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SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS
POST-POSITIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY
AND THE NEW ENLIGHTENMENT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Sino-African Relations

Post-Positivist Epistemology and the New Enlightenment in Global Politics

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COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: 

Date: 05th June 2007
Abstract:

This essay contributes to contemporary dialogue on the search for a new Enlightenment in international political theory, using relations between China and Africa as an opportunity to critique the exclusive position of realism in the study of global politics. Michel Foucault’s philosophy of epistemology and ‘power/knowledge’ directs theorists to prevent rationalism from assuming a dominant role in the production of knowledge truths about social relations. The investigation briefs the reader on Foucault’s quest for Enlightenment, the development of realism, and the critical theorists that have responded to this paradigm. From this discussion, Constructivism is selected as the most coherent sociological theory providing the metaphysical explanations about foreign politics that realism does not. Constructivism uses identities, values, cultures and historical perceptions to provide transformative understandings of international state behaviour. Realism focuses on material interests and the dynamic of power under a set of structural assumptions about the international system of states. A case study of Sino-Angolan relations presents both material/structural and social/transformative explanations of this partnership. In accordance with Foucault’s ambition to expose networks of ‘power/knowledge’ rather than replace them, it is not suggested that constructivism should supersede realism in international relations theory. The project concludes that realism alone offers only a limited number of truth possibilities, but through combining it with constructivism, more knowledge claims can be presented and dialogue within international relations will be greatly expanded; fulfilling the vision of Enlightenment.
“What we wanted to do was to enable expression of all opinions, making them available, so to speak, publishing things we liked and things we hated, it did not matter. What was vital for us was giving readers a choice”

Mai Ghoussoub (1952-2007)
Founding Director, Saqi Books
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Introduction:

April 2007 saw the annual cycle of Reith Lectures, an event where a distinguished thinker is invited to deliver five public radio addresses. The concept was inaugurated in 1948 in memory of Lord John Reith, the first Director General of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Not only does the series celebrate the medium of radio in aiding open political dialogue, the lectures are traditionally recorded in different venues that have come symbolise mankind’s intellectual Enlightenment since the late seventeenth century. From the Royal Society, London; The Earth Institute, New York; The Assembly Hall, Edinburgh; SOAS, London and The Room of the Ten Thousand Masses, Beijing- Jeffrey Sachs provided this year’s cerebral quintet. Sachs noted that world power and America have been synonymous in the last half century, but with the new economic strength of ‘the East’, this is no longer (BBC Radio 4 2007). The relative decline of the United States in the face of new competitors, combined with the global challenges of poverty and climate change, leads Sachs to conclude that the world must devise new political frameworks and dialogues in international cooperation. Paying tribute to Adam Smith at the Edinburgh broadcasting, he summarised the humanity of the Scottish Enlightenment economist as a truly global view, where man

‘looked forward to the day when free trade and the spread of ideas would eventually produce an equality of courage and force around the world, so that the benefits of globalization would be shared by all’ (Sachs on BBC Radio 4 2007).

The discipline of International Relations sits at the heart of many centres of learning and debate across the world, but with the dominance of realism within that discipline it has strayed from the sense of justice and creativity that older theorists aspired to. Sachs demands that Enlightenment must return to global politics in a new era where America is weaker, China is stronger, and many of the challenges of globalisation that confronted Adam Smith still remain two centuries later. How can this challenge be addressed?

This project uses contemporary relations between China and Africa as an opportunity to critically review international political theory. To justify this effort, the works of Michel Foucault are employed to argue that the objectivity of realism should not go unquestioned; making theorists open to historical, descriptive, and subjective epistemologies as well. This investigation introduces constructivist theory as a viable approach to determining truths that realism does not. However, in
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line with Foucault’s understanding of epistemology, it is discovered throughout the course of the arguments presented that realism should not be replaced by constructivism, as material explanations are also valid knowledge truths. Foucault’s approach to epistemology and the power of knowledge creation argues that theoretical paradigms should not seek to substitute each other. Such a goal is counter to the attainment of truly free knowledge under the Foucaultian interpretation of Enlightenment.

The rise of China has provided an important window to review the position of realism, the theory that has dominated research in global politics for over sixty years. Beijing’s influence in Africa is more dynamic and far-reaching than at any point during the Cold War. It signifies a new energy in south-south cooperation discourses, and the most powerful contender to several centuries of imperial control under Europe and the United States. China insists that its strategic partnerships with African states to acquire natural resources emerge out of a common history, and are based on mutual respect, friendship, and equality. The American government views the Chinese presence in Africa as a long term threat to the ability of its major oil corporations to obtain energy supplies, and remain the world’s most powerful political-economy. Most western governments, the IMF, and World Bank have criticised the willingness of the Chinese state to negotiate with corrupt African governments; undermining democratic reform, market development, and conflict resolution.

Foucault’s work is not deployed as a theory of foreign relations in its own right, but to argue the need for realism in IR theory to be kept in check by placing alternative viewpoints alongside it. With realism and constructivism operating concurrently, the range of truth possibilities about a relationship between China and Africa should be expanded, according to Michel Foucault. In positivist terms, this constitutes a hypothesis, while to suggest that realism and constructivism cannot deliver this prospect would represent the null. However, framing the research outline in terms of a rational hypothesis is problematic in these circumstances given the critical discussion on the limitation to knowledge offered in the first chapter. Under a Foucaultian ethos of how to produce knowledge, establishing a hypothesis at the outset of research is debilitating; a humanistic limitation on the outcome of an investigation before ‘investigation’ itself has begun. It has become troublesome in the context of social science, as the ‘hypothesis’ borrowed from mathematical positivism may not process amorphous notions of history and culture effectively. Therefore, in a project demonstrating that structural conclusions of realism can be expanded with sociological interpretations of process using a post-positivist epistemology, the term ‘hypotheses’ is used selectively.
Realism and Constructivism can combine to produce structural and transformative understandings of a Sino-African partnership. This fulfils Michel Foucault’s vision of Enlightenment by expanding the number and depth of truth possibilities in International Theory.

A hypothesis to realists, a starting point for dialogue to its critics. This project will discuss structural and transformative understandings of this global relationship against a background that calls for Enlightenment within this academic discipline. Chapter One outlines Michael Foucault’s attitudes to Enlightenment and theory in relation to several other philosophers. It is argued that the theoretical assumptions established by knowledge paradigms must be subject to critical review, but not necessarily replaced. It is observed that rationalism has assumed an overarching presence in the attainment of knowledge and truth, with the effect that metaphysical and sociological factors have been marginalised. In that respect, the chapter continues by reviewing the dichotomy between realism and critical theory in International Relations, and examines the characteristics of each approach. Kenneth Waltz is identified as realism’s structural opponent to arguments founded on social process. However, given the difficulty in finding unity among critical theorists in response to that opposition, the discussion turns to an analysis of Alexander Wendt’s Constructivism, which focuses on the role of state identities and cultural preferences in international behaviour. The goal is not to use a sociological epistemology to dislodge realism, but to combine positivist findings with subjective truth possibilities within one piece of research in the interest of producing a deeper knowledge Enlightenment.

Since constructivism uses 'history' and 'culture' as the determining variables of contemporary state identity, Chapter Two examines several of the main historical experiences that have transformed the global identities of China and the post-colonial African state. It intends to bridge the discussion of Alexander Wendt with the case study presented in the final section. Constructivism looks at how foreign policy is determined by conditions that are internal to the nation-state, and are part of its historical experiences of external engagement. These forces create new, and re-establish older, identities and values that the state uses to justify its strategic behaviour. This author considers the decline of Sino Communist ideology in the wake of China’s staggering economic performance and increased openness to the outside world. This has presented the People’s Party with concerns regarding the stability of China’s internal governance, which has prompted the crafting of a carefully managed ‘cultural orthodoxy’ as a result. China identifies strongly with visions of a multi-polar world and a weaker United States, but has learnt to adopt a pragmatic and non-aggressive approach to achieving it through increased multilateral engagement. The historical experience of the
post-colonial African state is quite different. Internally captured early on by popular nationalisms that celebrated independence from imperial administrators, an ideological scepticism for Western interference has remained a salient feature of the internal and external politics of many African states. With the failure of structural adjustment and difficulty in maintaining a viable agenda at the WTO, strategic relationships with more successful developing world countries is proving increasingly attractive- materially and ideologically.

The final chapter is the Sino-Angolan case study where realist and constructivist interpretations of this partnership are provided. Realism identifies the material significance of oil, while the importance of ‘the state’ and multinational corporations as primary actors in international politics is argued. The dynamics of power and competition, and the potential re-militarization of Africa by the United States in light of China’s influence are also considered. Therefore, several of the structural assumptions of Waltz’s realism are vindicated. Constructivism introduces a freer dialogue that looks at the historical formation of an identity between China and Africa through a mutual scepticism for ‘Western intrusion’. It is argued that China’s internal cultural identities that oppose American hegemony are directly interlaced with Angola’s experience of international involvement in its civil war, the disappointment of IMF policy, and the attempted application of political conditionalities. Chapter Two has provided the background to several of these influences. Constructivist arguments reveal that the concepts of anarchy and sovereignty cannot be treated exclusively as structural as realist theory would have it, but are subject to cultural change given the historical experiences of state transformation.
Chapter One: Calling for a New Enlightenment in International Relations

Epistemology and the Search for Enlightenment: Kant & Foucault

‘You never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view... until you climb inside of his skin and walk around in it’

Harper Lee (1974; 35) To Kill a Mockingbird

In 1960, American novelist Harper Lee chose the adventurous mind of a nine year old girl to carry her readers into the social hardship of America’s Deep South in the 1930s. This was personified by a fictional village in Alabama, crippled by the Great Depression and racism, as a call to social justice for millions of young students living amidst the aggravations of the Cold War. The beauty, compassion, justice, tolerance, and imagination symbolised by the mockingbird had become utopian visions against a stalemate that promoted military aggression and extreme ideological divisions.

Where researchers have become disenchanted with pessimistic outlooks for the future of international politics, the question of ‘What is Enlightenment?’ has stirred new interest. Michel Foucault took his cue from a response to this enquiry by Immanuel Kant, published in 1784 for a Berlin newspaper (Dreyfus et al. 1986; Norris 1994). Kant defined Enlightenment as ‘the attainment of maturity through the use of reason’ (Dreyfus et al. 1986; 109), celebrating the collapse of superstition and cosmology as the Medieval purveyors of truth, and seeking assured knowledge from the mechanical formulation of laws and explanations about the social world. Foucault dutifully recalls Kant’s statements as a welcome departure from a state of youthful ignorance, through a continuous process of discovery embarked on collectively by men (Norris 1994).

However, Foucault moved towards a less forgiving attitude on the dilemma posed by Kant’s views on the notion of critique,

‘that, on the one hand, takes rise in response to certain highly specific historical conditions, while on the other hand claiming to transcend those conditions through an exercise of the human faculties- of understanding, reason, and judgement – deduced a priori as a matter of timeless, self-evident truth’ (Norris 1994; 168)
Kant attempted to confine Man to the epicentre of scientific knowledge and the philosophical stage by human limitations; ‘the processes of life, the exigencies of labour, and the structures of language’ (Simons 1995; 14). He regarded these constraints as ‘positive’ (1995; 14). Man, as an object, could be observed and empirically understood; and in this process, establish conditions where other knowledge possibilities could be acquired and validated.

In Kantian terms, if the human limitations on knowledge are established, the format of any such knowledge is one of organised categories - such as cause and effect, action and reaction, opposites and similarities. These represent the valid truth because they are ‘limited by the a priori concepts which humans bring to bear in their perceptions and understandings of the world’ (1995; 14). Kant’s philosophy is contradictory in this respect, for while he advocates that reasoned critique must be kept within its limitations so as to avoid errors of judgement, the same constraints prohibit us from truly knowing the world directly in and of itself. As a result, potential truth possibilities may lie undiscovered, and lead us to question the authority under which some judgements are considered erroneous, and other not.

Foucault reprimands Kant’s human limitations on knowledge as an analytic of finitude (Simons 1995), and seeks to cut open avenues of critical reflection on the limits themselves by means of dialectical thought,

‘Kant claims to have overcome the antimony between Man as transcendental subject and as determined object, but Foucault argues that the two poles of the transcendental and empirical doublet of Man cannot be kept apart’ (Simons 1995; 15).

Therefore, it is important to note that while Kant and Foucault both believed in a process of critique as a release from an immature or powerless state of being and mind, their paths diverged on how such a critical knowledge should be obtained epistemologically. Foucault was open to Enlightenment, but rejected it as being the only road to truth. Critical reflection is required to avoid being duped by its beguiling power to create solely rational knowledge.

To Foucault, the desperation to be rational and to ‘cleave to a rationalist tradition’ (Simons 1995; 17) is the ‘blackmail’ of Enlightenment, by virtue of its association with humanism. Humanism restrains us from attaining knowledge maturity, because the limits placed on obtaining knowledge are not considered dynamic. Kant treats them as universal and necessary (Simons 1995), and in the
process suppresses our right to reflect on them as changing or redundant in the light of varying historical and cultural conditions.

The writings of Nietzsche were a strong influence on Foucault’s critique of Kant. Nietzsche understood that many practices, convictions, and values in society had become ‘routine, unquestioned, thoughtlessly accepted conventions that need to be scrutinized’ (Ransom 1997; 5). Similarly, Heidegger lamented the presence of a world with ‘deceptively neutral and natural practices’ (Ransom 1997; 3). We are led to believe that no experience can be completely natural, but is instead produced by the influence of both visible and invisible power.

A critique of Enlightenment is an appropriate beginning to question the dominance of realist international relations theory and its positivist based claims on the workings of power – a theory which Foucault would argue is itself the product of power exercised in the production of knowledge. The very notion of having ‘a theory’ about anything at all let alone foreign politics gave him great discomfort- a distinctly Nietzschean trait (Rorty 1986). While the rigid nature of Cartesian epistemology seeks rationality and the separation of mature sciences from religion and the arts, Foucault demands that we should be critically reflective of such a theory, but not desire a substitute for it (Rorty 1986). To seek a replacement would be contradictory to his ethos of knowledge. Instead, he wishes to use discourse to unmask networks of power in society, which most of the time may not even be seen as power, but known ‘as science, or fulfilment, [and] even liberation’ (Taylor 1986; 69). The desire not to seek theoretical substitution is later argued in this chapter as similar to Constructivism in International Relations theory, which sought to bridge realism with its adversaries, not reject and replace them.

Realism is viewed as having betrayed the quest of the Aristotelian project, that of an international political understanding, a polis, in a world were all matters are decided on by ‘words and persuasion, and not through force and violence’ (Neufeld 1995: 5). The polis, like Lee’s mockingbird, has a social purpose that cannot be understood in natural terms; rather it is given meaning by its social creation and appreciation by people. It is important to conceptualise the polis not as a place, but a system of living and human interaction (Neufeld 1995), or a ‘constructed’ reality. Kant was the first to attempt the idea of an international political polis, and other international relations scholars followed. However, not one theorist, from a neo-realist Kenneth Waltz to Marxist-inspired Immanuel Wallerstein seems to have adequately fought for the Aristotelian project,
‘little elaboration is needed…of the fact that theory committed to the reduction or eradication of constraints upon human autonomy remains poorly developed within the field of International Relations’ (Linklater 1986 in Neufeld 1995; 13).

Using China and Africa as a contextual basis, this essay posits that Constructivist Theory can provide a base that contributes to the ambitions of the Aristotelian project, where realism alone has failed. The remainder of this chapter discusses the dominance of realism in modern international relations theory, and its critics.

**America and Realism: Positivist Logic and Waltzian Anarchy**

*The Breakdown of Utopianism*

Grounded in positivist epistemology, Realism in International Relations has been the discipline’s prevailing paradigm since the end of the Second World War, serving an increased demand ‘to study the international system as it was, rather than as one might like it to be’ (Buzan 1996; 48). It dislodged the influence of the idealist paradigm that had taken shape after the First World War, primarily under the stewardship of Woodrow Wilson.

Wilson had embarked on an ambitious campaign of international institution building, rooted in idealist sentiments that were both historical and legalistic (Vasquez 1998). Its historical facet was very Kantian, for idealism summoned mankind to look back on its mistakes, or ‘immaturities’, and deploy reason and common interest to achieve peace and prosperity.

The establishment of the League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice reflected an academic legacy in the United States which educated students of international affairs through the study of diplomacy and international law (Vasquez 1998). The United Kingdom progressively added greater value to inter-disciplinary education in the humanities - such as geography, anthropology, sociology, and economics (Vasquez 1998). Sir Halford Mackinder, the first Director of the Fabian-inspired London School of Economics, shared similar views to President Wilson on the importance of education among ‘the masses’ under new forms of schooling ‘appropriate to educating imperial citizens in the “changing world” of a closed political system’ (Mayhew 2000; 781).
The United States did not experience the late-Edwardian crisis of confidence over the increasing weakness of the British Empire, which drove Mackinder to propose educational reform that would cultivate an imperial understanding of foreign lands and cultures among younger generations (Mayhew 2000). Woodrow Wilson visualized that education would enlighten the lay public about different societies, and gradually eradicate the ‘ignorance and prejudice’ (Vasquez 1998; 33) which contributed to war and suffering. The expansion of international law between the two wars represented a normative attempt among liberal idealists to promote an era of peace, and a step towards developing a rational and scientific approach to the analysis of international politics.

However, the failure to deter the outbreak of a second war did irreparable damage to the idealist paradigm in global politics. British historian, Edward H. Carr, launched a scathing critique on the ‘exuberance’ of utopian idealism in his 1939 publication, ‘The Twenty Years’ Crisis’. Carr (1939) strongly pressed for a scientific approach to international relations to counteract the negative results that derived from overly-ambitious visionary projects led by ‘primitive’ minds,

“When the human mind begins to exercise itself in some fresh field, an initial stage occurs in which the element of wish or purpose is overwhelmingly strong, and the inclination to analyse facts and means weak or non-existent” (Carr 1939; 7-8)

While he accepted that political science could never fully release itself from utopian desires, Carr stressed it had become essential to transit from the initial stage of dreams and wishes to a period of realism where a functional gathering of facts and an objective analysis of actions prevailed (Carr 1939). Carr referred to the importance of addressing power in the international system and its interaction with morality, but his work was never read as a truly theoretical alternative to studying the world (Vasquez 1998).

Immediately after the Second World War, University of Chicago professor, Hans J. Morgenthau, released Politics Among Nations (1948). With several new editions in the twenty five years that followed, it was accredited as the most influential textbook in international politics and installed political realism as the mainframe of American international theory. Morgenthau derived all politics, using objective laws, as a struggle for power,

‘the concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order... and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible... a realist theory
Morgenthau spoke with great self-confidence, if not arrogance and a politically Conservative bias, in his effort to distinguish weak and subjective knowledge from rational and unemotional thought. He lapses into grand statements that demonstrate the hypocrisy of seeking to eschew subjectivity and social complexities through what are normative pleas in themselves that claim an independent, accurate and rational truth. With McCarthian persuasion, he proposes that populace feelings on foreign policy could be rejected or in someway socially determined.

‘personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and all the weaknesses of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course. Especially ... under the conditions of democratic control... Yet a theory of foreign policy must for the time being... abstract from these irrational elements and ... paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence found in experience...’ (1973; 7)

Morgenthau presents a paradox he fails to resolve. On the one hand, rational foreign policy is depicted with deterministic fervour, to be understood as fulfilling a logical ‘course’ akin to any scientific expectation. However, the state’s decision makers are also advised to ‘paint a picture’ using objective analysis, which infers that a purpose should be identified first and then supported with the correct ‘rationally produced’ data. Despite his intention to steer our understanding of global affairs through objective analysis, Morgenthau’s identification of power as the discipline’s primary dynamic is widely accepted beyond the realist paradigm. He conceptualised power as a fundamentally human relationship moulded by the expectation of gains or the dread of losses between those who command it and those controlled by it. Yet he transforms what we imagine as an intensely complex social concept into materially based distinctions, that may be physically and objectively observed (Morgenthau 1973).

**Positivism- Legitimising Realism’s World View**

By superseding idealism’s utopian aspirations with realist assumptions, a fresh paradigm in international relations began to emerge. It attracted increasing numbers of scholars in the United States and Great Britain, who started to empirically develop and test original hypotheses using the state as the international system’s only fundamental actor, and subjecting the role of power to objective measurement in explaining its interaction with other states (Vasquez 1998).
The influence of realism in guiding the discipline towards the realms of natural science has often been viewed through the *behavioural revolt* – the conflict that arose by the late 1950s over the methods of inquiry used in political science. It was not, as some concluded, an effort to challenge the new realist paradigm in international relations, but a debate over what methods of scientific methodology should be employed in testing the assumptions of that paradigm (Vasquez 1998).

As Thomas Kuhn (1970) later argued, the history of scientific revolution demonstrates that scholars could not logically advance analytic techniques without being supported within the environs of a philosophical paradigm in which to ground their findings. How to translate the grand theories of Carr and Morgenthau into practical truth-seeking techniques split the ‘behavioural revolt’ between those who sought to protect the value of qualitative or descriptive techniques, versus the interest in exploring positivist methods. The latter proved more alluring to realist sympathizers, whose marriage to positivism, a commitment to a ‘formal’ unified science and the application of empirical methodologies, went largely unchallenged for forty years (Smith 1996).

Positivism evolved through several transformations, united by a similar epistemological interest that brought the study of the natural environment closer together with the investigation of man’s social relations. The origin of the term is credited to Auguste Comte, working in the early nineteenth century to devise a unified and hierarchical understanding of sciences; with maths as its dominant base and sociology at the apex. Logical Positivism, where many perspectives are shared with Morgenthau, emerged in the 1920s through the Vienna Circle- whose proponents shared the mutual assumption that no other form of knowledge existed, except science; ‘*moral and aesthetic statements were seen... as cognitively meaningless since they could not be in principle verified or falsified by experience*’ (Smith 1996; 14).

The belief in ‘Logicism’ and ‘Empirical verificationism’ has served to build a more unified identity between the natural and social sciences, blurring the traditional distinctions between the physical world and human interaction, while upholding a difference between ‘theories and observations’. Observations are neutral recordings of material existences, and if these measurements can be validated and identified as ‘causation’, then establishing a theory underpinned by the presence of regularities becomes possible (Smith 1996).

The ability to objectively prove the existence of repetitive circumstances in international relations afforded the realist paradigm considerable authority, and contributed to the acceptance of general principles about the international system of states. Decision Theory provided some of the earliest
examples of formal logic deployed in the discipline, whereby identifying the presence of a single decision maker, or group collective, the theorist calculated all of the expected utilities and probabilities of the possible outcomes in a given situation. On this basis, Robert Kennedy proclaimed during the Cuban Missile Crisis that there was a 1 in 4 chance of nuclear war (Bennett et al. 1994).

Recognising that outcomes from decision making could yield different advantages, other researchers devised models to help policy makers weigh up potential gains against each other. Using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Saaty (1983) produced a cost-benefit analysis of policies relating to the resolution of the Falkland Islands invasions. AHP conducts a descriptive analysis where one considers each side’s preferred responses to the enemy’s alternatives. This is followed by a cost-benefit analysis that rationally de-subjectifies those preferences by balancing the implications of certain actions against each other, ‘this is a safeguard against regretting certain actions that look attractive in the heat of the moment, but are judged to be counter-productive in the long run’ (Saaty 1983; 70). Sending the British Fleet proved an enormous cost, but one that satisfied the majority of the UK’s immediate and long term expectations.

Game Theory also became increasingly developed, with the goal of expanding the analytical reach to more complex international situations involving several parties (Bennett et al. 1994). Many of their contributions came to light against the politically heated assumptions on nuclear deterrence-a crucial power ability for key states during the Cold War (Cioffi-Revilla 1983). The role of credibility – the degree of believability in a state’s threat to retaliate - was subject to Cioffi-Revilla’s models of probability which concluded that even with high levels of actions designed to deter a nuclear threat, only moderate credibility would accompany them. Not surprisingly, further military expenditure seemed to be the solution.

**Constructing a ‘Popular’ Positivism:**
The use of quantitative techniques in international relations attracted widespread criticism for buttressing the hegemonic aspirations of the United States, and promoting a highly militarised realism in global politics, especially on the issue of nuclear armaments (Green 1966).

Nevertheless, there remained a powerful incentive for American governments to uphold a realist posture in foreign policy, often through political and cultural rhetoric that impersonated the objective truth, rather than regurgitating empirical facts. Maintaining a persistent conflict with the
Soviet Union justified significant military expenditures that protected trade and resource interests by leaving weaker countries little alternative but to co-operate, 'the logic behind this lay in the presumed transcendental identity between the American and world economies. The expansion of one was seen as good for the other’ (Agnew & Corbridge 1995; 39)

American security discourses espoused strength and confidence within the domestic electorate, establishing a base of political support for what were viewed abroad as controversial foreign policies. Government elites sought to enshrine America’s cultural exceptionalism by framing the country as the origin and destiny of modern democracy, where the world beyond its borders was wrought by conflict and poverty.

Kenneth Waltz contextualised this revitalisation of Jeffersonian norms through his vision of a global system with the individual nation-state situated in a natural environment of anarchy,

‘Among states, the state of nature is a state of war.’ (Waltz 1979; 102)

Although he didn’t appeal directly to the democratic superiority of the United States, he outlined a case for going to great lengths, militarily, to protect it. Waltz’s outlook is consistently pessimistic, banishing imaginations of a co-operative international politics with emphatic statements stressing the necessity of ‘self-help’ among an assembly of units where worry and suspicion are ubiquitous. The following observations are made from his theory.

Firstly, the ability of a state to offer ‘self-help’ is confirmed by the unquestioned belief that only ruling governments hold the legitimate right to the use of force, and this is intimately woven into the achievement of state goals and interests,

‘A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at anytime use force to implement its policies’ (Waltz 2001; 160)

States are less reserved about exercising that right internationally than they might be internally, since their interiors have agency structures that protect citizens. At the global level, states effectively become weak ‘citizens’, where there are no viable security organisations under the structure of anarchy to protect them. It is a matter of survival.
The formal right to the use of force is recognised by the UN Charter (1945) as a right to self-defence after an initial attack. However, Waltz (1979) transforms this into an all encompassing prerogative in the name of an undetermined number of state ‘interests’. With Darwinian paranoia, American administrations increasingly accepted that they possessed the right, if not obligation, to protect a wide range of strategic interests through permanent military readiness, and would not refrain from the use of force, as other states were assumed not to have any reservations about using it either.

Secondly, Waltz develops a simple axiom that America would sustain significant losses close to home if she became militarily complacent,

‘The cobbler depends on the tailor for his pants and tailor on the cobbler for his shoes... Kansas depends on Washington for protection and regulation and Washington depends on Kansas for beef and wheat. One need only say that the cost of breaking the interdependent relations would be high’

(Waltz 1979; 104)

The structure of the potential international threat, versus the mutually beneficial relationship enjoyed within the state, is Waltz’s objective justification for this imagery. These two environments are portrayed as intimately woven, rather than mutually exclusive. In an anarchic system, like units are said to ‘coact’ (1979; 104) but they are also anxious to maintain their survival and provide means of protecting themselves. This geo-political perspective recalls the general character of America’s policy towards Central America and the Caribbean during the Cold War. The Reagan administration became especially concerned that leftist governments in countries like Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Cuba would form rebellious alliances associated with ties to the Soviet Union. This was viewed as a nuclear threat to the US, damaging to regional markets, and a risk to her international credibility (Cochrane 1987). By actively controlling ideological allegiances in the area, America could form differentiated units that would perform more interdependently with her on favourable terms, rather than under the wing of an adversary. In Washington, the importance of America’s ‘backyard’ gradually became more intrinsic than the significance of Kansas alone; the cost of no beneficial interdependence among the Americas to accommodate US interests was perceived to be considerable.
However, thirdly, having differentiated units interacting under anarchic assumptions is still preferable to their existence under a hierarchical system, where so-called ‘structures’ of international organisations and global governance are present,

‘A self help situation is one of high risk … [but] it is also one in which organisational costs are low… risks may be avoided or lessened by moving from a situation of co-ordinate action to one of super- and subordination’ (Waltz 1979; 111)

Was it considered less costly to unilaterally make Central American states subordinate through military and covert interventions, than to cooperate with them through an international hierarchy? According to Waltz’s theory, there is little doubt. Leaders in international organisations are accused of seconding the aims of its members by being more preoccupied with the well-being of the organisation itself (Waltz 1979). In the presence of anarchy, rather than hierarchy, state units privilege their own interests over the preservation of the organisation and the desired result is achieved more rapidly, since ‘hierarchical elements within international structures limit and restrain the exercise of sovereignty’ (1979; 115-116).

Why then do we associate times of peace with the formation of friendly alliances among states? Waltz replies that this perspective is a confusion of structure with process. Less violence does not infer less anarchy, even cross borders transactions that do not entail the use of force are made under the motivation of self-help in pursuit of a state’s own interests. While one inter-state exchange is non-violent, the expectation that the next could be otherwise does not disappear (Waltz 1979).

General Laws of the International System: What remains unexplained?
Kenneth Waltz entrenched ‘customary’ beliefs about the international system that had gradually evolved with acquiescence through the work of post-war theorists under the realist paradigm. These broadly include;

- The nation-state and its decision makers are the most important actors in global politics
- The nation-state holds a legitimate monopoly over the use of force
- Nation-state behaviour is entirely determined by the need to satisfy its goals and interests
- State interests can be determined by the objective measurement of resources and capabilities
- All nation-states exist within structural anarchy
• Pursuing that satisfaction of interests is a struggle for power
• National politics is organised, centralised, hierarchic and maintains sovereign authority
• International politics is undirected, decentralised, anarchic and adapts to rival sovereignties
• The cost of acting independently as a state is lower than being subjected to a hierarchical global government.

Waltzian realism represents both the cause and consequence of America’s continuous attempts to re-affirm its hegemony, through a world vision that is attractive for its lack of complexity and high likelihood of material gain; ‘states are insecurity-driven, and because the anarchic structure provides few constraints on states pursuing power to the best of their ability, realism emphasises the competitive and conflictual side of international relations’ (Buzan 1996; 50 -51).

Waltz gives up on the possibility of an organised and co-operative union of states under the regulation of a law abiding society (Waltz 2001), settling instead for the authority of natural instincts. He justifies himself structurally, but deep analysis of the role and origin of state ‘aspirations’ is not provided by his theory. Positivist methodologies are employed to objectively observe a wide range of circumstances that define the foreign policy interests of a particular state, but they say little to explain why those interests exist in the first place and how they progressively re-shape. This entails handling the role of normative values and identities in coming to terms with how a material struggle for power interacts with culturally and historically defined preferences. Waltz (1979) boasts that his theory offers ‘clarity’ and an ‘economy of concepts’ (1979; 115); the following two sections discuss ideas that have been marginalised by that economy.

Critical Theory: Charlatans and Saviours

Where does the need for Critical Theory come from?
Critical Theory has been carelessly described as an amorphous heap of research projects intending to swim against the current of dominant paradigms. It is widely accused of failing to sustain a viable critique of social transformation (Poster 1989), yet remains ‘the best of what is left of the Left’ (1989; 3). However, others argue that its presence has broadened the horizon of International Relations, making a vibrant and inter-disciplinary field of political science in a globalising world. Andrew Linklater (1996) credits Critical Theory’s development with four principle achievements,
a) Contrary to positivism, it argues that truth-knowledge cannot be produced by attempts to separate a neutrally acting subject from objective reality. The relationship between the two is bound by social constructions and interests.

b) It rejects that empirically grounded claims cannot be challenged. Making such claims universal or immutable normalizes structures of power that enhance inequalities and maintain an unjust status quo.

c) Critical Theory expands understandings of traditional Marxism to create new historical readings using language and discourse, which explain social exclusion more deeply than simply resorting to the influence of class power and the negative effects of capitalist production.

d) The ability to embrace words and dialogue, rather than armed violence and intimidation, becomes a key variable in a reflexive critique of socio-political institutions. Neo realism’s propensity for military power and coercion is rebuked in favour of mechanisms that resolve conflict through consensus discourses.

Linklater’s summary of Critical Theory masks the difficult experience in reaching an agreement among authors who sympathize with the cause of critical reflexivity in the general terms described above, yet cannot compromise on how to achieve it epistemologically. Michel Foucault might argue that the object is not to reach a compromise at all, since this could result in the fixed dominance of a theoretical regime.

The difficulty in gaining appeal for Critical Theory among policy elites originates from their misguided interpretations of Marxist positions – Critical Theory’s founding inspiration. Few men have been more viciously misconstrued than Karl Marx. In American Cold War rhetoric he assumed a demonic persona as democracy’s anti-Christ, and chief influence on the spread of global disorder,

‘...within one hundred years of his death, half the world’s population was ruled by governments that professed Marxism to be their guiding faith.... Stalin, Mao, or Kim Il Sung treated his work rather as modern Christians use the Old Testament: much of it simply ignored or discarded,'
a few resonant slogans...‘opium of the people’ ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ are wrenched out of context turned upside down and cited as apparently divine justification for the most brutal inhumanities...’ (Wheen 1999; 1-2)

Despite America’s sense of triumph at defeating a Communist threat that Marx himself would never have associated with (Wheen 1999), there is currently a fresh bid to determine the course of modern Enlightenment drawing on new perceptions of this figure that dictators and democrats alike have abused for decades. The debate hosted by the civil society forum Open Democracy on the ‘End of History’, a term Francis Fukuyama extracted from Hegel and Marx, is one example of this (Fukuyama 2006).

While all, less a small handful of countries, will not deny that the ‘completion’ of history in the world envisaged by the 1848 Communist Manifesto failed to materialise, there is still anxiety about what political values and concepts will become universal as modernity progresses in a globalising world. Fukuyama’s (2006) response is to show how his prophecy on democracy’s Enlightenment in the international system departs from Samuel Huntington- on the issue of whether the institutions developed during the early western Enlightenment have universal possibility, (as Hegel, Kant and Marx expected), or are bounded by a particular culture.

Huntington believes that what many describe as ‘Western’ political institutions emanate from European Christian culture, and are incapable of being established beyond its boundaries. The enmeshed history of liberal democracy and Christianity is almost unchallenged. Hegel, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Nietzsche all concurred that modern democracy secularized Christian doctrine into the universal dignity of man, from where contemporary human rights discourses stem (Fukyama 2006).

However, whether these ideas may become detached from such origins and be re-rooted in non-Christian contexts is a moot point. While arguing that liberty and equality possess universal potential above Euro-American Christendom, and Islam, Fukyama (2006) meets Huntington halfway by claiming that a cultural homogenization between all nations is undesirable, if not impossible.

The new End of History discussion is relevant to the mandate of this thesis by drawing attention to the potential roles of history, culture, and identity as determining variables of political and
economic behaviour in international relations. Neither realism, nor Fukyama himself, offer a theory where the epistemology is capable of producing an explanation of the intertwined nature of power and cultural identity in foreign politics. Who claims to fill this vacuum?

*Finding critical reflexivity:*

Sociologist, Saskia Sassen (2006), identifies Fukyama’s determination to classify the principles of liberal democracy with universality as a significant flaw in his conception of the state system; a rationalistic attempt to forecast the end of the historical time line. Sassen’s reservations over giving liberty and equality a universal standing that transcends historic-cultural identity is inherently related to Foucault’s scepticism of Kant’s de-subjectified and ahistorical limits to knowledge that transcends the arts to give science its valid rationality. Together, they underline the importance of critical reflexivity in political research.

Sassen gives this a global framework by addressing Fukyama’s failure to deal with the possibility of decay within the democratic nation-state. She views this shortcoming as systemic of a wider inability among researchers to understand how that which is viewed as ‘foreign’ or ‘global’ is constituted *inside* the state as much as is it accredited to external forces beyond its borders (Sassen 2006).

Positivist realism has invoked what Nietzsche described as a normalising effect for understanding international politics through the material power capabilities of other states in relation to domestic capacities and goals. How the influence of culture, historical perception, and identity are generated *internal* of the state and the resulting effect on foreign policy is a lesser explored territory. The need for a strong Critical Theory presence in the study of International Relations cannot, therefore, be underestimated.

Critical Theory has sought to introduce discourses of reflexivity and human consciousness into the study of international relations by demonstrating that positivism has a normative facet its followers would refute,

"… the social and political context where reason is both privileged and limited to scientific episteme, to term an issue area ‘non-scientific’ cannot but be pejorative in its effect… given positivism’s contribution to the making of that context, and thereby to the impoverishment of
normative discourse, it must be concluded that positivist social science has a clear normative content in and of itself”
(Neufeld 1995; 101)

Michel Foucault gives critical reflectivity momentum by continuously attempting to expose how positivist epistemologies lurch over into ‘a metaphysical gesture to regulate the terms of reality’ (Poster 1989; 6). The risk of this transition is to make the theorist’s ability to pose ‘valid’ conclusions unquestioned, creating fixed and politically powerful identities in the process (Poster 1989).

Foucault desired to split open this linear format using discourses to expose how historically defined conditions determine the production of knowledge and its intrinsic relationship with the exercise of power. Some conceive this process to be a free discursive practice- a democratic, continuous, and non-violent exchange of ideas that unmask systems of control, yet Foucault is darker than this. Discourses are treated as discontinuous practices which knock into each other,

‘discourse has to be seen as the violence we do to things, or in any case as a practice we impose upon them; and it is within that practice that events in discourse find the principle of their regularity’ (Foucault in Macey 1993; 244).

Under this assumption, so-called ‘free’ discourses are adulterated by the implication that they are in themselves mechanisms of control and authority, though knowing this is our emancipation under Foucault’s interpretation of Enlightenment. However, if we crave a Critical Theory that demonstrates a continuous and unbounded conversation on knowledge subjects, unbundled and repackaged through historical conditions; David Macey’s anecdotal account of Foucault’s inaugural lecture to the College de France in 1972 demonstrates that the philosopher himself might sympathize. The concept of ‘inaugural’ went against Foucault’s, ‘deep conviction that absolute origins and beginnings are a myth (Macey 1993; 240);

‘...an inaugural, in the strict sense of the term, takes place against a background of ignorance, of innocence, of absolutely primal disingenuousness; we speak of inauguration if we are faced with something of which we know nothing, or of which we have never spoken, thought or known’ (Foucault in Macey 1993; 240).
This perspective confirms Nietzsche’s apprehension over the existence of ‘thoughtlessly accepted practices’ discussed earlier, produced through the conflict of differing instincts and identities, then normalised to the extent that other truth possibilities are driven to the back of ‘ignorant’ minds. However, the dilemma over the inaugural lecture in Paris does not vindicate Kant’s interpretation of Enlightenment as a transition from immaturity to a more superior level of accurate logic, or Fukyama’s transcendental and universal principles of democracy. Is Foucault equating Enlightenment with ‘inaugural’, by inferring that it is futile, if not mythical, to imagine a state where our knowledge has been absolutely primal or non-existent?

His tenure at the College de France suggests the answer is yes, since power is treated with an ubiquitous presence in the historical production of knowledge whether we are fully conscience of its presence or not,

‘no power is exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge.

At this level, we do not have knowledge on the one hand and society on the other, or science and state; we have basic forms of power-knowledge’ (Foucault in Macey 1993; 248)

Understanding reason and truth as products of specific historical circumstances (Smith 1996) appeals to the Neo- Marxian base of Critical Theory in international relations, yet Michel Foucault has not been as influential in cultivating the epistemological base of Critical Theory as Jurgen Habermas. The relationship between these two philosophers has been of great interest among their followers and critics.

Both assumed addressing critical reason to be the fundamental task of engaging in contemporary philosophy (Dreyfus et al 1986), and rejecting the universal truths that had prevailed through metaphysics and religion until early western Enlightenment. Foucault and Habermas each saw logic in Kantian arguments that critical rationality was essential to maturity in the development of knowledge. Yet from here on, their conceptualisations of modernity and the epistemological roles of discourse, knowledge and power diverge from each other.

Foucault remains committed to detaching the ideal of Enlightenment from humanism, and to maintain a permanent critique of modern pouvoir – the forms, regulations and structures built by power (Janicaud 1992; Simons 1995). This dissertation has entered that same domain, by attempting to illustrate that realism within the International Relations discipline has suppressed the
attainment of a broader dialogue and truth possibility. Habermas aligns himself with Marxian ambitions to complete the project of modernity— as if to reach an End of History— by using inter-subjective communicative actions to overcome the oppressive economic and bureaucratic institutions of modernity (Simons 1995)

Foucault’s treatment of the aesthetic and expressive arts was central to Habermas’s irritation with his work, as described by Simons (1995),

‘Foucault’s total critique of reason is incoherent because it relies paradoxically on the very structure of rationality it opposes. Foucault’s critique is particularly partial in so far as it is inspired by aesthetic modernism… although this tradition identifies rationalization as the enemy, the autonomy of its aesthetic discourse rests on the rationalized differentiation of the life world’

(Simons 1995; 112)

Foucault’s concern that rational scientific truth claims had assumed a superior level of power and acceptance at the expense of the arts was awarded sympathy from many critics, yet his desire to extend historical and cultural explanations of power into the scientific and technological sphere received just as many opponents. Habermas’s ambivalence towards the aesthetic-expressive sphere of knowledge assumed an aggressive edge. While he accepted that cultural identity, lifestyles and fashions could be a legitimate form of protest, for him, they lacked the internal logic of correcting modernity’s inequalities (Simons 1995). He strongly resented the intrusion made by mass media and post-modern cultures into the bourgeois public sphere of debate that had been inspired by early Enlightenment. That arena in the late twentieth century became characterised by the mutual intrusion of society and the state into each other, ‘the role that the public sphere had played in the intellectual life of society is then assumed by other institutions that reproduce the image of a public sphere in distorted guise’ (Holub 1991; 6).

While Foucault would recognise the same intertwining of public and private, there is no doubt that he would object to the implication that it hadn’t always been way in the first place, rather than undergone some late modern transition. Habermas seeks to re-invigorate an independent and emancipating political polis that is free from power to complete a democratic modern vision, using linguistic communication that will enable a consensus to be reached on how argumentative debate will take place. This way, subjects will recognise each other as equals (Simons 1995).
Surely to Foucault, obtaining a consensus is itself rationalistic, and implements a governed authority on those who had no say in determining such a consensus or felt pressured into accepting it in the name of some perceived ethical or cultural obligation that it was the right and just thing to do,

‘Habermas envisages freedom as practice devoid of power, where as Foucault identifies liberty as the practice of power. In Habermas’s world, valid claims would be recognised as such by rational interlocutors; where as Foucault’s parrhesiast accepts the risks of criticizing those in power’

(Simons 1995; 114)

The division between a neo-Marxist (Habermas) and a post-Modernist (Foucault) epistemological interpretation of how to advance Enlightenment’s call to maturity poses a difficulty in advancing a Critical Theory alternative to positivist Realism in International Relations. The contemporary debate between Fukyama, Huntington and Sassen implies a need for an international theory to address the influence cultural and historical identity has on a state’s perceptions and behaviour among other states.

These critical approaches as they stand cannot step up to the challenge individually. Habermas advocates using communication and language, though reveals a curious distain for the post modern aesthetic, and claims that a public space where power is absent could be obtainable. Foucault is inclined to elevate the role of the subjective aesthetic and privilege the ability of historical readings in demonstrating the omnipresence of power in all discourses and social knowledge structures. Realism is power focused, but in a material and empirical way that is deemed too rationalistic, and thus demands a more critically reflexive approach that reveals hidden social influences on action.

The following section proposes Constructivism as the best hope of knotting together these schools of thought that have developed in the name of Enlightened critical reason but have opposing views on its meaning, how to obtain it, and the dynamics of power involved.
Constructivism: Bridging different approaches to Sovereignty and the State System

‘Fear is not a good political advisor’

~German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, 2007

Critical Theory in international relations represents not one single theory in its own right, but a collective of sub-theories under a family umbrella; sheltering post-modernists, post-structuralists, feminists, environmentalists, neo-Marxists, and constructivists. All share an interest in supporting two principle claims in their challenge towards neo-realism. Firstly, that the production of structures in international affairs is social as well as material. Secondly, those social structures determine the identity and interests of actors, not just their strategic behaviour (Wendt 1995).

Opposing realism’s materialist and rationalist outlooks has exposed critically reflexive approaches to resistance from authors within the dominant paradigm. Robert O. Keohane poses a harsh wake up call to liberals with utopian world visions, saying ‘we would be foolish if we studied world politics in search of beauty or lasting truth’ (Keohane; 1988; 379). Keohane recognises that cultural values, shared beliefs and idealistic sentiments may influence international co-operation, but postulates that, ‘the sociological approach has recently been in some disarray... its adherents have neither the coherence nor the self confidence of the rationalists’ (Keohane 1988; 381)

The principle of sovereignty in the international state system is a matter of considerable antagonism between rationalists and social constructivists. The former are content with accepting a sealed definition of sovereign statehood under the Rawlsian assumption that it constitutes an embedded practice justified by behaviour and identifiable sets of rules that support it, such as territorial boundaries and the immunity from criminal prosecution afforded to diplomats (Keohane 1988).

However, sovereignty is a term that has been continuously repackaged through different rhetorical contexts since the time of Keohane’s article. China claims to defend the sovereignty of states in Africa by not questioning the humanitarian crimes of its governments, while the United States guards a unilateral right to pre-emptive military force in the name of protecting its sovereign interests. Critical theorists protest that rationalism treats sovereignty as a prior assumption to its

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1 The Chancellor is quoted in The Guardian (UK) January 2007
calculations, without accepting its evolutionary nature through historical reconfiguration and cultural learning.

Keohane (1988) accepts that rationalism falls short where the need to contextualize its investigations is concerned, as it ‘...accounts better for shifts in the strength of institutions than in the values that they serve to promote. Cultural variations create anomalies for the theory.’ (1988; 391) However, it is both fair and pragmatic to accept that rationalism’s failure to account for the historical and cultural influences of state preferences does not make the theory itself redundant. There is merit to limiting the number of variables a theory includes to provide manageable explanations; what is an enormous branch of political science needs to be honed by scholars with some epistemological sacrifices. Therefore, reflective approaches require a defined research programme that is recognisable to students (Keohane 1988).

*Alexander Wendt: Breaking Down the Dichotomy*

Alexander Wendt is recognised as one of the most important researchers in the field of Constructivist (or reflectivist) theory, seeking to provide a greater coherence amongst competing strands of critical theory in general, and part resolve its conflict with rational neo-realism.

Wendt (1992) challenges neo-realism’s concession to the existence of an anarchic *structure*, one that promotes the incentive to adopt ‘self help’ strategies which enhance the competitive nature of the international system and jeopardize hopes of achieving collective action among states. By failing to investigate changing social conceptions of state identity and interest, deep learning is overshadowed by simpler behavioural or material adaptation of the sovereign state;

‘‘Strong’ liberals should be troubled by the dichotomous privileging of structure over process, since transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations of structure’

(Wendt 1992; 393)

Wendt is not rejecting the existence of anarchy, but distinguishing it from an anarchic structure by challenging its superior and materialist conceptualisation as a power configuration. Instead, it becomes the product of a transformative process in shifting identities and interests; ‘Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it.’

(Wendt 1992; 395)
Like Saskia Sassen’s appeal to understand how state perceptions of ‘foreign’ circumstances and processes are generated internally, Wendt makes the conception of anarchy a matter of internal, as well as external forces,

‘my strategy… will be to argue against the neorealist claim that self help is given by anarchic structure exogenously to process… self help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure’ (1992; 394)

Wendt (1992) does not disguise the reality that his theory is a campaign to advance a stronger liberalism in international relations, but he does so by simultaneously transforming and supplementing the explanation of realist assumptions, not rejecting them. This is both Foucaultian and Nietzschean, in that Wendt is declining to supersede realism and create a new dominant theory. He is also providing a theoretical path to a middle ground between Sassen, Fukyama and Huntington, whose debate exposed the need to bring cultural identity and historical perception into analysing the international system. Wendt does not challenge the Waltzian description of the state system as competitive and anarchic, only its explanation. His arguments are formed on three levels.

Firstly, Wendt exposes the inter-subjective nature of anarchy by disconnecting its association with an objective analysis of state capabilities; referring to the virtue of Stephen Walt’s argument in describing the international system as a balance of ‘threats’, rather than Kenneth Waltz’s balance of material power. Social Constructivism mandates that people, or states, ‘act towards objects… on the basis of the meaning that the objects have on them’ (Wendt 1992; 397). The presence of an Islamist government in Sudan, and humanitarian atrocities in the Darfur region, labels it a threatening rogue state to the US, but an important one in the long term given its abundance of oil. China is attracted for the same reason, but has a mutual relationship with Sudan as a friend and regional ally. How can two states have the same material interests, but identify with the actor who will satisfy those interests completely differently? Like power, ‘identities are inherently relational’ (1992; 398), and identities have a role in the satisfaction of interests which operate within a social context.

Institutions are intrinsically important in the formation and re-formation of relations among actors and collective identities. They have an objective presence, but they are also a collective of knowledges and beliefs above the individuals that exist within them at any one moment, ‘institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests, not something
occurring outside them and affecting only behaviour; socialization is a cognitive process, not just a
behavioural one’ (1992; 399). Within institutions and amongst them, there may be both co-operation
and conflict.

Depending on the nature and development of the collective, it will invoke a wide range of practices
from those designed to serve only individual members, to others where members positively identify
a collective interest. ‘Self help’ is thus not the only form of anarchy, and neither is its historical
origins fully explained; Wendt argues,

‘...if we argue that, in virtue of anarchy, states in the state of nature necessarily face a ‘stag hunt’
or security dilemma, these claims presuppose a history of interaction in which actors have acquired
‘selfish’ identities and interests...’ (1992; 401-402)

Given the material composition of states, we are led to investigate how the desire to maintain that
physical wealth is perpetuated and dynamic in the international system. Are foreign policy interests
exogenous or endogenous of the individual state? (Wendt 1992) Social constructivism assumes that
the latter plays a significant role.

Secondly, once Wendt concludes that self-help emerges from processes where anarchy has a
constructive role, rather than a structural ever-presence, he argues that the identities and meanings
from which action is spurred are produced out of interaction itself. However, realist theory has an
acknowledged relevance here, for institutional interaction may not be dynamic and identities and
interests maybe held constant (Wendt 1992) if there is an organisation cost to institutional
participation or institutional instability. Nevertheless, the move towards self-interest is an
interactive process of actor socialization, often constituted through the mirroring of practices by
others that catch the actors attention and vice versa. Wendt explains,

‘this process of signalling, interpreting and responding completes a ‘social act’ and begins the
process of creating inter-subjective meanings’ (1992; 405)

Wendt provides the scholar with a wide margin in which to apply his theory here, with the
possibility of multiple subjective truth outcomes that have a more enhanced predictive capability
than positivist methodologies might. Once the first social act is completed, say between China and
Angola, expectations on both sides are created about how the other will act in the future. China then
makes another gesture and Angola responds. Repetition of exchange over time means that each state will begin to form certain ideas about the other and itself. Does China believe that Angola respects her as a more valuable partner than others? Does the Angolan government fear repercussions from other states over its interaction with China, or will shunning any criticism with distrust of the actor who initiated it become a characteristic feature of its foreign policy? These questions will be addressed in Chapter Three’s case study.

How long these ideas about self and others last will depend on the nature of gestures within the social act. Reciprocal interaction creates socialisation structures in which state interests and identities are formed and strengthened, or broken down and re-worked (Wendt 1992). These processes may function on both co-operative and competitive terms.

Finally, the crucial facet of Wendt’s Constructivist argument is that while anarchy in world politics may be regarded as socially constructed through identity and interest creation, it retains a realist meaning with respect to physical actions taken by the state. The feeling of anarchy fosters recourse to practices designed to resolve the sensation of insecurity, if such manoeuvres prove stabilising, their position in the international system is more resistant to change (Wendt 1992).

After the repetition of practices in the creation of a social identity, the members in that community begin to look upon such an identity as an ‘objective social fact’ (1992; 411), and only practice self help strategies that protect its existence, rather than others that might destabilise it. Actors fear the potential costs to severing ties with a particular character that is popular among a significant number of allies within their sovereign collective.

Iconic symbols, cultural expectations, and cherished ideals ‘may have a self-perpetuating quality, constituting path dependencies that new ideas about self and other must transcend’ (1992; 411). To escape identities that have become institutionally normalised, Wendt suggests that three inter-related transformations are possible;

- The principle of sovereignty, similar to identities and power, can be considered as relational. The mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial property rights empowers states to interact with each other, not simply to do as they please within their confines. Sovereignty has an inter-subjective understanding that may be continually redefined to accommodate
state interests. Governments will consistently weigh up the cost and benefits of altering the practices that define the general concept of sovereignty.

• Since sovereignty guarantees property rights (in most circumstances) states will transform their conceptions of security towards co-operation. However this is only viable if the likely gains from this interdependence cannot be achieved by unilateral behaviour. Through reciprocal interaction, one time egoists learn how to co-operate and simultaneously reconstruct their self identities and those of others.

• The changes of actor identity and interest through co-operation with others face two constraints. The process is generally very slow and secondly, co-operation assumes that the actors do not view each other in negative terms. Lack of trust means that security will be viewed in relative terms and promotes the competitive behaviour associated with realism. There only exists the possibility that actors will make the self-conscious decision to change negative identities and turn in a new direction. Actors thus have the capacity of ‘character planning’ (Wendt 1992; 419) and using their sovereignty to build new future identities. For the sake of stability, actors will not knowingly reinvent their identities repeatedly. They must have reason to reflect on themselves, and the benefits of doing so should exceed the cost.

Contemporary relations between China and Africa are a profound new chapter in global politics. They have invoked feelings of curiosity, hope, and antagonism on both sides and among their traditional partners and competitors. The sovereign decisions involved may be either a strengthening of old identities and interests, or the formulation of new ones.

The opportunity for the Left to argue that realism is not the only international looking glass has presented itself. For nearly sixty years, systematic international relations theories have treated identity and interest as exogenously given by the boundaries of a given structure, and created a dominant knowledge paradigm in the process. Constructivism offers the chance to visualise ‘analogies in which identities and interests and therefore the meaning of structure are endogenous to process’ (Wendt 1992; 423), and make the inter-subjective roles of cultural practice and historical perception open to greater analytical potential. Wendt is critically reflecting on the
assumptions of realism, just as Foucault challenged Kant and Habermas on the limits to knowledge in the Enlightenment.

The following chapter discusses the respective foreign policy identities of China and the post-colonial African state prompted by the observations of constructivism. Chapter Three follows with a case study of the Sino-Angolan partnership, to ascertain a connection between what the actors in question practice, and the cognitive structures representing their interests and identities. In other words, is there a correlation between what these states do, and what they are? (Wendt 1992) Their relationship is considered from both a realist and constructivist perspective; that highlights how the latter paradigm may serve as a valuable contributor to the arguments of materialist approaches based on objective structures.
Chapter Two: Constructivist Views of China and Africa in Global Politics

Michel Foucault is not a Constructivist himself, although his appeal to the role of history and the subjective in the creation of knowledge may appear to portray him as one. It is his belief in the critique of power-knowledge that has led us to Constructivism, given the superior influence realism has enjoyed during the last six decades. It is now Constructivism’s responsibility to present China and Africa as part of this project’s ambition to combine sociological truths with those from realist theory in the case study on Sino-Angolan relations later. This will expand the number and depth of truth possibilities to obtain a Foucaultian Enlightenment. This demands that the cultural identities and historical experiences of the state in each case should be considered as the determining variables when explaining the nature of strategic decisions. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the endogenous and exogenous events that have constructed the interests and identities of Chinese foreign policy from the beginning of Deng’s leadership, and the post-colonial African state since independence from European imperialism. These arguments address the influence of motives, cultural ideas, and ideological preferences, which have often been marginalised by material realism.

China - The International Socialization of a Growing Power

Over the last twenty-five years, China’s massive economic expansion has prompted a global re-orientation of industrial and financial systems towards the alluring prospects of emerging markets; yielding a rise in GDP from RMB 362.4 billion in 1978, the launch of the country’s reform process, to RMB 13.7 trillion by 2004. Regardless of small efforts to curb the risk of overheating and investment bubbles, a 10.7% GDP growth rate was reported consecutively in the first three quarters of 2006.

Despite this spectacular advance in industrial growth, there is little consensus among governments on whether the 21st century can expect a pleasant, restrained and pragmatic China, or a demanding, belligerent, and expansionist hegemon (Zhao 2004). An appreciation of China’s internal political dynamic, against its multilateral participation, provides a valuable introduction to understanding how its foreign identity is a product of interaction between these two forces.

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2 China Ability – www.chinability.com
3 China Ability – www.chinability.com
‘Self-Help’ and Cultural Nationalism:

Under Mao Zedong, the Communist ideology had an intensely destructive effect on foreign policy making, pitted against an American geopolitical rhetoric not sympathetic to Marxist or Leninist idioms (Zhao 2004). However, since Deng’s vision of reform towards rational economic modernisation, a decline in Communism matched by a strengthening Chinese nationalism has achieved a popular yet controversial role in ‘branding’ China as an ambitious and dynamic player in international relations (Zhao 2004b).

If Wendt (1992) argues that ‘self-help’ is not a structure of international politics, but the endogenous transformation of values within state institutions, how is this observed in China? The intentional crafting of nationalism by the Chinese state responded to the weakening of Communism and international outcry after the Tiananmen Square massacre in two inherently self-constructed ways. Through the country’s patriotic education campaign, guoqing jiaoyu, the Chinese leadership has sought to foster a national sense of stability by reinvigorating ancient Chinese dynastic culture; deceiving the population into thinking that its unique history is not yet ready for liberal democracy, like those of ‘imperial invaders’ that humiliated and collapsed traditional Chinese development in the nineteenth century (Zhao 2004b).

Secondly, an intriguing offshoot of this strategy has been the effective marketing of China’s development by cultural display to the rest of the world. This has resulted in the execution of a carefully designed ‘soft diplomacy’ using the arts and educational exchange to promote a friendly, open-doors China. As a strategy, it has assumed focal importance in the design of the country’s contemporary foreign policy (Hilton 2005),

‘Culture is soft but powerful ... because its essence is like water. It can exert a subtle influence on people ... Under economic globalisation; cultural exchange plays an increasingly important role in international relations.’

The connection made between economic globalisation and culture emphasises how deeply intertwined Chinese identity at home is with achieving national ambitions in a global economy. Under the constructivist thesis, where sovereignty is viewed as an interactive process not simply a

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legal structure, it appears that China is pragmatically using cultural policy to balance internal aspirations of democracy and the value of unique Chinese traditions with her external image abroad that hopes to attract business. China’s sovereignty as a relational concept with other states is being carefully ‘packaged’ to keep strong liberal values of democracy out, but capital and production coming in.

Despite a revival of Confucianism, increased access to buildings and artefacts, exhibitions, and record numbers of overseas tourists; cultural life in China has been a debilitating experience for its population, who confront an identity crisis from decades of oppressive cultural and media controls. Hilton (2005) explains,

‘The collapse of a state ideology that had been offered as a substitute for China’s historic cultural identity has left an unresolved cultural confusion, which has been a matter of concern for intellectuals since the collapse of the Qing empire (pp54) ....In the absence of a pluralist, liberal regime, the state is obliged to try to enforce cultural orthodoxy through surveillance and censorship, with the result that some of the most dynamic and original strands of contemporary Chinese culture are excluded from the official canon’ (Hilton 2005; 57)

This represents a tragic overlap of realist ‘structure’ and constructivist ‘process’. On the one hand, the legal and physical mechanisms that restrict expression in China are material and enforced with sometimes brutal effects, but the threats they are designed to counter stem from a constructed fear of international anarchy. The Chinese leadership sees no guarantee that the nationalism and economic modernisation they have instigated can be protected from foreign influences that could in turn de-legitimise their rule. Old authoritarian beliefs that forged distinct relationships in China’s past have become diluted in the changing environment, and new ideas and institutions are needed to fill the emerging voids (Howell 2005). The Communist Party stills promotes the peasantry as the backbone of its political identity, but millions from this demographic are migrating from the lagging interior to the prosperous eastern seaboard, where the rising number of private entrepreneurs has not escaped the attention of the political elite (Howell 2005).

Constructivism identifies the growth of an increasingly powerful class of creative, educated, and capitalist-minded individuals in China that identify with ‘being international’. If they are welcomed into the Communist Party, the long term identity of such an organisation must be expected to change radically, with consequences for other states given the country’s importance in the global
economy. Wendt (1992) suggests that where institutions sever ties with a particular identity e.g. champion of the working class, the material value of the new personality assumed must supersede that being replaced. As the pragmatic character of China’s attitude to policy change expects, and Constructivism confirms, this is likely to be a slow and cautious learning process.

The People’s Liberation Army and the Perceived Threat of Material Power:
For China’s Asian neighbours and the United States, the influence on China’s military of a distinct nationalism that promotes sovereign independence from foreign ideologies is of strategic interest. As the economy continues to modernize and gain power, how the PLA follows suit will have a dramatic effect in shaping China’s foreign policy identity with those of potential adversaries,

‘... the army [is] seeking greater autonomy from the party, the party attempting to strengthen its control of the army, and the government trying to increase its own jurisdictional oversight of the armed forces...’ (Shambaugh 2004: 11)

From a constructivist viewpoint, the tension described by Shambaugh (2004) and the notion of potential adversaries have important implications given Wendt’s distinction between the balance of ‘threats’ and the realist balance of material power. China does not simply see the United States as a potential adversary in terms of its military strength, but this possibility of hostile relations is being socially constructed by the discourses of Chinese nationalism designed to compensate for the weakness of the Communist ideology; winning the allegiance of military staff by promoting an ‘aigu’ – or ‘loving of the state’ that is not exclusive from the Party (Zhao 2004 b).

It is a nationalist dialogue that is sceptical of the United States and defends the country’s political legitimacy and territorial integrity against foreign condemnation. However, it is used prudently, apparent when the military elite are weary of being too yielding towards the United States and Japan (Zhao 2004 b), but retracted when the civil service is concerned that a hostile demeanour is damaging a global image that welcomes investment and trade co-operation. This supports the constructivist theory that those cultural and historically led identities that are most valuable in terms of gain will be maintained. Realism might argue that material assets themselves inspire the formation of certain social identities. However, Wendt refutes this as such ‘...claims presuppose a history of interaction in which actors have acquired ‘selfish’ identities and interests...’ (1992; 401-402), suggesting that an entrenched identity can itself spur the urge for material wealth and promote fear at the possibility of not obtaining it.
The Chinese military threats against Taiwan from the spring of 1995 to summer 1996 exposed a deeply fractured political relationship between China’s civil and military authorities (Joffe 1997; Shambaugh 2004). For that reason, it became essential for reformist politicians to protect the PLA’s identity as the defenders of a ‘Red’ cause against foreign imperialism, but also keep it in check to protect the country’s reputation for becoming more globally interdependent that is bringing industry to its doorstep. Framing China as an international power that condemns imperialism and American hegemony in favour of multi-polarity has been intrinsic to engaging Africa, as argued later, but it also serves to support the identity of the Chinese military. Furthermore, China’s engagement with African states has increased the total number of governments that no longer recognise Taipei, which reaffirms an important mutual cause of the PLA and the Communist Party.

*China and Trade: Fashioning New Identities through Global Negotiation.*

The globalisation of the Chinese economy has intrinsically bound together the challenges of its domestic political identity with participation in multilateral politics. Since the Communist ideology has begun to come apart with the expansion of private enterprise and industrial growth, Chinese citizens have expected a remoulding of the political rules within their borders, and foreign governments have anticipated change in how China negotiates within the global arena. That anticipation of change in light of trade interests is constructing new ‘relational identities’ under Alexander Wendt’s theory.

China’s integration into the international trade regime has been undertaken with caution (Pearson 1999), as Beijing’s policymakers feared the potential anarchy that would ensue within China’s borders from the socio-political upheaval caused by economic liberalization, rather than the Waltzian anarchy of the international system beyond. Until 1994, China’s trade integration was very confined, as the country sought to safeguard its sovereign identity against foreign regulation, maintain political stability, and foster its prestige among other states sceptical to international organisations dominated by Europe and the US.

The duration of diplomatic exchange over trade regime accession from the mid 1990s indicates that a new self-identity in China was being established, and her perceptions of the US (and vice versa) were changing, as though Alexander Wendt’s processes of actor ‘signalling’ and ‘response’ were being played out through a heated period of diplomatic exchange in reaction to a new economic environment. China had originally been characterised by itself and others an ‘economic suitor’
(Goldstein 2005; 76), trying to entice investors with cheap labour and a potentially massive consumer market. From 1994, her economic foundations allowed negotiators to be more assertive. Once in fear of sanctions and the containment policies of the United States, the country could now exert considerable leverage to determine whether it was the US and other major economies that were actually more desperate for China to obtain trade status than China itself,

‘Beijing’s behaviour during the mid 1990s... suggested that it saw itself in a transition from object to subject in the international economy’ (Goldstein 2005; 77).

Unfortunately, the level of distrust that began to engulf the US- China relationship during the WTO accession talks would indicate from a constructivist school that neither side could fully accept the benefits of international co-operation without considering the fall out cost of reinventing older identities closer to home. Chinese fears of domestic turmoil continued to perpetuate frosty behaviour as the US government levelled strong criticism at Beijing’s industrial policies designed to minimize the social cost of market transition. A rapid increase in unemployment was, and remains, potentially catastrophic to the identity of the Communist Party, completely de-basing its affiliation to the working class (Yang 2002; Pearson 1999).

China joined the WTO in 2001, but this did little to extinguish perceptions of the US as an aggressive hegemon seeking to contain her growth. However, Wendt (1992) advocates that sovereignty is an inter-subjective understanding redefined to accommodate state interests, and Beijing has clearly decided that an openly hostile relationship with the American government is not in the country’s interest, leading it to find new actors and paths of socialisation. China continues business on friendly terms by courting American industry directly, which subsequently encourages the White House not to alienate Beijing with aggressive posturing. Constructing mutually beneficial connections with non-governmental actors that have influence on the state, rather than risk the negative cost of arguing with the state itself has become an intriguing feature of China’s ‘soft diplomacy’. Hu Jintao’s decision to meet Bill Gates and tour a Boeing factory before seeing President Bush on an official state visit to the US (Times UK 2006) was a deliberate and imaginative breach of protocol that challenges the realist assumption of the US state as the most important actor in international politics and considers the role of social manoeuvring. In Chapter Three’s case study, the importance of multilateral corporations in the Sino-Angolan partnership is given special mention in light of this.
The restraint shown by Beijing after the collision between one of its fighter jets and an American spy plane over its territory, and the bombing of its embassy in Belgrade, was also a significant departure from realist expectations of a legitimate repercussion dealt by the Chinese state (Yang 2002). But China’s sovereign self-identity has become more intellectually complex and self-assured with its economic growth. For image purposes, it demanded an apology for US behaviour to satisfy public outrage and ‘the Red’ hardliners, but did not jeopardize the benefits to be gained from multilateral integration through the WTO.

In the period of China’s gradual integration into international trade, the construction of its sovereign identity has undergone a curious transformation, if not reversal. From being characteristically sceptical of external pressures and influences, China has become an assertive yet prudent mover in international negotiation. However, on its domestic plane, this has been mirrored by an increasing worry over the cohesion of the Communist Party, an entity that was historically one and same with self-perceptions of the state, but is now buckling under the influence of market induced freedoms.

*Security Engagement: Learning and Networking*

China’s acceptance into a range of global and regional security organisations has significantly altered its historic self-identity in relation to its security dilemma, a predicament that is not only derived of material power differences between states, but the effect of ideological rhetoric. Mao Zedong promoted a variant of traditional realpolitik and was a talented instigator of forming support movements through nationalist appeals to China’s Communist unity, initially against the hostility of the United States through allegiance with the Soviet bloc, and later in the 1960s breaking from the struggle between the two superpowers to attempt an alternative leadership role in the third world.

Resentment among China’s leaders of America’s disproportionate advantages, economically and militarily, remains the emotive undercurrent of efforts to unhinge that hegemonic dominance and shape a multi-polar world (Goldstein 2005). However, the constructivist idea of subjective sovereignties again suggests that the expression of such a sentiment is different today; owing to the lack of gain a radical identity has produced historically compared to the commercial benefits a more gentle approach has seen recently. China fears that Washington would take preventative action if intimidated, making its behaviour more discreet in response. Since the beginning of Deng’s reform, the challenge was,
‘...to devise policies that would facilitate a continuing increase in the country’s power relative to others while minimizing the likelihood that this trend would stimulate potential adversaries to offset China’s efforts’ (Goldstein 2005; 25)

This supports Wendt’s (1992) observation that state actors have a ‘character planning’ ability, using sovereignty as a basis to sculpt new identities where the benefits of doing so exceed the cost. The transition from Mao’s Communist-led foreign politics, to the development of a more restrained projection that secures economic opportunities through a pragmatic and culturally inviting discourse, has entailed a softening of anti-American/hegemonic tones. It has dampened the visibility of such oppositions but not diminished their importance; they are still vital to buttressing contemporary Chinese nationalism.

In the security arena, the constructivists Alistair Johnston and Paul Evans (1999) argue that the processes, not structures, of this transformation for China have been socialization and learning through participation in multilateral security organisations (Johnston et al 1999). By gradually assuming a more pro-active role in multilateral security organisations, China has passively undermined US credibility by co-operating with her adversaries and allies alike; securing her economic ambitions and political interest in global multipolarity in the process. China’s entry into the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1980 was the beginning of its participation in similar organisations. It corresponded with the ascendency of China’s economic ambitions under Deng and the parallel decline of Mao’s Cold War doctrine, diluting the negative intent of halting external threats with assuming a positive role in developing the power and respectability of a state opening its doors to the outside world (Johnston et al 1999).

While the moral arguments for participating in the CD have been few, the normative image created by arguing for ‘ethical’ co-operation on security concerns has re-branded China’s sovereign identity. This is defined less by being associated with promoting ‘goodness’ and ‘peace’, but developing a reputation for being consistent (Johnston et al. 1999). Constructivism argues that consistency develops a social group’s cohesion and legitimacy which in turn enhances power, respect and commendation received from others,

‘...a group will be sensitive to arguments that its behaviour is consistent or inconsistent with its self-identity. The more the audience...is legitimate, that is, the more it consists of actors whose
opinion matters, the greater the effect of social back patting and opprobrium... ’ (Johnston et al 1999; 252)

The audience surrounding an actor is thus intrinsic to the actor’s self-identification and aspirations. Socialisation within that international audience facilitates social connections that are instrumental to the physical realisation of goals. Chapter Three will argue that the imagery and rhetoric used by China to engage with African states has sought to portray the presence of a consistent, trustworthy and mutually beneficial relationship. In that process, it has downplayed negative memories of China’s role in the Cold War security dilemma and is attempting to craft the reputation of a new super power that is pragmatic and restrained.

This sociological change has provoked a tension in the self perceptions of Chinese sovereign identity; between one of historic pride in its power-autonomy, to being conscious of how it is measured by others through international participation. In constructivist terms, as a one time egoist China has learnt how to co-operate through international membership, which simultaneously reconstructs its self identity and those of others. For example, Asian –Pacific states have reshaped their perceptions in the midst of China’s rise. The ASEAN Forum and Council on Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific were originally founded to counter-balance a potentially aggressive China. Contrary to realist interpretations of the security dilemma in the past, Beijing now wishes to be included on friendly terms with these organisations. ASEAN principles inspire consensus reached by gradual and informal socialisation with minimal bureaucracy (Johnston et al. 1999). By most accounts, China has done little to upset this, even voicing opposition to calls by other states to introduce preventative diplomacy measures. It resists similar attempts by Western countries that condemn the conduct of African states. Beijing wants reciprocal trust between its neighbours, especially with long term American allies, and it is likely to dissuade the creation of regional mechanisms where close states could assemble and resist China. This would damage her economic interests and make a belligerent posture less resistible. David Shambaugh provides a fitting conclusion,

‘China’s new pro-active regional posture is reflected in virtually all policy spheres… most nations in the region [Asia] now see China as a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and non-threatening regional power’ (Shambaugh 2004b:64).
Africa: Old Enemies with New Faces

The Allure of Sovereign Visions

With the creation of over 50 independent African states after the Second World War, nationalist sentiments erupted in a euphoria that celebrated the end to an arduous struggle under colonial oppression. However, what became quickly defined as the post-colonial African state was characterised by the borrowing of mentalities and practices from its pre-independence ancestor.

Colonial governance had developed into an embedded organisational science, deriving power from constricting the breadth of civil society and preventing the political empowerment of native populations. However, this was matched by an increasing interest among European nations in the discourses of developmentalism in the post-war years – a late attempt to justify the historic necessity of colonial rule (Young 2004).

Once again, constructed visions of sovereignty have played an integral role in decolonisation as a socio-cultural transformation, where powerful actors have been forced to relinquish material claim to sovereignty, but have sought to retain a posture of being older and wiser at establishing democracy and strong economies to secure international credibility. In the new post-colonial state, leaders with little direct experience in the sovereign management of whole countries clung to the old *raison d’être* of the European rulers to administer, civilise and economically expand the weak state,

‘*a comparable prerogative of the youthful educated nationalist* [black] *generation* [was] *to exercise tutelage over an unlettered citizenry*’ (Young 2004; 29).

New leaders saw the historical learning and experience of colonialism as the only readily available ideals on which to construct identities that represented capability and legitimacy, while still condemning Western imperialism. The self-promotion of leader intellect and national vision drove a juggernaut of state-controlled development rhetoric as’ *the first wave of leaders had to consolidate power quickly, buying friends and talking ‘fine lines’- quite reminiscent of the colonialists’* (Thompson et al. 2000; 31).
However, in fulfilling the hopes of the modern African state, its leaders demanded a concentration of authority and an installation of ‘African-ness’ through self-help strategies intended to cement local support for independent rule by confronting the influences of foreigners. With disastrous consequences, there was a pan-continental attack on colonial industries and foreign immigrants, where the state in Tanzania, Algeria, Guinea, Zambia, and Nigeria took majority control of whole sectors, especially natural resources industries. Idi Amin in Uganda ordered the departure of all Asians in 1972, and Ghana, Sierra Leone and Malawi introduced various measures to expel foreign traders from local industry in favour of indigenous workers (Young 2004).

As Alexander Wendt (1992) anticipates, policies led by an anti-imperial identity appeared to resolve sensations of insecurity and stabilise leader rule. The hyper-nationalist rhetoric of zealous leaders was a salient force in rallying mass support, and thus very hard to relinquish. Chapter Three will consider whether threads of such discourses are sprouting once more, as China’s growing presence in Africa is met with local hostility, despite Beijing’s claims that China has suffered the similar experience of imperial influences.

The Impact on State Identity of Structural Adjustment and Political Conditionality:
Socialist controls over domestic African economies, backed by aggressive visions of new independence nationalism, brought the post-colonial state to crisis point by the late 1970s amidst antagonistic international surroundings. On the receiving end of efforts by the United States not to allow communist influences to take root, most African states formed new institutional relationships with the West through the lens of neo-classical economics to alleviate crippling debts and lack of production.

The principles behind the packages of assistance that came were later coined The Washington Consensus. This global paradigm was enmeshed with the neo-liberal agenda, and devised a broad set of policy recommendations with the emphasis on limiting the role of the state in the market, reducing the size of public bureaucracies, and removing barriers to capital, trade, and investment movements (Stephan et al. 2006).

The IMF structural adjustment programmes inspired by this school of thought reared catastrophic results for Africa in the majority of circumstances (Rodrik 2006). Most programmes were only partially implemented, if at all, and merely up heaved local systems without leaving viable replacements (Hibou 1999),
The greatest liability of structural adjustment was its detrimental effect on levels of corruption (Young 2004; Hibou 1999) and the deepening of patrimonial politics. The diversion of international loans and aid into the private accounts of elites proved opportune for political members wishing to maintain power and sustain extravagant lifestyles. The criminalised nature of African state institutions, in parallel with the collapse in economic productivity across states in West and Sub-Saharan Africa especially, prompted a critical review of the Washington Consensus which became pre-occupied with the need for institutional reform in Africa (Rodik 2006).

Crawford Young implies that a dramatic change in the relational identities between African states and the Western-led developmental regime was taking place at the end of the Cold War. From a constructivist perspective it becomes evident that neither party was willing to risk the loss of credibility and legitimacy by admitting they had made a mistake. African leaders had no material or political incentive for confessing to corruption, while the IMF were not inclined to jeopardise their reputation by acknowledging ‘best-practice’ development policy to be flawed. The most effective ‘self-help’ strategy for both parties in those circumstances was to blame each other. Regrettably, the level of distrust that now characterises structural adjustment agreements will require a very determined effort in ‘character planning’ to reverse the negative effects, if those involved find it to be in their interest. This is placed in the context of Sino-Angolan relations later, where it is argued that China has effectively taken advantage of the low performance partnerships between international organisations and African states by offering alternative arrangements presented in ways that ideologically appeal to African suspicions of Western policies.

As newly independent sovereignties, African states perceived themselves to be capable and enthusiastic to handle the management of their economies. In less than twenty-five years, this motivational identity and the euphoria of national self-determination had collapsed with mounting
skepticism of the leadership of international (Western-dominated) governance. Despite the implication of failed global economics for Africa’s underdevelopment and prevalence of conflict, the self confidence of international bodies has proved just as resilient as Africa’s patrimonial networks. The attempt to vindicate their knowledge authority by assigning blame on African states for poor institutional capacity has aimed at salvaging their legitimacy as leaders in developing world growth. In that respect, the imposition of political conditionalities on aid became the latest chapter in Africa’s relationship with Western donor countries.

The attachment of political mandates to the granting of aid from the early 1990s changed the relational identities between African states and Western policy once again. Among donors, it reflected a more cautious approach towards what could realistically be achieved from aid donation, a revised perspective of the inter-connections between politics and economics in the global context, and a willingness to redefine acceptable breaches of sovereignty in the name of development (Baylies 1995). If sovereignty is understood to be an inter-subjective understanding between actors, it is clear that western donors did not view African states as ‘sovereign’ in the same manner as they perceive themselves, or as African governments looked upon their recently acquired sovereignty. Under realism it is assumed that every actor values this concept in the same way since it is treated as a structure, not a process. However, different international attitudes to political conduct have made sovereignty malleable in this setting; provoking dialogue that justifies ignoring the internal prerogatives of governments, with corresponding claims defending those rights that use ‘colonialism’ as a historical justification against politically intrusive actions.

Political conditionality has a legacy in the negotiation of superpowers with developing countries (Baylies 1995). The concept is also referred to using the terms ‘democratisation’, ‘transparency’, and ‘good governance’, but there is increasing irregularity as to what these ideas mean? Does it replace the traditional aid and lending regime, or is it part of a larger package of reforms, and if so, how important is it? Should it be interpreted as a penalty, an offence on sovereignty, or used with incentives to frame it as a benefit?

Amidst this confusion, many African states became bewildered by the paradox that international organisations confronted them with, resulting in a negative and frustrating identification with globalisation. The state, indebted and poor at allocating resources efficiently, was initially perceived as the root of Africa’s economic ills under the early ethos of structural adjustment. Later, it appeared that the state would in fact be a crucial element to industrial growth and that a strong and
pro-active bureaucracy was needed at the helm (Baylies 1995). For developed donor countries, political conditionality has become consolidated within the rhetoric of their relations with most African states. Monitoring good governance has become routine, international financial gurus are now defenders of democracy, and for the United States in particular, promoting democracy abroad in the interest of its national security has almost become independent of any concern for African economic development (Baylies 1995). Despite the expansion of the international human rights movement through the discourses of development, both the acceptance of political conditionalities attached to aid and the interventionist character of American foreign policy after 9/11, have raised constructivist arguments that point to new social meanings of democracy. It is more widely understood that democracy is a culturally discovered and historically learned experience, rather than a structural institution within a vacuum. It cannot be easily ‘retailed’, exported through force, or coerced upon states that longer term democracies judge to be oppressive or potentially dangerous (Archibugi 2006; Baylies 1995).

Even ‘non-violent’ coercions like sanctions have been interpreted as aggressive posturing and largely counter-productive in making receiving states give up their non-democratic ways, while the employment of more forceful means is viewed by critical theorists as a repulsive contradiction with the desired outcome of bringing democratic peace (Archibugi 2006; Baylies 1995). In the face of these objections, finding democracy and prosperity in the worst-off African states becomes a challenge to be met primarily by the people within them, and the responsibility of on looking states to set an example. This example has not been fulfilled by the touting an international orthodoxy and a superimposed policy of democratisation bundled together with a sizeable bank loan (Aguirre 2005). From the constructivist school, Africa’s history with structural adjustment and political conditionality represents the negative impact of international institutionalisation, as the cognitive processes of socialisation have bred frustration and distrust out of a combined resentment of colonial subjugation and an internal failure to manage state economies. In addition to this, African leaders have profited among their followers from maintaining an ‘anti-West’ identity that now has a ‘political value’. The benefits of disassociating with this personality in favour of a more amiable approach to collective engagement with Western countries must outstrip the costs.

*International Trade and Africa: The Construction of a Global Agenda*

The frustration with reconciling liberal market directives within the African context has provoked various reactionary identities and emotions in the last decade; re-orientating how many developing world states foresee their future in the international system. The construction of these new
perceptions do not amount to a wholesale rejection of globalisation, but an improved effort to engage internationally among new partners within the South, rather than struggle against the power of industrialised nations protecting their self-interests in the North.

Talk of free trade is a very ‘cosmetic’ feature of international politics, designed to foster an atmosphere of co-operation and hope at multilateral conferences, but disintegrates as governments argue on behalf of their own business lobbies and constituents to secure political credibility at home. This confirms the persistence of mercantilism in international trade relations; the theory that describes the disposition of the nation-state towards protecting national interests by manipulating world markets in their favour (Stephan et al 2006). Why then bother with the ‘niceties’ of promising equality and justice in trade? Whereas mercantilism confirms that the international system is structurally anarchic and material self-help is the state’s dominant motivator, constructivism implies that states value the importance of maintaining certain ethical images or personalities rather than expose their material selfishness to an international audience from the outset.

This recalls Alistair Johnston’s arguments in relation to China’s participation in international disarmament treaties earlier. Co-operative discourse in free and fair trade, like disarmament, is less about actually being ‘good’ and genuinely interested in the well-being of others, but developing a reputation for consistent participation that may soften the ground for securing a state’s own material needs at a later date. However, in light of China’s economic rise, the ability of western countries to continue this style of diplomatic relations is questionable.

The WTO put pressure on the need for a renewal of African state capacity, but the sheer complexity of its regulations and the dominance of its most influential creators has, regrettably, ‘and at times ideologically, driven a tendency to foreclose all possibilities for creative action by African policy makers’ alternative to the neo-liberal orthodoxy (Soludo et al 2004; 60). This ‘impossibility’ thesis entrenched a defeatist understanding of the African state as so weak, corrupt, and technically immature, that it could never hope to replicate the success of the East Asian economies on its own (Soludo et al 2004). To constructivists, this has represented a cognitive ‘self-help’ strategy by industrial nations to secure the cultural exceptionalism of western liberal ideology as part of maintaining international power relationships where they materially benefit. In reaction, the material and ideological value of proving this attitude mistaken is becoming a hotly pursued aspiration in African states on its own, driven by historical recollections and the contemporary success in countries like China and India.
Africa’s suspicious perception of the WTO has rewound the historical cassette, re-awakening bad memories of structural adjustments programmes whose effects are still being lived. There are fresh aspirations among Africa’s political elite and intelligentsia, driven by the success of China and India, to re-legitimise the state as the principle actor in the quest for development, and embed a new social contract to enhance policy-making capacity (Soludo et al 2004). This confidence existed in the early years of independence from colonial rule and subsequently dissolved, as discussed earlier. Now it is finding a new relevance again in the desire to be a developmental state with a self-defined ideology of success and prosperity.

However, unlike the early independent state that tragically dissuaded foreign trade and investment through exclusionary mechanisms, the latest desire to have a role in economic management is demanding imaginative and pragmatic ideas about how to engage globally, and more importantly, with whom and to what effect on state identity. This need has materialised from repeated disappoints at recent WTO negotiations on the matter of agricultural subsides, where Europe and the United States have developed a consistently stubborn position. After the 2001 Doha ‘Development’ Conference and 2003 Cancun Ministerial, the antagonism between North and South on the issue of greater concessions and lower developed world farming subsides appears, for now, to be beyond the point of amicable settlement. Although this signifies a lack of material gain for African states from the realist perspective, constructivism would acknowledge it as an important learning experience as well, where several new perceptions have been formed from a largely negative socialisation process. Firstly, that despite the rhetoric of the institutional leaders in the World Bank and WTO of pushing a ‘development agenda’ on behalf of poor nations, such a gesture is now considered unsubstantiated without co-operation from industrialised nations that goes beyond mere participation in collective dialogue. Secondly, setting a development agenda of issues that are perceived to be in the common interest of all developing countries has its setbacks where there is not a comparable material interest. Constructivism and Realism overlap in this context; it may be argued that freeing trade in agriculture is not important for all but a small number of developing countries (Lechini 2005: Stephan et al 2006), although rallying the ideological support among a wider community of states helps satisfy the security dilemma. Thirdly, there is a new understanding that coalitions (the G21 for example) designed to challenge the dominance of industrialised nations are subject to reciprocal behaviour by industrialised states intended to divide such a unity. By competing amongst each other for preferential market access, developing states exacerbate this process themselves.
Therefore, the attitudes of developing countries to global participation and competition under what they perceive as a world order that has treated them unfairly are in the process of change; owing to historical transformations in perception and identity from events that are both internal and external to the state. The following case study recognises that trade and investment with rapidly expanding developing economies offers many opportunities and risks in terms of countering the influence of Western countries and international development organisations. The sociological identity of this is particular to the experiences of the two regions discussed, that reinforce certain nationalist discourses and cultural values. However, this does not imply that realism is made redundant as a result of acquiring this knowledge; it remains an intrinsic method to objectively accounting for the material interests that define the Sino-Angolan partnership. Constructivism is employed to provide subjective explanations in addition to material/structural conclusion. This will now contribute to a more mature knowledge Enlightenment within the topic in question.
Chapter Three: Angola and China

"Everything here is about image...they will hold the African football championships here in 2010, they will hold the African basketball championships here, they will also build a brand new international airport here - these developments are all very visible and obvious - but the reality of the people remains the same."


Few countries on the African continent can match Angola’s natural resource endowment. From January 2007, analysts concluded that Angola had definite reserves of 8.0 billion barrels of largely medium to light crude oil; much in demand for its low sulphur content. Given the country’s high rate of success in exploration, proven reserves are very likely to rise (Hodges 2001; Energy Information Administration 2007). Angola also boasts high value deposits of diamonds, and pockets of gold, copper and titanium among many other minerals whose prospects are yet to be fully determined (Hodges 2001).

Despite the huge potential of this economic cornucopia to bring civic prosperity, Angola’s post-colonial experience since independence from Portugal in 1975 has been one of Africana’s most tragic and violent. After a protracted civil war with successive attempts by the international community to assist in the creation of a stable multiparty democracy, an exhausted Angolan population is now waiting nervously for upcoming elections that have been repeatedly delayed. The rebel group turned opposition party, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), alongside approximately 125 other parties will contest the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) (Pawson 2007).

Angolans have much to fear from democracy, as most steps taken to achieve it have resulted in bloodshed (Pawson 2007). The last multi-party elections in 1992, held without the fulfilment of demilitarization objectives under the Bicesse peace process, resumed the civil war that originated from the earlier failure of Portugal to prepare a peaceful transition to self-determination (Hodges 2001). The gradual undermining of UNITA’s military strength by the government, and the death of its intolerant and uncompromising leader Jonas Savimbi, was a fortunate alignment of circumstances for the prospects of peace that contributed to the Luanda Agreement to cease hostilities in 2002 (Hodges 2001).
While components of Angola’s civil war will be visited later, in the context of how they have historically transformed the country’s foreign policy behaviour, it is essential to focus on the role of oil. Although not the root cause of the country’s 26 year long conflict, oil has assumed a quite extraordinary importance in positioning Angola within the international political economy. This single commodity has permeated almost every realm of the country’s governance, in particular its recent foreign relations with China (Hodges 2001).

The purpose of this case study is to amalgamate the discussions on realism and constructivism in the previous chapters. It is argued that realism has a capacity based on several structural assumptions to explain how oil is the material interest that defines Sino-Angolan relations. Constructivism then provides additional truth possibilities by unpacking the identity of this relationship; which is derived within both countries from their internal political changes, cultural rhetoric, and historical participation within the international system. This combination of theories and discourses provides the deeper Enlightenment in political dialogue that Foucault searched for, by preventing the dominance of a single rational paradigm such as realism.

**Sino-Angolan Relations: Realist Interpretations of a Petro-Partnership**

In 2005, the West African coastline stretching from Angola to Nigeria produced approximately five million barrels of crude oil daily. The average price that year was US$ 50-55 per barrel, producing a total oil value of around US$ 100 billion. This amount roughly matched the entire global aid budget (Shaxson 2006). Africa as a whole has contributed to one quarter of all oil discoveries in the last five years. However, the most intriguing element of this latest surge in capacity has been the composition of the market demand. China, and to a lesser extent Russia, India and Malaysia, have been the key drivers behind the growth in most African commodities that is now promoting alarm among western corporations and governments over their ability to compete in meeting energy security (Taylor 2006; Shaxson 2006).

As a result of this concern, Beijing’s relations with Angola are being closely observed by the West. In 2005, Angola became China’s top trading partner on the African continent, accounting for 27 % of a total volume worth US $ 39.7 bn (IMF Trade Statistics 2005 in Taylor 2006). All of China’s most senior officials have visited Luanda (BBC 2006a; BBC 2006b), signing nine agreements with the Angolan government last year; including a long term contract to supply oil from Angola’s
Sonangol to China’s Sinopec. At the expense of Total and Shell, China obtained the rights to explore several off-shore oil blocks (Wolfe 2006), proposed a joint buyout with Sonangol of Shell’s established interest in an existing block, and agreed to study the construction of a new oil refinery. How do the structural assumptions of realism discussed in Chapter One explain these agreements, and their implications?

- **Anarchy and Rational Behaviour in the National Interest**

According to Kenneth Waltz, realism mandates that the state, within the international structure of anarchy, will act rationally in pursuit of its internal demands. The state behaves in accordance with its material interests in an anarchic structure, since ‘anarchy’ is the realist confirmation that the state is ‘sovereign’ and does not submit to any higher authority. China’s national interest is to feed its appetite for energy brought about by its surging economy,

> ‘In only 10 years, China has turned from a petroleum exporter to the second largest oil consumer in the world... the Chinese market alone is responsible for 40% of the global increase in oil demand since 2000... [and] to achieve its goal of quadrupling its economy by 2020, its demand for energy and other resources must grow’ (Jiang 2005: 2)

Achieving energy security has become one the defining tenets of Chinese foreign policy, especially with resource abundant developing states like Angola. Above any other product or commodity, oil is highly politicised, and the desire for it emphasizes realism’s view that the state will act in order to reduce its vulnerabilities through material acquisition (Ziegler 2006). Being energy dependent, China is attempting to mitigate scarcity by obtaining oil from as many different sources as possible, as well as using its state oil firms to develop projects abroad in order to influence the supply more directly (Ziegler 2006). As discussed in the previous chapter, maintaining internal social stability is a major concern for the Communist Party as China embraces market reform; keeping the price of energy low and supplies in pace with economic growth is vital (Ziegler 2006).

The acquisition of oil abroad not only highlights the demand for it in respect to China’s economic growth, but also the country’s limited alternatives closer to home. China has less than 2% of the world’s known oil reserves, production from local wells is dwindling, and its vast reserves of coal are a controversial substitute. Coal already accounts for 60-70% of China’s non-renewable fuels (Jiang 2007), and despite Beijing’s goal to reduce the country’s reliance on coal to between 60.8-63.3 % of the total energy portfolio, economic growth is keeping demand alive (Ziegler 2006).
Matching the country’s increasing dependence on oil for growth with projects like the Three Gorges hydro-electric dam, plans for 40 new nuclear stations by 2020, and a partnership with Greenpeace to advance wind power (Jiang 2005), is viewed as an essential step towards reducing the crippling levels of air pollution in Chinese cities caused by the use of high-sulphur coal. In March 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao also announced that China would launch a national strategy for addressing climate change, after what has been judged the country’s ‘mildest’ winter on record (Jiang 2007).

As with most economies, oil supply and the integrity of the national transportation structure in China is inter-related. The Communist Party eagerly promotes automobile ownership as an economic stimulant and a strategy to maintain the acceptance among citizens that the reality of development is a good one, from the point of view of increased mobility and owning a high-value asset (Jiang 2007). China is the third largest car market in the world after the US and Japan, with 140 million new cars expected on it roads by 2010; approximately one half of all oil consumption in China by that time will be in the transportation sector (Ziegler 2006; Jiang 2007).

Therefore, Angola’s material purpose to China under this assumption of realism is its contribution to national energy security in light of insufficient sources on home soil. The nature of this vulnerability comes from the desire to sustain industrial growth, enhance environmental quality, expand transportation capacity, and overall, ensure civic stability between the Chinese state and its population. However, if Waltz also believes the state to be the most important actor in international politics, does this case study support that assumption?

- **States are the Most Important Actors in International Politics**

Angola’s transition between the last era of civil war and the forthcoming elections is placing huge burdens on a fragile state operated by a government of national unity, which needs to demonstrate peaceful leadership and capable governance to avoid a return to hostilities. A recent report noted that in the midst of Angola’s dilapidated civil society, there is no such thing as ‘citizenship’. Few people know their constitutional rights, and most are very sceptical of engaging in political discourse for fear of the reprisals that have been witnessed in the past (APPGA 2006). The Angolan government believes it can do very little to reverse these sentiments directly, for they are rooted in the torturous experience of the war. Instead, the leading policy focus is on restoring the country’s physical infrastructure, increasing expenditure on social services, and attracting foreign investment, as a means to maintain civic stability and legitimise corrupt elites approaching the
ballot box. Oil agreements between China and Angola consist of a unique arrangement, where substantial packages of aid assistance, infrastructure projects, and lines of credit have been bundled into the purchase of exploration rights (Taylor 2006). The style of this oil diplomacy is having a salient effect on Angolan policy-making,

‘Since the oil price boom, it [Angola] has taken an increasingly robust attitude towards the IMF, and moved instead towards what one Angolan politician has called the ‘Shanghai school of thought’ – a model involving huge splurges on infrastructure, and economic change without the kind of political reform… that western governments would prefer’ (Shaxson 2006; 3)

China has not only become a role model for Angola, but a substantial patron in its socio-economic development. The $2 billion loan that secured the long term oil supply contract in 2006 – with an interest rate repayment of 1.5 % over 17 years in return for 10,000 barrels per day of crude oil later rising to 40,000 barrels per day – was accompanied by a host of ‘humanitarian projects’. These included schools, clinics, inner city housing, rebuilding the Benguela rail road, a new airport, a television centre and updating the telephone network (Hare 2006; Taylor 2006).

By itself, the role of ‘the state’ in meeting Angola’s post-war reconstruction interests through oil partnerships with China, and correspondingly the function of the Chinese state in leading its international hunt for resources, both support realism’s thesis that states are the most important actors in international relations. However, the prominence of other institutions affecting the Sino-Angolan relationship does not make this conclusive, and leads the discussion closer towards the fundamentals of pluralism. Like realism, this theory also makes structural assumptions, but advocates that non-state actors like multinational corporations have an equally important role in global politics alongside the sovereign state (Viotti et al 1987).

The operations of traditional private international oil companies (IOCs) in Angola are coming under increasing pressure from the influence of Asian national oil companies (ANOCs), in a region where the former have comfortably held a ‘western’ monopoly (Mitchell et al. 2007). ANOCs, like Sinopec, ONGC Videsh (India) and Petronas (Malaysia) all have the weight of ambitious ‘developmental state’ governments behind them, and have proved adept at forging relationships with their counter-parts in oil exporting countries like Angola, Iran and Venezuela, ‘this synergy of commercial and political interests has led to a perception, among Western observers, of an...
aggressive expansion of the Asian sphere of influence in resource-rich nations’ (Mitchell et al 2007; 2).

The Chatham House study into Asian Oil by John Mitchell and Glada Lahn (2007) suggests that China’s foreign investment in oil can meet immediate demand, but cannot secure long term energy supply indefinitely. Aside from the fear it may run out, oil is susceptible to shocks and irregular market conditions brought on by the influences of groups like OPEC, who’s Middle Eastern national oil companies prohibit the resale of crude exported to Asia. As a result, there is virtually no commodities market in Asia, aside from what ANOCs could import from their own investments abroad and trade with. Combine this with the absence of a strategic reserve in China (although there are plans for one), a disruption in oil supply would make allocation to Asia-Pacific’s biggest importer very difficult.

These circumstances allude to an additional interest driving investment in oil by Asian companies aside from the national motives of their government shareholders; the possibility for corporate growth. (Mitchell et al 2007). Sinopec retains enormous advantages over its private western competitors, and if used to invest in overseas upstream oil production, could yield substantial growth in profits and capacity. In 2005, the foreign equity production in oil for Chinese NOCs amounted to 16% of Chinese oil imports, and oil purchased from host governments like Angola can be added to this (Mitchell et al 2007). It is hard to accurately assess what advantages Chinese national oil companies have over their private western competitors, but there are several observations.

Firstly, private firms complain that Chinese companies pay more for oil acquisitions than what the market would justify, because they have combined monetary and risk advantages. Lower Chinese interest rates in comparison to the US and Europe have reduced the cost of capital in China, while government involvement provides an added security that off-sets risks of projects that would deter most private companies. The Chinese state, as the majority shareholder is also willing to accept lower returns than private investors would (Mitchell et al 2007). Secondly, an advantage observed in the Sinopec- Sonangol agreements, is the ability of Chinese companies to offer refining and infrastructure projects that African producers want. The gradual expansion of this trend is empowering Sonangol, who has traditionally acted as a concessionaire, while gaining very little experience in actual exploration and production (Hodges 2001). The prospects of joint ventures or equity stakes with partners like Sinopec will give Sonangol increasing confidence to tackle
upstream activities where private companies have dominated (Hodges 2001). Thirdly, while examined in more detail under constructivism, there are various cultural and political motivations that have given Chinese companies a perceived attraction from the standpoint of Angola as a host country. Popular slogans that condemn western imperialism and the hypocrisy of imposing political reform have rallied an excitement about taking a stand against the strength of American and European corporations, and the condescending attitudes of their governments that openly criticise the perils of a ‘hopeless continent’.

- **Power, Competition and Militarization.**

On the one hand, the role of the sovereign state as the *primary actor* with *material national interests* is very clear. China must secure energy supplies to meet its domestic growth, and Angola has major reconstruction goals. Identifying oil as the underlying nexus makes any analysis of this partnership redundant without an appreciation of multinational corporations. While realism could argue, that as companies with government shareholders, Sinopec and Sonangol are controlled by their respective states and therefore one and the same with the state as a whole entity, it is argued that growth in profits and capacity may come above national interests. However, the growth of large state enterprises and the growth of the state as a whole must have an obvious and intrinsic link, as confirmed by the unfortunate nationalisation of industries in post-colonial Africa detailed earlier.

Nevertheless, the Chinese state is conducting international relations through its own corporate proxy in direct *competition* with *non-state* actors like Shell, BP and Chevron; contrary to Kenneth Waltz’s focus on competition solely between states. However, regardless of whether an international relationship is between states, non-state actors, or a combination of both, the realist paradigm persists with the notion that the balance of power between them is of more importance than anything. Power is open to multiple conceptualisations, but in the context of Sino- Angolan relations, it appears that competitive power relationships are being formed as countries like India, Russia and the United States are measuring their capability to secure oil supplies relative to the gains that China has made in Angola and elsewhere (Viotti et al 1987). These states act to rectify what they view as a security dilemma, or a disadvantageous balance of power brought on by a diminishing ability to materially acquire oil. As Waltz concludes, ‘*the balance of power is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen*’ (Waltz in Viotti et al 1987; 52).
The determining variable in how this manoeuvring will take shape is Angola, who is currently positioned to play competing bids for supply and access off each other. In recent years, China has been the most influential competitor in Angola, despite the continued dominance of international firms in deep-water drilling where Chinese technology lacks development. After Shell divested its oil interests in the country, it negotiated a deal with Indian oil giants to take over its 50% equity-stake in deep-water Bloc 18, then operated by BP. Sonangol evoked its right of first refusal as concessionaire, and gave the stake to Sinopec (Hare 2006). Sinopec also benefited when Sonangol refused to extend Total’s concession over one part of offshore oil Bloc 3 (Hare 2006).

However, by early 2007, there were indications that Angola is confidently willing to test the resolve of other companies that wish to trump China’s lucrative bids. Exxon Mobil and various partners continue to be the most efficient oil producers in Angola, with an output of over 550,000 barrels a day after completing two $7 billion projects in fields Kizomba A and Kizomba B of Block 15. The company plans to bring on Kizomba C next year. Chevron’s aim is to double its West African production in the next four years, and plans a liquefied natural gas partnership with Sonangol (New York Times 2007). Russia’s diamond giant, Alrosa, will sign a deal with Angola to start exploring for crude oil in addition to mining, as part of its plan to diversify southern African interests. The company president, Sergei Vybornov, said Alrosa did not feel threatened by China’s presence, and announced that its initial investment would be approx $50 million (Reuters 2007). India has moved to convene a special energy panel to devise new strategies to counter Beijing’s ability to obtain oil so readily in Latin America and Africa. New Delhi fears that it is being left behind in the race for energy (Times of India 2007), and has made attempts to enter the Angolan market by partnering with western firms (Hare 2006). In contrast to the recent assertiveness of its competitors, China experienced the collapse of negotiations with Sonangol, who ended the talks on Sinopec’s plans to invest in the earlier proposed $3bn oil refinery. This was the first major set back China has seen in its African ‘oil safari’; which coincided with Exxon’s transfer of a minority stake in the planned liquefied natural gas plant to Sonangol (Gulf Times 2007).

The nature of this competitive behaviour between companies and states jostling for Angola’s attention to stay in the game may lead Beijing to question the longevity of its current approach to oil diplomacy. It will also require Angola to be increasingly pragmatic in how it deals with new waves of frantic bidding by multiple parties. Realist theory vindicates that these are self-help strategies by actors in the effort to increase their relative material strength, but a return to chapter one’s
discussion of Kenneth Waltz reminds us that military posturing may also accompany efforts to achieve a balance of power.

While China’s contemporary foreign policy favours an international acceptance of multi-polarity among several major powers, America has traditionally been less sympathetic, and so has Kenneth Waltz. Waltz argues that multipolarity, in contrast to bi-polarity, provokes higher levels of uncertainty and therefore increases the probability of war (Viotti et al 1987). This mindset is a typical reflection of foreign policy thinking during the Cold War. While direct conflict at the bi-polar level between the Soviet Union and the United States was avoided, it didn’t stop either from leading military incursions into other states, to prevent a tilting of the power balance in the enemy’s favour.

The energy geo-politics currently being observed in Africa is generating fears that the United States will respond with a new phase of militarization in Africa in order to maintain dominance in resource extraction (Rogers 2007). America’s latest defence budget demonstrates a subtle re-orientation of defence policy towards Africa, and details the creation of an African Command; imaginatively named AFRICOM (Rogers 2007). The centralisation of US military strategy for Africa is designed to address what Washington views as a three-pronged threat – resource security, terrorism, and the influence of China, and is expected to alter the way the US relates with African states,

‘Africom… raises the expectation of a shift in the nature of the US’s bonds with a number of African countries - towards a situation where… Africa is mediated through military relationships fostered by the Pentagon…rather than through the much more constrained state department…’

(Rogers 2007)

America’s re-positioning is as realist theory would expect for a state with the legitimate right to use force, but China has yet to demonstrate any kind of comparable behaviour. China has done little, if anything, to re-structure its military in order to secure energy supplies, ‘this may be simply a nod to reality, since the PRC is far from being able to challenge the United States globally, or it may be a rational calculus that non military means are more cost-effective and present a greater likelihood of success than using armed forces’ (Ziegler 2006: 8)

In Chapter One, Norris (1994) noted that Michel Foucault had become dismayed that the majority of knowledge truths produced seemed to ‘transcend’ specific historical conditions through logical
judgments that have become unquestioned and thoughtlessly accepted. In that respect, the current section has observed how realism in international theory has established structural sovereignty and anarchy as the ‘self-evident’ truths of its approach to foreign politics, elevating the role of the nation-state as a rational actor who engages self-help to satisfy material demands. In the context of China’s relationship with Angola through oil, realism is clearly a relevant theoretical aide, and Foucault’s philosophy of epistemology would not deny its claim to knowledge-truth. However, if we do not pose alternative knowledges made under different epistemological approaches, we have failed society’s need for continued intellectual Enlightenment. Therefore, the following section turns to constructivist explanations of the Sino-Angolan relationship by providing transformative interpretations of anarchy and sovereignty treated not as structurally present, but as subject to cultural and historical change. Reference is made to the importance of renovated ‘south-south cooperation’ discourses that stem from the past experiences of Angola and China during the Cold War. Constructivism offers new meanings of anarchy and sovereignty, and identifies how states develop cultural preferences internally that affects their international behaviour.

**Constructivist Perspectives of Anarchy and Sovereignty from inside the State**

Constructivist scholars are united by a general suspicion of realism; arguing that explanations based on a material understanding of state interests under structural assumptions of an anarchic world do not explain strategic behaviour (Desch 1998). However, it is sometimes unclear as to whether the alternative sociological/cultural analyses put forth by constructivism are designed to supplement realism’s findings, or overtake them. Michael Desch (1998) supports the arguments made earlier in reference to Alexander Wendt, who viewed constructivism through its ability to bridge the dichotomy between realism and the complicated web of opposing critical theories. Desch (1998) emphasises that constructivist explanations, throughout their epistemological evolution in the Cold War, have displayed a tendency to make excessive claims from a relatively select number of cases.

Since this chapter has already discovered the national interest in oil as well as material interpretations of power, competition and the role of the state in accordance with realist theory, it is not the intention to provide an independent explanation of Sino-Angolan relations that supersedes realism. Instead, it is demonstrated that there are cultural and historical identities influencing the manner in which Angola and China project themselves internationally that provide additional truth possibilities and therefore deepen our knowledge of international politics in this context.
Sovereignty and the Power of Culture in China’s State Identity Formation

Hopf (1998) argues that the central role of constructivism in international relations theory is to address the politics of identity; the manner in which a host of inter-subjective influences, including nationalism, culture, learning, ethnicity, religion, and historical experiences of international cooperation, have on state behaviour in global affairs. Many of these factors were referred to in Chapter Two’s discussions of China and the post-colonial African state.

The structural nature of realism emphasises a certain level of uniformity in state behaviour, on the basis that the state is the most important actor in an anarchic international system, which will employ self-help strategies to accommodate its national interests. In contrast, constructivism acknowledges that there are many differences between states in the sociological and cultural manner they choose to execute self-help action. After a given period of time, the state in question may become associated with one particular identity as opposed to another. While this may be the product of its own doing internally, how other states respond to and interpret that projected identity are also factors in its construction.

Studies by Michael Barnett, referred to in Hopf (1998), speculated that the failure of measures to deter Iraq from annexing Kuwait implied that Iraq had viewed neighbouring Saudi Arabia as an ‘Arab state’ rather than a ‘sovereign state’. As an ‘Arab state’, Iraq did not believe the Saudis would allow US military deployments from their territory. However, they misjudged the mutually cooperative identity between Washington and Riyadh as allies through their heavily invested interest in oil. More recently, Pakistan has been identified by the United States as an ‘ally’, but not a ‘democracy’, in the context of the War on Terror. America has remained surreptitiously withdrawn from criticisms of the authoritarian regime in Pakistan, where President Musharraf promenades his country’s escape (so far) from being labelled ‘Islamic extremist’ by the US (Pant 2007).

It is clear that states seek recognition from other states in a way that contributes positively to achieving their national objectives. Therefore, to obtain energy security and corporate growth through access to Angolan oil reserves, how has China identified herself to the Angolan state? The origins of its approach can be found in its domestic strategy. As discussed in Chapter Two, the Beijing government has dealt with the internal risk of a weakening communist ideology and the positive marketing of its open economic policy simultaneously; by promoting a cultural nationalism through the revival of Chinese dynastic history that re-affirms China’s position as a ‘sovereign’
power independent of Western influence. This has encouraged China’s civic stability by instilling values that promote an admiration for the state and its ancestry, and a desire to be part of its development. To the outside world, cultural vibrancy has stimulated geographic imaginations of China as a great land of emerging opportunities and discovery, and a partner that is eager to negotiate on co-operative and friendly terms.

The execution of this approach within the Chinese state has transcended its borders through foreign policy. Intending to acquire natural resources with minimal cause for alarm among African states and the wider international community, China has made ‘soft’ rhetoric, hospitality, and cultural display, distinctive characteristics of its engagement with Africa. The language of ‘China’s African Policy’ (CAP 2006), the official state document outlining Beijing’s objectives, appeals to the existence of an intrinsic identity between the two regions based on an intercontinental friendship that values ‘Sincerity, equality ... mutual benefit, solidarity and common development’ (CAP 2006). These principles, or a variety thereof, are re-affirmed in almost every recent diplomatic agreement between China and an Africa state. The Joint Communique with Angola in June 2006 cited that it was,

‘imperative for the two countries to strengthen consultations on major international and regional issues in order to safeguard common interests and promote peace, stability and development’

(Joint Communiques- Chinese Government Official Portal, 2006)

A series of high profile visits to almost every African state by China’s most senior leaders throughout 2005, 2006, and early 2007, has developed a consistently positive public image for the Chinese government, whose representatives appear at the bedsides of patients in Congolese hospitals, tree planting ceremonies in Nairobi, and dancing to the beat of tribal drums in Liberia. These scenes not only flatter African leaders, who believe their governments are entitled to the same attention and diplomatic credence as politicians in the developed world, but flood the state-censored press in China where citizens have become increasingly ‘educated’ about Africa and admire that Chinese values and their leaders are well received abroad. The Chinese government reciprocates the hospitality of its African hosts, and surpasses expectations in doing so. The China-Africa summit in November 2006 was the largest independent gathering of African governments by a single country in history. Beijing symbolized to Africa, and the rest of the world who were not invited, the extent to which China is prepared to show her gratitude for international co-operation in trade and investment.
African politicians and the world media returned from the conference overwhelmed by the transformation of Beijing in their honour. Streets were decorated with installations of African wildlife grazing on savannahs, posters in public parks informed local residents about African customs and how to be polite to their foreign visitors, exhibitions and craft markets selling curios from Cameroon to Madagascar sprouted, and ministers packed hotel slippers and pillow cases that had been especially embroidered with their names (People’s Daily 2006a). While the underlying message to Africans was that favours for China will be rewarded, the massive preparations for the visit were also an exercise in promoting Chinese domestic nationalism by educating locals about the opportunities for China abroad that continue to make the country successful. This supports the constructivist interest in discovering state identities that have been created by endogenous processes, as well as Saskia Sassen’s appeal to theorists to understand ‘foreign’ meanings and values that have been developed inside territorial borders.

However, the most important element of China’s identification with Africa as a friendly power has been the contrasting of their ‘mutual relationship’ based on equality and respect, with the historical legacy of colonial rule, and repeated interventions from international bodies buttressed by western ideals and interests, as referred to in the previous chapter. In this process, China has presented herself as Africa’s historic partner, an exemplar of what developing states can achieve independently, and leader of a non-violent assault on western imperialism and American hegemony. These are facets of a constructed persona that China believes will help achieve growth ambitions, representing an intrinsic link between what states do and who they are. China has purposefully invoked ‘character planning’ through culturally and ideologically packaging certain mutually valued attitudes in order to help secure the material interests discussed under realism in the previous section.

These characteristics of China’s identity are not recently invented personas, but reconstructions borrowed from the country’s historical interactions with the Third World over the last six decades, and commemorate the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung as the event which conceptualised the solidarity of the developing world against imperial power (McTurnan-Kahin 1956). It is ironic that the original agenda of the conference focused on the issue of China being a military threat rather than a peaceful ally, and it was only on the urging of India’s Jawaharlal Nehru that the PRC was even invited. China has buried the fact that it actively supported various communist parties in Asia and Africa throughout the Cold War, and focuses instead on the neutral
partnerships of Non-Alignment ‘bound together by the common experience of previous enforced subservience to the West…’ (McTurnan- Kahin 1956; 11).

The Chinese government paid lip-service to non-aligned politics in the 1960s as its relations with the Soviet Union grew increasingly competitive. While Beijing entered into an intense period of diplomatic engagement with a select number of newly independent African states (notably Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt and Guinea) under the Bandung spirit of anti-imperialism, China encouraged nationalist dissidents in Africa to split from Communist Parties allied to the Soviet Union in an attempt to establish her own influence (Larkin 1971). The Cultural Revolution and the last years of Mao’s leadership put Beijing’s foreign and domestic policies into chaos, and its contact with Africa cooled significantly (Harris et al 1986).

However, from late 1980s to the present day, China’s sustained economic success has placed its leadership back in the international arena to rally the support of the Third World by calling for self-reliance and unity against western domination, and American hegemony in particular (Harris et al 1986). But on this occasion, Chinese rhetorical support has been accompanied by its major role in jump-starting the largest trade and investment movement within the global ‘South’ between Asia and Africa. The World Bank’s "Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier” (Broadman 2006), finds that exports from Africa to Asia have tripled in the last five years, making Asia Africa’s third largest trading partner (27%), close behind the EU (32%) and the United States (29%).

From the point of Africa’s recent experiences discussed in Chapter Two (failed structural adjustment, political sanctions, and disappointing attempts to sustain a development agenda at the WTO), China’s appeals to developing world strength supported by her economic clout have been well timed in influencing the ‘south-south cooperation’ movement. Chris Melville and Olly Owen (2005) summarize effectively how China managed to gradually re-orientate Africa’s disillusionment with the policies of international organisations to her own advantage,

‘…the post-Tiananmen period gave earlier ideological bonds a fresh twist: the hostility of many African leaders to democratic pressures and... “hegemonic” conceptions of human rights chimed with China’s own preconceptions. Throughout the 1990s, China increased its aid to African governments and resumed its earlier rhetoric of “mutual respect” and “concern for diversity” – a
discourse that resounded strongly in a continent highly attuned to the perceived neo-colonial reflexes of the former ruling powers’ (Melville et al 2005)

From this discussion, three constructivist arguments can be put forth. Firstly, using soft rhetoric, cultural exchange, and grand displays of hospitality, China has sought to construct an identity with Africa as a valuable partner that shares common interests and respects her sovereignty. As argued in the previous chapters, Johnston et al (1999) and Wendt (1992) anticipate that states will have a heightened chance of earning respect and trust if the behaviour that reinforces that reputation can be understood as consistent over an extended period of time. This explains why China repeatedly refers to its relations with African states as having a historic legacy. However, it is not assured that African states would feel this way if China did not show a material interest in natural resources. Therefore, constructivist interpretations of the Chinese government as a generous and non-aggressive ally merge with realist explanations of the material relevance of oil; indicating that Beijing’s embracing friendship is, to some extent, a veneer that escorts expectations of material gains.

Secondly, China’s approach towards Africa on the ideological basis that the developing world must unite and resist the intrusion of western imperialism is serving to provide new sociological meanings of ‘sovereignty’, that is considered by realism to be a prior calculation defined by accepted principles, but has inter-subjective meaning based on historical experiences. China’s self-help strategies to obtain oil are being channelled through cultural conceptualisations that sympathise with Africa’s troubled relations with international monetary bodies and the global structure of trade that favour the interests of the North. By reaffirming the ability of African states like Angola to defy the power advantages of ‘neo-colonial reflexes’ through south-south co-operation based on a self-defined ‘mutually equitable’ agenda, China is constructing new imaginations of sovereignty based on normative desires among African states to lead their own destinies.

While realism will continue to argue that sovereignty is an objectively measured norm of the state system, constructivist theorists Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink (1998) argue that subjective interpretations of international norms will open up new dialogues in international relations theory. As advocated here, sovereignty is an emotionally charged political goal (Finnemore et al 1998) that is not only structural in defining separation between individual states, but is also a cultural process (Wendt 1992) of transformation led by rhetorical ideals. These aspirations visualise the removal of western international policy norms that have generated global inequalities through the historical
subjugation of Africa. Regrettably, it might also be inferred that China is exploiting this process for its own material gain.

Thirdly, in separate studies by Jeffrey Legro (1996) and Elizabeth Kier (1995), both authors concluded, similarly to Saskia Sassen’s (2006) argument, that the development of a government’s preferential foreign co-operation with certain states is rooted by ideals that are constructed through domestic reactions to events and internal organisational cultures,

‘...culture is a determinant of resource decisions that in later periods tend to reinforce the viability of cultural assumptions regardless of their fit with situational strategic circumstances ...’

(Legro 1996: 122)

The key cultural theme that has required a pragmatic response from the Chinese government over the last decade has been the successive rise and fall of ‘anti-Americanism’ in Chinese society. While this has been periodically promoted by the Communist Party since its rise to power in 1949, its historical roots reach back nearly 200 years (Li 2005). When American missionaries first came to China in 1830 spreading word of the ‘superior faith’ and openly attacking Chinese dynastic culture and customs, resentment among local civilians intensified, and remained as more foreign influences ‘invaded’ China after the Opium War (Li 2005). A factor in the collapse of both the Qing court and the Nationalist regime was their inability to manage civilian conflicts that flared in response to economic modernisation and the deepening contacts between China and the United States.

Sixty years later, the Communist Party has found itself in another predicament on the issue of balancing popular feelings towards American culture and foreign policy. While Big-Macs, Coca-Cola and Hollywood were met with resounding popularity in China in the 1980s and anti-Americanism became more benign, the government sponsored several movements to curb the growing influence of ‘liberalism’ (Li 2005). In almost complete reverse, events during the 1990s discussed in Chapter Two caused waves of protest towards American policy. America’s position on China’s trade status, relations with Taiwan, the aircraft collision, and ultimately the Belgrade embassy bombing in 1999 mobilised hundreds of protests chanting Dadao Qiangquan (‘Down with Hegemonic Power’), and Fandui Qinglue (‘Opposing Invasion’) (Li 2005).
China’s projection of its policy towards Africa, as a joint partnership between two regions with a shared interest in combating the inequalities of hegemony, is directly related to its strategic interest in supporting such a sentiment within its borders. It is a foreign identity constructed through internal dynamics. Conservatives within the People’s Liberation Army will also continue to advance the need to resist America’s containment of the PRC by supporting Taiwan. An application of Wendt’s (1992) thesis implies that the nationalist value of a culturally independent and economically powerful China that rejects American hegemony is intrinsic, if not “the objective social fact” (Wendt 1992: 411) that interpretations of constructed identities reveal. The cost of not upholding that identity is viewed as significant. China perceives that its own anti-American or hegemonic values are intimately linked with Africa’s feelings of resentment towards the several international organisations that have failed to alleviate its poverty and underdevelopment, and continue to be supported by western thinking and industrial interests. African support for these ideals helps to legitimise China’s sentiments at the world level, and now that almost every African state officially recognises Beijing, rather than Taipei, China’s key reformers can demonstrate their renewed commitment to the ‘One China’ cause without directly promoting a heightened military posture against Taiwan or the US.

_Ananity and Angola: The Historical Ghosts of Global Meddling_

To substantiate their position in Africa on confronting the intrusion of imperialism and ‘neo-colonial reflexes’, Beijing continually refers back to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,

1. Mutual Respect for Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty
2. Mutual Non-Aggression
3. Mutual Non-Interference in Internal Affairs
4. Equality and Mutual Benefit
5. Peaceful Co-Existence

These principles formed part of several agreements signed between India and China in 1954 after the Chinese Government assumed sovereign control over Tibet. Although they didn’t prevent the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border War in 1962, the Five Principles have remained a prominent feature in Chinese international diplomacy and part of Beijing’s rhetorical effort to form a more equitable world through multipolarity. However, in the context of China’s engagement with Angola, as well as Sudan and Zimbabwe, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states has attracted criticism that China is selfishly ignoring the effects of state corruption and
human rights abuses in Africa, if not perpetuating them through its oil purchases and arms sales (Lyman 2005).

China’s influence has been met with approval by many African governments weary of political intrusion by organizations like the IMF, who attach conditions of fiscal transparency and democratic reform to their programmes. Angola was negotiating with the IMF to agree on a reconstruction loan where the international body was determined that mechanisms to improve economic management and revenue transparency be included. Luanda halted the talks as China’s alternative offer of $2 billion from its Exim Bank without any political conditionalities was accepted willingly (Taylor 2006). What is the relationship between Angola’s decision-making in this case and differing theoretical approaches to anarchy?

• *Angola, the IMF, and Economic Reform*

On a realist level, Angola’s decision to reject co-operation with the IMF is justified under the assumptions of a state-centric approach, where collective action in international relations is problematic owing to the egoism of the sovereign state in an anarchic world (Wendt 1994). Realism accepts that as an autonomous entity subject to no higher authority, Angola was entirely within its right to halt the negotiations. Under Kenneth Waltz’s thesis, Angola clearly viewed the economic cost of the IMF agreement to be higher than co-operating with the Chinese counter-offer, although this is subject to disagreement. While the borrowing rate with China was probably lower than most other lenders, and the Chinese presence in the oil industry added a beneficial dynamic to the market, Angola has lost opportunities for domestic job creation as many construction contracts have been awarded to Chinese companies that have imported foreign labour (Taylor 2006).

However, from the constructivist perspective, China’s ability to court Angola through a relational identity built on a mutual distain for the ‘unbearable’, ‘politically unacceptable’, and ‘humiliating’ conditions (Taylor 2006) imposed by developed countries has had a significant effect in altering the relationship between Angola and the IMF. Beijing’s diplomacy has succeeded in stirring up the ‘old-talk’ of early post-colonial nationalists that fought to prevent the continued interference of Western powers in Africa,

‘to many Africans- and especially intellectuals- they [Structural Adjustment Programmes and development NGOs] added up to a de facto recolonisation of the continent... Western assistance seemed to clothe itself in a dusted down version of the white man’s burden...’

(Nugent 2004; 327)
Angola’s experience with IMF structural adjustment and the liberal development orthodoxy in general has been lengthy and without much reward. There are two historical dimensions to this failed partnership that have put any hopes of future co-operation in jeopardy. Firstly, the fall in oil prices in 1985-86 caused Angola to have serious balance-of-payments problems and marked the beginning of a 14 year reform process where 9 separate programs were introduced in order to obtain macro-economic stability; some lasted only a couple of months (Hodges 2001). In less than a decade, Angola had issued three new currencies, experienced hyper-inflation, and made several failed attempts to align official and parallel exchange rates (Hodges 2001). Any glimmer of success tended to be at the whim of surging oil prices. IMF staff monitors did not criticize the liberalization measures recommended to the Angolan Ministry of Finance, but the weakness in local capacity to co-ordinate and implement them. Civil service personnel were recorded as lacking expertise and energy to tackle reform, while the commitment of senior political leaders was constantly erratic.

Secondly, the size of extra-budgetary operations concerned both the IMF and World Bank, who failed to appreciate the implications of directing economic reform against the backdrop of an aggressive civil war. While military and security needs accounted for some of the diverted funds, it became clear that elements of the liberal reform process were promoting unintended ‘benefits’ (Hodges 2001). The exchange rate policy, fixed interest rates below inflation, land privatization, and mechanisms to manipulate market competition, offered huge opportunities for arbitrage and private wealth accumulation for politically connected elites. These individuals had no incentive for economic programs to be fair and transparent as international bodies later concluded was essential.

These two dimensions have led to considerable tension between Angola and the IMF on the issue of democratic economic governance, which from the constructivist viewpoint highlights how both parties have perceived their relationship in an anarchic world, rather than constituted a structure in accordance with realism. Riding on a self-assumed identity of representing best-practice knowledge, the IMF resists criticisms that the Washington Consensus approach was overly ambitious and not suited to the Angolan context. The organisation and its donors accept that they are justified, on the international level, to influence Angola’s internal public management in spite of its sovereign autonomy, which represents a different constructed view of sovereignty from Angola’s. On the other hand, Angola’s political elites have recently sought to manage the level of international policy ‘intrusion’ in order to sustain their private interests. Liberal economic reforms have presented opportunities for patrimonial politics to flourish, but any deeper involvement using international political conditionalities is considered a threat and promotes anti-western rhetorics.
Therefore, the structural concept of anarchy, as the absence of an international political authority, is subject to what the Angolan state ‘makes of it’ (Wendt 1992), in light of how their identities and interests interact.

The IMF has actively pursued an agenda of political reform inside Angola, where elites have attempted to resist such an external influence which may affect their ability to extract wealth from the state. Since China has consistently behaved on Angola’s side by promoting non-interference, Angola identifies with Beijing as ‘a true friend of Africa’ (Taylor 2006) and the IMF as a meddling organisation of outsiders who have ‘always behaved as if they know better’ (Nugent 2004). China’s entrance into Africa on the rhetorical platform of anti-imperialism and active withdrawal from any international criticism of Africa’s reform misfortunes has made such an impact that international development policy has been forced to reconsider its engagement with Africa (Lyman 2005). Former World Bank Director, Paul Wolfowitz, retracted his earlier criticisms of China’s lending in Africa after the IMF concluded that there was little evidence to support his claims, providing Africa invested the debt wisely. Wolfowitz then called for the World Bank and China to work together for African development (Peoples Daily Online 2006b); Chinese aid to Africa will amount to $8.1 billion in 2007, compared to the Bank’s $2.3 billion (De Lorenzo 2007). The Chief Executive of NEPAD, which is primarily supported by the UK, cited that Chinese investment was invaluable for the continent’s prosperity (BuaNews 2007).

It is unlikely that China’s identity as a ‘non-interfering’ power would have had any effect without the capital and demand for natural resources that accompanied it, but in terms of the response by international development organisations, Constructivism can speculate that the World Bank and IMF are in fear of losing their long term credibility and purpose in Africa as they are gradually ‘outflanked’ by China (Observer 2007). The IMF experienced the cost of maintaining a confrontational approach with Angola when Luanda chose to break off negotiations, while a leadership crisis and difficulty in raising funds is challenging the World Bank. If these bodies now have to reclaim a legitimate identity in Africa through co-operating with China, it will be intriguing to monitor the reaction of their principle patrons in Europe and the United States as new identities begin to unfold in light of new interests and actors. This is a sociological transformation that constructivism will be better suited to analysing.

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5 The author is referring to Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa
Angola and the Anarchy of Superpower Competition:

This final section is prompted by two recent events that will impact on constructivist interpretations of Sino-Angolan relations. First is the admission of Angola into OPEC, the 12th member of the world’s most influential organisation on the price of oil. Secondly was the collapse of negotiations between Sonangol and Sinopec on the $3 bn development of a refinery in Lobito. On a realist level, there is a positivist explanation for why these two incidents happened so close together. As a member of OPEC, Angola will be required to restrict their oil output to maintain high prices, on a quota to be determined later in 2007 (Ford 2007). Therefore, foreclosing the construction of a refinery that would have increased the country’s production levels appears sensible (Corkin 2007). The realist emphasis on competition might also suggest that non-OPEC states will assess how best to respond in order to protect future investments in a country where there is now an added element of uncertainty in access.

However, in terms of Angola’s international identity, it is clear that Luanda is demonstrating a ‘newfound muscle’ (Corkin 2007); using high commodity prices and the new competitive dynamic of China as leverage. From a sociological perspective, this so called ‘muscle’ (or new feeling of confidence) is the product of the learning process that Angola has experienced over recent years in negotiating with China. It was mentioned earlier that the interaction between Beijing and Sonangol has served to ‘empower’ the Angolan state oil company by allowing it to identify with new functions and acquire new skills. In one sense, the desire or ambition to join the most powerful energy cartel has been born out of an integrated social learning process, where Angola has used its manoeuvring between competing importers to form an identity of confidence and self-worth which inspires the attainment of high material goals. However, constructivism can also determine how Angola’s membership in OPEC will affect the country’s image with other world powers competing for energy security and how this compares to its historical perception of anarchic international relations.

Angola’s accession to the world’s leading oil cartel not only increases her prominence in the most important global commodity market, but stands the country shoulder to shoulder with other states that are the subject of geo-political pressure between the US and China - notably Libya, Venezuela and Iran. Relations between these three countries and the United States have been strained, if not hostile, for extended periods of time. The Bush Administration only restored full diplomatic relations with Libya in 2006, and reluctantly removed the country from its list of states that sponsor terrorism. Assurances in January 2007 that the United States has no intention to attack Iran have not
subdued American-backed efforts to control what is viewed as an expansionist Shi’ite state (The
Middle East 2007). Iran has looked to Venezuela for support, where President Hugo Chavez has
built a popular following based on anti-American hegemony nationalism. Iran and Venezuela hope
to use OPEC to prevent Saudi Arabia from driving down oil prices to weaken Iran (The Middle East
2007). China’s approach to western fears of Iran’s uranium enrichment, along with Russia, have
been consistent; symbolic of two rising economies that both advocate world visions of multipolarity
and non-interference to protect material interests. Therefore, by vetoing UN sanctions, avoiding
public criticism of President Ahamdinejad’s regime, and urging a peaceful settlement to the crisis,
China and Russia have protected their oil investments in the Middle East and exerted non-
aggressive pressure to counter US dominance in the region.

Angola will identify with this pattern of relationships more closely now that it has joined OPEC,
and may fear becoming (in constructivist terms) ‘likened to’ Iran and Venezuela – oil rich,
politically unstable, sceptical of American foreign policy, and the subject of competition between
more powerful states. It will also have an interest in avoiding the occurrences of domestic violence
against the presence of international oil companies that OPEC-member Nigeria experiences
frequently. However, besides the social influence of gradual learning, what other cultural and
historical dynamics outweighed the potential risks of joining OPEC? As a non-member, Luanda
was aware of the international competition among other countries for access to her resources, and
may have assessed itself as too weak to cope with the implications given its historical record under
the influence of superpowers. In spite of a ‘newfound muscle’ it is still comparatively weak in
comparison to its oil market consumers. In that light, joining OPEC, an international collective with
other countries that relate to the same pressures, acts as a buffer between Angola and the power of
large oil-importing states. This has presented rational theorists with the ‘problem’ of a circular
argument, where material and social explanations for the decision to join OPEC are presented, as
well as two related sets of cultural fears for joining and not joining the cartel. However, within the
Foucaultian ethos of epistemology where continuous discourses are used to unmask networks of
knowledge power, a circular argument would appear to produce more truth possibilities and
therefore expand the overall dialogue (Taylor 1986). Since the discussion put forth for Angola’s
rationale for joining OPEC is part sociological, constructivism should explain what historical
experiences have influenced the country’s strategic behaviour historically.

Alistair Johnston (1995) outlines how some elements of a state’s international behaviour maybe
credited to a ‘strategic culture’, where ‘...different states have different predominant strategic
preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state... ’(Johnston 1995: 34)

This supports Alexander Wendt’s claim that international anarchy is a sociological construct reproduced by the state internally. Realism discards the accumulated influence of historical experience and social perception in favour of objective calculations of material need and utility; the need to control production in this case. Anarchy is also treated as a systemic structure entirely independent of national values and preferences. How can Angola’s bid for OPEC membership be interpreted as the result of a historically constructed ‘strategic culture’?

It is argued here that Angola’s fear of being trapped between superior competing powers has part influenced its government’s decision to reject the Chinese refinery project and seek greater security as a major oil-exporter through an international collective. This fear stems from the country’s civil war experience, a conflict that was protracted by the role of external powers and the value of oil. For the sake of its reconstruction effort and civil stability, the Angolan government is beginning to value efforts that quash perceptions of a country once again at the mercy of superpower manipulation.

Unlike the French and British dominions who were awarded independence, Lusophone Africa had to fight for liberation. Throughout the transition of Angola’s conflict, from being a war for independence to a internal civil competition for political recognition and economic wealth, an outer ring of international alliances remained, most prominently between 1976-91,

‘the rapid militarization of Angolan politics in mid-1975 is inseparable from the politics of the Cold War... the implementation of any kind of political programme became a practical impossibility... as rival movements and their international trainers slugged it out like out-of-shape heavyweight boxers.’ (Nugent 2004; 287)

Founded by intellectuals and the urban elite, the MPLA is the only Angolan party that truly clung to any form of ideological identity. It relied on China for its early survival and subscribed to Mao’s doctrine of a ‘People’s War’ (Jackson 1995; Nugent 2004) for liberation. However, as the MPLA sought to gain control over a wider demographic largely composed of the rural peasantry, its rhetoric became increasingly radical and revolutionary. When China and the Soviet Union grew apart, the MPLA positioned itself with the latter. China then supported both the FNLA and UNITA, who were also funded at different times by the United States, as Beijing and Washington both singled out the USSR as their main adversary in Africa. From official independence, the brutal
competition between the three political parties for recognition inside Angola and within the global community only drew superpowers deeper into the conflict. China continued to support, materially and diplomatically, anyone that stood in opposition to the incumbent Soviet-led MPLA, but publicly called for a peaceful solution between the parties (Jackson 1995). In 1979, talks between the MPLA government and China indicated a return to more amicable relations, and the following decade became the most significant in portraying the United States as a highly destructive power in Angola, relative to the more engaging and supportive approach of China. Beijing now adopted an ‘equidistance policy’ (Jackson 1995) between Washington and Moscow. The US was becoming more of a military threat than a strategic associate in light of Taiwan, and economic decline in Russia dampened her competitive ability. Chinese policy towards Luanda reflected this shift, and Beijing gradually identified Angola as a ‘sovereign’ independent state, rather than an object of Soviet imperialism (Jackson 1995). In contrast, the Reagan administration actively perpetuated the civil war by supporting the UNITA insurgency on a much grander level than China had. UNITA’s war of attrition left 800,000 dead or seriously injured and 3 million internally displaced persons by 1991- needless to say Washington argued that the consequences of Communism would have been more deadly (Nugent 2004).

China’s most recent engagements with Angola signal an attempt to resume the efforts Deng’s leadership made in the late 1980s, who had found China’s role in the Angolan civil war to be embarrassing, counter-productive, and largely redundant as the Soviet Union collapsed. Despite earning some MPLA support when it publicly condemned South Africa’s invasion in 1981, China’s claims that it supported all parties in finding peace when it was in fact aligned with anti-MPLA insurgent movements has been a tough historical legacy to put to rest. However, as Constructivism argues, certain material interests may reshape new identities, and in the case of contemporary Sino-Angolan relations, it has been in the objective interest of both governments not to allow certain historical recollections to remain prominent. They have intentionally engaged in forming new identities as part of a ‘character planning’ strategy to promote ideological values that contribute to the attainment of material goals.

There is little or no mention of China’s involvement in Angola’s civil war in current diplomatic exchanges between the two countries, which are now entirely characterised by Beijing’s fresh efforts to use a rebranding of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence to ensure it stays that way. Both countries have either gained commercially, or in terms of infrastructure and meeting energy demand. However, the historical legacy of Angola as country subjected to the influence of
external powers, and China’s response to that, lead to two summations in the context of current events affecting relations between the two states.

Firstly, Angola’s membership in OPEC is serving to divide analysts on how much this relationship will benefit either the country or the cartel. Those who fail to see how cutting production will help Angola’s economy conclude that the decision to join must have had political motivation (The Australian 2006). Was this motivation a ‘strategic cultural’ preference? The ‘formative experience’ of the Angolan state through civil war has only known a very destructive side to the nature of competition between international powers, and although this has benefited Angola’s private elites in the past, the latest power struggle for influence in Angola is altering its conception of anarchy. The anarchy of the world system is perceived within the Angolan state to be a violence-inducing force since there are few viable mechanisms to prevent stronger states from manipulating less powerful ones. Pitted against China’s surging demand for oil that is prompting a global scramble among competitors is Angola’s salient historical experiences with the caustic influence of imperial opponents. Angola identifies with being a resource-rich and politically weak state, where the competitive anarchy of international relations cannot rescue it from adverse manipulation. Therefore, joining OPEC maybe viewed as a necessary response to a culturally embedded suspicion of super-power influence, which can only be distanced through partnership with countries that identify with the same apprehensions. However, this raises one problem given the arguments offered previously. If it has been established that Angola’s commercial deals with China are influenced by an identity that is anti-imperial/hegemony, then how can the decision to join OPEC, which has negatively affected China’s leverage, be caused by a similar identity? Constructivism suggests that something has affected a subtle transition in the identity of China and Angola’s relationship in the period between the beginning of Beijing’s recent era of engagement with Angola and OPEC membership this year. Given the high material value of China’s projects, its lack of direct political intervention, and anti-western rhetoric - China is not viewed as a ‘western imperial power’. It is the perceived effect of China’s influence over Africa in the US and Europe that concerns Angola and the fear of how these industrialized regions will respond to a rising competitor. By association, China is therefore being identified as having the properties of a superpower, albeit more ‘friendly’ now than Angola has experienced with any similar entity in the past. This is a powerful illustration of how constructivism can reveal the subtle sociological differences in international politics that realism cannot obtain from material observation, or produce what Robert O Keohane referred to earlier as ‘cultural anomalies’ to an otherwise perfectly rational model. However, the potential for China to slide towards being categorised as a colonial imperialist,
even though the cultural tone of its diplomacy and rhetoric indicates otherwise, is a risk that is discussed next.

Secondly, China’s identity as an anti-imperial and non-interventionist power has not saved it from criticisms of being just as ‘neo-colonial’ as western states, in respect of its natural resource acquisitions and flooding of African markets with low-cost imports that have challenged the ability of local producers to compete in industries like textiles. Angola’s neighbour Zambia has witnessed the most visible demonstrations of anti-Chinese discontent, where the opposition leader Michael Sata ran his September 2006 election campaign in Zambia’s Copper Belt attacking the presence of Chinese unskilled labour, and the low wages and unsafe working conditions in Chinese firms (Hare 2007). Most sentiments about China’s neo-colonialism are sociologically constructed from populist messages, resonating attempts by early post-colonial leaders to rally nationalist support for prosperity in African states to be achieved without Western interference. In the haunting style of Idi Amin, Sata promised to chase away the Chinese, Indians and Lebanese- chanting that they were ‘infesters’ not ‘investors’ (Hare 2007). In South Africa, where clothing imports from China rose 480% since 2002, at the expense of 63,000 jobs in production, the Mbeki government was forced to sympathize with resulting accusations of Sino neo-colonialism by negotiating with Beijing and its own retail industry to restrict textile imports. Smaller opposition parties such as the Democratic Alliance have come out against the agreement on the basis that it will be difficult to enforce and lacks specific mechanisms for protection (Mail & Guardian 2007).

As Angola prepares for forthcoming elections in 2008 and 2009, the MPLA will be aware from both the South African and Zambian cases that opposition parties, especially UNITA, will attempt to use neo-colonialist imagery to penetrate the vote of trade unions, the unemployed, and working class. While most Angolan analysts and the party leaders themselves view a return to war as unlikely, the lack of political tolerance in the wake of frequent arrests and accusations of high level assassinations make the internal discussion of issues like China very difficult. The necessity of regime survival for President Santos, through forging appropriate international alliances, has been the enduring feature of his tenure since 1979 (Malaquias 1999). While alignment with the USSR against the United States served its political purpose during the Cold War, how desirable it is to let China fill the current vacuum is more uncertain. Talk of a ‘Chinese Invasion’ among Angolan firms losing out on large construction contracts and other anecdotes of anti-Sino rhetoric (Hare 2006) is more contained than in the cases of Zambia and South Africa, but Angola’s quite unique urban-rural transformation could make Chinese investment a heated election issue. The war led to massive
population upheavals with large influxes of ‘deslocados’ into the cities; over half the Angolan public now lives in urban areas where all the country’s main ethno-linguistic identities inter-mingle (Hodges 2001). If economic prosperity cannot be guaranteed, and the effect of China’s massive investments does not trickle down, UNITA could weaken the MPLA’s hold on urban areas and the recent solidarity demonstrated between China and Angola could be jeopardized. The collapse of negotiations on the refinery project together with OPEC membership can be understood in realist terms, but a constructivist viewpoint shows that the Angolan government doesn’t want to display a strategic preference for dealing with China, although it wishes to maintain a strong relationship. Foreign identities are built through juggling a mixture of material and sociological interests (Johnston 1995).

Alexander Wendt’s understanding of constructivism, through the concept of relational identities, is relevant for explaining China’s response to accusations of neo-colonialism. The internal political effect of Chinese trade and investment in Africa is evidently more significant than Beijing anticipated, although much of it needs to be placed in proportion. While populist messages reveal a China that is ‘buying up’ whole countries, the presence of other industrialised states is still significant in countries like Zambia (Hare 2007). South Africa may reduce the flow of Chinese textile imports, but there is little to prevent economies like India, Bangladesh and Malaysia filling pockets created by the opening. Beijing may be no more than an convenient target for opposition parties to draw attention to the failures of incumbent governments in implementing capitalist growth policies, but despite this, China has shown willingness to re-affirm its intent to promote ‘win-win co-operation’, and has made gestures to alter negative perceptions (Financial Times 2007). In October 2006, the State Council published ‘Nine Principles to Encourage and Standardize Enterprises' Overseas Investment’ that publicly called for Chinese companies to respect local laws and conditions abroad (Asia Times 2006). It appears Beijing will not change the cultural rhetoric and imagery of a ‘partnership identity’ it has invested considerable resources in and produced much in return, but design policies to reinforce it. In constructivist terms, it signals the high value placed by the Chinese state on maintaining this posture.
Conclusion: A Foucaultian Enlightenment?

"We dream of a world ruled by love and reason, only to wake up to a reality driven by ideology, prejudice and power, exercised with a calculated and systematic rawness that challenges even the most optimistic of optimists" (Edwards 2007)

As an author, publisher, and artist, the life of Mai Ghoussoub has been celebrated among circles of historians and political academics who admired the effort she describes at the beginning of this project, in expanding the knowledge and information available on the politics and sociology of the Middle East and North Africa. Her death coincided, somewhat fittingly, with recent opinions by journalist Ehsan Masood (2007) and Michael Edwards (2007), a project Director at the Ford Foundation. These three individuals have shown that the production of research within social science is facing a number of challenges, brought on in some cases by theorists themselves. Why does the production of knowledge lack the justice and imagination to transform it into public action? Why is the 'enterprise of knowledge' still limited to only a few? What makes certain types of knowledge available and others not? (Masood 2007; Edwards 2007) Their works raise several questions relating to Michel Foucault’s concern with the restriction of Enlightenment’s potential through the dominance of rational knowledge,

'Active social learning writ large is the only basis for democratic governance through deliberation and consensus-building...technocratic approaches to knowledge breed technocratic approaches to politics, and everyone suffers the consequences' (Edwards 2007)

It is the technocratic nature of realist knowledge in international relations that relates to Foucault’s disagreement with Kant over the separation of man as a ‘transcendental subject and as determined object’ (Simons 1995: 15). The study of foreign politics since the end of the Second World War has imposed structural assumptions that determine explanations by treating man as a ‘determined object’. Chapter Three considered three assumptions of Waltz’s realist theory of international politics that demonstrate ‘sovereignty’ and ‘anarchy’ to be structural features of global relations, where self-help action by states acting competitively and potentially militarily is inevitable. In the context of Sino-Angolan relations, the material value of oil was the determining variable in measuring this theory. Foucault would not argue that these conclusions presented constitute ‘bad’ knowledge, but the failure to question the limitations set in producing that knowledge and therefore
open the world to *different* truth possibilities is how we fall short of Enlightenment’s vision. Consequently the argument turned to constructivist theory where the concepts of sovereignty and anarchy are acknowledged as transformative, since the historical experiences of the state forces it to assume particular ideological identities and cultural values that affect international behaviour. Through combining the material with the sociological, this project has contributed to a deeper dialogue and broader production of knowledge about contemporary Sino-African relations.

By not accepting the relevance of constructivism alongside realism within the discipline of International Relations, scholars risk becoming trapped within a technocratic ‘power/knowledge’ paradigm where assumptions that are made on the bases of material observations, such as the ‘logic of self-help’ or laws that recognise sovereignty, become the ‘thoughtlessly accepted’ practices that Nietzsche and Foucault feared. Using contemporary Sino-African relations, it is shown that constructivism and realism combined can expand international political dialogue. The presence of such a dialogue where two theoretical schools can co-exist in the same space is how Foucault sought to unmask power. It is unlikely that many consider the realist paradigm, where power is theorized, as an institution of power in itself. Networks of power can be better known by other labels, such as ‘science, or fulfilment, [and] even liberation’ (Taylor 1986; 69). However, the influence of positivist realism in the last half century suggests that alternative epistemologies have been marginalized in a power/knowledge relationship, and this has damaged Enlightenment.

Alexander Wendt’s reply to realism’s structural and material analysis of international relations is that state interaction is unique to its particular historical and socio-cultural context. The construction of an identity between two states is relational, where certain postures are designed to provoke a desired response or secure material interests. This behaviour will be determined by the endogenous transformation of attitudes and values that transpire through a state’s historical experience in international relations. As a result, states develop ‘strategic cultural preferences’ that are also intrinsically linked to a perceived need to uphold an identity or ideological value as ‘an objective social fact’ to maintain government legitimacy and internal civic stability inside the state.

The analysis of Sino-Angolan relations illustrates that since realism can only offer truth possibilities limited to the structural assumptions it abides by, combining those with constructivist perspectives increases the depth and number of interpretations of this partnership overall. As structures, anarchy and sovereignty justify the important role of states in acquiring resources like oil, and discovering the national interests that lie behind it. Realism explains how power, and the
competitive self-help behaviour undertaken to achieve it, are the primary dynamics that operate within an anarchic system. However, as conceptualised processes, anarchy and sovereignty are subject to transformation through historical experience, cultural values and the rhetoric of popular ideologies. This is also in an effort to obtain ‘power’, but the epistemology used to explain it cannot be positivist if new truth possibilities are to be formed. China is actively pursuing visions of a multi-polar world, building a transcendental connection between the ‘sovereignty’ of her own dynastic culture and historic aspirations of newly independent African states that continue to have a salient presence in African foreign policy making. That link has given energy to constructing a relational identity characterised by a mutual objection to colonialism and the subjugation of developing world sovereignties to the forces and organisations of international developmentalism. Beijing has taken advantage of the aggravation felt in states like Angola of negotiating on international aid and political conditionality. The principle of non-interference in the internal sovereign affairs of African states has developed into a keenly accepted social value that has helped Chinese policy achieve its material goals in obtaining natural resources. The desire to feel independent and the prestige acquired from allies when a state confronts a more powerful entity has strengthened old friendships and yielded material gain, but Angola’s experience also causes it to dread the potential internal and external reprisals. The competitive behaviour between more powerful states for access to Angolan resources is furthering a sensation of insecurity in light of how the government historically perceives anarchy. For much of its short history since independence, Angola has been at the mercy of larger international actors with very little constructive support given through international collectivisation. In this respect, joining OPEC was a political decision influenced by a strategic culture that fears the possible impact of a global power play.

In terms of the ‘hypothesis’ or ‘starting point for dialogue’ presented in the introduction, it is evident that by exploring and combining both realism and constructivism in the context of Sino-African relations that the total number of truth possibilities about this international partnership is greater than having employed one theory and not the other. However, what is the implication of this in light of Foucault’s attitude to epistemology and Enlightenment?

Firstly, Foucault’s intent is to reveal how positivist epistemologies spill into ‘a metaphysical gesture to regulate the terms of reality’ (Poster 1989; 6). It was noted in Chapter One that Hans J. Morgenthau attempted to reject subjective values and social complexities through normative pleas for an independent, accurate and rational truth. Constructivism’s ability to demonstrate that anarchy
and sovereignty are subject to multiple interpretations when viewed through a state’s historical experience and cultural values would imply that realists have made a normative decision to suggest the opposite, by giving these concepts a fixed structural meaning in order to theoretically process material interests rather than emotional ones.

“... the social and political context where reason is both privileged and limited to scientific episteme, to term an issue area ‘non-scientific’ cannot but be pejorative in its effect... it must be concluded that positivist social science has a clear normative content in and of itself...”

(Neufeld 1995; 101)

Whether one acts as a positivist or not, a concept such as anarchy is interpreted however we want it to be under Foucaultian reasoning. This does not make the knowledge produced invalid, but the number of different truths produced greater in number, which fosters a freer public dialogue. We should acknowledge simultaneously that anarchy under realism confirms that China and Angola as states (with the influence of corporations) are the most important rational actors in the relationship; but as a social conceptualisations produced out of a history of civil war where certain actors have played a destructive role, anarchy influences state behaviour through identity formation. In this sense, Saskia Sassen and Michel Foucault have also made a worthy challenge against the bids for universality made by Kant and Fukyama. Like the principle of liberal democracy, there is no justification for making the structural and material understanding of global politics universal through a solely rational epistemology. History and cultural identity must be allowed to enter the dialogue, contrary to Hans J. Morgenthau belief in the weak knowledge role of ‘motives’. To separate cultural and ideological preferences from material need and utility severely damages the potential for Enlightenment in International Relations.

Secondly, if Foucault’s reaction to the concept of ‘inaugural’ is taken into account then a unique overlap between realism and constructivism in the context of Sino- African relations is noticed. Foucault observes that beginning research in a state of mind where theorists are set ‘against a background of ignorance, of innocence, [or] of absolutely primal disingenuousness’ (Foucault in Macey 1993; 240) is virtually impossible. The approach taken by constructivists supports that observation. Alexander Wendt does not throw out the explanations realism provides, but offers alternative and additional information about those explanations, therefore serving to deepen our political knowledge through combination and supplementation; rather than rejection and denunciation. This serves Foucault’s vision of Enlightenment. Constructivism doesn’t deny that
China needs oil and Angola has oil to give, forcing other importing states to reassess their capability to meet material demand, but demonstrates how those states engage with each other to secure material demands by explaining who they *are*. By treating anarchy and sovereignty as potentially structural and transformative at the same time, it is argued that realism produces knowledge truths only within the material boundaries it has established for itself. Constructivism may be included to expand on those truths and enhance the overall discourse. The impact of this on research is the production of multiple truth possibilities to one question. Chapter Three presents material and sociological explanations for why Angola joined OPEC. Neither Foucault nor Constructivism would suggest that one approach is *better* than the other, but ignoring the cultural-historical context of the decision to join the oil cartel would suggest that Angola took a rational decision amidst a complete vacuum. This is an unrealistic conclusion according to Foucault and implicates realism’s power status within IR theory. China and Angola’s mutual decision not to allow China’s influence in the civil war to feature in their contemporary diplomatic identity, owing to major commercial interests, also symbolises an interlinking of the two theories.

Thirdly, Foucault was committed to detaching the purpose of Enlightenment from humanism, and in doing so carve a greater niche for accepting ‘the arts’ into the production of social knowledge. As reviewed in Chapter One, Jurgen Habermas took a dislike to Foucault’s treatment of aesthetic expression, and the acceptance of mass culture and media into the sphere of political debate. However, the ability of constructivism to demonstrate the substantial influence of culture in determining Chinese foreign politics, and the role of popular ideological rhetoric against colonialism in Africa, suggests that Habermas’s harder line should be questioned. Habermas might reject the photo shoots of Chinese leaders performing ‘good works’ or the communiqués that speak of ‘common destinies’ that constructivism argues are important factors in state identity formation. Foucault’s less conservative approach to aesthetic-modernism is a defining feature of how he sought to dissect networks of power/knowledge. He effectively encourages scholars to look for additional theories like constructivism so that emotions, histories, media and cultures will not be excluded from the production of political knowledge. However, this should not intend to completely replace positivist knowledge.

In conclusion, Michel Foucault makes two fundamental assertions from his works on epistemology. The limits in place to obtain rational knowledge should be critically reviewed by understanding social relations and the production of knowledge within its cultural/historical context. Secondly, theories of knowledge are in themselves systems of power that can prevent the production of other
truth possibilities. A public ‘space’ where thought is free is not a structural location but a social understanding of producing knowledge about life where new paradigms do not seek to override established ones but acknowledge each other’s values and shortcomings on mutual ground. By presenting realist and constructivist arguments to explain a case study of Sino-African engagement, this project has produced a greater number of truth possibilities than use of the dominant paradigm in IR theory could have accommodated alone. This supports the ‘hypothesis’ by satisfying Michel Foucault’s vision of Enlightenment on two counts. Firstly, this investigation has created the opportunity to allow subjective and aesthetic interpretations back into the research of international politics where they have been overshadowed by material explanations. This should be valued as a welcome transformation in producing knowledge within the discipline. Secondly, it has been possible to accommodate interpretations of structure and process simultaneously in reference to the same case and prevent the dominance of a single power/knowledge structure. Realism produces truths that are limited to its structural assumptions; combining those with the findings of constructivism has emancipated an otherwise restricted dialogue.
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