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Does Support for Democracy Matter? A Cross-National Study of Regime Preferences and System Change

by
Christopher Bruce Phillips Claassen
CLSCHR002

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy, Politics and Economics

Faculty of Humanities
University of Cape Town
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Abstract

Using survey data from the third World Values Survey and democracy scores from Freedom House, I outline and test a supply and demand model of democratic change and stability. While “support for democracy” is a common concept in political science, the only empirical studies of the relationship between these regime preferences and democracy (Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann 2003) do not control for reciprocal causation and use poorly conceptualised and measured variables. They claim that deeply-rooted cultural orientations called “self-expression values” are a better measure of implicit support for democracy than overt expressions of regime preference. However, I find that once I control for the possibility that democracy is exogenous, there is little difference between the explanatory power of cultural values versus overtly expressed preferences. Furthermore, I argue that popular regime preferences (or demand) affect the change in the level of democracy, but do so only in relation to its current supply. “Net demand” is the driver of system change rather than absolute levels of popular support for democracy.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Does it matter what citizens think about the type of political system they live in? Are the fortunes of a regime affected by the degree of support it receives from its citizens? Do positive evaluations of autocratic rule strengthen the hand of authoritarian elites? Does popular demand for democracy lead to democratisation? This study is an attempt to answer these questions, all of which address the relationship between the type of political regime and the attitudes of the public to that regime. I use empirical survey data on popular social values and regime preferences from the third wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), and data on the extent of democratic rights and institutions collected by Freedom House (FH) to investigate "mass-regime" linkages across 44 countries over a constant five-year period beginning between 1995 and 1998. I demonstrate that attitudes to democracy matter for change in the actual level of democracy – and that they matter over and above the impact of broader social values as a form of demand-side pressure on the authorities of a political system. Furthermore, when explaining democratic change or stability, I find that it is the relative level of "net" or "unmet" demand that is important, not the absolute level of public demand for democratisation.

1.1 Research Problem

It is an axiom of political science that a political regime requires some form of popular support to survive as it depends on rule by consent rather than by coercion. In recent years, with the global spread of cross-national survey data, the concept of regime legitimacy has become quantifiable and survey questions concerning overt

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1 Support for democracy is called "regime preferences" and "explicit demand" in this study. Referring to these variables as supports is somewhat misleading because I argue that they should primarily be seen as mass demands.
2 The year at which the five-year period begins for a given country is determined by the date when the World Values Survey was conducted in that country.
expressions of support for democracy are now common. However, most empirical studies use mass attitudes to the political regime as the dependent variable (cf. Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999; Mishler & Rose 2001; Bratton & Mattes 2001; Lagos 2003). Thus, while these studies describe and explain support for democracy, they do not test whether support for democracy affects the institutions of the political system. The likely assumption is that mass-regime orientations have an effect on the structure of authority, either as a demand for reform or as a support for the existing regime. In other words, positive public evaluations of the regime, in the political science literature, are taken as a sign that the regime enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects (cf. Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998; Diamond 1999: chapter 5).

Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel and Hans-Dieter Klingemann have undertaken the only empirical tests of these assumptions in three recent papers (Inglehart 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2003; Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann 2003). They claim that a broad and deep-rooted syndrome of "self-expression values" (life satisfaction, trust, tolerance, political participation and post-materialism) is a better predictor of and explanation for democracy than overt expressions of support for democracy. However, methodological problems, particularly the untenable assumption of unidirectional causation, influence their conclusion that overt support for democracy is spuriously related to the level of democracy.

The rest of this chapter surveys the relevant literature on political culture and democracy, with particular focus on the work of Inglehart and colleagues (Inglehart 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2003; Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann 2003). In Chapter two, I adapt Easton's (1965) model of the political system to create a supply and demand model of democratic change, which predicts that popular demand matters, but does so only in relation to supply. Chapter three then operationalises this model, constructing variables of supply and demand from Freedom House democracy scores and survey data from the third World Values Survey. The fourth chapter begins by replicating Inglehart's studies, comparing the effects of self-expression values and regime preferences on the level of, and change in the level of, democracy. I then test

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3 Inglehart takes the correlation between values and democracy to mean that values cause democracy, without controlling adequately for the likely possibility that some of the covariance is a function of the effect of democracy on values. After all, democracy scores change slowly from year to year, so even if democracy is measured subsequent to the independent variable, it may still act as a proxy measure for an earlier level of democracy. In other words, the explanatory power of his models is inflated as he assumes that values are exogenous, but the direction of causation is likely to flow both ways.
the supply and demand model, analysing the effects of demand (relative to supply) on change in democracy. The final chapter concludes the study.

1.2 Literature Review

1.2(a) Culture and Democracy

The political culture paradigm of democratisation and consolidation explains political behaviour as a function of the politically relevant attitudes, values and beliefs of that society. Political culture has its origin in the writings of Aristotle, Rousseau and Tocqueville who argued that democracies require some level of normative commitment from the public. However, the first systematic study of political culture analysis was done by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, who argued that a civic culture based on "communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity" emerges with, and helps to ensure the survival of, democratic institutions (Almond & Verba 1963: 8).

Yet while this paradigm focuses on the cultural correlates of democracy, it should be noted that any political regime benefits from some measure of popular support because, as Easton puts it, "if the authorities are to be able to make decisions, to get them accepted as binding, and to put them into effect without the extensive use of coercion, solidarity must be developed around the major aspects of the system within which the authorities operate" (Easton 1965: 158). In other words, political culture assumes that the regime - the manner in which power is structured in a society, the particular arrangement of the apparatuses of government - is affected by the orientations of the public towards it. These "mass-regime" links have been most explicitly conceived in David Easton's (1965) cybernetic model. Much subsequent work on political culture, including this study, is located within the rubric of this model.  

4 An alternative approach to democratisation and system change is the political-economy paradigm. In this view, changes in the political system are explained as the product of strategic interactions between those actors who have power and an interest in the outcome (cf. O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Wintrobe 1998).

5 See Chapter Two for a detailed outline of the theoretical model used in this paper, which borrows heavily from Easton (1965).
After a lull in the previous decade, the analysis of political culture experienced a "renaissance" – to use Inglehart's (1988) description – in the 1990's, due to the greater availability of socio-political survey data from around the world, and the need to explain the collapse of the Soviet empire and the failure of authoritarian regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The first study of this generation was Inglehart (1988; extended in Inglehart 1990), which used data from the first World Values Survey to argue that – in the tradition of Almond and Verba – civic culture attitudes of trust and political participation could be used to explain the differing degrees of success of democracy and capitalism in various countries.

In his later work, Inglehart (1997, 1999; Inglehart & Baker 2000) moved away from the concept of civic culture and developed a broader measure called "self-expression values." Inglehart (1997) performed a principal component analysis of World Values Survey data, and argued that the key components were two orthogonal and significant dimensions of cross-cultural variation: "survival vs. self-expression values" and "traditional vs. rational-secular orientations to authority." He then went onto argue that these two dimensions had three important explanatory uses. First, when the values on one dimension are plotted against the other, the societies of the WVS arrange themselves into cultural and civilizational blocs (Inglehart 1999; Inglehart & Baker 2000). Second, examining the dispersion of GDP per capita on the same scatter-plot, a steady and clear increase in the level of economic development can be observed from the bottom left corner to the top right corner (ibid.). Thus, as the levels of both dimensions of values increase, the wealthier the society is likely to be. Third, (as discussed in the previous chapter) self-expression values exhibit strong positive correlations with the level of democracy in the respective countries (ibid.).

Inglehart and colleagues develop these observations into "the theory of human development", a type of modernisation theory (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann 2003). Socio-economic development – moderated by historical-cultural heritage – leads to generational value change as societies become more secular-rational, then more self-expressive (Inglehart 1997). In the words of Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann, "traditional conformity values, which subordinate...".

These findings are rendered more significant when one considers that the two dimensions of values are generated independently of the data on cultural blocs, economic development, or democracy, through a principal component analysis of a multitude of items from the World Values Survey.
human autonomy to community discipline tend to give way to more emancipative values that emphasise human choice” (2003: 342). Relying heavily on Abraham Maslow’s theory of the hierarchy of needs, Inglehart argues that in contexts of material poverty, children will grow up valuing material security, but when one’s basic needs are met, ‘higher’ post materialist or self-actualisation goals become important (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart & Baker 2000).

In the second step of the two-stage theory of human development, these self-expression values create the demand for human rights and removal of legal restrictions on individual autonomy, which are associated with democratic values. Inglehart thus claims that self-expression values are the cultural precondition for democracy (Inglehart 1999; 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2003).

1.2(b) Empirical Studies of Regime Preferences and Democracy

Building on his work that identified and explained self-expression values, Inglehart turned his attention to investigating the relationship between values and democracy. Inglehart (2003) seemed to demonstrate that self-expression values are a stronger predictor of stable democracy than explicitly expressed public regime preferences. He compares the correlations of self-expression values and a democracy/autocracy index – both calculated from the third or fourth waves of the World Values Survey (1995-2001) – with two dependent variables, the 1995 Freedom House democracy score, and the cumulative Freedom House scores from 1981-2009. He finds that self-expression values correlate at .59 and .83 with the respective measures of democracy, compared with .35 and .51 for the regime preferences index (Inglehart 2003: Table 3). He concludes,

[...]though lip service to democracy is almost universal today, it is not necessarily an accurate indicator of how deeply democracy has taken root in a given country. The extent to which a society emphasizes a syndrome of tolerance, trust, political activism, and Post-materialist values is a much stronger predictor of stable democracy. This syndrome has been labelled “Self-expression values ...” (Inglehart 2003: 51, emphasis in original).

Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann (2003: figure 3) control for the number of years a country has spent under a democratic constitution, and show that self-expression values still have a significant effect on democracy. However, the authors also use a different dependent variable, “effective democracy”, the product of Freedom House
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 democracy scores and Transparency International corruption perception ratings in an attempt to separate de jure from de facto democracies.\(^7\)

Finally, Inglehart and Welzel (2003) report that self-expression values explain 74% of the variance of effective democracy, compared with only 34% explained by regime preferences. Moreover, the effect of self-expression values remains robust even after controlling for regime preferences and experience with democracy (ibid: Table 2).\(^8\) They conclude that "lip service to democracy is widespread, but it does not reflect a deep commitment to crucial democratic norms", while "the evidence indicates that a political culture that emphasizes tolerance, trust, life satisfaction, and participation plays a crucial role in effective democracy" (ibid.: 76).

1.2(c) Critique of the Empirical Studies

1.2(c)(i) Measurement of the Regime Preference Scale

Inglehart and colleagues have a number of poorly conceptualised and measured variables in their papers. First, Inglehart (2003) uses a flawed regime preference scale. He adds together the percent that offer a positive evaluation of undemocratic rule in each of two questions,\(^9\) and adds the percent offering a positive view of democratic rule in each of two other questions.\(^10\) The total undemocratic support is then subtracted from the total democratic support. He does not test the validity or reliability of this scale – particularly a problem because he uses the WVS question concerning technocratic rule,\(^11\) which turns out to be weakly correlated with his other three items at the micro- and macro-levels. This suggests that Inglehart is not offering the most accurate measure of regime preferences, affecting the results of the bivariate

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\(^7\) See section 1.2(c)(iii), below, for an argument against this particular measurement of democracy.
\(^8\) "Experience with democracy" is equivalent to Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann's (2003) "years of democracy" – the number of years, between 1850 and 1995, that a country has scored +7 or higher on the Polity 98 index.
\(^9\) "For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country": "Having experts, not the government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country" and "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections". Percent answering "good" or "very good".
\(^10\) "Would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country": "Having a democratic political system", percent answering "good" or "very good", "Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government", percent answering "agree" or "strongly agree".
\(^11\) "Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country."
statistics he is reporting. The subsequent paper by Inglehart and Welzel (2003) remedies this: the authors use Klingemann’s (1999) democracy scale which measures consistent democratic preferences across four items from the World Values Survey, and excludes the technocratic rule question.\footnote{Instead of the technocratic rule question (see footnote 11), they use: “would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country, having the army rule?” The others three questions are the same as reported in footnotes 9 and 10.}

1.2(c)(ii) Timing of the Variables

Second, both versions of Inglehart’s dependent variable are measured prior to the independent variables, which undermines his conclusions. While Inglehart and Welzel (2003) use subsequent democracy scores, there is a time interval between independent and dependent variables that varies considerably across cases. Their measures of regime preferences date from between 1995 and 1998 while the dependent variable is the 1999 Freedom House scores. It is thus difficult to argue that the authors are accurately capturing the effect of regime preferences on democracy when, for some countries, there is a one year interval between these variables, while for others, four years passes. This is likely to weaken the relationship between these variables, especially in comparison with the relationship between self-expression values and democracy, for which there is a constant interval.\footnote{Their scores for self-expression values are from the same survey – and thus the same time – as regime preferences, but the authors calculate expected self-expression values for 1990 for every country. This is performed with regressions using data for those countries that participated in the second, third and fourth waves of the WVS.}

1.2(c)(iii) Measurement of Democracy

Inglehart, Welzel and Klingemann develop a measure of “effective democracy”, which is the product of FH scores and the national scores from Transparency International’s “Corruptions Perceptions Index” (CPI) (Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann 2002; Inglehart & Welzel 2003). As such, they regard FH scores as only providing a measure of “formal democracy”, while the CPI gives an indicator of “elite integrity”. Their argument is that “[f]ormal rights are effective only in so far as elites respect these rights” and “elite integrity ... distinguishes effective democracy from formal democracy” (Inglehart & Welzel 2003: 66). Their measure also has the apparent benefit of providing a means of differentiating amongst new liberal
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democracies and older established democracies, both of which get similar high scores on the FH index but which may exhibit very real differences in individual empowerment.

However, I believe their arguments are two deficient on three important points. First, while the concept of "effective democracy" is intuitively appealing it is flawed. Contrary to their arguments, Freedom House scores are not just a measure of "formal rights." In fact, FH explicitly state that their scale "recognises that formal electoral procedures are not the only factors that determine the real distribution of power ... [t]he more that people suffer under such domination by unelected forces, the less chance a country has of receiving credit for self-determination" (Freedom House 2002). Similarly with the civil liberties scale, "Freedom House does not mistake constitutional guarantees of human rights for those rights in practice" (ibid.).

Several of FH's survey questions are clearly addressed at outcomes rather than just procedures. Three examples illustrate this point, with words or phrases emphasised to show items that overtly measure de facto democracy or elite integrity (the full checklist of questions is supplied in Appendix B):

"Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?"

"Is there significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?"

"Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?" (Freedom House 2002, emphasis added).

Second, corruption perceptions scores do not address the problem that Inglehart and colleagues claim they do (i.e.: that Freedom House scores "do not take into account the extent to which given rights are respected in actual elite behaviour" [Inglehart & Welzel 2003: 67]). The authorities can certainly threaten democracy; empirical procedural democratic theory is an attempt to isolate and measure the criteria that would hinder the ability of self-interested elites to concentrate power in their hands, and thus protect, strengthen and deepen democracy. Corrupt elites, however, are not a threat to democracy in the same way. Corruption is a serious political problem, and probably an impediment to democratic consolidation, but corrupt authorities do not affect the very structure of the regime; they do not change the mechanisms for the authoritative allocation of value as power-seeking elites might. Corrupt officials are
interested in using their office for material gain rather than as a means for gaining more political power, and as such, elite corruption should be measured separately to democracy.

Third, even if one accepts Inglehart’s argument, the CPI measures mass perceptions of elite corruption, rather than attempting to give an “objective” measure of elite integrity. These public perceptions may be coloured by ideology, attitudes to democracy and social group, among other things. “Effective democracy” scores, like those from FH, are meant to be “objective” ratings – despite the obvious difficulties of this goal – that measure the actual extent of the concept in question in the political system. It is hard to justify the marriage of expert ratings of democracy and public ratings of corruption into a coherent concept.

1.2(c)(iv) Direction of Causation

Inglehart (2003) errs in assuming unidirectional causation, that values produce democracy, without considering the possibility of reciprocal causation, that democracy could also lead to increases in levels of self-expression. He simply correlates self-expression values and regime preferences with levels of democracy, but the explanatory power of these statistics is inflated through bidirectional causation. As mentioned, he also uses a dependent variable measured prior to the explanatory variables, exacerbating the problem.

It is important to note, however, that using subsequent democracy scores (as Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann [2003] and Inglehart & Welzel [2003] do) does not necessarily resolve this problem. Because levels of democracy across many countries remain much the same from one year to the next, democracy scores at time $t$ form a good proxy measure for democracy scores at $t-1$. Thus, while a correlation between values at $t$ and democracy at $t+1$ may appear to illustrate a unidirectional causal relationship, the effects of democracy at $t-1$ on values at $t$ may still be felt as the democracy scores at the two time periods are likely to be virtually identical. Thus, the only way to confidently show unidirectional causation is to control for prior levels of democracy.

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14 See Muller & Seligson (1994) and Jackman & Miller (1996) for a similar argument about reciprocal causation between civic culture values and democracy in Inglehart’s earlier work (1988, 1990).
Furthermore, not only is it likely that the level of democracy at a particular time affects subsequent measures of both self-expression values and regime preferences, but it may do so to different degrees. Values are viscous, deeply rooted cultural orientations. An individual’s level of self-expression remains relatively fixed over her lifetime, while macro levels of self-expression change only through generational shifts caused by increases in material wealth (Inglehart 1997: 34; Inglehart & Baker 2000). Regime preferences are more capricious, and can fluctuate sharply at the individual and social levels, as they involve individual cognition and evaluation of the political world, as well as early socialisation (cf. Rose & Mishler 2001: 309-315; Bratton & Mattes 2001; Mattes & Bratton 2003; Inglehart 2003: Table 4). Since regime preferences are “periodically updated and adjusted throughout life as initial beliefs are tempered, reinforced or challenged by later life experiences” (Rose & Mishler 2001: 309), factors that affect the social structure – such as economic development and democratisation – should influence preferences less than values (which are products of socialisation). In this way, the inflation of the relationship between values and democracy caused by reciprocal causation in Inglehart (2003) and Welzel and Inglehart (2003) is likely to greater than that between preferences and democracy.

Nevertheless, Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) and Inglehart and Weizel (2003) attempt to show unidirectional causal processes by controlling for the influence of previous levels of democracy on self-expression-values. Both papers attempt to control for prior levels of democracy by using a control variable called “democratic experience” or “democratic tradition”. This variable is defined as the number of years between 1850 and 1995 that a country has scored higher than +7 on the Polity 98 democracy index. Presumably the authors want to use this variable to control for any possibility that experience in a democratic system has socialised individuals into a pro-democratic political culture, but its 145-year time-span seems too long – extending far beyond the lifetimes of all respondents in the WVS.

Furthermore, this variable is a very crude measure of democracy. The authors effectively use a dummy variable, where all Polity 98 scores between +7 and +10 are coded as ‘1’, and scores between −10 and +6 are collapsed together to be coded as ‘0’, removing the information about degrees of democracy present in the original dataset.

15 This index is scored from −10 to +10.
In addition, the Polity 98 index is not as comprehensive a measure as the Freedom House dataset – it uses post-hoc scoring of democratic institutions and only considers formal democracy, not civil rights.\footnote{See the discussion on democracy in section 2.2(a)}

In addition, neither of the two papers uses this variable in a model that includes self-expression values, regime preferences \textit{and} experience with democracy, thus weakening Inglehart’s (2003) and Inglehart and Welzel’s (2003) conclusion that regime preferences do not matter. Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann (2003), for their part, do not tackle the issue of whether regime preferences or self-expression values offer a better measure of demand for democracy. Their path model only attempts to unpack the relationships amongst level of economic development, self-expression values and effective democracy.

Inglehart and Welzel (2003) draw their conclusions only from their seventh model, which regresses values and preferences, and their first and fourth models, each of which includes only a single regressor, values and preferences, respectively. As such, there is still no effective control for the issue of reciprocal causality between values and democracy in their paper.

\section*{1.3 Overview and Research Question}

Regime legitimacy is an important concept in political science, and one variant, support for democracy (or regime preferences) is widely measured in large socio-political surveys such as the World Values Survey and the Global Barometers. However, this data is used on “faith” – as Inglehart (2003: 51) puts it. There has been no empirical investigation as to the effects of support for democracy on the political system, except for the recent work of Inglehart and colleagues, who maintain that “lip service” to democracy is spurious, and self-expression values represent mass demand for democracy.

However, I argue that Inglehart and colleagues’ conclusion is supported by methodological flaws. In their papers, they assume unidirectional causation without controlling for it, and use a poorly conceptualised control; they also use an invalid measure of democracy; and there is an irregular interval between regime preferences
and democracy in their work. These flaws mean that the issue of whether support for democracy matters has still not been resolved, leading to my research question:

*Do mass regime preferences cause changes in the level of democracy?*
2.1 A Political System of Supply and Demand

I follow Easton in assuming that it is useful to think about a political system, being “a set of interactions through which valued things are authoritatively allocated for a society” (Easton 1965: 153). In this section, I adapt Easton’s basic framework, but also introduce the microeconomic concepts of supply and demand. The utility of a systems approach to politics is that it allows one to understand the behaviour of political elites as bound together with the public’s attitudes, beliefs and expectations to the authorities. In this light, the elements of this particular model are the public and the authorities, elites, or decision-makers. The actions of the authorities affect – and are affected by – public sentiments in a process of negative feedback (cf. ibid.: 28).

The decision-making apparatus can take different forms, or regimes (for example: liberal democracy, electoral democracy, one-party system, or military junta). A regime is the manner in which power is structured and distributed in a society. Furthermore, I assume that while political regimes can be arranged in various categories, they can also be ranked along a single dimension of the degree of democracy, or degree of popular control. The characteristics of democratic governments, such as fair elections and opportunities to contest power, may be present in greater or lesser degrees in different regimes – other differences between them notwithstanding.

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18 Easton (1965) identifies the “core” and the “environment” as his main elements. The core is analogous to my use of authorities, while his environment was broader than my conceptualisation of the public, including international society too. My model differs from Easton’s in another respect: he considers the “environment” to be outside the system. His political system consists of the “core” and the mechanisms for converting demands into outputs (see Easton 1965: 30).

19 This assumption is the subject of some debate, see Elkins (2000) and section 3.1(a) for more detail.

20 See section 3.1(a) for a full list of these characteristics.
The public demands and the authorities supply. Demand, as used here, does not mean vigorous lobbying by politically organised citizens, but is a fairly passive concept, referring either to support for the existing supply of political goods or a preference for more of a particular good. Elites supply a variety of political goods (such as taxation, law and order, education, money supply) – those with power tacitly or directly permit the bureaucratic machinery to execute a particular set of policies.

The public evaluate the supply of a political good and respond with a level of demand, (in this context it is more familiar to refer to their preferences as “supports”) which, in turn, affects the subsequent level of supply. In other words, there is a negative feedback loop between supply and demand. The effect of the feedback loop is to bring the system to equilibrium – to the point where demand is balanced by supply. If the level of demand is greater than the level of supply, there is excess demand, and thus pressure on the authorities to deliver more supply. Similarly, if demand is less than supply, the existence of surplus supply will result in the authorities allocating resources elsewhere.

Finally, the public may demand some types of political goods that affect the nature of the regime, for example: increased political rights, reduced elite power, or greater regional autonomy. These “mass-regime” demands – which are the focus of this paper – require the authorities to supply changes in the very structure of the regime. If we conceive of democracy as consisting of a cluster of characteristics centred around popular control of power (each of which may be present in the system to a greater or lesser extent) then the public can demand democracy if they demand more of these democratic characteristics, or if they demand that the existing ones be deepened or strengthened.

There are costs involved in the supply of any political good that are likely to disturb the rather sparse conceptualisation of supply and demand introduced here. The public’s demand for law and order, for example, is likely to be far higher than the level which is able to be supplied. Supply is thus a function of the costs of supply, as

---

21 Easton’s model holds that the authorities produce “outputs”, and the environment produces “inputs” (1965: 25). His use of these two terms reflects his placing public opinion outside the system – unlike this model where it is a component of the system.

22 For this reason I don’t follow Easton in separating inputs into “demands” and “supports” (see Easton 1965: 27). “Demand” does the work of Easton’s two concepts by itself.

23 These characteristics are detailed in section 3.1(a)
well as demand. In the case of demand for democracy, there are a different set of costs which are likely to be even more pernicious than the fiscal variety. If the authorities in an undemocratic system supply democratic goods, they will threaten their own positions of power through their actions. As such, we can assume that the supply of democracy is likely to lag behind the level of demand as elites have an inherent proclivity to consolidate power in their hands.

The consequences of this model for changes in the level of democracy are as follows:

1. *The authoritarian trap (stable).* When demand is low and supply is low (i.e.: when the system is undemocratic and the public doesn’t prefer democracy) the system will stabilise at an undemocratic level. Elites will deliver no more democracy than is demanded of them, and most likely, less.

2. *Popular democratisation (unstable).* Democratisation is the process whereby a political system moves from a regime of low democracy to a regime of greater democracy. High demand and low supply means that the system is out of balance. Despite the efforts of the authorities to retain power and suppress dissent, in the long run, elites will respond with democratic reform and political liberalisation, although perhaps only once there has been a change in incumbents.

3. *Mass apathy (unstable).* A democracy with little support – high supply and low demand – is unstable, again because the system is out of balance. The preference of elites for the concentration of power in their hands threatens the democratic rights and institutions in these countries. Over the long run, these states experience what Diamond (1999) calls the “hollowing out” of democracy.

4. *Stabilisation of democracy (stable).* Democracy becomes stable once demand for the regime consistently matches the level of supply at a relatively high level, and protects the regime from authoritarian drift. It is important to note that regime stabilisation is not the same as regime consolidation; the former is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the latter.

---

24 The concept of stability is used in this model to refer to a political system that consistently supplies a particular quantity of democracy over a length of time.

25 This study examines the effects of regime preferences on democratisation and regime stabilisation. In order to avoid tautological reasoning, it is not a study of consolidation, as this concept is defined partly by the level of demand, which is the independent variable here.
Table 2.1: Implications of Supply and Demand Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Authoritarian Trap: System will stabilise at undemocratic level</td>
<td>Popular Democratisation: System will become more democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mass Apathy: System will become less democratic</td>
<td>Stabilisation of Democracy: System will stabilise at a democratic level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, there are several consequences for empirical research that follow from this analysis. First, the theoretical model suggests that the effects of demand on change in democracy, rather than level of democracy, should be investigated. Second, the model highlights that demand matters only in relation to supply. It is the amount of unmet demand in a given political system that is of consequence, not the absolute level of demand. A high level of demand for democracy (ignoring for the moment how that is to be measured) will have different consequences depending on the supply of democratic rights available to the public. In a democratic system, high demand is likely to exert a stabilising influence; in an undemocratic system, high demand for democracy will put the authorities under pressure to implement democratic reform. The empirical analysis of this paper – unlike the published work by Inglehart and colleagues – will take heed of these consequences.

2.2 Conceptualisation of the Model

2.2(a) Supply

The model of supply and demand used the term “supply” as the output of political goods by the decision-making apparatus. Focussing on the area of change in the level of democracy, however, supply can be defined as the degree of democracy, or the
extent that the characteristics of democracy, are present in a particular political system at a point in time.

This conceptualisation of supply as a set of measurable democratic criteria matches Robert Dahl’s concept of “polyarchy”. Polyarchy is based on two dimensions – political competition and participation – with a third dimension, individual rights, to guarantee the first two (Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999). Dahl built upon Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942) narrow definition of democracy as the free competition for votes in a political marketplace with the realisation that the presence of free elections is not enough to prevent powerful interests from skewing the system to their advantage. Dahl thus stipulated seven specific – and given his positive approach, measurable – characteristics, which he felt provided a realistic, yet meaningful definition of democracy:

1. the election of government officials
2. free and fair elections
3. universal suffrage
4. unrestrained opportunity to run for public office
5. freedom of political expression
6. unrestrained access to alternative information
7. unrestrained opportunity to form independent political organizations (Dahl 1989: 10ff).

Since the third wave of democracy has swept by, and receded in a few countries, some authors have argued that democracy also requires a strong state (cf. Rose & Mishler 2003; Rose & Doh 2001). In this vein, Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer (1998) and Diamond (1999) contend that the rule of law is a necessary component of democracy, for otherwise venal or corrupt governors can undermine the de jure rights and opportunities of procedural democracy. In addition, Diamond (1999: 11-12) adds the criteria of horizontal accountability between the branches of government and minority rights to the realist definition of democracy.

I follow this procedural or realist approach to democracy. It matches the specifications of the model, which deals with degrees of popular control, and it is measurable and quantifiable, which suits my purposes in testing the effects of regime preferences. 26

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26 This empirical democratic approach has been criticized as “formal” or “elite” democracy for its minimal conception of rights and institutions that ignores the distribution of power in a society, and permits only a minimal conception of participation or representation (cf. Pateman 1970; McPherson
2.2(b) Demand

2.2(b)(i) Explicit Demand

In the model, I described demand as a passive approval of the current supply of democracy, or a predilection for more (or less) democratic rights. As such, demand fits the notion of a “preference” rather well. The public of a country demands more democracy when, ceteris paribus, they would prefer to have an amount, x+1, of democracy, rather than x (which is not to say that they will campaign, lobby, or demonstrate for this degree of democracy; although they may well do so). Explicitly expressed demand is a preference, and it is a preference about an aspect of the political regime (hence: regime preference).

The concept of a regime preference has an analogue in Easton’s systems model. He argues that the public can “support” three aspects of the political system independently of each other: the regime, the political community (or nation), and the authorities (or incumbent office-holders) (Easton 1965: 286-289). In Pippa Norris’ more detailed typology of five objects of support, regime preference matches the second, “support for the regime principles” (Norris 1999: 10-12). Regime preferences will be referred to as explicit demand.

2.2(b)(ii) Implicit Demand

Thinking of regime preferences as an explicit, overt form of demand for democracy is straightforward. Inglehart argues though, that self-expression values offer an implicit, indirect, but more deeply rooted and meaningful measure of a society’s “intrinsic support” for democracy (Inglehart & Welzel 2003: 74). In this study, self-expression values are used as a rival measure of demand for democracy. They will be called implicit demand and their explanatory power will be compared with regime preferences, or explicit demand.

1977). Furthermore, the empirical democratic school has been criticised for its tendency to cast itself as value-free (cf. Strauss 1962).

27 A maximum likelihood factor analysis of 11 questions from the WVS validates Norris’ second, third and fourth objects of support – support for regime principles, regime performance, and regime institutions – but splits support for regime principles into two factors, one involving evaluations of authoritarian rule, the other, democracy.

28 Similarly, Mishler & Rose (2001: 306) claim that “cultural approaches measure support indirectly”.

University of Cape Town
2.3 Overview

In this chapter, I have outlined a model of the political system that seeks to explain change in the level of democracy as a function of public demand for democracy (meaning: the public preference for democracy over alternative regimes). I suggested, that in the tradition of Easton (1965), demand and supply (or the extent to which democratic characteristics are present in the system) interact through a negative feedback loop so that, over the long run, if supply and demand are out of equilibrium, supply will be increased or decreased to match the level of demand. In the short run however, other factors intervene: most notably, the inherent aversion undemocratic elites have for democratic reform as it affects their positions of power.

The next chapter will build on the conceptualisation of the model introduced here. With an eye to the critique of Inglehart and colleagues' work discussed in the first chapter, I will outline the operationalisation of the model and its variables.
Chapter 3

Operationalising the Model

This chapter will describe operational measures for the variables of the model that build upon the conceptual foundations laid in the last chapter, and seek to remedy the methodological flaws of Inglehart and colleagues' papers that were discussed in the first chapter. The first section considers how the dependent variable, supply of democracy, can be measured and calculated. In particular, although I also use Freedom House democracy data, there are three major breaks with Inglehart's measurement. As per the supply and demand model, I focus on change in democracy; I also use a fixed interval of five years between the measurement of the independent variables and the last democracy score; finally, I dispense with Inglehart and Welzel's concept of "effective democracy" and argue why it makes good sense to use unadulterated FH data.

The second section moves on to describe the operationalisation of the independent variables measuring demand for democracy. As outlined earlier, there are two variants of demand: implicit and explicit, or regime preferences and self-expression values; data for both is taken from the third World Values Survey. I test the reliability and validity of various aggregation methods for constructing my explicit demand scale, and then outline how I calculated national implicit demand scores. Finally, I explain the use of the "net demand" variants of implicit and explicit demand, arguing that they should represent better explanations of democratic change than absolute levels of demand.

The third section discusses the sample of countries for which data is available, and outlines the statistical tests which will be used to analyse the data in the next chapter. I also introduce the hypotheses that will be tested.

Before I begin discussing the methodology of this study, it may be instructive to recap the problems with the Inglehart studies. First, Inglehart and Welzel (2003) and Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) use an invalid and poorly conceptualised dependent variable, which they call "effective democracy". Second, Inglehart and Welzel (2003) use an interval of nine years to show the effects of self-
expression values on democracy, while they use a much shorter – and inconsistent – interval of between one and four years to show the effect of regime preferences on democracy.

Finally, Inglehart (2003) does not control for reciprocal causation, which probably inflates his estimates of the effects of self-expression values on democracy – especially in comparison to the effects of regime preferences, because preferences are unlikely to be influenced by prior levels of democracy to the extent that values could be. Inglehart and Welzel (2003) and Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) attempt to resolve this problem by controlling for “democratic experience”, which, I argue, is an inadequate control for previous democracy. Moreover, neither of the papers uses this control variable in a full-enough range of models for the reader to gauge whether regime preferences are indeed just “lip service” to democracy, as Inglehart claims.

3.1 Dependent Variable: Supply

I use a conceptualisation of democracy as a measure of the degree to which the institutions and rights that guarantee – as best as possible – popular control of power, are present in a political system. I have discussed how this view of democracy builds upon the work of Robert Dahl, including the additional democratic criteria offered by scholars such as Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) and Diamond (1999).

Some scholars regard continuous measures of democracy as problematic, and prefer dichotomous classifications (Huntington 1991; Alvarez et al 1996; Przeworski & Limongi 1997). They criticise gradations of democracy on grounds of validity (that democracy is a kind of regime, not a quantifiable characteristic of regimes) and reliability (that dichotomous measures contain less error) (Alvarez et al 1996). However, Elkins (2000) tested these complaints and found that continuous measures have better construct validity and greater reliability. He concluded, “looking for traces of democracy in seemingly ‘nondemocratic’ regimes makes good theoretical and methodological sense” (ibid.: 299).
For my purposes, Freedom House (FH) provides the best relevant measure of democracy, as their index matches my conceptualisation of democracy by explicitly engaging with Dahl’s work, and by enabling me to discuss “degrees” of democracy.

Freedom House offers expert ratings of the extent of democracy in two scales, “political rights” and “civil liberties”, for nearly 200 countries and territories for every year since 1972 (Freedom House 2004). The political rights index of the Freedom House scale measures the degree to which

- the authorities are elected,
- campaigning and elections are fair,
- there is freedom of political organisation,
- there is opposition power,
- there is freedom from domination by powerful interests,
- there is reasonable self-determination for minorities.

The civil liberties index evaluates the extent to which

- there is freedom of belief and expression,
- there are associational and organisational rights,
- the rule of law prevails and human rights are respected,
- personal autonomy and economic rights are respected (Freedom House 2002).

When combined, the FH democracy score measures procedural democracy – as described in the previous chapter – including the core criteria of polyarchy, as well as the refinements suggested by later authors. Each index is scored from 1-7, with 1 the most democratic category. In this study, the scores are reversed, so that higher values represent “more” democracy, and a mean of the two indices is calculated.

My operationalisation of the level of democracy improves on shortfalls in Inglehart’s work in three ways. First of all, I use the democracy index from Freedom House, not Inglehart and Welzel’s invalid measure of “effective democracy”. Second, I use a fixed interval between the measurement of demand, and the measurement of supply of democracy. Finally, my main research question asks about the impact of public demand on the extent and direction of democratic change, which can be broadly categorised into: 1) regime democratisation, 2) regime “autocratisation”, or 3) regime stabilisation. Thus, in contrast to the Inglehart studies, which only use the

29 See Appendix B for the full checklist of criteria that Freedom House use to evaluate the strength of democracy in different countries.
level of democracy at \( t \) as a dependent variable, I use the change in the supply of democracy as well as testing the effects of demand on level of democracy.

My model identifies change in democracy as the effect of various levels of demand; but it has the additional benefit of resolving the reciprocal causality problem. If there is bidirectional causation between democracy and values or preferences, then testing the effects of the latter on change in democracy ensures that any correlations or regression coefficients are only reporting unidirectional effects.

Change in democracy is measured by calculating the change in FH scores. An initial mean score is extracted from the two yearly FH scores that straddle the year, \( 't' \), when the WVS was conducted in that country. Then a second mean score is extracted from the two FH scores that occur 5 years later, \( 't+5' \). These two scores also provide the data for the two “level of democracy” scores: democracy at \( t \), and democracy at \( t+5 \). The democracy at \( t+5 \) score is subtracted from the democracy at \( t \) score to get a measure of the change in democracy between \( t \) and \( t+5 \). For example, the WVS was conducted in Argentina in 1996 so a mean for the 1995/6 and 1996/7 FH scores is calculated, followed by a mean for the 2000/1 and 2001/2 scores, and the first mean is subtracted from the second to arrive at Argentina’s change in democracy score.\(^{30}\)

Inglehart and Welzel (2003) use an interval between independent and dependent variables that varies considerably, between cases, and between preferences and values. However, I calculate my dependent variables – whether level of, or change in, democracy – so as to maintain a constant five-year interval with the independent variables in order to measure the effects of demand more accurately.

3.2 **Independent Variable: Demand**

3.2(a) **Explicit Demand**

This study requires nationally representative data on regime preferences and self-expression values which allow for cross-national comparisons and which cover enough countries to permit multivariate analysis. The data must also not be too recent,

\(^{30}\) See Appendix for years of measurement and democracy scores.
or else the effects of explicit demand on change in levels of democracy cannot be examined.

The third wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted between 1995 and 1998 fulfils these criteria. In public surveys, questions tapping regime preferences generally ask respondents to support or oppose democracy and various undemocratic regimes. There are five relevant questions from the WVS:

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

V154. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
V155. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
V156. Having the army rule
V157. Having a democratic political system.

I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them?

V163. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.

On the face of it, these five questions seem to measure the extent of individual preference for democracy, but since an explicit demand scale will be constructed, they need to be tested for construct validity with factor analysis. The question concerning technocratic rule, V155, was removed because it had a very weak communalities loading and also reduces the reliability of the index (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.57). The factor matrix for the four remaining factors confirms the micro-level construct validity of regime principles as an object of mass demands.\textsuperscript{31} Furthermore, the scale is reliable at the macro level.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{31} Although – as mentioned previously – when a factor analysis is conducted on a broader set of questions pertaining to the objects of support, the two “democracy” questions are separated from the two “authoritarian rule” questions in the analysis.

\textsuperscript{32} Obviously, once the data is aggregated to the macro-level, the validity and reliability statistics are much higher. With an average percent preference aggregation methodology (see next sub-section), the percent of variance explained by the factor is 77.3\%, and the scale has Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89.
Table 3.1: Validity and Reliability of Explicit Demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy is better than alternatives (163)</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate: democratic system (157)</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate: army rule (156)</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate: strong leader (154)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variance explained by factor: 47%
Cronbach's alpha: 0.61

Source: Calculated from WVS (1998)
Notes: Individual level data
N = 68733
maximum likelihood; extracted a single unrotated dimension

3.2(a)(i) Aggregation Method

The factor analysis shows that it makes sense to create a regime preference scale, but the WVS provides individual level data, while this study makes a national level argument: the attitudinal data needs to be aggregated. This involves two steps. The first step requires calculating national scores for each item, and entails a choice between three methods of aggregation: national means; percent strong agreement (those respondents who strongly agree with the question); and percent general agreement (where strong or mild agreement is counted together).

The second step requires a further choice between three alternative methods. We can continue using mean scores, and simply find the average national score from the four national-level items mean scores. Alternatively, we can count the percent who prefer democracy (either generally or strongly) in two different ways: by counting only those who prefer democracy on every one of the four items (percent consistent preference); or the average percent preference for democracy across all four items for each country (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Recoding the Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Item</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Original Code</th>
<th>Recoded to</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>% Strong</th>
<th>% Prefer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;rate strong leader&quot; (154) &amp; &quot;rate army rule&quot; (156)</td>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairly good</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairly bad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very bad</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;rate democratic system&quot; (157)</td>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairly good</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairly bad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very bad</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;democracy is better than alternatives&quot; (163)</td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WVS (1998)

In the literature, regime preferences have usually been calculated with consistent general agreement or average general agreement (cf. Diamond 1999; Klingemann 1999; Inglehart 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2003; Lagos 2003; Mattes & Bratton 2003). The benefit of these methods is that they measure the size of particular constituencies, such as the percent of the public who prefer democracy to authoritarian alternatives. In addition, they offer an easily interpretable figure: the fraction of a national population who offer a positive evaluation of democracy.

A national mean, on the other hand, offers a measure of the democratic Zeitgeist of the public at one time, combining pro- and anti-democratic sentiments with information about the intensity of these preferences, as well as – if the “don’t know’s” are included as a middle category – counting the opinions of the undecided or impassive. While a consistent agreement scale collapses all response categories into two – those who prefer democracy or not – the national mean score measures five levels of preference ranging from strong dislike to strong preference, with neutral
responses inbetween. As such, this aggregation method contains the greatest amount of information.

I tested the five different aggregation methods (mean scores, percent general consistent preference for democracy, percent strong consistent preference, percent general average preference and percent strong average preference) against each other. The first test (Table 3.3) examines the national scores for each of the four explicit demand items, calculated according to the three methods of means, percent prefer, and percent strongly prefer. Table 3.2 shows how the three methods recode the micro-level data. (Note that for the mean scale, the items are all recoded so that higher scores represent preferences for democracy; this entails reversing the “polarity” of the democracy items, 157 and 163.) This macro-level data is then examined with factor analysis and reliability analysis (table 3.3); the former will determine which method yields a scale with the best construct validity; the latter will check reliability.

Table 3.3 shows that national scores that measure the percent who generally prefer democracy results in a scale that shows the best validity and reliability. Nevertheless, there is not much to differentiate the three, suggesting that the concept of regime preference is tapping a robust kind of public attitude.

However, such a scale can be aggregated according to either average or consistent agreement across the four items, a choice which is tested by examining the correlations of these two types of scales with the FH democracy scores at $t+5$ (table 3.4) Since we expect regime preferences to be associated with levels of democracy in the real world, this tests the criterion validity of these two aggregation methods. It is thus assumed that the stronger the relationship between a particular scale and the democracy scores, the better it measures the concept of regime preferences. Within each method, correlations are shown between the level of democracy at $t+5$ and an index of all four items, as well as for the democratic (V157 & V163) and authoritarian rule (V154 & V156) sub-indices (Table 3.4).

---

Democracy at $t+5$ is not my dependent variable (although I use it to build from Inglehart’s results), otherwise I would be guilty of choosing the operationalisation of the independent variable that best suits my argument.
Table 3.3: Testing Three Methods of Aggregating the Micro-level Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregation method</th>
<th>Validity</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of variance explained by factor</td>
<td>Cronbach’s Alpha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% who prefer democracy</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% who strongly prefer democracy</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean preference for democracy</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: National-level data for WVS items 154, 156, 157 & 163
N = 44
Maximum likelihood extraction

Table 3.4: Testing Two Methods of Combining the Aggregated Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation with FH democracy scores at t+5 ...</th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>Average r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average percent prefer democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy sub-index</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian rule sub-index</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total index</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent consistently prefer democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy sub-index</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian rule sub-index</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total index</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from WVS (1998), and FH (2004)
Notes: ** = significant at 99% level
N = 44

While both the different methods perform similarly well, combining the items by finding the average preference for democracy yields better criterion validity than using consistent agreement. Furthermore, table 3.3 shows that using percent general preference is the best method for aggregating individual-level data into national level scores. The percent average general agreement is thus the aggregation method that
best taps the concept of regime preferences, and the method which is used in this study.

3.2(b) Implicit Demand

My measure of implicit demand, self-expression values, is calculated according to the method employed by Inglehart (1997). He performed a factor analysis on 22 items from the first and second WVS to extract the two principal components referred to as “secular-rational orientations to authority” and “self-expression values”. Inglehart and Baker then report that using 10 selected variables generates very similar results (2000: 25). I replicate their methodology, obtaining nationally aggregated standardised scores for each of the 10 items across the 44 countries in this study, and running a principal component factor analysis at the national level with varimax rotation; there are only two components extracted. The secular-rational component explains 47 percent of cross-national variation, while the self-expression component explains 27 percent. The single anomaly in my construction of these value dimensions is that the “trust” item loads more weakly on the self-expression component than on the secular-rational component, in contrast to what Inglehart & Baker report. Like Inglehart, I report self-expression values as z-scores as they are the output of a factor analysis.

---

34 I use a different kind of factor analysis in building my explicit demand index -- principal component extraction is Inglehart’s methodology.
35 Inglehart & Baker report that the components account for 44% and 26% of variance respectively (2000: Table 1).
36 Converting data to z-scores is an attempt to standardise them. Z-scores are built on the assumption that the sample is normally distributed around a mean of 0, and with a standard deviation of 1, so that 68% of the sample has scores of between –1 and +1 and 95% of the sample has scores between –2 and +2. The scale is open-ended in both directions.
Table 3.5: Two Dimensions of Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rotated loadings on secular-rational component</th>
<th>Rotated loadings on self-expression component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secular-Rational values emphasise...</strong> (^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God is not important</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is more important for a child to learn independence than obedience and faith</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion is justifiable</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low national pride</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A negative view of respect for authority</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Expression Values emphasise...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-expression and quality of life rather than economic and physical security</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective happiness</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation by signing petitions</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuality is justifiable</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People can be trusted</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance explained by component</strong></td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Original data from WVS (1998).*

*Notes: \(^a\) according to Inglehart & Baker (2000: Table 1)*

\(N = 44\) national scores

Principal Component Extraction with Varimax rotation

3.2(c) Net Demand

I argued earlier, in Chapter two, that it is not the absolute level of demand in a system that is important, but demand relative to the level of supply that is the motive force of democratisation. The fate of a political system – whether it remains stable or experiences an increase or decrease in the level of democracy – is not determined by the level of demand alone, but by the demand for democracy relative to how much is
being supplied. As depicted in Table 2.1, if the regime is characterised by a high level of democratic rights and institutions, high demand may be expected to stabilise the system; while if the supply of democracy is low, high demand should lead to an increase in supply. Inglehart’s (and others’) use of absolute levels of regime preferences is thus misguided; it is the levels of demand relative to supply – or net demand – that matters.

Thus, in addition to the two variables I call explicit and implicit demand, I develop modified versions I call “net explicit” and “net implicit” demand, which measure both kinds of demand in relation to supply; in other words, they measure the amount of unmet demand, or excess (“unwanted”) supply. Net explicit demand is calculated as the demand score minus the supply score. Supply is calculated as the reversed FH scores at \( t \) converted into a percent measure, where 1 = 0% (no democracy) and the ceiling of 7 = 100% (a full democracy). This “percent supply” score is then subtracted from the percent average preference for democracy.\(^{37}\)

Since Inglehart & Welzel (2003: 74) and Mishler & Rose (2001: 306) agree that cultural values can be used as a measure of indirect support for democracy, I use them as a measure of implicit demand for democracy. Net implicit demand involves subtracting the supply of democracy scores from self-expression value scores. However, self-expression values are not reported as a percent. Being the products of factor analysis, they are calculated as z-scores (standardised scores). Thus I also convert FH democracy at \( t \) scores into z-scores and then subtract the latter from the former.\(^{38}\)

\(^{37}\) See Appendix A for data for each country.

\(^{38}\) This is not an ideal solution, as the calculation method between net explicit and net implicit demand is quite different. In particular, the percent method gives an absolute proportion of a known total; while the standardised score method only tells us where a case is relative to the other cases.

3.3 Sample, Methodology and Hypotheses

The third World Values Survey includes data for 61 societies; I excluded eight because they were not independent political systems (Puerto Rico, Northern Ireland, Moscow, the Tambov oblast, and the four Spanish regions). I excluded another seven because of missing data in the regime preferences section (Britain, China, Romania, ...
Ghana, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic). I combined the separate data for Serbia and Montenegro into Yugoslavia and East and West Germany into Germany. National measures of regime preferences and self-expression values are calculated from weighted WVS data for the remaining 44 countries; Freedom House provides democracy data for the dependent variable.

I report the empirical results in the next chapter. The first section provides a descriptive overview of the variables and the dataset. In the second section, I perform bivariate and multivariate tests of the effects of demand on democracy, engaging with Inglehart’s work by using absolute measures of demand and levels of democracy. Next, I control for reciprocal causation, either by using a control variable or by testing the effects of demand on change in the level of democracy. Finally, I move on to test the theoretical model, by reporting the effects of net demand on change in supply.

Research Question

Do mass regime preferences cause changes in the level of democracy?

Hypotheses

H1. The correlation between explicit demand and change in democracy will be at least as strong as between implicit demand and change in democracy.

H2. The correlation between explicit demand and change in democracy will remain even after controlling for the impact of implicit demand.

H3. The correlations between net demand and change in democracy will be far higher than between absolute demand and change in democracy.

H4. There is a strong, positive relationship between the level of net explicit demand and subsequent change in the level of democracy.

\[ \text{If demand} = \text{supply then the system will be stable.} \]

\[ \text{If demand} > \text{supply then there will be an increase in democracy.} \]

\[ \text{If demand} < \text{supply then there will be a decrease in democracy.} \]

39 The weight variable “v236” is used in producing aggregate national data to control for underrepresented minorities, and the weight variable “v237” is used for pooled individual level calculations to standardise the size of each national sample. See Appendix A for a list of states.
Chapter 4

Empirical Results

This chapter consists of three main sections. The first looks at what the data can tell us about the state of public values, regime preferences and levels of democracy across the 44 countries at time $t$ (1995-1998). I also describe the extent and nature of democratic change over the subsequent five years. The second and third sections examine the effects of absolute levels of demand and levels of net demand, respectively, on change in democracy.

The second section builds on the methodology of Inglehart (2003) – with some changes that have already been discussed – reporting simple bivariate correlations between regime preferences, self-expression values and a subsequent level of democracy. I then test the effects of both variants of demand with change in democracy (by controlling for initial levels of democracy).

The third section moves on to test the relationship between net demand and change in democracy, marking the shift from critically engaging with Inglehart et al’s work to testing the theoretical model developed in Chapter two. Initially, continuous variables are used in multivariate regression analysis before finally simplifying the data into categories for chi-square and ANOVA tests.

4.1 Description of the Data

4.1(a) The Representativeness of the Sample

Freedom House (2004) provides democracy data for 191 independent countries in 1996 – year ‘t’ for most of my sample. The third World Values Survey covers 61 societies, but stripping away those that are not independent states or that do not have data for the four regime preference items leaves a sample of 44.
Does Support for Democracy Matter?

There are two African countries in the sample, 10 from the Americas, 16 from formerly-communist Eastern Europe, six from non-communist Europe, four from Central and South Asia, five from East Asia/Pacific and one from the Middle East. Using Huntington’s (1996) typology of civilisations, there are 13 countries from the “Western Christianity” zone, 11 “Orthodox”, four “Islamic”, two “Confucian”, two “African”, 10 “Latin American”, and the “Hindu” and “Japanese” zones are represented by their single countries. Thus, the “West”, Eastern Europe, Latin America and South Asia are well represented in this sample, while East Asia, South East Asia, Africa and the Middle East, less so. Nevertheless, the sample includes countries from all the regions and cultural “zones” of the world.

At t, there was one authoritarian state, six pseudo-democracies, 14 electoral democracies and 23 liberal democracies – nine of them established and 14 less than a decade old. Once again, all types of regime are covered, although the less democratic regimes – especially authoritarian ones – are not well represented here. There is thus a bias in the sample towards Western, Eastern European and Latin American countries that are at least partially democratic. Generalising the results to others regions and regimes should be done with caution.

Generalising from this study is also constrained by the temporal location of the data: the late 1990s were a period of democratic success, where the buoyant global economy provided a secure environment for the many new “third wave” democracies. In addition, the momentum of the third wave continued, spreading democracy further afield.

4.1(b) Description of Key Variables


The mean country in my sample scored 5 on the reversed Freedom House scale of 1 to 7. This is on the upper end of the band that Freedom House rates as “partly free”, and

40 The definitions of these categories, and the categorisation of states (with a few alterations), are derived from Diamond (1999: 9-15, Appendix I). Pseudo-democracies hold elections, which merely serve to “mask (often in part to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination” (Diamond, Lipset & Linz 1995, cited in Diamond 1999: 15). Electoral democracies are “civilian constitutional system[s] in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage” (Diamond 1999: 10). Liberal democracies add the criteria of horizontal accountability, rule of law, cultural and religious freedom, freedom of association and alternative sources of information.
just short of a “free” rating, suggesting that the average country falls short of a liberal democracy on just one or two counts. In 1996, by comparison, the mean across all 191 countries that FH surveyed was 4.4, showing how the sample is slightly more democratic than the entire population of states.

Nigeria had the lowest initial democracy score in the sample, with 1.3 on a scale of 1 to 7. Six countries achieved a maximum score of 7: the USA, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Australia.

4.1(b)(ii) Change in level of democracy, 1995-98 to 2000-03

The dependent variable measures the change in democracy over a five-year period beginning between 1995 and 1998, depending on when the WVS was conducted in the particular country. The mean country saw a small increase in democracy (+0.35), while the mean change for the entire population of 191 states between 1996 and 2001 was lower, at +0.1. There were far more cases of democratisation than of democratic decay or reversal across the sample. Six of the countries experienced decreases in democracy scores: Russia, Venezuela, Pakistan, Ukraine, Bangladesh, and Belarus – with the first two dropping by 1.3 points on the seven point FH scale. Bangladesh was a marginal change and Pakistan was affected by a military coup that ousted an electoral democracy. The other four experienced what Diamond calls the “hollowing out” of democracy by powerful elites, which he identifies as the major challenge to democracy in a world where the discourse of democratic rule is virtually hegemonic (Diamond 1999: 6).

Sixteen countries remained at the same level of democracy, with all but two (Colombia and Macedonia) already at, or near the top of, the FH scale. Nine of these can be called consolidated democracies, having experienced at least two decades of liberal democracy at the time of the WVS. The other 22 countries saw an increase in democracy: Nigeria and Yugoslavia experienced dramatic democratisations of 3 and 2.5 points respectively, while the Dominican Republic, Peru, India, Mexico, Taiwan and Bosnia Herzegovina underwent moderate increases.

4.1(b)(iii) Implicit Demand

The mean self-expression score is, by virtue of being a standardised score, 0. The highest level of self-expression, 2.18, was found in Sweden, while Russia scored the
lowest with \(-1.6\). The highest level of supply that is surplus to implicit demand (i.e.: the lowest level of net implicit demand) is found in Lithuania, with a score of \(-2.05\). In other words, there is far more democracy supplied there than is implicitly demanded. Nigeria had the highest level of net (or unmet) implicit demand, suggesting that the cultural preconditions for democratic change were in place in 1995. Fittingly, in 1998, Nigeria’s military dictator, General Sani Abacha, died, making way for a democratic government to be installed the next year.

4.1(b)(iv) Explicit Demand

On average, 73 percent of the public preferred democracy in each country (this is the percent average agreement across all four items; using the stricter percent consistent agreement method, the mean preference for democracy was only 41 percent – with a range from 9% to 78%). India and Russia were the only countries where less than half the population (47 percent) preferred democracy, while 93 percent of Germans, on average across the four items, did so. Poland had the lowest level of net explicit demand: demand for democracy was 29 percentage points lower than supply of democracy. Nigeria, once again, had the highest level of net explicit demand: demand was 70 percentage points higher than the percent measure of supply of democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in democracy from ( t ) to ( t+5 ) (-6 to +6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial supply of democracy: FH democracy scores at ( t ) (1 to 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit demand: self-expression value scores (relative to a mean of 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit demand: % prefer democracy, average agreement (0 to 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net implicit demand: self-expression z-scores - supply z-scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net explicit demand: % explicit demand - % supply (-100 to +100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from WVS (1998) and FH (2004)
Note: \( N = 44 \)
4.2 The Effect of Absolute Levels of Demand on Democracy

In this section, I attempt to test the findings of Inglehart (2003), Inglehart and Welzel (2003) and Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) while correcting their methodological problems. To facilitate comparison with these earlier studies, I begin by using the dependent variable of the absolute level of democracy (Table 4.2), before examining change in the level of democracy by controlling for democracy at $t$ (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). In addition, I use absolute levels of demand – whether explicit demand or implicit demand – throughout this section, before testing the effects of net demand on change in democracy in section 4.3.

The first test replicates Inglehart (2003: table 3). It examines the correlations between implicit and explicit demand (as well as their constituent items) at $t$, on one hand, and the level of democracy at $t+5$ on the other. This analysis includes what I consider to be three improvements to Inglehart and Welzel’s studies: first, there is a constant interval of five years between the independent and dependent variables; second, the democracy scores are unadulterated FH scores, not “effective democracy”; and third, the explicit demand index used here has been calculated so as to offer the best reliability and validity.

The results are similar to those detailed in Inglehart (2003: table 3) although the difference between the explanatory power of implicit demand and explicit demand is reduced. Inglehart reported that self-expression values account for 35% of the variance in the 1995 FH scores, while his democracy/autocracy index only explained 12%. Table 4.2 shows that the respective figures here are 38% and 22%. Inglehart uses a larger sample of 77 states from the third and fourth waves of the WVS, but the stronger relationship between explicit demand and democracy in this study is likely to also be a function of my improved measure of explicit demand, and my use of subsequent democracy scores lagged five years as a dependent variable.
Table 4.2: Correlations of Demand and Level of Supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Pearson's correlation with democracy at $t+5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-expression and quality of life is more important than economic and physical security</td>
<td>0.58 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective happiness</td>
<td>0.35 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation by signing petitions</td>
<td>0.60 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuality is justifiable</td>
<td>0.66 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People can be trusted</td>
<td>0.45 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implicit demand</strong></td>
<td>0.62 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A strong undemocratic leader is bad</td>
<td>0.41 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army rule is bad</td>
<td>0.48 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A democratic system is good</td>
<td>0.40 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy may have problems but it is better than the alternatives*</td>
<td>0.43 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explicit demand</strong></td>
<td>0.47 **</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: National-level scores
N = 44
* = significant at 99% level; * = significant at 95% level
*N = 42

Nevertheless, the main problem with the work of Inglehart and colleagues is their failure to adequately control for the hypothesis that democracy causes pro-democratic values. I argued earlier that using levels of democracy that are measured subsequent to demand is not sufficient to show causation: on the whole, levels of democracy change very slowly, and democracy at $t+1$ is a very good proxy measure for democracy at $t-1$. The only solution is to use change in the level of democracy as the dependent variable, either by calculating the change over a fixed period, or by analysing the effects of demand on democracy at $t+n$ while simultaneously controlling for democracy at $t$. 
While Inglehart and Welzel (2003) and Welzel, Inglehart and Klingmann (2003) use a control for “experience with democracy”, this is not used in a broad enough range of models to permit comparison; neither is it conceptualised and measured in a satisfactory manner. This issue is addressed in tables 4.3 and 4.4. The first replicates table 4.2, but reports the partial correlation coefficients, controlling for democracy at $t$. The effect is dramatic: the explanatory “gap” between implicit demand and explicit demand vanishes. The former only explains 7% of the variance in change in level of democracy over five years compared with the 8% that explicit demand accounts for. Both implicit and explicit demand are more weakly associated with subsequent levels of democracy once the initial levels are controlled for, but the effect on implicit demand is most apparent. Four fifths of its explanatory power appears to have been spurious: an effect, rather than cause, of democracy.

This vindicates my argument that 1) it is likely the relationship between supply and demand consists of bidirectional, rather than unidirectional causation, and 2) implicit demand is more likely to be an “effect” of democratic institutions than explicit demand as the latter is the product of individual cognitive evaluations in addition to the structural forces of socialisation.

The multivariate regression models explaining level of democracy (Table 4.4) again reveal that, when controlling for the initial level of democracy, the explanatory advantage that implicit demand has over explicit demand vanishes. Model 2 uses these two variables as regressors and exhibits the pattern seen in table 4.2 and reported by Inglehart (2003) and Inglehart & Welzel (2003): implicit demand has a far higher Beta coefficient, and the variance explained in this model is only 2% higher than the 38% accounted for by implicit demand in table 4.2. However, once a lagged dependent variable is used (Model 5), the explanatory power of implicit versus explicit demand becomes indistinguishable, confirmed by Models 3 and 4.

It would appear that Inglehart has been too quick to dismiss public regime preferences as irrelevant for democracy. Once initial supply is controlled for, implicit and explicit demand are similarly powerful explanations of the subsequent level of democracy. In other words, once we remove the fraction of the variance in self-expression values that are a product of democracy, implicit demand is no longer a better measure of demand for democracy.
Table 4.3: Controlling for the Initial Supply of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Partial correlation with democracy at $t+5$, controlling for democracy at $t$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Self-expression and quality of life is more important than economic and physical security | $0.27$  
| Subjective happiness                               | $0.14$  
| Participation through petition signing             | $0.19$  
| Homosexuality is justifiable                       | $0.29$  
| People can be trusted                              | $0.20$  
| **Implicit demand**                                | **0.26**  
| A strong undemocratic leader is bad                | $0.14$  
| Army rule is bad                                   | $0.17$  
| A democratic system is good                        | $0.40$  
| Democracy may have problems but it is better than the alternatives* | $0.29$  
| **Explicit demand**                                | **0.28**  

Notes: df = 41  
* = significant at 99% level; * = significant at 95% level, + = significant at 90% level  
* df = 39
Table 4.4: OLS Regression: Explaining Level of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>β</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Initial Supply of democracy at t<sup>a</sup> | 0.766 (0.073) | 0.710 (0.077) | 0.673 (0.089) | 0.668 (0.088) | 0.85 ** ** **
| Explicit Demand<sup>b</sup> | -- (0.018) | 0.019 (0.010) | -- (0.012) | 0.013 (0.012) | 0.15 **
| Implicit Demand<sup>c</sup> | -- (0.208) | 0.724 (0.208) | 0.237 (0.089) | 0.149 (0.155) | 0.53 *** +
| Constant | 1.531 (0.383) | 4.117 (1.303) | 0.460 (0.685) | 2.004 (0.461) | 1.074 (0.937) |
| R<sup>2</sup> | 0.73 ** | 0.40 ** | 0.74 ** | 0.74 ** | 0.75 ** |
| Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> | 0.72 | 0.37 | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.73 |

Source: Data from WVS (1998) and Freedom House (2004)

Notes: Dependent variable is FH democracy score at t+5 (1-7 scale).
<sup>a</sup>FH democracy score at t, 1-7 scale.
<sup>b</sup>Regime preferences, %
<sup>c</sup>Self-expression values, z-scores
**coefficient significant at 99% level, + coefficient significant at 90% level.
N = 44

4.3 The Effects of Net Demand on Democracy

The effects of absolute measures of demand on change in democracy are negligible: Table 4.4 shows that adding explicit and implicit demand to the regression model (Model 5) only explains two percent more of the variance in democracy at t+5 than using democracy at t alone. Similarly if we calculate the dependent variable as the change in democracy from t to t+5 (Model 1 of Table 4.5), the variance explained by explicit and implicit demand is zero. This is to be expected. The theoretical model
explains that change in democracy is a function of demand relative to supply, or net demand. Nigeria, which experienced the biggest increase in democracy over the time period of this study, only has a moderate level of explicit demand (75 percent), and a low level of self-expression (-0.58), yet it has the highest levels of net explicit and net implicit demand because its initial democracy score is so low (1.3).

Table 4.5 shows the results when I test the effects of net demand rather than the absolute level of demand. The dependent variable here is no longer democracy at \( t + 5 \) controlling for democracy at \( t \), it is an overt calculation of change in democracy between \( t \) and \( t + 5 \). Once again, the measures of absolute levels of demand show no relationship with change in democracy, while both kinds of net demand show moderate and significant correlations (Models 2 and 3). Model 4 of Table 4.5 shows that net demand is a much stronger explanation for democratic change than the industry-standard measure of absolute levels of demand: together, net implicit and net explicit demand account for one quarter of the variance in change in democracy, compared with virtually zero for absolute measures.

Furthermore, the effect of net explicit demand remains significant even controlling for net implicit demand, while much of the relationship between net implicit demand and change in democracy appears to be accounted for by net explicit demand. The extent of a nation’s preference for democracy, relative to the supply of democracy, is far from “lip service”, and appears to be the best measure of demand for democratic change. It is a far stronger explanation than an absolute measure of values or preferences, or even a relative measure of implicit demand.
Table 4.5: OLS Regression: Demand versus Net Demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$ (s.e.)</td>
<td>$\beta$ (s.e.)</td>
<td>$\beta$ (s.e.)</td>
<td>$\beta$ (s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit demand</td>
<td>0.011 (0.013)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit demand</td>
<td>-0.137 (0.156)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net explicit demand$^a$</td>
<td>-- (0.005)</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net implicit demand$^b$</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.367 (0.127)</td>
<td>0.144 (0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.439 (0.973)</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.363 (0.110)</td>
<td>0.279 (0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from WVS (1998) and Freedom House (2004)

Notes: Dependent variable: change in democracy (1-7).

$^a$ net explicit demand = % regime preferences - % supply of democracy.

$^b$ net implicit demand = self-expression value z-scores - supply of democracy z-scores.

* significant at 95% level, ** significant at 99% level.

N = 44.

The relationship between net explicit demand and change in supply is illustrated in figure 4.1. A country’s shift in levels of democracy over a five-year period is the result of factors of structure and agency – as well as a little serendipity. Yet the graph shows how a single variable, net explicit demand, accounts for 26 percent of the variation in change in democracy over 44 countries. The more that public preference for democratic rule is not matched in practise in the political system, the bigger the likelihood that popular pressure will push elites to yield greater rights and democracy.
It is unlikely that any other factor is more important in accounting for specific changes in levels of democracy across a range of countries.

Figure 4.1: Scatter Plot: Net Explicit Demand and Change in Democracy

I have established that there is a positive linear relationship between the level of net demand and change in democracy. But the theoretical model in Chapter two generated hypotheses based on categories of net demand. In order to test these hypotheses, the data on net explicit demand and change in democracy is recoded into categories and tested using a cross-tabulation with a Chi-square test and an ANOVA test (tables 4.6 and 4.7).

Net explicit demand measures regime preferences in relation to supply, and can be separated into three categories: excess supply, where supply is substantially higher than demand; equilibrium, where supply and demand are at similar levels; and unmet demand, where demand is greater than supply. Table 4.6 compares the effects of these three categories on change in democracy, itself divided into three categories: decrease, increase, and stable.
The Chi-square test confirms that the dimensions of change in democracy and net explicit demand are not independent, i.e.: they are associated. As one moves to a higher net explicit demand category (towards the right-hand side of the table), so there tends to be more states showing positive change in democracy. The positive linear relationship between these variables is confirmed by the correlation (Kendall’s $\tau-b = 0.31$).41

The theoretical model predicts that excess supply, described as “mass apathy” in Table 2.1, should result in a decrease in democracy as elites use the space provided by lack of public support for democracy to consolidate their power. Although the small number of cases in this category makes it difficult to generalise, none of these countries experience reversals of democracy – contrary to the theoretical model’s predictions – although neither do any show increases in democracy.

When net explicit demand is at equilibrium, a large proportion of states remain stable, especially in comparison to the unmet demand category. Where demand for democracy exceeds supply, 82 percent of countries embark on pro-democratic change (compared to only 46 percent of cases where demand and supply are in equilibrium). Furthermore, there were no cases of democratisation where demand lags behind supply.

Finally, there is no evidence that there is any necessary or sufficient relationship between net demand and change in democracy. In other words, there does not appear to be a certain level of net demand that is sufficient for democratisation: the “unmet demand” category still has two cases of negative change in democracy. Nor is change in democracy necessarily a result of unmet demand: there are 13 cases of positive change in democracy in the “equilibrium” category.

---

41 This statistic measures the correlation between two ordinal variables, and gives a score between -1 and 1.
Table 4.6: Crosstabulation: Net Demand by Change in Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in democracy categories</th>
<th>Net explicit demand categories</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>excess supply</td>
<td>equilibrium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decrease</td>
<td>obs 0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>exp 0.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stable</td>
<td>obs 5 (100%)</td>
<td>11 (39%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>increase</td>
<td>obs 0 (0%)</td>
<td>13 (46%)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>exp 2.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5 (100%)</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
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Kendall’s $\tau$-b Correlation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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Chi-square Goodness-of-fit test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>15.29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</table>

Source: Data from WVS (1998) and FH (2004).
Notes: a % explicit demand - % supply, “equilibrium” is greater than -20 and less than 20
b Percentages of column total
c The number of observations expected if there is no relationship between the variables.

In Table 4.7, I build on the results of Table 4.6, testing whether the same independent variable (categories of net demand) explains change in democracy, as measured with the original continuous data. The theoretical model suggested that the effects of net demand would be different for each of the categories: unmet demand will produce negative change in democracy; zero negative demand will produce no change in democracy; and excess supply will produce positive change in democracy. These hypotheses are tested by examining the mean change in democracy for each group.

The ANOVA test shows we can conclude, at the 95 percent confidence level, that the difference in the mean change in democracy of the three groups is not due to chance. Categorising the countries of the sample according to the level of net demand makes a significant difference in the average democratic change in each group.

Furthermore, the $\eta$-correlation (0.38) confirms that there is a linear relationship between the net demand categories and change in democracy, with 14
percent of the variance in the latter accounted for by net demand.\textsuperscript{42} Similarly, the mean of the “unmet demand” category is the largest, followed by the “equilibrium”, then the “excess supply” categories, as expected. However, the “excess supply” category does not, on average, experience a negative change in democracy. Neither is the “equilibrium” category the most stable, although it is more stable than the “unmet demand” group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.7: ANOVA Test of Net Explicit Demand Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Categories</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess supply</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equilibrium\textsuperscript{b}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmet demand</td>
</tr>
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<td>Whole sample</td>
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</table>


Notes: \textsuperscript{a} measured on the 7-point FH scale.
\textsuperscript{b} defined as net demand > -20 and < 20

\textbf{4.4 Summary of Findings}

- Using a validity- and reliability-tested measure of explicit demand as an independent variable, a subsequent level of democracy as a dependent variable, and a fixed interval between the two, the gap between the explanatory strength of implicit demand over explicit demand is diminished.

- Testing the effects of demand on change in democracy by controlling for an initial level of democracy reveals that implicit and explicit demand are of similar

\textsuperscript{42} The \textit{eta} correlation is a measure of association used when one variable is continuous and the other is categorical.
strength. Although both have relatively weak relationships with change in democracy, we can be reasonably sure that these are causal effects, as controlling for initial democracy has removed the reciprocal causation that plagues Inglehart’s results.

- Nevertheless, the theoretical model specifies that relative demand is important—which is why the absolute measures of implicit and explicit demand have such weak effects on change in the level of democracy. Testing the effects of net implicit and net explicit demand reveals that each has a much stronger relationship with democratic change. Once again, the additional benefit of focusing on change in democracy is that we can draw conclusion about unidirectional causation.

- When each variant of net demand is controlled for the other, net explicit demand has a much stronger effect on change in democracy.

- The continuous data for net explicit demand is recoded into categories. These categories, “unmet demand”, “equilibrium” and “excess supply”, have significantly different effects on change in democracy.

- Once the continuous data for change in democracy is also recoded into categories, the linear, positive relationship between net explicit demand and change is reaffirmed with categorical data.

- The specific predictions made, in Chapter two, about the behaviour of each net demand category are not borne out, with the notable exception of the “unmet demand” group of countries, which have the highest proportion of democratising cases. However, there are a very small number of countries that fit the “excess supply” and negative change in democracy categories, permitting only tentative conclusions from the behaviour of the different categories.

- Finally, the cross-tabulation shows that, while there is a linear relationship between net demand and change in democracy, unmet demand is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for positive change in democracy. Similarly, there is no necessary or sufficient relationship between excess supply and negative change in democracy.
4.5 Verifying the Hypotheses

H1. The correlation between explicit demand and change in democracy will be at least as strong as between implicit demand and change in democracy.

The evidence from Tables 4.2 and 4.3 support this hypothesis.

H2. The correlation between explicit demand and change in democracy will remain even after controlling for the impact of implicit demand.

Model 5 of Table 4.4 shows that explicit demand has a weak, but positive relationship with change in democracy once the effects of implicit demand is controlled for.

H3. The correlations between net demand and change in democracy will be far higher than between absolute demand and change in democracy.

Table 4.5 provides evidence for this hypothesis, based on the importance of the level of demand relative to supply.

H4. There is a strong, positive relationship between the level of net explicit demand and subsequent change in the level of democracy.

This general hypothesis is supported with numerous tests: Figure 4.1; Table 4.5; the tau-b and eta correlations of Tables 4.6 and 4.7.

If demand = supply then the system will be stable.

There is not enough evidence to substantiate this hypothesis. While Table 4.7 shows that this “equilibrium” category is more stable than those with “unmet demand”, it is not as stable as the “excess supply” category.

If demand > supply then there will be an increase in democracy.

This hypothesis is supported by the data in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Most countries with “unmet demand” went through positive change in democracy over the ensuing five years.

If demand < supply then there will be a decrease in democracy.
There is very little evidence to back up this hypothesis because of the small number of cases. Furthermore, none of the “excess supply” countries experienced negative change in democracy.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

Legitimacy is common parlance in the political science literature, and one of its variants, “support for democracy”, is widely measured in surveys and reported and analysed in research papers. However, there have been few empirical tests of whether support for democracy – or explicit demand – actually matters. This study tested an obvious manner in which explicit demand could matter: that it exists as a demand side pressure in a political system of masses and elites. In other words, I tested for the impact of mass demand for democracy on democratic change.

I framed my analysis with a theoretical model of the political system – adapted from Easton (1965) and Downs (1957) – that operates through a feedback loop between mass demand for democracy and elite supply. The model provides a mechanism for explaining change in the level of democracy within a political system. I argued that what matters for system change is the level of demand in relation to the level of supply: “net demand”.

I began by engaging with the only empirical studies that have tested the effects of public demand on democracy – Inglehart (2003), Welzel, Ingehart & Klingemann (2003) and Inglehart & Welzel (2003) – who argue that deeply-rooted, broad cultural orientations called self-expression values are a better measure of support for democracy or legitimacy, while overt expressions of regime preference are spurious. I replicated their analysis, but used more valid measures of democracy and explicit demand and also controlled for the possibility that democracy causes pro-democratic values and preferences. The results showed that self-expression values (or implicit demand) and regime preferences (or explicit demand) are of similar importance in explaining change in the level of democracy, and neither can be dismissed as inconsequential.

I then tested the model of system change, which used the relative level, rather than the absolute level, of demand as the independent variable. Using continuous data, I found that net demand is a far stronger explanation for democratic change than absolute levels of demand. Net explicit demand – the extent of public preference for
Does Support for Democracy Matter?

democracy in relation to the existing supply of democracy – is also a far stronger predictor of change in democracy than net implicit demand. However, when using categorical data, only the group of countries classified as having “unmet demand” performed as expected – 82 percent experienced positive democratic change.

By controlling for the initial level of democracy – either directly, or indirectly by examining the change in the level of democracy – the reciprocal causation between values and democracy that muddies Inglehart’s analysis is eliminated. We can thus be confident that the moderate relationship between net explicit demand and change in the supply of democracy reflects a causal relationship. The level of demand (as reflected in overtly expressed public preferences for democracy) in relation to the existing level of democracy plays an important role in determining how the supply of democracy changes over the next few years in a particular country. Furthermore, net explicit demand alone explains a quarter of the change in democracy seen in the countries of the sample: it is probable that it is the single most important variable in accounting for democratic change or stability.

These results need to be replicated using a larger sample that is more representative of the different regions and political regimes of the world. In addition, the investigation into the effects of explicit demand on the political system could be performed more incisively and with a greater ability to draw causal conclusions through time series analysis. Among other things, this would allow us to examine the impact of a change in demand on change in supply. These objectives can be met as more waves of data from socio-political surveys, such as the fourth World Values Survey, become available – although a few years interval is needed before measuring the subsequent level of democracy.

The broader implications of this study are fourfold. First, explicit public expressions of support for democracy matter, and they matter over and above the impact of the broader political culture of a society. This vindicates the widespread analysis of regime preferences, and the usage of these types of questions in socio-political surveys. Second, the literature has focussed on the absolute level of explicit demand, when the amount of unmet or net demand is more important for democratic change and stability. Third, the concept of a political system, classically formulated by Easton and utilised in this paper, has provided a meaningful framework through which to examine the linkages between public opinion and system change.
Finally, Inglehart has shown that self-expression values are strongly correlated with level of development, with publics in poorer countries emphasising survival values rather than self-expression. Thus, if self-expression values (implicit demand) really were the motive force for democratization, many of the newer, less-developed third wave democracies would be doomed. However, in contrast to implicit demand, explicit demand can be as high in poor countries as in rich, established democracies, because it is a function of individual evaluation of the political system while self-expression values are engendered through socialisation and remain relatively static at the individual level. Thus, the importance of regime preferences for democratic change means that poorer societies are not necessarily trapped in a vicious cycle of authoritarian rule and economic decay.

Lagos (2003: Table 1) points out that the established democracies of Europe have the highest support for democracy (75%), but that Africa is second with 70% support.
References


Easton, David, (1965), A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (Chicago: University of Chicago)


------, (2003), “How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy – and How Can We Measure It?”, in Political Science and Politics, 36/1, pp


Mattes, Robert & Michael Bratton, (2003), Learning About Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience, CSSR Working Paper no. 48, (Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town)


### Appendix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Survey</th>
<th>Regime Category</th>
<th>Implicit Demand</th>
<th>Explicit Demand</th>
<th>Net Exp Demand</th>
<th>Supply at $t^*$</th>
<th>Change in supply $^*$</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mean:** -0.03 73 6 5.1 0.35

*Notes:* 
- "LD" is liberal democracy, "ED" is electoral democracy, "PD" is pseudo-democracy, "AR" is authoritarian regime.
- *Self-expression values.
- *Regime preferences, % average agreement.
- *% prefer democracy - % supply.
- *reversed FH scores.
- FH scores at $t+5$ – FH scores at $t$. 

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University of Cape Town
Appendix B

The Freedom House Democracy Checklist

Political Rights Checklist

1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections?
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots?
4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?

Additional discretionary Political Rights questions:
A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler?
B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?

The Civil Liberties Checklist

Freedom of Expression and Belief

1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the Survey gives the system credit.)
2. Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public religious expression?

Association and Organizational Rights

1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
2. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.)
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

Rule of Law and Human Rights

1. Is there an independent judiciary?
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the population treated equally under the law? Are police under direct civilian control?
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and
insurgencies? (Note: freedom from war and insurgencies enhances the liberties in a free society, but the absence of wars and insurgencies does not in and of itself make a not free society free.)

4. Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption?

**Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights**

1. Is there open and free private discussion?

2. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?

3. Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?

4. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?

5. Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of legitimate economic gains?