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The Politics of Regional Peace Operations in West Africa

The Relations among ECOWAS, the UN, and Major Powers

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A minor dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations

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and to my mum and dad for this opportunity.
COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, cited, and referenced.

Signature:________________________________________ Date:________________________
Abstract

As a “new world order” dawned with the end of the Cold War, traditional peacekeeping was adapted as a conflict management tool to fit a wide range of conflict conditions in a new security environment. Although this environment was drastically different from the one in which peacekeeping in its classical form was practiced, the sense of enthusiasm that swept over world leaders with the War’s end and with a number of peacekeeping successes allowed it to become the United Nation’s (UN) most visible instrument. Thus, from Cambodia to El Salvador to Angola, peacekeepers were placed in an array of conditions in an increasing number of conflict zones. Their responsibilities were also expanded after the publication of then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali’s An Agenda for Peace. This opened the door to conflict resolution through peacekeeping that included political, military, civilian, and humanitarian elements within a single peace operation. The UN found itself in hostile situations in which military force was necessary to enforce the peace and it struggled to keep up with the demand and scope of peace operations.

Conflicts in Africa proved especially difficult to bring under control. The peacekeeping failures in Somalia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively brought UN peacekeeping under intense scrutiny and triggered an international withdrawal from multilateral UN-led operations on the continent until the end of the decade. Indeed, Somalia and Rwanda illustrate the intricate difficulties of contemporary conflicts in Africa and complex peace support missions.
The West’s withdrawal contributed to the growing drive towards regional organisations taking on peacekeeping activities once performed exclusively by the UN. An increased confidence in “African solutions to African problems” has worked in tandem with this retreat. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took on the challenge and has been especially active in the field of peacekeeping. Its first improvised peacekeeping operation in 1990 in Liberia provides one of the case studies examined in this thesis. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group’s (ECOMOG) second mission in Sierra Leone and its more recent experience in Côte d’Ivoire are the other two instances that demonstrate ECOWAS and ECOMOG’s progress as well as its many challenges. They also provide the setting for significant unilateral involvement by the world’s major powers, namely the United States, Britain, and France.

In spite of its lengthy security presence in the region, ECOMOG’s efforts were impeded by complex alliances among member-states, perceptions of its partiality, and by its lack of institutional structure, peacekeeping experience, and logistical, military, and financial capabilities. Substantial international support did not come from the UN or the major powers until 1999, and did not reach a significant level until 2000, with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

Although the internal politics of various ECOWAS members has changed in the last 17 years, these same difficulties continue to challenge the regional organisation. Thus, the actual quality of the responses, which remains dubious, overshadows the questions that many have on the desirability of a division of
labour with the UN. The most critical issue that the cases underline is the necessity of active UN support and collaboration with sub-regional peace efforts.
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Introduction

The Context

Successful United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in the late 1980s in Namibia, Cambodia, and Iraq made peacekeeping the organisation’s centrepiece for conflict management in a range of varying scenarios. However, the Cold War’s end in 1989 brought significant changes to the international security environment. Traditional peacekeeping, as practiced during the Cold War, proved unable to effectively cease or control contemporary conflicts. These conflicts are generally characterised by state failure, ethnic violence, and human rights violations. Their effects, often manifested through mass refugee flows, arms trafficking, and cross-border raids, spill over into neighbouring countries and have brought disorder to many regions of the globe.

In the immediate post-Cold War era, the UN demonstrated a strong penchant for peace operations, as the organisation intervened in wars within states for the first time in its history. However, consecutive high-profile peacekeeping disasters in Somalia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively sealed the fate of African conflicts and extinguished the international community’s post-Cold War fervour for such operations. In particular, the UN Security Council members’ growing reluctance to commit their own soldiers to UN missions neutralised the organisation and impacted negatively on its ability

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to manage conflicts in the mid-1990s. Declarations of the UN’s inefficiency and redundancy set in motion appeals for reform.

The UN’s waning affected Africa more severely than other regions, as its decreased strategic value led to its virtual abandonment by Western states despite the need and demand for peace operations to manage its ongoing wars. In an attempt to fill the security gap left by the West, Africa’s regional and sub-regional organisations were exceptionally active in pursuing a conflict management role. In West Africa, where inter-related conflicts engulfed virtually the entire region in the 1990s, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been especially active, launching peace operations independently of the world organisation. Its efforts stand out, as ECOWAS has gained substantial experience through four operations in its neighbourhood in the last 17 years.

**Thesis Objectives**

There is a substantial amount of literature written on how to reconcile the relationship between regional organisations and the UN. It is not the aim of this work to offer solutions to the challenges of this relationship. Rather, this thesis offers a description of the relations between ECOWAS, the UN, and the major powers involved in the management of conflicts in West Africa in the post-Cold War era. The focus is therefore on the dynamics between these actors as shown through their cooperation and coordination, or lack thereof, in the peace management.

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2 The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) has operated peace missions in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire.
missions in the region. During the course of this account, the following empirical questions are raised: what were the relations among these actors during the conflict management process and what are the criticisms of those relations? These questions are considered through a survey of primary and secondary literature on peace operations, as these missions have become the most visible tool used by African regional and sub-regional organisations, as well as the UN, to manage conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the successes and failures that peacekeeping operations have produced have significantly tested the relations among all these actors. The ECOWAS and UN peace operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire are used as empirical case studies in this examination.

**Justification of the Topic**

I. The Politics of Peace Operations

In spite of being a primarily military undertaking, peace operations are in fact a highly political activity, as the “decision to respond to a given situation [and how to respond] is a political one.”3 Thus, they are also a means of projecting power in areas of strategic or vital concern, as the case studies will demonstrate. As such, the decision to send, withhold, or withdraw peacekeepers imbues a powerful political message indicating significant or limited commitment and, hence, strategic interest.

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Africa today remains the poorest continent on the globe. It is simultaneously overwhelmed by devastating wars that have defied regional and international actors alike. Since the end of the Cold War, the continent has found itself in a situation of strategic irrelevance. Yet, it has been the setting for some of the UN’s greatest peacekeeping failures and successes in the post-Cold War era. It has also seen significant unilateral intervention from the world’s major powers, namely the United States (US), Britain, and France. Such circumstances make it a particularly relevant region for the study of peace operations.

II. The Present Practice of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era have varied considerably in shape, size, make-up, and purpose. The world has seen contradictory actions by international actors in the name of bringing peace to conflict areas: the US *ipso facto* invaded Iraq on the grounds of humanitarianism; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombed the former Yugoslavia to stop ethnic cleansing; private military companies (PMCs) are engaged independently in conflicts throughout Africa; and the UN has actively participated in peace-building activities in Cambodia and El Salvador but has also been engaged militarily in Somalia. The practice of peacekeeping, therefore, has evolved into a confusing exercise involving a range of international, national, and sub-state actors carrying out military, political, and civilian activities. It is the aim of this work to clarify this empirical situation by identifying the actions of the major actors as well as how they were criticised for these actions in the context of regional peace operations.

III. From International to Regional Peace Operations:
The Progression

i) The End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War allowed national interest, rather than ideology or Superpower alliances, to determine states’ actions. There was a sense of optimism amongst the world’s leading powers, who hoped that these national interests would converge on the UN, allowing it to perform as envisaged, released from the immobilising grasps of Cold War rivalries. US President George H.W. Bush led the pack by proclaiming the beginning of a “new world order”. The international cooperative spirit facilitated a dramatic increase in UN activity and involvement across the globe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Between 1991 and 1994, UN peacekeeping operations worldwide spurted from eight to eighteen; a testimony to international collaboration, to the rise in the demand for peacekeeping operations worldwide, and to peacekeeping’s increased prominence as a UN mechanism for conflict resolution. Traditional UN peacekeeping has since been used, adapted, and expanded beyond the simple interposition of a small number of passive and unarmed observers to include more complex and more robust uses of military resources to achieve a range of political and humanitarian objectives.

ii) The United States and the United Nations in Somalia and Rwanda

Following a successful intervention in Iraq in 1991, the US offered to lead a UN humanitarian intervention into Somalia, where a severe drought and inter-clan warfare was impeding the delivery of humanitarian aid, contributing to a

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famine that had not been seen since the early 1980s in Ethiopia. The mission was cast as "the ideal test case" for UN-US cooperation and leadership in a new and evolving world order. However, the deaths of eighteen American Rangers on 3 October 1993 and the brutal images of a mutilated American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by a crowd of Somalis led the American government to immediately withdraw its support from the operation. This decisive political and military failure caused a major shift in Washington's attitude towards such larger and complex operations and led to a complete revision of US President Bill Clinton's policy of assertive multilateralism. The resulting policy guideline outlined in Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25), which was essentially "a formula for non-action in any ... future crisis", set strict conditions on any future American involvement in UN-led peace operations. Thus, without having stabilised the Somali conflict, the UN and other states quickly withdrew from Somalia.

No other peace mission than that of Somalia played a more integral role in, and indeed formed the basis for, the UN and American retreat from peace operations in Africa in the mid-1990s. A desire to be seen as doing "something" coupled with an extreme reluctance for involvement and an aversion to supply the adequate means to meet these ends replaced the short-lived optimism. The

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majority of Western peacekeeping efforts for the remainder of the 1990s thus
turned away from Africa, which bore little threat or strategic importance to the
world’s major powers, towards other crises materialising in Europe. The Somalia
operation is therefore treated as the trigger event for Western withdrawal from
further peace missions until the end of the decade.

The UN’s experience in Somalia unquestionably shaped its inaction just
months later in Rwanda, another African country of no strategic consequence to
any nation8, when in March of 1994, Hutu government forces initiated genocide
against the country’s moderate Hutu and Tutsi population. Traumatised by the
events in Somalia, the Security Council responded by ordering the retreat of the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). A skeletal core of 270
was left with “a mandate that allowed them to do little more than hunker down
behind their sandbags and watch”9 while an estimated 800,000 civilians were
brutally killed within three months. Again, as in Somalia and Bosnia, the UN sat
as a spectator to the unfolding tragedy.

These (and other) peacekeeping failures in the early 1990s attracted
negative attention for UN peacekeeping and exacerbated Africa’s post-Cold War
plight of strategic unimportance. The mounting political and material costs for
peacekeeping operations in the region, the major powers’ unwillingness to
commit the necessary material or political support, perceptions of unsolvable
age-old tribal conflicts, and a seeming endlessness to conflict throughout the
continent effectively terminated peacekeeping operations in Africa after 1994.

8 Shawcross, William, Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict
9 Gourevitch, Philip, We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families:
Save for select missions in Angola (1991-1999), Libya (May 1994), and Mozambique (1992-1994), the size and frequency of UN peace operations in Africa decreased drastically. The number of UN peacekeepers on the continent fell from more than 30,000 during 1993 to under 2,000 at its lowest point in 1999\(^\text{10}\).

### iii) The Regionalisation of Peace Operations

Motivated as much by sheer necessity as by a desire to find “African solutions to African problems”, a cocktail of actors, and in particular Africa’s regional and sub-regional organisations, moved to fill the security gap left by the UN and the world’s leading states. This development follows a global trend that has seen a significant increase in peacekeeping efforts made at the regional level. Thus, while only six “non-UN missions” took place worldwide in the 40 years between 1948 and 1988\(^\text{11}\), 10 such missions were being fielded by 1997\(^\text{12}\). Less than a decade later, in 2005, there were no fewer than 19 regional peace operations taking place in the world\(^\text{13}\).

Similarly, in Africa prior to 1990, there had been few peacekeeping operations ventured by regional organisations; a total of three had been

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\(^{11}\) Mays, Terry M., *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping* (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2004), p. xvii. There is little data on non-UN missions that is publicly available. The New York University-based Centre on International Cooperation, with the support of the UN Department of Peacekeeping and the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, is currently in the process of compiling comprehensive data on this type of mission from 1948 onwards. See Centre on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations*, 2006 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006) for more information on this and on current UN and non-UN missions.


\(^{13}\) See Centre on International Cooperation, pp. 154-159.
supported by two organisations - the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)\(^{14}\) and the Treaty of Non-Aggression Assistance and Mutual Defence (ANAD)\(^{15}\).

However, since 1990 to the present, a number of Africa’s sub-regional organisations, in addition to the OAU, have fielded no fewer than nine peace operations on the continent\(^{16}\). It is notable that over half of these missions have taken place in the West African region, which has been described as “an interconnected web of instability”\(^{17}\) because conflicts have tended to spill over and spread from one state to the other. The region’s permeable borders facilitate this, as well as the free flow of weapons and the export of former-combatants between the various war zones, causing sizable obstacles to any and all conflict management and resolution efforts. Nevertheless, amidst this “web of instability”, ECOWAS has vigorously attempted to manage the region’s conflicts since 1990. It devolved peacekeeping initiatives from the UN when no other body was willing.

The high propensity of peacekeeping operations in West Africa is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it reveals that the region’s security mechanism is a relatively new one, as all of ECOWAS’ peacekeeping experience has been acquired in the last 17 years alone. Secondly, and more importantly, it

\(^{14}\) The OAU was transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2002.

\(^{15}\) The OAU sent peacekeepers to Chad in 1980 and ANAD was present in Burkina Faso and Mali in 1986.

\(^{16}\) This includes the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) missions in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa’s (CEMAC) mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2002, ECOWAS’ peace operations in Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998), Guinea (2000), and Côte d’Ivoire (2002), and the African Union’s (AU) Mission in Sudan (2005). It should be noted that mediation efforts and observer missions, such as the OAU’s observer missions in Rwanda (1990-1993), Burundi (1995), in the Comoros (1997), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999), and in Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000), are excluded here.

\(^{17}\) Adebayo, Adekeye, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 15.
demonstrates that regional peacekeeping in West Africa, as well as the rest of the world, is a relatively new activity that warrants particular examination.

**Conceptual Definitions and Terminology**

UN peacekeeping terminology was first formed in 1992 by then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his work *An Agenda for Peace*. Its language has since become near-universally accepted. Boutros-Ghali outlined four phases for international action: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding. Preventive diplomacy is seen as an initial means of containing and preventing disputes from escalating into full-scale conflict, limiting the spread of such conflicts to other states and to the greater region. It can include fact-finding missions, mediation, confidence-building measures, and preventive deployment. However, once a conflict has erupted, it is the peacemakers who are to engage in bringing hostiles to an agreement through peaceful means. Where the fighting has ceased, peacekeepers, which Boutros-Ghali argued may be military, police, as well as civilian, are to preserve the peace, even if fragile, while the peacemakers pursue a diplomatic settlement. In *An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General defined peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned”\(^{18}\). This articulation of the term first opened the door to the possibility that consent in future operations may not be required.

*An Agenda for Peace* introduced the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding. This stage follows the cessation of hostilities and aims to

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revitalise and consolidate peace in order to prevent a relapse into conflict. The ultimate goal of this stage is the building or rebuilding of foundations for a long lasting peace that is more than just the absence of war. This necessitates the establishment or re-establishment of a stable, independent, and legitimate functioning government. Activities that fall under peacebuilding are disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes for former combatants, restoring institutional infrastructure destroyed by conflict, and the repatriation of refugees.

On the heels of An Agenda for Peace came peacekeeping operations that expressed a combination of military, civilian, and humanitarian elements. They have since been labelled complex peacekeeping, multi-dimensional peacekeeping, multi-functional, and second-generation peacekeeping operations. Other operations, though still mandated in the name of keeping the peace, did not require consent from the belligerents and were therefore, by nature, more combat-oriented. These missions, known as peace-enforcement, differed fundamentally from peacekeeping in its classical sense.

The typology of peace operations under consideration in this paper are of the post-Cold War multi-functional variety, many of which also have a peace-enforcement dimension. The general term of ‘peacekeeping’ is often misused by the media and political leaders as an all encompassing term for the full range of activities from peace-enforcement to humanitarian intervention, which are not peacekeeping in its traditional sense. An effort has been made to distinguish between these theoretically and practically distinct activities. However, because more recent peace operations have had a propensity to slip between
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, the terms ‘peace operation’ and ‘peace mission’ are used as an inclusive term to refer to the full range of multilateral first, second, and third generation operations designed to provide political, military, and civilian services to prevent or settle disputes in terms of Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Included under this broad term are peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace-building. These more specific terms are defined in accordance with the UN, and in particular, with An Agenda for Peace from 1992 and its Supplement, written in 1995.

The term ‘regional peace operations’ is used to refer to peace operations that are undertaken by formal regional or sub-regional arrangements that are also recognised as such. It must be noted that regional peace operations are often equated with hegemonic peace operations. As the driving force of a regional peace operation, a regional hegemon is also able to steer the mission according to its own agenda, as other member-states lack the capability to act as an effective counterbalance.

**Chapter Outline**

The thesis begins with an examination of the evolution of UN peace operations in Chapter 1. The development of this activity is traced over three distinct periods: the traditional peacekeeping operations launched before the Cold War, the retrenchment during the War, and the expansionism that occurred thereafter. An emphasis is placed on the current, more robust and complex peace missions that take place in hostile environments within a state. These are

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19 This is discussed further in Chapter 4.
examined in greater detail in the second chapter in the context of the UN and its peacekeeping terminology. Within the shifting security framework of the post-Cold War world, the UN operation in Somalia is considered as an example of a complex humanitarian intervention. More importantly, it serves as the operation that highlights the issues and problems surrounding multi-functional initiatives. Chapter 3 examines the consequences of the West’s withdrawal resulting from Somalia. Most notable was the world’s inaction, perhaps better described as its bad action, in Rwanda. The resulting retrenchment of the mid-1990s, the lessons learned, and policy changes in the US and within the UN are described. The fourth chapter discusses the emergence of regionalised peace operations in the West African context as a result of the West’s retreat. Empirical analyses of the Liberian, Sierra Leonean, and Ivorian cases follows in Chapter 5, where an emphasis is placed on the relations between ECOWAS, the UN, and the world’s major powers, most notably the US, Britain, and France.
Chapter One

The Evolution of UN Peace Operations

United Nations peacekeeping emerged in the course of the Cold War as a product of the prevailing circumstances and has since become the organisation's most visible conflict management instrument. This chapter traces the evolution of UN peace operations from its traditional form as practiced prior to and during the Cold War to its complex multi-dimensional variety that is prevalent today. Thus, peace operations are broken into three periods: those launched from 1946-1988, those from 1989-1994, and finally those from 1995 to the present. This evolution can be loosely traced over time, as the practice was moulded to fit the varying circumstances of the international political climate. More significant than the actual time periods is the progressive trend of peace operations fulfilling an assortment of more demanding and complex civilian and political functions in addition to the traditional military aspects of peacekeeping.

This chapter is divided into two sections with the first introducing conceptual and functional aspects of traditional UN peace operations as practiced from the 1950s until the end of the Cold War. The gap in peace operations between 1979 and 1988, when the Security Council was paralysed by relations between the US and the Soviet Union, is discussed very briefly as a phase leading to the resurgence in operations after 1989. The second section examines the effects of the end of the Cold War on the international security climate, with particular attention to the UN, freed from the Cold War stalemate and a Security
Council willing and eager to act. The characteristics and challenges of contemporary conflicts in Africa in the post-Cold War world are also discussed.

**UN Peace Operations and the Cold War World: Keeping the Peace**

I. The Development of Peacekeeping

The post-1945 world was “as inhospitable as could be imagined for the arrangements for keeping the peace which are outlined in the UN Charter.”20 The UN was unable to act as envisioned by its founders, due partly to external structural problems but also from internal difficulties. The onset of tensions between the US and the Soviet Union and the division of the world into hostile blocs made it impossible for the UN to project military power under Chapter VII. Peacekeeping was developed in response to this stalemate21. By positioning itself in a more neutral position, the UN was able to help bring smaller conflicts to an end, “[keeping] them from flaring anew, and [keeping] them from leading to a direct and potentially catastrophic clash of US and Soviet arms.”22

Peacekeeping’s neutral position and limited range of activities allowed it to grow in prominence in the political climate of the Cold War so that it has become the UN’s most visible contribution to international peace and security23 in spite of having no mention in the Charter itself. The award of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize to the UN peacekeeping forces is an acknowledgement of this contribution.

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The overwhelming majority of the UN's first 13 peace operations launched prior to 1978 followed the principles and functions of traditional peacekeeping. However, the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union prevented the UN from launching a single new peace operation between March 1978 and May 1988 in spite of regional conflicts and proxy wars taking place at this time.

In Africa, the UN peacekeeping absence dates to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960. ONUC was perhaps ahead of its time in that its complexity, size, and costs resembled the UN operations of the 1990s. Whether because of the UN's grim experience or because the organisation “had acquired an operational black eye ... as a result of its clearly partisan stance” in the Congo's internal conflict, ONUC was to be the last UN peace mission in Africa until the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) 29 years later.

The End of the Cold War: the Rebirth of UN Peace Operations

I. A Reinvigorated UN

The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of unprecedented American-Soviet cooperation, making the UN's resurgence possible. Thus, the late 1980s saw consensus that had not been experienced in the first 40 years of the UN's existence, as the five permanent members of the Security Council cooperatively...
took the lead in an unprecedented upsurge in the scope, size, and number of peace operations. The number of deployed peacekeepers increased from less than 10,000 to more than 70,000 in this period while the budget experienced a similar increase from $230 million to $3.6 billion, reaching roughly three times the UN’s regular operating budget of $1.2 billion.  

Various factors helped to bring the UN back onto the international security stage. Firstly, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s economic and political redirection of the Soviet Union, which helped to reinvigorate multilateralism as well as UN peacekeeping, prompted US President Reagan to modify his long-standing public stance against the UN. His successor, George H.W. Bush, continued this course, declaring in 1991 the coming of a “new world order... in which the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong...; a world where the United Nations – freed from the Cold War stalemate – is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders.” These changed attitudes of the two Superpowers were critical to the mounting of a number of peace operations between 1988 and 1989 that helped to raise the UN’s visibility.  

Secondly, the UN’s involvement in the 1991 Gulf War, “the first instance of any large-scale Chapter VII enforcement operation, placed [it] at the centre of the international security stage.” It was from the Gulf War that the US strategy of “assertive multilateralism” flourished to become the guiding force of its foreign

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30 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, p. 55.
policy until disaster struck on 3 October 1993 in Mogadishu31. Thus, according to Michael Doyle, “[m]ultilateral action under the United Nations Charter ... appeared to be a practical solution to global community when each nation caring a little seemed sufficient to ensure that all together cared enough.”32 However, the end of the Cold War had dramatically altered the international political environment and hence, conflicts. As Thomas Weiss and Jarat Chopra note, “[a] typology of peacekeeping is thus largely determined by a typology of conflict.”33 Consequently, peacekeeping evolved as a fluid concept in practice and the UN Charter was reinterpreted to fit the new circumstances. The following section discusses the changed security climate and the “new” conflicts that surfaced, with a particular focus on Africa.

II. The Changed Security Context and Contemporary Conflict in Africa

In the post-Cold War era, Africa has been the world’s most conflict-prone continent. According to the Human Security Report 2005, [a]lmost every country across the broad middle belt of the continent – from Somalia in the east to Sierra Leone in the west, from Sudan in the north to Angola in the south – remains trapped in a volatile mix of poverty, crime, unstable and inequitable political institutions, ethnic discrimination, low state capacity ... all factors associated with increased risk of armed conflict.34

32 Doyle, “Discovering the Limits,” in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 5.
It continues to state that “more people were being killed in wars in sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world combined.”\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, Africa’s conflicts do not take place within well-established states that are able to exercise control over their people, policies, and territories but rather inside states where “the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart.”\textsuperscript{36} According to I. William Zartman, the process of state failure has caused these conflicts; it is not the consequence of wars\textsuperscript{37}. As part of this struggle, nearly all of Africa’s regimes have laboured to find the appropriate balance between too much and too little government control, where both its excess and its shortage can bring failure and collapse to the state\textsuperscript{38}.

Where a weak government is unable to serve the needs of its people and to maintain order within its borders, conflicts have easily spilled over into neighbouring countries and have become struggles for regional balances of control\textsuperscript{39}, a third characteristic of modern African conflicts. According to Zartman, the “[r]egionalisation of conflict is produced by both pull and push factors, from the inside and outside respectively, negative externalities of the original process of state collapse.”\textsuperscript{40} This regionalisation of Africa’s conflicts helps to explain the development of Africa’s regional conflict management mechanisms, which are discussed in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Zartman, “Regional Conflict Management,” in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{40} Zartman, “Regional Conflict Management,” in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 83.
The internal dimension of state failure, which yields conflict within a state, has changed the very nature of warfare, as fighting between traditional national armies has lessened, and given rise to disorganised rebel factions recruited amongst the disenchanted, students, and even children. Distinguishing between soldiers and civilians is increasingly difficult and the scope of belligerents involved in a conflict widens to include anyone with a machete. Under these circumstances, naming an aggressor and a victim in a conflict for the purpose of collective action is a subjective process and is extremely difficult and ambiguous. As Paul F. Diehl notes, the inability to reach a consensus on identifying an aggressor can split UN membership, leading to inaction as well as conflict escalation, as seen in Cambodia, the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, and Kurdistan.

Contemporary African conflicts have had devastating civilian dimensions, with widespread murder, rape, and mutilation. Subsequent refugee flows have placed significant pressure on already poor neighbouring countries barely able to provide for their own populations. Refugee camps along borders have become recruitment grounds for factions, transforming internal civil wars into regional and trans-national ones, as seen in camps along the Liberian and Sierra Leonean borders. However, these conditions in Africa did not inhibit the UN from sending peacekeepers, who increasingly found themselves in compromising situations in conflict zones where no ceasefires existed, rendering adherence to

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Diehl, Paul F., “Regional Conflict Management: Strategies, Necessary Conditions, and Comparative Effectiveness,” in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 49.
the tenets of traditional peacekeeping virtually impossible. Much worse, UN peacekeepers were unable to keep the peace and were left powerless to protect those whom they were sent to protect.

Such contemporary conflicts in Africa have brought into question traditional notions of a state’s inviolable sovereignty, which is enshrined in the UN Charter. Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that “[s]tate sovereignty ... is being redefined... States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa.” To extend its jurisdiction to what was previously untouchable, the UN has expanded the operational meaning and interpretation of “threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,” which have since come to include civil wars, the disruption of humanitarian assistance, and “whatever nine members of the Security Council (absent a permanent member veto) [say] it [is].” Nevertheless, states remain the hallmark of the international system and there therefore remains strong support for the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states, particularly among the developing world.

Conclusion

In the post-Cold War era, the UN saved itself from security irrelevance by adapting one of its conflict management tools: peacekeeping. Although

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42 Instances of the UN’s presence in hostile territory where it was unable to keep the peace include its ventures in the Congo (1960-1964), Somalia in (1993-1995), and in Rwanda (1993-1996).
43 Article 2(7) of the Charter enshrines state sovereignty and precludes the UN from “intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”.
46 Doyle, “Discovering the Limits and Potential of Peacekeeping,” in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 4.
peacekeeping was first introduced to allow the UN to act and manage smaller conflicts in the politically hostile environment of the Cold War era, its *sui generis* character allowed the UN to become involved in significantly different circumstances than those faced at its inception. Thus, in spite of a stark absence of peace operations between 1978 and 1988, the conciliatory policies of the US and Soviet Union in the immediate post-Cold War era facilitated a resurgence of UN peace operations, which increased in number, size, and scope of activities. However, overwhelmingly intricate and difficult security conditions in Africa resulting from complex protracted conflicts in the post-Cold War era would test the world organisation's long term willingness and ability to maintain peace and security to all regions of the globe.
Chapter Two

UN Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War World: Complex Peace Operations

This chapter tackles the more complex multi-functional peace operations and peace-enforcement operations undertaken by the UN in the early 1990s. Reference is made to UN terminology and the writings of former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali, which formally expanded the vocabulary of peace operations as well as the scope of its activities. Again, conceptual and practical issues are discussed, lending insight to the UN operation in Somalia in 1992. The UN’s efforts to manage Somalia’s civil war by means of humanitarian intervention revealed the harsh realities, as well as the practical and conceptual difficulties of the ‘new peacekeeping’. These problems are examined in detail. The failure of the ambitious UN and American operations in Somalia, the “guinea pig” of the new world order, had a critical impact on defining the limits of UN peace operations in Africa in the post-Cold War era.

An Agenda for Peace

Following the UN’s success in the Persian Gulf, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced a report in 1992 on ways to enhance the organisation’s capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Previously, classical peacekeeping, in spite of its military nature, had been placed under
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. This chapter empowers the Security Council to make non-binding recommendations on appropriate methods of resolution, though the Council does not have enforcement powers for such resolutions. By extension, traditional peacekeeping’s essence was formed by a ‘holy trinity’ of values: consent, neutrality, and the limited use of force by peacekeepers. These principles enhanced the non-threatening nature of a peacekeeping operation and as a result created a political environment that was conducive to political cooperation between belligerents. Their practice and the perception of their practice during an operation thus enabled it to fulfill its purpose. The UN’s first thirteen peace missions generally fulfilled this doctrine and subscribed to the ‘holy trinity’.

An Agenda for Peace significantly transformed UN peace missions by articulating a general policy guideline where none had previously existed and by adding an ambitious spectrum of activities to traditional peacekeeping. It envisioned new components for UN peacekeeping that surpassed the traditional interposition of neutral forces between belligerents. The publication shifted the military goals of peacekeeping to the attainment of “far-reaching, just, and long-

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47 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, p. 16.
50 Hill and Malik, p. 15.
51 The UN Operation in the Congo from 1960-64 is the one exception in this time period.
term political solutions.” Thus, peacekeeping’s purpose became conflict resolution as opposed to just its management, with the aim being to reach a long-term settlement of the roots of the conflict in order to help build a long-lasting and stable government.

**From Traditional to Complex Peace Operations**

An Agenda for Peace spawned a new type of operation, which differs from traditional peacekeeping in that it combines military, civilian, and humanitarian elements within a single operation. These complex operations, although taking a substantial step beyond first-generation peacekeeping, nonetheless require the consent of the parties, although the nature of the consent and the purposes for which it is granted are qualitatively different from classical peacekeeping. The UN operations in Namibia in 1989, El Salvador in 1991, and Cambodia in 1992 provide successful examples of this second category of peacekeeping.

A third category of combat-oriented peace missions focused specifically on internal conflicts also emerged. Although the notion of peace-enforcement was first proposed in Boutros-Gali’s An Agenda for Peace in the context of peace-enforcement units, the term was subsequently redefined by Boutros-Gali to refer to “peacekeeping activities which don’t necessarily involve the consent of all

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53 Doyle, “Discovering the Limits,” in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 6.
55 Doyle, “Discovering the Limits,” in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 6.
56 Doyle, “Discovering the Limits,” in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 7.
57 Boutros-Gali, An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 44.
the parties concerned." 58 Missions such as the one in Somalia were erroneously
dubbed peace-enforcement by the media and the term was applied59 to all other
operations in which the use of force was sanctioned to compel compliance.
Peace-enforcement missions are therefore armed with the ability to use force,
which negates the necessity that consent be gained from the belligerents. They
are intended to be impartial, in that the mandates themselves and their
implementation must be impartial.

In 1993 the British military incorporated and successfully exported this
proactive approach into its own doctrine. Its army training manual, Wider
Peacekeeping, and drafts of Peace Support Operations, demonstrate the changes
that peacekeeping-by-consent had undergone after recent experiences in civil
wars60. 'Wider peacekeeping' was therefore seen as a fusion of the once-distinct
military cultures of war fighting, peacekeeping, and counter-insurgency with
political primacy at the operational level61. In this context of progressive military
doctrines, from 1990 to 1995, a previously unknown activism developed, as the
UN became involved in an unprecedented number of peace operations in often
hostile environments.

The international community's post-Cold War enthusiasm converged on
Somalia in 1992. The UN and American missions there are singled out because
they exposed two distinctive elements of peace support operations: the

58 See Boutros-Gali, Boutros, "Empowering the UN," p. 93, and Boutros-Gali, Boutros, Report on the
Work of the Organisation from the Forty-Seventh and Forty-Eighth Session of the General Assembly
59 Boulden, p. 16.
60 Pugh, Michael, "Military Intervention and Humanitarian Action: Trends and Issues," Disasters 22:4
61 Mackinlay, John, "Developing a Culture of Intervention," British Peace Support Operations Doctrine,
Joint Services Command and Staff College, 11 April 1993. Available at
www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/wsg/dsd/news/abstracts4.doc
deficiencies of peacekeeping, armed humanitarian intervention, and peace-enforcement in hostile areas of little strategic interest; and the inadequacy of Western leaders’ hollow declarations of a new world order and of assertive multilateralism. Peace operations in Africa decelerated in all aspects soon after the end of the operation in Somalia, almost as swiftly as they had surged in the early 1990s.

The UN in Somalia

1. Background and Context

In spite of being comprised of a single ethnic group sharing the same culture, language, and religion, Somalia has repeatedly been torn apart by clan-based civil wars since its independence on June 1, 1960. During the Cold War, the “superpower rivalry was raged [in Somalia] at fever pitch”62, with the US and Soviet Union pumping arms and money into the country, enabling dictator Siad Barre to stay in power. With the Cold War’s end and the retreat of the superpowers, a political power vacuum unsettled the country. Amidst civil war, Barre was overthrown by General Muhammed Farah Aideed in 1991 and a struggle for power broke out in the capital of Mogadishu, primarily fought between followers of Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohammed.

The “war of all against all”63, as Secretary-General Boutros-Gali termed it, gave rise to anarchic conditions that destroyed the country’s infrastructure and ruined the local population, creating a humanitarian disaster. Widespread

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63 As quoted in Shawcross, p. 86.
starvation afflicted the country, with 4 million of Somalia’s 5.1 million people reportedly living in famine-afflicted areas. With a quarter of the population facing imminent starvation, a situation worsened by drought, gunmen from various factions reportedly stole half of the food aid and resold it on the black market, making organised looting the new basis for the Somali economy while the general population faced starvation. Aid agencies were unable to deliver food to the starving population due to the lack of security throughout the country.

II. The UN and US Peacekeeping War

The UN first moved to intervene in April 1992 through an essentially classical peacekeeping operation. Following an UN-sponsored ceasefire between Aideed and Mahdi, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), a small security force of 500, was sent to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies. Security Council Resolution 751 was significant because it was the first instance where the concept of a threat to international peace and security was expanded to include “the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict”. This purely humanitarian-based operation “illustrated both post-Cold War euphoria and the unwillingness of the Council to take political action” at a high cost to the main powers.

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65 Seiple, p. 109.
67 Shawcross, p. 86.
Support from the US was therefore vital but the leaders of the world’s strongest military were “adamantly opposed to any escalation” of the UN operation. Then, with mounting crises in the former Yugoslavia, Washington began to shift in favour of armed intervention in Somalia, as a *limited* intervention by the American military presented fewer risks than the large-scale military intervention being called for in the Balkans. As one Pentagon official said, “[T]he best thing about Somalia was it saved us from Bosnia”\(^69\).

Signifying a radical departure from traditional US policy and in “tacit recognition of the lack of UN readiness to manage a Chapter VII operation”\(^70\), American leadership of a new mission was proposed and accepted. Thus, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) replaced UNOSOM I on 3 December 1992 in accordance with Resolution 794\(^71\). UNITAF, whose mandate was drafted by the Pentagon in consultation with Secretary-General Boutros-Gali\(^72\), was under American command and control and was overwhelmingly staffed by American soldiers. The multinational mission was armed with a Chapter VII mandate\(^74\) to use all necessary means to establish “as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia”. UNITAF was to be transferred to a


\(^{69}\) As quoted in Peterson, p. 60.


\(^{71}\) Howe, Jonathan T., “Relations between the United States and the UN in Dealing with Somalia,” in Clarke and Herbst, p. 175.


\(^{74}\) A mandate granted Chapter VII powers allows the UN to take all necessary means to restore international peace and security. It may do so through action by air, sea, or land forces. See UN Charter Chapter VII, article 42.
UN peacekeeping force once this directive was completed in May 1993, four short months later.

While the Secretary-General wished to widen UNITAF’s role to include the disarmament of rebel fighters beyond Mogadishu, the Americans insisted on the limited, short-term, and non-political character of the intervention. This underlying dynamic between the Secretariat seeking a Chapter VII peace-enforcement mission supported by peacebuilding and a reluctant, though self-imposed, US leadership seeking a quick victory was one of many sources of division and tension between the different approaches of the UN and its strongest member.

In spite of this rift, UNITAF successfully secured the supply routes for humanitarian activities and helped end the famine. The mission was formally handed over to the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in March 1993, three months into President Bill Clinton’s administration. Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993 expanded UNOSOM II’s enforcement powers beyond the protection of humanitarian relief supplies to include the “consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia”. It also turned UNOSOM’s goal into “nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations”, according to Madeleine Albright. Having warded off starvation, the UN and the US were drawn into measures to prevent famine from returning.

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76 Shawcross, p. 88.
That meant disarming the factions whose internecine wars had disrupted the food supply. Beyond that, it also involved the formidable task of constructing a stable political order.78

III. The Beginning of the End

On 5 June 1993, with the death of 26 Pakistani peacemakers79, the UN experienced the highest number of deaths in a single day for a peacekeeping operation since its operation in the Congo in 196180. The Security Council swiftly passed Resolution 837, authorising the Secretary-General to “take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks”81. This had “no relevance to humanitarian peacemaking, nor its dubious ancillary – establishing a secure environment”82. The wanted posters around Mogadishu and the $25,000 offered for Aideed’s capture “was tantamount to a declaration of war against [his] militia”83 and gave weight to the Somali leader’s accusations of the UN’s ‘imperialist designs’84 and foreign occupation.

On 3 October 1993, in what has become known as the Olympia Hotel battle, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down, 73 soldiers were wounded, and 18 US Rangers were killed in a battle between the UN and Aideed’s forces. Hundreds of innocent civilians were also wounded and killed in this one incident. Media clips of the battered corpses of two dead American soldiers being paraded

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79 Shawcross, p. 120.
80 Peterson, p. 73.
83 Ibid.
84 Peterson, p. 72.
and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by angry mobs were aired across America.

**IV. Withdrawal**

Four days after the battle, Clinton made a speech in which he stated; “If we were to leave [Somalia] today...our own credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged... And all around the world, aggressors, thugs, and terrorist will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people”85. These fateful words would prove to be all too true in Somalia and in subsequent peace operations around the world. With this confrontation, support from the US Congress and the White House for UNOSOM II, and more importantly for UN peace operations in general, effectively ended. Clinton announced that the US would withdraw fully from Somalia by 31 March 1994. In February 1994, the Security Council revised UNOSOM II’s mandate to exclude the use of coercive force86 and just over a year later in March 1995, the operation was completely withdrawn from Somalia, without having restored peace to Somalia.

The UN withdrawal that ensued after the events of October 1993 demonstrate its inability to effectively impose order with force. Instead of acting as an impartial multinational force or setting a precedent87, the UN became “complicit in a record of inadequate protection, seemingly unnecessary casualties, and Vietnam-like escalation on the one hand and 1930s-style

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85 As quoted in Ohaegbulam, p. 108.
appeasement on the other.” However, as Thomas G. Weiss cautions, it is important to consider the UN’s shortcomings in Somalia not in isolation “but rather contextualised in light of other [deteriorating] efforts in northern Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda.” In other words, there was a high demand for UN peace operations in the early 1990s and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) was considerably overstretched and under-resourced to adequately meet the needs of all these conflicts.

Tragically, the Olympic Hotel battle “rather than Operation Restore Hope, was the measure by which global humanitarian peacemaking operations were now to be judged. This view was illustrated by the myopic shibboleth ‘the Somalia syndrome.’” Indeed, as John Drysdale rightly notes, “no differentiation was made by the international community between a benign form of peacemaking to carry out urgent humanitarian missions ... and the untrammelled exercise of peacemaking with a relentless and all-powerful armed engagement by air and on the ground.” As a result of this failure to distinguish between the two separate activities, and indeed the UN’s own inability to set the two apart, misconceptions arose regarding UN peacekeeping and peace-enforcement in general and regarding the UN operation in Somalia specifically.

88 Doyle, “Discovering the Limits,” in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 8.
91 Ibid.
Issues and Problems of Complex Peace Operations

The Somalia case study demonstrates a number of external and internal challenges facing the UN. Perceptions of these challenges led many to claim that the organisation was experiencing a “crisis in peacekeeping”92. Five key conceptual and practical challenges that have contributed to this crisis are identified and discussed in this section.

1. Chapter VII Operations: Peace-enforcement as Peacekeeping

In spite of theoretical differences, there exists a tendency to lump first-, second-, and third-generation peace operations together, both in rhetoric and in practice. The “grey area”, or what Olara Otunnu identifies as “the thin end of the enforcement wedge”93 between peace-enforcement and full-scale enforcement has caused many scholars to equate peace-enforcement with war-making94 or counter-insurgency95. The result has been to question its compatibility with the philosophy, functions, and design of peace operations and, by extension, the desirability of the militarisation of these missions. When traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian-based functions merge, the absence of a clear and effective framework or mechanism for responding to “the challenge of the grey zone”96 causes significant confusion and misunderstanding over the precise nature of the different types of peace operations in which the UN participates.

The tendency for operations to slide from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement to

94 Doyle, “Discovering the Limits,” in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 7.
war and back adds to this misunderstanding. Moreover, using the all-encompassing ‘peacekeeping’ term to refer to any and all of these types of missions has tarnished the successes of traditional UN peacekeeping. As the Somali rebel Aideed pointed out, “[t]he way the UN was acting [in Somalia] was so inhumane. They implanted the minds of Somalis with these declarations of human rights and freedoms then [carried out] such actions against humanity.”

II. Lack of Funding

The UN has attempted to provide humanitarian and developmental assistance both during and after civil wars. In the case of failed states, this duty commits the UN to a country until the time when a functioning government, preferably democratic, is able to replace it. This process necessitates substantial costs from donors. However, funding has long been a source of problems for the organisation and the increase in peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era heightened the deficit. Accordingly, while the Security Council launched the “largest and most complex peacekeeping missions in UN history”, the cost of peacekeeping rose from $635 million in 1989 to $3.3 billion by 1994. Unpaid peacekeeping costs also reached unprecedented levels, increasing from $444 million to nearly $1.3 billion. Although the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion earlier in 1962 that all member-states are legally

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97 Peterson, p. 99.
obliged to bear their share of peacekeeping costs\textsuperscript{100}, states continue to pay their peacekeeping assessments late or only partially. The US is currently the largest debtor to the UN and has therefore been a key player in the UN’s financial crisis\textsuperscript{101}, owing more than $1 billion to the peacekeeping, regular, and international tribunal budgets\textsuperscript{102}. According to the UN, this failure by member-states to pay these assessments “has, in effect, shifted the burden of peacekeeping onto those States which have not been reimbursed for essential personnel, equipment and other elements they have supplied”\textsuperscript{103}. As a result, paying states suffer strains on their respective domestic military and financial capacities.

This financial crisis within the DPKO specifically and the UN generally has reduced the available “ready capital”\textsuperscript{104}. The insufficient funding has not only placed a ceiling on the number and scope of possible operations, but has also severely hampered the department’s ability to mount timely and effective peace operations. The organisation’s inability to secure the necessary funds, or more accurately, member-states’ failure to provide the necessary funds, renders statements of support moot\textsuperscript{105} and extensive mandates senseless.

\textsuperscript{100} “United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping, "A Note on the Financial Crisis." Peacekeeping costs are currently measured in accordance with a formula that member-states establish with the UN. See United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Meeting New Challenges," for more information. Available at [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/eq.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/eq.htm)


\textsuperscript{104} Karns and Mingst, “Maintaining International Peace and Security,” in Klare and Thomas, p. 211.
III. Lack of Resources

The UN’s similar reliance on member-states for material resources, including military and civilian personnel, military and non-military equipment, and logistical support, is a dimension related to its financial problems. The rise in demand for peace operations in the early 1990s required a similar increase in both the willingness and ability of its member-states to contribute personnel, equipment, and logistical support. But these, like peacekeeping finances, were less forthcoming in the surge of more dangerous and complex peace support and peace-enforcement operations in Africa. The result has been a commitment gap that is specific to Africa alone106.

This reality does not negate the fact that the greater complexity and higher level of danger in contemporary African conflicts necessitate better trained and better equipped personnel. However, leaders of the world’s most capable armies have generally been unwilling to put their soldiers at risk. This has prompted more military units being drawn from countries with little or no UN peacekeeping experience or capability, leading “the United Nations [to send] some of the worst soldiers in the world off to situations where it can only hope they are not called on to actually do anything.”107 Consequently, the UN’s most capable members contribute least to mission areas where death tolls are highest and the UN’s role most critical108. Fear of “mission creep” and a lack of a clear

108 Jones, p. 22.
exit strategy augment the unwillingness of Western governments, and the US especially, to commit troops to UN peace support operations in Africa.

IV. Lack of Will

The fundamental driver behind the UN's financial and material deficiencies is its member-states' lack of political will to initiate and maintain missions. More specifically, it is members of the influential Security Council who have shown little interest in establishing or continuing peace operations in areas of minimal strategic significance such as Africa. Thus, the decision to intervene and how to intervene are political questions that are informed by different views of self-interest that guide the process. Although it is clear that the UN cannot attend to every rise on the conflict radar, its spotlight in the mid-1990s on the former Yugoslavia, driven by Western and European members, contrasted sharply with the total disregard of similar conditions in Burundi, Sudan, and Rwanda. Thus, the UN was actively engaged in finding solutions in a few countries around the world, while “[p]eace and security, the responsibilities of the United Nations, were absent in dozens of [them].”

Conclusion

From the end of the Cold War until 1993, the Security Council, building on initiatives of the United Kingdom (UK), had evolved toward what the US would later call a strategy of “assertive multilateralism”; a strategy that flourished from the Gulf War in January 1991 until the Olympia Hotel battle in October 1993.

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109 Shawcross, p. 42.
110 Doyle, "Discovering the Limits," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 4.
The UN-US joint operation in Somalia was the turning point in the surge of expectations of heightened UN activism that had come when the Cold War ended. In its aftermath, UN peacekeeping in Africa entered a new phase, where well-meaning ideals contrasted sharply with a lack of resources and an absence of political will and consensus among Security Council members. Instead of the anticipated international cooperation, the American experience in Somalia caused the White House and Congress to completely reverse its stated policy of collaboration with the UN, rendering the Security Council ineffectual to act in conflicts where American strategic interest did not call for action. As a result, the UN withdrew from many of its existing peace operations in Africa and ceased to intervene in conflicts there. Rwanda was to be the first casualty of this Western disengagement.
Chapter Three

Disengagement

This chapter looks briefly at the UN and French course of action in Rwanda’s brutal genocide of 1994 and examines the resulting lessons that were drawn. To this end, particular attention is given to the policy shifts within the US – and particularly the White House and the American Congress - and within the UN. It should be noted that the reassessment of the UN in general and UN peacekeeping specifically were not confined to the immediate aftermath of Somalia and Rwanda, as seen in PDD-25 and the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, but continued to occur more recently as well, evinced by reports such as the Brahimi Report of 2000. These primary documents are given special consideration within the climate of international re-evaluation and reflection in the mid-1990s.

Rwanda

The UN and US failure in Somalia led directly to international inaction a few months later in March 1994 in Rwanda, the setting of “the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century”\(^\text{112}\). An estimated 800,000 to one million people were killed within three months. In spite of indications “clear enough to anybody who cared to look”\(^\text{113}\) of a planned genocide against the moderate Hutu and Tutsi populations, Security Council members refused an

\(^{111}\) See Power, Samantha, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (New York: First Perennial, 2003); Gourevitch; Shawcross; and Peterson.

\(^{112}\) Power, p. 334.

\(^{113}\) Peterson, p. xix.
endeavour that could potentially require long-term financial, military, and political commitment. The US in particular, with its failure in Somalia still fresh, did not wish to risk the lives of its soldiers by committing to another mission in a politically unstable area of low strategic interest without a clear mandate or exit strategy. Thus, according to Samantha Power, “[t]he logical outgrowth of this fear was an effort to steer clear of Rwanda entirely and be sure others did the same.”¹¹⁴ The Clinton administration's new policy of inaction, codified in PDD-25, is widely believed to have been the main reason for the world's general inaction¹¹⁵, as the policy restricted American participation in UN-led peace operations and urged Washington to “persuade others not to undertake the missions that it [the US] wished to avoid.”¹¹⁶

As President Clinton had predicted in his speech four days after the Olympic Hotel battle, the violent death of 10 Belgian peacekeepers had been strategically executed by Rwanda’s génocidaires, who knew that “the record showed that such peacekeepers were generally cowardly, inclined to ‘watching as spectators’ when violence broke out”¹¹⁷. Their calculations were correct. Washington immediately demanded that UN peacekeepers be withdrawn from Rwanda¹¹⁸, then refused to authorise the deployment of UN reinforcements. Believing that another Somalia could not be afforded and hearing no American demands for intervention, President Clinton and his advisers knew that the military and political risks of involving the

¹¹⁴ Power, p. 366.
¹¹⁵ Power, p. 342.
¹¹⁶ Gourevitch, p. 150.
¹¹⁷ Gourevitch, p. 100.
¹¹⁸ Just one week later, certain member-states of the UN began pushing for the UN's return to Rwanda, as undeniable evidence of genocide began surfacing
United States in a bloody conflict in central Africa were great, yet there were no costs to avoiding Rwanda altogether.\textsuperscript{119} Similarly, it was believed that "the UN had more to lose by sending reinforcements and failing than by allowing the killings to proceed."\textsuperscript{120} According to Philip Gourevitch, this "desertion ... was Hutu Power's greatest diplomatic victory... and it [could] be credited almost single-handedly to the United States."\textsuperscript{121}

\textbf{I. Opération Turquoise}

On 22 June, 1994, as the genocide had begun to lull, the Security Council endorsed France's \textit{Opération Turquoise}\textsuperscript{122} with Chapter VII powers despite having denied UNAMIR this capacity for months. France, according to Power, was "perhaps the least appropriate country to intervene because of its warm relationship with the genocidal Hutu regime"\textsuperscript{123}. This sentiment was widely expressed throughout the international community due to France's reputation as the \textit{gendarme d'Afrique} and its neo-colonial strategy of \textit{la Francophonie}. Indeed, its connection with its former colonies has remained the strongest of all former colonial powers and Paris continues to view them as a natural extension of the motherland, intervening in at least nine other African countries\textsuperscript{124} in 30 instances since the 1960s\textsuperscript{125}. France had signed a military and training agreement

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{119} Power, p. 335.
\bibitem{120} Power, p. 384.
\bibitem{121} Gourevitch, p. 150.
\bibitem{123} Power, p. 380.
\end{thebibliography}
with Rwanda in 1975 and had been providing aid money to the Habyarimana regime since then. In 1998 it was revealed by *le mission d’information parlementaire française sur le Rwanda*\(^{126}\) that the French government had also provided diplomatic, financial, technical, and military support to the government during the genocide in spite of an arms embargo, as well as to the *Interhamwe* and the *Forces armées rwandaises* (FAR) who had carried out the genocide\(^{127}\).

These political connections between the Mitterand and Habyarimana regimes led Paris to naturally regard the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) with intense suspicion. From these dubious beginnings, the operation began just as the RPF approached Kigali. According to former French president Valéry d’Estaing, *Opération Turquoise* essentially “‘[protected] some of those who had carried out the massacres’”\(^{128}\) by providing a safe area for fleeing Hutus. To many observers, this episode demonstrated the French government’s complicity in the Hutu government’s genocidal campaign. As an UN-sanctioned operation, this questionable performance was perceived by many as yet another stage in the accumulating failure of UN peacekeeping in Africa in the early 1990s\(^{129}\).

**Lessons and Policy Changes after Somalia and Rwanda**

“The spectre of Somalia has loomed over every world crisis since mid-1993, inhibiting debate and limiting options.”\(^{130}\) The “need to maintain absolute

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\(^{126}\) The French Parliamentary Information Committee on Rwanda.


\(^{128}\) As quoted in Gourewich, p. 157.


\(^{130}\) Clarke, Walter, “Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates,” in Clarke and Herbst, p. 3.
neutrality in the face of all provocation for fear of becoming unwilling participants in a civil war”¹³¹, and the fear of crossing the “Mogadishu Line” reigned throughout the West in the mid-1990s. This section traces the changes that Somalia effected on peace operations in Africa. The policy re-orientation made in the US following its operation in Somalia is addressed first, as this had a significant bearing for the international community of states and for the UN. An examination of the tangible decrease of UN peace operations in Africa follows. Thirdly, general policy changes of the UN are examined, with specific reference to Boutros-Gali’s Supplement to An Agenda for Peace of 1995 and the Brahimi Report of 2000.

I. American Policy Changes

In Somalia’s aftermath, peace operations in Africa entered a bleak phase, as the West disengaged and isolated itself from the continent. Among the Western states, disenchantment towards the UN and peace operations “was both stronger and more genuinely felt in the US than was the case in either Britain or France”¹³². This was perhaps because, as Michael G. MacKinnon contends, “no other world leader did more to spread the belief in [the] possibility [of a new world order] than US President George Bush”¹³³. Clinton entered the White House continuing this sense of enthusiasm, “[taking] office better disposed toward peacekeeping than any other administration in US history.”¹³⁴ His administration gave indications of its commitment to reversing Republican

¹³³ MacKinnon, p. xiv.
¹³⁴ Power, p. 341.
policies and of a "new relationship towards Africa [that would] differ in important respects from the approach of the past twelve years."\textsuperscript{135}

However, the failed US mission in Somalia, guided by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine\textsuperscript{136}, laid the limits of its peacekeeping policy. The White House's fears of being entangled in the "messy imbroglios of foreigners"\textsuperscript{137} and Congress' obligation to foot one-third of a growing UN bill led to increased opposition to US participation in UN-led multilateral peace operations\textsuperscript{138}. Thus, in the words of a senior US official, "[n]ot to cross that notional [Mogadishu] line became the overriding determination of the Clinton administration everywhere in the world. ... 'Mogadishu' and 'Somalia' are not place names now – they are cautionary slogans for disasters to be avoided at all costs."\textsuperscript{139}

Insisting that the UN "learn to say no" after Somalia, Clinton's signature of approval on PDD-25 in May 1994 codified America's inaction in future UN peace operations. The directive outlines sixteen criteria that must be met for any international US military involvement. These include the necessity of clear objectives, "an endpoint for US participation", "acceptable" command and control arrangements, and the continued

\textsuperscript{135} Berdal, "Peacekeeping in Africa," in Furley and May, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{136} According to MacKinnon, despite UNITAF's humanitarian motives and aspects, the operation's limited task was very much in line with the Weinberger Doctrine, which had become the government's guiding policy for matters that were not central to national interests, such as peace operations, after attacks on Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. It later came to be known as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine.
\textsuperscript{138} Ohaegbulam, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{139} As quoted in Shawcross, p. 122.
support of Congress and the American people\textsuperscript{140}. Furthermore, US participation can only be undertaken if it advances national interests\textsuperscript{141}. Should a mission not threaten American interests, the US should also bring other states in line with their policy by persuading them not to undertake the mission\textsuperscript{142}.

\section*{II. Evidence of Retreat}

Afflicted by US disinterest and recalibration after the twin failures of Somalia and Rwanda, the number of UN peace operations in Africa dropped significantly from the earlier part of the decade. Between 1989 and 1993, 55\% of the UN’s new peace operations were launched in Africa, but between 1994 and 1997, the number dipped to 15\% despite continued conflicts\textsuperscript{143}. In 1991, UN peacekeeping personnel numbered at around 14,000 while the budget was approximately \$400 million USD\textsuperscript{144}. These figures soared the following year, and continued to increase until 1993, when personnel reached a height of 78,000 personnel supported by a budget of \$3.6 billion USD\textsuperscript{145}. Although there were eighteen operations running in 1994, this number dropped substantially in 1995.


\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{142} Gourevitch, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{143} Between 1989 and 1993, ten of the eighteen operations began in Africa; between 1994 and 1997, only two of the fifteen operations were in Africa. See UNDPKO website for information.


\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
and by July 1998, UN personnel numbered only 8,000 while its budget had shrunk to $1 billion USD for 15 operations of which only four were in Africa.146

Although there began a slow resurgence of peace operations in Africa in 1998, beginning with missions in the CAR, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the UN was noticeably absent from Africa for five years until 1999. The robust United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) that year signalled the beginning of the UN’s return. It became the largest UN peace operation of its time in 2002, with close to 18,000 troops deployed. In 2000, seven new UN peace operations began after a prolonged absence. Five of these took place in Africa and remain there at the time of writing. These numbers offer striking evidence of the empirical effects of the UN’s experience in Somalia and the subsequent US pullout. Equally significant are the UN “policy” changes that took place in the five years between 1994 and 1998.

III. Policy Changes at the UN

The overall effects of Somalia and Rwanda were disastrous for the organisation’s moral authority, legitimacy, and credibility. Brian Atwood contends that “each time UN forces are successfully challenged or overwhelmed by those who oppose a peace mandate, serious damage is done to the United Nations.”147 The widespread demands calling for the reform of the UN are an outgrowth of this damage. Though delayed and haphazard, UN and NATO actions in Yugoslavia nevertheless contrast sharply with the international

community’s avoidance of similar circumstances in Africa occurring at the time and even with its involvement in Somalia. This disparity led then-Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to accuse the Security Council of “fighting a rich man’s war in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger to Somalia...”

i) Supplement to An Agenda for Peace

In the aftermath of Somalia, and while the UN struggled with problems in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Haiti, Secretary-General Boutros-Gali “trimmed his sails and recommended caution about the UN’s security role”.

His Supplement to An Agenda for Peace was issued in January 1995 in recognition of the over-ambition laid out in An Agenda for Peace, which had proven untenable in the conflicts of the post-Cold War world and with shrinking Western interests in those areas. The Supplement made a case for scaling back from peace operations requiring the use of force. Boutros-Gali acknowledged that “neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose [enforcement action], except perhaps on a very limited scale.”

He acknowledged that the UN’s financial and military capacity, including its ability to respond rapidly, required vast improvement for operations trying to address the political causes of failed states, genocide, or civil war through force. The Secretary-General continued that “it would be folly to attempt to [develop such a capacity] at the present time when the Organisation is resource-starved and hard..."
pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peacekeeping responsibilities entrusted to it."\(^{152}\)

**ii) The Brahimi Report**

Five years later, in August 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations issued a report “about how to do peace operations better within the structural parameters and constraints of the current global order”\(^{153}\) at the request of the Secretariat. The Brahimi Report provided an assessment of the shortcomings of the existing system and gave "specific recommendations for change"\(^{154}\). An aspect of the UN’s peacekeeping problems as identified by the Panel is the disparity between the rhetorical desire of member-states to do something when confronted with an emergency and what is actually provided. The Report therefore urges:

> Member States [to] recognise that the United Nations is the sum of its parts and accept that the primary responsibility for reform lies with them. The failures of the United Nations are not those of the Secretariat alone... Most occurred because the Security Council and the Member States crafted and supported ambiguous, inconsistent and under-funded mandates and then stood back and watched as they failed\(^{155}\).

This dynamic is named as the cause for many of the problems experienced by UN peace operations through the 1990s and is surely one of the reasons for the greater vulnerability of UN peacekeepers, as witnessed in Sierra Leone. Related to this issue is the organisation’s fundamental inability to project credible force,

\(^{152}\) Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 77.


which is demonstrated through its inability to deploy complex peace operations rapidly and efficiently, to sustain these efforts, and to support them with force when necessary. The Panel concludes that “no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force.”

Thus, where conflict continues, the report highlights that the UN and peacekeepers require “clear, credible, and resourced Security Council mandates.” If these are lacking, even ragtag rebels, as witnessed in Somalia and Sierra Leone, can “wreak havoc with missions and with the very concept of preventing and reducing conflict by limited intervention.” Therefore, part of the problem lies with member-states, who fail to provide the necessary “clear, strong, and sustained political support” for the mandates they themselves pass.

**Conclusion**

General Roméo Dallaire made no secret of his belief that Rwanda’s genocide could have been avoided had the international community intervened earlier and more effectively. However, rather than proactively prevent such tragedies from reoccurring, the US actively avoided embroiling itself in Africa’s conflicts. This American fear of engagement in African conflicts in the aftermath of Somalia led the international community’s inaction, perhaps better described as its bad action. There were evident policy shifts both within the US and the UN

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159 Ibid.
as a result. The Clinton administration turned away from assertive multilateralism to political inaction codified in PDD-25, while the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Gali’s Supplement to An Agenda for Peace recommended caution and called for a scaling back of the scope of operations previously outlined in An Agenda for Peace. Thus, for the latter half of the 1990s, peace operations in Africa suffered and Africans were obliged to tend to their own problems.
Chapter Four
Developments in West Africa’s Security Landscape

The UN’s inability to effectively manage conflicts, as witnessed in Somalia and Rwanda, led many to question its capability to maintain security in Africa in the post-Cold War era. Thus, peacekeeping, as the UN’s conflict management tool of choice, was also brought into question. This occurred at a crucial time at the end of the Cold War when the UN needed, but failed, to consolidate its legitimacy in the face of complex peace operations. In Africa in particular, a number of regional and sub-regional organisations filled the security vacuum left by the UN. This has occurred as part of a general proliferation of actors in Africa’s security framework. This chapter examines the growing trend of Africa’s regional and sub-regional organisations implementing peace and security responsibilities in their own neighbourhoods. Specific reference is made to ECOWAS efforts in the region, which provide general indications of aspects of regional peacekeeping within the context of Africa’s mechanisms for regional security.

The Regionalisation of Peace Operations

During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were able to suppress most violent conflict either through the threat of, or actual direct military intervention. Thus, regional organisations and their security mechanisms were contained by the interests of the US or the Soviet Union, which they ultimately served. The Cold War’s end gave new opportunities for regional efforts and
provided the political space in which they could freely act and seek to control their own strategic direction.

It should be noted that the basis for regional peacekeeping extends from the UN Charter itself, which describes the nature of the relationship between regional organisations and the UN in Chapter VIII\(^6\). Article 52 charges regional arrangements to make "every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes" before referring them to the Security Council and encourages the Council to promote such regional initiatives. An Agenda for Peace also describes the possibility for a division of labour between the UN and regional organisations and virtually all policy analyses of multilateralism since have emphasised this division of labour\(^6\). As a result, the visibility and possibility of regional security efforts was raised significantly.

**Terminology**

Although Chapter VIII of the Charter is devoted to regional arrangements, it does not provide a precise definition of a regional arrangement. This was deliberate in order to allow for greater flexibility for groups of states wanting to maintain regional peace and security\(^6\), however it has created debate over conceptual definitions. The Charter provides little guideline for such a debate and its ambiguity allows for a range of definitions for a region, which may be based on economics, ideology, culture, or geopolitics. Defence arrangements

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\(^6\) Although the Charter preserves the authority of the universal organisation, Article 52 declares that "[n]othing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security ... provided that [they are] consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations".

\(^6\) Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, p. 19.

\(^6\) Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 62.
such as NATO and economic arrangement such as the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) may all be considered regional arrangements under Chapter VIII. Thus, regional or sub-regional groupings approved by the UN qualify as such.

For the purposes of this paper, the terms regional organisation or arrangement are used with reference to organisations with formal and/or organisational infrastructures that are responsible for implementing a regional or sub-regional arrangement between governments. The focus is therefore on inter-state cooperation. For the purpose of succinctness, the sub-regional level remains at times undifferentiated where this distinction is deemed unnecessary and where the more general regional term is sufficient or appropriate. The regionalisation of peace operations refers to the regional responses to regional conflicts, where wars spill over national borders, drawing in or impinging on neighbouring states. In West Africa, this latter issue is most significant, as conflicts in the region have frequently crossed national boundaries to surrounding states, which has set off considerable regional efforts at peace.

**Advantages of Regional Peace Efforts**

The tension between the concepts of regionalism and universalism is an old one, which gives weight to the advantages and disadvantages that each carries. Indeed, regional peace operations may succeed or fail for many of the

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164 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, p. 21.
166 Ibid.
same reasons as UN missions. However, they offer some advantages unique to their regional status. Firstly, regional arrangements have a greater incentive to react to conflict because states bordering a country in conflict are more immediately affected by the destabilising consequences of war. These neighbouring states receive and accommodate refugees, as well as manage the political, social, and economic repercussions. The ensuing instability can greatly hamper the region’s economic development and can therefore generate political will to manage conflict more easily than a non-neighbouring state unaffected by the fighting.

Secondly, the argument is made that geographic proximity facilitates a faster and less expensive response to crises, making peace operations also more easily sustained from nearby. Flowing from this proximity is a greater knowledge and understanding of local cultures, languages, and customs, making regional organisations better-suited to build consensus and to act with sensitivity than an outside multinational force. Thus, familiarity with the region, culture, conflict dynamics, and conflict resolution practices lends a natural legitimacy to regional efforts. In addition, political leaders within a region are able to cultivate and foster relationships that make diplomacy both easier and more likely. Decisions made in these circumstances increase the possibility that a resolution may be reached and maintained in the long term. ECOWAS’ rapid response to emergencies in West Africa validates the proximity argument favouring regional security initiatives. A third important element aiding the success of regional

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peace operations is their ability to secure the support of neighbouring third party states. Diehl typifies these third-party states as neighbouring states to the conflict, states allied with the combatants, or extra-regional states with a vested interest in the outcome of a conflict.168

Fourthly, because there is less of a need to follow global precedents in a regional context, regional organisations are afforded a flexibility that the UN does not possess. In addition, “regional procedures are more likely to give the ‘have-nots’ of the UN a voice they are denied by the alleged elitist orientation of Security Council decision making.”169 In this sense, regional institutions and efforts can be a significant source of empowerment for regions that are under-represented or marginalised in the global order.

**Disadvantages of Regional Peace Operations**

Despite these logical conceptual advantages favouring regional arrangements and their conflict management efforts, many argue that the optimism for a regionalised framework for peace operations is in fact misplaced. The shortcomings are less a reflection of principles and more an outgrowth of empirical issues that plague the less-developed regions of the world and their respective organisations. For although regional conflict management efforts have had some success through regional organisations where membership is

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composed of wealthier states, such as NATO, it is the less-endowed regions, such as Africa, that expose the challenges of the regionalisation of conflict management.

Firstly, Jean-Marie Guéhenno highlights the UN’s “unique legitimacy” that is incomparable, as its “charter is accepted by all countries around the world.” Thus, “there is a universality of the UN that is irreplaceable.” Others are concerned that the “division of labour” could serve to erode the UN’s universality and ultimately its legitimacy, raising questions as to whether devolution is in fact desirable. However, it is clear that this same, or a similar, legitimacy is unlikely to be attained through a regional organisation. Furthermore, most regional actors support an “UN-first approach, as this provides a check on the possible misuse of hegemonic power”.

Vested interests in the outcome of a dispute or of a peace operation, prior commitment to one side, and the possibility of gains can make it difficult for regional interveners to act impartially or to be perceived as such. These political ambitions can make regional intervention unwelcome. Thus, although regional organisations have the advantage of proximity to conflicts and knowledge of issues, they are also more likely to suffer from conflicting national interests as there are “simultaneous considerations of absolute gain (stability) and relative gain (power).” Dennis Jett therefore contends that third-party states are in a

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172 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
better position to undermine a peace operation than they are to facilitate its success by, for example, providing arms and support to one or more of the factions. Consequently, regional actors are often perceived as partial or biased by belligerents, particularly where there is a history or the slightest reason for suspicion of predisposition. However, according to Dennis Jett, these states

A third cause for concern is the historical weakness demonstrated by regional organisations in their dealings with civil war, the greatest outgrowth of the Cold War’s end. Many leaders of developing states in Africa, as well as the former Soviet bloc and China, continue to view their domestic affairs as their own concern and accord other leaders the same consideration, adhering to traditional notions of sovereignty to avoid setting legal precedents that would sanction external regional involvement in their internal affairs. This tendency has perpetuated corrupt and despotic leadership, nepotism, and cronyism at the expense of a country’s economic, social, and political development.

Fourthly, the message sent by encouraging undemocratic or weak states to assist in maintaining security for other undemocratic or weak states is a questionable practice. As Diehl highlights, “collective security actions are designed to protect or restore the status quo in the event of an outbreak of violent conflict.” However, this requires that there be consensus on what the status quo is, and restoring democracy in a neighbouring country while one’s own situation is in disorder weakens the legitimacy of peace efforts. Nigeria’s

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leadership of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia while under Ibrahim Babangida’s military rule provides an example.

A fifth matter concerns the presence and potential influence of a regional hegemon within a regional organisation. Such a situation gives rise to what Adekeye Adebajo calls ‘hegemonic peacekeeping’, where a powerful state with global or regional interests is able bear a greater military and financial weight than other less powerful states in a multilateral intervention. According to Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system theory, hegemony means more than mere leadership but less than outright empire. Thus, although this dominance of one state over another is not achieved purely by force but rather requires some degree of consent from the subordinate states, these circumstances allow the regional hegemon to “exert disproportionate influence over military and political decisions regarding [a] mission” in a multilateral peacekeeping context.

Nigeria’s leadership status and role in West Africa’s peace operations provides an example of hegemonic peacekeeping, as its leaders were able to advance the country’s goals through political pressure on other ECOWAS members.

A sixth argument against regional peace operations draws on the non-conformity of many of these missions with the procedures set out in the UN Charter. ECOWAS’s actions in response to Liberia’s conflict in 1990, 2003, and to the war in Sierra Leone in 1997 were all undertaken without Security Council

178 As referred to in Ferguson, Niall, “Hegemony or Empire?” Foreign Affairs 82:5 (September/October 2003). Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901fareviewessay82512/niall-ferguson/hegemony-or-empire.html
approval. The Council did not condemn these breaches of protocol, nor was there much international debate over these actions, in sharp contrast to the international uproar generated by NATO’s unauthorised intervention in Kosovo. This raises perceptions that a Security Council mandate is unnecessary and hence concerns over the marginalisation of the UN. Moreover, it projects the notion that the lack of international and Council attention requires regional organisations to respond to crises with or without authorisation simply because no one else will.

The last point relates to Africa’s regional and sub-regional organisations and their member-states in particular. African countries’ willingness to participate in UN and multinational peace operations has dramatically increased in recent years. Prior to 1988, only 12 had contributed personnel to a UN peacekeeping operation. Since 1999, 29 countries have contributed to one or multiple UN operations. This involvement extends to Western-led multinational missions as well, in which African countries have participated in all but one that have received UN authorisation since 1990. In spite of this experience that has been gained, one cannot conclude that African states have the financial, logistical, or organisational capability to undertake peace operations independently or in a coordinated manner in a regional capacity.

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183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
Moreover, because the organisational, military, and financial requirements of a regional peace operation are similar, if not the same, as at the global level, these weaknesses experienced by the UN are only magnified at the regional level. Organisationally, the proper rules, procedures, structural mechanisms to direct and implement peace operations are often insufficient or lacking altogether among Africa’s organisations. Many regional peace operations are organised on an ad hoc basis, which undermines any possible deterrent effect and jeopardises any defensive action that might be needed. In addition, regional organisations have fewer states from which to draw resources and contributions, which places a larger share of the burden on each participating state. Where countries are already impoverished, as in Africa, this is an immense obstacle to overcome. The limited number of personnel trained in peacekeeping techniques and approaches amongst most regional groupings worsens this problem. The majority of African states have small, ill-equipped, poorly-led, and poorly-trained armed forces (by international peacekeeping standards) that emphasise internal security. This operational, logistical, and financial reality helps to explain the comparatively low quality of peace operations between African and Western regional organisations.

More specifically, in West Africa, it cannot be ignored that 10 of ECOWAS’ sixteen member-states are ranked among the 30 least developed countries in the world according to the UN Development Programme’s Human Development

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Diehl, “Regional Conflict Management,” in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 47.

Index of 2005\textsuperscript{188}. This limits ECOWAS' structural and organisational capability as well as its ability to project effective military power and makes it extremely reliant on the few economically developed and powerful states within the organisation. Indeed, NATO is an “unusual circumstance”\textsuperscript{189}, as it remains the only regional security organisation militarily capable of launching and sustaining complex peace support and peace-enforcement missions. This regional discrepancy makes it extremely unlikely that Africa’s regional organisations will successfully undertake complex peace operations in their neighbourhoods without external support.

The Security Council’s permanent members have shown more enthusiasm to invest in the regionalisation of international peace and security than in the UN’s collective structures. Michael Pugh observes that although successive US administrations have supported regional initiatives, they have in reality been more interested in effective power projection – hence Washington’s post-Cold War focus on assertive multilateralism, coalitions, and pivotal and anchor states\textsuperscript{190}. In this context, regionalisation quickly becomes a façade for harnessing regions to a hegemonic agenda and what Pugh calls “proxy policing”\textsuperscript{191}. Whether this is true will not be argued here, however such arguments should be considered when examining the regionalisation of peace operations, as it


\textsuperscript{189} Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, p. 22.


\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
provides a possible motive for international rhetoric and actual support for regional initiatives in Africa.

Despite these obvious limitations, many hope that Africa’s regional organisations will execute and fund peace operations in their regions where the UN Security Council can and will not. In an effort to achieve this reality, a variety of assistance programmes have been created since 1990 aimed at providing technical and financial assistance as well as military training for African states. The general aim of America’s African Contingency Operations and Training Programme (ACOTA)\textsuperscript{192}, France’s *Renforcement de la Capacité de la Maintien de la Paix* (RECAMP), and Britain’s Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) is to increase the capacity for African states to carry out their own peace operations. These permanent members of the Security Council hope that building this capability will “obviate their military presence or intervention in African conflicts”\textsuperscript{193}. All are part of ‘constructive disengagement’\textsuperscript{194}, though their methods and approaches differ considerably.

In 1998 the International Peace Academy (IPA) noted that these “oft-trumpeted international initiatives are usually very minimal in impact and quite

\textsuperscript{192} Previously known as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). In 2004 President George W. Bush announced the creation of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to which ACOTA would be subsumed. The programme’s goal is to increase the capabilities of militaries in areas such as human rights, interaction with civil society, international law, military staff skills, and small unit operations and to train forty thousand troops by 2010 with a projected budget of $650 million. See United States Government, Department of State, “Key U.S. Government Assistance Programs for Africa,” Washington, D.C., 15 June 2005. Available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2005/47996.htm

\textsuperscript{193} Ohaegbulam, p. 238.

marginal in funding". Eric Berman and Katie Sams concur, stating that these programmes have been “relatively insignificant” and offer “too little, too late.” Sponsoring countries have thus placed a greater emphasis on “training the trainer” in recent years with the view that this provides a more sustainable platform for continued training after the programmes are finished. Although Western officials have tried to temper such scepticism, “[t]he general perception is that, instead of the international community striving to complement African [regional] efforts, endeavours are being made to supplant them.” Moreover, their fundamental flaw lies in their inability to fill West African states’ basic lack of logistical and administrative capability to effectively launch the multi-dimensional peace operations that are required to manage the complex conflicts in its region. They are mere short-term solutions based on donor countries’ perceptions of what is needed by the recipients. The programmes also demonstrate the tendency among Western states to seek quick fixes and short-term solutions to overwhelmingly complex problems. This top-down approach to military assistance legitimately breeds concern among West African leaders about the motivation and interests of the programmes’ creators.

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States have thus approached the initiatives with uncertainty, caution, and suspicion, advocating instead 'African solutions for African problems'.

**Conclusion**

In a region that has seen significant political instability in a short 17 years, ECOWAS has tried to assume some of the responsibilities for maintaining peace and security at a time when the UN was unwilling or unable to. However, the unique advantages of regional organisations – their geographic proximity, their greater understanding of the cultural subtleties, and their greater flexibility to act and react quickly to crises – must be considered against the other difficulties they encounter: legitimacy issues, complex relations among member-states, the propensity to protect traditional notions of sovereignty, the influence of regional hegemons, and perceived competition with the UN. African regional organisations in particular face significant financial, military, and logistical shortcomings that their more developed counterparts do not, which not only further constrains their ability to respond to crises effectively, but also leads to varying quality of responses to such crises across the globe.

In West Africa in the 1990s, ECOWAS effectively immersed itself in a similar situation to that of the UN in the early 1990s, becoming entangled in complex regional civil wars while attempting to keep, enforce, and make peace. In spite of the strong political will to act among the majority of ECOWAS members, regional political dynamics constricted the organisation’s ability to act efficiently, while organisational, financial, and military deficiencies were more

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200 Ohaegbulam, p. 235.
limited, and thus even more accentuated, than in the global context. This served to complicate and impair ECOWAS’ efforts to bring peace to West Africa.
Chapter Five
The Cases: ECOWAS, the UN, and Major Powers in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire

West Africa has seen a number of conflicts in the last two decades that have torn the region apart. ECOWAS has been especially willing to undertake peace operations in these conflicts and has actively done so when no other actor showed the resolve.

This chapter examines the relations among ECOWAS, the UN, and external powers through three cases involving these actors: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. In examining each case, background to the civil war is given as a contextual base to the interventions. As each conflict possessed their own individual dimensions, each case is examined somewhat differently; however, the ECOWAS, UN, and, where applicable, external interventions are examined with respect to their peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peacemaking functions. General information on ECOWAS and the development of its security arm is also provided.

It should be noted that the discussion of Liberia focuses primarily on the earlier UN operation there, with particular attention to the unilateral efforts of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990. Being the earliest conflict analysed, the Liberia civil war took place years before Western disengagement or its trigger event, Somalia, and of efforts in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. Although it received far less publicity than Somalia, its significance lies in the fact that it was the international community and the UN’s first notable demonstration of its lack of will to act in an internal
conflict in Africa in the immediate post-Cold War era. In addition, it was notably
the first instance of a sub-regional organisation taking military action in a state,
with the UN in a supporting role.

**West Africa’s Conflicts**

West Africa today, locked in an intricate cycle of economic poverty,
protracted conflicts, and state failure, is one of the poorest regions in the world
according to the 2005 Human Development Index. In this context,
competition for control over mineral-rich soils has been a common dynamic in
many of the region’s wars, particularly in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean cases.
Rebel leaders financed their wars and simultaneously enriched themselves
through the acquisition and plundering of natural resources. This personal gain,
rather than a coherent political ideology, has driven the majority of the rebel
leaders to war. At the heart of the problem is the inability of the state to
exercise political control over its respective territories and over the means of
violence within its borders. The UN’s response to such conflicts in Africa was
negligible in the 1990s. Although its presence there has progressively become
more robust, as demonstrated by the Sierra Leonean and Ivorian cases, it was the
world organisation’s failure to act in Liberia that first prompted ECOWAS to
intervene. Its monitoring group, ECOMOG, was improvised and has since
evolved into the sub-regional organisation’s security arm that it is today.

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201 See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Index 2005.
202 Adebayo, Adekeye, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 47.
ECOWAS

ECOWAS was founded on 28 May 1975 by 16 West African states to promote the region’s economic cooperation and integration “in all fields of economic activity” in order to “maintain and enhance economic stability” and to “foster relations among member-states.” Although not conceived as a security organisation, ECOWAS had begun to take steps as early as 1978 towards conflict management with the adoption of the Protocol on Non-Aggression and the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence two years later. The latter made provisions for managing conflict within the sub-region, but these had yet to be implemented at the time of ECOWAS' first peacekeeping expedition in Liberia in 1990.

On 10 December 1999, ECOWAS heads of state endorsed an elaborate proposal, establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, which transformed ECOMOG into a permanent stand-by force. Drawing on ECOMOG’s experiences in Liberia and two years in Sierra Leone, its stated objectives were to “prevent, manage, and resolve internal and inter-state conflict, ... strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, [and] the control of cross-border crime...” and to “maintain and consolidate peace, security, and

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203 In 2000, Mauritania withdrew its membership, bringing ECOWAS' membership down to 15.
204 ECOWAS, Treaty of ECOWAS, Chapter 2 Article 3. Available at http://www.ecowas.int/
stability.”

The Mechanism thus sought to streamline the organisation and to expand its security-providing activities.

To achieve these aims, the Mechanism called for the creation of a Mediation and Security Council, a Defence and Security Council, and a Council of Elders aimed at streamlining the organisation and expanding its security-providing activities. Although a strict relationship was not delineated, the AU and the UN were to be kept informed of decisions made within ECOWAS. However, the Mechanism creates an Observation and Monitoring Centre within the Secretariat, which is to collaborate with the AU, the UN, and other relevant organisations as part of an early-warning system.

In doing so, it aimed to keep the AU and the UN informed of all its decisions, although guidelines to a relationship with these organisations were not delineated. An early-warning system is also incorporated into the Mechanism, which foresees some collaboration with the AU, the UN, and other relevant organisations through an Observation and Monitoring Centre within the ECOWAS Secretariat. The powers of the Executive Secretary are also broadened, allowing him to “initiate actions for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security in the sub-region [through] fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict.”

Significantly, the Mechanism appoints a Special Representative for each ECOMOG operation who is “responsible for the political orientation of the

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208 ECOWAS, Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, article 15.
mission” through the direction of peacekeeping activities, the initiation of diplomatic negotiations, and coordination of activities between ECOWAS and international organisations. This measure was taken from lessons learned in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where military commanders, unskilled in diplomacy, often haphazardly directed both the military and political aspects of the missions, to the detriment of the operation. As for the troops themselves, the Mechanism calls for the creation of a fully-equipped stand-by force capable of deploying at short notice. All 15 ECOWAS member-states pledge one battalion each towards the ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG), whose activities will range from preventive deployment, humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, to the control of trans-border crimes in intra- and inter-state conflicts.

The ECOWAS Mechanism is significant because it recognises the organisation’s need for a much-needed framework for the management of sub-regional conflicts. But, as the UN itself has struggled to implement and fund such an elaborate security system, it is not surprising that the ECOWAS Mechanism has encountered various difficulties. Firstly, it is important to note that the Mechanism makes no conceptual differentiation between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Although it may seem an academic debate, the lack of such a distinction raises questions over the potential for abuse of the mechanism by autocratic leaders.

Secondly, the Mechanism does little to address the internal politics of the region or the organisation. In West Africa’s regional collective security context,

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209 ECOWAS, Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, article 32.
210 ECOWAS, Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, chapters VI–X.
which is divided between French- and English-speaking countries cross-sectioned by varying informal alliances between leaders and the search for a regional balance of power between Nigeria and France, there is the potential that an operation be blocked by partisan interests at the expense of the interests of the greater region. This issue will need to be resolved for the ECOWAS Mechanism to function efficiently.

Thirdly, in light of the internal economic and political state of the majority of West African states and of ECOWAS’ own financial and military realities, the Mechanism is extremely ambitious. The system of funding as described in the Mechanism, which relies on a combination of funds from ECOWAS’ annual budget, special requests, and voluntary contributions made from the UN, the OAU, and other international groups, does little to correct ECOMOG’s previous ad hoc funding difficulties as experienced in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The scheme is only exacerbated by troop-contributing states being asked to pay for the first three months of a peace operation, with the costs incurred to be refunded by ECOWAS within a maximum period of six months. This is highly unrealistic given that only four members, Nigeria, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, have contributed regularly to the ECOWAS budget. To date, the implementation of the ECOWAS Mechanism has been slow. Its measures were only partially operational when civil war erupted in Côte d’Ivoire.

When the Liberian conflict exploded, ECOWAS had no procedural guideline or security framework. It improvised ECOMOG, which remained in

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211 ECOWAS, Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, chapter VII.

212 Adebajo, “The ECOWAS Security Mechanism.”
Liberia for eight years in a first attempt by an African sub-regional organisation to take military action in a member-state overtaken by civil war. However, its efforts were unable to prevent the violence and instability from spilling over into Liberia's neighbouring countries, with Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal also falling prey to internal protracted fighting. In Sierra Leone, ECOWAS responded to the civil war in 1997 following Nigeria's unilateral intervention. Its operation there preceded the UN's substantial, and successful, peacekeeping and peace-building mission. However, as the violence was dissipating in Liberia and Sierra Leone, war erupted in Côte d'Ivoire when it suffered its first military coup. Although the civil war has remained relatively contained, there are fears that the fall of the prosperous and stable heart of West Africa could again destabilise the entire region. Thus, concerted efforts have been made towards bringing security to the region in recent years. Together, the three neighbouring countries examined - Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire - provide the setting for 10 ECOWAS and UN peace operations in the last 17 years.

Liberia

I. The Civil War – A Summary

Civil war in Liberia began in December 1989 when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a rebel group under the leadership of Charles Taylor, invaded the northeast of Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire, ushering in a 16 year civil war. Ethnic violence became widespread, leading to 200,000 deaths and close to a million refugees fleeing to neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana, and Nigeria.

ECOWAS was able to stop the wanton killing of innocent civilians and to establish sufficient order in Monrovia to allow for the return of humanitarian agencies. However, the peace-enforcement and peacemaking processes were marred by inexperience, division between member-states, and perceptions of ECOMOG being a vehicle for Nigeria's hegemonic policy. The UN was needed to lend legitimacy and support. Its involvement, though three years after ECOMOG's, was crucial to ending the war in 1997. However, the peace was short-lived as violence again erupted two years later and the country once again saw the presence of ECOMOG and UN forces, which remain at the time of writing. Democratic elections were held in October and November 2005.

II. History and Conflict Dynamics

i) Settlement, Colonialism, and Ethnic Tension

\[\text{Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 43.}\]
Liberia was established following its settlement by freed American slaves in 1821. The Americo-Liberian settlers replicated the exploitative relationship from which they had been liberated and came to dominate the modern sector of the economy and the government at the expense of Liberia’s majority indigenous population. The social system came to be based “on a paternalistic ideology of the civilising mission or ‘the westernised black man’s burden’”\textsuperscript{216} so that, over time, “correlations began to develop between ethnicity, class, and social mobility”\textsuperscript{217}. This created a situation where “ethnic grievances [were] never too far from the surface, and ... therefore always available for politicians to exploit.”\textsuperscript{218}

The Americo-Liberians governed Liberia from independence until April 1980, when Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, of the Krahn tribe, overthrew William Tolbert’s regime. Doe promptly suspended the constitution and assumed dictatorial powers, alienating the indigenous population as well as the Americo-Liberians by favouring his own tribe. He implemented repressive policies and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) committed atrocities against citizens in his name. In strongly contested elections held in 1985, Doe was elected president of Liberia.

ii) The ‘Historical’ Motherland

The elections that brought Doe into the presidency were applauded by the US, Liberia’s most significant foreign supporter. Indeed, the ‘special relationship’ between the US and Liberia can be traced to its settlement. The US had extended diplomatic support since the 1800s and Liberia adopted a constitution and a flag

\textsuperscript{217} Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., “Regional Organisations,” p. 265.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
modelled on those of the US while its capital, Monrovia, was named after US President James Monroe. The US has gained considerably from this relationship, acquiring a million acres of Liberian land for the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, establishing the world’s largest rubber plantation, and for the construction of Pan-Am’s Roberts Field. In 1959 a mutual defence pact was signed. During the Cold War, Liberia was Africa’s largest single recipient of American financial and military aid, which totalled $278 million between 1962 and 1980. This amount increased under Reagan’s tenure, during which $500 million a year was donated between 1981 and 1985. Due to these factors indicating a special relationship, many Liberians looked to the US for military assistance and expected this to be offered. It was not. As war broke out, the US did not intervene to aid Doe and this provided Charles Taylor, of Americo-Liberian descent, with the opportunity to launch his rebellion. He did this with a small band of Libyan-trained rebels, invading from Côte d’Ivoire on 24 December 1989. With support from neighbouring states and a large section of Liberia’s opposition, Taylor’s NPFL quickly gained in popularity among ordinary Liberians due to the repressive nature of the Doe regime.

iii) Regional Dynamics

Personal and strategic alliances complicated resolution efforts to Liberia’s conflict. The Anglophone-Francophone rivalry, as illustrated by Côte d’Ivoire's...

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219 Roberts Field became a major World War I transit point for US soldiers and their Allied operations in North African and southern Europe.


221 Ofuaye-Kodjoe, “Regional Organisations,” p. 269.

and Nigeria, reveals some of the problems of regional conflict intervention. Ivorian president Félix Houphouët-Boigny supported Taylor out of his own personal animosity towards Doe, whom he blamed for the death of his son-in-law. However, strategic calculations also came into play, as Côte d’Ivoire, with substantial French support, sought to counterbalance what it saw as Nigeria’s hegemonic and Anglophone designs within the region, which had been growing since the 1970s. Burkina Faso also provided support to Taylor in the form of troops and facilities for the shipment of military supplies.

Doe, on the other hand, had “nurtured something of a special relationship with West Africa’s regional hegemon, Nigeria”, which had provided material support to his regime at the beginning of the conflict. In helping his friend and ally, President Babangida saw it as a means of “keeping out a protégé of Houphouët’s”, whom he viewed as an extension of Paris promoting the anti-Nigerian attitude prominent among West Africa’s Francophone states. Nigeria sought to minimise such external influence. In addition, its objective of establishing itself as the regional, and potentially the continental, hegemon was its inspiration for leading ECOMOG. However, it was Nigeria’s relations with Doe that led Taylor’s NPFL to view ECOWAS as a biased intervener.

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223 This rivalry dates back to Côte d’Ivoire’s military assistance to, and recognition of, the Biafra secession, which occurred during the Nigerian civil war from 1967 to 1970.
224 Houphouët-Boigny’s son-in-law had been arrested with President Tolbert and was later murdered in jail by Doe’s forces.
226 MacQueen, p. 176.
230 See Adebajo, “Hegemonic Peacekeeping” for further information.
Perceptions of Nigeria hegemonic aims only aggravated this and discredited ECOMOG's efforts.

III. International Inaction

Preoccupied with the Gulf War, and then later with operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the international community lent limited support to peace efforts in Liberia. The UN, overstretched in 1990, was unable, and in fact its member-states unwilling, to intervene in Liberia until November 1992\(^{231}\), when the organisation imposed the ECOWAS arms embargo against Liberia. For the US, to whom many West African leaders looked for intervention, there was tremendous fear of permanent involvement\(^{232}\). It therefore acted on the belief that “this was something for the Liberians to work out themselves”\(^{233}\) and limited its action to arms-length diplomacy\(^{234}\) in the form of rhetorical condemnation of the war, the provision of emergency aid, and the protection of American nationals. In May 1990, a US naval-marine task force was deployed to the Liberian coast to evacuate American citizens. Though these troops could have lent a decisive hand to help end the war, it remained there for months “sailing and sailing”\(^{235}\), doing nothing to stop the conflict or the slaughter.

IV. The ECOWAS Intervention

i) Peacemaking

The vacuum left by the international community was filled by ECOWAS. With the view that West Africa’s economic prosperity was being endangered by


\(^{232}\) Kramer, p. 7.

\(^{233}\) Kramer, p. 5.

\(^{234}\) Kramer, p. 8.

the civil war in Liberia and citing humanitarian grounds, it devised the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) on 28 May 1990, which was charged to mediate the civil war\textsuperscript{236}. The SMC was composed of Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Togo, and Mali, the only Francophone state\textsuperscript{237}. However, the exclusion and dissent of key francophone states from the committee, namely Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, marred ECOWAS’ political exercise from its inception\textsuperscript{238}.

Exacerbating the political process, and the later peacekeeping operation, was the strong enmity between Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria; both saw ECOWAS as a political playing field and acted accordingly, continually seeking to counterbalance one another’s power. Their antagonism was manifested in their differing approaches to the conflict: while Côte d’Ivoire and its allies sought political dialogue and negotiation, Nigeria had an overt preference for military action against Taylor’s NPFL. This internal division continued to plague the organisation for years until Francophone states agreed to contribute troops to ECOMOG in 1995. Until that time, strategic alliances and the Anglophone-Francophone rift prevented ECOWAS from reaching any consensus internally, and therefore from managing Liberia’s conflict effectively. In the interim, the first Yamoussoukro Process of June 1991 tried to correct the regional divisions within the SMC by transforming the committee into a Francophone-dominated Committee of Five to include Ghana, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. This was designed to restore a diplomatic role to the Francophone

\textsuperscript{236} Adebajo, \textit{Building Peace}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{237} Nigeria provided the largest component followed by Ghana. Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Guinea also provided troops. These states formed part of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC).
\textsuperscript{238} Adebajo, \textit{Building Peace}, p. 50.
states and was indeed a significant first step towards expanding the general consensus between ECOMOG members on a settlement.

Yet another contributing factor to the SMC's inefficiency was its lack of procedural guidelines. Indeed, the committee had barely existed for three months when ECOMOG's first troops arrived in Liberia in August 1990. The fact that its mandate was constructed to deal with conflict between "two or more member-states" only made the operation more difficult. Therefore, it was largely unprepared to intervene in a civil war context, as it had neither the formal structure nor framework method to guide its actions.

Shortly after the arrival of ECOMOG troops, the SMC created Liberia's Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer, a Liberian political scientist. However, the IGNU was rejected by Taylor as a puppet of ECOMOG, on whose security it had come to rely on. This as well as its protection of humanitarian supplies and its clear opposition to Taylor's NPFL drew ECOMOG into the conflict as one of the actors.

Between November 1990 and October 1991, the SMC initiated a number of unsuccessful peace talks between Doe and Taylor. However, Taylor continually refused to be disarmed by ECOMOG, which he saw as a Nigerian-led invasion force. ECOWAS' reliance on Nigeria for the brunt of the peacekeeping effort left it with little room to manoeuvre beyond Nigeria's purpose and Taylor's perceptions. Economic sanctions introduced in 1992 were also largely ineffective.

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and were undermined by the support certain ECOWAS members, such as Burkina Faso, gave to rebel factions.

Liberia’s war involved numerous actors and interests far beyond its own borders, which complicated ECOWAS and ECOMOG efforts from the onset. Indeed, the number of actors alone was cause for significant obstacles in trying to resolve the crisis. By 1991, there were no fewer than four factions taking part in the war: Taylor and his NPFL, ECOMOG forces, the Independent-NPFL (INPFL) under Prince Yormie Johnson, and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). Thus, ECOWAS’ diplomatic efforts heeded little results until broader international support was forthcoming from the UN with the Cotonou Accords of 1993.

ii) Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement

The problems within ECOWAS inevitably extended to ECOMOG and prevented it from managing the conflict effectively. Firstly, the inability of ECOWAS members to reach a consensus compromised ECOMOG’s peacekeeping and peace-enforcement efforts. Burkina Faso, along with the NPFL, continued to oppose the presence of peacekeepers, while ECOMOG itself collaborated with anti-NPFL factions in pursuit of its mandate. These dynamics “deprived the intervention of universal legitimacy and support.”

Secondly, perceptions held by rebel groups, and indeed by various ECOWAS member-states themselves, of Nigeria using ECOMOG as a vehicle for its regional policies severely hampered the operation. These perceptions were

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241 ULIMO was formed in Guinea and Sierra Leone in early 1991 through the amalgamation of three anti-Taylor groups: the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), the Liberian United Defence Force (LUDF), and the Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Muslims (MRLM).

242 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 50.
present from the moment of ECOMOG’s creation and Nigeria’s clear military, financial, and political domination of the operation did little to dispel such anxieties. Thus, when 3,000 ECOMOG forces arrived in Monrovia on 24 August 1990, Taylor condemned its presence as Nigerian policy aimed at restoring the Doe regime and as an ‘invasion force’ to be resisted. The peacekeepers therefore came under immediate attack from the NPFL.

Even so, the absence of a ceasefire and of Taylor’s consent to ECOMOG as a peacekeeping force did not stop the peacekeeping troops from continuing its mission. It did, however, make traditional peacekeeping impossible and led ECOMOG to use considerable force to physically insert itself into the conflict. As a result, it amended its peacekeeping mandate to one of peace-enforcement, deploying a total of 6,000, mostly Nigerian, troops. This adjustment allowed ECOMOG forces to engage in combat operations against the NPFL, which was subsequently driven out of the capital. Although the violence subsided and humanitarian agencies returned to deliver desperately needed supplies, ECOMOG had instantly compromised its neutrality by fighting alongside the AFL and the INPFL, two NPFL foes.

The enforcement action once again brought to light the tensions among ECOWAS member-states, as many were strongly opposed to this approach. Such differing military approaches and the Nigerian government’s lack of consultation with other contingent commanders, an accusation made again during ECOMOG’s intervention in Sierra Leone, were a constant undercurrent of

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245 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 56.
ECOWAS’ internal friction. Indeed, as Adebajo notes, “[e]ven judged by the terms of ECOWAS’ own charter and defence protocols, ECOMOG was on shaky legal foundations, with no specific clauses allowing for military intervention in a member-state’s internal conflict.”

Doe’s brutal murder on 9 September 1990 by INPFL forces under ECOMOG’s watchful eye led many more to question why the peacekeepers did not act to save Doe. This was one of many events that undermined ECOMOG’s credibility as a legitimate peacekeeping force.

V. The Conflict Regionalised

On 23 March 1991, Taylor encouraged a group of Liberian-based Sierra Leonean rebels, known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), to spread the conflict from northern Liberia into Sierra Leone’s diamond mining area. He argued that Sierra Leone had made itself a legitimate target by allowing its territory to be used as an ECOMOG base. However, Taylor had much to gain by deliberately extending the conflict into Sierra Leone: he calculated that acquiring the diamond region of Sierra Leone could serve to fund his own war while simultaneously destabilising Sierra Leone’s weak government, thus pressuring it into withdrawing from ECOMOG. In addition, as civil war in Liberia escalated into a war between Taylor’s NPFL and ECOMOG forces, Taylor looked to Sierra Leone’s border to open up a second front against ECOMOG. This would weaken its efforts in Liberia and expose its inability to keep peace and to prevent the war from spreading.

However, his plans were frustrated by ECOMOG’s

246 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 50.
248 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 54.
growing presence in Sierra Leone, which also reinforced his perceptions of the peacekeeping force as his rival.

By 1992, ECOMOG's financial constraints had become more visible. In October, Taylor launched Operation Octopus, a major attack on Monrovia, which further exposed ECOMOG's reliance on Nigeria. However, ECOMOG's dependence on the Nigerian army and navy, which supplied more troops and heavy weaponry in an otherwise conventional battle, and its fighting alongside ULIMO and AFL, renewed doubts over the regional force's stated impartiality. Its ever-changing role from one of peacekeeper to peace-enforcer only increased the NPFL's suspicion, hardened Taylor's uncompromising attitude, and constrained ECOMOG's ability to stop the fighting.

VI. The UN

In November 1992, Liberia's civil war finally received high-level attention when the UN, in support of the ECOWAS arms embargo, imposed the embargo on all parties to the conflict. Prior to this international backing, ECOMOG had been unable to implement the ban due to Taylor's refusal to be disarmed by ECOMOG forces. Following the appointment of a SRSG, however, Taylor's tone changed immediately and he declared his willingness to abide by the Yamoussoukro IV decisions under UN, rather than ECOMOG, supervision.

VII. The First Joint ECOWAS-UN Collaboration

The Cotonou peace agreement was signed on 25 July 1993 between Taylor, ULIMO, and the IGN. An attempt was made to legitimise ECOMOG by, firstly,


\[250\] Ofuatey-Kodjo, "Regional Organisations," p. 278.
“de-Nigerianising” and expanding it by bringing in Francophone states, some of which were openly supportive of Taylor, as well as troops from Tanzania and Uganda. Secondly, a small UN monitoring force of 368 personnel was created under Security Council Resolution 866 and launched in September 1993 to supervise and monitor ECOMOG’s implementation of the agreement. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was to support ECOWAS and the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) in implementing the peace agreement, investigating ceasefire violations, assisting in the demobilisation of combatants, investigating human rights violations.

However, difficulties in the ECOMOG-UNOMIL relationship quickly emerged. Firstly, friction between the organisations at all levels – from political direction to local command to personnel on the ground – was high, creating an undercurrent of mistrust and mutual disrespect. The hostility underlying this ‘partnership’ was partly rooted in the West African forces’ resentment that they required supervision and that their authority had been usurped by the international organisation, which had conceded Liberia little attention in the past three years. Also contributing to the underlying hostility were perceptions that the UN was naïve and insufficiently robust in dealing with the armed factions, especially the NPFL. UNOMIL’s legitimacy and authority suffered even more due to its powerlessness to investigate, or to act against, increasing accusations.

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255 MacQueen, p. 185.
over ECOMOG’s bad behaviour, which led to its nickname “Every Car or Moving Object Gone.”

Lastly, because UNOMIL was simply there to “support” ECOWAS, UN monitors were completely dependent on ECOMOG for their own personal security and that of their mission as a whole\textsuperscript{255}. As a monitoring and legitimating mission, this severely hampered UNOMIL’s independence and its ability to carry out its mandate, particularly the investigative tasks. When ECOMOG protection was not forthcoming, UNOMIL’s redundancy was obvious. Its weakness was revealed in September 1994 when 40 UN observers were captured, abused, and had their transport and equipment seized by elements of the NPFL in a number of locations throughout eastern and northern Liberia. As a result, UN observers were withdrawn from areas of high risk until they remained only in Monrovia, severely limiting the UN’s role outside the capital. UNOMIL’s role was again diminished following some of the worst fighting to date in Monrovia at the beginning of 1996. As the US moved to evacuate its foreign nationals UNOMIL personnel were reduced to single digit figures.

VIII. The War’s End and Resumption

On 19 July 1997, with the second Abuja Accord signed and disarmament scheduled, Charles Taylor was elected President with a 75% majority. His win, denounced as a ‘farcical affair’\textsuperscript{256} within Liberia, has largely been attributed to the general fear of a resumption of war if he lost. Upon election, Taylor’s government “continue[d] to function without accountability, exacerbating the divisions and

\textsuperscript{255} MacQueen, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{256} Gberie, “Liberia’s War and Peace Process,” in Aboagye and Bah, p. 61.
resentments fuelled by the war,” according to a 2002 Human Rights Watch report. Violence continued and, as Lansana Gberie contends, “the war never really ended with the elections ..., because pockets of fighting began soon afterwards, in 1998.” Full-blown civil war erupted once again in 1999 when fighting began along the Liberian-Guinean border. The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), consisting of former ULIMO fighters actively supported by the Guinean government, emerged in protest against Taylor’s rule. The fighting soon spread from the north of Liberia into the west and the centre of the country.

In April 2003, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), a faction of LURD armed and supported by the Ivorian government, also appeared, extending the fighting into Liberia’s south while LURD rebels attacked from the north. Within months, Taylor barely controlled one third of the country and LURD rebels approached Monrovia. This second leg of the Liberian civil war occurred amid ECOWAS and UN efforts to consolidate peace in neighbouring Sierra Leone and overlapped with Côte d’Ivoire’s first military coup in September 2002. Thus, Liberia’s war once again reached into its neighbouring countries.

i) The ECOWAS Mission in Liberia

Like a decade earlier, Liberians and the international community looked for an American-led intervention. Instead, President George W. Bush’s urged

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Taylor to leave Liberia immediately\textsuperscript{259} in order for there to be peace and stability\textsuperscript{260}. Though this was one of his administration's firmest statements on an African crisis, it fell short of expectations. Rather than send its own troops, the US provided logistical support to ECOWAS, which intervened on 4 August 2003. The fighting stopped almost immediately. However, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) experienced similar military, personnel, and financial limitations as its predecessor. This was due to the continuing limited capacity of ECOWAS member-states, which was heightened by the changing internal politics of West African states at this time. Their transition towards more democratic conditions made newly-elected regimes sensitive to public opinion and subject to parliamentary constraints. Nigeria in particular, which had footed the majority of ECOMOG's bill, could no longer uphold ECOMIL single-handedly as it had previously. Thus, at its strongest, ECOMIL stood at just 3,500 troops, contributed from eight member-states\textsuperscript{261}. As a result, ECOMIL was unable to establish security beyond the capital\textsuperscript{262}.

Nevertheless, Charles Taylor relinquished power on 11 August 2003 and departed Liberia for exile in Nigeria. He remained there until March 2006, when he was transferred to Sierra Leone's Special Court for charges of war crimes.


\textsuperscript{261} Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo contributed troops.

committed by rebels supported and controlled by him during the war\textsuperscript{261}. He is currently awaiting trial by the Special Court at The Hague. On 18 August, the Government of Liberia, LURD, and MODEL signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra. The agreement called for the establishment of the 1NTG, comprised of LURD, MODEL, and elements from Taylor’s regime, that would assume power in October 2003. ECOMIL was to be subsumed within a multi-dimensional UN peace support mission.

\textbf{ii) The UN Mission in Liberia}

Following Taylor’s resignation, Security Council adopted Resolution 1509 on 19 September 2003, which called for the deployment of 15,000 peacekeeping troops and 1,115 civilian police officers. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was mandated to carry out DDR programmes, provide security for government installations, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, protect civilians, and assist the transitional government, along with ECOMIL, to prepare for the October 2005 elections. Given this closer collaboration between ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN from the inception of the peace process, UNMIL was established with considerable ease, in sharp contrast to the tenuous relations between the UN and ECOMOG in the 1990s.

Although ECOMIL’s “advance force [in] Liberia provided a critical breathing space for the deployment of UNMIL,”\textsuperscript{264} the transfer from ECOMIL to the UN was not without its own challenges. The handover is said to have taken place before the UN was even ready to take command. This appears to have been

\textsuperscript{261}This marked the first time a former African head of state had been arrested and charged with human rights abuses committed in office.

\textsuperscript{264}Jones and Cherif, p. 22.
motivated by a desire to shift rapidly towards financial burden-sharing.\textsuperscript{265} The UN subsequently took over from ECOMIL in October 2003. Elections were held as scheduled in October 2005, which saw Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf elected as Africa’s first female president.

\textbf{Sierra Leone}

I. The Civil War – A Summary

Civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991 when the RUF under Foday Sankoh invaded the east of the country, ostensibly to overthrow Siaka Stevens’ repressive regime. The rebels, and later its allies, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), quickly demonstrated their brutality by using mass rape, physical mutilation, and young children as soldiers in an effort to instil terror among civilians. The country’s diamond-mining regions were captured and used to finance their war. This plundering, practiced for over a decade by successive regimes, has led to Sierra Leone’s ranking as the world’s second poorest country according to the 2006 Human Development Index.\textsuperscript{266}

As in Liberia, ECOWAS was the first organisation to send troops to Sierra Leone. However, its new-born security efforts continued to be hampered by internal rifts between Anglophone-Francophone member-states and their divisive support for various rebel factions involved in the conflict. ECOWAS was again militarily, financially, and institutionally unable to provide the decisive and

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid.

sustained support required. These were eventually supplied by the country’s former colonial master, Britain, which was instrumental in establishing UNAMSIL.

The civil war was officially declared over in 2002 by President Kabbah following the completion of the demobilisation and disarmament programme of former-combatants. To “create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights”\textsuperscript{267}, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, loosely modelled on South Africa’s, was established and a Special Court created to try those “bear[ing] the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes against humanity”\textsuperscript{268}.

II. History and Conflict Dynamics

i) Settlement, Colonial Rule, and Exploitation

Sierra Leone’s capital, Freetown, was first settled by freed slaves from Britain in 1787. Five years later, it became Britain’s first official West African colony and in 1808 the surrounding area was integrated under colonial rule. As the Americo-Liberians in Liberia, the freed British slaves, known as the Creoles, formed a minority 2\% of the population. These “Black British” governed Sierra Leone until its independence on 27 April 1961 and implemented Britain’s imperial policy of exploitation and extraction; a policy that generated poverty, an uneducated population, and massive unemployment. Emphasis on the country’s diamond industry distracted from its agricultural base, whichagravated poverty


and unemployment. As a result, politics became "a contest in which the objective was to seize control of the state and use it for the good of one's ethnic group." In 1978, a one-party system was established by President Siaka Stevens (1968-1985) under his party, the All People’s Congress (APC). His successor, Major General Joseph Momoh (1985-1992) ruled under a self-declared state of emergency, which granted him greater access to the country’s diamond mining industry. This misrule perpetuated the economic, social, and political unrest that began in the 1960s, as well as the government’s reputation for participating in the extraction of the country’s natural resources, namely its diamonds.

ii) Civil War in Liberia

Regional events in the 1990s impacted heavily on Sierra Leone’s stability. In March 1991, Sierra Leone was deliberately targeted by Charles Taylor, who imported his war to achieve strategic goals. The country was targeted specifically because Nigerian air forces were based at Freetown’s Lungi Airport for their bombing missions against NPFL forces in Liberia. Sierra Leone’s association with ECOMOG and its integral role as a part of ECOMOG's logistical supply route made it a natural target and enemy for Taylor.

III. The Civil War

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269 Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., “Sierra Leone,” in Boulden, Dealing with Conflict, p. 129.
270 Ibid.
The RUF attacks on Sierra Leone in March 1991 marked the beginning of the country’s 11 year civil war. Within a year, the rebel group controlled over half the country, including most of the diamond-producing areas. Nigeria was the first regional actor to intervene in March 1993. Since ECOMOG was deeply engaged in Liberia, it did so unilaterally based on a bilateral defence treaty with the Government of Sierra Leone. Indeed, it was not until 1997 that ECOMOG officially became involved in Sierra Leone as a peacekeeping force. In the interim, Nigeria acted in support of Strasser’s Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and its attempt to consolidate security and to reclaim the north of the country. Although no fighting took place, Nigeria’s pro-Strasser gesture put it at the head of the anti-RUF campaign and severely compromised ECOMOG’s efforts when it later entered as a peacekeeping force.

Following the RUF’s occupation of the diamond-mining regions of Sierra Leone in January 1995 and its approach towards Freetown, Strasser solicited help from ECOMOG in Liberia and Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African PMC, in his fight against the RUF. EO successfully re-established security for the return of 300,000 refugees, drove the RUF out of Freetown into the interior, and recaptured the mines.

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273 The RUF consisted mostly of disenfranchised youths, Burkinabés, and members of Taylor’s NPFL.
274 MacQueen, p. 181.
275 In exchange for its services, EO was paid $1.8 million per month and its partner company was awarded access to the country’s diamond-mining areas. See Montague, Dena, “The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 9:1 (Spring 2002): 229-237.
EO’s involvement in the civil war offers an example of a growing trend witnessed in conflicts “in over fifty nations, on every continent but Antarctica”\(^\text{276}\) that has raised questions over the drafting of these modern-day mercenaries. For PMCs are business ventures and have been hired by democratic governments, the UN, humanitarian organisations, as well as dictatorships, rebel groups, and drug cartels\(^\text{277}\). These freelance guns-for-hire companies can be extremely precarious if employed by the wrong group, acting as destabilising agents in a conflict and obstructing the end of violence. Moreover, as businesses seeking a profit, PMCs have limited interests in providing security beyond their mandate or in productively working towards ending the violence. In Sierra Leone, EO’s services were narrowly focused and “civilians unfortunate enough to be living outside of [the mineral rich enclaves of Kono and the Kangari Hills] would have been foolish to count on Executive Outcomes’ protection.”\(^\text{278}\)

Secondly, the hiring of PMCs by impoverished governments can hinder a country’s long-term recovery. Thus, the short-term security provided by EO tied the Government of Sierra Leone to a mining deal secured at a time of desperation. It left the government with a $30 million debt to EO \(^\text{279}\), which was aggravated by a 10% reduction of GDP and a 35% rise in inflation\(^\text{280}\). This severely impeded the government’s ability to economically rebuild the country or to develop its resources in the long-term. Lastly, the largest problem lies with the

\(^{277}\) Singer, p. 121.
\(^{280}\) Montague, p. 233.
contracting government. Once the company’s mandate is over, governments are often left to their own inadequate security devices in the ensuing vacuum. The Government of Sierra Leone was thus wholly dependent on EO to maintain security in order for it to remain in power. As a result, although elections were held in March 1996, only a year after EO’s entry in the conflict, the new regime under Ahmad Tejan Kabbah faced no less than three coup attempts within its first 10 months in office.281

Indeed, EO’s withdrawal from Sierra Leone in January 1997 in accordance with the Abidjan peace agreement, signed on 30 November 1996, was quickly followed by Kabbah’s overthrow by army general Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of reconstituted units of the SLA, known as the AFRC. Almost immediately, Koroma suspended the constitution, established the AFRC as the ruling party and unpredictably invited the RUF, against whom they had reportedly been fighting for the last six years, to join his government. The RUF accepted, declaring its rebellion over and ruled with terror as part of the Government of Sierra Leone. This unlikely alliance confirmed many suspicions that these sables282 fought the war in Sierra Leone as a means to profit from the exploitation of the country’s diamond resources under the pretext of warfare, rather than for political victories283.

IV. The UN: Non-Interventionism

281 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 85.
282 This term was used to describe SLA/AFRC soldiers who killed, maimed, and looted alongside the RUF rebels by night.
283 For further reading, see Smillie, Ian, Gberie, Lansana, and Hazleton, Ralph, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security (Ontario: Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000).
The UN’s contribution to re-establishing Sierra Leone’s security was minimal until 1999, when the Chapter VII-mandated United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established. Prior to this, UN involvement was limited to verbal condemnations of the humanitarian crisis generated by the fighting284, as reported by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)285. Even support to ECOWAS was limited until October 1997, when the UN placed an oil and arms embargo against Sierra Leone, charging ECOWAS with its implementation and declaring that it would take ‘appropriate measures’ to restore Kabbah 286. However, this measure was negligible due to ECOMOG’s inability to reinforce Liberia’s permeable borders, which made the embargo easily and widely breached.

Of particular significance was the Security Council’s silence regarding Nigeria’s unilateral intervention in Sierra Leone. This had the effect of silently legitimating the attacks and stands in sharp contrast to the international condemnation faced by NATO’s unilateral action in the Balkans two years later in 1999. The UN’s hands-off approach at this time was shaped by the backlash of the humiliation of the failed peace operations in Somalia and Rwanda. Indeed, Sierra Leone’s civil war occurred amidst the UN’s withdrawal from peace operations in Africa. In particular, the US, with its policy of non-involvement codified in PDD-25, “watched attentively and approved regional mediation efforts

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284 For an example, refer to United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 11 July 1997.
in Sierra Leone...but took no active role and worked to send late and
inappropriately limited UN forces to Sierra Leone as UNOMSIL.”

V. The ECOWAS Intervention

i) Peacemaking

The void left by the international community in Sierra Leone brought
action from the sub-regional level. Thus, while the UN looked to the Balkans,
Kabbah’s overthrow triggered Nigeria, supported by ECOMOG troops and
Sandline, EO’s sister company\(^{288}\), to attack Freetown on 1 June 1997 in a quest to
force the junta to step down. This intervention was a unilateral one based on a
bilateral defence treaty between the Nigerian and Sierra Leonean governments; it
was not authorised by the UN or ECOWAS, which did not formally give its
authorisation until August 1997 after substantial persuasion from Nigeria. Less
than a year later, ECOWAS leaders formally decided that it would not be
necessary for the organisation to seek Security Council authorisation prior to
launching future ECOMOG interventions\(^{289}\). This was determined based on the
Security Council members’ own unwillingness to intervene or to sanction UN
peace operations in Liberia or Sierra Leone and with the belief that autonomy
over this decision should remain within ECOWAS\(^{290}\).

To the detriment of later peacekeeping efforts, Nigeria’s natural alliance
with the Government of Sierra Leone caused the AFRC and the RUF to declare


\(^{290}\) Ibid.
their fight against the invading force, as the NPFL had in Liberia. However, Nigeria's initiative failed to bring down Koroma and an emphasis was placed on peacemaking. In August 1997, ECOWAS leaders implemented a "total embargo on all supplies of petroleum products, arms and military equipment" against Sierra Leone and required all member-states to abstain from conducting business with it. These sanctions, along with political dialogue and the use of force, formed the core of ECOWAS' effort to restore Kabbah. A Committee of Four was created to oversee the implementation of these measures and differed from its predecessor in that Francophone countries were involved from the start, resulting in fewer criticisms of Nigerian domination as well as less hostility between the Anglophone and Francophone states.

ii) Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement

Although ECOMOG successfully restored the democratically-elected Kabbah on 10 March 1998, its peacekeeping and peace-enforcement efforts were plagued by problems that had already been encountered in Liberia. Nigeria's support for Kabbah made ECOMOG's peacekeeping efforts "dead on arrival". Moreover, the support given by certain ECOWAS members towards various factions of the conflict divided the organisation and prevented it from functioning effectively. In particular, Burkina Faso and Liberia had a clear preference for the RUF and both countries had provided military training and arms to the RUF.

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291 Ofuatey-Kodjoe in Boulden, p. 133.
292 The Committee consisted of Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana. This later became the Committee of Five when Liberia joined. In 1999, it expanded once again to become the Committee of Seven after Togo and Burkina Faso also joined.
294 Ofuatey-Kodjoe in Boulden, p. 142.
prior to ECOMOG's launch. They were countered by Nigeria's support for the GoSL, which provoked significant criticism from the afore-mentioned members. Secondly, ECOMOG continued to face difficulties as a result of issues over its funding. The monitoring group’s improvised creation in reaction to civil war in Liberia made its financing based purely on voluntary contributions from ECOWAS members and international donors. Thus, it had neither a reliable nor a broad financial base, which limited its ability to respond to crises. Consequently, ECOMOG remained ill-equipped throughout its operation in Sierra Leone and this contributed to its inability to defeat the AFRC and the RUF in a conventional war.

More significantly, the financial scheme encouraged near-impunity for any country willing to cover the costs of an operation. As in Liberia, Nigeria bore the greatest financial burden in Sierra Leone, militarily dominating 90% of ECOMOG’s troops. As a result, “[t]he spectre of Nigeria as a bullying hegemon continued to haunt multilateral peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone, as it had done in Liberia.”295 This led many Nigerian commanders to compare their dominance of the force to the US role in NATO296. However, according to Adebajo, in spite of Nigeria's dominance over ECOWAS, it was in reality an aspiring hegemon at best because it lacked the legitimacy and the capability required of a hegemon297. Nevertheless, when Nigeria's General Abdulsalam Abubukar called on ECOWAS members to provide more troops in order to expand and diversify ECOMOG's presence in May 1998, no ECOWAS member

295 Ibid.
296 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 91.
297 Adebajo, "In Search of Warlords", p. 64.
responded. Accordingly, as Adebajo notes, while many ECOWAS members criticised Nigeria for its unilateral military actions in Sierra Leone, little could be done to dilute Nigeria’s strength. Thus, for all its criticisms, there was no other state in West Africa that was able to counter or neutralise Nigeria’s perceived dominance.

**VI. The Second ECOWAS-UN Collaboration**

UNAMSIL, the second UN mission to Sierra Leone, was dispatched in July 1998. Though authorised with 70 military observers, only 40 were deployed to monitor ECOMOG’s provision of security, its demobilisation of combatants, and its respect for humanitarian law over a six month period. Rebel activity intensified in October 1998 in reaction to Sankoh’s death sentence, handed in abstentia by Kabbah in October 1998 during a series of trials for captured junta soldiers. By December 1998, the AFRC and the RUF, strengthened by support from Burkina Faso, were once again on the outskirts of Freetown and on 6 January 1999 launched a devastating attack on the capital. The fighting was so intense that thousands, including President Kabbah, fled the city. In a replay of UNOMIL’s withdrawal from Monrovia in 1996, UNOMSIL personnel were quickly evacuated.

UNOMSIL’s early withdrawal rendered another UN mission ineffectual when it was most necessary. As a result, it failed to successfully oversee ECOMOG’s collection and destruction of arms, although this part of their mandate had become irrelevant even before the fighting in Freetown began due

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300 Sankoh was detained in Nigeria in March 1997.
301 MacQueen, p. 52.
to the deteriorating situation, which effectively ended any possibility of voluntary disarmament from either side. The Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council reflected the failure of the UN’s monitoring mandate, citing ECOMOG’s abuse of its powers in instances of arbitrary execution of suspected rebels and their supporters as well as the indiscriminate use of air power[^2].

By the beginning of 1999 it was clear that the situation was deteriorating: Kabbah lacked the resources and national support to exercise political control over the country and ECOMOG could not continue maintaining the balance of power on Kabbah’s behalf on an ad hoc basis. Thus, ECOWAS, at the urging of the UN, Britain, and the US, Kabbah settled with Sankoh and the RUF, which led to the signing of the Lomé Agreement on 7 July 1999. The agreement called for the DDR of all warring factions, lifted the death sentence on Sankoh, and brought the RUF and AFRC into a new government of national unity with Kabbah’s Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). A controversial blanket amnesty for all crimes committed was granted to all belligerents and a truth and reconciliation commission was to be established.

To maintain this tentative peace, the “Liberian peacekeeping model”, in which the UN acted as a legitimating force to ECOMOG’s intervention[^3], was expanded into a “hybrid peacekeeping model”. Accordingly, ECOMOG continued to act as the government’s protection force and to exercise control over the areas it held. It also worked alongside and coordinated with UNAMSIL[^4] under a separate command structures. The West African force was later to be subsumed

[^3]: MacQueen, p. 55.
by the UN operation, or “blue-hatted”. The joint mission was given Chapter VII powers in order to assist the new government in implementing the ceasefire, complete the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration process, restore law and order, provide security throughout the country, and to facilitate the flow of people and humanitarian assistance305.

The operation faltered at the beginning of 2000 as the last ECOMOG personnel were departing and as UNAMSIL was preparing to move into the RUF-held diamond mining areas306. In May, cantonment centres in rebel areas were destroyed and UNAMSIL troops were attacked and abducted. By the middle of the month, 500 UN peacekeepers were being held hostage by the RUF and the West Side Boys307 and another attack on Freetown was imminent. Morale within UNAMSIL was low and the operation seemed on the verge of collapse again.

VII. The British Intervention

On 7 May 2000, British troops launched Operation Palliser, which stepped in as a major independent force to sustain the UN-sponsored Lomé Accord, bolster the failing UN operation, and to rescue the UN hostages and British nationals. However, as British forces occupied strategic positions around Freetown, “it was soon clear that this was largely a pretext for a more substantial intervention”308. The hostage crisis brought to the fore criticisms of the UN’s failure to advance the peace process, which contrasted sharply with Britain’s rapid deployment and quick stabilisation of the hostage crisis. This public fiasco

307 The West Side Boys were a gang composed of remnants of the SLA, the RUF, the AFRC, and civilians who fought against both government and rebel forces.
308 MacQueen, p. 56.
“led to perhaps the greatest crisis for United Nations peacekeeping in Africa since the Rwanda genocide of 1994.”

British troops therefore remained deployed next to UNAMSIL in a separate but complementary military mission. Their high visibility actively deterred the RUF from moving into the capital. British troops also undertook extensive re-training of the remnants of Sierra Leone’s national army. This commitment came as part of the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) programme and has been a significant contribution to the post-conflict reconstruction of the country. The British intervention re-established security to Freetown and helped to sustain UNAMSIL, which peaked at 18,329 personnel in March 2002 to make it the UN’s largest peacekeeping force at that time.

VIII. The War’s End

A new peace agreement sponsored by ECOWAS and the UN was signed in Abuja on 10 November 2000, following Sankoh’s arrest in Freetown. Issa Sessay, the RUF’s new leader, was not the spoiler his predecessor was and agreed to UNAMSIL’s deployment throughout the country while pledging to return equipment stolen during the May crisis and to resume the DDR process.

By March 2001, UNAMSIL personnel were deployed throughout Sierra Leone, including the diamond mining areas, and DDR was taking place at an unprecedented pace. On 18 January 2002, President Kabbah formally declared an end to the civil war, marked by the disarmament of some 72,000 former combatants.

309 MacQueen, p. 56.
Côte d’Ivoire

I. The Civil War – A Summary

Côte d’Ivoire, once one of Africa’s most stable countries, recently joined the ranks of its West African neighbours overcome by destructive civil war. Its stable system began to fall apart in the late 1980s due to concerns over President Houphouët-Boigny’s succession, the falling prices of the country’s primary exports, and the disintegration of the army’s command and control. Houphouët’s successor stirred tensions over the issue of Ivorian nationality, bringing to the fore nationality and identity issues in a country with a substantial foreign national and immigrant population. In 2002, the disgruntled army launched coordinated attacks on government facilities, signifying the start of the civil war. Fighting between rebel forces in the north and government troops in the south effectively divided the country in two with French troops interposed along this line to guarantee a ceasefire.

France in particular has demonstrated a return to its neo-colonial interventionist policies after its political and military failures in Africa in the 1990s. However, its involvement in Côte d’Ivoire has led various factions to accuse the former colonial power of siding with the other, resulting in anti-French, anti-West, and anti-UN demonstrations throughout the country. The ECOWAS operation, which was again the first international presence, was “blue-

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311 Most significantly, in 1998, the French Parliamentary Information Committee on Rwanda (Le mission d’information parlementaire française sur le Rwanda) revealed that the French government had provided diplomatic, financial, technical, and military support to the Rwandan government before and during the genocide in spite of an arms embargo, as well as to the Interhamwe, and the forces armées rwandaises (FAR) who had carried out the genocide. (See Prunier for further reading.) Following these revelations, France slowly phased out its military bases and withdrew the number of its permanent troops and political support from many of its former colonies. It thus pulled out of Togo, closed its military base in the Central African Republic, and stopped its military support to Niger and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
hatted” and subsumed within a larger Chapter VII UN peace operation in 2004 and remains there at the time of writing.

II. Background and Conflict Dynamics

i) The Jewel of West Africa

Côte d’Ivoire became a French colony in 1893 and gained independence in 1960 to become a model of political stability and economic prosperity. It avoided the military coups and internal wars that have plagued other African states since the independence era. Until the recent conflict began in 2002, Côte d’Ivoire was West Africa’s success story. In spite of its size, pre-1999 Côte d’Ivoire was sub-Saharan Africa’s fourth largest economy, with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) rate that was more than double Nigeria’s, Africa’s second largest economy.\(^{312}\)

ii) Félix Houphouët-Boigny

Côte d’Ivoire, which is predominantly Muslim in the north and Christian in the south, was united under Houphouët-Boigny, who ruled from independence until his death in 1993. Stability stemmed in part from Houphouët’s close personal relations with the West, most notably with a string of governments from the country’s colonial motherland, France. International investment in the country’s coffee and cocoa industries helped it to develop economically in the 1960s and 1970s to become the world’s largest producer of cocoa and sub-Saharan Africa’s third largest economy after South Africa and Nigeria.\(^{313}\) Houphouët began a policy of openly encouraging workers from poorer

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neighbouring countries into Côte d’Ivoire in order to work its coffee and cocoa plantations314. The new immigrants, mostly employed in the agricultural sector, helped to form the basis of Côte d’Ivoire’s economic boom and were integrated into Ivorian society, with many holding important governmental positions.

In 1990, Houphouët legalised political opposition in an effort to democratise and won his first democratic election. His death three years later left a vacuum that contributed to the country’s fall into civil war and signalled “not only the end of a political era ... but perhaps as well the end of the close French-African relationship that he came to symbolise”315.

iii) Regional Dynamics

The regional dimensions of Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war are numerous and are related to conditions in its neighbouring countries as well as to those within. The recent conclusion of brutal and protracted civil wars in neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone makes the outbreak of conflict in Côte d’Ivoire all the more significant. Porous borders between Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire have made the implementation of DDR programmes all but impossible. The Security Council has noted instances where arms are being smuggled from Liberia across the border into Côte d’Ivoire where, if they are not used, will attract more compensation once Ivorian disarmament begins316. This regional dynamic is further enhanced by allegations that Liberian President Charles Taylor and

314 Ibid.
Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré have sponsored various rebel factions involved in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict.

Fears that continued conflict in Côte d’Ivoire could stall the tenuous peace conditions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone are real and make concerted regional solutions necessary. Internally, Côte d’Ivoire’s large immigrant population from surrounding Burkina Faso, Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea has made for an extremely volatile situation for the country itself and for the regions as a whole. Questions over Ivorian nationality have sparked widespread violence while the return of Côte d’Ivoire’s immigrants to their homeland and Ivorian refugees have contributed to increased poverty in the receiving countries, placing more stress on regional relations.

iv) The Motherland

France’s former colonial and political linkages, particularly among its 20 former colonies, have profoundly impacted on contemporary African international relations and continue to shape West Africa’s regional politics. France’s relationship with its African colonies during and since the colonial period has been characterised by an all-encompassing concept of relations based on cultural, political, economic, and military relations. These have been achieved through French cultural rayonnement, Paris’ close personal ties with Francophone African leaders, the creation of a preferential economic zone (the Communauté française d’Afrique (CFA) franc), and a series of bilateral defence and military cooperation agreements, of which one is with Côte d’Ivoire. Former

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President Mitterand’s statement that “without Africa, France will no longer have a history in the twenty-first century” demonstrates the thinking behind Paris’ policy-making and helps to explain its strong presence – political, economic, and military - in Côte d’Ivoire. As Boubacar Diop points out, “France is a central, and increasingly open, player in the [Ivorian] crisis.”

a) Post-Cold War Relations

Although France has continued to regard most of its former-colonies in the region as its traditional sphere of influence, in the post-Cold War era, France disengaged somewhat from its former chasse gardée. Major steps were thus taken towards loosening France’s economic and military grip in Africa: the CFA franc was devalued by 50% in January 1994 and France reduced many of its permanent troops and military bases. Adapting a more multilateral approach, France also extended its relations beyond the remit of its traditional pré-carré through greater cooperation with Anglophone African countries such as Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, leading to a steady decline of bilateral aid to Côte d’Ivoire and its former colonial dependencies.

b) Current Relations

Within West Africa, France has sought to balance Nigeria’s regional power, which it perceives as a potential threat to its small francophone ex-colonies. Côte d’Ivoire is a priority in this balance of power strategy, as demonstrated by France’s permanent military presence there (and 22 other

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320 Nigeria, on the other hand, views France’s presence in the region as a ‘Trojan Horse’ strategy. See Adebajo, Adekeye, Building Peace, p. 31.
African states), which facilitates its ability to intervene in the region “whenever an unacceptable situation [has] to be remedied” 321. Although France has reduced its traditional presence from its former colonies and has widened its policy to include non-traditional partners, its most recent military involvement in Côte d’Ivoire is an indication that a policy of intervention is again on the rise.

A recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report stated that “[t]he stakes in Ivorian politics are largely economic, although the debate is predominantly phrased in ethno-nationalist terms. Violence or the threat of violence facilitate economic gain at many levels simultaneously.” 322 Thus, the current crisis is perhaps better understood in the context of France’s economic interests, which represent 33% of Côte d’Ivoire’s foreign investments and 30% of the country’s GDP 323. French companies dominate Côte d’Ivoire’s transport, water, electrical, communications, and banking sectors 324 and France remains Côte d’Ivoire’s biggest trading partner, with 13.3% of its exports headed there as of 2001 325. France’s political actions are therefore strongly framed and informed by its economic interests.

v) Ethnicity and l’Ivoirité

The predominantly Christian south has traditionally dominated Côte d’Ivoire’s business, civil service, and government positions while the chiefly

321 As stated by former president Giscard d’Estaing in Le Monde, 29 January 1981.
323 Diop, “Ivory Coast: Colonial Adventure.”
324 Ibid.
Muslim population in the north has been relatively impoverished and politically marginalised. This dynamic was aggravated by the country’s 23% immigrant population, who mostly settled in the northern cocoa- and coffee-rich regions.

This line between economics-driven migration and the patterns of new settlements of migrants, creating a north-versus-south mentality, “constitutes one of the major sources of [the country’s] socio-political conflict.”

United under Houphouët’s rule, the drastic fall of world market prices in the early 1990s for coffee and cocoa triggered many Ivorians to view the presence of foreign workers as a burden, sowing seeds for the current disagreement over “who is, or should be, an Ivorian citizen.” This notion of *Ivoirité* (“Ivorianness”) became the ultra-nationalist rhetoric of the ruling *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI) in the late 1990s.

**III. The Deepening Crisis**

Controversies over Côte d’Ivoire’s nationality laws exploded when President Bédié, Houphouët’s successor, altered the country’s constitution to stipulate that all presidential candidates must be born in Côte d’Ivoire to parents who are themselves born in the country. It is widely believed that this was adopted as a policy to block Bédié’s main rival and threat, Alassane Ouattara of the *Rassemblement des républicains* (RDR), from running in the presidential

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326 It is estimated that there are 3 million Burkinabés, 2 million Malians, 500,000 to 1 million Ghanaians, over 250,000 Guineans and tens of thousands of Liberian refugees in Côte d’Ivoire. See Assié-Lumumba.


328 Ibid.
President Bédié was overthrown by the military under General Guei in Côte d’Ivoire’s first coup on 24 December 1999. This was viewed by most as a positive development: Western media described it as “Africa’s good coup”; Ouattara called it a revolution that would restore Côte d’Ivoire to democracy. However, General Guei began promoting Bédié’s xenophobic policies, endorsing even stricter constitutional amendments that limited eligibility for those seeking political office. This sparked a fight for the presidency between Guei and his main rival Laurent Gbagbo, a Christian from the south. With Ouattara continually and deliberately marginalised in elections, Gbagbo was declared president in 2000, leading to violent clashes between FPI and RDR supporters. The situation teetered between peace and violence until a new government of national unity was formed on 5 August 2002 that included all of the main opposition parties.

IV. The Current Crisis

Steps towards resolution and reconciliation were stopped short on 19 September 2002 when attacks on military installations were launched simultaneously in Abidjan, Bouaké, and Korhogo by soldiers protesting their

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329 Ouattara’s mother was Burkinabé.
331 Robinson, p. 27.
332 Ibid.
333 Guei fled to Benin after the October 2000 elections, during which he dissolved the National Election Commission.
unpaid wages. The number of rebels grew as civilians joined their ranks. Although the Ivorian army, les Forces armées nationales du Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI), quickly repelled the rebels from the capital, it was unable to stop them from consolidating power in the northern and western regions of the country. Many students rallied behind the Mouvement patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) under Guillaume Soro. By the end of September 2002, Gbagbo, along with the Young Patriots, an umbrella group consisting of three student organisations held the south of Côte d’Ivoire. The emergence of the Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (MJP) and the Mouvement populaire du grand-ouest (MPIGO), which held remnants of Liberian mercenaries, MODEL, and the RUF, in October 2002 increased the number of actors to the conflict to no less than six factions competing for power, adding new dynamics to the conflict.

V. The French Intervention

i) Peacemaking

In January 2003, France brokered the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement between Gbagbo’s FPI and nine of the major rebel factions. The agreement called for: the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation in which Gbagbo was to remain President, the appointment of a Prime Minister with wide-ranging powers in agreement with the rebels, and the re-organisation of the

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334 The Nouvelles forces (NF) were the armed faction of the MPCI.
335 Also known as the Congrès panafroicain des jeunes patriots.
336 These are the Front pour la libération du grand-ouest (FLGO), the Front pour la sécurité du centre-ouest (FSCO), and the Groupe de patriotes pour la paix (GPP).
337 These groups have since joined forces and are collectively known as the Nouvelles forces.
339 For a copy of the full text of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord, see International Crisis Group, “No Peace in Sight,” appendix C.
army. On the issue of Ivorian citizenship, the agreement urged that it be resolved constitutionally, although the matter remains a contested point of the peace process at the time of writing. French and ECOWAS peace operations were to support the implementation of the agreement. However, the agreement was met with widespread dissatisfaction and set off an increase in attacks against French foreign nationals and military bases. Accusations flew and France was charged with complicity by both the Gbagbo government and rebels.

**ii) Peacekeeping**

Although Gbagbo himself favoured a French intervention, his wife adamantly insisted that the French were better off leaving Ivorians to their own devices. To Gbagbo's disappointment, following a succession of non-interventionist governments in Paris that sought to "normalise" ties with Africa, France did not act to put down the September 2002 coup. The external power sought instead to protect its own interests and foreign nationals in the country. Approximately 700 French troops were sent on 22 September 2002 to stage a major evacuation of Western nationals from Bouaké while thousands of Ivorians fled on foot. It was President Gbagbo who subsequently requested France to monitor the ceasefire pending the deployment of ECOWAS troops. France therefore launched *Opération Licorne* to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1464 of 4 February 2003, the French, and later ECOWAS, were given Chapter VII powers "to take the necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement

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of their personnel and to ensure . . . the protection of civilians immediately threatened with political violence." French troops, in cooperation the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) and the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), were deployed across Côte d'Ivoire and were able to contain the spread of violence by enforcing the *zone de confiance*, which effectively prevented both the government forces and the rebels from moving further north or south.

However, the buffer line raised further suspicions from both sides over France's true intentions for its involvement in the country. The rebels perceived the ceasefire line as Paris' political manoeuvring to keep Gbagbo in power veiled under a peacekeeping smokescreen. Acknowledging the role of French troops, Soro conceded that the "only thing separating us [the NF] from taking power in Abidjan was the French." On the other hand, pro-Gbagbo factions also accused France of aiding and protecting the rebels, with some accusing France of helping to stage the September 2002 coup. Regardless of France's true motivations, it is clear that its peacekeeping and peacemaking roles were inappropriate for an external power with such an involved history with the region.

France's role in Côte d'Ivoire's crisis deepened significantly when nine of its peacekeepers were killed on 4 November 2004 in air strikes conducted by government forces and FANCI. Though the government insisted that the deaths were accidental, France's foreign minister, Michel Barnier, described the attacks

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343 MINUCI was established on 13 May 2003 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1479.
344 Gberie and Addo, p. 18.
345 "France Got them There," The Economist, 18 January 2003, p. 50.
as “inexplicable and unjustifiable”, believing that a firm response by France was required in order to stop the violence\textsuperscript{347}. France quickly and unexpectedly retaliated by destroying the entire Ivorian air force and seizing the international airport in Abidjan\textsuperscript{348}. Protests by Gbagbo supporters and attacks against French and Western expatriates increased but were met with French fire\textsuperscript{349}. This incident effectively transformed France’s role from peacekeeper to active player in the conflict and discredited it significantly as an impartial actor capable of leading the peace effort.

VI. The ECOWAS Intervention

i) Peacemaking

ECOWAS was the first organisation to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire’s coup, as it had been in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Its initial involvement was informed by AU and ECOWAS principles that view the unconstitutional change of government as intolerable\textsuperscript{350}. ECOWAS mediation efforts between the government and rebels began months before Linas-Marcoussis was brokered on 30 September 2002 and resulted in the signing of a ceasefire on 17 October 2002 by both the government and the MPCI. This was a significant diplomatic success for ECOWAS that restored dialogue between the government and rebels and was a first step towards ending the fighting in Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict.

\textsuperscript{347} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{348} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{349} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{350} The AU Algiers Declaration of July 1999 established a framework for reaction to this and the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance prohibits the recognition of any government that comes to power by unconstitutional means.
ii) Peacekeeping

ECOWAS’ Defence and Security Commission first made recommendations for the immediate deployment of peacekeeping troops on 26 October 2002 in order to monitor the ceasefire, disarm the rebel groups, and ensure the disengagement of the insurgents. On 31 December 2002, the ECOWAS Peace Force for Côte d’Ivoire (ECOFORCE) was deployed with 1,500 troops from Benin, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo. ECOMICI successfully re-opened corridors that allowed for the return of humanitarian workers and economic trade. As in Sierra Leone, ECOMICI also acted to protect and provide security to the Ivorian government, deploying in the capital as well as throughout the country.

However, ECOMICI experienced many challenges in its operation that reflected the new circumstances in which ECOWAS and its security mechanism were functioning. Firstly, ECOWAS was not organisationally prepared to handle the Ivorian crisis. It had yet to implement the structural framework that could streamline its military ventures, leading to its continued ad hoc nature and to inefficiency. Indeed, the Executive Secretariat consisted of only two officers when the crisis began and the Force Commander was named less than two weeks before ECOMICI’s full deployment. This made the operational implementation of the ECOWAS-brokered ceasefire highly dependent on the presence and cooperation of French troops. Secondly, ECOWAS members responded slowly to troop mobilisation. This was due in part to political changes within its member-states that altered their ability to launch high-risk and high-

351 Gberie and Addo, p. 22.
cost military interventions. Nigeria in particular, was unable to lead and sustain the military effort in Côte d’Ivoire as it had done in Liberia and Sierra Leone due to its own domestic political and security concerns.

ECOMICI’s greatest difficulty was again its modest financial, logistical, and military capability to carry out a large-scale multi-dimensional peace support operation. This reality has changed considerably little since ECOMOG’s first attempt in Liberia over a decade ago. In Côte d’Ivoire, ECOMICI was able to rely on the French for its mobility and support; however, France’s complex role in the conflict negatively affected ECOMICI’s operational and political independence and its neutrality as a peacekeeping force. As Lansana Gberie and Prosper Addo note; “[i]t is mainly through the assistance of the French, the government of Côte d’Ivoire, and through personal contacts of the Force Commander ... that [ECOMICI] was able to build up slowly, to survive, and then succeed.”\[352\] It is clear that similar circumstances may not be available to ECOWAS in the future, and indeed the appropriateness of these circumstances is questionable. Thus, the wherewithal to undertake timely and effective peace operations is likely to remain the organisation’s greatest problem for the near future.

VII. The United Nations Operation

In 2004, MINUCI was extended Chapter VII powers\[353\] and replaced by the new United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). Authority was to be transferred from MINUCI and ECOMICI to UNOCI to implement a complex peace support mission. UNOCI’s duties included monitoring the ceasefire and

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the movements of armed groups, providing support for the implementation of the peace process, and the DDR, repatriation, and resettlement former combatants. This mandate was to be carried out “in close liaison with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia”\textsuperscript{354}. French forces were to be deployed alongside UNOCI and were thus mandated to “use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI”\textsuperscript{355} to help secure the area around international forces, to intervene in support of UNOCI elements when their security is threatened, to intervene against belligerents outside of UNOCI-controlled areas, and to protect civilians.

South African President Thabo Mbeki moderated the Pretoria Agreement, which declared the immediate and final cessation of all hostilities and the end of the war throughout Côte d’Ivoire on 6 April 2005. By the end of the month, rebel forces began withdrawing heavy weapons from the frontline. Presidential elections were due to be held on 30 October 2005. However, at the time of writing, elections were postponed until October 2007 due to continuing civil unrest and disputes over disarmament and national identity.

\textbf{Conclusion}

ECOWAS actively applied the adage “African solutions to African problems” when little international help or support was offered to tackle horrific and extensive regional wars. Many have questioned the benefits of this regionalisation in peacekeeping; however the actual quality of the responses,


\textsuperscript{355} Ibid, paragraph x).
which remains dubious, overshadows questions on the desirability of a division of labour with the UN. Nevertheless, it is significant that ECOWAS intervened in its capacity as peacemaker, peacekeeper, and peace-enforcer in all three cases. Indeed, the organisation contributed considerably to ending civil war in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire through its presence in these conflict zones. The diplomatic efforts of ECOWAS leaders in particular played a substantial role: in Liberia, it successfully negotiated a ceasefire in 1990 that lasted for two years, allowing ECOMOG troops to re-establish security for the distribution of humanitarian supplies; and in Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor, Olusegun Obasanjo, and Togo’s Gnassingbé Eyadéma all played a crucial role in brokering the Lomé Accords\textsuperscript{156}.

Having said this, these three cases expose significant problems with ECOWAS’ ability to maintain security in its region. These are largely related to - or stem - from the nature of regional relations in general and from problems within ECOWAS specifically. As the cases demonstrate, the support given to dissident factions by sub-regional leaders intending to destabilise neighbouring regimes obstructed ECOMOG’s peace operations. Such intricate allegiances and vested interests make for a complex web of regional relations that undermined the moral authority and legitimacy of ECOWAS/ECOMOG efforts towards peace. These continuing traditional alliances will undoubtedly jeopardise future operations.

Secondly, ECOMOG struggled significantly in all three cases to maintain its neutrality, credibility, and acceptance as a peacekeeping force. In both Liberia

\textsuperscript{156} Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 98.
and Sierra Leone, it did little to conceal its preference for a certain side of the conflict and openly used force to compel rebel leaders to meet these ends. It was therefore drawn into the conflict as an active participant while its role mutated from peacekeeping to peace-enforcer. In Côte d’Ivoire, its dependence on the French also compromised its perceived-neutrality. Adding to this was Nigeria’s military and financial dominance over the operations, which further diminished the peacekeeping force’s legitimacy. Such perceptions informed many ECOWAS members’ actions and led to their conclusion that “ECOMOG...is nothing but a convenient camouflage for an effective Nigerian war machine.”

In addition, various political changes within ECOWAS member-states in the latter half of the 1990s altered governments’ ability to carry out high-risk and high-cost military interventions abroad. While some, such as Guinea, faced internal uprisings and financial crises, others were consolidating, or in transition to, democratic rule and found it increasingly difficult to justify the necessity of ECOMOG’s actions to their people. As a result, the personnel crisis experienced by the UN also came to plague ECOMOG, as seen by its slow and inadequate troop contributions during its more recent intervention in Côte d’Ivoire.

These regional factors affecting ECOWAS only accentuated facets of its internal obstacles. As a security mechanism, the organisation remains weak and institutionally inexperienced. As Zartman highlights, ECOWAS has been unable to create a system of norms to govern both the internal and international

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relations of the region’s states and to serve as guidelines for regional conflict management. The far-reaching protocols of the ECOWAS Mechanism will take a significant amount of time and resources to be executed and have yet to be fully implemented. The result of this deficiency is evident: over a span of 17 years, all three cases were highly improvised and lacked a clear or adequate mandate.

Thus, when the situation got difficult, ECOMOG struggled to respond decisively and was criticised for either using too little or too much force and for compromising its neutrality.

Related to ECOWAS’ limited organisational capacity is its scarce logistical, military, and resource capacity to successfully carry out large-scale complex peace missions. Kwaku Nuamah and Zartman rightly argue that ECOMOG’s failure to control Taylor “before his rebellion had broken down into internecine warfare ... would have precluded the creation of a rebellion in neighbouring Sierra Leone.” This failure, however, is not ECOMOG’s alone. Indeed, the UN itself has struggled with similar complex operations as attempted by ECOWAS, whose members are amongst the poorest in the world. James Woods points to the US, stating that “[t]here is little doubt that the US naval-marine task force dispatched to Liberia could have intervened decisively to bring an early end to the Liberian civil war precipitated by Charles Taylor.” Placing blame, however, does little to ameliorate the fact that the international community as a whole failed to act at the opportune time early in the Liberian conflict. This contributed

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360 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 138.
361 Nuamah and Zartman in Lahneman, p. 142.
to the subsequent civil wars that overwhelmed the rest of the region into the twenty-first century, costing thousands of lives and the UN millions of dollars in its mop-up peace operations and humanitarian programmes.

This leads to perhaps the more critical issue that the three cases underline: the importance of active UN support and collaboration with sub-regional peace efforts. Indeed, the UN’s unwillingness to act and widespread appeals for its reform in the early 1990s brought ECOMOG greater significance in the region. In all three instances, the world organisation belatedly, but necessarily, became involved and it was through concerted regional and international efforts that the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were brought to an end. The same should apply to Côte d’Ivoire. Fortunately, ECOMOG’s relationship with the UN has evolved considerably from the strains of its first experiment in Liberia in 1991 through its partnership in Sierra Leone into the sequenced management of the recent crises in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. These are indications that a larger and better partnership is growing. In 1997, the first UN peace-building office was established in Liberia and in 2002, the first regional peace-building office in the world, the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), was built.

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Concluding Remarks

Peacekeeping’s *sui generis* character allowed the UN to adapt it as a conflict management tool in an array of diverse conflicts around the globe in the post-Cold War era. However, the nature and scope of Africa’s humanitarian emergencies generated by conflicts at this time far exceeded the international community’s will and capacity to respond to crises in a region of limited strategic value. Political selfishness and inaction by the world’s major powers led to public peacekeeping failures in Somalia and Rwanda. At the same time, the stark absence of any adequate security structure within Africa itself capable of acting in the place of such international bad action prevented Africans from managing the conflicts on the continent. The results were unnecessary bloodshed and Africa’s disappearance from the world’s watch list for the remainder of the 1990s.

Policy changes within the US in particular, codified in PDD-25 under President Clinton, paved the path for international military non-intervention in Africa’s conflicts. Britain’s military presence on the continent followed and France, fresh out of controversy in Rwanda, recalibrated its traditionally heavy-handed ways as well. At the UN, former Secretary-General Boutros-Gali also called for a scaling back from the peacekeeping and interventionist resurgence of the immediate post-Cold War era in his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*. Crisis struck the UN, as calls for reform ensued, as well as financial, political, and logistical insufficiency, leading to delayed half-measures and a growing lack of consensus within the Security Council. Further inhibiting the organisation from greater involvement in Africa in particular was that the UN’s most powerful
members seemed content for it to exist in this state of perpetual volatility. Indeed, the diverse and often competing interests of the strongest members of the Security Council, who drive the UN’s decisions, and hence, its actions, dominated and prevented any decisive political or military involvement in Africa. Thus, according to Dr. Bruce Jones, this competition within and between governments relating to the institutional development of the UN was probably the most important factor driving the trend towards regional peacekeeping in the 1990s.

In Africa, this reassessment in the West allowed the continent’s regional and sub-regional organisations to fill the security void left by Western powers. In West Africa specifically, ECOWAS contributed significantly to bringing peace to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire through its immediate military presence and diplomatic efforts. Though armed with a strong political will to act and with significant peacekeeping experience amongst its members, the region’s political dynamics greatly restricted the organisation’s ability to manoeuvre freely and effectively. Moreover, ECOWAS’ organisational, financial, and military deficiencies were even more stretched than at the global level and were only accentuated by the regional context in which it operated.

As a substitute for actual multilateral military engagement through the UN, the US, Britain, and France chose to engage in their former colonies unilaterally, outside of a UN peace operation and mounted programmes directed at enhancing the operational capability of their former African client-states and

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366 Jones and Cherif, p. 19.
colonies to launch peace operations independently. The unilateral military expeditions launched by Britain and France in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire respectively, differed considerably based on the interests and approaches of the two major powers. The British operation worked alongside and bolstered the UN. Their mission was quickly developed into a broader long-term peace-building process that saw British troops remaining in Sierra Leone for years to build-up and train the new police and army, as per their wider peacekeeping doctrine. In Côte d’Ivoire, France’s controversial attack on FANCI and its military involvement indicated a reversion to colonial-era policies, and criticisms were quickly drawn. Its actions did little to quell suspicions over its economic and political objectives in its former colony. Indeed the varying results of these interventions demonstrate that the unilateral involvement of former colonial powers in contemporary conflicts can be extremely controversial and inappropriate, particularly when measures are taken without the consent and legitimacy of the UN.

With regards to the various assistance programmes funded by the major powers directed towards Africa, these have generally failed to address the basic lack of logistical, administrative, and military capability among ECOWAS member-states. They are therefore fundamentally flawed because the financial and military support that is provided is merely a short term solution based on donor countries’ perceptions of what is needed by the recipients. Moreover, these programmes ignore the role, and importance, of the UN and Africa’s and sub-regional organisations, focusing instead on bilateral relations with individual African states. This is perhaps one of the greater flaws of the programmes, for
they fail to recognise the value of Africa’s indigenous organisations. It also
demonstrates that it is not capability or financial and military resources that are
lacking, but rather the political will to act: and primarily in UN-led multilateral
operations. Unfortunately, it is unlikely and regrettable that this arm’s length
commitment will change as long as Western powers do not feel directly
threatened by conflicts in Africa, a stance that is increasingly difficult to morally
defend when the international community is trying to enforce general
humanitarian standards under multilateral authority.

However, the three cases examined offer some hope, for ECOWAS and
ECOMOG’s relationship with the UN and external powers have evolved
considerably from the first unilateral mission in Liberia in 1990 into a greater
partnership, as seen in the later cases of Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. Thus, a
linear progression of cooperation between ECOWAS, the UN, and the major
powers involved in conflict management within the region can be seen: UN and
regional troops have operated side-by-side in a coordinated fashion, as in Sierra
Leone and Côte d’Ivoire; UN troops have preceded or followed a regional force, as
in Liberia and Sierra Leone; and regional, UN, and national troops have operated
in an integrated fashion. Such hybrid regional peace operations, characterised by
greater cooperation and coordination between regional organisations, the UN,
and major powers, have undoubtedly facilitated the response and expanded the
quality of this response to conflicts in West Africa. It gives credence to the
argument that it is “no longer a case of either regional operations or UN
operations” but rather a time for a “smarter partnership” between regional and international institutions.

Institutional developments, as exemplified by ECOWAS' Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, have also occurred within ECOWAS itself, which could also help to ameliorate the quality of regional responses to crises. However, the implementation of the Mechanism has been delayed to emergency responses to ongoing conflicts in the region. The organisation also remains institutionally weak, as the majority of its operations have been ad hoc and in need of greater substantial political, military, and logistical wherewithal. The security wing can only be as effective as the strength of its political structure, and this currently lacks, among other things, adequate financing, political authority, and enforcement capability as well as a peacekeeping doctrine to carry out the complex peace operations that are necessary to manage the conflicts in the region. Clearly, this is due to the struggle of many of the organisation’s members to effectively control their territories and to fight extreme poverty within their borders. Political and military institutional procedures that are able to reinforce the greater organisation are therefore absent and this inherently weakens ECOWAS’ security capabilities.

For these reasons, concerns regarding ECOMOG’s long-term affordability and sustainability are serious and need to be appropriately addressed. ECOWAS must move away from its current ad hoc arrangement to a more permanent

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structure that encourages sustained military cooperation to enable it to develop more effective peace operations. This would require greater cooperation and burden-sharing between member-states and would also necessitate states to transfer more loyalty and authority to the regional organisation so that it could exercise greater regional influence and control.

Recent developments on the continent at the regional level may also contribute to strengthening ECOWAS’ conflict management capabilities. As previously stated, ECOMOG’s role has primarily developed into an interim one in peace operations, where the sub-regional organisation’s initial emergency response is handed to a UN-led multi-functional mission. Indeed, this same principle is outlined in the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF) Policy Framework and has undoubtedly influenced ECOWAS’ approach to its development of these standby forces. Thus, in accordance with this framework, the ECOWAS Defense and Security Commission has taken the lead in establishing a West African Standby Force of 6,500 soldiers that are able to be deployed rapidly in response to crises or threats to the sub-region’s peace and security.

For ECOWAS, this development within the AU and its Peace and Security Council should lead to better support from both the regional and international levels. Indeed, Britain has already pledged to help develop a peacekeeping doctrine for the West African Standby Forces. However, the capacity of ECOWAS members to provide more troops remains severely stretched. Moreover, it is national capacity and political will that will determine the availability of trained

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and equipped personnel. Thus, improving the number and quality of responses for peace operations will most effectively be achieved by supporting national capacity-building programmes, which will be strengthened if tied with a regional approach.

In West Africa, significant progress has been made towards establishing a real capability for peace operations in the region. However, the gap between aspiration and implementation remains extremely wide: although framework documents and protocols have been created and institutional structures are being built, operational capacity remains limited in the face of rising demands and expectations. Ultimately, ECOWAS still lacks institutional expertise and capacity and is comprised of some of the world’s least developed countries. Therefore, realism over what can be achieved in the short term by the organisation is required. Thus, building effective peacekeeping capacity in West Africa, and indeed Africa, will require time and a continued commitment from Africa’s many organisations, the UN, and major powers.
Appendix I

Maps

[Map of West Africa]

[Map of Liberia]
All maps are available at the UN Cartographic Section website:
List of Acronyms

ACOTA         African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance programme
ACPP          African Conflict Prevention Pool
AFL           Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC          Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
ANAD          Treaty of Non-Aggression Assistance and Mutual Defense
APC           All People's Congress
AFS           African Standby Force
AU            African Union
CAR           Central African Republic
CEMAC         Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CFA           Commmunauté économique de l’afrique de l’ouest
CPA           Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR           Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DRC           Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOBRIG       Ecowas Standby Brigade
ECOFORCE      Ecomog Force in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMICI       Ecowas Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMIL        Ecowas Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG        Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS        Economic Community of West African States
EO            Executive Outcomes
FANCI         Forces armées nationales du Côte d’Ivoire
FAR           forces armées rwandaises
FLGO          Front pour la liberation du grand-ouest
FPI           Front populaire ivoirien
FSCO          Front pour la securité du centre-ouest
gdp           gross domestic product
GPOI          Global Peace Operations Initiative
GPP           Groupe de patriotes pour la paix
ICG           International Crisis Group
IGNU          Interim Government of National Unity
INPFL         Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
IPA           International Peace Academy
LNTG          Liberian National Transitional Government
LPC           Liberian Peace Council
LUDF          Liberian United Defence Force
LURD          Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MJP           Movement for Justice and Peace
MINUCI        United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
MODEL         Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MPCI          Mouvement patriotique du Côte d'Ivoire
MPIGO         Mouvement populaire du grand-ouest
MRLM          Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Muslims
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>NF</td>
<td>Nouvelles Forces</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Opération des nations-unies du Congo</td>
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<td>PDCI</td>
<td>Partie démocratie du Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>PDD-25</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive-25</td>
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<td>PMC</td>
<td>private military company</td>
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<td>RDR</td>
<td>Rassemblement des républicains</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Renforcement des capacités de la maintien de la paix</td>
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<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone Army</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone People's Party</td>
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<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee</td>
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<td>SRSOG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
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<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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