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"Negotiating the Atrocious Past – An Exploration of the Impact of the Legacies of the Nazi-Period on the Third Generation of Post-War Germans"

by

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A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

Master of Philosophy in Justice & Transformation

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COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: __________________________ Date: __16/02/2007____
ABSTRACT

The aim of this qualitative study was to explore how the memory of the atrocious National Socialist past, and its legacies, affects a third generation of contemporary post-Second World War society Germans. In-depth, semi-structured narrative / biographical interview methods were employed to collect the data. Six grandchildren of the war-generation were interviewed in Germany; an additional two members of the sample were recruited and interviewed in South Africa (N = 8). The tape-recorded materials were transcribed and thematically analyzed drawing upon aspects of the Grounded Theory methodology to code, compare and categorize the data. Four thematic clusters emerged from this data refinement process; they are: Between Guilt and Responsibility; Conveying the Dark and Burdensome Past – A Cult of Guilt?; Struggling for Identity; and An Ambivalent Generation. Hollway & Jefferson's (2000) 'Gestaltist' approach to data analysis was used to integrate the themes in order to form a holistic frame of understanding in relation to the research question. Utilizing a framework cluster of theories, the results are discussed in relation to the concepts of intergenerational transmission of trauma, the principles of psychodynamic psychology, as well as elements of Social Identity Theory. The findings indicate that the Nazi-past remains affectively relevant to the lives of young Germans in contemporary society. A perception of continued cultural emphasis on shame and guilt vis-à-vis the past was prevalent among participants. A resulting sense of ambivalence and desire to dissociate from the painful memory upholds the inhibition to actively and directly engage with legacies of the Nazi-era. Furthermore, the results indicate that the current approach to memory management in Germany does not promote the development of a secure sense of identity among members of the third post-war generation.
## INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TITLE PAGE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Research Problem</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Memory: The Past as Existential Reference</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Narrativity: The Essential ‘Lifeline’</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Trauma: The Severed Self</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perpetrator Trauma: Tracing Guilt &amp; Shame Across Generations</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1945: The Perpetrator Trauma</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Intergenerational Transmission of Perpetrator Trauma</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Three Generations Away From The ‘Reich’: Sufficiently Removed?</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHOD</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Design</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Participants</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Data Collection</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ethical Considerations</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Data Analysis</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS &amp; DISCUSSION</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Themes</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Between Guilt &amp; Responsibility</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conveying The Dark &amp; Burdensome Past – A Cult of Guilt?</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Struggling For Identity</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The ‘Gestalt’: An Ambivalent Generation</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Significance of the Results / Study</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recommendations</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limitations of the Findings / Study</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICIES</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A: Informed Consent</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• B: Sample Interview Schedule (German)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• C: Sample Interview Schedule (English)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• D: Diagram – Concept Chart of Themes</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• E: Interview Transcript Sample</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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INTRODUCTION

“What are our possibilities for personal integration or integrity if we do not split off much that is sinister and ominous and bracket it out of our consciousness?”

(Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993, p. 3)

It is unmistakably clear that the Nazi-period, and most importantly its traumata in response to the atrocities, is still being ‘dealt with’ by millions of people - survivors, perpetrators, as well as their offspring - 60 years after the 2nd World War came to an end (Kellermann, 2001; Danieli, 1998; Auerhahn & Laub, 1998; Berger, 1990). With specific focus on (West-) German society, the traumatic rupture of the war experience has made it immensely difficult for subsequent post-war generations to claim ownership of their history (Bar-On, 1998; Behrendt, 1993).

Alexander (2004, p. 1) explains that socially and collectively relevant trauma ensues “when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, making their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways”. Accordingly, ‘dealing with the past’ has been a most contentious issue for Germans since the end of the Second World War, and the German debate around memory remains to be an awkward and controversial one (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). Geyer (1996) explains that the memorial culture of post-war society developed from outright denial, and later dissociative counter-positioning vis-à-vis the memory of the Nazi-era, to sophisticated pseudo-engagement with the legacies of that past, thereby creating “memory without praxis, history without present, brought about by an intellectual culture without public resonance” (p. 196), which continues to ‘haunt’ Germans over half a century after the Nazi regime came to an end (van Beek & Lategan, 2005).
Post-war German society had to construct pseudo-narratives to substitute the one that has inextricably linked the collective with unspeakable horror. The ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ and a focus on liberal and democratic German existence became essential denial-narratives that upheld positive self-images among post-war society (Giesen, 2004; Rensmann, 2004).

Although shifts towards more open engagement with that dark chapter of history have recently occurred within German collective consciousness, these developments still tend to be overshadowed by continued internal and external reinforcement of a generally dissociative stance among contemporary Germans in relation to the memory of the Nazi-past (Giesen, 2004; Geyer, 1996). Modern education about the Nazi-era, as well as outsider influence on present German geo-political pursuits, continue to support an ‘artificial’ maintenance of the affective salience of guilt among Germans, particularly younger members of society, thus upholding old narratives that can jeopardize the departure towards a more constructive culture of memorialization in Germany (Welzer, 2005; Olick & Levy, 1997).

Such a strained relationship with memory reflects Alexander’s (2004) above conceptualization of collective trauma: German self-understanding continues to be influenced by the legacies of the atrocious national Nazi past, and, to date, affects members of the post-war society across at least three generations. The width of this time- and generational span is exclusive in terms of research application (Berg-Schlosser, 2005). The Nazi period, the Holocaust, and its persistent influence, represent an invaluable and continuous case study for the development of knowledge, discussion and conclusions, which subsequently have the potential to enhance understandings concerning those trauma dynamics that are associated with more recent, and therefore less temporally expansive, instances of political violence and atrocities around the globe (Wiseman, Barber, Raz, Yam, Foltz, Livne-Snir, 2002). It is with this understanding in mind that the research presented here aimed to contribute to
current understandings of the legacies of Nazi terror and the Holocaust. In order to generate meaningful insights, such inquiry needs to unfold the complexities of German memory culture from the birth of post-Nazi Germany.

When the Nazi regime came to an end in 1945, war-generation Germans – those who participated in the perpetration of atrocities, and others who simply assumed the roles of bystanders and beneficiaries of the Nazi terror – chose to cover their individual Nazi-era conduct and narratives under a comprehensive veil of silence as the rebuilding of the new post-war German nation began (Giesen, 2004; Bar-On, 1989). Such creation of a ‘narrative gap’ – that is to silence the painful memory of the past and to exile it from consciousness - can become severely maladaptive, particularly if such repression occurs not only in the individual realm, but also on a collective scale (Bar-On, 1999; Auerhahn & Laub, 1998). Ruesen (2005, p. 338) notes that “history is a cultural interpretation of the past that helps to foster an understanding of present-day life”, thus clearly indicating that reference to the past – ‘the ownership of history’- is essential for the development of a sense of location in the presence. The German post-war experience, in relation to the society’s association with the Nazi past and its crimes, came to represent such a ‘rupture’ in the continuity of that interrelationship (Bar-On, 1999; Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993). The reality of the aftermath of the fall of Nazi-Germany was dramatically overwhelming for the population. The overt confrontation with German heinous war conduct and the associated feelings of guilt, shame and loss were dramatically intrusive experiences (Rensmann, 2004; Bar-On, 1999; Bar-On, 1993). They were too painful to relate to in a historical-narrative sense, thus creating a pattern of general dissociation from that chapter of German history among the population, which has resulted in a continuous inability among Germans to identify with their nationality (Giesen, 2004; Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993; Bar-On, 1989).

Such an interpretation of the German post-war situation, in terms of the above notion of a ‘rupture’, is conceptually supported by drawing on Ruesen’s
(2005) understanding of 'memory', which he conceptualizes to be "the constitutive factor of history" (p. 338) that provides people with a framework for guidance in their daily existence (Ie Goff, 1992). The well-documented "conspiracy of silence" (Danieli, 1998, p.4) – first conceived in relation to the post-war experiences of survivors of the holocaust, but later also linked to the German experience by Bar-On (1989) – and which surrounded the Nazi-period in the decades that followed the end of the war, clearly indicates that Germans commonly avoided 'touching' memories of that era as a frame of reference to inform their lives (Hardtmann, 1998; Hecker, 1993). This refusal to mention the Nazi-German past created a break in the continuity of the "web of meaning" (Giesen, 2004, p. 113) that human beings commonly rely on to form an identity and to make sense of their present (Ruesen, 2005; Ie Goff, 1992).

Despite all efforts to silence the past, beginning in the 1970s, the painful reality of Nazi-era memories 'reemerged' unexpectedly in West Germany in form of fictional television programs. These depicted the days of Nazi rule in all detail from the perspective of the individual, thus confronting the war-generation with the atrocious Nazi legacy to the extent that "they saw themselves for the first time in the double of the fictional image" as perpetrators and bystanders, thus emerging the self-concept which they had tried to exile from memory after 1945 (Naumann, 2000; Geyer, 1996, p. 184, Zielinski & Custance, 1980). Bearing witness to these developments, for the first time their children – the 2nd generation - became consciously aware of what had been hidden from them in their families (Bar-On, 1989). Subsequently, they began to raise questions regarding the involvement and conduct of their parents during the Nazi years. Some members of the 2nd generation, shocked by the possibility of family association with Nazi-terror, went as far as to assume accusatory positions in relation to their parents in an attempt to distance themselves from association with the atrocious past (Giesen, 2004; Anhalt, 1993). The result was an intergenerational conflict that constituted a degree of painful, disturbing, and awkward engagement with the issues that could no longer be avoided within
society (Hecker, 1993). However, these efforts of 'confronting' the historical burden in relation to the Nazi-German past were hesitant, short-lived, ambiguous, and frequently saturated with attempts that aimed to, like the silence of the parents, dissociate, rationalize and minimize the magnitude of the Nazi crimes (Betts, 2002; Safran, 2000; Bar-On, 1989). As a result, this reluctant initial engagement failed to generate sufficiently prevalent and enduring confrontation with the Nazi past throughout German society, thereby failing to 'mend' the web of meaning that had ruptured in 1945 (Bar-On, 1999). Inevitably, silence prevailed and continued to exert its influence, thus beginning to adversely affect a further – the 3rd – generation of post-war Germans (Hecker, 1993).

The 1980s saw the emergence of another, and presently developing, form of discussion surrounding the "brief and dark historical episode" (del Caro & Ward, 2000, p. vii) in public and political spheres in West Germany. Its main effect has been the creation of a culture of memorialization that requires members of the most recent (3rd) post-war generation to grow up in an environment in which the acquisition of knowledge about the Nazi-era is paramount (Giesen, 2004; Rensmann, 2004). Although still severely plagued by the aforementioned controversial rationalization and, more prevalently, normalization discourse, this 'new' wave of engagement has yielded more constructive or open debate across the strata of the German social realm, but it has equally upheld the culture of dissociation in more sophisticated ways and therefore needs to observed with a critical eye (Welzer, 2005; Rensmann, 2004; Feldman, 2003; Betts, 2002; Naumann, 2000).

The most recent significant developments, relating to the debate about contemporary German society's position vis-à-vis the atrocious past, unfolded during the events of the 2006 Soccer World Cup in Germany. In an apparently unprecedented manner, Germans, for the first time in post-Nazi German history, exhibited an unusual degree of public expression of national 'pride'. The national colours were displayed everywhere, and Germans voiced enthusiastic solidarity
with their country to an extent that, as noted by Purvis (2006), “threatened to outdo even America’s love affair with the red, white and blue” (p. 30). This unheard of behaviour on part of the German public was noted throughout the international press and, subsequently, propelled the question regarding contemporary Germans’ relationship with the past onto the centre-stage of national and international public debate (Purvis, 2006).

What creates the significant character of these displays, and induced the subsequent public discussion thereof, is the fact that the German ‘trauma’ of the Second World War is firmly grounded in the association of that nationality with incomparable evil. Since 1945 post-Nazi society has been unable to affiliate itself with being ‘German’ in order to inform one’s identity (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). Attempting to do so has meant to deconstruct any possibility of upholding a positive self-image, because the own nationality automatically re-surfaces the bitter memory of the Nazi-era (Giesen, 2004). However, it appears as if Germans seized the opportunity to use the hosting of the international tournament as an opportunity to demonstrate the benign nature of a modern society that is incongruent with the image of the Nazi-past. The question is if this self-understanding transfers from the edges of a soccer pitch to broader society. In other words, does this free and open re-embracement of the own nationality constitute comfortable integration of the bitter Nazi memory or is it simply another attempt at ‘forgetting’ the shameful past?

Despite their debatable value in terms of ‘dealing with the past’ constructively, these transitional developments are suggestive of differential historical-cultural milieus in which (West-) Germans have engaged with the Nazi-period and its atrocities, thus implying an altered relationship with these legacies across generations (Giesen, 2004; Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993; Bar-On, 1989).
Insights into those intergenerational dynamics that have been affecting the first and second generations appear to be abundant, and a number of theoretical approaches have become well established since the advent of this avenue of research in the mid-1960s (Danieli, 1998). However, Fossion, Rejas, Servais, Pelc, and Hirsch (2003), as well as Danieli (1998), emphasize that current understandings in the realm of multigenerational effects of trauma in relation to atrocities are anything but exhaustive, and thus require further investigation. This assertion is particularly true with regards to the 3rd generation level, since it has only become available for observation a few years ago with the birth and coming of age of the grandchildren of survivors and perpetrators of the Nazi-regime. Given the present research focus on the German context, Rensmann (2004) concurs with this observation, stating that “the most interesting cohort is the “third generation” of West Germans (those born after 1970 or after)”, and that “members of this generation are the first who grew up in a substantially democratized environment in which the Holocaust and national guilt” had become a dominating topic in the public sphere (p. 174).

Bar-On et al. (1998a) report that transgenerational dynamics appear to be still present at that generational level, albeit not as pronounced and elaborate as those of the 2nd generation. Living in an affluent and largely cosmopolitan society, young Germans are able to ignore references to the Nazi past, or to ‘engage’ with them in a more depersonalized and abstract manner in the context of textbooks or the public media (Rensmann, 2004; Giesen, 2004; Safran, 2000; Bar-On et al., 1998a). In line with this approach to memory, Safran (2000) concludes that Germans of the 3rd generation generally perceive themselves as being free of the shame and guilt that is associated with the 1st and 2nd generations’ relationship with the Nazi past. He suspects that 3rd generation offspring of Nazi-era grandparents can appear to be sufficiently removed from the original context of perpetration of crimes and atrocities, or inaction in response to them, to suggest evidence for the ability of the grandchildren to relate to that period of German history openly and in the absence of emotions of
guilt and shame (Rensmann, 2004; Safran, 2000). However, the results from Bar-On et al. (1998a) indicate that such self-perceptions may well be misleading, and are thus insufficient, to conclude a nonexistence of these feelings among 3rd generation post-Nazi era Germans.

Drawing on the researcher’s insider perspective as a 3rd generation young German, it seems reasonable to infer that memory of the Nazi period does indeed remain to be affectively relevant. Undoubtedly, life in modern German society is diverse, cosmopolitan and materialistically abundant enough to ‘side-step’ the legacies of the past for most of the time. However, the ‘bitter aftertaste’ continues to be palatable. The media salience of neo-Nazism in Germany bring to the fore the shameful association among members of the 3rd generation with that which is unspeakably evil. Contemporary high school education puts strong emphasis on the presence of responsibility in relation to the ‘dark and burdensome’ chapter of history. Under these circumstances assertions of diminished relevance of the legacies of the Nazi terror among younger Germans may need to be treated with caution and certainly warrant further investigation.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

In accordance with this need for additional research, the present study was conceptualized to explore what influence the ‘legacies’ of the atrocious National Socialist past have on young Germans of the 3rd post-war generation.

Albeit the exploratory and therefore relatively wide-scoped nature of this study, the available, yet ambivalent, insights (see for example Safran, 2000 and Bar-On et al., 1998a) outlined above suggested the inclusion of a number of more specific areas of interest from the outset of data collection. Although not taking the concrete form of exclusive ‘research questions’, the following, more narrow foci were ‘embedded’ within the broader frame of inquiry and thus integrated into the original interview schedule materials:
• An inquiry into the presence of experiences of guilt and shame in response to the memory of the Nazi-past among members of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} generation.

• An investigation of the effects of Nazi-era education and teaching style on young Germans' relationship with the painful memory.

• An exploration of identity construction among the 3\textsuperscript{rd} generation of post-war Germans in contemporary society.

The present research was framed in adherence to the qualitative paradigm. The interest was to gain experiential, subjective insights with respect to the area under investigation. In-depth, semi-structured interview methods were employed to generate data to that extent. The researcher traveled to Germany to select participants and to conduct the majority of the interviews. A strategy of convenience sampling, incorporating 'gatekeeper' and 'snowballing approaches', was used to select participants. The resulting interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed for in-depth examination. This analysis was conducted drawing on aspects of Grounded Theory methodology, as well as 'Gestaltist' techniques. This approach facilitated the development of rich qualitative themes and holistic explanatory schemes, which revealed a number of insights that are of value to current understandings in the area of psychological dynamics of transgenerational trauma in response to political violence and mass atrocities at the 3\textsuperscript{rd} generation level.

It is worthwhile to note that the coincidence of the running of the Soccer World Cup during data collection was most advantageous for the depth of this research. The events provided a vivid and immediate background against which participants were inescapably compelled to ground their subjective and
experiential insights in relation to the influences of the memory of the Nazi-past on their lives.

The remainder of the thesis will address the research aspects introduced above in more detail. Firstly, the theoretical basis that guided and framed a meaningful discussion of the results will be outlined immediately below. This section is followed by a review of selected literature that is pertinent to this study. A detailed outline of the research design and methodology will be given before the results, and the discussion thereof, are addressed concomitantly. The thesis will conclude with indications of, and recommendations from, significant insights that emerged from the research, as well as an acknowledgement of the limitations of this study.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to explore the influence of the Nazi-period on the grandchildren of war-generation a cluster of established theoretical concepts was deemed useful to frame the present research endeavor.

Firstly, the inter-generational communication pattern termed 'conspiracy of silence' is of crucial pertinence to the theoretical anchoring of this study. The phenomenon was first observed in relation to Holocaust survivors, but later discovered to be equally evident in Nazi-perpetrator families (see Danieli, 1998; Bar-On, 1989). An event that is perceived as profoundly disturbing and horrible may be experienced as being too overwhelming for adequate coping. In such a situation the only apparent available alternative is to remain silent about the painful memories in order to avoid the recurring emotional distress that interferes with life after trauma (Wiseman et al., 2002; Danieli, 1998). It is this silence that represents a fundamental component of the transmission dynamics that have been affecting subsequent post-war generations in Germany (Bar-On et al., 1998).
After the war the predominant emotional experience of Nazi-generation Germans were overwhelming feelings of guilt and shame in response to their undeniable connection with a German ‘Reich’ that had perpetrated horrendous crimes (Hardtmann, 1998). These emotions had to be defended against by repressing the associated memories and remaining silent, especially so in the family realm (Hecker, 1993). The works of Bar-on (1998a & 1989) and Hardtmann (1998 & 1982) suggest that, given the extensive collaboration of German society during the Nazi-era, this need to remain silent affected post-1945 Germany on a collective scale (Giesen, 2004; Bar-On, 1989). The resulting ‘narrative gap’ had profound consequences for the offspring of the war generation, as they were unable to rely on a coherent narrative to make sense of their lives in post-war Germany (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). It was this transmitted sense of fragmentation, or ‘dislocation’, which formed the core of the trauma experienced by the 2nd generation of post-Nazi Germans (Giesen, 2004; Brison, 2000).

Even though the relationship with the atrocious national history was re-framed in the decades after the war ended, from memory repression to moralization, both strategies constituted attempts at dissociation (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Giesen, 2004). Given the fact that this general pattern of multigenerational interaction with the Nazi-past persisted for as long as the late 1980s, it is reasonable to suspect that members of the 3rd generation – those born after 1970 – grew up in exposure to the adverse conditions of ‘narrative dislocation’ as well (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Safran, 2000).

Because self-understanding among the younger members of contemporary German society is inevitably linked to their relationship with the past, it is essential to locate the findings of this study in the German experience of ‘coping’ with memories of the NS-period and the Holocaust across generations (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Ruesen, 2005; Giesen, 2004; Behrendt, 1993). Accordingly, the theoretical basis of this study strongly draws on the concepts of
multigenerational transmission of trauma to explore some of the questions addressed below.

The second theoretical background used here is closely related to the above understandings of transgenerational trauma. The 'conspiracy of silence' is predominantly grounded in the psychodynamic concepts of 'denial' and 'splitting' in response to the overwhelming feelings of shame and guilt of the post-war context (Danieli, 1998; Hardtmann, 1998).

Denial is a defense strategy that constitutes a failure to acknowledge an unacceptable, painful or threatening, truth (e.g. atrocities) or emotion (e.g. guilt or shame), and to admit it into consciousness (Brown & Pedder, 1991). Splitting, also a defense mechanism, involves the division of objects – events or people - into polarized 'all-good' or 'all-bad' categories. Segal (1978) identifies this unconscious defense strategy as a common mechanism for coping in confrontation with the own 'evil' (e.g. the commitment of atrocities). Splitting allowed Nazi collaborators to assign absolute blame for heinous war crimes to those members of the Nazi-elite who were convicted at the Nurnberg tribunal, thereby perceiving the self as perfectly innocent. The prevalence of these strategies in post-1945 Germany was extensive, and, as parts of the 'conspiracy of silence', they were instrumental in the transgenerational transmission of the German 'perpetrator trauma' (Hecker, 1993; Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993). As such, these dynamics are bound to have had significant effects on the ways in which these subsequent generations have related to the darkest chapter of German history and need to be included in this research (Giesen, 2004; Hardtmann, 1998).

Lastly, aspects of the social psychological framework of Social Identity Theory (SIT), as conceptualized below by drawing on the understandings of Taylor and Moghaddam (1987), was used to theoretically locate and discuss participants' self-understanding, or identity, as members of contemporary
Germany society. SIT is most useful because it is specifically concerned with identity conceptualization dynamics. The theory stipulates that identity operates on a continuum between a personal and a social pole. The individual relates to a personal identity, as well as to a social one that is constructed through affiliation with social groups. The relative salience of either pole is contextually determined. It is important to note that social group membership is not only defined by the individual concerned, but also by others in the relevant context (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Of central relevance to this identity management complex is the self-understanding of the individual in relation to her affiliation with a group. The maintenance of a positive self-image is an essential, and thus strong, motivator of human behaviour. A threat to that self-concept, subsequently diminishing self-esteem, mobilizes the individual to change by employing various strategies aimed at rectifying the threatened self-image (identity management).

The immediate post-war situation illustrates the above dynamics of SIT in relation to the research topic. A primary strategy of the National Socialist regime was to use propaganda to emphasize the superiority of the ‘Germanic race’, thereby lifting individual self-esteem in the process of increasing the salience of a common positive ‘German’ social identity. After 1945, the Allied Powers, rather than Germans themselves, reinforced this social identity. In the immediate post-war context, the clear distinction between the victorious ‘Allies’ and defeated Germans, who were subsequently confronted and associated with the criminal-atrocious conduct of Nazi Germany, maintained identity salience at the social pole of the SIT spectrum. However, instead of leading to a positive self-evaluation in response to an in-group / out-group (German vs. Allies) social comparison, German self-understanding was severely threatened and self-esteem was low (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Austin & Worchel, 1979).

As implicated by SIT, such a situation prompts individuals to initiate some form of change. The nature / strategy of that change is contingent on a number of dimensions within the relevant context. For example, if the boundaries between
the social groups are rigid, a redefinition of the comparison dimension may be attempted to enhance self-image. A shift of attention from war ‘performance’ / conduct to post-war industrial performance in West Germany - the ‘economic miracle’ - can be understood to that extent (Giesen, 2004). Equally, if social change is severely constrained in a given context, identification with the out-group may be the only feasible option. The post-war ‘Americanization’ of West German society is suggestive of the conceptual presence of such a strategy (Kaemper, 2004).

Furthermore, SIT remains similarly applicable with regards to the 2nd generation. For example, the concerted efforts of the ’68 generation to construct a ‘leftist counter-identity’ can be understood as an attempt to dis-identify with the in-group, i.e. the parental 1st generation, its ‘denial German national identity’ and strong social-identity relationship with the atrocities committed during the Nazi-era (Giesen, 2004).

Re-emphasizing that dissociative attitudes towards the Nazi-past in Germany persisted well into the late 1980s, it is probable that self-understanding among young Germans continues to be affected in a manner that is conceptually close to those identity management dynamics of previous generations (Rensmann, 2004). Henceforth, it was expected that, utilizing aspects of SIT to trace developments and transitions of self-understanding in post-Nazi Germany, an appropriate basis was generated to explore and unfold how young Germans of Nazi-era family background understand themselves in relation to the Nazi-period 60 years after the end of the war. The review of research pertinent literature that follows immediately below will address and unfold a number of the framework-related theoretical concepts in more detail.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The body of literature addressing Nazi-era atrocities, and the Holocaust in particular, is extensive, and relevant insights come from a multitude of academic disciplines. Considering the various constrains associated with the completion of a minor thesis as part of a coursework & dissertation Master’s degree program, the following discussion of the research significant literature should not be understood as, and is not intended to be, exhaustive in nature. Acknowledging this situation of limited time frame and dissertation length, a number of key areas – contextually embedded within the research focus - were refined, and a number of essential pieces of literature identified and selected for review inclusion in each area (Mouton, 2001). The following conceptually relevant literature themes are outlined below: the role of memory in framing the present; the essential nature of narratives in the process of self-understanding; trauma as a result of a severed relationship with the past; the key dynamics underlying the transmission of perpetrator trauma in Germany; and available insights into the struggle for self-understanding among members of the 3rd generation of post-Nazi era Germans.

MEMORY: THE PAST AS EXISTENTIAL REFERENCE

The central concern of this study revolves around the effects of a chapter of national history on the contemporary self-understanding of members of that society 60 years after the events. Le Goff (1992) stresses that the distinction between past and present is an absolute necessity for the organization of human existence, since it provides a framework for the establishment of self-understanding and a sense of temporal location. Such organization thus needs to be grounded in a coherent conceptualization of the present through an awareness of the past, which manifests in form of memory (Kenny, 1999). It follows then that memory is the substantial source from which self-understanding, or identity, is formulated (Alexander, 2004; Fuchs, 2002).
Ruesen (2005) indicates that groups, such as societies, depend upon collective memories to define who they are and to distinguish themselves from others, i.e. to define a collective identity (Kenny, 1999; le Goff, 1992). He further explains that groups' “togetherness with each other and differences from others is presented by means of historical symbols (my emphasis) of shared significance” (p. 339), which become essential markers for the memory that informs the social and political culture of the group, as well as its identity.

Nazi-Germany was saturated with such symbolic markers of memory, for example the flags, the elaborate uniforms and the grandiose memorials. These symbols were made salient, and often contextually re-framed from other contexts, such as Bismarck's benignly used emphasis on the Volk (the 'unity of the people'), to incite and unite a group of people of 'higher racial purity' in their quest for superiority over the Jewry of Europe (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). As a consequence, these markers ultimately came to constitute a memory of terror and mass murder that is commonly conceptualized as being unprecedented and incomparable in magnitude and nature (Danieli, 1998; Jarausch, 1988). Van Beek and Lategan (2005) stress that, because of this tainted memory / identity (the inextricable association of German nationality of incomparable horror), “the Nazi regime and the Nazi past played an antithetic (my emphasis) constitutive role in the process of laying the foundations” (p. 362) for a post-Nazism Germany. Consequently, the ‘new’ Federal Republic was built in the explicit absence of salient markers of memory in order to avoid any, even symbolic, association with Nazi-Germany (Olick & Levy, 1997). Such a weak starting point of ‘new’ German collectivity, reinforced by the individual need of the people to ‘silence’ the atrocious Nazi past, created a ‘void’ of coherent collective memory (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). The result has been an immense difficulty for subsequent German generations to develop a secure sense of identity in relation to their nationality.
Since the end of the Nazi regime, three distinct periods of Nazi-era memory management have differentially affected the struggle for identity in Germany (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Olick, 1998; Olick & Levy, 1997). In the years following 1945 German society was primarily preoccupied with moving beyond the Nazi-era - avoiding the painful memories thereof - rather than to face up to the past in any constructive manner (Olick, 1998). Bar-On’s (1989) conceptualization of the perpetrator ‘wall of silence’ across German post-war society – that is the repression of the emotions of shame and guilt - is at the heart of memory management during that phase, which persisted until the late 1960s (Hardtmann, 1998, Geyer, 1996).

The following period was marked by concerted efforts, particularly in the political realm, to move Germany above the painful memories by means of moralization and normalization of the past (Olick & Levi, 1997). The idea was to pursue “an explicit identification with the victims and a moral condemnation of the perpetrators (my emphasis)” (van Beek & Lategan, 2005, p. 363), thus indicating moralization, in order to free German society from being "held hostage to Auschwitz" (Olick & Levy, 1997, p. 921) in terms of geopolitical conduct in the post-war context, which constitutes normalization. Although this shift in memory management was constructed to represent engagement with the atrocious past, these changes amounted to nothing more than another attempt to dissociate from the past by focusing on the atrocious deeds of the perpetrators only, thereby absolving the rest of German (Nazi-) society from the weight of their burden (Giesen, 2004).

The last, and still ongoing, period of German Nazi-memory culture has been developing since the German re-unification of 1989. During this phase, the previous dissociative strategies of memory management have fallen to pieces (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). The transition involved in the mending of East and West Germany brought to the fore a critical evaluation of those processes that informed the development of the two nations after 1945. These had to include a
reflection on the effects of the Nazi memory on national political organization (Olick, 1998). The result has been a more open engagement with the memories of the Nazi-period in the public realm (Naumann, 2000). Rensmann (2004) finds that post-1989 German society appears to confront the legacies of guilt and shame associated with the Nazi past, which would indicate that “those who attempt to efface Holocaust memory in Germany will fight an uphill battle against now (my emphasis) established traditions of memory” (p. 182).

These periodical changes seemed to have chronologically unfolded in congruence with the naissance of the three Nazi-era subsequent generations in Germany. The war generation tried to suppress their memories (Hardtmann, 1998). Conversely, the members of the 2nd generation, using the changing political milieu of the late 1960s, i.e. the turn from conservative post-war politics to a more liberal, leftist grounded approach to governance, protested the silence (Schmidtke, 1999). However, because of their own feelings of shame, this counter-stance was merely symptomatic of their need for denial (Giesen, 2004). The 3rd generation, coming of age in an environment that has been more open towards engagement with Nazi-memory, has had access to information regarding that chapter of German history, but the process remains painful and active personal engagement can not be conceptualized as a certainty (Rensmann, 2004; Bar-On et al., 1998a).

Although memory management has transformed over the decades, what appears to have remained constant across all generation is an inability to comprehensively bridge the ‘gap’ that ensued when the coherent sense of memory was severed by the commitment of atrocities at the hands of Nazi Germans during the Second World War (Safran, 2000; Bar-On et al., 1998a; Hardtmann, 1998; Bar-On, 1989). Whereas previous generations – the first and second - experienced a more direct affective link with shame and guilt in relation to the Nazi-crimes, hence the prevalence of dissociation from those memories, the third generation’s relationship in that respect seems to be somewhat
removed (Rensmann, 2004). The grandchildren of the war generation appear to be more ambivalent about their 'role' as members of the complex of perpetrators and bystanders (Bar-On et al., 1998a).

Ruesen (2005) explains that "every organized form of human life needs legitimacy, and this legitimacy often comes in form of narratives that tell people why their lives are organised (sic.) in this and not another way, and why the particular form of organisation (sic.) is good for them" (p. 337). German post-war politics – the organization of the nation – has been strongly influenced by the memory of the Nazi-period (Olick, 1998; Olick & Levy, 1997). In other words, the organization of post-1945 Germany, the Federal Republic, and the unified Germany is closely related to the manner in which the members of German post-war generations have chosen to conceptualize the painful memories of the Nazi-past.

Between 1945 and 1989 the apparent legitimacy of national organization was partly derived from that which was being silenced and excluded through the various approaches to dissociation, or 'covered' with substitute narratives such as that of the 'economic miracle' (Giesen, 2004). Under these circumstances, pseudo-narratives of national organization provided a sufficiently coherent image of legitimacy in the decades between the end of the war and the re-unification (Ruesen, 2005). However, reconsidering the apparent degree of affective removal of the 3rd generation, and the political changes since 1989, the legitimacy of the Nazi-era memory-informed organization of German self-understanding might be less convincing to young Germans today (Safran, 2000). These dynamics highlight the fundamental nature of narrativity to the intergenerational processes that have affected Germans’ relationship with the Nazi legacies.

What remains is the fact that post-Nazi period Germans have constructed their lives in the absence of a coherent narrative in relation to the memory of the
past, which renders the development of a secure self-understanding highly problematic (Kearney, 2002; Frankl, 1985). Given the significance of these concepts to the present research, it appears necessary to briefly discuss narrativity in the context of the strained multigenerational German relationship with the Nazi era. The relevant dynamics will be outlined in detail immediately below.

**NARRATIVITY: THE ESSENTIAL ‘LIFELINE’**

van Beek and Lategan (2005) support the assertion that self-understanding in the present is crucially dependent not only on identity, but also the narratives thereof, which establish “a relationship with the past and extol the virtues and special qualities of a group by building its identity in contrast to the images of the “other” (sic.)” (van Beek & Lategan, 2005, p.353). Applying this understanding to the case of Germany in relation to the Nazi-era, it becomes immediately clear that it is impossible for contemporary Germans to find positive grounds for self-reference in the ‘virtues’ of the Nazi-past. The symbols of the Third Reich, as well as the reinforcement of certain ‘German qualities’, primarily revolved around such ideas as the pursuit of ‘racial purity’ and the waging of violent aggressive warfare across Europe. The result is an inability to connect within a coherent identity narrative, which is essential to inform a secure and comfortable location of the self in the present (Langer, 1994). According to Kearney (2002), “narrativity is what marks, organises (sic.) and clarifies temporal existence; and that every historical process is recognised (sic.) as such to the degree that it can be recounted” (p. 130). In other words, a coherent and continuous narrative is imperative to be able to make sense of the self.

In order to remain coherent, narratives have to be conveyed from one generation to the next, traditionally in form of ‘story telling’, or simply by being embedded in the process of transference of knowledge and guidance from elders to younger members of society (Kearney, 2002; Valdes, 1991). This essential
mechanism broke down in German society with the end of the Nazi regime in 1945 (Rosenthal & Voelter, 1998; Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993).

In order to ward off feelings of guilt and shame, the war generation had to ‘sever’ the continuity of the ‘German narrative’ to protect themselves from these powerful and painful emotions, thereby setting the stage for the true “legacies of silence” that have been affecting subsequent generations of Germans ever since (Bar-On, 1989). Laub (1991) explains that “one has to know one’s buried truth in order to be able to live one’s life” (p. 77). It is precisely this fundamental association of narrativity that has instigated the vexed transgenerational relationship with Nazi memory throughout German post-war society (Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993). The truth about what happened during ‘those years’ was buried, thereby creating the ‘narrative gap’, and a ‘void’ in which the absence of symbolic markers have made it impossible to develop a secure identity in the context of contemporary Germany (Rensmann, 2004). This ‘wound’ of identity constitutes a principal aspect of the German trauma after the end of the Second World War (Bar-On, 1989). In order to investigate the transgenerational effects of this severed relationship it is important to highlight the manner in which dynamics of psychological trauma operate in this context.

**TRAUMA: THE SEVERED SELF**

The above notion of a ‘gap’ is central to the conceptualization of any experience of psychological trauma. It constitutes a ‘fragmentation’ of the self to which Kearney’s (2002) aforementioned ‘clarity of temporal existence’ is critical. The trauma “involves a radical disruption of memory, severing the past from present and, typically, an inability to envision a future”, thereby rendering impossible the crucial process of locating one’s existence within a coherent life narrative (Brison, 2000, p. 39; Auerhahn & Laub, 1998; Langer, 1994).
At the heart of such a shattered relationship are unbearable emotions, associated with the traumatic memory, that need to be processed; however, since the traumatic experience is so profoundly disturbing, normal memory processing strategies are inadequate to incorporate such experiences into a coherent narrative (Herman, 1992). As a result, the mind attempts to suppress these traumatic memories and related painful emotions in order to dissociate from the disturbing events (Wastell, 2005). Such a response to trauma may appear to be proactive, since any efforts at re-visiting the dreadful aspects of the past essentially threaten to obliterating any sense of 'residual' functional integrity that may remain after the shattering experiences have been exiled from narrative memory, and would therefore be too high a cost to bear (Hayner, 2001; Delbo, 1990). This - in actual fact self-defeating - attempt at coping represents the grasp for a straw that can keep the individual functional in order to have what appears to be the only chance to somehow continue to be able manage the present and to envisage a future (Herman, 1992).

However, in this state of fragmentation the mind attempts to reconnect that which became severed in the face of unbearable emotions. The central dynamic here is marked by the fact that traumatic memory can not be integrated into a coherent narrative structure; rather it is somatically stored "in form of vivid sensations and images" that can be triggered spontaneously in otherwise harmless everyday situations (Herman, 1992, p. 38). This process of intrusion directly undermines the ill-fated coping attempts outlined above. The result is a profoundly malignant 'tug-of-war' of memory that is most debilitating in nature, because it keeps alive the rupture between memory, meaning and identity (Wastell, 2005; Auerhahn & Laub, 1998; Frankl, 1985). It represents the paradoxical realm of traumatic memory: the internal struggle between dissociation from the past, the attempt to exile the experiences from consciousness, and the intrusive and horrifying flashes of memory thereof, which reach up from the depths of the unconsciousness to bring back the terror of the past (Herman, 1992).
In this internal battle of negotiating these powerful tensions, finding an avenue to reconnect past, present and future becomes the only way to stand a chance of re-locating the self within an existence that is marked by an experience of meaning (Brison, 2000; Kearney, 2002; Frankl, 1985). It appears, however, that German post-war generations have been unable to mend this vital connection and therefore remain adversely affected by the dynamics of psychological trauma (Rensmann, 2004; Safran, 2000; Bar-On et al., 1998; Hardtmann, 1998). Consequently, to be able to meaningfully interpret the relationship with the Nazi past among young Germans today, it is imperative to trace the dynamics and effects of the German trauma across the post-war generations.

**PERPETRATOR TRAUMA: TRACING GUILT & SHAME ACROSS GENERATIONS**

**1945: The Perpetrator Trauma**

When the Allied Forces finally overcame Hitler’s Third Reich in 1945, the German population was confronted with the consequences of their war conduct. Being faced with the magnitude of the Nazi crimes and terror, post-war reality was too horrible, painful and overwhelming to acknowledge what had happened (Hardtmann, 1998). All symbols of the strongly reinforced German wartime self-concept were stained with evil and atrocity, making it impossible for members of the war-generation to relate to them in a post-war context (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). In this environment the post-1945 society felt “defeated, debased” (Hardtmann, 1998, p. 88), and disgraced in the face of their guilt in relation to the Nazi terror.

The enormous extent to which the vast majority of the German population collaborated with the National Socialist regime during the war resulted in the fact that this affective state permeated the breadth of post-war society (Rosenthal, 2002; Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993). In order to be able to continue, the own
stake in that atrocious and criminal past had to be forgotten and denied, and associated memories suppressed or split off from consciousness (Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993; Hardtmann, 1982). Accordingly, members of German society during the Nazi-period - the 1st generation - chose to engage, similar to the survivor generation of the Holocaust, in the aforementioned ‘conspiracy of silence’ within their families after 1945, albeit for different reasons. Survivors resorted to absolute silence in order to protect their offspring from the horrors of their Holocaust experience (Danieli, 1998). For war generation Germans the decisive factor to exclude the Nazi-past from memory and narrative rested with the need to protect themselves by attempting to construct identities in absence of any link with the Nazi terror, thereby being able to uphold a tolerable self-image (Rosenthal, 2002). Their silence was a response to experiences of trauma that was induced by devastating emotions of guilt and shame that haunted them in response to their actions - or inactions - between 1933-1945 (Rosenthal, 2002; Hardtmann, 1998; Rosenthal & Voelter, 1998; Bar-On, 1989).

However, it is vital understand that the German ‘post-war trauma’ did not exclusively develop around the identification with the perpetration of atrocities. In addition, and largely ignored until recently, Germans themselves, as soldiers and civilians, were exposed to, and traumatically affected by, the full magnitude of the horrors of large-scale warfare (Giesen, 2004; Safran, 2000). For any significant analysis of the trauma that affected the population in the post-war context it is imperative to acknowledge that, eventually, the war was fought, to a large extent, in Germany and among the civilian population.

The fruitless Allied efforts to limit Nazi German industrial capacity through conventional aerial bombings from 1940 resulted in a change of strategy later during the war in terms of ordnance used and targets pursued, when indiscriminate firebombing campaigns, which comprehensively ‘leveled’ many larger cities, were carried out to shock and demoralize the German people (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Buruma, 1994). Besides nearly 11 million (killed &
wounded) German battlefield casualties, these attacks, and ensuing ‘firestorms’, killed and wounded – exact numbers are believed to be impossible to ascertain - millions of German civilians before the war was over in 1945 (Giesen, 2004; Stokesbury, 2004).

Such ‘strategies’, as well as other questionable displays of cruelty as part of Allied war conduct – for example the rape of Germany women at the hands of advancing troops – were not to be addressed in the aftermath of the war (Buruma, 1994). The victorious powers made explicitly clear to German post-war society that the Nazi nation was in no position to claim injustices committed against them, in order to, as objectified by US military advocate Col. Bernays, arouse “the German people to a sense of their guilt, and to a realization of their responsibility for the crimes committed by their government” (Smith, 1982, p. 35). This sentiment was institutionalized at the Nürnberg Trials, where it was procedurally ruled out that the accused could claim _tu quoque_ in defense of their deeds, i.e. to point out that the Allied Forces had committed comparable human rights violations against Germans (Buruma, 1994). In this environment of dictated ‘moral constrain’ the experience of loss among Germans was profoundly traumatic, because post-war society was denied any opportunity to mourn the members of their families who had lost their lives as a result of the war (Giesen, 2004).

Consequently, the notion of ‘Germans as victims’ became a taboo conceptualization after 1945 (Geyer, 1996). Claiming this position is often rejected as “reactionary, conservative or revisionist”, and it continues to be a most controversial issue to this day (van Beek & Lategan, 2005, p. 364). In fact, many Germans themselves reject the idea of ‘suffering’ because of fear of being accused of “Jewish envy” (Safran, 2000, p. 43) - seizing the role that _belongs_ to the victims of the Holocaust and Nazi terror. Laub (1991) stresses that the acknowledgement of victims is an essential component of mourning, which is critical for the ability to process the loss, to conceptualize a future ahead, and to
uphold one’s identity narrative (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). The German inability to mourn and acknowledge the nation’s ‘victims’ after the end of the Nazi regime meant that the war generation had to exile the images of their lost family members and friends from recollection in order to stand a chance of being able to move ahead (Hardtmann, 1998; Geyer, 1996).

In such a vacuum of repressed personal memories – the basis for self-reference – a post-war narrative gap developed that begot the profound difficulties of identity formation among the war generation in the period after the war, and which have been affecting Germans ever since (Giesen, 2004). Frankl (1985) notes that, under such circumstances, a sense of loss of beacons for self-reference within the life story ensues, resulting in a seemingly hopeless toil to continue to find meaning in one’s existence. This internal struggle transcends the individual realm through what Dori Laub (1991) calls “the loss of a sense of human relatedness (sic.)” (p. 78), thereby supporting the notion of a post-war German trauma on a collective scale (Ruesen, 2005; Giesen, 2004; Kenny, 1999).

Acknowledging the affective presence of guilt and shame across society, Heimannsberg and Schmidt (1993) reiterate that such emotions were experienced as being impossible to bear, but, consequently, the choice of (collective-) silence as a response “is paralyzing, and things which have been kept secret and repressed return in other forms” (p. 3). Hardtmann (1998) explains that the aforementioned psychodynamic defense strategies need to be understood as attempts at adaptation and coping in the post-war context. However, as conceptually outlined in relation to the dynamics of psychological trauma, such dissociative coping efforts are bound to fail because of the intrusive and involuntary nature of traumatic memory (Wastell, 2005; Herman, 1992). Given the pervasiveness and temporal extension of the collective silence, instances of breakdown of memory suppression strategies among the war generation occurred well beyond the immediate aftermath of the Second World
War, thereby exposing an entire subsequent generation of post-war Germans to its effects (Giesen, 2004; Bar-On, 1989). Henceforth the perpetrator trauma of members of former Nazi German society was transmitted upon their offspring.

**Intergenerational Transmission of Perpetrator Trauma: The 2\(^{nd}\) Generation**

When the silence of the war generation was disrupted in moments of defense-collapse – triggered by uncontrollable intrusive episodes - their children, the post-war (‘2\(^{nd}\)’) generation, born during or shortly after the war, were exposed to disturbing, erratic and destructive behaviours on part of their parents (Hardtmann, 1998; Herman, 1992). These ‘outbursts’ of that which had been hidden were aimed at fending off the unbearable emotions associated with the re-surfacing memory. The parents, re-living the war-related traumata and losses thereafter, once again felt the pain of being defeated, accused and unable to mourn (Heimmansberg & Schmidt, 1993). Attempting to defend against these powerful emotions, the parents resorted to splitting off and externalizing these feelings, often projecting them onto their offspring (see Anhalt, 1993). Such intergenerational interaction was capable of plunging the child into a “quasipsychotic world” (Hardtmann, 1998, p. 89) in which they often learned to identify with the projections of their parents, thereby internalizing their guilt and shame (Wiseman et al., 2002; Bar-On, 1989; Sigal & Weinfeld, 1989).

Being unable to comprehend the context of origin of these parental outbursts - grounded in their biographical memories - because of the absence of verbal articulation of the experiences, the relationship between memory and the emotions remained veiled (Auerhahn & Laub, 1998; Rowland-Klein & Dunlop, 1997). The children often became fearful towards these apparent ‘family secrets’, frequently coming to suspect family involvement in Nazi-era atrocities (Rosenthal & Voelter, 1998; Salm, 1993). However, to defend against such ‘acquired’ feelings of guilt and shame in response to these suspicions, the offspring of the war-generation often constructed elaborate fantasies about the Nazi-period
history of their family, which depicted the parents as non-involved in, or even opposed to, the Nazis during their reign of power (Welzer, 2005; Salm, 1993).

This form of intergenerational relationship led the 2\textsuperscript{nd} generation to become sensitive to their parents’ need for silence, which prompted the creation of a mutually reinforced “double wall of silence” that made clear that the Nazi-period had to remain an unmentionable issue in German post-war society, therefore continuing the ‘conspiracy of silence’ at this level (Wiseman et al., 2002, p. 372; Bar-On, 1989). Growing up exposed to this ‘narrative dislocation’ in their families, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} generation of post-war Germans was unable to draw upon a coherent frame of reference for the development of an adequate self-understanding (Hecker, 1993).

Giesen (2004) suggests that the ensuing intergenerational ‘conspiracy of silence’ was the very basis for the development of post-war identities in Germany. Created were ‘denial identities’ that could not incorporate the symbols of the recent national past as a reference point for their existence. Instead, the framework for the construction of a positive self-concept was conceptualized around images such as the ‘hard-working’ German people or the ‘economic miracle’ (Giesen, 2004). Nonetheless, Ruesen (2005) stresses that traumatic memory will remain to be a powerful reference marker for identity construction, even if it is silenced or repressed, because the essential narrative-grounded basis for self-understanding remains severed (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). This reasoning reflects the identity management dynamics after 1945: the atrocious past and associated guilt and shame in Germany, which were responsible for evoking the commonly suppressed negative self-concept, were still subliminally omnipresent throughout German post-war society (Olick & Levy, 1997).

Subsequently, adverse parent-child relationship structures, in relation to the struggle for a bearable identity for the parents, created an environment in which difficulties in connection with the development of defined self-concepts and identities in children (the 2\textsuperscript{nd} generation) of Nazi followers, collaborators, and

Bar-On (1989, p. 331) states that the 2nd generation’s adverse relationship with their parents “held them in the past and interfered with their attempts to disentangle themselves and move forward into the future”, thus making descendents of the war-generation “strangers in their own houses” (Hardtmann, 1982, p. 231), which symbolically describes the dislocated nature of their identities (Rowland-Klein & Dunlop, 1997). Having internalized the parental shame and guilt, children of the Nazi-generation submitted to the ‘double wall of silence’ and thus, continued their parents’ legacy of denial (Wiseman et al., 2002; Bergmann & Jucovy, 1982).

These dynamics remained unchallenged until the 1960s, when the Eichmann trial and Holocaust-related media coverage in Germany brought the atrocious past back into public awareness (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Geyer, 1996). In this environment, aided by general social liberalization, the walls of silence began to crumble as Germans of the 2nd generation became more outspoken and started to engage with the memory of the Nazi-period by questioning their parents about family involvement during the Nazi years, thereby surfacing the collective denial as a national stigma (Geyer, 1996). In the ensuing intergenerational conflict some members of this generation, particularly those associated with the 1968 student movement, started to develop a ‘leftist-grounded’ counter-identity to that of their parents’ Nazi-past, as well as to the relevant denial-identity of the post-war era, in order to be able to draw upon alternative symbols to provide reference for their identity construction (Giesen, 2004; Schmidtke, 1999). By confronting the war-generation openly, the 2nd generation aimed to express their anger about their ‘forced’ role of being collaborators in the ‘conspiracy of silence’ in their families and in society (Geyer, 1996; Bar-On, 1989).
Constructing their identities around symbols in direct opposition to those of the Nazi-era, i.e. leftist / Marxists ideology, and by accusing the 1st generation of hiding from their responsibility for the crimes committed ‘by Nazi-Germany in their name’, the 68-generation aimed to distance themselves from the war-generation and to ‘contain’ blame for Nazi terror at the level of their parents (Giesen, 2004). This strategy represents the shift from the initial phase of German post-war memory management – namely repression – to that of moralization, i.e. the 2nd generation ascribed responsibility to their parents and claimed the counter-position - the moral high ground - by identifying with the victims of the Holocaust in order to absolve themselves from blame (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Schmidtke, 1999; Geyer, 1996). However, these efforts constitute little more than a different approach to dissociation. Excluding themselves from the relationship with the Nazi-past, this generation was simply defending against their personal feelings of guilt and shame, thereby re-emphasizing the severed nature of the German narrative instead of generating open acknowledgement of the past with the potential to ‘mend’ that crucial link (Giesen, 2004; Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993; Bergmann & Jucovy, 1982).

By begetting another dimension to the 'gap' that had fragmented German self-understanding twenty years earlier, the 2nd generation continued to adhere to the dissociative relationship with Nazi memory, thus prolonging the national trauma, albeit in a slightly differential manner. The memory management shift to the moralization approach dominated the 'style of engagement' with the past throughout the 1970s (Olick & Levy, 1997).

Most notably, during this period the teaching of Nazi-period and Holocaust history formally entered high school curricula for the first time, and legislation was passed in 1978 that stressed the necessity of Nazi-period history education (Safran, 2000; Pagaard, 1995). Bar-On (1989) notes that such teachings had been entirely absent form history lessons prior to that period, when the relevant schooling either stopped abruptly with the Weimar Republic, or left a literal 'gap'
between Bismarck and the birth of the Federal Republic (Pagaard, 1995). The addition of Nazi-period history to the curriculum made such information broadly available to younger members of post-war German society, thus giving them an opportunity to engage more freely with that memory. However, occurring in the post-war 'age of moralization', these lessons appear to have leaned heavily towards compelling students towards "identification with the victims and a moral condemnation of the perpetrators" (van Beek & Lategan, 2005).

Not before the 1980s did another shift in memory management occur, when, particularly in the political realm, the debate about the past was reconstructed to reflect a discourse of 'normalization' of the relationship with the Nazi-era (Olick, 1998). The German government at that time actively pursued a direction of memory management that aimed to demonstrate that Germany was no longer held "hostage to Auschwitz" (Olick & Levi, 1997). Staging symbolic acts of normalization, such as the joint visit of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and US President Ronald Reagan to the Bitburg cemetery of fallen SS soldiers, thereby violating the taboo surrounding the issue of Nazi-Germans as victims, raised controversy and outcry, yet played towards the popular sentiments of that time (Geyer, 1996). Although these political acts were bold steps, the heart of the problem remained constant: the underlying aim of normalization was yet another way to put as much distance as possible between present and painful past (van Beek & Lategan, 2005).

If these normalization strategies, attempting to finally draw the infamous Schlüssstrich – the line that ends what came before, had any significant success, the memory dynamics following the Re-Unification in 1989 called into question once again the dissociative relationship of Germans with their atrocious past (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). In order for the two countries to rejoin after decades of a severed relationship, it was critical to ground that process of re-unification in a thorough understanding of the dynamics that had instigated the separation in the
first place, which ultimately required re-visiting the memory of World War Two (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Olick, 1998).

The result has created a third phase of memory management in the post-war context that is marked by (national-) self-critical literature, media, and public debate, which has been developing steadily (Rosenthal, 2002; Bar-On, 1989). This period began at a time – in 1989 – when members of the 3rd post-war generation – the grandchildren – were coming of age to be old enough to be in a position from which to find potential new ways to try and engage with the painful national history. The narrative gap has yet to be mended; the question is how this latest post-war generation is affected by the national memory of Nazi crime and terror.

THREE GENERATIONS AWAY FROM THE ‘REICH’: SUFFICIENTLY REMOVED?

The literature regarding contemporary young Germans in relation to the Nazi past is scarce. The available insights suggest that the effects of that memory appear to be still relevant to the grandchildren of the war generation, since young Germans still experience a distinct “hole in their identities” over 60 years after the end of the war (Heimannsberg & Schmitdt, 1993, p. 3; Bar-On et al., 1998a). However, whereas the 2nd generation was confronted with “the legacy of silence” (Bar-On, 1989) in their families and an equally ‘institutionalized’ collective silence in the general German social / public sphere, the 3rd generation has been in a position to engage with the Nazi past through factual knowledge and public discussion (Safran, 2005).

It took nearly forty years before Germans were able to begin - the process is still ongoing - engaging more constructively with the memory of the Nazi-era and the Holocaust (Rosenthal, 2002; Hardtmann, 1998). Bar-On, Ostrovsky and Fromer (1998a) suggest that the availability of factual knowledge, and the more open engagement with history, in contrast to the silence and denial that the 1st
generation, and passed on to their children to create the ‘double wall’, may have significant effects on how grandchildren of the war-generation engage with the question of constructing a positive identity as Germans (Wiseman et al., 2002). In addition, Safran (2000) indicates that association with the atrocities committed during the Nazi period is perceived as “more remote and therefore more abstract” (p. 42), thus suggesting that the 3rd generation may not experience the heavy burden of the “original sin” (p.44) of their parents and grandparents. However, Rensmann (2004) indicates that, despite generational distance and the open availability of information about the Nazi-era, more than two thirds of young Germans “have problems wholeheartedly identifying with their German nationality” (p. 174) because of the memory, and its management, of that period. This suggests that the introduction of formal Nazi-period / Holocaust education in the 1970s, and the opening of public debate, as well as the availability of factual knowledge, has not been free of contentious issues surrounding the management of Nazi German memory today (Welzer, 2005).

It appears feasible to suspect that, following decades of narrative dissociation, the ‘new’ and ‘open’ engagement, particularly through educational content, frequently evoked affective reactions among students of the 3rd generation which are reminiscent of those intergenerationally transmitted emotions that impinged on previous generations (Welzer, 2005; Rensmann, 2004; Schatzker, 1980). Repressed fears and suspicions of Nazi related family histories are likely to have been suddenly unlocked from the chest of dissociation, thereby provoking internalized emotions of guilt and shame that have prevailed since 1945 (Safran, 2000). Unfortunately, the educational setting has not been able to adequately address and manage these emotions as they occur (Welzer, 2005; Schatzker, 1980). As a result, young Germans have had to continue to struggle with a sense of incoherence in relation to these emotions and memories associated with the past.
Welzer (2005) notes that German Nazi-era and Holocaust education in all its forms – classroom, field trips, exhibitions, etc. - is perceived as being critically important, and its effects are judged a success throughout contemporary German society. Such opinions may well be true if one abstains from a critical analysis of how the 3rd generation translates this educational approach into action (Safran, 2000). The presentation of factual information and the assimilation of knowledge on a personal basis are two different concepts with incongruent effects: memory transmitted in form of the intergenerational dynamics was quite different from the textbook Nazi and Holocaust history of the educational realm. In other words, “what is learned cognitively is not always absorbed into the heart” (Harris, 2005, p. v).

In this context it is vital to note that the Nazi-era education of, and information dissemination to, the 3rd generation was largely conceived, legislated and implemented by members of the 2nd generation, i.e. during the memory management ‘phase’ of moralization in the 1970s and 80s (Olick & Levy, 1997; Pagaard, 1995). Under these circumstances, it appears reasonable to suspect that the overall framing of the educational approach was heavily influenced by the Nazi-period memory management needs of the 2nd generation. This meant that educational material, as well as its presentation, was designed to promote the attitude of victim identification, perpetrator condemnation and atonement that became the norm during that time (Rensmann, 2004; Pagaard, 1995). Consequently, it is well conceivable that members of the 3rd generation learned to internalize this conceptualization, which ultimately aimed to distance the present from the past or, in other words, to dissociate from it (van Beek & Lategan, 2005).

The result of such framing appears to be a response of passive absorption of educational content and information rather than any transference into active engagement action among the grandchildren of the war generation (Safran, 2000). These dynamics reflect a profound divergence between official and
private cultures of memory management in contemporary post-Nazi society, thus providing strong evidence for the continued existence of the 'severed narrative' in Germany (Welzer, 2005).

By engaging passively with the information surrounding the Nazi-period, the 3rd generation has been given an available avenue to actively disengage from the memory of that dark, burdensome and guilt evoking past, thus continuing a trend of dissociation in relation to post-1945 German memory management (Rensmann, 2004; Safran, 2000, Bar-On et al., 1998a). Subsequently, the fragmented relationship with the past remains untouched and is likely to continue to constrain national identity development among young Germans today (Rensmann, 2004).

However, the differential memory dynamics since the German Re-Unification in 1989 have once again brought to the fore the Nazi-past and the Holocaust as publicly salient topics (Olick, 1998, Geyer, 1996). The legacies of the incoherent narrative brought issues of national identity to the center stage, as it was a critical concept for the future of the re-united nation in 1989 (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Olick, 1998). The Re-Unification forced Germans to re-visit their distant relationship with the idea of a national identity (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). Fueled by their joy about the 'new rightful nation' – chants of "Wir sind das Volk" (We are the people [my translation]) reverberated as the Berlin Wall was torn down - yet faced with the reality of the narrative gap, members of post-1989 society stared into a void of markers while trying to conceive that vital identity (Hagan, Merkens & Boehnke, 1995; Ostow, 1995). This problem has persisted throughout the years that followed the Re-Unification and appears to have set the stage for a particular manifestation of post-1989 national identity management among younger Germans, namely that of Neo-Nazism.

Ostow (1995) notes that right-wing extremism in the re-unified nation was not a new phenomenon to post-war Germany. However, the developments after
1989 created an environment in which neo-Nazi appeal flourished among young Germans, a development that has drawn considerable international media attention (Hagan et al., 1995).

Central to the neo-Nazi idea in re-unified Germany has been the concept of Ausländerfeindlichkeit (xenophobia); a considerable influx of refugees and ‘guest-workers’ throughout the 1980s, and into the 1990s, has formed a basis for neo-Nazi organizations to recruit followers (Schmid, 1995). The rational behind these efforts exploits the fact that the Re-Unification, particularly in the case of young former East Germans, did not live up to people’s expectations in terms of job creation and transference of wealth (Ostow, 1995). The salient presence of foreigners, who are often entitled to draw from the German social system, created a perception that these immigrants deprive ‘German nationals’ of resources that could be put to use to build the new Germany, particularly in the former ‘worker state’ of the East (Schmid, 1995). Ostow (1995) stresses that “in the early 1990s, Germany had little to offer for young people from working-class backgrounds” (p. 90), thereby giving them little chance to find a frame of reference for a positive self-understanding in relation to the new nation. In this environment of ‘lacking perspective’ neo-Nazi groups have been lobbying for membership in their organizations (Hagan et al., 1995). What neo-Nazi affiliation has to ‘offer’ is a powerful frame of reference for national identity that can be easily integrated with contemporary nationalistic propaganda surrounding concepts such as Ausländerfeindlichkeit and a twisted framing of “Wir sind das Volk!”

Ostow (1995) indicates that, in the post-1989 years, “young Germans had nothing to look forward (sic.) to, [but] German history does offer rich traditions of backward-looking (sic.) projects of which late twentieth century identification with Nazism became one of the most popular options” (p. 90). In other words, in the environment of a post-war reinforced vacuum of symbols for German self-reference, thus destroying a coherent identity narrative and tabooing national
identity after 1945, it was difficult for the people of the re-unified Germany to express their desire for the attainment of a sense of national identity. To bridge that reference gap, the only readily available alternative, aided by the exploitative efforts of neo-Nazi organizations, was to 'revive' the symbols that had been lingering in the suppressed collective memory of Germans, namely those of National Socialism, thereby begetting a new wave of neo-Nazism among young Germans in the mid-1990s (Ostow, 1995).

However, the internationally noted appearance of 'Neo-Nazis', though salient, cannot be conceptualized to represent the only avenue to identity management in relation to the past in contemporary Germany, since their numbers appear to be relatively small by comparison to the general population (Schmid, 1995). These continued constraints and experiments beg the question of how young Germans engage with the Nazi-past in order to formulate identities in the context of contemporary German society, and therefore lies at the heart of what this study aimed to explore.

It is important to note that the above-outlined guilt / shame-grounded dynamics unfolded in, and were unique to, the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949 (West Germany) (Giesen, 2004). In the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) guilt and shame did not feature as emotional associations of the Nazi past; the post-war context was marked by the nation-founding myth that "the repressed [East-] German people had - assisted by the glorious Red Army - succeeded in overthrowing the fascist [Nazi-] regime" (Giesen, 2004, p.122), ultimately creating a German identity that, in reference to the Nazi-past, remained positive and became an important element for the development of the socialist East German state (van Beek & Lategan, 2005). Given this differential nature, the present research concerns itself exclusively with developments in the former West Germany. Methodological considerations to this extent, applicable in the realm of sample specification, are outlined in the following section.
METHOD

DESIGN

This study operated from the basis of the qualitative paradigm, in which the focus is to gain insights into subjective, contextual, and in-depth understandings of participant experiences (Kelly, 2002). The project was explorative in its approach to the investigation of 3rd generation post-Nazi period Germans’ relationships with the memory of the past, consequently setting out to broadly ‘map’ the area of interest as a basis for further, more specific research. With respect to the development of an appropriate research design, Durrheim (2002) notes that, in qualitative research, issues of validity are best realized adhering to the concept of design coherence; this is achieved by “ensuring that the research purposes and techniques are arranged logically within the research framework provided by a particular paradigm” (p. 35). The below-specified research methods and techniques were selected to reflect sound design coherence.

An essential characteristic of qualitative inquiry is a process of gradual, often unstructured and interpretive induction that develops an emergent product from the data (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). Henwood & Pidgeon (2003) note that research within the qualitative paradigm requires a sufficiently flexible design and associated methodology that can generate contextual and insightful accounts, as well as explanations that are subjectively relevant to those being studied. Such methodological basis also provides an adaptive space for a successful execution of research endeavors that are constrained in terms of limited scope and time frame, as was the case with the completion of this project in form of a minor dissertation (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 2002).

The aim of this investigation was to address the general research focus by drawing upon subjective understandings to develop an emergent "gestalt"
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 34) of young Germans’ reflections on their relationship with the painful memory from the data. Self-understanding is firmly grounded in references to the past (Ruesen, 2005; Giesen, 2004; le Goff, 1992; Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993). Therefore, an exploratory investigation of the affective link between young Germans’ self-understanding in the present vis-à-vis the Nazi national past needs to focus on biographical / narrative accounts in order to elicit meaningful materials that facilitate an analytical development of a valid Gestalt understanding with respect to the research focus (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). Neuman (1994) notes that the narrative approach, as part of the broader qualitative framework, can generate an overall sense of comprehension in relation to the data. In other words, collecting narratives “facilitates a combination of many different aspects of social reality around individuals and specific events” (Neuman, 1994, p. 386), which subsequently allows the researcher to refine a Gestalt from participant insights. In order to assist this process, the incorporation of methodological aspects of detailed, systematic, but equally flexible and open-minded, investigation was crucial for the analysis of initially scattered data. Grounded Theory research operates in congruence with this need, and elements of this approach supplemented the necessary design structure to execute the study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003).

Grounded Theory method stipulates a flexible approach to research by using an interdependent framework of collection and continuous ‘pre-analysis’ of the emerging data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Employing interpretive refinement methods, initially broad and unstructured data can be ‘distilled’ to display variation and thematic complexity in a conceptually relevant manner. In applying this process of ‘pre-analysis’ continuously, a more coherent and refined understanding of the data transpires. However, as Hollway and Jefferson (2000) stress, maintaining attention to the holistic context of the materials is most advantageous for attaining a comprehensive understanding of the research phenomenon. Accordingly, any resulting emergent conceptual structures will
become the foundation for a theoretically informed interpretive and amalgamated final analysis of the materials, i.e. the 'construction' of a holistic Gestalt-understanding of the results (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

PARTICIPANTS

The present study focused on an exploration of how young Germans relate to the atrocious national past of the Nazi-period, and how this national historical relationship affects them in their lives today. Given this focus, the criteria for participant selection were the presence of a continuous German-national family-tree, as well as residence of the family in Germany from the Nazi-period to the present. Re-emphasizing the fact that those dynamics associated with the research focus were unique to former West Germany, participants were selected from exclusively (former) West German families. Sampling for diversity along other dimensions, such as gender, social status, etc. did not appear relevant to the proposed area of interest and were non-essential within the employed research paradigm (see Bar-On's (1989) in-depth research accounts). Owing to the qualitative-interpretive nature of the study, inattention to any further sampling dimensions did not threaten design coherence or overall strength of the findings (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003; Kelly, 2002).

Terre Blanche and Durrheim (2002) explain that interpretive and exploratory research, operating from a qualitative paradigm, does not require large or random samples, since the aim rests exclusively with detailed, in-depth analysis. The participant selection frame of the present project was congruent with these outlined research design characteristics. Bearing in mind the limited scope and temporal constraints associated with the development of a minor dissertation, a strategy of convenience, i.e. non-random sampling was employed to recruit participants.
The researcher traveled to Germany during the mid-year academic vacation to conduct interviews in his home country. A total of eight people participated in the study. An initial contact with a ‘gatekeeper’ in Germany was established and facilitated through the student researcher’s project supervisor and her contacts in Cologne, Germany, prior to the researcher’s departure from South Africa. In collaboration with the ‘gatekeeper’, and also employing ‘snowball’ sampling strategies, six participants were recruited and interviewed in Cologne over a period of three weeks in July 2006. Two additional participants were interviewed in Cape Town in August, upon the return of the researcher to South Africa. These latter two participants were visiting post-graduate students in the Department of Psychology at the University of Cape Town from Germany and fulfilled all relevant selection criteria.

The resulting sample consisted of 3rd generation post-Nazi period (West-) Germans (N = 8) and was evenly distributed across the gender dimension (Female N = 4 / Male N = 4). The sample was relatively homogenous in relation to age distribution, with a female age range of 23-30 years, and a male age range of 23-28 years. A situation of participant homogeneity was also present in terms of educational background. All participants had completed the highest level (university entrance preparation) of German secondary schooling, and only one participant was not engaged in, or had completed, tertiary education. The final number of participants was sufficient for adequate generation of materials and subsequent application of the analysis within the framework of a coherent design (Durrheim, 2002).

DATA COLLECTION

The data for the study were collected by way of interviews. Given the exploratory nature and broad focus of the topic, Terre Blanche and Durrheim’s (2002) suggestion for the use of the semi-structured approach as the most appropriate method of material collection for the present design was followed.
(see appendix B or C for sample interview schedule). Even though data collection concentrated specifically on narratives, focusing participants by means of an interview schedule was apposite under the constrained research circumstances, as well as by virtue of the fact that the research focus did not require a consideration of complete narratives or life stories (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 2002). With respect to data collection by use of narrative interviews, it is crucial to acknowledge that this investigation aimed to explore a potentially sensitive area of human experience. Bar-On et al. (1998a) emphasize the continued affective relevance of the Nazi-past for young Germans, and, as their research demonstrates, confrontation with the subject can induce significant emotional distress. Acknowledging this reality, participants were expected to react to potentially distressing aspects of the interviews, for example the exploration of a family history that makes salient a grandparent association with Nazi terror. Feeling threatened by the confrontation with anxiety provoking materials, such as the memory of the Nazi-era, interview participants might choose to engage in defensive ‘tactics’ - for example by responding quite narrowly or by digressing from questions in order to dissociate from any negative affective responses - which would diminish the quality of the research.

To minimize the potential for the emergence of such adverse dynamics during individual data collection, the interview schedule was constructed in accordance with Hollway and Jefferson’s (2000) understandings of the biographical-interpretive method to interview research. Their guidelines for data collection from defensive participants suggest control techniques such as the use of open-ended questions, a focus on eliciting stories, avoidance of ‘why’ questions, etc., which give the participant a maximum of space to unfold their narratives for rich interpretive analysis. The relevant literature, the research supervisor’s extensive experience with research-pertinent theoretical concepts, and the researcher’s insights as a member of the target population, informed construction of the initial interview schedule materials. Employing Hollway and Jefferson’s (2000) approach to data collection with defended subjects, the
schedule opened with broad questions concerning general family history, before turning towards personal narrative information as well as more specific interests regarding the research foci (see appendix B or C for schedule).

Grounded Theory methodology stipulates that the interview schedule should be edited and updated in response to new insights, emerging from the data by use of comparative analysis, throughout the data collection process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In congruence with this, a process of concurrent refinement of the data collection instrument accompanied the inductive development of understanding during this study. Smith (2003) notes that interview schedule formulation in this way is harmonious with the foundation principles of qualitative inquiry, viz. the co-creation of the research product between the researcher and the data / participants.

Using the outlined sampling and data collection techniques, the first six participants were approached and interviewed over a period of two weeks in Cologne, Germany in July of 2006. Interview venues were arranged at the convenience of the members of the sample. Four interviews were conducted at the homes of each participant, the other two in park areas surrounding the University of Cologne. The remaining two cases of data collection were completed in Cape Town, South Africa. These participants were approached and interviewed on the premises of the Department of Psychology at the University of Cape Town in early August of 2006. Interview length ranged from ca. 45 to 120 minutes, but most conversations did not exceed one hour. All interviews were, with permission from all participants, tape-recorded for subsequent transcription and analysis. Process notes were kept throughout the data collection period to allow for immediate immersion in the data and to provide a basis for preliminary analysis in congruence with Grounded Theory methodology (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The present research is concerned with contemporary effects of the traumatic past of a society. Even though the relationship with the original events may have been a temporally distant one for the participants, the possibility of adverse affective experiences (see discussion of transgenerational dynamics above), during or after participation, could not be denied. In consultation with the supervisor, drawing upon her extensive experience as a clinical psychologist and researcher, instances of harmful psychological distress were not anticipated as a result of participation in the research. Nonetheless, it was vital to provide potential participants with all possible information regarding procedures, circumstances, dangers and goals of the research (Mouton, 2001; de Vos, 1998). Each potential participant was informed that, should any significant distress occur during or after the interview, professional assistance would be available to him or her. To be able to provide such support, the research supervisor had arranged collaboration with the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Cologne, where debriefing services would have been available if necessary. Furthermore, the right to refuse participation, to withdraw from the study at any time, and the right to confidentiality were impressed upon each interview partner. None of the participants displayed any signs of psychological distress during participation, and no affective difficulties, or any other problems, were reported in the period since the completion of data collection.

Any information identifying the participant has been stored securely and separately from the research data that was disclosed by the individual, and non-essential materials were destroyed as soon as possible. Informed consent (see appendix A) in relation to these issues was secured from each participant prior to any data collection. No strategies of deception were employed during the course of the research.
DATA ANALYSIS

Grounded Theory methodology prescribes concurrent data collection and analysis by means of constant comparison of the emergent material. This strategy subsequently shapes an increasingly focused understanding of the area of exploratory interest (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003; Glaser, 1992; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In line with this process, the German materials were reviewed - by listening to tape recordings - following each individual interview to allow for immersion and immediate preliminary analysis of the data, which took the form of informal interpretive memo-writing and diagramming, for example using flow-charts (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). Corbin (1986) states that the Grounded Theory approach to raw-data reduction ultimately aims to crystallize conceptual blocks that enhance a deeper understanding of the area of interest. Such preliminary analysis, using process notes and memos, helped the researcher to emerge salient insights from the data, which were used to focus the next case of data collection. This approach was followed continuously across all interviews and informed the slight, yet relevant adjustments to the interview schedule. This strategy aided the process of developing an increasingly clarified picture in relation the research question, which helped to further unfold the Gestalt with each subsequent interview (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000).

Following the conclusion of data collection, and the concurrent preliminary review of the materials, an amalgamated analysis across all refined data was conducted. The process notes, memos and diagrams suggested the presence of particularly rich data in five of the eight interviews. These accounts were transcribed verbatim – in German – for detailed review (see appendix E for a transcript sample). All resulting textual materials were categorized for comparison using interpretive open-coding methodology, which facilitated the emergence of more organized salient insights from the data (Lofland & Lofland, 1995). Using these categories as a frame of reference, relevant and confirmatory
passages from the remaining interviews were transcribed as sources of textual and analytical support.

However, instead of adhering to traditional analytic strategies of focusing exclusively on an arrangement of the data into a conceptual system of distinct elements that informs the results, the present research aimed to move beyond such fragmentation and to comprehend emergent insights as building blocks of a holistic structure of meaning, or Gestalt. Kelly (2002) stresses that, in interpretive research, “the meaning of the parts should be considered in relation to the meaning of the whole” (p. 406). Hollway and Jefferson (2000) support this view and argue that Grounded Theory-related analytical system arrangements can disjoint and even eliminated important aspects of meaning from the results. Their strategy of analysis of the final data rests on the aforementioned concept of the development of a Gestalt as a frame of meaning for understanding the research product as a whole (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). In accordance with this analytical approach, final conceptual organization of the extensively compared and categorized emergent materials involved their conclusive merger into a contextually relevant Gestalt (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). For that purpose a number of concept charts (for an example chart see appendix D) were constructed and refined to visually guide an interpretive integration of the categorized insights into a meaningful Gestalt understanding vis-à-vis the research focus.

Terre Blanche and Durrheim (2002) explain that qualitative research methodologies are flexible procedures that permit adjustment to the particular context the research is conducted in. Therefore, this minor deviation from established Grounded Theory approaches, i.e. merging its methods with those of the more holistic approach of Hollway and Jefferson (2000), does not pose a threat to design coherence and, subsequently, did not weaken the results of this study, which are outlined and discussed immediately below.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The rich nature of the collected materials suggested a multitude of valuable and relevant information in relation to the research topic. Unfortunately, the scope of this study does not permit an exhaustive presentation and discussion of insights that can be derived from the data. The themes outlined immediately below are presented to generate a fundamental, rather than a comprehensive, picture. Accordingly, the analytical process resulted in the densification of the data into four emergent, and conceptually relevant, thematic clusters. They are: Between Guilt and Responsibility; Conveying the Dark and Burdensome Past – A Cult of Guilt?; Struggling for Identity; and The ‘Gestalt’: An Ambivalent Generation.

THEMES

Using the analytical diagramming strategy of concept charting (see Lofland & Lofland, 1995) to visually guide conceptual organization of the theme clusters to display their relationships, it became clear that “The Ambivalent Generation” emerged from the data as an overarching frame that permeates the entire analytical width of the data (see Appendix D for final concept chart). In fact, the entire sample indicated bipolar, and frequently ‘paradoxical’, sentiments in relation to the full spectrum of relevant insights that transpired from the materials. Therefore, this theme constitutes the soul of the analytical Gestalt that best depicts the 3rd generation post-war Germans’ relationship with the Nazi-past among participants of this study.

However, in order to be able to draw upon the stipulated theoretical framework to develop contextually adequate explanatory schemes in relation to this Gestalt, all associated theme clusters need to be discussed in advance. It is crucial to understand what informs the uncertainty of young Germans when trying to incorporate the legacies of Nazi memory in their lives today. In other words, all
themes ‘flow’ conceptually into a Gestalt understanding of the grandchildren as the ‘Ambivalent Generation’ of post-war Germans. The following presentation and discussion of the results of the present research will reflect this interpretation and examine the holistic Gestalt as a last integrative theme that is composed from all other emergent insights of this study. Quotes from the data will be used to illustrate and ground the findings, and these data samples will be differentiated using letters (A-H) to identify the participant from which the insights was drawn. All quotes are translations from the original German interviews. The researcher is responsible for all conversions of the quotes included below.

**BETWEEN GUILT AND RESPONSIBILITY**

“There are those who admit that, as Germans, they share the burden of their nation, but it is ‘unclear’ (my emphasis) what that implies”

(Safran, 2000, p. 47).

The first pivotal feature emerging from the materials was the affective component in the conceptualization of the Nazi memory among the sample. There was unsolicited awareness of, and reference to, the critical issue of guilt across interviews. All participants initially placed strong emphasis on the fact that they perceive themselves as being free of emotions associated with guilt in relation to the atrocities committed by Germans during the Nazi-era.

“...there is this thing with ‘guilt’...or...or...or ‘shame’, or such stories, and...I believe that do not have that in me!” (A)

“...I was extremely upset of course [in response to meeting a Holocaust survivor during a high school educational], but I did not feel guilty, or anything like that!” (H).
These sentiments support Safran’s (2000) conclusion that younger Germans generally refuse the idea of being associated with the Nazi-past in terms of a sense of culpability for the crimes of that era. Members of the 3rd generation appear to prefer to understand the relationship with the legacies of the Nazi-era as a less immediate and more abstract one, which is of little surprise, given the temporal removal of that period and the increasingly liberal socio-political milieu of the present. Today, young Germans find themselves in a space that affords them the opportunity to identify with a Euro-cosmopolitan existence in lieu of one that is grounded in a German identity (Rensmann, 2004; Bar-On et al., 1998). Indeed, 75% of the sample specifically indicated that they had either studied abroad, or been on international high-school exchange programs at some stage in their lives. This biographical information supports the notion of an increasingly cosmopolitan European environment, which would explain the sense of perceived affective ‘distance’ between the legacies of the Nazi-crimes and the 3rd generation.

However, it was interesting to discover that participants reported experiencing any engagement with the past as awkward, anxiety provoking and burdensome, even though rejection of guilt and chronological distance to the atrocities were firmly emphasized. Some even ‘reversed’ their initial position on the question of guilt later on during the course of the interview to explicitly voice personal emotions of guilt.

“It became as if one…simply…well…ALL [participant emphasis] one carries is guilt…I find it that way!” (G)

“A sense of guilt is still there, even though one has nothing to do with it personally. I don’t know where it comes from, but…well…it is somehow there for me, it is a legacy!….Damn!...I am German!” (B)
The participants in this study clearly struggle with the issue of guilt. On the one hand it is important for them to make salient that the Nazi-past has no immediate negative affective influence on them. However, ultimately they concede that the memory of that period personally constrains them in form of a heavy burden that is most difficult, if not impossible, to discard, thus refuting the assertion that their affective dissociation is grounded in the fact that sixty years separate the grandchildren from the age of Nazi terror (Rensmann, 2004; Bar-On et al., 1998). Instead, given the traumatic character of the Nazi-German memory, and its multigenerational persistence since the end of the Second World War, it is reasonable to infer that members of the 3rd generation are affected by the painful national memory in a manner that is incontrovertibly reminiscent of features of trauma dynamics that have been documented in connection with the previous two generations (Bar-On et al., 1998; Rosenthal & Voelter, 1998).

Participants, like members of the war-generation, feel guilty in the face of memories of Nazi terror. However, they do so not because of shame about personal involvement in, or inaction in response to, crimes or atrocities, but because of sharing the national association with that of the original perpetrators (Rensmann, 2004). It is the incomparable, and thus exclusive, conceptualization of the atrocities of the Nazi-era - and the Holocaust - that seems to indefinitely link that which is "German" with unspeakable horror. Consequently, this 'marker' of national association becomes next to impossible to derive a positive self-image from (Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993). Participants, like their parents, thus perceive this national stigma as being impossible to cast off.

In order to defend against the resulting emotions of shame and guilt, grandchildren of the war generation attempt to dissociate from these feelings by denying their affective presence altogether. In their view, the Nazi past has very little direct relevance to their lives today, often citing the cosmopolitan lifestyle or the liberal European socio-political milieu to demonstrate their tolerant, non-
discriminatory and open-minded attitudes, which are altogether incongruent with any ideology that could be linked to that of the Nazi-past (Rensmann, 2004).

"...as soon as people [hold opinions] like...‘my country comes first’...that only leads to discrimination of minorities...and I think Germany can do without that! Well...or one can do without that altogether! I believe one should rather...like...what we should stand for as Germans is the concept of Europe...that’s where I get excited!...the borders, we would be just another ‘federal state’ in Europe..." (G)

Drawing upon Social Identity Theory, it appears as if members of the sample, in the face of the stigmatic link of ‘German' with unparalleled horror, desire to rectify their negative self-image, grounded in their national group association and the stigma, by pursuing a change in their collective self-reference dimension (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). In concrete terms, they welcome any idea of European federalism because it has the potential to give Germans the opportunity to reconstruct their self-understanding and self-images around the European collective, thereby enabling them to stay clear of an identity that needs to be constructed around German nationality (Rensmann, 2004).

Despite these attempts at sophisticated dissociation from and denial of the relevance of the legacies of the Nazi-era, the entire sample, at the same time, indicated that this past is not without reference to the contemporary post-war context. Albeit strongly detaching from the idea of guilt, participants stressed the importance of recognizing and demonstrating a sense of responsibility in relation to Nazi-era memory. This responsibility was framed as an indefinite obligation to remember the past in order to highlight the unexampled character of Nazi terror.

"...as a German, one still holds a certain responsibility...like 'what’s your opinion on that?'...one needs to be very cautious there...I find." (G)
“…if we learn and continue to concern ourselves with it, and continue to try, so to speak, um…well, I don’t want to say “to make up for it”…but to ensure, to the best of our abilities, that it does not happen again.” (H)

What is most striking about this emphasis on responsibility is the fact that members of the sample appeared to be uncertain about its actual substance. Participants frequently made reference to this common or shared responsibility, yet they always transferred a distinct absence of clarity as to what ‘it’ entails [my emphasis below].

“…it only works if we remember it, and say to as many others as possible: ‘listen up! If one does such nonsense, then this and that can happen, and we are the ones who need to make sure it does not happen again!’ (H)

As this quote highlights, members of the research sample continuously relied on neutral and vague language to make reference to the burdensome past. Although it is implicitly clear what the individual is referring to, she / he is unable to name the atrocious past, the Nazi crimes or the Holocaust. This inability reflects the fact that Nazi-era memory is still substantially painful and shameful for grandchildren of the war-generation (Bar-On et al., 1998). Omitting the historically ‘archetypical names’ of incomparable evil is the only way to be able to talk about the past. Such discourse behaviour illustrates the continuation of Bar-On’s (1989) legacy of silence, originally relating to the 2nd generation, at the level of the 3rd generation. The ‘identification silence’, i.e. refraining from identifying the shameful deeds by their name, among grandchildren of the war-generation appears to be an altered strategy of avoiding any negative emotions that are provoked by the Nazi-memory. The difference between the silence of the 2nd, and for that matter also the 1st, and 3rd generation may be grounded in the degree of available information, knowledge and awareness about ‘what happened’ during the Nazi-era (Welzer, 2005; Rensmann, 2004; Safran, 2000).
The Nazi-period, and thus information about the atrocities, did not feature in post-1945 German education for decades; history lessons ended, in the chronological sense, with the discussion of the Weimar Republic (Pagaard, 1995; Bar-On, 1989). Not until the late 1960s and early 1970s did that critical chapter of German history enter the curriculum and classrooms in the Federal Republic (Giesen, 2004). This means a broad base of open information did only become available on a collective scale for members of the 3rd generation (Rensmann, 2004). Growing up under the veil of the “collective silence” of German post-war society, which began with the inherently dissociative concept of the “Stunde Null” (‘zero hour’) – i.e. ‘forget all that happened’ - in 1945, their parents engaged in comprehensive avoidance-muteness (Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993; Bar-On, 1989). Conversely, the grandchildren of the war-generation have been receiving most thorough tuition addressing the Nazi-period (Pagaard, 1995).

“...this topic [the Nazi era] came up over and over again. Well, at some stage it really was like...this...well, at some stage...really often...it came up over and over again....” (G)

This significant difference in awareness and knowledge during earlier life stages has resulted in dissimilar approaches to the avoidance-silence between the 2nd and 3rd generations (Bar-On et al., 1998; Heimannsberg & Schmitd, 1993). Whereas the previous generation was able to dissociate in a conducive environment of comprehensive silence, the grandchildren have had to face and ‘integrate’ the publicly available information into their memory management behaviour and discourse. In other words, the 3rd generation is unable to engage in simple denial to cope with any feelings of shame and guilt; instead, they have to acknowledge awareness of the Nazi crimes in their efforts of controlling these emotions. Silencing the overt identifiers – the ‘names’ – of the Nazi period and its atrocities, when that past is present in discourse, appears to bridge this paradoxical gap for young Germans.
An additional approach to the amalgamation of ‘avoidance & awareness’, in response to the memory of the painful past, is the salience of the notion of responsibility among grandchildren of the war-generation (Safran, 2000). Guilt was affectively significant for the participants; however, the denial thereof is virtually impossible in the face of comprehensive availability of knowledge about the Nazi-past (Rensmann, 2004). History lessons in school have created an irrefutable awareness of the atrocities and crimes among the sample, albeit in a seemingly depersonalized manner (Schatzker, 1980). However, this knowledge creates an immediacy of Nazi memory that subsequently induces guilt and shame, because it has the potential to surface suppressed fears and questions regarding personal family history in relation to the Nazi-period, which subsequently needs to be defended against (Rensmann, 2004; Auerhahn & Laub, 1998; Hardtmann, 1998; Bar-On, 1989). This struggle between rejection of guilt and an omnipresent emphasis on individual awareness was striking among the sample. In order to come to grips with this toil, it appears as if these members of the 3rd generation amalgamate the notion of the ‘burden of the past’ with their socially expected, and thus undeniable, knowledge about the Nazi-era in order to seek ‘psychic refuge’ in the concept of responsibility.

For the participants, the idea of ‘responsibility’ is of a more bearable and manageable substance than that of guilt. Indeed, Safran (2000) suggests that there is an obligation for Germans to engage actively with the past in order to ‘work on’ Wiedergutmachung (to ‘make up’ for the deeds of the past). In that sense, the notion of ‘responsibility’ implies an active process by focusing on ‘carrying forward’ something, even though members of the research sample were not entirely clear as to what that actually constitutes. Conversely, ‘guilt’ denotes a more passive and static relationship with the atrocious past, which locks the individual in a position of culpability (Rensmann, 2004). Therefore, guilt is a marker that emphasizes a non-transformable negative self-image, whereas responsibility, even though equally linked to a negative self-concept, at least
maintains the possibility of transformation of that image towards a positive identity (Rensmann, 2004; Bar-On et al., 1998; Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

Interestingly, participants transferred an acute sense of ‘dislocation’ between the emotional conceptualization of the Nazi-past and their understanding of that much-cited responsibility. In other words, there was a distinct emotional gap, between ‘feeling ashamed’ of the past and the active engagement of ‘making sure it does not happen again’ (see quotes above). The participants’ explanation of the relationship between the burden of the past and their response thereto – the responsibility – did not transmit conviction, i.e. their repetitive emphasis appeared ‘empty’ and ‘removed’, which suggested that the insistence on ‘an obligation to carry forward the memory’ was more habitual or learned, rather than to reflect any coherent understanding on how to ‘engage’ with the painful past (see opening quote from Safran, 2000).

Rensmann (2004) notes that the processing of Nazi memory since the early 1980s has focused on “deliberate political recognition of historical national guilt” (p. 181). This observation corresponds temporally with the legislation of Nazi and Holocaust education in high schools, as well as with memory-political changes during that time towards ‘moralization’ and, after 1989, increasing public discussion surrounding the memory of the Nazi-era (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Naumann, 2000; Olick & Levy, 1997). Consequently, members of the 3rd generation were educated – they learned – about the Nazi-past during these years, thus they are likely to have come to understand their relationship with the memory of the Nazi-period in a particular frame that reflects the corresponding state of memory politics of that time. The nature of this frame is the substance of a further emergent central insight from the data, namely that of a perceived cult of guilt among participants.
2004; Geyer, 1996). Under these circumstances, it appears reasonable to suspect that members of this generation are prevalent among the population of educators, many of whom would have been students in the late 1960s, and who are responsible to instruct and frame the lessons of the Nazi-era and the Holocaust in the schooling context of the 3rd generation. Consequently, that task will undoubtedly be influenced by the teachers’ own strained, distressed and affectively laden relationship with Nazi memory (Donahue, 1994). A number of participants identified their parents as members of the ‘68 movement. One individual in particular, locating the parents in the context of that generation, specifically made the association between them and his teachers:

“For me...it [Nazi-era education] was presented...in the framework that was similar to the presentation [of the topic] of that of my parents...That was simply the same generation. My teachers were the same age as my parents. All of them...unbelievable!” (H)

Acknowledging that the moralization approach to Nazi memory reflects the (dissociative-) memory management strategy that was prevalent among the 2nd generation, it is very plausible that these educators’ own needs and affective responses impact on, and are acted out, in the context of classrooms that have been filled with members of the 3rd generation (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Fry, 1997; Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993). Consequently, young Germans have been taught to engage in a memory management process that is grounded in the inherently dissociative one of their parents’ generation. However, having grown up under differential circumstances (established democratic society, temporal distance to the Nazi-period, etc.), this ‘prescribed’ manner of relating to the Nazi-past feels disjointed and without meaning to them (Bar-On et al., 1998). Nonetheless, because of the insisting, dark and burdensome presentation of the topic, they feel compelled to habitually continue this tradition of memorialization (Safran, 2000). The 2nd generation educators’ needs and frame of communication impress and evoke guilt and shame - perpetuated by the
CONVEYING THE DARK AND BURDENSOME PAST - A CULT OF GUILT?

All participants in this study reported a first concrete sense of awareness of the Nazi-past as a result of history lessons in high school, which suggests that education - including field-trips, museum visits, etc. - was a fundamental factor of influence in the conceptualization of their relationship with the memory of the Nazi-era, as well as the impact thereof on their lives in contemporary German society.

"...in high school [did I become aware of the Nazi German history]...I think we [young Germans] are raised with a strong emphasis on knowing about it...that we are aware...so that it can't happen again." (E)

If the classroom setting was the primary context in which the 'burden of the past' was brought to conscious attention among grandchildren of the war-generation, then the 'framing', or teaching style, of that information will have had a significant impact on the manner in which the pupils integrated the knowledge (Welzer, 2005). It is undeniable that Nazi-period education evokes powerful emotions among students and teachers alike, but, unfortunately, the classroom setting, as well as the general approach to teaching this topic, does not incorporate any 'mechanisms' to address and manage any affective consequences of these lessons (Welzer, 2005; Fry, 1997; Alexander, 1978). Schatzker (1980) emphasizes the importance of unfolding and presenting "the truth without traumatizing" (p. 218) the students, which constitutes an approach to teaching that does not reflect the experience of participants in this research.

"This school education...it was...well, very...burdensome...and also like...to not liberate oneself from this guilt under any circumstances...instead...load the guilt heavily onto our shoulders." (G)
"He [the teacher] made certain that everybody paid full attention, and that no-one played any jokes, or such things...and that everybody was serious. In that sense...[it] was definitely different from other lessons." (A)
the 3rd generation are not in a position to simply deny – because of guilt and shame - the memory of the past, or to distance themselves from it (Welzer, 2005). Instead, they are expected, as suggested by the differential – ‘serious’ – atmosphere and treatment of the topic in class, to acknowledge the burden of the past to ‘somehow’ demonstrate that they living up to ‘an obligation’ in relations to the past – a conceptualization that is reminiscent of the idea of Wiedergutmachung (‘to make good’), although it remains far from obvious what that is (Safran, 2000).

Re-emphasizing the traumatic dislocation between memory, meaning and identity in relation to the Nazi-past, which has been symptomatic of the ‘narrative gap’ that has been a prominent feature for Germans since 1945, the 3rd generation lacks an appropriate frame of reference to locate that sense of obligation which they are raised and educated to adopt in order to live up to their heritage of responsibility (Wastell, 2005; Safran, 2000; Auerhahn & Laub, 1998; Bar-On et al., 1998; Frankl, 1985). Being aware of the seemingly profound nature of this ‘duty’, and feeling the dark and heavy atmosphere in which it is communicated, students appear to habitually submit to this frame of relationship with the past. In this way they ‘pseudo-engage’ with the memory of the Nazi terror in order to be perceived as having fulfilled one’s obligation and to ‘get the issue out of the way’, which constitutes little more than another form of dissociation in response to a painful and burdening past.

It is interesting to note that the aim of educating the 3rd generation towards an acknowledgement of the ‘responsibility to ensure it does not happen again’ corresponds ideologically to the concept of Wiedergutmachung, which was a most salient manifestation of the post-1968 memory management shift towards moralization (van Beek & Lategan, 2005; Geyer, 1996). This - essentially dissociative - approach towards the German relationship with the Nazi-past is associated with the affective response of guilt and shame among the 2nd generation, and the members of the ‘68 student movement in particular (Giesen,
absence of meaning and the 'narrative gap' - among the 3rd generation students, which they find difficult to understand and relate to (Frankl, 1985). Under these circumstances, the prescribed memory management strategy, albeit being unable to emotionally grasp and integrate its relevance, provides an established and available defense mechanism against the painful emotions. As a result, young Germans carry forward a 'ritual of dissociation' that has been at the heart of Germans' relationship with the legacies of the Nazi past since 1945.

Supportive evidence for this conceptualization of memory management dynamics was found in form of consensus among the sample in terms a strong emphasis on the necessity, in some cases even the desire, to keep the current approach to the reference of the Nazi-past alive.

“I hope that this…legacy of the [2.] World War, and this being guilty for it,…I hope that this prevents us, for as long as possible, to start another one” (H)

In other words, members of the 3rd generation hold on to this otherwise awkward and painful relationship with the past in order to liberate themselves from the daunting prospective of having to find their own way of managing the atrocious past, which might possibly require active and personal engagement with that memory.

Van Beek and Lategan’s (2005) concept of exclusive memory is of value to locate this dynamic; they state that “the exclusive mode memory tends to perpetually hold different groups apart, not infrequently in mutual hostility” (p.352). The reported participant perceptions of predominantly ‘negative’ framing of Nazi-period education and information efforts, for example in high school or museums, is indicative of such an exclusive mode of memory. The reinforcement of, or adherence to, that mode essentially locks the relationship with the past in a distinctly static position and therefore does not allow movement towards future engagement between groups that have been separated by virtue of their history.
(van Beek & Lategan, 2005). In this state of 'memory inertia' the experience of that dark and burdensome past – as expressed by the participants - remains constant across generations. However, as subsequent generations become further removed from the original events, adhering to the burden of an 'inherited responsibility' may actually represent an easier form of (passive or abstract) engagement than to mobilize the static German memory of the Nazi period. In other words, it is less threatening to take on a generational, ‘handed down’ concept of responsibility – which is of a substance that is vague and unclear to the 3rd generation - than to attempt to shed the heavy burden of that relationship with the past by attempting to engage with the 'other' in relation to the painful memory.

This seemingly persistent trend of memory management constitutes what van Beek and Lategan (2005) describe as “the reverse side of the dubious coin of denial and amnesia” (p. 362). More specifically, static memory and its manifestation - ‘the responsibility to ensure it does not happen again’ - comprises a scapegoat engagement with the past. It forms a defense barrier against the anxiety provoking perspective, or option, of having to engage with the 'other', that is, in more concrete terms, the victims and survivors of the Holocaust.

Rensmann (2004) reiterates that the current approach to memory management in Germany, and Nazism and Holocaust education in particular, nurtures an engagement with the past that is necessary to develop a "self-conscious, post nationalist collective self-image" (p. 186), which he envisages to be the basis for the development of dialogue willingness between the 'perpetrator society' and those who suffered because of Nazi terror. However, as Welzer (2005) indicates, the outcome of the contemporary approach to memory management and education appears to be quite incongruent with this idealized intention, a fact that may well be grounded in the 'memory management needs' of the second generation. Instead of promoting the envisioned active engagement with the past, the important educational frame provides an avenue
for continued dissociation. This is not to say that Nazi-era and Holocaust education should in any way be abandoned. Such reasoning would only create a situation that corresponds to the denialism of the war-generation's post-1945 strategy of upholding a positive self-image, and therefore would be jeopardizing any positive developments up until this point (Hardtmann, 1998). It may rather be worthwhile to reconsider the 'framing' of educational efforts and memorialization, since the creation of, and emphasis on, a dark and burdening atmosphere begets a need for dissociation among young Germans. This process facilitates habitual adherence to a 'cult of guilt' that is clearly counter-productive to any visions of dialogue as those outlined by Rensmann (2004) above, since this approach to coping with the painful memory of the Nazi crimes constitutes a way of avoiding precisely such forms of direct and active engagement.

Ultimately, the subscription to habitual pseudo-engagement with the past upholds those fundamental factors that inform a negative self-image among young Germans. Adherence to the 'cult of guilt' preserves the salience of national shame, thereby creating a continued need for dissociation from the atrocious past that prevents constructive engagement with the legacies of the Nazi-era. Under these circumstances Germany's narrative remains severed and the question of meaning - the essential source of identity - unanswered (Ruesen, 2005; Wastell, 2005; Frankl, 1985). Thus, the toil for the development of a secure self-reference in relation to their nationality continues for a 3rd generation in contemporary Germany.
STRUGGLING FOR IDENTITY

The participants of this study wrestled immensely with the issue of conceptualizing a comfortable self-image as Germans.

“...I believe I really have a slightly disturbed relationship with my nationality...well, maybe not ‘disturbed’, but...well, I just realize how different it is for me...with ‘nationality’...by comparison to other nations” (A)

As the quote illustrates, members of the sample recognized that this identity impediment is grounded in the national stigma of inextricable association of ‘Germany’ with the horrors of the Nazi-past. Van Beek and Lategan (2005) reiterate that Germans, since the end of the war, have “assumed negative identification vis-à-vis the dark period in their history” (p. 362). Given this post-1945 trend, those members of the 3rd generation who were interviewed for this research did not digress from this tendency. Because of the indoctrinated expectation of comprehensive awareness about the Nazi-past, young Germans cannot escape the realization that their nationality is tainted (Welzer, 2005). However, by virtue of the persistence of the ‘narrative gap’, as well as their temporal removal from that period, grandchildren of the war-generation struggle to make the affective connection between the burden of the past and their existence as Germans in a modern and liberal Europe (Rensmann, 2004; Bar-On et al., 1998). In other words, they know that identifying with, or being ‘proud of’, their own German nationality is still a taboo, or at least highly controversial, and thus try to dissociate from it, for example by explaining that one has no agency in the determination of one’s national association. Therefore, one cannot be held liable for any wrongdoings of previous generations.

“...because I know that it...that it does not mean anything to be born ‘somewhere’, and...I don’t know...I find ‘pride’...pride is something that one can
feel in relation to an accomplishment...and...to be born here [Germany], that simply isn’t anything that I’ve had any influence over” (B)

By essentially eliminating ‘nationality’ as a relevant reference marker for locating the self, young Germans try to rid themselves of the one social comparison dimension that potentially evokes a negative self-image in most people sharing that national identity (Giesen, 2004; Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987).

However, at the same time, young Germans, because of the affective dislocation between the Nazi-past and their modern lives, appear to develop a sense of uncertainty about the necessity to carry forward that dark and heavy burden in the form that is the still prevailing approach to the management of Nazi-era memory:

“...of course it is relevant for today! We do have that old responsibility...but it may be important to...to develop a bit of...national awareness...to be more critical...like...when we refused to participate in the Iraq-war, even though the ‘old obligation’ was used again...we are a sovereign nation!” (E)

“To be ‘German’...to me that means to...well...to slowly...to start feeling good about...not ‘national pride’!...but...I am happy to be German, I am happy to live in this system! It functions very well” (H)

Taking note of this interesting material, it was most fortunate for the depth of this research that data collection coincided with the events of the 2006 Soccer World Cup in Germany, which brought to the fore public discussion on self-image in relation to German nationality. The prevalent public notion of a ‘new German national pride’ at the time of data collection was a contentious topic for members of the research sample (Purvis, 2006). Their response to the idea of Germans feeling a sense of ‘pride’ in relation to their nationality was predominantly one of
considerable caution, which would reflect a relative adherence to the taboo of national identity among members of the 3rd generation (Ostow, 1995).

“Well, when I see an ocean of [German] flags, in a crowd of 50 000 Germans, then I spontaneously have to look upon that with suspicion...Well, I get a funny feeling when I look at that!...Simply because of associations with...like...‘3rd Reich’...” (A)

Ruesen’s (2005) notion of ‘historical symbols’ is relevant to such reservations in relation to displays of nationality among participants. He asserts that national symbols are essential reference markers for ‘togetherness’ of groups. As such they provide the group, in this case a nation, with a frame of identity and meaning that is grounded in the group’s history and its narrative thereof (Ruesen, 2005; Kearney, 2002). Such symbols have become synonymous with terror and atrocities in the German context. Images of ‘oceans of flags’, enshrined in photo-materials of the infamous Nazi-rallies, have become inextricably linked with fascism and the 3rd Reich. Because the German narrative has been severed, there has been no possibility to create new positive connotations in relation to symbols, such as flags, in contemporary society. As a result, and with the undesirable meaning of these symbols preserved, they evoke powerful memories of the atrocious past and thus induce the shame associated with that period among many contemporary Germans. This negative subtext to such symbols suggests that modern German society would refrain from making such markers excessively salient in the public realm. Nonetheless, participants reported that they welcomed the unprecedented nature in which Germans displayed their national enthusiasm in relation to the 2006 Soccer World Cup, which included the public flying of flags on every house and car in Germany (Purvis, 2006). However, members of the sample indicated approval of such use of symbols only as long as it occurred in a context that does not mirror any ideological motivation that could in any way be reminiscent of Nazi-dogma.
“...anyone who felt like putting up a flag at the window...I mean...should feel free to do so...but it should only relate to...like...only because of the sport...not for political reasons!” (H)

This emphasis on conditional display of national symbols reinforces the notion of a sense of caution, which subsequently reiterates that the German demonstration of national pride evoked affective discomfort among participants. By dissociating the marker of a negative self-image – the national flag - from its original broad meaning, namely that of indicating the 'togetherness' of a society, and making it applicable only to the display of affinity with a group of athletes in a cosmopolitan context, Germans were able to uphold a positive self-image.

The debates that ensued during the World Cup, as well as the materials from this research, once again highlight that the affective dynamics that have surrounded Nazi-era memories since 1945 are still very much relevant to a 3rd generation of Germans. Because they are grounded in nationality, the emotions of guilt and shame in response to the crimes committed by Nazi-Germans are, as argued above, evoked in any debate around national pride, and thus need to be defended against to be able to maintain a positive self-image from which some form of a bearable identity can be constructed (Rensmann, 2004; Giesen, 2004; Safran, 2000). Attempts to detach from the memory of the past – using the various strategies discussed up to this point – uphold the continued absence of a coherent German narrative, which normally forms the basis for a sense of meaning and self-understanding, thereby rendering the formation of a secure sense of identity impossible for young members of contemporary German society (Ruesen, 2005; Kearney, 2002; Frankl, 1985).

Nonetheless, the most recent developments in Germany, as well as the reported tentative enthusiasm about ‘being German’ among participants, suggest the possibility that younger members of society may slowly begin to be able to amalgamate the ‘burden of the past’ with a comfortable existence in the present.
as Germans. This does not mean that prevalent identity management dynamics of the past are in any way diminished in terms of their affective influence. However, what may have begun to gain momentum, with an event such as the Soccer World Cup as a catalyst, is a willingness among the 3rd generation to attempt to depart from established patterns and to use the increasingly liberal Euro-cosmopolitan context to carefully 'experiment' with the concept of national identity. If such developments are in fact unfolding, then the grandchildren of the war-generation are at a stage at which they are anything but certain as to how exactly to proceed towards a future in relation to the memory of the Nazi-past. This uncertainty appears to be the essence of what the participants of this research conveyed about their relationship with the legacies of the dark period of German history.

**THE ‘GESTALT’: AN AMBIVALENT GENERATION**

Rensmann (2004) stresses that “the younger [German] people are, the less likely they are to be highly identified with Germany, and the more likely they are to display feelings of collective guilt” (p. 179), which lends support to the assertion that grandchildren of the war-generation are, like their parents and grandparents, still constrained in terms of their ability to constructively integrate the legacies of the Nazi terror into their post-nationalist existence (Heimannsberg & Schmidt, 1993).

What transpires from the results, however, is that 3rd generation post-war young Germans interviewed for this research clearly find themselves in a state of ‘limbo’ with regards to their relationship with the Nazi-past. They are more ambivalent in their understanding and desire of how contemporary German society can and should manage its memory of the national atrocities. Although many of the memory dynamics, and responses thereto, that have been affecting previous generations remain operative at the grandchild level - feelings of guilt and shame are still prevalent, and dissociation continues - young Germans
equally appear to be at a point that suggests the possibility for progressive divergence from some of the trends manifested among their parents and grandparents, albeit departing in a frequently incoherent manner (Rensmann, 2004; Bar-On, 1998). What seems to slowly gain momentum is a longing to claim back some of that sense of national identity that Germans have not been able to relate to since the end of the Second World War because of the concept’s tainted association with unspeakable terror and suffering.

“...I want to be one people! I want to belong...I want to...I want to exist in a collective!...but because of history, one needs to re-consider this [thought or wish]!” (H)

What this quote illustrates is that, although Safran (2000) asserts that many young Germans simply, and often uncritically, reject the idea of guilt, members of the sample displayed conscious awareness of the ambivalent position they find themselves in, and which also incorporates a well-developed understanding of the implications of the legacies of the Nazi-past for contemporary life in Germany. In that sense, Nazi-era and Holocaust education will, undoubtedly, have had a positive impact in terms of producing knowledge about the past. What is significant here is the fact that members of the 3rd generation display a readiness to move forward in relation to the memory of the Nazi-past. However, whether development is constructive and actively engages with the legacies appears less clear.

Feldmann (2003) argues that an inappropriately framed and dislocated “indulgence in the past tends to replace agency” (p. 264), thus lending support to the concept of ‘scapegoat engagement’ as a means of avoiding direct and active engagement. Interestingly, the participants of this study demonstrated, although generally adhering to such a habitual and thus dissociative manner of engagement, a willingness to think about their position vis-à-vis the burden of the past in more progressive terms. They felt that a balance between
acknowledgement of the Nazi crimes and a renewed German national ‘self-awareness’ – ‘national pride’ was too strong a concept for most participants – is possible, and in fact desirable, for contemporary German society.

“I believe one can feel good about one’s [German] nationality and also say: ‘that [the Nazi-period] is also part of our history...’;...and we can feel even better about it, because we leaned from it!” (D)

Nonetheless, this willingness among participants was not accompanied by any, not even tentative, indications of meaningful action or suggestions for active engagement with the past in their lives. The explanation for such a seemingly hypocritical position may well be related to the above-discussed concept of ‘scapegoat engagement’. It may just constitute the ‘chosen strategy’ among 3rd generation Germans in response to the emphasis on a continuation of the ‘cult of guilt’ as a general frame of Nazism and Holocaust knowledge dissemination. In that sense, the contemporary approach to the management of Nazi-period memory appears to obstruct and prevent constructive, active and, most importantly, self-critical engagement with the painful past, because of its central reliance on ‘shocking’ the younger generation to make ‘the point’ about its incomparable nature.

“We went to visit the old GESTAPO-jail...and they locked us in a cell...well...it’s...to try to impress the...that you really feel...how it was...” (H)

Providing evidence for this assertion in the context of education, Welzer (2005) stresses that “the more comprehensive the knowledge about war crimes, persecution, and extermination, the stronger is the need” to employ strategies that can deflect inevitable aversive affective responses, which are undoubtedly evoked by the comprehensive unfolding of every aspect of the Nazi-terror. What this dynamic suggests is that, in order to fulfill the actual stated aim of Nazi and Holocaust education in Germany, namely to create a social “climate that is open
to compensation and to intragroup and intergroup communication on the atrocities of the past” (Rensmann, 2004, p. 186), the present frame of educational / memorial culture may well need to be readjusted to transfer the knowledge about the atrocious past in a manner that nurtures and develops the apparent emerging sense of possibility of envisaging a future that constructively incorporates the burdensome memory of the Nazi-period. In essence, what the current situation calls for might be Feldmann’s (2003) suggestion that “a valid role of memory in the production of identity then would be a critical and reflectively tempered acceptance of the past, oriented towards informed action in the future” (p. 264)

CONCLUSION

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESULTS / STUDY

The findings of this research clearly indicate that the Nazi-past and the Holocaust do indeed still exert influence over young Germans today. These results subsequently demonstrate that dynamics of multigenerational trauma can still be significantly prevalent, even if the original events are removed by three generations. Such conclusions undeniably raise questions in relation to the dynamics that are responsible for extending the transmission of intergenerational trauma to this extent.

Unfortunately, large-scale, politically motivated atrocities and mass murder have occurred since the downfall of Nazi-Germany, and the possibilities for further violence of extreme magnitude still appear to be a continuous reality in today’s world. Accordingly, the presence of intergenerational trauma in contexts besides the Nazi-German example is high, particularly so among the 1st and 2nd generation levels (see Danielli, 1998). The body of literature concerning the case
of Germany is rich and well established in relation to these levels. This abundance provides an ideal background against which 3rd generation dynamics can be explored. Subsequent insights will be most valuable to inform the development of strategies aimed at breaking the cycles of intergenerational transmission of trauma in cases of politically motivated mass atrocities in other contexts that have yet to include a 3rd generation.

The results and theoretical implications of this study are of significance because they supplement the still developing body of literature addressing the multigenerational effects of trauma associated with Nazi atrocities. As such, insights from this study can be utilized as a point of departure for further investigation, which ultimately should aim to crystallize sound understanding of underlying transmission mechanisms at the grandchild level.

RECOMMENDATIONS

What clearly transpires from this research is the habitual manner in which young Germans relate to the memory of the Nazi-period. The static nature of that memory appears to hinder any committed movement towards constructive engagement with the legacies of Nazi-Germany. Under these circumstances it seems appropriate and necessary to suggest a critical re-evaluation of the approaches to ‘memory-management’ in relation to the Nazi-period in contemporary Germany. The idea should not be to transform, or somehow ‘re-adjust’, the content of the memory. This would mean falling into the trap of attempting to ‘diminish’, ‘trivialize’, or ‘normalize’ the terror supported by Nazi-period Germans, which was the case during previous decades. Instead, it appears useful to explore a re-evaluation of the manner in which that memory is framed. In order for Germany, and more importantly Germans, to locate their own existence in a coherent narrative, from which a secure sense of identity can transpire, it is essential to actively engage with that period. The current approach to memory management seems to hinder such development.
In this context it is helpful to re-emphasize van Beek and Lategan’s (2005) conclusion that a comfortable self-reference can only come about by building a constructive and open-minded relationship with the past that can “extol the virtues and special qualities of a group by building its identity in contrast to the images of the “other” (sic.)” (p.353). This observation highlights the critical necessity for Germans to commit to candid engagement with the other. This means that it is vital for Germans to acknowledge the Nazi victims and to seek exchange with the survivor generations. Some would argue that acknowledgement, through continuous memorialization and public statements by government, has been sufficiently addressed (Safran, 2000). However, as the results of this research suggest, it is precisely the static manner in which this ‘agenda’ of acknowledgement is framed that diminishes the likelihood of direct engagement with the ‘other’. Safran (2000) captures this dynamic by observing that Germans today prefer to relate to Jews “in the abstract rather than to deal with them as part of a living community” (p. 49), meanwhile “insisting that the Holocaust not be forgotten” (p. 49), which manifests in form of the ‘dark and burdensome’ mode of remembrance that seems to be the less threatening ‘scapegoat’ alternative to direct engagement.

It is against this background that memory-management in contemporary Germany should potentially be critically re-evaluated. The guiding principle of revision should be to transform the German memory of the Nazi-period towards a more dynamic nature (not to alter its content!). Such a process of transformation should begin in the realm of education, where most young Germans appear to get their first concrete and detailed exposure to the legacies of the Nazi-era. As discussed above, it has been argued that the teaching of the Nazi-period, in the absence of any consideration and management of student affective responses to the materials, has a lasting problematic influence that reinforces the pattern of passive or abstract engagement with the legacies of the Nazi-period (Fuchs, 2002; Safran, 2000; Schatzker, 1980). Subsequently, the relationship of the 3rd generation revolves around the empty and removed mantra of the German
‘responsibility that it never happens again’, which can be quickly recited in the absence of any real meaning. Educators, policy makers and those in charge of ‘memory-management’ in contemporary Germany should consider an approach to history dissemination that is less grounded in a cult of guilt, but rather should conceptualize it from a perspective that understands “collective memory...as an active (my emphasis) process of sense-making over time” (Olick & Levy, 1997, p. 922).

LIMITATIONS OF THE FINDINGS / STUDY

This research endeavor was executed in a context that did not allow a comprehensive treatment of the topic from the outset. As a result, a number of concessions had to be made during the research process. Most importantly, the results presented here do not reflect the full spectrum of valuable insights from the data, which was incredibly rich in depth, given the constrained circumstances of data collection. The materials were gathered over an extremely condensed period of time. Consequently, strategies to increase the richness of the data, such as re-interviewing some of the participants, could not be employed. Recruitment of participants itself was quite pressured because of limited time in terms of the available data collection period in the schedule of a coursework & dissertation Master’s program.

Acknowledging these constrains, the finding that all participants initially reported self-perceptions of being free of emotions of guilt and shame in relation to the atrocities of the Nazi-past, albeit clearly demonstrating – and in some case overtly stating – contradictory sentiments, may have been a result of the fact that the sample was homogenous in terms of educational background. As demonstrated, the results support the observations of both, Rensmann (2004) and Safran (2000). The latter reporting that young Germans do indeed perceive themselves of being free of guilt and shame, thereby implying little relevance of the Nazi-past to their sense of location in the present (Ruesen, 2005; le Goff,
The former author, however, indicates that it is those 3rd generation members of contemporary German society of higher education who tend to engage with the atrocious past in a more constructive manner, and who report instances of emotions of guilt and shame in association with their ‘German-ness’ and the era of Nazi-terror. To these members of the 3rd generation the Nazi-past appears to continue to be relevant to their self-understanding as Germans today. Given this skewed sample, it would be advantageous to replicate this study incorporating a sample of less extensively educated young Germans in order to validate the findings of this research.
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APPENDIX A – Informed Consent Form  
(translated from German [my translation])

INFORMED CONSENT

Dear Participant,

This research is conducted by Oliver Fuchs, B.Soc.Sc. (Hons), research student under the supervision of Professor Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela at the University of Cape Town. The project aims to explore identity construction, in relation to national history, among young Germans.

Your contribution to this research will take the form of an in-depth interview. With your permission, the interviews will be recorded. All information supplied by you will remain strictly confidential, and nothing documented will ever identify you in any way as a participant of the research. Your personal details will be stored separately from the tapes and, should you request so, this information, as well as the tapes, will be destroyed as soon as possible.

Your research participation is entirely voluntary.

You have the right to terminate the interview at any time that you should wish to do so, and you have the right to refuse answering any question you deem inappropriate or too personal. Furthermore, you reserve the right to withdraw entirely from the study at any time during the ongoing research process.

The research is expected to be completed by December 2006. Should you wish to obtain the results of study after its completion, the researcher will make a copy of the final project available to you. In that case, please supply your contact details (the above described confidentiality assurances apply).

Should you have any subsequent queries, please feel free to contact Oliver Fuchs via email at ofuchs-sylt@hotmail.com.

By signing below, you indicate that you have understood the above, and give your informed consent to participate in the study.

..........................................................................................................................................................

Signature                                      Date
APPENDIX B – Sample Interview Schedule (German Version)

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Bitte erzähle mir von Deiner Familie
   A) was weisstDu über die Leben Deiner Grosseltern?
      • was haben sie Dir über sich & ihr leben erzählt?

   B) was weisst Du über die Leben/Aufwachsen Deiner Eltern?
      • was haben sie Dir über sich & ihr leben erzählt?

   C) wenn Du mit Ihnen über ihre Leben gesprochen hast, was hat Dich
      interessiert?
      • welche Fragen hast Du gestellt?

2. Kannst Du Dich erinnern wann Dir die Nazi-Deutsche Geschichte das
   erste Mal bewusst wurde?
   • Was waren Die Umstände?
   • Kannst Du Dich an Deine Reaktion erinnern? (emotionen)

3. Was wurde im Geschichtsunterricht in der Schule diskutiert/unterrichtet?
   • Koenntest Du beschreiben wie (pos/neg) Deutsche Geschichte
     präsentiert/untermalt wurde?
   • Wie hat dieser Unterricht auf Dich gewirkt? (emotionen)

   [•Stach irgendetwas ueber die Nazi Zeit heraus im Unterricht?]
4. Koenntest Du mir bitte beschreiben wie Du zur Geschichte der Deutschen stehts?
   • Was sind Deine Gedanken zur Deutschen Geschichte?
   • Was steht fuer Dich hervor?

5. Welche Relevanz haben diese Geschichtlichen Aspekte fuer Dein Leben?
   • Was beteutet es fuer Dich solch eine nationale Geschichte zu haben?

6. * German Students in SA only

   Koenntest Du mir bitte erklaren warum Du Dich entschieden hast Dein Leben ins Ausland zu verlagern?
   • Beweggruende?
     • Ist dies Dein erster 'laengerer' Auslandsaufenthalt?
   • Was erhoffst Du Dir von diesem Wandel fuer Dein Leben?

   • Was sind Deine Erfahrungen in Dieser hinsicht (Beispiele)

   • Hast Du jemals negatives Gegenuebertreten verspuert auf Grund der tatsache das Du Deutsch bist?

7. (Alt.) * German Students in SA only

   Koenntest Du mir bitte beschreiben wie Du Dich als Deutsche in einem 'fremden' Land fuehlst?
   • Wie veraendert es sich mit der Zeit?
8. Wie denkst Du werden Deutsche / Deutschland im Ausland wahrgenommen?
   • Was sind Deine Erfahrungen (Beispiele)?
   • Was fuer Reaktionen bekommst Du wenn klar wird das Du Deutsch bist?

   • War das das erste Mal? -> Wie war das erste Mal?
   • Was war Deine Reaktion? (Emotions)

    Wenn ja: • Kannst Du die Interaktion beschreiben?
    Wenn nein: • Gibt es Andere in Deinem Bekannten kreis die/der Kontakt hat? -> wenn nein: Warum denkst Du das es kaum kontakt gibt?

11. Koenntest Du bitte Dein erstes Zummsammentreffen mit einer Juedischen Person beschreiben? [REACTION]!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    • Wie war Deine Reaktion? (emotionen)
12. Was ist Dein Verständnis der Neo-Nazi Szene in Deutschland?
   • Wie interpretierst Du die Informationen über Neo-Nazis in den Nachrichten?
   • Wie denkst Du erklärt sich das Dasein der Neo-Nazi Szene?

13. Im Vorfeld der WM war das Thema Neo-Nazis gross in den Medien (im Ausland). Warum denkst Du war das so ein grosses Thema?
   • Wie denkst Du wird das Image Deutschlands im Ausland dadurch beeinflusst?
   • Wie reagierst Du wenn Du diese Nachrichten wahrnimmst?

14. WM, Schwarz-rot-gold überall, „ein vorher nicht dagewesenes Deutsches Nationalgefuehl (Medien)” erscheint im Mittelpunkt öffentlicher Diskussion…wie siehst Du das Thema ‘Nationalbewusstsein’?
   • Wie denkst Du sollte mit dem Thema "Deutsches Nationalgefuehl" umgegangen werden?
   • VERGLEICH DANSK: Ist es Zeit damit lockerer umzugehen?

15. Wird das Thema Nationalbewusstsein jemals in Deinem sozialen Umfeld diskutiert?
   • Worum drehen sich diese Gespräche?
   • Kannst Du eine allgemeine Meinung / Konsens erkennen? Wie sieht dieser aus?

16. Gibt es noch irgendetwas das Dir wichtig, erscheint, wir jedoch nicht angesprochen haben?
1. Can you please tell me about your family?  
A) What do you know about the lives of your grandparents?  
B) What do you know about the growing up of your parents?  
C) When you talked to them, what was of interest to you?  
  • what questions did you ask?  

2. Can you remember the first time you became conscious about the Nazi-German history?  
   • What were the circumstances?  
   • Please describe your reaction (emotionen)  

3. What was discussed in high school history lessons?  
   • Please describe how these lessons were taught/ framed (mood)?  
   • What was your reaction to these lessons? (emotionen)  

4. How does it feel to you to have such a national history?  

5. What relevance does this history have for your life today?
6. * German Students in SA only

Could you explain to me why you decided to move abroad?

7. Could you describe to me how you feel when you are abroad?

7. (Alt.) * German Students in SA only

Could you describe to me how you feel as a foreigner living abroad?
• what happens to your self-understanding as a German?

8. How do you think Germans are conceptualized abroad?
• What are your experiences

9. Can you recall / describe any instances in which your ‘being German’ has been an issue abroad?
• What was your reaction? (Emotions)

10. Do you know or do you have contact with any members of the Jewish community?
    If so: • Can you describe the interaction?

11. Could you describe to me an instance in which you came into contact with a Jewish person?
    • What was your reaction? (emotionen)

12. What do you know about the Neo-Nazi scene in Germany?
• How do you interpret the news about Neo-Nazi activity?
• How do you explain the presence of the Neo-Nazi scene in Germany?

13. How do you view the issue of 'new national pride' in Germany in relation to the Soccer World Cup?

• How do you think we should respond to these developments?

15. Is the topic 'national pride' ever discussed in your social realm?
    • What are the prevalent opinions?

16. Is there anything else of importance to you that we did not discuss?
APPENDIX D – Diagram: Concept Chart of Themes

The **Gestalt:** An Ambivalent Generation

Between Guilt & Responsibility

Struggling for Identity

Conveying The Dark & Burdensome Past: *A Cult of Guilt?*
R: kannst du dich erinnern wann dir die nazi-deutsche geschichte das erste mal bewusst wurde? Was da die umstehende waren? Wo das war?

P: hmmm...also ich wuerde jetzt spontan sagen in der schule. Aber ich glaub eigentlich...also...hab ich das bestimmt vorher schon irgendwie zu hause erfahren. Und...ob jetzt durchs fernsehen...oder aehm...durch irgendeinen roman den ich gelesen hab, das weiss ich nicht mehr genau. Aehm...ja, also wann das jetzt das erste mal war, das weiss ich nicht mehr so genau. Aber klar, in der schule wurde das ja dann noch mal ausfuehrlicher....

R: im geschichtsunterricht?

P: Uhu...

R: kannst du dich erinnern, oder kannst du mir beschreiben wie dieser aspekt der deutschen geschichte dort praesentiert oder untermahlt wurde?

P: hmm...erinnerung [laughs]...aehm...nee, aber...also ich weiss halt das die uns auf jeden fall auch mit bildern von so leichenbergen und so was schocken wollten und das hat naturlich auch gewirkt...also wie das jetzt genau...der unterricht gestaltet wurde, dass weiss ich jetzt gar nicht mehr, aber...auf jeden fall...die bilder die man sieht, dass ist ja das was aehm...ja, das einzige was...was auf uns heute noch wirkt...ja, das man auch mit wirklich...also das man’s glaubt...weil...also...klar, frueher wollte das schon keiner glauben, oder leute haben gesagt „das glauben wir nicht dass das passiert ist“...“hier war ein KZ?“, oder was...und...und ja...man kann sich das halt einfach nicht vorstellen ohne diese bilder...

R: du hast gesagt „geschockt‘, kannst du dich noch konkret an deine reaktion erinnern, oder die beschreiben?

P: hmm...also ich finde „schock‘ ist schon relativ passend. Also...viel mehr gibt’s da eigentlich nicht zu sagen [note participant continues to block deeper information (reaktions/emotions), albeit revealing material indirectly]

R: was bedeutet es fuer dich...also ueber dieses „pflicht‘-ding hinaus...oder gibt es fuer dich noch irgendwas was es fuer dich bedeutet eine solche geschichte zu haben? Was dich halt weiter beeinflusst...

P: hmm...also das man noch was anderes weitergibt?

R: was bedeutet es fuer dich eine solche nationale geschichte zu haben. Also einfach als junge deutsche...gibt es da noch irgendetwas?
P: hmm...ja, also ich mein' ich identifiziere mich jetzt nicht die ganze zeit mit der vergangenheit deutschlands. So ist das ja nicht! Aber achm...hmm...

R: kennst du oder hast schon mal kontakt gehabt mit judischen menschen?

P: nee, ich glaube ich kenne keinen einzigen juden.

R: kennst du oder hast schon mal kontakt gehabt mit judischen menschen?

P: nee!

R: warum meinst du ist das so?

P: [laughs]...weil's so wenig juden gibt wahrscheinlich! [check out jewish population in GER!!] also...ja also viele...die meisten juden leben glaube ich ja...ahm...in den USA und....

R: kannst du dich an ein zusammentreffen mit einer judischen person erinner? Das du das wusstest, oder das es dir klar war dass das ne judische person ist?

P: nee!

R: also ich lebe primaer in suedafrika, dewegen kannst du mir vielleicht ein bischen helfen...also ich bin hier angekommen als die WM schon losgegangen war, aber da halt ueberall ganz gross 'neues deutsches nationalbewusstsein'. Wie siehst du diese bislang nur kurze entwicklung? Wie sollte damit umgegangen werden, oder wie denkst du wird sich das fortsetzen?

P: ja...also achm...ich finde das...das die deutschen das auch duerfen auf jeden fall. Achm...ja, solange das von jeder nationalsozialistischen...von jedem gedankengang in die richtung...ausgeschlossen ist. Weil ich mein' jede nation ist irgendwie stolz auf ihr land. Ich selber kann...kann also zwar gar nichts anfangen, aber wenn jemand darauf stolz sein moechte, dann darf er das gerne sein, dass ist mir eigentlich relativ egal. Achm...ja, und also das steht jetzt auch halt wegen der WM wahrscheinlich auch total in der diskussion...also fahnen raushaengen und so, dass finde ich...finde ich eigentlich relative achm...ja, harmlos...also man gewoehnt sich dran. Also am anfang fand ich's komisch, aber auf einmal hat man's ueberall gesehen, und es ging halt um fussball, und...und achm...achm...ja, mit so'nem allgemeinen stolz vielleicht auch irgendwie vielleicht doch auf's land. Aber das hat mich jetzt eigentlich auch nicht gestoert oder so. also ich glaub vor einiger zeit haette mich das noch massiv gestoert! Weil...zum beispiel vorher achm...vor ein paar Jahren noch, wenn ich jetzt irg...zum beispiel irgendwie im schrebergarten mal ne deutsche fahne gesehen hab, da dachte ich sofort dran..."ach...was macht der denn da?? Wie kann man denn ne deutsche flagge aufheangen? Wie laepisch
ist den das?“, aber das ist halt so was was die halt lange aehm...lange nicht durften [note 'dueren'], und aehm...ich find’ das in ordnung also...ja...also man denkt ja dann halt auch direkt so daran...aehm...wie jetzt die welt dann auf deutschland blickt, und ich denke mal aehm...wenn halt keine anderen laender mehr anstoss darauf finden das die deutschen das machen, dann aeh...ja...also...obwohl das ist eigentlich auch egal...also dann ist es in ordnung. Aber aehm...gerade...man sieht ja schon, gerade das es gross diskutiert wird sobald irgendwie fahnen oder so zu sehen...sieht man ja schon wie brisant das thema immer noch ist, und aehm...das wird bestimmt auch noch n’ paar jahre dauern! Das wird niemals vom tisch sein [note definitive nature of 'topic'], also bestimmt nicht in den nachsten 20 jahren! Also ich mein’ das ist kein grosser zeitraum aber ich glaub’ das...die diskussion wird immer weitergehen und das finde ich...das finde ich auch in ordnung!

R: haengt bei dir ne fahne?

P: noel

R: warum nicht?

P: weil ich da nicht wirklich fanatisch bin...also mir ist das letztlich egal. Also nee, das stimmt nicht ganz! Also bei der EM hab ich auch so schweissbaender...schwarz-rot-gold...und da dachte ich auch so: „du bist ja total krass das du das jetzt machst!“, aber das war einfach dann die stimmung. Man hat sich mitreissen lassen [note negative association of involvement] und...ja, so ist das halt!

R: laeest es sich mit einander vereinbaren zu sagen auf der einen seite, so wie du es formuliert hat, haben wir ein erbe...eine verantwortung das weiter zu geben, auf anderen seiten...aehm...das nationalbewusstsein...das man das frei bekennen kann...laeest sich das miteinander vereinbaren?

P: ja, auf jeden fall! Also nationalgefuehl heisst ja nicht direkt aeh...faschismus [laughs]

R: siehst du irgend...ne’ offentlichere entwicklung eines deutschen nationalbewusstseins, siehst du ne gefahr darin? Oder ist da ein potenzial?

P: also bestimmt! Also ich find’s auf jeden fall schon befremdlich...das auf jeden fall! Und wie gesagt, also ich finde auch die...hier...neo-nazis werden auch total unterschatzt! Also so kurz vor der WM war ja dann...auf einmal das ein ethiopier krankenhaus-reif geschlagen wurde, lag dann im koma, und irgendwelche...staedte in mecklenburg-vorpommern wurden...teil...teile dieser staedte wurden dann auf einmal als 'no-go-areas' bezeichnet...fuer auslaender...das da dann nicht rein dueren, und das...also das finde ich schon...also das ist naturlich...entsetzlich irgendwo...und...und...also wenn sich jetzt so’n neuer nationalstolz entwickelt, haette ich schon...n’ bischen die befuerchtung das die tendenz wieder...ja, in den rassismus, faschismus irgendwie so uebergehen koennte. Vielleicht...also uebertreibe ich da auch, aber ich bin da auch relativ aengstlich. Also ich hab...also ich hege schnell solche befuerchtungen [note some insight-> oversensitivity],

101
und...ja, mir ist es selber total fremd. Also ich kenne jetzt niemals irgendwie...also ich glaub nicht das ich in meinem leben noch mal so was wie nationalstolz entwickeln kenne...und aeh...jetzt wenn...wenn ich jetzt mal kinder hab, und aehm...die sind dann anders drauf, dann faende ich das wahrscheinlich aehm... ja, also...klar, fuer die ist die...nochmal n stueck weiter weg, und die werden dann wieder ein neues bild irgendwie entwickeln, wahrscheinlich jetzt auch wenn das...wenn sich das so weiter entwickelt mit dem neuen nationalstolz, klar, die anders damit umgehen. Aber aehm...ja, ich hab halt angst vor...vor solchen aeh...tendenzen auf jeden fall. Ich glaub das...das wir ziemlich schnell...das man da irgendwie in das...reinrutscht

R: du sagst die neo-nazi szene wird in deutschland unterschaetzt, sollte das thema offener diskutiert werden?

P: hmm...jetzt in den medien oder...?

R: allgemein...ist ne notwendigkeit da das mehr rauszubringen? Ist das zu unterschwellig? Ich hab jetzt keine ahnung, ich war in den letzten Jahren wenig hier,...inwiefern es in den medien vertreten ist...

P: uhu...ja also nicht sehr stark. Und aehm...

R: weil du sagtest es waere unterschaetzt...

P: ja, das ist es ja halt eben! Und der...also jetzt hat...also in der medien-landschaft...man kriegt halt immer nur das mit was berichtet wird, und man guckt...man ist...also man guckt jetzt nicht selber...recherchiert nicht...wie viele aeh...rechte gruppiereungen gibt es in deutschland? Wie viele sind das? Wie sind die organisiert? Oder so. aber aehm...wenn man dann so was mitkriegt, dann heisst das ja „es gibt super viele neo-nazis wieder in deutschland“, und dann denkt man so „oh!...“, und dann zwei wochen spater hat man’s dann eigentlich wieder vergessen, wenn nicht noch mal drueber berichtet wird. Aber das ist...gerade das ist das was ich mir dann merke, weil...gerade weil es eben um die neo-nazis geht. Und aehm...ich glaub das viele halt auch gar nicht wissen das es viele neo-nazis in deutschland gibt. Und aehm...also...deswegen finde ich schon kenne man oefter mal irgendwie darauber diskutieren. Also ich mein’...aehm...man veraendert damit glaube ich auch nicht wirklich was, weil die leute die [laughs] aeh...eh nicht so gesinnt sind, die sind’s halt nicht...