Beyond the Rhetoric: A Theoretical Analysis of the Effects of Neopatrimonialism and Intergovernmentalism on the Integration Process in Africa

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Compulsory Declaration

This work has not been previously submitted, in whole or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contributor to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been properly cited and referenced.

Signature: _________________________________ Date: 28 October 2013
Dedication

To my son, Kai Robert Duthie, who was born just a few weeks before the completion of this dissertation.
Acknowledgements

This dissertation would never have been completed without the love and support of my wife, Lucy.

At UCT, my biggest thank you to my supervisor, Dr. John Akokpari, for his encouragement and advice. Also, thank you to the departmental administrators, Wahieda Gajjar and Joanne Polzin, for their help navigating UCT and the Political Studies department. They are the ones who make the department run as it does.
Abstract

The Organization of African Unity marked its 50th anniversary in 2013 and, despite the shift to the African Union and continued rhetoric from African leaders about the need for further integration, the progress towards the goal of economic and political integration has been ineffective. This thesis shows that integration has been ineffective in Africa namely because of the lack of political will to push integration further. The reason for this is the prevalence of neopatrimonialism on the continent, which creates a situation where leaders need access to a nation’s resources to remain in power. Economic and political integration will, inevitably, result in a loss of financial or political capital, which will then result in a lack of resources available for the client, who has used these resources to maintain their patronage base.

Thus, integration in Africa has progressed slowly, as leaders do what they can to undermine the process while maintaining the appearance of progress. The major option chosen to weaken integration has been to control the institutions of integration run intergovernmentally, rather than transfer some power towards a supranational organisation. Without a transfer of power to a supranational institution, the Regional Economic Communities and African states cannot proceed towards economic, let alone political, integration. The reason for this is that decisions taken in a purely intergovernmental body, such as the African Union, will be of the lowest common denominator, resulting in a slow and ineffective integration. For integration to progress effectively, some powers will first have to be transferred to a supranational institution, which will create more actors that are actively involved in the integration process and make it more difficult for leaders to slow down or stop the move towards African unity.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab-Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARIA</td>
<td>Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (UN ECA Report)</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Communauté Économique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel Saharan States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for East and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSDC</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EALA</td>
<td>East African Legislative Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central and African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of Western African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Western African States</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Commission</td>
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<td>MIP</td>
<td>Minimum Integration Programme</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAFMECA</td>
<td>Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAFMECSA</td>
<td>Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern Africa Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAM</td>
<td>Union Africaine et Malgache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAC</td>
<td>Union Dounaïère et Économique de l’Afrique Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN ECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The idea of integration is not new in Africa. During colonialism, there were calls for unity by Pan Africanists dating back to 1900. With independence came great hope and great rhetoric about this drive, but a realpolitik longing for territorial integrity and sovereignty after colonisation prevented this from becoming a reality. However, this did not stop the political rhetoric towards the dream of integration and steps toward integration, both economic and political, rose while African economies and states faltered. The ‘grand plan’ of a United States of Africa was replaced by gradual steps via the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was replaced by the African Union (AU), which now uses Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to further integration. The steps towards integration have started, stopped and then started again for over five decades – all in the quest for greater integration in Africa and improved development and standards for its peoples. Despite further rhetoric about the need for increased integration, the attempts have, for the most part, fallen short and have not been effective in facilitating African development nor increasing African integration.

This thesis argues that the major issue standing in the way of effective integration is a lack of political will on the part of African leaders. This lack of political will results from a leader’s reluctance to share or transfer their power with another institution, especially one with supranational powers, as doing so would compromise their position of power in a neopatrimonial political arena. However, refusing to do so will mean that integration in Africa can only proceed so far and the continent will not be able to achieve the goals set for integration, such as a continental free trade area or any form of political union. This is unfortunate, as the reasons to integrate outnumber the reasons not to integrate, as noted by many scholars and institutions. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA) noted in 1963 that while “the reduction or elimination of barriers to intra-African trade [is] in itself not sufficient, [it] remains a necessary pre-condition for the accelerated economic development of African countries” (Hazlewood, 1967: 4). This feeling has not changed half a century
later, which is evident by the recurrent calls for greater cooperation and integration by the UN ECA’s Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA) reports and the African Development Bank, which emphasises that “successful regional trade integration can help African countries reap economies of scale, expand markets and collectively exploit their resources, thus gradually raising their competitiveness in the global economy” (Ancharaz et al, 2011: 1). Politically, greater integration could result in increased bargaining power for African states, as well as help to improve governance in the continent. Despite these positives, integration in Africa has achieved few of the goals set by the myriad treaties signed by leaders and, hence, can be labelled as ineffective.

In his analysis of the obstacles to regional integration, Kaplan blamed poor integration on “rivalries between states, reluctance to compromise national sovereignty, internal instability within key states, resistance from officials who profit from disparate national policies, and a general lack of capacity and political will to move forward” (Kaplan, 2006: 87). All of these problems are centred on the political leaders – economic and international factors are important, but ultimately the decision to move integration forward or not rests, initially, with Africa’s leaders. Thus far, the form of integration in Africa chosen by these leaders has been intergovernmental, where Heads of State control the decisions of the institutions, as opposed to supranational, where some power is given to an institution above the member states. This intergovernmental decision-making results in little action, if any at all, in solving the problems of the continent as the consensus bargaining inherent in intergovernmentalism results in the lowest common denominator decisions. For this to change, leaders would have to give up some sovereignty to a supranational institution, which they are loathe to do. As Nzewi notes, “the reluctance of African leaders to delegate sovereignty in any form is driven chiefly by the need to protect state control at the national level” (Nzewi, 2009: 6), as African leaders need this control at the state level for them to remain in power – a situation compounded by the prevalence of neopatrimonialism in the national power structures. A loss of power to the supranational level would come at the expense of their power at the national level, and, eventually, a loss of the resources needed to stay in power in a neopatrimonial political system.
If Africa cannot break free of its intergovernmental system, can the continent expect to integrate effectively? This thesis will answer that no, the continent will not reach its goals of economic and political union without some sort of devolution of power towards a higher level. The most successful integration process to date, the European Union (EU), was able to continue integrating, even during times of intergovernmentalism, because of the initial supranational institution that was established: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This resulted in spillover, akin to Ernst B. Haas’ idea with neofunctionalism, not because of interests among business leaders and the supranational institution, but because as one transnational barrier is lowered (such as free trade of coal), there are more obstacles that need to be overcome for that barrier to be lowered properly (such as transport regulations), which will mean more areas will need to become supranational. This thesis does not compare the EU to the AU, but it does analyse the paths chosen by each intergovernmental organisation to illustrate how supranational power is needed for integration to continue effectively.

1.2 Problem Statement

While the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) strove to protect newly-independent states’ territorial integrity and sovereignty, it still alluded to the Pan Africanist dream of thinkers such as WEB Dubois and state leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah. The last two sentences of the Preamble to the OAU Charter states that it is "desirous that all African states should henceforth unite so that the welfare and wellbeing of their peoples can be assured (and) resolved to reinforce the links between our states by establishing and strengthening common institutions" (OAU, 1963: 1). Attempts at further integration, especially economic, continued with little success during the Cold War period (Mistry, 2000: 553), but there was a shift towards a ‘new’ regionalism in the 1990s, due to the end of the Cold War and the apparent success of the burgeoning EU model. This led to renewed hope and a spate of treaties and conventions, including the Abuja Treaty, which established plans for an African Economic Community (AEC), regional economic communities (RECs) as well as planned supranational institutions like the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), and the Sirte Declaration, which
called for a speeding-up of the timeline of integration and transformed the OAU into the AU. The AU and leaders of African states have, on numerous occasions, called for a “United States of Africa” and political integration to be the end goal of the African Union. More recently, the UN Economic Commission for Africa has stated that, in regards to the process of integration, “the experts in Addis are in an upbeat mood and have a renewed enthusiasm for shortening the period of the vision of the Abuja Treaty” (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2011). Despite this, integration in Africa has been slow and ineffective.

The study of this subject is important for several reasons. First, academic research in this area is scant and most research conducted is of economic outlooks for the RECs and proposed custom unions or free trade areas, but which pay little attention to the political side of integration, except for mentioning a lack of political will when outlining the obstacles to integration. This thesis will analyse the political factors preventing integration in Africa. Secondly, an Africa that is united either in regions or as an entire continent could help tackle the problems of development and growth which it experiences as divided states. A harmonization of policy and opening of borders could help to improve intra-African trade, as well as infrastructure and regulations needed to increase trade outside of Africa.

1.3 Research Aims and Questions

The first research aim is to analyse the reasons for the slow progress of African integration.

The second research aim will be to prove that integration cannot proceed very far in a purely intergovernmental fashion. Some sovereignty will have to be shared with a supranational institution for integration to be effective.

The research questions are:

What has caused the slow progress of African integration?
Can African integration progress meaningfully if leaders refuse to give power to a supranational institution?

The hypothesis for the slow process of integration in Africa is the lack of will on the part of political leaders to cede any sovereignty, and hence weaken their political authority, to a supranational institution. A good illustration of this refusal is the PAP, which was supposed to become a fully-functioning legislative body by 2009 and was one of the areas in which the UNECA has been ‘upbeat’, though as of yet is still only an advisory body and no action has been taken to convert it into the supranational, legislative body as it was originally designed to be. Nzewi states that, in regards to the PAP not becoming fully legislative, “article 2(3) effectively restrains the PAP from acquiring greater legislative, budgetary and supervisory powers, thereby removing any immediate threat to the principle of state autonomy that many African Heads of State clearly continue to value above the principle of continental political integration” (Nzewi, 2009: 4).

This refusal to cede sovereignty or weaken political authority will mean that integration cannot refuse meaningfully, as decision-making will be made in a purely intergovernmental manner which results in lowest common denominator decisions. A supranational institution and transfer of power towards it will be needed for integration to continue effectively.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical study of integration is relatively new, as there were few good examples of regional integration before the evolving of the EU in the mid-20th century. That said, the idea of states integrating for peace is not new, as demonstrated by Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” from 1795 and the works of Saint-Simon in the 19th century, among others. This thesis will focus on two theories to help explain integration (and the lack thereof) in Africa: neofunctionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism. While it is impossible to state that one theory is ‘correct’ and the other ‘incorrect’ (Moga, 2009:802), these approaches give a good insight into how decisions about integration are made and what the consequences of each approach are.
1.4.1 Neofunctionalism

The predecessor to neofunctionalism was Mitrany’s idea of functionalism, which was less of a theory and more of a normative concept, as, according to Mitrany, “the problem of our time is not how to keep nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together” (Mitrany, 1966: 28). Peace could be achieved by states pooling sovereignty in a low politic area to an entrusted. Mitrany first wrote of the idea of spillover, though did not go too far into explaining how this spillover would occur. These functional organizations would be able to decrease nationalism and increase interdependence, which were two areas that Mitrany saw as responsible for the major wars in Europe. This idea, while noble, still has many flaws – a major one being that if states’ motive for integration was peace, why did so many European states stay out of the ECSC and the European Economic Community?

Ernst B. Haas attempted to overcome these faults and develop a proper theory of integration using the ideas of functionalism and spillover. His theory of neofunctionalism is more concerned with the pressures for integration once it has begun, rather than why it was launched (Biswaro, 2012: 20). Haas discounted the role the state will actually play in integration and instead saw two primary actors in integration: interest groups and political parties below the state and supranational institutions above the nation-state. These two actors work together to pressure the nation-state into changes towards greater integration, as doing so maximises their own benefit. For supranational institutions, working with actors below the nation state is a more efficient way of increasing supranational powers as it legitimizes the institution and provides it with knowledge and expertise. On the other side, those actors below the nation state see greater benefits for themselves with more integration and thus lobby the supranational institution rather than the national government. As Haas states, “the process of community formation is dominated by nationally constituted groups with specific interests and aims, willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course appears profitable” (Haas, 1958: xiv) and that “tasks most intimately related to group and national aspirations can be expected to result in integration even
though the actors responsible for this development may not deliberately work towards such an end” (Haas, 1964: 35).

This process has three areas. First is functional spillover, where “integration in one sector may create problems that can only be resolved through further integration in other, related, sectors” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006: 94). Put simply, integration that begins in one area will spill over into other areas, which will then also become integrated to achieve the original goal. This process will then repeat.

Secondly, there is political spillover, where influential groups in society realize they cannot fulfil their aspirations at the national level, so they organize across borders for more influence. Finally, there is cultivated spillover, where common interests are upgraded to the supranational level. The supranational actor will be able to help member states resolve their differences by moving them to ‘a higher level’, thus allowing more concessions by member states and, at the same time, increasing the mandate of the supranational actor.

The theory of neofunctionalism was, by its own creator’s admission, “obsolescent” (Haas, 1975) and “a successful failure” (Schmitter, 1970: 836) during the Eurosclerosis of the 1970s. However, that did not mean that the theory was incorrect, but that it was in need of changes. One of the main academics in initiating these changes was Alec Stone Sweet, who reformed neofunctionalism to explain the continued push towards integration in the European Union. The focus became more on transnational actors and how as exchanges between them rise, so do the costs of maintaining separate national laws. These costs will, eventually, push states towards supranational institutions, which include a supranational organisation and common rules. As rules are established and hindrances removed, other new obstacles are found, continuing the push for more supranational power and spillover into other sectors (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). It is this cycle which this thesis will focus on in the explanation of how supranational institutions are needed for integration to be effective.
1.4.2 Intergovernmentalism

On the other side of integration theory is intergovernmentalism, which puts the main actor as the state, with integration being more of a series of bargains among the leaders of the states rather than an independent process. The two main thinkers behind this theory are Stanley Hoffman and Andrew Moravcsik. Intergovernmentalism critiques neofunctionalist notions that the state is no longer important once integration begins and contends that integration is a purposeful action chosen by states as they feel there is more to gain from integrating than not. Any integration that would not benefit a state in the long term would be quickly undone. In addition, Hoffman contends that neofunctionalism overlooks the impact of external countries on the integration process, such as the effect that US involvement in European security had on members of the European Community – either pulling them away from Europe towards the Atlantic, or pushing them towards greater unity to counter the USA. Neofunctionalism is also accused of underestimating the ability of nation-state actors, especially major powers, to “stop or to slow down the building of a central political system ... and the ability of national bureaucracies to resist the transfer of power to the new central one” (Hoffman, 1982: 30). Much like functionalism and neofunctionalism, which were updated to contend with the critics, intergovernmentalism was also reworked into a new theory. The new theory was called liberal intergovernmentalism.

This theory tried to explain the decisions made by the European Economic Community to continue integration. Like intergovernmentalism, it sees the state as the main actor in integration, and posits a two-stage approach to integration. First, a state’s preference towards further integration is dependent upon the constraints and opportunities of economic interdependence. Secondly, the outcome of integration – whether it will happen or not and to what degree – is decided because of the relative bargaining power of the member states and the level of incentives integration produces, as it lowers transaction costs versus the loss of control of domestic policy. The final agreement will be one of the lowest common denominator, as all parties will need to be accommodated for the agreement to take place. Member states which have more of an interest in a certain agreement will
have to concede more for an agreement to be reached than member states who do not have as much of an interest, which also lowers the overall quality of the final agreement.

Moravcsik focused his analysis on the ‘grand bargains’ of European integration – such as the Single European Act – and does not focus on the smaller day-to-day bargaining and agreements which also occur at a European level. In addition, another major problem with these theories is they imply that integration is easy – it only requires bargaining by states and a committal by larger states towards it and would start and stop because of converging, or diverging, preferences, but if that was the case, why has there been no further integration in North America? There is too little thought given to the political side of integration and a leader’s preference for sovereignty and self-determination rather than thinking about the economic approach to integration.

1.5 Methodology

This thesis will focus on library based research and will be based on qualitative analysis of integration attempts and theories of integration. Primary sources, such as treaties and resolutions, as well as secondary literature sources will be used to complete this work. The primary sources include, but are not limited to, the Organisation of African Unity Charter, the Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community and the African Union Constitutive Act. Secondary sources will include journal articles, books, newspaper articles as well as online sources.

The two case studies used in chapter four – the African Union and the European Union – will serve as useful examples of the different paths an intergovernmental organisation can take when embarking on a route towards integration. A historical comparison has been done to illustrate the similarities and differences between the two organisations, though it is important to note that this is not a comparative analysis between the two – the path chosen by each organisation (supranationality vs. intergovernmentalism) is what is looked at and not the organization itself. The EU is a logical choice in this regard, as it is the most successful integration process to date and is a loosely based model for the AU, in regards to timelines and institutional bodies (Babarinde, 2007).
1.6 Limitations and Delimitations

The research aim of the thesis is to explain why integration has not progressed as originally meant to in the continent. The aim is less to prove integration has not been effective, but rather to analyse why integration has not been effective. However, to analyse this ineffectiveness properly, this thesis must first show how integration in Africa has not been effective in fulfilling the principles of the treaties which guide the process. The organisations of integration which will be focused on are the African Union and its branches stemming from the 1991 Abuja Treaty and the African Economic Community (AEC), which are the eight regional economic communities. Other organisations which fall outside of these, such as the Southern African Customs Union, will not be covered.

The integration efforts to be looked at will be those attempted by independent African states and will not include attempts at federation or integration started and stopped before the end of colonialism. While the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Union will be looked at in chapter four, this is not in a comparative manner but in an illustrative fashion to show the different paths of integration an organisation can take at its beginning.

1.7 Structure of the Study

The study will be structured in three parts. Chapter 2 will outline the definitions for terms used in the study, as well as give a background on the history of integration attempts in Africa and show that they have been ineffective. Chapter 3 will look at why these attempts have been unsuccessful and integration has been ineffective. This will be explained by looking at the neo-patrimonial state of politics on the continent which results in a lack of political will towards integration, as it would result in a loss of power for state leaders. Chapter 4 will continue by analysing the two paths leaders can take in regards to integration – intergovernmental and supranational - and whether the process can function without leaders devolving power to a supranational institution. Chapter 5 will conclude the study.
Chapter 2: Context and Background

This section will outline the definitions needed for the thesis, followed by a look at the reasons and advantages of integration for states. The section will conclude with a background of integration attempts in Africa, which will focus on whether integration in Africa has been ‘effective’, according to the definition given.

2.1 Definitions

Before any analysis can begin, it is important to first outline the definitions of terms that will be used. Region, supranationality, integration and what will be referred to as ‘effective integration’ will be defined. Neopatrimonialism will also be conceptualised, as it is a major factor contributing to Africa’s lack of effective integration.

2.1.1 Region

The term, ‘region’, can be used in many different ways depending on one’s field of interest and has been given numerous suffixes, such as regional, regionness, regionally, regionalism, regionalisation, as well as been paired with other words, such as integration, disintegration, cooperation, building and so forth. As this thesis focuses on formal, institutional integration between states, it will not go into much unneeded detail regarding the regionalisation of Africa, but will focus on the term ‘region’ as it would be understood for formal regional integration. Hettne defines a region simply as “a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and a degree of mutual interdependence” (Hettne, 2006: 544). However, this can be seen as a definition of ‘old regionalism’, which was most prevalent after WWII during the rise of European integration, but has been replaced by what is aptly termed, ‘new regionalism’. Regionalism re-emerged in the 1990s, as the world moved from bipolarity to the possibility of a uni- or multipolar world and the new superpower, the USA, became more partial towards the idea of regionalism. This was combined with a growth of globalisation and interdependence between states and a change of attitudes among developing countries towards the neo-liberal economic order (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2000: 457) and resulted
in a new flurry of regional integration agreements around the world. This ‘new regionalism’ took into account the fact that a regional frontier may cut through states, with some parts of the state a part of this emerging region while others are not (Hettne, 2000:462), causing even further confusion for the study of a ‘region.’ There are also discrepancies on whether Africa has moved on to "new regionalism", which "go[es] beyond the mere dismantling of trade barriers and cover, for example, sanitary measures, liberalisation of trade in services, investment and competition disciplines, or the free movement of people" (Bachinger and Hough, 2009:45). Many of the 'old regionalism' projects in Africa have failed, but have been replaced by new efforts by African leaders, who try to use regional integration as a way to show the electorate they are responding to globalisation, when in reality the integration attempts never reach their full potential. This study, which focuses on the geographical continent of Africa, will use the term ‘region’ to denote a grouping of states that are linked together by borders or a mutual agreement, as per Hettne’s definition.

2.1.2 Supranationality

The term supranationality is not as contested a term. Many see it, simply, as a level of governance above the nation-state. To expand on this idea, this thesis will use Etzioni’s classification of supranationality, which breaks the term down into several elements. For a body to be termed ‘supranational’, it must contain one of the following elements. First, the decision making instrument of the body must not be made up of national representatives, i.e. individuals nominated by their country to work at the supranational body. The decision makers must have no loyalty to their home state and must follow the rules, policies and values of the supranational body rather than be instructed by their national governments. Second, the member states of the supranational body, as well as the citizens, corporations and unions of the nation state, are expected to adhere to the rules and decisions of the supranational body, even if contradictory to national regulations. Finally, and in regards to the second criterion, supranational bodies may have an enforcement capability, whereby they can fine member states who do not follow supranational rules (Etzioni, 2001: xix). By this definition, one can identify the European Union as a full-fledged supranational body, as the
European Commission (the EU’s supranational institution) is composed of European civil servants who are not instructed by their national governments. In addition, decisions by the Commission, and other institutions such as the European Court of Justice, are binding on nation-states, as well as its citizens, corporations and unions.

The definition of supranational used for this study does not include Etzioni’s prerequisites for full supranationality, which he believes are necessary for supranationality to advance to full maturation. For Etzioni, these include: legitimate control of the means of violence; allocation of resources among the member units; and command by the supranational body of the political loyalties of individuals that exceed that of their loyalty to their nation-state (Etzioni, 2001: xxii).

2.1.3 Integration

Unlike supranationalism, the term ‘integration’ has been more contested, as one can speak of market, economic or political integration, as well as integration that moves decision making to a new centre or to a collective decision making system. All definitions have different end points, but share similar criteria which gives a good indication of what ‘integration’ refers to. Balassa’s definition of economic and market integration outlines the several forms integration may progress through: a free-trade area; a customs union; a common market, an economic union; and complete economic integration. He also notes that there is a difference between integration and cooperation, which is useful for a definition of integration. Cooperation refers to actions that will lessen discrimination, while integration refers to measures which will completely suppress some forms of discrimination (Balassa, 1961). Therefore, agreements which merely lessen discrimination on goods, such as the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), would not qualify as integration, but as cooperation.

Mattli expands on the definition of economic integration, which he defines as “the voluntary linking in the economic domain of two or more formerly independent states to the extent that authority over key areas of domestic regulation and policy is shifted to the supranational level” (Mattli, 1999: 41). Haas’ definition is similar to this, but also includes political integration, which would include
policy regulation in areas that are not centred on economic policy, such as foreign policy or security. Haas, like Mattli, also sees a shift of decision making power away from the state, and defines integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958: 16). For both of these definitions, integration has been defined by states surrendering some sort of authority to a higher level than the nation-state.

On the other hand, Lindberg defines political integration as occurring when groups of states regularly make and implement common decisions that are binding on all states, with decisions made by collective institutions or processes (Lindberg, 1971: 45-46). In this definition, integration can occur just by the process of collective decision making, even if the decisions are made by heads of government rather than a supranational institution. Similarly, Nye defines political integration as a process, which leads “to political community – a condition in which a group of people recognizes mutual obligations and some notion of a common interest” (Nye, 1966: 84). This definition, like Lindberg’s, does not presuppose an overarching institution over the states, but rather just an acknowledgement that decisions must be mutually agreed upon. For example, this would include free trade agreements such as NAFTA as integration, since the binding decisions were made by the heads of government, which would not be the case for the definitions by Mattli and Haas, nor Balassa.

For the purposes of this thesis, integration can be seen as occurring when policy decisions are made by a group of nations or by a collective institution, and these decisions are binding on those states involved. This definition would include decisions made by the supranational European Commission, as well as smaller integration efforts such as RECs and FTAs and decisions made by international organisations in an intergovernmental manner, such as the African Union. With the definition of ‘region’ above, the term ‘regional integration’ will refer to the states linked in a geographic area and
with mutual interdependence coming together to pool their decision making authority and be bound by the decisions made.

2.1.4 ‘Effective’ Integration

Before looking at why integration has not progressed as intended, this thesis will first examine the integration process and show that it has not been ‘effective’. The word ‘effective’ refers to something being successful in producing a desired or intended result. For treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty or the Chemical Weapons Convention, effectiveness would be if it influenced a state’s behaviour and they followed the guidelines of the treaty. For treaties of integration, effectiveness refers to the completion of the objectives outlined in the treaty or resolution which instigated the integration process. In Africa, despite the myriad treaties and documents signed by African leaders over the years, few of the goals that were mandated have been completed, or, as Mattli notes, “the signing of a treaty does not establish integration” (Mattli, 1999: 12). For example, integration in Europe has been effective as the treaties, such as the Rome Treaty or the Single European Act, have been implemented according to what was mandated in the treaties, as have the initiatives in less grand integration treaties, such as NAFTA. However, the treaties signed by African leaders, such as those establishing the African Economic Community or the Pan-African Parliament, have yet to be implemented according to the mandate prescribed in the treaty and are, therefore, ineffective.

2.1.5 Neopatrimonialism

The term, patrimonialism, was initially used to refer to a form of traditional authority and a source of legitimacy, where there is a blurring between the public and private spheres of the state (Weber, 1947). In other words, the ruled accept the authority of the ruler not because of a system of laws and rules, as in a legal-rational society, but because of a personal connection between the two. In small scale situations, this may help to cement social bonds through reliance on trust and
reciprocity, but in a larger situation, such as in state institutions, it will corrupt authority and distort power (Pitcher, 2009: 130).

The ‘neo’ of neopatrimonialism refers to the pervasiveness of patrimonial structures of authority, as Weber states, but with the appearance of legal-rational institutions and bureaucracy. The concept is criticised by some as a ‘catch-all’ concept (Erdmann and Engel, 2007) which is difficult to pin down (Mkandawire, 2013: 6), though Christopher Clapham’s succinct definition of the term is shared by many writers. Clapham sees neopatrimonialism as “a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers... as a form... of private property” (Clapham, 1985: 48).

Caddock states that Africa is stuck at this stage of political development – where the ‘big men’ at the top use national resources not for state betterment but for personal interest – for several reasons. First of all, communities are highly reliant on patrons and this system is seen as legitimate. There is little outrage about abuses of power and corruption by leaders, as citizens fight for change (in a veil of democracy) so that it will then be their turn to ‘eat’. Secondly, the legacy of colonial rule has reinforced this system, as governance has always lacked any sort of accountability and legitimacy and, finally, the large amount of foreign aid and the discovery of an abundance of natural resources, has helped to ‘grease’ the clientelist machine (Caddock, 2007). Similarly, Bratton and van de Walle’s work on neopatrimonialism and democracy has shown that the prospects for democracy are less when emerging from a neopatrimonial regime compared to a settler or corporatist regime (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994: 487) and this will have serious effects on African economic and political development, as well as on the integration process.

### 2.2 Reasons for the Integration of Sovereign States

Many scholars have weighed in on the pros and cons of integration and why leaders may choose to pool their sovereignty in a collective decision making institution. Those on the realist side of the
literature would argue that states will agree to pool their sovereignty with others if the relative gains of such a move are in their favour. Lloyd Gruber believes that international institutions, such as the UN or the EU, are not to the benefit of all states, as theories such as institutionalism believe, as states with more capabilities and power can dictate the rules of the institutions and can ‘go-it-alone’ if smaller states refuse to join. These smaller states, however, will join these institutions regardless, as they are better off joining them than not (Gruber, 2000). The Bretton Woods institutions are a good example of this, where the United States were able to dictate the rules – a liberal economic order – and smaller states were forced to join these institutions and follow these rules that were actually not in their best interest. On the other side of international relations theory, liberal institutionalism argues that “institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity” (Keohane, 1995: 42). Therefore, it is in a state’s interest to be a part of these organisations, though it is important to note that the theory is not idealistic and does not believe that states will join for collective security – where no benefit is to be gained from cooperation, then cooperation will not happen.

This cooperation is not the same as integration, but it is useful to recognize why states would be willing to join international organisations and cooperate. In terms of integration, there are several theories for why states choose to do so. Walter Mattli argues that, in regards to regional economic integration, two conditions need to be met for states to integrate, and to integrate successfully. First, there must be significant potential for economic gains from market exchange. In other words, the integration must result in trade creation, in line with Viner’s theory of custom unions which is explained in more detail below. However, demand is not enough for integration to succeed and economic institutional theories which believe it is the only factor are naïve in their assessment. There must be a fulfilment of supply conditions, which refers to the conditions needed for leaders to be willing to listen to and accept proposals for further integration. As Mattli notes, “willingness depends on the payoff of integration to political leaders; they may be more willing to deepen
integration if such a move is expected to improve their chances of retaining power, for example, by notably improving domestic economic conditions” (Mattli, 1999: 42). Mattli believes that integration would be more likely to occur in times of economic despair, when leaders felt more pressure to enhance the overall economy (Mattli, 1999: 51).

In regards to integration in Africa, much of the literature reinforces that integration would be beneficial to the economy of the continent, as proven above. In addition, the depth of transnational problems on the continent – spill over of civil wars and rebellions, drought, climate change – mean that African leader should be pushing for more integration. It has been argued that there will be little chance of integration if there is no external or internal threat or if the state is relatively prosperous (Hazlewood, 1967: 4; Mattli, 1999: 51), but this has not been true of the situation in Africa. African states face vast economic despair and while this may partly explain the rhetoric behind the integration, it does not explain why integration has not been effective. What is missing for African integration is the supply condition – the willingness of leaders to move towards further integration.

2.2.1 Advantages of Integration

While debated, the ideas behind theories of institutions suggest that international organisations are a benefit for a sovereign society of states, as they create informational structures and reduce the uncertainty of enforcing agreements, thus helping states to achieve collective gains (Keohane, 1998). Integration takes this one step further and creates an interdependency between states as they share their sovereignty with an international organisation. In regards to Africa, there are several further reasons given to explain why integration would be a positive for the continent: to accelerate economic growth; increase bargaining power in the international arena; and increase good governance on the continent.
Accelerate Economic Growth

One of the first steps towards integration, and one that has been attempted for several decades, is economic integration of African economies, which is currently being attempted via the Regional Economic Communities with the goal of accelerating economic growth. The reason this growth would happen is simple: lower (or no) tariffs as well as increased flow of trade among African states would make for the most efficient trading environment within Africa. The World Bank has stated that "it is reasonable to expect that, particularly in the case of West Africa, regional integration will contribute to accelerated growth" (Kaplan, 2006: 85) and Richard Mukisa gives several benefits of economic integration, including: encouraging specialization by permitting some domestic production to be replaced by intra-regional imports; enlarging the domestic market, which leads to economies of scale; allowing member states access to resources that otherwise would not be available; and making member states less vulnerable to adverse developments in the international market as there would be less reliance on it for goods (Mukisa, 1995: 69-70). Additionally, many African states do not have the infrastructure, population or resources to create a viable national market and, as former World Bank vice-president for Africa Edward VK Jaycox notes, “some progressive degree of interaction will be important for the competitiveness of Africa in the world economy [as] these small economies cannot produce economies of scale” (Mukisa, 1995: 68).

Despite this, there are those who feel that Africa should concentrate more on the realities of globalisation and integrating with the world economy rather than with those in its region as preferential free trade agreements may result in protectionism and import-substitution rather than free trade (Lee, 2002: 1) or that Africa should focus more on rapid economic development rather than ambitious integration schemes (McCarthy, 1996: 230). However, there is no empirical proof that globalisation is in any way incompatible with regional integration and intraregional trade relationships (Kim and Shin, 2002). In other words, rather than wait for better economic conditions, advancing regional integration in Africa may lead to improved economic development and allow the continent to incorporate into the world economy.
This integration would most likely follow the steps outlined by Balassa above and would result in a customs union of the continent. Customs Union Theory, as expressed by Viner in 1950, would become either trade creating – where high cost domestic production is replaced by cheaper imports from member states – or trade diverting – where cheaper imports from non-member states are replaced by more expensive products from member states. The goal would be to reduce trade barriers between countries and promote economic efficiency in the allocation of resources (Biswaro, 2012: 5), and for each country to take advantage of its comparative advantage. One could argue that as intra-African trade is so low, any form of integration towards a customs union would result in more trade diversion, but studies have shown that “regional integration arrangements in Africa induced significant levels of trade creation” (UN ECA, 2012: 39). In addition, Hazlewood noted in 1967 that because of the economic structure of the underdeveloped countries in Africa which trade more externally than internally (which is still true today), customs union theory would suggest that there would be little to be gained from economic integration. However, he notes that customs unions are important because of the larger market they can provide for existing enterprises, but even more so because of the stimulus they can give to the creation of new productive capacity, particularly in manufacturing (Hazlewood, 1967: 7).

**Increased Bargaining Power**

Increased integration could also mean more common and harmonized positions among the member states, which will allow them to bargain more effectively in the international arena. This would be a huge advantage in negotiations which directly affect the African continent, such as trade, security or climate negotiations. Despite the AU Constitutive Act’s objective to “promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples” (AU, 2000: art. 3 (d)), this has not been the case. A good example of this was during climate change negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009. As Africa is the continent that will suffer the most because of climate change (Blackwell Publishing, 2006), there was much rhetoric from African leaders about the need to finalize a solution. In preparation, an African Common Position was based on the AU’s
Nairobi Declaration (AU, 2009) and was followed at the beginning of the negotiations. However, the common position was marginalised as external influences, such as some African states relations with China versus other states relationship with the EU, meant that the African Common Position was merely rhetoric, and not a concrete solution to a problem which will affect all African states (Hoste and Anderson, 2010: 3-5). A shift from intergovernmental negotiations to a common position stated by an AU team representing the continent as a whole, much like the EU has for transnational problems, would have much more weight in these negotiations, resulting in a stronger international standing for the continent.

**Improved Governance**

Finally, governance could be improved as member states become more economically and politically interdependent. As Biswaro states, “another major benefit of economic integration is good governance . . . [which] is aimed at shifting power from the Government as the only actor to other actors in society, thus making power more diffuse, less prone to abuse, and in the service of as many interests as possible” (Biswaro, 2012: xxiii). In addition, states who integrate may be involved in joint production of public goods, such as transport networks to increase trade, which may have otherwise been too costly for one country to sponsor alone (Mukisa, 1999: 70). Integration could also push some of the decision making structures higher than some corrupt national governments and create an improved business environment in Africa, as badly administered state bureaucracies that smother reform are circumvented in favour of supranational organisations (Kaplan, 2006: 82). The increased interdependence of economies and societies will mean that any overarching structure above the states will function as a watchdog over a state’s economy and political situation.

Integration will positively impact the lives of Africans, notes K.Y. Amoako, the executive secretary of the UN ECA:

> I want to see intra-African integration not because it will garner some utopian share of world commerce, but first and foremost because it will improve our lives here. It will
free up the time of African businesspeople to do business here. It will lower costs. It will make the African consumer’s plight so much more hopeful. We must build for ourselves. If we do that, others will come (Kaplan, 2006, 89)

2.3 A Background of African Integration

The African Union, the successor to the Organisation of African Unity, is now slightly over a decade old and is the latest and grandest plan for unification and integration of the African continent. Plans for integration in Africa began before independence, via the Pan African movement at the start of the 20th century. This section will examine the history of integration attempts in Africa and conclude that few of them can be deemed ‘effective’, according to the definition above.

2.4 Integration in Africa

The first calls for unity and integration in Africa actually occurred outside of the continent. In response to imperialism in Africa, the African diaspora in Europe and the United States convened a conference to discuss the way forward for Africa and Africans. Many of their resolutions centered on the ending of colonialism and self-determination for African peoples, as well as focusing on the future of the continent, which they hoped would unite politically. This section will briefly cover the history of integration in Africa, from its Pan African beginnings to its evolution toward the OAU and the AU and then analyse whether these attempts have resulted in integration that is ‘effective’, according to the definition above.

2.4.1 What is Pan Africanism

There are two main approaches to Pan Africanism. One is Afrocentric, which is a position that believes the longing for self-assertion on the continent began several millennia ago. The other, more subscribed-to approach, is Eurocentric, which sees Pan Africanism as a response to slavery and colonialism (Okhonmina, 2009: 86). Pan African scholar Tim Murithi agrees with the Eurocentric approach and sees Pan Africanism as “an invented notion with a purpose [and] ... a recognition of

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1 For a full list of integration attempts in Africa, please refer to Appendix I
the fragmented nature of the existence of Africans, their marginalization and alienation whether in
their own continent or in the Diaspora. Pan Africanism seeks to respond to Africa’s
underdevelopment” (Murithi, 2005: 7). This study will also follow the Eurocentric approach and see
Pan Africanism as a response to colonialism, and as the political philosophy behind African
integration efforts. This philosophy has gone through three stages: Pan African congresses, which
then evolved into the Organisation of African Unity, which was eventually transformed into the
African Union.

2.4.2 Pan African Congresses and Integration, 1900-1963

During colonialism, there were several calls and attempts towards integration. There were the Pan
African Congresses, which were organised after the initial Pan African Conference held in 1900 in
London. This conference, organised by Henry Sylvester Williams, set in motion the proceeding
congresses, which were organised by WEB Du Bois. The reason these congresses are important is
that they were some of the first official calls for an integrated, United States of Africa, type of
political system. There were several of these congresses between 1900 and 1963, but the most
important was in 1945 in Manchester, which was attended by African independence fighters such as
Kwame Nkrumah, Hastings Banda and Jomo Kenyatta. The idea of Pan Africanism, which believed
that “the self-determination of the dependent territories is the prerequisite to the federation of self-
governing states on a regional basis, leading ultimately to the creation of a United States of Africa”
(Padmore, 1956: 22), has been seen as a key inspiration to African leaders, especially Nkrumah, in
their quest for integration. The Pan African Congresses and the calls for decolonization were
followed by other conferences, such as the Conference of Independent African States and the All
African Peoples’ Organisation Conference, both in 1958. These two conferences held several other
meetings, but were largely abandoned once the OAU was established.

In regards to organisations of regional integration, nine attempts were made, though few were
successful as only the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the OAU lasted longer than a few
years. The other attempts at integration during this period began with the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in September 1958. The goal of this organisation was of full political independence, in this case after independence, of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. In 1962, states from Southern Africa were brought in and the organisation was renamed PAFMECSA, though was abolished with the opening of the OAU. Other attempts also failed because of the beginning of the OAU or because of UN recognition, such as the Union des Républiques de l’Afrique Centrale, which planned for full economic and political union between Congo, Chad, the Central African Republic and Gabon in 1960. Gabon refused to ratify the charter and it ended when the states obtained UN recognition.

There were also attempts at full integration of states, such as the failed Union of Independent African States in November 1958, when Ghana and Guinea united, later including Mali in 1960. This union was abolished after Guinea created closer ties with the United States, which was counter to the Marxist leanings of the other states. There was also the Mali Federation, between Senegal and French Sudan, which lasted just over four months before breaking up.

As states gained their independence and flirted with the idea of integration, cracks emerged which split the states into different camps. The politics centered mostly on ideological alliances and territorial disputes. Nkrumah convened the first meeting of the Conference of Independent African States in 1958, with plans to hold a conference every two years. By the time of the second proposed conference, politics had overtaken the ideals sought pre-independence, and African states split in different directions in terms of unity and integration. Despite this, the African states still attempted to work towards unity and integration. One of the first important meetings to discuss setting up an organisation to work towards African integration was in Brazzaville in December 1960. This meeting included Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy (Madagascar), Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and had a goal of commissioning a study of the prospects of integration, with a comparison to the
European Economic Community (EEC) and other international organisations. There were notable absences, especially of English speaking states and of Morocco, who felt that Mauritania was part of its territory and was unhappy with the Brazzaville Group’s calls for Mauritania’s admittance to the United Nations (UN).

To counter this, the Moroccan king invited Ghana, Guinea and Mali, who had joined to become the Union of Independent African States, to Casablanca in January 1961 to document their own path to integration in Africa. They disagreed with each point from the Brazzaville declaration and introduced the African Charter, which was for a full union of African states and was supported by the four states mentioned, as well as Libya, Egypt, Algeria and the Congo Kinshasa.

The groups differed in their proposed approaches to African integration. The Brazzaville Group wanted to take small steps towards integration, while still preserving their newly won sovereignty and territorial integrity, while the Casablanca Group proposed a full United States of Africa, with common economic and political policies with an emphasis on self-reliance, as dictated through its protocol of the African Charter and the Charter for the Union of African States.

In May of 1961, President Tubman of Liberia, neutral of both groups, invited all states to Monrovia to attempt to mediate the problems between the two sides. The Union of African States (Ghana, Guinea and Mali) cancelled, citing inadequate preparations for the conference, Morocco refused to attend because of Mauritania’s attendance and Sudan and the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) did not attend for unknown reasons. This left the Brazzaville Group as well as Nigeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ethiopia, Libya Tunisia and Liberia. These states were then called the Monrovia Group and it was decided to hold the first conference of this new group in Lagos, Nigeria, where the Lagos Charter was approved. This document basically upheld the principles of the Brazzaville Group and also led to the establishment of the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), an intergovernmental organization meant to establish further cooperation between the member states but which became defunct in 1985.
The Lagos Charter also proposed a meeting in Ethiopia for the next conference in May 1963, after Algeria achieved its independence. All parties were present for the negotiations and, with this cooperation, a draft Charter – containing compromises between the two opposing groups – was passed and the Organisation of African Unity was born.

2.4.3 The Organisation of African Unity, 1963-2002

The OAU was established on 25 May, 1963 and was “an instrument which [African leaders] hoped would lay the foundations for a continental union, or would at least lead to that degree of economic and political unity which is essential if Africa ... is to prosper (Cervenka, 1968: 1). The major preoccupation of the new organisation was to end colonialism; however the stated end goal of the organisation was to promote integration in the continent. However, this proved quite difficult as the OAU was given little power. The Secretary-General was originally called the Administrative Secretary-General to emphasise that it was more secretary than general. In addition, the only criterion to join the OAU was to be an African state, effectively negating any leverage the organisation may have had to reform state behaviour, which the European Union (EU) has been able to do through its Copenhagen criteria, which defines the rules for whether a country is able to join the EU.

The OAU was run as an intergovernmental organisation, which had contradictory purposes. One was to promote unity and coordination amongst African states, while at the same time defending the states sovereignty and territorial integrity. These objectives were put in to appease the two opposing camps, but made for an OAU that “was nothing more than a weak compromise organisation whose members were not as committed to political unity as their rhetoric suggested” (Mathews, 2008: 32).

The rhetoric for integration continued however, as other organisations committed to integration were started and abolished. Many of the organisations started at this time became defunct, but were then reborn as RECs through the Abuja treaty which established the African Economic
Community. For example, in 1964, the Union Douanière et Économique de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) was created between Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo, which became the Communauté Économique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) in 1994, with the goal of a full customs and monetary union. In addition, the East African Community, which had goals of a full federation between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, was created in 1967 but collapsed in 1977, although it was later revived with the same name. Finally, the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African began in 1981 and later became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

Some of the organisations created at this time are still around, including the Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee, which was set up in 1964 to make proposals to accomplish the Maghreb Economic Community, of which Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco are member states. Additionally, there is the Mano River Union from 1973, which is an association to foster economic cooperation between Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs; the Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale; the Indian Ocean Commission; and the Arab-Maghreb Union. These integration attempts will be analysed in more detail later to discover how effective their attempts at integration have been.

This period of African history was one of more lows than highs, as there were numerous coups, civil wars, long periods of economic decline and failed development plans, such as the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 and the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery in 1985.

The failure of these plans, along with major changes in the international system as the Cold War ended, the fact that democracy was more firmly established in the continent and the European integration experience gathering steam, reignited the quest for integration once more and leaders “rededicated themselves to work assiduously towards economic integration through regional cooperation [and] ... they also expressed their determination to take urgent measures to rationalise
the existing economic groupings on the continent in order to increase their effectiveness in promoting economic integration” (OAU, 1998: 2). To do this, in June 1991, the Abuja Treaty was signed which created the African Economic Community and a step-by-step plan for economic integration, based over thirty-four years and following the same timeline and steps as the European Union. In 1999, the Sirte Extraordinary Session was convened to expedite the process of integration, which ultimately led to the Durban Summit in 2002, which launched the African Union.

2.4.4 The African Union, 2002-Present

The AU has been referred to as everything from “the final goal of African Unity that leaders have been pursuing for more than forty years” (Okhonmina, 2009: 86) to “the OAU without the O” (Landsberg and Mackay, 2003). It has been a change from non-interference to non-indifference and the AU has attempted to stick to these principles, with peacekeeping missions authorized by the AU Peace and Security Council in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and West Africa. It has also been a textbook change from the old regionalism of the OAU to a new regionalism, which is more outward looking in its approach, as opposed to relying on inward focused policies, such as Import-Substitution Strategies like the Lagos Plan of Action (De Melo et al, 1995: 159).

This era also saw more regional organisations reborn, in line with the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and the African Economic Community. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference became the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development became the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1996 and the East African Community (EAC) was reborn in 2000. There were also many economic organisations that were established, all in the hopes of a common market, free trade area or monetary union in their region. These include the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the Communauté Économique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).
Finally, the Nile Basin Initiative was set up in 1999 to promote regional cooperation in some of the poorest areas of the continent.

Recently, there have been steps to integrate the RECs, such as the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Agreement, which is attempting to bridge all 26 states into a free trade area, as well as the Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee between COMESA, EAC, IGAD and the Indian Ocean Community (IOC), which attempts to coordinate each of the RECs efforts towards regional integration. These much needed attempts to prevent membership overlaps are still in a transitory phase and their ‘effectiveness’ still difficult to determine. However, this thesis’s analysis of the effectiveness of the participating RECs is a good indicator of the future of these agreements – if a smaller REC is unable to live up to its commitments, it is very doubtful that combining the RECs will help.

Clearly, there has been no lack of integration attempts in Africa and the push in the new millennium has been commendable. However, rhetoric will always be just rhetoric unless the integration pursued has been effective, which is what this thesis will look at next.

2.5 The Effectiveness of Integration in Africa

As has been shown above, there have been many attempts at integration. Many of those attempts have failed or have been transformed into new organisations, as they were unable to achieve their original goals. The failure for these initial attempts at integration has been blamed on “the structural characteristics of the Sub-Saharan economies, the pursuit of import-substitution policies, and the very uneven distribution of costs and benefits” (Foroutan, 1995: 234) as well as on a lack of support from the USA towards regionalisation, which it saw as potentially discriminatory (Bhagwati, 1995: 28). However, the failure of the original organisations is proof enough of their ineffectiveness and, in regards to those organisations that are still active, this thesis will look at the mandates and objectives of the organisations\(^2\) and analyse whether they have fulfilled them well enough to be labelled as ‘effective’. This thesis will focus on the organisations that are most key to integration,

\(^2\) Please see Appendix II for the major objectives of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities
namely the institutions of the AU and the AEC, rather than on the large number of African intergovernmental organisations, many of which can be labelled as either “dead”, such as the Mano River Union and the Indian Ocean Commission, or “zombies”, such as the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (Gray, 2012: 12).

2.5.1 The African Union

The AU’s objectives are quite vague and very broad. These objectives include achieving greater unity and accelerating the political and socio-economic integration of the continent, as well as promoting peace, security and democratic principles. As such, the AU should be seen as the overseer of the institutions of integration, as it attempts to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa, while accelerating the political and socio-economic integration of the continent (AU, 2000). These institutions include the Pan-African Parliament, the Peace and Security Council, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, the African Investment Bank, the African Central Bank and the African Monetary Fund. The 8 RECs stemming from the Abuja treaty and the African Economic Community will also be assessed.

2.5.2 The Pan African Parliament

The PAP was originally set up to eventually be the legislative body of the continent, with full legal powers over member states. It became fully operational in 2004 in Midrand, Johannesburg, as an oversight committee and the plan was to be fully legislative by 2009. However, this still has not happened and the PAP remains merely an oversight committee and observer. Its recommendations to the African Union are rarely passed and its mandated objective to work closely with national parliaments and civil society rarely happens (Emmanual, 2010: 7). As the PAP has not become a full legislative body, nor has it fulfilled smaller parts of its mandate, one can say that the PAP has not been effective.
2.5.3 The Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council has been chosen for inclusion in this thesis as it is one of the most important institutions of the African Union and a good estimate of how effective the African Union has been in following its mandate, namely promoting peace and security on the continent. It has evolved out of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and the PSC Protocol came into force in December 2003. Its mandate is simple: promote peace and security in Africa; anticipate and prevent conflicts; and implement peacekeeping and peace building initiatives. While the PSC has become one of the more important institutions of the African Union, its record is mixed. It has suspended members, such as Togo and Madagascar, when a coup has taken place, but has also been quick to come to the aid of dictators such as Robert Mugabe and the late Muammar Gaddafi, as well as allowing Ethiopia to remain in the PSC chamber after it acted in Somalia without consent of the PSC. In regards to preventing conflict, the Council has acted more to extinguish conflict after it has started rather than prevent it, as it is mandated to do (Williams, 2009: 609). Williams notes that the continent is better off with the PSC than without it (2009: 622), but the Council still has not lived up to expectations laid out in its founding protocol, such as anticipating and preventing conflicts and developing a common defence policy for Africa nor has the proposed African Standby Force (ASF) been quick to reach operational status, as called for in Article 13 of the PSC Protocol.

2.5.4 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights

The African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) is an amalgamation of the original African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Despite the 2008 protocol, the treaty has yet to be ratified by the required number of states and is still not in force. The African Court of Justice, which never actually functioned, was to be the judicial organ of the African Union. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which does function and came into force in 2004, monitors states’ compliance with the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. For the first several years, the court dealt mainly with administrative issues and despite officially starting its
operations in 2006, it wasn’t until 2010 that the court finally adopted its final Rules of Court (AU, n.d.). However, despite hearing some cases since that time, little progress has been made in protecting Africans’ human rights via this court (The Economist, 2012).

2.5.5 The African Banks

The three banks, the African Investment Bank (AIB), the African Central Bank (ACB) and the African Monetary Fund (AMF) have been grouped together for analysis. All were created with the Constitutive Act of the African Union and are still not yet operational. The AIB is to be headquartered in Tripoli, Libya and will function similarly to the World Bank, distributing loans to its members for development projects. The AMF will function similarly to the International Monetary Fund and will be based in Yaoundé, Cameroon. Finally, the ACB will be the central bank of the African single currency and will encompass the AMF as well. This last bank is obviously reliant on the success of the RECs in fulfilling their goals, but the fact that none of the banks are close to being established speaks to the ineffectiveness in this area.

2.5.6 The RECs

The eight RECs that make up the AEC have remarkably similar objectives. The majority of them tend to focus on developing economic and social policies that are balanced, harmonious and deepen cooperation between member states. These broad words constitute a vague reference to the AEC’s step-by-step instructions for a move first towards free trade area, then to a customs union and, eventually, to a full continental economic union.

On the whole, the RECs and the move towards free trade agreements has been the bright spot of African integration thus far, especially compared to the attempts mentioned previously. This in spite of the fact that in regard to the effectiveness of the AU, the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP), which was set up to monitor the integration progress of the RECs, states that the AU “is yet to fully play the role devolved upon it, namely: activities, projects and programmes designed to drive forward the process of regional and continental integration” (Minimum Integration Programme,
2010a: ii). However, it is the RECs that have the most impact on African states, as they are the ones that are charged with moving towards a full economic union. When looking at Table 1, it seems that integration in the continent seems to be progressing smoothly.

Table 1: Stages of the Abuja Treaty and Achievements of the RECs

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<td>RECs</td>
<td>Strengthening existing RECs and creation of new RECs where they do not exist</td>
<td>Coordination and harmonisation of activities</td>
<td>Gradual elimination of tariff and non tariff barriers</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
<td>Customs Union</td>
<td>Continental Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>study in progress</td>
<td>to be fixed</td>
<td>to be fixed</td>
<td>This stage will be achieved when all RECs have achieved Customs Union and harmonized their respective CET, with a view of creating one single continental CET</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
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Source: MIP, 2010a: 12.

However, the first area to notice is the lack of the Arab Maghreb Union, one of the original eight RECs. Started in 1989, the AMU’s lofty objectives are to adopt common policy in all areas and to realize the free movement of persons, services, goods and capital between member states (AMU/UMA, 1989). However, due to political tension between member states over the situation of the Western Sahara, little progress was ever made in attempting to complete these goals. Despite the recent creation of an investment bank in the region (Arab Maghreb Union states create investment bank, 2013), no summit of the AMU has been convened since 1994, and while there may be a new drive towards integration with the implementation of new governments after the Arab Spring, thus far none of the objectives of the AMU have been achieved (Rouis and Tabor, 2013: 110).
Secondly, one should notice that the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has still not completed stage two, due to conflicts between and inside member states. While the organisation has been actively pursuing peace in the region (in Sudan and Somalia) to varying degrees of success (Murithi, 2009), there has been no development on achieving the economic and political goals of their mandate, nor of the AEC.

The other RECs have had a better track record. Having grown to include 28 member states, the CEN-SAD is one of the largest RECs in the continent. A project of late Libyan leader, Col. Gaddafi, the organisation is trying to reposition itself with the changes in the Saharan region, with the first meeting since the revolution in Libya taking place in February 2013. The proposed FTA, which is vaguely stated as being "in progress", still has quite a long way to go and is nowhere near fulfilling its mandate.

What else is alarming is the lack of information on the progress of the RECs and the contradictory information that is available. Table 1 was from 2010; Table 2 is from 2013. Notice that the progress of the CEN-SAD has actually regressed to where stage 2 (the gradual elimination of trade barriers) is no longer complete.

**Table 2: Status of the Implementation of the Abuja Treaty per REC**

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*Source: AU, 2013:19.*
This seems to be the norm for the progress reports of the RECS and, while there have been some success stories, such as the EAC which has become a customs union, the timeline is rarely met and many obstacles have been in the way. COMESA, according to table 2, states that it has accomplished a customs union. The community, which replaced the Preferential Free Trade Area and contains the balance of African states on the east coast, from Egypt down to Swaziland, has as its objectives the goal to attain sustainable growth and development of the Member through harmonization and joint adoption of common policies (COMESA, 1993). However, COMESA still does not have a fully functioning Free Trade Area (FTA), let alone a common market or customs union, as member states still need to decide whether it is in their interest to join it or not (World Bank, n.d.). In addition, much like other RECs, the vague wording of the objectives, with references to “balanced”, “harmonious” and “joint” development, attempts to make it more difficult to measure the progress. However, as an REC under the AEC, its mandate is to follow a strict timeline leading to eventual economic union. According to the MIP, COMESA has concluded negotiations to become a FTA and was to become a customs union by 2009, which was signed. However, like the FTA not all member states have agreed to the union, because of fear of lost revenue, overlapping membership with other RECs, and a lack of political will.

Other RECs have had similar problems. SADC, ECCAS and ECOWAS have continuously pushed back their timelines for a customs union. SADC and ECCAS had a goal of 2010 and ECOWAS was supposed to be fully functional by 2009 according to the 2010 MIP report, but this changed to having no fixed date for ECCAS and 2013 and 2015 for SADC and ECOWAS, respectively, in the 2013 edition of the AU’s Status of Integration (AUC, 2013: 20). As the MIP notes, "these hesitant and indeed timid approaches seem to be evidenced by the different timelines that have been set, and then for the most part often postponed when due" (MIP, 2010a: 1). ECCAS, while having adopted protocols and set up a development bank, still has not made real progress towards completing their mandate (Uzokike, 2009:34), while SADC has also pushed back plans for their customs union. ECOWAS, which may have the most potential to fulfil its goals as many of the member countries already share the
common currency of the CFA Franc through the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), has also pushed back its timeline to become a full customs union. This, once again, shows the problems the RECs are having with fulfilling their mandate on time as dictated by their founding protocols.

One must also remember that the decisions made by the RECs and the AU institutions are still dictated by the Heads of State. The AU is a purely intergovernmental organisation, with the AU Assembly, made up of the leaders of the member states, being the institution which decides to take action and set policies of the Union. In regards to the RECs, the final decision also ultimately rests with the heads of state. While some of the organisations have attempted to implement supranational commissions into their treaties, such as ECOWAS, SACU and the EAC (Fagbayibo, 2013), these are rarely supranational in practice. For example, in ECOWAS it is the Authority of Heads of State and Government which is the supreme institution and the one in charge of the direction of ECOWAS (ECOWAS, 1993: art. 7(1)(2)), which leaves little room for the ‘supranational’ commission to function properly, which is the same for SACU’s Council of Ministers, the supreme decision making body of the customs union (SACU, 1992: art. 8(1)). One exception to this is the EAC, which has been able to set up a customs union, as well as a functional legislative assembly and regional court which, despite attempts by leaders to limit the EACs autonomy, has been able to be a part of decision making in the region. While the EAC Summit of Heads of State still has veto rights of the legislative assembly (Adar, 2005: 36), the EAC Court of Justice has been able to make rulings above the nation state, despite opposition from member states. A good example of this is when the Court disqualified nine Kenyan lawmakers from being sworn in as members of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA). The judges found that the EAC treaty was at odds with the elections rules and Kenya and were, thus, invalid (van der Mei, 2009). Despite amendments to the EAC treaty to remove the judges, the Court held out and continued its legal rulings against the breach, developing case law and precedent for the Court.
So while there have been some success stories, one can see that integration in Africa is still disjointed and not moving at the pace originally set by the AEC. Nor are the RECs fulfilling the mandates agreed by the member states, thus making the communities, and integration, ineffective.
Chapter 3: Ineffective Integration in Africa: Neopatrimonialism’s Influence on Integration

The previous chapter has outlined that integration would indeed be a positive for the continent, as well as given a background on the long and varied history of integration attempts in Africa, before concluding that the attempts made to integrate have, thus far, been ineffective. This chapter will focus on looking at why these attempts have been either unsuccessful or, in the case of attempts that actually have sustained, been ineffective. The chapter will first look at the possible reasons given for the lack of integration and conclude that, while not the only reason, the main reason for the lack of integration is the refusal of African leaders to properly implement treaties. This refusal would involve a loss of power for the state, which would then result in a loss of resources for patronage and, eventually, the leaders own national political power.

3.1 Reasons for Lack of Integration

Many reasons have been given for the lack of integration in Africa. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s Assessing Regional Integration in Africa I states that the reasons for Africa falling short of its goals include: multiple and overlapping memberships; reluctance to adhere to integration programmes because of concerns over relative gains; insufficient technical and analytical support; divergent and unstable macroeconomic policies; inadequate capacity and resources of member states; lack of coherence and links among sectoral cooperation programmes; ineffective mechanisms for organizing, implementing, controlling, monitoring and revising the integration progress; and an inability to make integration objectives, plans and programmes part of a national development framework (UN ECA, 2004: 33).

Mistry repeats many of these reasons in his own analysis of the situation, and adds in others, such as: unwillingness to subordinate immediate national interests in order to achieve long-term regional goals; an absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms; pervasiveness of parastatals, which are subject to political interference; African antipathy to markets, private enterprise and foreign
investment; political commitment to African integration being confined to a narrow coterie of political leaders and senior technocrats (Mistry, 2000: 558).

In addition, the prevalence of political instability and inter- and intra-state ethnic conflict make it difficult for integration to proceed. In regards to the OAU and the AU, Okhonmina has argued that the transition from the OAU to the AU took place before the OAU achieved “organisational actualization,” so the OAU was still an inefficient organisation which was transformed into another inefficient organisation, and, as such, the AU is still an evolving organisation which has yet to reach “organisational maturity” (Okhonmina, 2009: 92-93). Therefore, the AU will continue to have bureaucratic and implementation problems which will make integration more difficult.

However, almost all of these reasons for a lack of integration come down to political motives. Even the overlapping of membership is politically oriented, as the UN ECA found that half of the African states that join multiple regional organisations do so for political or strategic reasons, compared with only 35% who do so for economic reasons (UN ECA, 2006: xvii ). Ndulo notes that there is a “lack of political will in the member countries that is necessary to see integration succeed, expressed in the chronic non-observance of commitments undertaken with in the respective agreements and in the insufficient use of the instruments set up by these agreements” (Ndulo, 1992: 2). One can share the blame for the lack of integration on insufficient resources, unwillingness to implement and monitor programmes or political instability, but these all come down to political will to move integration further. This blame should be consolidated on the African leaders.

In Hazlewood’s landmark book, *African Integration and Disintegration*, which was published in 1967, he remarks: “despite the speeches, the conferences, the resolutions, the quest for African unity seems to approach little nearer its goal” (Hazlewood, 1967: 3). This remark is still true today, despite continued rhetoric about furthering integration by leaders. At the AU inaugural summit, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan warned leaders “not to mistake hope for achievement” (UNSG, 2002),
as African Heads of State seem more willing to sign a declaration of intent rather than actually implement any policies that will lead towards integration.

3.2 Why African Leaders Fear Integration

As mentioned above, integration in Africa would be positive for the continent and leaders have continued their statements of intention towards further integration, as illustrated by the Accra Declaration of 2007, which reiterated the push towards a United States of Africa and accelerating economic and political integration. So why do leaders refuse to take the steps needed to accomplish these goals? This section will look to answer this question by first looking at why states integrate and the possible reasons leaders have for not following the steps toward integration, as outlined in the treaties and declarations. Secondly, this thesis will argue that African leaders are reluctant to give up too much control over national resources and power for fear that it would lead to their own political end, as they rely on state resources to preserve their base of clients, which are needed to help them to stay in power.

3.2.1 African Leaders and Integration

This section will look at why African leaders may be hesitant to move towards further integration. The section above looked at the reasons why states will or will not integrate – this section will look at why that integration does not happen in Africa and argue that for both economic and political integration, leaders are loathe to cede any power – be it a loss of financial power or sovereignty – as this would limit their neopatrimonial opportunities and their grip on power. In regards to a push towards economic integration, such as a customs union or monetary union, Geda argues that there is little willingness among some governments, in Africa and around the world, to surrender the sovereignty of their macroeconomic policy making to a regional authority; face potential consumption costs that may arise from importing from a high cost member country; accept unequal distribution of gains and losses in the short run at the beginning of integration; and discontinue existing economic ties with non-members (Geda, 2007: 359).
In terms of political integration, the main deterrent towards this end is a desire to preserve sovereignty. The EU, the integration attempt which has proceeded the furthest, is now caught in a quagmire as it attempts to balance a financial crisis which requires more power being transferred to the supranational organisation against European countries desires to preserve their sovereignty, or their own decision making powers. In his attempts at uniting the continent, Nkrumah pushed integration directly from the end of colonialism, for fear that if sovereignty was not sacrificed while it was new, leaders would grow increasingly reluctant to sacrifice it (Nye, 1966: 14). Nkrumah’s prescient thought held true, and the idea of sovereignty has become the main excuse given from leaders to not follow integration agreements. This began in the newly independent states, where there was a tendency for national politics to be built around ‘heroes’ (Hazlewood, 1967: 359) who fought for independence and the newly won sovereignty. These ‘big men’ exploited the divided populations from the legacy of colonial borders and saw “any competition for power as a zero-sum game [which enabled] elites to exploit identity divisions for personal gain” (Kaplan, 2006: 83). The end result was an African state which was an extension of a traditional patrimonial system combined with features of a legal-rational bureaucracy left over from colonialism, which was inherited by African elites (Chabal, 1999: 12-13). This neopatrimonial system, which occurs in many African political institutions, means that the fear of losses associated with economic and political integration causes leaders to be hesitant, if not hostile, to pushing integration further as doing so may mean a loss of their own national power.

3.2.3 Neopatrimonialism in Africa

In traditional patrimonial societies, which have existed in Africa and many other areas, there is no distinction between the public and the private - the state was the personal domain of the rulers and they would use the resources of the state to maintain the obedience of the population (Pitcher et al, 2009:127). Neopatrimonialism is similar to classic patrimonialism, which Weber referred to as a form of government that is based on a rulers’ family household and the right to rule is attributed to an individual rather than to an office (Camic et al, 2005), but the "neo" part, although debated (Pitcher
et al, 2009; Erdmann and Engel, 2007), refers to the fact that, unlike traditional patrimonialism, there is a separation of the private and public in neopatrimonial states, though it is largely a facade. In addition, neopatrimonialism regimes occur where “the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994:458) and can be defined as “states that, despite possessing the formal structures of modern bureaucracies, operate on patrimonial principles – characterised by personalised political authority, weak checks on the private appropriation of public resources, and pervasive clientelism” (Alence, 2004:165). The clientelism referred to can be defined in a political manner as “an exchange relationship between unequals, which provides a political advantage to the more powerful agent and a material advantage to the less powerful agent” (van de Walle, 2007: 2).

The occurrence of neopatrimonialism in Africa has its roots in colonialism. Many African states, such as Rwanda and Burundi, used a traditional patronage system to structure the whole population, from the king to the peasant, with a patron-client organisation (Medard, 1982: 166). Even as colonialism instituted formal structures of governance, the redistributive logic of patronage – a pyramid-like structure in which patrons at the top distribute their resources to clients below them, who then do the same to their clients below them – continued and was implemented in the highest areas of the state (Beekers and van Gool, 2012: 8). In colonialism, those at the top of the pyramid were replaced by the colonialists, who then became the patrons to their clients, the chiefs. As a legal-rational system of governance was instituted, means by which patrons operated changed. They relied more on their access to government, which became the most profitable occupation during colonisation and after independence, and less on the amount of land they owned or how many people they employed. Those who were able to allocate government jobs became important patrons for clients who fought for independence, and those elites who were able to secure access to these positions quickly worked their way up in government. Those who were very skilled and “could manage political opponents effectively and keep potential insurgents in check ... could endure for decades. To do this, rulers needed to ensure that sufficient resources trickled down to their clients
to keep the majority satisfied” (Williams, 2011: 64). Chabal notes that even with the increase of
democracy on the continent, the neopatrimonial system still endures, as either the previous
incumbent is voted back into power, such as Kerekou in Benin or Ratsiraka in Madagascar, as there is
still a strong link between client or patron or, where a new leader is elected, they are hamstrung to
implement proposed reforms as a large number of new supporters, and clients, expect rapid pay-

The situation in other democratic states can also be defined as a patron-client relationship, as
leaders in democracy regularly promise and deliver special services or resources to local areas in
return for continued support during elections. These ‘pork-barrel politics’ are commonplace in many
democracies and other types of government (Lancaster, 1986). However, in Africa, leaders are less
concerned with satisfying the public by providing services than by satisfying the elites which keep
them in office and power. Leaders are also concerned with enriching themselves, leading to policies
which are to the detriment of the general population. As Williams states, “while African leaders were
often guilty of spending relatively vast sums of money on personal or ‘white elephant’ projects such
as stadiums, palaces or lavish conferences, arguably the most serious problem for neopatrimonial
rulers was that the unavoidable balancing act of elite co-optation encouraged them to adopt policies
which increased the likelihood that their state would suffer an economic crisis” (Williams, 2011: 62)
and Chabal reiterates “with very few exceptions, African governments simply exploited their
economic assets for patrimonial purposes, regardless of the consequences of such actions for the
country's future economic well-being” (Chabal, 1999: 113).

The risks to a leader’s rule may be heightened when external resources – political and financial – run
out and rulers are unable to continue their clientele system. There is a constant balancing act to
preserve the equilibrium between maintaining the stability of the population and maintaining the
leader’s status among the elites in society (Williams, 2011). While disorder such as small civil wars
between the ruling party and the opposition may be used by the leader to consolidate his power,
conflicts that affect the leader’s power are more likely to happen when rulers are “no longer able to assert their dominance over local strongmen in their patronage network” (Reno, 2007:328). For this reason, African leaders will find it more difficult and time consuming to retain power, even for a full term of office, than counterparts in Europe or places that are centred around more legal-rational forms of governance, as “regimes built on personal loyalty rather than bureaucratic authority are susceptible to institutional collapse when patronage resources run out” (Bratton, 1994: 460-461). In addition, those beneath the patron in government will have little choice but to maintain the regime, as Bratton notes that government insiders “derive their livelihood from state or party office. Because they face the prospect of losing all viable means of support in a political transition (like to a supranational actor), they have little option but to cling to the regime and to sing or swim with it” (Bratton, 1994: 464).

3.2.4 Neopatrimonialism’s Effect on Integration

This type of governance is detrimental to integration, as it may result in a loss of state revenue from reduced tariffs and diverted trade, or may limit a leader’s political sovereignty in some areas. This thesis will argue that for political or full economic integration to occur as African leaders have stated, there must be some transfer of power to RECs or another body such as a Pan-African Parliament, but neopatrimonial states are wary of allowing these organisations to function independently (Hoste, 2011: 9). Neopatrimonialism affects integration in two major ways. First of all, integration of states politically and economically will require the state to undergo a degree of institutionalisation and modernisation, which would be the end of patrimonialism (Chabal, 1999:5). The reason for this, as indicated above, is that integration will result in a loss of economic resources for the neopatrimonial state, as well as political power as there is a loss of some decision making capabilities for state leaders. Mistry writes that the African elite are “understandably reluctant to accelerate a paradigm shift that weakens their power and reduces opportunities for satisfying the private agenda of public officials” (Mistry, 2000: 558) in regards to a shift from state to market-oriented development, but this can apply to a shift towards further integration as well. Bach states that a “ruler owes his ability
to remain in power to his capacity for transforming his monopolistic control over the state into a source of opportunities for family, friends, and clients” (Bach, 2012: 27) and this shift towards further integration will result in leaders being unable to continue their patronage networks. The result will be a crisis, due less to a loss of legitimacy and more to dissatisfaction with the patron and political manoeuvres by other patrons attempting to gain power, eventually resulting in a change of leadership. In areas such as Europe, integration has progressed to respond to threats or crises. In Africa, leaders fear integration for the fact that it could cause a crisis and limit the resources they use to remain in power.

Secondly, neopatrimonialism affects integration as any integration that does take place, such as the progress of the RECs, is done more as a response to demands from international donors than as a way to increase the standard of living of the states’ citizens. Similar to the imposed implementation of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), leaders see integration as a challenge they need to overcome. On one hand, donors are asking for further integration in exchange for aid and preferential trade access, which is needed to appease the leader’s clientele base. On the other hand, further integration will result in fewer opportunities for leaders to use state resources as a patronage tool, resulting in challenges from other patrons and potential loss of national power. When faced with a similar issue with the SAPs, African leaders attempted to delay the reforms and undermine their effects in other ways, such as using them as a scapegoat for Africa’s continued economic decline and by following the path of least cost, meaning that African leaders lose little, but foreign donors are obliged to continue their aid as leaders are, on the surface, doing what is required of them (Chabal, 1999: 122). This has also happened in regards to integration. It was shown above how leaders continually delayed the integration process, pushing back dates or ignoring them altogether. Where they could not do this, as in the regional push towards free trade areas and customs unions, they have only implemented the minimum requirements needed to make it seem like integration has been successful, so as to continue support from foreign donors. An audit by USAID’s Southern Africa Trade Hub found that member states were
not complying with the basic obligations of the FTA and the issue of non-compliance is barely
mentioned by SADC (Nevin, 2013).

3.2.5 African Leaders and Power

But why do African leaders seem unable to relinquish some power and do what is best for their
country? While a leader refusing to give up power is by no means unique to Africa, there has been a
definite pattern of African leaders refusing to leave office peacefully. Violence in Kenya and Côte
d’Ivoire has resulted because of a leader’s refusal to leave office and Africa has had a long history of
‘big men’ in power since independence, such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire and Sekou
Touré in Guinea. Even with the introduction of term limits in much of the continent in the early
1990s, many elected leaders, such as Sam Nujoma in Namibia and Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso,
have changed the constitution to allow themselves to remain in power. Several reasons could be
given to explain a ruler’s decision to remain in power. Some authors argue that leaders stay in power
and commit the crimes they do because, simply, nobody is able or tries to stop them (Ayittey, 2011;
Mills, 2010). Many African leaders argue that the lack of development in Africa is because of the
experience of colonialism, so their refusal to give up power is due to a fear of the loss of sovereignty
and independence, such as during colonial times. Of course, the problem with this argument is that
the shift of political parties is to an African party, and not to a foreign colonial state. Along this same
vein, an argument could be that a loss of power resulting from integration will also mean a rise of
power from regional hegemons, such as Nigeria or South Africa, which will be to the detriment of
smaller states. Several scholars have argued that both Nigeria and South Africa are attempting to use
integration and regional organisations, such as the AU, SADC and ECOWAS, as tools to increase their
hegemony on the continent (Adebajo, 2010: 414; Lesufi, 2004: 809-829; McGowan and Ahwireng-
Oben, 1998: 165). The problem with this is that the continuing leadership of an African ruler of a
small African state, especially a corrupt one, will do little to change South African and Nigerian
foreign policy, so there is little reason to prevent integration on these grounds.
In the same vein of neopatrimonialism, many others see African politics as the place to make money in Africa, to reward patrons and themselves. Undoubtedly, for many African states the public sector is where there are possibilities to become rich, as opposed to the private sector. Many African rulers have used the state as their own personal bank and money-making venture, such as Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade who believes he should receive 35% of revenue generated from a $27 million statue built in Dakar since it was his idea (Sy, 2009). There has been an attempt to negate this trend by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which awards African leaders for exercising good leadership and performance during their time in office with five million dollars after they leave office and two hundred thousand dollars a year for the rest of their lives. The hope is this will give an incentive to leave office and not have to steal from the state treasury. Unfortunately, the prize has not been given out in previous years because of a lack of worthy candidates (Ibrahim Prize, n.d.). This, and the fact that many former African leaders, such as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, are alleged to have billions of dollars’ worth of investments and cash, proves that leaders do not refuse to leave power for fear of losing financial security.

Ultimately, David Shinn, talking about African leaders’ penchant for constitutional changes, sums up the situation best when he states, “those who change (their country’s) constitution simply want to extend their power. They decide that they like the position that they are in, that it provides them with the ability to extend a certain amount of patronage that is probably very satisfying to their ego. Theirs is nothing more than a desire to remain in power. Pure and simple” (Gombya, 2010). Again, this is not a feeling unique to African leaders. Jean Chretien, former Prime Minister of Canada, stated explicitly that “politics is about wanting power, getting it, exercising it and keeping it” (Chretien, 2007: 2). Despite this, Chretien left office peacefully, so why don’t African leaders?

There are two factors that contribute to the extreme numbers of African rulers who refuse to give up power. The first is the ruler’s image of themselves and the second is a lack of institutional power. While one could argue that African leaders have ‘a big ego’ and, therefore, feel they are best to run
the country or that they fear leaving office because of reprisals from opposition and loss of revenue, this thesis argues that there are deeper issues. First of all, many African rulers strive to gain recognition as ‘the Big Man’, similar to the role played by Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire or Dos Santos of Angola. There have been some studies that suggest that the period of the ‘Big Man’ has declined, as there are fewer irregular (i.e. overthrow by violence) changes of government (Posner and Young, 2007; Diamond, 2008). However, they also admit that “African leaders today [do not] have any less desire to stay in power than their predecessors did; ... simply that leaders today are more constrained by formal rules in trying to achieve their most preferred outcomes” (Posner and Young, 2007: 137). While more formal rules and desire for international approval may constrain leaders to a certain degree, it still does not entirely erase the desire to remain in power as ‘the Big Man’ since this phenomenon continues today. This position of power is aggravated via the neo-patrimonial system of African politics, as the form of the modern state is fused with “the informal reality of personalized, unaccountable power and pervasive patron-client ties” (Diamond, 2008: 145). These ties filter down to the mass of the population, which is dependent on local patrons of the ruler. This dependence adds to the personal image of the leader as ‘the Big Man’, as there is little dissent towards his rule. The African electorate has not pushed for major reforms which would end this neo-patrimonial rule, because they fear the short-term pain it may cause or because the neo-patrimonial system is so entrenched that the population expects to exchange political support for help, hence they are more likely to vote for a member of their tribe in exchange for sharing any financial gain that politician may accumulate (The Economist, 2004). This also explains why African populations are more likely to turn to violence if their particular candidate loses an election, as this loss will mean that the financial gains will shift towards a different electoral base.

Secondly, there is a weakness of institutional power in African states, which, if strong, could help to balance the power of rulers. As stated before, many constitutions are weak and rulers have changed them to suit their interests, such as choosing to abolish term limits. Conversely, the patronage system is very strong and this creates conditions where a ruler can continue in power without much
opposition. The “absence of effective institutional restraints is undoubtedly a critical consideration which disposes ambitious individuals or groups with access to power to contemplate and engage in unlawful bids for political control” (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984: 432). Africa’s leaders’ refusal to take integration seriously stems from the fact that doing so will impact their political power negatively. Further integration will only serve to strengthen institutions and minimize their resources for patronage, which helps to keep rulers in power. The desire to remain in power is not a phenomenon unique to African rulers, but the fact that it is not difficult to remain in power in Africa makes this desire a reality.

Therefore, leaders use the political rhetoric of integration to convince international donors and citizens that they are working to rectify the economic despair on the continent, while refusing to advance regional organisations beyond an intergovernmental manner of decision making. Leaders prefer an intergovernmental approach and view an organisation with supranational powers as a departure from a familiar and predictable path (Nzewi, 2009: 4), and “given the prevalence in Africa of weak states and political opposition to sharing sovereignty, it is not surprising that integration arrangements are characterised by loose supranational bodies and that virtually all institutions are intergovernmental” (Tavares, 2011: 226). Other authors agree that states, and their leaders, attempt to slow their integration so that other states integrate first, in an attempt to free ride and “defend the position of domestic interest groups, the support of which the political regime in question may be politically dependent upon” (Boas, 2001: 32) and that this suggests the importance of political issues, namely relating to the loss of sovereignty and lack of political commitment in regards to the issue of integration in the continent (Geda, 2007: 373).

One can see that much of the blame for the impeded progress of integration in Africa rests solely on the shoulders of those leaders who put their personal wealth and power ahead of that of the state and its citizens. Voluntarily ceding power to a supranational institution would require an institutionalization of power and the state and "proper institutionalization of the state would
obviate the need continuously to have to display the substance of one's power. If political
domination became embodied in the recognized juridical universe of the bureaucratic state, political
elites would no longer have to justify their prominence through the fulfilment of their patrimonial
duties. What this would mean, however, is that they would have to accept both the supremacy of
institutions over individuals and the temporary nature of their political eminence" (Chabal, 1999: 15).
Leaders, unfortunately, are loathe to do this and will prefer to a version of integration over which
they have veto power. However, integration can only proceed so far if leaders refuse to cede power
to a supranational institution.
Chapter 4: Integration in Africa: Intergovernmental versus Supranationalism

As expressed above, the trend in Africa has been towards regional organisations that are run in an intergovernmental manner. The question now becomes, can African integration lead to a full economic and political union in an intergovernmental manner?

This chapter will focus on two theories, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, to show that integration cannot progress towards the goals African leaders have set in a purely intergovernmental manner. A supranational organisation is needed to direct and influence the process, and this first push will help to start Africa towards greater integration. Africa still has not had this push, and thus, still has not had effective integration. This chapter will first do a historical analysis between the ECSC and the OAU. The ECSC began as a supranational organization, compared to the OAU which started intergovernmentally. Secondly, this chapter will use this analysis to look at how far integration can proceed if it continues to function intergovernmentally, concluding that it would be much more efficient if there were supranational elements involved in the process.

4.1 The ECSC and the OAU

4.1.1 Similarities

The reasons that states integrate can be broken down into two areas: first, security and secondly, economics. States may integrate because of neo-realist fears of being attacked by a larger state, so are willing to give up some sovereignty for the safety of numbers and allies. Economics may also drive integration, if states attempt to increase their economies by improving interregional trade and investment through integration, which creates increased interdependence and further cooperation among states. Both the ECSC and the OAU were created for security reasons, which then continued and evolved into an economic union. The ECSC, established on April 18, 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, sought “to avoid the risk of future conflict between France and Germany by linking the two basic
elements in their economies, the production of coal and the manufacture of steel, more closely together” (Thody, 1997, 1). Europe had witnessed a century of war and was determined to do what it could to prevent further wars for the continued security of the continent. Similarly, the OAU was established in 1963, after a wave of decolonisation to secure their own sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, as well as eradicate all continuing forms of colonialism (OAU Charter, 1963: art. II, (c)(d)). Both organisations were originally created as a response to insecurity on the irrespective continents, either in the form of war or colonialism. Economically, both organisations transformed into economic-based organisations. The ECSC, which was very successful in its immediate economic objectives (Thody, 1997: 3), was the starting point for the European Economic Community, while the OAU, which was not as successful at economic transformation, was eventually transformed into the AU, with loftier economic development goals in Africa through the RECs.

The path chosen for each organisation is also quite similar. Both rejected the idea of a grand ideal and wished to proceed step-by-step. The Schuman Declaration states that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity” (EUROPA, 2012), while African leaders shunned Nkrumah’s grand plan for a “United States of Africa” in favour of a more incremental path. The ECSC, comprised of only six members (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) opted for their integration through supranationalism and functionalism (Henig, 2002: 14), with a major push for this by Jean Monnet, a French statesmen who believed wholly in the idea of European integration and was the first president of the High Authority, the supranational arm of the organisation. As will be discussed below, the OAU did not take this path and instead followed a more intergovernmental form of decision making. However, just as there were controversies in Africa over the powers of the OAU, there were also controversies in Europe, though, with the exception of Communist nationals and some Republicans in the French Assembly, the arguments were not centred on the loss of national sovereignty, as in Africa (Mason, 1955). Much of the debate centred around the issue of democracy – an area that Schuman and Monnet did not give much attention to when drafting the
proposals for the ECSC – and suspicions of France’s ‘real’ motives and of a renewed Germany and its quest for hegemony (Mason, 1955: 22-29).

It is not surprising that similarities abound between the two organisations. Much of the attempts at African integration (and in other parts of the world) have been modelled on the European experiment. That said, few of the integration experiments outside of Europe have progressed as well and for that, one must look at the major differences between the organisations.

4.1.2 Differences

There are, of course, differences between the two regional organisations. The ECSC started in Europe, where there was already a history of bureaucracy, democracy and governance, compared to the OAU, which was started by leaders with little political or leadership experience. The ECSC also had the full support of the USA, both economically via the Marshall Plan and politically via the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The OAU had little financial support and, perhaps because of other failed integration attempts, the international community had little hope for this new organisation. As Haile Selassie notes in his acceptance speech as the first president of the OAU: “there are those who claim that African unity is impossible, that the forces that pull us, some in this direction, others in that, are too strong to be overcome. . . They predict dissension and disintegration among Africans and internecine strike and chaos on our continent” (Selassie, 1963).

However, the biggest difference between the two organisations was how the each was set up. The OAU, perhaps jealously guarding of their newly won independence, began as an intergovernmental organisation, and was based more on political cooperation than integration, as there was no move towards creating a new or larger entity (Mukisa, 1995: 57), while the ECSC was a revolutionary proposal, as states that joined had to sacrifice some national sovereignty over to a High Authority, which was given powers to reduce tariff barriers, abolish subsidies, fix prices and raise money by imposing levies on steel and coal production (McCormick, 2002: 66). However, despite the power possessed by the High Authority, its rulings were not always followed by the member states, as
illustrated by the refusal of Germany, France and Italy to follow the ECSC’s directive to declare a ‘manifest crisis’ during a recession of the steel sector and oversupply of the coal sector in 1959 (Alter and Steinberg, 2007: 8). In addition, the move towards more political integration, as Monnet envisaged, did not come to light because the proposed European Defence Community was rejected, though there was still a continuance of supranational authority in the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM) in 1957, though watered down relative to the High Authority of the ECSC. However, what is important to remember is that the OAU and its subsequent organisations never had this initial push towards supranationalism and that while “after five years of activity, the European Coal and Steel Community clearly had not brought with it a general enthusiasm for supranational institutions and federal powers in limited spheres, [it] gave an undoubted impetus to further integration (Haas, 1958: 110).

It was this difference that set the divergent paths of the respective organisations: the ECSC towards an evolution of integration, leading eventually to the European Union, while the OAU was stuck on a path of intergovernmentalism towards empty resolutions and promises, concluding with the AU, which, while still modelled after the EU integration plan, lacks the “supranational decision-making authority of its European counterpart” (Hoste, 2011: 3)

4.2 Intergovernmental Integration Without Supranationalism: The OAU

Like many other attempts at integration, the OAU started its life in an intergovernmental manner. As mentioned previously, its main goal was the end of colonialism on the continent and leaders did not want to share nor lessen any of their newly-won independence and sovereignty. Through the transformation to the AU, the organisation has remained intergovernmental, despite attempts to implement a supranational parliament or central bank, for example. The reasons for this were explained above and the question now shifts: how far can the continent integrate if it continues its path in a purely intergovernmental fashion?
This thesis will argue that integration cannot proceed much farther than several preferential trade agreements between countries on the continent. The reason for this is that, as explained by Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, the decisions made by the organisation are actually made by the heads of state, who will bargain with each other towards the lowest common denominator choice.

The main idea behind intergovernmentalism is that, put simply, the decisions made by an organisation are still made solely by the states, which is the way that the African Union, and many other integration attempts, operate. This realist way of thinking posits that states will join organisations because it is in their best interest, but will refuse to give up any power or sovereignty that threatens their national interest. This theory, best presented by Stanley Hoffmann, is explained in more detail in chapter two, as is liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik’s theory is the main theory which will be focused on to show that organisations which remain in an intergovernmental mode of decision making will be unable to integrate effectively and reach a strong economic or political union.

One must first look at how decisions, according to liberal intergovernmentalism, are made in an international organisation. The theory sees decisions of integration made by rational states, who weigh the costs and benefits of integration in regards to their national interest. These interests are the goals that states hope to realize as they bargain with other states – there is no input from supranational actors and domestic actors are only able to influence decisions through domestic political structures. The more a government wishes to see agreement on an issue, the less likely it is for that actor to leave the negotiations and, hence, the more concessions it will have to give up to realize its preferred goal. There is also a functionalist/liberal institutionalist role that is played, as the international institutions reduce the transaction costs and help in regards to monitoring and enforcement of the agreement (Moravcsik, 1993).
The major problem with organisations where decisions are made solely in this manner is that the decision chosen will always be one of the lowest common denominator. What this means is that as states bargain to accomplish their goals, they will need to make concessions so that a large majority of the members are happy with the outcome. This outcome will always be the one with the least cost to the states, and at the same time the least benefit to the majority of the states as well.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union can be seen as a document that was developed in this way. The African states of the OAU decided, at an extraordinary meeting in Sirte, Libya in 1999, to accelerate the treaty of the AEC and to establish the African Union. Remarkably, the Constitutive Act was adopted less than a year later in Lomé, Togo and the document, while full of the usual rhetoric that has been mentioned before in this thesis, is also a compromise between states. According to Tieku, the main instigators of OAU reform were South Africa, Nigeria and to a lesser extent, Libya (Tieku, 2004). Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo, both newly elected presidents in 1999 of South Africa and Nigeria, respectively, wanted to use the reform of the OAU to further their foreign policy interests. Mbeki wanted to extend his policy of the “African Renaissance”, which was a way to frame neo-liberal policies in a way where South Africa could not be accused of being a pawn of the west (Landsberg, 2000: 106). Obasanjo wanted extra support for the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), which he had tried to have passed by the OAU assembly since the early 1990s with little success. With domestic pressure to withdraw the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) from Sierra Leone, Obasanjo needed to revitalise the CSSDCA which would give him the external support needed from other African countries to continue the campaign (Tieku, 2004: 259). The Libyan leader, Gaddafi, wanted to push African integration forward quickly, to demonstrate his loyalty to pan-Africanism and reignite his position in African geo-politics.

As liberal intergovernmentalism showed, each of these leaders had specific goals they had hoped to achieve and all saw the reform of the OAU as the main road to accomplishing these goals. Hence, despite disagreeing with the Libyan leader’s plan for an ‘United States of Africa’, both Mbeki and
Obasanjo allowed Gaddafi to host the extraordinary meeting of OAU leaders in Sirte, Libya to avoid the high costs of hosting a summit, whilst also pushing forward OAU reform. At the same time, Obasanjo fully supported Mbeki’s proposals in return for support for his own suggestions of reform (Tieku, 2004: 255, 260). As the OAU required two-thirds majority to pass a resolution (OAU, 1963: article X (2)), the other 53 member states would also need to be persuaded to reform an organisation which, while not benefiting leaders extraordinarily, did not cost them much in regards to financial or political capital.

The end result of the negotiations, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, can be seen as a document of the lowest common denominator. While South Africa and Nigeria may have accomplished some of their goals, other states were able to water it down so that it became “simply an organisational framework for the future political integration of the African continent” (Maluwa, 2004: 196). While the document is a vast improvement over that of the OAU, it was still a long way off being a step towards providing Africa with the organisation needed to bring integration closer. While Gaddafi’s ideas of approving a single currency and African standing army at that time were extreme, they are a step in the right direction for African unity. However, in the end no mention of these ideas was included (Tieku, 2004: 262). In addition, like the OAU, the Assembly of Heads of State is still the supreme organ of the Union and institutions that were to be set up by the Constitutive Act that may have been able to check that power, such as the PAP, the Court of Justice and the Financial Institutions, have yet to become active, as proven above. They receive little wording in the original act, except for stating they will be dealt with in a later protocol. These protocols, when amended to the Constitutive Act, went through the same intergovernmental process and were also the lowest common denominator decision, with vague references and timelines, and no real danger to state sovereignty. Maluwa sees these amendments as another example of African states compromising to come to an agreement, one that is neither a victory nor a defeat (Maluwa, 2004: 203). Some of these dealt with issues such as human rights and collective security and leaders were unwilling to confront or take on these questions (Maluwa, 2004: 200).
Similarly, Baimu and Sturman argue that article 4(h), which gives the Union the right to “intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU, 2000: 4(h)), is actually “not intended to protect the individual rights but to entrench the regimes in power” (Baimu and Sturman, 2003: 43). What this means is that the AU, in which the Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme organ, can argue against external regime changes and can use the article 4(p), which condemns unconstitutional changes in government, to protect regimes that may experience nationalist uprisings.

One can see that in this liberal intergovernmental decision making framework, the decisions made will never be victories or defeats. They will always be the lowest common denominator decision, as states that want to see a goal accomplished, in this case South Africa and Nigeria, be willing to make concessions to other states with less involvement, such as watering down language that may be detrimental to a ruling leader’s power.

If decision making of this sort continues in Africa, integration can only proceed so far, as there will be no grand decisions agreed upon that would, for example, bind all states in a customs union, harmonize transport policies or allow for the free movement of people, goods and capital – all factors that would increase integration and development on the continent.

4.3 Integration with Supranationalism: The ECSC

The alternative to the above model is one where there is a supranational authority which is also involved in the decision making process. The ECSC, despite much opposition, had an element of supranationalism through its High Authority and has evolved into the EU, the single best example of regional integration to date. Despite political leaders’ reluctance, the EU continues to pursue deeper vertical integration. Why is this? This thesis argues that because of the original supranational push, the ECSC placed Europe into a supranational "black hole", as they could then not get out of it.
Despite attempts by leaders to try to win some power back, such as during the Eurosclerosis of the 1970s, integration has continued.

Despite their hesitation, European leaders did establish a supranational authority with the ECSC and continued this with their move to the EEC and EURATOM, with the supranational authority gaining more and more power throughout the decades, from the Single European Act of 1986 up to the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which gives much more power to the European Parliament and the European Commission, two supranational institutions. While realists and those in favour of intergovernmentalism argue that this is a rational choice on the part of the states, this thesis argues that neofunctional theory can best explain this continued integration and that for integration to proceed effectively, supranational institutions must be created.

Haas’ explanation of neofunctionalism, which was explained above in chapter one in greater detail, can be summarised thusly: elites will recognize a problem which cannot be solved at a national level and, as they find other elites in other states with the same problem, they push their governments to transfer the competence over that sector to a supranational institution. If the problem is big enough and the elites are strong enough, a supranational institution will be established. Once established, other groups recognise the benefits of supranational governance and begin to attempt to influence the supranational institution instead of the nation-state, allowing the institution to acquire expertise, information and legitimacy. Both the supranational actor and domestic elites will continue to pressure the national governments into transferring more powers away from the nation-state, resulting in spillover into other sectors.

This is the basic starting point of European integration, as explained above. After WWII, European states were fearful of a return to war so attempted to harmonize policies on steel and coal, materials which were vital during WWII. The member states, though hesitant, agreed and set up a supranational institution. Other elite groups recognized the advantage of this scenario and pushed for further integration, eventually leading to the EEC and EURATOM, a clear spillover into other
sectors. While speculative, it would be hard to imagine the European leaders agreeing to these extra institutions if the decisions made were purely intergovernmental and there was no pressure from the supranational institution and those elites below the nation-state who recognized its benefit.

These institutions are sustained because, despite member states’ interest in maximising their own autonomy and controlling their resources, the supranational institutions create rules which are to the benefit of the growing transnational society (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 305). As the supranational institution grows, so do the opportunities for transnational actors to play the national level off the supranational level and increase the supranational institutions legitimacy and knowledge once again. In other words, governments “may resist the shift toward supranational policy-making. . . but as they do so, they inhibit the generation of wealth within their territories by those actors who depend on European transactions” (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 306). This means that governments are reactive to integration – they act when there is pressure to do so, but they do not solely drive the integration process. Once there is a supranational institution, governments are unable to reclaim their powers very easily and are, thus, stuck in the ‘blackhole’ of supranationalism. This ‘blackhole’ continues since spillover into other sectors will happen as elites see the advantages of supranational governance, as Haas suggested, but also because as one hindrance is removed because of supranational rules then other obstacles are found, which then also need to be removed, which continues the spillover pattern (Sandholtz and Sweet, n.d.).

In Africa, this process has not taken place because of the lack of supranational institutions. As explained above, the majority of African resolutions and treaties of integration still place supreme power in the hands of the Heads of State. This is opposite to what happened in the Treaty of Paris in 1951, which established the ECSC, and the Treaty of Rome in 1956, which established the EEC. While there were, of course, contentions about the amount of power that the supranational organisation had, especially during the EEC negotiations, European states continued their integration with supranational institutions that were able to be decision makers from the start because “once a basic
commitment has been undertaken, even a government frightened by the possible consequences of supranationalism can be induced to go along with its partners” (Haas, 1958: 271). In other words, once leaders gave power to a supranational institution (the ECSC), it was difficult to take these powers back. While European leaders succeeded in decreasing some of the supranational powers of the EEC, they were not able to eliminate them, nor were the supranational powers abolished during De Gaulle’s ‘Empty Chair Crisis’ of the 1960s, the Eurosclerosis of the 1970s and Thatcherism in the 1980s. The supranational institution of the European Commission and the European Parliament remained and, while slowed, continued the process of a transfer of power from the nation-state (Awesti, 2006).

As stated earlier, the EAC has been the only REC to set up supranational organisations that are able to challenge the power of the nation state. The question now becomes: will the EAC follow the ECSC and the EEC and become more and more integrated? The answer to this is yes – now that there is a supranational organisation in this regional economic community and transnational exchange increases, spillover will occur throughout the sectors and there will be greater and greater integration. There may be attempts by leaders to push it back towards intergovernmental bargaining, which will result in a slowing of integration such as in the Eurosclerosis of the 1970s, but integration will continue. Indeed, the difficulty lies in developing a timeline for this integration. State leaders are already attempting to push back dates for the common market and monetary union and neo-patrimonial politics will continue to impede integration progress. This is because neo-patrimonialism undercuts capitalism and civil society (Bratton, 1994: 462 and 467), which is needed for neofunctionalism, and integration in general (Mattli, 1999: 49-50), to work well. It is the pressure put on leaders by civil society and national capitalist elites which will drive integration further, but this pressure will be minimal in a neopatrimonial society. As Nye stated in 1966, it was the united national industrial pressure groups in Europe which pressured Brussels to integrate, while in Africa “the interaction of bureaucracy and pressure groups did not provide an engine for interaction, partly
because the bureaucracy had few executive powers, and partly because open pressure politics were of questionable legitimacy” (Nye, 1966: 23).

With the supranational strides taken by one of the RECs, will this then spillover into other parts of Africa? The answer to this is no, unless other leaders are also willing to set up true supranational institutions and push integration further. Haas, in *The Uniting of Europe*, believed that for neofunctionalism to work and for political communities to be formed, there needed to be "(1) an industrialized economy deeply enmeshed in international trade and finance, (2) societies in which the masses are fully mobilized politically and tend to channel their aspirations through permanent interest groups and political parties, (3) societies in which these groups are habitually led by identifiable elites competing with one another for influence and in disagreement on many basic values, and (4) societies in which relations among these elites are governed by the traditions and assumptions of parliamentary (or presidential) democracy and constitutionalism" (Haas, 1958: xvi). While one could debate the whole of Haas' statement, this thesis does not have the room for such a discussion and will concentrate on the second statement. The lack of a functioning civil society and mobilized political masses is a direct occurrence from the neopatrimonial regime of many African societies. Even in the EAC, which is the most advanced REC in the AU, there is still not sufficient pressure from domestic elites and pressure groups to lobby the supranational institutions, which then does not give that supranational institution enough knowledge and legitimacy needed for it to push national governments for further powers and increased integration.

This could result in a two speed integration process in Africa, as the EAC continues integrating into other sectors (though slower than the EU project because of the neopatrimonial societies) while the other RECs continue to push back dates for integration and implement lowest common denominator decisions which lead to little improvement of the situation on the continent. Further integration is a positive for the continent, but halfway measures that are implemented by leaders for fear of a loss of power and resources will not provide the benefits of effective integration. Power must be
transferred to a supranational institution to force the integration process ahead into a ‘blackhole’
which they cannot get out of, which would be a positive to Africa and its people.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

This thesis may, at times, seem as though it has been written by an Afro-pessimist, but this could not be further from the truth. Africa’s rich resources and young population provide what is needed for it to be a highly successful continent and regional integration will only help it along this path.

Integration can help the continent along this path towards sustained economic growth, improved governance and increased bargaining power in a globalised world. The fact that this integration has not happened has been blamed on myriad factors, but the aim of this thesis is to show that integration has been ineffective in Africa because of the neopatrimonial political system, which makes leaders hesitant to cede any power to another institution as doing so could result in a loss of resources and, eventually, political power for that leader. The refusal to cede power means that integration cannot proceed as originally planned, as decisions and bargains about integration will be intergovernmental and result in the lowest common denominator decision. Some power will need to be ceded to a supranational organisation so that spillover mechanisms above and below the state can push the integration process to where it needs to be.

The first research aim of this thesis was to analyse the reasons for the slow progress of African integration. By first looking at the history of African integration, this thesis has shown that there have been many past attempts where leaders, espousing rhetoric of unity and integration, have failed to follow through on their promises and the organisations became defunct or never successfully started. Even the more recent attempts, through the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities, have been shown to be inefficient as they have been unable to fulfil the goals and objectives set in the founding treaties.

The reason for this inefficiency rests on the shoulders of the leaders, who despite signing and championing these treaties of integration, refuse to actually concede what is necessary for these treaties to be effective. They refuse to do so, because doing so would mean a loss of resources and power in the neopatrimonial political environment. The prevalence of neopatrimonial regimes in
Africa, which survive through a system of patronage and clientelism requiring a large amount of liquid resources at the leader’s disposal, mean that organisations that are set up to implement integration will inevitably be run intergovernmentally, as leaders are fearful of ceding any power to another organisation which they cannot control. However, the main problem with this attitude of leaders is that it means that integration will proceed at a slow pace and cannot proceed as far as the stated goals in the many treaties signed by these leaders – a goal of economic and political unity.

The second research aim was to prove that integration cannot proceed very far in a purely intergovernmental fashion. Some sovereignty will have to be shared with a supranational institution for integration to be effective. A solution to the problem of integration, though one which leaders are loathe to pursue, would be to establish an institution with supranational powers, which would be another actor in the integration discussions. The European Union followed this path, while the Organisation of African Unity and the African Union have not. Despite many similarities in their initial establishment, this major difference between the two organisations has been responsible for their different outcomes. African integration organisations have remained intergovernmental, which means that national governments and Heads of State are the supreme actors in the discussions. As such, decisions will be based on consensus, if not unanimity. This means that all member states effectively have a veto, and those who are pushing for integration and who do not want to ‘leave the table’ will have to compromise all other view points before a final decision is made. This results in a lowest common denominator decision being passed. If some power was to be ceded to a supranational organisation, this would result in functional spillover and better empower actors above and below the nation state. This would better enable these two actors to push for more integration, as loyalties would shift and knowledge would be gained. As restrictions in one area are removed, other obstacles are found which also need to be dealt with at a supranational level, resulting in a ‘blackhole’ of supranationality which leaders will find difficult to stop.
This thesis has shown how integration in Africa has not progressed nor succeeded as envisioned in the many treaties and resolutions for integration. The reason for this is a lack of political will by leaders, for fear of a loss of national power. This thesis has also demonstrated that integration cannot be effective if run in a purely intergovernmental manner, as it is in Africa. Some power will need to be ceded to a supranational institution so that there is another actor involved in the decisions and for functionalism to work, there will also have to be a solid civil society that can lobby and legitimize the supranational organisation.
## Appendix I – History of African Integration Attempts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of integration attempt</th>
<th>Details on integration attempt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td><em>Southern African Customs Union</em></td>
<td>29 June. Customs union between Union of South Africa (South Africa) and High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland. Relaunched in 1969 after independence. Namibia joined in 1990 and relaunched again in 2002 after apartheid. Allied with the Common Monetary Area, which creates a monetary union, on par with the rand. Replaced with Multilateral Monetary Area in February 1992, when Namibia joined the monetary union. Botswana is only member not involved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td><em>Union of Independent African States</em></td>
<td>23 November and officially recognized during 1st All African Peoples’ Organisation Conference in December 1958. Union between Ghana and Guinea and later Mali in 1960, when it was renamed Union of African States. Abolished in 1962 as Guinea created ties with the United States, which was counter to the Marxist leanings of the other states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td><em>Equatorial Customs Union</em></td>
<td>Between Gabon, Chad, Congo and CAR. Cameroon joined in 1961. Lead to the UDEAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Union Douanière de l’Afrique de l’Ouest</td>
<td>Superseded in 1972 by the West African Economic Community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Union des Républiques de l’Afrique Centrale (URAC)</td>
<td>Plan for an economic and political union between Congo, Gabon, Chad and Central African Republic. Gabon declined to ratify charter and then other states obtained representation at the UN, abolishing the union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM)</td>
<td>12 September. Changed name to Union Africaine et Malgache de Coopération Économique (UAMCE) in 1964, which confined it to just economic affairs. Members were Chad, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Mauritania, Niger, Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), CAR, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Zaire (DRC), Rwanda, Mauritius. Many withdrew in 1974. Abolished in 1985.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>East Africa Federation</td>
<td>June 5. Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda announce intentions to form federation by end of year, and later through the EAC, which was abolished in 1977.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
<td>22-26 May, met in Addis to discuss African Unity. Timing auspicious as was after Algeria became independent, as Casablanca group did not attend other meetings as Algeria...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>26 April. Tanganyika and Zanzibar unite after Sultan of Zanzibar overthrown, but Zanzibar remains semi-autonomous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa/Union</td>
<td>Became Central African Economic and Monetary Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee</td>
<td>1 October. Members are Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Makes proposals for further coordination and integration in region. Superseded by UMA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
<td>1 January. Created by approved referendums in Libya, Egypt and Syria in September 1971. No consensus on terms of the merger. Dissolved in 19 November 1977. Was also several other federations involving Egypt, Libya, Syria and Sudan during this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>West African Economic Community</td>
<td>Became the West African Monetary Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Economic Community of West</td>
<td>Treaty revised in 1993 to accelerate integration and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td><em>Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs</em></td>
<td>20 September in Gisenyi, Rwanda. Agreement by Burundi, Zaire (DRC) and Rwanda to promote regional cooperation and integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td><em>Preferential Trade Area</em></td>
<td>Became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td><em>Indian Ocean Commission</em></td>
<td>Intergovernmental organisation between Comoros, Reunion Island, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. Deals mainly with environmental issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td><em>Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)</em></td>
<td>Member states are Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Aims for economic and political unity. Inactive on account of political and economic disagreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td><em>Southern African Development Community</em></td>
<td>August. Previously known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)</td>
<td>January. Based on West Africa Monetary Union of the CFA franc zone. Currency is guaranteed at fixed parity to the Euro (656 to 1) through an arrangement with the French treasury. Members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Guinea-Bissau, which joined in 1997. Integration and development promoted by the Banque Ouest Africaine de Developpement, established in 1973.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Communauté Économique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC)</td>
<td>Previously the UDEAC. Customs and monetary union between Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)</td>
<td>Previously the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa. Members are Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya (since June 2005), Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Some members have withdrawn, including Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania and Namibia. Wants to set up full FTA and customs union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority</td>
<td>Superseded the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)</td>
<td>February. Goal is economic unity through a FTA. Member states are Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Djibouti, Gambia, Senegal, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Comoros, Guinea, Kenya, Sao Tome and Principe. Mauritania left the community in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>East African Community (EAC)</td>
<td>Re-established ties towards regional integration between Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Main objective is deeper economic integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>Includes all African states, except for Morocco. The main organisation for integration on the continent and above the RECs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix II: Select Objectives of the AU and the RECs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Major Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern African Customs Union</strong></td>
<td>-to facilitate the cross-border movement of goods between the territories of the Member States;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-to create effective, transparent and democratic institutions which will ensure equitable trade benefits to Member States;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-to facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue arising from customs, excise and additional duties levied by Member States; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-to facilitate the development of common policies and strategies (SACU, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mano River Union</strong></td>
<td>-to expand trade by the elimination of all barriers to mutual trade (MRU, 1974).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Community of West African States</strong></td>
<td>-to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent (ECOWAS, 1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs</strong></td>
<td>-to ensure the security of the member states and their populations; and -to promote trade and free movement of people and goods (CEPGL, 1975).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale</strong></td>
<td>-to promote and strengthen harmonious cooperation and balanced development in social and economic areas (CEEAC, 1983).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indian Ocean</strong></td>
<td>-to promote sustainable development of the Western Indian Ocean islands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Commission** | **Arab Maghreb Union** | - to adopt common policy in all areas; and  
- to realize the free movement of persons, services, goods and capital between member states (UMA, 1989). |
| **Southern African Development Community** | - to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life and support the social disadvantaged through regional integration; and  
- to evolve common political values, systems and institutions (SADC, 1992). |
| **West African Economic and Monetary Union** | - to strengthen the competitiveness of financial and economic activities as part of a rationalized and harmonized legal environment; and  
- to create a common market based on free movement of persons, goods, services, capital and the right of establishment (UEMOA, 2003). |
| **Communauté Économique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale** | - to promote peace and development within the framework of an economic and monetary union (CEMAC, 2008). |
| **Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa** | - to attain sustainable growth and development of the Member States by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of its production and marketing structures; and  
- to promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of its peoples and to foster closer relations among its Member States (COMESA, 1993). |
| **Intergovern-** | - to promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macro- |
| **Mental Authority on Development** | economic policies and programmes in the social, technological and scientific fields; and to harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, services, and people and the establishment of residence (IGAD, 1996). |
| **Community of Sahel-Saharan States** | -to establish a global economic union based on strategy through a development plan complementary to national development plans; and -to remove all restrictions hampering integration of these countries through adoption of free movement of persons, capital and interests of national of Member States, right of establishment, ownership and exercise of economic activity, free trade, movement of goods, commodities and services originating from the signatory countries (CEN-SAD, 1998). |
| **Nile Basin Initiative** | -to develop the Nile Basin water resources in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security, and peace for all its peoples and efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources |
| **East African Community** | -to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs (EAC, 1999). |
| **African Union** | -to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; -to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its |
Member States;
- to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;
- to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; and
- to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance (AU, 2000).
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