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HORACE IN DIALOGUE:

A BAKHTINIAN STUDY OF SPEAKERS, INTERLOCUTORS, ADDRESSEES AND AUDIENCES IN THE MORALISING SATIRES OF HORACE SERMONES BOOKS ONE AND TWO

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines a selection of poems from both books of Horace's *Satires* against a backdrop of the dialogic theoretical system conceptualised by the Russian thinker Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895-1975). The thesis proposes examining Horatian satire or *sermo*, as Horace himself termed his genre, as the 'conversation' that this name implies it is. Bakhtin himself observed that Horace's *Satires* were one of the works that could be considered ancient forebears of modern novelistic dialogic discourse, although he failed to elaborate on this. The thesis takes its cue from here, and seeks to explore the ways in which Bakhtinian theory can elucidate the many dialogic facets of the *Satires* of Horace.

The moralising satires ('diatribes') of both Horace's books of *Satires* are the focus of this thesis. The problematic 'diatribe', a term which has been historically incorrectly applied to a vivid dialogic style, and also wrongly viewed as a formal genre, is first redefined as an adaptive rhetorical mode found in a wide variety of texts. It is not restricted to those texts that are primarily ethical, as moralising polemic or exhortation is also suited to other areas of life: in Horace *Sermones* Book One, this mode is also arguably present in the literary satires 1.4 and 1.10. While the 'diatribe' mode is only a small part of the many dialogic aspects of Horace's *Satires*, it is one that provides a model on which the thesis' interpretations of the larger and more complex dialogic interactions are based. In the first book we are given the impression a strong and direct link between the satirist-speaker and his audiences, which is interpreted with recourse to the Bakhtinian theory of 'addressivity'. Awareness of the speaker's orientation towards his listeners' active understanding right from the start of the utterance has facilitated a number of new readings in the moralising and moralising-literary satires of Horace's first book.

In the moralising poems of the second book of *Satires*, the 'if someone were to say...' model of the imaginary interlocutors of the first book has been expanded to accommodate the larger-than-life personalities of Damasippus and Davus, who, having usurped the role of satirist, take it upon themselves to lecture Horace. The former moralist of the first book by contrast is reduced to the roles of audience, sometime addressee and interlocutor, and worst of all, target of the satiric attack. The thesis employs a number of Bakhtinian theories to make sense of these satiric inversions. The reversal of fortune experienced by Horace's speaker-character in Book Two is in itself part of a broader interlibral dialogue, an 'argument', if you will, between the books. Yet many of the criticisms flung at Horace also confirm his self-satiric voice that has been present in the *Satires* right from the beginning of Book One. That Horace's critics are allowed to voice their views on the erstwhile satirist means that different perspectives on 'Horace' are heard. It is suggested that in this manner the *Satires* are a forerunner of the polyphony or 'multi-voicedness' which Bakhtin identified in the modern novel. Another easily co-existing interpretation is that Horace's Saturnalian *Satires* anticipate Bakhtin's concept of the literary Carnival, whereby roles both social and literary are temporarily inverted. Although Horace reclaims his satiric 'crown' in the end, the reversals of the *Satires* ultimately allow him to explore thoroughly all the aspects and roles relating to moralising satiric discourse.
For my parents
(all of them)
PREFACE

It is with a mixture of horror and amusement that a contemporary student of Horace’s Satires reads G.L. Hendrickson’s witty analogy of the progression of classical scholarship on the first page of his famous article ‘Horace Serm. 1.4: a Protest and a Programme’, published in the American Journal of Philology in 1900. Classics is likened to a harvest: first come the reapers who cut down the corn, then it is the gleaners who appear and scrape together the remaining loose ears of corn, and lastly, the poor, desperate geese arrive, ‘pick up a few grains scattered here and there among the stubble’, and then waddle home, cackling with joy at their finds. Modern scholars are the geese, of course, like the pitiful ‘late-born classical student who essays to present new points of view concerning the work of an author to whom such long and devoted study has been given as to Horace’.

Amusing as it is, Hendrickson’s analogy, itself gleaned from two other sources, is now at least a hundred years old. It is a very modest introduction to an article that was to prove, well, seminal in its new approach and insights into Horatian satire. What has really changed in the past hundred years, are the angles from which the latter-day geese and goslings are examining the leftover grains. These new angles have enabled the modern scholar to gain fresh insights into old material. Of course, if we are to continue with the above analogy, this approach does not really feed the geese, but it is very interesting all the same, and is liable to produce quite a bit of joyful cackling.

The present study seeks to examine Horace’s Satires from a Bakhtinian angle, one that, to the best of my knowledge, has not been attempted before. That Horace himself prefers to call his satire sermo, conversation, is generally acknowledged by scholars, yet the vivid dialogic traits of his ‘conversations’ have often been underplayed or else viewed as highly problematic. The present study proposes to examine Horace’s Satires precisely as conversations, that is, as dialogues between speakers, interlocutors, addressees and audiences of the Satires. Even where they are formally presented as monologues, such as in the moralising first triad of Satires Book One, Horace’s sermones are speeches that are consciously
addressed to their recipients and tend to indicate awareness of their audiences throughout. The theories of the Russian thinker Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, and to a lesser extent, some of the ideas of the Czech scholar Jan Mukarovsky, have informed my analysis of the Horatian satirist in dialogue. It is worth noting that Bakhtin, a classicist by training, himself identified Horace’s *Satires* as one of the ancient texts which exhibited many of the dialogic traits which he had identified in the modern novel. Unfortunately, however, Bakhtin fails to go into more detail about Horace’s *Satires*. An application of some of Bakhtin’s concepts to Horace’s *Satires* is therefore not only a fairly orthodox extension of Bakhtinian theory to a classical author, but a study of this nature is, I think, also long overdue.

While the idea for my general area of study came from R.G.M. Nisbet at the request of Kathleen Coleman, the supervisor of my Masters’ thesis, it is to Frances Muecke that I owe the idea of using Bakhtin as the theoretical basis for this study. I met her in Australia at a conference that she organised at the University of Sydney in 1994. Unfortunately, I have not had much contact with her since that time. Apart from the above-mentioned, the advice, interest and support of a number of other scholars has proven invaluable. I thank in particular: my supervisor, Richard Whitaker of the University of Cape Town for his tireless encouragement, ongoing support and careful editing; Kathy Coleman for her endless support and help, especially when I visited Ireland; John Atkinson, for his cheerful enthusiasm as well as for being willing to act as the courier of a heavy tome at a very late stage in the proceedings; David Wardle for all his help at Oxford; my former colleagues at the University of South Africa, where I worked from 1995 - June 1996, especially Marc Kleijwegt, Gottfried Mader and Richard Evans; my former colleagues at the University of Potchefstroom, where I taught from July 1996 - 1999, particularly Annette Combrink, Jan Kroeze, Marianne Dirksen and Marietjie Nelson; Alex Nice, my current HOD in the Department of Classics at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, for his support and understanding, particularly in the last few months; Denis Saddington of the same Department for his encouragement and inspiration. I owe a great deal to the helpful co-
mments made by a number of visiting lecturers to South Africa, all of whom I am unable to name here.

I also owe a word of thanks to a number of university libraries both in South Africa and abroad for the kind use of their facilities. They are (more or less in chronological order): the Jagger Library of the University of Cape Town; the Bodleian and Ashmolean libraries at Oxford; the library of the Institute for Classical Studies, London; the library of Trinity College, Dublin; the libraries at Leiden University, the Netherlands; the library of the University of Sydney, Australia; the Samuel Pauw Library of the University of South Africa; the Ferdinand Postma-Biblioteek of Potchefstroom University; the library of the Rand Afrikaans University; and finally, the Wartenweiler and Cullen libraries of the University of the Witwatersand, Johannesburg.

For their personal friendship and support, I should also thank: Gideon Rossouw, his parents Betty & Pierre, Catherine Woeber and John Read (& of course Daisy), Paul du Plessis, Riaan Stiglingh, Mark Katz, Christopher Bosa, Linda Borcherds, Merida James, & Christine & Neels Bothma (Neels for his nagging). This thesis is dedicated to my parents (all of them), which is explained by my being part of an extended step-family: in memory of my biological mother, who died tragically young; to Jacky, who for over twenty years has been to all intents and purposes my mother, and to whom I owe so much; to my father, for his example and for his active belief in multum in parvo; in memory of my grandparents, all of whom I have had the privilege of knowing; and to Nella Walker, my surrogate mother in Potchefstroom (now resident in Knysna), with all my love.

The financial assistance of the University of Cape Town and of the former South African Centre for Science Development (CSD, now the NRF) towards this project is gratefully acknowledged. It goes without saying that the views expressed in this thesis are not necessarily those of the CSD (or of the NRF).

Suzanne Sharland,
November 2000,
Johannesburg, South Africa.
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# ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>A &amp; A</td>
<td>Antike und Abendland</td>
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<td>AC</td>
<td>L'antiquité Classique</td>
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<td>A Class</td>
<td>Acta Classica</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHAM</td>
<td>Anales de Historia antigua y medieval</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>American Journal of Philology</td>
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<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Anthologia Latina</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANRW</td>
<td>Aufstieg und Nedergang der römischen Welt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Anthologia Palatina</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARIEL</td>
<td>A Review of International English Literature</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUMLA</td>
<td>Journal of the Australasian Universities Modern Language and Literature Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL</td>
<td>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (1863-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJ</td>
<td>The Classical Journal</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Classical Philology</td>
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<td>CQ</td>
<td>The Classical Quarterly</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>Classical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>The Classical World</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMC</td>
<td>Echos du monde classique</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSCP</td>
<td>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUCA</td>
<td>Hebrew Union College Annual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Journal of Roman Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>LALIES</td>
<td>Actes des sessions de linguistique et de litterature de l'Ecole normale superieure</td>
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<td>LCM</td>
<td>Liverpool Classical Monthly</td>
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<td>LEC</td>
<td>Les Études Classiques</td>
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<td>md</td>
<td>materiali e discussioni</td>
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<td>PCPS</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMLA</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Modern Language Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAC</td>
<td>Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum (ed. T. Klauser et al, Stuttgart 1950-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBPh</td>
<td>Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Revue des études anciennes</td>
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<td>REG</td>
<td>Revue des études grecques</td>
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<td>Revue des études latines</td>
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<td>RFC</td>
<td>Rivista di Filologia classica</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFIC</td>
<td>Rivista di Filologia e di istituzione classica</td>
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<tr>
<td>RhM</td>
<td>Rheinisches Museum</td>
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<td>RSC</td>
<td>Rivista di Studi Classici</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEEJ</td>
<td>Slavic and East European Journal</td>
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<td>SEER</td>
<td>The Slavonic and East European Review</td>
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<td>SO</td>
<td>Symbolae Osloenses</td>
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| SVF  | Hanss Friedrich von Arnim (ed.) 1964  
*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (vols 1-4)  
Stuttgart: Teubner |
| TAPA | *Transactions of the American Philological Association* |
| TLL  | *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (Leipzig 1900-) |
| VChr | *Vigiliae Christianae* |
| WJA  | *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft* |
| WS   | *Wiener Studien* |
| ZRG  | *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte* |
INTRODUCTION:

VOICES IN THE MORALISING SATIRES OF HORACE:
‘DIATRIBE’ AS DIALOGUE

There is neither a first word nor a last word. The contexts of dialogue are without limit. They extend into the deepest past and the most distant future. Even meanings born in dialogues of the remotest past will never be finally grasped once and for all, for they will always be renewed in later dialogue...

M.M. Bakhtin ‘Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences’.

Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Horatian satire has tended to be regarded as the poor relation in that poetic family group that includes the illustrious Odes. While scholars have pored over Horace’s lyric poetry, the Satires by contrast have received relatively scant and sometimes disparaging attention. Where individual satires, such as Sat. 1.1, have attracted voluminous study, this has often ironically been due to notoriety for their perceived structural flaws. Generalisations may be unfair, but much scholarship on the Satires has favoured either the minute approach of the commentary, or the contained analysis of the individual phrase, or, as is very tempting, extended paraphrase of the argument. The second book of Satires has on the whole received far less attention than its counterpart, perhaps because many readers seem to have found themselves running out of steam after the end of the liber sermonum. Very little emphasis has

1 The blame for this has often been placed at Horace’s own door. Fraenkel, for example, accuses Horace of running out of ideas in the second book of Satires because of the repetition of themes there and because Book Two contains eight instead of ten satires: ‘We can hardly avoid the conclusion that Horace, as he went on writing sermones, began to run short of suitable subjects and settings. Possibly it was for the same reason that in this second book he contented himself with eight poems instead of attaining the ideal number of ten. Unlike many writers, satirists and others, Horace was wise enough not to continue his work to the end that in this second book he contented himself with eight poems instead of attaining the ideal number of ten. Unlike many writers, satirists and others, Horace was wise enough not to continue his work to the end where it would have to be done invita Minerva. But even so the second book of his sermones, while containing some masterpieces and proving throughout a model of resourcefulness and balanced execution, shows in more than one place signs of strain...’ (1957: 137-138; emphasis mine). Fraenkel assumes that repetition of theme, and fewer satires in the collection, are necessarily faults. However, it is a mistake to judge the Satires too strictly according to the standards of the Eclogues, and there may be method in Horace’s apparent madness and inconsistency. Both books of Satires are very similar in length but the second book is in fact longer (Book One is 1030, at most 1038 lines long if one adds the possibly spurious lines at the start of Sat. 1.10, while Book Two is 1083 lines long, cf. Armstrong 1964 (b): 122). Length is not a virtue according to the Callimachean principles Horace asserts, and our poet may even be playing parodically with the concept of length in the design of his second book. While Satires Book Two is actually longer than the first book, on average its individual satires are shorter (good in Callimachean terms), the difference being made up by
consequently been placed on the relationship between the first and second books. Often passed off as an early and somewhat misguided attempt to find a voice, the Satires have been viewed as Horace at half-mast in contrast to the lyric poems’ full sail.

It is only within the final decades of the twentieth century, with the contributions made by scholars such as Zetzel, Anderson, Freudenburg and others, that the artistic depth of Horace’s Satires has begun to be appreciated. What has emerged is that the Satires are highly complex aesthetic creations and are far from merely the simple moralising tracts or autobiography that they were once assumed to be. As with all artistic works of any depth, the Satires are however essentially ‘unfinalizable’, to use a Bakhtinianism, in the sense that they are constantly open to new insights and reinterpretations. Part of the problem behind the treatment to which Horace’s Satires have traditionally been subjected, in my opinion, is that the nature of Satires has largely been misapprehended or ignored. In contrast to many previous scholars who had struggled to account for the strange transitions of Sat. 1.1, Fraenkel (for all his disparaging comments on Satires Book Two a few pages later) astutely observed that the introductory piece of the liber sermonum is designed to give the impression not of a logical tract, but of a sermo, a conversation, with excursions typical of ordinary talk: ‘In a talk it is perfectly proper to wander, or to seem to wander, from the subject under discussion and elaborate some side issue...’. This observation on the informal, conversational nature of this particular satire holds true not merely for Sat. 1.1, but for Horace’s satire in general. Although many other scholars have paid lip service to the ‘conversational’ nature of sermo, little attention has been given to the Satires precisely as conversations.

the monster Sat. 2.3 which is 326 lines long, in which Horace, using Damascippus, demonstrates how not to write Callimachean satire. Whether Horace really shows ‘signs of strain’ in his second book will hopefully be clarified in the present work by regarding the relationship between Horace’s books as a ‘dialogue’.

1 1957: 94. Fraenkel may have derived this idea from who noted of Sat. 1.1: ‘Il y a un enchaînement des idées et l’on passe de l’une à l’autre, non d’après la logique du traité ou du discours, mais d’après la logique de la conversation’ (1911: 1). Fraenkel (ibid.) thought that the reason for Horace’s use of conversational style in Sat. 1.1, apart from the fact that it is natural to his particular genre, was his intention to avoid having his speech appear too much of a formal lecture: ‘[Horace] takes great care never to give the impression of delivering a lecture or preaching a sermon: he wants to talk, as a gentleman will talk in congenial company.’
Horatian satire is not just conversation, however; more specifically, it is dialogue in a Bakhtinian sense. Conversations do not just happen on their own, but consciously possess an addressee. *Sermo* was recognised by antiquity as essentially dialogic in this sense, as Varro observed: *sermo enim non potest in uno homine esse solo, sed ubi *ratio cum altero coniuncta* - 'Conversation cannot happen with one person only, but when speech is engaged in with someone else'. Moreover, as dialogues, even where formally monologic, *sermones* do not take place in isolation, but are always a response to prior discourse and an anticipation of future discourse. Conversations are also in conversation with each other. While this is potentially true of all texts, it is particularly true of the consciously dialogic *Satires*, as we shall see.

As *sermones*, Horace's *Satires* contain dialogic elements throughout, both on a large and a small scale. On the small scale, Horace uses the tradition of the moralising 'diatribe' style, in which the satirist engages constantly in mini-dialogues with imaginary or unidentified voices. Thus in the apparently monologic moralising satires which start the first book, 'Horace' talks to Maecenas, to us, and to various fictional interlocutors. In the satires of Book One which employ this so-called 'diatribe' mode, there is in addition a patent consciousness of the relationship between speaker and addressee or audience, in the bold addressing of 'you'. As *sermo*, therefore, Horatian satire is dynamically devised to seem a 'conversation' between the satirist-speaker and a recipient-audience. The *Sermones*, as talk, are full of it.

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4 See discussion below, pp. 35ff.
5 *De lingua latina* 6.64. Although Varro was thinking of *sermo* in its general sense (his concern here was chiefly etymology - he connects *sermo* to *series*), this observation is equally applicable to the literary genre.
6 Tzvetan Todorov (1984: x) summarises this cardinal Bakhtinian idea thus: 'The most important feature of the utterance... is its *dialogism*, that is, its intertextual dimension... Intentionally or not, all discourse is in dialogue with prior discourses on the same subject, as well as with discourses yet to come, whose reactions it foresees and anticipates...'. For the definition of an 'utterance', see Bakhtin 1986: 71ff.
7 For a discussion of which see pp. 9ff below.
8 Hereafter mostly called Horace, except where the fictional nature of the speaker requires particular emphasis.
Satiric reversals as dialogue

But there is also ‘dialogue’ of a broader, intertextual nature that places between the moralising satires of Horace’s two books. Reversals, it seems, are intrinsic to satire. In Jonathan Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels*, for example, the narrator first finds himself a giant among the Lilliputians, only to be relatively reduced, in the second book, to a miniature mannikin in the kingdom of the Brobdingnagians. An analogous reversal takes place between the first and second books of Horace’s *Satires*. In the first book of *Satires*, we are confronted by a moralising personality who, as speaker from the beginning of Sat. 1.1, dominates the *liber sermonum*. The second book of *Satires*, however, sees a reversal of this trend, as most of that book has Horace retreat from the position of speaker and allow others the floor. In the satires of the second book, posed as Socratic dialogues, we hear other speakers address and converse with Horace.

In *Sat*. 2.3 and *Sat*. 2.7, the Stoic lectures of the second book, Horace’s character is not only addressed but is taken to task by two imperfect Stoic converts, the mad Damasippus and the servile Davus respectively. In harmony with the topsy-turvy world of the Saturnalia in which both appear, Damasippus and Davus are each allowed to take the floor, while Horace retreats into the role not solely of audience and interlocutor, but of the target of the satiric attack. In the Saturnalian Stoic sermons of Horace’s second book, the poet’s persona is reduced to a recipient of moralising: author becomes audience, speaker turns addressee, satirist is made target. By contrast, former targets and audiences of the moral speaker of Book One now themselves appear as moralising speakers.9

The reversals between the first and second books of the *Satires* - which, understandably perhaps, make their strongest appearance in the moralising satires, 10 where there is a part-

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9 Until recently Damasippus has been a materialistic pursuer of valuable artefacts (2.3.20-26), making him akin to the wealth-obsessed targets that the satirist has so often derided; Davus, on his own confession, has been eavesdropping on Horace’s *prior sermones* in both senses (2.7.11f), marking the slave, as I shall argue, as an unintended former ‘audience’ of the *Satires*. It is, ironically therefore, a former target of Horatian satire who impugns Horace in *Sat*. 2.3, while a former audience hauls him over the coals in *Sat*. 2.7.

10 My concept of a ‘moralising satire’ is explained below at pp. 7-8.
particularly strong element of blame and attack - comprise, I maintain, a carefully orchestrated dialogue between the two books. But it is a polemic dialogue, a retort, or an argument, that takes place between them, and the basis for this retort consists in the reversal of speaker and audience. Moreover, the conclusion is open-ended, the dialogue 'unfinalizable': while Damasippus and Davus are themselves misdirected fools,\(^{11}\) either ideologically or stylistically, scholars have often been at pains to account for the fact that at the same time much of their criticism of Horace seems to hit home. The penultimate satire of the second collection tellingly concludes with Horace irately rebuffing his interlocutor, and thus the dialogue between the moralising voices of both books ends inconclusively: Davus is an idiot, but was he right about Horace? Is it a guilty conscience we hear in Horace's gruff treatment of his slave? Is the assertive speaker of the first book really an adulterer and a hypocrite?

Questions of author and audience, satirist and target, the speaker and the spoken to, must have been of interest to Horace as satirist - or he would surely not otherwise have played with these roles so enthusiastically. Introducing the various divisions of rhetorical discourse, Aristotle had observed that 'a speech is comprised of three components, namely the speaker, the topic of discussion, and the addressee, and its aim is directed towards the last of these, I mean the listener'.\(^{12}\) Most previous scholarship on Horace's *Satires* has, however, looked chiefly at the text itself, focussing on what is said rather than on who says it or to whom it is said. Considerations of the speaker and his audience have been largely ignored in favour of content. However, as a remark by Quintilian reveals, ancient audiences were disinclined to disassociate speech from the idea of a speaker: *Nam certe sermo fingi non potest ut non personae sermo fingatur* - 'For we cannot even imagine a conversation that is not attributed to a speaker'.\(^{13}\) More recent criticism has turned to an examination of the speaker of the first book of *Satires*, on the prompting of Zetzel with regard to the *liber sermonum*, that 'one must consider the first person singular in the

\(^{11}\) Anderson 1982:46, identifies the chief speakers of Book Two as *doctores inepti*, teachers who fail to grasp the implications of their own precepts and thus end as the figures of fun.

\(^{12}\) σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς δὲν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτον ἔστι, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἄκροασθήν (Rhetoric 1358a-b).

\(^{13}\) *Inst.* 9.2.32.
book.\(^{14}\) But, as the remarks by both Aristotle and Varro quoted above suggest, *sermo* also necessarily has an addressee or audience in mind. It is my aim in this thesis to consider not only the first person in the work, but in addition the second person singular (and plural), the addressee or audience in Horace’s *Satires*, and in particular to delineate the relationship between the speakers and the spoken to in, and between, the moralising poems of both books of Horace’s *Satires*.

The present work, then, attempts to provide a reading of Horace’s moralising satires or ‘diatribes’ by viewing them against a backdrop of theories on dialogism, as presented by Mukarovsky, but in particular by Bakhtin.\(^{15}\) Although the theories of both these scholars were designed to contribute to an understanding of the modern novel, both may enable us to think creatively about satire. Moreover Roman and particularly Horatian satire is a genre strongly conscious not only of its inherent dialogism, but of its direction towards an audience as well (in Bakhtinian terms, its ‘addressivity’),\(^{16}\) so it is my intention to focus on dialogue foremost as an interaction between speaker and addressee. In addition, not only are the *Satires* conversations between speakers and their addressees, but as individual poems and as books, are engaged in an intra- and intertextual discussion among themselves. It is thus my overall intention to offer a reading of both books of Horace’s *Satires* that regards them as dialogue in a Bakhtinian and post-Bakhtinian sense. Regarded dialogically, I contend, Horace’s *Satires* may be better understood in their full artistic complexity. First however, there are issues of terminology and definition that will have to be clarified.

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\(^{14}\) 1980: 61; cf. in particular Freudenburg 1993: 3-51. Zetzel, however, in contradiction to Quintilian (see above), had spoken of the voice that starts Horace *Sat.* 1.1 as ‘disembodied’ (*id.*: 68). This has since been challenged by Freudenburg (*ibid.*).

\(^{15}\) The Russian scholar Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895-1975), on whom my approach is primarily based, cannot really be grouped with other theorists. A highly original thinker, from the outset of his career Bakhtin rejected what he saw as any form of ‘theoretism’. In addition to the three main areas of work he developed, namely, dialogism, the ‘Chronotope’, and Carnivalesque literature, Bakhtin also had much to say, in contradistinction to formal narratology, on the relationship between authors, their texts and their audiences. Where appropriate, these ideas will be included.

\(^{16}\) See p. 46 and Part 1, chapter 1, pp. 63 ff below.
Moralising satires

Since it is my intention to concentrate on the moralising 'voices' of Horatian satire, in other words the relationship between the speakers and their audiences in the moralising satires of Horace *Sermones* Books One and Two, it is necessary to define what I mean by a 'moralising' satire. All satire is in a sense 'moralising', and morals can certainly be drawn from each of the *sermones*, but by referring to a satire of Horace as 'moralising', I mean one in which the speaker holds forth specifically on ethical issues in a fashion which is intended to impugn and reform. This can be contrasted with a satire the aim of which is, ostensibly, to relate 'personal' details about the speaker (e.g. *Sat*. 1.6), or to recount an entertaining anecdote (e.g. *Sat*. 1.8), or one in which the discourse, as in the cases of Catius in *Sat*. 2.4 or Teiresias' precepts in *Sat*. 2.5, seems aimed at instructing rather than impugning or reforming. Moralising in Horace's *Satires* is dialogic in the sense that, as *sermo*, it is designed to appear addressed to someone. Moralising is accompanied in Horace's *Satires* by the so-called 'diatribe' style, as we shall see, whereby the speaker seems to engage directly with his audience in a heightened fashion, energetically condemning vice and exhorting the addressee to virtue.

Horace's 'moralising' satires are usually understood by scholars as *Sat*. 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 in the first book, and *Sat*. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.7 in the second. These satires, often referred to by scholars as the 'diatribes', are those in which the satirist, or someone else, adopts the persona of a moralist and seeks to admonish his listeners on ethical issues, railing against dissatisfaction, greed, adultery, and ambition, and so on, virulently impugning the stock figures of the miser and the adulterer, among others, and advising his addressee to eschew these deplorable modes of existence. In these satires, *sermo* sometimes comes closer to 'sermon' than to 'conversation', and at times the speaker seems to resemble a polemic revivalist rather than the rational friend he claims to be.18

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17 See e.g. Rudd: 1966.
18 See Frances Muecke (1993: 6): 'The setting may be conversational but the speaker becomes more formally didactic, adopting at times a confrontational attitude towards the fictitious representative of the audience drawn into the satire.'
It is a moralising voice that begins Horace's *Satires*, engaging dialogically with a number of other voices. As has often been observed, the first three satires of the first collection form an apparently natural (but deliberately designed) triad: all three not only treat moral-philosophical themes, but do so in a conversational fashion using the so-called 'diatribe' or dialogic monologue style. However, in spite of what has just been said, to view these satires in isolation as a closed-off unit would be wrong. The moralising mode does not just cease at the end of *Sat. 1.3*, but continues into *Sat. 1.4*, generally regarded as the first 'literary' satire of Book One. The same moralising mode, again applied to literary concerns, is picked up in *Sat. 1.10*, the second 'literary' satire of the first book, and it also appears to a lesser extent in *Sat. 1.6*, which, like 1.4, is partly moralising, partly 'autobiographical'. *Sat. 2.2*, a satire which, as I shall argue, is transitional and intermediate between certain modes of Books One and Two sees the moralising style address the dialectics of diet. In *Sat. 2.3* and *Sat. 2.7* of the second book moralising returns in the mouths of a succession of *doctores inepti*, where, as noted, speakers other than the poet's persona try on the mask of the moralist for size. The speakers, addressees and targets of moralising discourse change places in these inverted 'diatribe' satires of the second book, as dialogic roles are entirely reversed. My reason for focussing on these particular satires, apart from the usual temporal and spatial restrictions, is that Horace's 'moralising' satires of both satiric books, as defined above, comprise a distinct dialogic group, an axis connecting the first book to the second.

19 This is the general view: cf. *inter alios* Fraenkel 1957: 90; Armstrong 1964 (a): 86; Rudd 1966: 1ff etc. These are the only three satires in Book One which directly and (on the surface) exclusively address philosophical-moral concerns. One way of grouping *Satires* Book One is to see three groups of triads followed by the concluding 1.10: 1.1-3 treat moral issues, 1.4-6 are 'autobiographical', and 1.7-9 are regarded as 'anecdotal'. There are a few dissenting voices: van Rooy (1968: 41ff) would prefer to group the *Satires* into pairs, while Codoñer (1975: 41ff) excludes *Sat. 1.3* from the grouping of the 'diatribes'. Triads are not the only way to group *Satires* Book One. Concentric arrangement around *Sat. 1.5*, with links between *Sat. 4* and 6, 3 and 7, 2 and 8, 1 and 9, with 1.10 separate again as the conclusion, was suggested by Rambaux (1971: 194) and taken up by Zetzel (1980: 67). There is no need to adopt one way as the only way to view the arrangement of poems in the *liber sermonum*, as there is clearly a deliberate myriad of links and associations criss-cross-ing the first book (cf. Freudenburg 1993: 199), not to mention the links with *Satires* Book Two.

20 Freudenburg 1993: 7 n. 14, remarks that he uses the term 'diatribe' to refer to *Sat. 1.4* in addition to the first triad because literary issues are treated by the 'same fictional moralist' whom Freudenburg identifies as the speaker of *Sat. 1.1-3*. *Sat. 1.4* and *Sat. 1.10* are treated in Part 1, chapter 4 of the present thesis.

21 *Sat. 1.1-3*, *Sat. 1.10*, *Sat. 2.2*, *Sat. 2.3*, *Sat. 2.7* are the ones on which this work will focus.
The ‘diatribe’

The reader will have noticed that I have already employed the term ‘diatribe’ several times. Before proceeding to examine the potential application of dialogic theory to Horace’s *Satires*, it will be necessary to examine this concept. ‘Diatribe’ is not only a catchword often applied to Horace’s moralising satires, but in addition Horatian scholars have been among those charged with using this problematic term without due recognition of the longstanding controversy that has surrounded this word and its correct semantic use.

The consensus of mainly German-speaking scholars towards the end of the nineteenth century had defined ‘diatribe’ or rather ‘Die Diatribe’ as a genre which comprised informal popular philosophical lectures, usually treating a single ethical theme. A lively, passionate style of address, paratactic sentence construction, brief sentences, a high incidence of rhetorical questions, fictional dialogue with an imaginary adversary, *prosopopoiiiai* or personified abstractions making their appearance as interlocutors, a conversational but sometimes polemic or exhortatory tone, the feature of *spoudaiogeloion* (the characteristic Cynic mixture of seriousness and humour), *chreiae*, fables, and direct quotations from epic and tragedy, were among the features listed as indicative of this ‘genre’ (*Gattung*).

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22 Rudd (1966: 1), for example, asserts that although the first book of satires ‘contains several entertainment-pieces and some literary criticism, *its reputation must stand or fall by the diatribes* ...’ (my emphasis). Rudd’s verdict here concerns chiefly the first book of Horatian *Sermones*, but, by implication, it may extend to Horace’s second book of *Satires*. A glance at any edition of Rudd’s 1966 work *The Satires of Horace* will reveal that he identifies the ‘diatribes’ as *Sat. 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 in Horace’s first book, and Sat. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.7 in his second* (1966: 1-35f; 160-201). Rudd seems to view the ‘diatribes’ of the second book as being of similar importance, since he devotes a chapter to these too. ‘The Diatribes...’ is the only title, apart from ‘Poet and Patron’, that Rudd has twice - once in relation to the first book of *Satires* and then with regard to the second.

23 See Jocelyn 1982:3: ‘Most Hellenists now either avoid the word...or apologise for using it. Theologians...and Latinists...are less careful’.

24 Typical is Wendland (1895: 3): ‘Unter der philosophischen Diatribe verstehe ich die in zwanglosem, leichtem Gesprächston gehaltene, abgegrenzte Behandlung eines einzelnen philosophischen, meist ethischen Satzes’.

25 ‘Die Diatribe’ was later adopted as ‘the diatribe’ by equally enthusiastic English-speaking scholars who were largely to ignore the later backlash against this scholarly construct by other German scholars.
Authors variously identified as exponents of this ‘genre’ were, first and foremost, the almost legendary Bion of Borysthenes, followed by Teles, a Megarian Cynic whose work was at that time valued chiefly as the main source of Bion’s discourses.26 Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, Philo, and Maximus of Tyre were among those cited as later examples of authors of Greek ‘diatribe’ in the Roman period; sections of Lucretius De rerum natura, philosophical works of Cicero, Horace’s Satires and Seneca’s Epistles were identified as among the chief imitations of this tradition in Latin literature; influences were also sought and found in the letters of St. Paul.

The ‘Diatribe’ was regarded as linked mainly to the Cynic and Stoic schools - hence the appellation ‘kynisch-stoische Diatribe’. It was also seen by some as the literary representative of the style of address presumably employed by itinerant popular Cynic preachers, who were envisaged travelling from town to town, appealing to the emotions of the average person of the Hellenistic age, an individual whom traditional scholarship has pitied for being lost in a brave new world after the decline of the polis as the primary cultural unit of the Greek universe.27 The concept of ‘diatribe’ has never entirely shed this ‘popular philosophical’ image, despite the recent efforts of scholars to attach it to the more rarefied world of the philosophical school.28

26 Recently González (1998: 4ff) has conclusively shown that Teles has been the main victim of previous scholars’ enormous enthusiasm for Bion of Borysthenes. Over the years Teles’ reliquiae, preserved in Stobaeus, have been plundered, the text has in places been substantially altered, and Teles’ own style has been disparaged by ‘Bionaniacs’ such as Hense in search of traces of the Borysthenite’s hypothetical originals. But, as González shows, Teles’ ‘diatribes’ make more sense if Teles’ own context is considered, and the text can better be appreciated if it is not regarded merely as a vehicle for the (occasionally quoted) Bion.

27 See in particular Wendland 1912: 75-96; cf. the RAC entry of Capelle & Marrou 1957: esp. 990-992.

28 New Testament scholar Stanley Stowers has moved firmly away from the traditional ‘popular philosophical’ conception of ‘diatribe’ and argued that it should be viewed entirely within the context of the didactic activity of the philosophical school. See especially Stowers’ comments in his published thesis The Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Romans (1981: 78): ‘The diatribe is popular philosophical if popular is understood in the sense of relatively non-technical. ‘Popular philosophical’ does not imply a specific pedagogical tradition, while ‘diatribal’ does’. Stowers elsewhere defines ‘diatribe’ as a ‘term for teaching activity in the [philosophical] schools, literary imitations of that activity, or for writings which employ the rhetorical and pedagogical style of diatribes in the schools’ (1988: 73). ‘Philosophical school’ was among the primary meanings of the Greek διατριβή. But whatever the origins of the term ‘diatribe’, and whatever the contexts in which it was originally used, the fact remains that the term has come to be understood as a particular style, as we shall see, which is used in contexts far broader than ones merely seeking to imitate the instructional modes of the philosophical schools. It has often been used, for example, in legal oratory. I maintain that the so-called ‘diatribe’ stems from and applies to a broader field than Stowers allows.
There are a host of problems with the concept of ‘diatribe’, as other scholars in the early years of the twentieth century were quick to point out. The application of the name ‘diatribe’ to the type of literature described above was soon questioned. Scholars argued and have continued to argue that while the Greek word διατριβή was sometimes able to refer to verbal discourse, it was never used of a specific genre in antiquity. There were also concerns expressed as to whether the style identified as ‘diatribe’ was ever under-

29 Notably, by Otto Halbauer in De Diatribis Epicteti (1911). For a discussion of Halbauer, and for more recent criticism on Bion’s connection with the so-called ‘diatribe’, see Kindstrand 1976: 97-99.

30 The basic meaning of διατριβή, derived from the verb διατριβέω, was ‘spending time’, and the term could commonly denote a ‘delay’, a ‘haunt’, or even a ‘waste of time’ (see Liddell & Scott 1968: ad loc.). In addition, διατριβή acquired the sense of spending of time on something, in other words, it meant a pursuit or study of some kind. The term enjoyed a long association with philosophy in particular, denoting the time spent in the study or pursuit of philosophical questions, or the context in which this activity took place, the philosophical school itself. In philosophical texts διατριβαί could, in addition to its basic meanings outlined above, refer to philosophical ‘pursuits’ or ‘pastimes’. Although ‘philosophical pastimes’ usually necessarily involved ‘conversations’, and there are a few instances where διατριβαί could plausibly denote verbal activities, διατριβαί are not universally synonymous with discourse; the term is concerned primarily with the idea that time was devoted to a particular pursuit, and not strictly with the manner in which it was pursued. Instead λόγοι is the usual term for ‘discourses’. The famous example where the term seems to be used of verbal activities is at Plato Apology 37d, where Socrates speaks of τάς εἴμας διατριβάς καὶ τούς λόγους. This may comprise a case of hendiadys, and, far from being opposites or different entities, the διατριβαί (‘pastimes’) in effect may consist of talking. The use of feminine adjectives (βαρύτεραι, ἐπιφθονώτεραι) in the line immediately preceding the mention of the διατριβαί καὶ λόγοι, indicates that the διατριβαί are referred to here. Socrates is pointing out that if the Athenians find his philosophical pursuits heavy-going and intolerable, neither will any other nation be able to put up with them. That the διατριβαί that Socrates would everywhere pursue amounted to conversations (λόγοι) is suggested a little further on. Socrates explains that wherever he were to go, he would have youths coming to listen to his talk just as they do at Athens: εὖ γὰρ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι ὅποι ἄν ἐλθὼ, λέγοντος ἔμοι ἀκροαοῦντι οἱ νεοὶ ἱόνες ἀνθίζατε... (37d). From this it is clear that Socrates’ διατριβαί are of a verbal kind, and in effect amount to λόγοι. The formula διατριβαί καὶ... λόγοι recurs at Gorgias 484e as τάς ὑμετέρας διατριβάς... καὶ τοὺς λόγους, where once again the context is talking.

31 Nowhere in antiquity does διατριβή/διατριβαί appear to be associated with a formal genre, certainly not one of the popular philosophical type with which modern scholars have identified ‘diatribe’. Διατριβαί does occur several times in Diogenes Laertius as the title of a number of works attributed mostly to philosophers of the Hellenistic age and later. Authors of Διατριβαί mentioned in D.L. include Bion (2.77), Aristippus (2.85), Zeno (7.34), Persaeus (7.36), Ariston (7.163), Cleaneath (7.175), and Sphaerus (7.177). Not all works entitled as such treated ethical concerns; some were apparently erotic works (e.g. Zeno and Ariston), while others were scientific (e.g. Sphaerus’ Διατριβαί of Heraclitus). These works called Διατριβαί seem sometimes to have contained instructive anecdotes concerning other philosophers or, in the case of Arrian’s Διατριβαί of Epictetus from the Roman period, records or recreations of a philosopher’s teaching. Sometimes, they even appear to have incorporated the type of verbal style which the moderns have identified as ‘diatribe’. However, we do not possess enough extant examples of works from works called Διατριβαί to conclude that they comprised a uniform genre with a recognisable style. Even Arrian’s Διατριβαί of Epictetus, our only extant text of any length actually entitled as such, does not keep up the same level of stylistic exhortation throughout. A fragment of Zeno’s Διατριβαί preserved in Sextus Empiricus (Math. 11.190 = P.H. 3.245) has more in common with the standard Platonic dialogue than the so-called ‘diatribe’ style: ‘Have you had intercourse with your beloved one? I have not. Did you not desire to have intercourse with him? Certainly. But, though desiring to win him to yourself, were you afraid of inviting him? Not at all. But you invited him? Certainly. Then did he not yield to you? He did not.’
stood as a genre (genus) under any title in antiquity. Critics have pointed out that the stylistic devices associated with ‘diatribe’ are restricted neither to works actually titled ‘diatribes’ nor to any one type of literature. The range of writings which scholars would include under the ‘genre’ of ‘diatribe’ moreover is outrageously broad. Alarming divergences were observed between the lively style of the earlier Hellenistic ‘diatribe’, represented by Bion-Teles, and the ‘drier’ one in the later Roman period, represented by the likes of Musonius Rufus. Then, the status of Bion himself as the founder of the ‘genre’ of ‘diatribe’ was also questioned. ‘Diatribe’ scholars were accused of ‘Biomania’, because of their relentless pursuit of evidence of the Borysthenite’s influence - interpreted largely as the ‘diatribe’ style - on a host of later writers. Although Diogenes Laertius tells us that according to Eratosthenes, Bion was the first to philosophy the flowery garb of a prostitute, it has been observed that the extent of Bion’s extant writings hardly supports the idea of his ‘invention’ of a particular style or genre. Most serious, however, has been the charge that ‘diatribe’ constituted an invented genre, a construct thought up by

32 See Boyancé (1951: 307), who dismisses ‘diatribe’ as: ‘...ce genre littéraire qui veut expliquer aussi bien les Satires d’Horace que les Épîtres de saint Paul’!

33 The most infamous Διατριβαί are probably those attributed to Bion of Borysthenes at D.L. 2.77. Here Diogenes Laertius attributes a certain chreia concerning Aristippus to οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς. Debate has arisen as to the meaning of the phrase οἱ περὶ τὸν..., and by association, the question has also been raised as to whether or not Διατριβαί were identical to ὑπομνήματα, students’ or followers’ records of a philosopher’s lectures. This is the only known reference to this entity, and where he is discussing Bion himself and the works he left behind at 4.47, Diogenes fails to mention the Διατριβαί. Diogenes appears to have followed a tradition that was unsympathetic to Bion - in Diogenes’ treatment, Bion is called a ‘versatile sophist’, his servile background, his opportunistic exploitation of a sexual liaison with his master, and his colourful dilettantism are all emphasised. Since he sought to portray Bion as a rough diamond, Diogenes’ suppression of the Borysthenite’s more literary side is not impossible. He claims Bion left behind only ὑπομνήματα and ‘sayings of useful application’, but also asserts he had no followers. Perhaps Diogenes is nodding, but for our purposes, the fact that Diogenes can leave out any reference to Διατριβή where he comes to treat Bion himself must mean that this was not a recognised name of a genre in antiquity with which Bion was ubiquitously linked.

34 ...ὦς πρώτος Βίων φιλόσοφις ἄνθινα ἐνδύωσε (D.L. 4.52). This was because Bion apparently mixed together all styles of speech: διὰ δὴ οὖν τὸ παντὶ εἶδει κεκράθαι λόγου... (ibid.).

35 Refer to the comments of Kindstrand (1976: 98) in this regard: ‘...Bion cannot be considered the originator of a completely new style... Bion was not an original character... However Bion was probably a well known exponent of this style which combined rhetorical and Cynical elements in such a strange mixture and he perfected it in order to attract listeners...’.
nineteenth century scholars. Calls for the removal of the term from scholarly discourse have not been uncommon.

Those who have sought suitably ancient evidence for ‘diatribe’ as a genre have often had recourse to the late definition given by the rhetorical writer Hermogenes at Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος 5.406. However, as Barbara Wallach has shown, a closer look at the passage in which this definition occurs reveals that what is being referred to here is not a genre, but the rhetorical device of characterismos or expolitio, the character sketch. The example cited thereafter by Hermogenes, the quotation of the exordium of Demosthenes’ On the Crown, in which the character of Meidias is strongly drawn by the character, would seem to confirm this.

However, recent students of a range of literature traditionally affected by the use of ‘diatribe’ have opted to continue with the term, in many cases redefining ‘diatribe’ in the process, albeit within the bounds of its now conventional scholarly interpretation. It is almost universally conceded to be ‘useful’. Miriam Griffin, in rejecting the idea of the influ-

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36 See Miriam Griffin (1976: 13), who describes ‘diatribe’ as ‘a discovery of German scholars at the end of last century’.
37 In his series of diatribes against ‘diatribe’ to appear in the Liverpool Classical Monthly between 1979 and 1983, Jocelyn irately likens the continued use of the term by classical scholars to the need for heroin among drug addicts (1982: 6), suggests that it is an in-term designed to confuse the layperson (ibid.: ‘There are some who seize upon apparent technicisms like ‘diatribe’ in order to mystify those outside their professional group. No encouragement whatsoever should be given to such persons’), and issues a series of ultimata for its immediate disappearance from scholarly discourse (‘The term should disappear from scholarly discourse along with all other bogus antiquities which the moderns use to adorn their essays on classical literature’, 1979: 146; cf. 1983: 91, where he exhorts scholars to ‘forget about the ‘diatribe’’). Jocelyn is not the only scholar to have expressed his opposition to this term. Others have been no less scathing: Pierre Boyancé, for example, dismisses ‘diatribe’ as ce fantôme (1951: 307, in his review of Festugière’s Le dieu cosmique).
38 Inspired to find a rhetorical definition for ‘diatribe’, scholars have frequently quoted the first six words of Hermogenes’ definition (Rabe 1969: 418) to support the modern idea of ‘diatribe’ as an ethical speech: Διατριβή ἐστὶ βραχέος διανοημάτως ἥθικον ἐκτασιν, ἵνα ἐμμείνῃ τὸ ἥθος τοῦ λέγοντος ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ ἀκούοντος (‘Διατριβή is an extension of a brief notion of character, in order that the character of the speaker/that the speaker is describing remain in the mind of the listener’).
40 That Hermogenes files his Διατριβή under the heading Περὶ περιττότητος, ‘on redundancy’, and in addition under the subsection ‘redundancy in speech’, is also revealing: although used by Hermogenes in a specialised and possibly idiosyncratic sense, semantically Διατριβή here is not far off its basic usage, nor does it depart dramatically from its use at Aristotle Rhet. 1418a, where it is employed in the sense of a ‘disgression’; cf. Jocelyn 1982: 3.
41 Scholars who have found some merit in ‘diatribe’ have included Jocelyn’s LCM adversaries Nicholas Horsfall and H.B. Gottschalk (Horsfall 1979: 117; 170; Gottschalk 1982: 92; 1983: 92). These scholars
ence of a genre called διατριβή on Seneca's dialogi, nevertheless concedes: 'But it is fair to admit that Seneca's dialogi owe a great deal to a long tradition of popular philosophical writing, for whose characteristic style and themes we can reasonably retain the term Diatribe' (emphasis mine). In his commentary on Lucretius' third book, Kenney refers to 'diatribe' as a 'sub-literary genre, one of a number of such genres of a generally homiletic type'. Discussing Plutarch, D.A. Russell comments that in being used to refer to a lecture or discourse on a moral theme, marked by a combination of seriousness and humour and a certain vividness and immediacy in language, the term 'diatribe', although strictly inaccurate, has come to describe 'a distinct tradition which needs a name'. 'Diatribe' in relation to Horace's Satires, however, has its own peculiar history.

**Horace and 'diatribe'**

Because he refers to his satires (and possibly also to his epistles) as Bionei sermones at Epist. 2.2.60, and often exhibits a moralising style exploiting many of the rhetorical devices grouped under the 'genre' of 'diatribe', Horace was one of the first authors to be identified by scholars as a suitable candidate for Latin 'diatribe' in verse. Richard Heinze considered the influence of Bion of Borysthenes on Horatian satire in his 1889 thesis De Horatio Bionis imitatore, using as his starting-point Horace's famous statement: Carmine tu gaudes, hic delectatur iambis/Ille Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro - 'You rejoice in odes, someone else likes epodes;/A third likes Bion-like discussions with their black wit' (Epist. 2.2.59-60).

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have argued that, whatever the problems associated with the term, the usefulness of 'diatribe' outstrips its faults. Nisbet and Hubbard use it, although they acknowledge it to be 'a term of more convenience than precision' (1978: 2-3); D.A. Russell (1973: 29 n. 25) calls it a 'useful term'; Schmidt, likewise, in his entry on the topic in Der Kleine Pauly terms it 'zweifellos nützlich' (1967: 1577f). It was in relation to such comments that Jocelyn snorted the reply that even heroin is useful to some people (1982: 6). Griffin 1976: 14; cf. Scourfield (1993: 17 n. 73), commenting on 'diatribe' in relation to Jerome's Letter 60: 'I use the term in the broad sense, to cover a range of Hellenistic philosophical literature of a generally moralizing character'. But see, however, the more traditional approach of Barbara Wallach (1975: 14), who writes about the history of the 'genre' of 'diatribe' and of its influence on Lucretius.

42 1971: 17.
43 1973: 29 n. 25.
Heinze formulated the theory that, in distinction to Lucilius who wrote ‘satires’, Horace wrote \textit{sermones} in imitation of the \textit{dιατριβαί} of Bion: ‘Satiras scripsert Lucilius: Horatius composit sermones...quod Bionis imitantur \textit{Διατριβάς}’.\footnote{1889: 6.} Heinze assumed, as have many scholars after him, that Horace’s use of the word \textit{sermones} at \textit{Epist. 2.2.60} translated the Greek \textit{Διατριβαί}. For this the groundwork had apparently already been laid two years earlier by Usener, who in the prologue to his \textit{Epicurea}, had neatly connected the \textit{Διατριβαί} of Bion mentioned at Diogenes Laertius 2.77, \textit{sermones}, and the concept of \textit{spoudaiogeloion}: ‘Bio Borysthenita sermonibus suis (\textit{διατριβαί} nomen erat) genus cynicum severitate risuque mixtum perfecti...’.\footnote{1887: lxix.} Although Usener has often been blamed for ‘inventing’ the ‘genre’ of ‘diatribe’ at this point,\footnote{Earlier there seems to have been consensus merely that Usener was the first to make the connexion between the \textit{Διατριβαί} of Bion at D.L. 2.77 and \textit{sermones}. He is credited accordingly by Hense in the prologue to his second edition of \textit{Teletis reliquiae} (1909: lxxix-lxxx - in reference to D.L. 2.77): ‘hic ille est locus, quo sermonibus Bionicis \textit{Διατριβαῖον} nomen fuisse edocemur ut acute animadvertit Usener...’. Halbauer observes less approvingly (1911: 10-11): ‘...Usener...primus statuit Bionis Borysthenitae sermonibus \textit{Διατριβαί} nomen fuisse’, noting (ibid.) that here Usener was dependent on Diogenes Laertius 2.77. More recent scholars tend to indict Usener as the ‘inventor’ of the genre of ‘diatribe’, e.g. Miriam Griffin (1976: 13 n. 3). Jocelyn however (1982: 3) points out that this idea was ‘conceived but not elaborated’ by Usener. See also Stanley Stowers (1981: 7ff), who points out that it was Wilamowitz’s seminal work on Teles, ‘Der kynische Prediger Teles’ (1881), which was responsible for the genesis of the ‘genre’ of ‘diatribe’, although nowhere in this work does Wilamowitz call Teles ‘preaching’ ‘diatribe’. The term seems later to have attached itself to the style described by Wilamowitz, because of the connection between Bion and Teles. Scholars appear to have assumed that the records of Bion in Teles were identical to the mysterious \textit{Διατριβαί} of Bion mentioned at D.L. 2.77. Responsibility for the ‘invention’ of the ‘genre’ of ‘diatribe’, however, cannot be laid at any one scholar’s door, but seems to have been a collaborative effort, a construct that grew up.} 48 Hense (1909) and Halbauer (1911), also writing in Latin, tend to refer to \textit{διατριβαί} as \textit{sermones}, even though neither is concerned with Horatian satire.

That Horace was imitating Bion’s \textit{Διατριβαί} in his satires, and that \textit{sermo} is the Latin equivalent for the Greek \textit{διατριβή}, an idea championed by scholars in the early twentieth
century,\textsuperscript{49} is still frequently asserted in contemporary discussions of Horatian satire.\textsuperscript{50} The assumption underlying this identification is that generically, Roman satire is at least greatly influenced by, if not the actual Latin counterpart or descendant of the Greek ‘genre’ of ‘diatribe’. This is reflected in Horsfall’s ‘epigrammatic’ assertion that ‘Horace will have known the Greek for \textit{Bioneis sermonibus}...’.\textsuperscript{51} The assumption of a link between satire on the one hand and something called ‘diatribe’ on the other is also there in the rather more oblique association suggested, for example, by Rudd: ‘Many of the techniques found in the Horatian diatribes...had already been employed by Bion, and it is no wonder that in \textit{Epist. 2.2.60} Horace should have referred to his own poems as \textit{Bionei sermones}...’.\textsuperscript{52}

Horace consciously links his \textit{Satires} with Bion at \textit{Epist. 2.2.60}, even if he does so, characteristically, by way of a joke. A case can certainly be made for Horace’s imitation and parody of Bion of Borysthenes,\textsuperscript{53} as the reference to \textit{Bionei sermones} suggests, but at the same time there is no automatic and direct semantic link between the Greek term διατριβή and Latin term sermo; neither does the plural form sermones translate διατριβαι. While Horace certainly plays with characterisations inspired by Bion and although Bion himself may even have been a successful representative of a rhetorical style which scholars have labelled ‘diatribe’, it would also be wrong to view Horace as deriving all his stylistic qualities that approximate what earlier scholars identified as ‘diatribe’ - in particular, the dialogic elements of his \textit{Satires} such as the use of the imaginary interlocutor - solely from Bion of Borysthenes. What has, stylistically, been termed ‘diatribe’ in Horace is connected to a wider tradition.

\textsuperscript{49} See e.g. Fiske (1920: 117-118): ‘The term \textit{sermo} is apparently a translation of the Greek διατριβή...’.

\textsuperscript{50} Horsfall (1979: 117) notes that ‘...\textit{sermo} is a word highly suggestive of links with the Greek διατριβή’, and goes on to suggest (\textit{id.}: 118) that scholars might profitably compare Horace’s \textit{Satires} with ‘the formal elements of Greek diatribe’. The dependence of Roman satire on ‘diatribe’ has been cited in numerous general studies, e.g. Duff (1961: 28) notes that Horace’s debt to Bion and the ‘diatribes’ was ‘considerable’. The notion that sermones are equal to Διατριβαί dies hard. Recently Kirk Freudenburg in his book \textit{The Walking Muse} also reveals that he considers sermo the Latin equivalent of διατριβή. He remarks (1993: 14) that Horace calls attention to the Cynic inspiration of his \textit{Satires} by referring to them as ‘diatribes like those of Bion’ (\textit{Bioneis sermonibus}) at \textit{Ep. 2.2.60}.


\textsuperscript{52} Rudd 1966: 18.

\textsuperscript{53} Recently this has been cogently argued by Freudenburg 1993: 5, 14ff.
Reconsidering 'diatribe'

The positivist trends in scholarship which started this trouble with 'diatribe' in the first place meant that students of a wide range of literature were not content merely to identify similarities between various texts, but were compelled to assign these to a genre and to ascribe them to the influence of a founder. In this, however, they went beyond what the ancient evidence would allow. It seems that what they were finding was instead a collection of rhetorical features that were common to a variety of related literary forms. They are generally forms which in some way - be they through the semblance of direct or epistolary conversation - mirror an exhortatory address mode and which retain, in their imitation of this address, a significant dialogic element.

In 1969 Helmut Rahn made an important contribution to the debate by suggesting that the 'diatribe' style comprised not so much an independent genre, but was a form which appears only in other genres as something 'diatribal' (diatribenartiges). By suggesting an adjective to replace a noun to describe this style, Rahn highlights a significant aspect of our problem, in that the continued use of the noun 'diatribe' reinforces the idea of a definitely delineated genre. While part of the problem is indeed the name 'diatribe', I would suggest that much too much ink has been spilt over the question of the suitability of this title. We have already seen that it was misinterpreted and inaccurately applied by scholars. However, whatever striking innovations many scholars have suggested to replace the term 'diatribe', when they come to discuss particular texts, it usually turns out that there is great uniformity as to how they view the concept. Recent replacements have included the use of the term 'monologistic dialogue' to describe more precisely the mode of imag-

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54 The 'diatribe', comprising as it does the recreation of a direct relationship between speaker and recipient, adapts well to the epistle. As such it is also frequently employed by Seneca who, although later than Horace, is another example of a writer who employs this style in the tradition of moral-philosophic writing.

55 Rahn (1969: 156): 'Morphologisch ist die literarische Erscheinung 'der Diatribe' als literaturwissenschaftlicher Begriff schwer faßbar und unergiebig; denn über den von uns betrachteten gesellschaftlichen Rahmen hinaus ergibt sie keine einheitliche Literaturform. Sie verbindet sie nur mit anderen literarischen Formen als etwas erlebnishaft 'Diatribenartiges'. He notes (ibid.) that the 'diatribal' elements in Horace's 'Diatriben-Satiren' differ from those in Seneca's philosophical discourses.
inary conversation with an interlocutor and other conversational aspects of the style. 56 There might be an equally valid argument for 'dialogistic monologue'. Both these terms are useful in that they describe what scholars have meant by 'diatribe'. However, an equally useful approach would be to consider how the term 'diatribe' has come to be used in practice, in our case, in relation to Horace's Satires.

'Diatribe' in Horace's Satires: a descriptive model

'Diatribe' tends nowadays to be used in a number of ways in relation to Horatian satire. Used loosely, it may apply to a broad tradition which is assumed to have influenced Horatian satire, as we have seen. It may also describe a moralising satire in a manner roughly equivalent to its English synonyms 'sermon' or 'homily'. In this way 'diatribe' is used by Horatian scholars to distinguish generally moralising satires such as the first triad 57 from 'anecdotal' ones such as 1.8, or 'autobiographical' ones such as 2.6, or from 'literary' satires such as 2.1. However, in relation to Latin satire, 'diatribe' has in addition evolved a specific, technical meaning: not only can it refer to satires which tend to be moralising as a whole or which consist largely of moralising, but it is also capable of referring to the style or mode that is typical in particular of the sermon satires. In the introduction to her commentary on Horace Satires Book Two, Frances Muecke points out that 'in Latin literary history the term 'diatribe' has acquired a special meaning'. 58 She notes that the 'diatribe-style' may be found in a range of genres, is characterised by 'concrete language and vivid imagery' and has a 'quasi-dramatic element in that it is addressed directly to the listener and at times incorporates the rejoinders of an imaginary interlocutor'. By pointing out that this is a specialised meaning, Muecke suggests that while this use of the term to apply to a particular style is historically inaccurate, it must be acknowledged that this is how the term has come to be used by classical philology in relation to Horatian satire. 59

56 See May 1990: 177f.
57 E.g. Wimmel 1962: passim; Rudd 1966: 1ff.
59 The use of the word may have altered since the time of antiquity, but so have other terms by which we identify a number of ancient literary concepts - epic, lyric, and satire are examples of literary terms which are all used nowadays in a much broader manner than that in which the ancients knew their equivalents.
This parallels that other usage of the term ‘diatribe’ that has developed in contemporary English, as a ‘tirade’, a ‘polemic speech’ or ‘virulent treatise’. This usage in English has possibly not only been influenced by classicists’ (mis)appropriation of the term, but may itself in turn have influenced scholarship. The continued use of the term ‘diatribe’ particularly in English in an ever more specific sense, alongside classicists’ adaptation of the terminology to their own ends, has coloured particularly English speaking scholars’ understanding of the application of the term, encouraging them to view a ‘diatribe’ as a polemic sermon. This is now complicated by the possibility of referring to Horace’s sometimes rather polemic tone with his adversary as diatribe in its English semantic sense, without necessarily implying anything about the piece’s lineage or style.

Rather than discarding the technical term ‘diatribe’ entirely, I suggest that we continue to use it but explain its application, particularly in relation to Horace. For practical purposes it seems reasonable that the term ‘diatribe’ should continue to refer to the style with

60 Although ‘diatribe’ is found in English in this polemic sense only from the nineteenth century, the word made appearance in English as early as the sixteenth century. First appearing as ‘diatriba’, which suggests that the term was introduced into English via Latin rather than Greek, it is cited by the OED as early as 1581 in the sense of ‘a discourse, disquisition, critical dissertation’. See e.g. OED 1989: ad loc.: J. Bell Haddon’s Answ. Osor. 246b ‘I heare the sounde of an Argument from the Popish Diatriba’ (1581). These early examples of the term’s use in English lack the virulence of its later semantic development as ‘a dissertation or discourse against some person or work; a bitter and violent criticism; an invective’. The use of ‘diatribe’ in the polemic sense appears to have begun in the early nineteenth century, and although in some cases they appear to refer to earlier polemic ‘diatribes’, this shade may have been attached later, see e.g. OED ibid.: Cunningham Brit. Paint. II. 132: ‘On the appearance of this bitter diatribe in 1797’ (1830); Kingsley Alt. Locke xxviii; ‘A rambling, bitter diatribe on the wrongs and sufferings of the labourers’ (18-50); Thackeray Newcomes II. 293: ‘Breaking out into fierce diatribes’ (1854); Morley Carlyle Crit. Misc. Ser. 1. (1878) 201: ‘The famous diatribe against Jesuitism in the Latter-Day Pamphlets’ (1877). In modern English usage the meaning of ‘diatribe’ seems increasingly to have moved in the direction of extreme polemicism: ‘a piece of bitter criticism; invective, denunciation’. (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1976: ad loc.). In contemporary English the term ‘diatribe’ moreover now has a distinctly derogatory tone, with a sense equivalent to ‘abuse, castigation, criticism...harangue,... tirade, verbal onslaught, vituperation’ (The Collins Thesaurus 1990: ad loc.). The term is often used to dismiss political opinions as vehement extremism, implying that a particular discourse is irrationally heated and overly polemic. e.g. J. Bumenthal of the Zionist Revisionist Organization, Johannesburg, in a letter to The Star Friday January 19 1996 p. 8: ‘Apart from this positive statement, the rest of Lutchka’s long diatribe is nothing but hot air’. It is worth mentioning that other modern language equivalents of ‘diatribe’ tend to mean a ‘lecture’ or ‘treatise’ rather than a specifically virulent tirade.

61 Cf. Russell (1973: 29 n. 25), who observes that the ‘connotations of English diatribe confuse the issue’.

62 I prefer to use quotation marks around the term as a reminder of its historical inaccuracy, to keep in mind that ‘diatribe’ is not necessarily identical to ancient texts which went by the name of Διατριβή. Cf. Schmeller 1985: passim; Muecke 1993: 6ff & passim.
which it has historically, albeit inaccurately, become entwined. Nevertheless, we should redefine what earlier scholars identified as a genre: ‘diatribe’ should be viewed as a *mode*, a collection of stylistic devices that together create a certain effect in a text, rather than as a formal ‘genre’.63 This allows for a grouping of devices across generic bounds, which in combination create a certain effect. Of course a number of what are now recognised as genres (including the novel) went unregarded by much of antiquity, and we may be challenged to change our concept of what constitutes a genre. However, particularly given the extent of ‘diatribe’ mania in classical scholarship in the past, it is important to state that ‘diatribe’ was not recognised as a formal genre *in antiquity*.64 Because, as Rahn notes, it appeared only in combination with other genres, what scholars termed ‘diatribe’ was not an independent type of literature, but an exhortatory mode which might appear in a number of related genres. In relation to Horace’s *Satires*, I find the reconstructed term ‘diatribe’ convenient both to refer to the stylistic mode and to describe a moralising satire or, within a satire, a moralising speech which employs this mode extensively.

**The imaginary interlocutor**

‘Diatribe’, rightly or wrongly, has come to be understood to comprise a vivid exhortatory style, in which a moralising speaker directly addresses an audience. The dialogic effect of this direct relationship between speaker and audience is joined by other mini-dialogues within an overarching monologue structure of moral exhortation.65 Typically the speaker

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63 Fowler (1982: 107): ‘...a mode announces itself by distinct signals, even if these are abbreviated, unobtrusive, or below the threshold of modern attention. The signals may be of a wide variety: a characteristic motif, perhaps; a formula; a rhetorical proportion or quality...’. For the differences between mode and genre, mode and subgenre, see Fowler (*id.*: 106-129); cf. Gerhart (1989: 371): ‘Genres constitute virtual systems of modes...’; I note that González (1998: 1 n. 1) comes to a similar conclusion about ‘diatribe’.

64 As we shall see later, if viewed instead from a Bakhtinian perspective, the ‘diatribe’ could indeed be regarded as part of a generic group that went unrecognised by antiquity. In a Bakhtinian sense, ‘diatribe’, Roman satire, and other forms are all members of a dialogic and alternative group of genres in opposition to antiquity’s formal generic pantheon.

65 It has long been recognised that the dialogic elements of this mode are central to its character (see e.g. Bultmann 1910: 10ff), and it is the intention of this study to highlight these aspects. As an exposition which uses dialogic elements, even imaginary ones, to convey a point, the style of the so-called ‘diatribe’ is related to the Platonic dialogue, where the response or level of contribution of the interlocutor may be very limited indeed. But there are differences between the ‘diatribe’ and the formal dialogue on the Platonic model. This has been complicated by the fact that a number of scholars have claimed that the ‘diatribe’ is derived ultimately from the Platonic dialogue itself. See esp. Norden 1909: 129 & n. 1, who referred to ‘diatribe’ as a
will exploit the rhetorical device of the imaginary interlocutor (*adversarius fictivus*), often appearing to be addressing someone else in the midst of his talk, and often firing a series of questions, interspersed with rebukes, at this fictive addressee. The device of the imaginary or indefinite interlocutor is one of the most striking features of the type of style that modern scholars have labelled ‘diatribe’. This fictional third party may be a straw figure representing the type of sinner that the moralist is seeking to show up, or may simply be a deluded representative of common opinion; within a didactic context, the interlocutor may also be imagined as a student whose ignorance the master wishes to correct.

The device of the imaginary interlocutor contributes significantly to the prominent dialogic element in the ‘diatribe’ mode. This figure is brought into the dialogue for the express purpose of being refuted and through this to allow the argument to progress: the main speaker is thereby enabled to treat and dismiss any potential objections to his mission in a dramatic manner. Whether the imaginary interlocutor stands for the great unwashed or for misguided disciples whom the speaker is taking to task, the device is commonly signalled either by a striking apostrophe or questioning of the interlocutor by the main speaker; the interlocutor’s ideas may also characteristically be introduced by the formula ‘someone might say...’ or ‘perhaps someone/people will say ...’; or the inter-

*Nebenform* of dialogue, and traced its development from various types of Socratic dialogue, particularly to those instances where Socrates is made to depart from Plato’s usual conversational format and instead addresses an imaginary opponent, often employing elaborate arguments against him. There is clearly an overlap between the two forms, and in many cases the distinction between one and the other is artificial: it is not in every case clear, particularly with fragmentary works, whether the writer is having an imaginary exchange merely for the purpose of making a point, or whether a true dialogue in the sense of a debate or conversation between two independent characters is taking place. Even the Platonic dialogues as literary works employ a fictive context, and the interlocutor is frequently reduced to nothing more than a yes-man interrupting the main discourse at appropriate intervals. However, as Hirzel pointed out (1895: 369 n. 2; 374-5 n. 5), ‘diatribe’ is closer to an address than a conversation. As a ‘dialogic monologue’, ‘diatribe’ is essentially a monologue style which employs dramatically fictive dialogic elements to enliven and propel its argument. Whereas in the Platonic dialogue, the adversary, however vaguely sketched, is usually a personality who, for the dramatic purposes of the piece, we are asked to envisage as being there in the flesh, in the so-called ‘diatribe’ mode however the imaginary interlocutor is often blatantly a stock type, or represents something as general as ‘public opinion’, or is a *prosopopoeia*, a personification of an abstract concept (Poverty, Nature, and so on) with whom the speaker imagines he is arguing or calling upon to support him in his argument. These peculiarities will be clearer once we have examined the ‘diatribal’ device of the imaginary interlocutor.
locutor may simply be made to interrupt the main speaker without invitation, like the seemingly independent interjections of a ventriloquist’s dummy.

This device is found in a wide range of moralising or philosophically instructive texts, or in texts which imitate a moralising or didactic mode, including Horace’s Satires. The inspiration for Horace’s use of this dialogic style may well have been his predecessor Lucilius, who appears occasionally to have used the device of a talking adversary. This can be seen for example at 1035 Marx (= 1075 Warmington): nunc, Gai, quoniam incilans nos laedis, vicissim - ‘Now, Gaius [i.e. Lucilius], since you harm us with your verbal la- shings, in turn...’, where the speaker is evidently not Lucilius. However, because of the fragmentary nature of our knowledge of Lucilius, it is difficult to study the entire context in which a device such as this would occur. We will gain more from looking at two other examples of moralising texts which utilise the imaginary adversary device. The texts referred to below are merely samples of the so-called ‘diatribe’ style, and there are many others which could equally well have been chosen. We are also not to assume that Horace was specifically imitating any of the following; he merely uses similar rhetorical dialogic techniques in his Satires.

The first part of Teles’ On Exile (Περὶ Φυγῆς) takes a form similar to a Platonic dialogue, with an interlocutor giving brief answers throughout such as ὅδε (3-4) or ὅότε τούτο (4-5) or καὶ μάλα (7). However, later the main speaker, defending the case of exiles, uses what scholars have understood as the ‘diatribe’ style - he employs a straw figure interlocutor in order to voice what is presented as common opinion concerning exile, only to re-

66 That the combination of indictment and protreptic typical of these lively exchanges with the fictive adversary are at home in moralising texts should not, as I cautioned earlier, lead us to conclude that all such texts therefore comprise an independent and uniform genre. What has been defined as ‘diatribe’ is hardly ever sustained throughout an entire speech or work, but rather appears as a mode into which the narrator slides when it is appropriate. The vividness of the device of the imaginary exhortatory conversation is merely particularly at home and effective in a moralising or protreptic type of discourse, the aim of which is to correct what are viewed as false assumptions. This does not mean, however, that the device could not be used in a different context, for example, to argue a point in a legal context that has (as nearly always) a strong ethical undertone, or to argue a point that is not particularly moral, or for literary purposes, or for the purposes of parodying moralising texts; the device of the imaginary interlocutor merely fitted the persuasive perlocution of ancient moralising texts especially well.

67 Hense 1909: 22.
ject these sentiments.\textsuperscript{68} That the device of the imaginary interlocutor, symbolic of popular opinion, rather than a Platonic-type interlocutor, is being used here is indicated by φασίν - 'they/people say...'. This fictional, indefinite group is made to express the commonly held unfavourable opinions about exile which the narrator seeks to correct. The speaker then responds with a set of energetic questions by which he seeks to set matters to right. When, a few lines below this, the interlocutor retorts: \textit{“All’ εν γε τῇ ἰδίᾳ οὐκ ἄρχουσιν οἱ φυγάδες - But exiles do not rule in their own country’}, this is clearly a continuation of the previous argument, likewise attributed to popular opinion, and therefore it is also to be viewed as issuing from the imaginary interlocutor. After the main speaker has replied to this objection,\textsuperscript{69} subsequent reprisals also occur.\textsuperscript{70}

Latin authors, especially those with a philosophical or moral agenda, also employ this device of the imaginary interlocutor. Cicero employs it in his \textit{Paradoxa Stociorum}, where he engages in a lively exhortatory style, often betraying the impression of a direct relationship between himself as speaker and his putative addressee. For example in his discussion of \textit{Paradoxon 3}, namely that all sins are equal, as are all good deeds (\textit{Aequalia esse peccata et recte facta}), he anticipates an objection from an indefinite interlocutor: '\textit{Nihilne igitur interest} (nam hoc dicet aliquis) \textit{patrem quis necet, an servum?} Nuda

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{id.: 23. οὐκ ἄρχουσι, φασίν, οὐ πιστεύουσι, οὐ παρρησίαν ἔχουσιν. ἔνιοι δὲ γε καὶ φρουροῦσι τὰς πόλεις παρὰ βασιλεῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ στρατὸν, καὶ ἐπὶ λαμπρὰς μεγάλας καὶ συντάξεις λαμπρὰς. Λυκίνου ἐκέεινος οὖν ἐφαρμόζει φυγάς ὦν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας, πιστεύουσαν μονον. Αὐτικόνως, καὶ τὸ προστατῆμον ἐν τῇ ἴδιᾳ μένοντες; Ίππομεδέουν ὁ Δακεδαμιὸν ὁ νῦν ἐπὶ Θράκης καθεσταμένος ὑπὸ Πτολεμαίου, Χρεμονίδης καὶ Γλαύκων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πάρεδροι καὶ σύμβουλοι; ἵνα μῆ τὰ παλαιὰ σοι λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμᾶς. - ‘[Exiles] do not rule,’ people say, ‘They are not trusted; they do not have the right of free speech.’ But some are guards over cities for kings, and are placed in positions of trust over the nations, and they receive huge gifts and quotas. Didn’t that fellow Lycinus, an exile from Italy, act as guard for us, since he was held in trust by Antigonus, and didn’t we perform what Lycinus ordered us even though we remained in our own country? Hasn’t Hippomedon the Spartan who is now in Thrace been successful under Ptolemy, and aren’t Chremes and Glaucon the Athenians his assistants and advisers (to tell you nothing of the olden days, but only of our present age)?...’

\textsuperscript{69} Here the speaker answers the imaginary interlocutor’s new assault by pointing out that neither do women nor young men nor the old enjoy full rights in their native lands, and then follows this up by responding with a further salvo of questions (Hense \textit{id.: 24}).

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{id.: 25}. 
Here the speaker imagines that someone (aliquis) will question his argument. The attribution of this question to an indefinite, imaginary interlocutor enables the speaker to address, in a dramatic and vivid manner, the possible pitfalls of the dogma he is treating. The question shades what is really a potential objection to the Stoic paradox that all sins are of equal weight and deserve equal punishment, namely that there must be some distinction between patricide, universally recognised as a great evil, and the killing of a slave. The speaker is very level-headed and unexcitable in addressing this objection, but a few lines down he waxes livelier and uses an active questioning mode in goading and responding to the interlocutor. Soon the foolish objections of the adversary are summarily squashed by his energetic interrogative sallies.

This mode is also paralleled in Horace’s Satires, although in a more sophisticated and perhaps parodic form. The adaptation of this vivid protreptic style to poetry had already been affected by Lucretius in his De Rerum Natura, particularly in his ‘Diatribe against the fear of death’ (3.830-1094), and may have also appeared in the verse of Horace’s

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71 'Is there no difference,' (someone will certainly ask this) ‘between someone who kills his father, or a slave?’ If you put these questions so plainly, they are such as are not easily able to be decided upon... (Paradoxa Stoicorum 3.24).

72 The speaker deals with the objection calmly, explaining firstly that killing a father is not always wrong as, for example, in a siege situation, death may be preferable to slavery, but finally (25), he gets out of the difficult corner by pointing out that in killing a slave one is only killing one individual, but in killing a father one is not only killing a man but someone who gave one life.

73 Histrio si paulum se monuit extra numerum, aut si versus pronuntiatus est syllaba una brevior aut longior, exsilabatur et exploditur: tu in vita - quae omni gestu moderatior, omni versus aptior esse debet - in syllaba te peccare dices? poetam non audio in nugis, in vitae societate audiam civem digitis peccata dimetientem sua? 'Si visa sint breviora, leviora videantur? ' Qui possint videri cum, quidquid peccatur, perturbatione peccetur rationis atque perturbata aequam semel ratione et ordine, nihil possit addi quo magis peccari posse videatur? - 'If an actor makes an the slightest movement out of step or recites a metric line that is too short or too long by a single syllable, he is booted off the stage. In your role in life - which should be more controlled than any stage gesture, more regulated than any metre - will you plead that you were only a syllable wrong? I do not listen to a minstrel who is only slightly out of tune, shall I pay attention to a citizen who, in life’s associations, measures his wrong acts by the length of his fingers? ‘If they look smaller, aren’t they that much lighter?’ How could they look so, when every wrong action throws reason and order into confusion, and once reason and order are in confusion, nothing can be added to make the wrong action look more wrong?' (Paradoxa Stoicorum 3.26; trans. & text Wright 1991: 89ff).

74 See Wallach 1975, 1976 for an analysis of this; but cf. Schützulpf (1998: 345-351) for objections to defining this part of Lucretius DRN Book 3 as a simple ‘diatribe’ in the way that this term has usually been understood. Schützulpf observes (id.: 349-350) that Lucretius’ adaptations of so-called ‘diatribe’ rhetorical devices are far more sophisticated than has hitherto been recognised. In his changes of perspective and in
satiric predecessor Lucilius, as we have seen. Horace's first satire, in which the speaker moralises about greed, utilises the device of the fictive interlocutor in its central sections, where the narrator has an imaginary interview with a stock miser-figure. This imaginary interlocutor is made to voice the general opinions of society concerning wealth, the lines that are clearly to be assigned to the figure of the miser contradicting the arguments of the main speaker.

Not all of the retorts are attributed to the figure of the miser, however, as public opinion (identified as bona pars hominum, 61) is also shown to be in the forefront of the targets whom it is the speaker's task to correct. That the little voice of the miser figure merges so effortlessly with that of the 'majority of humankind' reveals his universal and indefinite nature as a device, rather than as a character with an independent personality. At the end of their interview, after Horace has finished attacking miserly greed, the interlocutor is made to ask inanely if this means he must act the spendthrift instead: 'quid mihi suades? ut vivam Naevius aut sic lut Nomentanus?' (101-102). This misunderstanding on the part of the interlocutor is soon put right by the main speaker who, appealing to the ideal of the Mean, warns the interlocutor not to go to the opposite extreme (102-107). The fictional interlocutor is portrayed as characteristically rather dim and easily misled. Dramatically, this enables the speaker to foreshadow and thus treat all possible objections to his moralising discourse, however extreme or silly.

'Diatribe' and modern theory

As a rhetorical form, the so-called 'diatribe' or 'monologistic dialogue', with its continuous interruptions of other speakers, is a mode which is essentially a hybrid of or a

The characterisation of his addressees (id.: 350), Lucretius goes way beyond straightforward 'diatrial' exchanges. In this Lucretius is clearly an inspiration for Horace's equally complex adaptations of this mode. When asked by the speaker what use there is in piling up a stock of grain, the miser replies: 'quod si comminuas vilem ad assem' - 'But if you break it up it will dwindle to a worthless amount' (Sat. 1.1. 43). The speaker responds with a question: at ni id fit, quid habet pulchri constructus acervus? - 'But if this is not done, what attraction is there in the accumulated pile?' (44), and continues this line of reasoning until, exhorted by another question, the miser is forced to reply: 'at suave est ex magno tollere acervo' - 'But it's sweet to take from a large heap' (51).
form that is intermediate between monologue and dialogue. Aristotle expounded theories on dialogue and monologue, and Roman rhetorical theorists certainly acknowledged the inherent dialogism of the imaginary interlocutor device, identifying it sometimes with the figure of *sermocinatio*, sometimes with similar figures. However, none of these theories appears to have described the ‘diatribe’ mode sufficiently, or to have encapsulated both its dialogic and exhortatory characteristics - hence, perhaps, the modern controversy. It is important to note, moreover, that the ‘diatribe’ style, as it is adapted to Horace’s *Satires*, is only one aspect of a broader dialogism within the work as a whole (comprising both books). We will need a theory that is able to embrace Horace’s use of the dialogic both on the large and the small scale. The ‘diatribe’ mode and other dialogic aspects of the *Satires* could, in my opinion, prove more interesting and useful if studied against a backdrop of

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76 In his *Poetics* (1448a) Aristotle had made a distinction between dialogue, monologue and a mixture of the two the third way in which *mimesis* might be divided into types. The combination of a narrative and monologue mode, he suggested, characterised the narrative mode of epic, where the author spoke but also attributed speech to characters in the story beside his own authorial persona (‘just as Homer does,’ says Aristotle). This was distinguished from a continuous narrative, on the one hand, and pure dialogue, on the other. Dialogue, the direct enactment of all the roles, whereby the poet did not usually intrude into the action at all, but allowed everything to be communicated by the actors, dominated drama: ‘Ετι δε τουτων τριτη διαφορα τω ως έκκοσα τουτων μιμησιατο αν τις και γαρ των αυτως και τα αυτα μιμεοθαι εστιν οτε μεν απαγγελλοντα, ή έτερον τι γινομην ονσερ Ομηρος ποιει ή ως τον αυτων και μη μεταβαλλοντα, ή παντας ως πραττοντας και ένεργουντας ττους μιμουμενοιτ. - ‘And in addition to these there is a third distinction, that is the mode (lit. the ‘how’) in which each is represented. For within the same media it is possible to represent the same things by means of narration combined with the insertion of the speech of another character, as Homer does, or with narration without changing to another character, or with all the parties enacting and performing their roles’. However, the ‘dialogic monologue’ or ‘diatribe’ mode is clearly something other than just one of these three Aristotelian possibilities - the mixed form being the likeliest candidate - in that, in ‘diatribe’ mode, quoted speech does not only occur in the discourse, but is actually engaged dialogically by the narrator. In his *Rhetoric* (1368a) Aristotle is also frustratingly reticent about the ‘blame’ variety of epideictic rhetoric, with which many past scholars hoped to categorise ‘diatribe’. While traditional ‘diatribists’ would claim that this is because Aristotle pre-dated the development of the ‘diatribe’, later theorists are even more disappointing: cf. e.g. Diogenes Laertius’ lame definition of dialogue as ‘a discourse consisting of question and answer’ (3.48).

77 The *Ad Herennium* (4.65) categorises the device of the imaginary interlocutor as belonging to the broad figure of *sermocinatio* which ‘consists in assigning to some personality language and which as set forth goes with his character’: *Sermocinatio est cum alciui personae sermo adtribuitur et is expontum cum ratione dignitatis...* In a subcategory, *sermocinationes consequenties* (ibid.) are ‘hypothetical dialogues’, attributed to absent interlocutors: *Sunt ieiem sermocinationes consequentes, hoc genus: Namquid putamus illos dicturos si hoc indicaris? Nome omnes hac vienur oratione?* - *deinde subicere sermonem. Conformatio (= prosopopolia) however (4.66), consists of representing an absent person as present, or in making an inanimate or abstract thing speak, and attributing to it a definite form and language or a certain behaviour appropriate to its character: *Conformatio est cum aliqua quae non adest persona confingitur quasi adsit, aut cum res muta aut formis fit eloquens, et forma et oratio adtribuitur ad dignitatem accommodata aut actio quaedam...* Quintilian, however (9.2.29ff), recognises conversations with personifications of abstract concepts (*fictiones personae or προσωποποιηται*) and imaginary conversations with men (called *sermocinationes* by some, he remarks) as belonging to the same category (9.2.31-32).
two representatives of modern theory. Theories on dialogue advanced by the Czech scholar Jan Mukarovsky and, more significantly, the Russian Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, will go a long way towards clarifying the quintessentially dialogic nature of the ‘diatribe’ mode and of the moralising Satires generally. While Bakhtin’s ideas are far more influential than those of Mukarovsky, and derive from a fundamentally different philosophical viewpoint, one that was hostile to formal linguistic approaches, Mukarovsky’s ideas are nevertheless a useful starting point.  

Mukarovsky: monologue and dialogue

It has been remarked that, prior to Bakhtin’s reception in the West, comparatively few modern theorists had turned their attention to the questions of dialogue and dialogism. Mukarovsky however explored the dialogue-monologue interface in an essay, Two Studies of Dialogue (1940, republished 1977). In their broadest sense, Mukarovsky noted, dialogue and monologue are functional languages found in all human utterance presupposes at least two subjects, the one from whom the utterance or ‘linguistic sign’ proceeds (the speaker), and the one to whom this sign is addressed (the listener).

For linguistics, as Mukarovsky points out, monologue means ‘an utterance with a single
active participant regardless of the presence or absence of other passive participants. In a monologue, one of the subjects is 'constantly active, the second constantly passive'. Dialogue on the other hand comprises the alternation of the passive and active participants in the utterance. Viewed in terms of traditional linguistics, Horace's first triad of satires and most others of the first book, although formally addressed to Maecenas, are therefore strictly speaking monologue, in that the addressee himself is entirely passive. In terms of traditional linguistics too, in the satires of Horace's second book full dialogue can be viewed as coming into its own, as there entire satires are couched as interactions between Horace and other speakers. However, things are not quite so simple, as we shall see.

While the French scholar Gustave Tarde had argued that monologue was the original form of human speech, the idea of the primacy of dialogue, by contrast, was raised in 1923 by L.P. Yakubinsky (also sometimes spelt Jakubinskij), who saw dialogue as the basic and ‘natural’ member of this pair of linguistic oppositions. Monologue, Yakubinsky argued, is the ‘artificial superstructure of dialogue’. Yakubinsky pointed out that while interruption is a universal human tendency, a response to another's speech, monologue tends to take place only after certain conditions have been met to make the situation an ‘artificial’ one. Monologue is something that takes place in controlled environments,

82 Id.: 83 n.1.
83 Ibid.
84 Id.: 96.
85 Sat. 1.9 treats us to dialogue in part, although the whole event with the bore is also narrated by the poet's character as single speaker.
86 In an essay in 1922 Tarde envisaged a picture of early humans listening in stunned silence while a few elders with a 'special gift' held the monopoly of speech and verbal communication, comprising orders handed down from patriarchs to their chattels (Tarde 1922: 9, 92; cit. Mukarovsky 1977: 83). This is an improbable theory, as Mukarovsky remarks (1977: 85), given that the orders issued by fathers and chiefs are in fact themselves 'dialogues in which the replies are extralinguistic acts - compliance with the commands'. I find Tarde's an unlikely theory particularly since even in the animal kingdom, organisms will communicate with each other in a 'dialogic' fashion by means of sound, gestures and other signs.
87 Yakubinsky points out that society has to conspire in order to grant certain individuals the power and the privilege of a monologic utterance: 'Every unilateral action, insofar as it belongs to human perception, evokes in us a number of more or less strong reactions which strive to reveal themselves...In order for people to listen to a monologue certain secondary conditions are usually necessary, for example, the organization of a meeting with the order of the speakers, the yielding of the floor, the chairman, and nevertheless 'voices from the audience' are always heard...Dialogue which is without doubt a 'cultural'
and is often performed by those possessing hierarchical power - if not, the individuals have at least to be granted or to assume temporary power for themselves.\textsuperscript{88} It is Horace's own character-speaker who, for example, grants his slave Davus the opportunity to speak his monologue at the start of the Saturnalian \textit{Sat. 2.7: Narr!} - 'Speak!', he commands.

Monologue and dialogue are ultimately, however, not exclusive forms. As Yakubinsky noted, of the two varieties of speech, monologue, as the 'artificial' form, is constantly in danger of being eroded into dialogue, as responses from the audience are sometimes involuntarily drawn.\textsuperscript{89} Likewise Tarde observed that dialogue too may be destabilised by a tendency of one of the speakers to attempt to gain the upper hand and dominate the exchange - the monologic tendency of dialogue.\textsuperscript{90} Therefore, just as monologue has a tendency toward dialogization, so dialogue may contain within it a trend toward monologization. Rather than seeing one form as dominant, however, Mukarovsky envisaged a constant state of tension and competition between monologue and dialogue, noting: 'The relation between monologue and dialogue can be characterized rather as a dynamic polarity in which sometimes dialogue, sometimes monologue gains the upper hand according to the milieu and the time'.\textsuperscript{91} Likewise 'monologue and dialogue are simultaneously present in the speaker's consciousness in every speech act and are still struggling for dominance in

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\textsuperscript{88} Regarded in this fashion, the written text is also a type of monologue in that, even where a group has composed a work, the 'author' is also the single controlling voice of the text and its recipients are not always in a position to communicate their responses to the writer. The dialogic theory, on the other hand, would present texts as engaging in 'dialogue' with each other in that they always have a putative addressee (or else are aware of potential audience in the future), and are written either in response to a certain ideology or else they seek to provoke a response in other texts, i.e. intertextuality.

\textsuperscript{89} Yakubinsky \textit{ibid}. A good example of this would be a parliamentary debate, where speakers are continuously losing their monologic privilege to hecklers: democracy is essentially dialogic.

\textsuperscript{90} '...ordinarily the influence exerted by one of the speakers over the other or others is predominant and reduces that of the latter to almost nothing', Tarde 1922: 146, \textit{cit}. Mukarovsky 1977: 110. Mukarovsky remarks that Plato's dialogues are a good example of this. One of the speakers may gain the upper hand over the others, says Mukarovsky, for various reasons, but 'the one who does so 'always embodies the tendency toward the monologization of dialogue' (\textit{ibid}). (Contrast Bakhtin's views on the Platonic or 'Socratic' dialogue, as he terms it, discussed below, pp. 39-40.)

\textsuperscript{91} 1977: 85.
the very course of this act’. 92 This tension between the tendency toward a monologic utterance on the one hand, and dialogic one on the other, can clearly be seen in the ‘diatribe’ mode which, although strictly linguistically speaking, is a monologue, also demonstrates a distinct trend toward dialogization. Its alternative modern descriptive titles ‘monologic dialogue’ or ‘dialogic monologue’ are witnesses to this ambiguity.

Mukarovsky notes that there are at least three prerequisites which are the main and essential aspects of dialogue. 93 These factors arise because there is more than one participant in a dialogue, and although the participants supposedly share a theme and there is thus some ‘unity of meaning’, at the same time the statements from the alternating participants are different and may even be contradictory; therefore in a dialogue ‘sharp semantic reversals’ may occur where the responding discourses of the different individuals intersect. Because the speakers are continuously alternating, there is usually a strong need to delineate one speaker from his interlocutor. Therefore one of the main characteristics of dialogic discourse is, first, the strong opposition between ‘I’ and ‘you’, the opposition of the first and second person singular pronouns and the corresponding verbs. In Latin, this will manifest itself in the use of the second personal singular pronoun (tu) and also in the appearance of second person singular verbs. The addressive quality of the dialogue may also manifest itself in the use of vocatives and imperatives, and to some extent in the interrogative sentence. 94 Second, Mukarovsky notes that because of the speaking subjects’ relation to the actual situation in which the discourse takes place, the ‘here and now’, dialogue in general exhibits a tendency to use demonstrative pronouns, local and temporal adverbs, and favours the present tense of the verb. Third, the predominance of semantic reversals between the different participants’ contributions means that dialogue also has a tendency

92 Id.: 96. Cf. 102, where Mukarovsky admonishes that ‘monologue and dialogue must not be conceived as two mutually alien and hierarchically gradated forms of the utterance but as two forces which always struggle with one another for predominance, even in the very course of the utterance’.
93 Id.: 88.
94 Ibid.
to use 'lexical oppositions of an evaluative character' or a qualitative character.\(^95\) There is a strong tendency toward contradiction or paradox.\(^96\)

Although formally monologic, the 'diatribe' demonstrates aspects which are normally indicative of dialogue. In the passages referred to earlier,\(^97\) there is a strong distinction between 'I' and 'you'. The whole structure of the discourse is aimed at giving an impression of direct address, and the orientation of the discourse is also toward the here and now. References to contemporary exempla support the argumentation, and are often indicated by the use of demonstrative adjectives. The sharp semantic reversals that take place in dialogue, as Mukarovsky puts it, 'on the boundaries of the individual replies', arising out of the 'interpenetration of several contextures',\(^98\) and resulting in lexical oppositions of a qualitative or evaluative character, can also be found in these examples of 'diatribe' mode.

In using an address mode of this type, Horace's Satires, even where they are formally monologic, also display a distinct relationship to dialogue. The distinction between 'I' and 'you' is firmly marked, for example in the sudden and virulent apostrophe to the second person addressee that occurs at Sat. 1.1.38f in Horace's 'diatribe' against greed: \textit{cum te neque fervidus aestus...}, and in his continued interview of the second person singular fictional interlocutor. Not solely the fictional interlocutors but also the audience to whom Horace's discourse is addressed, whether or not this continues to be understood as Maccenas,\(^99\) is referred to in the second person, creating the impression of a conversation: \textit{ne te morer, audi quo rem deducam...} (Sat. 1.1.14-15). The use of the imperative in \textit{audi} here is another feature of dialogic speech as outlined by Mukarovsky. Together with the use of personal pronouns and adjectives, the use of imperatives gives a strong impression of direct address to a recipient.

\(^95\)\textit{id.:} 89. These 'lexical oppositions of an evaluative character' include adjectival oppositions like good-bad, beautiful-ugly, noble-base etc, and ones of a qualitative nature, e.g. big-small, young-old.

\(^96\) Mukarovsky points out (ibid.) that no dialogue lacks all of these criteria entirely, but naturally in practice they are present in different types of dialogue in different proportions.

\(^97\) Cf. pp. 22-24 above.

\(^98\) \textit{id.:} 88-89.

\(^99\) Refer to Part I, chapter I, esp. pp. 78ff for a discussion of this.
Horace’s speaker also fulfils the second of Mukarovsky’s criteria for a dialogic utterance. He speaks to the addressees in present time, and demonstratives feature in his discourse, frequently in relation to the examples that he cites: *ille gravem duro terram qui vertit aratro, perfidus hic caupo, miles nauvaeque per omne/audaces mare qui currunt, hac mente laborem/sece ferre...* (aiunt) - ‘That fellow who turns up the earth with his hard plough, *this* untrustworthy innkeeper, the soldier and the audacious sailors who rush over every sea, all maintain that they are bearing their toil with *this* attitude...’ (Sat. 1.1.28-31).

Apart from being a basic deictic device of rhetorical speech, Horace’s indication of his examples by means of ‘this’ and ‘that’ further strengthens the suggestion of immediacy, giving the impression that his discourse is dialogically orientated towards the listener in the ‘here and now’. The use of the adverb *nunc* also adds to the impression of present-tense discourse: *Nunc aliquis dicat mihi ‘quid tu?/nullane habes vitia?’* - ‘Now someone may perhaps say to me: ‘Hey you, don’t you have any faults?’’ (Sat. 1.3.19-20).100

The evaluative and emotive language of dialogue observed by Mukarovsky also finds a place in Horatian ‘diatribe’ satire. In being put on the spot in the first satire and questioned as to why he needs such a huge pile of supplies, for example, the miser interlocutor-figure is made to protest: *at suave est ex magno tollere acervo* - ‘But it is *sweet* to take from a *large* pile’ (Sat. 1.1.51). Here the stock figure of the miser, essentially a fictive adversary, is made to employ both an evaluative adjective (*suave*) and an quantitative one (*magno*) to explain his preference. A reversal of at least one of these adjectives occurs in the main speaker’s reply, and the other is rendered irrelevant by the argument: *dum ex parvo nobis tantundem haurire relinquis, cur tua plus laudes cumeris granaria nostra?* - ‘But if you give us leave to draw just as much from a *small* one, why should you praise your granaries *more* than our corn-bins?’ (52-53).101 Here the semantic reversals of *large-small*, the point at which the contexture of the speaker’s discourse intersects with that of the imaginary interlocutor, are reminiscent of real dialogue. That this is, at least in

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100 Here *nunc* is coupled with the use of a dialogic interruption of a nameless interlocutor, the use of the first and second person pronouns, and within this the appearance of a question.

101 It will be noticed that this example boasts, in addition to semantic reversals, also the emphatic use of personal pronouns and phrasing of the discourse as a question, two of the other features noted by Mukarovsky as typical of dialogue. (All emphasis in the above quotations is mine.)
a technical and stylistic sense, not true dialogue but merely the manipulation of dialogic elements within a monologic utterance, however, is revealed by the complete control maintained by the main speaker, who subordinates every utterance that is made by the wooden adversary to his own ends. Yet, at the same time, this ‘diatribe’ mode is also intensely dialogic in that it allows—however temporarily—other opinions, other thoughts, other voices, to engage with and to question the main speaker.

The style which has been described as ‘diatribe’ in essence comprises the dialogization of the oppositional tendencies which within a true monologue might have been expressed in terms of concessive or conditional constructions. In place of these constructions, in the ‘diatribe’ mode ‘popular opinion’ is instead dramatised and confronted. Mukarovsky acknowledged that dialogic traits might occur in a monologue in that there might also be an awareness of and a conscious, deliberate ‘address’ to the recipient that was normally not required of a monologue: ‘Even in a monologue...two parties participate in the discourse, but in no way does a monologue have to be ‘addressed’ by the speaker in a particularly striking manner’.102 Mukarovsky goes on to remark that ‘if such an ‘addressing’ of a monologue (by such means as apostrophe or second person personal pronouns) occurs, it colours the monologue dialogically’ (emphasis mine).103 In other words, the conscious addressing of a monologue to a recipient, as we see in the so-called ‘diatribe’ style in Horatian satire, results in a ‘dialogic monologue’. In demonstrating many of the characteristics of dialogue within a monologic structure, and above all by being addressed to other parties be they imaginary figures or his putative audience, Horace’s ‘diatribe’ satires may therefore be said to be essentially ‘dialogic monologue’.104

As we have seen, Mukarovsky was interested in what he viewed as the constant struggle between dialogue and monologue in every utterance. He was particularly interested in what he termed the dialogization of monologue texts and, by the same token, in the mon-

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102 Id.: 86.
103 Ibid.
104 Cf. Coffey (1976: 69): ‘Dialogue is the essential framework of the literary sermo...Even where, as in some of Horace’s earlier satires, the sermo is in the form of a monologue, the discourse gives the impression of being addressed to a listener who is thought of as being immediately present’.
ologic tendencies of dialogue. Monologue, he asserted, was the ‘indispensable companion and constant competitor’ of dialogue. We have seen that within the supposedly monologic moralising satires of Horace’s first book, there is a distinct tendency towards what Mukarovsky has termed dialogization. In Horace’s second book, on the other hand, while formally couched as dialogues in the Platonic mould, the moral lectures contained within certain satires become increasingly (and ironically) monologic. This is particularly true of *Sat. 2.3*, the monster satire in which Horace is subjected to a lengthy Stoic ‘diatribe’ by Damasippus, a failed businessman. Reduced in this satire to the passive recipient of the moralising, Horace plays the part of interlocutor, occasionally interrupting what is essentially a monologic homily placed in the mouth of this *doctor ineptus*, but for large sections remaining silent. In the central sections of that piece we are almost encouraged to forget Horace’s presence as character and listener. Finally, however, dialogue reasserts itself as at long last Horace reclaims his place as speaker (2.3.300ff). Davus’ speech in 2.7 is far more dialogically orientated than Damasippus’; even so, Horace allows this servile moralist almost an entire satire of monologue before aggressively reasserting his position as master and satirist towards the end (2.7.116-118). In these satires, in Socratic mode Horace grants other characters speaking time, allows them the special circumstances of the monologist, only to reaffirm his own position at the end.

Dialogism, as we shall see shortly, assumes a much larger role in Horace’s *Satires* than Mukarovsky’s theories allow. Nevertheless, it is possible (although not entirely satisfactory) to grasp the relationship between Horace’s first and second books of *Satires* as an inversion of the *formal* distinction between monologue and dialogue. As remarked earlier, a sort of semantic reversal on a larger scale takes place between Horace’s first and second books of *Satires*. Where the first book displays moralising satires in the guise of monologues with a dialogic quality, in other words ‘diatribes’ containing small dialogues, the moralising satires of the second book, on the other hand, in general comprise formal dialogues that open to reveal monologues, which may themselves contain dialogic ele-

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105 1977: 96.
106 But cf. Part 2, chapter 7, pp. 240-241, where I suggest that Horace has, in fact, fallen asleep during this long tirade.
ments. There is a reversal of speakers in the second book, too, as Horace's character becomes the satiric target. Dialogue struggles against monologue in these pieces as the poet seems to play with the concepts and roles of speaker, addressee and target of the moralising discourse. If looked at from another direction, however, the moralising satires of the second book could still be said to be 'dialogic' in spite of their internally monologic tendencies, in that neither Horace nor Damasippus nor Davus really has the final say in the book. In addition, the reversals that occur between the first and second books are in a sense the greatest 'dialogue' in Horace's *Satires*. This, however, requires an understanding of 'dialogue' in a broader sense than Mukarovsky's theoretical approach is able to accommodate.

**Bakhtin: the dialogic principle**

In essence all language, all utterances, all forms of discourse are dialogue, not only in that they automatically possess an addressee - whether that addressee is present or not, is actively represented in the discourse or not, or is the same individual as the speaker (as, for example, in a soliloquy) - but also in that any utterance is itself an answer to prior discourse, and in that of themselves they stimulate a response. This was touched on by Mukarovsky who spoke of the 'potential dialogic nature of every utterance', but the greatest single proponent of this theory has undoubtedly been the Russian scholar Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin. Bakhtin differs markedly from Mukarovsky not only in his enormous influence on the West, but more specifically, in relation to the present issues, in that while Mukarovsky still conceived of monologue and dialogue as more or less of equal significance, as alternative types of discourse constantly struggling against one another, for Bakhtin, dialogue is essential to all human discourse. For Bakhtin, truth is dialogic.

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107 *Id.*: 109.
108 See Holquist 1990: 58-59. While one might also see similarities between Bakhtin's emphasis on dialogue and Yakubinsky's assertion of the primacy of dialogue over monologue, these similarities are only superficial. For Bakhtin, dialogue is central to human thought and to his own entire view of life; it is interpreted in a much more extensive sense than either Yakubinsky or Mukarovsky understood it. 'Bakhtin's relentless emphasis on dialogic relations sets him apart even from those other thinkers who, like him, have sought the essence of language in dialogue', Holquist notes (*id.*: 57). Bakhtin 'conceives monologue as not only secondary in importance to dialogue, but as having a different ontological status. *Dialogue is real,*
Although most of Bakhtin’s ideas on dialogism were formulated in the 1920’s and 30’s, for political reasons they have become known to the West only since the 1960’s, and their influence is therefore comparatively recent. I must state at the outset that although Bakhtinian thought is complex and is so philosophically oriented as to resist mere skimming or dipping into, it is not my intention to follow Bakhtin slavishly, but rather to adapt some of his general concepts to Horatian satire. It is perhaps for his concept of dialogism that Bakhtin has become best known, and it is this aspect that I emphasise. Bakhtin speaks extensively of ‘the internally dialogic quality of discourse’, ‘intra-language dialogue’, ‘the primordial dialogism of discourse’, and so on. For Bakhtin, dialogism is native to speech: ‘The dialogic orientation of discourse is a phenomenon that is a property of any discourse. It is the natural orientation of any living discourse’. Bakhtin has often been criticised for supposedly claiming that ‘everything is dialogue’, but this, in my opinion, is mainly because many scholars have not fully understood Bakhtinian theory. Actually, Bakhtin appears to have understood the concept of dialogism in more

monologue is not; at worst, monologue is an illusion, as when it is uncritically taken for granted. Or at best, monologue is a logical construct necessary to understand the working of dialogue...’ (id.: 59; my emphasis). As Voloshinov, a member of the Bakhtinin circle, pointed out in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (a work often asserted to be Bakhtin’s but published under his friend’s name, a controversy not helped by Bakhtin’s own reticence concerning this issue in his lifetime), a monologic utterance is really one half of an on-going dialogue: ‘Any monologic utterance...is an unseverable element of verbal communication. Any utterance - the finished, written utterance not excepted - makes response to something and is calculated to be responded to in turn. It is but one link in a continuous chain of speech performances...’ (Voloshinov cit. Holquist 1990: 59; emphasis Holquist’s; cf. Voloshinov 1973: 72). This clearly anticipates the post-Bakhtinian idea of inter-textuality explored by Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes. On the issue of the disputed texts (including the question of the authorship of another text possibly by Voloshinov and one possibly by Medvedev, another member of the circle), see Todorov 1984: 7-11, who presents a balanced if inconclusive statement of the problem; cf. Holquist 1990: 8f, who believes the texts to be Bakhtin’s, cf. Morson & Emerson 1990: 101-119, who do not, cf. Dentith 1995: 8-10, who is ‘agnostic’ on the issue. There is no space here to go in detail into this heated controversy. There are indications, however, that the disputed texts may at least have been written by Voloshinov and Medvedev on the basis of conversations with Bakhtin; the latter may therefore have had a ‘dialogic’ influence on them.

Having narrowly escaped being a victim of the pogroms of the Stalinist era, Bakhtin had been living in comparative obscurity at the University of Saransk when he was rediscovered by students in the 1960’s. Surprised to find him still alive, the students made pilgrimages to see him and encouraged him to edit and republish his works. His work was initially introduced to the West by Tzvetan Todorov and Julia Kristeva.

It is also inevitable that some simplification, through selection, of Bakhtin’s thought will be necessary given the limited space I have to discuss it here.
than one way: although he claims that all *living* utterances are definitively dialogic, Bakhtin also uses the term dialogue in a second *literary* sense, that allows some utterances to be dialogic and others to be nondialogic or monologic, according to the ‘task’ or ‘aim’ of the utterance. Some forms of literature, such as the novel, Bakhtin’s chief area of investigation, are more dialogic than others, or at least absorb and reflect the natural dialogism of *living* discourse more faithfully; in the same way, some novels can even be more ‘dialogic’ than others. According to Bakhtin, then, there are two basic types of discourse in literature: *single-voiced* and *double-voiced*. Double-voicedness was interpreted by Bakhtin in a number of ways with regard to the novel. What is significant for our purposes is that Bakhtin variously credited both ‘diatribe’ and Horatian satire, among others, with being seminal forms which ultimately contributed to various dialogic phenomena which he identified in the modern novel.

**Polyphony**

Bakhtin employed the term ‘polyphony’, originally a musical metaphor, in his book *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics* (1929, revised and republished 1963), to describe what he claimed was an innovative characteristic of Dostoevsky’s fiction. With his idiosyncratically ‘impulsive and at times even prophetic pen’, Bakhtin nowhere defines polyphony (or any other concept, for that matter) precisely, but his discussions gradually reveal how this idea is to be understood. According to Bakhtin, Dostoevsky created a new type of novel, the polyphonic novel, in which a number of different consciousnesses, different

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113 See e.g. Martindale (1993: 33): ‘Bakhtin makes the concept of dialogue so all-embracing as to run the risk of emptying it of analytic power: if everything is dialogue, nothing is...’.  
116 Morson & Emerson 1990: 146.  
117 In the 1929 version of his work on Dostoevsky (*Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics* - I use the 1984 English translation of the 1963 version), Bakhtin credited this novelist with the invention of what he termed the *polyphonic novel*. In his later version of this work, however, Bakhtin revised this position, arguing that Dostoevsky was working within a long tradition stretching back all the way to antiquity. More on this below, pp. 39ff.  
118 Morson & Emerson *id.*: 147 (emphasis mine). Bakhtin sometimes also rather confusingly refers to single-voiced discourse as ‘without quotation marks’ and to double-voiced discourse as ‘with quotation marks’. The ‘quotation marks’ do not necessarily literally refer to punctuation (particularly not, of course, with regard to ancient literature), but to the speaker/writer’s awareness and conscious demarcation, by any means available, of the different ‘voices’ in the discourse.  
voices, different points of view were all heard; the author did not, as authors usually do, monologize the discourse or offer a superimposed reading of his characters, but instead allowed each of his ‘independent’\(^{120}\) characters to speak, as it were, for themselves:

Dostoevsky is the creator of the polyphonic novel. He created a fundamentally new type of novelistic discourse... A character’s word about himself and his world is just as fully weighted as the author’s word usually is; it is not subordinated to the character’s objectified image as merely one of his characteristics, nor does it serve as a mouthpiece for the author’s voice. It possesses extraordinary independence in the structure of the work; it sounds, as it were, alongside the author’s word and in a special way combines both with it and with the full and equally valid voices of the other characters.

*Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics* (1984: 7; emphasis Bakhtin’s).

Dostoevsky’s novels are about ideas and all his characters are ideologists, according to Bakhtin.\(^{121}\) He sets one idea against another, off-sets one personality against the other, by creating this ‘plurality of consciousnesses’\(^{122}\) in his works. Ideas are attributed to individuals who ‘voice’ them in the course of the work: ‘Dostoevsky’s world is profoundly personalized. He perceives and represents every thought as the position of a personality’.\(^{123}\) The dialogic fabric of Dostoevsky’s novels depends on this polyphony, this multi-voicedness, and without the myriad of different voices, different point of view, and different personalities to express them, the peculiar nature of the Dostoevskian novel would dis-integrate into the mere monologue of single-voiced authorial dialectic: ‘In Dostoevsky’s

\(^{120}\) Bakhtin (1984: 75) emphasises that the author of the polyphonic novel does not retain what he calls a ‘surplus’ knowledge or understanding of his characters - the author, in other words, does not pretend to be omniscient and know more about the characters than they know or can express about themselves. The author’s relationship to them, as is the reader’s - as we shall see - is merely dialogic. ‘The author retains for himself no essential ‘surplus’ of meaning and enters on an equal footing [with the characters] into the great dialogue of the novel as a whole...’ (*ibid*).

\(^{121}\) Bakhtin (*id.: 23*) describes Dostoevsky’s novels as fundamentally ideological: ‘...his hero was the idea’ (*ibid*).

\(^{122}\) *Id.: 6*.

\(^{123}\) *Id.: 9*. Bakhtin remarks, significantly, later in this same work: ‘In Dostoevsky, two thoughts are already two people, for there are no thoughts belonging to no one and every thought represents an entire person’ (*id.: 93*). Dostoevsky’s ‘form-shaping worldview does not know an impersonal truth...There are only integral and indivisible voice-ideas, voice-viewpoints, but they too cannot be detached from the dialogic fabric of the work without distorting their nature’ (*id.: 96*). Truth, for Bakhtin as well as for Dostoevsky, was dialogic, personalised, and ‘relative’.
work each opinion really does become a living thing and is inseparable from an embodied human voice. If incorporated into an abstract, systematically monological context, it ceases to be what it is.\textsuperscript{124} In a monologic work, by contrast, the ‘whole mass of ideology ... must be subordinated to a single accent and must express a single and unified point of view’.\textsuperscript{125}

The polyphonic ‘dialogue’ or rather multi-voicedness of the individual characters in a Dostoevskian novel translates into a ‘dialogicality’ of the entire work: ‘In Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel we are dealing not with ordinary dialogic form... No, here we are dealing with an ultimate dialogicality, that is, a dialogicality of the ultimate whole...’.\textsuperscript{126} The entire work takes on the dialogic nature of its components, and this, Bakhtin remarks, has the effect of drawing the reader or audience into the work’s great dialogue: ‘...the interaction provides no support for the viewer who would objectify an entire event according to some monologic category... - and this consequently makes the viewer also a participant’.\textsuperscript{127} We will later see how this almost contagious dialogicality of the polyphonic work has significance for an understanding of the relationship between speaker and audience as it is represented in a dialogic work.

In his 1963 version of \textit{Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics} Bakhtin placed polyphony in its wider generic perspective, tracing its roots to various ‘polyphonic’ ancient genres,\textsuperscript{128} particularly those which fall under the heading of τὸ σωταινεζέλον, the serio-comical, opposed to the serious genres of epic, tragedy, history, and so on, which he saw as monologic. He praises the Platonic dialogues profusely (which he describes, typically but rather incredibly, as ‘carnivalistic’) for the ‘Socratic notion of the dialogic nature of truth, and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{124} \textit{Id.: 17}.
\bibitem{125} \textit{Id.: 84}.
\bibitem{126} \textit{Id.: 18}.
\bibitem{127} \textit{Ibid.} He also notes here that ‘everything in the novel is structured to make dialogic opposition inescapable’, and elsewhere that the ‘polyphonic novel is dialogic through and through’ (\textit{id.: 40}).
\bibitem{128} Bakhtin’s interest in classical literature can be traced to the fact that for his first degree he read Classics at the University of St. Petersburg between 1914 and 1918 (he was especially enthusiastic about Greek), and retained a life-long interest in the ancient world and in ancient literature as can be seen in all his writings, but particularly in his works on ‘Carnival’, and on the ‘Chronotope’, and here; cf. Dentith 1995: 4.
\end{thebibliography}
the dialogic nature of human thinking about truth'. Socrates' dialogues, at least the early ones, showed that 'truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction...'. Socrates 'knew how to force people to speak, to clothe in discourse their dim but stubbornly pre-conceived opinions, to illuminate them by the word and in this way to expose their falseness or incompleteness...'. In the 'Socratic dialogue', the participants, as in Dostoevsky, are ideologists; Socrates is the prime ideologist, but everyone is drawn into the dialogue by Socrates' methods, and so compelled, even against their will, to become an ideologist. In the Socratic dialogue, as in Dostoevsky, 'the idea is organically combined with the image of a person, its carrier... The dialogic testing of the idea is simultaneously also the testing of the person who represents it'. The Socratic dialogue is therefore recognised by Bakhtin as 'one of the starting points' of the line of literary development that, for him, culminates in Dostoevsky.

Bakhtin also includes Menippean satire, Roman satire (he mentions Lucilius and Horace at least once), and refers to 'diatribe' several times in the list of types of literature which had been the forebears of the polyphonic novel. These types of literature are recognised by Bakhtin as multi-styled and multi-toned and therefore harbingers also of multi-voicedness. He also notes that 'these genres are all akin to one another in the external and internal dialogicality of their approach to human life and human thought'.

The dialogic nature of the 'genre' of 'diatribe' does not pass unnoticed: 'The diatribe is

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129 1984: 110.
130 Ibid.
131 Id.: 110-111.
132 Id.: 111.
133 Id.: 111-112.
134 Id.: 112.
135 Id.: 113ff.
136 Ibid.
137 Id.: 113, 119, 120, 143, 149, 154, 156.
138 Id.: 119-120.
139 Bakhtin appears to use the term 'diatribe' in a conventional sense, as he is constantly referring to it as a 'genre' (ibid.); if he had any knowledge of the controversy surrounding the term, he shows no indication of it. Nevertheless, a close examination of what Bakhtin actually says about 'diatribe' reveals that he views it not as a formal genre (his whole approach to literature is based on rejecting formal, 'high' literature) but as a 'rhetorical genre' (id.: 120; cf. above). He uses 'genre' in its broader rather than its formal sense.
an internally dialogized rhetorical genre, usually structured in the form of a conversation with an absent interlocutor - and resulting in a dialogization of the very process of speech and thought'.

Horace, 'diatribe' and dialogicality

While I am not about to claim Dostoevskian polyphony, as identified by Bakhtin, for Horace, it is clear that as one of the works that might be regarded as part of the same broad polyphonic tradition, Horace's Satires are full of multiple voices and belong to what may be termed the same dialogic family of genres, as Bakhtin himself hints. Although the moralising satires of Horace's first book are in formal linguistic terms monologue, as 'diatribes' they are also replete with a cacophony of different imagined voices which interrupt the satirist, raise objections, engage in argument with him, even criticise him. The use of the internally dialogized 'diatribe' mode allows Horace to create a world which is 'profoundly personalized', in which every thought is represented as the position of a personality, albeit an imaginary one. The use of 'diatribe' in Book One of the Satires results in a 'dialogization of the very process of speech and thought', and comprises the building blocks of a dialogicality that extends to the whole of the Satires, finding its fullest expression in Book Two.

In the mock Socratic dialogues of the second book,\(^{141}\) the interlocutors are more fully delineated, taking the floor from Horace and reversing the roles of the first book entirely. It is as if Horace has taken the 'if someone were to say...' device of the 'diatribe' style and enlarged it into a complete characterisation in the persons of the interlocutors of the second book. But most important is that Ofellus, Stertinius, Damasippus, Davus, in their various combinations, are allowed to speak. They are all ideologists, like the characters of Plato and Dostoevsky; and as with these other authors, the dialogic testing of the idea is also the testing of the person who represents it. Like Dostoevsky, Horace does not mono-

\(^{140}\) Id.: 120. My emphasis.

\(^{141}\) See Anderson (1982: 13ff), who argues that Horace presents himself in his second book as 'The Roman Socrates'.


logize the discourse, he does not offer a superimposed reading of his characters, but rather permits them to speak for themselves. Like Socrates, the Horace of Book Two knows how to compel people to speak, to reveal themselves and expose their falseness or ineptitude. But, unlike Socrates, at the same time he allows his interlocutors to expose his own guilt as a character in the *Satires*.

Horace's second book ends without any explanatory declarations by the author, despite the fact that *Sat. 2.7* has seen Davus call into question virtually every self-vindicating claim that Horace as speaker has made throughout his *Satires*. No 'surplus' regarding either Horace or his interlocutors in the second book is given us at its end. Indeed, the final satire of the second collection, *Sat. 2.8*, finds Horace at the opposite pole to his position of main speaker at the beginning of *Sat. 1.1*, now the recipient of a narrative related of an event at which he was not even present. No one is there to explain that Damasippus and Davus are liars as well as idiots, and in addition, Horace's disturbing reactions to their criticism would seem to point to a guilty conscience, as suggested. The 'unfinalizability' of the dialogic *Satires* and their inconclusive ending means that the reader or audience is inevitably drawn into the dialogic process of the *Satires*, and has to decide for him- or herself how to 'read' the *Satires*: '...the interaction provides no support for the viewer who would objectify an entire event according to some monologic category... - and this consequently makes the viewer also a participant'.\(^{142}\) For Horace, as for Bakhtin, truth cannot exist in one person, but is born between people, and characters, in the process of their interaction.

**Heteroglossia and other types of dialogic discourse**

Bakhtin also identified other forms of dialogism that, he argued, occurred especially in novelistic discourse. In his essay *Discourse and the Novel* (1934-35),\(^{143}\) he is concerned

\[^{142}\] Bakhtin 1984: 18, as noted above.

primarily with the dialogic nature of discourse in novelistic prose. He discusses what he terms ‘heteroglossia’ in the modern European novel, by which he means the ‘otherness’ of discourse that occurs in this form, whereby a proportion of language within the modern novel comprises, even without (actual) quotation marks, utterances that although they may be attributed to the authorial discourse, are essentially alien - in the sense that they belong to another’s speech or are taken from the discourse of other social groups. In the novel this dialogism is usually simultaneously also the narrator’s discourse, or is consciously made part of the authorial speech while still retaining its inherent ‘otherness’, a situation which possesses enormous potential for irony and parody of the alien discourse. Authorial discourse may contradict the alien discourse, engaging in a type of ‘dialogue’ with it.144

Bakhtin attributes the novel’s heteroglossia,145 its use of multiple voices even within authorial formally monologic speech, to the novel’s hybrid character and its status as a prose genre. Poetic discourse has, according to Bakhtin, made itself immune to ‘otherness’ in speech.146 While poetic discourse may use dialogue as a device, in that event dialogue merely remains a ‘thing’, and is not internally dialogized: ‘Poetic style is by convention suspended from any mutual interaction with alien discourse, any allusion to

144 Bakhtin shows, for example, how the Dickensian comic novel effectively exploits heteroglossia in order to comment ironically on the social hypocrisy of nineteenth century Britain (1981: 302-308). It is important to note that heteroglossia is a type of different social language, a ‘foreign’ code or dialect that is incorporated into authorial or attributed discourse; what heteroglossia does not mean is dialogue in the sense normally understood in the novel, and which is how it has been interpreted by some scholars. Ironically, Bakhtin seemed to think that conventional dialogue, even the dialogue of a drama, was usually monologic in that it really expressed only one position or ‘language’; truly multiple voices would destroy drama, he claimed (cf. e.g. Bakhtin 1984: 17).

145 Polyphony and heteroglossia are essentially different concepts, developed at different stages of Bakhtin’s career and related to different aspects of the novel: while polyphony is multivoicedness in the relationship between author and characters, such as Bakhtin saw in Dostoevsky’s work, heteroglossia on the other hand is dialogism within the author’s own discourse, a conscious splitting of the authorial voice. Morson and Emerson relate that ‘...polyphony is not even roughly synonymous with heteroglossia. The latter term describes the diversity of speech styles in a language, the former has to do with the position of the author in a text. Many literary works are heteroglot, but very few are polyphonic’ (1990: 232). But it is evident that both these concepts stem from Bakhtin’s theory of dialogic discourse and of novelistic discourse in particular.

146 Bakhtin’s stress of prose over poetry as the bearer of double-voiced language has led Morson & Emerson (1990 passim) to speak of Bakhtin’s approach as a ‘prosaics’ as opposed to a ‘poetics’. It is worth noting, however, that many scholars have subsequently made a case for extensive ‘dialogism’ in lyric poetry, for example, so Bakhtin’s prejudice against the more formal poetic genres may be misplaced.
alien discourse'. On the other hand, in the speech of everyday life, Bakhtin asserts, and in the 'rhetorical genres', dialogization has taken place through the incorporation of alien discourse, although not as intimately as in the modern novel. He does acknowledge, in addition, that 'a certain latitude for heteroglossia exists...in the 'low' poetic genres - in the satiric and comic genres and others'.

Later in this same essay Bakhtin traces the roots of 'novelistic prose' to a selection of ancient 'genres', including satires and 'diatribe':

The embryonic beginnings of authentic double-voiced and double-languaged prose did not in ancient times always achieve the status of a novel, as a definite compositional and thematic structure. For the most part novelistic prose flourished in other generic formats: in realistic novellas, in satires, in some biographical and autobiographical forms, in certain purely rhetorical genres (for example, in the diatribe), in historical and, finally, in epistolary genres. In all these forms the germs of novelistic prose can be found, that is, there is an orchestration of meaning by means of heteroglossia.

Bakhtin is referring to the capacity of all these forms for engaging a dialogism whereby the discourse or 'languages' of other sources are brought into and stylized in the text. He even enthuses especially about 'diatribe': 'Of the Hellenistic forms, the diatribe contains the largest amount of novelistic-prose potential: it permits, even requires, a great variety of speech manners, a dramatized and parodic-ironic appropriation of other points of view ...'. Likewise he sees these 'germs of novelistic prose' in Horace's satires, particularly in Horace's famous self-parody and in his 'parodic stylization of the accepted approaches, others' points of view, the going opinions'.

148 Id.: 287.
149 Id.: 371; emphasis mine.
150 Id.: 371 n. 40.
151 Ibid.: n. 38.
In the numerous ‘voices’ introduced in the ‘diatribe’ tradition and in Horatian satire, Bakhtin sees the beginnings of his heteroglossia. The interlocutors who make their appearance in what scholars have termed ‘diatribe’ are concrete versions of the internal dialogism which Bakhtin finds in the modern novel. Like the later novel, both satire and the so-called ‘diatribe’ tradition were hybrid, ‘low’ and were free to exploit a certain polemicism and irony which Bakhtin asserts is also novelistic. As moralising discourse, both ‘diatribe’ and satire also anticipate the later social commentary of the modern novel. Imitating the conventions of everyday dialogue, *sermo* is at odds with what Bakhtin terms ‘poetic discourse’, which, as we have seen, he asserted exhibited a certain conservative immunity to heteroglossia. Thus Horace himself ironically anticipates Bakhtin’s prosaics when, tongue firmly in cheek, he jokes that minus the metre, satire is just conversational prose: *nisi quod pede certo/differt sermoni, sermo merus* - ‘without its metre distinguishing it from everyday conversation, it is plain everyday conversation’ (1.4.47-48).

In his prose-imitating verse, Horace engages in an on-going dialogue not only with his imaginary interlocutors but also with other ‘languages’: these are the languages of his predecessors, including Ennius, Lucilius, and (the curiously unnamed) Lucretius, the languages of everyday life and of the Roman streets, the languages of other genres, and so on. It should be noted, however, that it is extremely difficult to detect heteroglossia in a work that is of such an age and distance from us as Horace’s *Satires*, as the modern reader may find it hard to appreciate what is truly ‘other’ in an ancient text.\(^{152}\) There is, however, another variety of heteroglossia in the *Satires* which we shall have occasion to examine in detail, and this is something of which Horace himself is highly conscious, particularly in his second book: Horace seems constantly to be playing with the idea of what we may term ‘derived’ discourse, in that the speeches of the second book are repeatedly attributed to speakers other than Horace, and often, in addition, these speakers have themselves derived their words from still other sources. Thus in *Satires* Two we are constantly engag-

\(^{152}\) Bakhtin cautions (1981: 418) that the ‘more distant the work to be analyzed is from contemporary consciousness, the more serious this difficulty [of detecting heteroglossia] becomes...’; cf. Morson & Emerson 1990: 363. While we shall not always be deaf to multi-voicedness in the *Satires*, this problem is one that inevitably informs the study of a work that is as old and as removed from the reader as is Horace’s *Satires*. 
ing with voices that are 'other', 'foreign' apparently both to Horace and to ourselves. The Bakhtinian theory of heteroglossia, with its various ramifications that we shall only have space to explore later,\(^{153}\) provides a useful backdrop against which to examine this type of multi-voicedness in the moralising satires of Horace *Sermones* Book Two.

The common roots of all Bakhtinian theory (which is extraordinarily cohesive throughout his long career) can be traced in two other ideas which I have found illuminating with regard to Horace *Sermones* Books One and Two: these are the concepts of 'addressivity' and the 'Carnivalesque'. 'Addressivity', a concept developed by some of the original members of the Bakhtinian circle, concerns the relationship between the speaker and the addressee. In contrast to the Saussure-Jakobson model of communication, Bakhtinian addressivity stresses the two-way relationship between speaker and addressee (often referred to as a 'bridge'): from the very start of the utterance the speaker orientates his speech towards the addressee's active understanding. Reception theory based on the concept of addressivity therefore insists that we take the addressee's 'apperceptive background' into account when trying to discover the meaning of the utterance: as Aristotle suggested, the aim of a speech is encoded in its orientation toward its listener.

Since Horace's 'diatribe' satires of the first book are so emphatically orientated towards their various audiences, I have found addressivity a useful model for developing my own interpretations of *Sat.* 1.1-3 as well as for offering a better understanding of the sometimes obfuscating 'dialogue' of *Sat.* 1.4 and 1.10. Addressivity is also helpful in analysing aspects of the moralising satires of Horace's second book: in *Sat.* 2.3, it is precisely the lack of the 'addressive' quality in the long speech given by Damasippus-Stertinius (in stark contrast to Horace's own dialogically-oriented moralising style) that brings me to certain conclusions about that satire. A more detailed introduction to the ramifications of addressivity is given in chapter 1, the introductory chapter to Part 1 of this thesis.

\(^{153}\) See Part 2, chapter 5, pp. 184ff of the present thesis.
While addresivity is the focus of Part 1 of this thesis, and also provides a useful background to my analyses of the moralising satires of Horace Sermones Book Two, Bakhtin’s concept of the ‘Carnival’, on the other hand, is one that I have used in my interpretations of the larger ‘dialogue’ that, I argue, takes place between the two books. The relationship between Satires Book One and Two, as noted earlier, is one of reversal and inversion. Two of the most prominent moralising satires of the second book are set at the time of the Saturnalia, the Roman December festival that was in many ways the ancestor of the medieval Carnival-type festival so extensively explored by Bakhtin. Akin to its later counterpart, the Saturnalia was the festival where the ‘normal’ world was temporarily turned upside down, where societal hierarchies were inverted, where slaves got to air their views to their masters (as Davus does in Sat. 2.7). Can it be accidental that the second book’s reversal of all the themes of the moralising satires of Book One reaches its climax in Horace’s penultimate satire? As I shall argue in a more detailed discussion of this in chapter 5, the introductory chapter to Part 2 of this thesis, and in chapter 8, my final chapter, both books of Horatian satire can together be viewed as a large-scale adaptation of the reversals of the Saturnalia to literature: anticipating Bakhtin, I shall argue, Horace’s Saturnalian satire is proto-Carnivalesque.154

Inspired by Mukarovsky’s and Bakhtin’s ideas on dialogism, but refusing to be bound exclusively by them, in the present work I intend to test the thesis that Horatian satire can be viewed as essentially ‘dialogic’ in a number of different ways. In Horace’s first book of Satires authorial speech is shared with other voices in the so-called ‘diatribe’ mode. In Horace’s second book the dialogism already inherent in the formally monologue satires of Book One is further dramatised and diversified, parcelled out, and even reversed. The comparisons, similarities and interrelationship between the moralising satires of both books point to the greater ‘dialogue’ between them. It is this greater dialogue, as well as the smaller dialogues, external and internal, animating Horace’s Sermones, that the present work seeks to address.

154 Bakhtin himself pointed out how his concept of the ‘Carnivalesque’ in literature fitted in with his theories of the dialogic tradition, noting that: ‘Carnivalization is combined organically with all the other characteristics of the polyphonic novel...’ (1984: 159).
PART 1:

MULTIPLE VOICES:

DIALOGIC DISCOURSE AND ADDRESSIVITY IN THE MORALISING SATIRES ('DIATRIBES') OF HORACE SERMONES BOOK ONE.
I bought a dozen volumes on banking and credit and investment securities, and they stood on my shelf in red and gold like new money from the mint, promising to unfold the shining secrets that only Midas and Morgan and Maecenas knew.

F. Scott Fitzgerald *The Great Gatsby* (1926: 10).

If Roman *satura* is a dish full of a variety of different ingredients, Horace’s *Satires* are, from their start, replete with a plurality of different voices. While most of the satires of the first book are formally presented as monologues, right from the beginning of *Sat.* 1.1 the main speaker also shares the page with a number of other voices. Even in the moralising first triad, it seems that the audience is constantly being invited to listen to the magnified sounds of a polyphonic world: we overhear disgruntled professionals bemoaning their lot, a miser defending his vice, the objections and excuses of profligates and adulterers, the nicknames fathers give to their children, and so on. It is almost as if tiny microphones were strategically placed in a variety of arenas of human existence, enabling us to hear and the speaker to engage in interactive dialogue with a multiplicity of different voices.

The *Satires* are dialogic not only in the sense that the main speaker deliberately magnifies other voices, but also in that the orientation of the ‘diatribe’ speaker is explicitly toward his audiences. Horace’s first book of *Satires* begins with a question addressed to his patron,¹⁵⁵ but whether this is a rhetorical question or an attempt to engage Maecenas in conversation, we never hear Maecenas’ reply. Instead, what follows are three moralising ‘monologues’, the triad of ‘diatribes’ which start Book One (*Sat.* 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3), and which address topics including dissatisfaction, greed, adultery, and the correct attitude to friendship. Thereafter ‘Horace’ continues in a chatty way for the remainder of Book One,

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¹⁵⁵ *Qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem/seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illacontentus vivat, laudat diversa sequentis?* - ‘How does it happen, Maecenas, that no-one lives content with the lot that either choice has granted him or that chance has thrown in his way, but instead praises the paths that others pursue?’ (1.1.1-3).
as he reveals titbits about his ‘background’,\textsuperscript{156} recounts events from his ‘life’,\textsuperscript{157} regales us with stories from his ‘travels’,\textsuperscript{158} tells us jokes and amusing anecdotes,\textsuperscript{159} offers snippets of gossip and makes snide remarks about his rivals,\textsuperscript{160} and takes us into his confidence about his literary ideas.\textsuperscript{161} But whether his addressee is to be understood as Maecenas or other recipients, and even when his satire is formally structured as a monologue, Horace is always talking to someone.

As we heard in the Introduction, \textit{sermo} cannot take place with one party, but occurs only when speech is joined with another: ‘conversations’, even where there is only one active speaker, consciously possess an addressee. Mukarovsky observed that if a monologue is consciously ‘addressed’ by the speaker to a recipient, this ‘colours the monologue dialogically’,\textsuperscript{162} resulting, as we saw, in a dialogic monologue. Although he rejected formal linguistic approaches, Bakhtin too emphasised the dialogic ‘addressivity’ of discourse, the idea that ‘the utterance’ is always addressed to someone.\textsuperscript{163} Replete with references to ‘I’ and ‘you’, Horace’s \textit{Satires}, particularly where they use the ‘diatribe’ mode, consciously exhibit a direct relationship with regard to their audiences, as they seek to impugn imaginary opponents and instruct imaginary addressees. Not only do these opponents and addressees listen, however, but within the text itself Horace represents his ‘audience’ engaging in dialogue with him, responding to his provocative statements. In ‘diatribe’, audiences are potential interlocutors. From time to time, therefore, we hear not only the interruptions of the speaker’s wooden adversaries, the misers and adulterers, but also challenges and questions from the indefinite audience whom the satirist purports to educate against the varieties of immorality or foolishness he impugns. Not only does the satirist reveal the foolishness of his interlocutors’ positions, but in the \textit{liber sermonum} he

\textsuperscript{156} See esp. \textit{Sat.} 1.4 & 1.6.
\textsuperscript{157} This apparently ‘autobiographical’ trend begins more or less at \textit{Sat.} 1.3.63f, if not before, and continues in a number of satires, including 1.4, 1.6, 1.9.
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Sat.} 1.5.
\textsuperscript{159} E.g. \textit{Sat.} 1.5., 1.7.
\textsuperscript{160} E.g. \textit{Sat.} 1.4.13f.
\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Sat.} 1.4 & 1.10.
\textsuperscript{162} 1977: 86.
already allows his own ideological position to be questioned. As moralising speaker, Horace is frequently compromised by these objections that seem to come at him out of the blue, and his self-defensive attitude contributes to a telling and amusing variety of self-satire.

This on-going self-satire of the speaker-figure in the first book will eventually develop into a complete attack on ‘Horace’ by others in the moralising satires of the second book, where the integrity of both speakers and listeners is ultimately called into question. It becomes clear there that no-one has the last laugh, and that truth is revealed only in the interaction between parties. The dialogue of Horatian satire is, in the end therefore, ironically ‘unfinalizable’ in a Bakhtinian sense. However, the seeds of this dialogicality are clearly already present in the ‘monologues’ of Book One, and these are first observed in Sat. 1.1. Sparring voices are also, as we shall see, internalized within the speaker’s own authorial discourse as ironised heteroglossia. In the first book of the Satires Horace uses ‘diatribe’ mode in order to effect a ‘dialogization of the very process of speech and thought’. 164

While a dialogic approach to the Satires would seem to militate against separate analyses of individual satires, and while it is my intention to place the moralising satires of both books in dialogue with one another, revealing their inter- and intra-textual polemics, it is also true that dialogue cannot happen if everyone or everything is made to speak simultaneously. After a brief introduction to the general concerns of Part 1 of this thesis, the present chapter consequently examines the dialogic relationships of Horace’s first satire, Sat. 1.1, but even here similarities and contrasts between Books One and Two are able to offer us compelling insights. A brief contrast between the presentation of speakers in either book is therefore my point of departure.

164 Bakhtin 1984: 120.
Speakers in Books One and Two

The difference in the manner of presentation of speakers in Horace's first book of *Satires* and in his second is striking. In the Stoic 'diatribes' of Book Two, *Sat. 2.3* and *2.7*, the main speakers, Damasippus and Davus respectively, are introduced to us within the dramatic context of dialogue. At the start of *Sat. 2.3*, we hear a voice that offers literary criticism to someone who suffers, apparently, from writer's block. The voice is soon identified as that of Damasippus by the other speaker (2.3.16ff), who is himself in turn positively identified with Horace's character in the final section of the piece. Horace plays the role of listener again in *Sat. 2.7*, where the main speaker, the slave Davus, is introduced in the second line, in his master's response to the slave's timid approach:

*Davus*: 'Is that Davus?', which is at once confirmed (2.7.2). It is Davus' reference to his addressee's servitude to his patron Maecenas that identifies his audience as his master Horace (2.7.33f). In both *Sat. 2.3* and *2.7*, therefore, the guest speakers are introduced early on, whereas the audience - 'Horace' - is revealed sooner or later.

In the first triad of Book One, the opposite (or the same, in another sense) applies: while the first line of *Sat. 1.1* addresses itself unambiguously to Maecenas, the speaker himself remains strictly unintroduced. Indeed, the voice which appears out of the blue to address Maecenas has been referred to as 'disembodied'. Horace's interlocutor is named, while the authorial persona is implied. This is not to say that we find out nothing about the way the speaker is intentionally characterised, but in contrast to the later *Sat. 2.3* and *2.7*, it is striking, in retrospect, that no-one turns round to greet this speaker. Maecenas, once

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165 See Damasippus' mention of his addressee's ambitious emulation of Maecenas and so on (2.3.307ff). Nevertheless, the reader or audience has been primed to recognise and interpret Damasippus' interlocutor as 'Horace' from fairly early on in the satire. We should also bear in mind that Horace would have disseminated his work by reading and indeed 'performing' his *Sermones* to his exclusive audience of friends in the circle of Maecenas, and thus, during this reading he would presumably have had the scope to portray or 'perform' the roles both of his *propria persona* as well as of his opponents and other interlocutors.

166 As is Catius, likewise, at 2.4.1. The Platonic echo here of the start of the *Phaedrus*, however, is clearly supposed to suggest an ironic set-up in which 'Horace' plays the part of the Socratic interlocutor. For Horace's character in the second book as the 'Roman Socrates', see Anderson 1982: 13-49.

167 Zetzel (1980: 68): 'We begin with a voice that is all but disembodied, except for the fact that he is addressing Maecenas on a philosophic topic'.
engaged in conversation, is not made to ask: 'Is that Horace?'. In the first few satires of Book One Horace’s moralist-satirist is established purely through a type of conversational ‘dialogic’ monologue. This speaker is a character whose parameters are gradually drawn.\footnote{Here I side more with the interpretation of Zetzel (id.: 69), who argues for a gradual revelation of the satiric persona as the first book unfolds, against that of Freudenburg (1993: 10), who by contrast sees the character of the ‘diatribal’ speaker as instantly accessible from the start of Sat. 1.1. However, Zetzel’s idea of the voice being ‘disembodied’ is rather extreme (see above). The solution lies somewhere between these two approaches.}

### The speaker of the *Satires*: Horace’s ‘second self’

To say that in Horace’s *Satires* it is a created figure who addresses us may seem to be stating the obvious. In the not-so-distant past, however, many scholars confidently understood Horatian satire as autobiography, taking everything we are told by the first person speaker in the *Satires* literally and associating the speaker entirely with Horace the historical author.\footnote{See e.g. Fraenkel (1957: 1), who is clearly thinking largely of the *Satires* (the first work he quotes after the *Vita Horati* of Suetonius) when he begins his book on Horace thus: ‘Horace tells us more about himself, his character, his development, and his way of life..., than any other great poet in antiquity.’} It is not surprising that these scholars have done so, for, as we shall see shortly, in spite of the gap between the author as creator and the authorial subject within the text as created, ‘autobiography’ is one of the specific fictions that the *Satires* contrive to project. The result of a naively autobiographical approach, however, is confusion, disillusionment, or both, as the speaker of the *liber sermonum* plays with the reader mercilessly. For example, he promises a serious enquiry, only to carry on in his usual light-hearted manner.\footnote{praeterea ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens/percurram... (Sat. 1.1.23-24a). Of course, a joke may have some lesson to impart, Horace adds: ...quamquam ridentem dicere verum/liquid vetat? (24-25a). Having acknowledged the virtues of the light-hearted approach, he nevertheless promises that he will now put away childish things and commit himself to a serious investigation: sed tamen amoto quae ramus seria ludo (27). Supposedly dismissing the anecdotes of the entire first section of Sat. 1.1 as a joke not wholly to the point, these reflections seem designed to have the listener think that the ensuing revelations, which go on to link dissatisfaction with greed, will indeed show what the point is. At the same time, however, the apparent surface intention of these programmatic statements is subtly undercut. Although Horace purports in line 27 to be turning over a new leaf, undertaking to be serious, as is reflected in his use of the ablative absolute amoto ...ludo (‘fun and games having been got out of the way’), the word order of the sentence, on the contrary, suggests otherwise: it may be no accident that the last two words of the line are seria ludo, which appear in identical order to the components of the Greek term for the half-serious, half-humorou s type of popular moralising often identified with the tradition of ‘diatribe’, τὸ σοφοδιαγγέλλον. Is it possible that Horace...} At one moment he is assuring us that satire is not poetry,
but at the end of that very poem linking himself with a wild band of poets.\(^{171}\) He expresses his enthusiasm throughout for Callimachean principles of composition, but at the end of the *liber sermonum* adds a line to a slave suggesting that just the opposite is really his own method of writing.\(^{172}\) As Zetzel remarks, 'Horace is perhaps the most ironic and contradictory poet of antiquity; to take anything he that he says as completely sincere is to ignore his style and his intention.'\(^{173}\) But until a few years ago this is exactly what the majority of Horatian students used to do, assuming that the author of the *Satires* was as direct and as artless as his speaker.

Events and people seemingly earnestly presented in Horace's *Satires* Book One, such as the portrait of Horace's 'father' in the fourth and sixth satires,\(^ {174}\) and the famed journey to Brundisium in *Sat. 1.5*,\(^ {175}\) have been shown to be considerably embellished by the satirist's pen. Since Lucilius had, as it were, set his whole life out on tablets for all the world to see,\(^ {176}\) so it seemed fitting that in the *Satires* of his successor, the 'life' of the speaker-character should there appear to be frankly displayed. The chatty directness of the *sermo* may lull the reader into the easy security that what he is hearing are extracts from a personal diary, but this is far from being the case. As his many outrageous statements can only suggest, the satiric narrator, the fictional Horace who appears in the *Satires*, is distinct from the historical author. A speaker appropriate to the discourse of Lucilius' genre, on the surface the satiric Horace comes across as generally more pompous, forthright, and simple-minded than, for example, the poet of the *Odes*.

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\(^{171}\) Cf. *Sat.* 1.4.39ff & 141.

\(^{172}\) *Sat* 1.10.92.

\(^{173}\) 1980: 63.

\(^{174}\) See Leach 1971: 616-632, esp. 618-622.

\(^{175}\) Gowers (1993 (b): 50) argues that while *Sat. 1.5* need not be read entirely as fiction, the poem is 'an exercise in writing Horatian satire' rather than simply a travelogue.

\(^{176}\) See *Sat.* 2.1.30-34.
In recent years a number of students of the *Satires* have moved away from the traditional autobiographical model of interpretation. Persona theory, based on the conventions of ancient rhetoric, instead considers the ‘mask’ that the writer of a particular genre adopts. Persona-theorists have asserted that the moralising speaker of the first few satires is a mask, no less than is the Priapus as speaker of Sat. 1.8. Various theories have been advanced as to the nature of the persona or personae that Horace takes on in his *Satires*. Some persona theorists have gone too far, however, in my opinion, in assuming that the speaker who appears at the beginning of Book One is removed from the authorial subject entirely. Recently, for example, it has been argued that the speaker of the first four satires of Book One is a carefully drawn persona separate from the speakers of the other satires, a buffoon-like character from the world of Comedy. Freudenburg, the author of this thesis, is in disagreement with other persona-theorist scholars such as Anderson and Zetzel, who, according to him, have mistakenly asserted a single persona for the *Satires*. Freudenburg on the other hand sees a number of personae in the first book, starting with the ‘diatribist’ of the first four satires, and suggests that a ‘single persona’ theory is untenable.

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177 'It is a trivial observation to point out that Horace was never a tree trunk, nor a god, nor was he permanently attached to the Esquiline hill' (Zetzel 1980: 61). Even here, however, there are comparisons between the Priapus, that 'disarmingly traditional image of ithyphallic garden-furniture' (Henderson 1989: 108), and the dramatic 'Horace' of the *Satires*. Recently Martha Habash (1999: 285f) has suggested that Sat. 1.8 is a parody of an Homeric hymn, that Priapus is Horace in disguise, and she also draws a number of parallels between the fig-wood god and Horace. Both Priapus and Horace have been rehabilitated by and are in the service of Maecenas, both are (self-satirically?) portrayed as cowardly, winning in difficult situations by default rather than by consciously assertive behaviour (Zetzel compares the Priapus with the egoism and cowardice of the speaker of Sat. 1.9, 1980: 61), and perhaps Horace would like to imagine that they share other, physical dimensions. The Priapus has the task of scaring away thieves and birds from the gardens Maecenas has built; the satirist could be expected to enjoy an equally apotropaic and aggressive role. Traditionally Priapus was supposed to punish trespassers by means of the threat of or the actual carrying out of rape - anal, vaginal, or oral (Richlin 1983: 121ff & passim). But it seems to escape Richlin, Zetzel and Habash that Horace's Priapus accidentally uses a device that is fundamentally (!) the opposite of his usual mode of attack. Like the Priapus who fails to use his traditional weapon in Sat. 1.8 to scare away the witches, but farts instead, so the Horatian satirist shies away from direct invective of individuals (an accusation he places in the mouths of an anomalous group of adversaries in Sat. 1.4), but nevertheless provokes laughter (as at the end of 1.8 - *cum magno risuque tocoque videres*, 50). Sat. 1.8 may be viewed as a rejection of the vitriol of the iambographic tradition and of the *Lucilius* character in Horace's *Sermones*. But the Priapus' fart, I would suggest, also provides an indirect literary statement in that he uses the 'blunt end' of his weapon to bring the satire to a quick close, just as at 1.10.72ff the Horatian satirist advises using the other side of the *stilus* in the stringent editing that is so important for good composition: *saepe stilum vertas*...

178 Freudenburg 1993: esp. 27ff. 179 *Id.*: 7-10.
Although Freudenburg's thesis concerning the ineptitude of Horace's speaker in the 'diatribe' satires is well presented, it is hard to see why he should want to separate this speaker from 'Horace', self-satirised in the rest of the liber sermonum and indeed in the second book of Satires. The links between each and every satire, recognised by Freudenburg himself for the first book, argue instead, to my mind, for an on-going portrayal. Freudenburg's problem, as I see it, is a failure to draw the distinction between, on the one hand, the various voices which Horace uses in the Satires, and on the other, the overriding persona who is there in a sense throughout the Satires, Horace's 'second self' as he appears as character and speaker in the work.

It is my contention, in contrast to Freudenburg, that the speaker through whom the writer Horace begins to addresses us, or rather Maecenas, in the first satire, far from being one of a fragmented series of personae, is a single and dramatically delineated character, not only in the first three 'diatribe' satires, nor in the first four satires, nor merely in the first book of Satires, but throughout both satiric books. It is on this single character, speaker in the first book and listener for the most part in the second, that much of the integrity of the two satiric books depends, as we shall see. Far from surrendering his integrity as fictional dramatic speaker, I maintain, Horace's chief literary persona in both books of Satires is an imaginary alter ego of the historical Horace. Despite the gap between creator and created, this created figure nevertheless reflects, or purports to reflect, some of the biographical details of the historical Horace, as can be seen in his reference at Sat. 1.1.58 to the geographical boundaries of the historical Horace, as 181 at Sat. 2.1.18, where he makes a pun of his own cognomen, and a few lines after this where he jokingly blames

180 Freudenburg (id.: 198ff) notes that while Horace 'understood the power of arrangement on all levels' and while numerous patterns suggest themselves for the relationships among the satires of Book One, the relationships are not only larger architectural structures, in terms of which prior scholars have tended to think, but rather (following Zetzel) the poems are arranged contextually, according to the patterns of conversation: 'Individual satires...are perfectly 'placed', blending into the contexture of the surrounding poems' (id.: 200). Each is like a 'tile in a mosaic' (ibid.) in its relations to surrounding poems.

181 In 'a characteristically personal touch' (Brown 1993: 94), Horace here has the Aufidus, a river near his native city of Venusia, play the part of the raging torrent into which the greedy miser is in danger of fulling: *cum ripa simul avulsos ferat Aufidus acer.*

182 *nisi dextro tempore, Flaccil/verba per attentam non ibunt Caesaris aurem, cujus male si palpere recalcitrant undique tutus* (2.1.18-20). Here Horace makes a pun based on his cognomen Flaccus in contrast to Caesar's attentive or 'pricked' ears. Muecke (1993: ad loc.) suggests that the alert, socially
his satiric virulence on the war-like heritage of his historical descent. Horace attributes to this literary persona his own real-life name and origins. This persona may have touches of Bion, a buffoon, Socrates, but after all, he also addresses himself to the very contemporary Maecenas. The main speaker of the Satires would therefore seem to be more than just a persona; he is another ‘Horace’, a ‘second self’ who appears to engage us in conversation.

It is not uncommon for the main characters of contemporary televised situational comedies, a genre indirectly related to satire through its Comic roots, to have some connection with or even be named after the chief actor who stars in the series; the actor plays an on-screen role that reflects, nominally at least, or is perceived to reflect his or her real-life identity, a persona that mirrors, however inaccurately, his or her real-life self. The TV-character is a ‘second self’, but still a persona, a created figure. Rather like the eponymous stars of these shows, the character which Horace adopts in the Satires is at once a skew reflection of his historical self, but the ‘second self’ also has a fictional life of his own which he acts out within this ‘complex poetic world’. Horace’s ‘satirist’ is himself a character who plays a role within the universe of the Satires, no less than other figures.

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183 At 2.1.34-39, claiming to be following the virulence of Lucullus, he says: ...sequor hunc, Lucanus an Apulus anceps! nam Venusinus arat finem sub utrumque colonos; missus ad loc., pulsis, vetus est ut fama, Sabellis; quo ne per vacuum Romano incurreret hostis; sive quod Apula gens seu quod Lucania bellum incurseret violenta. Horace apparently here refers to the Third Samnite War when in 291 B.C. L. Postumius Megellus captured Venusia and turned it into a buffer between two war-like neighbours, the Lucanians and Apulians. Horace blames his vituperative qualities of his satire on his descent from the war-like neighbours. Gordon Williams notes that here ‘the poet reflects on his own identity in a particularly interesting way’, and that he ‘regards himself as belonging to one of the pre-Roman Sabellian tribes’ in the area (1995: 302-303).


185 Id.: 2ff.


187 To refer to a number of relatively recent examples, ‘Fran’ the Nanny shares a name with the actor, Fran Drescher, who portrays her; an even more striking contemporary example is that the TV-character ‘Ellen’ eventually shared a sexuality with her real-life counterpart, Ellen DeGeneres. However, ‘Seinfeld’ has been perhaps the most extreme version of this phenomenon.

188 Zetzel 1980: 73.
who parade through the work, characters such as Fabius, Crispinus, Hermogenes Tigellius and Canidia. Horace is the star of his own show.

The unity of Horace's persona or 'second self' in the Satires does not however preclude his use as speaker of a multiplicity of different voices, some of which blatantly contradict each other. Horace's 'second self' in the Satires tries on a number of masks in the course of the work. I suspect that, while reading the poems to his elite audience within the circle of Maecenas, Horace would actually 'perform' the Sermones, adopting different voices to identify the various speakers. What we have then are a number of smaller personae or roles 'put on' by an over-arching authorial persona, whose main role would however be as 'himself'. The character adopted by the author Horace in the Satires, for one, consciously assumes the mask of moralising preacher within the first few poems of Book One, but from time to time this authoritative discourse is itself undercut by the speaker. He also assumes, without contradiction, the masks of 'the satirist', 'the friend' and 'the author'. Indeed, the speaker of the liber sermonum often refers self-consciously to his writings themselves in the course of his discussions, and his status as an 'author' and 'satirist' are central concerns of particular satires of the first book, notably Sat. 1.4 and 1.10. To qualify Zetzel's statement quoted earlier, Horace merely plays the role, among others, of Rome's 'most ironic and contradictory poet'.

While the figure who addresses us in Horace's Satires is a created figure, then, a second 'Horace', at the same time he is, as noted, misleadingly granted certain characteristics of the historical author - in fact, Horace actually seems to play with the concept of satire as

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189 It is likewise my contention that Horace's speaker-persona operates within a fully delineated dramatic context right from the beginning of the first book of Satires, but more light will be shed on this later.

190 Ellen Oliensis, however, seems to me to have gone too far in reversing persona theory when she argues that Horace's poems are 'consequential acts within society' (1998: 2-3) which could have had serious repercussions for his career. While I would agree that Horace is highly conscious of the image (what Oliensis terms the 'face', id.: 1ff) that he is presenting to the world, both of himself and of his circle of friends, I find that Oliensis' approach not only tends to take Horace too literally, but also fails to give readers such as Maecenas any credit for their sophistication and humour. For further criticism of Oliensis' 'New Historicism', see the review of Freudenburg (1999: 480).

191 Mitsis (1993: 123 n. 21) has, in relation to Lucretius, likewise argued for a 'more flexible conception' of the relation between persona and author, 'in which mask and wearer at times become indistinguishable and at other times the mask is assumed as a pose...'. 
‘autobiography’. The problem with Horatian satire is that *posing as autobiography* is perhaps its chief fiction.¹⁹²

**Reversals of the authorial voice**

That Horace’s ‘second self’ within the *Satires* is to be understood as a single fictional character may be appreciated when we consider the relationship of the first to the second book. Unless this persona is seen as a single ‘Horace’, a figure who sets himself up as ‘The Satirist’ in the course of the first book, only to be undercut in the second, much of the interlibral reversal will pass unnoticed. Without the extensive construction of the ‘author’ in the *liber sermonum*, there can be no deconstruction of this humorously exalted (if self-satirically sabotaged) character in the second book.

The construction of this character takes place over the ten satires of Book One, as the ‘diatribe’ of the first triad gradually begins to give way to the revelation of ‘personal’ details of the speaker. In *Sat.* 1.3, 1.4 and 1.6 ‘diatribe’ has to share space with our growing scrapbook of his ‘autobiographical’ memento’s. By the end of the *liber sermonum* the satirist’s character has been assembled. He has told us a number of things about himself, has made a number of attacks against others, both nameless groups and named individuals, and has asserted his stylistic ideals. The ‘second self’ appears to us consciously in the role of both a poet and a satirist, although, true to form, on occasion he denies both appellations.

In the second book, however, we will see him relinquish these roles to play the part of listener and interlocutor. Everything, or almost everything that he has told us about himself, will be called into question in the second book of *Satires*, by Damasippus and by

¹⁹² See DuQuesnay (1984: 26): ‘To suppose that Horace’s technique in his satires is not deliberate and that the effects are not intended would be to underestimate grossly the skill of Horace as a poet and his self-consciousness as an artist...’. As an artist, therefore, Horace deliberately fosters (*ibid.*) ‘the impression that the reader is hearing the authentic voice of the historical character Q. Horatius Flaccus... Nothing is done which would allow the reader to feel conscious of any gap between the image presented in the poems and reality...’.
Davus in particular. The 'second self', the 'Horace' who appears to us as a character of the *Satires* sets himself up in the first book only to be undercut, in the second book, as the trends that in the *liber sermonum* appear as joking self-satire, are fully dramatised and confirmed in the mouths of others in Book Two. Indeed, Horace needs no assistance from outside as his straw authorial character comes unstuck in the proto-Carnivalesque Saturnalian *Satires* of the second book: Damasippus and Davus are his deconstructors.

But in taking Horace to task, these other figures are themselves compelled to assume the role of the satirist, and thus inevitably in turn set themselves up as the authorial moralising voice, inviting a similar fate and leaving the equation ultimately dialogically ‘unfinalizable’. Looked at in Bakhtinian terms, the authorial and other speakers of the *Satires* are only as good as their dialogue with other voices. The ‘dialogue’ between Horace’s two books of *Satires*, which comprises the building up of the authorial persona in the first book of *Satires*, and its corresponding breakdown in the second, begins in the first book, however, with the dialogic relationship between the speaker and his addressees there.

**Satire and audience**

It is not solely the speaker, the authorial satirical voice, that enables the dialogue of the *Satires* to take place, but also the audience, the addressees to whom the moralising is addressed and who thus comprise an equally important participant in the dialogue.¹³ Peter Rabinowitz, for example, argues that at least four audiences might be posited for any narrative text: the authorial, actual, narrative and ideal narrative audiences, but acknowledges that there might be an even greater number of audiences discernible in works of a more complex nature. The authorial audience is that ideal group that the historical author had in mind when he wrote his work. Rabinowitz (1977: 126): ‘...the author...designs his work rhetorically for a specific hypothetical audience. Like a philosopher, historian, or journalist, he cannot write without making certain assumptions about his readers’ beliefs, knowledge, and familiarity with conventions’. The actual audience comprises the recipients of the text in any day or age, in other words, the historical audience (1977: 126; cf. Muecke 1990: 39). The narrative and ideal narrative audiences (Rabinowitz *id.*: 125) are two hypothetical sets of addressees: the narrative audience is an audience that the actual audience must pretend to be, according to Rabinowitz, an audience that suspends disbelief and tries to accept the work of fiction as real. The ideal narrative audience (left out by Rabinowitz in his 1986 classicist-oriented article in *Arethusa*) assumes a role similar to that of a narrative audience, but one which plays along with the narrator even more loyally than does the narrative audience, and which gullibly agrees with everything the narrator says (1977: 135). Although Rabinowitz’ latter two audiences, the narrative and ideal narrative audiences, are clearly more specifically appropriate to the novel than to satire, as a writer of fiction Horace does however construct a fictitious world in his *Satires* which he, as narrator,
though all nature of texts will have what are known to narrative theory as the authorial and actual audiences,\textsuperscript{194} and in addition other audiences as well, clearly the varieties of audience may alter according to the type and nature of the work in question. Satire, however, far exceeds other forms of narrative in its deliberate consciousness of its audiences. Ancient texts tended on the whole to be far more rhetorically audience-orientated than is the modern novel,\textsuperscript{195} on which so much of audience-oriented criticism has been based. But Roman satire, particularly Horace’s ‘diatribe’ satire, is even more consciously audience-related than other types of ancient narrative.\textsuperscript{196} Because Roman satire engages its audiences far more directly than the novel, it may be useful to find a different model for delineating satire’s addressees. In a study of Horace’s Sat. 1.1, for example, Barbara K. Gold has seen a primary audience (in Maecenas, the dedicatee), an authorial audience clearly asks his audience to believe. In his role as narrator he constructs a morality, an ‘autobiographical’ background for himself, a social context; as narrative audience we are asked to pretend to believe all this, but it is only a hypothetical ideal narrative audience that would swallow it lock, stock and barrel. Scholars who have taken literally everything the satirist has said, and have consequently adopted an autobiographical approach to the Satires, have in effect fallen into Horace’s traps and have unwittingly played the part of an ideal narrative audience. But the Satires are addressed not only simultaneously but also consciously to more than one audience, and what one audience is expected to accept, another is clearly meant to see through.\textsuperscript{197} Rabinowitz points out that a gap will always exist between the authorial and the actual audience, a gap which must be bridged by the actual readers if they are to appreciate a work fully (1977: 127). Moreover, the ‘greater the distance - geographical, cultural, chronological - between the author and his readers, the more of a challenge this is likely to provide’ (ibid.). Naturally, when a gap stretches over two thousand years, over linguistic, cultural, and literary divides, having as huge dimensions as those of the gap that confronts the modern reader of classical texts, there is a far greater distinction between the authorial and actual audiences than generally exists in, say, a novel written within the last three hundred years. There is an enormous distance between the present day actual audience or, more properly, reader of Horace’s Satires, and the contemporary authorial audience whom Horace had in mind when he wrote the Satires. Ironically, given what we know of ancient customs, it seems that there would have been very little distance between the first actual audience to experience Horace’s Satires (initially, in all probability, an audience which was physically present at a recitation, and would presumably later re-read the poems for their own pleasure), and the authorial audience for whom they were written. Horace lists his ideal audience, comprising a group of educated poets and friends, at Sat. 1.10.81-90. He also tells us there whom he would specifically not like as readers. Of course the modern reader can never experience the Satires in the same way as Virgil (mentioned as an ideal reader at Sat. 1.10.81), for example, although this would be true for any other reader, even a less-favoured contemporary of Horace. At the same time we, the actual audience, are a type of reader whom Horace, for all his talk of posterity in Ode 3.30 (Exegi monumentum), could never have anticipated. One may add that the discipline of Classics is broadly directed at trying to narrow the gap between the authorial and actual audiences of ancient texts (in a sense, our pursuit is vainly aimed at narrowing the gap between us and Virgil).\textsuperscript{198} Muecke notes that ancient literature has as a whole been classed as ‘Du-litteratur’ (1990: 43).\textsuperscript{199} Muecke (ibid.) points out that satire’s difference ‘lies in the dramatic character of the interaction with the second person’.
(Horace's group of friends, his ideal audience), an actual audience (the present-day readers), and an internal audience (the imaginary interlocutor miser-figure).\footnote{Gold 1992: 162ff; cf. Muecke 1990: 34ff.}

But the satirist is also a far more aggressive and subversive character than even the most ardent socially-inspired novelist-narrator. We see this particularly in the satirist's attitudes toward his audiences. For example, as narrator, perhaps because ethical issues concern so much of his attention, the satirist not only requests but actually demands that his audiences subscribe to the ranks of his 'ideal' audience. Those who decline to do so are utterly condemned: failed audiences and undesired audiences are readily identified and ridiculed by the satirist.\footnote{See esp. Sat. 1.4.71-78, where Tigellius Hermogenes and the common mob are Horace's undesired audiences, contrasted with his small group of friends as his ideal audience; cf. 1.10.81-91, where Horace catalogues his ideal learned audience, but condemns others such as Demetrius and Tigellius. Lucilius of course had himself been just as specific in claiming that he wanted an average audience, neither too learned or otherwise, to read him: Persium non curo legere, Laetitum Decimum volo (593 Marx = 635 Warmington); nec doctissimus nec scribo indoctis nimis>. Marx>; jumi Persium>; haec legere nolo, Junium Congum volo (595-6 Marx = 632-4 Warmington); cf. Horace Sat. 1.10.76: nam satis est equitem mihi plaudere... See Muecke id.: 35; 1979: 55f.}

The attitude of the satirist to his audience is ambiguous: it may be positive or negative, depending on where the audience is positioned, or where the satirist positions himself with regard to the audience. The nature of satire itself accounts for this: where a straightforward novel's primary purpose is to relate and perhaps condemn indirectly, satire's is to impugn and condemn directly. Part of the problem is that one of satire's audiences is often an indefinite group of targets ('you' can be the one guilty of the vice the satirist attacks). With the shifting voices of the satirist, too, the relationship between the audiences is far more fluid, and there is also the constant danger that any or all of the audiences may become the target of the satire. Muecke notes: 'Satire works by deliberately confusing its target with its receiver and claiming a critical function'.\footnote{1990: 42.} Roman, particularly Horatian satire, then, is challenging because of its marked consciousness of its audiences, its manipulation of manifold audiences, and its attitude to its various audiences. Horatian satire is therefore not something that has simply to be decoded by an audience, but depends, for its effectiveness, on its definitive and often ambiguous audience-orientation which is there from the outset.
Addressivity: speakers and audiences in Bakhtinian thought

Although 'audience' is an area to which Bakhtin did not devote as much attention as many scholars would have liked, his conception of 'audiences', or addressees, as he terms them, challenges many of the assumptions of Western narrative theory, and therefore may provide a more useful model for approaching Horace's *Satires*. Underlying much of the Western narratological concept of author-audience relationships is the Saussure-Jakobson communication model, which is based on the one-way pattern of *sender-message-receiver*. In Bakhtin's terms there is much wrong with this model, as Bakhtinian thought, in which I include the ideas of members of Bakhtin's circle in the 1920's, stressed not so much the one-way transaction between senders and receivers, but rather the relationship that is established between a speaker and a listener. The chief Bakhtinian contribution to this area of investigation is to suggest that we are to conceive of speaker and addressee simultaneously.

Instead of viewing communication as something formulated by the speaker, encoded, sent and decoded by the receiver, Bakhtin and his circle regard the listener as being present in every utterance as it is being made, and not as an afterthought. As Medvedev, one of the Bakhtinian circle, comments, there is no ready-made message x that is simply sent from A to be decoded by B in the manner of a telegraph. Rather, '...it takes form in the process of communication between A and B. Nor is it transmitted from the first to the second, but

200 While in strict Bakhtinian terms all audiences should be viewed as *addressees*, my own usage is generally more conservative. Throughout this thesis I tend to draw a distinction between 'addressees' and 'audiences', although there is naturally some overlap. I understand the term 'addressee' to denote a recipient who is directly or indirectly consciously addressed by Horace in his *Satires*, generally coinciding with his 'primary' and 'authorial' audiences, whereas the term 'audience' for me has a far broader scope, denoting any recipient or group of recipients of the *Sermones*, ancient or modern. Although Horace's present-day readers can certainly be termed an audience (an 'actual' audience) of Horace's *Satires*, we seem mostly to be playing the role of eavesdroppers rather than that of direct addressees (but cf. p. 66, n. 212 below for the Bakhtinian concept of the 'Superaddressee'). That readers and other recipients of the *Satires* are indeed cajoled into playing specific roles by Horace is beyond a doubt, however, and much of this thesis is devoted to exploring the interrelationships between the *Satires' speakers, addressees and audiences.

201 Jakobson, revising Saussure's theories, remarks: 'One must distinguish sharply between two positions, that of the encoder and the decoder, in other words, between the role of the addressee and that of the addressee... [for the decoder] meaning emerges only as a conclusion, whereas for the speaker meaning is primary...' (1985: 32, based on a 1959 lecture).

is constructed between them, *like an ideological bridge*; it is constructed in the process of their interaction.\(^{203}\) Likewise, Voloshinov, another of Bakhtin's circle in the 1920's, notes that 'word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant. As word, it is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addressee and addressee... A word is a bridge thrown between myself and another.'\(^{204}\) In other words, the speaker is conscious of his audience throughout; the addressee is not a passive recipient but shapes the utterance as much as the speaker does.\(^{205}\) In Bakhtinian thought, therefore, the listener or audience is not someone or something to which an utterance is 'sent', but rather is an entity already present in every utterance from the outset. Every utterance is contracted with an audience in mind. The speaker and listener both come into being at the start of the utterance - indeed, they 'do not even exist in such capacity before the utterance\(^{206}\) - and remain in that relationship for as long as the utterance lasts, connected by the unseen 'bridge'. That an utterance 'requires both a speaker and a listener...who... have joint proprietorship of it',\(^{207}\) is known in Bakhtinian terms as its 'addressivity'.\(^{208}\)

In relation to the highly dialogic nature of the *Satires* of Horace, which not only possess addressivity but in addition are deliberately marked in their orientation toward an audi-

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\(^{203}\) Medvedev *cit.* Todorov 1984: 55-56 (I have given Godzich's translation of Todorov here; my emphasis); Medvedev 1985: 152. Medvedev's work has sometimes been thought to be Bakhtin's own, or at least to have been written on the basis of discussions with Bakhtin. For the question of the controversial texts, refer to my Introduction, pp. 35-36, n. 108 above.

\(^{204}\) Voloshinov (1973: 86) goes on to remark: 'If one end of the bridge belongs to me, then the other depends on my addressee. A word is territory shared by both addressee and addressee, by the speaker and his interlocutor'; cf. Morson & Emerson 1990: 129. Voloshinov's work has also often been attributed to Bakhtin, and may likewise have been influenced by conversations with Bakhtin.

\(^{205}\) Bakhtin was later to attribute the speaker's orientation toward the listener to the former's consciousness of the part that the addressee's active understanding plays in his construction of the utterance: 'It is precisely such an [active] understanding that the speaker counts on. Therefore his orientation toward the listener is an orientation toward a specific conceptual horizon, toward the specific world of the listener ...' (1981: 282; cf. 1986: 67-70). Likewise, in one of his last writings Bakhtin again refers back to the idea, presented in Voloshinov's and Medvedev's work, of the two-way communication bridge between speaker and listener, in opposition to the idea of the one-way encoded message: 'Semiotics prefers to deal with the transmission of a ready-made message by means of a ready-made code, whereas in living speech messages are, strictly speaking, created for the first time in the process of transmission, and ultimately there is no code...' (Bakhtin 1986: 147). For Bakhtin's application of this theory to literary works, see *id.*: 98-99.

\(^{206}\) Todorov 1984: 55.

\(^{207}\) Morson & Emerson 1990: 131.

\(^{208}\) Bakhtin 1986: 95-100.
ence, this Bakhtinian two-way concept of *speaker-utterance-listener* is ultimately of more use than the Saussure-Jakobson one. The Bakhtinian concept of the utterance as a bridge instantly linking speaker and listener is significant for the dialogicality of Horatian satire. 'Horace' as speaker, as well as many of the other speakers that he introduces, are conscious of and directed toward their audiences from the outset; the 'addressivity' of Horace's *Satires* means that they are not to be viewed as messages, encoded and decoded, but rather as interactions. The speaker usually demonstrates that he has his addressee in mind as he makes the utterance.

Not only did Bakhtinian thought stress the relationship between speaker and addressee, however, but two other considerations were also raised. First, Bakhtin argued that the speaker's (or author’s) heteroglot sources should also be noted as making a contribution to the equation: 'The author (the speaker) may have unalienable rights upon the discourse, but so does the listener, so do *those whose voices resonate in the words found by the author* (since there are no words that do not belong to someone)...'. In other words, with double-voiced discourse there may be a lot more going on than merely a direct address of audiences; the speakers may simultaneously be multiple too. Horace’s satire possesses not only addressivity, but multiple addressivity.

Second, Voloshinov suggested that we should consider 'also the extraverbal aspects of the situation', by which he prompts us to view even the simplest utterance as the enacting of a little drama. In other words, we should attempt to consider broader aspects of the interaction and more particularly, the background to the interrelationship between the speaker and his audience. The entire *situation* of the utterance, the external context as we can determine it from the text, in particular the specific social relationship between speaker and listener, as stressed by Voloshinov, has therefore also to be considered. This Bakhtinian emphasis not solely on the relationship between speaker and addressee but on

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209 Bakhtin *cit.* Todorov 1984: 52 (Godzich’s translation of Todorov; my emphasis); Bakhtin 1986: 121-122.
211 Todorov 1984: 47; see Voloshinov *id.*: 93-96, 103-104.
also their sources and their entire ‘context’ will shortly be seen to be highly significant in Horace’s presentation of moralising speech to his patron Maecenas in his initial satire.

It is my intention, in the remainder of the present chapter, to illustrate the points discussed above by considering primarily the orientation of the speaker toward the audiences of the initial ‘diatribe’ satire of Horace’s first book, Sat. 1.1. The rest of Part 1 of the present work (chapters 2 to 4) will focus on the ‘addressivity’ of the moralising and moralising-literary satires of Book One. In each of the following chapters I shall consider the relationship between the voices in dialogue, as well as the entire context of the interaction between speaker and addressee. In our quest to become a little more like Horace’s ‘Superaddressees’,212 it is my contention that we should regard the Satires, as dialogue in a Bakhtinian sense, from the simultaneous perspectives of both speaker and listener, ‘author’ and audience, satirist and target. No single party is to be allowed to dominate, but all are constantly to be set in an ‘unfinalizable’ dialogue with each other.

The start of the first triad: Sat. 1.1

Horace’s initial three satires, the ‘diatribes’ of the first book, all address moral issues in a chatty style. They are spoken by a first person singular speaker who engages directly with his audience. As a number of scholars have argued, each of the three is connected to its successor in a manner which suggests an ongoing discussion, rather than entirely separate individual satires.213 All three also display, in addition, a comparable structure.214 What is

212 In his later work Bakhtin finally also developed the idea of a ‘Superaddressee’, an ideal, hypothetical listener, who understands everything that the speaker or writer is attempting to communicate (1986: 126). The idea of the ‘Superaddressee’ is clearly in some ways akin to narratologists’ ideas of the authorial and narrative audiences, but it is also distinct. Not only does the concept of the Superaddressee simplify the confusing multiple subdivisions of audiences suggested by Western narrative theory, but in addition, unlike the strict compartmentalisation of audience in Western theory, Bakhtin’s concept is more fluid, granting virtually any audience the potential to achieve greater understanding, and thus to get closer to the status of Superaddressee - dialogue is thus ongoing and of itself ‘unfinalizable’. However, it appears that in practice the status of Superaddressee would be essentially unreachable, being limited to one’s identical twin or else, in Bakhtin’s view, to an omniscient divine being, ‘God’. In the case of Horace’s Satires, as he suggests (Sat. 1.10.81-90a), the Superaddressees would undoubtedly be his audience of friends in Maecenas’ coterie.

213 See Armstrong 1964 (a): 87ff; van Rooy 1968: 41 (van Rooy acknowledges this while preferring to divide the satires into separate consecutive pairs). While Sat. 1.1 ends on a consideration of the Golden Mean, an inverted version of this topic begins 1.2, where the theme is nil medium est; 1.2 and 1.3 are
of interest to the present study, however, is that the first triad, as moralising satire, displays a complex set of relationships between speaker, target and audience which, I contend, not only sets the tone for the remainder of the *liber sermonum*, but culminates in the interesting dialogic experiments in author and audience in Horace's second book of *Satires*.

One of the most controversial satires because of the fact that its two themes, dissatisfaction (equivalent to the Greek μεμψιμοιρία), and greed (equivalent to πλεονεξία or φιλαργυρία) are kept separate throughout most of the poem, but are united rather clumsily and transparently at its end, *Sat.* 1.1 has attracted much scholarly attention.\(^2\) Not only have scholars struggled to account for the manner in which the initial poem may be said to be programmatic,\(^2\) but the issue of the 'problematic' structure of this satire, around which most of the debate has been centred, is well-known to Horatian scholars: the satirist starts out by treating the dissatisfaction of various professionals in terms of a well-

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\(^2\) For example, one of the striking features of the first triad, the 'diatribes', of Book One is their use of indirect beginnings. This indirect approach, although by no means restricted to these satires, is nevertheless perhaps most striking in the first three satires of Book One. In each of these satires, the speaker starts by treating a topic that is substantially different from that treated in what could be regarded as the satire's body. In each case, however, there is a subtle although sometimes tangential link between the topic of the introductory section and that treated in the central or main section. In two of the cases (1.1, 1.3), an attempt (although not always a successful one) appears to be made to return in some manner to the subject of the initial section, to create a sort of ring composition; in 1.2, however, which ironically starts out by treating the question of a mean, no such attempt is made. Towards the end of the first satire the speaker announces that he is 'returning to where he left off' (1.1.108ff), and his questionable success at ring composition has caused *Sat.* 1.1, rather than the other two satires, to be the focus of much criticism at the hands of scholars who seem to have expected a more clearly structured poem to herald the start of the first collection.

\(^3\) For example, observed that the arguments of *Sat.* 1.1 were not seamlessly joined: 'Duo hac satira perstringuntur vitia: invidia et avaritia....quaque argumenta non tam arte inter se cohaerent ut non nunc etiam intellegatur componi diversa'. Gercke too (1893: 41-42) commented on the heterogeneous components of this satire, remarking on *Sat.* 1.1's three different sections (clearly more or less 1ff, 38ff, 108ff). He was perplexed (*id*: 42) by the relation of the themes of the first two sections, dissatisfaction in one's career and miserly greed respectively, to the 'envy' theme of the final section, pointing out that while no-one is said to envy the miser who appears in the central sections of the satire, neither is the self-satisfied miser himself said to envy his neighbour.

\(^4\) Fraenkel (1957: 96) comments that *Sat.* 1.1 'lacks the definite character of a prelude to the whole following book', but notes that it does contain a number of 'hints' at the topics of succeeding satires; but cf. van Rooy 1972: 298ff, 1977: 266ff. For a more sophisticated 'literary' reading of the programmatic aspects of *Sat.* 1.1, see Freudenburg 1993: 187-193.
worn Hellenistic *topos*, with no direct mention, in the initial lines (1-22), of the poem’s coming and conventionally associated theme - greed. The central core of the poem (41-107), involves a lengthy interview - a ‘diatribal’ exchange - with the imaginary figure of the ‘miser’, who is portrayed obsessively heaping store upon store and is taken to task for doing so by the main speaker. The central section concludes with an exhortation to an imaginary audience to eschew the miser’s behaviour, but not to go to the opposite extreme either (105-106). An apparent attempt to tie up loose ends occurs in the final section of the first satire, at 108ff, where dissatisfaction, the subject of the initial section of the satire, and greed, that of the satire’s body, are united, and in addition a new, potentially unifying element - competitive ambition - is added to the mixture.

Scholars have not, on the whole, been very impressed.\(^{217}\) Palmer, for example, observed that while the ‘avowed subject’ of the first satire is discontent with one’s lot and envy of the lot of others, ‘there are in reality two subjects, discontent and avarice, but Horace tries to treat them as one, and the suture is apparent’\(^{218}\). Sat. 1.1, with its ‘manifest stitching’ has been viewed almost universally as a problem to be blamed on a number of factors - immaturity at the time of writing, the ‘inorganic’ nature of this particular piece,\(^{219}\) ‘layers’ of composition due to the start and finish of the satire belonging to a later date than its central portion,\(^{220}\) the transitional position purportedly occupied by this satire in terms of

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\(^{217}\) Lejay sums it up well in the introductory statement to his discussion of this poem: ‘Le plan de cette satire a embarrasse les commentateurs’ (1911: 1).

\(^{218}\) 1883: 113. Of the two, Palmer also (ibid.) considered avarice to be the ‘real subject’, and noted the ‘suture’ while claiming that the *avarus* had been introduced as an example of ‘the discontented man’. Cf. Fiske (1920: 219): ‘Horace’s first satire represents an attempt, only partly successful, to fuse two favourite themes of Cynic-Stoic philosophy’.

\(^{219}\) See Radermacher (1921: 148) who complained that the themes were not entirely ‘organically’ linked: ‘Deutlich ist, dass die erste Satire zwei Motive nicht ganz organisch verarbeitet’; cf. Knoche, who points out that, while the themes of dissatisfaction and greed may be united at the poem’s end by the theme of envy, which is common to both, no ‘organic’ unity is restored through this: ‘Die beiden Hauptgedanken sind zwar durch ein Scharnier (Neid) miteinander verbunden, aber eine organische Einheit ist nicht hergestellt.’ (1949: 49).

\(^{220}\) See Radermacher (*id.*: 151), who concludes his treatment of *Sat.* 1.1 by opining that the beginning and end sections of the satire (*Mantelstück*) are relatively late in composition compared to the central portion: ‘Es is relativ jung, wie das Mittelstück relativ alt’.
composition dates, Horace’s own ineptitude, or more recently, the ineptitude of the persona he adopts.

Other scholars - admittedly in the minority - have jumped to Horace’s defence, drawing out the satire’s hidden potential links. But while it certainly is possible to find subtle links in the satire, and it is also true that the concept of πλεονεξία may unite the themes of both dissatisfaction and greed, not to mention competitive ambition - in that the greedy want both more than they have at present and more than anyone else - it is nevertheless clear that, far from disguising the ‘stitching’, Horace seems deliberately to have called attention to the satire’s much discussed ‘sutures’, and even appears to

\[221\] See Wimmel 1962: 18-19; but cf. the criticism of Brink 1964: 162-163.
\[224\] In the final section the greedy person is now imagined, for example, eyeing his neighbour’s cow enviously (110-111). Competitive greed itself has, however, been mentioned prior to this at line 40: nil obstet tibi dum me sit te ditior alter. This seems to anticipate line 113, where the competitive greedy person’s hasty desire to outdo everyone else is emphasised: sic festinanti semper locupletior obstat. The echoes of obstat obstat and the synonyms ditior/locupletior are also encouraging in this regard.
\[225\] Fraenkel (1957: 91) observed that greed was the cause of the other vices criticised in the poem, the motivating factor behind dissatisfaction and envy: ‘It is avaritia that is at the bottom of the misguided yearning after other men’s lot. All those people would not be prepared to change; rather they will, out of greed, put up with any toil and danger. Greed impels them to call other people happy, to envy them, to try to outdo them.’ Armstrong (1964: 88) likewise remarked upon the obvious link between the themes of dissatisfaction and greed in that avarice was presented as the prime obstacle to retirement to the contented life. Niall Rudd observed that the satire’s two main themes were indeed ideologically connected in that the question of discontent was ultimately reduced to the issue of greed: the reason that the malcontents refused to alter their ways was that they were in their prospective professions for the money (1966: 12-14). Rudd acknowledges, however, that his summary makes ‘the poem appear more systematic than it is’ (id.: 12).
\[226\] See Rudd (id.: 14) on πλεονεξία: ‘This vice had two complementary aims - more money for oneself and more money than other people. And so within this idea, for which there is no Latin word, avaritia and invidia are as inseparable as concave and convex.’
\[227\] For example, the deliberate echoes of the initial part of the satire at 108ff have the ironic effect of emphasising the satire’s clumsy connections rather than showing the things they connect to their best advantage. Echoes may effectively be used to point to thematic links in an artistic work, but again, they may also be used to suggest links where there are, in actual fact, none: repetition itself may alone even be the chief instigation for positing a link. At the same time repetition, as an apparent ‘attempt’ to suggest a link may ironically draw attention to the very lack thereof. Even a word correlation (like labor), sprinkled throughout the satire, is unable to disguise the disjointed impression that a linear reading of the poem is patently contrived to evoke. Fraenkel (id.: 94f) pointed out that even the repetition, partially verbatim, of the satire’s introductory was ‘only so in appearance’, and observed that a ‘momentous shift’ had indeed taken place between the introductory lines of the satire and 108ff. The iteration of the list of professionals, slightly altered, at 28ff, the recapitulation of the opening lines, with a few changes, at 108ff, are therefore merely artful duplications at places where there is a return to a previous thought only in the most oblique sense. Far from making the satire seem unified, these forced attempts at unity have the opposite effect: purportedly sewing the satire together, they do no more than effectively draw the observer’s attention to the stitches.
separate naturally (and traditionally) linked themes. Indeed, one could argue that it was never Horace's intention to disguise the stitching, as scholars have traditionally assumed he should. We can only suppose that Sat. 1.1 stands as Horace intended it to stand, and that any of its 'faults' perceived by modern scholars are deliberate.

While it is not my intention to enter the old debate about the structuring of Sat. 1.1, it seems that part of the problem behind the almost endemic scholarly dissatisfaction with this piece lies, as hinted, with scholars' own assumptions and expectations concerning the first satire, in that they have mostly approached the Satires from a monologic rather than a dialogic perspective. As Fraenkel and Lejay observed, an informal, 'conversational logic' underscores the satire, and in the genre of 'talk' it is to be expected that the speaker will often be inclined to wander from topic to topic. The first satire is in a sense even more chatty than the others, since here the speaker engages in the niceties of beginning a discussion rather than merely continuing one, and he seeks to attract the attention of his patron and audience. The informal logic of conversation dictates that Horace will avoid beginning such a discussion by setting out a table of contents, explaining beforehand the

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228 Two later Hellenistic Greek passages where the connection of these topics is suggested survive. Both passages are comparable with Horace's treatment in Sat. 1.1, although it is generally assumed that the writers were not imitating Horace, but employing a common tradition (see discussion below, p. 72 n. 235). In the pseudo-Hippocratic example (Epist. 17), the link between μεμψιμορία and φιλαργυρίη is revealed about nine Teubner lines after the appearance of the twin sets of exempla of dissatisfied professionals. Discussing people who return to things which they have renounced, the writer identifies the underlying motivation as greed: καὶ τοῦτων πάντων αἰτία η φιλαργυρίη. It may be significant since in his treatment of the topos, separates the themes entirely - that the pseudo-Hippocratic writer makes the connection between the two relatively late in the discussion, and in addition the actual causal links and ramifications of the relationship between dissatisfaction and greed are not spelt out. However, in the Maximus of Tyre example (Diss. 21.1), by contrast, the connection between μεμψιμορία and πλεονεξία is drawn just prior to the introduction of the examples of dissatisfied people: καὶ πλεονεκτεῖ ἔτερος ἔτερου. However, here again, as in the Horatian passage, it is the living conditions or the degree of personal freedom made possible by the particular social status of each example, rather than money or possessions, that is so coveted by their opposite. In this passage too, then, no close connection is made within the treatment of dissatisfaction itself with what is allegedly its underlying cause: the soldier, for example, envies the civilian because of his peaceful lifestyle and not because he has more.

229 Fraenkel (id.: 94): 'Horace is in fact fully aware of the causal nexus between φιλαργυρίη and μεμψιμορία, but he chooses not to lay it bare and only now and then lets us catch a glimpse of it through the glittering embroidery of his conversation.' Cf. Freudenburg (1993: 13) who notes that while much scholarship has attempted to find links between the disjointed (but traditionally associated) themes, it is a much better proposition to assume that Horace had some purpose in relating his themes in a haphazard fashion.

230 Fraenkel id.: 94; cf. Lejay 1911: 1.
order that his speech is to take and the topics it is to treat, or anticipating what his conclusion is to be. Rather, he starts by posing what he considers (or pretends to consider) to be an interesting question, followed by amusing illustrative anecdotes.

The satire’s ‘conversational’ structure, as remarked by Lejay and Fraenkel, is itself an indicator of its dialogical nature. But in addition to this, it is my contention that Sat. 1.1 displays a dialogicality that is even more extensive than mere imitation of an informal discussion: the satire possesses a plurality of voices, both authorial and otherwise, and also a deliberately exploited ambiguity of audience. Horace’s first satire establishes the dialogic and multi-voiced atmosphere which will be continued in subsequent sermones. Indeed, Barbara K. Gold sees the manipulation of numerous voices and audiences in Sat. 1.1, the satire’s ‘polyvocality’, as one of the chief ways in which this often maligned poem could be said to be truly programmatic. If considered from a traditionally monologic perspective, Sat. 1.1 indeed appears to be a confusing and frustrating cacophony; it is only if it is regarded dialogically that the ingenuity of the first satire begins to emerge.

Dialogicality in Sat. 1.1

The first satire is, right from the beginning, intensely dialogical. Near its start the speaker proceeds to trot out four exempla of dissatisfied professionals to illustrate his point that no-one is content. Although they echo a common tradition, Horace’s contrasting pairs

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231 This is, in effect, what the proselytizing Stoic speaker Stertinius-Damasippus does at Sat. 2.3.77-81.
233 Horace has the worn-out soldier with the gammy leg wishing for the seemingly glamorous life of merchant: ‘o fortunati mercatores!’ (4-5). The scene quickly switches to the merchant, however, who, in the expressly unfortunate position of being at peril on the sea, is heard moaning about his lot and insisting that the life of the military man is preferable, because in contrast to his own drawn-out sufferings, not least the spectre of imminent drowning, the soldier’s troubles, or so the merchant claims, are at least hastily resolved by a swift death if not redeemed by a glorious victory: ‘contra mercator, navem iactantibus Austris/’militia est potior. quid enim? concurrur: horae/memento cita mors venit aut victoriae laeta’ (6-8). The merchant’s fantasies about life in the army have of course just been proved wrong by the appearance of the pitiful broken-limbed veteran, who is more likely to face a penniless retirement than the romantic if alternately gory ending envisaged for him by the merchant. Likewise the mercatorial life, awash in a tub, has been revealed as not nearly as glamorous in reality as in the soldier’s daydreams. The second pair of exempla, the lawyer and the are shortly shown to be equally deluded in their wishes for another existence. The lawyer praises the farmer’s life, on those days when, we learn in the following line, he is forced out of bed in the early hours by the urgent
of exempla, with their direct speech, are presented in a much livelier and dialogic fashion than either of the other surviving examples of the topos of μεμψιμορία in two later Greek texts, that of pseudo-Hippocrates or Maximus of Tyre. In Horace’s presentation of the topos, we actually hear the moans and groans of the malcontents, whereas the Greek texts report on the professionals’ dissatisfaction indirectly and far less vividly. The deus ex machina who shortly appears in order to chide the discontented is also actually heard to speak (15-19), and the main speaker, in addition, appeals to the actual audience to back the god up (19-22). Moreover, in his choice of examples Horace’s speaker has

knock of a client: agricolam laudat iuris legumque peritus/sub galli cantum consulitur ubi ostia pulsat (9-10). The farmer, when unlucky enough to be subpoenaed and dragged to the city on a surety default, shouts that the life of the townspeople is the only one worth living: ille, datis vadibus qui rure extractus in urbem est/solos felices viventis clamat in urbe (11-12). Again, the lawyer is clearly wrong in imagining that a farmer would never have to get up early; on the contrary, as everyone knows, early rising is the norm in an agricultural lifestyle. Likewise the farmer’s envy of the city-folk is equally deluded: does he suppose that they are never in danger of falling foul of the law? Their only advantages in a situation like his would be that they have less far to be dragged to the court-house, and perhaps a smidgeon of urban sophistication which would make them slightly less bewildered by the legal system.

Horace’s pairs of exempla in illustration of μεμψιμορία are likewise paralleled by a similar set at Maximus of Tyre Diss. 21.1, which again must reflect earlier Hellenistic moralising sources, the inspiration for both his passage and Horace’s (see Fiske 1920: 220, who argues that it is more likely that both Horace and Maximus drew on a common source than that Horace directly influenced the latter, but cf. Lejay 1911: 8, who claims that the similarities between the two passages bear witness to ‘la profonde influence d’Horace sur les moralistes qui l’ont suivi’). After making a few general statements about the nature of human dissatisfaction (paralleling the generalising question at the start of Sat. 1.1), Maximus launches into two sets of exempla demonstrating this dissatisfaction: the farmer calls the city-dwellers blessed (...τόν μὲν γεωργὸν μακαρίζοντα τοῖς ἀστικοῖς...), while the latter praise the agricultural life; the soldier can be heard eulogising the life of the civilian (...τὸν εἰρήνικον εὐδοκίμους...), whereas the latter wonders at the life of the soldier. Although Maximus’ variation of the verbs he uses makes him more comparable to Horace than the pseudo-Hippocratic writer is, and while he also does not merely reproduce his first set of exempla in his second, nevertheless both sets of examples that Maximus cites are, as in the other Greek passage, nothing more than neat opposites of each other. Although this was evidently all that was required by the tradition, Maximus’ treatment cannot but look pale beside that of Horace, who has instead to great effect gone beyond a mere reproduction of the tradition.
been innovative, not only adding a distinctly contemporary Roman touch in the *ius consular* but also manipulating the commonplaces at will.

In so doing Horace has, however, failed to impress some scholars. Freudenburg regards the presentation of the dissatisfied pairs at the start of *Sat.* 1.1 as evidence of Horace’s speaker’s thorough-going ineptitude. His complaint is that, unlike the standard *exempla* which appear in Greek moralising texts, Horace’s examples are not true opposites of one another, particularly in the case of the first two, the merchant and the soldier, and that in addition, the satirist ‘against all precedent, makes his characters choose a way of life that contains the very problems they seek to avoid’. However, I would argue that the changes that Horace has made to the tradition, far from undercutting the point he is making, actually support its ultimate punchline. The utter foolishness of each exemplar’s desire to change his lot, plain as day to the audience, is wholly appropriate considering that, by the time Horace has completed the illustration, the professionals will have been revealed as unwilling to take up any offer to change jobs, even if Jupiter himself were to make it to them (15-22). In view of the malcontents’ eventual tendency to refuse their dreams-come-true, Horace’s selection of his exemplars’ crazy ideal lifestyles is entirely prudent: as with a modern joke-teller, what at first seem irrelevancies in the speaker’s tale eventually are shown to have been cannily chosen.

Horace’s alterations to the tradition display the professionals’ foolishness even more obviously than do the standard sets of *exempla* paraded in the later Greek texts: of course the merchant is stupid to envy the soldier whose far-flung lifestyle and drawn-out sufferings are not that different from his own, only not as generously paid; naturally the early-rising lawyer is deluded in imagining that the farmer’s life is a (slumbering) bed of roses.

Unlike Maximus’ *exempla*, who only want to change once they have sampled the manner

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237 Ibid.; Freudenburg observes for example that the lifestyles of the soldier and merchant, supposedly two opposing *exempla*, are not that dissimilar, and that in Horace’s day, for exemplary purposes, these were regarded as much the same type of profession. Both went off to seek their fortunes in far lands, which certainly included extensive travelling, especially sea-faring, the most dangerous and consequently most feared type of travel in the ancient world (*id.*: 24).
in which the other half live, Horace’s characters’ self-delusion, shortly to be confirmed, is instead immediately revealed in the professionals’ refusal to concede what in their case should be obvious from the start: the grass is no greener on the other side. In contrast to the Greek texts’ predictably linear progress, then, Horace cleverly anticipates the outcome of his illustrations at the outset. Significantly, it is precisely through his use of dialogicality that Horace achieves this innovation: by allowing, for the most part, the voices of his exemplars to be heard, and by permitting their statements to be checked against the assertions and experiences of the other parties, Horace ensures that their inconsistency is revealed. Whatever he is up to in Sat. 1.1 (and as we shall see later, it is my suspicion that he is up to no good), as speaker Horace’s character certainly knows what he is doing.

Authorial double-voicedness in Sat. 1.1

In addition to the first satire’s lively illustrative dialogicality, there is also, however, a more complex type of ‘dialogue’ afoot. Horace’s first satire displays a duality, an ambiguity, in relation to its subject matter, its authorial voice, and also its audiences. When the speaker addresses Maecenas in the first line of Sat. 1.1, the fiction presented to us, the actual audience, is that we are overhearing a private chat between Horace and his patron. However, the philosophical-ethical nature of Horace’s topic of conversation, which is established right from its first line, coupled with its appeals to universal ideas, for example, that no-one (nemo) is content, and followed by adaptations of the standard exempla of μεμνημόνευμα, almost automatically declares his talk a moralising ‘diatribe’, potentially aimed at all humankind. Horace also encourages a formal impression by suggesting that he has adopted the stance of a school-teacher in relation to his audience, as he later likens his listeners to little children who have to be bribed with sweeties in order to learn the basics (25-26).

238 ut pueris olim dant crustula blandidio doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima. Horace’s ‘spoonful of sugar’ idea here is an echo of Lucretius DRN 1.936-938, where Lucretius likens his art to physicians’ tricks in getting children to swallow wormwood by means of honey-smeared cups: sed veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes/cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum/contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore. Mitsis (1993: 113ff) has argued that Lucretius’ likening of his audience to sick children who have to be deceived in order to be cured is part of this author’s elaborate rhetorical manipulation of his readers. I would suggest that Horace’s rather more benign classroom version of the Lucretian image at Sat. 1.1.25-26
Moreover, as ‘Horace’ adopts the mask of moralist almost self-consciously, a number of competing voices emerge. Right from the beginning of the first satire, in addition to speaking through the mask of moralist-teacher, Horace also counters the moralising voice by means of an authorial commentary on the alien authoritative discourse which he has placed in the mouth of his satirist persona.\textsuperscript{239} Analogous to the later heteroglossia that Bakhtin saw in the modern novel, in Sat. 1.1 authorial discourse deliberately intervenes to ironise the alien voice of authoritative discourse. Far from merely donning the mask of the moralist and issuing forth parodies of ethical discourse, the authorial voice is actually heard to engage in dialogue with the ‘alien word’ of the moralist persona.

For example, after the standard examples of dissatisfied people have been duly trotted out at the start of Sat. 1.1, there is a pause as a voice comments: \textit{cetera de genere hoc, adeo sunt multa, loquacem I delassare valent Fabium} - ‘There are many more examples of this nature, enough to wear out even the prolix Fabius’ (1.1.13-14). Although this comment is attributed to the main moralising speaker, its ironic slant, apparently conscious of the tediousness of the authoritative discourse, introduces another ‘voice’ into the equation, one which stands outside the bounds of the dramatic presentation of the moralist. The foregoing speech, however, with its vivid dialogic aspects, has hardly been dull or long-winded, and Horace has not exceeded the standard number of four dissatisfied professionals found in the later Greek texts. Also, this comment implies that the \textit{exempla} are commonplace, whereas we have seen that, in terms of the tradition, Horace’s examples are highly innovative. Horace at once pretends embarrassment at, but nevertheless persists with, his moralising persona.

\textsuperscript{239} How a self-righteous moralising speaker such as this could be ironised by an almost contemporaneous Horatian authorial voice can be seen from \textit{Epode} 2, for example, where an extensive eulogy of the simple life is revealed, in the final lines of that poem, as the discourse of Alfius the incorrigible money-lender. Within both books of satires as a whole, too, as we shall see, Horace’s moralist persona who begins his career in Sat. 1.1 is also satirised when, for example, in the penultimate satire of the second collection, Horace’s personal slave Davus is made to undercut all his master’s prior moralising discourse by demonstrating that the satirist has not practised what he has preached.
However, it is not merely voices but ideologies that are in conflict within the authorial discourse. Within the satire's first three lines, Stoicism and Epicureanism were already set at loggerheads, in the provocative juxtaposition of opposing ratio and sors (1.1.2). The strikingly Lucretian phrase cetera de genere hoc (13), placed alongside the attribution of the preceding discourse to the likes of the long-winded Stoic Fabius, strengthens this intratextual polemicism. This authorial double-voicedness is aimed, it seems, partly at scoring a point against the Stoics and simultaneously as a captatio benevolentiae of Maecenas. One might imagine the probably Epicurean Maecenas shortling as he good-humouredly denies Horace's self-satiric assertions but enjoys the joke at the expense of the Stoics. Right from the start of the satire, therefore, Horace's speech is orientated towards his primary addressee and dedicatee, Maecenas: ne te morer, audi..., he continues apologetically (14).

Likewise, at the end of the satire, Horace excuses himself by at once attacking and associating his preacher-persona with another apparently long-winded Stoic: ne me Crispini scrinia lippil/compilasse putes, verbum non amplium addam - 'So that you don't think that I have purloined the scrolls of bleary-eyed Crispinus, I shall not add another word more' (120-121). Self-satire is a common trick of the Horatian satirist, but here again there appears to be a dialogic splitting of the subject as the speaker breaks out of his preaching mode to ironise his own discourse. At the same time, he comments on the discourse of other characters with whom he identifies his alien persona. But as with Horace's earlier throw-away dig at Fabius, with whom he had ironically associated but simultaneously contrasted

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240 Freudenburg (1993: 11 n. 22) notes that ratio dederit represents the Stoic belief in 'the λόγος as a conscious providential force', while fors obiecerit by contrast suggests 'the haphazard clashing of atoms propounded by the Epicureans'.

241 The phrase cetera de genere hoc occurs 11 times in Lucretius, see e.g. DRN 3.481; 4.590, 1170; cf. Palmer 1883 ad loc., Kiesling-Heinz 1921: 5, Brown 1993: 91. Cf. the echo at Horace Sat. 1.125-6 of DRN 1.936-938 (observed above), and the correspondence of Sat. 1.1.118-119 with DRN 3.938-939 (discussed below).

242 DuQuesnay 1984: 33. Few scholars, I suspect, would accept the recent suggestion by William Turpin (1998: 127-128) that Maecenas is characterised as a Stoic in Sat. 1.1-3, even if by 'inversion'. The unflattering presentation of Stoics as interminable windbags is an on-going joke in the liber sermonum, with Fabius and Crispinus starring as Horace's chief stylistic enemies (e.g. Sat. 1.4.13ff). In the second book, the Stoics are equally bad as Horace is subjected to the seemingly endless Stoic 'diatribe' recited by the dreadful Damasippus in Sat. 2.3.
his own discourse, so his comment, at the satire's end, about not wanting to be going on like Crispinus, not only ridicules the Stoic but also bolsters Horace when one considers that, despite what he is implying, 120 lines are by no means a lot.\textsuperscript{243} Still, Horace seems set to exact approving chortles from his audience as he departs like the proverbial contented guest, once again echoing instead the Epicurean Lucretius.\textsuperscript{244} The final comment is thus a clever way of taking a side-sweep at the Stoics, fishing for compliments and at the same time achieving closure - for the moment.

Horace's first satire is an exercise in double- or multi-voicedness. In Sat. 1.1 we witness Horace mockingly try on the mask of moralising speaker. Authoritative discourse, in the guise of the broad tradition of 'diatribe', is claimed and simultaneously disclaimed.\textsuperscript{245} Authorial comment strives against the preacher persona and his 'authoritative word',\textsuperscript{246} as Horace peers out from behind the mask. This double-voicedness or heteroglossia, however, ultimately has a context and a purpose against which it is to be viewed: Horace's self-satiric but simultaneously anti-Stoic comments are arguably aimed at encouraging an impression of him as modest and affable in the eyes of his patron. The impression of modesty and affability is important, considering that Horace has not only posed as a moralist, but could even be viewed, as we shall see shortly, as addressing his lecture to the patron himself throughout much of Sat. 1.1. There may, however, be another motive for getting the addressee on his side...

\textsuperscript{243} Cf. Gowers' comments (1993 (b): 60) on Horace' ironic labelling of his relatively short Sat. 1.5 (in comparison to his other satires so far and the Lucilian poetic journey which inspired it) a \textit{longa charta} (1.5.104).

\textsuperscript{244} There is an echo at Sat. 1.1.118-119 of \textit{DRN} 3.938-939, the 'contented guest' topos in the midst of Lucretius' 'diatribe' against the fear of death: \textit{cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis/aequo animoque caps securam, stulte, quietem}?

\textsuperscript{245} The uneasy ambiguity of this satire might in fact explain the clumsy attempt to 'unite' the separately developed themes in the final section (108ff) that has irritated so many scholars: in this we seem to see the speaker's fumbling desire to preserve the semblance of a formal moral lecture. His version of ring composition - quickly uniting his two themes by the addition of a new element - is reminiscent of a magician who produces, at the end of his act, a string of connected coloured squares, without ever revealing the process of tying them together.

\textsuperscript{246} As Bakhtin has observed: 'Within the arena of almost every utterance an intense interaction and struggle between one's own and another's word is being waged, a process in which they oppose or dialogically inter-animate each other' (1981: 354).
Multiple voices and the audience

The duality of *Sat. 1.1* thus translates into an ambiguity of audience or, more precisely, of target. Although the first satire demonstrates a marked consciousness of its audiences, the satirist, however, seems to effect a deliberate confusion of addressees, so that throughout there is uncertainty as to the precise identity of the second person singular. In particular, the relationship of Maecenas, the primary audience, to the moralising voice and the moral issues that dominate most of *Sat. 1.1* is problematic. While Maecenas’ name itself is not mentioned again in *Sat. 1.1* after the first line, the second person singular is used several times subsequently. Indeed, at line 38 the speaker suddenly turns aggressive and starts an attack on a second person singular addressee which continues throughout the central portion of the satire (38-107). The much-berated interlocutor, who assumes the role of the ‘miser’ stock figure of comedy in the central section of the satire (40-107), and de-

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247 The next occasion on which the speaker uses the second person singular is: *ne te morer...* - ‘so as not to hold you up’ (14). Here a genuine second person addressee (rather than the Latin equivalent of ‘one’ or an indefinite ‘diatrical’ second person singular) is doubtless intended, and the logical conclusion, after the invocation of Maecenas at the start of the satire, is that it is the patron to whom the speaker is speaking. The speaker, apparently aware that he is taking up the audience’s time, promises to be brief. This might be understood merely as an idiomatic phrase, a way of politely if belatedly begging Maecenas’ forgiveness for the intrusion of the speech, or perhaps we are to imagine that it is a response to an impatient or bored look on the patron’s face. In the midst of his speech in *Sat. 2.7*, for example, the slave Davus refers to the threatening looks that his master Horace is giving him, and hastens to reveal the direction his speech is taking: *aufer/ime vultu terrere; manum stomachumque teneto; dum quae Crispini docuit me tanitor edo* - ‘Stop trying to frighten me with your expression; keep your hand and bile in check while I relate what Crispinus’ doorkeeper has taught me’ (2.7.43-45). Davus implies, even while joking, that his master is in danger of hitting him. Horace’s angry response to Davus’ discourse is indeed eventually displayed at the end of the satire (2.7.116f). Should we imagine that Maecenas is as hostile to the speaker in *Sat. 1.1* as ‘Horace’ is in 2.7? 248 *cum te neque fervidus aestus/demoveat lucro neque hiems, ignis, mare, ferrum, nil obstet tibi dum ne sit te dittor aler* (38b-40). This abrupt apostrophe of the second person singular is quite startling, given that up until now the speaker has been favouring the third person, and has recently used the first person plural jussive subjunctive to create a sense of unity between speaker and receiver (*quaeramus* - ‘let’s inquire’, 27). The change to the second person singular at line 38 is so sudden, midway through the point that the speaker is making in contrasting the humans with the ant, that it seems to take all audiences by surprise. The speaker next poses a question: *quid iuvat immensum te argenti pondus et aurifurtim de fossa timidum deponere terru?* - ‘What good is it to dig up the ground and deposit a huge weight of silver and gold in the earth?’ (41-42). Unlike the prior questions, which either ranged the audience against a group of third party targets (as at 20-22), or which were essentially rhetorical in that the answer was contained in the question itself (as at 24-26), this latest question is more aggressive: while not necessarily demanding a reply, this is the type of question which could be asked of the target, rather than one that is unambiguously *about* the target. Audience and target are aligned, and thus it is a relief when a little voice does indeed answer back at 43: *quod si comminuas, vilem redigatur ad assem.*
fends his accumulation of wealth, would be instantly recognisable to an ancient audience as the commonplace adversary of the ‘diatribe’ style. Should Horace, then, be seen as ‘silently dispensing with’ Maecenas in the course of the satire and engaging solely with other audiences? If this is the case, Maecenas is merely the figurehead, the dedicatee of the poem, and has no personal association with the vices tackled therein. However, it is possible, within the dramatic setting of the first satire, to read the ‘diatribe’ in another way entirely - in Voloshinov’s terms, as a little drama, an interaction between speaker and audience.

R.O.A.M. Lyne has recently argued that the equivocal nature of the first satire, supposedly a private little chat with the patron but at the same time a moralising tour de force, is exploited by Horace in an extremely ‘cheeky’ way. According to Lyne, Horace’s use in Sat. 1.1 of the second person singular, which could be formal Latin usage, or the ‘diatribal’ convention of a typical moral speech, could also, if the initial address to Maecenas were presumed to be continued throughout the satire, refer to the patron himself. Indeed, Lyne argues that there is nothing to stop us assuming that all second persons singular in

249 As my Introduction (see pp. 25, 31-33 above) included an examination of the speaker’s ‘diatribal’ exchange with the miser figure, this will not be repeated in full here. Horace’s imaginary interlocutor, termed an ‘internal audience’ by Barbara K. Gold (1992: 162f), foolishly defends the accumulation of wealth from an ideological standpoint. This imaginary interlocutor could also be regarded as a ventriloquial audience, as the voice originates with the speaker himself: like a ventriloquist’s puppet, the character of ‘the greedy miser’ is entirely under the control of the main speaker and is made to answer back to his questions so as to educate other audiences about the error of his ways. The ventriloquial audience in fact naturally assumes the existence of another audience that stands to learn from the ridicule of this figure. Faced with the option of either learning something from the satire or being impugned by it, the actual audience naturally aligns itself with the former. As target, the definite but imaginary miser figure can be merged into that indefinite group - the majority of humankind - which is also given a chance to speak at 61ff. After we have heard the opinion of the bona pars hominum, the other audiences are invited to join the satirist in deriding the new collective target (63-64).

250 Gordon Williams has remarked in relation to Horace’s first Epistle, a poem that is often compared to Sat. 1.1, that: ‘Horace begins with a personal address to Maecenas, but by the middle of the poem he is supposing that his addressee may be subject to all sorts of physical and moral imperfections. In fact, though the poem begins by addressing Maecenas, soon the addressee becomes any reader, a representative human being, likely to be afflicted with any conceivable frailty’ (1968: 5-6).


252 Latin uses the second person singular where English tends to prefer the impersonal and more formal ‘one’. Lyne (id.: 140) notes that ‘the use of ‘you’ for one is colloquial in English, orthodox grammar in Latin’.
the poem may be interpreted as Maecenas. In Sat. 1.1 Horace, according to Lyne, ‘cheekily’ pretends to take his patron to task for the vice of miserly greed, and in so doing severely tests the bounds of libertas. This suggests that there is a distinct comparison between ‘Horace’ as speaker here, and Horace’s slave Davus, speaker in the penultimate satire of the second book: just as Davus attacks his master Horace in that Saturnalian satire, so in Sat. 1.1 Horace, according to Lyne, criticises his patron Maecenas. Both Davus and Horace are in that case not simply doctores inepti, but in addition are foolhardy in that they aim their inept speeches at entirely unsuitable and even dangerous targets, targets which in either case have power over the speakers.

Caught up in divining motives for lack of order in the ‘inorganic’ Sat. 1.1, the majority of scholars have either failed to notice (or refused to see) this possibility that Lyne has suggested, or else have explained the hapless ‘you’ of the satire’s central section as the imaginary interlocutor of the ‘diatribe’ style. The idea that ‘you’ might equal Maecenas throughout the satire had certainly been considered prior to Lyne’s article, but scholars who did so on the whole expressed dismay and shock over what they perceived as Horace’s impudent and almost inexplicable hauling of his patron over the coals in Sat. 1.1. William Henry Lowe, for example, remarks in his 1979 thesis at how outrageous it is for Horace to...

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253 In most cases it is impossible to distinguish between a general ‘you’ in the sense of ‘one’, and ‘you’ as a literal second person singular addressee, and in some cases the ambiguity may be deliberate. Apart from its other possible interpretations, ‘you’ is the way in which one would address another person directly. In ‘diatribe’, also, ‘you’ can of course refer to a number of different audiences. For a discussion of these confusions in Horatian satire, see Seeck 1991 (a): 539-540.

254 Freudenburg (1993: 21) sees parallels of the parodies of Stoic ‘diatribe’ in Sat. 2.3 and 2.7 in the ‘diatribes’ of the first book.

255 The possibility that Maecenas himself might be interpreted as the addressee throughout Sat. 1.1 was noted by Lowe in his thesis Horace Sermones Book I: A Study (Brown University). Lowe (1979: 39) observes that the second person singular addressees in the poem, apart from their ‘diatribal’ usage, ‘not only can, but grammatically must, when no antecedent is present, refer to Maecenas himself’. Lowe (id.: 38) thinks that it is Horace’s attack on his patron here that is referred to when at Sat. 1.4.78ff, Horace is accused of enjoying harming others: laedere gaudes... I would however rather agree more with Lyne’s suggestion that in Sat. 1.1 Horace cleverly hides behind the ambiguity in the combined use of ‘diatribe’ convention, in which the tu means an imaginary interlocutor, and a personal speech, in which it literally means ‘you’. It is uncertain whether tu necessarily means Maecenas - in which case he would be directly attacked - because at the same
'call his patron on the carpet as he does here, and give him the severe scolding meant for the agricola, caupo, miles and nauta'. Others dismissed the idea that Maecenas could be even the implied addressee of the central tirade against the avarus. Barbara K Gold, for example, who, as we have seen, divides the satire’s audiences into the primary, authorial, actual and internal audiences, has argued that, viewed in this manner, it is unlikely that Maecenas is aligned with the miser of the satire’s central portion. Gold remarks that Horace is careful to exclude himself and Maecenas from the internal audience, the speaker’s imaginary group of targets whom he takes it upon himself to set right in the satire.  

While I would agree with Gold that Maecenas as dedicatee and member of the authorial audience cannot seriously be aligned with the internal audience, the imaginary interlocutor and straight man against whom Horace spars, Lyne’s idea is worthy of consideration. Although few scholars would deny that, on one level, the interlocutor of the satire’s central portions is undoubtedly to be seen as the stock figure of the miser, the ‘diatribal’ adversary, who cannot literally be Maecenas, the question is whether the stock figure does not simultaneously signify anyone else besides. Far from allowing the poem’s various audiences to remain neat and separate entities, our poet may be playing shamelessly with multi-voicedness. At the very least Maecenas might take note of the warning: mutato nomine de te fabula narratur... In other words, in terms of Lyne’s view, Horace exploits

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256 *Id.*: 39. The possibility that Maecenas may be directly impugned here is also considered by Seeck (1991 (a): 542), who suggests that this is, however, largely dependent on Maecenas’ own willingness to read himself into the satire. I must confess that I find that Seeck’s overly literal approach in the remainder of this article grossly underestimates the sophistication of both Horace and his patron.

257 Both Horace and his dedicatee-patron ‘also have an existence outside of the group, as the observer-addressee and the observer-speaker. If they can objectivize ‘nemo’ in their conversation, they cannot themselves be identified with the group of people to which the word refers’ (1992: 167-168). Gold (*id.*: 173-174) also argues that Maecenas fades from focus from the first line of Sat. 1.1, and this anticipates his role in the remainder of the first book.

258 As Lyne himself notes (*id.*: 142 n. 4), line 84, in which the miser figure of the central portions is referred to as having a neglected wife and a son who are indifferent at best to his death (non uxor salvum te vult, non filius...), confirms that this is a stock figure, and is explicitly not the historical Maecenas who is attacked here. While Maecenas’ relationship with his wife Terentia was said to be an on-off affair (see Seneca *Epist. 114.7: *...qui uxorem milliens dixit, cum unam habuerit; cf. Costa 1988: *ad loc.*), the indifference or negativity of the miser’s family towards him is clearly yet another well-worn *topos* of literature.
the very ambiguities of addressivity to launch an outrageous, joking attack on his patron.259

According to Lyne, Sat. 1.1 is in direct contrast to Sat. 1.6 in which Maecenas is praised and his greatness acknowledged.260 The satire’s indirect approach is also explained by Lyne: because dissatisfaction is treated first and Horace’s transition out of the first section is achieved gradually, the attack on the greedy, which begins in earnest at line 38, is consequently far removed from the only mention of Maecenas by name in the satire, in the first line.261 Of the two main topics treated in the satire, dissatisfaction seems the safer bet with which to begin a moral lecture addressed to the fabulously wealthy.262 Lyne likewise sees the abrupt ‘return’ to the issue of the pursuit of wealth at 108ff, which also unmistakably throws in the relatively unexplored theme of competitive and envious greed, as an attempt by Horace ‘to drop the cheeky diatribe with such obvious relevance to Maecenas’.263

However, ambiguity or no ambiguity, to attack one’s patron, however subtly and amiably, cannot but be foolhardy; if Maecenas is really to be identified, even obliquely, with the

259 Horace deliberately uses his multiplicity of audience, consciously exploiting or even mockingly fostering ambiguity between the rarefied authorial audience on the one hand, and the despised internal (ventriloquial) one on the other. The ideal, authorial reader or listener is meant to see that while on one level, the poem is a generally moral ‘diatribe’ against the greedy and of universal significance, on another, however, it is simultaneously a ‘cheeky’ if disguised and entirely unserious personal pep-talk directed at the poet’s patron. The anomaly of the satire lies in the fact that recipients are free to read it either way.

260 1995: 139. Sat. 1.6 is also marked as the counterpart of Sat. 1.1 in other ways, such as the fact that it starts with an address to Maecenas. Generally Sat. 1.6 is regarded as balancing the first satire in that 1.6 begins the second half of the liber sermonum just as 1.1 starts the first half.

262 Likewise in Sat. 2.7 Davus begins indirectly, obliquely attacking the vice of inconsistency in a general way, and it is only when Horace, exasperated, begs him to get to the point that Davus begins his attack on his master in earnest (2.7.21ff). The ‘indirect’ approach here could be ascribed to timid Davus’ caution and his fear of the consequences of offending his master, Saturnalia or no Saturnalia (cf. 2.7.2: reformido...).

263 Id.: 143. In the echoes of the introductory lines of the satire at 108f slight alterations have been made: while the words nemo (108) and laudet diversa sequentis (109) are direct echoes of the first and third lines of the satire, what is missing, however, is a repetition of the patron’s name as in line 1. Instead what is present is the issue of greed, by now explored extensively in the satire (... ut avarus, 108). In retrospect this not only suggests that the question of greed was there all along, but in leaving out the patron in this repetition while adding greed, the speaker may also appear to imply that, while he was well aware of the link between dissatisfaction and greed from the start, he had tactfully chosen to disguise it from his addressee who suffered from a literal embarrassment of riches.
miser, *Sat.* 1.1 is then not simply ‘cheeky’, as Lyne would have it, but downright rude and extremely risky. It is simply hard to believe that Horace, rehabilitated from Philippi only a few years before, would really devote his introductory satire to an attack on his patron and benefactor. An attack of this nature, even if made in fun, could potentially be misread and misused by political opponents; if it fell into the wrong hands, it would delight the enemies of Octavian and Maecenas more than it would tickle the patron. Lyne’s approach is significant, however, in that it encourages us to look for a reason for Maecenas’ presence as addressee in the satire apart from occupying the obvious position of dedicatee: *Qui fit Maecenas...?* Lyne is right in pointing out that the direction of a ‘diatribe’ concerned with material dissatisfaction, wealth and greed to an enormously wealthy patron cannot be fortuitous. Maecenas’ associations with material good fortune bring such irony to the satire’s start that it is easy to see how intimations of the wealth-focused topic of greed treated only later in the satire would, for a Roman audience, already be latent in the initial question on professional dissatisfaction. Contemporary equivalents such as: ‘Excuse me, Mr Gates, why is nobody content with his lot...?’, may give us an inkling. However, it is my contention that this irony is cunningly employed by Horace to achieve an end quite different to the one which Lyne has read.

Although it portrays wealth very negatively, the first satire is also deliberately quite ineffective and blunt, as a number of loopholes are granted Maecenas. As the satire develops, it becomes apparent that it is not merely wealth that is the problem. The identification of the interlocutor of the satire’s central section with the ‘miser’ becomes clearer

264 Lyne’s thesis is that while Horace ‘teased’ Maecenas in later poems as well (e.g. *Epist.* 1.1 & 1.7), he was able to be freer and cheekier when younger and less established than later on in his career, when he might rather have been seen to be actually threatening to Maecenas (1995: 139-140). This idea should be weighed against the comments of DuQuesnay on the context of Horace’s and Maecenas’ relationship at the start of the former’s career as a poet: ‘Horace could have remained independent, if he had chosen to do so... Instead, as he openly avows, he had freely accepted the friendship of Maecenas with all its material advantages and social obligations. If he had then gone on to express in his works distaste for or disapproval of what Maecenas stood for at that time he could not have expected this to be taken as a sign of a praiseworthy independent spirit or the fulfilment of some mystical duty as a poet to be subversive and to question the nature of his society. It would have been taken simply as a sign of impudence and churlish ingratitude...’ (1984: 25). Throughout this thesis I shall argue that in his presentation of his personal relationship with Maecenas in the *Satires* Horace ultimately supports his patron and his circle of friends, including Octavian, often at the expense of his own character-persona.
after line 65, where it transpires that it is the *sordidus ac dives* that is the object of scorn and not just someone who enjoys (*suave est...*, 51) taking what he needs from a large stock. Between lines 38 and 65, however, one might imagine many awkward moments as much of what is said would apply to any wealthy person, stingy or not. As the eventual donor of Horace’s Sabine farm, however, an event so celebrated later in the *Satires* (even though, at this point, the happy event is still in the satirist’s pseudo-autobiographical ‘future’), Maecenas could hardly be described as stingy - as the miser is - or so attached to his wealth that he is compelled to guard it night and day. Indeed, suggestions of Maecenas’ *luxuria* in other sources have indicated quite the opposite.

What we have, ironically, then, is a ‘diatribe’, directed mainly against miserliness, but addressed to a man known for his enormous opulence and in some circles, for his effeminate and luxuriant hedonism. An ‘attack’ of this nature is as toothless as the insinuation, in the following satire, that the known adulterer Sallust is mad about *mimae.* Maecenas’ obvious innocence of the particular vice of stingy miserliness means that any implied or equivocal association of the patron with the target of Horace’s tirade is unambiguously a joke, in no way truly threatening to the great man.

**Horace’s hidden agenda?**

Is Horace’s character-speaker so inept that he cannot even effectively impugn his patron? Or perhaps that was never his intention. Perhaps his lengthy attack on the stingy is really a way of flattering the patron, and in this way of making, in a roundabout fashion, a specific request. What motive could there be for going on and on to a wealthy man about the

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265 The miser is described going to sleep atop a pile of money-bags, gaping as he snores, and cherishing his wealth as though it were something merely to be admired, not used (70-72). The classic miser paranoidly fears thieves, fires, and his own slaves (76-78).

266 See in particular, the virulent criticism at Seneca *Epist.* 114.4ff, where Maecenas’ luxurious loose living (symbolised by his loose, unbelted tunic) is compared to his ‘loose’ literary style. Cf. Graver 1998: 607ff, and esp. 620-629 for an explanation of the Stoic literary theory which appears to have motivated Seneca.

267 See *Sat.* 1.2.48-49, discussed on pp. 102-103 & n. 311 below.

268 Rather, in his luxuriousness Maecenas may possibly be nearer to the other extreme - the profligate - cautioned against at the end of the tirade against the miser (101-104). Anticipating the start of the next satire, however, this is for the moment nothing but a check to keep the scales in balance.
evils of miserliness and ridiculing the miser-figure? Entertainment is one possibility, but there is also another: the underling addresses a humorous moral speech to his gloriously wealthy patron, devoting most of his ‘diatribe’ to an attack on miserliness, just the vice he would want his patron to avoid. Far from being neutral, this entertaining moral ‘diatribe’, addressed to the patron, has a specific although maybe not very altruistic aim. Devoting a ‘diatribe’ to an attack on stinginess, Horace is in effect asking Maecenas for a ‘raise’, or at least, jokingly imploring him to continue his generosity toward his ‘dependent’. The treatment of the miser in the central section, not only safely removed from the direct address of the patron at the satire’s start, as Lyne notes, but strictly inapplicable to him, may serve at most as an indirect, polite and subtle warning of the path that the wealthy and generous Maecenas should continue to eschew.

Not only is it understandable, therefore, that Horace takes a long time to approach the point of his speech in Sat. 1.1, but his dithering is entirely appropriate, if we consider what I have claimed is on his mind - first, he goes on appropriately if obliquely about the idea of professional dissatisfaction, only to reveal (equally appropriately) its foolishness (4-22), then he seems to attack wealth in itself (38ff), having belatedly identified this as the reason behind the dissatisfaction (28ff), before more suitably coming down like a ton of bricks on the rich per se, but on the rich but miserly (65ff). The miser is presented as deluded and ridiculous, and a large portion of the ‘diatribe’ is devoted to rubbing the

269 Whether or not Horace was personally independently wealthy in ‘real life’ (which indeed he seems to have been) is here strictly beside the point: it is not only a well-worn topos that poets are poor, but, as I shall note, throughout the Satires it is also an on-going joke that Horace is a sort of parasite figure or scurra to Maecenas, cf. e.g. Sat. 2.7.32ff. Augustus himself would later combine this ‘in’ joke with a healthy dose of self-satire when he apparently invited Horace to leave Maecenas’ “parasitical” table and to join his own ‘kingly’ one instead: Veniet ergo ab ista parasitica mensa ad hanc regiam... (Suet. Vita Horati 22-23; Rostagni 1964: 114). On the relationship between the scurra and the parasite in Roman satire and related genres, see Damon 1997: 109-112. Recently William Turpin (1998: 128ff) has suggested that Horace’s persona in Sat. 1.1-3 is satirised as a specifically Epicurean parasite as against Maecenas’ (most improbable) characterisation as a Scio, cf. p. 76, n. 242 above.

270 In Sat. 2.7 one is also left with the impression that Davus has a number of ‘requests’ concealed in his ‘diatribe’ on slavery and in the extensive comparisons between himself and his master. Cf. Part 2, chapter 8, pp. 298 & 302ff of the present thesis. Is ‘Horace’, in a roundabout way, asking Maecenas for something - a raise or a ‘perk’? A Sabine farm, perhaps?
point in (65-100). The section finishes fittingly with the miser's death, a sticky end at the hands of a freedwoman who plays the role of a poor man's Clytemnestra (99-100).²⁷¹

At the end of the satire, after responsibly warning his addressee not to go to the opposite extreme and waste all his money (104-105), Horace makes a blatantly half-hearted attempt (108ff) to link all the themes on which he has touched. He reflects philosophically, in this final section of his speech, on the truism that there will always be someone relatively richer than oneself (110-116), and rather more ominously, considering the relative wealth of himself and his addressee, he warns that human beings will always be envious of those wealthier than themselves (110). It is an ongoing joke in the Satires, particularly in the second book, that Horace's character is a dependent parasite or scurra to Maecenas' character. At the end of the first satire, Horace the deluxe parasite politely excuses himself from the table, knowing he will be back another day to avail himself of his patron's generosity (117-121). Whether one thinks his approach would be successful or not is beside the point: the laughable situation in Sat. 1.1 where 'Horace' adopts the role of moralist in order to ask for a raise in a roundabout fashion is a joke at the expense of the satirist rather than his patron. But as Horace himself has claimed earlier in this very satire, nothing prevents one from burying what one really wants to say inside a joke.

More than one dramatic context could be envisaged for Horace's recitation of Sat. 1.1, just as the 'polyvocality' of more than one audience is possible: we could even picture our speaker safely addressing his patron in absentia, practising what he wishes to communicate to the great man. This, after all, is what is often necessary when one intends to ask for a raise or something similar. On the other hand, there is another ongoing self-satiric joke in the liber sermonum, and that is that Horace's character is a little too liber, too direct and outspoken. By seeming at first to impugn the wealthy in a 'diatribe' dedicated to an extremely rich man, and by then going on about the evils of being stingy with one's

²⁷¹ Being hewn in two was the only way in which the miser was able to achieve the 'Mean' (Rudd 1966: 22-23). This image anticipates the themes of Sat. 1.2 (cf. van Rooy 1968: 43).
wealth, Horace may indeed be reckoned somewhat liber in relation to his patron, however flattering the appeal for generosity may be.\footnote{Oliensis (1998 (b): 89) suggests that Horace is not so much jokingly ‘attacking’ his patron in Sat. 1.1 as defending himself against possible accusations by contemporaries that he is merely after Maecenas’ wealth. While I do not think that this is Horace’s primary aim here, his joking presentation of himself as a scurrus would certainly have dispelled any such suspicions far more effectively than a serious denial. Throughout much of Satires Book One Horace tackles potentially awkward topics by taking the bull by the horns. One only has to look at the awful joke of Sat. 1.7 to realise how Horace makes it clear that freedom of speech ruled within Maecenas’ circle, for all the loyal silence that was necessary outside of it (cf. Sat. 1.5 & 1.9). simplicior quis et est qualem me saepe liberenterobtulerim tibi, Maecenas, ut forte legentem aut tacitum impellat quovis sermone molestus... (1.3.63-65). In chapter 3, pp. 129ff & 138f below, we shall see that simplicior may be a euphemism for truculentior and plus aequo liber. In Sat. 1.4 Horace eventually explores the concept of libertas in depth, redefining his own libertas in contrast to the model of plus aequo liber (Sat. 1.4.103-104, cf. 89). See chapter 4, pp. 159-160 below.}

In the third satire, as we shall see, ‘Horace’ begs his addressee to try to consider friends’ faults as virtues. Addressing Maecenas directly for the first time since the opening of the first satire, Horace there admits that he himself has been simplicior, ‘rather direct’, and asks the audience to picture him coming upon his patron unexpectedly while the latter is peacefully reading or reflecting, and pestering Maecenas with chitchat.\footnote{simplicior quis et est qualem me saepe liberenterobtulerim tibi, Maecenas, ut forte legentem aut tacitum impellat quovis sermone molestus... (1.3.63-65). In chapter 3, pp. 129ff & 138f below, we shall see that simplicior may be a euphemism for truculentior and plus aequo liber. In Sat. 1.4 Horace eventually explores the concept of libertas in depth, redefining his own libertas in contrast to the model of plus aequo liber (Sat. 1.4.103-104, cf. 89). See chapter 4, pp. 159-160 below.} It is tempting to regard this as the scenario that the reader of the Satires is retrospectively encouraged to envisage for the dramatic context at the start of Sat. 1.1. Horace comes upon his patron, who is otherwise engaged, and rather abruptly begins a discussion on moral-philosophical questions, in which he assumes his patron is interested, and in which, as we have seen, Horace may well have ulterior motives. This calls for an apology, which, I maintain, we also see in Sat. 1.3. But by that stage the Horatian satirist’s libertas has not only extended to his approach to Maecenas in the first satire: the satirist has also been rather frank about sexual misdemeanours in Sat. 1.2. This, however, is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER TWO:

SAT. 1.2: ADDRESSING ADULTERY, SPEAKING SEXUALITY

Writing about sex, however jokingly, one inevitably writes one's own sexuality. In his second satire, which addresses sex, Horace, however, as I intend to show in the present chapter, poses as self-confessional 'autobiographer', and writes the sexuality of his 'second self', the Horace who is satirist and speaker in the Satires. To continue Roland Barthes' analogy quoted above, the second satire, as will be shown here, is a dishevelled text, without a real centre or balance (nil medium est), rather like someone fleeing an adulterous escapade with his clothes half off and with only one shoe on. In addition, this satire begins an intertextual dialogue which not only makes a joke of the speaker's own sexuality but which will be continued in many of the other poems in both satiric books, paralleling the other self-satiric dialogues which inhabit the Satires. Sat. 1.2 has itself been highly controversial, however, as scholars to comment on this poem have, inevitably and often rather amusingly, written their own views on sex.

Sat. 1.2: Horace on sex

Until the 1960's and shortly after, when a spate of more tolerant articles appeared, Horace's second satire had tended to be regarded, particularly by English-speaking schol-
ars, as lewd and scurrilous\textsuperscript{276} where \textit{Sat}. 1.1 had been criticised for its lack of order. \textit{Sat}. 1.2, unlike its predecessor, does not invoke Maecenas, and this, in combination with the sexual nature of the subject matter and the speaker's frank approach to it, has encouraged scholars to date \textit{Sat}. 1.2 as Horace's earliest satire, apparently a folly of his misguided youth before he met his patron.\textsuperscript{277} While it is not my intention to discuss questions of the poems' relative dates here, I note, with others, that the appearance of poems in a collection of \textit{Satirae} would, after all, indicate that the pieces must have been edited at least once after their initial composition, and this renders the issue of the actual date of their inception, to all literary intents and purposes, irrelevant.\textsuperscript{278} Nor do I think that the absence of Maecenas' name is of any significance in dating of \textit{Sat}. 1.2.\textsuperscript{279} The dating of the poems is surely unnecessary for an understanding of the \textit{Satirae} as a literary work; rather more

\textsuperscript{276} But see e.g. DuQuesnay (1984: 20): 'It is incredible that \textit{Satire} 1.2 should have shocked either Maecenas or Octavian, hard to believe that they gave anything less than wholehearted approval to this first onslaught on adultry.'

\textsuperscript{277} See Palmer (1883 \textit{ad loc.}), who notes: 'Horace's friendship with Maecenas had not yet begun; and the coarse treatment of the subject betrays a youthful and imperfect style...'; cf. Fraenkel (1957: 76), who asserts that \textit{Sat}. 1.2 is 'probably the earliest, or at any rate one of the earliest, of Horace's satires'; cf. Rudd (1966: 10), who comments that 'the bawdy themes and treatment, the plentiful and aggressive use of names, and the absence of any reference to Maecenas all point to an early date. So does the rather uncertain structure'; cf. Shackleton Bailey (1982: 10), who, citing Rudd, describes \textit{Sat}. 1.2 as 'the only one which can confidently be assigned to his earliest period before his acceptance by Maecenas'. Many commentators (e.g. Fraenkel, Shackleton Bailey) accordingly have treated this satire first in their discussions of the first book.

\textsuperscript{278} It has often been observed that the second satire is clearly prior to the fourth, since a line of the second poem is actually quoted in the fourth satire (1.4.92, cf. 1.2.27), and the fourth is prior to the tenth, which is designed as a deliberate continuation of the argument of 1.4, but this follows the ordering of the satires in the book in any case. All this does is merely confirm that the present arrangement of these satires is as the author designed it, but tells us nothing about their relative dates of composition. See Gordon Williams (1972: 17 n.1), who has pointed out that there is no way of dating the satires precisely or of determining their sequence of composition.

\textsuperscript{279} Maecenas does not need to be mentioned in \textit{Sat}. 1.2 because he has already been mentioned at the start of \textit{Sat}. 1.1, of which the second satire is arguably a continuation, and will again be addressed in the following satire, at \textit{Sat}. 1.3.64, as well as at the start of \textit{Sat}. 1.6. The placing of Maecenas' name is more likely to have literary meaning than any significance for the dating of the poems. In the first satire the mention of the dedicatee's name served as an introduction to the book as a whole; in the third the patron's name is again appropriate because of the subject matter of friendship. The theory that Horace composed some of the satires before he became the \textit{amicus} of Maecenas is without foundation (see DuQuesnay 1984: 20): even if Maecenas were not content with the \textit{commendatio} given Horace by Virgil and Varius Rufus, and required proof of Horace's skill as a writer, DuQuesnay suggests, there is no reason to think that any of Horace's earlier attempts survived or that they were satires. As all of the satires were included in a book dedicated to and thus associated with Maecenas, DuQuesnay argues, they must anyhow have been acceptable to the patron in their final form: 'All ten poems were judged worthy of and suitable for inclusion in a \textit{libellus} dedicated to, and so publicly associated with, Maecenas: obviously, then, all of them could have been composed after the beginning of their \textit{amicitia}. Certainly the absence of Maecenas' name proves nothing...' (\textit{ibid.}). There may in fact, as I shall argue below, be good motivations for Horace's failure as speaker to address Maecenas in \textit{Sat}. 1.2.
significant must be the poet's arrangement of his poems, whatever the relative dates of composition.\textsuperscript{280}

There are good reasons for seeing \textit{Sat.} 1.2 as a member of a unit consisting of the first three satires,\textsuperscript{281} rather than as a once-off unsuccessful early attempt at practical moralising on Horace's part. As with the first 'diatribe' satire, \textit{Sat.} 1.2 begins indirectly. The cautions against the extremes of profligacy, on the one hand, and miserly greed, on the other, made at the end of the previous satire (1.1.101-107),\textsuperscript{282} are picked up at the start of the second satire. In fact, the first 22 lines of \textit{Sat.} 1.2, before the audience is introduced to the topic of sex, sound more or less like an extension of the first satire.\textsuperscript{283} However, in the second satire the greedy and stingy, motivated by the desire not to appear spendthrifts (1.2.4-6; 12-22), are now specifically contrasted with those who spend money like water in order not to be thought stingy (7-11a, and, by implication, 1-3), illustrating the idea that \textit{dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt} - 'in avoiding vice fools rush to the opposite extreme' (24), or put differently, \textit{nil medium est} - 'there is no Mean' (28a). The example of Tigellius at the beginning of this satire, moreover, also links it to the third satire, at the start of which we find another humorous attack on Tigellius. The mention of Fabius (1.2.130), at the satire's end, likewise recalls \textit{Sat.} 1.1.13-14. These correspondences suggest

\textsuperscript{280} See Armstrong (1964: 86): '...to say that the three moral discourses which open Book 1 of the \textit{Satires} form a triad of parallel structures that make best sense when read one after another is to obviate discussion \textit{in vacuo} of their relative date of composition'; cf. Zetzel (1980: 63): 'The only significant chronology in a \textit{liber} of this sort is that of unrolling the that we are to read the first poem before the second, the second before the third. The order of reading creates its own dramatic time... Any interpretation that takes the poems out of order separates them from the literal unrolling of time and ignores the poet's clear intention'; cf. also the discussion in Freudenburg 1993: 198ff.

\textsuperscript{281} As noted in my Introduction (p. 8 n. 19), triads are the easiest way to subdivide \textit{Satires} Book One: 1.1-3 treat moral issues, 1.4-6 are 'autobiographical', 1.7-9 are regarded as 'anecdotal', while 1.10 is the conclusion; see e.g. Fraenkel 1957: 90; Armstrong \textit{ibid.}; Rudd 1966: 1ff. Van Rooy (1968: 41ff) however would prefer to group the \textit{Satires} into pairs. Concentric arrangement around \textit{Sat.} 1.5, with links between \textit{Sat.} 4 and 6, 3 and 7, 2 and 8, 1 and 9, with 1.10 separate again as the conclusion, was suggested by Rambaux (1971: 194) and followed by Zetzel (1980: 67). Any number of links and associations may however be found relating satires in Horace's first book (Freudenburg 1993: 199), as well as, indeed, in his second.

\textsuperscript{282} \textit{est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines, quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.}

\textsuperscript{283} Armstrong (1964: 89) notes that 'the opening of 2 is continuous with with what we have just read in 1.1' (emphasis Armstrong's). There are also, as Armstrong observes (\textit{ibid.}: n. 3), parallels between \textit{est modus in rebus} (1.1.106) and \textit{nonne cupidinibus statuat natura modum quem} (1.2.111), and with 1.3.115ff.
that whatever their order of composition, the first three satires are to be seen in their ‘published’ form as a unit, as a continuous narrative.

Not only is the second satire a clear continuation of the first, but, like Sat. 1.1, it also displays a consciously ‘conversational’ structure. Through a casual progression of associations natural to a ‘talk’, the speaker slowly graduates from the indirect beginning to a focus on the issue of sex, especially adultery, against which he is to caution and rail for much of the remainder of the satire. After the introduction, in which miserliness and profligacy are contrasted, other types of behaviour - in each case extremes on either side of the ‘Mean’ - are soon mentioned: extreme sartorial preferences are deviations from the norm, as are olfactory opposites. The sartorial and olfactory extremes anticipate the subsequent examples of the opposing sexual preferences of various men: the matrona, on the one hand, is pitted against the prostitute, on the other, as each is represented by images of dress and smell respectively. Each type of woman also has her advocates, who are dialogically represented by being quoted: while the prostitute is championed by the famous dictum of Cato (saving husbands from being cuckolded by providing an outlet for youthful testosterone), the adulteress by contrast is endorsed by Cupiennius (‘Randy’). The idea of sexual extremes is used to introduce, and perhaps is to be imagined as suddenly suggesting to the speaker, the subject of the satire’s main body. Just as the first satire turns into an attack on miserly greed, so the second, after an equally ‘indirect’ beginning, turns into a condemnation of adultery. In 1.2 the satirist contrasts adultery with the various other sexual options open to Roman males, purporting to weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages of each.

284 Lejay’s observations on Sat. 1.1 are equally applicable here: ‘Il y a un enchaînement des idées et l’on passe de l’une à l’autre, non d’après la logique du traité ou du discours, mais d’après la logique de la conversation’ (1911: 1), cf. Fraenkel 1957: 94, discussed in my Introduction, p. 2 above.
285 Maltinus tunicis demissis ambulat; est qui/inguen ad obscenum subductis usque facetus (1.2.25-26).
286 pastillos Rufillus olet, Gargonius hircum (27).
287 ...sunt qui nolint tetigisse nisi illas/quarum subsuta talos tegat instita veste;/contra alius nullam nisi olentii in fornice stantem (29-30). See the comments of Curran (1970: 222ff) on the significance of clothing imagery in this satire (discussed below).
288 It can hardly be accidental that Cupiennius (36), whose name seems to be constructed from the stem of cupid (Rudd 1966: 143) plus the suffix -ennius appears just prior to Horace’s parody of a famous quote from Ennius himself at 37ff (Henderson 1989: 105-106; Freudenburg 1993: 194); cf. p. 94, n. 293 below.
Dialogicality of *Sat. 1.2*

Like the first satire, *Sat. 1.2* is not merely ‘conversational’ in its structure and transitions, but is also intensely dialogic. Although not addressed to a dedicatee as is the first, the second satire nevertheless manifests an interesting consciousness of audience. The dialogic aspects of the ‘diatribe’ style of the second satire involve both a direct relationship between speaker and audience, and fictitious dialogue with a panoply of imaginary interlocutors. Throughout the speaker questions, ridicules or disagrees with the statements he places in the mouths of the interlocutors, and the use of mostly the second person to address the interlocutors, in combination with the use of questions, contributes to the admonitory tone associated with the ‘diatribe’ mode.

*Sat. 1.2* has a wider variety of addressees and interlocutors than *Sat. 1.1*. Apart from those with whom the poet enters directly into fictional dialogue, the satire is replete with the quotations of various other personages: there is the *sententia* of Cato (31ff), contrasted with the quoted opinions of the appropriately named adulterer Cupiennius, the *mirator cunnii...albi* (35-6); the *prosopopoïa* of the *muto* which addresses and admonishes its owner, the ill-starred *exclusus amator* Villius (69ff); the cries of the deluded over-enthusiastic admirers of female anatomy *o crus! o brachchia!* (92), to which the narrator responds by pointing out the unfortunately less appealing truth; empty promises in the form of conditional affirmatives made by the stock figure of the adulterous *matrona* are also quoted (*post paulo, sed pluris, si exierit vir*, 120), only to be dismissed by a comment attributed to Philodemus: such a woman is for the *Galli* (or ‘Galluses’, 121).

References to conversation are made obliquely and succinctly to great effect, as competing cheers of...

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289 Freudenburg (1993: 196-197) notes that the adjectives used to describe the ideal woman at *Sat. 1.2.123-4* (*candida, recta, longa, and alba*) are equally applicable to a literary text, as they enjoy ‘a second life in the metaphorical terminology of Latin literary criticism’ (id.: 197). The perfect lover is thus also the perfect poem. Freudenburg also points out (*ibid.*) that scholars’ and translators’ usual interpretation of Philodemus’ statement (quoted at 1.2.121) that the inaccessible woman, by contrast, is *Gallis* - ‘for the Gauls’ or ‘for the Galli, i.e. priests of Cybele’ could just as well therefore be interpreted as ‘for the Galluses’ as a joking reference to Rome’s famous elegist Gallus (and imitator of Callimachus, whom Philodemus is pitted against), given that parody of elegy is clearly on the cards here (cf. Baldwin 1970). On Horace’s relationship to Philodemus, see p. 111, n. 326 below.
approval and grunts of disapproval are filtered through the main discourse: e.g. 'iure'
_omnes_; _Galba negabat_ (46). _Sat._ 1.2 is full of chatter and counter-chatter.

**Transitional interlocutors**

Dialogicality in 'diatribe' mode means that not solely imaginary adversaries but also fictive audiences are drawn into the conversation: Bakhtin observed, as we have seen, that the 'unfinalizability' of the polyphonic work means that the reader or audience is inevitably drawn into the dialogic process, and made a participant in the dialogue. In the dialogic 'diatribe' mode this is directly represented in the text itself. 'Audience participation' in _Sat._ 1.2 takes place at lines 17f, where an imaginary interlocutor ('maxime' quis non/ 'Iuppiter!' exclamat simul atque audivit?..., 17-18) is made to question what the speaker has been saying with regard to his latest miser _exemplum_. This prompts further explanation from the speaker (19-22). Shortly after this another imaginary speaker is introduced, who demands to know where the speech is headed: _si quis nunc quaerat 'quo res haec pertinet?' illuc..._ (23). An extension of the 'diatribal' stylistic device whereby potential objections to the main speaker's argument are handled in a dialogic fashion by being attributed to another speaker who breaks into the discourse, and are then consequently contextualised or refuted, interruptions of this sort by a fictive audience appear frequently in Horace's 'diatribe' satires of the first book as a transitional device. It therefore seems appropriate to term this type of imaginary interlocutor a 'transitional' interlocutor, although any interlocutor is to some extent 'transitional' in that he or she enables the speaker's argument to progress from one point to another. Here, in _Sat._ 1.2, apart from enabling the speaker to progress to the next point, these transitional voices also help create the indel-

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291 A comparable transitional device was used at _Sat._ 1.1 14-15, although the possible question or objection was anticipated by Horace himself as speaker: _...ne te morer, audilquo rem deducam. si quis deus..._. In both cases, _Sat._ 1.1.14-1 and 1.2.17ff, the suggestion to get to the point, placed in the mouth of either the narrator or the interlocutor, seems to imply that the foregoing treatment has been long-winded and the reasoning somewhat unclear. At _Sat._ 1.2.23f, therefore, the indefinite interlocutor facilitates communication of the message of the first section. The interlocutor's interruption enables a transition to be made to the speaker's point: that while fools try to avoid one extreme they run headlong into its opposite (1.2.24). A similar transitional device can also be seen at _Sat._ 1.3.19ff.
ible fiction that there is an unspecified audience that is listening to ‘Horace’ (rather like the ubiquitous ‘live studio audience’ on television), and foster the idea that unspecified, even imaginary recipients have a significant contribution to make to the satiric process. The satirist then makes an apparent attempt to engage formally the attention of an audience to whom he wishes to address his speech, the audience which, it is suggested, has something to learn or at least to gain from all this (after all, aut docere aut delectare poetae volunt).

Summoning the satiric audience

At 37-40 Horace, suddenly assuming the guise of a soap-box orator, addresses a group in the second person plural, inviting them to come and hear the perils awaiting adulterers:

audi re est operae pretium, procedere recte/qui moechis non vulits, ut omni parte laborent;/utque illis multo corrupta dolore voluptas/atque haec rara cadat dura inter saepe pericla.

The approach of the speaker, as in the first satire, is a practically rather than an

292 It has been suggested that Horace was parodying the formal Stoic invocation of an audience at Sat. 1.2.37f; cf. Lejay (1911: 30), who refers to 2.3.77f and notes: ‘Horace parodie la prédiction stoicienne’. Damasippus also issues a formal invitation to listeners of his Stoic ‘diatribe’ at Sat. 2.3.77-81: audi re atque togam iubeo componere, quisquis/ambitione mala aut argenti palle t amore,/quisquis luxuria tristive superstitione/ aut allo mentis morbo calet; huc proprius me,/dum doceo insanire omnis, vos ordine adite.’ - ‘I bid him come to listen and arrange his toga, whosoever blanches with evil ambition or love of silver, whosoever burns with luxury or miserable superstition or any other mental illness; draw nearer to me over here, while I teach, one by one, that you are all mad...’. Cf. my discussion at Part 2, chapter 7, p. 229, n. 666 & p. 248ff. Because of the all-encompassing nature of the Stoic paradox on which he preaches (all but the sage are mad), Damasippus’ audience and targets clearly coincide; Horace’s audience is, on the other hand, allowed a loophole and may potentially separate themselves from his apparent set of targets, the adulterers.

293 Porphyrion (ad loc.) recognised this as a deliberate echo and parody of Ennius’ Audire est operae pretium, procedere rectique rem Romanam Latiumque augescere vulits. Porphyrion praised this parody as urbane, and was particularly tickled by Horace’s alteration of the positive Ennian vulits to non vulits. See Lejay ad loc.; Kiessling-Heinze ad loc.; Fraenkel 1957: 82: ‘The audacity with which Horace drags the lofty patriotic notes of Ennius...into a very different sphere is brilliant. The respectable verb procedere is degradingly yoked with moechis...’; cf. Baldwin 1970: 462; Gigante 1993: 63-64. With this parody, Horace seems cheekily to be suggesting that adultery was as much a Roman institution as other nobler traditions. This parodic allusion to Ennius also comes after the mention of an adulterer named Ennius, as noted above - another cheeky touch. Towards the end of this same satire, Horace will just as cheekily compare the ideal parabilis Venus, whom he is casually ‘fucking’, with two of Rome’s founding mothers, Ilia, mother of Rhea Silvia, and Egeria, wife of Numa (126).

294 ‘It is worth your while listening, you who do not wish adulterers well, how they struggle on every count, and how their pleasure is spoilt by much misery, and how it is often foiled by terrible dangers’. Note the prominent positioning of pericla at the end of line 40, effectively emphasising the speaker’s point. What follows immediately (41-46a) is a terrifying catalogue of these pericla.
ethically oriented one: adultery is to be avoided not because it is morally wrong, but chiefly because it is fraught with inconveniences and dangers. That the addressees here are plural seems to underline the point that as ‘diatribe’ speaker, Horace’s intended audience in the locker-room atmosphere of *Sat.* 1.2 is not strictly Maecenas himself, although he is the dedicatee of the *Satires* as a whole, but rather the set of all Roman male citizens, including but not singling out the patron. This is particularly important since Horace, as we saw, played rather provocatively with ‘polyvocality’ in the previous satire, before ultimately letting Maecenas off the hook. The moral speaker’s audience in *Sat.* 1.2 is more obviously a general one and Horace may deliberately fail to mention Maecenas’ name in the second satire in order to communicate this. In *Sat.* 1.2 Horace is clearly addressing the ‘boys’; in fact, this is a role that any actual audience of *Sat.* 1.2 is automatically forced into assuming, just as someone who happens to be innocently passing a sex shop in a seedy area is automatically coerced into the role of ‘potential customer’ by the ubiquitous, aggressive and indiscriminant marketers of such places. Therefore the members of Maecenas’ circle, the actual audience of this poem at its first reading, would also have been jokingly characterised as ‘potential customers’.

The satirist is equally aggressive in directing his listeners’ away from one sexual option, and in encouraging them to consider others instead. The negative sexual option presented in *Sat.* 1.2 is adultery, presented here according to the topoi of Comedy, mime, and possibly also the ancient equivalent of ‘urban legend’. Thus Horace proceeds to describe the horrible fate that has befallen a number of adulterers (41-46). The audience, addressed in the second person plural (*quī...non vultis*), is presented as one which is - or which should be - hostile to adulterers. Ostensibly aligned on the side of the speaker, the audience is made to regard with disdain, along with the satirist, the antics of the satire’s targets, and in addition the speaker seems to encourage this audience to experience a certain *Schadenfreude* in hearing the disasters that apparently befall adulterers. In view of the sobering spectre of the adulterers’ sufferings catalogued straight after this, including being urinated on by the husband’s servants and castrated, this statement outwardly also constitutes a

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295 Henderson (1989: 103, 106) characterises this satire as ‘men’s talk’.
threat to the actual audience to align themselves against adultery if they have not already done so. This audience will then listen in, somewhat relieved, while Horace does battle with a number of satiric targets who appear as imaginary interlocutors.

**Interviews with satiric targets**

In what follows the speaker engages directly with a selection of imaginary adversaries on the issue of sexual folly, particularly (although not exclusively) adultery. As in the first satire, the sparring with and castigation of these figures occupies the central portions of the piece. Again, as in Sat. 1.1, statements attributed to imaginary interlocutors suggest a dialogue between the poet-moraliser and the targets he claims to be setting out to correct. The employment of this dialogue enables the moral instruction to take on a more vivid and dramatic tone, and the correcting attitude adopted by poet-moraliser toward the incorrigible adulterers and wastrels is largely responsible for the satire's humour. As in the first satire, the introduction here of the imaginary interlocutors, the internal audience, whom the speaker humorously admonishes and with whom he argues in the second person, also provides a third party, a tangible target who is heard to argue with the satirist and who thereby, as scapegoat, removes direct blame from the actual audience, thus making that audience in turn more receptive to the speaker's argument. In Sat. 1.2 the multiplicity of these adversaries, most of whom are also actually named in the satire, makes it less likely that these targets may become confused with the audience, as in Sat. 1.1. In addition, the light-hearted, humorous approach of the second satire, reflecting the rident-em dicere verum idea presented in 1.1, also softens the argumentative points the speaker makes. Nothing illustrates this better than the muto, the talking Penis which appears as one of the satire's interlocutors.

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296 The section in which this occurs could be viewed as lasting from approximately lines 47 (or 54) to 119, but it is not quite as clear-cut as this line division would imply. In this broad section, however, the speaker engages in dialogue with rakes, dandies and adulterers, who play the role of our internal 'ventriloquial' audience.
A talking Penis

A speaker enlisted against adultery, and thus on the side of the main speaker, a talking Penis appears in the role of moral adviser to its owner, the hapless adulterer Villius, at 68ff. Although this element is possibly copied from Lucilius (where the use of the unusual term mut(t)o is attested), Horace has used the muto (‘prick’, perhaps, rather than ‘penis’) in a brilliant and original manner in order to parody the rhetorical convention of prosopopoeia, the address by an abstract personage frequently found in passages which employ the ‘diatribal’ style. The muto adopts the role of polemic moraliser, addressing his owner in the second person singular common to the prosopopoeia, and employing the typically ‘diatribal’ questioning style, replete with exhortations to reason: quid vis tibi? num-quid ego a te/magno prognatum deposco consule cunnun/velatunque stola, mea cum conferbuit ira? (69-71). Appropriately, the personified muto thinks and speaks only in terms of his counterpart, a personified cunnus, described as being dressed in a stola.

The standard example of a moralising prosopopoeia often cited is Bion’s prosopopoeia of Poverty in the Hellenistic Cynic writer Teles Περὶ Ἀ νταρκηας. While I am not sugg-

297 Lucilius 307 (Marx) pictures a mutto weeping (at laeva lacrimas muttoni absterget amica), which no doubt set the precedent for Horace’s personified talking one at Sat. 1.2.68, cf. Porph. ad loc. muttonem pro virtil membro dixit Lucilius imitatus. The term mut(t)o is rare, and is only found in these two passages; cf. Adams 1982: 63.
298 Adams (ibid.) points out that the term mut(t)o must once have been used in general or vulgar use, as it survived as the cognomen Muto (CIL V.1412. 8473). There is also some evidence that the term survived in derived form in some Italian dialects, although there is no evidence that it was used in classical Latin apart from this Horatian instance (Adams ibid.).
299 This recalls the albus cunnus of line 36, the adjective albus (‘praeternaturally white’) there having bothered nearly every scholar. Porphyrion (ad loc.) pointed out that it was unlikely that albus meant simply candidus (‘fair’, ‘creamy white’), but thought that it probably referred to the white clothes worn in particular by matronae. I think that, in spite of this acceptable explanation (cf. the cunnus wearing the stola at 70b-71a), there is also something deliberately coarse about ‘white cunt’, and there may also be some deliberate ambiguity: in addition to the possible reference to patrician descent (the white Alban sow?; cf. prognatum ...consule cunnun, 70), there are intimations of contempt, age, even disease in albus cunnus. This is men’s locker-room discourse, after all. Henderson (1989: 103) suggests that the use of obscenities provides the main speaker with ‘street cred’. When however the muto speaks of a cunnus, as at line 70, this is naturally appropriate, even quite ‘cute’ (I find), as if we were dealing with talking finger puppets. How much ‘street cred’ does Mr Prick need? He’s stuck on the street in any case while his owner plays exclusus amator.
300 διο καὶ εἰ λέξει, φησίν ο Βίων, φωνῇν τὰ πράγματα, ὅν τρόπον καὶ ἡμείς, καὶ δύνατο δικαίολογεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἴποι, φησίν, [πρὸτόν ἡ πενία, ἀνθρωπέ, τί μοι μάχη;] ὡσπέρ οἰκέτης πρὸς τὸν κύριον ἐφ’ ἱερὸν καθίσας δικαίολογεῖται ‘τί μοι μάχη; μή τί σοι κέκλυφα; οὐ πάν το
esting that Horace knew or has deliberately copied Teles, it is interesting to look at this passage as an example of the convention Horace is parodying. In the Teles passage the speaker calls upon Πενία (Poverty) to make an appearance in order to upbraid an adversary who has complained about her. She does so with a barrage of rhetorical questions: ‘Why do you fight me?’ - Poverty would say to the man who complains - ‘You aren’t being deprived of anything good because of me, are you? Of wisdom? Of justice? Of courage? Surely you aren’t in want of the necessities?’..’ Poverty is made to emphasise that she does not withhold from her addressee (‘the man who complains’) the basic necessities: ‘...aren’t the roads full of vegetables and the springs overflowing with water? Don’t I offer you such beds as the earth affords, and the leaves for mattresses? ...don’t I provide you with an inexpensive and simple sauce, your hunger?’ Indeed, the hungry person, Poverty suggests by means of further rhetorical questions, enjoys his food without needing expensive sauces, and the thirsty person most enjoys drinking and does not thirst for the drink that is not at hand.301

After hearing the speech made by the personified Poverty, Teles’ narrator himself adds a standard rhetorical question: ‘If Poverty were to say these things to you, what would you have to say in return? I for my part would certainly be unable to say anything.’302 Likewise in Lucretius’ proopopoiia of Nature in his ‘diatribe’ against the fear of death (DRN 3.931ff) - a more probable Horatian intertext than the Greek one just quoted303 - after the

prostataitmenon ὑπὸ σοὶ ποιώ; οὐ τὴν ἀποφορὰν εὐτάκτως σοι φέρω; καὶ ἡ Πενία <ἄν> εἶποι πρὸς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα· τί μοι μάχη; μὴ καλὸν τίνος δί ʿεμὲ ἀτερίσκη; μὴ σωφρούνης; μὴ δικαιοσύνης; <μὴ> ἀνδρείας; ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν ἐνδείχῃς εἰ; ἡ οὐ μεστὰ μὲν αἱ ὅστις λαχάνιν, πλήρεις δὲ αἱ κρήναι ὄδαρκας;...... - ‘Therefore, as Bion says, if things were to take on a voice, in the manner that we do, and were able to speak for themselves, wouldn’t they speak, [poverty first], saying, ‘Why do you fight me, Man?’. Just as a household-slave, after he has taken up position in a temple, would defend himself to his master: ‘Why do you fight me? I haven’t stolen anything from you, have I? Have I not carried out your orders? Do I not pay you a tribute in good order?’ And Poverty would say to the one who complains: ‘Why do you fight me? Have I deprived you of anything fine? Of wisdom? Of justice? Of courage? But if you are in need of anything, aren’t the roads glutted with vegetables and the springs full of water?’...’, Teles Περὶ Ἀυτοπρακτίας (Hense 1909: 6-7). On the question of Bion in Teles, see p. 10 n. 26 above. 301 Teles Περὶ Ἀυτοπρακτίας (Hense id.: 7-8). 302 εἰ ταῦτα λέγου τῇ Πενίᾳ, τί ἄν εχον ἀντεπείν; ἢ γὼ μὲν γὰρ <ἄν> δοκῶ δύνονος γενέσθαι: (Hense id.: 8). At the same time, the use of the optative mood (e.g. λέγοι) indicates clearly that this interlocutor has been entirely imaginary. 303 As we have seen, Lucretius is one of the Horatian satirist’s favourite intertexts. The Lucretian Nature’s tirade concerning the fear of death is replete with all the belittling questions of the ‘diatribe’ style, she
personified Nature has finished speaking, the narrator comments: *quid respondemus, nisi iustam intendere liitem/naturam et veram verbis exponere causam?* (3. 950-951). Horace adopts a shortened form of the above formula at 1.2.72, matching his syncopated rendition of the entire convention: *quid responderet?* - ‘what would he reply?’ In the Horatian adaptation, too, the question placed at the end of the personified speech is doubly appropriate, as one would expect someone addressed by his own Penis to be even more stunned than someone blasted by a personified Poverty or Nature. However, the incorrigible Villius is so brazen as to answer back: *magnopatrepaternata puellaest* (72).

In a style where imaginary interlocutors usually acted as adversaries, and defended misconceptions apparently held by popular opinion, the device of *prosopopoilia* is by contrast brought in to lend support to the ‘diatribal’ moralist. As fictional interlocutors, the personified *Penia* of Teles, Nature in the Lucretian passage, and the Penis in Horace *Sat.* 1.2 thus comprise imaginary supporters of the moralists rather than imaginary adversaries. The Penis, personifying Nature, argues against the societal prejudices of his owner. The personified speakers also strengthen the impression of their direct relationship with their audiences (especially appropriate in the case of the *muto*) by means of their interrogative

disparingly refers to her adversary as *stulte* (939), and appeals to the ‘contented guest’ *topos* also used by Horace at the end of the first satire. The *finem...laboris* idea at the end of the following quote (940) has also been picked up at Horace *Sat.* 1.1.93: *Denique si vocem rerum natura repente/miti at hoc alciit nostrum sic increpet ipsa*/ *quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris lucubris indulges? quid mortem congerem ac fies?/nam si grata viia anteacita priorque et non omnia periusum congesta quasi in vas commodo perflexure atque ingrata interiere./cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis,/aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem?/sin ea quae fructus cumque es periere profusa/vitaque in offensast, cur amplius addere quaeis, rursum quod pereat male et ingratum occidat omne,/non potius vitae finem facis atque laborum?*... - ‘Suppose that Nature herself were suddenly to find a voice and round upon us in these terms: ‘What is your grievance, mortal, that you give yourself up to this whining and repining? Why do you weep and wail over death? If the life you have lived till now is a pleasant thing - if all its blessings have not leaked away like water poured into a cracked pot and run to waste unrelished - why then, silly creature, do you not retire as a guest who has had his fill of life and take your carefree rest with a quiet mind? Or, if all your gains have been poured profitless away and life has grown distasteful, why do you seek to swell the total? The new can but turn out as badly as the old and perish as unprofitably. Why not rather make an end of life and labour?’...’ (DRN 3.931-943: translation of R.E. Latham).

The later satirist Juvenal uses a similar formula after quoting a speech attributed to one Laronia (*Sat.* 2.44ff), and suggests that she has said only things that are true. In this case, Juvenal’s use of the conventions of this type of instructive speech is equally funny, as the moral speaker is ironically a prostitute, here satirising male homosexual hypocrites. Like Horace’s talking *muto*, with its obscene associations, Laronia is a *persona non grata*. In either case the ‘immoral’ or the more crudely physical are shown to have a better idea of morality than the respectable.
'diatribe' style of address,\textsuperscript{305} and by their use of the second person singular. The actual audience of \textit{Sat.} 1.2 is supposed to derive instruction by listening in, and there is inevitably a good deal of \textit{Schadenfreude} in seeing Villius so utterly but humorously vilified by all and sundry, including his own Penis, with the result that the actual audience is in turn also naturally rendered more receptive to the message. Rhetorical questions continue to be lobbed at this second person addressee by the main speaker who has closely allied himself with the personified guest speaker (\textit{tuo vitio rerumne labores/nil referre putas?}, 76-77), and the addressee is directly exhorted to stop courting disaster by continuing with his adulterous pursuits, as these are more trouble than they are worth: \textit{quare, ne paenitet te, desine matronas sectarier, unde laboris/plus haurire mali est quam ex re decerpere fructus} (77-79).\textsuperscript{306}

Horace's argumentation demonstrates distinct similarities to the sort of argumentation used by Teles. Although Teles is strictly Cynic and 'Horace' himself is inclined to an Epicurean perspective, the points being made are extremely commonplace and were indeed common property of most philosophical schools. We have already seen that Lucretius used the same type of argumentation and style in an Epicurean context. In her role as polemic moraliser, Teles' Poverty ridicules the idea that someone would think that they needed the best food and wine when they were hungry or thirsty. In the Horatian passage, the \textit{prognatus consule cunnus velatusque stola} - or, to phrase it more politely, as the personified penis' interlocutor and owner does, the \textit{puella magno patre nata}, in other words, the high-born \textit{matrona} - is the equivalent of the fine food and drink of the Teles passage: she is a luxury that one can ill afford and which one does not in fact need to fulfil one's sexual urges. Horace likewise appeals to the advice of Nature: \textit{at quanto meliora monet}

\textsuperscript{305} The aggressive attempts by Poverty to inculcate the correct attitude in her addressee, and the attempts of the \textit{muto} to reason with his owner, also mirror the often polemic stance adopted by the main 'diatribe' speaker.

\textsuperscript{306} This parallels the direct exhortation to the miser, in the previous satire, to stop pursuing money in the previous satire: \textit{denique finis sit quaerendi...} (1.1.92ff). The description of the adulterer's troubles as \textit{labores} just prior to this in the second satire (1.2.76-77), also parallels the presentation, at more or less this same place in the first satire, of the miser's pursuits as \textit{labor} where he is being encouraged to give them up...\textit{et finire laborem/incipias...} (1.1.93-94).
It is quite normal for Horace, in his role as a moralising speaker, to appeal to natural needs and logical reasoning rather than to moral precepts to persuade his audience of the correct path. When, however, in a highly ridiculous turn, a Penis pops up to support the moralist’s point, the seriousness of the argument cannot but be upstaged by the nature of this personified speaker. Whatever similarities with serious ‘diatribal’ tradition may be found for this amusing interlude, the substitution of the *muto* for the personified abstract concepts usual in *prosopopoeia*, like Poverty or Nature, creates a highly humorous effect, suggesting that parody of the ‘diatribal’ conventions rather than serious moral dialectic was what Horace had in mind. This parody, this conscious self-satire, need not necessarily be seen as an indication of Horace’s thorough-going ineptitude as a speaker, as Freudenburg has chosen to view it; rather, there seems to be an internal heteroglot ironisation of moralising within the authorial discourse itself. In *Sat.* 1.2 the splitting of the subject into a moralising speaker, on the one hand, and someone who simultaneously pokes fun at moral discourse on the other, continues from *Sat.* 1.1. Clearly, Horace’s approach to his subject in *Sat.* 1.2 is more light-hearted than many scholars have assumed.

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307 Later, Horace draws a more direct analogy between food and sex, which parallels a further point made by Poverty’s tirade in Teles. Poverty demands: ‘...isn’t it true that a hungry man most enjoys eating...? And the thirsty man most enjoys drinking and least awaits the drink that is not at hand? Or does anyone hunger for cakes and thirst for Chian?’ Horace’s speaker makes the comparable point: *num tibi cum fauces urit sitis, aurea quaeris/pocula? num esuriens fastidis omnia praeter/pavonem rhombumque?* - ‘When your throat is parched with thirst, do you look for golden goblets? When you are hungry do you turn your nose up at everything except peacock and turbot?’ (114-116). The analogy with sex is spelt out in the lines that follow: *tument tibi cum inguina, num si/ancilla aut verna est praesto puer, impetus in quem/continuo fiat, mailis tentigine rump?* - ‘...when your groin is throbbing, and if there is a slave-girl or household slave-boy at hand, on whom an attack can at once be made, do you prefer to burst from lust?’ (116-118). Or, as the *muto*, the spokesman for Nature, earlier put it: ‘Do I demand from you a cunt sprung from a consul, in a long dress, when my passion has come to the boil?’ (70-71).

308 See Freudenburg (1993: 25): ‘No matter how seriously the satirist may seem to intend the lesson at hand, one cannot escape the fact that he has here presented the picture of a man arguing with his own penis...the picture is simply too absurd and distracting to command sober reflection on the part of the reader.’
Freedwomen as the ‘Mean’ in Sat. 1.2?

Sat. 1.2 is thus double-voiced: on the one hand, it is presented largely in the style of a moral ‘diatribe’; on the other, there are also joking elements like the muto, as we have just seen. By focussing exclusively on the one half of this double-voicedness, many scholars have, understandably perhaps, come to the conclusion that Horace has a coherent, serious moral argument to present in this satire, and they have consequently wrestled over what this is. Although the second satire has attracted less attention than Sat. 1.1, debate has arisen, for example, over the relation of Horace’s argument in the satire’s body to the ‘Mean’ idea of the first 28 lines. Scholars have often viewed the statement at line 47ff: *muto at quanto merx est in classe secunda,/libertinarum dico, Sallustius in quas/non minus insanit quam qui moechatur*,\(^{309}\) as proposing freedwomen as an Aristotelian ‘Mean’ between the two extreme sexual options of adultery with high-class matronae, on the one hand, and fornication with lowly prostitutes on the other. However, Horace’s statement about freedwomen at 47ff requires further investigation.

It is striking that the two halves of the statement do not quite add up. While lines 47-48a (*muto at... libertinarum dico*) suggest that freedwoman are a good idea, 48b-49 (*Sallustius in quas... quam qui moechatur*) caution by contrast that it is possible, as demonstrated by the case of one Sallust, to go just as far, and fornication with lowly prostitutes on the other. Horace’s statement about freedwomen at 47ff requires further investigation.

\(^{309}\) ‘But how much safer is doing business with the second class, I am talking about freedwomen - about which Sallust is just as mad as one who is an adulterer’.

\(^{310}\) Shackleton Bailey (1982: 12-13) has suggested that the first half of the statement (47-48a) is spoken by Horace himself. It is true that this would logically continue the argument that the adulterer’s position places him at a disadvantage if not in great danger: therefore *muto... merx est*.... Shackleton Bailey gives the second half of the statement (48b-49) to somebody defending by contrast the position of adulterers. Shackleton Bailey determines to call him Cupiennius, and he takes this name of course from the adulterer of line 36. See Shackleton Bailey’s arguments for the possibility of a relative clause as a means of response (he quotes Plautus *Epidicus* 699f). I would suggest that it could in fact be regarded the opposite way around: the first half of the statement could be placed in the mouth of an interlocutor who merely suggests the possibility of freedwomen, which opinion is then countered by the main speaker by means of a relative clause. The main speaker’s point is then that one can go to equal lengths and be just as irresponsible and as self-destructive
statement on the part of the speaker. What we then see is a type of Bakhtinian authorial double-voicedness: with the first half of the statement the speaker expresses a common opinion (47-48a), while in the second he undercuts the first assertion (48b-49). In either case, the speaker is not seriously following an Aristotelian path by suggesting freedwomen as a mean between the other two extremes. Adopting, as in Sat. 1.1, a ‘reasoning’ approach that is practical rather than moral, as ‘diatribe’ speaker Horace cautions that even a relationship with a freedwoman may be harmful if taken to extremes and pursued insanely.

Horace then proceeds to quote the expressed opinions of a certain Sallust, who, according to other sources, is known have committed adultery, \(^{311}\) but here, in what is perhaps a joke on Horace’s part, is identified as a party who is said to be mad about freedwomen: verum hoc se amplectitur uno,/hoc amat et laudat, ‘matronam nullam ego tango’ (53-54). That Sallust, if he is indeed identifiable with the historical personage, should here be made to defend a vice opposite to the one for which he was infamous, may undercut and make a joke out of the argument. Or, on the other hand, the inversion itself may support the idea that extreme behaviour in either direction from a ‘Mean’ is equally undesirable. It is the extreme that is the problem, rather than its specific direction.

Sallust, then, ironically presented in Sat. 1.2 as an example of someone who is mad about freedwomen, is likened to one Marsaeus (55-56), who, in spite of wasting his entire patri-

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with freedwomen as with adulterous matronae. More likely, however (see above), is the possibility that the whole statement is an ironic one attributed to the main speaker.

\(^{311}\) The name Sallustius was rare, and may have been the historian. There is a problem however in that the historian Sallust, according to the accounts of Varro (Gellius 17.18) and Asconius (pseudo-Acron), was supposed to have been accused of adultery and had suffered a beating for his adultery with Sulla’s daughter Fausta (mentioned at 1.2.64). One explanation has had Sallust express this opinion after his bitter experience with adultery or to defend himself in the senate against the charge of adultery (rejected as unlikely by Brown ibid.). It is more likely, however, that Horace has deliberately inverted Sallust’s accusation from adultery to an obsession with freedwomen as a joke, which would support an ironic reading of lines 48b-49. See Zetzel (1980: 64): ‘I suspect, although I cannot prove it, that Horace has deliberately reversed the story to make a joke of the personal attack’. This reference to Sallust is generally recognised by scholars as the place where the Horatian satirist comes closest to impugning an historical personage, and an inversion of the vices for which Sallust was notorious would therefore undercut the satiric bite. At the same time, Sallust is poignantly quoted as denying the very charge that was directed at him in ‘real life’. This would perhaps have been analogous to satirising Oscar Wilde for overindulgence with women, and have him deny all intercourse with boys.
mony on a mime actress, is heard to boast: *nil fuerit mi...cum uxoribus umquam alienis* - 'I will never have anything to do with other men's wives' (57). By quoting the opinions of those who apparently pride themselves on not committing adultery, but who still ruin their family name and waste their resources, Horace dialogically reveals the irony of their self-delusion. He responds to his imaginary interlocutor Marsaeus in 'diatribal' manner, engaging in a fictional dialogue with this deluded spendthrift, and firing a series of aggressive rhetorical questions at him.312 His point is that Sallust and Marsaeus assume that it is enough that they avoid the role (*personam*) of ill-starred adulterer, and do not see that they should avoid what it is that causes the damage, whatever the type of woman involved.

In summary, the 'freedwomen interlude' (47-63) functions in effect, whether or not we choose to read an interlocutor at 47f, as the equivalent of the standard objection of the imaginary interlocutor in the 'diatribe' style: it presents possible objections or alternatives to the main speaker's argument, which are then in turn contextualised and rejected by the main speaker. The idea: 'What about freedwomen?', is brought up as an alternative to the extremes of prostitute or adulteress, but, as we have seen, the speaker rejects the freedwoman suggestion as *necessarily* the solution, by arguing that one can equally go overboard in the direction of the *classis secunda*: if one is intent on wrecking one's good name and dissipating one's patrimony, it hardly matters whether the woman is a *matrona* or a freedwoman-cum-mime-actress or a prostitute (*verum est cum mimis, cum meretricibus*, 58).313 Freedwomen are thus raised as a possibility, but are rejected as a solution.

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312 *verum est cum mimis, est cum meretricibus, unde fama malum gravius quam res trahit. An tibi abunde personam satis est, non illud quidquid ubique officii evitare? Bonam desperdere famam, rem patris olimare, malum est ubicunque. Quid inter-est in matrona, ancilla peccesne togata?* (58-63).

313 This is perhaps also why Sallust's charge (48-49) is effectively reversed in the satire - one extreme or its opposite both have the same effect, and thus it does not really matter with whom one destroys one's life.
A type of relationship as the ‘Mean’ in Sat. 1.2?

However, if he steered a middle course, the man mad about freedwomen too could be generous without depleting his resources or ruining his reputation.\(^{314}\) In relating the body of the satire to the ‘Mean’ idea of its start, Cynthia Dessen has thus argued that rather than prescribe the type of woman that is the key, Horace suggests instead the type of relationship to which one should aspire.\(^{315}\) She suggests that the ‘Mean’ to which the speaker aspires is not the freedwoman as such, as a supposed halfway point between the matrona and the prostitute, but rather a relationship that satisfies nature without costing too much in either material or physical terms. Thus, in Dessen’s view, the ‘Mean’ promoted by Sat. 1.2 as a whole (if indeed there is such a thing) is a question of the type of relationship in which a man engages, rather than the type of woman with whom he sleeps. Dessen has effectively pinpointed what in essence the speaker should be attempting to argue, and what he does indeed argue for a portion of the satire, but unfortunately this is not the main thrust of Sat. 1.2 as a whole. Dessen’s argument, that the type of relationship rather than the type of woman is the important thing, is valid insofar as between 47-63 the speaker strives to contextualise, and thus ultimately reject, the idea that the freedwoman is necessarily the ‘Mean’, the solution to the problem. In my view, however, Sat. 1.2 is too ‘dialogic’ and indeed too conversationally structured for this neat solution to apply throughout.

\(^{314}\) \textit{at hic siliqua res, quia ratio suaderet, quaque modestie/munifico esse licet, veilet bonus atque benignus/esse, daret quantum satis essit nec sibi damnos/ dedecoriqque fore/...} - ‘But if this fellow could be good and generous according to the limits within which his fortunes and reason would allow, and within which he could be moderately liberal, he would be giving as much as is necessary and without being a cause of shame and ruin to himself’ (49-53). This parallels the satirist’s similarly exasperated comments, in relation to the professionals who would not wish to alter their circumstances even if given the chance, at Sat. 1.1.19: \textit{atqui licet esse beatiss} - ‘But they could be happy!’; and in relation to the miser at 1.1.63-64: \textit{iubeas miserum esse, libenter/quotenus id facit} - ‘You may as well order him to be miserable, since he chooses to be so himself’. However, the \textit{benignus} of 1.2.51, prominently placed at its end, echoes 1.2.4, where Tigellius was said to have been \textit{benignus}. The use of this term at the start of the satire had had negative connotations, considering that Tigellius was patron to the dregs of society, the \textit{ambuabaiarum collegia} and various mime artists and quacks, who, it was made clear, mourned the loss of his generous patronage rather than the man himself: \textit{quippe benignus erat}. As a result, \textit{benignus} at line 51 of the same satire may inherit an ironic and cynical caste, potentially undercutting the sincerity of the assertion.

\(^{315}\) 1968: 200: ‘He is primarily interested not in the kind of woman to satisfy sexual needs, but rather in the kind of relationship existing between sexual partners’.
A larger problem with *Sat.* 1.2, as I see it, is that its overall argument is a negative one rather than a positive one, a practical one rather than a strictly ethical one, and one that is presented conversationally rather than formally. The speaker, as conversationalist, shifts his perspective as it suits him to get his point across, which is why Dessen’s arguments are correct, but only for a certain section of the satire (lines 47-63). At 62-63, for example, the speaker argues that it makes no difference if one sins and destroys one’s life with a *matrona* or an *ancilla togata*; at 82, however, the *togata* is lauded above the *matrona* as a promising sexual partner. The *matrona*, on the other hand, comes to be regarded in an increasingly negative light as the satire’s argument unfolds.

The overall practical message of this conversationally structured satire is: stay clear of married women. Particularly as the satire progresses, it is striking that the speaker would insist on conceptualising the sexual ‘relationship’ purely in terms of the *object* of desire, and in fact presents all his arguments in relation to specific types of partner rather than types of relationship. In a very human way, he understandably pictures sexual preference as a person, rather than the more abstract ‘type of relationship’, just as the *muto*, likewise, cannot really be faulted for speaking of his love interest as a *cunnus*. Moreover, the sexual partners of which the satirist speaks in *Sat.* 1.2 are recognisable not only as stock personages but in particular are identified by the specific attire which marks them as such: the emphasis on clothing, so much stressed throughout this satire,\(^{316}\) underlines very strongly the point that the particular types of sexual partner presented in this satire are not only visualised as persons but are visualised specifically in the garb that conventionally displayed their personal status to society.

The down-to-earth satirist is, as noted, more concerned with offering his audience practical guidelines than formulating a specific theory, and in practice, the identity of the sexual partner, as indicated by the outward signs of dress, does indeed matter. It matters, however, in a strictly negative sense. What matters is that the identity of the sex-partner is *not* that of the *matrona*: while one is free to off-load all one’s wealth onto any woman, one is

\(^{316}\) See esp. Curran 1970: 225ff; discussed below at p. 110 n. 323.
more likely to be relieved of it by the wealthy adulteress, whose art of concealing figure-faults may also ensure that one pays too high a price, in the figurative sense, for shoddy merchandise (103-105). For with the matrona one is more likely to land in grave physical danger, stripped not only of one’s clothes, as lines 37-46 as well as the satire’s ending (126-134) make clear. In practice, it is easier to achieve the ‘Mean’, to live happily within the bounds of nature, and so on, if one avoids other men’s wives. While all relationships may naturally go bad, the point the speaker makes is that the one with the matrona is riskier than the others: in modern terms, adultery is a minefield. The image of what one has to avoid is a lady dressed in a stola.

Much of Sat. 1.2, particularly as the discussion develops, is by contrast directed at promoting the parabilis Venus, who may be a prostitute or any ‘lady of easy virtue’ (82), a pais kalos (81-82a), or even one of one’s slaves, male or female (116-118), at the expense of the matrona. The parabilis Venus may come in many different guises, all of which are pictured by the speaker as types of people. ‘Quite often’, says Horace vaguely, after praising the legs of a pais kalos, ‘it even is better with the toga-clad girl...’ (atque etiam melius persaepe togatae est, 82). The freedwoman, prostitute, slave-boy, slave-girl, and the puer delictatus, are all potential parabiles Veneres, and they are all potential opposites of the adulteress. What they all have in common is that, quite simply, they are not matronae.

Again, our speaker is more interested in giving practical advice than in formulating a theory of conduct or suggesting one ideal partner. But while he refuses to be tied down to a single sexual preference, he is explicit about which sexual partner one should undoubted-ly avoid. From a practical viewpoint, his main brief is to warn his audience off the perils of adultery, as personified by the matrona. In order to make this point, however, Horace employs a two-pronged method of attack: on the one hand, he aims to show that adultery is disadvantageous and dangerous, on the other, that other sexual partners are indeed preferable to (i.e. more available, accessible and less dangerous than) the adulteress. Not for any moral reasons, but simply because of the danger and inconvenience involved in adultery, any sexual partner is better than another man’s wife. When you get desperate, he ad-
vises, grab anything on (hopefully good) legs as long as it's not a married woman. There are many (unhooked) fish in the sea, he consoles us... and himself.

Although, on a formal level, then, and for a certain portion of the satire, Dessen is right in suggesting that Sat. 1.2 approves of a 'Mean' in terms of the type of relationship, one which suits nature, and although Curran is likewise correct in drawing out the custom vs. nature (nomos-physis) debate presented in 1.2,\(^{317}\) in practice all this comes down to the speaker's warning his addressees off adultery, personified by the stola-clad matrona. In fact, the negative focus of Sat. 1.2 means that a great deal of attention is given to the matrona precisely in the sense that one should be avoiding her. This sense of the matrona, on the one side, vs. all the other preferable and approved sexual partners, on the other, unbalances the equation so that it reads, fittingly, very much like the satire's motto: *nil medium est.*\(^{318}\)

**More than meets the eye?**

There remains the uneasy feeling that there is simply more going on in 1.2 than scholars have normally perceived. As with Sat. 1.1, whatever 'purpose' we are able to detect in this second satire, without a doubt it is not exclusively the presentation of a moral argument. Indeed, Barry Baldwin has some justification in seeing Sat. 1.2 as devoid of any moral message, a parody of elegy and other Latin love poetry.\(^{319}\) Other scholars have in recent years explored more fully the manner in which the poem is grounded in the conventions of the farce and the popular comic stage.\(^{320}\) In my view, too, Sat. 1.2 is not

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\(^{318}\) In fact, the structure of Sat. 1.2 as a whole is 'unbalanced'. Unlike the other two 'diatribes' of the first triad, the discussion of the second satire departs on the tangent (of sex) around line 28ff, and never even attempts to return to the initial topic or to 'unite' the poem's themes, as we saw at the end of 1.1. In the structure of 1.2, then, as well as in its handling of theme, *nil medium est.*

\(^{319}\) Baldwin has observed that Sat. 1.2 has more in common with the later mock-didactic *Ars Amatoria* of Ovid than with serious moral tracts: 'His prime concern is rather to make fun of the grand passions of the Love Poets by reducing sex to a comic physical exercise. The didactic tone of the poem is largely parody and has no serious intent' (1970: 460). See also the more recent discussion of Sat. 1.2.127-133 by Labate (1994: 116-117): 'L'amore che piace ai poeti è messo in ridicolo...'.

simply a moral ‘diatribe’, but just as with its predecessor, the discourse of this satire can and should be viewed within an entire dramatic context. While the literary aspects of *Sat.* 1.2, as drawn out by scholars such as Baldwin and Freudenburg, are not to be underestimated, in my opinion the satire has in addition something at once rather more personal and more self-satiric to communicate.

The lecturer as lecher

Firstly, there is something going on in *Sat.* 1.2 that has escaped most commentators, partly, no doubt, because it is something below the proverbial belt. Many scholars have understandably felt the need to rescue this satire from the negative criticism it has received precisely on the grounds that it is lewd,321 and they have aimed to find instead some respectable, if undeniably pragmatic, argument for the satirist to pursue. While the practical -moral argument is indeed there, as we have seen, the desire to rehabilitate or ‘sanitise’ this satire is perhaps what has led most scholars to assume that Horace is in *Sat.* 1.2 foremost or exclusively concerned with a serious philosophical message. As a result, they have downplayed or even ignored the following: that Horace seems to be most concerned, as his speech progresses, with the physical appearance, even anatomy, of the women in question, supposedly inasmuch as this relates to their sexual delivery, but in so doing the speaker also seems deliberately to be presenting himself as rather lecherous.

Horace devotes an inordinate proportion of his speech (80-105) to a detailed discussion of how much you can actually see of the various women’s bodies, given their attire. Here he drops his moralising as well as his attack-mode, which he has adopted throughout much of the satire in relation to the imaginary adversaries, and adopts instead an advice-mode, as he describes in detail the respective visual advantages of the prostitute’s attire, and the

321 But see, in this regard, the remarks of Curran (1970: 220), who suggests that scholars are wrong to ignore or underestimate the function of obscenity in *Sat.* 1.2: ‘The traditional scholarly approach to poetry of this sort...reminds one of officious cleaning women in a high-class brothel, who ignore what is really going on as they air the rooms out... So scholars ignore the coarse vitality as they busy themselves with less unsettling matters, such as analysis of structure and prose restatement of philosophical ideas, tidying up arguments like so many tangled bedsheets or scattered pillows...’
disadvantages of that of the matrona: whereas with the adulteress, who is decked out in a long stola from head to foot, præter faciem nil cernere possis - 'You can see nothing other than her face' (94), on the other hand, altera, nil obstat: Cois tibi paene videer est /ut nudam, ne crure malo, ne sit pede turpis; metiri possis oculo latus - 'With the other, nothing is in the way: in her Coan silk you can see her as though she were naked, you can see whether she has bad legs or ugly feet; you can take a visual measurement of her body' (101-103). Rather than a moral or even a practical-moral speech, Sat.1.2 begins to sound like a titillating guide for peeping-toms.322 The moralising or reasoning tone is now absent; the ‘diatribe’, supposedly so concerned throughout with dress as an indicator of status,323 has turned into a peep-show. Skirt-chasing instead becomes a striptease.

Women are even further objectified and dehumanised at 86ff, where sizing up a potential sexual partner is likened to the tack used by wealthy people when buying a horse, only the opposite way around: with horses, it helps if you cover them up, so as not to be led astray by their pulcherrima tota; with women, it’s best if you can spy their figures through their see-through garments first, see them next-to-naked before you commit yourself financially or otherwise (101-103).324 One should perhaps take into consideration the fact that in

322 Alison Parker (1986: 60) observes that Horace ‘rants on...with a most unphilosophical indignation, accompanied as it is by an obsessed and lustful fascination with the female anatomy.’ Henderson (1989: 104) also notes that women are treated here as ‘bits’ or ‘object lumps of body’. He suggests that what Horace is doing is in fact ‘crudely summing up the crudity of male objectification of women’ (id.: 105). Therefore what is actually satirised in Sat. 1.2 is not the choice of certain types of women as sexual options or even the risks of adultery, but the ‘voice’ and viewpoint of masculinity. And, whether we like it or not, the audiences of Sat. 1.2 also inevitably become voyeurs at Horace’s peep-show (id.: 106).

323 Curran (1970: 222ff) points out how extensively the issue of dress pervades this satire. Dress symbolises convention, which in Sat. 1.2 is pitted against nature: ‘As an especially pervasive, tangible, and visible fact of life, dress is a specific convention particularly well suited to be the concrete poetic symbol of the abstract, general idea of convention itself.’ Dress symbolises extremes on either side of the Mean at lines 25-26, where Maltinus dresses to advertise his effeminacy, another his masculinity; the matrona is defined and is instantly recognisable in terms of her dress: ...sunt qui nolint tetigisse nisi illuste quorum subsuta talos tegat instita veste, at lines 28-29. At the end of the satire, however, it is the adulterer who has to run dishevelled and barefoot from the scene (132): discincta tunica fugiendum est et pede nudo.

324 Curran (1970: 227) comments that this analogy allows Horace ‘to stay close to the general idea of clothing and to give further expression to the ruthlessly practical and realistic attitude toward women’s bodies.’ He also (id.: 234) observes that the analogy of horse-woman is maintained when the horse’s anatomical parts are referred to only in terms of parts used to describe the woman: facies, pede, clanes, caput, cervix. Although the woman and the horse do have a number of body parts in common anyway, it is interesting, as Curran points out, that there are no hooves here, rather feet; the horse, traditionally an erotic animal anyway (cf. e.g. Semonides fr. 7, where the glamorous but expensive wife is likened to a horse with flowing mane),
recent years readers have generally become more sensitive to and less favourable towards misogynist literature than an ancient audience is likely to have have been, and these comments may consequently elicit a far stronger negative reaction in a modern reader than in an ancient, just as modern sentimentality has tended to misconstrue Horace's throwaway remarks about leaping on home-born slaves should no other sexual partner be available. This aside, there is much to make one suppose that Horace may even deliberately and self-satirically be presenting himself as rather a randy bastard in Sat. 1.2: the lecturer is increasingly revealed as a lecher as the satire lurches toward its conclusion.

Satirist on the run

Although couched in the commonplaces of the adultery mime of the popular comic stage, the final few lines of Sat. 1.2 are a case in point. Prior to this Horace, scoffing at the protestations in favour of the unobtainable matrona presented by the imaginary adversary who quotes Callimachus, instead touts the parabilis atque facilis Venus (119ff), the

is here presented as though it were a beautiful woman. The horse is thus humanised at the same time as the woman is dehumanised.

At 92-3 the interlocutor had been imagined praising the physique of the high-born mistress with the exclamations: o cru! o brachial!, parodying the words of Philodemus (AP 1.132): οί ποδεῖς, οί κοινής... - 'O feet! O calves!...'. The narrator responds to the interlocutor's exclamations by cautioning that in the case of the aristocratic matron, her physique is in fact not ordinarily visible. After reasoning for a few lines, he adds the rhetorical question: an iti mavis/insidias fieri pretiumque avellier antelquam mercem ostendi? - 'or do you prefer to be ambushed and have the cash snatched away from you before the goods have been displayed?' (103-105). This is followed closely by a virtually translated quotation of a statement by the speaker in a Callimachean poem (AP 12.102). This is used to present a case for hard-to-get loves: meus est amor huic similis; nam transvolat in medio posita et fugientia captat (107-108). The narrator responds: 'Do you hope that pains and the tides of passion and the heavy cares can be driven out from your heart by these little verses?' (109-110), and then enters into questioning mode. There follows a set of four additional rhetorical questions questioning the position of the adulterer, who likes to go through great difficulties in order to obtain a sexual partner not easily accessible. Towards the end of the poem, Philodemus is however brought in to reject the unobtainable matrona (121). Horace's relationship to the Epicurean Philodemus has long been an area of speculation. Tsakiropoulou-Summers (1998: 20), however, has pointed out that while
natural beauty so often praised by Latin love poetry (123-124). Scholars have frequently squabbled over whether this partner is to be identified as a prostitute, a freedwoman, or some other available female, but, as noted, the important point is not so much her positive identity as the fact that she is not a matrona; there is no husband in the offing to return from the country at any moment, driving the adulterer into the cupboard or out of the window, according to the topoi of Comic farce.

Horace, moreover, describes himself enjoying the hassle-free advantages of the parabilis Venus, as he uses striking and unambiguous first person verbs in relation to the topic of 'safe' sex: nec vereor dum futuo... - 'and I needn't be afraid, while I'm fucking...' (127). What Horace need not fear while on the job with the parabilis Venus is vividly portrayed in the lines that follow. In the satire's final lines, Horace presents himself as if, caught in flagrante delicto with an adulteress, and in a state of undress, he is on the run from a jealous husband, fearing for his money, his arse, and his reputation, and in that order: discincta tunica fugiendum est ac pede nudo, ne nummi pereant aut puga aut denique fama (132-133). Although the scene is sketched with all the subordinate verbs in the subjunctive (recurrat...frangatur...latret, etc.) in a clause of fearing (after vereor, 127-131), at the same time, Horace's insertion of first person pronouns: egomet mi, prominently positioned at the end of line 131, hints all too strongly, I would argue, that the adultery scenario is indeed one of which 'Horace', the satirist's character within the Comic universe of the Sermones, has regrettable first-hand experience. Subjunctives do not prevent the audience of Sat. 1.2 from conjuring up the irresistible and indelible impression of Horace in urgent and compulsory flight from the furious and vindictive vir. Rather than choosing

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It is likely that Horace met Philodemus during his lifetime; recent papyrological discoveries have largely discredited the old thesis that Horace actually studied under Philodemus at some stage during his youth. She could of course, also potentially be a pais kalos or a slave-boy in terms of the arguments Horace has been putting forward (81-82; 116-118; see above), but toward the end of the satire the parabilis Venus is imagined rather as a woman, who, easy and accessible, is in striking contrast with that other woman, the matrona, with whom relations are notoriously difficult and dangerous.

Freudenburg (1993: 45f) has examined in detail the influences of Comedy and Roman mime on this scene. The modern equivalent, so beloved by movies and television, he notes (id.: 46), typically has 'the lover in boxer shorts, tripping over his pants, which keep falling down to his ankles...'. But cf. Curran (1970: 237), who notes: 'Actually, as 'egomet mi' (131) indicates, Horace imagines himself in both roles, that of the undisturbed fornicator and that of the surprised adulterer but a distinction between the two is made by an extended use of subjunctive for the situation of the latter.'
to end on the satisfying and carefree note of lines 125-127, the satirist leaves the second satire running.

Rather like the ending of *Epode* 2, in which the speaker who throughout has been praising the simple life is ironically revealed, at the poem’s end, as a money-lender, so here the ending of *Sat.* 1.2 forces the audience to reconsider the foregoing argument in the light of the final hints: the moralist who has been preaching against adultery seems himself to have a lot of first-hand knowledge of the flight of an adulterer. In recreating, even in the subjunctive, his hurried, nightmarish escape from a husband, Horace seems deliberately to allow us the impression that he knows whereof he speaks. The less than three lines that suffice to present the carefree and uncomplicated sexual encounter with the *parabasis Venus* (125-127a) contrast with the more than six lines that describe the adultery episode gone wrong (127b-133). As presented here, in fact, adultery involves very little sex but a lot of evasive action to escape the husband. Throughout, as speaker, Horace has adopted a practical approach to sex: adultery is undesirable, he has repeatedly warned, not because it is morally wrong, but because it is dangerous and one has no guarantees of enjoyment or satisfaction. The second satire’s ending would consciously seem to create the impression, then, that Horace has all the while been warning his audience off adultery in this fashion, not merely as a practical moralist, but from bitter personal experience.\(^{330}\)

In a Bakhtinian fashion, there is again a splitting of the subject: on the one hand, the speaker of *Sat.* 1.2 is The Moralist, who warns his listeners of the ills of adultery; on the other, however, he is an all too fallible individual who guiltily reveals, in his use of first person pronouns and verbs at the satire’s end, that he knows all about adultery from his own experience: *deprendi miserum est; Fabio vel iudice vincam* (134).\(^{331}\) That the satirist jokes about being able to prove to Fabius that getting caught in adultery is miserable further

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\(^{330}\) This renders the warnings of the punishments that have befallen other adulterers (41-46a) all the more terrifying, as this is what our speaker has narrowly avoided.

\(^{331}\) ‘Getting caught is wretched; I could prove my case even if Fabius were judge.’ Fabius, the wordy Stoic of *Sat.* 1.1.14, rather than supposedly being an adulterer, probably constitutes a reference to the Stoic idea of the sage’s immunity to pain (Brown 1993: 114).
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strengthens the impression that he has personal experience of this. Once bitten, twice shy, as it were.

The veiled confessions at the end of this satire do not necessarily have anything to do with the historical Horace, any more than do suggestions that he was Maecenas' scurra, but rather they are part of the ongoing self-satiric portrayal of his satirist speaker. If the flight of the adulterer at the end of Sat. 1. 2 is redolent of the well-worn topoi of Comedy and farce, then Horace's character-speaker in the Satires himself inhabits a comic world.

When all is said and (not) done, however, this satire is one which comes down very strongly against adultery, and thus keeps on the right side of morality and the incipient Augustan regime. Indeed, the pathetic and laughable picture that is painted of the adulterer's sufferings in Sat. 1. 2, even more effective if it is from an erstwhile first-hand but now repentent perspective, makes adultery seem more undesirable than the most virulent moralistic condemnation could ever do. Yet however 'true' the points that are made here, in Sat. 1. 2 as in the previous satire, the joke is again on Horace's character.

The on-going joke

Engaging the ending of the second satire certainly is, but the joke does not end there: the sexuality of Horace's character is an on-going issue in both books of Satires. His laughable lack of sexual success can be witnessed for example at Sat. 1. 5. 82-85, the description of Horace's famous 'wet dream' after he is stood up by the mendax puella, another

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332 Brown (ibid.) comments in addition that '...the conclusion also conveys irony at the satirist's own expense; deprendi miserum est, following the picture of the poet himself having to escape from an act of adultery, is tantamount to an experto crede, virtually suggesting that the satirist (not necessarily Horace himself, but the persona adopted in the poem) has learned the folly of adultery which he has attacked by bitter experience, and that it is this which will make his case to Fabius so convincing - a disarming and engaging touch to the poem.'

333 The famous Augustan moral legislation against adultery was still in the future at this stage, but we can be sure that, even in this period, Octavian and his supporters were certainly not in favour of adultery.

334 hic ego mendacem stultissimus usque puellam/ad mediam noctem exspecto. somnas tamen aufer/t ientum Veneri: tum immundo somnia visum nocturnam vestem maculant ventremque supinum. Reckford (1999: 545) has recently suggested that Horace's 'wet dream' may be symbolic of his fearful scepticism concerning the reconciliation between Octavian and Antony, since their meeting in the south of Italy in 37 B.C.E. is generally recognised as the unmentioned background to the curiously apolitical Sat. 1. 5. Horace's description of his sexual failure may thus, according to Reckford (ibid.), be an indirect way of suggesting
frustrating non-event on his 'inconsequential journey'. Posing as a Priapus in the eighth satire, the speaker is likewise forced to fight back with the blunt end of his weapon, as it were, in order to scare off his female tormentors.  

But there are also more presentable models, although these are perhaps not faithfully followed by the speaker of Sat. 1.2. Parallels may be drawn, for example, between the advice given by the moralist at Sat. 1.2 and that given Horace by his father at Sat. 1.4. 103ff. The father’s promotion of a concessa Venus in contrast to the dangers and troubles of the adulterous liaison on the one hand, as well as common prostitutes on the other, may have relevance for the second satire. Horace’s ‘father’ likewise emphasises practical rather than ethical considerations: his concern is apparently solely that his son should retain the family’s good name and fortunes, and not with the abstract moral implications of his misdemeanours.

In many ways the practical orientation of Sat. 1.2 is comparable to Horace’s father’s telling his son about the ‘birds and the bees’ in Sat. 1.4. Like the father, the moralist of Sat. 1.2 has, as we have seen, a practical rather than an ethical focus, and among his chief concerns are the retention of reputation (fama) and fortune (res). Indeed, since Horace claims...
to have inherited his satiric art from his ‘father’,\footnote{Sat. 1.4.105-106:...insuevit pater optimus hoc me,/ut fugerem exemplis viorum quaeque modo...} it is fitting that, like his paternal instructor, the satirist should instruct by way of example. However, the audience of Sat. 1.4.103ff must inevitably recall the ending of Sat. 1.2, where it had been suggested that Horace had failed to obey at least one half of this paternal advice. The failure of the son to live up to these paternal ideals is, as we have seen, one of the great jokes of Horace’s satiric irony.\footnote{Indeed, at the end of the ‘father’ section in Sat. 1.4, when describing the moral instruction given him by his father, Horace undercuts the morally superior attitude he has been cultivating by deliberately overstating it and ironising himself, when he claims that because of all this advice, he does not suffer from vices that cause one’s ruin, although he is, he admits, in the grip of less serious, venial sins: ...ex hoc ego somus ab illis, perniciem quaeceumque ferunt, mediocribus et quis/ignoscas vitiis teneor... (129-131). This is a similar (equally ironic) sentiment to that which he expresses at Sat. 1.3.19-20, where he jokingly claims that his faults are lesser ones.}

The engaging and disarming inclusion of the satirist with the victims of satire reaches its climax in Horace’s ‘diatribes’ of his second book of Satires, which, as I argue, are to be read as a continuation and answer to the ‘diatribes’ of the first book, and which to a great extent subvert some of the apparent seriousness of those of the first book. While at Sat. 2.3.325, Damasippus’ final accusation flung at Horace, before he is cut short, is promiscuity: *mille puellarum, puerorum mille furores*, it is rather in Horace’s penultimate satire, *Sat. 2.7*, that other Stoic ‘diatribe’, that Horace is directly accused of adultery. In *Sat. 2.7* Davus the slave is shown giving Horace a Saturnalian dose of his own medicine. It is not my intention to anticipate my later analysis of this pivotal satire here, but for our present purposes we may note that, in the course of his speech, Davus is made to suggest that Horace is guilty of adultery, or at least of thinking about it: *Te coniunx aliena capit, meretricula Davum* - ‘Somebody else’s wife enthralls you, a little tart Davus’ (2.7.46). Davus by contrast lauds himself for having the sense to satisfy his natural urges with the prostitute, clearly presented as the *parabilis Venus* in *Sat. 2.7*, as we shall see in greater detail later. Horace, himself now ironically in the role of audience and occasional interlocutor, is presented by Davus as defending himself against the charges of adultery: ‘*Non sum moechus’ ais* - ‘I am not an adulterer,’ you say.’\footnote{This would ironically parallel the claim made by the spendthrift interlocutor Sallust at Sat. 1.2.47-54, who had supposedly wasted all his money on freedwomen: *matronam nullam ego tango.*} Davus points out, however, that the
only reason Horace is not an adulterer is his fear of the danger involved (72-73). Thus Horace’s slave throws back at his master what was essentially the practically-oriented ‘diatribe’ message of Sat. 1.2.

In pointing out his master’s adulterous tendencies, held in check only by fear, Davus on the one hand undercuts the position of Moralist against adultery that Horace had adopted in the second satire, but also confirms the joke, at that satire’s end, that it had been bitter experience that had made his master, the satirist, arrive at this conclusion. The strategically placed Sat. 2.7 subverts most of the satirist’s formal stances that he has adopted as moral speaker throughout both satiric books, as we shall see. However, in addition to our earlier observations on Sat. 1.1, the self-satiric ending of Sat. 1.2, which cannot but retrospectively colour the rest of the second satire, suggests that the polemic ‘dialogue’ of the two satiric books begins as early as the first triad, with Horace’s hilarious self-mockery there.
CHAPTER THREE:

SAT. 1.3: THE DIALOGUE OF FRIENDSHIP

Gentlemen, I need hardly say that, so far, I have been jesting. Yet, poor as my jests have been, not everything which I have said has been uttered in mockery; for some of my jests have been spoken through clenched teeth. Certain questions are vexing my soul, and I beg you to solve them...


Although Sat. 1.3, the third member of the initial triad of Horace Sermones Book 1, has attracted the least scholarly attention of the three, it not only continues the conversation started by the first two satires, but, as I shall argue here, Sat. 1.3 also engages these prior satires in an interesting manner. On the face of it, Sat. 1.3 is a moralising lecture on the correct attitude to adopt towards friends, just as Sat. 1.1 and 1.2 were, at first glance, exhortations on the correct approaches to money and to sexuality. The third satire has, however, often been perceived as substantially different from the first two, even by scholars who have upheld its designation as a ‘diatribe’ satire. It has for example been suggested that Sat. 1.3 is somewhat gentler than the other ‘diatribe’ satires. It has also been remarked that apart from echoes of Lucretius, the third satire does not contain much ‘literary material’, and even Fiske found in this satire unusually little recognisable Lucilian influence. Sat. 1.3, it has also been claimed, contains ‘none of the universal similes of popular philosophy’, but is ‘richer in metaphor than either of the other pieces’. Stylistically, 1.3 has also sometimes been seen as a deviation from the previous Satires: the Spanish scholar Codoñer, for example, argued that Horace’s third satire is not to be classed as ‘diatribe’ satire along with 1.1. and 1.2 at all; instead he groups the first two satires with 1.10.
What these scholars with reservations about *Sat. 1.3* have perhaps all been pointing to, in their different ways, is that the third satire is a departure, in a sense, from the first two satires. Stylistically and thematically, *Sat. 1.3* looks forward to later poems in the *liber sermonum*. It is typical of nearly all the satires in having distinct links with both its precursor and successor. However, with *Sat. 1.3* there is also a shift in orientation and emphasis that marks it out as distinct from the first two satires. As the final poem of the first triad, *Sat. 1.3* emerges from a linear reading of the *Satires* as retrospective in orientation and apologist in emphasis. It is, as we shall see, what could be termed an anti-'diatribe', in that it is both an answer to and an 'unwinding' of what has gone before. *Sat. 1.3* is, in an intratextual sense, in dialogue with its two predecessors.

**The dialogicality of *Sat. 1.3***

Like *Sat. 1.1* and 1.2, the third satire is itself strikingly dialogic. From its start it resounds with a number of voices as the satirist, continuing in the conversational mode of the *Sermones*, engages targets and imaginary audiences. Later other voices contribute to the satire's polyphony: we hear the nicknames fathers give to their children, we listen to the titles with which, according to the satirist, we regrettably saddle our friends, and are informed of what we should call them instead. The Stoics are ridiculed and, particularly toward the satire's end, their ideas are directly quoted and outrageously derided, balancing the laughable opinions attributed to Tigellius at the satire's beginning. The dialogic manner in which this mockery is effected continues the impression of conversation created by the *liber sermonum* so far. From line 25 the speaker energetically engages a second person singular addressee, and appeals specifically to Maecenas himself more or less halfway through the satire (1.3.64), the first time that the patron has been addressed by name since the start of *Sat. 1.1*.
Tigellius’ inconsistency

The third satire begins with a generalising statement of the type often found in Horace’s moralising satires, but this is quickly illustrated by one particular exemplar, Tigellius, who had been mentioned at the start of the previous satire. Tigellius had, by his extreme behaviour, seemed single-handedly to embody the dictum of the previous satire, ‘there is no mean’. According to the satirist the thoroughly inconsistent Tigellius used constantly to swing from one extreme to the other (1.3.1-19a): just as in the previous satire nil medium est (28), so here nil aequale homini fuit illi (1.3.9), and nil fuit umquam/sic impar sibi (1.3.18-19). The first example is the Sardinian’s inconstancy towards his friends, which, in view of the satire’s later focus, is perhaps the most serious charge: Tigellius, like all singers, would refuse to sing if requested by his friends - even if powerful and influential amici such as Octavian asked him - but if uninvited he would perform in all possible keys throughout dinner (4-8). A series of humorous pairs of other contrasting examples of Tigellius’ behaviour are then given, and the dialogicality of the satire is enhanced by the occasional quotation of the opinions of the man himself.

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349 Omnibus hoc vitium est cantoribus... (1.3.1). Sweeping, generalised overstatements such as this are common to Horace’s ‘diatribe’ style, which frequently includes statements (or questions) to the effect that no-one or nothing or everyone or everything is like this or that: cf. Qui fit...ul nemo...? (1.1.1), nil medium est... (1.2.28), and various other assertions in the ‘diatribe’ satires of the second book, e.g. male verum examinat omnis/corruptus iudex (2.2.8-9); insanis et tu stultique prope omnes (2.3.32). For a discussion of these generalised overstatements in the ‘diatribes’ of the first book of Satires and the manner in which they help to classify the ‘diatribe’ speaker, see Freudenburg 1993: 12. Cf. chapter 4 below, p. 149, n. 420 & 421. 350 Freudenburg (1993: 114-117) follows other scholars who have seen the wide-ranging changes of key in Tigellius’ music as a reference to the historical figure’s political shifts of loyalty. The Sardinian is thought to have wavered between the Pompeians and the Caesarians, and eventually to have fallen out of favour with Octavian - hence, presumably, Tigellius’ status as Horace’s most satirised character (Freudenburg id.: 114). We should, of course, note that Horace himself had also changed political horses, which makes him somewhat comparable to Tigellius. Some Horatian self-satire may thus be evident in the ‘confession’ at Sat. 1.4.73 that, in contrast to Tigellius (mentioned at 1.4.72), ‘Horace’ himself will only recite his work to his friends, and then only when they beg him: nec recito cuiquam nisi amicis idque coactus.

351 Sometimes Tigellius would rush along like a man fleeing the enemy, at other times walk as slowly as someone in a religious procession (9b-11a); the number of his slaves varied between ten and two hundred (11a-12b). One day he was all big talk, going on about kings and potentates (12b-13a), the next professing commitment to the simple lifestyle: ‘Just give me a three-legged table and a fresh salt cellar and a toga, however coarse, to ward off the cold’ (13b-15a). Although purportedly frugal and content with little, he could get through a million sesterces in less than a week (15b-17a). He stayed up all night and snored all day (17b-18a).
The account of Tigellius' inconsistent habits sounds like malicious gossip, even if it is retrospective - as we heard at the start of *Sat. 1.2*, Tigellius is apparently dead. A concentrated *nominatim* attack of this length on an individual, alive or dead, has not been seen in Horace's *Satires* before this. Amusing as the satirist's bitching about Tigellius' inconsistency is, ultimately it is used to introduce another topic of conversation. A moralising treatment of the subject of inconsistency could understandably have been anticipated as the focus of the remainder of *Sat. 1.3* - that is, if the audience were not already used to the satirist's conversational style. Like the other two satires of the first triad, however, the equally chatty *Sat. 1.3* employs an indirect approach in that, as usual, after 20 lines or so a change of subject is effected. In *Sat. 1.3* this is achieved in a particularly interesting way: through innovative use of the device of the transitional interlocutor, the satire changes direction and moves away from an attack on Tigellius' *inaequalitas* to an appeal for a different kind of *aequalitas*, equity towards one's friends. Eventually the satire will turn into a tirade against the Stoics' impractical insistence on the *aequalitas* of all transgressions. An exploration of the different shades of *aequalitas* therefore connects the topic of the initial section to the issues of the central section.

**The transitional interlocutors**

An indefinite interlocutor, introduced in the standard manner with an indefinite pronoun followed by a subjunctive (*nunc aliquis dicat mihi...* - 'now someone may say to me...'), introduces *Sat. 1.3* (1.3.19f), is made to interrupt the speaker, and to ask reproachfully whether the satirist...
himself does not have any faults. To this the satirist replies: ‘Yes, but they’re different, smaller ones!’ This is likened to the case of one Maenius who, when criticised by someone (quidam ait..., 22) for attacking Novius behind the latter’s back, responded: egomet mi ignosco - ‘I am forgiving myself’ (23), and earns the satirist’s disapproval: stultus et improbus hic amor est dignusque notari (24). The satirist follows the joke he has just made - of brushing off the question of his own faults - with criticism of another who does the same. The substitution of Maenius for the narrator thus allows the latter, by means of a clever twist, to direct his satiric ire toward the position he himself was occupying just a moment before. This is an implicit criticism of an ethical double standard: the critic has one ethical rule for himself and another for other people.

Horace began Sat. 1.3 in his most aggressive satiric manner yet, attacking a single target by name in a virulent but amusing fashion. After almost 20 lines he has the voices of interlocutors interrupt the satirist and start to question, in dialogic fashion, the very position and role of the satirist-moralist himself. These interlocutors are made to imply that the satirist has pompously put himself above everyone else. Dialogic responses of this direct and penetrating nature on the part of interlocutors are likewise unprecedented in the Satires to date. Having effectively set his persona up to be cut down to size, at Sat. 1.3.19f Horace, as so often in the Satires, is making a joke at the expense of his own satiric persona. In the past, however, scholars have sometimes failed to discern that this criticism is aimed at the role of satirist that the poet has adopted rather than at the real historical Horace.

\[\text{sententious conclusiveness to it, there is no hint prior to the interruption that the satirist is about to have his entire modus operandi questioned.}\]

\[\text{...quid tu?nullane habes vitia? (Sat. 1.3.19-20).}\]

\[\text{immo alia et foriasse minora (Sat. 1.3.20); cf. 68-9, where the moralist tells us: nam vitiis nemo sine nascitur: optimus ille esti minimis urgetur... This consciously self-promoting (and thus self-parodying) attitude that the satirist assumes appears again at Sat. 1.4.129ff, where the satirist claims that because of his father’s moral instruction, he is free from serious, destructive vices, but is in the grip of less serious failings that people can forgive (mediocribus et quisignoscas vitiis...).}\]

\[\text{Shackleton Bailey (1982: 23-4) is concerned that ‘...at first sight Horace seems to be accusing himself of an ‘unsympathetic’ misdemeanour, something he never does elsewhere for all his self-deprecation’.}\]
At the start of *Sat*. 1.3 the tables are turned not only on Horace's persona but on the role of satirist itself. This ironic critique of criticism, this attack on attack itself is, as we shall see, arguably a subtext of the third satire as a whole. It is no accident, therefore, that this satire is placed third, since here for the first time Horace directly questions the role of the moralist that he has adopted so far. *Sat*. 1.3 may thus be shown to be far more programmatic than has often been assumed, particularly in terms of what, I shall argue, happens in the second book of *Satires* in its dialogic relationship to the first: this satire on satire anticipates the reversals and inversions of the second book of *Satires*.

**Dialogic orientation towards an addressee in *Sat*. 1.3**

Although Codoñer asserted that *Sat*. 1.3 is not truly 'diatribal', it is nevertheless dialogic in that it is exhortatory and engages its audience directly. And while it may be true that at comparatively fewer places throughout the third *sermo* does the speaker use the rhetorical questions commonly associated with 'diatribe' mode, this is perhaps because the aim of the third satire, as I shall argue, is to exhort its primary addressee directly rather than to engage in an interview with imaginary adversaries. In this satire, too, the exhortatory function is to some extent assumed by jussives (e.g. 49-53). Despite (or perhaps because of) their relative dearth, where questions are used, their strategic and prudent placement does much to sustain the impression of a direct address in a polemic tone. For example, the question which begins the section arguing for leniency towards friends is sudden, exacting and almost unexpected. It follows on the statement in line 24 to the effect that Maen-

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357 As we have seen, when used in an ethical context, such questions usually help to create the impression of an exacting moralist; by speeding up the pace of a passage, questions can create the impression of a harsher tone. This relative dearth of questions in the third satire may have helped to foster the impression of a 'gentler' or 'more humane' lecture. The sole question that occurs in the initial part of the satire is that placed in the mouth of the interlocutor (19-20); another question (25-27) introduces the section advising on the proper attitude to adopt to friends' faults, but the treatment that follows (28-75) is devoid of them; in the long mock-epic passage (96-124) questions do not appear, and indeed they would be inappropriate and would probably ruin the effect of the parody, belonging as they do to a more rhetorical than epic mode. The only two sections of this satire in which questions do occur, apart from the question attributed to the interlocutor in the initial section, and that which introduces the second section, are 76-95, in which the speaker vehemently attacks the paradox of the Stoics that all sins are of equal weight, and 125-142, the *coda* in which the speaker ridicules another Stoic paradox, that of the ideal Stoic sage being a king, wealthy, and the master of every craft. The tone becomes harsher as the speaker becomes more exacting in the sections where he is directly attacking the Stoics.
ius’ attitude deserves censure. Horace attacks a second person addressee, appealing to a Roman version of the ‘beam in your own eye’ idea, and demanding why, when you look at your own faults, you do so with eyes that are inflamed and covered in ointment, whereas when you look at the faults of friends, you perceive things as acutely as does an eagle or an Epidaurian snake: *cum tu pervides oculis mala lippus inunctis, cur in amicorum vitis tam cernis acutum/quam aut aquila aut serpens Epidaurus?* (25-27).\(^{358}\)

This question coincides with a sudden turn to the second person addressee in an aggressive and polemic tone that is reminiscent of the sudden and striking apostrophe of the second person singular in Horace’s first satire (1.1.38). The reproof of a second person singular addressee continues in the lines that follow. We hear that in turn you will be so judged by your friends, as Horace continues his striking use of second person singular pronouns: *at tibi contralevenit, inquirant vitia ut tua rursus et illi* - ‘But your fate is that they in turn will examine your faults’ (1.3.27-8). A few lines below this, the imperative used in conjunction with second person singular pronouns creates an even more strongly admonitory effect: *...denique te ipsum/concute num qua tibi vitiorum natura aut etiam consuetudo mala...* - ‘...then give yourself a shaking, to see whether nature or even bad habit has sown any faults in you...’ (34-6).

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\(^{358}\) The eagle’s sight was traditionally regarded as sharp, cf. *Iliad* 17.647ff (cf. Otto 1971: 32-33, n. 144); serpents were also considered to have sharp sight and were regarded as sacred to Aesculapius the god of healing whose temple was at Epidaurus (*id.*: 319, n. 1632). The mention of the Epidaurian snake at line 27 might be ironically appropriate because of the analogy between physical and moral wrongs, which was conventional to the ‘diatribe’ tradition. The exacting friend looks into his friend’s moral ailments as the snake, associated simultaneously with sharp sight and healing, could (one would suppose) look into physical ailments. But the friend is blind to his own faults or moral ailments, as his very illness - the bleary eyes - prevent him from perceiving them. The term *lippus* (‘bleary-eyed’) is one which occurs frequently in the *Satires*: at *Sat.* 1.1.120 it was used in relation to the prolific Stoic writer Crispinus, who is continually satirised by Horace as the type of long-winded writer whose example is not to be emulated. He is ‘bleary-eyed’ because he stays up too late writing too much. Moral blindness at 1.3.25-27 is therefore described in the same way as, previously, stylistic short-sightedness. Horace also applies *lippus* self-satirically to himself at *Sat.* 1.5.30, and even has himself smearing on eye-ointment to alleviate his discomfort on the satiric ‘journey’ there. In the fifth satire Horace’s apparent ailment corresponds to his friend Virgil’s stomach upsets, illnesses that force them both to retire while Maecenas pursues more sporty interests (1.5.48-49).
A 'friend from hell': Horace and self-satire?

Criticism itself, the issue raised at the end of the first section, has become specifically the criticism of friends.\textsuperscript{359} The exhortation just quoted (34-36) concerns retrospect the attitude that Horace had prescribed for his second person singular addressee to adopt with regard to a certain 'friend' of his. Horace turns, as at the beginning of the satire, from a general statement (25-27) to a specific example (29ff). The friend is described as \textit{iracundior ... paulo} - 'somewhat irascible' (29), and \textit{minus aptus acutis/naribus horum hominum}, 'out of fashion in terms of the acute sensibilities of modern living' (29-30) - in other words, he is a bit of a 'nerd'. Both descriptions have a dialogic quality and could be understood as the quoted opinions of society concerning the friend. Apart from the fellow's character traits just mentioned, his dress-sense is a decided embarrassment: the friend provokes derision because, instead of the right haircut, his coiffure resembles what modern parlance would describe as a 'run-in with a lawnmower', his toga trails after him, and his shoes are too big and threaten to fall off his feet (\textit{riderti possit eo quod/ rusticus tonso toga defluit et male laxus/in pede calceus haeret...}, 30-32). This description appears to voice the judgement of society concerning the fellow's physical appearance, just as the foregoing information seemed to echo the general attitudes towards his character. But,

\textsuperscript{359} The question whether the initial section is more directly linked to the issue of the judgment of friends developed at 25ff has often been raised. The theme of friendship itself is foreshadowed in the references to the concept of \textit{amicitia} in the first few lines of the poem: 1.3.1: ...\textit{inter amicos}; 1.3.5: \textit{si peteret per amicitiam patris atque suam}... However, the possible connection between friendship and criticism in the initial section is more elusive. This would have been appropriate, considering that in the following satire, 1.4, it is the attack of friends behind their backs that is strongly connected to the idea of the bad satirist, the \textit{niger}. Tigellius however does not criticise his friends, but merely refuses to sing for them when they want him to do so. Horace of course criticises Tigellius but as indeed a number of scholars (e.g. Rudd 1966: 6; Shackleton Bailey 1982: 23) have also pointed out, Horace in no way presents himself as Tigellius' friend - on the contrary, Tigellius consistently appears in the \textit{Sermones} as a target of uncompromisingly virulent satire (e.g. 1.2.1-3). Is Maenius to be understood as a friend of Novius, though? In the following satire, at \textit{Sat.} 1.4.81ff, for example, the satirist contrasts himself and his own type of (apparently honourable) censure with the despicable type of person who runs down a friend behind the friend's back: \textit{absentem qui rodit amicum}. The term \textit{absentem} occurs in a similar context at \textit{Sat.} 1.3.21, which may suggest that with the term \textit{absentem} Horace could intend the reader to supply \textit{amicum}. If Maenius and Novius were real people, a Roman audience may have known of their possible friendship; the name Maenius, however, is Lucilian, and that of Novius may represent simply a 'New Man'. It seems more plausible to say that the initial section of \textit{Sat.} 1.3 is concerned with criticism in general, although the mention of friendship itself (and Tigellius' unsympathetic behaviour in the context of friendship) occurs in the initial section, indirectly anticipating what is coming. In the second satire, the mention of \textit{vimae} at line 2 could also have been seen to anticipate part of the subject matter of the body of that poem.
Horace as speaker responds in dialogic contradiction, he's a good man, there's none better, he's a friend, with an incredible intellect behind that uncouth exterior: *at est bonus, ut melior vir/non alius quisquam, at tibi amicus, at ingenium ingens/incultum latet hoc sub corpore* (32-34). 'Shame on you for finding him an embarrassment!', Horace seems to scold his addressee (34-37). He defends the friend against society's evaluations of him, and in so doing engages in dialogic polemic with common opinion.

Freudenburg follows the few other scholars who have identified this nerdy friend with Horace himself, but differs from the majority of them in regarding this not as the historical Horace but rather his literary persona. The occurrence of a similarly self-satiric presentation of Horace's personal appearance in the first poem of the *Epistles*, apparently echoing this passage in the *Satires*, might seem to confirm this: at Epist. 1.1.94ff Horace, addressing Maecenas (cf. Epist. 1.1.3), and apparently referring unambiguously to himself, complains that his patron laughs (*rides*, Epist. 1.1.95, 97) when he, 'Horace', sports a bad haircut, or wears a tattered shirt under a tunic, or if his toga hangs skew. Likewise at Sat. 1.3.30ff, as we have seen, this character is laughable (*rideri possit*, 30) for his haircut from hell, his trailing toga, and ill-fitting shoes. Although at Sat. 1.3.30ff the friend is referred to in the third person, this does not mean that it cannot be 'Horace' who is satirised here: as we shall see shortly, there may be a reason for Horace's adopting this oblique approach at the start of the third satire.

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360 See Freudenburg 1993: 27-33, esp. 28 n. 69. As a persona-theorist Freudenburg points out that scholars' 'traditional aversion to the idea that the satirist here describes himself is based on the false assumption that Horace and the satiric persona are one and the same' (27-8). Kiessling-Heinze (1921: *ad loc.*), while noting that it is a particular person and not a type that is meant, assert that this cannot be Horace himself, because of the fact that Horace as narrator actually praises this character at 32-34: '...es ist ein bestimmtes Individuum gemeint...nicht ein Typus wie v. 49 fg.... An Horaz selbst darf man bei dieser Schilderung nicht denken: schon der Überschwang des Lobes v. 32-34 schließt das vollig aus.' However, other scholars, e.g. Lejay (1911: 77), have identified this personage with Horace himself: 'On voit dans ce passage plus généralement une peinture d'Horace lui-même.' Scholars who have made this connection have generally assumed that this description applies literally to the historical Horace rather than to his literary persona in the *Satires*. The character has also sometimes been identified with Virgil following pseudo-Acro.

361 *Si curatus inaequalis tonsore capillos/occurret, rides; si forte subcula pexaeltrita subest tunicae vel si toga dissidet impar, rides...* (Epist. 1.1.94-97).
Freudenburg goes further, however, in linking this sketch of Horace's own self-satirised persona at *Sat.* 1.3.29ff to the buffoon of the popular comic tradition. Whether or not one thinks that Freudenburg is going too far in this, nevertheless the idea of Horace's persona as the ill-adjusted, socially-inept *scurra* may anticipate the later descriptions of the uncouth fellow who, in a drunken and disorderly state, pees on his friend's couch, breaks an antique, and rudely snatches a piece of chicken from the other side of the plate (90-94a), as some readers have also chosen to identify this unfortunate figure with Horace. But even before we get that far in the satire, the description at 1.3.29ff also possibly anticipates Horace's confessions at 63-65 (to be discussed shortly), which concern his behaviour in relation to Maecenas, behaviour which his speaker-persona apparently considers laudable, but which the satire's audience is clearly invited to regard otherwise. However, since self-satire is arguably a substantial aspect of the third satire, as indeed it was in the first two satires, it is undoubtedly an attractive and not entirely implausible proposition that the gauche friend mentioned at 29ff is already to be identified with Horace's satiric self.

**Lovers, parents, and friends**

But whether or not the awkward friend is indeed to be identified with Horace's persona, the satirist's indignation over his addressee's attitude towards this fellow leads into a heated discussion about the correct attitude to hold towards friends. First, by way of contrast and example, Horace asks his addressee to consider the subjective manner in which lovers indulge their beloved, in that, blinded by passion, they even hideous virtues (38-40). Surprisingly, instead of the ridicule of the lovers' foolishness

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362 1993: esp. 30-33.
363 Horace uses the commonplace that love is blind (*Sat.* 1.3.38-40) to initiate the argument that one should ideally treat friends in an indulgent manner and be blind to their faults. However, Horace soon replaces the *exempla* of lovers' delusions about their loved ones (cf. Plato *Rep.* 474d-e; Lucretius 4.1153-70; echoed later at Ovid *Ars Amatoria* 2.657ff, cf. *Remedia Amoris* 327ff), with a catalogue of examples of fathers' euphemisms concerning their sons' defects (41ff). The idea of inverting faults to create virtues and *vice versa* is also treated at Thuc. 3.82 in relation to warfare (reckless daring comes to be considered courage, watchful waiting cowardice etc.); cf. Plutarch (*How to tell a flatterer...*, 56), who refers back to both Plato's and Thucydides' use of this construction. Horace's use of fathers rather than lovers or examples from other spheres blends well with the theme of friendship. The 'father' images also anticipate the appearance of Horace's own 'father' as moral instructor at 1.4.105ff and as the admirable guide and role-model in *Sat.* 1.6. If *Sat.* 1.3 is indeed to be understood as addressed to Maecenas, Horace's *patronus*, as I shall argue, then
that one would expect, Horace wishes that we could make similar 'errors' concerning our
friends (41-42). Thereafter a more extensive catalogue of examples is quoted concerning
the equally subjective indulgences that can be seen in the nicknames that fathers give to
their children, disguising physical defects as endearing qualities (43-48). The passage rid-
icules but also draws didactic direction from the euphemistic names that fathers give to
their children. The affectionate nicknames, which are quoted in contrast to what in each
case the child's physical fault should perhaps more accurately be called, are presented in a
distinctly dialogic fashion: it is as though the names assigned to the children by their fath-
ers are actually overheard.

In what follows (49ff), the fathers' indulgences are likewise suggested as suitable role
models for us to adopt in our attitudes towards our friends. The narrator first presents each
defect of character, only to suggest quickly the different, positive manner in which we
should rather regard our friends' faults. A repetitive stylistic device is maintained over a
number of lines, so that the comic effect succeeds in driving the message home. Jussive
subjunctives appear in the second part of each construction to achieve a strongly exhort-
atory effect: parcius hic vivit: frugi dicatur. ineptus/et iactantior hic paulo est: concinnus
amicis/postulat ut videatur. at est truculentior atque/plus aequo liber: simplex fortisque
habeatur/caldior est: acris inter numerentur... - 'This fellow lives rather stingily: let him
be called 'frugal'. This one lacks social graces and is a little too boastful: 'pleasant' is
how he must appear to his friends. Yet another is quite aggressive and outrageously out-
spoken: let him be held 'frank and fearless'. This one is rather hot-tempered: let him be
considered a 'passionate sort'...' (49-53). Horace implores his addressee to try to consider
friends' faults as virtues as this, he assures him, is what establishes and maintains friend-
ships (53b-54).

the use of fathers may also say something about the ideal conception of such a relationship: the patronus
should ideally react to his friend in the manner of a pater. Indeed, discussing the presentation of Horace's
'fathers' in Sat. 1.4 and 1.6, Catherine Schlegel has recently remarked that while in Sat. 1.4 Horace's bio-
logical 'father' displaces Lucilius as the 'father' of his satiric art, in 1.6, on the other hand, 'Maecenas is
paired with Horace's father to mark the similarities between the two men and their roles in Horace's life...' (2000: 110).
However, a cynic (in the modern sense) would perhaps point out that, as they are presented here, the friends are really what the first description in each case says they are, just as prior to this the children's real deformities had repeatedly been glossed over by paternal nicknames; in the case of the friends at 49-53, the second title is 'window-dressing'. Thus if one reverses the 'window-dressing', the friend, for example, whom Horace advises us to call 'frugal' really has the unfortunate fault of being stingy, and the friend who is, according to positive thinking, to be called 'frank and fearless' (simplex fortisique), is, in actual fact, too aggressive and outspoken (truculentior atque plus aequo liber). We shall see shortly how this may be significant.

As the speaker is quick to remark (55-56), our misfortune is that we do exactly the opposite of what this positive thinking recommends, and we mistakenly label even our friends' virtues as faults. There follows a list of the supposedly 'real' attributes that friends possess (56bff), followed by examples of the manner in which positive qualities are in each case turned into faults by the person's 'friends'. This section is replete with dialogism in that the labels given to the friends are quoted and contrasted with what the narrator has claimed is the rather more positive reality: 'A certain honest, very modest fellow is friends with us: we give him the titles 'slow' and 'lazy'; another escapes all traps and never leaves a flank exposed, since he is in a dangerous profession and one in which crime flourishes: instead of 'extremely sane' and 'careful' we call him 'fake' and 'calculating' (56b-62). Either friend here represents one of two extremes on either side of a supposed mean: one person is too sluggish and slow in the opinion of his 'friends', the other too quick and shifty. Again, nil medium est. Ironically, particularly in view of the criticism of the satirist that took place earlier, our 'friends' are thus shown to be damned if they do and damned if they don't, as it were. The common judgements of society in relation to friends are at this point already thoroughly condemned, something which will be of importance in what follows.

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364 probus quis/ nobiscum vivit, multum demissus homo: illitardo cognomen pingui damus. hic fugit omnis/insidias multique malo latus obdit apertum/cum genus hoc inter vitae versetur ubi acris/invidia atque vigent ubi crimina: pro bene sano/ac non incauto fictum atque astutum vocamus.
‘Frank and fearless’ or ‘aggressive and outspoken’?

Horace’s final example, in the list of friends that are treated badly, is one that relates to his own persona. Addressing Maecenas directly for the first time since the opening of the first satire, Horace describes himself as *simplicior*, ‘rather frank’, and paints an impression of himself sneaking up on the relaxing patron, and irritating him by pestering him with conversation: *simplicior quis et est qualem me saepe libenter/obtulerim tibi, Maecenas, ut forte legentem aut tacitum impellat quovis sermone molestus...* (63-65). As I hinted at the end of chapter one, it is tempting and amusing to imagine this as the opening scene for the ‘conversation’ which begins Sat. 1.1. That Horace here calls himself *simplicior* may be ironically significant, since at line 52 he has specifically indicated that *simplex* is in fact the more generous label for someone who might otherwise be considered *truculentior atque plus aequo liber*, ‘quite aggressive and outrageously outspoken’. It is therefore striking that Horace claims to regard himself as *simplicior*, and even hopes that Maecenas will come to a similar conclusion (*...qualem saepe libenter/obtulerim tibi*, 64-65).

However, a pessimistic interpretation of this statement would be that rather than being ‘frank and fearless’, as he hopes, Horace has actually confessed to being unreasonably rude and a little too outspoken. General opinion is quoted, condemning Horace’s behaviour: *communi sensu plane caret* inquimus (66). An amusing type of self-satiric double-voicedness therefore both suggests that the speaker’s behaviour has been foolish, and at the same time satirises the bizarre assurance that Horace’s persona appears to grant himself and seems keen to foist onto Maecenas also - that he, Horace, has actually acted well. Horace suggests that the prejudice of people toward their friends - in other words, that they turn their friends’ ‘virtues’ into faults - could also therefore compromise his own position in relation to his friend Maecenas when, using the royal ‘we’, he exclaims: *eheu, /quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam!* - ‘Alas, how rashly are we sanctioning an unjust law against ourselves!’ (66b-67). It would thus appear that self-satire pervades

365 See p. 87 above.
the third satire just as it did the first and the second. But more than this, it actually suggests that something other than the mere philosophical consideration of the correct attitude to take to friends’ faults is on the agenda in Sat. 1.3: as I shall argue, the third satire does not just concern friendship in general, but is specifically about Horace and Maecenas.

Meanwhile, the speaker, apparently feeling very strongly about the issue, insists that all people have flaws, and that the best person is he who is beset by the smallest ones, or perhaps the smallest number of faults: *optimus ille est/qui minimis urgetur* (68-69). By this he undoubtedly means to refer to himself. An *amicus dulcis* will balance his friend’s faults against his virtues, and incline to the side of the latter, Horace goes on to assert, and he adds a mock-modest ‘personal’ touch by commenting: *si modo plura mihi bona sunt* - ‘that’s if my good points are greater’ (71). In short, he demands that friends accept each other, warts and all. 366

**Horace’s attack on the Stoics**

Developing out of his consideration of the absurdity of large punishments for small offences at 76ff,367 Horace’s argument progresses to an attack on the Stoic paradox concerning the equality368 of all transgressions. The connection between the foregoing material and the section which follows is apparently Horace’s concern lest ‘friends’ be punished equally for small offences as for large, which is what would happen if their friends were

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366 *qui ne tuberibus propriis offendidat amicum/postulat, ignoscet verrucis illius; aequum est/peccatis veniam poscentem reddere rursus* - ‘The man who would not turn his friend off with his boils should forgive that fellow’s little warts’ (73-75). Again, Horace is concerned with what is fair (*aequum*).

367 Fraenkel (1957: 87) notes that a new section begins at line 76, marked out by the initial *denique*.

368 The Stoic ideal of the *aequalitas* of transgressions (treated at Cicero *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 3: *Aequalia esse peccata et recte data*), and attacked in Horace’s third satire, provides a link with Tigellius’ inconsistency (his *inaequalitas*, cf. 1.3.9) ridiculed in the first section. But it is interesting that Horace does not use the word *aequus/aequalis* itself to describe the Stoics’ idea; instead he uses *pares* (96) and *pares* (121). He reserves the term *aequus* by contrast for what he considers to be fair, applied to his own precepts rather than to those of the Stoics: it is fair that anyone asking forgiveness for his transgressions grant it in return (*aequum est/peccatis veniam poscentem reddere rursus*, 74-5); the Stoic dogma is opposed to expediency (*utilitas*), the mother of justice and fairness (*justa ... maler et aequi*, 98); a scale must be applied if one wishes to impose fair penalties on offences (*adsita regula, peccatis quae poenas irroget aequus*, 117-8). The term *aequus* however connects the vocabulary of the initial section with different sections of the body of the satire. The opposite of what is *aequum* (i.e. *inaequalitas*) connects the various targets of the satire: Tigellius, the judgmental friends, and the Stoics.
to take to heart the Stoic paradox of the equality of all sins in judging them. As we have
seen, he seems to think himself guilty only of very small offences, if any.

Horace ridicules the abstract Stoic theory by revealing the impracticality and thus insane
absurdity of their theoretical philosophy.\textsuperscript{369} Using a type of \textit{reductio ad absurdum}, he
gives the example of a slave who has committed a minor indiscretion, but who, if the ten-

tents of Stoicism are literally applied, should be crucified for this offence.\textsuperscript{370} What about
your friend, he then adds - if he has merely behaved badly at dinner and you avoid him
thereafter, what on earth are you going to do if he does something really bad? As noted
earlier, the ‘minor offences’ committed by the friend were urinating on the couch in a
drunken state, breaking an antique, and grabbing a piece of chicken from his host’s side
of the dish. These apparently excusable escapades are put into perspective by being con-
trasted with the more serious crimes of theft, breaking confidence or going back on one’s
word.\textsuperscript{371} Describing the ‘minor offences’, Horace asks if this should make him any less of
a pleasant friend: \textit{minus hoc iucundus amicus/sit mihi?} (93-94). Yet one cannot help con-
cluding, and of course one is meant to conclude, that any friendship would be sorely tried
by such behaviour.

As noted, many scholars have thought that this badly-behaved friend is supposed to re-
present Horace’s persona within the \textit{Satires}. That Horace speaks rhetorically and in the
third person, and that he appears to propose that he himself should be lenient with this
fellow, should not force a decision on us: ‘Is he to be less pleasant as a friend to me?’

\textsuperscript{369} Like those whom the satirist has been attacking to date in the \textit{Satires}, the miser (1.1.93), the adulterer
(1.2.38) and so on, the misguided Stoics are later described as ‘struggling’ (laborant, 96) when it comes to
reality, and Horace adds that common sense, tradition and expediency, the ‘mother of justice and fairness’,
are ranged against those with such unrealistic ideas: \textit{quis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant/cum
ventum ad verum est; sensus moresque repugnant /atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi} (96-8).
Therefore for Horace in \textit{Sat.} 1.3, the wrong-headed ideology of the Stoics is seen in the same terms as basic
moral wrongs such as greed and adultery.

\textsuperscript{370} \textit{Sat.} 1.3.80-82a: \textit{si eum servum patinam qui tollere iussus/semesos piscis tepidumque ligurriter
ius/in cruce suffigat, Labeone insanior inter/sanos dicatur ...} ‘If someone were to nail to the cross a slave
of his, who, ordered to clear away a dish, had licked the leftovers of the fish and the luke-warm sauce, he’d
be called insaner than Labeo by sane people...’.\textsuperscript{371}

\textit{comminxit lectum potus mensae catillum/Evandri manibus tritum deiectit, ob hanc rem/laut positum
ante mea quia pullum in parte catini/sustulit esuriens, minus hoc iucundus amicus/sit mihi? quid faciam si
furtum fecerit, aut si/propiderit commissa fide sponsumve negarit?} (1.3.90-95).
(93-94). In my opinion, it is really not important whether or not the badly behaved friend here is necessarily identified with Horace; rather, what is significant is that a high degree of tolerance, in clearly trying circumstances, is held up as a paradigm to Horace’s addressee. The question at 93–4 is one which Horace’s addressee is urged to ask himself.372

The attack on the Stoics, who have fared badly throughout the Satires to date but have done especially so in Sat. 1.3, reaches fever pitch in the final section of this satire, which adds insult to injury with its parody of another famous Stoic paradox, that of the sage as ‘king’.373 At 121-122 the opinions of the Stoic interlocutor had already been mentioned, if indirectly: *...cum dicas esse pares res/furta latrocinii...* In the final section of the third satire dialogic elements are directly represented as the ‘conversation’ between Horace and the Stoics continues, and becomes increasingly contentious. The appearance of an imaginary interlocutor here is prompted by the narrator’s questioning of the Stoic tenets that

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372 To drive this point home, Horace next directs his energies at condemning virulently the impracticality of the Stoic idea of the equality of all sins (96-98). His comment at line 98, that utility is essentially the mother of both justice and equity (*ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi*), leads into an excursive section (99ff) with strong Lucretian echoes, in which Horace advances arguments on the origins of justice. Adopting a ‘creation myth’ mode, Horace summarises the much longer account of the gradual evolution of justice at Lucretius *DRN* 5.783ff, but in the course of this adaptation adds a few of his own touches. Horace’s use, for example, of the term *cunnas* at line 107 unequivocally recalls the previous satire, in which the word had appeared more than once. See *Sat.* 1.2.36 & 70; cf. p. 97 above. Far from undercutting Horace’s argument, however, this obscenity seems rather to add to the impression of a down-to-earth no-nonsense speaker: it gives one the idea, as it undoubtedly is intended to do, that the speaker is someone who is not going to mince words. It strongly distinguishes the practical, informal philosopher from the formal school philosopher and thus helps to communicate Horace’s point that justice came into being as human societies gradually progressed, and that above all justice came into being for practical reasons, and not merely in order to justify an abstract theory thought up by an armchair philosopher. Nature, Horace points out, cannot mark off justice from injustice as she does good things from bad, desirable things from things to be avoided: *nec natura potest iusto secernere iniquum,* dividi ut bona diversis, fugienda petiendis (113-114). The account of the practical origins of justice is used to question the naturalness and usefulness of the Stoic paradox of the equality of sins (115-124a). The Stoics’ ideas are thus revealed as impositions on reality, and the worst philosophical insult of all, ‘unnatural’.

373 See D.L. 7.122ff: *...οὐ μόνον δ’ ἐλευθέροις εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλέας...* The Stoic rex at *Sat.* 1.3.125 is linked to the idea that Horace asks his audience to entertain with horror at lines 123-124 - the insauspiciously titled (for Roman ears) *regnum* that would arise should the Stoics and their silly beliefs gain supremacy. As rex was also a term often used to describe a patron, particularly in an asymmetric patronage relationship, William Turpin has suggested that Horace is here jokingly addressing his patron Maecenas as the Stoic rex (1998: 135-137; cf. 128). However, not only is it difficult to imagine the very probably Epicurean Maecenas as a Stoic, but in the final lines of the satire (esp. 137-142) the virtually friendless Stoic rex is unfavourably pitted against Horace and his group of *amici*, among whom Maecenas himself was foremost; cf. p. 76, n. 242 and p. 85, n. 269 above.
the sage alone is handsome, a good cobbler (i.e. an expert) and a king. If the Stoic is already all these things, including a king, and thus supposedly enjoying this regnum, why, asks Horace, are the Stoics still in the philosophic rat-race, attempting to gain this supremacy? In other words, why are the Stoics striving after what they are supposed to possess already?: si dives, qui sapiens est, et sutor bonus et solus formosus et est rex, cur optas quod habes? (124-6).

A nameless Stoic interlocutor replies to Horace’s criticism, defending the tenets of his philosophy, claiming that Horace does not understand what ‘father Chrysippus’ means. With recourse to the formal beliefs of Stoicism, this imaginary spokesperson attempts to explain the Stoic paradox of the wise man being an expert in all spheres. Horace responds abruptly to this interlocutor: qui? - ‘how?’ (128). Short questioning responses of this type are highly effective at suggesting an air of dismissal on the part of the respondent narrator towards the statements of the interlocutor. The cornered interlocutor then proceeds to explain the conventional Stoic arguments (129-133), but, returning to the idea of Tigellius Hermogenes as a singer, as at the start of the satire, these are hollow voices, and as speaker Horace has already all but declared himself victorious.

The satire ends with the laughable persecution of the Stoic sage in the streets of Rome at the hands of naughty boys, as once again practice meets and overcomes theory. The mishaps that befall the sage and the criticism he endures in this section, it has often been observed, balance the attack on Tigellius at the satire’s start. The sage’s friendless round (balancing Tigellius’ disregard of his friends’ requests), his attending the baths accompanied only by Horace’s bête noire Crispinus, is ridiculed and contrasted to Horace’s happy life with his friends, who forgive each other their failings as the satire draws to its

374 This is based on the Stoic precept that the sage or wise man does all things well, since all virtues involve one another (as they have common principles), and therefore the possessor of one virtue is the possessor of all virtues (cf. D.L. 7.125).
375 ‘non nosti quid pater’ inquit ‘Chrysippus dicat...’ (1.3.126f).
376 ‘...vellunt tibi barbamilascivi puers, quos tu nisti fiste coercisiturgeris turba circum te stante miserque rumperis et latras, magnorum maxime regum (133b-136).
The theoretical ideal of the Stoic 'king' is revealed to be a hollow concept in comparison to the practical joys of the give and take of forgiving friendship.

Addressee and addressivity in Sat. 1.3

Much of the aggression in Sat. 1.3 is, as we have seen, directed at a second person addressee in accordance with 'diatribal' convention. The addressee is blamed for being critical of his friends, and of one friend in particular. Although the speaker continues for much of the satire in an apparently impersonal way, nevertheless even in the section on the origins of justice, for example, and in the final attack on the Stoics, it is abundantly clear that Horace is passionate about proving his point to his addressee. It is only at line 64, however, that an addressee, Maecenas, is named: Horace expresses the hope that his patron will think positively of him in spite of the fact that his own behaviour towards Maecenas has on occasion been irritating and inconsiderate.

It seems that we are again concerned with some of the issues that confronted us in Sat. 1.1, and again the tempting question is the following: can Maecenas, the only person addressed directly in the third satire, be understood as the addressee of Sat. 1.3 as a whole? In the first satire it seemed a distinct possibility that, alongside any conventional 'diatribal' usages of the second person singular there, the satirist had deliberately played with ambiguity and was possibly to be understood as addressing Maecenas throughout. On the other hand the second satire, with its use at line 38 of the second person plural in place of singular, and where multiple voices made themselves heard from early on, seemed to have a potentially heterogeneous group of addressees.\(^{378}\) It is both possible and plausible that Maecenas only enjoys the brief apostrophe in the third satire at 63ff. The final section of the satire is also clearly directed at a Stoic addressee. However, that the third satire is the first occasion since Sat. 1.1.1 that Maecenas himself is addressed by name, must be of some significance. We may reflect here on the ideas of the Bakhtinian circle discussed.

\(^{377}\) 1.3.137-142.

\(^{378}\) A puer delicatus, Cerinthus, was directly addressed in the middle of that satire (1.2.81), but seemed no more than a brief apostrophe.
earlier, especially those of Voloshinov, who encouraged us to imagine a conversation, whether spoken or textual, as a dynamic and dramatic relationship, a ‘bridge’ between speaker and addressee. In short, it is the relationship between the speaker and the addressee(s), in other words the addressivity of the text which is to be considered. It is probable that Maecenas, as the only named audience here, is not only the dedicatee of the liber sermonum as a whole, but also the chief addressee of Sat. 1.3.\textsuperscript{379} This interpretation is compelling in view of the nature of the subject matter of this satire: Maecenas is, after all, Horace’s amicus.

\textit{Sat. 1.3: an anti-‘diatribe’?}

\textit{Amicitia} is undoubtedly the central issue in Sat. 1.3: even near the very start of the poem, in its ‘indirect’ beginning, references were made to friendship.\textsuperscript{380} However, the question is whether this lecture addressed to Maecenas is merely about friendship in general, or whether there is some specific aim to it. Horace as speaker goes on and on about how important it is to take a positive approach to one’s friends, that one should not judge them out of hand, nor take any heed of the stupid impractical ideas of the Stoics on the equality of all sins nor their ideals concerning the equality, likewise, of the expurgation of these sins, and how on the contrary, one should ensure that the punishment fits the crime, and so on. It is my opinion that, within the fiction of the Satires, this sermon on the correct attitude to take to friends is not there simply because ‘Horace’ or his addressee Maecenas is interested in such questions, but rather in order to fulfil a specific hidden agenda in the satire, one which concerns Horace’s own relationship with his patron.

We have already examined the possibility that the cameos of awkward friends that are scattered through Sat. 1.3 are evocations of Horace’s own persona in the Satires. Whether

\textsuperscript{379} This is what Armstrong (1989: 38-39) has suggested, but cf. Brown (1993: \textit{ad loc.}).

\textsuperscript{380} Unfavourable characters, such as Tigellius, treat their friends badly, and do not heed their friends’ requests or consider their feelings (1-8). Tigellius is out of sympathy with \textit{amicitia}, as the Stoics are later shown to be, with their extreme ideas about justice and judgment. It is no coincidence, therefore, that in the final section of the satire, as we have seen, the friendless Stoic sage is gleefully pictured going to the baths with Crispinus as his sole escort (137-139), and Horace, despite his faults, is by contrast described as enjoying the company of his friends (139b-142).
or not we agree with the interpretations that would see Horace himself in the awkward and embarrassing ‘friends’ who stumble and bumble through this satire, in the course of his exhortation to lenience and tolerance towards friends, Horace refers unequivocally to his own case as a persona in the *Satires* (63ff). Whether or not this unflattering self-portrait at 63ff is indeed backed up by the other negative portraits of friends in *Sat.* 1.3, we are still left with the impression of an extremely badly behaved character whose intention it nevertheless is to apologise for his past conduct, on the one hand, but who also, on the other hand, sees fit to prescribe to his *amicus* the approach which he should adopt in addressing this behaviour. In short, the speaker’s aim in *Sat.* 1.3 seems to be both to excuse his past behaviour and to appeal to his *amicus*, as he reviews these misdemeanours, not to feel tempted to punish him too harshly: the *amicus* should try to weigh Horace’s merits as he pardons his offences. This possible interpretation of the third satire is plausible and indeed makes sense if, as suggested above, we allow ourselves to entertain the idea that, within the fiction of the *Satires*, there is a single, powerful and highly significant *amicus* who is the chief addressee of *Sat.* 1.3 - Maecenas.

*Sat.* 1.3 is thus conversationally designed to persuade its addressee - Maecenas - to adopt a lenient attitude to his *amicis*, and to Horace in particular. Those who judge their friends harshly, or twist their friends’ virtues into faults, are utterly condemned. Horace wishes to seem *simplicior* to his patron instead of *truculentior* and *plus aequo liber*, and therefore he implies that to view this the other way around would be twisting his virtues into faults. In addition, as speaker Horace goes out of his way to suggest that those, like the Stoics, who, because they believe all sins to be equal, would therefore also prescribe an equally extreme form of punishment for all transgressions, even for minor misdemeanours, are out of touch with reality. The patron is exhorted to regard Horace’s sins as small ones, worthy of no major castigation.
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The satirist: plus aequo liber?

For what specific transgression(s) is Horace apologising in Sat. 1.3? Although, as we have seen, the embarrassing descriptions of the addressee’s friend’s behaviour at 29ff and at 90ff have sometimes been applied to Horace himself, the more direct confession, and ultimately the far more significant one is that given at 63ff where Horace addresses Maecenas directly and by name. Horace has thus sketched an impression of himself sneaking up on Maecenas and taking him unawares, bothering him with his conversation (sermone, 65), and he has suggested, moreover, that in this he may have been simplicior, ‘rather direct’ - in other words, read truculentior and plus aequo liber. This scenario cannot but have literary significance in addition to its obvious significance for the ‘relationship’ between Horace and Maecenas as portrayed in the Satires. Horace, the fictional second-self who makes his appearance in the Satires, is liable to bother his patron and addressee with direct and outspoken sermo - meaning simultaneously both ‘conversation’ and ‘satire’.381

Not only is it Horace’s character within the Satires who is rather too rude and outspoken, but it is also his persona as satirist, confirming the criticism of the satirist that interrupted the start of this satire. In the two preceding satires, 1.1 and 1.2, Horace has broached two delicate topics - money and sex - somewhat directly. The third satire acts firstly, in effect, as an anti-‘diatribe’, an apology for, and an unwinding of, the outspoken first two moralising satires. But it also anticipates the following satire, 1.4, where the satirist’s libertas and the question whether or not Horace as satirist has at all been harsh, are among the central issues. In the third satire, aequalitas has been a thematic link between the indirect beginning of the piece and the central sections. It is therefore appropriately proleptic that Horace should in Sat. 1.3 entertain the idea, even if indirectly, that he, the satirist, should be considered plus aequo liber - ‘unreasonably outspoken’, already linking the concepts of the third and fourth satires. As the use of the term sermo at line 65 hints, the joke is

381 Another double entendre involving sermo occurs at Sat. 2.3.4, where Damasippus berates Horace for composing nil dignum sermone. Here, once again, the fact that sermo simultaneously both means ‘conversation’ or ‘talk’, on the one hand, and refers to Horace’s actual genre, on the other, is exploited. Thus, according to Damasippus, Horace writes neither ‘anything worthy of talk’ nor ‘anything worthy of (being called) sermo’.
that it is in the *Satires* themselves that Horace has been outspoken. However, the lecture on the correct attitude to take to friends is also a subtle way of warning the patron and dedicatee of the *Satires* not to be too eager to adopt the role of virulent satirist and critic himself - although, as we shall see in *Satires* Book Two, others will take up this particular challenge. Within the context of *amicitia*, forgiveness is requested of the addressee of Horace's *Satires*.

**Janus-like satire and satiric reversals**

*Sat*. 1.3 therefore occupies a pivotal position in the *liber sermonum*: it engages simultaneously in dialogue with *Sat*. 1.1 and 1.2, on the one hand, the *sermones* in which Horace had tackled sensitive issues, and in which, ironically, he had ended up satirising himself rather than Maecenas. In so doing *Sat*. 1.3, too, participates in the creation of the fictional 'Horace', the speaker-persona of the *Satires*, and at the same time adds its own voice to the on-going satire of this creature. On the other hand, the third satire engages, Janus-like, also in forward-looking dialogue with the issues of the following satire, *Sat*. 1.4, and, in its polemic questioning of the role and position of the satirist, whoever may assume that role, seems even to anticipate the trends and reversals of Horace *Satires* Book Two. There, in the second book, self-satire will become externalised as an attack from without, while at the same time the new critics will inevitably (although unintentionally) target themselves: unavoidably, criticism becomes self-criticism, satire becomes self-satire. *Sat*. 1.3 illustrates, as effectively as did *Sat*. 1.2, that the seeds of Horace's experiments in satiric inversion, which finally bear strange and interesting fruit in his second book of *Satires*, were already germinating as early as the first triad of Book One.
CHAPTER FOUR:

SAT. 1.4 AND 1.10: EVASIVENESS AND ADDRESSIVITY
IN THE LITERARY DIALOGUE

Speech is interlocution. Understanding is active, is responsive, is a process. That process of understanding includes the listener's identification of the speaker's apparent and concealed motives and of the responses that the speaker invites and hopes to forestall. The interaction among speaker, listener, and context constitutes a 'field of answerability' which is the meaning of the utterance...

Morson's anonymous (female) interlocutor in Bakhtin: Essays and dialogues on his work (1981: 6).

In the past three chapters we have seen that Horace's initial triad of moralising satires exhibits an exhortatory rhetorical mode which not only fosters an impression of a direct relationship between speaker and audience, but also incorporates a number of smaller dialogic exchanges with fictive addressees. Using this so-called 'diatribe' mode to a varying extent in Sat. 1.1-1.3, Horace repeatedly skirmishes with imaginary interlocutors who represent misers, adulterers, Stoics, and 'common opinion', and admonishes his audience not to follow their example. At the same time, however, Horace also cultivates a relaxed conversational effect, as the Satires have a personal dimension, being addressed, on one level at least, to Horace's amicus Maecenas and his exclusive coterie.

However, while the first three poems of Sermones Book One are traditionally known as the 'diatribe' satires, Horace's conversational adaptations of this exhortatory addressive mode are not merely restricted to the first triad: dialogic devices conventionally identified as belonging to the 'diatibal' mode are also used in some of the satires of the first book which scholars have not usually described as 'diatribe' satires - in Sat. 1.4, to some extent in Sat. 1.6, and again in Sat. 1.10. Sat. 1.4 and 1.10 are usually together identified as the 'programmatic' or 'literary' satires of the first book, since in these pieces Horace con-

382 As Rahn (1969: 156) observed, 'diatribe' mode tends to be found in combination with other forms rather than as a generic entity on its own; cf. Introduction p. 17 n. 55.
383 See Sat. 1.10.81-90a, discussed at p. 172 below.
384 See e.g. Brink 1963: 156. As a 'literary' satire, 1.4 has links with 1.10 as well as with the introductory poem of the second book, Sat. 2.1. The latter, however, has the form of a conventional dialogue.
siders his literary programme and ponders, among other things, his relationship with his satiric predecessor Lucilius.

'Diatribe' mode and the literary satires

Despite the fact that at the start of the fourth satire we are confronted with what appears to be the first real change of subject and orientation in the first book, there are thematic echoes of the 'diatribes' in Sat. 1.4, in particular strong correspondences between Sat. 1.3 and 1.4, and a line from Sat. 1.2 is actually quoted in the fourth satire. It seems natural that Horace as conversationalist should continue his style of presentation at least into the first half of Sat. 1.4. Dialogic devices which appeared in a moralising context in the first triad are now used to make a literary defence. Not only the sequential position of the fourth satire in the unrolling of the first book, therefore, but also thematic and stylistic echoes of the first three in this satire, demand that we read the fourth satire with the other three preceding ones in mind. Sat. 1.4 both takes its departure from and simultaneously reflects on the 'diatribe' satires. The fourth satire could be said to be 'in dialogue' with Sat. 1.1-3.

Horace again uses his exhortatory moralising style in a literary context in Sat. 1.10. Since Sat. 1.10 appears to refer to Sat. 1.4 in its first line, and to echo the fourth satire direct-

385 See van Rooy 1968: 56ff; cf. Zetzel (1980: 65): 'The first major break in the book apparently comes with the magisterial opening of the fourth poem, which seems to represent a total change of topic, from ethics to literary criticism, from almost impersonal diatribe to personal statements of the poet. And yet that break is by no means total...'.
386 Sat. 1.4.92: pastillos Rufillus olet, Gargonius hircum, echoes Sat. 1.2.27.
387 See also Wili (1948: 93) who views Sat. 1.4 as the culmination of the first three satires.
388 Freudenburg (1993: 7) has been one of the few to group 1.4 specifically with the 'diatribe' satires of Book One. In Sat. 1.4, he asserts, there is a continuation of the moralist persona found in the first three satires. As I shall argue, there is in addition a corresponding continuation of style and tone into the fourth satire, which continues the conversation, as it were, of the first three satires. This is not to deny that 1.4 is simultaneously 'in dialogue' with the second triad (1.4, 1.5, & 1.6), all of which are apparently more 'autobiographical' in their focus, and to which the second half of 1.4 especially contributes.
389 Cf. e.g. Fraenkel 1957: 128. Nempe incompesito ... pede (1.10.1) is usually considered a reference to Horace's criticism of Lucilius' style at 1.4.6-10, where Lucilius, having taken over the subject matter of Old Comedy changing only the metre (mutatis tantum pedibus numerisque, 1.4.7), is berated for having a over-enthusiastic but casual attitude to the composition of his verses: ...in hora saepe ducentos/...versus dictabat
ly at a number of other places, the two poems have often been studied in conjunction.\(^{390}\) I shall argue that *Sat.* 1.10 is also ‘in dialogue’ with *Sat.* 1.4, as it seems to continue the conversation begun in that earlier satire. However, unlike 1.4, which immediately follows the ‘diatribe’ satires, *Sat.* 1.10 is placed after five intervening poems (*Sat.* 1.5-1.9) which are generally very different from both the ‘diatribes’ and 1.4. None of these could be described as exhortatory in the direct sense that the ‘diatribes’ are. However *Sat.* 1.6, which to a certain extent engages in exhortatory moralising in treating ambition, may be the exception, and of all these satires *Sat.* 1.6 has the closest similarity to the ‘diatribes’ and the programmatic satires.\(^{391}\) The others (1.5, 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9) are all far more narrative than exhortatory. *Sat.* 1.10 is not only conversationally orientated as a continuation of *Sat.* 1.4, but it is also the final satire in the first book and could therefore be viewed as an epilogue to *Satires* Book One.\(^{392}\) However, as we shall see, there is a curious open-endedness to the conclusion of *Sat.* 1.10, which seems to anticipate some of the reversals of Horace’s second book of *Satires.*

To understand both *Sat.* 1.4 and 1.10 it is necessary to be aware of Horace’s conversation-al pace, his dialogic jokes and his internal polemicism. But an equally significant aspect of the literary satires’ ‘conversation’ is their overriding concern with and their orientation towards their audiences. In both *Sat.* 1.4 and 1.10 Horace is much concerned with distinguishing the desirable from the undesirable audiences of satire.\(^{393}\) By targeting a fictional audience who has got it all completely wrong, just as he had previously impugned those who were morally deluded, Horace hopes to instruct his authorial and actual audiences on

\(^{390}\) See e.g. Fraenkel 1957: 124-135; Rudd 1966: 86ff.

\(^{391}\) Parker (1986: 74) notes that in *Sat.* 1.6 Horace again makes use of the ‘diatribe’ style. While ‘diatribal’ characteristics occur in *Sat.* 1.6, which is usually classed as an ‘autobiographical’ satire, an exhortatory style is not maintained throughout. *Sat.* 1.6 is however, an important limb of what I would see as the *Sat.* 1.1-3 and 1.4-1.10 axis in that 1.6 is a moralising satire which, albeit to a lesser extent, participates both in the dialogue and in the dialogic devices of the other moralising satires. In addition, *Sat.* 1.6, as we shall see in Part 2, chapter 8, contributes to the broader dialogue between the moralising satires of both books.

\(^{392}\) Some scholars (e.g. Hering 1979: 65), however, have cautioned that there are other elements in the tenth satire, which did not feature in the preceding nine. *Sat.* 1.10 both reflects on the first book, and looks forward to the second book of *Satires.*

\(^{393}\) See Muecke 1979: 56; 1990: 35.
how to receive his satire. He also challenges the audiences extensively, largely through his conversational presentation of ideas. Such is the addressivity of the literary satires that they depend on their audiences to aspire to the role of comprehending addressees, to understand, and indeed to fill in the gaps of what is being said. The literary satires can only appear very confusing pieces to those who would insist on reading them as monologic, straightforward and serious entities.

In Sat. 1.4 and 1.10, therefore, Horace has transferred his dialogic moralising style, with its devices and vocabulary, to a literary universe. To a great extent Sat. 1.4 and 1.10 are moralising satires, as in these poems Horace plays on the idea that a bad style is as bad as or even worse than bad morals: misconceptions about satire are treated in the same way as ethical wrongheadedness in the previous satires. Ultimately, together with the first triad, the literary satires of the first book constitute one voice in the dialogue that takes place between Horace’s two books of Satires, as the stylistic ‘diatribe’ contained within Sat. 1.4 and Sat. 1.10 is eventually echoed in the moralising satires of the second book.

**Sat. 1.4: a response to actual contemporary literary criticism?**

Much scholarship on Sat. 1.4 has concerned the question of whether or not the historical Quintus Horatius Flaccus had really been subjected to actual contemporary criticism for his *Satires*, to which Sat. 1.4 is the response. As early as 1900, G.L. Hendrickson, going very much against the contemporary current, had questioned the view that Horace was responding to the actual attacks of contemporaries in Sat. 1.4; Hendrickson argued instead that the satire is ‘a piece of literary theory put concretely’. Yet many scholars,

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394 See Freudenburg (1993: 185-198) on the parallel universes of morality and literary aesthetics in the *Satires*. The parallels will equally be seen in what I shall suggest are points about Horace’s literary agenda made indirectly in the moralising ‘Stoic’ satires of Book Two, *Sat.* 2.3 and 2.7. See discussions in Part 2, chapters 7 and 8 below.

395 And, as we shall see later, Sat. 1.10 has also been regarded as a response to an actual outcry over Sat. 1.4 amongst Horace’s contemporaries. This has been the interpretation of Sat. 1.10 offered even by scholars (e.g. Hendrickson) who have viewed Sat. 1.4 itself as a dramatic expression of Horace’s literary ideals rather than a response to actual criticism.

396 1900: 124. Hendrickson disputes the usual interpretation that Sat. 1.4 is a literal response to criticism for Horace’s foregoing satires: ‘But we shall find it hard to believe that this one composition of an author...
including Niall Rudd, have championed the view that in *Sat. 1.4* the historical Horace was reacting to actual prior criticism, and have furthermore insisted that the onus is on those who disagree with them to prove their case. Given the dearth of external evidence, however, it must be admitted that it is impossible to prove or disprove satisfactorily that Horace had been the recipient of hostile contemporary criticism. The question itself is not only unanswerable but also futile, since we can never be certain to what extent literature reflects life, particularly life separated from us by two millennia. The burden of proof therefore surely always lies with those who claim to have identified a definitive historical context for a literary phenomenon. There is no need to go beyond the *Satires* themselves in order to understand *Sat. 1.4*, since the conversation of this ‘literary’ piece is entirely oriented towards Horace’s portrait of his fictional persona within the *Satires*. To insist on an autobiographical interpretation is to underestimate the sophisticated fiction of Horatian satire.

Scholars who contend that *Sat. 1.4* is a response to concrete criticism have often felt compelled to scrutinise Horace’s prior *Satires* for the possibly offensive content that occasioned the supposed ‘attack’ on Horace. If the poems preceding *Sat. 1.4* in Book One are considered, the piece most frequently identified as being potentially offensive is *Sat. 1.2*. It has even been hinted that it is the racy subject matter of *Sat. 1.2* that is the culprit. Yet nowhere in *Sat. 1.4* does Horace even suggest that he has been criticised for obscen-
ity. Rather, the charge placed in the mouth of the indefinite adversaries in *Sat.* 1.4 is that of harsh satire:* faenum habet in cornu; longe fug...* (34), *laedere gaudes* (78), and so on. Scholars have repeatedly pointed out that there is hardly much in Horace’s *Satires* to date that could be taken as a direct attack on a contemporary or near-contemporary of respectable social standing.\(^{401}\) Rufillus and Gargonius, excerpted from the second satire and referred to in *Sat.* 1.4, are clearly fictional stock characters.\(^ {402}\) That Horace represents himself as being in big trouble for satirising obviously fictional characters should be one of the things to alert the modern reader to the fact that, rather than seriously responding to actual criticism in *Sat.* 1.4 Horace is, above all, having a great deal of fun.\(^ {403}\)

*Sat.* 1.4 also has extensive literary precedents. Dramatised critics in a literary context appeared in Callimachus’ Prologue to the *Aetia*, where the poet introduced his programmatic agenda by claiming that the clearly fictional Telchines had criticised his poetry because of jealousy.\(^ {404}\) Callimachus was much on Horace’s mind in both *Sat.* 1.4 and 1.10, as the Alexandrian’s literary ideals are obvious in his criticism of Lucilius’ style.\(^ {405}\) However, Lucilius himself appears to have been fending off an attack on the nature of his satire in Book 30,\(^ {406}\) so it is also possible that a satiric defence of this nature was an aspect of his predéc-

\(^{401}\) See e.g. Fiske 1920: 280; Coffey 1976: 91; Zetzel 1980: 62 & esp. n. 19. Even Rudd (1960: 172), the champion of the ‘actual criticism’ theory, although pointing out that Horace’s use of names in his *Satires* was ‘far from uniform’, admits that it is unlikely that Horace usually had real people in mind. Horace may have made an unflattering reference to the historian Sallust at *Sat.* 1.2.47-49, but even here, as we saw, the venom was significantly diluted in that Horace seems jokingly to have criticised his victim for a vice quite unlike that of which Sallust is known to have been accused. See p. 103 n. 311 above. While at 1.2.47ff a Sallust is said to be guilty of dalliances with freedwomen, ironically the historical Sallust was known to have been accused of adultery (Varro at Gellius 17.18; cf. Rudd 1966: 135-6; Zetzel 1980: 64).

\(^{402}\) *Sat.* 1.4.92: *pastil/os Rufillus olet, Gargonius hircum*, a direct echo of *Sat.* 1.2.27, occurs in the context of a discussion of what Horace had previously said as satirist. For the obvious fictitiousness of these characters, see Ullman 1917: 123.

\(^{403}\) *Sat.* 1.4 is not an extract from Horace’s ‘diary’ (see Zetzel 1980: 60-61), but rather voices the standard impersonal and conventionalised generic criticism against ‘The Satirist’ - that he is too virulent.

\(^{404}\) Callim. *Aetia* 1.1-6. The Telchines, a mythical race of spiteful sorcerers or goblins, simply cannot be real critics but stand for spiteful backbiting. The Telchines themselves crop up at Horace *Odes* 4.4.33, for a discussion of which see Young 1987: 152-7. Callimachus’ presentation of a literary attack with the Telchines as adversaries is dramatic and dialogic elements are used, e.g. where he makes his reply to the Telchines at 7ff.

\(^{405}\) Horace for example describes Lucilius’ text as flowing muddily (*cum fluetur lutulentus...*, 1.4.11). This recalls Callimachus’ metaphor of the muddy, polluted Assyrian river to characterise the bombastic, lengthy contemporary epic in contrast to his own ideals of brevity and refinement: *Ἄσσυριον ποταμόν μέγας μοῖρος ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ/κύματα γῆς καὶ πολλὸν ἐφ’ ἔδαπτο σουφιτὸν ἐλκει* (*Hymn to Apollo* 108-109).

\(^{406}\) See the discussion of Fiske 1920: 277ff.
essor's work that Horace was consciously copying. Lucilius' probable description of the harsh satirist as a scorpion with its tail raised and about to strike\textsuperscript{407} is paralleled in Horace's image of the satirist as a raging bull at \textit{Sat.} 1.4.34. It is, however, amusingly ironic that Horace uses the tail to sting and the horns to butt Lucilius himself in \textit{Sat.} 1.4.\textsuperscript{408} The fiction of \textit{Sat.} 1.4, its 'poetic framework',\textsuperscript{409} is that Horace has been attacked for writing supposedly harsh satire, and his assertions about satire are therefore phrased as a defence. It is undoubtedly testimony to the skill with which Horace uses the vivid 'diatribe' mode that scholars have taken his literary exposition so literally: the impression that Horace deliberately fosters is that someone has actually been talking to him, and that he is answering back.

Nevertheless, whether or not they think that Horace has actually been attacked by his contemporaries, both sides of the debate have assumed that there is a serious literary or moral purpose to \textit{Sat.} 1.4. Some scholars have seen Horace in \textit{Sat.} 1.4 both distancing himself from and redefining the harsh concept of satire in the Lucilian mould;\textsuperscript{410} others have argued that Horace is instead firmly establishing himself as Lucilius' successor. My view of this satire is far more sceptical than theirs: I find myself unable to take many of Horace's assertions that seriously. Although Horace undoubtedly uses \textit{Sat.} 1.4 (and 1.10) to expound dramatically Callimachean literary ideals and to explore his relationship with his predecessor Lucilius, he also appears to be playing the fool at the expense of the reader or audience. We shall examine this 'joking' aspect of the literary satires further in the course of this chapter. If Horace had really been attacked, as Rudd and others think, his defence is not a very serious one. While the formula mentioned in the first satire \textit{ridentem dicere verum} may be Horace's motto here, there is a very small grain of \textit{verum} in a great deal of Comic laughter.

\textsuperscript{407} Lucilius 1022 (Marx); cf. Fiske \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{408} Yet, as we shall see, it is on his failure to uphold Callimachean stylistic ideals rather than on the issue of satiric content or virulence that Horace attacks Lucilius.
\textsuperscript{409} See Williams 1972: 15ff. Williams (id.: n. 6) notes that 'poetic framework' is 'something given, in the sense that its correspondence to reality or otherwise is irrelevant'. He rejects the 'autobiographical' approach, regarding 'modern attempts to find out who attacked Horace and why as mistaken'.
\textsuperscript{410} E.g. Hendrickson 1900: 124.
Satire and conversation

As moralising satires, both 1.4 and 1.10 have principles to expound, albeit literary ones, and targets to attack for not upholding these principles - the hapless Lucilius being one of these, as we shall see shortly. They also have an audience to instruct in a literary sphere which parallels the moral one of the first triad. But like the prior moralising ‘diatribes’, Sat. 1.4 and Sat. 1.10 are equally sermones - conversations. Although he assures us that he is not as garrulous as Lucilius, Horace carefully if casually portrays the ‘literary’ satires as his chance to let off steam about a number of issues. We are given the impression in Sat. 1.4, and not accidentally, that Horace is for the first time really talking to us, the readers or audience, apart from Maecenas and his group of friends. We are encouraged to feel privileged to be drawn aside by Horace and to hear the low-down on his genre, on his predecessor, and his contemporaries, before being party to some even more (supposedly) personal details. The conversational elements are of two types: on the one hand, there are ‘quoted’ voices in the text itself and Horace’s opinionated revelations to his audience; on the other, there are structurally digressive aspects, which are so intertwined with the former that it is nearly impossible to separate them. An examination, in what follows, of the conversational ‘swerves’ in subject matter in the first half of Sat. 1.4 - together with other ‘dialogic’ devices - will illustrate this. Appropriately, in Sat. 1.4 form is content.

Mud-slinging at Lucilius: 412 the start of Sat. 1.4

Horace launches the satire with the type of sweeping assertion characteristic of the style to which we have become accustomed in the three previous satires, only here the generalisation is applied to a literary rather than to a moral question. After a brief description of the libertas of the Old Comedians in branding crooks, assassins, and adulterers (1.4.1-

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411 Some of the members of the audience are also numbered among the satirist’s targets. Muecke (1979: 56) points out that the debate about contemporary criticism ‘has obscured the point that the ‘critics’ whose views are represented are essentially readers, and readers of the wrong kind...’.

412 We have seen (p. 145, n. 405 above) that one of Horace’s criticisms is that Lucilius’ style itself is ‘muddy’ (cum fluerei lutulentus..., 11).
5), 413 Horace claims that Lucilius was entirely dependent on this tradition: *hinc omnis pendet Lucilius*... (1.4.6; my emphasis). Lucilius, Horace assures us, followed the Old Comedians entirely, changing only the metre. 414 Scholars have often puzzled over Horace’s outrageous claim that Lucilius was completely dependent on Old Comedy. 415 One could argue, as many have, that Horace is thinking only of one aspect in common between Old Comedy and Lucilius, the freedom to rebuke those who deserve censure. 416 Although he has some praise for his predecessor on this count, 417 the sweeping nature of his claim needs some further explanation. 418 In my view, it should be read as a deliberate overstatement, something which tests the reader: it is surely meant to be taken only as seriously as the statement, a few lines later, that Lucilius used to compose two hundred lines an hour standing on one foot. 419

This overstatement about Lucilius might, as suggested, be seen as a continuation of the emphatic manner of Horace in his guise as a moralist: ‘Nobody is content with his lot...’

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413 The mention of adulterers as one of the targets of Old Comedy (*quod moechus foret...*) as early as the fourth line of 1.4 already consciously links this satire to the theme of the second ‘diatribe’ satire where the folly of adulterers (*moechi, 38*) was exhibited. Crooks and assassins have not been seen so far, however, since the ‘diatribes’ have preferred to concentrate, as is generically appropriate, on the general, mundane, less serious, self-destructive and -defeating foibles such as greed and ambition, rather than on violent crime. This is worth bearing in mind when, in the course of 1.4, Horace pretends to have been attacked for his virulence as a satirist. Accusations of criminality, however, are later shown instead to be the province of the *niger scurra*, cf. 1.4.94-100a.

414 *hosce secutus/mutatis tantum pedibus numerisque* (6b-7).

415 See e.g. Rudd (1966: 89) who remarks on this ‘absurd over-simplification, ignoring as it does not only the various Hellenistic influences on Lucilius’ work but also its characteristically Roman flavour’; Brink 1963: 158.

416 See Hendrickson 1900: 125. Recently Brown (1993: 128) has cautioned that the ‘famous claim about [Lucilius’] debt to Old Comedy...should be seen in the context of *multa cum libertate notabant 5*, and is valid insofar as it suggests that [Lucilius] showed the same satiric spirit and outspokenness as the Old Comedians...’. Brown (*ibid.*) goes on to note that Horace ‘concentrates on the aspect of Lucilius which seems most to have impressed his successors’ but that he has blatantly overlooked other aspects of the genre.

417 This really only occurs at 7b-8a: *...facetus/lumuncet nares...*, before Horace states that Lucilius was *durus componere versus* (8b).

418 Cf. e.g. Parker 1986: 1, 44.

419 The expression *stans pede in uno* was a proverb for facility (cf. Otto 1971: 275, n. 1392). Earlier scholars however had other suggestions - for which see e.g. Fritsche 1875: *ad loc.*, Kiessling-Heine 1921: *ad loc*. There is undoubtedly also the idea of being rather too careless, casual and in addition physically as well as stylistically ‘unbalanced’ on Lucilius’ part. The over-all effect is a humorous one - which plays no small part in undercutting Lucilius’ importance and thus adding to his satire.
(1.1.1f), 'there is no happy medium...', (1.2.28), 'all singers have this fault...' (1.3.1f).

Overstatements of this nature contributed to an impression of a vivid, polemic tone in Horace's moral 'diatribes' where they suited the apparently extreme nature of the vices the Horatian moralist treated as deviations from the Mean. These three examples of generalisation in Horace's prior satires were all applied to the victims of satiric attack - the discontented in the first satire, the foolish who run to extremes in the second, and Tigellius and his ilk in the third. In the fourth satire Lucilius is about to join their ranks, not as the target of a strictly moral disorder like the misers and adulterers, but because he has committed sins on the stylistic plane: nam fuit hoc vitiosus - 'for it was in this respect that he was vice-ridden' (1.4.9; my emphasis), says Horace, using moral vocabulary to denote literary transgressions. Horace will suggest shortly that Lucilius is as extreme in stylistic vice as are the morally depraved in their ethical errors, and consequently, even although the attack on the predecessor is unexpected and has not yet begun, at line 6 Lucilius is already rewarded with as sweeping a judgment as Horace's other targets have received.

Swerve to attack

The sudden attack on Lucilius at 9ff coincides with a change in focus: Horace abruptly turns away from the issue of content, with which he had begun this satire, and now criticises instead the stylistic aspects of Lucilius. Lucilius is taken to task for his anti-CaL-

420 See the discussion of Freudenburg (1993: 12), where he also remarks that the 'speaker of the diatribe satires is the sworn enemy of subtlety and nuance' and is 'given to overstatement'. It is interesting that 'sweeping statements' of this nature seem to occur at the start (often in the first line) or near the beginning of a satire; the reason may be that they are one of the identifying traits useful for establishing the satirist's moralising persona.

421 A generalisation of this type is not an isolated occurrence within the conversational mode of the fourth satire itself either: for example, Horace later assures us that absolutely no-one reads his poetry (cum mea nemo scripserit legat, 22-23; my emphasis), because every person in every crowd (25f) has some guilty reason to fear satire and hate the moralising satirist, or, as he puts it, 'they all fear verses and hate poets' (omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas, 33; emphasis mine).

422 This change to overt attack on Lucilius is comparable in its unexpectedness to the sudden apostrophe of the second person singular at Sat. 1.1.38ff. But cf. the apostrophe at Sat. 1.4.19ff (p. 152 below) which is far more addressive than merely attacking Lucilius in the third person, as here.

423 Rudd (1966: 90) notes that Horace unexpectedly 'swerves aside to discuss the question of style'. He also notes that the same thing happens at 33f. Horace seems to have dropped entirely the issue of Old Comedy (1.4.8ff), pace Rackham (1916: 224) who argued that Horace intended the phrase durus componere versus
imachean verbosity and what Horace labels his stylistic laziness (garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem, 12). Lucilius' vice is his disinclination to write properly, in other words to edit his work, as scribendi recte replaces vivendi recte as the ideal in the new literary universe. Although the libertas of satire is implicit even in this 'swerve' to assail Lucilius' style at 9ff, as there is enormous irony in the attack on a famous and virulent satirist by his upstart successor, it is only there in a covert capacity. On the face of it, after line 9 Horace is discussing style where a moment ago he was concerned with content. In so doing, Horace marks the first of a number of evasions in the satire: for the moment he escapes telling us exactly where he stands on the issue of libertas. Thus, in its informal conversational structure, Sat. 1.4 is to some extent similar to the first three satires, with their indirect beginnings and characteristic subject changes. There is, moreover, a curiously delightful aspect to this half-jesting and sudden attack: it is as if, on the surface anyway, Horace is patting Lucilius on the back one minute, and then suddenly throttling him the next.

At first sight Horace may seem to have followed the advice he himself gave in Sat. 1.3 concerning the constructive criticism of friends, in that he considers Lucilius' virtues first (1.4.7-8), before weighing these against his stylistic vices (9-13). Clearly, however, Lucilius is not a friend of Horace's (although he might be considered a type of generic comrade-in-arms), and more significantly, the fact that the attack comes second, after the positive things Horace has had to say, gives the negative comments more impetus. Horace devotes about five lines to stylistic criticism of Lucilius (9-13), as opposed to the two

(8) to apply equally to the Old Comedians as to Lucilius. While Rudd's contention (id.: 89) that Horace exaggerated the influence of Old Comedy on Lucilius so that he could claim that Aristophanes, Lucilius, and he himself were all 'links in the same illustrious tradition' is to some extent valid, this association is ultimately upstaged if not actually sabotaged by Horace's extensive polemic against Lucilius in Sat. 1.4. Ullman (1917: 113) pointed out that Horace thus escapes having to make a direct statement about his own relationship to the libertas of Old Comedy and Lucilius, and adds: 'How well he has succeeded is shown by the fact that some editors think that Horace is classing himself with Lucilius and the Old Comedy, while others assert that he is disclaiming all connection with them!'

425 One thing that Horace does not do here, however, is to address Lucilius directly. Rather, the show is all intended for the benefit of his addressees, and the deceased Lucilius is not among them. This is addressivity by means of a Bakhtinian 'sideways glance' at the audience (see Bakhtin 1984: 32).

426 See van Rooy (1968: 61): '[Horace] thus balances [Lucilius'] virtutes against his vitia, but he quite clearly does not turn the scale in favour of the former, nor does he regard the latter as minor faults, but as serious ones...'.


or at most three that are given over to praise (6-8), which means that it is Lucilius' 'vices' rather than his virtues that are emphasised. As so often in gossip, compliments prepare the ground for a full-scale attack.\footnote{Thus Horace's comments on Lucilius are ironically comparable to the attack of the \textit{niger scurra} on his friend Petillius later in this satire - pleasantries there are followed by a subtle and indirect attack (1.4.96-100a).}

\textbf{Adversaries and interlocutors}

Horace's stylistic criticism of Lucilius is suddenly interrupted by the appearance of one of Horace's 'contemporaries' (13bff) - Crispinus, who has already been tagged as a long-winded stylistic baddy in Horace's \textit{Sermones} so far,\footnote{See \textit{Sat}. 1.1.120-121; cf. 1.3.138-139, where he is \textit{ineptus Crispinus}.} and therefore is another foil to Horace's implied Callimachean ideals. Crispinus pops up unexpectedly to challenge our poet to a ludicrous competition to see which of them can compose more in a given space of time: ...\textit{eccel/Crispinus minimo me provocat...} (13-14).\footnote{Crispinus' elevation of prolixity of course echoes Lucilius' alleged feat of two hundred lines in an hour standing on one foot! Like the allegedly anti-Callimachean Lucilius, fast and furious composition is the deluded fellow's ideal, according to Horace.} Allowing the absurdity of this interlocutor's attitude to speak for itself, with the mock-modesty so typical of his satiric persona Horace loudly thanks the gods that by contrast he has little to say himself and then only on rare occasions.\footnote{\textit{di bene fecerunt, inopis me quodque pusillifinxerunt animi, raro et perpauco loquentis} (1.4.17-18). Cf. \textit{Sat}. 1.1.120-121; cf. 1.3.138-139, where he is \textit{ineptus Crispinus}.} This comment, saved from blatant arrogance by the humour of the satirist's self-irony, is comparable to Horace's frequent and equally amusing boasts elsewhere in the \textit{Satires} that he only suffers from minor, forgivable faults.\footnote{\textit{As exhibited for example at} 1.3.20, 1.4.129bff, and 1.6.65-66.} It is also similar to an aside in Comedy, as Horace's audience is made to feel that we are being permitted a privileged knowledge of his stylistic ideals that he hides from his horrid puppet-like adversaries.

As interlocutor Crispinus occasions a transition from the attack on Lucilius to a comparison between Horace and his contemporaries, thereby paralleling the use of the transitional...
interlocutor at 1.3.19f. Horace’s response to Crispinus is followed by the sudden apostrophe of a second person addressee, introduced here by a polemic at tu...: at tu conclusas hircinis follibus auras, /usque laborantis dum ferrum molliat mavis, /ut mavis, imitare... (1.4.19-21). Horace turns on the addressee for his pompous long-windedness, in much the same tone that he has to date reserved for the greed-driven fiends and other deserving targets in the moral satires. Whether or not this second person is meant to be Crispinus himself, the image of Horace’s adversary bellowing away on the ancient equivalent of the bagpipes until they burst is highly vivid and amusing. The use of humour, so often successfully employed in the ‘moral’ satires, makes the attack itself more effective. The verb laborare too, which was used often in the preceding satires in relation to moral vices, is applied here in its present participial form to prolixity (laborantis, 1.4. 20). Again the vocabulary of the ethical universe is applied to its literary twin, and moral sins are paralleled by stylistic ones.

In contrast to the popularity of one Fannius, moreover, Horace claims that he never dares recite his works in public. Exhorting his audience: quemvis media elige turba (25), he proffers a list of examples of the types of vices, treated by satire, that are to be found lurking in every crowd of people - hence the unpopularity of the genre. Horace is reviewing

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432 This also anticipates the way in which Lucilius is eventually let off the hook in Sat. 1.10, as Horace’s ‘contemporaries’ Tigellius and his side-kicks bear the brunt of Horace’s attack on stylistic grounds. The age in which Lucilius lived is instead blamed for his stylistic rough edges (1.10.67-71).
433 Similar sudden reproachful addresses to a second person singular occurred in the moralising ‘diatribe’ satires, see e.g. cum te... 1.1.38; an tibi... 1.2.59; cum tua... 1.3.25ff.
434 Callimachus also applied the loud braying of the ass to the dreaded epic, while describing his own ‘sound’ as the high, clear note of the cicada (Aetia 1.29-32).
435 As Horace will later state at 1.10.14-15: ridiculum acrilfortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res.
436 Cf. Sat. 1.1.5, 30, 93, 112; 1.2.38, 76, 78; 1.3.96.
437 Fannius (21b-22a) balances Crispinus as another example of a poetaster used as a foil to Horace’s Callimacheanism. Fannius’ desire for publicity has won him extensive popularity - symbolised by the material benefits of a book-case and a self-portrait. Although Fannius is not strictly an interlocutor, the reference to him is relevant for our purposes as it too occasions a conversational transition: this example is employed as a pivot in order to return to the topic of the nature or content of satire. Horace achieves this transition by contrasting the arrogance and material good fortune of beatus Fannius with his own modest pretensions, just as previously he contrasted Crispinus’ bombasticity with his own modesty. The assertion that he has no public readership (22bff) anticipates Horace’s later claim that he recites only to his friends (73-74). Also, even before the charges of harsh satire are quoted, Horace has stated that no one reads his satire anyway.
438 The reason for satire’s unpopularity is that most people, mutatis nominibus, are able to recognise themselves as victims of satire’s moral tirades (25-33). Popularity - in Callimachean terms the highway that carries much traffic to and fro (Aetia 1.25-28) - is a literary sin parallel to longwindedness; but whereas
his own moralising satire in the list at 1.4.26ff, 439 as all the topics mentioned have been
treated in the first triad. 440 All satire’s deserving targets, 441 Horace assures us, fear verses
and hate poets: omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas (33). By subtle shifts and pivots,
Horace has thus returned his focus once more to the content or nature of satire: although
his ‘zigzagging’ between the topics would seem to reflect an informal conversational ap-
proach, as he engages us in his literary discussion, it is clear that ars est celare artem and
these ‘swerves’ are far from the accidents that they are made to appear.

Comic life: the satirist as scurra

Eventually Horace, in dialogic fashion, quotes what is apparently said against himself as a
satirist (34-38). According to this criticism, the satirist is as dangerous as a raging bull, 442
is interested only in raising laughs even at the expense of himself and his friends, 443 and
quickly scrawls his satire and rushes off to show it to the common people: 444 ‘the Satirist’

longwindedness was a stylistic sin, popularity is really the wages of a sin of content which satire, because of
its honesty in exposing moral vice, fails to commit.

439 aut ob avaritiam aut misera ambiitione laborat: hic nuptarum insanit amoribus, hic puerorum/hunc
capit argenti splendor; stupet Albius aere; hic mutat merces surgente a sole ad eum quo/vespertina tepet
regio, quin per mala praecepisferrur ut pulvis collectus turbine, ne quid/summa deperdat metuens aut
ampliet ut rem... - ‘...he’s struggling either on account of his greed or with wretched ambition; one is mad
for love-affairs with married women, another for encounters with boys; the splendour of silver captivates
this fellow; Albius is transfixed by bronze; this one trades his wares from the land of the rising sun to the
region warmed by its rays, except that he’s borne headlong from one disaster to the next, like the
dust that’s swept up in a whirlwind, afraid that he might lose something from his capital or that he would
not increase his profit...’ (1.4.26-32).

440 As we saw, Sat. 1.1 dealt with dissatisfaction, greed and competitive ambition, topics to which lines 26
and 28-32 refer; Sat. 1.2 explored adultery and other sexual extremes similar to the ones mentioned here at
line 27. This list is thus much closer to Horace’s own prior subject matter than the crooks and assassins
mentioned earlier at 1.4.3ff, as the subjects treated by the Old Comedians, the only point of comparison
being the moechi (cf. 1.4.4) and the person who nuptarum insanit amoribus (1.4.27).

441 Horace’s victims are deserving like moral targets of the Old Comedians and Lucilius are (1.4.3: si quis
erat dignus...; cf. 25a: culpdi dignos).

442 The exclamation faenum habet in cornu; longe fuge - ‘There’s hay tied to his horns - keep well clear!’
(34), attributed to an unnamed interlocutor to describe the satirist’s aggressive stance, was a Latin proverb

443 Being prepared to spare neither oneself nor others for a laugh goes back, as has frequently been noted, to
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, where according to the concept of the illiberal jest - which Aristotle sees
as typical of Old Comedy - this is characteristic of the βομολόγος, the buffoon or in Latin, the scurra:
οὐτε ἐκαυτοῦ οὐτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσατε... (EN 4.14, 1128a36; cf. Hendrickson
1900: 128). For the scurra, see n. 445 over page.

444 Horace hints that he has been attacked for the very vice that he has earlier been claiming to eschew -
rapidness and carelessness of composition, suggested by the verb illeavit - ‘...he has scrawled’ (36). This is
We soon see what a true blackguard *scurra* is like,\(^447\) in contrast to Horace's milder approach.\(^448\) In addition, Horace's 'father', whom we meet later in this satire, and from whom he claims to have inherited his satiric habits,\(^449\) as has been shown in recent years, is a figure derived from the world of Comedy.\(^450\)

In *Sat. 1.4*, where the pencil sketch of
is thus accused of being harsh and unforgiving in his choice of subjects for attack, unsel-
ective in his choice of audience, and hasty in his composition. In other words, the satirist
is presented by his ‘adversaries’ as a scurra, a scandalmonger from the world of Com-
edy. Even if the stylistic critique inherent in this caricature is set aside, the suggestion that
the satirist is out to raise a laugh at all costs, at the expense of his friends (non hic cul-
quam parcet amico, 35), would be particularly stinging for Horace, considering that he
had spent the better part of his previous satire asserting the importance of loyalty to one’s
amici. However, if our interpretations of the preceding satires are valid, raising laughs at
the expense of both himself and his closest friends is just what Horace has been doing so
far: Sat. 1.1 made a mild joke at the expense of the wealthy Maecenas while at the same
time exposing Horace’s character to even greater derision; Sat. 1.2 humorously hinted
that our satirist was a failed adulterer; Sat. 1.3 portrayed ‘Horace’ as the most gauche and
unsophisticated of friends, and lightheartedly suggested that he wished for Maecenas’
pardon. While no-one could seriously charge him with harsh satire or hasty composition,
the joke of Sat. 1.4 is that ‘Horace’ takes the accusation of mockery at his friends’
expense a little too seriously, and attempts to evade it.

No-one should fear him, Horace later assures us, because, unlike Caprius and Sulcius, he
does not ‘publish’ his satires (65ff). The Comic theme also pervades Horace’s answer.

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445 The satirist-scurra lurks about waiting to read his scurrilous scribblings to ordinary people of all
descriptions (‘both boys and old women’) as they return from the communal bakehouse or the water-tank: et
quodcumque semel chartis omnislgestiet afurno redeuntis scire lacuque,et pueros et amas (38-9).
At Plautus Curculio 477ff the scandalmongers who hang around just past the water-tank are reviled as con-
fidentes garrulique et malevoli supera lacum...; cf. Freudenburg 1993: 93. Satire has its roots
in... Horace asserts at the start of Sat. 1.4, and the ‘satirist’ who is represented in Sat.1.4 is therefore likewise
a Comic construct, inhabiting the conventionalised ‘ordinary’ world of Comedy. For a full discussion of the

446 ...Sulcius acerlambulal et Caprius, rauci male cum libellis... There has been some controversy over the
identity of Caprius and Sulcius. While the scholiasts assumed that they were informers, their libelli being
tables with indictments inscribed on them - thieves, after all, have to fear them (magnus uterque timor
latronibus, 67), Ullman (1917: 117f) on the other hand suggested that they were satirists. However, their
real contrast with Horace is that they are very loud and public in their censure, whereas he is quite unlike
this: no shop or pillar will display Horace’s verses for the hands of Tigellius Hermogenes and the common
mob to sweat over (71-72); instead he recites them only to his friends, and then only when they beg him
(73ff). In harmony with the Callimachean ideal of exclusivity, and in opposition to the loud din associated
with the enemies of Callimachean aesthetics, Horace contrasts himself with those who recite in the baths
We soon see what a true blackguard scurra is like, in contrast to Horace's milder approach. In addition, Horace's 'father', whom we meet later in this satire, and from whom he claims to have inherited his satiric habits, as has been shown in recent years, is a figure derived from the world of Comedy. In Sat. 1.4, where the pencil sketch of
his satiric persona is inken in for the first time, 'Horace' is depicted as a caricature with a contented cartoon-like background and cardboard cut-out enemies.

Response and evasion

The poet's own immediate dialogic response to the criticism of the Satirist at 34-38a, however, is a direct appeal to the listener to hear the other side: *agedum, pauca accipe contra* (1.4.38b). The chatty suggestion that Horace as speaker is going to be short (*accipe pauca*...) is something that we have heard before. However, it is a while before we get a definite answer out of Horace, as he first evades the issue of harsh and unforgiving satire by digressing. The *agedum* of 1.4.38, roughly equivalent to modern English 'C'mon then', has a distinctly informal conversational ring to it, and the casual feel of this statement of transition accords with the impression of digressiveness which follows. *Agedum, pauca accipe contra* (38b) and *hactenus haec* ('so much for these questions', 63) together mark and enclose a section in which a digression takes place.

Supposedly in an attempt to answer the charge of 'harsh satirist', a poet whom everyone hates and fears (*omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas*, 33), Horace does something quite surprising: appealing to the style of comedy and satire as opposed to *sermo merus* (47-48). The impression not simply of an excursion but of an actual evasion at 39ff is deliberately encouraged: instead of replying that as moralist he engages with the

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451 The speaker of the first 'diatribe' satire, for example, kept saying things like 'so as not to detain you...' (*ne te morer...*, 14) and 'it's not a long story' (*non longa fabula*, 95), and he would often ironically proceed to develop his points at the leisurely pace of conversation (see Freudenburg 1993: 12). At 1.4.13 a similar statement is made when the speaker proclaims that he will not dwell on the great extent of Lucilius' writings: *nam ut multum, nil moror*. Appropriately, Horace will avoid being long-winded by not dwelling on Lucilius' long-windedness. Instead, Horace passes on to another exemplar guilty of prolixity, Crispinus. 452 Cf. Knoche 1935: 480; Fraenkel 1957: 127. Similar expressions used in the first triad to mark or even to foster an impression of digression include *illuc unde abii redeo* (1.1.108) and *illuc praevertamur* (1.3.38). 453 Like New Comedy, Horace asserts, satire is a versification of the language of everyday life (esp. 52-3), and is not true poetry as the 'higher genres' epic and tragedy are (43-44). Horace has digressed again into a stylistic aspect of satire apparently in order to evade the question of its content and nature. He had left the issue of content aside at the satire's start, only to return to it, and has returned to it only to leave it again.
universal faults of humanity and is not simply out to raise a laugh at all costs, Horace presents himself as attempting to escape the accusation of being a harsh and hated poet - which he himself had articulated - by claiming that satire is not poetry and that he is therefore not a poet.

This conversational sleight that Horace affects between lines 39 and 63 appears confusing and frustrating if viewed from a purely (mono)logical perspective. However, viewed from a conversational perspective, it is plain that this evasion not only enables Horace to treat a different aspect of satire at length, but also creates the impression that 'Horace' is bent on 'escaping' the accusation of 'harsh satirist', a charge of which Horace is undoubtedly innocent, as any consistent audience of his Satires to date would be aware. This consideration is, however, clearly subordinate to the game that Horace is intent on playing with his audience. His 'evasion' of what he had presented as the issue at stake tests the audience or reader considerably, and we have to follow the conversational twists of the satire to its conclusion to find the solutions.

Eventually Horace promises to consider elsewhere (alias) whether 'this type of writing' (genus hoc) is really poetry (63f). Addressing a second person singular adversary, Horace promises to confine himself to whether 'your suspicions of this genre are justified' (64-65). Despite the fact that this formula allows Horace to return to the question of the nature of satire again - with which he was expected to be concerned in the foregoing section - the statement at 63-5 also flies in the face of the very section which precedes it, in which Horace has just gone to great lengths to explain that he isn't a poet just as the writers of Comedy aren't (45-56a). Now he seems to admit that there is a chance that satire is poetry, and that he therefore possibly is a poet. This consideration is put off, and is not raised again directly - although it is answered indirectly, at the end of the poem, as we shall see shortly. That Horace puts off the question that he has just treated at great length to focus on other considerations at 63ff casts a doubt on the seriousness and significance

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454 hactenus haec: alias iustum sit necne poema/nunc illud tantum quaeram, meritone tibi sit/suspectum genus hoc scribendi (63-65).
of the previous section; it reinforces the idea that the previous section was a digressive evasion of the 'real' issues raised by the interlocutor at 34-38.

That Horace indicates that he will deal with the question 'elsewhere' adds to an impression of disorganisation and vagueness on his part: the use of an indefinite term like alias strengthens the impression that loose ends have deliberately been left dangling. The fact that, despite his qualifying protestations, Horace is ironically simultaneously writing verse as he claims not to be a poet also seems to beg the question and to challenge the reader's belief in his statements.455 Also in contradiction to the satirist's speculations as to whether the tradition in which he writes qualifies as poetry, is the mention in the first line of Sat. 1.4 of the Old Comedians as poets, prominence being given to the word poetae placed strategically at the end of the first line. The question of satire's status as poetry (and the satirist's status as a poet) is raised indirectly again at 1.4.140ff,456 where Horace imagines himself being rescued by a huge band of poetae (multa poetae veniat manus auxilio quaelsit mihi..., 140-1), in whose number he clearly includes himself (and among whom the addressee will also be counted whether he likes it or not): nam multo plures sumus...ac veluti te/ludaei cogemus in hanc concedere turbam (142-143; my emphasis). The use of the first person plural makes a joke of the earlier claim by the satirist that he is not a poet and confirms our suspicions of the credibility of Horace's earlier statements.

Thus, all told, in Sat. 1.4 Horace is not simply being digressive or evasive: he is consistently inconsistent and having a great deal of fun at the expense of his audience. He makes a joke out of satire’s conversational style while simultaneously reflecting on its status as sermo merus: in fact, he uses the genre’s very status as ‘mere conversation’ to mock and challenge its recipients. While Horace's assertions are often technically or partly true (he is indeed not a ‘poet’ in the manner of a writer of epic or tragedy), their presentation is something that tests the listener and seems to demand a response. Horace dares us to be-

456 Horace still does not do directly at 1.4.140ff what he promises at 63ff, where he says that he will ask (quaeam) elsewhere whether satire is poetry; at 140-143 he does however indirectly answer the question in indicating that he considers himself part of a great band of poets.
lieve what his narrator-figure, his second ‘Horace’, tells us: with apologies to Bakhtin, therefore, ‘truth’ is somewhere between what the speaker asserts and the audience is prepared to believe.

Friends and free speech

The charge that the satirist is harsh is repeated at 78b ff, as a fresh accusation from the interlocutor accuses Horace of enjoyment in harming his victims: ‘laedere gaudes’/inquit, ‘et hic studio pravus facis’ (78b-79). Horace responds to this unidentified interlocutor with two indignant questions: unde petitus/hoc in me lacs? est auctor quis denique eorum/vixii cum quibus? - ‘Where did you get this charge to fling at me? Was any of my friends the source?’ (79b-81a). While the second question seems to be strictly rhetorical, suggesting that this cannot possibly be the case, Horace is also pretending to speculate that one of his friends has betrayed him (after all, they are the only ones party to his satire, 73-74). Undoubtedly the question offers a tongue-in-cheek challenge to each member of Horace’s authorial (and allegedly, sole) audience - his group of friends in Maecenas’ circle. One can still almost hear the feigned gasps of horror and denial over two thousand years later. We should keep in mind that this is the audience with whom Horace is consciously playing, and for whose benefit he is shortly to redefine satiric libertas in the context of amicitia.

In the final part of Sat. 1.4, having heard Horace explain that, as a result of his paternal education, he is immune to serious faults, we are assured by him that whatever rough edges remain will be sorted out by longevity, a frank friend, or his own reflection (fortassis et instinc/largiter abstulerit longa aetas, liber amicus, consilium proprium... , 131-133). Libertas has thus been wrested from the negative context of the scurra (‘inspired’ by the god Liber), and reorientated within the positive one of friendly counsel or self-reflection on the model of the paternal advice-giver. Satire, we are asked to believe, has become a

457 ‘Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction... ’ (1984: 110; emphasis Bakhtin’s).
reciprocal exercise within the context of amicitia, and, in addition, Horace himself, we are assured, is also a candidate for his own satire. We are even treated to a snippet of how Horace reasons with himself as he puts his consilium proprium into practice (133b-137). Horace thus suggests that he is a friend before he is a satirist: writing satires, he tells us, is just a by-product of this on-going course of self-improvement set in motion by his paternal example. Naturally, this implies that any criticism handed out in the Sermones is well-meant, and ultimately for the good of the recipient, just as a father intends only to benefit his son, and a friend aims only at helping his fellow amici.

Yet Horace is not through with his audience. Finally, another comment tests us further. Usually he'll walk around with pursed lips, Horace would have us believe, but when he gets a chance, he'll 'play around' on paper: haec ego mecum/compressis agito labris; ubi quid datur otiilludo chartis... (137-139). This suggests that the 'Horace' who appears in the Satires and who has been addressing us in Sat. 1.4 is not so much an author as a character who happens to scrawl a few things down when the mood takes him. This also implies that the composition of Horace's Satires is indeed the casual, unedited affair that was suggested earlier by an adversary (1.4.36: ...quodcumque semel chartis ille verit...). The audience is challenged to swallow this latest suggestion or to reject it as a joke: either way, we are dared to engage with Horace.

Fact and fiction

In Sat. 1.4 Horace plays with the concepts that modern audience criticism has termed a 'narrative' versus an 'ideal' audience (the latter could almost be considered, in Bakhtinian terms, the 'Superaddressees'). the obstacle course that he has set out for us requires that, contrary to most fiction, we avoid becoming the former and become instead the

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458...neque enim, cum lectulos aut me/porticus excepi, desum mihi: 'rectius hoc est: hoc faciens vivam melius: sic dulcis amicit/occurram: hoc quidam non belle; numquid ego iili/imprudens olim faciam simile?' - 'For whether I am lounging in my bed or out and about, I never give myself a break: 'It is better this way; if I do this I shall lead a better life: this way I shall come across as kind to my friends; so-and-so didn't do that very nicely; could I ever do something similar without thinking?''

459 Cf. p. 173 below for the apparently last-minute comment given at Sat. 1.10.92.

460 See p. 66 n. 212 above.
discerning latter. Horace shows himself struggling, sometimes in devious ways, to escape the tags that his 'enemies' allegedly pin on him. But at the same time, Horace’s ideal audience or ‘Superaddressees’ are undoubtedly meant to see that this is indeed all a joke, just as they are also meant to know that *Sermones* are poetry, even if satire is closer to everyday speech than epic or tragedy. In *Sat.* 1.4 Horace extinguishes a make-believe fire with an equally fictional fire-extinguisher, and he expects the audience to recognise this. Those who would say that there is no satiric smoke without a contemporary fire have merely fallen for Horace’s elaborate smoke-screen.

**Sat. 1.4 and 1.10: Horace in further ‘dialogue’**

In *Sat.* 1.10 the exhortatory ‘diatribe’ mode is once more applied to a literary context. As in *Sat.* 1.4, the ‘lessons’ which Horace seeks to impart in the tenth satire are literary ones, and again the arguments of misguided critics are quoted and actively rejected in a vivid and dramatic manner. \(^{461}\) Like *Sat.* 1.4 also, *Sat.* 1.10 is primarily concerned with its recipients: indeed, the chief ‘dialogue’ of the tenth satire is the conversation Horace engages in with his addressees, and here too it seems that audience response is required to make sense of the satire. The dialogic structure of *Sat.* 1.10, moreover, creates the impression that Horace is constantly returning to things he said in the fourth satire, indicating that the final satire of the first book is intended to be read as a continuation of the ‘conversation’ of its first ‘literary’ satire, and suggesting that Horace has unfinished business that he wishes to raise anew. \(^{462}\)

That *Sat.* 1.10 resumes the discussion of *Sat.* 1.4 can be seen for example in the fact that Horace begins the final satire of Book One with a reference to what he had said previous-

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461 The conversational devices in *Sat.* 1.10, just as in *Sat.* 1.4, are twofold: these comprise ‘diatribal’ dialogue with imaginary interlocutors, on the one hand, and a digressive ‘conversational’ structure, on the other. Once again, these two aspects work together to such an extent that it would be pointless to prise them apart.

462 *Sat.* 1.4 and *Sat.* 1.10 touch on the issues of both satiric content or nature as well as style in their introductory sections. However, while *Sat.* 1.4 eventually focussed more completely on the nature or content of satire rather than on stylistic issues, which were ‘put aside’, the tenth satire, by contrast, concentrates on the issue of style.
ly about Lucilius’ verse: *Nempe incomposito dixi pede currere versus/Lucili...* (1.10.1-2a). This statement, which I take to be the first line of the tenth satire, refers directly to Horace’s earlier criticism of his predecessor’s style at *Sat.* 1.4.6-10, where Lucilius had been berated for his unrefined fast and furious composition *stans pede in uno*. The use of *nempe* (‘certainly’) not only helps to create an informal, chatty style, but reinforces the idea that the sentence refers to a previous conversation. The impression fostered is that the audience or reader somehow stumbles upon an already established fictional dialogue between Horace and an indefinite interlocutor or set of interlocutors.

In the lines immediately following this, Horace asks provocatively: *quid tam Lucili fautor inepte est ut non hoc fateatur?* (1.10.2-3). A question, a common feature of the ‘diatribe’ mode, as we have seen, is thus used to drive the point home. At 1.10.3-4 Horace adds in a strongly adversative manner that *but ‘on the same page’* he praised Lucilius for his wit: *at idem, quod sale multo urbem defricuit charta laudatur eadem*. This refers to Horace’s assertion, at the start of the fourth satire (1-6), that Lucilius descended entirely

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463 Although the general consensus is that the eight lines (*Lucili, quam sis mendoros... ut redeam illuc*, 1A-8A), which are attached to the beginning of Horace’s satire in some of the manuscripts (MS group Fκ), are spurious, there has been a small but substantial body of scholarship that has tried to re-instate them. Hendrickson (1916: 250) suggested that they may have been the work of Horace, but were subsequently deleted by the poet himself. The reason for their deletion, according to Hendrickson (*id*.: 263-264; 1917(a): 77), was the removal of direct personal reference to Valerius Cato. The standard contemporary view is that the lines are un-Horatian but the work of a contemporary (see e.g. Brink 1963: 167 n. 1; Freudenburg 1993: 170 - Freudenburg nevertheless (*ibid.*) uses this 8-lined ‘introduction’ in support of his thesis that Valerius Cato does hide a group of contemporary literary critics). An important point was made by Fraenkel (1933: 396): no Horatian satire actually begins with such a great digression as is occasioned by these ‘false-start’ 8 lines tacked onto the start of 1.10 (emphasised by *ut redeam illuc*, 1.10.8A). Fraenkel in addition (*ibid.*) draws our attention to the fact that the direct address, in the vocative, of the poet he is on the point of criticising (*Lucili, quam sis mendoros..., 1.10.1A*) is also highly unusual for Horace. He also (*id.*: 394) advances another cogent argument for the non-authenticity of the disputed first eight lines when he points out that the start of Persius’ third satire (*Nempe haec adsiduae...*) can only be appreciated as an imitation of the start of the tenth Horatian satire if the first line of the latter is indeed *Nempe incomposito dixi*. This is not the only example of this in Persius, as Fraenkel notes: the start of Persius’ fifth satire (*Vatibus hic mos est...*) for example is recognisable as an echo of the start of Horace’s third (*Omnibus hoc vitium est cantoribus...*). If the 8 questionable lines are ignored, *Sat.* 1.10 is intelligible as a continuation and development of the argument of *Sat.* 1.4. The author of these lines, whoever he was, may consciously have attempted a facsimile of Horace’s digressive style. That the line which starts the text proper seems itself to begin *in medias res* might explain the perceived need for an added introduction in the first place.

464 As Bakhtin maintained, all speech is a response to words that have been uttered before (see Morson’s discussion, 1981: 3). Horace, however, is clearly very conscious here in underlining this.

465 Some scholars have attributed this statement at 1.10.2-3 to the imaginary interlocutor, but as it is not truly adversative but follows logically on the previous sentence, it makes more sense to assume that it is spoken by the narrator himself.
from the tradition of *libertas* of the Old Comedians in branding deserving targets. Horace's use of an adversative statement adds to the impression that he is already engaging in an argument with an adversary. In the Introduction we saw that adversative statements were one of the aspects identified by Mukarovsky as typical of dialogic discourse, and since *Sat.* 1.10 is structured as an argumentative 'conversation', it is even more appropriate that many of its statements should be structured adversatively. This is the first of a series: *at idem... laudatur* (3), *at magnum fecit...* (20), *at sermo lingua concinnus utraque...* (23), *at dixi...* (50), and *fuerit Lucilius, inquam...* (64). We have intruded, apparently, upon Horace in a polemic mood.

Mention here of the stylistic castigation Lucilius in the fourth satire is therefore soon followed by reference to his praise there (1.10.1-4), inverting the sequence of 1.4.1-13, where approval was followed by criticism. Not surprisingly, it has been claimed that *here finally* Horace takes to heart the advice he so liberally dished out in *Sat.* 1.3, and balances Lucilius’ virtues against his faults. But contrary to the advice of the third satire, Horace does not in fact come down on the side of the former. He says that while granting that Lucilius possessed the attribute of much incisive wit, he will not concede 'the rest'. Not only does it turn out that this incisive wit is the sole Lucilian virtue that Horace will grudgingly acknowledge (3-4), as in *Sat.* 1.4, but in addition he proceeds immediately to pile on further Lucilian faults and to downplay this single virtue, saying that this alone is not enough (7-8). By advocating brevity directly after asserting the insufficiency of humour on its own (9-10), Horace reminds us of a point he developed in the fourth satire,

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666 *si quis erat dignus describi* (1.4.3); *quibus comoedia prisca viris est* here (1.10.16) echoes *quorum comoedia prisca virorum est* (1.4.2).
668 Hendrickson (1917(a): 78 n.2) identified these as the five instances, four of which are introduced by the adversative *at*, which indicate statements attributed to an interlocutor and on which, he noted, the argument of 1.10 is based. Of these examples, however, those at 3, 50 and 64 seem to be spoken by the main narrator, ‘Horace’, as he conducts his *sermo* in a polemic fashion and orientates himself against his adversaries even when these are not themselves heard to speak.
669 Cf. 1.3.70-1. At 1.10.64-71 Horace again weighs up Lucilius’ good points against his faults, and after listing the former: *fuerit Lucilius, inquam/comis et urbanus, fuerit limatior idem/quam rudis et Graecis intacti carminis auctor/quamque poetarum seniorum turba...* (64-7), he comes down on the side of the latter, suggesting that Lucilius would do things very differently if he were still alive in Horace’s age: *sed ille/si foret hoc nostrum facto dilatus in aevum...* (67-8f; the adversative aspect of the *sed* here is striking).
670 *nec tamen hoc tribuens dederim quoque cetera...* (1.10.5).
namely that brevity was not among the virtues enjoyed by Lucilius (9-13). Even the virtue of humorous treatment is ultimately ascribed not to Lucilius but to the Old Comedians, and it is their example rather than that of Lucilius, that is to be imitated (16-17a). 471

From the start of Sat. 1.10, therefore, Horace is deliberately cultivating the impression that he is engaged in further dialogue - indeed, that he is involved in an on-going argument - about the merits of Lucilius, and that he is reaffirming the statements of his fourth satire. Horace suggests that, painted into a corner by his plaintiff 'opponents' (who surely are no more than personifications of positive sentiment towards Lucilius) he is pig-headedly sticking to his guns regarding his earlier criticism of his predecessor. This stylistically-created impression of heated polemic is what has left some scholars without a doubt that in-between the 'publication' of Sat. 1.4 and that of 1.10, the historical Horace had again been the target of virulent contemporary criticism at the hands of a pro-Lucilian brigade. 472 But these scholars have merely made the mistake of swallowing Horace's seemingly 'autobiographical' fiction. In Sat. 1.10, as in Sat. 1.4, Horace continues to test the reader with outrageous statements, indicating that the tenth satire is neither an earnest defence of his satire nor a serious attack on any other group. Again, as in the fourth satire, the 'addressivity' of Sat. 1.10 is such that the audience is drawn into the conversation and is asked (or dared) to make sense brazenly asserts.

471 Cf. Sat. 1.4.1ff, where, however, Lucilius is asserted to descend entirely from the tradition of Old Comedy.
472 The situation presented in Sat.1.10, as many scholars have understood it, is that supporters of Lucilius have come to his defence and attacked Horace for his criticisms of Lucilius in Sat. 1.4. Thus Sat.1.10, like Sat. 1.4, has often been read in a literal, biographical manner. Scholars who have done so have generally assumed that the eight questionable lines that are usually supplied at the start of Sat. 1.10 are genuine. Even Hendrickson (1916: 251ff), who, as we have seen, so strongly argued against this approach with regard to 1.4, assumed that the statements of the tenth satire were a response to actual criticism, actual criticism, Hendrickson claimed, made in hostile reply to Horace's previous response to Valerius Cato's supporters in 1.4 (id: 253-254). Hendrickson later argued that in Sat. 1.10 the interlocutor concealed contemporary Neoterics (1917 b: 329-330). Other scholars (e.g. Rudd 1966: 93; LaFleur 1981: 1806), while not necessarily going so far as to identify Valerius Cato and associates as the critics, have argued that Horace was responding to a real group of Lucilian supporters. Still others (e.g. Frankel 1957: 129) have seen the tenth satire as a general attack on the Neoterics, perhaps in response to a Neoteric defence of Lucilius (cf. the apparently negative reference to Calvus and Catullus at 1.10.17-19). It has been pointed out, however (see Scodel 1987: 204), that many of the Callimachean stylistic ideals to which Horace appeals in the tenth satire, as well as the terms by which he identifies these ideals (libellum, versiculi etc.) are for the most part in harmony with the ideals of and the vocabulary employed by the Neoterics.
Conversational style in Sat. 1.10

In the tenth satire Horace’s conversational style also occasions a number of shifts in subject, comparable to those of the fourth satire. At 1.10.20ff we are back with the question of Lucilius’ style again, but it is a different issue that is raised. Horace plunges into fictional dialogue with a vague though virulent group of Lucilian supporters. Representative of this indefinite group, an imaginary or indefinite interlocutor is made to protest that Lucilius achieved a great deal by using Greek words in his Latin: *at magnum fecit quod verbis Graeca Latinis/miscuit* (20-21a). Horace responds energetically, defending the stylistic principle of *Latinitas* - itself ironically an adaptation of *Hellenismos*. He vividly illustrates his own willingness to practice what he preaches by initially chiding his adversaries with a translated: *o seri studiorum*, instead of the Greek ὁ σπουδαῖος - ‘late learners!’ (21). This introduces a section in which things Greek and things Roman are pitted against each other.

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473 Sharp ‘swerves’ in subject occur in the first section itself (1.10.1-17a), where Horace keeps shifting the focus backwards and forwards between questions of style (1-3a; 5-6; 9-10; 12-14a) and those of content, notably humour (3b-4; 7-8; 11; 14b-17a). Moreover, just as at 1.4.9ff Horace had shifted his attention away from the question of the nature of Lucilian satire and onto that of its style, and at 1.4.14ff he had turned away from a consideration of Lucilius himself to focus on his own contemporaries, so at 1.10.7ff Horace switches from a discussion of Lucilius’ style to prescriptions for satire in general, and from 17-19 he focuses entirely on his hapless contemporaries. But in addition to these shifts in this first section from the specific (Lucilius, 1-5; Lucilius compared with Laberius, 6) to the general (prescriptions for writing satire in general, 7-15; satirists advised to copy Old Comedy, 16-17a), to specific contemporaries who are criticised (17b-19), when Lucilius is reintroduced in the second section there is again a movement from the specific (Lucilius, 20-21) to the general (21-24), then to specific contemporaries (25ff). The series of: Lucilius; composition in general; contemporaries, is therefore an underlying pattern in the externally casual structure at the start of the tenth satire.

474 Horace himself has however used the odd transliterated Greek word in his satires thus far, although only in contexts where this contributed to the required atmosphere, such as *pharmacopoleae* (potion-pedlars) appear at 1.2.1 for example. This poly syllabic word in an unusual hexameter line of only three words (for parodic mock-epic effect) is used together with *ambubaiarum* (flute-girls), a word apparently formed ultimately on an Aramaic stem (Brown 1993: 101). These foreign words emphasise the foreign origins of the types that clustered around Tigellius. To the use of both words however could be applied the same criticism as that which Horace applies to Lucilius’ importation of Greek words into Latin. That in the *Ars Poetica*, too, Horace permits the poet to use new invented words, provided that they are from a Greek source and are employed sparingly (*A.P. 52-3*) should not detain us with regard to Horace’s statements at 1.10.20ff, given the possibly highly satiric nature of the *A.P. (cf. Frischer 1991)* as well as *Sat. 1.10.*

475 Cf. Theophrastus *Characters* 27; *Cicero Ad familiares* 9.20.2.
A 'diatribal' exchange follows as the anonymous interlocutor in return replies to Horace's tirade, now appealing to the imagery of wine-mixing to defend Lucilius' mixed diction: at sermo lingua concinnus utraque/suavior, ut Chio nota si commixta Falerni est (23-4).

The style of this interlocutor's adversative response and the terminology he uses (at... suavior) is reminiscent of the avarus adversary's response at Sat. 1.1.51: at suave est ex magno tollere acervo. In that context the interlocutor and the moralist were arguing about the greedy person's perceived need to draw his essential supplies from a huge heap, an image which was shortly to be translated into drawing a cupful of water from a swollen river (1.1.54ff). The miser argued that doing so was 'sweet' (suave), just as Horace's interlocutor argues at 1.10.23ff that the concinnus sermo ('elegant discourse') derived from a mixture of the two languages (lingua...utraque) is 'sweeter' (suavior). The use of suave /suavior therefore implies that the dramatised opponents whom Horace takes to task here appreciate their literary theory (and their wine) in like manner and for the same reasons that the misers relish well-stocked barns, full rivers and bulging money-bags.

Horace's debate with the indefinite adversary here is strikingly dialogic and polemic, even from a formal linguistic perspective: as we saw, 'lexical oppositions' of an evaluative (suavior) and qualitative (at magnum fecit) character were among Mukarovsky's observations of discourse that could be termed 'dialogic'. The use of second person pronouns was also listed by Mukarovsky as an aspect of the addressive quality of dia-

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476 The image of the mixing of Falernian with Chian wine is of course symbolic of the mingling of the Latin and Greek vocabulary. Wine, like water, was symbolic of poetic inspiration and thus of poetry itself. The Greek epigrammists of the Hellenistic age speak of a 'debate' between those who upheld water and those who upheld wine as the ideal source of poetic inspiration. Often these images of inspiration involved drinking the water/wine (see the discussion of Crowther 1979: 4ff). The epigrammist Hedlyus may be twisting Callimachean terminology to his own ends when he ascribes the attainment of λεγετατον to wine-drinking (Athen. 472f.; 473a; cit. Crowther 1979: 5) At Ep. 1.19.1-11 Horace, tongue-in-cheek as usual, takes the side of the wine-drinkers in this mock-debate, appealing once more to the example of the Old Comedian Cratinus: Prisco si Maecenas docte, Cratino/nulla placere diu nec vivere carmina possunt, quae scribuntur aquae potioribus (1-3). Shades of Monty Python loom for the modern reader as Horace goes on to appeal quite irreverently to the exempla of the tipsy Muses, smelling of drink every morning (vina fere dulces oitierunt mane Camenae, 5), the 'wino' Homer (vinosus Homerus, 6), and father Ennius himself who 'never leapt forward to tell of arms without drinking first' (7-8). For Horace's own alleged tippling, see Sat. 2.3.3-4 and 2.7.114.

477 Lucilius' 'great' achievement in mixing his diction (at magnum fecit, 1.10.20) parallels the misers' approval of 'great' stores of supplies (ex magno tollere acervo, 1.1.51; magno de flamme, 55).

478 See Introduction, pp. 30ff.
logue: appropriately, Horace responds to the latest statement of his interlocutor in an interrogative mode, again appealing directly and energetically to this adversary, addressed emphatically in the second person singular (te ipsum percontor..., 25). Horace soon becomes absorbed by the question of Greek words in Latin (esp. 27ff), and, taking up other examples of anti-Callimachean stylistics, wanders further and further from a discussion of Lucilius' style.

Horace's conversational digressions in Sat. 1.10 allow him to turn gradually away from the issue of Lucilius and to contrast his own modest Callimachean-inspired style with a number of contemporary anti-Callimacheans. For example, Horace's previous endeavour at writing 'little Greek verses' (although 'slight' in the proper Callimachean sense, by now they are commonplace),

the turgidus Alpinus and his equally turgid style,

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479 The 'Alpinus' at lines 36-37 as well as the Greek throng mentioned in the lines preceding him are large, full, replete or swollen in some manner, and both stand for anti-Callimachean literary principles. The Graecorum catervae ('crowds of Greeks') are comparable to the well-trod path (to use another Callimachean image) that Greek literature had, according to this argument, become by this stage. The jump from a debate about writing in Greek in 35 to the sudden intrusion of the swollen Alpinus in 36 is somewhat startling, but it is deliberately startling, underlined by the geographical and ethnic leap juxtaposed at the end of one line and the beginning of the next: magnas Graecorum...catervas/turgidus Alpinus.

480 turgidus Alpinus iugulat dum Memnona dumque...defingit Rheni luteum caput, haec ego ludo (36-37). This is normally considered to be a reference to the Furius satirised in similar vein at Sat. 2.5.41, a contemporary epic poet who apparently wrote an epic on Caesar's Gallic wars (in which he famously described Jupiter as spitting snow on the Alps, cf. 2.5.41, Quint. 8.6.7), and may have also written an Aethiopis in which Memnon is slain by Achilles (hence iugulat...Memnona). The light-heartedness of the verb ludo at the end of line 37 contrasts with the harshness and strenuousness of iugulat in the previous line. Horace appeals to the Callimachean tradition by suggesting that his own works are trivial games haec ego ludo, 37). It is interesting that here the pompous epic writer appears first and the description of him takes up over one and a half lines (36-37 - with elaborate enjambement he spills over into the following line), whereas Horace's modest trifles are given proportionately less than half a line (37). Cf. Horace's self-effacing description of himself at 1.4.138-9 as merely 'playing around' on paper when he has the spare time: ...ubi quid datur ovillum ludo chartis...

481 The turgidus Alpinus is said, among other things, to mould a muddy head for the Rhine: defingit Rheni luteum caput (37a). Brown's suggestion (1993: 188) that luteus may mean 'made of mud' rather than 'muddy' seems to me (contrary to his protestations) to be over-precise. The association of mud with a river at any point in its course must, particularly in a literary context, always evoke the famous Callimachean image (Hymn to Apollo 108-109; cf. p. 145 n. 405 above). Brown notes (ibid.) that luteum caput may refer either to the source of the river or to the head of the personified river-god. A river is not, however, usually really 'muddy' at its source but is normally so further along its course, once it has accumulated silt and other debris along the way (this is what one is asked to visualise when Callimachus uses the Euphrates as a symbol of the bombast and prolixity of contemporary epic). Perhaps, however, in the case of this Furius, whose effusive epic prolixity was such that it is stressed again at 2.5.41, Horace is suggesting that the 'muddiness' of his style is so exceptionally bad that it has extended even to the source of his literary river. The recollection of this famous Callimachean image foreshadows the reference, a few lines later, to Horace's having called Lucilius' style lutulentus (1.10.50; cf. 1.4.11).
idea of loud competitive recitation in the temple, or of repetitive exhibition in the thea-
tre, are all linked by their common opposition to Callimachean ideals. All represent
the easy, well-trodden path which, following Callimachus, Horace claims to eschew. All
these digressions, in my opinion, are defensive evasions, necessary because as the final
satire of the first book, Sat. 1.10 is a thinly-disguised comic cry of victory on a Quixotic
battlefield where our hero claims to have usurped Lucilius’ position by having renovated
and re-invented satire stylistically. The evasions allow Horace to duck and dive, before
finally coming in for the ‘kill’. But, as we shall see shortly, Horace’s attitudes of self-
effacement and mock modesty ultimately allow him, in a type of proto-Carnivalesque
fantasy, to ‘crown’ himself re-inventor of Roman satire without actually ‘uncrowning’
Lucilius.

Outrageous claims

As Horace asserts, he took up satire because it was an area which had been infrequently
and unsuccessfully attempted (46-49). Combined with his self-effacing claim to be in-
ferior to Lucilius at 48 (inventore minor - despite his extensive criticism of satire’s ‘in-
ventor’ both in 1.4 and here), Horace’s outrageous claim at 46-49 is reminiscent of the
mock-modest attitude he has adopted throughout the Satires, and is on a par with the oth-
er questionable statements that have occurred, such as his assertion in Sat. 1.4 that he is
not a poet. Whereas earlier in Sat. 1.10, we had the deified Romulus appearing from

482 By contrast Horace’s claim (at 1.10.38-39) that his works are not designed to resound in competition in the
temple nor to reappear again and again in the theatre, recalls the assertions of 1.4 which stressed the ex-
clusivity of his writings: at 1.4.71ff he announced that no shop or pillar would have his little books (libellusos)
for the masses to sweat over. Horace would only recite his poetry among his friends and then only when
they begged him, in contrast to those who liked to recite their writings in the middle of the forum or at the
baths. This appeal to the Callimachean ideal of exclusivity anticipates the equally theatrical description,
towards the end of 1.10, of the selective audience with which Horace would be content (76ff): ... nam satis
est equitem mihi plaudere...

483 Horace (31ff) describes how the quintessentially Roman god Quirinus (who, as the deified Romulus,
admiringly meets Roman satire’s requirements) interrupted him in a ‘midnight dream’ during the period in
which he was attempting to write ‘little Greek verses’ (Graecos... versiculos), and suggested that he try
something else rather than carry coals to Newcastle (34-5). An amusing Romanisation of the Callimachean
epiphany of Apollo, and ultimately based on Hesiod’s famous meeting of the Muses, Horace uses the tradit-
ional apologia for not writing epic for a choice not only of genre, but also of language. The idea of patriot-
ically writing Latin instead of Greek has been introduced by the derogatory reference to the Canusian bi-
lingual (1.10.30), and prior to that, the emotive argument that was used against the practice of mixing Greek
above to sanction Horace’s literary choice, he now informs us that he really chose satire simply because there was no contemporary he would challenge in doing so: satire, he would have us believe, was a generic free-for-all. Although this is partly an appeal to the Callimachean ‘untrodden path’ idea, it also makes a mockery of such ideas: the young and timid Horace only chose this area of endeavour because no one else was currently working on it. It seems to me that this assertion at 46ff is one of the things in the tenth satire that begs belief. There is a dualism in that it is partly true but partly also a game that Horace has with us - as he says, *haec ego ludo* (37). He challenges the audience or reader here, just as he did in Sat. 1.4, to swallow throwaway statements such as this, but I suspect that in doing so he anticipates laughter rather than a serious response from his ideal audience. Indeed, as Horace asserts in the final section of this satire, he would like his ideal group of recipients to find his work amusing: *arridere velim...* (89).

But Horace has altogether another aim in mind, as I have suggested. Having explained his choice of satire, at 47ff Horace returns to the issue of Lucilius, saying that he does not wish to strip Lucilius of ‘the crown that clings so gloriously to his head’ (i.e. the title of ‘inventor’ of satire). Although the blame for satire’s less-than-perfect past is partially shifted onto Varro of Atax ‘and certain others’ (...*experto frustra Varrone Atacino/atque quibusdam aliis..., 46-7), nevertheless it seems that Horace’s suggestion that satire was the one area lying open for him to improve upon (40-45) unavoidably challenges Lucilian satiric hegemony. How is Horace actually going to improve upon satire (*melius quod scribere possem, 47b*) without usurping Lucilius’ ‘crown’?

with Latin: *scilicet obitus patriaeque patrisque Latini!...!*...*patriis intermiscere petita/verba foris malis...* (27-30a). The extensive use of words relating to ‘father’ and ‘fatherland’ here has heralded the (literally) patriotic tone (see van Rooy 1970: 13), and led by association to the epiphany of Quirinus. Scodel (1987: 201-2) notes that the Quirinus episode continues an implicit theme of the previous passage: that writing Greek seems to be ‘the obvious, easy choice, the beaten track of the Callimachean original...just as writing impure Latin is not *difficile et mirum*’.  
485 D’Anna (1972: 286) has that the consideration of satire here in a list of Augustan genres is another aspect of Horatian polemicism against Lucilius, since the latter had regarded satire as the one genre which sustained and embraced all the others.
Horace is at pains to make clear is that it is *stylistically* that he will improve on Roman satire. The return to a discussion specifically about Lucilius' style is brought about at 50ff by an adversative: *at dixi... 'But I said...'*, indicating a return to a prior issue. Horace again echoes the fourth satire, as the 'dialogue' with *Sat. 1.4* is maintained: *at dixi fluere hunc lutulentum, saepe fentem/ plura quidem tollenda relinquendis* (1.10.50-51) is a direct reference to 1.4.11: *cum flueret lutulentus, erat quod tollere velles*. This reference to the earlier satire also reinforces the dialogic relationship between them: Horace now attempts to make amends, to mollify his previous statements about his predecessor, to set the record straight, as it were, but without detracting from his own position. Horace reaffirms what he has been saying up until now about his predecessor and his own mission with the genre of satire, but in what follows he manages to keep the peace, reaching a compromise and making a concession regarding Lucilius. If Lucilius lived in Horace's day, he tells us, the father of Roman satire would edit his work, and a finger-gnawing, head-scratching mode of composition would replace his happy-go-lucky balancing on one foot. To continue the 'one footed' analogy, Horace presents himself striking an awkward balance between standing by his own Callimachean principles and making assertions that will mollify his imaginary opponents. Yet the attitude characteristic of 'Horace' has not disappeared - he establishes himself simultaneously as both heir to and improver upon Lucilian satire. If he lived in the present day, Horace asserts, Lucilius would ascribe to the same Callimachean ideals of refined editing that Horace does: in short, Lucilius would be Horace.

Horace then exhorts his addressees to do the same (72-3), replacing the ethical injunctions of the 'diatribes' with stylistic commands: *saepe stilum vertas, iterum quae digna legi sint/scripturus...* His addressees should, moreover, in the best Callimachean tradition,

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486 *This dixi* at just over halfway through the poem (1.10.50) parallels that of the first line: *Nempe incompisato dixi pede currere versus/Lucili (1-2)*, and likewise refers to a previous fictional conversation, that of 1.4. See above.

487 A few lines down, Horace refers directly to his amusing image at *Sat. 1.4.9-10* of Lucilius dictating two hundred lines an hour 'standing on one foot', with the added touch now, that Lucilius' speed of composition allowed him to write two hundred verses before dinner and the same number afterwards: *amet scripsisse ducentos/ante cibum versus, totidem cenatus* (1.10.60-61).

488 67b-71; cf. 1.4.9-10.
be content with few readers (*contentus paucis lectoribus*, 74), just as in the 'moral' satires there had been repeated praise for those able to reach ethical contentment without becoming victims of greed for more possessions. The issue of *satis est* is thus as important in the literary as in ethical sphere (cf. *Sat*. 1.1.120). Horace indicates that he too knows the meaning of *satis* in the literary arena as well as in the moral. With an echo of the Lucilian *Persium non curo legere, Laelium Decimum volo*, Horace says that he will be satisfied if a 'knight' - presumably designating a 'middle-of-the-road' audience - receives his work warmly: *nam satis est equitem mihi plaudere* (76).

**Author and audience**

Like *Sat*. 1.4 therefore, *Sat*. 1.10 is patently concerned with the issue of audience. Both satires, in addition, as we have seen, test the audience extensively and part of this test is for the audience to decide where to align itself. In *Sat*. 1.4, it had been a morally bad audience, the misguided and guilty readers of satire, that were presented as having caused the trouble in the first place (1.4.25ff). The good and indeed sole audience, according to Horace, was by contrast his group of friends (73-74). Yet the danger of satire, as we have seen, is that it can turn audiences into targets. The blackguard satirist, for example, chooses to make his friends his targets instead of his audience in order simply to raise a laugh (81-83; 96-100a); later, when more inebriated, he even turns his immediate audience into his targets (88). Horace, however, learnt his satiric technique as an audience of his moralising 'father', and as a result he is still open to receiving moral criticism - either from his own life experiences, his own reflection, or from a *liber amicus* (131-133). Horatian satiric *libertas*, accordingly, needs a familiar audience if it is to benefit anyone.

489 Lucilius 593 Marx, cf. p. 62 n. 198 above.
490 However, true to from, no sooner has he has said it than Horace immediately undercuts this statement with the comment: *ut audax contemptis aliis explosa Arbuscula dixit* - 'as Arbuscula, contemptuous of the rest, said defiantly when hissed off stage' (76b-77). This reference, comparing Horace's own attitude as satirist to that of a thespian of the previous generation under duress, amusingly suggests mock-pomposity in the face of rejection, but also seems simultaneously to insure Horace against possible audience rejection by winning sympathy by the very revelation of his fear of it. Again, Horace both mocks himself and courts his audience.
Stylistically, both in *Sat. 1.4* and in 1.10, Horace himself has a lot to say from his perspective as a reader or audience of Lucilius, and in the tenth satire, he invites the audience to join him in assessing others (1.10.51bff). It is, in addition, as readers that Horace and his adversaries fight over the merits of Lucilius. Towards the end of *Sat. 1.10* Horace lists his friends as learned men (...*doctos...amicos*, 87), who, in his opinion, have themselves achieved the stylistic ideals he has been setting out all along, and therefore make the ideal group of listeners. Modestly, the ‘Horace’ who appears in the *Satires* claims to derive his greatness chiefly by association. Undoubtedly flattering for Horace’s contemporary audience, at the same time this allows us, the actual audience, to imagine ourselves as part of Horace’s extended coterie of friends: if we are recipients of Horace’s *Satires*, and he has stated that only his friends get to hear them, either we are to call his bluff or we are to call ourselves his friends. We are encouraged, it seems, to include ourselves among the ever expansive *com pluris alii* (87a) who are added to Horace’s ideal audience. After all, what modern reader prefers to identify with the anti-Callimachean baddies Demetrius and Tigellius, whom, Horace makes abundantly clear, he does not desire as an audience?

The two occasions on which the undesirable audience is mentioned towards the tenth satire’s end (78-80; 90b-91) actually sandwich the list of Horace’s friends and ideal recipients of his *Satires* (81-90a). The unwanted Demetrius and Tigellius are unambiguously bade, in the latter example, to go and whine among the chairs of their summer school attendants: the audience is warned of what will happen if we fall foul of the satirist. Horace’s literary enemies are thus banished to outer darkness, while his cosy circle of friends, including Maecenas and Virgil (81), are praised as his ideal group of Superaddressees.491 Yet it is Demetrius and Tigellius, and not Maecenas or Virgil or any of Horace’s *amici*, who are the last named addressees in the satire and in the book (1.10.90). The dialogism of the *Satires* means that even the undesirable audience is still an audience: satire is addressed to its targets as much as it is addressed to its ideal group of recipients.

491 On the other hand, Freudenburg has recently remarked (1999: 480) that a reader hostile to Horace might well read this list of friends as ostentatious last-minute name-dropping!
Conclusion?

Horace hates neat conclusions, and at the very end of Sat. 1.10 he has an ace up his sleeve. His dialogue is not yet over and he has one last test for the audience. In the final line of Sat. 1.10 ‘Horace’ famously gives the order to his slave to be off and hastily append this last satire to his little volume: *i, puer, atque meo citus subscribe libello* (92). This final line, implying a speedy and careless rather than a slow and painstaking approach to composition, contrasted with the ironically diminutive *libello*, calls into question if not undercuts all that Horace has been asserting throughout Sat. 1.10 about his supposed Callimachean ideals. It suggests an attitude to composition which we have been led to believe would be more appropriate to Lucilius than to Horace and, in addition, hints that the tenth satire has been a mere afterthought.

Far from negating Horace’s oft-stated Callimacheanism, however, this ambiguous final line to the *liber sermonum* encapsulates what, in essence, Horace is doing both as a satirist in general and in Sat. 1.4 and 1.10 in particular: he plays the fool with everything, *even* with the Callimachean aesthetics to which he so obviously subscribes. Self-satirically, Horace may be conceding that he is really no better than Lucilius after all. Oops, he is almost *becoming* Lucilius... But he may also be indicating that Roman satire, with its conversational structure and continual dialogic surprises, will to some extent always evade explication in terms of neat stylistic principles. This ultimate dialogic reversal in the final line of Sat. 1.10, therefore, with its possibly dual and uncertain meaning, indicates that no one has the last say and that meaning is truly ‘unfinalizable’. In this open-ended uncertainty, Horace allows a loophole to remain free for further dialogue - further dialogue which, as we shall see in Part 2, is taken up in his second book of Satires.

492 Cf. Zetzel (1980: 72), who notes that Horace seems hereby to deny ‘all his statements in the poem about slow and careful composition, implying that he, like Lucilius, writes standing on one foot, dictating to a slave...’
PART 2:

OTHER VOICES:

SPEAKERS, AUDIENCES AND OTHER ROLE
REVERSALS IN THE MORALISING SATIRES OF
HORACE SERMONES BOOK TWO.
CHAPTER FIVE: INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER TO PART 2

THE MORALISING SATIRES OF HORACE'S SECOND BOOK: AN ECHO AND A RETORT

Crowning/decrowning is a dualistic ambivalent ritual, expressing the inevitability and at the same time the creative power of the shift-and-renewal, the joyful relativity of all structure and order, of all authority and all (hierarchical) position. Crowning already contains the idea of immanent it is ambivalent from the very start.


In the moralising satires of Horace’s first book of Sermones, as we have seen, lectures emanate from a speaker who coincides with the Horatian satirist persona. In Part 1 we explored, with recourse to the Bakhtinian theory of dialogic discourse and ‘addressivity’, the satirist’s strongly audience-orientated speech, his relationship with his recipients, and - in spite of the formally monologic structure of his addresses - the complex dialogue of competing voices in the first triad of Book One. In Horace’s second book of Satires, however, much changes. Most striking is alteration, on a formal linguistic level, of the form that the satires take: in the second book full-blown ‘dialogue’ takes the place of the dialogic ‘monologue’ or the so-called ‘diatribe’ style of Book One. In addition, ‘Horace’, the authorial speaker-persona of the first book, is now largely replaced by other speakers with their various axes to grind, sometimes at Horace’s expense.

We are prepared for these changes by the introductory satire of the second book (2.1), in which Horace consults Trebatius, a legal expert, about the dangers satiric. The legal consultant cautions Horace to avoid provocative satire. While in Sat. 2.1 itself Horace seems not to have taken this advice very seriously, in subsequent poems

493 See e.g. Sat. 2.1.21-23; 60b-62a; 79-83a.
494 See 2.1.82ff for the pun on mala carmina, meaning simultaneously ‘libellous verses’ in the legal sense and ‘bad verses’ in the literary/stylistic sense (Muecke 1995: 218). Horace also deliberately plays on the contradictions of ‘law’ in the legal sense and as a generic rule, i.e. the ‘laws’ of the genre of satire (id.; 203ff). However, for the contemporary political significance of having Caesar act as the final arbiter of Horace’s verses, see Tatum 1998: 693-699. That Caesar could be seen to appreciate Horace’s sophisticated wit and style, and could even enjoy jokes possibly at his own expense would, in my view, undoubtedly win for him positive press.
there are indications that the satirist persona may indeed be taking it to heart. Throughout much of the remainder of the second book we see ‘Horace’ making a hasty retreat from the active role of satirist which he has been warned off in Sat. 2.1: instead of holding forth on a variety of issues as he did in the first book, a ‘Socratic’ Horace now poses as interviewer to a succession of ideologists. Allowing others the limelight, in Book Two Horace retires to the roles of listener, interlocutor and ironist.\footnote{In Sat. 2.5 Horace’s speaker-character even disappears from the scene completely, as that satire comprises a dialogue between two somewhat altered epic personalities, Teiresias and Odysseus.}

**Addressivity readdressed: the author-audience inversions of Book Two**

Horace’s second book of *Satires* inverts and reverses many of the trends of the first book, although, as we shall see, it also expands on others.\footnote{For example, it has often been remarked that the apparently moral and social concerns of *Satires* Book One are reduced to dietary ones in Book Two, as the issue of food looms large in all the even-numbered satires of the second book. Food and the *cena* or dinner-party as a satirical context do feature in the first book, but these are substantially enlarged in the second.} Whereas the ‘diatribes’ of Book One had Horace assuming the guise of moralist, on the contrary in what may be termed the ‘moralising satires’ of the second book it is mostly speakers other than Horace himself who are granted this authoritative role. In Sat. 2.2, the first overtly moralising piece of Horace’s second book, the *sermo* is attributed by Horace to one Ofellus. In the ‘Stoic’ satires, 2.3 and 2.7 respectively, the would-be moralists and inept fanatics Damasippus and Davus address the satirist, whose ability (or inclination) to respond is limited to a few brief interjections. The speaker of the first book has become the addressee and sometime interlocutor of the second.

The moralising ‘diatribes’ of Horace’s first book of *Satires* exhibited a sophisticated dialogicality which included a complex orientation towards various addressees and audiences. In our examination of dialogism in the moralising first triad (Part 1) we concentrated chiefly on the concept of addressivity, the reciprocal relationship between ‘Horace’ and his audiences. The switch from the format that is formally ‘monologue’ in...
most of the satires of Book One, to one comprising mostly conventional ‘dialogue’ in the second book, means that questions of who is speaking, or to whom he is speaking, are in many cases more transparent in the latter. In Sat. 2.3 and 2.7 particularly, the formal dialogue structure differentiates the speaker of the individual ‘diatribe’ speeches from his addressee and recipient. In these satires the speakers are hailed by name, though not always enthusiastically, by Horace’s character; ‘Horace’, too, is sooner or later revealed, by suggestion rather than name, to be the addressee of the strident Stoic ‘diatribes’.\footnote{Damasippus, whose literary assault starts Sat. 2.3, is identified by name for the first time at line 16 in his victim’s initial retort. His interlocutor wishes a barber upon the now bearded Stoic convert and inquires how it is that Damasippus knows so much about him: \textit{di te, Damasippe, deaeque/verum ob consilium donent tonsore. sed unde/tam bene me nosti?} (16-18). Both the literary subject matter at the start of Sat. 2.3, where Damasippus’ addressee is ironically criticised for writing in the manner advocated by the Callimachean Horace of the first book (cf. e.g. Sat. 1.10.64-74, esp. 72-74), and the hints at 2.3’s end about the interlocutor’s profession, habits, and relationship to Maecenas (305-326), would seem to confirm that Damasippus’ audience and victim is ‘Horace’ himself. Similarly Davus in Sat. 2.7 is introduced by his generic servile name almost at once: \textit{Davusne?} - ‘Is that Davus?’, asks his addressee and master as early as line 2; \textit{ita, Davus...} - ‘Yes, it’s Davus...’, comes the prompt reply. Here likewise, hints concerning the addressee’s relationship with Maecenas (2.7.32ff) and mention of the Sabine farm in a threat at the poem’s end (118), suggest that Davus’ master is indeed ‘Horace’. Cf. Part 1, chapter 1, p. 52 above.} At the same time the complexity of the reversals affected in the second book means that other issues come into focus.

In the second book the relationship between author and audience seen in Horace’s first book is stood entirely on its head; in Book Two the author, or at least the fictional representative he presents in his work, has become the audience. The moralising speakers of Book Two are likewise topsy-turvy versions of the Horatian moralist in the first triad of the \textit{liber sermonum}. Indeed, almost every textual role discernible in Book One is switched in the second book of \textit{Satires}: inversions not only of author and audience, but even of moralist and target occur. Characters, for example, who might easily have been the targets of the ‘diatribes’ of the first book, such as the ex-businessman and Stoic neophyte Damasippus in Sat. 2.3, get to tell ‘Horace’ off for his own faults and failings.\footnote{For Damasippus’ business background and conversion to Stoicism, see Sat. 2.3.18ff; for his criticisms of Horace’s character, see 2.3.1-16a, 303ff.} And in that most thoroughgoing inversion of roles, the Saturnalian Sat. 2.7, Crispinus, a much despised target of Book One, even turns up as the ultimate authoritative source for the servile
satirist Davus.\(^{500}\) In this penultimate satire the slave, on his own admission a veteran eavesdropper,\(^{501}\) takes the floor and attempts to reverse many of the claims Horace has made in satires of both books prior to Sat. 2.7. In particular, Davus seeks to revise the appealing self-portrait Horace sketched in Book One. A prior unofficial audience of his master's voice, as his many echoes of foregoing poems attest, Davus finally gets to give the Horatian satirist a dose of his own medicine.

But while even an eavesdropping slave is permitted to turn satirist in the second book of Satires, by contrast some of the addressees of the first book are relegated to the sidelines, as the the new dialogue format has inevitably shifted the poems' dramatic centre. In the Stoic 'diatribes' of Book Two, Horace, as addressee, himself assumes the position formerly occupied by his patron Maecenas.\(^{502}\) Although Maecenas and his circle are not directly addressed in Book Two, it appears certain that Horace composed the sequel to the liber sermonum with what Bakhtin would term a 'sidelong glance'\(^{503}\) at his amici, in particular Maecenas.\(^{504}\) To keep him content, the patron receives a great deal of positive press in Satires Book Two, which is all the more subtly complimentary for not being vulgar direct flattery. By contrast, it seems that the actual audience - the modern readers - are reduced to eavesdroppers:\(^{505}\) no longer directly addressed either, we overhear the contretemps between Horace and the individual Stoics.

Horace's ever-present self-mockery in the first book of Satires is replaced by direct attack set in the mouths of others in Book Two. The humorous humiliations heaped on Horace's

\(^{500}\) Sat. 2.7.45.
\(^{501}\) See 1ff (iamdudum ausculto...)
\(^{502}\) Oliensis observes: '...Damastippus and Davus stand in the same relation to Horace as Horace stood to Maecenas in the diatribes of the first book... In the diatribes of both books, a speaker of inferior status addresses someone of superior status. In the second book, this narrational dyad is transposed downward on the social scale: Horace takes the seat formerly occupied by his patron Maecenas, passing the satiric megaphone to his social inferiors...' (1997: 96).
\(^{503}\) See e.g. Bakhtin 1984: 32.
\(^{504}\) Oliensis (id.: 102-103) notes: 'If Horace no longer addresses his patron directly, it is nonetheless clear that the satires of the second book are designed for Maecenas' overhearing'. For the introduction of Augustus, too, as amicus and interested 'overhearer' of Satires Book Two, see Sat. 2.1.83ff, cf. Tatum 1998: 293ff.
\(^{505}\) For audiences as 'eavesdroppers' of other Horatian texts, see Pedrick 1986: 194 (on Odes 3.9); cf. Sutherland 1995: 448 (on Odes 1.5).
own character’s unfortunate head seem more credible in the second book, given the fact that here the criticism is attributed to outsiders and others who have apparently had the chance to observe the incorrigible satirist’s comings and goings. In retaliation the Horace of Book Two also replaces the various anonymous interlocutors who in the previous book would regularly interrupt and attempt to contradict the main moralist speaker. Hilariously, in the second book more often than not Horace’s cries of protest fall on deliberately deaf ears, forcing him, in the end, to resort to threat and ultimatum. Interviewing and listening to a succession of other speakers, in sum the Horace of the second book takes the place not only of Maecenas, the dedicatee of Book One, and the exclusive group of friends who had there been Horace’s ideal audience, but he also replaces the internal audience, the indefinite adversaries and targets of Book One.

Remarking on the ‘strange world’ of the new book, William Anderson laments the fact that Horace ‘lets himself be ... off the stage by fools who proclaim their warped ideas on various subjects, while the poor satirist meekly listens to them...’ However we may interpret the other changes of Book Two, unquestionably the very inversion of speaker and addressee, author and audience, satirist and target, as well as the realignment of other textual roles, invites speculation as to the meaning of these roles in themselves, and as to the significance of their transposition in the second book. Ultimately, the second book seems set to provoke contemplation as to the nature of moralising and the moralist, satire and the satirist. It is able to do so chiefly by means of its relationship to its predecessor, Horace Satires Book One.

Horace through the looking-glass: the relationship between the satiric books

The inversions or reversals of roles between Horace’s two satiric books have caused scholars to liken the second book of Satires to a shattered mirror which reflects only fragmentarily and partially the images of the first book. But is the ‘Horace’ presented

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506 See Sat. 1.10.81-90a.
507 1982: 42.
in the second book of *Satires* to be viewed solely as a distortion of the apparently pristine image of the speaker-persona of Book One? What exactly is the relationship between the two books of *Satires*? To regard the second book only as a distortion of the first is to my mind to oversimplify a far more complex interrelationship between *Satires* One and Two. Dependent on the *liber sermonum* by virtue of its very interlibral inversions and reversals, Book Two shows itself to be a brilliant variation on its predecessor. The alignment of the author persona with the audiences in the second book is a rather clever move. To transpose the ideas of modern experimental theatre to ancient satire, it is as if 'Horace' joins the audience in their seats while still engaging in dialogue with other characters on stage. Having identified himself with the audience, Horace almost automatically evokes our sympathy. Instead of simply being sidelined, therefore, in the second book the authorial and actual audiences are in turn urged to align themselves with Horace: the ideal authorial audience of Horace's contemporaries is subtly entreated to witness Horace's battle with a succession of loquacious adversaries; the actual audience, rather than being reduced merely to an eavesdropping role, as surmised above, is flattered by being invited to join the authorial audience in following the satirist's exposure of the inept through irony rather than through direct attack, as before.509

While much changes in the new book, some of the trends of the *liber sermonum* continue. Horace's unquestionable ability to laugh at himself, even through the eyes of his detractors, can only endear him even further to the audiences. As noted, this self-satire which in the second book of *Satires* is amusingly placed in the mouths of Horace's adversaries and critics, is in itself nothing new. In the past four chapters we have examined in detail Horace's tongue-in-cheek presentation of his own character-speaker in the formally monologic moral speeches of Book One. It was precisely the internal multiple voices and polysemy of the moralising poems there that made this undercutting of the main speaker possible. In Book Two, to be sure, this self-satire becomes increasingly virulent as Horace permits ever more outrageous and insulting accusations to be lobbed at him by voices

509 Speaking of the second book and its 'Socratic' satirist in the role of audience, listening to the inept speakers, Anderson notes (1982: 42): '...it seems to me that I am expected to do precisely what Plato asks of his readers, to criticize the foolish speaker with my own rational faculties...'. 
attributed to others, particularly (and understandably) in the ‘Stoic’ moralising satires, 2.3 and 2.7. As we shall see, Damasippus and Davus certainly aim to give the moralising speaker of the first book, now voluntarily turned captive audience, tit for tat. At the same time, however, the gratifying ineptitude of the speakers themselves means that much of the criticism, while threatening to expose Horace’s faults and briefly entertaining the audience with the spectre of them, fails to do any lasting damage. Horace emerges from his indictment even more pathetically human and universally appealing than before. His escape, one suspects, has more to do with the foolishness of his attackers than his own innocence.

In the very irony of its twists and turns, its revolts and reversals, Horace’s second book of *Satires* seems to me to have been written with an eye fixed firmly on his first book. I cannot however agree with the recent verdict of Ellen Oliensis that ‘Horace’s second book is the product of second thoughts, an attempt to write over and thus blot out his earlier production...’. Rather than being an unequivocal negation of the *Satires* to date, Horace’s second book, in my view, continues and even intensifies some of the trends of the first book, while at the same time inverting and reversing others. Like a mirror image, Book Two reflects the shapes and colours of the first book, but reverses their direction. This is not a distorted image so much as a reversed one. Again, to use a verbal analogy rather than a visual one, the second book, composed as a sequel, is an answer to the first book, a fully weighted dialogic reply, which inverts and contradicts but does not shout down or attempt to obliterate, ‘blot out’, the first book’s utterance.

The dialogic relationship between Horace’s books is established through a lively orchestration of the reverberations of Book One in Book Two. As I noted in my Introduction, it is the moralising satires of both books that display an especially close interlibral relationship, and it is on this particular correspondence that Part 2 of the present thesis will focus. The moralising *Sat.* 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, the literary-moralising *Sat.* 1.4 and 1.10 of Horace’s

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510 1997: 102. She goes on to acknowledge that ‘yet in the process Horace inevitably retraces, and with a heavier hand, the original design.’ Cf. Oliensis (1998: 57), where she imagines that Horace ‘winced’ at ‘the occasional grossness of his self-defense’ on rereading *Satires* Book One.
first book, and Sat. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.7 in his second provide, I contend, an arena in which the two books can engage in a complex and sophisticated ‘dialogue’ with each other. As we shall see, the moralising satires of the second book are both an echo of and a retort to the moralising satires of Book One.

‘Other Voices’: Bakhtinian theory and the moralising satires of Book Two

Complex inversions of the ‘addressivity’ displayed in the moralising poems of Book One are not the only thought-provoking factors in Horace’s second book of Satires. Book Two, in addition to its experiments in author-audience reversals, is an exploration of what may be termed ‘Other Voices’. After all, it is the introduction of different voices in the second book of Satires, and the allocation of extensive space therein to speakers other than Horace, that occasions the rearrangement author-audience role-playing. Yet the alternate voices which appear in the second book of Satires make their presence felt in a very different manner to the multifarious voices of Book One. The following sections are directed at examining this difference and the problems that arise from the changes. Bakhtinian theory is explored as a means of understanding the new types of dialogicality that inhabit Horace’s second book.

Other Voices take over: the ‘monologizing’ tendency in Book Two

The second book of Satires witnesses a multiplication, a proliferation of other voices on a grand scale. For a start, the satires of the second book are for the most part presented in the form of dialogues.\footnote{The only exceptions to this are Sat. 2.2 and the feted Sat. 2.6. The second satire of Book Two, however, is arguably Horace’s first experiment in the extensive use of other voices, as his speech is emphatically not his own, but is attributed to Ofellus: nec meus hic sermo est, sed quae praecepit Ofellus/rusticus.... (2.2.2-3). This satire shares aspects both with Horace’s moralising speeches of the first book and with those of Book Two, as we shall see in the next chapter. Although, as I shall argue, ‘Horace’ is to be regarded as the relayer of the precepts concerning the simple diet, the ‘real’ Ofellus is heard at the end of the piece (116-136). The famous sixth satire, too, although also formally presented as a monologue, is similar to satires of the first book in its use of many internal dialogic features. A substantial portion, likewise, at the end of Sat. 2.6 is devoted to the charming tale of the Town Mouse and the Country Mouse (79-117) as told by Horace’s} Book Two is as much like a modern talk-show as a Socratic
session: Horace acts as host to an array of guest speakers, interviewing them on their ideological positions, but generally allowing them to speak for themselves. The personalities we meet in the second book vary, but most are more than ready to take the floor and to provide a disquisition on diverse subjects for the benefit of their audiences. In much of Book Two we therefore listen, along with Horace, to a succession of different main speakers: the ‘dialogues’ of Book Two are ironically no more than inverted monologues. In Sat. 2.2, 2.3, and 2.7 - the satires of the second book which I term ‘moralising’ in the sense that they indulge most overtly in ethical lecturing - the main speakers’ homilies occupy not only the core but the greater portion of the poem. In the case of the obese Sat. 2.3, the overgrown discourse of the ‘other’ voice appears to strain and stretch the girth of the satire itself, ironically rather like the puffed-up frog to which Damasippus unflatteringly compares Horace. 512

While Horace plays the long-suffering host in Book Two, it seems that some of his ill-mannered guests are reluctant to relinquish any speaking time at all. Paradoxically, the magnification of voices on the larger scale in the second book is at the expense of dialogism on the small scale. Like the first triad, many of the second book’s speeches do incorporate short ‘diatribe’-like interviews with imagined adversaries, and many are in addition replete with inserted apophthegms, anecdotes and fables. But on the whole, in spite of their outwardly dialogic appearance and frames, the moralising speakers of Book Two do not readily tolerate interruptions by interlocutors: on the surface the ‘diatribes’-in-dialogues of the second book, as louder voices, appear to shout down some of the variant voices, including Horace’s, which seek to contradict them. Domination by a single speaker within these satires could be viewed as the ironically ‘monologizing’ tendency of the formal dialogues of Book Two, 513 as against the dialogic tendency of the formally monologue moralising satires of Book One. Yet, at the same time, the moralising satires of the second book are arguably possessed of other varieties of dialogicality identified and exp-

512 Sat. 2.3.314-320, see Oliensis (1997: 95): ‘In a sense...it is Damasippus, not Horace, who is the over-inflated frog of this puffed-up poem.’
513 The theorist Tarde commented on this tendency of formal dialogue; see my Introduction, p. 29 n. 90.
plored by Bakhtin. In what follows, I shall suggest that the 'diatribes' of Horace's second book of *Satires* anticipate three closely related 'dialogic' categories variously promulgated by Bakhtin as phenomena of modern 'novelistic prose': heteroglossia, polyphony, and Carnival.

**Other Voices as Sources: heteroglossia and the moralising satires of Book Two**

The 'other' discourse that we hear in Book Two is itself derived discourse. Many of the chief speakers of Horace's second book, and not solely the utterers of the strictly ethical harangues, attribute their stories or teachings to still other sources. Catius, for example, in the pseudo-didactic *Sat.* 2.4 derives his culinary philosophy from an instructor he declines to name. The three moralising satires of the second book - *Sat.* 2.2, 2.3, and 2.7 - all contain exhortatory sermons which their preachers claim to have derived from elsewhere. At the beginning of 2.2, our speaker ('Horace') informs us that the coming speech is not his, but that of his former neighbour, the country philosopher Ofellus. In 2.3 Horace listens to Damasippus recount the Stoic lessons he claims were bequeathed to him by his saviour, the guru Stertinius. In 2.7 Davus admits to having received the ethical theory he hurls at Horace from a doorkeeper, who has in turn heard it from his master the Stoic Crispinus. In 2.2, therefore, the lecture is once-removed, as it were, from its origins; in 2.3 Horace, relaying Damasippus' version of Stertinius' lecture, passes on to us a sermon twice-removed from its source; in 2.7, Horace's recounting of Davus' already twice-relayed discourse means that the Stoic address is thrice-removed from its apparent originator, Crispinus.

Although the concept of a removed source appears, especially in 2.2, to add authority to the moral lecture, it inevitably raises doubts about the reliability of the process of transmission itself: if one transmits the discourse of an absent source, one is also in a position to alter accidentally or even consciously misrepresent the original. Clearly the process of retelling itself has great potential for a 'broken telephone' phenomenon: much of the original message may have been lost or altered *en route*. When the original discourse is thrice
-removed, the risk of misrepresentation, accidental or deliberate, is tripled. One may, for
example, substantially enhance one's own ideas by suggesting that they originate with a
hallowed source. The concept of addressivity is also significant, in that a speaker usually
adapts what he is saying so that it applies to his particular addressee. But there may equally
be the case where someone has faithfully absorbed the speech of his source, only to
repeat it parrot-fashion to a new audience without engaging with the source material in
any way or even attempting to adapt it to its new addressee.

Sources were as important an aspect of the Bakhtinian theory of dialogue as addressees.
Bakhtin often made the observation that human discourse is never pure nor original: all
our words and utterances are ultimately built on the words and utterances we have heard
from others. Bakhtin pointed to both the universality and the fallibility of this derived
'otherness' of our discourse: 'In all areas of life and ideological activity, our speech is
filled to overflowing with other people's words, which are transmitted with highly varied
degrees of accuracy and impartiality.'\textsuperscript{514} None of us is consequently truly an 'original'
speaker, for none of us is an 'original' human.\textsuperscript{515} Literary texts are likewise replete with
the echoes of earlier discourse, written or spoken. The genre which, in Bakhtin's view, is
most receptive and creative both in importing and in stylizing 'other voices' within the
text, is the modern novel.

The consciously depicted derivative nature of language and discourse in the modern novel
Bakhtin, as we have seen, termed heteroglossia, a concept which refers to the discourses

\textsuperscript{514} Bakhtin 1981: 337 ('Discourse in the Novel'). On the question of accuracy in transmission, Bakhtin
further cautions that 'the speech of another, once enclosed in a context, is - no matter how accurately trans-
mitt - always subject to certain semantic changes. The context embracing another's word is responsible
for its dialogizing background, whose influence can be very great. Given the appropriate methods for fram-
ing, one may bring about fundamental changes even in another's utterance accurately quoted...'. Quotation
and 'framing' is of great importance in the 'diatribe' style, where common opinion is quoted or framed in
such a way that it may be contradicted or 'disproven' by the moralist. These concepts will also be of signif-
icance in relation to the moralising satires of Book Two, wherein the speakers supposedly seek to transmit
the discourse of their various sources to their addressees, but must inevitably, to some degree, engage in
their own dialogue with these voices.

\textsuperscript{515} Bakhtin explains: 'Only the mythical Adam, who approached a virginal and as yet verbally unqualified
world with the first word, could really have escaped from start to finish this dialogic inter-orientation with
the alien word...Concrete historical human discourse does not have this privilege: it can deviate from such
inter-orientation only on a conditional basis and only to a certain degree...' (id.: 279).
of different social strata and even languages that contribute to the novel. Bakhtin, however, points out that social heteroglossia is linked ultimately to the novel’s broader ‘diversity of individual voices, artistically organized’. Thus heteroglossia in the dialogism of the modern novel may refer also to discourse that was originally another’s, but which is included in the present speaker’s discourse. The speaker interacts with the alien discourse that he has imported, engaging in dialogue with it, as it were, and inevitably placing on it his own stamp, adapted to his own addressees. Bakhtin thus observed: ‘As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing, as heteroglot opinion, language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the border between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes ‘one’s own’ only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention...’

Like the speaker of the first triad of Book One, some of the ‘diatribe’ speakers in the second book of *Satires* are fired with intentions not simply to pass on information to their addressees, but also to persuade their listeners of certain points of view, making use of their authority as moralisers, temporary or otherwise, to do so. Other speakers, however, may be using derived discourse simply to enhance themselves. In his essay ‘Discourse and the Novel’, Bakhtin distinguishes between two varieties of discourse with authority, one of which he terms ‘authoritative discourse’. This is a powerful but closed-off ‘prior discourse’, ‘located in a distanced zone’, which ‘demands our unconditional allegiance’, and which one must either entirely accept or reject. This clearly renders a

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516 *ibid.:* 262.
517 *ibid.:* 293.
518 *ibid.:* 342ff.
519 *ibid.* (emphasis Bakhtin’s).
520 *ibid.*
521 *ibid.:* 343.
522 *ibid.*: ‘It enters our verbal consciousness as a compact and indivisible mass; one must either totally affirm it, or totally reject it.’ Examples that Bakhtin appears to have been thinking of as ‘authoritative discourse’ are religious or legal injunctions which can be obeyed or disobeyed, but not really engaged in debate or dialogue. These are isolated, eternal types of discourse that demand either to be accepted wholly or rejected wholly.
dialogic response to this type of discourse, either as transmitter or as recipient, impossible: thus one cannot really ‘represent’ authoritative discourse, but only transmit it.523

The other type of discourse with authority Bakhtin terms ‘internally persuasive discourse’.524 This, as I understand it, is a discourse of authority that the transmitter himself has heard, has perhaps wrestled with, but has ultimately reclaimed and passed on as partly his own. Internally persuasive discourse is assimilated into and dialogized by the new speaker’s own discourse. Thus, as opposed to discourse that is externally authoritative and almost ideologically inviolate, internally persuasive discourse becomes ‘tightly interwoven with ‘one’s own word’,525 and ‘the internally persuasive word is half-ours and half-someone else’s’.526 In contrast to ‘authoritative discourse’, therefore, internally persuasive discourse is either contemporary or is reclaimable as contemporary,527 and is primarily audience-orientated, with a ‘special conception of listeners, readers, perceivers ...’528

Internally persuasive discourse is, then, a type of authoritative discourse which for the recipient and transmitter has credibility and relevance, and is worth passing on in one’s own words, if needs be, in a re-accented form.

Bakhtin’s ideas about different voices as sources were originally formulated with regard to the modern novel: are they strictly applicable to Roman satire? Although he identified heteroglossia chiefly with the novel, Bakhtin acknowledged that its roots went back further: ‘...long before the appearance of the novel we find a rich world of diverse forms

523 Id.: 344.
524 Id.: 342ff.
525 Id.: 345.
526 Ibid.
527 Id.: 346. This is clearly in contrast to ‘authoritative discourse’ which is said to be ‘located in a distanced zone’ (id.: 342f). As opposed to the inviolate nature of ‘authoritative discourse’ (for which it is probably useful to imagine an ancient canonized religious text, e.g. the Biblical ‘Ten Commandments’), dialogic and addressive ‘internally persuasive discourse’ would be immediate and relevant to its new addressees - what Mukarovsky would call an orientation toward the ‘here and now’ (cf. my Introduction, p. 30ff). Practically this would mean appealing to examples from daily life (as Horace himself usually does in Satires One) rather than to rarefied epic exempla (as Damasippus does in Sat. 2.3); cf. Bakhtin 1984: 108. For the Horatian moralist’s own rare (and humorous) use of a mythological reference, see Sat. 1.1.99-100 (the poor man’s Clytemnestra who finally puts the miser out of his misery): libert.. fortissima Tyndadirarum, p. 86 above.
528 Internally persuasive discourse always ‘presupposes a special conception of the listener, of his apperceptive background and the degree of his responsiveness...’ (Bakhtin 1981: 346).
that transmit, mimic and represent from various vantage points another’s word, another’s speech and language... '. 529 In antiquity, heteroglot forms were not necessarily novels. As we saw in our Introduction, Bakhtin traced the origins of novelistic heteroglossia back to a number of ‘low’ genres in antiquity, including ‘diatribe’ and Roman satire. In his essay ‘Discourse and the Novel’, Bakhtin even mentions Horace’s Satires by name, suggesting that they were an early harbinger of heteroglossia. 530 There Bakhtin noted approvingly that the ‘diatribe’ style comprised ‘a dramatized and parodic-ironic appropriation of other points of view...’. 531 and he likewise praised Horace’s Satires for their ‘parodic stylization of the accepted approaches, others’ points of view, the going opinions...’. 532

In Horace’s second book of Satires, the parodying of other points of view, based on the ‘diatribe’ mode, has been extended to embrace whole speeches by guest philosophers and moralisers. Moreover, the moralist speakers of Book Two have all, to various degrees, appropriated still other points of view. Yet some of these speakers have also made the authoritative speeches of their heteroglot sources their own, by dialogizing them, absorbing them, and adapting them to their new addressees. The moralising satires of Horace’s second book consist of multiple layers of voices and sources, of quotes within quotes, and speakers within speeches.

The second satire of the second book appears to be Horace’s first experiment as satirist with the question of sources. The speaker of Sat. 2.2 attributes his virulent moral lecture on the simple diet to Ofellus, but as the satire progresses, it becomes increasingly clear that he has taken a great deal of licence with his rustic source. The poem is, in effect, a struggle for the appropriation of moralising discourse: ‘Horace’ has remodelled ‘Ofellus’ in his own words. In Sat. 2.3, however, the disciple Damasippus has simply swallowed Stertinius’ doctrine hook, line and sinker, and now simply regurgitates the dogma, without consciously seeking to adapt it to his new addressee and intended convert, Horace. As

529 Id.: 50 (‘From the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse’).
530 Id.: 371 n. 38; cf. my Introduction, p. 44 above.
531 Bakhtin ibid.: n. 40.
532 Ibid.: n. 38.
I shall show, apart from its preface and aftermath, Damasippus' speech is indistinguishable from his master Stertinius'. At its end, therefore, Horace is compelled to inquire of the relayer how precisely the Stoic paradox relates to him, as this has not been made clear. In Sat. 2.7 Davus, by contrast, seems to have appropriated the discourse of his sources more fully. He has not only made the 'internally persuasive' Stoic lecture he has indirectly acquired of his own, but on the occasion of the levelling Saturnalia, the slave has sought to apply it unsparingly to his addressee and target, his master Horace. Davus, it seems, unabashedly appeals to what he imagines is the authority of his sources to back up what he clearly wishes to have Horace know anyway.

**Other Voices on Horace: polyphony and the moralising satires of Book Two**

In Satires Book Two, as noted, Horace has become not solely the addressee and recipient of moralising, but its target. The moralising Saturnalian speakers of the second book, who offer merciless and extensive criticism of 'Horace', brazenly unseating the satirist of the first book, are undoubtedly among the most problematic figures of Book Two. Damasippus in Sat. 2.3 and Davus in Sat. 2.7 gleefully put spokes in Horace's wheel: the former criticises both Horace's literary output and his morality, while the latter is of the opinion that the satirist fails entirely to practice what he preaches. The greatest reversal of the second book is the demolishing of the positive portrait of Horace, a little inept but always honest and straightforward, that the readers or audiences of Book One have built up: now we are asked to believe that Horace is not just occasionally a bit silly or too outspoken, but that he has deliberately deceived his listeners from the start.

Yet are the blatant assertions of these bitter Stoic converts to be regarded as 'true' or 'accurate' within the world of the Satires? Is Horace, for example, the 'diatribist' against greed and ambition in Book One, really going all out to emulate the high-born Maecenas, as Damasippus suggests he is? Does he live beyond his means? Are we to believe that he truly is the playboy consumed by passion for a thousand girls and as many boys? And what of Davus' numerous accusations and intimate observations? Is Horace really as
fickle and as foolish as the slave claims? Is the former satirist no better than a feeble yes­man, responding happily to an eleventh-hour invitation to dinner, and jumping obediently when Maecenas says to do so? Are we, in addition, to understand that Davus’ master, the once bitten, twice shy anti-adultery propagandist of Sat. 1.2, is still a would-be adulterer who sneaks off at night incognito to visit a married woman? Is our poet the irascible, greedy and snobbish hypocrite his accusers imply?

The criticism aimed at Horace’s character in the ‘Stoic’ pieces of the second book, Sat. 2.3 and 2.7, was the cause of much consternation among earlier scholars, many of whom, consequently, leapt to Horace’s defence and attempted to clear the poet’s ‘name’ by various means, often confusing the historical Quintus Horatius Flaccus with the authorial persona masquerading as him within the Satires. Scholars have sought to rescue Horace from the embarrassing ‘adultery charge’ in Sat. 2.7 by regarding the relevant part of that satire (46-71) as an excursus addressed not to Horace himself, but to an anonymous ‘diatribal’ adversary, who conveniently takes Horace’s place for that portion. Others have suggested the adulterer, who is said to doff the ring which identifies him as an eques before a night on the town (2.7.53f), cannot be Horace on the grounds of latter’s alleged lack of equestrian status. As we shall see later in our study of Sat. 2.7 itself, these arguments are most implausible. They are compromised by the fact that in order to affirm the Stoic paradox and subject of his lecture - that no-one but the sage is free - Davus twice in the lines in and surrounding the supposed excursus pointedly emphasises his addressee’s ironic position as his master.

Another manner in which scholars have sought to redeem Horace is to disqualify his attackers on the grounds of incompetence. Here they are immeasurably helped by the would-be Stoic philosophers themselves, as both Damasippus and Davus prove foolish in a number of ways. After deriding Horace for failing to write enough, Damasippus launches into a mammoth lecture devoted to the paradox that all people are mad, barring of course the

533 See Kiessling-Heinze 1921: 325.
534 For criticism of this standpoint, refer to the article of Taylor (1925: 161-170), which still remains valid.
535 Sat. 2.7.75, 81; cf. Higet 1973: 275.
Sage. Apparently intent on showing that everyone is mad in his peculiar way, Damasippus discusses four main varieties of insanity, illustrated by a flurry of seemingly endless examples. Although many scholars have found his moral principles in themselves defensible, the neophyte's obsessive and naïve new-found faith in Stoic dogma, quirky interpretations of mythology, and rambling reliance on *exempla* suggest that Damasippus is very much a misguided if not (conventionally) mad moralist. Moreover, Damasippus' outsize 'diatribe' can only be a stylistic nightmare for the self-confessed Callimachean Horace, who had in addition elsewhere claimed that he had been warned as a youngster, apparently by a fortune-teller, to steer clear of the verbose.  

Davus appears even more unhesitatingly erroneous than Damasippus, beginning his disquisition by suggesting, outrageously, that perseverance in the same vice is better than vacillating either between vices or between virtue and vice. The slave's newly and indirectly acquired Stoic theory is sometimes employed in an unorthodox if not inaccurate manner. At other times Davus' grasp of Stoicism is theoretically correct, but entirely inappropriately applied. Lapses of learning and logic on the part of these and other authorities in Horace's second book led William Anderson famously to dub Damasippus, Davus and others the *doctores inepti* or 'inept instructors' of *Satires* Book Two.  

To some extent the self-appointed Saturnalian satirists are indeed the *doctores inepti* that scholars have suggested they are. By contrast, Anderson pictures Horace the ironist listening to the speakers with a subtle Socratic smile and an occasional dry comment, as he permits them, nay, eggs them on to make utter fools of themselves. Damasippus and Davus are indeed laughable in their roles as would-be moralists. However, if a neophyte struggles to get his Stoicism straight, or is over-virulent in his newly adopted faith, does this necessarily mean that he is way off mark in all his observations about Horace? Although, as we shall see, over-zealous application of Stoic theory may explain away Davus' notorious adultery accusation, why is it that the domestic slave's impression of Horace rushing

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536 *Sat.* 1.9.29-34.  
537 See 1982: 46.  
538 *Id.*: 42-43.
off at the last minute to join Maecenas’ dinner-table remains one of the most convincing and enduring images of the Horatian satirist? Why do even certifiable Damasippus’ images of Horace’s ambitious striving to keep up with the magnificent Maecenas ring so true?

Nor is enigmatic impassivity Horace’s sole response to the lectures of the *doctores inepti*: although he responds to Catus’ cooking class with patronising irony at the close of *Sat.* 2.4, it takes considerably more on Horace’s part to get Damasippus and Davus to shut up. In both *Sat.* 2.3 and 2.7 Horace reacts with impatience, mockery and increasing irritation, and, at the end of 2.7, with rage. We are left with the lingering suspicion that the censure contains *some* elements of truth responsible for inciting Horace’s incensed reactions.539 How, then, are we to interpret what the ‘Stoic’ satirists have to say concerning Horace? Who, in other words, should we regard as ‘right’?

It appears that the moralising satires of Horace’s second book are populated by more than one set of views, more than one perspective, more than one ‘voice’, as it were, on ‘Horace’. Rather than finding one of these voices exclusively ‘right’, we should, in my opinion, attempt to balance these voices against each other, allowing if necessary for two or more ideological viewpoints to be simultaneously valid even if ambivalent. Truth, as we saw, is according to Bakhtin not to be discovered in any one viewpoint or voice, but is only to be achieved by at least two voices or viewpoints engaging in dialogue with one another.540

In the Introduction, we saw that Bakhtin developed the theory of polyphony to describe the interplay of multiple independent voices in the novels of Dostoevsky. According to Wayne C. Booth, Bakhtin’s invention of this dialogic theory in relation to the novel appraises primarly ‘the quality of the author’s imaginative gift - the ability or willingness to

539 Reckford (1997: 592-3) remarks on our reaction to Horace’s angry response to Davus’ portrait of him at the end of *Sat.* 2.7: ‘Nothing, we think, could be less like Horace... Yet Davus strikes a nerve... Perhaps it is true, or close to true: for Horace loses his temper, and calls for stones and arrows, and thereby brings the discussion - and with it, the satire - to a quick, farcical, and very arbitrary end’.

540 Bakhtin 1984: 110.
allow voices into the work that are not fundamentally under the ‘monological’ control of the novelist’s own ideology. \(541\) Deriving ultimately from a musical metaphor, \(542\) Bakhtinian polyphony refers to an effect whereby the discourse of characters in a novel is presented as equally serious, valid and significant as that of the author-figure. In terms of polyphony, ‘a character’s word about himself and his world is just as fully weighted as the author’s word usually is’. \(543\) Rather than acting merely as the mouthpiece for the author’s voice, the character’s discourse is allowed to sound uncensored within the work, ‘alongside the author’s word’, \(544\) as Bakhtin would have it. Within the work the characters’ independent and autonomous voices thus engage unhampered in ‘dialogue’ with one another and with the voice of the authorial ‘personality’.

Voices and viewpoints in Dostoevsky, according to Bakhtin, do not sound on their own, but are each assigned to a complete personality: ‘...Dostoevsky’s world is profoundly personal. He perceives every thought as the position of a personality...’. \(545\) Equally, ‘out of every contradiction within a single person Dostoevsky tries to create two persons, in order to dramatize the contradiction and develop it extensively...’. \(546\) Thus in his novels Dostoevsky may portray a character being confronted by his conscience, his alter ego, a caricature of himself, and so on. \(547\) Indeed for Dostoevsky, ‘two thoughts are already two people, for there are no thoughts belonging to no one and every thought represents an entire person...’. \(548\) Dostoevsky’s individual heroes are thus all men of the idea - ideologists\(549\) - whose ideas are brought out only through their dialogic interaction with other consciousnesses. \(550\) It is within the polyphonic novel, with its multiple voices and acc-

\(541\) Id.: xx, in Wayne Booth’s introduction to the 1984 English version of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics.
\(542\) Id.: 22.
\(543\) Id.: 7; cf. my Introduction, p. 38 above.
\(544\) Bakhtin: ibid.
\(545\) Id.: 9.
\(546\) Id.: 28.
\(547\) Ibid.
\(548\) Id.: 93.
\(549\) Id.: 78.
\(550\) Id.: 87-88.
ompanying 'plurality of consciousnesses',\(^{551}\) that the testing of ideas and the people who hold these ideas can take place.

Bakhtin had originally attributed the discovery of the polyphonic novel solely to his beloved Dostoevsky.\(^{552}\) However, in his 1963 rewriting of the Dostoevsky book, of which the 1984 English version is a translation, Bakhtin acknowledged that the novelist had been working within a tradition stretching back to earliest antiquity, and he added a chapter devoted to a discussion of the ancient sources of Dostoevskian novelistic polyphony.\(^{553}\)

As with his theory of heteroglossia, Bakhtin traced the origins of the polyphonic novel to the 'low', frequently 'folkloric', serio-comical genres of antiquity.\(^{554}\) These various genres, notes Bakhtin, shared \textit{inter alia} their down-to-earth, contemporary (rather than a distant, mythic epic) orientation,\(^{555}\) their use of everyday \textit{exempla} and appeals to common experience, their deliberate embrace of stylistic variation rather than monologic unity, and finally, their inclination to incorporate 'other' voices and discourse within them.\(^{556}\) Thus the 'represented word' appears alongside the 'representing word', and in some genres, these are combined into what Bakhtin terms a 'double-voiced word',\(^{557}\) whereby the discourse of the authorial personality resonates with the accents of another or of others. Bakhtin lauded above all Menippean satire as the prime exemplar of this group,\(^{558}\) and had much praise also for 'the Socratic notion of the dialogic nature of truth' he perceived in

\(^{551}\) \textit{Id.}: 6.
\(^{552}\) See again Bakhtin (\textit{id.}: 34): 'In our opinion Dostoevsky alone can be considered the creator of genuine polyphony'. But see also below.
\(^{553}\) Near the start of his chapter 'Characteristics of Genre and Plot Composition in Dostoevsky's Works', Bakhtin reneges on his previous position and notes concerning Dostoevskian novelistic polyphony: 'The only new thing was Dostoevsky's polyphonic use and interpretation of generic combinations. Its roots reach back into the most remote antiquity' (\textit{id.}: 105). For criticism of Bakhtin's change of tune in this regard, see Bezeczky 1994: 341.
\(^{555}\) The serio-comical genres are 'presented not in the absolute past of myth and legend but on the plane of the present day, in a zone of immediate and even crudely familiar contact with living contemporaries' (Bakhtin \textit{id.}: 108).
\(^{556}\) \textit{Ibid.}
\(^{557}\) \textit{Ibid.}
\(^{558}\) \textit{Id.}: 113ff.
the Platonic dialogue. Roman satire - Lucilius and Horace - and ‘diatribe’ were among those varieties recognised as kindred ‘genres’.

In our study of the first book of Satires we examined Horace’s adaptations of the so-called ‘diatribe’ style, with its ‘dramatized and parodic-ironic appropriation of other points of view’. As we have seen, the ‘diatribe’ style has often been defined according to its customary use of imaginary and indefinite interlocutory ‘voices’ which represent misguided public opinion, or the delusions of misers, adulterers and others that the main speaker seeks to contradict. The signature device of the imaginary interlocutor means that, in ‘diatribe’ mode, every viewpoint, every opinion, is represented as belonging to a person. In Horace’s first book of Satires, as we have seen, the ‘diatribe’ mode was used to dramatize the delusions entertained by the satirist’s enemies, moral or stylistic. The anonymous interlocutor provides a voice and a ‘personality’, however temporary, against which the satirist spars. Like Dostoevsky’s, the satirist’s world too is profoundly personalized, as he perceives every idea as emanating from the perspective of a personality.

In the second book of Satires the ‘personalization’ and dramatization of viewpoints takes place on merely a much larger scale: as noted my Introduction, it is as if the ‘if someone were to say...’ construction of ‘diatribe’, by which the imaginary interlocutor is often introduced, has been enlarged to such an extent that it now embodies whole, named personalities and the entire speeches of Horace’s critics in the second book. In some manner Damasippus and Davus are over-developed versions of the imaginary interlocutors of the moralising satires of Book One, come to life to voice their opinions at and about ‘Horace’. Both Damasippus and Davus, however imperfect, are ideologists, men of an idea, no matter how far-fetched. But Damasippus’ and Davus’ views are not contradicted, and as

559 id.: 110. Elsewhere in the same work (id.: 100 n. 1, cf. 81), Bakhtin seems to have felt the need to defend the Platonic dialogue from accusations of ‘philosophical monologism’: ‘The idealism of Plato is not purely monologic. It becomes monologic only in a Neo-Kantian interpretation. Nor is the Platonic dialogue of the pedagogical type, although there is a strong element of monologism in it...’. Bakhtin appears to have found the character of Socrates, rather than the Platonic dialogue per se, a paradigm of dialogic interaction. Cf. my Introduction, pp. 39-40 above.

560 id.: 113.

noted, Horace's own exasperated response seems, if anything, to add to their credibility. The fact that their 'other' viewpoints, their 'other' voices on Horace, are allowed to sound in the second book of *Satires* alongside the opinions and beliefs presented by the satirist himself, is, I would suggest, testimony to a type of polyphony, or use of multiple voices in Horace's *Satires*.

The unflattering caricatures, or perhaps rather the ruthlessly honest portraits of 'Horace' painted by Damasippus and Davus in Book Two offer us another candid look at Horace's character within the *Sermones*, no less valid than the flawed but rather more flattering impression Horace himself offers us in his first book of *Satires*. These alternate voices or views are allowed to coexist and to be mutually tested in the *Satires*: not one but both sides of the coin are made part of the mythology of 'Horace'. This polyphony which I have suggested for Horace's *Satires* is comparable, although not identical, to that detected by Bakhtin in the much later novels of Dostoevsky. But, as represented in an ancient genre which Bakhtin himself recognised as part of the dialogic tradition, this proto-polyphony - if we may call it that - of Horace's second book of *Satires* is arguably worth investigating further.

*Saturnalia as proto-Carnival*

Horace's *Satires* are not only proto-heteroglot and proto-polyphonic, but they are in addition part of an associated tradition which was also researched by Bakhtin - that of Carnival. In what follows I shall suggest that some of the moralising poems in *Satires* Book Two may be termed 'proto-Carnivalesque'. It cannot be accidental, for instance, that the major reversals of Book Two - of author and audience, speaker and addressee, satirist and target - are most clearly defined in *Sat. 2.3* and especially in *Sat. 2.7*. It is in these satires, too, that the criticism of 'Horace' at the hands of new self-appointed satirists becomes most contentious. Both satires are set at the time of the ancient Roman festival of the Saturnalia (17-23 December), in many ways the forerunner of the later European Carnival. This Roman festival pivoted, as did the later Carnival, on temporary reversals of
normal societal power and status. The Saturnalia, like its later counterparts, apparently aimed to provide marginalised (and in this case servile) members of society with a way of letting off steam. At Rome slaves were traditionally granted leave to dine at their masters' tables, and, like Davus in Sat. 2.7, to speak their minds freely to their masters, although perhaps not as freely as Davus does.

Carnival, the theme of Bakhtin’s thesis and book on Rabelais, is the subject (apart, perhaps, from ‘dialogue’) most commonly associated with him, and it has certainly been one taken up most enthusiastically in the West. Bakhtin not only acknowledged the similarity between the Roman Saturnalia and the later European Carnival, but even suggested that there was in effect no break in the tradition from antiquity to the Middle Ages. Although one could probably be rather more sceptical about positing a direct link between the ancient and Medieval versions, the Saturnalia and its representations in Roman literature could arguably be viewed as a type of proto-Carnival. Indeed, many of Bakhtin’s observations about the European Carnival, as lived and depicted during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, seem retrospectively valid for the Saturnalia.

Bakhtin defines the phenomenon of Carnival (‘in the sense of a sum total of all diverse festivities of the carnival type’, and apart from its literary transpositions) as a ‘syncretic pageantry of a ritualistic sort’ and he notes that the types of Carnival may vary greatly, ‘depending upon the epoch, the people, the individual festivity’. Carnival is something which is neither contemplated nor performed, but is lived: ‘...its participants live in it, they live by its laws as long as those laws are in effect.’ Participation in Carnival, Bakhtin maintains, is inclusive and potentially universal: ‘Carnival is a pageant without foot-

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563 Kleijwegt (id.: 309ff) attempts to delineate Saturnalian reality from the use of a Saturnalian context as a literary theme, suggesting that there existed a fairly wide gap between the two.
564 For a discussion of the Western reception of the Bakhtinian concepts of ‘dialogue’ and ‘carnival’ in comparison to recent Russian readings, see Shepherd in his Introduction to Bakhtin: Carnival and other Subjects (1993: xxiff).
565 Bakhtin 1984: 129.
566 Id.: 122.
567 Ibid.
568 Ibid.; emphasis Bakhtin’s.
lights and without a division into performers and spectators... everyone is an active participant, everyone communes in the carnival act'. Carnival involves the suspension of the laws, prohibitions and restrictions of ordinary life: all distance between people, including that of a socio-hierarchical nature, is done away with during Carnival, and in its place ‘free and familiar contact among people’ prevails. Bakhtin notes that this ‘familiarization’ of Carnival, this reduction of ‘distance’ between people and the minimization of socio-hierarchical distinctions effected by the world of Carnival often leads to strange juxtapositions, carnivalistic mésalliances: ‘Carnival brings together, unifies, weds, and combines the sacred with the profane, the lofty with the low, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the stupid’. In short, Carnival (and Saturnalia), with their suspensions and reversals of hierarchic order, represent ‘life turned inside out’ or ‘the reverse side of the world’ (monde à l’envers).

In accordance with Bakhtin’s very positive (and frequently criticised) faith in Carnival-esque potential, Carnival’s reversed or inverted world, as well as its reduction of hierarchic distance, provides its participants with an opportunity to explore a ‘new mode of interrelationship between individuals, counterposed to the all-powerful socio-hierarchical positions’ of non-Carnival life. Some critics have labelled Bakhtin’s belief in Carnival’s potential for social experimentation and change as overly optimistic. Carnival, like Saturnalia, they have argued, was aimed merely at keeping society’s underlings in their places by providing them with a temporary outlet for their frustrations. The view that Carnival might have offered real scope for societal renewal is consequently condemned as hopelessly naïve: that which masqueraded as potential regeneration was simply another variety

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571 1984: 123.
572 Id.: 122; cf. 1984 (b): 11.
574 Cunliffe (1993: 65) points out that in this regard Bakhtin effectively plays into the hands of his detractors by acknowledging that ‘Carnival’ tended to be employed more or less as a societal ‘safety-valve’: ‘As Bakhtin implicitly suggests, what better way is there for authority to divert resentment than a relatively controlled space which offers marginalised groups the illusion of living life in a more ‘real’, authentical fashion?"
of disguised repression. When the festivities are over, these critics have suggested, Carnival (and Saturnalia) always turns bitter.  

However, it seems that Bakhtin too was acutely aware of the limits of the reversals and inversions of Carnival, since he acknowledged, for example, the ambivalence inherent in the Carnivalistic ‘crowning and uncrowning’ phenomenon. Later European Carnival’s ‘king for a day’ rituals, according to Bakhtin ‘the very core of the carnival sense of the world’, paralleled similar Saturnalian ceremonies, whereby Roman slaves were appointed ‘king’ or ‘master for a day’, and, in an inversion of the usual pecking order, were temporarily permitted to rule the roost. Although the short-term changes of Carnival are to be seen as celebrating ‘the creative power of the shift-and-renewal, the joyful relativity of all structure and order, of all authority and all (hierarchical) position’, Bakhtin nevertheless cautions that within the act of ‘crowning’ itself, from the very start there exists already the idea of immanent uncrowning. The one who is crowned, in the Medieval Carnival, is ‘the antipode of a real king, a slave or a jester’, in the same way, at the Roman Saturnalia the one given freedom of speech is the opposite of the free man and master he is allowed to address. At the end of both Carnivalesque ceremonies the ‘king for a day’ and the slave will return to their original positions or worse. All the same, in Bakhtin’s view, ‘Carnival celebrates the shift itself, the very process of replaceability, and not the precise item that is replaced’.

Bakhtin draws a direct link between the transposition of Carnival into literature and its contribution to what he termed the ‘dialogic’ genres, the tributaries of the modern novel-

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577 Epictetus (Diss. 1.25.8) refers to the custom of choosing a ‘king’ by lot at the Saturnalia, and he goes on to describe how according to this game the temporary ‘king’ is made to give the orders as a type of ‘master of ceremonies’: ‘ἐν Σατορναλίοις λέγονται βασιλείς ἑδοξε γὰρ παίζει ταύτην τὴν παιδίαν. προστάσας τού πίε, τού κέρασον, τού φασον, τού ἀπελθε, τού ἐλθε.’ - ‘At the Saturnalia a king is chosen by lot; for it has been decided to play the following game. He issues orders: ‘You there - drink! you, sing! you, go away! you, come here!’” Cf. discussion of Bradley 1979: 115.
578 Bakhtin ibid.
579 Ibid.
580 Id.: 125.
istic stream. He views the themes, images and characteristics of Carnival as part and parcel of that 'dialogic' group of genres, among which, as we have seen, he included Roman satire.\textsuperscript{581} The 'familiarization' of Carnival, with its lessening of epic and tragic distance, is held largely responsible for the varieties of 'dialogism' identified by Bakhtin in the low, 'dialogic' line of generic development from antiquity onwards: 'These carnival categories, and above all the category of free familiarization of man and the world, were over thousands of years transposed into literature, particularly into the dialogic line of development in novelistic prose'.\textsuperscript{582} Carnivalization, Bakhtin claimed, determined 'that special familiarity of the author's position with regard to his characters (impossible in the higher genres)...',\textsuperscript{583} an attribute which Bakhtin elsewhere terms 'polyphony'. Indeed, 'Carnival' and 'polyphony' are perceived to be in close association with one another, as Bakhtin notes: 'Carnivalization is combined organically with all the other characteristics of the polyphonic novel...'.\textsuperscript{584} In addition, the ambivalent theme of crowning / uncrowning, which Bakhtin saw as an essential part of Carnival, was in itself extraordinarily influential on this type of literature: 'This ritual determined a special decrowning type of structure for artistic images and whole works...'.\textsuperscript{585}

Satiric Saturnalia: Horace's proto-'Carnival'

The second book of Horace's \textit{Satires} presents 'a world turned upside down', a proto-Carnivalesque \textit{monde à l'envers}, since, as we have seen, it is in many ways an inversion of the first book of \textit{Satires}. In particular, the 'diatribes' of Book Two produce striking inversions and reallocations of the literary roles discoverable in the first triad of Book One. The specifically Saturnalian settings of \textit{Sat.} 2.3 and 2.7 coincide, appropriately, with the especially clear textual role reversals of these satires - here, as we have observed, the former satirist and moralist of Book One becomes the addressee, audience and target of

\textsuperscript{581} Bakhtin earlier suggests that one of the defining characteristics of the serio-comical genres was their 'carnival sense of the world' (\textit{id.}: 107).

\textsuperscript{582} \textit{Id.}: 124.

\textsuperscript{583} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{584} \textit{Id.}: 159.

\textsuperscript{585} \textit{Id.}: 126. Bakhtin remarks (\textit{id.}: 125) that crowning/uncrowning was the Carnival ritual most often transposed into literature.
the moralising lectures placed in the mouths of Damasippus and Davus. In these satires Horace indeed allows his world to be turned upside down or inside out, as in either satire he is confronted, respectively, by the equivalent of a former potential target and an unofficial prior audience of his sermons, both of these having assumed moralising authority. Just as the actual Saturnalia, as a precursor of Carnival, involved the suspension of the laws, prohibitions and restrictions of ordinary life, so Horace's literary Saturnalia means the reversal of the normal laws and conventions of the genre of Satire.

In Sat. 2.3 and especially in Sat. 2.7, as others take over the role of moralist, the former satirist is given tit for tat. As satisfying as it is to see Horace's bluff called, especially with the introduction of 'other voices' which we hear accusing the ex-satirist of not practising what he has been preaching, the reversals of the literary Saturnalia ultimately result in further shifts. As remarked earlier, Horace's realignment as both internal audience and target of the satiric moralising seems almost automatically to endear him to the actual audience of the Saturnalian satires: curiously, the prior moralist's new role as underdog subtly nudges audiences into pitying and supporting him, into feeling that we are on Horace's side, as it were. We are all thus drawn into becoming active participants in the textual event, communing in the 'carnival act' of Horace's literary Saturnalia. As the divisions between performers and spectators are blurred, the 'footlights' of Saturnalia, too, disappear.

Although, as we have seen, Bakhtin's extremely positive approach to 'Carnival' led him to suggest that all forms of hierarchy and social control were done away with on the occasion of such a festivity, it is clear that Horace's presentation of Saturnalian contexts in his second book of Satires, especially in Sat. 2.7, takes more critical and realistic account of the social inequalities that ultimately remain in force despite (and because of) the temporary respite from them. Davus, as we shall see, initially tackles Horace cautiously and indirectly, because, even although it is the occasion of the free-speaking Saturnalia, he is fearful of his master's power. Throughout his speech Davus also constantly makes refer-

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586 *Id.*: 123.
ences to his fear of punishment, proving himself to be the standard Comic slave his name implies he is. At the end of the penultimate satire of the second book, Horace will indeed use his authority as master (and ultimately, of course, as author) to threaten Davus into silence. Consciousness of the ‘day after’, when the festival freedoms are removed and life is back to ‘normal’, is in fact very clearly present in Davus’ Saturnalian satire: despite its provocative if temporary explorations of literary reversals and social inversions, Horace’s Sat. 2.7 is, as Bernstein has suggested, already a ‘bitter Carnival’. 587

‘Crowning’ and ‘uncrowning’... and snatching it back

For his Saturnalian experiments in satire, moreover, Horace has adopted a ‘crowning’/‘uncrowning’ type of structure - which Bakhtin would eventually claim as Carnivalesque - both in the pivotal and penultimate Sat. 2.7 as well as on a broader scale. In Sat. 2.7 the slave Davus is allowed to usurp the role both of master and of satirist, and is thus empowered to give Horace a lecture on all his failings, dwelling extensively, as we shall see, on the many ways in which the prior moralist has not in fact practised what he has preached. Almost every theme explored and vice berated in the moralising satires of both of Horace’s satiric books prior to Sat. 2.7 is thrown back at him, with a clear and ironic accusation of hypocrisy. This will be examined in greater detail in my final chapter.

There is, in addition, a broader structure of ‘uncrowning’ - that of ‘Horace’ himself - in the two books of Satires taken together. As Bakhtin observed, the transposition of Carnival (or Saturnalia) into literature might engender ‘a special decrowning type of structure for artistic images and whole works’. It is my theory that Horace’s Satires was one of these works which employed what Bakhtin would eventually term a Carnivalesque (or Saturnalian) structure. In the moralising satires of Book One Horace sets himself up as moralist and satirist, albeit a very human and sometimes laughable one; in Book Two, by placing the satire now in the mouths of others, Horace allows himself to be ‘dethroned’ and ‘uncrowned’. However, when he can no longer tolerate this state of affairs, a vitriolic

and vituperative Horace seeks unceremoniously to snatch his ‘crown’ back, thereby simultaneously ‘uncrowning’ his temporarily exalted detractor, Davus.

Therefore the broader structure of both Horace’s satiric books taken together - and it is my understanding that they are meant to be taken together - reflects the structure of the significantly second last satire, 2.7. And at the same time, 2.7 in turn mirrors the structure of the *Satires* as a whole. This clearly important penultimate satire of both books ultimately answers - by echoes and retorts - to the statements of the other moralising poems of Horace’s *Satires* Books One and Two. Investigating these voices and their dialogue further will be the task of the remaining three chapters of this work.
CHAPTER SIX:

SOURCES, SPEAKERS AND ADDRESSEES: HORACE’S EXPERIMENT IN ‘DERIVED’ DISCOURSE IN SAT. 2.2

‘My God! Look at the company that I am keeping!’ thought I to myself. ‘Yet what a fool I must look to them all!... Do these blockheads really imagine that they are doing me an honour by giving me a place at their table? Cannot they understand that it is I who am doing them an honour?...’


The second satire of Horace’s second book is the first in a series consisting of the even-numbered pieces of the second collection, all of which are in some way concerned with food or dining. But, unlike the other food-oriented satires of the second book, Sat. 2.2 is also for the most part a moralising satire,588 stuffed with a reproving sermon on the ethics of eating. As a moralising satire, Sat. 2.2 may be seen as precursor to the subsequent Sat. 2.3 and the penultimate Sat. 2.7, both of which contain moral lectures, although 2.2 is in many ways distinct from these Saturnalian pieces.589

In form, the second satire of Book Two is reminiscent rather of the ‘diatribes’ of Horace’s first book. In Sat. 2.2, as in the first triad of Book One, we are presented with a moralising first person speaker, who in this case energetically lectures his audience on the virtues of the ‘simple diet’ and forcefully berates the sins of the gourmand. Yet there is a new development since, unlike in the ‘diatribes’ of Book One, the moralising discourse of the second satire is presented as consciously derivative, in that the lessons imparted therein are

588 I have elsewhere defined an Horatian ‘moralising satire’ as one in which the speaker holds forth specifically on ethical issues in a manner which ostensibly is intended to impugn and reform. See my Introduction, pp. 7-8 above. Of the other even-numbered satires of Book Two, 2.4 may seem to have the greatest claim to the title of ‘moralising satire’. While comparable to Sat. 2.2, Sat. 2.4 however contains more of a pseu- didactic rather than a strictly ethical lecture. There the speaker, Catius, hopes to inform his listener of the correct way to prepare certain dishes. But Catius confuses food and morality: his fault is that he treats recipes as if they were on a par with moral philosophy. The sermoniser in Sat. 2.2, however, is concerned precisely with the correct moral attitude to food, wherein he seeks to reform his audience. The speakers’ aims are thus diametrically opposed: Catius elevates food, whereas the moralist of Sat. 2.2 seeks to put food in its place, under the guidance of morality. One makes morality out of a meal, while the other makes a meal out of morality.

589 Rudd (1966: 160ff) terms Sat. 2.2 one of the ‘diatribes’ of *Satires* Book Two, and groups it loosely with Sat. 2.3 and 2.7.
said to emanate from another, supposedly more authoritative source. In this respect, rather than reflecting the first triad, the second satire of Book Two anticipates aspects of Sat. 2.3 and Sat. 2.7. Sat. 2.2 is thus intermediate between the formally monologic (but as we have seen, also significantly ‘dialogic’) moralising satires of the first book and the ‘dia-tribes’ within-dialogues of the second. Sat. 2.2, as I shall argue with recourse to Bakhtinian theory, is both an unsung pivotal piece within Horace’s second book of Satires, and is also central to the moralising axis that I am suggesting exists between both books of Sermones. It is therefore not so much my purpose to examine the subject matter treated in Sat. 2.2 as to investigate the relationship between speakers, sources and addressees in this often misunderstood piece.

A question of speakers

At the start of Sat. 2.2, almost at once, our speaker asserts that the sermo (‘talk’, ‘speech’, but simultaneously also ‘satire’) is not his own, but is derived from the precepts of one Ofellus, a rural eccentric and amateur philosopher who, we later discover, was known to ‘Horace’, apparently in early childhood.590 nec meus hic sermo est,591 sed quae praeeptit Ofellus/rusticus, abnormis sapiens cressaque Minerva - ‘This speech isn’t mine, but what the rustic Ofellus, an unconventional and homespun philosopher, taught’ (2.2.2-3).592 The above two lines interrupt the satire’s first sentence grammatically, and are thus placed in

590 Sat. 2.2.112f: puer hunc ego parvus Ofellum... Touted as a rustic, down-to-earth authority fit to echo the famous figure of Horace’s ‘father’ in Sat. 1.4, Ofellus is also paralleled by that other country neighbour in the second book of Satires, Cervius, who appears as speaker towards the end of Sat. 2.6, relating the fable of the Town Mouse and the Mouse (77ff).
591 This is an echo of Plato Symposium 177a, where Eryximachus begins his speech on love by disclaiming authorship and attributing what he has to say ‘in the manner of Euripides’ Melanippe’, as he says, to Phaedrus: Ἡ μὲν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστι κατά τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ Φαέθοντο τούτοις δὲ μέλλω λέγειν. This is derived from Euripides’ play Melanipphe the Wise fr. 488N, where Melanipphe explains that the account she is about to relate (about the origin of the world) is not her own, but comes from her mother (paralleled in Sat. 2.2 by the elder male ‘father’ figure of Ofellus?): καύκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ ἐμὴς μητρὸς πάρα... The Latinised version: nec meus hic sermo est, could be taken as a formula for Horace’s second book of Satires, with its constant stream of ‘other’ speakers and the complex layers of derived discourse in many of the poems.
592 The nuances of Ofellus’ homegrown coarsely-woven wisdom have been already extensively explored by other scholars, so I shall not attend to them here. For discussions of Ofellus’ description as abnormis sapiens cressaque Minerva, see e.g. Palmer 1883: ad loc., Lejay 1911: ad loc., Kiessling-Heinze 1921: ad loc. But cf. the more recent interpretation of Bond 1980: 117ff.
parenthesis by a number of editors and commentators,\textsuperscript{593} indicating for some an aside on the part of the speaker, for others an authorial interjection \textit{in propria persona}. For the statement at 2.2.2-3 is one of the things that have perplexed many readers of the satire, and there is no consensus among scholars as to who is to be understood as the chief speaker of \textit{Sat.} 2.2: is it 'Horace' or 'Ofellus' who is the moraliser here, or is it rather a combination of the two, such as, for example, Horace reporting, either \textit{verbatim} or in his own words, the old rustic's sermon? Or alternately, is the frugal, countrified authority on the simple diet (whose name, a play on \textit{ofella}, may fittingly be rendered 'Mr Morsel' or 'Mr Titbit')\textsuperscript{594} another of the satirist's masks? In short, does Ofellus represent Horace, or Horace Ofellus?

While Palmer\textsuperscript{595} and Lejay\textsuperscript{596} thought that Ofellus, as recollected by Horace, was to be regarded as the speaker of the \textit{sermo}, Kiessling-Heinze, on the other hand, reasoned that if Ofellus were indeed the main speaker of 2.2, the old farmer should have to be credited with an extensive knowledge of Hellenistic philosophy such as an Italian rustic was unlikely to have acquired: for the satire's lecture on diet is saturated with the \textit{topoi} of Hellenistic moralising. Indeed, apart from the final twenty lines which are unambiguously attributed to Ofellus, much of the satire is replete not only with philosophical allusions obviously beyond the farmer's ken, but also with references to contemporary Rome. Kiessling-Heinze therefore concluded that the speaker in the first 115 lines of the satire was to be understood as Horace himself, reporting in his own words the teachings of Ofellus.\textsuperscript{597}

\textsuperscript{593} E.g. Fritzsch 1875: \textit{ad loc.} (brackets used), Palmer 1883: \textit{ibid.} (dashes used), Lejay 1911: \textit{ibid.} (brackets), Wickham 1912: \textit{ad loc.} (brackets), Kiessling-Heinze 1921: \textit{ibid.} (brackets).

\textsuperscript{594} Although Ofellus is a real name of Oscan origin (cf. discussion of Muecke 1993: 116), its striking similarity to the word \textit{ofella}, the diminutive of \textit{apia}, can hardly be accidental in the context of this satire. To call Ofellus 'Mr Titbit' is appropriate, both in terms of the subject matter of \textit{Sat.} 2.2, the \textit{tenuis vicitus}, and because, as we discover at the end of the satir, the simple Living old farmer has been left with very little yet remains content with the titbits that are left to him. For \textit{ofella}, see TLL 9.2 col. 485.

\textsuperscript{595} Palmer (1883: 256) thought that Ofellus' discourse was to be understood as reported \textit{verbatim} by Horace, and wishes he had used inverted commas for the rustic's speech in his version of the text.

\textsuperscript{596} Lejay (1911: 312) argues that line 2 is to be taken literally. Thus Ofellus, as recorded by Horace, is to be understood as the speaker.

\textsuperscript{597} 'Aber da er im Hauptteil des \textit{sermo} nicht Ofellus sprechen läßt, sondern über seine Lehre berichtet, übernimmt er doch, anders als bei den Vorträgen des Damascus (I 3) und Davus (7), selbst die Verantwortung für den wesentlichen Inhalt; und indem er es im einzelnen dahin gestellt sein läßt, wieviel von dem Gesagten auf Rechnung des Ofellus, wieviel auf die seines Interpreten kommt, schafft er sich auch die Möglichkeit, Verhältnisse und Personen heranzuziehen, von denen der apulische Bauer nicht wohl Kenntnis hab-
If, on the contrary - as many scholars have insisted - Ofellus is regarded as the chief speaker of 2.2, the problem of the satire's learned allusions is hardly laid to rest by Lejay's supposition that the farmer may have had at his disposal a private library containing a few scrolls of Lucilius. This unnecessary conjecture juxtaposes Ofellus' 'countrified' characterisation with an improbably scholarly image. While Fiske concluded that a Lucilian filtering of earlier Greek moralising may underpin much of Sat. 2.2, he also pointed out that Ofellus could thus be no more than a 'mouthpiece for Horace's own philosophical ideas...'. Elsewhere, however, Fiske had allowed that Horace could equally be seen as playing the role of reporter of Ofellus' precepts in the tradition of ἀπομνημονεύματα.

Rudd declared Sat. 2.2 'less satisfying than the other satires in the book', due both to the uncertainty of Horace's relationship to Ofellus and to the equally unsolved and obviously connected question of the poem's setting. Rudd himself felt that the setting was Horace's contemporary Rome, and dismissed Ofellus as 'a rather feeble device' because the old rustic was 'too vague and shadowy a figure' to absorb all the opinions expressed in the piece and prevent them from being ascribed to Horace. Coffey likewise noted the preponderance of contemporary Roman references as well as the Greek commonplace in the lecture on the 'simple diet' which, he too suggested, would have been 'better suited to a Greek moralist' than an elderly Italian country dweller. In contrast to Rudd, however, Coffey hinted that the distance deliberately placed between Horace, his speaker and the discourse of Sat. 2.2 was, in the end, useful for the satire's purposes. Coffey surmised that Horace had to avoid attacking the new owner of the old countryman's

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598 Lejay 1911: 313. The gourmand Gallonius who appears at 2.2.47 is very likely an echo of Lucilius 1238ff Marx (= 203-5 W). 599 1920: 381-387. 600 Id.: 379. 601 Id.: 156. This uncertainty on Fiske's part appears to have led Bond (1980: 112) to attribute to him a 'middle position' in the debate about Ofellus' role in the satire. 602 1966: 171. 603 Ibid. 604 Id.: 172. 605 1976: 83.
former farm directly, being unable to do so either *in propria persona* or through the device of Ofellus; accordingly, the criticism of Umbremus at the satire's end would be rendered safely indirect and innocuous by the distancing devices of the poem as a whole.  

More recent students of *Sat. 2.2*, likewise, have sought to explain the anomalies of the satire as deliberate, and have tended also to be more conscious of a complex and possibly ambiguous relationship between Horace and Ofellus. Robin Bond, for example, regards Ofellus as the speaker of the satire's main portion as well as of its last lines, and argues that, as presented in the poem, Horace's attitude towards the rustic philosopher is ironic and not as favourable as was often thought in the past.  

Bond's Ofellus, as speaker of the satire, is far from perfect: the rustic is characterised as a conservative exponent of the *mores maiorum*, as unsophisticated, xenophobic, often banal, and as limited and inconsistent in his grasp of philosophy. Bond argues that within the satire itself Horace purposefully distances himself from Ofellus 'in order to ensure that he is not identified either with the person or the personality' of the old farmer. Yet towards the philosophical precepts themselves, Horace is seen as neutral, being 'neither totally in agreement with the views' he ascribes to Ofellus, 'nor [discounting] their value entirely'. Further, while Bond allows that Horace's learned allusions to Greek philosophy are placed in his banal speaker's uncomprehending mouth, at the same time he suggests that these references are carefully stage-managed by the poet to 'cut across or even undercut the prevailing message of Ofellus' stream of eloquence'.

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606 *Ibid.* Coffey is of course assuming that both Ofellus and Umbremus are real individuals, rather than merely inhabitants of Horace's satire. However, given the recent political past and rehabilitated present context of the historical Quintus Horatius Flaccus and his relationship with Maecenas and Octavian/Augustus, it would naturally seem wise for him not to criticise the political decisions of the new dispensation too virulently or indeed, directly. However, I shall argue later in this chapter that rather than side-stepping these potential problems, Horace takes the bull by the horns, as it were, and effects something very clever in *Sat. 2.2*.


608 *Id.: passim.*

609 *Id.: 116.*

610 *Ibid.* Bond argues that, in like manner, Horace neither condemns nor approves the Stoic ethical ideas which he places in the mouths of Damasippus and Davus in *Sat. 2.3* and *2.7* respectively.

611 *Id.: 117.*
By contrast, Alison Ruth Parker regards Horace himself both as the main speaker of *Sat. 2.2* and as a *doctor ineptus* who transmits, alters, but does not fully comprehend and therefore often misrepresents the teachings of his source, Ofellus. As translator of the old rustic's precepts to his sophisticated contemporary audience, 'Horace', Parker suggests, has unfortunately adopted a persona that is extreme, insensitive and inappropriate. Misinterpreting the 'real' Ofellus' teachings, 'Horace' has assumed the role of inept instructor ahead of its other exemplars who will make their appearance later in Book Two: 'Horace has made precisely the same mistake that we shall see in Damasippus and Davus. He has uncritically and overzealously embraced the ideas of another, and in so doing, mangled them. Horace is the real rustic of the poem...' ⁶¹²

**Horace and/or Ofellus**

While Bond and Parker reach diagonally opposed conclusions about the identity of the main speaker of *Sat. 2.2*, both display an acute awareness that the satire's layers of 'voices' and the characterisation of its speakers are far from superficial. One could argue, quite simply, that as author-figure in the *Satires*, 'Horace' is as much Ofellus' 'reporter' as Ofellus, as a character in the *Satires*, is Horace's 'mouthpiece': each represents and is represented by the other. In much of the lecture, however, their voices appear thoroughly merged and inseparable, the boundaries between them smudged.⁶¹³ Indeed, the very existence of the controversy over the speakers in *Sat. 2.2* indicates that the distinction between 'Horace' and 'Ofellus' is far from clear.

Nevertheless, the main speaker of *Sat. 2.2* has gone to great lengths to insist that 'Ofellus' is an independent source. Not only did he announce, at the start of the satire, that the lecture which was to follow was derived from the rustic philosopher, but he has also punctuated his subsequent talk with several further references to Ofellus by name, alluding to

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⁶¹² 1986: 115.
⁶¹³ Knoche (1971: 54-55) suggested that while Horace is to be imagined as reporting Ofellus' speech to a group of friends, the resultant speech comprises a mixture between the two voices, since Ofellus' opinions have become blurred with Horace's.
him always in the third person,\textsuperscript{614} and thus implying that ‘Ofellus’ is distinct from that of
the main speaker.\textsuperscript{615} Shortly before the speech at the satire’s end, the speaker once more
mentions Ofellus by name (112), anticipating the moment when the audience finally is
allowed to hear the old farmer’s direct speech, albeit in a relayed form. Here the main
speaker adds to the impression of authenticity by relating that the farmer has been known
to him since boyhood, and indicates Ofellus as the paradigm of the simple diet and sens-
ible living. Ofellus’ direct speech, it is implied, will add weight to the preceding argu-
ments (\textit{Quo magis his credas}, 112ff).

Scholars have pointed to the striking metrical and stylistic changes that occur in the last
twenty lines of the poem, fueling the argument for a change of speaker in this final part.
When old Ofellus is at last given the chance to be heard ‘in his own words’, as it were,
we are in for a big surprise: neither in style nor in content is he the man we have been led
to believe he is.\textsuperscript{616} Ironically, this last section, which, as Kiessling-Heinze argued, comp-
rises the only part of the poem which is unquestionably attributed to Ofellus, is metrically
and stylistically far ‘smoother’ than the foregoing material. For example, it has been ob-
served that while in the first part of the poem there are as many as 12 lines that fail to end
on the desirable two- or three-syllabled word (the norm for polished verse of that period),
in the last twenty lines there is only one line (127) that does not meet this requirement.\textsuperscript{617}

‘End-stopped’ lines, another indicator of refined poetic style, are also far more frequent in
the last twenty lines of \textit{Sat} 2.2 than in the preceding portions.\textsuperscript{618} In addition, the final line
of the satire is famously a so-called ‘Golden Line’ (abCAB), which is unprecedented in
the first 115 lines of the poem, and is moreover very rare in Horace’s satiric corpus as a

\textsuperscript{614} Besides the reference at 2.2.2 \textit{quae praecipit Ofellus}, there is also \textit{Ofellus iudice} - ‘in the opinion of
Ofellus’ (53), and \textit{Ofellum} (112), where Horace is speaking of having known the farmer as a young boy.
This last reference may be strategically placed to remind the listener of Ofellus shortly before we hear the
old man’s direct speech, quoted in the last 20 lines of the satire. Admittedly the name Ofellus occurs in the
final 20 lines as well (in what I understand as Ofellus’ quoted speech, 133), but here the context is clearly
one in which the actual name under which the farm is registered is specifically being discussed.

\textsuperscript{615} See Parker 1986: 114.

\textsuperscript{616} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{617} This was observed by Nilsson 1952: 184-185; cf. Flintoff 1973: 814-815.

\textsuperscript{618} Flintoff \textit{id.:} 815-816.
whole. The metrical differences between the final twenty lines and the foregoing portion of the poem, too numerous to be coincidental, contribute to the impression that Ofellus, presented in this way, is meant to be a character significantly different from the speaker of the satire's main part. The rustic turns out, metrically at least, to be more refined than the sapiens.

But in terms of content too, it has been suggested that Ofellus, as revealed at the satire's end, does not in any way subscribe to the strenuous and unattractive asceticism advocated by the speaker in the first 115 lines of Sat. 2.2. Parker has remarked that in spite of Ofellus' modest dining on workdays, and in contrast to the well-meaning but gauche ancient Romans mentioned earlier, who would offer a rancid boar to their guests, Ofellus could provide a sufficient if not elaborate feast when he wanted to do so. Moreover, as he 'looks back on those feasts with loving openness' and is set quite apart from the 'anal asceticism' of the main speaker, the kindly and moderate Ofellus himself ironically comes far closer to symbolising the 'mean' than the virulent 'diatribist' who has sought to represent him. Indeed, the 'real' Ofellus' nearest parallel is most likely the hospitable and sensible Country Mouse in Sat. 2.6.

But who, then, is the speaker of the satire's initial part? Either this speaker is an idiot who really thinks that storing a rancid boar in the pantry is a good idea, or else something entirely different is on the go in the main portion of Sat. 2.2: the speaker, it seems, is playing mercilessly with his audience, as we have seen 'Horace' is wont to do. At the start of Sat. 2.2, for example, the main speaker confesses, with typical Horatian irony, that the sermo

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619 Flintoff id.: 816. Flintoff notes that 'Golden' lines, while rare in Horace's Satires, are more characteristic of Virgil, particularly of the Eclogues. Cf. n. 620 below.
620 Flintoff (ibid.) suggests that Horace was consciously reproducing 'a pastiche of the techniques' that his friend Virgil had employed in his recently published Eclogues, as Ofellus the countryman is ironically made to speak in a manner reminiscent of Virgil's shepherds (cf. id.: 814). Whereas the speaker of the 'diatribe' which coincides with Sat. 2.2's main body impugns mollitia as a modus vivendi, paradoxically the old farmer who has the last laugh at the satire's end adopts a style which Horace himself had described as molle atque facetum (Sat. 1.10.44).
621 Sat. 2.2.89-92.
623 Ibid.
is not his own even as he himself is speaking it. This is perfectly in tune with the self-satiric pseudo-modesty of an authorial persona who, in the first book of Satires, had claimed not to be a poet even as he was writing poetry, or to have chosen satire because it was the only field in which his contemporaries had not excelled. We are thus encouraged to conclude that in the first 115 lines of Sat. 2.2 it is 'Horace' who has assumed the stance of a virulent moralist but has seen fit to attribute this to 'Ofellus'. Quite simply, then, 'old Ofellus' is Horace: he is an ill-fitting mask which Horace's speaker-character (already in itself a type of mask) has adopted - partially in the initial 115 lines of the satire, and more fully in its final 20 lines. In this final section of 2.2, I would imagine, Horace gives a performance of a revealingly different 'Ofellus': here he becomes the 'real Ofellus', as it were. Naturally however, both Ofelli are actually Horace.

By making a number of moral assertions in the initial 115 lines, but by regularly attributing all these ideas to the mysterious agrarian philosopher Ofellus, 'Horace' can be seen to achieve at least two things: first, he himself escapes responsibility for the moralising he spouts, some of which is fairly virulent; second, by alleging that his lecture on the simple diet derives from a suitably hoary rustic source, he also seems to win for it a certain cachet, combining authenticity with authority. Paradoxically, the naming and distancing devices not only reaffirm Ofellus' status as source, but also render more authoritative the teachings attributed to him as 'Other'. Moreover, Sat. 2.2 is the successor to Sat. 2.1, the introductory piece of the second book in which Trebatius was heard to warn Horace of the dangers of his chosen genre. It is therefore appropriate that an apparent awareness that his satire should be toned down informs the drama of Horace's subsequent satires: while in 2.2 the poet may merely pretend to disclaim authority for his monologue, in succeeding satires he goes even further, as we shall see, not only assigning the moralising lectures themselves to other speakers, but reducing his own status to that of addressee, interlocutor and in places, to that of target. This is the elaborate experiment of Satires Book 2, and Sat. 2.2's attribution of its moralising speech to another, outside source appears to be the satirist's first step in that direction.
'Derived discourse' in *Sat. 2.2*: Horace and heteroglossia?

In *Sat. 2.2* we are addressed, then, by a merged moralising voice consisting of two different voices, which are, in many places in the satire, rendered barely distinguishable, and yet in other places are revealed to be distinct. The irate rebuking of contemporary culinary fashions which punctuates *Sat. 2.2*’s dietary sermon,\(^{624}\) the sneering references to Roman topography for supposedly determining the value of a fish as a delicacy,\(^ {625}\) and the speaker’s disproportionate concern with the current condition of Rome’s architectural heritage,\(^ {626}\) all indicate that a contemporary urban voice is loudly heard within the piquant ‘dia-tribe’ which, Horace has assured us, belongs to an unschooled Italian peasant. From a Bakhtinian theoretical perspective, *Sat. 2.2* is ‘double-voiced’.

Many of the other speakers who appear later in *Satires* Book 2 claim to derive their discourse from elsewhere, from sources that are perceived to provide their renditions with an authoritative stamp. As we shall see in the following two chapters, there is a particularly conscious assertion of this in the moralising satires of Horace’s second book, *Sat. 2.3* and *Sat. 2.7*. *Sat. 2.2*, however, is unique in that, unlike in the later moralising satires, here we are provided with a chance to evaluate the success of the speaker’s relaying of his claimed source: in the final twenty lines of the poem we are permitted to hear a distinctly different Ofellus, the ‘real Ofellus’, as it were, and to compare this character with that presented by the satire’s main speaker, ‘Horace’, as the source of his moralising on the simple diet. We are invited, it seems, to unravel source from speaker.

In previous discussions we have seen that Bakhtin developed an extensive theory to account for the representation in discourse of other voices and alien sources, so as to study the particularly conscious emphasis on these within the tradition of what he termed ‘nove-  

\(^{624}\) See e.g. *Sat. 2.2.23ff*, 46b-52.  
\(^{625}\) See 31-33.  
\(^{626}\) See 103-104.
oglossia not only as a diversity of social languages or ‘speech types’, which are incorporated into and reflected in novelistic discourse, but also as a ‘diversity of individual voices’ which may be represented in this generic stream.\textsuperscript{627} All languages of heteroglossia are, according to Bakhtin, ‘specific points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views...’.\textsuperscript{628} Heteroglossia enters the novel either as the impersonal stylization of a social language, or ‘as the fully embodied image of a posited author, of narrators, or, finally, as characters...’\textsuperscript{629} In the case of the latter possibility, Bakhtin notes that these characters, the speaking persons in the novel, are all ideologues - representatives of an idea - and that within the work the speaking characters are charged with presenting their varying ideas or views on the world.\textsuperscript{630} Yet, as we have seen, none of these heteroglot ‘languages’ or ‘voices’ is, or indeed, is able to be original: all human discourse is ultimately derivative and some is consciously so.

Not only is much of human discourse derivative - that is, constructed out of the words of others, or transmitting the discourse of others - but at the same time it often appears consciously self-reflective, being concerned precisely with human discourse itself (‘what people say...’): ‘The transmission and assessment of the speech of others, the discourse of another, is one of the most widespread and fundamental topics of human speech. In all areas of life and ideological activity, our speech is full to over-flowing with other people’s words, which are transmitted with highly varied degrees of accuracy and impartiality’.\textsuperscript{631} This concern with the transmission and assessment of the words of others, as prevalent as it is in daily life, translates naturally to that generic group, closely associated with the everyday world, which would eventually become what Bakhtin would term ‘novelistic discourse’. Novelistic discourse attempts not only to transmit but also to represent and ultimately, to assess speech belonging to another.\textsuperscript{632}

\textsuperscript{627} Bakhtin 1981: 262-264 (‘Discourse in the Novel!’).
\textsuperscript{628} Id.: 291-292.
\textsuperscript{629} Id.: 331-332.
\textsuperscript{630} Id.: 333. Thus the novel may be defined as ‘a dialogized representation of an ideologically freighted discourse...’ (ibid.).
\textsuperscript{631} Id.: 337.
\textsuperscript{632} Id.: 338-340.
We have seen that Bakhtin himself identified the so-called 'diatribe' style, the mode and mainstay of moralising in Horace's first book of Satires, as an early prototype of what he termed novelistic discourse. The 'diatribe' mode, as we have defined it, is indeed concerned primarily with the topic of human discourse itself ('what people say...'). This rhetorical mode operates, as we have seen, by means of the signature device of the imaginary interlocutor, according to which erroneous ideas or common opinion are attributed to a person (often only identified as 'someone...' or 'people') and are quoted, dialogically engaged with, debunked and refuted by the main speaker. 'Diatribe' thus transmits, represents and assesses words and opinions attributed to others. As a commonplace rhetorical mode, 'diatribe', we have observed, might also include prosopopoeia, the introduction of a personified abstract concept into the text to present arguments in support of the main speaker's brief. In either event, the so-called 'diatribe' mode is principally concerned with personalised points of view on the world, expressed by fictional ideologues of the simplest type. It is appropriate, then, that Bakhtin recognised this mode as an early vehicle for the prototype of his later novelistic heteroglossia.

As we have seen, Horatian satire, too, was identified by Bakhtin as one of the possible forebears of the later novelistic discourse. In the moralising poems of his liber sermonum, as we have observed, Horace began to modify and adapt the commonplace 'diatribe' rhetorical mode to create the immediate impression of a conversation between himself as speaker-satirist and other fictional characters, addressees and audiences. The imaginary interlocutors used in the 'diatribe' mode of the moralising satires of Horace's first book are replaced in Book Two, however, by more fully developed speaker-characters or 'ideologues' who now address Horace. The Saturnalian speakers Damasippus and Davus, in Sat. 2.3 and 2.7 respectively, can be likened to larger-than-life versions of 'diatribal' fictional adversaries, who in the second book have grown perilously out of all proportion and are ambitiously threatening to unseat the satirist himself.

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633 See pp. 97ff above.
Horace’s attribution of his discourse to Ofellus in Sat. 2.2, on the other hand, particularly the appearance of the ‘real Ofellus’ at the satire’s end, is supposed to function much like a prosopopoeia: while Damasippus’ and Davus’ accusations are to be denied, as we shall see, the input of old Ofellus is meant to be akin to that of hoary Poverty or Nature in the ‘diatribal’ tradition. The representation of Ofellus’ ‘transmitted’ speech, both alluded to throughout the main body of the satire, as well as directly quoted (apparently) towards the satire’s end, is evidently intended to lend an air of authority and authenticity to Horace’s talk. With its attribution of much of its moralising speech to another, removed authoritative source, Horace’s Sat. 2.2, then, is aimed at exploring not only the transmission but also the representation, and finally, the assessment of derived discourse. But while Horace assures us that he is faithfully transmitting and representing discourse belonging to Ofellus himself, the task of assessing this is ultimately the audience’s. Indications - clues - have been left here and there in the satire to help us reach a conclusion.

Other aspects highlighted by Bakhtinian theory may assist us further. We have noted above that Bakhtin expressed doubts that derived discourse is necessarily a true echo of its source, observing instead that it tends to be transmitted ‘with highly varied degrees of accuracy and impartiality’. If one transmits or represents the discourse of an absent source, one is inevitably in a position to alter by accident or even deliberately misrepresent the original. Alternately, an independent message that the new speaker wishes to get across may be substantially enhanced by being associated with or attributed to a seemingly venerable source. A third possibility is that the source may be accurately quoted, but may at the same time have been absorbed and reanimated by the new speaker’s intentions (‘internally persuasive discourse’), and by being aimed at the new addressee or audience, its meaning may have been substantially altered (the concept of ‘addressivity’). We shall dis-

634 For Poverty personified, see e.g. Teles Περί Ἀνταρκτικῆς pp. 6-7 (Hense); for Nature personified, see Lucretius DRN 3.931ff. Cf. pp. 97ff above.
635 As noted above, the introduction of Ofellus’ direct speech towards the end of 2.2, Horace tells us, is so as to make the arguments he himself has already been advancing more credible: Quo magis his credas... (112).
636 See chapter 5, the introductory chapter to Part 2, p. 184f above.
cover shortly whether any or all of these possibilities may apply to Horace's supposed re-
laying of Ofellus' teachings in Sat. 2.2.

In Sat. 2.2 the main speaker demonstrates interesting relationships both with his alleged
sources and with his own unnamed addressees. In this regard, the second satire anticipates
the representations of moralising speech, allegedly derived from other sources, placed in
the mouths of Horace's interlocutors in Sat. 2.3 and 2.7. As proto-novelistic discourse,
Sat. 2.2 may be seen as an experiment in the transmission, representation and assessment
of authority, as well as a study of the relationship between moralising sources, those who
transmit or transmute what emanates from these sources, and those who are their new re-
cipients. Bakhtinian theories of both heteroglossia and addressivity, loosely applied, could
help us to appreciate Sat. 2.2 better, as an analysis of the relations between the speaker,
his supposed source and his new addressees may permit us to grasp something of what
Horace may be up to in this generally underestimated satire.

Horace and his 'source'

Repeated references to Ofellus during the moralising lecture on the simple diet are evid-
ently meant to suggest not only that the old farmer is the source of this dietary harangue,
but also that 'Horace' is assiduously viewing the contemporary urban environment of the
wealthy from the perspective and ethical standards of a different setting entirely, appar-
ently that of his rural boyhood. Rather like the imagined resurrection in the Pro Caelio of
the ancient moral paradigm Appius Claudius, summoned from the grave by Cicero's rhet-
oric to lecture his recalcitrant descendant,\(^{637}\) so the sermon in the main body of Sat. 2.2
comprises what 'Horace' seems to reckon Ofellus would say if he were there to witness
the decadent diet of the contemporary Roman elite. But while Horace diligently keeps
suggesting that the old farmer-figure is the inspiration for and source of his virulent
lecture on the tenuis victus, the revelation of the 'real', distinct Ofellus at the satire's end
indicates that, prior to this, the claimed guru has been at worst merely an endorsement of

\(^{637}\) Cicero Pro M. Caelio Oratio 33-34.
the speaker's tirade, at best no more than a mask, and a badly-fitted one at that. From behind the obvious mask of 'Ofellus' there peeks out another thinly-disguised persona, that of 'Horace', the author-persona in the world of the *Satires*. 

But why is it so very patent that 'Ofellus' is, precisely, an ill-fitting mask, a 'vague and shadowy' figure, or merely a name to be dropped intermittently to suggest, incredibly, that the tirade on urban contemporary gluttony emanates from a respectable rustic source? In my view, the answer to this is paradoxically to be discovered in Horace's relationships with those whom he is addressing in *Sat. 2.2*. The main speaker's relationships with his addressees and audiences are as complex as that which he shares with his reputed source, although this aspect of the satire's 'conversation' has never been given as much attention as the latter. However, the Bakhtinian emphasis on 'addressivity' - the view that the addressees of the speaker's discourse are an integral part of his utterance from its inception, and are central to an understanding of that utterance - prompts us to pay attention to this side of the 'conversation'. Whom, after all, are we to understand Horace is addressing in *Sat. 2.2*, and how does this reflect on Horace's relationship with his (ac)claimed source? At whom does 'Horace' peek out from behind the makeshift mask, and what is he really up to in this satire?

**Horace and his audiences**

In the first line of *Sat. 2.2* Horace already indicates his group of primary addressees by means of the plural vocative *boni* (usually rendered 'gentlemen' or 'sirs' by translators). Commentators have noted that *boni* is a direct translation of the Greek ὀγαθοὶ, sometimes found in the context of philosophical addresses. The nuances of this form of address at once characterise Horace's listeners as an elite, wealthy and educated audience, presum-

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638 Bond (1980: 114ff) argues that *boni*, as the direct Latin translation of the Greek ὀγαθοὶ, underlines the creative tension between Greek and Roman influences in the poem. Moreover, this form of address, in either the singular or the plural, was often employed where the speaker intended to persuade his listeners of a particular argument (e.g. Aristophanes *Knights* 843, Plato *Protagoras* 311a). Bond also points out that ὀγαθοὶ shares the conservative and elite connotations of the associated phrase καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ, which usually described 'men who enjoyed to the full the benefits and the responsibilities which derived from the possession of inherited wealth, based on the possession of land...' (id.: 115).
ably one familiar with philosophical discourse. As the Greek singular form ἀγαθός is far more common than the plural, however, it may be that by using the Latin version of the more unusual plural Horace is deliberately stressing the fact that his addressees are many. The plurality of Horace’s audience is underlined by his use of the plural imperative discite at the beginning of the fourth line, and further by impransi... disquirite in the seventh. Therefore the impression that Horace is addressing a group of listeners rather than an individual is indelibly fixed in our minds, despite the fact that there is shortly to be a switch to the conventional, unnamed second person singular addressee so common to the ‘diatribal’ tradition (Sat. 2.2.13ff). It is plausible that the evidently educated and clearly contemporary group of listeners addressed at the satire’s start are to be identified with Horace’s elite, literary-oriented friends in the circle of Maecenas, such as were listed towards the end of the first book of Satires (the ‘authorial audience’).

That the ‘authorial audience’ of Sat. 2.2 is in for a difficult time, however, is already signalled by Horace’s request within the first few lines of the satire that his exclusive addressees listen to his lecture ‘unlunched’ (impransi, 2.2.7). The idea of listening to a learned disquisition on an empty stomach and not in front of a tempting, dazzling dinner-table, which Horace warns against, may admit of an excellent cultural or philosophical pedigree. What cannot be ignored, however, even if it is not immediately apparent so soon

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639 In the following satire Damasippus prefaces his version of Stertinius’ Stoic ‘diatribe’, which he relays to Horace, with the Latin singular vocative form bone (Sat. 2.3.31).
640 The use of disquirite (‘join in an investigation’) is curious, being found only here in classical Latin; the noun disquisitio does occur, however, but chiefly in legal contexts. Scholars have suggested that disquirite here is a Latin substitute for διαζητείτε (cf. Plato Rep. 2836), but even in Greek the noun form ζητοί is more common than the verb (Kiessling-Heinze 1921: ad loc.; Muecke 1993: ad loc.). Kiessling-Heinze suggest that disquirite is intended to echo discite three lines earlier. In my opinion the high incidence of abnormal words in the first few lines of Sat. 2.2 (abnormis/ab normis itself in line 3 has been another scholarly bone of contention in the past) is meant to suggest that something serious and philosophical is about to follow. But this intimation of a serious enquiry of a philosophical nature belies the virulent sermon (a modern ‘diatribe’) which follows instead. Later in the second book of Satires Horace claims that sophisticated philosophical dialogues were customary at dinners on his country estate, cf. Sat. 2.6.70b-76.
641 For Horace’s list of docti amici whom he would choose as his audience, see Sat. 1.10.81-90.
642 The morning (before lunch) was considered the appropriate time for scholars to concentrate on taking in their lessons (cf. Muecke 1993: ad loc.). Being faced with food, Horace suggests, would cloud the judgment of his ‘pupils’. Coulter (1967: 40), moreover, suggests that the concept of the ‘corrupt judge’ at lines 8-9 is possibly a reference to Aristotle EN 1109b8-9, where it is cautioned that no-one is a neutral or unbiased judge of pleasure.
into the satire, is that Horace’s lecture is to dwell extensively on the very subject of food and its consumption. In true discursive style, Horace soon deviates from the idea of the *tenuis victus* in the strictly positive sense, and instead departs on a tangent concerning the sins of gluttony and conspicuous consumption. What is more, this tirade against the gluttonous, fussy eater is laden with detailed, mouth-watering descriptions of luxurious meals and costly delicacies. Are we to imagine that in *Sat. 2.2*, as Parker has suggested, Horace’s poor authorial audience is compelled to listen with grumbling stomachs to a lecture that not merely denounces but also describes at length irresistible edible indulgences?643

Sustained harangue of the second person singular addressee, which begins at line 13 (*seu te discus agit...*), continues at length through the satire. While this is a convention of ‘diatribe’, as we have noted, the constant use of the second person singularironically renders the effects of the moralist’s barrage of accusations all the more direct and personal: any and every member of Horace’s audience(s) is at times encouraged in the impression that he himself is the unfortunate ‘you’ endlessly berated here. Moreover, the culinary foibles and gluttonous fads which Horace attacks in *Sat. 2.2* all specifically belong to a manifestly contemporary Roman setting. Thus the tirade which is conveniently but rather implausibly attributed to the old rustic moralist Ofellus may even seem to serve as an indictment of Horace’s contemporary urban audience of friends, who certainly are Romans rich enough to indulge, or at least are sufficiently well-connected to be indulged in this manner.644 The joke is that Horace hides rather obviously behind the flimsy mask of ‘old Ofellus’ in order to attack his audience of wealthy contemporaries. The tactlessness which in *Sat. 1.1* could be read into Horace’s ‘diatribe’ on the contrasting sin of miserliness - there awkwa-

643 See Parker 1986: 112. Unlike Parker, however, it is not my view that Horace in so doing is characterising his own persona as a *doctor ineptus*. Rather, the suggestion that his audience listen on empty stomachs to a lecture all about food seems to me to be part of the elaborate teasing that takes place between ‘Horace’ and his authorial audience in *Sat. 2.2* (cf. n. 644 below for the likelihood that the opposite was in fact the case). Horace’s teasing of his audience is counterpoised to the equally merciless self-satire that is evident in this satire, as in most.

644 Reckford remarks (1999: 531 n. 26) that the convention of after-dinner recitations among the literary elite in Rome may well have meant that Horace’s audience of friends at this poem’s first performance received it not *impransi* but when they were already ‘comfortably wined and dined’. However, it would be nearly ironic if we were indeed meant to imagine Horace’s satiric persona (rather than the historical Horace) depriving his poor ‘addressees’ of sustenance, while the reality was the exact opposite of this scenario.
rdly addressed to his wealthy patron Maecenas - appears to have returned with a vengeance in Sat. 2.2. This new attack seems as foolhardy as that of the first satire: an attack on the decadence of those with sesterces to scatter can hardly be the way to win the favour of the elite authorial audience.

But as in Sat. 1.1, so in Sat. 2.2 the indefinite second person singular addressee ('you') may at the same time be viewed simply as the imaginary adversary or 'internal audience' that we have seen employed so frequently in Horace's adaptations of the 'diatribe' mode. Thus, throughout the virulent tirade against gluttony and dietary fads, the internal audience could be regarded as being again made to bear the brunt of the moralising attack. As in the other Horatian 'diatribes', therefore, so in Sat. 2.2 the beleaguered internal audience provides relief for the authorial audience, who might otherwise have been the moralist's direct butt. According to the conventions of 'diatribe', the internal audience is summoned to shield the authorial audience from the moralist's ire, just as in this satire the obvious mask of 'Ofellus' protects the underlying authorial persona, 'Horace', from direct responsibility for this ire.

The impression of a direct attack on the authorial audience is tempered, in addition, by the many deliberate 'errors' evidently committed by 'Horace': these reveal a speaker who is fallible and thus, ironically, all the more tolerable. The extremism and heightened rhetoric of his speech itself is at times over-the-top and consequently amusing. But what of the context, the question of the poem's setting? Alison Parker has suggested that Horace's addressees at the beginning of Sat. 2.2 (whom, as we have seen, he calls boni) are to be understood as guests that he is supposed to be entertaining on his Sabine farm. It is

645 Cf. pp. 78ff above.
646 This, despite (or because of?) the fact that far less backchat from the internal audience is allowed in Sat. 2.2 than in the other 'diatribe' satires that we have examined to date. Throughout the tirade against the glutton, the sense of a conversation is kept going chiefly by the main speaker's numerous questions that imply responses or opinions held by the adversary. A fictive adversary responds only at 39-40 (here the glutton's gullet rather than the glutton himself expresses its opinion) and at 99-101, which spurs the main speaker on to a succession of highly dramatic questions in true 'diatribical' rhetorical style (102-111). This reduction of textually-based dialogic elements I term the paradoxically 'monologizing' tendency of the 'diatribes'-in-dialogues of Horace's second book of Satires.
647 1986: 111.
equally possible, if somewhat less satisfactory, given the ‘country’ feel contributed to Sat. 2.2 by the figure of Ofellus, to imagine Horace entertaining guests at his house in Rome. As I have argued, there is reason to believe that these guests are not just anyone, but are Horace’s elite and exclusive group of friends in the coterie of Maecenas. Might Horace on the other hand not also be understood as a guest at a party hosted perhaps by his patron? In that event it is ironic that, like the viciously negative satirist of Sat. 1.4 who would spatter both guests and later, when inebriated, even the host with his abuse, Horace appears to have hijacked a social occasion and to be subjecting all and sundry to his inauspicious jeremiad. As either kind of hospes, ‘Horace’ is presented as compromising severely the sacrosanct guest-host relationship.

That the context of Horace’s tirade on gluttony may indeed be a dinner-party or luncheon, perhaps one hosted by himself, is supported by the repeated emphasis on the nature of guest-host relationships around the dinner-table: this theme is often touched on in the Satires and especially in Book Two, but is particularly striking in this satire. Some of the polemic of Sat. 2.2 is aimed not solely at the bad dietary habits of individuals, but at their treatment of their guests. We are led to evaluate the implied neglect of his guests by Horace’s own authorial persona in the light of other extremes of conduct presented in Sat. 2.2. On the one hand, the miser Avidienus (Mr ‘Avaricious’) is described as stingy even on festive occasions. On the other hand, however, the zealous ancient Romans are also shown to be ridiculous – they are reputed to have gone overboard trying to preserve a whole but regrettable rather mature meal (well past its sell-by date, in modern parlance) for the unexpected guest. Horace’s clearly tongue-in-cheek praise of the latter unfortunate custom is aimed deliberately, we can be sure, at heightening the effect of revulsion in his sophisticated contemporary audience.

648 See e.g. Rudd 1966: 171.
649 For the bad behaviour of the niger, see Sat. 1.4.81-91; cf. p. 155, n. 447 above.
650 Sat. 2.2.60-62.
651 Sat. 2.2.89-92. See Parker’s comments on the use of rancidus here, which is an unusual and rather strong word also used by Lucretius (DRN 6.1155) to describe the stench of rotting corpses (1986: 114).
Finally, however, towards the satire’s end the ‘real’ Ofellus, who by his own confession could offer his guests a substantial but inexpensive meal when this was called for, is unmasked as the paradigmatic ‘Golden Mean’ between these two extremes. That Horace by contrast has his own persona committing the grave sin of keeping his guests and friends waiting for their meal with a ‘diatribe’ on gluttony, may be one of the chief jokes contained in Sat. 2.2: Horace, it seems, has behaved more like a schoolmarm than a welcoming host (or a gracious guest). Horace’s audiences are therefore led to conclude that Ofellus has not been faithfully represented in the body of the satire; rather, his name has been used to add authority to a lecture which Horace intends in any case to give to his peers.

Arguably designed to lighten the load shouldered by his authorial audience, in addition, is what appears to be Horace’s assumption of personal guilt within Sat. 2.2. How is it, after all, that ‘Horace’ knows all about the fancy foodstuffs that he alleges are indulged in by the idle wealthy, unless he himself has (more than likely) so indulged? Even if (as one might protest) Horace has merely observed these indulgences in others, he has taken an inordinate amount of interest in them. Just as in Sat. 1.2, where all the detail concerning female anatomy and the in’s and out’s of adultery seemed to the away, implying that ‘Horace’ was speaking from rather unfortunate personal experience, so in Sat. 2.2 Horace’s extensive knowledge of the tables of the rich, as revealed in his elaborate images of the delicacies, implies complicity in the gourmet lifestyle rather than any intimate experience of either the ‘stingy diet’ indulged by the miser Avidienus, or indeed,

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652 Sat. 2.2.118-122. Unlike Horace, Ofellus also has drinking games (rather than a moral lecture) to entertain his guests (123ff).
653 An amusing image is suggested at 2.2.23ff, where Horace proposes the idea of himself whipping away a dish of roast peacock from the person (guest?) who has been served it, and trying to replace this exotic dish with chicken: *vis tamen eripiam posito pavone veils quin hoc quam gallina tergere palatum...* (23-24). The combination of sensual stimulation in the culinary context (*tergere palatum*) - necessary of course because of the subject’s corrupted sense of taste - and the matter-of-fact aggression of the moralist (cf. *eripiam*), in my opinion makes for a striking image, and suggests to us an impression of Horace, as either host or guest, suddenly snatching the offending meal away.
654 There are a number of correspondences between the castigation of sexual vice in Sat. 1.2 and that of culinary overindulgence in Sat. 2.2. Both in its subject matter and in its structural arrangement of this subject matter, Sat. 2.2 illustrates the failure of the mean in the dietary sphere, just as Sat. 1.2 had illustrated this with regard to the sexual (see Fiske 1920: 378-9). Luxury in the culinary sphere and sexual overindulgence were arguably almost one and the same vice in Roman eyes, as Catharine Edwards remarks (1993: 8-9 & passim).
the balanced diet recommended by Ofellus. This is reflected in the fact that in *Sat. 2.2* there is a greater number of lines devoted to the excessive diet than to the other types of diet.\(^{655}\) This is not because Horace is a thorough-going *doctor ineptus* who cannot count his lines, but because here, as in *Sat. 1.2*, the joke about Horace’s authorial persona is that he simply has a great deal to say about that with which he is personally familiar and about which he is enthusiastic.

Is the tirade against gluttony and gourmandism in *Sat. 2.2*, then, not admittedly the talking-to which ‘Horace’ himself so richly deserves? Perhaps we are to imagine that the old farmer ‘Ofellus’ has recently given the adult ‘Horace’ a piece of his mind, which the latter now relays, in a possibly altered and more sophisticated form, to his own urban audience (i.e. ‘internally persuasive discourse’). Moreover, if we are to picture Horace’s physical appearance as short and fat, as is indicated by Suetonius,\(^{656}\) then the irony of a rather rotund, ‘vertically-challenged’ speaker addressing the elite on the issue of a healthier and more frugal diet becomes plain.\(^{657}\) Once more, as often in *Satires* Book One, Horace’s own implied imperfections to a great extent let his addressees off the hook.

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\(^{655}\) See Parker *id.*: 113. For Parker the disproportionate lines are further proof that ‘Horace’ is in *Sat. 2.2* characterised merely as a *doctor ineptus*. It is somehow appropriate, however, that the description of both the ‘stingy diet’ (*sordidus victus*, see 53) and the ‘simple diet’ (*tenuis victus*, see 53 & passim) are given less space than the excessive diet, which is described and criticised at great length and in great detail (20-52; but the tirade stars off again at 73ff). In the case of Avidienus’ miserable fare, Horace appropriately allocates a relatively ‘stingy’ amount of space to the miserly side of the scale of vices (55-69).

\(^{656}\) For evidence that the historical Horace was overweight and/or ‘under-tall’, see Suetonius’ *Vita Horati* 53ff: *Habitu brevis atque obesus….* This seems to be based on Augustus’ purported teasing of Horace in a letter: *Sed tibi statura deest, corpusculum non deest*… (id.: 58-9), cf. Rostagni 1964: 118-119. We are surely at liberty to ascribe the historical Horace’s physical attributes to his alter ego or his ‘second self’ within the world of the *Satires*. This is an example of how Horace deliberately plays with the idea of the *Satires* as ‘autobiography’: in *Sat. 2.7* Davus chides Horace for his bloated, unhealthy body (the result of feasting on delicacies too often) which puts great strain on his feet (107-109a); Horace’s short stature is referred to by Damasippus (2.3.308-309).

\(^{657}\) If this is the case, it may be that Horace’s hurried assurance *nec meus hic sermo est*… in the second line of the satire (right after the idea of the simple life/diet has been introduced) is to be understood as drawing knowing laughter from his authorial audience, who are presumably familiar with their friend’s ‘healthy’ appetite.
Positive press and philosophical defeat

But Horace does not merely let his audience off the hook in Sat. 2.2: he even allows a degree of positive press to slip through on behalf of his amici. There is, for example, a certain conspiratorial recognition - even a celebration - of prosperity in the ‘diatribe’ of Sat. 2.2, in that both ‘Horace’ and his high-society friends know what it is to enjoy the fruits of patronage by the wealthy, indeed, that they are all in so privileged a position as to have indulged irresponsibly in the excesses of personal affluence and the joys of a period of relative political peace. After all, even criticising or bemoaning problems caused by opulence is a way of highlighting its existence.658 This may even be a backhand manner of offering thanks for Maecenas’ generosity as patron, as well as for the peace recently brought about by the new regime of his amicus Octavian - this in a satire which deals, perhaps more directly than any other,659 with one of the effects of the civil wars, namely the land confiscations in Italy after Philippi.

The subject of the land confiscations in Italy, raised indirectly in Ofellus’ speech in the final section of the poem, is admittedly a sensitive topic for someone like Horace, converted, relatively recently, from the ‘wrong’ side of the civil wars, to be tackling.660 But even here, I submit, Horace affects a cunning sleight of hand. It is true that the ‘real’ Ofellus revealed at the satire’s end has an enviably orthodox philosophical attitude to life: his balanced approach to his lifestyle, including his diet, and his acceptance of external circumstances (as advised by nearly all the major philosophical schools in antiquity) allow him to accept change aequo animo. Ofellus, as presented at the satire’s end, has thus

658 Octavian would be unable to complain about the flouting of sumptuary restrictions as on the surface, anyway, Horace has virulently attacked culinary luxury. For a concise discussion of sumptuary legislation and everyday practice with regard to Sat. 2.2, see Rudd (1966: 163-164).
659 Except, of course, for the rather risqué Sat. 1.7, which also appears to tackle sensitive civil war-related issues head-on, even ending with a pun on ‘Rex’. For my reading of this, see p. 87, n. 272 above.
660 The historical Horace is known to have come from an area of Italy (and indeed, a family) affected by the land reallocations which in Sat. 2.2 his (presumably) childhood neighbour Ofellus is shown to endure: according to Appian (B.C. 4.3), Venusia was among the towns whose lands were confiscated as reward for the soldiers of the victorious parties after the Battle of Philippi. While this is not, however, to suggest a ‘biographical’ approach to the Satires, we should bear in mind that the authorial persona of the Satires is ultimately a fictional version of the ‘real’ Quintus Horatius Flaccus. Cf. pp. 53-59 above.
often been applauded as the concretisation of the sage, indicating that Hellenistic philosophical ideals are indeed able to be lived out by an Italian peasant. In contrast to Bond and more recently, Ellen Oliensis, I do not think that Ofellus’ success as a sage is meant to be questioned. Rather, we are permitted to see that while Ofellus’ beliefs may be commonplace, they are effective: even the new owner of the farm, the absent and ‘shad-owly’ Mr Umbrenus, turns out to be an insubstantial threat in the face of well-worn truths about fate and fortune. It is no accident, then, that the end of Sat. 2.2 reads rather more like a Virgilian eclogue than an Horatian satire: such is Ofellus’ autarchy and independence that he has stepped right out of the satiric genre.

Finally, however, I would suggest that a subtle political point is simultaneously being made. In terms of Ofellus’ worldview, the land reallocations are not significant either as military strategy or even as a political whim, but they are merely an example of the indiscriminate vicissitudes of Fortune. Moreover, the ideas suggested by Ofellus’ example, that philosophy and not politics should dictate one’s lifestyle, and that having been on the ‘wrong’ side of the political fence should not prevent the practice of true philosophy, may be perceived to lend themselves to a politically valuable corollary: those who are not successfully able to weather political storms along with life’s other little knocks have only themselves and their own philosophical attitudes to blame. On the contrary, trying political and financial times are the chance for the true philosopher to show his mettle. Horace’s presentation of Ofellus at the satire’s end, then, seems to assure Maecenas, Octavian and their friends that they need not have any sleepless nights over little Mr Titbit: as a graduate of the so-called ‘University of Life’ (and thus the complete opposite of Horace’s elite, formally educated audience and of himself), Ofellus can survive on titbits. The presentation of the ‘real’ old Ofellus at the satire’s end paradoxically acts as a subtly

661 See above for discussions of Bond’s 1980 article.
662 Oliensis groups Ofellus, along with Damasippus and Davus, as one of ‘life’s losers’ (1998: 53). Clearly reading Ofellus as the chief speaker of Sat. 2.2, she suggests that this ‘loser’ status is the reason why he, like the others, is compelled to turn to satire: ‘Misery - cynics might say - loves company’ (ibid.).
663 See 2.2.133-135.
propagandistic trumpcard which ultimately works in favour of Horace’s patron Maecenas and their amicus Octavian.664

Derived discourse and the moralising satires of Horace’s second book

Sat. 2.2, like the other moralising satires of the second book, is an experiment in ‘other voices’. By asserting that Ofellus is his source, and by revealing this ruse in retrospect twenty lines before the end of the satire (along with the clues provided throughout), Horace shows how the position of ‘moralist’ is essentially up for grabs, as it were. In an extensive exploration of what Bakhtin, centuries later, would term ‘internally persuasive discourse’, Horace demonstrates how ‘derived’ discourse is altered when it is addressed to new recipients. Language, according to Bakhtin, lies on the border between oneself and the other, and where discourse is received, engaged in dialogue by its new recipient and ultimately passed on, the discourse of the other becomes ‘tightly interwoven with one’s own word’. As ‘internally persuasive discourse’, therefore, derived discourse tends to be populated with the new speaker’s intentions, as it is now aimed at the new speaker’s addressee(s).

With the experiment of Sat. 2.2 Horace is preparing his audiences for further explorations of ‘derived’ moralising discourse in Sat. 2.3 and 2.7. As we shall see shortly, in 2.3 Damasippus will relay to Horace the Stoic lecture which he claims to have derived from his guru Stertinius; in Sat. 2.7 the slave Davus will subject his master, Horace, to another moral lecture, derived second-hand from a doorkeeper. The degree to which these ‘diatribes’, now apparently aimed at Horace, are actually addressed to him will be explored in the remaining two chapters.

664 For a discussion of the propaganda value of the Satires (Book One), see DuQuesnay 1984: 19ff.
CHAPTER SEVEN:

SPEAKING WITH AUTHORITY: ‘AUTHORITATIVE DISCOURSE’ VERSUS ‘INTERNALLY PERSUASIVE DISCOURSE’ IN SAT. 2.3

‘hunc neque dira venena nec hosticus auferet ensis, 
nec laterum dolor aut tussis, nec tarda podagra; 
garrulus hunc quando consumet cumque: loquaces, 
si sapiat, vitet, simul atque adoleverit aetas.’

‘Him not fell poisons nor the steel of martial foes 
Nor painful pleurisy nor cough nor halting gout 
Shall carry off, but, whenso’er his end betide, 
A chatterbox shall wreak it; once his age matures, 
Let him, if he be wise, avoid the talkative.’

The prophecy of the old Sabine woman, Horace Sat. 1.9.31-34, 

We have seen that Sat. 2.2, the first overtly moralising piece of the second book of Satir- 
es, was prefaced by Horace’s assertion that the coming speech was not his own: nee meus 
hic sermo est ... (2.2.2). In the following poem, Sat. 2.3, the sermo is ostensibly not Hor- 
ace’s either: here the poet presents his own character as the victim of a lengthy Stoic lect- 
ure, recited to him by one Damasippus, and framed at either end by a professional and a 
personal attack on Horace’s character by this Stoic neophyte. In the prior Sat. 2.2, after 
stating that the speech that he was about to relay was not his own, Horace had suggested 
to his audience that the teachings were those of the wise farmer Ofellus, known to him in 
boyhood. In Sat. 2.3, however, the sermon to which we listen derives from a source which 
is at least twice-removed: Horace presents us with the speech of the nauseating new Stoic 
convert Damasippus, who in turn attributes his moral lecture to his personal ‘saviour’, 
one Stertinius. Sat. 2.3 is therefore, like its predecessor, occupied among other things 
with ‘derived’ discourse and with the various layers of speakers whose voices are heard 
within it.

665 Damasippus’ speech is framed by mention of his Stoic teacher Stertinius (33, 296). Within this frame, 
Sertinius’ lecture, as repeated to Horace by Damasippus, is itself framed by mention of the famous Stoic 
philosopher Chrysippus (44, 287).
Layers of speakers

The various layers of speakers within Sat. 2.3 are multiple - at least threefold - something which invites closer examination: for a start, as satirist Horace relays to us, the audiences and readers, a speech that he suggests was reported to him by Damasippus; within this satiric presentation, Damasippus relates what he asserts to be Stertinius' sermon on the theme of the Stoic paradox 'every fool is mad' (Πάς ἄφρων μαίνεται), allegedly delivered to Damasippus in order to prevent the ruined businessman's intended suicide; within the repeat-performance of the sermon we also seem to hear echoes of the original preacher Stertinius as he addressed his would-be convert; within Stertinius' reported talk, moreover, we occasionally hear the traces of what may have been prior, 'standard' versions of his Stoic 'diatribe', evidently addressed to larger groups of people, possibly presented to students in the lecture-hall, or bellowed out, perhaps, from the streetcorners.\footnote{The formula at lines 77-81, for example, appears to derive from a speech addressed to a multitude of potential listeners: audire atque iogo tubo componere, quibus/ambitione mala aut argenti pallet amore, quisquis luxuria tristive superstitione aut alio mentis morbo calet; hac propius me, dum doceo insanire omnis, vos ordine adite - 'I bid ye settle down to whosoever suffers from evil ambition or love of silver, whosoever is feverish from luxury or troublesome superstition, or any other spiritual affliction; draw near to me, as I teach you that you are all insane, one by one, come forward...'. Also, Damasippus uses the verb crepare ('to croak, rattle') to describe Stertinius' style of speaking (si quid Stertinius veri crepat... - 'If there is any truth in what Stertinius' croaks on about...'). Many scholars have found Damasippus' use of this verb problematic (e.g. Rudd 1966: 175, who labelled it 'disrespectful'). However, it would seem that crepare might aptly describe the Stoics' tendency to preach in the open air and therefore, of necessity, at the top of their lungs (et alta quidem voce docere solet, Orelli ad loc., cit. Bond 1987: 10; cf. Lejay 1911: ad loc.). We are thus invited to imagine the zealous Stertinius still preaching hoarsely in his usual rhetorical style, as if to a huge congregation, albeit now to his new audience of one, Damasippus. While finding that crepare was nearly always ironic or unfavourable, Lejay (ibid.) argued that Damasippus was to be understood as unconscious of the Horatian irony in his use of this term. Bond (id.: 10-11) follows Lejay here.}
neither as pleasant nor as harmless as old Ofellus: the dismantled satirist displays the tiresome Damasippus, who in turn uncovers his long-winded guru, Stertinius.

That the layers of speakers in Sat. 2.3 imply, in addition, successive layers of addressees and audiences is of great significance for our purposes: here we may again test the Bakhtinian theory of 'addressivity' or the manifest awareness of audience that is said to characterise 'dialogic' discourse. Damasippus was the addressee of Stertinius' 'diatribe', just as Horace is the addressee of Damasippus' transmitted version of that lecture. Horace, as a character within the Satires, as satirist, and ultimately, as the author of Sat. 2.3, is obviously conscious of (at least some of) his own addressees and audience(s). Each layer has a different addressee or set of addressees, and one could expect each speaker to have a different aim in addressing his intended audience. However, because the discourse of Sat. 2.3 is 'derived' from sources within sources, things are not quite so straightforward: within the satire's multiple layers, each presumably with its individual stamp of orientation towards its particular audience, there resound echoes of prior layers with their own respective audiences and intentions. The interrelationship of these layers and their various degrees of addressivity will be the present chapter's main focus. ⁶⁶⁷

Exchanging roles: 'other voices' take over in Sat. 2.3

Horace's role as main speaker, which has characterised most of the Satires so far (even Sat. 2.2, despite protests to the contrary), is for the first time seriously undermined in Sat. 2.3. As is made clear within its first few lines, the third satire of the second book, like the seventh, is set at the time of the Saturnalia (ipsis/Saturnalibus, 4-5), the Roman proto-Carnivalesque festival which, as noted in the introduction to Part 2 of this thesis (chapter five), occasioned temporary yet fundamental reversals in positions of societal status. In the Saturnalian satires of Horace's Book Two, literary inversions within the genre of Latin satire mirror the social role-swapping of this Roman festivity. Sat. 2.3, the first of these satires, comprises for the most part a moralising monologue to which Horace is subjected.

⁶⁶⁷ For a recent in-depth treatment of the Stoic aspects of Sat. 2.3's central sermon, see Bond 1998: 82-108.
In accordance with the topsy-turvy inversions of the Saturnalia, Damasippus usurps the satirist's right to monologue, and he thus takes the floor as speaker, while Horace is reduced to the status of occasional interlocutor. This is the most extensive example of the monopolisation of speaking time by another voice with authority in either book of Satires so far.\textsuperscript{668}

A further trading of roles takes place, however: a freshly converted and loyal disciple of Stoicism, Damasippus hastens to surrender his new-found privilege as sole speaker to his master Stertinius, whose teachings he now claims to relay. From line 38 to 295 it is therefore supposedly the commanding voice of Stertinius, even further removed from the reader than is Damasippus, which dominates the satire as the voice with authority. But where does Stertinius begin and Damasippus end? How much of Sat. 2.3's central Stoic sermon can be attributed to Damasippus himself?\textsuperscript{669} Since diligent Damasippus assures Horace that he has 'made notes' during Stertinius' lecture (\textit{descripti docilis praecepta haec, 34}), it is certainly possible that he has respectfully preserved the Stoic message in his \textit{ἀπομνημονεύματα}, and that he now transmits it intact as the 'gospel truth'. As we have seen, Bakhtin termed this type of discourse with authority 'authoritative discourse', which he explained as a '\textit{prior discourse}', 'located in a distanced zone', which 'demands our unconditional allegiance', and which one must either entirely accept or reject.\textsuperscript{670} It is im-

\textsuperscript{668} Even where full dialogue, rather than merely dialogic elements such as the imaginary interlocutor, has been present in the \textit{Satires} prior to this, it has hardly been comparable to what happens in 2.3 in that Horace always seemed to keep control: in 1.9, the most dialogic satire of the first book, in which the poet fell prey to another of the dreaded \textit{loquaces}, conversation with the bore was recounted Horace himself, and the stichomythic interplay between the two parties alternated with Horace's narration of the event. Although 2.1, the consultation with Trebatius, was a dialogue, it was one in which Horace did most of the talking. In 2.2, although heterogeneous elements were present in a moralising speech attributed to Ofellus, these were subordinated to the main speaker's discourse until the final twenty lines.

\textsuperscript{669} Rudd (1966: 174-175) complains of 'blurring' at a number of points in this satire, including in the presentation of Damasippus' character. Uncertainty over what is attributable to Damasippus and what to Stertinius is reflected in the tendency of some modern scholars to speak continuously of either 'Damasippus' or of 'Stertinius' (e.g. Wallach 1975) as the speaker of the Stoic sermon contained in Sat. 2.3. In criticizing Rudd's allegations of incompetence on Horace's part, Bond (1987: 15) argues that we 'should talk rather of the conscious existence or non-existence of such blurring, rather than ascribe incompetence to such a master craftsman as Horace...'. My own interpretation is that confusion or 'blurring' between what Damasippus is supposed to have said himself, and what can be attributed to Stertinius, is deliberately fostered by Horace. We shall examine the effects of this below.

\textsuperscript{670} See Bakhtin 1981: 342-343; cf. p. 186ff above.
important to realise that one cannot engage with 'authoritative discourse' at all, only transmit it: any creative or dialogic response to it is rendered impossible.\textsuperscript{671}

Yet there is undoubtedly some tension between, on the one hand, Damasippus's consciousness of the need to preserve and communicate the Stoic 'gospel' in as orthodox a form as possible, and the new convert's enthusiasm, on the other hand, for the teachings he has recently digested, and thus his inclination to get the message across in his own words. Indeed, where in foregoing chapters we explored the nuances of 'derived' discourse, we saw that someone who transmits the discourse of an alien source is always likely to alter the article somewhat: a former audience can even become rewriter of the script. As he transmits the discourse he has derived from Stertinius, therefore, Damasippus could at least be expected to add to it his own slant. The question of 'addressivity' should again be considered: if the transmitter of the discourse shows himself to be dialogically aware of his new addressee, this could be expected to alter the transmission of the discourse to some degree. In that case the proselyte-turned-preacher may, for the benefit of his own addressee, not only transmit but also represent in a creative manner and even evaluate the discourse that he has derived from his source.

We have seen that Bakhtin labelled this second type of discourse with authority 'internally persuasive discourse', describing it as 'tightly interwoven with one's 'own word'', 'contemporary or reclaimable as contemporary', and 'primarily audience-related', with a 'special conception of listeners, readers, perceivers...'.\textsuperscript{672} Thus 'internally persuasive discourse' tends to be highly 'addressive' - patently conscious of its addressees and intended audiences - while 'authoritative discourse' is not. Since, therefore, both at the beginning and at the end of \textit{Sat.} 2.3, Damasippus directly addresses Horace and makes valiant if misguided attempts to improve by reproving him, we could anticipate that in the central sections of the satire, too, having engaged enthusiastically with Stertinius' sermon, hav-

\textsuperscript{671}Authoritative discourse can not be represented - it is only transmitted... It enters the artistic context as an alien body, there is no space around it to play in, no contradictory emotions - it is not surrounded by an agitated and cacophonous dialogic life, and the context around it dies, words dry up...'' (\textit{id.}: 344).

\textsuperscript{672}Bakhtin \textit{id.}: 345-346; cf. pp. 186-187 above.
himself ‘internally persuaded’ by it, and having made it his own, as it were, Damasippus now passes the ‘message’ on to his own addressee, Horace, in a manner in which he hopes will be convincing to this intended convert.

Unfortunately, however, the degree of ‘addressivity’ in the central sections of Sat. 2.3 is severely limited. For although framed by dramatic dialogue between Horace and Damasippus, and despite being dialogic in a variety of superficial and minor ways, the central ‘diatribe’ of Sat. 2.3 is not, on the whole, effectively addressed to Horace by Damasippus.\textsuperscript{673} Perhaps partly because of the universal compass of the paradox that it treats, the central Stoic sermon lacks a sustained, effective consciousness of its immediate audience. Damasippus is unable to sustain addressivity beyond the quick ‘sidelong glance’\textsuperscript{674} at Horace. This is because, unlike Davus’ speech in that other Saturnalian satire of Book Two, Sat. 2.7, to which it is often compared, Damasippus’ derived lecture in the central portions of Sat. 2.3 has not been tailored to Horace’s measurements. True to the title of doctor ineptus, as he is often labelled by modern scholars,\textsuperscript{675} the convert fails to realise that it is unnecessary to treat almost every conceivable variety of human insanity in order

\textsuperscript{673} A certain section of Damasippus’ lecture (lines 64-76) clearly derives from Stertinius’ own attempts to adapt his Stoic ‘diatribe’ to Damasippus as an individual. In this section, we distinctly hear Stertinius addressing Damasippus in the latter’s own situation, and even using humour to appeal to his potential convert (e.g. the example of Perellius’ senseless calculations of what Damasippus is unable to pay back, 75-76). Moreover here Stertinius twice refers to Damasippus by name, in lines 64 and 65, and at line 68 (cf. 25) also mentions Damasippus’ former ‘patron god’ Mercury, who presided over material fortunes (merx). Damasippus, however, stupidly relates the whole of this section to Horace, without thinking to change it or adapt it to his new addressee’s own situation. To what degree Stertinius himself had made any further effort to adapt his lecture to Damasippus we cannot be sure; from line 77 we are back with the formulaic approach and the lecture now applies to all humanity. But presumably Stertinius did achieve more than the mere transmission of his gospel, because he successfully converted Damasippus by convincing him that virtually the whole of humankind is mad and not solely he, Damasippus. That Damasippus does not seem able to convince Horace of the same, I shall argue, is partly due to his failure to adapt Stertinius’ lecture specifically to his own present addressee, Horace. However, Damasippus was certainly a more eager if also a more gullible recipient of the Stoic message than the sophisticated Horace. Damasippus’ state of despair made him fertile ground for Stertinius’ proselytizing: on the brink of suicide, he was ready to give up all the beliefs he had previously held and to embrace an ‘authoritative discourse’ completely and unquestioningly.

\textsuperscript{674} See e.g. Bakhtin 1984: 11. But note that dialogic discourse ‘is accompanied by a continual sideways glance at another person’ (ibid.) because of its orientation towards an audience or, at least, its ‘intense relationship with another consciousness’ (ibid.). By contrast Damasippus very rarely if ever manages to alter the discourse he has inherited in order to ‘connect’ in any way with his own addressee. We shall, however, examine a possible instance of this at pp. 254-255 below.

\textsuperscript{675} See esp. Anderson (1982: 46), who coined the term doctor ineptus; Anderson had previously referred to the satirist-speaker of the moralising triad of Satires Book One, by contrast, as doctor (id.: 36, 40).
to get his point across. As he berates the madness of all mankind at length, it becomes apparent that Damasippus has even proven incapable of editing the speech that he has inherited so as to be particularly relevant to his present addressee: hence the richly deserved question, once his talk is completed, as to how exactly all that precedes applies to Horace.\textsuperscript{676}

This complete lack of the ‘addressivity’ that by contrast is common to what Bakhtin would term ‘dialogic’ discourse, indicates that in \textit{Sat.} 2.3’s central lecture we have to do with a rather more ‘monologic’ type of discourse. In Damasippus, I would go so far as to suggest, there has been a struggle,\textsuperscript{677} in Bakhtinian terms, between ‘prior authoritative discourse’ and ‘internally persuasive discourse’, that seems to have led to the former neutralising the latter. Because Damasippus allies himself so completely and so uncritically with his source, because he is such a true believer in Stertinius’ message, this inviolate and unquestionable ‘prior authoritative discourse’ has ironically in effect \textit{become}, for Damasippus, ‘internally persuasive discourse’. This is, after all, what ‘blind’ belief or thorough conviction effectively comprise: a prior authoritative discourse that is internalised by the believer. As a result, the believer ‘dialogises’ or engages with the authoritative discourse only to a very limited extent, and the fundamentals of the dogma never come into question. Damasippus’ faith in the Stoic message has made Stertinius’ authoritative discourse seem personally persuasive to him: in other words, he has swallowed it hook, line and sinker.

Damasippus’ complete belief in and thus total identification with his master Stertinius means that he ensures that they, too, present a united front. Whether or not Damasippus is to be understood as repeating Stertinius’ teachings verbatim, religiously replaying his ma-

\textsuperscript{676}\textit{Sat.} 2.3.300-301.

\textsuperscript{677} Bakhtin sees \textit{struggle} as natural to ‘internally persuasive discourse’: ‘...it enters into an intense \textit{struggle} with other internally persuasive discourses. Our ideological development is just such an intense struggle within us for hegemony among various verbal and ideological points of view, approaches, directions and values...’ (\textit{id.}: 346). In Damasippus’ case, however, I am arguing that whatever ‘internally persuasive discourses’ were previously competing for dominance within him (causing enough internal disturbance to have him contemplate suicide on the failure of his business) have been overrun by the overwhelming, unassailable ‘authoritative discourse’ of Stertinius’ Stoic dogma.
ster's voice, the fact remains that it is hard for us to separate convert from teacher. Within the Stoic sermon itself the two speak mostly in one, combined authoritative voice (which I shall later have occasion to refer to as 'Damasippus-Sertinius').

678 Just as when (in the present author's country) it is observed that trainee born-again Christian preachers sometimes acquire a patently fake American accent, which they seem to regard as admirably authoritative and tend to use particularly when they are repeating teachings which they have picked up from their sources, so Damasippus has absorbed Sertinius' manner of speech along with his dogma. Sertinius' discourse has become Damasippus' own discourse, and heteroglossia is now the register of the brainwashed.

Silencing the interlocutor: the 'monologisation' of Sat. 2.3

But the 'monologising' tendency of Sat. 2.3 goes further than this. We have noted that Horace's status in Sat. 2.3 has become that of 'occasional interlocutor' - in fact, his responses are very occasional indeed. Unlike the first triad of Satires Book One, Sertinius' homily, as relayed by Damasippus, allows little opportunity for the usual 'diatribal' interventions of an adversary nor, indeed, does it anticipate the potential objections of an audience. Damasippus presents himself as having never, in his awe, interrupted or questioned Sertinius' evangelism, or at least he does not relay this to his new audience. Like-

678 The discourse of the central sermon should be 'double-voiced', since Damasippus has derived it from Sertinius. However, because Damasippus recites Sertinius' whole speech from start to finish without any intelligent editing, it is a singular voice that we hear. Bond (1998: 107), on the other hand, argues for a 'precise characterisation' of the three protagonists and for precise boundaries between each of their speeches (id.: passim).

679 The analogy between the avid newly converted Stoic and some modern charismatic Christians was already suggested by Bond: 'Like some born-again charismatic with his foot thrust firmly into Horace's doorway, Damasippus' intention is to give his victim the 'good news'...' (1987: 10).

680 Inasmuch as Sertinius and Damasippus are to some extent homogenised or 'blurred', as Stoics they are both equally the victims of Horace's satire and parody.

681 See Rudd (1966: 185), who argues that Sertinius' 'diatribe' addresses itself to an 'anonymous listener' rather than an adversary because this addressee never answers back.

682 But see MacKay (1940: 164-6), who argued that lines 84-103 could more logically be explained by distributing them between Sertinius and Damasippus. Notably, MacKay would apportion sive ego prave...animum vidisse (87b-89) to Damasippus. The subsequent question quid ergo sensit ...heredes voluit? (89b-91a) is then attributed to Sertinius in reply, and so on. If MacKay is right, this would mean that 84-103 is another section (like 64-76) early on in the lecture in which we hear Damasippus rather dim-wittedly relaying his entire interaction with Sertinius to Horace. From line 84, moreover, Sertinius is appropriately addressing avarice, the variety of insanity from which Damasippus could be said to have been
wise Horace is either not granted or else he does not claim the opportunity to interrupt Damasippus' repetition of Stertinius' sermon. Rather, the lengthy 'diatribe' seems to floor all opposition as an inviolate, prior 'authoritative discourse' which largely ignores its audiences. Indeed, it may be noticed that the only interruptions that 'Horace' does manage are on the periphery of Damasippus' relaying of his master's speech - before it really starts and after it has clearly ended.

The poet's address of Damasippus by name (...Damasippe...) at 16bff divulges to the reader, if this is not already evident, that it is someone other than Horace who has spoken the initial 15½ lines of the satire. The placing of this interruption coincides more or less with the usual line positioning of the interruptions of the transitional imaginary interlocutors in the moralising triad which begins Horace's first book of Satires. If we were to compare the structure of Sat. 2.3 loosely with that of the 'diatribes' of Book One, this would make Damasippus' initial tirade against what he alleges to be Horace's slack literary output analogous to the indirect beginnings of the first triad, and Horace's objection the equivalent of that of a transitional imaginary interlocutor. Horace again responds to Damasippus at 26-31, but thereafter he is silent until line 300: between 31 and 300 he makes no

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683 See e.g. Sat. 1.2.17-19; 1.3.19-20.
684 Horace's own reading of Damasippus is perhaps best revealed by the comments he makes here. He likens the eclipse of Damasippus' earlier obsession by a newer and worse one to a new illness which has displaced an old one (27-8), or to a case where an illness has moved from one part of the body to another (28-9), and even more vividly, to a case where a victim of lethargy becomes a boxer and beats up his doctor (ut lethargicus hic cum fit pugil et medicum urget, 30). The last image has special significance, as Horace, the moralist of the first book of Satires but now himself the target of a 'diatribe', is indeed analogous to the victimised doctor, as he is attacked by Damasippus, a moral 'patient' incorrectly 'healed' by another 'doctor'. Ironically, the ex-patient now considers himself well and fit enough to diagnose and cure the mental illnesses of others by repeating the prescriptions of his 'doctor' Stertinius (80). In the past, lines 27b-30 have often been assumed to belong to Damasippus (e.g. Palmer 1883: ad loc.). I am following the alternative tradition, however, which has assigned lines 26b (Novi...) to 31 (...est ut tibet) to Horace (Kiessling-Heinze ad loc.;
attempt to interrupt Stertinius-Damasippus. Ironically, in comparison to the Stoic lecture in Sat. 2.3, the ‘diatribes’ of Satires Book One, although formally couched as monologues, are in effect more ‘dialogic’ in their relative openness to the potential objections of ‘other voices’, and are also more ‘addressive’ in their constant awareness of their audiences - this despite the fact that the ‘listener’ of Sat. 2.3 is undoubtedly to be imagined as physically present throughout the sermon. It is therefore clearly not just speakers and listeners but varieties of discourse that are reversed in Sat. 2.3: monologue has reasserted itself within a frame formally structured as a dialogue.

Not only does Horace permit the Saturnalian reversals of Sat. 2.3 to deprive him of his voice as the main if not the sole speaker, but he also goes further, denying himself for the most part the right to take the floor even as adversary. Instead, Horace has joined the audience as passive recipient of the sermo. Furthermore, both at the beginning of Sat. 2.3, where, as we shall see shortly, Damasippus makes an attack on what he asserts is Horace’s lack of poetic industry, and at its end, where Damasippus, when asked to be specific, castigates Horace on the grounds of the latter’s alleged lifestyle, Horace has become a direct satiric target. And, while not effectively or personally addressed by Sat. 2.3’s central sermon, Horace is its indirect victim: this ‘canned’ lecture not only applies to all of humanity because of the universal nature of the Stoic paradox that it treats, but it also on occasion aims some oblique blows (‘with a sidelong glance’) at its new recipient, as we shall see. In 2.3 Horace, the prior satirist, assumes the doubly passive role of generally disregarded audience but also occasional target of a second-hand lecture.

Rudd 1966: 174 & 297 n. 20; Muecke 1993: 136). It has been noted that something is needed to provoke Damasippus’ statement at 31bff, which as many scholars note, is virtually unintelligible if 27-30 is also to be regarded as spoken by the Stoic convert: ...o bone, ne tel/strare, insanis et tu stultique prope omnes (e.g. Muecke 1993: 136). Rudd likewise argues that the final statement attributed to Horace (according to this view) - esto ut libet (31) - incites Damasippus' reply. The adversative aspect of lines 31ff in response to what precedes, which perhaps can be explained as Damasippus’ desire to take Horace down a notch, points to a dialogic exchange rather than a monologue, in formal linguistic terms and at least in this section of the satire (cf. my discussion of Mukarovsky’s ideas in the Introduction, pp. 30ff).
Names and identities

In *Sat. 2.3*, therefore, for the first time in the *Satires* to date, Horace appears truly to have taken a back-seat, and to have permitted another to assume the reins of his chariot. But who exactly is this Damasippus who has been allowed to take over from Horace, and to become, however temporarily, the new speaker and moralist of the *Satires*? How are we, the readers, to take him? In *Sat. 2.3* there are many hints as to how we could read Damasippus, or at least, how the satirist would evidently like us to read Damasippus. For example, despite the fact that, when he does take note of him, our new speaker shoves Horace into the role of satiric victim, it is ironic that, before his recent conversion, Damasippus himself would have been among the chief culprits of the vices castigated by the poet in his own moralising discourse in *Satires* Book One. As a merchant Damasippus had formerly, on his own confession, devoted his energies to tracking down expensive antiques.\(^{685}\) His business interests were in fact comparable to those of the dissatisfied *mercatores* who, racing over every sea in hurried pursuit of wealth, were lampooned by the Horatian moralist in his first satire.\(^{686}\) Prior satiric roles, it turns out, are indeed thoroughly reversed in *Sat. 2.3*: while the former satirist has now become a satiric victim, by contrast an erstwhile target of Horace’s moralising has turned moralist in this, the first Saturnalian satire of Book Two.

In spite of his forays into the houses and gardens of the elite (24-5), Damasippus has very much retained the common touch: until recently he used to hang out at the crowded crossroads (*frequentia...compita*, 25-6), where he was known by his nickname ‘Mercury’ s

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\(^{685}\) This former financial hotshot had relished discovering (and failing that, probably inventing) such curiosities as the exact Corinthian bronze piece in which the city’s mythical founder Sisyphus had reputedly washed his feet: *...olim nam quaerere amabamiquo vafer ille pedes lavisset Sisyphus aere* (20-21). This impossibly antique piece, as Rudd comments, ‘would have caused quite a stir at the Roman Sotheby’s’ (1966: 174). Damasippus was thus formerly like the Albius, captivated by bronze, who appears in Horace’s list of satiric targets in *Sat. 1.4*, the literary satire in the first section of which the topics of the three preceding moral ‘diatribes’ are catalogued: *...stupet Albius aere* (1.4.28). Alternatively, Damasippus could also be said to have pursued his prizes with much the same deluded vigour as the gourmand Catius pursues culinary specialities in *Sat. 2.4*.

\(^{686}\) See *Sat. 1.1.6-8; 29-30*. When Damasippus’ own metaphoric ship however sank on the ancient equivalent of the stock exchange *...postquam omnis res mea ranumlad Medium fracta est...*(Sat. 2.3.18b-19a), he was resorting to the Fabrician bridge before Stertinius’ timely intervention.
man' because of his (former) winning streak in business. The influence of the common folk on Damasippus is still evident after Fortune has turned against him - even the method by which he was planning to commit suicide was apparently one associated with the lower classes. As we shall see shortly, Damasippus’ proletarian background makes him thoroughly incompatible with the exclusivity, both social and literary, to which Horace had appealed repeatedly in his first book of Satires.

Another clue to Horace’s attitude, as satirist, to the Stoic speaker lies in the name ‘Damasippus’ itself, which, in spite of the fact that it has been identified with a real person mentioned in Cicero’s letters, may also be a joke. The name’s Greek origin suggests someone of servile or freedman birth, in keeping with the Saturnalian context of the satire. But there may be more. It has been remarked, for example, that Damasippus’ conversion in extremis parallels that of the famous Stoic Chrysippus, who was said to have come to philosophy after the misfortune of having his property confiscated. While this sort of story concerning philosophers is not uncommon, nevertheless the similarity between the names Chrysippus and Damasippus is also striking, as they share the originally aristocratic second element -ippus, the Greek ἰππός - ‘horse’. Literal translations notwithstanding...

687 Throwing oneself off heights onto the earth or into water was to be expected of the lower classes or of slaves (van Hooff 1990: 70, 78; cf. Grise 1982: 94). Jumping seems to have been despised because it resulted in a disfigured corpse; as a method which required no technical preparation, it appealed to the poor or desperate. Jumping to one’s death was only admired in cases of ill-starred lovers’ suicide pacts or when a besieged city was on the point of being taken (van Hooff id.: 73-77). The ‘well-bred’ were traditionally supposed to embrace their swords in an honourable Romana mors, although under the Principate the senatorial elite were more inclined to open their veins in a hot bath, sometimes even with the emperor’s doctor in attendance to provide expert assistance (id.: 47-54). Antiquity placed madness (furor) and bankruptcy among the less noble causes of suicide (id.: 96ff, 115).

688 Cf. especially Horace’s moralising and programmatic satires in Book One (counterbalancing both the moral and literary fronts on which Damasippus attacks Horace). Not only were crowds the hotbeds of every vice under the sun: quemvis media elige turba... (l.4.25ff), but the common mob was an undesirable satiric audience, whose approval need not be cultivated: neque te ut miretur turba labores (1.10.73). Horace’s satires would not be exposed to public circulation for the common mob and Tigellius Hermogenes to sweat over with their greasy hands (1.4.71-2). See discussion below.

689 Cicero Ad Fam. 7.23; Ad Att. 12.29. In the first reference Damasippus’ name was mentioned in the context of an offer to buy statues, and thus he may plausibly be an antique dealer here; in the second Cicero is potentially interested, but only as a last measure, in buying gardens which Damasippus appears to have been selling. Could Damasippus have been auctioning off his property once his affairs had gone wrong?

690 D.L. 7.181; see Bond’s discussion (1987: 7).

691 The Athenian name suffix -ippus would almost always refer to someone of an upper class background in a Classical or Hellenistic Greek context. In the Roman context, however, Damasippus’ Greek name would ironically rather be indicative of servile or freedman origins.
ing ('tamer of a horse'?- from verb δαμάω), another entirely unorthodox interpretation suggests itself from the fact that the name Dama occurs independently several times in Horace's *Satires*, where it is generically synonymous with the servile and the low. Together the two halves of the name 'Damasippus' may evoke the idea of 'a poor man's Chrysippus', which indeed the Saturnalian speaker of *Sat*. 2.3 effectively is.

Stertinius' name may also have significant, even humorous connotations. The first element is so similar to the Latin verb stertere, to snore, that it is hard to believe that no pun is intended, especially since Stertinius' 'diatribe' is long enough to have had a soporific effect on an audience sufficiently sophisticated to find the commonplaces somewhat wearisome - could somnolence be the reason for Horace's silence between lines 31 and 300? In other words, the lecture attributed to Stertinius (or, as he may be rendered in English, 'Prof. Snore') is so long and boring that 'Horace' has become the most passive of possible (living) audiences: he has fallen asleep. It is interesting, moreover, that

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692 While 'Chrysippus' means a 'golden horse', 'Damasippus' may be interpreted as a would-be aristocratic 'horse-tamer' if we consider that Horace is the 'horse' which he is to 'tame' - in his terms, to convert to Stoicism - in *Sat*. 2.3. Horace sometimes likens himself to a horse or donkey, cf. *Sat*. 2.1.18-20, where Horace describes himself as a 'floppy-eared' (Flaccus) donkey, in contrast to Caesarius, who is here pictured as a highly-strung race-horse with pricked-up ears and a tendency to kick. Cf. p. 56 n. 182 above.

693 The name Dama is synonymous with someone of servile or lowly origins, cf. also *Sat*. 1.6.38; 2.7.54, cf. also the dirty Dama at 2.5.18: *Utne tegam spureo Damae latus?*, the inheritance-hunter Ulyses asks of Teiresias when bidden to cultivate the rich but low-born.

694 Coupled with Dama-, the suffix -ippus would seem to suggest an oxymoronic 'low/high-class' person. Ironically, in spite of his attacks on Horace's ambition (307ff), Damasippus is a lower class individual who seems to have 'gotten above' himself. In support of my unorthodox interpretation of Damasippus' name, it may be worth noting that Chrysippus' name was itself played on by his contemporaries: Carneades, for example, apparently dubbed him 'Crypsippus', 'horse-hidden' or 'obscure' horse - the proverbial 'dark horse' (D.L. 7.182).

695 Snoring could also be symbolic of moral delusion and folly, as it is used at Lucretius *DRN* 3.1048 (in the midst of the 'diatribe' against the fear of death), where the addressee is derided for entertaining the standard human illusions about life: *et vigilans stertis nec somnia cernere cessas* - 'when awake you are still snoring and don't stop dreaming'. It is interesting that sterto is used in a similar sense at Persius *Sat*. 3.58, a satire which ends with a positive version of the Stoic paradox treated in Horace *Sat*. 2.3, to which satire it has often been compared (Smith 1970: 306 & n.9; cf. Morford 1984: 45-49). Stertinius, his name would imply, is therefore not only boring, but also deluded.

696 At the beginning of this satire Horace is accused of being *vini somnique benignus* (2.3.3); although here it presumably refers to his general habits in *Sabins*, we might also imagine Horace warmed by wine and perhaps even a little drowsy when accosted by Damasippus.

697 Horace mentions a Stertinius again at *Ep*. 1.12.20. Ps.-Acro at *Ep*. 1.12.20 tells us that Stertinius wrote 220 books on Stoicism in Latin verse, which might mean that it is his reputation for tortuous longwindedness that is satirised in Horace *Sat*. 2.3. If this is the case, Stertinius' unfortunate but fitting name would be an additional cause for mirth in 2.3.
when Horace does begin to respond to Damasippus-Stertinius’ lecture after line 300, his first question refers to the start of the long argument that he has supposedly just sat through, and not to its middle or ending: has Horace just woken up? If Horace has been nodding off or even slumbering while Damasippus waffles on, it is not surprising that the poet has been unable to apply his usual Callimachean file to the resultant satire’s bulk.

**Deflating the poet, inflating Damasippus?: the start of Sat. 2.3**

There are, however, two sections in Sat. 2.3 in which ‘Horace’ is undoubtedly awake - at the start and at the end of the satire, where Damasippus and Horace engage in straightforward dialogue with one another, and which together ‘frame’ the poem. In these sections, where Damasippus is engaging in personal criticism rather than Stoic sermonising, he does indeed address Horace directly. These sections are especially revealing: certainly the initial 15½ lines of the satire, where we are confronted with Damasippus’ impromptu (and unwelcome) criticism of our allegedly unproductive poet, are densely packed with images and hints indicative of the character and convictions of Horace’s immediate interlocutor. Although it will not be possible to treat every aspect of this initial section in what follows, it is clear that one of its effects is to put forward an unfavourable and unsympathetic portrait of Damasippus that will remain with us, unavoidably, throughout Sat. 2.3, confirmed and augmented by his long and boring lecture.

Damasippus, finding Horace apparently ensconced in the country at what must be his Sabine farm, begins the satire by hauling the poet over the coals for apparently not com-

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698 The apparently unwarranted attack at the start of Sat. 2.3 is balanced by the somewhat more directly solicited criticism of Horace’s lifestyle at its end, thus ‘framing’ the satire. This framing device not only allows for the introduction of the speaker-within-speech constructions used in this satire, but also recalls other dialogic works which are structured around the idea of framed speeches, such as Plato’s Symposium - arguably here one of Horace’s chief intertexts (as we have seen, the nec meus hic sermo est... device used in the previous satire was also possibly derived from Symp. 177a). Plato (whom I take to mean the writer of philosophical dialogues) is moreover among the writers whose works Horace has prescribed himself for holiday reading (11). Although scholars have seen sense in some of the arguments presented in the lengthy bout of moralising which occupies the central sections of Sat. 2.3, the Stoic lecture itself is, inevitably, set off on either side by its frame (see conclusions of Bond 1987: 15f).

699 This is how most scholars interpret hue fugisti (line 5) - Horace has ‘taken refuge’ out on his farm on the occasion of the Saturnalia (see e.g. Rudd 1966: 173). The cosy villula ‘little country house’ to which Dama-
posing often or fast enough, despite, with the best intentions, having packed four hefty tomes into his rucksack to take away with him. Damasippus’ first words to Horace sum it all up: *Sic raro scribis...* - ‘You write so infrequently...’ (2.3.1f). Horace, he observes, calls for new parchment only four times a year, indicating that he has been producing what Damasippus considers to be very little. Damasippus’ criticism that Horace does not write enough is made, ironically, at the start of what is to be by far the longest satire of both collections (well over 300 lines where most are just over 100). Since most of *Sat. 2.3*, however, is to be understood as ‘spoken’ not by ‘Horace’ himself, but by Damasippus reciting his guru Stertinius’ hand-me-down lecture, it is in effect Damasippus and Stertinius rather than ‘Horace’ who, as conversationalists, are the ‘authors’ of the sermo. After his attempts to motivate Horace have failed (...*incipi. nil est*, 6b), Damasippus produces Horace’s satire for him by reiterating Stertinius’ lecture.

Yet the literary criticism with which Damasippus attacks Horace at the start of *Sat. 2.3* may ironically be motivated by something which is far from literary. Damasippus is trying, after all, to convert Horace, and as such it is his duty to convince our poet that he needs to be converted. As Damasippus, like Chrysippus, was ripened for Stoic conversion by complete financial and emotional breakdown, so, I would suggest, the motive behind Damasippus’ highlighting of Horace’s struggle to write poetry is a much misguided attempt to break down the poet’s artistic esteem, thus guaranteeing, the Stoic hopes, a conversion. But the criticism of the poet’s failure to write also has ironic programmatic significance for *Sat. 2.3* and for Horace’s *Satires* on the whole, as a number of scholars have seen: Damasippus’ glorification of speed and bulk as criteria for writing flies in the face of the Callimachean stylistic ideals of brevity and slow, painstaking composition that Horace has asserted in his first book of *Satires*. The criticism expressed by Damasippus at

700 Damasippus refers in line 10, and which Horace has evidently been longing for, bears this out. The fact that Horace is, in addition, said to have brought study material with him is another motivation for seeing him as having left the city (11-12). The important point is that the unsympathetic Stoic busybody Damasippus is interfering with Horace’s Epicurean-inspired *ataraxia* at the latter’s supposedly solitary retreat (cf. Bond 1987: 2). The gift of the Sabine farm is of course famously treated in *Sat. 2.6* (*Hoc erat in voce*...).

700 *Sat. 2.3.1-2:* ...*at tota non quater anno/membranam poscias...* It is moreover the rough practice sheets, the *membranae*, that Horace uses so sparingly, and not even the *charia* or paper made of papyrus on which the final version would be copied (see Muecke 1993: *ad loc.*).
the beginning of Sat. 2.3 is a Saturnalian inversion of the literary ideals asserted in Book One. By complaining that Horace writes slowly, therefore, Damasippus ironically indicates that the poet is indeed carrying out his Callimachean compositional ideals.

In the *liber sermonum* the long-winded and the prolix had been Horace’s stylistic targets and enemies in much the same way as the greedy and the adulterous had been the butt of his moralising. Long-winded Stoics - Fabius and Crispinus - inhabited a number of satires in the first book, where they were the bane of the Callimachean-inspired satirist’s life. Moreover, Chrysippus himself, on whose name, as we have seen, ‘Damasippus’ seems a pun, and to whose authority the Stoic lecture appeals twice, was credited with having been an exceptionally prolific or prolix writer, depending on one’s bias. As a Stoic, therefore, although a new one, Damasippus - the poor man’s Chrysippus - is fittingly longwinded, and is also appropriately aligned with the ridiculous Stoic windbags of the *liber sermonum*. It is not surprising, then, that Sat. 2.3, Horace’s longest satire, should owe its bulk to a lengthy Stoic lecture. The Stoic’s concerns are evidently not composition but conversion, and consequently, like the paradox he preaches, he strives to be as inclusive as possible.

Since the literary references of the first 15½ lines of Sat. 2.3 have already been mined extensively and successfully brought to light, I shall attempt to elucidate only a few further facets. Horace keeps undoing and reweaving his work a dozen times, complains Da-

701 Fabius appears near the beginning of Horace’s first satire as the ‘wordy Fabius’ - *loquacem...Fabium* (1.1.13-14). Crispinus is said to challenge Horace to a competition to see who can write more in a limited time, which the poet declines, thanking the gods that they have furnished him with a puny intellect (*pusilli ...animi*) so that he has little to say and then only on rare occasions (1.4.13b-21). Crispinus expresses active appreciation of the anti-Callimachean notions of ‘bigger’, ‘faster’, and ‘more’. The scholiast Porphyrian describes Crispinus as the author of poems written *tam garrule*, but it is hard to show that Porphyrian is not indebted to the *Satires* themselves for this piece of information.

702 *Sat.* 2.3.44, 287.

703 Diogenes Laertius (7.180) tells us that Chrysippus wrote much but not very well: No one was more industrious (ποικιλότατος), by which Diogenes explains that Chrysippus was the author of over 705 works. Regarding volume as a virtue, Chrysippus, according to Diogenes, thought to increase the number of his publications by arguing repeatedly on the same subject. Corrections made merely added to the bulk, and the text was heavily padded with quotations, once, incredibly, including almost the whole of Euripides’ *Medea*. However verifiable these outrageous assertions, Diogenes’ later representation reflects an amusing tradition that Horace, tongue in cheek, saw fit to use against the Stoics, just as he mocked their paradoxes and dogma.
masippus, again unaware that this is the correct approach for a Callimachean: ... scriptorum quaeque retexens (2.3.2). The ‘weaving’ image, a metaphor for composition, may have an additional meaning, as not only is the verb retexo significant, being found only here in the Horatian corpus, but in addition the image would seem to recall the most famous weaver (and un-picker and re-weaver) of them all - Penelope. Like Penelope, Horace unpicks and reweaves. The Homeric Penelope’s undoing and redoing of her handiwork would ensure that Laertes’ shroud was never completed. This aspect may well be understood by Damasippus as the crux of the analogy as applied to Horace: Horace will never complete his work at the rate he is going.

But there is, I would suggest, another side to this analogy which must escape Damasippus. Penelope’s refusal to complete the shroud was due to her desire to stay faithful to her absent husband Odysseus, and to avoid having to marry one of the suitors. Likewise, Horace’s motive in ‘unpicking’ his work is similarly based on a principle of exclusivity, which is closely allied to his stylistic tenets - the desire for an exclusive audience. On the contrary, Damasippus’ popular reputation and his common touch mark him out as part of the turba, as we have seen, and this is reflected in his brash lack of understanding of Horace’s stylistic and compositional exclusivism. By comparing Horace with Penelope, even although he is undoubtedly blind to its full range of nuances, Damasippus is therefore ironically made to suggest that Horace’s literary scheme parallels Penelope’s strategy for preserving her fidelity, in that by constantly reworking the textum of his poems, Horace

704 Retexo is however also used of Penelope’s weaving at Cicero Ac. 2.29.95, and later by Ovid at Amores 3.9.30. For the Homeric treatment, see Odyssey 19.149-151, where Penelope recounts her diurnal weaving and nocturnal unpicking strategy. She also relates how she was eventually betrayed and caught (cf. 152-156). Like Penelope, Horace’s strategies for textual composition have been found out and, in the course of this lengthy satire, are also frustrated by his critic Damasippus.

705 In his first book of Satires, Horace had intermittently expressed the intent to address himself to a limited and exclusive audience. His works were not to be on sale in shops or be posted on pillars for the sweaty hands of common mob and of Tigellius Hermogenes to fondle (Sat. 1.4.71f). Instead, Horace would recite his works only to his friends and then only when they compelled him (nec recito cuiquam nisi amitis, idque coactus, 1.4.73). A catalogue of Horace’s preferred readers appears towards the end of the final satire of Book One, where he also links the ideals of slow with those of exclusive composition in the Callimachean tradition: ‘You must often use your eraser, if you’re to write something worth a second reading, and you shouldn’t strive for the admiration of the crowd (turba), but should be satisfied with a limited readership ...’ (1.10.72-74). Unlike the garrulous Lucilius, who claimed that he wanted average people to read him, Horace, as his catalogue in 1.10 reveals, will settle only for the best of his generation. Only a refined, constantly edited style would assure him of that exclusive audience.
addresses himself to an exclusive audience in much the same way as Penelope, by an analogous device, reserved herself solely for Odysseus.\textsuperscript{706}

Equally ironic is Damasippus' assertion that our 'unproductive' poet is lavish with wine and sleep (\textit{vini somnique benignus}, 3): wine is one of the proverbial sources of poetic inspiration.\textsuperscript{707} Damasippus understands the enthusiasm for wine in a more literal sense, however: Horace is too drunk\textsuperscript{708} and too sleepy to compose poetry, he asserts. Perhaps, as I have suggested, we may understand the effects of this, in combination with the tedious lecture, rather literally too - the inebriated and thus drowsy Horace nods off while Damasippus, following Stertinius ('Prof. Snore'), composes the satire on his behalf. Foolishly also, Damasippus accuses Horace specifically of not 'singing' anything worthwhile, anything worthy of \textit{sermo}:
\textsuperscript{709} \textit{nil dignum sermone canas} (4). Damasippus' choice of termino-

\textsuperscript{706} Another image with roots in the \textit{Odyssey} is that of the \textit{Siren} (line 14; cf. \textit{Odyssey} 12.37ff, 153ff). Anderson (1961: 105ff) has drawn attention to the positioning of the unexpected noun-in-apostrophe \textit{Desidia} at the start of the following line: \textit{vitanda est improba Siren/Desidia}. - 'Take care to avoid the shameless Siren Sloth!' (14-15). Anderson notes that, from a Epicurean perspective, \textit{doctrina} might have been the anticipated word, since Epicurus is thought to have urged his followers to flee from education as if from a Siren (id.: 106). From a Stoic perspective, on the other hand, it would indeed be \textit{desidia} (indolence, sloth) which was \textit{improba} and to be avoided. Anderson therefore suggests that we have here in Horace's \textit{Satires} an early mimicking of standard Stoic parody of Epicurean teachings (id.: 107), although this would have been ironical beyond Damasippus' own grasp (cf. id.: 105). While the term \textit{Siren} had become associated with 'the lure of intellectual things' (id.: 106) - for example, Alcibiades is made to use it of Socrates at \textit{Symp.} 216a - Damasippus interprets Horace's intellectual pretensions concerning his art of composition as sloth. Anderson (id.: 108) sees the mention of \textit{Desidia} here as part of an indirect propagandistic statement on Horace's part concerning his new, apparently laid-back manner in \textit{Satires} Book Two.

\textsuperscript{707} The 'wine-drinkers' were often pitted against the 'water-drinkers' in terms of this commonplace (see A.P. 11.20; cf. Crowther 1979: 4ff). Horace had earlier used the image of wine-blending to describe an impure Latinity at \textit{Sat.} 1.10.23ff - cf. p.166 n. 476 above.

\textsuperscript{708} I follow Bentley and Kiessling-Heinze (1921: \textit{ad loc.}) in understanding \textit{sobrius} (line 5) as belonging to the sentence beginning in line 4: \textit{at ipsis/Saturnalibus hoc fugisti sobrius} (4-5). This suggests that Horace arrived at his holiday-house sober (promising great poetic output), but has proceeded to get drunk once there. The alternative, as in Lejay (1911: \textit{ad loc.}) and in the Oxford text (Wickham 1941: \textit{ad loc.}), is to take \textit{sobrius} with what follows: \textit{sobrius ergodicit aliquid dignum promissis...} (5-6). This, however, would seem to contradict the phrase \textit{vini somnique benignus} in 3, unless of course Horace has sobered up in the meantime (this seems unlikely), or if \textit{sobrius} should be interpreted as meaning 'serious-minded' or 'reasonable' rather than the opposite \textit{ebrius} (also unlikely). However, this other meaning would still not exclude the likelihood of Horace's inebriation on his farm, especially in view of line 3. Has Horace been consuming the supplies of Falernian that if preserved, would only go to his heir one day anyway?

\textsuperscript{709} There are a number of ways to understand \textit{dignum sermone}. The word \textit{dignum} is likely a literal translation of the Greek \textit{dv\\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧}\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧, a significant Stoic term designating value (Cicero \textit{Fin.} 3.50-1, cf. Bond 1987: 4, who suggests that we are to imagine the neophyte readily using the jargon of his new faith wherever possible). However, it is unnecessary to assume, with Bond (\textit{ibid.}), that only one of the interpretations he suggests can be right or that more than one meaning cannot coexist. Therefore \textit{dignum sermone} (\textit{dv\\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧}\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧ \textit{Lo}\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧\\̧, cf. Kiessling-Heinze 1921: \textit{ad loc.}) could mean simultaneously 'worthy of talk', 'worthy of your talk' (i.e.
logy here is unfortunate if he is to inspire Horace to practice his satiric art: 'singing' was associated with the higher genres of poetry, as is reflected in the first line of the future *magnum opus* of Horace's friend Virgil. Thus the Horatian satirist's refusal to 'sing' on Damasippus' orders is again an indirect form of the standard Callimachean-inspired programmatic *re cusatio*.

Horace's inverse programmatic assertion at the start of *Sat.* 2.3 thus emerges from the anti-Callimachean Damasippus' literary criticism set out there, which is simultaneously the latter's own positive programmatic statement for the speech he is about to make: indeed, the greatest contradiction to Horace's stylistic ideals (and, at the same time, a confirmation of Damasippus' ideas) is the very length of *Sat.* 2.3 itself. As far as the practice of *sermo* is concerned, Damasippus has, by producing a satiric of enormous length, put his money where his mouth is. Having, he supposes, deflated Horace's poetic ego by his criticism, Damasippus thereafter proceeds to inflate his own ego as he expands the girth of *Sat.* 2.3 with his lengthy Stoic speech. As main speaker of *Sat.* 2.3, swollen with hot air, Damasippus ironically far better approximates the image of the self-inflating frog to which he later unfavourably compares the allegedly ambitious Horace.

what you said you would do') - like *dic aliquid dignum promissis* (6) - and ironically (in that this layer of meaning is hidden from the speaker, Damasippus) also 'worthy of one of your satires'. It may also be significant that Stertinius, upon finding Damasippus planning to step off the Fabrician bridge, tries to prevent him from doing anything 'unworthy' of him: *cave faxistis quicquam indignum* (38-9). This refers to the Stoic belief in suicide only at the appropriate time, itself discernible only to the sage. However, there may be some correlation between *indignum* with reference to Damasippus' own situation on the verge of conversion, and *nil...dignum* (4) with regard to Horace's. If Horace has not written much and what he has written is not *dignum sermone*, then, Damasippus seems to be suggesting, Horace's present literary position equals Damasippus' own professional one when he was desperate enough to exchange a leap off a bridge for a leap of faith. This would support the idea that Damasippus' motive for literary criticism parallels the motive for his moral criticism of Horace: conversion.

The writers that Horace has stuffed into his bag and taken away for holiday reading (Plato, Menander, Eupolis, and Archilochus, 11-12) suggest that he is to be imagined as working on his *Satires* and *Epodes* (cf. Haight 1947: 147ff) rather than more high-flown genres requiring to be 'sung'. There may, however, be another aspect to the reference to 'singing'. If Horace is consistent (as I maintain he is) from satire to satire and from book to book in his construct of a satiric identity and a literary polemic, it may be significant that 'singing' (as opposed to talking, which is the art of satire) has received very bad press in *Satires* Book One: Horace's favourite satiric butt Tigellius Hermogenes was a singer (1.3.1-3; 129), and his pal the ape 'sang' only Calvus and Catullus at *Sat.* 1.10.19. This 'singing' may be interpreted as 'recite in a sing-song fashion' - in other words, without understanding or much feeling (see e.g. Brown 1993: *ad loc.*).

The image is applicable both to Damasippus, inflated with self-importance, and to the enormous satire itself. See Oliensis (1997: 95), who calls Damasippus 'the over-inflated frog of this puffed-up poem...'. In a sense Damasippus is *Sat.* 2.3, and in the end, of course, Horace will pop both.
Yet, unmistakably, Damasippus will never equal Horace’s magnitude as satirist, even if he burst himself in the attempt. While in the recent past, as we have noted, Damasippus would have been among the targets of the Horatian moralist in the first book of *Satires*, presently he also shows himself to be a veritable stylistic nightmare: in bulk alone *Sat. 2.3* deserves the subtitle of ‘how *not* to write Horatian satire’. Not solely in terms of the ideas set out by Damasippus at its start, therefore, but also because of their realisation in the very length of its central sermon, the Saturnalian *Sat. 2.3* is both an inverse confirmation of and a dialogical retort to the literary ideals Horace expressed in *Satires* Book One.

*How *not* to write Horatian satire*

Yet the central sermon of *Sat. 2.3* is not just ‘un-Horatian’ because of its length, but by its very nature. On the surface it seems that there are many similarities, both in style and content, between Damasippus-Stertinius’ treatment here and the moralising satires ascribed to ‘Horace’ as speaker in the first book. However, the apparent dialogicality of *Sat. 2.3*’s Stoic lecture is merely superficial, as we shall see shortly. In addition, the far more structured nature of the Stoic sermon indicates that it is closer to an ‘authoritative’ formal lecture than to the ‘addressive’, informal conversational style cultivated by the Horatian moralist of Book One. Since it is undesirable to fall into the trap of following every twist of the lengthy Stoic lecture, in what follows we shall examine only a few salient samples of the manner in which the speech of Damasippus-Stertinius is comparable to but also strikingly different from the ‘diatribes’ attributed to Horace’s own character, especially in the moralising triad of *Satires* Book One.

When set against the ‘diatribes’ of the *liber sermonum*, the most strikingly different thing about Damasippus-Stertinius’ homily is the habit of announcing what one is going to do before one does it, something quite foreign to Horace.712 Even before beginning his ‘diate­ribe’ proper, Stertinius, as quoted by Damasippus, reveals to his listener his intentions therein: he will look at what it means to be mad, and if it turns out that only Damasippus

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712 This was already remarked by Lejay (1911: 356).
is mad, he will not prevent the latter from committing suicide (41-2). Immediately thereafter the topic of his ‘diatribe’, the paradox of everyone but the sage being mad, is announced, and the orthodoxy of this tenet is trumpeted by an appeal to Chrysippus himself: ‘Whomever evil stupidity and ignorance of the truth drive blindly on, Chrysippus’ students and followers declare mad. This formula applies to whole populations and great kings, all except the Stoic sage’ (43-46a). The lecture itself will confirm that Damasippus-Stertinius’ approach is precisely what he calls it - a formula (45), a general rule taken to apply in every case.

At 77-81 Damasippus-Stertinius summons all those who suffer from ambitio (78a), avaritia (78b), luxuria (79a), and superstition (79b), and other forms of madness (80a), and invites them to hear his homily. This announcement functions as a preview of the subject matter that Damasippus-Stertinius will treat, and indeed, it turns out that the speaker more or less faithfully follows the approach which is mapped out here. There is also a reiteration of the argument to which the Stoic preacher intends to subordinate his subject matter - that all are mad excepting the sage (81). Throughout Sat. 2.3’s central sermon there is a recurrence of key terms and phrases which, metrically, amount to rubrics in Damasippus-Stertinius’ speech. There is, for example, the repeated use of the pedagogically-toned munc (now), which indicates whatever the Stoic speaker is embarking on next:

713 quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri/caecum agit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex/autemat. haec populos, haec magnos formula reges, excepto sapiente, tenet.

714 Audire atque togam iubeo componere... huc propius me, dum doceo insanire omnis vos ordine, adite. As noted above, it is as if Stertinius’ ‘diatribe’ was prepared with a larger audience of students in mind, and the standard welcome is merely reiterated even when it is addressed to only one. However, the universal nature of the standard Stoic thesis Stertinius is spouting encourages this cursory expansion of the lecture in any case. In this there is the implication that Horace (and each one of us, the readers, as well) is included among the targets of this ‘diatribe’.

715 Although the order of appearance of the first two subjects Damasippus-Stertinius mentions are in practice reversed (has Damasippus mixed them up?), this is indeed more or less the order in which the subjects are treated. Avaritia, apparently considered the worst form of insanity (82-3), is treated first and at greatest length (82-178), followed by ambitio, which is treated briefly (179-186). After an interlude, luxuria is treated (224-246), followed by madness in love (247-280), which presumably would either be a subsection of luxuria (since both vices were closely associated) or would fall into the category of alius mentis morbus. These are followed finally by a treatment of superstition (281-295).

716 Nilsson (1952: 186) noticed that these ‘headings’ (Rubrikverse) are metrically marked out from the other lines by the high degree of elision in them; cf. Reinelt 1969: 82. It is almost as though these Rubrikverse are treated to the metrical equivalent of the modern typographical convention of putting headings in bold or underlining them (i.e. distinguishing them in some way).
'Now hear why everyone, including you yourself, is insane...' (46b-47); 'Now I am going to show that all people are mad with a similar delusion' (62-63); 'Now, come on, help me in taking luxury and Nomentanus to task...' (224). There is also the regular repetition of the standard Stoic term ratio (reason), by means of which Damasippus-Sertinius frequently prefaces new sections in his lecture. The final section on superstitio is the only part of the lecture that is itself unheralded, but is labelled instead in retrospect.

By contrast, in the satires of the first book, Horace constantly took his audience by surprise and we could never be sure what he was going to do next. Seldom would he proclaim his programme in advance: more often he would approach his topics indirectly, and on occasion he would even promise to do something which clearly he had no intention of doing. As speaker of the moral 'diatribes' of Book One, Horace often adopted the style of a casual but intimate conversationalist rather than that of a formal lecturer or preacher, as does Damasippus-Sertinius. Also, unlike Damasippus-Sertinius who readily drops the name of the Stoic messiah Chrysippus (44), moral 'diatribes' of the first book Horace never appealed seriously or directly to a philosopher or to a single school of philosophy, but appeared to mould his own personalised moral universe around an idiosyncratic adaptation of popular moralising. He also tended to attack formulae and formal tenets, particularly Stoic ones, such as the belief that all sins are equal (in Sat. 1.3).

717 Nunc accipe quaere/desipiant omnes aeque ac tu... (46b-47); Nunc ego vulgus/errorem similem cunctum insanire docebo (62-3); Nunc, age, luxuriam et Nomentanum arripe mecum... (224).

718 See lines 83 (where ratio is used to start off the section on avaritia), 227 (where it begins the section on luxuria) and 250 (beginning the sub-section on indulgence in love). Undoubtedly ratio translates the Greek λόγος, the fundamental and all-pervasive principle of the universe, according to the Stoics. Muecke (1993: ad loc.) suggests that the use of ratio in these contexts means, in effect, 'a correct interpretation, according to us Stoics...'.

719 The famous instance of this is at Sat. 1.4.63-4: ...alias iustum sit necne poema,nunc illud tantum quaeram..., a pledge Horace fails to fulfil directly in this satire. But the tone is obviously mock-serious and at the end of that piece Horace hints that he does consider satire poetry as he clearly includes himself in a gang of poets (141-143).

720 As Fraenkel noted, 'Throughout his sermones, Horace...takes great care never to give the impression of delivering a lecture or preaching a sermon: he wants to talk, as a gentleman will talk in congenial company...' (1957: 94). In conversation, moreover, it is perfectly acceptable to go off on a tangent or, at least, to seem to do so (ibid.). Anderson also remarks on the succinct and carefully-cultivated unpredictability of Horace's conversational style in the Satires: 'Reading Horatian satire, then, is work. There are no moments for relaxation. Even the transitions from sentence to sentence often escape the casual reader, who suddenly finds himself in new territory, totally unable to explain how he got there...' (1982: 19).
In support of his doctrine, nevertheless, the Stoic speaker of *Sat.* 2.3 has delved deep into the bag of common philosophico-rhetorical persuasive gimmicks and stock-in-trade arguments.\(^{721}\) As a result, in spite of Horace's exclusion from any dialogic interchange with Damasippus-Stertinius, minor dialogic elements enliven *Sat.* 2.3's central lecture. Superficially comparable to the 'diatribist' of the first book, therefore, the Stoic speaker often punctuates his speech with questions addressed to a fictional interlocutor, such as the stock-figure of the miser (122-128), or a character from epic (187ff). More obviously than the 'diatribist' of the first book, however, the Stoic speaker appears to answer almost every 'rhetorical' question himself, thus rendering these 'dialogues' little more than didactic exercises supplied with model answers.\(^{722}\)

As a result, Damasippus-Stertinius controls the dialogic elements of the sermon like a ventriloquist his dummy: 'Who is sane, then? The man who is not a fool. What about the miser? He's stupid and a madman. Well? If someone is not a miser, does it follow that he is sane? No. Why, Mr Stoic? I'll tell you...' (158-160).\(^{723}\) These dialogic exchanges are clearly more like a catechism, with neat, standard and expected answers, than a dynamic conversation in which different viewpoints are expressed. It is striking, moreover, that despite their obvious similarities, the puppet miser-figure of *Sat.* 2.3 is not heard to argue back at the moralist, as the rather more vociferous miser-interlocutor of *Sat.* 1.1 was permitted to do. Even the targets of *Sat.* 2.3's central sermon are fictional 'listeners' rather than fictional interlocutors.

Like the 'diatribist' of Book One, however, Damasippus-Stertinius makes use of lively stories (*fabulae*) which often combine narrative with dialogic elements. Anecdotes abound concerning, among other things, the drunken Fufius missing his cue on stage (57-62); the wealth-obsessed Staberius' financially-minded epitaph (84-99); the stingy Opimius'

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\(^{721}\) As Muecke notes (1993: 131), a popular preacher in the process of proselytizing could not afford to be completely dull as well as long. It is an indication of Horace's skill as a poet that Stertinius' lecture is indeed entertaining to the modern reader, if somewhat lengthy, while being evidently boring to 'Horace', the character in the *Satires*.

\(^{722}\) See e.g. 2.3.89b-94; 99b-103; 199-203a; 295 (quone malo mentem concussa? timore deorum).

\(^{723}\) *quinas remigitur samus?* 'qui non stultus? 'quid avarus? *stultus et insanus. quid, siquis non sit avarus, continuo samus?* minime. 'cur, Stoic? 'dicam.
refusal to take his medicine even when at death's door (142-157); the cunning Servius Oppidius' testamentary therapy for his sons' problems (168-181); the profligate Nomentanus' instantly dissolved patrimony (224-238); Metella's pearl, equally quickly dissolved and swallowed by Aesopus' son in an act of supremely decadent luxuria (239-242); the crazy freedman who prays for unique immortality (281-286); and the superstitious mother's foolhardy vow on her son's recovery (288-295) - all of the above animate the sermon with their charm and variety, even if, paradoxically, their raison d'être is to support the singular argument that everyone shares the same degree of insanity. Indeed, the Stoic's whole technique of argumentation is founded simply on heaping illustration upon illustration.

In and surrounding these illustrations, the common stock of moralising topoi concerning the cardinal vices of avarice, ambition, and so on, has been hauled out and put on display. While these anecdotes and topoi may have satisfied the ex-businessman Damasippus when related to him by Stertinius, their repetition to a more sophisticated audience has a less happy result: for one, they appear to have bored Horace to sleep. Yet recognisable parallels with, or possibly even echoes of Horace's own treatments of these vitia in the 'diatribes' of Satires Book One have prompted some scholars to argue that the central

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724 While the parallels may be indicative rather of an inheritance of popular-philosophical moralising common both to Stoicism and other schools, the similarities themselves beg us to compare Damasippus-Sertinius' use of topoi with Horace's. The comparable topoi in turn invite comparison between the entire moralising style of Sat. 2.3 and that of the 'diatribes' of Book One. The section in which Damasippus-Sertinius treats avaritia (2.3.82-128), for example, has much in common with Horace's treatment of avaritia in Sat. 1.1 (and Sat. 2.2). The miser of Sat. 2.3 is said to hide away his money and gold, unaware of how to use what he has accumulated and fearing to touch it as if it were sacred (qui nummos aurumque recondit; nescius uti compositis metuensque velut contingere sacrum, 109-110). In Sat. 1.1, unlike the ant which in hibernation wisely used up the supplies it had gathered in the summer (non usquam prorepi et illis utitur ante /quaesitis sapiens, 1.1.37-8), the miser did not understand the use to which money was to be put: nescis quo valeat nummos, quem praebeat ussum? (1.1.73). Cf. nescis ussum (1.1.73) and nescius us (2.3.109). Damasippus-Sertinius' miser lies awake keeping vigil over his heap of corn, stretched out and armed with a long stick, not touching a grain of it even when hungry, despite the fact that he owns it: si quis ad ingentem frumenti semper acervum porrectus vigilat cum longo fuste neque illic/audet esurien dominus contingere granum... (2.3.111-113). Likewise Horace's miser had an equally uncomfortable night, going to sleep on top of his pile of money-bags, with mouth agape (...congestis undique saccis/indormis inhians,..., 1.1.70-71), or staying awake all night long, anticipating the fires and slaves that could consume or assume his wealth (1.1.76-8: an vigilare metu examinem...). The miser of 2.3 is like the man who does not dare touch his heap even when hungry (112-3), but in fear seems to regard his wealth as something sacred (...metuensque velut contingere sacrum, 110); likewise the miser of Sat. 1.1 preserved his money-bags as if they were sacred objects (...et tamquam parcere sacris/cogeris,..., 1.1.71-2), not using them for any practical purpose, but
moral lecture is above reproach and that it should be divorced entirely from Damasippus’ inept and unsympathetic character portrayal elsewhere in Sat. 2.3. However, it is not that Damasippus-Stertinius’ fabulae or use of other topoi are problematic in themselves; it is rather that every one of them adds up to a relentless barrage of illustrations that renders the lecture exhausting. Even if all his arguments are above reproach, Damasippus’ moralising is simply too much of a good thing. However, there is no sign of recognition from the insensitive Stoic speaker that he may be going on for far too long, as story is heaped upon story.

As the relatively concise speaker in the ‘diatribes’ of his first book, by contrast, Horace would on occasion apologise for possibly wearying his audience, even when such an apology was entirely unnecessary. In addition, Horace exhibited a certain impatience with simply regurgitating standard ‘diatribal’ illustrations or topoi; instead he would often alter them or, where possible, give them a contemporary relevance. We have already seen that Bakhtin described the dialogically- and audience-orientated ‘internally persuasive discourse’ as ‘contemporary or reclaimable as contemporary’. Admittedly Damasippus-Stertinius, too, has recourse to a number of contemporary Roman illustrations, but then he embellishes his lecture with an equal selection of mythological exempla from epic and tragedy, something quite uncharacteristic of Horace’s own moralising style in Book One. While Damasippus-Stertinius’ Roman exempla might be reclaimable as contemporary, the Stoic speaker’s interpretations of mythology, along with many of his other anecdotes and examples, are largely confused and decidedly quirky.
Ineptitude, idiosyncracy and irony

For a start, the Stoic misinterprets as a sign of insane profligacy the famous anecdote about the Cyrenaic philosopher Aristippus (99-103), who was said to have ordered his slaves to dump the gold they were lugging through the desert because their burdens slowed them down too much.\(^\text{729}\) Damasippus-Stertinius views this as an example of fatuous extravagance, an insanity which is the opposite equivalent of the miserliness he has just treated (\textit{uter est insanior horum?}, 102b). His understanding of the tragic Orestes' madness follows the tradition of the orators rather than Aeschylus, as he suggests that Orestes was already mad before he committed matricide.\(^\text{730}\)

Responsibility for a good portion of this inept idiosyncracy may be laid squarely at the door of Damasippus-Stertinius' inflexible dogma. His unusual readings of a well-known \textit{chreia} concerning a philosopher on the one hand, and of the Oresteian cycle on the other, are motivated mainly by the thesis that all except the Stoic sage are mad and equally so, the argument to which he subordinates everything: thus to maintain the validity of this tenet he must, of necessity, regard both the Cyrenaic philosopher and the pre-matricidal Orestes as insane. Alternatives, such as the possibility that Aristippus might have been motivated by moral independence of such externals as material possessions rather than by insanity, or that Orestes might have killed his mother for the purpose of avenging his father's murder, and might in turn owe his temporary insanity to the avenging Furies, either escape or are pointedly ignored by this speaker.

On a more complex level, however, the authorial and actual audiences of \textit{Sat.} 2.3 are invited to detect degrees of irony between the different layers of the satire. For example, at 104ff, where he is impugning avarice as a variety of insanity, Damasippus-Stertinius cites three \textit{exempla} of people who acquire the equipment appropriate to particular professions.

\(^{729}\) See D.L. 2.77, where this \textit{chreia} is also said to have been recounted by Bion \textit{èν ταίς διατριβής}.  
\(^{730}\) See lines 134-136. This is made to fit the speaker's suggestion, just prior to this, that someone who kills his mother or his wife is as insane as someone who stones his slaves, for whom he paid cash (128b-132).
but fail to use this equipment. These three exempla, which are metaphors for the miser's twin vices of acquisitiveness and refusal to use his store of supplies, are: someone who buys lyres only to store them up and never to use them (104-5); someone who buys cutting tools when he is not a cobbler (106a); someone who buys ships' sails when against the idea of trading (106-7).

Each of these exempla, I would suggest, may have broader significance within the poem as a whole: the example of the person who buys lyres never to use them in the service of any Muse could have literary connotations, and within the context of Damasippus' repetition of the Stoic speech, this may be an indirect dig at Horace, the reluctant poet whom Damasippus had attacked at the start of Sat. 2.3. Again, the third example, that of the man who buys sailing equipment when aversus mercaturis (107a), may be another touch of Horatian self-satire placed in a Stoic mouth. We have seen that merchants were among the Horatian moralist's targets in his first satire, as they were continuously sailing the seas in pursuit of wealth. We have also seen that Damasippus had himself ironically been a merchant (and thus one of Horace's targets) prior to his financial demise and subsequent conversion. What is more, as he listened to Stertinius' original version of the lecture, Damasippus would as yet have been the failed merchant in the process of conversion. However, in this particular instance Damasippus had at least been an active merchant - unlike Horace, of course, whom Damasippus himself has ridiculed as a passive and unproductive poet. While on the surface merely repeating Stertinius' exempla, Damasippus may even 'with a sideways glance' be comparing himself favourably to Horace. If, however, the subtleties of both these exempla are felt to be beyond Damasippus, they may alternatively be read as ironies perceived and exploited by Horace himself in his recounting of the event.

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731 We have seen that, at the start of Sat. 2.3, Damasippus might have been exhorting Horace to attempt the higher genres, possibly lyric, when he berated him for not 'singing' (line 4). However, here the owner of the lyres neither plays them nor, indeed, honours any other Muse: nec studio citharae nec Musae deditus ulli (105).
But what is of particular importance for satire of the Stoics is the irony contained in the second example, which should almost certainly be read as a contribution added in the course of Horace’s own transcription (i.e. composition) of the lecture. This is the *exemplum* of someone who buys shoe-manufacturing tools when he is not a cobbler (*si scalpra et formas non sutor...*, 106). In this case, I would suggest, the import is philosophical rather than literary. Being a cobbler, despite no practical experience of this trade, was one of the standard attributes which the Stoa ascribed to the sage, and the bizarre nature of this impracticable idea was itself ridiculed by Horace in *Sat.* 1.3. 732 Although this may be fortuitous, the fact that the speaker at *Sat.* 2.3.106 appeals to the example of the *sutor*, rather than to that of any other tradesman, may be significant: the point the Stoics made about their *sapiens* - a master in every *techne* despite having never practically engaged in a particular one - is of course an entirely separate affair to that of a man who buys the tools of the trade but fails to use them. But the lack of practical experience in either case - the man who owns the title of ‘cobbler’ despite never having made a pair of shoes, and the man who owns the equipment for shoe-making but does not make any - in some sense renders them curiously analogous. In having Damasippus-Stertinius ironically refer to the *sutor*, Horace pokes fun at the Stoics, reminding us of his derision of their crazy, impractical ideas at the end of *Sat.* 1.3.

**Addressivity and Authority: conclusions**

Even the manner in which Damasippus concludes the speech derived from Stertinius is definite and tidy, which is again something uncharacteristic of Horace’s own discursive style. In this conclusion, 733 Damasippus announces that his preceding speech has comprised the ‘weapons’ (*arma*, 297) donated to him by Stertinius, whom he loyally flatters.

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732 See e.g. ὁ μὴ σκυτεύς at *Epict.* 3.23.8; cf. Kiessling-Heinze 1921: *ad loc.* At *Sat.* 1.3.127-128 the interlocutor, appealing to the authority of Chrysippus, had been made to announce the paradox that the *sapiens* is a *sutor* although he has never made any shoes or sandals; ‘*sapiens crepidas sibi numquam/nec soleas fecit; sutor tamen est sapiens*’. Horace’s response to this had been an unceremonious but deserving: *qui?* (128).

733 *haec mibi Stertinius, sapientum octavus, amico/arma dedit, posthac ne compellarer inultus./dixerit insanum qui me totidem audiet atque/respicere ignoto discet pendentia tergo* (2.3.296-299).
by proclaiming 'the eighth sage' (*sapientum octavus*, 296).\(^{734}\) These ‘weapons’, granted to his ‘friend’ (*amico*, 296) by Prof. Snore, are aimed at defending Damasippus against the insults of all those people who persist in calling him mad - and there are evidently many, since he was driven to the brink of suicide by their taunts of insanity. But if they call him insane again in future, Damasippus assures us, they will hear the same in reply, courtesy of the speech on the Stoic paradox of all but the sage being mad. Damasippus’ conclusion is then neatly rounded off further with a reference to a children’s game mentioned earlier.\(^{735}\)

The defensive nature of this formal conclusion to the speech, reflected in its imagery of weaponry, reveals what Damasippus himself perceives to be the purpose of his recitation - which may in turn explain his curious failure, throughout most of the talk, to indicate his awareness of, or at least to adapt his speech to his audience, Horace. For although it is Damasippus’ duty to convert Horace to Stoicism, and it is made clear elsewhere that this is indeed his intention, in the central sections of the satire, as he relays Stertinius’ message, Damasippus proves incapable of addressing Horace personally and directly. In other words, as we have noted, there is a dire lack of ‘addressivity’ in Damasippus’ repetition of Stertinius’ speech: Damasippus recites the speech *at* Horace, instead of talking *to* him.

We have seen that while, in Bakhtinian terms, dialogic and addressive ‘internally persuasive discourse’ could be said to characterise the discourse with authority of Horace’s own moralising satires in Book One, by contrast ‘authoritative discourse’, which is fixedly ‘prior’ and ‘distanced’, typifies the doctrine that Damasippus transmits, for the most part without any creative representation or independent evaluation, in the central sections of *Sat. 2.3*.

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\(^{734}\) This was a commonplace variety of compliment in antiquity, e.g. calling Sappho ‘the tenth Muse’ or Berenike ‘the fourth Grace’. We may recapture the bathos of Damasippus’ misplaced compliment by considering modern equivalents such as ‘a second Einstein’.

\(^{735}\) Cf. *respicere ignoto discet pendentia tergo* (299), and *qui te deridet, caudam trahat* (53). The first reference at line 53 can almost certainly be attributed to Stertinius himself. In repeating this idea at the end of the speech, Damasippus may of his own accord be recalling the earlier illustration, or he may, for his own benefit, be repeating parting advice possibly given him by Stertinius at the end of the latter’s recitation.
Damasippus does not address Horace, I would maintain, because he is not reciting the central speech for Horace’s benefit; rather, like someone fingering worry-beads, Damasippus repeats Stertinius’ address at length to himself and for his own reassurance. Damasippus, it seems, intends to convince himself that not only can he protect himself against the taunts, but that he can also take revenge on those who call him crazy, as the imagery of line 297 in particular (arma dedit...inultus) suggests. Yet within the following two lines the images of warfare are exchanged for those of playground battles: as lines 298-299 would indicate, Stertinius’ speech is Damasippus’ security as victim against Rome’s bullies, and the puerile Damasippus seems to think that he must repeat it as fully and as accurately as possible for it to take effect, to point to the tails on the backs of those who taunt him. This defensive and selfish motivation for Damasippus’ recitation of Stertinius’ lecture may explain why many readers have felt that Damasippus fails utterly to ‘connect’ with Horace in the central sermon of Sat. 2.3: there it is for the most part not Horace’s conversion but Damasippus’ own confidence and comfort that are being addressed.

In the final 27 lines of the poem, there is a return to dramatic dialogue between Damasippus and ‘Horace’, as from line 300 onwards the latter starts to reassert his authority, beginning by reclaiming the role of interlocutor, continuing with some incisive questioning of the claims and assumptions of Damasippus’ relayed speech, and finally reaffirming his own position as host, main speaker, satirist, and ultimately, as author. First asserting that he feels himself to be sane (...ego nam videor mihi sanus, 302b), Horace shortly allows that he may be foolish (stultum me fateor..., 305a), or even mad (atque etiam insanum..., 306a), but demands to know with which vice Damasippus believes him to be afflicted (quo mel/aegra... putes animi vitio, 306-307).

Pressed, Damasippus comes up with a belated explication of exactly how Horace can be considered insane: first, although he is vertically- and socially-challenged, the ambitious Horace is allegedly engaging in extravagant building projects (presumably on the Sa-

736 This is belated precisely because of Damasippus’ failure to address or at least to adapt his derived lecture to Horace prior to this; likewise, that it is so belated could be regarded as further testimony to the dearth of ‘addressivity’ in Sat. 2.3’s central sermon.
bine farm, where this interlude has taken place); he is apparently out to emulate his patron, Maecenas, who is mentioned here by name for the first time in the second book of Satires (307bff). By way of illustration, Horace is now famously compared to the self-inflating frog in the fable which tries to emulate a calf, which it will of course never equal, even if it should burst itself in the attempt (314-320). Undoubtedly this is as much a compliment to the patron as it is a joke at Horace’s expense. The mention of Maecenas, and the allusion to the emblem on his seal - which apparently depicted a frog - inevitably draws our attention to the final or ‘outermost’ shell of this satire’s multiple layers, where ‘Horace’ not only plays the role of a character within the world of the Satires, but is also the main speaker and author, and where Maecenas is not only among the authorial audience of Sat. 2.3, but is ultimately the primary audience and could nearly be considered the ‘Superaddressee’ of the Satires. This comes, fittingly, just as Horace is in the process of reclaiming the roles of speaker and satirist from Damasippus. By now all the satire’s pieces have been reassembled and the babushka doll is complete once more.

The remainder of Damasippus’ accusations now come thick and fast, and as these increase towards the satire’s close in frequency, outrageousness, and proportionate improbability, we get the impression that Horace’s Stoic critic is grasping at straws in a desperate attempt to indict him: not only is Horace ambitious and too big for his boots, as evidenced by his building, but he is also insane, according to Damasippus, because he is a poet (adde poemata nunc..., 321a), because of his quick temper (...horrendam rabiem..., 323), his extravagant lifestyle beyond his credit limit (cultum/maiorum censu, 323-324), and his allegedly insatiable sexual appetites (mille puellarum, puerorum mille furores, 325).

Damasippus’ suggestion that Horace’s poems indicate his insanity ironically not only reflects the well-established topos that poets should be a little crazy, but is also unfair in view of his attack on Horace at the start of this very satire for not producing poetry speedily enough: as a poet Horace, it seems, is damned if he does, and damned if he doesn’t. Of

737 Cf. A.P. 453ff, for a humorous treatment of the vesanus poeta. The concept of the ‘mad’ poet as the truly inspired poet also goes back at least to Plato Phaedrus 245a.
course, since Damasippus’ criticism of Horace’s slack poetic output, Horace has penned the longest satire of his career, three times the average length, even if this has consisted almost entirely of Damasippus’ own lengthy speech. Therefore if Horace is insane for his versifying, and the poem which results consists mostly of what Damasippus has to say anyway, the latter is indirectly admitting to having had a hand in this ‘mad’ poetry. But, as has been pointed out, Damasippus ‘nowhere denies his own insanity’; his point is, after all, that madness is a universal human malaise, if only manifested in different ways. Yet, as Horace’s own comment in the final line of this poem suggests, madness is a relative concept, one that, contrary to Stoic belief, is a question of degree. True madness, for Horace, does not consist of a plethora of competing voices or of the chatter of numerous personalities, but of one endless, monologic, undialogised and unchallenged single voice.

For all his faults, much of what Damasippus has to say, particularly about Horace in the final section of the satire, rings unmistakably true - at least, none of his accusations is contradicted, and Horace’s infuriated response would seem to indicate that something has indeed struck home. The poet’s horrenda rabies is confirmed when, almost as soon as Damasippus has spoken of it, Horace starts threatening to fly into a rage (iam desine..., 323). In the final few lines of Sat. 2.3, Damasippus suggests that Horace’s satiric character is not the modest, contented personality that he himself had sketched in his self-portrait in Satires Book One: rather, ‘Horace’ has more ambition than he would admit to in Sat. 1.6, he is more irascible than he had hinted in poems such as Sat. 1.9, less likely to live within his means and perhaps not as sensible in sexual matters as his own warnings in Sat. 1.2 and his father’s practical advice in Sat. 1.4 had exhorted him to be.

Even if we do not believe them, Damasippus’ accusations are amusing simply because of the way in which ‘Horace’ has been characterised in the liber sermonum. Damasippus is a dramatic externalisation of Horace’s self-satiric tendency which was evident as early as the first triad of Satires Book One. Whether viewed as Horace’s alter ego, a Stoic-inspired incarnation of his conscience, or as his stylistic bête noir, Damasippus nevertheless

738 Palmer commenting on Sat. 2.3.32 (1883: ad loc.).
offers another voice, an equally valid viewpoint on 'Horace'. This 'polyphony' anticipates Davus' own reading of 'Horace' as expounded in the penultimate Sat. 2.7, which will be my final area of focus.
CHAPTER EIGHT:

A WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN:
SATURNALIA AS PROTO-CARNIVAL IN SAT. 2.7

You must remember that for forty years I, through a chink, have been listening to the kind of stuff which you usually utter. Yes, I have been listening to it, and thinking it over, until it is no great marvel that I have learnt it all by heart, and can set it down in more or less literary form...

Fyodor Dostoevsky Notes from Underground (1994: 34).

At the start of Horace’s penultimate satire, as in Juvenal’s first, a listener finally gets the chance to speak. Sat. 2.7 begins with Horace’s slave, who bears the generically Comic name of Davus, announcing that he has been ‘listening’ for a long time (lamdudum ausculto, 1), and is itching to have a words with Horace (cupiens tibi dicere.../ paucae,..., 1b-2a). Davus is exhorted by his master to take advantage of the freedom granted him by the Saturnalia - for as in Sat. 2.3 the December holiday is also the present satire’s context - and to speak: libertate Decembri/... utere; narra (4-5).

Because the Comically resonant ausculto of the poem’s first line lacks an object, it is uncertain to what exactly Horace’s slave has been listening. The time scale of lamdudum is also vague: to how long a period does ‘for some time now’ refer? A number of suggestions have been made to explain these uncertainties, namely that Davus was listening

739 The later satirist Juvenal has his persona indignantly begin his Satires by expressing a similar frustration with the role of listener and stating his desire to take the floor: semper ego auditor tantum, numquamne reponam? (Sat. 1.1ff). This may be a deliberate echo of Horace Sat. 2.7, a symbolic claim to the role of satirist on the part of the later poet/speaker, just as Sat. 2.7.1-5 signals the start of Davus’ brief reign as satirist. On Juvenal’s persona here and indignatio, see Braund 1988: 1ff.

740 That auscultare, which often occurs in Roman comedy, is used instead of audire helps both to establish Davus’ Comic persona and to emphasise the Comic setting of Horatian satire. It is interesting that when in Plautus’ Miles gloriosus the servus callidus Palaestrio comes on stage for the first time, as he is addressing the audience and asking for their rapt attention, he repeats auscultare three times in a row (albeit in different forms) as he prescribes the Comic audience’s behaviour: Mihi ad enarrandum hoc argumentum est comitas; si ad auscultandum vosstra orit benignitas; qui autem auscultare nolet exsurgat foras;/ ut sit ubi sedeat ille qui auscultare volt (79-82; my emphasis).

741 Scholars have suggested various contexts for the words lamdudum ausculto. These are outlined by Palmer 1931: 356-7 ad loc.; cf. discussion of Bond 1978: 85. Palmer notes that while Bentley (1) suggested that this meant ‘while Horace was reciting the last satire’, and Orelli (2) thought it meant ‘while Horace was reading out or talking to himself’, the older commentaries (3) had proffered ‘when Horace was scolding
while Horace was reading aloud or talking to himself, listening while Horace was scolding some slaves, listening while Horace scolded Davus himself, listening at the door while Horace was sleeping or was slumped in a depression, or listening for Horace’s command. All these possibilities can be defended within the dramatic context of the satire itself as well as from what we know about servile existence in the Roman household. But I would suggest that the open-ended nature of the statement *lambdum ausculto* is deliberate: in this way Horace allows for the additional possibility of a ‘literary’ interpretation, namely that Davus has been overhearing all sixteen of the poet’s previous satires and is now ready to comment.

What Davus means by *pauca*, ‘a few words’ (2a), it turns out, is a moralising lecture aimed at his master: offered the floor, the slave takes the opportunity to scold Horace at length for all his shortcomings. Davus is helped in this by his tenuous grasp of Stoicism, indirectly obtained, we later discover, via a somewhat unreliable source - the janitor of Horace’s perpetual *bête noire* in the first book, the Stoic windbag Crispinus. Evidently, then, Horace is not the only speaker to whom his slave has been giving an ear. Understandably, the Stoic paradox *none but the sage is free and every fool is a slave* (Μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἔλευθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος) has struck Davus’ fancy, as it must also have

some slaves’. Palmer preferred (3). Other offerings have included the scenario where Davus would have been (4) ‘listening at the doors for his master’s commands’, or (5) ‘listening until Horace awoke from sleep, or rose from his lectus lucubratorius’ (Palmer ad loc.). Bond (1978: 85) suggests that Davus is intent chiefly on repaying Horace ‘for some of the verbal punishment which he has had to endure throughout his lifetime as a slave...’, but adds that the idea of Davus ‘interrupting the private, but spoken, musings of his master, possibly self-critical musings’ is also attractive, given that the slave is on the point of launching a critical attack on Horace *(ibid.)*. Cf. the idea of Horace sneaking up on Maecenas in Part 1, p. 87 above.

Slaves usually stood within earshot outside the door to a room, at their masters’ beck and call. Prohibited from speaking out of turn, slaves were to listen (cf. *ecquis audit?*, Sat. 2.7.34-35); it was this state of affairs that the Saturnalia would temporarily reverse. On servile eavesdropping and gossiping, see Aristophanes *Frogs* 749ff. For extreme cases of slaves being forbidden to talk, see Seneca *Epist.* 47.2-4.

As Harry B. Evans observes, ‘Davus, having listened to Horace sermonize for a long period (indeed we have already encountered 16 satires in the two books) now has his chance to play satirist and proceeds to deliver his own diatribe’ (1978: 309-310). The literary significance of the Saturnalian background can be found in the topsy-turvy inversions of Sat. 2.7: here a prior audience of the *Satires* (however surreptitiously he has performed that role) usurps the role of satirist.

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744 Cf. *Sat*. 2.7.45: ...*quaes Crispini docuit me ianitor...* Correspondences with Book One, such as the reappearance of Crispinus here, would seem to confirm the close interrelationship that I am suggesting exists between both books of Horace’s *Satires*.

745 Cf. frs. 349-366 von Arnim *SIF* 3. This famous Stoic paradox had already been treated in Latin by Cicero at *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 5 (...*solum sapientem esse liberum et omnem statulum servum*). In places
impressed Crispinus’ slave, and this provides the theoretical background to the ‘diatribe’. As the satire progresses, Davus works his way around to the idea that his master Horace, although technically free, is ironically a moral slave to various vices - unfortunately the very vices he has been wont to impugn as satirist.

An audience comes out of the woodwork

I am therefore inclined to imagine Davus the slave lurking all the while in the background as an eavesdropping audience of Horace’s Satires to date. Eavesdropping, typical servile behaviour in Roman comedy, is often the recourse of the powerless, a measure resorted to by those whose lives or livelihood depend entirely on the whims of others, and who need access to knowledge not otherwise available to them. Like Crispinus’ janitor who is clearly in the habit of overhearing his master, Davus, we are to imagine, has made it his business to listen in on Horace as he composes his Satires and dictates them to his scribe.746

Like the janitor also, until now Davus has been leading a liminal existence, as an ignored, unaddressed, unintended, and largely hidden audience who has been hovering on Horace’s threshold,747 and who can now be read retrospectively into the prior world of the Satires. At the start of Sat. 2.7, this audience has finally come out of the woodwork, ready to give his master, the satirist, a dose of his own medicine.

This interpretation is encouraged by the many echoes of Horace’s prior themes and diction in Davus’ speech, echoes which go back as far as Sat. 1.1 and which engage the poem in intertextual dialogue with a number of satires in between. For example, inconsistency,
the topic that Davus first addresses, and of which he eventually accuses Horace, had been
the subject of discussion at the start of Sat. 1.3, where Horace had similarly impugned the
hapless Tigellius; discontent, of which Davus also claims Horace is guilty, had been the
topic of the start of Horace’s first satire; adultery, an accusation to which Davus devotes a
large portion of his attack, had been ridiculed by the Horatian satirist himself in Sat. 1.2;
and gluttony, of which the slave also judges his master guilty, had been taken to task in
Sat. 2.2. Davus turns the tables on the satirist and accuses him of the very vices which he
had seen fit to criticise in others. By suggesting that many of the assertions made by Hor­
ace throughout his Satires about his own character and about his habits are untrue, or are
in fact the opposite of what he claimed they were, Davus implies that the satirist is a hyp­
ocrite. Horace, according to his household slave, has not practised what he has preached.

Saturnalian satire: proto-Carnivalesque role reversals in Sat. 2.7

In Horace’s penultimate satire, the freedom of the Saturnalia, on which slaves were tra­
ditionally allowed to have their say, thus appropriately occasions a thoroughgoing reversal
of roles both social and literary: a slave assumes the chastising authority of his master,
and a former audience of the Satires gets to lecture the satirist. Almost every textual and
extratextual role discernible within or in relation to Horace’s Sermones is reversed, ex­
changed, or rotated in Sat. 2.7. Not only has Horace relinquished the role of speaker and
assumed that of addressee and interlocutor, as in much of the second book, but taking the
trends of Sat. 2.3 even further, he has become the central target of the new moralist’s att­
ack. While Sat. 2.7 occasions a dramatic and dialogic interaction between Horace and his
slave, we, the actual audience, now ourselves cast in the role of eavesdroppers, are com­
pelled to listen in on Davus’ upbraiding of the erstwhile satirist. Positioned just before

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748 Another person reduced to the role of interested eavesdropper is, of course, Horace’s patron and former
direct addressee and dedicatee (‘primary audience’) Maecenas, who is mentioned by name at 2.7.33. As I
shall argue, there are certain things in Sat. 2.7 which appear to be clearly marked for the patron’s attention
and which are in effect designed for Maecenas’ overhearing. Again, we shall see that Horace’s satire is
composed with a subtle ‘sideways glance’ at the patron. On ‘eavesdropping’ audiences, cf. p. 178 n. 505
above.
the end of Horace’s second book, *Sat. 2.7* is strategically placed to undermine the entire edifice of the *Satires* that Horace has been constructing since the start of his first book.

These inversions and reversals in *Sat. 2.7* create a Saturnalian or - to name it by its later title - a Carnivalesque spectacle whereby the entire miniature universe of Horace’s *Satires* to which we have been privy up to this point has been completely turned upside down (the Carnival *monde à l’envers*). True to the customs of the Carnival, and its predecessor the Saturnalia, a lowly character (in this case, Davus) has been elevated to the position of the ‘king’ figure, and is allowed to ‘reign’ temporarily. At the same time the usual authority figure (in this case, Davus’ master, the satirist Horace) has been demoted and for the time being is subject to the power of the new ‘king’ figure and must do his bidding. In the context of *Sat. 2.7*, this means that Horace is required to listen to Davus, while the latter is granted the privilege of monologue. 749

**Davus: doctor ineptus or capable critic?**

Not everyone, however, has welcomed the thorough role reversals of *Sat. 2.7*: a number of modern scholars have evidently found the slave’s criticism of Horace contentious. As a result, they have tried to vindicate Horace, often by attempting to nullify the criticism itself and its vehicle, Davus. An impression of autobiography, as we have seen repeatedly, is one of the foremost fictions that Horace consciously creates in the *Satires*. That many earlier scholars seem to have felt the urge to defend Horace and to deflect Davus’ criticism from him is unquestionably the result of their often naively autobiographical approach towards the *Satires*. 750 This is exactly the effect that the attack on the ‘poet’ is design-

749 On monologue as generally a privilege of the powerful, usually occurring only once specific conditions have been fulfilled, cf. my Introduction, pp. 28-29 above.

750 As we have already noted at p. 190 above, some earlier scholars (Lejay 1911: *ad loc.*, Kiessling-Heinze 1921: 325) have tried to shelter Horace from Davus’ notorious adultery charge by suggesting an excursus between lines 46 and 71, in which Davus is said to attack an imaginary target rather than his master. According to this view, Horace is again the focus of attention only from lines 72 onwards. However, on Davus’ own assertion, at least from line 22 on (*ad te, inquam*), the criticism is indeed aimed at Horace. Moreover, as Hight (1973: 274-275) has pointed out, it is incredible that *o totiens servus* (70) should be directed at one person (the ‘diatribal’ straw-figure target) and *tune mihi dominus?* (75) and *imperitas aili servis miser* (81) at another. It is obvious that the development of Davus’ ‘moral slavery’ argument will only make sense
ed to have: having poor 'Horace' presented as the underdog wins for him audience- support. But to take Davus' critique as referring unambiguously to the 'real Horace', the historical author himself, is surely to make an error of judgement. Davus' stock servile name, which is introduced as early as line 2, establishes his interaction with his master as part of the world of Comedy. Moreover, as a dramatic enactment of the 'if someone were to say...' construction of the 'diatribal' mode, Sat. 2.7 presents a fictive exercise rather than an actual occurrence.751

Fiction or not, however, scholars need to explain why Davus' irreverent caricature of 'Horace' in this, the penultimate satire, rings so unmistakably true and remains one of the most abiding images of the Horatian satirist. Efforts on the part of modern scholars to dismiss Davus, as Horace eventually does at the satire's end, have failed consistently. Wili's solution, for example, was that Davus' inevitably servile viewpoint (Sklavenperspektive), which apparently made him envious of Horace, in effect disqualified him from being a serious critic of his master.752 This blanket condemnation of Davus on account of his servile status would, I suspect, strike most recent scholars as unfair. While Roman ideology certainly rated slaves as among the lowest in society, and 'lowness' to the Roman meant 'every kind of inferiority imaginable, physical, intellectual, moral',753 Davus' observations are not to be discarded simply because he is a slave: modelled as he is (however imperfectly) on the servus callidus of New Comedy whose pithy advice is designed to help the

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751 As we have seen, it is another 'Horace', a second self rather than the historical Quintus Horatius Flaccus, who appears as the author-figure within the Satires. The 'real Horace' may well have included in this satire references to his 'real life' outside his artistic work, canny jokes at his own expense for his amused circle of friends - but identifying most of these is surely beyond the scope of a modern audience. While the world presented in the Satires may likewise parallel or even partially reflect Horace's Rome, it is surely not intended to be viewed as a faithful reproduction of his contemporary city. Cf. p. 53ff above.


753 Bradley 1994: 142; cf. 1984: 35, where he remarks how low social status was equated in the Roman mind with moral baseness.
master in the vicissitudes of life, Davus should be heard out, at least on the occasion of the Saturnalia.

Indeed, as I shall argue, the model of the Bakhtinian Saturnalia or Carnival is a far more useful way to view the interaction between slave and master, former audience and erstwhile satirist, and ultimately, to understand *Sat. 2.7*. Carnival (and its ancient Roman predecessor, the Saturnalia), as Bahktin noted, removed all distance between people, and introduced in its place an eccentric new mode of interrelationship between individuals which entirely disregarded or else inverted the hierarchical power-relations of their usual day-to-day existence. Through its inversions and reversals, Carnival (and Saturnalia) characteristically juxtaposed opposites, matched incompatibles, and joined odd couples (the carnivalesque *mésalliances*). As Bahktin put it, 'Carnival brings together, unifies, weds, and combines the sacred with the profane, the lofty with the low, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the stupid.'

Accordingly, Carnivalised literature often brings together images or things which are chosen either for their striking contrast, or, by the same token, for their inexplicable similarity. Davus is both the opposite of Horace, as he is his slave, but, as he asserts with the aid of his favourite Stoic paradox, they are also ironically identical: Horace is as much a 'slave' in the moral sense as Davus is in the literal. By having a character such as Davus freely air his views on his poetic alter ego, Horace was doubtless casting the slave in the role of his character's externalised conscience. It is Davus' task to swap roles with his master, to take his place as moral critic, to make the satirist his target, and thus to unseat Horace from his satiric throne - in Bakhtinian terms, Davus is Horace's Carnivalesque 'decrowning double.'

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754 See e.g. Palaestrio in Plautus' *Miles Gloriosus*, Tranio in *Mostellaria*, and Pseudolus and Epidicus in the plays named for them respectively.
757 *Id.*: 126.
758 *Id.*: 127.
As speaker Davus is far from perfect: his lecture contains a plethora of inconsistencies and infelicities of a logical and ideological nature, as we shall see. Due to these lapses of logic, most contemporary critics follow Anderson in labelling Davus, along with the other would-be Stoic Damasippus in Sat. 2.3, a doctor ineptus. Thus the recent modern consensus is that Davus is the latest in the long line of idiotic speakers to whom Horace allows himself to be subjected, and has his gentle Socratic-style irony expose in the course of Satires Book Two. While not denying this useful approach, we should bear in mind that, as we have noted, the Saturnalian-Carnivalesque tradition, according to Bakhtin, juxtaposes and unites precisely '...the lofty with the low, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the stupid...'. For the topsy-turvy universe of the Carnivalesque elevates the fool, its equalising force places the lowly on a pedestal, and the free and familiar contact among people fostered by the festivities permits the relatively insignificant and imperfect to address (at length) the great and powerful. Therefore a Bakhtinian-Carnivalesque perspective on Sat. 2.7, as opposed to a traditional reading, encourages us to value Davus' viewpoint, in spite of all this speaker's infelicities.

Furthermore, as the Horatian phrase ridentem dicere verum itself suggests, mere foolishness or even ineptitude as a Stoic does not necessarily exclude the truth. But we should not expect Davus' accusations of Horace to be provable - what he and his master are engaged in, in Sat. 2.7, is a ritual rather than a court case. Nevertheless, much of Davus' criticism of Horace is curiously convincing within the dramatic context of the Satires. If we acknowledge the fictional world of the Satires, we must assume that as Horace's domestic slave, Davus is party to all sorts of personal information about his master, and in the course of his speech, he shows that he is only too eager to serve and tell. In the dramatic context of Sat. 2.7, this domestic slave's comments, presumably inspired by intimate observation, are surely to be taken more seriously than, for example, the attack on Horace by

759 Anderson 1982: 46; cf. e.g. Parker 1986: 106; Freudenburg 1993: 47.
760 Bakhtin id.: 123; cf. above.
761 In a sense Horace's Satires have been Saturnalian or proto-Carnivalesque throughout, since from the beginning of Sat. 1.1 Horace has been lecturing the relatively great and powerful Maecenas, and in the final satire of the first book Horace also boasts of being on the point of (but refraining from) stealing Lucilius' coveted corona (1.10.48-49). We shall discuss the Carnivalesque nature of the Satires as a whole in greater detail towards the end of this chapter.
the outsider Damasippus in Sat. 2.3. Davus’ onerous ineptitude should therefore constantly be weighed up against the ingenuous clarity of the servile speaker’s complaints against his master ‘Horace’.

**Amicum mancipium: friendly advice at a price**

Davus, for his part, is keen to establish his credibility as Horace’s personal critic. Almost at once Horace’s slave introduces himself rather curiously as an *amicum mancipium*. Attention is drawn to this interesting phrase by its position straddling the second to third lines of the poem. Davus uses *amicum* adjectivally, to qualify *mancipium*, a ‘bought slave’ - thus he is ‘your friendly bought slave’ or ‘a friend and a bought slave’. By terming himself a ‘friend’, the appropriately named Davus places himself firmly within the tradition of Roman Comedy, where, as noted, the *servus callidus* would indeed act as a friendly agony uncle to his master or his master’s son, helping out where possible and often rescuing the family from certain disgrace. This is appropriate to the Comic atmosphere of Horace’s *Satires* in general and this one in particular. However, the term *mancipium*, with which *amicum* appears in tandem, has a technical ring, since it is ‘usually confined to cases in which the slave is regarded as a chattel’. But it also appears in Roman comedy: at least two Plautine examples see *mancipium* applied to a *servus callidus* in contexts where the individual slave has been acting as anything but a chattel, which the ironic use of this term underlines.

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762 Translators sometimes get around this oxymoron by using a concessive construction, e.g. ‘his master’s friend, though a bought slave’ (Muecke 1993: ad loc.).

763 See Buckland 1908: 8; cf. Muecke 1993: ad loc. Referring in origin to the formal legal purchase of anything, including a slave, *mancipium* is predictably employed in legal texts (e.g. Gaius, Paulus), and when generally used of slaves tends to occur where ownership is to be emphasised (e.g. Seneca *De Beneficiis* 5. 19.1). Until the time of Justinian, Roman slaves were legally defined as *res mancipi* (Thomas 1976: 129).

764 At Captivi 954, for example, the angry Hegio calls his restored slave Stalagus who had long before run off, kidnapping his master’s younger son, to account with the words: *lepidum mancipium meum*, ‘my charming piece of property’; at Epidicus 686, one of the master’s friends terms the cheeky eponymous slave, who has been unashamedly taunting his master, a *mancipium scelestum*, ‘a villainous piece of property’. Of course, by the end of both plays, the *mancipia* are not only vindicated but freed, as their actions have, even if accidentally, made them their master’s ‘friends’ and benefactors.
In Roman society outside of the Saturnalian period, however, one could not be both a *mancipium*, a bought slave, and an *amicus*. Based as it was on a system of obligations, *amicitia*, whether patronage or something more, usually described the extrafamilial relationship between free men, not that between master and slave.\(^\text{765}\) The obligations of slavery were automatic to the servile relationship itself, and there was no need of further bonds to enforce them. Of course, *amicitia* of a formal and perhaps also of a personal nature would replace the servile relationship once it was ended by manumission. Slaves could literally be turned into *amici*, just as in Comedy freedom was often the reward of the *servus callidus* who had to all intents and purposes been a true ‘friend’ to his master in his vicissitudes. But in practice there was usually an ambiguity concerning the nature of a personal ‘friendship’ between master and slave, or between a former master and his freedman.\(^\text{766}\)

Davus’ presentation of himself as an *amicum mancipium* therefore juxtaposes, on the one hand, the idealised worlds of Comedy, philosophy, and common sentimentality, in which slaves might indeed be ‘friends’ of their masters, with that of formal Roman society, on the other, where they would not. As an oxymoron, the phrase *amicum mancipium* is entirely appropriate to the Saturnalia, the one occasion on which slave and master would

\(^\text{765}\) Although it is clear that the term *amicitia* could refer to a vast range of relationships in Roman society (cf. *TLL* 1.1892f &1893f; Brunt 1988: 381), research in the 1980’s tended to identify *amicitia* foremost with patronage - characteristically an extra-familial asymmetrical relationship based on the concepts of reciprocal obligation and exchange (see Saller 1982: 1ff). More recently, David Konstan (1997: 128, 136-137 & passim) has sought to re-emphasise the emotional, personal dimensions of *amicitia* in addition to its other more formal incarnations, arguing that in certain contexts *amicitia* was not so different from modern concepts of friendship. No matter how one interprets *amicitia*, however, clearly it was usually understood to exclude slaves, at least on a formal level. This exclusion lends an ironic slant to Seneca’s retort: *amicici, to his imaginary adversary’s ‘Servi sunt’ at Epistle 47.1: Servi sunt. Immo homines...Servi sunt. Immo humiles amici*. That, later in the same letter (47.16), Seneca exhorts Lucilius to find his friends at home (i.e. among his slaves) rather than in the forum or senate-house indicates that the latter locations were the usual sources for *amicici, and thus highlights the revolutionary nature of Seneca’s suggestion.

\(^\text{766}\) This is illustrated by the well-known Roman adage that however many slaves a man had, he had so many enemies, and by the truism that a loyal slave was a priceless possession. Where Cicero’s brother Quintus, for example, discusses the freeing of a favourite slave, Tiro, at *Ad Fam*. 16.16, he congratulates his brother that he should prefer to have Tiro as a friend rather than as a slave (*nobis amicum quam servum esse maluisit)*. On the one hand Quintus is lauding the grant to Tiro of a status that was really rightfully his all along, but at the same time the wording also confirms that although the two states, servitude and friendship, might coincide in practice, perhaps particularly in the master’s experience of the relationship, they were nevertheless formally incapable of co-existence, no matter how the individual slave was privately regarded.
indeed seem to associate as ‘friends’. Designed to underline the concomitant subversion of the formal structure of Roman society and to blur the distinctions between slave and free, the phrase anticipates the Stoic paradox on which Davus will speak, according to which both he and his master are equal in the eyes of philosophy. The phrase is also appropriate to a world infused with the topoi of Comedy, according to which status of slave or free was fabulously fluid.

However, one of Davus’ own motivations for presenting himself as his master’s friend, apart from this being the nervous slave’s captatio benevolentiae, is, I contend, to be found within Horace’s Satires themselves, and this, as with much of my interpretation, argues for a continuum between both books. If Davus has indeed been eavesdropping intently on most of Horace’s prior sermones, he cannot but have overheard many of Horace’s previous assertions and pithy sayings about friendship, faults, and frank speech. In Sat. 1.3, for example, Horace had gone to great lengths to assert friendship as the ideal context for the give and take of moral support and constructive criticism: an amicus dulcis would weigh the faults and virtues of his fellow amici fairly but give positive emphasis to the latter. In Sat. 1.4, admitting to the possession of a few minor, harmless faults, which even his father’s vigorous moral training had been unable to eradicate, Horace had suggested that he might eventually be rid of these forgivable failings by longevity (longa aetas, 1.4.132), the advice of a frank friend (liber amicus, 132), and by his own reflection (consilium proprium, 133). After listening to all this, and having taken it all to heart, it seems, Davus

767 amicus dulcis ut aequum est/cum mea compenset vitis bona, pluribus hisce - /si modo plura mihi bona sunt - inclinet, amari/si volet: hac lege in trutina ponetur eadem (1.3.69-72).
768 ...ex hoc ego sanus ab illis/perniciem quaecumque ferunt, mediocribus et quis/ignoscas vitis teneor. fortissis et istinc/argiter abstulerit longa aetas, liber amicus,/consilium proprium... (1.4.129-133a; my emphasis). Frank speech among friends was highly valued (e.g Aristote EN 9.9), and was thought to enable one to tell a flatterer from a true friend (e.g. Cicero De Amicitia 25.95, 26.99; Plutarch ‘How to distinguish a flatterer from a friend’). It was thought that people required criticism in order to recognise their faults; flatterers could be recognised by their tendency to approve base behaviour. However, a friend-critic was also supposed to balance the necessary criticism with sufficient praise, always be courteous, and not be too liberal with his freedom of speech (cf. Konstan id.: 15; 100ff). Horace had himself, however, confessed to having been a little too direct (simplicior) in his criticism of Maecenas at Sat. 1.3. 63ff (for which read: truculentior atque/plius aequo liber, 51-52). Cf. Part 1, chapters 3 and 4 of the present work. Davus’ frank criticism of Horace could be seen to parallel Horace’s own approach to Maecenas in Book One.
has risen to the challenge of the libertas Decembris and has aspired to become the equivalent of the second of these categories - the liber amicus.

On the occasion of the Saturnalia, therefore, Horace’s slave has taken upon himself the role of a friend, charged with drawing Horace’s faults to his attention. He has adopted a temporary persona who not only speaks freely but also enjoys a relationship with Horace that mimics roles which officially existed only between free men. In Sat. 2.7 the servile Davus therefore embraces libertas, even if it is temporary and only of a verbal kind. Through the medium of the brief Saturnalian libertas, in the sense of verbal freedom, the slave is able to address the topic of true libertas, in the sense of moral freedom; the significant freedom lacking to him, however, is permanent freedom within Roman society.769

Awkward addressivity

In spite of his temporary Saturnalian freedom, and despite his bold introduction of himself (1-4), once invited to speak, Davus starts his speech by attacking the vice of inconsistency in a general manner (lines 6-20), without any direct reference to his addressee. While an ‘indirect approach’ was typical of the initial sections of Horace’s moralising satires in Book One,770 Davus’ initial attempt at moralising is so obscure and cautiously general that it hardly makes sense at all, and the illogicality of the argument causes Horace to lose patience with him (21ff). However, the motivation for Davus’ indirect approach is undoubtedly grounded in his relationship, as speaker, to his addressee, Horace. Here is an unusual and rather awkward type of ‘addressivity’: since his addressee is also his owner, Davus has first to test the waters, as he cannot afford to engage in personal criticism right away.771 For in spite of the temporary relief of the Saturnalia, if he pro-

769 For the different nuances of libertas, see esp. Sat. 1.4 (Part 1, chapter 4 of the present work). Davus’ Saturnalian promotion of himself as an amicus mancipium ultimately fails to win for him a permanent appointment as a liber amicus. Rather, his true powerlessness as slave and protagonist in relation to master and satirist is demonstrated at the end of Sat. 2.7, when he is silenced with all manner of threats.

770 E.g. 1.1.1-22; 1.2.1-22; 1.3.1-19a.

771 Scarpato (1969: 21) suggests: ‘Il preambolo di Davo è volutamente generico per non irritare subito il padrone ...’; Bond likewise (1978: 86) suggests that Davus starts with a generalised approach in order to test his master’s reaction, avoiding becoming too personal too quickly. Horace’s notoriously bad temper has
ceeds too far with his *libertas*, Davus is all too aware that he still faces the possibility of castigation once the holiday is over, a possibility that, as the many references to servile punishment and characteristic timidity throughout this piece suggest, is uppermost in his mind. ⁷⁷² Therefore, even although he has expressed his intention to tell Horace ‘a few things’ (1-2), and in spite of having been specifically invited by his master to speak on the occasion of the Saturnalia (5), it is not surprising that Davus’ initial foray into satire should be vaguely general and circumspect.

Inconsistency, the topic with which Davus begins, had been the theme of the introductory section of *Sat.* 1.3, where Horace had lampooned Tigellius for his irregular habits; indeed, within the first fourteen or so lines of his Saturnalian lecture, Davus seems deliberately to be emulating the start of Horace’s third satire. ⁷⁷³ However, right from the start, we are

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already been hinted at by Damasippus at the end of *Sat.* 2.3 (*horrendam rabiem*, 323), and we shall witness another bout of it at the close of the present satire (116-118).

⁷⁷² Cf. e.g. *...servus!... reformido*, 1-2.

⁷⁷³ Reputedly the most erratic individual who ever lived (*nil fuit umquam/sic impar sibi*, 1.3.18-19; cf. p. 120 above). Tigellius had illustrated single-handedly the famous Horatian adage *dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt* (*Sat.* 1.2.24). He was a microcosm of the extremes of vice and excesses of virtue. Just as Horace said of Tigellius: *nil aequale hominifuit illi* (1.3.9), so Davus says of his inconstant exemplar Priscus: *vixit inaequalis...* (2.7.10), and *Vertumnis quotquot sunt natus iniquis* (14). As the many manifestations of Vertumnus, the Etruscan god who presided over change or metamorphosis, are indicative of Priscus’ mutability and fickleness, this statement is more or less the equivalent of saying nowadays: ‘He was born with all his planets in opposition...’. Tigellius and Priscus are ridiculed chiefly for inconsistency in social comportment: the former was inconsistent in his manners at *cenae* (1.3.3b-8), and in his manner of walking (1.3.8-9), the latter in his choice of accessories (2.7.9-10); both varied in their style of living, Tigellius’ number of slaves in attendance and claims of devotion to particular lifestyles vacillating greatly (1.3.11-15) and Priscus’ style of abode differing almost as much (2.7.11-12). Priscus’ extreme changeability is illustrated by his tendency to change his outfit with the hour: *...clavum ut mutaret in horas* (10), the ‘stripe’ (*clavis*) indicating that he had a habit of making a number of quick changes in and out of the striped senatorial or equestrian toga, perhaps in an attempt to disguise his status. This looks forward to Davus’ description of Horace’s evasion of detection as he consorts with a married woman, where he goes out disguised as a ‘Dama’, having thrown off all signs of his equestrian rank (53-57). Priscus also varies the number of rings he wears: *saepa notatus/cum tribus anellis, modo laeva Priscus inani* (8-9), just as later we are told that Horace specifically removes the ring indicative of his equestrian status (*anulo equestri*, 53) when he is allegedly off to commit adultery. We may perceive a possibly indirect form of criticism of ‘Horace’ in Davus’ description of Priscus’ lifestyle: *iam moechus Romae, iam mallet doctus Athenis/vivere* (13-14; cf. Bond 1978: 89). If we take *iam...iam* to mean ‘at one time...at another time...’, rather than to designate any sequence of events, it is possible to regard this statement as an indirect slight on Horace, who in his younger days had studied philosophy at Athens, and who now, as Davus will shortly be alleging (46ff), lives the life of an adulterer at Rome. The variations of place stressed in *Romae...Athenis* (13) also possibly anticipate Horace’s restless dissatisfaction with place shortly to be chronicled by Davus (28-9). The subtleties of this allusion suggest that it should probably be read as an authorial joke rather than as a witticism ascribed independently to Davus.
made aware that all is not well with our new speaker. Davus’ outrageous argument in this initial section is that consistency in vice is better than continually vacillating between vice and virtue, or between different vices.\textsuperscript{774} Horace had frequently cited opposing examples of vice in his previous ‘dihatribes’, as we have seen, and this is arguably the stylistic precedent for Davus’ antitheses of now one, now another opposing example. Unlike the Horatian moralist, however, Davus is actually praising one of the examples he cites and moreover it is the wrong one and for the wrong reasons. Davus compares the example of Priscus, who see-sawed between virtue and vice, to an example of what he considers more positive behaviour: the \textit{scurra} Volanerius is upheld as someone who admirably stuck to one vice - gambling\textsuperscript{775} - well into old age, so that he had to be assisted in his pursuit of this in the end (15-18a).

Further, Davus endeavours to explain his theory on the superiority of consistency in vice by means of a practical illustration: he says that the person who is consistent in vice gets ahead of someone who struggles (\textit{laborat}) against a rope which is drawn taut one minute and let loose the next: \textit{qui iam contento, iam laxo fume laborat} (20).\textsuperscript{776} Bond notes that this vivid image seems to describe someone who is being pulled along in a gang of slaves or prisoners; the slave image would, of course, be entirely appropriate and credible in Davus’ mouth.\textsuperscript{777} As Bond has pointed out, however, the imagery of tension may be an attempt to reflect the Stoic theory of \textit{tonos}, or the degree of harmonious tension in the soul.\textsuperscript{778} In that case, Davus is going too far, as he is implying that the firm \textit{tonos} which was supposed to be associated with virtue (\textit{contento}) is no better than having a loose, untoned soul (\textit{laxo}); it is better to be lax with vice consistently, the slave suggests, rather than to

\textsuperscript{774} \textit{Pars hominum vitiis gaudet constanter et urget/propositum; pars multa natat, modo recta capessens/interdum pravis obnoxia} (6-8).

\textsuperscript{775} Praise of gambling is appropriate in a Saturnalian context, not only because it might be indicative of the inversion of roles and societal expectations, but also because gambling itself was one of the activities permitted to slaves on the occasion of this festival (\textit{AE} 395, 48; Veranel 1993: 149; Kleijwegt 1997: 308).

\textsuperscript{776} The \textit{iam...iam} here echoes the \textit{iam...iam} seven lines earlier (13), where the expression was used to emphasise Priscus’ inconsistent behaviour. The echo further stresses the inconsistency in the present context.

\textsuperscript{777} See Bond 1978: 87. Since slave gangs were the usual method of transporting servile workers on the rural estates (Bradley 1984: 120), this image may ironically anticipate Davus’ threatened rustication at this satire’s end.

\textsuperscript{778} See Bond \textit{id.}: 87-88.
waver between virtue and vice. The argument to which Davus has subordinated his Horatian echoes is one which would have been acceptable neither to Stoicism nor to most other contemporary philosophical schools: he has gone too far by replacing the criterion of virtue with that of consistency. The slave's ineptitude at handling formal Stoic dogma calls his authority into question.

Exasperated by Davus' vague and inept moralising, Horace demands to know where 'all this rot' is headed. Challenged as to the relevance of his pilot attempt at satire, Davus asserts that his argument is indeed aimed at Horace (ad te, inquam... 'At you, I say...'; 22), and shortly (22bff) provides three examples of Horace's alleged inconsistency. It will be noted, however, that the slave fails to demonstrate how his thesis on the superiority of consistency in vice should relate to Horace: that Davus does not in fact exhort his master to choose one vice and stick to it implies an acknowledgement on the slave's part that his foregoing hypothesis is indeed drivel (tam putida) Horace has suggested it is, or that whatever he has said in his indirect beginning is not his primary aim.

**Polyphony: preaching and practice, poet and patron**

All three of Davus' examples of his master's alleged inconsistency do not merely undercut the assertions of the first book of *Satires*, but they also have a bearing on the issue of *amicitia*, and, I would suggest, make some comment on Horace's relationship with Maci-
cenas as represented in the *Satires*. Davus’ first point is that although Horace, apparently dissatisfied with the present, claims allegiance to the *mos maiorum*, and, like many moralists, apparently prefers the ‘good old days’ (*mores antiquae plebis*) of Rome to contemporary life, he is not serious in this, and that ‘if some god’ (*si quis...deus*) were suddenly to take him back to olden times, Horace would ironically resist to the end. In *Sat.* 1.4 Horace’s Comically inspired ‘father’, whom he had claimed as the model for his role as satirist (1.4.103ff), had been made to ascribe his own teaching to common sense and, significantly, the *mos maiorum*. Indeed, the ‘father’ had appealed to the *traditum ab antiquis morem* (117), rather than to any formal, newfangled school philosophy (115-119). Ironically, Davus the Stoic is suggesting that, despite all this, Horace is not committed to the paternally-derived ideals to which he has paid lip-service in his *Satires* so far.

But Davus’ diction here is also reminiscent of the introductory section to *Sat.*1.1, where Horace had trotted out modified (and Romanised) versions of the standard *topoi* surrounding dissatisfaction with one’s lot (*μεταψυχορία*). No-one was happy with his lot, and each had instead praised that of somebody else, just as Horace praises the men of old. Indeed, *laudet diversa sequentis* (*Sat.* 1.1.3) may be paralleled in *laudas/fortunam...* (*Sat.* 2.7.22-3). Moreover, in *Sat.* 1.1 Horace had gone on to assert that if a god were to grant the professionals the chance to change places with those they envied, they would refuse to

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782 That Davus should seek to address *amicitia* is appropriate considering that at the start of this satire, as we have seen, he proposed to establish himself as a temporary sertvice version of the *liber amicus*. However, as I hope to make plain in what follows, it is doubtful whether this *amicum mancipium* has really understood the subtleties of *amicitia*, as Horace has defined it in his *Satires* thus far, especially in Book One. Therefore, although the personal criticism that is placed in the mouth of a household slave in *Sat.* 2.7 contributes to the on-going satire of Horace’s character that can be seen throughout both books of *Satires*, at the same time this is balanced by an ironic vindication of Horace’s own position as a loyal *amicus* of his patron Maecenas.

783 *laudas/fortunam et mores antiquae plebis*, *et idem/si quis ad illa deus subito te agat, usque recuses* (22b -24). Davus ascribes this either to hypocrisy on Horace’s part - he does not really believe what he preaches (*aut quia non sentis quod clamas rectius esse*, 25), or to his inconsistency - he is not constant in his defence of what is right (*aut quia non firmus rectum defendis...*, 26).

784 *Qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem/seu ratio dedit seu fors obierit, illa/contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentis?* (*Sat.* 1.1.1-3; my emphasis). This is followed by Horace’s examples of the dissatisfied professionals: the soldier, the merchant, the lawyer and the farmer. Cf. my discussion of the start of *Sat.* 1.1 at p. 71ff above.
do so. Davus appears consciously to be echoing Horace’s *si quis deus* (1.1.15) with his *si quis...deus* (2.7.24), and thus deliberately calls attention to the parallels between the two passages. While Horace had begun his *Satires* by ridiculing the dissatisfied and inconsistent, according to Davus he is really no different from them: in spite of his moaning, the ungrateful Horace would be as quick as they to turn down an offer to change his circumstances.

Although the idea of refusing an offer to return to the past is clearly an *adynaton* employed for rhetorical purposes, and although one might protest that Horace has indeed followed the *mos maiorum* in allowing Davus’ Saturnalian speech to take place at all, the accusation may nevertheless express an indirect compliment to Maecenas. As the second most powerful man at Rome and supporter of Octavian, Maecenas certainly had a vested interest in supporting the new status quo. And while it is certainly true that the Augustan regime became increasingly backward-looking, idealising the supposed morals of Rome’s past, the claim that Horace does not really want to turn back the clock may, I contend, be the poet’s subtle way of indicating to his patron his true satisfaction with the present, whatever poses he may assume as a moralist. Couched in the dramatic context of Horace’s slave’s scolding, the particular accusation that Horace would not return to the past if you paid him is an indirect way for the poet to express his approval of the new regime.

Davus next charges Horace with longing for the country when in Rome, but praising the city to the skies when in the country. Again, this example, like the previous one, is reminiscent of the start of *Sat. 1.1*, where Horace’s examples of dissatisfied people had included a stressed-out city lawyer who misguidedly praised and envied the life of the farm-

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786 Cf. *quando ita maiores voluerunt, Sat. 2.7.5.*

787 *Romae rus optas, absentem rusticus urbes/tollis ad astra levis...* (28-9). The slave describes his master as *levis*, suggesting again a clear case of inconsistency. This ‘grass is greener’ or perhaps, ‘lights are brighter’ syndrome, whereby the constantly dissatisfied Horace longs for the country while in the city but clearly wishes to be back in the city once his wish has been granted, parallels the previous point Davus made: just as Horace is not committed to his praise of the olden days, and would refuse the opportunity to live in such times, so his desire for the country-life, Davus suggests, is a mere whim.
er, and a farmer who in turn had claimed that only city-folk were fortunate. The lawyer's and the farmer's opposite dissatisfactions, their praise of the lifestyle in the country and the city respectively, and the fact that in either case their bluff is called, are simultaneously mirrored in Horace's alternating longing for and frustration with both city and country. Davus thus suggests that Horace is similar to the prior targets of his moralising, only twice as bad.

The town-country dichotomy has been prominent throughout the Satires, but Davus' accusation is made in the poem which immediately follows Sat. 2.6, Horace's celebration of Maecenas' gift of the Sabine farm which, he would have had us believe, had long been in his prayers, and over which he professed contentment (2.6.4). In addition to aligning Horace with the targets of the start of Sat. 1.1, therefore, Sat. 2.7 urges a reinterpretation of 2.6 in a retrospectively negative light. Far from contentedly downshifting on his small-holding, Horace, we are to imagine, is soon bored with the noxes cenaeque deum and is desperate to get back to town. The noble and idealised views to which the satirist most directly lays claim in Sat. 2.6, traditionally regarded as the pinnacle of Horatian satiric achievement, provide an excellent foil for self-satiric deflation in 2.7.

On the one hand, boredom with the country house could be perceived as a potential insult to the patron, but, on the other hand, the occurrence of the statement in this particular satire, Sat. 2.7, may be a strategically significant indirect compliment to Maecenas. In 2.6, in order to emphasise by contrast his joy in his holiday house, Horace had moaned interminably about his life in the bustling city, the thankless tasks that were required of him, and particularly the demands which being part of Maecenas' group necessitated (2.6.18ff). In that preceding satire, the Epicurean-inclined satirist had complained that a day in the city was wasted amid all his responsibilities, causing him to pine for his country estate: o rus, quando te aspiciam? (2.6.60). With the deliberate contrast, in Sat. 2.6, of idyllic country life in the Sabine hills, and the unenviable existence of a member of Maecenas' circle at

788 agricolam laudat turis legumque peritus, sub galli cantum consultor ubi ostia pulsat ille, datis vadibus qui rure extractus in urbem est, solos felices viventis clamat in urbe... (Sat. 1.1.9-12). Cf. pp. 71 ff above.
Rome, Horace might even seem to have suggested that being Maecenas' urban *amicus* was more trouble than it was worth. The second example of Horace's inconsistency placed in Davus' mouth in 2.7 may therefore be a subtle way of mollifying any harshness towards Maecenas and his circle that *might* be perceived in the preceding poem. By balancing Horace's urban dissatisfaction with an equally frequent rural frustration, Davus is made to suggest that the fault lies not with Maecenas or his circle, but with Horace himself.

Davus' third and most extensive example of Horatian inconsistency paints another not very flattering portrait of the poet, but again, I would argue, elevates Maecenas. Davus first sketches an impression of Horace, having failed to get an invitation to dinner, enthusing over his vegetarian supper and congratulating himself for 'not having to be out drinking anywhere'. Davus' aside, in the manner of a Comic *servus callidus*: *velut usquam/vinctus eas* - 'as if you ever went out anywhere under compulsion', or literally, 'bound' - seems to confirm the slave's claim to intimate knowledge of his master, which in turn enhances the credibility of his next observation: if at the last minute Maecenas were to invite him to dinner, the hypocritical Horace would, to the vexation of his own parasites, drop everything and rush off to join his patron.

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789 Years later Horace was to echo Davus' accusation in an apparently personal confession in his *Epistlès*: *Romae Tibur amem ventosus, Tibure Romam* (Ep. 1.8.12). By placing the accusation in the mouth of an apparently unsympathetic speaker in *Sat.* 2.7, Horace makes the idea of his vacillation between city and country, and the fact that he does not really prefer one over the other, seem entirely credible. 790 *si nusquam es forte vocatus ad cenam laudas securum holus ac, velut usquam/vinctus eas, ita te felicem dicis amasse/quad nusquam tibi sit potandum...* (29-32).

791 This not only reflects the pervasive imagery of bondage and servitude that appropriately weighs this satire down, and anticipates the image of Horace himself as a moral slave, but suggests too that Horace is stubborn and self-centered, points which are shortly to be picked up by his plaintiff parasites.

792 Ironically Horace's sudden success with his patron has left his own *scurræ* to wonder where their next meal is coming from. The parasites are Davus' fellows both in the domestic universe ruled by Horace, and also of course on the Comic stage. One of the *scurræ*, Mulvius, dismayed to see his promised supper disappearing into the sunset, is introduced into Davus' speech in the guise of an authoritative speaker. Just as a slave will accuse his master of servitude, so a *scurr* is made by that slave to Horace with being a parasite of Maecenas. And just as Davus will argue that Horace may be more of a 'slave' to his passions than he, Davus, is, the parasite likewise is made to suggest that Horace is an even worse parasite than he. In most editions of the *Satires*, Mulvius' whine merges with the continuation of Davus' own speech, making essentially the same point (42ff). Mulvius is thus a useful if temporary mask, another safety mechanism for our cautious critic Davus.
The idea that Horace's character is a *scurra* has been an on-going joke in the *Satires* right from the beginning of Book One. That Horace is described by Davus as jumping unashamedly when Maecenas says to do so, even although it is made abundantly clear that he is only being invited at the eleventh hour to fill in the gaps around his patron's table, once more brands him as no better than a *scurra*. The corollary is that when Horace praises his solitary meal it may simply mean that he has been unsuccessful in gaining an invitation to dinner. Davus' unflattering portrait of his master makes a mockery of the attitudes that the satirist has been expressing throughout his *Satires*, but this sketch undercuts in particular the self-portrait that Horace had presented in *Sat.* 1.6, in the description of his ideal 'Epicurean day'. Towards the end of that satire, Horace had fondly depicted his leisurely window-shopping at the market, which had included making enquiries about the price of vegetables and other basic foodstuffs,793 followed by a simple meal on his return home. The poet had there seemed to revel in drawing this homely picture, showing himself, ambition foresworn but nevertheless secure in Maecenas' friendship, leading the ideal simple life of autarchy and *ataraxia*. Davus' presentation of Horace's domestic set-up in 2.7, however, casts quite a different light on this meal and forces us to wonder in retrospect whether Horace's detailed and proud account of himself in 1.6, happy at home, and thriving on his *tenuis victus*, was not merely a case of sour grapes.

But in spite of the humour of this portrait of Horatian inconsistency, Davus is clearly wrong in castigating Horace for being eager to please his patron. Not only would it have been construed as extremely *ingratus* for Horace to have refused a dinner invitation from his *amicus* Maecenas, but Davus' disapproval of his master's delight and flurry upon being invited to Maecenas' *cena*, even at the last minute, is undoubtedly another example of Horace's indirect way of flattering the patron through self-satire: Maecenas is important enough to Horace for him to drop everything, even his cherished carefree lifestyle, at a moment's notice, and to do his best to get ready in a hurry. Although he has hinted that he is a 'friend' of his master, Davus makes it only too plain that he has not grasped the niceties of *amicitia*. Rather, it is obvious that Davus' frustration with his master is motivated

793 *percontor quanti holus ac far*, 1.6.112.
by the patently servile perspective of someone who has regularly to attend Horace in the flat spin described here. Primarily an audience of orders, Davus is one of the intended addressees of the domestic demands often heard on these occasions: ‘nemon oleum fert ocius? ecquis/audit?’ - ‘Won’t somebody hurry up and fetch the hair-gel? Hey, is anybody listening?’ (34-35).

Davus’ three exempla of Horace’s inconsistency may thus all be interpreted as indirect ways of flattering Maecenas: in his desire to please and avoid insulting his patron, Horace, if inconsistent, is so for all the right reasons. Yet despite all this and also in spite of the many flaws in Davus’ argument, here is the rub: at least some of the criticism sticks to Horace, undermining the image that he has built up as satirist. While Davus’ assertions, as noted, have an inherent credibility on account of his intimate perspective as the satirist’s domestic slave, the criticism is further championed by Horace’s angry grimace in response to it. This is what we are encouraged to imagine when Davus requests that his master stop trying to frighten him with his expression, and keep himself from lashing out in anger: aufer/me vultu terrere; manum stomachumque teneto... (43b-44). Horace’s servile assailant has indeed struck a nerve. But while this angry response, which anticipates the satire’s end, adds weight to what Davus has been saying, it also thereby confirms the indirect compliments to the patron that are encoded in the slave’s very criticism of ‘Horace’. As we have seen many times before, the jokes at Horace’s character’s expense ultimately support Maecenas.

The proto-Carnivalesque ‘lower bodily stratum’: Davus on sex

Davus next tackles sex - his favourite topic, judging by the relative space devoted to it. The servile speaker is starting to develop his point that Horace is a ‘slave’ to various compulsions, and that the satirist’s moralising is thus incompatible with his lifestyle. The

794 However good the intentions behind Horace’s erratic behaviour, the fact remains that he is inconsistent. That the inconsistency itself and the individual examples of it proffered by Davus all echo topics previously treated in the Satires would appear to insinuate that Horace is inconsistent and perhaps even hypocritical not only as a protagonist within the Satires but also as satirist.
argument starts to become even more personal as Davus not only confronts Horace with his failings, but has what he claims is his own lifestyle compare favourably with what he asserts is his master’s. Davus contends that not only is Horace a slave to his passions, but that the satirist is at the mercy of even worse passions, than he, Davus, is. For a start, Davus alleges, the poet is an adulterer while he himself prefers the brothel: *Te contiumx aliena capit*, \(^{795}\) *meretricula Davum* \(^{46}\).\(^{796}\)

However, immediately after alluding to the sexual preferences of both Horace and himself, Davus reveals his ineptitude by jokingly asking his master to consider which of them is more liable for crucifixion: *peccat uter nostrum cruce dignius?* \(^{47}\). In practical terms this is a moot point, since of the two only Davus could be liable for crucifixion, the standard capital punishment for slaves and foreigners. However, the question is clearly a rhetorical joke, one of the *adynata* the temporary nature of Davus’ *libertas* and the hypothetical nature of his argument foster. Davus applies the spectre of the most extreme form of servile punishment - a deterrent to crime in everyday life - to his construct of his master’s moral subjection to foolish vices: a slave in the moral sense, Horace would do well to consider the penalties that hung over those who were slaves in the literal sense.

But although he is using the terminology of Stoicism (*peccat*), the point which Davus is making is inappropriate in a Stoic context. By phrasing his question to Horace with a comparative adverb (*dignius*), Davus is making a distinction between one degree of

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\(^{795}\) The verb *capit* here looks forward to the theme of servitude in love to be explored in the section to follow, especially at 66-71 and 89b-94. Not only does this verb contribute to one of the many images of servitude and capture that occur throughout the poem and are entirely appropriate in the mouth of a slave, and because of the particular paradox that he is presenting, but, capturing/captivating is also of course a standard image of love poetry. The overlap of servile and erotic images is exploited by Davus in his attempt to show how Horace is a slave to love.

\(^{796}\) *You another man’s wife captivates, a little tart Davus...* (my emphasis). This sentence is structured chiastically (which I have tried to reflect in my translation), with the shared verb *capit* in the middle: Horace (‘you’) - Adulteress - *capit* - Prostitute - Davus. The *te* at the beginning of this line contrasts with *Davum* at its end, and, marking the start of the treatment of the Stoic paradox on moral servitude and freedom, it also signals the point where comparison between Davus and his master begins in earnest, and where the roles of master and slave begin to be emphatically reversed. In contrast to the rather formal and solemn *contiumx aliena* assigned to Horace, the diminutive *meretricula*, although possibly *metri gratia*, has the added advantage of appearing far less threatening, and even seems affectionate.
"sinning" and another; as the Stoics, however, argued for the equality of all sins, one sin could not, according to them, be better or worse than any other. Not only the rhetorical question in line 47, therefore, but also Davus' entire contrast of his own and Horace's sins, which begins in earnest in this present section, while morally significant from a general perspective, is in fact incompatible with orthodox Stoicism. Although he has claimed an indirect Stoic source for his material only two lines earlier (45), Davus has either not been exposed to or else has not grasped this aspect of Stoic theory. An infelicity such as this must cause the audience to question whether Davus knows much about Stoicism at all, beyond the paradox that suits his own situation.

Fortunately, however, the arguments which follow are influenced instead by the practical moralising of Horace's first book of Satires. Having identified Horace as an adulterer, Davus proceeds with an elaborate contrast between what he depicts as his own carefree enjoyment of a prostitute, and what he alleges are his master's deluded sexual habits in pursuing married women. Davus cautions that the matrona, unlike the prostitute, is not sexually agreeable (63b-65), is financially draining (commites rem omnen...), and the whole adulterous escapade is an extremely dangerous and fearful undertaking (56ff) - not least because of the probability of a jealous husband lurking in the wings. Not only are most of Davus' arguments the stock-in-trade of moralising on adultery, but many of the points he makes are also strongly reminiscent of Sat. 1.2, in which Horace had himself conducted a 'diatribe' against adultery as expensive, perilous to one's person and lethal to one's reputation. Davus' accusation that Horace is an adulterer therefore suggests that the satirist is at best inconsistent, at worst hypocritical.

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797 In Sat. 1.3, as we have seen, Horace ridiculed the Stoic tenet that all sins are of equal weight. In an attempt to demonstrate the unfairness and extreme impracticability of this Stoic credo should it be applied to forms of punishment, Horace had asserted that someone would be considered insane if he were to crucify a slave for the minor offence of licking half-eaten dish that he had been ordered to clear away - in other words, if a slave's minor sin were to be treated as if a major one: si quis eum servum patinam qui tollere iussus/semosos piscis tepidumque ligurrierit ius/in cruce suffigat, Labeone insanior inter/sanos dicatur (1.3.80-83a). Ironically, Horace's anti-Stoic position would have been more lenient towards a slave in trouble than a literal application of Davus' own recently embraced faith. The joke is on Davus in that, in failing to grasp the niceties of Stoic theory, he does not comprehend how disadvantageous, if literally executed, these could be.

798 In Sat. 1.2 (cf. Part 1, chapter 2 of the present thesis) Horace had railed against reckless sexual relations with any woman, even the freedwoman, but in particular the matrona, the high-born uxor aliena, who
Consorting with the virtually inaccessible *matrona* is so fraught with difficulty and of such a threat to Horace’s good name that Davus describes his master having to venture out in disguise to meet another man’s wife (53-56a, cf. 67). Having thrown off the insignia of his rank, the adulterer Horace appears in public incognito, disguised as someone effeminate and of low social status (a Dama), with a cloak covering his perfumed head: *prodis ex iudice Damaturpis odoratum caput obscurante lacerna* (54-5). It has been remarked that Horace’s hiding of himself, represented by the cloak with which he has covered his head (*obscurante lacerna, 55*), contrasts sharply with the prostitute’s openness, reflected in her nakedness in the bright light of the lamp (*clara nuda lucerna, 48*). In *Sat.* 1.2 Horace had cited the prostitute’s nakedness under her transparent attire as evidence of her complete lack of dissimulation. Hiding behind his cloak, as described in *Sat.* 2.7, however, Horace is ironically more like the *matrona* of *Sat.* 1.2, who concealed herself beneath her long *stola* (1.2.94-100). As a result, in 2.7 Horace compares negatively not only with Davus but even with the prostitute.

We saw that *Sat.* 1.2 ended with a scene, which, although presented as hypothetical, had Horace in the role of adulterer, having been caught in *flagrante delicto*, pictured rac-
dishevelled from the scene of his sins. This unfortunate personal experience at which Horace hinted at *Sat.* 1.2.127-133 would retrospectively have added credibility to his preceding admonitions to others to avoid adultery at all costs: the satirist, it appears, knew first-hand what he was talking about when he asserted that life was tough for adulterers. At 2.7.58-61 Davus likewise pictures Horace being forced to hide from the jealous husband in a chest, the equivalent of the bedroom closet in modern farce. The graphic nature of both these Horatian passages indicates their probable debt to the perennial ‘adultery especially was regarded as a drain on a man’s finances and a risk to his good name. Horace had by contrast upheld the prostitute as available, accessible (a *parabillis Venus*), open and artless. Pitting whoring against adultery, Davus likewise argues that the prostitute is far more easily available and compliant (47b-50), eager to please, and of no risk to one’s reputation (51ff).

799 For the clever contrast in the wordplay on *lucerna...lacerena*, see Rudd 1966: 191; Scarp 1969: 26-27.

800 All the verbs in the vignette at *Sat.* 1.2.127-133 are in the subjunctive in clauses following a verb of fearing (*vereor ne...*). But in spite of this, the apparently first-hand detail and the fact that Horace speaks in the first person suggest his personal involvement. Cf. Part 1, chapter 2, pp. 112-113 above.
mime', a favourite of the contemporary popular stage. The stock figures, stage props and topoi of adultery that contributed to this raucous mime routine are all there in both sketches. In both, the conscia, the maid accomplice, is present just as in mime, desperately scheming to engineer a solution to the looming problem, but putting the adulterer's interests last when the chips are down. In both Horace evades the jealous husband, although by different means - fleeing in 1.2 and hiding in 2.7.

Hiding in a chest may well have led to the adulterer's detection in the classic mime scene, but Davus presents Horace as having escaped (evasti, 68) - for the present - just as the end of Sat. 1.2 saw him running away. The point Davus makes with his mention of Horace's escape is that his master is crazy enough to go back, even after his farcical getaway. Far from a case of once bitten, twice shy (doctusque cavebist), Horace, Davus suggests, will not learn from his mistakes. That Davus in 2.7 has located Horace within another stock adultery scene and has had him escape, echoing his escape at the end of Sat. 1.2, helps to entrench the impression, however unjustified, in the mind of the reader of

801 The 'adultery mime' was one of the most famous and most popular of mimes (Reynolds 1946: 77). On the mime in general, see Fantham (1989: 153-163); and for a Petronian adaptation of the adultery mime, see Panayotakis (1995: 122-135). Reynolds (id.: 78) argues that the brevity of the sketch of the mime scene placed in Davus' mouth at lines 58-61 confirms that such a scene would have been instantly recognisable to Horace's contemporary audience. Reynolds therefore concludes that there is a strong probability that Horace's image derived 'from the popular stage of his day' (ibid.). Freudenburg (1993: 46) compares this to the modern commonplace, seen so many times on television and in movies, with the lover tripping over his boxer shorts as he attempts to escape the husband.

802 Hiding the lover in a chest when the husband returns unexpectedly was well known to mime, something that is also later referred to by Juvenal at Sat. 6.41-44, where the speaker expresses amazement that Postumus is thinking of taking a wife when he used to be the most infamous adulterer in town, having hidden in more chests than a comic protagonist (quem totiens textit perituri cista Latini, 44). Latinus was one of the most famous mime-actors in Juvenal's day, who seems to have played the part of the adulterer (Reynolds id.: 82). Reynolds (id.: 81) suggests that the adultery mime may have consisted of a single scene, which probably took place in the woman's bedroom. It began with the two lovers on stage alone, interrupted by the return of the husband, just prior to which event the woman (or her maid) concealed the adulterer in the chest, where he was cramped and uncomfortable (see Horace 2.7.61) and maybe almost smothered (cf. Juvenal 6.44 - probably the sense of perituri). 'At last he was discovered, and the three characters appeared on the stage together for the denouement' (Reynolds ibid.). Possibly, the lover would voluntarily reveal himself when the oppressive atmosphere in the chest became too much (id.: 83). The ending of the adultery mime is uncertain (ibid.), but the adulterer would probably flee the stage, as at the end of Horace's second satire, perhaps with the cuckold in hot pursuit.

803 According to Davus, Horace is a slave to adultery, and, quite unlike any beast which has broken out of its chains, he in unnatural fashion returns willingly to his captivity: evasti: creda, metus doctusque cavebist: quaeres quando iterum paves? iterumque perire possis, o totiens servus! quae belua ruptis/cum semel effugit, reddit se prava catenis? (68-71).
both books of *Satires*, that in spite of all his protests, Horace is a repeat offender in adultery. While Davus is himself a character out of New or Roman Comedy, Horace’s lifestyle is no better than a farce. Foolish enough to hand over to a raging master (*dominoque fur-enti*, 66) his entire fortune, his life, his reputation and person, Horace is a slave, and what is more, a perpetual slave (*o totiens servus*, 70) to his passions. The satire positively clanks with the imagery of bondage and servitude as Davus works his way around to the Stoic paradox that only the sage is free.

By presenting his master as a shame-faced adulterer, Davus suggests once more that Horace has failed to practise what he preached in his earlier bouts of moralising. But there are two things which have the potential to redeem Horace in our eyes. One consideration is that the poet has already undercut his own position and satirised his own persona by hinting at an intimate knowledge of adultery at the end of *Sat. 1.2*. By accusing himself first, Horace has pre-empted much of the blame which Davus tries to attach to him. *Qui s'accuse, s'excuse.* As we have seen, Horace was able to laugh at himself long before his Comic slave took it upon himself to draw his master’s many faults to his attention.

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804 *Sat. 2.7.66-67*: *dominoque furienti* committed *rem omnem et vitam et cum corpore famam*? The *locus classicus* for sexuality as a ‘raging master’ can be found in comments attributed to the aged Sophocles near the start of Plato’s *Republic* (329b-c). However, the *dominus furens* at *Sat. 2.7.66ff* is one of the many images of servitude that anticipate the paradox that Davus is about to explore. Ironically, the poem itself ends with a real raging master when Horace appears to lose his temper and indicates all too clearly that he has had enough of Davus *(2.7.116-118)*. This outburst at the end is anticipated by Horace’s frowning and glaring to which Davus himself refers halfway through *(43-45)*.

805 Even the fear and trembling associated with the tense moments in the adulterer’s career are now, in the context of a slave’s speech on moral servitude, attributes that assume servile connotations: the adulterer’s heart-stopping fears *(metuens, 56; tremis, 57; metues, 68; paveas, 69)* could be seen to parallel the characteristic timidity of a slave *(reformido, 2)*. Surpassing the Stoic paradox which is the theme of Davus’ speech, the slave has become like a free man, while the free man by contrast has acquired attributes traditionally associated with servility.

806 Ironically, as noted above, images of bondage and servitude were also the province of love poetry: thus the literary *topos* of *servitium amoris* and actual servile behaviour meet in Davus’ presentation of both the symbolic and real servitude displayed by Horace as an adulterer.

807 I would like to imagine that as eavesdropper Davus failed to grasp the subtleties of Horace’s indirect ‘confession’ at the end of *Sat. 1.2*, that the servile listener took the satirist entirely at face value. Perhaps one could argue that the accusations of adultery may even have been concocted by the earnest Davus himself, possibly because he has misunderstood Horace’s self-deprecating joke at the end of *Sat. 1.2*. Davus has a very literal approach as audience of the *Satires*, but this is ultimately necessary if he is to call Horace’s bluff.
Second, however, as Davus himself is eventually forced to acknowledge, no charge of 
adultery can be pinned with certainty on our poet. Davus anticipates Horace’s indignant 
objection by means of the ‘diatrical’ device of imaginary interlocution: ‘Non moechus 
sum’ ais - ‘I’m not an adulterer,’ I hear you say’ (72). Reduced to the role of imaginary 
opponent, Horace and his protestations are at Davus’ beck and call. In this moralising and 
argumentative ‘diatrical’ mode, the onus is on Davus to refute the statement he has plac-
ed in the mouth of his imaginary interlocutor, ‘Horace’. But the slave can merely be relied 
upon to come up with a suitably servile analogy: just as Davus ‘wisely’ (sapiens) passes 
by silverware, resisting the temptation to steal it (72-3), so Horace avoids adultery on ac-
count of his fear of the consequences. But take away the danger, Davus adds, and Horace’s 
natura will burst out of its constraints: tolle periculum,iam vaga prosiliet frenis natura re-
motis (73-4).808 The accusation of adultery is thus applicable not to what Horace actually 
does, but only to what his domestic slave claims he would do were it not so dangerous.809 
By arguing that Horace is an adulterer only by intent,810 Davus admits by default that his 
allegations are, for all practical purposes, untrue. Or again, a more cynical reading could 
interpret this to mean that, as has been implied in the descriptions of his narrow ‘escapes’, 
Horace has failed at adultery, though not through lack of trying.

It is curious that Davus’ accusations, although incapable of convicting ‘Horace’ of actual 
vice, do seem to stick to him. This is partly because, while Davus’ allegations contradict 
the formal claims made by Horace in Sat. 1.2, they are not really at odds with the overall 
impression of his character and past experience that the satirist deliberately let slip in that 
satire. Although nothing definite can be proven, Davus’ charges of adultery have the eff-
ect of raising or confirming our suspicions about ‘Horace’, thus further undercutting any

808 This image echoes that of the animal bursting out of its cage at lines 70-1, and is in addition part of the 
imagery of bondage, captivity and servitude which pervades Davus’ entire speech and the satire as a whole, 
e.g. cf. 18-20, the image of the slave-gang.
809 It should be recalled that in Sat. 1.2 Horace had argued that adultery was to be avoided not because it 
was morally wrong but because it was so dangerous.
810 Bond (1978: 91) notes that here ‘Davus describes the Stoic doctrine of intentio with some accuracy.’ 
According to the Stoics, a person’s intention and inclination were recognised as equally significant, if not 
equivalent to, committing an act (cf. Cicero De Fin. 3.9.32: sic timere, sic maerere, sic libidine esse pecc-
atum est, etiam sine effectu). However, in practical terms (as opposed to Stoic theory) Horace is ‘innocent’ 
because he does not manage to commit his intended vice.
privilege that the authorial persona of Book One might yet enjoy. Presenting his character as a flawed and all too human individual, nevertheless Horace continues to make himself more sympathetic to the audiences of the *Satires*. That some of Davus’ accusations are eventually revealed to be unsubstantiated or possibly even fabricated, can only win the poor, victimised ‘Horace’ even more sympathy.

**Only the (smooth, round) sage is free**

Davus, however, avoids dwelling on his failure to prove that Horace is an adulterer in act as well as intent by plunging forthwith into an exposition of the argument he is developing (75ff), describing the nature of the Stoic sage or *sapiens*,811 the only one who is truly free (83-88).812 But the neophyte’s enthusiastic communication of the graphic side of Stoic doctrine must also contribute to our impression of his lack of sophistication. Davus’ cartoon-like image of the apathetic sage as smooth and round (*teres atque rotundus*, 86) - like an impregnable ball which the lame dame Fortune (*manca...Fortuna*, 88) has to attack in vain - although formally correct, appears to highlight the rather comic side of this image.813 What is more, if we are to believe the tradition that Horace himself was short and fat,814 then Davus’ ball-like sage is ironically the physical epitome of the audience and target of this Stoic ‘diatribe’.

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811 Davus’ reference to the *sapiens* (83), however, echoes his prior application of the epithet to himself earlier at 73, where he had audaciously described himself as ‘wise’ for not stealing silverware. While Davus is certainly not going so far as to call himself a sage, the manifestation of the term *sapiens* in its correct Stoic usage a mere ten lines after its appearance in a colloquial context is unfortunate, and undercuts the impact of Davus’ serious point about the Stoic wise man.

812 ‘Who, then, is free?’ - *Quisnam igitur liber?* (83), this question, a rhetorical one placed in Davus’ own mouth rather than that of an adversary, parallels a similar rhetorical question in Cicero’s treatment of this same Stoic paradox: ‘What, then, is freedom?’ - *Quid enim est libertas?* (*Paradoxa Stoicorum* 5.34). The answer is, of course, that only the wise man is free: solely *sapiens* is equal to *liber*. Davus’ *sapiens sibi qui imperiosus* (83), mirrors Cicero’s reply that *libertas is potestas vivendi, ut ve lis*. Although Davus’ response is far less sophisticated than Cicero’s, both make the point that the wise man has power over himself and control over the way in which he lives - in short, freedom.

813 Bond (1978: 92) also notes that the metaphor here has been taken ‘to unnecessarily amusing lengths’.

814 Cf. p. 224 n. 656 above.
Slave to love

Davus returns briefly to the amatory theme at 89b-94, where he imagines his interlocutor as the ‘slave’ of a willful and demanding mistress, having to suffer the indignities of being shut out of her door, drenched and generally abused. Davus’ use of the second person singular at 90ff, in the midst of his on-going address to Horace, places his master in the farcical guise of the exclusus amator. Davus may be using this illustration of servitium amoris to make up for his recent failure to show that Horace is really an adulterer (if indeed he is conscious of that failure): since he has been unable to prove Horace’s subjection to the feminine in the literal sense, he reiterates the idea of the poet’s servitude to love in the literary. As a result, where he has previously been reduced to addressee, interlocutor and target of satire, the former satirist is now even further diminished to the role of a ridiculous stock figure in a literary context. Once again the commonplaces of literature, whereby love is likened to slavery, are harnessed to Davus’ presentation of the Stoic theory of moral servitude: while Horace, Davus suggests, is an unfortunate servus amoris and exclusus amator, he also makes the point that Horace is a ‘slave’ in the metaphorical Stoic sense.

815 The woman described here is not necessarily the matrona with whom Davus has previously accused Horace of consorting, nor, as sometimes suggested, a prostitute (see e.g. Rudd 1966: 193): although the specific monetary value of her request (quinque talenta) is admittedly meretricious, the huge amount suggests a woman with a hyperbolic estimation of her own worth, far in excess of the common whore. The key is that we are no longer in Horace’s contemporary Rome which, however fictional, had seen him nervously disguising his equestrian status, but rather in the highly literary realms of New Comedy and love poetry, with Horace playing the role of ill-starred lover of a demanding high-class courtesan.

816 Having clearly grown in confidence, the formerly timid Davus exploits the ambiguity of the second person singular as both a formal aspect of Roman rhetorical speech, and as literally referring to a direct singular addressee, almost as fearlessly as we have seen Horace himself did in his address to Maecenas on miserliness in Sat. 1.1. Cf. Part 1, chapter 1 of the present thesis.

817 In his treatment of this same Stoic paradox, Cicero had similarly posed the question as to whether the man who is in a woman’s thrall can be called free: An ille mihi liber, cui mulier imperat? cui leges imponit, praescribit, tubet, vetat quod videtur? poscit, dandum est; vocat, veniendum; eiicit, abundum; minatur, extimescendum (Paradoxa Stoicorum 5.36). If Davus is being made to imitate either Cicero or the type of Stoic rhetoric of which Cicero is typical, then Cicero’s poscit, dandum est may be picked up in Davus’ quinque talenta poscit te mulier (89-90), and his vocat, veniendum; eiicit, abundum may be reflected in Davus’ foribusque repulsus...rursus vocat (90-91). Cicero’s Stoic verdict is that the man who allows himself to be subject to a woman is not only a slave but a slave of the most vile kind: ego vero istum non modo servum, sed nequissimum servum, etiam si in amphilissima familia natus sit, appellandum puto (Paradoxa Stoicorum 5.36). Davus contends that no-one who subjects himself to feminine tyranny such as he has described could possibly call himself ‘free’ (91b-4). Cicero also shortly thereafter makes the point that although there may be a hierarchy of slaves in a household, they are still slaves - just as Davus toys with the que-
However, Davus may also be recalling Horace's own prior treatment of the *exclusus amator* at *Sat.* 1.2.64ff, where, as we saw, the satirist had described one Villius suffering a series of indignities, culminating in his exclusion from his mistress' abode. The vilified Villius, we recall, ended up being addressed by his own penis in a distinct parody of the standard 'diatribal' *prosopopoia* (1.2.69ff). While in the penultimate *Sat.* 2.7 our poet is mercifully spared a lecture by his male member, he does suffer the embarrassment of having the satiric tables turned on him by a lowly member of his household.

On the whole, Davus' descriptions of how he and his master compare when it comes to sexual enjoyment are so lengthy and graphic (literally 'pornographic', since the site of Davus' activities is the πορνείον, the brothel) that one cannot help concluding that, apart from relishing the details, Davus has some additional motive in this. Davus' almost all-consuming stress on sex in *Sat.* 2.7 is comparable to Horace's own disproportionate emphases, as speaker, on tempting women and tempting food, in *Sat.* 1.2 and *Sat.* 2.2 respectively. Sex is an understandable topic for Davus to focus upon: this is one of the few areas of life in which both he and Horace can compete on an equal footing, *as men*, whether technically slave or free. Davus' detailed, almost boastful, descriptions of his own sexual prowess with the prostitute may be deliberately titillating, aimed at arousing both Horace and his envy. Emphasising what Bakhtin was to term the 'lower bodily stratum' or the 'material bodily principle', something which often features in the later Carnival-esque literature, Davus' steamy sex scenes certainly contrast sharply with his master's adulterous frustrations.

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818 See pp. 97-101 above.

819 Bakhtin (1984 b: 181) emphasises the positive but graphic images of the body that are often depicted in Carnival-esque literature: '...the material bodily principle, that is, images of the human body with its food, drink, defecation, and sexual life, plays a predominant role.' In my view, the emphasis on the body (and especially, the grotesque body) grew greater in Medieval and Renaissance Carnival-esque literature than it had been in the Latin literature of the Saturnalia (as here) because the later Carnival-esque literature was partly a reaction to the highly negative attitude to the body on the part of the Church.
Another self-satiric joke at the expense of Horace's character, as we have seen throughout the *Satires*, is that he is continuously plagued by sexual failure and misfortune: from being the bed-soiling victim of the *mendax puella* in *Sat.* 1.5 to his hinted-at close brushes with the dangers of adultery, the 'Horace' of the *Satires* has had trouble getting laid. Davus exploits this insecurity on his master's part in order to drive home his point about Horace's moral enslavement. Horace's choosiness and his enslavement to luxury rather than being content with satiating basic appetites - things that he has ironically criticised in others throughout his *Satires* - are at the root of the problem. This fussiness can also be seen in Horace's tastes in the two other areas of life that Davus tackles next: art and food. The constant champion of the simple life, it turns out, is not so modest and content after all.

**Art appreciation**

At line 95 Davus proceeds directly from the amatory to the aesthetic as he begins to contrast his own and his master's differing tastes in the visual arts. While Horace swoons over paintings by Pausias, Davus is impressed by flashy depictions of gladiatorial fights, by which we should probably understand lively posters advertising events in the arena (95-101). Constantly drawing attention to injustices and inequalities between the type of treatment that either of them receives, Davus complains that while he is labelled a good-for-nothing and a dawdler (cessator) for stopping to admire his taste in art, Horace on the

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820 Not only are these topics naturally linked, but Cicero too, in his treatment of this paradox, directly after asserting that sexual subjection was servitude, had suggested that equally enslaved and no less deluded were those led astray by an extravagant delight in a host of antiques and collectables, which included paintings: *...pari stultitia sunt, quos signa, quos tabulae, quos caelatum argentum quos Corinthia opera, quos aedificia magnifica nimio opere delectant...* (Paradoxa Stoicorum 5.36). Cicero's addressee was accused of being held spellbound by a painting by the artist Aetion and by a statue Polyclitus, but the argument is comparable to Davus' in that the so-called art enthusiast is merely a wretched slave to these things: *Aetionis tabula te stupidum detinet aut signum atquod Polycleit...intuentem te, admirantem, clamores tollentem cum video, servum te esse ineptitarum omnium judico...* (Paradoxa Stoicorum 5.36). Cicero's treatment associates the paintings with the accumulation of other *objets d'art*, and criticises the art enthusiast for his acquisitiveness and greed, as well as the foolishness (cf. *ineptitaria*) of his pursuit.

821 *nequam et cessator Davus, at ipse/subtilis veterum iudex et callidus audis* (100-101). Being labelled a loiterer (cessator) may, at least at a later period, have earned a slave more than a mere rap over the knuckles: an edict in the *Digest* (21.1.1.11) lists dawdling as one of the things from which the buyer of a slave must be protected, and it seems to be regarded here at least as seriously as fugitivism.
contrary is hailed a connoisseur.\textsuperscript{822} Davus' point is that Horace's addictive attachment to art, however tasteful, is a type of moral servitude, and that it is merely social rather than moral differences that render Horace's indulgences acceptable and his own deplorable. Once again linking the literal and the metaphoric, Davus suggests that Horace is no less servile in his passion for refined art than the basest slave in his appreciation of the most garish of popular artforms.

Pausias, Horace's preferred painter, was a fourth century pupil of Pamphilus of the Sicyonian 'school' which took an intellectual approach to art, with emphasis on technical virtuosity. Pliny the Elder,\textsuperscript{823} who informs us that the whole collection of Pausias' paintings was brought to Rome from Sicyon after a liquidation sale, also reveals that Pausias was a generally slow worker whose paintings were habitually small, often depicting erotic subjects featuring boys and women with flowers.\textsuperscript{824} His enemies argued that he painted miniatures because he was too slow to paint anything larger, and furthermore they maintained that it was his painstaking encaustic technique that slowed him down; in response Pausias, unlike Horace when challenged by Crispinus,\textsuperscript{825} rose to the occasion, and completed a picture of a boy in a day. This was not Pausias' usual style, however, as the nature of this anecdote reveals. Some may have regarded him as a painter of trifles: a remark made by the painter Nicias, for example, criticised those who chose small subjects, instead of epic-

\textsuperscript{822} Horace's enslavement to the aesthetically pleasing is excused on the grounds of refinement. Cf. the sarcastic comments that Davus earlier in his speech attributes to the disgrunted \textit{scura} Mulvius when Horace runs off to dinner with Maecenas. Horace is no better than Mulvius, it is suggested, although he acts as though he is and cloaks his vice in fine words: \ldots velut \textit{melior verbisque decoris} obsolvas vitium? (2.7.41-42). Cf. p. 279, n. 792 above.

\textsuperscript{823} See \textit{HN} 35.124.

\textsuperscript{824} McGann (1956: 98 n. 5) refers to comments by Fronto which mention Pausias: \textit{quid si Parrhasium versicolora pingere iubet aut Apellen unicolora... aut lascivia Euphranorem aut Pausiam t <ristitit > a satura?} - 'What if you were to order Parrhasius to paint multi-coloured pictures, or Apelles monotonous one-toned paintings, ...or Euphranor to portray erotic subjects or Pausias subjects of a serious satiric nature?' (I.131; van den Hout 1988). The question is of course ironic, suggesting in each case by adynaton that the painter in question try something that is the opposite of his own tendency and style. Pausias is contrasted with Euphranor, as Apelles is with Parrhasius. McGann (\textit{ibid.}) has suggested that the erotic nature of Pausias' subjects accords well with the placing of this criticism by Davus straight after he has drawn attention to Horace's alleged enslavement to adulterous \textit{matronae}, compared with Davus' more pragmatic preference for prostitutes. Indeed, Horace the art-lover appropriately \textit{swoons} (verb \textit{torpes}) at the sight of the paintings. Horace does not just admire the paintings - he is infatuated with them.

\textsuperscript{825} See \textit{Sat.} 1.4.13b-21a; cf. pp. 151-152 above.
scale cavalry battles and naval battles.\textsuperscript{826} It is apparent, however, that as far as Pausias is concerned, Davus is complaining of Horace’s approval of the work of an artist who stood for steady if slow technical excellence and miniature refinement.

Apart from being yet further criticism of Horace placed in Davus’ disgruntled mouth. I would suggest that this section on our protagonists’ differing tastes in art is an indirect literary statement on the part of the poet: what Horace approved of on paper, it follows he would also appreciate on canvass.\textsuperscript{827} Throughout his \textit{liber sermonum} and particularly in the final satire of his first book, Horace had asserted, as we have seen, the ideals of a slow, detailed, and technically proficient method of composition. In accordance with the Callimachean slim style and slim Muse, ‘less is more’ was the Horatian satirist’s expressed stylistic credo. With regard to subject matter, too, Horace emphasised, in the tradition of the Alexandrian poet, small, contained treatments rather than large, epic-scale ones. Just as Pausias painted trifles, so Horace wrote little books (\textit{libelli}, \textit{Sat.} 1.4.71) and little verses (\textit{versiculi}, 1.10.32, 58). Pausias’ refined paintings, the product of slow and critical work, have found an exclusive, comprehending audience in Horace, just as the poet envisaged for his \textit{Satires}.\textsuperscript{828}

\textsuperscript{826} At Demetr. \textit{Eloc.} 76 (Roberts 1902: \textit{ad loc.} = Overbeck no. 1825; cf. McGann 1956: 98), Nicias is quoted as criticising the representation of small subjects like birds and flowers, and recommends instead the depiction of large, worthy subjects such as cavalry-battles and sea-battles: Νικίας δ’ ὁ ωγράφος καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ἔλεγεν εἶναι τῆς γραφικῆς τέχνης οὐ μικρὸν μέρος τὸ λαβόντα ὅλην εὐμεγέθη γράφειν, καὶ μὴ κατακερματίζειν τὴν τέχνην εἰς μικρά, οἶον ὀρνιθία ἡ ἄνθη, ἀλλ’ ἵππομαχίας καὶ ναυμαχίας...

\textsuperscript{827} Painting was a common metaphor for writing and is later used elsewhere by Horace, notably at the start of his \textit{Ars Poetica}. Yet while the Horatian phrase \textit{ut pictura poesis} (\textit{A.P.} 361) has become almost representative of the painting-literature analogy, Horace himself, as Hardie (1993: 120) remarks, is curiously ‘one of the least pictorial of Latin poets’. This emerges when one compares Horace with the likes of the later Propertius, or even with his contemporary and friend Virgil (\textit{id.: passim}). Generic considerations may be partly to blame, but the relative scarcity of the graphic emphasis in Horace’s \textit{corpus} could arguably render the ‘artworks’ passage at \textit{Sat.} 2.7.95-101 all the more significant.

\textsuperscript{828} As we have seen, Horace has throughout regarded the multitude (\textit{turba}) or the common throng (\textit{vulgus}) as representative of a general, undesirable and undiscriminating audience, better suited to his stylistic enemies than to his \textit{Satires}; cf. \textit{Sat.} 1.4.25ff, 71ff; \textit{Sat.} 1.10.72-74. Likewise, as noted in the previous chapter, the ex-businessman Damasippus’ prior alliance with the \textit{turba} partly explained his failure to comprehend Horace’s literary ideals; cf. pp. 238-239 & p. 244 n. 705 above.
In the passage on artworks in Sat. 2.7, therefore, Horace’s appreciation of small, detailed paintings, treating subjects on a modest scale with a high degree of technical excellence is in agreement with the stylistic ideals he expressed in his first book. It is also interesting that, by contrast, Davus’ wonder at large, gaudy posters, treating loud subjects, is closely associated with the ‘bigger is better’ ideology of Horace’s stylistic enemies. Davus’ straining calves (contento poplite, 97)\textsuperscript{829} as he tries to view the pictures not only indicates his undeniable enthusiasm for them, but may also suggest, among other things, that the scale of the paintings is huge or that a multitude (turba) has gathered to view them, and that Davus has to attempt to look over all their heads in order to catch a glimpse of the popular images. Also, Davus clearly sides with the vast majority of antiquity in his appreciation of verisimilitude in art (\ldots velut si / re vera pugnent ... - ‘as if they were really fighting’, 98b-99a). The gladiators depicted in Davus’ favourite posters are described as soldiers fighting painted battles (proelia...picta, 98), which suggests a mockery of the subject matter of the epic genre which Horace, with his professed Callimachean aesthetics, had rejected. Likewise, the prominent juxtaposition of arma and viri at the start of line 100 adds to the parody of epic by having a serious heroic formula describe the clashes of painted gladiators.\textsuperscript{830}

\textsuperscript{829} Although most commentators, taking contento poplite with miror (97), have interpreted this to refer to Davus’ own legs, a minority, however, have understood contento poplite to refer to the straining limbs of the painted gladiators engaged in combat (e.g. Palmer 1883: \textit{ad loc.}, cf. Bond 1978: 94). If there is any deliberate ambiguity here, it would imply that Davus has to struggle almost as hard as the gladiators do in the arena in order to glimpse the depiction of their endeavours. Possibly we are to imagine Davus so rapt in his role of viewer of the exceptionally realistic portrayal that he acts as though he too, is taking part in the fight - in Muecke’s translation Davus has ‘straining knees’ (1993: \textit{ad loc.}). The contento in contento poplite adds this to Bond’s list of this satire’s satirical devices (ibid.). Rudd (1966: 193) thought that Davus’ reference to his straining limbs meant that he was rooted to the spot (admittedly another battle image), but I would prefer to imagine the (relatively short?) servile Davus standing on tip-toes to view the pictures.

\textsuperscript{830} Bloch (1970: 208f) suggests that the combination of arma vir- may already have been used by Ennius. He notes that it occurs at least 11 times in Virgil’s Aeneid in addition to its use at Aen. 1.1 (arma virumque cano...), and only occasionally in relation to Aeneas himself; cf. Aen. 9.777, where it is used of Turnus’ singer Cretheus: \textit{semper equos atque arma virum pugnasque canebat}. Bloch (id.: 209) surmises that the combination of arma vir(or)um canere is a free translation or indirect imitation of the Greek epic formula \textit{ἀείδομεναι κλέα ἀνδρών - ‘to sing of the glorious deeds of men’}. At Sat. 2.7.100a, however, a mock-up of the Latin formula arma vir- contributes to a parody of epic, as it is placed in a slave’s mouth and applied to pictures of gladiators. It is clear that Horace has deliberately juxtaposed arma and viri, since it is not grammatically necessary for them to be together, arma being accusative object of the present participle moventes (line 99) and viri nominative, referring back to the understood subject (the gladiators). If Horace’s close friend Virgil, mentioned in two satires of his first book (Sat. 1.5.40, 48; 1.10.45, 81), had already begun thinking about and even composing pieces of his coming epic in this early period, which does not seem impossible, it is tempting to see this as a private, teasing reference to the opening words of that work.
As in the introductory section of *Sat. 2.3*, the lecture to which Horace is subjected in *Sat. 2.7* incorporates a subtle vindication of the satirist’s professed stylistic ideals, again ironically placed in the mouth of his critic. Davus’ own (albeit indirect) contact with Crispinus, Horace’s long-winded, bombastic Stoic neighbour, has aligned him with the ‘wrong’ stylistic side in the dramatic context of the *Satires*. In addition, to return to the erotic analogy, the exclusivity and inaccessibility of the artworks Horace admires are analogous to the type of women that Davus maintains Horace courts - the high-class *matronae*, who, although unfaithful are at least discerningly so. The brightly coloured and flashy posters Davus admires, on the other hand, are, like the women the slave favours, accessible, loud and common, in a word - meretricious, as they indiscriminately satisfy a need for the graphic in all who pass by them.

The ‘grotesque body’, or ‘you are what you eat’...

As is almost inevitable in Comedy, and as is appropriate in a book of *Satires* in which alternate poems treat the topic of the edible, Davus’ conversation eventually turns towards food. Like the Comic slave who gripes about his meagre rations, Davus once again draws attention to the iniquitous discrepancies between his own starvation diet and his master’s elaborate feasts. Davus is the first to admit his own servitude to the belly, but later adds that he has a more immediate if not higher price to pay for giving in to the temptations of a steaming pudding\(^{831}\) - his back is beaten and he is considered a good-for-nothing as a result of this action. Horace, on the contrary, is neither physically beaten for his indulgence, nor is reputation really affected.\(^{832}\) However, Davus consoles himself

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\(^{831}\) A *libum* was literally a cake that was offered to the gods, especially on a birthday; therefore it may have been appropriate on the festive occasion of the Saturnalia. Davus’ submission to the temptation of the cake (*ducet libo fumante...*, 102; my emphasis) parallels the *scurra* Mulvius’ confession earlier, quoted by Davus, that he is a fickle slave of his belly and that his nose turns up at the smell of cooking (*ducet ventre levem, nasum nidore supinor*, 38; my emphasis), an admission that had likewise preaced a stronger indictment of Horace. Davus’ giving in to the cake also contrasts with his earlier reference to his ‘wise’ avoidance of the temptation to steal the silver (72-73). Again flying in the face of the Stoic idea of all sins being equal, the consequences of stealing silverware far outweigh those of stealing a bite of a cake, and this is perhaps why Davus indirectly confesses to having done the latter.

\(^{832}\) Davus is called a ‘good-for-nothing’ (*nil ego*, 102) for his appreciation of food, just as he is labelled a good-for-nothing (*nequam*) and a dawdler (*cessator*) for stopping to admire the gladiatorial poster (100). And just as Horace was praised for his enslavement to art (101), so the master does not really lose people’s
with the thought that his master is punished in his own way for his gluttony. Not only does Horace have to expend great effort and money in order to obtain his culinary luxuries, but the overindulgence in rich food, in his ‘endless round of feasts’ (epulae sine fine), means that he suffers the physical consequences of having overdone it. As a result of all the feasting, Davus relates, Horace finds that his hearty meals have turned bitter, and his feet are no longer able to carry his unhealthy, bloated body around. Davus paints a most unflattering portrait of Horace, describing him as fat and unhealthy, with a gruesome body which is vitiousum, thus indicating his moral disapproval of the physical outcome of his master’s lack of self-control.

It was precisely this indulgence in a luxury diet and lifestyle that Horace had argued against as speaker in Sat. 2.2. Appealing there to the teachings of the old countryman Ofellus, as we have seen, Horace had argued for the ideal of living on little (vivere parvo, 2.2. 1), and had criticised his imaginary adversary for pursuing costly and hard-to-come-by culinary delicacies (23-33). By accusing his master of addiction to a costly and unhealthy diet, and of developing a bloated body as a result (Horace’s vitiousum

833 The dainties that Horace craves are both rare and expensive: tu impunitior illa/quae parvo sumi nequeunt obsonia — ‘Are you any less punished,’ asks Davus, ‘when you chase after those delicacies which cannot be bought at a discount?’ (105-106). The use of the verb capitas implies that the luxury foodstuffs are not easy to come by and thus have to be stringently pursued, a topos of satiric and moralistic literature. Davus even goes so far as to align Horace, if he cannot identify him, with that profligate stock figure, the man who sells his estates to do his master’s bidding and finance the next round of luxury foodstuffs: qui praedia vendit, nil servile, gulae parens, habet? (110-111).

834 nempe inanamarescunt epulae sine fine petillae.illusique pedes vitiousum ferre recusant/corpus (107-109a). Horace’s burgeoning body as described by Davus here anticipates the grotesque body of later Carnivalesque literature which, according to Bakhtin, ‘is a body in the act of becoming. It is never finished, never completed; it is continually built, created...[it] outgrows its own self, transgressing its own body...’ (1984 (b): 317). Among other things, the grotesque body ‘overeats,’ (id.: 319), and thus ‘protrudes, bulges, sprouts...’ (id.: 320), manifesting the symptoms of ‘over-indulgence and disease...’ (id.: 325; cf. vitiousum).

835 Refer to Part 2, chapter 6, pp. 205-212 above, where I argue that Horace, using the mask of old Ofellus, is to be understood as the main speaker of Sat. 2.2.

836 The complex luxury diet was said to deaden the tastebuds (21-22), and to weigh down the stomach, the body and even the soul (73b-79). The bloated corpus onustum pesternis vitis (77-8) was certainly not a picture of health. Much like overindulgence in sex, an immoderate diet and the pursuit of delicacies brought about disgrace and financial ruin: grandes rhombi patinaeique/grande ferunt una cum damno dedecus... (95-6).
...corpus here matches the corpus onustum...vitiis he had derided at 2.2.77-78), and of devoting too much time and money to hunting this luxury diet, Davus suggests that Horace is a gourmand and a glutton, equivalent to his prior targets in Sat. 2.2. Indeed, we have seen that Horace's detailed descriptions of luxury foods in Sat. 2.2, while supposedly aiding his moralising attack on gluttony, also suggest that he himself must have had personal experience of the feasts of the Roman elite and moreover, he seems to have placed too much importance on their hedonistic excesses.

Davus' allusions to the endless round of feasts Horace attends (107) balances the mention he made earlier of his master's rushing off at the last minute to attend Maecenas' cena (32ff), and also counters that previous intimation that Horace was only called in, like a scurra, at the eleventh hour, to fill up the table and provide some entertainment. Now Davus presents his master as a dandy, dining out almost every night, and enjoying fine foods. There may be another veiled nod to Maecenas in this, although the speaker's criticism focusses on the unhealthy consequences of this overindulgence rather than on the generosity of those at whose tables Horace enjoys such feasting. However, what Davus - the self-styled amicum mancipium - has disregarded again, is the importance of this endless parade of parties in the context of amicitia: Horace has a duty to attend the epulae sine fine, and would have been considered ingratus if he had failed to do so.

Also, we may remind ourselves that Davus' attack on his master's excessive eating habits takes place at the time of the Saturnalia, a festival which allowed not only freedom of speech but which also occasioned an opportunity to eat, drink, and make merry. The Saturnalia was traditionally an occasion when masters and slaves would eat together. As Horace has honoured the ancestral custom of servile libertas on this day, we are probably also to imagine that he has laid on some eats for Davus. Are we to envisage the slave

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837 See pp. 223-224 above. It is interesting that Davus, by contrast, does not dwell on the nature of the dishes themselves or where they are obtained, as Horace did in Sat. 2.2. Rather, the domestic slave understandably concentrates on the debilitating effects that, in his observation, the endless feasts have had on Horace. 838 Seneca Epist. 47.14; Bradley 1979: 113; but cf. Kleijwegt (1997: 309-311), who suggests that Seneca is here merely referring to the example of the maiores in order to argue for more humane treatment of slaves. 839 Cf. ut maiores voluerunt, 2.7.5.
attacking his master with his mouth full? In this context Davus' criticism of Horace's appetite would be comparable, in modern Western terms, to a guest calling his host a 'fat slob' just as he is partaking of the latter's Christmas pudding. Yet at the same time, also within the tradition of the Saturnalia, Davus is of course assured the right to criticise such things in his master. If we reflect on the nature of Horace's own lecture in Sat. 2.2, it is only too clear that Davus uses this right, once again, to point out the poet's inconsistency and hypocrisy.

Horace's life of relative culinary luxury and indulgence, moreover, is contrasted with the lot of a poor slave who involves himself in petty theft - stealing a strigil to swap for a bunch of grapes - in order to ward off hunger (109-111). Although he does not actually admit to it directly, Davus, the self-confessed slave to his gullet, may himself be concealed in the seemingly indefinite example of the slave who steals in order to supplement his diet. By introducing into his moral speech a reference, however oblique, to what may well have been his own personal misstep, Davus is asking for his master's theoretical sanction of a hypothetical action, and thus, in a roundabout way, the slave is safeguarding his own hide should his sin ever be laid bare. This section of Davus' Saturnalian speech may therefore include a hidden agenda in addition to its formal Stoic one. As I shall shortly suggest, Davus' interest in the paradox that only the wise man is free and every fool is a slave is not entirely altruistic either.

Too close to home?

Davus next proceeds to make further observations about his master that appear to be at once more personal and of an even more serious nature.\footnote{adde quod idem/non horam tecum esse potes, non otia recte/ponere, teque ipsum vitas fugitivus et erro./iam vino quaerens, iam somno fallere curam:/frustra; nam comes atra premii seguiturque fugacem. - 'And another thing - you are incapable of being on your own for an hour, you do not organise your spare time properly, and you avoid yourself like a runaway slave and fugitive, seeking at one moment to deceive anxiety with wine, at the next with sleep. In vain, for a shadowy companion presses on you and pursues you in your flight...' (111b-115).} To top it all Horace, according to his domestic slave, cannot stand his own company even for an hour, evidently wastes
his spare time (*otia*), and attempts to escape his problems by indulging in wine or sleep, thus confirming Damasippus' prior accusations.\(^{841}\) Far from the contented, confident, even brash persona of *Satires* Book One, grateful to his father, loyal to his friends, and critical of his enemies, the Horace presented here is anxious and morbid, hitting the bottle or retiring to his couch at the drop of a hat. However, the rattled, edgy Horace is able neither to drown his sorrows in drink nor to forget his cares in sleep. This is because a sinister 'black companion' (*comes atra*, 115) accompanies him, and is the cause of his disturbed behaviour. This is a reference not only to the care which weighs Horace down (which nowadays we would call 'depression'), but also to an ever-present *memento mori*, an awareness of death, the ultimately unavoidable. Davus' point is that once again, Horace is 'enslaved' to these cares, but what is worse, he is unable to run away from them as a truant or fugitive slave would, since these are not tangible, physical troubles. Here Davus uses the imagery of fugitivism, an escape from actual slavery, to illustrate by contrast his master's frustration at his inescapable moral captivity.\(^{842}\)

However, Davus' insouciant airing of his master's deep personal crises in this latest batch of charges eventually proves too much for his addressee and target, Horace. Both the nat-

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\(^{841}\) Cf. 2.7.114, *nam vina quaerens, iam somnia fallere curam*, and 2.3.3-4, *vini somnique benignus* (my emphasis). Davus echoes Damasippus' prior complaints about Horace's lazy and decadent behaviour. If Davus has overheard Damasippus' lecture, or at least Horace's repetition of its later drafts, this is a conscious confirmation of the prior charges. If, however, as seems more likely, *Sat. 2.3*’s probable location on the Sabine farm could be surmised to have excluded the urban slave Davus from eavesdropping on it. in that case Davus' independent observations would make Horace's indictment on these charges even more watertight.

\(^{842}\) A passage on a similar theme is found at Lucretius *DRN* 3.1053-75, where, towards the end of the 'diatribe against the fear of death', discontent is shown making itself felt through restlessness and inconsistent behaviour. Lucretius relates how the owner of a stately mansion in town grows tired of staying at home, goes out, comes back, and then is off to his country estate; however, no sooner has he crossed the threshold of his holiday-house than he starts yawning or goes to sleep in grumpy mood, or else wants to return immediately to his city house. Davus has already criticised Horace's restless shuttling between the city and the country (28-29). He has also hinted that Horace was unable to stand his own company when, as we have seen, he earlier described his master's relief and eagerness on the invitation to attend Maecenas' dinner (29ff). Lucretius explains that the reason for the man's changeability and restlessness is the fact that he is running away from none other than himself - just as Davus has claimed for Horace. But since the fellow is bound to himself and cannot escape, he grows to hate himself, Lucretius tells us, like a sick man, because he does not know the cause of his illness. The Epicureans advise that the man devote himself to philosophy instead, and ponder questions larger than himself, such as the nature of the universe, to take his mind off this petty self-pity (1071-1075). It is surely Horace's joke that the last point made by the Stoic-inspired Davus should derive from an Epicurean source.
ure of the issues Davus touches on, as well as the tone of the last few lines of his speech, are atypical of the subject matter and approach of the satiric genre. Davus has gone so far in his criticism of the satirist, that he is now threatening to step outside of satire altogether, and into the melancholy bounds of something else - perhaps Horace's incipient lyric? Nevertheless, Davus must be stopped and the only one able to do this is his master, the satirist.

**Horace blows the whistle**

At 116, therefore, Horace at last interrupts Davus' discourse, abruptly demanding: *unde mihi lapidem?* - 'Where can I get a stone?'. We are suddenly returned to the type of dialogic exchanges last seen at the satire's start, accompanied by an atmosphere of more typically Comic humour, as the master and satirist suddenly begins to reassert himself. Davus' understandable response is to ask Horace why he needs the stone. Ignoring the question, Horace asks: *unde sagittas?* - 'Where can I get arrows?' (116). It has been remarked that while the first weapon Horace asks for is suggestive of comedy, the second is more typical of tragedy: the register changes dramatically between the start of line 116 and its end, as a 'tragedy' looks set to happen at the hands of the angered master. The master's amusingly threatening mien towards his slave is not, however, an entirely unusual Comic situation. But the interruption has been so sudden that Davus has failed to grasp that the Carnival is over, and that they are back in the 'real world', the so-called 'day after', where the joke is on Davus, not Horace, and the master, not the slave, has the last laugh.

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843 Evans (1978: 311) suggests that Horace is demonstrating that he has 'exhausted the possibilities of satire', and is ready to move on to greener pastures. I prefer to think more positively of Horace as having satisfactorily completed a cycle which he had begun in the first book of Satires. Rather than regarding this as a 'farewell to satire', I see it as a statement of what satire is not and of what Horace will not allow it to become.

844 See Scarpat *ad loc.;* Muecke *ad loc.* Muecke's translation 'Whence arrows?' takes the alteration of tone into account. The stone might be used to drive away a troublesome dog (cf. Plaut. *Mostell.* 266), whereas the arrows, the weapons of the gods, are arms of a higher register and more serious nature. It is as if Horace's notorious anger surfaces and worsens within line 116, as the close of *Sat.* 2.7 confirms Damsippus' prior accusations at the end of *Sat.* 2.3 (cf. *horrendam rabiem,* 2.3.323).

845 The initially timid Davus, we can assume, has been lulled into a false sense of security as his Saturnalian lecture of his master has proceeded unhindered. Davus has made the mistake of reading Horace's lack of
Pelting people, including slaves, with stones was considered a sign of madness in antiquity,\footnote{It is perhaps worth noting that at \textit{Sat.} 2.3.128-130, Damasippus had cited the example of someone hurling stones at people, but in particular at his own slaves, for whom he had paid good money, as the standard test case for extreme madness: ...\textit{populum si caedere saxis/insanum te omnes pueri clamentique puellae...} If stoning people was considered a common sign of insanity, then stoning those who were one’s own property was regarded as exceptionally crazy. That in \textit{Sat.} 2.7, therefore, Horace should be shown reaching for the stones, may be an intimation by the satirist that his persona has been driven ‘insane’ by Davus, and is now ironically identical to the paradigms of Damasippus’ Stoic tirade against madness.} and therefore it is not surprising that Davus’ next response should question Horace’s sanity: \textit{aut insanit homo aut versus facit...} ‘Either the man is insane or else he is versifying’ (117a). This is Davus’ final comment on his master, and it may be another disguised literary statement placed in the slave’s mouth: tradition, of course, connected madness with poetry, insanity being regarded as one of the marks of a poet.\footnote{The \textit{topos} of the \textit{vesanus poeta} is explored by Horace at \textit{A.P.}453-476. Cf. Damasippus’ reference to Horace’s insanity in connection with his poems at 2.3.321-322: \textit{adde poemata nunc.../quaes si quis sanus facit, sanus facit et tu.} By using the formula \textit{aut...aut} here (2.7.117), however, Davus is effectively made to say that \textit{either} Horace is mad \textit{or} he is a poet. In this way Horace is finally able to establish both his identity as a poet, and as (relatively) sane one.} By placing this accusation in the mouth of his interlocutor, in the midst of what is unmistakably verse, Horace is subtly asserting his identity as poet, something which in the past he has had occasion to deny, even if as a joke.\footnote{For the famous instance of this, see \textit{Sat.} 1.4.39ff.}

The protagonist Horace ignores Davus’ last comment, however, and instead his final threat, an overwhelming demonstration of power, ends the satire and silences Davus. Horace plays his ace, which is the warning that Davus will be packed off to join the ranks of labourers on his master’s Sabine farm, if he does not shut up and be off at once: \textit{ocius hinc te ini rapis, accedes opera agro nona Sabino} (117-118). While Horace is to some extent joking with Davus, twisting his arm a little to get him to stop, such a statement would undoubtedly terrify a slave. As master, Horace would traditionally have enjoyed, within certain limits, the right of life and death over his slaves, and it was currently within his rights to alter their ‘conditions of service’ at will.

\footnote{For concepts of the ‘day after’ in Carnivalised literature, and the ‘bitter Carnival’, see Bernstein 1981: 99-121.}
Ironically, the same Sabine farm which had been Horace’s longed-for rus, the epitome of contentment in the satire preceding this one, is now used as a weapon of masterly might. The urban (if not urbane) Davus, who has been preaching, however inexpertly, on the Stoic view of moral enslavement, is now faced with the realities of physical slavery: either he is to hold his tongue or suffer banishment to the harsh and isolated ways of lowly rustic servitude. Davus must either forgo his Saturnalian libertas, or face a drastic reduct- ion in the little freedoms that, in spite of his servile status, he ordinarily enjoys in the urban context.

**Short talk to freedom?**

What, are we to understand, is Davus’ aim in Sat. 2.7? Apart from his satisfaction at simply ‘having his say’ for once, and apart also from a probably genuine desire to rescue his master from a life of vice, Davus may well be up to something else. I have already suggested that our servile speaker wishes at least to ensure compassionate treatment from his master.\(^{849}\) By arguing that both he and his master are moral slaves in the Stoic sense, and even by overstepping the bounds of Stoicism when he suggests that Horace is marginally the ‘more guilty’ of the two, Davus is attempting to have Horace reflect on their common humanity, and thus be merciful towards him. Davus is clearly unaware, however, that despite their often acclaimed humanism, the Stoics, to whom he has been appealing directly and indirectly throughout, traditionally disdained mercy on the grounds that it was a ‘passion’.\(^{850}\) Nevertheless, Davus’ descriptions of his hardship as a slave win sympathy from a modern audience where he was likely to have earned derision from an ancient. We, the actual audience, ironically come far closer to being Davus’ ‘Superaddressees’ than either ‘Horace’ or any of his contemporaries.

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\(^{849}\) We have already seen that Davus may in some instances be insuring himself against the punishment which was bound to be forthcoming as soon as the Saturnalia was over; cf. p. 298 above. See also Stahl 1974: 49.

\(^{850}\) Again, Davus is deluded as to Stoic theory because of the dangerous little he knows about it, courtesy of Crispinus’ doorman: ‘Mercy is a fault and a vice of the human soul,’ declared traditional Stoicism, ‘Only the fool is merciful. The sage is not moved for anyone: he does not condone the faults of anyone. A strong man is not conquered by entreaty or deterred from an appropriate severity’ (frs. 213ff. von Arnim SVF 1).
However, the Stoic paradox of only the wise man being free and every fool a slave, reflecting as it does on servitude in a strictly moral sense, and suggesting that real servitude is independent of an actual servile or free(i) state, maintains rather than subverts the Roman status quo. Yet in the mouth of a slave, the paradox is especially poignant. As Epictetus, who himself was once a slave, was later to point out, the foremost desire of every slave was freedom. To a Roman audience it would seem not unlikely that, with a sermon on the universality of servitude and the moral freedom of the wise, a slave such as Davus should be aiming above all at manumission: the mancipium would at last be transformed into the amicus he had dreamt of becoming. If this is indeed the case, Davus’ real foolishness lies in his naive belief that, by convicting Horace of moral failure, will succeed his master of his own culpability, will turn him around, will thereby win his eternal gratitude - and hopefully be rewarded for his efforts by being set free, a frequent fate of the successful servus callidus in Comedy. But even before Hor-

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851 The paradox on which Davus speaks in Sat. 2.7 was used by its free Stoic exponents, either, like Cicero, solely in the moral sense, or like Seneca, to argue for amelioration of servile conditions. Cicero or Seneca never use the paradox for such revolutionary purposes as to argue for freedom or manumission, and certainly not to advocate the abolition of slavery. In the ancient world, ‘social categories are so firmly fixed that in ritual reversal, however revolutionary its images, the playful alternatives never carry the germs of structural social change’ (Versnel 1993: 118).

852 ὁ δούλος εὐθὺς εὑρεται ἄφεθηναι ἥλεοθερος (Epict. 4.1.33). Here, however, Epictetus uses the idea of the slave’s yearning for freedom as the first step in his argument that no-one is ever satisfied with what they formerly desired once it has been achieved, but rather always want more (cf. Sat. 1.1). Yet this context also indicates that the servile desire for freedom was something taken for granted in antiquity. Stoicism did, of course, also maintain that no-one was born a slave (cf. fr. 352 von Arnim SVF 3).

853 In view of this, it is possible to re-read a number of things Davus says in the course of his speech in a slightly different light: the reference to the mundior libertinus in his introductory section (12), which might on the one hand be seen as an example of Davus’ own elevation to the status of a freeborn speaker in that a freedman is given as an example of someone fairly low on the social scale: ‘even a freedman would not like to live there...’, or may on the other hand even be seen as an oblique reference to Horace’s own supposed paternal background (libertino patre natus, 1.6; cf. Williams 1995: 296-313), may in addition be viewed as a hint on Davus’ part. In the same way Davus’ point that Horace cannot even be liberated from his moral slavery by manumission (76) may be intended partly to put the idea of manumission in the master’s head. As with his moral lecturing, however, the inept Davus’ attempts to hint about manumission also fall flat - if he thinks he is going to be freed by driving his master to distraction, the last section of the satire shows that he is clearly wrong.

854 It would indeed be ironic if Horace is to be imagined as wearing the pilleus, the cap that was traditionally worn upon manumission by ex-slaves, but which was also worn by the free populace at the Saturnalia (Martial 14.1; 11.6.4; cf. Versnel 1993: 147) all the while that Davus the slave is giving his talk on freedom. Davus’ over-the-rainbow freedom fantasy is explicable in terms of the topoi of Plautine Comedy, where the particularly crafty slave was sometimes given his manumission as a reward for successful machinations on his master’s behalf. An example of this occurs in Plautus’ Epidicus, where the eponymous servile hero is liberated at the play’s end. The epilogue explains that here was a fellow who won his freedom by his
ace threatens violence and eventually banishment, it is clear that Davus’ fate is not to be manumission: if every fool is a slave, then this slave is a fool.

Saturnalia as proto-Carnival

Nevertheless, by juxtaposing the poet and his slave, Horace’s Saturnalia has, like the later Carnival, united ‘...the lofty with the low, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the stupid...’. On the occasion of this proto-Carnival, fools must be heard out, and indeed, in spite of his well-documented ineptitude, Davus’ criticism of Horace has an uncanny aptness within the context of the Satires. Through the reversal of roles in Sat. 2.7, the former moralist is revealed, point by point, as a more than worthy target of his own satire. In Davus’ eyes, Horace is a malcontent like those he had mocked in Sat. 1.1, a would-be adulterer like those he had impugned in Sat. 1.2, inconsistent like Tigellius at the start of Sat. 1.3, a self-destructive rake of the type his ‘father’ had warned him about in Sat. 1.4, a gourmand and a profligate as he had criticised in Sat. 2.2. Neither is Horace, according to Davus, really the self-contained, contented individual that he saw fit to present in satires such as 1.6, where he claimed to rejoice in his simple lifestyle, or 2.6, where he purported to delight in his rural estate. Davus’ dramatic criticism of his master invites the audiences to reassess their images of the satirist, as the ‘diatribe’ of 2.7 relentlessly unravels what Horace has claimed for himself and established as his own persona in the Satires to date. This ‘most inclusive of all diatribes’ stands prior satires on their heads and calls into question Horace’s moralising authority.

During Davus’ attack on the satirist in Sat. 2.7, therefore, we witness a ritual unmasking of the authority figure. Davus crowns himself ‘moralist’ in Horace’s place, and reigns throughout most of 2.7 as sole speaker. But this does not mean that the satire is strictly monologic: not only is Davus’ speech far more ‘addressive’ than that of Damasippus, as

cunning: Hic homo est qui libertatem malitias inuenit sua. Davus, as we have seen, has been attempting to model himself after the servus callidius.

856 Bakhtin 1984: 123.
857 Rudd 1966: 194.
the servile speaker actively brings a series of Horace's faults to his attention, but in addition the penultimate satire is itself engaged in intense intratextual 'dialogue' with the prior moralising satires of both books. *Sat. 2.7* repeatedly reviews and rejects the claims of its predecessors, although, as we have seen, it confirms some of the allegations made against Horace in *Sat. 2.3*. Like Damasippus, Davus is an ideologist, informed first and foremost by an *idea*, and as such he presents another voice within the *Satires*, offering another viewpoint, another interpretation of 'Horace'. In the multi-voicedness or polyphony of the *Satires*, Davus' views on 'Horace' are just as significant and as memorable as the satirist's expressed views on himself. Davus' discourse on the world of the *Satires* from the admittedly insular but also intimate perspective of Horace's household is thus as fully weighted as the discourse of the authorial figure: in Bakhtinian terms, Davus' voice sounds alongside the authorial voice.\(^{858}\)

Horace's irate response to Davus' accusations at the end of *Sat. 2.7*, even if feigned, nevertheless goes some way to suggesting that there is more than a little truth in what the slave has been saying. Yet much of what Davus alleges against Horace has already been dealt with, albeit indirectly, by the satirist himself in *Satires* Book One. In the moralising satires of his first book, as we saw in Part 1, Horace had shown his character to be far from perfect, alluding not only to his status as an ex-adulterer (*Sat. 1.2*), but also 'admitting' that he was, in fact, the truculent and tactless interrupter of the great and graciously tolerant Maecenas (*Sat. 1.1* and 1.3). Far from introducing an entirely new angle on 'Horace' and his place in the world of the *Satires*, Davus thus vocalises what up until now has been no more than a murmur consistently undermining the moralist's superficial bravado. Whether recognised as Horace's alter ego, heeded as the voice of his conscience, or regarded as the dramatic personalisation of the 'if someone were to say...' device of 'dias-tribe', Davus is also the eventually embodied voice of Horatian self-satire.\(^{859}\) This is a voice that has been present all along, hovering in the background.

\(^{858}\) Cf. Bakhtin *id.*: 7.

\(^{859}\) It is true that as satirist Horace has often made mention of his own imperfections, but he also asserted that these were few and far between, like moles dotting an otherwise attractive body: *Sat. 1.6.66-7*: ... *velut singulatio inspersos reprehendas corpore naevos*; cf. *1.4.129-131*: ... *ex hoc ego sumas ab illis perniciosam quacumque ferunt, mediocribus et quisignoscas vitis teneor*. The difference between Davus and Horace
There is undoubtedly some satisfaction in seeing the satirist, who, as we have witnessed, has been berating others throughout the moralising satires, finally get his just deserts for being guilty of the very sins he has been lecturing against - sins which he hinted that he too had committed, but to which he never confessed directly. By permitting his privileged position as satirist to be undercut, first to a small extent in Sat. 2.3, and then radically in Sat. 2.7, Horace appears to question the very role of moralist-satirist, and as a result, the penultimate satire leaves us in doubt as to whether anyone who is human is entitled to take on this role. And yet, by snatching away Davus’ temporary ‘crown’ at the end of Sat. 2.7 once the slave’s comments have become too much, Horace vividly demonstrates the power that the author and satirist has over his creation and over the protagonists within it: despite his valid voice within the Satires, it is Davus and not Horace who is the real puppet of the show, and at the end of the day he goes back into his box. The bitter proto-Carnival of Sat. 2.7 is now over, and the usual power relations and rules of both society and of satire reassert themselves.

By retorting to the claims and assertions of Horace’s prior satires, and in particular the moralising satires of both satiric books, Sat. 2.7 presents, as it were, a detailed inverse miniature world of the Satires, a topsy-turvy universe in microcosm. But Horace’s penultimate satire also echoes another aspect of both books of Satires taken together, and this is the proto-Carnivalesque aspect: not only does Sat. 2.7 follow a Carnivalesque structure - with the ‘crowning’, ‘reign’ and ‘uncrowning’ of the temporary Saturnalian ruler - but the Sermones as a whole do so also. Davus, the cautious but audacious lecturer of his relatively great and powerful master Horace in Sat. 2.7 parallels another speaker who undertakes to address at length the great and influential - the relatively lowly Horace himself, who at the start of Sat. 1.1 boldly begins to lecture his illustrious, wealthy patron Maecen-

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is one of perspective: while Davus magnifies the moles, Horace naturally prefers to focus on the greater unblemished remainder.

860 See Sat. 2.7.81b-82, where Davus suggests that Horace is no better than a wooden puppet (lit. ‘a mobile piece of wood’) manipulated by somebody else (i.e. Maecenas): atque/duceris ut nervis alienis mobile lignum.
as on contentment, and eventually, miserly greed. And later, in the literary sphere, Horace (almost) strips the crown (corona) from his predecessor Lucilius’ head.\(^{861}\)

A proto-Carnivalesque literary ritual could indeed provide the context in which to locate and explain the playful ‘buffoon’-like characteristics observed by Freudenburg and others in the speaker of the moralising satires of Book One. Horace, like Davus, is a speaker far from perfect, but like Davus too, he is permitted extensive speaking time and his overbearing directness appears to be tolerated. Like Davus also, Horace gains self-esteem, starting with the moralising first triad and continuing over the seven remaining satires of the first book, as he establishes himself as part of Maecenas’ coterie. Thus the structure of the moralising satires of both satiric books taken together follows Horace’s address to the great Maecenas at the start of Book One, his ‘reign’ as main speaker and moralist throughout most of that book, culminating in his miraculous ‘crowning’ of himself (without actually ‘uncrowning’ Lucilius) in the final poem of Satires Book One; this is shadowed in Book Two by the Satirist’s gradual retreat from the limelight, ending with his inglorious penultimate ‘uncrowning’ in Sat. 2.7. Although Horace unceremoniously snatches his crown back at the end of Sat. 2.7, when he finally reasserts his authorial rights, it is a crown which, dented by Davus, will never again fit quite so well. It remains merely for Sat. 2.8 to provide an epilogue to the Sermones, with ‘Horace’ staying well clear of the satiric fray.\(^ {862}\) When the Saturnalia is over, so is Horatian Satire.

**Audience and amicitia**

Yet, all told, by means of his Saturnalian displacement in Sat. 2.7, Horace once again demonstrates to his audiences that he is aware of his faults, can laugh at himself, and above all, understands the importance of amicitia. It is not accidental that Davus introduces

\(^{861}\) Sat. 1.10.48-49: ...neque ego illi dethrahere ausim/haerentem capiti cum multa laude coronam.

\(^{862}\) However, Sat. 2.8, in which ‘Horace’ is now more than ever completely part of the ‘audience’, has its own internal proto-‘Carnivalesque’ structure. We see an attempted self-crowning but equally swift uncrowning of the ambitious but hapless host Nasidienus. Ellen Oliensis has suggested that in trying to amend his fortunes by means of his ‘art’ (...ut arte/elementaturus fortunam, 84b-85a), Nasidienus stands at least partly for Horace himself (1997: 102).
himself as an amicum mancipium at the start of 2.7, but is ultimately shown not to have grasped the niceties of this institution. Horace, on the other hand, as he had stated at the end of Sat. 1.10, has his beloved circle of amici as his audience. As the many subtle references to this group in the second book have indicated, Horace’s amici are never far from his thoughts - particularly Maecenas receives many a positive mention, many a ‘sidelong glance’, even when he is not directly addressed: Satires Book Two is designed for the patron’s delighted overhearing.

In his penultimate satire, however, the last one in which he himself appears as an active protagonist, Horace, as we have noted, presents himself as the target and the victim of the satire. He thereby appeals consciously to other potential audiences, even encouraging modern readers to regard him sympathetically and to jump (sometimes foolishly) to his defence, to act protectively - in short, to act as though we are his amici. Whereas at the end of his first book of Satires, Horace had urged his friends to be his audience, in the penultimate poem of Satires Book Two, by contrast, he invites his other audiences to be his friends. In his second last satire Horace admits, and not for the first time, that his satiric persona is morally far from equalling the teres atque rotundus sage of the Stoics whom he has ridiculed so often. Rather, the Horace of the Satires is an only too human individual who encourages us to engage in dialogue with him, to examine and forgive his own (albeit limited) failings as he examines and forgives ours.
CONCLUSION

At the start of this thesis I proposed investigating the manner in which both books of Horace’s *Satires* could be said to be ‘dialogic’ in a Bakhtinian sense. I expressed my intention to study the *Sermones* precisely as conversations, paying attention not only to what is said, but to who says what to whom and why. Right from the beginning of *Satires* Book One ‘Horace’ converses animatedly with his dedicatee, Maecenas, and with his other addressees and audiences. He also engages in dialogue with a number of different voices, many of which, particularly in the moralising (‘diatribe’) satires which start the first book, are attributed to imaginary interlocutors and adversaries.

In my Introduction, I examined the concept of ‘diatribe’, a term that has often been attached to Horace’s moralising satires, and I concluded that, although not historically accurate, the term is best applied to a collection of rhetorical devices that together constitute a vividly dramatic, exhortatory or polemic mode. The so-called ‘diatribe’ mode typically engages in snatches of dialogue with the voices of imaginary or indefinite interlocutors, and is thus halfway between full monologue and dialogue. This mode, as I defined it, is used in a wide variety of texts, and it is also imaginatively adapted to Horace’s *Satires*.

After examining a number of theories on the dialogue-monologue interface, including the ideas of the Czech scholar Jan Mukarovsky, which I have had occasion to refer back to at a number of places in the course of this work, I settled on the dialogic theories of the Russian thinker Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin as being most comprehensive and insightful for my purposes. Bakhtin, a classicist by training, had himself on more than one occasion included both ‘diatribe’ and Horatian satire in a list of those ancient varieties of literature which he identified as the forerunners of the later ‘dialogic discourse’ which he had found in the modern novel, especially in Dostoevsky. My Introduction also introduced the reader to a number of important Bakhtinian dialogic concepts, such as polyphony and heteroglossia. I have found that the extraordinary cohesiveness of virtually all of Bakhtin’s major theories is well suited to the multiple dialogism of Horatian satire. The use of the ‘dia-
mode is merely one of the many ways in which the *Satires* of Horace can be said to
be dialogic; there are a host of other dialogic aspects to the *Sermones*, not least the inter-
libral dialogue which takes place between the two books of *Satires*.

Part 1 of this work was concerned chiefly with the multiple voices that are heard within
the *liber sermonum*. Here I specifically analysed the relationships between speakers,
interlocutors, addressees and audiences in and between the moralising satires of Horace’s
*Satires* Book One. The Bakhtinian concept of addressivity, whereby the relationship be-
tween the speaker and the recipient of an utterance is regarded as immediate and contin-
uous, like a bridge linking both parties in an ongoing dialogue, was applied to the relat­
ionships between the main speaker of the ‘diatribes’ of Book One and his addressees and
audiences.

The application of addressivity to the moralising first triad of Horace *Satires* Book One
led me to a number of fresh insights concerning these often-studied ‘diatribes’. Consider-
ing the broader context of Horace’s lecture addressed to his fabulously wealthy and luxur-
ious patron Maecenas on the issue of greed, particularly miserly greed in *Sat.* 1.1, I conclu-
ded that, while this address may initially appear to be in poor taste, it is actually an elab­
orate joke which is at Horace’s expense rather than that of his generous patron. Casting
himself in the role of a Comic *scurra*, Horace’s speaker-character attempts an indirect re-
quest for a ‘raise’ from his wealthy patron, or at least aims to ensure Maecenas’ continued
generosity. Horace’s apparently obscure philosophical route to this insinuation, if consid-
ered in the light of whom he is addressing, is in fact highly amusing. Furthermore, I am
encouraged by my examination of the beginning of *Sat.* 1.1, in combination with suggest-
ions that are made retrospectively in *Sat.* 1.3, to imagine that Horace starts his *Satires* by
sneaking up on Maecenas while the latter is peacefully reading or reflecting, and subject-
ing his captive audience to: *Qui fit Maecenas*... Alternately, we may imagine Horace spe-
aking the whole of *Sat.* 1.1 to the mirror, practising - as is often necessary when asking
for a ‘raise’ - what he intends to say to Maecenas. We should also bear in mind that at the
first reading of this satire, the patron, as dedicatee, would indeed be the recipient of *Sat.*
1.1, together with other members of his circle of literary friends, who would all, I am sure, find the idea of Horace preaching before Maecenas on the issue of miserly greed as amusing as I do.

In Sat. 1.2, on the other hand, Horace addresses a much broader audience on the issue of sex, as he explicitly warns his recipients off adultery. Devoting much of this satire to unnecessarily lengthy descriptions of types of women, and explaining exactly what one is able to see of their bodies through their attire, Horace compels his audiences - including his original authorial audience, the members of Maecenas' coterie - to become voyeurs along with his own speaker-character. I have taken the unbalanced nature of Sat. 1.2 - here, truly, nil medium est - and the numerous hints in that satire into consideration in my conclusion that in the second satire of the liber sermonum Horace's speaker-character indirectly confesses to his own unfortunate experiences with adultery, hence the virulence of his warnings against it. Once bitten, twice shy, as it were. The speaker of Sat. 1.2 is thus revealed to have been previously guilty of the vice he now preaches against - a trend which comes into its own in the moralising satires of Horace's second book. Again, as with Sat. 1.1, awareness of Horace's self-satire is central to an understanding of Sat. 1.2.

Likewise, much of Sat. 1.3 is devoted to emphasising the importance of forgiveness in the context of friendship. Horace's speaker-character suggests that friends should even go so far as to consider their friends' faults as virtues. Horace includes a catalogue of friends' faults, and he also makes a number of specific suggestions as to the kindlier ways for amici to interpret these faults: among the examples is the injunction that the friend who is rather aggressive and unreasonably outspoken (truculentior atque plus aequo liber) is instead to be regarded as frank and fearless (simplex fortisque). Thus when Horace later describes himself as interrupting the relaxing Maecenas, and pestering him with chitchat, and he favourably terms his behaviour simplicior ('rather frank'), a cynical audience could be excused for reading 'rather aggressive and outspoken' instead. As Horace addresses his patron by name at 1.3.63ff for the first time since the start of the Satires, it is probable that he is aiming this lecture specifically at Maecenas, who is, after all, at this stage his
most significant and most powerful friend. Horace, I have suggested, is trying to secure Maecenas' forgiveness for his bad behaviour in the past - this is why he goes on and on about how important it is for friends to forgive their fellow amici, and even deliberately overlook their faults. *Sat. 1.3* is to be read as an elaborate attempt by Horace's speaker-character to apologise for his earlier intrusion on his patron, as well as for his supposed outspokenness in the *Satires*. Therefore once the concepts of addressivity and context are applied to this satire and the motives of the speaker are questioned, the noble ideals that are expressed so boldly in *Sat. 1.3* are revealed to be not so altruistic after all. Once again, the joke is on 'Horace'.

Horace's outspokenness is a joke which continues into *Sat. 1.4*, the first 'literary' satire of *Satires* Book One, where the issue of Horace's libertas is explored further. My inclusion of the first book's two 'literary' satires in my analysis in itself indicates that I have come to certain conclusions about these satires: both *Sat. 1.4* and *1.10*, while addressing literary concerns, use the same 'diatribe' style, employ the same moralising vocabulary, and treat stylistic issues in much the same manner as the first triad of the *liber sermonum* treated ethical subjects. In the 'literary' satires a bad style is as bad as (if not worse than) suspect morals, as the moral universe of prior *sermones* finds reflection in the literary universe of *Sat. 1.4* and *1.10*. In this sense, as I argue in chapter 4, the literary satires of Horace's first book are, for all intents and purposes, moralising satires. It is misleading to suppose that the 'diatribe' mode is employed solely in Horace's first triad (apart from the literary satires this mode also occurs to a limited extent in *Sat. 1.6*), or that exhortation and polemicism are excluded from any topic in Horace's *Satires* that is not strictly moral-ethical.

Not only do *Sat. 1.4* and *1.10* appear to be in 'dialogue' with one another - the first few lines of *Sat. 1.10* make it quite clear that the final satire of the *liber sermonum* is continuing the conversation of the earlier literary satire - but many scholars have assumed that one or both of these satires is also in dialogue with the outside world, with actual detractors who attacked Horace for his virulence as satirist in the case of *Sat. 1.4*, and for *Sat. 1.4*’s criticism of Lucilius in *Sat. 1.10*. After a careful examination of the use of dialogic
and dramatic elements in these pieces, I concluded that not only had Horace created an elaborately fictional world in the literary satires, where, using the 'diatribal' idea of the nameless adversary, he had presented himself as being in big trouble for crimes of which he was only too patently innocent, but also that he had consciously and shamelessly played the fool with his audiences throughout these satires - satires in which, for the first time, it had seemed that Horace was speaking directly to us, his actual audience, rather than solely addressing Maecenas or his elite group of friends. The mention of the various members of Maecenas' learned coterie towards the end of Sat. 1.10 is aimed for as much at outsiders as it is intended for the ears of the select few. Horace's playful attitude in the literary satires of Book One is confirmed in the final line of 1.10, where once again, the poet jokes around and pretends to contradict his previously much asserted Callimachean stylistic ideals. An analysis of the addressivity of the literary satires - in other words, the relationship between the speaker and his audiences in these satires - as well as an awareness of the manner in which Horace dramatically extends the dialogic 'diatribe' mode, has helped to unlock these aspects of the literary satires.

Although formally couched as monologues, the moralising and moralising-literary satires of Horace Sermones Book One resound with a cacophony of different voices. In these satires Horace, in the role of main speaker and moralist, actively engages in dialogue not only with the voices attributed to the imaginary or indefinite interlocutors of the 'diatribal' mode, but also with his patron and dedicatee Maecenas, and with his other addressees and audiences. The satires of Book One on which I have chosen to focus, Sat. 1.1-3, 1.4 and 1.10, are not so much monologues but dialogues, not so much lectures or sermons but conversations between 'Horace' and a number of other voices.

In the moralising satires of Book Two the trends of Book One are largely reversed: no longer does Horace maintain the roles of main speaker or of active moralist. Instead, throughout much of this new book, the poet retreats into the roles of addressee, interlocutor, audience, and sometimes even that of target of the moralising discourse. By contrast, the role of moralist/satirist is increasingly assumed by former targets and erstwhile audiences.
of *Satires* Book One, as ‘other’ voices now get a chance to take centre stage, often at Horace’s expense. Particularly in the case of Damaspipus and Davus, the speakers of the Stoic sermons, it is as though the imaginary adversaries of the *liber sermonum* have suddenly become larger than life in a dramatic expansion of the ‘if someone were to say...’ device of the ‘diatribe’ mode, and get to lecture Horace. The climax, as it were, of all these reversals coincides with the penultimate *Sat. 2.7*, where on the occasion of the Saturnalia, Horace’s slave Davus gets to unseat the satirist from his privileged position by recounting all his master’s faults. The sins catalogued by this domestic slave are those which Horace had himself preached against throughout much of Book One, as the many echoes of prior satires in the penultimate satire indicate. Part 2 of this thesis examined the conversation between ‘Horace’ and these other speakers in the moralising satires of the second book, against a backdrop comprising chiefly Bakhtin’s theories of heteroglossia, polyphony and the Carnival. The Bakhtinian concept of addressivity, moreover, continued to be a central reference point in the analyses of these satires.

*Sat. 2.2*, which presents its moralising discourse as consciously derivative, is in many ways intermediate between the moralising satires of Book One and Two. The moral precepts spouted in the first part of the satire are attributed to an authoritative ‘other’, the rustic homespun philosopher Ofellus (‘this speech isn’t mine...’). However, the scarcely disguised speaker of this attack on the excessive diet is, as I have argued, Horace himself, whose own excessive lifestyle and corpulence should disqualify him from the moral high-ground when it comes to the *tenuis victus*. As *Sat. 2.2* is much concerned with the issue of sources and their representation, as well as with the transmission and evaluation of their teachings, this pivotal satire clearly anticipates the heteroglot aspects of *Sat. 2.3* and 2.7, in both of which the moralising lecture is attributed to a removed source. *Sat. 2.2*, however, is unique in that for once we are given the opportunity to evaluate the success of the speaker’s relaying of his claimed source. Ofellus, Horace’s supposed source, is shown at the satire’s end to be a true philosopher, far more refined than the aggressive speaker who had earlier impersonated him. Yet again, the joke is on Horace’s character.
If *Sat. 2.2* displays what happens when a speaker falsely attributes his moralising discourse to a removed, authoritative source, the following *Sat. 2.3*, on the contrary, explores the results of a prior authoritative discourse that is taken over too naively and too completely by a speaker desperately in need of some dialectic to help him make sense of his circumstances. The unfortunate Damasippus in *Sat. 2.3* has thoroughly absorbed the Stoic dogma recited to him by his guru Stertinius, who discovered him on the brink of suicide after his business had been destroyed. In *Sat. 2.3* we witness the brain-washed convert Damasippus passing the lecture he has received from Stertinius virtually verbatim on to Horace, without bothering to readdress the message to his new recipient. The topic of this madman's monologue is, ironically, 'everyone but the Stoic sage is mad'. The utter lack here of the addressive quality so typical of Horace's own dialogic style of moralising in Book One may be one of the factors that result, as I have argued, in the bored Horace falling asleep during Damasippus' lengthy repetition of Prof. Snore's lecture.

The only parts of *Sat. 2.3* where Damasippus is indeed successfully addressing his talk to Horace are the portions of dialogue prior to the start of the lecture, and, at the poet's own specific request, after it has ended. On either side of the lecture, however, Damasippus indulges in active criticism of Horace. At the start of 2.3 Damasippus complains that Horace does not compose poetry quickly enough, which immediately establishes the Stoic convert's position as an anti-Callimachean. This position is borne out by the immense length of the lecture that Damasippus delivers, which, with its dire lack of addressivity or any truly dialogic qualities (even his relays with imaginary interlocutors read more like a catechism than a conversation), could be entitled 'how not to write Horatian satire'. While there may well be nothing amiss with Damasippus' arguments or *exempla*, as some scholars have observed, what there is, it seems, is simply too much of a good thing. I suspect that we are to imagine that the satire mushroomed into its monstrous proportions while the usually Callimachean Horace dozed off for a while...

I have suggested that the reason for Damasippus' virulent castigation of Horace's slow pace of composition at the start of *Sat. 2.3* is his misguided if altruistic intention to bring
the poet to a state where he will supposedly be in as much despair as Damasippus was upon the failure of his business, and thus be ripe for Stoic conversion. The ignorant Damasippus' comments nevertheless enable Horace to demonstrate indirectly, with a Bakhtinian 'sidelong glance' at his better informed audiences, the practical application of his Callimachean ideals. In the central portions of Sat. 2.3, however, Damasippus seems to forget Horace's presence, as he indulges, like someone compulsively fingering worry-beads, in reciting Stertinius' lengthy sermon for his own reassurance. This may explain why so many readers have felt that Damasippus simply fails to 'connect' with Horace in the central parts of the satire. True madness, for Horace, does not consist of a number of different voices, but of one undialogised and unchallenged single voice. The last part of Sat. 2.3, in which Damasippus, apparently at Horace's own instigation, lobs a succession of personal criticisms at the poet, anticipates the similar but far more comprehensive attack which will come in the second Stoic Saturnalian sermon of Satires Book Two - in Sat. 2.7.

Sat. 2.7 is the satire which stands all prior satires on their heads. In chapter 8 I showed how many of the virtues or at least, the venial sins to which the Horatian satirist had confessed in the moralising satires of Book One are revealed in Sat. 2.7 to have been flawed or far worse than the poet had admitted. At the same time, however, the events of the penultimate satire are the culmination of the self-satiric trend in which Horace has been indulging right from the beginning of Satires Book One. Not only is Davus an enlarged, animated personalisation of the imaginary interlocutor figure of the first book, the human face of the 'if someone were to say...' device, but he is also the dramatic externalisation of Horace's trademark self-satire. What is more, up until now (according to his own confession) Davus has been an unintended, uninvited eavesdropping servile audience lurking all the while on Horace's threshold. At last, thanks to the Saturnalia, Davus is permitted to have his say, which involves hauling Horace over the coals for not practising what he has been preaching.
While it is somewhat satisfactory for us, as audience, to see the erstwhile moralist get his just deserts, Horace’s final retreat into the roles of addressee, recipient, and most significantly, target of the satiric attack, also endears him to his fellow audience members: it is as if the poet has joined the listeners in their seats, while the coveted, powerful role of ‘The Moralist’ is usurped by another. Yet much of this audience sympathy is undone by Horace’s angry threats at the end of Sat. 2.7, which have suggested to a number of readers (as indeed they are meant to do) that there must be some truth in the accusations which Horace’s domestic slave has been making. Whatever his motivations - and I have suggested that these are understandably self-seeking rather than entirely altruistic - Davus’ charges have hit home.

Both Damasippus (in the last section of 2.3) and Davus provide us with different views, different voices, different perspectives on Horace’s speaker-character in the Satires: these ‘other voices’ on Horace are the chief way in which the Satires engage in what Bakhtin was centuries later to identify as polyphony. Horace builds up his authorial persona in the moralising satires of Book One only to have other self-appointed moralists happily take his character down a few notches in Book Two. For these reversals to be understood, for the great interlibral joke to work, for the dialogue in which these new satirists engage with the satirist of the first book to be comprehensible, it is necessary that Horace’s two books of Satires be viewed, if not as a unit, then at least as two peas in a pod, as partners in the dialogue that takes place between them. It is also necessary that the ‘Horace’ of the Satires be recognised as a single but also created entity. Indeed, throughout this work I have attempted to steer a middle path between the extremes both of the ‘autobiographical’ (including the ‘new historical’) approach, and of the persona theorists. Posing as autobiography may be one of the fictions at which Horace’s Satires well and truly excel, but there is also a tenuous - and often cleverly exploited - link between the historical Quintus Horatius Flaccus and the caricature of the Sermones.

In addition, I have frequently found it necessary to consider the effect that Horace’s Sermones would have on the wider social and political arena. Horace would certainly not de-
liberately go against Maecenas or Octavian in his Satires, nor did he have any cause to do so. On the contrary, Horace appears to flatter Maecenas and his coterie in some subtle and remarkably inventive ways in the course of the Sermones. Not only is Satires Book One expressly dedicated to Maecenas, but the patron is presented positively in both books, usually at the expense, of course, of the hilariously hapless 'Horace'. While the Satires are not conventionally political (in some cases, such as Sat. 1.5, they seem exasperatingly apolitical in the midst of the most political of contexts), they do some good public relations work for Maecenas. For Horace, the political is personal.

The moralising satires of both books of Horace's Sermones together join not only what is surely one of the clearest links between the two books, but they also provide an arena in which a complex set of reversals takes place. I have found that the second book's striking inversions of satirist and target, speaker and listener, author and audience - reversals which reach their zenith in the Saturnalian swapping of the roles of master and slave in Sat. 2.7 - are best understood as an anticipation of Bakhtin's literary Carnival. Horace's Saturnalian satire, as proto-Carnival, unites disparate elements, invites a slave to take his master to task, and allows a Comic stock-figure to come to life and to beat the satirist at his own game. And although as master and as satirist, and ultimately, as author of the sermo, Horace finally returns Davus to his place, although the 'bitter' Saturnalia is over all too quickly, nevertheless the slave's temporary libertas and what it has enabled him to say has irrevocably captured the imagination of the satire's recipients. Horace's Saturnalian satire, as proto-Carnival, celebrates the joyous replaceability of roles both societal and generic.

Not only is the Saturnalian Sat. 2.7 an anticipation of the Bakhtinian Carnivalesque text, but, as I have suggested, the penultimate satire also mimics the nature and structure of the Sermones as a whole. The rise of Horace's own persona within the circle of Maecenas in Book One is in itself a type of proto-Carnivalesque literary 'crowning' ritual, although not without some original quirks. In Sat. 1.10, Horace crowns himself the new master of satire without actually, he assures his listeners, depriving poor old Lucilius of his corona.
Of course, Horace's uncrowning comes in Book Two, where he is replaced by a number of other would-be satirists. The 'Horace' set up and crowned in Book One is torn down and ridiculed in the Saturnalian sermons of the second book, particularly by Davus, the slave who turns satirist for a day. The reigns of these new, largely inadequate satirists are, however, also shown to be ephemeral: Horace eventually silences them and reclaims his (albeit crumpled) crown.

Yet Horace's proto-Carnival is in itself a type of dialogue, an exchange that enhances all the other dialogic aspects of the Satires Books One and Two. There is a naturally close association between the Carnivalesque and the dialogic, particularly polyphony, as Bakhtin himself observes. As author Horace allows different voices to sound in his Satires, he does not insist on monopolising or monologising the discourse, nor, in spite of the fact that all the voices and speakers within the Sermones are ultimately, of course, Horace himself, does he demand that there be one version of the truth. Horace, like the much later Bakhtin, was - at least as satirist - possessed of a dialogic imagination. Showing that sermo should ideally be situated in the forgiving context of amicitia, Horace too seems to have grasped that truth cannot exist on its own or inside the head of one person, but is born only between people in the process of their dialogue.
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