attitude of the former Boer republics towards the AME, was reversed under the post-war British colonial dispensation.17 In Natal, independent church activity was also subject to severe restrictions.18

Although it has been suggested that there was a general softening of policy towards the independent churches after the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903-1905, this took effect very unevenly.19 A less harsh approach was

16. There were other smaller secessions from the AME in South Africa, including those in 1904 and 1906 led by Rev. James Brander and Rev. R.S. Temba respectively. Hughes, H. (1976) pp. 53-54.


18. A petition which dealt with this issue was submitted to the Natal Governor in 1908. In 1910, AME ministers were still not allowed free access to Natal, and magistrates were still unwilling to distinguish between churches in the broad grouping of "Ethiopian". TA NTS 132 F243 J.Z. Tantsi, M.M. Maxeke and H.R. Ngcayiya to Governor 19/3/1908; Samuelson to Ngcayiya 30/8/1907; Magistrate Newcastle to Under Secretary of Native Affairs 11/8/1910; Petition Ngcayiya and deputants to F.R. Moor MLA 20/6/1907; Rich, P. (1978) p. 126; Hughes, H. (1976) p. 48.

discernible in the communications of senior officials in government departments, but this was not so evident at magisterial levels, and among the lower echelons of the Native Affairs Department and the Education Department. Reservations about the AME still lingered in the minds of colonial officials as late as the 1920's.20

In the Cape Colony, a more liberal approach towards the AME was in evidence. Officials adopted a 'wait and see' policy during which applications for independent church recognition were treated 'on merit'. Meanwhile, surveys of independent church activity that were conducted, failed to produce incontrovertible evidence of sedition.21 Although the Cape government recognised the AME as a Church according to the Marriage Order in Council of 1838, it was prepared to recognise only twelve ministers of this body as marriage officers.22 This measure curtailed the AME's work and damaged its credibility among congregations in the Cape.

The South African AME suffered a serious leadership dispute in the first decade of the century. The American Bishop C.S.

20. As late as 1921 on their arrival in South Africa the new AME Bishop of the 14th District, Bishop W.T. Vernon, his wife and son were detained aboard ship and transferred under guard preparatory to immediate deportation. Their sudden departure was only forestalled after substantial correspondence had passed between the American Consul General and the Minister of the Interior. Berry, L.L. (1942) p. 167. TA NTS 483 6/64 Garthorne to R.M. Herschel 24/4/23.


Smith, who succeeded Bishop L.J. Coppin in 1904, arrived when the church was experiencing major financial difficulties. Local congregations which expected Smith to arrive with enough funds to revive AME building projects and educational operations, were disappointed. Smith promptly returned to the United States ostensibly to collect funds. However, he was not convinced that the AME should maintain its missions in Southern Africa, which he considered to be a "white elephant". Smith left behind tensions and unresolved differences with local leaders. 23 It was left up to the Reverend F.M. Gow to reconcile the 14th District with the mother church, and to reunite the local congregations which had lapsed into disunity under Bishop Smith. 24 As General Superintendent in the Cape Districts, Gow was also an important influence in the growth of the schools.

The secessions, internal disputes, and colonial repression that dogged expansion of the AME in Southern Africa between 1896 and the 1920's, severely affected the religious and educational activities of the church. Notwithstanding these problems, by 1903 the AME had functioning congregations in the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, Southern Rhodesia, Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Barotseland. By 1904, membership recovered to levels that had been attained before the secession of Dwane and about 10 000 adherents in 1899. 25 It has already been noted that Dwane's defection weakened the Cape region of the church. After 1907, the American Bishops of the South African 14th Episcopal District all took up residence in the Transvaal which tended to focus growth in the


Witwatersrand rather than in the Cape. Nevertheless, congregations were established in the Cape Colony at Port Elizabeth, Queenstown, Grahamstown, Mafikeng, Kimberley and in the Tembuland and Pondoland territories. Before 1904, Bishop L.J. Coppin travelled extensively in order to promote the church. This was also true of his colleague, the Reverend H.R. Ngcayiya, who reported having covered 2,000 miles on horseback and on foot in the Grahamstown district in 1900. In the Western Cape, the Church had constituted congregations at Cape Town, Maitland Location, Rondebosch, Groen Rivier (Malmesbury), Wellington, Montagu, Worcester and Piquetberg by 1904.

This overview of the general pattern of church growth should be sufficient to place the case-studies of its rural schools in the Western Cape, in context. It is now necessary to highlight important characteristics of the AME ethos that informed the educational practises of its members.

26. This is inferred from a letter from Bishop Johnson describing work to the north, in Berry, L.L. (1942) p.182. Where the Bishop lived must have influenced the development of these regions of the church. In the Cape, Coppin, 1900-1904 and Smith 1904-1907 were Cape based. The rest of the Bishops were Transvaal based, Derrick 1907-1908, Johnson 1908-1916 and Beckett 1916-1920. Berry, L.L. (1942) p.181.


29. The growing influx of blacks Africans from the rural areas to new locations like Rondebosch Extension provided a fresh pool of possible converts. Coan, J.R. (1961) p.308.

30. Dwane's defection from the church is most likely to have affected the eastern districts of the AME, leaving the western districts more or less intact. According to Coan, concerted reconstruction of the church took place in Cape Town. Coan, J.R. (1961) pp.252-253.
3. The AME: Race, Pan-Africanism and Respectability

3.1 The AME Ethos and Educational Values

The organisational conduits of Afro-American contact, which have been identified, fed an emerging consciousness of race pride, independence, black identity and Pan-African fraternity among Coloured and African people in Southern Africa. This political assertiveness was linked to a desire for economic improvement. In addition, the AME expressed a strong missionary zeal. At an interdenominational church "Congress on Africa" held in Atlanta in 1895, the redemption of the 'Dark Continent' was enthusiastically discussed, and the religious "duty" and "obligation" of American blacks to redeem Africa was stressed. This obligation was considered all the more binding on account of transatlantic bonds of "racial kinship" and "racial affinity". At a meeting of the "World's Parliament of Religions", Afro-American AME Bishop B.W. Arnett employed social Darwinist theory to justify mission work in Africa by black Americans. He proclaimed, "A redeemer of a people must be from the same genus, species and variety of the redeemed, and the African continent is no exception to the rule".31 This argument was backed by other claims that black Americans were physically "better adapted" to the climate of Africa.32

Afro-American attitudes to African congregations derived partly from higher education levels and their western outlook. To some extent, their command of modernity, with its assumed superiority over traditional cultures, estranged them from the people with whom they were assumed to share a racial affinity. This led Bishop L.J. Coppin to proclaim:

> What has been done for the uplift of the coloured man in America, by schools and colleges and by contact with a superior civilisation, means, not only that he


should be a helpful agency in the body politic; but also he should bear his part of the religious burden of uplifting the world. 33

In spite of the heavy emphasis on fraternal links between Africans and Afro-Americans, AME missionaries sometimes expressed views that were not markedly different from those of white missionaries. Thus Afro-Americans who had presumed that local Africans were savage and unintelligent, were by their own admission "dumbfounded to find the Africans intelligent and quite capable of governing themselves". 34 Flournoy points to the irony that the "same biases and attitudes which caused the Ethiopian Church to sever ties with the white missionaries would later cause severe conflicts between Afro-American and African members of the AME church". 35 Levels of paternalism evident in the approach of Afro-American missionaries from time to time conflicted with the aims of Africans who, though willing to accept religious and educational assistance from the AME, were not willing to relinquish their own control over church affairs. 36

The Colonial authorities distinguished between Afro-Americans and local Africans. Afro-Americans enjoyed a special status as well educated foreigners which presented them with opportunities that would not normally have been open to local Africans. The AME's leaders were able to employ their experience of the United States to the advantage of the local church in negotiations with government departments. On the other hand, their political distinctiveness which derived from the experience of emancipation and post civil war politics, attracted great suspicion. For example in 1908, the Chief Magistrate of the Transkeian territories stated:

34. Flournoy, B. (1975/6)p.541.
It has been considered politic to exclude Asians as far as possible from the Native Territories, and the American Negro of the type known in South Africa is equally undesirable. There is reason to believe that his inclination would induce him to disseminate republican ideas, with of course the Native of the Country in the dominant position, and thus become a disturbing element in the administration of the country.37

Native Affairs Department and Education Department administrators considered Afro-Americans to be potentially dangerous political agents. However, the administrators were also cautious in their dealings with the Afro-Americans because of their political and educational sophistication. In the eyes of certain white authorities, this made the AME seem even more dangerous than the indigenous independent churches, and they took measures to prevent the AME from taking root. It is therefore not surprising that the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei should claim in 1908 that no Afro-American independent churches had been granted church or school sites in the locations of that territory.38

The question of race relations39 was strategic for the AME churches and schools.40 By the turn of the century, white

37. TA NTS 132 F243 CMT Umtata to NAD 14/3/1908.
38. TA NTS 132 F243 CMT Umtata to NAD 14/3/1908.
39. The AME in South Africa did not discriminate on the basis of colour. In 1903, Bp. Coppin stated; "our church was blind to colour" and "we receive men only on good faith for character and character only". This statement was made in response to allegations made by a white man, Mr. van der Poel, that the church was racist. However, he was reputed to have been defrauding AME members. Gordon Papers, File No.9, AME Cape Annual Conference 1901-1905 Aliwal North 1903, p.88.
40. The Cape Argus carried a supportive article on the First Annual Conference of the AME in 1901. The Mayor of Cape Town had promised to address the opening session of the Conference along with American Consul General Mr. Bigham. However, antagonistic attitudes were gaining the ascendancy. CA GH
antagonism against the AME was expressed in letters to the South African Spectator. This newspaper, which was produced for the black community, was 'adopted' by the AME. It was considered "the obligation" of loyal AME members to support the paper.\textsuperscript{41} An aggressive letter was published in the Spectator in 1902, which attacked the AME on political grounds:

But, and if a Church, such as the AMEC Church goes out of its way, stirs up strife and disloyalty, meddles in politics; and under the cloak of religion preaches a crusade against the powers that be, it suborns its sacred calling .... Pray, I would ask, what real complaints have the coloured races here...?\textsuperscript{42}

The Spectator's Ghanaian proprietor, F.Z.S. Peregrino, railed against unjust criticism of the AME which emanated from the mission churches and white colonial sources:

Why will certain ministers of the prejudiced kind insist on willfully misrepresenting the African Methodist Episcopal Church? One can understand a misrepresentation based on ignorance or error, but the cruel and willful lying of a sanctimonious humbug we have but the most supreme contempt for.\textsuperscript{43}

Under conditions of such sensitivity, barring utter compliance, blacks in the Cape could not easily avoid accusations of 'meddling' in politics. The AME in turn wanted to avoid advancing the impression that it aspired to be a political force in the Colony. Church leaders such as the Reverend Gow denied any political involvement and protested the neutrality of the church. Whether Gow's declaration

\textsuperscript{35/84 "AME CHURCH First Annual Conference" Clipping Cape Argus 18/12/1901.}
\textsuperscript{41. Page,C.A.(1978)p.330.}
\textsuperscript{42. "Mr. Harris on the AME" South African Spectator 23/9/1902.}
\textsuperscript{43. "Oh ye Hypocrites!" South African Spectator 24/8/1901.}
revealed a sincere belief that politics did in fact have little or nothing to do with the activities of the church, was not apparent. AME leaders learned to their cost that being implicated in political matters was damaging to the development of legitimate church and educational projects. Such problems in all likelihood motivated them to maintain as cordial a relationship with the colonial authorities as possible.

In 1902, one recorded incident did take place in which anti-government and anti-white sentiments were expressed publicly by an AME preacher at Uitvlugt Native Location. He was accused of "creating a disturbance" and "molesting" the location's white stable foreman.44 It was alleged that the preacher, whose name was not divulged, had angrily cursed "the bloody rotten government" because "the bloody rotten government wanted to live on the Kaffirs money".45 For his outburst the preacher was "at once suspended from all official standing" pending final action which was to be decided at the following AME Quarterly Conference.46 The Reverend Attaway who mediated with the Native Affairs Department on the matter, reaffirmed the AME's "pledge to co-operate".47 In a public speech he denied any connection between the AME and political activity and emphasised the church's willingness to acquiesce to the status quo;

We are not adventurers in South Africa. We are not dreamers, neither are we theorists or a disturbing element coming to South Africa ... We are not politicians, our policy has been everywhere to gracefully adjust to the prevailing political, economic and social exigencies(sic).48

44. CA NA 545 /A770 Secretary of the Native Affairs Department to Attaway 5/7/1902.
45. CA NA 545 /A770 Evidence of John Jackson. n.d.
46. CA NA 545 /A770 Attaway to Cumming 20/7/02.
47. CA NA 545 /A770 Attaway to Cumming 20/7/1902.
This incident illustrated how decisively the AME leadership reacted in order to remain on the right side of the government. In a similar vein, Bishop Coppin strenuously preached loyalty and obedience to the laws of the Cape Colony. His views on the role of blacks in the Colony were endorsed by Peregrino in the Spectator, who reported with approval on a speech by Coppin in 1901:

Some of the people who prate about the mischievous tendencies of the presence here of the AME Church, or any other educational agency, should have heard Bishop Coppin's address the other evening at Ebenezer Hall. The Bishop's enjoinment to loyalty, and his masterly exposition of the duties of the subject to his rulers and his obedience to the laws, can be excelled by none and equalled by few. We do not come to destroy but to build, is the motto... 49

The AME leaders wished to convey that their church's response to colonial dispossession, growing discrimination and inequities in Cape society, was to promote earnest, honest industry, and not to engage in political action. This led Bishop Coppin, who was born of free parents in the period of slavery, to urge; "The passion of revenge must be overcome. We must not strike back".50

Although the AME's public rhetoric appeared to affirm the status quo, there was undeniably another stream of thought that informed the actions of many AME adherents. An emerging Pan-African nationalism was expressed, in the words of AME member, Charlotte Manye, who on her return from the United States proclaimed that although she "left a Basuto girl, they returned me an African girl for the whole of Africa"51 Manye


married Marshall Maxexe who also studied in the United States and on his return, elected to teach in AME schools in the Cape and the Transvaal. Charlotte Manye became a prominent woman member of the South African Native Congress and founder of the Women's League which fought against women's pass laws. In her career as a school teacher, she was determined that black pride should be nurtured in her students. Manye argued that in the schools, the students should see pictures on the walls which depicted "our own people" rather than portraits of the British monarchy. "Our children", she said, "must learn to know and respect the(ir) race, their benefactors and their ministers".

The work of pioneer Charlotte Manye highlights the position of women in the AME. Their role was far more conspicuous than in the other independent churches under investigation in this thesis. The AME openly acknowledged that women had "taken the front ranks side by side with men". At the 1901 Cape Annual Conference, sessions were scheduled and organised by churchwomen. In 1902 Mrs Coppin began organising South African AME women by establishing a section of the church called the Sarah Allen Missionary Society which was named after the wife of the church's founder. Even so, women's involvement was couched in the role of supporter rather than leader. In her address to the conference in 1902, Mrs Coppin confirmed this orthodoxy by claiming that women in the AME were given the place of Ruth whose functions included "gleaning moneys", "visiting the sick" and ensuring "that children (were) sent to school".


their schooling, an expectation reinforced by the number of AME women who became "servant girls" in the homes of white Cape Town families. Thus, the educational horizons of women in the AME were bounded by their roles as home-makers and servants in white homes. The domestic role of AME women was emphasised in this report of a speech by Mrs. Coppin:

She desired that girls be given all literary education possible, but let them have their domestic and industrial training in full, for that is their life duty ... the success of their husbands and children is inseparable from their character. 56

Despite this legacy, an account in this chapter of one rural AME school in the Piquetberg district will show that AME women did find opportunities for leadership. Mrs Sarah Bell displayed leadership qualities and considerable resourcefulness in maintaining her school in the face of Dutch Reformed Church opposition.

The educational struggles of the AME school congregations were conducted in a political context that was different to that pertaining in the region within which the case studies of the African Presbyterian Church and the Order of Ethiopia were located. A distinguishing feature of the Western Cape was the heightened political awareness among people of colour in the region. This was expressed concretely in terms of a great volume of correspondence that was addressed to the Education Department. The communications ranged from complaints to petitions covering a wide spectrum of problems, some of which dealt with conditions of service for teachers and irregularities in the management of schools. Thus there was a far greater willingness on the part of black people in the Western Cape to demand access to education, and to defend their rights in education.

The following incidents sampled from the rural Malmesbury and Piquetberg divisions in 1910, indicate a keen sensitivity to signs of discrimination, unfair treatment or wrongdoing by teachers in the schools. Mr. Jack Jawaka alleged that the schoolmaster of the English Church Mission School, Hoedjes Bay, Malmesbury had employed his children to carry water for the Principal. Jawaka took exception to the treatment of his children and removed them from the school. In 1911, Mr. C Wannenburg of Paarl Road, Malmesbury, complained that his children had been excluded from the DRC mission school because of a dispute over the payment of fees. In 1910, Mr. J.E. Landers complained to the Education Department that his children were not admitted to the DRC school at Hoedjes Bay unless he paid double fees, because they were Malay. Landers was clearly aware that the Education Act of 1905 had not been applied to his children. He complained that his "children (were) running about the street." The aggressive approach expressed by Coloureds and Africans in the protection of their civil liberties was recognised by white politicians such as John Garlick who stood as candidate for the Legislative Assembly in 1902. He attempted to rally Coloured support by placing a full page advertisement in the South African Spectator in which he claimed that he would "support colonial industries", "compulsory education" and "equal rights for all civilised people".

This heightened politicisation of education stemmed in part from the development of black political activity in the Cape, particularly under the aegis of the African Political

57. SGE 1/995 Malmesbury Jawaka to SGE 16/5/1911, L.Barboni de Mendonca to SGE 19/6/1911, Acting SGE to Rev.A.F.Jeffery 30/5/1911.

58. SGE 1/995 Malmesbury Wannenburg to SGE 24/7/1911, SGE to Wannenburg 12/8/1911.


Organisation (APO) which had established 96 branches by 1910.\textsuperscript{61} Certain lay members of the AME were openly involved with the APO. William C. Collins, an AME lay preacher, was president of the organisation for a short period.\textsuperscript{62}

The APO identified education as one of its primary campaign areas. The general lack of access to education, lack of post-elementary education and poor qualifications of teachers were consistently reported by its branches. Much APO activity involved raising funds for the purchase of land, for the establishment of schools, and for supporting students who travelled abroad.\textsuperscript{63} Chapter 2 has described in more detail how the APO launched an offensive against the Cape Colony's School Board Act of 1905 which had entrenched preferential treatment for the children of whites in the statute books of the Colony for the first time. With the support of other groups such as the Coloured Peoples Vigilance Committee of Cape Town, the APO waged a bitter though unsuccessful campaign for free and compulsory schooling to be extended to all races.\textsuperscript{64} Despite the failure of its campaign against the 1905 Act, the APO raised political awareness to new levels among black people in the Cape.


\textsuperscript{64} SGE 1/1088 Malmesbury Peregrino on behalf of the Coloured Peoples Vigilance Committee to SGE, Murray to Peregrino 18/12/1912, Murray to Golightly 5/12/1912; SGE 1/1184 Malmesbury Peregrino to SGE 4/1/1913; Lewis, G.(1987) pp.20-27,29-34,67-69.
3.2 Education, 'Improvement' and the Promise of Prosperity

Education was considered to be a vital cornerstone in the quest for improvement among AME members. Publications of the home church reinforced a widespread faith in education as a vehicle for self help. The need to give priority to education was impressed on local adherents in statements such as; "All praise philanthropy, but we have contributed for our own education: $15,065,000". In 1901, Peregrino reported in the *Spectator* that the superior opportunities offered for improvement by the AME had contributed to the popularity of the church among Africans:

The Native races seem anxious to avail themselves of the opportunities for higher culture and broader usefulness afforded by this denomination... 66

AME members constantly sought to enhance educational awareness at many levels. At the AME Cape Annual Conference in Cape Town in 1902, it was proposed that March 12 should be declared "Education Day". The imperative to educate or become educated, was expressed almost as a sacred duty. At the Cape District Conference in 1908, Reverend A.W. Phijeland of Chatsworth and Piquetberg, made the following impassioned speech on the rights of the Church to command both the spiritual and educational development of AME children:

... the greatest need in and out of our church is education. ... we must make more use of the opportunities which tend to education.... every member of my church must know as soon as they have brought the child for baptism, that the minister has as much right as the parents to claim the


66. "The AME Church and Schools" *South African Spectator* 27/7/1901.

child for the church and see that it is educated.\textsuperscript{68}

Other indications of the pervasive concern for education in the Church were regular reports tabled on educational achievements in the various districts. Addresses on educational topics were frequently presented at the AME Cape District Conferences by various officers of the church.\textsuperscript{69} For the AME, the importance of possessing the skills of literacy was bound up with the importance of possessing books as both instruments of schooling and symbols of educational status. The AME educators therefore laid great stress on the acquisition of books and libraries for their schools. This was reflected in reports of the Worcester AME Quarterly Conferences between 1902 and 1911 where the question, "What number of books in library?", was regularly asked.\textsuperscript{70} By 1920, the AME schools at Bethel, Diep Rivier, and Wellington, were members of an elite group of mission schools that had a substantial collection of books in their libraries.\textsuperscript{71}

In the early phase of AME growth, F.Z.S. Peregrino, as a self-appointed advocate of Coloured improvement, played an important part in the promotion of the schools.\textsuperscript{72} The

\textsuperscript{68} Gordon Papers, File No.8, AME Cape District Conference 1904-1914, 4/11/1908.

\textsuperscript{69} Miss. Johanna Gow, Rev. Phijeland, Rev. Nyombolo, D. Gordon, Stewart, Esau frequently gave addresses on educational topics. Unfortunately, the full texts of these speeches were not recorded in the minutes. Gordon Papers, File No.8, AME Cape District Conference 1904-1914.

\textsuperscript{70} For example, in 1908 P. Williams wrote to the SGE complaining that lack of funds was hampering his efforts in buying books. This is significant as there is no evidence to suggest that the Department was funding the acquisition of library books in mission schools during this period. SGE 1/687 Cape Suburbs P. Williams to SGE 10/11/1908.

\textsuperscript{71} At this stage Wellington school was the best equipped AME institution with 174 volumes. Gordon Papers, File No.19, Quarterly Conference Worcester AME, 1902-1911. Education Gazette Quarterly Statistics for the Fourth Quarter, 1920.

\textsuperscript{72} An indication of his importance in the AME community is evident from his being invited to address the first annual
letterhead of his newspaper, the South African Spectator, was "The Advocate of Liberty, Education and Temperance". Peregrino aimed "to write intelligently on the educational status of the people" and scrutinised the Education Department's operations for signs of discriminatory practices.

The AME Cape Annual Conference established a committee on the proposed AME South African College for higher education. It has been noted that the plan to build a higher college, the "Wilberforce of Africa" near Queenstown which would offer courses in a range of professions ranging from the ministry to teaching, agriculture and engineering, never came to fruition. The only alternative was to send students to America. In 1900, at least fourteen South African students were attending American institutions such as Wilberforce University, Howard University, Morris Brown College and Maharry Medical College. In 1903, Bishop Coppin stated that his church had sponsored 23 students, while overall estimates of black South African attendance in American universities and colleges was estimated to be between 100 and 400 students by 1911. F.Z.S. Peregrino responded quickly to this demand. In 1902 he posted

conference of the AME on "The Mission of the A.M.E. church in South Africa" Cape Argus 18/12/1901.

73. SGE 1/316 Cape Town Peregrino to SGE 12/2/1902.

74. This led him to correspond with the SGE in 1902, requesting that the Department explain the reservation of a vacation course for white teachers only. Subsequently, vacation courses for coloured teachers were held, but on a separate basis. SGE 1/316 Cape Town Peregrino to SGE 19/9/1902.


76. For a list of graduates, see Appendix.viii, Coan, J.R. (1961) pp.455-456. For list of students who went to Wilberforce "South African students being trained in America" South African Spectator 1/6/1902.

advertisements for educational opportunities overseas in the Spectator which proclaimed; "Give your Boy a Sound and Useful Education wherein his Hands as well as his Head are trained and a useful Trade taught him". The growing importance that was accorded to "useful" forms of industrial education was utilised by Reverend A.H. Attaway to attract students to his school near Malmesbury.

The promise of improvement that underpinned AME activities extended into the realm of economic self help. Schemes to make the "church more prosperous financially" were constantly being proposed. AME members were encouraged to succeed as far as possible on an individual basis. The South African Spectator carried several articles on black business in the United States. One of them entitled "The Black Phalanx" listed the numbers of "coloured" people successfully "undertaking businesses" which ranged from laundry businesses to stenography and store-keeping.

However, community co-operation was considered essential to achieve black economic success. In 1902, the South African Spectator reported that "enterprising Coloured people" had contributed to a "business boom in the sixth district (District Six)" which was "most encouraging and evinces the disposition to do something for themselves". In the same year, the AME linked Plumstead Co-operation Society, aimed to

78. The numbers of Black graduates from Harvard and Yale were noted in the Spectator. "The Black Phalanx" South African Spectator 22/3/1902.


80. Gordon Papers, File No.8, AME Cape District Conference 1904-1914, 24/2/1904.


open "intelligently managed co-operative stores at Plumstead" which were to be based on the values of "thrift and industry".83 This scheme which involved trading stores where there was "no middleman to pay", was advertised in the South African Spectator.84 Related to this was the idea of creating self sufficient co-operatives among AME communities. In 1903, it was announced that as the first step toward a "co-operative movement", the Reverend Attaway intended to build "a school community on the order of Tuskegee Institute" at Chatsworth, the fate of which will be examined later in this chapter.85

Education was a primary medium for popularising an improving way of life based on Christian temperance86, and forbearance in the personal, public and economic life of AME members. In recognition of the poor financial position of the AME community, frugality and saving were considered vital strategies. A decision was made at the AME Cape District Conference in 1909, to teach the people "domestic savings".87 On several occasions, church leaders asked the Education Department for permission to close their schools so that


86. Intemperance was a sensitive issue among AME congregations, a volatile one in and out of the schools. See incident in which Malmesbury AME school manager, A.W. Phijeland terminated the appointment of principal Stephen Olifant on grounds of intemperance. SGE 1/1405 Malmesbury Phijeland to SGE 7/6/1915, Phijeland to SGE 15/2/1915, Phijeland to SGE 2/2/1915; SGE 1/1285 Malmesbury Oliphant to SGE 16/2/1914

church bazaars could be held for fund raising. Material frugality was also linked to moral self control. Charlotte Manye, argued that the savings from reduced alcoholic consumption could be employed in upliftment:

With regard to temperance, you know that the saloon or canteen is the only thing open to our people. Schools are closed against us, hotels as well. What means this? It means that we are desired to sink and never to rise. Let us then be careful and strictly temperate and not create any unnecessary expenses instead of applying that money in some great work towards uplifting our race.

For AME congregations, a major route to economic well-being lay in the acquisition of land. It was believed that financial independence could be gained through land which would serve as a stable economic base and as protection from white authority. At the Cape Annual Conference in 1901, Bishop Coppin urged the AME to buy land as an investment strategy and as security for future generations:

The Bishop said that we ought to buy land while it is yet cheap. He urged that our men should buy land even if they cannot at the time put it to use, their coming children will need it.

The idea of establishing co-operatives, land purchase schemes and public companies was taken up by other Ethiopian churches.

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88. SGE 1/1405 Malmesbury Phijeland to SGE 27/2/1915

89. The AME members were unmercifully strict on each other especially in the early period. Suspensions were made so frequently that Bp. Coppin was concerned that the church would "soon have no members". Gordon Papers, File No.9, AME Cape Annual Conference 1901-1905, p.34

90. Gordon Papers, File No.9, AME Cape Annual Conference 1901-1905, p.22

91. Gordon Papers, File No.9, AME Cape Annual Conference 1901-1905, p.29.
Former AME minister, Reverend H.R. Ngcayiya,\textsuperscript{92} who became
President of the Ethiopian Church of South Africa was a
Director of the "Ethiopian Association Limited", a company
incorporated under the Companies Act No.31 of 1919.\textsuperscript{93} Over
many years he attempted to purchase farms in the Transvaal and
the Orange Free State for church, educational and agricultural
activities.\textsuperscript{94} In 1902, a missionary stationed at Butterworth,
T.R. Curnick noted that Ethiopians in the Transkei had tried
to form an African "Co-operative Trade Company" as a strategy
to cut out white traders.\textsuperscript{95}

AME advocates of black industry tacitly linked work and
politics. Church members were taught that political change
should be wrought by resolute application and hard work. The
idea that blacks should earn civil rights by 'proving'
themselves, rather than through direct political action was
publicly expressed. The Reverend Attaway articulated this
position in a lecture which outlined acceptable ways of
conquering the political problems of black people:

\begin{quote}
Let the black man's best friends over leap
the bounds of sectarian jealousies: let
morbid minded misguided agitators cease to
terrorify the people with idle tales of
political ghosts. Let the black man roll
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{92} Ngcayiya left the AME after he came to the Transvaal as a
schoolmaster in 1908. TA NTS 132 F243 Deputy Commissioner of

\textsuperscript{93} TA NTS 3483 201/308 Ngcayiya to Secretary Native Affairs
Commission 20/2/1923, Secretary Native Affairs to Ngcayiya
21/3/1923. The shareholders were H.R.Ngcayiya, Robert Payne,
Josiah Sibiya, S.Nzoyi, Jonah Sibiya, W.G.L.Liwane and
I.Tshabalala.

\textsuperscript{94} Ngcayiya had made moves to buy a farm in the Wakkerstroom-
Volksrust District, where he had intended to erect a large
church, school buildings and a training college for candidates
for the ministry. Under the banner of this Association,
Ngcayiya made an application in 1923 to purchase a farm in the
Lydenberg district and to hire two other farms in the Carolina
district. This attempt to gain access to lands was blocked by
government. There was also an application made to Steynsburg
Municipality. TA NTS 133 Assistant Magistrate Volksrust to
U.SNA 17/4/1914, U.SNA to Provincial Secretary 24/2/1914.

\textsuperscript{95} CA NA 497 T.R.Curnick to RM Butterworth 1/9/1902.
up his industrial sleeves and actively engage in the nobleness ever given to men or gods - that man who can meet and conquer the problems herein named, is the man of the hour. 96

The educational ethos of the AME, was thus a complex amalgam of assertive Pan-Africanist ideas and resignation to the almost submissive ethic of improvement solely through industriousness. It was both a product of the precarious status of independent churches in the political context of the Cape colony, and a response to the tenuous economic position of the "respectable poor" in the Western Cape. 97

4. AME Schools in the Western Cape

4.1 Urban and Rural Growth

The main focus of this chapter is on the development of schooling under the banner of the AME in rural areas of the Western Cape. However, it is necessary to contextualise the studies of the three AME rural schools; Piquetberg School, Morris Brown School and Chatsworth Industrial School through a brief overview of AME urban and rural schooling initiatives. Special reference will be made to the Bethel Institute, a major AME venture located in Cape Town, so that the scale of the rural schools can be viewed in perspective. 98 This is


98. A task made difficult by fragmentary data and often rather dry correspondence. For example; According to the files of 1908, the "Belle Ville" AME mission school in Durbanville had 40 students, the Diep River school had 51 students, and the Plumstead school had 41 students. By 1914, the AME Church mission school in Diep River, managed by Philip Williams had an enrolment of 107 pupils and an average attendance of 82. By 1908, in the Cape Suburbs division, the AME had schools at Plumstead, Diep River, and Goodwood which were officially inspected. A school at 2 Cheetham Rd. Salt River with 2
important because although the schools in the two previous studies on the African Presbyterian Church and the Order of Ethiopia were rural, they had no links to as large an urban context as Cape Town.

At first, AME schools were slow to take root in the Cape. The church set up a number of schools before the turn of the century, but was successful in acquiring a grant for only one school. A Cape government report stated that this was because AME communities had "failed to show that their applications were made at the instance of any substantial following of residents of the locations in which they desired land and in which there were already missionaries of recognised bodies at work".99 In addition, the AME school teachers had to contend with rumours that the children attending their classes would "receive no recognition".100 However, in the Cape Colony, the authorities could not unilaterally reject applications for grants which fulfilled the statutory qualifications. Thus by 1908, the AME Cape District Conference declared that it was operating ten day schools, five of which were in the region of greater Cape Town and five in outlying districts (Table 10).

For years, most of these schools did not receive government recognition, and as a result, several collapsed in the interim. By 1917, only five AME schools received aid from the Department of Education (Table 11).

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### TABLE: 10

**AME Schools, Cape District, 1908**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greater Cape Town:</th>
<th>Attendance figures:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bethel Institute</td>
<td>no figures given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diep Rivier-Plumstead</td>
<td>no figures given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodstock</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwood</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belleville</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outlying Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groen Rivier</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington-Paarl</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piquetberg</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montagu</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 512

### TABLE: 11

**AME Schools Receiving Government Grants-in-aid, 1917**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>£ sterling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diep River</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethel</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatsworth</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piquetberg</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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101. Gordon Papers, File No.8, Cape District Conference 1904-1914, 5/11/1908. There is a problem in establishing the exact extent of the schooling of the AME during the period under consideration. Evidence in the SGE files is not always sufficient because unregistered schools were not taken into account.

102. CA PAE 239 E252 Acting SGE to the Provincial Secretary 10/5/1917.
MAP 6. A.M.E. SCHOOLS IN THE SOUTH - WESTERN CAPE, 1910

KEY
- Roads

Source: Juta's Magister AMase- Cape Province-South p.50.
AME scholars and teachers in Cape Town faced similar problems to those encountered by their contemporaries in the countryside with respect to the physical conditions in the schools such as overcrowding, high drop-out rates, inadequate equipment, unqualified teachers and competition with schools of other denominations. 103

While there were similarities between urban and rural AME schools, they were also different in a number of important respects. First, the Cape Town schools had a larger membership base and immediate access to the church headquarters. Second, struggles in the town were complicated by the existence of several denominations in very close proximity which all claimed rights to grants-in-aid. Tussles with other denominations over the control of schools, and the need to avoid being accused of poaching by the missionary denominations, sapped the energy of AME initiatives in Cape Town. Sometimes, congregations of other denominations wished to join the AME against the will of their missionaries and the Department. This put the AME Superintendent of Schools in Cape Town, the Reverend F.M. Gow, in an uncomfortable position for even if people voluntarily joined, his church it was open to accusations of poaching students. Such a conflict arose over Goodwood Race Course Mission School in 1907 between Wesleyan, Congregational Union and AME interests. Even though the congregation decided to affiliate with the AME, the Reverend Gow initially refused to accept the Goodwood congregation lest he be accused of stealing adherents. 104 In contrast, in the

103. These factors were evident when Inspector Noakes visited the Newtown AME school in Plumstead in 1901. The school, labelled as a private mission school had 98 students attending "exclusive of infants in arms". It failed to qualify for a grant for several years. By 1905 the school had evidently not met with the approval of the SGE for in that year it was again proposed by Rev. F.M. Gow. SGE 2/1/3 No. 1376 Cape Suburbs; SGE 2/88 Informal visit of Inspector No. 1208 27/11/1901; SGE 7/5 No. 591 SGE to Noaks 14/2/1906.

rural areas of the Western Cape under study, the AME was engaged in a direct tussle with the DRC.

4.2 The Bethel Institute

The Bethel Institute was intended to be the flagship of the AME church until the Wilberforce Institute was established in the Transvaal in 1908. It embodied many features of the large mission institutions and was designed to meet a variety of educational needs that were articulated by AME members in greater Cape Town. As such, it was the urban equivalent of the Reverend Dwane's education settlement scheme, which has been described in Chapter 4.

Because of its importance to the church, the siting of Bethel was subject to heated debate at the Cape Annual Conference in 1901. It appeared that a substantial body of people wished to place the Institution in the Eastern Cape, while others favoured the Transvaal. The Reverends Ngcayiya and Gabashane, referred to the "inconveniency of Cape Town", arguing that "the Northerners cannot send their children so far at such expense". The "scantiness" of boarding facilities for boys to lodge and a lack of accommodation for girls was a troublesome problem. In spite of predictions that the scheme would fail, Bethel endured.

In July 1901, a large eleven-roomed house together with an adjoining empty land allotment on the corner of Hanover and Blythe streets was purchased by the AME at a cost of £4,000.


106. A place of accommodation was offered by Mr. Jonathan Wilson in 1901 but in 1904 it seems the problem of accommodation had not been resolved. Gordon Papers, File No.9, Cape Annual Conference 1901-1905, pp.25-26,36; Coan, J.R. (1961) p.332.
Once renovated, the property became both a school and a mission house.\textsuperscript{107} In 1902, the Bethel Institute was opened by its Principal, the Reverend Attaway and a staff complement of five which included Mrs. C.F. Attaway, Reverend J.A. Gregg, Reverend H.C. Msikinya and Mrs. E.R. Ingram.\textsuperscript{108} The Institution's multiracial student complement reached 300 in the first month, some of whom were the sons of chiefs from the countryside. It was estimated that the Institute could eventually accommodate 400 students.\textsuperscript{109} In 1910, Bethel had an average attendance of only 105 full-time students but attendance grew in the next decade to 322 students.\textsuperscript{110}

Overall, Bethel was prepared to offer a far broader range of educational opportunities than ordinary mission schools. Classes were offered during the day and at night in the hope that adults would avail themselves of the opportunity of schooling after work.\textsuperscript{111} Front page advertisements in the South African Spectator indicated that "Intermediate, Grammar, High School, Collegiate, Business, Theological and Musical

\textsuperscript{107} The first annual AME conference was held there in December 1901. "AME Church: First Annual Conference" Cape Argus 18/12/1901. Concurrent acquisitions were made of property for church and school sites in Worcester and at Rondebosch Extension. "The AME Church and Schools" South African Spectator 27/7/1901. According to a letter by Coppin, the cost was $22,000. Cited in Coan, J.R. (1961) p.310.

\textsuperscript{108} Page, C.A. (1978) p.329. Attaway graduated from Wilberforce University Ohio and the Normal and Industrial College Florida, Mrs.Attaway from Cookman Institute, Msikinya from Wilberforce, Gregg from the University of Kansas, and Ingram from Lincoln Institute all of the USA. Advertisement South African Spectator 22/3/1902. The trustees were F.M.Gow, A.H.Attaway, M.Mokone, Mrs.J.W.Boyce and D.P.Gordon. Gordon Papers, File No.9, Cape Annual Conference 1901-1905, p.35.


\textsuperscript{111} "Bethel Institute" South African Spectator 22/2/1902; Page, C.A. (1978) p.329. This was also set up so that candidates for the ministry could continue their studies and work at the same time. Gordon Papers, File No.9, Cape Annual Conference 1901-1905, p.31.
Courses" were offered. The Reverend Attaway assured the Cape Annual Conference, that Bethel would, "at the appropriate time give industrial education" thereby showing that the industrial ideal was present in the aspirations of AME congregations.

This chapter has briefly outlined the arrival and development of the AME in Southern Africa. It has also described the vicissitudes of church growth in the Cape region. Particular attention has been given to the linkages between schooling, politics, and economic betterment which were integral elements of the AME's culture of educational improvement. Lastly, this chapter has endeavoured to show key differences between the nature and extent of AME educational institutions in greater Cape Town and those in the rural Western Cape. It will now examine the early growth of three AME schools based at Piquetberg and Malmesbury.

5. AME Rural Schools and the Dutch Reformed Church in the Western Cape

By the time the AME appeared in the 1890's, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) had long established itself in the rural Western Cape. The DRC's second parish was established in Stellenbosch in 1686. By 1745, the church had created its third parish at Zwaartland, now known as Malmesbury. In 1829, the church appointed Leopold Marquard as its first missionary among Coloured communities in the Western Cape. Shortly thereafter in 1833, a DRC church at Piquetberg was established. In

112. According to Coan, fees at Bethel were $80 per annum, a sum considerably higher than might have been expected at other mission schools. Theological tuition was offered free of charge. Some students who were obliged to earn money in order to pay for their tuition, were placed in local private homes as domestic workers. Page,C.A.(1978)p.329; Coan,J.R.(1961)pp.316-318.


1881, the DRC set up a separate mission church, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerk (NGS). NGS missions were not immediately established in every parish, but parallel mother church and mission church congregations gradually emerged with time in the various parishes.

After discord surfaced among Coloured members of the Piquetberg DRC congregation in 1901, disaffected members seceded from the "Boer Kerk" to form a Piquetberg AME congregation in what was a "more or less political affair". The white DRC church council constituted a "sendinggemeente" or mission congregation at Piquetberg in 1903, probably with the aim of deflecting demands from its Coloured members for greater participation in the running of the church. It is noteworthy that the AME church and school challenge escalated at the same juncture.

5.1 Sarah Bell and the "Boer Kerk" of Piquetberg

A central figure in the early tussle between the fledgeling AME and the DRC in the Piquetberg area, was a teacher, Sarah Barron. She commenced her career as an assistant pupil teacher in 1881 at the age of 24. On qualifying she was stationed at Goedverwacht Moravian Mission school, and shortly thereafter she "was called" to Piquetberg as principal of the DRC school, where she taught from 1882 to 1903. During this period, she

115. SGE 1/384 Piquetberg Esau to SGE 24/7/1903. Frans Esau was one of a group of AME pioneers in Piquetberg which included: Peter Kirby, Klaas Dirks, Michael Bell, Smith, Javan, and Coetzee. They seceded from the "boer kerk" led at that time by Eerwaarde De Wet. Interview Rev. John Bell Coetzee, Chatsworth 20/4/1988.

married Michael Bell, a post rider between Gouda, Porterville and Piquetberg. 117

In July 1903, the Superintendent General of Education was informed by a representative of the DRC mission school at Piquetberg that the headmistress, Sarah Bell, had "joined a certain religious sect who style themselves Ethiopians" and further that she took "a leading part in the proceedings". 118 This created some difficulty for the DRC, who were disturbed at having their head teacher involved in the affairs of another denomination, particularly a dissident independent church body. Evidently the Education Department Secretary, Charles Murray, who handled the case, was not sure of what action would be appropriate, for a note pencilled in red on the original letter of complaint showed that he presumed it not to be the Department’s business to "interfere as long as school work (was) efficiently done". 119 In the meantime, one Frans Esau, a land proprietor and active AME member, wrote to inform the Department that Mrs Bell had been given notice of severance by the DRC. He requested that a new AME school be recognised with Bell as head teacher. The Inspector of Schools for the Piquetberg circuit, was consulted.

In contrast to the laissez faire attitude of Murray, Inspector Logie was very clear on the matter. He endorsed the action taken by the DRC Church Council, of dismissing Bell on the grounds that she was aiding a movement likely to damage the


118. The Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (DRC) holdings on Swartland/Malmesbury and Piquetberg in the Cape Archive were investigated. No evidence of school matters was found in the Church Council Minutebooks. Holdings of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerk (NGS) for the two parishes only begin in 1915. CA G5 1/4 Notule van Kerkraad, 1872 Oct - 1913 Feb; G51 1/2 Notule van Kerkraad, 1893 Apr - 1919 Des.

119. SGE 1/384 Piquetberg Dommsise to SGE 13/7/1903.
According to the Reverend Retief of the DRC, Sarah Bell had been too active a proponent of AME ideas at his school:

Parents have come to us complaining of the training their children get from one whose religious principles they disapprove of. The school room is being used for meetings aiming at anything but unity and cooperation with the church.

Inspector Logie had warned Bell against pursuing the interests of the AME but his instruction was defied. He was thus implacably against the idea of allowing the establishment of an AME school. Of Esau’s letter of application he had this to say:

The school, on behalf of which the letter is written, belongs to the Ethiopian Church, and, in Piquetberg it is not under the control of any responsible person. It originated in a schism from the DRC Mission there. Moreover the school needs of the community are fully provided for by the existing aided Mission School. I recommend that the Application be refused.

The letter exhibited several of the themes common in the minds of those opposed to the independent churches and their schools. The wish to defend a white mission church, damaged by schism, was revealed as straightforward religious intolerance. The argument that the schoolgoing needs of the community were adequately provided for appeared to be a rational response, but obscured both an intolerance of competition and a denial that the demand for schooling was greater than the single white controlled DRC mission school could cope with. Furthermore the letter revealed a discriminatory attitude in

120. SGE Piquetberg 1/384 Logie to Murray 7/8/1903, Dommisse to SGE 21/8/1903.

121. SGE 1/384 Piquetberg Retief to SGE 10/8/1903.

122. SGE 1/384 Piquetberg Logie to Murray 7/8/1903.
that only whites could be considered "responsible" enough to run schools.

The period following this July exchange of correspondence was a tense and strategically crucial phase for both groups. By this stage, the DRC had suffered the loss of a significant number of their people to the AME, following the defection of head teacher Sarah Bell. New hope for their fortunes appeared with the arrival of the youthful 27 year old Wellington-trained Dutch Reformed missionary, George Jean August Enslin, to "take charge of the coloured people who (had) not joined the Ethiopians". Enslin was also expected to teach in the mission school.123

In the meantime, AME connections with the African Political Organisation in Cape Town led the APO to intercede on behalf of the Piquetberg community. A Mr William C. Collins, who was President of an APO branch based in St. Phillip's Street, Cape Town, called on the Education Department. He informed the Superintendent General of Education that the "Coloured portion of the DRC congregation had seceded from that church and allied themselves with the AMEC". They had begun with the construction of a school and a teacher's house and requested that the grant be transferred to them.124 In December, Frans Esau again wrote to the Department, requesting recognition for the AME school which by then had 29 boys and 40 girls attending, and was shortly expecting another 30 enrollments. He also alleged that in Malmesbury, both the DRC and the AME schools were recognised. Given that the AME school in Malmesbury was without government recognition, this appeared to be a calculated fabrication with the aim of extracting aid from the Education Department.125

123. SGE 1/384 Piquetberg Dommisse to SGE 21/8/1903.

124. SGE 1/384 Piquetberg Memorandum SGE to General Correspondence 11/8/1903.

125. SGE 1/348 Piquetberg Esau to SGE 1/12/1903.
The efforts of the AME and their supporters, Esau and the APO were to no avail. They received no assistance from the Department, but persevered with the school. Meanwhile, the DRC struggled to find staff for their school until January 1906. At this point Mrs Bell returned to her old post with the DRC. It is probable that the AME congregation could not afford to pay Sarah Bell without government assistance because the DRC was still the recipient of a grant-in-aid. Her only option was to recant and seek re-admission to the DRC. The letter she wrote to the Superintendent General of Education was either a strategic and calculated exercise in garnering his sympathies, or a pathetic plea for mercy and reconciliation laced with Christian piety:

Now, Sir; as the Ruler of all nations, whom I acknowledge as my Guide, leads me back to work in the former circle, I am willing, hoping to do my best, not only to your satisfaction and approval but the approval of my heavenly master. God bless you, give you wisdom and power to work to His Honour and Glory.126

Whatever her motives, this extravagant written submission was sufficiently convincing for Mrs Bell to regain her former position as principal of the DRC school. For two years, the schooling situation remained unchanged. No incidents disrupted the status quo until 1908, when a fresh dispute erupted between the DRC and a defiant Sarah Bell. This time, the local DRC church wardens precipitated a clash over her remuneration.

Before the altercation erupted, Sarah Bell was receiving the Education Department grant of £7.10.0, and school fees of £2.10.0 which were collected from the parents. In terms of the agreement, she received free housing as an additional benefit.127 In January 1908, she was asked to sign the

126. SGE 1/550 Piquetberg Bell to SGE 22/1/1906.
127. In fact, Bell was entitled to claim £3.15.00 as her local equivalent in accordance with the Departmental rule of a two to one subsidy. Effectively, she was already underpaid from the local contribution. SGE 1/725 Piquetberg Bell to SGE
quarterly financial certificate which gave details of her earnings, but Mrs Bell refused because the document now declared that she would be charged £8.0.00 for her accommodation. This meant that the free housing as stipulated in the original contract, was now reflected as a deduction of eight pounds. On account of the fact that she had not been given notice of this change in the contract, Mrs. Bell considered it her "duty to refuse to sign ... this illegal certificate". She was summarily served with one quarter's notice by the church wardens.

The decision to reduce her salary was announced at a meeting of members of the DRC mission church held to discuss the financial condition of the mission. The Reverend Enslin merely informed those assembled that Mrs Bell's salary would be decreased. Enslin refused to review his decision despite being questioned by one William Daniels (Jun) as to whether the church wardens had the right to make such changes without consultation with the parents. The legality of Enslin's decree was questioned by Bell. She argued that the church wardens had illegally presented themselves as the school committee, which had not met for some months. This meant that the entire process had been initiated without the knowledge of the parents. According to Bell, the decision to give her notice was done out of "spite" and "vindictiveness", in reprisal for her refusal to accept the unconstitutional change of her salary.128 It also revealed the authoritarian approach of the missionary Enslin in the affairs of his Coloured congregation.

This trouble was serious enough for the Reverend Enslin to visit the Superintendent General of Education on 22 January 1908. Enslin stated that the dismissal of Sarah Bell was on account of "insubordination to himself as Manager and Pastor"

20/1/1908. Memorandum Piquetberg Dutch Reformed Mission School 22/1/1908.

128. SGE 1/725 Piquetberg Bell to SGE 20/1/1908, Hofmeyr to Long 29/1/1908.
and her "unsatisfactory work as a teacher". He also gave the distinct impression that he feared personal assault and that he fully expected that he would have to resort "to force to eject her". Significantly, Enslin’s evidence on the salary issue at this meeting was incomplete, which suggests that he wished to hide the full details. The Superintendent General of Education was forced to request that Enslin "give in writing a full statement of all the circumstances" relating to the case. 129

Such information was not forthcoming. Two days later, Enslin wrote to inform the Department of the dismissal of Mrs Bell. He alleged there had been "no progress" in the school which had lead to the loss of students to "other" schools. However, the major reason cited for the dismissal was not educational. The Reverend Enslin was more concerned that Bell had not been deferential and respectful enough in her attitude towards himself and the school committee, which he had persuaded to back him. This threatened to undermine his own authority over the school students. He therefore complained that Bell’s "behaviour in school and towards the chairman and members of the School Committee has been such as to influence the children and young people to disrespect their superiors". 130

The heavy emphasis put on the unsuitability of Mrs Bell as incompetent and as insufficiently capable of inducing her students to accept the authority of the white DRC leaders is significant. It suggests that her return into the DRC fold did not entail the loss of her personal integrity or her will to challenge DRC authority. It also shows how the unfair and unconstitutional readjustment of Mrs Bell’s salary was conveniently ignored by Enslin who preferred to bring to bear what he surely felt to be more serious and justifiable reasons for her dismissal.


130. SGE 1/725 Piquetberg Enslin to SGE 24/1/1908.
Despite the furore, Bell remained for another school quarter. In March Enslin wrote to the Department complaining that Bell had again refused to sign the Quarterly statement. This proved to be Sarah Bell's last act of resistance. Available evidence suggests that her links with the DRC were finally severed by April 1908. By then, Bell had won some hard-fought victories. She had successfully contested unfair treatment by the Piquetberg DRC office bearers, and forced them to observe proper procedures and to operate through appropriate channels. Enslin and his committee could no longer alter salary and other employment conditions without proper consultation, and they had to give formal written notice of any decision which they made.131

After leaving the DRC mission school, Mrs Bell started a private school with 18 pupils. In the meantime, the Reverend W.C. Collins of the APO again attempted to gain a grant for the AME school at Piquetberg. He interviewed Inspector Hofmeyr and wrote to the Superintendent General of Education. The dismissal of Mrs Bell and his reopening of the AME campaign cannot be merely coincidental. The AME school, now five years old, was proving successful. It had 95 students on the roll and an average attendance of 62. The school building, with a board floor and seven windows, housed 22 forms, 10 desks and one table, and had two offices. As such, it was better equipped than many mission schools of the time. Despite this, Inspector Hofmeyr stated that a grant should not be allowed unless a "competent teacher" could be found. Though Sarah Bell was an obvious candidate for this post he was "not inclined to favour" her appointment because she had "fallen foul" of the

131. Another contentious issue fought by Bell was her salary. In terms of the two-to-one government grant ratio, Bell was entitled to expect £15 as the local contribution over and above a £30 Government grant. She only received £10, but was at least properly informed of this by letter from the DRC committee. SGE 1/725 Piquetberg Enslin to SGE 30/3/1908, Memorandum. SGE to General Correspondence 12/10/1908.
DRC managers. In addition he asserted that her work was unsatisfactory.132

Yet again the hopes of Collins were dashed. The Department announced "with regret" that it could not supply a grant. No reason was forwarded for this decision. Stung into action, Collins wrote again in July. His letter was a mixture of frustration, indignation and desperate resolve to assure the Department of the respectability of the school and its people. He assured the Superintendent General of Education that the school was controlled by a committee. Furthermore, he argued that because parents of several children were property owners and rate payers, they were contributing to the School Board.133 Consequently, he complained: "... it is only fair that some consideration be given us or definite reasons be given why our application cannot at present be entertained".134 The Department replied that it could not commit itself to funding Piquetberg AME School until it was known what provision of funds would be allocated by Parliament.

Whether this was a bureaucratic tactic or a valid cause of delay, it represented a temporary stay of decision. Gradually the Department was being made aware that there were no legitimate grounds for refusing a grant. Inspector Hofmeyr seemed to be expressing the dilemma most accurately when he wrote; "I do not know whether an application for aid may be

132. SGE 1/725 Piquetberg Memorandum. SGE to General Correspondence 12/10/1908, Hofmeyr to SGE 7/5/1908, Collins to SGE 30/5/1908, Hofmeyr to SGE 10/6/1908, Collins to Department of Public Education 16/7/1908.

133. The SGE replied that coloured land owners were not obliged to pay rates levied by the Divisional Council if there was no coloured school provided. SGE 1/725 Piquetberg SGE to Collins 4/8/1908.

134. SGE 1/725 Piquetberg Collins to SGE 27/7/1908, Collins to SGE 19/8/1908.
reasonably refused".135 Eventually, the Department grudgingly gave in. A small grant of £24 was made available to Sarah Bell from 1 July 1908. Strong objections were voiced to the proposed employment of Mrs Bell. As the Superintendent General of Education put it, the Department did not "wish to overlook the long previous service of Mrs Bell, but considers that the unsatisfactory nature of her recent work must be borne in mind". 136 Collins in turn was appropriately deferential, even ingratiating:

I must thank you for the mercy shown towards this teacher for her long previous service in allowing her to remain with us. The grant is very meagre but considering your expressions re the unsatisfactory nature of her work she must be made to feel her position. I am therefore thankful for this small mercy. And shall deem it my duty to see that she does her work.137

Thereafter, Collins attempted to create an assistant teacher's post at the school, with limited success. In September of 1909 he was eventually able to employ twenty one year old James Collins, who was presumably W.C. Collins' son. Collins junior had no qualifications and his only prior work experience was as a messenger.138 Within nine months, the AME school at Piquetberg was to face a crisis of reputation and credibility, which began with an indiscretion on the part of the young Collins. In July 1910, he was found guilty in the Magistrate's Court of being drunk and disorderly. According to Inspector Hofmeyr, further evidence led in court showed that Collins had also been guilty of "gross immorality".139

135. SGE 1/725 Piquetberg Hofmeyr to SGE on E18, Collins to SGE 16/7/1908.
136. SGE 1/725 Piquetberg SGE to Collins 14/10/1908.
137. SGE 1/725 Piquetberg Collins to SGE 16/10/1908.
139. SGE 1/907 Piquetberg Hofmeyr to SGE 1/7/1910.
Hofmeyr might never have discovered this matter had he not been informed of Collins' conviction by the Reverend Enslin, who asked not to be named as the informant. He argued that "... this teacher is drawing government grant (so) I think it is not more than right that this matter should be investigated".\(^{140}\) This was a golden opportunity for him to appear to be self-righteously protecting the morals of the Coloured school children while he was simultaneously placing the AME cause in severe jeopardy. By capitalising on the incident in such a manner, he hoped to destroy the opposition AME school.

Reverend Collins wrote immediately to the Department to say that he had investigated the incident. He assured the Superintendent General of Education that James Collins had been reprimanded and vouched that at no time prior or subsequent to the incident had young Collins been intoxicated. According to Collins senior, apart from this incident James had acquitted himself well both in and out of the school for there had been no other complaints.\(^ {141}\) In response, the Inspector, Hofmeyr, ignored the conviction passed in the magistrate's court. However, he referred pointedly to evidence of immorality:

This teacher was guilty of gross immorality. He had been found in bed with a young coloured woman. Everybody in the place knows it - schoolchildren as well as others.\(^ {142}\)

Though already publicly censured in court, James Collins' prospects were subject to the sole judgement of the Inspector. In July, Collins was duly informed that because of the

\(^{140}\) SGE 1/907 Piquetberg Enslin to Hofmeyr 19/5/1910.

\(^{141}\) SGE 1/907 Piquetberg Collins to SGE 8/7/1910.

\(^{142}\) SGE 1/907 Piquetberg Hofmeyr to SGE 14/7/10.
James Collins was clearly not cowed by this experience. Evidence suggests that he pursued APO work in the Porterville area. In August, the Education Department received information from C.A. Bastiaanse, a DRC missionary at Porterville, that a teacher of the AME named Collins had appeared twice at Porterville. The young Collins gave political speeches and attempted to have an APO school opened in opposition to Bastiaanse's school. Although James Collins' career as a teacher at Piquetberg was terminated, the controversy surrounding his dismissal was not severe enough to oust Sarah Bell's school. Thereafter, DRC agents made no further attempts to disrupt or remove the Piquetberg AME school. Although the Piquetberg AME school had established a bridgehead, it required dedication and resolve from Sarah Bell and her staff members to hold their own in a battle of attrition with Inspector Hofmeyr.

In August of 1912, the Department was informed that Collins was "no longer pastor" of the Piquetberg church and had also ceased to be correspondent of the School. On his departure, the Reverend A.W. Phijeland became the new incumbent. After Phijeland's take over, the Piquetberg school grew in

143. SGE 1/907 Piquetberg SGE to Collins 18/7/1910. The AME was subject to internal policing on the issue of 'immorality' which was seen in a serious light. Later, in separate incidents, the Principal of Piquetberg AME school Mr. J.B. Makanana, and a Miss Paulsen of the Chatsworth School were dismissed without notice "both having been found guilty of immoral conduct". The dismissals made internally, reflect attitudes to the role of the teacher in society and to expectations of teachers held by particular communities. SGE 1/1768 Piquetberg Phijeland to SGE 27/3/1918, Long to Phijeland 8/4/1918.

144. SGE 1/907 Piquetberg Bastiaanse to SGE 31/8/1910.

145. SGE 1/1097 Piquetberg Bell to SGE 16/9/1812.

146. SGE 1/1097 Piquetberg Gow to SGE 15/8/1912.
strength. By 1918 it had 95 students and a staff of three teachers, one of whom had trained as a pupil teacher at the AME's own Bethel Institute. 147 Many pupils who graduated from Piquetberg continued their schooling at Trafalgar High or the Wesleyan Training College in Cape Town. 148

This account of the struggle for survival of the Piquetberg AME school, has illuminated the texture of relationships between teachers and managers in the mission schools of the Western Cape. The DRC missionary, the Reverend Enslin, was accustomed to exercising power that derived from his appointment by the parent DRC to the newly constituted Piquetberg Coloured mission congregation of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerk. In response to the growth of the AME and dissension in his congregation, he aimed to stamp his authority as soon as he arrived. He attempted to crush Sarah Bell through making unilateral decisions, without the consent of the parents. In doing so, he contravened administrative practises and conventions. However, the conditions under which mission school superintendents could act in an autocratic manner with impunity, were fast disappearing. Enslin's appointment at Piquetberg, soon after the turn of the century, coincided with the inexorable but uneven expansion of government influence in education. Mission societies were slowly being forced to accept the intrusion of school inspectors and the implementation of standard procedures and practises in the administration of their schools. This process curtailed the sole discretionary authority of the missionary school superintendent. As a result of these changes, Bell was successful in challenging Enslin's authority, even though in the end she was forced to leave the DRC mission school. Thereafter, she spearheaded an independent AME school, which revealed how the monopoly of the missionary churches in black education was being eroded.

147. SGE 1/1768 Piquetberg Phijeland to SGE 26/7/1918.

5.2 The Reverend F.M. Gow, Inspector Golightly and the "Morris Brown School" at Chatsworth

The campaign for recognition of the AME "Morris Brown School" at Chatsworth, near Malmesbury, had essentially the same elements as the Piquetberg episode. A tussle for supremacy evolved between the DRC and the AME. Both AME schools suffered as a consequence of the efforts of School Inspector Golightly and the local DRC missionary, to destroy them. However, the nature of conflict in the two schools was somewhat different. The DRC missionary at Piquetberg, the Reverend Enslin, attempted to nullify Mrs Bell's challenge through recourse to his religious authority as DRC appointed head of the mission, and he sought to discredit her school through capitalising on the indiscretions of James Collins. In the case of the Morris Brown AME school, School Inspector Golightly proved to be the chief antagonist. The Inspector employed bureaucratic and procedural devices, such as the 'three mile rule' in an attempt to stave off the AME challenge.

Morris Brown school had been in operation for eight years in 1911, when the Department first received a joint application for a new grant from the Reverend F.M. Gow in Cape Town and from the school's manager, the Reverend A.W. Phijeland. Francis Macdonald Gow was a South African AME minister who had been trained and ordained in the United States. In 1900 he was appointed General Superintendent of the AME's Cape district and became minister to the Bethel Church congregation. Andrew William Phijeland who had left a local Moravian mission to join the AME was ordained in his adoptive church in 1900.149

Gow explained that their reason for not applying for a grant at an earlier stage was that the school building had not been "sufficiently finished". In addition, he related that the congregation had only recently become financially "better

prepared" to support a certificated teacher.\textsuperscript{150} Phijeland's case for a grant seemed good. The school boasted a large hall with an earth floor, a few desks and twenty benches. Stephen Oliphant, who had taught previously at a Wesleyan school in Viljoensdrift, Orange River Colony was appointed to take over the position of teacher from an uncertificated woman incumbent. There were 58 students on the roll with 45 regulars and an additional 30 enrollments were expected. Approximately 150 children of schoolgoing age were living within one mile of the building. Gow stressed that there were enough children "to crowd more than two schools".\textsuperscript{151} This statement gave tacit recognition to the existence of the local DRC school at Groen Rivier. The application from Morris Brown for government recognition immediately threatened the financial support that the Groen Rivier school customarily received from the Department.

Inspector Golightly informed the Department that there was "considerable jealousy between the authorities of the respective schools". He urged that the DRC missionary, Reverend C.J. Grove, who had recently arrived from the Clanwilliam and Ceres region, should be consulted as to whether the AME operation could prejudice his school's chances

\textsuperscript{150} In 1907, Inspector Golightly stated that a private school was in operation with 40 students in attendance at lesser Catsworth run by A.Phijeland of the AME. This is confirmed by the DRC minister, Rev. Groves who stated that the school of Phijeland was not at Chatsworth, the location of the Industrial School established by H.Attaway and located on a Mr van Reenen's farm, but in a direct line between Groenrivier and Dassenberg/Katzenberg. This left the original Chatsworth on the right. Further evidence to back this up was that originally, the name used for the school was Morris Brown School only later assuming the name Chatsworth. According to Rev. Bell, Attaway's Chatsworth was set up before Morris Brown. SGE 1/994 Malmesbury Grove to SGE 6/12/1911; SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 22/1/1907; Interview Rev. John Bell Coetzee, Chatsworth 20/4/1988.

\textsuperscript{151} SGE 1/994 Malmesbury Gow to SGE 14/11/1911, Phijeland to SGE 27/11/1911, Gow to Golightly 28/11/1911, Gow to SGE 23/3/1912.
in any way, before a decision was taken in the Department. This strategy of soliciting Grove's opinion may be interpreted more as a means of marshalling evidence against the proposed AME school than as preparation for an impartial decision. Under the circumstances it was highly improbable that the DRC leaders would welcome opposition that endangered the standing of their school. In the meantime, Golightly recommended that the application should remain "in abeyance" until he visited the area in the new school quarter of 1912. The AME leaders would have interpreted this as a delaying tactic on Golightly's part.

As expected, Golightly raised a number of objections to the proposed school. The first issue of contention concerned the proximity of the AME school to the Groen Rivier DRC school. Although the Reverend Gow gave the distance as "rather more than" two and one half miles, presumably by road, Inspector Golightly gave it as "not more than a mile". The Inspector also argued that there were "only 3 or 4 houses at the site of the AME school" which were, according to his estimation, better served by the existing DRC school. Furthermore he observed that there were a number of AME pupils who actually bypassed the DRC school en route to Morris Brown. His report therefore inferred that the AME school was drawing students who would otherwise have attended the DRC establishment. Under these circumstances, Golightly argued that a grant would undoubtedly be to the detriment of the DRC school. The Reverend Gow was duly informed that the Department could not "sanction" aid to his school. No reasons were given for the decision.


153. SGE 1/994 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 29/11/1911, SGE to Grove 5/12/1911, Golightly to SGE 14/12/1911.

154. SGE 1/994 Malmesbury Gow to SGE 28/11/1911, Golightly to SGE 29/11/1911, Grove to SGE 6/12/1911, Golightly to SGE 28/2/1912.
MAP 7. SKETCH SHOWING A.M.E. SCHOOLING IN THE MALMESBURY REGION, 1910

KEY

- Road
- - - Rail
- - - River
However, the situation as outlined by Golightly was not quite as clear cut as it appeared. First, he made no reference to the dispersed settlement pattern of the dwellings in the area, and second, he neglected to mention that for a short while, the DRC school had actually closed down. Golightly's reference to "only three or four houses" near the AME school gave the impression that there were insufficient inhabitants in the area to justify its existence. In March, Gow personally visited the Superintendent General of Education to put the case for Morris Brown. He stated that there were in fact over one hundred cottages in the catchment area of the AME school. These dwellings lay in a scattered distribution in the direction of Dassenberg which lay on the opposite side of the AME school from the DRC establishment. The Morris Brown school thus lay between Dassenberg and the DRC school which meant that although the actual distance between the schools was one and one half miles, the majority of students from the Dassenberg area were actually closer to Morris Brown School than to the Groen Rivier School.

The second issue involved the DRC school's closure for a period during which many of its former students enrolled at the AME school in order to continue their studies. When the DRC school re-opened, a number of children did not return, preferring to remain with the AME school. This meant that the DRC had lost scholars as a result of their school's closure, and not because they had been poached by the AME. This explanation of the DRC losses appeared to satisfy the Education Secretary, Charles Murray. At the same interview, Reverend Gow assured Murray that no child from the DRC school at Groen River had defected to his school since that school had reopened. His evidence sufficiently convinced Murray to renew enquiries.155

155. It was not possible to establish the causes of or the duration of the closure of Gren River DRC school. SGE 1/1088 Malmesbury Memorandum Malmesbury Division, Proposed A.M.E. B, Chatsworth.
Despite further investigations pending a review of the Morris Brown case, Golightly remained obdurate, falling back on the distance between the schools as the substance of his case against the AME school. He suggested that the only solution to the *impasse* was to move the AME school out of range of the DRC school, nearer to Dassenberg. He also laboured the issue of competition:

> If the (AME) school had been in existence 5 (five) years why has no grant been applied for till now? So long as there was no aided school any where near Mr Phijeland professed to be quite indifferent about Government Grants and inspection. Now that a school has been started at Green River which is regularly inspected he finds that the coloured people are beginning to prefer this school- hence the present application.\(^\text{156}\)

The Department again refused to recognise the Morris Brown School unless it was moved in the direction as indicated by Golightly. Under the circumstances, this was an unreasonable, manipulative, even callous rejection of the AME’s application. The AME community had already constructed a permanent building for the school at a cost of over £400. The proposal to move Morris Brown was clearly unreasonable. In reply, the Reverend Gow voiced the "painful distress" of the struggling AME school community, and bemoaned his own role; "I oftentimes regret that I have to do with the educational matters, it brings me nought but incessant worry and thankless return".\(^\text{157}\)

Gow argued convincingly that Golightly was not fair in presenting the AME case. The Inspector had clearly made no genuine attempt to assess the situation at Morris Brown School. Furthermore, it was apparent that Golightly’s perfunctory inspection was performed late on a Saturday afternoon after working hours. Thus Gow asked; what could

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\(^\text{156. SGE 1/1088 Malmesbury Memorandum Malmesbury Division, Proposed A.M.E. B, Chatsworth.}\)

\(^\text{157. SGE 1/1088 Malmesbury Gow to SGE 23/3/1912.}\)
Golightly "report as to the needs of the people(?)". In his own defence, Golightly argued that the issue was not one of "needs", but one of "facts":

The point was however, not to see the children - there was no dispute about their existence but to decide about the distance of the AME building from Groen River.158

The bureaucratic stance of Golightly, clearly concerned only with the inflexible implementation of regulations and rules, stood in stark contrast to Gow's plea:

... if he had visited the school - on school days - and saw 71 eager anxious faces of all conditions- intent upon getting whatever little education they can before facing the world -- he would have firstly said - "by all means let the children have their small Government aid"159

Golightly was blind to the educational needs of the community, and was concentrating on enforcing a rule which ultimately worked in the favour of the DRC monopoly rather than towards the general extension of local schooling. Yet it was the issue of provision that proved to be the loophole. Eventually, the very rules and regulations that the Inspector had used to impede the progress of the Morris Brown School, were employed by Gow to the advantage of his school.

Gow's most powerful counter argument was based on the small capacity of the DRC school which was simply a converted cottage on the farm of a Mr. du Plessis. According to Gow, Du Plessis wished "to concentrate" the school premises on his ground. This was because his labourers were more likely to continue working on his farm if education was provided for their children. The cottage was originally intended to accommodate only the children of the farm workers on Du Plessis's land, and as such it was just large enough to

158. SGE 1/1088 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 2/4/1912.
159. SGE 1/1088 Malmesbury Gow to SGE 23/3/1912.
accommodate 44 scholars. Thus Gow was able to make the strategically powerful point that, there were more than enough children to feed both schools. Consequently he argued that the "two schools, not only are not rivals - but they do not in any way clash with each other". The problem of "competition" was clearly invented by Golightly to prevent the Department from allocating two grants in the same area.

Despite Golightly's seemingly implacable efforts to prevent the AME from gaining a toehold, the Superintendent General of Education decided in April 1912, that on the basis of the time Morris Brown had been in operation and its constant attendance figures, a grant would be sanctioned. This concession was offered on the understanding that an "adequate" teacher should be found and that no interference with the DRC should be entertained. The Morris Brown School was not yet secure, for Golightly still persevered in his efforts to obstruct the AME. In mid-May, he was again exploring the possibility of moving the AME school. Phijeland told him this was impossible and offered a guarantee that no DRC pupils would be received into his school. Golightly was contemptuous of the promise, saying, "This of course will be taken for what it is worth, as experience has generally shown that such agreements are seldom lasting".

Golightly also supported the DRC's hastily announced plans to construct additional school accommodation on Du Plessis's land. The farmer attempted to present his DRC school as an "undenominational" institution which would accept AME children. He feared that children attending the school on his land would go over to the AME school once it was recognised by


the Education Department. The implication of the DRC’s plan was critical, because as soon as the DRC completed construction of the additional classrooms, the Department could refuse to assign grants-in-aid to Morris Brown on the grounds that the DRC did have sufficient space to service the schooling needs of the entire population of Chatsworth. Accordingly, Golightly indicated to the Department that the DRC was "somewhat apprehensive" as to whether their investment in the school could "prove an unnecessary outlay". In the light of his strenuous efforts to force the AME to abandon their school building which had long been in existence, Golightly’s favouritism was conspicuous.

Meanwhile, the Reverend Grove of the DRC also intensified his campaign against the AME, complaining that an additional government-aided school at Chatsworth would be detrimental to his schooling operations. Furthermore, he argued that it would weaken "school matters in general and will result in two weaklings instead of one flourishing school". In spite of Grove’s protestations, the Reverend Gow was informed in late May 1912 that the Education Department would provisionally sanction a grant on the condition that no pupils would be taken from the DRC school. By now attendance at Morris Brown School, Chatsworth, had risen to 85 with 45 additional students expected to register.

At Morris Brown, matters ran smoothly until September of 1913, when the DRC teacher, Weber, complained that five children had joined the AME school without settling their fees. Weber also alleged that the manager of Morris Brown, the Reverend

162. SGE 1/1088 Du Plessis to Grove 11/5/1912.
163. SGE 1/1088 Malmesbury SGE to Golightly 20/4/1912, Golightly to SGE 16/5/1912, Grove to SGE 15/5/1912.
164. SGE 1/1088 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 19/5/1912, Secretary SGE to Grove 27/5/1912, Secretary SGE to Gow 27/5/1912.
165. SGE 1/1088 Malmesbury Phijeland to SGE 6/6/1912.
Phijeland had not responded to his letter of complaint. Phijeland who had received specific instructions from Gow not to compromise the AME cause, found himself in a difficult position. He claimed that he had not been actively soliciting support but that in some instances, he relented when children are "forced on him by the parents". The Department was unhappy with Phijeland's explanation of the matter, but the AME principal was fortunately able to smooth over the matter by proposing an agreement between the schools to prevent further friction. 166

Clearly, the DRC school leaders were disturbed at losing students to the AME school, but there was little they could do if these transfers were voluntary. The only option open to them was to enforce contractual agreements with DRC parents which would prevent them from removing their children without notice. Less than six months later, Weber was again complaining that a Mrs Fortuin had transferred her children to Morris Brown without settling her account. After voluminous correspondence, Weber had to admit that the alleged outstanding fees were actually paid, but he complained that Mrs. Fortuin had not "satisfied the rules of our school by settling for a quarter's fees in lieu of notice for wanton withdrawal". 167 Gow again reiterated his earlier statement that the AME was in a difficult position:

The fact is the Pastor Rev Phijeland the principal and myself have to definitely set our face against the application of many of the children's parents, who for

166. SGE 1/1184 Malmesbury Weber to Grove 20/9/1913, Golightly to SGE 28/9/1913, Grove to Golightly 26/9/1913, Murray to Gow 4/10/1913, Gow to SGE 1/10/1913, Secretary to Golightly 7/11/1913, Golightly to SGE 11/11/1913, Murray to Gow 16/10/1913, Oliphant to Gow 5/10/1913, Oliphant to SGE 3/11/1913.

one cause or another, are anxious to send their children to our school.¹⁶⁸

The admission by Weber that he had unfairly accused Mrs Fortuin utterly destroyed the DRC case, even though Golightly still commented ominously that it was "strange that this kind of complaint should always come from the same side."¹⁶⁹ This was in effect the final effort of the DRC to dislodge Morris Brown school.¹⁷⁰

This episode has shown how at Morris Brown AME School, Inspector Golightly and the DRC school managers manipulated procedures and employed the 'three mile rule' in order to restrict the AME. In spite of these gambits, the AME's representatives were also in a position to deploy the departmental regulations to their advantage, and secure recognition for Morris Brown. Thus the bureaucratic logic of the slowly expanding Education Department caught up with Golightly. As much as he used it to benefit white mission interests, it could also be employed to counter his influence.

5.3 Reverend A.H. Attaway and Chatsworth Normal and Mechanical School: 1903–1908

Another facet of educational activities associated with the AME in the Western Cape was the establishment of Chatsworth Normal Mechanical and Industrial School by the Reverend Allen Henry Attaway. He had arrived in the Cape Colony in 1901 to become Principal of Bethel Institute in Cape Town, but evidently developed his private business interests at the same

¹⁶⁸ SGE 1/1285 Malmesbury Gow to SGE 21/5/1914.

¹⁶⁹ SGE 1/1285 Malmesbury Golightly to Secretary 30/5/1914.

¹⁷⁰ The DRC school’s attendance fell from 119 in late 1913 to 50 in mid 1916, while the AME school attendance also dropped though not so steeply from 85 to 50 in the same period. SGE 1/1496 Malmesbury Du Plessis to Grove 26/6/1916, Phijeland to SGE 25/7/1916. By 1969, Morris Brown School had an attendance of 197 students with four teachers. Interview Rev. John Bell Coetzee, Chatsworth 20/4/1988.
time. In 1903, he had floated a land syndicate which aimed to sell plots to prospective Coloured and African buyers. Eventually, he hoped to attract as many as two thousand families to the Chatsworth Estates, with each family paying between £6 and £14 for their plot. To this end, he began travelling far afield in the Cape Colony to sell allotments. The Chatsworth Normal Mechanical and Industrial School served partially as a source of income through the levy of boarding and school fees, but its main purpose was to attract people to buy land at Chatsworth from Attaway.

In January 1905, he lost control of the venture, and his estate was sequestrated. A private white owned enterprise, the South African Real Estate Company (SAREC), took over in the same year, and Attaway became the SAREC's agent. Reverend Attaway’s participation in the affairs of the Cape Town AME and the Bethel Institute formally ended in 1905 when he was succeeded as Principal of Bethel by H.C. Msikinya, but what transpired between 1905 and his return to the United States in 1908 remains obscure. Furthermore, AME historians have not recognised Morris Brown School and the Reverend Attaway’s Chatsworth Industrial School as entirely separate entities partly because of confusion arising from the association of both institutions with the place name, Chatsworth. 171 This has led to the erroneous impression that only one school existed at Chatsworth. 172 Through reference to hitherto unexplored archival material, an analysis will be offered of the controversial Reverend Attaway’s involvement with the

171. In 1907, Inspector Golightly indicated that apart from Attaway’s venture, there was another unrecognised school at "Arendsdale or Lesser Chatsworth" two miles away. It was run by Andreas Phijeland a minister of the AME. By this stage, Attaway’s connections with the AME had been severed. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 22/1/1907. The name Morris Brown School was used interchangeably with its location, Chatsworth by the Department of Education. See correspondence in 1913. SGE 1/1184 Malmesbury Phijeland to SGE 16/10/1913.

Chatsworth Industrial School, about which Coan has noted; the "Church papers are rather silent".173

It has often been taken for granted that historical increases in the provision of schooling are part of the process of improvement and upliftment of society, while those engaged in such activities have commonly been perceived to be admirable reformers. This perspective has been challenged by those who point out that many missionaries saw education merely as a means to the end of converting African people. In the general context of colonisation, the political role of mission education in domesticating African people has also been subject to critical scrutiny.174 However, the means whereby agents could exploit schools for private financial gain have not been scrutinised.175 Nor has the practice of promising education - or access to schooling - in order to extract financial advantages been interrogated. The Reverend Attaway's activities suggest that he was using the Chatsworth Industrial School to accrue revenues and as a bait to induce African and coloured people to buy or rent land from him. The SAREC which bought his insolvent business, made strenuous attempts to secure government recognition for the same reasons. Had the plan succeeded, the government would have been effectively subsidising the business interests of the SAREC through school grants-in-aid. Ironically, even though both Attaway and the SAREC appeared to have opened schools in order to benefit themselves, they did, however imperfectly, increase access to


education for Coloured and African people when it was most needed.

The Reverend Attaway was well-connected in the AME through his father, a presiding elder in the United States, and had studied at Wilberforce University and the Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College before he and his wife arrived in the Cape Colony in September 1901 to teach at the Bethel Institute. While he was still working at Bethel, he dabbled in land deals as the proprietor of "Arcade Estates and Auctions Agency". In 1903, he organised a land syndicate to purchase a farm of 10,000 acres at Groen Rivier, Malmesbury, in the vicinity of the Morris Brown AME School. This land was to be sub-divided into plots and sold to prospective small farmers with the aim of establishing a self help "co-operative movement" or "a school community on the order of Tuskegee Institute". As an incentive, prospective land purchasers were offered the opportunity to enrol their children at the Chatsworth Normal Mechanical and Industrial School (hereafter Chatsworth Industrial School). Prospective patrons of the school were encouraged to pay cash for their plots so that the money raised could be used for construction of the school building.

Attaway's plan appeared to be in accordance with Bishop Turner's injunction that the AME should work for the "moral, intellectual, civil and commercial advancement of that


This chapter has shown how, among AME congregations, education was perceived to be of paramount importance in attaining such objectives. Attaway himself frequently presented public lectures on a variety of subjects including industrial schooling and the "The Native, a Labourer" when he taught at the Bethel Institute in Cape Town and was therefore considered somewhat of an expert in these matters. The project at Chatsworth seemed to exemplify the AME ideals of self-sufficiency and community development through land ownership, training in skills and industriousness. It therefore attracted Coloureds and Africans who desired land, education and profitability.

The project was soon shrouded in controversy. Although at first, Chatsworth appeared to be part of the AME's plan to extend the Bethel Institute, it was not formally sanctioned or supported by the AME. Church leaders apparently made efforts to dissociate the AME from the Reverend Attaway between 1905 and 1907. Attaway lost control over Chatsworth when, in late January 1905, a compulsory order of sequestration was granted against him. Between January 1905 and April 1917, a further twelve accounts were filed against his insolvent estate.

183. From Coan's fragmentary account it seems that Attaway's venture was not recognised by the church's missionary department from the start. Coan, J.R. (1961) pp. 409-410. His name was also struck from the Cape Colonial Secretary's list of Marriage officers at the request of local AME Bishop Smith sometime in 1905. Page, C.A. (1978) p. 477.
184. The first petition for the sequestration of Attaway's estate was made by Frank van Renen and his brothers, Jacob and Hendrik who were probably the original owners of the land at Groen Rivier. CA Register of Insolvent Estates File No. 74, Entries from 1905 onwards.
In the following months, the South African Real Estate Company (SAREC) a syndicate of white entrepreneurs whose Chairman was a Member of the Legislative Assembly, took over the Chatsworth land and school venture.\(^{185}\) SAREC then employed Attaway on condition that he severed his association with the AME. It will be shown that Attaway was initially engaged in attempts to secure recognition and grants-in-aid for the Chatsworth Industrial School on behalf of the SAREC. However, the Education Department opposed his continued involvement in the school because Department policy was aimed at restricting black control over mission schools as far as possible. Moreover, Department representatives who had received word about Attaway's insolvency, were distrustful of the project. Consequently, the white directors of the SAREC were forced to shift him out of the school. Thereafter his main function was to travel in the Colony and sell plots of land and places at the Chatsworth Industrial School to Coloured and African buyers. In this capacity Attaway, appeared to achieve some success. He also gained some notoriety in the Herschel district as a political agitator. This brief account of Attaway's activities will first discuss how he was gradually divorced from school affairs at Chatsworth. It will then examine the role he played in the SAREC scheme with special reference to his equivocal relationship with SAREC's directors, and the ambiguous role he played as salesman and political agitator in Herschel.

Attaway first began to make earnest attempts to gain government recognition for the Chatsworth Industrial School in 1906, after SAREC's takeover. By this stage, he had recruited the Reverend and Mrs. John. A. Gregg from the Bethel Institute to staff Chatsworth Industrial School where Gregg acted as principal. Attaway was frequently absent from the school, on recruiting drives and his land selling ventures. By 1906, Attaway claimed that the school plant comprised a hall with

\(^{185}\) Part of Attaway's land was bought by Isaac Arendse who later moved to Kraaifontein and gave his part to the AME. Interview, Rev. John Bell Coetze, Chatsworth, 20/4/1988.
ten acres of ground. He indicated that facilities at the school included a "building of Croyden pressed brick, containing school rooms, a dining room and dormitory". There Attaway envisioned the provision of courses in a variety of skills and trades including brickmaking, carpentry, tailoring and mechanical engineering.

Later reports on Chatsworth submitted by government School Inspector Golightly suggest that the school's facilities were not as grand as Attaway had made them out to be. Golightly's communication with the Department in September 1909, disclosed that the main hall in which the school was conducted could be converted into two classrooms with the use of folding panels. It was sparsely furnished with two benches and two forms while the walls were bare of "any maps, or educational pictures". School was held from 10a.m. to 1p.m. daily except on Saturdays. There was no timetable or written work scheme. Girls did sewing for two hours in the afternoon, while boys were engaged in carpentry, dairying and gardening for four hours per day on the farm attached to the Institute. The head of the carpentry section was Mr. M.J. Michaelson, a former Norwegian ship's carpenter with no teaching experience, who was originally contracted to construct the school buildings but stayed on as an instructor. The dairying department was the responsibility of Edward Petersen a former coach painter. Golightly reported that in the "industrial portion" of the institution, there was "no appearance of any systematic work".

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186. In addition he indicated that he had an option on "an additional one hundred morgen including a splendid farmstead". SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Attaway to Crewe 15/5/1906.


189. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 29/9/1906.

190. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 29/9/1906.
At that stage, thirty four children, 29 boys and five girls, ranging in age from six to twenty attended the school from Standard one to Standard five. Of the 34 students, 21 were boarders recruited by Attaway from places as far afield as Basutoland, Queenstown, Herschel, and Johannesburg. Boarders increased the revenue making potential of the school because they paid £12 to £20 per annum. Local pupils were expected to pay between two to three shillings each per month for their schooling.

In May 1906, the Reverend Attaway wrote to Colonel Crewe, the Colonial Secretary, in an effort to convince him that Chatsworth was both viable and worthy of support. Attaway was astutely aware of the prevailing attitudes among colonial authorities with regard to the effects of education on black labour. Thus his carefully worded argument that the "solution of the Native problem lies in giving them a training suited to making them intelligent labourers in every branch of industrial activity" would have found acceptance with most missionary and colonial educators. He claimed furthermore to have "lost no opportunity to impress British Ideals upon the minds of Native and Coloured people," and his final gambit was to assure Crewe that the school would receive financial support from certain unnamed British and American philanthropists. Aside from assuring Crewe that he, Attaway, was "... actuated by high and unselfish motives", the American confided that he had been "compelled to observe the insideous(sic) process by which the sympathies of a section of the Native and Coloured people have been alienated from the Progressive Party" of which Crewe was apparently a supporter.

191. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 29/9/1906; CA NA 497 Chief Constable to RM 20/11/1906.

192. CA NA 497 Chief Constable to RM 20/11/1906; SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 29/9/1906; CA NA 497 Chief Constable to RM 20/11/1906.

Attaway assured Crewe that "some act of constructive statesmanship will do more to regain the confidence of these people than anything else, the one need upon which all sections of the Native and Coloured people are agreed, is higher education". Clearly, Attaway was implying that Chatsworth Industrial School was the key to meeting both black educational "needs", and to restoring the reputation of the Progressive Party among Coloureds and Africans in the Cape Colony. His open suggestion that educational improvements could raise black voting support at the polls, echoed the Reverend Mzimba's attempts on behalf of the African Presbyterian Church to barter votes for classrooms with Cape politicians.

The crux of Attaway's letter lay in his request for a special grant of £2 000 per year for industrial and mechanical training, so that "the educational question so far as the Coloured and Native people of this Colony are concerned (would be) solved". The reaction of the local Inspector of Schools, Golightly, who had already expressed his opposition to aid for the school unless it was under white superintendence, was unequivocal. He stated that the school "would be an unmitigated evil" under the "regime" of Attaway.

Meanwhile the SAREC needed to open a school at Chatsworth which would legitimise its economic interests and act as an incentive to increase participation in their scheme. The directors were beginning to appreciate that Attaway's

194. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Attaway to Crewe 15/5/1906.

195. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Report of Inspector Golightly and Memorandum by Rev.C.Earp-Jones. In the same region, the white public schools were undergoing considerable expansion. Between 1903 and 1905 four first class white Public Schools at Darling, Riebeeck West, Malmesbury, and Vredenberg each received loans exceeding £1,200 in terms of the "Local Works Loans Act" for buildings. CA 1/MBY 5/4/8 Assistant Treasurer, Treasury Department to CC Malmesbury 13/6/1903 and following correspondence.
involvement was an obstacle to recognition. To avoid a second rebuff, Mr. Zietsman who was Director of the SAREC, and Member of the Legislative Assembly, visited the Education Department twice in 1906 to pursue the question of aiding "an Industrial School for Natives at Kalabas Kraal" that accommodated 100 pupils. Zietsman proposed to the Education Department that the Malmesbury School Board should take over responsibility of Chatsworth School which would be recognised as an undenominational school. The undenominational aspect of the Chatsworth School was emphasised by Attaway and the SAREC in order to gain support from blacks who were disenchanted with mission schooling, but it had to meet more stringent Departmental requirements to qualify for aid than did the mission schools. The proposal was denied by the Secretary of the Department, Charles Murray. Zietsman's persistence sparked a flurry of investigations through channels of the Education Department, the Native Affairs Department and the Police at Malmesbury. Yet again, Inspector Golightly's report was unremittingly negative. However, it became apparent that the Inspector's primary objection to aiding Chatsworth was not based on educational grounds, for he was only prepared to recommend a grant with the installment of "European management".

196. Kalabas Kraal was the railway siding nearby Chatsworth.


198. Pencilled note appended to; SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 29/9/1906, Department of Public Education to African Real Estate Company 28/11/1906. Other provisions of the School Board Act would also have been implemented.


201. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 29/9/1906.
In spite of these setbacks another representative of the SAREC, Mr. T. Palmer M.A., LL.B., personally interviewed the Superintendent General of Education in January 1907 with a new proposal for recognition. At this meeting it was clear that Attaway's plan for an undenominational industrial institution had finally been ditched. Palmer indicated that the SAREC merely wished to establish an ordinary elementary school for the children of about 100 families living on the Chatsworth Estate. As an inducement to the Education Department, the SAREC offered to contribute £100 for teachers salaries. By this stage the Company desperately needed to offer at least elementary schooling opportunities in order to lure people to Chatsworth.

Palmer also announced that Attaway's links with the institution had been severed and that the former AME minister was to have "no control or connection with the school" forthwith. Consequently, Inspector Golightly was again instructed to check on "Greater Chatsworth". 202 Fortunately for the SAREC, Golightly accepted Palmer's assurances that the Reverend Attaway was no longer involved with the school. Nevertheless, the Inspector made demands that would minimise Afro-American influence in its operations, because he found the Afro-American contingent at the school to be somewhat disturbing. The resident "business manager" of the site and acting correspondent for the school was a Mr Spense from Carolina in the United States, while Mr Marshall "a coloured man from the West Indies" who served as Attaway's secretary, and Mrs Attaway comprised the teaching staff. 203 Golightly stipulated that a properly qualified teacher should be appointed to replace both Mrs. Attaway and Mr. Marshall, and

202. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Department of Public Education to T. Palmer 19/1/1907, Memorandum Chatsworth Estate Malmesbury 11/1/1907.

203. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 22/1/1907.
that the school should be closely supervised by the SAREC Secretary, Palmer.204

Thereafter, the SAREC was slow to react, and experienced difficulty in finding an appropriately qualified teacher. In February the Superintendent General of Education reiterated that "the question of the management and scope of the school" was still in question. He suggested that the SAREC should "definitely undertake the management of the school".205 What transpired thereafter in the affairs of the school will not be pursued because by this stage, Reverend Attaway's association with the school had been terminated.

Meanwhile, the SAREC's directors saw fit to continue employing the Reverend Attaway because they knew he was capable of drawing black people onto the Chatsworth Estates from which the company could profit. Through the efforts of travelling agents operating "round the country" capitalising on the dissatisfaction "known to exist amongst a section of the people at various mission stations," the SAREC hoped to attract Coloureds and Africans to lease or buy plots of land with cash or on an installment system. The aim was to have over 2 000 families settle on the Chatsworth Estates. Plots or allotments of either 100 or 200 feet square were sold either by instalments of 10 shillings after an initial down payment of ten shillings, or the payment of the full amount of between £6 and £14. In November 1906, two hundred plots had been sold, on which 18 African and 92 Coloured men lived, but only 2 African and 8 Coloured men had settled for their land in full. The rest paid rent at £3 per year.206 One of the provisions of the contract issued by the SAREC was that immediately upon the

204. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Golightly to SGE 22/1/1907.
205. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury African Real Estate Company to SGE 1/2/1907, SGE to African Real Estate Company 9/2/1907; Department of Public Education to Inspector Logie 11/1/1907, Logie 18/1/1907, Stat.Branch list. 22/1/1907.
payment of the first instalment, the purchaser was liable to forfeit all payments to the Company should there be a default in payment. Furthermore, purchasers would only get transfer of the property once all instalments were paid up. Many purchasers who lived far away had no hope of fulfilling the payments and therefore were simply forfeiting the first installment of 10 shillings. For the SAREC owners, the scheme represented a means of accumulating funds at little risk to themselves.

The perils of financial involvement with the SAREC's Chatsworth Estates came to the notice of F.Z.S. Peregrino who published two critical letters in the South African Spectator. The first attacked the Chatsworth Institute as "A Nightmare" and the second warned prospective patrons to "Leave it alone":

Certainly this institution has not for the past year been lacking in the direction of being advertised, nor have those who are interested therein been modest in pressing its claims upon those for whose benefit it has been said to have been designed. I have no wish at this juncture to do more than to advise briefly those who have sought my advice, equally with others among the Native people who may be contemplating the patronage of this school - to bide a wee. Don't be carried away because certain members of parliament are

207. CA NA 497 ARM Ndabeni Location to SNAD 5/10/1906 and enclosures. Application for Lots, Privileges and Conditions, and Agreement/Deed of Sale of the SAREC, Savings Bank Building, Cape Town; Chief Constable to RM Malmesbury 20/11/1906.

208. CA NA 497 Letcher to RM Herschel 5/10/1906.

209. Peregrino changed from being a staunch supporter of the AME to an severe opponent of the Church and especially Attaway. It has been suggested that this was partly because of business competition between Attaway and Peregrino who ran the "House Room renting and Real Estate Company". Page,C.A.(1978)pp.478-9.
or said to be, interested in the school. 210

Missionaries in the immediate area, observed the growth of Chatsworth with disquiet. The Reverend C. Earp-Jones, Superintendent of the Abbotsdale Anglican Mission Station, was most concerned that "a large number of malcontents gleaned from various mission stations" could settle at Chatsworth. He observed that the majority of people arriving there were defectors from the Dutch Reformed Church mission of Malmesbury. The Chatsworth community was however far from stable because there appeared to be as many people leaving as arriving. 211 Native Affairs Department officials were also concerned that Chatsworth was exempt from certain provisions under the Private Locations Act No. 30 of 1899, which gave the owners, dwellers and tenants on the land greater freedom from government intervention. 212 Activities at Chatsworth were therefore closely observed by missionaries and colonial officials alike.

By February 1906, Attaway was far afield, "touring the Colony" to get "students and sympathetic support" for Chatsworth. He travelled extensively, relying on support from pro-Ethiopian groups in the Transkeian Territories and Basutoland. 213 On being warned by the Inspector of Native Locations to leave the district of Sterkspruit, Attaway delegated his secretary, Mr Marshall, to supervise the transfer of approximately twenty


211. SGE 1/623 Malmesbury Report of Inspector Golightly and Memorandum by Rev.C.Earp-Jones. Izwi Labantu reported that a number of Africans moved from Ndabeni Location to Chatsworth. Izwi Labantu 24/9/1906


213. He focussed especially on the Quthing district. CA NA 497 H.Gordon-Turner to CC Herschel 11/10/1906.
children to Chatsworth. Although his whereabouts and activities in other areas are not known, available evidence on his nine month sojourn in Herschel gives an indication of his modus operandum.

From about March to November in 1906, Attaway plied his trade in the district of Herschel. In each area, he would work through the local headmen, usually persuading them to arrange meetings at which he would address those assembled on the virtues of the Chatsworth land scheme and its educational facilities. In Herschel, Attaway actually invited the Resident Magistrate to preside over one of his meetings. The American enclosed with the letter of invitation, a "catalogue" or prospectus for Chatsworth as well as press clippings which reported on speeches he had delivered as an AME preacher.

By embroidering on the reality, Attaway endeavoured to give the impression that Chatsworth was far more established and substantial than it really was. He referred confidently to the "Chatsworth Township" where "free sites" had been given to all religious denominations recognised by the government and stressed the non-denominational status of the school. Attaway was also "pleased to state" that the Chatsworth Industrial School had been "generously commended by the present Government", a lie that was exposed when in November, the Native Affairs Department informed the Resident Magistrate that the Education Department had "at no time commended the institution".

Attaway's arrival in Herschel was reported to the Native Affairs Department headquarters in April without eliciting any

214. CA NA 497 INL to CC Herschel 7/10/1906.
216. CA NA 497 Stanford to CC Herschel 15/11/1906; Attaway to Captain Turner 27/6/1906.
reaction.\textsuperscript{217} Some months elapsed before his past caught up with him in the form of Colonel Crewe, the Colonial Secretary, with whom he had dealings in the Western Cape. Upon discovering Attaway's presence when he arrived in Herschel, Crewe, who was convinced that the former AME leader would "swindle" local Africans "as he has done others", cabled the Native Affairs Department to find out if it was at all possible to have Attaway expelled from the district or to "obtain sufficient evidence to prosecute" him.\textsuperscript{218}

If Crewe held hopes that Attaway could easily be dispensed with, he must have been disappointed by the Native Affairs Department's reply. No laws could be invoked to authorise the expulsion of Attaway. Moreover, any other intervention such as publicly advising people not to buy land from Attaway as representative of the SAREC could give rise to court claims against the Government for damages.\textsuperscript{219} It was feared that because Chatsworth was "bounded" to the SAREC's white directors, they would cause "great difficulty" for proceedings against Attaway.\textsuperscript{220} The Secretary to the Native Affairs Department, Walter Stanford, sent a consoling telegram to Crewe, suggesting that the "better course" was for the "people concerned to learn wisdom by experience".\textsuperscript{221} He referred specifically to a disputed transaction involving Attaway and the Lozi Chief Lewanika in which the Chief lost £636.

In 1904 an AME church emissary, Willie Mokolapa was despatched by Chief Lewanika from Barotseland with £636 to purchase river boats and wagons in the Cape Colony. He sought advice from

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\textsuperscript{217} CA NA 497 RM Herschel to SNAD 13/10/1906.

\textsuperscript{218} CA NA 497 Crewe to SNA 4/10/1906.

\textsuperscript{219} CA NA 497 Crewe to SNA 4/10/1906, NAD to CC Herschel 5/10/1906, NAD to Colonial Secretary 5/10/1906, Stanford to CC Herschel 15/11/1906.

\textsuperscript{220} CA NA 497 Memorandum Statement by Dr. Muir 24/10/1906.

\textsuperscript{221} CA NA 497 Stanford to Crewe 8(?)/10/1906, Crewe to Stanford 8/10/1906.
Attaway, then AME Superintendent, who in turn referred Mokolapa to the firm I. and J. Herman with which Attaway had business dealings. Shortly thereafter, Herman went insolvent. His estate was sequestrated, and Lewanika's money was lost. It was suspected that Attaway failed to protect Lewanika's money "in order to accommodate Herman with whom he had certain interests in common". Although the Criminal Investigation Department followed up, no evidence was found on which to base legal proceedings. 222 Subsequently, a number of cases of alleged fraud were made against Attaway but none were conclusively proven. 223

Under the protection of the SAREC, Attaway was able to achieve some success in furthering the financial interests of the owners of the SAREC. The Resident Magistrate observed with increasing disquiet that Attaway was supported by a range of Africans including those receiving relatively high incomes. 224 The Inspector of Native Locations knew of at least four leading men, including an African constable in his office and a local headman, who had fully paid for their plots in cash. Others paid their deposits in stock and grain on which Attaway depended for his livelihood. 225

The African community in Herschel proved to be a convenient site for Attaway's activities. He enjoyed the support of a prominent Herschel shop owner who was alleged to be an "out and out Ethiopian", and visited the settlement of Ndofela


223. For various allegations, see; CA NA 497 RM Herschel to SNAD 13/10/1906, Rev.Letcher to RM Herschel 5/10/1906.

224. The RM hoped to use the provisions under Section 20 of Act No 37 of 1884 to expell Attaway. While Attaway was not resident in any location the above legislation could not be brought into effect. CA NA 497 RM Herschel to SNAD 13/10/1906, Stanford to CC Herschel 15/11/1906.

225. CA NA 497 INL to CC Herschel 7/10/1906.
which was an Ethiopian stronghold in 1906. The effects of his activities were felt when the Colonial Secretary toured the district. None of Attaway’s supporters and clients attended Crewe’s meetings and the Inspector of Native Locations alleged that Attaway was "preaching and disseminating the very worst form of Ethiopian doctrine". In frustration, the local Native Affairs Department officials ordered the surveillance of Attaway’s activities, but he proved to be an elusive quarry, easily evading African constables despatched to trace him. No informers offered to testify against him and he left behind no hard evidence that could prove incriminating.

Attaway’s achievements evidently derived from his ability to persuade his would be clients that Chatsworth was for all intents and purposes a black controlled corporation and a viable project worthy of investment. His technique depended on pointing out the economic disadvantages that black people suffered at the hands of whites so that they would be inclined to throw in their lot with the SAREC. For example, Attaway told Africans that they were being unfairly treated by whites. He apparently compared salaries of African teachers and white magistrates claiming that the latter earned in one month what the teachers earned in a year. He also asserted that white traders were "doing" Africans by overcharging them for blankets, which provided an ideal opportunity to persuade his listeners to send their children to Chatsworth where they would learn how to make their own shoes and clothes. On another occasion, Attaway was alleged to have exclaimed; "You Native people in Herschel are afraid of the white man, and bow to him in everything. You do not dare to call your souls your own".

226. CA NA 497 INL to CC Herschel 7/10/1906, INL to CC Herschel 11/10/1906.

227. CA NA 497 Letcher to RM Herschel 5/10/1906.
The utterances attributed to Attaway show that at times he was prepared to make straightforward political statements. His other assertions were also political in that they highlighted the kinds of exploitation and inequality that were evident in the Cape Colony. Yet they were also couched in such a way that they would induce a response in his African audience from which he would benefit. The implication is that Attaway manipulated political sensibilities in order to sell plots of land and school places at Chatsworth. Ironically, Attaway’s self-interest as a salesman and agent of the SAREC unavoidably contributed both to the politicisation of African communities in Herschel and to his reputation as a political revolutionary. He was, furthermore directly contributing to the swelling consciousness among African and Coloured communities of education as a vehicle for gaining security and economic independence. The case of the Reverend Attaway is replete with ambiguity, for even though his activities suggest that he was at least an opportunist, there is no reason to suggest that he was not a sincere agitator – even if he did benefit financially from his own anti-white Ethiopian rhetoric.

By the end of 1906, Attaway may have felt under pressure to leave Herschel, because he appeared in Basutoland the next year. There he again made attempts to establish a non-denominational school on the same lines as Chatsworth. However, new opportunities for implementing his schemes were disappearing as his reputation preceded him and as inter-colonial communications improved. The Government Secretary in Maseru made enquiries through the Cape Secretary for Native Affairs, whose negative response in October abruptly ended Attaway’s career in Basutoland and for that matter in Southern Africa. The Reverend Attaway returned to the United States the following year, 1908.

228. SGE 1/623 Memorandum Chatsworth by Dr. Muir 24/10/1906.

In the battle to establish schools in the Western Cape, the AME faced an array of constraints, including hostile officials of the Education Department and representatives of the mission churches. The Department was extremely reluctant to admit independent schools into the favoured ranks of the subsidised mission schools. As in the previous chapters, it has been shown that when the Education Department was called on to arbitrate between independent church and mission church claims for school grants, mission church interests were usually given precedence. In addition, the evidence of white missionaries and the School Inspectors was commonly held to be of greater validity than the representations of independent church agents.

Nevertheless, this chapter has demonstrated that the sole authority of the missionary over school affairs was being curtailed as the Education Department’s influence became stronger. In effect, bureaucratic management forms were beginning to supersedes autocratic mission jurisdiction. At Piquetberg, the school principal, Mrs Sarah Bell, was able to force the DRC’s Reverend Enslin, to comply with accepted procedures and to retract decisions that he had made without consulting the school committee. At Morris Brown AME School, Inspector Golightly manipulated procedures and exploited the ‘three mile rule’ in order to restrict the AME. In spite of his efforts, the AME’s representatives were also in a position to employ the departmental regulations to their advantage, and secure recognition for their school. As much as Schools Inspectors used Department procedures to advance white mission interests, independent church representatives employed the same system to counter the Inspector’s influence. Through recounting the success of these AME school ventures in the rural Western Cape, this chapter has illuminated the process whereby mission and independent church schools were gradually being captured within the framework of the Cape education system. Public funding and legal government recognition
validated a new managerial-bureaucratic logic that was employed by representatives of the Education Department. Both missionary and African independent church school leaders had to negotiate their survival within this sphere of influence.

In the case of the AME schools, the support of its Cape Town representatives and of APO agents were of crucial importance. The AME was able to take advantage of its proximity to the Education Department in two ways. Firstly, the proximity of the Department's headquarters made the option of visiting the Supt.Gen.of Education and presenting the AME case in person, a viable tactic for the AME leaders. Through direct interaction with decision-makers in the Department they were able to drastically reduce the influence of Inspector's reports and missionary letters. Secondly, because the Cape headquarters of the AME were in Cape Town, the Reverend Gow who was stationed there as General Superintendent was able to represent the outlying AME school interests, and to respond in ways that would allay suspicions that were harboured by officials in the Department's head office.

For those independent church schools far from the seat of government and the Education Department headquarters in Cape Town, the possibility of adequately representing their cause was remote. In order to appeal in person against any particular judgement by the Education Department, men like the Reverend Mzimba or the Reverend Dwane would have to travel hundreds of miles. Consequently, they were forced to rely on indirect white mediation in the hope of achieving what the AME rural schools could achieve through its own representatives in Cape Town.

In comparison with the Eastern Cape case-studies, this chapter has revealed a heightened political awareness among people of colour in the Western Cape and a greater willingness to defend their rights in the schools through formal bureaucratic channels and through the conduit of representative political organisations. This was partly attributable to the influence
of organisations like the APO which focussed much of its resources on contesting discriminatory educational provision in the Cape Colony. Furthermore, from their experiences in the American context, the AME leaders brought sophisticated levels of diplomacy and a degree of political confidence that contributed to their successes in negotiating the continued survival of their schools.

The AME congregations in question did not manifest the heightened political tensions that characterised the relationships between African Christians in the communities where the African Presbyterian Church and Order of Ethiopia were constituted. The two Eastern Cape case studies revealed how political consciousness was concentrated in ways that effectively split communities. Political energies were focused on ethnic and denominational divisions that validated sometimes violent struggles for control over scarce resources like land or education. The political context of the AME rural schools was somewhat different. Political activity on the part of AME members was not invested in ethnic and denominational conflicts to the same extent as it was in the Eastern Cape. The resources available to AME communities were therefore deployed less in conflict generated through internal divisions, and more in supra-ethnic and supra-denominational organisational conduits such as the APO which provided for some level of organised representative political activity.

Finally, the controversial history of the Chatsworth Industrial School and its founder, the Reverend A.H. Attaway contributes an important dimension to this research in that it demonstrates that the independent school initiatives were not uniformly admirable instances of resistance to missionary schooling. The account is particularly valuable on one level for illustrating how one man could pursue his own self-interest while simultaneously expressing anti-colonial sentiments. At another level, it illuminates how the complex web of negotiations and compromises that the Reverend Attaway
engaged in could not be reduced to a categorical depiction of him as shyster, Pan-Africanist hero or collaborator.
CONCLUSION

Independent schools conducted by African independent churches in the Cape Colony at the turn of the century were greeted with chagrin by missionaries and suspicion by colonial officers. Politics had a large role to play in the creation of these dissident churches. By their very existence as an expression of independent church initiative, it was inevitable that the schools themselves would be politicised. Yet, as much as they owed their political notoriety to independent church links, these schools in their own right indicated the politicisation of colonial education. The number of black people laying claim to educational opportunities was growing progressively larger while the dearth of school places, and lack of access to control over schooling had become contentious political issues.

In terms of its original conception, this work was aimed at investigating 'resistance' to mission education through a set of micro-focused case-studies. Yet this inevitably required locating the case-studies within the macro context of the gradually unfolding education 'system' in the Cape Colony, because the nature of the 'system' as it developed, had a direct influence on the growth of independent school initiatives and vice versa. Thus, the 'system' that developed in the Cape was the product of interaction between the central government Education Department which "developed centrifugally ... spreading outwards" and peripheral initiatives which impinged centripetally on the Department's dominion.¹

The 'system' was strong at the centre where the Superintendent General of Education was engaged in constructing a head-office bureaucracy, but it was weak at the periphery. There, in the educational divisions and school-board circuits, its attenuated framework provided only a feeble grasp over day-to-

day school matters. Visits by School Inspectors were sporadic, and the missionary school superintendents who acted as their proxies were often too engrossed in other church business to attend to the schools. Thus as has been demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, African school leaders in mission and independent schools capitalised on the state of underdevelopment of the education 'system' by manipulating schooling in the interests of their supporters.

However, the intervention of School Inspectors, though gradual and uneven, signified the response of the Education Department to the persistent growth of uncoordinated competitive school initiatives, and the escalation of conflict between missionary and oppositional independent school parties. The growing capacity of the Education Department to compel school managers to implement procedures and to standardise practices relating to the administration of the schools, effectively curtailed the dominance that missionaries had hitherto taken for granted. Chapter 5 on the African Methodist Episcopal Schools showed how the Education Department's bureaucratic apparatus ruptured the parochial authority of the missionaries and signified the 'capture' of mission schools in the enveloping government education 'system'. Thus control over the Cape schools was moving from an "entrepreneurial" mode characterised by missionary and independent enterprise to a "managerial" mode characterised by bureaucratic government authority.2

This work therefore reflects as much on the emergence of a 'system' of education as on the question of resistance in the history of education. Through identifying the links between micro educational processes in the case studies and macro system development, it should have contributed to our understanding of the dialectical interplay between volition at the periphery and imposition from the centre.

By 1920, the extent of direct colonial government intervention in education was far greater than it had been at any time since the establishment of the Department of Education in the 1840's. This was evident from the rapid implementation of segregation and a deliberate policy of discriminatory financial allocation from the 1890's onwards. Meanwhile, the potential for government intervention increased as the Education Department's bureaucratic structures and system of inspection were rapidly expanded. The education authorities also began to pressurise the missions to restrict the time spent on religious instruction each day and to limit religious content in the curriculum. These procedures represented the secularisation of both the curriculum and the administration of schooling in the Cape Colony.

Even though the Education Department's inspectorate was expanded, this measure did not appreciably increase government control in all regions. The numbers of schools and students were increasing at approximately the same rate so that the proportionate workload of each inspector remained virtually unchanged. Furthermore, the haphazard development of the mission school system, aggravated by antagonism between denominations made inspection and control a formidable task. Therefore, advances in effectively bringing mission schooling under Education Department jurisdiction varied, especially in the rural areas of the Colony. Thus, as had been observed, in situations where government Education Department jurisdiction was incomplete, or where mission school supervision was ineffective, black communities seized the opportunities to pursue their own objectives.

The launching of autonomous schools by independent churches, though a shock to the missionary denominations, did not necessarily constitute a radical change in the day-to-day administration of mission schools where black people had already been actively involved as unofficial leaders. Teachers at mission outstations often operated without regular supervision or support, and some senior African Christians
managed schools without professional training or supervision. These experiences were to exert an influence on former mission church Africans such as the Reverend Mzimba who led opposition schools. Independent schools were not the only sources of dissent in the colonial educational context. From time to time, Africans who were loyal to the mission churches also contested for ascendancy in mission schools. Thus the fragmented mission education system left opportunities for Africans to exert influence over school matters, albeit at the local level.

The school conflicts described in the case studies were enacted in two realms, the politics of curriculum and teaching processes, and the politics of authority over the schools themselves. Although the antinomies of contest and co-option were evident in both realms, the major focus of this work is on the latter question.

Independent church leaders opened their schools with the primary aim of maintaining their independence from mission dominance. At one level, the schools' struggles were pursued between the government Education Department, mission agents and independent church school representatives. This was essentially a battle for jurisdiction where a long tradition of mission hegemony in the schools and the increasingly intrusive school inspectors were crucial factors. At another level, there was contestation between contending mission-loyal and dissident African independent church factions over control in the schools. These contests both reflected and reinforced local allegiances and patronage relations, especially in the locations of the Eastern Cape.

The efforts of independent church communities to resist mission mastery over their schools were contradictory in that they embraced the potential for contest and the possibilities of co-option. Very soon, independent church schools came under the influence of the Education Department. In order to secure recognition and funding they were compelled to
negotiate with the Superintendent General of Education and his subordinates. To achieve the aims of by-passing mission control and securing government grants-in-aid, the independent church leaders had no alternative but to make concessions in regard to the strategic question of white supervision. This process has been recognised by Archer who argues that as independent schools become increasingly public through interaction with the government, "they receive public funding and in return have to yield some autonomy to accountability; they receive legal recognition but have to cede independence to incorporation".3

Nevertheless, the relationships which the independent churches entered into with white go-betweens could not be fairly cited as evidence of total collaborative submission. Nor were the relationships with white mediators unequivocally beneficial. The benefits that derived from compromises negotiated between the Reverend Mzimba and the Victoria East Inspector of Native Locations, and between the Reverend Dwane and the Church of the Province of South Africa were offset by certain disadvantages. In each case, the price of keeping educational interests alive was ironically a reduction in the autonomy of the schools. Thus, the independent church leaders had to frame strategies within the constraints of their circumstances. Moreover, they could not always predict the consequences of alliances and clientships they entered into as the weaker party.

An important paradox of the independent church school operations was that they engaged with the missionaries over the control but not over the content of mission education. Ironically, they strenuously resisted the structures of missionary control over schooling but adopted the colonial curriculum without critically questioning its basic assumptions. Evidence suggests that colonial school authority structures and the colonial curriculum were replicated in the

independent church schools. Monitorial teaching methods, instruction on a mass scale and emphasis on verbal repetition at elementary school levels were implemented. This was generally supplemented by 'garden work' and a powerful emphasis on discipline, regimentation, and the dignity of labour which were the hallmarks of mission school programmes at the time. Thus the Resident Magistrate of Flagstaff in the Transkei could report in 1902 that the "character and teaching" of independent church schools in his district was "similar to the Wesleyan" schools in the "ordinary elementary subjects of reading writing and arithmetic".4

Such a curriculum was noticeably oriented to "shaping character", thereby contributing to social control. The aim of "civilising of the working class" which was explicitly acknowledged in English education, had strong resonances in the Cape Colony.5 Clearly the independent church schools and mission schools alike were introducing their students to the dominant colonial consciousness whose power was physically represented in prevailing military, political and economic colonial structures. African Christians in both the mission and independent churches sought to absorb the European socio-cultural universe as it was expressed in order to enhance educational improvement and economic advancement and perhaps also to defend broader political interests.

Although it appears that the independent church students absorbed the dominant western colonial consciousness through the assimilative mechanism of the curriculum, it is important not to interpret the acceptance of colonial curricula as some kind of ideological capitulation which would then justify perfunctory dismissal of the schools as assimilationist. Andrew criticises the historicism of this proposition through

4. CA NA 497 RM Flagstaff to CMT 3/9/1902, RM Nquanduli to CMT 15/9/1902.

reference to the alternative educational initiatives of working class people in Britain;

Neither the lifestyle and cultural modes of the middle classes nor those of the working class existed in isolation. Each was influenced, modified and transformed by those of the other. If we accept, as the evidence suggests we must, that even radical working class leaders with "alternative" views on education had often attended church elementary schools, were sometimes fervent Methodists, frequently had aspirations to "respectability" and were in many cases loyal to the company for which they worked as well as trying to change what they saw as an unacceptable, exploitative, social structure, then we begin to realise the futility of seeking to establish whether or not they were representatives of an alternative culture which in some way can be measured for ideological correctness. 6

Before assessing the putative 'collaborative' actions taken by independent church and school communities, it should be recalled that not all African Christians broke away from the mission churches. The majority who remained loyal to the missions probably believed that they could satisfy their desire for education and modernisation more successfully by retaining their links with the mission churches. Thus judgements based on hindsight, which pronounce the actions and strategies taken in the schools by African Christians as collaborative, fail to grasp the complex ambiguity of the milieu.

The independent church schools initiative has been probed in this study with special reference to the politics of control but the related question of political teaching in the schools could not be conclusively answered. Allegations of political

teaching were frequently made by missionaries such as Reverend Dieterlen who argued;

Native ministers ... have a great deal to do with political matters ... They speak on them in public meetings or from the pulpit; and their voice is listened to with much reverence ... Much evil can be done by bad evangelists, school teachers or ministers. (Emphasis added) \(^7\)

Claims such as the above tended to be general rather than specific, while circumstantial evidence in reports by colonial officers - not renowned for their support of the independent churches - suggest that allegations of political teaching in the independent church schools were exaggerated.\(^8\) The main problem is lack of evidence, for it is improbable that independent church leaders would have engaged in Africanist or Ethiopian rhetoric in the classrooms while white colonial officers were present.\(^9\)

This study indicates that colonial curricula were accepted in the independent church schools, thus making it unlikely that Ethiopian teaching was fundamentally part of a conscious and systematic political training. Nevertheless, in terms of the

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9. Thus, Odendaal who claims that "Ethiopian ideas were also imparted in the schools started by the separatist churches" cannot cite evidence in corroboration of his claim. He only cites Saunderson's reference to the possibility of political teaching is speculative rather than specific. Saunderson, C., "Tile and the Thembu Church: Politics and Independency on the Cape Eastern Frontier in the Late Nineteenth Century" Journal of African History 11(4), (1970)p.570; Odendaal, A., Vukani Bantu! The Beginnings of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912 (Cape Town, David Philip, 1984)p.84.
hidden curriculum, an ethos of black pride and independence that was particularly evident in the African Methodist Episcopal Church activities must have permeated the sensibilities of independent church students in the schools, thus corroborating claims that at "the end of the nineteenth century, it was in the independent churches that the assertion of equality by Africans was expressed most clearly and strongly".10

The case-studies in this work focus on independent school initiatives motivated by the political principle of self-determination and by the basic desire to improve access to education. The aim has been to show, without glorifying or eulogising each initiative, how plans and projects of each church brought foreseen and unforeseen successes and failures. In this regard, an important dimension is illuminated through the account of the controversial Reverend Attaway's attempt to set up Chatsworth Industrial School ostensibly under the aegis of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, but which turned out to be for private gain. The failure of Reverend Attaway's scheme usefully demonstrates that not all African independent church school projects were uniformly admirable incidents of resistance to mission schooling. This episode is particularly valuable for illustrating how one man could pursue his own self-interest while simultaneously expressing anti-colonial sentiments. At another level, it demonstrates how the complex web of negotiations and compromises that the Reverend Attaway engaged in could not be reduced to a categorical depiction of him as a paragon of pan-Africanist resistance or as a collaborator.

Although this research cannot produce an unambiguous finding on the matter of politics per se in the independent church

schools, it can reflect more accurately on the degree to which education was politicised in the communities under investigation. Chapter 5 on the African Methodist Episcopal Church in the Western Cape reveals a higher level of involvement among the Coloured people in specific educational matters in comparison with the Eastern Cape case studies. This is clearly demonstrated in the volume of communications between the Department of Education and parents, teachers and school managers on a range of issues. The greater willingness of black people in the Western Cape to defend what they believed to be their rights in the schools can be ascribed to a more developed awareness of education as a political issue. This consciousness was enhanced by the African Political Organisation which identified education as one of its key campaigning areas, and the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) which acted as a conduit for an Afro-American ethos within which education and non-discrimination featured as primary elements.

The AME schools leaders from America employed the rhetoric of improvement, discipline and non-involvement in politics, but were nonetheless vitally imbued with race pride and a concern for upholding black rights. They also brought from their experiences in the American context sophisticated levels of diplomacy and a degree of political confidence that contributed to their successes in negotiating the continued survival of their schools. Furthermore, the Afro-American leaders were able to take advantage of their proximity to the Education Department by interacting directly with the Superintendent General of Education and placating the Department on sensitive matters relating even to outlying AME schools.

Several other important facets of the AME rural school enterprise distinguished them from those of the African Presbyterian Church and the Order of Ethiopia schools in the Eastern Cape. As has been noted, the large Coloured population in the Western Cape displayed a different political
consciousness to African independent church adherents in the eastern Cape. The AME school leaders were more preoccupied with achieving their goals through engaging with the Education Department hierarchy and in utilising supra-ethnic and supra-denominational political conduits such as the African Political Organisation. In essence, the contest over schools in the case of the AME, was conducted more in the realm of the politics of negotiation with the Education Department bureaucracy than in the cauldron of local community conflicts generated through ethnic and religious allegiances that were so evident in the Eastern Cape case-studies.

The accounts of schools sponsored by the African Presbyterian Church and by the Order of Ethiopia illustrate how ethnic and denominational conflicts were inextricably bound up with school and land disputes. The two Eastern Cape case studies reveal how political consciousness was concentrated in ways that effectively split communities. Political energies were focussed on ethnic and denominational divisions that sometimes validated violent struggles for control over scarce resources like education and land. The intensely parochial focus of these conflicts inhibited antagonists in the locations from fully perceiving the sources of their impoverishment in the colonial political economy.

It is worth reiterating that the chief mechanism of growth in the independent church movement was through secession which fragmented African Christian society. In addition, the independent church schools were not born in the context of a conscious African nationalist struggle for the control of the state or even over the nature of the state. Nor were the schools conceived of as a large-scale counter to the system of the mission schools. Therefore the independent church phenomenon - and its schools - conferred a fragile consciousness of shared social allegiances and an attenuated awareness of overarching political links among those embroiled in the inter-church rivalries under investigation. The consciousness and culture of African Christians was therefore
"formed in their day-to-day experiences of life in a very small segment of society". 11

Although the conflicts in the schools under study were overtly between independent church communities and African Christians who were loyal to the missions, other allegiances were important. Loyalties were expressed through modernising or conservative orientations, typified in the "red" - "school" dichotomy, or through Xhosa - Mfengu ethnic identifications. Deteriorating economic fortunes contributed to recognisable stratification among the Ciskei African population, between an emergent African elite and the majority of African rural dwellers who were unable to withstand the forces of proletarianisation. Economic insecurity caused by declining agricultural production, landlessness and labour migration heightened conflict between richer and poorer households, between the rural petty bourgeoisie and an increasingly proletarianised majority. The tensions surrounding access to land and economic survival vitalised conflicts around the independent church schools. Thus the schools conflicts both drew energy from and added fuel to tensions between emergent social groups. 12

These cleavages between school and traditionalist, Mfengu and Xhosa, elites and landless rural dwellers were exploited by both African mission church loyalists and independent church leaders in their struggle for control over the schools. Although it has been shown that the emergent progressive Christian elite forged proto-nationalist political movements such as the early South African Native Congress, in the schools they drew their power from parochial sources,


mobilising local support through manipulating social cleavages. The prime example in Chapter 4 was Chief Bomvane Mabandla, who by virtue of his traditional leadership position and his educational background, was able to mobilise educated elites, traditionalist and the poorer school oriented rural Africans in support of Mzimba's church.

This work therefore affirms the "vitality, intensity and inventiveness of local political life" and demonstrates "the flexibility of self perception, and the situational nature of 'ethnic' boundaries and divisions" in rural political consciousness among African Christians in the Eastern Cape that have been identified by Beinart and Bundy in their studies of popular movements in the Transkei.

As a history of schooling per se, this study hopefully adds to our understanding of an important dimension which Bundy, Beinart and other social historians have not touched upon - the growing institutionalisation of schooling as part of rural life. The conflicts over schools that have been analysed in the case-studies signal the incorporation of education into the social lives of many black people between 1890 and 1920. Greater numbers of Africans and Coloureds were expending their energies, investing their money, and devoting time to the pursuit of education for their children or for themselves. Education increasingly offered the prospect of financial security and stability in a context of deteriorating economic fortunes, land hunger, and rapidly diminishing incomes from agriculture. The ineluctable link between education and its political and economic context was drawing tighter in the period under investigation.

This study has also clearly outlined the parameters of racist education policy in the crucial decades 1890 to 1920.


Hitherto, the segregation of black education in the Cape has not received due attention. Insufficient accounts of the elaboration of segregationist policy in this period have contributed to the popular misconception that racist policies were implemented in the Cape schools in a much later period. This misapprehension has persisted because of a serious underestimation of state intervention in the period under discussion, which has hitherto been characterised by scholarly neglect. For example, Molteno argues that the growth of black schooling before the mid-1940's was so slow because "minimal interest in black schooling was displayed by the state, capitalists and employers in general".15 In contrast with this view, the findings of this study show that government intervention intensified in the 1890's in response to growing antagonism towards black education among whites and the problem of 'poor whiteism'. Consequently, segregation and significant differences in educational appropriation between black and white were implemented well before the 1920's. In the light of the findings on the development of segregation and diminished funding for black education, the establishment of schools by the African independent churches must be understood as a response to a genuine shortage of access to schooling opportunities for black people, and not simply as an instance of anti-colonial resistance in the mission schools.

While the trend of increasing demand for education has been generally acknowledged by historians, its characteristics have not been analysed. In particular, historians have been content merely to observe the increase in demand without asking: demand for what forms of education? The value of Chapter 2 in this thesis is that it has described the context and the extent of rising black demand for schooling in the Cape Colony, while the value of the case-studies is that they illuminate some features of that demand. Over and above

secular elementary education, a wide range of educational needs were articulated, which included training for the ministry, post-elementary schooling, sound industrial training, teacher training and university education.

The shortages described above prompted a number of plans for establishing ambitious educational institutions such as James Dwane’s education settlement scheme and Henry Attaway’s attempt to establish an industrial institution at Chatsworth. In retrospect, their blueprints may have been unrealistic given the shortage of skills and lack of resources available in black communities. However, the schemes that never came to fruition and others that did succeed, such as the African Methodist Episcopal Church’s Wilberforce Institute in the Transvaal and John Dube’s Ohlange Institute in Natal, should be interpreted as attempts to meet the diverse educational needs of black people in a colonial context which denied them all but the most basic elementary and manual-oriented schooling. It should not be surprising that the independent church educational schemes were modelled on the operations of the major mission institutions for it was only in these privileged mission educational environments that Africans could experience the kinds of education that approximated to their needs and desires.

The South African educational historiography has accorded famous ‘mission institutions’ such as Lovedale, Healdtown and St. Matthews much attention. These large, well established institutions were replete with traditions and infused with a colonial ethos. They admitted relatively high student numbers in boarding accommodation and offered a variety of schooling opportunities under an encompassing missionary regime. Current general interpretations which have been constructed from accounts of these institutions, tend to assume that mission education hegemonically conditioned the characters of African Christians. While this reading appears appropriate to the relatively small number of premier institutions like Lovedale and Tigerkloof, the same cannot be said for the vast number of
small mission schools. Using the three case studies as its base, this work brings to the South African educational historiography a perspective on the common mission school in the period. It provides insight into the fine grain of interactions in the myriad of small outstation mission schools that hitherto have been ignored. It has demonstrated that in these schools, the opportunities existed for Africans to select, redefine, and control educational processes in their own interests. The outstation mission schools were consequently far less powerful in imposing a colonial mindset than the main mission institutions.

In Chapter 4, this work interrogates the links between church politics and education, in particular the role of education in the process of inducting converts into the Christian church and in the process of educating candidates for the priesthood. Neither has been fully recognised as a legitimate arena of analysis by South African historians of education who tend to focus on secular educational activities. Yet both secular and religious schooling involve the same processes of instruction, assimilation of knowledge, and assessment. Therefore, in the same way that secular education has been shown to be a mechanism for excluding people from privilege in society, it has been demonstrated that religious education was equally a mechanism of gatekeeping in the Church. The Order of Ethiopia's congregations were obliged to complete the rite of Catechism - which involved an intrinsically educational component - or were excluded from union with the Church of the Province of South Africa. The impoverished training that the religious leaders of the Order of Ethiopia received ensured that they would always be subordinate in knowledge and rank to white priests in the mission Church of the Province of South Africa. This ensured that the caste-like structure of the mission church hierarchy was reproduced in the relationship between Church of the Province of South Africa priests and their counterparts in the Order of Ethiopia.
In conclusion, this work contributes directly to the education historiography in two ways. First, it has clearly delineated crucial changes in the colonial education dispensation with respect to segregation, discrimination, and secularisation. This suggests greater continuities between education policy before and after 1953 than has hitherto been acknowledged, especially with regard to segregation and funding.

Second, resistance in education from the inception of formal schooling in South Africa has been associated with early student avoidance of colonial schooling and later student rebellion in the mission schools. Active engagement by black parent communities and teachers has been associated with resistance to Bantu Education from the 1950’s onwards, when parents set up schools which were independent of the state run system. It is commonly assumed that those schools operated by the African National Congress and the African Educational Movement in the East Cape and East Rand in the 1950’s were the first examples of ‘resistance’ in which control over the school itself became a contentious issue. This thesis firmly locates contestation over the control of schools much earlier in the 1890’s, under the auspices of African independent church communities. This suggests that historians of education working in the period before the institution of mass education in South Africa, will find a richer and more varied tradition

of black assertion in school affairs than has been acknowledged.
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