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Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
Justificational Narratives:
What is the role of fear in Israeli narratives of war?

El Inocente stood before the table and gestured for silence. He preached a long sermon, of which I cannot recall a single word, but I can tell you that it was full of vitriol, decorated and embellished to the point where one might almost believe that it was a noble speech.¹

By Sasha Evans, EVNSAS601
Supervised by Professor Kay McCormick
May 2004, UCT.

Justificational Narratives:
What is the role of fear in Israeli narratives of war?
By Sasha Evans, May 2004

Abstract

The body of this thesis contains two main parts. The first (section 3) is a critical linguistic analysis of a selection of political speeches (which I have called ‘policy narratives’) delivered by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in the period February 2002 – October 2003. I have sought, with reference to Aristotle and other writers on persuasion, to delineate the rhetorical devices employed by Sharon and his speechwriters, and to demonstrate that one of their most important functions is to contribute to and enhance the overall climate of fear among the Israeli people, for the furtherance of Sharon’s own political goals. I focus primarily on the speeches surrounding and leading up to the March 2002 announcement of ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, which was described by Palestinians and international aid workers as the harshest military assault on the WBGS since the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

After examining the policy narratives I provide another representation of the ‘reality on the ground’ experienced by the Palestinian population at the receiving end of Sharon’s ‘operations’.

The second (section 4) is a linguistic analysis of the ‘narrative of personal experience’ of a civilian reservist – Moshe Nissim – who was recruited in April 2002, at the height of ‘Defensive Shield’, to drive a D-9 bulldozer through the West Bank’s Jenin refugee camp. Nissim, who seems motivated by his own personal fears and failures, apparently sees in Jenin the long-awaited opportunity to redeem himself. Although he does not appear to have been inspired by the arguments and themes of Sharon’s narratives, the overall atmosphere of fear and hatred that is legitimised and given weight by Sharon in his speeches, sets the stage for Nissim to act on his darkest urges and later to be considered by himself and others as a hero for having done so.

I contend that Israeli right wing hegemony both feeds and is fed by fear.
Acknowledgements

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Professor Edward W Said, who passed away on 25 September 2003...

... and to Yasmeen, who was born the same year.

Thanks to Kay for her patience and help; to Anis for so many long and interesting conversations, and to Goolam, for rescuing my work from a corrupted hard-drive!
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1. Introduction

This thesis approaches the question – what is the role of fear in Israeli narratives of war? – by analysing two forms of war narratives: political and personal. The political narratives are a selection of speeches and one article delivered by the current prime minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, in the period February 2002 - October 2003.1 I will be examining some of the persuasive and mythmaking techniques they exemplify in their production and presentation of a particular ideological vision. Neither the vision nor the themes identified here are limited to this period, or to Sharon, but political ideologies are most focused and therefore easily identifiable at times of heightened conflict and of politically far-right leadership, both of which are fulfilled at this time. The analysis also refers more broadly to the policies these speeches seek to legitimise, and to their effects on the physical and emotional reality of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories,2 I contend that policy narratives such as these are generated by and for the Israeli (and American) domination of the Palestinian people and their environment, and that these purposes, and the means of achieving them, can be clearly identified from the texts.

The term ‘policy narratives’ is defined by Roe as “the stories – scenarios and arguments – that are taken... as underwriting (that is, establishing or certifying) and stabilising (that is, fixing or making steady) the assumptions for policy-making in the face of the issue’s uncertainty, complexity or polarisation.”4 For the sake of this discussion I use the term specifically to mean the “stories, scenarios and arguments” narrated by the current Israeli prime minister, which are replicated throughout society but in particular by the spokespeople of the Israeli army (IDF), that underwrite and stabilise the assumptions upon which are based the country’s militaristic policy towards the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS).

Insofar as ‘propaganda’ is defined as “an association or scheme for propagating a doctrine or practice,”5 ‘policy narratives’ can also be seen as a form of propaganda. According to Pratkanis and Aronson,

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1 The full texts of these narratives can be found in Annex Pl: Ariel Sharon speeches in full, pp A1-A24.
2 Physical and emotional realities include: unemployment, poverty, malnutrition; the spread of diseases such as TB due to the denial of medical treatment in times of curfew, the shared reality of an environment rendered ‘war-torn’ and the trauma resulting from this and from exposure to repeated and prolonged periods of shelling, shooting, curfews and incursions, as experienced by the vast majority of the WBGS Palestinian population. In this context, ‘reality’ might be said to be that which has no (verbal) presentation.
3 The US contributes over USD billion per year to Israel’s national budget. Around USD 4.4 billion of this is military aid, approximately 80% of which is used to buy weapons from American manufacturers. See for example Francis, 9 December 2002.
4 Roe, 1994, p3.
5 OED, 1996.
[The word propaganda has evolved to mean mass 'suggestion' or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual. Propaganda is the communication of a point of view with the ultimate goal of having the recipient of the appeal come to 'voluntarily' accept this position as if it were his or her own.6]

The 'personal experience' narrative is that of an Israeli army bulldozer driver after the contentious April 2002 IDF operation in Jenin refugee camp.7 Although he defines himself politically as “heavily on the right,” his narrative and the actions it describes seem largely unmotivated by political or religious concerns - perhaps surprisingly so, for such an intensely 'political' environment as Israel/Palestine. It seems from this that the motivational power of policy narratives and other forms of political discourse is multilayered. On one level, they reinforce the ideology of government authority, which allows for certain demands by a government on its people (you must serve in the army, you must defend your country). In doing so, they also simultaneously establish the societal spectrum of ‘acceptable behaviour’ through an ideological framework to justify violent behaviour that is perhaps motivated by more personal concerns. The policies and their narratives provide the stage and script for an individual to “sanction social practices through reference to collective interests and systems of values.”8 In other societies and circumstances, the actions and motivations implied by the bulldozer driver’s narrative might be differently interpreted, but in times of ‘war’ he can be constructed by himself and by others as a ‘hero’.

Although both acting and then constructing his narrative of his own free will, influenced as we shall see by a catalogue of personal failures and frustrations, the bulldozer driver’s “2 whisky-fuelled hours of destruction are staged, sanctioned and rewarded by Sharon’s government and military agents, who themselves also act within the atmosphere of the prevailing narratives. From analysing these texts, I have come to believe that the values set on certain forms of behaviour within a society are not just directed from the 'top-down', in spite of the demonstrably persuasive power of the policy narratives themselves. In fact, in times of war, government discourse is most motivational (and therefore able to harness popular energy, which is clearly an important political aim) when it legitimises, and even provokes, the sustained and exaggerated expression of people’s deepest fears and insecurities. While problematising the concept that propaganda is unidirectional, it seems clear that the policy narratives of leading politicians can play a vital role in fanning the flames of hatred and fear, whatever their source, and in redirecting and focusing their energy for the fulfilment of political purposes. I contend that Israeli right-wing hegemony both feeds and is fed by fear.

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See Annex P2, pp A25-A34: Personal Experience - Moshe Nissim.
1.1. Why Analyse Policy Narratives?

In general, the aim of policy narrative analysis, which is also conducted under the name of critical discourse analysis or critical linguistics, wherever these confront policy presentations, is to “analyse issues of social relevance” while attempting to expose “inequality and injustice,”9 or to find and expose the ‘myths’, conveyed and built upon by these narratives, which actively contribute to human suffering by helping to construct and then ‘naturalise’ oppressive circumstances and the attitudes necessary to perpetuate them. Wodak defines “critical linguistics” as “an interdisciplinary approach to language study with a critical point of view” for studying “language behaviour in natural speech situations of social relevance.”10 It is often underestimated just how much difference to our perception of a person or thing can be made simply by altering its framing terminology, and the narratives which help to construct a policy are to some degree responsible for its consequences, which can include war, destruction and death. According to Chomsky,

For those who stubbornly seek freedom around the world, there can be no more urgent task than to come to understand the mechanisms and practices of indoctrination. These are easy to perceive in the totalitarian societies, much less so in the propaganda system to which we are subjected and in which all too often we serve as unwilling or unwitting instruments.11

Furthermore, as Chomsky notes in a December 2001 interview with Norman Solomon, “understanding the world doesn’t help anyone else, or oneself very much either for that matter, unless it leads to action.”12

1.2. The Mythology Of The Mythologist

Since “writing about the politicisation of language is in itself politicised,”13 the analyst should acknowledge what Barthes calls the “mythology of the mythologist”14 - the influence of his or her own perspective on the analysis. According to Simpson:

Although the main aim of a critical linguistic analysis is to examine the ideologies which underlie texts... [What is needed is explicit recognition that the diagnostic readings may themselves be ideologically motivated and that the analyst has a particular stance which informs their particular interpretation.15

---

9 Wodak, 1989, introduction.
10 Wodak, 1989, introduction.
12 Solomon, 6 December 2001.
Pursuing a similar point in *Orientalism*, Said cites Gramsci:

"The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself' as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory... therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory."¹⁶

Although it would be impossible to compile a full inventory of the "infinity of traces" that led me to this research, it (and the ideological standpoint that governs it) was predominantly inspired by the outrage of four years (1997 - 2001) spent in the West Bank, monitoring and recording a range of human rights violations¹⁷ against the Palestinian population by Israeli government apparatuses such as the army, police and civil administration. Based in Ramallah, I frequently travelled between the towns and cities of the West Bank, and sometimes into the Gaza Strip, to speak with victims of human rights violations and their families, and to photograph and record video footage of the destruction wreaked by the incursion of heavy military equipment into densely-populated civilian areas. In the process, and particularly in the year following the outbreak of the current 'Intifada',¹⁸ I witnessed and experienced some of the harshest realities of life under Israeli occupation.

Afforded some degree of protection by my foreign nationality, I nonetheless experienced severe travel restrictions at checkpoints, although eventually allowed through the blockades that ordinary Palestinians were not permitted to cross under any circumstances.¹⁹ I also witnessed countless violations of the right to life and safety of person, and at each of the demonstrations I attended, mostly on the outskirts of Ramallah or Jerusalem, unarmed

¹⁵ Simpson, 1993, pp14-5.
¹⁷ By 'human rights violations' I mean violations of the rights laid down in the 1947 UN Declaration of Human Rights, as well as of the International Geneva Convention concerning the rights of civilians in times of war.
¹⁸ It is useful to compare the official narratives of 'both sides' (that is, the narrative that has taken prevalence to be accepted more or less as 'truth' by each nation) of the conflict concerning the 'outbreak' of this period. Palestinians agree that it began when Ariel Sharon entered the Al Aqsa courtyard flanked by over 1000 soldiers, who responded to the inevitable protests with live ammunition. The next day, the soldiers returned to the mosque, without Sharon, killing six in the mosque courtyard. In the two weeks that followed over 80 Palestinian protesters were shot and killed before retaliatory strikes began. Israelis, on the other hand, say that the Palestinian Authority had long planned an uprising; that to blame the 'Sharon trigger' was merely PA opportunism, that the Palestinians in the mosque courtyard had been throwing missiles at the Jewish worshippers on the other side of the Western Wall, and that Sharon had every right, as a Jew, to 'visit' the 'Temple Mount' (even if it is currently overlaid by Al Aqsa mosque and administered by the Islamic Waqf).
¹⁹ In the period September 2000 to December 2002, 75 Palestinians died at checkpoints, due to lack of access to hospital/medical treatment, including 17 babies at birth. The Electronic Intifada, electronicintifada.net/12/1/article988.shtml. According to press releases and other communications from Palestinian, Israeli and international human rights workers, the situation has deteriorated still further in the two years that followed, since many towns and villages have been comprehensively sealed off from the outside world with no access to medical resources whatsoever. According to 'Moshe', one of the hundreds of Israeli army dissidents (or 'refuseniks') to make their views public in the past 40 months, "What struck me was that all the roads from the Palestinian villages were blocked. As a medical student, my first thought was: 'What if someone has a heart attack or a woman needs to give birth?' Moshe, who declined to have his full name published for fear of reprisal, was interviewed by Conal Urquhart for *Israel shaken by crack troops who declared war unjust*, the
people (including children) were shot and either killed or maimed by Israeli soldiers. The firing of live ammunition, “rubber” bullets and tear gas into crowds was and remains common, often provoked by stone-throwing at soldiers but sometimes without apparent provocation, and I video-recorded many such incidents. Driving was dangerous because soldiers would frequently shoot from roadside high points over the top of queues of traffic at stone-throwing youngsters on the other side; towards the end of 2001 it became all but impossible to drive in any case because of the destroyed roads and frequent checkpoints. In Ramallah, as throughout the WBGS, there was the terror of frequent nightly shelling of the town from helicopters or tanks. Curfews are announced suddenly and leave tens of thousands of people locked for indefinite periods inside whichever buildings they happen to be in at that moment. People’s homes, businesses and livestock sheds are routinely demolished with their contents inside; these have been known to include animals and in some cases, as reported in Jenin refugee camp, Gaza and Nablus, humans. Thousands of acres of fields, olive groves and orchards have been uprooted by Israeli army bulldozers, for “security reasons;” tens of thousands of Palestinians have had their homes demolished for the same reason.

Living so intensively within ‘the news’ while closely following its presentation in the international media, it became clear that a different world was being described from the one I inhabited, even if the televised images looked familiar. The American international news network CNN, according to (Palestinian) popular assessment, is “more accurate if you turn the sound off.” Having held numerous discussions (and arguments) with the young Israeli soldiers charged with enforcing the restrictive measures on the Palestinian population, I became intrigued by the mechanism that had produced their certainty of the need for the army’s actions, and their own as its soldiers.

Sunday Independent (South Africa), 15 February 2004, p.5.
20 “Rubber” bullets are in fact steel bullets encased in rubber. At close range they can easily kill, and in the course of a year I spoke to seven children and/or their parents (two aged 16, one 14, one 13, two 12 and one just 9 years old) who lost an eye after being hit with these bullets. There have been countless other such cases; see for instance reports by Defence for Children International (DCI-Pal) and Amnesty International, among others.
21 In 2002, Palestinian residents of the city of Hebron had to stay inside their homes for almost 270 days. See LAW Society press releases, http://www.lawsociety.org.
22 In 2002, Palestinian residents of the city of Hebron had to stay inside their homes for almost 270 days. See Annex B11, p A43: Once upon a time in Jenin, by Huggler and Reeves, 25 April 2002. Also see the analysis of Moshe Nissim’s narrative in section 4.
23 “As of April 2002, the [agricultural] sector has suffered at least a 70% decline due to the siege and total losses were estimated to have reached US$992 million, including the destruction of crops and agricultural lands through bulldozing, burning and tree uprooting, preventing work on cultivated land, settler attacks on farmers working in their fields, damaging greenhouses, irrigation networks and agricultural equipment, death of livestock due to shelling or lack of food, export bans of agricultural products,” PASSIA 2003.
1.3. Propaganda In Nation-Building And War

Policy narratives, everywhere "the armature of everyday life in government," are particularly important when popular motivation must be maintained for intensive long-term war and/or nation-building projects.

1.3.1. Nation-Building

The ideological framework within which Sharon operates is Political Zionism, a nationalist movement with its roots in the latter part of the 19th century. The creation of the state of Israel on the land of Palestine necessitated (and its expansion today still necessitates) the forced removal of many of the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants.

It is the duty of Israeli leaders to explain to public opinion, clearly and courageously, a certain number of facts that are forgotten with time. The first of these is that there is no Zionism, colonisation or Jewish State without the eviction of the Arabs and the expropriation of their lands.

The early Zionist pioneers and today the state of Israel sought to establish and maintain a demographic balance of no more than 20% non-Jews in Israel. Currently the 'Arab-Israeli' population stands at approximately one million, although several thousand more are not registered and live in 'unrecognised villages' inside Israel. The founder of the World Zionist Organisation, Theodore Herzl, suggested in 1895: "Spirit the penniless population across the frontier by denying it employment... Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly." Neither discreet nor circumspect, the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, which Israel refers to as the 'War of Independence', caused

25 Roe, 1994, p34
26 It is important to indicate a difference between political and religious Zionism. The former is an expansionist colonialist ideology whose pursuit necessitates the removal of the indigenous population to make way for a uniquely Jewish state. The latter is translated as the dream of the Jewish people for a homeland over the millennia since their diaspora. Due to a blurring of this distinction in political Zionist discourse, anti-Zionism, in the sense of resisting the uprooting of the Palestinian population, is very often described as anti-semitism, or the deliberate thwarting of a sacred Jewish dream, as well as the Jewish right to self-determination and security. As a result, according to Robert Fisk, "Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines 'anti-Semitism' as 'opposition to Zionism: sympathy with opponents of the state of Israel.' Fisk, A Warning to Those Who Dare to Criticize Israel, The Independent Weekend Edition, 24/25 April 2004.
28 Because they are not recognised, these villages receive no infrastructure support or other services. See for example www.amberonline.com/gallery/exhibitions/54/notexist4.html: "Within the state of Israel today are some 70 Arab villages, which officially do not exist at all and do not appear on any maps. Successive Israeli governments have left them out of official plans and branded them illegal, zoning the land for agricultural use only, even though these communities have resided on it for generations. The inhabitants are Palestinian Arabs. In order to persuade the inhabitants to move, the Israeli government pursues the following policies: basic services such as electricity, drinking water and access to roads are withheld - the villages are forbidden to be connected to national networks; existing schools and clinics have been closed: all new constructions, including improving as well as building new homes, is strictly forbidden."
approximately 726,000¹¹ Palestinians to leave their homes and seek refuge in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank (then a part of Trans-Jordan), while some 531 Palestinian villages in the land that became Israel were either destroyed or resettled by the new Israelis.¹² Since then the refugees have been consistently denied the right to return,¹³ for the simple demographic reason articulated by Sharon: “the return of Arab refugees... to [Israel’s] territory... would effectively terminate the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state.”¹⁴ US President George Bush recently validated this claim by declaring the return of the refugees to be “unrealistic.”¹⁵

Meanwhile, more than three and a half million¹⁶ inhabitants of the WBGS now live under varying degrees of Israeli military occupation; for the same demographic reasons the state will not simply annex the land it occupied in 1967 and accord them rights as citizens, but it continues to govern the wealth of the WBGS’s environmental resources, such as water and arable land, for the benefit of its own population. To the inevitable expressions of dissatisfaction by Palestinians, the Israeli military responds with military force, while the ‘demographic threat’ posed by Palestinians is presented to the Israeli public in dehumanising narratives of fear (because “dehumanisation succeeds in resolving any dissonance that may be aroused by our cruelty towards our enemies.”¹⁷) Prominent Israeli politicians have long referred to Palestinians, for example, as “beasts walking on two legs,”¹⁸ “drugged cockroaches

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¹¹ UN Conciliation Commission estimate, 1948. Cited in PASSIA 2003, p269. The war in 1967 caused a further 300,000 refugees. Today, the number of UNRWA (United Nations Relief Works Agency)-registered Palestinian refugees lies at 3,973,360, and according to PASSIA, “some 90% of refugees in the Diaspora are not registered with UNRWA because of its narrow definition... the definition does not include refugees who fled elsewhere, those displaced in 1967 (at least 352,600)...” also not included are the WBGS Palestinians who overstayed their permits while abroad, and thus have not been allowed to return. There are over 50,000 such cases.” PASSIA 2003, p269.

¹² PASSIA 2003, p269. See http://www.jerusalemite.org/crimes/destroyed_villages/list.htm for a list of 419 villages destroyed in 1947-1949. In 1969, Israeli war hero Moshe Dayan addressed the Haifa Technicon: “Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages, and I do not blame you because geography books no longer exist, not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either. Nahal arose in the place of Mahlul; Kibbutz Gvat in the place of Jibta [ ... ]. There is not one single place built in this country that did not have a former Arab Population.” Moshe Dayan, cited in Ha‘aretz, 4 April 1969.

¹³ This right is enshrined in UN General Assembly resolution 194 of December 1948: “The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date... compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return.” On 14 April 2004, George Bush “made it explicitly clear that any final deal would not provide for refugee families displaced by the 1948 war to return to Israel.” Donald Mackintyre, Sharon and Bush reach their own settlement on Israel, the Independent Online; http://www.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/story.jsp?story=311391, 15/04/04.

¹⁴ Sharon, 08-04-02, §43k-0. As will be explained in due course, the notation system applied to Sharon’s speeches is as follows: 08-04-02 is the date the speech was delivered, the symbol § refers to the stanza number, and the letters refer to the lines within a stanza. The full texts of all Sharon’s speeches, broken down in this manner, is available in Annex Pz; pp A1-A24.


¹⁶ According to The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, the total Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2003 was 3,634,495. PASSIA. 2003, p267.

¹⁷ Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, p38.

in a bottle,” 19 “grasshoppers,” 20 “crocodiles,” 21 and “[akin to] the rocks of Judea, as obstacles that had to be cleared on a difficult path.” 22 Today, “Israeli right wing hegemony is fed by terror.” 23 Terrorism itself bears only partial responsibility for radicalising Israeli society; it works in harmony with the terror of terrorism, and by extension, of Palestinians, that is generated not least through stereotypical representations of them in policy narratives and the media. Current Israeli state discourse seeks to instil terror of terrorism in its target audience—perhaps, as Chomsky writes, because “[e]ngendering fear and hatred is a standard method of population control.” 24 By analysing the arguments treated as fact at the 'top'—that is, by governmental rhetoricians—we can easily see how similar attitudes achieve an aura of acceptability at all levels of society.

1.3.2. War

War, "a continuation of political activity by other means," 25 is a state of affairs that is most often rationally chosen by politicians, but because of its huge human and financial cost it must seem to the population to have been 'forced upon' them by 'the enemy'. It happens that warfare is high on Sharon's policy agenda, as revealed by the most cursory glance at his speeches or at the amounts of money and effort invested in military actions under his tenure. For this military approach he has acquired a large following, since his infamously long and bloody military career and 'hard-line' approach to the Palestinians 26 are seen by his followers as manifestations of his devotion to Zionism and the Israeli people.

Brown sees propaganda as "a weapon in the total warfare of modern times, beginning with the First World War, when lies, political subterfuge and atrocity stories were unscrupulously employed in an attempt to influence the final result." 27 The 'final result' must to some extent depend on the motivation and morale of the population, and although modern warfare has evolved to the point where those living in the most powerful countries no longer feel its devastation, 28 they will to some extent be affected by the financial and moral constraints of
sustained military action against another population:

One of the most pernicious functions of war propaganda is to make it easier for members of one nation to destroy members of another nation with psychological impunity. The cognition “I and my country are decent, fair and reasonable” is dissonant with the cognition, “I and my country have hurt innocent people.” In this situation the most effective way to reduce dissonance is to minimise the humanity or maximise the culpability of the victims of your action ~ to convince yourself the victims deserved what they got.²⁹

The ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction is necessarily heightened in times of warfare, since it resolves a fundamental moral dilemma – soldiers must kill some people (‘them’), they are told, in order to defend others (‘us’). The more a soldier ‘defends’ ‘us’ (and, by implication, kills ‘them’), the more heroically s/he can be portrayed. Propaganda plays a powerful role in polarising perspectives, and not least, in perpetuating a feeling of fear in the people supposedly ‘being defended’, to underline the importance of defending them. The provision of “psychological impunity” referred to by Pratkanis and Aronson³⁰ is important, because it suggests that while people are ultimately motivated by their own concerns, in case of ‘cognitive dissonance’ they will often seek a logical justification from an authoritative overarching ideological framework. This seems similar to the way in which a narrator might attempt to make his or her own ‘evaluation’ of something more convincing to an audience, by inserting a ‘heteroglossic’ (“where the source of an attitude is other than the narrator”) affirmation of that evaluation into the narrative. The more ‘official’ the imported source (and here the government ranks high), the more credibility lent to the narrator’s own position. This is perhaps one of the most important elements of the intertextual dynamic between the policy narratives and the narrative of personal experience analysed in sections 3 and 4.

1.4. The Ideological Pill

The mass media “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers [or viewers, or listeners] what to think about...”³¹ Even without successfully imposing a ‘ready-made’ ideological framework in the mind of the individual, mere repetition of a theme constitutes a form of propaganda known as ‘naturalisation.’ According to Barthes, “The essential function of myth is to naturalise a concept. This is why myth is experienced as innocent speech: not because its intentions are hidden, but because they are naturalised.”³² Once a phenomenon has been ‘naturalised’ in popular awareness it begins to constitute a part of the status quo and to resemble the natural

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²⁹Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, p38.
³⁰Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, p38.
order of things: thus the West Bank would surprise us if it were not presented by the media as 'war torn.'

According to Wilkin, "[t]he effects of propaganda are the most contentious area of communication research," and it is therefore imperative in any discussion of propaganda and persuasion techniques to indicate awareness that "[s]ubordinate groups" – i.e., the 'target audience' – "do not simply swallow an ideological pill," as otherwise the analyst may seem to be making "assumptions about how the language of mass communication is 'received' by its 'addressees.'" As we shall see, the 'personal experience' narrator whose account is analysed below is only marginally concerned with the specific doctrines propagated by Sharon and his government. He, however, influenced by the prevailing atmosphere of 'might is right' that these doctrines have established. The study of Sharon's policy narratives is concerned with how this atmosphere is created, and with the general effects of propaganda based on human response theories, but it does not claim that propaganda will necessarily work on its audiences exactly as intended: "studies in the way the media is received by audiences show that people can sometimes be immune to the efforts of the ideologies supposedly in the texts."

It is important to note that among the Israeli people are a considerable number who pit themselves in varying degrees of opposition to their state's treatment of the Palestinians, including, significantly, hundreds of army 'refuseniks' who have been imprisoned for their dissent, while, in spite of Sharon's repeated assertion that "Israel is not only an Israeli project. Israel is a Jewish, worldwide project," scores of Jewish-run organisations outside Israel seek recognition that they also do not endorse Israeli policies and, moreover, that these policies trigger anger and hatred against Israelis and Jews. Ronnie Kasrils, former South African minister of water and forestry, frequently speaks out against Israel's behaviour "not just as a human being who should cry out against this injustice, [but also] because I am Jewish and the Israeli government purports to talk and act on behalf of Jews everywhere, and I believe Jews like myself should say, 'No, not in my name.'"

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54 Wilkin, 1997, p130. *Emphasis in the original*
55 Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert and Leap, 2000, p 333.
56 Mesthrie, Swann, Deumert and Leap, 2000, p227
57 See Annex B6, p A25: We're Air Force Pilots, Not Mafia, concerning Israeli army and air force dissidents.
58 Sharon 13-08-03, §4d-e.
59 Prominent examples include: Not In My Name; Jews Not Zionists; Jews in Defence of Palestinian Rights, etc. Gideon Levy, Amirah Hass, Tanya Reinhart, Jeff Halper, Ran Hacobes, Uri Avnery. Uri Davis and many others are Israeli writers and activists committed to exposing and addressing the injustices committed by Israel.
1.5. Terminology

Bourdieu's contention that "there are no longer any innocent words" is particularly appropriate to discussion of Israel/Palestine, where "the gun and the dictionary march hand in hand." As Suleiman points out, "[i]n both the short and the long term, the conflict of labels in the Middle East is a deadly serious one. It concerns claims of legality and counter-legality as well as which version of history will formulate, rather than just articulate, reality." To illustrate, the media (primarily the English-language media) throughout the world are often bombarded with complaints following their reports on this issue, depending, for example, on whether the same areas of land have been referred to as the 'Occupied Territories' or 'Aza, Judea and Samaria.' US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other administration members have recently taken to side-stepping this problem (and international legality) by referring to them as "the so-called Occupied Territories."

There is a growing number of organisations on both sides of the dispute (although the Israeli side is undeniably better-organised and more effective) dedicated to 'media activism', which involves recruiting 'media patrollers' to analyse presentations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for "terminological bias," and triggering email and other response campaigns against offending media outlets. The Israeli 'HonestReporting.com' website, for example, provides detailed advice on how to analyse media texts for 'bias', how to compile an inventory of the instances of bias that occur over a specific period, and how to compose letters of complaint and prompt as many others as possible to do the same, pressurising media outlets to change their framing terminology.

Even the UN is not free from accusations of bias, with more than a hundred resolutions condemning Israel for its treatment of the Palestinian people passed since 1948 confirming to many that it "operates an anti-Israel agenda." However, in the absence of other

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61 Bourdieu, 1994, p40
62 Suleiman, 1999, p11
63 Suleiman, 1999, p11 (emphasis in original).
64 According to HonestReporting.com; "You will never be able to convince the media to do things 100% your way. Refrain from nit-picking little points. Instead, pick one point that is the key to many others. For example, demanding that suicide bombers be labelled “terrorists” frames the conflict in completely different terms. Another example is contrasting Palestinian corruption and incitement with Israeli democracy. Choose your main battle and hammer away until your point is heard." See Annex B16, p A57: Become a media patroller, http://www.honestreporting.com. See also CAMERA; http://www.camera.org.
65 According to one organisation, "The United Nations [is] An Enemy of Israel" because "The Arab world blames Israel for the violence. The United Nations agrees and has passed literally hundreds of resolutions condemning the Jewish state since 1948. The U.N. has passed more resolutions condemning Israel than it has all other nations combined, including Iraq." http://israel-arab_conflict.tripod.com/UNresolutions.htm
67 When visiting Jenin after the IDF's April 2002 operation, Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN's special envoy to the Palestinian territories described what he saw there as "horrific beyond belief" and "morally repugnant." Israeli spokesman Rana'an Gissin was quick to accuse him of "operating an anti-Israel agenda" and being therefore
internationally recognised definitions, I shall use the UN-sanctioned terms ‘Occupied Territories’ or ‘West Bank and Gaza Strip,’ abbreviated to ‘WBGS.’ ‘Israel’ indicates that state and the land within its internationally recognised, post-1948 boundaries; prior to 1948 the whole of Israel and the WBGS were referred to as ‘Palestine’. Other terms will be clarified during the course of the discussion.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir expressed (and reinforced) the popular Israeli feeling of international misunderstanding by stating that “The UN, the world court, international arbitration, or international conference – it’s always against us.” (Yitzhak Shamir, 1988, cited in Dowty, March 1999). The view of UN bias and even “anti-semitism” is widely accepted in Israeli discourse, while some organisations accuse the UN of being “anti-godly,” since Israel is the nation of ‘God’s chosen people’ and to criticise its behaviour is therefore “to criticise God himself.” See for example Further Anti-Godly UN Resolutions Against Israel and Jerusalem, www.templewoodfaithful.org/Newsletters/2004/2004-01.html.

“International law does not recognise the boundaries of Israel as having legally changed since the 1967 occupation of the WBGS, which is why these are called ‘occupied territories’.
2. Methodology And Literature Review

2.1. Methodology

As outlined in the introduction, this thesis incorporates a critical linguistic analysis of two types of what I call ‘narratives of war’; the first is a selection of the policy narratives of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and the second is the ‘narrative of personal experience’ of an IDF reserve soldier. Both describe and justify the prevailing situation of warfare, the first from a mainly ideological perspective, and the second from the personal perspective of experience in combat. I will also conduct a brief semiotic analysis of two visual images produced at the time of the events discussed in this thesis.

The analysis of Sharon’s narratives is built with reference to six of his televised speeches delivered between February 2002 and October 2003 and one article authored by him for publication on 9 June 2002, with particular focus on those delivered around the time of the announcement of ‘Operation Defensive Shield’. My reasons for selecting narratives from this time period have been dealt with in Section 1. Unlike more spontaneous forms of speech, the selection (of information) process can be deliberately and carefully considered prior to delivery, usually by trained speechwriters and rarely by the speaker him/herself. However, on delivering a speech the politician, in this case Sharon, claims ownership, and the speeches can thus be analysed as if they contained his own words. Moreover, if we compare the speeches with the article he did write (09-06-02), we find them to be ideologically identical, with no obvious difference in linguistic style. This points to the conclusion that the texts are so ideologically imbued that individual authorship is not relevant; in a sense the ideology itself has authored them. To paraphrase Roe,70 ‘the ideology we are talking about has many narrators, but few, if any, authors.’

Although many of the texts were originally produced in Hebrew, their English translations are provided by the Israeli Prime Minister’s office, and so are assumed to relay precisely the message he wishes to send to ‘the world’. As with any block of text, it is useful to organise them according to Dell Hymes’ ‘ethno-poetics’ model in order to gain better access to “the proportions and weighting of the material.”71 The ‘poeticised’ texts are broken into ‘theme

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70 Ariel Sharon addresses the Israeli nation on 1) 21-02-02 and 2) 31-03-02; the Israeli parliament (Knesset) on 3) 08-04-02; his article entitled The Way Forward in the Middle East was published on 4) 09-06-02; he addresses the Weizmann institute on 5) 22-01-03; George Bush and the cameras at the White House on 6) 29-07-03; and the veterans of the 1973 Yom Kippur war on 7) 07-10-03. For full texts of these speeches see Annex P1, pp A1-A24: Ariel Sharon speeches in full.
71 Roe’s original words are: “the budgets we are talking about, in other words, have many narrators, but few, if any, authors.” Roe, 2001, p.24.
72 Hymes, 1996, p.138
blocks', which tend to conform to the 'paragraphs' of the transcriptions. These might be defined by Gee as 'stanza' - "the basic building blocks of extended pieces of discursive language"; I shall use this term and the symbol [§] to denote it. The full texts of all speeches referred to can be found in Annex P1 on ppA1-A24.

The reserve soldier's narrative forms the backbone of an article that appeared in the Israeli Yediot Aharonot newspaper entitled "created for them a Teddy stadium in the middle of the camp." The article and transcript appeared originally in Hebrew, but were translated into English and disseminated in both languages by several organisations, including the Israeli peace organisation Gush Shalom. Both the Hebrew and English versions of this transcript are available on Gush Shalom's website; www.gush-shalom.org, from where this translation was taken. While the translation of this narrative comes from a reliable source and closely resembles another available translation, it is important to bear in mind that the text has been separated twice from its original delivery; first in the transcription and second in the translation. As a result certain key elements of the narrative are unavailable to us for analysis - it is impossible, for example, to study aspects of Moshe's delivery such as his intonation, pauses and physical gestures, since no videotape of the interview is available. Also, it would be problematic to attach too much meaning to the lexical nuances of each or any word that may, after all that, have been slightly distorted in translation. The full text of Moshe's narrative is available in Annex P2, ppA25-A34; for analysis it is broken down in the same 'stanza's and lines' manner outlined above for Sharon's narratives. In both cases, the details of what is focused on and how the data are laid out and analysed will be given in the chapters of data analysis.

Linguistic analysis is necessarily at the root of all analysis, since "the scientist, the historian, even the philosopher, lives with his objects only as language presents them to him." The linguistic analyses presented in this thesis draw extensively on the work of, among others, Cameron, Hymes, Ochs, Ochs and Capps, Kress, and Martin and Rose, as well as on the writers discussed below, some of whom contribute to the "interdisciplinary approach" required by Wodak (1989. See Section 1.1. above).

2.2. Analytical Approaches To Policy Narratives

Research in the name of 'policy narrative analysis' seems thus far to have been conducted mainly within the fields of the environmental sciences and economics. The emerging field of

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7 Gee, 1991, p23.
7 Yeheskel, 31 May 2002. For the full text of the narrative, see Annex P2, ppA25-A34.
‘environmental justice’ marries modern environmentalism to the social sciences, and particularly linguistics. By looking at the effects of the environment on individuals alongside the power structures which impose particular (‘just’ or ‘unjust’) environments upon them, it draws attention to the growing need for an interdisciplinary approach to examining the linguistic webs (or ‘policy narratives’) woven around the actions or policies of power.

Although the environmentalist Emery Roe (2001) focuses on the texts of budgets and policy narratives on environmental issues such as pesticide use and animal rights, his explanations on the immutability of policy narratives – once created and deposited into public consciousness they are difficult to retract or contradict – help us to understand why even the most audacious narratives seem to spin out of words into reality, eventually made palpable in the manner of the “self-fulfilling prophecy.” It is interesting that environmentalism would be among the first disciplines to apply the title ‘policy narratives’ to government discourses – what discourages the more traditionally ‘people-orientated’ social sciences from seeing governments as producing ‘narratives’? Perhaps it is a matter of perception: the word ‘narrative’ is laden from literary analysis with the concept of fictional perspective, such that ‘policy’ would seem almost to contradict it. A ‘narrative’ would traditionally require a ‘narrator’, and most governments are too full of “loosely coupled officials contributing at different times and in completely unpredictable ways to an outcome or decision” for the deliberate composition of narratives.

But this reasoning goes in the opposite direction to my own (and to that of Roe, who discusses “no-author national budgeting.”) A ‘policy narrator’ might be one speechwriter, a whole government, or every individual who is to any degree aware of (or affected by) public policy. Just as Bakhtin “considered readers to be authors and the act of reading to be a dialogue between a text already produced and a reactive text created by a reader,” policy narratives are ‘out there’, and each individual can extract from them, if they so choose, certain justifications for their understanding of the world. Equally, they can extract other justifications from other discourses, such as those surrounding and defining religious ideologies, and so on. In this way, those who draw upon the narratives contribute to their existence as independent, almost organic, forces. The absence of a single author, then, need

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74 Cassirer, 1946, p28.
75 This is achieved, for example, by the channelling of certain natural resources (such as water) for the benefit of one sector of society over others, or by providing certain education, health, refuse, etc services in more quantity and quality to one sector than to others.
76 ‘Self-fulfilling prophecy’ – “the tendency for a definition of a situation to evoke behaviour that makes the definition come true” – Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, p47.
77 Roe, 1994, p129.
79 Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, p999.
not prevent us from seeing politics and its actors in terms of stories and even dramas with 'plot' and 'structure'. This imposition of a sense of sequential continuity on otherwise random events is after all an effect that is demonstrably sought after by propagandists, with the aim of transforming "the 'rhapsody of perceptions', by which the world of sense is actually presented to us, into a system, a coherent epitome of laws." Thus, for example, it is now 'common knowledge' that the United States went to war with Afghanistan and Iraq 'because of' September 11, and so on.

2.3. Policy Narratives, Propaganda And Democracy

While democratic nations allow freedom of speech and opinion, democracy as an ideology is based on the premise of popular consent to the actions of those who govern. Since consent is a product of opinion, and opinions are not formed without information, any power within a democratic structure will seek to present itself and its actions the most favourable way possible. Aristotle tells us that "rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion," and it makes sense to assume that the goal of political public speaking in this context is to persuade as many individuals as possible to entrust their mandate to the speaking politician (and the party that s/he represents).

According to Aristotle, "the political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the grounds that it will do good; if he urges its rejection he does so on the grounds that it will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration." The politician must convince the electorate that his/her policies will best fulfil their interests, and later, that they are indeed going according to plan. If the audience is broader - perhaps a policy has attracted international attention - the politician also seeks the support of those, such as the leaders (and by extension their electorates, where this applies) of more powerful nations, who may choose to facilitate or impede the policy's implementation.

In any case, the political (or policy) narrative seeks to create a logical framework, into which events and their outcomes may be comfortably inserted, for the purpose of furthering political interests, since "[p]olicy, to have meaning, must be continuously re-made by its own

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75 Ochs and Capps, 2001, p3.
76 Cassirer, 1946, p27.
77 Aristotle. Rhetoric. Book I Chapter 3, @322BC.
78 Aristotle. Rhetoric. Book I Chapter 3, @322BC.
2.4. Truth And Myth In The Pursuit Of Power

Wilkin, with Chomsky, sees narrative domination as achieved through the exercise, and for the benefit, of power: "If we want to know why social and political events are described in the way they are then we have to trace the lineage, intentions and interests of these actors, institutions and authorities who dominate these official pronouncements and histories." Chomsky's "Principle of Universality" calls into question "the way things are," by looking at policy and policy narratives through the tenet that "if an action is right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or wrong) for us." The "history of attempts at control and manipulation in democratic politics" – which Chomsky calls the 'manufacture of consent' – relies on harnessing and building popular narratives and myths to surround and distort the motives and aims behind potentially unpopular courses of action. Echoing Orwell, who claimed that "in our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the indefensible," Chomsky argues that "the propaganda system works that way [because] it recognises that the public will not support the actual policies. Therefore it is important to prevent any actual knowledge or understanding of them." In a democracy it is difficult to prevent 'knowledge or understanding' of policies by suppressing information or relying on direct falsehood, so the information must be distorted in the manner most favourable to the politicians and their policies: in other words, it must be "tamed." According to Barthes, "[m]yth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts. Myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion." To be successful, the kind of myth employed in policy narratives, like the narratives themselves, must be persuasive; it must approximate an identifiable reality, which is then "frozen," distorted, and "impoverished."

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84 Wilkin, 1997, p107. See also Chomsky and Herman, 1988. The authors discuss a 'propaganda model' made up of five filters through which information must pass, and they observe that jointly these filters help shape media choice without any conscious conspiracy required. The "filters" are: Ownership; Advertising; Sourcing; Flak; and Ideology, and propaganda campaigns can only occur when consistent with the interests of those controlling and managing these five filters.
85 Chomsky, 10 July 2002. Also see Chomsky, November 1998: "The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... constituted a step forward in the slow progress towards protection of human rights. The overarching principle of the UD is universality. Its provisions have equal standing. There are no moral grounds for self-serving relativism, which selects for convenience; still less for the particularly ugly form of relativism that converts the UD into a weapon to wield selectively against designated enemies."
87 Chomsky and Herman, 1988.
90 Barthes, 1993, p118.
92 Barthes, 1993, p118.
or emptied of its own meaning or history. Thus "the meaning will be for the form like an instantaneous reserve of history, a tamed richness." Taylor elaborates,

To assume that propaganda is about lying, or at best half-truths, is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of propaganda... Propaganda, like any other process of persuasion, is about communicating 'our truth' to a particular target audience... if the content is to be credible to a target audience it needs to be based on facts and information that can be believed because they are patently true rather than false.

For Said, the issue is not so much whether propagandists deliberately employ falsehood:

The real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions and political ambience of the representor... a representation is eo ipso implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things beside the "truth," which is in itself a representation.

In any case, argues Bourdieu, the issue of truth is irrelevant, because political assertions are unverifiable by nature:

Political propositions, programmes, promises, predictions or prognostications are never logically verifiable or falsifiable. They are true only iso far as the person who utters them is capable of making them historically true, by making them come about in history; and this is inextricably bound up with his aptitude for judging realistically the chances of success, and with his capacities for mobilising the forces necessary to achieve that end, by managing to inspire confidence in his own truthfulness, and thus his chances of success.

In other words, with sufficient power, the person who utters a political promise or prophesy is able to make it 'come true', if not in reality then at least historically, because history is chronologised through the subjective narratives of the powerful. As for inspiring "confidence in his own truthfulness," Sornig says that "it is not the verifiable truth of a message which is relevant and likely to impress an audience and make it act upon a certain impulse; it is the way things are said, irrespective of the amount of genuine information carried by an utterance." The way things are said, in this case, is the presentation by the politician of his or her policy narrative.

2.5. The Modes Of Persuasion In Political Rhetoric

Barthes insists that the "very principle of myth [is to] transform history into nature" – in

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94 Barthes, 1993, p118.
95 Taylor, January 2003.
98 Sornig, 1989, p95. [emphasis in original]
99 Barthes, 1993, p129. For more discussion of Barthes' second-order system, see Annex B.1, p A35.
other words, to benefit the powerful by defining the status quo as ‘natural’ and therefore somehow ‘right’ and inevitable. Barthes’ “second-order semiological system,” which outlines the relationship between language and myth (see Annex B A1), seems conceptually akin to Cassirer’s “upper stratum of logic”\textsuperscript{100} – the ‘stratum’ of theoretical rather than physical knowledge – as well as to Freeman’s idea that narrative, whether policy or personal, spoken or written, “gives us a language for exploring a third realm, namely that of culture itself.”\textsuperscript{101}

Aristotle provides, in his \textit{Rhetoric}, what is considered the oldest model of persuasive technique in the Western canon to which we can still refer today. Of the modes of persuasion “such as we can construct ourselves by means of the principles of rhetoric,” Aristotle identifies ‘ethos’ (“the speaker’s power of evincing a personal character which will make his speech credible”); logos’ (“[the speaker’s] power of proving a truth, or an apparent truth, by means of persuasive arguments,”) and ‘pathos’ (“[the speaker’s] power of stirring the emotions of his hearers.”)\textsuperscript{102} For Aristotle, persuasion is achieved by these three modes, respectively, through the speaker’s evinced personal character, through the message of the speech itself, and through the listeners via their own emotional responses. For our purposes they can be labelled, also respectively, as the ‘source’, the ‘message’, and ‘emotion’, and in the following section I shall follow Aristotle’s model and examine the use made by Sharon and his speechwriters of all three elements separately, while emphasising their necessary interrelation.

\textsuperscript{100} “All the concepts of theoretical knowledge constitute merely an upper stratum of logic which is founded upon a lower stratum; that of the logic of language... the work of naming must have preceded it... for it is this process which transforms the world of sense impression... into a mental world, a world of ideas and meanings.” Cassirer, 1946, p28.

\textsuperscript{101} Freeman, 1997, p171.

\textsuperscript{102} Aristotle, \textit{Rhetoric}, Book I Chapter 1. @ 322BC.
3. Ariel Sharon's Policy Narratives

In spite of appearing at the centre of several recent corruption scandals, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has maintained a high public approval rating over the course of his tenure. Initially elected in February 2002, he called a second election in January 2003 and his party increased its presence in the 120-member Israeli parliament from 19 to 37 seats. Sharon's success cannot simply reflect a natural popular satisfaction with his performance, as he has not yet fulfilled the promises of his election campaigns - to improve Israeli security and protect the public from the threat of terrorism. Instead, while the Palestinians report IDF incursions and other activities of unprecedented brutality, the number of attacks and attempted attacks against Israelis - both at home and abroad - rises exponentially. Sharon's 'Iron Fist' policy would seem to be exacerbating, rather than reducing, the problem he was elected to solve.

However, this apparent contradiction dissolves when approached from within the political and broader social discourse that has been constructed around Sharon and his policies by his government and speechwriters and repeated, replicated and otherwise reinforced by his supporters (and opponents, since by arguing with a discourse they are also feeding it) at all levels of society. According to this discourse, the increased dangers today facing Israel are not a reaction to the physical and psychological effects of Sharon's oppressive and expansionist policies, but rather, proof of their necessity (since without Sharon's 'security' measures the threat, it is believed, would be far worse). In the words of Israeli military historian Martin Van Creveld,

> Look, we in Israel are feeling increasingly desperate. We are being bombed to pieces every day. As you know, desperate times lead to desperate measures. If we feel desperate enough, then you can be 100 per cent certain that the entire Israeli cabinet, the entire Israeli parliament and the entire Israeli people will unite around Sharon, just as indeed back in 1967.

If Professor Van Creveld is right, it may well be in Sharon's political interest - since the interest of an elected politician, by definition, lies in causing the "entire" electorate to unite around him or her - to enhance the existing tensions between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Thus he is able to instigate regular military incursions into Palestinian areas, shelling, 'targeted assassinations', curfews and closures of Palestinian population centres, destruction of the Palestinian infrastructure and economy, accelerated settlement building on Palestinian land, the unilateral definition of borders by means of the so-called 'security

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101 CNN.com, Sharon claims 'great victory' at polls
104 Israeli military historian Prof. Martin Van Creveld, interviewed by Maxine McKew, Sharon's Game Plan? 23
fence', and so on, all in the name of 'Israeli security' – and all incurring the need for more ‘security’.

The widespread feeling of ‘desperation’ referred to by Van Creveld cannot be attributed only to the actual incidence of Palestinian attacks, which, although shocking, have directly affected only a minute proportion of the Israeli population, and there are no Palestinian tanks in the streets or fighter jets overhead to frighten those not otherwise personally affected. Indeed, “security cannot be measured simply by the objective threats that a nation faces; in the end it is a subjective feeling of safety in the minds of individuals.” According to Israeli journalist and academic Ran HaCohen, that subjective feeling of safety (or the lack of it) has much to do with the way the attacks are presented to the Israeli public by their politicians and media:

If there is a Palestinian terror attack, all programmes are immediately suppressed in favour of reports and commentary on that, broadcasted for hours in an endless loop. A retired army general is interviewed: “Don’t you think Israel is showing much too much restraint?” A commercial television channel that once stuck to its normal schedule after a suicide attack was punished by the state regulator.

Through constant repetition and exposure in the mass media, intricate myths, arguments and counter-arguments, embedded with layers of complex historical debate, can be evoked from the simplest of sound-bites: “A few snappy words are sufficient when they harmonise with the conventional wisdom in a matter of seconds.” Said remarks that “Israeli security is now a fabled beast. Like a unicorn it is endlessly hunted and never found, remaining, everlastingly, the goal of future action. That over time Israel has become less secure and more unacceptable to its neighbours scarcely merits a moment’s notice.” In the words of Levi Strauss, “the purpose of a myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction.” The ability of Israel’s policy narratives to overcome any apparent internal contradiction, such as that noted by Said above, lies in their manipulation of causality through the construction of myths, and the force of these myths is that they – along with the policies themselves – both address and reinforce public fear.


According to Israeli human rights organisation B’tselem, a total of 838 Israelis were killed by Palestinians in the period 29/09/00 to 21/01/04, as follows: 198 Israeli civilians and 183 soldiers in the Occupied Territories, and 377 civilians and 80 soldiers in Israel. This represents less than a quarter of the number killed by road accidents over the same period (http://bolt.gov.il/english/statistic.htm). In contrast, South Africa, a popular holiday destination perceived throughout the world as a paragon of peace and reconciliation, produced 7081 deaths by firearms in 2003 alone, of which 89% (or 6302 deaths) were homicide, 12% accidental and 9% suicide. (www.sacas.co.za/presrels/acs/2003/30_pres_2003.htm)


3.1. The Modes Of Persuasion In Sharon’s Policy Narratives

The modes of persuasion, in this case, persuasion to conflict, can be summarised in diagrammatical form as follows:

![Diagram of modes of persuasion]

While the elements are interrelated, emotion takes its rightful position at the centre of the process. Sharon’s aim is not only to convince his people that the policies of the state are legally or logically justified; he must also persuade them to implement those policies. There must be people to wear uniforms and carry guns, to make and distribute weapons, to design and build the ‘security fence’, to live in settlements, to interrogate Palestinians, to humiliate them at checkpoints and turn their environment to rubble. Much can be achieved through the payment of salaries, but

[all the basic motives in man are emotionally-conditioned. The expert will make use of love, anger, fear, hope, guilt, and any other feelings, emotions, and sentiments useful to the purpose in hand.]

3.1.1. The Source

In terms of being a persuasive ‘source’, Sharon renders himself, and therefore his message, credible by: asserting common ground with his listeners (including, of course, emotional common ground), placing himself within the events he describes, and reinforcing his arguments with reference to authority (religious, moral, intellectual, etc). His credibility as
source does not so much rely on his character per se, but his ‘hard-line’ reputation is certainly helpful at a time when ‘hard-line’ policies seem (or are made to seem) necessary, and it is primarily on the basis of this reputation that he was elected Prime Minister of Israel in February 2001.

3.1.2. The Message

Meanwhile, “the institutional authority to categorise people is frequently inseparable from the authority to do things to them,” and Sharon’s ‘message’ comprises both a vehement categorisation of the Palestinians and a logical conclusion of the necessity of military action against them. According to Foucault, discourses are “practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak,” and Sharon’s discourse is no exception: its internal cohesion depends on characterising the situation as a ‘war’, which indeed the situation increasingly resembles. In war, as we are frequently told by Israeli governmental and military spokespeople, there is a different set of rules. In his speeches Sharon speaks of being in the midst of “a war for our homes,” and even “a war for the survival of the Jewish people,” while referring to and reinforcing certain mythologised stereotypes of Palestinians and Israelis.

While the weight and positioning of Sharon’s topics differ according to his audience, the content and (sometimes contradictory) themes remain consistent: ‘Israel is vulnerable, its existence threatened by inherently hostile and murderous Palestinians/Arabs. As a result it has been forced into conflict, although its true desire is peace. Fortunately it has a host of advantages – technological, military, moral etc, as well as the courage and dedication of its people. The Palestinian leadership is “infested with terror,” so there are no political solutions. Anyway Israel cannot negotiate under fire. A complete ceasefire, with no Palestinian attacks or attempted attacks, must precede any negotiations. In the meantime, the free world should understand Israel’s duty to protect its citizens by any means possible.’

There is nothing new about these arguments, which have appeared in various context-dependent manifestations since before the establishment of the state of Israel; I am interested in examining how they are conveyed (Sornig’s “the way things are said”).

3.1.3. Emotion

It is widely agreed by writers on persuasion and rhetoric that these cannot exist in any effective form without the manipulation of emotion, which, like so many rhetoricians, Ariel
Sharon makes full and careful use of to underpin his arguments. Emotion is not so much a category in its own right as the underlying force behind the whole persuasive process, and both the source and the message are governed and made credible by the presentation and evocation of emotions. Hawthorn notes that “persuaders of all times have recognised that action is triggered off more quickly and completely by emotional pressure than by rational agreement – especially when the emotional pressure masquerades as rational agreement.”

The successful triggering of emotions induces an audience towards ‘self-persuasion’, as people are most likely to be convinced by an argument when they feel it to be true. But feelings can be deceptive, particularly when deliberately evoked by means of tried and tested persuasion techniques, and

the propagandist is not always doing anything so clear cut as attempting to spread a specific doctrine or practice; quite often, as in war propaganda, he is merely trying to arouse strong emotions of hatred or approval for or against another group from motives of expediency, strategy, or plain greed. But emotional pressure is fundamental to the whole process.

For Aristotle, anger, fear and its opposite, confidence, are the most important emotions that any political rhetoric on warfare should seek to evoke. A politician seeking warfare must “speak so as to bring his hearers into a frame of mind that will dispose them to anger, and to represent his adversaries as open to such charges and possessed of such qualities as do make people angry.” He or she must also be able to speak so as to “prove people to be friends or enemies; if they are not, we can make them out to be so.” Duszak reiterates, “[l]anguage gives us a most powerful tool for conveying social identities, for telling (and making) friends and foes. The construction and the management of social identities are done through discourse and by means of various linguistic mechanisms and strategies.”

As for fear, “when it is advisable that the audience should be frightened, the orator must make them feel that they really are in danger of something.” A reason for this, according to Pratkanis and Aronson, is that “fear appeals... channel our thoughts away from careful consideration of the issue at hand and towards plans for ridding ourselves of the fear.” In general terms, if a democratic government seeks popular mandate for belligerent activity against another nation, it must find ways of instilling in the populace a sense of fear, which inspires a natural desire to avoid whatever is threatening, and a tendency to trust the

1 Sorvig, 1989, p95. [emphasis in original]
3 Brown, 1979. p2z.
4 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 2, Chapter 2. @ 323BC.
5 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 2, Chapter 4. @ 323BC.
7 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 2, Chapter 5. @ 323BC. For some examples of the similarity between aspects of Sharon’s narratives and Aristotle’s prescriptions for evoking fear, anger and confidence, see Annex B.A2, p A40.
8 Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, p162
decisions of those who are more powerful – such as the government, when it is perceived as acting in the best interests of its people – and who claim to know how to avert the threat. Fear is a disempowering emotion, and on its own does not provide sufficient motivation for fighting or war; it must be compounded with properly-directed anger, which creates a desire for retribution, and with the confidence that any action taken will succeed. Pratkanis and Aronson support this recommendation:

A fear appeal is more successful when 1) it scares the hell out of people, 2) it offers a specific recommendation for overcoming the fear-arousing threat, 3) the recommended action is perceived as effective for reducing the threat, and 4) the message recipient believes that he or she can perform the recommended action.125

3.2. The Source

As the one who shoulders the responsibility for the fate of this nation and its future, I have to weigh all the considerations and choose the thing that contains the least danger to Israel.126

The techniques used by Sharon and his speechwriters to reinforce his credibility as source can be examined in the following areas: presentation; ‘friends in high places’ and self-placement.

3.2.1. Presentation

Sharon’s presentation of himself and his message varies according to the broader political context, the purpose for which a given speech has been produced, and the intended audience. So, for example, after a month of intensified military assault on Palestinian areas127 and the suicide attack of 27 March on Jewish diners at a restaurant in Netanya,128 international media attention to ‘the Middle East’ had already risen sharply in anticipation of further developments. On 31 March there was another large suicide bombing, this time of a restaurant in Haifa,129 and Sharon appeared live on Israeli television amid national and international expectation that he would announce a new phase of escalated military action across the Palestinian territories.130 He did not disappoint; in fact, as he tells us, ‘Operation Defensive Shield’131 had already been decided upon: “In the Israel government session on

125 Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, p165
127 On March 3 Sharon had already told his ministers, “We must hit them [the Palestinians], and hit them again and again, until they understand.” For a list of the events of March 2002 as compiled by PASSIA (the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs), see Annex BI9, p A79.
128 On 27 March 2002, a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 29 and wounded over 100 at the Park Hotel in Netanya.
129 On 31 March 2002, a suicide bomber killed 14 and wounded dozens more near Haifa’s Matza restaurant.
130 Sharon 31-03-02. Annex FI, pp A9-Ab.
131 This is sometimes translated from Hebrew as ‘Operation Defensive Wall’. The wall [or ‘security fence’] currently being built in the West Bank constitutes a part of this operation, whose end has not yet been announced.
Thursday last, the decision was taken to uproot the infrastructure of terrorism directed by the Palestinian Authority," (31-03-02 §8a-c).

Although addressed, in Hebrew, to the “Citizens of Israel,” the speech was also broadcast live (with simultaneous interpretation) on international news networks such as CNN, as well as across the Arab world, highlighting the urgency of the situation. Significantly, Sharon does not acknowledge his broader audience: in spite of the efforts that have been made to present this speech to the world, non-Israelis are cast as ‘overhearers’ rather than addressees, and Sharon is not obliged to mince words. The networks’ own commentaries before and after the speech included interviews with government and military spokespeople and survivors of the recent suicide attacks, as well as providing detailed information on the attacks themselves, footage of the chaos of their aftermath, the names and numbers of casualties, and analytical speculation of what Sharon and his cabinet might be planning (sometimes interspersed with scenes of Israeli soldiers at work in the occupied Palestinian warzone).

Sharon both highlights and employs the resulting sense of urgency in the presentation of his message, which is essentially a declaration of war: “Citizens of Israel, the state of Israel is in a war...” (31-03-02 §1a-b). As ever, he appears sombre and serious, in line with his emphasis on the difficulties being faced by the state and by himself as its leader. As is often the case in televised addresses by leading politicians everywhere, the national flag and rows of leather-bound books are behind him, signalling both the breadth of his knowledge, for “knowledge [is] viewed as an entitlement to narrate,” and its focus, the Israeli state and people. This 481-word speech is by far the shortest of those I analyse. While emphatically repeating key phrases (“The only thing we’ve had in return for our efforts has been terrorism, terrorism and more terrorism,” §5a-b), it is empty of the descriptive detail and poetic flourishes we see embellishing his speeches elsewhere. As well as underlining the emergency nature of the situation, this presentation reinforces Sharon’s own credibility as a strong and decisive leader who would replace words with actions, leaving the details of the Palestinian attack and of his intended response to be communicated – emphatically – through the media.

By contrast, his speech to a special session of Knesset (the Israeli parliament) on 8 April

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12 The transcript is provided by CNN at www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/04/31/Sharon.transcript.
13 Ochs, 1997, p199
2002\textsuperscript{134} presents its message in over 4,200 words, in 67 stanzas, with heavy use of poetic effect, imagery and rhythm, along with detailed evidence to support his argument, which in essence does not differ from that of 31 March. This time he acknowledges his wider audience, explicitly addressing not only the Knesset but also, in turn, “the Palestinian people” (§§3a); “the leaders of the Middle East” (§§5a); “the leaders of the Free World” (§§6a – this immediate contrast pointedly denoting that the Middle East is not considered to be a part of “the free world”) and “the people of Israel” (§§7a). Operation Defensive Shield, to which this time he refers by name, is already over a week old, and its ferocity has provoked sharp criticism from journalists, politicians and NGOs in Israel and abroad, to which he must, in a fashion, respond. The speech’s stated aim, which appears only at the very end, is to request, in accordance with the Basic Law, parliamentary approval “to bring in additional Zionist elements” (§§9n) by making several new appointments to government. The unstated aim, which implicitly transpires during its course (and in view of the broader intended audience), is to justify the nature of the IDF incursions and other activities taking place and to seek an end to any parliamentary, wider Israeli and international dissent on the matter: “I call upon each and every one of you to maintain this unity, not to stretch the boundaries of argument, rivalry and dispute,” (§§6f–g).

3.2.2. ‘Friends In High Places’

In Sharon’s policy narratives these are primarily members of the American administration, whose president he describes as “the leader of the free world,” (29-07-03, §9b). While the emphasis of shared suffering with America has only emerged as a rhetorical device in Israeli state discourse since the infamous ‘September 11’ attacks, the evocation of American friendship has long been a theme in Israeli state discourse. Since America provides Israel with aid – primarily military aid – to the tune of around US $5 billion per year,\textsuperscript{135} and it regularly vetoes UN resolutions condemning Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians,\textsuperscript{136} this friendship – or at least, political

\textsuperscript{134} Sharon 08-04-02. Annex P1, pp A6-A15.

\textsuperscript{135} Around $4.4 billion of this is military aid, approximately 80% of which is used to buy weapons from American manufacturers. See for example Francis, 9 December 2002.

\textsuperscript{136} According to Donald Neff, former Time Magazine Bureau Chief to Israel, as reported in the Washington Report, “Had the U.S. never exercised its veto, the total number of UN resolutions condemning/criticising behaviour of Israel or in support of Palestinian rights would be 100 in the period 1972-1997. The total number of U.S. vetoes of UN resolutions condemning Israel between 1972 and 1997 was 32.” The trend has not stopped in recent years. Over 60 resolutions to some degree confirm Palestinian rights, but no sanctions have been applied for persistent non-compliance. See Annex B11, p A72, for a list of the UN resolutions vetoed by the US in 1972-2002.
support – is deep-rooted. The reassurance of US understanding is repeatedly emphasised to his own people by Sharon, on 8 April 2002 as elsewhere: “The United States, which is spearheading the international anti-terrorism campaign, knows and understands that it is our duty to protect the lives of our citizens,” (08-04-02, §13:i). Here he underlines the message that Israeli military action against the Palestinians is perpetrated for the sole aim of protecting the Israeli people, with the reassurance that America – at least – knows and understands the necessity (“it is our duty”) of such action.

Reciprocally, due to the well-documented strength of the Zionist lobby within America, support for Israel is requisite for the political success of any American leader. On 14 April 2004, George Bush (flanked by Sharon) publicly announced that Israel could retain some of its biggest settlements on the West Bank in any final peace deal with the Palestinians – a licence to build and expand on occupied land, as well, it will transpire, as to confiscate and demolish Palestinian houses and land in the name of ‘security zones’ for the settlements. Much is made (in both countries) of America’s support for Israeli policy, and in the public exchange of speeches by George Bush and Ariel Sharon at the White House on 29 July 2003, Sharon begins, “It is a great privilege for me to be here, at the White House, for the eighth time. I am always pleased to visit and feel that I am among friends – true friends of the State and people of Israel,” (29-07-03, §1a-f).

A more overt demonstration of friendship, or an example of what Cameron might describe as “synthetically personalised talk,” comes in the final stanza of the same speech. Until this point, Sharon has addressed Bush as “Mr. President,” with the level of ‘politeness’ usually considered appropriate in the public interactions of politicians. However, in §13 he merges public with private, foregrounding the sincerity of his statements and connoting a higher degree of intimacy or solidarity than would normally be expected: “I wish to thank you again, George, for your friendship and understanding towards the State and people of Israel.” (§13a-

137 According to Chomsky, “It’s not surprising that Israel continues to pursue these policies, as long as the US provides the means and the support. The core of the problem has been in Washington, and remains there. At any point in the past 25 years, the US could have joined the international consensus it has been blocking and paved the way towards a meaningful political settlement. The longer the conflict goes on, the more fear and bitterness escalate, the harder it becomes to move towards sensible resolution.” Chomsky, cited in Irish Times, 4 Dec. ’02.

138 The emphasis of this friendship in Israeli political narratives perhaps offers some comfort to those Israelis disturbed by seeing their own government repeatedly castigated by other nations and by the UN.

139 See Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry’s recent appeal for support from Jewish voters: “I have a 100 percent record ... of supporting the special relationship and friendship that we have with Israel,” Kerry said. “I can guarantee you that as president, I understand not just how we do that but also how we end this sweetheart relationship with a bunch of Arab countries that still allows money to move to Hamas, Hezbollah and the Al Aqsa Brigade.” The Associated Press, Kerry appeals for Jewish votes in Florida, Ha’aretz, 20 April 2004. A similar dynamic operates in America’s and Israel’s other main ally, the UK. Most recently see the public disgrace of UK Liberal Democrat MP Jenny Tonge, who was asked to resign by her party after expressing understanding for the motivations of Palestinian suicide bombers.


141 Cameron, 2001, p32.
Justification Narratives

Ariel Sharon's Policy Narratives

Since "linguistic exchanges are also relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between speakers of their respective groups are actualised," Sharon's break with convention within this staged linguistic exchange serves to highlight the symbolic equality between the two leaders, and therefore between their nations, reinforcing the message that Israel is powerful enough on a global scale to act – and justify its actions – as it pleases. The absence of rhetorical deference to the American leadership makes it clear that there will be no political deference either.

3.2.3. Self-Placement

During his speech of 31 March, Sharon's sincerity and common ground with his listeners, particularly the Israelis among them, are asserted through his presented air of fatigue and sadness, pre-evaluating the atrocity to which he will refer and which forms the basis of the argument he will deliver. He uses the words 'we' or 'our' 29 times in this 481-word speech, with the effect of eroding individual identities and drawing his listeners – those included in the pronoun, at least – into "a cohesive entity sharing a collective past, similarities of outlook, a common language (metaphorically and otherwise), and common vision." The words 'I' or 'my' appear only twice, but these are close to the beginning of the argument (§2a and §2c), positioning Sharon as leader of the state and emphasising the personal efforts he has made to improve the situation:

31-03-02 §2a The state of Israel, under my leadership,
   b has made every effort in order to achieve a cease-fire
   c Every single moment since I was elected
   d in the midst of the wave of Palestinian terrorism,
   e we have set for ourselves a goal of achieving peace and quiet
   f in order to be able to undertake political diplomatic negotiations.

While casting his actions in the third person as those of the 'state of Israel', he emphasises his position as leader, contextualising his leadership with a backdrop of ferocity imposed by the Palestinians from which neither he nor the state have had a moment's rest. His perspective is a matter of good common sense and moral virtue; according to §7b-d, for example, it is shared by "everyone who has been educated in the values of liberty and democracy."

The definitions of Sharon's own identity are interestingly flexible: In §2a, Sharon is first

143 This point was already made perfectly, unambiguously clear by Sharon in a meeting of Knesset almost two years earlier, in a remark to Shimon Peres: "Every time we do something, you [Peres] tell me America will do this and will do that... I want to tell you something very clear: Don’t worry about American pressure on Israel. We, the Jewish people, control America, and the Americans know it." Ariel Sharon, Tel Aviv, 3 October 2001.
145 Tolmach Lakoff, 2000, p.32.
merged with the state as a single third person subject making "every effort to achieve a cease-fire," before being immediately recast in §2c as its exclusive first person, or leader. While the passive action of 'being elected' places Sharon's "I" firmly at the deictic centre, it also implies the full consensus of the population in placing him there. By §2e he has rejoined a plural pronoun, although this time he appears to be referring to himself within government (as authority) instead of within the state (as institution). In the same way as "a speaker uses modality to protect his utterances from criticism," the reason for these deictic shifts might be that they represent the decisions of Ariel Sharon as those of the government and of the nation – a subtle yet effective imposition of popular consensus, which simultaneously deflects any potential accusations or blame from Sharon himself.

In this excerpt the word 'every' is active, (§2b and §2c), providing an emphatic quality which interacts with that of the "wave of Palestinian terrorism" of §2d to create polarised contrast between the activities of the Israeli state (and of Sharon) and those of the Palestinians. If we consider the sequence "...I was elected in the midst of the wave of Palestinian terrorism," we see a connotative contrast between the two defined 'sides': while Israelis were engaging in the civilised and democratic practice of electing a new leader, the Palestinians were having a wave of terrorism. A 'wave' carries the sense of a natural disaster, like a tidal wave, and with its definite article, "the wave of Palestinian terrorism" connotes an episode so ingrained in public awareness that it requires no further introduction. Sharon's election "in the midst of" this "wave" implies his function as a kind of flood barrier or other effective emergency measure.

So far Sharon is cast as narrator, leader and protector, but in the lyrical epic of 8 April, discussing the bombing in Netanya, he makes a brief 'cameo' appearance within the narrative action, placing himself as emotionally as well as responsibly involved:

08-04-92 §2a On the recent evening of the seder, while I was sitting with my family at the table, I received the terrible news of the massacre in Netanya.

Like the victims, Sharon was innocently sitting at a seder table with his family – and what greater sign of sincerity and high moral values is there than a family meal? – when disaster struck (theirs was the attack, his was receiving its news). In this way he is presented as suffering alongside the families of the victims and with every Israeli, but in the following stanza he builds on this impression to reassert his elevated status:

§3a There is no more dreadful moment
b in the term of a prime minister,
c than that horrendous moment when the telephone rings,
d or a note is passed during a meeting,
e and carrying Job’s tidings.

These lines also have the effect of moving the effects of the attack, emotional and otherwise, from the personal to the general. While §2 describes a specific personal moment – Ariel Sharon receiving news of the Netanya bombing – §3 de-isolates the incident ("no more dreadful moment in the term of a prime minister,") retreating into generality. A demonstrative pronoun ("that horrendous moment"), a present simple tense ("when the telephone rings"), and an alternative method of receiving the news ("or a note is passed,"") combine to imply recurrent frequency. By these means it is made clear that this was no isolated incident, either in his tenure or in the history of the state as a whole, as too is the impression of inevitable recurrence in the future. The imposition of a sense of inevitability is important because it reinforces the mythmaking process, turning “history into nature” and replacing the question of ‘why does this happen?’ with ‘this will inevitably happen, so what can we do to protect ourselves?’

3.3. The Message

One of the most important functions of these communications is their reference to and reinforcement of an overarching narrative ‘frame’, or “structure of expectation,” to which the premises they define will comfortably contribute. If “[narrative activity... is at once a discursive medium for collective probing and problem-solving and a tool for instantiating social and personal identities,” in the context of these policy narratives, the speaker takes the role of guide, steering the minds of his audience towards particular collective findings about the natural identities of a situation and of its key players.

Since politicians are elected primarily on the basis of credible authority and the appearance of knowing what to do (or at least, what to say), audiences reasonably expect a higher degree of logic – or the appearance of it – in their arguments. Where a politician makes persuasive use of emotional appeals and mythologies, even where these are easily identifiable as such, the overlying veneer of rationality lent by the credible political source reassures voters while contributing respectable authority to the emotions and myths themselves. Although the

15 Barthes, 1993, p129.
audience's expectations contribute to this veneer, linguistically it is reinforced with judicious use of conjunctions, anaphora, juxtaposition, exemplification, explanation, logical relations, ellipsis, highlighting, contrasting, comparison, semantic relation, and so on, all of which help with the establishment of premises and the drawing of seemingly logical conclusions.

For example, the premises of 31-03-02 §2 discussed in 3.2.3. above - that "we" have made "every effort", "every single moment", to work towards achieving peace and quiet - are built into logic with causative conjunction: "every effort" has been made (by us) in order to achieve a ceasefire; the decisions and actions of "every single moment" have been taken in order to undertake diplomatic negotiations. The exact nature of these painstaking 'efforts' remains hidden, eclipsed by their purported goals - a "ceasefire" and "diplomatic negotiations." Since the goals are morally righteous and desirable, we might be inclined to believe that the 'steps being taken' to achieve them are similarly so.

By contrast, Sharon's "wave of Palestinian terrorism" of the same stanza could not take place without a sea of Palestinian terrorists to carry it. There can be no reasoning with such an unfathomable menace, and he makes frequent reference to the futility of even trying:

31-03-02 §5c You cannot make any compromise with terrorism
f You cannot compromise with people who are prepared,
g like the suicide bombers in Israel's street,
h or the Twin Towers in the U.S.,
i to die simply in order to kill innocent people -
j men, women and children
k to die in order to sow terror and horror.

If, in the presentation of Israeli actions, the aims both eclipse the means and are righteous and painstaking, the methods of Palestinian actors are highlighted and emphasized through repetition ("to die", §5i and k), while their aims are brutal and meaningless ("simply in order to kill..." §5i).

Thus the situation, its key players (the Palestinians and the Israelis), and the logical conclusions ("You cannot make any compromise with terrorism," have been simultaneously defined. These definitions are what constitute 'the message'.

3.3.1. Defining Situations

There is inevitably a great deal of overlap between the definitions of the situation and those of the key players, and frequently the former are described to indirectly evaluate the latter and vice versa. Without human involvement there can be little 'situation' - for the politician at least - to speak of, while to make sense of a described action an audience requires a
referential framework within which to locate it. In some cases a single narrative will directly provide its own referential framework, perhaps by outlining the important features of its core ideology at the outset; that kind of narrative might be appropriate as an introduction or summary for outsiders wishing to 'find out' about an idea or ideology. Such an audience will probably not have encountered – or absorbed – many other texts on the subject, so the narrator is restricted in the use of intertextual references whose layers of meaning, if captured and correctly interpreted, can add subtextual flavour, depth and validity to the arguments presented. However, where a narrative has made the evolution into a discourse and beyond, into an ideological system (it has passed "from semiology to ideology"), as has happened with Israeli state ideology, its adherents – and critics – can be relied on to possess a great deal of ideological reinforcement in the form of 'prior knowledge'. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has no place among text-book writers or journalists, and it is not his job to convert the uninitiated. He has at his referential disposal an intricately embroidered ideological framework comprising the thoughts and ideas over a hundred years of the millions of people involved in this nation-building project, whom he currently represents as their successor and leader.

### 3.3.1.1. Contextual Framing

Once we begin speaking in the configurational dimension, plot and so forth, we are speaking in large measure of a distinctly retrospective mode of interpretative activity: to be able to extract the plot of a story involves returning to earlier episodes, seeing how they relate to subsequent ones and to the evolving whole that is the narrative itself. The 'situation' described within these speeches can be considered in three main categories: the situation today, the present context, and the general overview (the situation since the establishment of the state). These categories are ideologically identical, in that they present the same cohesive 'cause, effect, action and agency' structure; what differs is their historical scope. Diagrammatically, the growing contextual framing of 'situation' can be represented as follows:

![Fig. 3.2.1: Contextual Framing](image)

In the speeches analysed here, the **situation today** is characterised as a period of heightened military assault against Israel, juxtaposed with the direct or implicit negation of Israeli

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agency and assertion of Palestinian instigation. For example, "We are currently in the midst of a difficult campaign forced upon us - a brutal campaign of terrorism" (21-02-02, §2a-d) and "Citizens of Israel, the state of Israel is in a war, a war against terrorism. It's a war that has been imposed upon us. It's not one that we have chosen to undertake," (31-03-02, §1a-e). From Aristotle, we know that this formula can be used to provoke 'anger' in an audience ("the fact is that anger... is excited by our knowledge that we are not the wrongers but the wronged."153) In this dimension, Israeli action is reactive only and based on immediate existential concerns ("it is a war for our home," §1f).

The present context is defined by means of narrative 'potted histories', whose elements are selected from recent or longer-term history to configure a simplified sub-narrative in support of the larger whole. In this frame, Israel is presented as striving to improve the (always undesirable) 'situation today', whether by seeking all possible solutions to the conflict or simply being thoroughly equipped, both socially (with the courage and unity of the people) and militarily (with the best army and weapons) to respond to it. The general overview is an achievement of broad intertextuality, drawing on the definitions provided by previous orators and their narratives to provide the foundational understandings that the present orator can 'take for granted' in his audience and upon which is structured the overarching 'plot' of his narratives.

To illustrate, on 21 February 2002154 Sharon delivers the following stanza, wherein he makes use of a 'general overview' to illustrate his portrayal of the present context, which in turn provides the definitions needed to help us understand 'the situation today':

21-02-02 §6a Just take a moment and ponder
b the past year and a half of struggle
c that has been forced upon us
d I believe that we have endured this experience admirably
e Soldiers and civilians,
f new immigrants and veterans,
g demonstrate resourcefulness and valour,
h willingness to reach out to others
i and a spirit of volunteering,
j All these are a testimony to a healthy society,
k full of vitality and willpower,
l a society whose sons and daughters
m are no less qualified
n than the generations which established the State,
o broke the siege imposed upon us in 1967
p and pulled themselves out of the depth of the abyss in 1972

152 Freeman, 1997, p173.
153 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book II Chapter 5. ¶ 32:3 BC.
Here the 'present context' is both "the past year and a half of struggle that has been forced upon us," and the behaviour of those he includes in the 'we' pronoun: "we have endured [it] admirably..." The 'general overview' provides broader evaluation of the 'present context' through implicit comparison with previous contexts, presupposing his audience's knowledge that the state was established through the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948; that the six-day war in 1967 is often described in Israeli discourse as a "siege"; that "the depth of the abyss" refers to the 1973 'Yom Kippur' war; and finally, the eulogised character of the "sons and daughters" involved in all of the above. Through this growing contextual framing, the audience is led to understand that, in Sharon's definition, 'the situation today' constitutes an existential crisis comparable to the three regional wars to which he refers, and further, that the Israeli military's activities in the Palestinian territories demonstrate the highest level of courage and dedication, in view of the presupposed intensity of the dangers they are facing.

3.3.2. Defining Key Players

As we have seen, Sharon's speeches are striking for their evaluative polarities, which are arguably a feature of political discourse as a whole, but particularly so in cases where warfare ranks high on the policy agenda. In this discourse there is no room for moral ambiguity - 'they' are "murderous" while 'we' are "peace-loving," etc - and for this effect he draws heavily on myth to establish the natures of the key characters. As we shall see, if there is any variation from this general polarity, those it describes are linguistically 'marked', making them the exception rather than the rule.

In his statement of 21-02-02 §Sd that "we have endured this situation admirably," along with defining the situation on the simplest level as 'something to be endured', Sharon simultaneously delivers a personal appraisal (or 'judgement') of 'we' (as 'admirable'), and implicitly, as we have just been told of "the past year and a half of struggle that has been forced upon us," (§5b-c), a negative judgement of whoever is doing the forcing. Sharon, confident of his audience's prior exposure to this discourse, knows that we know who he means. He has already referred in the second stanza to "a brutal campaign of terrorism," (§2a-d); in stanza 8 to "our neighbours" (I discuss the implications of this term below), and in stanza 11 to "terrorism and terrorists." It is not until stanza 13 that he mentions the word 'Palestinian', and even then only to state, "I will continue to meet with Palestinian officials" - it would almost be possible, thus far, for an uninitiated listener to miss the connection.

155 Referred to in Israeli discourse as the 'War of Independence'. For Palestinians, it is the 'Naqba', or catastrophe.
156 A 'siege' because all the Arab armies are said to have mobilised around Israel's borders. 'Breaking' that siege involved Israel's seizure of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and Sinai peninsula. Sinai was returned to
between these innocuous ‘officials’ and the existential crisis at hand. That the two components of the phrase ‘Palestinian terrorism/ists’ are in many circles interchangeable has been helped in no small part by the discourse of politicians like Sharon:

§3a We have co-operated with the American emissary, Zinni, and we’ve received terrorism in return
b We’ve co-operated with Vice President Dick Cheney, and we’ve received terrorism in return.

§4a We gave our—in order to achieve a cease-fire, our requirement of seven days of peace and quiet, and we got terrorism in return
b We removed our troops from the cities, and we got terrorism in return.

c The only thing we’ve had in return for our efforts has been terrorism, terrorism and more terrorism
b We have to combat this terrorism uncompromisingly and we have to uproot it.
iIsraeli agency is presented in a detailed inventory of concessions and gestures, all responded to with archetypal Palestinian monomania. Even Israeli demands are presented as donations, such as in §4a-b’s “We gave our— in order to achieve a cease-fire, our requirement of seven days of peace and quiet.” Following Ochs and Capps (2001), the repeated formation of “we got terrorism in return” is an emphatic assertion of victimhood, because “the verb ‘got’ is typically used to make a protagonist look like a victim in a situation that calls for accountability.” Not once does the word ‘Palestinian’ appear in the above extract, but still, ‘Palestinian’ accountability is conveyed. According to Said, in Israel, the US and elsewhere, all indications of:

the daily, minute occurrences of what Palestinians have to live through are hidden and, more important, covered over by a logic of self-defence and the pursuit of terrorism (terrorist infrastructure, terrorist nests, terrorist bomb factories, terrorist suspects—the list is infinite)... Ideas about terrorism have thus taken on a life of their own, legitimised and re-legitimised without proof, logic or rational argument.

One political consequence of casting the Palestinians as a single entity with the same incomprehensibly violent behaviour is an implicit justification of their ‘collective punishment’ in IDF military operations and restrictive measures.

Egypt, Syria’s Golan annexed to Israel, and the WBGS remain under occupation to this day.

Ochs and Capps, 2001, p49.

Said, April 2002.

When a Palestinian commits an act of terrorism, the standard Israeli response is to invade his or her town or village, shellimg and terrorising the neighbourhood and bulldozing the terrorist’s family’s home. Curfews are frequently called – in 2002, some 300,000 Palestinian residents of Hebron spent a total of 286 days in their homes under strict curfew (LAW Society press releases; http://www.lawsociety.org; also see Hanan Ashrawi’s
3.3.2.1. Evaluation And Opposition

A great deal of the evaluation of people within these texts also functions to impose, by contrast, the necessary 'opposite' characteristics on the polarised 'opposite' people: a slight variation on the theme of "we are what we are because they are not what we are."\(^{160}\) Since Sharon repeatedly defines the situation of Israel as 'at war' or 'in conflict' with the Palestinian (terrorists), the narrated activities and characteristics of the key players (wherein lies most of their evaluation) are also, as a matter of internal cohesion, understood to conflict even where this is not explicitly stated. In other words, by presenting the situation as a 'war', the polarity between the 'sides' is necessarily heightened, to the extent that any positive evaluation of 'us' carries within it, by contrast, an implicit condemnation of 'them', and vice-versa.

For instance, if 'we' are said to "demonstrate resourcefulness and valour," (21-02-02 §g), there is the underlying supposition "in the face of X" – X being the situation or persons which have provoked or necessitated our demonstration of those qualities (whose identities are clearly indicated elsewhere in the texts). If X was revealed as posing no threat, our "valour" would be seen as inappropriate and perhaps relabelled. The power of suppositional reciprocity is masterfully illustrated by De Cervantes in *Don Quixote*, whose eponymous protagonist confronts a lion – but the lion, a circus animal "more courteous than arrogant," merely turns its back and yawns. Is Don Quixote brave, or a fool?\(^{161}\) What is interesting here is that the question only arises because the nature and (re-)actions of the *lion-as-individual* are described, distancing it from its mythological lion-ness. Had the author wished to impose on his readers the belief that in this instance Don Quixote was in fact heroic, he would have reduced his description of the lion, using language to reflect rather than alter the prevailing mythologised perception of lions as wild and dangerous beasts. Similarly, Ariel Sharon is careful not to over-describe the Palestinians, since he must maintain and perpetuate the mythologised view (of wild and dangerous terrorists) rather than implying any individual variation between them, which might call Israeli "valour" in this context into question.

3.3.2.2. Addressing 'Them'

In §20 of his 21 February 2002 speech,\(^{62}\) Sharon turns from speaking about the Palestinians to speaking to them, as follows:

21-02-02 §20a I turn from here also to the Palestinian people
b to say what I have said in the past —


\(^{161}\) This illustration is taken from Edith Grossman’s translation of Miguel de Cervantes’ *Don Quixote*, reviewed by Andre Brink in the South African *Sunday Independent* on 1 February 2004.

c I know that it is not easy being a Palestinian.

It is useful to compare the linguistic form and communicative function of the first line of this excerpt — “I turn from here also to [address] the Palestinian people.” Is Sharon really addressing the Palestinians? If so, the introductory statement of §20 would probably fit the narrowest definition of a ‘speech act’ or ‘performative utterance’, in the manner (but unfortunately not the form) of Searle’s widely-cited ‘I apologise’. Cameron notes that “utterances of this kind cannot be false... If someone [says] ‘I apologise’ I cannot respond, ‘no you don’t’, since the utterance itself constitutes an apology.” Similarly, if someone says ‘I turn to you to say’, where the addressee is present, that statement describes the action it performs, and it would be difficult to label it false. But the spatial deixis of “I turn from here also to the Palestinian people” in fact implies their absence. Throughout this speech the only other stated addressees – the “Citizens of Israel” – are considered (metaphorically at least) to be where Sharon is, and so they require no such deictic markers in their address.

§21a I turn to those Palestinians who do not want war
b and are not involved in terrorism
c Those Palestinians whose sole purpose is to support their families
d and afford clothes for their children
e You are observing us, Israelis, yearningly,
f and see Israel’s many achievements
g In the last 53 years
h Israel has developed flourishing industries and agriculture,
i among the most advanced in the world;
j our hi-tech industry will prosper again
k with the recovery of the world economy;
l one of the most advanced food industries in the world;
m modern cities with hundreds of thousands of citizens
n and education and health systems
o which are envied across the world
p All this has been achieved in 53 years.

Sharon continues to refer to the Palestinian people in the third person (as “what is being talked about”) until §21e, whereafter they are shunted from the picture in favour of a catalogue of Israel’s qualities. Although one cannot politely switch addressee without first indicating that this will occur, and a noun or third person pronoun is necessary for a short transitional period, by continuing for so long with this pronominal arrangement Sharon indicates that “that third person is excluded from the interaction and relegated to the position of object.” The statement is therefore not a ‘speech act’, and Sharon is not directly addressing the Palestinian people as he claims.

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16 I use the term ‘speech act’ here to mean utterances that perform a particular action in and of themselves, rather than Cameron (2001, p69)’s broader notion that “when we say something we are always also doing something.”
164 Also according to Cameron, an apology remains an apology whether it is sincere or not. Cameron, 2001, p69.
In all forms of speech there must always be consideration of the ‘overhearers’ as well as of the addressees, and the distinction is easily blurred. A self-conscious mother might reprimand her child in public for a misdemeanour that in private would pass without comment, so although ostensibly addressing the child the reprimand is actually performed for the benefit of the overhearers, perhaps to convey to them the message that she is a ‘competent parent’. Similarly, Ariel Sharon may ostensibly address ‘the Palestinians’, but this seems to be more for the benefit of the national audience, as well as for potentially critical international ‘overhearers’.

If, as I believe, Sharon is not really aiming his speech at the Palestinians, then what communicative function does his claim fulfil? To answer this question, it is necessary to look at what he says about them under the guise of speaking to them. At first, §20c’s “I know that it is not easy being a Palestinian,” amplified through predefinition as “what I have said in the past,” (§20b), might resemble an almost conciliatory acknowledgement of Palestinian hardship. But Sharon does not say anything along the lines of ‘it is not an easy time for the Palestinian people’ – in contrast, see §2e and §3a of the same speech, where he states, in relation to Israeli hardship, that “these are not easy times.” The simple assertive structure of §20c conceals a realm of ideological implications: the difficulties faced by Palestinians are not circumstantial, and certainly not a result of Israeli policy, but relate to the essential, genetic fact of “being a Palestinian,” being, in other words, someone whose hardship is caused by their own existence. As Wilkin points out,

> to attribute essential qualities to human beings can serve to limit or curtail the possibilities of social change and to reinforce the established social order. This, it is often noted, is exactly what we would expect powerful social groups and forces to desire in order to maintain their own authority in society.  

and by introducing this proposition with the cognitive verb “I know,” Sharon frames his essential assessment of Palestinian-ness as fact.

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[^167]: The conditions faced by those in the Occupied Territories could not by any standards be described as “easy” when military incursions, closures and curfews have devastated morale and resulted in unprecedented levels of unemployment and poverty. By February 2002, unemployment (by ILO standards) averaged 41%: 64.3% in the Gaza Strip and 32.4% in the West Bank. Passia, 2003. In January – February 2002 more than two-thirds of Palestinian households were living below the poverty line on less than US $1.90/day. Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, figures released April 2002. http://www.pcb.org. According to a joint press release issued on 23 February 2003 by Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights and Al Haq, two Palestinian advocacy groups, one year later in February 2003 the rates of poverty and unemployment in the OPTs had reached 80-85% and 64% respectively, as a direct result of Israeli military action and human rights abuses.

[^168]: Wilkin, 1997. p61
In §21a-b Sharon refines the object of his address to “those Palestinians who do not want war and are not involved in terrorism.” A polarity may seem to have been modified, since there now arises the possibility that there are ‘good’ Palestinians as well as ‘bad.’ However, the former are still described in terms of the latter, with the negative aspect immediately evoking those who do want war and who are involved in terrorism. Kress and Hodge illustrate how “negatives can create a universe of alternate meanings, which... exist as a result of [the speaker's] renunciation,” with the sentence “There isn’t a tiger in that room.” While we might not suppose the statement to be untrue, “that room immediately becomes one where a tiger might reasonably be.” Similarly, the link between Palestinians, war and terrorism is here effectively (re-)emphasised, and with the insertion of a demonstrative pronoun, those Palestinians to whom Sharon refers are marked, and therefore, it is subtly implied, less typical than the unmarked ‘normal’ Palestinians who do want war and terrorism.

§21c Those Palestinians whose sole purpose is to support their families

d and afford clothes for their children

e You are observing us, Israelis, yearningly,
f and see Israel’s many achievements.

In §21c, we receive a helpfully idealised definition of these non-belligerent Palestinians. They are “those Palestinians whose sole purpose is to support their families and afford clothes for their children.” Narrowly defined, the Palestinians and their essential misfortune sit in one of two constructed categories: they are either terrorists, or they have a ‘sole purpose’ that Sharon can comfortably identify to his supposed ‘overhearers’. If there are Palestinians with more than one purpose, or who do not have families and children, or who do have children and yet still believe in the necessity of armed resistance, or any other of the infinitely complex combinations and motivations of human existence, they have no place within this discourse. The Palestinians who have made it this far through the definitional process are finally rewarded with their own addressive pronoun, along with a stringent expectation of what they must be thinking: “You are observing us, Israelis, yearningly, and see Israel’s many achievements,” (§21e-f). In other words, ‘good’ Palestinians are envious of and “yearn” to emulate Israeli achievement. Here again Palestinians are defined in purely Israeli terms; they do not exist in and of themselves but only as enemies or acolytes of Israel. At last we have reached what seems to be the real intention behind this section – self-description ‘through the eyes’ of the ‘other’, in the form of a series of congratulatory statements about Israel’s achievements of the past 53 years:

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16 Kress and Hodge. 1979, pp144-5
§21g In the last 53 years
h Israel has developed flourishing industries and agriculture,
 i among the most advanced in the world;
j our hi-tech industry will prosper again
 k with the recovery of the world economy;
l one of the most advanced food industries in the world;
m modern cities with hundreds of thousands of citizens
 n and education and health systems
 o which are envied across the world
 p All this has been achieved in 53 years.

It is interesting to consider that a Jungian interpretation might see the above stanza as a projection of Sharon’s own desire to emulate the position of countries such as the US. Otherwise, the message of this stanza if directed at the Israeli people might be tailored to inspire the requisite ‘confidence’ component of warfare’s emotional trilogy (fear, anger and confidence), since according to Aristotle, “We feel confidence if... we believe ourselves superior to our rivals in... the possession of all, or the most important, appliances of war.”

3.3.2.3. Modes Of Judgement

Martin and Rose present a useful system for analysing ‘appraisal’, which is concerned with “the kinds of attitudes that are negotiated in a text, the strength of the feelings involved, and the ways in which the values are sourced and readers [or listeners] aligned.” The form of ‘appraisal’ is defined by its object: the appraisal of things is ‘appreciation’; that of their feelings is ‘affect’; and that of people’s characters is ‘judgement’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JUDGEMENT</th>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Implied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Admire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criticise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>Praise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Condemn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 3.3.2.3: Modes of Judgement (Martin & Rose)

‘Judgement’ can be direct or implied, personal or moral. Personal judgements relate to personal characteristics – to call someone ‘intelligent’, for example, is an example of direct personal admiration; if we say that he or she is ‘sharply’ or ‘fairly’ intelligent we thereby amplify or mute our positive personal appraisal. Similarly, and as the term suggests, moral judgement relates to moral character, and comes in the form of direct or implied praise or condemnation. Negative judgements can masquerade as mildly positive attitudes, as with Sharon’s apparent modification of polarities in 21-02-02 above. Having refined his address to “those Palestinians who do not want war and are not involved in terrorism,” he takes a benevolent advisory tone toward them, as follows:

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17 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Book 2 Chapter 5. @ 323BC
21-02-02 §22a Today I suggest that you think long and hard
b what you and your children
c would want to achieve in the coming years
d Will you continue to follow
e those who lead you to ruin, destruction and despair?
f Will you continue to be misled
g by those who call upon your sons to commit suicide,
h or will you follow those who choose to progress and to thrive?

There appears to be some faint hope for the Palestinians, if only they would “follow those who choose to progress and to thrive,” (§22h). The terminology of ‘following’ and ‘being led’ is interesting, in that agency is at once accorded and denied; the only choice to be made by the Palestinians is who to follow. From Sharon’s presentation the answer is clear, thanks to his repeated characterisation of the Palestinian leadership in terms like “Arafat’s organised bureaucracy of murder,” (08-04-02 §13k) which “is infested with terror,” (08-04-02 §25h). While on one level we may interpret “those who lead to ruin, destruction and despair” as the small minority of Palestinians involved in an organisational aspect with the “armed struggle against Israel,” (22-01-03 §11n), Sharon intends and manages to portray the whole of Arafat’s Palestinian Authority (PA) as the “abettors and dispatchers” (22-01-03 §5x) of terrorism. Thus the leaders of terrorism and the leaders of the Palestinian people are the same; terrorism is another essential aspect of Palestinian-ness. According to Sharon’s advice, if the Palestinians are to improve their circumstances they must renounce their own leadership in favour of that of Israel, cease their resistance to Israeli oppression, overcome “the myth of bloodshed forced upon them by their current leaders” (08-04-02 §39g-h) and wholeheartedly embrace whatever decisions and actions, military and otherwise, that Israel takes in their regard. They must accept the status quo.

A ‘judgement’ breakdown of 21-02-02 §22 reveals the existence within it of several negative judgements and one positive, directed at Palestinians and Israelis respectively, not including the initial positive personal and moral judgement of Sharon himself implied through his self-positioning as advisor. In §22, the ‘you’ pronoun applies exclusively, as delineated above, to “those Palestinians who do not want war and are not involved in terrorism,” the targets of Sharon’s advice, while the other Palestinians (those who do want war) continue to be referred to in the third person.

§22a Today I suggest that you think long and hard
b what you and your children
c would want to achieve in the coming years.

In §22a-c, Sharon suggests “that you think long and hard what you and your children would

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want to achieve in the coming years." The implicit judgement of someone who must be told to "think long and hard" on such an issue is that they are otherwise rash and impetuous; this judgement, in Martin and Rose's terminology, is negative, personal and implied.

§22d Will you continue to follow those who lead you to ruin, destruction and despair?

Within the question of §22d-e are couched two more negative judgements; although apparently already defined as 'good' Palestinians, "you" are currently following those miscreants, as revealed by the verb "continue," and are thereby implicitly judged once again in negative personal terms. Meanwhile, those who "you" are following receive a stronger expression of disapproval in the form of a negative moral judgement, implied through the immorality of their described behaviour, which itself is defined through the strong attitudinal lexis and emphatic tautology of "ruin, destruction and despair." Sornig tells us, with reference to Barthes, that "tautological expressions always have an aggressive effect... exercised by making somebody listen to one and the same argument over and over again." In brief, a 'judgement' breakdown of §22 might resemble the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judgement</th>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Implied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Admire</td>
<td>those (Israelis) who progress and thrive (§22h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criticise</td>
<td>I suggest that you (Palestinians) think long and hard (§22a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>Praise</td>
<td>those (Israelis) who choose to progress, etc. (§22h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Condemn</td>
<td>Those (Palestinians) who lead you to ruin, destruction and despair (§22e)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 3.3.2.3b: Modes of Judgement in 08-04-02 §22

3.3.2.4. Judging Behaviour

According to Martin and Rose, and as we have seen above, one of the most effective methods for conveying implicit personal or moral judgement is through description of behaviour. To this end, exemplums, which "relate an incident in order to comment on the behaviour of the people involved," are useful. To illustrate, §4t-cc of 08-04-02 contains the short exemplum of Zahava Wieder, providing an example of how mythologies gain credence through the appropriation of fact, and how an exemplum of one person's behaviour can be attached to the appraisal of a larger group.

08-04-02 §4t the face of Zahava Wieder —

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1) Sornig, 1999, p104.
3) Sharon 08-04-02, Annex P1, pp A6-A15.
Wieder, who lost several close family members in the Netanya suicide attack, "agreed to donate her husband's organs to a Palestinian family in Shuafat," (§4y). As a result, according to Sharon, she is "a true heroine of the people of Israel," (§4u). Although her heroism should not be denied, it is doubtful that he would have found it so worthy of public comment had she donated those organs to an Israeli or other family, so within the direct moral and personal praise of Wieder is an implied, mildly negative judgement of the recipients — "a Palestinian family" who, we infer, were really quite fortunate to receive this gesture, as they pointedly share the ethnicity of her husband, daughter and son-in-law's killers. Nonetheless, her action has become 'our' action (not only a true heroine, she is a true heroine of the people of Israel), and "she is living proof of the fact that, even at the most trying times, we remain humane," (§4aa-cc, emphases added). Aside from the flippant characterisation of the devastation of Wieder's world as "trying," with this 'we' Sharon manages implicitly to insert himself, along with the entire nation, into his positive personal and moral 'heroic and humane' judgement of Wieder. There is some paradox in the fact that Wieder's altruistic decision — to use death to save lives — has been appropriated for the justification of "intensified" military action.

In the following stanza, Sharon confusingly merges his description of the Netanya attack with that of the attack in Haifa, and we learn that Wieder's family, who died in Netanya, were, along with the (Jewish) Israelis killed in Haifa, "victims of coexistence" rather than of war, since the latter were killed "while eating at an Arab restaurant — their blood mixing with the blood of Israeli Arabs who were sitting beside them" (§5d-e):

§5a Victims of coexistence,
  b those whose worlds fell apart
c while eating at an Arab restaurant in Haifa —
d their blood mixing with the blood of Israeli Arabs
e who were sitting beside them
f Entire families, Jewish and Arab, are destroyed
g in the heat of the murderous insanity
h which has taken hold of our Palestinian neighbors
i And thus the killers and dispatchers intend to destroy the hope for peace,
j hope for the future
k and hope for a normal life.

The implicit message here is that coexistence is a dangerous and untrustworthy state of
affairs. Since we are concerned with the message carried in the labels of things as well as in their appraisal, it is worth noting in passing the terminology 'Israeli Arabs,' which provides a useful propaganda distinction between the Palestinians living in Israel as citizens and those in the Occupied Territories. Sharon makes use of it to imply unity (as well as equality, which is not in fact the case) between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel, an implicit counter-argument to those who would accuse Israel of running an 'apartheid state'. Entire families, Jewish and Arab, are destroyed in the heat of the murderous insanity which has taken hold of our Palestinian neighbours: these "neighbours" are shared by Jewish and Arab Israelis alike. In this account their actions abusing "coexistence" and killing even "Israeli Arabs"—implicitly reinforce the direct moral condemnation carried in "the murderous insanity which has taken hold of them," the (Palestinians) are 'murderous' and 'insane' (which, by contrast, implies that we are not). Further, their "murderous insanity" results from a "heat" which has "taken hold" of them: they do not have any rational control over it. In this way is implied still more personal (as opposed to moral) criticism. Arabs and Muslims, it is well known from the intertextualisation of years of Orientalist discourse, are irrational, impulsive creatures, dangerous for the likelihood of their being seized at any time by the most alarming whims and passions.

176 In fact, apart from their status as citizens, the only difference between 'Israeli Arabs' and 'Palestinians' is that the former (who today number approximately 1.2 million) descend from those who managed to remain in place during the 1948 war, when most of Palestine became Israel. Confusingly, this terminology is not used to refer to Arab Jews (Jews from Yemen, Iraq, North Africa etc who have since become Israelis). Most 'Israeli Arabs' still define themselves as 'Palestinians' and have close relatives in the OPTs. Until very recently, 'Palestinians' did not exist at all in Israeli discourse — there were only 'Israeli Arabs' and other 'Arabs', since the term 'Palestinians' implied the (pre)existence of Palestine: in 1969, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir famously declared, "There is no such thing as a Palestinian people... It is not as if we came and threw them out and took their country. They didn't exist." (Statement to The Sunday Times, UK, on 06/15/69). However, with the 'peace process', the concept of the 'two-state solution' and the installation of the Palestinian Authority, 'Palestinians' has become an accepted identity, although it is often used in a context that renders it synonymous with 'terrorist(s)'. Interestingly, in the past year members of the American administration have begun to use the term 'Palestine', presumably with reference to the isolated bantustans currently under Palestinian authority.

177 Said delineates "the web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, and dehumanising ideology" that demean Arabs and Muslims in Western discourse and which he refers to as 'Orientalism.' 1978, p27.
3.3.2.5. Palestinian ‘Neighbours’

The phrase ‘our neighbours’ appears frequently in Sharon’s discourse as a semantic equivalent to ‘the Palestinians’. On the most basic level, it indicates close physical proximity, useful in the invocation of fear as “we do not fear things that are a very long way off.”179 Within these texts it usually appears amid varying degrees of negative judgement, such as the “murderous insanity” discussed above. On 21-02-02, we are told that “Unfortunately, our neighbours have misinterpreted both our yearning for peace and our way of life,” (§9a-c); on 8 April, that “For eighteen months Israel has been under bitter and bloody attack, initiated by our Palestinian neighbours,” (§14a); and on 22 January 2003 Sharon begins by announcing that he will focus his comments on “our conflict with our Palestinian neighbours,” (§1b).

In this context, ‘neighbours’ might seem for Sharon to be a slightly jocular euphemism for ‘our nearby enemies’, but critical analysts such as Labov, Cameron, Martin and Rose and others strongly emphasise the use of contrast as an evaluative device. Since the term ‘neighbours’ usually holds connotations of friendliness and fellow-humanity,180 its apparent incongruity here emphasises, rather than detracts from, the surrounding negative judgement of Palestinians. By performing the many evil deeds explicitly attributed to them in the speeches, ‘they’ are violating the “expected rule of behaviour”181 of neighbours, emphasising a huge contrast between what they are and what they should be. Meanwhile, thanks to the morally polarised framework of these narratives, ‘their’ un-neighbourliness automatically implies ‘our’ neighbourliness: Israel’s intentions towards the Palestinians are neighbourly, with all the (cruely spurned) friendliness and good-intention that the term evokes. Furthermore, since ‘neighbours’ tend to live on their own land, in their own homes, these implications are also carried, creating a masterfully implicit denial that the Palestinian ‘neighbours’ are all living under varying degrees of Israeli occupation, and not so much ‘neighbours’ as unwilling hosts to the Israeli armed forces and settlers. Finally, it should be noted that the possessive pronoun renders ‘our neighbours’ an attribute of ‘us’: once again, as throughout the texts, the Palestinians are defined in purely Israeli terms, and do not exist in and of themselves.182

3.3.3. Constructed Logic

So far I have discussed some of the ways in which the narrator might convey subjectivities as

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179 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Book 2 Chapter 5, @ 338 BC.
180 The second definition offered by the OED for ‘neighbour’ is “fellow human being,” while ‘neighbourly’ is defined as “like a good neighbour; friendly; kind.” OED, 1996.
181 Labov, 1972, pp370-1.
182 Although Sharon does not refer to it in his speeches, “the practice of compelling Palestinian neighbours to tour buildings suspected of being booby-trapped... is a widely-used method, which has even been given a regular military appellation: ‘neighbour practice’.” -- Uri Avnery, Palestine Chronicle, 19 August 2002.
fact, or how myths, as Barthes has it, “transform history into nature.”

The defining evaluations of both the situation and the key players, whether direct or implied, positive or negative, form the premises from which Sharon can briefly outline his intended action, in the place and form of logical conclusions.

According to Kress, “the major content of an utterance is often to be found in the modal operations, rather than in the ostensible content.” Making a similar point, Gee (1999) reproduces the first stanza of Carroll’s *Jabberwocky* to explain the difference between ‘function’ (or ‘grammatical’) words, which “show how content words in a phrase, clause or sentence relate to each other, or how pieces of information fit into the overall ongoing communication,” and ‘content’ (or ‘lexical’) words, the “pieces of information” themselves.

```
Twas bryllyg, and the slithy toves,
Did gyre and gymble in the wabe.
All mimsy were the borogoves.
And the mome raths outgrabe.
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Although “function words... tend to be informationally less salient than content words,” they “can help us make guesses” about confusing or unknown content words by clarifying their relationship to each other. In spite of the meaninglessness of its ‘content words’, *Jabberwocky* makes grammatical sense and even achieves sensory impression; “Thus,” says Gee, “we readily interpret the [Carroll] stanza as a description of an outdoor scene with creatures of various sorts frolicking or moving about.” While this or any other interpretation of the poem must have much to do with the sounds of the content words, it is clear that function words can be used to create seemingly logical structures from otherwise meaningless premises.

Sharon’s speeches do not contain nonsensical content words (it could be said that the reverse is true, although being imbued with so many layers of meaning does not necessarily make words more intelligible), but there is something analogous in the way he constructs a logical relationship between ‘content phrases’ by means of causal ‘function words’, as follows:

```
22-01-03 §10a Israel should obviously not be expected to make political concessions b prior to a proven state of calm and Palestinian governmental reforms. c The reform process is necessary d in order to remove Arafat from the reins of power and decision-making e and to establish a more proper government.
```

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183 Barthes, 1993, p129.
188 Gee 1999, p101.
which will lead to security, economic and democratic reforms. In this context it should be emphasized that one of the most important tests of the new regime will be not only the prevention and dismantling of terrorism, but also a complete cessation of incitement and the nurturing of an education system that teaches the values of peace and coexistence.

Breaking the above stanza (loosely) into ‘content’ and ‘function’ words or phrases yields the following:

- **[function 1]**: Obviously *(It is ‘fact’ that)*:
  - [A]: **Israel should not be expected to make political concessions**
- **[function 2]**: until *(A depends on B)*
  - [B]: **there is a proven state of calm,**
- **[function 3]**: and *(B requires C)*
  - [C]: **Palestinian governmental reforms**
- **[function 4]**: in order to *(C must achieve D)*
  - [D]: **remove Arafat from power**
- **[function 5]**: and *(D requires E)*
  - [E]: **establish a more proper government**
- **[function 6]**: which will lead to *(D and E must cause F)*
  - [F]: **Reforms**
- **[function 7]**: it should be emphasised that *(It is ‘fact’ that)*
  - [G]: **the new regime**
- **[function 8]**: will be not only *(G must fulfil H)*
  - [H]: **the prevention and dismantling of terrorism**
- **[function 10]**: but also *(H requires I)*
  - [I]: **a complete cessation of incitement**
- **[function 12]**: and *(the nurturing of) *(H and I must achieve J)*
  - [J]: **a new education system**
- **[function 13]**: that *(J must achieve K)*
  - [K]: **teaches the value of peace and coexistence**

The above is not an exhaustive breakdown of §10’s ‘function’ and ‘content’ words, since it does not acknowledge, for example, the cases where function words are embedded within a content phrase, such as “a proven state of calm,” or “establish a more proper government.” “Proven” and “more proper” are informationally unsalient, because they indicate a relativity whose parameters are not clearly defined. However, it does illustrate the circular endlessness that has been built into the logic of this stanza, where each ‘content’ phrase prerrequires fulfilment of the one that follows, thus:
Sharon explains that requirements of each step of the process are constantly under review. In other words, the process may be interrupted indefinitely at any stage because of a politically subjective assessment, with undefined criteria, of the ‘progress’ being made, and at the end of all this is the chance – but not the certainty – that Israel will ‘make political concessions’. The nature of the concessions themselves is unclear, although since they are presented as being desirable to Palestinians, they imply that Israel will cease its assaults and appropriations. Aside from the fact that to do so is framed by sleight of hand as ‘making concessions’, the structure of the logic is in any case such that the end can never be reached. If we look carefully we see that many of the content words, such as [C] (Palestinian governmental reforms); [E] (a more proper government); [F] (Reforms) and [G] (the new regime) contain the same or very similar information. The result is an endless loop. In Sharon’s vision there must be peace before peace is negotiated, and in the meantime Israel will continue to occupy, assassinate, and restrict human rights and liberty as it sees fit.

The above logic is also presented as the only possible course of action: “This is the only way to win a war and the only way to achieve sustainable peace,” (21-02-02 §3j-k); “There is no other way,” (21-02-02 §26k) and so on.

3.4. Emotion

Emotional response is sought in Sharon’s audiences by several means, including the use of stereotypes and slogans, as well as parallelisms, hyperboles, climax and metaphors. Direct invocation of pain and suffering usually takes place at the outset of his speeches, in a form of ‘orientation’ to inform the listener of the context within which his statements are situated. Whether they are originally delivered in English or viewed in translation, his speeches are remarkable for their noticeably flowery, almost poetic use of imagery, to an extent unusual in political discourse. Sharon also tends to juxtapose emotionally-charged words and phrases against an overarching structural rationality. These aspects will be discussed below.

Mr Sharon likes to say that he stands up to terrorists to show he is not afraid. In fact, his policies are driven by fear. His great talent is that he fully understands the depths of Jewish fear of another Holocaust... and he is an expert at harnessing all of it for his political ends. For Sharon, Jewish fear is a guarantee that his power will go unchecked, granting him the impunity needed to do the unthinkable: send troops into the Palestinian Authority’s education ministry to steal and destroy records, bury children alive in their homes, block ambulances from getting to the dying, sabotage all international attempts to get at the truth of what...
Ariel Sharon is expert at tapping into and increasing feelings of bewilderment, insecurity and isolation among the Jewish and Israeli people. His announcement at the beginning of ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ that “we are fighting a war for our homes, a very tough battle for the survival of the Jewish people!” may seem sensationalist even to those outsiders who support “Israel’s right to defend herself,” it is completely absurd to Palestinians at the receiving end of Israel’s military invincibility, but its sentiment echoes throughout the Israeli media and would seem to have been comprehensively absorbed by a great many of the people.

3.4.1. Emotional Orientation

A common feature of all Sharon’s narratives examined in this thesis is the ‘emotional orientation’ of their opening stanzas, where he routinely either evokes the death and destruction of the most recent attacks against Israelis or asserts Israeli victimhood with reference to a contextually appropriate historical event. This has the effect of contextualising his remarks from the outset; providing them with an emotional response according to which any reciprocal action (which might be in the mind of the audience from other sources) seems automatically justified.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often described by the international media as a ‘cycle of violence’, and the advantage of a ‘cycle’ for propagandists (on any ‘side’) is that they need only specify a starting point for everything that follows to seem consequentiaL In other words, once you have pinpointed a ‘beginning’ then you have also attributed blame, cause and effect for everything that unfolds from that point onwards, whatever may have preceded it. For Sharon, the ‘beginning’ is always a Palestinian attack, to whose bereaved and injured he expresses deep regret. In so doing, as well as defining the emotional context within which the logic of his arguments can be followed, he also reinforces his own credibility as an insider source, or ‘one of the people’. To illustrate emotional orientation I shall refer to four of the

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199 BBC World Service, 10 April 2002.
190 This formation of Israel as “she” is widely used by “her” supporters, including US President George W Bush: 18 April 2002. President Bush, Secretary Powell Discuss Middle East, Remarks by the President and Secretary of State Colin Powell, The Oval Office, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020418-1.html. In English, countries do not normally take a gender pronoun and are referred to as ‘it’, but the ‘feminisation’ of Israel can frequently be found in English-language discussion. This may simply be a direct translation from Hebrew, where countries are feminine, but it is unclear why George Bush and many other non-Hebrew speakers opt for this term. Perhaps it is an attempt to demonstrate sympathy by ‘personifying’ the country; or perhaps a demonstration of Israel’s vulnerability, a trait classically endowed upon females.
192 According to the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ website FAQ section, ‘There is no ‘cycle of violence’, rather there is Palestinian violent action followed by Israeli defensive reaction. The violence cannot end until the Palestinians abandon terrorism, allowing peaceful negotiations to resume.” http://www.mfa.gov.il/
texts, as follows:

1) On February 21 2002, immediately after greeting his audience ("citizens of Israel"), Sharon states, "I extend my deepest condolences to the bereaved families of the victims of the murderous attacks, and wish a speedy recovery to the wounded," (§1b-g). This brief expression of sympathy develops a complex theme in one sentence: It is clear that people were killed in the attacks to which he refers, and that those who died were not the only victims, having left behind their families, who are now bereaved, as well as the wounded, who now suffer. With their emphatic positioning at the beginning of the speech, these terrible happenings take the shape of its premises, while instilling in the listener a series of emotions pertaining to victimhood, murder and loss. To critically evaluate the argument that is based on such premises, listeners must perform the difficult task of overriding their emotional— and therefore apparently instinctive—response, which readily transposes itself onto whatever conclusions may be drawn by the speaker. In other words, the emotional response triggered by the argument's opening premises leave the listener more willing to accept its conclusions.

2) On 8 April 2002 Sharon is at his most lyrical in his speech to the Knesset, whose function, inter alia, is to respond to the storm of controversy attracted by the events of 'Operation Defensive Shield'. He begins with reference to the suicide bombing in Netanya: "Our dead lie in a long row: women and children, young and old. And we stand facing them, facing the vacuum created by their murders, and we are speechless," (§1b-f). For the first four stanzas of this speech, Sharon concentrates on orientating his listeners with vividly emotive imagery, appraising his own 'affect', or emotions, in reaction to the attack. After briefly outlining his personal involvement (§2a-§3e), he widens the scope to include his listeners and their emotions alongside his own, making intertextual reference to the "faces and human stories" pouring from the television screens and newspaper pages—those who did not encounter these would have been few, and by referring to popular knowledge Sharon has also implicitly aligned himself as one of the people, and one of the victims.

3) The article published in the New York Times on 9 June 2002 reaches back to the 'Six Day War' of June 1967 when "Israel faced a threat to its very existence as a coalition of Arab armies massed their troops along the fragile armistice lines that had separated Arab and Israeli forces since 1949," (§1b-f). The emotional evocation of a threat to Israel's "very existence" (with 'very' acting here to imply the core of its existence as soft, exposed and at

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risk) is unmistakable, with the country, as this narrative would have it, protected only by “fragile armistice lines” (where was the army?) while a whole coalition of Arab armies “massed their troops” ready to attack; menacing, innumerable, and once again entirely unfathomable. Fortunately it transpired that the ‘threat’ was eradicated in just six days.

4) On 7 October 2003, addressing the veterans of the 1973 Yom Kippur war and their families, Sharon reaches back thirty years to define the beginning point of yet another war in the cycle: “the fires of war were suddenly lit amidst the sanctity of Yom Kippur,” (§1b-c), and how it pertains, emotionally, to the present: “Thirty years have passed since your loved ones hastened directly from their synagogues and homes to the heavy battle, and did not return. Those same thirty years have engraved the moment of a hasty separation and the bundle of precious memories, the truth of war and the shock of the most terrible of all news, in your hearts,” (§1d-l).

3.4.2. Logical Formulae

The frequent superimposition of logical formula onto highly emotionally-charged statements creates the impression that Sharon, as responsible state leader, is attempting to contain the emotions of his audiences, presupposing these to be already intense, rather than to impose them, as follows:

21-02-02 §3a These are not easy times
   b A rasping cry is heard from some quarters
   c in these days when we must –
   d more than ever –
   e remain calm, reasonable and restrained
   f When it comes to matters of war and peace,
   g we must not act rashly
   h There is a time for everything –
   i not too late and not too early
   j This is the only way to win a war
   k and the only way to achieve sustainable peace.

In this stanza, the speaker is ostensibly advising his people to contain their emotions and await further instruction, entreating them to maintain a level head in spite of the circumstances as defined by Sharon himself. In view of what has gone before (“murderous attacks,” §1e; “a brutal campaign of terrorism,” §2d, etc) and of what is to come (“...escalation and deterioration into an all-out war,” §13i; “our war against those who are trying to destroy our people,” §28c, etc), §3a’s “these are not easy times” seems to constitute an obvious and heavily-muted understatement. It is implicitly acknowledged as such by the speaker through

its repetition (see §2e, §25a and §25i) and other contextual devices, such as the close juxtaposition of the “rasping cry,” with the overall result of amplifying the meaning far beyond that which the words themselves would otherwise contain.

Sharon has established the premise that the people listening are all suffering, and that he is aware of the extent of their suffering. Through this acknowledgement, he implicitly indicates his understanding of the intense pre-existing emotion that might motivate his audience to one of two undesirable courses: either to take wild and “rash” retributive action against the unnamed agent (the Palestinian people) whose actions and existence are clearly understood to have caused the difficulties; or to lose faith in Sharon’s leadership, which has not yet produced the promised result of increased security for the Israeli people, and dissent in search of other solutions. In other words, perhaps mindful of the fact that “a speech should not only sound meaningful, it should also neutralise defensive reactions the listener may have,”197 he has given his listeners the choice between three potential alignments: 1) with Sharon; 2) to the right of Sharon (by acting “rashly beyond his chosen course of action) and 3) to the left of Sharon (by casting doubt on the efficacy of his chosen course of action). The last two are discredited as over-emotional (they are not “calm, reasonable and restrained,” §3e), unlike Sharon’s way, which has been framed as central, mainstream and wise: it is “the only way to win a war, and the only way to achieve sustainable peace,” (§3i-k).

21-02-02 §3a These are not easy times

b A rasping cry is heard from some quarters

The “rasping cry” of §3b stands out because of its particularly emotive adjective and noun combination, and their apparent incompatibility, since “rasping” might apply to a low, weary, gravely kind of voice, almost a whisper, while a “cry” pertains more to sudden, loud shouts or screams of grief or pain. “Rasping” can also have sinister connotations, which could discredit the message of the owner of this voice, but because its “some quarters” source is contained by the ‘we’ pronoun, they are not external, and their message can only be one of dissent, dissatisfaction, or pain caused by external agents. It may be that the intention here is to convey a sense of suffering over time: what was once a spontaneous shriek has hoarsened through repetition and fatigue into a rasp. It is difficult to ascertain precisely what is meant because, interestingly, we are not told what is being said by the rasping cry. Later in the speech Sharon refers to other nameless voices, but each time he allows the nature of what they are saying (or what he says they are saying) to act in their judgement, for example when he speaks of “expressions of disobedience,” (§8i) and “those who are talking about a collapse,

197 Wodak, 1989, p144.
despair and loss of hope,” (§27a-b). The only message that might possibly be attributed to the rasping cry comes three stanzas later, in the form of a refutation from Sharon: “[t]he State of Israel is not collapsing and will not collapse,” (§6a-b) – but the connection is far from clear. In any case, according to the logic of this stanza, “rasping” is defined as the opposite of remaining “calm, reasonable and restrained,” and is therefore undesirable, although Sharon seems to express some degree of sympathy for its cause. It is tempting to conclude that the phrase has been included more for its evocative atmospheric qualities than for its precise semantic meaning.

Within the context of these highly emotional premises and the general atmosphere of pain (posited, of course, by the speaker himself), he takes the chance to re-order the emotional disarray, with his ostensibly un-emotional advice becoming the central theme of the stanza. Even here there is room for emotional manipulation. The assertion “we must remain calm, reasonable and restrained,” (§5c-e), is interrupted by the phrase “more than ever” (§3d), which alerts us to the fact that level-headedness is probably more difficult than ever as the situation is now worse than ever. Also implied is the judgement that ‘we’ have always been “calm, reasonable and restrained” (since we must “remain” so). Other intensifiers include the presentation of this stanza as slow and deliberative, through the repetition and drawing out of its central point with tautology: “there is a time for everything – not too late and not too early,” (§3h-i). All in all, the stanza resembles in its patterning the kind of slow, calm advice that might be given to someone on the edge of hysteria, which of course implies that there might be cause for hysteria. If the listener was not emotional before, he or she might very well by now be wondering why on earth not.\footnote{For further discussion on the imposition of rational formula to disguise emotional content, see Annex BA3, p.}

3.5. The Policy Narrated

3.5.1. Operation Defensive Shield

So thoroughly constructed is the spectre of the Palestinians’ terrorist intent that when we are told, on 8 April 2002, that “the government of Israel has thus decided to instruct the IDF and other security forces to embark on Operation Defensive Shield,” (§23a-c), and “IDF soldiers
and officers have been given clear orders: to enter cities and villages which have become havens for terrorists; to catch and arrest terrorists and, primarily, their dispatchers and those who finance and support them," (§24a-d), as well as to “dismantle” the “infrastructure of terrorism” (§15a and §56m) it seems almost churlish, as if we are somehow missing the point, to mention that these same cities and villages are home to several million innocent people.

The opening weeks of ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, according to internal and external commentators, took the form of the most intense military assault on the Occupied Territories since the 1967 war, and in dismantling the “infrastructure of terrorism,” the IDF managed to comprehensively dismantle the civilian infrastructure, destroying water and electricity networks, driving tanks over cars and traffic lights, through shop windows and ancient stone walls, ransacking government ministries, schools, offices, cultural institutes, hospitals, television and radio stations and even supermarkets, shelling all of the above, destroying or confiscating computer hard drives and files that had been compiled by both Palestinian ministries and civil society organisations, taking over the airwaves of the stations whose transmitters had not been destroyed to broadcast pornographic films, with widespread defecating on walls, floors and office equipment for good measure. In the meantime, millions of Palestinians were held under such intense curfew, many for several weeks on end, that people were reduced to drinking poisonous urine to stay alive, while unable to reach the dead and injured outside their windows. In some cases, where people were killed inside their homes as a result of indiscriminate shelling and shooting, their families were not permitted to take the decomposing bodies outside to bury them until at least ten days later.

In the following section we move to Jenin refugee camp, one of the main stages for the performance scripted and stage-directed by Operation Defensive Shield, whose justificational policy narratives are by now familiar. To ‘set the scene’ for the narrative analysis of Moshe Nissim that follows in section 4, I will refer to contemporary news reports and media coverage, as well as to the reports of Amnesty International and the IDF.

3.5.2. Jenin Refugee Camp

"Inside that camp it’s a hornet’s nest of potential suicide bombers."

A41: Containing Emotions, which discusses Sharon 08-04-02.

See writings by Edward Said (eg Thinking ahead, 5 April 2002, http://www.ivevs.com) and others, including Israeli journalists such as Amira Hass and Uri Avnery, and a great many of the communications from international activists and Palestinian residents of the WBGS at the time. See also Annex B12, p A76: Tzaporah Ryter’s Eyewitness Report from Ramallah, 2 April 2002.

It is interesting to consider the soldiers’ more scatological offerings in light of the abuse photographs recently emerging from occupied Iraq.


Alan Johnston, settler from New Zealand, interviewed from his West bank settlement, gesturing in the
During the Israel Defence Force’s controversial 4-15 April 2002 operation in Jenin refugee camp, the ramshackle camp was comprehensively sealed and...

...the IDF denied access to Jenin refugee camp to all, including medical doctors and nurses, ambulances, humanitarian relief services, human rights organisations, and journalists. Amnesty International and other organisations tried to get information by the only means that seemed possible: constantly telephoning residents under curfew.

These telephone calls, some of which were later published by Amnesty and other NGOs, reported scenes of brutality and destruction including: heavy IDF fire prohibiting people from reaching the dead and injured in the streets, the use of Palestinian civilians as ‘human shields’, mass arrests, group executions, and, after 11 April, the bulldozing of houses with people still inside. According to one testimony, “some bodies are buried under the rubble, others crushed by tanks, and the rest are left lying in the streets.”

By 9 April, the Israeli daily Ha’aretz newspaper was reporting that “100 Palestinians have already been killed in fighting with IDF forces,” and that Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres (among others) was “referring to the battle as a ‘massacre.’” The same report speculated on the army’s reasons for forbidding access to the camp, citing an anonymous IDF source: “When the world sees the pictures of what we have done there, it will do us immense damage.” The Palestinian Authority, for its part, announced on 15 April that “more than 600 people have been killed [in Jenin],” but this claim was later withdrawn as false. Amid the horror, there was some faint optimism among the Palestinians that ‘the world’ would no longer be able to ignore the situation, and indeed, Israel was already facing a barrage of difficult questions from the international community.

However, the hubbub quickly died down. The IDF published its own report in response to that of Amnesty International, claiming that “the Palestinians [had] tried to weave a net of lies regarding Jenin - including allegations of a massacre and the prevention of humanitarian aid, and even went so far as to stage fictional funerals” for the sake of international sympathy. As the Israeli establishment attempted to draw the focus outwards from the individual deaths and suffering its army had caused, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs published aerial photographs highlighting the section that had been razed, whose dimensions...

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202 ‘Hamid’: “But the most terrible thing was seeing Israeli soldiers take eight men and line them up and kill them.” Di Goran, 9 April 2002.
204 Benn and Harel, 9 April 2002.
described by the caption as “100m x 100m” – look relatively small within the distant physical relief we understand to be the refugee camp. We will note later that Moshe Nissim has received and absorbed this information (“I didn’t mind seeing the hundred by hundred we’ve flattened...”\textsuperscript{199}), although in fact these dimensions are contested by journalists and relief workers who later visited the scene.\textsuperscript{200} The ‘official’ figure cited by the IDF for Palestinians dead stands at 52 – somehow presented as a small amount of death, and justified by the claim that “the majority of [them] were terrorist activists who actively participated in the battle against the IDF”\textsuperscript{211} – with 23 Israeli soldiers.

As with other such incursions into densely-packed civilian areas, Israel compared its methods favourably to those employed by other countries in war. Government spokesman Danny Seaman explained that, “One of the reasons we had these casualties [the 13 Israeli soldiers who were ambushed and killed during their incursion in Jenin camp] is that unlike the US and the UK we don’t bomb first to clear the ground.”\textsuperscript{212} As we have recurrently noted, negatives evoke their opposite, so with Seaman’s “unlike”, he is implicitly comparing Israel with the US and the UK – perceived throughout the world, rightly or wrongly, as the two most ‘powerful’ nations (largely due to the wars they wage and win, their colonising influence, and their alliance). The Israeli army, it is therefore implied, is equally powerful as those of the US and UK, but more humane. It does not kill indiscriminately. Like Sharon, Seaman implicitly raises the stakes of the conflict through presupposition: it has become a ‘war’, where tactics such as “bombing first to clear the ground” take place and are potentially justifiable.

According to the IDF, “the fighting in Jenin” (referred to as “the capital of suicide bombers”\textsuperscript{213}),

should be perceived in its widest context, as part of Israel’s ongoing struggle against the Palestinian campaign of terror. These terrorist organisations are connected to international terrorist organisations that threaten worldwide peace and security.\textsuperscript{214}

Almost imperceptibly the prevailing narrative shifted\textsuperscript{215}: plans for a UN fact-finding mission were dropped, there was no official independent investigation, and although the IDF

\textsuperscript{199} Moshe Nissim, §62f-g, See Annex P2, pp A25-A34.
\textsuperscript{200} See Annex B11, p A43: Once upon a time in Jenin, by Hugger and Reeves, 25 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{211} Military spokesman Captain Jacob Dallal, 25-04-02, cited in Lancaster, 26 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{212} Danny Seaman, director of Israel’s Government Press Office, interviewed on BBC World news, 9 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{213} Jenin was the ‘capital of suicide bombers’, in which a terror infrastructure - unprecedented in scope - perpetrated a large number of terror attacks.” - IDF, 11/02. See Annex B11, p A84: IDF Response to Amnesty Report on Jenin.
\textsuperscript{215} For a contemporary news report from the time of this shift, outlining its rationale, see Annex E115, p A86: Israel v. The World, by Bradley Burston, Ha’aretz, Israel: 1 May 2002.
conducted a 'cleaning-up' campaign before re-opening the camp (amid Palestinian claims that dead bodies were being surreptitiously driven away in trucks), residents were given no heavy machinery to facilitate their search under the rubble – some of which had once stood several storeys tall – for missing people. Because there were no 'unbiased observers', there is deep uncertainty to this day over what 'really' happened in Jenin – exactly how many died, whether what took place constituted a 'massacre',

and whether the IDF behaved in contravention of international legality. According to Uri Avnery in Ha'aretz, "there is full agreement between all those who were in the Jenin refugee camp on only one thing. A week after the end of the fighting, foreign journalists and IDF soldiers, UN representatives and hired hacks in the Israeli media, members of the welfare organisations and government propagandists all report that a terrible stench of decomposing bodies lingers everywhere."

3·5·3. Narrative Images: A matter of perspective

Figure 3.5.3. above contrasts two separate visual representations of the aftermath of the April 2002 events at Jenin refugee camp. The image on the left side is the one referred to above, taken from a section devoted to “the battle in Jenin” on the website of the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs, while the image on the right is one of countless news agency photographs taken from the ground by journalists once the camp had been reopened to the public by the IDF, captioned as it appears on the Associated Press website. These images can be seen as representative samples of two genres: the first being part of a 'justificational narrative' in the form of an official response to widespread criticism and concern over the IDF's actions, and the second a report of the stench described by Uri Avnery.

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216 It is commonly accepted today by journalists and NGOs that it did not. However, the Palestinians disagree, asking how the invasion of a refugee camp and the killing of 52-56 people there can be termed anything but a massacre.

217 Avnery, 20 April 2002

218 This and the rest of the series of aerial images can be found at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/asp/MFAI01160
the second taken by neither an Israeli nor a Palestinian photographer and as such presenting the assumed objectivity of news reportage. Together they provide a strong, but not polarised, contrast of two perspectives from which narratives on Jenin can be framed, illustrating the breadth of the divide between Israeli military discourse and the emotional and physical reality experienced by Palestinians.

In the discussion on representation and interaction in their work entitled *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design*, Kress and Van Leeuwen outline the resources of visual communication for constituting the interaction between the producer and the viewer of an image. They begin by defining two types of participants: the ‘represented participants’, who are “the people, the places and things depicted in images,” and the ‘interactive participants’, who are “the people who communicate with each other through images, the producers and viewers of images,” in other words, the “real people who produce and make sense of images in the context of social institutions.” The authors then define the possible relations between these participants as follows: “1) relations between represented participants; 2) relations between interactive and represented participants [...] and 3) relations between interactive participants.” Of course this third category of relation, in the context of published and widely circulated images such as these, and particularly in the day of the internet, is rarely direct. When we are presented with an image through the mass media, we do not meet the photographer or the editor who has selected and may have framed, resized and cropped it. Similarly, the producers also do not know us, the viewers; we are necessarily an ‘idealised’ audience, expected to ‘make sense’ of the images before us in a predictable manner. As such, the producer and viewer cannot know each other’s intentions or reactions, they can only interpret them, and the viewer’s interpretation of the producer’s intentions must often be based only on an interpretation of the image itself.

Neither of the two images displayed above is, strictly speaking, what Kress and Van Leeuwen would describe as a ‘demand’ picture, since neither of them contains represented participants who look directly at the viewer or somehow engage us (Kress and Van Leeuwen offer the example of the 1914 ‘Your Country Needs You!’ British army recruitment campaign poster as an archetypal ‘demand’ picture – not only does the depicted officer look directly ‘into our eyes’, he also engages us by pointing at the viewer, to whom he is depicted as being probably close enough to touch).

The IDF image contains no human participants, or rather, it contains many thousands of

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19 Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1996.
them but none close enough for the viewer to see. It is categorically an ‘offer’ picture, technical and non personally-engaging, whose purpose is to provide information from a purely military perspective, as emphasised by the surrounding text. The extreme long distance creates an “invisible barrier between the viewer and the object,” which is there “for our contemplation only,” and in fact, the relationship between ‘we’ interactive participants – the concerned viewers and the IDF producers – is enhanced by our shared distance from the (un)represented human participants, who lie so far below as to appear absent or irrelevant, avoiding any chance of emotional response or human interaction with them. Even the houses are so far away as to seem like little other than physical relief; they are certainly indistinguishable as people’s homes. Although the photograph represents a place where tens of thousands of people live their daily lives, at this level of detachment it is simply a map; a very abstract representation of geographical space.

This perspective is further enhanced by the surrounding text which, in military technicality, draws our attention to the levelled area by encircling and labelling it the ‘combat zone’, justifying the military action and rendering it ‘proportionate’: only a relatively small section of the refugee camp has been damaged, says this picture, and from that section is deleted all evidence of human existence. The bracketed dimensions, along with the “1000 meters (2/3 mile)” caption below, demonstrate that things are not so bad as we might have thought; the levelled area seems tiny from all the way up here and we might even suspect the IDF and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to have overstated its size (it looks like less than a tenth of the overall depicted area).

Returning to the issue of the viewer’s relationship with the producer, which in this case is fortified at the expense of the (un)portrayed people far below, it is perhaps worth noting in passing that this image was clearly taken at night with the aid of ‘flares’ to illuminate the scene. From the ground it is all but impossible to tell the difference between an aircraft that drones overhead simply for the purpose of taking pictures and one that is about to launch a missile, and since Jenin refugee camp was subjected to intensive shelling as well as other forms of assault, the photograph that here is presented to reassure us viewers is likely to have caused, in the moments of its production, as much anxiety to the people below as any potential bomb.

As for the second picture, it could perhaps be argued that we are invited to feel sympathy for the two Palestinian women searching in the rubble for the household items buried beneath it, but the invitation does not
come from the women themselves, who are thoroughly absorbed in their task and whose faces are wholly or partially obscured. This too is an 'offer' picture; although its represented human participants are themselves the object, they do not engage us either by demand or by close distance. The woman closest to us is at 'far social distance' (according to Edward Hall, "this distance has a more formal and impersonal character than in the close phase,"221) while the second woman, whose face we cannot see, stoops at 'public distance' (the distance between her and us is "the distance between people who are strangers."222)

Although this image is 'humanised', we are not invited by its producers to identify too closely with the represented participants – they too are there simply for our observation, and any sympathy the observer may feel is not due to the manner in which they are presented but through the implications of their activity (and, perhaps, now that I have joined the chain of 'interactive participants' by selecting the picture for inclusion here, the stark contrast with the utter impersonality of the IDF picture beside it). Can we imagine ourselves rummaging in the ruins of our own homes? Most of 'us' who will see this picture are clearly not expected to be able to do so. Neither woman is directly facing the viewer: they are both represented at what Kress and Van Leeuwen describe as an 'oblique point of view', which is described as saying "what you see here is not part of our world; it is their world, something we are not involved with."223 Again, the viewers are being addressed as 'uninvolved,' a function perhaps of the ostensibly 'objective' stance taken by news reportage. Although this picture shows 'more' than the other one, and would usually be seen as 'sympathetic to the Palestinians', it too is part of a narrative that makes no reference to an insider's viewpoint, and is therefore silent about the lived experience of real people.

The narrative analysed in the following section is delivered from a very similar perspective to that of the IDF photograph discussed above. There are no (or hardly any) Palestinian people present in the narrative of Moshe Nissim, the driver of a D-9 bulldozer that flattened the Hawamish district of Jenin camp.

223 Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996, p143.
4. Narrative of Personal Experience: Moshe Nissim

His sense of purpose clarified and grew until he was veritably a man who, like so many before him, would know no peace until he had drowned evil in its own blood.²²⁴

The narrative of personal experience to be analysed in this section is that of Moshe Nissim, a reserve soldier in his early forties recruited for the latter part of the IDF's operation in Jenin to operate a 'D-9L'; a heavy armoured bulldozer employed by the army for its demolition work in Jenin and elsewhere.²²⁵ Moshe's narrative, elicited in an interview by Tsadok Yeheskeli, provides the backbone of an article that appeared in the Israeli Yediot Aharonot newspaper on 31 May 2002, under the title I Created For Them a Teddy Stadium in the Middle of the Camp.²²⁶

The 'Teddy Stadium' is the main Jerusalem stadium for sporting events, and as we shall see it is also an important narrative theme for the "man who knows no fear," (§23e).

![Fig. 4: "I left them with a football stadium, so they can play." Reuters picture.](image)

Because the article first appeared in Hebrew, a detail of translation worth mentioning at the outset is a slight confusion with tense correlation. Since Hebrew, like Arabic, does not operate as many past tenses as English, even the most skilled translators sometimes fall into the trap of translating 'one degree closer to the present', for example producing a present perfect ('I have done') where a simple past ('I did') is required. Hence, where the text says, "What haven't I done for them to take me?", Moshe's meaning, as is clear from the context,

²²⁵ According to BBC News Online UK Edition, 25 January 2004, the UN reports that since October 2000, more than 14,000 people in the Gaza Strip alone have lost homes to Israeli bulldozers, almost 10,000 of whom are in Rafah. UN Warns Over Israeli Demolitions, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3428517.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3428517.stm).
should be interpreted as ‘What didn’t I do [to get] them to take me?’

§17e What haven’t I done for them to take me?
  f I sent the guys to twist the battalion commander’s arm,
  g I phoned the company commander,
  h I drove them mad
  i “I promise to work,” I pleaded with the battalion commander.

Similarly, we also find verbs mistranslated into the present tense instead of the present perfect. For example, “I cannot go to the Beitar matches for half a year now” would seem to imply that he will be unable to go for the next half a year, but Moshe means that he has been unable to go for the past half a year, as we infer from the description that follows:

§27g I cannot go to the Beitar matches for half a year now
  h The suspense kills me,
  i and I am constantly afraid of getting a heart attack
  j Sometimes, i can walk around ’Teddy’
  k with a ticket in my hand,
  l and I can’t go in.

Although these tense inaccuracies are easily unravelled with reference to their context, there are enough of them in the text to warn against applying models for ergative and transitivity analysis of verbs, such as that provided by Simpson. However, these and other translation pitfalls do not obscure Moshe’s narrative direction, and nor do they prevent us from examining other narrative aspects such as repetition, ellipsis, metaphor, ‘sourced’ opinions and so on. Martin and Rose’s advice on ‘appraisal’ analysis prompts consideration of “the kinds of attitudes that are negotiated in a text, the strength of the feelings involved and the ways in which values are sourced,”227 because “[a]ppraisal is to rhetoric as conjunction is to logic – it unfolds dynamically to engage us, to get us on side, through a spectrum of manoeuvres that work themselves out phase by phase.”228

4.1. Overview

Before examining Moshe’s attitudinal indications, it is worth making some more general observations about the narrative in its entirety. According to Ochs and Capps, “All narrative exhibits tension between the desire to construct an over-arching storyline that ties events together in a seamless explanatory framework and the desire to capture the complexity of the events experienced.”229 In Moshe’s narrative, particularly if we assume it to be ‘about’ Jenin, this tension is so great that neither an over-arching storyline nor the complexity of the events experienced seems adequately achieved, with the result that there is nothing to help us

228 Martin and Rose. September 2001. p64.
"experience [the situation] alongside the protagonists." 

Whatever the explanatory framework that justifies armed combat and motivates soldiers, it must surely be overtaken in the moment of combat by other less intellectual urges related, for example, to power, fear and survival. To express the complexity of events such as these, words are truly inadequate tools: no quality or quantity of verbal description can hope to capture the sensory reality surrounding the cognition, for example, that ‘there is shooting all around me.’ Furthermore, if we permit a moment of imaginative empathy for Moshe, we might see that very little detail is likely to filter through the roar of falling buildings and the exhilaration of causing them to fall, fuelled for three days as he was only by ‘whisky and something to munch on,’ (§42i), but even the falling buildings themselves are only fleetingly mentioned. If he is “avoiding facets of a situation that don’t make sense within the prevailing storyline,” these facets are many, particularly when he finally reaches the requested (or ‘core’) narrative of ‘in Jenin’ itself.

The “complexity” expressed all takes the form of detailed, repeated evaluation of Moshe’s own mindset, emotions and character. To adapt Ochs and Capps, another point of tension in this narrative is its subject matter. If we adapt our expectations and realise that the narrative is actually ‘about’ Moshe himself, rather than Jenin, we can find an overarching storyline (Moshe is victim-turned-hero) and complexity (Moshe is fearless and altruistic, but misunderstood, so his ‘fearlessness’ is sometimes perceived as ‘madness’, etc). Although this is not meant to be a politically persuasive speech, it does seek to elicit approval or admiration for his actions, and he attempts, with occasional nods towards, for example, “the pictures on the television,” (§55a), to pin his narrative onto a ‘socially acceptable’ framework, widely available from the sort of propaganda I discuss elsewhere in this thesis: Moshe can be victim-turned-hero (turned indestructible war machine) in perfect harmony with the doctrines of Ariel Sharon et al (“If there is a national lesson... the lesson is that... in matters regarding our security, Israel’s strength must be ready and able at all times... in fighting spirit and equipment alike, as if the next war was around the corner”), whose discourse would have this progression at the heart of Israeli national identity.

Moshe’s narrative is full of contradictions. Although he opens with the words, “I entered
Jenin driven by madness, by desperation,” (§1a-c), he later explicitly denies that his own problems had influenced his work in Jenin: “The moment I drove the tractor into the camp... all the desperation caused by my personal condition just vanished at once,” (§32a-c). The point is reiterated in §42f-h: “For 75 hours I didn’t think about my life at home, about all the problems. Everything was erased.” By applying the negative aspect to contrast what ‘really happened’ with what ‘might have been expected’, Moshe inadvertently gives credence to the very possibility that he seeks to deny: that his ‘personal condition’ was the main motivating force behind his desire to do “a good job operating the tractor,” (§56i), and to “get as many houses as possible,” (§47m-n). Concluding the theme in §§53a-b, Moshe emphasises “I had lots of satisfaction in Jenin, lots of satisfaction. It was like getting all the 18 years of doing nothing into three days.” In spite of these assertions and expectations, a later comment to his interviewer explicitly merges the ‘Disasters’ and ‘Jenin’ themes to end the overall narrative, like so many of its threads, in disappointment instead of triumph: “Jenin... helped me forget my troubles. I had hoped it would be some turning point, until this [his son’s illness] hit me.”

Similarly, this narrative contains many different manifestations of fear (primarily felt, according to Moshe, by the other people around him). They appear alongside such elaborate protestations of his own fearlessness that it is worth examining the text for rebel manifestations of his own fear and insecurity. In brief, Moshe’s narrative contains strong indications that he may be afraid of the judgement of others, of inadequacy, of failure, and even of life itself. These fears, although ostensibly unlike those sought in the ‘ideal audiences’ of Ariel Sharon (fear of terrorism and of existential threat), are nonetheless a powerful motivational force behind the bulldozer driver’s self-expression in Jenin. Sharon’s discourse explains how to respond to fear – by taking up arms and becoming invincible – and this ‘acceptable reaction’ framework allows Moshe to “sanction [his] social practices through reference to collective interests and systems of values.” In short, it will be argued that Sharon’s discourse provides the script, and the IDF mission in Jenin provides the stage, for Moshe Nissim to externalise his demons and wreak havoc on the Palestinian reality.

4.1.1. Structural overview

Breaking the text into stanzas and lines (as explained in section 2.1. above) highlights the relative proportions of ‘In Jenin’ and ‘Not in Jenin’ narrative it contains. Immediately apparent from a structural overview, represented in Fig. 4.1.1. below, is that the core

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230 This quote is attributed to Moshe by Yeheskeli. 31 May ‘02, but not included in the interview transcript.

narrative – ‘what happened in Jenin’ – can only really be said to ‘begin’ after 34 stanzas (of a total of 62). Moshe creates, with varying degrees of commitment, no less than nine possible entry-points to the core ‘Jenin’ narrative (§1a; §22a; §23a; §28a-b; §32a; §33a; §34a), but each time immediately retreats to the realm of background information, usually with a sub-narrative explaining his psychological state or reinforcing an aspect of his self-evaluation (such as §28c-e, which underlines previous assertions about his defiance in the face of authority). In Fig. 4.1.1., potential entry points to the core ‘Jenin’ narrative are denoted ‘J-’.

Moshe begins the narrative with an n-stanza ‘recount’ (“designed to chronicle and evaluate the significance of events”) of the catalogue of disasters that have contributed to his “desperation”; “for two years it is just one blow after another,” (§1a), ending with the realisation that he has not been called for reserve service along with “the guys,” (§1a). Two more illustrative diversions (‘Military Service’ and ‘Versailles’) demonstrate that, according to Moshe, his negative evaluation by his commanders was based only on the side of his character he had so far chosen to show them, “Truth is, I understood my commanders. Hey, I’ve been doing my reserves duty for 16 years now, and I was useless. I did nothing but make trouble,” (§12a-c), but the other “truth is,” that “they didn’t even know me,” (§1sa).

‘Convincing Them’ outlines the effort he applied to gain their acceptance, and ‘Driving Lesson’ shows us that Moshe does indeed learn fast when he applies himself. By §22, he seems to have been armed with enough positive self-appraisal to enter the bulldozer and begin his work, but although it is located in Jenin, this stanza turns out to be another false start, again to illustrate how quickly he can learn:

§22a This is what happened in Jenin as well
  b I have never demolished a house before,
  c or even a wall
  d I got into the D-9 with a friend of mine,
  e a Yemenite
  f I let him work for an hour,
  g and then told him,
  h ‘OK. I got the idea.’

Moshe interrupts this thread with the words, “but the real thing started the day that 13 of our soldiers were killed up that alley in the Jenin refugee camp,” (§23a-c, emphasis added). Although the IDF had already bulldozed several houses by then, it was indeed in response to that ambush that “the army began knocking houses down indiscriminately, creating a vast
plaza of rubble in the centre of the camp, a crossroads for the Israeli tanks.” However it seems that for this narrator the “real thing” is not what we might anticipate (either the beginning of the core narrative ‘action’ or a sub-narrative about the thirteen soldiers), but instead an elaborate projection of the other soldiers’ reactions to him (“When they brought us in, I knew that nobody wanted to work with me,” etc, §24), followed by a short sub-narrative to illustrate the extent of his fearlessness (and to position himself firmly within a framework of fear):

§24a When they brought us in,
   b I knew that nobody wanted to work with me
   c They were afraid to be with me on the tractor
   d Not only did I have a reputation of a troublemaker,
   e but also of a man who knows no fear,
   f and they were right about that
   g I really have no fear
   h They knew I had no fear,
   i that I don’t give a damn,
   j and that I can go anywhere,
   k without asking questions,
   l without an escort of tanks or APC’s or anything
   m Once, in Jenin,
   n I left the tank that escorted us everywhere...

In §25a we again enter the camp, but only for long enough to see Moshe tying his football team’s flag to the bulldozer, having “told the family and the kids: ‘you will see my tractor on television. When you see the Beitar flag that will be me,’” (§25i-k), as if to illustrate his desire for ‘positive’ recognition, before departing immediately on the ‘Beitar’ sub-narrative, which outlines his obsession with that football club (“Beitar is a kink in my brain,” §27a) and reveals a great many personal motivations in the process. It is only in §32 – after yet another informative little sub-narrative, this time about his chosen ‘nom de guerre’ – that we are finally enveloped in the requested narrative. Even now Moshe makes three more consecutive false starts before beginning the narrative action, returning immediately to his own mind after the introductory clauses of each new stanza:

Action: Entering the camp

§32a The moment I drove the tractor into the camp,
   b Something switched in my head
   c I went mad
   d All the desperation caused by my personal condition
   e just vanished at once
   f All that remained was the anger
   g over what had happened to our guys
   h Till now I am convinced,
   i and so are the rest of us,
   j that if we were let into the camp earlier,
   k with all our might.

* Goldenberg, 16 April 2002.
Twenty-four soldiers would not have been killed in this camp.

The moment I went into the camp for the first time, I just thought of how to help these soldiers. These fighters, children the age of my son, I couldn’t grasp how they worked there, where a charge blows up on you with every step you take.

With the first mission I was given, to open a track inside the camp, I understood what kind of hell this was.

My first mission, voluntarily, was to bring the soldiers food. They haven’t eaten in two days. You couldn’t poke your nose out. I filled the tractor till the roof, and drove the tractor right up to the door of their post. so that they would not have to take even one step outside their shelter. One step was enough in order to lose an arm or a leg.

The ‘narrative clauses’ of §35, with something of a progression of time and action, indicate that we have finally embarked upon the core narrative, and now that we have entered we remain in Jenin until Moshe reaches its coda in §60-62. As such, stanzas §32-§35 can be seen, loosely, as the structural ‘dividing line’ between two discrete sections of this narrative; ‘Before Jenin’ and ‘In Jenin’, which differ not only in focus but substantially in character. In ‘Before Jenin’ Moshe takes care to fill in what he seems to perceive as necessary background information for our favourable judgement of him, before we embark on the hazy, structureless account of the three days ‘In Jenin’, with its absence of descriptive detail and specific temporal markers.

4.1.2. Sub-narratives

Fig. 4.1.2. provides another structural representation of Moshe’s narrative, with the Jenin section at the core. Each main sub-plot (as delineated in Fig. 4.1.1.) is represented by another ring, whose width is proportional to the number of stanzas that form it. In this way we can see at a glance the number and length of obstacles placed by the narrator on the path to Jenin.

After ‘Disasters’, the longest diversion is the ‘Beitar’ sub-narrative (§25-§30), ostensibly inserted to explain “why the Beitar [football team’s] flag was on the bulldozer in Jenin,” (§28a-b). Moshe periodically uses the ‘football stadium’ metaphor to summarise his intentions and accomplishments in Jenin – “I said, ‘I am going to make a Teddy stadium
here. Don’t you worry”, (§29n-i); “By the end, I built the ‘Teddy’ football stadium there,” (§44m); and “As far as I am concerned, I left them with a football stadium, so they can play,” (§62g-i). This contrivance may in part have developed from external sources. For instance, if he has often retold the story in the month between the events and this account, the flag on his “tractor” may have elicited admiration or some other desired response and so the theme might subsequently have been developed. The bulldozed area of Jenin was frequently referred to in the ensuing media reports as “the size of a large football field,” which may also have contributed to developing the metaphor.

Whatever its roots, the ‘Beitar’ sub-narrative is as important to our analysis as it is to Moshe’s story, but for different reasons. It neatly – but presumably unintentionally – mirrors the structure of the overarching narrative. If we refer to Fig. 4.1.2. above, we see a structural representation of Moshe circling around his core narrative, so often unable to find entry. In this, the 27th stanza of preamble to entering Jenin, he informs us of a similar difficulty he has entering the real football stadium: “The suspense kills me, and I am constantly afraid of getting a heart attack. Sometimes, I can walk around ‘Teddy’ with a ticket in my hand, and I can’t go in,” (§27i-j). With his insistence on the ‘football stadium’ metaphor to describe his actions there, Moshe indirectly associates Jenin with the fear and vulnerability represented by the Beitar matches. With his reluctance to enter either the real or the metaphorical stadium, we are tempted to see the football stadium metaphor as having been created from memories that he cannot face. As if aware of the potential for exposure, he presents his fear in contrastive juxtaposition (“In Jenin, I was not scared for a moment, but I cannot go to the Beitar matches for half a year now,” §27e-f). Although he cannot access Beitar, what he can do, according to this narrative at least, is to recreate, from the homes of the Palestinian residents of Jenin, a Teddy where he may ride, brave and invincible in a D-9 bulldozer, straight into the middle, without fear and without failure.

The effect of this Beitar sub-narrative, then, is to arm him for entry to the core narrative, and in fact he is almost there. The final sub-narrative is short, and located more or less in Jenin – Moshe provides a brief description of the tussle with his superiors over the name to which he
will respond, followed by an equally brief exemplum to illustrate:

§30a On the radio, they wanted to call me ‘Moshe-Bear’,
   b but I insisted on Kurdi
   c I told the Golanis, “I am Kurdi,
   d and I won’t answer if you call me by any other name.”
   e That is how ‘Kurdi Bear’ was born.
   f This is my name,
   g and I am stubborn.

§31a In the reserves,
   b they already got used to my signature:
   c ‘Moshe Nissim Beitar Jerusalem’
   d For a while they asked me to stop
   e but finally they just gave up.

For Moshe, this is simply another example of his defiance in the face of authority (and of his ‘fearlessness’), similar to that of the earlier ‘Military Service’ sub-narrative, where “Kurdi always did his thing,” (§13n). But the issue of Moshe’s identity is intriguing. We already suspect that although the narrative is intended to be ‘about’ Jenin, or his experience of it, its primary function is to present a (highly contrived) portrait of Moshe himself. Over and again, he indicates the wrongfulness of negative appraisals of his character (“This is a terrible injustice... bribery? Me?” §7a-e); in fact, of the identity that has been imposed upon him, particularly by his commanding officers and others in authority. Persuading them to enlist him for work was a matter of persuading them that they had misjudged him; they did not know the ‘real’ Moshe (“When I am given responsibility, I can act differently,” §15b-c). Here, in a final flourish, he is able to disburden himself entirely of the imposed identity, simply by refusing to answer to his allocated code name. The fact that his real name and his code name are both ‘Moshe’ also seems to indicate some discomfort with his own identity, as well as a similarity between his ‘real’ identity and that which is imposed on him by his superiors. For now, however, he has replaced an external label for himself with one of his own design, and within the narrative he is now fully empowered to enter Jenin.

The lengthy prelude may have been compelled by Moshe’s awareness that, as with the football matches, once inside he would lose control of his own excitement, and thereby the coherence of his “over-arching storyline.” Just as “an interview, for example, may yield a tidy story that subsequently disintegrates,” in Jenin the elaborate control mechanism of the previous section fragments into contrived flippancy (“Difficult? No way. You must be kidding,” §45a-c), contradiction (“I took the opportunity to bring down some more houses;

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243 ‘Kurdi’ denotes someone of Kurdish origin; ‘Bear’ is the IDF code for its D-9 operators.
244 Ochs and Capps, 2001, p4.
not because I wanted to..." §46d-e, emphasis added), insubstantial justification ("it was all under orders," §47x), and eventually to unconcealed satisfaction ("I found joy with every house that came down, because I knew they didn’t mind dying, but they cared for their homes," §48k-m).

From §51g, Moshe tells of the Israeli army’s order for the bulldozers to redeploy ("because the army didn’t want the cameras and press to see us working," §51k-l). Although chronologically this might naturally represent an ending, relatively little has actually been said, and there follow four stanzas of analepsis and another four that end the story by reinforcing the message of his popularity and triumph at Jenin ("I’ve invited them all for Kubch at my place," §560), before he eventually reaches his three-stanza coda (§560-$562). Moshe’s unwillingness to end the core narrative mirrors his earlier reluctance to begin it, as well another important textual theme – his reluctance to stop working when the time came: "I bitched them to give me more work. I would tell them... ‘Why are you letting me rest? I want more work!‘" (§52a-d). Emphasised by repetition, this theme is clearly important to Moshe in that it illustrates the characteristics for which it seems, according to this analysis of his narrative, that he would like to be famed as selfless, brave and dedicated. "Even when we had a two-hour break," he tells us, "I insisted on going on," (§49b-c). The point is elaborated at length for the remainder of §52: "All this time, I was really sick. I had fever. I got back from Jenin, I came out. Torn to bits. The next day, I went up again. One of the guys was ill, and I volunteered to help. I got back there. The battalion-commander was in shock when he saw me. The other operators all cracked up and needed rest, but I refused to leave. I wanted more." (§52e-o).

4.2. Fear And Insecurity

Moshe’s desire for social acceptance and integration is a dominant, although sub-textual, theme. It can be argued with reference to this narrative that Moshe is (or perceives himself to be) highly socially disintegrated, and that he desires approval and positive evaluation above all. It is probably for this reason that he causes so many aspects of his self-evaluation to be reinforced through ‘heteroglossia’ ("where the source of an attitude is other than the narrator"21). Other characters’ positive appraisals of Moshe are either direct or implied, attributed as direct speech (eg, "The soldiers came up to me and said: ‘Kurdi, thanks a lot. Thanks a lot,” §53c), or to be inferred from their actions: "Reservists who went home on short leave came back with Beitar flags, just to imitate me,” §29b-d, emphasis added). Much ostensibly ‘external’ appraisal – whether positive or negative – is achieved through projection, without reference to specific speech or action from the other characters.

Interestingly, these projections are usually preceded by the verb ‘to know’, indicating that their findings are a matter of fact rather than of Moshe’s own speculation: “I knew that nobody wanted to work with me,” (§24b). Even when his speech returns from the narrative action to explicitly address the listener, it does so to project a certain appraisal of himself onto the addressee: “I know it sounds crazy,” (§26a), and “I know how this sounds,” (§27m).

4.2.1. Sources of Attitudes

Very little of what we are told about in Moshe’s narrative takes place outside his own mind, and where other people do appear, they function only to illustrate an aspect of his self-evaluation. For instance, we know there is a partner in the bulldozer with him (“I got the big D-9L, me and the Yemenite, my partner,” §25d-e). Although presumably sitting beside Moshe for the duration of his time in Jenin, this partner is mentioned only twice, each time to illustrate his fear in reaction (and contrast) to Moshe: “Gadi, the other operator who was with me, nearly fainted,” (§24s-t), and “My partner screamed at me to reverse...” (§50e-f).

For a closer look at the roles of fear and of interpersonal appraisal (of Moshe by others, and of the others by Moshe) in Moshe’s narrative, I shall return to stanza 24 with reference to Martin and Rose’s model for appraisal analysis:

§24a When they brought us in,
  b I knew that nobody wanted to work with me
  c They were afraid to be with me on the tractor
  d Not only did I have a reputation of a troublemaker,
  e but also of a man who knows no fear,
  f and they were right about that
  g I really have no fear.

At the beginning of the stanza, he indicates awareness that “nobody wanted to work with me,” (§24b), which constitutes a projection of affect, or Moshe’s assessment of the feelings of others, presented as negative personal judgement of himself, reinforced by the assertion that he knew (as opposed to ‘felt’, or ‘thought’) it to be true. He makes use of the fact that this is his narrative to reciprocate their (real or imagined) negative judgement with one of his own, by asserting a reason for it: “they were afraid,” (§24c). This constitutes a direct personal negative judgement of those who, to Moshe’s mind, have already judged him.

Moshe’s judgement is already stronger than that which sparked it, since it is direct while the first was indirect; the point (that he is brave while they are not) has already been made. He

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24 It is not absolutely clear from the text whether he is referring in both cases to the same partner, or whether the incident with Gadi happened on another occasion. According to the article from which this narrative was taken, Moshe’s partner was Yeffet Damti, but it is possible that ‘Gadi’ is a nickname.
has negated their negative judgement and emerged with an indirect positive personal judgement of himself (indirect since it is presented through contrast). Nonetheless, he continues building the contrast: not only are they afraid while he is not, but the cause of their fear, he tells us, is his own fearlessness. “Not only did I have the reputation of a troublemaker, but also of a man who knows no fear,” (§24d-e). If they are afraid of his fearlessness then their judgement of him is the judgement of cowards and has been further negated, while his own has been enhanced and re-emphasised, not least with the positive non-modalised conclusion “and they were right about that. I really have no fear,” (§24f-g). But Moshe is not yet satisfied:

§24g. I really have no fear
   h They knew I had no fear,
   i that I don’t give a damn,
   j and that I can go anywhere,
   k without asking questions,

He reiterates, reinforcing his direct positive self-appraisal (§24g) by re-inserting it into the minds of his alleged detractors and presenting them once again as the source of the appraisal: “They knew I had no fear, that I don’t give a damn...” (§24h-i). But still Moshe’s self-appraisal is not complete, and it gathers momentum once more as he takes us from the immediate scene of events and into another illustrative anecdote. Again, he presents an external source – this time his partner – to back up the truth of what he is saying and against whom he contrasts favourably in a very similar manner. From the description of Gadi’s behaviour (“he started going mad,” §24s), we discern an indirect negative personal judgement of Gadi, because he is also afraid in contrast with Moshe’s fearlessness.

§24q. Gadi, the other operator who was with me,
   r nearly fainted
   s ‘Get back,’ he shouted,
   t ‘we have no escort!’,
   u but I had to get to know the place better,
   v to find an exit,
   w just in case we needed one
   x I was not afraid to die
   y ‘At least I was insured
   z This would have helped my family.

To end the sequence, he emphasises that his motivation is level-headed and altruistic: “I had to get to know the place better, to find an exit, just in case we needed one,” (§24v-x), and states for the second time in the narrative that he was not afraid to die, because “at least I was insured. This would have helped my family,” (§24z-aa). It is not clear, and apparently irrelevant to Moshe, whether Gadi’s family would have been similarly recompensed had they

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both died (and another question altogether is whether this was ever truly a risk). Other
reinforcements of Moshe's positive self-judgement include 'amplifications' such as the
insertion of "anywhere" and "anything," to emphasise that nothing is too difficult or
frightening for him, however much it may intimidate others, and the 'appreciation' of props,
such as, in this stanza, the tank, whose importance is emphasised by being "the tank that
esorted us everywhere," (§24n). The stressed importance of the tank highlights Moshe's
departure from it as a brave act. In brief, an 'appraisal' breakdown of stanza 24 might look
something like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude:</th>
<th>Affect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[§24b] I knew that nobody wanted to work with me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[§24c] the other operator who was with me, nearly fainted. He started going mad:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement</td>
<td>[§24e] They were afraid to be with me on the tractor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciation</td>
<td>[§24f] I left the tank that escorted us everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source:</td>
<td>[§24g] Gadi... nearly fainted. He started going mad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With its elaborate positioning of Moshe within a framework of fear, this stanza is a defining
point in the narrative, as emphasised by its introduction as "the real thing," (§23a). The fact
that the framework is constructed primarily through the portrayal of other people's negative
reactions to him, and then by overemphasis of his fearlessness, suggests that for Moshe there
might be a strong (inverted) connection between fear and social integration. His response –
to 'prove' his own fearlessness through wild example (§24m-y) – demonstrates, I believe,
precisely the urge that led him to commit such thorough and indiscriminate destruction in
Jenin refugee camp.

4.2.2. Contrast and Juxtaposition

The emphasis of Moshe's fearlessness is so important that as well as being juxtaposed
alongside other people's fears, it is also contrasted with the way it is perceived by others
("they told me I am mad," §40e), as well as with his own fear in an apparently unrelated
context ("In Jenin, I was not scared for a moment, but I cannot go to the Beitar matches... I
am constantly afraid of getting a heart attack," §27f-g). Related contrasts include Moshe's
indestructibility ("For me, in the D-9, it was nothing. I didn't mind. You would just hear the
explosions," §37a-c) versus the soldiers' vulnerability, as follows:

§39a I fell in love with those children
 b I was willing to do with my tractor
c anything they would ask for.

"Those children" of §39a are "these soldiers. These fighters. Children the age of my son,"
§33c-e); as Moshe tells us in a later stanza, “my heart went out for them,” (§44i), and it is interesting to see how, here and elsewhere, he evokes their vulnerability and positions himself as their protector (“I would erase anyone with the D-9, just so that our soldiers won’t expose themselves to danger,” §44b-c; “I was afraid for our soldiers,” §44e).

§40a They, in return, protected me
b I would leave the tractor without weapons,
c nothing,
d just walked in
е They told me I am mad,
f but I said: ‘Leave me alone
g anyhow, the armored vest will not save me.’
h This is how I worked
і even without a shirt
j half naked.

Although they reciprocated his protection (and, implicitly, his affection for them), presumably by ‘covering’ him when he left the bulldozer and “just walked in,” (§40d), Moshe’s own indestructibility, “even without a shirt,” (§40i), is portrayed as superior to that of the heavily-armed soldiers of one of the world’s most powerful armies, who thought he was “mad.” Revealingly, they also “protected” him when he had finished working:

§56a After I finished the work,
b I got out of the tractor,
c piled up some clothes on the side of the road,
d and fell asleep
е They looked after me,
f so that I won’t get run over by a tank or something.

It is not clear where he was sleeping, but Moshe indicates that it was not far from the “tractor” – in other words, very near the scene of events, although presumably behind Israeli lines. Since there are no Palestinian tanks, this stanza must refer to the possibility of being run over by an Israeli tank, which seems very unlikely to happen, as well as illustrating the absence of a threat from the Palestinians in the area (who may have been too busy extricating themselves from the rubble of their homes). Similarly, although we have no way of knowing how many times Moshe left “the tractor without weapons,” (§40b), the event is linguistically constructed as recurrent (with the ‘habitual aspect marker’ “I would leave,” instead of ‘I left’.) However, the narrated speech events which follow (“they told me,” and “I said,”) are both described in the past simple, as ‘one-off’ events, seeming to indicate that it only happened once. But even this seems unlikely, as there is absolutely no description of what happened when he got off the bulldozer, where he went (“I just walked in” – to where?), or what was going on around him – we begin to suspect that although Moshe would like us to imagine him leaving the bulldozer several times and wandering around the refugee camp with bullets
and shells whizzing past his ears, this was far from being the case.

In any event, he is very soon to contradict his own assertion: “Do you know how I held out for 75 hours? I didn’t get off the tractor,” (§41a-b, emphasis added), and “Anyhow I could not leave the tractor. You open the door, and get a bullet,” (§42c-e, emphasis added). His nakedness (“This is how I worked. Even without a shirt. Half-naked,” §40h-j) seems far less defiant from within the impenetrable confines of the heavily armoured D-9 bulldozer (“Clothes? Didn’t need any. A towel was enough,” §42a-b). Nonetheless, for the purpose of Moshe’s self-appraisal, two very important points have been made – he is popular with the other soldiers, and, of course, he is brave.

4.2.3. Family and Home

While these are not often mentioned in Moshe’s narrative, when they do appear their allocated function is similar to that of all ‘other people’ - to reinforce an aspect of his own self-evaluation. However, the episodes where he mentions his family also contain revealing contradictions to Moshe’s self-presentation. For instance, his financial problems (inserted to support Moshe’s protestation that he is innocent of accepting bribes) are emphasised in §8h with the lamentation “and I have four children to keep,” implying that a ‘real man’ supports his family, which Moshe cannot. His mission in Jenin is presented from the outset as a way to somehow gain their positive evaluation of him (“I wanted the family to be able to identify me. I told the family and the kids: ‘you will see my tractor on television. When you see the Beitar flag, that will be me’,” §25h-k), to the extent that if he dies in action, “no big deal,” (§te):

§2a  I told my wife:
   b  "If anything happens to me,
   c  at least someone will take care of you!"

This sentiment, as noted above, is echoed in §24:

§24v  I was not afraid to die
   z  At least I was insured
   aa  This would have helped my family.

Moshe’s assertions that he is not afraid to die, when they occur, are hinged on this caveat: if he dies, at least he will finally, through his life insurance policy, be able to help his family. It is possible to speculate that one of the reasons that he is not afraid of death is because he is afraid of life: in life he perceives himself as inadequate, incompetent and insufficient, but in death he can provide.
4.3. Justifications

§61a All the human rights organizations
b and the UN
c that messed with Jenin,
d and turned what we have done there into such an issue,
e are just bullshitting, lying
f lots of the walls in those houses
g just exploded by themselves,
h at our slightest touch
i it is true, though.
j that during the last days we smashed the camp
k and yes, it was justified
l they mowed our soldiers down
m they had a chance to surrender.

Having thus far pointed at certain (internal) motivating factors behind Moshe’s actions in Jenin, I turn now to the ways in which he might be seen to seek the “psychological impunity” described by Pratkanis and Aronson,246 and justifications from the overarching narratives available to him, including the echo of those presented by Ariel Sharon.

4.3.1. Logic And Ideology

Moshe’s narrative makes very little mention of the policy narratives and propaganda discussed above, and here it becomes clear that the persuasive strength of such propaganda does not lie in its details so much as in the overall atmosphere it creates. In other words, the recipient (in this case Moshe) need not necessarily understand or even listen to the finely-constructed logic of Ariel Sharon, because “increasingly, the goal of modern propaganda is not to inform and enlighten but rather to move the masses toward a desired position or point of view.”247

Moshe is apparently unmotivated by religious or nationalistic concerns. The word ‘Israel’ does not appear in his narrative, and nor does the endless oppression of the Jewish people. In fact, according to his narrative, against the ‘solidarity’ doctrine of Sharon, Moshe’s Israel is broken into a range of smaller groups, with everyone he refers to carrying a regional label. He refers twice his partner as a ‘Yemenite’ (§22e, §25e); the soldiers and officers he works with are ‘Golani’248 (§28i, §29f, §30c, §51c, §54h), and of course he himself is Kurdi249 (§26n, §30c). Similarly, the ‘others’ are ‘Palestinian’ (§53k, §54b, §55d) or ‘Arab’ (§60e).

Politically, Moshe defines himself as a member of the nationalistic Beitar youth movement

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246 Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, p38.
248 ‘Golani’ come from the Golan Heights.
249 ‘Kurdi’ means that he is of Kurdish origin.
and Sharon’s ruling Likud party (§60b), emphasising that he is “heavily on the right,” (§60c).

From juxtaposition, as well as from his insistence that being right-wing has “nothing to do with what I have done in Jenin,” (§60d) we discern that the main implication of this alignment is a licence to take harsh ‘revenge’ on the Palestinians:

§60a I know many people will think that my attitude
b stems from me being a ‘Beitar’ and ‘Likud’ member.
c It is true. I am heavily on the right.
d But this has nothing to do with what I have done in Jenin.

§60e I have many Arab friends.

f And I say, if a man has done nothing –
g don’t touch him.
h A man who has done something –
i hang him, as far as I am concerned.

Having dismissed the notion that his narrated actions stem from political concerns, Moshe constructs an elaborate alternative framework to represent his attitude towards the Palestinians as morally justifiable, beginning with the classic disclaimer of racism that “I have many Arab friends,” (§60e). The sequence might indicate Moshe perceiving that declaring himself “heavily on the right” could imply to some that his actions had been facilitated by a racist attitude, and hastening to rebuff that notion. If a man has done nothing, don’t touch him; but a man who has done ‘something’ could justifiably be hanged. Once again, Moshe warms to his theme to the detriment of his own preconstructed logic:

§60f A man who has done something –
i hang him, as far as I am concerned.
j Even a pregnant woman –
k shoot her without mercy,
l if she has a terrorist behind her.

In this way Moshe illustrates his perception, echoing Sharon’s notion of ‘collective punishment’ discussed above, that the Palestinians are all guilty, purely by merit of their ethnicity: in spite of the assertion that a ‘man who has done nothing’ should not be touched, “even a pregnant woman” (who has done nothing) can be justifiably shot “without mercy” if there is a terrorist lurking somewhere behind her.

4.3.2. Propaganda

As part of the analysis of Moshe’s “language that justifies and explains violence,” it is important to look at his narrative representations of the people who live in Jenin refugee camp (where they do occur). As discussed in the analysis of Sharon’s policy narratives, it is easier to cause death without remorse if those we would kill are not perceived as human, or
'like ourselves', because "by reducing dissonance, a person defends the ego and retains a positive self-image."\footnote{Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, P35.} For Moshe, all Palestinians are guilty and deserving of punishment: "I didn’t feel sorry for all those Palestinians who were left homeless,"\footnote{Various sources estimate the Palestinians left homeless after the Jenin operation at between 6 and 10,000.} (§54b), except perhaps the children. After their homes had been destroyed, Moshe includes himself in a display of altruism toward them: "We took care of them, of the children. The soldiers gave them candy," (§54k-l). Moshe’s compassion quickly recedes: "But I had no mercy for the parents of these children," (§54m).

Moshe twice points to televised propaganda as a source of his attitude towards the Palestinians. For example, he tells us that he was not thinking about his problems during his three days in Jenin, but to fill the void, "sometimes images of terror attacks in Jerusalem crossed my mind," (§42i). As so often in Sharon’s narratives, there is no need to mention Palestinians because the connection is clear. More explicitly, in §55, he explains why he "had no mercy":

\begin{quote}
§55a I remembered the picture on television,
 b of the mother who said she will bear children
c so that they will explode in Tel Aviv
d I asked the Palestinian women I saw there:
e 'Aren’t you ashamed?'
\end{quote}

According to Ochs and Capps, "Narrators often shape the narrative to make their own comportment appear morally superior to that of another protagonist. This predilection is what discourse analysts... call the 'looking good' principle.\"\footnote{Ochs and Capps, 2001, P49.} By placing the requirement of shame onto his victims, he seeks to reassure himself (and us) that he is morally superior to them. Presumably he did not meet the woman from “the picture on television,” (§55a) – indeed, as discussed above, it is uncertain whether he ever got down from the bulldozer at all, which implies that it might be only now, in the telling of his story, that Moshe reaches out to propaganda for justifications. For Moshe, as for Sharon, the Palestinians form a single entity; they all look and act the same, and to punish one is to punish them all. It is not too difficult to imagine the state’s motivation for inserting these “picture[s] on the television” into the “endless loop”\footnote{"If there is a Palestinian terror attack, all programmes are immediately suppressed in favour of reports and commentary on that, broadcasted for hours in an endless loop.” HaCohen, 19 April 2002. See Annex B18, p A63.} described by HaCohen, since they provide men like Moshe, already heavily armed with the force of their own failures and insecurities, with all the information they need to justify the destruction of other lives. As Moshe says, “If I had been given three weeks, I would have had a lot more fun. That is, if they let me tear the whole camp down,” (§60q-s).

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item Payne. 22 May 2002.
  \item Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, P35.
  \item Various sources estimate the Palestinians left homeless after the Jenin operation at between 6 and 10,000.
  \item Ochs and Capps, 2001, P49.
  \item "If there is a Palestinian terror attack, all programmes are immediately suppressed in favour of reports and commentary on that, broadcasted for hours in an endless loop.” HaCohen, 19 April 2002. See Annex B18, p A63.
\end{itemize}
Propaganda, like all mythology, “impoverishes the meaning”\textsuperscript{255} of that which it portrays, providing a set of ready-made justifications to those who would execute policy will. In this context the most basic achievement of state propaganda, for all its embellishments, is an overarching polarisation of ‘we’ and ‘they’, to stimulate emotions of fear and anger or, where those emotions already exist, as we have seen in Moshe’s narrative, to channel them towards a socially acceptable outlet – destroying the ‘other’ – which can then be described as ‘work’.

4.3.3. Acknowledgement And Excuses

Moshe’s ‘core narrative’ is peppered with phrases like, “It is not as if I wanted to kill,” (§45i); “not because I wanted to,” (§46c); “I would have to do it even if I didn’t want to,” (§46i), and so on, implying a request not to judge him too harshly as he was simply acting under orders. If Moshe is making – or implying – excuses, this points to the conclusion that he is on some level aware of how difficult his tale might be for an ‘outsider’ to understand, and, as will emerge, that he may even have received some criticism for his actions in Jenin from within his own circle.

The excuses do not tend to appear alongside ‘excuse markers’ – in other words, they are implied excuses but not directly acknowledged as such, indicating Moshe’s resistance to the idea of accepting, or admitting, any responsibility for the negative consequences of his actions. The negative consequences would seem to be the very “facets of a situation that don’t make sense within the prevailing storyline,”\textsuperscript{256} whose absence makes Moshe’s narrative so surreal and disjointed. It seems that his discourse would be unsustainable with any explicit acknowledgement of guilt or even of the potential for having done wrong, so excuses, however mild, must be stripped of their markers and merged with the narrative. Nonetheless an excuse without a marker will usually still point to its object, as in §45i’s “it’s not as if I wanted to kill,” which conveys the implicit admission that he did in fact kill people, along with the unmarked excuse that that had not been his desire. To illustrate further we refer to the core of the narrative where, following §39e’s description in of Moshe begging, “Let me finish another house, open another track,” he has been asked to explain what he means by ‘opening a track’.

First, because Moshe does not, it is necessary to give a brief description of the place he was working in. Most refugee camps in the WBGS\textsuperscript{257} began life as rows of tents donated by

\textsuperscript{255}Barthes, 1992, p118.
\textsuperscript{256}Ochs and Capps, 2001, p4.
\textsuperscript{257}As well as those in neighbouring Arab countries such as Syria and Lebanon.
UNRWA\textsuperscript{28} after the 1948 war. Since then, they have received infrastructural development only through sporadic donations from international aid agencies. With 56 years' population growth, the 'camps' have become densely-populated shanty towns, with closely-packed buildings and narrow labyrinthine alleyways. It is extremely difficult for the IDF to perform its 'operations' under these circumstances, as the alleyways and rooftops naturally favour their own inhabitants. For the Israeli army, the answer is to 'open tracks' with bulldozers in order to allow its soldiers to pass through safely in their tanks. Moshe describes his job as "erasing buildings. On both sides," (§43b), with the justification that "There is no other choice, because the tractor was much wider than their alleys," (§43c-d).

There are numerous indications that Moshe is aware of having killed people as he "opened" these "tracks," and we can identify three variables in these indications: the explicitness of their presentation; the degree of acknowledgement they portray; and their vicinity to an excuse or excuse marker. It is interesting to look at these variables in relation to each other, as follows:

Immediately after stating "it's not as if I wanted to kill" in §45i, Moshe continues, "We didn't harm those who came out of the houses we had started to demolish, waving white flags. We screwed just those who wanted to fight," (§45k-n). In this context "screwed" clearly means 'killed', so Moshe is saying in fact that 'we killed just those who wanted to fight'. In other words this assertion is a strong, explicit acknowledgement of having killed people, albeit justified by their having been "those who wanted to fight." The 'excuse' has already appeared in §45i as noted above, without an explicit marker to present it as such. But it is worth observing that while the 'excuse' itself is delivered in the first person singular, he retreats into 'we' for its elaboration; another presumably subconscious attempt to deflect any personal blame for his actions similar to the later protestation that "it was all under orders," (§47X).

In §46o-p, Moshe says, "What we did actually saved the lives of the Palestinians themselves." In this sentence, "actually" and 'themselves' add a defensive slant to the non-modalised 'what we did saved the lives of the Palestinians'; serving to imply that Moshe is pre-empting the unspoken allegation that 'what [you] did killed Palestinians.' These lines are an implicitly presented and weak acknowledgement that Palestinians were killed. With "themselves," Moshe emphasises that his actions were for the greater good not only of the Israeli soldiers but also of the Palestinians 'themselves', which would imply another attempt at mitigation. Similar to the previous example, Moshe's defence again involves the fact that he was part of a larger project, and that his actions were caused by 'we' rather than 'I' alone. However, the

\textsuperscript{28} The United Nations Relief Works Agency.
bravado is all his own:

§47a For three days, I just destroyed and destroyed
  b The whole area
  c Any house that they fired from came down
  d And to knock it down,
  e I tore down some more
  f They were warned by loudspeaker
  g to get out of the house before I come,
  h but I gave no one a chance
  i I didn't wait
  j I didn't give one blow, and wait for them to come out
  k I would just ram the house with full power,
  l to bring it down as fast as possible
  m I wanted to get to the other houses
  n To get as many as possible
  o Others may have restrained themselves,
  p or so they say
  q Who are they kidding?
  r Anyone who was there,
  s and saw our soldiers in the houses,
  t would understand they were in a death trap.

As his excitement grows Moshe appears to become less guarded about the degree of
acknowledgement he expresses. In §47f-l it is so high as to be almost explicit: “They were
warned by loudspeaker to get out of the house before I come, but I gave no one a chance. I
didn’t wait. I didn’t give one blow, and wait for them to come out. I would just ram the house
with full power, to bring it down as fast as possible.” He is clearly aware that there were
people in these buildings, since he has told us that he gave them no chance to leave. This
sequence is devoid of any excuse or excuse marker; its purpose in fact is to convey the
pleasure, which he returns to and emphasises in later stanzas (“I had plenty of satisfaction. I
really enjoyed it,” §50a-b), that Moshe took from destroying buildings.

In the conflict between caution and bravado Moshe tends to contradict himself and
undermine his own defence. For example, as regards the issue of what he did or did not
‘want’ to do, he has already told us that “I wanted to destroy everything. I begged the officers,
over the radio, to let me knock it all down from top to bottom, to level everything,” (§49d-h).
Moshe’s protest that he acted only under orders is contradicted by the description of himself
begging for those orders. Similarly, he tells us in §470-p that “others may have restrained
themselves, or so they say,” which implies that he may have been criticised by those “others,”
or at least that they have compared his actions with what they might have done in the same
circumstances. Perhaps, in the manner of other negative judgements he attributes to others,
this criticism is merely projected upon them (see 4.2.1.), but it implies that Moshe’s restraint
(or the lack of it) was to some extent a matter of individual choice. In any event Moshe is
eager to deflect any actual or potential criticism, first by denouncing it: “Who are they
kidding?” (§47q), and then by providing a brief illustration of not only the necessity but also the altruism of his behaviour: “Anyone who was there, and saw our soldiers in the houses, would understand they were in a death trap. I thought about saving them,” (§47r-u).

§47u I thought about saving them
v I didn’t give a damn about the Palestinians,
w but I didn’t just ruin with no reason
x It was all under orders.

Moshe continues the sequence by reverting back to the excuse he has only just dismantled, and §47v-x highlight his caution/bravado dilemma. On one hand it seems he means to say that “I didn’t give a damn about [killing] the Palestinians,” but such is his lack of concern (whether feigned or genuine) that the word ‘killing’ is not inserted. It was not even an issue at that point, and nor was it his primary source of satisfaction (as he tells us later, “I found joy with every house that came down, because I knew they didn’t mind dying, but they cared for their homes,” §48k-m). On the other hand, he finds it necessary to follow this sentiment with yet another repetition of the excuse that “it was all under orders,” seizing justification from the prevailing political and military narrative. Moshe’s actions are justified as having been demanded by the government, the army and the people who issue the orders. The excerpt constitutes a strong implicit acknowledgement that Palestinians were killed, along with the boast that he “didn’t give a damn,” followed immediately by an unmarked excuse as further implicit acknowledgement.

Similarly, in his concluding stanza, Moshe once again conveys tension between the desires to be recognised for his heroism and mitigated for his actions:

§62a No one expressed any reservations against doing it
b Not only me
 c Who would dare speak?

In §62a and b, he reasserts his usual defence of acting under orders and collective responsibility. Since “no one [else] expressed any reservations against doing it” – ‘it’ being turning Jenin refugee camp into “a football stadium” – Moshe implies that he surely cannot have been expected to express such reservations on his own and go against the tide of what ‘everyone else’ was doing; what had been ‘ordered.’ §62c’s “who would dare speak?” almost seems to indicate that he and his co-workers were afraid of reprisal if they resisted the commands of their superiors. However, this possible defence is immediately shattered in the lines that follow:

§62c Who would dare speak?
Although we cannot tell whether Moshe's company was afraid and in awe of him to the extent he would have us believe, §62d-e is the strongest confirmation yet that Moshe was not, and does not perceive himself to have been, acting "under orders." In any case, he has already informed us in §60n that he "answered to no one."

The most explicit - or at least the most descriptive - acknowledgement of Palestinian death takes place in §48a-f: "Many people were inside houses we went to demolish. They would come out of the houses we were working on. I didn't see, with my own eyes, people dying under the blade of the D-9 and I didn't see houses falling down on live people. But if there were any, I wouldn't care at all." This description is perhaps only possible because it is emphatically presented in the negative, distancing Moshe as far as possible from the information it contains. With the insertion of "with my own eyes," Moshe exemplifies the potential loophole that recurs in cases where perpetrators are eventually questioned about their crimes. During the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for example, with its requirement that amnesty applicants make "full disclosures," much attention was paid to the issue of selective amnesia. As I argued in *Representations of Benzien at the TRC*, it is possible to be cognisant of having committed certain acts without remembering them specifically. In the same way, it is possible for Moshe to have been aware that there were "people dying under the blade of the D-9" and "houses falling down on live people" without having seen it 'with his own eyes': it is enough to have known, as he did, that there were people inside the buildings he pulled down. Wherever recognition of this fact seems logically imminent, what Moshe does with his narrative is to 'delete' them, in an interesting parallel with the IDF photograph discussed in 3.4.3. above.

In her work on 'Confessional Performances', Leigh Payne remarks that "Perpetrators often block memories. They learn a language that justifies and explains violence, and they erase from memory acts or emotions that contradict that story." Although it is impossible to know whether the vast gaps in Moshe's story are due to memory failure or conscious self-censorship, they would seem to indicate some inconsistency between the information he does provide and an unvoiced 'inner narrative' ("that contradict[s] that story"). To focus too much on the buildings themselves, beyond his action of causing them to fall, might require some consideration of their function as homes to living people, and wherever this does happen, Moshe quickly follows with the defensive assertion that he "didn't give a damn." Beyond the

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dust, there is very little else to see ‘outside’ the bulldozer, which is a dangerous place: “You couldn’t poke your nose out,” (§35f); “one step was enough in order to lose an arm or a leg,” (§35k), and “You open the door, and get a bullet,” (§42d-e).

4.4. Conclusion

It is difficult and disturbing to reach too far for Moshe’s ‘inner narrative’, since there is strong evidence of hatred and vindictiveness (such as §48k-m’s “I found joy with every house that came down, because I knew they didn’t mind dying, but they cared for their homes”), and much room for discussion on whether or not he actually saw himself causing death and abject terror all around him, whether or not this gave him pleasure, and so on. Whatever emotions are evoked in the circumstance of driving a bulldozer through a refugee camp, they belong to a different reality from that of posthumous explanations. According to Linfield,

| Acknowledgement does not automatically occur once people reveal their experiences. Acknowledgement is a process – one that requires critical self-consciousness, openness, fluidity, and a capacity for surprise, remorse, guilt, awe, grief, and shame. This is the ‘working through’ of the past […] It is a process that rejects both amnesia about the past and the grandiose, futile ambition to ‘master’ it, and that requires the assumption not of collective guilt but, rather, of individual responsibility.261 |

As we have seen, Moshe’s attempts to ‘master’ the past through this narrative along with his frequent protestations of collective rather than personal responsibility, show that he is far from acknowledging the full implications of his own actions, and there is no hope of any legal or psychiatric assessment to help him do so. The process of acknowledgement by men like Moshe has been indefinitely postponed due to the solid legitimising framework provided in the prevailing discourse of the Israeli government and army. Whether or not it had previously been the IOF’s intention to demolish such a large section of Jenin refugee camp, and whether or not we believe Moshe’s assertion that “It was all under orders,” the facts remain that he was not prevented in any way from doing so; in response to international criticism, the IDF published a report elaborating the necessity of this and similar operations, and Moshe was later awarded a medal for bravery for his work in Jenin.

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260 Payne, 22 May 2002.
261 Linfield, Summer 2000.
262 IDF, November 2002.
5. Conclusion

According to Ochs and Capps, "to understand the life of narrative... as a discursive and creative activity, it is vital to examine prosaic as well as artistic realisations." In this thesis, the narratives under discussion are loosely grouped together as what I have called 'narratives of war', with the "artistic realisations" being Ariel Sharon's poised and polished policy presentations, which explain the need for violent military action against the Palestinian population, and which have been shown to draw heavily on the same mechanisms of persuasion that have been tried and tested by political orators since at least the time of Aristotle. The "prosaic realisations," meanwhile, are the "less polished, less coherent narratives that... are a hallmark of the human condition": here Moshe's hesitant, confused and ideologically incoherent personal experience narrative. In linguistic terms, it is clear that political speeches tend to be pre-prepared, facilitating their smooth delivery and structural cohesion, unlike more spontaneous forms of narrative such as Moshe's, which might therefore be said to reveal more in the way of 'hidden' urges and, of course, personal – rather than merely ideological – motivations and belief-structures.

Initially the idea behind this thesis was to trace the justificational logic of Israeli government policy narratives from 'source' to 'recipient' and to delineate the ways in which the government's 'ideas' may have directly influenced the personal narratives of soldiers involved in torturing, killing and/or humiliating their fellow human beings. Admittedly, this line of inquiry was based on the assumption that people would require logical and ideological motivation for committing such actions, and that one of the roles of military leaders and governments in times of war is to propagate that motivation. During the preliminary analyses, however, it quickly became clear that soldiers do not seem to operate on the ideological level of propagandists, presumably because their duties require actions rather than words, and justification has already been provided by the fact that they are placed in their role by a higher authority, whose orders they must follow.

Although the motivations presented by Sharon and his government and military spokespeople, such as, for example, "we must continue fighting terrorism relentlessly, determinedly and stubbornly," did occasionally 'filter down' to personal speech, they were no longer presented as motivation so much as posthumous justification, apparently more to deflect the potential criticism of audiences than to explain anything salient to the narrator.
himself. In this sense, it is perhaps salient to apply the term 'justificational narratives' only to retrospective narratives; policy narratives, in their provision of ideological justification for war and warfare, might be better described as 'motivational narratives'. In terms of temporality, policy narratives are naturally more concerned with future events, while narratives of personal experience are more of a "sense-making activity" for what has gone before, in that they "provide a discursive forum for human beings to clarify, reinforce, or revise what they believe and value." Moshe's narrative stood out as something of a failed "sense-making activity" for the reasons of incoherence and senselessness discussed during the analysis, as well as for the scale of what had clearly been 'deleted'; and it is this very discord between narratives of motivation and those of justification that inspired what seemed to be a more interesting approach: to try to discern the personal motivations of an individual actor, through the political lens that encouraged, legitimized and staged their expression. As we have seen, Moshe appears unmotivated by political or religious concerns - such propagandised ideals, at this level, seem to provide little more than a justificational framework through which to make some sense, two months after the event, of a far more prosaic reality. So how, then, is he influenced by Ariel Sharon?

As should be clear from the analysis, Ariel Sharon's speeches provide justifications on all levels for violent responses to fear. Moshe's personal narrative is embedded, and thereby made sense of, within the overarching political context. In other words, he has integrated his personal conflict into the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and in so doing he has found a solution and 'acceptable reaction' framework for the personal problems he started with. The personal has become political, rather than, as I had initially assumed, the other way around.

Because Moshe's narrative bears so few direct traces of Sharon's, it could be argued that he is unique; even if we are disturbed by the narrative presentation of his actions in Jenin, it proves nothing about the overarching ideology of the state. The strongest response to this argument is that those actions were staged, sanctioned and rewarded by the Israeli government and its agents. By his own admission (§19-§22) Moshe, a civilian reservist, received no more than a few hours' training before being let loose on a refugee camp of 30,000 inhabitants in the massive D-9; once there he was allowed to continue unabated, drunk on whisky (§41d-i) and, I assume, the feeling of power, bulldozing indiscriminately and finding "joy with every house that came down," (§48k), for 75 hours without a break. Even without considering the residents of the camp, the irresponsibility of his supervisors, in an army that prides itself on its professionalism, is startling.

All of the narratives I analysed, whether or not they have been included in this thesis, were delivered by men.

The main influence of war propaganda is its provision of a tacit set of cause and effect relations, which institutionalise particular cognitive frames. The danger of subjecting societies to this form of propaganda is that it creates mythologies to render certain violent actions acceptable, even if they are not performed for the reasons suggested by the propaganda. In other words, they enable self-interested actors like Moshe (whose self-interest has been discussed at length) to 'borrow' intellectually, emotionally and/or morally satisfying justifications for the outward expression of their own pre-existing emotions. In other words, it legitimises an external response to personal evils; as well as externalising those evils themselves and embodying them in the 'other'. For those like Moshe who, it seems reasonable to suspect, may not have the critical consciousness (or interest) to fully evaluate the nuances of Sharon's intellectual arguments (and the similar arguments of other government and military spokespeople), the 'might is right' message will be filtered down only into a licence for brutality. In all cases, the role of fear in narratives of war is justification.

Having clarified the different nature of the narratives analysed here, it is worth noting several points of comparison between their presentations of 'reality.' Perhaps one of the most important is that both Moshe and Sharon use rationality to disguise emotion. By assuming that his audience is already emotional, Sharon is able to impose a causational argument for the need to 'flatten' the enemies who have ostensibly inspired the negative emotions, in this case fear and insecurity, by their presupposed ferocity and innately violent tendencies. Emotion (what we 'feel' to be true), supported by mythologised caricatures, establishes the boundaries of what seems logical. Moshe, on the other hand, makes frequent attempts to foreground his own rationality ('what is 'opening a track'? You erase buildings. On both sides. There is no other choice,' §43a-c) but seems unable to suppress his emotional satisfaction.

Both draw heavily on the terminology of 'victimhood', making frequent reference to the past as a motivational force for present and future attitudes and actions. As I have argued, one of the most important functions of Sharon's speeches is to inspire and maintain in his national audience a sense of victimhood, as exemplified by his repeated portrayal of the current crisis as something over which they have no power ('We are currently in the midst of a difficult campaign forced upon us,' etc) and to which they can only react. However, Moshe's sense of personal victimhood seems most likely to have been inspired not by Sharon's speeches but...
by the disasters (§1-§11) that he represents as having conspired to send him into Jenin "driven by madness, by desperation," with the feeling that he "had nothing to lose," (§1a-d).

Both narrators represent themselves to some extent as the leader and saviour of other people (Moshe is repeatedly portrayed as 'protecting' the other soldiers), but only Sharon, with the advantage of his actual position as head of state, as well as that of having his speeches written for him in advance, is successful. Flawless in wording, structure and presentation, they contain no contradictions, while Moshe's narrative contains too many hints of a conflicting 'internal' narrative, such as his narrative discontinuity and gaping ellipses, the labyrinthine passage to Jenin, and the overwhelming absence of descriptive detail once he gets there, for his 'heroic' self-presentation to be wholly credible. Finally, both Sharon and Moshe preempt resistance to their narratives and make efforts to deflect potential criticism; Moshe with his embedded excuses, and Sharon, as discussed in detail above, with the structural logic of his arguments and his deictic shifts.

Ariel Sharon is not single-handedly responsible for the thought processes of his people, or even of the minority who commit atrocities against the Palestinian people. He is also not single-handedly responsible for the prevailing narrative of his government. However, through his narratives Sharon helps to maintain a society that allows men like Moshe to be more prominent than he would otherwise be. In other societies he would perhaps have been controlled by institutions, but here he is encouraged and rewarded: perhaps the same is also true for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
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The annexes are categorised into three departments: Primary Annexes (P), Background Analysis Annexes (BA) and Background Information Annexes (BI). The Primary Annexes contain the texts of the narratives analysed within this thesis, namely those of Ariel Sharon and of Moshe Nissim. Background Analysis annexes contain deeper analysis of some of the issues dealt with in the thesis, and Background Information annexes contain supporting documentation and relevant articles or data.

**Primary Annexes**

Annex P1: Ariel Sharon Speeches In Full

1. 21 February 2002: Sharon Addresses the Nation
2. 31 March 2002: Sharon Addresses the Nation
3. 08 April 2002: Sharon Addresses Knesset
4. 09 June 2002: The Way Forward in the Middle East
5. 22 January 2003: Sharon Addresses Weizmann Institute
6. 29 July 2003: Sharon at the White House
7. 07 October 2003: The Yom Kippur Memorial Service

Annex P2: Personal Experience - Moshe Nissim

**Background Analysis Annexes**

Annex BA1: From Barthes' Second-Order Semiological System
Annex BA2: Aristotle And The Rhetoric Of Fear, Anger And Confidence
Annex BA3: Containing Emotions

**Background Information Annexes**

Annex BI1: Once Upon A Time In Jenin
Annex BI2: Fears For The Demographic Balance At The Zionist Conference
Annex BI3: Assassinating Sheikh Yassin
Annex BI4: Ariel Sharon Biography
Annex BI5: We're Air Force Pilots, Not Mafia
Annex BI6: Media Activism, HonestReporting
Annex BI7: UN Resolutions Concerning Israel 1955-1992
Annex BI8: In Times of War Crimes - The Banality of Evil
Annex BI9: Ariel Sharon Interview 05-04-04
Annex BI10: Palestine Chronology March 2002
Annex BI11: 30 Years Of U.S. UN Vetoes
Annex BI12: Eyewitness Report From Ramallah
Annex BI13: Operation Defensive Shield Overview
Annex BI14: IDF Response to Amnesty Report on Jenin
Annex BI15: Israel v. The World
Primary Annexes

All primary texts have been broken into lines and stanzas for ease of reference. The stanzas are indicated by the symbol [§]; their lines are lettered.

Annex P1: Ariel Sharon Speeches In Full

[1] 21 February 2002: Sharon Addresses the Nation


This speech was delivered in Hebrew and translated; grammatical errors are presumably those of the translator.

§1a Good evening citizens of Israel.
  b I extend my deepest condolences
d to the bereaved families
c of the victims of the murderous attacks,e
  d to wish a speedy recovery
  e to the wounded.

§2a We are currently in the midst
  b of a difficult campaign
c forced upon us -
d a brutal campaign of terrorism
  e These are not easy times
  f and I express my gratitude
  g to the Israel Defense Forces,
h the Israel Police,
i the Border Police,
j the security services
  k and the Mossad
  l for their courageous stand

§3a These are not easy times.
  b A rasping cry is heard from some quarters
  c in these days when we must -
d more than ever -
e remain calm, reasonable and restrained.
f when it comes to matters of war and peace,
g we must not act rashly.
h There is a time for everything -
i not too late and not too early.
j This is the only way to win a war
  k and the only way to achieve sustainable peace.

§4a We are a nation
  b That has accumulated vast experience
  c in confronting problems
  d and we have an inexhaustible source of talent
  e and the ability to pull ourselves out.
f if there is anything that concerns me
  g it is not our ability to confront and solve problems,
h but the gap between
  i our true capability on the one hand
  j and this unfounded doubt that we have in our ability, on the other.

§5a Just take a moment and ponder
  b the past year and a half of struggle
  c that has been forced upon us.
d I believe that we have endured this experience admirably.
e Soldiers and civilians,
f new immigrants and veterans,
g demonstrate resourcefulness and valor,
h willingness to reach out to others
  i and a spirit of volunteering.
j All these are a testimony to a healthy society,
full of vitality and willpower,

...sons and daughters

...no less qualified

...broke the siege imposed upon us in 1967

...and pulled themselves out of the depth of the abyss in 1973

§6a The State of Israel is not collapsing

...and will not collapse.

c Everything is in our hands,

d and future developments depend on us -

e our conduct,

...our courage

...depends on the attainment of complete unity between us,

...facing the dangers together

...and striding together toward hope.

...We are proud of our democracy,

...we yearn for peace with our neighbors,

...even at the price of painful concessions.

...to maintain our freedom and our way of life.

...are an open society

...we insist on remaining so,

...despite the tremendous threats

...which have been hovering over the State since its inception.

§7a We want to live peacefully

...and nurture the prosperity of our society,

...our children's education,

...the dignity of the elderly -

...equal opportunities for all.

...to study and work,

...trade, research and develop.

§8a Unfortunately, our neighbors have misinterpreted

...both our yearning for peace and our way of life.

...also fail to understand our domestic disagreements,

...which are not only the lifeblood of our democracy

...but also one of the sources of our strength.

...they are wrong in their estimate that our nation is faltering.

...Expressions of disobedience

...naturally encourage terrorist organizations

...and motivate them to intensify their actions.

§9a But they are wrong.

...The people of Israel are much stronger and more resilient than they imagine.

§10a The "Merkava" Tank (developed by Maj. Gen. Tal - "Talik")

...is the winning tank - the best in the world.

...the IDF is one of the greatest offensive armies in the world.

...Our Air Force and Navy are also among the most outstanding in the world.

§11a We will continue to fight terrorism and terrorists with all our might

...will intensify our activities.

...will not rest until terrorism is eradicated,

...their infrastructure is dismantled

...and their weapons are confiscated and destroyed.

...Simultaneously,

...we will continue to do everything in our power to promote a cease fire -

...which will lead, eventually,

...to a settlement, an agreement, peace.

§12a I wish to emphasize that

...contrary to what is being published,

...the political echelon has placed no constraints

...on the security forces in taking whatever action

...is deemed necessary to fight terrorism.

...Israel's security policy is determined by our needs.

...I strongly reject all the unfounded publicity

...suggesting that Israel is prevented from taking action

...because of international pressure.

...The United States, which is spearheading
Justificational Narratives

Annex Pr: Ariel Sharon Speeches In Full

k. the international anti-terrorism campaign,

l. knows and understands that it is our duty

m. to protect the lives of our citizens.

§13a I will do everything in my power:

b. to bring an end to violence and terrorism

c. and achieve a cease fire.

d. I will continue to meet with Palestinian officials

e. and take whatever security steps are necessary,

f. in accordance with the government decisions.

g. I will continue, on my part,

h. to make every effort to avoid escalation

i. and deter escalation into an all-out war.

§14a In order to enhance the security of the citizens of Israel,

b. and for the purpose of achieving a security separation,

c. we have decided to establish buffer zones.

d. During a discussion by the “extended kitchenette”

e. it was decided to immediately begin marking buffer zones

f. and placing obstacles along them.

§15a Citizens of Israel,

b. We all want peace,

c. we are all committed to peace,

d. My aim is to achieve a comprehensive peace with the Palestinians,

e. to ensure a quiet and peaceful life for both our peoples.

f. This agreement will be predicated on two stages:

§16a The first stage:

b. an armistice agreement that creates a situation of non-warfare.

c. A complete demilitarization of the Palestinian zone is categorical.

§17a The second stage:

b. the permanent settlement

c. which will determine the final borders

d. for ourselves and the Palestinians.

e. These will reflect the character of our relationship.

§18a But one must remember that there are no magical solutions,

b. and we must not be duped by false prescriptions

c. proffered by “experts and commentators.”

d. Negotiations on a political settlement

e. can only take place after a complete cease fire.

f. This is how it was when we signed the peace agreement with Egypt—

g. an agreement preceded by all the stages

h. leading to a complete cease fire and interim agreements.

§19a I have said before and I say today:

b. for the sake of real peace,

c. there will be painful compromises.

d. But there will not be any compromise

e. on the security of the State of Israel and its citizens.

f. First the terrorism will stop,

g. then calm will be restored

h. and then we will talk peace.

§20a I turn from here also to the Palestinian people

b. to say what I have said in the past—

c. I know that it is not easy being a Palestinian.

§21a I turn to those Palestinians who do not want war

b. and are not involved in terrorism.

c. Those Palestinians whose sole purpose is to support their families

d. and afford clothes for their children.

e. you are observing us, Israelis, waringly,

f. and see Israel’s many achievements.

g. In the last 53 years

h. Israel has developed flourishing industries and agriculture,

i. among the most advanced in the world;

j. our hi-tech industry will prosper again

k. with the recovery of the world economy;

l. one of the most advanced food industries in the world;

m. modern cities with hundreds of thousands of citizens.
n and education and health systems
p which are envied across the world.

§22a Today I suggest that you think long and hard
b what you and your children
c would want to achieve in the coming years.
d Will you continue to follow
e those who lead you to ruin, destruction and despair?
f Will you continue to be misled
g by those who call upon your sons to commit suicide,
h or will you follow those who choose to progress and to thrive?

§23a Today I promise you all,
b Jews and Arabs alike,
c when quiet prevails and you stop encouraging hatred,
d we will all prosper.
e And I know that eventually this is how it will be.

§24a Citizens of Israel,
b As I am convinced that we will overcome terrorism,
c which will take time and require patience and determination,
d I am also convinced that we will overcome
e the international economic crisis
f which resulted in the local economic crisis.
g Finally, after many hardships,
h we succeeded in passing the national budget,
i and will start pursuing that goal.

§25a I know that today it is not easy to ask you to be patient.
b As I have stated in the past, restraint is strength.
c I am telling you today - determination is also strength.
d We have proven this to be true.
e We are having a difficult time -
f I am having a difficult time -
g but I am asking you
h to continue to live by those principles today.
i The economic and security situations are not easy,
j but together - only together - we can overcome them.

§26a I know that the war of terrorism
b which was forced upon us 17 months ago
c raised serious questions.
d I hear the voices asking every day:
e Where are we headed?
f What should be done?
g From this platform, I turn to each and every one of you -
h we will overcome,
i we will prevail,
j not only because our cause is just,
k but because there is no other way.

§27a I would also like to turn to those who are talking
b about a collapse, despair and loss of hope.
c This is not the time to utter words of disaster -
d it is the time to stand firm and united
e and assist wherever you can.
f This is the time for demonstrating the unity
g which is at the core of the character of the Jewish people.
h This is the time to demonstrate
i that we are proud to be Israelis and Jews
j in the Land of Israel.
k Yes, proud to be Israelis and Jews
l in the Land of Israel.

§28a Citizens of Israel,
b We will always continue to aspire for peace -
c and our war, against those who are trying to destroy our people,
d will continue to be painful and uncompromising.
e We have always stood united in our common goal,
f and when we reach a cease-fire which will bring quiet -
g then we will be able to talk peace.
31 March 2002: Sharon Addresses the Nation

Source: CNN www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/03/31/sharon.transcript. This speech was delivered in Hebrew with simultaneous interpretation for the international media.

(_JOINED IN PROGRESS) SHARON (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): ... for a speedy recovery to the many people who are in hospital, recovering from their injuries.

§1a Citizens of Israel,
  b the state of Israel is in a war,
  c a war against terrorism.
  d It's a war that has been imposed upon us.
  e It's not one that we have chosen to undertake.
  f It is a war for our home.

§2a The state of Israel, under my leadership,
  b has made every effort in order to achieve a cease-fire.
  c Every single moment since I was elected
d in the midst of the wave of Palestinian terrorism,
e we have set for ourselves a goal of achieving peace and quiet
  f in order to be able to undertake political diplomatic negotiations.

§3a We have cooperated with the American emissary, Zinni,
  b and we've received terrorism in return.
  c We've cooperated with Vice President Dick Cheney,
  d and we've received terrorism in return.

§4a We gave our -- in order to achieve a cease-fire,
  b our requirement of seven days of peace and quiet,
  c and we got terrorism in return.
  d We removed our troops from the cities,
  e and we got terrorism in return.

§5a The only thing we've had in return for our efforts
  b has been terrorism, terrorism and more terrorism.
  c We have to combat this terrorism uncompromisingly.
  d We have to uproot it.
  e You cannot make any compromise with terrorism.
  f You cannot compromise with people who are prepared,
  g like the suicide bombers in Israel's street;
  h or the Twin Towers in the U.S.,
  i to die simply in order to kill innocent people -
  j men, women and children
  k to die in order to sow terror and horror.

§6a This terrorism is being directed, promoted,
  b initiated by one person,
  c Yasser Arafat.
  d Yasser Arafat is the head of a coalition of terrorism.
  e He operates an infrastructure of terrorism.
  f Yasser Arafat is the enemy of Israel
  g and the enemy of the free world.

§7a Everyone who is peace-loving,
  b everyone who has been educated
  c in the values of liberty and democracy
  d must be aware of the fact that
  e Yasser Arafat is a stumbling block to peace in the Middle East.
  f Yasser Arafat is a danger to the entire region.

§8a In the Israeli government session on Thursday last,
  b the decision was taken to uproot the infrastructure of terrorism
c directed by the Palestinian Authority.
  d We will uproot the whole of this infrastructure
e because we know the only way of achieving a cease-fire
  f proceeding to negotiations and reaching a settlement in peace,
g is only if we manage to wipe out this infrastructure of terrorism.
  h The state of Israel is a state which strives for peace.
  i Our hand has been and still is outstretched to the Palestinians in peace.
  j But no one should be deceived:
  k Our hand is not outstretched toward terrorism.
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§9a Citizens of Israel,
 b the state of Israel is currently in a very difficult situation.
 c We have been in very difficult situations before
d and we have overcome them.
e This time, too, we will win out.
f This time, too, we will be victorious.
g And when this happens,
h we will be able to live here together in peace.


§1a Mr. Speaker, Members of Knesset,
b Our dead lie in a long row:
c women and children, young and old.
d And we stand facing them,e facing the vacuum created by their murders,
f and we are speechless.

§2a On the recent evening of the seder,
b while I was sitting with my family at the table,
c I received the terrible news
d of the massacre in Netanya.

§3a There is no more dreadful moment
b in the term of a prime minister,
c than that horrendous moment when the telephone rings,
d or a note is passed during a meeting,
e and carrying Job's tidings.

§4a And then the sights and sounds come rushing in,
b the sights of destruction,
c the cries of the wounded,
d the sirens.
 e Then the awful silence of the funerals,
f the faces and human stories
g which stare at us from the newspapers:
h the face of Rachel Koen,
i whose husband and two children were buried
j on the same day,
k side by side,
l a short distance from her;
m the face of Karmit Ron,
n forever separated from her husband,
o 21-year-old daughter,
p and 17-year-old son;
q the face of Adi Shiran
r who was buried while both her parents are unconscious,
s fighting for their lives in the hospital;
t the face of Zähava Wieder —
u a true heroine of the people of Israel —
v who lost her husband,
w daughter and son-in-law at that seder.
x and during the seven days of mourning
y agreed to donate her husband's organs
z to a Palestinian family in Shuafat.

aa She is living proof of the fact that,
bb even at the most trying times,
cc we remain humane.

§5a Victims of coexistence,
b whose worlds fell apart
c while eating at an Arab restaurant in Haifa —
d their blood mixing with the blood of Israeli Arabs
 e who were sitting beside them.
f Entire families, Jewish and Arab, are destroyed
 g in the heat of the murderous insanity
h which has taken hold of our Palestinian neighbors.
 i And thus the killers and dispatchers intend to destroy the hope for peace,
 j hope for the future
It is not a coincidence, members of Knesset. The murderous gangs have a leader, a purpose, and a directing hand. They have one mission: to chase us out of here, from everywhere — from our home in Elon Moreh and from the supermarket in Jerusalem, from the cafe in Tel Aviv and from the restaurant in Haifa, from the synagogue in Netzarim — where the murderers slaughtered two over 70 worshippers, walking in their prayer shawls to morning prayers — and from the Seder table in Netanya.

§7a And there is one dispatcher: Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasir Arafat. He is the man who, in a series of agreements, promised to abandon the path of terrorism, refrain from committing murder, use his forces to prevent it — and betrayed all his promises. Because of his promises Israel agreed to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. That is why Israel agreed to transfer security responsibility in the areas given to its control.

§8a Thus, Israel agreed to the establishment of Palestinian security forces. We hoped that the Palestinians would understand, as they promised, that ruling does not mean a license to kill, but rather the assumption of responsibility for the prevention of killing.

§9a But what was merely apprehension at the beginning, and intensified into suspicion, has turned into solid facts which nobody can deny. In the territories under his rule, Arafat has established a regime of terror, which nationally and officially trains terrorists and incites, finances, arms and sends them to perpetuate murderous operations across Israel.

§10a There is overwhelming evidence, accepted by all serious people in the world. For example, in a chilling document which was found in Arafat’s offices, terror tariffs are displayed.

§11a Mr. Speaker, I admit that ordinarily it is not customary to present a document to the Knesset, but the horror, malice, brutality and deception revealed here are alarming. I will not show the document, but I am allowed to read it, Mr. Speaker. Here is a letter signed by Yasir Arafat, addressed to him as “the President, warrior, brother Abu-Amar. God protect him,” and requesting that he “kindly allocate funds in the amount of $5,500 to the following brothers: Ra’ad el-Karmi (I hope you still remember him), Ziad Muhammad Ash, Ammar Ka’adan.”

There are additional documents which incriminate murderous terrorist elements, some of whom — thanks to our security system — will not be inflicting any more harm.
There is also a letter signed by Marwan Barguti addressed to "the President, brother Abu-Ammar, God protect him," asking him to "instruct that $1,000 be earmarked to each of the fighting brothers," with the same list mentioned earlier.

§12a And there is another interesting document, detailing the cost of murdering a Jew. We have a financial report from the "Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade" to the person who served as the liaison between Arafat and the Iranians — Fuad Shubaki. The report specifies the cost of an explosive belt — 700 NIS, stating that: "we need 5-9 charges each week for the groups in the various areas."

There are complete details as to the cost of each deadly weapon aimed at murdering innocent civilians in cold blood.

§13a Such and such an amount for a suicide attack, such and such an amount for a charge of explosives, such and such an amount for an explosive belt. The document contains the "bloody" accounting in the handwriting of Arafat's treasurer — the man who paid for the attempt to smuggle Katyushas and rockets, and who, today, sits with Arafat in Ramallah and enjoys his personal protection. This is the bill for the price of Jewish lives at Yasser Arafat's organized bureaucracy of murder.

§14a Members of Knesset, for eighteen months Israel has been under bitter and bloody attack, initiated by our Palestinian neighbors. We have paid a high price in blood, solely because of our honest wish to live in peace with them, and because of our belief that they want the same.

§15a The infrastructure of terror against Israel was established before this government took office. The main purpose of our National Unity Government was to achieve a cessation of violence and incitement as a vital and essential condition for the resumption of our efforts to achieve peace in the region. This is the essence of this government's existence.

§16a On my first day in office, I sent a personal letter to Arafat. I offered a practical proposal to end the violence, and reiterated our wish for peace. I promised that we did not intend to harm innocent civilians, and suggested ways to ease their suffering. I extended my hand in peace, and my hand was rejected.

§17a Since then we have made an endless number of efforts to reach a cease-fire: we tried to ease security measures — and each time we lifted a closure, opened a road, withdrew the IDF, we were immediately answered with horrific terrorist attacks; we accepted the Mitchell plan, which includes painful compromises for Israel; we accepted the Teret plan; we even waived the most elementary demand for seven days of quiet — we did not even get seven hours free of an attempt to perpetrate a murderous suicide attack; we cooperated with General Zinni — and I take this opportunity to thank him for his continuing efforts — but Arafat rejected all his proposals.
§18a We remained patient and moderate as one atrocity followed another.

§19a Despite the fact that we knew of our power to act, we hoped that we would not be forced to use our forces, and rejected extreme suggestions of all sorts. We gave many opportunities to world leaders, those who promised over and over again that they were capable of stopping terror by means of persuasion or pressure on Arafat.

§20a We have not given up on direct dialogue, to bring about an end to violence. I have personally hosted several Palestinian Authority officials, and reiterated our proposals for a cease-fire and the resumption of political negotiations.

§21a Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres has left no stone unturned in his efforts to find a partner for dialogue. I have personally hosted several Palestinian Authority officials, and reiterated our proposals for a cease-fire and the resumption of political negotiations.

§22a We have not given up on direct dialogue, to bring about an end to violence. Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres has left no stone unturned in his efforts to find a partner for dialogue. I have personally hosted several Palestinian Authority officials, and reiterated our proposals for a cease-fire and the resumption of political negotiations.

§23a In talks with various world leaders, I presented our ideas for the political settlement possible after the cessation of terror. We presented Israel’s honest wish for a peace that will bring honor, prosperity and security for both peoples.

§24a IDF soldiers and officers have been given clear orders: to enter cities and villages which have become havens for terrorists; to catch and arrest terrorists and those who finance and support them; to confiscate weapons intended to be used against Israeli citizens; to expose and destroy terrorist facilities and explosives, laboratories, weapons production factories and secret installations.

§25a All the aforementioned should have been carried out by the Palestinian Authority, according to its agreements with Israel, and as they were requested to do by all the responsible leaders in the world. Only when it transpired that the Palestinian Authority...
g was not willing to fulfill its promises,
h that it is infested with terror,
i and that it has factually turned into an authority
j which is actively involved in terror —
k only then, having no other choice,
l we were forced to act.

§26a The IDF has achieved great successes,
b thanks to the intelligence and courage of its officers,
c and the determination and perseverance of its soldiers.
d The IDF has taken the territories according to plan.
e Over 1,500 fugitives have been arrested,
f including over 500 with Israeli blood on their hands.
g Dozens of terrorist facilities were discovered and destroyed.
h Terrorist organizations have stopped functioning
i and their members are on the run.
j We have foiled terrorist plans
k and prevented many casualties in the heart of our country.

§27a During these days
b we are seeing the people of Israel at its best —
c a proud people whose spirit will not be broken,
d a people determined to protect its home,
e while extending its hand in peace.
f Every day we see new expressions of courage,
g volunteers and mutual assistance.

§28a I wish to take this opportunity to express our gratitude
b to our soldiers and officers,
c to those in compulsory service and the reservists;
d to the families on the home front
e who are the real backbone of the army,
f to the anonymous security personnel,
g to policemen and border guards,
h to civilian rescue units — Magen David Adom,
i to the fire brigade,
j the "Zaka" (identification of disaster victims squads),
k security of guards,
l civil defense volunteers,
m and to each and every one who
n in spite of the worries and understandable fear,
o still continue our lives.

§29a To all of you — thank you, from the bottom of our hearts.

§30a Members of Knesset,
b From the outset,
c this IDF operation was planned be temporary,
d lasting for the span of time required
e to complete the actions I described.

§31a These actions have not yet been completed,
b and the IDF will therefore continue to operate,
c as speedily as possible,
d until the mission has been accomplished,
e until Arafat's terrorist infrastructures are uprooted
f and until murderers holed up in various places are captured —
g including those in the Church of Nativity, in Bethlehem,
h since we have no intention of desecrating the site,
i unlike the murderers who have commandeered the church
j and are holding the clergymen hostage.
k We expect the international community to demand
l that they lay down their weapons and leave the holy site.
m Until that time the IDF will remain there
n to prevent them from escaping justice.

§32a We never intended and do not intend
b to permanently reoccupy Palestinian cities.
c After the IDF completes all its missions, it will withdraw,
d in accordance with the instructions of the government,
e to defined security zones.
f In my talks with President Bush,
g and recognizing his sincere wish for peace in our region,
I have promised to make every effort
to accelerate our military activities,
and to withdraw our forces
from those places in which our actions have been completed.

§33a In these security zones,
our forces will deploy to constitute a buffer
cross Palestinian territories and our territories,
in order to prevent any penetration into Israeli communities,
attacks on Israeli citizens,
and threats to our security.
Correspondingly, our forces will be prepared
to precisely target anyone who tries to contrive
this war of terrorism against us,
regardless of his identity, status or position.

§34a The IGF will carry out its missions
from within the security zones,
making a genuine effort to distinguish
difference between the perpetrators of terrorism
e and the civilian, non-belligerent population.
We have no quarrel with the Palestinian people
and we want to see the Palestinians, like us,
live in peace, security and dignity.

§35a But peace can only be attained if,
we evacuate the territories,
find a responsible Palestinian leadership,
accept the primary responsibility of every regime —
to prevent the use of its territory
for the purpose of killing and murdering its neighbors.
Peace negotiations can commence and move forward
only after terrorism has ceased.

§36a Accordingly, Israel accepts and warmly welcomes
the important initiative of U.S. President George W. Bush:
Since the horrific attack on Sept. 11,
effectively one year after the outbreak
of the Palestinian terrorist campaign against Israel,
the United States has been leading the world
in a heroic struggle to uproot terrorism
as well as the regimes which support and sponsor it.

§37a Israel is proud of its friendship with the United States
and of America's leadership
in the moral and historic, political military struggle
d against the forces of evil
which have risen up against the civilized nations.
Since that deadly attack in September,
the partnership between Israelis and Americans has,
unfortunately,
become a "partnership of blood" between victims of terror.
We are partners to the principle set forth
by President Bush in his most recent speech,
and I quote:
"Terror must be stopped.
No nation can negotiate with terrorists.
For there is no way to make peace with those
d whose only goal is death."

§39a If such a Palestinian leadership should arise,
be extended toward peace and negotiations.
who have seen all the horrors of war,
refuse to extinguish the hopes for peace
and the faith that the Palestinian people will recover
g from the myth of bloodshed
forced upon them by their current leaders,
and will find the way to peace and good neighborly relations.

§40a Peace is important to Israel,
but not only to Israel.
c. It is important to the Palestinians,
  d. because only through peace
  e. will they find their way to existence
  f. as a nation in dignity and prosperity.
  g. Peace is important to all the peoples of the Middle East,
  h. because the continuation of terror and violence
  i. encourages fundamentalist elements and regimes
  j. to try and achieve their goals through violence.

§41a Israel will do everything in its power to repel these threats,
b. avoid escalation and maintain regional stability.
c. In this spirit, we are noticing the first buds of a transformation
d. in the longtime Arab trend
  e. to deny the very right of the State of Israel to exist.
  f. Despite the extreme demands included
  g. in the resolutions of the conference of Arab leaders in Beirut,
h. I welcome the fact that an important Arab leader
  i. such as Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has, for the first time,
j. acknowledged Israel's right to exist
k. within secure and recognized borders.

§42a There is a positive component of the Saudi initiative,
b. but the details must be negotiated
c. between the parties themselves.
d. Peace negotiations cannot be dictated.
e. They must be based on mutual respect
f. and a genuine attempt to reach a compromise.
g. In the absence of open dialogue between the parties,
h. this initiative will remain devoid of any real content.

§43a No party can enforce unilateral conditions.
b. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338
  c. affirm Israel's right to exist in peace,
  d. and in secure and recognized borders,
  e. free from any military threat,
  f. like any other nation in the region.
g. These borders
  h. and the way to ensure Israel's security
  i. in the face of any military or terrorist threat
  j. must be directly negotiated between the parties.
  k. Israel cannot discuss the return of Arab refugees —
   m. a consequence of a war forced upon Israel by the Arabs —
  n. as it would effectively terminate the existence
  o. of the State of Israel as a Jewish state.

§44a That is why I offered to go to Beirut
b. to meet with the leaders of the Arab States.
c. A mere willingness to make peace is meaningless
  d. without the willingness to meet and negotiate.
  e. I take this opportunity to reiterate my proposal
  f. to meet immediately
  g. with moderate and responsible leaders in the Middle East.
  h. I am willing to go anywhere,
  i. without any pre-conditions from any party,
j. to discuss peace.

§45a The United States can and should be
b. a leading and driving force behind such an initiative,
c. just as it spearheaded the negotiations
  a. leading to the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference
  e. over a decade ago.

§46a U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
b. will be arriving in the region this week.
c. I intend to discuss methods of achieve an end to terrorism
d. and advancing my initiative to meet with regional leaders,
e. in order to restart the negotiating process
f. on the framework for peace in the Middle East.

§47a What is the outline through which
b. a comprehensive peace in the Middle East may be advanced?
§48a Personally, I am skeptical
   a as to the prospects of “leaping”
   b from the current violent conflict
   c directly into a permanent agreement
   d that will bring a complete and final end to the conflict.
   e Such an approach would rapidly return us to a dead end.
   f After all, the Palestinians rejected
   g the previous government’s proposals
   h which included far-reaching concessions,
   i j refused to negotiate over them,
   k and chose to try and enforce their will upon Israel through terrorism.
   l Only when they come to the realization
   m that this attempt has failed
   n will we be able to achieve a real cease-fire.
   o It is from that point that I propose to move forward
   p toward a long-term interim agreement,
   q which will determine the character of the neighboring relations
   r between Israel and the Palestinians.

§49a It is in this situation that the Palestinians
   s will be able to build an independent society,
   t free of any traces of occupation,
   u and rebuild their ruined economy.
   v We can and are willing to generously assist them
   w in preparing their people for peace
   x and good neighboring relations.
   y z Such an agreement
   a would put an end to the ongoing suffering
   b of the Palestinian population,
   c d those who wish to live in peace and prosperity.

§50a The further the relations and coexistence
   e between Israel and the Palestinians evolve,
   f and as damaging fanatic elements
   g d are increasingly relegated to a corner,
   h e in which we can determine the final borders between us
   i f and reach an agreed compromise on all outstanding issues.

§51a The history of the political relations
   g between Israel and the Arab states
   h c is proof of the advantages of a gradual approach.
   i d We were in a state of ferocious war with the Egyptians.
   j e We went through five terrible wars.
   k f The war ended with an agreed cease-fire,
   l g in accordance with U.N.S.C. Resolutions 338 and 339.
   h i Since that cease-fire came into effect,
   j k not one bullet has been fired
   l m between the Israeli and Egyptian armies.
   n o Shortly afterward,
   p l we proceeded toward long-term interim agreements,
   q m which led to the commencement of direct negotiations
   r n and to permanent agreements between the parties.

§52a Peace with Egypt has been sustained
   o because it was predicated on the solid foundations of peace
   p c alongside painful concessions.
   q d Although the situation with the Palestinians
   r e is more complicated,
   s f the outstanding issues are more difficult
   t g and the bitterness is greater,
   u h together, we can build a vision
   v i of a better future for both our peoples.

§53a Members of Knesset,
   g b From here, I address the Palestinian people.
   h c On behalf of the people of Israel, I tell you:
   i d we have no quarrel with you.
   j e We have no desire to control you or to dictate your fate.
   k f We want to live side by side with you in peace,
   l g as good neighbors,
   m h helping and respecting each other.
§54a But in order for this to happen,
   b you can and must take your fate into your own hands.
   c If you want to seize a place of honor
   d among the family of nations,
   e you must eschew terrorism,
   f the murder of children and the elderly,
   g the terrible violence,
   h the murderous hatred and incitement.
   i Do not surrender to those elements among you
   j who have brought you one disaster after another
   k over the past 55 years,
   l because those same forces —
   m they and not us —
   n will guarantee your next disaster.

§55a From here, I address the leaders of the Middle East.
   b Terrorism threatens not only Israel.
   c It threatens you as well.
   d It does not lead to peace —
   e terrorism is the enemy of peace and stability.
   f Just as I am willing to focus on the positive
   g rather than the negative aspect of your recent resolution,
   h I implore you to accept my initiative for a meeting between us.

§56a From here, I address the leaders of the Free World.
   b You must remember that leniency toward terrorists
   c is the same as a green light to terrorists,
   d who have already proven that
   e they do not distinguish between blood and blood,
   f between a Jewish victim and any other victim.
   g You cannot fight terrorism on the one hand,
   h and condemn the victims of terrorism on the other.
   i There is absolutely no equivalence
   j between those who send teenage suicide bombers
   k to kill and maim,
   l and those who take self-defense actions
   m and try to uproot the infrastructure of terrorism.
   n Only your stand against terrorism
   o and actual sanctions against its perpetrators
   p in the Palestinian Authority,
   q and primarily Arafat,
   r will enable you to make a real contribution
   s to the advancement of peace in the Middle East.

§57a From here, I address the people of Israel.
   b This battle will not be easy.
   c Unfortunately, I cannot guarantee that there will be no more victims,
   d and that we will know no more grief and bereavement.

§58a But we will overcome this challenge —
   b first of all, because we are an ancient nation,
   c a nation which is all too familiar with pain and hardship,
   d a nation which has overcome the greatest of tragedies.

§59a Secondly, because we are united
   b and we stand together.
   c We are one people.
   d Indeed there are different opinions
   e and different sentiments among us,
   f but that which unites us is greater.
   g It is my understanding of this crisis
   h that has led me to struggle for the establishment
   i of a National Unity Government,
   j and in order to maintain unity
   k I am sometimes willing to forgo my own pride.
   l This is not weakness, but strength.
   m I make every effort to maintain this unity
   n and to bring in additional Zionist elements.

§60a Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I hereby announce that,
   b in accordance with Article 33 (c) of the Basic Law: the Government,
   c the following ministers will be added to the government:
   d 1. Mr. Efraim Eitam.
And in accordance with Article 3 (c) of the Basic Law: the Government, I request the Knesset approval of these appointments.

Members of Knesset,

These are important additions to the government, especially at this time.
The NRP and Gesher factions have demonstrated national responsibility, taking the ongoing campaign and the upcoming challenges into consideration, and agreeing to join the government and the coalition.

Each of the new ministers will undoubtedly make their own unique contribution to the government.

My friend David Levy, for whom I have the highest respect, has gained vast experience during service in Israeli governments over many years, and his judgment in political matters will undoubtedly assist in the crucial and complicated decisions ahead.

Rabbi Yitzhak Levy has served as a minister in several governments.

Mr. Effi Eitam, a former military officer, will make an important contribution with his military expertise.

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, in accordance with Article 37 (a) of the Basic Law: the Government, I hereby inform the Knesset that I have appointed MK Naomi Blumenthal to the position of deputy minister in the Ministry of National Infrastructures, in place of her position as deputy minister in the Prime Minister's Office.

Unity is our greatest asset in this struggle which has been forced upon us, and in our path toward peace and security. This is not an easy path, but it is nevertheless a necessary one.

I call upon each and every one of you to maintain this unity, not to stretch the boundaries of argument, rivalry and dispute, but rather to strengthen the sense of unity, lend a helping hand and demonstrate a spirit of volunteerism and good will.

With the help of God, together, we can and will triumph.

Thank you.

Thirty-five years ago, on June 5, 1967, the start of the Six Day War, Israel faced a threat to its very existence as a coalition of Arab armies massed their troops along the fragile armistice lines that had separated Arab and Israeli forces since 1949.

Along the hills of the West Bank, which had been occupied by the Jordanians, armored and infantry units were deployed, ready to cut Israel's narrow coastal plain, which was only eight miles wide at Netanya.

A third of the Iraqi army was crossing Jordanian territory,
Justificational Narratives

Annex Pt: Ariel Sharon Speeches In Full

m ready to join the coalition against Israel.
n The declared goal of the attack was Israel's elimination.

§2a Israel entered the West Bank
b only after its cities and airports had come under heavy fire.
c Israeli actions were legal –
d resulting from a clear-cut war of self-defense.
e For that reason, the United Nations Security Council determined
f in a historic decision, Resolution 242,
g that Israel was entitled to "secure and recognized boundaries"
h and was not expected to withdraw
i from all the territories that its forces had entered –
j and from which it was attacked –
k in the Sth Day War.
l In effect, the resolution established
m that these were disputed territories
n where Israel had legitimate rights to defensible borders,
o besides the claims of the Arab parties to the conflict.

§3a Under Resolution 242,
b which became the cornerstone of peacemaking,
c Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula
d in accordance with the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt.
e It was under the principles of Resolution 242
f that Israel attended the 1991 Madrid peace conference
g where President George W. Bush
h spoke about a "territorial compromise" between the parties.
i And again in line with Resolution 242,
j Israel, operating under the 1993 Oslo agreement,
k withdrew its military government over the Palestinian population
l so that by 1999,
m 98 percent of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
n were under Palestinian rule.

§4a Nonetheless, the Palestinian leadership
b decided to initiate the current war against Israel
c after the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000.
d Rather than resolve Israeli-Palestinian differences peacefully,
e it deliberately promoted a wave of terrorist attacks
f against the people of Israel.
g It failed to implement its written obligations
h to dismantle international terrorist groups
i like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
j Instead it provided them with sanctuary in the area under its jurisdiction.
k It also unleashed some of its most loyal forces,
l like the Tanzim militia of the Fatah movement
m and the presidential guard, Force 17,
n against Israeli civilians.
o Finally, Yasir Arafat's personal financial adviser, Fuad Shubaki,
p not only paid for many of these attacks,
q but also organized a consortium of Middle Eastern terrorism
r built on the Palestinian Authority, Iraq and Iran.

§5a Despite this situation, there is a way forward.
b First, Israel must defeat terrorism;
c it cannot negotiate under fire.
d Israel has made painful concessions for peace before
e and will demonstrate diplomatic flexibility to make peace again,
f but it requires first and foremost a reliable partner for peace.
g In 1977, when Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat came to Jerusalem,
h he told the people of Israel, "No more wars."
i From that point onward,
j the threat of violence was removed from the Egyptian-Israeli relationship
k as both negotiated their 1979 Treaty of Peace.
l King Hussein of Jordan followed the same pattern in 1994.
m This elementary commitment to permanently renouncing violence
n in the resolution of political differences
o has unfortunately not been kept by the present Palestinian leadership.

§6a Second, when Israel and the Palestinians eventually re-engage in negotiations,
b diplomacy must be based on realism.
c The race to a permanent-status agreement at Camp David
d and in talks at Taba, Egypt, in January 2001

A16
e failed because the gaps between the parties were too wide.
f The only serious option for a successful negotiated settlement
g is one based on a long-term interim agreement
h that sets aside for the future
i issues that cannot be bridged at present.

§7a In the nearly two years of the Palestinian intifada,
 b the people of Israel have seen Israel's vulnerabilities exploited,
c its holy sites desecrated
d and massive weaponry smuggled and used against Israel's cities.
e For this reason, Israel will not return
 f to the vulnerable 1967 armistice lines,
g redivide Jerusalem
h or concede its right to defensible borders under Resolution 242.
i Movement from a long-term interim agreement
j to a permanent settlement
k can only be guided by changes
 l in the reality of Israeli-Palestinian relations on the ground
m and not by a rigid timetable.

§8a Finally, in order to reach a stable peace
 b there has to be regional scope to diplomacy,
c In the Six Day War, Israel faced a coalition of Arab states
d It is logical that Israel cannot reach a permanent peace
e with the Palestinians in isolation.
f Israel needs peace with the entire Arab world,
g For this reason, Israel has proposed a regional peace conference
 h of like-minded Middle Eastern states
 i that reject terrorism and seek to enhance regional stability.
j The idea of the conference is based on the principle
k that eradicating terrorism will set the stage for peacemaking,
l and not the reverse.

§9a A little over a decade ago,
b the American victory in the Persian Gulf war
c established the necessary conditions
d for convening the Madrid peace conference.
e It was proved then that security is the prerequisite of peace.
f Similarly, a victory in the war on terrorism today
g will provide a new diplomatic basis for a stable Middle East peace.

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§1a Gentlemen,
b I wish to focus my statements this evening
c mainly on our conflict with our Palestinian neighbors
d and the path which I believe we must follow -
e with patience and responsibility -
f in order to lead the State of Israel
g from the abyss of a violent conflict
 h to a different reality of stability, security and peace.

§2a For two and a half years,
b the people of Israel have borne this struggle
c with courage and stamina,
d our spirit has not broken
e and the terrorists' schemes have come up
f and been shattered
g against our strength and our fortitude.
h Despite its desire for peace and tranquility,
i our people know the truth:
j that there is no recipe or magic wand
k for ending the conflict in a flash.
l The safe path to peace is long and arduous.
m We are marching along this path
n and making progress on both the military and political fronts,
o and this is the path which will lead us safely to our destination.
p Let us not be tempted to take "short-cuts" -
q either from the left or the right -
r because there are none.

§3a We must not provide free gifts.
 b We must not unilaterally withdraw
 c without political rewards
 d or in the absence of an agreement.
 e And here we must emphasize:
 f beyond the detrimental interpretation
 g that the Palestinians and the Arab states
 h will apply to the vision of deserted and ruined communities,
 i and the fact that this will be construed as an Israeli defeat
 j and will encourage terrorism,
 k there is another grave danger:
 l withdrawal without agreement relieves the Palestinians of all responsibility.
 m The Palestinians will continue to maintain large military forces uninterrupted
 n and to manufacture weapons.
 o They have already established a military industry,
 p and they will be free to enter into alliances with Israel's enemies
 q and continue the path of terror.
 r Above all, the United States will be relieved of any of the commitments taken
 s when we arrived at an agreed-upon plan.
 t We have arrived at an agreed-upon plan with the United States,
 u and once we deviate from it,
 v the United States will also deviate from it,
 w despite the great efforts invested in a long and difficult negotiation process.
 x My seven visits to Washington during the last eighteen months
 y have not been easy,
 z and they have certainty not been in vain.

§4a Therefore, we must continue fighting terrorism
 b relentlessly, determinedly and stubbornly,
 c using every scheme and means at our disposal,
 d The IDF, the General Security Service and the Israel Police
 e are engaged in the most thorough, courageous and sophisticated work,
 f with exceptional success.
 g In this kind of warfare,
 h there is obviously no chance of a hundred percent success
 i in thwarting and prevention.
 j Unfortunately, most successes remain unpublished,
 k while the few instances where terrorist attacks do occur
 l naturally receive comprehensive media coverage.

§5a In the framework of our fight against terrorism,
 b we must continue the construction
 c of the security separation fence,
 d in order to create a continuous physical buffer zone
 e between the population centers of the State of Israel
 f and the terror centers.
 g The fence is currently being constructed,
 h with tremendous investment and at full speed.
 i The fence's main section -
 j from Salem to the Cross Samaria road -
 k will be completed by summer.
 l At the same time, I must emphasize:
 m the significance of the security fence
 n should not be magnified beyond what it is -
 o another important obstacle to terrorism
 p and a vital cornerstone
 q in the comprehensive battle
 r against the terrorist organizations,
 s but not beyond that.
 t It is not a magic drug
 u and is certainly no substitute for the continuation of the IDF activity
 v in the terror centers
 w and against the terrorists,
 x their abettors and dispatchers.

§6a Simultaneously, we must constantly strive toward real peace,
 b demonstrate initiative and maximum flexibility,
 c but without compromising our security and Israel's vital interests.

§7a There is no doubt that the main partner
 b to any feasible political initiative for peace in the Middle East
c is Washington.
d During the past two years,
e I have nurtured our ties with the United States
f and cemented Israel's status in the White House and on Capitol Hill.
g we have, as you know, true friends there,
h and the understanding, cooperation and coordination with them
i have reached an unprecedented level.

§8a These relations are a primary political and strategic asset to the State of Israel.
b They yield invaluable security benefits,
c They also yield significant economic fruits,
d regarding the guarantees and the special security grant.

§9a The foundation for a political settlement in our region
b was anchored approximately six months ago,
c on June 24, 2002,
d in President Bush's speech on the Middle East.
e I have said before,
f and I reiterate,
g that the President's peace plan is a reasonable, realistic and feasible one.
h The underlying principle of this plan –
i which is acceptable to Israel –
j is progress in phases,
k with the first phase being a complete cessation of Palestinian terrorism.
l The transition from one phase
m to a more advanced one
n is not defined according to a pre-determined timetable,
o but on the basis of performance.
p Each transition to the next phase is conditional
q on complete fulfillment of the commitments in the phase preceding it.

§10a Israel should obviously not be expected to make political concessions
b prior to a proven state of calm and Palestinian governmental reforms.
c The reform process is necessary
d in order to remove Arafat from the reins of power and decision-making
e and to establish a more proper government,
f which will lead the security, economic and democratic reforms.
g In this context it should be emphasized that
h one of the most important tests of the new regime
i will be not only the prevention and dismantling of terrorism,
j but also a complete cessation of incitement
k and the nurturing of an education system
l that teaches the values of peace and coexistence.

§11a Israel will never again place their trust in someone
b who has proven time and again
c that he is not worthy of trust.
d Yasser Arafat is not,
e never has been
f and never will be
g a leader of peace.
h His path is rife with destruction and terror.
i He is to be counted among the leaders
j who brought disaster upon disaster on the Palestinian people.
k Arafat abused his position
l and the recognition he was granted
m to build a murderous terrorist regime
n to continue the armed struggle against Israel.
o Instead, he has wreaked havoc on his people.
p More and more people understand the disaster,
q but they are ruled by a regime of terror,
r and their voices are silenced.

§12a I am referring to his treacherous betrayal of
b his essential commitment:
c the very essence of the agreement he signed
d with the late Yitzhak Rabin:
e the literal and absolute commitment
f to abandon the path of violence and terrorism
g and to solve our differences at the negotiation table.
h Arafat's personal history
i is filled with violent violations of signed agreements,
j with us and with leaders of the Arab world,
As far as he is concerned, the written word is worthless and there is no connection between commitments made at formal ceremonies and practical intent.

§13a After over 700 Israelis were killed and more than 5000 wounded since the Camp David Conference, I cannot fathom that anyone in Israel would trust this man again, negotiate with him, or view him as a reliable partner to any kind of agreement. Is it even conceivable to shake the hand of the man responsible for the evil system of savage, violent and anti-Semitic incitement in educational institutions and in the P.A. media, which has bred a culture of murder and suicide to slaughter Israeli citizens?

§14a During the past two years, my government has managed, in a successful political effort, to increase international awareness of the fact that Arafat constitutes an obstacle to peace and he must step down. This political accomplishment must not be undermined by irresponsible statements granting the isolated and besieged arch-terrorist even a spark of false hope. The statements made by the failed Palestinian leader regarding the need to cease terrorist attacks until after elections in Israel proves yet again the issues emphasized by Israel over the past two years – that Yasser Arafat, leading the coalition of terror he has established, is responsible for terror, controls the "flames", and manipulates them at his will.

§15a Israel's voice must be heard loud and clear, and so it shall: he who seeks peace must encourage the Palestinians to replace their leadership. There is no other way.

§16a I have said more than once that if these conditions are met, I will be prepared to go far and agree to painful concessions. Only he who is prepared to make painful concessions can make genuine peace, a peace which will last for generations. It is only he who is willing to suffer pain as the price for these concessions, who is able to do whatever is necessary to preserve the peace and to ensure that his concessions will not be in vain. I will only be prepared to do so when it is proven beyond any doubt that we are offered true peace, and that Israel has a partner who genuinely seeks peace and coexistence for the benefit of both peoples.

§17a The final subject which I would like to address briefly is Iraq. The war which the United States is planning to wage in order to drive out Saddam Hussein's cruel and dictatorial regime is a war in which Israel is not involved in. We wholeheartedly support U.S. efforts to free Iraq and the entire area from the threat of Baghdad's evil regime. Saddam Hussein is already responsible for the deaths of over one million people, including hundreds of thousands of his own people,
Justification Narratives


§1a Mr. President,
b It is a great privilege for me to be here,
c at the White House,
d for the eighth time,
e I am always pleased to visit
f and feel that I am among friends –
g true friends of the State and people of Israel.

§2a Mr. President, I congratulate you
b on the impressive victory in the Iraqi campaign
c and for removing Saddam Hussein from power –
d one of the most ruthless and tyrannical leaders in history.
e For thirty years, the Free World has witnessed
f the recklessness and brutality of this dictator.
g Only you, Mr. President,
h have shown the courage, determination and leadership needed
i to spearhead the successful campaign
j to oust this merciless despot, his dynasty and evil regime.

§3a For the first time since World War II,
b the freedom and peace-seeking democratic world
c had the wisdom to go after murderous and evil rulers
d and bring them to justice.
e I have no doubt, Mr. President,
f that thanks to you,
g any villain,
h in any corner of the world,
i knows that the long arm of justice will reach them.
j So many will owe their lives to you
k and the great nation of America.

§4a I am confident, Mr. President,
b that the lessons learnt by the nations of the world and the region
c from the courageous action of the United States in Iraq
d will serve to advance the peace process between Israel
e and the Palestinians,
f and the entire Arab world.

§5a Your latest statements
b regarding the threats emanating from Syria and Iran
c prove, once again, the seriousness of your intentions
d to continue leading the fight against terror.
e It must be made clear to these countries
f that their evil deeds cannot continue.
There can be no compromise with terror and evil.

§6a The people of Israel, Mr. President,
are greatly thankful and appreciative of your activity,
unrelenting commitment to Israel's security
and the safety of its citizens,
your determination to advance the peace process
between us and the Palestinians.

§7a We are currently at an important juncture
in our relations with our Palestinian neighbors.
While relative quiet currently prevails in Israel,
terror has not yet completely ceased.
This relative calm was achieved, first and foremost,
through the uncompromising activity of the Israeli security forces,
and as a result of your personal efforts,
and the actions taken by the United States
among Arab and European countries.

§8a We are thankful for every hour of increased quiet and less terrorism
and for every drop of blood that is spared.
At the same time, we are concerned
d that this welcome quiet will be shattered any minute
e as a result of the continued existence of terror organizations
f which the Palestinian Authority is doing nothing
g to eliminate or dismantle.

§9a Mr. President, I am confident that you,
as the leader of the Free World in its war against terror,
c will act to ensure that the Palestinians
d put a complete stop to the threat of Palestinian terrorism,
e so that it will never rear its head again.
I wish to move forward with the political process
with our Palestinian neighbors,
and the right way to do that
is only after a complete cessation of terror, violence and incitement,
full dismantlement of terror organizations
and completion of the reform process in the Palestinian Authority.

§10a We had a useful talk today,
where we examined ways to advance the peace process
c between us and our Palestinian neighbors.
In this context, a number of issues came up:
the security fence which we are forced to construct
in order to defend our citizens against terror activities,
the removal of unauthorized outposts
and the freezing of settlements
in Judea and Samaria.

§11a I listened carefully to your statements on these subjects
and assured you, Mr. President, that I would address them:
c the security fence will continue to be built,
d with every effort to minimize the infringement
e on the daily life of the Palestinian population.
Unauthorized outposts will be removed
g as required in a law-abiding country.
We will continue to discuss all these issues
both directly and through our bureaus,
j which maintain close contact.

§12 Mr. President, we also discussed a series of issues
which could serve to promote the peace process.
In a statement published on my behalf last Friday,
we listed a long series of steps
e to accommodate the Palestinians,
f If calm prevails
g and we witness the dismantlement of terror organizations,
h Israel will be able to take additional and substantial steps
i to advance the process.

§13a I wish to thank you again, George,
for your friendship and understanding
towards the State and people of Israel,

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s speech at the official ceremony at Mt. Herzl in Jerusalem, in memory of members of the IDF who fell in the Yom Kippur War and the War of Attrition.

§1a Mr. President, Dear families, Honored guests.

b Thirty years ago, the fires of war were suddenly lit
c amidst the sanctity of Yom Kippur.
d Thirty years have passed
e since your loved ones hastened
f directly from their synagogues and homes
g to the heavy battle,
h and did not return.
i Those same thirty years have engraved the moment of a hasty separation
j and the bundle of precious memories,
k the truth of war and the shock of the most terrible of all news,
l in your hearts.

§2a The time that has passed has bound the wounds,
b but sorrow cannot be healed
c and the longing has no end.
d The photo is on the wall,
e and a name is engraved on the headstone in the military cemetery.
f Life continues thanks to those who fell 150;
g and in their absence.
h The heart cannot forget.

§3a Every war, first of all,
b belongs to the soldiers and commanders on the field of battle,
c despite the fact that others, not far to the rear,
d take the laurels for themselves.
e The Yom Kippur War belonged to all those warriors.
f It is they who, with their fighting,
g with their blood and heroism,
h contained the harsh surprise and more than a few mistakes,
i and led to victory.

§4a The State of Israel emerged changed from that war –
b hurting, sobered and humbled.
c Yom Kippur itself will not be what it was before that Yom Kippur.
d It has since been marked
e by the sorrowful memories of the fallen,
f the cries of the wounded
g and the cacophony and turmoil of war
h that violated the tranquility of the holy day.

§5a I still carry with me the image of the courageous fighters
b from the battles to blunt the enemy’s drive,
c and of the heroes who successfully changed the face of the war;
d O still remember the look of the dead
e and the smell of the burnt equipment,
f the blood and the smoke;
g I still hear the soldiers in the bunkers who cried out for aid –
h and many received none.

§6a If there is a national lesson,
h it is not just in berating ourselves for being haughty.
c The lesson is that in security,
d we cannot rely on shrewd assessments or deterrent ability alone,
e or even on agreements.
f In matters regarding our security,
Israel's strength must be ready and able at all times; we must constantly foster and develop this strength's qualitative advantage, in fighting spirit and equipment alike, as if the next war was around the corner. We are not immune from surprises. Only if we are constantly prepared will we achieve peace, and we will achieve it.

§7a Today, we also remember the many soldiers who fell during the long and anonymous War of Attrition, in which the faces of young soldiers stared at us day after day in the newspapers. There, far away, in the bunkers, during battles in the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley, clearing terrorist nests in alleyways in Gaza and Rafiah, in special operations deep into enemy territory, in land, air and naval battles, far from where anyone could see, this tenacious war took place, with much spilling of blood, and bravery. The soldiers, mostly in compulsory service, but also many volunteers, those same 'tigers' who came to aid us, thwarted the enemy's strategy to weaken Israel and force us to withdraw. The War of Attrition was pushed aside, overshadowed and eclipsed, between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. This year we have redeemed the honor of its fighters. They also deserve recognition.

§8a You, the bereaved families, know better than anyone else the heavy price of war, those of you who were there in the fields of death, those of you who commanded the fighters in battle and who lost best friends and subordinates also know the curse of war and will despise it to the end of your days.

§9a The Hebrew month of Tishrei is a month of introspection, and the shadow of those wars has lasted more than three decades. The battle continues. This generation of fighters carries in it the courage and abilities of those before them, of their parents, of those who fought in Sinai and the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the Jordan Valley, in the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur war. This generation is leading Israel's necessary battle against the terror organizations, whose murderous desires were demonstrated to us on Saturday. Israel will not recoil from defending its citizens and will strike its enemies in every place and with any means. At the same time, we will not miss an opening or an opportunity to reach an agreement with our neighbors for the peace we long for so much.

§10a Only with this combination will it be possible for this generation to see with its eyes the end of war and enter the gates of peace.

§11a May the memory of those who fell in Israel's wars be bound in the chain of life.
Annex P2: Personal Experience - Moshe Nissim

This transcript was published in the Israeli Yediot Aharonot newspaper on 31 May 2002, under the title I Created For Them a Teddy Stadium in the Middle of the Camp. Interview with Israeli reserve soldier and bulldozer driver Moshe Nissim by Tsadok Yeheskeli for Yediot Aharonot's 7-Day magazine, 31 May 2002.

§1a I entered Jenin
  b driven by madness,
  c by desperation,
  d I felt I have nothing to lose,
  e that even if I 'get it',
  f no big deal.

§2a I told my wife:
  b "If anything happens to me,
  c at least someone will take care of you!".

§3a I started my reserve service
  b in the worst conditions possible.
  c Maybe this is why I didn't give a damn.
  d Not about explosive charges,
  e not about gun fire.

§4a My life was in deep shit
  b for the past one and a half years.
  c For almost half a year I am suspended from work
  d as a senior inspector in the Jerusalem municipality.

§5a I worked there for 17 years,
  b till that cursed day,
  c January the 20th,
  d exactly my 40th birthday,
  e when the police came and arrested me.

§6a They said
  b that I and my colleagues in the inspection unit
  c are suspected for being bribed by contractors
  d and other business owners,
  e that in fact,
  f we are a corrupted bunch.

§7a This is a terrible injustice.
  b I am a very friendly guy,
  c and in this job you mix with people you inspect.
  d But bribery?
  e Me?

§8a I am in debt for hundreds of thousands of Shekels
  b long before all this story.
  c Had I taken bribes,
  d I would have money,
  e but I couldn't even pay the lawyer.
  f Since then I am suspended.
  g My wife was fired as well,
  h and I have four children to keep.

§9a This was not the first blow.
  b A few months earlier,
  c I was injured badly in my back,
  d my wife was fired,
  e and my son got run over
  f and had to be operated to save his leg.

§10a Today he is OK,
  b but his big dream,
  c and mine,
  d that he will once be a player
  e in the Beitar Jerusalem team,
  f this dream is probably gone forever.
  g Pity.
He was really talented.
I have already promised him.
To get him into the children’s Beitar team.

§11a
For two years, it is just one blow after another.
I haven’t got a cent,
but I love people.
I cannot be indifferent.
Every holiday, I distribute food packages for the needy.
The same at Passover.
I ran around like crazy.
And just then:
I started getting phone calls from the guys:
"Kurdi", they said,
"we are all being recruited to do reserve service,
but you are not called."

§12a
Truth is, that I understood my commanders.
Hey, I’ve been doing my reserves duty for 16 years now,
and I was useless.
I did nothing but make trouble.

§13a
During my obligatory Military service,
I was constantly sentenced to prison,
because I refused to be a vehicle electrician.
In my unit as well,
in the tractor unit,
I was supposed to be an electrician,
but actually, I did nothing,
just messed around.
I would come to the unit,
and immediately open a card table,
open a bottle.
If any officer would dare send me to guard duty,
I would send him first.
Kurdi always did his thing.

§14a
If I felt like going to a Beitar football match,
or going home,
no one could stop me.
I would just start the car and go.

§15a
Truth is, they didn’t even know me.
When I am given responsibility,
can I act differently.
In the "Versailles" disaster,
I was in charge of all the inspection team on location,
When I was seen by one of the guys of my military unit,
he was shocked.

§16a
He said:
"In the army you can’t tie your shoelaces,
and here you are a big chief!"

§17a
The truth is that
when I finally decide to do something,
I am one stubborn guy.
I will go for it till the end.
This time was one of those moments.
What haven’t I done for them to take me?
I sent the guys to twist the battalion commander’s arm,
I phoned the company commander,
I drove them mad.
"I promise to work", I pleaded with the battalion commander.
Finally, he agreed to give me a chance.

§18a
I said to myself:

1 In Israel, men are recruited at the age of 18 for 3 years of obligatory military service, At 21 they enter the reserve corps, usually necessitating 30 days of service each year until the age of 45.
2 In January 2001, a building in Jerusalem collapsed during a wedding in a hall named Versailles. Some 25 people were killed.
b "Kurdi, you can't let them down.
  c No more running wild!"

§19a The funny bit is,
  b I didn't even know how to operate the D-9.
  c I have never been an operator.
  d But I begged them to give me a chance to learn.

§20a Before we went into Shekhem (Nablus),
  b I asked some of the guys to teach me.
  c They sat with me for two hours.
  d They taught me how to drive forwards
  e and make a flat surface.

§21a I took it on with no problem
  b and told them:
  c 'That's it.
  d Move aside and let me work'.

§22a This is what happened in Jenin as well.
  b I have never demolished a house before,
  c or even a wall.
  d I got into the D-9 with a friend of mine,
  e a Yemenite.
  f I let him work for an hour,
  g and then told him,
  h 'Ok. I got the idea.'

§23a But the real thing started
  b the day 13 of our soldiers were killed
  c up that alley in the Jenin refugee camp.

§24a When they brought us in,
  b I knew that nobody wanted to work with me.
  c They were afraid to be with me or the tractor.
  d Not only did I have a reputation of a troublemaker,
  e but also of a man who knows no fear,
  f and they were right about that.
  g I really have no fear.
  h They knew I had no fear,
  i that I don't give a damn,
  j and that I can go anywhere,
  k without asking questions,
  l without an escort of tanks or APC's or anything.
  m Once, in Jenin,
  n I left the tank that escorted us everywhere.
  o I wanted to have a spin around the camp,
  p see what's going on.
  q Gadi, the other operator who was with me,
  r nearly fainted.
  s He started going mad:
  t 'Get back,' he shouted,
  u 'we have no escort!'
  v but I had to get to know the place better,
  w to find an exit,
  x just in case we needed one.
  y I was not afraid to die.
  z At least I was insured.
  aa This would have helped my family.

§25a When we got into the camp,
  b the D-9's were already waiting.
  c They were hauled from Shekhem.
  d I got the big D-9 L.
  e me and the Yemenite, my partner.
  f First thing I did was to tie the Beitar team flag.
  g I had it prepared in advance.
  h I wanted the family to be able to identify me.
  i I told the family and the kids:
  j 'you will see my tractor on television.
  k When you see the Beitar flag, that will be me'.
  l And this is exactly what happened.
§26a I know it sounds crazy,
b but for me,
c to hang this flag was completely natural.
d Like eating.
e Here, look at this Beitar pendant around my neck.
f It never comes off.
g Not off me,
h and not off the kids.
i I carry the Beitar flags everywhere I go.
j Look at my car, all covered with these flags.
k This is the way I am.
l I always go to the Beitar matches,
m in a Beitar colored Galabia,3
n and a big drum of the Kurds from the C.
o Once, after our first national championship,
p I took a ride on the roof of a car,
q carrying the drum,
r all the way to Jerusalem.

§27a Beitar is a kink in my brain.
b There is no other way to explain it.
c After my family,
d it is the most important thing in my life,
e and the only thing that can kill me.
f In Jenin, I was not scared for a moment,
g but I cannot go to the Beitar matches for half a year now.
h The suspense kills me,
i and I am constantly afraid of getting a heart attack.
j Sometimes, I can walk around "Teddy" 
k with a ticket in my hand,
l and I can't go in.
m In the match, in Beit Shean,
n I fainted after they scored a goal.
o I know how this sounds,
p but that's the way it is.
q Incurable.
r At home, they know better than to talk to me
s if Beitar lost a match.

§28a So now you understand why
b the Beitar flag was on the tractor in Jenin.
c Someone told me
d that my commander wanted to take it off.
e But no way.
f If I had a say in the matter,
g there would be a Beitar flag
h on the top of the mosque in the camp,
i I tried convincing the Golani officer I worked with
j to let me go up there and hang it,
k but he refused.
l He said I would be shot if I tried.
m Pity.

§29a The flag was the most outstanding object in the camp.
b Reservists who went home on short leave
c came back with Beitar flags,
d just to imitate me.
e It made a lot of noise, my flag.
f The Golani soldiers were stunned.
g 'You brought Beitar here,' they told me.
h And I said: 'I am going to make a Teddy stadium here.
i Don't you worry.'

§30a On the radio, they wanted to call me ‘Moshe-Bear’,
b but I insisted on Kurdi.
c I told the Golani, I am Kurdi5,
d and I won't answer if you call me by any other name.
e That is how 'Kurdi Bear' was born.

1 an Arab man's dress
2 the main Jerusalem stadium
3 'Kurdi' denotes someone of Kurdish origin; 'Bear' is the IDF code for its D-9 operators.
This is my name, and I am stubborn.

§31a In the reserves, they already got used to my signature: ‘Moshe Nissim Beitar Jerusalem’. For a while they asked me to stop it, but finally they just gave up.

§32a The moment I drove the tractor into the camp, something switched in my head. I went mad. All the desperation caused by my personal condition just vanished at once. All that remained was the anger over what had happened to our guys. Till now I am convinced, and so are the rest of us, that if we were let into the camp earlier, with all our might, twenty-four soldiers would not have been killed in this camp.

§33a The moment I went into the camp, for the first time, I just thought of how to help these soldiers. These fighters. Children the age of my son. I couldn’t grasp how they worked there, where a charge blows up on you with every step you take.

§34a With the first mission I was given, to open a track inside the camp, I understood what kind of hell this was.

§35a My first mission, voluntarily, was to bring the soldiers food. I was told: ‘The only way to get food in there is with the D-9’. They haven’t eaten in two days. You couldn’t poke your nose out. I filled the tractor till the roof, and drove the tractor right up to the door of their post, so that they would not have to take even one step outside their shelter. One step was enough in order to lose an arm or a leg.

§36a You could not tell where the charges were. They dug holes in the ground and planted charges. You would just start driving, and you would hit a 3” pipe, welded on both ends. As you touch them, they go off. Everything was booby trapped. Even the walls of houses. Just touch them, and they blow up. Or, they would shoot you the moment you entered. There were charges in the roads, under the floor, between the walls. As you make an opening, something goes off. I saw a bird cage blow up in some pet shop, where we opened a track. A flying birdcage. I felt sorry for the birds. They just planted charges everywhere.

§37a For me, in the D-9, it was nothing. I didn’t mind. You would just hear the explosions.

§38a Even 80 Kilos of explosives only rattled the tractor’s blade.
Justificational Narratives

Annex P2: Personal Experience - Moshe Nissim

Justificational Narratives

Annex P2: Personal Experience - Moshe Nissim

c It weighs three and a half tons.6
d It's a monster.
e A tank can get hit in the belly.
f Its belly is sensitive.
g With the D-9,
h you should only look out for RPG's
i or 50 Kilos of explosives on the roof.
j But I didn't think about it then.
k The only thing that mattered was
l that these soldiers must not risk themselves
m just to eat or drink something.

§39a I fell in love with those children.
b I was willing to do with my tractor
c anything they would ask for.
d I begged for work:
e 'Let me finish another house, open another track.'

§40a They, in return, protected me.
b I would leave the tractor without weapons,
c nothing.
d Just walked in.
e They told me I am mad,
f but I said: 'Leave me alone.
g Anyhow, the armored vest will not save me.'
h This is how I worked.
i Even without a shirt.
j Half naked.

§41a Do you know how I held out for 75 hours?
b I didn't get off the tractor.
c I had no problem of fatigue,
d because I drank whisky all the time.
e I had a bottle in the tractor at all times.
f I had put them in my bag in advance.
g Everybody else took clothes,
h but I knew what was waiting for me there,
i so I took whisky and something to munch on.

§42a Clothes? Didn't need any.
b A towel was enough.
c Anything I could not leave the tractor.
d You open the door,
e and get a bullet.
f For 75 hours I didn't think about my life at home,
g about all the problems.
h Everything was erased.
i Sometimes images of terror attacks in Jerusalem
j crossed my mind.
k I witnessed some of them.

§43a What is 'opening a track'?
b You erase buildings. On both sides.
c There is no other choice,
d because the tractor was much wider than their alleys.
e But I am not looking for excuses or anything.
f You must 'shave' them.
g I didn't give a damn about demolishing their houses,
h because it saved the lives of our soldiers
i I worked where our soldiers were slaughtered.
j They didn't tell all the truth about what happened.
k They drilled holes in the walls,
l holes for gun barrels.
m Anyone who escaped the charges,
n was shot through these holes.

§44a I had no mercy for anybody.
b I would erase anyone with the D-9,
c just so that our soldiers won't expose themselves to danger.
d That's what I told them.

6 The D-9 actually weighs 48.7 tons, without armour. The armour brings the weight closer to 60 tons.
I was afraid for our soldiers.

You could see them sleeping together, 40 soldiers in a house, all crowded.

My heart went out for them.

This is why I didn't give a damn about demolishing all the houses I've demolished - I and I demolished plenty.

By the end, I built the 'Teddy' football stadium there.

§45a Difficult?

No way.

You must be kidding.

I wanted to destroy everything.

I begged the officers, over the radio, to let me knock it all down; from top to bottom.

To level everything.

It's not as if I wanted to kill.

Just the houses.

We didn't harm those who came out of the houses we had started to demolish, waving white flags.

We screwed just those who wanted to fight.

§46a No one refused an order to knock down a house.

No such thing.

When I was told to bring down a house, I took the opportunity to bring down some more houses; not because I wanted to - but because when you are asked to demolish a house, some other houses usually obscure it, so there is no other way.

I would have to do it even if I didn't want to.

They just stood in the way.

If I had to erase a house, I would do it.

And believe me, we demolished too little.

The whole camp was littered with detonation charges.

What we did actually saved the lives of the Palestinians themselves, because if they had returned to their homes, they would blow up.

§47a For three days, I just destroyed and destroyed.

The whole area.

Any house that they fired from came down.

And to knock it down, I tore down some more.

They were warned by loudspeaker to get out of the house before I come, but I gave no one a chance.

I didn't wait.

I didn't give one blow, and wait for them to come out.

I would just ram the house with full power, to bring it down as fast as possible.

I wanted to get to the other houses.

To get as many as possible.

Others may have restrained themselves, or so they say.

Who are they kidding?

Anyone who was there, and saw our soldiers in the houses, would understand they were in a death trap.

I thought about saving them.

I didn't give a damn about the Palestinians, but I didn't just ruin with no reason.

It was all under orders.

§48a Many people were inside houses we went to demolish.

They would come out of the houses we were working on.

I didn't see, with my own eyes,

dying under the blade of the D-9
e and I didn’t see houses falling down on live people.
f But if there were any, I wouldn’t care at all.
g I am sure people died inside these houses,
h but it was difficult to see,
i there was lots of dust everywhere,
j and we worked a lot at night.
k I found joy with every house that came down,
l because I knew they didn’t mind dying,
m but they cared for their homes.
n If you knocked down a house,
o you buried 40 or 50 people for generations.
p If I am sorry for anything,
q it is for not tearing the whole camp down.

§49a I didn’t stop for a moment.
b Even when we had a two-hour break,
c I insisted on going on.
d I prepared a ramp to destroy a four-story building.
e Once I steered sharply to the right,
f and a whole wall came down.
g Suddenly I heard shouting on the radio:
h ‘Kurdi, watch it! It is us!’
i Turns out there were our guys inside,
j and they forgot to tell me.

§50a I had plenty of satisfaction.
b I really enjoyed it.
c I remember pulling down a wall of a four-story building.
d It came crashing down on my D-9.
e My partner screamed at me to reverse,
f but I let the wall come down on us.
g We would go for the sides of the buildings,
h and theram them.
i If the job was too hard,
j we would ask for a tank shell.

§51a I couldn’t stop.
b I wanted to work and work.
c There was this Golani officer
d who gave us orders by radio –
e I drove him mad.
f I kept begging for more and more missions.

§52a I bitched them to give me more work.
b I would tell them, over the radio:
c ‘Why are you letting me rest?
d I want more work!’
e All this time, I was really sick.
f I got back from Jenin wiped out.
g Torn to bits.
h The next day, I went up again.
i One of the guys was ill,
j and I volunteered to help.
k I got back there.

§53a I had lots of satisfaction in Jenin,
b lots of satisfaction.
c. It was like getting all the 18 years of doing nothing –
d. into three days.
e. The soldiers came up to me and said:
f. ‘Kurdi, thanks a lot.’
g. ‘And I hurt for the Thirteen.’
h. If we had moved into the building
i. where they were ambushed,
j. k. we would have buried all those Palestinians alive.

§54a I kept thinking of our soldiers.
b. I didn’t feel sorry for all those Palestinians
c. who were left homeless.
d. I just felt sorry for their children,
e. who were not guilty.
f. There was one wounded child,
g. who was shot by Arabs.
h. A Golani paramedic came down
i. and changed his bandages,
j. till he was evacuated.
k. We took care of them, of the children.
l. The soldiers gave them candy.
m. But I had no mercy for the parents of these children.

§55a I remembered the picture on television,
b. of the mother who said she will bear children
c. so that they will explode in Tel Aviv.
d. I asked the Palestinian women I saw there:
e. ‘Aren’t you ashamed?’

§56a After I finished the work,
b. I got out of the tractor,
c. piled up some clothes on the side of the road,
d. and fell asleep.
e. They looked after me,
f. so that I won’t get run over by a tank or something.
g. All the fatigue of the past 75 hours just landed on me.
h. There was a lot of excitement in what I did:
i. The fact that I did a good job operating the tractor,
j. the soldiers who came to me,
k. after it was all over,
l. ‘and said: ‘thank you’.
m. This was enough for me.

§57a ‘Do you want the entire company
b. to come over to your house?’

§58a I told him: ‘As far as I am concerned,
b. bring the whole battalion.’

§59a I phoned my mother, from the D-9,
b. and told her that the whole battalion was coming.
c. She said: ‘no sweat.
d. I am waiting for them.’

§60a I know many people will think that my attitude
b. stems from me being a ‘Beitar’ and ‘Likud’ membe,
c. It is true, I am heavily on the right.
d. But this has nothing to do with what I have done in Jenin.
e. I have many Arab friends.
f. And I say, if a man has done nothing –
g. don’t touch him.
h. A man who has done something –

7 Kurdi is referring to the day in which 13 Israeli soldiers were killed by Palestinian fighters in an ambush in Jenin.
8 Two right-wing movements. Beitar, the youth movement, is more nationalistic. Likud is the major right-wing party, headed by Ariel Sharon.
I hang him, as far as I am concerned.

Even a pregnant woman -

If she has a terrorist behind her.

This is the way I thought in Jenin.

I answered to no one.

The main thing was to help our soldiers.

If I had been given three weeks,

I would have had more fun.

That is, if they would let me tear the whole camp down.

I have no mercy.

§61a

All the human rights organizations

and the UN

d and turned what we have done there into such an issue,

e are just bullshitting, lying.

Lots of the walls in those houses

just exploded by themselves,

at our slightest touch.

It is true, though,

that during the last days we smashed the camp.

And yes, it was justified,

They mowed our soldiers down.

They had a chance to surrender.

§62a

No one expressed any reservations against doing it.

Not only me.

Who would dare speak?

If anyone would as much as open his mouth,

I would have buried him under the D-9.

This is the reason I didn’t mind

seeing the hundred by hundred we’ve flattened.

As far as I am concerned,

I left them with a football stadium,

so they can play.

This was our gift to the camp.

Better than killing them.

They will sit quietly.

Jenin will not return to what it used to be.

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* The size, in meters, of the part of the camp that was totally demolished, according to the IDF report, November ‘02.
Background Analysis Annexes

Annex BA1: From Barthes' Second-Order Semiological System

In a longer work on the subject of this thesis I would like to include and expand upon the following discussions, towards a deeper analysis of the issue of mythology.

Section 2.i. is a discussion of Barthes' Second-order Semiological System. 2.ii illustrates the Palestinian as signifier, and 2.iii. discusses the possibility of a third order system.

(2.i.) Turning History into Nature: Barthes' Second-Order Semiological System

Barthes sees mythology as performing the oppressive social function of "naturalising" reality, since only the powerful would seek "to keep the reality without keeping the appearances." Meanwhile, "the oppressed... has only one language, that of his emancipation," so myth is a tool and a privilege of power: "the language of the [oppressed] aims at transforming, the [oppressor] at eternalising." It is true that when a people are drastically oppressed – in situations of extreme endurance such as war or famine – their immediate concern must be their own survival, which leaves little energy for mythological 'casting'. As for the less oppressed, who may enjoy limited freedoms, their mythologies, however persuasive or apt, will rarely be heard beyond their particular linguistic, social or political boundaries. But with sufficiently powerful backing, certain mythologies can reach the status of "fact," even on a global scale. On these premises, Barthes discerns that "the function of myth is to empty reality," and so it "is always a language-robbery."

Barthes contends that this theory about myth can only be understood if "look[ed] at... from the point of view of the thing that has been robbed; and within the signifier, from the point of view of the language-object, that is, the meaning." To illustrate he outlines a "second-order semiological system," representing the relationship between Language and Myth:

![Diagram of Language and Myth](attachment:image.png)

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10 Barthes, 1993, p149.
11 Barthes, 1993, p149.
12 Barthes, 1993, p149.
13 Barthes, 1993, p149.
In the first order system, a linguistic or otherwise symbolic unit is the form (or 'signifier') allocated to portray a concept or thing; (ie that which is 'signified'). On the most basic level the first order can represent the relationship between a 'word' and its 'meaning'. It is widely agreed, in 'Western' theory at least, that there is no essential relationship between an utterance and what it denotes but rather that the 'meaning' of a structure of sounds is agreed upon, then learnt, by those who utter and understand it. The words are then applied as to them seems normal. Those with more power are sometimes able to simply impose the labels on things that to them seem normal. It often happens that a word, previously assigned a different meaning within a speech community, is (re)appropriated to mean something new, whereupon the old meaning is largely abandoned over time. In this way, language is continually evolving. Where the old meaning is entirely displaced, the signifier becomes fresh and empty of any previous significations. In this way, the signifier combines with the signified to produce the word that can be used by one and understood by others. This Barthes designates as the 'sign', a composite whole imbued as it is with meaning from both sides of its 'family tree': the signified and the signifier.

On the second level, the 'sign' and all it implies are taken to aid the delivery of a new thought or concept. To illustrate, Barthes gives the example of a magazine cover that portrays a young black man in French military uniform, saluting the French flag. For Barthes, the photograph reinforces the status quo because, "If I state the fact of French imperialism without explaining it, I am very near to finding that it is natural and goes without saying." Here, not only the fact of "French imperialism," but also a strong image of its benign and all-embracing nature, are illustrated, or 'signified', by one of its subjects: The illustration is all the more convincing because, by representing a proud-and-happy imperial subject, the 'source' of the assessment is the 'other'. Stripped of his own identity and history, he has been transformed into a sanitised representation of the conceptually complex historical and cultural fact of French imperialism.

"In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics... it organises a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth..."

(2.ii.) The Palestinian Signifier

In theory, the word 'Palestinian' should be able to evoke endless potential associated images, since there exist Palestinian history, culture, traditions, people, etc. However, in our "world... without depth," it now happens that several stock associations have been welded to this word throughout the world (although focused in some areas). The most immutable, 'Palestinian Terrorism/ists/s', is repeated so often in media reports that it has stripped the Palestinian of all other possible connotations or activities. In Israel itself,
Justificational Narratives

Annex BA1: From Barthes' Second-Order Semiological System

In turning 'history' (the fact that the Palestinians are repeatedly enraged by Israeli provocation, and that some resort to bombing) into 'nature' (if this is their nature then it may make sense to contain them), the predominant but apparently 'no-author' narrative, it is also what Barthes would call a "language robbery," and not just because of the Palestinian-as-adjective structure of the phrase itself. 'Palestinian cookery,' for example, allows the adjective to retain a multiplicity of implications depending on its context - it allows for a detailed history of taste, tradition, preferred ingredients, methods of cooking and beyond, to social order and family hierarchy, and so on. If "the fundamental character of the mythical concept is to be appropriated," then perhaps we can tentatively invert Barthes' findings and seek to identify mythologies according to whether a signer's own history seems flattened or enhanced from within the overall sign. If we see an 'empty' signer, there is a chance that its function is to illustrate a myth.

(2.iii.) Suggestion for a Third Order – From Myth to Reality

We can adapt and expand Barthes' semiological system to a third order, to explain how policy narrative (PN), with enough power at each level, is transformed into reality. Power is the constant 'signified'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PN (Policy Narrative)</th>
<th>Power (Signified)</th>
<th>Signifier</th>
<th>Power (Signified)</th>
<th>Signifier</th>
<th>Power (Signified)</th>
<th>Signifier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy Sign Propaganda</td>
<td>2nd order Signifier</td>
<td>Power (Signified)</td>
<td>2nd order Signifier</td>
<td>Power (Signified)</td>
<td>3rd order Signifier</td>
<td>Power (Signified)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetuation of public support for policy</td>
<td>Creates 'Conventional Wisdom'.</td>
<td>3rd order Signifier</td>
<td>The sign produced from the 2nd order signifier (propaganda) and the 2nd degree signified (power), is where &quot;semiology becomes ideology,&quot; (or mythology, in Barthes' system). Ideology, the second order sign, is now the signifier of a third order of power (the 3rd order signified); it is accepted as conventional wisdom.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reality</td>
<td>3rd order Sign</td>
<td>The sign produced by the third order: the policymakers whose power is now conventional wisdom are directly dominating the reality of those affected by their policies and described in their narratives. This is the level of powerful national governments and international corporations.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

What is always being demonstrated or 'signified' with mythology, according to Barthes, is power: "the language of the [oppressed] aims at transforming, the [oppressor] at eternalising." All propagandists make a big show of power, for what is the point / incentive / etc in supporting an ideology that doesn't seem like it's going to win? Even the less powerful make a show of bravado and defiance, such as Iraq's threats prior to the recent war to 'annihilate' the United States. Threats like these are often re-appropriated by the more powerful, and this is how grossly disproportionate 'clashes' are justified. This

21 Barthes, 1993, p143.
23 It is tempting to assert that this holds true for positive as well as negative mythologies, with reference to the concepts of 'freedom', 'truth' and 'justice' as expounded by dominant nations, particularly in the context of forcing these qualities upon others through their expansionist and belligerent foreign policies.
would seem to reinforce Barthes' contention that the oppressed do not produce the prevalent mythologies, even if they appear to have contributed to them.

Finally, all too often the propaganda is not aimed at the people whose lives and/or environment are to be altered, but at the domestic electorate of the government that either directly oppresses, or resorts to placing its nation 'at war' with, the other. This focus resembles what Said describes as the "imperial perspective," which is "that way of looking at a foreign reality... seeing its people as subjects whose fate can be decided by what distant administrators think is best for them."25

Many words used in modern English have changed their meaning over the years. This is shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Original Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>awful</td>
<td>deserving of awe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brave</td>
<td>cowardice (as in <em>bravado</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterfeit</td>
<td>legitimate copy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>girl</td>
<td>young person of either sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guess</td>
<td>take aim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knight</td>
<td>boy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>luxury</td>
<td>sinful self indulgence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neck</td>
<td>parcel of land (as in <em>neck of the woods</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>notorious</td>
<td>famous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nuisance</td>
<td>injury, harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quick</td>
<td>alive (as in <em>quicksilver</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sophisticated</td>
<td>corrupted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tell</td>
<td>to count (as in <em>bank teller</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truant</td>
<td>beggar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The word *silly* meant blessed or happy in the 11th century going through pious, innocent, harmless, pitiable, feeble, feeble minded before finally ending up as foolish or stupid.

Pretty began as crafty then changed via clever, skilfully made, fine to beautiful.

Buxom began with the meaning obedient and changed via compliant, lively, plump to large breasted.

The word *nice* meant stupid and foolish in the late 13th Century. It went through a number of changes including wanton, extravagant, elegant, strange, modest, thin, and shy. By the middle of the 18th Century it had gained its current meaning of pleasant and agreeable.

Words are changing meaning now: consider how the words *bad* and *gay* have changed in recent years.

http://www.krysstal.com/wordname.html
Annex BA2: Aristotle And The Rhetoric Of Fear, Anger And Confidence

Aristotelian definition (all definitions are quoted from Aristotle's Rhetoric, Book II.)

Date, ref.: Sharon example

Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future.

21-02-02, §7: "The State of Israel is not collapsing and will not collapse. Everything is in our hands, and future developments depend on us — our conduct, our courage."

Fear is caused by whatever we feel has great power of destroying us or of harming us in ways that tend to cause us great pain.

21-02-02, §7: "the tremendous threats which have been hovering over the State since its inception."

21-02-02, §33: "our war against those who are trying to destroy our people..."

Fear is caused by the enmity and anger of people who have power to do something to us.

21-02-02, §18: "A complete demilitarisation of the Palestinian zone is categorical."

Fear is felt by those who believe something to be likely to happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, and at a particular time.

08-04-02 §4: "They have one mission: to chase us out of here, from everywhere — from our home in Elon Moreh and from the supermarket in Jerusalem, from the cafe in Tel Aviv and from the restaurant in Haifa..."

There is no fear without some faint expectation of escape, [because] fear sets us thinking about what can be done, which of course nobody does when things are hopeless

21-02-02, §31: "I would also like to turn to those who are talking about a collapse, despair and loss of hope. This is not the time to utter words of disaster, it is the time to stand firm and united and assist wherever you can."

The orator must make them feel that they are really in danger of something, pointing out that it has happened to others who were stronger than they are...

06-04-02 §32: "Since that deadly attack in September, the partnership between Israelis and Americans has, unfortunately, become a "partnership of blood" between victims of terror."

We feel confidence if we believe we have often succeeded and never suffered reverses, or have often met danger and escaped it safely.

21-02-02 §4: "We are a nation that has accumulated vast experience in confronting problems and we have an inexhaustible source of talent and the ability to pull ourselves out. If there is anything that concerns me it is not our ability to confront and solve problems, but the gap between our true capability on the one hand and this unfounded doubt that we have in our ability, on the other."

21-02-02 §6: "All these are a testimony to a healthy society, full of vitality and willpower, a society whose sons and daughters are no less qualified than the generations which established the State, broke the siege imposed upon us in 1967 and pulled themselves out of the depth of the abyss in 1973."

22-01-03 §2: "For two and a half years the people of Israel have borne this struggle with courage and stamina, our spirit has not broken and the terrorists' schemes have come up and been shattered against our strength and our fortitude."

Also if we believe ourselves superior to our rivals in... the possession of all, or the most important, appliances of war.

21-02-02 §11: "The 'Merkava' Tank (developed by Maj. Gen. Tal - "Talik") is the winning tank — the best in the world. The IDF is one of the greatest offensive armies in the world. Our Air Force and Navy are also among the most outstanding in the world."

The fact is that anger makes us confident — that anger is excited by our knowledge that we are not the wrongers but the wronged...

21-02-02 §6: "Just take a moment and ponder the past year and a half of struggle that has been forced upon us."

21-02-02 §30: "the war of terrorism which was forced upon us 17 months ago..."

...and that the divine power is always supposed to be on the side of the wronged.

08-04-02 §6: "With the help of God, together, we can and will triumph."
Annex BA3: Containing Emotions

By Sasha Evans, work in progress

Disguising the imposition of emotion by superimposition of an apparently logical formula is an approach that takes place over and again throughout the speeches of Ariel Sharon. In most cases, the formulaic quality is provided simply by imposing causative conjunctions and other forms of attribution to what might be more honestly presented as tentative or tenuous conclusions. To illustrate we turn to perhaps the most emotionally-charged speech; that of 8 April 2002:

08-04-02 §14a Members of Knesset,
  b For eighteen months Israel has been under bitter and bloody attack,
  c initiated by our Palestinian neighbours.
  d We have paid a high price in blood,
  e solely because of our honest wish to live in peace with them,
  f and because of our belief that they want the same.

§15a The infrastructure of terror against Israel
  b was established before this government took office.
  c The main purpose of our National Unity Government
  d was to achieve a cessation of violence and incitement
  e as a vital and essential condition
  f' for the resumption of our efforts to achieve peace in the region.
  g This is the essence of this government's existence.

These stanzas take the scientific form of a 'timeline', conveying the impression of unadulterated factuality in cause and effect. By the time of this speech, the so-called 'Palestinian Intifada' has indeed been running for eighteen months, if we accept the 'common knowledge' of both the Israeli and the Palestinian narratives that the current crisis began on 28/29 September 2000. If the "eighteen months" part of §14b is widely accepted as 'fact', our resistance to the second and third parts of the sentence is diminished: Ariel Sharon is telling us that Israel has been under "bitter and bloody attack," and he as Prime Minister is certainly in a position to know what has been happening to Israel. And when Israel is under attack, the attackers, as we all know, can be none other than the Palestinians (or, in extension, the 'Arabs'), so the information contained in the third part of the sentence is understood even before it has been delivered. According to §14d-f, "We have paid a high price in blood, solely because of our honest wish to live in peace with them, and because of our belief that they want the same." This sentiment echoes that of the "victims of coexistence" (08-04-02 §5a) discussed above.

So/ely because we wanted to live in peace;
  because we believed that they wanted the same; we are being killed and wounded. Again heavily reliant on intertextual reference and audience pre-knowledge, Sharon is referring here to the breakdown of the 'peace process' and the collapse of the Camp David talks in July 2000. According to the Israeli narrative, the Palestinian refusal to accept the terms of Camp David constitutes proof that they do not

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26 I believe that the term 'Intifada' was originally imposed on the Palestinians by outside sources, since although I was living in Palestine at the time I heard it first on CNN, while Palestinians were still reeling at the ferocity of the Israeli army's response to their demonstrations against Sharon's visit to the Aqsa mosque and had not yet begun to use the word to describe what was happening around them. 'Intifada' means 'uprising', but in the first few days of this conflict there was no 'uprising' to speak of except in the form of unarmed demonstrations: over 80 Palestinians had been killed before the first attacks on Israelis took place. However, the term was quickly accepted - perhaps after the first two or three weeks - by the Palestinians themselves. Nonetheless, I maintain that the phrase "Palestinian intifada" is inaccurate because it attributes the notion of Palestinian instigation to the events of the past three years.

27 See Sharon's article The Way Forward in the Middle East: "the Palestinian leadership decided to initiate the current war against Israel after the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000. Rather than resolve Israeli-Palestinian differences peacefully, it deliberately promoted a wave of terrorist attacks against the people of Israel." (09-06-02 §4a-e).
want peace,\textsuperscript{28} while the liberties accorded to the Palestinians during the years of the peace process simply gave them time to organise and amass forces and weapons to be used against Israelis. In Sharon's terms, the peace process was a mistake for this reason, all of which can now be condensed into the sentiments of §14d-f.

Meanwhile the listener's emotions are tweaked by a series of evocative adjectives – Israel has been under "bitter and bloody" attack; 'our' wish to live in peace with 'them' was "honest" (as ever, 'honesty' carries with it connotations of innocence and naive good will), and the result has been the paying of "a high price in blood." Continuing with the timeline, "The infrastructure of terror against Israel was established before this government took office," (§15a-b). Although this comment seems assertive and factual, its meaning is vague and unclear. The "infrastructure of terror" is a term that has been repeated so often, both in Israel and internationally, that explanation no longer seems necessary, if indeed it has ever been explained – but it remains problematic, particularly in view of its societal connotations. When speaking of the "war of attrition," commonly accepted as taking place from 1967-70, he describes Israeli soldiers "in pursuit of terrorists in the Jordan Valley, clearing terrorist nests in alleyways in Gaza and Rafah," (07-10-03 §7f-h). Presumably these terrorists had already begun to establish their "infrastructure" (long before this government took office in February 2001), but it seems more likely that Sharon is again referring to the 'peace process' years, when, according to his comments to the Weizmann Institute, "Arafat abused his position and the recognition he was granted to build a murderous terrorist regime to continue the armed struggle against Israel," (22-01-03 §11h-k). During the 'peace process' the Palestinians established their own infrastructure which, along with roads, electricity and water networks, included the Palestinian police and security forces. Once again, the distinction between "terrorists" and Palestinians is subtly blurred.

However, the primary aim of this sentence (08-04-02 §15a-b) seems to be to temporally distance the current Israeli government from the advent of terrorism, implicitly rebutting accusations that its policies may be responsible for provoking terrorist attacks. Indeed, Sharon continues, the "main purpose" of the government he heads was "to achieve a cessation of violence and incitement," (§15d). There is no discussion of precisely what measures were taken to this end, but it is interesting to note that the ending of violence and incitement does not constitute peace itself, as we might expect, but rather "a vital and essential [pre]condition for the resumption of our efforts to achieve peace." In other words, it is not necessary to aspire to the "cessation of violence and incitement" as one would aspire to peace – something of a non-sequitur which might seem to betray the belligerent overtones of the measures taken so far.

\textsuperscript{28} According to the Palestinians, the terms of the accord were simply unacceptable.
Background Information Annexes

Annex B11: Once Upon A Time In Jenin

What really happened when Israeli forces went into Jenin? Just as the world is giving up hope of learning the truth, Justin Huggler and Phil Reeves have unearthed compelling evidence of an atrocity.

25 April 2002, The Independent, UK (http://www.independent.co.uk)

The thought was as unshakeable as the stench wafting from the ruins. Was this really about counterterrorism? Was it revenge? Or was it an episode – the nastiest so far – in a long war by Ariel Sharon, the staunch opponent of the Oslo accords, to establish Israel’s presence in the West Bank as permanent, and force the Palestinians into final submission? A neighbourhood had been reduced to a moonscape, pulverised under the tracks of bulldozers and tanks. A maze of cinder-block houses, home to about 800 Palestinian families, had disappeared. What was left – the piles of broken concrete and scattered belongings – reeked.

The rubble in Jenin reeked, literally, of rotting human corpses, buried underneath. But it also gave off the whiff of wrongdoing, of an army and a government that had lost its bearings. “This is horrifying beyond belief,” said the United Nations’ Middle East envoy, Terje Roed-Larsen, as he gazed at the scene. He called it a “blot that will forever live on the history of the state of Israel” – a remark for which he was to be vilified by Israelis. Even the painstakingly careful United States envoy, William Burns, was unusually outspoken as he trudged across the ruins. “It’s obvious that what happened in Jenin refugee camp has caused enormous suffering for thousands of innocent Palestinian civilians,” he said.

The Israeli army insists that its devastating invasion of the refugee camp in Jenin earlier this month was intended to root out the infrastructure of the Palestinian militias, particularly the authors of an increasingly vicious series of suicide attacks on Israelis. It now says the dead were mostly fighters. And, as always – although its daily behaviour in the occupied territories contradicts this claim – it insists that it did everything possible to protect civilians.

But The Independent has unearthed a different story. We have found that, while the Israeli operation clearly dealt a devastating blow to the militant organisations – in the short term, at least – nearly half of the Palestinian dead who have been identified so far were civilians, including women, children and the elderly. They died amid a ruthless and brutal Israeli operation, in which many individual atrocities occurred, and which Israel is seeking to hide by launching a massive propaganda drive.

The assault on Jenin refugee camp by Israel’s armed forces began early on 3 April. One week earlier, 30 miles to the west in the Israeli coastal town of Netanya, a Hamas suicide bomber had walked into a hotel and blown up a roomful of people as they were sitting down to celebrate the Passover feast. This horrific slaughter on one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar killed 28 people, young and old, making it the worst Palestinian attack of the intifada, a singularly evil moment even by the standards of the long conflict between the two peoples.

Ariel Sharon, Israel’s premier, and his ministers responded by activating a plan that had long lain on his desk. Operation Defensive Shield was to become the largest military offensive by Israel since the 1967 war. Jenin refugee camp was high on the list of targets. Home to about 13,000 people, it was the heartland of violent resistance to Israel’s 35-year occupation.

The graffiti-covered walls bellowed the slogans of Hamas, Fatah and Islamic Jihad; radical Islamists and secular nationalists worked side by side, burying differences in the name of the intifada. According to Israel, 23 suicide bombers had come out of the camp, which was a centre for bomb-making. Yet there were also many, many civilians. People such as Atiya Rumeleh, Afaf Desuqi and Ahmad Hamduni.

The army was expecting a swift victory. It had overwhelming superiority of arms – 1,000 infantrymen, mostly reservists, accompanied by Merkava tanks, armoured vehicles, bulldozers and Cobra helicopters, armed with missiles and heavy machine guns. Ranged against this force were about 200 Palestinians, with members of the militias – Hamas, al-Aqsa brigades and Islamic Jihad – fighting alongside Yasser Arafat’s security forces, mostly armed with Kalashnikovs and explosives.

The fight put up by the Palestinians shocked the soldiers. Eight days after entering, the Israeli army finally prevailed, but at a heavy price. Twenty-three soldiers were killed, 13 of them wiped out by an ambush, and an unknown number of Palestinians died. And a large residential area – 400m by 500m –
lay utterly devastated; scenes that the Israeli authorities knew at once would outrage the world as soon as they hit the TV screens. "We were not expecting them to fight so well," said one exhausted-looking Israeli reservist as he packed up to head home. Journalists and humanitarian workers were kept away for five more days while the Israeli army cleaned up the area, after the serious fighting ended on 10 April.

The Independent spent five days conducting long, detailed interviews of survivors among the ruins of the refugee camp, accompanied by Peter Bouckaert, a senior researcher for the Human Rights Watch organisation. Many of the interviews were conducted in buildings that were on the verge of collapse, in living rooms where one entire wall had been ripped off by the bulldozers and that were open to the street.

An alarming picture has emerged of what took place. So far, 50 of the dead have been identified. The Independent has a list of names. Palestinians were happy, even proud, to tell us which of the dead were fighters for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa brigades; which belonged to their security forces; and which were civilians. They identified nearly half as civilians.

Not all the civilians were cut down in crossfire. Some, according to eyewitness accounts, were deliberately targeted by Israeli forces. Sami Abu Sba'a told us how his 65-year-old father, Mohammed Abu Sba'a, was shot dead by Israeli soldiers after he warned the driver of an approaching bulldozer that his house was packed with families sheltering from the fighting. The bulldozer turned back, said Mr Abu Sba'a – but his father was almost immediately shot in the chest where he stood.

Israeli troops also shot dead a Palestinian nurse as she tried to help a wounded man. Hani Rumeleh, a 19-year-old civilian, had been shot as he tried to look out of his front door. Fadwa Jamma, a nurse staying with her sister in a house nearby, heard Hani's screaming and came to help. Her sister, Rufaida Damaj, who also ran to help, was wounded but survived. From her bed in Jenin hospital, she told us what happened.

"We were woken at 3.30 in the morning by a big explosion," she said. "I heard that one guy was wounded outside our house. So my sister and I went to do our duty and to help the guy and give him first aid. There were some guys from the resistance outside and we had to ask them before we moved anywhere. I told them that my sister was a nurse, I asked them to let us go to the wounded."

"Before I had finished talking to the guys the Israelis started shooting. I got a bullet in my leg and I fell down and broke my knee. My sister tried to come and help me. I told her, 'I'm wounded.' She said, 'I'm wounded too.' She had been shot in the side of her abdomen. Then they shot her again in the heart. I asked where she was wounded but she didn't answer, she made a terrible sound and tried to breathe three times."

Ms Jamma was wearing a white nurse's uniform clearly marked with a red crescent, the emblem of Palestinian medical workers, when the soldiers shot her. Ms Damaj said the soldiers could clearly see the women because they were standing under a bright light, and could hear their cries for help because they were "very near." As Ms Damaj shouted to the Palestinian fighters to get help, the Israeli soldiers fired again: a second bullet went up through her leg into her chest.

Eventually an ambulance was allowed through to rescue Ms Damaj. Her sister was already dead. It was to be one of the last times an ambulance was allowed near the wounded in Jenin camp until after the battle ended. Hani Rumeleh was taken to hospital, but he was dead. For his stepmother, however, the tragedy had only just begun; the next day, her 44-year-old husband Atiya, also a civilian, was killed.

As she told his story, her orphaned children clung to her side. "There was shooting all around the house. At about 5pm I went to check the building. I told my husband two bombs had come into the house. He went to check. After two minutes he called me to come, but he was having difficulty calling. I went with the children. He was still standing. In my life I've never seen the way he looked at me. He said, 'I'm wounded', and started bleeding from his mouth and nose. The children started crying, and he fell down. I asked him what happened but he couldn't talk."

"His eyes went to the children. He looked at them one by one. Then he looked at me. Then all his body was shaking. When I looked, there was a bullet in his head. I tried to call an ambulance, I was screaming for anybody to call an ambulance. One came but it was sent back by the Israelis."

It was Thursday 4 April, and the blockade against recovering the wounded had begun. With the fighting raging outside, Ms Rumeleh could not go out of the house to fetch help. Eventually she made a rope out of headscarves and lowered her seven-year-old son Mohammed out of the back window to go and seek help. The family, fearful of being shot if they ventured out, were trapped indoors with the body for a week.
A few doors away, we heard the story of Afaf Desuqi. Her sister, Aysha, told us how the 52-year-old woman was killed when the Israeli soldiers detonated a mine to blow the door of her house open. Ms Desuqi had heard the soldiers coming and gone to open the door. She showed us the remains of the mine, a large metal cylinder. The family screamed for an ambulance, but none was allowed through.

Ismehan Murad, another neighbour, told us the soldiers had been using her as a human shield when they blew the front door off the Desuqi house. Her nephew, Aysha, told us how the 52-year-old woman was killed when the Israeli soldiers detonated a mine to blow the door of her house open. Ms Desuqi had heard the soldiers coming and gone to open the door. She showed us the remains of the mine, a large metal cylinder. The family screamed for an ambulance, but none was allowed through.

Ismehan Murad, another neighbour, told us the soldiers had been using her as a human shield when they blew the front door off the Desuqi house. They came to the young woman's house first, and ordered her to go ahead of them, so that they would not be fired on.

Jamal Feyed died after being buried alive in the rubble. His uncle, Saeb Fayed, told us that 37-year-old Jamal was mentally and physically disabled, and could not walk. The family had already moved him from house to house to avoid the fighting. When Mr Fayed saw an Israeli bulldozer approaching the house where his nephew was, he ran to warn the driver. But the bulldozer ploughed into the wall of the house, which collapsed on Jamal.

Although they evacuated significant numbers of civilians, the Israelis made use of others as human shields. Rajeh Tawafshi, a 72-year-old man, told us that the soldiers tied his hands and made him walk in front of them as they searched house to house. Moments before, they had shot dead Ahmad Hamduni, a man in his eighties, before Mr Tawafshi's eyes. Mr Hamduni had sought shelter in Mr Tawafshi's house, but the Israeli soldiers had blown the door open. Part of the metal door landed next to the two men. Mr Hamduni was hunched with age, and Mr Tawafshi thinks the soldiers may have mistakenly thought he was wearing a suicide-bomb belt. They shot him on sight.

Even children were not immune from the Israeli onslaught. Faris Zeben, a 14-year-old boy, was shot dead by Israeli soldiers in cold blood. There was not even any fighting at the time. The curfew on Jenin had been lifted for a few hours and the boy went to buy groceries. This was on Thursday 11 April. Faris's eight-year-old brother, Abdel Rahman, was with him when he died. Nervously picking at his cardigan, his eyes on the ground, the child told us what happened.

"It was me and Faris and one other boy, and some women I didn't know. Faris told me to go home but I refused. We were going in front of the tank. Then we saw the front of the tank move towards us and I was scared. Faris told me to go home but I refused. The tank started shooting and Faris and the other boy ran away. I fell down. I saw Faris fall down, I thought he just fell. Then I saw blood on the ground so I went to Faris. Then two of the women came and put Faris in a car."

Abdel Rahman showed us where it happened. We paced it out: the tank had been about 80m away. He said there was only one burst of machine-gun fire. He imitated the sound it made. The soldiers in the tank gave no warning, he said. And after they shot Faris they did nothing.

Fifteen-year-old Mohammed Hawashin was shot dead as he tried to walk through the camp. Aliya Zubeidi, a 14-year-old boy, was shot dead by Israeli soldiers in cold blood. There was not even any fighting at the time. The curfew on Jenin had been lifted for a few hours and the boy went to buy groceries. This was on Thursday 11 April. Faris's eight-year-old brother, Abdel Rahman, was with him when he died. Nervously picking at his cardigan, his eyes on the ground, the child told us what happened.

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In a deserted road by the periphery of the refugee camp, we found the flattened remains of a wheelchair. It had been utterly crushed, ironed flat as if in a cartoon. In the middle of the debris lay a broken white flag. Durar Hassan told us how his friend, Kemal Zughayer, was shot dead as he tried to wheel himself up the road. The Israeli tanks must have driven over the body, because when Mr Hassan found it, one leg and both arms were missing, and the face, he said, had been ripped in two.

Mr Zughayer, who was 58, had been shot and wounded in the first Palestinian intifada. He could not walk, and had no work. Mr Hassan showed us the pitiful single room where his friend lived, the only furnishing a filthy mattress on the floor. Mr Zughayer used to wheel himself to the petrol station where Mr Hassan worked every day, because he was lonely. Mr Hassan did his washing; it was he who put the white flag on Mr Zughayer's wheelchair.

"After 4pm I pushed him up to the street as usual," said Mr Hassan. "Then I heard the tanks coming, there were four or five. I heard shooting, and I thought they were just firing warning shots to tell him to move out of the middle of the road." It was not until the next morning that Mr Hassan went to check what had happened. He found the flattened wheelchair in the road, and Mr Zughayer's mangled body some distance away, in the grass.

The Independent has more such accounts. There simply is not enough space to print them all. Mr Bouckaert, the Human Rights Watch researcher, who is preparing a report, said the sheer number of these accounts was convincing.
"We've carried out extensive interviews in the camp, and the testimonies of dozens of witnesses are entirely consistent with each other about the extent and the types of abuses that were carried out in the camp," said Mr Bouckaert, who has investigated human-rights abuses in a dozen war zones, including Rwanda, Kosovo and Chechnya. "Over and over again witnesses have been giving similar accounts of atrocities that were committed. Many of the people who were killed were young children or elderly people. Even in the cases of young men; in Palestinian society, relatives are quite forthcoming when young men are fighters. They take pride that their young men are so-called 'martyrs'. When Palestinian families claim their killed relatives were civilians we give a high degree of credibility to that."

The events at Jenin - which have passed almost unquestioned inside Israel - have created a crisis in Israel's relations with the outside world. Questions are now being asked increasingly in Europe over whether Ariel Sharon is, ultimately, fighting a "war on terror", or whether he is trying to inflict a defeat that will end all chance of a Palestinian state. These suspicions grew still stronger this week as pictures emerged of the damage inflicted by the Israeli army elsewhere in the West Bank during the operation: the soldiers deliberately trashed institutions of Palestinian statehood, such as the ministries of health and education.

To counter the international backlash, the Israeli government has launched an enormous public-relations drive to justify the operation in Jenin. Their efforts have been greatly helped by the Palestinian leadership, who instantly, and without proof, declared that a massacre had occurred in which as many as 500 died. Palestinian human-rights groups made matters worse by churning out wild, and clearly untrue, stories.

No holds are barred in the Israeli PR counterattack. The army - realising that many journalists will not bother, or are unable, to go to Jenin - has even made an Orwellian attempt to alter the hard, physical facts on the ground. It has announced that the published reports of the devastated area are exaggerated, declaring it to be a mere 100m square - about one-twentieth of its true area.

One spokesman, Major Rafi Lederman, a brigade chief of staff, told a press conference on Saturday that the Israeli armed forces did not fire missiles from its Cobra helicopters - a claim dismissed by a Western military expert who has toured the wrecked camp with one word: "Bollocks." There were, said the major, "almost no innocent civilians" - also untrue.

The chief aim of the PR campaign has been to redirect the blame elsewhere. Israeli officials accuse UNWRA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, for allowing a "terrorist infrastructure" to evolve in a camp under its administration without raising the alarm. UNWRA officials wearily point out that it does not administer the camp; it provides services, mainly schools and clinics.

The Israeli army has lashed out at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Palestinian Red Crescent, whose ambulances were barred from entering the camp for six days, from 9 to 15 April. It has accused them of refusing to allow the army to search their vehicles, and of smuggling out Palestinians posing as wounded. The ICRC has dismissed all these claims as nonsense, describing the ban - which violates the Geneva Convention - as "unacceptable."

The Israeli army says it bulldozed buildings after the battle ended, partly because they were heavily booby trapped but also because there was a danger of them collapsing on to its soldiers or Palestinian civilians. But after the army bulldozers withdrew, The Independent found many families, including children, living in badly damaged homes that were in severe danger of collapse.

The thrust of Israel's PR drive is to argue that the Palestinians blew up the neighbourhood, compelling the army to knock it down. It is true that there were a significant number of Palestinian booby traps around the camp, but how many is far from clear. Booby traps are a device typically used by a retreating force against an advancing one. Here, the Palestinian fighters had nowhere to go.

What is beyond dispute is that the misery of Jenin is not over. There are Palestinians still searching for missing people, although it is not clear whether they are in Israeli detention, buried deep under the rubble, or in graves elsewhere.

Suspicions abound among the Palestinians that bodies have been removed by the Israeli army. They cite the Israeli army's differing statements about the death toll during the Jenin operation - first it said it thought that there were around 100 Palestinian dead; then it said hundreds of dead and wounded; and, finally, only dozens. More disturbingly, Israeli military sources originally said there was a plan to move bodies out of the camp and bury them in a "special cemetery." They now say that the plan was shelved after human-rights activists challenged it successfully at the Israeli supreme court.
Each day, as we interviewed the survivors, there were several explosions as people trod on unexploded bombs and rockets that littered the ruined camp. One hour after Fadl Musharqa, 42, had spoken with us about the death of his brother, he was rushed to the hospital, his foot shattered after he stepped on an explosive.

A man came up to us in the hospital holding out something in the palm of his hand. They were little, brown, fleshy stumps: the freshly severed toes of his 10-year-old son, who had stepped on some explosives. The boy lost both legs and an arm. The explosives that were left behind were both the Palestinians' crude pipe bombs and the Israelis' state-of-the-art explosives: the bombs and mines with which they blew open doors, the helicopter rockets they fired into civilian homes.

These are the facts that the Israeli government does not want the world to know. To them should be added the preliminary conclusion of Amnesty International, which has found evidence of severe abuses of human rights - including extra-judicial executions - and has called for a war crimes inquiry.

At the time of writing, Israel has withdrawn its co-operation from a fact-finding mission dispatched by the UN Security Council to find out what happened in Jenin. This is, given what we now know about the crimes committed there, hardly surprising.
### Annex B12: Fears For The Demographic Balance At The Zionist Conference

By Amiram Barkat and Jonathan Lis,

Ha'aretz, Israel.

November 11, 2003, p. 11


The demographic balance between Jews and Arabs was one of the main topics discussed at the Israeli Zionist Conference, held yesterday in Jerusalem. Various speakers agreed that if current indicators continue, it is the most serious threat to the future of Israel as a democratic, Jewish state.

The talk was organized by the Zionist Council, the executive wing of the World Zionist Organization in Israel. For the talk, the council issued a position paper containing recommendations on how to deal with the anticipated proportional increase of Arab citizens. The council’s Strategic Forum prepared a position paper based on the expectations of Prof. Arnon Sofer and Dr. Yitzhak Ravid, who predict that the Arabs will comprise 22% of the state’s citizens by 2020, compared to the current 16%.

Prof. Arik Carmon, head of the Israeli Institute for Democracy, said during the discussion that the recommendation to limit the ability of Palestinians to obtain Israeli citizenship through marriage contravenes democratic principles.
Annex BI3: Assassinating Sheikh Yassin

Sharon Edges Closer to World War

March 22, 2004, by Gilad Atzmon*

Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was murdered at daybreak on Monday. Israel Air Force helicopters fired missiles at the car carrying the wheelchair-bound head of the Islamic group as he left a mosque near his house in Gaza City. It also appears Ariel Sharon was in direct command of the assassination operation, not entirely surprising considering his bloody history.

For those who fail to realise, today's barbaric Israeli act is an open call for a world war. It is the final wake up call for every Muslim around the world. It is violent proof that Israel isn't only against the Palestinians but rather against Islam. Israel killed a prime spiritual leader on his way out of the mosque. I have no doubt that this Israeli act won't be forgiven. I also have no doubt that many Israelis will pay with their life for Sharon's act. Moreover I am sure that sooner rather than later many innocent non-Israelis around the world will die just for being near by an Israeli embassy, Israeli consulate, a synagogue or even an American bank. This is the reality Sharon favours the most.

This is exactly what Israel wants: to turn the entire world into a victim of terror. This might help us to realise the main difference between the Israeli left and right. While both believe in the right of the Jews to live in Zion at the expense of the Palestinian people, the Israeli right wing rely on maintaining a bloody struggle, oppressing the Palestinian people (in particular) and humiliating Arabs (in general). While the Israeli left would attempt to come up with some unrealistic righteous suggestions to appease the Palestinian people and the world community (Oslo accord for instance), the right wing Israelis will suggest that the only method to guarantee Israeli security is to maintain the conflict with the Palestinian people and to let it escalate into an international battle.

On the surface it seems bizarre considering Sharon was just recently pretending to suggest a plan of Israeli disengagement from the Gaza strip. Today he gave us a real chance to peep into his mind. The 'disengagement plan' was just another of Sharon's tricks. In fact, Sharon and the Israeli right wing need the Palestinians, they need them oppressed and humiliated, they need their terror. Israeli right wing hegemony is fed by terror. And now there is a new need emerging. Israel is facing a demographic disaster. Within five years there will be a Palestinian majority in the territories controlled by Israel (between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River). This is literally the end of the Zionist dream. Eventually Israel will have to give away its Jewish identity. While the Israeli left remains confused about this reality, the Israeli right wing is fully prepared. For years Israeli warmongers have openly discussed 'transfer': the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people. Considering the current world affairs and general opposition to Israel it is hard to believe that large scale ethnic cleansing would go ahead unless some colossal catastrophe was in place. Sharon is preparing the ground for such a disaster. He needs a war, a big one, something that will allow him to go wild, to go out of control, to initiate a campaign in which Israeli soldiers will become murderous squads ready massacre against the Palestinian civilians. Sharon wants to re-launch the 1948 Nakba. Sharon fully understands that this is what the Israeli public want. He is very good at reading their innermost desires.

The killing of Sheikh Yassin pushed the violence far beyond any recognisable measure. It is pushing the Palestinian masses towards martyrdom. According to the Israeli military doctrine, Israel would never be defeated by terror. But at the same time every Israeli realises that the Zionist adventure will be categorically defeated by a demographic crisis. The assassination of Sheikh Yassin is there to push the Palestinians towards acts that will allow the Israelis to impose the most murderous measures against the Palestinian civilians. Mr Sharon, a world acclaimed war criminal and serial murderer proved again that at least when blood games are concerned, he is one step ahead of the game.

Gilad Atzmon was born in Israel and served in the Israeli military. He is the author of the new novel A Guide to the Perplexed. Atzmon is also an accomplished jazz saxophonist in Europe. His new CD, Exile, was just named the year's best jazz CD by the BBC.
Ariel Sharon
Prime Minister of Israel
Minister of Immigrant Absorption (Likud)

This page contains Sharon's official biography from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs interspersed with annotations by The Electronic Intifada (in grey boxes), a note on Sharon's record and international law, and offers both related articles and recommended reading. For a much larger resource on Ariel Sharon, see http://indictsharon.net/.

SHARON'S OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHY FROM THE ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

With annotations from The Electronic Intifada in grey boxes.

Ariel Sharon was born in Kfar Malal in 1928.

He joined the Haganah at the age of 14. During the 1948 War of Independence, he commanded an infantry company in the Alexandroni Brigade.

In 1953, he founded and led the "101" special commando unit which carried out retaliatory operations.

[1] The Electronic Intifada notes: As commander of the notorious Unit 101, Sharon led attacks on Palestinian villages in which women and children were killed.

The massacre in the West Bank village of Qibya, on October 14, 1953, was perhaps the most notorious. His troops blew up 45 houses and 69 Palestinian civilians -- about half of them women and children -- were killed.

The U.S. Department of State issued a statement on 18 October 1953, expressing its "deepest sympathy for the families of those who lost their lives" in the Qibya attack as well as the conviction that those responsible "should be brought to account and that effective measures should be taken to prevent such incidents in the future." (Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 26, 1953, p. 552).

Sharon was appointed commander of a paratroop brigade in 1956 and fought in the Sinai Campaign.

[2] The Electronic Intifada notes: On 16 August, 1995, Ohad Gozani in Tel Aviv, writing for The Daily Telegraph, in an article entitled, "Israelis Admit Massacre", reported:

"Reports of how Israeli paratroopers killed about 270 Egyptian prisoners of war 40 years ago are straining relations between the two countries. Egypt has demanded an investigation into the alleged atrocities, which date back to Israel's involvement in the 1956 Anglo-French campaign to take the Suez Canal."

The killings were revealed in a paper on the Sinai campaign commissioned by the army's military history division. They were described in graphic detail in newspaper and television interviews. In all, 273 Egyptians, some of them Sudanese civilian road workers, were killed in three separate incidents, according to the accounts.

Arye Biro, a retired army general, admitted shooting the Sudanese at a quarry two days into the campaign at strategic Miltia Pass in central Sinai. Mr. Biro, then a company leader in the 890 Paratroop battalion, said the 49 terrified prisoners were taken into a quarry and shot dead. He said: "We couldn't take care of anything else before we got done with them. One escapes with bullets in the chest and in the leg, but came back on all fours because he was thirsty. He soon joined his [dead] comrades."

Mr. Biro said he and his troops later killed 56 Egyptian soldiers and irregulars as they were advancing in a truck to the oil port of Ras-al-Sudr on the Gulf of Suez.

"Six survived the initial bursts of gunfire," he said. "They later went to sleep with the rest. Blood was
coming out of every hole in the flatbed truck and in huge quantities."

A witness told the newspaper: "When the rear flap was lowered, all the bodies poured out in one mass. I couldn't bear the thought that we shot people without a fight." Another 168 Egyptian soldiers were cut down as the paratroopers headed South.

Mr. Biro's commanding officers were Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eytan...

In 1957 he attended the Camberley Staff College in Great Britain.

During 1958-62, Sharon served as an infantry brigade commander and then as Infantry School Commander.

He was appointed Head of the IDF Northern Command in 1964 and Head of the Army Training Department in 1966.

He participated in the 1967 Six Day War as commander of an armored division.

In 1969 he was appointed Head of the IDF Southern Command. [3]


"In August 1971 alone, troops under Mr Sharon's command destroyed some 7,000 homes in the Gaza Strip, uprooting 12,000 people [Palestinian refugees] for the second time in their lives. Hundreds of young Palestinian men were arrested and deported to Jordan and Lebanon. Six hundred relatives of suspected guerrillas were exiled to Sinai. In the second half of 1971, 104 guerrillas were assassinated."

Sharon resigned from the army in June 1972, but was recalled to active military service in the 1973 Yom Kippur War to command an armored division and lead the crossing of the Suez Canal.

Ariel Sharon was elected to the Knesset in December 1973, but resigned a year later, serving as security adviser to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1975).

He was again elected to the Knesset in 1977 on the Shlomzion ticket.

Appointed Minister of Agriculture in the first government created by Menachem Begin, he pursued agricultural co-operation with Egypt.

In 1981, Sharon was appointed Defense Minister, serving in this post during the Lebanon War, which brought about the destruction of the PLO terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon. [4]

[4] The Electronic Intifada notes: As minister of defence in 1982, Sharon orchestrated Israel's invasion of Lebanon, a military operation that killed tens of thousands of civilians as Israeli forces sought to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organisation's infrastructure in the region. According to the statistics published in the Third World Quarterly (Volume 6, Issue 4, October 1984, pp. 934-949), over 29,500 Palestinians and Lebanese were either killed or wounded from 4 July 1982 through to 15 August 1982. 40 percent were children. Israel's stated motive for its "Operation Peace for Galilee" invasion of Lebanon was to bring peace to frontline Israeli communities in Northern Galilee. In fact, the disastrous events of 1982-85 were the very catalysts of the Hizbullah Shi'a resistance movement in South Lebanon. Previous to Israel's military interventionism in the early 1980s, the Shi'a of South Lebanon had not professed any aggression or hostility towards the Israelis.

Ariel Sharon is responsible for the massacre of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, on the southern outskirts of Beirut. The slaughter in the two contiguous camps at Sabra and Shatila took place from the evening of September 16, 1982 until the morning of September 18, 1982, in an area under the control of the Israeli armed forces. The perpetrators were members of the Phalange (Kata'eb, in Arabic) militia, the Lebanese force that was armed by and closely allied with Israel since the onset of Lebanon's civil war in 1975. Prior to the massacre, Sharon had meetings with the Phalange forces.

For over 60 hours -- aided by an Israeli siege around the camps and guided by the light of Israeli flares -- forces belonging to the Israeli-allied Phalangist militia went through the camps, killing Palestinian and Lebanese civilians. Some were lined up against walls and mown down by machine-gun fire. Others were left in heaps on the floors of their homes or on the streets of the camps. Children were shot dead, women
and girls were raped and mutilated and men were disembowelled prior to being executed.

The precise number of victims of the massacre may never be exactly determined. The International Committee of the Red Cross counted 1,500 at the time of the massacre but by September 22 this count had risen to 2,400. On the following day 350 bodies were uncovered so that the total then ascertained had reached 2,750. Israeli military intelligence estimated that 700 to 800 were killed.

UN Resolution UNSC 521 (1982) of 19 September 1982 offered unequivocal condemnation of the Sabra and Shatila Massacres, although it avoided naming any perpetrators at this early stage. The question of direct Israeli involvement in the massacres is one that has never been fully resolved. However -- despite denials -- it is not credible that Israeli troops surrounding the two camps were unaware of what was going on inside:

"From 5-5.30 am low level flights of Israeli planes over Sabra and Shatila took place, after which shelling promptly commenced."
(Source: The New York Times, 16 September 1982, quoting Dr. Witsoe, Gaza hospital.)

"The Israelis established observation posts on top of multi-storey buildings in the north-west quadrant of the Kuwaiti Embassy. From these posts, the naked eye has a clear view of several sections of the camps, including those parts of Shatila where piles of bodies were found."

"Throughout the night flares lit up the sky. They were fired at the rate of two a minute, as reported by an Israeli soldier from a mortar unit."
(Source: The Jerusalem Post, 21 September 1982.)

A Jewish-American registered nurse, Ms. Ellen Siegel, was working in Gaza hospital in the Sabra refugee camp in Beirut, where she and a medical team treated the first victims of the massacre. She and other health workers were lined up against a bullet-riddled wall by Phalangists who were about to execute them, with rifles aimed, when an Israeli officer came running to stop this possible execution. She told The Electronic Intifada that:

"I spoke with Zeev Schiff [a military affairs correspondent for Ha'aretz newspaper] in person about this incident. The wall was located just outside the camp but obviously if the commander could see this, he could see other things. We were taken to the area of the FCP [Forward Command Post]. From there one could look down onto the camps. My understanding is that the IDF had sophisticated visual equipment. There was a BBC film made in '92 ("See No Evil"). In this film they interviewed Israeli soldiers who were at the camps. They clearly allude to knowing what was going on."

An official Israeli commission of inquiry -- chaired by Yitzhak Kahan, president of Israel's Supreme Court -- investigated the massacre, and in February 1983 publicly released its findings. The Kahan Commission found that Ariel Sharon, among other Israelis, had responsibility for the massacre, although it carefully side-stepped any accusation of direct involvement in the massacre and chose not to attempt to reconcile much of the contradictory testimony. The commission's report stated in pertinent part:

"It is our view that responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defence for having disregarded the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population of the refugee camps, and having failed to take this danger into account when he decided to have the Phalangists enter the camps. In addition, responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defence for not ordering appropriate measures for preventing or reducing the danger of massacre as a condition for the Phalangists' entry into the camps. These blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defence Minister was charged."

The Commission also concluded:

"[I]n his meeting with the Phalangist commanders, the Defence Minister made no attempt to point out to them the gravity of the danger that their men would commit acts of slaughter... Had it become clear to the Defence Minister that no real supervision could be exercised over the Phalangist force that entered the camps with the IDF's assent, his duty would have been to prevent their entry. The usefulness of the Phalangists' entry into the camps was wholly disproportionate to the damage their entry could cause if it were uncontrolled."

The Commission further noted:
"We shall remark here that it is ostensibly puzzling that the Defence Minister did not in any way make the Prime Minister [Menachem Begin] privy to the decision on having the Phalangists enter the camps."

In the realm of international relations, he was instrumental in renewing diplomatic relations with the African nations which had broken off ties with Israel during the Yom Kippur War. In November 1981, he brought about the first strategic co-operation agreement with the U.S. and widened defense ties between Israel and many nations. He also helped bring thousands of Jews from Ethiopia through Sudan.

Between 1984 and 1990 Sharon served as Minister of Trade and Industry. In this capacity, he concluded the Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. in 1985.

In 1984-1990, he served as Minister of Construction and Housing. Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the waves of immigration from Russia, he initiated and carried out a program to absorb the immigrants throughout the country, including the construction of 144,000 apartments. [5]

From 1992 to 1996, he served as a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

In 1996, Ariel Sharon was appointed Minister of National Infrastructure and was involved in fostering joint ventures with Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians. [6]

He also served as Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Bedouin advancement.

In 1998 Ariel Sharon was appointed Foreign Minister and charged with conducting negotiations towards a final agreement with the Palestinian Authority. He accompanied Prime Minister Netanyahu to the Wye River Plantation as chief negotiator. While serving as Foreign Minister, Sharon met with U.S., European, Palestinian and Arab leaders to advance the peace process. [7]

"Everybody has to move, run and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because everything we take now will stay ours... Everything we don't grab will go to them."

He worked mostly to create and advance projects such as the Flagship Water Project funded by the international community to find a long-term solution to the region’s water crisis and a basis to peaceful relations between Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians and other Middle Eastern countries.

Following the election of Ehud Barak as Prime Minister in May 1999, Ariel Sharon was called upon to become interim Likud party leader, and in September 1999 was elected Chairman of the Likud.

On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister. [8] He presented his government to the Knesset on March 7, 2001, retaining also the Immigrant Absorption portfolio.

[5] The Electronic Intifada notes: Sharon was a key player in the settlement explosion throughout the 1977-1992 Likud-era of Israeli government. This period was characterised by more land confiscation and more settlement activity than had ever been seen before in Israeli history. The number of settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories increased by over two thousand percent during this period, to approximately 110,000 people.

[6] The Electronic Intifada notes: Yet again, Sharon was in charge of settlement construction. In the post-Oslo period, Israel established 30 new settlements and thus nearly doubled the settler population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 109,000 in 1993 to nearly 200,000 in 1999 (figures exclude new settlements in the greater Jerusalem metropolitan area). Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace.

[7] The Electronic Intifada notes: Sharon’s concept of "advancing the peace process" remained somewhat flawed during this period. According to an Agence France Presse report of 15 November 1998, while addressing a meeting of militants from the extreme right-wing Tsomet Party, Foreign Minister Sharon stated:

"Everything we don't grab will go to them."

[8] The Electronic Intifada notes: Only four months before his election, the ever-confrontational Sharon visited al-Haram ash-Sharif on 28 September 2000 and sparked off the Second Palestinian Intifada that saw 393 Palestinians killed up to March 8th, according to the Palestine Red Crescent Society. On 19 October 2000, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, meeting in an emergency session, adopted a resolution titled, "Grave and massive violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people by Israel," which condemned:
"the provocative visit to Al-Haram al-Sharif on 28 September 2000 by Ariel Sharon, the Likud party leader, which triggered the tragic events that followed in occupied East Jerusalem and the other occupied Palestinian territories, resulting in a high number of deaths and injuries among Palestinian civilians."

Sharon's visit to the third holiest site in Islam, guarded by -- according to the most conservative reports - - 1,000 armed Israeli soldiers, was overtly designed to demonstrate Israel's "sovereignty" over Jerusalem, especially over the Al-Haram Ash-Sharif (which most Israelis call "the Temple Mount") and provoke an angry response. It was also intended to impress the right wing of the Israeli public, who later castigated Labour Prime Minister Barak for his "restraint" in the face of the Palestinian uprising by electing Sharon, who sparked it off.

Sharon holds a degree in Law and Middle Eastern Studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1962). He has published a book and numerous articles in local and foreign newspapers.

He is widowed and has two sons.

[ends]

A NOTE ON SHARON'S RECORD AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:

War crimes and crimes against humanity are particularly heinous crimes. Responding to the atrocities committed in the course of the second World War, the international community set itself an objective to combat such crimes. This ambition has found expression in a number of international treaties, notably under the aegis of the United Nations.

The 1998 request for the extradition of Augusto Pinochet and the legal battles that ensued demonstrated a heightened interest in bringing persons involved in grave crimes to justice. The Pinochet case reaffirmed the principle that human rights atrocities are subject to "universal jurisdiction" and can be prosecuted anywhere in the world. Two rulings by the House of Lords found that Pinochet was not immune from prosecution even though he was head of state at the time the crimes were committed.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's personal history is intertwined with war crimes and crimes against humanity. Cases such as those of Yugoslavian former president Slobodan Milosevic, the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, and others, provide compelling precedents for ending the impunity that Ariel Sharon has thus far enjoyed. Sharon should be indicted for the crimes in which he bears responsibility as the first step in a process of accountability that will bring justice to his victims and their families.

Judicial authorities in Israel have never shouldered their legal responsibilities and thoroughly investigated and prosecuted Ariel Sharon for the massacres and other crimes he committed. The failure of the Israeli legal system to act obligates the international community -- in particular the European Union since all its member states are High Contracting Parties of the Geneva Conventions -- to hold Ariel Sharon accountable, regardless of whether he is a private citizen of Israel, a cabinet minister, or the head of a government.

Article 146 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War states that each High Contracting Party "shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed" grave breaches of the Convention, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case."

Article 147 of the Convention states that the grave breaches noted in Article 146 include wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Annex B15: We're Air Force Pilots, Not Mafia.

We don't take revenge

Israel's F-16 and Black Hawk refuseniks say why they could not obey illegal orders and kill innocent Palestinians

Chris McGreal in Tel Aviv


For two months, a rebel group of Israeli Black Hawk helicopter and F-16 fighter pilots has been denounced as traitors for saying they will no longer bomb Palestinian cities.

Until now they have maintained a resolute silence on their motives, preferring to limit their criticism of Ariel Sharon's war to a letter signed by 27 reserve and active duty pilots refusing to carry out what they described as illegal orders, and denouncing the occupation as eating at the moral fabric of Israel.

Now, having been thrown out of the air force, they are talking publicly about what brought members of the most revered branch of the Israeli military to make an unprecedented challenge to the handling of the conflict with the Palestinians.

"I served more than seven years as a pilot," said Captain Alon R, who, like all the younger pilots, hopes to return to combat flying and so declines to use his full name in order to retain his security clearance. "In the beginning, we were pilots who believed our country would do all it could to achieve peace. We believed in the purity of our arms and that we did all we could to prevent unnecessary loss of life."

"Somewhere in the last few years it became harder and harder to believe that is the case."

The line was crossed for most of the pilots with the dropping of the one-tonne bomb last year on the home of a Hamas military leader, Salah Shehade, killing him and 14 of his family, mostly children.

One captain described the bombing as deliberate killing, murder even. Another called it state terrorism, though some colleagues swiftly stomped on that interpretation. But they all agreed that the attack sowed the doubts that resulted a year later in the letter that sent shockwaves through the Israeli military.

"The Shehade incident was a red light for us, a final warning," said Capt Alon R. "With Shehade I began to re-evaluate my beliefs. We killed 14 innocent people, nine of them children. After my commander gave an interview in which he said he sleeps well at night and his men can do the same. Well, I can't. We refused to see it as an innocent mistake."

Capt Assaf L, who served as a pilot for 15 years until sacked for signing the letter, had similar doubts.

"You don't have to be a genius to know that the destruction from a one-tonne bomb is massive, so someone up there made a decision to drop it knowing it would destroy buildings," he said. "Someone took the decision to kill innocent people. This is us being terrorists. This is vengeance."

Lieutenant-Colonel Avner Raanan is among the most respected pilots to have signed the letter. He served for 27 years and was awarded one of Israel's highest military decorations in 1994. "If you look at the past three years, you see that, if we had a suicide bombing, the Israeli air force made a big operation in which civilians were killed, and that looks to innocent eyes like revenge," he said.

"You hear it in the streets of Israel; people want revenge. But we should not behave like that. We are not a mafia."

More than 30 pilots have now endorsed the letter refusing to fly bombing raids on Palestinian cities, although four retracted, one an El Al pilot threatened with dismissal, and another a reserve pilot who lost his civilian job.

At its core, the letter questions the legality of the "targeted assassinations" that have claimed the lives of more civilian bystanders than their Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade targets. In October, 14 civilians were killed when the air force fired missiles at a car in Gaza's Nuseirat refugee camp.

"Is it legitimate to take F-15's and helicopters designed to destroy enemy tanks, and use them against cars and houses in one of the most heavily populated places in the world?" Capt Alon R asked.
"Because of the terrorism, we have become blinded by the blood on our own faces. We cannot see that on the other side, beside the terrorists, is a whole nation of innocent people. It's important that we recognise that, and that, as military people, we say that."

The pilots' stand shook Israeli society. There is no shortage of critics of the prime minister's militarist tactics but those of the peace camp are widely viewed as pacifists and marginal. Doubts raised by the army chief of staff, Moshe Ya'alon, and four former heads of the Shin Bet intelligence service alarmed many Israelis, but the criticisms were focused solely on whether Mr Sharon's tactics were fuelling terrorism.

The pilots straddle both issues, raising moral and legal questions on the conduct of the war and challenging the government's claim its strategy is about defending Israel.

"Our government's policy is to maintain fear in the public," Capt Assaf L said. "We're not weak. It's not 1967 or 1973, with the Syrian army on the border waiting to attack us. This is maintaining a war to maintain the occupation."

"We've the strongest nation in the Middle East. The terrorists are bastards, but we must fight to not become terrorists ourselves."

Many who poured scorn on the pilots accused them of wading into politics for going beyond questions about the legality of their orders and challenging the occupation. "We are not pacifists. We don't think we should sit back and let suicide bombers attack us. But all this is a direct result of our being in the [occupied] territories."

"Our fight to keep the settlements and suppress the Palestinian people is killing us. It is killing our right to live safely in the country of Israel. A very small group of radical Israelis is leading the sane majority to catastrophe."

Col Raanan scoffs at the accusation that the pilots have denigrated their uniforms by wading into political issues.

"The air force commander spoke in favour of the [Jewish] settlements while sitting in uniform next to Sharon at a Likud party convention," he said. "That is political. This country has a defence minister who, as army chief of staff, was the most political ever. It is hypocritical to say lower ranking officers cannot express an opinion. What they mean is, we can be political so long as we agree with the government. Well that's not democracy."

The pilots say they have received more than 500 letters of support, including one from a Holocaust survivor, and numerous calls from fellow pilots. Several leftwing former cabinet ministers praised the pilots' stand, saying it proved the armed forces were moral.

Concern in the air force prompted its commander, Major-General Dan Halutz, to meet groups of pilots to tell them that "targeted assassinations" were not a war crime.

"Halutz said we were traitors," Capt Assaf L said. "In our eyes, what we did is a very Zionist act. We did it to save Israel."

Colin Powell said yesterday he had the right to talk to anyone with ideas for peace, dismissing Israeli criticism that it would be a mistake for him to meet the authors of the unofficial Geneva accord. "I am the American secretary of state. I have an obligation to listen to individuals who have interesting ideas," he said.

Although he did not say he would meet the accord's Israeli and Palestinian authors, US officials have said such a gathering could take place this week in Washington.
Annex BI6: Media Activism. HonestReporting

Become A Media Patroller


Many HonestReporting members have expressed the desire for a greater level of involvement than the twice-weekly communiqués. Additionally, there are many foreign members who need a more localized approach to fighting media bias.

This is the idea behind our brand-new Media Patrol Program. Here’s how it works:

1) From a list of hundreds of newspapers worldwide, choose one newspaper to monitor on a daily basis. You can also get involved in organizing a group of local activists. Contact details for hundreds of U.S. newspapers is online at: http://search.yahoo.com/bin/search?p=Newspapers+U.S.+list

2) To be registered as an official HonestReporting Media Patroller, send your name and the name of the media outlet you are monitoring to action@honestreporting.com

By working together, we can make the changes that are very necessary, and ensure that Israel gets the fair media coverage that every nation deserves. Welcome to the team!

The Staff of HonestReporting

* * *

THE 10 PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA PATROLLING

1. Put yourself in the shoes of a reporter or editor. They are more receptive to constructive criticism than they are to pressure. Don’t just demand that the media be pro-Israel -- but rather, factual, impartial, and honest. Always ask yourself: What would make this report better? Show the news agency not only what’s wrong with their story, but how there is a more balanced alternative. One way to do this is by showing how their competitors reported the story more fairly. This is the difference between complaining and constructive criticism.

2. Mobilize a local monitoring group to increase your impact. Build an email list and alert the entire group when bias is spotted. This is the principle behind HonestReporting: One person acting alone may not be able to make a difference, but hundreds or thousands working together can. Be in touch with others from your city, for coordinated patrol activities.

3. Clearly document any bias you see. Keep a log book and note the specific article (with URL), or the exact date and time of a broadcast. What exactly did the reporter say? Then pinpoint why it is a problem, by citing relevant facts, etc. Also note examples of excellent reporting.

4. You will never be able to convince the media to do things 100% your way. Refrain from nitpicking little points. Instead, pick one point that is the key to many others. For example, demanding that suicide bombers be labeled “terrorists” frames the conflict in completely different terms. Another example is contrasting Palestinian corruption and incitement with Israeli democracy. Choose your main battle and hammer away until your point is heard.

5. Conduct an extensive study of your local media to determine if there is an objective pattern of bias. Analyze every article for one month, and systematically tabulate the frequency of photos for each side, the frequency of spokespeople quoted, etc. Individual examples intuitively indicate anti-Israel bias, but the typical response from media agencies is: “Our reporters are under extreme deadline pressure, and occasionally there will be an error in judgment. But it all balances out -- sometimes skewed toward one side, and sometimes toward the other. But overall, our reporting is 100 percent fair and impartial.” This month-long content analyses will lay rest to that claim.

6. Arrange a meeting with local writers and editors to express your concerns, to better explain the Israeli position, and to hold the newspaper accountable for what it publishes. Formulate a name for your group - e.g. the Gotham City Concerned Citizens Coalition; this demonstrates broad-based community support for your position. At the meeting, make your case persuasively and with as much documentation as possible; present your month-long content analyses. Instead of attacking the newspaper’s character, focus on their work and appeal to their professional integrity. A newspaper’s entire ability to stay in
business is based on their perception of being accurate and impartial. If you have evidence to the contrary, they will listen.

7. Meeting: Phase Two. At the end of the meeting, make them a deal: If they will agree to regular meetings, you will promise to restrain your rapid-response team and to restrict your complaints to only major errors. This takes tremendous pressure off the media, who abhors being flooded with email complaints and all the bad publicity. This also creates an ongoing dialogue, whereby local editors will eventually turn to HonestReporting activists as a resource on the Israeli perspective. You can then encourage local editors and reporters to visit Israel to see the complex issues first hand. Offer to help plan their itinerary and meet former local citizens who now live in Israel. And you can invite local reporters to meet with visiting Israeli academics or decision-makers.

8. If the media agency refuses to meet with you, or if they continue to display an anti-Israel bias, then consider a public protest. This may take the form of a rally in front of their building (this must be coordinated with the local police department), or it may involve a campaign to cancel subscriptions (even for one day). Beware, however, that these methods can have a negative backlash, as it strikes some people as an attempt to limit freedom of the press. These tactics must be used wisely, and only when other methods have failed to produce results.

9. Don't limit yourself to print and broadcast media. Make your voice heard as well in Internet chat rooms, bulletin boards, and radio call-in shows. Hand out informational flyers at your local community center, school, and house of worship.

10. Expand your horizons. Get your news from a variety of sources in order to get a good sense of how different media groups promote different views. Also visit pro-Palestinian websites (e.g. ElectronicIntifada.net) to see how the other side is operating, and the arguments they use. You can also use this information to encourage your local media to report examples of incitement in the Arab world.

HOW TO ANALYZE THE MEDIA

You click on MSNBC.com and notice a hot new development in the Mideast. How should you go about analyzing the news report? There are certain questions you can keep in mind that may reveal underlying bias. For example:

Are acts of violence directed against civilians termed "terror"? If not, does this conform to the media's policy regarding other areas of conflict around the world?

In reporting violence, is the sequence of events clear, as to which side was attacked and which side retaliated?

Is sympathy being elicited for one side of the conflict, through the portrayal of its victims in humanizing terms (e.g. including personal information like the victim's name, age, familial relationship, or profession)?

Though both sides blame each other for perpetrating the violence, is one side portrayed as the more violent aggressor?

Are the perpetrators of violence described in passive or active terms?

Does the media attempt to give justification for an act of violence -- e.g. for reasons of poverty, frustration, or national liberation?

Are suicide bombers and collaborators included in Palestinian casualty counts? Are causality counts expressed unqualified, or is a distinction made between combatants and civilians?

Is "equal time" granted to both sides of the conflict, or is one side given preferential treatment -- hence lending more weight and credibility to that side's position?

When one side makes a claim, is the other side given a chance to refute, or does the claim stand unchallenged? Does one side usually "get the last word"?

Does the media quote dissenting or extremist opinions within each camp, or does the media only quote moderate voices that parrot the leadership's line?

Does the headline skew the story by failing to identify which side was the aggressor and which side the victim?
Photos and captions: Are these pertinent to the story, or do they diverge from the main story and garner out-of-context sympathy for one side or the other?

And finally, look specifically for the "7 Violations of Media Objectivity":

1. Did the story contain misleading definitions and terminology?
2. Was the reporting one-sided and imbalanced?
3. Did the reporter editorialize in what was supposed to be an objective news story?
4. Did the reporter fail to provide proper background and context?
5. Was key information missing (selective omission)?
6. Did the reporter use true facts to draw false conclusions?
7. Did the reporter distort the facts?

TIPS FOR WRITING GOOD LETTERS (Tips adapted from Camera.org)

1. Be quick. Respond while the issue is still fresh. Ideally, try to send your letter within 24 hours of publication of the article.
2. Be clear. If you cannot summarize your message in one or two sentences, it's not clear enough in your mind. Pinpoint in stark, unambiguous terms what you want to communicate.
3. Be specific. Why was the article unfair? Did it show lack of context, imbalanced reporting, or omission of key facts? For example: "Your report inappropriately quoted only pro-Palestinian sources, leaving the Israeli position unrepresented."
4. Be concise. Most publications will not print a letter to the editor longer than 250 words. Editors are more likely to publish a letter that they don't have to spend time shortening.
5. Be focused. While an article may contain numerous instances of bias, focus your critique on just one or two. It's better to fully explain one point than to inadequately cover five.
6. Know the goal. You want your letter to inspire the media to change. When possible, ask the media to issue a correction based on your points. A good way to end your letter is to ask: "Can I expect a rethinking of your editorial policy on this point?"
7. Request a reply. Let the media know there is a consequence to biased reporting -- even if the consequence is having to answer hundreds of e-mails! You could end your letter with: "I would appreciate a response explaining why you have allowed such a biased article to appear in your fine publication."
8. Stick to the facts. Preserve the integrity of the HonestReporting campaign by keeping your comments clean and respectful. Hostile or overly-emotional language is counter-productive. Accusing the media of anti-Semitism will always be met with great resistance (besides being frequently untrue). This is not the place to vent your frustration.
9. Write as a concerned individual. Mentioning that you are part of an organized campaign may lessen the impact of your letter.
10. Use the CC button. Maximize your efforts by sending a copy of your letter not just to the editor, but also to the reporter, foreign editor, publisher, and even advertisers and members of Congress.
11. Include contact info. Before publishing a letter, most papers will call to verify that you wrote it. Remember to include your full name, title (if applicable), address, and daytime phone number.
12. Follow up. When possible, follow up with a phone call to the comments editor to ask if your letter will be published. If the editor doesn't remember your letter, offer to read it over the phone.
13. Keep us in the loop. Whenever you receive a response to your correspondence (other than a simple acknowledgment), send a copy of that response along with your original correspondence, to: action@honestreporting.com. Good luck!
Annex BI7: UN Resolutions Concerning Israel 1955-1992

(see http://www.un.org)

Resolution 106: "...condemns Israel for Gaza raid."
Resolution 111: "...condemns Israel for raid on Syria that killed fifty-six people."
Resolution 127: "...recommends Israel suspends its 'no-man's zone' in Jerusalem."
Resolution 162: "...urges Israel to comply with UN decisions."
Resolution 171: "...determines flagrant violations by Israel in its attack on Syria."
Resolution 228: "...censures Israel for its attack on Samu in the West Bank, then under Jordanian control."
Resolution 237: "...urges Israel to allow return of new 1967 Palestinian refugees."
Resolution 248: "...condemns Israel for its massive attack on Karameh in Jordan."
Resolution 250: "...calls on Israel to refrain from holding military parade in Jerusalem."
Resolution 251: "...deeply deplores Israeli military parade in Jerusalem in defiance of Resolution 250."
Resolution 252: "...declares invalid Israel's acts to unify Jerusalem as Jewish capital."
Resolution 256: "...condemns Israeli raids on Jordan as 'flagrant violation."
Resolution 259: "...deplores Israel's refusal to accept UN mission to probe occupation."
Resolution 262: "...condemns Israel for attack on Beirut airport."
Resolution 265: "...condemns Israel for air attacks for Salt in Jordan."
Resolution 267: "...censures Israel for administrative acts to change the status of Jerusalem."
Resolution 270: "...condemns Israel for air attacks on villages in southern Lebanon."
Resolution 271: "...condemns Israel's failure to obey UN resolutions on Jerusalem."
Resolution 279: "...demands withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon."
Resolution 280: "...condemns Israeli's attacks against Lebanon."
Resolution 285: "...demands immediate Israeli withdrawal form Lebanon."
Resolution 298: "...deplores Israel's changing of the status of Jerusalem."
Resolution 313: "...demands that Israel stop attacks against Lebanon."
Resolution 316: "...condemns Israel for repeated attacks on Lebanon."
Resolution 317: "...deplores Israel's refusal to release Arabs abducted in Lebanon."
Resolution 332: "...condemns Israel's repeated attacks against Lebanon."
Resolution 337: "...condemns Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty."
Resolution 347: "...condemns Israeli attacks on Lebanon."
Resolution 425: "...calls on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon."
Resolution 427: "...calls on Israel to complete its withdrawal from Lebanon."
Resolution 444: "...deplores Israel's lack of cooperation with UN peacekeeping forces."
Resolution 446: "...determines' that Israeli settlements are a 'serious obstruction' to peace and calls on Israel to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention."

Resolution 450: "...calls' on Israel to stop attacking Lebanon."

Resolution 452: "...calls' on Israel to cease building settlements in occupied territories."

Resolution 465: "...deplores' Israel's settlements and asks all member states not to assist Israel's settlements program."

Resolution 467: "...strongly deplores' Israel's military intervention in Lebanon."

Resolution 468: "...calls' on Israel to rescind illegal expulsions of two Palestinian mayors and a judge and to facilitate their return."

Resolution 469: "...strongly deplores' Israel's failure to observe the council's order not to deport Palestinians."

Resolution 471: "...expresses deep concern' at Israel's failure to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention."

Resolution 476: "...reiterates' that Israel's claim to Jerusalem are 'null and void'."

Resolution 478: "...declares (Israel) in the strongest terms' for its claim to Jerusalem in its 'Basic Law' .

Resolution 484: "...declares it imperative' that Israel re-admit two deported Palestinian mayors."

Resolution 487: "...strongly condemns' Israel for its attack on Iraq's nuclear facility."

Resolution 497: "...decides' that Israel's annexation of Syria's Golan Heights is 'null and void' and demands that Israel rescinds its decision forthwith."

Resolution 498: "...calls' on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon."

Resolution 501: "...calls' on Israel to stop attacks against Lebanon and withdraw its troops."

Resolution 509: "...demands' that Israel withdraw its forces forthwith and unconditionally from Lebanon."

Resolution 515: "...demands' that Israel lift its siege of Beirut and allow food supplies to be brought in."

Resolution 517: "...censures Israel for failing to obey UN resolutions and demands that Israel withdraw its forces from Lebanon."

Resolution 518: "...demands' that Israel co-operate fully with UN forces in Lebanon."

Resolution 520: "...condemns' Israel's attack into West Beinut."

Resolution 523: "...condemns' Israel 'vigorously' for bombing Tunisia in attack on PLO headquarters."

Resolution 587: "...takes note' of previous calls on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and urges all parties to withdraw."

Resolution 592: "...strongly depletes' the killing of Palestinian students at Bir Zeit University by Israeli troops."

Resolution 605: "...strongly depletes' Israel's policies and practices denying the human rights of Palestinians."

Resolution 607: "...calls' on Israel not to deport Palestinians and strongly requests it to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention."

Resolution 608: "...deeply regrets' that Israel has defied the United Nations and deported Palestinian civilians."

Resolution 636: "...deeply regrets' Israeli deportation of Palestinian civilians."

Resolution 641: "...deplores' Israel's continuing deportation of Palestinians.
Resolution 672: "...condemns' Israel for violence against Palestinians at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.

Resolution 673: "...'deplores' Israel's refusal to cooperate with the United Nations.

Resolution 681: "...'deplores' Israel's resumption of the deportation of Palestinians.

Resolution 694: "...'deplores' Israel's deportation of Palestinians and calls on it to ensure their safe and immediate return.

Resolution 726: "...'strongly condemns' Israel's deportation of Palestinians.

Resolution 799: "...'strongly condemns' Israel's deportation of 413 Palestinians and calls for their immediate return."
Annex BI8: In Times of War Crimes - The Banality of Evil

by Ran HaCohen* April 19, 2002, Ha'aretz

"The lesson one could draw in Jerusalem was that such a detachment from reality and such thoughtlessness could cause more destruction than all the malicious instincts that man might possess."

(Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, a Report on the Banality of Evil.)

Even when some of the atrocities in the West Bank are reported in the Israeli press, it is done in a way that keeps the readers emotionally detached. It is also a function of the division of labour in the press. A tabloid like Yedioth Achronoth, with its cheap melodramatic overlay of every Israeli casualty, gives little or nothing on living conditions in the Occupied Territories. The quality paper Ha'aretz, with its excellent journalist Amira Hass (the only Israeli journalist living in the Occupied Territories), is confined to a high-brow, factual, unemotional style. (Ha'aretz journalist Gideon Levy, in a personal weekly column, breaks this rule, which is why he is permanently under fire.)

Last week I was trying to explain this to a friend: a mother of two children, very much pro-peace, anti-settlements and anti-Sharon. Can you imagine, I asked her, what it means when children are locked day after day at home with their grandmother's corpse, that the Israeli army wouldn't let evacuate?

"Right, I've also read about that," said the friend. "What I can't understand is: why don't they bury those corpses in the garden?"

I suggested that there might not be much of a garden in a refugee camp, and if there was one, they might not be allowed to go there under curfew.

"Well what I would do is simply put the corpse in the refrigerator, so that it doesn't stink. Corpses stink terribly, you know."

I reminded her that power supply was cut in most Palestinian towns since the invasion.

"It doesn't matter. The stink stays inside the fridge, even if it's off."

I hinted that not all Palestinian refugees possessed an expensive double-door American fridge like in North Tel-Aviv. It might be too small for a corpse.

"Well I'm sure they can somehow fold it." She now tried to demonstrate with her own body how this should be done.

The conversation ended here. Later, I couldn't forgive myself for my own complicity in it, in reducing atrocities to technicalities. I also recalled that that friend had once told me the good thing about her dog was that it was tamed to get rid of dead cockroaches; she couldn't stand the sight of them.

The Enemy Within

I almost stopped following Israeli electronic media and switched to BBC World and Al-Jazeera instead. Israeli radio and television news usually open with an elaborate report on all the important events of the day: two soldiers scratched, a third one broke a fingernail. Stones thrown at a settlers' car, no injuries, the settlers returned fire. Twelve people injured in last week's suicide attack are still in hospital. And so on. After all these dramatic developments, if there's some time left, we get some marginal stories, like "Palestinian sources claim that 30 of their people were killed today" or "West Bank hospitals may soon have water again."

That's on a quiet day. If there is a Palestinian terror attack, all programmes are immediately suppressed in favour of reports and commentary on that, broadcasted for hours in an endless loop. A retired army general is interviewed: "Don't you think Israel is showing much too much restraint?" A commercial television channel that once stuck to its normal schedule after a suicide attack was punished by the state regulator.

All that is still not enough for the ruling junta. You can never be enough of a mouthpiece for them. Therefore Israeli Journalists are kept out of the territories. Ha'aretz (4/19/02) reports of a new kind of army checkpoints, where soldiers stop journalists, claiming it is "a closed military zone", but let settlers go through. An Israeli Journalist who had been stopped this way removed his press stickers, pretended he was just a settler and was allowed to pass. Listen to what a senior officer in the so-called "only democracy in the Middle East" has to say re. freedom of the press (Ha'aretz, 4/12/02):
"The majority of the people is with us, not with the media. It's a war and we have no intention to facilitate your access. Only those playing by our rules will be allowed to enter. Let's see what you are worth without the army's help. And anyway, you should be grateful for what you get. Foreign journalists don't even get a fraction of that."

Like in any other dictatorship, subversiveness becomes the name of the game. Walls in Tel-Aviv are covered with a new graffiti: "It is good to die - for the settlements?" When the public television channel widely covered Sharon's latest spin - the celebrated "regional peace conference" - the reporters could hardly suppress their laughter.

**The Enemy Without**

In the bus, on my way to the university, immediately before and immediately after the top-of-the-hour radio news, I heard a new commercial spot: "CNN is biased against Israel. Do not watch it. Do not advertise in it. Flood CNN with letters of protest. Call this number for details." Yes, CNN, not some European television (everybody knows that all Europeans are anti-Semites). Even CNN isn't Zionist enough for some people.

In the university, the Students' Union was collecting signatures. A couple of days earlier, the same Students' Union had announced its objection to demonstrations of Arab students in the campus. Just like that, on a purely racist basis, not even disguised.

"What's that," I asked.

"A petition against the foreign press, it's biased against Israel," the two students replied.

"Can I sign here also against war crimes?"

"No, we don't run such a petition. Maybe others do."

"I see. Do you find the foreign press more important than war crimes, like letting injured people bleed to death in Jenin?"

They didn't really answer. Maybe they were embarrassed, maybe they thought I was crazy, maybe they knew or assumed I was a teacher.

"We had Holocaust Memorial Day last week, remember?"

They said they remembered.

**Package for Our Soldiers**

"Listen to this: in school they asked my child to bring a package for the soldiers." I heard this line from six or seven different parents. Each of them believed it was only in their school. When I told them it seemed to be the same all over the country, they were all fairly astonished: everyone sees his part of the picture, but cannot believe it is a grand pattern.

They all experienced the same problem: on one hand, they didn't want to give any packages to soldiers. On the other hand, they didn't want their children to feel isolated in class.

One father told me his son was boasting at home that he would tell the whole class loudly what he thought of that war, but that he knew his son and he would probably shut his mouth when it comes to it.

One mother said her daughter put an angry letter in the package, telling her dear soldier he had nothing to look for in the occupied territories.

Another father told me his son asked his mother why the package was so heavy: "Are you sure daddy didn't put a bomb inside?..."

Another mother, divorced, said it took her days to make up her mind about what to say to her child, putting the matter off from one day to the next. Why couldn't you tell him the truth, I asked. "What truth," she answered. "His father is a reservist. Should I tell him his father is a war criminal?" At last, she told the little boy that she had to have a serious talk with him. "Never mind, mum, it's too late now. I've already told them you forgot." DV

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"My plan will force Palestinians to give up dreams for years"

By Aluf Benn, Ha'aretz Correspondent, Monday April 05, 2004

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon says that his disengagement plan is a blow to the Palestinians, in that it will force them to give up on their aspirations for many years to come, until a new leadership emerges on their side that is ready to fight terror. Meanwhile, says the prime minister in an interview to Ha'aretz for the Pesach holiday, they will not be able to set up a state.

Q: Don't you think they are correct in viewing an Israeli exit from Gaza as a victory?

"Let's say we had reached a peace agreement and we had to get out of much larger areas than now. Would that not be seen as a victory over Israel? It would be seen in exactly the same way."

Q: Your critics argue that unilateral withdrawal is a reward for the terrorists.

"And today, when we are there, is there no terror?"

Do you think that terror will continue after the withdrawal?

"I don't see the terror stopping. I hope there will be a decline in terror. The Palestinians understand that this plan is, to a great extent, the end of their dreams, a very heavy blow to them, and it could be they will take steps. Although, in the past, when the Palestinian Authority claimed it was acting against terror, it did so out of fear that Hamas would take over."

Q: Won't the withdrawal enable Hamas to take control in Gaza?

"It doesn't have to happen. The Palestinian Authority has large forces in the Strip that have been almost unharmed in our operations. They could have established control over Hamas, but they aren't doing this, because they don't want to fight terror. They aren't fighting terror, they want terror."

Predictably, Sharon parries the criticism over the assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and backs the threat issued publicly by Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon against Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

"I wouldn't suggest that either of them feel immune," he says. "I wouldn't advise any insurance company to give them coverage."

Q: By the way, when will the government decision to remove Arafat be implemented?

"No one is safe. Anyone who sends someone to kill Jews is a marked man. Period."

PM: I believe in polls, but they change according to the times

Sharon is in the midst of a dual battle - over his plan of disengagement from the Gaza Strip and over his innocence in the "Greek Island" corruption affair. In the Pesach holiday interview, he wanted to project a message of self-control and calm, even in a situation of distress. Sharon again finds himself alone at the front and under attack from all sides - a situation he knows well from his decades in the military and in politics. He believes - and is trying to convince his listeners - that this time around, too, he will survive.

Sharon is aware of his poor public standing. "I do not operate according to opinion polls," he says. "I believe in polls, but they change according to the times, the situation and the developments. True, I am at a low in the polls, but it is natural that after every low point, the tide rises."

Q: Why has support for you plummeted?

Sharon: "I'm not sure that there is anyone who would be able to hold up in the face of the fire that I am under. My ability to endure pressure situations, and to work quietly and with self-control, is what enables me to stand up to all this. I don't know many people who would be able to endure such a heavy onslaught, day after day."

This year, more than ever, the main question in the prime minister's Pesach interview is "what has changed?" In his previous wave of interviews last year on the eve of Rosh Hashanah, Sharon said, "Any unilateral step, without an agreement, will result in Israel withdrawing in the face of terror. Terror will continue."
So what happened? Why did he reverse his position and decide on a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the evacuation of settlements in the West Bank? How could he abandon his long-standing commitment to the settlers, who have moved from being his adherents to a place among his most vocal adversaries?

"It's not that in our region everything remains frozen, and only my views change," he says today. "There are developments and situations, and as the one who shoulders the responsibility for the fate of this nation and its future, I have to weigh all the considerations and choose the thing that contains the least danger to Israel."

According to Sharon, his disengagement plan was born after it became clear to him "that the chance of finding a Palestinian partner had disappeared." The prime minister says he supported the road map peace plan, and that "today, I would prefer to reach an agreement, if there was a partner."

It was during his contacts with former Palestinian prime minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), that Sharon says he began to consider a unilateral move. Then Abbas resigned and his successor, Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala) proved to be a disappointment. "I heard what he had to say and I saw the difficulties in trying to set up a meeting with him. It's a fact that until now there has not been a meeting, despite the correct relations between us and our meetings in the past. It was clear to me that there was no possibility that they would implement [the road map] and reach an agreement."

Last November, Sharon met with Elliott Abrams, the White House envoy to the Middle East, in Rome. "He came to talk to me about other matters in the Middle East. I described the situation to him, [said] that in the absence of a partner I foresaw danger to Israel, and so we had to free ourselves from the road map and move to another plan."

Abbans was surprised. "The conversation revolved around principles, and the Americans didn't really understand in the beginning," Sharon recalls.

Q: Did you tell him of your plan to evacuate settlements?

"I mentioned it among the principles."

Sharon says he considered four alternatives. The first was the removal of the Palestinian Authority. "I hear the voices calling for the dismantling, the destruction of the Authority, and see it as something that must not be done, that would be to Israel's detriment."

Q: But for a long time you employed force in a bid to topple the Palestinian Authority.

"Only when it was involved in terror, or did not act against terror. The intention was not to wipe out the Palestinian Authority. Wiping it out means having to take back full control over 3.5 million Palestinians, and then we will have to deal with their education, health and sewerage. (The international organizations, who support 1.8 million Palestinians, have threatened to cease providing aid even under current conditions.)"

The second alternative was to go for an agreement like the Geneva initiative, which Sharon views as "something irresponsible, which we have already tried in the past and which did not bring about a cessation of terror, but rather pressures on Israel."

The third option was "to do nothing" - a comfortable choice politically, but threatening from a diplomatic standpoint.

In Sharon's view, "the paralysis is very dangerous" and results in the region being swamped with far-reaching political plans. "I had to alleviate these pressures on Israel, otherwise we would have been forced to accept a dangerous plan," he says. He therefore chose disengagement and sees no other alternative.

He recalls that prior to the 2001 elections, he spoke of "painful concessions" and repeated this phrase on the eve of his re-election in 2003. At the time, he spoke of concessions within the framework of an agreement. Now, he says that Israel would have to pay a higher territorial price in the event of an agreement.

Q: Why didn't you offer the withdrawal and evacuation of settlements to Abu Mazen?

"He never ever asked for the settlements. And even if he had asked, he wouldn't have gotten them, because we were operating according to the road map, which included a series of ordered actions, and deviating from the plan was viewed as bad."
Q: Maybe he would have remained in power if you had been more generous?

"I am surprised at how quickly we are ready to blame ourselves. Two things led to Abu Mazen's downfall - the first was Yasser Arafat, and the second was that instead of fighting terror, he tried to make deals with it. I told him that in the end it would bring him down."

Sharon was prepared for questions on the difficulties he faces in his decision-making. He rejects as "all nonsense" the assertions that he was dragged into accepting the idea of disengagement by his son Gilad and the head of his bureau, Dov Weisglass. "No one influences me," he says. "Arik influences Sharon, and Sharon influences Arik. This didn't just start today. When it came to key decisions in the army, this is also how I acted."

Sharon says he often conducts consultations, and that as someone who has been exposed to national decision-making at least since the Sinai Campaign of 1956, he has "never seen such thorough preparations as the ones being undertaken now. I heard that the Americans heard about the matter [of disengagement] in an interview in Ha'aretz [with Yoel Marcus]. That's not true. I raised it with them already in November, and since then there have been three visits by the Americans, and visits by my aides there, telephone calls and consultations with many people in all areas."

'Wait and see'

Q: After all the promises and declarations that have not been fulfilled, why should the public believe that you are going to implement your disengagement plan?

"It seems they will have to wait and see the thing being carried out. That's the best answer. I will live up to what I promised - both security and the [disengagement] plan."

Q: Your good friend and close partner in the establishment of the settlements, Ze'ev Hever (Zambish), called the evacuation of settlements a "psychiatric illness. II Are his night-time visits continuing despite the turn you have made?

"Zambish is truly a wonderful guy, with phenomenal ability. Zambish and his wife Rivka, a very special woman, are both my friends. When this whole thing started, I called him and told him that we have conflicting positions, but that we have to draw a line between our friendship and family relations and the political and diplomatic issues. I told him that when it comes to his struggles, from my point of view he is completely free - even though I think he is wrong - of any obligation that he might feel as a result of the long-term relations between our families. The personal relations continue, and I can't recall a Friday evening when he and Rivka don't phone, before Shabbat comes in, to say 'Shabbat Shalom,' and to tell what's been happening in their family."

His decision to turn his back on the settlers has not forced Sharon to have second thoughts about the enormous effort he invested in building the settlements. "Whoever thought that winning the end we would reach a peace agreement, knew that we would have to make concessions and that not all the settlements could remain. I said this for many years."

Q: So, looking back, building the settlements was a mistake?

"I don't think so. The situation was different. You can't look at a situation that existed 20 years ago or more. There have been developments, and we have to make an effort to ensure the price is as low as possible."

Q: Did you ever think you would be the one to dismantle the settlements?

"Already in 1988 I recommended to Likud ministers that we should bring about the division of the territory. At that time a Palestinian state was the pinnacle of the Palestinians' dreams. I said that we had to hold on to what was vital for us, and to try to reach an agreement, and I warned that if we did not do this, we would have to fight over the 1967 borders."

Q: And that's what is happening today?

"Yes. The current arrangement [with the Americans] determines for sure that Israel will not return to 1967 borders."

Sharon talks of two alternatives that existed regarding the disengagement plan: withdrawal from Gaza alone; and a pullout from Gaza as well as four settlements in the West Bank (Kadim, Ganim, Sa-Nur and Homesh). According to him, the Americans were prepared to offer Israel less for a pullout from Gaza alone. "The American position was that this directly serves Israel, and that there was no need for any special reward," he explains.
Sharon says that what Israel gets from the U.S. in exchange for the withdrawal will only be finalized when he meets President George W. Bush next week. Even if Israel had only withdrawn from Gaza, he says, the U.S. would have pledged to stick to the road map and to block pressure on Israel to accept any other plan. "And, of course, backing for Israel over its right to self-defense and actions against terror in areas that will be evacuated."

Q: What about negation of the Palestinian demand for the "right of return" for refugees?

"The Americans also have problems. Internal ones, as well as problems with the European countries and with the Arab world."

Sharon believes that the current timing is favorable to his plan, because "a situation has been created in which it is possible to do the things I want and to get an American commitment."

Q: Because of the upcoming elections there?

"Not because of the elections, but because of the fact that the Americans know today that the Palestinians ... aren't taking action and don't plan to take action. Today, the Americans are not placing blame on Israel."

Q: Will disengagement help Bush in his bid for re-election?

"A move that shows that things are happening, that things are developing, that maybe it is an opening to another development, certainly can help him. But we don't interfere in elections in other countries, and we are very happy that there is no interference in our elections. But when something happens, when something moves, it is definitely an achievement."

Sharon says he wanted to leave all of Gaza, including the Philadelphi route on the Egyptian border, so that Israel would be completely free of any responsibility for the Strip, and to hand it over to the international community.

"During one of the deliberations with defense establishment officials, it was clear that they were very concerned with handing over the Philadelphi route to the Egyptians. The talks with the Egyptians must continue, but I think that in the first phase, until we see what's happening in Gaza, it will remain completely sealed off. There will be no passage to Egypt, no port and no airport."

The building of the separation fence in the West Bank "is continuing and will continue," Sharon says, adding that the government "had to make minor changes to the fence" because of the problem that emerged of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who found themselves in "enclaves" as a result of the original route of the fence. "We had to free them from the enclaves as much as possible." The Americans have been satisfied by the changes and no longer have demands regarding the route of the fence.

Q: What happened to the plan for an "eastern fence" in the Jordan Valley?

"I don't see a fence being built there today, unless we need to. Here and there we will block access points to the Jordan Valley."

Q: Will the Jordan Valley remain under Israeli control in a final status agreement?

"Israel will need a security zone."

Q: Do you think there will be a final status agreement?

"I believe we have to hope."

'I would set up another government'

Sharon says he is not holding negotiations with Labor Party leader Shimon Peres over the creation of a national unity government. But, says the prime minister in an interview to Ha'aretz for the Pesach holiday, "there are contacts on this matter."

Sharon is in touch with Peres, and spoke to him several days ago. Peres was in the U.S. and was about to meet the head of the World Bank, and Sharon asked him to promote the idea of international aid for the rehabilitation of Gaza and the development of the Negev.

Q: Do you miss Peres in the government?

"Political life is not a matter of [personal] longings."

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Q: Isn't it more comfortable for you to have him as head of the opposition?

"The best for me would be to continue with the current coalition. All those who disagree with me today knew exactly what type of government they were getting into. I think that one of them was even given freedom to vote as they see fit on the diplomatic issue, or something like that, so there is no surprise. [The coalition agreement with the National Religious Party includes a clarification saying that the party is opposed to a Palestinian state and will fight against its creation - A.B.] But if there are parties that want to leave the coalition, I will not leave the country without a government, and I will not take the people to elections. I will set up another government."

The prime minister is convinced that he will successfully navigate the referendum on his disengagement plan among Likud voters.

"My estimation is based mainly on the fact that I don't see any other possibility," he said.

"Everyone has already tried, previous prime ministers tried, and nothing came of it. Maybe something can come only from this, if it has support. In the Likud as well, people understand the importance of quiet and of the possibility of initiating a diplomatic process of some kind."

Sharon says he would have preferred a referendum among the general population, but that because of the legislative changes that would have been required, the whole matter would have been drawn out over "six months to a year, and in my eyes time is the main factor."

Q: Why don't you fire ministers and deputy ministers who attack you?

"In this sensitive situation as well, one has to consider things carefully and act patiently, and not operate out of feelings of anger."

Q: If you resign, do you think that another prime minister from the Likud will carry out the disengagement plan?

"I don't like hypothetical questions. I hope that I can continue in my job and carry out this plan, as well as steps in other areas that Israel has to take."

'My hands are clean'

In the interviews that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon gave on the eve of Pesach last year, after winning a second term, he said he believed that the reports of investigations against him were a passing phase that would subside after the elections. But he was wrong, and the investigations continue to cast a shadow over his political future.

As is his way, Sharon does not relate to details of the investigations, saying only that "my hands are clean, I believe in my complete innocence, and I also believe that no indictment will be filed."

Q: Do you have full faith in the attorney general?

"Absolutely."

Sharon also rejects claims by his critics that the disengagement plan and the talk of evacuation of settlements were meant to extract him from his legal woes.

"There is no link, not even the slightest, between some other problems I have and the diplomatic plan. My positions on national matters are in no way influenced by the problems I am facing. I am able to distinguish between these matters, and these assertions are baseless.

"Not long ago, Yossi Sarid asked me if this thing [the investigations] doesn't interfere with my ability to do my job. It doesn't. I have already proved over the years that my ability to function in situations of difficulty and decision-making is not diminished. I am built for tough situations."
March 2002

March 2: After 24 hours of Israeli military assaults on Palestinian RCs, in which 24 Palestinians are killed, Palestinians suspend security and political talks with the Israeli leadership.

March 3: Seven soldiers and three settlers are killed by a lone Palestinian sniper shooting at an Israeli roadblock near Ofra settlement near before escaping unharmed. Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claim responsibility.

- The Israeli security cabinet approves an IDF-recommended operation to put constant military pressure on the PA and Palestinian ‘terrorist’ groups. DM Ben-Eliezer praises the actions in Balata and Jenin RCs, saying “Psychologically, we broke the taboo of the refugee camps and the feeling the terrorists had that they have immunity there.”

March 4: In Ramallah near Al-'Amari RC, an Israeli tank shell hits the car of Hamas member Hussein Abu Kweik, driven at the time by his wife Bushra, killing her and their three children, 17, 14 and 8 years old. In the car behind them, two other children, Arafat and Haima Al-Masri, 16 and 4, are also killed.

- Israeli planes bomb Al-Muqata'a compound, totally destroying the headquarters of Palestinian General Intelligence chief Tawfiq Tirawi.

March 5: Israeli F16 jets destroy the PA intelligence headquarters in Bethlehem.

- In Ramallah three senior Tanzim and Force 17 members - Muhammad Abu Halaweh, Omar Qa'dan, and Fawzi Murrar - are killed in a helicopter attack in Beitunia.

March 6: In an overnight incursion into Gaza seven Palestinians are killed, several others injured and arrested. Two Israeli soldiers are also killed. Near Khan Younis four Palestinian homes are demolished and in Gaza City the home of Yasser Arafat as well as a UN school for the blind.

- Israeli right-wing Min. of Infrastructure, Avigdor Lieberman, urges PM Sharon to order the army to begin a systematic bombing of Palestinian population centers saying, as quoted in Yediot Ahranot, “At 8 o'clock, we bomb all commercial centers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At 12 o'clock, we bomb all fuel stations. And at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, we bomb all the banks.”

March 7: IDF begins wide-ranging operation overnight in Tulkarem and its RCs, killing at least 15 Palestinians, among them two PRCs ambulance medics, and leaving behind much destruction.

March 8: In two Israeli attacks overnight on Khuza'a village next to Khan Younis and Beit Hanoun and Jabalia RC, 27 Palestinians are killed, incl. Maj.-Gen. Ahmed Mufrej (Abu Hmeid), a high-ranking Palestinian officer.

- Israeli forces kill 11 Palestinians in assaults in the northern West Bank, mainly in Tulkarem, where also over 100 Palestinians are arrested. At the end of the day, the death toll has reached at least 44.

March 10: Israeli helicopters fire at least 35 missiles at PA Chairman Arafat’s seaside office building in Gaza City, destroying it and wounding over 20 people.

March 11: The Knesset approves a new legislation in its first reading with 23 to 12 to outlaw Israeli citizens and residents from joining the PA security apparatus or militant organizations operating in the PA.

March 11-12: Israeli military forces enter Jabalia RC and impose a military closure on areas in northern Gaza. At least 18 Palestinians are killed, many more wounded and several buildings destroyed.

March 12: Israeli forces invade Ramallah and Al-Bireh, imposing curfews on many areas, occupying several building, and kill at least five Palestinians. In Al-Amari RC, troops demolish three homes, incl. that of suicide bomber Wafa Idris.

- UN Sec.-Gen. Annan condemns Israel's use of heavy weaponry against Palestinians and demands that Israel "stop the bombing of civilian areas, the assassinations, the unnecessary use of lethal force, the demolitions, and the daily humiliation of ordinary Palestinians” as well as “end the illegal occupation.”

- The UNSC passes a US-drafted resolution referring for the first time to a Palestinian state existing side by side with Israel by 14-0, with Syria abstaining.

March 14: US Mideast envoy Anthony Zinni arrives in Israel; meets Sharon and urges him to leave the PA areas.
March 15: DM Ben-Eliezer orders the gradual pullback from Ramallah, which is left in severe damage.

March 16: EU leaders call on Israel and Palestinians to rein in violence, saying there "is no military solution to this conflict." They urge Israel to withdraw its forces from PA areas, lift restrictions on Arafat's movements, freeze settlement building, relieve the closures, and allow international observers to monitor a cease-fire. They condemn Israel's "use of excessive force" against Palestinians as unjustifiable, especially "actions against medical and humanitarian institutions and personnel," and its "executions without trial" of Palestinians. They call on the PA to fight terrorism.

March 19: An aerial survey conducted by Peace Now has revealed that since the election of Sharon in Feb. 2001 34 new settlement sites have been established in the West Bank.

March 22: The US announces that it is adding the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades to the State Dept.'s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Israel applauds the decision.

March 25: A delegation of renowned intellectuals from the International Parliament of Writers (IPW) meets with Arafat in Ramallah. Among them Portuguese Nobel Prize laureate Jose Saramago (Literature, 1998) compares Israeli policy in the territories to "Nazi" tactics and equates the Palestinians to concentration camp victims, saying the situation in the Ramallah resembled "the spirit of Auschwitz" and "what must be done is to ring all bells of the world, to say that what's happening in Palestine 's a crime that we can stop.' Juan Goytisolo of Spain says that Israel is employing state terrorism and that the group had come to show solidarity with the Palestinians living in ghettos, and Breyten Breytenbach, who spent eight years in jail for opposing apartheid in South Africa, asked if he did not fear he would be termed anti-Semitic, says "We have to reject this kind of cultural terrorism that sees every criticism of Israeli crimes against the Palestinians as an expression of anti-Semitism."

March 26: After meeting with Palestinian officials, who presented their response to his compromise proposals, asking for further clarifications as the text departed too far from the original Tenet text, US envoy Zinni says that the gaps between the two sides are too wide. The next meeting of the joint security committee is postponed indefinitely.

March 27: 29 people are killed and over 100 wounded, when a Palestinian suicide bomber - Abdel-Basset Odeh from Tulkarem - blows himself up in the Park Hotel in Netanya. Hamas claims responsibility.

March 27-28: The Arab summit in Beirut opens without King Abdullah and Pres. Mubarak, who do not attend because of security reasons. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah reiterates his proposal of "normal relations" with Israel for recognition of a Palestinian state and the refugees' right to return. The Palestinian delegation walks out after a speech by Chairman Arafat is not aired. On the second day, Arab states approve final draft of Saudi peace initiative.

March 29: After Sharon declares Arafat "an enemy" and the Israeli cabinet decides to isolate him, IDF troops launch "Operation Defensive Wall", invade Ramallah and surround Arafat's headquarters. Israeli troops seize most of the buildings, confining Arafat to a few rooms. Five Palestinians are killed and 50 wounded; one Israeli soldier is also killed. Israeli troops prevent ambulances and paramedics from evacuating the wounded and destroy electricity networks and other infrastructure. Various buildings are turned into military outposts.

March 30: In the night, Israeli tanks enter and re-occupy Bethlehem and Beit Jala.
- UN Gen.-Sec. Annan calls upon Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territory and not to harm Arafat.
- The UNSC holds a meeting over Mideast situation behind closed doors and passes Res. 1402 calling for Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities with 14:0, with Syria boycotting the vote because of the text's soft tone.

March 31: The Israeli army declares Ramallah a closed military area, banning journalists from the city; soldiers also seize local TV channels and replace normal programming with pornographic films.
- A suicide bomber - Shadi Tobassi, 18, from Jenin - blows himself up near the Matza restaurant in Haifa's Romema district, killing 14, and wounding dozens others. Hamas and Islamic Jihad take responsibility.
- PM Sharon addresses the nation, saying "We are at war, and it is a war for our home" ... "This terror is being directed, put into practice and initiated by a single individual - Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. He is the enemy of Israel and the entire free world, an obstacle to peace in the Middle East and a threat to the stability of the entire region."
## Annex BI11: 30 Years Of U.S. UN Vetoes

**How the U.S. has Vetoed 1972-2002**


### Year | Resolution Vetoed by the USA
--- | ---
1972 | Condemns Israel for killing hundreds of people in Syria and Lebanon in air raids.
1973 | Affirms the rights of the Palestinians and calls on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories.
1976 | Condemns Israel for attacking Lebanese civilians.
1976 | Condemns Israel for building settlements in the occupied territories.
1976 | Calls for self determination for the Palestinians.
1976 | Affirms the rights of the Palestinians.
1978 | Urges the permanent members (USA, USSR, UK, France, China) to insure United Nations decisions on the maintenance of international peace and security.
1978 | Criticises the living conditions of the Palestinians.
1978 | Calls for developed countries to increase the quantity and quality of development assistance to underdeveloped countries.
1979 | Calls for an end to all military and nuclear collaboration with the apartheid South Africa.
1979 | Strengthens the arms embargo against South Africa.
1979 | Offers assistance to all the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movement.
1979 | Concerns negotiations on disarmament and cessation of the nuclear arms race.
1979 | Calls for the return of all inhabitants expelled by Israel.
1979 | Demands that Israel desist from human rights violations.
1979 | Requests a report on the living conditions of Palestinians in occupied Arab countries.
1979 | Offers assistance to the Palestinian people.
1979 | Discusses sovereignty over national resources in occupied Arab territories.
1979 | Calls for protection of developing counties' exports.
1979 | Calls for alternative approaches within the United Nations system for improving the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
1979 | Opposes support for intervention in the internal or external affairs of states.
1979 | To include Palestinian women in the United Nations Conference on Women.
1979 | Safeguards rights of developing countries in multinational trade negotiations.
1980 | Requests Israel to return displaced persons.
1980 | Condemns Israeli policy regarding the living conditions of the Palestinian people.
1980 | Condemns Israeli human rights practices in occupied territories. 3 resolutions.
1980 | Affirms the right of self determination for the Palestinians.
1980 Offers assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movement.
1980 Attempts to establish a New International Economic Order to promote the growth of underdeveloped countries and international economic co-operation.
1980 Declaration of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
1980 Emphasises that the development of nations and individuals is a human right.
1980 Calls for the cessation of all nuclear test explosions.
1980 Calls for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
1981 Promotes co-operative movements in developing countries.
1981 Affirms the right of every state to choose its economic and social system in accord with the will of its people, without outside interference in whatever form it takes.
1981 Condemns activities of foreign economic interests in colonial territories.
1981 Calls for the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.
1981 Calls for action in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, curb the arms race and promote disarmament.
1981 Urges negotiations on prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.
1981 Declares that education, work, health care, proper nourishment, national development, etc are human rights.
1981 Condemns South Africa for attacks on neighbouring states, condemns apartheid and attempts to strengthen sanctions. 7 resolutions.
1981 Condemns an attempted coup by South Africa on the Seychelles.
1981 Condemns Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, human rights policies, and the bombing of Iraq. 18 resolutions.
1982 Condemns the shooting of 11 Muslims at a shrine in Jerusalem by an Israeli soldier.
1982 Calls on Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights occupied in 1967.
1982 Condemns apartheid and calls for the cessation of economic aid to South Africa. 4 resolutions.
1982 Calls for the setting up of a World Charter for the protection of the ecology.
1982 Sets up a United Nations conference on succession of states in respect to state property, archives and debts.
1982 Nuclear test bans and negotiations and nuclear free outer space. 3 resolutions.
1982 Supports a new world information and communications order.
1982 Development of international law.
1982 Protects against products harmful to health and the environment.
1982 Declares that education, work, health care, proper nourishment, national development are human rights.
1982 Protects against products harmful to health and the environment.
1982 Development of the energy resources of developing countries.
1983 Resolutions about apartheid, nuclear arms, economics, and international law. 15 resolutions.
1984 Condemns support of South Africa in its Namibian and other policies.
1984 International action to eliminate apartheid.
1984 Condemns Israel for occupying and attacking southern Lebanon.
1984 Resolutions about apartheid, nuclear arms, economics, and international law. 18 resolutions.
1985 Condemns Israel for occupying and attacking southern Lebanon.
1985 Condemns Israel for using excessive force in the occupied territories.
1985 Resolutions about cooperation, human rights, trade and development. 3 resolutions.
1985 Measures to be taken against Nazi, Fascist and neo-Fascist activities.
1986 Calls on all governments (including the USA) to observe international law.
1986 Imposes economic and military sanctions against South Africa.
1986 Condemns Israel for its actions against Lebanese civilians.
1986 Calls on Israel to respect Muslim holy places.
1986 Condemns Israel for sky-jacking a Libyan airliner.
1986 Resolutions about cooperation, security, human rights, trade, media bias, the environment and development. 8 resolutions.
1987 Calls on Israel to abide by the Geneva Conventions in its treatment of the Palestinians.
1987 Calls on Israel to stop deporting Palestinians.
1987 Condemns Israel for its actions in Lebanon. 2 resolutions.
1987 Calls on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon.
1987 Calls for compliance in the International Court of Justice concerning military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua and a call to end the trade embargo against Nicaragua. 2 resolutions.
1987 Measures to prevent international terrorism, study the underlying political and economic causes of terrorism, convene a conference to define terrorism and to differentiate it from the struggle of people from national liberation.
1987 Resolutions concerning journalism, international debt and trade. 3 resolutions.
1987 Opposition to the build up of weapons in space.
1987 Opposition to the development of new weapons of mass destruction.
1987 Opposition to nuclear testing. 2 resolutions.
1989 Condemns USA invasion of Panama.
1989 Condemns USA troops for ransacking the residence of the Nicaraguan ambassador in Panama.
1989 Condemns USA support for the Contra army in Nicaragua.
1989 Condemns illegal USA embargo of Nicaragua.
1989 Opposing the acquisition of territory by force.
1989 Calling for a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on earlier UN resolutions.
1990 To send three UN Security Council observers to the occupied territories.
1995 Affirms that land in East Jerusalem annexed by Israel is occupied territory.

1997 Calls on Israel to cease building settlements in East Jerusalem and other occupied territories. 2 resolutions.

1999 Calls on the USA to end its trade embargo on Cuba. 8 resolutions (1992 to 1999).

2001 To send unarmed monitors to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

2001 To set up the International Criminal Court.
Annex BI12: Eyewitness Report From Ramallah

By Tzaporah Ryter, Tuesday, April 2, 2002

Ramallah, Occupied Palestine -- My name is Tzaporah Ryter. I am an American student from the University of Minnesota. I currently am in Ramallah. We are under a terrible siege and people are being massacred by both the Israeli army and armed militia groups of Israeli settlers. They are shooting outside at anything that moves.

I am urgently pleading for as much outside help as possible to help save lives here.

I arrived in Ramallah last Thursday. I had come back for a visit to the Palestinian city where I had been previously living and studying. On Thursday afternoon, the Israeli army began sealing off each entrance to Ramallah and there were rumors that they planned to invade.

People were rushing back home from across checkpoints and also people were trying to flee. People were not allowed to go out and many working people -- with homes and children to return to -- were not allowed in, everyone was trying to take cover. Those traveling in began desperately searching for alternative ways and traveling in groups, but the Israelis were firing upon them and everyone was running and screaming.

Women carrying their children were trying desperately to flee from Ramallah, carrying infants and toddlers, and their young children were running along in the rain through the fields, slipping and falling on the rocks, trying to reach safety. Israeli jeeps were speeding across the terrain pulling up from every direction and shooting at the women and children, and also at me, as we ran in opposite directions. They were chasing down people, hunting them like that in the fields.

When I reached Ramallah, people were panicking and trying to buy bread, rice and milk from corner stores, but most supplies were already gone. We bought what we could and went inside to wait for what was coming.

When night fell, Israeli tanks began to invade and also we saw Israeli troops coming on foot from the valley, and surrounding our house. I could hear them calling to each other in Hebrew. They were against our door and all around. They were firing everywhere a barrage of bullets and there was tank fire. We had to lay on the floor and keep silent. We stayed there, on the floor, for nearly four days in the darkness.

We knew that our circumstances were better than others because old people or infants or people with medical emergency needs had no help. It was very cold, with most families packed all in one room. Some people are without life sustaining medicines like insulin, and they are altering their doses dangerously if they have any medicine left to take. People are becoming dangerously sick from lack of food and water and heat. The fear and terror only makes things worse, but it cannot be avoided.

In the daytime, we heard them shooting people in the streets, and could hear them screaming and screaming. No ambulance was allowed through. Then their screams stopped and there was just silence.

We had a telephone and would receive calls from all over telling us what was happening. Everyone is in grave danger and Israeli soldiers were killing people everywhere. They are arresting medics and ambulance drivers, including foreign volunteer medical workers.

They keep taking doctors and medics, just now another call. Again, this time the wife of a doctor telling us her husband has been taken from the ambulance.

Large groups of people have been found in rooms, shot dead, there are blood marks where they have lined people up on their knees and shot them, with their ID cards laying on top of them. They are taking people from their homes, blindfolding them, removing their clothes, taking them away or lining them up and shooting them against the wall.

People are making phone calls and saying that these soldiers and militia have come in and are shooting people and then the line cuts off.

The numbers of these killings I fear are much greater than the numbers confirmed in the press, because the human rights offices and the media centers have been stormed, and everything is shut down. No one can move without almost certain chance of being shot by the Israeli snipers, who are everywhere.
The Israelis are demanding that all journalists leave Ramallah and today another foreign journalist was shot. They do not want any more internationals here and are deporting people. It seems quite clear that they do not want eyewitnesses which is only heightening my own fears.

The hospitals have also been surrounded and invaded and Israeli troops are taking the injured people and interrogating them. Today a woman, a patient, tried to walk out from hospital. The Israelis shot her in the neck and killed her.

The Palestinian Ministry of Health is saying that they fear the spread of diseases because of the number of unburied corpses.

The numbers are only growing in reports of the mass killings here and Israeli troops continue to round up people. People are calling frantically, missing a relative and we do not know where they have been taken, including children.

The numbers we have now exceed 600, and we are estimating between 700 and 800. All human rights groups and legal advocates are being denied any information of where the detained are being held. From what we know confirmed is that 10% of those taken so far have been children under age 18.

On the fourth day I decided to try to move. People were running out of supplies and I also was so worried about people, and had to check to see if they were okay. If I didn't, I feared panic would overtake me so badly that I really had no other choice but to try and go.

It was not safe where I was in any case and at least if I left I would still have my sanity. It was really terrifying as there are some internationals here, usually traveling in groups, and the Israelis are saying on the radio that they will arrest or shoot the internationals. They did shoot some yesterday and regardless, it's not as if snipers differentiate and they are everywhere.

My friends told me not to go, and were really scared for me, but I had to go. When I went outside, there were cars all shot up and hit by multiple bullets and shells in the middle of the road; unparked. There must have been people in them but I don't know where their bodies are. There are no reports of them, but they must exist.

I got to the corner trying to go to the bakery for bread and food for people. Some people were calling and calling with only one cup of rice left. I made it to the corner but they opened fire on my first try, and shot at me, so I had to turn back.

After that I tried again and it took me one day to make it a block because I had to start over again and again. I had to climb through the valley, and as I passed house by house, people were warning me and pointing out what path seemed safest for these two minutes. In the next two minutes, it would be something different. They really helped to keep my path safe.

Today is Day Five and they are still rounding up people like this and we hear them shooting all day long.

This afternoon the Israelis suddenly lifted the curfew, suddenly announcing that everyone had two hours to go out to get food. However, the Israeli soldiers also took food from many of the stores, looted, and there is no bread or things. People went to get whatever they could.

Even though the Israeli army said it had lifted the closure for two hours -- in which we still were not able to transfer medical supplies and still was not long enough to everything that was badly needed -- the Israelis continued shooting people in the streets indiscriminately on their way, so people were running around trying to make it to the store or find a safe route only to have to run back home again. It was an added cruelty and terror tactic in this macabre situation, a sick joke: starve people and then shoot them when they try to find food with your permission.

In an apartment building in Beitunia neighborhood where I used to live, they took 60 people who were my neighbors, including several families, and pushed them into one room since last night. The Israelis told them that they are to be used as “human shields”, as the apartment building is across from a building that they were invading.

One child needs to go to the hospital since last night and, initially, the families were able to call outside. Now, the Israelis have taken their phones.

There are reports that they are rounding up men between the ages of 14 and 45 in that neighborhood, and these civilians, from these same Palestinian families trapped in that building, were just used to walk in front of an Israeli tank as it invaded the Preventative Security Compound.
Reports also have alleged that the Israelis were saying that some could leave but shot them when they attempted to leave. The buildings there are burning, and people are trapped inside.

We keep calling to try to find people but there has been no electricity and most people's phones are dead now. I do not know what is happening to many people. The only solution to this is to try to brave the deadly streets in order to check, but its almost impossible and terrifying to leave the house at all.

Each place I come to, I am afraid to leave not only for myself but for everyone else in this horrifying position. Israeli death squads have been yanking people into the street. I also hear only shooting and shooting, with no return fire. This suggest that unarmed civilians are being gunned down mercilessly everywhere and I am so scared for everyone. I feel like maybe if I leave one place, one area or neighborhood I will never see the people again alive.

There are more explosions outside now and more shooting. Another explosion. More firing, it just doesn't stop.

This is a massacre. The foreign delegations tried to get in but were turned back, the International Committee of the Red Cross is trying to help but they are being ignored. Please help.

I am not only scared for myself and for people here, but if this cannot be stopped, I am truly scared for all of humanity, for a world in which we send men to the moon but cannot stop ethnic cleansing.

There do not seem to be any reports of what is happening. In truth, it's got to stop. Please go out to the streets, please demand a response from your representatives. Be loud, march up to the capitals, refuse to leave until the Israelis withdraw. Act now! Tell them the Israelis are murdering innocent people whose only crime is being born in their own homeland, a Palestinian under a military occupation.

Demand international protection for the Palestinian people, scream that this is an affront to humanity and that it is time that the US not only stop supporting Israel, but that the US stop its abuse of human rights within its own borders. This is about all of our struggles. For the love of God, please stop this slaughter. Please help.
Annex BI13: Operation Defensive Shield Overview

UNRWA Overview of Operation Defensive Shield (www.unrwa.org)

According to the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (December 10, 2002):

- 22 per cent of Palestinian children are suffering from acute or chronic malnutrition. Four out of five children in Gaza and the West Bank have inadequate iron and zinc intake, deficiencies that cause anemia and weaken the immune system.

- Unemployment has risen to over 50 per cent in the occupied territory as a consequence of the closures and is the root cause of Palestinian poverty and malnutrition.

- In the West Bank, UNRWA has received donor funding to rebuild 400 shelters destroyed in Jenin camp. However, in Gaza and the rest of the West Bank another 5,500 refugees have had their homes destroyed during Israeli military operations. Thousands more have had their shelters damaged in the fighting.

- Demand for the Agency's medical services has leapt since the start of the intifada. There has been a 60 per cent increase in consultations and a 30 per cent growth in physiotherapy cases.

- Curfews and closures have crippled Palestinian education. UNRWA lost on average one month's schooling per pupil in the West Bank in the 2001-2002 academic year because students or staff could not reach their classes. Test scores have collapsed.

- Poverty rates among Palestinians have reached 60 per cent of the population.

UNSCO report (www.unsco.org)

UN: New economic figures for West Bank and Gaza show rapid deterioration leading to human catastrophe

29 August 2002

The Palestinian economy is mired in a deep crisis, with unemployment levels rising significantly over the first half of 2002, according to preliminary figures released today by the Office of the United Nations Special Co-ordinator (UNSCO). These figures, part of a report due out next month, are the first international economic statistics on the Palestinian economy since Israel reoccupied West Bank urban areas last spring.

Particularly hard hit are the West Bank cities and towns, which the Israeli military has placed under lengthy curfews in response to a wave of terror attacks earlier this year. On days with curfew, the estimated unemployment rate reached 63.3 percent. Income losses now total US$3.3 billion since October 2000. Poverty levels continue to increase at alarming rates, reaching 70 percent in the Gaza Strip.

"I am deeply disturbed by the figures. But I am not surprised -- given the iron grip that Israel has applied on the West Bank," said Mr. Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN Special Co-ordinator. "Aid cannot fill the gap, but without it the economy would collapse. Against this backdrop, and before the eyes of the world, the Palestinian civilian population is scrambling to survive."

Mr. Larsen unequivocally condemned the terror attacks by Palestinian groups that prompted the Israeli action, and emphasized Israel's legitimate right to self defense. But in the face of the growing human catastrophe, Mr. Roed-Larsen asked Israeli officials to review their severe restrictions on the movement of Palestinian people and goods.

"In light of the hardships facing Palestinian civilians, within the next few days I will meet with senior Israeli officials and urge them to re-examine the application of their security measures. While I welcome Israeli statements that it will take steps to ease the situation, I would argue that some of its measures, in fact, are not reinforcing security," he said. "Indeed, there is a gray area where legitimate defense of Israeli civilians has the de facto consequence of collective punishment for Palestinian civilians."

Preliminary Figures Reveal Rapid and Steady Deterioration
UNSCO has been providing economic data and analysis on a regular basis for several years. These figures are widely recognized as useful for governments and major organizations. They provide credible estimates of the development - or in this case, the rapid deterioration - of the Palestinian economy, a linchpin in the pursuit of peace.

The numbers reveal an economy in dire straits, one that has deteriorated steadily since the beginning of a closure regime in October 2000. There are three main preliminary findings - unemployment, poverty levels and income losses - which are part of a 30-page report to be released next month on the performance of the Palestinian economy in the first half of 2002.

### Unemployment

UNSCO estimates that the overall adjusted unemployment rate for the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the second quarter of 2002 increased from roughly 36 percent to approximately 50 percent. Unemployment fluctuates greatly according to the extent of curfews. UNSCO estimates that on curfew days involving approximately 600,000 people, the non-Jerusalem West Bank unemployment rises as high as 63.3 percent. Unemployment in the Gaza Strip has remained steady at nearly 53 per cent.

### Income Losses

Income losses stand at $7.6 million per day, for a total of almost $3.3 billion dollars since October 2000. This includes income from jobs in Israel as well as from domestic productive activities. Loss of income as a result of closures and restrictions far exceeds anything that the international aid community can provide.

### Poverty Levels

UNSCO estimates put poverty - based on two dollars or less consumption per day -- at 70 percent in Gaza and 55 percent in the West Bank.

### A Devastating Impact on the Civilian Population

Throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinians have run out of money and are unable to work to earn it. They increasingly must rely on handouts, selling personal items, credit - anything simply to survive. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the period from just before Operation Defensive Shield to the weeks that followed, more than 56% of households lost at least half their income, and nearly 20% lost their income altogether.

The World Food Programme says that it will soon deliver food assistance to more than half a million beneficiaries. In addition, UNRWA has provided ongoing food aid to nearly a million refugees since October 2000. Aid money has largely shifted from projects intended to build a prosperous Palestinian state. Now it goes to short-term relief for the Palestinian people intended to reduce such things as malnutrition and epidemics.

For more information, and a copy of Mr. Larsen's statement, please contact Mark Dennis, Senior Media Adviser, UNSCO, +972-67-651-189, +972-2-568-7289, dennism@un.org

### Children

**The effects of Operation Defensive Shield on Palestinian children living in the West Bank**

Samia Halileh, *Institute of Community and Public Health, Birzeit University*, 29 June 2002

http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article636.shtml

The Israeli Operation Defensive Shield began on 29 March 2002 with the reoccupation of the city of Ramallah followed soon after by the rest of the Palestinian cities. The reoccupation lasted variable lengths of time, with the longest in Bethlehem for 45 consecutive days.

For Palestinian children, this meant the interruption of normal life including education, social interactions, accessibility to health care, and loss of income for their families. In addition, there was psychological trauma from exposure to shelling, shootings and beatings that led to injuries, disabilities and loss of life.
Objectives

This report summarizes some specific violations of children's rights that occurred between 29 March and 31 May 2002 as a result of Operation Defensive Shield - the rights to life, physical and psychological well-being, healthcare, education, and protection from torture.

Methodology

This report focuses on children under the age of 18. Information was obtained from local and international organizations that deal with children - Defense of Children International (DCI) - Palestinian Sector, National Plan of Action (NPA), UNICEF, the Red Crescent Society (RCS), Ministry of Health (MoH) and Human Development and Information project (HDIP). In addition, the local papers and the internet were screened for reports on events affecting Palestinian children during that period.

Results

Deaths

During the reported time period, 55 children were killed. Thirty-eight percent (21) were under 12 years of age and 85 percent (47) were males. Forty-four percent (24) died from live bullets including rubber-coated metal bullets, 13 percent (7) from shelling, bombing or explosions, 9 percent (5) from delays in receiving healthcare, 19 percent (10) from acts of violence such as beatings or being struck by army vehicles, and 11 percent (6) were buried under the rubble by a bulldozer. Of those who died, 34.5 percent were from Nablus and 25.5 percent from Jenin. 14.5 percent and 12.7 percent were from Bethlehem and Hebron respectively.

During the third day of the incursion into Nablus, the Shu'bi family home was demolished by an Israeli bulldozer; the mother, seven-months pregnant, and three brothers, Abdullah, 8, Azzam, 6, and Anas, 4, were buried under the rubble, along with their grandfather and two aunts.

Another family, from Qabatia near Jenin, was similarly devastated when an Israeli tank fired at the family, as they were cultivating their land, killing the mother and her two children, Abeer, 3, and Basil, 4. The father was detained for a couple of hours and ambulances were prevented from transporting the children and the mother for several hours, by which time they were all dead.

On 23 April, Ameen Ziad Thawabte, 14, from the village of Beit Fajjar near Hebron, was returning from school with a small group of children his age at approximately 1:00 p.m. An Israeli jeep passed nearby and fired a single shot that killed Ameen. There were no clashes or confrontations with soldiers in the area at the time and there was no curfew on the village. The Israeli army claimed that the children were close to a settlement. However, the nearest settlement, Mijdal Oz, is located three kilometers from the place where Ameen was shot.

Five deaths were due to delay in receiving health care, three of which were babies delivered at checkpoints who died soon after birth. The other two were sick children who either died at checkpoints or later due to delays in getting healthcare. Dr Ali Sha'ar's newborn from Nablus, became unwell soon after home delivery. The Israeli occupation force prevented his transport to a hospital and he died a couple of hours later. Haleema al-Atrash, a woman in labor from Walajeh village near Bethlehem, was prevented from reaching an ambulance located only 10 meters away from her. As a result, she delivered at the checkpoint, but the baby died soon after.

The Israeli occupation force regularly left mines in commonly used Palestinian areas before their withdrawal and 11 children were affected, seven of them have died. On 23 April, Asad Orsan lost four limbs, Saed al-Wahshi, 12, suffered severe burns and shrapnel over his entire body, and on 17 May, Ameer Nashrati, 12, was injured while playing in the rubble.

Injuries

The data on injury is by no mean complete as not all the injuries were reported. Overall, 342 injuries were documented. Forty percent were from Nablus, 33.6 percent from Hebron, and 13 percent were from Tulkarm, the rest were from the other cities. Of these injuries, live bullets, including rubber-coated metal bullets caused 24 percent, and beatings, collisions with an army vehicle, and shock injury caused 51 percent, the rest were due to other causes. Forty-seven percent of the children were from the city while the rest were split equally between villages and refugee camps. Again, as in death, 37 percent were under 12 years of age and most of the injured were males (82.5 percent).

The DCI - Palestine Sector, documented some stories of the injured children.
On 3 April, during a three-hour break in the curfew in Ramallah, Israeli troops fired randomly at Palestinian civilians who were attempting to buy food, water, and essential goods. A 14-year old boy, Kindi Qutteineh, who lives in the center of the city, was shot in his leg by live ammunition fired from an Israeli tank. An eyewitness to the shooting told DCI, “I was walking up the street to buy some food when Israeli soldiers shot randomly at people. Kindi was near his house. It took around one hour before an ambulance could reach him and take him to hospital.”

On 5 April, 9-year old, Mohammed Amin Abdul Rahman al-Zougher of Hebron was seriously injured during an assassination attempt on the life of a Palestinian activist. Mohammed and his father were next to their car when an air-to-surface missile slammed into the vehicle. The attack caused third-degree burns to 80 percent of Mohammed’s body.

On 10 April, 16-year old Abdul Rahman Ismail Mohammed Abu Hadwan from Hebron sustained injuries to his lower leg and ankle when Israeli soldiers shot him with a fragmenting bullet.

On 16 April, 16-year old Shadi Issa Mohammed Yunis Jaradat of Hebron sustained injuries after being shot in the chest with live ammunition during an Israeli army invasion into Hebron.

Detention

Defense of Children International revealed that as of 22 May around 40-50 children are being detained in Ofrah prison near the city of Ramallah. When the DCI lawyer attempted to visit the children, he was allowed to see seven of them, but only after much difficulty. The prison is composed of nine compartments separated by metal wire, with four tents in each section, housing 25 to 35 prisoners. The tents are erected on a concrete floor and prisoners sleep on wooden benches with only a thin mattress and dirty, smelly blankets. There is no electricity in the tents and the prisoners are completely cut off from the outside world. There are no cleaning facilities and two of the compartments have flooded sewage. Food is prepared and eaten from large containers, shared by eight prisoners.

One of the children said he was arrested on 23 April, interrogated and the next day he was taken to Ofrah and beaten on the way. On arrival, he was interrogated again for an entire day and one of the soldiers kept banging his head against a table.

On 7 June, the Israeli Minister of Prisoner Affairs announced that there are 7,500 prisoners detained in 12 prisons (two of which were recently opened); 170 are children and 20 female.

Family visits have been made difficult and if allowed, the mothers are humiliated through requests such as removing their clothes in order to be searched.

Psychological trauma

Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, Palestinian children have been exposed to harassment, displacement, shooting, and destruction of their homes and schools. These measures were drastically increased during the recent occupation, accentuating the psychological effects on children.

Prior to the incursion, in April - May 2001, which is 7 to 8 months after the intifada began; the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) began to document the shooting, bombing and harassment of children. The results showed that even at that time, 27331 (1.3 percent) of the Palestinians in the West Bank had changed their residence due to the situation - 22.3 percent permanently and 54 percent temporarily. Of 483,460 school children interviewed at that time, 3 percent had been stopped at checkpoints, 1.2 percent shot at, 1.4 percent humiliated, 0.8 percent beaten, and equal number harassed.

At least half of the school children showed psychological symptoms such as crying and fear from loneliness, the dark, and loud noises. About a third showed symptoms of sleep disorder, nervousness, decrease in eating and weight, feelings of hopelessness and frustration, and abnormal thoughts of death. About half of the children showed deterioration in their schoolwork and one-third were unable to concentrate. In the same report, around 7 percent of families had experienced shooting at their houses, 3.5 percent raids into their homes by Israeli soldiers or settlers, and 6 percent were exposed to tear gas. Five percent of families reported damage to their land, 3 percent to their homes, and 4 percent to their cars.

Recently, at the end of the recent incursion, May 2002, the Institute of Community and Public Health (ICPH), Birzeit University prepared a brief statistical report on the daily life, health and environmental conditions of families living under curfew. The report sampled five cities and showed that 23 to 37 percent of families housed other families because of life-threatening danger, houses being demolished or taken over by the army, or being stranded and not able to reach their homes. A range of 31 to 87
percent of families reported considerable destruction to their neighborhoods and 28 to 59 percent reported exposure to shooting and/or destruction of their own home.

The Israeli occupying forces searched between 30 to 50 percent of homes; 12 to 36 percent of households reported the arrest of at least one family member. As a result, between 70 and 93 percent of interviewees reported mental health problems in at least one family member. Symptoms included great fear among children—shivering, crying, loss of appetite, and lack of sleep. Methods for coping included prayer, sleeping with the children, and intensification of normal activities, explaining to the children what is happening, and sometimes seeking help from a counselor by telephone.

Now, after the third incursion, June 2002, psychologists expect that all the children to have been traumatized, as shooting, damage to properties, bombing and house demolition has become a regular event in all areas of the West Bank.

Examples of events causing psychological trauma to children include the main incursion of the Jenin refugee camp with 600 houses completely destroyed by bombs and bulldozers and 200 houses unfit for habitation, leaving 1,250 families homeless.

One personal tale began on 5 April. The Abu Ramaileh family had hidden in the kitchen for a couple of days to avoid shelling and shooting at the Jenin refugee camp. At a quiet moment, the father decided to check damage in the sitting room. A shot was heard and when the mother went to check on her husband, she found that he had been shot dead. The ambulance could not reach the house for seven days and she convinced her children, Muhammed, 7, Hazar, 6, and Rami, 4, that their father was tired and asleep.

In Nablus, 250 houses were destroyed, the families housed in schools, mosques, and temporary apartments before their houses were repaired or a permanent residence was available.

Health

Child health in general is dependent on preventive and curative services. In the Palestinian territories, these services are provided free of charge during the first three years of life. After this age, curative services are covered by private or government insurance policies or direct payment for the service.

The PCBS studied health-seeking behavior for curative services on the West Bank during April and May 2001, a year ago. Results showed that 28.6 percent of families who needed curative services did not obtain medical care because medication was not available, 32.9 percent said they had no money, 26.6 percent could not reach a health center, and 16.8 percent reported that the doctor could not reach the health center.11 A month prior to the study, March 2001, PCBS found 10.7 percent of households in the Palestinian territories had lost their income and 64.2 percent were living below the poverty line. Since then, poverty and inaccessibility of drugs and healthcare has become increasingly worse, especially after the reoccupation on 29 March 2002 that led to tighter curfews imposed on Palestinian cities.
Annex BI4: IDF Response to Amnesty Report on Jenin

The full text of this report can be found at http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/amnesty0407-2.htm

The Battle in Jenin – The Israel Defence Force’s Response to the Report by Amnesty International

Introduction


This response will address the allegations found in the report (some of which have appeared in reports published by other agencies), with a special focus on the assertions concerning the battle that took place in Jenin. The response will present the background to the IDF operation in Jenin which was designed to deliver a blow to the extensive terrorist infrastructure located there; will detail the conditions surrounding the battle in Jenin and its results; will address the allegations raised against the IDF operation; will present the Palestinian crimes, which were not appropriately documented in the report; and will refute the web of lies weaved by the Palestinians regarding the battle. The response will conclude with a reference to the manner in which the report was written.

Following is a summary of some of the central points elaborated upon in the main part of the response:

* The IDF operation in Jenin was part of the response, forced upon the State of Israel, to a wave of Palestinian terror attacks. These attacks, including suicide attacks, reached their peak in March 2002, necessitating the IDF to move into Palestinian civil population centers, from where terrorist activities were conducted unhindered. Jenin was the “capital of suicide bombers”, in which a terror infrastructure - unprecedented in scope - perpetrated a large number of terror attacks.

* The IDF operation in the Jenin Refugee Camp encountered harsh resistance from terrorist activists, who planted thousands of booby traps and explosive charges, used different kinds of fighting tactics, operated from houses belonging to civilians and exploited the civilian population, including women and children, for cover, and used ambulances for the execution of terrorist activities.

* The IDF’s mode of operation was tempered, first and foremost, by the dictate to minimize the danger of causing harm to the civilian population. Consequently, modes of military action that could have accomplished the mission expeditiously and with minimal risk for to the lives of the soldiers -such as the use of planes and artillery - were rejected.

* The IDF operation in Jenin accomplished significant achievements in the fight against terrorism which undoubtedly saved many Israeli lives, including the uncovering of extensive terrorist infrastructures, the apprehension of terrorist activities and the uncovering of huge stores of weapons.

* There was no massacre in Jenin. The Palestinian leadership tried to promote a false charge that a massacre had been carried out in the camp. As a result of these allegations, the possibility of sending an international fact-finding commission to the region was considered. In actuality, these allegations were subsequently refuted and found to be groundless, and the international community dissociated itself from them.

* The vast majority of the Palestinian fatalities in the camp were armed terrorists. The responsibility for the civilians killed lies at the door of the Palestinian terrorist organizations that operated from within the civilian population. There are numerous statements given by Palestinian terrorists, glorifying the use they made of children and women for the perpetration of terror.

* The charges that the IDF prevented the provision of medical and humanitarian aid are groundless. They ignore the aid provided by the IDF, in coordination with Palestinian and international agencies; the complex fighting conditions; and the fact that the Palestinians themselves used ambulances in order to carry out terrorist activities.

* IDF activities are continually subject to control and supervision - including inquiry procedures, military police investigations, trials, procedures by commanders and overall supervision by the Supreme Court and so forth. In contrast, on the Palestinian side - there is no accountability, no supervision and no taking of responsibility. Palestinians who commit severe crimes pay no penalties.
* The Palestinian side has committed severe crimes, which constitute grave violations of international humanitarian law, including acts of terrorism and violence that fall under the category of "crimes against humanity." These include: the booby trapping of civilian residences; the use of children in terrorist activities; the use of civilians as suicide terrorists; the use of the civilian population as "human shields" and as hostages; the use of medical facilities and holy places for terrorist activities. These crimes are hardly mentioned in the Amnesty report.

* The Palestinians tried to weave a net of lies regarding Jenin - including allegations of a massacre and the prevention of humanitarian aid, and even went so far as to stage fictional funerals.

* The story of the battle in Jenin epitomizes the struggle of Israel against terror that derives from her right of self-defense and is part of the international campaign against terrorism.

* The Amnesty report presents a tendentious, biased and groundless image. The report adopts the Palestinian viewpoint and fails to explore the events that led to the Israeli operation. The report includes mistakes, groundless conclusions and half-truths, and its overall attitude is un-objective and prejudiced against Israel.
Sharon may need to offer Arabs new deal if Bush is to fend off UN

By Bradley Burston, Ha’aretz Correspondent
Ha’aretz, Israel; May 01, 02

Nearing a dangerous precipice with the United Nations Security Council, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon may need to make an overture the Arabs can’t refuse if he is to win White House support in diplomatic warfare over the disputed bloodshed in Jenin.

Sharon is to visit the White House next week. Bush administration officials had hoped that by the time the prime minister reached Washington, the hydra-headed negotiations regarding IDF-Palestinian standoffs at Yasser Arafat’s besieged Ramallah headquarters, Bethlehem’s Church of the Nativity, and the Jenin investigation impasse, would have been resolved by the time President George W. Bush welcomed Sharon to Washington.

True to form, however, the Middle East has little patience for quick solutions. In a cascade of policy reversals over the past two weeks, Sharon has twice agreed to and twice rejected Israeli co-operation with the UN fact-finding mission charged with the on-site sifting of evidence over the IDF offensive in Jenin refugee camp.

Israel maintained its insistence that it had nothing to hide in the face of Palestinian allegations - now largely in doubt - of wholesale massacres and summary executions of Palestinian civilians in the camp. However, the Sharon government has balked at the possibility that the evidence gathered by commission members could someday be used to fuel war-crimes proceedings against soldiers, commanders, and even the leaders who ordered the operation.

The resultant diplomatic limbo has left the UN team stranded in Geneva, pending a late Wednesday Security Council debate over the impasse, and a subsequent decision by Secretary-General Kofi Annan on whether to disband the mission.

Furiously pulling diplomatic levers of his own was Arafat, the focus of Sharon’s High Noon war of nerves, whom the prime minister has kept sequestered in a corner of a dingy, largely destroyed Ramallah compound in an explicit bid to isolate the Palestinian leader from the world.

But as Bush administration intervention increased in recent weeks, Arafat has been bathed in the spotlight of a range of international diplomatic efforts. Arafat’s repeated past declarations that he wished for nothing more than martyrdom in his Ramallah confinement have now given way to fresh negotiations and a steady stream of American and European mediators.

If Israelis had harbored hopes that the issue would disappear along with the UN mission, their optimism was quickly dispelled by widespread fears that Israel’s international diplomatic plight could dramatically worsen - and soon.

Former foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami said that an enraged Security Council determined to show a defiant Israel who was boss, could raise the stakes of an investigation, appointing a full-blown commission of inquiry into the events of Jenin as well as other elements of the broad IDF West Bank offensive ordered in response to an unprecedented series of suicide bombings. UN sanctions could follow.

A UN inquiry would likely pose a much more profound problem for Israel, Ben-Ami said. Moreover, if the government rejected such a commission, the step could lead to a “frontal confrontation with serious operative decisions regarding Israel, which would in turn put additional pressure on the United States, with respect to its ability to stand alongside Israel.”

At the same time, pressure on Sharon has increased at home. On Sunday, Sharon dismayed rightists by persuading the Cabinet to accept a Bush administration plan aimed at securing Arafat’s release. In the past, Sharon had declared that Arafat would stay put until he handed over the killers of slain cabinet minister Rehavam Ze’evi. Under the U.S. plan, the suspected assassins, who have been Arafat’s guests in the Ramallah compound, are to be transferred to a Jericho prison under American and British supervision, with Arafat’s freedom to follow.

According to Ha’aretz commentator Akiva Eldar, Israeli leaders had agreed to the proposal under the mistaken belief that in return, the Bush administration would act to quash UN action over Jenin.
Now, after having caved in on the Arafat issue without the hoped-for diplomatic compensation, Sharon will likely be forced to come up with another quid pro quo to offer when he visits Washington. "This will then allow Bush to then say 'I have received something from Sharon that is worth the cost of a UN veto,'" Eldar says.

"Sharon must come with an offer that the Arabs cannot refuse, an offer good enough to compensate them for forgoing pressure over Jenin," Eldar continues. "For instance, Sharon could go to the White House on Monday and say 'Okay, I'm willing to discuss and give my blessing to the new version of the Saudi plan, let's have an international conference.'

"Sharon needs something big, just to shift the emphasis from Jenin to something new. He needs to make it possible for Bush to be able to tell the Arabs 'Listen, I've got something even bigger for you, and (if you reject it, then) I will have to impose the veto.'"