Fantasy Football –
Assessing Changes in Perceptions and Interpretations of the 2010 FIFA World Cup’s legacies for South Africa

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Arts in Political Studies

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COMPULSORY DECLARATION
This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Abstract

Mega-events have become more and more a part of modern life, however most impact studies focus on the economic and tourism benefits and not on underlying intangible legacies, such as social and political implications, of event hosting. This dissertation uses a case study of the FIFA World Cup 2010 in South Africa to analyse the question of how perceptions and interpretations of mega-event legacies change over time, from the bid process, through preparation, the event itself, and post-event reckonings of event legacies. As a wide spectrum of stakeholders were involved in the 2010 World Cup, the conclusions drawn in this dissertation reflect these differences of interest and how their perceptions of the World Cup legacies have changed during the various event phases. A certain trend towards legacies that need to be managed has also become visible. This dissertation shows that the World Cup leaves both positive and negative legacies behind, and, moreover, has had ambiguous and complex implications for actors involved.
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List of Abbreviations

ANC – African National Congress
AU – African Union
BEE – Black Economic Empowerment
BRT – Bus Rapid Transport System
COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions
CEO – Chief Executive Officer
DEA - Department of Environmental Affairs
FIFA – Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
IOC – International Olympic Committee
NBI – National Branding Index
NEDLAC - National Economic Development and Labour Council
SACP - South African Communist Party
SADC – South African Development Community
SAFA – South African Football Association
UN – United Nations
UNEP – United Nations Environmental Programme
WCCA - World Class Cities for All
1. Introduction

Mega-events have become hallmarks of the contemporary global scene. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cups as well as Olympic Winter and Summer Games have in recent decades become pompous events that everyone wants to take part in, host or watch. This has led to a sheer bidding war between potential host countries to obtain the privilege of hosting the next Football World Cup or Olympic Games. A lot is expected from hosting mega- and large scale events like the FIFA World Cup, the Olympics or smaller events such as the Rugby and Cricket World Cups, as well as Regional Championships. Slogans that mega-events advance the country’s or city’s image in the world, increase national prestige, have positive effects on the economy, employment, infrastructure and overcome social differences persuade countries to spend billions on infrastructure, stadia, and security for a three to four week event. Countries promise everything under the sun to, on the one hand, convince their people that this is the best way to spend their money and, on the other hand, to convince international sports organisations, like FIFA or the IOC, that they are the best host for the next mega-event.

Hosting a mega-event means not only creating the facilities to host a major conference or sporting event, but coping with the social, economic, environmental and political consequences of it in the host country. These consequences, or lasting impacts, are often referred to as ‘legacies’ of the event. They are tangible and intangible products such as stadia, infrastructure, revenue, employment, CO₂ emissions, national pride and nation branding that remain when the event has moved on. They can have both positive and negative implications for the host country or city (Gratton et al. 2012; Stevenson 2012).

But are the promises made by host governments actually fulfilled after the event? Nearly ten years of preparation, building and organising goes into a four week spectacle. What remains? Is the increase in employment, economic gains, prestige, nation building and infrastructure as high as promised or does it suddenly ‘go quiet’, with the real legacy of the mega-event withheld for fear of upsetting those convinced of the positive effects of the event?

This dissertation will not attempt such an impact assessment (although it will draw on many such assessments). It will instead use a case study of the FIFA World Cup 2010¹ in South Africa to analyse the question of how perceptions of mega event legacies change over time, from the bid process, through preparation, the event itself, and post-event reckonings of event legacies. What, in South

¹ The Trademark symbol relating to the use of FIFA World Cup South Africa will not be used as this thesis is an academic text.
Africans’ perception, remained after the euphoria of the World Cup ebbed away? Did they see white elephants, expensive infrastructure, and increased inequality? Or did they perceive economic gains, more tourism, better livelihoods, higher employment and incomes? Or perhaps a bit of both?

Different stakeholders come to different conclusions on the legacies of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. This means that depending on their involvement in and view of the World Cup their interpretations and perceptions change over the period of bidding for the event until the aftermath of it. For example, governments try to generate a positive event perception to mobilise popular and media support for the event. Even if during the preparation phase of the event the positive effects intended seem to become less likely, the government would not admit to negative impacts of the event because of possible negative implications on the government itself. Other stakeholders go through similar processes during the event phases.

South Africa was in the unique position of being the first African country to host a FIFA World Cup. It wanted to show the world what Africa was capable of and what it meant to include the whole continent in its good fortune in hosting one of the biggest mega events in the world. Additionally, South Africa wanted to use the World Cup to overcome racial divides, to create a social legacy that would bring its people closer together, make football the sport for everyone, and increase employment, attract tourism and new foreign investment.

South Africa is the strongest economy in Africa, but still an emerging economy that lags behind in resources and institutional knowledge of many industrial states that are frequently mega-event hosts. But at the same time South Africa has had a positive track record for large-scale events since the end of Apartheid, with the 1995 Rugby World Cup, the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations and the 2002 Cricket World Cup being the major sporting events it has hosted. The FIFA World Cup nevertheless was a huge step up the mega event ladder, with it being one of the biggest mega-events in our society. With South Africa’s huge ambitions, despite FIFA’s and developed countries’ scepticism, it managed to pull off a successful World Cup in 2010. But did it manage to fulfil all government, society and international expectations? Did it manage to create a lasting legacy? Did it manage to deliver to its people the positive effects it promised?
1.1. Research Question

Based on the issues related to communication on and management of mega event legacies, the following research question will be at the centre of this dissertation:

- How and why have interpretations and perceptions of the prospective ‘legacies’ of the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa changed over the past decade?

To answer the research question, particular focus will be placed on three phases of literature published on the 2010 World Cup:

- The bidding process until 2003
- Analyses, expectations and reports before the World Cup 2010
- Analyses and conclusions after the World Cup until 2013

This dissertation will focus especially on the topics of economic and political expectations and perceptions of the South African government, FIFA, the public and international stakeholders, and how these have changed in the last decade. The time during the World Cup is not included in an extra chapter, since it is reflected in the section ‘analyses and conclusions after the World Cup until 2013’. Since South Africa is an emerging economy, attention will additionally be given to the question of what it means to host a mega event in a developing country.

1.2. Methodology

The research conducted to complete this Masters Dissertation is based on a literature review. A review of literature is the best methodology to be able to answer the broad research topic of this thesis. It will take into account literature from different sources, such as media reports, surveys, government statements and publications, analyses by economic consultancies as well as critical analyses by scholars of the field. The World Cup in South Africa initiated many local scholars to write extensively on the topic. This broad variety of resources was chosen to be able to thoroughly answer the research question of the changes in perceptions and interpretations of the different stakeholders during the World Cup. A study to this extend has not been published before, as most analyses of the World Cup have focussed on either economic or tourism legacies or certain aspects of the political motivations behind mega event hosting, but not on a broader view on the 2010 World Cup’s tangible and intangible legacies.

The literature used is split into three main timeframes in order to be able to answer the research questions. Firstly, it will be focussed on literature around the bidding process up until 2003, secondly, literature that was researched and/or published mainly before the World Cup 2010, and
thirdly, literature that deals with the actual impact of the World Cup after the event occurred, until October 2013. This deadline on the literature research had to be set due to the time limitations of the Masters Dissertation. During the research it became apparent that most literature was published during the preparation phase of the World Cup, when the interest in the event was the biggest. There is little literature that analyses the event ex post, which is the reason why many of the arguments in this dissertation refer to a small amount of publications. This has been noted as one of the critical points of this dissertation.

1.3. Limitations

The main limitation for this research project is the limited time period and length of the Masters Dissertation.

The literature used is based on publically accessible literature reporting and analysing the 2010 World Cup. The limitation lies in the availability of sources, especially from the side of the government and a possible lack of documentation of the processes in South Africa. Additionally, the research has shown that the literature is concerned mainly with the possible and expected outcomes of the World Cup before the event occurred. Ex post analyses of the actual impact and the legacy of the World Cup are much fewer in number. This is most likely caused by the availability of financial resources and political will to analyse possible impacts before the event, but with there being no interest in ex post analyses due to the possibility that certain expectations were not met.

The author limits herself to an analysis of the lasting impacts, or legacies, of the 2010 FIFA World Cup; and to the analysis of the perceptions and interpretations of such legacies before and after the World Cup. The author does not aim to write a comprehensive impact report of the World Cup. Cases and examples of host cities and certain processes are used to support the argument but they are not exhaustive. Examples will be drawn mainly from the host cities Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban due to the fact that they have the most information accessible to the author. Additionally, the four spheres where legacies can occur: economic, social, political and environmental, will not be dealt with exhaustively but arguments in each sphere will be based on available literature.

This dissertation is written for the attainment of a Master Degree from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. Presenting this Masters Dissertation in South Africa means for the author that the historical, political, social and economic background this dissertation is based on will not be explained in further detail but seen as a prerequisite for engaging with the content of this dissertation.
1.4. Chapter Outline

In chapter two the focus will be on an overview of the idea of mega-events, theoretical discussions concerning major mega-events and positive and negative examples of legacies in previous host countries. Specific emphasis will be put on the question, why countries want to host mega-events and what it means for developing countries to host such an event. This chapter sets out the basis for the analysis of the South Africa case study, introducing relevant theoretical discussions on event legacies that will be built upon in chapter three.

Chapter three contains three major parts in analysing the legacy of the World Cup in South Africa. Firstly, the author will discuss why the South African government was motivated to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup and look at the bidding process before 2003 and the South African bid to be selected as host country. Secondly, the chapter will look at analyses, expectations and reports prior to the World Cup and thirdly on the perceptions and interpretations of the successes and/or failures of the World Cup ex post. Hereby the seven ‘promises’ related to hosting mega-events in the second chapter will be used to structure the analysis and frame the topics discussed.

The fourth chapter will then combine the case of South Africa with the theoretical discussions about mega-event legacies and draw conclusions on the changes in stakeholders’ perceptions and possible reasons that influenced these changes. Hereby the chapter aims to answer the research questions in relation to the Football World Cup in South Africa 2010.

The fifth chapter will draw a conclusion to the dissertation, looking at the broader picture that was introduced in the second chapter and setting out the relevance and importance of this dissertation for future research and mega-event hosting.
2. Mega-Events and their legacies - a theoretical discussion

The following chapter will give an introduction to the notion of mega-events and their possible legacies as a growing field of research in several disciplines, such as economics, sociology and political studies. The focus of this chapter will be mainly on theoretical discussions related to the topic, as well as the introduction of past mega-events and their positive or negative legacies. The examples used will be the FIFA World Cup in Germany 2006, South Korea and Japan 2002 and the Summer Olympics in London 2012 as they are very dominant examples in the literature concerning the legacies of the mega-events in these countries/cities.

2.1. Mega-events, a definition

Before taking a closer look at the impacts, or legacies, of mega-events for different stakeholders and what makes them so interesting to host, a working definition of the term mega-event shall be discussed. Hall (1992) defined mega-events as: “major fairs, festivals, expositions, cultural or sporting events which are held on either a regular or one-off basis”. Since then different authors have extended this basic definition to include different spheres of mega-events that differentiate them from other events. Roche (2000: 1) writes that mega-events are “large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance”. Here a sphere of internationality and emotion is added to the definition. Other authors such as Horne and Manzenreiter, add the dissertation that mega-events are “central to late modern capitalist societies” (2006: 1), emphasising the modernity of mega-events, even though the emphasis on capitalist societies can be criticised, as mega-events have throughout modern history been used by many different regimes. Furthermore, Roberts argues: “what defines certain sport events as mega is that they are discontinuous, out of the ordinary, international and simply big in composition – ‘megas’ have the ability to transmit promotional messages to billions of people via television and other developments in telecommunications” (2004: 108). Generally the basic features of mega-events, defining them as large-scale events that are attractive to massive audiences, international, emotional, and one-off or periodically recurring with different host countries or cities, are not contested in the scholarship (see Klenk 1999; Horne, Manzenreiter 2006; Roberts 2004; Roche 2000; Cornelissen 2009). The working definition for this dissertation will be the definition by Cornelissen (2009: 133): sports mega-events are “short-term, one-off or recurring international sport competitions hosted on a rotating basis by different states, that are of such scale, level of media coverage and spectatorship that they may be regarded as global affairs.” This definition is chosen because it includes the main features of mega-events and focuses directly on sports mega-events, which are the only mega-events considered in this dissertation.
The term mega-event, as defined above, can relate to different events, such as sport events, exhibitions or concerts. In this dissertation the term solely relates to sports mega-events, such as the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup. The following parts will take a closer look at global sporting organisations and why countries are interested in hosting mega-events.

2.2. The growing importance of sport and the influence of global sporting organisations

“Sport seduces the teeming ‘global village’; it is the new opiate of the masses; it is one of the great modern experiences; its attraction astonishes only the recluse; its appeal spans the globe. Without exaggeration, sport is a mirror in which nations, communities, men and women now see themselves. The reflection is sometimes bright, sometimes dark, sometimes distorted, sometimes magnified. This metaphorical mirror is a source of mass exhilaration and depression, security and insecurity, pride and humiliation, bonding and alienation. Sport, for many, has replaced religion as a source of emotional catharsis and spiritual passion, and for many, since it is among the earliest of memorable childhood experiences, it infiltrates memory, shapes enthusiasms, serves fantasies.” (Mangan, Majumdar, Dyreson 2009: vii)

Sport has in the times of globalisation become ever more important and easily accessible to everyone. Sport is a manifestation of national identity, status and superiority (Mangan, Majumdar, Dyreson 2009: vii). Throughout history, sport has been used as a political mechanism, and has today become a part of domestic and foreign policy (Jackson, Haigh 2009: 1). Today sport is a global spectacle; countries from around the world showcase themselves at the Olympics, FIFA World Cups or other major sporting events, and the whole world watches in anticipation. Because of this enormous reach – the IOC has with 203 National Olympic Committees more members associated to it than the UN and roughly 3.9 billion people watched the Olympics in Athens 2004 (Jackson, Haigh 2009: 2) – mega sport events have gained political interest and influence (Jackson, Haigh 2009: 1).

Sport has a symbolic and cultural currency that is hardly matched by any other phenomenon in the modern world. In foreign policy sport and mega-events have an increasing influence as they directly affect issues such as climate change, resource depletion and environmental degradation through production, consumption as well as tourism related to the events. The growing importance of sport can also be seen through the linkage of sport with terrorism – in total 171 terrorist attacks have been logged between the 1972 Munich Olympics and 2005 (Jackson, Haigh 2009: 3).

The field of sport as research, especially the notion of mega-events, has gained more and more interest in different sciences, caused by the increasing commercial value of sport. Mega-events have
become an important output of the world’s production, as shifts in the global political economy are starting to occur, and changes in global consumption and leisure patterns become apparent (Cornelissen 2009: 135). The growing importance of mega-events politically and socially has led to greater acceptance of mega-event and sport research in different disciplines in the scholarly world. Sport research is often interdisciplinary, as “in the modern world sport is everywhere: it is as ubiquitous as war” (Mangan, Majumdar, Dyreson 2009: vii).

Most sport mega-events are hosted under the umbrella of two international sporting organisations, FIFA and the IOC, which are responsible for the organisation of the Football World Cup and the Summer- and Winter Olympics, respectively. Since 1914 sport has been increasingly commercialised and has gained economic significance internationally. It has become an important economic sector, accounting for close to 2% of GDP and employment in some developed countries (Gratton et al. 2012: 13). Global sporting organisations, such as FIFA and the IOC, have developed from non-profit organisations to organisations with commercial interests (Gratton et al. 2012: 26). With headquarters in Switzerland, they are monopolists in the supply of major sporting events, and increasing demand for hosting such mega-events in the last 30 years have boosted their profits enormously (Gratton et al. 2012: 29). Mega-events’ increased prestige and influence have led to more and more corporations wanting to be part of this phenomenon in order to increase their profits through sponsoring mega-events (Cornelissen 2010: 26). Highly standardised rules and strict organisation and supervision of the global sporting organisations make these mega-events independent from their hosts, because the host countries or cities have to adapt to the regulated event concepts (Baasch 2010: 77). Due to these reasons, critical voices have argued that “sport is no longer their objective but a means for other more economically oriented organisational ends” (Foster, Pope 2004: 114).

It is important to take a closer look at one of the global sporting organisation, FIFA, at this point to be able to have a better understanding of the further theoretical discussions on reasons to host mega-events and their legacies. FIFA is the owner and content provider of the World Cup and operates according to market principles. The event must be profitable for FIFA, which means the organisation has a tight grip on the organisation of the event, leaving little or nothing to chance. The potential host country has to agree to 17 compulsory requirements in order to be able to host the World Cup. The requirements include conditions regarding immigration regulations, security measures, information and communication technology, protection of property, marketing rights, health care system and central financial-technical questions. The stipulations are secured through national guarantees provided by the host country’s ministries. This stringent system and the ability
of FIFA to enforce it in the host countries, show how willing host governments are to accept the influence in order to hopefully gain something from the World Cup (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 17). FIFA is an organisation with enormous global reach, which critical media voices, such as the South African cartoon artist Zapiro in Figure 1, voice as the FIFA empire, which has a huge influence over the individual host countries during the World Cup preparations.

**Figure 1: The Holy FIFA Empire (Zapiro 2010a)**

The enormous commercialisation of sports mega-events was possible for several reasons. Firstly, new developments in technologies in mass communication, especially satellite television, has made it possible to reach a much bigger audience than the people in the stadium, leading to a competition between broadcasting companies around the world to ‘buy’ the rights to see these mega-events (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006: 3). In 1990 the sales of television rights for the Football World Cup were estimated at around USD 65.7 million, in 2006 TV rights (excluding the US) were sold for USD 1.97 billion (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006: 5), showing a huge increase in revenue for the organisers. At the same time continuous economic growth in the biggest economies, increasing income and changing consumption patterns linked to a globalisation of football and increased football consumption made this commercialisation of sport possible (Cornelissen 2010: 26).

Secondly, commercial expansion was possible due to the formation of a sport-media-business alliance. The idea behind this is to package sponsorship rights, exclusive broadcasting rights and merchandising for sponsors, who are attracted to being associated with sport and the massive exposure to a global audience (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006: 5). Thirdly, cities and regions have become more and more interested in hosting mega-events because of the possibility of showcasing their region to the world and gaining positive momentum for their economy and tourism industry (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006: 6).
2.3. Why do countries host mega-events?

Besides mega-events becoming commercial ‘machines’ that organisers, such as FIFA and the IOC, profit from, they are argued to have positive impacts for host countries or cities. What are these promises that make hosting mega-events so interesting? Mega-events are ‘must-see events’ that are prestigious, popular (Baasch 2010: 77) and are promised (by economic consultancies, media, global sporting organisations to the host cities, countries, governments and people) to have positive impacts economically, socially, environmentally and politically. These ‘promises’ will be looked at more closely in this chapter, followed by a critical analysis of these promises.

**First promise: positive economic impact.** Olympics and FIFA World Cups have become important economic events that boost investment, improve infrastructure, increase employment, and have positive impacts on the GDP, as spending increases and more revenue is made through increased tourism during the mega-event (Shipway, Fyall 2012; Black 2007: 261). For example, when Athens won the bid for the 2004 Olympics its stock exchange increased by 8% within a few days (Klenk 1999: 46). Economic expectations are often positive pre-event predictions to gain popular support for the event (Dowse 2012: 28) and are needed because bids for mega-events are generally initiated by cadres of societal (for example, political or corporate) elites (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 108). Mega-events are aimed to satisfy the country’s development goals2 or ambitions as they stimulate investment and development in the broader economy of the aspiring or current host (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 110).

**Second promise: increase of tourism.** Mega-events can be used as a catalyst to transform a location into a tourism destination; they are marketing opportunities for the country and cities where the event is hosted. Hosting mega-events has in recent years often become part of a broader tourism strategy in many countries, to initiate urban regeneration and tourism development (Gratton et al. 2012: 38). The attraction of visitors and a long-term increased profile are at the centre of these tourism development strategies (Li, Jago 2012: 13; Hall 2006: 59). Pre-event investments in higher service standards, destination repositioning and branding of the host city or country are aimed at having a long-term positive legacy for the host (Gratton et al. 2012).

**Third promise: enhancement of national image.** Part of the opportunity to attract tourists and foreign investors comes through the possibility of increasing the national image by hosting mega-

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2 Development goals are the individual goals the country has set for their development, focusing, for example, on employment creation, poverty alleviation, health or economic growth. The importance of certain goals is different from country to country, depending on their individual needs, but certain goals could be expedited by mega-event hosting with sufficient focus during the event preparation.
events (Cornelissen 2009: 133; Gratton et al. 2012: 38). As one of the hallmarks of modernity, mega-events have long managed to integrate industrial, corporate and government interest with respect to urban development and imaging (Hall 2006: 60). The hosting of world fairs and exhibitions in particular was a catalyst to enhance a host’s image. Even though world fairs do not have the same impact anymore, through the shift in the public, media and commercial interest, sports events provide a similar platform for the improvement of national image today (Hall 2006: 60). The media-sports complex of sport mega-events provides global visibility and exposure, which is close to the impact of natural disasters or wars (Black 2007: 264).

Nation images have a high endurance, and negative nation images especially tend to ‘stick.’ The image of a country is shaped through primary and secondary experience, and the media has a great influence in shaping a certain national image as most people do not have primary experiences of the relevant country. Mega-events can be used by the hosts to send positive messages to the world, trying to improve their nation image. This is especially important in the pursuit of other goals of hosting mega-events: increased investment, attraction of tourism and political influence (Klenk 1999).

**Fourth promise: political impact.** Events are seen as markers of distinction for states and are used as a means to translate political and economic disadvantage in the world system to an advantage – actors and activities are set around the pursuit of profit, entertainment and prestige (Cornelissen 2009: 134). They are argued to be a powerful window for national and international politics. This is mostly because mega-events allow for a view of the “connection between sports and politics, putting governance, diplomatic and advocacy dynamics right under the global audience’s spotlight. This is more relevant today than ever, as global sporting events usually involve the participation of massive media audiences” (Acuto 2013: 1).

Nationally, hosting mega-events has a positive impact: different spheres of government come together to deliver a joint result (Shipway, Fyall 2012: 7) and the potential of collaboration is realised (KAS 2011: 21). Government is the main driver in financing mega-events and vast arrays of state structures have to be mobilised to deliver what is essentially a major state project (Dowse 2012: 29). Many national sports policies include the hosting of major sports events as a major objective (Gratton et al. 2012: 36), because of the expected positive implications. Sports mega-events provide unique opportunities to pursue symbolic politics – reframe narratives, reinforce messages of change and signal important changes of direction to the world as well as to society, mobilising support for the ‘ideas of state’ (Black 2007). Internationally and domestically, image-projecting narratives are used to appeal and reinforce the national image and with that the national government, to convince
the international community to win the bid to host the event and to convince the people of the positive legacies of the event (Black 2007: 263).

**Fifth promise: social impact.** National communication pre- and during mega-events emphasises the positive effect upon social aspects of a host community. Along with the positive economic impact of hosting mega-events, which will benefit citizens through higher employment rates and increased incomes, events attempt to be used to support social regeneration of communities, increase national pride and the volunteers workforce (Shipway, Fyall 2012: 1). These form part of the promises made by international organisations and government to increase public support to host the mega-event. Social impacts of mega-events can be positive or negative, depending on how the interface with the locals is handled. Mega-events often lead to an increase in pride, nationalism and activities available for the host communities, but drunken and unruly behaviour of visitors, as well as noise, congestion and price increases related to the mega-event can also have negative social impacts (Gratton et al. 2012).

**Sixth promise: support environmental initiatives.** Mega-events have recently been used as catalysts for sustainable development through including event greening initiatives in the planning of the event (KAS 2011). Part of this recent development is to enable sustainable, accessible, inclusive facilities (Shipway, Fyall 2012: 1) and showcase a greater care for the environment as part of an enhanced national image.

Event greening includes the incorporation of social and environmental responsibility into planning, organisation and implementation of the event. It means that the event is organised to promote sustainable development and create positive media attention, which raises the event profile, host location and venue as well as the public image. The history of event-greening at mega-events is still very young; as regards to related to the FIFA World Cup the first greening strategy was in Germany 2006 (KAS 2011: 26).

**Seventh promise: sport development benefits.** One major promise of hosting sports mega-events overlooked is that of growing demand for certain sports (Gratton et al. 2012: 36; Shipway, Fyall 2012: 1) and an improved infrastructure for the regional sport as well as the promise to attract future mega-events.

These seven promises are not a finite list of possible reasons why mega-events are attractive for host countries, but they provide an overview of the most discussed topics in the literature. These seven promises will be used throughout the dissertation to structure the case study of South Africa and thus the arguments and examples used to answer the research question. Often these promises
are interrelated, for example, employment increase or decrease has an effect both economically and socially in the country. At the same time different states use mega-events for different non-sport ends, depending on their national circumstances and priorities (Black, van der Westhuizen 2004). The willingness of the governments to humble themselves before the IOC or FIFA shows the value the governments place on hosting the Olympics or Football World Cup (Houlihan 2002: 194).

Mega-Events are due to their size, meaning and impact never undisputed and can be for years a reason for domestic conflict (Klenk 1999: 42). The positive aspects, or promises, mentioned above are not assured impacts of mega-events but are often promises made by governments to convince the IOC and FIFA, as well as the public, of the positive impacts the hosting of a mega-event will have on the applying city or country (Klenk 1999: 42). In line with this economic impact studies are commissioned to legitimise the mega-event bid rather than to represent the economic truth (Bond, Cottle 2011: 42). The actual results of the pledges made prior to mega-events are often considerably lower than promised.

Sports mega-events are a significant part of modern experiences, but they are not a solution to social and economic problems (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006: 15). Hosting mega-events means “large-scale public expenditure, construction of facilities and infrastructure, urban development and revitalisation strategies which may have undesirable long-term consequences for public stakeholders although significant short-term gains for some corporate interests” (Hall 2006: 59). The economic potential of mega-events is often over-emphasised (Gratton et al. 2012: 36), but the failure to include, for example, the question of opportunity costs as well as broader development goals, has indicated in a growing body of research that the drawbacks of mega-events can eradicate most gains made from the events in the first instance.

Likewise, the calculation of actual economic impacts of mega-events is controversial, as different methods and measures have led to different results in the past (Gratton et al. 2012: 37). Here one of the problems is related to the quality of data obtained for such impact analyses and that most impact studies are done in advance of the mega-event on behalf of proponents of the mega-event, such as the government or interested sponsors (Gratton et al. 2012; Gratton and Henry 2001: 309). Some impact studies include gross spending in their calculations, including displaced spending of local residents on the event, which would normally have been spent elsewhere in the economy, or multiplier effects caused by displacements in the whole economy are not sufficiently taken into account. This exaggerates the financial impact of the event (Baade, Matheson 2004). With this in mind, it is not surprising that Olympic and FIFA bids are surrounded by secrecy on the actual private impact assessment reports. The USA, for example, refuses to make their bids for the 2018 and 2022
World Cups public (Bond, Cottle 2011: 42).

There are fewer examples of successful mega-events than there are of costly initiatives that have incurred great debt for host countries (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 110). But at the same time, the fact that the event bids, forecasting benefits to hosting mega-events, are nearly always wrong has not dampened the enthusiasm of countries or cities to become hosts (Black 2007). Expected social, environmental and economic gains justify the high costs involved in staging a mega-event, as arguably the public money spent generates a spill-over effect for the local economy that sees increased revenues during the mega-event (Gratton et al. 2011, KAS 2011). It is striking to note that the promises identified indicate universal benefits for the country. In reality only the costs for the World Cup are spread, while the benefits are often highly selective to particular businesses, governing departments, sporting organisations or political parties. Still, much controversy remains between scholars on the actual nature of long-term event legacies, but the ‘politics of overestimation’ seem to be prevailing (Cornelissen 2009: 142). In many cases, such as in Germany, South Korea and Japan and South Africa, real costs to host a mega-event turn out to be considerably higher than originally planned, but this does not stop the war-like contests between potential hosts in front of FIFA or the IOC to win the bid for the next big event (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006: 13; KAS 2011).

2.4. Mega-event legacies

Building on the outlined reasons why countries want to host mega-events, even though their positive impacts on the host country or city are not undisputed, this chapter will take a closer look at the notion of legacies related to mega-events and what they mean for the different stakeholders of a mega-event.

A legacy can be the positive, negative, tangible, intangible, intentional and/or unintentional effect that a mega-event has on a country that remains after the event has already passed (Gratton et al. 2012: 39). The term legacy has many definitions, but the term normally encompasses a mix of physical, infrastructural, economic, image, social and sustainability aspects related to a major event (Stevenson 2012: 71). Mega-events leave behind legacies that will have an impact on the community for much longer than the event endures and are therefore an extremely significant component of place promotion (Hall 2006: 59; Gratton et al. 2012). Legacies are the major driver behind the ‘promises’ mentioned in the previous chapter, but as already pointed out, they can be positive or negative, depending on how the host plans and manages them.

Considering the legacies of mega-events other than the economic impact leads to a more holistic
evaluation (Li, Jago 2012) of the event, focussing attention on the long-term effects (Stevenson 2012: 71). As mentioned above, often impact studies of mega-events are cost-benefit analyses that make a wide array of assumptions on, for example, direct expenditure and direct benefits related to the event. Most of the time the costs, especially investment, related to the event are not easily distinguishable from the amount of investment that would have occurred without the event (Li, Jago 2012: 14). Therefore more qualitative studies on the impact of mega-events might give a more thorough picture of their actual impact on the relevant host country or city.

Gratton and Preuss (2008) argue that there are six major legacy effects of major events: infrastructure, knowledge (skills development and education), image, emotions (pride, nationalism), creation of networks (with international organisations, other governments) and culture. These effects do not mention the economic impact of mega-events, which will also be considered in this dissertation. Some of the legacy effects were explained above under the heading, Why countries want to host mega-events, and some of these legacies can be positive or negative side-effects of hosting a mega-event. Often legacy development has been used as a ‘catch word’ in recent Olympics and World Cups for host cities and global sporting organisations to justify their immense investment in the event, when there is a whole range of national social issues also demanding financial support (Preuss, Solberg 2006). Because of this, mega-events of today are expected to deliver a lot more than just a short term elite sporting event (Hughes 2012: 42).

The concept of legacy is not a new one; every Olympic Games or Football World Cup has left behind some kind of legacy in their host cities or countries (Cashman 1998), but the planning for a legacy is a new development. Only in 2002 the IOC started framing the concept of legacy and in 2007 the creation of positive legacies and ‘sport for all’ policy guidelines were enshrined in the IOC as part of their hosting strategy (Hughes 2012). Post-event legacies are planned during the construction of the event and consist of two possible dimensions: the footprint of the event itself and the event’s potential as catalyst for a broader shift (City of Cape Town 2011: 16).

The most obvious legacies of sports mega-events are a sports legacy as well as the facilities and infrastructure created for the event. Facilities, such as stadia created are a very controversial topic surrounding mega-events as they are often doomed as ‘white elephants’, buildings that cost an enormous amount to build and are most likely under-utilised, costing the city lots of money to maintain after the event (Hughes 2012; Horne, Manzenreiter 2006). Usually after the mega-event has finished questions start to be raised about the real legacies of the event. Tourism numbers are often considerably less than expected because of a ‘crowding-out’ effect that keeps tourists away because of the mega-event itself (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006). Job-creation numbers are looked at
more closely – what kind of jobs were created? Part-time, full-time, temporary, permanent and for whom? (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006: 13) Mega-events have led to considerate employment growth, but mostly in the area of temporary employment and dependent on the different phases of the event (KAS 2011). Social promises such as the development of urban communities, reduction of social exclusion or crime – were they met? Also cultural identities, that were meant to conform to generally positive stereotypes during the event are a ‘show’ put on for the international audience and do not display the actual ‘locals’ and atmosphere in the host country (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006: 13). It has been previously argued that mega-events have even deepened social inequality as preparation to host the event can lead to investment redistribution, relocation and removal of informal activities (KAS 2011: 29), which plays an especially big role in those developing countries that are hosting mega-events. Considering the possible negative outcomes of mega-events, which will be discussed in more detail in the case study, why is it of interest for developing countries to host these events?

2.5. Mega-events and developing countries

The attraction for developed as well as developing countries to host an event of global reach is the huge, promised, positive impact and legacies of the event. This chapter will take a closer look at specific obstacles developing countries face when hosting mega-events.

As discussed above, successful hosting offers global exposure, prestige and legitimacy to the host city and the entire country, which is especially desired by emerging economies eager to prove that they have become major players on the global stage (Black, van der Westhuizen 2004). Those countries that are historically not close to the world centre, the USA or Europe, in particular hope to gain from hosting a large scale event (Black 2007), and will attempt to convince other governments as well as possible investors that they can play in their league. Mega-events may enable developing countries to embark on a foreign policy course, which they would not normally have taken (Cornelissen 2013: 134). The “allure of global games” (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006: 9) often leads to a very politically motivated decision to host mega-events.

Developing states use relatively limited resources to compete against more powerful applicants to host mega-events, but often their appeal for the bid committees are that their bids display cultural distinctiveness, natural assets and beauty, or lay claim to a status of international marginality and exclusion (Cornelissen 2009: 134). Nevertheless only in the last couple of decades have the international sporting organisations started to diversify in their choice of mega-event hosts. For many developing countries the mere participation in the bidding competition is an attempt to use
their limited resources to increase the state’s status or as a forms of diplomatic manoeuvring or marketing, utilising their capital in the best way, as they see it, to gain maximum leverage, no matter if the bid in the end is unsuccessful (Cornelissen 2009: 136).

The hosting of mega-events is alluring, but only a limited number of participants is allowed, due to the fiscal risk involved and the exclusivity of hosting an event that only happens once in four years (Cornelissen 2009). Mega-events operate in a self-sustaining orbit; once a country has become a host, they tend to desire more, and often larger events in the future (Cornelissen 2009: 137). Developing countries tend to use sports mega-events in a very different way from developed countries. They use the events to achieve specific political or foreign goals, signalling particular messages to the international community or as a “means of engaging in international activities beyond what objective measures of their international capacity would enable” them to (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 111). Developing states are trying to ‘punch above their weight’; examples of this are seen in activism around mega-events in Malaysia, China and South Africa in the early 2000s, which were aimed at increasing the specific country’s image and international profiling as well as to gain economic advantage (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 111). But this kind of use of mega-events for developing countries also bears a great risk, as it could rebound or jeopardise other development plans.

Hosting mega-events is a huge affair for countries with limited resources, and, in countries with deep social and economic disparities and complexities, an insufficient budget to meet development demands makes the promised positive legacies even harder to achieve (KAS 2011, Cornelissen, Swart 2006). In order to create positive and sustainable legacies for developing countries, an understanding of how these events work and how to make the most of the opportunity is critical for the hosts (Chalip 2004, Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 120). But in reality this is not always achieved in developed and developing countries. There has been no case where a single event has turned the direction of development around and realigned it (Häußermann et al. 2008, 267 in Steinbrink et al. 2011: 20) – this would mean that mega-events do not per se positively or negatively affect development, but simply accelerate already existing trends. This is particularly relevant in developing countries as their development path seems to be more accelerated by hosting mega-events, than that in developed countries (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 20).

2.6. Legacies of previous events

In order to gain a better understanding of the theoretically discussed possible legacies of mega-events, this chapter will look at a few examples of previous mega-events and their legacies. This will
also set the scene for the following case study of the FIFA World Cup in South Africa 2010 and the consequent analysis of the perceived legacies of the event.

Mega-events must be profitable for FIFA or the IOC; the FIFA World Cup in Germany, for example, generated FIFA a profit of over USD 2 billion and FIFA forecasted for the World Cup in 2010 profits of USD 3.2 billion (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 17). This surplus for global sporting organisations is beneficial for the national and international sport, but at the same time the events often mean huge losses for host cities because of the vast investment they put into infrastructure development. As these investments have a lifespan of up to 50 years they cannot be counted against a 3-4 week long mega-event (Steinbrink et al. 2011).

Economically, countries hosting mega-events have experienced significantly lower growth in the years when they hosted the Football World Cup or Olympic Games. A study of 20 of the world’s largest economies over the past 30 years has shown that. Also the recent financial crash of the Greek economy was partly blamed on the 2004 Athens Olympics, which cost nearly double the initial budget (Bond, Cottle 2011: 41). This sheds a very negative light on the possible economic effects of mega-events.

One of the promises to hosts has been the increase of tourism in the host country. The World Cup in South Korea and Japan, 2002, shows that this promise is not always fulfilled: Japan only counted about 30 000 more visitors during the World Cup, and South Korea reported fewer tourists than the previous year. This was mainly caused by a crowding-out effect of the World Cup. While more European visitors were counted during the World Cup, the regular Japanese tourists stayed away because of the mega-event (Baade, Matheson 2004). With investment of USD 2 billion for 10 new stadia in South Korea, and investment of USD 4 billion for 7 new and 4 refurbished stadia in Japan, the World Cup notoriously under-delivered on expectations, highlighting replacement spending and ‘crowding out’ effects by tourists (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 110). Displacement effects are often not taken into account when looking at tourism numbers. The 2000 Sydney Olympics, for example, reported 100% occupancy in Sydney, while other major cities, Melbourne and Brisbane, reported occupancies of 19 and 17% during the Games, if compared to the previous year (Baade, Matheson 2004).

Job creation is another example of how hosts were misguided: most jobs created in the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona were short term and low paid, while the analysis of the 2000 Sydney Olympics voiced concerns about the actual distribution of the social and economic benefits, and opportunity costs still linger (Horne, Manzenreiter 2006: 10).
The FIFA World Cup in Germany 2006 had a considerable influence on the organisation of the World Cup in South Africa through knowledge sharing and support. Studies on the World Cup in Germany have shown that national pride increased during the event, but only marginally and for a short period of time, showing that mega-events seem to only have a popular appeal but no long-term integration effect for the host (Künzel 2010: 77). However other discussions about the ‘feel-good factor’, the net-result of beneficial effects of personal experience and leisure, leading to social cohesion and increased civic pride, argue that the 2006 World Cup was “one of the greatest and economically most important events in Germany, greater willingness to pay for a sporting or other event in Germany has not been recorded before” (Maennig, Porsche 2008: 1). The ‘feel-good factor’ was according to Maennig one of the greatest measurable effects of the 2006 World Cup, while other forecasted positive effects for tourism, income and employment were not realised (Maennig, Porsche 2008: 2). Impact studies of the World Cup have shown that the predicted income growth of EUR 2-10 billion and the additional 10,000 jobs were not evident in any of the World Cup host cities (Bond, Cottle 2011: 41). A survey by the Deutsche Industrie und Handelskammertag (German Association Chamber of Commerce and Industry) found that more than 80% of respondents expected no positive spin-offs from the World Cup. This led the director of the German Institute for Economic Research, Gert Wagner, to conclude, “The World Cup's contribution to economic growth has been negligible. It was great fun. Nothing more, nothing less” (Bond, Cottle 2011: 41). The sole beneficiaries of the World Cup in Germany were the German Soccer Association, DFB, and FIFA.

This shifts the more intangible legacies of mega-events, such as positive political, social, feel-good and/or image effects, to the centre of attention, where economic analyses previously dominated (Maennig, Porsche 2008: 2). While mega-event problems in the areas of security, transport, ecology and the use of public funding have had a negative impact on public perception, increased advertisement and sponsorship, especially socially responsible sponsoring (like the prize draw for tickets in response to the negative perception of ticket scarcity), enhanced public perceptions on the World Cup, increased acceptance of the event have sensitised the population to their role as World Cup hosts (Maennig, Porsche 2008). But also the good weather during the event and the success of the national team added to the positive feelings towards of the World Cup 2006 (Maennig, Porsche 2008: 11).

Internationally, the general perception of Germany changed positively and the emphasis on ecology with the ‘Green Goal’ programme was meaningful for the country and image boosting, because of the off-setting of high carbon emissions associated with the hosting of mega-events (Maennig, Porsche 2008: 19). The ‘Germany’ brand gained from hosting the World Cup (Tödter, Bangerth 2009:}
and despite not fulfilling the economic expectations, the World Cup had a positive effect on Germans as well as foreign visitors.

Another example to look at more closely, especially due to its recentness, is the associated legacies of the London Olympics 2012. The London Olympics’ main legacy goal was to generate a green legacy associated with the Games, showcasing green leadership to the world (Acuto 2013). In their bid for the Olympics, London had already promised to provide the ‘greenest Games ever’. This approach was surrounded by much controversy, especially since in 2011 it seemed likely that London would fail to meet the expected carbon emissions reductions for the Games, and since accusations were made that London was neglecting the impact of the Games on low-class communities, which were displaced by the Olympic preparations. But the ‘green’ path continued, and in April 2012 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) sanctioned the ‘green measures’ that were being taken (Acuto 2013).

Besides the green legacy, London was determined to make a lasting imprint on the city’s sustainable development. As the organising committee put it: “We weren’t only going to put on the biggest sporting event in the world; we were going to hold the world’s first truly sustainable Olympic and Paralympic Games, leaving a legacy far beyond the departure of the Olympic flame” (in Acuto 2013). One of the major targets for redevelopment related to the Olympics was the upgrade of the transport system. London invested over GBP 11 million in walking and cycling routes leading to the venues and promoted an ‘Active Travel Programme’ that aimed at enhancing sustainable alternatives to public services (Acuto 2013).

Other initiatives implemented to promote the city’s innovation in sustainable urbanism and event management were, for example, the monitoring of the Games carbon footprint from construction and staging, and the promotion to use sustainable fish. This made London the first ‘Sustainable Fish City’ and its success has inspired further collaborative projects (Acuto 2013). This shows that cities have the capacity to link diplomatic action and public diplomacy with substantial developments and innovations on the ground that create a lasting legacy for the city and incentives for future events (Acuto 2013). Nevertheless, the Olympics were also a very sensitive topic in the UK. The Games were part of a longer range project to move the London’s economic centre of gravity eastwards, a project that began in the 1980s by building a new financial district, the millennium dome, housing regeneration in the old docklands, expensive extensions to the underground etc. leading to a perceived neglect of redevelopment in the North and Midlands, as well as, Scotland and Wales (Butler, Rustin 1996). This could be one of the reasons why sustainability and not redevelopment was one of the key legacies of the Games.
These examples have shown that event legacies can vary greatly between host countries or cities, depending on their main legacy goals. As has been previously pointed out, identifying what the actual economic, social or political impacts of a mega-event are, is not a straightforward matter, and there is often a lot of controversy surrounding the perception before and after the event on its positive and negative legacies, depending on where the information comes from. At the same time, mega-events often promise more than they deliver, and recent research has shown that many of the intended legacies cannot be met. This dissertation aims to address this problem in looking closely at the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa and how the perceptions and interpretations of possible legacies of stakeholders have changed from the event preparation to after the event has finished, drawing on the outlined theoretical discussions and analysing the impact this has on the hosting of mega-events.
3. The FIFA World Cup in South Africa

Following a theoretical discussion on mega-events and their legacies this chapter will take a close look at South Africa and the FIFA World Cup 2010. This chapter is split into three main parts for the purpose of analysing the change in perceptions and interpretations connected to the World Cup. The first part will analyse the bidding process South Africa took part in for the 2010 World Cup, the second part will look at interpretations, perceptions and research surrounding the World Cup before the event itself and the third part will explore the World Cup and especially its legacy after the event until mid-2013.

But before an examination of the bidding process for the FIFA World Cup 2010, a closer look will be taken at South Africa and its mega-event history. There has been a trend in the last decade that more and more mega-events take place in the Global South, especially in countries known as emerging economies (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 15). South Africa, in line with this trend, has become a keen participant in the global mega-event circuit (Cornelissen 2009: 134) since the end of apartheid. The hosting of the Rugby World Cup in 1995, the Africa Cup of Nations 1996, and the 2002 Cricket World Cup as well as submitting bids for the 2004 Olympic Games, 2011 Rugby World Cup and the 2006 and 2010 FIFA World Cup, show that South Africa is keen to host major sporting events and has a successful track-record in doing so. This cumulative experience, starting with the positive effect of seemingly uniting a highly divided and racialised society during the 1995 Rugby World Cup (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 112), bolstered the country’s confidence, and that of the government and other mega-event protagonists, that South Africa possesses both the capacity and a range of intangible features to set the country apart from other competitors (Cornelissen 2009: 138).

South Africa’s foreign policy goals are mainly driven by its ambition to become a global middle power, with the claimed objective to aid the whole African continent towards a more secure position in the international arena. Using sports mega-events in the domestic context, as a force for social cohesion and to bolster economic growth, has served to create leverage in the international arena as a tool to attain certain foreign policy objectives, which has distinguished South Africa from other developing states with similar motives (Cornelissen 2009). Analyses of South Africa’s original bid for the World Cup conclude that a great amount of diplomacy was used to win the rights to host. Leaders of South Africa’s post-apartheid government used sport and cultural credentials to assert South Africa’s image (Acuto 2013). The main factor in the decision to bid for the World Cup was a political one, as only the political executive can make the far-reaching decisions needed for public expenditure, allocation and legislation in hosting this kind of mega-event (Dowse 2012: 29). There is a visibly growing demand of ‘non-traditional’ hosts to have mega-events in their countries, driven by
social and political motives, and despite the potential for disproportionate cost and risk implications (Dowse 2012: 30).

Domestically, mega-events have become catalysts for economic, political and development goals. Economic spin-offs of mega-events such as employment creation and infrastructure investment are widely publicised pieces of information around which bid promoters seek to mobilise support and which at a later stage become self-generating ideologies (Cornelissen 2009: 138). It needs to be observed that while sports and tourism departments in the government are protagonists of mega-event hosting, different parts of the government have different interests in event hosting. National Treasury, for example, is weary about huge expenditures and the provinces hope to extract investments in infrastructure and stadia from the national government during the event preparation. Sport is used as effective instrument in forging national cohesion; the South African victory in the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the symbolic impact of Nelson Mandela’s appearance had become characteristic of the instrumentality of sport in the post-apartheid era (Cornelissen 2009: 139). But not only is sport symbolic as a unifier in South Africa, but also in the way in which it became a vehicle for the political struggle between the National Party and anti-apartheid movements, playing itself out in international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the IOC. Sport during apartheid was used as a “forceful basis for identity of entitlement for the dispossessed and of virtue for those in power” (Cornelissen 2009: 139) - for most of the black population sport was important for civic organisation and social interaction. At the same time parallel sport organisations were created for Black, White and Coloured to mirror the manufactured division in the system (Cornelissen 2009). Understanding the importance of sport in South Africa, a closer look will now be taken at the bidding process for the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

3.1. The bidding process

South Africa’s event-centred development strategy (Black 2007: 265) gave it a good starting point for a successful bidding campaign for the World Cup. The six-year period that involved South Africa first challenging Germany and subsequently Morocco to host a first-order mega-event shows clear parallels of bidding competitions with international relations, and mirrors world schisms of influence, power, rivalry or conflict (Cornelissen 2009: 136). While the bidding campaign for the 2004 Olympic Games was connected to a domestic campaigning against the bid, based on the costs the event might incur, the bids for the 2006 and 2010 FIFA World Cup were not questioned in broad public campaigns (Cornelissen 2009). This can mainly be attributed to the sport promoted – football, which is a medium of identification especially for the black citizenry and symbolic for racial divide (Cornelissen 2009: 140) – and more effective promotion by the bid committee on the ‘fact’ that the
World Cup would, for example, create 123,000 new employment opportunities and add an additional ZAR 5.6 billion (USD 800 million) to the country’s GDP (Cornelissen 2009: 138). But what did the South African bid actually include?

The South African campaign very clearly centred on the fact that this World Cup was an African World Cup. Thabo Mbeki writes in a letter to Joseph Blatter in the South African Bid Book (2003: 1/3):

“We want on behalf of our continent, to stage an event that will send ripples of confidence from Cape to Cairo – an event that will create social and economic opportunities throughout Africa. We want to ensure that one day, historians will reflect upon 2010 World Cup as a moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on centuries of poverty and conflict. We want to show that Africa’s time has come.”

Mbeki clearly signals that he wants the World Cup to show the world a new Africa, one that overcomes afro-pessimism and focusses on themes such as ‘empowerment’ and ‘afro-pride’ (Cornelissen 2010: 27). This symbolic strategy was geared especially to gain maximum support both domestically and internationally for South Africa’s bid (van der Westhuizen, Black 2004). This African revival, as well as a developmental argument, had been recurring features in bids since the bid for the 2004 Olympics, but are often cited to be the reason for outright failures of previous bid campaigns (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 113).

The South African bid for the 2010 World Cup included a strong focus on the building of training facilities and improvement of community facilities, as part of a developmental strategy to leave a lasting legacy (South Africa 2010 Bid Book 2003: 10). But besides this development notion, the bid had increased from 9 stadia for the 2006 bid to 13 stadia for the 2010 tournament – 7 with minor upgrades, 3 with major upgrades and 3 newly built stadia (South Africa 2010 Bid Book 2003: 10/3). Furthermore major infrastructure projects were linked to the event – developmental projects such as the Gautrain and the establishment of a new international airport in Durban were fast-tracked, and consequently became politically controversial affairs (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 119).

South Africa expected the World Cup to lure about 280,000 international air travellers to the World Cup, which was an estimate of 30-40% of all World Cup tourists (South Africa 2010 Bid Book 2003: 13/14). The government expected a great positive impact on the national GDP, and expected revenues from ticket sales of USD 467,459,448 (South Africa 2010 Bid Book 2003: 7/4). The following table shows the total expenditure as published in the South African 2010 Bid Book (2003: 7/7):
## Table 1: Total Expenditure for 2010 World Cup, status July 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>USD</th>
<th>CHF (Swiss Franc)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Administration, Organisational Expense</td>
<td>47,983,405</td>
<td>125,524,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Safety and Security</td>
<td>36,274,183</td>
<td>94,893,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Stadium and other Infrastructure</td>
<td>158,453,174</td>
<td>414,512,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Media Organisation and Support</td>
<td>51,037,772</td>
<td>133,514,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transport</td>
<td>13,470,373</td>
<td>35,238,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ticketing</td>
<td>8,557,494</td>
<td>22,386,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. IT Solution</td>
<td>8,324,999</td>
<td>21,778,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Official Events</td>
<td>31,926,036</td>
<td>83,518,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Accommodation</td>
<td>9,596,986</td>
<td>25,105,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Advertising and Marketing</td>
<td>13,165,376</td>
<td>34,440,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Support Services</td>
<td>26,714,741</td>
<td>69,885,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL EXPENDITURE</strong></td>
<td><strong>405,504,540</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,060,797,531</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between estimated expenditure (USD 405,504,540) and revenue (USD 467,459,448) shows that South Africa expected a profit of USD 61,954,908 from the World Cup. Most of the actual numbers included in the bid book were calculated by Grant Thornton’s Kessel Feinstein, who concluded in its 2003 report that the World Cup 2010 “will create significant direct and indirect economic benefits of the country’s economy, with minimal tangible and intangible costs” (Grant Thornton in Bond, Cottle 2011: 44).

As evident in the above cost estimate, there are two broad categories of costs involved with hosting a World Cup: the logistics and management of the event itself and the investment in infrastructure and stadia. Generally the first set of costs is paid for by broadcasting rights, on-going corporate partners of FIFA and global corporate sponsors and local corporate supporters (Bond, Cottle 2011: 44). The costs related to infrastructure building are met from public funds; in the case of South Africa, the World Cup was to be financed mainly with Government Grants of USD 31.6 million and Local Authority Grants of USD 25.3 million (South Africa 2010 Bid Book 2003: 7/5).

The World Cup bid, as well as a lot of a country’s interest in hosting mega-events, is marked by the steering of capital. The South African bid was financed by multinational companies, such as Anglo American, BMW, SABMiller and Adidas (Bond, Cottle 2011: 44), showing these sponsors’ profit-driven interest (Cornelissen 2009: 138). An example of the extent of commercial interests in World Cups is that it was not a coincidence that Daimler-Chrysler contracted a major trade agreement with the president of Hyundai, shortly before the voting rounds for the 2006 World Cup, leading to the
Asian confederation within FIFA to vote en bloc for the German candidacy (Cornelissen 2009: 136). This commercialisation of mega-events has reduced the benefits for host countries in favour of commercial sponsors and international sport organisations that control and organise these events, leaving local authorities unwilling or unable to mitigate (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 117). Especially in a developing country like South Africa the commercial interest of large, white-owned corporations as sponsors for the World Cup creates political difficulties in the context of transformation and justice, as the government’s goal is to change economic ownership patterns with policies such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) (Cornelissen 2009: 138).

Further significant political implications of the Bid Campaign were a temporary patching up of ties between the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), the tri-partite alliance, which was starting to show signs of ever-growing rifts. COSATU’s public announcement to support the bid legitimised it as something that would have positive consequences for the South African society (Cornelissen 2009: 139).

Besides the positive economic estimates for the World Cup, there is an overarching political economy to first-order mega-events. The global reach, scale of spectatorship and revenue potential make a World Cup a profit driven endeavour, not only in the economic sense. But the international organiser, FIFA, maintains tight control of all Finals. It generally requires the availability of 10 stadia of high standard, to be able to accommodate 32 teams and 64 matches, spread across the whole country as well as a list of additional guarantees by the host country. The unique ‘brand’ developed for each final, publicity materials and promotional campaign, have a significant impact on the host country and led to political wrangling in South Africa after the announcement in 2004 (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 112). The South African Bid book includes all required guarantees to FIFA, including visa, duty and tax exemptions, stating, for example, that FIFA, FIFA subsidiaries, FIFA delegation and host broadcaster were to be treated as tax exempt persons or entities (South Africa 2010 bid book 2003: 4/5), meaning that the South African government refrains from any income from the FIFA World Cup revenue. The extensive guarantees given to FIFA and the general outline of the Bid Book make it read like a desperate plea to secure the World Cup the second time round, bending over backwards to protect and promote FIFA’s business interest and taking responsibility for financing every cost (Horn 2011: 148). This is also confirmed in the letter from President Thabo Mbeki at the beginning of the Bid Book:

“As the national Government, we unequivocally commit ourselves to provide every guarantee requested and every resource necessary to assure the FIFA Executive Committee of our ability
to provide Africa’s Stage in 2010 for a highly successful, prestigious international series of events.” (South Africa 2010 Bid Book 2003: 3)

Critical voices during the bidding process and the decision for South Africa to host the 2010 World Cup saw these challenges and question the organisational abilities of South Africa as host of a mega-event. The international press especially showed great concern about the high crime rates in South Africa and as late as 2008 a survey by Welt Online, the online platform of a German newspaper, asking 642 people if they thought that South Africa was overextended with the organisation of the World Cup, concluded that 67% believed it was (Haferburg, Steinbrink 2010: 11). However, at the same time the expectations of the South African population were high, caused by the extensive promises made by the government in the bid book and beyond (Cornelissen 2010: 27).

Opponents in society and academics of South African mega-event bids argue that the money spent on them should rather be used for social and economic development programmes in South Africa (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 113). And another critical point on the bidding process is that the South African Bid Book was only made publically available in 2010 after a court order to release the information (Mail & Guardian 2010c). South African press argued that it is a “curious mélange of hyperbole and underestimation” (Tolsi 2010).

The underlining power that FIFA has over the host countries, who see the hosting of a FIFA World Cup as a privilege, judging from the competition during the bidding process (Klenk 1999) and extent of guarantees given to host the Finals, makes meeting any intangible legacies, such as positive effects on the African image and the South African society, connected to a mega-event increasingly challenging. In particular intangible legacies might be hard to fulfil in the light of the strict FIFA regulations (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 112). For a developing country, meeting the required guarantees and at the same time fulfilling their promises on positive tangible and intangible benefits, such as raising the profile of the country, increasing tourism and foreign direct investment in addition to growing national pride (KAS 2011; Cottle, Bond 2011) as lasting legacies of the mega-event, are crucial factors for an overall successful World Cup.

The bidding process is dominated by positive communication of the World Cup by the government, which needs to gain popular support for the bid by the population and financial support from investors. At the same time, the South African government has to convince FIFA of its eligibility as World Cup host. Therefore the perception and interpretations of the World Cup bid are steered by positive government propaganda of the event. Impact studies at this time are assigned by the government and paint a throughout positive picture of the future event’s legacies. In the case of a
successful bid, as in South Africa, critical voices might have been apparent but were not successful in changing the overall perceptions for the future event.

### 3.2. Studies before the World Cup

From the initial stages of the bidding process and the successful outcome for South Africa – South Africa was the first African country to host a FIFA World Cup – the process of building, renovating and organising began, and at the same time the media’s as well as experts’ and public interest in the possible implications of the mega-event for the country and beyond increased. In the following chapter the publication of studies before the World Cup itself, focussing on predictions about the implications or legacy of the World Cup on South Africa will be examined.

#### 3.2.1. Growing expenditures for the World Cup preparation – estimated economic impacts

South Africa underestimated the costs for the 2010 World Cup by a factor of about 20 in their initial calculations in the bid book (KAS 2011: 28). The refurbishment of Soccer City, for example, was projected at about ZAR220 million and eventually completed at a cost of more than ZAR3.3 billion (Tolsi 2010). This cost explosion was partly caused by massive increase in prices in the building sector for material and land, due to the extensive building activity before the World Cup (Tolsi 2010; Steinbrink et al. 2011). But additionally, the building sector is, according to a Transparency International Report from 2005, one of the most corrupt sectors in the global economy (Tolsi 2010). A further consequence of this price escalation was that less social housing could be built and the housing shortage in South Africa increased (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 21).

The government on the national level had initially committed about ZAR 9 billion (USD 1.2 million) to contribute to the 2010 World Cup, using tax revenues to upgrade infrastructure, which would, controversially, benefit mainly the better-off as it was built in order to meet FIFA requirements (Kersting et al. 2010). By comparison, German investment in their World Cup was about EUR 3.4 billion. If one compared the investments in terms of per capita gross national product of the two host countries, South Africa’s burden was about 15 times larger than Germany’s – and it is questionable if Germany would have hosted a World Cup that cost them EUR 50 billion (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 18). Additionally, mega-events do not have a major effect on the economy in developed countries, such as Germany, as their effects on GDP growth and costs involved in hosting compared to the overall GDP are significantly smaller. In small economies the investments have a considerable greater effect, leading to the danger that the state deficit is increased and future growth...
marginalised (Künzel 2010: 252).

Seeing this extensive expenditure of the South African World Cup in context, what are the other direct economic effects? Trevor Manuel promised 400,000 new jobs because of the World Cup, but generally the direct economic effect of a mega-event is difficult to calculate and often less than expected (Kersting et al. 2010: 41). Most people would not feel a direct impact of the World Cup, as most profit goes directly to FIFA and official sponsors that have a priority in the high revenue areas, such as the stadia and the public viewing areas (Grill 2009; Kersting et al. 2010). Therefore the local benefit from marketing, licensing and hospitality attached to the World Cup is questionable.

Experience from previous mega-events shows that the overriding factor of these events is the wider political economy and by which rules the events are hosted (Cornelissen 2009: 142). But critiques like these from scholars have been consequently denied by the South African government. Official statements say that government expenditures are not made at the expense of other priorities and the World Cup is a win-win situation for the whole of South Africa (Haferburg, Steinbrink 2011: 18).

The World Cup bid had a strong developmental slant to it, especially in terms of infrastructure upgrades in the country (Cornelissen 2009: 141). FIFA seemed to be more willing to include broader national transformation and development goals than the IOC for the 2004 Olympic bid. However, at the same time, event sponsors often have little interest in this more long-term and ‘softer’ focus of community inclusion and empowerment in the hosting of a mega-event (Cornelissen 2009: 142). This means that South Africa would have had little room to follow its developmental stance.

The developmental idea during the organisation and preparation was focussed mainly on the underdeveloped public transport system, addressing economic and spatial legacies of apartheid, but facilities built served the purpose of the mega-event more than the actual local communities (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 119). This is mainly caused by the difficulty to bring in line the development needs of the country with the FIFA requirements. Large flagship projects, such as the Gautrain, evolved from a major infrastructure investment for the province to a central development around the World Cup, rapidly escalating in costs and increasingly slow progress (Cornelissen 2009: 142).

Another public transport project which was fast-tracked for the World Cup was Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) systems in South Africa’s major cities, such as Johannesburg and Cape Town. Here the main focus of the new bus routes was to connect the airport, city and stadia. The BRT development was going to be a long-term public transport project to increase transport volume especially from the low-income areas to the cities. These routes are mainly covered by a mini-bus taxi transport system.
that developed under apartheid, because public transport systems to the townships were neglected. The development of the BRT system, however, led to major outcries from the often violent mini-bus industry, claiming the public transport system would take away their jobs and monopoly (Mail and Guardian 2010a). Major marches were organised by the taxi drivers and they even resorted to violence by shooting at and burning the new buses (Mail and Guardian 2010b). This shows that even the possible positive development connected to the World Cup in South Africa was not an easy task for the government to implement.

Traffic planning leading to the World Cup was meant to expand the existing public transport system to be able to cope better with the increasing numbers of passengers, which would have a long-term positive impact for the cities. But not all the urban community was be able to benefit from these improvements, as the main focus of new public transport developments was on routes from the airports to the city and to the stadia, to fulfil the needs of the World Cup. Projects in peripheral districts were postponed in favour of the event requirements. Therefore one can conclude that the projects connected to the World Cup did not really aid the overcoming of the fragmented urban structure caused by apartheid, which was the original developmental goal (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 24).

While the World Cup expenditures were escalating and this became a topic in the media, the overall positive economic promises by the South African government were more unlikely to be realised. Prestigious infrastructure projects such as the Gautrain and BRT Systems in Cape Town and Durban became World Cup flagships to showcase South Africa’s abilities to its citizens and the world. But negative developments were not taken quietly everywhere, and World Cup perceptions, especially in the population became more negative due to local media coverage and slowly visible impacts of the mega-event preparation.

### 3.2.2. The relationship to FIFA

As mentioned previously, FIFA has a very powerful status in the organisation of the World Cup as the international organiser and keeps tight control over the whole event. The event is hosted according to FIFA rules and maximising its commercial interest (Cornelissen 2009). Even though FIFA awarded the 2010 World Cup to South Africa, it held South Africa ransom right up until the last few months in early 2010, threatening it would ‘take away the World Cup’ if South Africa did not deliver profits and First-World type benefits to FIFA (Horn 2011: 148). South Africa had limited room to manoeuvre and fulfil its developmental agenda that was supposed to underlie the whole World Cup. FIFA’s influence was known in the media and criticised throughout South Africa, as visible in this cartoon by South
African cartoon artist Zapiro:

![Zapiro Cartoon](image)

Figure 2: Sepp Blatter plays God (Zapiro 2010b)

The subordination of the South African government to FIFA was evident in statements, such as this one by Danny Jordaan, CEO of the FIFA World Cup 2010: “The FIFA World Cup must deliver at least 2.7bn [ZAR]. It’s the cash cow for FIFA. If we fail, Africa will probably wait another hundred years. We aim to give FIFA comfort” (in Haferburg, Steinbrink 2011: 17). The hopes for South Africa for the World Cup and its lasting legacy were so high that it would accept the great influence FIFA had on the organisation of the event. But at the same time the profit interests of FIFA and South African goals seemed to be merging prior to the World Cup, and fulfilling the infrastructure upgrades expected by FIFA obliged the South African government to use financial resources that were then missing in other places (Haferburg, Steinbrink 2011: 17).

FIFA influence was also visible in the South African Football Association (SAFA), with FIFA president Joseph Blatter putting pressure on the association to postpone its elections until after the World Cup to minimise delays and conflict during the organisation phase (Cornelissen 2010: 32). Even the African ambitions that South Africa was trying to achieve with the World Cup was influenced by FIFA, when FIFA announced in 2008 that all training venues and team accommodation would be in South Africa, excluding neighbouring countries, partly because of political turmoil there (Cornelissen 2010: 35).

Host cities had to give FIFA control over certain urban areas to comply with FIFA regulations on trademark rights. Only FIFA-licenced traders were allowed to do business in, for example, Johannesburg’s two official fan parks and in the exclusion zones surrounding the two stadia Soccer City and Ellis Park. This increasingly drove informal traders, a substantial part of the urban economy, out of the inner city areas and increased pressure on the cities itself, which had to deal with the
small vendors that wanted to generate income with the World Cup (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 24). Nevertheless small business owners and street vendors used other areas that were not FIFA-controlled for vibrant local trade (KAS 2011: 57).

Coming back to FIFA’s influence on one of the most important parts of the World Cup - the stadia - the case of the Cape Town stadium shall be looked at more closely. The original bid by South Africa was to supply 13 stadia for the World Cup, but under the encouragement of FIFA the number was reduced to 10 in 2005. This was not well received by local authorities, because they had already mobilised and established partnerships for all host venues. Following this reduction, host city contracts were finalised in 2006, but the lobbying for venues was likely to continue until the final FIFA inspection in 2008 (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 118). The below map shows the final host cities and stadia for the 2010 World Cup:

![Map of South African Stadia for the FIFA-World Cup](image)

Figure 3: Host cities and stadia of the 2010 World Cup (Haferburg, Steinbrink 2010)

For the World Cup bid, South Africa proposed the Newlands stadium in Cape Town, a well-established stadium that is mainly used for rugby matches, as venue for the World Cup. The stadium would have needed only minor upgrades in order to fulfil the requirements as a quarter-final venue. The Newlands Stadium is situated in a majority white suburb and has little space for parking or to offload buses with spectators. Therefore the stadium was quickly denounced after the ANC took
over the provincial government in the Western Cape (Künzel 2010: 246, Hlatshwayo, Blake 2011: 226). Instead the Athlone Stadium, home of the football teams Ajax Cape Town and Engen Santos, and situated in one of the poorer suburbs, was suggested as alternative, but declined by FIFA. Athlone could have been a catalyst for development in the Cape Flats, mostly coloured and black suburbs, an important signal for a departure from historical marginalisation. But this made Athlone at the same time very unattractive for FIFA, which was not interested in bringing football fans to the townships (Hlatshwayo, Blake 2011: 225). Additionally, FIFA argued that Athlone “would not form suitable background for the television viewers” (Hlatshwayo, Blake 2011: 229). It was instead intended to be renovated and used as one of the training venues (Künzel 2010).

As an alternative it was suggested that the area of the Green Point Stadium could be used for a new stadium that would have a capacity of 60,000 seats, enough for a semi-final match. This idea was quickly supported by the organising committee. The Democratic Alliance and Mayor Helen Zille subsequently started a discussion as to whether Cape Town could afford to build a new stadium in view of the poverty level in the city. But in the end the prospect of a semi-final match that would attract more tourists and more investment to the city was the decisive argument for the new Green Point Stadium (Künzel 2010: 247). Civil society complaints about the building of a new stadium in Green Point came mainly from the privileged, white population that was worried about future noise levels and the impact on the golf course on the Green Point common, which is one of the oldest golf courses in South Africa. For the black population the building of Green Point Stadium meant a symbolic conquest of the mainly white city (Grill 2009, Künzel 2010).

But the building of the new stadium raised more issues for the city. How would the stadium be utilised after the World Cup? The question of sustainability was not a decisive factor for FIFA, which was more worried about a buffer zone for sponsor activities and security around the venue (Künzel 2010: 248). With the increased capacity of the stadia in South Africa, the question of sustainability of the investments made to fulfil FIFA requirements for the World Cup needed to be posed already before the World Cup itself. Usually local championship games have an average fan base of 20,000, which is very unequally distributed with most teams attracting a few thousand spectators and the best known South African teams, Kaizer Chiefs and Orlando Pirates, attracting around twenty to thirty thousand fans. Therefore the stadia in Ellis Park and Soccer City would be well utilised after the World Cup, but most of the other stadia would not (Künzel 2010). Historically it has been shown that the hosting of World Cups increases the average number of spectators slightly, but as the World Cup in South Korea and Japan has shown, not to the extent that is needed to cover the costs of the new stadia. Furthermore the renovation of small stadia, like Athlone, as training venues is mostly
done according to the needs of elite sporting, which is often of no advantage to or use for the
general sport that occupies the stadia after the event, and it remains unclear how the increased
maintenance costs would be financed (Künzel 2010).

FIFA’s influence over the World Cup preparations hugely affected the ability of the South African
government to fulfil the developmental aims it connected with hosting. Because of FIFA’s
commercial priorities many of the local organising committee’s ideas, such as the inclusion of
informal traders or the venue in Athlone for the Cape Town Stadium, to make the World Cup more
sustainable could not be realised. Although FIFA’s influence was publically known, the extent of the
influence was an unknown factor to the general population. Nevertheless, FIFA had a major impact
on the development of a more negative perception of the World Cup for many stakeholders as its
tight grip had effects on the planning of World Cup legacies.

3.2.3. The effect on tourism

One of the main promises connected with hosting a World Cup is the showcasing of the country to
the world and ultimately making it more attractive for tourists (Kersting et al. 2010). The event itself
is often argued to have positive effects on tourist numbers, but statistics from the two previous
World Cups in Germany and South Korea and Japan showed that tourist numbers lagged behind the
expectations. This could have been a similar story for South Africa, in particular as travel costs to the
World Cup were very high because of South Africa’s geographical location, which means that the
regional effect on tourism was likely to be small (Künzel 2010). But at the same time there could
have been a big opportunity for South Africa to avoid the off-season low in the year of the World
Cup, as more tourists than usual would come in the winter months, when it is less attractive to travel
to South Africa (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 120). This meant that the tourism industry prepared for
many additional tourists to be accommodated during the Finals.

3.2.4. South Africa’s political agenda

The political agenda connected to the hosting of the World Cup in South Africa has been touched on
throughout the dissertation and is one of the most decisive factors for hosting the World Cup. The
way South Africa uses the mega-event as foreign policy tool and to achieve domestic goals, shows
the various different ways developing countries can use such an event for their advantage
(Cornelissen 2009: 142). The population wants the World Cup and has huge expectations connected
to the event (Grill 2009: 10), which makes the World Cup a great challenge for South Africa, as it
needs to deliver to the domestic population and at the same time show the world what it can do
(Cornelissen 2009: 142). The African agenda, which will be looked at more closely later in this
chapter, in regards to the Finals is one of the major diplomatic difficulties for South Africa, as it needs to satisfy the expectations it has created among supporting states (Cornelissen 2009: 142). The restraints posed by FIFA make it difficult to achieve the developmental and international agenda South Africa related to the 2010 World Cup and coloured the politics surrounding the organisation and planning of the Finals (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 109). At the same time, this process had a direct impact on the overall legacy of the World Cup in South Africa (Cornelissen 2010: 27).

Domestically South Africa faced pressure from all political groupings to host a successful World Cup (Kersting et al. 2010). But this political pressure made it possible for opposition parties to work together in trying to achieve a common goal. The World Cup came at a good time for South African politics; President Mbeki had resigned in September 2008 and the new president, Jacob Zuma, was able to use the prestige of the World Cup for his own image (Haferburg, Steinbrink 2011: 14). At the same time, because the Finals dominated the news there was significantly less space available for government-critical analysis (Steinbrink et al. 2011).

Football is a good political vehicle – the World Cup created the magic of big moments and allowed people to forget the worries of their everyday lives (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 17). This is called the ‘feel-good factor’ of mega-events, a mainly social-psychological effect of, for example, mega-events, which can, additionally, influence the economic situation of hosts (Kersting et al. 2010). This effect can be supported by initiatives from the organisers, such as participation of the population, security, transport, social responsible marketing and public viewing. Some examples from the South African World Cup were that many matches were screened for free on the national TV channel SABC, the tickets were about 4% cheaper for the local population and FIFA introduced a ticket fund in cooperation with Sony to distribute tickets to children and young people (Kersting et al. 2010).

Another major impact of mega-events is argued to be the ‘nation-building’ effect. It is the possibility of boosting national pride and true South African identity. Danny Jordaan argued that the World Cup is “not only important for football, but it will help strengthen and consolidate our democracy” (in Black 2007: 267). Similar to previous mega-events in South Africa the World Cup was supposed to bring integration of the post-apartheid society (Haferburg, Steinbrink 2011: 14). It was by far the largest event the country had ever hosted, and especially symbolic for nation-building because football is the historic sport of the black majority, making it possible for this event to send a powerful signal of change in the historic racial order of the South African society (Black 2007: 267).

Internationally hosting a first-order mega-event is attractive because it can ‘set a country on the world map’, with direct and short term profits associated to the event leading to a long-term and
stable image improvement for the host (Kersting et al. 2010: 47). For South Africa that meant re-branding the country as a safe, well-governed country with good infrastructure, a high level of technology, efficient economic structures and a high quality of life in order to attract future investment and tourism (Kersting et al. 2010, Steinbrink et al. 2011). The World Cup meant that South Africa would signal to the world the arrival of not only South Africa on the world stage, but Africa as a whole (Black 2007: 271).

The South African bid for the 2006 and 2010 World Cup was centred around a projection of African identity, which was part of the bid’s success, but at the same time led to serious diplomatic challenges for the country on the African continent (Cornelissen 2009: 136). Projecting an African identity was for South Africa a form of validation and competitive differentiation - a highly innovative and to some extent effective political tool of the South African government. It was based on a complex line of arguments about the nature of football and its cultural and social constitution for African societies, including “the colonial origins of the sport and the perpetuation of colonial divisions in the manner in which the sport was internationally managed” (Cornelissen 2009: 140). Through this argumentation the bid highlighted a great moral gravity for the international community - the obligation to contribute to greater equality and justice (Cornelissen 2009: 141).

The extension of the World Cup beyond its own borders asserted for South Africa that the legacy of the 2010 World Cup would be different from previous events. Involvement of the African Union in the ‘ownership’ of the World Cup was meant to ensure its pan-African impact (Black 2007: 268). But while this was the narrative on the one hand, the World Cup’s associated elevation for South African cities and the economy was likely to widen the gap between not only the rural and urban South Africa but also between the strong South African economy and most of the rest of the continent (Black 2007: 272), on the other hand.

The South African government portrayed the event itself as an ‘African showpiece’, to signal Africa’s renaissance and arrival as a full, dignified and confident participant in the global community (Black 2007). Political consequences arose from this line of argument for South Africa, partly driven because FIFA announced shortly after the 2006 bidding competition that future finals would be organised on a rotational basis and Africa was to be the first continent to benefit from this new arrangement. The African identity argument therefore became considerably harder to carry through as other African contenders challenged the self-righteousness of which South Africa claimed to be the representative for the African continent. This becomes evident when looking at how the African members of FIFA voted – none of the four Confederation of African Football members (Cameroon, Botswana, Mali, Tunisia) voted for South Africa and the World Cup was awarded to South Africa with

South Africa’s history with the rest of the continent, minority rule and apartheid, resentment towards South Africa’s economic and military power, the prominent and growing role of its multinational corporations, and the negative attitudes of many South Africans towards their neighbours, had great impact on the reservation of other African countries towards the ‘African’ World Cup proclaimed by South Africa (Black 2007: 268). South Africa sees itself as the regional hegemon: it is the 5th most populated country in Africa, the 2nd in sub-Saharan Africa, it is the only country on the continent with an international competitive economy, its GDP is 4 times bigger than that of Egypt, it is home to many multinational corporations, such as SAB Miller, Anglo-American and Sasol, has a stable and well-established banking sector, is diplomatically represented in 40 African countries and increasingly invests in other African countries (ZAR 26 billion in 2000). The figures speak for themselves to support South Africa’s hegemonic tendencies (van Soest 2010: 27-28). At the same time South Africa sees itself as exceptional in its peaceful transformation and its political elite proclaims ‘responsibility’ instead of ‘leadership’ in its diplomacy. Seen in this light, hosting the World Cup was the jewel in former President Mbeki’s mission of the African Renaissance (van Soest 2010: 29).

But the South African hegemony is strongly criticised in the rest of Africa. It is often questioned whether South Africa is a real African country or if it is a ‘minion of the West’. Also other states, such as Liberia and Nigeria, continentally, and Zimbabwe and Angola, regionally, have tendencies towards regional leadership. Differences of interest are widely seen and countries are sceptical of the South African intentions – questioning, for example, whether the reductions of tariff barriers in the South African Development Community (SADC) region were going to be used merely to South Africa’s advantage? South Africa follows its hegemonic tendencies mostly through cooperation, for example, by contributing to regional organisations such as the SADC and African Union (AU) (van Soest 2010: 32). But in spite of the strong criticism from the continent, its hegemony is widely accepted in the ‘North’.

Seeing the regional political and historical tensions, the success of the African World Cup strategy is, not only from the involvement of neighbouring countries in the World Cup itself, but also from the acceptance of the proposed idea, very questionable. South Africa is nevertheless, because of its economic power and political weight, predestined to host this mega-event. The African Renaissance portrayed through the World Cup could on the one side be a vehicle of foreign policy for South Africa, and on the other a desire to show Africa in a more positive light, to generate greater
international respect and significance for the continent (van Soest 2010).

South Africa’s idea was to boost the whole continent (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 117), with training venues and team accommodation in neighbouring countries, but it was unable to fulfil this promise because of FIFA regulations. South Africa’s official World Cup slogan was: “Ke Nako – Celebrate Africa’s Humanity” (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 17) and in this light the success or failures of the World Cup were widely regarded as a test for the African continent and the developing world (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 109). Negative effects of the World Cup were likely to have direct political implications for South Africa on the continent (Black 2007). The South African organisational capability was not to be questioned, as to fulfil its African agenda the World Cup needed to have positive impacts on the country and region (Cornelissen, Swart 2006: 120).

In the leading up to the 2010 World Cup other negative events shook South Africa in 2008. A wave of violence spread through South Africa, focussed mainly on African immigrants. While Pan-Africanism is positive in high and middle income levels, this xenophobia has been a recurring theme in low income areas and townships. African migrants are seen as competition for the few jobs and social welfare (Kersting 2010: 37). This tension was a worrying factor for the World Cup and did not facilitate the African World Cup narrative.

This chapter has argued that there was a wide range of political developments colouring perceptions during the seven years of World Cup preparation. Domestically the South African government tried to include legacies of nation building, ‘feel-good factors’, greater political collaboration and a positive political campaign for the president to hatch onto the positive image of the World Cup and generate a lasting effect in the domestic perception of the state. Internationally, South Africa was planning to increase its image by proclaiming an all-African World Cup and putting itself on the world map’ by hosting a successful event. This narrative was widely criticised by other African states that did not share South Africa’s hegemonic interpretations, but accepted by many states in the developed world, agreeing with South Africa’s hegemony on the continent.

3.2.5. The World Cup’s possible social impact

Besides the economic and political impact, mega-events promise to leave a positive social legacy behind for the host countries. This is usually portrayed through an increase of pride for the country, a ‘feel-good factor’ and a feeling of ‘togetherness’ associated with the event. But what are other social impacts that played a role in the South African context?

South Africa has a very unequal society, its Gini index (a measure for income inequality) of 63.1 for 2009 (0= total equality; 100= total inequality) is one of the highest in the world. One of the predicted
outcomes of the World Cup, despite all the positive predictions, was likely to be an increase of inequality in South Africa between urban and rural areas as well as between the different regions (Künzel 2010: 252), caused by several factors.

FIFA promised to allocate free tickets for low income households that would not be able to afford the high ticket prices to attend the World Cup matches. But these tickets were restricted, and with the main soccer fans in South Africa being the black population, realistically higher income groups gained more from the event (Künzel 2010: 247).

During the building of the stadium in Nelspruit, people were displaced to make space for it and schools were closed to accommodate the builders (Osmanovic 2010). Also in other urban renewal initiatives connected to the World Cup, for example, in Ellis Park, Johannesburg, the city wanted to revitalise the area around the stadium and consequently former inhabitants were displaced and the fast-tracking of projects meant the exclusion of those affected by the urban regeneration. These examples show how mega-events can contribute to greater marginalisation (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 21).

Also the visibility of social problems was a thorn in the eyes of FIFA, but in developing countries, like South Africa, it is impossible to hide them. For example, as soon as a domestic or international traveller arrives in the City of Cape Town informal settlements are visible, as they stretch from the airport towards the city. The international attention of mega-events tends to lead to urban action, trying to make these problems less visible through, for example, demolishing and resettling communities. Along the N2 highway in Cape Town, from the airport to the city, six informal settlements were redeveloped as the ‘Gateway’ to Cape Town, making it more attractive for visitors. Former inhabitants were moved to Delft, into transit camps that are reminiscent of refugee camps (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 22).

The biggest danger of these kind of short term planning and projects is that they might become part of the general legislation and planning practice and may still be effective long-term. Especially in South Africa these kinds of policies show a tendency towards a rejection of the democratic participatory process and a return to a repressive approach that is in some ways reminiscent of apartheid (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 23). This could become a long-term negative legacy of the World Cup.

Predictions for positive social impacts of the World Cup were sparse. Socially, insufficient planning of positive legacies could have a great negative effect on the population and the perceptions of the World Cup itself. World Cup preparations led to displacement of inhabitants and ‘cleaning up’ of less
pretty sights in the eyes of FIFA and possible foreign tourists. In South Africa’s unequal society that could lead to an increase of marginalisation instead of positive nation building and overcoming of social divides. The biggest danger of these short term solutions to social problems in order to ‘show-off’ to the World are the lasting impacts on the population and planning practice.

3.2.6. A possible environmental legacy
A recent development connected to mega-events is the creation of a ‘green legacy’ of the event. Mega-events have very high and concentrated carbon emissions associated to the event through the building of new stadia, increased tourism, flights, transport etc. that in the light of climate change are becoming more important to address by the host and organiser. Green legacies can, additionally, be used to support sustainable development of the cities, helping them to face future development challenges (KAS 2011) and reducing the direct impact of the World Cup.

The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) published a few guidelines on event greening and the sustainability of the World Cup. According to the DEA the main goals of the greening strategies connected to the World Cup were to minimise environmental impacts of the event by building sustainable facilities that could, for example, be used for other events such as concerts, raise awareness and lay foundations for new and higher environmental standards, and for South Africa to remain on top of the global environmental management best practice (DEA 2011). Practical goals were, for example: planting of trees, enhancement of water quality, increase of energy efficiency in public spaces, increase of environmental awareness and responsibility within communities. In 2010 South Africa decided to write a policy on ‘National Strategy for Sustainable Development’ to re-orientate the country’s development path to a more sustainable direction (Death 2010: 102). Besides this rather general overarching approach the greening of the World Cup was not one of the main goals for South Africa and of the organisation team, but some cities, such as Durban and Cape Town, incorporated their own greening initiatives into the project (KAS 2010: 24).

Greening was not one of the main World Cup legacies the South African government wanted to leave behind, but it is becoming a more and more important topic in research connected to mega-events. This is caused especially due to the huge carbon emissions connected to these events and the growing understanding and urgency of climate change. Greening during the World Cup was supported by the national government, but left in the hand of the host cities and not widely funded, which minimised its possible legacy effects and popular attention of the topic.

3.2.7. General Outlook
Marrying up the promises mega-events are seen to fulfil with actual development from the bid to
specific topics before the World Cup shows that a lot of the intended effects of the World Cup were not easily planned and implemented, but that there was a wide variety of factors related to the success or failure of certain initiatives by the host to create long-lasting positive legacies of the event.

A realistic prognosis before the World Cup was that the World Cup would create jobs, but would not overcome high unemployment rates, it would enhance public transport, but not solve the overarching problems of the transportation system, it would create growth impulses, but not lead to a sustainable growth. The main winner of the World Cup would be FIFA (Grill 2009: 11).

Besides this modest prognosis, the global media communication on the World Cup was mainly based on stereotypes, and the world looked at South Africa as the host of the 2010 World Cup with great scepticism (Grill 2009: 22). The World Cup rehearsal – the Confederations Cup in 2009, which ran smoothly and successfully, overcame many of these negative views, to the surprise of many international observers (Grill 2009: 238). South Africans on the other side had very high expectation for the World Cup and responded to sceptics cynically if they hadn’t seen the Rugby World Cup in 1995, the Cricket World Cup in 2003 and how well South Africa mastered these events (Grill 2009: 29).

However, the high political, economic, social and environmental goals South Africa set for the World Cup seemed difficult to achieve in the environment set by the organising committee, FIFA and sponsors (Cornelissen 2010: 41). This led to much differentiated perceptions of the World Cup during the preparation of the event. While the government tried to create and plan for positive legacies of the event, incidents communicated through the media and experienced by the population created a more sceptical outlook of the positive effects of the Finals, especially on its social implications. Economically World Cup expenditures skyrocketed and decisions of the local organising committee were strongly influenced by the FIFA, creating less room to manoeuvre for the South African developmental goals. Politically South Africa tried to make this first World Cup on the African continent an all-African World Cup, which was seen sceptically by many neighbours but supported by international observers. But here, too, FIFA interfered and influenced South Africa’s discretionary in organising the World Cup.

3.3. Studies after the World Cup

The World Cup had the potential to accelerate development, unlock resources, upgrade infrastructure and generate a positive international identity for South Africa (Dowse 2012). The event has partly met these goals, but in many areas not to the extent intended. Expectations on the
popular level were very high and mismanaged by the main stakeholders. The World Cup was unable to deliver more widely, partly because of corruption and a conflict of interests during the organisation (Dowse 2012). This chapter will look more closely at the direct outcomes related to the World Cup and show how different these are to the promises made in the bid book.

### 3.3.1. World Cup expenditures – the economic impact

The announcement of the host for the 2010 World Cup “elicited both exhilaration and trepidation, locally and internationally” (Schreiner, Go 2011: 133). Government and business were aware that the Football World Cup was a different ball game to a Rugby and Cricket World Cup (Schreiner, Go 2011). After the event itself that swallowed up one tenth of South Africa’s annual GDP, it is still unclear whether it will translate into positive or negative long-term economic legacies (Cornelissen 2011: 3018).

Economically the event was anticipated to generate a new profile for South Africa to encourage foreign investment and tourism. But the prosperity argument used before the mega-event has in independent ex-post analyses never recorded any significant or positive impulses for the national or regional economy. There is a noticeable discrepancy between the politician’s assertions and actual outcomes of mega-events. The public enthusiasm is a condition for the event’s success – in a commercial sense for FIFA and in a political sense for South Africa (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 19).

The analyses of the actual economic impact of the World Cup in South Africa show a very wide variety of conclusions. Major economic consultancies, such as Grant Thornton and KPMG, view the World Cup as having a positive outcome. KPMG concluded that the World Cup “has pumped an estimated R93-billion into the local economy, has rebranded South Africa and created a favourable climate for direct foreign investment and tourism growth” (Prinsloo 2010). Grant Thornton, who was assigned the original impact study for the World Cup bid by the South African government, saw the event as providing the “impetus for both direct spend on World Cup infrastructure, and the greater spending on roads, airports, buses, the Gautrain; which is of huge benefit. Much needed improvements were fast-tracked and they will deliver long-term benefits” (Saunders 2010). They moreover point out the profits for small business owners made through the World Cup, arguing that sales took place at every street corner in the country (Saunders 2010). According to the accounting firms’ reports the World Cup contributed about 0.5% to South Africa’s yearly GDP and 4-6% to its quarterly growth (Prinsloo 2010). This is considerably less than the predicted 3% impact on annual GDP (Bond, Cottle 2011: 45). This sounds like a complete economic success for the country. But there are some problems with mainstream economic accounting, especially when assigned the task
by the government: the failure to consider opportunity cost of the state investment, neglecting to incorporate negative social and environmental ‘externalities’, as well as the lack of cognisance of dangerous foreign debt and foreign exchange outflow overhangs associated with the World Cup, shine a different light on these positive reports. These problems are very costly, as they offset some of the calculated World Cup benefits and can create political-economic and political-ecological problems (Bond, Cottle 2011: 39).

Calculating the actual economic benefits of the World Cup is extremely difficult, as the total amount of costs involved, including investments in long-term projects such as infrastructure upgrades, are difficult to calculate. Not even the direct revenue from ticket sales, advertising, hotel and restaurant trade and other related sales goes directly back into the South African pockets – foreign firms were hired for the building of stadia, the mascot was produced by Chinese suppliers etc. Downstream spin-offs are difficult to estimate and also the long-term benefits that attract tourism and foreign investors can often not easily be attached to one event (Bond, Cottle 2011).

South Africa invested in total about ZAR 600 billion (USD 85.7 billion) to host the event, and made an estimated return of about ZAR 93 billion (USD 13.2 billion) – only one sixth of the money spent (Cornelissen 2011: 3018). It cannot be clearly determined, how the revenue of ZAR 93 billion increases the net income of South Africa and its citizens, because all expenditures are pooled, which means that the economic impact reports were mere ‘best guess scenarios’ or ‘guestimates’ (Bond, Cottle 2011: 46). While these reports by supporters of the event find great positive economic impacts for the host country, ex-post evaluations tend not to find any positive income and employment effects of mega-events (Bond, Cottle 2011: 40). Critical voices argue that the “promises of the tickle-down economic effects of the World Cup legacy evaporated almost as soon as the drops landed” (Bond, Cottle 2011: 1). Predicted impact studies, such as the report underlying the South African bid book are generally inaccurate.

Comparing the numbers estimated in the Bid Book 2003 (South Africa 2010 Bid Book 2003) with the actual numbers by The South African Ministry of Finance (KAS 2011: 49), as seen in table 2, shows that the World Cup not only made a huge loss financially, but that it cost about 17 times more than estimated.
Table 2: estimated vs. actual World Cup expenditure and revenue (KAS 2011)

Also evident is that the numbers published by the South African government are very different to the numbers provided in independent studies cited above. One reason could be that different costs and revenues were used to calculate the balances, and opportunity costs and long-term investments were included differently. This shows that a definite conclusion on the total cost involved and economic impact of the World Cup is difficult to draw. A conclusion that can be drawn from these numbers, nevertheless, is that the World Cup cost South Africa considerably more than estimated, had a smaller impact on the GDP than estimated and brought less revenue. But a possible hint of a positive economic impact internationally was given by United Nations (UN) secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, who “affirmed his belief of a new confidence in ‘sustained investment on the continent’” (Dowse 2011).

Another estimated economic impact was the creation of 400,000 new jobs related to the World Cup, promised by Trevor Manuel (Kersting et al. 2010: 41). In the aftermath of the World Cup, Statistics South Africa released its Labour Force Survey, stating that in Quarter 2, 2010, an annual decrease of 4.7% (627,000 jobs) in employment was calculated, especially in the construction sector where a decline in employment of about 7.1% (54,000 jobs) was visible. This is mainly related to the completion of all World Cup related construction in the beginning of 2010 (Bond, Cottle 2011: 50), showing that also in this sphere the promises made by the South African government were not met.

One of the main developmental strategies for the World Cup was to improve the transportation system as well as break down inner city disparities, one of the greatest post-apartheid urban challenges. The World Cup has not succeeded in achieving this agenda, but further intensified fragmentation and marginalisation in the cities. New transport routes were built to achieve convenience for visitors and access to the stadium; developments in the housing sector were accompanied by displacement and segregation (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 25).

However, government and reports by event supporters, such as Grant Thornton, claimed that the infrastructure developments led “to a better quality of life, and provide long-term, valuable assets to communities” (Saunders 2011). The government chose the World Cup as a mechanism for helping South Africa to meet its developmental imperatives and create a long-term legacy (Saunders 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(in million)</th>
<th>Estimated (SA Bid Book)</th>
<th>Actual (SA Ministry of Finance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>USD 405.5</td>
<td>USD 7,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>USD 467.5</td>
<td>USD 509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>USD 62</td>
<td>USD -6,579</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
And even though most of the infrastructure built was not for the benefit of the people that need it, it might be a great step forward in South Africa overcoming the apartheid legacy. The Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system in Cape Town, for example, was officially launched, after being used during the World Cup in 2010, with three main routes. This was the first part of the project, which is planned to take about 15-20 years, to completely implement the bus system in the city (City of Cape Town 2013). More routes are planned, but they have been delayed because of the financial burden of the infrastructure development for the city, and resistance from the operating mini-bus system (Goldwyn 2013).

The actual economic impact of the event is difficult to calculate, but it has become clear that the World Cup was much more expensive than intended and did not lead to the expected returns for the South African economy and employment. Infrastructure upgrades were mainly prestigious affairs connected to the World Cup and did not aid to overcome historical divides in the host cities. But the investments cannot be written off as ‘a waste of money’ but have the possibility to become lasting legacies of the event, especially for the public transportation system. The foundation for a more inclusive infrastructure was fast-tracked by the World Cup and extensions are promised to follow.

### 3.3.2. FIFA’s influence

The concern about the influence of FIFA on the event prevailed until the event itself had finished. South Africa struggled to protect their national interest throughout the planning and execution of the World Cup (Dowse 2012). FIFA was able to override any concerns related to the huge investments made to host the event (Bond, Cottle 2011: 41). FIFA spent in total USD 3,558 million on the event and made an income of about USD 4,189 million – this profit of USD 631 million is the highest in FIFA history (KAS 2011: 49), and, compared to the losses made by the South African government, it shows that the World Cup is mainly driven by FIFA’s profit interest (Cottle 2011: 3). This is also evident in relation to the stadia built for the World Cup.

According to reports by Grant Thornton, the long-term profitability of the stadia is dependent on their usability for other events, such as concerts, religious gatherings and other sporting matches. Even Grant Thornton notes that some South African stadia will have difficulty breaking even, while others, like the FNB and Cape Town stadium, will be able to make profits by hosting different kinds of events (Saunders 2011).
Most critical voices question the necessity of the construction of the new stadia, claiming they will be ‘white elephants’ (Taylor 2011: 179). Many of these critical voices came from the South African media, which is visible in the above cartoon by South Africa’s most popular cartoonist Zapiro, who often reflects popular opinion in South Africa in his cartoons (see Figure 4). These stadia are mostly cited as being the Peter Mokaba Stadium in Polokwane, the Mbombela Stadium in Nelspruit and the Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban, based on the fact that Polokwane and Nelspruit do not have popular football or rugby teams that could occupy the stadia after the World Cup. Additionally, those stadia, such as the Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium by Port Elisabeth and the Green Point Stadium in Cape Town, have huge yearly maintenance bills that need to be subsidised by local government. Already eight months after the World Cup the Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium had to cut ZAR 800 million in service delivery provisions due mainly to the expenses for the stadium (Bond, Cottle 2011: 60).

Taking a closer look at the Cape Town Stadium, which was for commercial and political reasons built in Green Point instead of Athlone, an economic impact assessment report had concluded that a 68,000 seater stadium would raise the already high opportunity cost of the World Cup (Hlatshwayo, Blake 2011: 233). The stadium cost ZAR 4.5 billion after completion, 3 times more than the 2006 estimated ZAR 1.6 billion, caused by increased subcontractor costs, the overheated construction industry and complexities of the stadium’s frame (Hlatshwayo, Blake 2011: 235). Annual operating costs of the stadium are estimated at about ZAR 46.5 million, which would mainly be covered through activities such as sports events, conferences, concerts and religious gatherings. For the stadium to be sustainable, about 13-20 events would need to be hosted, reports predicting that the stadium would make a profit from 2014/15, if the government subsidises the operations.
(Hlatshwayo, Blake 2011: 243). Ajax Cape Town, one of the local football teams, made the stadium its home venue after the World Cup, but saw after the first matches that that is financially unsustainable, as not enough spectators were attending the event and the matches made financial losses (Hlatshwayo, Blake 2011: 244). The Western Cape Rugby Club was not interested in moving to the Green Point Stadium either, as they were historically and financially connected to their home base of Newlands. Since the end of the World Cup the city has repeatedly started talks with the Rugby Club and other potential anchor tenants to move to the stadium, but up to 2013 the stadium has not found a main tenant. This means the stadium remains a financial burden for the city, based on its operational costs and unattractiveness for sports clubs to move into the stadium. The Green Point Stadium was a clear example of FIFA’s ability to influence South African government and development strategy, showing clearly who had more power in the game (Hlatshwayo, Blake 2011: 245).

After the World Cup FIFA’s influence in many spheres during the event preparation was clearly visible and widely criticised by the media, public and academics, influencing stakeholder’s perception of the World Cup legacies. FIFA’s domination had led to many of the intended World Cup developments in infrastructure, social and environmental legacies being underdeveloped or non-existent because they did not follow the profit interest of the global sporting organisation. Much of the missed opportunities for positive World Cup legacies can be attributed to this.

3.3.3. Increase in tourism?

South Africa expected 280,000 international travellers for the World Cup (South Africa 2010 Bid Book 2003: 13/14). Grant Thornton claimed that about 350,000 foreign visitors spent approximately ZAR 8 billion during the event (Saunders 2011). Other sources, such as the Western Cape government reported that tourism figures were far lower than expected, showing an occupancy rate of only 55% in the City of Cape Town during the event (Hlatshwayo, Blake 2011: 241).

Long-term tourism impacts of the World Cup are difficult to assess and predict. Part of the slow growth of tourism in South Africa has been due to the financial crisis in 2008/09, and growth rates of about 1-1.5% for 2011-2015 higher than without the World Cup were estimated by Grant Thornton (Saunders 2011).

A survey by African Response in 2010 found that 96% of World Cup visitors would possibly return to the country, and 92% would recommend it as a holiday destination (Prinsloo 2010). It was additionally found that the majority of tourists, about 60%, were from the African continent. The high numbers of tourists expected during the World Cup were not met, a factor arguably caused by
the prevailing financial crisis on the one hand and a crowding-out effect of regular tourists on the other (Bond, Cottle 2011: 51). The general impact of the World Cup on the tourism industry is mostly speculative. South Africa has been experiencing an upward growth in tourism since 2003 with an annual increase of 3.9% on average (Bond, Cottle 2011: 52), and how much of the post-World Cup increase is caused by the event or the general trend is not possible to conclude.

### 3.3.4. Political impacts and the national image

Visible in the post-event media reporting is that the World Cup has been widely perceived as a resounding success – a complex event had been delivered at a high standard and to deadline, leading to international recognition for South Africa (Dowse 2011). The World Cup was a multi-site operation that required mobilisation and coordination of multiple city, provincial and national government institutions, leading to resource implications that developed the experience of ministerial and civil servants, led to the passing or amending of legislation and the re-configuration of the national budget. The event increased institutional learning and closer relation between the different government departments, but the mega-event also could have negative side-effects on national legislation and the amendment of laws that need to be managed to not lead to negative long-term outcomes. South Africa needs to manage these contradictions and plan for the long-term effect of the World Cup in order to gain and learn from it. Areas such as accountability, governance, national interest and national sovereignty were especially challenged throughout the World Cup preparation through the influence of FIFA and the pressure of hosting the event (Dowse 2012: 39).

Besides these domestic implications, the World Cup was used to show economic achievement, signal diplomatic stature, to place South Africa more centrally in the international world order and highlight the African distinction (Cornelissen 2011). As previously mentioned, South Africa and Africa had been at the receiving end of negative publicity and image for a long time, and the World Cup narrative was trying to overcome this afro-pessimism (Schreiner, Go 2011: 135). But while both South Africa and FIFA presented 2010 as the African World Cup, in reality it was a South African World Cup (Cottle 2011: 2). The South African ambitions to make this an event that the whole continent could profit from was evident, but the spill-over effect of the event was not as big as hoped for and there is great scepticism about the World Cup’s regional impact (Dowse 2012: 37). South African and African government stakeholders acknowledge that the immediate tourism and development benefits did not occur (Dowse 2011). But the World Cup did create an informal space for close diplomatic relations with foreign states and one African Ambassador regarded the African World Cup strategy as a “political masterstroke” (Dowse 2011), as it would heighten South Africa’s image in the eyes of the rest of the continent and create a basis for reciprocal support in other
areas. South Africa gained significant social capital in the region, partly as a result of inviting all African heads of state to both the opening and closing event (Dowse 2011).

The mega-event was used as ‘big bang’ approach to make a global impression and use the World Cup’s foreign policy potential as soft power. It was also thought to have a possible positive effect on South Africa’s influence in the African Union and United Nations (Dowse 2012: 38). Other ambitions of the President were to further the country’s aims to join the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) grouping, in order to gain greater acknowledgement and leadership in the developing world (Dowse 2011; Cornelissen 2011). These ambitions were successful as South Africa joined the informal grouping in 2011.

Part of its strategy was for South Africa to re-brand itself, creating a positive brand that would not only increase their political standing, but attract foreign investment and tourism. This means hosting the World Cup has the potential to change the popular perception of the host, and in the case of 2010, of the entire continent (Dowse 2012: 32). South Africa could have overcome stereotypes of crime, poverty, incapacity, afro-pessimism and limiting the stereotypes of game parks and safari’s as the image of Africa (Dowse 2012: 33).

The media coverage of the World Cup was exceptionally positive. Changing popular perception is not achieved through a one-time positive event, but perception and stereotypes, especially negative ones, tend to linger and are hard to eradicate. The result of the World Cup in South Africa is argued to have raised awareness and overall perception, but limited to the World Cup itself, and not showing any change in the underlying issues associated with South Africa (Knott et al. 2013). Schreiner and Go argue that no matter how big an event is, if critical social issues are not improved the image of the whole country is not likely to gain considerable positive reputation (2011: 136). With coverage increasing on South Africa from April 2009, positive news only lasted until a few months after the event, but public services strikes and other negative news pulled the added positive associations down again (Schreiner, Go 2011: 136).

Comparing this with Germany 2006 and Beijing 2008, where similar media coverage was visible, shows that mega-events seem to create media awareness, but coverage does not necessary show non-event related topics. This means the awareness is there, but without in-depth reporting the general image of a country is unlikely to change significantly (Schreiner, Go 2011: 138-140).

There was research done on this topic immediately after the World Cup, looking at the change in foreign perception. The Reputational Institute Research concluded that there is an overall visible improvement in South Africa’s ranking from 44.6 to 49.11, grouping it with the USA, Peru and
Mexico (Cottle 2011: 3; Schreiner, Go 2011: 141). Research conducted by SABMiller, in a survey of 4000 people in the United Kingdom before and after the World Cup, found that the event created more positive awareness and familiarity around South Africa, but respondents concluded also that the event was unlikely to benefit the majority of the people (Schreiner, Go 2011: 142). GCIS Tracker Research came to similar conclusions, with an increase of positive exposure of South Africa across all regions, except East Asia, being noted, and with most mention of its scenic beauty and as tourism destination (Schreiner, Go 2011: 142). South Africa Tourism Research found through interviewing tourists in South Africa that the view of South Africa as a tourism destination had improved, but serious concerns were evident among the visitors about the underlying social issues in the country (Schreiner, Go 2011: 143).

One of the main indices in nation branding research is the Arnholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index. It has previously received some criticism for its scientific standards, but is an important marketing tool for foreign direct investment and tourism (Kersting et al. 2010: 47). The Nation Branding Index (NBI) shows a mixed picture on the impacts of the World Cup on South Africa’s image. It concludes that the World Cup did not lead to the hoped for major reputational boost and in 12 out of 19 countries polled for the index South Africa has seen a decline since 2009, based mainly on unfulfilled expectations and false positive views of South Africa before the World Cup. These were caused mainly by the huge promises made by the South African government before the event, which are only a partial version of reality (Arnholt-GfK Roper 2010: 9). The NBI concludes that the extensive media coverage before and during the event led to a correction of the view of South Africa, downwards, but as a tourism destination South Africa’s image has improved through the World Cup (Arnholt-GfK Roper 2010: 10).

These different indices show a very different impact of the World Cup on the country, all drawing somewhat different conclusions. But what is clear seems to be that South Africa’s reputation as a tourism destination has increased, while its overall image could not be changed greatly through hosting the World Cup. All research related to the above was concluded immediately after the World Cup (Schreiner, Go 2011: 144, Knott et al. 2013), and no newer research on the development of South Africa’s image since 2011 was available. The World Cup hype lasted until about one week after the event, when the first negative news came out (Schreiner, Go 2011: 145). This international branding research shows how creating a positive image is a long-term strategy and cannot be achieved through one event if other underlying issues are not improved at the same time (Schreiner, Go 2011: 145).

South Africa’s ambition to change the national image with the hosting of the 2010 World Cup was
not fulfilled according to international indices, such as the National Branding Index by Arnholt-GfK. Roper and positive changes were mainly visible in tourist perceptions of the country’s beauty, but not the intended economic and political image boost to attract foreign investment. But the media has drawn a very positive conclusion of the World Cup for South Africa, overcoming many of the negative perceptions and outlooks prior to the event. South Africa did not manage to make the World Cup an all-African World Cup, as many of the ideas to include neighbouring countries in the event were prohibited by FIFA. Nevertheless, small political gestures, such as inviting the African heads of states and tying new diplomatic relations is likely to have a long-term positive political impact for the country that has shown its capability to pull off a first-order mega-event.

3.3.5. The event’s social impact

Nation-building is said to be one of the positive effects related to hosting mega-events - it means increasing the ability to transcend racial divides and promote community cohesion. Mega-events provide ‘moments in time’ around which the country can celebrate national pride and patriotism. This effect was widely felt in the Rugby World Cup 1995, and plans for 2010 were to capitalise on its momentum and create a unifying effect through football in South Africa. The immediate reflections on the impact of the World Cup on nation-building were positive. Flags and multi-racial compositions of stadia audiences were seen as signs of reconciliation and South African identity development (Dowse 2012). But the possible legacy was not well planned and no obvious strategies or end-goals supported a possible nation-building campaign (Dowse 2012: 36). The nation-building was undermined by the practical ways in which the World Cup preparation included strategies such as criminalisation and crowding-out of the poor from key urban development sites, which further reinforced racial and social division in South Africa (McKinley 2011: 30). The World Cup represents an elite-led, capitalist branding and image-making exercise, a “hugely costly and ultimately ephemeral exercise in myth making” (McKinley 2011: 30).

South Africans were told to expect great, positive improvements for their lives from the World Cup. Grant Thornton concluded that 91% of South Africans felt the event unified South Africans and improved national pride and extended a greater allegiance with the African continent (Saunders 2010). A survey by the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) in 2007 showed that about 50% of people perceived economic growth and job creation as main benefits of the event and 1/3 believed they would personally gain from the World Cup, but by 2009 only one in a hundred South Africans believed in the positive impact the World Cup would have on their life (Bond, Cottle 2011). Part of this change in attitude was the impact of the media on the population, simply through paying attention to news, like delays and mismanagement in the preparation of the World Cup and ignoring...
the rest (Schreiner, Go 2011: 134).

Little money trickled down and most evaporated – FIFA’s top-down approach led to approximately 100,000 street vendors and informal traders losing their livelihoods, as they were removed or banned from trading in areas near the World Cup. No opportunities were created for the urban poor. People in Durban, for example, were relocated to a toxic landfill site without services to enable the enlargement of the existing stadium (Horn 2011: 134). Another example of the missed opportunities to include South Africans is that the World Cup mascot, the Zakumi doll, was produced in China instead of by local industry (Bond, Cottle 2011: 62). Major construction companies’ aggregated pre-tax profits increased more than 100% per annum 2004-2009, leading to more income inequality and major retrenchments of workers when the World Cup projects were finished. The wage gap in the construction sector between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and general worker increased from 166 in 2004 to 285 in 2009 (Bond, Cottle 2011: 63).

In opposing these developments, the World Class Cities for All (WCCA) campaign, for example, started to involve journalists in reporting on mistreatments and the social side of the World Cup (Horn 2011: 146). Letters to FIFA President Blatter received no response, but under pressure FIFA started opening up some opportunities for street vendors. The WCCA campaign also tried to gain support from government, but a framework that was concluded with National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) and to be negotiated with the FIFA Local Organising Committee, which included a clause on human rights, was verbally agreed but never signed (Horn 2011: 145).

Involving a wide variety of people in the World Cup could have made the event a real African World Cup, allowing street traders to be the public face of the tournament, promoting pan-African unity and ‘Ubuntu’ among all Africans, and including African sponsors could have created the desired effects in South Africa and on the continent. One of the only African features which survived exclusion or trademarking by FIFA was the Vuvuzela (Horn 2011: 148).

Potential positive effects on grassroots soccer were not visible. FIFA claimed a large portion of funds were going towards the development of football in South Africa, in the building of 20 Football for Hope Centres across Africa (of which six were existent at the time of the statement) by 2010, but the 2009 FIFA Financial Report shows the official World Cup campaign received a total of USD 2.2 million out of a total yearly income of USD 1 billion. For other development expenditure, such as the GOAL campaign, FIFA allocated only about 15% of its 2009 income to football development (McKinley 2011: 29).
This sheds a very negative light on the social implications of the 2010 World Cup. Most promises were not met and instead of a social uplifting many South Africans experienced the opposite. This was caused not necessarily by a lack of government will, but through the overarching commercial interest of FIFA and the official sponsors that did not leave room for sustainable social improvements and a lasting legacy. But what South Africa has gained from the World Cup is increased skills training; 41,000 police officers were trained and thousands of people in the country have more skills and are therefore more employable, even though employment creation was limited (KAS 2011: 58). Additionally, the successful delivery of the event has been perceived as helping to restore faith in the government’s capacity to deliver (Dowse 2012: 36).

3.3.6. The real environmental legacy

Critical voices argue that the strategy of FIFA and the South African government concerning the sustainability and greening of the World Cup was “giving the appearance of doing something but actually doing nothing” (Taylor 2011: 182), which is one of the oldest diplomatic tricks. Many promises were made to make the World Cup green and to offset the carbon emissions generated through the event, but these were only partly met. Part of the agenda was to invest in infrastructure in order to reduce road traffic and increase public transport use, but consequences of this strategy were that mainly tourists and middle-class commuters used the new infrastructure, while commuting from the poorer suburbs remained dangerous and inconvenient (van der Westhuizen 2007, Death 2011). However, the experience during the World Cup especially of middle-class South Africans that generally use private cars for all their journeys, can lead to a changing attitude towards public transport in South Africa, leading to significant environmental and social consequences for the country (Death 2011: 107). As mentioned above many of the new bus or train routes built were in order to fulfil FIFA requirements, and are intended to be extended in the near future.

The World Cup was an opportunity for South Africa to improve its standing in the world, to strengthen its branding, political commitment, to catalyse greater environmental awareness and ecological modernisation, and to enhance life for the society as a whole (Taylor 2011), but it was largely missed due to the lack of coordination and leadership (Death 2011). There are two dimensions to greening an event – the mitigation of the direct environmental impact, including carbon dioxide emissions, and the potential to generate a lasting legacy towards more sustainability (Death 2011: 101, City of Cape Town 2011). A successful World Cup greening could reinforce the mega-event’s expression of modernity and the cosmopolitan and environmentally responsible character of the host nation or cities (Death 2011).
To green the World Cup in South Africa, a country with poor public transport infrastructure, a carbon-intensive and coal-reliant economy and where most fans arrived by air, was a significant challenge (Death 2011: 100). The greening campaign that was connected to the World Cup was part of the broader vision of an African World Cup. A defining feature of the greening programme was absence of leadership and vision from the South African government until very late in the process, when the National Greening 2010 Framework was released. The sums of money spent on greening were marginal and the greening programme never achieved major government support. This meant that many projects initiated were underfunded or could not secure funding, and the FIFA’s attitude towards greening was generally unhelpful (Death 2011: 109). Declaring the World Cup as green was a propaganda move to ‘keep the cash rolling’ and to deflect attention from real environmental challenges (Taylor 2011: 175). The 2010 World Cup was the most carbon intensive the FIFA’s history with an emission of 2.7 Mt of CO₂ equivalent emissions, eight times more than the World Cup in Germany 2006. Of these emissions 67% were caused by international travel, 17.6% by inner-city transport and 12.6% by energy use (Taylor 2011: 178). This shows that the biggest contributor to carbon emissions was international flights taken by spectators.

A national greening programme was the ‘Green Passport’, endorsed by United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), a guide for tourists on how to make their trip in South Africa environmentally friendly. Included in the passport were suggestions - such as don’t leave taps running, switch off lights when leaving a room and don’t eat endangered fish – but no actual ideas about how to green the World Cup (Taylor 2011: 183). The Green Passport at the same time passed the responsibility to offset carbon emissions to the individual instead of making it the organisers’ obligation. A study by the DEA and Norwegian government found that to offset the World Cup emissions would cost about EUR 20 million of carbon credits, and tenders for these credits were never filled (Taylor 2011: 186).

But most initiatives to green the event came from the host cities itself, especially Cape Town (Death 2011: 103). The City of Cape Town’s Green Goal programme was one of the most successful ones, standing out as proactive and far-reaching with detailed planning. The success of this programme, similar to a successful greening programme in Durban, was partly thanks to previous event-greening experiences in the cities (Death 2011: 104). Many host city greening initiatives focussed on the construction and operation of the stadia – to use local work force and materials and up to 95% of demolished components from the old stadia were salvaged, recycled and reused (Death 2011: 107).

The Cape Town Green Goal programme was based on grant funding of ZAR 8 million from the Western Cape Province and City of Cape Town and was implemented through 42 projects across
nine environmental targets (City of Cape Town 2011: 10). Over the four years of the project noteworthy success was accomplished in areas of recycling and use of public and non-motorised transport, reducing the environmental impact of the event. For example, more than half of the fans used public transport or walked to the matches in Green Point stadium, renewable energy from Darling Wind Farm was used to partly meet the stadiums’ energy consumption and 58% of waste was recycled (City of Cape Town 2011: 11). Of the 42 projects run in Cape Town 17 were legacy projects that would contribute to the residents’ well-being after the event. The Green Goal 2010 programme built on a similar programme in Germany 2006 and was a platform to communicate environmental and sustainability awareness. Another big part of the World Cup’s sustainability in Cape Town was the energy and water efficiency built into the Green Point Stadium and the Green Point Park, surrounding the stadium itself. The park was designed according to ecological principles, including a biodiversity garden, using spring water from Table Mountain for ponds and wetlands to replace irrigation and a hydro turbine that generates the parks’ electricity, as well as the promotion of recycling (City of Cape Town 2011: 30). But the Green Goal Programme in Cape Town was a positive exception to the general greening initiatives included in the 2010 World Cup.

It seemed inevitable that the environmental politics and sustainability agenda would suffer in South Africa under FIFA demands. FIFA expected from the hosts to create host cities as attractive as possible, meaning that many replacements, upgrades and repairs were done to prioritize short term appearance over long-term sustainability. This meant that besides some positive exceptions, “FIFA and national government did and said just enough about the environment to make it look like everybody cared and to avoid a public relations disaster” (Death 2011: 186), but the green legacy of the event and leap towards sustainable development for the country was very questionable.

### 3.3.7. General World Cup conclusions

‘The 2010 World Cup was great!’ is what football fans and spectators said. South Africa ‘pulled it off’ – doubts about its capabilities to host the World Cup were unfounded, ratings by FIFA, international visitors and TV viewers were constantly positive – this would lead to the conclusion that the 2010 FIFA World Cup was a ‘great success’ (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 24). But many of the hopes connected to the 2010 World Cup remained unfulfilled – the social agenda was ‘political lip service’ and poorer communities and citizens suffer most from the mega-spending connected to the event. But resultant cuts to other services were not accepted quietly, as recurring protests have shown over the last couple of years. Social tensions were not overcome by the ‘feel-good factor’ of the World Cup (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 25; Bond, Cottle 2011: 51).
But international consultancies, such as Grant Thornton, still argue that the World Cup was money well spent, adding much needed infrastructure, adding to South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), generating national pride, boosting tourism and improving the international perception of South Africa. The World Cup even added a new word to the Oxford English Dictionary, after ‘vuvuzela’ was voted the Word of the World Cup during July 2010 (Saunders 2011). However, as mentioned before, many of these economic impact studies fail to include externalities, such as environmental destruction (Bond, Cottle 2011: 64).

There has been little effort by the government or other organisations to conduct a more accurate impact study about the wider implications of the World Cup that were considered partly in this dissertation. A failure to consider positive as well as negative outcomes will lead to a repetition of the model in future mega-event bids and no marked learning curve for the country. While tangible benefits of the World Cup had been greatly exaggerated to legitimise the event (Bond, Cottle 2011: 64), as the World Cup ended, positive effects seemed to disappear quickly with new xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals and recurring strikes of workers across South Africa (Cottle 2011: 1). So, what conclusions can be drawn from the developments before and after the World Cup in South Africa?
4. Analysis and Conclusion

After looking at the development of interpretations and perceptions of the 2010 World Cup, by local and international media and scholars, from the bidding process until after the event, this chapter will analyse the underlying developments and draw conclusions to answer the research question: How and why have interpretations and perceptions of the prospective ‘legacies’ of the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa changed over the past decade?

One of the first promises made by the government and FIFA was the positive economic impact the World Cup would have for South Africa. The actual cost of hosting the World Cup is difficult to calculate and different studies come up with different numbers, depending on what costs are included in their calculations. But all studies draw the same conclusion: The World Cup was much more expensive for the country than expected, and the economic benefits, measured in additional GDP growth, fell short of the expectations.

A second, economic and social promise was the positive impact the World Cup would have on employment numbers. Trevor Manual promised 400,000 new jobs (Kersting et al. 2010). The World Cup did generate employment, especially during the construction phase, but most of these jobs were temporary, and in 2010 employment already had decreased by 4.7%, because stadia were finished and the total amount of construction work was reduced (Bond, Cottle 2011: 50).

The money spent on the World Cup by the government was mostly from tax revenues, but benefitted predominantly the wealthier population. Infrastructure upgrades were focussed on the routes to the stadia, most of which are located in wealthier suburbs to meet FIFA requirements (Kersting et al. 2010). Economic impact studies claim that the infrastructure developments connected to the World Cup, especially in the public transport sector, helped South Africa meet its development imperatives (Saunders 2011), but travelling from the townships to the city centre is in 2013 as expensive, uncomfortable and dangerous as before the World Cup. The legacy of the Football World Cup can nevertheless be argued to be a positive one. Infrastructure development projects were fast-tracked thanks to the event, and BRT Systems were started, leading to plans for extensions into more suburbs in the near future. By using public transport during the event, white, middle-class South Africans in particular have overcome certain stereotypes, leading to a possible greater acceptance and use of public transport by all South Africans in the future (Death 2011). Without the World Cup the upgrade and development of the public transport system in South Africa would have taken considerably longer.
One of the biggest World Cup related developments were the stadia. On this topic international and national voices are most critical, questioning the amount of money spent on stadia that will mostly be ‘white elephants’ as most of them are underutilised and obsolete after the matches. They have high maintenance costs, in most cases paid by the city, and only two of South Africa’s football teams are able to fill the stadia with spectators and fans for their matches. Sustainability plans, for the Cape Town stadium, for example, rely on non-sports events, such as concerts, to cover the running costs. Most stadia were built or refurbished only to meet the World Cup requirements, not looking into the future and the sustainability of the stadia for the cities or regions in the future. But at the same time the building of ‘white elephant’ stadia can be seen as a national project of prestige, showcasing the credibility and ability of the South African state (Death 2011, Knorr et al. 2013).

The influence of FIFA is one of the main drivers for negative legacies of the World Cup. The original South African bid had a strong developmental and regional stance to it, but most of the South African ambitions were dampened by FIFA requirements. South Africa, like other host countries, saw hosting the World Cup as a privilege (Klenk 1999), making huge concessions to the international organisation in order to be allowed to host the event. FIFA is a commercial organisation that is focussed mainly on the profit of the World Cup and not the sustainability or environmental integrity of the event for the host, which is evident in their actions relating to the preparation and organisation of the 2010 World Cup as well as previous World Cups. FIFA made the highest profit in history from the FIFA World Cup 2010, but South Africa’s prostitution for the international organisation did not pay off economically for the country, as it recorded financial losses after the event. This was also taken up by critical voices in the South African media (see Figure 5) and largely influenced the perception of event stakeholders.
South Africa expected, as one of the World Cup legacies, to improve the country’s image in the world for reasons of tourism, investment and political advantage. The long-term effect of the event on tourism is difficult to predict, but South Africa has seen a positive tourism trend since 2003, which has continued after the World Cup (Bond, Cottle 2011). Visitors and TV spectators asked for their opinion of South Africa as a tourism destination had a very positive view after the event (Prinsloo 2010). This leads to the conclusion that a positive tourism legacy of the World Cup is clear, although whether the steady increase in tourism is caused mainly by the event is not possible to know with certainty. The World Cup might have merely supported a general trend towards South Africa as a tourism destination.

Furthermore the World Cup was intended to attract additional foreign investment into South Africa. Foreign Investment had been declining worldwide after the 2008/2009 financial crisis and is slowly increasing again. After the World Cup in 2012 South Africa experienced major mining strikes, which dampened inward investment. It can generally be concluded that the World Cup was not a game changer in the investment market for South Africa, and had no direct visible impact on foreign investment.

One of the main positive World Cup legacies was a political legacy of the event. Domestically the organisation of a first-tier mega-event brought not only the governing parties, the tri-partite alliance, closer together (Cornelissen 2009), but the organisation required inter-departmental collaboration, which strengthened the administration, created trust between departments and has a long-term positive effect for the government’s capacity. Staging a successful event additionally increased public trust in the government that it is able to deliver on promises made.
Internationally the World Cup was intended to showcase not only South Africa, but the African continent as a whole in overcoming afro-pessimism and negative stereotypes of the continent. But this promise could not be kept. FIFA interfered with South Africa’s plans to have some of the team accommodation and training facilities in neighbouring countries, so in the end the World Cup was a South African one alone. The World Cup nevertheless did have a positive impact on South Africa’s national image. National Branding indices see a slight positive spike in South Africa’s image after the World Cup, which was not lasting because of new xenophobic attacks after the event. Many international sceptics concerned about hosting a World Cup in South Africa were proven wrong as the event itself went smoothly with no major hiccups.

However, the visible political legacy of the event cannot be attributed to a good strategy or planning from the government. With adequate legacy planning the World Cup could have had a much more profound and positive impact for the country (Dowse 2012). This was partly caused by the immense influence FIFA had over the organisation of the event, leaving little room for South Africa’s ambitions and developmental goals to be included in the event itself (Steinbrink et al. 2011: 25). President Zuma wanted to use the event to increase his prestige as the new president, but the World Cup was an event over a limited time-period, which could not overcome public scepticism of him as a person or stop the public from questioning other actions of his before and after the event.

Socially, the World Cup did not keep the promises made to the public. At the outset most South Africans were behind the idea to host the World Cup, believing it would have a positive impact on their lives. But the World Cup did not deliver. Jobs created to prepare for the event were temporary, leading to more unemployment after the event than before. Street vendors were excluded from close World Cup proximities, leading to loss of income for many families. However, many people that had a job connected to the World Cup preparations increased their skills and the South African labour force is more educated than before the event (KAS 2011).

A ‘feel-good factor’ and national pride brought South Africans closer together during the World Cup, showing that social and racial divides can be overcome (Death 2011). But the euphoria was not long lasting. The people that most benefitted from the World Cup were the wealthier part of the population – they profited from new infrastructure and the event itself. This, in the end, is likely to have increased the inequality in South Africa instead of overcoming historical divides.

Environmentally the World Cup was the most carbon-intensive World Cup ever. The Green Goal Programme was not widespread and publicised enough to make a great impact on the event itself, and if one asked South Africans and visitors on the street, most would not be aware of the
programme. This is mainly due to a lack of will from government and FIFA to include event greening as a major pillar in the World Cup organisation and a subsequent lack of funding for the greening programme. But the Green Goal programme in Cape Town shows that even with little money and good ideas a lot can be achieved. The World Cup might have an impact on behaviour for many that were aware of the campaign and it will definitely have an impact on future events in South Africa and the world, as not only the South African government, but also FIFA have realised that the trend towards event greening and more sustainable events is an inevitable one (Death 2011).

Lastly, on the sport development side the World Cup gave the sport of football a big push, overcoming its stereotype as a ‘black’ sport. But that does not mean it had a long-term effect on the national tournaments or spectators, as on the whole it was brought into the centre of the nation’s attention just for the four weeks of the tournament, with everyone going back to supporting their favourite sport again after July 2010.

This dissertation has shown that many promises made to the population were not kept. Positive expectations slowly crumbled in the years of event preparation. South Africa was not able to gain as much positive impact for the country as it intended because of external restraints as well as internal incapacity. As a developing country South Africa had to juggle between huge government spending required to host the event and the problems of development - creating housing, jobs, providing clean water and other facilities. The World Cup did not benefit the poor population of South Africa, although this was one of the promises made to the people. But it did benefit the government and companies or organisations with commercial interests in the event, making the highest profit ever for FIFA. The World Cup was in the eyes of many a successful event – it created euphoria, national pride, and brought people together. Archbishop Desmond Tutu put it this way, “It is the first time this prestigious tournament has been held on the African continent, and therefore important for who we are, for our self-esteem as a continent and as South Africans” (in Death 2011: 111). But it did not change the country. Underlying problems are in 2013 still not overcome. The World Cup was a nice event. It showcased South Africa in a positive light to the world without having a lasting social, environmental or economic impact. It mainly accelerated pre-existing development trends in South Africa (Steinbrink et al. 2011).

The perceptions of the World Cup by the different stakeholders, locally and internationally, changed over the period from the bidding to host the event until the event itself was finished. Domestically, South Africans and the South African government looked with positive expectations towards their event, but as it became clearer that many promises made in the bidding process could not be kept, they slowly adjusted their hopes for the event. Nevertheless the euphoria and positivity created by
the event can mainly be attributed to perceptions, such as the ‘feel-good factor’ and positive media attention the event received. For many it was a once-in-a-lifetime experience to be at or close to a World Cup. This feeling during the event itself seems to overcome most critical perceptions and what remains is the memory of something extraordinary, which is part of the allures of global events.

Internationally the perceptions changed from being very sceptical in the beginning, both from international media, FIFA and governments, to a very positive one the closer the event came. South Africa ‘delivered’ a successful event, which many critics did not expect. It was a memorable World Cup. However, economically and politically the World Cup as a single event could not change the perception of South Africa as a whole; this is a process that requires more positive news than one successful event.

What do these both positive and negative outcomes of the football World Cup mean for South Africa? The FIFA World Cup was not the last mega-event for South Africa, but probably only the beginning of more efforts to host mega-events. In 2011 Durban hosted the International UN climate conference, 2012 South Africa hosted the Africa Cup of Nations, and there is continuous speculation in the media that South Africa will submit an Olympic bid for 2024 or 2028 (Zaccardi 2013).

The South African government is aware of the negative outcomes of the World Cup and that the event did not manage to overcome many historical differences for the population or reduce poverty and inequality. But the intangible legacies of the event, especially national image, prestige and national pride seem to be the driving factors for the South African government to conclude that the World Cup was successful and similar events should be staged in the future (Mbalula 2010).

This dissertation has shown that interpretations and perceptions of mega-events, showcased through the example of South Africa, change over time. Starting with a convincing bid for the international sporting organisation and to persuade the public and investors, the euphoria to be a World Cup host hides many of the actual costs and negative impacts the event can have for a country. As generally expected, realistic interpretations and expectations only become evident during the event preparation or after the event itself.

Here a major problem becomes clear: ex-post analyses of mega-events are rarely available. Most real effects of the event are never publicised and negative impacts on, for example, employment and the economy only become evident if deeper research is carried out. For the public the event generally ends in a ‘feel-good’ state, full of positive emotions and euphoria that we ‘pulled it off’. Once the event has passed the actual long-term impact is not of interest to the media and therefore...
often not questioned by the general public.

This dissertation has shown that the expected long-term legacies cannot be majorly positive, if they are not sufficiently planned for or taken note of during the event preparation. Mega-event hosting needs to include legacy planning by the main actors, the government and FIFA, to have a significant implication after the event itself. There is a need for more ex-post analyses of mega-events and their impacts on developed and developing countries. The commercially driven international sporting organisations, such as FIFA especially, need to include, besides their interest in profit, a sustainability agenda. South Africa in 2013 has stadia it cannot fill, public transport systems that do not cater for large parts of the population and expenses that are not supporting their development.

However, this does not stop countries from wanting to host more mega-events. South Africa has manoeuvred itself into a mega-event circuit that it cannot and seemingly does not want to come out of. Hosting mega-events is one of the domestic and foreign policy goals, and intangible legacies, such as nation building, prestige and international image, override all negative effects the mega-event leaves behind. Most important is the ‘feeling’ connected to the event itself and the memory of it, as this is what lingers the longest in the people’s minds. Economic rationality does not seem to be the main driver of mega-event hosting. This is evident not only in South Africa but in all previous and future mega-event hosts. Otherwise why would the government downplay suicide bombings carried out a few months before the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia? And, why would international organisations choose hosts for the Winter Olympics without much snow or countries with 40°C average temperatures for the FIFA World Cup?

The South African case has in many ways confirmed legacy developments found in previous World Cups, related to job creation, economic influence, tourism and sustainability. But the hosting of mega-events in developing countries draws more attention to possible negative legacies of the event than in developed countries, as more money is spent in relation to national wealth and the event has a greater impact on the economy and population. At the same time developing countries arguably have less capacity and knowledge to do exactly this: to plan for the positive legacies of the event.

With intangible benefits being the driving factor for governments to apply to host, and the public, most of the time, being easily convinced of the grandeur connected to hosting an event in their own country, the mega-event hype is likely to continue. The next World Cup will be in Brazil 2014 and media attention during the preparation phase has been focussed in South Africa on the USD 64,000 question of whether Brazil can pull it off, if it will complete its stadia in time and how safe it will be in
the country during the World Cup. Nonetheless, Brazil will pull it off, just as South Africa did. It will host a successful World Cup and then ‘forget’ about possible negative effects of the event in the aftermath, relying on the promotion of national identity and ‘feel-good factors’ for its people.

This dissertation has shown that perceptions and interpretations of mega-event legacies change during the preparation and event itself. It has also shown that it is not necessarily the tangible legacies, such as economic benefits, increase employment and tourism figures that are the decisive argument for countries to host an event, even though these areas are often the main focus for estimates by investment firms and governments in convincing investors and the population prior to the event. The legacy of an event cannot be forecasted, but this dissertation has shown that there are certain trends towards event legacies that need to be and can be managed by the organising committee. Legacies are not only positive or negative, but, most of the time, show shades of both – even negative legacies can have a learning effect for the stakeholders or have intangible benefits that cannot be seen without further analysis.

The world closes their eyes to too much negativity surrounding World Cups and Olympics. The events are a magnet for international ‘showing-off’ and national ‘feeling-good’. They offer a brief moment of the extraordinary; moments where people can forget their everyday problems. This is the driver of mega-events. This dissertation does not attempt to argue against mega-events as a whole, but showing that perceptions and interpretations of mega-events are moulded by the government and media to achieve certain goals. Awareness about the actual effects as well as drivers of mega-events need to be more publicised. Analyses of the impacts of the event before and after the event itself are of great importance for the government in planning and overcoming possible negative legacies and for the international organisations to learn from what has gone before and adapt their strategies accordingly.
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