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An examination of administrative capacity to implement development programmes in South Africa

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Supervisor: Prof. Robert Cameron
Abstract

This thesis examined the concept of administrative ‘capacity’, which has been employed to critique the ability of public administrations to implement development programmes in South Africa. References to administrative capacity in South African academic discourse have generally treated the term as a concrete item, often translated as public sector organisations lacking the ability/capacity to respond to the increasing scale of development needs which accompanied the country’s recent political transition. This emphasis has in turn raised questions about whether these bodies possess the requisite or sufficient capacity to carry out development activities, and where this is judged not to be the case, that efforts should be directed at acquiring this capacity, i.e. capacity building or strengthening. This thesis argued that this prevailing twofold interpretation of capacity was too narrow, because it did not adequately capture how the organisational and operational circumstances under which public sector bodies functioned, might influence their ability (in other words, capacity) to implement development programmes. The research question then focussed on identifying and explaining those factors found to have influenced the capacity of public sector organisations to implement development programmes.

This study adapted and applied a systematic framework of variables employed by Samuel Paul, to examine the organisational and operational conditions through which public sector bodies implemented development programmes. The application of this framework was influenced by the conceptual and theoretical development of this study’s interpretation of administrative capacity, informed by literature in comparative and development public administration. At a theoretical level, a key adjunct to the research question became: to what extent are bureaucratic characteristics of public organisations representative of those factors found to have influenced the capacity of these entities to implement development programmes? Employing a case study approach, this thesis examined two large-scale development programmes being implemented by South African government departments. Data comprised a mixture of primary and secondary sources, including 45 qualitative interviews mainly with government officials, and the analysis of government documents. Interview data was collected and subsequently coded against the framework of variables used.
This thesis identified four overarching factors found to have influenced the capacity of public sector organisations to implement development programmes: 1) the adaptability of programme objectives, 2) the flexibility of programme operating rules, 3) the functional accommodation of demands introduced by a programme, and 4) inter-organisational authority relations. The significance of these factors was also expressed in the finding that bureaucratic characteristics associated with the organisational and operational conditions through which programmes functioned featured strongly in this study. This primarily took the form of inflexible, inconsistent and conflicting operating as well as objective rules to which implementing departments were bound, which resulted in limited departmental flexibility and discretion to respond to the objective and operational demands introduced by the programmes. This also saw inter-organisational conflicts of hierarchy expressed through decentralised and horizontally-configured programme structures.
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# Glossary

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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme</td>
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<td>CBPWP</td>
<td>Community-based Public Works Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Deputy Director-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEAT</td>
<td>Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Department of Land Affairs</td>
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<td>DOA</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
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<td>Department of Health</td>
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<td>DOL</td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
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<td>DORA</td>
<td>Division of Revenue Act</td>
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<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transport</td>
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<td>DPLG</td>
<td>Department of Provincial and Local Government</td>
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<td>DPW</td>
<td>Department of Public Works</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPWLA</td>
<td>Department of Public Works and Land Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSD</td>
<td>Department of Social Development</td>
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<td>ECD</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development</td>
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<td>EPWP</td>
<td>Expanded Public Works Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFC</td>
<td>Financial and Fiscal Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCBC</td>
<td>Home and Community-based Care</td>
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<td>LRAD</td>
<td>Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>MIG</td>
<td>Municipal Infrastructure Grant</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEDLAC</td>
<td>National Economic Development and Labour Council</td>
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<td>NEF</td>
<td>National Economic Forum</td>
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<td>NPWP</td>
<td>National Public Works Programme</td>
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<td>NQF</td>
<td>National Qualifications Framework</td>
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<td>PIG</td>
<td>Provincial Infrastructure Grant</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SETA</td>
<td>Sector Education Training Authority</td>
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<td>TDR</td>
<td>Technical Development and Reorientation</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The capacity of the public service to deliver and expand basic services will be the hinge between a stable political economy driving development … [and] a volatile country beset with massive inadequacies in service delivery.

McLennan, Wooldridge (1995: 91)

1.1 Overview of research problem

This thesis concerns the subject of administrative ‘capacity’ and how it specifically relates to the ability of public administrations to carry out development programmes in South Africa. The relationship between administrative capacity and the implementation of programmes defined by development has, since 1994, become commonplace in assessments of the South African government’s performance. It was in this year that the country held its first non-racial democratic elections, which initiated a process of significant political and administrative restructuring. More specifically, the relationship between the capacity of South African public sector bodies and their implementation of development programmes has been premised on an expectation that these entities, functioning in a reformed system of public administration and guided by a new constitutional principle of equal access to services, would have to significantly scale up their activities in response to severe under-development that had become endemic among large sections of the country’s population.

This premise, and the central role administrative capacity plays in it, was in fact evident before South Africa began its political transition in 1994. FitzGerald (1992: 63), for example, referred to capacity by alluding to the consequences of a future South African system of public administration scaling up its activities, by anticipating that ‘[e]ven assuming a comparatively non-violent transition and the adoption of an enlightened and

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1Prior to 1994 the policy of apartheid, or separation between designed race groups (i.e. white, coloured, African, Asian/Indian), dictated government policy and administration in South Africa. This included public administration being divided into several public services attached to a white-minority controlled Republic of South Africa, and various public services attached to ‘homeland’ and ‘self-governing territories’, created to house the country’s African population.

coherent development policy, a future post-apartheid state will face severe constraints regarding its direct development capacity’. Also commenting prior to the country’s political transition, Koster (1993: 5) suggested that the capacity for strategic policymaking and planning should be the starting point for broader public sector transformation, where changes in the development circumstances of South Africa (and hence being able to respond to these conditions) were considered paramount. These changes and their implications for capacity were also evident in a post-apartheid government White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994). Pointing to a historical neglect of service delivery in parts of the country, the White Paper argued that ‘[t]he capacity to implement development programmed [sic] in rural areas is a serious bottleneck, which will be addressed as a priority’ (Government Gazette 1994: 41).

Three years into a new political and administrative dispensation, Wallis (1997: 89) also used the term capacity when describing the challenges facing public administration in South Africa. He stated that ‘[t]he difficulty facing the [South African] public services might well be summed up by depicting them as overloaded … The issue of institutional capacity is clearly linked to overloading.’ This remark resurrected a decades-old observation from the academic research on ‘development administration’, where Koteen (1972: 47) cited a United Nations official who commented that ‘planned development is necessarily a disequilibrium system where the “administrative load” is continuously outpacing administrative capability’. Fehnel (1997: 374) offered another perspective on Wallis’s concern about overloading affecting capacity, by arguing that the ‘new [South African] government has the legitimacy which the prior government lacked, but it lacks the management capacity to plan and implement reconstruction and development activities on the massive scale it has promised.’ Finally, Luiz’s (2002: 594, 596, 601) more recent assessment of South African ‘state capacity’ was prefaced by the argument that ‘[s]tate-led development will have disastrous consequences where the state does not possess the capacity to formulate and execute a developmental vision’.

Perhaps attesting to the enduring profile of administrative capacity in South Africa, the country’s Public Service Commission (PSC), a constitutional body charged with monitoring and evaluating the activities of the public service, has also linked the implementation of development activities with administrative capacity in its State of the Public Service reports. The PSC (2006: 30) specifically referred to findings from an audit
of poverty reduction activities undertaken by government departments, describing the situation as follows:

In itself, the immensity and diversity of the range of interventions that government has initiated to address poverty is strong [sic] indication of its commitment to a comprehensive and systematic approach to meeting the development challenges faced by the country. What needs to be done now is to ensure the availability of appropriate capacity in the Public Service to ensure their success.

It is evident from the concerns and observations of researchers and government entities that references to the South African state’s administrative capacity tend to pivot on the question of whether its public administrations possess the ability to carry out an expanded agenda of development activities. The link between the need for expanded development and the explicit implications for capacity also arose in a series of interviews which were conducted with a group of South African public administration academics. These interviews were intended to supplement references to administrative capacity in the secondary literature. A number of interviewees noted that the 1994 political transition was accompanied by an increase in the demand for services from segments of the population that were not previously catered for. This arose in a political context that emphasised a more negotiated or participatory approach to implementing development activities. One respondent described this as follows:

The state in essence was in a position where it provided services to less than eight or nine per cent of the total population, so immediately then you have a raise in demand for services from 10 per cent of the population to 100 per cent of the population, you suffer from a serious lack of capacity in terms of the basic competencies, so that’s, that is an issue.

Another interviewee also characterised the state as having a limited capacity to respond to an increased demand for services after 1994, but this time referred to the additional effect on public administrations of having to adjust to a more consultative approach when working with beneficiaries:

[B]ut I think it did in fact greatly heighten the awareness in bureaucracies of the need for communities, and although that will result in tensions, I mean I’m a great believer in the idea that tension is not necessarily a bad thing, and that would be an example I think of the kind of creative tension that was produced as a result of the growth of expectations and the limited capacity of bureaucracy to respond to them.
The characterisation given to administrative capacity, in view of an increased demand for socio-economic services generated in a context of growing political openness was succinctly captured by Walker (1998), who remarked that government’s ‘lack of capacity’ had become a South African ‘catch phrase of the 1990s’ (see also SAIIA not dated). Furthermore, what can so far be described as a focus on the South African state’s possession of capacity has also been partnered by its logical conclusion: if concerns were expressed about public administrations not having the capacity to implement new development priorities, their capacity would have to be improved or strengthened.

Other critical analyses of South Africa’s public administration have also observed this twofold interpretation of capacity. One example was a 10 year review study commissioned by the government to evaluate the implementation of programmes across all service delivery sectors since 1994 (The Presidency 2003). A content analysis of the document revealed that there were at least 30 references to capacity. Of these, 28 references, or 93 per cent, related to either the possession of capacity or the strengthening and building of capacity. Making up this 93 per cent, 53 per cent of the references pertained to the possession of capacity, whilst 40 per cent dealt with strengthening capacity. References to the possession of capacity were characterised by terms such as capacity ‘constraints’, ‘sufficiency’, ‘shortages’, ‘adequacy’, ‘poor’ and ‘limited’. Strengthening capacity was usually defined as ‘building’, ‘improving’ and ‘enhancing’ capacity.

Another example illustrating the dominance of the possession-improvement view of administrative capacity is the application of the ‘developmental state’ concept to South Africa, which was originally modelled on rapidly industrialising East Asian countries. Southall (2006) has given a particularly thorough overview of this debate, by outlining three ideological positions (economic liberals, Jacobins, developmentalists) taken on South Africa as a potential developmental state. What is most interesting in his analysis of these positions is the prominence of the state’s possession of capacity, as embodied in the bureaucracy, to drive development, although these positions critically diverge around broader policy questions of economic ideology, which transcend a narrower administrative focus on capacity. Southall (2006: xlii) interestingly observed that despite the ideological differences between the economic liberals and Jacobins around the state’s role in the economy:
[T]hey converge around the issue of the seriously limited capacity of the South African state as it is today and raise important questions about the simultaneous short-term pursuit of “demographic representivity” and “efficiency” … Beyond this, furthermore, their concerns overlap with those of the developmentalists about how “state capacity” can be both analysed and improved, …

To summarise: the issue of administrative capacity in assessments of South Africa’s post-apartheid public administration has revealed concerns that public sector bodies have lacked the ability to respond to the expanded and varied development needs arising from a major political transition. These concerns have been voiced in critiques questioning whether the country’s public administrations possess the requisite or sufficient capacity to carry out development activities formulated in response to these needs; and, where this has been judged not to be the case, that efforts should be directed at increasing or strengthening the capacity of these entities. Such a twofold interpretation of the term assumes the existence of a particular standard of capacity. In other words, employing the term to characterise public administrations has tended to be translated into some measure of sufficient human, as well as material and financial resources (suggested by the phrase ‘lack of’). Capacity is therefore treated as an item which is judged to be either adequately present in an administrative setting or not, and if not, requires remedy.

Indications of this also appeared in interviews with South African academics, many of whom referred to human resource deficiencies when describing capacity:

I say that they are well trained, we have enough well trained people in this country … we also have enough motivated people, that really want to make a difference … but the level of experience lacks and that is the problem with their capacity, on the job, the shifting things around on the job level, the level of experience is a problem.

Other academic contributors also mentioned ‘experience’. One noted the ‘loss of institutional memory over the past 15 years, through the whole political process there were people with a memory of how things happened who were replaced with new officials’, adding that ‘loss of experience, which I think affects to some extent some of the development programmes’. Another mentioned that ‘the process of transition is still ongoing; we have new elites in government at the moment, they don’t have the experience that the old apartheid bureaucrats had, they are to a
large extent inexperienced, they've come from the outside, they must build up experience, they must build up knowledge where the knowledge base does not exist'.

Finally, another academic contributor conveyed a broader and more mixed description:

So, there are issues around competencies and commitment that impact upon capacity, some of these things are technical, some of it has to do with attitudes, and some has to do with basic, basic lack of just ... the knowledge and skills of financial management, of public management, of the hard core administrative things.

The latter contributor expressed concerns about more than just insufficiently experienced officials, by questioning the commitment of officials as well as their technical and managerial abilities. Concerns about a lack of management abilities affecting capacity were extended by other academic contributors, who added that that this could transcend a lack of experience and technical expertise to incorporate other features:

[T]hat means internal reasons, and those internal reasons you can in most cases relay back to managerial problems, which means basically, coming back to what I've said initially, either ignorance of management requirements, lack of knowledge of good management practices, incompetency, and a whole range of different managerial problems. It could be a lack of commitment, it could be a lack of vision, lack of leadership, lack of strategic co-ordination, lack of operational project management skills.

Relating capacity with management or managerial problems in public administration has a lengthy history in the academic literature. Heady (2001: 300) referred to weaknesses in trained administrators with management capacity, development skills and technical competence related to the execution of development interventions. Iversen (1979: 90) observed that 'it is widely assumed that the failure of development projects largely results from a lack of managerial capability'. Finally, in ‘Key Problems in Development Administration’, Koteen (1972: 47) remarked that two decades of assistance to developing countries had produced significant improvements in administrative systems relative to sustained deficiencies in managerial capacity. He went on to observe that '[n]ational development programs ... have too often fallen short of expectations for reasons of managerial weakness'. References to management or managerial capacity suggest a distinction between managerial and administrative capacity, which can in fact
be traced to disciplinary debates distinguishing public administration and public management. Though recognising this debate, this study will elect to employ the terms administrative and managerial interchangeably in pursuing its primary objective of examining factors influencing the capacity of public administrations to function, where Lynn (2003: 15-16) identified references which either equated or closely related the two terms to scholarship as early as the mid-1920s.

To summarise, observations from interviews coupled with references from the literature tend to foreground and emphasise a human resource dimension to administrative/managerial capacity. A problem with this interpretation of the term is now suggested. Although references from the secondary literature and interviews have indicated that a number of qualities have been associated mainly with this human resource dimension of capacity in the South African case, it was otherwise evident that the ‘lack of’ descriptor has remained generally constant. This has tended to be translated into some standard or measure of capacity being present, which, if not present, should be built or strengthened. This thesis generally accepts the notion that the lack of human, material as well as financial resources can have an effect on the ability of public administrations to function, where such deficiencies ought to be rectified where they are observed to be present. This study will argue however that relying solely on such a twofold interpretation of the term capacity limits the contextual scope for identifying underlying factors that could potentially affect these conditions.

The research problem being proposed is that the prevailing twofold interpretation of capacity does not adequately explain how the organisational and operational circumstances under which public administrations function in South Africa, might influence their ability to deliver services and implement programmes. Interpreting capacity in this third way widens the limitation attached to a focus on the extent to which public administrations possess some standard of capacity in order to function, and if they do not that they should. This third perspective shifts analytical focus towards identifying the underlying features, embedded in the organisational and operational environments in which public administrations function, which can be observed as influencing their ability (in other words, capacity) to carry out their interventions. The distinction between the three interpretations of administrative capacity being advanced by this thesis may be summarised as follows:
1. The *possession* of capacity, usually based on assessments of whether public administrations have a requisite or sufficient supply of capacity to be able to function; where this is found not to be the case they are judged to be lacking capacity. This has mainly been linked to human resources, but may also include material or financial resources.

2. The *acquisition* of capacity, which focuses on capacity being built or strengthened where public administrations are judged to be lacking it.

3. The *influence on* capacity, which focuses the analysis on the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations function, and to determine what impact these have on their ability to implement development activities in particular.

The emphasis being placed on the third interpretation of capacity in this thesis is reflected in Painter’s (2002: 210) observation that ‘[t]erms like “loss of capacity” carry an evaluative and normative load, but they are principally about effectiveness, a means-end criterion concerning the attributes of a process that contribute to objectives’. This thesis submits that an analysis of the organisational and operational conditions through which public administrations implement development activities, which appears to speak to Painter’s emphasis on uncovering the ‘attributes of a process’, needs to be factored into and inform evaluative statements which conclude that these entities lack capacity. In accordance with this perspective, capacity per se, or what constitutes it, is not at issue here; the interpretation being pursued by this thesis does not assume that capacity represents an item that can be measured on the basis of a particular standard. Rather, the perspective of capacity adopted by this study emphasises the identification of factors which can be observed as influencing the ability of public administrations to implement development programmes. This perspective of capacity is generally lacking in the South African public administration literature, and it is hoped that this research can make a useful contribution to enhancing knowledge of this subject.
1.2 Research question and aims

On the basis of the background just introduced, this thesis proposed the following research question:

What are the factors that influence the capacity of public administrations in South Africa to carry out development programmes?

The primary aim of the study was to systematically isolate, define and examine the effects of factors that can be observed as influencing the capacity of South African public sector bodies to carry out development programmes. The benefit of adopting this perspective was that isolating and examining the characteristics of such factors would enable additional explanatory and theoretical insights to be drawn about the administrative circumstances (the organisational and operational conditions) that underlie more common applications of the term capacity, that is, ‘lack of’ in South Africa.

Before giving a description of the research methodology employed by this thesis, a definition of a development programme, which represented the object of this research, is given below. Agreeing on a consistent definition of a development programme was required in order for this thesis to select an object for empirical analysis. Before arriving at such a definition, though, it is necessary to briefly discuss the concept of development and consider its relationship with administrative capacity.

1.3 Administrative capacity and development activities

The term ‘development’, as discussed broadly in Political Science and Development Studies literature, has usually been presented as an umbrella concept, generally referring to a mixture of depressed social, economic and political conditions existing within particular societies. In this context, the term has also been employed to refer to Official Development Assistance, characterised by the transfer of various forms of financial and technical assistance from economically developed to relatively less-developed or poorer countries, in support of activities designed to ameliorate these conditions. The use of the term development has therefore acknowledged that particular
conditions exist within societies which have required the intervention and aid in support of government bureaucracies and non-governmental actors.

Without wanting to belabour a discussion on such a complex concept such as development, it is necessary to acknowledge that it possesses a multi-dimensional character, which makes it a difficult concept against which to attach administrative responsibility. For example, on what basis does one proceed to analyse the concept of development in relation to Wunsch and Olowu’s (2000: 71) description of the term, as incorporating a mixture of economic, social and political decision-making, involving complex and co-ordinated behaviour by diverse peoples across large areas of time and space? Having said this, the literature going back many decades did recognise, from the vantage point of administrative transformation in post-colonial societies in particular, that development diverged from other public policy matters around the idea of ‘change’, where this differed from the maintenance of law and order (Gant 1979: 20; Stone 1965: 52). The qualities of change were concisely set out by Gant (ibid), who stated that change be directed at ‘stimul[ing] and facilitate[ing] defined programs of social and economic progress’. Attir (1965: 79) similarly described development as a concerted effort in various interrelated fields leading toward higher forms of social and economic life. The point that this study of administrative capacity ought to bear in mind is the notion that development seems to centre around decision-making and actions taken by government bureaucracies that are centred on changing (by seeking to improve) social and economic conditions in their wider societies.

It is from this understanding of development that an association can begin to be drawn between the concept and the administrative interventions designed to respond to it. In this regard, this thesis elected to follow White’s (1987: 13) description of what a public sector-administered development programme should be designed to address, as it was felt that her threefold criteria coincided with how development has been described in the literature as well as the prevailing circumstances in South Africa. White has suggested that a development programme should be designed to:

1. Carry out a nation’s development goals.
2. Introduce change in a society or community to increase its productive or organisational capacity.
3. Improve the quality of people’s lives, including improvements in the well-being of the poor.

A development programme should then speak to the articulation of a country’s broad development goals; promote the improvement and self-sufficiency of its targeted beneficiaries; and seek to enhance the socio-economic welfare of these individuals or communities. White’s description proved particularly useful for this thesis because it corresponded closely with the emphasis directed after 1994 on instituting far-reaching government-wide development programmes to redress backlogs in socio-economic services that had accumulated among large sections of South Africa’s population.

This emphasis has perhaps best been illustrated in the South African government’s 1994 White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, the heart of which consisted of a proposed ‘Reconstruction and Development Programme’ (RDP). The RDP was explicitly defined as a ‘policy framework’ as compared to a distinct development programme, consisting of five broadly defined and non-sector-specific programme areas,\(^3\) which were collectively designed to contribute to the post-apartheid transformation of the South African economy and government (Government Gazette 1994: 6-7). The five programming areas identified as part of the RDP generally corresponded with the criteria that White suggested a development programme ought to address: meeting basic needs (concern for quality of life); developing human resources (i.e. enhancing the organisational capacity of communities); and building the economy together with democratising the state and society (which were major developmental goals in transforming the structure of a society which had engrained economic inequality and political repression).

Chapter 9 of the RDP White Paper showed just how influential the framework, at least in its intentions, was designed to be, by making broad recommendations covering policy objectives, programmes, targets, lead ministries, institutional reforms, legislative programmes and financial arrangements for nearly all national ministries and accompanying departments, which in any event were in the early stages of organisational restructuring following South Africa’s first non-racial democratic elections.

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\(^3\)These were: meeting basic needs, developing our human resources, building the economy, democratising the state and society, and implementing the RDP.
The influence of the RDP for this particular study stems from its early attempt to programmatise, however broadly conceived, a collection of various activities across all government departments which were designed to contribute towards the comprehensive transformation of South African society. In this regard, the RDP can essentially be considered the progenitor of the many sector-specific development programmes sponsored by the government, which were elsewhere described in its framework and emerged subsequently in its wake. Acknowledging the RDP was significant in that it directly informed this study’s selection of relevant development programme cases for empirical examination.

The next section of this chapter gives an overview of the research methodology used in this thesis to empirically identify factors influencing the capacity of public administrations to carry out development programmes.

1.4 Research methodology

1.4.1 Research approach

Gathering empirical data to inform the interpretation of administrative capacity being put forward by this thesis required a research methodology capable of identifying and delineating the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations have carried out development programmes. This was a prerequisite that enabled the task of identifying factors observed as influencing the capacity of these entities to carry out these activities. It is instructive to keep in mind that the interpretation of capacity being advanced in this thesis was more exploratory in nature, seeking to isolate and systematically define factors, without presuming or hypothesising what they were. It became evident that a methodology designed to obtain clarity from potentially complex operational circumstances associated with the carrying out of development programmes would be preferred. It was consequently decided that a case study approach would be favourable for organising and analysing empirical data.

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4Chapter Nine: Summary of Departmental Programmed [sic] to Advance the RDP, outlined department-specific activities, including programmes, in accordance with the broader objectives of the White Paper.
A number of methodological descriptions of the case study appeared to lend weight to its suitability and possible benefit to this study. In her book, *Research Methods for Public Administrators*, Johnson (2002: 51; see also Behn 1993: 44) observed, for example, that case studies have frequently been used to gain an in-depth understanding of a process, event, or situation, where its usefulness can be linked to questions concerning how something works, understanding a process, or examining people’s perspectives about an experience. Paul (1982: 12), who employed case studies to research public sector-implemented development programmes, also commented on these methodological instruments as being a ‘fruitful means of capturing the complexity of public management and generating hypotheses to be tested through large-scale studies in future’. Of note in these examples is an emphasis on undertaking in-depth examinations, directed at understanding complex administrative processes, among other things, which lends itself to the interpretation of administrative capacity being advanced in this thesis. This focuses on analysing the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations carry out development programmes.

Extending the points made by Johnson and Paul, Jreisat (2002: 68), writing with specific reference to research in comparative public administration, defined the case study as a systematic research method concerned with context as well as variables, which primarily seeks to discover rather than confirm or test hypotheses. It was mentioned earlier that the research question introduced by this thesis did not presume or hypothesise what factors actually influenced the capacity of South African public administrations to carry out development programmes, given that the interpretation of administrative capacity on which it was based was largely absent in South African scholarship. Jreisat’s reference to context was also worth noting where, in its search for factors influencing the capacity of public administrations, this thesis focused on the operational conditions under which these organisations carried out development programmes.

Another factor which favoured the adoption of a case study approach corresponded even more directly with the rationale behind this study’s research question. It was earlier mentioned that using the term capacity to critique the ability of public administrations to carry out development programmes lacked a sufficient explanatory grounding, and in particular an understanding of the underlying administrative circumstances that could affect how judgements about the possession of capacity were made. In a chapter on
case analysis research in *Public Management: The State of the Art*, Behn (1993: 44) observed that the objective of this method is to do more than tell an interesting story, but ‘to identify the underlying principles that explain why a combination of specific activities interacting with particular circumstances produced the observed outcomes, and to describe those principles so that they can be applied to other situations’. Behn’s characterisation of case analysis corresponded with the explanatory course plotted by this study’s research question. In this regard, specific administrative activities were being directed at the execution of a development programme, where these were taking place within a particular set of operational circumstances, which need to be taken into account in so far as these could be observed as affecting the capacity of a public sector organisation to carry out these activities.

### 1.4.2 Methodology

This study selected two development programmes being implemented by South African public sector organisations as case studies. The programmes in question were the *Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme* (CASP) and the *Expanded Public Works Programme* (EPWP). Both programmes corresponded with White’s threefold description of what a development programme should be designed to address, and could be traced directly to the RDP White Paper. The aim of the research was to systematically isolate and describe those factors that could be observed as influencing the capacity of the public organisations involved in executing the programmes, to carry these out.

Another methodological feature of this study is that it deliberately selected case programmes that were in the midst of their implementation, and so had not yet been completed or concluded. This study was therefore not fully retrospective, where the rationale for selecting currently implemented development programmes was driven by the increased likelihood that more secondary documents and key informants would be available for analysis and interviews respectively. The research covered by this thesis spanned the period 2004-2007 since both programme cases began implementation in 2004 and were still operating by the end of 2007. It should be added that the research conducted by this thesis was not intended to evaluate the two programmes in terms of their end of term outputs, outcomes, and impacts, which a fully retrospective study would
require, but was intended to extract scholarly insights into the organisational and operational conditions under which the programmes functioned in practice, in order to make observations about factors influencing the capacity of their implementing public bodies.

The process of systematically examining the implementation of two case study development programmes relied on an analytical framework that was selected because it was judged to be relevant for isolating factors observed as influencing the capacity of government departments to carry out these programmes. This thesis adapted a framework employed by Paul (1982, 1983) to analyse public sector-implemented development programmes, where Paul also researched and presented his analysis in the form of case studies. The advantage of Paul’s framework was that it could be translated for systematically examining the public organisational and operational circumstances under which development programmes were carried out, based on four variables: a programme’s environment, strategy, structure, and processes. Paul’s description of these variables was deemed especially relevant for this thesis because these acted as a lens through which the activities engaged in by public administrations to carry out the programmes could be discerned, and correspondingly for factors influencing their capacity to do so to be identified and examined.

A mixture of secondary and primary data analysis was critical for this study in attempting to maximise the analytical breadth of the case study approach, and to establish as wide an understanding as possible of the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations carried out development programmes. The secondary data consisted largely of official government documents outlining the planning and implementation of the two development programmes under study. This mostly comprised programme-related documents produced by their implementing government departments, and available in the public domain, as well as materials procured directly from departments by the researcher.

The primary data accumulated by this thesis consisted of 45 qualitative interviews. These interviews were held with a broad spectrum of senior government officials, non-governmental actors directly involved in programme implementation, and the academics referred to earlier. The findings from these interviews, together with the secondary data,
were combined in the final analysis to reveal factors that could be observed as influencing the capacity of implementing departments to carry out the development programmes under study.

The next section will give a general overview of the structure of this thesis, together with a summary of its contents.

1.5  Structure of thesis and summary of contents

This thesis consists of nine chapters and three appendices. The introductory chapter has identified administrative capacity as the subject of its enquiry. It has given a brief overview of the research problem associated with the treatment of capacity, which exposed how the issue was interpreted in relation to the carrying out of development programmes by public administrations in South Africa. The problem identified was that interpretations of the South African government’s capacity had tended to be more narrowly confined to whether public bodies possessed some standard of capacity, usually expressed in human resource terms, which did not sufficiently take into account underlying administrative circumstances which influenced the ability of these bodies to carry out development activities. A research question was then proposed based on this perspective. The introductory chapter has also described the methodology employed by this thesis to generate empirical data to inform its research question.

Chapter 2 will present a review of the academic literature that has specifically dealt with the issue of administrative capacity in developing countries. This review will help to establish a working definition of administrative capacity, which corresponds to the interpretation of capacity introduced in this chapter. The literature review will then locate this working definition of administrative capacity in a wider conceptual discussion of the issue, which has for instance been extensively dealt with in literature associated with comparative and development administration. Reviewing this scholarship will also enable this thesis to make theoretical and methodological observations on how best to apply its working definition of administrative capacity.

Building on the literature review carried out in chapter 2, chapter 3 will present a framework of analysis for collecting empirical data to inform the research question. In
presenting this framework, the chapter will survey literature that has employed systematic sets of variables for studying the circumstances associated with the carrying out of development programmes by public administrations. As indicated earlier, a framework adapted from Paul’s work on public sector-implemented development programmes will be used. Chapter 3 will also explain how this thesis intends to translate Paul’s analytical framework for the purposes of enquiring into administrative capacity.

Chapter 4 will give a more detailed explanation of the research methodology and data collection methods employed by this thesis to gather empirical data to inform its research question. This will include a description of the sampling process used to select the two case study development programmes from a larger list of candidate programmes; a description of how secondary materials and qualitative interviews were employed to generate observations about the functioning of case programmes; a profile of all qualitative interviews conducted by this thesis; and finally how the data generated by this thesis was recorded and analysed.

Chapters 5 through 8 detail the findings of this thesis based on the analysis of the two development programme cases. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on CASP, whilst chapters 7 and 8 concern the EPWP. Two chapters are allocated to each programme: the first is a background chapter and the second a more detailed findings chapter. The opening chapter will give a brief historical background on each programme, constructed mainly from an analysis of secondary materials. The purpose of the background chapter is to give essential contextual foundation to the subsequent analysis of findings on each case. The findings chapters will provide a combined analyses of all secondary and primary (interview) data sourced by this thesis on each programme, where the aim is to isolate and discuss those factors found to have affected the capacity of the programme’s implementing bodies.

Chapter 9 will give a general conclusion to this study. It will outline what this research found to be the key factors influencing the capacity of public administrations to carry out development programmes. In specifying these factors, this chapter will also say something about their scholarly significance, or in other words, what these revealed about the characteristics of public organisations implementing development programmes based on theoretical assumptions identified in chapter 2. The chapter will end by
commenting on the scope for employing similar approaches to the study of administrative capacity in South Africa.
CHAPTER 2

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY: CONCEPT AND THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of chapter 2 is to give a more detailed conceptual outline of administrative capacity by reviewing relevant academic literature on the subject. This will also help to further develop the working definition of administrative capacity identified in chapter 1. Examining literature which has, in particular, framed thinking about administrative capacity and the implementation of development activities will also allow this chapter to situate the issue in a broader theoretical arena, which will further inform the process of empirically applying this study's working definition.

2.2 Administrative capacity: building on a working definition

Taking its cue from the introductory chapter, this first section of the literature review will briefly consider the argument for distinguishing amongst three interpretations of administrative capacity as outlined earlier, and through this process develop the working definition of the third interpretation that will guide this thesis. This will allow the remainder of the chapter to examine relevant literature associated with the third interpretation.

The first interpretation of administrative capacity focuses mainly on concerns that state institutions lack the requisite ability to carry out an expanded slate of development activities. This interpretation is oriented towards public bodies possessing capacity. The introductory chapter provided examples which illustrated this perspective. The second interpretation of capacity usually follows as a function of the first, where, if a public body is judged to be lacking the requisite or sufficient ability to meet service delivery expectations, it is said that it does not possess enough capacity, where capacity will then have to be built or strengthened. It is then acknowledged that public administrations would have to acquire capacity, which usually takes the form of human, as well as material or financial resources.

This second interpretation of capacity is probably best associated with the ‘capacity-building’ or ‘capacity-strengthening’ literature which has been extensively promoted by the international development community. Examples of how this perspective of capacity
has been applied to South Africa include McLennan and Wooldridge’s (1995: 102, 111) submission that the country lacked the capacity and skills (focus on human resources) to shift from a public administration oriented to performing regulatory and law enforcement functions, to one performing development functions. The researchers then identified a range of skills areas deemed more appropriate to this new focus, which public administration would presumably then need to acquire in order to operate effectively in a changed environment. This included a range of general and specific skills pertaining to administrative functioning, including policy, finance, planning, project management, information technology, change management, interpersonal skills, decision-making and communication. Picard’s (2005) publication *The State of the State: Institutional Transformation, Capacity and Political Change in South Africa* also discussed the acquisition of capacity at length by focusing on human resource development and training in particular. Finally, Barichievy, Piper and Parker (2005: 381) have observed that the term capacity has assumed a ‘particular nuance in South Africa in recent times’ where actions by the government in particular have indicated a strong emphasis on education and training, which corresponds with a focus on the acquisition of capacity.

In relation to the two interpretations of capacity referred to above, this thesis submitted that a third interpretation of capacity was possible, necessary and empirically viable in the South African case. This interpretation broadened the prevailing twofold view of administrative capacity by seeking to identify and explain the underlying factors, embedded in the organisational and operational environments through which public administrations function, which could influence their capacity to carry out development activities. This perspective of capacity appeared generally evident in VanDeveer and Dabelko’s (2001: 25) treatment of the term, where they remarked that ‘capacity, like incapacity, is contingent on contextual factors associated with the public sector functions under examination’. Nelissen (2002: 13) similarly referred to ‘effective administrative capacity’ as the capability of governing bodies to act, and the context within which that action occurs. It is argued that the context in which public administrations carry out development activities ought to be factored into interpretations of their capacity to act, which would serve to augment more common yet limiting perspectives of capacity described earlier.

An explicit link between the context within which public administrations function and their capacity was drawn by one South African academic interviewed for this study. When the topic of administrative capacity was introduced into the discussion, the respondent offered the following description:
So capacity then is ... the individual, individuals who have skills, and ... attitudes, who have to be in a framework, which is itself complex, because it involves policy, regulatory, and then the actual systems and structures that allow that to be used to impact on the world, and then that whole thing has to be enclosed in some sort of useful culture.

The key word in the respondent’s description of administrative capacity is ‘framework’, or in other words, situating the functioning of the more concrete and commonly mentioned element of capacity – human resources – into a framework consisting of policies, regulations, systems and structures, which have all been recognised as affecting the ability of public administrators to carry out their activities. In adopting the third perspective of capacity as this study’s working definition, this thesis is choosing not to treat capacity as a measurable item based on the existence, or lack thereof, of a particular standard, typified by statements such as ‘lack of capacity’, ‘capacity shortages’, or ‘poor capacity’. This study recognises rather that there may be factors associated with the organisational and operational circumstances through which public administrations attempt to carry out development activities, which might then affect their ability to execute these initiatives. Section 2.3 will examine how these circumstances may be defined and understood in more detail.

2.3 Administrative capacity and the organisational and operational circumstances of public administrations

The aim of section 2.3 is to review academic research that speaks to and builds on the working definition of administrative capacity employed by this thesis. This begins with Grindle and Hilderbrand’s (1995: 445-447) work on public sector capacity in developing countries, where the researchers explicitly discussed the subject of capacity in relation to a network of organisational, inter-organisational and extra-organisational relationships and environments. Grindle and Hilderbrand attributed the following characteristics to this context:

- **Action environment** referring to economic, political and social surroundings within which government administrations carry out their activities.

- **Institutional context** of public administration, comprising the rules and procedures regulating government operations and the activities of public officials, and the responsibilities that government assumes for development initiatives. Building on Grindle and Hilderbrand’s description of the ‘institutional’ context, the public ‘institution’ is distinguished from the public ‘organisation’ where the institution
represents the underlying legal, policy and strategic framework that governs the work of government organisations. This follows from Lusthaus, Adrien and Perstinger (1999: 6), citing North’s employment of the term.

- **Task network** referring to the inter-relationship between organisations in the public, as well as private and non-governmental sectors, towards the accomplishment of specific tasks.

- Public **organisations**, viewed as the ‘building blocks of the task network’, where the focus is on understanding how the structures, processes, resources and management styles of organisations, which can be said to represent a particular set of dynamics within an organisation, affect the establishment of goals, structure work, define authority relations, and influence performance.

In their treatment of administrative capacity, Grindle and Hilderbrand adopted an orientation that encompassed a wider web of intra-, inter- and extra-organisational relationships and institutional settings. With reference to the latter, they submitted that the institutional context could either constrain or facilitate the accomplishment of particular tasks (Grindle, Hildebrand 1995: 447). Where it can be argued that these tasks could contribute directly to a development intervention, it is suggested that this statement speaks to the perspective of administrative capacity adopted in this thesis.

Other researchers have also remarked on the organisational context within which public administrations function, when discussing capacity. Writing on development and public administration in Africa, Umeh and Andranovich (2005: 47) for instance indicated that the process of capacity requires an assessment of an organisation’s capabilities at more than one level: managing intra-organisational relationships, managing inter-organisational relationships, and an organisation’s management of wider political, economic and social relationships. Although Umeh and Adranovich’s description implies an assessment of whether public administrations possess the capacity to manage these relationships, it is the features that make up the relationships themselves that are of relevance to this study’s interpretation of capacity.

Writing from the perspective of public sector development planning in South Africa, Wallis (2000: 135) has also suggested that assessing capacity should move beyond the ‘competence of staff members’, which in the context of this thesis emphasises the possession of capacity, to capture wider organisational and operational factors. These
were said to include the structure of and co-ordination between public organisations. Another South African commentator, Mokgoro (2000: 3-5) has added that an emphasis on training initiatives alone, emphasising the acquisition of capacity, was an inadequate response to understanding the issue of administrative capacity in the country. Drawing on Grindle and Hilderbrand’s work, he suggested that an interpretation of capacity be linked to the ability of public administrators to navigate their organisational and institutional environments, where the public service was described as a complex system composed of many interdependent and interrelated subsystems. The corollary of Mokgoro’s description would tend to suggest that capacity cannot be adequately understood without taking into account the effect of the organisational and institutional environments of the public service.

The makeup of public service intra-, inter- and extra-organisational and institutional environments and their influence on capacity was also widely mentioned and given greater definition by South African academics interviewed for this thesis. Indicative segments of these interviews are included below, which begin with a slightly confusing (in terms of distinguishing an institution from an organisation) but no less pointed remark about the link between capacity, institutional and organisational context:

[P]art of the capacity problem is around institutionalisation, and it’s not only institutionalisation it is organisational format, it’s also institutionalisation in terms of the norms and the values, and the particular institutions that create the dynamics within institutions.

Another academic respondent was more specific in his characterisation of an apparent constraint resulting from inter-organisational arrangements:

For me … that is the level of lack of capacity, it is not higher up in the system, it also lies there in terms of poor decentralisation, because the theory tells us … that decentralisation means decision-making power being dislodged from the top and diversified [sic] down to the bottom giving people power, but they don’t really have power.

The same respondent made a further point concerning intra-organisational communication:

[W]hilst I say that they [officials] are well trained and they don’t have the capacity, it also seems to me that they are not asserting themselves, in terms of, in those silos where they work, and where they so poorly communicate with one and other on a horizontal level, there’s not integrative thinking, there’s not multi-disciplinary planning taking place.
Two other academic contributors broadened the observation made about communication to include potential capacity constraints resulting from the conduct of inter-organisational co-operation. The first offered the following observation:

[T]here are certain features of bureaucracy that we have to deal with, I mean I think there’s still a very rigid bureaucratic style in this country, it comes out in things like the silo mentality … departments working in their individual silos, a lack of co-operation between governmental structures whether it be on the basis of horizontal links or vertical links, whether it be between provinces and the centre [national level], whether it be between different departments working at the centre or indeed different departments working in the province, that kind of rigidity … compartmentalism, which are features of bureaucracy, which I think are widely regarded as being dysfunctional … these new development strategies can only be successful if you can find ways of sort of … across some of these departmental constraints, these bureaucratic constraints.

The second interviewee added:

[H]ow do you integrate services, how do you integrate … things like the RDP, things like the extended public works programme … and the cluster system … that [South African President] Mbeki introduced in the late ’90s … assuming a capacity to work transversally, as well as in your silos, and … there were a lot of debates about that as well, because you have to run programmes that threaded transversally through government. Just, just organising functions like, a lot of functions that we had in Environmental Affairs and Tourism, the policy was us, national, but the implementation was provincial, and that was a huge problem. The Western Cape government … at the time didn’t have an environmental unit … they had a conservation unit, but there were a lot of people who were obsessed about conserving plants and animals and looking after the national parks, which is all very well, but they had no capacity to administer things like environmental impact assessments … we tried to persuade them … so even in a silo, there’s problems of joining things up.

Finally, another academic contributor, commenting on the organisational structure of the state, conveyed a more nuanced observation which this time involved inter-organisational co-ordination and its effect on capacity:

[A]nd then the question of the lack of or the insufficient co-ordination between the stakeholders in implementing the [development] programme … and as you mentioned there is an attempt to integrate … but who co-ordinates, and whoever co-ordinates, do they have the political power to make decisions, sometimes a co-ordinator is the junior partner, and simply because someone needs to do the job, but the rest wouldn’t really listen or participate, and that’s a tricky one. [respondent then made a general example]

These commentaries from interviews provide useful impressions and characteristics of the organisational and operational circumstances through which public bodies have
implemented development activities in South Africa. This yielded a description of issues which appear to have adversely affected the capacity to function: decentralisation, communication, co-operation, and co-ordination. Moreover, these observations are generally consistent with the references drawn from the academic literature, whilst pointing to more specific contextual features of the experience of public bodies implementing development activities in South Africa.

So far this chapter has settled on a working definition of administrative capacity that emphasises the search for factors associated with the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations carry out development activities. It has defended this approach by citing references from international as well as South Africa-specific research. The next section will take the discussion further by situating this approach to administrative capacity in the wider academic literature on comparative and development administration.

2.4 Comparative and development administration and interpretations of capacity

The literature on comparative and development administration has been a fruitful source of knowledge on the capacity of public administrations to carry out development activities. Research associated with this literature goes back many decades, and was initially spurred by a wave of post-colonial state reconstructions following the Second World War. Key features of this reconstruction included an examination of how post-colonial administrations could re-orient and reform their structures and processes to respond to the considerable development challenges that they inherited.

The relationship between ‘comparative’ and ‘development’ administration was initially defined in relation to the interest taken by Western governments and academics in the post-colonial reconstruction of non-Western states and state bodies. The research generated by this early comparative perspective was driven largely by development administration, which as a term had its roots in efforts to reconstruct and reform administrative systems in relatively poor countries, which in many cases were undergoing political decolonisation (Jreisat 2002: 13). Dwivedi (1994: 1) recalled that the conceptual genealogy of development administration was distinctively Western, representing a convergence of two interconnected Euro-American traditions. The application of this conceptual worldview to non-Western societies in Asia, the Middle East and Africa represented the early basis on which a comparative perspective on administration functioned.
An overview of the development administration literature also revealed that the subject of capacity was central to its purpose, and which emphasised the interplay between the \textit{possession} and \textit{acquisition} of capacity by developing country public administrations. This was especially acute in those countries seeking to re-orient and restructure administrations from the colonial period, where a key objective was to assist a new corps of indigenous public administrators engage in activities to improve the development circumstances of their populations. Sapru (1994: 9, 42) for example, recalling the early development administration literature, essentially linked the problem of executing development strategies in poor countries to the need to strengthen the capabilities of administrative actors. Riggs (1998: 23), regarded as one of the pioneers of research in development administration, observed that the substantial funding provided to the Comparative Administration Group (CAG), of which he was a part, was directed at researching how developing countries could improve their practical implementation of development projects.

Studies in development administration yielded rich observations about the transformation of public bodies in developing countries, and more specifically, retained a fundamental interest in the capacity of these bodies to carry out development activities (Diamant 1966, Riggs 1966 quoted in Zafarullah, Huque 2006: 26). The primary interest of these studies appeared, however, to reflect the first two interpretations of capacity mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, which questioned whether public administrations possessed the requisite or sufficient capacity to carry out development activities, and where this was judged not to be the case, that efforts were needed to increase or strengthen their capacity. For example, Bryant and White (1982: 27) have pointed out that the history of the development administration field was essentially one of various efforts to address the needs of Third World bureaucracies and to find ways to increase their capacity. Another notable contributor to the field of development administration, Heady (1998: 35), also commented that ‘[t]he bulk of research undertaken in both comparative and international organisation/administration\textsuperscript{5} has been directed at analysis of the operating problems and identification of steps toward improvement in capabilities of the administrative entities most crucially important in each field’.

Having observed that generally the emphasis in development administration was on the first two interpretations of capacity, it was also apparent that these understandings of the
term were not necessarily ignorant of contextual circumstances that could affect capacity. For example, the United Nations (1975: 32, 136) submitted that the term ‘development administration’ could, on the one hand, be viewed as the *development of* administration, highlighting the objective of improving administrative capability in developing countries (which speaks to *acquired ability*). On the other hand, the term could be read as the administration of *development*, which referred to the organisation of various development tasks, or the objective of establishing and managing the organisations necessary to execute these tasks. The latter reading of the term, although when read in context held an interest in whether public administrations *possessed* the requisite capacity to organise tasks, or that the capacity was available to manage organisations for this purpose, could not reasonably ignore the organisational and operational conditions through which development tasks and the public organisations mandated to implement these activities functioned.

Farazmand (2001: 16) also referred to two broad subsets of development administration, the first of which was labelled ‘administrative development’ and the second ‘development administration’. The former referred to enhancing administrative capacity and skills in areas such as personnel, finance, accounting, management, and organisational development. The latter was geared to the administration of national development plans. Jreisat (2002: 118-119) made a similar contribution by pointing out that administration development was not contextually rooted to poor countries, observing that it could involve any administration in any setting seeking to reform, change or improve its capacity, which again favoured an interpretation of *acquired* ability. He then defined ‘development administration’ as policies, organisations and processes particularly adapted to the initiation and implementation of development objectives. Esman (1991: 19) also picked up on what he referred to as two competing perspectives in the subject matter of development administration, or management, by contrasting ‘management development’ with ‘development management’. The former functioned on the assumption that once ‘managerial capabilities’ were in place, which Esman viewed as a longer-term exercise, public sector entities would be endowed with the ability to undertake developmental tasks. The latter emphasised the shorter-term need to manage concrete development activities, which encapsulated the process of carrying out programme operations with the managerial resources that exist at the time.

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5International administration referring to the administrative form and functions of international bodies, such as the United Nations
This study submits that its interpretation and working definition of capacity can best be accommodated under an administration of development approach, as this focus allows for a factoring in of the organisational and operational processes through which public administrations carry out development activities. Section 2.5 will shift direction somewhat to enquire into the relationship between administrative capacity and the ‘development’ content of these activities, as defined from an administration of development focus.

2.5 The administration of development activities and administrative capacity

This section will show that the development activities that came to be associated with administrative capacity, within the comparative and development administration literature, exhibited a particular normative character that triggered debates about how public administrations in developing countries should respond when carrying out these activities. It is necessary to discuss this normative problem as it might affect the process of attempting to systematically observe and identify factors influencing the capacity of public administrations to carry out these activities.

A good example of the potential challenge that normative descriptions of development activities have posed for assessing administrative capacity can be attributed to Grindle and Hilderbrand’s (1995: 445) discussion of public sector capacity in developing countries. In this instance, the researchers described capacity as the ‘ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently and sustainably’. The inclusion of the word ‘appropriate’ attaches normative value to the tasks to be carried out, based on some judgement of their suitability, where analysing the ability to carry out these tasks then becomes subject to whether these tasks are deemed appropriate, and if so, on what basis. Questions about appropriateness subjects the issue of administrative capacity to debates about what is and is not a suitable development task. This results in a knock-on effect on the process of defining variables to locate factors that could influence the capacity of public administrations to carry out development activities, where this is linked to a prescribed course of action.

The above example illustrates how normative questions surrounding the appropriateness of development activities may affect how the issue of administrative capacity is interpreted. Another example stems from the United Nations Development Programmes’ (UNDP) publication, Capacity for Development (2001), which contains a chapter that essentially subsumed the issue of administrative capacity in an explicitly
normative framework. Malik’s description of capacity in this chapter essentially fused the administrative sphere, which he referred to as institutional capacity, with two other ‘interlocking categories’ in a developing country setting. The first of these categories was termed development vision, which required broad-ranging debates to be undertaken to construct priorities for development in line with a nation’s culture and social conditions. The second category was termed social capital, which, much like the construction of a development vision appeared to require that institutions demonstrate an ability to draw on social norms and cultural values in the production of a country’s development vision. In the scenario painted by Malik, an understanding of institutional capacity flows from a prescribed institutional ability to guide, co-ordinate and facilitate a development vision through broad-ranging debate that draws on social capital. This amounts to a process that public administrations ought to engage in, in an effort to execute these activities.

The interpretation of administrative capacity adopted by this thesis vis à vis development activities proceeds from a more neutral identification of those factors that can be observed as affecting the capacity of public administrations to carry out development activities. Because the emphasis of this interpretation rests more on the administrative sphere of the equation, it would tend to accept that development visions have already been articulated in the form of policy, strategic or programmatic objectives, and in proceeding to assess administrative capacity, will be oriented more towards understanding the effect of the organisational and operational conditions through which public administrations try to give effect to these objectives. The orientation assumed by this thesis therefore deviates from Malik’s illustration of capacity, which prescribes a set of actions which public administrations ought to engage in for the purpose of carrying out a development activity.

The scenario drawn by Malik is just one example of efforts, promoted largely by international development organisations, which have cultivated an understanding of administrative capacity through a normative lens. A further example is Bolger’s (2000: 2) reference to capacity, published as part of an occasional paper series for the Canadian International Development Agency. In his paper Bolger describes the issue of capacity as containing:

"[A]bilities, skills, understandings, attitudes, values, relationships, behaviours, motivations, resources and conditions that enable individuals, organisations, networks/sectors and broader social systems to carry out functions and achieve their development objectives over time."
Underpinning Bolger’s description of capacity is a normative orientation that defines the issue to the extent that public administrations and actors outside the administrative sphere should work together to reach development objectives that are acceptable to all parties. Hope’s (2006: 589) description of capacity in the context of development employs a similar construct to Bolger, by focusing on the ‘competency of individuals, public sector institutions, private sector entities, civil society organisations, and local communities to engage in activities in a sustainable manner that permit the achievement of beneficial goals’. As with Bolger’s account, Hope’s reference to capacity exhibits a more normative direction by emphasising that public administrations and outside actors should engage each other in activities of mutual benefit. Such normative constructions of capacity as the ability to work together to achieve mutually desirable development objectives again tend to deviate from a more neutral attempt at identifying factors observed as having affected the capacity of public administrations to carry out development activities.

This thesis must define an analytical approach that neutralises the normative problem of how development activities ought to be carried out, by accepting how the purposes and objectives have been specified for a development activity. This should not assume a normative stance, which would tend to critique and outline a preferred development objective and specify a corresponding administrative course of action to achieve it, and where this would condition and therefore narrow the analytical lens through which the capacity to carry out such a course of action may be examined. Rather, this study will accept how development objectives have been specified and endeavour to identify factors that can be observed as influencing the capacity of public administrations to organise themselves to carry out the activities which are intended to realise these objectives.

The next task for this chapter is to begin to elevate what has largely been a conceptual discussion to a more theoretical level, which can inform the empirical application of this study’s interpretation and working definition of administrative capacity. To begin to do this, the chapter will revert to an earlier discussion of the literature in comparative and development administration.
2.6 Development versus ‘comparative’ administration: adopting a middle range theory approach to researching administrative capacity

Viewed as a subsection of the academic field of Public Administration, comparative and development administration has endured a turbulent intellectual history in the deliberations of the wider discipline. This history has been characterised by long-standing debates about the ability of research in this area to render scientifically orthodox ‘comparable’ studies of administrative systems spanning a variety of country contexts. A major challenge for comparative and development administration has therefore been establishing consensus on the basis of comparison itself.

The task of researching the transformation of state institutions in developing countries undergoing political transitions presented an exceedingly complex challenge for researchers in comparative and development administration. The difficulty for comparative scientific research lay in isolating and delineating the properties of administrative systems for comparative study, whilst controlling for the explanatory complexity of political, social, and economic features accompanying their transformation. Henderson (1969 quoted in Heady 2001: 26) pointed out that this particular context proved challenging for scientifically stringent comparative research, where the work being spearheaded by the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) in the United States, for example, lacked a central thrust and in particular anything that was distinctly ‘administrative’ in that thrust. This comment was reflected in Riggs’s claim (1998: 23) that CAG was not able to nor did it try to establish a common (administrative) framework or paradigm, where this could have facilitated ‘comparative’ research. Having said this however, Riggs (ibid) also conceded that the implicit premise behind the research grants which funded CAG’s work was that American administrative experience and know-how could be drawn upon to enhance the ability of developing countries to carry out development projects. This coincided with development administration’s emphasis on transmitting Western thinking and practical know-how to resolving administrative problems in developing countries, which also attached a normative character to these activities not dissimilar to how this was described in section 2.5.

A research focus that emphasised the execution of development projects in developing countries, based on the explicit transmission of particular models of administrative practice from developed countries, was seen by some as inhibiting the scientific objectivity required to isolate elements of administrative systems for comparative study.
In this regard, criticisms arose that the early emphasis adopted by development administration projected a cultural bias between (superior) Western administrative behaviour and practice and that observed in developing countries. Essentially, the task of seeking a more scientifically acceptable basis of comparison to research public administrations was viewed as being obscured by political, social, economic and cultural factors. Peters (1988: 3) described this as the administrative focus being clouded by undertaking a series of excursions into the exotica of world political systems. Similarly, Derlien (1992) and Page (1995 quoted in Brans 2003: 425) observed that studies in development administration tended to yield 'impressionistic' conclusions that were overly dependent on vague variations in political culture. Essentially, the critics of development administration were arguing that scientifically orthodox comparative study based on objectively isolating the fundamental elements of public administration systems, was being obscured and in some instances prejudiced by how Western practitioners viewed these systems.

The criticism of development administration as it had developed resulted in greater discussion of how the comparative element in administration could be rehabilitated. In this regard, one of the observations made about development administration was that research in this area had tended to emphasise 'grand' theorising (Welch, Wong 1998: 44). This had the consequence of obscuring the administrative level of analysis for comparative study, because of the manner in which political, economic, social and cultural attributes of the societies within which these institutions functioned were incorporated in analyses. The solution for those seeking to reposition comparative administration was to settle on a more restricted focus or level of analysis that could yield more scientifically reliable results. In contrast to grand theorising, then, a different theoretical approach emerged which defined itself as 'middle range'. This approach advocated a narrower and sharper theoretical scope by identifying sub-areas of an administrative system that could enable more focused comparative study (Brans 2003 427, 431). Presthus (1959: 26) was one of the first to articulate this middle range perspective, noting that it attempted to explain a restricted set of relationships as opposed to factoring in the characteristics of a broader social system. Presthus argued moreover that the need for a middle range theoretical approach, in the context of social science as a whole, was greater in the field of comparative administration than

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6 In their discussion of an ‘impending crisis in development administration’, Nicholson and Connerley (1989) also linked this to studies that lacked scientific validity.

7 This takes into account the functioning of public administrations in broader social systems (incorporating economic, political, and cultural factors), as in Riggs’s prismatic model.
elsewhere because it was almost impossible to obtain consensus about the impact of cultural forms and values on administrative systems (ibid).

The significance of the shift in emphasis towards middle range theory, for this thesis, is reflected in this study’s need to identify organisational and operational factors that influence the capacity of public administrations to carry out development activities. It is imperative that this study give sharper definition and focus to these administrative elements, through which development activities are carried out, in an effort to systematically isolate and examine the impact of factors on the capacity of public bodies to function. This will also allow this study to avoid subjecting its interpretation and application of administrative capacity to normative meanings associated with ‘development’ activities.

On a more practical level, it has been accepted in the comparative administration literature that in addition to comparing attributes of more than one administrative system (i.e. between countries), this area of study can also accommodate single country cases (within countries, such as that proposed by this thesis). Sigelman and Gadbois (1983 quoted in Van Wart, Cayer 1990: 240) have for instance submitted that a relatively stringent test for comparative study, in the case of single cases, is that these are ‘more readily theoretically comparable either by comparing intra-national governments, by being theoretically oriented, or by testing hypotheses’. It has elsewhere been recognised that a comparative perspective could be employed to examine changes in administrative systems within single country studies, emphasising the study of difference or change across time or space (Baker 1994; Farazmand 1999; Peters 1994; Benjamin 1982, Gladden 1972 in Peters 1988: 5).

Whereas this study’s research question does not strictly propose to test a hypothesis, it is structured in a way that could contribute theoretically useful data about the nature of the factors stemming from the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations function, which can be observed as influencing their capacity to carry out development activities. To this end, Jreisat (2005: 239) has observed that although early contributors to comparative administration were largely single-case or country studies, ‘[m]any foundational concepts and practical insights have been derived from such international experiences’, where ‘[i]nvariably, these scholars agreed that contextual or environmental constraints do influence organisational capacity to act effectively.’
This thesis will, in employing a middle range theoretical approach, need to identify a level of analysis within an administrative system that can best speak to the perspective of administrative capacity being advanced. A number of researchers have made useful contributions to the application of middle range theory by defining the sub-components or levels at which a system of public administration could be studied. Aberbach and Rockman (1999: 488) identified three levels in a middle range approach, comprising: 1) Structures (organisations); 2) Actors (bureaucratic officialdom); and 3) Actions (behaviours). Jreisat (2002: 54) presented a slightly different listing of three levels, consisting of: 1) Organisation and its capacity; 2) Individual and group behaviours; 3) Overall characteristics and performance of national bureaucracy. Peters (1988) described four levels of analysis: 1) Organisation; 2) People; 3) Attitudes (behaviour) and 4) Power (relationship/interaction between political executives and career civil servants. These are presented in table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Levels of analysis from the perspective of middle range theory

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<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Structures (organisations)</td>
<td>Organisation and its capacity</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Actors (officials)</td>
<td>Individual and Group behaviour and performance</td>
<td>People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>Actions (behaviour)</td>
<td>Overall characteristics and performance of national bureaucracy</td>
<td>Attitudes (behaviour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
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There is some consistency in identifying three primary levels of analysis from a middle range perspective. These comprise the public organisation (structures), public officials (individuals and groups), and administrative behaviour (i.e. actions, attitudes). Jreisat presented a more complex relationship between the levels, by combining within one level individuals and groups, and adding to this, behaviour and performance. Finally, he referred to a super-organisational level by suggesting that research could also compare the general characteristics and performance of national administrative systems. Peters extended his list of three levels by including as a factor, power, referring to the relationship between political executives and public servants (officials). This level would appear to cut across the other three, in its potential to influence how public organisations are structured and staffed, and the behaviour of public servants.
The organisational level seems to have acquired a particularly favourable rating within middle range theorising. Jreisat (2002: 68) observed that the most effective use of middle range concepts has been at the organisational level, via case studies. He added that the organisation was considered a superior unit for comparative analysis because of its durable and measurable characteristics, referring to features such as specific purpose, concrete structures, determinable boundaries, established routines and technologies, and central co-ordination systems (March, Simon 1958: 2-9 quoted in Jreisat 2002: 55). Peters (1988: 104-105) gave further support to the organisational unit by referring to the likelihood that it would exhibit a relatively distinct legal standing and more easily distinguishable mandate.

Taking this study’s perspective of administrative capacity into account, it is likely that this thesis would gravitate towards the structural/organisational level of analysis, where it has been argued that more prevalent interpretations of administrative capacity in South Africa risked ignoring the potential impact of factors on capacity, associated with the organisational and operational circumstances under which public bodies functioned. Moreover, an inclination towards the individual level of analysis, comprising the study of individuals and groups of administrators, would be resisted in the context of this study’s perspective of capacity because of the risk that focusing on the possession of, for example, skills, competencies, experience, know-how and formal qualifications, might not easily accommodate this key organisational perspective. Having said this, it may be more likely that broadening a perspective to the organisational level, or in other words placing the functioning of a public organisation at the centre of the analysis, might more easily accommodate the activities of the human resources that are deployed within, and that are integral to, the functioning of these entities. In this vein, Jreisat (2002: 25) has suggested that ‘organizations coordinate and facilitate individual efforts, converting them into sustained collective actions that accomplish or service goals, above and beyond the capacity of any individual’.

In other words, it is contended that a fuller exposition of factors that could influence the capacity of a public body, beyond the particular qualities possessed by individual public servants, could be generated by situating the actions of these individuals in the organisational environments in which they function. This firstly sets aside a focus on the individual level, which runs the risk of favouring an interpretation of capacity that emphasises the possession of, in this case skills, competencies, experience and know-how, and qualifications. Secondly, it links a middle range emphasis on the public organisation to the visibility of this level of analysis of the conceptual description of
administrative capacity in section 2.3. These references accentuated the public organisational level in an analysis of capacity, by exhibiting an interest in inter-, intra- and extra-organisational relationships and institutional settings within which public bodies carried out development activities.

The next and final section of this chapter will suggest that engaging with debates concerning the effects on capacity of the ‘bureaucratic’ characteristics of public organisations will add theoretical depth to the adoption of an organisational level of analysis.

2.7 The bureaucratic characteristics of public organisations, middle range theory and administrative capacity

The bureaucratic form of public organisations represents one of the most influential and enduring frameworks of analysis in the study of Public Administration, the impact of which has also been seen in the application of middle range theory. The framework is probably best associated with the ideal-type rational-legal model of organisation as articulated by Weber (see Gerth, Mills 1948). In the sixth edition of Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective, Heady (2001: 47) wrote that there has been an increasing recognition of the bureaucratic model as the dominant conceptual framework within middle range theory. Heady (1998: 34) had also made this statement three years earlier. In associating the development of middle range theory with two tracks, one problem-driven, linked to environmental determinants, the other discipline-driven, emphasising the disciplinary development of comparative administration, Brans (2003: 427 - 429) also associated the subject matter of the latter track with the bureaucratic model, referring to its utility for acquiring comparative data on administrative issues.

Jreisat (2002: 43) also referred to the influence of the bureaucratic model, relating its appropriateness for comparative study to its prevalence as a global institutional type, and correspondingly to the relative applicability of its framework compared to grand models that generally sought to incorporate ‘sweeping visions and characterisations’. He also noted more pragmatically that the popularity of the framework, which lends itself to single as well as multiple case analyses, has meant that more information has generally been available about bureaucracies (ibid). In Comparing Public Bureaucracies, Peters (1988: 5) also remarked on bureaucracy’s durability, arguing that it was especially well-suited to informed historical analysis (i.e. across time, within single countries) because it
had been an identifiable institution longer than other institutions associated with contemporary government.

In addition to facilitating comparative studies of administrative systems, the characteristics attached to the bureaucratic organisational framework have also had a long association with the carrying out of development activities, and with capacity in particular. One contributor to the literature, Esman (1991: 31), following Blau’s (1963) earlier work, described some of the key organisational properties of the term bureaucracy as exhibiting ‘hierarchical structures of authority with explicit divisions of labour, formal rules governing flows of work and information, and specific provisions for interaction with the public’. Milne (1973: 415) interestingly debated ‘[b]ureaucracy as an impediment to development administration’ nearly 20 years prior to Esman, whilst also paying particular attention to the features of organisational ‘hierarchy’ and the adherence to ‘general rules’.

A further review of the literature revealed a view that the bureaucratic organisational form might adversely influence the capacity of public administrations to carry out development activities. Van Ufford (1988: 9) noted for example that ‘development bureaucracies’ were facing a new crisis, where questions were being asked about their ‘capacity’ to solve development problems in Third World countries. He then suggested, more pertinently to this thesis, that organisational problems arising ‘in between’ the intentions of development policy and its effects were badly under-researched (van Ufford 1988: 12). It is precisely the ‘in between’ organisational and operational conditions through which development objectives are sought, through the vehicle of programmes, that this thesis is interested in examining capacity against.

Other observations citing the characteristics of bureaucratic organisations have also pointed to their effect on the carrying out of development programmes. These include Jain’s (1990: 42) reference to an ‘implementation gap’ in his presentation of the role of bureaucracy in India, noting that: ‘[p]erhaps the most important intervening variable between development plans and their implementation is the bureaucratic machinery, whose function it is to translate planned goals into action. It has been argued that, despite the relative effectiveness of bureaucracy in India in the area of policy execution and implementation, the traditional bureaucratic structure and processes are incompatible [sic] the implementation of developmental tasks.’ (cites Chowdhry 1979). Nicholson and Connerley (1989: 404) also noted that ‘although there is an anti-hierarchical [i.e. characteristic of bureaucracy] current in the development administration
literature at the moment, that position, like the American preference for hierarchy, is based more on normative preference than on empirical research on hierarchies and their effects in development settings’.

As to the substance of the argument that bureaucracy adversely influences administrative capacity, in *Managing Development in the Third World*, Bryant and White (1982: 24) explained the point as follows:

>[J]ust as development has its obverse in under-development, development administration has its observe in administrative incapacity. Administrative incapacity is an inability to respond to needs conveyed by citizens. It is characterised by swollen bureaucracies encumbered with formalistic procedures that delay rather than expedite service delivery and program implementation.

The crux of Bryant and White’s submission was their equating bureaucracy with administrative capacity (or *incapacity*), on the basis of swollen public organisations hampered by formalistic procedures that delayed implementation of service delivery and (development) programmes. The inability of public bureaucracies to respond to development matters was therefore viewed as being constrained by cumbersome organisational structures and rigid functional adherence to required procedures. Wallis (1989: 16), writing on the role of bureaucracy in Third World development, interestingly employed the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ – which conventionally referred to the ability of developing country governments to use foreign aid for its intended purposes – as a means of transcending a narrower concern for developing country governments having insufficient human resources to execute development programmes. In the process, he explicitly sought to broaden this to encompass the wider administrative context or set of circumstances which could affect a bureaucracy’s absorptive capacity, which similar to Bryant and White’s observation, focused on organisational and procedural arrangements:

Bearing in mind that absorptive capacity is not merely a matter of staff but also of organisational structures and methods of working, questions may also be asked about such superficially minor factors as the design of forms, the sequencing (or phasing) of activities, job descriptions, and the allocation of resources within projects.

Recognition of a kind of bureaucratically induced inability to respond to development activities has also been associated with the character of the development activities which public administrations have been expected to respond to. Dwivedi and Henderson (1990: 15) have for instance argued that development bureaucracies needed a
framework that was, among other things, more ‘flexible in its operation’. Kiggundu (2002: 293), citing a number of bureaucracy’s ‘limitations’ in industrialised and developing countries, included among these a need to shift the focus from ‘bureaucracy to organisation and management of complex, interdependent systems operating in dynamic environments’. Wallis (1989: 10) continued this theme by comparing the Weberian notion of goal achievement efficiency through adherence to structural and procedural norms, with what Merton (1952) referred to as ‘trained incapacity’, or conforming to a rigidity of approach that made it difficult to adjust to altered circumstances.

Remarks about what could be described as the reactive inflexibility of public bureaucratic organisations to respond to a more dynamic set of circumstances accompanying development activities was given greater detail by Rondinelli (1993: 7-8). He submitted that the introduction of development policies that aimed to, for instance, alleviate poverty, increase agricultural productivity, expand employment opportunities and provide greater access to social services to more and more people, made the design of corresponding initiatives more complex and their success more uncertain. He then observed that methods employed by public administrations to carry out these initiatives tended to reinforce characteristically bureaucratic features: centralised, control-oriented planning and administration, apparently as a coping measure, where these were perceived to be an effective means of reducing uncertainty and increasing the efficiency of response. Rondinelli (1993: 8) added that rational planning and control were also employed to preserve the authority of politicians and civil servants over the policy aspects of development activities, which may be consistent with trying to cope with the complexity and uncertainty accompanying these activities. Following Benveniste (1972: 24, quoted in Rondinelli: ibid), he also submitted that in many cases the maintenance of rationalistic approaches were related to ‘the inability [in other words, incapacity] of organisations or entire governments to function in an environment that has become too uncertain’.

The references discussed in this section essentially displayed an argument that public organisational bureaucracies had demonstrated an inability to react to and carry out development activities. This was moreover acutely manifested in their structural and procedural inflexibility to respond to the relatively more complex circumstances attending these measures, and where these conditions were also said to reinforce this inflexibility. The significant point for this thesis is recognising that the source of this supposed organisational incapacity is said to emerge from the characteristic makeup of bureaucratic arrangements, consisting of hierarchical structures and rule-bound
procedures. Such a premise has a potentially useful import for this thesis, in that it lends additional explanatory power to selecting an organisational level of analysis from middle range theory, in proceeding to identify whether factors associated with a public organisation’s bureaucratic features can be linked to its capacity to carry out a development programme.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter developed the interpretation and working definition of administrative capacity in a developmental setting by situating the issue in a wider literature on comparative and development administration. This resulted in the acquisition of a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the effect on capacity of the organisational and operational conditions through which public administrations implemented development programmes. The orientation of this study’s reading of capacity towards the analysis of organisational and operational circumstances led the discussion to adopt a more systematic middle-range theoretical approach, centred on the organisational level, to empirically examine factors that influence capacity. In this regard, debate pointing to the effects on administrative capacity of the ‘bureaucratic’ characteristics of public organisations added additional explanatory strength to the process of identifying factors influencing capacity.
CHAPTER 3

A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS TO RESEARCH ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY

3.1 Introduction

The aim of chapter 3 is to present a framework of analysis to identify and assess factors observed as influencing the capacity of public administrations to carry out development programmes. Before commencing with a discussion on the characteristics that such a framework should display, this study would suggest that there are a minimum criteria or set of prerequisites that a framework should meet before its suitability for this study can be assessed. The criteria should ideally reflect this study’s overall research question, interpretation of capacity, and theoretical orientation (i.e. middle range theory) as outlined in chapters 1 and 2. In other words, the relevance of prospective analytical frameworks will flow from their compliance with the core elements of this thesis. The following threefold criteria reflect these elements.

First, a framework of analysis must direct its focus at the organisational and related operational conditions under which public administrations carry out development programmes, in order to locate factors influencing their capacity to do so. Chapter 2 showed that researchers had, in describing these circumstances, identified the potential influence on administrative capacity of intra-organisational arrangements, inter- and extra-organisational relationships and the wider institutional framework which regulated the activities of public organisations. This observation also coincides with this study’s choice of an organisational level of analysis in the context of middle range theory, which the chosen framework will need to reflect. Chapter 2 recognised that the makeup and activities of the organisational unit formed an integral component of a public administration’s operating environment, where focusing on this unit could permit a wider exposition of potential factors influencing the capacity of these bodies to carry out development activities. Finally, assumptions linked to the bureaucratic characteristics of public organisations added additional explanatory impetus to selecting the organisational level for examining the effects on administrative capacity.
Second, a framework of analysis should engage with the circumstances that make up the development content of the tasks public administrations are charged with carrying out. This will require a framework that can relate to the content of the development policy agendas being assumed by administrative bodies, whilst remaining insulated from normative features associated with these agendas (see chapter 2), which emphasise how public administrations *ought* to carry out these mandates. It was suggested in chapter 2 that this thesis should accept how public administrations translate their development objectives into corresponding activities (for example, strategies, projects, and programmes). The task would then be to recognise the existence of these objective frameworks and concentrate on identifying factors that could be observed as influencing the ability of administrations to respond to their objectives by executing these initiatives.

Third, a potential analytical framework should use a concrete definition of the object which administrative capacity is to be examined against. This thesis has sometimes referred generically to development ‘activities’, as the object that public administrations are tasked with carrying out. The process of selecting an analytical framework will need to settle on and systematically define a more concrete form of a development activity before it can engage in any empirical examination of administrative capacity.

Table 3.1 summarises the minimum criteria that should be met by potential frameworks of analysis intending to identify factors influencing the capacity of public administrations to carry out development activities.
Table 3.1: Criteria for assessing the suitability of frameworks of analysis for researching administrative capacity

1. An analytical framework must direct its focus at the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations carry out developmental activities, in order to locate factors influencing their capacity to do so.

2. An analytical framework should engage with the ‘development’ content of the activities that public administrations are charged with carrying out, whilst avoiding a normative judgement about how these activities should be carried out.

3. An analytical framework must clearly define the development object of administrative capacity

3.2 Overview of frameworks of analysis

This section will not regurgitate references made in the literature review in chapter 2 when seeking to identify potential sources of analytical frameworks. Rather, it will have to select from amongst this body of research sources that can be shown to best correspond with the aforementioned criteria for selecting a framework of analysis. When reviewing the literature with this in mind, research by Samuel Paul (1982) and Louise White (1987) on the public sector management of development programmes was judged to be particularly relevant to this study’s research question and interpretation of capacity.

It may be of initial interest to note that neither Paul nor White employed the term capacity in any significant sense in their writing on the management of development programmes.\(^8\) Having observed this, however, it will be shown that the frameworks they proposed focused mainly on the prevailing organisational and operational circumstances under which these programmes were carried out by public sector bodies, which is consistent with this study’s interpretation and working definition of administrative capacity, and which did not define capacity as a concrete item.

\(^8\)White (1987: 26) makes reference to capacity in her framework, although this is interpreted, from the perspective of this thesis, as acquired ability, where the aim is to build or strengthen capacity.
The most relevant feature of Paul and White’s research is their specification of a framework of variables for analysing the functioning of development programmes. The potential applicability of the variable sets proposed by both researchers were assessed for their ability to systematically isolate factors that could be observed as influencing the capacity of public organisations to execute development programmes. The variable frameworks proposed by Paul and White are described in table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Comparison of variables for analysing the functioning of development programmes

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<td><strong>Environment:</strong> A development programme’s scope: geographical spread and sectoral makeup; diversity of its setting: physical-geographical, cultural, socio-economic and political characteristics of its beneficiaries; uncertainty: unforeseen changes in the conditions of beneficiaries.</td>
<td><strong>Work with and co-ordinate multiple organisations and groups</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy:</strong> objectives specified by government, how these objectives are translated into operating goals and action plans, resources allocated to the programme, impact of programme’s environment</td>
<td><strong>Contribute to the development content of a programme’s design</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure:</strong> functional and organisational arrangements in place to support implementation</td>
<td><strong>Expand a programme’s resources and political support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Processes:</strong> means through which decisions are reached and actions taken in carrying out a programme.</td>
<td><strong>Exercise leadership</strong></td>
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Paul has proposed a set of four variables for analysing the functioning of a development programme. This comprises the *environment*, consisting of external properties in a programme’s setting; the *strategy* or strategic make-up of a programme, encompassing its objectives, how these are translated into operating goals, and the resources allocated to a programme; the functional and organisational *structure* that a programme operates by; and the *processes* which influence decision-making and the actions taken in carrying it out. White has suggested a fivefold set of criteria to assess the functioning of a development programme. This includes a programme working with and co-ordinating the actions of multiple organisations and groups; expanding a programme’s resources and
its political support; programming officials engaging with the development content required for programme design; building the capacity of intermediary organisations involved in delivering a programme’s services (including government offices located at more than one level: national, regional, local); and programme officials exercising leadership.

Section 3.3 will assess the relevance of Paul and White’s frameworks in more depth by observing how they correspond to the criteria introduced earlier in this chapter.

### 3.3 Assessing the suitability of proposed frameworks for examining administrative capacity

The analytical suitability of the frameworks proposed by Paul and White should firstly demonstrate a focus on the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations carry out development programmes. This thesis submits that the variables referred to by the authors can demonstrate such an interest. In her scenario White focuses on features such as multiple organisation and group co-ordination, the strengthening of implementing organisations, and the need to expand programme resources and political support. These variables correspond to extra- and inter-organisational relationships, and the institutional environment within which a development programme functions, where sponsoring public bodies typically lobby and compete for resources and political support through organisationally-based budgetary appropriations.

Paul also describes variables that take into account these circumstances, such as a programme’s functional and organisational structure, how the objectives of public bodies are operationalised and resourced, and the extra-organisational environment within which programmes are carried out. He adds that the management of development programmes are ‘bound to be influenced by the organisational processes of the government which spawns them’. These processes included characteristics that have been directly associated with bureaucracy, such as hierarchical authority, rule-oriented observance of procedures and inflexible adaptation to changing tasks (Paul 1982: 121).

The variables described by Paul and White should secondly demonstrate that they engage directly with the ‘development’ circumstances of the programmes they represent.
This is also evident in the work of both researchers. Perhaps the obvious point is that both present their variable constructs in the context of public bodies carrying out development programmes. More specifically, White (1987: 29) reveals this through a concern for programming officials contributing to the ‘development content’ of their designs. Paul (1982: 108, 110) also alludes to a concern for the developmental circumstances attending the beneficiaries being responded to by a programme, when discussing the strategy variable, explaining that ‘[t]he complexity of the environment is the other factor that influences the choice of operating goals and action plans of the program’. The complexity associated with development programmes recalls a similar discussion in chapter 2 (see Rondinelli).

Further, the variables introduced by Paul and White should distinctly define the object of administrative capacity, which in the context of this thesis requires a concrete identity to be given to a development activity. Both researchers do in fact demonstrate this by systematically defining the characteristics of a development ‘programme’. Before outlining these features, it is necessary to note that this thesis recognises some distinction drawn in the literature between development ‘programmes’ and ‘projects’, with the former representing a more comprehensive set of activities of which the latter constitutes a subset (Paul 1982: 7; White 1987: 10; see also Nel 2001: 609).

White (1987: 8-12) defines the development programme according to the following five characteristics:

- **Programs are connected to an ongoing host country organisation**: Programmes are said to be integrally linked to existing organisational units, in other words they work within existing structures.

- **Programs continue over time**: Recognises that unforeseen problems and opportunities will continually arise. Programmes will also need to ensure a continued supply of resources to sustain activities.

- **Programs are ongoing systems for delivering services**: Reflects a growing number of programmes that are structured for delivering a variety of related services, as opposed to the once off delivery of a good or service.
• Programs are systems of activities and services designed for different settings: Programmes usually have to adapt to a number of different settings and will need to develop procedures to facilitate adaptation.

• Programs have a substantive policy identity: Programmes stem from substantive policy outlooks, which represent the characteristics of various (development) sectors.

Paul (1982: 9-10) also proposes a definition of a development programme, which exhibits the following four features:

• Policy Sanction: This would normally stem from a specific legislative enactment preceding the creation of a new development programme. Executive sanction will suffice if a programme is part of an already existing national development plan.

• Development Focus: Contrasting with regulatory programmes whose development impact might be indirect, development programmes would be expected to generate economic and social outcomes (measurable and immeasurable) consistent with national development goals, such as income growth and distribution, and improving quality of life.

• Organisational Identity: A development programme should possess an identity of its own, reflected in an organisational structure, budget and personnel. It should be possible to identify a programme by reference to a relatively permanent organisation with its own structure, assignment of tasks and responsibilities, and reporting relationships. Recognises that a programme may also be under the administrative control of an existing organisational structure such as a ministry or government department.

• Replication: The programme’s mission tends to be the replication or adaptation of a developmental product or service over the entire country or some of its constituent regions for the benefit of a specified client group. The developmental service may also consist of a system designed to deliver a product or service.
The constituent features of development programmes as described by Paul and White have a visible track record in the study of comparative and development administration. Hirschmann (1999: 288) for example, relied on Schaffer's definition of development administration as being 'about development programmes, policies and projects in those conditions in which there are usually wide and new demands and in which there are peculiarly low capacities and severe obstacles to meeting them'. Schaffer's definition also interestingly encompassed the subject of capacity. The 'project' mechanism through which governments pursue their development objectives has however not gone without criticism in the literature. Jreisat (2001: 28) acknowledged one of these criticisms which focused on the ‘projectising’ of administrative tasks, where Morgan (1983 quoted in Jreisat: ibid) in particular feared that this could run the risk of insulating developmental problems, organised into discrete project tasks, from potentially important elements existing outside the project structure, including the characteristics of the labour force, the quality of institutional support, or impact on population. Jreisat (2001: 29) responded to this criticism by arguing that:

[I]t is important to recognise that forming a disciplined, focused conceptualisation of project management … cannot be equated with having autonomous project authority. Generally, projects are organisations or parts of organisations. Therefore project management is consistent with organisation management, and the competence of one contributes to the competence of the other.

Jreisat’s situating of a programme or project mechanism within a public organisational setting confirms the relevance of the public bureaucratic organisation, in the context of middle range theory, as the primary level of analysis for this thesis, where this study will principally seek to identify factors influencing the capacity of these bodies to carry out distinct development activities, where the latter assume the identity of a programme. This is consistent with other descriptions of the development programme-public organisation interface, where Brinkerhoff (1991a: 16) has noted that ‘[b]ecause programs are located in organizations, a program is subject to the bureaucratic context in which its implementing organization(s) are situated’. This, together with Jreisat’s suggestion that there is a kind of symbiotic relationship between a project and the organisation of which it is a part, assumes that it will be possible to identify factors affecting the capacity of public bureaucracies to carry out development programmes.
This section reviewed the extent to which the variable frameworks proposed by Paul and White spoke to a minimum criteria for selecting a relevant framework of analysis for this thesis. It was found that both generally corresponded to these prerequisites. The next section will contrast the frameworks proposed by both researchers in an effort to identify which of these might more effectively contribute to this study’s research question and interpretation of capacity.

3.4 Contrasting frameworks for assessing administrative capacity

Before deciding which of the frameworks presented by Louise White and Samuel Paul would be the most suitable for this study it is necessary to acknowledge that each variable-set tested favourably against the minimum criteria described earlier. Although they responded to these prerequisites in different ways, it cannot be concluded that this variance is sufficient to favour one set of variables over the other. The reason is that, at this stage, the prerequisites constitute untested assumptions stemming from this study’s interpretation of capacity and its research question. The task facing this section is therefore to determine which one of these variable constructs may be able to generate a fuller explanatory understanding of factors observed as influencing administrative capacity.

One discernible difference between the variables presented by Paul and White is that the activities to which these are attributed, in White’s framework, tends to reduce the analytical scope from which factors influencing the capacity of programme implementing bodies can be observed. Examples include programme implementing bodies contributing to the development content of a programme’s design; a need for these bodies to enhance the development capacity of implementing organisations; and a need to expand programme resources and political support. The advantage of specifying these activities in this way is that it gives clear direction to the researcher when applying these to actual cases, which would require an investigator to look for instances where public bodies are, or are not as the case may be, contributing to the development content of their programmes; acting to enhance the development capacity of implementing organisations; and working to expand programme resources and political support. Given the orientation accompanying the variables described in White’s framework, the identification of factors observed as influencing the administrative
capacity of public organisations to carry out a development programme would necessarily be influenced by either the presence or absence of these conditions.

A potential disadvantage of employing White’s perspective on the activities carried out by a public organisation to implement a development programme also stems from the observation that these have been given a relatively narrow focus. This would in practice reduce the analytical space for this thesis to be able to identify factors that influence the capacity of programme-implementing bodies to execute these interventions, where these are not limited by the presence or absence of a set of conditions. This then raised the question of whether Paul’s variable framework might equip this thesis with wider (i.e., by being less conditional) analytical space.

The specification of variables in Paul’s framework did generally appear to facilitate greater explanatory scope, when directly compared with those described by White. Firstly, the four variables described by Paul were defined by a set of somewhat more generic categories, comprising a programme’s ‘environment’, ‘strategy’, ‘structure’ and ‘processes’. Secondly, the properties or sub-variable elements associated with each main variable also appeared less narrowly conceived in their description. For example, where the strategic emphasis for White is on actions that contribute to the development content of a programme’s design, the strategy variable in Paul’s framework suggested that this may be influenced by the objectives set for a programme by the government, how these are translated into operating goals and action plans, and how the programme is resourced, coupled with the effects of the programme’s environment. Whilst a structural concern for White included actions that enhanced the development capacity of implementing organisations, which in any event represents a perspective of capacity as acquired ability, Paul submitted that the functional and organisational correspondence or its lack, between a programme and its sponsoring public bodies could reveal constraints that affect its implementation.

Acknowledging the broader scope emanating from the explanatory variables employed by Paul, it should further be noted that there is explicit recognition in the title of his publication, *Managing Development Programs: the lessons of success,* that the discussion and application of the four variables to actual cases ultimately attempted to identify the more or less ideal circumstances under which the variables operated, and
their effect on programme performance. Having said this, Paul (1982: 106) also suggested that his study would attempt to highlight the inter-relationships among the variables, recognising ‘the possibility that there might be varying combinations of the variables influencing performance and which are appropriate under different conditions’. The perspective guiding Paul’s employment of variables then offered relatively wider analytical space for this study to try to expose the particular conditions and attendant variable factors found to have affected administrative capacity.

To summarise, this section has suggested that the framework employed by Samuel Paul to analyse the functioning of development programmes could be usefully adapted to inform this study’s examination of administrative capacity. Section 3.5 will consider Paul’s contribution within wider scholarship on public sector-implemented development programmes.

3.5 Development programmes and administrative capacity in the context of broader research

This chapter has not yet demonstrated why, in the context of more recent research, Samuel Paul (1982) and Louise White’s (1987) decades-old studies on the management of development programmes are considered especially relevant to this study’s interpretation of administrative capacity. The systematic construct and orientation of the frameworks devised by Paul and White for assessing the implementation of development programmes was an important feature underpinning their relevance.

More recent research on the management of development programmes, such as Brinkerhoff’s (1991b: 4) *Looking Out, Looking In, Looking Ahead: Guidelines for Managing Development Programs*, have also proposed systematic constructs for understanding how these initiatives are carried out, based on tasks clustered under a programme’s internal administrative operations (‘looking in’); its setting within wider organisational, political, economic and social settings (‘looking out’), and its outputs and impacts (‘looking ahead’). Brinkerhoff’s construct is, however, similar in orientation to that of White, where the actions clustered under these three dimensions are more narrowly oriented.

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For example, the ‘looking in’ task in managing a development programme includes programme officials: *examining* the level of innovation required by the initial programme design in terms of predictability of outcomes, and *proceeding* with programme design using a team approach. The ‘looking out’ task requires programme officials to *conduct* a rapid initial reconnaissance to prioritise the relevant factors in a programme’s external environment (i.e. economic, socio-political, technical, and cultural), and to *conduct* a stakeholder analysis. Finally, the ‘looking ahead’ task requires officials to *balance* the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness within a programme; and to *assess* who is interested in the programme’s performance and why? (Brinkerhoff 1991b: 5-7, 12)

Overall, Brinkerhoff’s (1991b: 1) contribution is very useful for highlighting practices which can enable development programmes to be carried out more effectively, with its focus on presenting ‘practical guidelines for managers’ based on applied research findings. The perspective of and analytical approach to administrative capacity adopted by this thesis is however dependent on a less-prescriptive framework for examining the implementation of development programmes by public bureaucracies.

Other recent research has also framed its observations of development programmes in narrower and more prescriptive terms, where this has been particularly oriented towards methods of evaluating or appraising programme performance. Examples include Bond’s (2002) contribution on ‘Planning and Managing Development Projects’. In his discussion Bond emphasised recommended approaches and techniques for planning, implementing and monitoring development projects, including illustrations of planning and monitoring cycles and constructs. Weiss’ (2002) chapter from the same volume also focused on recent developments in ‘project appraisal and evaluation’. An earlier edited volume by Analoui (1994) contained a variety of contributions that continued this more didactic approach to the treatment of issues such as management techniques in development projects, and project planning and evaluation methodologies. Finally, Hubbard’s (2000) input also concentrated on development project evaluation methods, introducing what he termed a ‘potential-impact’ assessment that could be employed to ‘assist project design and evaluation’. Finally, an emphasis on understanding the practical applications of development programmes has also been evident in the South African literature, which
most notably includes Nel's (2001) discussion of a ‘project management approach’ as a tool in development programme implementation.10

The development programme management literature exhibits a mixture of empirically grounded observations, models and practical guidelines to assist researchers to systematically study these initiatives and the public bodies that implement them. A great deal has been learned and documented about what makes the activities that contribute to implementing a development programme effective or not effective. Having said this, this study’s research question emphasised the identification and analysis of the nature of those factors found to have influenced the capacity of public organisations to carry out development activities, or ‘programmes’. Given that the source of and particular characteristics of these factors was not assumed, a priori, and that these programmes were not being evaluated in relation to their expectant performance, it was necessary for the thesis to select a framework that could apply a wider explanatory breadth to identifying potential factors influencing the capacity of their implementing public organisations. The next section will translate Paul’s framework for use by this thesis.

3.6 Translating Samuel Paul’s development programme management framework for application by this thesis

This study submits that an analytical framework capable of identifying and defining factors that influence the capacity of public organisations to carry out development programmes could be usefully based on the variables employed by Samuel Paul to examine the functioning of public sector-driven development programmes. The following sections will describe the conditions associated with each variable as described by Paul, and the assumptions that inform these conditions, including the inter-relationship between the variables he proposes. This thesis will suggest that the definition of these variables by Paul could be usefully employed to isolate factors affecting the capacity of development programme implementing bodies to carry out these interventions.

10 See also Public Service Commission (2007), for a non-academic South African example that adopts a more evaluative approach to examining development programmes.
3.6.1 A development programme’s environment

A development programme’s environment consists essentially of the characteristics of its external setting, which its implementing organisation(s) would need to negotiate in order to carry out the intervention (Paul 1982: 103). Moving away from what he terms the ‘conventional’ view of environmental analysis, which emphasises the segmentation of an environment according to economic, political, social, and technological circumstances, Paul (1982: 107) submits that there are certain underlying properties associated with a development programme’s external environment that could affect how it is carried out. These properties constitute three dimensions or sub-variables, for the purposes of this study.

The first sub-variable is the scope of a programme, defined by the extent of its geographical or spatial spread, and its sectoral profile, which takes into account the profile of the services it offers. Paul (1983: 49) gives the example of ‘[a] programme which deals with one crop or commodity [that] has a more limited environment than a multi-crop programme or a programme which attempts to integrate agriculture with social services.’ This indicates that a programme might cross-cut more than one sector. He adds that the scope of a development programme will have implications for the design of its strategy and structure. For instance, an increase in a programme’s geographical and/or sectoral scope will increase the likelihood that a programme will implement its services sequentially (ibid), where sequencing is elsewhere defined as the phased or incremental expansion (i.e., delivery) of a programme’s services. The rationale for this relates to managing, in the absence of a phased expansion, the rolling out of services concurrently across a relatively wide geographical and/or sectoral environment, recognising that ‘[p]rogramme failures arise from the lack of a strategy for sequential expansion’ (Paul 1983: 66). Paul (1982: 108) also argued that an expansion of environmental scope may put pressure on ‘conventional’, or in other words, overly rigid organisational structures through which development programmes deliver their services. He added that ‘hierarchical’ control over some parts of an organisation’s structure may become increasingly unfeasible where a development programme’s environmental scope expands.
The second feature of a programme’s environment is termed \textit{diversity}, which relates to the physical-geographical, cultural, socio-economic or political characteristics of a programme’s beneficiaries/clients, particularly where there is variety in these circumstances. The argument is that problems may arise if the package of services defined by a development programme does not correspond with the diversity of needs evident among its beneficiaries. The assumption is that if diverse beneficiary groups have to be served, it becomes necessary to adapt a programme’s service offering to their various needs (Paul 1982: 108). Paul also notes that a diverse beneficiary environment also affects a programme’s organisational configuration, where relatively greater diversity tends to favour more decentralised organisational structures.

The third element in a development programme’s environment is \textit{uncertainty}, defined broadly as unforeseen changes, and which Paul (1982: 108) relates to sudden or even unpredictable occurrences precipitated by the socio-economic, political and even physical conditions of programme beneficiaries.\footnote{Physical changes include the example of changeable weather patterns affecting farmers’ behavior and responses to an agricultural development programme (Paul 1983: 50).} He added that ‘[c]hanges in the perception of clients or their dissatisfaction with a service can significantly change their response to a programme’ (Paul 1983: 50). The likelihood that a development programme will experience greater environmental uncertainty will, it is said, demand greater flexibility from its strategy and structure, which could for instance include greater participation by beneficiaries in the design and delivery of a programme’s services, and increased autonomy (as well as organisational decentralisation) of field-level bureaucrats/functionaries to expedite adaptation to changing circumstances (Paul 1982: 108; Paul 1983: 50). The description of ‘uncertainty’ in Paul’s framework recalls Rondinelli’s (1993: 7-8) observations in chapter 2 about the relationship between centralised control-oriented development planning and the ability of public organisations to function in complex and correspondingly more uncertain environments.

\textbf{3.6.2 A development programme’s strategy}

The second variable discussed by Paul (1982: 110; 1983: 57) is termed strategy, which comprises at least three properties. The first is the \textit{objectives laid down by the government} for the programme. This relates closely to the next element, which looks at
how these objectives are translated by programming officials into *operating goals* and *action plans*, and a further feature, which refers to the *resources allocated to a programme*. Features in a development programme’s environment can also have an effect on its strategic make-up.

Although the specification of a development programme’s objectives might appear obvious, there may be conditions associated with this process that could affect the capacity of its implementing bodies to carry it out. Paul (1983: 58) notes for instance that if the goals of a programme do not fit the objectives of the government that sponsors it, programme leaders will find it difficult to obtain resources and other forms of support. Alternatively, depending on the level of specificity attached to the objective(s) of a development programme, programme implementers may experience limited space (in other words, flexibility) to determine the best operational means of achieving the objective(s).

In discussing the resources allocated to a development programme as part of its strategy, Paul (1983: 69) acknowledges that this is commonly thought of in financial terms. What he stresses with this sub-variable, however, is the likelihood that programming officials will need to ‘mobilise’ these and other kinds of resources, serviced by inter-agency co-operation and support from political leaders, in order to facilitate a programme’s pursuit of its objectives. He expands on this by arguing that the process of implementing a development programme may:

> [E]ntail co-ordination with several other agencies whose support and active cooperation become critical to the success of the programme. External linkage building may turn out to be a key function of the top management of a multi-sectoral program which has to deal with diverse beneficiary groups and several departments in the government whose resources, both political and financial, are important for the program. (Paul 1982: 115)

Finally, although it is reasonable to assume that the makeup of a development programme’s resources will include tangible (i.e. financial) as well as other related forms of support (i.e. administrative and political co-operation), it is advisable to include the circumstances under which programmes are human resourced, where this has exhibited particular resonance in the literature on administrative capacity in South Africa. Overall, the notion of resource ‘mobilisation’ extends the ability of this thesis to scrutinise the
organisational and operational conditions under which programmes function, in order to locate resourcing-related factors that may have affected the capacity of programme implementing bodies.

3.6.3 A development programme’s structure

The third variable associated with a development programme is its structure, which according to Paul refers to the functional and organisational arrangements in place to support a development programme’s implementation. The distinction between ‘functional’ and ‘organisational’ structure was interpreted as follows: Paul (1983: 77) defined functional structure as the division of organisational tasks according to what is relevant to a particular service. ‘Organisational’ structure, meanwhile, which is the phrasing applied by the researcher, refers to what Paul (1982: 117) described as ‘centralised structures’, which essentially relates to how decision-making authority is organisationally configured to carry out a development programme, and within which functional tasks are defined and implemented.

A relevant theoretical assumption stemming from Paul’s (1982: 116) portrayal of the structure variable corresponds with the bureaucratic features of public organisations as discussed in chapter 2, where he argues that ‘[t]o the extent that the environment, goals, and tasks of a development program differ from those if its sponsoring ministry, there is a case for designing the program’s organisational structure along lines which differ from the bureaucratic mode’. He goes on to suggest that features of the bureaucratic mode could pose ‘severe constraints’ on the organisational structure of development programmes, which also recalls the concerns about reactive inflexibility mentioned in chapter 2. As to the features of the ‘bureaucratic mode’, Paul (1982: 117) submits that the constraints emanating from the bureaucratic mode are likely to emerge when a development programme is embedded within the existing line functions of its implementing bodies, where these bodies are also more likely to employ centralised decision-making structures – the bureaucratic hierarchy referred to in chapter 2. The extent to which there is correspondence between the demands introduced by new development programmes and the structures within which these are accommodated will likely reveal structural dis-functionalities and the kind of bureaucratic inflexibility that might affect the capacity of a public organisation to carry out a programme.
Research by J.C. Ickis (1983) on the ‘structural responses to new rural development strategies’ in five Latin American countries\(^{12}\) represents a useful application of a structural perspective not unlike that presented by Paul. Ickis studied rural development programmes in the five countries between 1976 and 1978; he was specifically concerned about the relationship between the strategy and structure of the programmes, and the design of the implementing organisation or network of organisations (Ickis 1983: 5). Findings from the study included observations of dysfunctional organisational processes, for example between central and field structures/offices, undifferentiated structures, particularly where differentiated client groups were being served (see same point under environment variable earlier), and over-centralised decision-making (Ickis 1983: 24-28).

Implicit in Paul’s description of the structure variable, as well as being evident in the work by Ickis, is the likely participation of more than one public organisation in the implementation of a development programme, for instance at a lower/field/localised level. In his discussion of development bureaucracies, Van Ufford (1988: 12) also referred to this as the linkages between development organisations at different levels. This thesis should therefore expect to see the contribution of more than one public organisation in the implementation of individual development programmes.

### 3.6.4 A development programme’s process

The fourth variable, defined as ‘process’, refers to the characteristics that shape decision-making and actions taken in a development programme, or in other words, ‘how’ decisions are made and how actions are taken (Paul 1982: 121; Paul 1983: 93). The features that Paul associates with the study of a programme’s processes include *participation*, *monitoring*, *human resource development*, and *motivation*. Paul firstly hypothesises that a wider participatory process to inform decision-making may be beneficial to a programme’s planning and operations. Monitoring refers to the extent that information and reporting systems have shifted from the observance of ‘procedures’ (connoting bureaucracy), which refers to the rules governing decision-making processes and budget control, compared to programme ‘performance’. Human Resource Development deals with the extent to which the recruitment, development and

\(^{12}\)Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua
compensation procedures employed to staff development programmes depart from that of government norms in general and so called ‘routinised’/’conventional’ tasks in particular (another feature commonly associated with bureaucracy). Finally, motivation concerns the use of incentives to encourage commitment, including monetary incentives, status and recognition, participation, ideology and authority (Paul 1982: 122-124).

It is submitted that applying the process variable may either be superfluous, relative to the other three variables, to the ability of this study to effectively respond to its research question, or in other cases be irrelevant to its interpretation of administrative capacity. For example, Paul (1982: 121) was earlier quoted as stating that the processes employed by a development programme are an important consideration where programmes ‘are bound to be influenced by the organisational processes of the government which spawns them’. Although an otherwise noteworthy point, it may be difficult in this instance to distinguish the process variable from the structure variable, which also concerns itself with a programme’s organisational arrangements. The structure variable’s interest in assessing the functional and organisational consistency between development programmes and the structures through which these are carried out presumes that the processes emanating from these arrangements will emerge and can therefore be analysed. In addition, the ‘ organisational processes’ to which development programmes are subject could also affect capacity at a strategic level, where Paul (1983: 94) has observed that:

In formulating a programme strategy, allocating funds and choosing a structure, heads of ministries or departments commonly convey their decisions to subordinates for implementation. Centralised government structures reinforce this practice. Those below in the hierarchy have little discretion in this ‘top-down’ process of decision making.

In other cases, the nature and form of beneficiary participation in a development programme may be examined as a component of a programme’s environment, and in particular its adaptation to uncertainty as noted earlier. The monitoring processes of a development programme could also be assessed as a feature of the roles that structures perform, including the carrying out of ‘information and reporting’ activities (Paul 1982: 122-123). Elsewhere, features associated with the ‘process’ variable appear more closely attuned to an acquisition of capacity perspective. This includes the human resourcing processes adopted by a development programme, through efforts to build or
strengthen human resources. Finally, the use of incentives to encourage and motivate administrative commitment also appears to coincide more closely with direct efforts to strengthen capacity.

Table 3.3 summarises how this thesis will adapt the variables described by Samuel Paul to examine administrative capacity.
Table 3.3: Analytical framework employed to research administrative capacity (adapted from Samuel Paul)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. A development programme’s ‘environment’</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1(a): <strong>Scope</strong>: This will entail collecting data on a development programme’s geographical/spatial spread, and its sectoral profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(b): <strong>Diversity</strong>: This will entail collecting data on the physical-geographical, cultural, socio-economic, and political characteristics associated with the circumstances and needs of a development programme’s beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(c): <strong>Uncertainty</strong>: This will entail collecting data on unforeseen changes associated with the social, political, economic and physical conditions of a development programme’s beneficiaries</td>
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<tr>
<th>2. A development programme’s ‘strategy’</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2(a): <strong>Objectives</strong>: This will entail collecting data on the objectives specified for a development programme by a government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(b): <strong>Operational planning</strong>: This will entail collecting data on the translation of a development programme’s objectives into operating goals and action plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(c): <strong>Resources allocated to the programme</strong>: This will entail collecting data on the circumstances associated with a development programme’s resourcing (i.e. financial, human) and resource mobilisation.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>3. A development programme’s ‘structure’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3(a): <strong>Functional and organisational arrangements</strong>: This will entail collecting data on the functional and decision-making authority relationships between development programmes and their sponsoring organisational bodies (ministries/departments)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Application of framework:**

This thesis firstly recognises an intersection between these variables, in accordance with Paul’s approach. Secondly, this thesis will apply this framework of variables to individual development programme cases, a process that will, together, expose a set of organisational and operational conditions from which factors can be observed as having influenced the capacity of programme implementing bodies to carry out the interventions.
3.7 Conclusion

This chapter began by stating that an analytical framework capable of identifying factors influencing the capacity of public administrations to carry out development programmes would need to meet certain prerequisites corresponding to the research question, interpretation and theoretical perspective of capacity adopted by this thesis. An analytical framework modelled on a set of variables proposed by Samuel Paul to examine the public sector management of development programmes was identified for its suitability in identifying factors observed as influencing the capacity of public bodies to carry out these interventions. On the basis of the literature review and analytical framework described in chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 will give a more explicit description of the research methodology that will apply the analytical framework described in this chapter.
CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This thesis has outlined the conceptual and theoretical questions underpinning its enquiry into administrative capacity. This has included a description of the research problem and a question in response to that problem; a working definition of the research subject (administrative capacity); a means through which this subject can be researched (development programmes); a unit of analysis for undertaking the enquiry (public organisations); and an analytical framework through which the research question can be examined. Chapter 4 will build on the introductory discussion on research methodology provided in chapter 1, by giving a more detailed outline of the methodology employed by this thesis, including research design, the data gathering process, and the approach to data analysis.

4.2 Approach to research methodology

The introductory chapter noted that a case study methodology would be employed by this thesis. The choice of a case study approach was driven largely by the nature of the research enquiry, which seeks to understand the quality of the factors that could be observed, through detailed analyses of individual cases, as influencing the capacity of public organisations to carry out development programmes. As this thesis did not hypothesise what these factors would be, apart from suggesting that the three variables making up this study’s analytical framework could help to identify and explain them, the makeup of the research question was exploratory, with the aim of systematically isolating and explaining how these factors influenced administrative capacity. A case study approach was therefore considered well suited to the demands of the research question.

Further discussion on the relationship between case study research methodology and this study’s research question could also be seen in Mouton and Marais’ (1990: 103) description of the concept of ‘analysis’ in social science research. The researchers indicated that analysis results in isolating the ‘constituent variables or factors that are
relevant to the understanding of a phenomenon or an event’. This holds methodological value for this thesis in two respects: first, it mirrors the intention of the research question, which seeks to identify factors that influence the capacity of public administrations to carry out development programmes. In this instance, analysis, approximating the exploratory search for factors relevant to understanding a phenomenon or event (if a development programme is viewed as a series of events) is appropriate. Second, the use of the term ‘understanding’, as in the goal of the research question being to understand a phenomenon or event based on the identification and analysis of particular factors, might also affect a useful methodological outcome in how this study proceeds to capture and organise case study data to facilitate an understanding of the phenomenon or events (through development programmes) which it represents.

In discussing the relationship between research methodology and the objectives of social science research, the question of approach, or how to apply methodology, is also raised. This includes the distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods. In trying to distinguish these major types of social science methodology, Mouton and Marais (1990: 168, 170) have suggested that the former (qualitative) was oriented to ‘understanding’ social phenomena by emphasising more in-depth inquiry. This supposedly differs from the latter (quantitative), which is oriented towards ‘explaining’ or ‘describing’ this phenomenon through identifying causal relationships between variables; or describing a phenomenon on as broad a scale as possible, including for the construction of typologies. Drawing a distinction between ‘understanding’ and ‘explaining’ social phenomena may be questionable, since both terms could be said to contribute to the end-goal of this thesis: that is, to isolate, explain and understand the effect of factors influencing the capacity of public organisations to carry out development programmes. It would therefore be advisable not to project such a distinction between the supposed inclinations of qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches.

It has, however, elsewhere been recognised that qualitative and quantitative approaches do use different techniques for gathering data. Generally speaking, quantitative methods tend towards the use of statistical techniques, especially to provide an aggregate picture of data being studied, whereas qualitative methods generally employ more interpretative analysis of smaller and more limited segments of data (Kelle, Erzberger 2004). Recognising the differing contributions that each approach can make when trying to
define social phenomenon, it is suggested that the use of both techniques could complement the analysis of data in so far as both can yield ‘a more comprehensive picture of the object under investigation’ (Kelle and Erzberger 2004: 175). It has also been observed that the use of qualitative procedures is ‘particularly indispensable when investigators have no a priori access to the typical meaning patterns and action orientations in the subject area being investigated’ (Kelle and Erzberger 2004: 176).

Picking up on Kelle and Erzberger’s last point, it was mentioned earlier that the interpretation of administrative capacity adopted by this study did not advance a specific hypothesis concerning the identity and nature of factors observed as influencing the capacity of public organisations to carry out development programmes. Save for recognising in the literature the potential importance of the organisational level of analysis for generating insights about capacity, this thesis did not therefore proceed on the basis of an a priori understanding of what could be termed ‘typical’ meaning patterns and action orientations, where only a limited indication of how these factors might present themselves was evident in the assumptions attached to the analytical framework presented in chapter 3. Instead, this thesis took the decision that a more qualitative approach would better serve the interpretation of administrative capacity being promoted.

4.3 Exercising a qualitative approach to methodology

The adoption by this thesis of a qualitative methodological approach raises a further question of how this translated into instruments for gathering and recording relevant data. It was earlier mentioned that this thesis employed case studies as the vehicle through which it sought to isolate and analyse those factors affecting the capacity of public administrations to carry out development programmes. Using the case study as the focal point of the research enquiry, this thesis then employed a mixture of primary and secondary qualitative data gathering methods in order to inform its research question.

Relying principally on the interpretation of primary and secondary sources, where this was framed by the three variables in the analytical framework described in chapter 3, the author first sourced a range of secondary materials on the development programme
cases selected for study, which existed in the form of published and in-house (i.e. non-published departmental documents) generated by the public organisations overseeing the programmes under study. These included scoping or feasibility studies, organograms or institutional arrangements, strategic and business plans, monitoring and evaluation reports, policy documents and speeches, quarterly reports, regulations concerning financial allocations, and policy and legislative oversight documents (such as parliamentary hearings).

Then the author analysed the primary data consisting of qualitative interviews, which were carried out largely with individuals (mainly government officials) directly involved in the implementation of the development programme cases through their affiliation with the public organisations (i.e., government departments in the main) responsible for implementing these programmes. The data generated by these interviews represented the core findings of this research, where interviews were able to give a more precise identity to and provide a more extensive description of factors affecting the capacity of public organisations to carry out development programmes. Section 4.3.1 provides further details on the use of interviewing in this study.

4.3.1 Qualitative interviewing

As indicated above, qualitative interviews were considered particularly useful for this study, including when consulting some of the literature on interviewing in social science research, such as Rubin and Rubin (1995) and Wengraf (2001). Before interviewing could begin, it was recognised that interviewing as a particular type of social enquiry could also take more than one form. These include unstructured and semi-structured formats (Rubin, J., Rubin, I.S. 1995: 5). The following passage from Wengraf (2001: 5) on the use of semi-structured formats was particularly noteworthy:

Semi-structured interviews are designed to have a number of interviewer questions prepared in advance but such prepared questions are designed to be sufficiently open that the subsequent questions of the interviewer cannot be planned in advance but must be improvised in a careful and theorized way.

Following Wengraf’s description, this thesis was guided by a semi-structured format for qualitative interviewing. The rationale for adopting this format flowed from this study.
having used a pre-constructed analytical framework (i.e., see chapter 3) comprising variables and sub-variable categories, as a guide to locating factors that could be observed as influencing administrative capacity. In practice this consisted of questions prepared in advance that asked interviewees to describe factors associated with the strategy, the environment and structure of their development programmes, which affected the capacity of their departments to implement these. Follow-up questions depended on the initial responses of interviewees, and were designed to probe for greater detail and clarity. The next section will give details of how this study applied the methodology just introduced.

4.4 Research design

This chapter has thus far identified the approach to and exercise of a qualitative research methodology to identify and examine factors influencing the capacity of public organisations to carry out development programmes. The chapter will now discuss the process used by this thesis to identify the objects of its research enquiry, or the actual development programme cases studied.

4.4.1 The identification and selection of development programme cases

The process of identifying development programme cases began by cataloguing all the relevant programmes that were currently being carried out by public sector organisations in South Africa. The decision to target programmes that were currently being implemented was taken to increase the likelihood of sourcing a wider array and larger volume of secondary materials, as well as identifying a larger sample of interviewees who could more easily recall and provide detailed testimonials on existing programmes. This study’s research enquiry therefore covered the period from 2004 to the end of 2007, which coincided with the introduction and partial implementation of the development programme cases that were eventually selected.

The process of identifying and selecting development programme cases firstly acknowledged that although South Africa’s Constitution recognises three spheres of government (national, provincial, local), it is only at the national sphere, consisting mainly of ministries and corresponding departments, where programmes would typically exhibit a national focus. This is significant because it speaks to the criterion of
‘replication’ in Paul’s description of a development programme (see chapter 3). This thesis therefore limited its selection of candidate development programmes to those being carried out by public organisations in the national sphere.

Identifying the programmes began by scanning the latest available annual reports (2004/05) of all national-level government departments in South Africa from the 2004/05 financial year. These departments are legally recognised public institutions that derive their status from Schedule 1 of South Africa’s Public Service Act (No. 103 of 1994). The Act in question also incorporates the transformation of national and provincial government departments brought about by political changes after 1994. It should be noted that this thesis deliberately confined its selection of public organisations operating at the national sphere to ministries and their associated departments, which together with provincial departments legally constitutes the public service in South Africa. In so doing it excluded other potentially eligible national level organisations such as public entities. Public entities, as defined in South Africa’s Public Finance Management Act (No. 1 of 1999), are specialist entities operating independently from national and provincial departments, but which are otherwise functionally associated with and legally overseen by government departments. Public entities are tasked with performing a range of largely regulatory and specialist service delivery functions relevant to the portfolios of the departments which oversee them.

The process of cataloguing all potentially relevant development programmes carried out by national departments began by sourcing the annual reports of these organisations. Annual reports proved useful for identifying potentially relevant development programming activity, as these reports typically contained a broad, descriptive and generally similar portrayal of a department’s administrative, programmatic and financial activities for a specified period. In cases where the 2004/05 annual reports were not obtainable, as in the case of the Secretariat for Safety and Security, a recent strategic document pertaining to the activities of the primary organisational component of the Secretariat (South African Police Service) was consulted. In addition, it was only possible to obtain a copy of the 2003/04 Annual Report of the National Intelligence Agency. Despite these difficulties, it was in the end possible to scan the 2004/05 annual reports for 29 of 31 government departments at the national level. Hard copies of these
documents were sourced from Government Publications at the University of Cape Town and from the Document Stores section of the South African Parliament.

Once an up-to-date list of national departments had been identified, and their annual reports obtained, each report was scanned to identify programmes that exhibited the development and programmatic features attributed to White’s description of what a development programme should be designed to address (see chapter 1), and Paul’s description of a development programme’s characteristics (see chapter 3). This was significant for the methodological validity of the study, as the selection of candidate cases had to conform to a common understanding of a development programme in order to record consistent observations about factors influencing the capacity of public organisations to carry out these initiatives.

The resultant scan of national department annual reports yielded the list of candidate development programmes. These are shown in table 4.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of National Government Department</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Name of Relevant Development Programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Arts and Culture</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Cultural Development and International Cooperation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Communications</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Correctional Services</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Communications and Information Service</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Education</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Auxiliary and Associated Services Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Health</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Home Affairs</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Housing</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Justice and Constitutional Development</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Service Delivery Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Land Affairs</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Land Reform Implementation Management and Co-ordination Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Minerals and Energy</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Mineral Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>2003/04 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Treasury</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Provincial and Local Government</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Presidency</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Public Works</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Expanded Public Works Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Public Enterprises</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Public Service and Administration</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of Safety and Security</td>
<td>2005/06 Planning Information for the SA Police Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sport and Recreation</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Building for Sport and Recreation Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Science and Technology</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Technology for Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Social Development</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Poverty Relief Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Trade and Industry</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Enterprise and Industry Development Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Transport</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Water Affairs and Forestry</td>
<td>2004/05 Annual Report</td>
<td>Working for Water Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 31 national departments scanned, 12 were observed to be implementing programmes that corresponded to the developmental and programmatic criteria outlined by White and Paul. These included the Departments of Agriculture, Arts and Culture, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Labour, Land Affairs, Minerals and Energy, Public Works, Sport and Recreation, Science and Technology, Social Development, Trade and Industry, and Water Affairs and Forestry.

The next task was to select from among these 12 programmes those that could be employed as case studies. This had a direct effect on the methodological question of representivity or, in other words, how would such a selection affect the ability of this study to present findings considered to be generally representative of all government-sponsored development programmes? This study offers no simple answer, save to say that it deliberately opted for a smaller number of cases consisting of two development programmes. Although recognising that the more cases under study the greater the ability to generalise findings, it was decided to concentrate on a fewer number of cases in order to facilitate a more in-depth examination of programmes, especially in view of the complex multiple variable and accompanying sub-variable categories that constituted this study’s analytical framework.

However, this study cannot claim to offer findings that are representative of or generalisable to development programmes being carried out by government departments in South Africa. In defence, the interpretation and working definition that this thesis applied to the issue of administrative capacity in South Africa is atypical of how the issue has been more commonly examined (see chapter 1). It was therefore thought that a more prudent approach would be to begin with a smaller case assessment in view of the nascent perspective being employed, and in order to test the efficacy of the methodology applied. In deliberately opting for a smaller number of cases, this thesis did try to compensate somewhat in how it eventually narrowed down its selection of two cases. It was decided to choose programmes of relatively greater organisational complexity so as to enable a fuller application of this study’s analytical framework. It was also decided to select programmes that appeared to exhibit a comparatively higher profile or priority within the South African government’s development programmes, to capitalise on the potential for greater sources being available. Based on these criteria the two programmes that eventually emerged as
strong candidate cases were the \textit{Expanded Public Works Programme} (EPWP) and the \textit{Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme} (CASP). A brief overview of these two programmes follows.

Since 1994 government-sponsored public works programmes have had an explicit developmental focus, emphasising employment creation, income generation and enhancing productive capacity as a means of contributing to the reduction of poverty. The EPWP is the latest incarnation in this public works orientation. The programme is co-ordinated by the national Department of Public Works and was among only a few short-term programmes mentioned by Aliber et al (2006: 50-51) in their overview of government interventions designed to address underdevelopment and poverty in South Africa.

The EPWP exhibits a particularly complex sectoral profile, including the participation of a range of national departments, provincial governments and municipalities, grouped according to four sectors (Department of Public Works, not dated b: 3). The programme also has a strong profile across government, as an intervention designed to create significant numbers of work opportunities in response to a persistently high rate of unemployment in South Africa.

The argument for including the Department of Agriculture’s Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) as a second case study can be traced back to a Parliamentary address by South African President Thabo Mbeki in May 2004, where CASP was explicitly mentioned among only a handful of development interventions that the government intended to make following South Africa’s third democratic elections in April 2004 (South Africa Government Online 2004). Two years after his speech, the South African President was joined by the leader of Tanzania in accentuating the importance of state interventions in agriculture to respond to underdevelopment, at a meeting of the World Economic Forum (iafrica.com 2006).

The CASP programme also responds favourably to the development programme criteria presented earlier by White. This includes the objective of improving productive capacity, incomes and welfare circumstances through promoting agricultural development in rural areas (Department of Agriculture 2005a). The CASP programme was also highlighted in
the list compiled by Aliber et al (2006: 52, 54, 56) of short-term programme interventions in response to underdevelopment in South Africa, raising its profile among public sector-administered development programmes in general. Finally, the relatively more complex sectoral circumstances of CASP, involving the participation of the national and provincial departments of agriculture, as well as the national Department of Land Affairs, also lent impetus to its inclusion (Department of Agriculture 2003?).

This section has provided an overview of the process employed to identify and select development programme case studies to support and inform this study’s enquiry into administrative capacity. The next section will describe the actions employed by this thesis to gather secondary and primary data on these two programme cases.

### 4.5 The data gathering process

The process of gathering data on the two case study development programmes selected for this thesis used a mixture of primary and secondary sources to try to build a comprehensive picture of each programme’s organisational and operational activities. This was necessary to facilitate the search for factors that could be observed as influencing the capacity of the programme’s implementing organisations to carry out these initiatives. The following illustrates how the researcher proceeded to source primary and secondary data, as well as the nature of the data. It will begin with secondary materials, as this was the first type of data sought in trying to construct an initial overview of the two programmes.

#### 4.5.1 Secondary source materials

This chapter referred earlier to examples of secondary data on development programmes, where these generally consisted of published and internal documents on the structure and operations of development programmes. The initial step in gathering secondary source material relevant to the two cases under study was identifying precisely what had been produced on each programme. The researcher began by searching for specific document references to these programmes identified in the annual

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13 The question mark '?' accompanying the date given to this and other references denotes how these were catalogued in the Government Publications collection, University of Cape Town, and reflects uncertainty about year of publication.
reports of the Department of Public Works (DPW) and the Department of Agriculture (DOA), which appeared to be the sponsoring departments of the EPWP and CASP, respectively. The next step was to consult all available hard copy documents held under the public works and agricultural sectors in the Government Publications library, at the University of Cape Town. This activity did in fact yield documentation pertaining to the two programmes. The contents of these documents were broad in their descriptions of the programmes, containing information on policy objectives, operational design, stakeholder environment and organisational structures. Although these were relevant, they were not sufficiently detailed to construct a satisfactory initial description.

In an effort to expand the sources of potentially relevant secondary materials available on both programmes, the researcher next scanned the websites of the DPW and DOA. In the case of the DPW, a separate website dedicated to the EPWP programme was in operation, which housed a range of more detailed documentation on the programme including overviews, sector profiles, legislative and implementation frameworks, and progress reports. These documents were downloaded for later analysis. Information pertaining to the CASP programme was not as extensively available on the DOA’s website, which contained a page giving an overview of the programme and its objectives, contact information, as well as a limited number of progress reports, which were also downloaded for later analysis.

A further step taken by the researcher to expand the availability of secondary sources entailed arranging three separate research trips to the headquarters of the DPW and DOA in Pretoria.¹⁴ These trips took place between 18 October 2006 and 17 March 2007. During the course of these trips, meetings were arranged with departmental officials specifically assigned to the two programmes. The trips yielded commitments from departmental officials to assist the researcher with accessing documents that had not been found or were not available through initial library and internet searches (particularly fruitful in the case of CASP), and a commitment to facilitate access to departmental colleagues for a later phase of interviewing. The third research trip, which took place between 15 and 17 March 2007, was arranged to attend a workshop organised by the DOA, where findings were to be presented from an official review of the CASP programme.

¹⁴The researcher is based in Cape Town.
4.5.2 Primary source materials

Primary data on the operations of the EPWP and CASP programmes was informed through qualitative interviews. In total, 45 interviews were carried out by this study and constitute its primary source material. The bulk of these comprised interviews with programme-related officials with a smaller number of interviews with academics who had written on the subject of administrative capacity in the context of South African public administration. Preparation for interviewing began after the researcher had held initial face-to-face meetings with representatives of the DPW and DOA, which were preceded by a letter sent to the Heads of the two departments, which outlined the purpose of the research and made an official request for co-operation.

The organisation of interviews was purposive rather than random, the aim being to target a wide range of officials directly involved in the implementation of the two programmes. However, the sheer number of officials involved across various spheres of government meant that it was not possible to speak to a representative sample of officials. The targeting of interview respondents sought to cover a broad cross-section of officials primarily in senior level positions in their departments, where the span of responsibility resting with these officials could try to compensate for the challenge in both time and resources required to accommodate a representative sample. In the end, about 66 percent of the interviews held with government officials were with individuals in senior management (director and above), which is the highest functional level in the South African public service. The designations of the remaining government officials included those holding middle management and other supervisory designations, including assistant and deputy directors, senior and chief planners, and programme managers.

The interview roster began to take shape after requesting information from the DPW and the DOA on the implementing structures of the EPWP and CASP programmes respectively. This mainly took the form of a programme organogram, in the case of the EPWP, and a departmental organogram in the case of CASP. In the EPWP case, this was followed by a request for the names and contact details of senior officials heading the various functional components of the programme. These officials were then contacted individually by fax to request an interview. The fax covered the subject of the
research, and indicated that the researcher had already sent correspondence to the Department and had held an initial meeting with a member of the programme (on an earlier research trip). In the case of CASP, the researcher began to develop a roster by making face to face contact with a number of relevant senior officials attending the programme’s Review workshop held in March 2007, as well as requesting and then receiving the contact details of national and provincial department officials directly involved in the programme’s implementation.

Another source of primary material used in the analysis of interview data was a series of testimonials given by beneficiaries of the CASP programme. These testimonials were delivered during the course of a workshop reviewing the CASP programme, which the researcher attended in March 2007. As part of the Workshop’s agenda, programme beneficiaries representing South Africa’s various provinces were invited to address the gathering on their observations and experiences with CASP. In total, beneficiaries representing eight provinces addressed the gathering one by one, providing firsthand testimonials about their specific experiences. The researcher was able to record (in writing and in real time) the observations and cross-reference these with a recording captured by an official rapporteur at the review workshop. For the purposes of verifying these observations, relevant excerpts of the official rapporteur’s version were used in the analysis (see Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007, chapter 6). These did however correspond directly with what was captured by the researcher.\textsuperscript{15}

4.5.3 Interviewing protocols

The actual process of interviewing programme-related respondents involved the initial preparation of a small number of questions requesting respondents to describe the conditions that affected the capacity of their departments to carry out the programmes under study. Respondents were given some guidance in formulating their responses by indicating that the researcher was particularly interested in learning about environmental, strategic and structural factors, and a general description of these variables was given in accordance with the analytical framework employed by this study. Respondents were then requested to elaborate on these circumstances, with follow-up questions probing for greater detail guided by information that had already been conveyed by interviewees.

\textsuperscript{15}The researcher’s record of beneficiary testimonials is provided in appendix 2.
The interviewing of academics entailed a different process, which involved the preparation of a questionnaire, attached in appendix 1, which was emailed to a select group of academics who had written on the subject of capacity or who had contributed more broadly to the literature on public administration and development in South Africa. The researcher then arranged face to face interviews with each of the academics except one, which was held telephonically. The academic interviews held a dual purpose. The first and foremost aim was to supplement the limited local literature that this study was able to identify, which dealt with the subject of administrative capacity in a context characterised by public organisational restructuring and changing development policy mandates. The second purpose was to obtain a view from academics, based on their research and experience, on what they believed to be key constraints, present among the organisational and operational conditions through which public bodies carried out development programmes, which affected their capacity.

The questionnaire contained three questions:

1. What do you consider to be the key ‘inherent’ constraints that affect the capacity of South African public administrations to carry out development programmes? (see appendix 1 for an explanation of what was meant by ‘inherent’ constraints)

2. What is the impact that development programmes have had on the capacity of public administrations to carry out these interventions, which in practice took into account changing development policy mandates accompanying South Africa’s transition to democracy?

3. What are the key issues, associated with a development programme’s environment, strategy and structure, following Paul’s framework, which in your estimation affect the capacity of public administrations to carry out these initiatives?

4.5.4 Overview of interviews

The following illustrations give a statistical breakdown of the final interview sample. In the case of government officials and other stakeholders directly involved in the implementation of the two case programmes, a list covering the departments, date and
place of each interview is presented in appendix 3 to this thesis. The names and
designations of officials and programme stakeholders, excluding academics interviewed,
are not given in order to preserve the anonymity of the respondents.\textsuperscript{16} In total, 45
qualitative interviews were carried out. Figure 4.1 shows that these consisted of 37
interviews with a range of government officials and other principals directly involved in
the implementation of the EPWP and CASP programmes. Two further interviews were
held with other key informants. The first was with a senior official of the Public Service
Commission, which undertakes research on, among other things, the implementation of
development programmes by government bodies. The second was with a senior official
in the National Treasury (Department of Finance) responsible for monitoring and
evaluating inter-governmental financing instruments for service and programme
implementation, which included mechanisms used in both EPWP and CASP. Finally, six
interviews with public administration academics were also recorded.

Figure 4.1: Overall breakdown of interviews (N=45)

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & EPWP & CASP & Other & Academic \\
\hline
Number & 21 & 16 & 2 & 6 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

A further breakdown of the interviews is shown in figure 4.2, which shows the
organisational affiliation of each respondent.

\textsuperscript{16} Reference is made to Wengraf’s (2001: 187) discussion of anonymity and confidentiality in
qualitative interviews.
Before discussing the contents of figure 4.2, it must be conceded that, as with the selection of only two development programme cases, interviews with officials and other individuals associated with the two development programmes is not generalisable to all members directly involved in their implementation. This would have to potentially take into account a great many individuals functioning at various organisational levels in order to carry out the programmes. The selection of respondents therefore had to be more selective, where in respect of figure 4.2, the figures show that for the EPWP, the majority of interviews were held with officials attached to other national departments which, according to the programme’s structure, were required to contribute to the programme’s overall objective of encouraging labour-intensive expenditure in four sectoral areas: Infrastructure, Social, Economic, and Environment and Culture. In other words, the structure of the EPWP saw the bulk of implementation channelled to various national departments (and their provincial counterparts) whose contributions were clustered under the programme’s four sectors. A smaller collection of interviews were held with officials of the national Department of Public Works, which was designated as the programme’s co-ordinating department, and which entailed a responsibility to support as well as evaluate the sector-specific contributions of partnering national and provincial departments, and municipalities. This thesis was however able to interview DPW officials who retained a responsibility to co-ordinate all four sector areas which defined the study,
as well as DPW officials responsible for other key functional and administrative elements of the EPWP: training, monitoring and evaluation.

Finally, in accordance with the comment on generalisability, it should be noted that it was simply not feasible to extend interviewing to provincial department counterparts of national departments contributing to the EPWP, as well as municipalities, where all 283 local governments in the country were expected to contribute to the programme’s Infrastructure sector. An effort was however made to include within the national-level interviews, representatives of private sector entities, public entities and Members of Parliament who, as stakeholders, were directly involved in the programme’s implementation and who could speak firsthand about the experiences of sub-national departments. These interviews were included under ‘other’ in figure 4.2.

A similar logic was employed in purposively selecting CASP interviewees, where the bulk of these were held with officials of provincial departments of agriculture. According to the structure of CASP, provincial departments were allocated primary responsibility for implementing the programme. The researcher was able to interview officials from seven of South Africa’s nine provincial departments of agriculture, where an effort was made to contact officials in all provinces. In all cases, the officials that were selected for interview were directly responsible for co-ordinating or otherwise overseeing the implementation of CASP in their provinces. It must be restated that these officials were not the only members of provincial departments involved in the implementation of CASP, and so their observations cannot be generalised to those of all relevant provincial officials. A comparatively smaller number of interviews were held with officials of the DOA which, as with the DPW, retained responsibility for oversight, co-ordination and rendering support as part of the programme’s implementation. The relatively smaller number of DOA representatives did however include a full-time CASP Programme Manager, along with two senior officials responsible for performing direct strategic oversight over CASP. Interviews were also held with officials of the national Department of Land Affairs, which partnered the DOA in executing CASP, and with an official of the National Treasury responsible for overseeing budgeting for the agriculture and land affairs sectors. Finally, the researcher was also able to interview a member of a consultancy team which carried out an officially sanctioned mid-term review of CASP.
The ‘other’ category illustrated in figure 4.2 includes the two interviews held with senior officials in the Public Service Commission and the National Treasury mentioned earlier.

Figure 4.3 provides a breakdown of the formats used in the interviewing. The percentages are calculated on the total number of interviews held (45), and show that over 75 per cent of the interviews were held in person, whilst the remainder were conducted by telephone. Interviews by telephone, although not as favoured as face-to-face situations, have nonetheless been generally accepted in social scientific methodology, where time and costs present difficulties (Rubin and Rubin 1995: 141-142; Babbie 1998: 272). Time and cost constraints did arise for example when preparing to interview officials of provincial departments of agriculture, which were located in seven provinces. All but one of these interviews (excluding the Western Cape, where the researcher is based) was therefore conducted by telephone.

Figure 4.3 also shows that over 91 per cent of the interviews were tape-recorded, which enabled the researcher to prepare written transcripts of each interview conducted. An observation by Babbie (1998: 266) was instructive here: ‘[w]henever the questionnaire contains open-ended questions, those soliciting the respondent’s own answer, it is very

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17Before each interview respondents were asked if they would consent to the discussion being tape recorded. This was meant to ensure the accuracy of data collection.
important that the interviewer record that answer exactly as given’ where the ‘exactness is especially important because the interviewer will not know how the responses are to be coded before processing’. In the few cases where interviews were not recorded, this was due to the unavailability of recording equipment, the unexpected failure of recording equipment, and in one case a respondent requesting that the interview not be recorded. The written transcripts of the tape-recorded interviews comprised the source material for the later coding of interview data.

4.6 Approach to data analysis

The approach to analysing primary data (based on interviews) followed generally accepted procedures. In discussing the analysis of primary data, i.e. in the form of semi-structured interviews, Schmidt (2004: 255-256) defined the coding of interview data as the relating of particular passages in the text of an interview to categories, or the classification of material captured in an interview according to analytical categories. Another description of coding viewed it as a ‘process of grouping interviewees’ responses into categories that bring together the similar ideas, concepts, or themes you have discovered, or steps or stages in a process.’ (Rubin, H.J., Rubin, I.S. 1995: 238)

The key point stemming from these observations of how qualitative data is interpreted is the search for and discovery of themes that might be relevant to a particular research question.

To assist the process of coding interview data, this thesis used a pre-existing framework of analysis consisting of three variables and associated sub-variable categories defined by Paul (see chapter 3). This framework constituted what Schmidt (2004: 255-256) referred to as ‘analytical categories’, which represent a kind of explanatory guide derived from existing theoretical or conceptual thinking. The process of coding essentially entailed the identification of themes, patterns and commonalities in the text material of interviews, which were deemed relevant to the research question (see Esterberg 2002: 158). In other words, the text material of interviews was systematically analysed and categorised according to the variables in the analytical framework employed by this thesis, and coded where text material revealed conditions affecting the capacity of public organisations to carry out the development programmes under study.
In practice, this entailed initially preparing written transcriptions of all recorded interviews, where in the few cases where interviews were not able to be recorded, written notes were taken during the course of the interviewing. The physical process of coding involved breaking up interview data into distinct sections or segments, where these were then coded according to which variable and sub-variable categories these segments best corresponded with, in remarking on circumstances which affected the capacity of programme-implementing organisations. Table 4.2 below illustrates the coding process.

Table 4.2: Interview coding process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables employed (Samuel Paul)</th>
<th>Sub-variable categories</th>
<th>Coding process</th>
</tr>
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<td>3. Structure</td>
<td>3(a): Functional arrangements</td>
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Not all pieces of interview text were found to have been directly relevant in describing instances where a public organisation’s capacity to carry out a programme was affected. These segments of commentary tended to describe or raise more general points, issues or circumstances surrounding the functioning of the development programmes under study. These segments of interview text, which comprised useful background descriptions of the programmes, were separated from coded segments, and were subsequently brought into the analysis of each case where they could clarify or augment impressions coming out of the coded data.

Finally, the recording of interviews and the coding process itself was carried out with the aid of a computer and basic word processing software. Firstly, each interview was assigned a number so that the extraction of the contents of each could be easily traced back to its source interview. The researcher then went through each interview
individually, separating out each relevant segment of text and assigning a code to these, which corresponded with a relevant sub-variable category (see table 4.2 above). Interview data was then ready to be analysed. The process of analysing the final coded segments of interview text entailed an initial examination of these within each sub-variable category, which then moved to an analysis of each of the three major variable groups. Due to the qualitative nature of the study, and the fact that the interviews could not feasibly draw on a representative sample of officials directly involved in programme implementation, coded as well as un-coded interview data were analysed together, along with observations drawn from a range of secondary materials and other primary sources (CASP beneficiary testimonials) on each programme case, in an effort to generate a more comprehensive set of findings.

4.7 Reliability and validity

This chapter concludes the discussion on methodology by commenting on steps that were taken by this thesis to strengthen the reliability and validity of its results. Reliability in social science methodology has been defined as ensuring the dependability of data and the procedures used to record and document it (Flick 2002: 220-221). Peräkylä (1997: 203) has also remarked that the quality of tapes and transcripts has important implications for the reliability of what she termed conversation analytic research (i.e. interviews). Important elements of reliability include the selection of what is recorded, the technical quality of recordings, and the adequacy of transcripts (Peräkylä 1997: 206). This thesis did take what it regards as relevant steps to comply with these general expectations of reliability. This principally included the use of multiple sources of data for preparing the analysis (secondary literature plus primary interview data). In its audio recording of data, which covered over 91 per cent of respondents, this thesis captured the entire contents of interview sessions and subsequently prepared written transcripts of these sessions before coding could take place.

It has been said that validity involves the ‘correspondence between a theoretical paradigm and the observations made by the researcher’. (Peräkylä 1997: 212) Validity therefore refers to how the results of research are interpreted and arrived at. Kirk and Miller (1986: 29-30) have added that asking the wrong question is often the source of most validity errors. In trying to comply with expectations attending the validity of data,
this thesis consistently applied a tripartite (or three variable) framework of analysis in
collecting, presenting and analysing both secondary and primary data, the source of
which can be traced back through to this study’s research question. This ensured that
responses solicited from interviewees could be guided and ultimately linked back to this
study’s research question.

4.8 Methodological limitations

Although this chapter has already alluded to limitations experienced by this study, it is
necessary to collectively acknowledge these before proceeding to review the findings.
Firstly the selection of case programmes could not purport to be representative of and
generalisable to all public sector-implemented development programmes in South Africa,
since the choice of only two cases was taken in order to employ a more in-depth
qualitative enquiry in keeping with the exploratory (in other words, under-researched)
interpretation of administrative capacity being proposed by this thesis. A related
limitation was experienced at a data gathering level, where only a limited number of
interview respondents could be selected.¹⁸ In this regard, observations conveyed by
respondents cannot be considered representative of or generalisable to all government
officials and other individuals directly involved in the implementation of the two
programmes. With this said, and recalling a statement made in chapter 1, it should be
stated that this thesis was not intended to be an evaluation of the programmes in terms
of their end of term outputs, outcomes and impacts, which might be more sensitive to a
more extensive process of consultation with programming principals.

Having acknowledged these methodological limitations, it is necessary to state that, in
the pursuit of more scholarly insights into the organisational and operational conditions
under which development programmes functioned, and the effects on their capacity to
do so, it was necessary for this study to combine primary (e.g., interviews, questionnaire
to academics) and a large variety of secondary data sources, including published and
unpublished documents, in order to derive substantive impressions about the factors that
influence administrative capacity.

¹⁸ In a few instances requests for interviews were not responded to, or officials were unavailable.
4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has described the research methodology employed by this thesis to locate factors affecting the capacity of South African public sector organisations to carry out development programmes. The methodological approach adopted by this thesis consisted of a mixture of primary data, mainly in the form of qualitative interviews, and a variety of secondary materials including published as well as non-published documents accessed on the functioning of two development programme cases. The next series of chapters will present the findings of this study on these cases.
CHAPTER 5

COMPREHENSIVE AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME: BACKGROUND

5.1 A historical overview of the public agricultural sector and the issue of comprehensive agricultural support

This chapter will give a historical picture of the emergence of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). This will take account of the changing administrative circumstances accompanying South Africa’s transition to democracy in the mid-1990s, and its effect on the delivery of farmer support services. It is worth recalling for instance that prior to 1994 South Africa’s system of public administration was highly fragmented, and which according to the Public Service Commission (1995: 5-6), consisted of as many as eleven public services, each with its own legislation, structures, systems and personnel composition (see also Ncholo 2000: 89, 95). This structure was spawned by the government’s policy on race relations, or apartheid (see chapter 1), which had a profound effect on South Africa’s public agricultural sector. Lewis (1990: 43) for instance cited data showing that of the total arable land (in hectares) available in the territory of the white minority-controlled RSA (Republic of South Africa) and the African homelands, 84 per cent was within the RSA. It should also be noted that with the passage of the Natives Land Act (No. 27), the acquisition and hiring of land by Africans was restricted to areas designated for this purpose, which served as the genesis of the future homelands policy (Government Printer 1913). The political transition of the country to a non-racial democracy in 1994 would effectively result in these separate geographic and administrative zones being collapsed into a single geo-political entity.

The national Department of Agriculture (DOA), the forerunner of the pre-1994 department of the same name, is the primary organisational sponsor of CASP. Although the DOA along with other national departments underwent organisational restructuring as a result of the country’s political transition, the DOA had actually begun to render technical and related support to ‘emerging farmers’ in 1992, two years prior to the

19The term ‘emerging farmer’ has been used in the public agricultural sector to refer to black South Africans who were discriminated against under apartheid period governments.
beginning of large-scale public sector restructuring. A scan of DOA Annual Reports just prior to the South Africa’s political transition showed that the department had been involved in black farmer support activities of a kind not dissimilar to what would later emerge as CASP, as early as the 1992/1993 financial year. In its 1992-1993 Annual Report, the DOA (1993: 6) explained that a Chief Directorate called ‘Agricultural Advancement’ had been created, resulting from a Cabinet decision to phase out the Department of Development Aid (DDA), which was specifically mandated to support economic development in self-governing territories. The disestablishment of the DDA resulted in its agricultural functions and staff being assigned to the DOA. The new Chief Directorate was specifically tasked, through its Directorate: Farming Development, to essentially continue the work of the DDA by maintaining State land for the settlement of black farmers, and to support this constituency to achieve greater self-sufficiency and economic independence in production (Department of Development Aid 1992: 1, 41, 43). Other objectives of this Directorate were to:

- Support the planning of farming units on State land (originally purchased as quota land for self-governing territories) with the aim of establishing profitable and stable agriculture,
- Develop State land for the settlement of farmers on an economic basis,
- Select aspirant farmers in conjunction with the authorities of self-governing territories
- Coordinate after-care for established farmers

(Department of Agriculture 1993: 57)

Although the general form of these services was not unlike a continuation of efforts to support black farmers after 1994, it should be pointed out that prior to 1992/1993 the DOA did not render services to black farmers, where its functions were oriented towards assisting and regulating more established commercial agricultural activity in the then RSA, which due to factors such as land ownership restrictions involved primarily white farmers. Responsibility for supporting black farmers was largely assumed by a combination of homeland government departments of agriculture and other RSA national

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20 This can be confirmed for example by viewing the programming activities in annual reports of the DOA prior to 1992/1993.
departments, such as the Department of Development Aid and its predecessor the Department of Co-operation and Development. These entities were specifically charged with providing assistance to homeland governments in various aspects of social, economic and physical planning, which included agricultural production (Bureau for Economic Research 1976: 77-85; Department of Cooperation and Development 1985; Department of Development Aid 1987). The reintegration of the self-governing and homeland territories into the RSA bureaucracy from 1994, and the consequent disestablishment of departments such as the DDA, would result in the DOA taking on greater policy responsibility for black farmer support.

Before remarking on the content of these policy changes, it is necessary to describe the functional structure of the public agricultural sector as it coincided with South Africa’s transition to democracy. South Africa’s 1993 interim Constitution, which preceded the country’s first non-racial democratic elections, defined Agriculture as a provincial legislative competency in Schedule Six. Significant changes to the country’s political system after 1994, including the abandonment of policies designed to segregate populations based on race, was accompanied by a stronger socio-economic policy orientation aimed at redressing a nation-wide backlog of services that was most acutely experienced by the country’s black African population. This, coupled with a new governing party, the African National Congress, intent on substantiating this shift in policy direction through introducing measures such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), as well as establishing its own national executive authority, ultimately led to the national sphere of government retaining an influential hand in determining the future policy priorities of the public agricultural sector. A year after the 1994 political settlement, a government White Paper on Agriculture (1995) reflected this by acknowledging that although the agriculture function was provincialised, agriculture had a ‘national character as an integrated sector.’ The following year, South Africa’s final Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) confirmed this view by explicitly making agriculture a ‘concurrent’ or shared legislative competency between the national and provincial levels of government.

Perhaps the most significant early indication that South Africa’s 1994 political transition had prompted a sizeable shift in policy concerning support to black farmers came in 1995, with the publication of the Broadening Access to Agriculture Thrust (BATAT)
strategy. The BATAT initiative essentially represented the DOA’s post-apartheid reconstruction and development strategy, aimed at broadening access to agriculture for primarily black Africans who lacked or were subject to restricted access to land and agricultural production assistance under previous governments (Department of Agriculture 1995a: 1). The document in question, entitled: Preliminary Findings of the Broadening Access to Agriculture Thrust (1995) provided some clues about the thinking around why past administrative support to black farmers needed to change in view of the political transition that had occurred a year earlier. The document effectively argued that the entire spectrum of administrative support to black farmers had to be re-evaluated, implying that existent administrative functions in the agricultural sector would need to undergo some measure of reform in order to facilitate broadened access to a black farmer constituency. The scale of this reform was to apply to a range of agricultural services, including marketing, financial services, human resource development and training, technology, and agricultural extension. In other words, the intention was to bring black farmers into the commercially oriented mainstream functions of the DOA.

The policy ideal of ‘broadened access’ held potentially considerable administrative implications for the DOA. This was suggested by the comment that ‘the Government must not only ensure access to existing services for emergent and small farmers, but also ensure that they have a chance to prosper’ (Department of Agriculture 1995a: 3). The accompanying expectations was spelled out more explicitly in Chapter 9 of the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (Government Gazette 1994), which proposed a reformed policy agenda for the DOA, including:

To initiate, promote and support the contribution of Agriculture to the development of rural communities, society at large and the national economy, in order to enhance income, food security, employment and the quality of life in a sustainable way.

This was to be catered for programmatically through ‘entrepreneurial development with special reference to broadening access to agriculture’. A change in political circumstances had essentially brought with it a concomitant shift in the DOA’s historical, if brief, activities in providing direct production support to black farmers, where these efforts would henceforth need to be scaled up to mitigate the socio-economic consequences of food insecurity and unemployment (i.e., poverty), and to foster greater numbers of sustainable farmer entrepreneurs.
The earliest policy seeds of what would eventually grow into CASP can be traced back to the DOA’s first major articulation of this post-apartheid shift in policy. The CASP grew out of a relatively incremental and organic policy debate within the Department, beginning with the publication of a 1995 White Paper on Agriculture. The White Paper would pick up from where the RDP White Paper left off, by acknowledging an expectation that a transformed DOA would, in delivering services to black farmers in particular, ensure that this constituency would have a chance to prosper. The attendant challenges of meeting this expectation, where the political stakes of not demonstrating progress had increased in a non-racial democracy was rendered more difficult because the DOA was also being asked to maintain its traditional focus on supporting larger-scale commercial agricultural production. Section 2.2 of the White Paper (1995b: 7) noted for example that:

Agricultural production systems and practices will be organised in such a manner as to improve national as well as household food security. The Government should therefore support the full spectrum of production systems and practices, from urban food gardens and small-scale production for household incomes and food security to large-scale production systems which can add considerably to national food security.

This section of the White Paper was also prefaced by the statement that a country can be a net exporter of food whilst many of its people lived on the poverty line. The document’s acknowledgement that a post-apartheid DOA had to simultaneously support parallel production tracks in order to mitigate the adverse consequences of food and nutritional insecurity was largely driven by black farmer support. This departed from past orientations, by foregrounding the consequences of an absence of economic independence, self-reliance and sustainable income generation, contributing to a condition of poverty, which became more pronounced in policy terms after 1994.

This emphasis was renewed in 1998, when the DOA issued a further discussion document concerning agricultural policy in South Africa. In section 1.3, which dealt with ‘Agriculture, Rural Poverty and Food Security’, the document noted that departmental programmes were to be examined in terms of their direct and indirect contribution to household food security through their effect on rural incomes and the distribution of those incomes. The document argued more specifically that ‘Increasing the production of
small scale farmers will improve the availability and nutritional content of food, and hence food security generally among the poor.’ (Department of Agriculture 1998: 7)

Given that land was the primary material resource for rendering targeted agricultural support to black farmers, this issue would also become a prominent feature of the DOA’s policy on black farmer support after 1994. This again can be traced to the RDP White Paper, where the Agriculture Ministry was expected to settle and support new farmers on state land ‘in collaboration with the Department of Land Affairs and the provinces.’ Section 3.10 of the 1997 White Paper on Land Policy also argued that the beneficiaries of post-apartheid land reform initiatives\(^\text{21}\), designed to increase access to land for black Africans in particular, whose ownership access had been historically restricted (see earlier footnote), required the government to render financial, technical and marketing assistance to facilitate the productive use of land (See: http://www.gov.za Accessed 5 September 2006).

Before CASP was even on the policy map, the land element entered into the agricultural support equation with the introduction in 2000 of a Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme, designed jointly by a national Department of Land Affairs (DLA) and the DOA, which after 1994 were clustered under a single Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs (2000: 13-14). The creation after 1994 of a separate national Department of Land Affairs was testament to the significance of redressing land restriction policies practiced under apartheid. The purpose of LRAD was to facilitate access to land for agricultural production purposes by black South Africans, who were previously discriminated against, through assisting these individuals to purchase land through matching grants. Under LRAD, The DLA administered grant applications for the purchase of land for agricultural use, and assisted applicants throughout the purchasing process. The DOA was then required to provide extension services to advise and assist grantees with agricultural production activities. (Department of Land Affairs 2002?: 11)

Despite the building-in of the land question into black farmer support activities, the Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture published in 2001 observed that greater administrative attention needed to be given to the ‘support’ element. The Plan argued

\(^{21}\)Includes programmes in land restitution and land redistribution, carried out by the Department of Land Affairs.
that whilst considerable organisational energy and funding had been expended on facilitating access to land for new entrants to farming since 1994, ‘less attention has been given to farmer support programmes’ \(^{22}\) (Department of Agriculture 2001a: 9). It added that post land settlement support to participants in land reform programmes had been organised on an ad hoc basis (ibid: 9). A similar observation was made in the government’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Review on agriculture which preceded the introduction of CASP in 2004 (National Treasury 2003a: 134). In the DOA’s 2002/3 Annual Report (2003: 35), it appeared as if this message was being heard, where a sum of R3, 7 million was transferred to provincial departments for what was described as LRAD support, ‘as part of the initial phasing in of the Comprehensive Farmer Support Package’.

The way was then being paved for the first substantive policy description of what was to become the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme or ‘CASP’ in 2003. In one of the first descriptions of the Programme, it was evident that in addition to supporting land reform, the programme’s policy heritage could be traced back to the very foundations of post-apartheid policy thinking on black farmer support. The document cited the following as constituting the policy framework for CASP:

- The BATAT (Broaden Access to Agricultural Thrust) Strategy (1995)
- The Strauss Commission Report (1996), which investigated the provision of rural financial services, stressed the financial impediments faced by black farmers in growing and consolidating viable farming businesses, and ultimately to prosper, as recorded a year earlier in the BATAT document. The significance of the Strauss Commission’s findings for CASP is seen in the programme’s inclusion of a financial assistance service pillar, namely MAFISA. (Commission of Inquiry into the Provision of Rural Financial Services, Strauss Commission 1996: 72)

\(^{22}\)Examples of black farmer support interventions introduced after 1994 included a Grant Assistance for Small-Farming Development Scheme, which saw the provision of grant assistance for the development of infrastructure in the small farming sector. The Department’s 1996-1997 Annual Report (1997: 1, 59) indicated that R42,9 million was transferred to provincial departments to support seventy-four projects under the scheme.
5.2 Conclusion

This historical background to the introduction of CASP was designed to present a limited yet pertinent set of facts about the evolution of black farmer support in South Africa’s post-apartheid public agricultural sector, until the official launch of CASP in 2004. Chapter 6 will engage in a more extensive discussion and analysis of the findings from interviews together with an analysis of secondary materials, which together will be used to identify factors found to have influenced the capacity of CASP’s implementing organisations to carry out the programme.
CHAPTER 6
COMPREHENSIVE AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME:
CASE STUDY

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will present an analysis of findings from interviews conducted mainly with officials of the national Department of Agriculture (DOA) and as many as seven of South Africa’s nine provincial departments of Agriculture, which together have been charged with implementing the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme. In total, 16 qualitative interviews were conducted for the CASP case study. Findings from the interviews were analysed together with a reading of secondary literature sourced on the programme, which included a range of documents covering official programme and other government reports, speeches, presentations, and statistical data. These primary and secondary sources were analysed together in order to locate and explain factors found to have influenced the capacity of implementing organisations to carry out CASP. The analysis will be structured according to the three variables of ‘strategy’, ‘environment’, and ‘structure’, as adapted from Paul’s work on public-sector implemented development programmes, and will be assessed against the assumptions contained in his description of these variables, as outlined in chapter 3.

6.2 The ‘strategy’ variable

A development programme’s strategy as adapted from Paul’s framework encompasses the following three elements: the objectives specified by the government for the programme, how these objectives are translated into operating goals and actions plans, and how resources are allocated to a programme. Prior to the analysis of interviews, an initial but superficial impression of possible factors associated with the strategic make-up of CASP, which could have affected the capacity of its implementing bodies, was observed in a November 2006 briefing to a new Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs (Lulama Xingwana). This included references to ‘lack of capacity’, which in this context meant human resources in the form of engineers and economists; a lack of understanding of procurement procedures, which also entailed a resourcing issue; and
poor planning and alignment of planning structures, including with land reform programmes (Department of Agriculture. 2006a: 11).

A more in-depth search and analysis of factors influencing the capacity of CASP implementing organisations, which goes beyond this more symptomatic portrayal, will now be presented in relation to each of the three sub-variable elements of the strategy variable. This will begin with the objectives specified for the programme by the South African government.

6.2.1 Factors associated with CASP programme objectives

The content of the objectives specified by a government for a development programme could constitute a factor(s) affecting the capacity of its implementing bodies to carry it out. This may yield direct and possibly adverse effects, according to Paul, depending on a number of conditions: the congruence between political objectives and how these are translated into on-the-ground implementation goals and plans; and the level of space accorded to implementing officials to determine how best to achieve, at an operational level, a programme’s objectives, where the content of the latter allows for this flexibility (Paul 1983: 58). Depending on the content of these conditions, the objectives of a development programme could yield factors that are influential to understanding the capacity of its implementing bodies to act. In the case of CASP, it is first necessary to outline the objectives specified for the programme by the South African government.

In a speech preceding the launch of CASP in 2004, the then Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs Thoko Didiza stated that the ‘overall aim of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme is to provide post settlement support to beneficiaries of the Land Reform processes - namely restitution, land redistribution - including LRAD and in the coming period, land tenure reform.’ (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2004) The Minister’s statement not only confirmed the close sectoral relationship that existed between the agriculture and land affairs portfolios, over which she held joint executive authority, but also conceded that a ‘gap’ had developed in providing agricultural support to beneficiaries who had newly acquired land. To this end, the Minister also revealed that budget increases in land delivery to facilitate access to land had ‘not been matched
adequately by the agricultural budget, posing a threat to sustainability of agricultural programmes as highlighted in the case of land restitution and LRAD specifically’ (ibid)

The objective imperative stemming from the Minister’s statement has its roots in the historical issue of access to land for agricultural purposes, where it was mentioned in chapter 5 that access to and ownership of land for black Africans was severely restricted under apartheid-period legislation. In an effort to remedy this situation, the DOA commented on how it would support a government-wide commitment after 1994 to promote black Economic Empowerment (BEE), by ‘contribut[ing] through its existing programmes to increasing access and acquisition of agricultural land by black South Africans;' (Department of Agriculture 2004a: 11). Moreover, this document made specific reference to CASP when discussing government initiatives in relation to ‘agricultural support services’ (ibid: 14).

The objective significance of the land issue for CASP was clearly identified in the programme’s Business Plan Framework (Department of Agriculture, Not dated a: 5). This document indicated that 70 per cent of the funding allocated to provincial departments in the form of a grant for CASP must be directed at land reform initiatives and their corresponding beneficiaries, including programmes such as LRAD and the government’s Land Restitution Programme.

23 The importance of the land reform sector to CASP was also signalled in a preliminary interview with the DOA, where the Department pointed out that agreement on realistic medium-term expenditure for CASP (according to a three-year funding cycle) was largely dependent on the setting of land reform targets. 24 Moreover, the conditions attached to CASP’s Grant Framework (Government Gazette 2005b, 2004b) also included amongst its ‘measurable objectives/outputs’, the ‘number’ of targeted beneficiaries, in other words from land reform programmes, gaining access to agricultural support services.

23One of the first tasks that a post-apartheid government set itself was the establishment of a Land Claims Commission, which was mandated to investigate cases involving past statutory dispossession of lands occupied by black Africans (Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 1996: 7).
24Interview national Department of Agriculture, 7 December 2006, Department of Agriculture offices, Pretoria.
25CASP also accommodated non land reform beneficiaries, that is, clients who had been able to acquire land through private means.
The Minister’s description of CASP, together with the sectoral commitments made under the AgriBEE and the programme’s funding guidelines, indicates that CASP shouldered a significant responsibility to provide support to existing government land reform initiatives. An additional element embedded in the aim of providing post-settlement support to beneficiaries of land reform concerned the issue of ‘support’. This was spelled out elsewhere by the DOA, where ‘[t]he aim of (CASP) is to enhance the provision of support services to promote and facilitate agricultural development targeting the beneficiaries of the land and agrarian reforms’ (Department of Agriculture 2004c: 1). In a presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Agriculture in the same year, the DOA also described the aim of CASP as being to ‘enhance the provision of support services’ (Department of Agriculture 2004b: 2).

Seeking to enhance the provision of agricultural support services suggests that CASP was also developed in order to improve the efficacy of existing support services being delivered by the public agricultural sector. The strategic significance of enhancing the provision of existing agricultural support services was captured in the DOA’s (2003?: 10-11; see also Department of Agriculture 2004c: 9-10) first major description of the programme, which situated CASP in the context of a 2003-2006 Strategic Plan for the Department of Agriculture, as well as the National Treasury’s (Department of Finance) 2003 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review of the agricultural sector. The former observed problems with the alignment and co-ordination of ‘deliverables in agriculture’. The latter described ongoing measures in the sector to ‘develop common budget programmes’ in the provinces and align these with the separate budget programme structure of the DOA.

The objective of enhancing the provision of agricultural support services in the context of a more coherently aligned intergovernmental framework has also been recognised in the statutory conditions attached to CASP’s grant funding, which will be discussed in a later section dealing with the programme’s resourcing. For present purposes though, the conditional Framework attached to the disbursement of CASP funding stated that:

The development of support services is a national priority given that they will enhance the productive capacity and economic success of resource limited land users; households and communal food producers; beneficiaries of the Land Reform and Agrarian Reform Programmes
The aim of enhancing the provision of agricultural support services is also consistent with a number of objectives/outputs attached to CASP’s funding mechanism, including: increased access to and improvement in the quality of agricultural support services provided to targeted beneficiaries, and improvement in the capacity of the departments of agriculture (at provincial level) to deliver agricultural support services (ibid).

In summary, the objectives specified for CASP by the Government of South Africa were essentially twofold: firstly to provide post-settlement agricultural support to beneficiaries of land reform, and secondly to enhance the provision of existing agricultural support services by improving intergovernmental co-ordination and programming between the national and provincial departments of Agriculture. It is against this background that the findings from interviews will be assessed, to obtain some impression of the effect that CASP’s objectives have had on the capacity of implementing bodies to carry out the intervention.

Those interviews which did express concerns about the objectives of CASP pertained exclusively to the provision of post-settlement agricultural support to beneficiaries of land reform, where these essentially coalesced around an objective distinction that was being drawn in practice between the programme’s concentration on the needs of land reform beneficiaries, versus the more limited portion of funding that could be directed at non land reform beneficiaries. This included concerns about the widening of the programme to assist inexperienced, in agricultural terms, new land entrants (beneficiaries of land reform), and the extent to which some provincial implementing bodies felt able to enhance the production sustainability and economic success of a beneficiary pool that was expected to overwhelmingly cater to new entrants (70 per cent). One potential consequence of the objective constraint referred to above was portrayed in the following passage from an interview:

I think a problem with CASP at the moment is that it’s … all things for all people and we need to have a serious discussion around whether or not it CASP should remain this kind of broad extension support fund, or whether it should be...
narrowed in focus to become something more clearly defined, perhaps a commercial farmer development programme

Another interviewee also believed that CASP was too broad in its focus and that it needed to be narrowed around a clearer definition of ‘commercialisation’, expressing a more gradual movement of producers from subsistence towards commercialisation or moving farmers ‘from stage one to stage two’. An expressed need for CASP to narrow its focus around commercialisation indirectly appeared to harbour concerns about the level of farming/production experience displayed by the beneficiaries being prioritised, remembering that CASP implementing bodies were required to direct 70 per cent of allocated funds to individuals that had recently gained access to land via state-sponsored land reform programmes. The implication in these references is that CASP, as it was initially designed, was likely to be heavily constrained in the extent to which it could assist beneficiaries to achieve commercially viable production. This suggests a possible tension between one of its core objectives: providing post-settlement support to land reform beneficiaries, and a key output of its second core objective: strengthening existing agricultural support services, which was intended to enhance the ‘productive capacity and economic success’ of its beneficiaries.

Other interviews with provincial departments, tasked with the on-the-ground implementation of CASP, further indicated that this objective constraint also manifested itself in the form of risks being assumed in directly servicing the programme’s land reform clientele in particular. One provincial official for instance contested the requirement that 70 per cent of monies allocated for CASP had to be directed at land reform beneficiaries, arguing that it posed ‘a very huge challenge’ for their department. They also added the following, which hardened the distinction between land reform and non-land reform beneficiaries:

[T]here’s a guy who buys himself a farm through the bank, he’s been trying to make ends meet, never received any kind of support from government at all … and then now you are dictated to by CASP to look after the person who has been given funding to buy that farm, and also who probably has had a bit of change to buy a few things over and above the land, and now you are forced to ignore a person who has never received anything from government, who has tried hard to show …this person, because he was prepared to use his money, that this man has got passion for this thing, and now you are forced to take on board a person who might be a risk
The official clearly viewed servicing land reform beneficiaries as being a greater risk for their department as compared to beneficiaries who had risked their own resources and therefore appeared to display a greater determination to farm. It was also evident in this description that the Department was concerned about the sustainability of projects and its investment in those involving land reform beneficiaries, compared to projects involving apparently more committed producers. An official in another province expressed a similar sentiment:

> We really have seen that land reform farmers are people who are just pushed into farming by virtue of the right that they have, whereas there are people who go and buy farms themselves, and those are real farmers because those people have passion, and they take risks, those are business people. And CASP is not supporting those people, except by training.

A sharper distinction between land reform farmers and other farmers was again being drawn in practice, and linked to characteristics such as potential, risk taking, and attitude, which can be traced back to questions about the potential of CASP to encourage commercially viable agricultural production. Finally, other comments offered by an official in a third province took a slightly different tack in observing a lack of farming capability in land reform beneficiaries, and its extraordinary effect on the servicing department. The official described new entrants as ‘not understanding the environment of agriculture … I think that’s our biggest challenge at this stage is that we are not working with traditional farmers’, where their department is not using CASP on people ‘whose got a history in agriculture’. The official commented that ‘[w]e are not looking, in the selection process, we are not looking at the client, who are bringing into agriculture here, we are not selecting the farmers out there, … [s]ometimes those farmers just haven’t got the capability to farm’.

Overall, factors emanating directly from the makeup of CASP’s objectives were mentioned by just over half of the provincial departments (four) interviewed for this thesis, where this study might uncover more explicit capacity-related consequences of the programme’s objective makeup in other strategy-related sub-variables (e.g., operational goals and plans, resource allocation). Having said this, of those interviews that did offer relatively pointed critiques of CASP’s objective framework, it was at least evident in the context of Paul’s discussion of a programme’s objectives that the
conditions under which the programme was expected to direct support to beneficiaries of land reform programmes (70 per cent requirement), generated concerns amongst a number of observers and provincial officials about the relative circumstances of this constituency (including limited farming background, potential and commitment, and commercial viability) and its potentially burdensome effect on the capacity of provincial departments to render effective services. These concerns also revealed the limited flexibility that provinces appeared to have had in defining the land reform beneficiary audience being prioritised in the objectives of CASP. 26

The next section will look at factors associated with the translation of CASP’s objectives into operating goals and plans.

6.2.2 Factors associated with CASP’s operating goals and planning

The operational planning of a development programme refers to how its objectives are translated into goals and action plans, and how these are affected by its environment. The assumption is that the conditions under which the translation and environmental influences occurs, may provide clues about the effect on an implementing organisation’s capacity to carry out a programme.

Firstly, the specification of a development programme’s operating goals and actions plans have been recognised by Paul as being intimately entwined with its broader policy objectives. It was earlier observed that the conditions under which CASP’s implementing bodies could influence the shape of the programme’s beneficiary audience was largely limited in view of the objective emphasis directed at servicing land reform beneficiaries. This was found to have elicited uneasiness amongst officials of some provincial departments about the relative agricultural potential and commitment of these beneficiaries and the attendant difficulties this posed for rendering support services. Beyond the limited space accorded to provincial departments to influence the shape of CASP’s beneficiary constituency, and in view of the twofold objective of CASP, it would also be necessary to observe the conditions under which the DOA along with provincial departments were expected to enhance existing agricultural support service delivery, where Paul (1982: 110) has suggested that ‘some situations yield greater flexibility to

26This point will be developed in a later discussion on the environment of CASP.
the program manager [or in this case the provincial implementing departments] to choose, interpret and sequence operating goals’. It would consequently be necessary for this thesis to enquire into the conditions relating to the interpretation, selection and sequencing of support services available under CASP, and the implications for and effects on implementing body capacity.

Outlining the conditions that affected the interpretation, selection and sequencing of support services under CASP begins with the observation that the programme borrowed extensively from the BATAT strategy (1995), in terms of its twofold objectives of providing post-settlement agricultural support to beneficiaries of existing land reform initiatives and enhancing the provision of existing agricultural support services. The idea under BATAT was to improve black farmer access to support in various mainstream services that were already being provided by the public agricultural sector in South Africa, such as marketing, financial services, technology, and extension. CASP essentially borrowed from this approach by focusing on the provision of support services in six areas or so-called service ‘pillars’:

1. Information and knowledge management
2. Technical and advisory assistance, and regulatory services
3. Marketing and business development
4. Training and capacity building
5. On/off farm infrastructure
6. Financial support
The process through which South Africa’s public agricultural sector was expected to plan the delivery of the six service pillar areas was guided by the observation that ‘[t]he roles of the nine Provincial Departments of Agriculture in implementing CASP is being articulated through the Intergovernmental Review Process’ (Department of Agriculture 2003?: 18). This process has its roots in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution, which designated agriculture as a concurrent or shared function between the national and provincial spheres of government. Reference to this process was therefore a formal acknowledgement of the country’s constitutional framework for inter-governmental relations, which constitutes a formal system of revenue-sharing and planning in which programmes such as CASP have to operationally adhere to.

The operational realities of this inter-governmental system of service delivery were marked however by a public agricultural sector that had in the past, and as noted earlier, experienced ‘deficits in service delivery’ in its attempts to promote food and agricultural production, which furthermore saw a ‘fragmentation of service delivery within the three tiers of government’ (Department of Agriculture 2004c). The response of CASP was correspondingly aimed at removing ‘limitations in effective service delivery within the 27

Regulatory services was subsumed under technical and advisory assistance, and financial support was brought in as a sixth pillar.
agricultural sector’, and developing a mechanism for enhancing provincial programming and budgeting for farmer support as well as progressively aligning provincial activities with national priorities overseen by the DOA (2003?: 16, 11). The operational imperative of alignment was then married with the strategic objective of enhancing the provision of post-settlement (agricultural) support services. This was further projected in operational terms into a scenario where ‘the provincial departments of Agriculture are implementing and managing CASP activities and functions on behalf of the National Department of Agriculture (DOA)’ (Department of Agriculture, Not dated b: 3). The operational consequences of this arrangement has seen the national department assume a role that, in practice, is largely defined by oversight, monitoring, guidance and support to provincial departments. This has been translated into the following responsibilities:

- Agreement on outputs and targets with provincial departments of agriculture in line with grant funding objectives
- Providing guidelines and criteria for the development and approval of business plans by provinces
- Monitoring implementation
- ‘Provide[ing] Support’
- Submitting quarterly performance reports to National Treasury (Department of Finance) and Parliament (National Council of Provinces)
- Submitting allocation criteria, MTEF allocations and the final conditional grant framework relating to this grant to National Treasury
- Submitting approved business plans to National Treasury

Source: Government Gazette 2005b

With regards to its oversight and monitoring role, the operational procedures associated with CASP required the DOA to convene a National Assessment Panel to evaluate and approve business plans submitted by provincial departments. The Panel was expected to comprise designated departmental officials and representatives of the Department of Land Affairs, given the programme’s land reform beneficiary audience. The Panel was further tasked with ensuring that provincially generated business plans complied with the conditions underpinning the grant that provinces received to implement CASP (Department of Agriculture, Not dated b: 2). A service delivery agreement was then
agreed between provincial departments of agriculture and the DOA, which constituted a ‘commitment by provinces to implement and manage the [CASP grant] allocation and function in their provinces’ (ibid). The sign-off on this agreement triggered the transfer of funds to provinces, which according to the grant Framework was disbursed according to a staggered payment schedule.

The Business Plan Framework devised by the DOA (Not dated a) for CASP appears to provide some scope for provincial departments to define their CASP interventions according to the agricultural circumstances prevailing in their jurisdictions, so long as their proposed activities are consistent with the service pillars of CASP, and in line with the objective emphasis on beneficiaries of land reform programmes (the 70 per cent rule). Having said this, the Framework does not appear to go so far as to prescribe a uniform model for how CASP interventions ought to be made by provincial departments in the six service areas. (Department of Agriculture 2005b: 11). Furthermore, apart from provinces being expected to comply with specific reporting conditions, and demonstrating ‘confirmed capacity to implement projects and operational funding to support this capacity’ the conditions in the grant framework under which provincial departments received monies for CASP were limited to utilising funds ‘to supplement provincial budgets in order to improve and increase farmer support services within the CASP framework’ (Government Gazette 2005b, see also Government Gazette 2004b), and according to the service pillars illustrated in figure 6.1. This appears consistent with the second objective of CASP, which was to enhance existing agricultural support services. Overall, these conditions suggest that provincial departments of Agriculture, which were handed the primary task of implementing CASP services under the guidance, oversight and support of the DOA, assumed relatively greater flexibility to at least select and sequence the provision of the programme’s six service pillars in their jurisdictions.

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28CASP’s Operational Manual described this as provincial departments ‘Agree[ing] to use allocated funds for agreed programmes under the comprehensive package’ (Department of Agriculture 2005b: 11).
29‘Capacity’ in this usage was not defined.
30Relative to the limited flexibility afforded to provincial departments of Agriculture in defining the Programme’s beneficiary audience, where 70 per cent of funds received for CASP were required to be directed at land reform beneficiaries.
With this background in mind, findings from interviews began with what could be described as a generally expected outcome made by an independent analyst of CASP, who indicated that provincial departments of Agriculture were exercising considerable room in interpreting the delivery of agricultural services targeted by the programme. The interviewee recounted the following:

[T]he problem lies with the kind of monitoring systems that are in place ... there is a great deal of recalcitrance, if you can put it that way, in the provinces, where they're basically spending CASP on their core functions, what they see as important, and the monitoring systems are not really picking that up because the focus of monitoring at this point is really on expenditure ... are they hitting their expenditure targets ... but no one's actually going out to look at where are they and what are they spending that money, and I think that's a major weakness in the programme

This description is noteworthy however in pointing to a 'problem' concerning the apparently wide operational discretion being exercised by provincial departments in what they allocated CASP monies on, suggesting that what they regarded as priorities might differ from the DOA's expectations. It also spoke directly to Paul's (1982: 122; 1983: 102) description of a development programme's monitoring processes, and specifically the emphasis on observance of procedures and rules compared to 'performance' outputs. These rules encompassed among other things, 'budgetary control', which in this case clearly involved provincial expenditure. Moreover, a DOA official interviewed for this study similarly recalled, with reference to the Department's monitoring of provincial implementation, that 'it's typically been, "get your spending up", that's what we've been doing in the past, but I think even in future we'll be looking to use these [monitoring] teams to look at other issues that arise.' Paul (1983: 102) offered a more frank description of a development programme's monitoring processes, arguing that '[t]hose who monitor and control programmes are concerned about how money was spent and whether the proper procedures were followed.'

A more detailed analysis of interviews together with secondary sources appeared to give greater definition to what might have contributed to this problem. This suggests an operational vacuum created by insufficiently developed and incoherently applied national implementation guidelines having influenced the apparent operational flexibility being exercised by provincial departments, and which might have otherwise impaired the
monitoring ability of the DOA to ensure that alignment between national and provincial service priorities was being attained.

Other findings based on analysis of more extensive interview data seemed to portray a more nuanced picture to that described by the interviewee however, where the apparent operational flexibility being exercised by provincial departments did not appear to encompass the selection and sequencing of service pillars, but may have been confined to how the various services available under CASP were to be implemented. This moreover could have arisen as a consequence of insufficient national guidelines having been drafted. Indeed it appeared that the programme’s objective of providing post-settlement agricultural support, and the key land reform beneficiary constituency being targeted by this objective, limited the capacity of provincial departments to exercise flexibility in the selection and sequencing of service pillars, where the rules encountered in rendering agricultural support services to land reform beneficiaries also constrained provincial as well as national department capacity. Before discussing these issues, evidence outlining the insufficiency of implementation guidelines will be discussed.

One of the responsibilities of the DOA in CASP’s implementation was the provision of guidelines and criteria for the development and approval of business plans by provincial departments. Interview findings revealed that there was some degree of ambiguity and related confusion expressed by provincial officials in particular about the existence of implementation and project assessment guidelines, where one official interviewed at the National Treasury indirectly remarked on the inadequacy of guidelines: ‘[i] think we need to get guidelines … assessment of applications, what measure do you use to say this guy deserves … one Rand and this one two Rand’ This remark was situated in a broader context in which the interviewee questioned the existence of a criteria or set of guidelines against which applications for funding could be assessed. An official of a provincial department of Agriculture was more direct on this score:

When you dedicate a new programme to provinces, also have to give guidelines to how that must be administered, also have to give capacity to such, and I think that’s what lacks from national. It’s not uniform across the provinces as to how CASP is managed. You never got any dedicated admin budget, but also guidelines as to how we should operate it.
Insufficiently clear and consistent implementation guidelines were also indirectly evident in this input from an official of another provincial department:

I think the other problem ... that's confusing us is mixed messages from national departments [sic] that's running with CASP ... one moment they will tell you but you can buy inputs out of CASP, the next moment they say no ... it's a commercial project you can't buy inputs, if it's a food security project you can buy. You can't buy machinery from CASP or a tractor here, but they allow other provinces to buy that or one other province to buy that ... you cannot buy for example tractors, you cannot buy inputs from CASP if it's a commercial project, now they're not quite clear the definition when is a project a commercial project and when is it a food security project, you see so where do you draw the line?

Inadequately developed implementation guidelines appeared consistent elsewhere in an interview with an official of the DOA, who reported that after three years of implementation there were ‘no norms and standards’ linked to the implementation of CASP’s various service pillars, or as it later emerged in the interview, that these were insufficiently detailed in a form that they could be clearly ‘measured’. 31 A similar conclusion was drawn by the authors of an officially sanctioned independent review of CASP which took place in 2006/2007, although they failed to draw a distinction between conditions governing service pillar selection and sequencing, and conditions affecting ‘how’ services were to be rendered. The review submitted that ‘[t]he objectives and outcomes set for the programme are not measurable, and at a provincial level CASP appears to have become a simple extension service with no strategic objectives or frameworks guiding and informing the targeting and nature of implementation.’ (Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 98). Further scrutiny of secondary documentation did however reveal that norms and standards had in fact been published, but that these seemed to be available for only two of the programme’s six service ‘pillars’, those for on/off farm infrastructure and marketing (Department of Agriculture 2005c: 16, 17; Department of Agriculture. 2004c: 18). Imprecision around this issue suggests that implementation guidelines were insufficiently developed in breadth, to capture all six of the programme’s service pillars, as well as in depth, in terms of their degree of measurability.

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31This arose in a follow-up telephone interview on 14 June 2007. This reference might also explain the earlier comment by an independent analyst of CASP about the provinces spending programme monies on their core functions, or what they saw as important, where the monitoring systems were ‘not really picking that up’
The likely consequences of deficiencies in the specification and consistent application of implementation guidelines concerning CASP’s service pillars may have also contributed to the quality of business planning processes in provincial departments. A DOA official observed for instance that, ‘[a]nd at the same time, they [provinces] will just submit [business plans] because they’ll know a year in advance how much they are getting as provinces so they’ll just thumb-suck and send provincial business plans … but when they are to implement, the problem is, if you don’t have a business plan which is implementable, it becomes a problem’ Overall it would appear that insufficiently developed and in other cases inconsistently applied operating guidelines hindered the ability of provincial departments to effectively plan their service interventions, whilst also affecting the capacity of the DOA to render effective monitoring, other than through a more narrow expenditure lens.

Further analysis revealed other instances where this time both national and provincial department planning capacity was being adversely affected (through implementation delays) by a persistent procedural disjuncture between CASP and land reform programmes managed by the national Department of Land Affairs (DLA). The disjuncture essentially created a gap between the accessing of land through land reform programmes and the provision of agricultural support services under CASP. In keeping with the requirement that 70 per cent of grant funding allocated to the provinces for CASP needed to be directed at beneficiaries of land reform programmes, the idea was for agricultural support services to be rolled out to these clients after they had obtained access to land through programmes administered by the DLA. Several Interviews revealed that there remained a temporal disjuncture between the rules by which land reform programmes, such as LRAD, operated, and those underpinning the functioning of CASP, which essentially resulted in a gap between the accessing of land by new entrants and their acquisition of post-settlement support via CASP. The persistency of the problem was explained by one DOA official:

CASP money gets attached to projects after the project is already launched, so there’s some sort of period of delay … between, for example land affairs purchases land and transfers land to a beneficiary, the actual CASP money can only be added to that for … even if the timing is correct, in terms of, even if the application for CASP money arrives when this transfer is taking place … it’s still a year later probably only that the money will be available because of the bureaucratic process of obtaining money through national department … we’ve
got to fix that mechanism so that it is more in synch, exactly how we do that is not quite sure, because there’s also an allocation, the total pot across nine provinces … but certainly that’s what we’re looking at.

An official of the DLA described a similar set of circumstances:

But now with CASP, the problem has always been, they [beneficiaries] cannot even begin to apply for CASP … only once we’ve got the land for them then they can go to their PDA and apply for grants, and that gap there has always been a problem, because it would have been an ideal situation for them to apply for CASP while they still applying for their funds for land … so that the whole … it happens simultaneously, so that after buying the land they don’t have to wait for implements and other … so that has always been the administrative problem that we have

Another DLA official explained that the DLA and DOA had recognised the problem and had come up with what was termed ‘CASP and LRAD alignment’, where the departments had agreed to try to synchronise the release of monies for the purchase of land under LRAD, and the accessing of post-settlement support under CASP. This was described as ‘trying to align their [DOA] funding structure because they are different’.

A particular problem arising from the existence of this inter-departmental procedural gap was elsewhere described by one DLA official interviewed, where it was found that the gap in time between the provision of land and the subsequent availability of agricultural support services held potentially harmful consequences for would-be beneficiaries as a result of their economic circumstances. It could also have adversely affected the capacity of provincial departments of Agriculture to service available land reform recipients:

It has been realized that we will give land today, and CASP intervention will come at a later stage, by then maybe the project has already disappeared or the project has got problems with regard to sustainability, because you’ll find that beneficiaries can’t continue with their activities because they still lacking financial support or other support that might be relevant to the project

Interestingly, a different manifestation of a planning disjuncture between CASP’s post-settlement support and DLA-administered access to land programmes was observed in the secondary literature on the programme. This referred to observations that in some projects beneficiaries had received support for similar purposes from CASP and DOA-
administered land reform programmes, and were therefore judged to have received an unnecessarily high-level/duplication of support. This was termed ‘double-dipping’ (Department of Agriculture 2005c: 14).\footnote{This was also revealed in a follow-up phone interview with an official in the DOA, 14 June 2007.} One possible source of the problem was traced to confusion between the criteria for support given under CASP, compared to that given under LRAD. Findings from the Eastern Cape province of South Africa contained in a CASP review report indicated that there was lack of a ‘clear linkage’ between LRAD and CASP, where beneficiaries of the former programme were already in possession of business plans, suggesting possible confusion around how the post-settlement support available under CASP was supposed to differ from what was being considered under LRAD (Department of Agriculture 2005d: 59).

In another CASP Progress report, the key responsibilities of the DLA were said to include: ‘[p]rovid[ing] land acquisition grants under the LRAD (and ensure that the agricultural component is also financed) and planning grant’ (Department of Agriculture 2004c: 8), where it was difficult to detect how ensuring financing for the ‘agricultural component’ and providing a ‘planning grant’ differed from services being offered under CASP. Moreover, in another description of LRAD published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (2000: 7) under which the two separate departments of Land Affairs and Agriculture operated, it was noted that the grant support available through LRAD could be used for more than just the acquisition of land, where it could be employed to cover expenses incurred in making ‘land improvements, infrastructure investments, capital assets and short-term agricultural inputs’. This suggests some overlap with services being offered under CASP.

It was not possible to explain why this particular problem did not feature in the interviews, where it can only be speculated that the issue did not figure as strongly as sequencing the availability of post-settlement support via CASP with the accessing of land through land reform programmes. Moreover the secondary literature did not remark extensively on double-dipping, noting only that it had been observed in some projects. Further investigation into the factors that may have contributed to this disjuncture included one provincial official of the DLA who referred to ‘communication’ problems and an ‘information gap’ between provincial department of Agriculture and Department of...
Land Affairs officials in their respective province, where beneficiaries of land reform programmes were not simultaneously being informed about CASP support:

I think one of the things, we will be holding information sessions on LRAD alone, but not focussing on CASP, it will sort of those people will lose out, so they’ll wait for someone from Agriculture, maybe that person will come after 3 years, after they’ve accessed the land … whenever we go to, land affairs, we go to the community to talk about land reform/redistribution, we must be accompanied by the official from the Department of Agriculture, at the same time programmes available from their side which will assist farmers with post-settlement support … In the process of land acquisition the people must be informed about the CASP.

It is reasonable to assume that one consequence of such an ‘information gap’ could have seen beneficiaries not being able to establish clarity on the distinction between the type of assistance available under a land reform programme such as LRAD, and that under CASP. The interview findings did not explicitly reveal similar inter-departmental communication problems, although the official CASP review (Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007) documented, via its own set of interviews, incidents from at least two other provinces:

- Bypassing of DLA inputs into CASP proposals by one provincial department of Agriculture,
- A confirmation of the ‘communication’-related joint-planning problems between provincial DLA officials and provincial agriculture officials, as cited above by a provincial land affairs officer. This centred again on a bypassing of DLA inputs into agricultural planning,
- ‘No real engagement’, as cited by another provincial land affairs official, in CASP

Overall, capacity constraints associated with the provision of agricultural support services, via CASP, to beneficiaries of land reform programmes administered by the DLA, appeared to have arisen in this instance from procedural inconsistencies embedded within previously distinct government programmes that CASP, through its provincial implementing bodies, was subsequently obliged to align with. This, in an effort to satisfy one of its key objectives: rendering post-settlement agricultural services to the recipients of land reform. A less significant operational issue concerned the level of inter-departmental planning between land affairs and provincial department of agriculture officials. The potential seriousness of the inter-programming disjuncture involving
agriculture and land affairs departments was evident in its appearance in a kind of to-do list (‘Land reform support alignment’) prepared by the DOA for a new Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Lulama Xingwana, over two and a half years after CASP was introduced (Department of Agriculture 2006a: 11). It was also mentioned at a DOA briefing to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Agriculture and Land Affairs as late as October 2007, where a department official reported that ‘[t]he DOA had formally worked with DLA and it came down to better alignment of CASP and Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD)’ (PMG 2007).

Another issue, which recalls an earlier reference to confusion (in the form of ‘mixed messages’) expressed by one provincial official about conditions underpinning how agricultural support services could be rendered, emphasised the purchasing of ‘inputs’. The reference to inputs meant production inputs, including mechanised implements, seed or fertilisers, which under CASP rules provincial departments were not allowed to fund (Department of Agriculture 2005b: 14). Findings revealed that at least two provinces reported that allowing departments to render support in the form of production inputs would have been a more valuable source of support to beneficiaries in their areas. Beneficiaries were said to have a greater interest in and more urgent need for production inputs, especially in the form of mechanised implements, which could have enabled them to generate income more rapidly to meet immediate needs, as opposed to infrastructure, which was not viewed as being as ‘burning’ an issue. This example showed that although implementation guidelines/norms and standards were recognised as being insufficiently developed, in other respects there were clear limitations to the operational flexibility that provincial departments were able to exercise.

The reason for raising the production inputs example is that it channels the discussion into what was earlier described as the exercise of provincial operational discretion not having penetrated the selection and sequencing of service pillars available under CASP. The issue essentially revolved around the on/off farm infrastructure pillar, which under further analysis was prioritised by the DOA in CASP’s first year, and which required provincial departments to spend their CASP allocations only on this service area (as

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33 An independent review of CASP commissioned by the DOA in December 2006 also observed that stakeholders in three provinces, which included government officials, argued for production support to be included (Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 86-87).
seen in the ‘measurable outputs’ section of the 2004/2005 Grant Framework, as reproduced in Department of Agriculture 2005c).

The DOA argued that on/off farm infrastructure was ‘one of the main obstacles preventing beneficiaries to produce on their land’ (Department of Agriculture 2004c: 13). Whilst this requirement would clearly have limited the capacity of provinces to operationally sequence the provision of support services for CASP, it was revealed in an interview with a DOA official that the on/off infrastructure pillar was only prioritised in the programme’s first year, where ‘the following years we [DOA] said all the pillars, it’s just that maybe some provinces were not implementing the decision.’ The phasing in of all CASP pillars was elsewhere reported to have been incorporated into new grant condition and business planning frameworks for the programme’s second year of operation: 2005 (Department of Agriculture 2005c: 20).  

Despite the phasing in of all service pillars from 2005, and the temporary emphasis directed at the on/off farm infrastructure pillar in the programme’s first year, the shadow of the infrastructure pillar continued to exert considerable influence over the capacity of provincial departments to exercise discretion in the implementation of other service pillars that may have been regarded as more significant to their needs. This was evident in the findings of an official Review of CASP carried out between December 2006 and March 2007, when provincial stakeholders were asked to comment or otherwise raise concerns about the ‘appropriateness’ of products/services available under the programme. The findings showed that despite a removal of the conditions requiring spending on the on/off farm infrastructure service pillar in year one, there remained dissatisfaction about the lack of support for a wider basket of services, including specified pillars available under CASP:

- The lack of production support (i.e., inputs), though this was not strictly a service pillar,

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34 The inclusion of ‘all’ pillars was not however clearly apparent when comparing the 2004/2005 grant allocation framework with the 2005/2006 version, where the only relevant difference appeared to be the inclusion of an additional ‘measurable output’, which focussed on the accessing of markets, market information and training on markets for land reform beneficiaries.

35 These stakeholders comprised provincial department officials, DLA officials, and farmer representatives.
Lack of technical support to assist farmers to utilise infrastructure effectively,
Finance, training and marketing seen as ‘critical gaps’.

*Source*: Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 86-87

Perhaps the most noteworthy observation of all saw stakeholders in seven out of nine provinces indicating that a more ‘comprehensive’/broader package of support services was still needed, where one commentator observed that CASP was only addressing a ‘portion of the needs, and that is the physical aspects only.’ (ibid) This pointed to a lingering emphasis on the on/off farm infrastructure pillar. To this end, it may be useful to consider other observations about the operationalisation of service pillars other than infrastructure. For instance, one provincial department official interviewed for this thesis criticised the manner in which CASP’s service pillars were prioritised and rolled out, expressing concern that the pillar intended to provide farmers with financial support in the form of loans, termed MAFISA\(^\text{36}\), was not rolled out earlier in the programme. The interviewee added that the MAFISA pillar was ‘supposed to be strong’, where ‘that could have supported most of our projects, other than the infrastructure part’. The official review of CASP concurred, observing that ‘A key omission noted in almost all provinces is the lack of appropriate agricultural financing for emerging farmers. Mafisa, although being piloted in selected districts in the country, is not yet operational’ (Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 96). The staggered introduction of the financial services pillar then effectively curtailed the capacity of provincial departments to exercise discretion in prioritising this service, where it was deemed important to their circumstances.

A second observation from the official CASP Review also signalled the possibility of poor communication between the DOA and provincial departments concerning the relative status of the six service pillars. The Review observed that all nine provinces were continuing to spend the largest portion of their funding on the on/off farm infrastructure pillar (as high as 75 per cent, with two other provinces estimating 70 per cent). This, despite the opening up of grant conditions to all pillars from 2005/2006, and an explicit acknowledgement of this change by an official of the DOA interviewed for this thesis,\(^\text{36}\)This stands for Macro Agricultural Finance Scheme of South Africa.
and quoted earlier. Indeed, the Review stated that officials in the Free State provincial department of Agriculture had even reported that ‘the instruction from National DOA was that for the first three years of CASP implementation the emphasis should be on infrastructure development’, which contradicts the message received from the DOA\textsuperscript{37} (Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 46). This was corroborated by a beneficiary from Mpumalanga province who reported being informed that the programme only assisted with infrastructure, and was surprised to hear that there were actually six pillars (Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 132; appendix two). Even more interesting was the limited room that provincial departments appeared to have in selecting other service pillars. This was confirmed by the programme’s Business Plan Framework (Department of Agriculture, Not dated a: 5), which reported that only 10 per cent of CASP funds could be directed at the training pillar; with the DOA’s 2006/2007 Annual Report (Department of Agriculture 2007: 22) mentioning that five per cent of the grant was available to be spent on the marketing pillar.

Although the Review did not indicate a specific source(s) of the continued expenditure emphasis on the on/off farm infrastructure service, a possible clue was observed elsewhere in a CASP Progress Report (Department of Agriculture 2005c: 7), which noted the following:

The rationale for prioritization of infrastructure was due to the fact that this element had not been adequately provided for within the provincial budgets to support the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD)

Reference to LRAD is of course a reference to the circumstances of land reform beneficiaries. It could therefore reasonably be suggested that the CASP Business Plan requirement that 70 per cent of the funds allocated to provinces had to be directed at beneficiaries of land reform programmes, in view of the past neglect in servicing this constituency’s infrastructure needs, could have influenced the continued and high-level (in terms of expenditure) emphasis on infrastructure spending by the provinces. The official CASP Review moreover indicated that of the nine provincial departments

\textsuperscript{37}Speaking before Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Agriculture and Land Affairs in October 2007, a member of the DOA delegation was also reported to have noted that although CASP had a number of pillars, it focussed on the infrastructure pillar, and most of the money went on infrastructure. See PMG 2007.
implementing CASP, a majority (six) were prioritising beneficiaries of land reform programmes, whilst two were not and one was unable to be estimated. This situation suggests that the limited de facto operational flexibility enjoyed by provincial departments in selecting and sequencing service pillars under CASP was essentially engineered by provincial departments having to otherwise comply with a key objective attached to the programme: post-settlement support to land reform. Having said this, it could be argued that a potential source of tension then emerges within the objective makeup of CASP. This arises on the one hand from an emphasis on the delivery of specific service areas regarded as being especially important to the key land reform beneficiary constituency (i.e., Infrastructure), whilst at the same seeking to enhance the provision of support services as a whole, which speaks to the earlier-mentioned goal of aligning and co-ordinating deliverables in agriculture by working towards common budget programmes between the provinces and the DOA. The following passage from a DOA official interviewed for this thesis signals this potentiality:

I think, what we experience, as I said earlier on, we as a national department have a particular objective with CASP … now that objective may or may not be, 100 per cent in line with the objectives of the provincial departments. Remember it’s…a supplementary grant, so, there would be an overlap in what they were doing anyway, they may well be … it may or may not be so that a particular province believed that infrastructure, in terms of their package … had been important…it could have been that if you looked at these different pillars that a particular provinces says, look, we are quite satisfied … our infrastructure, on farm/off farm is fine, we are dealing with [problems with] financing, we are dealing with production grants … so here we come and we give them supplementary money for infrastructure, so it might or might not be that…that was what they were intending to do … now, in as much as there might be a disjuncture … in as much as the priorities of the province might be slightly different, it could then be that we are imposing upon them something which is either an opportunity for them, or not an opportunity but some sort of imposition

In the context of the framework adapted from Paul’s research, it would appear that the drive to align national and provincial budgeting and programming around the needs of land reform beneficiaries resulted in provincial implementing departments having little de facto control over the interpretation of, selection and sequencing of the full suite of service pillars available under the programme. This seems to have constrained their

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While implementation guidelines/norms and standards were available for the Infrastructure pillar, the observation that these were insufficiently developed (i.e., measurable) must be given priority.
operational capacity to respond to other potentially more pressing service needs identified in their areas. In other respects, both provincial department and DOA capacity was adversely impacted by the procedural constraints experienced in the process of aligning rules governing the delivery of post-settlement support services under CASP, with access to land under DLA-administered programmes such as LRAD. Although it generated strategic-operational effects, this issue speaks more directly to the structural environment in which CASP was introduced, which will be discussed in more detail under the structure variable.

The next section will focus on CASP’s resource allocation.

6.2.3 Factors associated with CASP’s resource allocation

The resources allocated to a development programme relate to the conditions underpinning its financial as well as human resource makeup, and recalling Paul’s description includes the mobilisation of these and other forms of administrative and political support. Overall, the assumption is that the extent of and circumstances relating to the mobilisation and allocation of a programme’s resources may adversely affect the capacity of implementing bodies to carry out the initiative. This section will first cover the financial resources allocated to CASP.

The resourcing of CASP corresponds to the inter-governmental makeup of the public agricultural sector in South Africa, which is defined as a shared constitutional competency between the DOA and provincial departments of agriculture. The document, Trends in Intergovernmental Finances 2000/01 – 2006/07 (National Treasury 2004: 84-85), published by South Africa’s National Treasury (Department of Finance), further noted that the national Department of Agriculture is primarily responsible for formulating (national) government policy, including the setting of norms and standards of delivery, and overseeing equitable access to and distribution of natural resources and support services. Provincial departments assume responsibility for ‘implementing national policies’, including extension and farmer settlement and support services. The financial implications of this arrangement were exposed elsewhere in this document, which noted an ‘increase of funding to provinces for the implementation of agriculture programmes, specifically farmer support activities’ (ibid: 85-86). The financing instrument designed to
deliver increased funding for farmer support activities (via CASP) to the provinces was embedded in existing public finance legislation, which governed the allocation of South Africa’s national budget across national, provincial and local (municipal) spheres of government.

The DOA (2005b: 6) observed that CASP was a Schedule Four conditional grant allocation in terms of a Division of Revenue Act (DORA), and as such, was distributed as supplementary funding to provincial departments of agriculture from the national fiscus. The DORA was invoked each financial year to provide for the ‘equitable division of nationally-raised revenue amongst the three spheres of government (Government Gazette 2004a, 2005a, 2006). More specifically, section 7. (1)(a) of the 2004 DORA defined a Schedule Four allotment as an ‘allocation to provinces for general and nationally assigned functions’. This definition was firstly consistent with the general, or in other words, supplementary purpose of the CASP allocation, which was intended to augment existing or core provincial budgets for farmer support funded from an unconditional ‘equitable share’ of revenue distributed to all three spheres of government. It also recognised that the programme was conceived as a national priority, for which provinces would receive supplementary funds on condition that these comply with expectations in the programme’s Grant framework.

The DOA (2005b: 6) went on to state that the Department was to act as the ‘national transferring department’ for the CASP Schedule Four allocation, requiring it to administer the allocation and monitor expenditure and non-financial outputs in the provinces (Department of Agriculture, Not dated b: 1). The structure of CASP’s funding was therefore intended to be consistent with the programme’s objective emphasis on enhancing existing agricultural support services, through initiating a supplementary funding scheme. This was revealed through conditions stipulating that funding was intended to ‘supplement provincial budgets in order to improve and increase farmer support services within the CASP framework’ (Department of Agriculture 2005b: 4). The financial resources allocated to CASP are illustrated in table 6.1.
Table 6.1: CASP allocation to provincial departments of agriculture (Rand millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Year 2004/05</th>
<th>Year 2005/06</th>
<th>Year 2006/07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>38,043</td>
<td>47,552</td>
<td>57,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>16,870</td>
<td>21,088</td>
<td>25,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>4,582</td>
<td>5,727</td>
<td>6,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>37,016</td>
<td>46,270</td>
<td>55,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>33,428</td>
<td>41,786</td>
<td>50,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>18,903</td>
<td>23,629</td>
<td>28,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>10,518</td>
<td>13,148</td>
<td>15,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West Province</td>
<td>26,875</td>
<td>33,594</td>
<td>40,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>13,765</td>
<td>17,206</td>
<td>20,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>200,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>250,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>300,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Department of Agriculture 2006a: 8*

Table 6.2 indicates that the programme did not experience a lack of financial commitment, having been initially resourced for a period of three years (2004/5-2006/7), with incremental annual increases in grant allocations to provincial departments of Agriculture. It also displays how serious the agricultural under-servicing of land reform beneficiaries was viewed by the South African government. The successful sourcing of funds for CASP proved however to be a more difficult benefit to sustain, as early provincial expenditure indicated. Figure 6.2 shows the generally slow and varied pace at which provincial departments were spending their CASP grant allocations, with an average of 65 per cent expenditure in the first year increasing to 82 per cent in the second year. More striking however was the large variance between provinces, with some spending below 10 per cent whilst others spent over 80 per cent in the first year, with greater equivalence in the second year.
Expenditure variation at the provincial level, for a programme that was essentially a national, that is, DOA priority, effectively exposed the national department’s level of reliance on provincial departments to not only expend resources committed for CASP, but also to allocate the supplementary resources received for the programme. This takes into account the reality that provincial departments of agriculture had already been receiving core monies for farmer support activities as part of their unconditional allotment of nationally raised revenue.

The potential consequences of this arrangement for ensuring that resources committed for CASP were spent on the activities for which these were intended was reflected in the minutes of a Portfolio Committee meeting on Agriculture and Land Affairs in August of 2006. Here, a department official speaking on CASP was reported to have stated that the DOA had ‘followed the money-trail’ to the provinces to establish expenditure effectiveness, where it had found that in some cases the funding had been ‘parked’ elsewhere. He was reported to have added that although the DOA was receiving expenditure reports from the provinces on how monies were being spent, ‘it became clear that DOA needed to go to the provinces and investigate everything in detail’ (PMG 2006). The only reference that this thesis could find on the possible circumstances that

Source: Illustration based on figures presented in Department of Agriculture 2006b. *Figures were not reported for Gauteng and North West province for 2004/2005
may have contributed to the parking of money elsewhere was described in a DOA 2003-2005 Draft Progress Report on CASP. This cited insufficient early planning and ‘poor communication’ between provincial treasuries, to which CASP funds were initially transferred, and provincial departments of Agriculture, as the final receivers of the grant (Department of Agriculture 2005c: 13).

A related resourcing feature which appears to have further exposed the DOA’s level of reliance on its provincial counterparts was linked to the type of conditional grants employed to finance CASP, as defined in the Division of Revenue Act. Research on the structure of conditional grants conducted by the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC), a constitutional body mandated to advise the South African government on public finance and budgeting matters, noted for instance that the DOA was critical of the relatively greater discretion embedded in Schedule Four type grants such as that employed for CASP, which appeared to limit a national department’s level of influence over how provinces used the grant. The FFC observed in relation to Schedule Four grants that a national department like the DOA could only transfer funds and provide support where needed, where it ‘cannot impose its views’. This was described as being different from a Schedule Five or ‘specific purpose’ grant which in this instance funded another national-provincial agricultural programme called LandCare, where the DOA held ‘that it has more control as it actually decides the full programmes of the grant.’ (Financial and Fiscal Commission 2007: 31). Consulting the Division of Revenue Act in more detail indicated that a Schedule Four conditional grant to provinces differed from a Schedule Five allocation in constituting either a ‘general’ or ‘nationally assigned’ allocation, as opposed to a ‘specific purpose’ allocation. The difference seemed to be that Schedule Four grants provided assistance to provinces to support more generally defined activities in functional areas (e.g., agriculture, health, social development) without being as specifically-defined as in Schedule Five grants (Government Gazette 2004a; Government Gazette 2005a).

Distinguishing between conditional grant types, as a factor that may have affected the capacity of the DOA to, in this case, exercise greater influence over how the provinces spent their allocations, is problematic. This recalls an earlier discussion which exposed the de facto emphasis on infrastructure pillar spending, which tends to minimise concerns about the actual degree of inconsistency between the DOA’s emphasis on
on/off infrastructure and the capacity of provincial departments to pursue needs covered by other service areas. Furthermore, it was argued that this situation seemed to have been engineered by the need to comply with a key objective and related conditionalities of providing post-settlement support to the beneficiaries of land reform. The FFC (2007: 32) appeared to be hinting at the same thing, in the context of a broader discussion noting the emphasis on the infrastructure pillar ‘to the exclusion of other spending areas [pillars]’:

The bigger problem of land reform that the grant is trying to address is a critical issue that requires consideration. CASP for instance, is a land reform issue and cannot be viewed in isolation. Thus, in its design, cognisance of this fact must be taken into account.

With this in mind, it may be more useful to enquire into the circumstances underlying the expenditure performance of the provinces, as a means of isolating factors that could have influenced their capacity to implement the programme on the ground. An early sign of this was present in the South African government’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, published by the National Treasury (2003a: 134) prior to the introduction of CASP. The chapter concerning Agriculture observed that:

The key challenge facing Government is to expand its support services for black and small-scale farmers. However, departments of Agriculture in poor provinces are unable to provide the necessary support, as their budgets for such activities are squeezed out by personnel expenditure. Over two-thirds of provincial budgets are dedicated for the payment of salaries of large numbers of low-skilled staff, and they are not skilled to provide the support services required by black and small-scale farmers.

This is an otherwise curious statement in view of the human resourcing effects of the public agricultural sector’s post-apartheid restructuring, where the DOA observed that the national department transferred a significant number of posts to the nine new provincial departments of agriculture, including ‘[a]ll the personnel involved in extension, training and technology development’ (Department of Agriculture 1996: 1) Agricultural economists responsible for micro-economic research at farm level and for assisting farmers to farm profitably were also placed under provincial control. Over two-thirds of the posts attached to the DOA were transferred to the new provincial departments after 1994 (ibid). This comprised 7000 of 10500 posts transferred on 1 November 1994. The national Department also reported that 3709 posts were filled as of 31 March 1995
(Department of Agriculture 1996: 71). Over 10 years later, the Department (2005a: 217), indicated that it had 2476 posts filled as of 31 March 2005, illustrating the permanence of provincial transfers.

Attempting to reconcile the apparent inability of provincial department personnel to service programmes in black farmer support, despite the provinces having benefited from the transfer of a substantial number of technical personnel from the DOA after 1994, could begin by focussing on one of the intentions of CASP, which was to ‘expand’ support services to black farmers, and in particular that beneficiary segment gaining access to land through land reform programmes. A number of provincial officials in fact recognised the positive contribution that CASP was making in providing supplementary funding to aid farmer support activities. One official indicated that ‘for us CASP has made a lot of difference because our portion for farmer support was not really adequate to reach out to many farmers as we currently doing, since the inception of CASP’ An official from another province added that ‘given the backlog since 1994, land reform started in 1994, CASP came in recently, … we were not having funds to support farmers, using EU [European Union] fund, had its own limitations/conditions’

Despite the benefit of having received additional monies to scale up their level of support to an emerging black farmer constituency, interviews also revealed that some provinces were finding it difficult to mobilise their existing human resources to meet the service demands that accompanied the additional funds being provided for CASP. The findings exposed gaps in the availability of sufficient numbers of personnel as well as in adapting existing employees to the particular needs of CASP beneficiaries. These issues were especially acute in the supply of agricultural engineers and extension service personnel.

The availability of engineers or extension officers with engineering training was acutely felt by some provinces, as one official observed:

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39 Officials from three of the seven provincial departments interviewed explicitly identified insufficient engineering capabilities as a challenge, whilst this was also mentioned by most DOA officials interviewed.
[A]s you’d know by now, the main focus, but not the only focus [of CASP] has been on infrastructural development. With time, when the farms were bought, some of the infrastructure was not in a good state, and some needed to be upgraded, some needed completely new construction, and we needed engineers to sort of assist in terms of doing the necessary planning, design, and even ensuring that the work that was being carried out is according to the standards, specifications. So that has been our major challenge.

Concerns about the adequacy of engineering skills available in provincial departments to respond to the particular demands and emphasis placed by CASP on the infrastructure pillar was more revealingly described by an official in another provincial department:

The biggest problem that we experience out of a program level…first, we did extension work … giving advice to farmers … when CASP came it was a total different story, they actually made extension officers engineers, because infrastructure is actually an engineer’s function … but our people didn’t have those kind of technical background or knowledge, but they had to do that … So now for the past 3 years … our extension people are doing infrastructure, we are not doing support services anymore, because our guys are running around with tenders and quotations and all those kind of things

An even more enlightening excerpt, which also acknowledged the pressure felt by provinces in mobilising available engineering capabilities to carry out CASP, was expressed by another provincial department official:

[B]ecause that’s how it’s [CASP] designed you know, it doesn’t come with any administrative support, it comes as money … just money … it comes onto a department that already has capacity problems, in terms of our ratio of admin to technical people, always been a challenge … Then you have to deploy your experts to refine business plans, you want now, need to have technical people, engineers, to produce specifications for you … and as I speak we only got two engineers to do everything that is required by the Department

Another official from the same province recounted that the department had to acquire specialist engineering expertise from outside the department (from a public entity specialising in agricultural research). They also made the following more broadly directed comment that ‘the challenge that I think government will have to look at, if we want to increase the slice [going directly to farmers] … how can we do it, do we have to appoint a lot of people or do we have to go this outsourcing route, where we will then appoint consultants to come on board to assist us’
A sustained emphasis on the infrastructure pillar appeared to have placed extraordinary demands on an existing supply of engineering resources in some provincial departments. This is somewhat surprising when considering that the 2003 Intergovernmental Fiscal Review (National Treasury 2003a: 120) on agriculture noted that before CASP came on stream non-personnel capital expenditure by provincial departments increased over five fold between 1990/2000 and 2002/2003, from R37 million to R201 million. Part of this capital budget was directed at farming infrastructure, including the kind of activities being promoted by CASP; where the Treasury added that the provinces were actually citing expenditure of R245 million on agricultural infrastructure including monies not classified as ‘capital’. It might appear difficult to reconcile these figures, which suggests that the provinces were not necessarily unprepared to implement infrastructure services before CASP came on stream. The interview findings indicated however that the reality may favour the technical inability to cope with the significant additional demands being made by an injection of a further R200 million for CASP, the great majority of which was and continues to be spent on infrastructure.

Some provinces (at least three) were also reporting difficulties with the availability and provision of extension service personnel to support CASP projects. As with engineering services, this encompassed both a limited supply of extension officers and insufficiently skilled personnel. Interviewees indicated that CASP appears to have had a peculiar effect on the way their extension officers were previously used:

[As one challenge, the extension officers, CASP, for you to manage CASP you have to have project management, we have to have plans in place and you have biggest challenge our extension officers are not trained as project managers, so for them it’s very difficult to monitor the projects]

An official in another province described a similar picture:

You’re working with a coal face that’s never been trained, or that has never had that culture of managing projects in a more project management style, culture operating in, because you’re implementing CASP projects through extension service, which is geared to your overall farmers, not necessarily to your CASP beneficiaries
The official CASP Review discussed the on-the-ground circumstances of extension services in each of the nine provinces at great length. The Review (Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 59) moreover offered the following description, which although it was limited to observations in only one province, appeared to give more scope to the kind of project management impact CASP seems to have had on existing agricultural extension services:

Most extension officers are poorly trained and equipped to handle the demands of emerging commercial farmers. Extension training is dated and at dissonance with the multiplicity of demands new farmers face in their attempts to grow into successful commercial farmers.

The description suggests that the introduction of CASP, which was precedent-setting in the scale of its emphasis on agricultural support to land reform beneficiaries, altered the orientation of extension by intensifying the planning and delivery of support (ideally to facilitate commercialisation) to the relatively greater and more complex agricultural needs of this beneficiary audience. In other respects, CASP also appeared to have stretched the supply of extension offices in some provinces:

Extension officers, the number that we had over time was not really adequate enough to see to the implementation of the new projects and also to go back and take care of, after-care, for the old ones, so that the beneficiaries are actually not left in the lurch

In another province, an official described a situation where extension officers in some areas of the province were being overburdened with the number of CASP projects being taken on, in addition to carrying out their usual extension work; whilst extension officers stationed in areas where land was not being utilised for CASP projects focussed solely on their usual extension support. The official simply noted that ‘so that is one area that we have not at this point in time have had time to put systems in place to make sure that we correct it.’

As with engineering-related resourcing capabilities, the interview data could really only speak to the challenges faced by some provinces of taking on the additional extension support demands introduced by CASP, where according to the National Treasury (2003: 121-122) the provinces were by 2003/2004, that is prior to CASP, already spending a considerable 41 per cent of their agricultural budgets on extension services. Having said
this though, a member of a DOA delegation speaking before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Agriculture and Land Affairs (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2007) was reported to have said that in the Department’s medium term expenditure framework a request was made to the Treasury for R252 million to be allocated to provincial departments of agriculture to expand their extension services.

A final observation on CASP’s resource allocation, drawn from an analysis of interviews and secondary materials pointed, firstly, to the inflexibility of government procurement regulations, which governed the purchase of physical and professional supplies/equipment; and secondly the compatibility between these and CASP planning timeframes. This was again only evident amongst some (i.e., three) of the seven provincial departments interviewed by this thesis, where in its conclusion the CASP Review (Department of Agriculture, Umhlabu Rural Services 2007: 97) report also appeared to highlight planning constraints ahead of procurement:

A large part of the problem relates to poor coordination and alignment in planning between the two principle departments [DOA and DLA] … Lengthy provincial procurement and limitations and staff capacity further delay project implementation.

In one province, an official reported that ‘it really killed us big time’, when referring to procurement rules, noting elsewhere however that insufficient communication between programming and procurement officials sustained incompatibility between procurement rules and programme planning:

So there is a time where finance will say, they are closing/accepting log1’s on a particular day that information will not flow to the project people (implementers), sometimes our project cycle not talking to their compliance systems. Since now we came up with plan, from April going out on tender, close on particular date. Things are now working properly.

The two other provincial departments which raised the issue of procurement emphasised the inflexibility of adhering to standardised regulations when more enabling procurement solutions appeared to have been identified at ground level. For example, one provincial official asked:
Our procurement system is just not friendly to deliver on time … it seems that National Treasury don’t understand, they keep coming back and saying its poor planning, I mean, why must a tender run 28 days if you can go walk across the street and go buy the thing there, within one or two days you can deliver that thing

An official in another province similarly questioned the rigidity as well as outlined the potential impact of the procurement regime on beneficiaries. The official gave the example of sourcing a specialist piece of infrastructure, a broiler unit/house, which could not otherwise be constructed by departmental engineers:

[O]kay we go on tender, only one company doing that thing in country, then subject whole thing into a tender process simply because you have to procure according to your procurement. As long as it’s about R500 K, will have to go on tender, whether there’s any other service provider for that or not, it doesn’t matter. Those are the little hassles, administrative hassles, when you procuring from within government system. Now you have to take about six months before you put up a structure, in mean time farmer loses contract that he might have got with market, loses profit for the six months

Overall, the availability of financial resources was not a factor which affected the capacity for CASP to be implemented, where the programme was initially able to secure a multi-year funding commitment that also accommodated a year-on-year rollover of funds in cases of under-expenditure. The programme therefore enjoyed a high level of government support, given the specific contribution it was intended to make to the politically significant land reform issue. More notable resourcing-related factors which influenced the capacity of CASP’s implementing bodies could again be traced to the programme’s objective emphasis on land reform beneficiaries, and its rigid prioritisation on services (i.e., Infrastructure) deemed most relevant to the circumstances of this constituency. This however exposed gaps in the availability and adaptation of existing provincial personnel (engineers and extension officials) to service the extent and nature of the needs being introduced. In view of Paul’s framework, this also demonstrated the dependency of provincial departments to mobilise the requisite financial and administrative support and cooperation from national agencies in particular (DOA, National Treasury) in view of the human (personnel) and physical (procurement of goods) resource constraints sustained in servicing the demands of CASP.
6.2.4 Overall impressions on the strategy of CASP

An overall impression of CASP’s strategy demonstrated that the programme’s objective makeup, and particularly its emphasis on servicing the agricultural needs of beneficiaries who had acquired access to land via government programmes, generated concerns about the affect this would have on the capacity of provincial implementing departments to render services to this beneficiary grouping. The effects this had on capacity became more manifest when CASP was analysed at an operational level, which indicated that provincial departments had little de facto control over and guidance in relation to the interpretation, selection and sequencing of the full suite of service pillars available under the programme. This was evident in the effective concentration on service areas tailored to the most pressing needs of land reform beneficiaries (i.e., Infrastructure), and the limited operational flexibility this afforded provincial departments. Finally, an analysis of CASP’s resourcing provided an even more tangible account of factors that affected provincial capacity, which again could be traced to the programme’s objective emphasis on servicing the needs of land reform beneficiaries.

Findings pertaining to the strategic make-up of CASP also revealed a number of bureaucratic constraints affecting capacity, where this reflected characteristics described in this study’s theoretical outline (see chapter 2), and explicitly contained in Paul’s description of a development programme’s structure and processes. One example was the persistent procedural constraints experienced in the process of aligning rules governing the delivery of support services under the DOA-sponsored CASP, with those regulating the access of land under DLA-sponsored programmes such as LRAD. No doubt a key contributing factor to this constraint was the programme’s business planning and conditional grant stipulations concerning the percentage of funds (70) required by provincial departments to be directed at beneficiaries of land reform programmes. This can also be traced to the inter-departmental structural environment in which CASP was introduced (to be discussed in a later section on structure).

Another bureaucratic constraint involved the inflexibility of general rules governing the procurement of goods and services, which adversely affected the resourcing capacity of provincial departments to expedite the implementation of individual projects under CASP. This firstly pointed to the constraints arising from CASP implementing
departments having to adhere to rules regulating the purchasing of inputs. This was also evident in Paul’s description of the resourcing sub-variable, which demonstrated a need for programme implementing bodies to ‘mobilise’ support in the form of inter-agency (as well as intra-agency) co-operation and support, and which in this instance would have involved agencies directly overseeing government procurement regulations (such as the National Treasury), as well as the finance sections within provincial agriculture departments.

Finally, a further bureaucratic constraint that could be directly linked to a development programme’s processes was evident in CASP’s monitoring. Here the DOA’s monitoring was criticised for its concentration on ‘procedures’ relating to budget control vis-à-vis provincial expenditure, to the neglect of performance outputs, and where its capacity was probably limited by insufficiently detailed national implementation guidelines. Having said this, the circumstances under which monitoring was carried out under CASP speaks to the structural relationship that defined the DOA’s role in the programme relative to its provincial counterparts, where this might offer a more direct and robust explanation of what could have affected its capacity. This will be reviewed in more detail in section 6.4

The next section will discuss findings on the ‘environment’ variable.

**6.3 The ‘environment’ variable**

Findings associated with the environmental make-up of CASP revealed a striking concentration of factors associated with uncertainty, as defined in Paul’s framework. Moreover, these instances were mentioned by most (i.e., five out of seven) of the provincial departments interviewed for this thesis.

**6.3.1 Factors associated with CASP’s environmental uncertainty**

According to Paul (1982: 108; 1983: 50) environmental uncertainty in a development programme refers to unforeseen changes in its environment, associated mainly with sudden or unpredictable occurrences precipitated by the socio-economic, political and physical conditions of programme beneficiaries. These may include changes in the perception of beneficiaries or their dissatisfaction with a service, and changes in ‘political
conditions’. Such circumstances, he adds, will likely affect the strategic and structural makeup of a programme, which would have to be designed with ‘greater flexibility to facilitate adaptation to unforeseen contingencies’. Furthermore, he suggests that beneficiary participation in the design and delivery of services and increasing the operational autonomy of implementation officials might also be ‘interpreted as an adaptation to environmental uncertainty’.

Instances of uncertainty were overwhelmingly reported in those interviews commenting on CASP’s environment. In general accordance with earlier findings, which showed the effects that CASP’s strategic emphasis on land reform beneficiaries had had on the capacity of its implementing bodies, it was found that the socio-economic and political circumstances associated with these beneficiaries also affected the capacity of some of the provinces consulted. Moreover, the primary source of these uncertainties appeared to have arisen as a consequence of working with groups of beneficiaries.40 This resulted from individuals typically pooling the amount of their own contribution (in labour, kind or cash) in order to access larger matching government grants to be able to purchase land under programmes such as LRAD. One interviewee based at the national Department of Land Affairs noted for example that:

Well it’s not simple to buy a piece of land with this amount of R20 00041, normally they will group themselves together in the form of 10 or 12, then the land will be purchased ... What most implementers will say is actually the high cost of the land, because prices are too costly, that’s a challenge

Another interviewee also noted that:

But, as I understand it from the research that’s been done, the bulk of LRAD grants are still at the bottom end of the scale, so basically the kind of people that are accessing the previous once-off subsidy [called SLAG], still constitute the bulk of people accessing LRAD, and they’re accessing small grants and they’re doing it as groups, so in a sense we’re still churning out these land reform

40Four out of the five provinces in which instances of environmental uncertainty were mentioned referred to working with groups of land reform beneficiaries. A beneficiary attending a CASP programme review workshop also commented on a perception that in order to access support, beneficiaries had to be part of a group, where this applied in particular to ‘blacks’. See Department of Agriculture, Umhlaba Rural Services 2007: 134; appendix 2.

41An amount of R20 000 is the minimum matching contribution available to be accessed for making the minimum own contribution, in cash, labour or kind (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs. 2000: 7-8).
projects with large beneficiary groups, which is giving rise to all of these problems that you’ve noticed.

SLAG, which stands for the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant, preceded LRAD. An official of the DOA recalled the following in an interview: ‘[i] think as a background, from 1994 that’s when we had SLAG … which was when Department of Land Affairs was buying farms for people who wanted to get into the farming stream, and in that year I think people were accessing R16 000 grants, and then the problem then was that R16 000 was too little and what used to happen is they just group themselves into so many people, so that they multiply the R16 000’. Comparing this comment with others cited in this section indicates that LRAD, the successor to SLAG, in many instances experienced a continuation of individuals grouping themselves to multiply the value of the total grant obtainable in order to purchase land.

The nature of the problems referred to in the previous interview passage essentially defined the uncertainties experienced and relayed by some provincial departments of agriculture when working with groups of land reform beneficiaries. These problems resulted from inconsistencies between members of groups about the kind of farming assistance they desired under CASP, which sometimes led to conflict between group members; as well as unexpected shifts in farming priorities being relayed to provincial department officials. Examples included the following observation by one provincial official:

As soon as you too much people onto a farm, then it’s conflict, because each and every one got their own idea as to what they want to do, because there is no owner42, and that’s our biggest problem … In the planning phase they will tell you, or when the application, now I need this and this and this, as soon as we inform them listen your project is approved, they say no no no no, forget about that things that we said before that we want from you, we’ve got a different list of priorities now … now we waste a lot of time, now you start into negotiations with those people again.

The same provincial official remarked on inconsistent intentions amongst group members:

42This refers to groups of individuals constituting themselves as a legal entity, usually in the form of Trusts.
It's about one or two farmers or three in a group of 60, 70 ... that wants to farm, but to get the money from government, they must collect a lot of people ... so they collect all those people and then they become part of this business ... and the other one is the sleeping partners ... they are not part of the farm, they are not there ... because there name is on the list, but they heard this rumour that they have access to a farm now ... they’re all quiet in the planning phase, but when it comes to moving onto the land, those people are suddenly there ... They are just shareholders.

An official in another provincial department recounted a similar set of circumstances:

Some of these projects, more than one beneficiaries, and sometimes they'll have some differences, social problems, political problems, and projects you know cannot take off. We've got a LRAD project, but when this project, land affairs, because they were given R20,000 in order to buy that farm, so you need to have 20 people to make that selling price, those people, 20 people cannot work together, other people are not keen farmers, they thought that they'll be given money, cash, they didn't know that they have to work in order to realise what they wanted, rather than buying into a farm.

An official in a third provincial department remarked on the effect of these uncertainties on departmental operations:

A huge effect in a sense that we, most of the times we have to do social facilitation, trying got make people understand what are they into, and which, in terms of ... we need to be implementing projects for this financial year, and we cannot just go on someone’s farm and say where is the leader here, show us the leader ... we must find where all the community, what their interests is ... we always say we inherit those problems, with CASP we support people who have already been formed into groups. By virtue of the fact that people get the land by virtue of their rights, then every time we will have to find conflicting ideas, with little exception for LRAD, but with most other programmes, that is very predominate. It affects your timeframes that you have, it throws it out and you have to go with the flow.

A further problem expressed at the provincial level and resulting from the manifestation of intra-group dynamics concerned the sustainability of such projects, where some officials cited a tenuous commitment to farming being expressed and/or a lack of understanding/knowledge amongst beneficiaries. This included an observation that 'normally most of these beneficiaries have a little knowledge about farming’, or are ‘not understanding the environment of agriculture’, as well as the department inheriting people that do not have any ‘business acumen’, or not being ‘business-oriented’, where the department had to try to ‘sift or work out that you find people who are really farmers’.
These kinds of descriptions correspond with earlier concerns recorded under the strategy variable, which pertained directly to the objectives of CASP, and which involved distinctions being drawn in practice between land reform and non land reform beneficiaries on the basis of farming potential, risk-taking and attitudinal attributes.

Enquiring further into the group profile of CASP projects led to the sourcing of DOA figures which seemed to indicate that comparing total number of projects with total number of beneficiaries was equating to highly varied average project sizes (see table 6.2) across the provinces. This included relatively large groups of beneficiaries in some provinces. These numbers could not be employed to confirm the specific profile of groups, as these did not distinguish land reform from non-land reform beneficiaries nor clarify whether beneficiaries were directly participating in projects or were indirectly benefitting, for instance children and minors. The strategic prioritisation of land reform beneficiaries by at least two-thirds of the provinces would otherwise however tend to suggest that the presence of beneficiary groups consisting of new land entrants generated uncertainties for an appreciable number of provincial departments and which influenced their capacity to respond to these clients.

### Table 6.2: Beneficiary profile of CASP projects 2005/2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No. projects</th>
<th>No. beneficiaries</th>
<th>Average beneficiaries/project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>8544</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu Natal</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>30773</td>
<td>226.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8370</td>
<td>1046.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2699</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>4278</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2898</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1069</strong></td>
<td><strong>59441</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Department of Agriculture. 2005c: annexure 7*

The environmental effect on the capacity of provincial departments, sustained by working with groups of land reform beneficiaries displaying competing intentions and

[^43]: Another table produced by the Department of Agriculture (2006a: 9), which was not disaggregated by province, recorded a slightly smaller total beneficiary number of 53,206 for 1069 projects in 2005/2006.
uneven commitments to agricultural production, also probably exposed a lack of experience on the part of provincial departments in being able to effectively adapt to these circumstances. This, given the historical neglect of post-settlement support services to land reform prior to CASP, as well as budgetary increases to facilitate land delivery not having been adequately matched by the agricultural support budget. A DOA official interviewed for this thesis also hinted at the provinces’ lack of historical budgetary support to plan for land reform clients:

The motivation also was that now that we are coming up with land reform, and land reform is a national programme, then the provinces are now sitting with a burden of having to assist, support so many farmers, the farmers that they were not planned for within their budgets, so that’s when Treasury gave national these conditional grants, in the form of CASP

6.3.2 Overall impressions on the Environment of CASP

An overall assessment of the environmental features of CASP tends to coincide with findings observed under the strategy variable, which showed that features that emerged out of the programme’s objective prioritisation of land reform beneficiaries created uncertainties that ultimately affected the capacity of provincial departments in particular to service CASP’s targeted clientele. In this instance, the objective emphasis on servicing the agricultural needs of constituents gaining access to land via government programmes bequeathed a tangible set of uncertainties resulting from the land acquisition process (group acquisitions). It was against this background that a sizeable number of provincial departments cited difficulties negotiating intra-group social and political dynamics in the process of rendering agricultural support services.

The effect on administrative capacity attributed to the intra-group social and political dynamics experienced by provincial departments generally corresponded with Paul’s (1982: 108; 1983: 50) description of the uncertainty variable. This included circumstances precipitated by the socio-economic, political or even physical conditions of beneficiaries, where ‘changes in the perception of clients or their dissatisfaction with a service’ could affect their responses to the programme. This was mainly displayed in the form of divergent beneficiary perceptions concerning the value and use of land for agricultural purposes. Having said this, Paul’s suggestion that programmes ‘might’ seek
to adapt to instances of environmental uncertainty by encouraging beneficiary participation in the design and delivery of services, and increasing the autonomy of ground level implementation officials, does not seem to have applied in the CASP case. In the first instance, the source of the uncertainties being experienced by provincial officials derived from the beneficiaries themselves, where this was influenced by how their participation in the programme proceeded (i.e. through group acquisitions). In the second case provincial departments had already been handed a considerable degree of autonomy, relative to operational flexibility, to implement CASP on-the-ground. Given their lack of prior experience in budgeting and planning for land reform beneficiaries in particular, it is doubtful that any further autonomy, short of the objective flexibility of determining how best to agriculturally accommodate and service land reform beneficiaries, would have better enabled provinces to negotiate such uncertainties.

The next section will discuss findings on the ‘structure’ variable.

6.4 The ‘structure’ variable

The structure variable adapted from Paul’s description refers to the functional and organisational arrangements underpinning a public organisation’s capacity to carry out a development programme. In functional terms, this refers to a situation where organisational tasks are broken up, or structured, according to what is relevant for the delivery of a particular service. In organisational terms, this refers to the configuration of decision-making authority within and between public organisations, through which a development programme’s functional activities are carried out. A characteristic that is explicitly mentioned in Paul’s (1982: 116) description of the structure variable is the appearance of ‘bureaucratic’ constraints, arising from the relationship between a public body’s existing functional and organisational structures, and the demands introduced by a new development programme.

The discussion thus far, which has focused on the strategy and environment variables have already revealed a number of operational dis-functionalities in the course of carrying out CASP. 44 These were firstly attributed to provincial implementing

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44 Another relatively less significant functional problem experienced by CASP provincial implementing departments involved adhering to inflexible government procurement regulations.
departments having little de facto flexibility and guidance (from the DOA) to interpret, choose and sequence the full suite of service pillars available under the programme. This secondly referred to the capacity constraints sustained by agriculture departments in servicing the support needs of land reform beneficiaries, where this was caused by a disjuncture in the operating rules between CASP and government land reform programmes being carried out by other departments (such as Land Affairs). This latter occurrence partially corresponds with the following scenario drawn by Paul (1982: 117), which pertains to the structure of a development programme:

> New programs with a different definition of the problem and a set of [functional] tasks which cut across different ministries and even external organizations may not perform well when structured along the same functional lines [that is, along the existing line functions of a given ministry or department]

In the case of CASP, the programme essentially reoriented the existing functional services of the public agricultural sector towards a beneficiary constituency which had mainly been assisted by a separate Department of Land Affairs. This equates to the description of ‘[n]ew programs with a different definition of the problem and a set of tasks which cut across different ministries [or in this case different departments]’. This reorientation or different definition of the problem, which also encompassed the introduction by CASP of agricultural support services along six pillars, was accompanied by provincial departments of agriculture enjoying a reduced scope to configure the services available under the programme for delivery. Finally, the provinces were also provided with limited guidance on the implementation of CASP in the form of nationally developed norms and standards. These operational conditions produced adverse consequences for the capacity of provincial departments in particular to functionally embed and service CASP within their existing line function activities.

With this in mind, and given that the very intention of the grant allocated to provincial departments for CASP required these bodies to embed their responses to the programme within their existing line function activities, it is a priori reasoned under the scenario drawn by Paul that structuring a functional response to CASP ‘along the same functional lines’ would have likely generated additional bureaucratic constraints on capacity, or in other words over and above the operational constraints described above. Having said this, the findings did indicate that the structural decentralisation of CASP’s
implementation, which was in any case a direct consequence of the constitutional concurrency of the agricultural function, did appear to have augmented the strategic dis-functionalities referred to earlier, which ultimately affected the capacity of the DOA to achieve ‘parity across the provinces and consistency in delivery’.

The examples begin with two provinces which commented on difficulties experienced in making initial functional arrangements for CASP, or in other words integrating the programme’s services into their existing farmer support activities, which in one case resulted in material under-expenditure. One provincial official noted that:

Initially the challenge that we had ... treating CASP, It was not integrated into our departmental programmes, it was like a programme on its own, I think that was a challenge, we should have used CASP like we are using it currently, just as an enabler to fund our programmes, way we were dealing with CASP when it started, programme on its own, that’s why the under-expenditure initially, we do have programmes already in the department [farmer support], we should be using CASP as an enabler to support farmers in the pillars. I’m sure everybody did not understand what is this CASP thing?

An official from another provincial department recalled that:

Initially when we started, challenge, because CASP regarded as just an added on thing, but as we progress, we’ve made them to realize CASP not add not add on but we have to do it, we were given for the first time R38 million ... so we were given the biggest chunk, out of 38 million only 12 million [spent]. Everybody not ready for this kind of money, we do have other programmes, CASP came in regarded as added on, no people were ready to say we’re ready to implement programme, so I was roped in, had to identify people, took me some time to convince even who people should be in regions.

A more serious problem with the functional accommodation of CASP was reported by an official in a third provincial department, which recounted in an interview that when CASP was introduced into the province, it came into a department that was seriously lacking in ‘administrative systems’, including a ‘dedicated wing that will just deal with projects, or CASP projects or any other developmental projects’ The interviewee also indicated that

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45 This differed from Paul’s concern for the application of a ‘centralised’ decision-making structure to a programme where environmental conditions warrant a more decentralised structure to facilitate local adaptation.
the department did not at the time make functional provision to provide a ‘marketing’ service, which was one of the six pillars of CASP.

These observations point to instances where some provinces were functionally ill-prepared to absorb the new service demands being introduced by CASP, where this could have resulted from a number of factors. This includes insufficient or ineffective communication about the programme’s supplementary contribution to existing farmer support activities between the DOA and provincial departments, and inadequate planning. Moreover, this may have been aided by insufficiently clear or developed national norms and standards, as reported earlier. Overall, observations from only three departments cannot be considered representative of the entire provincial situation. Findings elsewhere did however expose other structural constraints associated with the embedding of CASP into existing provincial line functions. In order to better appreciate these, it is necessary to give a brief overview of how the DOA structurally arranged itself to oversee CASP.

As early as 2002/2003 the DOA was discussing a future comprehensive farmer support initiative, where it specifically noted that ‘[t]he policy will be implemented by the many directorates within the Department’ (Department of Agriculture 2003: 35). This was followed by a more detailed statement indicating that ‘considerable attention was paid during 2004/05 to aligning all support services to the six CASP service pillars’ (Department of Agriculture 2005a: 26). Citing the direct implementation involvement of ‘many directorates’ in the Department demonstrated an intention to align the DOA’s various functional units to the six service pillars of CASP.

Perhaps the clearest illustration of a deliberate attempt to link CASP’s six functional services with core functional units within the DOA was portrayed in the Department’s 2004/2005 Annual Report, which corresponded with the programme’s first year of operation. The Report in question was, on the surface, no different from other annual reports published by government departments in South Africa, which generally reported on the activities of line function units within the DOA for the year. What was unique about this particular report was the space allocated to each directorate in the Department to report on the specific contributions each was making to CASP pillars. These were tabulated by the researcher and presented in table 6.3 below.
Table 6.3: Relationship between CASP functional pillars and DOA line function directorates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASP Functional services ('Pillars')</th>
<th>NDA Line functional contributions to CASP pillars (2004/5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information and knowledge management</td>
<td>• Directorate: International Trade&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Scientific Research and Development&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Plant Health&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Animal Health&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: South African Agricultural Food Quarantine and Inspection Service&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Agricultural Information Services&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Programme Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and advisory assistance, and regulatory services</td>
<td>• Directorate: Business and Enterprise Development&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Production and Resource Economics&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Animal and Aquaculture Production Systems&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Plant Production Systems&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Genetic Resources Management&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Land Use and Soil Management&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Water Use and Irrigation Development&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Food Safety and Quality Assurance&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Plant Health&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Animal Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing and business development</td>
<td>• Directorate: Marketing&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: International Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and capacity building</td>
<td>• Directorate: Agricultural Statistics&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Education and Training&lt;br&gt;• Grootfontein Agricultural Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On/off farm infrastructure and product inputs</td>
<td>• Directorate: Water Use and Irrigation Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial support</td>
<td>• Directorate: Agricultural Finance and Co-operatives Development&lt;br&gt;• Directorate: Agricultural Risk and Disaster Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Agriculture 2005a

Interviews with senior officials in the DOA also revealed that the Department had already been engaging in efforts to monitor and support provincial departments to implement CASP activities. One official reported that:

[W]e have nine regional offices … and we call those provincial coordinators, and they are mainly looking at land reform programmes, and it’s a system that they are managing, we call that LRAD system … they record all LRAD and CASP, in fact land and agrarian reform projects, the status, what the problems are, and interact with other relevant directorates to say, if there’s a problem with marketing, then they need to meet up with the marketing directorate to say, we have this project here in this areas … these are the problems, and then they’ll have to source that assistance
Another official added that:

[W]e as a national department have allocated a, what we call a DEXCO team to each province, so each of the management, from chief director above, has a province he or she is responsible for and a team of management, that has in the past, and will probably in the future, go to a particular province, and oversee the spending and, oversee CASP in the province.

Despite the rational arrangement of its functional oversight and support to provincial implementing departments, the DOA elsewhere admitted to weaknesses in exercising oversight and monitoring over provincial department activities. One official, who acknowledged reports of human resourcing problems in the provinces, relayed the following: ‘but, national department of agriculture, in as much as we have a Secretariat\(^\text{46}\) … and we have some people in provinces as well, inspectors … they have not been doing intense auditing or oversight of individual projects, so, I don’t think we can tell you whether at the project level, where there’s a planning problem or not.’ This generally corresponds with comments made by a DOA official speaking before Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Agriculture in August 2006, who, in relation to provincial expenditure on CASP, remarked that it was clear that the national department needed to go to the provinces and ‘investigate everything in detail’ (PMG 2006).

DOA officials interviewed for this thesis also offered a different perspective on the structural scenario underpinning the Department’s monitoring capacity, by describing a ‘problem that we always have now’, which ‘we need to sort … out’ of provincial departments not fully accounting for the activities that they expended CASP monies on:

[S]o the money is transferred to provinces, when they spend, just spend the money as support, from provincial side, they just support to all the farmers, but what we are saying the CASP cut, when they account, because the DG must account to Treasury, they must also indicate what they used the money for.

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\(^{46}\)The Secretariat refers to the CASP Secretariat, with the Directorate: Land Use and Soil Management tasked with overseeing and ensuring provincial department of agriculture compliance with CASP conditional grant funding conditions. This was based on the Directorate’s prior experience in grants administration for other national-provincial department programmes (i.e., LandCare) (Department of Agriculture 2005c: 8-9; Department of Agriculture, Not dated c: 1).
Although the interviewee also recognised that the supplementary form of the CASP grant meant that it was ultimately absorbed into the existing farmer support budgets of provincial departments from where it was spent, the programme required the DOA, in terms of its designated oversight and monitoring role, to account for how the grant portion was spent. This indicates a possible source of structural tension between the supplementary nature of the grant, which recognises the shared functional responsibilities for agriculture in general, and farmer support in particular, between the DOA and provincial departments, and the specific oversight and monitoring role that CASP assigned to the DOA vis-à-vis the provinces. This again seems to accord with Paul’s reference to new programmes with a different definition of a problem and a set of tasks that cut across different ministries, and in this case spheres of government, not performing well when structured along existing line functions. Further exposition of this potential structural constraint will be offered a little later, but for the moment the problems experienced by a fourth province in embedding CASP within its existing line functions will be discussed.

An official in this province described a somewhat different functional experience to other provinces which recounted difficulties trying to embed CASP in their existing functional structures. The difference was reflected in its ability to more fully integrate the programme within its line functions. Having said this, the official’s description was otherwise consonant with the kind of bureaucratic impediments referred to by Paul (1982: 116-117) in his assumption about new programmes with a different definition of a problem being structured along a department’s existing line functions:

There’s a champion for CASP in the province, … she is overseeing/协调 the whole budget that we get for the province, also she’s administering what we do, which is 70 per cent of the allocation for land reform, and then 10 per cent for training, 10 per cent for food security, etc. Now, it would have been best if that person was directly involved in those programmes, because what I find is the 10 per cent for food security is done for food security is done by the regions, manager is responsible for that, budget is directly allocated to those people, and they take decisions, sometimes the communication between co-ordinator and them is very poor … so I’m saying … it becomes difficult for the coordinator to coordinate between different units like it is happening … especially because we don’t report to one senior manager, it’s two different sub-components that we are belonging to, so it won’t be appropriate if; In our department we have two DDGs [Deputy Director Generals], then from those we have Chief Directors, then below we have senior managers, I’m saying then, CASP is being managed by one chief business office, or one DDG, whereas the most implementation is happening
with one DDG. Implementation happens with one DDG, training is with another DDG. And putting these people together is very very difficult to someway we must try and identify a very seamless way ... identify a best way of managing this programme.

This observation, from a fourth province, indicates that problems experienced trying to embed CASP in the existing functional activities (dedicated to farmer support) of some provincial departments was not the only type of constraint experienced, where the cumbersome outcomes of a fuller integration of the programme appeared to impair capacity in other ways.

Adding to this manifestation of bureaucratic constraints on capacity were other observations conveyed by more than one official at the DOA, which this time emanated, interestingly, from the decentralised organisational structure of CASP, as opposed to the imposition of a centralized structure as mooted by Paul (1982: 117). The following findings could moreover advance the notion of a structural constraint underpinning the problematic monitoring capacity of the DOA as referred to earlier. Following on from a DOA official who earlier recounted difficulties obtaining performance output information from provincial departments, another official in the Department echoed these concerns by recalling an incident where the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs had once asked ‘where are the projects’. In other words the Minister asked for a more detailed description of outputs generated at the provincial level, where there was a concern that officials at this level were choosing only the ‘good ones’, or being selective in reporting on projects. The official then interestingly conveyed that greater scrutiny by the national department might become a ‘turf issue’ between the DOA and provincial departments. This was also curiously mentioned by another DOA official, who in discussing problems with obtaining ‘sufficient’ and ‘detailed’ information on the status of CASP projects at provincial level, relayed the following concern:

[A]nd I fear that we may well be going even into a more vague environment if we go to the CASP arena because it’s not even your own people, you’re in a different department, there are other sort of dynamics there, and ... unless we can prove to provinces ... that the effort that they would be going through to give us the information for this money that we’re giving them, that we will then capture it and provide it back to them in an electronic format which is useful to them, unless we can prove that case ... they’ll just say this is an administrative imposition and it’s not useful.
References to a ‘turf issue’ between the DOA and provincial departments, and concerns about administrative ‘impositions’ by provincial departments, speaks to the shared functional authority that the DOA and provincial departments of agriculture were constitutionally invested with, which in operational terms extended to farmer support activities. This arrangement therefore necessitated the involvement of both spheres in the execution of a national programme such as CASP, and particularly where a specific functional activity such as farmer support was already being rendered by both spheres, for which supplementary funding was arranged. In accordance with this scenario, it was evident that the structural decentralisation of the programme between the DOA and the provinces also manifested what could be described as bureaucratic impediments exposing conflicts of hierarchy. At one level, this seems to have constrained the capacity of the DOA to exercise effective monitoring, whilst from a wider perspective interestingly recalls an earlier reference by a DOA official to the potential strategic ‘imposition’ by the national Department of service pillar priorities that may not have matched those of provincial departments.

6.4.1 Overall impressions on the structure of CASP

This section argued that the strategic design and environmental characteristics which accompanied CASP had already contributed to a problematic functional scenario between national and provincial departments involved in carrying out the programme. This included problems aligning inter-departmental programming rules between the DLA and agriculture departments, and provincial departments of agriculture enjoying limited room to configure service areas and beneficiary targeting for rendering support services available under the programme, which also yielded resource-related consequences for their capacity. These conditions primarily stemmed from CASP’s key objective, which emphasised the rendering of agricultural support services to the beneficiaries of land reform programmes.

Having said this, the initial dis-functionalities which were influenced by strategic factors were also found to have been augmented by the programme’s structural configuration, which handed on-the-ground implementation responsibility to provincial departments whilst requiring the DOA to monitor and account. In functional terms, findings from at least four provinces indicated that capacity was affected by difficulties experienced with
trying to and the constraints generated by eventually embedding CASP in existing department line functional activities. These observations generally coincided with Paul’s concern about the bureaucratic effects of introducing new programmes with a different definition of a problem into existing functional structures.

Bureaucratic constraints on capacity was also evident in how structural authority for the programme was arranged between the DOA and its provincial counterparts, yet unlike in Paul’s scenario, this did not arise as a result of the centralisation of national department authority but, interestingly, manifested itself in the context of the programme’s structural decentralisation. This was in any event a direct consequence of functional authority for agriculture being constitutionally shared between the DOA and provincial departments in South Africa. In this particular case, the decentralisation of what was a national programme saw the creation of inter-organisational authority conflicts, stemming from the particular roles that CASP introduced into this shared framework, and which in this instance required the DOA to monitor and oversee provincial performance. This appears to have adversely affected its capacity to effectively carry out this designated role. It may be pertinent to note that this was experienced on the back of an already problematic strategic relationship, including on service pillar prioritisation, between the DOA and its provincial counterparts.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented an analysis of factors associated with the strategy, environment and structure of CASP, which were found to have influenced the capacity of its implementing organisations to carry out the programme. The impressions documented in this chapter will contribute to a consolidated identification of factors in the conclusion of this thesis. Chapters 7 and 8 will present an analysis of the Expanded Public Works Programme.
CHAPTER 7

EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME: BACKGROUND

7.1 A historical overview of the public works sector and the issue of job creation

This chapter will provide a historical account of the emergence of the Expanded Public Works Programme\(^\text{47}\) (EPWP), which is the latest incarnation under a policy theme originally designed to generate large-scale employment opportunities through existing government-expenditure on infrastructure. The roots of the Programme are also reflected in the transformation of its designated co-ordinating body: the national Department of Public Works (DPW). The primary function of the DPW prior to South Africa’s 1994 political transition was the procurement, administration and maintenance of state-owned or leased property, and the provision and maintenance of physical infrastructure (accommodation) for government departments. The Department’s main function was therefore to service the physical infrastructure needs of the state (1994: 3; 1993: 3; see also 1992: vii) These functions entailed activities such as the renovation of buildings, their upkeep and repair, property valuation, construction management, and the preservation of national monuments. Prior to political reform the Department consisted of two branches, each headed by a Deputy Director-General. The first was concerned with building services (architectural, engineering, quantity surveying) whilst the other was responsible for accommodation and land affairs.

The DPW’s responsibility for providing and maintaining building infrastructure for the state had, even before the political transition, recognised the job creation benefits that could accrue as a result of such activities. The Department was however never sufficiently resourced or accorded the policy space to foreground job creation as a primary objective of its construction activities. When commenting on the planning of capital works in its 1984 Annual Report, the Department noted for example that ‘In

\(^{47}\)Some media reports and government speeches (see The Presidency 2004) have, for unknown reasons, substituted the word ‘Extended’ for ‘Expanded’ when referring to the EPWP. The Expanded Public Works Programme is the correct and formal name given to the programme and is employed throughout in DPW documentation examined by this thesis. In other words, there is no Extended Public Works Programme, and nor is this form of the name employed in DPW documentation.
striving to curtail Government expenditure as far as possible, one of the aims was to limit
the planning of new building projects to the most urgent cases only, and this effort has
proved largely successful' (Department of Public Works and Land Affairs 1985: 43). Four
years later, the Department again remarked that it was, ‘as a result of the limited funds
available for the erection of buildings, to a great extent still dependent on hiring to
provide for the accommodation needs of the user departments’ (Department of Public
Works and Land Affairs 1989: 66). The limited fiscal scope for new capital projects
existed until South Africa’s political transition, when the DPW began to express concern
at the growth of annual expenditure on leasing accommodation, which was outpacing
spending on capital projects. In response to this situation, the Department noted that it
‘would like to make a greater contribution to the stabilisation of the building industry by
executing more capital projects, and in so doing also creating more jobs’ (Department of
Public Works 1994: 45).

Despite resource limitations, the Department of Public Works and Land Affairs (DPWLA)
as it was known during the mid 1980s recognised ‘job creation’ as an important bi-
product of its capital projects. In its 1986 Annual Report the Department commented on
‘Measures for Job Creation’ when reporting on a provision of buildings, structures and
equipment programme. Here it noted that in the Eastern Cape, where unemployment
was identified as being especially serious, it had commissioned building projects that
were estimated to have created 1828 years of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled work in
building and related industries (Department of Public Works and Land Affairs 1987: 35).
Bromberger et al (1987: 12) also documented a large-scale public works project taking
place outside Pietermaritzburg in the province of Natal, although it was not made clear
which government body was responsible for implementing the project or even if the
Department of Public Works was involved:

> The severity of unemployment among blacks has prompted the government to
allocate funds towards projects aimed at creating employment. The recent
canalization [sic] of the Baynes Spruit near Sobantu Village [near to
Pietermaritzburg] was allocated R1 356 000 and was considered the largest
unemployment relief project in the country some months ago.

The Department’s limited efforts and those of other government agencies to create jobs
and address unemployment through capital works projects were not going unnoticed by
commentators at the time. Abedian, Schneier and Standish (1985: 37) for instance
mooted the possibility of a national public works programme funded through a separate budget vote, which had a precedent in public works programmes introduced in the 1920s to alleviate poverty amongst South Africa’s white population. Abedian and Standish (1986) reiterated their call a year later, this time suggesting that a large scale public works programme could be used to alleviate poverty and unemployment amongst the African population. Directing a public works effort at this constituency was further supported by Reynolds (1984: 16; 26), who concluded that ‘[t]he position in South Africa would appear to be one of massive open unemployment in the countryside’, where ‘If the public works route is not followed, it is hard to see what else to do.’

Despite calls to roll out a more ambitious national public works programme to reduce unemployment and poverty amongst South Africa’s black and mainly African population, the political oppression of this community under apartheid policies was not otherwise lost on some commentators. They recognised for example that ‘[i]t is unlikely that the [black] people of this country will accept a PWP [public works programme] controlled by government and implemented through existing bureaucratic institutions’, where in lieu of identifying the precise form that such an implementing body should take, the authors confined themselves to suggesting that such a body should ideally be independent and at arms length from government, including in how it sourced its funding (Abedian, Standish 1986: 30-31).

Interestingly, concerns about unemployment in the 1980s and how to address this did not go unnoticed by the South African government, which in 1985/1986 allocated R600 million to support what it termed ‘special job creation programmes’, described as ‘temporary and special measures to involve as many unemployed as possible and, as far as practicable must not compete with permanent avenues of employment.’ (Department of Manpower 1986: 139; see also Barker 1986) The most interesting feature of this initiative was its remarkably similar appearance to the Expanded Public Works Programme some twenty years later. This was evident in the following characteristics exhibited by the scheme (Department of Manpower 1986: 139-140; Department of Manpower 1987: 170-172, 176)

48Employment for poor and unskilled whites was generated in building railway infrastructure and staffing the civil service (Abedian, Schneier, Standish, 1985: 16, 19).
• The principle of labour-intensity was being advanced, or that involving the participation as many unemployed persons as possible (numbers of unemployed benefiting from the programme were tallied along with number of man-days worked);

• Employment was to be temporary;

• Resources allocated directly to government departments at the national, provincial and local levels, including those departments allocating funds for projects in independent and self-governing homeland territories, which housed South Africa’s black African population;

• Overall co-ordination of projects and accountability rested with a single department, which in this case was responsible for Manpower;

• A portion of the funding set aside for job creation was allocated to the training of unemployed persons and persons entering the informal and small business sectors. Training areas covered construction and a range of other fields, including industrial, manufacturing clerical/administrative, and artisanship activities;

• Finally, the activities through which jobs were being created varied, including the building and maintaining of physical infrastructure; transport infrastructure (e.g., roads, dams); services infrastructure (e.g., water and power); environmental conservation; and agricultural projects.

Despite these similarities, the then Department of Public Works and Land Affairs was, curiously, a comparatively insignificant contributor to the special job creation programmes. Department of Manpower (1986: 142) figures showing the amount appropriated for ‘job creating measures’, which comprised over half the total allocation of funds, indicated that around one per cent of the funds were allocated to the DPWLA. This was compared to the 41 per cent distributed to the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, to be spent via local authorities and boards on ‘self build housing and upgrading of black townships’. Figures for the 1986/1987-1988/89 period, which appears to have covered the full duration of the initiative, did not show any funds appropriated to the DPWLA (Department of Manpower 1989: 175).

A broader perspective on the scheme’s budgeting further indicated that the emphasis was in fact aimed at departments which were more directly involved in the upkeep of
South Africa’s racially segregated geo-political system. This contributed to the scepticism which commentators attached to how beneficiaries of a public works scheme would likely respond to initiatives controlled by the government, given the overarching political circumstances in the country. For instance, in addition to the more than 40 per cent of funds allocated via the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning for job creating projects to upgrade black townships, Departments responsible for Development Aid and Foreign Affairs also received substantial funding. These departments were responsible for providing development assistance to African self-governing territories as well as maintaining diplomatic relations with independent homeland states. The Development Bank of Southern Africa (1987: 26) also received funding to support small business development in homeland states.

The beginning of the end of apartheid just a few years after the special job creation programmes came into existence, followed by South Africa’s first non-racial elections and the voting in of an African National Congress-led government in 1994, would significantly alter the political and administrative environment in the country. These changes encompassed the dissolution of or policy shifts in departments responsible for engaging with soon-to-be defunct homeland territories, and the beginning of a considerable rationalisation and restructuring of provincial administrations and municipalities. In this context, responsibility for government-sponsored job creation schemes was transferred to the previously marginal Department of Public Works and Land Affairs.

The policy transformation of the Department of Public Works (DPW), as it again became after 1994 with the creation of a separate Department of Land Affairs, was spelled out in the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994: 73). The White Paper proposed that the DPW needed to go beyond its historical role facilitating the provision of infrastructure assets for state institutions, by ‘simultaneously creating sustainable employment and building capacity of beneficiaries’, objectives that were recognised but not emphasised in its previous mandate. The publication of a Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy in 1996 further mooted the possibility that government programmes could ‘add a further quarter of the new jobs, mainly through accelerated labour-based infrastructural development and maintenance of public works in urban and rural areas.’ (Department of Finance 1996: 19) Although this was not a historically
unexploited area in view of the apartheid period special job creation programmes, the DPW’s contribution to it was being substantially redefined.

A 1997 White Paper on Public Works consolidated the change in emphasis being proposed in the RDP White Paper by commenting in section 2.1.4 that the Department was in a position to make direct contributions to overall government objectives ‘in large part by including socio-economic [which meant job creation] factors in cost-benefit analyses related to departmental operations for the first time’. 49 (Government Gazette 1997) This included, *inter alia*, new production regimes that stressed labour-intensity for workers. The widening policy mandate being assumed by the DPW after 1994 also had a direct effect on the Department’s administrative structure. This could be traced to the deliberations of a National Economic Forum (NEF), predecessor to what would later become the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a statutory body consisting of representatives of government, labour, the private sector and civil society. The NEF proposed a framework for the implementation of a ‘national public works programme’, which included two notable components. The first was premised on a systematic re-orientation of public sector approaches to the provision of infrastructure, which would favour the utilisation of labour in order to increase the potential for job creation. The second called for a designated fund to support communities to undertake their own public works (NEF 1994: iii). Although these proposals were not radically different to the thrust of the apartheid government’s special job creation activities in the mid 1980s, they would be given a substantially different administrative identity, wherein the RDP White Paper not only accepted the NEF proposal but specified in Chapter 9 that a ‘National public works programme’ (NPWP) should be incorporated as a Directorate in the DPW.

Developments in the DPW after 1994 confirmed that the Department had taken up the recommendations flowing out of the NEF and RDP White Paper. The Department’s 1995 Annual Report (1996a: 5) reported that the establishment and staffing of an NPWP branch had been approved by the Public Service Commission and that all posts, from Deputy Director-General (DDG) down, had been advertised during July 1995. Two years later, the Department reported that a DDG had been installed to oversee the NPWP,

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49 This clause first appeared in the 1996 Public Works Green Paper, which preceded publication of the White Paper
which was taking forward a new policy mandate designed to increase job creation through greater labour absorption in public sector infrastructure spending. This included a ‘Technical Development and Reorientation’ (TDR) programme, which according to the Department’s 1995 Annual Report (1996a: 3-4), was intended to experiment and promote more labour-intensive techniques in the construction activities of relevant government departments. The Green Paper on Public Works (1996b) also made reference to specialised sector infrastructure being implemented by government departments other than the DPW, whose mandates included housing, roads and transport, water and electricity, and telecommunications. The Department subsequently reported that under the TDR Programme it was overseeing the implementation of 12 pilot projects to test labour-intensive construction methods. This included the drafting of operational guidelines for incorporating labour-intensive principles in the delivery of infrastructure projects (October 1996), and the production of similar guidelines for incorporating vocational training in infrastructure projects (DPW 1997: 8).

In administrative terms the addition of another branch within the Department, and overseen at Deputy Director-General level, was a relatively significant occurrence for which policy sanction had effectively been granted by the RDP White Paper. Another new initiative that had its roots in the NEF process and the RDP White Paper was the creation of a Community-based Public Works Programme (CBPWP), to be housed under the NPWP. The CBPWP essentially tried to test the principle of labour-intensive infrastructure development at a community level, with the aim of maximising the use of localised labour to create, rehabilitate and maintain physical assets in communities, whilst benefiting community members with work and training opportunities (DPW 1998b: 1; DPW 1997: 9-10).

By 1997, only three years into the DPW’s new mandate, the seeds of a second major policy shift were beginning to appear. Section 3.2 of the Public Works White Paper observed for example that uncertainty about the duration of the NPWP as a strategy translated into uncertainty about its funding, leading to year-on-year planning which was deemed inadequate and expensive. It added that the link between the long-term and short-term strategies of the NPWP had not been fully explored, developed and exploited, which essentially referred to the pace at which people being trained under the CBPWP were subsequently able to enter the formal labour market in the construction industry.
Moreover, the White Paper also remarked on the limited extent to which the NPWP was able to demonstrate a concrete contribution to government-sponsored job creation, and to correspondingly exploit the potential for more labour-intensive infrastructure provision. Sean Phillips (2004: 3-4), then Chief Operations Officer at the DPW, also reflected critically on the contribution of the NPWP. Phillips wrote that the programme failed to realise the goal of reorienting public sector expenditure on infrastructure towards labour-intensive techniques as a result of a number of extraneous factors, including ‘a context of major political restructuring, multiple demands on a new government, and an uncertain legal framework for labour intensive construction’ He was specifically alluding to the absence of an underlying legal framework to regulate working conditions under labour-intensive schemes, where such a framework was subsequently developed (see chapter 8). A similar kind of framework was not clearly observable in the description of the ‘special job creation programmes’ initiative, which included remunerating beneficiaries in the form of a ‘contribution’ or ‘allowance’, part of which was allocated in the form of food and transport costs (See Department of Manpower 1987: 171; Barker 1986: 171)

Although the White Paper did not explicitly propose that the NPWP be replaced by a new instrument that could presumably obviate such challenges, the structure of the NPWP as a seemingly looser programmatic collection of initiatives designed to experiment with greater labour intensive methods in public sector infrastructure provision may have limited its ability to effectively corral and focus these various interventions towards a more common set of outcomes. Section 3.3 of the White Paper further suggested that policy and ‘practical orientation’ on public works programmes, again taking aim at the NPWP, needed to be better co-ordinated. Reference to co-ordination and practical orientation reflected how the DPW defined its own role in the NPWP, where in section 1.2.3 of the Green Paper on Public Works (1996b), the department commented that ‘[a]lthough the PWD [public works department] has been given responsibility for implementing the NPWP, it is a programme of the entire government. The role of the NPWP is primarily co-ordinating, monitoring and evaluating.’ Moreover, the NPWP was reported to have engaged in bilateral discussions with various other

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50This described an arrangement where other infrastructure delivery departments in the government were encouraged to employ greater labour-intensive methods of implementation, where the DPW, under the ‘Reorientation’ initiative, was tasked with researching techniques and methods, and providing assistance to departments.
government departments involved in the delivery of sector-specific infrastructure. 51 Some of these would later become participants in the EPWP: the Departments of Agriculture and Water Affairs and Forestry (Environment and Culture sector), and the Department of Constitutional Development, now the Department of Provincial and Local Government (Infrastructure sector).

Recognising a need to improve the co-ordination of labour-intensive infrastructure delivery across government also began to take on a greater socio-economic character, which had the additional effect of extending the notion of public works beyond the delivery of physical infrastructure. Phillips (2004: 6) recalled for instance that the policy momentum behind an ‘expanded’ public works programme could be traced to the 51st National Conference of the governing African National Congress (ANC) in 2002, which resolved that there should be a large-scale expansion of the use of labour-intensive construction methods to ‘alleviate unemployment and to address the backlogs of infrastructure in previously disadvantaged areas’. The ANC further argued, under the heading: ‘infrastructure development’, that:

The apartheid era left a legacy of social and economic infrastructure that is unintegrated, environmentally unsustainable, of poor quality and unequally distributed. The interests of white communities, business and security considerations influenced infrastructure programmes. There was little or no reference to the needs of the poor and rural areas.

The Party added that:

The Expanded Public Works Programme must be a major priority and be designed to make a significant contribution to reducing unemployment and providing livelihoods for the poor, women, youth and people with disabilities ... it should adopt a differentiated approach to social and economic infrastructure that ensures the design of social infrastructure, including all urban and rural social facilities, infrastructure for basic household services, amenities in residential areas focusing on:

- Creation of jobs through labour intensive construction and maintenance
- Creating sustainable assets for the poor
- Creating income generating opportunities for communities, and
- Providing opportunities for skills development and training

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51 This included the Departments of Transport; Water Affairs and Forestry; Agriculture; Housing; and Constitutional Development (now Department of Provincial and Local Government). See DPW (1996a: 4; 1997: 8; 1999: 13).
Source: Resolutions adopted by the 51st National Conference of the African National Congress, Stellenbosch, 2002

A greater social and economic orientation had in fact appeared under the NPWP as early as 1997, when the CBPWP was allocated a sum of R85 million to implement a ‘fast track poverty alleviation’ programme aimed at especially poor provinces (DPW 1998a: 10). The projects being supported were however similar to those found in the earlier special job creation programmes, including physical infrastructure (e.g., community halls and sport and recreation facilities); transport infrastructure (e.g., access roads and village bridges for access); and agricultural infrastructure (e.g., livestock dipping and handling facilities, micro-irrigation schemes) (DPW 1999: 9). Moreover by 2001 it was being reported that the CBPWP was implementing projects cutting across a range of sectors beyond physical infrastructure.52

The adoption of a more poverty-oriented focus by the CBPWP was also accompanied by a concern for the ability of these activities to generate longer-term social and economic benefits to beneficiaries. This was evident in a Parliamentary Media Briefing (South Africa Government Online 2000) by Public Works Minister Stella Sigcau as early as February 2000, where the Minister reported the following:

We have now placed a stronger focus on sustainability of jobs and development, community facilitation and the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure to serve larger pockets of communities … Our immediate implementation and delivery will focus on: balancing temporary poverty alleviation efforts with long term sustainability of rural economies, infrastructure creation and service provision

The Minister was essentially arguing that the link between short-term strategies and longer-term outcomes associated with government works initiatives, which it was claimed the NPWP had not effectively bridged, also depended on instruments that could effectively contribute to the longer-term sustainability of rural economies. A more pronounced emphasis on the poverty-alleviating outcomes of CBPWP activities was, in an effort to facilitate sustainability, expected to be linked more ‘directly to Local

52See DPW 2001: 27. Projects included improving road access and facilitating community markets; providing employment in small-scale agriculture, e.g., food lots; small-scale irrigation; the operation of crèches to facilitate childcare of working parents; and projects on waste collection and recycling.
Economic Development and Integrated Development Planning initiatives, which constituted existing medium to longer-term planning instruments employed by local governments in South Africa (Department of Public Works 1999: 8).

Interestingly, in her briefing to Parliament and in what could be viewed as a reflection of the co-ordination challenges that were earlier associated with the NPWP, the Minister also remarked that the true impact of the CBPWP on rural development would only be secured through an ‘integrated’ strategy working with other national departments, provincial and local governments (South Africa Government Online 2000). The challenge of facilitating sustainable longer-term socio-economic benefits from labour-intensive works initiatives effectively brought together a call to integrate these activities more closely with existing spatial planning mechanisms, as well as an appeal to state institutions carrying out relevant physical, social and economic infrastructure activities to co-ordinate their efforts more effectively. The stage was then complete for the introduction of an Expanded Public Works Programme, which three years later was described by the DPW (2003: 34) as building on the experience of the CBPWP by being charged with ‘facilitate[ing] and create[ing] employment opportunities for the poor, vulnerable and alienated groups through an integrated and coordinated labour-based approach to government infrastructure delivery and service provision’ (DPW 2003: 34).

7.2 Conclusion

This historical background to the introduction of the EPWP was intended to present a limited but pertinent set of facts about the evolution of government-sponsored labour-intensive measures designed to create employment opportunities in South Africa. Chapter 8 will engage in a more extensive discussion and analysis of the findings from interviews together with a reading of secondary materials, which together will be used to identify factors found to have influenced the capacity of EPWP implementing organisations to carry out the programme.

CHAPTER 8

EXPANDED PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME: CASE STUDY

8.1 Introduction

This chapter will present an analysis of the findings from interviews conducted mainly with a cross-section of government officials directly charged with implementing the EPWP. These included officials in the department mandated to co-ordinate and monitor the programme’s implementation: the national Department of Public Works (DPW), and officials from various national departments contributing to each of the programme’s four sectors. In total, twenty-one qualitative interviews were conducted for the EPWP case study. Findings from the interviews were analysed together with a range of secondary documents sourced on the programme, which covered official programme and government reports, speeches, presentations, and statistical data. These primary and secondary sources were analysed together in order to locate and explain factors found to have influenced the capacity of implementing organisations to carry out the EPWP. This analysis will be structured according to the three variables of ‘strategy’, ‘environment’, and ‘structure’, as adapted from Paul’s work on the functioning of development programmes, and will be assessed against the assumptions contained in Paul’s description of these variables as outlined in chapter 3.

8.2 The ‘strategy’ variable

A development programme’s strategy as adapted from Paul’s framework encompasses the following three elements: the objectives specified by the government for the programme, how these objectives are translated into operating goals and action plans, and the circumstances under which resources are allocated to a programme. As with CASP, the analysis and discussion of factors influencing the capacity of EPWP implementing organizations, associated with the strategic make-up of the programme, will be presented in accordance with each of the three sub-variable elements described above. This will begin with the objectives specified by the South African government.
8.2.1 Factors associated with EPWP programme objectives

The substance of the objectives specified by a government for a development programme could constitute a factor(s) affecting the capacity of its implementing bodies to carry it out. This may yield direct and possibly adverse effects, according to Paul, depending on a number of conditions: the congruence between political objectives and how these are translated into on-the-ground implementation goals and plans; and the level of specificity attached to a programme’s objectives, which may affect the flexibility with which implementing organisations are able to determine the best operational means of achieving these (Paul 1983: 58). Depending on the makeup of these conditions, the objectives of a development programme could highlight factors that are influential to understanding the capacity of its implementing bodies to act.

As noted earlier, the idea of an ‘expanded’ public works initiative was first introduced by the governing African National Congress party in 2002. The policy impetus behind this initiative was elaborated a year later by two landmark events. The first was the convening of a Growth and Development Summit by the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) (Department of Labour 2003). Section two of the final Summit agreement made specific mention of ‘expanded public works programmes’, which specifically referred to initiatives that could be introduced by any of NEDLAC’s constituent groups (government, labour, private sector and civil society). Of particular interest was how closely the notion of expanded public works programmes resembled the circumstances under which the apartheid government introduced its special job creation programmes initiative, where the idea was to provide ‘poverty and income relief through temporary work for the unemployed’ (ibid) Moreover, the range of activities that could be introduced via such programmes covered physical as well as other types of infrastructure, including the maintenance of various public buildings; transport infrastructure (fencing of national roads, access roads in rural areas); environmental conservation (tree planting, erosion control and land rehabilitation); and agricultural activities (community gardens, dipping and irrigation schemes).

The second event gave official policy sanction to a government-sponsored ‘expanded public works programme’, which South African President Thabo Mbeki announced in a State of the Nation address (South Africa Government Online 2003). The President’s
remarks on the government’s new public works initiative stressed the notion of ‘social and economic infrastructure investment’, which had earlier motivated the CBPWP’s adoption of a more poverty-oriented stance. The President’s announcement would, as with the creation of the NPWP ten years earlier, have a direct effect on the functions of the DPW (2005a: 29), as it was to be given the task of ‘co-ordinating’ the implementation of the programme. Final policy endorsement of the EPWP was granted by Cabinet in November of 2003 (DPW 2007: 2).

Launching the EPWP in a rural village in the province of Limpopo54, South African President Thabo Mbeki stated that its aim would be to draw significant numbers of low-skilled unemployed into productive employment, and to provide these individuals with opportunities to undergo skills development whilst employed. The expectation was that workers would ‘increase their capacity to continue working elsewhere’ upon leaving the programme, given that it would only provide temporary employment. The President added that the EPWP would pursue its aim by promoting labour-intensive, in other words labour absorbing, employment methods (The Presidency 2004).

In relation to the EPWP’s two-pronged objective, that is 1) to create temporary work opportunities for the unemployed; 2) and to include training as part of this package, the government went a step further by stating that the programme would be expected to create work opportunities for at least one million people over an initial five-year period (2004-2009), via the contributions of various participating government departments clustered under four sectors (DPW Not dated b: 1-2). Similar features were also evident in the apartheid government’s special job creation programmes nearly twenty years earlier, although this initiative did not appear to have organised departmental contributions according to sectoral groupings.

Each of the EPWP’s sectoral groupings, and the departments which comprised these, would be expected to decide how each would contribute to the programme’s overall target for work and training opportunities. These were to be spelled out in individual

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54 The DPW’s 2004/2005 Annual Report stated that the Programme officially commenced on the 1st of April, 2004, and would be launched in all provinces during the course of that financial year (Department of Public Works 2005a: 29).
sector plans. A summary of the sectors, their constituent departments, and their employment and training targets is presented in tables 8.1-8.3

Table 8.1: EPWP sectors and participating departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EPWP Sector</th>
<th>Participating departments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Infrastructure</td>
<td>• National Department of Public Works (also overall co-ordinator of EPWP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Department of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Department of Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Department of Provincial and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provincial departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Local government (municipalities) via their capital budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• State-owned enterprises (public entities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Economic</td>
<td>• National Department of Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Social</td>
<td>• National Department of Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Department of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Department of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provincial departments in these sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Environment and culture</td>
<td>• National Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Department of Arts and Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provincial departments in some of these sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cutting sectors</td>
<td>• National Department of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sector Education Training Authorities (SETA), statutory bodies involved in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organising industry-specific training and apprenticeships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 8.2: EPWP employment targets by sector (2004/5-2008/9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Work opportunities</th>
<th>Person-years of work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>750 000 (4-month average duration)</td>
<td>250 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>200 000 (1-year average duration)</td>
<td>200 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>150 000 (12-18 month average duration)</td>
<td>200 000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>12 000 (18-month average duration)</td>
<td>18 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1 million plus</td>
<td>650 000 plus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Public Works 2004b: 17
Table 8.3: EPWP training targets per sector (2004/5-2008/9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Training days</th>
<th>Learnerships/ Skills programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>9 million days (average of 12 days per participant)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>2 million days (average of 10 days per participant)</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>4.5 million days (average of 30 days per participant)</td>
<td>35 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>36 000 (average of 12 days per participant)</td>
<td>3 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.5 million plus</strong></td>
<td><strong>43 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ibid*

The EPWP was therefore at its core a highly multi-sectoral programme, where it has also been said that the initiative, ‘[a]s an overall government programme … is highly decentralised’ (DPW 2004c: 1). Key to the programme’s capacity to respond to its objectives was the efforts of government departments, grouped under four sectors, to realise the job creation and training potential of their existing functional activities. In the Infrastructure sector for instance, the idea was to promote labour-intensive means of implementing capital works projects being financed through conditional infrastructure grants that were allocated to provincial and municipal governments. In the Environment and Culture sector additional job creation would be expected to be generated from existing activities being carried out by departments receiving support from a special poverty relief allocation. In the Social sector, programmes in Early Childhood Development and Home/Community-Based Care were chosen for their potential to increase work opportunities and training in particular. Finally, the situation was slightly different in the Economic sector where a new activity, in the form of a ‘Venture Learnership’ programme, was to be created and tasked with providing entrepreneurial and management training along with on-the-job experience to beneficiaries (DPW 2005e).

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55 The Infrastructure sector was set the additional objective of providing more specialised training to 15 000 emerging private sector contractors in the management of labour-intensive contracts.
The EPWP generally retained the activity area foci of previous public works/job creation efforts, going as far back as the special job creation programmes in the mid 1980s, by incorporating physical infrastructure activities (building and transport); environmental-related activities (conservation, agriculture, water affairs); economic activities (small business development); and social activities (childcare). The Department of Labour, post-apartheid successor to the Department of Manpower, was also expected to assist sector departments with the provision of training under the Programme. The incorporation of a social sector was however a relative newcomer to government-sponsored job creation efforts, having begun under the CBPWP. The inclusion of a social sector was otherwise prominent in President Mbeki’s contextualisation of poverty in South Africa, including the contribution that government’s spending in social services, which at the time comprised 58 per cent (see National Treasury 2003b: 16) of total government expenditure, was expected to make to job creation via the EPWP (South Africa Government Online 2003):

> It is in these areas [where concentrated poverty was observed] that we find the largest concentration of the marginalised sections of our population, which require dedicated interventions to extricate them from conditions of underdevelopment and entrenched poverty. This dictates that we focus on them with regard to our social spending as well as social and economic infrastructure investment.

Perhaps the most notable feature of the EPWP’s objective design was the DPW being designated as the programme’s overall co-ordinator, which, reflecting on the background presented in chapter 7, appeared to have arisen as a direct result of the administrative restructuring that accompanied South Africa’s political transition. This saw a shifting of responsibility for government-sponsored special job creation schemes to the Department. It should also be remembered that a considerable portion of the activities implemented under the apartheid government’s special job creation programmes initiative, despite being overseen by the Department of Manpower and being largely channelled to departments servicing racially segregated areas and needs, were of an infrastructural nature, which generally aligned with the functional activities of the DPW.

Findings from interviews revealed a curious cross-section of concerns being expressed by diverse sectoral departments, which conveyed a general reluctance and some uncertainty in adapting their erstwhile functional activities to the ‘labour-maximising’ and related ‘job creation’ objectives being introduced by the EPWP. The distinction between
these two features of the programme is noteworthy, where job creation referred to its primary objective output, whilst labour-maximisation/intensity defined the means through this was supposed to be achieved. It will be remembered from chapter 7 that the EPWP was expected to make a more concrete contribution to job creation than was able to be achieved by the NPWP, where the NPWP’s focus lay more in experimenting with labour-intensive/maximising methods of delivering public infrastructure. The objective significance of the EPWP was that it was expected to respond to both the means and ends of labour-intensity and job creation.

Turning to the objective concerns expressed by a wide cross-section of participating departments, it is acknowledged that commentary was elicited from a number of DPW officials, officials from participating sector departments, and stakeholders from outside the government who were otherwise directly involved in the programme’s implementation. One DPW official offered the following observation in relation to the Infrastructure sector:

But the point I want to make here with regard to reporting would be, do national departments in the Infrastructure sector, provincial departments in the Infrastructure sector, and municipalities where they deliver on MIG56 projects, do they actually have the full grasp around that, to know that yes I can clearly up front state that at the beginning of my financial year these will be my labour intensive projects I will be undertaking … And so I think a lot of the under-reporting could have a lot to do with an understanding of what needs to be done.

The respondent also remarked that they believed a lot of under-reporting could be attributed to whether implementing bodies clearly understood the difference between a labour-intensive or employment intensive project, and a ‘machine-based project’, adding that the creation of frameworks to support implementation of the EPWP in the Infrastructure sector did not necessarily facilitate understanding. They specifically remarked that ‘[i] think the fact that they have put out documents … frameworks, logframe … but the fact that it’s there, doesn’t mean that it is actually clearly understood’.

Another DPW official conveyed similar sentiments:

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56MIG stands for Municipal Infrastructure Grant, which municipalities receive from the national fiscus to spend on local infrastructure.
Well I think the biggest one is institutional … we have a mandate to deliver a million jobs … what makes up that million we assume that provinces would take their share, and municipalities would take their share … and then, you have the dilemma in provinces where people say alright now what do we do, do we do things the way we’ve been doing it all along, or do we shift, do we focus on EPWP, is EPWP different from what we’ve been doing, so there’s this continuous role clarity that you’re trying to clarify

There were other concerns about how clearly municipalities in particular were adapting their implementation activities to suit the new expectations (labour intensive-job creating) introduced by the EPWP, where a Parliamentary observer of the programme recalled that ‘when we went around, what did we then discover, we discovered that in each and every local municipality very few had an understanding of what the Expanded Public Works Programme is all about, save to come up and then say, but you have your MIG, right, but what are you doing with it?’ Finally, another interviewee corroborated difficulties with the programme’s objective penetration at the municipal level, by querying what exactly it was seeking to ‘expand’ (budgets, outputs?), adding that ‘[i]n my view this policy is not fully understood at the municipal level’.

Other findings revealed that infrastructure-delivery departments, especially at a municipal level, were not, necessarily, only unclear about the labour-maximising emphasis of the EPWP, but also seemed to be demonstrating some reluctance to adapt existing operational approaches for ideological and circumstantial reasons. More than one interviewee for example noted that there was some resistance to moving from mechanised (namely the use of physical equipment) modes of creating infrastructure such as roads, to employing more labour-intensive methods. One particular interviewee observed that some resistance was encountered from the ‘engineering fraternity’ who were ‘probably the most reluctant to go labour based approaches’. This was partly attributed to an observation that engineers had insufficient formal training in delivering infrastructure through labour-intensive means, as well as an opinion held amongst some that this ‘compromised quality’. Another interviewee noted that some municipalities were themselves reluctant to adopt greater labour-intensive means of creating infrastructure,
where this risked slowing down the delivery of infrastructure in situations where these bodies were being pressured to attend to service ‘backlogs’:

Then of course you have implementing departments, whether it’s water or electricity, whatever within these municipalities that in themselves are reluctant … to change their design to accommodate labour-intensive means, and the principle reason for this is that they are faced with huge service delivery challenges and backlogs, and to superimpose the EPWP on the challenges that they face they just … a challenge to take on, and as a result reluctance, given from them to do it

Finally, another observer alluded to potential problems with municipalities being able and willing to absorb additional demands being introduced by the EPWP, where the interviewee recalled that there were about seven programmes that municipalities were expected to respond to, ‘which in their view might or might not constitute their key objective which is the disbursement of money and the recovery of money through their billing system, that’s their key objective’. Although the interviewee did not specify what these other programming priorities were, he directed the researcher’s attention to a document which reported that ‘[i]t is clear that municipalities are hard-pressed to respond to the number and complexity of support programmes, which have to be aligned, integrated and coordinated. This requires “buy-in” by municipalities’ The initiatives in question included the EPWP; various IDPs (Integrated Development Plans, which are a national legislative requirement for municipalities in South Africa); Urban Renewal Programmes and the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme; the National Spatial Development Perspective (planning instrument); local economic development initiatives, which is also a national policy priority, Municipal Infrastructure Grant and equitable share expenditure (DBSA 2006: 16).

In addition to the interview data, inadequate incorporation of guidelines promoting labour-intensive methods by Infrastructure sector departments was also being cited in EPWP progress reports. The following passage is from a DPW (2006) report dated two years after the programme began its implementation:

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57 A Department of Provincial and Local Government (2006: 6) workshop on Municipal Infrastructure Grant performance similarly recorded that: ‘There is a perception with municipalities that EPWP projects delays spending of funds and is more expensive.’
In order to ensure that provinces and municipalities contribute to the EPWP, the PIG and MIG\textsuperscript{58} have specific EPWP conditions attached to them. These conditions require that the implementing agents using these grants implement their projects in accordance with the EPWP tender and design guidelines. \textsuperscript{59} Although the Department does not have numerical data on the extent to which public bodies have adopted the EPWP tender and design guidelines for their tender documentation, the general impression of the EPWP unit is that many government bodies have not yet adopted them, and have not yet changed their tender documentation to specify the use of labour-intensive methods.

Problems encountered with incorporating the EPWP’s objective emphasis on ‘labour-intensive’ job creation into the functional mandates of its participating departments were also experienced in the programme’s Social sector. This sector was held to a considerably smaller job creation target and, unlike the Infrastructure sector, had little prior history contributing to labour-intensive job creating activities. Having said this, departments in this sector appeared to be facing a more basic difficulty adapting existing functional activities to the programme’s job creation imperative. One official in a Social sector department remarked that:

\begin{quote}
The EPWP is, has really been used as a vehicle within the social sector, primarily to drive up service delivery, and so, the way that we’ve described our contribution to the EPWP is that the primary objective is to increase access to services, and it’s within that increase to access to services that we’re saying let us look at job opportunities, you know so the secondary component is job opportunities
\end{quote}

The interviewee’s comments firstly drew a distinction between what they held as the Social sector’s primary objective, which was to increase access to social services, and a secondary objective of job creation, a relationship which they later described as an objective ‘tension’. This differed from the objective difficulties experienced by Infrastructure sector departments, which concerned adjusting to the labour-maximising means of contributing to the EPWP’s job creation objective, where it essentially distinguished between competing objectives: the erstwhile orientation of social sector departments on improving access to services in education, health and welfare, versus an emphasis on creating jobs in the process of delivering these services. The Social

\textsuperscript{58}A more recent EPWP progress report (DPW 2007: 12) added that no ‘comprehensive report on the MIG [Municipal Infrastructure Grant] contribution to the EPWP is currently available as the MIG reports submitted through the MIG MIS [Management Information System] contain insufficient detail for reporting on the EPWP’ (DPW 2007: 12).

\textsuperscript{59}This refers to the following document: Guidelines for the implementation of labour-intensive infrastructure projects under the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP).
sector’s plan for the EPWP interestingly recognised that activities in Early Childhood Development (ECD) and Home/Community Based Care (HCBC) were significantly under-developed in terms of their prior job creating performance, where ‘[m]uch of the work of these three Departments relies on the input of volunteers and civil society organisations and is suitable for the development of the EPWP.’ The Plan added that ‘[w]hile there is recognition that a number of programmes present a range of opportunities for work creation, two have been selected [ECD and HCBC] as the lead pilot programmes for the Social sector EPWP for 2004/5.’ (DSD, DEd, DoH 2004: 8).

A DPW official elsewhere confirmed the difficulties experienced by Social sector departments in trying to incorporate a job creation emphasis within their existing delivery of social services:

Many people don’t see the bigger picture ... especially in the social sector, they see their role in terms of poverty alleviation, but they haven’t really pictured that in terms of the economy, in terms of employment creation.

The same interviewee recounted what transpired when the DPW was invited to present an overview of the EPWP to a provincial department in the social sector:

[M]ost of them were thinking EPWP is about building [physical infrastructure] hospitals and clinics ... so, and these people are managers, officials report to them, so how do you expect EPWP to take off if managers are still having that kind of mindset ... So it took time, now I want to be convinced that everybody understands the concept, and how they fit into it, but for us, for me I think the challenge was changing the mindset.

Although the observations of the DPW official generally aligned with that of an earlier-referenced department official, exposing an initial objective tension in translating the sector’s emphasis on social service delivery to job creation, the experience of Social sector departments broadly intersected with that of Infrastructure sector departments. In this regard, the means-end philosophy being advanced by the EPWP, which focussed on increasing the potential for job creation, did not easily penetrate the existing activities of these organisations. This was remarkable given the different histories of Infrastructure and Social sector departments in special job creation/public works schemes.
Another example from a department in the EPWP’s Environment and Culture sector exposed a similar difficulty reported by departments in the Social sector, which entailed translating the EPWP’s objective emphasis on job creation and training into existing functional activities. At the heart of the concern expressed by one sector department interviewed was that the usual operating approach being employed by a programme through which this Department was contributing to the EPWP, conflicted with the latter’s job creation objective and training criteria:

For EPWP it’s a requirement that projects should have a job element, should have a training element, while for [Department X] we are saying, it’s a mindset thing, it’s a mindset thing that people have to understand the contribution of the resource, natural resource, to them. They have to understand how much they can get out of the resource, for them … and if they understand, it’s then that jobs will be created.

Due to the difficulties experienced by this Department, the interviewee noted that at the time less than 50 per cent of the projects contributed by the Department were reported as complying with EPWP requirements. A less sympathetic perspective on the lack of operational compliance by the department-in-question was given by an official of the DPW, who observed that ‘[n]ow three years into EPWP [Department X] has been giving us their … projects the way they were, but without really like making a conscious effort to design them and making sure that they like comply’. The official added however that ‘the other challenge for me is the varied nature of the programmes that are implemented … they are so varied’; where it was additionally noted that no ‘uniform’ implementation guidelines were in place in the Environment and Culture sector.

Concerns about adjusting existing functional activities to the objectives mandated to the EPWP were also expressed by officials in the programme’s Economic sector, which despite being handed a considerably smaller job creation and training target (tables 8.2-8.3), this sector, similar to its Social counterpart, was essentially being tasked with implementing as yet untested job creating activities. One official in the DPW recounted that ‘[i] think that debate still continues’ concerning the inclusion of the Economic sector in the EPWP, where it was much easier to identify work opportunities over and above what was already being created in, e.g., the Infrastructure sector. The official further noted that:
The way the way I would describe it is that, obviously the way we approached this was that like I said there was a lot of debate initially about whether you need an economic sector ... the approach we've taken is to be able to lead by example, okay, and then based on what happens to hopefully develop it as best practice and get it accepted.

The interviewee continued by noting that the focus would be on aligning strategies in the Sector’s lead department\(^\text{60}\) with those developed by the DPW, i.e., in the Economic sector’s Plan, although they conceded that this ‘hasn’t been finalized’ by the lead Department. The interviewee also mentioned that the vehicle through which the sector would make its contribution to the EPWP (New Venture Learnership) had also not yet been ‘embedded’ in the sector’s lead department.

References to factors emanating directly from the objective makeup of the EPWP were communicated by and involved departments in all four of the EPWP’s sector groupings, where these varied (Infrastructure versus Social sectors) in terms of their historical experience contributing to government job creation programmes. Of those interviewees that did offer relatively pointed comments about the application of the EPWP’s objective framework, it was evident that core features of the programme’s objective makeup: job creation through maximising the use of labour in sector service delivery, faced a visible degree of reluctance from contributing departments in all sectors to buy into.

In the Infrastructure sector, there was a mixture of uncertainty and reluctance to adjust existing functional activities to these new demands due to circumstantial and ideological factors. This was despite a history of participation by relevant departments in special job creation/public works schemes, along with the specification of implementation guidelines explaining how ‘labour-intensive’ infrastructure provision was intended to be carried out (through tender and design guidelines). The situation was different in the Economic, Social and Environment and Culture sectors, where the former two sectors did not possess the kind of experience in mass job-creating activities as the Infrastructure sector did, where contributing departments appear to have sustained difficulties re-orienting existing and largely untested functional activities towards the more basic job creation imperative. Finally, a department in the Environment and Culture sector also indicated that the modus operandi employed by a programme through which it was contributing to

\(^{60}\) Lead’ department should be read in conjunction with table 8.1, where one department in each of the EPWP’s four sectors was designated as the lead or coordinating department for the sector.
the EPWP conflicted with the job creation expectations being demanded by the programme.

From the perspective of Paul's research, these findings suggest that departments in all of the EPWP’s contributing sectors exhibited some reluctance to adjust their existing functional activities to the labour intensive-job creation philosophy underpinning a key objective of the programme. This was due to circumstantial (adapting existing modalities of delivery, Economic sector); prevailing needs and commitments (Infrastructure sector); and in other cases ideological factors (Infrastructure, Social and Environment and Culture sectors) observed in participating sector departments. This appears to have most acutely affected the ability of the EPWP’s co-ordinating department, the DPW, to, as Paul (1982: 110) indicated, ‘have room to initiate and influence the formulation of strategy.’ Although, as Paul (ibid) argued, programme managers may be able to exploit such room if objectives are vaguely specified, and even when they are not (i.e., if measurable targets are given as in this case), where goal-means relationships are seldom specified, in the EPWP case the means through which sector departments were expected to contribute to the objective targets set by the programme were largely left to them to determine, via sector plans. This seems to speak directly to Paul’s (1982: 110) claim that ‘[t]he degree of freedom a program manager has in formulating strategy is influenced by the manner in which the government initiates his program.’ In this instance the manner in which the EPWP was arranged by the government saw sector departments retain the responsibility for determining how they would contribute to the Programme’s job creation objectives, through sector plans.

This aspect of the programme’s design likely contributed to the DPW’s limited capacity to influence the objective compliance of participating departments, a difficulty it continued to refer to up to three years into the EPWP’s implementation by reporting that:

There is an ongoing need for aggressive advocacy and communication to position the EPWP as a programme of the whole of government and to encourage the widespread use of more labour-intensive methods in the creation of infrastructure, through the use of the EPWP tender and design guidelines (DPW 2007b: 21).

The next section will look at factors associated with the translation of the EPWP’s objectives into operating goals and plans.
8.2.2 Factors associated with the EPWP’s operating goals and planning

The operational planning of a development programme refers to the translation of its objectives into operating goals and actions plans, where it is assumed that how these activities occur and the outcomes thereof may adversely affect the capacity of implementing organisations to carry out the programme. In the context of Paul's framework, the policy objectives attached to a development programme are intimately entwined with the specification of its operating goals and plans. Following on from the previous discussion of the EPWP’s objectives, this section will need to enquire more directly into the conditions relating to the interpretation, selection and sequencing of EPWP activities by the programme’s various implementing bodies, and identify the implications for and effects on their capacity. This corresponds with Paul’s (1982: 110) suggestion that ‘some situations yield greater flexibility to the program manager [or in this case implementing organisation] to choose, interpret and sequence operating goals’.

In the EPWP case, an extensive legislative and non-legislative framework of operating conditions and planning guidelines were created to operationalise its objectives. These are listed in table 8.4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Description of instrument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code of Good Practice for Employment and Conditions of Work for Special Public Works Programmes (Government Gazette 2002b)</td>
<td>Statutory notice put out by the national Department of Labour in 2002, as part of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1997). Makes reference to ‘Special Public Works Programmes’. Intended to be read in conjunction with Ministerial Determination. Provides good practice guidelines for the protection of workers on special public works programmes, including the selection and profile of beneficiaries (prioritisation of vulnerable groups such as women, youth and the disabled), duration of participation, and guidelines for contracting of workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPWP-related job creation conditions attached to existing statutory grants provided to provincial and municipal governments in South Africa to support infrastructure delivery. This includes a document entitled: Roles and Responsibilities of Municipalities and PMUs in the Management, Administration and Implementation of the MIG (municipal infrastructure grant) Programme.</td>
<td>These refer to adding conditions to existing statutory grant funding instruments distributed to provincial and local governments in South Africa for sector-specific spending, where receiving departments would be expected to expend the grants in accordance with the labour-intensive/job creation expectations and related guidelines of the EPWP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines for the Implementation of Labour-Intensive Infrastructure Projects under the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP)</td>
<td>Specifically relevant to the infrastructure sector, these guidelines aim to assist provincial and municipal governments to assess activities based on their suitability for employing labour-intensive methods. Also contains guidelines on contracting procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Expanded Public Works Programme</td>
<td>The framework provides methodologies for and criteria against which EPWP activities could be measured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Plan for Labour-Intensive Emerging Contractor Learnerships</td>
<td>Guidelines on the management of labour-intensive contractor learnerships (training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Programme Overview and Logical Framework</td>
<td>Provides a comprehensive overview of operational information, which in particular includes a logical framework breakdown of the EPWP: goals, purpose, approach, outputs, assumptions and risks; funding; institutional arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Coordinating role of the Department of Public Works in the Expanded Public Works Programme</td>
<td>Document detailing what the overall ‘co-ordinating’ role of the DPW on the EPWP consists of.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It was evident from the content of the instruments listed in table 8.4 that a substantive effort was made to overcome previous weaknesses in the post-apartheid implementation of large-scale public works programmes, bearing in mind Phillips’ earlier reference to an ‘uncertain legal framework for labour intensive construction’. This was addressed with the publication in 2002 of a Code of Good Practice and a Ministerial Determination governing the implementation of ‘special public works programmes’. It was also evident that an effort was made to address ‘co-ordination’ and ‘integration’ deficiencies which had restrained the full potential of previous labour-intensive public works activities (see chapter 7). This could be seen in the publication of an implementation framework and guidelines, a monitoring and evaluation framework, and a document specifying the DPW’s co-ordinating role on the EPWP.

Other documentation reviewed by the researcher revealed a further layer of operational planning, where each of the four sectors that comprised the EPWP along with their participating departments (see table 8.1) were expected to draft sector-specific plans on how each would contribute to the objectives of the programme. These plans were specifically intended to outline how sector departments would generate work and training opportunities in accordance with the objectives of the EPWP. This included specifying the individual programmes and activities through which departments would seek to create jobs and training opportunities, as well as outlining the organisational arrangements (roles and responsibilities of each sectoral department) through which each sector’s contribution to the EPWP would be made. At the time of writing an individual plan was in place for each sector (economic, social, infrastructure, environment and culture).

Interview findings at an operational level, and analysed according to Paul’s framework, interestingly revealed a further layer of capacity constraints that were not evident when the programme’s labour intensive/job creation objective imperative was examined earlier. It was found that some implementing departments (particularly in the Environment and Culture sector) experienced capacity constraints in the process of translating the EPWP’s objectives into operating goals, where the conditions and guidelines (see table 8.4) specified for the programme did not create the kind flexibility that enabled some departments to interpret and sequence operating goals. Even more interesting was the more widely experienced (across departments in more than one
sector) operational constraints experienced by implementing departments in responding to the conditions attached to the EPWP’s training objective.

In the Environment and Culture sector, one department expressed frustration at restrictions associated with having to adapt its existing functional activities to EPWP operational criteria being applied by the DPW. The department described their experience thusly:

[T]he biggest constraint that this programme [EPWP] has is that this programme is viewed as an infrastructure programme and the fundamental reason why it’s viewed as an infrastructure programme is twofold, the one is that it’s being managed or being co-ordinated by a public works department, which most function [sic] is government infrastructure; and the other reason is that because your EPWP co-ordinating unit is a public works department, your methodology, your systems, your way of thinking is all infrastructure-related. So the definition of a job opportunity would be a job opportunity based on an infrastructure project. Definition of labour-intensity would be based on a labour-intensity project … Now because infrastructure projects are that much shorter in terms of duration, they believe it can happen that way and they therefore impose that on everybody else and if we do not comply to those sets of rules you are not EPWP compliant.

The constraint being referred to by this interviewee stemmed from having to narrowly adjust and adhere to a set of operating rules for creating jobs to the exclusion of operating procedures that their Department had already been engaging in. The interviewee added greater weight to this point by suggesting that ‘If you look at all of the sectors…and you then get define [sic] parameters for the whole of the EPWP by taking cognisance of the varying projects within the EPWP and not just the infrastructure sector, you will then be able to come to a situation where you have more EPWP compliant jobs and you can actually show more jobs’ They further mentioned that ‘[t]he EPWP does not necessarily have an implementation framework or mechanisms that tells departments how to implement…But I do not think that sufficient work is being done by the EPWP unit to support departments in EPWP implementation.’

Reflecting on the interviewee’s comment about the apparent absence of an implementation framework, it must be worth noting that this thesis was only able to locate a set of implementation guidelines for Infrastructure sector projects under the
EPWP\textsuperscript{61}, where guidelines oriented to the functional circumstances of other sectors were not visible amongst the programme’s documentation. It could be reasoned then that the visible lack of a comprehensive set of guidelines covering more than just the Infrastructure sector, to inform the operationalisation of the EPWP’s objectives, would have contributed directly to a situation where an Environment and Culture sector department was citing constraints in how the programme’s operating rules were being applied to its contributing activities. Conversely, it would also appear logical that the non-existence of guidelines to, for instance, facilitate the implementation of Environment and Culture sector contributions to the EPWP, created a situation where existing guidelines, that is, for the infrastructure sector, were being applied essentially as a default operational framework.

Another example which this time exhibited a paradoxical feature of how EPWP operating rules were specified, also involved an Environment and Culture sector department which earlier reported being constrained by rules governing job creation. This time the department expressed difficulties associated with having to adhere to the working condition requirements applied by the EPWP. The department in question reported that the lack of specificity attached to the setting of wage rates under the Code of Good Practice, which governed the employment of beneficiaries on special public works programmes, had resulted in adverse implementation consequences for implementing departments:

\[\text{You have three implementing bodies implementing in one jurisdiction, right. What the Code of Good practice says is that you need to refer to the minimum wage in terms of the Department of Labour or the municipality within that jurisdiction ... you are then not allowed to pay the workers below the minimum wage, but you not allowed to exceed the minimum to such an extent that you draw people away from permanent jobs ... now what happens is that Working for Wetlands pays one rate, Working for Water pays one rate, we pay another rate ... workers talk to one and other ... we all talk to one and other, so you now have a situation on your hands where your workers are dissatisfied because I want to know why you earn more than me ... There’s no consistently adhered to in terms of the Code ... so it’s therefore not possible according to law to have a standard wage rate for every single project}\]

\textsuperscript{61}This again refers to the document: Guidelines for the Implementation of Labour-Intensive Infrastructure Projects under the Expanded Public Works Programme.
This contrasts with observations made in an interview with a DPW official who essentially reported that in other respects (namely training) the Code was too specific about the sequencing of training required to be provided to beneficiaries, where training days were accumulated based on a specified number of days beneficiaries worked, and where in the official’s opinion this was having adverse planning and implementation consequences for contributing departments:

[T]he one area of conflict is … the Code of Good Practice, which is the two days [training] for twenty-two days [worked] … which is extremely difficult to implement … Now we’ve taken some decisions that are going to solve this. One we are emphasizing a lot more prior training … that where training is done up front, before the project even starts, it’s much more successful, you don’t have that planning crisis\textsuperscript{62}, and it fits more into the Department of Labour systems

Ironically, the DPW official’s reference to the programme moving towards the provision of training up front, in other words, prior to the commencement of working days, corresponded with the experience of another department in the Environment and Culture sector, where an official indicated that the programme through which it was contributing to the EPWP had a different training regime to that of the EPWP. Interestingly, the source of the incompatibility related to how this Department sequenced training was based on its allocation of training days at the beginning of a project, which differed with EPWP rules, where training days accrued based on the number of days worked, as stipulated in the Code of Good Practice.

The collective experiences of Environment and Culture sector departments, coupled with at least a partial concession by a DPW official on a similar score, indicated that a lack of operational flexibility in some instances adversely affected the capacity of implementing departments to interpret and sequence operating goals in the course of making job creation and training contributions to the EPWP. Extending this point, it was curiously reported in an interview with a former official of the DPW that the Department did not initially intend to regulate (via the Code of Good Practice) the operational contributions of non-infrastructure departments participating in the EPWP:

\textsuperscript{62}This planning crisis was evident in other findings, including the following passage that describes one of the current challenges with training: ‘[job] Contractors want to finish contract, training happens at end of project [after training days have been accumulated], learner leaves-negative impact on our funding commitment and training provider.’ (DOA, DPW, DOL 2006)
But we never had much of an emphasis on changing the existing public works programmes, ... the EPWP never never itself never specified for example things about wages and things like that, that was done prior to the EPWP, [the code of good practice], and it was particularly related to construction, labour-intensive construction ... it was negotiated in the construction industry, but then when it was issued by the Department of Labour they had its applicability to programmes like Working for Water in mind, so Working for Water used it, but there was never an intention of the EPWP to get all the different public works type programmes in government to use that code of good practice, it was never really an objective of the EPWP, or a strategic focus, so those kind of compliance issues, I would argue, are not really strategic issues.

The interviewee claimed that the Code of Good Practice and presumably the Ministerial Determination, which together outlined employment and training conditions to be applied under the EPWP, were not intended to be uniformly applied to the various sectoral departments contributing to the programme, outside of the Infrastructure sector, for which these conditions were originally designed. Evidence from non-infrastructure departments (Environment and Culture sector) and the DPW official quoted earlier revealed however that this had in reality become the case. Having said this, it does seem incongruous to accept that the statutory Code of Good Practice was ‘never intended’ to be applied to all the different public works type programmes in government, when in chapter 7 it was noted that one of the reasons the NPWP failed to effectively promote labour-intensive approaches was because of an ‘uncertain legal framework’.

Another factor that more widely affected the capacity of EPWP sector departments also emerged from the Programme’s framework of conditions, and specifically its logical framework, which noted that ‘[a]s far as possible, all [EPWP-related] training must result in NQF-accredited certification’ (Department of Public Works 2004b: 17). The acronym NQF stood for National Qualifications Framework (NQF), which referred to an integrated and more structured post-apartheid framework for assessing learning achievements in South Africa. 63 This was introduced as part of the South African Qualifications Authority Act, Number 58 of 1995. The problem which emerged under the EPWP was that the pace at which the Department of Labour had formally been able to accredit vocational training providers and re-align courses to the requirements introduced by the NQF, limited the ability of EPWP implementing departments to, ‘as far as possible’, make

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63 This was more structured in terms of the progression and related credit earned through undergoing training, including unit standards, and leading to certification. (DPW 2004b: 17; DOA/DPW/DOL 2006)
provision for training that met NQF qualifications. This situation was described in more detail by a Department of Labour official:

The EPWP training needs to be accredited, and we not there yet, all our courses have all these years been on the old training of unemployed persons system, unaccredited training, and we moving over now to the accreditation of training providers, and that is a very very challenging process because you have to re-cost all the courses to include now assessment, you have to come up with a new costing formula, you have to align all the courses that’s on our system to unit standards, you have to, you know … train our own people to know and sort of monitor a little bit deeper than they did in the past and … also the SETAs, we have to form alliances with them now because we can’t, we haven’t got the capacity really to do the proper quality assurance

The Department of Labour explained that the EPWP requirement that training provided by sector departments be accredited outstripped the more modest medium-term targets that it had set for broader non programme specific skills development, in other words separate from the needs of just the EPWP. The DPW itself conceded with reference to accredited service providers that ‘[i]t’s not many in South Africa that has achieved that status’. Participating departments interviewed also cited problems with accessing a sufficient supply of accredited training providers. A department in the Social sector reported that:

[O]ne of the challenges is that getting accredited service provides [sic] so that people can be trained to be … NQF level … But the Department of Health, through the HR [human resources] … has hired somebody to see how they can help us … relying on the external it takes too long … Yes, because now the standard is that they must be accredited so that people can get credit and they can … so that has been a big challenge.

A Department in the Environment and Culture sector also mentioned that the accreditation requirement had had a material effect on its capacity to ensure that training was provided:

There is a challenge with regards to Department of Labour … Department of Labour made in fact R28 million available for training … and the release of that money … in order to get that training done and get it accredited, it must be a

64The impact of the accreditation rule on the Social sector was also mentioned in an EPWP progress report (DPW 2007: 16) covering the period April to June 2007. The report recorded the following amongst challenges facing the sector: ‘The limited numbers of accredited training service providers, especially in rural areas, constrain the roll-out of training’.
Department of Labour approved service provider, and there is a massive shortage of vocational training service providers … that is a major challenge … So we end up having to fund the training through our operational costs, so that is our cost that taken away from invasive alien plant clearing, we fund that through operational costs and we use trainers that’s not necessarily accredited … ultimately our people get training that’s not accredited with SAQA.

Overall, findings showed that limited operating flexibility seems to have adversely affected the capacity of some departments (Environment and Culture sector) to interpret and sequence operating goals in the process of responding to the EPWP’s job creation and training objectives. In addition, the operating emphasis on ‘accredited’ training more widely affected the ability of contributing departments to source available service providers, which effectively exposed a disjuncture between the operating demands being introduced by the programme and the overall ability of the government’s training accreditation system to service these needs. From the standpoint of Paul’s (1983: 58) research, it was evident that despite the existence of an elaborate operational framework of guidelines and conditions, which was in part a response to an absence of such instruments to promote inter-departmental labour-intensive job creation under the NPWP, the manner in which these were applied did not enable the kind of ‘considerable [and in some cases coherent] scope in [some departments] choosing between alternative ways to achieve an objective’, and which moreover affected departmental capacity.

The next section will focus on the EPWP’s resource allocation.

**8.2.3 Factors associated with the EPWP’s resource allocation**

The resources allocated to a development programme, with reference to Paul, relate to the conditions underpinning its financial as well as human resourcing makeup, which includes the mobilisation of these and other forms of administrative and political cooperation and support. The assumption is that the extent of and circumstances relating to the mobilisation and allocation of a programme’s resources may adversely affect the capacity of implementing bodies to carry out the initiative. This section will first cover the financial resources allocated to the EPWP.
The financing of the EPWP was described as running ‘through the normal budgeting process’ (DPW Not dated b: 2, DPW 2004b: 20). In practice this meant that there was no separate or distinct fund for the EPWP as such, where monies to support the programme were channelled through budgeting instruments that were already resourcing existing departmental programmes contributing to the EPWP. These appropriations were made via an annual statutory process of dividing nationally raised revenue across national, provincial and local government bodies. A brief overview of this inter-governmental fiscal process is explained below.

In 2004, the year in which the EPWP was introduced, South Africa’s National Treasury (National Department of Finance) published a document entitled Trends in Intergovernmental Finances: 2000/1 – 2006/7, which provided a useful background for understanding the normal budgeting process in the country. Understanding South Africa’s system of public financing should of course take note of the way its system of government is set up, which comprises national, provincial and local spheres of government, and which also recognises that whilst some functions are performed exclusively by one sphere of government (namely the national sphere), ‘most functions are shared (concurrent) between spheres’ (National Treasury 2004: 1). South Africa’s Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) stipulates these shared functional areas in Schedule 4, where at the level of revenue distribution the provincial governments, and to a much lesser extent, municipalities, are largely dependent on transfers from the national fiscus (National Treasury 2004: 4).

The reference to EPWP financing flowing through the normal budgeting process effectively meant that a variety of existing transferring instruments would be used to finance the activities of departments contributing to the programme, depending on how these public bodies normally received allocations of national revenue. For example, in the Infrastructure sector, funding was channelled via conditional infrastructure grants to provincial and municipal governments (DPW Not dated b: 5, DPW Not dated a: 3; DPW 2005c: 12). The allocation of a Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) to local governments began in the 2003/2004 financial year, with the aim of removing backlogs in the delivery of a range of basic services such as electricity, storm water management, water supply, refuse removal and sanitation, roads, public transport, fire fighting, municipal health services, and local sports facilities (Municipal Infrastructure Task Team 2004). At a
provincial level, documentation from the National Treasury indicated that conditional infrastructure grants to provinces had been in existence since at least the 1998/1999 financial year, preceding the introduction in 2000/2001 of a R300 million ‘provincial infrastructure grant’ (PIG) (National Treasury 2000: 67).

In the Environment and Culture sector, financing was channelled primarily through a specialised fund designed to support poverty alleviation programmes which were already being implemented by national departments (February 2004 Environment Sector Plan: 19). 65 In the Social sector, funding flowed through a mixture of departmental equitable share transfers (unconditional transfer of core monies to provinces and municipalities from the national fiscus) and conditional grants (supplementary monies) to provincial counterparts of national departments (DSD, DEd, DoH 2004: 16). Finally, in the Economic sector, funding instruments were less certain and depended on the number of public bodies participating in this sector, which was not specified in the sector plan. Moreover, entrepreneurial ‘learnerships’ 66 under the Economic sector were also expected to receive funding from existing statutory training bodies (Sector Education Training Authorities), set up under a Skills Development Act (Number 97 of 1998), and which according to the Act were partially financed by a ‘skills development levy’ on employers (Government Gazette 1998). Additional financing would also be expected from public bodies contributing to the Economic sector (DPW 2005e: 5, 6, 17; DPW 2004b: 16).

An illustration of the EPWP’s funding targets by sector is presented in table 8.5

Table 8.5: Distribution of funding for the EPWP (2004/5-2008/9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>EPWP Public Sector Budget Allocations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>R15 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>R 4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>R0.6 billion (planned to increase to R2 billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Subject to level of public sector participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Public Works 2004b: 20

65 This refers to the Special Poverty Relief Programme Allocation, overseen by the National Treasury.
66 A ‘learnership’ comprises practical work experience of a specified nature and duration, according to the Skills Development Act (Number 97 of 1998).
Similar to CASP, the EPWP was not hindered by a lack of financial investment, having enjoyed an initial and substantial four-year resource commitment (2004/5-2008/9). The reinvigoration yet modest earlier efforts at rolling out government-sponsored job creating schemes after 1994 provides helpful context to the significant budgetary commitment attached to the programme.

Finally, in accordance with the DPW’s co-ordinating responsibility, documentation also confirmed that the Department ‘does not have a fund for funding EPWP projects’ (DPW Not dated b: 2). In other words, the Department did not oversee the disbursement of a separate fund to participating sector departments to finance their implementation of EPWP projects, which was consistent with funding having flowed directly to departments via existing instruments to finance their functional activities. This arrangement resembled the funding scheme employed under the apartheid government’s special job creation programmes initiative, co-ordinated by the Department of Manpower.

Figure 8.1 illustrates a calculation of expenditure in the EPWP’s four sectors, covering the period 2004/2005 – 2006/2007 and based on data compiled by the DPW. The figures firstly show varying levels of expenditure, with Social sector departments consistently recording the highest spend of funds allocated for the programme, followed closely by departments in the Environment and Culture sector. For the Social sector, this level of consistency was remarkable given that there was a 279 per cent increase in the Sector’s budget between 2005/2006 and 2006/2007, from 166 to 464 million Rands. 67 Data published in EPWP progress reports (DPW 2007a: 9) on work opportunities created by the Social sector also showed that the sector was nearly meeting its annual target, where by June 2007 a total of 78,310 work opportunities had been created, where if its total portion of 150,000 was subdivided into 30,000 per annum, it should have created 90,000 work opportunities. Findings elsewhere in the documentation and interviews however gave a somewhat different perspective on this performance, whilst exposing factors that were adversely affecting the Social sector’s capacity to make what could be argued was its more significant training contribution to the EPWP.

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67 A significant increase of funds, totalling R4,2 billion over a three-year period, was allocated to provincial Social sector departments beginning in 2006/2007.
Although the Social sector’s plan acknowledged that programmes such as ECD and HCBC presented opportunities for work creation, the Plan also recognised that much of the erstwhile work of Sector departments in these areas relied on the input of existing volunteers and civil society intermediary organisations. A 2003 national survey of HCBC services for instance recorded a total of 19,616 volunteers, of which 15,326 received no stipend (DSD, DEd, DoH 2004: 8). Although no comparative figures were given for ECD, the Plan did otherwise note that a national audit of ECD identified a total of 23,482 sites, where caregivers stationed at these sites either had insufficient or no training and a limited source of income (DSD, DEd, DoH 2004: 11-12). An imperative for Social sector departments was therefore formalising the working conditions of a large base of existing beneficiaries, by supplying remunerative compensation in particular.
An EPWP progress report for the 2005/2006 period recorded for instance that the Social sector had contributed 18,300 work opportunities whilst paying out over R85 million in wages. The same report noted elsewhere though that ‘[t]raining forms the backbone of the sector. Currently there is insufficient capacity within provinces for both HCBC and ECD teams to provide and manage NQF level accredited training’. The situation was also described as ‘urgent’ (DPW 2006: 6; 18). For the 2006/2007 period, the sector created over 37,000 work opportunities and paid out over R191 million in wages. Elsewhere, the sector’s capacity to supplement its compensatory support with training was constrained by a number of factors which spoke to the resourcing circumstances underpinning the supply of training, including ‘limited capacity’ to fast-track accreditation by relevant SETAs; limited supply of accredited training service providers ‘constraining’ the roll-out of training; and the ‘programme design’ being constrained by human resource limitations in provincial and local government departments (DPW 2007b: Annexure A; 20). These references suggest that whilst overall expenditure (inc. wage payouts) and work opportunity creation was high in the programme’s second and third years, resourcing conditions affecting the supply of training according to EPWP conditions (NQF accreditation) severely constrained Social sector department capacity.

These conditions must be read in combination with observations pointing to inadequate human resource mobilisation in provincial and national departments to service the administrative demands which followed their participation in the EPWP. This was acutely felt from the 2006/2007 year, which saw a massive medium-term (3 year) budget allocation of R4,2 billion allocated for ECD and HCBC. A former DPW official commented for instance that:

In the Social sector the main challenge is to put in place the, to operationalise that massive increase in Early Childhood Development and Home Community Based Care, and to put in place the necessary operational capacity to make it happen, and I think that’s where they’re struggling in the Social sector.

Another DWP official described a situation where the administrative and reporting demands being placed on provincial departments by the EPWP, which in this case involved the ECD component, were ‘normally’ being shouldered by a limited number of
assigned personnel, who assumed responsibility for the programme in addition to performing other activities. The official stated that:

You see this person now has, EPWP is putting pressure on this person to get additional information to do audits, to make sure that there is a database, to make sure they report to us on a quarterly basis, people cannot cope … So we are interfacing with officials who still have to convince the Chief Director or whoever that we need to align these things, because if it’s aligned, you will see that you need two or three more people to manage this process, there is no way that with the current capacity that is in the provinces you will be able to deal with this thing, because with us it is very intensive, intensive in the sense that you need updated information in terms of what is happening, and remember the challenge is, a lot of this information that we need is sitting everywhere, not consolidated, so now because we are requesting this people have to get information and put it together

The same official elsewhere confirmed what had been reported in EPWP progress reports, where department officials in the Social sector were struggling to comply with the operational requirements attached to the training component:

[B]ut you don’t have also people with the right skills, if you look at the training that is required for EPWP, it’s like a higher quality training, because we emphasise accredited training, and then it means that you have to have programmes that are NQF aligned, and officials most of these officials in the Social sector, some of them are social workers, of them are teachers, and most of them do not have a very good understanding of NQF, because it’s specialised thing

Inadequate human resourcing arrangements in the Social sector was also evident at the national level of government, where one department recounted that when a considerable increase in monies to support ECD and HCBC activities was signed off from the 2006/2007 financial year (R4,2 billion) no portion was allocated to national departments to manage and oversee implementation in provincial departments. This department explained that the increased funding allocated to the programmes would impact directly on its capacity to perform monitoring, noting that ‘the monitoring must really be, and we need to develop systems that enable us not just to listen to people and assume that what they’re telling us is what’s actually happening … which requires then a different kind of size of personnel’. The department added that ‘[w]e don’t have systems to check

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68 Another official in a national Social sector department also noted that ‘[y]ou have the same kind of thing in the provincial level, it’s an add-on job, for which you do not really have that amount of time, because there are no staff.’
on this evidence on the reporting, so you in KwaZulu Natal [province] says that you are training 600 people in your EPWP programme … given them R2000 stipend or whatever, so, why do we get all these letters from people saying, “I never got paid“

Another department in the Social sector described a similar and more detailed set of circumstances, indicating that for a considerable period only one official was assigned to oversee the department’s ECD-related activities under the EPWP, which they were carrying out in addition to performing their normal line function activities. The official confirmed that of the sizeable increase in funding allocated for ECD and HCBC from 2006/2007, the national department did not receive a portion to support monitoring, where ‘at the end national Department of Social Development and national Department of Education didn’t get one cent, it was all for the provincial level’. The official further mentioned that other policy priorities facing the national department also impacted on the availability of internal funds to support its ECD activities under the EPWP:

[You must now understand where I am located now, [respondent refers to their line function structure] … at that point, one of our main functions that we have at the national level is legislation, policy, norms and standards … My Chief Director is responsible for the new Children’s Bill, this Children’s Bill is now dragging on for past eight years … so for my Chief Director this is a priority … so the bulk of the money that is being allocated to the Chief Directorate must go to the completion of the Bill and the Act … so that was the scenario in which I am functioning.

Finally, a potentially more serious resourcing constraint that would have adversely affected the financial and human resource capacity of provincial Social sector departments concerned a re-direction of funds intended for ECD and HCBC as part of the R4,2 billion package, to support other activities in some provincial governments. An EPWP progress report covering the 2006/2007 financial year noted that ‘[s]ome of the funds allocated for expansion of ECD and HCBC (R4.2 billion over MTEF) have in some provinces been allocated to other programmes and, as a result, the overall targets to accelerate service delivery and create employment will not be achieved.’ (DPW 2007b: 20). This does not seem to have been significant in expenditure terms however, where as noted in figure 8.1, 86 per cent of allocated funds for the 2006/2007 financial year were reported as spent. This incident did however elicit a number of insightful observations from interviewees, including a consultant to the EPWP who explained that:
I think Treasury makes the assumption at national level that by the time it gets motivations for budgets, etc., that the provinces have sorted out their priorities at a provincial level, and that may indeed be the case, but once the money flows ... as equitable share [unconditional allocation to provinces], it gives the province discretion on how to apply and allocate that money ... In this particular case, R4.2 billion was motivated for the Social sector, agreed to and allocated by National Treasury to provincial treasuries, and in the case of many of the provinces, that money has not flown to the departments ... that it was intended to flow to. And ... based on our framework, inter-governmental framework ... there's nothing that National Treasury can do about it, so the departments at provincial level must motivate hard with their respective treasuries at provincial level to make sure that their allocations are actually given to them, it's a challenge.

An official with a Social sector department contributed the following:

So sometimes this works well, in that the amount of money that has been allocated at national level manages to get into the department and manages to get into the programme, and it's the same amount of money, but in many instances it slips through, and they can do that ... because this provincial process is determined by provincial priorities, the national process is determined by national priorities, one assumes that the national priorities, which are not our priorities, it is priorities that we have got from provinces, that those priorities are the same as the priorities that are going to be dealt with at provincial level, and it magically doesn't happen.

Despite references by one DPW official to their being 'consensus at a provincial [departmental] cluster level', there is consensus and there is buy-in', the official also conceded that they were 'not sure ... if, at that level, there is communication with [political] leadership in the provinces, and that is my biggest challenge' They added that it was their 'understanding' that there was 'buy-in' on this Programme, referring to the EPWP social sector activities in ECD and HCBC, amongst department heads, political leaders such as provincial ministers (MECs) and the heads of provincial governments (Premiers).

The interviews did not contain any noticeable findings concerning the resourcing of Environment and Culture sector departments, therefore little can be reported on this sector. EPWP progress reports were however showing that the Sector as a whole had exceeded its original work opportunity target of 200,000, generating 271,896 by June 2007 (DPW 2007a: 9). It should be remembered that the operational constraints

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69. ‘Cluster’ level means a clustering of the heads of Social sector departments (i.e., Education, Social Development, Health)
reported earlier by at least one Environment and Culture sector department, which also incidentally obtained by far the largest financial allocation in this sector, did not concern its ability to generate work opportunities per se, but dealt with the operational limitations experienced in having to comply with EPWP guidelines and conditions. In addition, although no comparable reference to this sector’s contribution to its overall training day target was available, it was otherwise evident that all EPWP sectors were struggling to keep pace with their overall training target of 15.5 million days, where by September 2007 just 23 per cent of this target was reached, compared to 77 per cent of the target for work opportunities (DPW Not dated d: 4).

A basic picture of the Economic sector’s resourcing circumstances showed some expenditure volatility in the first three years, with a low of just 49 per cent of allocated funds spent in 2006/2007, as compared to the previous year’s 79 per cent. It was also observed that the total allocation for the Economic sector increased seven-fold, from about R33 million in 2005/2006 to R235 million the following year, which is generally consistent with the demand-driven nature of public body participation in the sector. Having said this, the EPWP was reporting that by June 2007 the sector had nearly achieved its work-opportunity target, where this stood at 11,512 out of the 12,000 planned (DPW 2007a: 9). With this said, work opportunity creation appeared ancillary to the Economic sector’s core focus on identifying and training potential entrepreneurs via a learnership programme, where a target of 3000 had been set by the sector (DPW 2005e:4). Findings showed that by the end of the 2005/2006 financial year, only 120 learners were participating in the venture learnership initiative, where no comparable figures were available in the 2006/2007 consolidated report (DPW 2006). By late 2007, another programme report indicated that the venture learnership programme had created 310 companies in five provinces (DPW Not dated d: 17).

Interview data revealed that a number of resourcing constraints had been experienced by the EPWP’s Economic sector, which likely impacted on its capacity to effectively respond to its learnership objective. One factor appeared to reflect difficulties experienced by the DPW in encouraging participating public bodies, particularly in the provinces, to become more involved in the learnership scheme. One DPW official

70 Another EPWP progress report concluded that ‘[t]raining is an area that needs serious attention from all implementing bodies’ (DPW 2007b: 21)
observed for instance that strategic attention was being directed at the provinces on whether there was willingness to undertake learnerships. The official also mentioned that the DPW had received approval to create new staffing posts in five provinces in particular, ‘where persons are based in the provinces from our unit’. Other resourcing constraints appeared to arise from circumstances outside the direct control of the DPW. This included non-performing mentors responsible for supporting learners, a SETA in the Construction industry running out of money to fund learnerships, SETAs not being present in some provinces, problems with learner attendance (see later discussion on environmental uncertainty), and problems booking training venues.

The Infrastructure sector’s ability to expend resources indicated that considerable difficulties were being experienced, with around 50 per cent of allocated funds being spent. The figures presented in figure 8.1 were reported to comprise funding transferred via MIG and PIG grants, as well as funds allocated through a province’s unconditional equitable share of nationally raised revenue, where provincial departments comprised the majority portion by far. Interestingly, the National Treasury (2007: 87) had noticed that provincial departments of Roads and Transport, which were allocated relatively large portions of EPWP infrastructure sector grants, were sustaining ‘severe shortages [understaffed] of technical skills’, commenting that ‘[t]he few remaining senior engineers available play a more managerial role, so departments do not really benefit from their technical skills’. These observations were generated from a Treasury survey in five provincial departments in 2006, and describe an existing set of circumstances within which the EPWP was introduced.

By the end of March 2007 the DPW was reporting that the Infrastructure sector had accumulated 342,873 of its five-year target of 750,000, which on a year-by-year basis meant that the sector was reaching about 76 per cent of its per annum target, with an average of 114,291 (DPW 2007b: 9). The sector dramatically improved work opportunity creation, as reported on in the 2006/2007 year, although its performance against the training objective seemed less impressive. Although DPW data for 2004-2006 combined training and person-years of work, making it impossible to disaggregate out training generated per sector, the 2006/2007 report did indicate that the total person-years of training generated by the Infrastructure sector was 1,959 (DPW 2007b: Annexure A). If it is assumed that the total number of person-years of training allocated to the
Infrastructure sector is 39, 130, based on its target of nine million divided by 230 days/annum (figure used in EPWP reports), the sector should be generating an average of over 7,800 person years of training every year. Again due to inconsistent and incomplete data, this thesis could elsewhere verify that by the end of the second quarter of 2007, the Infrastructure sector had only generated 12 per cent of its annual training day target for the year, lower than all other sectors (DPW Not dated d: 8).

Overall, the reported expenditure and output performance of the Infrastructure sector must take into account an earlier discussion on the EPWP’s objectives, which included references to confusion and reluctance on the part of Infrastructure sector departments to adjust to the programme’s labour-maximisation imperative. For example, despite the generally favourable pace of work opportunity creation being reported, DPW documentation two years into the EPWP was observing that the department could not objectively verify the operational use by Infrastructure sector departments of the EPWP’s tender and design guidelines. The department did however concede a general impression that many departments were not adhering to these conditions (DPW 2006: 14). This coupled with the observation at the end of the programme’s third year that ‘[u]nfortunately no comprehensive report on the MIG contribution is currently available’, where existing reports ‘contain insufficient detail for reporting on the EPWP’, raises questions about the objective legitimacy of this sector’s work opportunity creation, as well as the potentially adverse affect of the programme’s underlying compliance arrangements. (DPW 2007b: 14) 71

Staying on the MIG-related data, and recognising that this information was being described as insufficient, interview findings were also revealing municipal-level circumstances which appeared to have affected the capacity of these bodies to comply with the programme’s operational guidelines. A consultant to the EPWP remarked that:

> We would look at what the blockages are, and many times we found that blockages are procurement processes which are friendly to the MFMA [Municipal

71 An official at the national Department of Provincial and Local Government, which is responsible for disbursing MIG funding to municipalities and receiving reports on expenditure, also noted in an interview that ‘[w]e do not monitor compliance with EPWP’, where the Department provided ‘basic’ output information to the DPW, including number of projects and jobs created.
Finance Management Act\textsuperscript{72} but unfriendly to labour-intensive methods of construction, and the procurement department is reluctant to change any of these policies because it took them a lot of time, money, effort to make them friendly to the MFMA, and now they have to change them yet again to make them friendly to the EPWP.

This observation should ideally be discussed in the section on operational planning, but because it concerns rules governing the procurement and allocation of resources, it is dealt with here. The issue acknowledged by this observer suggests a conflict between EPWP operating rules, which in this case concerned its tender and design guidelines and specifically the conditions applying to the contracting of tenderers to supply labour-intensive works, and existing tender-related guidelines prescribed in broader municipal finance legislation. This conflict may have contributed to reluctance or, alternatively, could have affected the pace at which municipal officials were able to adapt the latter to accommodate the former, which was required in order to demonstrate operational compliance with the EPWP. This would also have affected the capacity of the DPW to effectively encourage compliance. Another way of describing this, in the context of Paul’s framework, would acknowledge that the operating demands introduced by the EPWP yielded little flexibility for implementing departments to interpret, in this instance, procurement goals, let alone choose between these, given that compliance with EPWP conditions was embedded in division of revenue legislation.\textsuperscript{73}

Another resourcing-related issue found to have adversely affected the capacity of municipalities to procure goods and services in response to the EPWP this time ironically included adjusting to the new supply chain management (which dealt with purchasing goods and services) regulations introduced by the MFMA. An official at the national Department of Provincial and Local Government reported that complying with the prescribed tendering rules required under the Act was proving ‘difficult at this stage to get that off the ground within the municipalities’. The interviewee added that it was ‘delaying [overall] project implementation considerably’, and not just EPWP projects.

\textsuperscript{72}The Act (2003) regulates the conduct of financial management, controls and reporting in South African municipalities. This includes a section on ‘supply chain management’, or procurement of goods and services.

\textsuperscript{73}Division of Revenue legislation incorporates conditions attached to the infrastructure grants allocated to provinces and municipalities in South Africa. See DPW 2005d: 1.
A final observation on the resourcing circumstances of the EPWP recalled a previous debate about the resourcing design of a programme of this nature, which asked whether funding should be centralised and presumably disbursed by a single entity, or decentralised and disbursed separately to participating public bodies. The EPWP opted for the latter arrangement, where two interviewees remarked explicitly on this arrangement. The first described the fact that the DPW did not disburse money for the EPWP as a ‘potential constraint’ on its ‘leverage’ over the contributions of implementing departments. Another interviewee argued that ‘there must be a budget ... for the Department to begin to do the coordination and driving’. A similar concern has also been expressed by McCord (2008: 559) in her analysis of the EPWP, where she suggested that:

[S]ince the EPWP itself does not have an operational budget, it is only able to create employment in as much as it can encourage shifts in the factor intensity of government spending to promote labour intensification.

The most interesting feature of McCord’s observation together with the comments conveyed by interviewees was that these appeared to exhibit less of a concern about the institutional arrangement of EPWP budgeting per se. This was compared to a stronger emphasis on the potentially adverse implications of a decentralised organisational arrangement for the ability of the programme, and its co-ordinating department in this case, to encourage objective and operational compliance with labour-intensity and associated conditions. Having observed this, an interview with a former DPW official revealed that an evaluation of a centrally disbursed special poverty relief fund which preceded the EPWP had influenced the National Treasury’s decision not to allow the EPWP to replicate such an arrangement:

So for those kind of reasons Treasury recommended to Cabinet that there must a single budgeting process, so you don’t have these kind of problems, and you shouldn’t have a separate poverty relief, separate fund for poverty relief programmes, that poverty relief programmes should be mainstreamed through the normal budgeting process ... Now, that decision took place before we finalised the planning of the EPWP, now in our discussions with Treasury on the design of the EPWP they made it very clear that there was no way that they were going to bring back this idea of a separate fund for EPWP, and that there was also no way they were going to give national public works a whole lot of money for funding stuff which was not within their mandate.
The interviewee noted that one of problems experienced by the centralisation of poverty relief funding, which it appeared to have inherited from a centralised Reconstruction and Development Fund, was that it resulted in problematic resource planning alignment between spheres of government. They gave the example of a special clinic building programme financed through the RDP Fund and undertaken by the national Department of Health, which experienced problems at the provincial level. The reason was that departments at this sphere, which assumed functional responsibility for staffing and medicines supply to clinics, had not adequately budgeted for supplying these resources to the clinics being built by the national department. In an early evaluation of the RDP Fund, Cameron (1996: 239-240) reflected other concerns about the potentially adverse consequences that its centralised arrangement created for intra- and inter-sphere budgeting:

One of the major concerns was that the RDP undermines sound budgeting. At one level, it created red tape in that departments were forced to apply to the RDP funds [sic] for funding which they previously received. This was time-consuming and led to delays … A similar point is made by Nattras (1995). She argues that if the entire cabinet supports the RDP, why shouldn’t the allocation of funds be left to the Minister of Finance and various departmental ministers?

The centralised imperatives of the RDP are understandable in that the GNU [Government of National Unity] wants public-sector bodies to redirect its priorities and policies. However, if the major function of provinces and local authorities is to implement RDP policies [through applying to a central office for funds], this could affect the autonomy of subnational government substantially.

The South African government was evidently then unwilling to risk a repeat of the adverse operational consequences (which included implementation delays and limited policy discretion) that centralising special programme funding had historically generated, when designing the EPWP. Having said this, the experience of the EPWP case has seen that decentralising the funding and primary level of planning that went with this did not absolve the programme, and the DPW as the designated ‘co-ordinating’ department, from a responsibility to encourage the objective and operational compliance of contributing departments. This echoes earlier references to the Department’s ‘leverage’ vis à vis other departments, and it needing to ‘drive’ and ‘encourage’ other departments contributing to the initiative. Under these circumstances the only tools that the DPW seems to have had at its disposal were human and political resources. Although these
have been forthcoming, these have not necessarily been sufficient to obviate the kind of objective, operational and resource-related capacity constraints that were directly experienced by the programme’s various implementing bodies, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter.  

Overall, the resourcing circumstances which affected the capacity of EPWP contributing bodies to carry out the programme varied across its four sectors. In the context of Paul’s description of a development programme’s resourcing, a key factor shared by departments in at least three of the four sectors (Social, Infrastructure, Economic) however concerned instances where implementing bodies, primarily at the national level, experienced difficulties mobilising resources, in the form of inter-governmental support and co-operation (provincial and local government) to respond to the programme’s objectives. Although in some instances the unconditional allocation of financial resources for the EPWP (namely the equitable share allocation of Social sector funding to provinces) may have abetted this problem, in other cases this was found not be the case (the stipulation in PIG and MIG conditional grants that recipient bodies employ EPWP tender and design guidelines). Finally, the decentralised financial resourcing of the EPWP, although it sought to depart from centralised and administratively cumbersome multi-sectoral programming arrangements of old, exposed the limited instrumental capacity of the DPW, as the programme’s designated co-ordinating department, to encourage the objective and operational compliance of contributing departments.

Instances where the existing resourcing circumstances of sector departments were found to have adversely affected their capacity to respond to the objective demands introduced by the EPWP included the availability of accredited training providers (Department of Labour), where this was also discussed as an operational constraint. Other examples displayed a need to augment and adapt existing line function personnel in national and provincial Social sector departments to respond to the operating demands introduced by EPWP-related activities; existing human resource capacity constraints in Infrastructure sector departments (provincial) impeding their

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74 A number of DPW officials (at least 3, plus a fourth which mentioned a request for additional resources) interviewed by this thesis commented on having secured additional human resources to support their co-ordination roles.
implementation of EPWP activities; and finally conflicting as well as constraining statutory requirements governing the procurement of goods and services by Infrastructure sector departments (municipalities), which impacted on their capacity to comply with conditions stipulated by the EPWP.

8.2.4 Overall impressions on the strategy of the EPWP

An overall impression of the EPWP’s strategy firstly indicated that the programme’s means-end philosophy of increasing the potential (through labour-intensity) for job creation created uncertainty and reluctance from departments in all four of its participating sectors to adjust, due to a combination of prevailing circumstantial and ideological factors. This ultimately affected the capacity of its designated co-ordinating department (DPW) to encourage objective compliance. These capacity constraints were extended at an operational level, where departments in the Environment and Culture sector in particular expressed concerns about the effect of the programme’s restrictive operating rules in respect of job creation and training provision, on their ability to respond to its objectives. These constraints were most widely experienced in relation to the EPWP’s training objective, where various sector department capacities were being constrained by the circumstances attending the programme’s ‘accreditation’ requirement.

Finally, the affect of the EPWP’s resourcing on the ability of its implementing departments, similar to other sub-variable categories, again saw variation due to the prevailing functional circumstances in participating sectors, where this revealed problematic financial, regulatory and human resourcing arrangements to absorb the demands introduced by the EPWP. In addition, factors also spoke directly to Paul’s concerns about development programme implementing bodies needing to mobilise financial and other (administrative and political) types of resource-related co-operation and support, including instances where national implementing bodies experienced difficulties mobilising co-operation at sub-national levels of government.

The next section will discuss findings on the ‘environment’ variable.
8.3 The ‘environment’ variable

Factors associated with the ‘environment’ of the EPWP were, unlike in the CASP case, and relative to the strategy and structure variables, not strongly evidenced in the interview findings and documentation. Consequently, little can be added about factors associated with this variable having affected the capacity of EPWP implementing bodies. With this said however, it was interesting to note that of those references to environmental factors that did appear, these almost exclusively concerned instances of ‘uncertainty’ experienced by implementing departments in the delivery of training, mentorship and learnership activities, and in the roll out of Social sector programmes.

The notable aspect of this finding was, similar to CASP that the delivery of these services required implementing departments to engage more formally and didactically with relatively impoverished beneficiaries who possessed little formal education, which generally corresponds with the lower-skilled unemployed beneficiary audience targeted by the EPWP. The difference of course was that these uncertainties were not experienced in the large-scale and more rapid generation of work opportunities, but appeared in the training element. Examples of uncertainties experienced in the delivery of EPWP programmes included problems with beneficiary attendance on learnerships; literacy levels amongst beneficiaries undergoing training, raising concerns about their ‘ability for competence’; resistance to or lack of interest in training from some beneficiaries who, according to one official, expressed greater interest in opportunities to earn money to meet ‘bread and butter issues’. Attempts to formalise and standardise training and employment conditions of ECD and HCBC volunteers in the Social sector has also had to confront unpredictability in the constant movement of beneficiaries to where they could access the best stipends.

In general terms, these findings reflected Paul’s (1982: 108; 1983: 50) description of the uncertainty variable, which encompassed circumstances occasioned in this instance by the socio-economic conditions of beneficiaries (i.e., driven by an income-generating job imperative), where in addition ‘changes in the perception of clients or their dissatisfaction with a service’, i.e., their reactions to training, could affect their responses to a programme.
The next section will discuss findings on the ‘structure’ variable.

8.4 The ‘structure’ variable

The structure variable refers to the functional and organisational arrangements underpinning a public organisation’s capacity to carry out a development programme. In functional terms this refers to how organisational tasks are broken up, or structured, according to what is relevant for the services rendered by a programme. In organisational terms this refers to the configuration of decision-making authority within and between public organizations, through which a development programme’s functional activities are carried out. Paul’s description of the structure variable includes explicit reference to ‘bureaucratic’ constraints arising from the relationship between a public body’s existing functional and organisational structures, and the new demands introduced by a development programme. The findings so far, which have concentrated on the strategic influences on implementing department capacity, have already hinted at potential structural constraints, which related primarily to the DPW’s capacity to encourage sector department compliance with the EPWP’s labour-intensive, job creation objective.

An examination of the interview findings begins with one respondent who remarked that ‘[i]n terms of the functions within the departments, it was difficult to find the glue to keep these things all together’, when referring to the EPWP’s multi-sectoral departmental makeup. The interviewee added that ‘In this particular case it’s the EPWP and its, in my view, it’s so called intrusion into the social, and economic and environmental spheres, which were actually outside of the departmental structure of the public works department’. Although the respondent later recalled that the glue that bound the various sector departments together was primarily the programme’s job creation objective, they included the proviso that ‘they [departments] all have different ways of doing it obviously, within their functions’.

These passages firstly point to functional and methodological differences distinguishing the various departments that came together to contribute to the EPWP’s job creation objective. This was earlier cited by a department in the Environment and Culture sector with reference to the limited operational flexibility that it experienced interpreting its
contribution to the programme’s job creation objective. The second observation recalls another potential structural constraint on the DPW’s capacity which this time can be linked to the notion of the EPWP, and by association the DPW, ‘intruding’ into other sectoral spheres, which suggests a kind of conflict arising from the configuration of line function decision-making authority introduced by the programme. Both of these references speak to the kind of bureaucratic constraints on capacity encapsulated by Paul in the assumption that ‘[n]ew programs with a different definition of the problem and a set of tasks which cut across different ministries … may not perform well when structured along the same [in other words existing] functional lines.’

The effect on capacity created by the introduction of the EPWP into an existing arrangement of line function decision-making authority was in fact mentioned across a number of interviews spanning at least three of its four sectors. To begin with, problems were raised in relation to the DPW’s role as overall co-ordinator of the programme. Before dealing with these, it is necessary to provide some background on the structure of the DPW’s co-ordinating role.

It will be recalled that the central role played by the DPW in special public works initiatives could be traced back to 1994/1995, when the Department began to host a National Public Works Programme, whose activities included experimentation with labour-intensive infrastructure delivery across government departments. It should be remembered that the DPW had a more loosely defined co-ordinating role under the NPWP, where it was tasked with encouraging other government departments to employ greater labour-intensive approaches in the delivery of infrastructure, which it supported by research and experimentation into appropriate methodologies. The NPWP though lacked the concrete output targets and more formal monitoring, evaluation and reporting role vis à vis participating sector departments introduced by the EPWP, which was to alter the character of the DPW’s erstwhile co-ordinating function. For example, it was reported that ‘[d]ifferent public bodies implementing EPWP projects all report directly or indirectly to DPW … Furthermore DPW is also responsible for evaluating the overall EPWP and the projects that are implemented as part of the EPWP.’ This also comprised ‘evaluat[ing] how well the EPWP is being implemented, whether or not all public bodies are participating and identifying the reasons why they are not participating’ (DPW 2004c: 2)
The structural arrangements to host the EPWP in the DPW mirrored how the NPWP had been taken on board. These arrangements began by first incorporating the EPWP within the National Public Works Programme branch (NPWP) of the DPW. The Department’s 2004-2007 Strategic Plan, which coincided with the launch of the EPWP in 2004, confirmed that it then comprised a sub-programme falling under the NPWP (NDPW 2004: 13). This was largely an unremarkable occurrence however when considering that the EPWP was simply the next in a line of various programmes which had been housed under the NPWP since its inception (see chapter 7). The EPWP would soon however take on a more independent structural identity within the Department, as commented on in the same Strategic Plan, which noted that the DPW was in the process of a restructuring that would result in the creation of four new branches: Policy and the National Public Works Programme, Asset Management, Operations (Regions), and Expanded Public Works Programmes (ibid).

The Department’s 2003/4 Annual Report presaged the structural upgrade of the EPWP by indicating that the programme was to be overseen under a new Deputy Director-Generalship (then vacant), which, in organisational terms, was to function alongside a restructured NPWP and Policy branch, also headed by a Deputy Director-General (DPW 2004a: 4). It added that all posts comprising this branch were to be advertised and expected to be filled during the course of the 2004/5 financial year (DPW 2004a: 33). In the following year’s Annual Report (2004/5) the Department stated that a DDG had been appointed to oversee the EPWP branch (DPW 2005a: 4-5).

Although the EPWP would assume a distinct structural identity within the DPW, it would continue to function under the strategic umbrella of the NPWP. This was confirmed in both the 2003/4 and 2004/5 Annual Reports. The NPWP would continue to function as a strategic intervention of the Department focussed on continuing the work of ‘promoting transformation in the construction and property sectors and contributing to poverty alleviation, job creation and skills development through labour based projects’ (DPW 2005a: 13). The EPWP did not therefore replace the NPWP, but functioned on a parallel track which was however assigned sole responsibility for co-ordinating the single largest programmatic attempt to merge labour intensive infrastructure delivery with socio-economic asset creation in South Africa.
Although the distinct structural identity given to the EPWP was not unprecedented in form, given the experience of the NPWP, it did introduce a new set of ‘co-ordination’ conditions for the DPW given the output targets, operational design and sectoral configuration that the EPWP had to function by. The interview findings revealed that these conditions did generate concerns about the ability of the DPW in particular to effectively exercise its designated co-ordinating role. A former official of the Department recalled a debate prior to the roll out of the EPWP in which the Department’s co-ordinating role was seriously questioned on the basis of the relative functional authority it possessed in government:

And in fact, as officials in public works ... we were saying to people in the Presidency that it’s going to be very difficult to make this programme work if coordination responsibility is given to the Department of Public Works, because the Department of Public Works doesn’t have that much influence over other departments in government ... it’s a relatively junior portfolio in Cabinet, and that we suggested that it should be co-ordinated by a central, by a more central body with more influence over the rest of government.

The same interviewee stated that in their view what has made the EPWP not achieve as much job creation as it could have generated, ‘is this institutional problem of how does, is the fact that public works is responsible and is held accountable for delivery on the programme but it has no authority over other departments nor other spheres of government’. Another DPW official commented that the department’s role as co-ordinator elicited a more mixed reaction, where ‘there are departments that feel that we have no right to give guidance on the programmes, or even to tell them what to do with the programmes, or even to tell them, you know, what training they should be doing’, whereas ‘[t]here are some departments which agree that you know there is a gap and we might be playing a role’. The same official conceded however that the DPW lacked a source of influence to enforce its co-ordinating function, where ‘[a]t some stage I was saying to myself, maybe this unit should have been placed in the Presidency, so that it is not identified with a specific line function department.’

A different perspective on essentially the same problem was offered by a Public Service Commission official interviewed for this thesis, who remarked that ‘it’s one of the challenges that they [the DPW] face that because they get seen as a responsibility of usually the coordinating department, the kind of guidance that is needed at the level of
implementation faces challenges’. He likened this to implementing departments declaring that ‘[w]e have our own responsibilities, the Expanded Public Works Programme is yours’. Employing both perspectives as described above reveals firstly that structural constraints on the DPW’s capacity functioned along both horizontal and vertical lines, and secondly that these constraints, stemming from the nature of the co-ordinating role that it assumed under the programme, held potentially wider consequences in the shape of implementing department commitment.

Another interviewee painted an even more difficult scenario in which the DPW found itself, where ‘constitutionally we [DPW] have to respect the authorities … the line functions, because you cannot simply find yourself encroaching into another department and begin to tell another, one department cannot tell another department what to do, then how do we then do the coordination?’ The interviewee then recalled that despite President Thabo Mbeki having instructed the DPW to not only co-ordinate but that it ‘must be the driver’ of the programme (see Benton 2006), they wondered ‘what ammunition are you going to have if you’re supposed to be the driver thereof?’ The respondent then conveyed the possibility of ‘internalised fears’ or perceptions amongst ministers and department heads about having to report to a ‘super minister’. The thrust of the issue then appeared to go beyond just the structural configuration of authority being introduced by the EPWP, by noting the DPW’s resourcing position in the programme, or its possession of ‘ammunition’ to influence the actions of contributing departments. Earlier it was mentioned that aside from human resources and political support, the DPW did not centrally disburse and control the financial resources available for the EPWP. Another official from an EPWP sector department talked about the difficulties they believed the DPW experienced as a result of this lack of financial ammunition, however, this was again explained in a wider context marked by how line functional authority was structured in the government:

I think EPWP has found it much more difficult than Treasury did, because Treasury, because it holds the purse strings, is the first among the equal partners in government, so they are more powerful … And more so than we do now with EPWP, because it’s more difficult for Treasury to, I mean for [the Department of] Public Works to really impose on us in the same way that Treasury could.75

75The interviewee was referring to a programme that his department was implementing under a poverty relief allocation overseen by the National Treasury, prior to this programme contributing to the EPWP.
Capacity constraints arising from the structure of inter-departmental functional authority were not limited to the coordinating role assigned to the DPW, where this extended to the relationships between departments in other EPWP sectors. Again some background is necessary. Figure 8.2 illustrates the organisational structure of the EPWP. Although it resembles a hierarchical configuration of relations seen for instance in intra-departmental organograms, what it is supposed to represent is a set of inter-departmental co-ordinating relationships within the programme, with the DPW assuming the status of overall co-ordinator, and with each of the four departmental groupings having a designated sector co-ordinating department. At the apex sits an overseeing co-ordinating structure in the form of a steering committee, constituted by the Heads of the DPW, the four sector co-ordinating departments, and the Office of the Presidency.

**Figure 8.2: Organisational structure of the EPWP**

![Organisational structure of the EPWP](image)

Source: Department of Public Works 2004b: 20

Some attempt was made to rationalise the structural relationship of contributing departments under the EPWP’s four sectors. This can be seen in how these groupings were constituted by public bodies regarded as possessing relevant and related functions or portfolio mandates. For instance, the Social sector comprised the Departments of Social Development, Education and Health; the Environment and Culture sector
consisted of the Departments of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Water Affairs and Forestry, and Arts and Culture; the Infrastructure sector involved the DPW along with the Department of Transport; whilst the Economic Sector was largely driven by the Department of Trade and Industry. Provincial counterparts of national departments and municipalities are also taken into account. This structure was generally consistent with the evolution of sectoral co-ordinating mechanisms in the wider South African government. For example, the introduction of a new Cabinet Committee system in 2000/2001 saw the clustering of ministries (and corresponding departments) along related functional lines. This re-organisation resulted in the creation of six clusters at ministerial level: social; economic; investment and employment; international relations, peace and security; justice, crime prevention and security; governance and administration. Ministerial clusters were also replicated at a senior administrative level, consisting of five\(^76\) clusters presided over by heads of government departments (Directors-General).

With this background in mind, findings from Environment and Culture sector departments mirrored the kind of concerns expressed about the capacity of the DPW to exercise its co-ordination role. One DPW official, who suggested that many of the projects being reported in this sector were being generated by only one department, which in this case was the sector’s designated co-ordinating department\(^77\), observed that:

As you can see DEAT is a department, it would be difficult for DEAT to even enforce EPWP implementation in Department of Agriculture … or to go to Department of Agriculture to enforce implementation of EPWP as DEAT department, because as you can see here from the line of authority these departments are on the same line, so DEAT does not have that upper power to make sure that Agriculture or Water Affairs has done what it’s supposed to be done.

\(^76\)The economic, investment and employment clusters were combined as part of the Director-General (DG) Clusters (The Presidency 2001: 16).

\(^77\)Figures for the 2006/2007 financial year showed that work opportunities generated by projects were in fact dominated by two departments in the Sector: DEAT and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. These two departments, and particularly DEAT, were also given the largest financial resource allocation by far amongst all departments in the Sector (DPW 2007b: Annexure C1). The respondent’s point about the capacity of the DEAT to ‘enforce’ EPWP implementation on other departments in the sector is otherwise taken.
The constraints emerging from the structuring of line functional authority between departments in the Environment and Culture sector were more acutely expressed in another interview, which responded to an expectation that the lead department in this sector would need to ‘validate’ the contributions being made by other departments before reporting these to the DPW. An official in the sector’s co-ordinating department commented that ‘[i] do not have the capacity or the locus standi to be able to go and institute those kind of things and then in addition ask my staff to conduct site inspections’. The same official explained that they did not think it was possible ‘to be able to conduct site inspections on behalf of another department, even as a sector lead department’. Although not directly relevant to the Environment and Culture sector, further insight into the kind of difficulty that a co-ordinating department like DEAT or for that matter the DPW faced, arose in an interview with an official at the Public Service Commission. This individual indicated that it came down to a question of accountability, where officials usually accounted directly to their own departmental managers and not necessarily to officials in departments co-ordinating a joint programme initiative like the EPWP. This then presented difficulties for co-ordinating departments to ensure that if reports were not forthcoming they could directly enforce the compliance of officials over whom they did not exercise direct accountability, without going through their line managers first.

Capacity-related constraints arising from the configuration of line functional authority under the EPWP also appeared in the Social sector, where this time the source of the constraints appears to have arisen from hierarchical rank designations at both a national and provincial level. This gives a more nuanced picture of the cross-departmental accountability constraints referred to by the PSC official. An official based in the sector’s national co-ordinating department recalled that:

[O]ne of the big problems that we had as coordinating the sector was that we didn’t have the power actually to talk to a Chief Director in another department on something on A, B and C, you know it just couldn’t be done … One of the other challenges also is to get people to understand on the provincial level that they really have to work together in an integrated manner, and that ranks are a little bit beside the point … I’ve been to one of the provinces and I was asking the lady specifically, listen, how are you working now together, she said no there have been challenges because she’s on a, say, assistant director level, the person who is running, a director say in Education, and she feels her rank is too low to work with her, so she’s not properly informed.
The interviewee noted that one of the problems that their department initially confronted was that the level at which it had designated functional responsibility for the EPWP did not equate to the level designated by other departments in the Sector. A similar scenario was described at the provincial level, where unequal rank designations appeared to have hampered the ability of departmental officials to consult across departments.

A more interesting set of circumstances conveyed elsewhere by this interviewee might help to explain earlier resourcing constraints affecting the capacity of national Social sector departments, and the DPW, to mobilise resources in the form of inter-governmental support and co-operation (provincial governments) to facilitate the sector’s response to the EPWP. Although these circumstances do not explicitly point to the structure of line functional authority relations, the suggestion is that structural factors, which potentially included rank designation hierarchy conflict as noted above, may have contributed to the outcome of Social sector departments in some provinces not having received equitable share revenues as part of a R4,2 billion package appropriated in 2006/2007. It should be conceded that this thesis was unable to uncover evidence indicating precisely why monies distributed as part of this appropriation was re-directed to other programmes, and consequently did not flow to all provincial departments concerned. Having said this, an official of a national Social sector department did report that there had been a failure to finalise provincial business plans for ECD activities. This was linked back to earlier sector plan between national and provincial departments being hurriedly compiled at the request of the DPW in 2003 for Cabinet consideration, and at the expense of national departments fully consulting with provincial counterparts. The official reported that ‘[n]ow up till now, we also do not have the final business plans yet, for implementation … on the Expanded Public Works Programme’, where ‘the HoDs [Heads of Department] have signed it off, we have drafts, but not the final document’.

If it can be conjectured that non-finalised planning could have influenced political decision-makers in some provinces to withhold and transfer funds intended for Social sector EPWP activities, and ECD programmes in particular, to other provincial

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78 The same official elsewhere reported that the Department had since designated an official at the rank of Chief Director to oversee its role on the EPWP.
programmes, then the interviewee’s description of the incomplete (referring to interdepartmental) process of trying to finalise provincial planning across various departmental structures may have contributed to this result. This, when read in the context of Paul’s assumption that new programmes with a different definition of a problem and tasks that cut across different ministries might not perform well when structured along existing functional lines. The interviewee continued that:

[B]ut now you must remember the situation requires that the different departments on the provincial level must now come also in and work together, because that’s what’s now required, they had to put business plans together … there’s a unrealistic expectation on how fast processes can move, even if you have the money.

Another manifestation of how the configuration of line functional authority introduced by the EPWP may have affected the capacity of the DPW to encourage operational compliance was observed in the Infrastructure sector. A former official of the DPW explained that one of the authority ‘tools’ that the DPW had at its disposal in this sector was the Division of Revenue Act, where EPWP-related conditions were attached to the release of provincial and municipal infrastructure grants which were sanctioned under this statute. They added however that ‘the Division of Revenue Act specifies clearly that provinces and municipalities must use the tender and design guidelines for infrastructure projects … but very few as far as I know still relatively few municipalities and provinces are literally using those guidelines, they’re ignoring the Division of Revenue Act, and no one does anything about it’ Another DPW official relayed a similar observation:

I mean if you look at the Infrastructure sector, there are some people who do not follow guidelines and they get away with it, and those guidelines are based on the DORA, and they get away with it, so we need to be able to enforce certain regulations of government to say this will be done.

Although these observations recall earlier strategic conditions (influenced by prevailing needs and commitments, and ideological factors) that likely influenced the lack of tender and design guideline use by Infrastructure sector departments, in the context of the present variable it revealed the structural incapacity of the DPW, as the co-ordinating department for the sector and the programme as a whole, to encourage or otherwise enforce EPWP compliance on provincial and local authorities. This again reflected Paul’s reference to ‘programs with a different definition of the problem and a set of tasks which
cut across different ministries [and in this case, levels of government]. It should moreover be remembered that these sub-national governments were expected to adapt their existing line function infrastructure delivery activities to operating guidelines being imposed by the EPWP via the DPW.

Other structural constraints which affected the co-ordinating capacity of the DPW in the Infrastructure sector appeared to have arisen more directly from the process of embedding responsibility for the EPWP within existing line functional activities. A DPW official remarked on a problem observed in provincial departments of Transport, where there were ‘huge inconsistencies’ cited in the outputs being reported, where this was ultimately connected to how reporting responsibilities for the programme were implanted in existing line functions. In this instance the official described a scenario where reporting was essentially being split, where one official in a department’s finance section wrote the ‘Treasury report’, or in other words a more general report required from provincial departments on how they spent their overall PIG allocation; whilst another official prepared the ‘EPWP report’, which was more specifically focussed on reporting outputs for this particular programme. The inconsistencies emerged as a consequence of how functional reporting on EPWP outputs was arranged, the structuring of which also seems to reflect Paul’s description of a development programme’s monitoring processes, and in particular the extent of the shift from a bureaucratic observance of procedures to programme performance. In wider terms, the reporting inconsistencies could ultimately be linked to the fact that, on the one hand, the EPWP constituted a stand-alone programme with expected targets and outputs, whilst on the other hand these outputs and targets were expected to be generated and met via an existing resourcing instrument (PIG), which possessed its own functional reporting protocols.

A final observation from the interview findings appeared to again speak to Paul’s concern about the extent to which programmes structured along existing line functions were, through their implementing bodies, able to respond to the particular demands and in some cases uncertainties generated by these initiatives. This time the findings revealed the structural incapacity of the DPW to respond to tasks which were judged as falling outside its designated functional remit in the EPWP, but which arose unexpectedly in the course of the programme’s implementation. The issue at hand arose in an interview with the National Treasury, in the context of a discussion on the financing
of the DPW’s EPWP Unit. A Treasury official recalled that the Unit had previously motivated for increases to its budget allocation which in Treasury’s opinion appeared to overstep what it believed to be the Unit’s primary responsibility to monitor and co-ordinate EPWP activities. The example given by the Treasury official concerned mentorship and entrepreneurial learnership programmes in the construction industry, where according to the Treasury the Unit appeared to be motivating that it should become more directly involved in the planning, execution and funding of these activities, which was denied on the grounds of functional responsibility resting with a construction industry SETA. The official remarked: ‘we, I think, took the stance that we thought this is not really Public Works’ function, because you’ve got a construction education and training authority, that specific SETA for the construction industry, and we were of the opinion those guys should rather drive those processes rather than public works’ They further explained that:

You see it doesn’t serve purpose for a national department to take over the functions of other institutions or entities, so it won’t serve any purpose to, even for a short term intervention, for a national department to take over let’s say the tasks of a tertiary institution, or a SETA, of whatever the case might be, I mean it might help you in the short term but it’s not a long term solution.

Although the Treasury’s opinion on where the EPWP Unit’s functional role should stop was clear enough, this passage also revealed that the learnership example seemed to have arisen from unforeseen operational difficulties experienced by the SETA in question in carrying out these learnership obligations, which motivated ‘taking over’ in the short-term the functions of another organisation. This was confirmed elsewhere by the Treasury official where the construction industry SETA had apparently run out of money. 79 The DPW’s attempt, as overall co-ordinator of the EPWP, to motivate for additional government funds which it could allocate to address the shortfall, obtained the following response from the Treasury: ‘no, that’s not the intention of your [DPW] functions, and ultimately those were then denied those requests’.

Further examination of this particular incident raises pertinent questions about the functional rigidity that was in this case applied by the National Treasury, where although

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79 The financial problems of the Construction SETA was also mentioned in an interview with a DPW official
the DPW did not possess the primary functional mandate to implement learnership activities, it did otherwise possess considerable functional experience in the construction industry where these learnerships were expected to take place. This would tend to lend further credence to Paul's concern about structuring development programmes, which introduce new service delivery demands that cut across different organisations, within existing functional mandates, where the latter in this case was rigidly adhered to and hindered the capacity of the DPW to respond to unexpected needs.

8.4.1 Overall impressions on the structure of the EPWP

This section on the structure of the EPWP began by suggesting that the findings so far had detected potential structural constraints on the capacity of its implementing organisations. This mainly recalled strategic factors undermining the DPW's capacity to encourage departmental compliance with the programme’s job creation and training objectives, and accompanying operating conditions.

Findings on the EPWP’s structure were remarkably consistent with and expanded on this earlier observation, where the programme’s configuration of structural relations confirmed Paul’s assumption about bureaucratic constraints accompanying the introduction of a programme with a different definition of a problem and tasks that cut across different organisations being structured along existing functional lines. Departments in at least three of the EPWP’s four sectors expressed concerns about the capacity constraints experienced whilst implementing the programme, where this mainly exposed conflicts of hierarchy (similar to the CASP case) generated by line functional authority designations introduced by the initiative. This emerged most strongly where the relationship between implementing organisations was structured according to ‘co-ordinator’ and ‘co-ordinated’ roles. In other instances capacity constraints were experienced in relation to how EPWP demands were accommodated within existing line functional structures. In one case this produced inconsistencies in provincial Infrastructure sector monitoring due to the procedural arrangements by which EPWP outputs were being recorded and reported inside departments, which adversely affected the capacity of the DPW to ensure consistency of reported outputs. In another case the DPW’s overall co-ordinating capacity was constrained by its inability to intervene in a
programming area that was designated as falling outside of its line functional mandate (namely construction sector learnership activities).

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented an analysis of factors associated with the strategy, environment and structure of the EPWP, which were found to have influenced the capacity of its implementing organizations to carry out the programme. The impressions documented in this chapter will contribute to a consolidated identification of factors in the next chapter, which will conclude this thesis.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

9.1 Introduction

This chapter will summarise the main findings and wider research contributions that this thesis has tried to make by examining the administrative ‘capacity’ to implement development programmes. It will begin by summarising the premise, and the motivation behind the premise that influenced the study’s interpretation of administrative capacity, and which eventually informed the research question and conceptual and theoretical outline. This chapter will then identify and discuss the overarching factors found to have influenced the capacity of public administrations to implement the CASP and EPWP development programmes. The thesis will then outline the contribution that this thesis has sought to make to wider research on administrative capacity in developing countries, and end by outlining a further research agenda to examine this subject in the South African context.

9.2 Administrative capacity: outlining the premise

The premise that this study came to associate with administrative capacity – which generally refers to the ability of public administrations to function – emerged almost entirely from observing how frequently and in what form the term capacity had been employed in discussions and debates about the performance of South Africa’s public administrations (outlined in chapters 1 and 2). A more detailed examination of the local academic literature on administrative capacity revealed that a concern for the capacity of the country’s public administration had in fact been present at the very outset of its political transition to a non-racial democracy in the mid 1990s. Moreover, its usage was closely associated with the significant increase in the socio-economic development demands that political transformation handed to a new government and a restructured public administration. In this context, the predominate view of capacity that emerged came to be defined by whether South Africa’s public administrations possessed the requisite or sufficient capacity to respond to an expanded agenda of development
demands, and where this was deemed not to be the case, that this capacity should be acquired, or in other words built or strengthened.

This thesis then submitted that such a twofold interpretation of the term capacity had tended to be translated into some measure of sufficient human (mostly), material or financial resources (suggested by the phrase ‘lack of’), where it was treated as an item that was judged to be either adequately present in an administrative setting or not, and if not, required remedy. This study then indicated that while it generally accepted the argument that a lack of human, material and financial resources could affect the ability of public administrations to function, where such deficiencies ought to be rectified, relying solely on such a twofold interpretation of capacity limited the contextual scope for understanding the underlying factors that potentially affected these conditions. In other words, the prevailing twofold interpretation of the term did not adequately explain how the organisational and operational circumstances under which public administrations functioned might influence or affect their capacity to deliver services and implement programmes.

With this in mind, this thesis proposed the following research question:

What are the factors that influence the capacity of public administrations in South Africa to carry out development programmes?

The primary aim of this study was to systematically isolate, define and examine the effects of factors that could be observed as influencing the capacity of South African public sector organisations to carry out development programmes. It was then suggested that isolating and examining the characteristics of such factors would enable additional explanatory and theoretical insights to be drawn about the administrative circumstances (the organisational and operational conditions) that underlie more common applications of the term capacity, that is, ‘lack of’ in South Africa.

The remainder of this chapter will focus on identifying and discussing the four overarching factors that this study, based on findings from two case development programmes, found to have influenced administrative capacity. These are:

1. Adaptability of programme objectives
2. Flexibility of programme operating rules
3. Functional accommodation of demands introduced by a programme
4. Inter-organisational authority relations.

9.3 Discussion of overarching factors found to have influenced administrative capacity

An outline of the four key factors mentioned above is presented in accordance with the three variables and sub-variable categories used in this study to examine public sector-administered development programmes. These variables, adapted from research by Paul (1983; 1982), in this study’s estimation best approximated its primary task of investigating the organisational and operational circumstances under which public administrations carried out development programmes, in order to isolate factors affecting their capacity. This section begins with the ‘strategy’ variable.

9.3.1 Strategic factors influencing capacity

A development programme’s strategy, in relation to Paul’s framework, encompassed the circumstances under which objectives were set for it by the government, how these objectives were translated into operating goals and action plans, and finally the conditions underpinning its resourcing. Circumstances associated with the strategic makeup of the two development programmes were widely reported in this study. Beginning with the objective makeup of CASP and the EPWP, it was evident that a key factor common to both programmes, which affected the capacity of their implementing organisations, was the adaptability of programme objectives. Adaptability in this instance refers to the extent to which the makeup of the objectives introduced by the programmes could be accommodated within the prevailing operational circumstances of participating departments. However, the conditions under which this occurred differed for the two programmes.

For CASP, a notable concern expressed by just over half of the provincial departments interviewed stemmed from the objective requirement that 70 per cent of monies received under the programme had to be directed at government land reform programmes and their corresponding beneficiaries, where in observing a distinction between servicing
land reform and non land reform beneficiaries on the basis of farming potential and attitudinal attributes, departments were citing an increased risk to their ability to service the latter clientele. The portrayal of this risk also seemed to correspond with comments made by other interviewees who were expressing doubts about the commercial focus and corresponding viability of CASP. The prevailing operational circumstances within which this key objective of CASP was introduced was defined by a situation where limited and ad hoc administrative attention had been given, prior to CASP coming on the scene, to the agricultural support element linked to initiatives designed to improve access to land. Concerns expressed about provincial department capacity to respond to the beneficiary circumstances introduced by this objective requirement of CASP also revealed insights about the limited flexibility that provinces appeared to possess in defining the land reform beneficiary audience being prioritised by the programme. It also created the possibility of an objective tension between, on the one hand, providing post-settlement support to land reform beneficiaries, and a key output attached to the programme’s objective of strengthening existing agricultural support services, where this was intended to enhance the ‘productive capacity and economic success’ of its beneficiaries.

A similar but potentially more serious situation was evident in the EPWP case, where departments in all four of the programme’s sector groupings were exhibiting a broader reluctance to take on board the labour-intensive job creation philosophy being introduced by the programme. Unlike in the CASP Programme, sector departments were afforded greater discretion to determine how best to allocate available resources under their existing activities to respond to the EPWP’s job creation objective, through intensifying the use of labour. However, prevailing operational circumstances in participating departments, encompassing existing modalities of delivery\textsuperscript{80} (i.e., Economic sector), prevailing needs and commitments (i.e., Infrastructure sector), and in other cases ideological factors (i.e., Infrastructure, Social and Environment and Culture sectors), contributed to this reluctance. Ultimately, this affected the capacity of these departments to respond to this core objective of the EPWP, and more acutely affected the ability of the Department of Public Works, as the programme’s designated co-

\textsuperscript{80}The resourcing circumstances of public sector bodies could also be included under ‘existing modalities of delivery’. This study found for instance that conflicting as well as constraining statutory requirements governing the procurement of goods and services affected the capacity of municipalities in particular to comply with EPWP requirements.
ordinator, to ‘have room to initiate and influence the formulation of strategy’, as Paul (1982: 110) has described.

A second major factor that was common to both programmes studied, and which was found to have produced more tangible effects on implementing department capacity, concerned the flexibility of programme operating rules. In both cases, implementing departments were limited in the extent to which they could determine and plan the specific activities through which they would be expected to contribute to programme objectives. This factor spoke directly to Paul’s (1982: 110) statement that ‘some situations yield greater flexibility to the program manager [or in this case implementing departments] to choose, interpret, and sequence operating goals’.

In the CASP case, despite the specification of six agricultural support service pillars being promoted by the programme, and direct references claiming otherwise, provincial departments of agriculture enjoyed little de facto control over the interpretation, selection and sequencing of all available services, which prioritised the delivery of on/off farm infrastructure, and which effectively constrained their capacity to cater to other potentially more pressing service needs identified in their regions. This thesis suggested, moreover, that the maintenance of this situation seems to have been objectively influenced by provincial departments having to prioritise the needs of land reform beneficiaries, where infrastructure was cited as having been a neglected service area directed at this clientele. The capacity constraints experienced by provincial departments of agriculture resulting from the limited extent to which these organisations could determine and plan their interventions, were most markedly evident in human (i.e., engineers and extension officers) and physical resource (i.e., procurement rules) deficiencies and impediments, which exposed the inability of provincial departments to adequately respond to these demands. Finally, the capacity of the national and provincial departments of agriculture to deliver their support interventions to land reform beneficiaries was further constrained by the operating rules linking CASP with land reform programmes being carried out by the national Department of Land Affairs. This issue will be discussed further in a later section on structural factors.

A generally similar scenario was observed in the EPWP case, where inflexible, and in some instances inconsistent and conflicting operating rules governing the job creation
and training expectations of the programme inhibited the capacity of departments in some sectors to fashion their interventions in response to these objectives. Furthermore, departmental operating inflexibility was perhaps most widely felt across sector departments in adjusting to the ‘accreditation’ rules attached to the delivery of training, which essentially exposed a disjuncture between the operating demands being introduced by the EPWP and the ability of the government’s overall training accreditation scheme to service (especially through resource mobilisation) the accreditation requirements of contributing departments.

9.3.2 Environmental factors influencing capacity

Environmental factors affecting capacity overwhelmingly concerned instances of ‘uncertainty’ which, according to Paul, arose from unforeseen, or sudden or unpredictable changes precipitated by the socio-economic, political and physical conditions of a development programme’s beneficiaries. The findings showed that instances of uncertainty, which were evident in both CASP and the EPWP, involved, in the first case, difficulties faced by some provincial departments of agriculture in being able to negotiate intra-group socio-economic and political dynamics generated by land reform beneficiaries. Having said this, the observation that these ‘group’ dynamics were generated by how land reform beneficiaries organised themselves to acquire access to land via government-prescribed programming rules, spoke directly to the objective make-up of CASP (i.e., 70 per cent of funding directed at land reform programmes and their corresponding beneficiaries), and to the adaptability of its objectives as discussed earlier. In the EPWP case, the socio-economic circumstances of beneficiaries did affect their response to the delivery of training and the formalisation of Social sector services under the programme.

9.3.3 Structural factors influencing capacity

Structural factors affecting capacity referred to the functional and organisational arrangements in place to support a development programme’s implementation. Findings from both case studies were mostly consistent with a key assumption that Paul associated with a programme’s structural makeup, which suggested that features linked to what he termed the ‘bureaucratic mode’ could pose severe constraints for a
development programme’s structure. The constraints that he associated with the bureaucratic mode arose from development programmes being embedded within the existing line functions of their implementing bodies, where these bodies were inclined to impose a centralised decision-making structure on a programme. This description also reflected characteristics associated with development bureaucracies mentioned in chapter 2: hierarchical structures and adherence to general rules. The first major structural factor found to have influenced departmental capacity across both programmes highlighted what could be described as the **functional accommodation of demands introduced by a programme**.

In the case of CASP, a factor found to have stubbornly constrained the capacity of both the national and provincial departments of agriculture to respond to the important land reform clientele concerned the temporal disjuncture experienced in releasing agricultural support services under CASP, to beneficiaries who had accessed land via separate government programmes such as LRAD. This disjuncture could essentially be traced to a misalignment in the rules governing when CASP could release agricultural support services, and rules applying to the provision of land to beneficiaries. Having observed this, the structural nature of this problem stemmed from these rules having been functionally embedded in the practice of separate departmental bodies, i.e., national and provincial departments of agriculture, and a national Department of Land Affairs, both of which astonishingly reported to the same political head (Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs). Other instances where provincial department capacity was affected by the functional accommodation of new demands introduced by CASP saw some departments being either functionally ill-prepared or unclear about how to absorb the supplementary contribution that the programme made to their existing delivery of farmer support services. In other cases, this was displayed in the cumbersome arrangements resulting from how CASP was embedded in existing provincial department functional structures.

The effects on capacity produced by the functional accommodation of CASP were also evident in the EPWP case. To a large extent this could be traced to the inherent makeup of the programme, which required sectorally diverse departmental structures to contribute to the objective of labour-intensive job creation and training via their existing functional activities. Having said this, an analysis of the actual workings of the EPWP tended to confirm that the capacity of some departments, especially the Department of
Public Works (DPW), designated as the overall co-ordinator of the programme, was affected by the extent to which contributing departments demonstrated an ability to operationally absorb the objective demands being introduced by the programme. Although strategic factors such as the adaptability of the EPWP’s labour-intensive job creation objective, and the flexibility of its operating rules, had already exposed potential difficulties for departments to functionally accommodate the programme’s demands, in other instances these took on a more distinct structural profile.

Examples included the complicated monitoring procedures exercised by provincial infrastructure-delivery departments in functionally reporting on the EPWP, which ultimately affected the ability of the sector’s co-ordinating department (DPW) to ensure consistency in outputs being reported. Another example which demonstrated the extent to which the DPW, as the programme’s overall co-ordinator, was functionally constrained from responding to uncertainties arising from the implementation of the EPWP, related to its inability to assume emergency responsibility for learnership programmes in the construction industry, which were judged as falling outside its functional mandate.

The second major structural factor found to have influenced the capacity of CASP and EPWP implementing departments was attributed to inter-organisational authority relations. The findings interestingly showed that although the nature of the authority relations in both cases exposed structural conflicts of hierarchy, this did not conform to what Paul described as the imposition of centralised structures, where this was rather attributed to decentralised, and in other cases horizontally configured, structural arrangements. In the CASP case, this was most visibly expressed in the monitoring and oversight role performed by the national Department of Agriculture (DOA), compared to the responsibilities for on-the-ground implementation assumed by provincial departments of agriculture. This exposed concerns about ‘turf’ issues and inter-organisational ‘impositions’, demonstrating conflicts of hierarchy which affected the capacity of the DOA to effectively exercise its monitoring and oversight role under the programme. It should be remembered that the public agricultural sector in South Africa was constitutionally decentralised, where functional responsibilities were shared between a national and provincial departments.
A similar but more complex scenario was evident in the EPWP, where cases of hierarchical conflict sprang from the co-ordinator and co-ordinated roles and associated responsibilities assumed by departments under the Programme. This functioned on vertical and horizontal axes, was observed at both national and provincial levels of government, and was evident at the level of rank designations of officials. The capacity constraints on departments assigned a co-ordinator role was especially acute for the DPW, whose responsibility as overall Programme co-ordinator of the EPWP had become more formalised and output sensitive vis-à-vis sector departments participating in labour-intensive public works schemes. At the same time, the department's relative standing among peer group departments to exercise this role, which did not include the authority to allocate funds to other departments, was considered by some to have limited its ability to exercise strategic influence.

Findings from both programmes suggest that inter-organisational authority relations, which exposed bureaucratic conflicts of hierarchy and which functioned in a decentralised environment, do not, ipso facto, undermine the validity of Paul's emphasis on the bureaucratic effects of centralised decision-making structures. Rather, it would be more appropriate to say that the evidence extends Paul's observation, because issues at the core of his concern with the effects of centralised structures, including the configuration of decision-making and the exercise of discretion, were also evident in how the decentralised relationship between public organisations contributing to both programmes was structured.

9.4 Significance of the findings to existing research on administrative capacity

The factors found to have influenced administrative capacity, which again emphasised the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations implement development programmes, were generally consistent with the effects on capacity of inter-organisational relationships, intra-organisational settings, and institutional rules as observed by previous scholars such as Grindle and Hilderbrand (1995), Umeh and Adranovich (2005), and Wallis (2000). The findings also generally corresponded with and were given more local expression in the observations of South African public administration academics interviewed for this study. This included a
reference to bureaucratic constraints adversely affecting inter-organisational cooperation (at vertical and horizontal levels); as well as the effects on capacity of how shared functional mandates were negotiated across levels of government (i.e. national and provincial), which one academic referred to as ‘... joining things up ...’ It will be remembered that another academic referred to the potential problem faced by organisations tasked with a coordinating role, in influencing the contributions of partnering organisations. The EPWP case spoke specifically to this scenario.

Both the CASP and EPWP case examples clearly demonstrated that the capacity which public administrations possess, or seek to possess, and which is typically reflected in human resourcing capability, can often be adversely affected by or subject to specific organisational and operational conditions and imperatives that are potentially changeable and not necessarily then fixed. This observation would tend to advise against overly static and simplistic assessments of public administration’s ‘lack of capacity’, which would logically accept that throwing more capacity at a public policy problem will, in and of itself, advance a solution.

The findings of this thesis also interestingly corresponded with observations made in research contemporary to Samuel Paul’s work that so influenced this study’s analytical framework. This research was contained in Grindle’s (1980) edited volume, Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World. The case research published in this volume found, similar to this thesis, that administrative capacity to implement development programmes is sometimes adversely affected by broader organisational and operational factors. These most notably included policy objective/goal setting, choices about a programme’s implementing organisations, and the effects on programme implementation of decentralised structural arrangements.

Focussing back on the findings of this thesis, a closer look at the specific organisational and operational conditions that influenced capacity revealed that the bureaucratic characteristics associated with public administrations featured strongly, and it is hoped, has added usefully to the employment of middle range theoretical approaches. This was again consonant with existing literature such as Bryant and White’s (1982) reference to ‘administrative incapacity’ and Brinkerhoff’s (1991a: 16) description of development
programmes being ‘located in organizations’, where these are ‘subject to the bureaucratic context in which its implementing organization(s) are situated’.

These bureaucratic characteristics were given sharper definition through Paul’s framework in the following ways: In the first instance this took the form of inflexible, inconsistent and conflicting operating as well as objective rules to which implementing departments were bound under the two programmes. The consequences that this generated for administrative capacity were reflected in limited departmental flexibility and discretion to respond to the objective and operational demands introduced by the development programmes, where this also created tensions between participating departments depending on the roles they assumed under the programmes (i.e. monitoring versus implementation, co-ordinator versus co-ordinated). A notable example from CASP ironically seemed to show that rule compliance may have even contributed to increasing environmental uncertainty, which adversely affected the capacity of provincial departments of agriculture. This seemed to speak to Rondinelli’s reference to public administrations adopting control-oriented planning where this was perceived as a means of reducing uncertainty. The example relates to agriculturally servicing groups of land reform beneficiaries who had accessed land via rules governing land reform programmes being administered by a second government department (i.e. Land Affairs).

In the second instance, the fact that centralised hierarchical structures were not a feature of either programme did not remove the saliency of hierarchy itself, where the circumstances attending decentralised and horizontally configured structural arrangements did expose capacity constraints arising from conflicts of hierarchy expressed through inter-organisational authority relations.

9.5 Scope for further research on administrative capacity

The aim of this study was to try to demonstrate that the prevailing interpretation of administrative capacity in the South African literature did not adequately capture how the organisational and operational circumstances under which public administrations

\[81\] In discussing bureaucracy as an impediment to development administration, Milne (1973: 415) interestingly commented that ‘it has been said that horizontal relations, as opposed to vertical relations, were neglected by Weber’.

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functioned might also influence their ability to deliver services and implement programmes. This premise was adopted in response to a situation where administrative capacity, in terms of the developmental response of public administrations, had become fixated on the possession and acquisition of sufficient human (mostly), as well as financial and material resources. It is firstly hoped that the four overarching factors found to have influenced the capacity of public administrations to carry out CASP and the EPWP have contributed to the overall aim, by demonstrating that administrative capacity should also be interpreted as a mixture of disabling constraints that affect or act upon a public body’s resources. Secondly, it is also hoped that the insights drawn about the implications of these factors, in terms of the study of public bureaucracies, have contributed to Van Ufford’s call (in chapter 2) for further research into the organisational problems arising ‘in between’ the intentions of development policy and its effects.

As a final note, it is instructive to illustrate why there remains real potential to employ the same interpretative approach to analysing administrative capacity in the South African case. This was evident in a document made available to the researcher by government officials during the course of this study. The document, outlining a framework for the management of joint programmes, presented a set of guidelines to be used by government departments when jointly implementing individual programmes, especially those with a development focus. These were defined as interventions requiring cross-departmental involvement in planning, budgeting and service delivery, and where a number of departments were often responsible for specific aspects of the programme, but where none was responsible for it in its entirety (Governance and Administration Cluster 2005: 5) This definition encapsulated the two programmes examined by this thesis. The problem emerged in the document’s explicit reference to capacity, which, following the conventional approach where the term was limited to problems arising from ‘lack of capacity and capability deficiencies in government departments’, was later defined and distinguished as follows:

There is therefore a clear distinction between what can be referred to as capacity and what is referred to as capability. Capacity is more related to issues of human resources (personnel, budget and infrastructure) whilst capability relates to competency, that is, the ability to apply knowledge and skills to achieve goals. (Governance and Administration Cluster 2005: 6).
Again, with an obvious focus on the possession of human capacity and what it distinguished as capability, or the application of this capacity, a wider reading of the document indicated that nowhere was an explicit connection being drawn between these interpretations of administrative capacity and potentially influential factors in the wider organisational and operational environments in which programmes were jointly delivered. Indeed, the following statement seemed to partially illustrate this gap:

This framework is aimed at addressing the weaknesses in the current procedures and processes of planning, budgeting and implementation that are hampered by weak capability to deliver. (Governance and Administration Cluster 2005: 3).

A relevant question arising from the statement, in terms of the working definition of capacity used in this thesis, would be: to what extent can current procedures and processes of planning, budgeting and implementation also have an effect on the capability to deliver? This effectively turns the aim as described in the above quotation on its head, by recognising that the capacity to deliver could be as much a function of organisational and operational processes as it could be an enabler of these. Having said this, there is, in the considered opinion of this researcher, extensive scope for examining administrative capacity from the former perspective, not only in view of the widespread use in South Africa of development programmes as a service delivery vehicle, but also as a reflection of the increasing organisational complexity by which these programmes are being implemented, exemplified by the government’s need to establish guidelines for joint departmental implementation.

From a research perspective, the continued use of case studies would, in the short-term, further enrich an understanding of the complexities of inter-departmental development programme implementation, and the effects on administrative capacity. Given the large number of programmes being implemented throughout the South African bureaucracy however, it would be equally advisable to work towards refining relevant analytical frameworks for gathering data on larger numbers of programmes in pursuit of generalisability. The use of semi-structured questionnaires could usefully aid this pursuit. Finally, there is also scope and indeed an expectation within the comparative public administration literature to examine multiple country cases, which could include cross-country analysis of factors that influence administrative capacity to implement development programmes. One example that could support this purpose from the
developing world could include an analysis of South African, Indian and Brazilian bureaucracies in view of the increasingly close trilateral relationship forming under the IBSA Dialogue Forum, which includes sharing experiences in public administration (Tshwane IBSA Summit Declaration 2007). It would be fascinating to examine the relatedness of factors affecting administrative capacity, given the different administrative histories of these countries coupled with their shared development challenges.
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APPENDIX 1

Questionnaire on administrative capacity

As an introduction to the contents of appendix one, which is presented overleaf, it is necessary to refer to the brief questionnaire distributed to South African public administration academics as it contains an important conceptual proviso. Chapter four indicated that ‘capacity’ was described to the respondents as the ‘inherent’ ability of public bureaucracies to carry out development programmes, where they were asked to identify, from their experience, key inherent constraints affecting the ability of South African public administrations to carry out these programmes. These inherent constraints were meant to signify the in-built structures, mechanisms and modes of administrative decision-making and actions that formed part of the process of implementing development programmes.

Having said this, in the course of one interview an academic respondent signaled a potential interpretive problem with the notion of ‘inherent’ constraints. The researcher re-examined this wording in relation to the perspective of capacity being advanced by this thesis. Although the idea of inherent constraints was originally intended to capture the organisational and operational circumstances within which programmes were carried out, it was decided that its use could be problematic if it implied, unintentionally, that these circumstances were somehow fixed and unchangeable. The researcher therefore decided to abandon the notion of ‘inherent’ in favour of simply stating that the perspective adopted by this thesis concentrated on capacity as being influenced by the organisational and operational conditions under which public administrations functioned, which retained the thrust of the perspective of capacity being employed.
Expert Assessment of Administrative Capacity for Development in South Africa

Question 1:

In this thesis, a ‘development’ programme has been defined according to the following criteria, where such an initiative must exhibit the following features:

1. Carry out a nation’s development goals,
2. Introduce change in a society or community to increase its productive or organizational capacity,
3. Improve the quality of peoples’ lives, including improvements in the well-being of the poor.

In your view, what impact have development programmes had on public bureaucracies in South Africa, in terms of the latter’s ability to organize and carry these out? You may make your response in the form of key impact points:

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 

Question 2:

In this thesis, ‘capacity’, in the context of public and development administration/management is being defined from the perspective of:

- The inherent ability of public administration to respond to public (development) policy objectives.

This perspective acknowledges that bureaucracies by definition have in-built structures, mechanisms and modes of decision-making and actions that come into play when development policy objectives are defined and pursued, through programmes for example.


2Derick Brinkerhoff (1991a: 22) spoke to this perspective of capacity when he defined the term as the latent ability of a development programme organisation to generate outputs, where this was in turn linked to an ability to effectively combine existing physical, human and administrative resources.
In your view, what would you say are the key ‘inherent’ constraints that South Africa’s public bureaucracy has sustained in being able to carry out development programmes (as defined in question 1). You may make your response in the form of key points:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Question 3:

This thesis submits that researching the capacity (inherent ability) of public bureaucracies to carry out development programmes can proceed with reference to three variables in particular: 1) environment, 2) strategy, 3) structure. (See overleaf for definition of these variables)

In your view, what would you say is the key issue affecting the capacity of South African public bureaucracies to carry out development programmes, associated with each of the three variables?

1. Environment Key issue:

2. Strategy Key issue:

3. Structure Key issue:

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END OF ASSESSMENT

MY SINCEREST THANKS FOR TAKING THE TIME TO PROVIDE YOUR VIEWS

Vinothan Naidoo
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Appendix

In researching the public management of development programmes, Samuel Paul (1982) attributed the following features to the three variables identified on page 2 above:

1. Environment

   - The *scope* of a development programme, encompassing its geographical and sectoral spread;
   - The *diversity* of a development programme, comprising physical-geographical, cultural, socio-economic and political features in a programme’s setting. For example this could refer to the make-up of a programme’s beneficiary audience
   - The *uncertainty* accompanying a development programme, referring to how a programme responds to unpredictable or unforeseen changes

2. Strategy:

   - The *objectives* specified by a government for a programme and how these objectives are to be arrived at. This would include:
     - Policy goals set for the programme
     - The allocation of financial resources
     - The specification of a programme’s operational framework
   - The *relationship between* a programme’s strategic objectives and its environment

3. Structure:

   - Functional relationship between programmes and their sponsoring administrative bodies (i.e. departments)
   - Organisational relationship between programmes and their sponsoring administrative bodies (i.e. departments)
APPENDIX 2

Farmer testimonials: CASP Programme

CASP Review Workshop
14 March, 2007
Midrand, Johannesburg

Farming beneficiaries from South Africa’s provinces attended a CASP Programme review workshop that took place on the 14th and 15th of March 2007. The farmers were given an opportunity to address the gathering to report on their experiences, concerns and observations about participating on the CASP Programme. Comments from farmers representing eight of South Africa’s nine provinces (excluding Limpopo province) were recorded by the researcher as well as officially recorded by a representative of the consultants appointed to carry out the CASP review. Unfortunately, the researcher was not in possession of a tape recorder and so was unable to tape record the beneficiary testimonials, nor was the official transcription a verbatim recording, where it comprised a list of main points captured.

The researcher attempted to record specific comments made by the farmer beneficiaries about their experiences with CASP. The researcher then sought to check/verify as well as elaborate these recordings by comparing them against the written transcript of the testimonials recorded by the rapporteur, and provided to the researcher. A final list of main points captured by the researcher is provided below.
More of social development in the Department of Agriculture than commercial development – referring to the approach of CASP, appears to exhibit less of a commercial imperative.

CASP needs to be appropriately planned for ‘farms’, not just ‘farmer’, towards making the farm a profitable enterprise.

Distinction drawn between ‘what do you need’, reference to what the farmer is asked (by Extension Officer) and ‘what is your strategic plan for your growth’. Mentioned that the first question that I got was wrong, or as the farmer seemed to feel, the wrong way of going about providing support.

Need for continuous training and mentoring until we are self-reliant.

‘CASP must work with us’. Another farmer received grant. ‘when we do these things, we would really would like to work with you’. Quote referred to by representative from the Northern Cape: ‘Don’t plan for me without me’

Reference to ‘wanting to become businesses and not projects of the Department of Agriculture’

Issue over how the grant is provided to farmers, where one farmer compared the Department of Social Welfare, which gives people grants directly, with the Department of Agriculture, which says ‘we’ll buy for you’. Beneficiary questioned whether this was appropriate.

Gives us sufficient funds, we will get the rest from others, we don’t want a hand out.

You have to be a group to get government funding, bias in the practice of the Department, unless a group of ‘blacks’ you won’t get money.

Farmer quotes section 38 of Public Finance Management Act, there is no reason not to give farmers funds directly to spend, why not give it directly to farmers. Is it the duty of the official to buy on behalf of farmers? Section 38 of the PFMA allows for transfers to legal entities who show sufficient controls.

Farmer was told that funds weren’t available when this was supposed to be committed. He was then told to re-apply.

After approval the service provider refused to deliver because there were no prior arrangements on advance payments and payments after delivery of the service. This was reported to the department, who informed him (farmer) that the money that was approved for these projects was not available anymore. He is still waiting. The department told him that the money was used, and that the next budget does not include his approvals.
- In another testimonial, they applied for assistance and after a long wait they were informed that the application was wrong.

- Pressure on farmers to spend monies committed late in financial year, where they were told the money would be taken back if it was not spent. This is a problem for farmers as they had already planned for their production. Farming organisation budgeted on R1, 2 million allocated to them but there were many delays, until a contractor was appointed last month (February?). The group was not involved in the appointment of the contractor. He has not been to the project yet. They received a letter informing them that the money will be taken away if not spent by the end of this month (March).

- Problems between contractors/service providers and administrators: farmer had to sell pigs (sows) at a loss because the piggery structure was not completed. The farmer has discovered that there are many 'carcasses' (incomplete erections) on other farms. In another incident, they received money for an irrigation system. A service provider was appointed. The farmers were not involved. The service providers left the work half done. In another instance, the service provider threatened to repossess the goods. The department claimed that the paper work was wrong. Suggested to the department that they change the system to allow him to pay up front and provide the receipt later to the department. This suggestion was rejected.

- Procurement—it takes too long.

- Procurement system was a ‘total mess’; length it took to get feedback on quotation was a problem as quotations have a lifespan. After submitting three quotations, approval was given but after a long time. This happened after the lifetime of the quotation, with the result that the approved amount was inadequate.

- A need to take fencing out of CASP, because it doesn't support production or ability of farmer to enhance production and enterprises, towards reaching profitability. At the moment we have farmers with twenty cows applying for fencing. Fencing is given, but there is no income generating activities so the farmer cannot salvage loans.

- We need CASP to have a visibility. In Mpumalanga they were told that CASP only assisted with infrastructure, but was surprised to hear that there are actually six pillars. This information needs to filter to the ground. First time we heard of CASP last week (Northern Cape) – De Aar. In a review meeting of the programme in Gauteng – the majority of the participants (farmers) did not know about CASP.

- That information doesn’t go down to the farmers; they don’t understand it – this in relation to six pillar strategy and not just the infrastructure pillar.

- Application forms: ‘most of the people don’t understand it’
- Farmers mostly know how to farm (I think this refers to general practices), but they don’t necessarily understand government policy/objectives.

- Criticism of extension officers who may know technical aspects of agriculture but don’t have ‘business’ competence

- We need business ‘support’ and ‘advice’ not assume we don’t know anything about farming/growing.

- Time cycle is an issue: planting, soil preparation must wait for resources, can’t wait.

- Disjuncture between farming season – and input requirements, and project planning, which sometimes leads to delays in production planning. The timeframes for considering applications are problematic. Sometimes resources are only approved after the planting opportunity has gone.

- Problem of communication between service providers and farmers around ‘technical’ issues, where service provider indicated to farmer that the erection of a structure had to be changed for ‘technical’ reasons/because of ‘technical’ issues, the farmer must know/understand what that means. Example: farmer applied for a dam but received water tanks. This was done without consulting her.

- A lot of people are grouped together to farm, what happens when they have different interests (relates to needing to bring together a group of farmers to be able to purchase land, i.e. willing seller/willing buyer, on the reality that land could only be purchased on a collective basis where the grant per individual farmer was not sufficient to purchase land.

- Groups are too big (farming groups), each group has its own group dynamics

- Planning by group members is sometimes a challenge
APPENDIX 3

List of interviews conducted
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Departments interviewed as part of EPWP case study (For reasons of anonymity and confidentiality, the names and designations of officials and stakeholders have been withheld)</th>
<th>Date and Place of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>National Department of Public Works</td>
<td>22 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Department of Trade and Industry</td>
<td>22 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) (Public entity involved in the implementation of the EPWP)</td>
<td>23 January 2007, Midrand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>National Department of Provincial and Local Government</td>
<td>23 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>National Department of Public Works</td>
<td>23 January 2007, Centurion</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>National Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism</td>
<td>24 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>National Department of Education</td>
<td>25 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>National Department of Labour</td>
<td>25 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>National Department of Public Works</td>
<td>25 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>National Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>25 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>National Department of Public Works</td>
<td>26 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>National Department of Public Works</td>
<td>26 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>National Department of Health</td>
<td>8 February 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>National Department of Social Development</td>
<td>8 February 2007, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry</td>
<td>6 February 2007, Cape Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Departments interviewed as part of CASP case study (For reasons of anonymity and confidentiality, the names and designations of officials and stakeholders have been withheld)</td>
<td>Date and Place of interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>National Treasury (Department of Finance)</td>
<td>8 February 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>National Department of Public Works</td>
<td>9 February 2007, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Member of Parliament, Republic of South Africa</td>
<td>12 February 2007, Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Shisaka Development Management Services</td>
<td>16 February 2007, (via telephone)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>National Department of Public Works</td>
<td>9 February 2007, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>National Department of Water Affairs and Forestry</td>
<td>26 February 2007, Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>National Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>3 April 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>3 April 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<td>3 April 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>National Treasury (Department of Finance)</td>
<td>3 April 2007, Pretoria; follow-up phone interview on 2 May, 2007</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture, Western Cape province</td>
<td>18 April 2007, Elsenburg, Western Cape</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>National Department of Land Affairs</td>
<td>26 April 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Umhlaba Rural Services</td>
<td>23 April 2007, via</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Other interviews (names and designations of officials withheld for reasons of anonymity and confidentiality)</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>National Department of Land Affairs</td>
<td>26 April 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal province</td>
<td>4 May 2007, Via telephone</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>National Department of Land Affairs</td>
<td>16 May 2007, Via telephone</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Eastern Cape province</td>
<td>17 May 2007, Via telephone</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture, Free State province</td>
<td>31 May 2007, Via telephone</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture, Free State province</td>
<td>30 May 2007, Via telephone</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Gauteng province</td>
<td>29 May 2007, Via telephone</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture, Land Reform, Environment and Conservation, Northern Cape province</td>
<td>6 June 2007, Via telephone</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture, North West province</td>
<td>14 September 2007, Via telephone</td>
</tr>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Office of the Public Service Commission</td>
<td>24 January 2007, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>National Treasury (Department of Finance)</td>
<td>11 June 2007, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Academics interviewed</td>
<td>Date and place of interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>F. Cloete, Professor, School of Public Management and Planning, University of Stellenbosch</td>
<td>22 March, 2007, Stellenbosch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>E. Schwella, Professor, School of Public Management and Planning, University of Stellenbosch</td>
<td>22 March, 2007, Stellenbosch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>F. Theron, Senior Lecturer, School of Public Management and Planning, University of Stellenbosch</td>
<td>12 April 2007, Stellenbosch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>F.C. de Beer, Professor, Department of Development Studies, formerly Department of Development Administration, University of South Africa</td>
<td>26 April 2007, Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>M. Wallis, Executive Dean: Faculty of Commerce, Durban University of Technology</td>
<td>7 May 2007, via telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>P. FitzGerald, Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Finance, University of the Witwatersrand</td>
<td>22 January 2008, Johannesburg</td>
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</tbody>
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