The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
THE ZIMBABWEAN CRISIS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A dissertation submitted to the Sociology Department in partial fulfillment of the

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

By

SENZENI NCUBE: NCBSEN001

Supervised by: Professor L. Ntsebeza

December 2008
PLAGIARISM DECLARATION

1. I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is using another’s work and to pretend that it is one’s own.

2. I have used the Author Date Method as the convention for citation and referencing. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this essay/report/project/… from the work, or works of other people has been attributed and has been cited and referenced.

3. This essay/report/project… is my own work.

4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of passing it off as his or her own work.

SIGNATURE: ____________________

DATE: ___________________________
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I extend my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor L. Ntsebeza. Your wisdom and advice has gone a long way towards refining my work.

To all my respondents, thank you for your contribution towards this research. Your stories were really insightful and invaluable. This study would not have been possible without your input.

I would also like to thank Nesbert Zinyakatira for his unconditional support, editing as well as spurring me on throughout my research journey.

This thesis would not have been successfully completed without the assistance of my friends Glen Mpani, Nompilo Ndlovu, Mpiwa Mangwiro, Patience Mungwari, and Elizabeth Mumbengegwi who tirelessly discussed and fine tuned my ideas. Thank you very much.

I have a special appreciation for my family for their support throughout my academic endeavours. Dickson Ncube, Nontokozo, Sithembile, Nkululeko, Thembelihle, and my late mother, thanks for believing in me.

I would like to thank the NRF Research Chair Initiative in Land and Democracy in South Africa for funding this research.

Last but not least, I thank God for making my academic vision possible and for providing all my needs towards accomplishing it. This is for you.
ABSTRACT

This study is an exploration of the Zimbabwean crisis using secondary literature and perceptions of young Zimbabweans living in Cape Town. Its main aim is to provide a solid overview of the crisis, particularly focusing on its origins and nature as well as prospects for the future. The study relies heavily on secondary literature and perceptions of Zimbabweans who live in Cape Town.

The study has traced the development of the crisis as from 1980 when the country attained independence. It has established that the Zimbabwean crisis is of a deepening nature. The main argument is that the crises faced by Zimbabwe as from independence until the late 1990’s during the failure of Structural Adjustment are almost similar to those faced by other African countries. However, Zimbabwe is currently undergoing a crisis of a distinct nature following its decision to redistribute land formerly owned by white farmers in 2000, leading to the economic isolation of the country by the West. The catastrophic crisis resulting from economic isolation has indeed proved that the Zimbabwean crisis cannot be understood outside its link with the global system in which it has been a periphery country for several decades. In essence, what has happened in Zimbabwe proves that no Third World country can escape the tentacles of capitalism without serious consequences. The crisis in Zimbabwe has also proven that no country can live in isolation from the international community. With regard to the future, Zimbabwe needs to be re-integrated into the international community. The country is faced with two options on its re-integration; either to go back to its previous stage similar to the 1990’s when it was dependent on the West but still in a crisis better than the current, or to continue with its pursuit of autonomous development through delinking as articulated by Samir Amin. The latter could bring lasting solutions to Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis because it considers that land has been redistributed to the citizens, and it will not be returned to its previous owners when Zimbabwe re-enters the global scene.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

ESAP: Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

IMF: International Monetary Fund

MDC: Movement for Democratic Change

NCA: National Constitutional Assembly

NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa’s Development

UN: United Nations

US: The United States of America

WHO: World Health Organization

WTO: World Trade Organization

ZANU PF: Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

ZAPU PF: Zimbabwe African People’s Union Patriotic Front

ZIDERA: Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM DECLARATION .............................................................................................................................. I

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................................................... II

ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................................................. III

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................................. IV

CHAPTER ONE .......................................................................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY .......................................................................................................................... 1

1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY .............................................................................................................. 2

1.3 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................... 3

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY .................................................................................................................................. 8

1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................................................................................. 8

1.6 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................................... 8

1.6.1 Secondary Literature .................................................................................................................................................. 8

1.6.2 In-depth Interviews ......................................................................................................................................................... 9

1.6.3 Method of analyzing data ................................................................................................................................................. 10

1.6.4 Ethics Appraisal ...................................................................................................................................................... 11

1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ................................................................................................................................ 11

1.8 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS ..................................................................................................................................... 12

CHAPTER TWO ....................................................................................................................................................... 13


2.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 13

2.2 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................... 14

2.3 THE DAWN OF INDEPENDENCE AND CHALLENGES ....................................................................................... 18

2.4 ZIMBABWE UNDER ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT; LATE 1980’S TO MID-1990’S ...................... 21

2.5 EFFECTS OF ESAP .............................................................................................................................................. 24

2.6 POPULAR RESPONSE TO THE ESAP GENERATED CRISIS .................................................................................... 26

2.7 FORMATION OF THE MDC ...................................................................................................................................... 31

2.8 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................................... 32

CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................................................... 34

ZIMBABWE’S DISTINCTIVE CRISIS: 2000 TO DATE ......................................................................................... 34

3.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 34
### Table of Contents

3.2 The Draft Constitution, Its Rejection and Government Repression ......................................................... 35
3.3 Intense Land Redistribution .................................................................................................................. 39
3.4 A Deepening Crisis: Isolation from the International Community ...................................................... 42
3.5 Effects of the Crisis ................................................................................................................................. 46
3.6 The Zimbabwean Crisis: A Distinct Crisis? ........................................................................................... 49
3.7 Prospects: Beyond the Zimbabwean Crisis ............................................................................................. 50
3.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 56

**Chapter Four** ....................................................................................................................................... 58

Perceptions by Zimbabweans ................................................................................................................... 58

4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 58
4.2 Zimbabweans’ Perceptions of the Nature of the Crisis ......................................................................... 59
4.3 Zimbabweans’ Perceptions of the Origins of the Crisis ........................................................................ 64
4.4 Zimbabweans’ Perceptions of the Development of the Crisis until June 2008 ................................... 64
4.5 Zimbabweans’ Perceptions of Prospects for the Future ....................................................................... 69
4.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 75

**Chapter Five** ....................................................................................................................................... 77

Summary and Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 77

5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 77
5.2 Research Findings ................................................................................................................................. 78
5.3 Overall Assessment ............................................................................................................................... 80
5.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 81

References ................................................................................................................................................. 82
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction of the Study
Inflation levels pegged at 89, 7 sextillion, food, electricity and water shortages are some of the glaring indicators of the Zimbabwe’s crisis (www.zimbabwesituation.com 2009). Over 80,000 Zimbabweans have been infected with cholera since August 2008, and 3,759 lives has been lost from the outbreak. The World Health Organization (WHO) Case Fatality Outbreak highlights that Zimbabwe’s cholera situation is one of the world’s largest ever-recorded (IRIN News 2009). This is a country that has been undergoing Economic Sanctions from the West\(^1\) due to the government’s decision to redistribute land formerly owned by white colonial farmers in 2000 (Hondora 2008). Once Southern Africa’s “Bread Basket”, Zimbabwe is facing a massive decline in agricultural produce since 2000. Statistics show that tobacco, which was Zimbabwe’s highest foreign currency earner declined from US$ 600 million in 2000 to less than US$ 125 million in 2007 (Mambondiani 2008:1). It is without doubt that indeed Zimbabwe is going through an ongoing crisis.

This study is an exploration of the Zimbabwean crisis. It particularly seeks to understand the origins and nature of the crisis by tracing its development from 1980 to date. It also explores prospects for the future beyond the crisis. The main aim of the study is to provide a solid overview of the crisis. The study relies on two sources of information in order to establish the complexities of the Zimbabwean crisis. The first source is an analysis of secondary literature, which has been used to trace the development of the crisis. The second source is perceptions of young Zimbabweans living in Cape Town of the origins and nature of the crisis and prospects for the future.

\(^1\) In this study, the “West” has been used to refer specifically to Britain, America and the European Union
The main argument of the study is that the Zimbabwean crisis is of a deepening nature. A careful analysis from the early 1980’s reveals that Zimbabwe was going through its “golden years”. Signs of a crisis began to emerge in the early 1990’s leading to the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment programme (ESAP). ESAP further deepened the crisis. The disbursement of war veteran gratuities on 1997, the government’s decision to participate in the DRC war in 1998 as well as the intense land redistribution of 2000 all furthered the deterioration of the economy and politics. What was left of Zimbabwe was then further battered by sanctions from the West following the government’s decision to redistribute land.

I further argue that the Zimbabwean crisis is a distinct crisis. As from 1980’s up until the period of Structural Adjustment in the 1990’s, the crises faced by Zimbabwe did not show any features different from those of other African countries that had undergone structural adjustment. However, what made the crisis distinct is the land redistribution of land formerly owned by whites without compensation undertaken by the government, thereby leading to the country’s economic isolation by the West. The more catastrophic crisis that followed sanctions from the West proved that indeed no country can live in isolation from the global network. I therefore emphasize with regard to prospects for the future that Zimbabwe needs to re-enter the global scene. I also argue that the country’s economic isolation could put it in a strong bargaining power when it re-enters the global network. The reality is that Zimbabwe has redistributed land that was formerly owned by the minority white capitalist farmers to a significant proportion of the citizens. In this regard, the country can bargain on clinging to the status quo regarding land in negotiating to re-enter the global network and emerge as a better periphery compared to other African countries that have not undergone any land redistribution.

1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Study

In the light of the above, the main aim of the study is to provide a solid overview of the Zimbabwean crisis. The study seeks to address the following objectives:

- What are the origins of the Zimbabwean crisis?
- What is the nature of the crisis?
- What are the prospects for the future beyond the crisis?
1.3 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The Zimbabwean crisis and prospects for the future cannot be understood without analysing the country within a broader global framework which it has been part of for several decades before isolation. Owing to the fact that Zimbabwe’s economic isolation has led to an even more catastrophic and ongoing crisis, it is apparent that no country can live in isolation from the global scene. On this note, the theory of periphery capitalism is the most suitable framework within which the origins and nature of the Zimbabwean crisis can be analyzed. On the other hand, Amin (1990)’s delinking theory is very useful in exploring prospects for the future.

In the global system, Zimbabwe falls within the group of countries known as periphery countries. The global system consists of “core” or “metropolis” or “centre” countries which are the Western developed countries responsible for the spread of capitalism to the rest of the world. Periphery countries are those countries mostly known as Third World countries, who are direct recipients of capitalist expansion from the centre. Theodorson and Theodorson (1970) define capitalism as an economic system based upon accumulation investment of capital by private individuals who then become owners of the means of production and distribution of goods and services. They also note that capitalism is characterized by economic motivation through private profit, competition the determination of prices and wages primarily through supply and demand, an extensive system of credit, freedom of contract, and a free labor market. It is clear from this definition that in the context of the global system, capitalism is designed to solely benefit the core countries to the detriment of the peripheries (Amin 2002).

A comparison of centre and periphery countries in the global scene reveals remarkable differences between the two. According to Amin (2002), centres are inward looking, auto-centered and simultaneously integrated in the global system in an active way while periphery countries are integrated into the system such that they do not play a significant role in shaping its relations. Zimbabwe, like other periphery countries has also been integrated into the global system in a passive way.
Zimbabwe became a periphery through several decades of modernization. Nabudere (2006) defines modernization as a process of change towards those types of social, economic, and political systems that had developed in Western Europe and North America between the nineteenth and twentieth century, to the South American, Asian and African continents. Following modernization’s main assumption that if Third World countries follow similar stages of development taken by Western countries they will become like the West, Zimbabwe, like other periphery countries became caught up in the notion of ‘catching up” in its pursuit of modernity.

A consideration of the main criticism lodged against modernization gives insight into its failure to bring its promised results in Zimbabwe and also how it positioned the country as a dependent of the West. Frank (1971)’s argument on the fruitlessness of expecting underdeveloped countries to repeat the stages of economic growth passed through by modern developed societies whose classical capitalist development arose out of pre-capitalist and feudal society seems true. Amin (1972) also argues in agreement with Frank (1971), that due to the definitiveness of social formations, it is absurd to draw an analogy between the same modes of production belonging to societies of different ages. On the other hand, Alavi (1982) comments that the kind of capitalism established by modernization in periphery countries is different from that established in the centre countries. He notes that periphery capitalism does not allow forces of production in periphery countries to grow into classical capitalism. Indeed through modernization, Zimbabwe was not led to modernity like what the modernists would like us to believe. However, it was directed to being what (Amin 1972, Frank 1971; Alavi; 1982) refer to as dependency and underdevelopment. The kind of capitalism that resulted in Zimbabwe is indeed unlike classical capitalism as Alavi (1982) has stated. Instead, it’s a form of capitalism which positioned Zimbabwe such that it became dependent on its links with the West.

Zimbabwe’s dependency relations with the West can be traced as far back as the colonial period where, like other periphery countries, it received capitalism from outside. Before independence, capitalist development in Zimbabwe saw the dispossession of land from Zimbabweans by the colonial government while delineating the Africans to unfertile Reserves. Arrighi (1973) explains that this destroyed peasant manufacturing while creating a new need for previously
independent peasants to earn cash as labourers in colonial farms and industries. He also notes that at the end of the day, capitalist development established a dual economy with white Europeans at the hegemonic position over Africans.

Global capitalist development has been established such that core countries benefit in their development from the resources of the periphery countries. Amin (1974) states that this development monopolizes an export sector in all periphery countries to usurp raw materials to core countries at production costs lower than those at the centre. On the other hand, Alavi (1982) comments that the role of generalized commodity production by periphery countries is a structural condition that is satisfied only by virtue of the periphery’s link with the metropolis. Zimbabwe falls within these descriptions. Like other periphery countries, the country has played a role of exporting raw materials and agricultural products to Western countries as well as African countries under conditions of unfair trade described by Amin (1974). These links strengthened Zimbabwe’s relations with the West for several decades before the economic isolation of 2000.

Alavi (1982) highlights another interesting aspect of the structure of periphery countries which is crucial to understanding the origins and nature of the Zimbabwean crisis. He notes that due to their dependency to core countries, they cannot be understood without taking into account their link with capitalism on a global framework. He goes on to explain that the effect of capitalism on these countries is that it breaks down their self sufficiency such that they cannot reproduce themselves except within the congruent of capital in which they are part of. In consideration of these structural constraints, Zimbabwe’s prospects for the future should indeed be analyzed by placing the country in the wider global scene.

Alavi (1982) also stresses that due to the nature of periphery countries described above, they cannot be independent from their links with the core. He notes that even after undergoing political independence, they still remain under indirect economy domination and control of their former colonial masters. Zimbabwe is an illustration of periphery countries that remained under the control of its colonial masters. Moyo (2004) and Stoneman and Cliffe (1989) point out that at independence, the country inherited a dual structure from the colonial period where agricultural,
industrial and mining interests remained owned by the local and foreign capitalists under monopolistic conditions. Zimbabwe went further to adopt the modernist oriented Structural Adjustment Programme by World Bank and IMF in the 1990’s in an attempt to revive the economy. These links further perpetuated and strengthened dependency relations between Zimbabwe and the West.

This is the global system that Zimbabwe has been economically isolated from. The country’s periphery position and hence its lack of influence in the global framework raises serious questions regarding prospects for the future. The reality of Zimbabwe’s need to re-integrate into the global system is inevitable if we consider its retrogressive and ongoing crisis.

Whilst in his earlier work, Amin (1972) likens the situation of periphery countries to a dead end; Zimbabwe has the potential to defy this description. Land has been redistributed in Zimbabwe, therefore reversing the dual ownership inherited at independence where whites owned most of the arable land. On that note, it is worth considering if there aren’t any possibilities for Zimbabwe to be re-integrated into the international community without losing the acquired land and without returning to its previous stage of ESAP of the 1990’s in which the country was still in a crisis but better than the current one.

Amin (1990) proposes possibilities for periphery countries to extricate themselves from the tentacles of capitalism through delinking from capital. This I argue can be pursued by Zimbabwe on re-entering the global scene. Amin (1990:62) defines delinking as a pursuit of a system of rational for economic options founded on the law of value on a national basis with popular relevance, independent of such criteria of economic rationality as flow from the dominance of the capitalist law of value operating on a world scale. In essence, delinking entails rejecting the blind surrender to the demands of international competitiveness by Third World countries in an attempt to restore their lost autonomy He also argues that delinking is associated with a ‘transition” outside capitalism and over a long period of time towards global socialism.

One of the major conditions of delinking according to Amin (1990:53) is that Third World countries should go through a moment of separation or isolation from the world capitalist system
after which they should re-integrate into the global world hopefully adjusting to socialism. Zimbabwe is a country already in isolation from the global system. In this regard, it is possible for the country to determine the terms in which it is integrated into the global system through delinking. Since land has already been redistributed to the citizens, Zimbabwe can bargain on clinging onto this status quo. Amin (1991:53) uses China and Russia as illustrations of countries that emerged as semi-peripheries and centres after delinking. This reality infuses hope for the Zimbabwean situation. The country could possibly re-integrate itself into the global system with more dignity and assume a better position than it had before isolation.

Amin (1990:54) also points to the emergence of new ripe centres to challenge global hegemonies such as China and Russia as one of the measures that could extricate periphery countries from their crisis of dependency on capitalism. I argue that Zimbabwe has already positioned itself such that delinking is possible. Moyo and Yeros (2007) note that while the country has been economically isolated, Zimbabwe has already strengthened relations with China through its “Look East Policy” in an attempt to align itself with new centres with which it does not share a colonial past. This is a step towards the right direction.

In other words, with regard to prospects for the future, Zimbabwe is presented with two options; either to return to modernization and its promise of “catching up” to modernity or detecting its terms of re-integration into the global system through delinking as elaborated by Amin. The former would take Zimbabwe back to a position similar to Economic Structural Adjustment of the 1990’s, which is a better crisis than what the country is currently facing. The latter could provide more lasting solutions for the country’s ongoing crisis because it addresses the structural issues of the country that have kept it dependent on the West. This option ensures that Zimbabwe not only clings to the status quo with regard to land, but it can re-enter the global scene with more dignity through delinking. Amin (1990) admits that the transition to socialism through delinking is not linear and that it is still distant and that its point of arrival is largely unknown. For a country like Zimbabwe, I would argue that delinking is still worth pursuing.
1.4 Significance of the Study
This study is a contribution to existing debates on the Zimbabwean crisis. It provides a new academic twist by dissecting the distinctive nature of the crisis through the country’s economic isolation following the government’s decision to redistribute land and placing the crisis within a wider global context. It also provides a new way of thinking regarding possibilities for the future with the contribution of Zimbabweans that have experienced the crisis directly and indirectly. While it is true that Zimbabwe is faced with a crisis of magnitude proportions, this study stresses that in the midst of this impasse, Zimbabwe can emerge in the global scene with more dignity by maintaining its status quo regarding land ownership. This contribution will elicit further debates on the crisis, which will provide other angles from which it can be understood. I argue that by changing the way people think about the crisis; this study will also call for a positive and more pragmatic change in solutions made for the future.

1.5 Research Design
A qualitative approach has been adopted for this research. According to Babbie, Mouton and Provesky (2001), qualitative research attempts to study human action from the perspective of the social actors themselves. They state that this design seeks to understand social action in terms of its specific context rather than attempting to generalize to some theoretical population. It also allows the researcher to satisfy their curiosity and desire for better understanding and develop new hypotheses about existing phenomenon. The nature of qualitative research explained above made it the most suitable research design to understand Zimbabweans’ personal understanding of the origins, nature of the Zimbabwean crisis and prospects for the future.

1.6 Methodology
1.6.1 Secondary Literature
This study relied heavily on secondary literature in tracing the development of the crisis from 1980 to date. Peer Reviewed Academic Journals and Published Books were the main source of information. Where necessary, the researcher also consulted a few published online articles particularly focusing on the most current developments of the crisis. The literature consulted
provided the invaluable and divergent angles from which the crisis has been analyzed. In this regard, it was crucial in establishing the foundation of the study before carrying out fieldwork.

\textit{1.6.2 In-depth Interviews}

In-depth interviews were adopted as a qualitative research method of gathering data for this study owing to its explorative nature. According to Babbie, Mouton and Provesky (2001) a qualitative interview is essentially a conversation in which the interviewer establishes a general direction for the conversation in which the interviewer establishes a general direction and pursues specific topics raised by the respondent. In-depth interviews allow the object of the study to speak for him/her/itself and also give room for probing for further specific information (Babbie, Mouton and Provesky 2001).

Twenty young Zimbabweans between the ages of 24 and 32 living in Cape Town were interviewed between April and June of 2008. In-depth interviews allowed space for these Zimbabweans freely articulate their perceptions through guided conversations. Looking at the characteristics of the respondents, eight were postgraduate students studying at the University of Cape Town in fields such as politics, sociology and economics. Seven were professionally qualified and formally employed for example two people in this sample were academics who have written and published articles on the Zimbabwean crisis before, while others worked in Non Governmental Organizations and the Government. The remaining five were employed in semi-skilled jobs such as selling curios and waitressing. The sample consisted of nine males and eleven females.

All respondents seemed to be informed about the crisis. Access to various forms of media such as newspapers, internet sources and television was identified as their main source of information. Their level of knowledge was also determined by their social class. I gathered that those who were studying at the time of the research and the two formally employed academics had a much deeper understanding of the crisis than the rest of the sample. In order to protect the privacy of the respondents, this study uses pseudo names for the respondents as agreed during the signing of
the consent forms before the interviews. All interviews were tape recorded with the consent of
the respondents.

All the respondents grew up in Zimbabwe where they observed the changes that took place in the
government and economic scene with dramatic changes in the standard of living. 70% of the
respondents left the country because of the intensification of the crisis after 2000 while 30% left
before 1995 to advance their studies and take up formal employment. While in South Africa, all
the respondents have kept in contact with their families and friends back home who continually
update them about the current situation. They also rely on their experiences from constant visits
to Zimbabwe for information about the crisis. While in South Africa, the respondents discuss the
crisis with other fellow Zimbabweans in their social circles.

The decision to interview Zimbabwean living in Cape Town was reached after a careful logical
consideration. I argue that there is value in interviewing people who have left the country to tap
into their previous experiences while in Zimbabwe as well as their current informed perceptions.
In terms of proximity, this was a convenience sample because I am currently a student in Cape
Town. I had the chance to revisit my respondents to clarify certain aspects of the interviews that
needed further explanation. The location of the respondents was strategic because I incurred less
research costs. In addition, such a research would not have been successfully carried out in
Zimbabwe given the current tense political climate, which was worsened by the violence that
accompanied the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections at the time of my fieldwork. This
could have compromised my safety as a researcher.

1.6.3 Method of analyzing data
The grounded theory method of analysis described by Tesch (1990) was used to analyze the data.
After carrying out fieldwork, I transcribed all the interviews. I then read the transcripts carefully
to identify significant features and patterns. This was followed by sorting the data also known as
coding. According to Tesch (1990), coding entails tagging text segments with information and
placing them into different thematic categories. It also involves placing everything that belongs
to one category in one place, so that it can be read in a continuous fashion about everyone’s
perception on the topic. After this process, I then assigned the categories or themes names that best described them.

I continuously read the data in order to organize it into finer sub categories which grounded me with the interviews. During this process, I did encounter new categories as outlined by Tesch (1990). For material that belonged to one category, I undertook preliminary analysis. Tesch (1990) defines preliminary analysis as identifying commonalities in content, uniqueness in content, confusions and contradictions as well as missing information with regard to the research question. I then reported the findings accordingly in their respective categories. The major themes were reported first, in a descending order, where the smaller themes were discussed last. The whole process of analysis was guided by the research question.

The grounded theory was the most suitable method of analysis for this research because of its explorative nature. It allowed me to familiarize with the finest details of Zimbabweans’ perceptions of the crisis enough to make comparisons with secondary literature.

1.6.4 Ethics Appraisal
Since this research involved interviewing individual people, I was fully aware of ethical issues. In particular, I managed to record all my interviews with the full consent of the respondents. Before the interviews, each respondent was asked to fill in a consent form as proof for their admittance to participate in this study. This consent agreement assured them that their real names would not be used in the final research report to create anonymity of their identities. In this regard, in reporting information from the interviews, I used pseudo names instead of their real names in order to protect the privacy of the respondents. All the interview transcripts were handled with strict confidentiality. During the research process, I did not encounter any factors that could have positioned me in a dishonest manner with respect to the respondents.

1.7 Limitations of the Study
This study only engaged a small sample of respondents during fieldwork. In this regard, the perceptions of the young Zimbabweans in the study cannot be extrapolated to make wide
generalizations. However, the respondents’ perceptions provided invaluable information which facilitated a deeper understanding of the crisis. Over and above their knowledge of the crisis, they also added their experiences as well and their perceptions regarding the future. This enriched the quality of the analysis of the crisis.

1.8 Outline of Chapters

Including this chapter, this study has been broken down to five chapters. The next chapter is an analysis of the Zimbabwean crisis from 1980 to 1999 using secondary literature. It focuses on the development of the crisis during the 1980’s when the country was going through its “golden years”. It also looks at the emergence of an economic crisis in the early 1990’s as well as the adoption of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and its impact on deepening the crisis. The chapter also explores the government’s attempt to redistribute land following challenges from an emerging war veteran movement as well as the beginning of tensions between Zimbabwe and the West.

Chapter Three is a continuation of the development of the Zimbabwean crisis using secondary literature. It is confined to the period between 2000 to date. The chapter looks at the Draft Constitution, its rejection and government repression. It also explores the intense land redistribution of 2000 and Zimbabwe’s economic isolation by the West which further deepened the crisis. It concludes by discussing possibilities for Zimbabwe’s future beyond the crisis.

Chapter Four provides an overview of young Zimbabweans’ perceptions of the origins and nature of the crisis and prospects for the future. It also analyzes if there are any similarities and differences between the projection of the crisis in secondary literature and perceptions by Zimbabweans. This is followed by the Concluding Chapter which provides a summary of the research findings, as well as concluding remarks.
CHAPTER TWO


2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the Zimbabwean crisis using secondary literature. The chapter provides a historical overview of the crisis from the time the country attained its independence in 1980 to the late 1990’s. This was a period when Zimbabwe went through its “golden” years of economic prosperity in the 80’s before the emergence of an economic crisis in the late eighties. This was followed by a period of structural adjustment during the early 1990’s to the mid 1990’s which further deepened Zimbabwe’s crisis. Another significant feature of this period is the government’s attempt to redistribute land following challenges from an emerging war veteran movement, which soured Zimbabwe’s relations with the West.

The chapter has been broken down into four significant periods. The first period is a brief contextual background, which covers key economic and political issues in the late 70’s leading to the formation of the independent state in 1980. This section highlights the Lancaster House Agreement between Zimbabwe and Britain and other structural dynamics of the country, which are crucial towards understanding the Zimbabwean crisis. This is then followed by a section looking at the period between 1980 and the late 1980’s, analysing the various debates centred on Zimbabwe’s “golden” years and the underlying political and economic dynamics which were responsible for the crisis of the late 1980’s. The period between the late 1980’s and the mid 90’s will be the next section. This section focuses on the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and its effects on further deepening the crisis. This will be followed by the period between 1997 and 1999, which looks at the emergence of the war veteran movement as well as the government’s decision to be involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war. It also focuses on the emergence of a vibrant Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party and pressure exerted on the government to redistribute land.
In this chapter, I argue that from 1980 up until the period of Structural Adjustment between the late 1980’s and mid-1990s, the crises in Zimbabwean did not show any distinct features compared to experiences of other African countries that had undergone similar Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes. However, there are signs that the Zimbabwean crisis could be different owing to the government’s sour relations with the West following its first attempt to redistribute land.

2.2 Contextual Background
In order to understand the Zimbabwean crisis, it is important to provide a context of the late 1970’s to 1980, a time when Zimbabwe attained independence after several decades of colonialism. This section details the challenges faced by the new ZANU PF government in consolidating its power and the difficulties of delivering the promises of the liberation war. This is not a comprehensive and detailed section as it is not the focus of this study. However, it is crucial in providing the context from which the origins of the Zimbabwean crisis can be traced.

Zimbabwe is a product of a colonial past heavily laden with deep-seated economic and political problems. Campbell (2003) remarks that politically, Rhodesia, as Zimbabwe was called before independence, underwent a severe period of repression from the then presiding Prime Minister Ian Smith. He adds that the political repression followed Smith’s declaration of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of the mid 1960’s in which he adamantly swore that there would be no majority rule by Africans in his lifetime (Campbell 2003:24). According to Coggins (2006:364), Smith’s rule was a major impediment to any possibilities of either repealing or altering the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which allocated half of the country and prime agricultural land to whites. He stresses that these are the conditions under which, in 1972, the ZANU stepped up the programme of armed struggle that had begun in 1966 following unsuccessful talks with the Smith regime.

The liberation movement was composed of two factions. The first was the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo. The alliance between the two was called the Patriotic Front
(Campbell 2003). However, both parties were sponsored and aided by different countries. ZAPU was sponsored by the Soviet Union, while ZANU was sponsored by China (Hodder-Williams 1983). Moyo (2004) argues that one of the war’s major promises was to return the land to the Zimbabweans. Raftopoulos (2003:217) on the other hand, points to a wider scope of motivations for the war, in which they reveal the need to return land to its people, to promote human rights and restore the dignity of the people.

The economy of Rhodesia was also facing major challenges of continual decline during the 1970’s. According to Coggins (2006:370), the decline was a result of economic sanctions lodged against the Smith regime following his defiance to grant independence to the country. Bond (2006) argues that the war itself amplified uneven sectoral development by drawing resources into military production, which further interrupted trade in many areas. He sees the crisis as a result of overaccumulation of capital, a situation in which excessive investment has occurred and hence goods cannot be brought to market profitability, leaving sectoral bottlenecks or speculative outlets without being put back into its new productive system (Bond 2006:7). Drought, high oil prices, lack of foreign exchange, imposition of British embargoes on pre-independent Rhodesia’s tobacco, sugar and other products and suspension of the country’s access to London capital markets are some of the descriptions of this pre-independence crisis (Coggins 2006).

The intensification of the war, the resultant need to resolve vital questions of power between Smith and the Africans as well as the need to address economic problems under sanctions gave birth to the Lancaster Agreement of 1979 between the Smith regime and the Africans (Tamarkin 1990:225). Various explanations have been given for Smith’s co-operation in the agreement. It is argued that the radical performance of the Africans in the war disillusioned the Smith regime to the extent that fighting to the bitter end to defend a black majority was not appealing (Tamarkin 1990). Others remark that the West feared that the intensifying struggle would mobilize peasants behind the programme for an alternative, radical transformation of society (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989:30). Whatever the reasons, a ceasefire was declared and arrangements for the transition to independence and a new constitution brought the two parties on to the negotiating table (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989).
The Smith Regime and the Africans agreed that in order to create an all-inclusive society and a smooth transition from colonialism to independence, private property rights regarding land had to be protected (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003). They both agreed that an independent Zimbabwe would permit land acquisition during the first decade of independence (1980-1990) only through a willing seller willing buyer approach and that Britain would fund the acquisition (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:4).

It must be highlighted however that ZANU PF signed the agreement after several months of resistance because it maintained that throughout the war, the party had pledged to the people that land will be returned to them after the war (Campbell 2003). However, Campbell (2003:24) explains that Africans were in a weaker position in the negotiating table because of various attacks lodged against them. He notes that 14 ZANU members were killed and Robert Mugabe’s life was threatened through bombing attacks on his house and a reward was pledged by white vigilante groups for the murder of Joshua Nkomo who led the ZAPU PF during the Africans’ dealings with British Forces at the Lancaster.

The signing of the Lancaster House Agreement led to an immediate ceasefire and removal of British sanctions against the country and Zimbabwe’s political independence on the 18th of April 1980 (Tamarkin 1990; Campbell 2003). ZANU PF won the majority of the seats during elections and came to power. Zimbabwe inherited a dual structure from the colonial period where agricultural, industrial and mining interests remained owned by the local white and foreign capitalists under monopolistic conditions (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989; Moyo 2004). The white minority, (about 6000 farmers at independence), owned 39% of the land, amounting to 15.5 million hectares of prime agro-ecological farmland, while one million black households remained consigned to 41.4 million hectares of land, or 16.4 million hectares of marginal land (Moyo 2004). The white minority (about 3%) also controlled approximately two-thirds of national income; while the black majority (97%) took the remaining one-third (Moyo 2004:5).

The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 was a major impediment to ZANU PF’s ability to redistribute land to the people as they had pledged when Africans embarked in the liberation war (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) best describes this situation:
After the signing of the Lancaster Agreement the emancipatory traditions of the liberation movement as well as the African nationalist project were saddled in the heavy weight of the formidable forces of liberation to the extent that the African nationalist project presided over the neo-colonial state with black faces at the political helm and white at the economic helm (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006:9).

What Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) means above is that Zimbabwe was no longer in a position to extricate itself from white rule because most of the land and the economy remained in the hands of the white minority, defeating the nationalist government’s promise of redistributing land at independence. Neo-colonialism means that in a politically independent state, multinational corporations continue to have a major influence in the development of the productive capacity of the Third World (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989:29). In other words, Mugabe, at independence, had to compromise the demands of the African nationalist movement and renege the noble promises of the liberation struggle, for the purposes of nation building and power consolidation, which was further compounded by Zimbabwe’s considerable economic dependence on world markets and on external capital through the national reconciliation policy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006:19).

Despite Mugabe’s compromise of the liberation war promises to build the nation; his government adopted a socialist perspective. Stoneman and Cliffe (1989:121) reveal the government’s socialist stance in promising to “...establish progressively a society founded on socialist, democratic and egalitarian principles and [to] end imperialist exploitation, and achieve greater and more equitable degree of ownership of natural resources including land...” They explain that this stance stood in contradiction with the capitalist nature of the economy in which the minority whites owned the economy as agreed in the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. In this regard, the government did not fully enforce its socialist principles because it feared to confront imperialism. For most of the 1980’s the government maintained the socialist-capitalist contradictions which had the potential of exploding into a crisis in the future.
2.3 The Dawn of Independence and Challenges

Regardless of the dilemmas faced by ZANU PF, Zimbabwe became a beacon of hope. Sanctions against the Smith regime had been lifted, and the international community favoured Zimbabwe, and donor assistance poured in (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003; Dansereau 2004). Consequently, the Zimbabwean economy, at independence, was the second most industrialized in Sub Saharan Africa (Moyo 2004:5). Economic growth and stability looked encouraging (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003). The government came up with a Transitional National Development Plan in which the state was the engine of growth and development (Dansereau 2004:9). Under this plan, the government aimed at increasing state control through investment, improving guidelines and public sector investment aimed at stimulating private investment and improving skills and creating employment (Dansereau 2004:9). During the period between 1980 and 1981 alone, Zimbabwe had a record breaking economic growth of 26%, owing to the removal of sanctions and high gold prices (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003; Dansereau 2004).

Its large commercial farming sector and dynamic economy was the envy not just of all African states (including South Africa), but also of emerging economies in other developing regions (Hawkins 2004). Zimbabwe is an agro-based economy (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004). The contribution of agriculture and forestry to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fluctuated between 13% and 19% during the 1980’s and 1990’s, and contributed about 60% towards the economy’s foreign exchange earnings (Economic Report for Africa 2002:113). During the first decade of independence, the agriculture sector employed about 70% of the population (Moyo 2004:5) The agricultural sector contributed 60% of local agricultural output into local manufacturing while 20% was absorbed back into agriculture (Economic Report for Africa 2002:113). Depending on the year, agriculture generated between 40 and 50% of the total export revenue, over half of which came from tobacco. The dynamic agricultural sector of the country led to the country’s renowned image as the Bread Basket of Southern Africa. The period between 1980 and 1984 alone saw relatively rapid land acquisition through the market, totalling approximately 2,200,000 hectares, at 430, 000 hectares per year with the assistance of funds from Britain (Moyo and Yeros 2005:183).
The 1980’s also saw the extension of social services to the poor by the government with assistance from the international community. The social services included free health and education (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). The state also took measures to protect its workers through legislation such as the Minimum Wages Legislations Act, which gave greater recognition to workers’ rights trade unions (Raftopoulos 2003:222). It also focused on advancing other public services such as water supplies and reconstruction of roads for the people (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). The international community favoured Zimbabwe, and donor assistance poured in, which made the country a model of what other countries liked to emulate for their own communities (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003).

However, the economic prosperity of the 1980’s overshadowed some deep seated economic and political dynamics that were to emerge as a crisis later. Moyo (2004) states that the fact that the government could not adequately deliver its promises of land after being bound by the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 was one of those dynamics. He reiterates Stoneman and Cliffe (1989:33)’s early observation that by guaranteeing property rights, the agreement made it expensive to redistribute land, industrial properties and resources to the people. According to Moyo (2004:17), collaboration from the international community since 1980 was very limited over the funding of land reform, and the tenor to call multilateral support to Zimbabwe’s land reform by UK and USA had negative responses as donors saw the land reform to be a bilateral agreement between the UK and the Zimbabwean government. Even though UK provided finances, these were very limited (Moyo 2004). UK provided grants worth approximately 33 million British Pounds (US $ 44 million) during the 1980’s for the market land acquisition as well as for various resettlement inputs. Moyo (2004) remarks that this money, conceptualized as “aid” rather than reparations, was provided as a matching grant to the government of Zimbabwe’s own inputs, and disbursed as reimbursements for the government’s land purchases approved by the relevant offices in the UK (Moyo 2004:6).

Regarding the above, Moyo and Yeros (2005) argues that between 1980 and 1984, the process of land acquisition was slow. They add that it also delivered land of a low aggro-ecological value compared to the land the white minority still retained. Only a small proportion of the 2,200,000 hectares of land was of prime aggro-ecological value, the rest being in less fertile regions (Moyo
and Yeros 2005:184). They emphasize that this also included land that had been abandoned by white landowners in the liberated zones of the war, and hence more easily acquirable. Furthermore, most of this land was bought for people who “squatted” on land as a means of motivating the government to purchase land for them at market prices.

The period from 1985 to 1992 saw a further decline of land acquisition according to Moyo and Yeros (2005). Only 75,000 hectares of land was acquired per year to a total of only about 450,000 hectares. The government had established Squatter Control Committees accountable to the Ministry of Local Government, for the purpose of monitoring illegal self provisioning. These were also responsible for carrying out mass evictions. This new system explains the further decline of land acquisition during this period. In this regard, Moyo and Yeros (2005:184) note that the slow and mistargeted nature of the land reform process would become, in the future, a source of bitter diplomatic conflict between the governments of Zimbabwe and the UK. In other words, they remark that these realities were potential problems that would emerge as a crisis in the future.

On the other hand, Bond (2006:15) explains that by focusing on socialist principles, ZANU PF overlooked the problem of overaccumulation which it inherited during the 1970’s. This too is one of the seeds of a future crisis that remained unresolved by the ZANU PF government at independence. He also reveals many significant signs of economic deterioration in the early 1980’s, a period which included economic stagnation, fall in the value of production and lack of investments. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006:24) adds that the fact that Zimbabwe inherited colonial debt is one of the constraints with a high propensity of emerging as a crisis in the future.

Zimbabwe became in a position of being dictated to in its economic policies by the IMF due to borrowing funds from as early as the 1980’s (Moyo and Yeros 2005). Dansereau (2004) explains that Zimbabwe found itself in this position due to international recession resulting in falling commodity prices and deteriorating terms of trade. The government borrowed US$ 30 million from the IMF in 1981 under heavy conditionalities. According to Peet (2003:66) conditionalities are commitments made by the lending institution as the basis for making a loan or allowing subsequent drawing of previously committed loan money. Chakaodza (1993:17) adds that these
are actual terms or policies that countries pursue in the course of using the IMF and World Bank’s resources. In other words, to ensure that the recipient country complied with these conditions, the IMF monitored the country’s economic performance over time. Dansereau (2004:10) reveals that Zimbabwe also borrowed again in 1983, where conditionalities were heavier, requiring the country to abandon its Transitional Development Strategy as early as 1984. She adds that these transactions, which were not made public, required an increase in support for the export sector and a reduction in government spending on infrastructure and food subsidies. The government’s compliance to these conditionalities led to an 18% decline in government spending, while increasing the loans and debt service ratio, which moved from only 2% in 1980 to 30% in 1983 -1984 (Dansereau 2004:10). These are some of the underlying problems overshadowed by the years of economic prosperity.

While it is clear that during the period from 1980 to the late 1980’s seeds of potential crises were planted owing to problems inherited from the colonial state, these were not visible because Zimbabwe was going through its golden years. The prosperity of the 1980’s therefore overshadowed these underlying contradictions, which would emerge in the late 80’s to be unsustainable crises.

2.4 Zimbabwe under Economic Structural Adjustment: Late 1980’s to Mid-1990’s

From the late 1980’s to the early 1990’s, an economic crisis began to emerge visibly in Zimbabwe. Dansereau (2004:12) describes the crisis as economic stagnation, lack of investment, rising debt levels, shortages of foreign exchange, rising unemployment and declining real wages which sank below the 1979 levels. Davies (2004:12) on the other hand, argues that growth rates were too low and the binding constraints of foreign exchange needed to be broken. This was unlike the 1980’s when Zimbabwe once registered an economic growth of about 26% between 1980 and 1981. My reading of the literature reveals that the crisis of the late 1980’s was a result of the seeds which were glossed over by the prosperity of the 1980’s that began to explode. Indeed, various schools have linked this crisis back to the early 1980’s.
According to Davies (2004:23), the crisis of the early 1990’s exposed that the gains of the 1980’s were easily reversible, since they were based primarily on redistribution of income rather than growth. What he means is that health and education were investments in human capital which were expected to provide the basis for sustained benefit. However, he explains that they are “capital” only in so far as they permit higher inflows of income in the future, which required employment creation (Davies 2004:23). The government’s failure to create jobs generated a climate in which the value of investment in human capital could not be realized. Furthermore, the expanded education system was predicated upon the ability of the budgetary process to continue to finance it, while the health gains of the 1980’s depended on the support of donors. He stresses that these programmes created unsustainable burdens on the budget. In his view, these provisions did not create measures of their own sustainability owing to their reliance on donors for finance.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006:22), in hindsight, critiques the social services provided by the government in the 1980’s by stating that as long as these reforms did not touch the core of settler ownership of the economy they remained merely cosmetic reforms. Bond (2006) on the other hand, furthers his previous argument that Zimbabwe had inherited a crisis of overaccumulation from the colonial period. He states that this crisis of the 1990’s was a culmination of the ugly features of the crisis of overaccumulation that the government did not address during the 1980’s. Dansereau (2004:12) argues that this crisis was a result of the combination of international recession, the opposition of important sectors of the domestic economy in mining and agriculture and the vulnerability of the economy to outside shocks which imposed serious limits on economic transformation.

This crisis led to the adoption of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’ Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) in an attempt to boost the economy (Dansereau 2004). Structural Adjustment Programmes are loans focused on macro-economic policies and institutional change at country level (Peet 2003). The adoption of ESAP in Zimbabwe exposed that the government’s maintenance of a socialist perspective in a capitalist economy throughout the 1980’s was unsustainable. Dansereau (2004) exposes this dilemma. She explains that through ESAP, Zimbabwe became caught in the dilemma of “the struggle between
an internally-oriented development strategy aimed at strengthening domestic forces through local accumulation on the one hand, and the requirements of the Bretton Woods institutions to externalize the economy towards global interests on the other” (Dansereau 2004:17). According to Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003:5), this period also saw the collapse of Soviet socialism, and the rise of neo-liberalism. In this regard, Zimbabwe, by adopting ESAP, inevitably acknowledged the triumph of capitalism over its socialist stance (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003).

There are huge academic debates surrounding Zimbabwe’s adoption of ESAP. Davies (2004) explores some of these debates. In his work, he reveals that one of the explanations for adopting ESAP was that in the face of the economic crisis, it was the only way forward for Zimbabwe. (Davies 2004:28). The other explanation he gives is pressure exerted by the World Bank and the IMF. On the other hand, he states that the motive to acquire personal wealth by the ruling elite was one of the motivations for the adoption of ESAP Davies (2004:30). Chakaodza (1993:65) explains that the critics of ESAP had predicted that since ESAP had failed in Tanzania and Zambia, Zimbabwe could have tried to find other means of extricating the country from the crisis.

Before focusing at the effects of ESAP on Zimbabwe’s politics and economy, we have to look at its impact on the land reform. Moyo (2004:7) comments that the early 1990’s were crucial years regarding the land question since the market-based transfers of land had expired in 1990 as per Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. As mentioned by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) earlier, land had long been promised to Zimbabweans soon after independence and the government was not able to deliver that pledge because of the Lancaster House Agreement constraints. However, Moyo (2004) notes that the government’s decision of adopting ESAP at a time when the environment was conducive to focus on the land redistribution shifted most of its focus towards ESAP and less focus on the burning problem of land reform. He explains that the land reform was submerged (Moyo 2004:7). As a result the racial imbalances of land ownership still remained an ongoing problem unaddressed by the government.
Moyo and Yeros (2005) describe some of the developments advanced by the government regarding the land issue during this period. They state that the government established the Land Acquisition Act in 1992, which legalized compulsory acquisition with provisions for compensation and legal recourse, without displacing the market principle (Moyo and Yeros 2005:176). However, they still maintain that the pace of land acquisition still remained slow, with only 790,000 hectares of land acquired at a pace of 158,000 hectares per year between 1992 and 1997 (Moyo and Yeros 2005:184). In his previous work, Moyo (2004) explains that part of the slow redistribution of land during the 1990’s period was due to the fact that landowners challenged the redistribution system and were successful in maintaining their land even though the market based transfers of the Lancaster Agreement had expired. It is clear indeed that the land issue, even after the expiry of the Lancaster House Agreement, still remained unresolved, which, according to Moyo (2004) was a crisis that was fermenting. The next section describes the effects that ESAP had on the Zimbabwean economy and politics.

2.5 Effects of ESAP

Upon adoption of ESAP, Zimbabwe already owed IMF US$ 2.5 billion which it acquired under several conditionalities since 1980 (Bond and Manyanya 2002:43). There is a consensus that ESAP had drastic effects on the politics and economy of Zimbabwe, which further deepened the crisis. Below are some of the numerous effects that ESAP had on the social, economic and political front in Zimbabwe.

ESAP had promised a 5% annual growth rate, an overall budget deficit drop to 5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which would then lower the inflation rate from 20% to 10% between 1991 and 1994 and a further drop in the debt service ratio (Bond and Manyanya 2002:30-31). However, it did not deliver its promises. The GDP only reached 5% in 1994, and averaged 1.2% from 1991 to 1995. Inflation averaged more than 30% whilst the budget deficit was more than 10% of GDP during the ESAP period (Bond and Manyanya 2002:32). ESAP conditionalities required the government to relax price controls for basic commodities leading to rising inflation levels up to 50% in 1993. Shortages of basic commodities, constant hikes of food prices up to 51% and the rise in transport costs are some of the indicators of a continuous decline in the
economy under ESAP (Chakaodza 1993; Bond and Manyanya 2002). Between 1990 and 1995, about 62% of the households could no longer afford all necessities because of these changes and this widened the gap between the poor and the rich (Chakaodza 1993; Bond and Manyanya 2002).

ESAP conditionalities also forced the government to cut down on public spending (Chakaodza 1993:65). This saw the reversal of the early 1980’s government provision of free health and education, rendering these services out of reach to many poor Zimbabweans who could not afford them leading to massive rates of school dropouts in the 1990’s due to massive fee increases (Bond and Manyanya 2002:35). With regard to health, a fall in health care per capita spending by 20% between 1991 and 1995 raised serious challenges to the poor who could not afford these services, coupled with the impact of the HIV epidemic slowly appearing. A government Poverty Assessment Survey conducted in the mid-90’s confirmed the extensive prevalence of poverty in Zimbabwe. It concluded that about 61% of the population lived in households with income per person below a level sufficient to provide basic needs, while 45% lived below the Food Poverty Line as a result of ESAP (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:6).

ESAP led to massive unemployment for many civil servants following the public sector’s retrenchment of employees and lowering of wages under ESAP conditionalities (Chakaodza 1993:65). Bond and Manyanya (2002:37) add that about 18 000 government jobs were abolished and the civil wage bill was reduced from 15, 3% of GDP in 1990 to 11, 3% of GDP in 1994 (Chakaodza 1993). Other researchers emphasize that the civil service was reduced by approximately 23 500 established posts (Mumvuma, Mujajati and Mufute 2006). De-industrialization also contributed towards this unemployment crisis (Bond and Manyanya 2002:35). The export sector dropped from US$ 1 753 billion in 1990 to US$ 1 531 in 1992, while manufactured exports had fallen from US$ 537 million to US$ 443 million in 1991. Many workers responded through intensified public sector strikes (Raftopoulos 2003:227).

ESAP mired the Zimbabwean economy into a vicious cycle of debt. In all its dealings with the IMF and the World Bank, the country borrowed in order to alleviate the spiralling economic crisis (Bond and Manyanya 2002). The country became more and more dependent on the Bretton Woods institutions (Chakaodza 1993). Bond and Manyanya (2002:48) highlight that foreign debt
rose from US$3.25 billion to US$5.05 billion in a five-year period of 1990-1995. This had grave impact on Zimbabwe’s economic priorities. While the majority of the citizens suffered due the economic crisis, Zimbabwe spent a significant percentage of its export earnings on servicing these debts, which further strained the economy.

While to a great extent ESAP had drastic effects on Zimbabwe’s economy, particularly deepening the crisis, a few people benefited from it. Worth noting is that ESAP made the poor poorer and the rich richer (Chakaodza 1993). A large section of the rich people who became richer were traders and business people who benefited from the government’s removal of price controls under ESAP conditionalities, allowing them to raise prices in the face of no competition, as a result of a shortage in basic commodities, thereby maximizing profits (Chakaodza 1993:65).

ESAP also had very serious political implications for the Zimbabwean government. Chakaodza (1993:65) states that the failure of the programme eroded the base power of President Robert Mugabe, leading to the emergence of opposition political and social forces, notably urban workers, who mounted their discontent with ESAP by mid-1992. He notes that the spiralling rise in the cost of living, combined with all sorts of constraints imposed by ESAP began to turn the most significant social forces in the country away from the government. On the part of the government, this was experienced as a legitimacy crisis because it lost a considerable part of its traditional mobilizing power because of its economic reforms (Chakaodza 1993:66).

2.6 Popular Response to the ESAP Generated Crisis

Moyo (2004:9) states that the failure of ESAP exposed the long unaddressed problem of land. He highlights growing poverty and retrenchment of workers under ESAP as some of the factors that contributed to the demands for land. He points to an indigenous middle and capitalist classes that emerged at that period showing an escalated interest on the land as they had begun to expand their focus on accumulating capital through emerging markets based on land and natural resource uses as some of the groups that enforced pressure on the need for land. He also identifies the severe drought during the 1991/92 farming season which led to extensive commercial farm retrenchments, adding to ESAP induced retrenchments. These measures increased the pressure
on communal area land and natural resources, and hence increased the need for land redistribution.

The general response to the failure of ESAP according to Moyo (2004:9) was the intensification of “illegal” land occupations, which had started in the early 1980’s, leading to widespread poaching of natural resources in various areas. More insight into the squatting problem is provided below:

In one trend, squatting spread from large-scale commercial farming areas to other land tenure regimes, to such an extent that the bulk of officially recognized squatters were now in communal areas (33%), plus resettlement areas (12%), urban areas (10%), and state lands (31%) and only a minority (14%) on commercial farms (Moyo and Yeros 2005:185).

The initial response of the state to these occupations according to Moyo (2004:8) was the eviction of “squatters” in a violent fashion, through court actions and the police in collaboration with the white farmers and local authorities. He also asserts that the government also tolerated some “squatter settlements” and managed some of the popular struggles through the diversion of land hunger by the delivery of agricultural support schemes intended to effect agrarian reform within communal areas and by improving the intensity of land use on already available land for the Zimbabweans. He also highlights that while the squatter policy promised to evict squatters, it failed to stem the “squatting” problem mainly because its legitimacy in doing so was questioned at the local level due to slow redistribution.

These dynamics remind us of Moyo (2004)’s early argument that the failure to address colonial land ownership imbalances would emerge to be a crisis in the future. Clearly the government was struggling to manage a long postponed problem of land. The next section highlights various responses to the ESAP generated crisis.

Moyo and Yeros (2005) also portray the end of the Structural Adjustment in 1996, as a tense period for the government which was faced by various challenges from its citizens challenging its legitimacy. They point to 230 strikes across several industries including construction, commercial, hotel and catering, cement and lime, railways, urban councils, and post telecommunications as the height of responses to the deepening crisis caused by ESAP. They
also emphasize that for the first time, farm workers also downed tools in a wildcat strike in protest over poor working conditions, which stood at less than one sixth of the poverty datum line (Moyo and Yeros 2005:186).

An even more challenge to the government came through the war veterans who, precipitated by the collapse of the state sponsored War Veteran Compensation Fund, demanded that the state compensate them for their participation in the liberation war (Moyo and Yeros 2005:186). Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004:360) explain the precarious relationship between the government and the war veterans. They note that on the one hand, the government had always sanctioned and encouraged war veterans’ violence against its opponents and rewarded them for the work well done. It had also invoked its role in the liberation struggle to justify its use of war veterans and its objectives. On the other hand, the war veterans used their allegedly superior contribution to the liberation struggle to justify their claims for preferential access to state resources such as jobs, promotions, pensions and land through the use of violence and intimidation. In this regard, Moyo and Yeros (2005) emphasize that the war veteran challenge was of a different magnitude because the war veterans were also firmly embedded in the state apparatus and were also in charge of security, including the president’s office. They reiterate Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003:7)’s explanation, who stated earlier that the government was aware of the veterans’ political capital in relation to their primacy in Zimbabwe’s national liberation history, and was reluctant to face losing their support or the prospects of an even more violent challenge from them.

The government yielded to the war veteran demands. 50 000 war veterans were awarded Z$ 50 000 each and a monthly pension of Z$ 2 000 as a direct response of this challenge (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:360; Bond and Manyanya (2002:29). Moyo (2005:187) adds that the government also promised to designate 1,470 white commercial farms in which 20% were to be given to war veterans. Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004:360) argue that Mugabe’s abrupt decision to grant war veterans their new demands for financial compensation signalled a decisive shift by the President towards greater reliance on the coercive capacity. They insist that while this strengthened the government and war veterans’ long standing relationship, these unbudgeted funds had a huge strain on the already ailing economy. Bond (2006:24) also stresses that due to
the government’s decisions; the Zimbabwean dollar lost 74% of its value on the 14th of November over a four hour period in 1997, a reality that chased away most of the country’s foreign investors. He notes that for most Zimbabweans, this crisis was felt in the form of unprecedented rates of inflation rising from below 15% in September 1997 to 45% over a period of eighteen months.

Moyo and Yeros (2005:187) add that the second Structural Adjustment Programme (ZIMPREST) was abandoned, balance of payments support from IMF was suspended, and the economy continued on a rapid decline in the same year. They explain that in the same year, the government also faced a challenge from the war veteran led movement consisting of various rural alliances, urban grievances, spirit mediums, urban working class and elites, including largely ZANU PF government officials, traditional leaders, who rebelled against the government, demanding land redistribution (Moyo and Yeros 2004:15). While the demand for land was from a large pool of people, the war veterans, who had been promised 20% of the 1,471 farms to be designated, were at the forefront. As predicted earlier, Moyo (2004) highlights serious differences between Robert Mugabe and Tony Blair in which they openly disagreed in Scotland over Britain’s responsibility for redressing land reclamation in response to the escalating need for land in Zimbabwe. He argues that from 1997, the new British Labour government dishonoured the commitments by the Conservative party to finance the land reform programme because they were not descendents of the land owning stock (Moyo 2004:19). In this regard, the government chose to respond to the demands of the war veteran formulated movement. In November 1997, 1,471 farms, most of which belonged to the whites, were forcefully designated for appropriation by the government (Moyo 2004:17). Worth noting is that these farms were designated and had not yet been acquired.

According to Moyo (2004:17), the designation of 1,471 farms for appropriation in 1997 by the ZANU PF government brought UK and Zimbabwe back to the negotiating table in a conference of 1998 in which the former expressed the intention to fund the land reform under certain conditions. He points out that UK argued for market friendly land acquisition, which was sceptically viewed by the Zimbabwean government to be an evasion of colonial responsibility and lack of commitment to fund redistribution. However, in the final conference agreement, UK
promised donor funds based on a broad set of conditions, which included improved governance of the land reform process, a poverty reduction approach, market friendly land reform approaches, the use of the rule of law and sustainable economic policy.

It seems that the 1998 meeting was scheduled too late for the land hungry Zimbabweans. Moyo and Yeros (2005:187) highlight that on the eve of this conference, a wave of occupations swept through the country, for the first time since the early years of independence. They explain that these occupations were organized by dissident ruling party politicians, traditional leaders, displaced workers, and the war veterans’ association, further demonstrating the cleavages of the ruling party (Moyo and Yeros 2005:187).

The reality is that, the government’s decision to accede to the war veteran movement by designating white farms meant that it simultaneously soured its relations with the white farmers and inevitably the West, who had been in control of Zimbabwe’s economy after independence. We must remember that Zimbabwe benefited tremendously from Western financial support as stated earlier. The suspension of services of the IMF to Zimbabwe after the country abandoned ESAP in 1997 is one of the overt signs of a relationship that was already turning sour. It could be that like Moyo (2004:2005) predicted, with the initial forced occupations of white farms in 1997, the crisis was moving to a higher stage of fermentation.

It is noteworthy that the critical attempt to compulsorily acquire the 1,471 designated farms was unsuccessful. Moyo (2004:18) explains that the landowners successfully challenged the government’s decision in court and still managed to retain the land. He states that 40% (640) of the 1,471 farms had been delisted by the government following an argument that the land acquisition process needed to conform to various objectives of land policy. The remaining 847 farms which remained on the acquisition list were struck off it by the court in early 1999 following landowner successful challenges (Moyo 2004:19). This reflected the numerous loopholes in the legal procedures set for compulsory acquisition. It also frustrated the ruling party, which saw these procedures as an obstacle to fast land redistribution. In this regard, the land reform remained unresolved.
Following closely after the initial attempt to redistribute land occupied by white farms was the government’s decision to be involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war in 1998, which also had a severe strain in the economy according to Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004:363). They comment that while the government’s initial agenda was to shore up SADC collective security structures, it was quick to push Zimbabwean entrepreneurs into looking at DRC market as something of an alternative to declining economic opportunities at home. Furthermore, the DRC offered openings for the Zimbabwe defence Force to establish “low cost” commercially useful networks. Bond (2006) highlights that in the midst of foreign currency shortages in the country because of ESAP; the government reportedly spent US$ 1 million daily in the DRC campaign. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006:28) emphasizes that this decision broke the spine of the Zimbabwean economy.

2.7 Formation of the MDC

It is clear from the events leading to the land occupations of 1997 that the growing discontent towards the government was becoming overt. Worth noting is that, this discontent led to the emergence of a solid opposition from civil society structures in the midst of these developments (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004). The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) merged to form the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition party in 1999 (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:359; Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:10). In the midst of political turmoil regarding the land issue and the failure of ESAP, MDC became a major threat to the legitimacy of the government as it began to exhume issues around civic rights and democracy, which had been sidelined in political debates (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:359). The government responded by tightening its repressive hold, denying MDC supporters the right to citizenship, freedom of expression, protection under the law, access to land, and even in some cases food (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003).

Moyo (2004:17) reveals that relations between the government and the international community visibly tumbled in 1999 as the land donors conference failed to deliver economic aid or finance

---

1 The National Constitutional Assembly was formed in 1997 to push for the drawing up of a new constitution in Zimbabwe.
for land reform. He adds that these relations were further soured when the government, in the same year, perceived the international community to have embarked in an earnest and coordinated political regime change track, rather than on a development dialogue process, given its alleged support for the new MDC and its civil society alliance. A sign of a relationship that had turned unpleasant is highlighted by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006:28) who states that in the same year, IMF withdrew its services from Zimbabwe following its attempt to redistribute land.

2.8 Conclusion
This chapter focused on the historical progression of the Zimbabwean crisis from 1980 to 1999. One of the key issues that emerged in the chapter is that the Zimbabwean crisis has partly been inherited from the colonial period. The early 1980’s were the “golden years” in Zimbabwe with a booming economic growth. However, the prosperity glossed over serious issues regarding the failure to adequately redistribute land, a problem inherited from the Lancaster House agreement, the unsustainable maintenance of the socialist-capitalist contradictions among other issues. The early 1990’s was a period where the economic crisis became visible. Whilst the Lancaster market based land acquisition constraints expired during this period, Zimbabwe found itself adopting ESAP to address the economic crisis, while paying little attention to the land issue. ESAP proved to be a failure, drawing Zimbabwe deeper into a crisis, therefore exhuming the long postponed land question. In the late 1990’s, the demand for land increased, leading to the forceful occupation of 1,471 farms by the war veteran led movement on the eve of a 1998 Land Conference. This was a crucial time for Zimbabwe because as President Mugabe acceded to the war veterans, he inevitably soured relations with the West. The disbursement of war veteran funds and the government’s involvement in the DRC war are some of the factors that deepened the economic decline. In the face of an established MDC opposition party, Mugabe’s government faced another serious challenge.

A careful analysis of the evolution of the crisis from 1980 to 1999 to a great extent reveals that the crises faced by Zimbabwe are not peculiar to the country. Zimbabwe did not show any features different from those of other African countries that underwent Structural Adjustment. Tanzania and Zambia for example, also adopted Structural Adjustment and experienced almost
similar results to those experienced in Zimbabwe (Chakaodza 1993:64). However, the fact that in the late 1990’s Zimbabwe’s relations with the West were souring does show a distinctive twist in the way Zimbabwe’s crisis would progress. The next chapter will build on these relations and their implications for the future.
CHAPTER THREE

ZIMBABWE’S DISTINCTIVE CRISIS: 2000 TO DATE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the progression of the Zimbabwean crisis from 2000 to date. This is a period when civil society campaigned for a new constitution following the escalating crisis of legitimacy faced by the government in the late 1990’s. It is also during this period that intense land occupations occurred, reversing the former colonial imbalances of land ownership. Worth noting is also Zimbabwe’s isolation from the West following the land occupations. This I argue made the Zimbabwe’s crisis a distinct one. Some of the significant features in this period include the deepening crisis under economic isolation, and the collapse of the agricultural sector, which was the country’s backbone of the economy. Zimbabwe’s inability to exist outside the international community is also explored. The chapter concludes by exploring the possibilities for Zimbabwe’s future beyond the crisis.

The chapter has been broken down to five sections. The first section focuses on the draft constitution, its rejection in 2000 by citizens and the resultant tightening of repressive laws against opposition by the government. This will then be followed by a brief discussion of the intense land redistribution which started in 2000. The next section looks at Zimbabwe’s economic isolation by the West and the resultant deepening of the crisis. This will be followed by a section detailing the distinctiveness of the Zimbabwean crisis. This explores the dynamics of Zimbabwe’s isolation and their effects on the progression of the crisis. It also stresses the country’s need to be re-integrated into the international community. The last section explores Zimbabwe’s prospects for the future beyond the crisis.

In this chapter, I argue that since 2000 Zimbabwe is undergoing a distinct crisis because the country is currently facing intense economic sanctions from the West following its decision to redistribute land. At the same time, I also argue that this international isolation could put
Zimbabwe in a strong bargaining power when it re-enters the global scene. The reality is that Zimbabwe has redistributed land that was formerly owned by the minority white capitalist farmers which benefited a significant proportion of the citizens. In this regard, the country can bargain on clinging to the status quo regarding land in negotiating to re-enter the global network. The fact that land has been redistributed in Zimbabwe gives it more bargaining power and leverage with the international community through which it can re-enter with more dignity compared to most periphery countries that have not undergone any land redistribution.

3.2 The Draft Constitution, its Rejection and Government Repression

The year 2000 saw a heightening of the government’s legitimacy crisis. The government was facing opposition from the National Constitution Assembly (NCA), which had been formed in 1997 to push for the drawing up of a new constitution of Zimbabwe (Dorman 2003). As indicated in the previous chapter, NCA is one of the bodies that merged with the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) to form MDC. According to Hatchard (2001:210), NCA had campaigned for a fully representative constitutional assembly tasked with the drawing up of a new constitution. This followed their concerns over the steady and detrimental accumulation of presidential power through a series of constitutional amendments made by the ruling party in 1987. Dorman (2003:848) adds that NCA voiced that the constitutional amendments made by the government on the Lancaster House Constitution lacked public scrutiny and accountability and portrayed an abuse of power and lack of transparency by the government. This is a time when the ZANU PF government was faced with the failure of ESAP coupled with its souring relations with the West (Moyo 2004). At the same time the government was also facing multiple strikes due to the escalating economic crisis and worsening standard of living discussed in the previous chapter (Moyo and Yeros 2005: 186). In the same period, the political scene was marked by both signs of a strong emergent opposition on the one hand, and the menacing presence of a coercive ruling party structure on the other hand (Raftopoulos 2003:230).

In response to the NCA demands, the government established a committee to seek citizens’ views on the government performance and input towards creating a new constitution (Hatchard 2001). This process, which faced criticism from the NCA for its loopholes, exposed severe
discontent towards the government by the citizens (Dorman 2003). Dorman highlights that in 1987, the government had made amendments on the constitution and gave Robert Mugabe executive presidential powers. She notes that citizens particularly linked the executive presidential powers the growing political and economic crisis (Dorman 2003:853).

After the consultation process with citizens regarding the new constitution, the committee submitted the final report to the President. The President inserted a new provision providing for the compulsory acquisition of agricultural land for resettlement without compensation (Hatchard 2001:213). He then sought the approval of the people through a national referendum in February 2000 in which the voters were asked whether they wished to replace the 1979 Constitution with the “New Democratic Constitution”. The constitutional referendum was widely rejected by citizens in which a significant 697 754 people voted against it, while only 578 210 voters accepted it (Hatchard 2001:215). In essence, the no vote was a sign of discontent towards the presiding government following the intensification of the crisis.

Dorman (2003) explains that the rejection of the referendum was partly due to NCA’s successful campaign against it. She remarks that most voters rejected the referendum because they felt that their contribution during the consultation process in which they complained about the powers of the executive were not addressed in the new constitution. Moyo (2004:19) adds that a serious MDC campaign against the referendum in which they exhumed the lack of legitimacy of the government and the loopholes of the draft constitution, also precipitated its failure.

Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004:364) argue that the rejection of the constitutional referendum revealed a deep sense of dissatisfaction with the ZANU PF government. They add that it also revealed the capacity to mobilize this discontent into an effective opposition. Dorman (2003) further explains that the referendum succeeded in politicizing debates and allowed the opposition to take a stand. She adds that the victory of the “No” camp publicly underlined the government’s claim to represent the wider citizenry (Dorman 2003:862). Hatchard (2001) stresses that the “No” vote to the draft constitution posed a serious threat for the government. MDC and NCA had successfully campaigned against the referendum, and were clearly an alternative for the majority who voted against it. Raftopoulos (2003) notes that this happened at a time when
Zimbabwe was awaiting parliamentary elections in June 2000. He highlights that for ZANU PF, the defeat threatened a general election victory for the MDC in the June elections (Raftopoulos 2003:230).

Chuma (2004) notes that the late 1990’s leading to 2000 saw the press as a significant terrain for mobilization around issues of poverty, democratic rights and corruption as expressed by those opposed to the government. Furthermore, private press had assumed, by default, a range of roles normally performed by the opposition. This came as a response to increased public disgruntlement with the government’s management of the economy and the failure of ESAP which gave way to the deepening poverty and social relentlessness (Chuma 2004:132). He further states that private media, especially the newly launched Daily News and a few other weeklies, had successfully campaigned for the “No” vote against the referendum (Chuma 2004:132).

According to Chuma (2004:133), the government, faced with an unprecedented threat to its political security, resorted to both legal and extra legal processes designed to contain the media and an increasingly relentless civil society. The government introduced the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) of 2002, which forced all journalists to be registered by a Media and Information Commission. It also gave the Minister of information the power to cancel registration certificates any time he deemed necessary. AIPPA saw the closure of three privately owned newspapers in a period of eight months. The Daily News and The Daily News on Sunday were closed in September 2003 while the weekly Tribune was closed in May 2004 (Chuma 2004:135). The Public Order Security Act (POSA) and the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) were both introduced in the same year (Chuma 2004). He states that the latter made it impossible to operate a private commercial media or community broadcast in Zimbabwe. POSA, among other deterrents of free expression, criminalizes the publication of false statements prejudicial to the state.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) argues that when looking at it from another angle, the period after the rejection of the draft constitution saw an intense and violent competition for power between the newly formed MDC and the ruling ZANU PF. Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) add that through
the introduction of repressive legislation, the government further entrenched political intimidation and tightened the hold of the ruling party over state mechanisms through arrests, incarcerations, violence, and control of people and resources. They highlight some of the brutal measures taken by the government to silence opposition in the form of driving it underground or into exile or in other ways silencing any individual opposition activists or supporters. Any public criticism of the regime, no matter how peaceful or non-partisan was met with increased brutality from the government (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:11).

A careful analysis of the literature reveals that the violent and repressive nature of the government portrayed after 2000 can be traced back to the 1980’s. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006:20) highlights that Zimbabwe inherited brutal authoritarian tendencies and its repressive nature from the colonial government. He points out that the ZANU PF government in the 1980’s did not have any tolerance for any political challenge even though multi-party politics was enshrined in the Zimbabwean constitution. He argues that the ZAPU PF opposition party, led by Dr Joshua Nkomo bore the brunt of the ZANU PF intolerance in which an estimated 20 000 supporters of the ZAPU PF were killed on the orders of ZANU PF in the period between 1980 and 1987 during the dissident war. According to Eppel (2004), this violence was in the form of massacres, mass beatings and destruction of property, known in political and academic circles as the Gukurahundi. These events led to the swallowing up of the ZAPU PF party, forcing a unity agreement with ZANU PF in 1987, leading to a de facto one party state led by a seemingly reconfigured ZANU PF (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006:25; Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:5). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) ZANU PF had always operated as a hegemonic institution that intervened and extended its tentacles into every sphere of life.

The political repression of the 1980’s was part of the seeds of the crisis which were hidden behind Zimbabwe’s “golden” years. While this aspect was downplayed during the ‘golden years’, Raftopoulos (2003) explains that the ZANU PF government became more and more brutal with the deepening of the crisis owing to its continual lack of legitimacy. At this point most of the ugly features of the ruling party had become overt in its dealings with the vibrant opposition.
3.3 Intense Land Redistribution

Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004:364) argue that the refusal of the draft constitution is linked to the intense land redistribution of 2000. They comment that it posed a defeat for the government because it signalled not only a deep satisfaction with ZANU PF, but also the capacity to mobilise this discontent into an effective opposition. They also add that in the government’s perspective, the defeat not only registered the birth of mass opposition, but also opposition which was backed by white farmers and supported by the West, which was determined to roll back the gains of liberation. It is from this background that they argue that the intense land redistribution of 2000 started. Moyo (2004:19) on the other hand notes that the government decided on intense land redistribution because of its total failure to acquire the bulk of the farms gazetted for acquisition in 1997. He adds that the failure of dialogue between the government and donors as well as MDC’s rhetoric which continued to delegitimize the fast track land reform also precipitated this decision. The 2000 elections campaign challenge by the birth of a strong opposition MDC party and the declining performance of the economy tied to reduced international assistance also spurred intense land redistribution according to Moyo (2004).

Moyo and Yeros (2005) states that in February 2000, mass land occupations, led by war veterans, began in the southern province of Masvingo and spread to every province. At their height in June 2000 about 800 farms had been occupied. These occupations were targeted at farmers and black elite capitalist farmers. Moyo and Yeros (2005) emphasize that the degree of up scaling was radicalized from year to year. He states that by the end of 2002, the “fast track” land reform programme had compulsorily acquired 10 million hectares of land, approximately 90% of white commercial farmland, and redistributed most of it to 127,000 peasant households and 8,000 black middle capitalist farmers (Moyo and Yeros 2005:188).

According to Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003:11), for a significant part, the occupations were a means of punishing and eliminating a constituency of white commercial farmers and farm workers who were widely viewed to have voted ‘no’ in the referendum, and, by implication, to support the opposition more generally. In this regard, the occupations led to an escalation of state
supported and sponsored violence as described by Chuma (2004). Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) noted that the violence spread to include widespread attacks on actual or suspected members of the opposition MDC.

There is an intense debate between Moyo (2001) and Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) regarding the fast track land reform that commenced in 2000. While Moyo (2001) argues that this was a culmination of a land question that had long been subsumed firstly by the evolving state at 'independence and secondly by ESAP, Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) differ with Moyo (2001)’s assertions stating that his view is narrow and superficial and follows a nationalist rhetoric of ZANU PF. They argue that instead, the Zimbabwean crisis is of multiple origins in which land reform is part of. This is highlighted below:

The crisis is not about a single issue, neither is it rooted in a one-off event or single historical trajectory, nor is it the predictable outcome of an assumed pattern of “failed states” in postcolonial Africa...It is a crisis generated by and generating particular ensembles of politics and practice related to at least three interweaving analytical themes and empirical arenas: the politics of land and resource redistribution, reconstructions of nation and citizenship; and the remaking of the state and modes of rule (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:2-3).

In the light of the above, Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) maintain that land has lent itself easily to a particular nationalist narrative, serving especially the ruling party’s need to assert its hegemonic claim to historical “truth” and sustained legitimacy. They argue that the notion of “land question” has been presented as the basis for its singular status, as the sole, authentic signifier of national identity (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:19). They also dispute Moyo (2001)’s stance on land in saying that there are increasingly complex layers of differentiation and combinations of social classes with competing interests in land, which will not be discussed here because of the small scope of this study. In their view, such a dense and dynamic social fabric and the multiplicity of land and national resource conflicts which it generates can hardly be explained in the legacy of colonial conquest and land appropriation such as Moyo would like us to believe (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:19).

I acknowledge Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003)’s views above to be an acceptable analysis of the crisis in Zimbabwe with regards to land redistribution. However, it downplays the fact that
land has always been at the heart of Zimbabweans since independence as has been traced by Moyo (2004) in the previous chapters. While their view that the government has used the land issue to legitimize its hold in the country holds water especially focusing on the intense opposition and hostile political climate during the land redistribution period, it ignores the fact that Zimbabweans have always “squatted” illegally on land, a process which intensified during the 1990’s as a sign that the land question is key to understanding the crisis as evidenced by Moyo (2004) and Moyo and Yeros (2005) earlier. I agree with Moyo (2004), that indeed, the land issue cannot be analyzed without focusing on the historical imbalances in land ownership that were inherited at independence, and that the period between 2000 to date marks a burst out of a crisis that had long been fermenting.

Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) also argue that the Zimbabwean crisis was generated from reconstructions of nation and citizenship. They argue that at independence, Zimbabwe had a “civic nationalism” which was a broadly inclusive nationalism which maintained that the nation was composed of all-regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:25). However, due to the loss of credibility by the government as opposition to it multiplied (especially after 2000), the move towards accumulation from this led to a new nationalism by the ruling class and its allies; a form of exclusive nationalism. In relation to Zimbabwe’s crisis, they argue that this new nationalism has created narrow categories of identity defined in terms of political loyalty and war credentials, which have been made to signify sovereignty (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:26). In this case, national sovereignty has been seen to be a rejection of Western principles of democratic governance and neo-liberal economics, arguing instead for finding “African solutions for African problems” while in the domestic arena, sovereignty has been turned and used to construct enemies accused of allying with neo-colonial and imperialist interests and hence being a threat to the final phase in the nationalist land revolution (Raftopoulos and Hammar 2003:26). Consequently, the Zimbabwean government also reinvented its contours of rule. They argue that the crisis in Zimbabwe reinforced an authoritarian and increasingly repressive mode of rule.

Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) raise very crucial issues above which do add insight to the nature of the Zimbabwean crisis. I agree that indeed the government has created an exclusive
nationalism in Zimbabwe, and that it has tightened its repressive rule as has been discussed earlier. However, it is important to remember that during the height of the land reform, Zimbabwe had very serious but unsuccessful dialogues with Britain regarding financing the land. In this regard, the land reform actually had to be a very radical and contradictory process if the country had to maintain its stand against the triumphant West (Moyo and Yeros 2007:105). Furthermore, I still maintain, in agreement with Moyo (2004), Moyo and Yeros (2005) and Moyo and Yeros (2007) that none of the multiple origins of the Zimbabwean crisis have attracted the international community and Zimbabwe’s economic isolation by the West like the land redistribution has thus far, hence the need to acknowledge the land redistribution as one of the most significant aspects of this crisis which has soured relations between Zimbabwe and the West. The reality is that land was redistributed in Zimbabwe and this mired the country in an even deeper and more retrogressive crisis.

3.4 A Deepening Crisis: Isolation from the International Community

The consequent results of the land redistribution were the further deepening of the Zimbabwean crisis following its economic isolation by the West. According to Moyo (2004:36), whilst Zimbabwe’s economic isolation began in 1996 with the failure to sign the ZIMPREST ESAP programme leading to the reduction of external financing to the country as discussed in the previous chapter, in 2000 external financial flows to Zimbabwe were completely stopped following intense and fast track land occupations. Zimbabwe is currently facing heavy sanctions from the international community.

The following description of sanctions against Zimbabwe is drawn from the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) found in the US Senate Bill of 2001: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s107-494. In 1999, the United States of America (USA) had already instructed all multilateral agencies like IMF, World Bank and Africa Development Bank (ADB) among others to stop any credit facilities (in all their various forms) to Zimbabwe until the country improved its human rights record, observance of the rule of law, carry out a proper land redistribution among other conditions. In May 2000, the International Development Association (IDA) suspended all other lending to the government of Zimbabwe.
This was followed by the suspension of disbursement of funds for ongoing projects under previously approved loans by IDA in September 2002. Furthermore, until Zimbabwe adhered to the US conditions the sanctions wouldn’t be lifted. The country was also denied any extension of any loan, credit or guarantee and any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness. In this regard, it is clear indeed that Zimbabwe was isolated from the international community.

Restoration of the rule of law including title property, allowing freedom of speech and association and an end to all lawlessness tolerated and condoned by the Zimbabwean government were some of the conditions that Zimbabwe had to adhere to for sanctions to be removed. Zimbabwe was also expected to demonstrate a commitment to an equitable, legal and transparent land reform program consistent with agreements made at the International Donors Conference held in Harare in 1998. Zimbabwe was also expected to withdraw from the DRC war, conduct free and fair elections, support independent free press and promote democracy and governance by the ZANU PF.

In February 2002, the European Union also posed travel ban to members of the ruling party into their territories if they did not meet certain conditions. It also prohibited the sale of arms to Zimbabwe from EU member countries. The EU sanctions arose from a concern over the escalation of violence and intimidation of political opponents and independent press and the infringement on the rights to freedom of speech to Zimbabweans.

In the light of the above, the importance of understanding Zimbabwe’s crisis by placing the country into its global context is inevitable. Amin (1990) notes that the world of competitiveness on a world scale is presented such that it is an inescapable and unavoidable fact, to ignore it is to turn one’s back on ‘progress’. Zimbabwe, through redistributing land, is an example of a periphery country that has defied the Western notion of progress because it has turned its back on global modernization, hence the intensification of the crisis (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006). Moyo and

---

Yeros (2007) locate the Zimbabwean crisis within the country’s relations with the West. They liken Zimbabwe’s decision to redistribute land and the resultant crisis to an interrupted revolution (against the West). A revolutionary situation is defined by Moyo and Yeros (2007) as follows:

This is a situation in which society is highly mobilized and in conflict, both among its socio-political formations and between them and the state. Moreover, it is a situation in which bourgeois institutions come under fundamental threat, in a progressive way. In this context, property rights and formal democratic norms and procedures (human rights) are either threatened or suspended (Moyo and Yeros 2007:105).

They state that in the case of Zimbabwe, the revolution was in the form of violence against local forms of opposition, land occupations and violence against neo-colonialism and its services. This led to an escalation of socio-political conflict, suspension of formal democratic norms and procedures and abrogation of property rights in a progressive way and suspension of bureaucracy in the countryside. However, they argue that in Zimbabwe, the revolution was not successful, but led instead to a radical state that has rebelled against imperialism. A successful revolution according to Moyo and Yeros (2007) is one that leads to the escalation of contradictions and the implementation of deep structural changes without interruption, or it may stall after a first set of radical reforms. In this instance, a successful revolution would have been one where Zimbabwe was able to successfully chart its development trajectory without the assistance of the West.

According to Moyo and Yeros (2007), the failure of Zimbabwe’s revolution is mainly a result of internal contradictions within the country following the divide of people amongst the ZANU PF and MDC factions. What this means is that, the fact that not all people fully support ZANU PF’s stance against the West because of allegiances to MDC, the government’s power to sustain a revolution has been weakened. As a result the excluded sections in the population mobilized by the opposition in alliance with imperialist forces weakened the revolution according to Moyo and Yeros (2007). Furthermore, the shortcomings of the ruling party particularly its coercive nature contributed to its failure (Moyo and Yeros 2007:105). The radicalization of the state was in the form of reform against agrarian relations and radicalization of nationalism. Politically, the implications of this radicalization have entailed a protracted confrontation with imperialism, both internally and externally which elicited negative responses from the West.
Moyo and Yeros (2007) argue that Zimbabwe’s monopolistic plan in response to sanctions worsened the crisis because it emerged to be dialectically in conflict with the West. While the West’s main condition of lifting the sanctions was regime change, the Zimbabwean government instead responded through normalization. Normalization is defined as an attempt to restore order politically and economically in the face of sanctions (Moyo and Yeros 2007:106). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) emphasizes that the Zimbabwean government proved to the West that they can do without their assistance. In his earlier work, he quotes the government in saying that “Zimbabwe will no longer be a colony again”, “Land is the Economy”, “People first: Our land is our prosperity” and “Work the land, reap prosperity, build the nation” as part of its stance against the West Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006:30).

According to Moyo and Yeros (2007), in response to sanctions, ZANU PF assumed singlehanded control of the monetary policy, which includes controlling of prices and interest rates and the fiscal policy and investment policy in which it regulated banks and started a move towards acquiring and controlling 51% of all foreign owned mines. In the trade policy, the government took over trade regulation, rejected foreign aid from the United States and diversified trade partners with the East (Moyo and Yeros 2007). It also monopolized the land and foreign policies. The government also opposed the World Trade Organization (WTO) and reform attempts from the United Nations, undermined NEPAD, confronted US imperialism and South Africa sub-imperialism. Instead, the ZANU PF government implemented a “Look East’ policy in search for new alliances with China with the aim of diversifying financial and technological dependence away from the West (Moyo and Yeros 2007:107).

Moyo and Yeros (2007) identify the government’s Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) which came as a project of restoring political and economic order under siege of sanctions in 2005 as one of the measures taken by the government to restore order politically. This involved a military assault on irregular urban settlements, the destruction of residential and business structures, and mass evictions. They argue that this exercise severely compromised the image of the ruling party as an anti-imperialist and Pan Africanist movement. On the other hand, imperialist forces exploited the tragedy and renewed pressure on the ruling party and its
leadership to step down by magnifying the tragedy, claiming in the UN report, that 70,000 families were displaced. This has also revealed the gravity of contradictions between Zimbabwe and the West, while maintaining superficial perspectives on the polarization and “governance” deficit according to Moyo and Yeros (2007:115).

3.5 Effects of the Crisis
ZANU PF’s stance against Western sanctions had drastic effects on Zimbabwe’s economy. Moyo and Yeros (2007) highlight heightening levels of speculative activity and short-term profiteering through the informalization of business activity and the creation of parallel markets as some of the indicators of an economy that is in a crisis. Examples of these are banks and financial houses, which externalize business activities both outside the country and outside the formal economy inside the country by conducting foreign exchange transactions in parallel markets. Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004) add that a huge black market in foreign currency has emerged, with linkages to the state itself. They argue that this has thus created severe economic leakages, which counteracted effects of hyperinflation under control and undermined heterodox economic and political survival as a whole. The situation has been worsened by the government’s ad hoc decisions which have facilitated the growth of businesses close to the ruling party and have been taken in the context of stopgap measures dealing with immediate economic problems (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:373). Moyo and Yeros (2007:114) note that these economic activities have hampered the government’s success in its stance against the West.

Agriculture, which was historically the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy, was severely affected by land redistribution. Statistics show that annual wheat production has fallen from a high 300 000 tons in 1990 to less than 50 000 tons in 2007 (Mambondiani 2008). Tobacco, which was Zimbabwe’s highest foreign currency earner declined from US$ 600 million in 2000 to less than US$ 125 million in 2007 (Mambondiani 2008:1). According to Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003:14) many observers including the Commonwealth Secretariat and United Nations Agencies blamed the food crisis on manmade and politically motivated factors. However, Moyo (2004) states that this type of transitional decline was uncommon where extensive land reforms
were affected although in the case of Zimbabwe, the transition was longer for various reasons. He explains that in reality, production fell because of interrelated macro-economic conditions, land transfers, sustained droughts and economic isolation, reflecting both internal and external factors. He adds that landowner resistance of the land acquisition, particularly in the courts, and conflicts over land allocations also elongated the transition process (Moyo 2004:34).

As mentioned earlier, Zimbabwe is an aggro-based economy. In this regard, Moyo (2004:37) argues that a fall in agricultural outputs led to shortages in foreign currency due to reduced agricultural exports and external isolation, while the exchange rate policy and price controls, which were reactive to shortages, inflation, and parallel markets exacerbated matters. He reiterates Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003)’s early assessment where they described the crisis as lack of foreign currency to import food into the country which worsened food insecurity in the country. Besada and Moyo (2008) add that currently, cereal production in the 2007-2008 crop years will only meet only 55% of Zimbabwe’s requirements, and an additional 1.03 million metric tons of cereal imports will be essential. They argue that chronic shortages of foreign currency needed to pay for such basic fossil fuels, electricity, medicine, and fertilizer –and the vanishing purchasing power of the Zimbabwean dollar pose serious challenges for the government in its attempt to make up for the cereal shortfall (Besada and Moyo 2008:12).

According to Clemens and Moss (2005), the government and some relief organizations identified drought as primarily responsible for the economic collapse in Zimbabwe. They argue that this argument does not hold up if we consider that the drought of 2000/01 for instance, was only about 22% below average, and less severe than at least twelve other recent low rainfall periods. They also highlight that the tight relationship between GDP growth rates and rainfall cycles, which held over two decades was no longer feasible after 1999.

Zimbabwe ranked one hundred and fifty out of 177 countries in a poverty survey, and results showed that the portion of the Zimbabwean population living below USS 1 a day stood at more than 80% in 2006, up from 36% in 1990 (Besada and Moyo (2008). It is estimated that the number of Zimbabweans in need of food aid until March 2003 arose from 6.7 to 7.2 million (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004:370).
In the midst of this crisis, Zimbabwe has been attached by a cholera outbreak since August 2008 (IRIN News 2009). Over 80,000 Zimbabweans have been infected by cholera, which has claimed 3,759 lives. This situation has been exacerbated by the shortage of medical health care facilities as well as the skeletal staff on medical centres due to nurses and doctors’ strikes (IRIN News 2009).

Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) highlight soaring inflation, crippling food shortages, affecting all sectors of the economy, a drastic fall in the Zimbabwean Dollar; eroding real incomes significantly, the collapse of key public services as some of the descriptions of the crisis after intense land redistribution. This is complemented by Besada and Moyo (2008:7) who emphasize that the Zimbabwean dollar has continued to lose value, trading for about Z$ 6 million to the US dollar in January 2008 and falling to Z$ 70 million to the US$ by March 2008, even though the official rate was Z$ 30 000 to the US dollar.

The Zimbabwean crisis has contributed to an unprecedented exodus of Zimbabweans, with more than 3.5 million people, approximately 25% of the population, having emigrated over the past few years to countries such as Zambia, Botswana, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, and in particular South Africa (Besada and Moyo 2008:15). A South African survey of 4,654 Zimbabwean migrant arrivals highlights an intensified traffic of Zimbabweans into the country since the land redistribution of Zimbabwe in 2000 (Makina 2007). The survey revealed that 92% migrants of the sample arrived between 2000 and mid 2007. This is contrasted with migrant arrivals between 1979 and 1999 that constituted only 8% of the sample (Makina 2007).

According to Besada and Moyo (2008), the health sector has been severely affected by the exodus of skilled labour. They note that up to 80% of the pharmacists, therapists, doctors, nurses, and radiologists who were trained in the country after independence have already emigrated. Approximately 90% of junior doctors trained by the University of Zimbabwe’s Medical School leave the country within four years of graduating (Besada and Moyo 2008:17). Inevitably, the health sector has undergone severe skills shortages. This amplifies Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004)’s early assertion that the combination of food shortage, malnutrition, severely depleted health services and HIV/AIDS have produced a lethal cocktail for disaster, in which households
are likely to be pushed into deeper structural poverty by survival strategies that place too heavy a cost or opportunity cost burden on them.

3.6 The Zimbabwean Crisis: A Distinct Crisis?

A careful analysis of the crisis that ensued after the intense land redistribution in 2000 is strong evidence that Zimbabwe crisis is distinct in nature. Comparison of the current crisis with the crisis under ESAP illustrates a remarkable difference in the fact that the crises under ESAP resembled those faced by other African countries which had undergone the same programme. However, what makes the Zimbabwean crisis distinct is the land redistribution of land formerly owned by whites without compensation undertaken by the government, thereby leading to the country’s economic isolation. What this essentially means is that while during the ESAP crisis, Zimbabwe was part of the global network, the moment the land redistribution phase started, economic ties with the West were subsequently cut, making the country no longer dependent on the West as of 2000. This had the effect of worsening the crisis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Zimbabwe is an agrarian economy. In this regard, the collapse in the agricultural sector meant that other sectors that were heavily dependent on agriculture also faced immense deterioration.

A deeper exploration into the Zimbabwean crisis confirms Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006:3)’s conclusion that the Zimbabwean crisis is a reflection of the risks involved in any African attempt to defy the “disciplining” forces of globalization and neo-liberalism and is located within the broader context of African responses to globalization, neo-liberalism and cosmopolitanism. He argues:

Zimbabwe crisis is situated within a current global environment, which is characterized by triumphant neo-liberalization and its concern with maintaining the status quo through aggressive “disciplining” of any alternative way of imagining the world (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006:3).

I agree with Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006)’s assertion, especially considering the magnitude and retrogressive nature of the crisis after the land redistribution. Indeed the form of radicalization through land redistribution has been perceived by the West as anti-systemic and anti-status quo even for those radical transformations that are pro-people (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006).
The reality is that Zimbabwe’s crisis will continue retrogressively if the country remains in isolation. Mutambara (2006) emphasizes that Zimbabwe cannot live in isolation especially focusing on the resultant crisis. He asserts that:

Under globalization, there is no country that can thrive without dealing with the international community including the multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank... What is critical is to engage these institutions with the view to extract favourable arrangements for our country. In the current global economy, the IMF is ostensibly a gatekeeper. If they are not involved in your country, there is no investment and trade that will occur there. We cannot go it alone (Mutambara 2006).

The above quotation reiterates Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006)’s analysis that the crisis is best understood if placed into the global scene from which the dynamics of isolation and their effects on Zimbabwe can be understood. It stresses that Zimbabwe needs to be re-integrated into the global community in order to address the ongoing and further deteriorating crisis.

3.7 Prospects: Beyond the Zimbabwean Crisis

The need for Zimbabwe’s re-integration into the global system is a recurring theme with regard to prospects for the future. Scholars have projected two different options that Zimbabwe can pursue on being re-integrated back into the system. The first school foresees Zimbabwe’s return to previous neo colonial status of the 1990’s where the country was still dependent on the West but still in a crisis better than the current one. The second school of thought maintains that upon re-integration into the global scene, land that has been redistributed to the black Zimbabweans should not be returned back to its owners. It advocates for the continuation of the government’s radical stance concerning land.

Moss and Patrick (2005:8) state that for Zimbabwe to move from the crisis, Mugabe needs to leave office after which a government of national unity should be considered to chart the way forward for the country. They also suggest that IMF and World Bank should assist the Zimbabwean transitional authorities in developing a comprehensive National Reconstruction and Development Framework (Moss and Patrick 2005:10). Under these conditions, they go on to say that, Britain, America and the South African governments are most likely to provide resources to
Zimbabwe. They also point out that the successor government should immediately find a number of obstacles in the way of rejoining the international community.

Part of what has been suggested by Moss and Patrick (2005) above has already been implemented in Zimbabwe. ZANU PF and MDC signed a Unity Government deal on the 15th of September 2008 in which President Mugabe has retained his position, while Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC president has become the country’s Prime Minister. Although the Unity Government was formed without excluding Mugabe as suggested by Moss and Patrick (2005), ZANU PF and MDC committed to working together in re-integrating the international community with a view of bringing to an end the country’s international isolation.  

With regard to land, Moss and Patrick (2005) stress that the donor community should play an important role in assisting with the stock taking of land use and ownership formulation of a new agricultural strategy and consideration of options for further distribution. They suggest that external agencies should provide an independent oversight to some kind of transparent arbitration process that is almost certainly going to be necessary as disputes over land ownership arise. Worth noting is that Moss and Patrick (2005)’s analysis does not acknowledge that Zimbabwe has actually gained tremendously through the land redistribution programme. Their predictions and recommendations follow a Western rhetoric that argues that the crisis in Zimbabwe is merely a crisis of poor governance and in particular by Mugabe. As a result, their prospects lean towards returning Zimbabwe to a period similar to the 1990’s where the country was dependent on the West.

Gwisai (2008) foresees the continuation of poverty, deprivation and suffering in Zimbabwe even after the signing of the Unity Government deal. He comments that the success of the deal lies on Western supported economic neoliberal programmes, which itself is facing the worst economic crisis since the 1930’s. He also remarks that the fact that the unity deal affirms ZANU PF’s position that the land reform is problematic. In his view, it allows ZANU PF to protect its crucial base ahead of future elections while hoping that any economic recovery will minimize the

4 The agreement between the ZANU PF and MDC formations on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe 2008. http://www.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/mdc_zpf_agreement_080915.pdf
opposition’s protest vote. In essence, he notes that the Unity deal leaves Mugabe in power, which hampers possibilities for a quick positive response from the international community.

However, there are scholars who acknowledge the development gains of land through Zimbabwe’s crisis and argue that these gains need to be maintained when analyzing prospects for the future. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) is optimistic that Zimbabwe can rejoin the international community with more dignity. He argues:

Thus, the Third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe, while attended by some negative political issues like violence, press censorship, and farm invasions, returned the land to the landless people and in the context of a post-settler society, it was a great achievement notwithstanding the economic crisis it generated... Though at the moment Zimbabwe is still mired in a crisis situation, there is no doubt that it has now reached its climax and what is left is for it to normalise (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006:8).

Moyo and Yeros (2007), Scones (2008) and Besada and Moyo (2008) all agree with Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) above that any prospects for the future should take into cognisance the gains attained by Zimbabwe through land redistribution. A similar standpoint with regard to land was maintained in the current Unity Government signed between ZANU PF and MDC in September 2008. The deal emphasized that land redistribution will not be reversed when Zimbabwe re-enters the global scene. However, both parties agreed to take a land audit through which some land will be repossessed from all the people who own multiple pieces of land and redistributed to other Zimbabweans who do not have land. ⁵

Moyo and Yeros (2007) state that Zimbabwe needs a political force that will carry forward the country’s radical nationalist inheritance. Scones (2008:1) also highlights that while the land redistribution mired Zimbabwe into a catastrophic crisis, it was not a total failure. He points to A1 schemes of smallholder farming resettled people, who have done reasonably well regardless of low capital investment and reliance on local labour as an example of some success stories of the land redistribution. He rejects the myth that the beneficiaries of the land redistribution were largely political cronies by highlighting that a significant percentage of the poor, former farm

⁵ The agreement between the ZANU PF and MDC formations on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe 2008. http://www.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/mdc_zpf_agreement_080915.pdf
workers and civil servants benefited from the land reform. In the midst of the dire effects of the crisis, he points out to evidence of substantial investment in new business in the Masvingo resettlement area, which created the much-needed rural employment (Scones 2008:3).

Besada and Moyo (2008) also emphasize that returning land to whites is neither feasible nor politically practical. They argue that in reality, Zimbabwe will not return to its status as the bread basket, but measures should be taken to improve financial and technical assistance, development of transparent agriculture markets for the new farmers (Besada and Moyo 2008:20).

In order to advance the development of Zimbabwe whilst retaining the land gains, a need for change in political outlook to advance this agenda is inevitable. Moyo and Yeros (2007:117) suggest that Zimbabwe needs a “New Left” political force to establish the organizational means to engage in sustained ideological confrontation with imperialism both internally and externally. They argue that the “New Left” must sink its new roots in the working class and unify the proletariat across the rural-urban divide. To avoid partisan bias, they also emphasize that the “New Left” should be dissociated from political parties, the state and external interference. It should be responsible for establishing organizational means to engage in sustained confrontation with imperialism both internally and externally. Gwisai (2008) agrees that indeed Zimbabwe needs a united front of the radical, anti-neoliberal and left forces including organized labor, to advance for pragmatic change for Zimbabwe.

Moyo and Yeros (2007) state that the New Left should decide the necessary political strategy and tactics that are relevant to normalization and determine the most beneficial relation between social movements and political parties. It also needs to determine progressive politics for Africa’s peasantry and decide on the kind of nationalism and internationalism that Zimbabwe requires. They also emphasize the necessity of urging the working class to radically dissociate itself from fast track land reform to establish a united working class platform. In order to minimize contradictions within the country, they highlight the need for democratization of the rural movement and the working class to succeed the land occupation movement as well as the need to collaborate with war veterans to make this movement successful.
In Moyo and Yeros (2007:118)’s view, Zimbabwe needs social movements that are democratic, accountable and autonomous, and whose main task should be that of defending the economic interests of the working class, building of alliances in society and the articulation of political strategy. They note that social movements should withdraw from the political parties in order to begin anew the process of organization and mobilization on an autonomous basis. The political tasks of these social movements should be those of defending the economic interests of the working class, the building of alliances in society, and the articulation of political strategy. They strongly assert the need for working class to have power as illustrated below:

The assumption of power, whether constitutionally or not, is an empty accomplishment if power is not wielded by the working class, for the working class (Moyo and Yeros 2007:119).

In the light of the above, they suggest decentralization of power in social movements to avoid political repression. They also call for new thinking on how to organize the countryside in a manner in which economic and political organization is mutually reinforcing and inclusive into the new strategy. In essence, they emphasize the need for new nationalism that is clearly proletarian, free from bourgeois patronage and distortions. They also suggest that people in the countryside should be allowed to organize themselves such that they are collective and conscious of their own potential and power. They should establish self-management and permanent structures that cultivate a working class consciousness and engage in systematic political activity, both nationally and internationally. They quote Amin (1983) who suggests that the working class should be free to partake in the national project, to construct a national economy by delinking where agriculture assumes a leading role and industry an auxiliary role in the modernization of agriculture.

On another extreme, Moyo and Yeros (2007:117) acknowledge the possibility of Zimbabwe returning to structural adjustment. This possibility, according to Moyo and Yeros (2007), could be triggered by the failure of the nationalist party to reconcile its contradictions and its devotion to parliamentary politics, dependence on foreign aid and therefore neglecting of the socio-economic issues. Nevertheless, the likely persistence of the economic decline in the midst of attention on politics could lead Zimbabwe back to the IMF and World Bank. Besada and Moyo (2008:20) add that key to Zimbabwe’s return to the international community will be the
resolution of foreign debts to multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank. I maintain that while this option could be an easier route for Zimbabwe, it has the possibility of leaving the country in a crisis which is worse than the current one. A careful consideration of Zimbabwe’s experience with ESAP in the 1990’s confirms that indeed these structural reforms do not deliver long term solutions but in the case of Zimbabwe, had the effect of even further deepening the crisis.

I agree with Moyo and Yeros (2007) that Zimbabwe can chart its own form of nationalism that maintains the land in the hands of the Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe is at a position where it can re-engage into the international community in new forms. While the working class organizations of periphery countries proposed by Moyo and Yeros (2007) cannot choose the ideal international arena in which to participate, Zimbabwe can establish anti-imperialist principles of foreign policy and international solidarity and demand that ‘comrades” recognize and respect them. Zimbabwe has indeed taken such a stand in the Government of National Unity. While the Unity Government has openly requested that all forms of sanctions and measures against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to find solutions for the crisis, they maintain that whilst Zimbabwe desperately needs to re-enter the global system, the government has chosen to acknowledge that land has been redistributed and it will not be returned to its former white owners.

I further agree with Moyo and Yeros (2007) that Zimbabwe can actually navigate ways in which it can be integrated into the global scene with more dignity. Amin (1990; 2006) suggests possibilities that Zimbabwe can pursue to re-enter the global system while maintaining the gains of land redistribution. The first option is delinking, which has been discussed in the first chapter. Amin (1991:62) defines delinking as “pursuit of a system of rational criteria for economic options founded on the law of value on a national basis with popular relevance, independent of such criteria of economic rationality as flow from the dominance of the capitalist law of value operating on a world scale” (Amin 1991:28). In essence, he comments that periphery countries have an option of delinking in order to regain their lost autonomy. As detailed in the first chapter periphery countries need to pass through a moment of “separation” or “isolation” from the world capitalist system after which they should then re-integrate themselves into the capitalist order.
such that they determine how they want to be integrated. After delinking, periphery countries can then choose global relations that are of benefit to them.

The second option that Amin (2006) argues for is a possibility of a multi polar world, which can alleviate the situation of periphery countries in the global system. He defines multi polarity as a radical revision of “North-South” relations in all their dimensions, which creates a framework that makes it possible to reduce the power of forces within the capitalist system that operate in such a way as to exacerbate the polarization of wealth and power (Amin 2006:2). In essence, he states that there is a possibility that the world can have many core countries which advance socialist principles with the aim of reducing the power of the US capitalist hegemony. One of the conditions that could make a multi polar world possible according to Amin is the prevalence of “market socialism” in China over the strong tendencies to construction of “national capitalism”. He also proposes that the world should advance towards a different “social” Europe, and hence a Europe that has begun to disengage from its imperialist past and present and embark on the long transition towards socialism (Amin 2006:157).

3.8 Conclusion
This review traced Zimbabwe’s crisis starting from 2000, a period of intense land redistribution to date. What emerged is the refusal of the draft constitution by Zimbabweans, consequently increasing the government’s repressive nature and spurring on the intense land redistribution of white farms and black elite capitalists. This has led to Zimbabwe’s complete isolation by the West, further worsening the crisis. At this point, the I argue that the Zimbabwean crisis is a distinct crisis and could not be understood without placing the country in the global system from which it was been isolated. This also raises the critical reality of Zimbabwe’s need to be re-integrated into the global system.

Zimbabwe is a country that is already living in isolation from the international community as per delinking conditions. In this regard, it has the power to bargain or determine terms in which it is re-integrated into the global capitalist system such that it emerges as a better periphery country. Zimbabwe can choose who to engage with in the global system based on what the country thinks
will benefit it. With regard to Amin (2006)’s option of a multi polar world, Zimbabwe can actually build alliances with other core countries other than the West (Britain and America) on its re-integration. These countries, which do not share a colonial past with Zimbabwe, can build beneficial relations with Zimbabwe because they will allow the country to retain its status quo with regard to the land that has already been redistributed. It can be argued that the country’s “Look East” policy, in which it has established relations with China takes away dependence from the West as highlighted by Moyo and Yeros (2007:107) earlier, could be a step in that direction. I agree with Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) who comments that the land gains which have been attained at the cost of such a glaring crisis and perseverance against the West, cannot be lost back to the former minority few whites who previously owned it.
CHAPTER FOUR

PERCEPTIONS BY ZIMBABWEANS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is an overview of young Zimbabweans’ perceptions of the origins and nature of the crisis on the one hand and prospects for the future on the other. It investigates if there are any overlaps or divergences between the projection of the crisis in secondary literature and perceptions by Zimbabweans. The main aim of the chapter is to provide a deeper insight of the crisis.

As indicated in the first chapter, twenty young Zimbabweans between the ages of 24 and 32 living in Cape Town were interviewed. The interviews were carried out between April and June 2008. The sample consisted of nine males and eleven females. Eight of the Zimbabweans were postgraduate students registered at the University of Cape Town in fields which include politics, sociology and economics. Seven were professionally qualified and formally employed. Two people in this sample were academics who have researched and published on the Zimbabwean crisis in the previous years. The rest of the group worked in the government and some in non-governmental organizations (NGO’s). The remaining five were employed in semi-skilled jobs such as selling curios and waitressing.

Access to media was the main source of information for most of the respondents. Constant visits to Zimbabwe as well as maintaining links with people back home while in South Africa were other means of gathering information on the crisis. This was further replenished by discussing the crisis with Zimbabweans in their peer groups. Regardless of the fact that the sample was composed of males and females, the young Zimbabweans’ perceptions did not portray any gender variations. In this chapter, pseudo names have been used in order to maintain the anonymity of the respondents as agreed during the formal procedures of signing consent forms before the interviews.
The main argument of this chapter is that the young Zimbabweans’ perceptions provide invaluable insight on the crisis over and above the knowledge documented in secondary literature. Since these are people who have not only experienced the crisis but are also affected directly and indirectly by it, their perceptions go a long way towards revealing how people have made meaning of their lives in the face of the crisis and its effects on ordinary Zimbabweans in general. I also argue that those instances where their perceptions concur with the literature confirm the validity of knowledge on the development of the crisis. On the other hand, those perceptions which diverge from secondary literature provide an alternative way of thinking about the crisis which should be considered in making people centred solutions for the future. They also provide shades of meaning about how individuals view the crisis which are not necessarily provided by secondary literature.

The chapter has been structured according to the research question and has been broken down into four sections. The four sections focus on the Zimbabweans’ perceptions on the nature of the crisis, the origins of the crisis, the development of the crisis until June 2008 and prospects for the future.

4.2 Zimbabweans’ Perceptions of the nature of the Crisis

The respondents revealed that Zimbabwe is going through a crisis of a political and economic nature. When asked to describe the crisis, the first thing that came to mind from all the respondents was the current post 2000 crisis.

About 90% of the respondents, all from different social backgrounds, noted that politically, there has been a general lack of democracy and freedom of expression for opposition in Zimbabwe since 2000. Vicky narrates her perception below:

...so that’s how I would describe the crisis... the opposition party has no space to express themselves politically if you look at the fact that in the media they are not even acknowledged unless they advertise on private media. 6

Themba also concurs with Vicky when he states that:

---

6 Interview with Vicky (journalist), 10 June 2008
If you try to express your frustrations over the president you get arrested there is no freedom of speech. People might say it’s a democratic country, it’s a free country but you can’t express yourself without being arrested. The moment you do, you are breaking the boundaries.  

About 30% of the respondents, who are employed in formal and semi-skilled jobs, went further to express that president Mugabe’s long incumbency and executive powers have contributed to the political impasse. Bongi stresses this point:

...the executive became an unchecked bull and as a result of that it has created a huge serious crisis we have someone who is the law above the law they can veto the law, they can make the law they can appoint the judges, the parliamentarians, at the end of the day it makes everything centred on one person... and that person is Mugabe.

These are just a few of the responses that I gathered from the interviews concerning the political problems faced in Zimbabwe.

On an economic level, about 90% of the respondents, 50% who belonged to the semi-skilled group and the remaining 40% split equally between the professionally skilled and the postgraduate students, complained that there has been a shortage of basic commodities since 2000. Nyasha narrates part of his experience in his last visit to Zimbabwe in January 2007:

Things like water there was a shortage. Even to bath yourself you had to struggle to do so. It wasn’t just there for you to use. Food as well; bread especially there was a shortage a few occasions where we went without bread.

Mandy also concurs with Nyasha when she states that in her last visit to Zimbabwe in December 2007, “people could not get cash in the bank and even if they did, it came in dismal amounts which cannot even buy anything on a day to day basis.” The respondents further noted that in Zimbabwe, most scarce commodities are usually available on the black market at exorbitant prices. In this context, the black market refers to the sale of scarce goods and commodities outside the formal market, at prices beyond those stipulated by the government.

---

7 Interview with Themba (political analyst), 1 June 2008  
8 Interview with Bongi (postgraduate student), 26 May 2008  
9 Interview with Nyasha (postgraduate student), 7 April 2008  
10 Interview with Mandy (postgraduate student), 17 April 2008
High levels of hyper-inflation experienced through the escalation of commodities were also identified by the respondents as some of the problems faced by Zimbabweans since 2000. This response came from basically all the respondents. Vicky narrates her experience of this crisis before she left Zimbabwe in 2001:

You could tell yourself that I am going to buy myself a TV this month and then you see it for say, Z$ 1000. And you earn, let’s say a thousand Zimbabwean Dollars coz obviously you can’t use all that money to buy that TV so you say to yourself let me save Z$ 500 this month and then Z$ 500 next month and then the other Z$500 I’ll use it for transport then you get to next month, you have saved your Z$1000 the TV is now Z$ 3 000 literally.\(^{11}\)

This is just an illustration of how Vicky experienced the crisis of escalating prices for commodities while in Zimbabwe. Vicky is one of the respondents formally employed who left Zimbabwe in 2001 due to the escalating crisis.

In general, all respondents pointed out that there is a severe deterioration of the economy in Zimbabwe characterized by a significant drop in the standard of the health delivery system as well as very high levels of unemployment among other problems. With regard to the former, I gathered from the respondents who were students that Zimbabwe’s problems cannot be understood in isolation. Chipo’s experience clarifies this reality. She stresses that in her last visit to Zimbabwe in February 2008, she faced cash shortages, fuel shortages and other challenges while struggling to access scarce drugs for her sick relative in hospital.\(^{12}\) This is an illustration of the overlap of several problems that make up the Zimbabwean crisis. Bongi, who is a postgraduate student, further elaborates this overlap:

Well this crisis has got many faces to it. I know people tend to look at it from one angle but it’s a crisis that has got leadership and governmental crisis, it’s an economic crisis, it’s a even a corporate crisis, even financially we have a crisis so how I would describe it? I would say it’s a crisis whose roots have spread to every aspect of our country in such a way that to describe it from a political perspective only or from an economic perspective only would not be enough.\(^{13}\)

\(^{11}\) Interview with Vicky (journalist), 10 June 2008

\(^{12}\) Interview with Chipo (postgraduate student), 15 April 2008

\(^{13}\) Interview with Bongi (postgraduate student), 26 May 2008
Bongi’s response shows a deep understanding of the crisis. This could be informed by the fact that as a student, she has access to various forums where issues surrounding the crisis are discussed which replenishes her knowledge from academic studies as she is currently registered in the politics department.

With regard to unemployment, Themba, who left Zimbabwe because of lack of jobs and is currently employed by the government of South Africa, describes this problem:

Almost 90% unemployment you can’t find a job. I mean a recent graduate. If you graduate in Zimbabwe the only job you can get is to be a teacher. So every university graduate is becoming a teacher, and I mean for that pay, you know, you can’t even buy clothes to go to work with.14

Again these are some of the experiences shared by the young Zimbabweans that show the gravity of the economic crisis.

After reflecting on their last two current visits to Zimbabwe, about 80% of the respondents, 40% who are formally employed and 20% in semi-skilled jobs and the rest being postgraduate students, reported that the crisis in Zimbabwe is deepening in nature. Tino, the employed academic whose last two visits were in December 2006 and December 2007, narrates this observation:

The situation each time I go to Zimbabwe would have gone worse. I mean it’s like going down a hole. Each time you get all sorts of bad news so and so has died. This long distance bus no longer comes here. Fuel is no longer found, all the kind of challenges I mean. It never gets better. It just gets worse each time I go to Zimbabwe. I have terrible challenges each time I go to Zimbabwe.15

Nyasha, who is a postgraduate student, reiterates Tino’s perception:

I can specifically remember in 2002 where we started having these price hikes and inflation was about 60% and we thought that was unimaginable but these days you can imagine, we have got about 150 000% of inflation so it’s a huge difference. I think the crisis gets worse.16

---

13 Interview with Themba (population analyst), 1 June 2008
14 Interview with Tino (lecturer), 7 June 2008
15 Interview with Nyasha (postgraduate student), 7 April 2008
While Tino’s perception is based merely on his experience of his visits to Zimbabwe, Nyasha shows evidence of an informed position of the crisis. His analysis of the inflation figures shows that as a student he has been assessing the progression of the crisis over time. It could be that as a student she has a wider pool of resources to inform her on the crisis over and above her exposure from her academic studies.

Most of what the respondents identified as Zimbabwe’s political problems remind me of Chuma (2004), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) and Raftopulos (2003)’s analyses of the political situation in Zimbabwe after 2000. They all point to a lack of democratic space for opposition and lack of freedom of expression for the opposition as one of Zimbabwe’s major problems in the previous chapter. The post 2000 economic problems highlighted by the respondents are also similar to the description of the crisis in secondary literature. Shortages of basic commodities, high levels of inflation and unemployment and deterioration of the health system are problems that were clearly articulated in the previous chapter by Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004), Moyo and Yeros (2007), Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003) and Besada and Moyo (2008). Furthermore, a careful analysis of the development of the crisis in secondary literature indeed points to the fact that Zimbabwe’s crisis is a deepening one as also observed by the respondents.

One major difference between secondary literature and responses from the interviews is that while the former has a holistic view of the crisis which began to emerge visibly in the early 1990’s, the latter only focused on the post 2000 part of the crisis. This narrow focus on the crisis by the Zimbabweans could be a result of that it is what they are currently facing directly or indirectly, and therefore inevitably becomes the first thing that comes to mind when speaking about the Zimbabwean crisis. Nevertheless, their perceptions are valid especially considering the fact that the current crisis is actually more catastrophic than any other crisis faced by Zimbabwe in the previous years.
4.3 Zimbabweans’ Perceptions of the Origins of the Crisis

On being asked to establish the origins of the crisis, respondents began to reflect back to the period before 2000. 40% of the sample commented that the Zimbabwean crisis started in 2000 after the intense land redistribution. This group consisted of all Zimbabweans who were employed in semi-skilled jobs and a few from formal employment. 35% of the respondents on the other hand, argue that the crisis started during the period of ESAP in the 1990’s. This sample consists mainly of a few who are formally employed as well as postgraduate students. The other group, which consists of the two formally employed academics and politics students, noted that the crisis actually originated in 1980 when the country attained independence.

It is possible that the first group, who thought that the crisis started in 2000, did not have detailed knowledge to trace the chronological events of the crisis before 2000. Those who thought the crisis started during ESAP most probably started experiencing it during the 1990’s when the government started retrenching workers or they could have experienced the popular unrest against the government due to the failure of ESAP. The last group portray detailed knowledge of the crisis compared to the other groups because these are the academics that have had exposure on the theoretical details of the crisis as well as current researches in their institutions. The bottom line is that the three periods highlighted by the young Zimbabweans fall within a linear progression of the crisis at different stages. While in 1980, the crisis was not yet visible, it became deeper during ESAP’s failure and then became even more catastrophic after the land redistribution of 2000. These historic developments will be discussed in detail in the next section.

4.4 Zimbabweans’ Perceptions of the Development of the Crisis until June 2008

From all the stories told by the young Zimbabweans, I could trace the crisis through the independence period; the ESAP period of the 1990’s and its implications on the economy, the disbursement of war veteran gratuities in 1997, the government’s participation in the DRC war as well as the land redistribution and its effects on the economy and politics that have been discussed in the previous chapters.
25% of the respondents noted that the crisis actually started at independence in 1980. This portion of the respondents consists of the academics and postgraduate students who have gone the extra mile towards understanding the origins of the crisis. They state that the government actually inherited its repressive and authoritarian nature in 1980. Thamu emphasizes this point:

I think it has been like the history of ZANU PF... it’s not a problem that is only happening now but I think it’s a problem that has always been there if you follow events from 1980 the early 1980’s where the situation of the Matabeleland the ZAPU coming with an alternative they wanted another alternative representation of Zimbabwe and they were suppressed so I think it has always been the nature of our government that democratic space is not freely provided.¹⁷

Sizwe adds more insight on this issue. He states that:

Since 1980, we adopted and inherited an institutional framework that is very repressive and what it did is that it has now turned and used those repressive systems against the locals in Zimbabwe.¹⁸

These postgraduate students have a more informed understanding of the crisis because of their academic knowledge, exposure to public forums and access to more recent and current literature on the Zimbabwean crisis. Sizwe is one of the two respondents who has written on the issue and published scholarly articles on the crisis.

ESAP of the 1990’s was also identified by the respondents as part of the decisions that led to the deepening of the crisis. 45% of the respondents mainly who are formally employed and postgraduate students provided these responses. Vicky, who is a postgraduate student, comments on ESAP below:

I think it was in 1994 when one of the conditionalities of the ESAP policies outlined that in order for them to pay off the loans it had to cut back on expenditure on things such as education now that is to me I think is destroying a country because of the average Zimbabwean is not going to access basic education then where are we gonna get our accountants from, doctors and other professionals to carry the economy if they don’t have access to basic education¹⁹

---

¹⁷ Interview with Thamu (postgraduate student), 2 June 2008
¹⁸ Interview With Sizwe (postgraduate student and project officer), 10 April 2008
¹⁹ Interview with Vicky (journalist), 10 June 2008
The respondents also state that the decision by the government to award gratuities to war veterans in 1997 further deteriorated the economy. Tino who is an employed academic reveals that:

I mean the government did not have money to pay the war veterans. We are talking about a group of about close to 50,000 people who were supposed to be paid Z$ 50,000 each and a lump sum and Z$ 2,000 subsequently on a monthly basis and a cocktail of other provisions. I mean the state did not have that money. That money had not been budgeted for. And obviously what happened is that the state had to print money to do that and that led to the dramatic collapse of the currency on the so called Black Friday on the 14th of November 1997.20

Vicky and Tino’s perceptions are illustrations of informed views about the details of the crisis. While Vicky is specialising in the field of sociology in which she most probably acquired information on ESAP, Tino on the other hand has written and published academic work on the situation in Zimbabwe. His response is also an accurate analysis of the crisis which shows an intense knowledge of the subject area. Both respondents also have access to various forms of media that inform their perceptions as well as other academic forums where such issues are discussed.

About half of the sample pointed to the government’s participation in the DRC war as another development that escalated the crisis. This portion of the sample consists of 30% of the postgraduate students, 10% of formally employed people as well as 10% of semi-skilled Zimbabweans. Tino, who belongs to the formally employed group, expresses this view:

One thing that I forgot to mention is that the war that we fought in the Congo, we could not afford to sustain that war at all but Mugabe without even consulting parliament and he went to Congo in 1998. South Africa could have done that but they did not... To me that’s quite a disappointment but also a major crisis caused by individuals who acted out of their own self interests, then people made money in the DRC many of them in ZANU.21

20 Interview with Tino (lecturer), 7 June 2008
21 Interview with Tino (lecturer), 7 June 2008
Thamu from the same group as Tino concurs that “security forces were sent to DRC but they were mainly protecting personal interests there like the president’s diamond mines there but they were paid in foreign currency”. 22

Most respondents, about 80%, also commented that the period of intense land redistribution of 2000 had severe effects on the country’s economy and politics. In particular, there was a general consensus that land redistribution led to a drastic reduction in agricultural produce and exports. Chipo, one of the postgraduate students stresses this point:

...food production was greatly reduced, tobacco, where we got most of our foreign currency from was reduced and that had an effect on the economy and I think that’s where the crisis then really became pronounced because they were no longer getting this money from the foreign currency exports. 23

About half of the respondents consisting of formally employed academics and post graduate students took this discussion further to reveal that land redistribution soured Zimbabwe’s relations with the West leading to the withdrawal of financial support to Zimbabwe. Busi who is a postgraduate student reveals that:

Those international donors and staff have lost interest due to the negative statements made towards England and the UK and the things that they said to us and how a lot of donors and people that had invested in the country in the past have pulled back because of the Land Reform issue. 24

Sizwe, who is a formally employed academic, went further to highlight the impact of land redistribution on investment opportunities in Zimbabwe. He narrates that:

So the first problem that the government did is that they never respected property rights. In any environment what is needed to be done is to respect property rights and when they stopped respecting property rights in redistributing land, companies felt that they no longer need to invest in Zimbabwe. 25

25% of the respondents who were all employed in semi-skilled jobs also commented that that whilst land redistribution was a noble idea, it was not properly managed by the government.

22 Interview with Thamu (postgraduate student), 2 June 2008
23 Interview with Chipo (postgraduate student), 15 April 2008
24 Interview with Busi (postgraduate student), 8 April 2008
25 Interview with Sizwe (postgraduate student and project officer), 10 April 2008
They further noted that it was also used to gain political mileage for ZANU PF. Gidza stresses this view:

... when the land reform started, which was done in a wrong way because the land reform was done as a campaigning tool for ZANU PF when it discovered that MDC was gaining momentum as an opposition so in fear of losing, they decided to use land as a campaign gimmick.  

There is a consensus between secondary literature and perceptions of the young Zimbabweans concerning the development of the crisis from 1980. The respondents highlight some key periods which are crucial for tracing Zimbabwe’s deteriorating crisis like ESAP of the 1990’s and the intense land redistribution of 2000. Bond and Manyaya (2002) and Chakaodza and other scholars have adequately dealt with Zimbabwe’s experience of ESAP in chapter two. Moyo (2004:2005), Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004), Raftopoulos and Hammar among other scholars also emphasize the drastic effects of the government’s decision to disburse funds to war veterans, the venture into the DRC was as well as the intense land redistribution on the economic and political situation of Zimbabwe. In this regard, most of the respondents’ perceptions fit into the wider debate of the development of the crisis.

Interestingly, the respondents also highlight the distinct nature of the crisis after 2000 when Zimbabwe was faced economic isolation from the West following its decision to redistribute land formerly owned by white farmers. This has been explored in the literature by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) and Moyo and Yeros (2007). However, respondents do not see the land redistribution as an issue that dates as far back as the independence period. Their analysis of the land issue starts from 2000, and ignores the fact that land had always been a burning issue which needed to be resolved at some stage as discussed by Moyo (2004) and Moyo and Yeros (2005) in the previous chapter.

Gidza’s contribution where he states that the land redistribution was merely a campaign gimmick is contested in the previous chapter. This view reiterates Raftopoulos and Hammar (2003)’s previous argument. It does not take into cognisance that land has always been at the heart of Zimbabweans since independence as traced by Moyo (2004) and Moyo and Yeros (2005). It also

---

26 Interview with Gidza (waiter), 2 June 2008
ignores the historical imbalances in land ownership that were inherited at independence and hence the need for Zimbabwe to redistribute land at some stage. Since this view comes from those Zimbabweans who are employed in semi-skilled jobs, it is possible that they are not aware of these debates surrounding the land issue in Zimbabwe. Compared to academics and postgraduate students, this group is less exposed to current and solid researches from which to follow up these issues. On another note, the respondents’ overall perceptions of the development of the crisis are expected of people who once lived in Zimbabwe and are currently being updated with the progression of the crisis. To a greater extent, there is evidence that they were informed about the crisis.

4.5 Zimbabweans’ Perceptions of Prospects for the Future

After describing their perceptions of the origins and cause of the crisis, respondents were also asked to share their perceptions regarding Zimbabwe’s future. All the respondents emphasized that Zimbabwe needs to be re-engaged into the international community. They also highlighted the need for a change of government in Zimbabwe and a high propensity of the crisis deepening further if Robert Mugabe remains in power. Most respondents suggested a government of national unity between the presiding ZANU PF and MDC as one of the pragmatic steps towards addressing the crisis. These themes are individually discussed below:

75% of the sample consisting of all the postgraduate students and formally employed people revealed that Zimbabwe needs to be re-integrated into the international community in order to address the crisis. They also commented that Zimbabwe’s ongoing and further deepening crisis is a result of its soured relations with the West and sanctions imposed against the country, hence the need to reintegrate into the global network. Bongi expresses this view:

...and if we continue saying we will not be a colony again ok fine, but the worst thing that will continue to happen to us is that we gonna continue going down the drain coz we can’t continue living under sanctions, we can’t afford that.27

---

27 Interview with Bongi (postgraduate student), 26 May 2008
About half of the 75% of the respondents also explained that Zimbabwe’s isolation from the international community hinders any form of pragmatic development to extricate the country out of the crisis. Bongi narrates her opinion:

I think that we just have to swallow our pride. If we can also engage international community and develop some relations which are of benefit, not relations which have got nothing to offer for us. Those are things we need to look at. This policy of “Zimbabwe will go it alone” will not work.\(^{28}\)

These are just a few of the responses that highlighted that Zimbabwe cannot line in isolation and therefore needs to be re-integrated into the international community. Clearly respondents felt that if the country remains in isolation, the economic and political problems are likely to persist.

Some of the academics and formally employed respondents also expressed Zimbabwe’s serious need for financial assistance from the international community. This elicited divided responses from the young Zimbabweans. The first group consisting mainly of half of the formally employed Zimbabweans genuinely felt that an injection of capital will revive the economy, while the other group of mainly students acknowledged the need for a financial injection, but were also sceptical of that land could be part of the conditionalities attached by the international community on those funds. Vicky, from the first group, narrates her concern:

The best way to go now is just to get donor funds not just only to sustain our livelihoods but also to resuscitate the means of production… If we send money to those areas so that we can be able to produce again what that means is that we will be able to export and get money to sustain ourselves.\(^{29}\)

Chipo, from the second group, comments that:

You’ve got to ask yourself that if they have to give so much money what’s in it for them? There are obviously vested interests and I am concerned that the biggest thing that has caused the rift between Zimbabwe and the international community is the land issue, in my opinion. They may declare not in so many words that what they are interested in is land so I am concerned that that money will come to Zimbabwe at a price which I am very afraid is land.\(^{30}\)

\(^{28}\) Interview with Bongi (postgraduate student), 26 May 2008

\(^{29}\) Interview with Vicky (journalist), 10 June 2008.

\(^{30}\) Interview with Chipo (postgraduate student), 15 April 2008.
This group of respondents seemed to have more understanding of the implications of foreign financial aid to Zimbabwe. This is the same group who raised concerns about conditionalities that were lodged on the country during the ESAP period of the 1990’s and their effects on further declining the economy. Because of their academic knowledge and access to theoretical details about the crisis, they were quick to point out that aid that comes to Zimbabwe will definitely come with a price.

On another note, all respondents suggested a change of government as one of the necessary steps towards addressing the crisis. Tino who is a formally employed academic, comments that “the Zimbabwean crisis is so precisely a ZANU PF crisis and there is no way in which you can address it without removing the ZANU PF party”. He also elaborates his perception in saying:

My point is that, Zimbabwe can never get better under ZANU PF. I don’t see that happening, coz ZANU PF has become severely compromised. Everyone has got their hands very dirty so much that they are incapable to carry the country forward they can’t. We need a new government. There are prospects under a new government, and there cannot be prospects under a ZANU PF.31

The young Zimbabweans further explained that a change of government would particularly boost foreign investment into the country. Thamu one of the formally employed Zimbabweans, stresses this view:

Investors and all the aid which has been stopped to Zimbabwe because of the current government which is there, those top government officials. Once those people are removed, once we have a new government, we will boost the confidence of the investors.32

About 30% of the sample further highlighted promises that have been made to Zimbabwe by the IMF should it change government. According to Nyasha who is a student:

…from what I have heard on the news last week, the IMF and other donor organizations want to give 1 billion British Pounds to Zimbabwe every year for ten years until Zimbabwe’s economy recovers, you know, that kind of money. They are not prepared to engage with Mugabe’s regime. That alone shows you that change is actually possible.33

31 Interview with Tino (lecturer), 7 June 2008
32 Interview with Thamu (postgraduate student), 2 June 2008
33 Interview with Nyasha (postgraduate student), 7 April 2008
This is evidence that students are more informed about the crisis than other segments of the group because over and above their studies and other academic forums from which they can learn about the crisis, they also rely on the media for replenishing their knowledge.

Another segment of the sample, about 10% who are formally employed, recommended the MDC opposition party as capable of extricating Zimbabwe from this crisis. They felt that MDC will attract international goodwill and the much-needed investment from the international community. They were also adamant that since MDC won most of the parliamentary seats in the June 2008 elections, it is capable of ruling the country. Sizwe clarifies this view:

We have gone through an election and people have selected their leadership and they want to be led by the MDC. This should be respected. No matter how many shortfalls the MDC might have, no matter how uhhhhm how people might think Morgan is; that’s what the people want. It’s what democracy entails: will by the people to select their leadership.34

This just shows the extent to which these young Zimbabweans have no confidence in the current government. It also reminds us of their concern for lack of democratic space as part of their descriptions of the nature of the crisis described earlier.

60% of the respondents who are postgraduate students and those in formal employment also suggested a government of national unity between ZANU PF and MDC as one possible way of addressing the Zimbabwean crisis. Nyasha, one of the students explains that:

...I think a lot of us, people in our generation prefer to see a transition rather than a turnaround, a government where a few guys from ZANU PF will be working together with MDC coz I don’t think it’s possible for MDC to come and change things overnight.35

However, 20% of this sample who are formally employed as well as academics disagreed with the idea of a Government of National Unity. They argued that ZANU PF and MDC cannot formulate a proper unity owing to the repressive nature of ZANU PF. Tino highlights this point:

---

34 Interview with Sizwe (postgraduate student and project officer), 10 April 2008
35 Interview with Nyasha (postgraduate student), 7 April 2008
ZANU PF believes in an all or nothing at all kind of approach to politics and I think the MDC should rule. They have won the elections. They should go ahead and form a government so that if things go wrong they take the blame. So you see that national unity governments are very funny animals. ZANU PF and MDC are chalk and cheese that differ in terms of their approach to the economy and the approach to what democracy really is.\textsuperscript{36}

Vicky agrees with Tino by stating that "We just need a fresh start; you can’t go to bed with the enemy. How do you know that your enemy won’t bite you? How do you know that your enemy won’t teach you his ways?"\textsuperscript{37} This is another opportunity that the respondents used to show their lack of trust for the government because of its authoritarian tendencies.

In the light of the above, some Zimbabweans pointed to the need to address the problem of leadership in the country which they believe has mired the country into a crisis. This view came from about 40\% of the respondents which includes those who are in semi-skilled jobs and the formally employed. They complained that if there is no change of president, the Zimbabwean crisis would further deepen. Themba stresses this point:

If Mugabe retains power, whether legally or illegally, I don’t think anything is going to change. Things are going to get worse. More people are going to leave I think and things are going to get worse.\textsuperscript{38}

This goes on to show just how much the respondents have concern over the lack of legitimacy for the president.

Part of the young Zimbabweans’ perceptions above fit into the wider debate in secondary literature concerning prospects for the future. Moyo and Yeros (2007), Sones (2006), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) among all others scholars agreed that indeed Zimbabwe needs to be re-integrated into the global scene in order to address the crisis as emphasized by the respondents. With regard to Zimbabwe’s need for financial assistance, Chipo and Nyasha’s views raise a critical debate on how the country is to be re-integrated into the global system, which has been elaborated in the previous chapter. Nyasha’s view foresees Zimbabwe going back to its former

\textsuperscript{36} Interview with Tino (lecturer), 7 June 2008
\textsuperscript{37} Interview with Vicky (journalist), 10 June 2008
\textsuperscript{38} Interview with Themba (population analyst), 1 June 2008
periphery state of the 1990’s during ESAP in which it was dependent on international finance and yet still in a crisis better than the current because it does not make provision for the maintenance of land that Zimbabwe has gained already. His view reiterates debates made by Gwisai (2008) and Moss and Patrick (2005) in the previous chapter. Chipo’s view, on the other hand, takes cognisance that Zimbabwe has had gains through the land redistribution which should be maintained when Zimbabwe is re-integrated into the global system. This perception is aligned to Moyo and Yeros (2007) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006)’s argument, who state that Zimbabwe should cling to its status quo regarding land when it re-enters the global scene.

What has been suggested by the respondents concerning the Government of National Unity has already been implemented in Zimbabwe. The only difference is that while their idea of a Government of National Unity is to reposition Zimbabwe in its former periphery state of dependence, the Unity Deal between MDC and ZANU PF maintains that land that has been redistributed and will not be returned to its previous owners. Through this achievement, Zimbabwe has an option of clinging to the status quo of land ownership and align itself with other global powers that do not share a colonial history with the country in order to emerge as a better periphery through delinking.

The only difference between the respondents’ perceptions and secondary literature is that unlike the former, who argue for a mere change of government in order to address the crisis, Moyo and Yeros (2007) in the previous chapter rather argue for the formation of a new political force which is not partisan whose main aim is to sustain Zimbabwe’s agricultural revolution. They also argue that it should engage the working class and democratize the rural movement and war veterans in order to support the land reform and re-enter the global network with more dignity. In my view, Moyo and Yeros (2007)’s view is a wise option of addressing the crisis because they focus on long term changes which will benefit the people other than the former, who focus on cosmetic changes that are likely to provide short term solutions.
4.6 Conclusion

This chapter was an analysis of young Zimbabweans’ perceptions of the origins and nature of the Zimbabwean crisis and prospects for the future. The respondents identified shortages of basic commodities, high levels of inflation, unemployment and the deteriorating health service system when asked to describe the nature of the crisis. They also commented that the Zimbabwean crisis is a deepening crisis which consists of various crises that are interrelated and cannot be understood in isolation.

With regards to origins of the crisis, some thought that the crisis started in 1980 while others thought that it started during ESAP in the 1990’s. The last group thought the crisis started in 2000 after the intense land redistribution. The respondents generally identified key historical moments in the development of the crisis dating from 1980 to date. These are; the inheritance of a repressive government from the colonial period by ZANU PF in 1980, ESAP of the 1990’s, the government’s decision to award war veteran gratuities in 1997, the government’s venture into the DRC war in 1998 as well as intense land redistribution of 2000. They were also able to show how these developments further deteriorated the crisis.

As for prospects for the future, the respondents stressed that Zimbabwe needs to be re-integrated into the international community in order to address the crisis. They also emphasised the need for a change of government as one of the necessary steps towards a solution. In this regard, they felt that if there is no change of leadership, in particular, President Mugabe, the crisis is likely to further deepen. A government of national unity was also suggested as a more pragmatic solution for Zimbabwe’s crisis.

Most of the young Zimbabweans’ perceptions were based on how they experienced and perceived the crisis. To a great extent, their perceptions could fit into the wider debates of the crisis discussed in secondary literature. However there were also major differences. When looking at the nature of the crisis, respondents were only confined on the current post 2000 crisis and not its holistic and historical nature which is detailed in the literature. With regards to land, the respondents did not see it as a continuous problem that dates as far back as independence that needed to be addressed as discussed in the literature. Their focus was on the immediate post
2000 period and how it affected the country. As for prospects for the future, some Zimbabweans were more confined on partisan politics which entailed the need to remove the president and his government. This is in contrast with the main argument in the literature which states that Zimbabwe needs a more long term plan, and a more democratic leadership structure that is not caught up in partisan politics in order to advance the agrarian revolution successfully.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction
As indicated in the first chapter, this study sought to provide a solid context of the Zimbabwean crisis particularly focusing on its origins and nature as well as prospects for the future. It focused on establishing when the crisis actually started, how it started and also how it presented itself and developed from 1980 to date. Having done that, the study went further to explore the possibilities for the future.

The main argument of this study was that Zimbabwe is undergoing a deepening crisis. This argument was reached after analysing the development of the crisis since 1980 in which significant periods which deepened the crisis were identified. These are the adoption of ESAP in the 1990’s, the disbursement of war veteran gratuities by the government in 1997, the government’s involvement in the DRC war in 1998 as well as the fast track land redistribution of 2000.

I also argued that the Zimbabwean crisis is of a distinct nature. An analysis of the crises faced by Zimbabwe from 1980 to the late 1990’s after the adoption of Structural Adjustment revealed that these are almost similar experiences undergone by other African countries that also adopted Structural Adjustment. However, the distinct nature of the crisis is marked by the intense land redistribution of 2000 which led to the country’s economic isolation. In this regard, the study established that Zimbabwe cannot live in isolation from the international community. With regards to prospects for the future, the need to re-integrate into the global scene was identified as one of the most necessary steps that Zimbabwe must take in an attempt to address the crisis. I further argued that Zimbabwe’s isolation can put the country in an advantageous position on its re-integration into the global network. Because land has already been redistributed to the citizens, Zimbabwe can bargain on maintaining the new status quo of land ownership in its re-integration and emerge as a better periphery than it was before isolation.
5.2 Research Findings

One of the key findings of the study is that the Zimbabwean crisis is of a deepening nature. A careful analysis of its development from 1980 to date using secondary literature proves that it has become more and more catastrophic with time. Both sources of information highlight the adoption of ESAP of the 1990’s, the disbursement of war veteran gratuities on 1997, the engagement in the DRC war in 1999 and the land redistribution of 2000 as the main decisions made by the government that contributed significantly towards further deteriorating the crisis.

This study has also established that the current Zimbabwean crisis is of a distinctive nature. While the crisis dates as far back as the late 1980’s, most of Zimbabwe’s experience from independence up to the ESAP period of the 1990’s is more or less similar to what other African countries that have adopted ESAP experienced. The crisis takes on its distinct nature in 2000 when the country redistributed land previously owned by white farmers without compensation which led to economic isolation by the West. A careful consideration of the catastrophic crisis that followed economic isolation proves that indeed Zimbabwe cannot live in isolation. The young Zimbabweans also identified the period after 2000 as a time when the crisis was most catastrophic. They also highlight the need to take into cognisance the country’s relations with the international community when looking for pragmatic solutions for the future. These findings validate the need to understand the crisis by placing the country into the wider global framework in which it was part of for several decades before isolation.

Both secondary literature and perceptions of young Zimbabweans revealed that Zimbabwe is beset with a crisis of a political and economic nature. Lack of democratic space and lack of freedom of expression for the opposition under authoritarian leadership were identified among other descriptions of Zimbabwe’s political problems. On the economic side, a drastic deterioration of the economy which includes hyper-inflation, a fall in agricultural output, shortages of basic commodities, unemployment are part of the plethora of economic problems faced by the country.

With regards to the origins of the crisis according to secondary literature, the crisis is partly a result of the remnants of deep seated political and economic problems of the colonial period
which were inherited by the ZANU PF government in 1980 and only began to emerge visibly as a crisis in the late 1980’s. The failure of the ZANU PF government to deliver its promises of redistributing land to the citizens at independence due to Lancaster House Agreement constraints as well as the adoption of the repressive system of rule are some of the problems that Zimbabwe inherited from the colonial period which later exploded into a crisis. This is also coupled with the maintenance of a socialist rhetoric in a capitalist economy by the government in the early 1980’s which also emerged later as a crisis. As for the respondents’ perceptions, 40% of the sample revealed that the crisis started in 2000 after the fast track land redistribution. 35% of the respondents thought that the crisis started in the 1990’s during the ESAP period. The last 20% noted that the crisis originated as early as 1980 during independence.

Looking at prospects for the future, there is a general emphasis that Zimbabwe needs to be re-integrated into the global community in secondary literature. Two options through which Zimbabwe can be re-integrated were identified. The first option is that of going back to Zimbabwe’s dependency stage of the 1990’s in which the country was still reliant on the West, but still facing a crisis which is of a less magnitude compared to the current one. This view does not acknowledge that Zimbabwe has actually made gains through land redistribution. In this regard, it does not make any provision for the maintenance of the land that has been gained. A significant part of the young Zimbabweans’ perceptions is aligned to this argument, which is expected of people living in a periphery country.

The second option is that of maintaining the status quo of land ownership when Zimbabwe re-enters the global scene. It maintains that land that has been redistributed to citizens will not be returned to its previous white minority owners. On this note, Zimbabwe has an option of bargaining for relations that will benefit the country when re-entering the global network through delinking (Amin 1990). Zimbabwe is a country that is already living in isolation. It has the option of determining the terms in which it can be re-integrated into the global system such that it benefits from its position as suggested by Amin (1990). The country can also choose to align itself with other core countries with whom it does not share any colonial past in order to preserve the land gains. In essence, Zimbabwe has an opportunity of emerging into the global network with a better status compared to other African countries that have not undergone land
redistribution. Only a few respondents took into cognisance Zimbabwe’s need to preserve its land gains in the light of the second option.

There are also some differences between the literature and perceptions of Zimbabweans concerning the Zimbabwean crisis. The first thing that came to mind when the respondents were asked about the crisis was the current post 2000 crisis. They did not think of the crisis in its chronological development as described in the literature. Respondents were also not informed about the origins of the land question. Their analysis of the land issue was also confined to the 2000 onwards period, while overlooking the long contentious and postponed land problem which was only addressed in 2000. While literature maintains that Zimbabwe needs a long term solution which will carry forward the maintenance of land redistribution with regards to prospects for the future, most Zimbabweans’ propose solutions that foster for a change in leadership and partisan politics which do not challenge the structural constraints of Zimbabwe as a periphery country in a global system of uneven development.

5.3 Overall Assessment

The use of secondary literature as well as perceptions of young Zimbabweans achieved the role of giving more insight into the crisis. To a large extent, the Zimbabweans’ experiences and perceptions of the crisis overlap with the development of the crisis as articulated in the literature. This validates and solidifies the authenticity of the knowledge about the crisis. The differences between the two sources of information are also very insightful. They add new shades of meaning particularly showing how in some instances the analysis of the crisis in secondary literature differs from how people experience and perceive it. The differences also provide alternative ways of thinking about the crisis which are useful for making pragmatic and people centred solutions for the future.

The study concludes that indeed Zimbabwe is going through a crisis of magnitude proportions and that this cannot be understood by analysing a single time period in isolation. The origins of the crisis and its nature need an understanding of the historical development of the crisis. Furthermore, owing to Zimbabwe’s position as a periphery in the global system, throwing the
crisis into the global scene sheds more light into other external and structural factors that are crucial in understanding the crisis. By analysing Zimbabwe within this context, the study succeeded in portraying the lack of power of these periphery countries to influence the rules of the global system as highlighted by Amin (2002) in the first chapter. Furthermore, it clarifies that indeed no country can live in isolation from the global network and that any country that plays against the global rules is likely to face severe consequences from the major global players.

5.5 Conclusion

Alavi (1982)’s early description that periphery countries cannot be understood outside their links with the core in a global setting seems true if we consider the crisis in Zimbabwe. An insightful analysis of the Zimbabwean crisis has indeed confirmed this view. Zimbabwe’s links with the West before and after isolation have been very crucial in understanding the crisis and prospects for the future. There is hope for Zimbabwe even under such critical conditions. Zimbabwe has the potential to emerge into the global system as a better periphery than most of its African counterparts. After such a gruesome crisis, going back to the notion of “catching up” with modernization which will revive the country’s dependence to the West whilst the country remains in a crisis like that of the 1990’s will be a waste of the sacrifices taken by the government against sanctions which have had adverse and traumatic effects to the people. Zimbabwe is already a country living in isolation. It can move forward by charting its own development trajectory through delinking. Whilst Amin (1990) maintains that the future of delinking is yet unknown, Zimbabwe has a choice of going ahead to pursue delinking. This is a country that has single-handedly defied all rules of the global capitalist expansion. What is left is to further pioneer the delinking option with the same kind of defiance and bravery. Zimbabwe has a high potential of becoming a model to Africa, very much unlike its former bread basket status of the early 1980’s, but an example of the possibility of Third World African countries to restore their long lost autonomy.
REFERENCES


Bond P. 2006. *Competing theories of Zimbabwe’s long economic crisis*. South Africa: University of KwaZulu Natal, School of Development Studies and Centre for Civil Society.


Tesch, R. 1990. *Qualitative research: Analysis types and software tools.* Great Britain: The Falmer Press.


Zimbabwe's inflation rate at 89, 7 sextillion percent. [Online].


Zimbabwe: Staff returns to hospitals but not to work. [Online].