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PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION IN AFRICA: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY IN MOZAMBIQUE

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of Cape Town, in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Studies.

JOÃO C.G. PEREIRA
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DECLARATION

I, João C.G. Pereira, declare that this thesis is my own unaided work, both in concept and execution. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Cape Town, South Africa. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at this or any other university.

João C.G. Pereira

Wednesday, 19 November, 2008
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my lecturers: Luís de Brito, Manuel de Araújo, Willem Neeleman, Rafael da Conceição, João P.B. Coelho, Fernando Ganhão, Isilda Nhantumbo, Bernhard Weimer, Conceição Osório, Miguel Buendia, Maria José Arthur, Terezinha da Silva, Tereza Cruz e Silva, Isabel Cassimiro, António Sopa, Luis Felipe Pereira, David Hedges, Joel das Neves, António Manso, Vitorino Sambo, Gerald Lisegang, José Negrão, Harry West and Ken Wilson, whose wisdom and scholarship have instructed and inspired me. They are not merely mentors of my life but valued friends.

To my parents, cousin and uncle, Cândido Braz Pereira, Augusta L.G. Pereira, Lourenço Veniça and Carlos Carneiro who taught me to fight for what I believe in and never give up, and helped me to understand that the future does not just happen - you dream it, shape it, sculpt it, and fight for it.

To the memory of António Grispos who played a pivotal role in my life and who taught me three things that helped me to cope when I felt discouraged: accept, trust and fight for what you believe. I also learned from him that the resources that we need to turn our dreams into reality are within us, merely waiting for the day when we wake up and claim our birthright.

The impossible is Allah’s ideal and in you, LORD, I trust for the next step of my life.
ABSTRACT

In Mozambique, as in most of Africa, multi-party democracy is relatively new and thus the study of electoral behaviour is still in its infancy. In this study Mozambican survey data from a 2002 survey conducted by Afrobarometer is used to shed some light on partisan identification. The survey interviewed a sample of 1400 Mozambicans over the age of 18 from August to October 2002, randomly selected from 11 provinces of the Republic of Mozambique. Face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondents’ choice were conducted.

Collecting data on political attitudes in new democracies in Africa poses a number of challenges and thus this thesis is mainly exploratory and relies on a single cross-sectional survey.

In this study the sources of partisan identification in Mozambique are examined. It examines whether reported identification with the governing or opposition parties is related to the kinds of factors usually identified in the comparative literature on partisan identification and voting behaviour. These factors include social cleavages (such as ethnicity or region), cultural values (such as individualism versus collectivism, democratic versus authoritarian values), economic factors (including ‘pocketbook’ assessments and sociotropic assessments, retrospective and prospective evaluations), political factors (including assessments of the performance of the government) and cognitive awareness (including access to media or political discussions with friends).

Bivariate and multivariate analyses were used to assess the significance of these various factors in partisan identification.

The results of the study revealed that partisan support for the ruling party in Mozambique is driven by popular evaluations of the performance of the incumbent; secondly, partisan support for opposition parties is difficult to predict. Thirdly, cognitive awareness distinguishes voters who use economic reasoning for choosing among political parties from voters who revert to social or cultural identities and values. Finally, this study did not find any important effects of region, rural vs. urban location,
religion, generation, gender or class on party identification. This challenges widely-held assumptions about the impact of these factors either in Africa and/or new democracies.

One of the most important findings of this study was the important role that cognitive awareness plays in differentiating distinct bases of partisan choice. This study points to the fact that cognitively aware voters make better informed and more performance-based decisions than disengaged voters. When the people are informed, they help to move African politics from the realm of cultural identity to the realm of competing policies - the mechanics that tend to shape partisan identification in other democracies.

A fuller test of theories of party identification in countries like Mozambique requires more comprehensive data and a better political environment. Nevertheless, this thesis provides methodological and theoretical contributions and opens up new avenues that researchers can take to improve our understanding of partisanship in Mozambique specifically, and in Africa in general.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is in some ways a synergistic product of many minds and hands. It began in the middle of March 2003, and during this process I received spiritual, material and academic support from a number of different people. I feel a deep sense of gratitude to all of them, especially my supervisors Professor Robert (Bob) Mattes and Professor Jeremy Seekings. Robert Mattes and Jeremy Seekings have been a source of encouragement, advice and positive criticism during the research process, and their advice has proved invaluable for the finalization of this thesis. For me as a young scholar, it was a tremendous opportunity to work closely with these two scholars who are deeply interested in how African citizens make political decisions. I am forever indebted to them and I hope that they will continue to be my mentors in my career as a political scholar.

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To my lecturers at the Eduardo Mondlane University (Mozambique), Wits University (South Africa) and the University of Cape Town (South Africa) who helped me to reach
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Last and most importantly, without certain people this thesis would not exist. Most obvious and most important are the people of Mozambique who responded to the Afrobaromter questionnaires even under tremendous poverty. Without their help and confidence, this account of partisan identification could not have been written. This is not my thesis, it is yours.

Allah Bless you
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>ADEMA</td>
<td>Alliance for Democracy in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALIMO</td>
<td>Independent Alliance Party-Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress-South Africa</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Patriotic Alliance-Mozambique</td>
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<td>BDP</td>
<td>Botswana Democratic Party</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>United Democratic Congress of Democrats-Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Enlarged Opposition Front-Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Patriotic Action Front-Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Mozambique Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUMO</td>
<td>United Front of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>Lesotho Congress for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANU</td>
<td>Mozambique African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBG</td>
<td>United Front for Change and Good Governance-Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multiparty Democracy</td>
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<td>MONAMO</td>
<td>Mozambique National Movement</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Rainbow Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANAMO</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANAOC</td>
<td>(National Party for Workers and Peasants-Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASOMO</td>
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<td>(Solidarity and Freedom Party-Mozambique)</td>
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<td>PD</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
<td>(Party for Peace, Democracy and Development-Mozambique)</td>
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<td>(The Revolution Democratic Party-Mexico)</td>
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<td>ZANU</td>
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CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY

1.1. Introduction

“What are the sources of partisanship?” This is one of the key issues studied in political science (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1969; Gerber et al., 1998; Achen, 1989; Franklin et al., 1983; Fiorina, 1981; White et al., 1997; Rose et al., 2002; Brader et al., 2001). Different studies have suggested that several factors contribute to the development of partisanship. These include parental partisanship (Achen, 2002; Jennings et al., 2001), political engagement (Campbell et al., 1960; Jennings, et al., 2001), and the patterns of attachment that often come with age (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1969). Scholars have also asserted, somewhat more controversially, that adult party identification is the product of more-or-less rational evaluations of policy and performance (Achen, 1992; Fiorina, 1981). In these models, voters are assumed to judge differing policy and performance benefits associated with competing parties and to update their partisan attachment in the light of this information.

Although many scholars have explored the sources of individual vote choice in Africa (Ottaway, 1998; Chazan et al., 1999; Palmberg, 1999; Omolo, 2002; Atieno-Odhambo, 2002; Saskia et al., 2002), few have explored the sources of mass partisanship (e.g. Norris et al., 2003; Seekings, 2005; Ishiyama et al., 2006; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2006). One of the most common assumptions about Africa’s nascent party systems concerns the primacy of ethnicity (Ottaway, 1998; Ajulu, 1998, 2002; Chazan et al., 1999; Thomson, 2000; Posner, 2002). Most election results in Africa have been interpreted as signifying regional and ethnic dynamics, the latter of which are linked to shared identities based on religion, language or other cultural characteristics (Posner, 2001; Chazan, 1982; Posner, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). Africans are commonly believed to be strongly rooted in local communities through primary ties of “blood and belonging, including those of kinship, family, language and religion, as well as long-standing cultural bonds” (Palmberg, 1999: 26; see also Omolo, 2002; Atieno-Odhambo, 2002; Ajulu, 2002; Saskia et al., 2002). According to Palmberg (1999), these primary ties are then somehow represented in political practice (see also Scaritt et al., 1999; Mozaffar et al., 2003; Reyna-Querol, 2002).
Other popular explanatory factors in Africa are patronage and urban-rural cleavages. With regard to patronage, in developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, voters are seen to maximize the amount of resources they can secure from the state, including jobs, agricultural subsidies, food relief, and infrastructure such as water supply, roads, clinics and schools (see Thomson, 2000; Chandra, 2004). As a result, many analysts have understood African politics to revolve around politicians' exchange of these scarce resources in return for voters' political support. They argue that patronage politics and ethnic favouritism tend to go together in systems referred to as “patronage democracies” (Posner, 2001; Bratton et al., 1997; Nugent, 2001, Wantchekon, 2003; Van de Walle, 2002, 2003). Ethnic groups remain an important form of social organization in patronage democracies because they serve contemporary political and economic needs (Thomson, 2000). Thus ethnicity is one of the key agents of political mobilization. Atieno-Odhiabo (2002:230) offers a good summary of the importance of ethnicity in political practice in Africa:

Kenya Africans do not speak of tribalism in their offices, on public platforms, or in whispers along the street. They talk and think about tribalism as the regular experience of their everyday lives, in its many enabling capacities, its incapacitating impediments upon the hopes of individuals, and it’s blocking of opportunities for whole communities. They use tribalism as a practical vocabulary of politics and social movements.

Similarly, studies of party politics and voting behaviour in Mozambique have mainly focused on ethnicity, urbanization and regional identities (de Brito, 1996; Pereira, 1997; Tollenaere, 2002; Cahen, 1998, 2002). However, the greatest emphasis has been on ethnic identity and regionalism. When the preliminary results of the 1994 elections were published, newspapers described support for RENAMO in the central and northern regions as an “ethnic vote”, though the pro-FRELIMO vote in the south was said to be purely “national” (Cahen, 1998).

Indeed, it is true that there are clear regional differences in party support in Mozambique, and that these appear to constitute one of the most salient political cleavages in the country. Yet what is important is how one interprets these regional
cleavages in voter preference—correlation does not equal causation. As Achen (1992) has argued, a correlation between demographic factors and voting does not explain voting, rather, these factors themselves need to be explained. Social scientists thus need to identify specific characteristics of demographic variables that influence voter decisions.

To date, most studies of elections and voter behaviour in Mozambique have relied on macro-aggregate data broken down by constituencies,¹ or alternatively, microanalysis of qualitative in-depth interviews. Surprisingly, there have been few attempts to test the influence of policy preferences, performance evaluations, cultural values or cognitive awareness on voting behaviour. A much broader approach needs to be taken which moves beyond aggregate analysis or a focus on ethnic, regional or rural-urban differences in voting patterns. The recent availability of representative national surveys which measure citizen perceptions of economic, market and political reforms may provide new insights into party preference in Mozambique and allow for a more in-depth analysis of the determinants of party preference.

This study uses such data (the Mozambique 2002 Afrobarometer survey) to understand partisan identification. The survey was designed as a national sample survey. The sample frame was based on the Mozambique 1996 Population and Housing Census. A subset of the population was randomly selected and asked a common schedule of questions on the political economy of Mozambique. A total of 1400 respondents were interviewed. With a sample of this size, responses can be taken to represent the opinion of all Mozambicans on these issues at a 95% confidence level with a confidence interval of 2.5%.

It should be noted that as part of the Afrobarometer team in Mozambique, the author of this thesis helped to implement this survey as a national investigator (NI). His role as NI was to coordinate all the processes of the implementation of the survey in Mozambique. This included planning the logistic implementation of the survey, supervising the sample design, recruiting and training supervisors and writing the reports.

¹ The Electoral Administration Technical Secretariat has provided most of the data.
1.2. Purpose of this study

This thesis aims at identifying the factors that determine party identification in Mozambique. Various factors will be analysed that may shape voter decisions to identify with particular political parties, including the following:

- Social cleavages (including ethnicity, region of origin, urbanization, religion, social class, age and gender)
- Cultural values (such as individualism vs. collectivism and democratic versus authoritarian values)
- Economic factors (including “pocketbook”, “sociotropic” influences and evaluation of government economic performance)
- Political factors (including satisfaction with democracy, evaluation of the extent of political freedom, corruption and the performance of leaders)
- Cognitive awareness factors (such as news media exposure, education and cognitive engagement)

It is important to remember that the characteristic features of transitional Mozambican society include the absence of stable social cleavages and differential bases of interest, the lack of a civic culture, and the existence of “anti-party” legacies of a one-party state and a command economy and historical underdevelopment. In addition, the party system is also characterized by new political parties which have neither the time nor the resources to develop strong ties with their potential voters. According to Dalton et al. (2007), citizens in new democracies cannot expect “partisan push” because their parents lack party ties or a life history of voting in democratic elections. Given these abnormal circumstances in Mozambique society and the party system, it would seem that voters might rely heavily on information coming from the news media, friends, colleagues, neighbours, and other groups. In other words, cognitive awareness could well be a catalyst in voter decision processes with regard to party identification. High levels of political information and awareness will focus voters’ attention on criteria relevant to them when they want to identify with a political party. Thus, the cognitive awareness model plays an important role an analysis of Mozambican voters’ attitudes and behaviour.
1.3. Research Question

Although the concept of party identification and its origins have been discussed thoroughly in the literature, empirical analyses of its emergence in new African democracies are scarce.

The research question is thus the following: What are the sources of partisanship amongst voters in Mozambique?

This question is asked with special reference to the following questions: To what extent do social cleavages (e.g. ethnicity, region, urbanization, religion, age and gender) influence partisanship in Mozambique? If they do, which social cleavages have the most influence? Do cultural values influence voter choice in Mozambique? If so, which cultural values? Do economics play a role? If so, what type of role? Do voters look at their pocketbooks, or at the state of national accounts? Do economic voters “punish” rulers for bad times and reward them for “good times”? Are voter judgments based on past economic performance or future policy promises? In terms of political evaluations, to what extent is the incumbent’s party rewarded or punished for increased freedom, accountability, effectiveness and trust or for promoting democratic values in Mozambique? Finally, how important is information in shaping partisanship?

It is hoped that this analysis will contribute to the comparative literature on partisanship, as well as towards a better understanding of the dynamics of political and economic reform in Mozambique. The answers to the research question also have fundamental implications for party campaign strategies, and the future of multi-party competition in Mozambique.

If voter’s decisions simply reflect social cleavages, elections will reflect ethnic and cultural identifications rather than satisfaction with actual performance in office. This may foreshadow increased patronage and clientelism rather than the institutionalization of the rule of law, government accountability and democratic responsiveness. If, however, voters make decisions based on their evaluations of political or economic performance, this might promise an emergence of accountability where party preferences reflect the attribution of responsibility for economic and political performance. Such responsibility is the chief mechanism through which individuals hold actors accountable.
for their conduct. This would heighten the chances for democratic governance, because elections would serve as “referenda” on party performance, rather than reflect demographic distribution.

1.4. Significance of the Study

The challenge facing scholars of new democracies is not only to understand the construction of stable and legitimate institutions but also to understand how citizens develop partisanship. According to Dalton (1999), partisanship stimulates citizen support of a political system because it signals allegiance to a party-based regime (see also Holmerg, 2003). In addition, partisanship affects citizen system support by providing a link through which political parties may communicate their positions to their partisans more effectively. It also increases the likelihood of citizen reliance on the party as a normative standard for guiding personal political orientations and the power of persuasion that parties have over their supporters (Conover et al., 1989).

Although the study of partisan identification and voting behaviour is well-established in political science, the bulk of the research concerns the older democracies of Western Europe and North America, particularly those studies based on survey data on voting behaviour, political attitudes and partisanship. The introduction of a multi-party democracy, and to some extent the emergence of survey data, offer a valuable opportunity to study aspects of partisanship and electoral behaviour in Mozambique's new democracy. It is hoped that this study can shed light on differences between the evolving politics of a young system and the origins of deeply-embedded orientations in older systems. This study also represents a significant departure from existing research on and theories of party preferences in Mozambique and Africa as it offers a more comprehensive and dynamic analysis of the sources of partisan identification than is currently available in the literature.

This analysis fills a gap in current research as it is the first account of party identification based on a representative survey of the Mozambican public and also the first to apply voting theory approaches developed mainly in Western democracies and North America to Mozambique.
At the same time the design of the questionnaire and the fact that only Mozambican data is being analysed imposes important methodological limitations. For example, the roles of factors such as political socialization (i.e. parents, colleagues, friends, schools, group membership) or the impact of electoral institutions, the impact of the size and stability of party systems or the effect of macroeconomic indicators (i.e. unemployment, inflation) on partisanship cannot be analysed.

1.5. The Outline of this thesis

This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an outline of the theoretical framework of this research. Chapter 3 relates concepts and hypotheses to the Mozambique case--explaining how theories of social structure and political values can be applied in terms of the county's political history and emerging party system. Chapter 4 covers the measurement of the dependent variable of “partisan identification” by using the Mozambique Afrobarometer Round 2 Survey, the statistical techniques applied, and the operationalization of the independent and dependant variables. Chapters 5 to 9 test the utility of different theories in explaining partisan identification in Mozambique--starting with social cleavages, followed by socio-political values, economic performance evaluation, political performance evaluation, and cognitive awareness (i.e. factors related to education and access to information). In addition, chapter 9 examines the combined integrated effects of the different factors (social cleavages, cultural values, economic evaluations, political evaluations and cognitive awareness) on partisanship. The final chapter concludes this thesis by summarizing the main findings of the analysis, relating them to the comparative literature on partisanship and its implications for the future of a party system or democracy in Mozambique.
CHAPTER II: THE APPROACH UNDERLYING THE RESEARCH

2.1. Introduction

There are a number of different explanations of why voters choose to support particular political parties. Each theoretical model is characterized by a particular “angle”, and a different interpretation of party preference. There are five main theoretical streams offering explanations of partisanship: the sociological model, the cultural model, those relating to economic performance, those concerned with political performance and the cognitive awareness model. The aim of this chapter is to discuss and analyse these theoretical frameworks to assess the extent to which they might be useful in explaining partisan identification in Mozambique.

In order to assess the importance of these theoretical frameworks on partisan identification in Mozambique this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets out key aspects of the sociological assumptions. Section 2.3 offers an overview of the socio-psychological assumptions. Section 2.4 contains summaries of the key aspects of the rational choice assumptions (economic and political). Section 2.5 outlines the key values choice assumption (political and social). Section 2.6 focuses on the key aspects of the cognitive awareness assumptions. The final sections, 2.7, summarize the key points of each theoretical framework.

2.2. The Sociological Approach

The sociological approach is based on the role that social structures play in determining party preference. This model links electoral behaviour to group membership by arguing that individual voting patterns reflect the economic and social positions of the group to which voters belong. According to this model, the interests of the common group tend to shape party identification and define views concerning which party is most attuned to the group's needs (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Alford, 1967; Rose et al., 1969, 1970; Lijphart, 1979, 1980). Voting is seen as instrumental as people vote for parties that best reflect the interests of their group.
Electoral behaviour is also seen to be influenced not only by group identities, but also by cleavage structures that determine the types of political parties in a given polity (Lipset et al., 1967). According to Lipset et al. (1967), the social divisions that emerged in the past left a significant mark on European nation states and these cleavages had powerful effects on the creation of political parties. Political parties are thus viewed as products of cleavage lines generated by the effects of the great revolutions that took place during the process of state- and nation-building. Lipset et al. (1967) distinguish four basic sets of cleavages that underlie the party systems of Western countries: 1) subject vs. dominant cultures, 2) church vs. state, 3) primary vs. secondary economies, and 4) workers vs. employers (Lipset et al., 1967; Rokkan, 1970). In addition, political conflict may differ substantially from one nation to another, especially with respect to ethnic and religious matters, and, in any case, not all social cleavages necessarily become politicized (Przeworski et al., 1986).

This suggests that voters enter an election favouring the party or parties that have historically supported the class or religious group to which they belong (Alford, 1957; Andersen, 2000). According to Alford (1967), the relationship between class position and voting behaviour is a “natural” and expected association in Western Europe for a number of reasons: the existence of enduring class interests, the representation of these interests by political parties, and the regular association of certain parties with certain interests. Given the character of the stratification and the way political parties act as representatives of different class interests, it would be remarkable if such relationships were not found. Parties adopt programmes, encourage legislation and appeal to voters in ways that make them representatives of specific sets of class interests. Lipset et al. (1967: 220) believes that “even though many parties renounce the principle of class conflict or loyalty, an analysis of their appeals and their support suggests that they do represent the interests of different classes”.

The question that then arises is why associate social differences with political differences? Berelson et al. (1954:75) suggest that for a social difference to be translated into a political cleavage the following three conditions need to be fulfilled:

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2 Lipset et al. (1967) suggest that there are three specific connotations to the term “cleavage”. First, a cleavage involves a social division that separates people by at least one key social characteristic such as occupation, status, religion or ethnicity. Second, groups on either side of a cleavage must be conscious of their collective identity and be willing to act on that basis. Third, a cleavage must have an organizational component that gives formal institutional expression to the interests of those on one side of the division.
a) Initial social differentiation such that the consequences of political policy are materially or symbolically different for different groups
b) Conditions of transmission from generation to generation
c) Conditions of physical and social proximity providing for continued in-group contact in succeeding generations

The first condition requires that the social groups concerned must have differing material or symbolic interests which are affected by government policy. The second and third conditions relate to the processes by which social and political divisions are maintained and reinforced (Denver, 1994).

In recent years, however, class, religious, regional and urban-rural differences have been declining. For instance, Franklin et al. (1992) have compiled comprehensive evidence supporting this conclusion by tracking the ability of a set of social characteristics (including social class, education and income levels, religiosity, region of residence and gender) to explain partisan preference (see also Dalton 1984, 1991, 1984, 1996(a), 1996(b)).

The cleavage model, however, has been strongly criticized because, by focusing on social groups, it ignores individual self-interest. Cleavage theories posit voting as the result of demographic distribution and ethnicity or class, rather than popular preferences based on an evaluation of government (Harrop et al., 1987). Thus, this model of explaining voting behaviour has several limitations. First, it is able to explain only a modest proportion of the vote among European electorates, and an even smaller proportion amongst the less polarized American electorate. Second, this approach is unable to explain why cleavages, such as social class, have stronger relationships to voting attitudes in some countries than they do in others. Third, this approach assumes that each voter belongs to one social group. However, voters might belong to a variety of social groups and the theory offers no insight as to which will be decisive in determining an individual’s party support and why. Fourth, it is not self-evident that a large and relatively heterogeneous group of people will have the same interests--who decides what a group’s interests are, and in what sense can political parties be said to represent group interests? Fifth, this approach does not explain how some voters deviate from group voting norms. Sixth, the theory tends to give the impression that party choice is the spontaneous effect of social location and ignores the active role that political parties play.
in mobilizing and structuring the electorate (Denver, 1994). Finally, a sociological approach emphasizes continuity and stability, and thus has limited value in explaining electoral change.

Despite such criticism, this approach has heavily influenced voting research in Western democracies. What about Africa, post-Communist countries and Latin America? According to Erdmann (2004), the social cleavages assumption can be applied to these situations, but with some limitations. In Erdmann’s view, the social cleavages model cannot be applied in a sequential (diachronic) way, but only in a heuristic manner as a synchronic model of party formation in Africa. Although Lipset et al. (1967) did not address the factors of ethnicity or regional politics explicitly in their study, these can be subsumed under the “centre-periphery cleavages” approach. These cleavages are based on the concept of “territorial opposition”, and are characterized by conditions of universal suffrage: “commitment to the locality and its dominant culture: you vote with your community and its leaders irrespective of your economic position” (Lipset et al., 1967; Erdmann, 2004; Sartori, 1976). Most traditional European points of social cleavage (urban vs. rural, religious vs. state, labour vs. capital and centre vs. periphery) can be identified in Africa, as well as in many newly democratized countries worldwide (Toka, 1996; Tucker, 2002; McAllister, 2005; Evan, 2006). However, according to Dalton (1996b), emerging party systems are unlikely to be based on stable group-based cleavages, especially when democratic transition has occurred quite rapidly, as in Eastern Europe (see also Mair, 1996). In other words, social cleavages may affect party choice, but they are either not sufficiently crystallized or they are weakly developed, and thus contribute little to the formation of parties and party politics.

Yet, social cleavage models are the most widely used models to explain electoral behaviour in Africa. Social structures seem to impact substantially on electoral behaviour in Africa (Agyema-Duah, 2000; Ajulu, 1999; Omolo, 2002; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Ajulu, 2002; Saskia et al., 2002; Anthony, 2002; Anebo, 2000). The application of this model relies on the assumption that African societies are traditional and agrarian, and are characterized by subsistence livelihoods such as hunting, farming,

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3 While in Western Europe this cleavage was about the dominant culture of the centre in the course of nation-building, in Africa conflict is about socio-economic distributions (that is, who is entitled to control the distribution of the resources at the centre). Both conflicts can, of course, result in secessionism. Usually, however, because of the multi-ethnic composition of African states, there is no major conflict over national culture and, related to that, national identity (Erdmann, 2004).
fishing and unskilled labour, with low levels of literacy and education, and minimum standards of living. It assumes restricted social and geographic mobility rooted in a complex web of social forces, such as clan influences, lineage bonds and influences related to cultural associations and village communities (Chazan et al., 1999; Thomson, 2000; Norris et al., 2003; Posner 2004a; 2004b). Citizens in traditional agrarian societies are believed to have a much stronger preference for parties that support their particular ethnic group rather than the national interest. However, when compared to Western societies, many African countries do not have easily recognizable and well-defined economic classes, and therefore different interests tend to emerge along regional or territorial lines, often in the name of ethnicity (Carr, 1995). For scholars of this approach, ethnicity in particular, and identity in general, is conceptualized as primordial, static and essentialist. Identity is acquired at birth, and remains intact despite other multiple and secondary identities assumed later in life.

Some scholars have rejected these assumptions regarding identity and conceive of ethnic identities as dynamic and situational (Thomson, 2000). Yet, for the present time ethnic groups remain an important form of social organization and continue to serve contemporary political and economic needs. Ajulu (2002) also suggests that ethnic divisions become more acute under special circumstances. While in general ethnic identity may not feature significantly in interactions between different groups, competition has often emerged in periods of acute contestation over resources or state power. Ethnic groupings have thus remained the dominant instrument for dispensing resources and patronage (see also Barth, 1969; Jenkins, 1986, 1996; Parsons, 1985; Horowitz, 1985(a), 1985(b); Carr, 1995).

In Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Horowitz (1985a) characterizes elections in “deeply divided societies,” as are found in Africa and Asia, as “ethnic censuses”. For Horowitz, ethnicity exerts a strong influence on voter choice in segmented societies by generating a long-term psychological attachment that anchors citizens to parties, where casting a vote becomes an expression of group identity. By implication other social divisions become secondary:

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4 According to Posner (2004(a), the mere presence of ethnic groups and political parties which represent these groups cannot possibly be a sufficient condition for the emergence of political or social strife. The emergence of political cleavages that might affect the electoral output will also depend on the size of the groups and the administrative boundaries. For instance, when the size of ethnic groups is less than 5% of the national population, the cleavages will remain unexploited and politically irrelevant. In other words, the bigger the ethnic group, the higher the chance for them to be used as a political vehicle during election campaigns and influence the electoral results.
In severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded (...). In ethnic politics, inclusion may affect the distribution of important material and nonmaterial resources (Horowitz, 1985(a):291).

Horowitz’s approach became a key model for Africa, where many domestic and international political analysts have described electoral results in countries as “ethnic-regional” or “racial” censuses (Mattes et al., 1999(a)). What this means is that ethnic identities determine political preference and party systems in Africa. Most scholars seem to have assumed that party preference could be explained in terms of social identities or cleavages that could be reduced to race or ethnic-regional identities.

Voters are assumed to enter the electoral process with pre-existing ethnic-regional loyalties, and when they go to the polls they favour the party or parties that have historically supported their ethnic group or region of origin. Seen from this perspective, election events become elections only in the most formal sense. Election results reflect demographic distributions, or ethnic or racial censuses, rather than popular preferences (Mattes et al., 1998). When voters go to the poll they register their affiliation, and choice is preempted by birth (Horowitz, 1985). In other words, the vote in Africa is now seen to be expressive of identity rather than instrumental. Voters are perceived to be registering identity, not choice. This might be called the “social determinism” approach, as in this theory party choice appears to be an almost automatic consequence of a voter’s social characteristics.

Most studies are thus based on qualitative assessments of particular election campaigns, and by comparing aggregate election results at district level (Rule, 2000; De Brito, 1996; 2000(a); Pereira, 1997) rather than surveys. However, one of the main problems of using aggregate data is that it cannot provide information about the impact of other social variables, such as age, gender and class. Furthermore, there is no way to infer which set of social cleavages are the most powerful predictors of party preference.

As has been mentioned above, many scholars have assumed that electoral behaviour can be explained in terms of social cleavages, and that these in turn can be reduced simply to ethnicity (or, in some cases, regional loyalties or level of urbanization). Ethnicity has therefore become an automatic explanation for party support, and is often used in the
news media without an in-depth examination of electoral behaviour. It is only natural, it is presumed, for ancient ethnic rivalries to influence electoral outcomes, as “Africans are inherently tribalistic and will therefore act in a tribalistic manner” (Chazan et al., 1999; Thomson, 2000). It has thus been argued for instance by Rule (2000), that voters in southern Africa tend to make electoral choices in groups, rather than as individuals.

This argument has also been applied to other parts of Africa. For instance, in Mozambique, De Brito (1996) used the “ethnic-regional” variable to explain electoral behaviour\(^5\) (Omolo, 2002; Norris et al., 2003; Posner, 2001, 2004a, 2004b; Mustapha, 2000; Ajulu, 1998; De Brito, 1996; Cheeseman, 2007). This cleavage is a product of the history of the country during the last century, in terms of the relations between the different local groups and the modern, colonial or postcolonial state (de Brito, 2000a). Recent studies by Erdmann (2007), Lindberg et al. (2007) and Norris et al. (2003) suggest that ethnicity has a significant impact on party support in some African countries. A similar result was also found by Gyimah-Boadi et al. (2003). Based on a representative survey, Gyimah-Boadi et al. demonstrate that there is a strong correlation between respondents’ party affiliation and their region of origin.

Apart from explanations related to ethnic-regional identities, scholars have also used race to analyse election outcomes, particularly in South Africa. The 1994 and 1999 elections in South Africa were seen by some as a “racial census.” South African voters were thought to be more influenced by racial identification than by rational assessments of the economy, party programmes or policies (Lodge, 1994; Southall, 1994; Schlemmer, 1994). With the exception of rural KwaZulu-Natal, almost all Africans voted for the ANC, while large majorities of white, coloured and Indian voters supported the NP, which may have served as the basis for Johnson and Schlemmer’s conclusion of an “ethnic census”. However, scholars also use “racial and ethnic census” as a process of causation\(^6\), with race (or ethnicity) determining party preference.

Another commonly cited source of cleavage in Africa is the division between urban and rural voters (Ewusi, 1987; Herbst, 1993; Nugent, 1999; Mikell, 1989; Ninsin, 1991;  

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\(^5\) FRELIMO won in four constituencies in the south and in two constituencies of the far north, while RENAMO won in the provinces of the centre and centre-north.

\(^6\) Horowitz’s thesis and terminology were appropriated by scholars who shared his view that South Africa was, above all, a racially or ethnically “divided society”, and that race (or ethnicity) was the most important factor underlying individuals’ attitudes and behaviour.
Aubynn, 2002; Neocosmos, 2002; De Brito, 1996; Pereira, 1997). For instance, in Mozambique, most analysts expected that the results of the two elections would reflect a rural-urban dichotomy, based on the assumption that the urban areas in Mozambique benefited immensely from FRELIMO’s rural post-independence policy. De Brito (1996), who carried out the first major study of Mozambican voter behaviour, emphasized this rural-urban dichotomy. De Brito (1996) and Pereira (1997) argued that the cleavage between rural and urban voters reflected the impact of FRELIMO’s socialist projects, which affected rural society much more than urban society, especially in central and northern Mozambique. The policy of building communal villages and disturbing peasants’ social organizations and customs had a destructive impact on the cohesion and social balance of rural communities (Casal, 1991; Harrison, 2000; Isaacman, 1987; Geffray et al., 1985, 1986, 1988; Cahen, 1987, 1989/90; Roesch, 1988, 1992, 1993).

Traditional leadership may also account for “bloc-voting” in rural areas. In this context, party preference may not be based on individual decisions, but on decisions made by chiefs or other leaders on behalf of their followers. For instance, the support of traditional leaders in Mozambique was seen as a major contributing factor to RENAMO’s rural victories in the 1994 and 1999 elections (Pereira, 1997). In order to consolidate its control over the rural areas, FRELIMO had restructured the colonial local governance systems by introducing “dynamising groups” and party secretaries in tribal areas previously under the control of traditional authorities. FRELIMO leadership went on to portray chiefs as corrupt opportunists who had profited personally from their roles as tax collectors, labour recruiters and local police agents (Vines, 1991; Harrison, 2000; Roesch, 1992, 1993).

Yet most researchers have ignored the variables of social class and religion that are often found in Western industrialized societies (a notable exception is the case of South Africa). Analysts explain that class-consciousness has never fully formed in African countries due to underdevelopment (Chazan et al., 1999; Thomson, 2000). Nevertheless, studies of electoral behaviour in South Africa have found a correlation between income, social class and party preference (Mattes, 1995a; Eldridge et al., 1996; Habib et al., 1999). Mattes (1995a), for instance, found a distinct correlation between income and electoral behaviour, and a clear relationship between occupation and voter choice. Habib et al. (1999) also found a strong correlation between income and party preference,
particularly in coloured and Indian communities. Eldridge et al. (1996) reached a similar conclusion, although they analysed voting preference according to levels of education.\(^7\)

In the Middle East, the social cleavages approach has been used to explain voting behaviour over a relatively long period. For instance, Israeli society is often portrayed as deeply divided along ethnic, religious and national lines, and research has linked these to party preference and voting behaviour, while largely ignoring the variables of social class, gender and age (Shamir et al., 1999; Andersen et al., 2003; Smooha, 1993). Smooha (1993) suggests that the intertwining of ethnicity and religion in Israel make class politics difficult to identify, and further, that class consciousness has simply never developed in the country (Smooha, 1993).

Social cleavage theory has also long been applied to Latin America. Researchers explaining electoral behaviour in Latin America have emphasized the role of class, region, urban vs. rural, age and gender on voter choice (Dominguez et al., 1995; Canton et al., 2002; Torcal et al., 2003; Gisselquist, 2005). In Chile, Torcal et al. (2003), for instance, replicated the broader approach to social cleavage analysis by using different socio-demographic indicators such as religion, urban vs. rural setting, class and gender in explaining party choice.

2.3. The socio-psychological approach: a stable characteristic or an effect of short-term forces

Party identification is often referred to as an individual’s enduring affective or emotional attachment to a political party rooted in socialization experiences. Since the seminal work of Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Stokes in *The American Voter* (1960), the study of partisanship has been central to research and theory on political attitudes and behaviour in democracies. Debate continues, however, over the degree to which political context and other determinants, such as economic factors, presidential performance and trust in authority influence changes in partisan identification (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Abramson et al., 1991; Abramowitz, et al., 2004; Fiorina, 1981; Markus et al., 1979; Mackuen et al., 1989; Weisberg et al., 1995). Debate has also continued over the significance of partisan

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\(^7\) Eldridge et al. (1996) consider data on income from a survey as notoriously unreliable, especially in settings such as South Africa. They believe that education represents a reasonable proxy for class: working-class voters have consistently less schooling than middle-class voters.
identification in determining electoral behaviour (Fiorina, 1978; Niemi et al., 1995). Although all of these propositions have engendered a good deal of debate, none has garnered more attention than issues around the stability of partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Mackuen et al., 1989; Weisberg et al., 1995; Green et al., 2002).

Campbell, Converse and Stokes (1960) introduced the classic theoretical concept of partisan identification. According to the authors' conceptualization, partisanship is "the individual’s affective orientation to an important group-object". They theorized that an individual's identification to this "group object" in the political realm typically develops in childhood and is strengthened over the course of the life cycle (Campbell et al., 1960). In other words, partisan identification is something acquired through one's family, reinforced through membership of politically-uniform social groups and confirmed by life-long electoral habit.

The Campbell et al. model departed from the sociological approach and "represented a shift in emphasis from explanation in sociological terms to the exploration of political attitudes that orient the individual voter's behaviour in an immediate sense" (1960:16). Campbell et al. (1960) agreed that social-structural variables are important to electoral behaviour, but they characterized the voting process as a funnel: First, people learn their party identification from parents and socialization. They form a psychological attachment to this party. As such, their partisanship shapes the development of their attitudes: because they like their party, they adopt its positions. Their (underlying) attitudes are then reflected in their positions on the six attitudinal dimensions: the personal attributes of the democratic candidate, the personal attributes of the republican, the groups involved in politics and the questions of group interest affecting them, the issues of domestic policy, the issues of foreign policy, and the comparative record of the two parties in managing the affairs of government. Finally, these issue positions are the proximal cause of their voting decision.

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8 Although Fiorina’s (1978) earlier article does include partisan identification as an independent variable explaining voter choice, his book (1981) is one of the rare exceptions of a model of voter choice that specifically does not include partisan identification.

9 Partisan loyalties are formed when parents are the dominant influence in a child’s life. Once individuals establish party ties it can be seen that later partisan experiences often follow these early predispositions. Parents play a central role in the socialization of these values and party attachments of these parents are frequently re-created in the values of their offspring (Gerber et al., 1998).
Campbell et al. (1960) classified electoral behaviour in three ways: partisanship, issue opinions, and feelings toward individual candidates. They claimed that the most important motives in particular elections represent the net sum of differential forces operating on individual election decision-making. Attitudes develop mainly from experience, exposure to certain communications during specific election periods and stimuli that are sustained over the period of several campaigns. Campbell et al.’s study became known as the “partisan identification” model, although it is also referred to as the psychological, social psychological, and the Michigan model, due to its origins at that university. The partisan identification model suggests that voters may have psychological attachments, allegiances, loyalty and commitment to particular political parties, and that the strength and direction of this partisan identification will impact centrally on attitudes and forms of political behaviour.

According to Dalton et al. (1996(a):198), the funnel model has provided a useful device for examining voting behaviour. It is crucial to recognize the relationship between the different factors involved in comprehending voting decisions. The wide end of the funnel pictures broad social conditions that are removed temporarily and psychologically from the present vote. Maintaining the funnel analogy, attention then changes to factors which are more clearly political, involving personal beliefs and being more closely linked to voting choice.

Campbell et al. (1960) see partisan identification acting as a filter that orientates individuals to see what is favourable to their own partisan orientation. Thus, partisans perceive themselves as belonging to a party in a similar way to how they perceive themselves as belonging to an ethnic group. In terms of Campbell’s model, voting is seen as a manifestation of partisanship and election forces as an interaction between a voter’s long-term party identification and various short-term influences, such as current political issues, campaign events and the personalities of party leaders or candidates. Voting becomes an act of affirmation rather than choice (Campbell et al., 1960). This act of affirmation occurs because partisan feelings are strongly shaped by party identification (that is, party identification leads to partisan feelings, not the reverse.) Party identification is a psychological force or tie through which voters interpret political issues. In this sense, the party acts as a supplier of cues by which the individual may evaluate the elements of politics.
It is important to distinguish partisanship from electoral behaviour. Firstly, partisanship is seen as a psychological element, while voting is seen as a behavioural aspect of voter characteristics. Secondly, voting is time-specific while partisanship is not. Voting occurs relatively infrequently in many countries—while identification is ongoing and continuous. Thirdly, partisanship varies in intensity and voting does not. Some people can be strong party supporters whilst others can be strongly weak supporters (Denver, 1994).

In *The American Voter* Campbell et al. (1960) introduced a new element to the concept of the independent voter. The authors argued that the independent voter is the least informed:

“The ideal of the independent citizens, attentive to politics, concerned with the course of government, who weigh the rival appeals of a campaign and reach a judgment that is unswayed by partisan prejudice, has had such a vigorous history in the tradition of political reform—and has such a hold on civic education today—that one could easily suppose that the habitual partisan has the more limited interest and concern with politics. But if the usual image of the independent voter is intended as more than a normative ideal, it fits poorly the characteristic of the independents in our sample. Far from being more attentive, interested and informed, independents tend as group to be somewhat less involved in politics. They have somewhat poorer knowledge of the issues, their image of the candidates is fainter, their interest in the campaign is less, their concern over the outcome is relatively slight, and their choice between competing candidates, although it is indeed made later in the campaign, seems much less to spring from discovered evaluations of the elements of national politics” (Campbell et al., 1960:83).

According to Keith et al. (1992), independent voters have nothing to be loyal to. Independent voters respond more freely than partisan voters to short-term forces related to the campaign, the candidate and issues that provide the dynamic element in elections.
2.3.1. Party attachment as a “running tally” of performance assessments

A sharply differing perspective on partisan identification identifies partisan identification as a factor that intervenes between social structure and actual vote. This view holds that party identification is not a fixed identity (Key, 1967; Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Franklin, 1984; Lockerbie, 1989, 2002; Achen, 1992). Although party identification is primarily a psychological concept, it has a direct counterpart in rational choice theory in which Key talks about the concept of the “standing choice” (Key, 1967), or a store of good-will based on cumulative evaluation of the parties’ performances (Fiorina, 1981; Achen, 1992). Key (1967) stated that voters tend to see voting as a way to reduce the expenses of collecting and assessing political information. They usually make judgments about parties deemed close to their own ideological and policy positions and continuously support them unless there are changes that suggest a reassessment of their positions. Voters maintain a “standing choice” that can be changed in response to contingent events. This is also known as the “running tally”. The tallies lead voters to parties that best serve a personal interest. In this sense, Fiorina (1981) argues that partisan identification is either crucial or situational, based on retrospective evaluations. In contrast, Campbell et al (1960) suggests that attachments to any political party are not the result of rational evaluations but purely pre-dispositional or inherited through early socialization.

Scholars following this “running tally” approach suggest that partisan identification is a more dynamic process, driven by factors ranging from past votes (Markus et al., 1979), to present political and economic evaluations (Green et al., 1998), or policy perspectives (Franklin et al., 1983). According to this theory, voters will identify with the party that has most reliably served their interests, and partisan identification is therefore based on a summary evaluation of available information and past performance (Popkin, 1994). As voters gain more experience and information about particular parties, their identification may change. If a chosen party, whether in government or opposition, performs well, voters may stay loyal to that party. However, if the party does not perform well, or a better alternative is presented, these loyalties may weaken and partisanship may change accordingly.

Fiorina’s research using panel studies rather than recall questions showed that approximately 20% of respondents had changed their partisan identification over a two-year period. Partisan identification was therefore construed as more flexible than traditional models had assumed.
The “running tally” theorists share the view that partisanship is relatively stable, but they are able to explain change over time in a way that the Michigan School (i.e. the partisan identification model) cannot. Indeed, Fiorina supports Key’s metaphor of the “standing choice”, an image that reflects persistent concerns and associated political judgments. In his study, *The Responsible Electorate*, Key (1967:58-59) states “that voters are not fools”. “We have established patterns of movement of party switchers from election to election and the patterns of stability of the ‘standing choice’ pattern lead us to a conception of the vote that is not often propounded”. From Key’s perspective, voters have consideration and preferences and they change their minds in ways that are consistent with their preferences.

Voters make decisions based on information in an assessment process that is continuously updated. The updated knowledge is retrieved from memory while the information that led to this knowledge is discarded. In an election period, the voter retrieves this knowledge and makes a choice for candidates with the highest score in the assessment (Hastie et al., 1986; Lau et al., 2001; Redlawsk et al., 2001).

Green et al. (2002) challenge the dynamic approach presented by Fiorina and others. Green et al. present four major claims related to contemporary partisan identification: 1) Partisan identification is more stable at both the aggregate and the individual level than most recent scholarship has suggested. Outside of the South, there has been little change in the distribution of partisan identification in the United States for several decades. 2) Voters’ party loyalties are largely insulated from the effects of current issues such as the state of economy and the performance of the incumbent president. 3) Party loyalties exert a powerful influence on citizen’s issues position, evaluations of political leaders, and voting decisions. 4) Most importantly, partisanship is based mainly on identification with social groups rather than a rational evaluation of the parties’ ideological orientations or policies. According to Green et al. (2002:8), social identification involves comparing a judgment about oneself with social groups. As people reflect on whether they are Democrats or Republicans (or neither), they call to mind some mental image, or stereotype, of what these sorts of people are like, and square these images with their own self-conceptions. In other words, “people ask themselves two questions when deciding which party to support: what kinds of social groups come to mind as I think about Democrats, Republicans, and Independents? Which assemblage of groups (if any) best describes me?” (Campbell et al., 1960).
Why don’t changing political and economic circumstances have a bigger effect on partisanship? The answer offered by the authors of *The American Voter* is that partisans ignore or deflect information that is inconsistent with their party attachments. Campbell et al. (1960:133) argue that, “Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation”.

### 2.3.2. How well does the concept of partisan identification “travel”?}

The concept of party identification lies at the heart of much research on political preferences and behaviour in established democracies, but has had little influence on research on the new democracies in Africa, Latin America and post-Communist Europe. The applicability of the partisanship concept has generated strong debate in Western democracies. There are those who claim that partisan identification is merely an American concept and does not exist in Africa, post-Communist countries and European political culture, while others acknowledge its existence, yet view it as a factor with no durability (Miller et al., 1996). A great deal of controversy has also emerged surrounding issues of questionnaire wording and the durability of political parties, and scholars have debated the usefulness of the partisan identification approach vs. Fiorina’s re-formulated partisan identification assumption.

Colton (2000) argues that a truncated time scale of key events was the main impediment to importing the concept of partisan identification, particularly in the former Soviet bloc. The party of the day held a legal monopoly over partisan activities until March 1990. The Russian parties that stood for elections were only a few years old and in some cases had only existed for a few weeks at the time of elections. While some parties persisted, more often they came and went changing their names and legal status, or splitting and merging with other organizations along the way. This led Colton to question how well-entrenched such identification could have been.

Brader et al. (2005) have argued that people have strong affective ties to reference groups in their social circumstances that are given priority by political parties. Miller et al. (2000) and Brader et al. (2001) argue that in certain new democracies, in this case

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11 The underdevelopment of new political parties may be explained by the characteristic features of transitional societies, including the absence of stable social cleavages and differential bases of interest, lack of civic culture and development that could sustain political parties, and the “anti-party” legacies of both the Communist regimes and of the pro-opposition and mass political movements (Kuusela, 1994; Golosov, 1997).
Russia, critics often deride partisan politics as overly personalist. Charisma has built up affective ties to particular leaders which fostered the development of partisanship.

In Africa, some scholars have used the partisan identification concept to analyse voting behaviour or political attitudes (Mattes, 1995; Mattes et al., 1999(b), 2001; Norris et al., 2003; Seekings, 2005; Ishiyama et al., 2006; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2006; Mattes, 1995; Mattes et al., 199(b), 2001; Norris et al., 2003; Seekings, 2005; Ishiyama et al., 2006; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2006). However, the studies undertaken by Norris et al. in 2003 and Ishiyama et al. in 2006 are the only ones that attempt a comparative analysis across sub-Saharan African countries; the rest of the studies are single-country analyses (e.g. Mattes, 1995; Mattes et al., 1999b, 2001; Seekings, 2005; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2006). Although the studies of Norris et al. (2003) and Ishiyama et al. (2006) are relevant to partisanship and electoral behaviour studies in Africa, there has been no work on how the relationship between, for instance, ethnicity, religion or perceptions of the government’s economic performance and party affiliation have developed over time. Therefore the study of the origins and nature of partisan identification is a new field that requires further research, not only by country, but also from a comparative perspective. For instance, Mattes (1995) suggests that existing patterns of partisan identification in South Africa are the product of voters’ ideological beliefs and their views on party performance over long periods. Mattes thus understand partisan identification to be situational, not pre-dispositional. Limited work has also been undertaken on partisan identification in post-Communist countries (Rose et al., 2002; Carnaghan, 1994; Norris, 2004). These studies have attempted to apply existing theories in contexts outside the United States and older democracies. However, relatively little of this work around the world has focused on the origins of partisan identification.

2.4. The rational choice approach

The rational choice approach suggests that voting decisions are based on a pure cost-benefit analysis, where voters match their individual issue preferences with party platforms (Olson, 1965; Downs, 1957). The rational choice model of voting sets aside

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12 Mattes et al. (1999a) developed a simple model that explained partisan identification and electoral behaviour without recourse to race or other "structural", i.e. sociological, variables. They found that a battery of purely attitudinal variables explained why most voters either identified with the ANC or identified with a competing party or, if they identified with no party, for which party they said they would vote. The attitudinal variables used included views on the competing parties and assessments of their past and prospective performance.
both the sociological variables that are of central importance for the Columbia and social-cleavages approaches, as well as notions of political attitudes and psychological processes on which the Michigan model is based. Instead, it portrays voters as rational actors: “Voters behave as rational actors, like consumers in economic markets, by choosing the party programme closest to their own view on important issues” (Downs, 1957). The assumption is that individuals are self-interested and have the rational capacity, time and emotional detachment necessary to choose the best course of action, no matter how complex this choice may be. According to this model, voters choose the party whose policies or performance comes closest to their own interests and priorities, and which is most likely to achieve specific ends. In this view, elections are rarely won or lost in the space of a month-long campaign. Instead, government popularity and national economic conditions are predictable indicators of individual voting choice in the run-up to polling day.

Another important difference between the rational model or economic approach and the Columbia and Michigan schools of electoral study is how they deal with the problem of the lack of information on the part of voters. Rather than constituting a troubling reality that is far from the democratic ideal, it is perfectly rational. As Downs put it (1957):

In general, it is irrational to be politically well-informed because the low returns from data simple do not justify their cost in time and other scarce resources. Therefore many voters do not bother to discover their true views before voting, and most citizens are not well enough informed to influence directly the formulation of those policies that affect them”. Because of the collective nature of elections and the impossibility that a citizen can influence the results in a significant manner, the individual investment in acquiring information is a cost to be avoided. Rational voters can reduce the cost of information acquisition by attending to the flow of free information in all societies, coming primarily from the providers of information like advertisers, interest groups, political parties, and the government, as well as from those citizens who possess a certain level of information. (p.259)

In this model the success or failure of an incumbent party is directly related to change (real or perceived) in economic conditions prior to elections. Incumbent parties are rewarded with more votes when economic conditions have improved (or are expected to
improve), and punished with fewer votes when economic conditions deteriorate (Fiorina, 1978, 1981, 2003; Hibbs, 1982a, 1982b; Abramowitz et al., 1988; Clarke et al., 1990; Sanders, 2001).

Rational choice scholars propose two approaches to analysing election outcomes and party preference. First, researchers can analyse party preferences by using macro-level economic data, such as unemployment rates, inflation, income levels and GNP to explain aggregate election outcomes. One particular school of thought argues that GNP (or GDP) is the principal economic predictor of election outcomes (Fair, 1988). In contrast, other scholars, such as Nadeau et al. (2002:162), have rejected a “strict constructions” position that voters respond to a single macroeconomic measure. Nadeau et al. (2002) believe that voters examine different indicators and form their own unique judgments about economic performance. These individual assessments, when aggregated, form a national collective perception of the condition of the economy.

Another school of thought is based on micro-level economic evaluations gathered through surveys, which are used to explain individual party choice. Studies of “economic voting” at the individual level attempt to test whether individuals are “pocketbook” or “sociotropic” voters. Those individuals who vote “egocentrically” base party choice on the state of their household finances, while those who vote “sociotropically” assess the economic well-being of the country as a whole (Key, 1967; Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Clarke et al., 1990, 1994)13. Still others, such as White et al. (1997), argue that both perspectives are significant, as they often go together.

Rational choice scholars also focus on whether voters think retrospectively or prospectively. Retrospective voting implies that “votes are cast on the basis of past achievement, rather than future policy proposals” (Key, 1967). 14 Many early studies

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13 The theories of Key, Downs and Fiorina all suggest that a voter’s ultimate concern is for his or her own well-being. Fiorina (1981) is a bit less restrictive in casting retrospective voting in purely self-interested terms. He concludes that measures of voters’ estimates of their own condition and of national conditions are both statistically significant as predictors of the vote. Kinder et al. (1983) argue that voters are sociotropic rather than self-interested, meaning that they care more about the conditions of the national situation or of specific socio-economic groups than about their own well-being.

14 Key (1967) argues that voters are “rational gods of vengeance and reward”, who observe the performance of the incumbent and “cast him out” if his performance is poor. As Key claimed, “voters may reject what they have known; or they may approve what they have known. They are not likely to be attracted in great numbers by promises of the novel or the unknown” (1967:61). Rather than attempting to anticipate the consequences of various policy proposals, voters look at past results. Elections, then, are plebiscites. Fiorina (1981) further develops and tests the theory of retrospective voting in the United States, and comes to similar conclusions about retrospective voting. Voters appear to weigh past
assumed that voters only judged political performance retrospectively by evaluating candidates in terms of improvements and contributions to individual households and communities, rather than what they proposed to do in the next term (Key, 1967; Fiorina, 1978; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Norpoth, 1996a, 1996b). This can be called the “reward-punishment model”: if voters are happy with current events, they reward the incumbent with a vote. If they are unhappy, they punish the incumbent by voting for the challenger. Such voters are retrospective (consider the past rather than the future) rather than policy-oriented.

A very different theory holds that voters look forward, rather than backwards (Down, 1957; Achen, 1992). The inclusion and success of retrospective evaluations in voting models is due to their correlation with other means of candidate evaluations, but according to the prospective model, they do not ultimately determine electoral behaviour. Achen (1992), like Down (1957), believes that voters have the motivation and information necessary to anticipate how different candidates or parties will behave in office (Mackuen et al., 1992, 1996; Sanders, 1993). This model is called “rational retrospective voting”: people use past information to get an idea of what candidates will do in the future. Voters are prospective (consider the future rather than the past) and policy-oriented rather than outcome-oriented. Note that this theory assumes candidates and parties pursue consistent policies over time. Still others argue that both perspectives are significant (Clarke et al., 1994; Lewis-Beck, 1988).15

2.4.1. The political evaluation assumptions

But do voters only look at economic conditions and the economic policy of the government to make voting decisions? Some scholars argue that citizens are able to make “separate and correct distinctions” between a “basket of economic goods”, which may be deteriorating, and a basket of political goods, which may be improving (Linz et al., 1996; White et al., 1997; Bratton et al., 2007). On election days, the government and opposition parties expect to be judged on their past, current and future performance in outcomes heavily and to pay scant attention to policy prescription.

15 Analyses of economic voting are further complicated when there is no obvious incumbent, when there is power-sharing, or when the government is divided. Unlike presidential or legislative elections in two-party systems, elections in the post-Communist democracies of Eastern Europe often involve ruling coalitions, where no single party is incumbent at election time. In the USA the Congress, the Federal Reserve and the president are all political economic actors, which complicates the voter’s electoral calculations and also poses a new dilemma to scholars who analyse economic models (Tyler, 1982; Peffley et al., 1985; Alt et al., 2000; Norpoth, 2002).
terms of political goods, such as evidence of freedom of expression, accountability and trust.

In new democracies voters compare the costs and benefits associated with different regimes, and align themselves with parties that best serve their individual and collective interests (White et al., 1997). Where democratic institutions are not yet deeply rooted, political institutions are responsible not only for aggregating economic policy preferences and transforming them into outcomes, but also for the provision of political goods such as freedom, trust, political accountability, transparency, and security. Elections are therefore essentially a referendum on political performance (Duch, 2001; White et al., 1997). Voters punish incumbents who fail to deliver acceptable political outcomes and reward governments that meet their expectations. This approach assumes an agency relationship between voters and political leaders, in which voters are the “principal” and have the power to sanction or reward their agents. Politicians are agents and are subject to voter oversight and sanctions (Duch, 2001).

There has been little focus on economic and political performance voting in many African and post-Communist countries, and scholars have only recently (late 1990s) started to apply the economic and political evaluation hypothesis to Africa and post-Communist countries. In recent decades, the economic voting model rapidly achieved a higher profile in electoral studies and in the literature on post-Communist and Latin American regimes. The success of former Communist opposition parties in Poland in 1993 and in Hungary in 1994, for example, tends to support the referenda model of economic voting (Markowski et al., 1998). In these cases, voters responded to serious economic decline in the country by rejecting the incumbent party. The notion that the economic model applies to countries at varying levels of democratization is also supported by Mattes (1995) and Norris et al. (2003) in their studies of South Africa and by Remmer (1991) in Latin America, Posner et al. (2002) in Zambia and Youde (2005) in Ghana. Using survey data, Mattes (1995) found that voters in South Africa based their electoral decisions on assessments of the economy, government performance, and party stance on particular issues, such as combating violence, political freedoms, law and order, and education (Mattes et al., 1999a, 1999b).

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16 In Africa and post-Communist countries, scholars are using aggregate and micro-scale analysis of economic voting (e.g. Jasiewicz, 2003; Pacek, 1994; Mattes, 1995, 1999a, 1999b; Posner et al., 2002; Youde, 2005).
Certain aspects of theories of economic voting, such as the role of egotropic (or pocketbook) vs. sociotropic voting and retrospective vs. prospective voting, have not been tested in Africa as they have been in post-Communist countries (Jasiewicz, 2003; Harper, 2000). The Youde (2005) study on Ghana is the first empirical study that applied economic aspects of the theory to Africa. Youde demonstrated that economic considerations, especially prospective economic evaluation proved significant in explaining government support, not just ethnic, regional or geoGraphical ties.

2.5. The values choice approach

This school of thought argues that values are important determinants of attitudes and behaviours. It assumes that deeply embedded values invest social situations with distinctive meanings that regulate individuals' attitudes and behaviour (Dalton, 1996a; Inglehart et al., 1994; Inglehart, 1981, 1987). According to Dalton et al. (1996a), people structure their lives around their beliefs about what is important to them and make their choices, for example, of careers, partner, or a movie on a Saturday night based on these beliefs. Values identify what people feel are, or should be, the goals of society and its political systems. Shared values help define the norms of a political and social system.

Yet values are not static. According to Maslow's (1954) motivation theory, people have a hierarchy of values that change once priorities are achieved. In other words, once basic needs, for example, linked to survival, are fulfilled, individuals begin to prioritize needs at higher levels, such as those for security and stability. When these second-level needs are met, individuals strive to fulfill a number of social needs, such as those for acknowledgement, status, independence, freedom and respect.

Value priorities have changed in industrialized societies from material concerns related to economic and physical security to more emphasis on political freedoms, self-expression and quality of life (Inglehart, 1971). Inglehart suggests two hypotheses on value change: (1) the scarcity hypothesis, in which material sustenance and physical security are the first requirements for survival. Thus, under conditions of scarcity, people give top priority to material goals, whereas under conditions of prosperity, they become more likely to emphasize post-material goals; and 2) the socialization hypothesis, in which the relationship between material scarcity and value priorities is not primarily one of immediate adjustment. A substantial time lag is involved here because one's basic
values to a large extent reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s pre-adult years (Inglehart, 1985).

The combination of the scarcity and socialization hypotheses produced a general model of value change. This model indicates that an individual’s basic value priorities are initially formed early in life in reaction to the conditions of this formative period. Once these values develop, they tend to endure in the face of later changes in social conditions (Dalton et al., 1996).

Changes in values are driven by socioeconomic development seen in traditional, modern and postmodern states. The rich nations present postmodern values which place emphasis on self-expression, life balance and satisfaction, and focus on issues around ecology, leisure, free choice and good health (Inglehart, 1977, 1990). Citizens of middle-income countries focus on achievement, faith in the state, rejection of out-groups, and appreciation of money, and hard work and determination. Whereas citizens of low-income countries have traditional values related to survival needs, respect for authority, religious faith, national pride, a strong work ethic and strong family ties.

Over the last few decades, economic, technological, and sociopolitical changes have transformed the cultures of advanced industrial societies in profoundly important ways. This value shift is part of a much broader process of cultural change that is gradually transforming political, economic, and social life in these societies. Inglehart (1990) uses a massive body of time-series survey data from 26 nations, gathered from 1970 through 1988, to analyse the cultural changes that are occurring as younger generations gradually replace older ones in the adult population. These changes have far-reaching political implications, and they seem to be transforming the economic growth rates of societies and the kind of economic development that is pursued.

The clash between alternative and traditional values creates a basis for political competition over which values should shape public policy. Thus, Inglehart (1971) proposed a new theoretical approach to understanding electoral behaviour in Western democracies, called the value change theory. With respect to voting behaviour, Western democracies appear to be becoming more cultural (Baker, 2005; Inglehart, 1985) and less social structural, i.e. voting seems to be based more on values rather than on social structural issues.
The values model has been the basis of intensive research in Western democracies and the United States, but few scholars of new democracies use this approach to understand partisanship and voting behaviour. There are different reasons for this: firstly, the predominant African approach that has dominated the study of electoral politics over the past 50 years has largely ignored values cleavages among voters in democratic societies. The predominant African approach (e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Mozaffar, 2003; Norris et al., 2003; Posner, 2004) is rooted in a social-structural paradigm. It conceptualizes electoral conflicts as competition based upon structural cleavages involving ethnicity, religion affiliation, region, urban vs. rural, and if relevant, class position. Secondly, the process of modernization has been so recent that some individuals holding modern values also retain traditional values, making it difficult to identify clear cultural cleavages. Thirdly, new democracies in Africa in particular have seen few civic organizations emerge to promote and defend specific types of values. Many civic organizations in fact promote and defend both traditional and modern values. Finally, the industrialization and liberalization of local economies have not deeply penetrated the rural areas where many Africans still live traditional lifestyles. However, African societies are not static. They undergo cultural cleavages on issues such as communitarianism versus individualism, clientelism versus the rule of law, and authoritarian versus democratic values. Thus, the cultural values model may still be useful in electoral studies in new democracies to provide a new means of assessing the behaviour of African voters.

2.6. The cognitive awareness approach

The cognitive awareness approach emphasizes the influence of cognitive factors on political attitudes and proponents of this school of thought argue that this depends on the characteristics of political communication transmitted to the citizens (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Downs, 1957; Huckfeldt et al., 1987; Popkin, 1994; Popkin et al., 1995; Kelly et al., 1985; Sniderman et al., 1991; Lupia et al., 2000; Zaller, 1989, 1991; Nadeau et al., 1999; Mattes, 2005). This approach was cultivated by the Columbia school guided by the work of Lazarsfeld et al. These three pioneers commenced research on political information during electoral campaigns. They examined the following three processes: 1) the direct transmission of political information through the mass communications media, 2) indirect flows of political information through membership of secondary
associations (trade union, religious groups, fraternal organizations, etc.), and 3) the
direct transfer of political information through face-to-face contacts within personal
networks.

The main finding of this research was that face-to-face contacts turned out to be the most
important influences stimulating opinion change (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). In contrast
with the then widespread belief that the news media exercised the greatest influence over
the electoral behaviour of voters, the authors concluded that “personal relationships are
potentially more influential for two reasons: their coverage is greater and they have
certain psychological advantages over the formal media” (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944:150).
The study of Lazarsfeld et al. therefore became known as the “political intermediation”
model, although it is also referred to as the Columbia model due to its origins at that
university.

The early Columbia approach focused more on political intermediation with respect to
the role of the family, friends and colleagues rather than that of the media. Recent work
by Huckfeldt et al. (1987) also focuses on the role of social networks in determining
electoral behaviour (Popkin, 1994; Sniderman et al., 1991; Lupia et al., 2000). Social
networks have functional values for voters in different societies, as they provide political
cues that guide them through the complex world of politics. These networks do not only
facilitate the voting process, but also assist in shaping public opinion and evaluating
political events (Downs, 1957; Huckfeldt et al., 1987; Popkin, 1994; Kelly et al., 1985;
Sniderman et al., 1991; Lupia et al., 2000). According to Downs (1957), voters do not
need to watch the news on television, listen to the radio or read newspapers in order to
get information, as every society essentially provides its members with a constant flow of
“free information” about a variety of issues. It is based on this “free information” that
voters are able to evaluate government performance or opposition attitudes; in societies
where there is no readily available information, voters use “shortcut” information based
on their “daily-life experience” to make political evaluations. Downs' central insight is
that citizens do not have much incentive to gather information about politics solely in
order to improve their voting choice. They will rely on information shortcuts as
substitutes for more complete information about parties, candidates and policies.
Because citizens use shortcuts to obtain and evaluate information, they are able to store
far more data about politics than measurements of their textbook knowledge would
suggest. Shortcuts for obtaining information at low cost are numerous and include party

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identification, endorsements, and demographic information. Given the limited information about government which most citizens possess, determining which issues will matter in any election is problematic. It is not the importance of a policy, or even the extent to which parties or candidates differ regarding policy, that determines when an issue will become central to voter decision-making. What makes it central is the information people have about the issue, and the manner in which their beliefs about how the world works connect an electoral issue to their own life situation and to the office, candidate and party for which they are voting.

Apart from friends, families and colleagues, voters also obtain information from different organizations to which they belong. Organizations or social groups (such as churches, trade unions, political parties, ethnic groups, and environmental organizations) have been shown to play a central role in aiding individuals' political judgments in a complicated world. Politically relevant groups help voters orientate themselves and others in the political realm through their activities and affiliations by providing valuable cues to those who either share or oppose their interests (Wlezien et al., 1997; Beck et al., 2001).

Voters may also acquire political information through the party political “styles”, of candidates' campaign strategies, and demographic traits to decide electoral behaviour. Voters may assess the way candidates present themselves during the campaign in terms of their appearance: the type and colours of clothes that they wear, the way that they speak, the language they use, mistakes they make, or their accent or ethnic features (Popkin, 1994; Mattes et al., 1999a). Voters can also see the style in which candidates and parties campaign: do they speak with confidence or authority? Do they seem to know what they are talking about? Do their messages reflect voters' views? All of these can send powerful messages about candidate or party stance, values, and ability to represent voters' interests. According to Riggle et al. (1992), a single picture or image of a candidate provides a tremendous amount of information about that person, including gender, race, age, and often general “likableness”, which immediately brings many social stereotypes into play. People with little formal understanding of politics may nonetheless know a great deal about other people, and make social judgments on several levels using social understanding and stereotypes with great cognitive efficacy.
Social networks, party identification and demographic characteristics are of special importance for certain groups of voters, but by no means for all groups (Converse, 1964; Dalton, 1984). For instance, according to Converse (1964), party identification was of special concern for a certain segment of the electorate, as “partisanship provides a clear and low-cost voting strategy for the unsophisticated voters”. As political sophistication was not considered to be widespread in the industrial society (Converse, 1964), the functional value of party identification was considered to be high in that kind of society. However, one of the consequences of the transition to advanced industrial societies is that the functional values of partisanship vanish. The transition brings about a radical improvement of citizens’ political resources, arguably largely as a result of a rise in the level of education. At the same time, the media explosion considerably raises the supply of political information available. Thus, the media explosion is associated with citizens becoming more capable in processing the information they receive (Dalton et al., 1996).

This process has been called “cognitive mobilization” (Dalton, 1984) or “political sophistication” (MacDonald et al., 1995) or “political awareness” (Zaller, 1992). Despite some difference about the way researchers use this concept and these indicators, they seem to agree that cognitive mobilization deals with both skills and involvement. Cognitive mobilization implies that “citizens possess the skills and resources necessary to become politically engaged with little dependence cues. In addition, cognitive mobilization implies a psychological involvement in politics” (Dalton, 1984:267). In constructing the cognitive dimensions, Dalton builds upon the work of Inglehart et al. (1976), using education as an indicator of skills and general interest in politics as an indicator of “political cognition”. Regarding political involvement, Inglehart et al. do not apply the concept of political interest as Dalton does, rather, they use participation in political discussion as their reference point. The concepts of “political sophistication” and “political awareness” are essentially the same as the concept proposed by Dalton. Admittedly, MacDonald et al. (1995) explicitly state that “political interest” is expedient when voters lack a measure of political knowledge, but they do not seem to have any hesitation in mixing these rather different notions together. Furthermore, the definition of “political awareness”, as presented by Zaller (1992), also looks very much like the definition of “cognitive mobilization” given above as it refers to the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has encountered (Zaller, 1992).
With increased political mobilization or awareness, the voter is also more able to understand how political systems work. According to Popkin et al. (1995, p.2)

Persons with knowledge of political institutions have conceptual maps of the world that are less vague and uncertain and anxiety provoking. Without this knowledge people see economic and social change as more uncertain. Any discussion of citizen competence must recognize the importance of political knowledge in helping persons to evaluate politicians and policies and cope with social and economic change.

Zaller (1992) argues that the degree of a citizen’s knowledge about politics plays the key role in the reception and acceptance of communication from the political elite groups. According to the “reception” axiom, the greater a person’s awareness, the more likely they are to receive a given political message and to understand it (Zaller, 1992:20). According to the “resistance” axiom, awareness regulates acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communication to which a person is exposed in interaction with their political predisposition.

Studies in the field of political psychology have also emphasized that information affects the attitudes-behaviour relationship, because attitudes tend to be consistent with behaviour to the extent that those attitudes are readily retrievable in behavioural situations (Krosnick, 1988; Lavine et al., 1996; Alvarez et al., 2002). According to these studies, two main “information effects” can be identified. First, information reduces attitude uncertainty, since additional information enables individuals to become increasingly certain in their opinions. Information on an issue can thus lead to stronger and more stable and accessible attitudes. Second, information makes predispositions and values relevant for beliefs about specific issues (Hobolt, 2005). In other words, political information enables individuals to link attitudes with specific policies and in turn enables them to act on the basis of these attitudes.

In contrast to voters in Western democracies and America, voters in Mozambique--and Africa in general--are characterized by having little formal education, limited media exposure, and low levels of political awareness. Yet, this does not mean that African “voters are fools” (Key, 1967). Voters in Africa can, and do, make use of “free information” provided by their society or community. Voters use “shortcut” information
based on their “daily-life experience” to make political evaluations (Popkin, 1994; Mattes et al., 1999a). As in Europe and America, voters in Africa garner political information from personal contact with others--their families, friends, neighbours, colleagues, and leaders (Downs, 1957; Huckfeldt et al., 1987; Popkin, 1994). Apart from these sources voters also obtain information from different organizations to which they belong. As argued above, organizations or social groups have been shown to play a central role in aiding individuals' political judgments. In agrarian societies, such as exist in Africa, ethnicity, level of urbanization, region of origin, religion, and class may provide low-cost guides (information cues) to voters. In this context, social groups will operate in Africa and take their cues as an “informational shortcut which serves to tell voters where their interests lie” (Mattes, 1995:11). Again, as argued above with reference to Western democracies, politically relevant groups help voters orient themselves and others in the political realm through their activities and affiliations by providing valuable cues to those who either share or oppose their interest (Beck et al., 2001). The function of these groups in Western democracies thus has its counterpart in an African agrarian setting.

How effectively has the cognitive awareness model been applied around the world? As noted above, even though the importance of these information-flow processes has been widely acknowledged ever since the seminal work of Lazarsfeld and his collaborators (Lazarsfeld et al., 1994; Berelson et al., 1954), these linkages have been largely unexplored in African studies of electoral behaviour. Rigorous and systematic analyses of the influence of awareness on voter choice are needed in Africa and other new democracies around the world. The neglect of these information-flow processes has led to an incomplete understanding of the dynamics of voting choice in Africa. In other words, cognitive awareness is not the sole factor, but it is an important element in explaining electoral behaviour and partisan choice in modern elections.

2.7. Summary

In summary, it is relevant to stress that most sociological approaches either exclude or do not emphasize the notion of partisanship, considering it to be a concept that is distinct from the vote. The social psychological approach includes the notion within vote choice theories, but has a limited notion of partisan identification (partisan identification largely explained the vote for those who had a partisan identification, but competed with
candidate and policy opinion picked up from campaigns). The rational approach originally did not include the notion of partisan identification (Downs, 1957), but later approaches, beginning with Key and Fiorina, adopted the concept, as did the Michigan funnel of causality model, which, however, re-interpreted partisan identification as more instrumental, responding to governance and economic and political performance factors.

The cultural values approach incorporates the notion of partisan identification in that this school views partisan identification as a dependent variable, rather than the actual vote. With respect to cognitive approaches, some scholars have looked at how cognitive evaluations moderate the impact of performance on partisan identification (Bartels, 1996), while others (Dalton, 1996a) have looked at how partisan identification and cognitive mobilization interact to influence the actual vote.

The sociological model holds that groups affect attitudes which, in turn, shape voter choice. The Michigan approach posits the existence of an interaction between a voter’s long-term party identification and various short-term influences, such as current political issues, campaign events, and the personalities of party leaders or candidates. Yet, ultimately, voting decisions are almost automatic consequences of voters’ partisanship.

The rational choice approach is more individualistic, suggesting that voting decisions are based on performance evaluation. The values approach holds that people with the same values tend to have similar political beliefs and vote the same way, even when they are members of different social groups. The values approach argues that values cut across groups. By contrast, the sociological approach argues that members of the same social group have the same beliefs that affect their attitudes and behaviour.

The cognitive awareness theory is concerned with the effect of information intermediation on the voting process. Growing access to formal education and electronic news media has steadily reduced the effect of structural forces like class or religion on the vote, and resulted in a more sophisticated generation of voters, less likely to rely on party labels and more likely to gather information about government performance and the position of alternative parties. The cognitive approach is not necessarily incompatible with either the sociological or partisan identification approaches. The cognitive awareness model recognizes that voters may also access relevant information through their social groups or the political parties they belong to.
CHAPTER III: A MODEL OF PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION

3.1. Introduction

The previous chapters summarized a number of theoretical models of voting behaviour that can be applied to explain partisanship. Next these theoretical frameworks will be applied to the Mozambican context using available data from the 2002 Afrobarometer survey data.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 addresses the social cleavages evidence in order to test sociological cleavage assumptions. Section 3.3 provides evidence on political and social values for testing the cultural values hypothesis. Section 3.4 presents the economic evidence that allows us to replicate economic voting assumptions. Section 3.5 summarizes the major political evidence needed to analyse the political performance evaluation assumptions. In the final section evidence of cognitive awareness is presented that will allow us to examine the cognitive awareness hypothesis in Mozambique.

3.2. Social cleavages

According to the social cleavages approach, voter choice is determined by social location rather than political and economic issues, the personalities of candidates or short-term performance evaluations. Despite evidence suggesting that political parties have not built strong, grassroots support in Mozambique, there are nevertheless grounds for suggesting that social cleavages are of concern to Mozambican voters.

3.2.1. Ethnic political conflict

Despite the division of Mozambique's population into numerous small ethnic subgroups, there is no real dominant group, this, however, does not mean that conflict and animosities between groups do not exist. Under colonial rule, the Portuguese took advantage of the multiplicity of ethnic groups by implementing a conscious policy of “divide and rule”. Under this policy, major ethnic groups were set against each other to
the advantage of the colonial power (Alpes, 1974). During the liberation war, the Portuguese soldiers distributed pamphlets in the northern part of the country, particularly in regions inhabited by the Makwas, claiming that the war was a tribal conflict between the Makondes and Makwas\(^{17}\), and that the Makwa groups should join forces with the Portuguese to fight against the Makondes. The Portuguese then set up their major lines of defence in Makwa areas, and enlisted the Makwa leadership to challenge the penetration of FRELIMO guerrillas in these areas. The same approach was used by the Portuguese in the central regions of the country.

When FRELIMO took power, most of the central and northern ethnic groups were marginalized as a result of internal struggles that occurred during the liberation war. The history of FRELIMO during the independence struggle (1962-1974) was marked from the start by a series of internal struggles.

The formation of this movement was in fact the product of a new alliance of groups coming from the interior; although this movement was formally recognised as being the result of the fusion of three nationalist movements (UNAMI, UNAMO and MANU) set up previously in neighbouring countries and based on existing nuclei of Mozambican migrants. From the start, splits and expulsions occurred, and continued until the late 1960s, affecting mainly representatives of the small elites of the centre and north of the country. The last important FRELIMO leader belonging to the small elite from the centre of the country, the deputy president, Urias Simango, was removed in 1969, as part of the succession debate around the leadership of FRELIMO, caused by the death of its first president, Eduardo Mondlane. The removal of Urias Simango created the political space necessary for the southern elite to control the liberation movement. As a result of this dominance by the southern elite, the first Mozambican post-independence government was comprised of mainly FRELIMO supporters from ethnic groups south of the Save River, and by the Makondes (Lundin, 1996; Hoile, 1994).

It should be noted that the new political framework introduced by FRELIMO allowed little room for any type of ethnic identification. When FRELIMO took power in 1975, they referred to people as Mozambicans, regardless of their various ethnic group names. For FRELIMO, it was necessary to eliminate all vestiges of ethnicity such as names,

\(^{17}\) It is clearly not possible to call FRELIMO a predominantly Makonde movement, when so much of its leadership and fighting cadres were drawn from different ethnic groups around the country.
symbols and organizations that in their view would only prolong adherence to these more traditional values (Cahen, 1989, 1998; Pereira, 1997; Carbone, 2003a, 2003b; Casal, 1991; Coelho, 1998a).

By contrast, RENAMO’s discourse and style is based on the manipulation of exactly those types of traditional values—religious beliefs, support for traditional leaders and ethnic identities (Geffray 1986, 1988; Pereira, 1997, 2006; Carbone 2003a, 2003b; Cahen, 2002; Manning, 1998). Thus, during the election campaigns of 1994 and 1999, RENAMO aggressively sought to use the ethnic factor to its advantage. When the president of RENAMO spoke to people in the central and northern parts of Mozambique, he primarily spoke to people by their ethnic identity such as “my Makua brothers” or my “Sena sons and daughters”—phrases that had been barred from the nationalist discourse for years (Cahen, 1998, 2002). In addition, RENAMO campaign activists spoke mainly in local languages. By doing so, RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama wanted to remind Mozambicans, particularly those in central and northern Mozambique, that they had had a bad life under the one-party system and portrayed RENAMO as a party of the marginalized.

3.2.2. Regional asymmetries

Regional differences are also historically significant. Regional development has taken place asymmetrically, with Maputo and the southern part of the country developing faster. Residents from southern Mozambique are seen to benefit most in terms of life opportunities and development (Weinstein, 2002). This has created a strong anti-southern feeling, particularly towards Maputo as the site of massive post-war investment.

A survey study carried out by CEP (1997) seems to confirm this cleavage between the southern region and central-northern region. The CEP survey revealed a relatively balanced distribution between those who thought that centralism was necessary and a good thing, and those who thought it was bad.18 The former (38%) were slightly more numerous, but there was also a large number who did not reply (32%). But, when the

18 The exact text of the question was as follows: “Some people say that the central government, in Maputo, takes all the important decisions for the country and that is not good for balanced development. Other people think that to have this balanced development, it is necessary that the government in Maputo should take decisions. Which of these opinions is closer to you?”
same data is broken down in terms of the three major regions of the country, i.e. the north (Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces), the central (Zambezia, Tete, Manica and Sofala) and the south (the capital and Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo provinces), there are distinct differences regarding the question of decentralization. Indeed, opinion in the southern region contrasts with the other regions. In the south centralization is viewed as a good thing by 54% and bad by 46%. In the north, the opinion of centralization is reversed with 47% believing it to be a good thing and 53% thinking it bad. Finally, in the central region the opinion that centralization is bad prevails with 60% support, while only 40% favour centralization. The same question was asked in 2001\(^\text{19}\) and the results revealed a trend towards radicalization around this issue. The central region continues to have the least favourable opinion of central power, with the number of replies favouring decentralization rising to 70%. The same feelings prevail in the northern region, where the proportion in favour of decentralization rose greatly, to 67%. Even in the south, although in a more modest form, the idea of greater power for the provincial governments was supported by 55% of the respondents. It should be noted that in this area the percentage of respondents not replying fell to 14%, which may mean that there was less fear of replying (CEP, 1998).

During the 1994 and 1999 election campaigns, RENAMO leaders accused the FRELIMO government of regional favouritism and portrayed FRELIMO as a southern movement comprising mainly Shangaan people. Furthermore, some citizens in central areas also believed their region to be underdeveloped because of FRELIMO’s mismanagement of their resources.

Apart from differences in levels of development and resource allocation, there are also differences in the history of pre-independence resistance to colonialism and the emergence of political party leadership. The centre of the country is where FRELIMO was most heavily opposed by local colonial elites due to its investment in counter-insurgency programmes, intelligence-gathering, the Africanization of the military, and the building of a strong nucleus of settler farms in the Manica province (Darch, 1989;

\(^{19}\)The question underwent slight redrafting: “Some people think that, in order for there to be a balance, it is necessary that decisions should be taken by the central government in Maputo. Others think that it is better to give greater power to the provincial governments. As far as you are concerned, is it better for decisions to be taken by the central government in Maputo, or it better to give more power to the provincial governments?”
Minter, 1994; Vines, 1991, 1993). As a consequence, during the first period of independence, some FRELIMO leaders launched vicious verbal attacks against people from the central region. FRELIMO accused many residents from the central region of being traitors, and some central elites who opposed FRELIMO were sent to “re-education camps”.

The FRELIMO leadership is mainly from the south and the extreme north, while the leadership from RENAMO and other opposition parties comes mainly from the central and northern parts of the country. These regional differences are reflected in terms of electoral results. In the 1994 and 1999 general elections, FRELIMO won in the four southern provinces as well as in the two furthest north, Cabo Delgado and Niassa, while RENAMO took all the provinces of the centre/north and centre. De Brito (1996) has made a detailed analysis of the provincial and district level results. He found that the two main parties each had “sanctuaries” where in 1994 they won more than 75% of the vote. FRELIMO’s sanctuary coincided with the areas in the south from where many of the party’s past leaders came, and in areas in the far north, where the struggle for independence was waged the longest and where FRELIMO had established “liberated zones”. RENAMO’s sanctuaries coincided with the central regions where its military activities began and from where many of its cadres were first drawn. De Brito furthermore suggests that a sense of marginalisation from the FRELIMO state translated into voter support for RENAMO.

Thus in terms of a sociological approach one would expect that voters from the south would identify with FRELIMO. Their vote would be perceived as an expression of loyalty with members of their region who, like themselves, were born and had grown up in the south. By contrast, the electorate from the northern and central part of the country should identify with RENAMO.

### 3.2.3. Rural vs. urban cleavages

Mozambicans are also divided along urban and rural lines. Approximately three-quarters of Mozambicans living in the rural areas are small-scale peasant farmers. FRELIMO has had a historically hostile policy towards peasant communities, developing rather a rural policy based on state farms and the “villagization” of the population. At the same time, FRELIMO has been unable to organize a satisfactory
agricultural marketing system. By contrast, urban populations benefited from increased development (De Brito, 1996; Pereira, 1997). In addition, heightened unemployment, together with the high level of poverty under which most Mozambicans live, has created tension between the rural and urban areas. There is a perception that people living in urban centers, and particularly those in the “cement areas” of the city, enjoy better living conditions than those living at the periphery of cities or in rural areas. Moreover, the rural areas suffered more from the consequences of the civil war than the urban areas. During the period of armed conflict, both RENAMO and FRELIMO tried whenever possible to control places of geographic influence. With the signing of the Rome Accord in 1992, these areas began to generate conflict, even leading to the existence of dual administrations. Thus, party preference has been seen to reflect this conflict between the “bush”, “rural elite” (RENAMO) and “urban elite” (FRELIMO) (West, 1998; Vine, 1991).

3.2.4. Religious cleavages

Despite FRELIMO’s attempts to convert the religious beliefs of Mozambicans to scientific Marxist–Leninist doctrines, religious institutions continue to play a very important role in the lives of people. The population is divided among Catholics, Muslims, Protestants, and the African traditional churches. There are over 500 distinct religious denominations and 107 religious organizations registered with the Department of Religious Affairs in the Ministry of Justice.

Religious communities tend to draw members from across ethnic, political, economic, and racial lines. According to the 1997 census, the population distribution in terms of religious affiliation is as follows: Catholic--24%, Protestant--8%, Muslim--18%, Zionist churches--18% and others (including those with no religion)--32% (INE, 1999). While the various religious communities are dispersed throughout the country, the northern provinces and the coastal strip are predominantly Muslim, the central provinces are mainly Catholic, and the southern regions are generally Protestant.

During the colonization period, the colonial government gave a higher status to Catholics than to non-Catholics. In fact, one of the prerequisites for “assimilation”

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A more detailed analysis (desegregations by provinces, for example) shows weaknesses in the gathering of census data on religion. It seems that differing criteria were used in asking questions and recording the answers. For a critical analysis of the Census Data, see Cahen et al., 2002.
honor (honorary white status) was to become Catholic (Lundin, 1996; Monteiro, 1993; Alpes, 1999). When FRELIMO came into power in 1975, it reversed a colonial policy that incorporated religions tenets, and favoured certain denominations in particular (Alpes, 1999; Baloi, 1991; Monteiro, 1993; Cahen, 1998; Morier-Genoud, 1996, 2000, 2002). FRELIMO then adopted a Marxist policy that lead to the abolition of all churches (Vines, 1991; Pereira, 1997, 2006). FRELIMO intervened in the internal affairs of religious institutions, nationalized hospitals and schools, and prohibited citizens from attending religious ceremonies. This policy aggravated the tension between organized religion and the State, and the Catholic Church in particular. Catholic and Muslim institutions were marginalized from the social and political life of the country. FRELIMO’s religious policy, however, was more ambiguous towards the Protestant Church (Cruz e Silva, 1991, 2002). It should be noted that the black elite that waged the liberation struggle was almost exclusively Protestant and, furthermore, Protestants were regarded as higher up the social ladder than Muslims (Lundin, 1996).

RENAMO has tried to exploit these tensions to its own advantage. During the civil war, RENAMO developed different strategies to gain religious support, avoiding attacks on churches, protecting priests, nurses and pastors, and allowing citizens to pray and to attend religious services (Pereira, 1997, 2006). By doing so, RENAMO succeeded in making allies of the Muslim elite and their religious communities, Catholic leaders and their congregations, and traditional religious leaders.

3.2.5. Class cleavages

The scale of socio-economic transformation in Mozambique has impeded the emergence of class cleavages. Like their bourgeois counterparts, the Mozambican peasant and working classes are incompletely formed and internally differentiated in terms of status and power. In the case of Mozambique, such incomplete class formation may result in the emergence of weakly integrated interests. With respect to the proletariat, this incomplete formation is partly attributable to the low level of industrial activity in the country. Furthermore, the destruction of the market economy and private ownership of the means of production as part of the liberation struggle has resulted in a decline of the capitalistic bourgeoisie after the civil war, and lessened socio-economic cleavages between workers and owners. The lack of strong class consciousness in Mozambique is
also the result of weaknesses in organizations and institutions that strengthen social differentiation.

During the post-independence period, the government introduced a centralized or command economy, where all productive sectors were under the control of the State. However, the process of economic liberalisation has subsequently created opportunities for the emergence of a class of proprietors and entrepreneurs, and in recent decades, the gap between rich and poor has widened dramatically. The rich in Maputo are clearly benefiting from liberalization and a globalizing world, thus income and wealth are becoming the most important divisions in Mozambican society.

FRELIMO is perceived to be the party that appeals to the wealthy people, who have moderate to high incomes, live in non-traditional types of houses, and who are business owners and professionals. By contrast, RENAMO is perceived to be the party representing the poor people who live in traditional houses, have a low level of income, and who constitute the rural peasantry and the urban unemployable (De Brito, 1996; Pereira, 1997).

During election campaigns, RENAMO leaders behaved like poor people who did not have the resources to stay in expensive hotels or organize rally parties. Most of the RENAMO leaders leading the campaigns were people with low income and in many cases were unemployed. They spoke the language of the poor and unemployed voters. For instance, during the rallies they told the crowds:

Look at the FRELIMO candidates, they are rich people, with expensive cars and they cannot speak our language. Most of them said that they were born in this province or district. But they are living in Maputo for many years. The majority of the FRELIMO leaders who live here are not candidates to the parliament. However, you need to ask yourself how someone who does not live here and comes from the same environments like us needs to sleep in the expensive hotels or nice houses in the districts, eat specials foods, drink mineral water and not speak our language? They cannot be like us. Those who claim to represent us are RENAMO. We speak your language without interpreters; we have been eating your food and have been living
with you for many years. Therefore we are the only ones who can represent you. Vote RENAMO, not FRELIMO (Pereira, 2007)

3.2.6. Age as cleavage

The Mozambican electorate can be divided into two main age categories reflecting the social and political experiences of these groups: under 35-year olds and over 35-year olds, signifying those born before and those after independence. These two groups will have different party preferences. Most voters under 35 years old are likely to support new political parties or become independent voters, whereas voters above 35 years old will be more inclined to vote for historical parties. The over-35 generation is typically socially and politically conservative, and according to White et al. (1997), is less likely to depart from the political values and beliefs into which they were originally socialized. Most of the electorate in this age group will support a party with historical roots, in this case, FRELIMO.

By contrast, the under 35-year-old generation is socially more open-minded and less resistant to political change. Their life experiences are very different from those of their elders. Furthermore, younger voters have had less time to form stable political orientations or partisan identification.

3.2.7. Gender cleavages

In Mozambique, men and women have differed historically greatly with regard to political rights and social relations. The main place reserved for women is the home, with all the accompanying duties, particularly with regard to raising a family. In most societies it is difficult for women to depart from this domestic role. In Mozambique, discrimination against girls and women in the lower social and economic classes is part of everyday life. Women have fewer opportunities to express their opinions or to participate in decision-making, and generally have lower levels of education.

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21 It should be noted that Mozambique has a relatively significant number of women in high political offices. About one-third of the 250 members of Parliament are women, and 3 of the 22 ministers are women. But at district administration level, women are underrepresented: less than 5% of administrators are women. In the decision-making organs at provincial and district level, as well as within public service, women are also clearly in the minority.

22 The illiteracy rate is high in Mozambique, and it is much higher among women than men. In the 15-to-29-year age group, 51% of the women,
problem of gender inequity is also reflected in inheritance and land rights, and is perpetuated through underage marriages, sexual exploitation, and domestic violence.

Political party policies differ in terms of their stance on the role of women in the family and community. The opposition parties, particularly RENAMO and PIMO, favour conservative policies that emphasize the domestic role of women. The leadership of RENAMO is overwhelmingly male. By contrast, FRELIMO presents itself as a modern party with relatively radical policies that aim to empower women in the political process. After independence, FRELIMO promoted the creation and development of women’s organisations (OMM). FRELIMO has also nominated the greatest number of women as party candidates for parliament. 23

3.2.8. Hypotheses

These types of social cleavages have the potential to influence partisanship and electoral behaviour. Thus, the following hypothesis will be tested:

- **Ethnicity**: Members of the Shangaan-Ronga group are more likely to identify with FRELIMO.
- **Regional asymmetries**: Voters from the south are more likely to identify with FRELIMO.
- **Rural vs. urban cleavages**: Urban citizens are more likely to identify with FRELIMO.
- **Religious cleavages**: Protestant voters are more likely to identify with FRELIMO. By contrast, Islamic and Catholic voters are more likely to identify with RENAMO.
- **Class cleavages**: Voters belonging to the middle or upper classes are more likely to identify with FRELIMO.
- **Age cleavages**: Older voters are more likely to identify themselves with FRELIMO. By contrast, younger voters are more likely to be independent of all parties.
- **Gender cleavages**: Women voters are more likely to identify with FRELIMO.

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23 In the 1994 multiparty elections FRELIMO was the party with the highest number of women candidates (130) followed by PPPM (82), PT (46) and UD (40). Lower down on the list were RENAMO (38), SOL (36), UNAMO (34), FUMO (33), PCN (27) and PRD (24). (For further details see Abreu et al., 1996.)

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3.3. Cultural Values

According to the cultural values theory, most of the values that people acquire arise as a result of long-standing norms, orientations and values embedded in cultures (e.g. ethnic, religious) and are transmitted to succeeding generations through socialization (Almond et al., 1963). Cultural values shape the thoughts, preferences and actions of the individual and thus impact on, among other things, a country’s choice of economic and political regime and voting behaviour (Almond et al., 1963; Inglehart et al., 1994; Inglehart, 1981, 1987). In other words, the cultural values approach assumes that deeply embedded values invest social situations with distinctive meanings that regulate individual attitudes and behaviour. People thus structure their lives around an internally constructed value hierarchy. Thus, during election periods, voters might express the types of values that guide their lives.

For cultural values to shape partisan preferences, the following prerequisites must be met:

i) There must be significant cleavages around these values.
ii) These cleavages must be linked in some way to relevant political issues.
iii) These linkages must be clearly emphasized and articulated by political parties (Almond et al., 1963; Eckstein, 1997; Inglehart et al., 1994; Inglehart, 1981, 1987)

The most important set of value cleavages meeting these criteria are a set of dimensions that relate to the broad changes that have affected Mozambican society over the past 30 years. These relate to democratization, liberalization and modernization. More precisely, in Mozambique there are four core socio-political values that shape electoral behaviour.

3.3.1. Communitarianism vs. individualist values

A communitarian philosophy in which collective interests are placed above the materialist or individual destiny reflects the fundamental beliefs of many Africans. Respect, cooperation and the sharing of knowledge and material benefits were part of
the traditional values instilled from childhood (Chazan et al., 1999; Fafunwa, 1982). The principle of mutual or communitarian responsibility can be seen in the family system. For instance, Bindura-Mutagadura (2001) reports that the main form of support for households coping with incidents of morbidity and mortality in Zimbabwe comes from the extended family. And Chazan et al. (1999) indicate that the extended family, lineage, and, in some cases, the more inclusive clan, define a person’s immediate social networks and obligations.

To some extent, these value systems have resulted in Mozambicans being passive agents with limited control over their own lives. Such values promote norms of conformity that stress adherence to time-honored customs and traditional moral and religious beliefs, a distrust of new ideas, and an intolerance of what is different. These value systems have been systematically eroded since the 1980s, principally by the liberation of the economy. Economic liberalization has placed people in rural areas under tremendous pressure. High levels of unemployment in rural areas, brought about by structural adjustment, have forced rural job-seekers into urban areas, where the nuclear family system developed without any larger social cohesion. Urban living and individual livelihoods marked a change from traditional lifestyles, where land and possessions were shared, and where there was a strong sense of community spirit of shared experience. Under the influence of Western capitalism, some Mozambicans are gradually developing a more materialist or individualist world view, most pronounced in the economic activities of the modern urban elite in Mozambique. As a result of these changes, collectivist behaviour and attitudes are being replaced by a more materialistic or individualistic ethos.

However, the liberation of the economy has not yet removed all vestiges of collectivist values from Mozambican society. In the deeply rural areas of Mozambique, people continue to maintain livelihoods marked by traditional lifestyles, where land and possessions are still shared, as is the community spirit of shared experience. In other words, despite the liberation of the economy, Mozambican values are still structured around the idea of an organic society where all individuals are inherently and fundamentally interconnected. The interests of the group or community thus override those of the individual. More important than individual rights are the duties and obligations that individuals have toward the family, elders and other social leaders and they are expected to respect the social hierarchies. Individual behaviour is guided by the
perceived virtues of maintaining harmonious relations with others. Leaders gain legitimacy by virtue of their position in the social hierarchy, rather than their individual qualities. In turn, paternalistic leaders (in both the family and the state) will look after the best interests of society.

The communitarian philosophy is also supported by various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSO). According to McFubara (2002), many African NGOs apply communitarian principles based on voluntary actions.

Under these circumstances of diffused communitarian vs. Individualist values, FRELIMO adopted the strategy used by so called “vote-seeking parties”. According to Wolinetz (2002), a vote-seeking party is a party that is primarily focused on winning elections—policies and positions are not locked in. Instead, policies and positions are regularly manipulated in order to maximize support. Such a party would be a classic Downsian party. If it were operating either in a heterogeneous society, and/or under a winner-take-all system of elections, a vote-seeking party would probably have a coalitional structure, broad enough to embrace different social groups and socio-political issues thereby giving the party a chance of winning a majority. In a multiparty system, the equivalent would be a catch-all or electoral-professional party, trying to maximize support from a broad, through not necessarily all-inclusive portion of the electorate.

In a departure from previous post-independence policy, FRELIMO declared that the privatization process and the development of a strong national business class and private sectors constituted one of the key pillars of FRELIMO policy once it had been elected. At the same time, FRELIMO tried to portray itself as a party that accommodated different social groups and socio-political issues. During the 1994 and 1999 FRELIMO campaign rallies in Zambezia, FRELIMO stressed its commitment to developing Mozambican businesses which would lead to an increase in employment and national wealth as well as to protecting the interests of all citizens (Pereira et al.; 2005, Pereira 2007).

RENAMO responded to this FRELIMO campaign by reminding voters of the negative aspects of FRELIMO’s post-independence policy. The most prominent message that RENAMO tried to convey in the 1994 and 1999 general elections was that it was the
main political party that forced FRELIMO to introduce more a liberal economic policy and private ownership. In their electoral manifestos and discourses RENAMO pledged to turn the economy around, and improve the private sector, free market and individual initiatives, rather than focus on collectivism.

3.3.2. Secularism vs. Religion

During the socialist period of the 1970s and 1980s, FRELIMO intervened in the internal affairs of religious institutions and prohibited citizens from attending religious ceremonies (Pereira, 1997, 2006; Morier-Genoud, 1996, 2000, 2002).

The anticlerical policies implemented by the FRELIMO government after independence resulted in the “deconfessionalising” of great numbers of people, and a secularization of society overall. The country endured 15 years of aggressive atheist propaganda and an accompanying campaign to crush organized religion under the one-party regime. But when Joaquim Chissano initiated a multiparty democracy at the end of the 1990s, he spoke of the moral values that religion generated and had embodied for centuries, and proclaimed that these could “help in the renewal in our country” (Morier-Genoud, 2002). Chissano went on to pursue and facilitate the renewal of spiritual values in Mozambique. As a result, there was a revival of religious institutions and there are many manifestations of spiritual renewal in Mozambique, evidenced in the rebuilding and re-opening of Christian churches and Islamic mosques in different parts of the country.

Yet, despite some changes in FRELIMO’s approach to religious institutions, FRELIMO is still perceived as the party responsible for marginalizing religious institutions. During the civil war, RENAMO developed different strategies to gain religious support, avoiding attacks on churches, protecting priests, nuns and pastors, and allowing citizens to pray and attend religious services. At RENAMO bases religion was much in evidence with pictures of Jesus displayed (Wilson, 1992).

Of all the religious organizations, the only group that experienced problems with RENAMO were the Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused to co-operate. RENAMO had initially counted upon gaining the support of Jehovah’s Witnesses who had been persecuted by FRELIMO in the early years of independence. Between 1980 and late 1986 it sought to persuade and later to force Jehovah’s Witnesses to support the war
effort. RENAMO’s attempts to make concessions and to negotiate were unsuccessful, and failed to intimidate Jehovah’s Witnesses even through brutal murders and beatings. This religious group refused to relinquish their pacifist and non-political stance and instead chose to relocate to other parts of Mozambique free of RENAMO or left for Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia.

With regard to traditional religious Graphs, the core of RENAMO’s motivating ideology in its dealings with the peasantry during the civil war was expressed in a religious idiom rooted in traditional African ancestor worship. The central political propaganda refrain of RENAMO military commanders in the field was that the war they were waging was a “war of the spirits” in which FRELIMO was condemned for having turned its back on Mozambican religious traditions. RENAMO, on the other hand, was portrayed as being in an alliance with the ancestral spirits in a war to return Mozambique to its traditions and ancestral ways (Roesch, 1992). According to Wilson (1992), this “war of the spirits” in Mozambique was RENAMO’s version of ZANLA’s programme in the Zimbabwe liberation war (Ranger, 1985; Kriger, 1992; Lan, 1985). After all, the Rhodesians had originally trained RENAMO in ZANLA methods and imparted a range of other methodological techniques, such as the “majubas” auxiliaries, and the use of “mhondoro” “lion spirit” mediums (Wilson, 1992). The use of ancient religious and ritualistic symbols served to facilitate the process of guerrilla legitimacy.

3.3.3. Authoritarianism vs. democracy

When Mozambique gained its independence in 1975, FRELIMO asserted its own vision of national unity based on a socialist ideology and programmes that had been developed during the liberation struggle, swiftly consolidating the one-party rule and implementing a range of other measures to limit opposition and establish control over the populace (Naidu, 2001). With this socialist agenda, FRELIMO committed itself to centralizing the economy and political decision-making. The centralization of governance was enshrined in the 1975 constitution, and implemented by FRELIMO in 1977 (Cahen, 1987, 1990; Carbone, 2003a, 2003b).

To extend its control to the rural areas and to the peasants, FRELIMO introduced communal villages and collective farms. The creation of communal villages reflected a
genuine anxiety about the possibility of peasants being beyond state control. As Samora Machel put it:

The communal villages are a political instrument because they unite and organize us and thus enable us to exercise power... We must realise that if we are dispersed and disorganised we will not be able to exercise power... (Noticias, 26.10.82)

To avoid peasants being beyond state control, FRELIMO began increasing pressure on the peasantry to abandon its traditionally dispersed way of life and move into communal villages. As a result, peasant confidence in FRELIMO declined rapidly. The vast majority of peasants were simply unwilling to abandon their ancestral homes and move into the highly centralised resettlement schemes that FRELIMO wanted them to occupy (Roesch, 1992). In the early years of the communal village programme in central Mozambique, peasant resistance to resettlement took the form of formally agreeing to move into communal villages, and even building homes in the villages, while still continuing to live in their former residences. This strategy, which was employed in many other areas of the country in which peasants opposed resettlement, was at best only temporarily effective. After 1980, FRELIMO began using increasingly coercive measures to force peasants to move into communal villages. In some areas, people’s homes were destroyed and whole families were forcibly resettled into communal villages (Roesch, 1992; Pereira, 1996; Geffray, 1991) As a result, people became increasingly disenchanted with FRELIMO and certain strata of the peasants became much more receptive to RENAMO’s propaganda against communal villages.

From 1977 to 1990 several measures were implemented by FRELIMO in order to ensure defence and control of the communal villages. The first step in this process consisted of controlling the villagers’ movements. All the inhabitants in the communal villages were to be registered, and everybody was to have a special identity card issued by the local administration or by the military. Roads and houses inside the villages were to be named and numbered. Population movements from village to village or from village to fields were to be strictly monitored by the militia.24

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24 In tandem with the implementation of the villagization programme the government trained one thousand local militia as a way to control and protect villagers in communal villages.
FRELIMO also restructured the colonial local governance system by introducing new structures in the “tribal areas”. Thus, “tribal areas” which were under the control of traditional authorities, were put under the authority of the dynamising groups, and party secretaries. FRELIMO leadership came to view and portray chiefs as corrupt opportunists who had profited personally from their roles as tax collectors, labour recruiters and local police agents.

By attempting to destroy the colonial administrative organisation in rural areas, FRELIMO wanted to ensure its control of rural communities. One of their strategies was to remove forces that they believed were collaborators or that might prove to be obstacles in their revolutionary project. President Samora Machel claimed that FRELIMO had destroyed the very essence of Mozambique society, its ethnic structures and consciousness:

“"We killed the tribe to give birth to the nation."” (Hoile, 1989).

The establishment of communal villages and new administrative structures by FRELIMO was felt and seen by some peasants as a direct attack on the traditional life and organization of the rural population. Most of the peasants who felt this way about FRELIMO's rural policy were classified as contra-revolutionary and were killed without trial or sent to re-education camps.

As a way of eliciting support for its war, RENAMO targeted every aspect of FRELIMO's rural policies and programmes. It demolished communal villages and abolished collective production. Anyone associated with FRELIMO such as party militia, secretaries, village presidents and district administrators, was attacked and killed. RENAMO encouraged peasants and their chiefs to return to their traditional lands.

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25 The exclusion of traditional authorities from power created space for those who had never enjoyed the possibility of social and political positions under the old system.

26 When the Portuguese established their administrative structures in rural areas, chiefs and their subordinates occupied the lowest rungs of the state political hierarchy. Their duties were to settle domestic conflicts concerning land and marriage, collect taxes and maintain order. Traditional authorities were further motivated to provide labourers to local private settler farms and regional plantations by receiving commission for the labourers they provided. Many chiefs used “Chibalo labour” on their own individual agricultural fields. In specific areas of Mozambique, where people cultivated cotton, chiefs supervised and managed cotton growing. Chiefs distributed seeds and pesticides, and made sure that producers planted on time, weeded at periodic intervals and harvested properly. Along with company agents, chiefs also registered cotton growers and supplied the sacks for carrying the crop to markets. They had considerable power to adjudicate land disputes within the family sector and to allocate additional land in the event that producers wished to expand areas under cultivation (Pitcher, 1998).
During the 1994 and 1999 election campaigns, RENAMO portrayed FRELIMO as an authoritarian movement and attacked it for the social, economic, cultural and political crimes it committed against the people of Mozambique under the one-party system. Personalities such as Dhlakama, Vincente Ululu, Raul Domingos, David Alone and their colleagues held public rallies throughout the country, reminding people of the evils of the one-party state. These included detention without trial, mysterious deaths, suppression of religious beliefs, the abolition of traditional leadership, the villagization programme and the nationalization of private property. FRELIMO was portrayed as an authoritarian and Marxist-Leninist movement that would never change its ideology and the RENAMO party president, Dhlakama, was portrayed as the true father of democracy.

3.3.4. Command economy vs. market-oriented economy

FRELIMO was strongly influenced by socialist values. One of the changes they brought about was the introduction of a centralised economy. Jobs were lifelong jobs, the labour market did not exist, and prices were subsidised and controlled by the state and education and health care were free. But, as the Mozambique economy began to stagnate in the mid-1980s as a result of a decreasing budget and balance-of-payment deficits, stagnant growth and delayed social improvements, the Mozambican government decided to adopt a market economy which was to play a crucial role in the transformation from a one-party system. The implementation of a market economy introduced new types of values that challenged collectivist beliefs and communal ownership systems.

Despite chances implemented by FRELIMO government regards economic policy in 1980s, RENAMO tried to portray FRELIMO as a party which emphasis socialist and communitarian values. RENAMO promised to abandon the command economy and to re-introduce the rights of private property owners. The party further promised to return all nationalized property and establish a good relationship with the business people who fled to neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Some went to live in Portugal and Germany. As a way of eliciting support for its war, RENAMO targeted most of these people who fled to neighbouring countries as well as to those who were disenchanted with FRELIMO's nationalization policy.

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27 It should be noted that when FRELIMO introduced a central economic policy, many middle class people and owners of the nationalized companies fled to neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Some went to live in Portugal and Germany. As a way of eliciting support for its war, RENAMO targeted most of these people who fled to neighbouring countries as well as to those who were disenchanted with FRELIMO's nationalization policy.
had abandoned Mozambique in the early days of independence. The same types of discourse were also used during election campaigns. RENAMO argued that if elected into government, the party would “defend a market economy based on private initiative, where freedom and respect for social and human rights are indispensable conditions for the well-being of all Mozambicans” (Pereira, 2007).

3.3.5. Hypotheses regarding cultural values

These types of conflicts with regard to cultural values have the potential to impact on partisanship. Thus, the following core hypotheses will be tested:

- **Communitarianism vs. individualist values.** The more communitarian a person’s values are, the more likely they are to identify with the opposition.
- **Secularism vs. religious values.** The more religious a person’s values are, the more likely they are to identify with the opposition.
- **Authoritarian vs. democratic values.** The more authoritarian a person’s values are, the more likely they are to identify with FRELIMO.
- **Command economy vs. market-oriented economy.** The more a person’s values are oriented towards a command economy, the more likely they are to identify with FRELIMO.

3.4. Economic evaluations

In contrast to sociological theory, proponents of rational approaches argue that voters’ decisions are based on their evaluation of performance rather than their position in the social structure. Voters reward incumbent governments for good performance and punish them for bad performance (Fiorina, 1978, 1981; 2003).

Voters acquire information from looking at their own direct or indirect experiences as a basis for evaluating government performance (Lau, 2006; Popkin, 1994; Mattes, 2005; Mattes et al., 1999a). Many Mozambicans have lived under different types of economic policies and know what changes each brought about in their lives. They have formed opinions of the advantages and disadvantages of centralized versus liberal economies, and of single and multiparty politics. During election times voters can use what Popkin
(1994) calls “low information reasoning” to decide which party to support. Achen (1992) concluded the following:

Voters do not ignore the information they have, do not fabricate information they do not have, and do not choose what they do not want. Thus, the voters need be neither geniuses nor saints. They are required only to do the best with the information they have. (p.198)

Thus, economic performance evaluations may appear central to determine the sources of partisan identification in Mozambique. With relatively high levels of poverty and dissatisfaction with the economy, Mozambican voters may not think about their social identities when it comes to choose which party to support. Rather, voters might raise the following questions when they go to the polling stations: How did I/my family benefit from economic reforms? How much food does my family have in their house? Why has the price of matches, salt and cigarettes increased in the past year? How many job opportunities has the government created in the past few years? How many jobs is the government planning to create in the next year? Who was responsible for my community’s economic problems in the past years?

3.4.1. Unemployment and economic dissatisfaction

Mozambique is one of the world’s poorest countries. Notwithstanding the fact that over the past years it has had one of the strongest rates of economic growth in Africa, this growth has never been reflected in the life of Mozambican citizens. Fauvet (2000) comments on the economic growth in Mozambique as follows:

If there is growth currently in Mozambique, asked the UN Development Programme’s 1998 National Human Development Report on Mozambique, what is growing and for whom? The growth of absolute poverty for the great majority, or the growth of ostentatious incomes for a small minority? The growth of social and civil security, or the growth of crime? Economic growth that promotes the human development of Mozambicans, or growth that is exported to soften the country’s indebtedness? The growth of democracy and participation, or the growth of political apathy and abstention? The equitable growth of human
development, or the inhuman deepening of inequalities between the sexes, and between social, ethnic and racial groups? (p.12)

Poverty is higher in rural areas (71%) where 80% of the population lives than in urban areas (62%). Recent official data show reduction in poverty for rural areas from 71% to 55% (i.e. 16%) and for urban areas from 62% to 52% (i.e. 10%) (INE, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2004; Fox et al., 2005; Tvedten et al., 2006). Looking at regional and provincial levels in more detail, the incidence of poverty is higher in the provinces of Inhambane and Maputo, and lowest in the province of Sofala and the City of Maputo. According to a UNDP (2005) study, the province of Sofala has seen the most dramatic reduction in the level of poverty. Mozambique’s northernmost province of Cabo Delgado and southernmost province of Maputo are the only provinces that have seen an increase in poverty (Fox et al., 2005; Tvedten et al., 2006).

Although the radical transformation of the Mozambican economy has resulted in increased foreign investment, Mozambique has nonetheless experienced the economic hardship associated with the transition to a market economy. There are no reliable graphs on unemployment, but estimates range from 50 to 70%, while annual inflation rates vary between 5 and 15%. On the other hand, market reforms have increased access to basic food supplies, reducing what Rose et al. (2002) called “window shops” because high prices restricted household consumption. Even so, overall household incomes have dropped for many Mozambicans in recent years. A study carried out by UNCTAD (2002) used a “dollar a day” income to define the poverty line, and on this basis estimated that 20% of the Mozambican population was living on less than one dollar a day, and about 80% on less than two dollars a day.

During the electoral campaigns, RENAMO leaders attempted to capitalize on dissatisfaction with the pace of economic growth, and the ongoing cost of price hikes, unemployment, inflation and uncertainty about household livelihoods. The party focused on the negative aspects of FRELIMO’s performance, particularly unemployment and poverty. For instance, during the rallies RENAMO leader asked the crowds the following questions:
Who is the father of poverty in Mozambique? Do you know? I will tell you who the father is. It is not the World Bank and Monetary Funds. It is not RENAMO guerrillas.

The father of poverty and unemployment is FRELIMO and its leaders. They are the people who decided to nationalize the private companies. They are the people who said to the smaller farmers and business people link up with the plantations companies to leave Mozambique in 24 hours (Pereira, 2007).

In retaliation to the RENAMO campaign, FRELIMO leaders pointed out the dangers that Mozambique would face if RENAMO won the elections, which included a lack of skills and human resources to manage the country, unclear policies, and international distrust of the party, particularly from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In doing this Chissano wanted to portray the RENAMO Electoral Union as an incompetent political party that would take the country backwards. To show how the opposition could be detrimental for the country, different songs were created. For instance, during the FRELIMO rallies the following song was sung:

Dhlakama is a witch
Chissano is a father
RENAME is a witch
FRELIMO is a father
I will vote for Chissano
I will vote for FRELIMO
No vote for Dhlakama because he is a witch who can destroy the country
No vote for RENAMO (Pereira, 2007).

3.4.2. Clear-cut government and durable political parties

The economic model of voting is suitable for two-party systems like Britain and the United States, but is arguably less applicable to multiparty systems (Down, 1957). Although minor parties have contested all three democratic elections in Mozambique, the country exhibits a classic two-party system centred around FRELIMO and RENAMO. The country’s major political cleavage is between the two political forces that fought each other militarily and later obtained the best results in the 1994, 1999 and
2004 elections. The small parties that emerged after 1990 did not affect the main contenders for power in Mozambique. The small parties that managed to enter parliament in the 1999 and 2004 elections came through the backdoor, so to speak, via coalitions with RENAMO.28

In 1994 the first multiparty elections were held. In the propositional representative system based on the closed party lists with the constituencies comprising the 11 provinces of the country, FRELIMO failed, however, to score an absolute popular majority in the legislative elections, winning only 44.3% of the valid votes. But it was able to secure an absolute majority in parliament (with 129 seats out of a total of 250), since a clause in the constitution restricted representation to those parties receiving 5% or more of the popular vote. RENAMO effectively became the leading opposition party, its candidates securing 37.8% of the vote. Of the minor parties, only the UD qualified for representation in the legislature, receiving 5.1% of the vote.29 FRELIMO leader Joaquim Chissano won the presidential election, receiving 53.66% of the valid votes against 33.7% in favour of RENAMO leader, Afonso Dhlakama. There were many other candidates but all fared poorly: PADEMO leader Wehia Ripua came in third with a mere 2.8% of the valid votes cast.

Mozambique's second multiparty legislative elections were held in 1999: FRELIMO received 48.5% of valid votes cast, RENAMO-EU 38.8%, and others 12.7%. FRELIMO leader Chissano was re-elected as president with 52.2% of the popular vote; RENAMO leader Dhlakama gained 47.7%. Voter turnout was about 70%—well down from 1994—with 8.4% blank votes and 3.2% invalid votes.30 These election results show an even more bipartisan pattern than the one obtained in 1994; neither the UD nor any other minor party or grouping attained the 5% threshold to qualify for a seat in parliament.

28 In the 1994 and 1999 elections, smaller parties that did not pass the minimum threshold won 13% of the vote, which means that only 87% of the electorate was represented in parliament (Carbone, 2003).
29 Eighteen political parties and 12 presidential candidates registered for the 1994 elections. The political parties were AP, UNAMO, PT, FUMO-PCC, FRELIMO, SOL, PIMO, RENAMO, PRD, PACODE, PADEMO, PPPM, PCN and UD. The presidential candidates were Joaquim A Chissano, Afonso MM Dhlakama, Carlos A dos Reis, Carlos JM Jeque, Casimiro M Nhamitambo, Domingos AM Arouca, Jacob NS Sibindy, Mario FC Machele, Maximo DJ Dias, Padimbe MK Andrea, Vasco CM Alfaazema and Wehia M Ribua.
30 Nine political parties and a coalition of three parties registered for the 1999 parliamentary elections. These were PIMO, PALMO, FRELIMO, PT, PADELMIO, PANAOCC, SOL, PASOMO, PPLM (political parties) and UMO, UD and RENAMO-EU(coalition). The presidential candidates were Joaquim A Chissano and Afonso MM Dhlakama.
It was believed that the third multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections in 2004 would be highly competitive and that RENAMO-EU would provide a serious challenge to the ruling party, FRELIMO. In the end, however, RENAMO-EU and other minor parties did not perform well, with RENAMO-EU recording the biggest loss.\footnote{Fifteen political parties and five coalition parties registered for the 2004 parliamentary elections. These were FRELIMO, PDD; PT, PIMO, PALMO, SOL, PEC-PT, PASOMO, PARENA, PAREDE, PPD, PADELIMO and PAZS (political parties); RENAMO-EU, FAO, UD, MBC and USAMO (coalition parties). The CNE rejected two political parties (PAMOMO, PPLM), two coalitions (GO, BIS) and the only group of citizens (Democratic Movement for Social Change). PAMOMO was only noteworthy because its leader, Albano Maiope, was once a judge. The PPLM—which once called itself the Progressive Liberal Party of Mozambican religious communities, although not a single community supported it—is led by the eccentric Graph of Neves Serrano. Its most successful feat was to take $50,000 from a US-run trust fund for political parties in 1994, and then failed to provide a single candidate for that year’s elections. The were rejected by GO and BIS because they failed to register with the Ministry of Justice, while the stated argument for rejecting the Democratic Movement for Social Change was because, according to the law, no groups of citizens can stand for general elections.} FRELIMO again won the parliamentary elections, taking 62% of the votes (160 seats) compared to RENAMO-EU’s 30% (90 seats). FRELIMO’s Armando Guebuza was elected as president with 63.7% of the popular vote, while RENAMO leader Dhlakama won 31.7% of the vote.\footnote{The Constitutional Council accepted five of the eight presidential nominations for the 2004 elections. Three were rejected because they did not present at least 10,000 valid supporting signatures from registered voters. The five approved candidates were Armando Guebuza (FRELIMO), Afonso MM Dhlakama (RENAMO-EU), Raul Domingos (PDD), Carlos Reis (Coalition for Change and Good Government), and Jacob NS Sibindy (PIMO). The three rejected candidates were Neves Serrano (PPLM), Joaquim Nhota (PADELIMO), and Jose Chicuara Massinga (PANADE).} Under these electoral circumstances, voters are in no doubt about whether FRELIMO or RENAMO is responsible for the way the country is being governed, because of the fusion of executive and legislative authority in the hands of the majority party in parliament.

To reinforce the idea which political party is in power in Mozambique and therefore responsible for the country’s social-economic problems, RENAMO leaders in Sofala and Zambezia, asked the voters the following questions:

Who is in power in this country? Who manages the public companies in this country? Which party manages the donor’s money in this country? Which party leaders are involved in corruption in this country? You know that there are no other party parties in power, apart from FRELIMO. You know that FRELIMO members lead most of the public institutions and therefore if your father does not have job it is because of FRELIMO…If your hospitals in the rural areas do not have pills, dedicated nurses and medical doctors you have to blame FRELIMO
not RENAMO or PIMO. FRELIMO is the devil responsible for most of your problems. Vote RENAMO, we will change your life (Pereira, 2007).

In response, crowds chanted “FRELIMO”, “FRELIMO” and FRELIMO”. RENAMO leaders then said to the crowds, “now I know that you know which party is responsible for your problems and what you have to do is to go to the polling stations to vote against FRELIMO”.

Responding to the RENAMO discourse, Chissano announced in a rally in Sussundenga in Manica province:

These politicians who say they want to change, they’ve already shown us how they change things. The electricity line from Cahora Bassa to South Africa runs through here, in Sussundenga, and we saw how they changed that. The pylons were as they are now, standing up, but they brought them down. (AIM, 9th October 1999).

FRELIMO leaders also focused their campaign more on current issues and the party’s competence to govern. Chissano and other FRELIMO leaders argued that his party had thought about the solutions to Mozambique’s problems, and had been willing to put these into practice. He accused RENAMO of being “experts in nothing but destruction”, and asked crowds of voters how many schools, hospitals and roads they had had in their villages ten years earlier. Chissano then asked how many of these amenities had been built over the last ten years, and which party had brought water and electricity to their communities. In response, crowds chanted, “FRELIMO”, “FRELIMO” and FRELIMO”. Chissano then reminded the crowds of the devastating effects of RENAMO’s sabotage efforts during the war:

When you go home ask your conscience about what RENAMO did to your community, your families, colleagues and friends… Ask yourselves how many schools did this banditry group called RENAMO destroy? How many hospitals did they destroy? How many teachers, nurses and peasants did they kill? If you can’t remember because you were too young during the war period, ask your father or grandfather… They will tell you how dangerous this devil is called RENAMO (Pereira, 2007).
3.4.3. Hypotheses regarding economic evaluations

Thus, the rapid transition of the Mozambican economy, despite being classified by donors as a “success story”, has had negative consequences for the lives of many Mozambicans, where unemployment and inflation have increased and the standard of living has dropped. Thus, the following core hypotheses will be tested:

- Pocketbook voting hypothesis (current, retrospective, prospective). Identification with FRELIMO is positively related to an individual’s present, past and future positive economic assessment. The core pocketbook hypotheses are inverted for opposition and independence. Identification with opposition or independence is negatively related to an individual’s present, past and future positive economic assessment.

- Sociotropic voting hypothesis (current, retrospective, prospective). Identification with FRELIMO is positively related to present, past and future positive economic assessment nationwide. These core hypotheses are inverted for opposition and independence. Identification with opposition or independence is negatively related to present, past and future positive economic assessment nationwide.

3.5. Political performance evaluations

Political performance is part of the state function in order to provide political goods to the citizens. According to Besancon (2003), political goods are defined as the capability of political systems to perform vital functions such as human security, rule of law, political and civil freedoms, medical and health care, schools and education communication networks, money, bank system, fiscal and institutional contexts and support for civil society, or regulating the sharing of the environmental commons (see also Rotberg, 2004).

Voters do not only look for the delivery of economic goods but also political goods. A high level of satisfaction with the way that democracy—or political institutions—works increases the probability of voters supporting the incumbent party. When citizens’
expectations of a government’s political performance remain unfulfilled through successive administrations, growing distrust of government institutions results. This can lead to a loss of the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens and give voters reason to look for alternative parties (While et al., 1997).

The issue here is how can the political performance explanation explain partisan identification in Mozambique? As with economic evaluation, voters are not required to watch the news on television, listen to the radio or read newspapers or have formal education in order to get information on “political goods”. Voters can use their daily experience in dealing with political institutions such as local municipalities, or their contacts with government officials or elected representatives, to garner information. If they do not have personal experience, voters can still get the information that they want from personal contact with their social network: family, friends, neighbours and colleagues (Popkin, 1994; Sniderman et al., 1991; Lupia et al., 2000).

Voters may raise the following questions to assess political performance: How did my family and I benefit from political reforms? How well are the new political institutions working? How much freedom has been gained by the collapse of the one-party system? Who can be trusted to represent my interests? Are those in power corrupt? How easy or difficult is it now to get help from government bureaucrats? Is the government able to enforce the law? Is the government more or less effective in delivery of services? How often is my ethnic group treated unfairly by government? How often are citizens treated unequally? Do our elected representatives look after the interests of the citizens, and do they listen to what ordinary citizens have to say?

3.5.1. Accessibility of public goods

Voters can use different strategies to evaluate how much improvement has been made by FRELIMO in terms of political issues such as civil rights, government’s trustworthiness, and leadership performance, but also in terms of government services provided to facilitate civic processes, such as obtaining identity documents (birth certificates, driver’s licenses or passports), voter registration cards, a place in primary school for a child, household services (like running water, electricity or telephone) and help from the police. According the World Bank Development Indicators (2000-2005), government
effectiveness in Mozambique is improving in a number of areas of human development as illustrated in the Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1: Government effectiveness regarding public goods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, total (years)</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility rate, total (births per women)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>151.6</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of HIV, total (% population ages 15-49)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School enrolment, primary (% gross)</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>104.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School enrolment, secondary (% gross)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School enrolment, tertiary (% gross)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved water sources (% of population with access)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, 2005

Despite an improvement in government effectiveness in a number of different areas of human development, RENAMO attacked the poor services offered by the FRELIMO government. RENAMO argued that if elected into government, the party would “defend a good quality of public services”.

### 3.5.2. Delivery of political freedoms

A major difference between the previous and incumbent regimes is in the differing values and goods associated with freedom. Supporters of the one-party system argue that “true” freedom is impossible under capitalist systems, because the system creates a false consciousness among workers (White et al., 1997). The authoritarian apparatus of the state imposes severe restrictions on what citizens can choose to do or say, preventing people from expressing their opinion about leaders, the state or other political issues. By contrast, democratic regimes operate on the theory that citizens should be free from obstruction by the state: they are free to determine their actions or express their opinions,
or criticize the government for poor performance. Soon after independence in 1975 and the implementation of "garrison socialism", a gradual erosion of human rights started (Pereira, 1997). At first this involved the withdrawal of certain "first generation" rights (freedom of expression, association, and movement) in the name of socialist development, which was supposed to give priority to "second generation" rights such as the right to education, health and a decent standard of living. With the intensification of the Cold War and the destabilization policies of neighbouring South Africa which provided support for the rebel party RENAMO (Vines, 1991, 1996), however, increasingly harsh measures were adopted to curb what was seen as "the enemy within". These measures included "Operation Production" by which the urban unemployed--including many single women accused of being prostitutes--were shipped out to be more productive in the distant province of Niassa, "re-education camps" where thousands were banished to without due legal process, and detention without trial, flogging and the death penalty. The Grupos Dinamizadores (dynamizing groups), which had originally been conceived as community organizers, aided the much feared East German-trained SNASP in hunting out "internal enemies". Even the Law Faculty of the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Eduardo Mondlane University) (UEM) was closed down in 1984 for reasons which have never been made explicit, but which certainly had to do with a desire to eradicate this potential focus of opposition to the regime. During the civil war RENAMO tried to build its social base around those who were discontent with the authoritarian style of FRELIMO. Generally, during the war, re-education camps became one of the key targets of RENAMO attacks. RENAMO became an outspoken defender of those who were in re-education camps, who were given 24 hours to leave the country and who were marginalised by FRELIMO rural policy (Carbone, 2003; Cahen, 1998).

In young democracies with strong legacies of authoritarianism, delivery of political freedoms usually becomes a key issue. This was evident during the first African election campaigns, political debates and the polling process. In Mozambique, during the 1994 and 1999 election campaigns, RENAMO tried to portray themselves as “fathers of political freedom”. RENAMO leader, Afonso Dhlakama, held public rallies in the central part of the country and reminded voters about FRELIMO’s post-independence policy regarding political freedom. This included tight political control, exclusive party-state ownership of media, institutionalized censorship, informal party directives, and unbounded propaganda which made the media the instruments of the FRELIMO
government’s ideological mass persuasion associations (Pereira, 2007). The political environment did not allow political parties to operate without intimidation, and there was control and elimination of critical voices, control of public spaces, and re-educations camps for those who did not agree with FRELIMO policy. FRELIMO was accused to be an authoritarian movement that would never change its behaviour.

During the electoral campaign, RENAMO’s strategists decided to rely on greater numbers of political activists from the groups that were sent to re-education camps and members of families that had lost family members because they seemed to have disagreed with FRELIMO post-independence policy and from those who fled the country. RENAMO activists were instructed to speak mainly in local languages and to tell the crowds about their experience in the re-education camps, losing family members or living in exile for many years. In doing this, Dhlakama attempted to remind voters, particularly those who had suffered hardships under the one-party system, of the atrocities of FRELIMO and portrayed his party as one with a strong commitment to political freedom.

FRELIMO in turn focused on its role in liberating Mozambique and the benefits gained from the termination of colonialism. In addition, at the local level many FRELIMO leaders told the population that Dhlakama was a bandit, thief and assassin, and that RENAMO was a political party that had killed many people and destroyed schools, hospitals, companies, roads, and bridges (Pereira, 2007).

3.5.3. Corruption

The issue of corruption is especially relevant in Mozambique, opportunities for which have increased in the wake of rapid privatization and economic growth (Hanlon, 1996). Corruption in Mozambique has gone far beyond the prosaic level of greased palms and kickbacks in government contracts. Powerful political Graphs in Mozambique, or persons with family ties to leadership, work in active co-operation with organized crime syndicates in the region, using Mozambique as a channel for money-laundering, drug manufacturing and smuggling, and trafficking in stolen vehicles (Gastrow et al., 2002; on corruption see also Hanlon, 2001, 2002; Etica, 2001; USAID, 2002).
With the democratization process, corruption and transparency have become key issues for public debate in Mozambique. Media organizations cover most of the corruption scandals and offer response space to independent analysts and politicians. For instance, Carlos Cardoso’s newsletter, *Metical*, aggressively covers financial scandals and other controversial issues, particularly related to massive bank fraud. Despite media efforts, no real debate over political solutions to corruption has emerged among the different political parties. However, opposition parties have attempted to bring up the issue of corruption during the election campaigns. In terms of corruption, RENAMO supporters made extensive use of songs to discredit the ruling party and the words of the songs were usually defamatory of President Chissano and his colleagues.

RENAMO’s party strategy was to portray itself as a party with a clean record in terms of corruption in order to appeal to as many voters as possible who were unhappy with the current regime. In contrast, FRELIMO avoided public discussion of corruption in its campaign, concentrating instead on government achievements in the areas of education, health, infrastructure, and the economy.

3.5.4. Hypotheses regarding political performance evaluation

In summary, the introduction of a multiparty democracy in Mozambique, despite being classified by donors as a “success story”, has not yet been able to meet the political expectations held by the Mozambicans—for example, there has been no end to corruption, law enforcement has not been improved and elected representatives are still not held accountable. Thus, the following core hypotheses will be tested:

- Regime performance (satisfaction with democracy, the extent of democracy, levels of delivery of freedom and perceived corruption). Identification with FRELIMO is positively related to positive regime assessment.
- Leaders’ performance (presidential performance, performance of government leaders, representatives’ responsiveness and trust in the president). Identification with FRELIMO is positively related to positive leadership assessment.
- State performance (law enforcement, access to public goods and trust in political institutions). Identification with FRELIMO is positively related to positive state performance assessment.
3.6. Cognitive factors

Uninformed voters can still reach decisions based on “free information” provided by their social environment. The cognitive approach highlights the extent to which those citizens with differing amounts of information may make different decisions or make their decisions in different ways. The question thus arises to what extent is the cognitive awareness thesis really important in shaping attitudes and voting, when compared to other aspects? Does the extent and nature of media access or education have some bearing on how voters assess the government’s economic or political performance?

Mozambicans have a low level of formal education and, with the exception of radio broadcasts, they also have a low level of exposure to the media. Access to news media and education are key motivators of social change. News media is also one of the channels that informs people about the way things work outside their environment and this creates an awareness of the political process. Whatever their level of education and media exposure, Mozambicans now enjoy unlimited opportunities for awareness in the form of discussions with friends, colleagues or neighbours. The political freedoms that Mozambicans have enjoyed since 1990 allow them to some extent to discuss “hot” topics freely with others, to write letters to newspapers or to participate in radio talk shows. In addition, democratization has also led to the flourishing of local forums in rural areas where citizens and local representatives are invited to discuss issues that are relevant to their communities.

3.6.1. Expansion of mass media

Despite attempts to suppress the freedom of the press, coupled with restrictions on access to information, Mozambique still enjoys a relatively free press compared to some other African countries. Freedom Houses (2006) designates Mozambique as “partly free” in terms of press freedom with a score of 43, which places it at the upper end of the “partly free” category (scores between 31-60 rank as “partly free”, with lower numbers reflecting the levels of freedom). This score is, however, lower than that of Zambia (64), Malawi (55) and Tanzania (50).

There are a large number of media organizations in different sectors, and the diversity of these organizations is reflected in their ownership profiles: 34% of the media is owned by
the State (particularly in the radio and television sector), 36% by private and commercial interests, and 28% by private non-profit organizations, such as NGOs, political parties and religious organizations (Bonin, 2001). However, the independent print media, as well as state-owned and private sector television, still reach only a small fraction of the population in Mozambique. Newspaper readership is low in rural areas, where circulation is limited, and among the urban poor who cannot afford to buy daily papers and may be illiterate.

Radio is therefore the most effective communication medium, given the wide area covered by Radio Mozambique, which broadcasts in several local languages. An increasing number of national and regional FM stations are now broadcasting to a larger national audience. In addition to a number of national and regional FM stations, there are a number of community radio stations spread around the country. Basically, there are four kinds of community radio in Mozambique: those set up by the Catholic Church, through the Mass Communications Institute (ICS), those set up by the Catholic Church, but with a community orientation, those set up by civic associations, with donor funding, and one municipal radio in Nacala, Nampula province (Sales, 2003).

All these different channels of communication provide an interactive forum for discussing Mozambican public affairs, from the local to the national level. This has strong implications with regard to creating political spaces for other actors in the public arena.

Apart from local newspapers, radio and television, the Mozambican elite and the middle class can now gain access to different types of information from satellite television as well as e-mail and cellphones. These new channels of communication expose Mozambicans to new ideas and opinions outside the control of the ruling party or political groups inside the country.

Most of the people who have access to information from different types of news media serve as opinion leaders who diffuse vital information to those who do not participate in these types of forums about civil liberties, political parties, political rights and the operationalisation of multiparty systems. It is common in Mozambique to encounter

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33 The impact of the media is also limited due to constraints in accessing resources, equipment and financing, and a lack of trained professionals.
people disseminating information they got from the radio or newspapers about ordinary things like the price of beans or electricity or other issues to those who do not have access to the mass media.

3.6.2. Education

Although the Portuguese invested heavily in education in the last decade of their rule, for centuries before that education for Africans was restricted in Mozambique as a matter of policy. It is estimated that 90% of Mozambicans were illiterate at the time of independence in 1975 (Hanlon, 1984). The first Mozambican government mounted a literacy campaign and introduced compulsory education for children from ages 6 to 12, or for a total of seven years. Schooling, however, was disrupted by the civil war, continuing only in the towns that escaped major conflict. The 1997 census shows that 60% of people older than 15 are illiterate. While only 19% of urban men are illiterate, 49% of Mozambicans nationwide aged between 19 and 25 are illiterate. The Graph rises to 96.2% amongst rural women over the age of 60. The vast majority (78%) either never went to school, or never concluded their primary education; further, 18% of adults concluded their primary education, but did not advance to secondary school. Just 3% of adults have attended secondary school, technical schools or higher education, and only 0.1% holds a university degree (INE, 1999).

Education is a primary socialization agent, that is, educational institutions transfer political values and information to pupils. This form of transference of values and awareness also impacts on the broader community around the institutions. Pupils serve as strong opinion leaders in that they disseminate vital information about the political systems, political parties, and the quality of health and education systems.

3.6.3. Political involvement

Apart from information, a vital basis of an empowered democratic citizenry is the willingness of people to be involved in public affairs. People with a high level of political involvement are more able to make decisions based on careful evaluation of available choices. People are able to evaluate government performance through the lens of their immediate environment-personal experience or household circumstance, but
involvement in politics provides people with alternative information they can use to place their own circumstances within a national context.

In Mozambique, local and international organizations are encouraging citizens to become directly involved in the political and policy process through civic education. These organisations provide information about civic rights and duties, and create a forum where citizens and elected representatives can interact. In addition, some local organizations also are helping citizens and their leaders at the community level in terms of lobbying, petitions and using the news media to express their vision.

Thus, political information can be conveyed through typical institutions like schools or via the news media. Derived from the theory of cognitive awareness, the following hypothesis will be tested:

- Greater information use will lead voters to emphasise different criteria when identifying with political parties.

It is expected that Mozambicans with high levels of political information are more likely to choose a party based on a political and economic assessment rather than social-structural paradigms. In contrast, those who have low levels of information will be more likely to use social-structural paradigms. This expectation is based on the fact that society in Mozambique is transitional, characterized by unfrozen social cleavages, the lack of a civic culture and new political parties without strong ties to their potential voters.

**Table 3 2: Summary of the hypotheses to be tested**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected correlation with Party Identification (PID)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social cleavages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values cleavages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive awareness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER IV: MEASURING PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION

4.1. Introduction

As outlined in chapter 2, partisan identification is a central concept in the study of voting behaviour. Partisan identification has been described by one group of scholars as an effective attachment to a group which is learned at a young age, persists throughout the course of the person's life cycle, and is exogenous with respect to short-term political events (Campbell et al., 1960; Miller et al., 1996). However, “revisionist” groups has conceptualized party identification as a composite of short-term forces evaluation, and believe that partisanship is updated incrementally in response to candidate evaluation, to short-term forces evaluation, or relative issue positions (Down, 1957; Key, 1967; Fiorina, 1981).

Since the focus of this research is on partisan identification, this study does not seek to explain voting behaviour itself. However, most research includes partisan identification as a key predictor of the actual vote. Thus, today few serious scholars would attempt to explain voting without reference to something like partisan identification. Partisanship provides structure and meaning for individual belief systems. It provides a perceptual screen that helps individuals organize the complexities of politics (Campbell et al., 1960). Partisanship is also ultimately heuristic; because it acts as a reference structure for the evaluation of new political stimuli (what position does my party take on this issue?). Stronger partisans are more likely to make their political choice or to vote for the party with which they identify, and to be stable in their party choice over time, than are their weaker counterparts; and non-partisans (or independents) are more likely to make their political decisions based on their assessment of the parties’ policies. However, they are also less likely to actually vote. Party attachments are also a stimulus for engagement in campaigns and elections.

The Afrobarometer survey can provide clues for understanding partisanship in Mozambique. The variables used in this study are indicators used in both classic and more recent studies on electoral behaviour around the world. The Afrobarometer survey data contains detailed measures of the socio-economic characteristics of Mozambicans.
that allow for the construction of theoretically and empirically valid measures of class, religion, age, and gender, as well as of economic and political attitudes relevant for an assessment of partisan identification in Mozambique. In other words, the Afrobarometer fits almost all of our needs, including a measure of party identification, despite the fact that it does not have a measure of the vote, particularly in the first and second rounds.

Different factors determined why the Afrobarometer Round 2 data was used without a measure of the vote along with additional items on elections. One reason was that when this research started (2003) the Afrobarometer Round 3 was not available. This only became available in 2005 after which the preliminary analysis had already been carried out. Secondly, partisanship is strongly linked with vote (we can assume that virtually all partisans will support the party they are close to). Therefore, understanding what makes voters feel close to certain parties is a critical first step in explaining how they vote (Ferree et al., 2007:4).

The Afrobarometer survey also helps to test whether partisan identification in Mozambique resembles the Campbell et al. model developed three decades ago. Do Mozambicans perceive their partisan identification as psychological attachment to political parties, as argued by the Michigan School, or more as a Fiorina-style (1967) “standing choice” or a Keys-style (1981) “running tally”? To address these questions, a number of different statistical tests will be run on the Afrobarometer data, such as face validity and reliability. These tests will allow the researcher to assess the quality of the measures in terms of consistency and validity, which is important, given that the concept of partisan identification is newly implemented in the electoral behaviour debate in Mozambique as well as in Africa.

Section 4.2 will explore the criteria for validity in order to see if the measure of party identification in Mozambique is related to measures of partisanship in different parts of the world. Section 4.3 will outline the criteria for reliability as a way of assessing the consistency of a measure of party identification over time in Mozambique. Section 4.4 will examine different types of statistical analyses that will be applied in this thesis and in the final section the variables will be operationalized that will be used to test the five voting behaviour theories in the Mozambican context.
4.2. Representativeness of the sample

The issue of sample representativeness is one of the key elements of reliability. Merely having a large number of people responding to the survey is not enough. The way in which respondents are selected forms the basis for the reliability of the data produced.

A representative sample is a sample whose characteristics reflect those of the population from which it is drawn. The Afrobarometer survey consisted of a representative, random sample of 1,400 adults of 18 years and above (see Appendix A). A multi-stage, stratified, area cluster sampling technique was used to draw a representative sample from the voting population, giving each Mozambican of voting age an equal chance of being included in the sample. The distribution of the sample was based on the 1997 census. Selection of wards and enumeration areas (EAs) was based on the 2000 Mozambique master sample of the National Statistical Institute (central statistical office) which identified 1510 EAs. Out of these, 760 are rural while 750 are urban.

The master sample was designed to be used for different demographics and socio-economic surveys. The sample allowed for inferences to be made about the national population with a margin of sampling error of no more than 2.5% (or a confidence level of 95%). In other words, in 19 cases out of 20, the results obtained from the sample differ by no more than 2.5 percentage points in either direction from the results that would have been obtained had the entire adult population been interviewed. This objective was achieved by strictly applying random selection methods at every stage of sampling, including the selection of enumeration areas, households and respondents. The area stratification increased the likelihood that distinctive ethnic or language groups were included in the sample. The urban-rural stratification is a means of ensuring that these localities are represented in their correct proportions. However, in the case of Mozambique, disproportionate oversamples were drawn in rural areas and provinces as a way to ensure proportionality. The reason for using disproportionate oversamples was that in Mozambique erratic and recurrent population movements occur due to periodic natural disasters and due to an outdated population census and cartographical and mapping references. As censuses are taken every ten years, census data quickly becomes out of date. Often the National Institute of Statistical (INS) will provide population projections for the ten-year period between censuses. However, these projections are based on assumptions that may not reflect the true situation. For example, the
assumption made by many INS projections that mortality rates will continue to fall has been proven to be false by the impact of HIV on mortality. Equally, projections for small areas within countries (district level and below) are liable to have a wide margin of error. Therefore, all interviews were then post-weighted based on the most estimates that attempt to update the existing census data.

Interviews were conducted across all 11 provinces, and rural and urban areas within each province. An average of 12 interviews per site was conducted. In order to make sure that women’s voices were fully reflected, every second interview was with a female respondent.

Interviews were conducted in Portuguese (the official language) and in four other national languages (Changana, Sena, Ndau and Macua). The research instrument was a questionnaire containing structured and semi-structured items administered face-to-face to respondents by teams of trained interviewers. To adapt the questionnaire to local conditions, all items were pre-tested in trial interviews in urban and rural areas. The original Portuguese version was translated into 4 relevant home languages (Changana, Sena, Ndau and Macua) and all interviews were administered in the language of the respondent’s choice.

The representativeness of respondents can be compared with a number of characteristics in Mozambique’s census of 1997. The sample shows to some extent a good fit for gender, age, provinces, and urban/rural divisions (see Table 4.1):
Table 4.1: Sample distributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Weighted</th>
<th>Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niassa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Delgado</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambezia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tete</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo province</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo City</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urbanization</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45+</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional/formal houses</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional house/hut</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary structures/shack</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat in block of flats</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary or high</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not working</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No wage</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage earner</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3. Criteria for validity

4.3.1 Face validity

Face validity is concerned with whether a measure appears to cover its related concept. Does it seem like a reasonable way to gain the information the research is attempting to
obtain? Does it seem well designed? With regard to partisan identification, one of the
first problems that arises when doing research on partisanship outside the United States
or Western democracies is to actually be sure that the whole phenomenon that is the
focus of the study is being measured in a meaningful way. In this sense, it is crucial to
examine how the question of partisanship has been posed in Mozambique. To what
extent do the questions that measure partisan identification in Mozambique relate to the
larger notion of partisan identification in different parts of the world? How does the
wording of the Afrobarometer questionnaire compare with questions in other studies like
the American National Electoral Studies (ANES), the Comparative Survey on Electoral
Studies (CSES) and the Comparative National Electoral Project (CNEP)?

The measurement of party identification has long been a focus of scholarly
disagreement. Debates have centered around how applicable the notion of party
identification is in countries outside the United States, and what survey questions should
be used to obtain comparable measures of party identification for cross-national analyses
(Eijk et al., 1993; Weisberg, 1999; Garry, 2006; Brader et al., 2001; Rose et al., 2002).

Around the world, scholars have used different questions to measure the concept of
partisan identification. Since 1952 most academic studies in the United States based on
the American National Electoral Study have asked the same partisan identification
questions. Every respondent is first asked:

“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a
Democrat, or Independent, or what?”

The words “usually or generally” are thought to prompt respondents to consider long-
term orientations beyond voting in one particular election (Norris, 2004:131).

Follow-up questions then probe for the strength of any partisanship. Respondents are
asked:

“Would you call yourself a strong Democrat (or Republican) or a not very strong
Democrat (or Republican)?”
Respondents who identify themselves as Independents in the first question are then asked: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?” This generates a seven-point scale ranging from strong Republican to strong Democrats34, where six of the seven categories could be, and usually are, considered to measure partisanship. Thus, even respondents who self-identify as Independents in the first question may be considered partisans in much of the research conducted in politics in the United States.

According to Burden et al. (2003), the traditional method of measuring partisan identification relies on supplying cognitive cues to respondents by explicitly asking them to “think” about their partisanship. However, the traditional Michigan theory of partisan identification posits partisanship as primarily affective. In their study on “Affect and Cognition in Partisan identification”, Burden et al. (2003) explore the effects of asking respondents to “feel”, rather than to think, about their partisan identification, with several notable findings. In comparison to the traditional question, the only changes made are that the phrase, “Would you call yourself”, has been replaced by, “Do you feel that you are”, in the former, and “Do you think of yourself” has been replaced by “Do you feel” in the latter case.

Use of this new approach to phrasing partisanship questions revealed the electorate to be more Republican than previously thought: a finding that helps explain why election results in the United States have so often favoured Republicans, who were assumed to be outnumbered by Democrats. The implications of these findings are remarkable: they suggest that “thinking about” politics results in favouring the Democratic Party, while “feeling” politics favours the Republicans. It suggests that at least a subset of the American population is Democrat in their heads, but Republican in their hearts.

Brader et al. (2001) argue that the classic measure of partisanship used by the American National Electoral Study is not easily adapted to a multiparty system, particularly with respect to question wording, which, it is argued, biases respondents towards a single partisan identity. In theory at least, voters could have multiple identities (Weisberg, 1999; Garry, 2006). Eijk et al. (1993), Weisberg (1999) and Garry (2006) shared Brander’s et al. (2001) concern. Weisberg (1999:727), for instance, notes that analyses of

34 The points on the seven-point scale are as follow: Strong Republican, Republican, Weak Republican; Independent, Weak Democrat, Strong Democrat.
party identification in the United States on this measure have assumed that people are Republicans or Democrats or Independents, but not more than one of the above. Weisberg argues that the Campbell et al. measure represents quite a limited operationalization of their general concept of partisan identification as it does not facilitate the holding of multiple identities by individuals.

The basic point in Weisberg’s argument is that in systems with several parties there are likely to be a number of parties that are not very dissimilar to each other and so “such multiple identification should not be surprising” (Weisberg, 1999:727).

Elsewhere, scholars have used other questions to measure partisanship. Surveys in Germany ask respondents whether they “lean toward a particular party over the long term” (Baker et al., 1981). The question does not list the parties and increases the chances that a respondent does not identify with any of the parties. By contrast, some of the British and Canadian items list major parties within the question text. The partisanship question sometimes parallels the American wording, except that “independence” is not offered as an option. Indeed, some of the British and Canadian items do not prompt for non-partisanship at all, with the exception of providing the opinion of “or what” for respondents (Blais et al., 2001). In surveys conducted in post-Communist countries, questions were similar. White et al. (1997) asked respondents, “Do you identify with any political party or movement?”, whereas Colton, (2000) asked the respondents if they considered any party to be “my own”. Rose et al. (2002) asked respondents if they feel close to any political party, whereas Norris (2004) asked respondents if they think that there is any political party that they feel close to. Post-Communist scholars also employed alternative questions to ask whether voters believe there is a party that represents their interest (Miller et al., 1998). According to Brader et al. (2001), the Miller et al. (1998) ways of measuring partisanship seem to be a priori a reasonable adaptation to the context where political parties are new political phenomena.

The follow-up questions typically attempt to ascertain the degree of identification with a particular party. The American question asks whether they “would call” themselves “strong” or “not very” strong Democrats or Republicans, while the Canadian question asks how strongly liberal the respondent “feels”. The follow-up question for those with
no identification, for both Canadian and American surveys, is whether the respondent thinks of him/herself as a little closer to one of the parties (Blais et al., 2001:7-8).

Turning to the African context, the Afrobarometer’s measure of partisanship in other African countries, including Mozambique, is taken from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which adapts the traditional question to the following:

“Do you usually feel close to any particular political party?” If yes, “Which party is that?” “Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?”

As in the German surveys, partisan identification is initially confirmed by a “Yes” answer to the first question. In the Afrobarometer survey, however, the respondent must name a particular political party. The key difference between this line of questioning and American measures of partisan identification is that the CSES sequence does not incorporate any cues referring to specific parties. According to Norris (2004), this difference in wording could be critical, as direct comparison across items in the NES and British Electoral Studies (BES) suggests that the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) measures generate significantly lower rates of partisan identification than “cued” questions. In other words, the CSES and Afrobarometer partisanship measures impose a minimal level of consistency in the requirement that respondents answer “yes” to the first question, and then subsequently name a specific party in order to be considered “partisans” (see also Huber et al., 2004).

Despite the fact that there has been some debate around the applicability of the notion of party identification outside the United States, fairly wide ranging research carried out in new democracies suggests that it is indeed possible to import the concept of party identification (Clem et al., 1995a; Clem et al., 1995b; Rose et al., 1995; White et al., 1997; Brader et al., 2001).

4.3.2. Predictive validity

Another way to address the validity of the measure is to examine whether partisans behave in the way that the literature predicts they should. Partisanship seems to influence individual attitudes and behaviour. Partisan identification enables citizens to
become politicized, especially in terms of contacting elected leaders, signing petitions, participating in community meetings, voting, and being better informed about political issues. If the Afrobarometer survey actually measures the concept of partisan identification, we would expect to find these types of partisan identification in the political behaviour of Mozambicans.

To test whether partisan identification predicts other forms of behaviour, correlation analyses were done (using Tau B). It was found that partisan identification does indeed predict participation in political meetings, discussion of politics, media usage, interest in public affairs and making contact with local government leaders (see Table 4.2). These results suggest that the survey is actually measuring partisan identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Closeness to political parties versus fell close to no political parties</th>
<th>Tau B</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More likely to discuss politics with friends</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More likely to get news from radio</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More likely to be interested in public affairs</td>
<td>.157</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More likely to contact local government councilor</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.3. External validity

External validity concerns the relationship between the study results and real political events. As a way to test external validity, the partisan identification results were compared with the actual general electoral results. In other words, is partisanship identified in the survey consistent with electoral results? It should be noted that it would be naive to expect a one-on-one correlation between partisan identification and actual votes. The reasons for this are, firstly, partisan identification is based on an overall respondent sample. Secondly, voting results are based on those who vote and some partisans may “defect” in this instance; and, thirdly, it is not clear how non-partisans or independents split their votes.

The level of party identification with FRELIMO is roughly comparable to the FRELIMO portion of votes in the 1999 and 2004 general elections. But identification with the opposition is far lower than actual support for the opposition. The 2002 Afrobarometer results showed that among those who claimed party identification, 59% feel close to FRELIMO and only 4% said that they felt close to an opposition party. In
the EISA 2005 post-election survey, an even greater majority (72%) of the entire sample said that they identified with FRELIMO, whereas only 9% identified with opposition parties. Similar patterns were reflected in the Afrobarometer 2005 survey (73% of respondents identified with FRELIMO while 8% with opposition parties).

With regard to the first general elections in 1994, FRELIMO won 44% of the vote, and RENAMO 38%. Other small political parties won less that 2%, with the exception of the 5% vote captured by the UD. In the 1999 elections, FRELIMO won an even greater 49% of the vote, while the RENAMO-Electoral Union won 395 and other small opposition parties less than 5%, falling short of the threshold necessary to gain seats in parliament. Then, in the 2004 elections, FRELIMO won 62% of the vote, whereas the RENAMO-Electoral Union won only 30%.

Graph 4.1: FRELIMO party identification and FRELIMO electoral results
Does the case of Mozambique illustrate a pattern with regard to the partisanship effect on electoral choice in Africa or elsewhere? Partisanship measured in Africa is approximately consistent with recent electoral results in some southern African countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana (see Graph 4.3); but not in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe (see Graph 4.4). It should be noted that the difference between partisan identification and vote share is much larger for the opposition than it is for the ruling party (see Graph 4.5).

In South Africa, Mattes (2004:72) demonstrates that voter support for the African National Congress (ANC) tends to be significantly higher than its actual partisan base. This is especially visible within the black electorate: the ANC has been able to garner between eight and nine out of every ten black votes at election time, despite approximately one-third of voters having denied allegiance to any particular political party. This suggests that many non-partisan votes favour the ANC as the best election option, despite dissatisfaction with current governance.
Graph 4.3: Consistent partisanship with electoral results by the southern African countries (per cent)

Source: Afrobarometer surveys and African Electoral database

Graph 4.4: Inconsistent partisanship with electoral results by the southern African countries (per cent)

Source: Afrobarometer Surveys and African Electoral database

Graph 4.5: Partisanship and electoral results by countries (southern African countries) (per cent)

Source: Afrobarometer surveys and African Electoral database
4.4. Criteria for reliability

4.4.1. Test-Retest

Test-retest reliability is used to assess the consistency of a measure over time. With reference to Mozambique, the 2002 Afrobarometer results showed that 30% of respondents classified themselves as “not close” to any particular political party, 59% as close to FRELIMO and only 4% as close to an opposition party. A further 5% refused to answer the question, and 1% responded “do not know”. Respondents were subsequently asked if they felt “very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?” Here, 30% of respondents felt very close to the party they identified, while 18% said “not very close”, 12% “somewhat close”. The question was “not applicable” to an additional 37% who had not indicated any partisan identification, and a very small number (3%) answered, “don't know”. In the EISA 2005 post-election survey, 92% identified with FRELIMO, whereas 9% identified with opposition parties. A similar pattern was reflected in an Afrobarometer 2005 survey (73% identified with FRELIMO, 8% with opposition parties). This is a general pattern in Africa where the Afrobarometer survey has been conducted (Cape Verde, Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).

Bratton et al. (2004:257) demonstrated that a majority of Africans interviewed “feel close” to a political party (57%), but at the same time, a large minority insist on remaining nonpartisan (43%). The Afrobarometer survey results show that partisan identification varies widely across countries: partisanship is highest in Malawi, high in Tanzania and Botswana, and low in Nigeria and Zambia. The Afrobarometer datasets from surveys in 2002-2003 reflect similar results, with widespread partisanship in Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania compared with much lower levels in Zambia, Uganda, Nigeria and Cape Verde. More recent Afrobarometer datasets from surveys in 2005-2006 reveal similar results, with widespread partisanship in Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Tanzania compared with much lower levels in Nigeria. Graph 4.6 presents the results of partisanship across the countries where it is to some extent stable, while Graph 4.7 presents partisan identification across countries where it is unstable.
With reference to African identification with political parties, the Afrobarometer Round I dataset shows that identification with the ruling party is relatively higher than with the opposition. The largest party support is for the CCM in Tanzania (62%), and SWAPO in Namibia (52%) and the smallest support is for the Uganda-NRM (20%), where other Ugandan parties cannot legally contest the elections; and the Nigeria-PD (24%). The Afrobarometer Round 2 survey results show that the Tanzanian CCM is no longer the most widely supported party; the current ranking is SWAPO (61%), the FRELIMO (59%), and the CCM (58%), followed by the LCD (55%) and the NRC (52%) in Kenya. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the distribution of partisanship (stable and unstable government party) in the previous 12 and current 15 countries surveyed by Afrobarometer, according to partisan identification (incumbent and opposition).
Table 4.3: The distribution of stable support for political party (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Largest party</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>All opp. parties</th>
<th>Largest party</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>All opp. parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer surveys (1999 and 2002)

Table 4.4: The distribution of unstable support for political party (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Largest party</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>All opp. parties</th>
<th>Largest party</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>All opp. parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>ADEMA</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>ADEMA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>PAICV</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer surveys (1999 and 2002)

The fact that the results differ to some extent from survey to survey makes it difficult to establish the strength of partisanship in Africa’s new democracies. Back et al. (2006) found the same types of challenges in Russia. The fact that partisanship in Russia differs widely from survey to survey, between around 20 and 55%, makes it difficult to give any final answer as to strength of partisanship in Russia. According to Dalton et al. (2007: 182), variation across the nations may reflect cultural norms about the open expression of one’s partisan leanings, or norms about expression of more current, short-term sympathies towards political parties (see also Dalton et al., 2005). They also suspect that the translation of partisanship into different languages will produce linguistic variation.

Placing the Mozambican case-study in a comparative context is instructive. Norris (2004) argues that partisanship is significantly higher among electorates in older democracies than in more recently formed democracies; she thus concludes that the bonds between voters and parties strengthen with the democratic consolidation process. Norris (2004:134) holds that party attachment is weakest in “newer democracies where
party competition has not yet stabilized”. Accordingly, Mozambican citizens should display a low level of partisanship. The Mozambican results of the Afrobarometer surveys are, however, closer to those of Western European countries than to other emerging democracies.

In most Western democracies, 60-70% of voters identify at least partially with a political party, though this has declined in recent decades. In Latin America the Graph is 67% in Uruguay, 38% in Argentina, 36% in Chile, 33% in Venezuela, and 33% in Brazil (Mainwaring, 1999). In post-Communist countries, according to Rose et al. (1995a), the model is “don’t know” (see White et al., 1997; Miller et al., 1996). Based on comparative survey data from ten post-Communist countries, Rose’s (1995) findings indicate weak partisanship amongst the electorates. The majority of voters seem to be “demobilized”, that is, they are distrustful of political parties. As a result, Rose found that committed partisans made up only a quarter of all voters, and concludes that the “modal group is a ‘don’t know’ when asked to express a party preference”. Even when asked how they would vote if an election were held “that week”, the largest response was usually “don’t know” (see also Rose et al., 2002). Similarly, in How Russia Votes, White et al. (1997) conclude that most of the Russian electorate, about two-thirds of the voters, lack any partisan identification. Based on an analysis of a separate dataset, also from 1993, Miller et al. (1996) state that only about 20% of Russians and 14% of Ukrainians interviewed around the same time had party attachments. They attribute these Graphs to the long-time dominance of the CPSU, which left voters in the former Soviet Union skeptical of commitment to political parties (see also Miller et al., 1998).

Evans et al. (1995) report on surveys conducted in 1993-1994 in Russia, as well as seven other post-Communist countries. Only 13% of Russian respondents interviewed during the summer of 1993 gave answers that conveyed specific partisan identification or attachment. Of all the countries surveyed, partisan identification was found to be lowest in Russia, with Lithuania demonstrating the highest levels of identification at 50% of respondents. But Miller and his colleagues (1998), using more recent data, came to a much more encouraging assessment. They found that about half the Russians, 60% of Lithuanians, and 30% of Ukrainians indicated partisan identification in 1995. By the

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35 Dalton et al. (2005:6-7) similarly argue that partisanship will be stronger in older democracies, drawing on social learning theory (see Converse, 1969). The argument is that since citizens in new democracies “can expect little ‘partisan push’ from their parents” they are not likely to become strong partisans.
beginning of 1997, the partisanship Graphs in those three countries were up to 61%, signifying a rapid rise in political identification. Of course, chronology and the wording of questions need to be taken into account when interpreting these results (Back, 2006). Russians would have logically reacted differently to an interrogation about parties in 1993, prior to the first multiparty election, than they would only a few years later, when organized opposition to the government was deemed less heretical, and other parties had moved into the mainstream (Colton, 2004).

4.4.2. Internal reliability

Internal reliability is about whether we can trust the findings and whether they do not merely reflect a level of mistrust of the Afrobarometer interviewers or a general sense of political fear.

The Afrobarometer survey was conducted in Mozambique at a time when the country was emerging from many decades without any rule of law, political freedoms, or public debate. From the pre-colonial and colonial to postcolonial periods, most political institutions operated under authoritarian rule. During the transition from colonialism to independence, Mozambique became a de facto one-party state, which allowed little room for the development of an independent, organized civil society. FRELIMO’s rule was marked by human rights abuses, absence of basic freedoms and strong public control. From the start of the Civil War in 1977, FRELIMO increased its authoritarian control over communities by deploying the military and police to maintain law and order. These forces were responsible for human rights violations, arbitrary arrests of suspects, and administering instant justice. RENAMO also exerted unlawful pressure on communities, collaborating with traditional leaders to keep order. Citizens feared for their lives and tried to avoid entrapment in the elaborate and ruthless security systems (CEP, 2002).

It could be argued that the intrusion of an “independent survey model”, such as the Afrobarometer, into this climate of suppression of freedom of expression would meet with ambiguous response from the “newly constituted” electorate. Public opinion surveys and research are relatively uncommon in Mozambique, and are rarely encountered in everyday life. Under the single-party state, most research was conducted by institutions with strong ties to FRELIMO, the ruling party. Many Mozambicans appear to still believe that the government controls public opinion research in the
country. To test the extent of this belief, the Afrobarometer asked respondents the following question: “Who do you think sent us to do this interview?” The majority of respondents believed that the Afrobarometer study was sponsored by the government (56%), while 3% answered “FRELIMO” and 1% “the president”. Only 5% of respondents understood that the study was sponsored by university institutions (UEM). There were also a large number of respondents who “did not know” who sent the Afrobarometer team to carry out the survey.

It was therefore important to check respondents’ perceptions of who sponsored the Afrobarometer survey and how their perceptions impacted on their willingness to disclose partisanship and to answer politically sensitive questions. To measure political fear, respondents were asked how often “in this country, people have to be very careful of what they say about politics”. In response, 46% of respondents said that they always or often have to be careful, while 40% responded “never” or “rarely happens”. Similarly, respondents’ answers to the following questions could shed light on the issue of fear of expression, coupled with their perceptions of the origins of the survey, and their expressed fear of saying something about politics in Mozambique: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party? If yes, which political party?” “I am going to compare our present system of government with the former system of mono-party rule. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same. A) Freedom to say what you think, B) Freedom to join any political organization you want, C) Freedom from being arrested when you are innocent, D) Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured.” “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? A) The president, B) The National Assembly, C) The National Electoral Commission, D) Provincial court, E) Ruling party, F) Opposition political parties.”

According to the results (see Table 4.5), fear does not appear to prevent citizens from expressing opinions and partisanship.
Taken together, these findings seem to validate partisanship identification, both as a concept and as a factor that might influence political behaviour outside the US and Western democracies. Careful analysis of the data shows that the scepticism of the utility of party identification in voter choice studies in Mozambique is not warranted.

4.5. Methods of analysis

4.5.1. Descriptive and bi-variate analysis

For the correlation analysis, the study used descriptive and different bi-variate statistical tools such as Phi, Lambda, Cramer’s V and Tau B. The choice of technique depended on the level of data (nominal, interval/ratio or ordinal) and on the number of response categories. When the variables were nominal and the table was 2 by 2, Phi was used; and when the size was larger than 2, Cramer’s V was used. Kendall’s Tau was used for ordinal variables, and Lambda when one variable was ordinal or interval, and the other variable nominal (Shott, 1991; Wright, 1995; Field, 2000).

With regard to the descriptive analysis, the following should be noted:

- Percentages reported in the Graphs and tables reflect valid responses. Unless otherwise noted, “don’t know” responses are included, even if they are not shown. But missing data, refusals to answer and cases where a question was not applicable are excluded from the calculation. Except where noted, the share of
missing data is small and does not significantly change the sample size or confidence interval.

- All percentages have been rounded to whole numbers. This occasionally introduces small anomalies in which the sum of total reported responses does not equal 100%.
- In many cases, response categories were combined. For example, “satisfied” and “very satisfied” responses are added together and reported as a single Graph. Rounding was applied only after response categories were aggregated.

4.5.2 Ordinal least square analysis vs. logistic regression analysis

There are different statistical techniques that can be applied to analyse the type of relationship or association between independent variable(s) and the dependent variable. The choice of these techniques is based on their popularity and the common origins of these techniques in the “general linear model” which has led in recent years to the development of a whole new branch of data analysis known as “structural equation modeling”. Among the large body of statistical techniques available the most common applied in the social sciences are multiple regression analysis, path analysis and factor analysis (Halli et al., 1992).

The multiple linear regression models are probably the most common techniques and have became an integral component of any data analysis concerned with describing the causal relationships between a response variable and one or several explanatory variables. The principal aim in regression analysis is to increase the value of the multiple correlations. Perhaps because of its widespread popularity, regression may be one of the most abused statistical tools in the social sciences. While estimates derived from regression analysis may be robust against errors in some assumptions, other assumptions are crucial, and their failure will lead to a quite unreasonable estimate. Such is the case when the dependent variable is a qualitative measure rather than a continuous, interval measure (Aldrich et al., 1984). Ideally speaking, both dependent and independent variables should be measured on an interval-level scale or continuous scale.
To avoid some errors that might arise from using regression estimates with a qualitative dependent variable, the probability model or logistic regression should be used. Logistic regression is multiple regression but with an outcome variable that is a categorical dichotomy and predictor variables that are continuous or categorical. Despite the similarities between linear regression and logistic regression, linear regression cannot be applied directly to a situation in which the outcome variable is dichotomous, the reason being that one of the assumptions of linear regression is that the relationship between variables is linear. Thus, linear regression can only be used if the observed data contains a linear relationship. When the outcome variable is dichotomous, this assumption is usually violated (Field, 2000:165).

Logistic regression operates on the individual or micro-level rather than aggregate data, and is analogous to linear regression in that a continuous response variable is modeled as a linear function of a set of continuous predictors. As in ordinary least square regression, a categorical predictor can be entered into the equation as a set of dummy variables. Logistic regression assumes that each member of the population has some underlying probability of success on given independent variables. Some researchers recommend the probit models as one of the best tools with which to analyse dichotomous dependent variables rather than the logistic regression model (see Aldrich et al., 1984; Hosmer et al., 2000). These two are very similar and yield essentially identical results after adjusting for scale difference. The choice between a probit and logistic model is influenced by practical considerations such as availability of software, personal preference and experience (Halli et al., 1992:112). However, logistic specification is more common due to its link to log-linear models and the availability of computer software.

The question thus arises as to which statistical methods are most applicable for analysing the sources of partisan identification in Mozambique? In this study, partisan identification was chosen as the dependent variable. With reference to this variable, it was necessary to decide whether it would be more effective to use an ordinal scale (opposition/independent/government) or a series of dummy variables. A decision was made to create a series of dummy variables. These statistical techniques were used by Bratton et al. (2008), Sobolewska (2005) and Norris et al. (2003), and this study applied their analyses to the study of partisanship in Mozambique.
The following are important in understanding logistic regression results: $B$ is an indicator of the change in odds resulting from a unit change in the predictor. As such, it is similar to the B coefficient in logistic regression; the Wald Statistic is commonly used to test the significance of individual logistic regression coefficients for each independent variable. It is the ratio of the unstandardized Logit coefficient to its standard error. It corresponds to significance testing of B coefficients in OLS regression (Field, 2000).

The log likelihood is a probability, specifically, the probability that the observed values of the dependent variable may be predicted from the observed values of the independent variables. Like any probability, the likelihood varies from 0 to 1. The log likelihood (LL) is its log and varies from 0 to minus infinity (it is negative because the log of any number less than 1 is negative). LL is calculated through iteration, using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Log likelihood is the basis of two alternative tests of a logistic model, deviance chi-square and the more widely used model chi-square test.

The Cox and Snell's R-Square is an attempt to imitate the interpretation of multiple R-Square based on likelihood, but its maximum can be (and usually is) less than 1.0, making it difficult to interpret. Nagelkerke's R-Square is a further modification of the Cox and Snell coefficient to assure that it can vary from 0 to 1. That is, Nagelkerke's $R^2$ divides Cox and Snell's $R^2$ by its maximum in order to achieve a measure that ranges from 0 to 1. Therefore Nagelkerke's $R^2$ will normally be higher than the Cox and Snell measure, but will tend to run lower than the corresponding OLS $R^2$. Nagelkerke's $R^2$ is the most-reported of the R-squared estimates.

**4.6. Model-building strategies and methods for logistic regression for this study**

The main problem with any model-building is to choose from a large set of covariates those that should be included in the “best model” and the goal of any method is to select variables that result in a “best” model within the scientific context of the problem. In order to achieve this goal Hosmer et al. (2000) argue that researchers must have 1) a basic plan for selecting the variables for the model, and 2) a set of methods for assessing the adequacy of the model in terms of both its individual variables and its overall fit. Different statistical methods can be used to define which variables to include...
in the model. However, scholars have not agreed which methods are the most appropriate for selecting the variables. There are several steps one can follow to aid in the selection of variables for a logistic regression model or regression model and the most common are the univariable approach and stepwise model.

When building different logistic models, many scholars will start with a careful univariable analysis of each variable. One problem with any univariable model is that it ignores the possibility that a collection of variables, each of which is weakly associated with the outcome, can become an important predictor of outcome when taken together. To solve this problem Hosmer et al. (2000:95) argue that researchers should choose a significance level large enough to allow the suspected variables to become candidates for inclusion in the multi-variable model.

Another approach to variable selection is to use the stepwise method in which variables are selected either for inclusion or exclusion from the model in a sequential fashion based on statistical criteria. There are two main versions of the stepwise procedure--forward selection with a test for backward elimination, and backward elimination followed by a test for forward selection (see Field, 2000; Hosmer et al., 2000). Employing a stepwise procedure for selection can provide a fast and effective means to screen a large number of variables, and to fit a number of logistic regression equations simultaneously. In recent years, there has been a shift away from deterministic methods for model building to purposeful selection of variables.

The models in this study will not be driven by univariables or a stepwise approach but will be driven by the theoretical framework and other studies on partisanship or voter choice and the importance of those variables to Mozambican context. In other words, the independent variables will be based on pre-existing knowledge about different factors that might influence partisanship in Mozambique. In terms of methods for logistic analysis, “Enter” will be used. The “enter method” is the best appropriate tool to apply in this type of study, particularly because the theory and knowledge about correlations of phenomena is well developed. Stepwise methods are used in explanatory analysis, when there is more focus on theory development rather than on theory testing. Such research may occur in the early stages of the study of a phenomenon, when neither theory nor knowledge about correlates of the phenomenon are well developed. Therefore, the stepwise procedures is inappropriate for theory
testing because it capitalizes on random variations in the data, and produces results that tend to be idiosyncratic and difficult to replicate in any sample other than the sample in which they originally were obtained (Menard, 2002:42).

It should be noted that two types of indicators were used in this study: single item and a set or cluster of items represented in a single composite index, called a multi index. Single item indicators reflect one survey question and multi index indicators reflect at least three survey questions. In order to construct multi indices, factor and reliability analyses were done. While factor analyses test the validity of the index being constructed; reliability analysis tests its internal consistency. The acceptability of these analyses depends on certain statistical rules: In factor analysis, the single items by which we pretend to construct a composite index must generate one factor and an eigenvalue greater than 1; while reliability analysis acceptability requires a value greater than or equal to .60.

The factor and reliability analyses are based on the maximum likelihood extraction method and the direct oblimin rotation. The strength of combining the maximum likelihood extraction with direct oblimin rotation lies in the fact that this combination will “guarantee that if a factor solution can be found, it will also be found via all other methods” (Bratton et al., 2005:355). Factor and reliability analyses reflect valid responses, including “don’t know”. Missing data, refusals to answer and cases where a question was not applicable are excluded, not only from the calculation of factor and reliability analyses, but from the entire analysis. With regard to “don’t know”, the approach of King et al. (2001) and Bratton et al. (2004) was applied to Mozambique. According to King et al., (2001) wherever possible, “don’t know” should be re-coded as theoretically defensible spots on the response scale (usually a middle, neutral category). With regard to other balanced scales with no original middle, neutral point (such as a four-point scale that runs from “1=very badly” to “4=very well”) it is necessary to create a middle category, and place “don’t know” responses there, re-coding the entire scale to run from 1 to 5 with “don’t know” set to 3. The use of this approach is based on the argument that a “don’t know” is a real piece of information that should be modeled, not thrown out and/or imputed (see also Kroh, 2006).
4.7. Operationalization of variables to be tested on the selected models

In this analysis, most factors are examined that are identified in the literature as influencing electoral behaviour, including demographic variables (e.g. gender, age, rural/urban, region, ethnicity), sociopolitical values, (e.g. communitarian vs. individualist values, command economy vs. market-oriented values), economic performance evaluation (e.g. view on the state of the national economy, personal economic conditions), political performance assessment (e.g. political trust, political freedom, and the performance of political institutions), cognitive awareness (political interest, news usages, discussing politics with friends). The Mozambique 2002 Afrobarometer dataset includes most of these variables that can be used in analysing the five electoral behaviour theories. The following sections identify each survey item used to test theories on election behaviour in Mozambique.

4.7.1. Dependent variable

Partisan identification

In this study, partisan identification is used as the key dependent variable for determining sources of partisanship. This concept of partisan identification was operationalized based on questions asking respondents about their party preference. In modeling the dependent variable on this concept, however, it was difficult to determine whether the main dependent variables should be based on ordinal scales (opposition, independent, government), or on a series of dummy variables. Eventually, three dummies variables were created: if the respondent felt close to the ruling party, his or her response was coded as “1” in the “incumbent” dummy variable. Respondents who did not express any identification with the incumbent party were identified as “opposition” and were coded as “0”. Similarly, in the “opposition” dummy variables, if respondents felt close to an opposition party they were coded as “1”, while those close to the incumbent and independent parties were coded as “0”. In the “non-partisan” dummy variable (independent), if the respondent did not feel close to any party, the case was again coded as a “1”, while incumbent and opposition supporters were coded as “0”.

4.7.2 Independent variable

(a) Social cleavages

The Afrobarometer survey provides a number of useful socio-demographic items that could be used to analyse the impact of social cleavages on party preference. In particular, “home language” was used as a measure of ethnicity. This variable is based on the three dominant Mozambican ethnic language groups (Shangana-Ronga, Sena-Ndaw, and Makwa-Lomwe). “Region” describes respondents’ region of origin, limited to either “south”, “central” or “north”. Rural-urban cleavages will be measured based on the information about the sample distribution across different provinces and districts of the country. “Urban” was excluded from the model.

Similarly, religious affiliation, gender and age variables were used to test social cleavages along these lines. Religion was measured based on the information about the respondent’s religious affiliation. Also included in the model was the gender variable. Age is measured in absolute numbers, in a range from 18 to 99, but categorized as: young, individuals younger than 55 but older than 35, and old. Finally, respondents’ class was determined by occupation. The occupation variable was based on respondents’ broad class of occupation, and includes six main categories: “never had a job”, “peasant”, “owner”, “worker”, “professional” or “other” occupation (see Appendix B).

(b) Cultural values

A number of indicators were selected to test cultural values, many of which attempted to capture citizens’ perceptions in terms of communitarian vs. individualism values, secular vs. religious values, political regime preference and command economy vs. market-oriented economy values. Specifically, the Afrobarometer survey measured respondents’ acceptance of different types of values by asking questions related to these values. For example, should people be responsible for their own well-being, or should the government bear the main responsibility for the well-being of the people? Is a free market preferable to an economy run by the government? The responses to these questions were coded to range from “agree with neither” to “very strongly agree with A or B” (see Appendix B).
(c) Economic voting

In terms of assessing economic voting, the 2002 Afrobarometer dataset has a number of key economic evaluation items that allow a testing of the competitive economic hypothesis. Each standard measure of a national economic evaluation offered five response categories. The Afrobarometer survey questions asked respondents to compare current economic conditions to those in the past year (retrospective), and those expected during the next year (prospective). The survey also asked respondents to evaluate government performance and policy in terms of managing the economy, improving the standard of living, job creation, keeping prices stable, narrowing the gap between rich and poor, and the availability of goods, in terms of policy related to state intervention in the economy. In general, the responses to these questions were coded so that they range from “much worse” to “much better”, or from “not at all satisfied” to “very satisfied”. However, some responses were also coded from “agree with neither” to “agree very strongly with A or B” (see Appendix B).

(d) Political evaluations

The 2002 Afrobarometer dataset also offers important indicators for assessing the importance of political evaluations. The survey asks respondents to evaluate a number of different issues related to democracy and the way political institutions work in Mozambique. Eight of these items were selected for analysis: evaluation of the performance of democracy, levels of satisfaction with democracy, levels of perceived political freedom, evaluations of government policy performance, levels of trust in political institutions, evaluations of incumbent performance and of levels of corruption, and government responsiveness. The responses to these questions were coded to range from “agree with neither” to “very strongly agree with A or B”, or from “much worse” to “much better”, or from “not at all satisfied” to “very satisfied” (see Appendix B).

(e) Cognitive awareness

Finally, in testing the importance of cognitive awareness, the following variables were used from the Afrobarometer dataset: media exposure as measured by asking respondents how often they obtain news from radio, television and newspaper; education, measured by asking respondents about their highest level of education; civic
engagement, measured by asking respondents if they discuss politics with friends and neighbours; and interest in public affairs, measured by asking respondents if they are interested in politics (see Appendix B).
CHAPTER V THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL CLEAVAGES

5.1. Introduction

The social cleavages approach traces individual action to social structures or group membership. According to this approach, individual voting patterns reflect the economic and social positions of the group to which they belong. Common group interests shape coalitions and define views concerning which party is most attuned to the groups’ needs. The aim of this chapter is to test the social cleavages explanation, and find out which if any, social cleavages are the best predictors of partisan identification in Mozambique.

In order to assess the importance of social cleavages on partisan identification in Mozambique, the different aspects of social cleavages (ethnicity, region of origin, religion, level of urbanization, gender, age and class predictors) are first examined as well as the bivariate correlations between these and partisan identification. Then a multivariate logistic analysis will be done in two stages. First, all social cleavages items will be introduced, and secondly, the social cleavages variables will be dropped that are not statistically significant at $p \geq .05$. In the tables only the social cleavages variables will be presented that are statistically significant. The column contains the standardized regression coefficients (Beta). The levels of significance are in parentheses. All effects that are statistically significant and which indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected are highlighted.

The negative or positive sign in each coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. Non-significant effects mean that the two variables are not at all connected. At the end of the first column the sample size (n) is presented and the total explained variance (Adjusted R square) of the model on each dependent variable.
5.2. Results

5.2.1. Ethnicity

If ethnicity is understood as a primordial identity, ethnic identification would generate profound loyalties amongst members of an ethnic group that are more basic and therefore stronger than other loyalties, such as the national identity required for democracy, producing a permanent confrontation between competing ethnic groups. Research based on this perspective usually finds that ethnic differences necessarily cause tensions and can lead to democratic instability and even breakdown (Ajulu, 1998, 2002).

The primordialist conception of ethnicity has increasingly been challenged within the academic world (Carr, 1995; Thomson, 2000; Ajulu, 2002). Gradually the social sciences are growing to regard the complexity of ethnicity as a social construct. This perspective is based on the acceptance of the notion that identities are constructed in relation to relevant characteristics within the boundaries of a social space. Constructivist approaches seem more complex, but also have more verisimilitude in relation to a phenomenon that is complex per se. The effects that ethnicity understood in this way can have on democratic government are also more nuanced and less straightforward.

It seems clear that the process of constructing a politically relevant ethnic identity must be based on some objective historical differences, namely cultural attributes, language, and race. This explicitly discards an extreme version of constructivism in which an individual can freely “choose” any identity. These characteristics can be understood as the basis of an ethnic cleavage that can be (but not necessarily is) politically activated.

Political parties in Africa are widely seen to mobilize voters around ethnic issues rather than ideology or policy. As a result, their supporters tend to be those who are affiliated with specific ethnic groups. The personalization of the post-colonial state and its diminished capability has led to the revitalization of ethnicity and kinship relationship as systems for maintaining meaning and security (Lundin, 1996). In both private and public spheres, hiring decisions and promotion prospects are widely assumed to be linked to a person’s ethnic background.
This is also how many people see the two main political parties in Mozambique. They are seen to have emerged from, and being based on, ethnic conflicts. FRELIMO is often seen to be a party with a Shangana-Ronga appeal and RENAMO as a party with Sena-Ndaw appeal (Lundin, 1996). When FRELIMO took power in June 1975, the main task of the government was to remove all vestiges of tribalism in political discourse and build a new kind of state that reflected the interests of the broad labouring masses, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism (Coelho, 1998a, 1998b; Pitcher, 2002). Although FRELIMO attempted to remove all vestiges of ethnicity and traditional culture, Mozambique is still a country with different ethnic groups and cultures. This is confirmed by the two Afrobarometer surveys. In the Round 2 Afrobometer survey, respondents were asked to name their home language. The results reveal very diverse profiles of ethnic pluralism. Nevertheless the main ethnic groups are Makwa (43%), Shangana (14%) and Sena (10%) (see Graph 5.1). In the Round 3 Afrobarometer survey, respondents were asked not only about their home languages but their ethnic group (What is your tribe? Or your known ethnic or cultural group?). Again, the results reveal that, despite Mozambique being an ethnically pluralist society, Makwa make up the main ethnic group (37%), followed by Shangana (21%). In relation to most other African countries, ethnicity in Mozambique plays a minor role in politics (Vaux et al.; 2005).

Graph 5.1: Ethnic group distribution in Mozambique

According Ferree et al. (2007:4), self-identification is not an ideal measure of identity for at least two reasons. First, survey respondents may not answer survey questions in a
truthful manner. If prevarication occurs at low levels and more or less randomly, it most likely will not create serious problems. However, if respondents lie systematically--perhaps to cover up allegiance to normatively undesirable groups--this could introduce bias in the analysis. Second, survey responses are static and single-dimensional, where we know that identity is dynamic and multidimensional. A person who identifies as a “student” in one context might be a “southerner” in a different one and a “Muslim” in yet another. The Afrobarometer, and all surveys like it, give respondents the opportunity to answer in only one way, collapsing their identities to a single dimension. Furthermore, according to Ferree et al. (2007), we do not know which dimension this is and whether or not it is relevant to politics. What we want to know is an individual’s identity when he is standing at the ballot box, casting his vote. Based on this criticism, this study has avoided using the self-identification measure for the analysis, but rather used the respondents’ home languages measure.

Although Mozambique is divided into different ethnic groups, ethnicity has had remarkably little influence on the conduct of previous wars. Under colonial rule, the Portuguese manipulated the multiple ethnic groups and inter-group conflict by implementing a conscious policy of “divide and rule” but never created the kinds of divisions that were the colonial legacy elsewhere in Africa. In the last few years there have been some minor violent episodes relating to the use of different ethnic languages in churches and elections, but none of these have been on a large scale.

While more recently there has been an infusion of different ethnic groups in government, there is still a perception that members of southern ethnic groups enjoy better opportunities through the political system in Mozambique than those from the central and northern parts of the country in terms of jobs, political positions and business opportunities. Accordingly, FRELIMO is dominated by elites of the Shangana-Ronga and Makonde groups, while opposition parties are seen to be controlled by the Ndaw, Sena and Makwa (Lundin, 1996).

In general, however, divisions in the country currently revolve around regional differences and relate to economic factors rather than ethnicity, but there remains a possibility that ethnicity could be mobilised during a desperate political struggle. Therefore ethnicity cannot be discounted as a factor that might determine electoral behaviour. According to De Brito (1996:476), FRELIMO benefited from strong support
in the Makonde and Shangana territory in the 1994 general elections. But despite this, it would still be legitimate to ask if these Makondes and Shangana voted for FRELIMO because they are Makondes and Shangana, as if the vote was an expression of their ethnic nature. Or did they vote because many of the fighters and leaders of FRELIMO came from these communities, and also because, in the particular case of the Makonde region, a large part of this territory was freed from colonial rule early on in the struggle by FRELIMO? The same kind of question can be asked about the zones that favoured RENAMO, for instance in the nine (out of 13) Sofala districts where RENAMO took more than 75% of the vote.

The most direct way to measure the extent to which political parties in Mozambique are “ethnic” is to look at the proportion of a party’s support that is provided by the largest ethnic bases. According Cheeseman et al. (2007), this is a crude measure of the extent to which ethnicity shapes political parties, but provides an accessible way to compare political parties. Following Horowitz (1985:291-292) and Scarritt (2006:237), in this study an ethnically-based party is defined as one which “derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of groups) and serves the interests of that group” (Horowitz, 1985:291-292). Based on this definition, Cheeseman (2007) classified ethnic parties into five categories: Non-ethnic parties, multi-ethnic party-no majority ethnic group, multi-ethnic party-majority ethnic group, potentially ethnic party and ethnic party. Parties which receive 85% to 100% of their support from one ethnic group clearly fit the criteria laid out by Horowitz and Scarritt and are classified as “ethnic parties”.

According to Scarritt (2006) and Cheeseman et al. (2007), parties that receive less than 80% but more than 66% of their support from one ethnic group are classified as “potentially ethnic” parties. Such parties are neither so dominated by one group that they will be encouraged to tailor polices solely to that community, nor independent enough of the support of the group that the party leadership can risk alienating this support base.

Parties which receive between 33% and 66% of their support from one ethnic group are classified as “multi-ethnic” parties--these are genuinely broad-based alliances in which

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36 Scarritt chose a tighter threshold of 90-100% (2006: 238). I have opted for the Cheeseman (2007:12) threshold of 85-100%. The reasons that Cheeseman (2007:12) used this threshold were that with the high level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization of the Afrobarometer sample in many countries, a 90% threshold would result in there being very few, if any, ethnic parties. Even with this lower threshold Cheeseman finds a very small number of ethnic political parties in Africa.
the party is reliant on support from a number of different ethnic groups. Cheeseman et al. (2007) further subdivide the “multi-ethnic” category into multi-ethnic parties--majority ethnic group (50-60%) and “multi-ethnic” party--no majority ethnic group (33-50%). Finally, they also assume that where the largest ethnic group constitutes less than a third of the party it is “non-ethnic”.

Using these categories and percentages, Cheeseman et al. (2007:13-14) reveal that in 2006 just 19% of parties in Africa were “ethnic”. Furthermore, the three parties from Botswana are “ethnic” out of necessity rather than choice, given the ethno-linguistic homogeneity of the national population. The remainder of the “ethnic” parties is generally smaller opposition parties that have little chance of making it into government. For example, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in South Africa and the National Congress for Democratic Initiative (CNID) in Mali only just make the 5% threshold for inclusion in the Cheeseman analysis (see Table 5.1). This suggests that such parties need to piece together multi-ethnic support to build a winning coalition and has encouraged the vast majority of electorally competitive parties to recruit support from at least two ethnic groups.
Table 5.1: Size of largest ethnic support base across 16 African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of largest ethnic support base</th>
<th>Party Country</th>
<th>Percentages of parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-ethnic (0-33%)</td>
<td>PCP (Ghana); NARC (Kenya); DTA (Namibia); ANC (SA); NRM (Uganda);</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-ethnic party: No majority ethnic group (33-50%)</td>
<td>UDF (Malawi); URD (Mali); FRELIMO (Mozambique); PDP (Nigeria); DA+DP (SA); MMD (Zambia); UNIP (Zambia)</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-ethnic party: Majority ethnic group (50-61%)</td>
<td>LDP (Kenya) KANU (Kenya); DPP (Malawi); ADEMA (Mali); RPM +IBK (Mali); Citoyen (Mali); RENAMO (Mozambique); PDS (Senegal); PS(Senegal); AFP (Senegal); UPND (Zambia)</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potentially ethnic party (66-84%)</td>
<td>NPP (Ghana); MCP (Malawi); SWAPO (Namibia); AG (Nigeria); UPC (Uganda); DP (Uganda); PF (Zambia); MDC (Zimbabwe); BNF (Botswana); BDP (Botswana);</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic party (84-100%)</td>
<td>BCP (Botswana); CNID (Mali); AGPA (Nigeria); IFP (South Africa); ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe); ANPP (Nigeria)</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cheeseman et al. (2007:14)

What are the Afrobarometer Round 2 data results in this regard? They show that identifiers with FRELIMO are slightly higher among Shangana-Ronga (62%) and Makwa-Lomwe speakers (60%), while they are lower for Sena-Ndaw (55%). But, these differences are insignificant. Ethnicity is statistically weakly associated with FRELIMO
support\textsuperscript{37} and statistically significantly associated with support for opposition parties.\textsuperscript{38} There is no association between ethnicity and independence (or non-partisanship). \textsuperscript{39}

5.2.2. Regional asymmetry

There is a high level of inequality in development between Mozambique's regions. The central provinces of Sofala, Manica, Tete and Zambezia have long perceived themselves to be neglected, perhaps deliberately, as a result of government policies. The southern part of the country, particularly Maputo, is far more developed than the rest of the country. The residents of the southern part of the country are seen to benefit more than the rest of the country in terms of life opportunities and development. There is a perception that development projects which are sustainable and economically viable are always set up in the south.

On the other hand, those which have little economic viability are established in the central and northern part of the country and put in the hands of elites from these regions in order to show them to be incompetent. Popularly the regional differences are explained in terms of the following story: “The dog goes hunting and the cat stays at home. But when the time comes to eat, the dog is given bones and the cat meat. And when it is asked why the dog is eating bones, they say that the dog likes bones”. The feeling that there is a refusal to share benefits in an equitable manner seems to be very strong in the central and northern parts of the country. There appears to be some truth in this. The UNDP Human Development Report indicates that, although incomes in Maputo have risen consistently, provinces such as Zambezia have actually become poorer and the overall ratio between the richest and poorest provinces has increased (UNDP, 2001).

Regional imbalances are a recurring part of political debate in Mozambique. Since the beginning of civil war until the 2004 general election campaign, RENAMO leaders have accused the FRELIMO government of systematically under-developing the central and northern parts of the country. During the election campaign RENAMO leaders asked people from these regions to rise up and fight this domination of southern elites (Pereira,\textsuperscript{37} Cramer's V= .074, p=<.053.\textsuperscript{38} Cramer's V= .103, p=<.002.\textsuperscript{39} Cramer's v= .061, p=<.162.)
2007). The actual voting results from the 1994 and 1999 general elections seem to reveal regional differences. According to De Brito (1996), political parties have startlingly different geographic bases. FRELIMO draws its support from four constituencies in the south—Maputo City, Maputo province, Gaza and Inhambane regions, and in the two constituencies of the far north—Cabo Delgado and Niassa, while RENAMO support is based in the central regions and part of the north—Sofala, Manica, Tete, Zambezia and Nampula (see also Lundin, 1996). Under these circumstances we might expect that regional influences will predict partisanship in Mozambique.

However, no real difference was found between regions with regard to identification with specific political parties. FRELIMO support is slightly stronger in the north (61%) and south (60%), and slightly lower in the central area (57%). There is no association between region and identification with independence. However, the results do show statistically modest associations between regions and support for opposition parties.

5.2.3. Urban vs. rural differences

Mozambicans are also divided between those who live in urban areas and those who live in rural areas. Rural people still derive their income from agriculture and only small percentages from wage-labour jobs. By contrast, urban people derive their income from wage-labour and small businesses. Increased poverty, to which much of the population in rural areas is currently subject, has created strong tensions between rural and urban worlds. There is a perception that, since independence, FRELIMO policy is geared more to urban people than rural ones (West, 1998; Harrison, 1996; De Brito, 1996; Pereira, 1997, 2006; Vine, 1991). After independence, the development strategy established by the government for the rural areas was based on a country-wide villagization programme run by the state and based on two main pillars—population resettlement and the transformation of production relations (Roesch, 1988, 1992, 1993; Harrison, 1999). The aim of this villagization programme was to change all aspects of rural life—not simply to make production more efficient. The government’s main concern with communal villages was to concentrate rural populations, rather than increase collective production (Pitcher, 1998, 2002; Coelho, 1993). This concern reflected a genuine fear that the peasants might be beyond state control.

41 Cramer’s V = .133, p = .000.
When RENAMO started its military operation in the central region in 1979, FRELIMO was also forced to accelerate and expand the villagization programme to new areas. The government decided to group and organise the isolated population in specific areas where there was a strong presence of FRELIMO soldiers so that the people had to support the government against RENAMO. This concept was one of regrouping the dispersed habitations into large villages located where they could be easily watched and protected by the government. What FRELIMO intended was to improve the security of the district by preventing any contact between peasants and RENAMO soldiers. By grouping scattered people into the confines of communal villages, the government strove to evaporate the “water”, to employ Mao’s well-known metaphor, in which the guerrilla swims like a fish. The peasants generally viewed the communal villages as a war strategy (Coelho, 1998; Pereira, 2006).

In addition, during this period several measures were implemented by FRELIMO in order to assure defence and control of the communal villages. The initial mechanism began with the control of village's movements. All the inhabitants in the communal villages were to be registered, and everybody was to have a special identity card issued by the local administration or by the military. Roads and houses inside the village were to be named and numbered. Population movements from village to village or from village to fields were to be strictly monitored by the militia.42

From 1979 to 1986, an increasing number of peasants challenged the villagization programme by avoiding it if possible and drifting back to their lands clandestinely. Some constructed houses in communal villages but then returned to their own farms (Geffray, 1991; Casal, 1991; Roesch, 1992; Pereira, 1996). Most of these people who challenged FRELIMO’s villagization programme did not want to leave their traditional land and property behind and live in communal villages devoting their labour to collective production. FRELIMO did not seem to realise that for millions of peasants in rural areas home for the living is essentially the home of the dead. Life is seen only as good if you live where your ancestors lived before you. On the other hand, the government did not

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42 In tandem with the establishment of the villagization programmes, the government trained thousands of local militia as a way to control and protect villagers in communal villages.
realise that communal villages had destroyed the “familistic collective” centred around the idea of sharing between richer and poorer members of the community.

Under these circumstances, peasants became increasingly disenchanted with FRELIMO and certain strata became much more receptive to RENAMO’s rhetoric against communal villages and collective production. RENAMO intensified the sense of resentment over the lost ancestral lands, and generalized it by showing how communal villages, party secretaries, dynamising groups, and collective production, negatively affected the whole country. RENAMO promised that when it came into power it would destroy all FRELIMO projects related to communal villages, party secretaries, and dynamising groups, and such like. Thus, RENAMO articulated the grievances of the rural peasants.

Cleavages between rural and urban groups seem to be reflected in the electoral results. RENAMO enjoyed great support in the countryside and on the periphery of the cities, while the reverse was true for FRELIMO. In 1994, FRELIMO won 59% of the vote in urban districts, while RENAMO only took 29%. But in rural districts, RENAMO outpolled FRELIMO, taking about 41% of rural votes to FRELIMO’s 40% (De Brito, 1996:468).

Are these differences reflected in partisanship in Mozambique? It was found that rural people seem less likely to identify with FRELIMO (52%) than the urban population (61%). These are weakly associated with support for FRELIMO and independence, and not associated with support for the opposition.

5.2.4. Religion

Religion is a multidimensional concept, and in the past two decades literature on religion and politics has begun to account for this multidimensionality more carefully by placing emphasis on two psychological facets of religion—theological beliefs and religious behaviours (Guth et al., 1995; Kellstedt et al., 1996).

43 As a result of communal villages many family members were arbitrarily separated and dislocated.
44 Phi=-.083, p=<.002.
45 Phi=-.061, p=<.023.
46 Phi=-.006, p=<.808.
Political parties frequently play an important role in generating relationships between dimensions of religious and political behaviour. Parties may form to represent distinct religious groups or traditions, as was the case with Catholic political parties in Europe (Lipset et al., 1964). In these circumstances, the party-group linkage is direct, and party support comes mostly from the social group it claims to present. Even if not explicitly representing a single religious group, parties may make appeals to particular religious groups, basing the appeals on the groups’ social status or on policy positions that are aligned with religious beliefs and values. In addition, churches provide an important social context in which political information is exchanged. Different churches communicate different political ideas, and people affiliated with various kinds of churches are likely to adopt partisan attachments that are consistent with the messages received (from both religious elites and fellow parishioners). The type of church one attends is central to the contextual theory of religious influence, and is particularly important among those in the process of learning about politics in a new country.

Religion is one of the important bases of group solidarity in Mozambique. Different religious affiliations exist in Mozambique and the main ones are Catholics, Muslims and Protestants. When Afrobarometer Round 2 asked Mozambicans about their religious affiliation, 35% classified themselves as Catholic, 22% said that they were Muslim, 20% said that they were Protestants, 11% belong to other religious affiliations and 12% said that they do not have any religious affiliations (see Graph 5.2). Protestant affiliation in Mozambique is 14% lower compared to the rest of the African countries surveyed, but 9% higher with regard to Catholicism and 4% higher with regard to Islam (see Graph 5.3).
Yet, although there are different religious affiliations there is no sign of social or political tension between them and there are no political parties that claim to represent specific religious groups. But this does not mean that religious issues are not part of the political debate in Mozambique. When FRELIMO took power in 1975, it intervened in the internal affairs of religious institutions, nationalized most church infrastructure (e.g. hospitals and schools) and prohibited people from attending religious ceremonies. In addition, FRELIMO reversed a colonial policy which had favoured religion in general and certain denominations in particular. Whereas the Portuguese state had attempted to incorporate the Catholic Church into its colonial policy and had financially supported some Muslim brotherhoods in the 1960s and 1970s in order to gain allies, FRELIMO
adopted a Marxist policy which entailed the marginalization and submission of all churches (Morier-Genoud, 1996). This aggravated the tensions between FRELIMO and religious institutions, particularly the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church opted for a critical public stance. By contrast, the Protestant churches (from where most of FRELIMO leadership came) reacted differently, giving the FRELIMO government a chance and because they believed in secular rule, remaining officially politically silent.

During the civil war, RENAMO was able to exploit the rivalries and contradictions between religious organizations and FRELIMO, turning the whole issue of religious discontent and the defence of religious values into a central feature of its mobilization ideology. RENAMO provided religious authorities and their followers with an ideologically congenial ally and the opportunity to move from ideological to military resistance against the government.

When RENAMO guerrillas were in rural areas they made contact with religious leaders for information, particularly the Catholic and Islamic leaders. As a result, Catholic and Islamic leaders became suspect in the eyes of many citizens. During election campaigns these two religious organizations were seen as channels for the mobilization of their believers to support RENAMO (Catholic Church) and FRELIMO (Protestant churches).

Therefore, to what extent does religious affiliation affect partisan identification in Mozambique? FRELIMO seems to succeed in obtaining identifiers from both those who are Catholic (65%) and those with other types of Christian affiliations (59%); but less amongst those with Islamic affiliation (51%). Statistically, religion is moderately associated with FRELIMO identification, and weakly associated with identification with the opposition and with independence. 47

5.2.5. Class

The concept of class is still a valid concept for analysing partisanship. However, it is a clouded concept with tremendous difficulties of definition and measure. Theoretically it is well known that there are a number of different ways of conceptualizing class. Most of them revolve around three potentially independent dimensions: production,

47 FRELIMO: Cramer's V=.114, P=<.001; Opposition: Cramer's V=.087, P=<.032; Independent: Cramer's V=.093, p=<.018.
consumption and sectors. Approaches that focus on the sphere of production argue that class is about the work that people do and/or the conditions under which they work (including authority and rewards) (Shalev et al., 2000). This usually implies an occupation-based definition of class categories (Erikson et al., 1992; Wright, 1985).

In practice, however, class is more often equated with consumption levels of capacities (e.g. housing conditions or income). Both occupation and consumption patterns may in fact be a basis (along with extra-economic criteria like race and “breed”) for what Weber called “social closure” (Parkin, 1979). Closure results in the formation of status cleavages that can cross-cut as well as reinforce class divisions (Shalev et al., 2000). To further complicate matters, researchers in a variety of fields have noted the presence of vertical or “sectoral” cleavages that complicate the horizontal divisions normally associated with class. Notably the role of the state as factor in the economy and social policy may result in cleavages between sectors of employment or between different “housing classes” (Dunleavy, 1979).

Despite most of these difficulties that exist in conceptualizing class, one of the first factors in explaining class inequalities would have to be the differences in wealth and income. Carl Marx's theory on income and wealth in western societies can be used to help explain this. Marx believed that the maturing of capitalism would bring about an increasing gap between the wealth of the minority and the poverty of the masses of the population. According the Marx (1971), the wages of the working class would never rise far above survival level, while wealth would pile up in the hands of those owning capital. Marx also believed that those in the low levels of society would suffer, "accumulation of misery, agony, labour, slavery, ignorance, brutality, moral degradation..." (Marx, 1971).

From this quote we can see that to a certain extent Marx was right, especially about the persistence of class inequalities in industrialized societies such as Mozambique as well as the rest of the world in anticipating that great inequalities of wealth and income would continue. Marx was wrong, however, to assume that the income of most of the population would remain low. For instance, it seems that a greater number of people in Western democracy today are much better off materially than comparable groups in Marx's day.
It should be noted that although wealth and incomes explain class inequalities, studies of class voting in Western nations have typically focused on occupational class (see Evan, 1999). The Afrobarometer surveys in Mozambique offer information on these lines as well as information that can be used to measure socio-economic status (SES), which sociologists typically measure by combining education and income. Israeli researchers have relied more heavily on SES to understand voting behaviour (see Kraus et al., 1990; Ben-Porat, 1989; Shalev et al., 2000). However, in this study the Evan (1999) approach will be followed with regard to the conceptualization of class.

At the end of the civil war, strong pressures from the international community led to a rapid process of privatization which enabled an elite group to acquire extraordinary wealth and use this wealth to reinforce and consolidate political power. For example, public funds have been used on a massive scale to bale out banks and other failed privatization ventures. In effect, money is taken away from national development and given to this extractive clique. But the effect is masked for only so long as foreign aid replaces the losses. Perhaps the most serious impact is the subsequent failure of privatized industries. This has contributed to unemployment.

The liberalization of the economy created opportunities for the emergence of proprietors and entrepreneurs, and reinforced economic inequalities among Mozambicans. Mozambican society is divided into different occupational classes: there are those who have never had a job, peasants, workers, owners, professionals and other occupations. When the Afrobarometer Round 2 survey asked Mozambicans about their occupation, 37% of respondents said that they were peasants, 28% said that they were owners (people who grow food for cash, traders, lawyers, accountants), 16% said that they never had a job, 5% said that they were workers, 4% said that they were professionals and 10% said that they belong to other occupational groups such as students or domestic workers (see Graph 5.4). Thus, the mean number of business persons in Mozambique (28%) does not differ so much from the rest of the other African countries surveyed (27%). Turning to the peasant categories, Mozambique is 24% higher than the mean of the other surveyed countries. When it comes to the workers, Mozambique scores 16% points below the Afrobarometer country average (21%).
FRELIMO is regarded as a party which appeals to the relatively wealthy (people with moderate and high incomes, owners and professionals) and RENAMO as a party which appeals to the poor (people who have a low level of income and who are peasants or who never had jobs). In its election campaigns RENAMO leaders have criticized the FRELIMO policy of catering to the elite, middle class rather than to those in low positions, such as peasants, the poor and the unemployed. RENAMO has asked these social groups to rise up and resist all policy that keeps them poor by voting for RENAMO.
To what extent does class influence partisan identification? There are some differences in terms of occupation with regard to partisanship. FRELIMO succeeds in drawing support evenly across several occupations, particularly among owners (65%), peasants (60%) and professionals (57%), though less so among workers (46%) and those who have never had a job (54%). The association between class and partisanship is very weak with regard to identification with the opposition, but not significantly related to FRELIMO support or independence.

5.2.6. Age

In many theories of political behaviour age is regarded as a significant political identifier, and this is also the case in Mozambique. Older people are less likely to depart from the political values and beliefs into which they were socialized 50 to 70 years before. Older people also have distinctive interests: for example, how government policy on pensions affects their monthly income. By contrast, young Mozambicans belong to a generation with a very different experience from that of their elders—the youngest Mozambican voter was only a child when FRELIMO took independence. Furthermore, younger voters have not had time to form stable political orientations or party identifications.

Voters in Mozambique can be divided into three important age groups: (1) those who turned 18 under colonialism, and (2) those who turned 18 under the one-party system, and (3) those who turned 18 under the multi-party system. In this study, to test the influence of age on partisan identification, Mozambicans are divided into two groups: under 35 years (post-1975 independence groups) and over 35 years (pre-independence groups). Older Mozambicans are most likely to identify with FRELIMO rhetoric about liberation and colonialism. They have been described by senior FRELIMO members as “the greatest generation”, because they fought against colonialism and liberated the country. By contrast, the younger generation has been labeled by senior RENAMO leaders as “the lost group”, those individuals who have relatively good education and skills, but most still sell in the informal market and live in poverty. Under these circumstances, one might expect that generation will shape partisanship in Mozambique. There is a slight generation gap in partisan identification as FRELIMO is slightly more popular among older people (66%) than among young people (55%).
is a negative strong association between younger people and independents, but a positive strong relationship with support for FRELIMO as well as similar patterns with support for opposition parties.\textsuperscript{50}

5.2.7. Gender

The status of women in Mozambican society is low, and they have limited rights and sharply defined gender roles. Literacy and levels of education for women are much lower than for men. This means that women lack the information to make political choices and have difficulty contributing to political debates, especially if discouraged by men. If women judge by their own experience, health and education services are likely to be significant factors in how they vote. Corruption in the health and education services, for example, could be a major determinant in women’s voting patterns. On the other hand, the neglect of women’s education and participation could increase the volatility of electoral results. Moreover, women’s education has consistently been identified as a critical factor in lifting families out of poverty. Greater involvement of women in political and development issues is likely to have a positive effect in relationship to political conflict.

Since the liberation war FRELIMO has aggressively promoted women’s issues in its political agenda and appears to have a pro-women agenda. By contrast, RENAMO appears to be more traditionally oriented with a conservative approach to the role of women in society. Under these circumstances, one might expect that gender will shape partisanship in Mozambique.

Some gender differences were found in partisan identification. Identification with FRELIMO is significantly higher among males (63%) than among females (55%).\textsuperscript{51} Women are more likely to support independence, but no gender difference is found with regard to identification with opposition parties\textsuperscript{52}.

\textsuperscript{50} FRELIMO: Phi= -.119, p=<.000; opposition: Phi=.117, p=<.000; Independent: Phi= -.170, p=<.000.
\textsuperscript{51} FRELIMO: Phi= -.075, p=<.005.
\textsuperscript{52} Independents: Phi= -.065, p=<.016; opposition: Phi= -.052, p=<.062
5.3. Predicting Identification with FRELIMO

Before starting with an in-depth analysis, the reader is reminded that the social cleavages test in this dissertation has five testable arguments with the following hypothesis:

- Ethnicity will have a significant impact on party preference; it is thus expected that the Makwa-Lowmue and Sena-Ndaw are more likely to identify with the opposition and the Shangana-Ronga are more likely to support FRELIMO.
- Regional observance will have a significant impact on party preference, with the central and northern part more willing to identify with the opposition, and the southern area with FRELIMO.
- Urban vs. rural population will have a significant impact on party preference, with urban people more predisposed to identifying with FRELIMO and the rural population with the opposition.
- Religion will have a significant impact on party preference; expect that those without religious affiliations and Protestants will be more inclined to support the incumbent government (FRELIMO).
- Class will have a significant impact on party preference, with the middle or upper classes more likely to identify with FRELIMO, and the peasants with the opposition.

In order to test the social cleavages hypothesis and to see which one of these hypotheses are the best predictors of partisanship in Mozambique, a multivariate logistic regression analysis was carried out. A multivariate analysis allows the analyst to cope with the very large numbers of alternative variables contained in the social cleavages literature. The multivariate analysis is done in two steps: 1) All the variables will be run at the same time so that a global assessment of the explanatory power of social structure can be obtained; 2) Then all the variables that are not statistically significant at $p \geq .05$ levels will be dropped. This will avoid artificially inflating $R^2$ through the inclusion of many insignificant variables which, even though not significant, will explain a small proportion of the variance in the dependent variables. By following these two steps, interpretation of the model is facilitated and the model will be more parsimonious.
How relevant is the “freezing” or social cleavages hypothesis in predicting partisanship in Mozambique? Table 5.2 reports the following results for FRELIMO after controlling for all demographic variables, and dropping all variables that are not statistically significant at $p \geq .05$. Urban voters are actually less likely to identify with FRELIMO than rural voters, which are inconsistent with the hypothesis, since its effects are statistically significant in the opposite direction. This flies in the face of assumptions presented by De Brito (1996) and Pereira (1997) who argued that urban voters are more likely to identify with FRELIMO. These new findings support the argument presented by many scholars in Africa which emphasize that urban people are less likely to support the incumbent party than rural people.53 What about the other social cleavages? Youth is also a significant predictor, with FRELIMO being supported less by young people. Among all these variables youth is the most powerful predictor of FRELIMO support. Taken together, however, demographic factors do not help us understand partisanship in Mozambique to any great extent, explaining just .034% of the total variance in FRELIMO support.

53 This widely held view is based on the assumption that the rural areas in many African countries have benefited immensely from the strong investment that governments are making in terms of improving drinking water, constructing roads and electrification (Tabatabai, 1986; Herbst, 1993; Ewusi, 1987). In contrast, urban dwellers are reported to have borne the brunt of the SAP through retrenchments and high prices, particularly following the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of currency (Herbst, 1993; Ninsin, 1991).
Table 5.2: Multiple logistic analysis and its effects on partisan identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FRELMIO</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Independents</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Makwa-Lomwe</td>
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<td>Sena-Ndaw</td>
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<td>Region</td>
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<td>Central</td>
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<td>Religious affiliation</td>
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<td>Islamic</td>
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<td>Catholic</td>
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<td>Protestant</td>
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<td>Never had a job</td>
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<td>Peasants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urbanization (urban)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (under 35 years old)</td>
<td>-.475 (.000+++)</td>
<td>-1.093 (000+++)</td>
<td>.778 (.000+++)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 log Likelihood 1582.947 416.523 1437.687
Cox & Snell R Square .025 .031 .029
Nagelkerke R Square .034 .099 .041
Constant .819 -.3.902 -1.296
N 1193 1193 1193

Predictor variables: Ethnicity is measured by questioning respondents in their language that they spoke most often at home. Three dummy variables were created: 1=Makwa-Lomwe, 0=others; 1=Sena-Ndaw, 0=others, 1=Shangana-Ronga (other ethnic groups used as reference). Region: 1=North, 0=others, 1=Central, 0=others (South used as reference); Urbanization: 1=Urban, 0=others. Religion: 4 dummy variables were created: 1=Catholic, 2=Islam, 3=Protestants (other religious affiliations used as reference). Class measured by occupation: 5 dummy variables: never had job, peasants, owners, workers, professional (other occupation was used as reference). Generation: 1=under 35 years old, 0=others. Gender: 1=male, 0=others. The dependent variable “identification with FRELMIO” was coded: 0=else; 1=FRELIMO; with opposition coded as: 0=else; 1=opposition and with independents coded as: 0=else; 1=independents. F<.001+++ , P<.01++, P<.05+. Entries are level of significance; standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented outside of entries. A dash (-) indicates that the relationship is insufficiently strong and significant to include the independent variable in a final, reduced model. The analysis presented in this table is based on the weighted dataset.

5.4. Predicting identification with the opposition

The extent to which social cleavages predict identification with opposition parties is now examined. The multiple logistic analyses reveal the following results. Region of origin is an important factor in predicting identification with the opposition, with people in the central region more likely to identify with the opposition than those in the north or south, which is consistent with the hypothesis since their effects are statistically significant in the predicted direction. This finding supports De Brito (1996) who argued that central voters are more likely to identify with FRELIMO (see also Lundin, 1996).
Youth is also a statistically significant predictor with young people less likely to identify with opposition parties than older voters, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Among the entire variables, living in the central part of the country is the most powerful predictor of opposition support. Significantly, social structure is a much better predictor of support for the opposition than support for government, explaining 10% of variance. The reason for this is that opposition parties in Mozambique, particularly RENAMO, emerged as a result of some of the social cleavages—mainly region, ethnicity, rural and urban and religious (see Cahen, 1998, 2002; Casal, 1991; Geffray, 1985, 1986, 1991; Carbone, 2003a, 2003b).

5.5. Predicting identification with non-partisans (or independence)

The impact of social cleavages in predicting non-partisanship or independence is now examined. Table 5 reveals that youth predicts independence, with young people more likely to identify with independence. Significantly, demographic factors do not help us to understand independence in Mozambique to any great extent, explaining .041% of the total variance in support for independence.

Overall, the results reveal that a full suite of hypotheses linked to the ethno-linguistic, religious, class and gender assumptions cannot be confirmed at this point. These variables are not significant predictors of partisan identification in Mozambique, whether the dependent variable is FRELIMO support, support for opposition parties or independence. The following question thus arises: Why do ethnicity, nor class, nor religion not play a role in explaining party identification in Mozambique? In a country where social stratification has increased and crystallized over the years, one would expect class to play some role in this matter. And what are the implications of these findings for the future democracy or party systems in Mozambique?

A number of different arguments can be proposed to explain why ethnicity plays no significant role in Mozambique. Firstly, Mozambique like many African countries is a multi-ethnic society without a dominant ethnic group. In other words, the country contains large numbers of small ethnic groups, none with sufficient numerical strength to constitute a majority in the country (Mozaffar, 2001). Even the three main regional ethnic groups Changana-Ronga (south), Sena-Ndaw (centre) and Macua-Lomwe (north) cannot claim to represent all ethnic groups of these regions: there are other sub-
ethnic groups that believe that they do not belong to Changana-Ronga or Sena-Ndaw. These sub-ethnic groups claim their own ethnic identity. On the other hand, these three main regional ethnic groups do not have sufficient numerical strength to determine the electoral victory of any political party that might claim to represent these ethnic groups. Under these conditions, parties do not have much room to manoeuvre as they seek to construct support bases. This situation creates an opportunity for the political elite to create parties that represent the diversity of all ethnic groups. And this is precisely what most political parties are trying to do by applying a “catch-all-ethnic groups strategy” rather than representing only one. If a party would try to represent only one ethnic group they would commit electoral suicide. Parties try to present themselves as national parties that represent all Mozambicans. Even the main opposition party (RENAMO) that was portrayed as a Ndaw party appeared during election times with heterogeneous approaches and leadership, particularly from the Sena-Ndaw and Macua alliance. By doing this RENAMO was trying to dispel the Sena-Ndaw stereotype (Manning, 1998; Ostheimer, 1999).

Secondly, despite FRELIMO and RENAMO being seen as parties which represent certain ethnic groups (FRELIMO as a party of Changana-Ronga and RENAMO as a party of Sena-Ndaw), both parties developed different strategies to expand their alliances across different ethnic groups in the country. FRELIMO leaders were able to accommodate, through formal and informal clientelism and patronage networks within political parties and state apparatus, the elites from different ethnic groups. These processes were also extended to other elites that emerged outside the FRELIMO party, particularly from civil society organizations, universities, technical schools and different interest groups. Some of these elites were appointed ministers, vice-deputy ministers, mayors, national and provincial directors or senior managers of big companies such as Telecommunications of Mozambique, Electricity of Mozambique, Maputo, Beira and Nacala Port and Rail Station. As a result, there is no clear evidence of growing inequalities between these elites that could lead to a change in ethnic relationships within them. Furthermore, those who do not benefit from “sharing the cake” do not have the capacity, tactical know-how or influence to provoke political cleavages. In other words, they are not equipped to manipulate symbols by means of which they could challenge those in authority or create ethnic conflict. The absence of such political graphs reduces the probability of an ethnic vote.
Thirdly, it is not the mere existence of ethnic divisions that can be manipulated by political mobilization, but factors such as social receptivity, political opportunity, organization capacity, leadership, ideology profile and programmes, communications and symbols also play a role (Barany, 2002). In Mozambique some of these factors are present such as ethnic divisions, political opportunity, leadership, some organization’s capacity and symbols, but there is no social receptivity. Mostly, social receptivity emerges in the context of exclusions, and unequal and oppressive relations in terms of different ethnic groups.

In order to assess the perception of unfair treatment among different ethnic groups the question is commonly asked whether the ethnic groups that citizens identify with are being treated unfairly by the incumbent government. Twenty-two per cent of respondents in the Afrobarometer 2002 survey felt that the ethnic groups were never treated unfairly by the incumbent government whereas 2% felt that their ethnic group was always treated unfairly. About 13% of the respondents felt that sometimes the incumbent government treated them unfairly and just 5% felt that the incumbent government treated their ethnic group unfairly. The survey also asked those respondents who identified with an ethnic group whether the economic conditions of their ethnic group were much worse, worse, the same or much better/better than those of other ethnic groups in the country: 13% of the respondents declared that the economic conditions of their ethnic group were much better whereas 10% much worse/worse, 18% considered them to be about the same and 3% did not provide an answer. These findings seem to suggest that there are no ethnic factors that can be mobilized to benefit any particular political system. This seems to confirm the argument by Claggett et al. (1982) which posits that political strategies or the political elite provide initial “mobilization along ethnic lines, but whether ethnicity becomes an enduring political cleavage depends on whether it is rooted in a receptive social base in a plural society” (see also Zielinski, 2002; Piombo, 2004).

Region is statistically significant with regard to partisanship, with residents of central area being less likely to support the opposition. Although in Mozambique there are strong asymmetries between regions it is common to hear people in the central area and northern part of the country attributing expressing support for FRELIMO and its government who have no interest in promoting investments in areas where the opposition has a great deal of electoral support. Thus expressing support for the ruling
party may be a way of accessing state resources which seem to be in the hands of the southern elite. That is, it is better for these voters to show some neutrality in terms of their political affiliations or voting preference, in order to ensure access to these resources. Secondly, in a country such as Mozambique, region might function as a guide to voting preferences because people living in a given place are expected to be different from people living elsewhere, not because of any asymmetries or origins of their leadership, but rather because they share common cultural attributes that affect their political and social attitudes and behaviour (Rose et al., 1990).

Turning to the findings in respect of religion, in the Mozambique debate there are two different arguments regarding the effect of religion on voting behaviour. Some scholars argue that there is a religious voting (Morier-Genoud, 1996) based on the assumption that Protestants have historical links with the FRELIMO elite who are affiliated with the Protestant churches and the Protestant alliances which the party succeeded in making—most notably with the Igreja Universal de Deus. The Catholic church was seen to balance on the “razor’s edge”, by persuading voters to divide their vote between FRELIMO and RENAMO, and Muslims were seen to vote in general for FRELIMO. Other scholars have denied that voting took place along religious lines, saying that religious issues did not feature in the political debate during the campaign. In other words, since there was no religious political mobilization, religion could not possibly have had any impact on voting behaviour (Baloï, 1996). It was expected that this study would find that those without religious affiliations as well as Protestants would be more inclined to support the incumbent government (FRELIMO), based on the assumption that FRELIMO tried to abolish religious institutions and promote the “culture of man without religions” and its elites are seen to be strongly affiliated with Protestant churches. On the other hand, there was also the expectation that Islamic and Catholic organizations and those affiliated with traditional religions would play a role in explaining support for the opposition. This was based on the assumption that these religious institutions were under stronger attack by FRELIMO’s leadership after independence and RENAMO elites tried to explain the reasons for war in terms of religious cleavages. The central propaganda refrain of the RENAMO military commanders in the field was the war they were waging was a “war of the spirits”—a crusade during which FRELIMO was depicted as traitor organization which forced people to abandon their traditional values and religious beliefs (Wilson, 1992; Pereira, 1999). The questions arising from the logistic regression analysis are: How can these
types of results be explained? In other words, why do religious beliefs, in particular Catholic and Islamic beliefs which were one of the most politicized religious cleavages post-independence and after the one-party state, play no role in explaining support for party identification? There are a number of different explanations that can be put forward with regard to this issue.

Firstly, in terms of religion, the 1990 Constitution embodied almost everything that opposition parties had been fighting for, particularly a guarantee of individual basic rights like freedom of belief, opinion, and association. This meant that religion was unlikely to become the main factor governing voter choice in Mozambique.

Secondly, the main religious institutions are very fragmented and their leaders are in permanent conflict. Some of the leaders established strong alliances with the incumbent party and others with the opposition parties. For instance, many Muslim leaders at national level are very close to incumbent party, but at grassroots level to the main opposition parties. This scenario is similar in the case of the Catholic church where their leadership was divided between the southern part and central part: in the central area, the Catholic leaders established strong alliances with the main opposition party, while in the south they were very close to the incumbent party. This happened as a result of the “Machiavellian strategy” developed by FRELIMO which intervened in the internal affairs of religious institutions by ensuring that religious leaders such as pastors who supported the party were placed in strategic places within religious structures.

Thirdly, each political party is made up of different religious groups, particularly Protestants, Catholic and Muslim groups. This makes it difficult for leaders of political parties to mobilize supporters based on religious affiliations or to make strong commitments with regard to which religious institution their party should support.

Finally, the formation of religious parties was forbidden by the electoral law and none of the religious institutions formed a political party and most of them decided (at least officially) to keep out of politics.

Turning to class, there are a number of different reasons that might explain why class plays a relatively minor role in party identification in Mozambique. Firstly, in Western European democracies party formation and party systems were based on class
cleavages that emerged from industrialization processes. However, in Mozambique the centralization of political institutions followed by the abolition of the market economy and private ownership resulted in the destruction of the capitalistic bourgeoisie and as a result the socio-economic cleavage (workers versus owners) falls away. Secondly, during the period when Mozambique was a one-party state, its own form of industrialization and modernization took place, which did not allow for different kinds of civic organizations to establish themselves that could provide the foundation for party formation and class consciousness among different social groups. The trade unions, youth organizations, women's organizations, association workers, farmers, teachers, students, lawyers, entrepreneurs and media were under strict control of the FRELIMO apparatus. Autonomous organizations that could serve to develop class cleavages such as trade unions54 and business associations, which often support parties elsewhere in the world, are only weakly developed in Mozambique. The high level of unemployment in the country and the economic crisis affected a large number of companies after privatization which demands greater competitiveness to guarantee their continued existence in the market. These factors have put unions (who only cover a small number of all workers) into a weak position for any negotiations.

Thirdly, when government began to liberalize the economy in the late 1980s and privatized many assets, the people who bought them (often on the strength of a down payment) were the senior managers of nationalized firms. With some exceptions, this group of people became the cornerstone of Mozambican business. Most of them by history, sentiment and, often, by family, had close ties to FRELIMO. The survival of their business depended on a patronage network between the ruling party and themselves. As result of this, they feared losing control of political and economic resources if they supported new political projects or created organizations without any political links with the ruling party. Most of the new elite have sought to protect their security, assure their access to resources and improve their well-being rather than to challenge the ruling party or to help the poor or unemployed people to trace the links between the state's industrial and labour market policies and unemployment and poverty, even if these policies contribute to rising capital intensity and productivity rather than job creation.

54 Mozambique has only four independent trade unions, which resulted from a split in the OTM (Mozambique Workers' Organization). The OTM was formed when the country was a one-party state (in 1984, when the Councils of Production were transformed into unions). In 1997, 14 unions were affiliated to the OTM.
Indeed, while Mozambican voters consistently identify unemployment as the most important problem facing the country and rate the government's performance on employment as very poor (Pereira et al., 2003; Pereira et al., 2004) they do not generally hold the FRELIMO government responsible for unemployment. The FRELIMO government might be responding inadequately, but the causes of unemployment are seen to lie elsewhere (Pereira, 2008). Similar problems are also found in South Africa (see Nattrass et al., 2002; Seekings, 2002). Fourthly, most of the parties in Mozambique are very much “electoral parties” as opposed to clear ideology and mass membership organizations. FRELIMO and RENAMO developed electoral strategies that can catch all, not only groups based on social background. In other words, both parties (FRELIMO and RENAMO) appear in the public as parties which represent the interests of all groups of Mozambicans (peasants, farmers, elite, workers, etc.).

Finally, there is another possible explanation for the acquiescence of poor voters. Most poor voters are positive about their future. This seems to be the case in many African countries. For instance, Seekings (2004) argues that in South Africa expectations are shaping voting behaviour. Most poor voters have remained loyal to the ANC, in part because they are patient in waiting for their expectations of change to be met (see also Nattrass et al., 1998). Perhaps these voters’ expectations of future improvements are more important than their current experiences of hardship, which may even be deepening.

The absence of any strong influence of social cleavages in voting in the Mozambican context, particularly with regard to class, religion and ethnicity, might have two types of implication for the future of party systems in Mozambique. First, the absence of ethnic, class and religious voting might encourage the FRELIMO government not to concentrate its efforts on finding out about the social groups which might benefit from its policies and abandon its pro-poor spending policy in rural areas. The Mozambican government might rather focus on resolving problems related to criminality and corruption which constitute one of the key criticisms leveled at the FRELIMO government by the media and international communities. Secondly, since there is no strong effect in terms of ethnicity cleavages, there is less room for turning politics into ethnic issues or for candidates to style themselves as ethnic entrepreneurs rather than national representatives of public good (Battle et al., 2007). Thus, political parties might
develop cross-ethnic alliances in order to secure and retain power which might also transform the process of how parties are selected into an authentic referendum model (punish and reward) where government performance is weighed up by the voters.

5.6. Conclusion

The evidence produced in this chapter on the effect of social cleavages on partisan identification suggests that social cleavages play a role in predicting partisanship in Mozambique, particularly when one looks at religion, urbanization, regional influences and age.

With regard to FRELIMO support, the results suggest that level of urbanization and youth have a negative and statistically significant correlation with support for FRELIMO. That is, urban people and young people are less likely to identify with FRELIMO. Turning to the opposition, the findings reveal that region and youth (under 35) are statistically significantly correlated with opposition support. People in the centre are more likely to identify with the opposition compared to southern and northern people, but young people are less likely to identify with opposition support. With regard to independence, the results reveal that youth (under 35) has a positive and statistically significant correlation with independence, which means that young people are more likely to identify with independence.

With regard to the power of models, a social structure is a much better predictor of opposition support than support for government or independence, explaining 10% of variance. With regard to FRELIMO support, social cleavage factors only explain 3% of variance and with regard to independence; they explain 4% of variance.

A full suite of hypotheses linked to the ethno-linguistic, religious, class and gender assumptions cannot be confirmed at this point. These variables are not significant predictors of partisan identification in Mozambique, whether the dependent variable is FRELIMO support, support for opposition parties or independence.
CHAPTER VI: THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL VALUES

6.1. Introduction

Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) has claimed that the key to understanding political preferences and behaviour lies in childhood socialization, because early experiences influence the formation of different values priorities. Growing up under circumstances of relative economic affluence and physical safety leads one to favour quality of life, and postmaterialist issues over materialist (economic) issues. Alternatively, experience of economic hardship, war or major social and political upheaval contributes to development of materialist values (Inglehart, 1977:23).

Since values are formed in childhood and early adolescence, and tend to remain relatively stable over life these should be reflected in citizen's political decisions. A cultural values explanation of partisan identification suggests that party loyalties can be shaped by values rather than social structure or rational evaluations of government performance. This chapter tests the applicability of the cultural values model in explaining party preference in Mozambique. It investigates whether this model is valid, and which values are most important in determining partisanship in the country.

Adopting the same procedures as in chapter 5, a bivariate and logistic regression analysis will be carried out to test the sociopolitical values on partisan identification in Mozambique. The analysis will start by estimating the impact of sociopolitical values assumptions and the bivariate correlations between these and partisan identification. Then, a multivariate logistic analysis will be run, based on a single model with all sociopolitical value items included in the model, to see the impact of each of these variables on partisanship. Then those sociopolitical values that are statistically insignificant at $p \geq .05$ will be dropped and a logistic regression analysis will be run again based on only those variables that were significant in the previous model. As in chapter 5, only those sociopolitical values variables that are statistically significant will be presented. As in chapter 5, the column contains the standardized regression coefficients (Beta). The levels of significance are in parentheses. All effects that are statistically significant are highlighted, which indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected.
A positive coefficient on the variables indicates consistence with the positive hypothesis tested. By contrast, the negative sign in each coefficient indicates the rejection of the positive hypothesis. Non-significant effects mean that the two variables are not at all connected. At the end of the first column, the sample size (n) and the total explained variance (Adjusted R square) of the model is presented for each dependent variable.

6.2. Results

6.2.1. Communitarian vs. individualist values

Communitarian vs. individualistic values refers to the inclusive principle of mutual responsibility whereby members of society pursue values they hold in common and mutually or if the community reduces its responsibility shared by the entire social group to the individual.

The new society that emerged from Mozambique’s market and political reforms is characterized by a conflict between communitarianism and individualism. People who have communitarian rather than individualistic values may develop antipathies to political parties that support individualistic policies. The Afrobarometer survey measured the communitarian vs. individualistic values by asking different types of questions such as the following, “We shall now touch on the type of community we would like to have in the country. Which of the affirmations would you say is closest to your opinion? A. People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success. B. Government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of the people. C. Each person should put the well-being of the community ahead of their own interests. D. Everybody should be free to pursue what is best for themselves as individuals.” The respondents are offered the option of “agree very strongly with A”; “agree with A”; “agree with B”; “agree very strongly with B”; “agree with neither” and “don’t know”.

When Mozambicans are asked whether “people should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success” or whether “government should bear the main responsibly for the well-being of the people,” 45% opted for individual responsibility while 48% agreed with the alternative view that individual welfare is the responsibility of
government. Asked whether a person should put the “well-being of the community ahead of their own interests”, 41% felt that the well-being of the community should be prioritized while 45% agreed that everyone should pursue their own interests (see Graph 6.1).

**Graph 6.1: Communitarian vs. individualistic values in Mozambique**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree very strongly with A</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with A</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with B</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with neither</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison to the results of Round 2 Afrobarometer survey conducted between 2002 and 2004, there is variation regarding communitarian vs. individualist values across African countries. Mozambique support for communitarian values is lower compared to Senegal (76%), Mali (68%) and Ghana (61%). But it shares more or less the same level of support for communitarian values with Uganda (43%), Zambia (42%) and Malawi (42%). The lowest level of support for communitarian values in Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey comes from Cape Verde (19%) (see Graph 6.2).

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55 In Zimbabwe, the Round 2 Afrobarometer survey was implemented in 2004 due to political instability and this type of question whether a person should put the “well-being of the community ahead of their own interests” was not measured.
These results reveal that Mozambicans express significant sympathy for both individualism and communitarianism. This is reflected in the RENAMO and FRELIMO discourse. Since the beginning of the civil war and during the 2004 general election campaign, RENAMO has attempted to mobilize people based on a combination of individualist and communitarian discourses. RENAMO has accused the FRELIMO government of lacking policies that might reduce the gap between rich and poor, and has reminded voters that it was FRELIMO who created collective farms and opposed the private sector and individual initiatives.

To what extent do differences in communitarian vs. individualistic values affect party preferences in Mozambique? Support for FRELIMO is much more likely to come from individualists rather than communitarians: 71% of respondents who strongly approve of the idea of a large gap regarding wealth differences identify with FRELIMO compared to just 57% of those who strongly disagree with wealth differences. Sixty-one per cent of those who strongly agree with the idea of freedom to pursue own self-interests identify with FRELIMO as opposed to 57% of those who strongly agree with putting the well-being of the community first. Statistically, however, an acceptance of large wealth gaps has only a weak positive correlation with FRELIMO support, a weak negative correlation with independence and no correlation at all with opposition support.56

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56 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .085; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.021; p=<.351; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.076; p=<.001.
Support for “putting the well-being of the community ahead of individual well-being” is not related to FRELIMO support, opposition support or independence.57

6.2.2. Religiosity

Religiosity has been examined in Mozambique and elsewhere by measuring such things as attendance at religious services or frequency of prayer. Mozambicans have witnessed an increase in religious movements and a renewal of religious beliefs and participation in religious activities. However, this does not mean that secularism has been removed from Mozambique. The Afrobarometer Round 2 survey asked people the following question: “Excluding weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?” The respondents are offered the options of “never; about once a year or less”; “about once in several months; about once a month”; “about once a week” and “more than once a week”; “don’t know”.

In general, the level of attendance of religious services is relatively low with some variation in terms of regularity. Thirty-one per cent of respondents claimed to attend more than once a week; 22% claimed that they attend about once a week; 10% said about once a month; while 12% said about once every several months. Ten per cent claimed to attend religious services about once a year or less and 14% of the respondents said that they never attend religious services and 1% did not provide answers (see Graph 6.3). Thus, as in many post-Communist countries, the FRELIMO offensive failed to eradicate religious beliefs.

57 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.014; p<=.558; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b .028; p<=.190; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.024; p<=.320.
When compared with the results of the Round 2 Afrobarometer survey, religiosity in Mozambique is higher compared to Cape Verde (34%), Mali (42%), Namibia (43%), Botswana (46%), Lesotho (48%) and South Africa (51%). But it is very low compared to Zambia, Tanzania, and Senegal. In these countries respondents profess high levels of religiosity (89%, 83% and 82% respectively) (see Graph 6.4).

During election campaigns RENAMO leaders have tried to portray FRELIMO and its leaders as communists and as people with no religious values who fought to abolish churches and religious institutions. RENAMO attacked FRELIMO for what they called
religious crimes that they committed during the period when Mozambique was a one-party state. RENAMO deliberately selected the unpopular aspects of FRELIMO with regard to its relationship with church institutions after independence. Under these circumstances one might expect religiosity to predict partisanship in Mozambique. There is some difference in partisanship related to religion. FRELIMO identifiers come from amongst those who regularly attend religious services (63% of those who attend more than once a week and 62% of those who attend once a week, but less among those who attend religious services less often). There is a weak positive association between religiosity and FRELIMO support and a weak negative association with support for the opposition, but no association with independence.58

6.2.3. Rejection of alternative regimes

Rejection of authoritarian regimes refers to a popular disapproval of four types of authoritarian regimes, namely: one-party, one-man, councils of chiefs making all decisions and military rule. In many African countries multi-party systems have not yet removed all of the authoritarian values from political institutions. Political leaders live and work in a multi-party system but still hold old authoritarian values. Thus, voters are often confronted with a choice between political regimes: there are proponents of the old authoritarianism and defenders of pluralistic institutions. According to White et al. (1997), in the post-Communist countries voters were clearly aware of the importance of multiparty elections in terms of political regimes--choosing between either a continuation of an authoritarian regime or a democratic regime (see also Mair, 1996; Rose et al., 1996).

To measure the rejection of various alternative regime types the Afrobarometer survey posed a standard question that has been employed in barometer surveys in Latin America and the former Soviet Bloc. It asks the following, “There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? A. Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office. B. A council of chiefs or elders makes all decisions. C. The army comes in to govern the country. D. Elections and the national assembly are abolished so that the president can decide

58 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .050; p=<.036; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.074; p=<.003; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.007; p=<.779.
everything." The respondents are offered the options of “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “agree”, “strongly agree” and “don’t know”.

What are the levels of Mozambicans’ rejection of these forms of authoritarian regimes? Graph 6.5 reveals the distribution of respondents in this matter. The results show that given Mozambique’s past experience with a one-party system and military rule, the level of rejection of authoritarian rule is relatively low. Just less than half (42% and 41%) of all respondents, respectively, reject one-party rule and one-man rule. However, military government seems to be rejected at slightly higher levels. More than half (53%) of respondents strongly reject going “back to military rule”, while 16% approve of this idea, suggesting that after 16 years of experience of the long and destructive civil war Mozambicans are less likely to tolerate the army coming in to govern the country than a one-party rule or “strong man rule”.

Graph 6.5: Rejection of authoritarian rule in Mozambique

Using factor analysis and reliability analysis, it is possible to broaden the constructs of rejection of authoritarian regimes index. From these items (one-party, one-man, councils of chiefs make all decisions and military rule), it is possible to extract a single unrotated factor with an eigenvalue of 1.403 that explains 35% of the variance common to all four items. The reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) = .669. The items load on the factor as follows: rule by the president without elections (.697), rule by the military (.654), rule by the...
council of chiefs (.507), and one-party rule (.483). Its composite index called *Rejection of Alternative Regimes Index* is used in further analyses.

If you compare Mozambique with the other Afrobarometer countries with regard to rejection of “authoritarian” regimes, Mozambique scores the lowest in Africa. While Mozambique and Namibia have the lowest proportion of disapproval of one-party, one-man and military rule, Zambia and Kenya have the highest levels. Zambians lead the way in rejecting military rule, Ugandans share the lead in rejecting one-man rule and Nigeria is the most dismissive of one-party rule. When it comes to chiefs rule, Mozambique’s rejection of traditional rule is about 23% lower than the Afrobarometer average (52%). Among the African countries surveyed, Tanzania and Zambia present the highest level (73% respectively), followed by Ghana (69%), South Africa (63%) Zimbabwe (62%) and Nigeria (61%). The lowest level of support for traditional rules in Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey comes from Mozambique (29%), Mali (34%), Namibia (36%) and Senegal (45%) (see Graphs 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9). According to Bratton et al. (2005:80), the Tanzania result is understandable in terms of the central government’s systematic campaign to discredit the indigenous authority structure and replace it with a network of ten-house cells and party cadres.

**Graph 6.6: Rejection of military rule across the Afrobarometer countries**

![Graph showing rejection of military rule across countries](source.png)

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 Survey, 2002
Graph 6.7: Rejection of one-party rule across the Afrobarometer countries

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 Survey, 2002

Graph 6.8: Rejection of one-man rule across the Afrobarometer countries

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 Survey, 2002

Graph 6.9: Rejection of chief’s rule across the Afrobarometer countries

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 Survey, 2002
But if this assumption is true, many readers might ask why in a country like Mozambique, which adopted the same approach as Tanzania, is the rejection of traditional rule so low? There are a number of different factors that can explain the low level of rejection to chieftaincy rule in Mozambique. Firstly, it is true that the FRELIMO government of post-independence Mozambique, as in Tanzania, opted for a policy of exclusion of traditional authorities from power, replacing them with party secretaries, accountable directly to the party leaders in national government. There is, however, evidence that customary institutions were never de facto completely or always without real influence in the rural areas, although details on their position and relationships within the social structure are rather locality-specific (Geffary, 1991; Pereira, 1997, 2006; Picher, 1998). Secondly, the FRELIMO government post-independence inherited a country with weak political institutions, a lack of cadres and an underdeveloped communication system which left many rural communities to their own devices. Thirdly, before and during the 17 years of civil war that ravaged the country, the armed RENAMO opposition took advantage of the FRELIMO stance toward traditional authorities to win them over for their cause, collaborating closely with them. Therefore, the degree of local legitimacy of traditional authorities varies tremendously, and reflects the history of their interaction with the Portuguese colonial regime, the FRELIMO government and RENAMO opposition after independence. Finally, FRELIMO also introduced Decree 15/2000 that recognized the role and importance of traditional chiefs in the process of governance in Mozambique. Since this decree was implemented, more than 2000 leaders from the categories of “traditional leaders” and “secretaries of suburban quarters or villages” have been recognized as “community authorities” in semi-urban and rural areas of Mozambique (see Blom, 2002; Braaten et al., 2001; Bertelsen, 2004; Artur et al., 1998).

In general, the average proportions of these considerations in Africa indicate that the large majority of Africans reject authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the average of disproval of military rule is 78% among Africans, while the average disapproval of one-man, one-party rule and chiefs rule is respectively 77%, 68% and 52%.

Democratic political regimes are generally preferred compared to their alternatives. People who support democracy say they prefer it to any other kind of government. The Afrobarometer survey also estimates support for democracy by means of the following standard question that has been posed in scores of countries on several continents,”
Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. B. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. C. For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government I have.”

The results reveal that democracy has not yet taken firm root in the hearts and minds of many ordinary Mozambicans (see Graph 6.10). Just 54% agree that democracy is “always preferable” to any other form of government. Sixteen per cent believe that a non-democratic government is preferable, and 11% feel that the matter of democratic versus authoritarian government does not matter. Importantly, approximately one-fifth of respondents (19%) did not offer any response.

Graph 6.10: Support for democracy in Mozambique

Compared to the other Afrobarometer countries, Mozambique’s avowed support for democracy is 10% lower than the 16-country average (64%). With regard to support for democracy, Kenya presented the highest level (80%), followed by Senegal (75%), Uganda (75%), Mali (71%), Zambia (70%), Nigeria (67%), Botswana (66%), Tanzania and Cape Verde (65%), Malawi (64%) and South Africa (57%), followed by Mozambique and Namibia (both with 54%). Zimbabwe (48%) and Lesotho (50%) score the lowest percentage from all African countries to endorse democracy as “only game in town”. Graph 6.11 presents the results of support for democracy (“always preferable”) across 16 African countries.
According to Shenga (2007:15), this low level of popular commitment to democracy (e.g. support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian regimes) in Mozambique reflects low levels of elite commitment to democracy. While Mozambique’s political elite agreed on the rules for competing for power, they have not yet agreed on ways to enforce limits on state authority. All electoral institutions, including the constitutional council, are controlled by the ruling party, reducing the scope of political competition and participation. The entire state authority rests on the president who is both the head of state and of government, and parliament cannot hold the head of government accountable since the constitution allows him to delegate his power to the premier whenever he wishes.

Although Mozambicans express a low level of rejection of authoritarian values, they reveal high commitment to the practice of elections as the best means for selecting their leaders. They were asked whether “we should choose our leader in this country through regular, open and honest elections”, or whether “Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country’s leaders”. Over 70% saw elections as the best option to choose a leader in Mozambique, while 18% agreed with the idea of adopting other methods (see Graph 6.12). However, when the survey inquired whether “political parties create division; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Mozambique”, or whether “political parties need to make sure that Mozambicans have real choices in who governs them”, less than half of the respondents (43%) believed that even if political parties create division and confusion,
they are nonetheless needed for choice. Forty per cent agreed with idea that political parties are unnecessary political institutions in Mozambique (see Graph 6.13).

Graph 6.12: Choose leaders through elections vs. adopt other methods

Questions: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B: A) We should choose my leader in this country through regular, open and honest elections; B) Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country’s leaders”.

Graph 6.13: Many political parties unnecessary vs. many political parties needed

Questions: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B: A) Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore necessary to have many political parties in Mozambique; B) Many political parties are needed to make sure that Mozambicans have real choice in who governs them”.

The 1994, 1999 and 2004 RENAMO and FRELIMO electoral campaigns focused on issues of democracy and authoritarianism. RENAMO emphasized that it had fought to liberate the country from authoritarianism. They accused FRELIMO of being expert in building re-education camps, suppressing freedom of expression and controlling all independent civil society organizations. At the same time, FRELIMO avoided mentioning any negative aspects of their past and argued that they were the only
political party that had fought for the liberation of the country and had maintained political stability, and rebuilt the country after a long civil war (Pereira, 2007).

Despite three elections, democracy has struggled to take root in Mozambique. These elections have not yet led to consolidation of democratic institutions and democratic governance. Under these circumstances elections may be referenda about political regimes. Thus the question arises whether a political regime's value affects party preferences in Mozambique. The results show that FRELIMO draws its support mainly from those who strongly approve of authoritarianism: 72% of respondents who strongly approved of rule by one party identify with FRELIMO compared to 54% of those who strongly disapproved of one-party rule. Sixty-nine per cent of those who strongly support rule by councils of chiefs identify with FRELIMO as opposed to 61% of those who strongly disapproved. There is a weak relationship between the rejection of “alternative regimes” and support for FRELIMO, no relationship with regard to opposition support and a negative weak relationship with support for independence.59 With regard to support for democracy, FRELIMO’s support is slightly higher amongst those who perceive that non-democratic regime is sometimes preferable (64%) compared to 59% who perceived that democracy is always preferable. Support for democracy is not related to support for FRELIMO, the opposition or independence.60

6.2.4. Command economy vs. market economy

A command economy is perceived as a popular preference of the state government to regulate various factors of production. The command principle strives to fully and effectively replace the operation of market forces in the key industrial and developmental sectors of the economy, and render the remaining (peripheral) markets manipulatable and subordinate to political direction. Thus the command principle is likely to clash with the operation of market forces, yet a command economy may nonetheless contain and rely on the market mechanism in some of its sectors and areas, for example, influencing labour allocation or stimulating small-scale private production of some consumables. By contrast, in a market economy, the central or state government does not regulate various factors of production and it is the market which decides what to produce, when to produce and the cost of production. To develop a market economy presupposes the

59 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .059; p=<.009; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.023; p=.<.239; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b .074; p=<.001.
60 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .027; p=.286; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.005; p=<.849; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.049; p=<.057.
existence of multiple sectors of the economy. It means that the transformation from the former planned economy into a market economy is one from two kinds of public economy, i.e. the state-owned economy and collective economy into multiple sectors of the economy.

Mozambique's dual transitions to a market economy and a pluralist democracy have helped to reduce the paternalist approach of the socialist state and introduce a new type of relationship between the state and citizens. The state has been forced to dramatically reduce its subsidies. However, the liberalization of the economy has not yet removed the old vestiges of paternalist values, particularly those related to full employment, and free or cheap education and health systems. These new and old types of social values are in conflict.

In order to explore the issue of state vs. markets, the Afrobarometer survey generates different types of questions such as: “Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? A. A free market economy is preferable to an economy run by the government. B. A government-run economy is preferable to a free market economy. C. For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of economy system I have.” Those citizens who find the free market to be preferable are deemed to support market values. Other questions in this regard are: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? A. The cost of reforming the economy is too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies. B. In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardship now.” “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? A. It is better for everyone to have a job even if this means that average wages are low. B. It is better to have higher wages, even if this means that some people go without a job.” “Which of the following statement is closest to your view? A. All civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country. B. The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay some of them off.”

Although FRELIMO changed its policies with regard to the economy--from a centralized economy to a market economy--RENAKO still labels FRELIMO as Marxist with a centralized and paternalistic approach to economic issues. It is common to see the RENAMO party leader, Dhlakama, refer to FRELIMO as a communist party or as Marxist in his speeches. By contrast, FRELIMO leaders appeal to voters with many
different political ideologies (for example, those who are pro-market, great power patriots or nationalists).

When evaluating the long-term importance of market reform, Mozambicans appear to be divided. When asked to choose between a government-run economy or a market economy, half of the respondents (51%) said that a market economy was preferable; and 26% indicated that government should run the economy, 9% felt that the matter of a state-run economy versus a market economy does not matter, 14% did not offer any response (see Graph 6.14).

Graph 6.14: Prefer market vs. government-run economy

On a comparative basis, Mozambican's avowed support for market reforms is about 7% higher than in the other African countries surveyed. Mozambique's support for a market economy is statistically on a par with Nigeria (51%) and Ghana (51%). Among the 16 African countries, Uganda (57%) along with Tanzania (54%) and Malawi (54%) register the highest level of support for a market economy. In contrast, Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe present the lowest support for a market economy in Africa--24%, 26% and 35% respectively (see Graph 6.15).
Graph 6 15: Support for market economy across the 16 Afrobarometer countries

When people in Mozambique were asked to choose between the following two statements: “The cost of reforming the economy is too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies”; and “In order for the economy to improve in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardship now”, 31% of respondents agreed with the idea that government should abandon its current policies whereas 37% did not agree; 12% did not offer a clear answer whether the government should or shouldn’t abandon the economic reforms in Mozambique, and 20% did not know (see Graph 6.16).

Graph 6 16: Abandon economic reforms vs. accept hardship

Question: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. A: The cost of reforming the economy is too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies. B: In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardship now”
When people were asked whether it is better to have job for life with low average wages or cut some of the jobs and increase wages, the majority of Mozambicans (70%) preferred to have a job for life with low wages rather than to have high salaries with fewer people working (see Graph 6.17).

**Graph 6.17: More jobs, low wages vs. fewer jobs, high wages**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with neither</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree very strongly with B</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with B</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with A</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree very strongly with A</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. A) It is better for everyone have a job even if this means that average wages are low. B) It is better to have higher wages, even if this means that some people go without a job.”

When they were asked whether “All civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country”, or whether “The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay some of them off”, 56% agreed with the idea that “all civil servants should keep their jobs despite the high costs of salaries”, while 17% agreed with the idea of lay some of them off (see Graph 6.18).

**Graph 6.18: All civil servants keep jobs vs. lay-offs to reduce costs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Level</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with neither</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree very strongly with B</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with B</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with A</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree very strongly with A</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. A) All civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country. B) The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay some of them off”
These results seem to suggest that although some market principles appear to have support among Mozambicans; the greater majority is not in favour of losing jobs.

Does support for a state vs. market economy affect party preference in Mozambique? There is no clear picture about differences between support for a market economy and party identification. FRELIMO supporters are more numerous amongst those who support the idea of accepting economic hardship now (64%) as opposed to those who disagree (56%). However, FRELIMO also draws support from those who agree with the idea of a government-run economy (66%). Attitude to a market economy is weakly and negatively related to FRELIMO support, is weakly but positively related to opposition support, and has no relation to independence.61

When it come to the question of “civil servants should keep their jobs vs. government should lay some of them off” or “it is better for everyone to have a job with low wages vs. it is better to have higher wages with fewer jobs”, FRELIMO seems to draw its support from various groups. FRELIMO is supported by 67% of those to whom it did not matter if “it is better to keep a job with average wages low” versus “higher wages, even if this means some people go without a job” and also by 70% of those who “strongly agree” with the idea of laying off some civil servants because the government cannot afford so many public employees as opposed to 55% who “strongly agree” with the idea that all civil servants should keep their jobs. However, support for retrenchments is not related to support for FRELIMO, for the opposition or for independence.62 A similar result is also found with regard to responses to the question related to keeping a job even if this means that average wages are low.63

6.3. Predicting identification with FRELIMO

One of the key debates in comparative Western European politics over the past generation has been the extent of erosion of the “old” social cleavages (notably class, regional difference, religion, ethnicity, rural vs. urban) in favour of new post-materialist values (such as environment, minority rights and citizens participation), as a result of

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61 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.047; p=<.051; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b .050; p=<.038; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b .010; p=<.674.
62 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.007; p=<.778; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b .030; p=<.224; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b .016; p=<.537.
63 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.007; p=<.778; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b .030; p=<.224; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b .016; p=<.537.
social changes and fragmentation in advanced capitalist economies (Dalton et al., 1984a, 1990, 1996a, 1996b; Inglehart, 1971, 1977, 1987, 1990). Transporting such assumptions to the African context despite all limitations should be relatively simple as the basic logic still applies. In general, for the African cases, there are new types of sociopolitical values that might affect electoral behaviour. These are communitarian vs. individualist explanatory variables; secularist vs. religious; authoritarian vs. democratic items; and command economy vs. market economy (Bratton et al., 2005).

In terms of the above discussion and based on the evidence found in the Mozambican context, the sociopolitical values should predict the following:

- **Communitarianism vs. individualist values.** Individualistic-oriented people are more likely to identify with FRELIMO while less individualistic-oriented people are more likely to identify with the opposition.
- **Secularism vs. religious values.** Secular-oriented people are more likely to identify with FRELIMO whereas the less secular-oriented people are more likely to support the opposition.
- **Authoritarian vs. democratic values.** Authoritarian-oriented people are more likely to identify with FRELIMO whereas less authoritarian-oriented people are more likely to support the opposition.
- **Command economy vs. market-oriented economy.** Command economy-oriented people are more likely to identify with FRELIMO while less command economy-oriented people are more likely to identify with the opposition.

Since this study seeks to make inferences about the effects of these hypotheses, the analysis will be carried out in two steps. Firstly, as in the previous chapter, the logistic regression analysis will be run which includes all sociopolitical values (communitarian vs. individualist explanatory variables, secularist vs. religious items, authoritarian vs. democratic items, and command economy vs. market-oriented economy predictors) in a single model. The second step will involve the dropping of those variables that are insignificant, since there is a more accurate Adjusted R Square, and run the logistic regression analysis again which will help to develop a more parsimonious model.

As can be seen in Table 6.1, the results reveal a number of different types of sociopolitical values factors that impact on the support for FRELIMO.
Communitarianism, authoritarianism and a command economy and market-oriented economic policy factors do play a role in predicting identification with FRELIMO. Support for these is a positive predictor of FRELIMO support. This means that all those who agree with communitarian values (avoid large gaps between rich and poor), with the idea of an authoritarian government, that democracy is always preferable and support a command economy (approve of the government running the economy) are more likely to identify with FRELIMO. However, some of the support for a command economy (cost of economic reform is high and government should abandon it and job for life vs. laying off some of them) is negatively related to FRELIMO support. This means that those who agree with the idea of a command economy (cost of economic reform is high and government should abandon it and all civil servants should keep their jobs rather than be laid off to reduce the cost) are less likely to identify with FRELIMO. When statistically insignificant effects are dropped, all variables left explain .046% of variance.
Predictor variables: Communitarian vs. individualist items measured by asking respondents if they agree with the following statements: “Each person should put the well-being of the community ahead of their own interests vs. everybody should be free to pursue what is best for themselves as individuals”, and “It is alright to have large differences in wealth because those who work hard deserve to be rewarded” vs. “I should avoid large gaps between rich and poor because they create jealousy and conflict”. The secularism vs. religiosity item is measured by asking respondents how often they attend religious services, and authoritarian vs. democratic values items measure how far respondents disapprove or approve of the following regimes: “only one party is allowed to stand for election, a council of chiefs makes all decisions, the army comes in to govern the country and elections and national assembly are abolished so the president can decide everything (this on a 4-point scale)”; command economy vs. market is measured by asking respondents whether it is preferable for the government to run the economy rather than having a free market economy and if the government should abandon the economy reforms because of the hardship endured. The dependent variable is identification with FRELIMO and was coded: 0=Else; 1=FRELIMO; the Opposition was coded: 0=Else; 1=Opposition and Independents was coded: 0=Else; 1=Independents. P<.001+++ , P<.01++ , P<.05+. Entries are level of significance; standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented outside of entries. A dash (-) indicates that the relationship is insufficiently strong and significant to include the independent variable in a final, reduced model. The analysis presented in this table is based on the weighted dataset.

6.4. Predicting identification with opposition parties

Given the researcher’s interest in tracing the path by which Mozambicans identify with the opposition, an analysis of sociopolitical values regarding the opposition is included in this study. Thus a logistic regression analysis of sociopolitical values was run on the opposition in order to see which factors influence support for the opposition. As mentioned in the previous chapter, sociopolitical values perform poorly in predicting identification with opposition parties. Nevertheless, the logistic regression analysis
reveals that religiosity is negatively related to opposition support, which means that those who never attend religious services are more likely to identify with opposition support. The other sociopolitical values do not play a role in predicting identification with the opposition. The sociopolitical values variables explain .042% of the variance (see Table 6.1).

6.5. Predicting identification with non-partisanship (or independence)

In order to analyse the effects of sociopolitical values with regard to independence, the effects of nine sociopolitical variables were evaluated. The results for all sociopolitical value indicators are shown in Table 6.1. Only variables that are statistically significant are reported. Among all sociopolitical value items introduced in the multivariate analysis, only four (communitarian, authoritarianism and support for a market economy) play a role in predicting independence. Communitarian, authoritarianism, and command economy support are negatively related to independence; however, support for market-oriented economic policies is positively related to independence. That is, those who disagree with the communitarian values (avoid large gaps between rich and poor), and those who disagree with the idea of authoritarian rule and a command-oriented economy (government should run the economy) are more likely to be non-partisan or independent. But those who disagree with the idea of left social policies (job for life rather than laying some people off to reduce the cost) are less likely to identify with independence. All variables explain .034% of variance.

The basic hypothesis in terms of the cultural values approach is fairly clear: fundamental values conflicts exist within society which cause tensions. The individual involved in this conflict searches for partners (e.g. political parties and civic organizations) in order to influence the political decision-making processes. Consequently, voters will identify with the party that represents their values. However, the logistic regression analysis reveals moderate effects of sociopolitical values in explaining opposition support in Mozambique.

What factors account for the relatively weak impact of cultural values cleavages in Mozambique? One explanation for this is that voters must have a clear and objective problem in terms of values. A clear objective problem means that the public needs to be divided in its opinion and support only a few values. When voters hold a number of
different values simultaneously or have a high level of agreement (consensus) in terms of values, for example, with regard to the achievement of personal freedom or they may wish to preserve traditional values and security as well as pursue self-realization, consensus and mixed values cannot account for electoral behaviour. In other words, to apply values cleavages to political decisions, people need to prioritize their value preferences and make a decision one or the other way. If value preferences are not fully hierarchical and competing sides are equally weighted, values cannot easily serve to make choices. By supporting competing values, ambivalence arises about the choice one needs to make (Keele at al., 2004).

This seems to be the case for many voters in Mozambique--voters' values preferences are not fully hierarchical. As a result it is difficult to see any cultural values cleavages impact on the political system. Furthermore, the translation of values cleavages to voter choice requires the existence of strong organizational networks. A cultural value vote is facilitated by the existence of a social network that manipulates or coordinates the voting actions of many individuals. The absence of strong organizational networks can inhibit the rise of values cleavages when it comes to electoral choice. This seems to be the case in Mozambique where organizational networks are very weak and have no clear position in terms of which values to advocate or defend. Mozambican organizational networks have developed “catch all” strategies in terms of their role in the society. This does not mean that there is no civic organization to promote a specific value. With the introduction of a multi-party system in 1994, a number of pressure groups have emerged which can be defined along traditionalist versus modernist lines, but the pressure groups are not strongly rooted in the society and have not moved into the political arena.

Thirdly, another reason for the weak impact of cultural values cleavages is that cultural values cleavages only can be reproduced in a political system if there is a political party that promotes and defends values issues during or after election campaigns. The party also needs to have strong connections with civic organization networks that promote the same types of values. In many new democracies, as is the case in Mozambique, political parties have little connection with and even less support from grassroots (e.g. environmental organizations, women’s organizations, religious organizations) and they never adopted a coherent cultural values debate during their elections campaign. This contrasts starkly with Western Europe where, for instance, the green party emerged from
grassroots protest movements into the political arena and now participates in election campaigns.

Fourthly, political parties need to have a clearly defined view regarding values. When political parties have unclear positions in terms of values or they have no consensus, values cannot be easily translated into a political system. Mozambican political parties are characterized by their “catch all nature” and weak ideological and social roots. During election times parties did little more than provide voters with incoherent and unclear party programmes in terms of values or economic policy. Values issues were almost entirely absent from the campaigns. Given the lack of parties representing values issues (traditionalist versus modernist, communitarian versus individualist), voters with values preferences may use other indicators to identify with political parties or in extreme cases abstain from identifying with any of the political parties. Finally, values cleavages can be translated into a political system only when there is some stability in terms of political institutions and economic policy. In other words, values voting can only occur when democracy has already been stabilized. In new democracies, voters seem to be more concerned about political stability and major economic problems rather than values issues. It seems that in emergent democracies voters are confronted more with issues of survival in their day-to-day living rather than with a choice between different values.

6.6. Conclusion

The evidence regarding the effect of cultural values on partisan identification reveals that cultural values do matter in predicting partisan identification in Mozambique, particularly when one looks at values related to support for communitarianism, religiosity and authoritarianism, support for either left or right economic policies and support for a command economy.

FRELIMO support is determined by support for communitarianism, authoritarianism and support for a command economy and right economic policy. People who agree with the following are more likely to identify with FRELIMO: communitarian values (avoid large gaps between rich and poor), the idea of an authoritarian government, the idea of democracy and a command economy (approve of the government running the economy). However, those who agree with the idea of a command economy (cost of
economic reform is high and government should abandon it) and those who agree with the idea of left social policies (all civil servants should keep their jobs rather than lay off some to reduce the cost) are less likely to identify with FRELIMO.

With respect to support for opposition parties, among all sociopolitical values introduced in the model only religiosity plays a role. Those who never attend religious services are more likely to identify with opposition parties. With regard to support for independence, the factors that determine non-partisanship are support for communitarian; authoritarianism, right economic policy and a market economy. This means that those who disagree with the communitarian values (avoid large gaps between rich and poor), authoritarian rule and a command-oriented economy (approve government to run the economy) are more likely to be non-partisan or independent. But those who disagree with the idea of “left economic policy” (job for life rather than lay some of them off to reduce the cost) are less likely to identify with independence.

Sociopolitical values are much better predictors of party support, explaining 5% of variance and 4% on opposition. On independence, these values explain 3% of variance.

Sociopolitical values are much better predictors of FRELIMO and support for the opposition, explaining 5 percent of variance and 4 percent on opposition. On independence, these explain 3 percent of variance.

Lying behind the weakness of a cultural values approach is the absence of stable political institutions and economic stability. Because they live in an unstable political climate and economic situation, voters may turn more of their attention to economic and political issues rather than to value-based issues. A fuller understanding of party preferences requires us to go beyond an examination of social cleavages and values to economic voting, political evaluations and decisions based on cognitive awareness. In the next chapters, I will try first to test the effect of economic voting on party preference and then test the influence of political evaluations and cognitive awareness on partisan identification.
CHAPTER VII: THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

7.1. Introduction

Lewis-Beck et al. (2000) noted the following:

Good times keep parties in Office, bad times cast them out...the economic voters...hold the government responsible for economic performance, rewarding or punishing it at the ballot...the citizen votes for the government if the economy is doing alright; otherwise the vote is against. (p.183)

Research in the United States and elsewhere provides evidence for claims such as the one cited above regarding the importance of what has become generally known as economic voting. However, this view has not yet been put to the test in Mozambique. Thus we need to ask the question whether the government’s economic performance plays a role in predicting partisanship in Mozambique. If it does, do Mozambicans choose political parties based on pocketbook or sociotropic evaluations? Do Mozambicans use retrospective or prospective evaluations when they want to choose a political party?

In this chapter a number of different aspects of economic evaluations will be examined. These include pocketbook items, sociotropic items, government performance items (economic performance index, government performance scale, evaluation of the decreased role of the State in the economy and perceptions of the government’s ability to reduce inequalities), and the bivariate correlations between these and partisan identification. Since the dependent variable of partisanship is coded as dichotomous, logistic regression analysis is employed to examine the relationships of the independent variables to partisanship. The logistic regression analysis will once again take place in two steps: 1) All economic assessment items are introduced: pocketbook items, sociotropic items, and government performance items. 2) The economic variables that are not statistically significant at $p > .05$ will be dropped. As in previous chapters, the tables will only present socio-economic evaluation variables that are statistically significant. The column contains the standardized regression coefficients (Beta).
levels of significance are placed in parentheses. All effects that are statistically significant are highlighted, and which indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected.

The negative or positive sign in each coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. Non-significant effects mean that the two variables are not at all connected. At the end of the first column the sample size (n) is presented as well as the total explained variance (Adjusted R square) of the model on each dependent variable.

7.2. Results

7.2.1 The state of the economy: reality and perception

A consolidated democracy requires good government performance (good governance) in order to create better socio-economic and political conditions for its citizens. One of the most important areas for people’s evaluations of new political systems are their opinions about how the government is doing its job, both generally as well as in specific areas. Different studies in Mozambique have measured these opinions in their most general form (general approval/disapproval of how political institutions have performed their job in past years) as well as in more specific areas (how well government has performed in a number of specific policy areas).

Mozambique has been reported as a post-war rehabilitation success. Since the end of the civil war the Mozambican government has embarked on a series of impressive political and economic reforms. With control over inflation since 1996, Mozambique has been able to record a remarkable rate of economic growth over the past years. The average annual GDP and GDP per capita growth rates for the years 1995 to 2002 were 8% and 6% respectively (Bruck et al., 2006). The main sources of economic growth have been the recovery of smallholder agriculture, as well as the expansion of the services sector, buoyed by transport and financial sector growth. Manufacturing has performed well recently thanks to increased demand, fuelled by donor inflows. In spite of these gains, Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world. This is evidence that the pace of economic growth is an indicator that individual citizens feel only indirectly (McPherson, 2001).
The Afrobarometer survey provides different variables, which can be usefully employed to operationalize economic perceptions, such as the following: a measure of optimistic versus pessimistic view about the respondent’s financial future; a measure of whether the respondent’s and the country’s economic conditions have improved or worsened over the past years; a measure of the extent to which the respondent’s household is experiencing difficulties by asking the following questions: “Let’s begin by talking about economic conditions. In general, how would you describe: A. The present condition of this country? B. Your own present conditions? Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to 12 months ago? A. Economic conditions in this country? B. Your living conditions? Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse? A. Economic conditions in 12 months time? B. Your living conditions in 12 months’ time?” The responses for each item are scored as “much worse”, “worse”, “same”, “better”, “much better”, “don’t know”.

When Afrobarometer Round 2 asked people about their economic situations, there was no hesitancy in giving answers: only 1% did not respond. A total of 40% said that their personal life conditions were “fairly”/very good”, 27% said “neither good nor bad” and 32% said that their life conditions were “fairly”/very bad” (see Graph 7.1).

**Graph 7.1: Present personal economic conditions**

When asked to assess “their past personal economic condition” and “their future economic condition”, 39% said that their past economic conditions were better/much better; 31% said they were the same; 27% said their situation was worse/much worse, and 3% refused to answer the question (see Graph 7.2).
When it comes to future personal economic conditions Mozambicans tend to be more pessimistic--only 48% of those interviewed said that they expected their domestic economic conditions to improve in the future whereas 10% said that their situation would be worse/much worse. Twenty per cent said that their economic conditions would not change, and 22% did not respond (see Graph 7.3).

Comparing current personal conditions with other African countries, the level of satisfaction in Mozambique is about 9% higher than in the remaining 16 African country
averages (31%). When examining past personal economic conditions, the level of satisfaction in Mozambique is to some extent about the same compared to the average of other African countries (37%). In terms of personal prospective assessment, the level of satisfaction in Mozambique is about 7% lower than the average of other African countries.

Table 7.1: Level of satisfaction with personal economic conditions: present, past and future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>27</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Lesotho</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afro Mean</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 Survey, 2002

When Afrobarometer Round 2 survey asked people about their country’s economic conditions, 54% of Mozambicans felt that the country’s economic conditions were “better” or “much better”, whereas 20% felt economic conditions in the country were either “fairly bad” or “very bad” (see Graph 7.4). Nineteen per cent felt that they were the same and 7% did not respond to the question.
When asked to “look back and compare the country’s current economic conditions with those of the past”, 50% felt that their country’s economic conditions were “better” or “much better” 12 months ago than currently. Twenty-one per cent felt that economic conditions were the same and another 21% felt that they were “worse” or “much worse”. Only 8% did not respond (see Graph 7.5).

With regard to the country’s economic future, Mozambicans seem to be relatively optimistic. Fifty-seven per cent of respondents expected the country’s economic conditions to improve in the near future, while 9% expected them to be “worse” or
“much worse” and 13% expected conditions to stay the “same”. Twenty-one per cent did not respond to the question.

Graph 7.6: Country’s future economic conditions

Question: “Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse? Economic conditions in twelve months time?”

When comparing the results of Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys, the level of satisfaction in Mozambique with the country’s current economic conditions (50%) is about 21% higher than the average of the remaining 16 countries (33%).

When comparing past economic conditions, Mozambicans’ level of satisfaction with their country’s past economic conditions is about 12 percentage points higher than the 16 country average (38%). While Kenya (51%), Mozambique (50%) and Namibia (46%) have the highest level of satisfaction with their country’s past economic conditions, Lesotho (21%) and Malawi (25%) have the lowest levels.

With regard to the future economic conditions, notwithstanding the negative view of current and past economic conditions, many Africans think that future conditions are destined to get “better”. Cape Verde (79%), Kenya (78%) and Namibia (76%) are those with the most positive view about their future economic conditions. The Basotho (24%) and Malawians (25%) are the most pessimistic about their country’s future economic conditions (see Table 7.2).
Table 7.2: Level of satisfaction with countries’ economic conditions: present, past and future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Future</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
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<td><strong>Afro Mean</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 Survey, 2002

Objective economic performance assessments by “experts”, such as the Bertelsmann index describe Mozambique as a “market-based democracy with deficiencies” with economic management described as “successful with weaknesses”. But are these macro-economic gains (as referred by GDP growth) reflected at the micro-level an improvement of people’s living standards? Assuming that “citizens’ opinions are ultimately what matter most in terms of the feasibility of the democratic project” (Mattes et al., 2005). In order to measure government performance in a number of specific policies, the Afrobarometer asked, “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? A. Managing the economy; B. Creating jobs; C. Keeping prices stable; D. Narrowing gaps between rich and poor”. Each is scored as “very badly”, “fairly badly”, “fairly well”, “very well”, “don’t know”.

Less than half (48%) of Mozambicans said that the government is managing the economy well. And two-thirds said that government was handling job creation (71%) and keeping prices stable (67%) badly. In addition, more than half of the respondents

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64 The Bertelsmann Transformation Status and Management Indexes for 2006: The status index result represents the mean value of political and economic transformations. The management index evaluates managements by political decision-makers while taking into consideration the level of difficulty. (Retrieved from www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de)
(57%) voted government performance in narrowing the gap between rich and poor as bad (Graph 7.7).

**Graph 7.7: Government handling the economy**

These economic performance evaluation attitudes can be combined in a valid and reliable representation of a single dimension labeled *economic regime performance index*, which can be used in bivariate and multivariate analyses, instead of using each attitude separately. From these items it is possible to extract a single unrotated factor with an eigenvalue of 2.183 that explains 54.6% of the variance common to all seven items. The reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) = .716. The items load on the factor as follows: keeping the prices stable (.808), creating jobs (.804), narrowing gaps (.733) and managing the economy (.589). Thus, instead of using each item of assessment separately, the composite index is used in further analyses (bivariate and multivariate analysis).

In order to test public opinion on the effects of the larger economic reform process, the Afrobarometer asked, “We are going to compare the present economic system with the economic system a few years ago. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now that they used to be, or about the same. A. The availability of goods; B. People's' standard of living; C. The availability of job opportunities.” Each item is scored as “much worse”, “worse”, “about the same”, “better”, “much better”, and “don’t know”.
The results in Graph 7.8 reveal that the government received negative performance ratings mainly with regard to the issues of availability of jobs and people's living standards. The proportion of respondents saying that the availability of job opportunities is worse or much worse is far higher (61%) than for their living standards (22%) or the availability of goods (22%). The proportion of Mozambicans who believe that the availability of jobs opportunities is worse or much worse is the same as in the other surveyed African countries (61%). With regard to improving people's living standards, the Mozambique mean score is 14% lower than the average of the other 16 African countries (41%). The Mozambican mean score on the availability of foods is 4% lower compared with the other countries (26%).

**Graph 7.8: Evaluation of economic reform**

![Graph 7.8: Evaluation of economic reform](image)

**Question:** “We are going to compare my present economic system with the economic system a few years ago. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now that they used to be, or about the same. A) The availability of goods, B) People’s standard of living, C) The availability of jobs opportunities, D) The gap between the rich and the poor”.

**Graph 7.9: Average of the 16 Afrobarometer countries’ evaluation of economic reform**

![Graph 7.9: Average of the 16 Afrobarometer countries’ evaluation of economic reform](image)

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 Survey, 2002
Using factor and reliability analysis it is possible to construct a single dimension labeled economic governance performance index, which can be used in bivariate and multivariate analyses, instead of using each attitude separately. A single unrotated factor was extracted with an eigenvalue greater than one (1.396), which explains 60.731% of the common variance, and it is sufficiently reliable (.657). This composite index will be used in further analyses (bivariate and multivariate analysis).

7.2.2. Egocentric influences

Egocentric assessment is the method by which a voter will take into account their personal economic conditions. Egocentric assessment can be formed on the basis of simple facts and Graphs about the present, past and future economic conditions of the household.

During the pre-election public discourse on economic issues the voice of RENAMO was less audible and also less convincing. Therefore, no real debate occurred between FRELIMO and RENAMO on the fundamental direction of the country’s economy. The FRELIMO leadership only emphasized their competence to govern and their capability in developing the country’s infrastructure (Pereira, 2007). Apart from their achievements in terms of infrastructural development in rural areas, FRELIMO emphasized the fact that their economic reforms have been classified as one of the most successful in the history of Africa. By contrast, RENAMO attempted to capitalize on dissatisfaction with the pace of economic growth and the asymmetrical distribution of associated benefits in rural areas. RENAMO based their election campaign on the negative aspects of FRELIMO’s performance, particularly those related to poverty alleviation and the high level of unemployment in the country.

The quality of the dialogue around economic growth during the electoral campaign reflected a lack of economic knowledge on the part of the political commentators. Nevertheless, voters could make their own assessments of the economic advantages of their political choices. Voters might use egocentric assessment to decide about their partisanship. Egocentric assessments could be based on the state of a person’s domestic finances or they could be formed on the basis of simple facts related to their household income and expenditure around election time. In addition voters can also make assessments based on their past or future personal economic conditions. They may
compare the wealth of their household with that of other Mozambicans for example, or assess how many houses, schools or hospitals the government promises to build.

To what extent do personal economic conditions affect partisanship in Mozambique? It was found that FRELIMO support is higher among those who are satisfied with their present economic conditions (65%) than among those who are not (38%). There is an association between current personal economic assessment and identification with FRELIMO or independence. 65 However, the results do not show association with support for the opposition. 66

What about retrospective personal assessment? It was found that FRELIMO supporters are more likely to be found among those who perceive that their personal economic conditions were much better in the past year (63%) than among those who perceived that their economic conditions were much worse (40%). There is no association between retrospective personal assessment and identification with the opposition or independence. 67 However, the results do show a modest association between retrospective personal assessment and support for FRELIMO. 68

Regarding prospective household assessment, FRELIMO still garner their support from those who believe their personal economic conditions will be much better in the future (70%) as opposed to the 35% who are negative about their future personal economic conditions. Prospective assessment is weakly associated with support for FRELIMO and the opposition, but not associated with independence. 69

7.2.3. Sociotropic influences

Voters may also use sociotropic assessments to make their decisions about which political parties to vote for. Sociotropic voting sees voters evaluate the current economy as a whole rather than only in terms of their own personal situation. Voters influenced by sociotropic motivations seem not to use their personal financial difficulties as a gauge, but instead consider the larger situation of the community, province, or nation. Sociotropic voters also take into account past economic assessments and future

65 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .109; p=<.000; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.071; p=<.005.
66 Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b .037; p=<.157.
68 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .052; p=<.032.
69 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .071; p=<.004; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.066; p=<.010; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.024; p=<.336.
collective assessments, and will make a decision to vote for or against incumbents based on these. Sociotropic judgements can be formed on the basis of facts and graphs about the current economic situation of the community by for instance comparing how many schools and hospitals the government is building in a particular community. When voter perceptions of the current economic conditions of the community are positive, they tend to reward the incumbent government with support. If not, they punish the government by withdrawing their support.

FRELIMO seems to draw its support from respondents who are positive about the present economic conditions of the country (63%) as opposed to those who are not satisfied with the economy (45%). Satisfaction with the country’s present economic conditions is relatively strongly associated with support for FRELIMO and for the opposition, but not associated with independence.\(^{70}\)

What about retrospective viewing of the country’s economic conditions? It was found that FRELIMO supporters are more likely to be found among those who are positive about their country’s past economic conditions (57%) than among those who are not (47%). Sociotropic retrospective assessment is not associated with identification with one party or independence.\(^{71}\)

With regard to prospective economic conditions, FRELIMO still draws its support among those who are positive about the country’s future economic conditions (68%) rather than among those who are negative about the country’s economic future (51%). Sociotropic prospective assessment is strongly associated with support for FRELIMO, modestly associated with independence, and not associated with support for the opposition.\(^{72}\)

7.2.4. Economic regime and government performance

According to Rose et al. (1999:147), the governance of democracy is a demand-supply relationship. The public demand certain actions from governors, and state representatives or elected officials supply what the citizens get. State officials or

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70 FRELIMO: Kendall’s-Tau-b .099; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.092; p=<.000; Independent: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.045; p=<.075.
71 FRELIMO: Kendall’s-Tau-b .031; p=<.203; Opposition: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.020; p=<.455; Independent: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.011; p=<.659.
72 FRELIMO: Kendall’s-Tau-b .115; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.034; p=<.185; Independent: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.052; p=<.036.
representative leaders are required to provide citizens with good performance in the areas of stabilizing prices, ensuring the availability of goods, creating jobs, reducing inequalities, increasing citizens’ standard of living and increasing access to services. In many African countries, Mozambique included, citizens evaluate the incumbent government in relation to social performance (education and health care delivery) and areas related to management of the economy (inequalities, job creation, price stability) (Bratton et al., 2004; Pereira et al., 2003).

RENAMO has tried to sell itself as the party that is able to implement policies that will increase the standard of living of the citizens of Mozambique by reducing inequalities, increasing job opportunities and keeping prices stable. Its campaigns have focused on negative aspects of FRELIMO’s performance, particularly concerning the reduction of poverty, inequality and unemployment. In response, FRELIMO has argued that the State does not have the resources to solve the socio-economic problems the country is facing. This argument seems to counter Mozambicans’ perceptions of the state’s ability to solve peoples’ problems. Six out of ten (58%) respondents in the survey felt that the government should be able to solve all (17%) or most (41%) of the country’s problems. Almost a quarter of the population (28%) thinks that the government can at least solve some of the country’s key problems. Only one in ten responded pessimistically, with the view that the government can solve “very few” (6%) or “none” (3%) of the nation’s problems (Pereira et al., 2003:20).

Under these circumstances, voters may use indicators of poor performance on the part of government to punish FRELIMO. Thus, to what extent does an assessment of government performance influence partisan identification? The data indicates that FRELIMO supporters are more likely to be found among those who are satisfied with the government’s reduced role in the economy (62%) than among those who are not satisfied with this role (48%). With regard to job opportunities, FRELIMO support is higher among those who are satisfied (75%) than among those who are not satisfied with the government’s performance in this regard (54%). However, there is no association between the economic performance index and identification with any political group or independence.73

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73 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .017; p<.467; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b .031; p<.159; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b .030; p<.203.
7.3. Predicting identification with FRELIMO

“When the economy is good, the citizens vote for incumbent”. In order to test this economic voting assumption regarding FRELIMO support, all the economic assessment items were considered: a) personal current economic conditions; b) personal retrospective economic conditions; c) personal prospective economic conditions; d) collective current economic conditions; e) collective retrospective economic conditions; f) collective prospective economic conditions; and g) government performance items (economic performance index, government performance scale, evaluation of the decrease role of the State in the economy and perception of the government’s ability to reduce inequalities). The analysis is guided by the following hypothesis:

- Intention to identify with incumbent party (FRELIMO) is positively related to the individual’s positive current, retrospective or prospective pocketbook assessments.
- Intention to identify with incumbent party (FRELIMO) is positively related to the individual’s positive current, retrospective or prospective sociotropic assessments.

As before, the multivariate logistic regression starts with a full model that contains all independent variables selected. Then the independent variables whose partial regression coefficient is least significant are removed from the model. The final model is presented in Table 7.3 where the irrelevant independent variables have been eliminated by using the .05 level of significance as the criterion for dropping those variables that are insignificant in the model. Results indicate correlations between partisanship and positive perceptions of the country’s present economic conditions. This is consistent with the hypothesis, since their effects are statistically positively related to FRELIMO support. This means that those who perceive the country’s economic conditions as good and those who approve of the reduced role of government in the economy are more likely to support FRELIMO. Among effects that are statistically significant in the opposite direction is the effect of the economic regime performance index, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. That is, those who are satisfied with the government’s economic performance are less likely to identify with FRELIMO. The economic regime performance index, despite being in the wrong direction, is the best predictor of
FRELIMO support. All economic assessment variables explain .053% of the total variance.

Table 7.3: Multi-variety analysis and its effect on partisan identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FRELIMO</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Independents</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pocketbook items</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Current personal econ. conditions</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-.213 (.001+++)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sociotropic items</td>
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<td>Country’s present economy</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retrospective</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prospective</td>
<td>.273 (.001***)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economy and gov. performance items</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic regime performance index</td>
<td>-.293 (000***)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic gov performance index</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease role of state in the economy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP create inequalities</td>
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</table>

-2 log Likelihood: 1344.695 430.702 1540.293
Cox & Snell R Square: .039 .002 .010
Nagelkerke R square: .053 .005 .015
Constant: -.153 -3.412 -.469
N: 1029 1089 1297

Predictors’ variables: Current personal economy, personal economy 12 months ago, and future personal economy 12 months ahead. These personal economic concerns were coded as 5=very good; 4=fairly good; 3=neither good nor bad; 2=fairly bad, 1=very bad. Current country economy, country economy 12 months ago and future country economy 12 months ahead. Country economic concerns were coded as above. Economic regime performance index: 3-point scales measure how better or worse things are with the present economic system in terms of availability of goods, people’s standard of living and availability of jobs. Decreased state role in economy: “The government has reduced its role in the economy. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way this policy works?” Perception of SAP creating inequalities: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view: a) The government policies have helped most people, and only a few have suffered; b) In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardship?”. Economic Government Performance Index: this 4-point scale measured how well or badly people thought the current government was handling the following matter: managing economy, creating jobs, keeping the prices stable, narrowing the gap between rich and poor. The dependent variable identification with FRELIMO was coded as 1=FRELIMO; 0=Else. P<.001+++, P<. 01++, P<. 05+. Entries are level of significance; standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented outside of entries. A dash (-) indicates that the relationship is insufficiently strong to include the independent variable in a final, reduced model. The analysis presented in this table is based on the weighted dataset.

7.4. Predicting identification with opposition parties

According to economic voting theory, opposition support is based largely on voters dissatisfied with bad incumbent performance (Kramer, 1971), i.e. people identify with the opposition based on their negative assessment of the incumbent’s performance. The act of punishing government based on economic conditions can be considered a generalized indicator of holding government accountable for actions while in office (Norpoth, 1996). This analysis is guided by the following hypotheses:
• Intention to identify with opposition is negatively related to individual’s negative current, retrospective or prospective pocketbook assessments.
• Intention to identify with opposition is negatively related to individual’s negative current, retrospective or prospective sociotropic assessments.

Does the punishment assumption hold for Mozambique? As shown in the logistic regression equation presented in Table 7.3, the dependent variable is the odds (or log odds) of identifying with the opposition. When considering only those variables that are statistically significant predictors of support for the opposition, the results reveal that economic performance assessment factors perform poorly in predicting opposition support. None of the economic coefficients are statistically significant predictors of opposition support, which is contrary to the hypothesis. It seems that voters in Mozambique do not take into account economic factors when they want to choose opposition parties. These findings support Posner’s (2002) results in Zambia. According to Posner, Zambian voters responded to declining economic conditions by withdrawing from the electoral process rather than via support for the opposition.

7.5. Predicting identification with non-partisanship (or independence)

The reward or punishment assumption does not work only for the incumbent government. Voters do not evaluate government only. Voters also evaluate other political actors who represent their concerns to political institutions, particularly the performance of opposition parties in parliament. If the government and the opposition have not performed well, voters might punish both of them and become non-partisan (or independent). Table 7.3 sums up the results of this assumption. Among all economic assessment indicators introduced in the multivariate analysis, only the hypothesis based on current personal economic conditions plays a role in predicting independence. This means that those who feel that their personal economic situation is worse are more likely to identify with independence. Taken together, however, economic assessment indicators do not help us to understand non-partisanship in Mozambique, explaining only .015 % of the total variance in support for independence.

Reflecting upon the findings from the empirical tests of five theoretically-based economic voting hypotheses, the impression that dominates is that, despite strong
expectations to the contrary, economic factors had at best a modest effect on partisanship in Mozambique. Why does economic voting have such a modest effect, particularly with regard to the opposition party? Why is FRELIMO support associated with negative performance assessments of the economic regime? Do these results mean that party loyalty supersedes rationality? Different reasons may account for the weakness of economic voting in explaining opposition support in Mozambique. First, the existence of social networks might reduce the pain of economic hardship at a personal level. In Mozambique people are involved directly or indirectly in multi-faceted support networks, whether guided by kinship ties through extended families, or neighbourhood groups of various types, or even friendship circles. Second, in the new democracies that are emerging from long periods of civil war and with long histories of repression, the main concern of people might not necessarily be linked to personal economic conditions, but to achieving and keeping political stability and re-building the country’s socio-economic infrastructures. When respondents were asked in which areas government should invest its money as a way to help ordinary people, 34% of the respondents declared money should be spent on health systems, 27% on schools, 11% on water systems, 9% on roads and transport and only 7% on trading (CEP 1997). This result reveals that people were more concerned about common goods that are not within their power to build rather than family goods.

Third, during the 1992 pre-transitional period, which culminated in the signing of the peace agreement and the subsequent liberation of the economy, Mozambique received strong support from numerous international donors. Between 1992 and 2002 the international donors increased foreign aid to Mozambique significantly. At the same time the multilateral debt grew by approximately 14 times, and by the end of 1995 Mozambique owed multilateral creditors more than $1.6 billion, roughly 30% of the debt stock.

Between 1984 and 1993, the country signed four external debt-rescheduling agreements with the PARIS CLUB and one with the LONDON CLUB of commercial creditors. During this time, the PARIS CLUB canceled more than $800 million worth of debt, more than $700 million of which was canceled by France, Italy and Germany combined. With enormous new financial resources, made available by foreign credits, relative
increase in tax revenue, and the privatization of state enterprise, Joaquim Chissano and FRELIMO were in a position to recapture the loyalty of different groups. Joaquim Chissano and FRELIMO embarked on projects to build schools, hospitals, roads and public services infrastructures in poor communities across the nation. It appears that all these investments provide peasants with patience regarding their own economic conditions and they seem to be content to wait for better opportunities in the future.

Fourthly, FRELIMO leaders have shown little sympathy for the notion of separating the state from the party. The Constitution gives the president wide-ranging powers, including the direct control of the police, judiciary and security forces. This power has been used to protect FRELIMO’s supporters and sympathisers. However, it prevents the development of independent state functions including effective oversight bodies, except where absolutely demanded by the donors (Vaux et al., 2006).

The socialist ideology of FRELIMO has long since been replaced by pragmatism, opening the way for decisions and policies based on patronage. Relations based on extended families (and in some cases ethnic affiliations) determine access to state resources and political power. FRELIMO operates as a state within the state. In practice, formal official relationships may not be as important in decision-making as relationships between party members. This leads to the exclusion of those outside the party and favours the clique within the party.

Loyalty within such a system has to be constantly fuelled with rewards, and power can only be exerted by those who have resources giving them a certain amount of control. Hence, the formal financial processes are shadowed by informal financial processes that reflect patronage relationships. Even the political opposition becomes part of the same system. But the rewards of patronage as opposition are nothing compared with the rewards of actual power.

Fifthly, the incumbent government (FRELIMO) blames the personal economic problems not on the poor performance of the government or lack of economic policy,

74 Large-scale privatization of government corporations came about in August 1996 when the government sold 30% of shares in its national airline, LAM, to international investors, and another 21% stake to domestic investors. Parts of the rail and harbors company, CFM, and the state oil company, Petromoc, have also been sold off. The process of privatization and restructuring large enterprise was completed in 1998 and for small- and medium-scale enterprises in 1999. The privatization of public enterprises provides a huge short-term injection of fiscal resources into the state’s coffers (Harrison, 1999; IMF, 2003).
but on war and the international donors (World Bank and International Monetary Fund)\textsuperscript{75}. It is common to see government leaders during their visits to communities talking about the socio-economic infrastructures that were destroyed by the war and how hard the government is working to find investors to rebuild them. In terms of the World Bank and International Fund it is also common to see some of the government representatives and civil society “close” to the incumbent party accusing these two institutions of not helping the incumbent government to adopt more pro-poor policies and pro-state interventions\textsuperscript{76}.

These types of discourses make people believe that the cause of their personal economic conditions lie elsewhere. In the 1994 and 1999 campaigns, FRELIMO leaders led voters to believe that the main goal of FRELIMO was to rebuild all the infrastructure that had been destroyed during the war and to negotiate with the World Bank and International donors a new policy to help reduce poverty and create jobs opportunities.

Sixthly, all opposition parties spoke the same development language. Foremost among the national issues that formed part of their agenda was the need to develop the economy, eradicate poverty, create jobs, and fight criminality and corruption. They clearly had difficulties when it came to articulate their overall vision with more practical approaches that could show the voters how their personal economic conditions would change once they were in power.

Seventh, in a specification of the reward-punishment hypothesis, Sanders (2000) notes that…

\begin{quote}
\textbf{two ancillary assumption} underpin the hypothesis: 1) that there is ‘clarity of responsibility’ in terms of which party (or parties) is (are) responsible for macroeconomic policy or performance …; and 2) that there is a viable and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{75} It is common in Mozambique to see religious leaders, civic organizations leaders and academics criticizing the World Bank and International Monetary Fund for the country’s economic problems. For instance the Catholic Church magazine made the follow statement in relation to Word Bank and International Monetary Fund: “…in contrast to what we would like to think, the rule of Africans are not the various Africa States…The bosses of Africa and of Mozambique are the World Bank and IFM” (Hanlon, 1996).

\textsuperscript{76} Since Mozambique joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund structure adjustment programme, the government has been under tremendous pressure. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund forced the government to accelerate the privatization programme, reduce the size of the state and to make big cuts on government spending.
politically credible opposition party or coalition to which voters can transfer their allegiance if the governing party’s performance is deemed inadequate. (p.277)

In terms of the second of Sanders’ assumptions, it becomes clear that the absence of an alternative, credible, opposition in Mozambique may play a role in voting behaviour. Until the late 1990s, such an alternative was not evident. Experts suggest that the lack of credible alternative governing parties between 1994 and 2004 may explain FRELIMO’s electoral success (Pereira, 2008). There are a number of cadres in the ranks of FRELIMO who have acquired skills in running the country which no other political party has had the opportunity to accumulate. Thus, as a result of its presence in power and its patrimonial type of management of the country, FRELIMO has managed to retain its influence in society, more so than the opposition parties (Pereira, 2008).

RENAMO, the main opposition party, successfully managed to make the transition from a military movement to a political organization, and proved to be a formidable electoral contender, but it lacks cadres, has a weak internal organization, in addition to being weak in urban implementation and in recruiting intellectuals to its ranks. This has contributed to its poor capacity for political analysis, and to the rather unfavourable image of RENAMO in urban areas (as well as among diplomats). The image of RENAMO is that of a highly unpredictable force, short on competence. It should be noted that RENAMO is dominated by a single charismatic person, Dhlakama, whose mercurial style has inhibited the emergence of a broader-based leadership or a coherent political programme. Under these circumstances, voters might rather vote for the “devil you know than for the devil you don’t know”. This view is similar to the one proposed by Magolani (1997) in his thesis on electoral behaviour in Mexico and Hamann’s analysis (2000) in Spain. For instance, Magolani (1997:126) suggests that voter uncertainty about opposition leads many to vote for the “known devil”. Voters tend to be more tolerant regarding poor economic performance because they are reluctant to put their trust into an uncertain opposition alternative. In other words, voters who fear negative political, economic and or social consequences from an opposition victor tend to support the status quo (see also Domingues et al., 1996), or become independent or do not vote during the elections.

77 This negative image is strengthened by the treatment it receives from most of the national media.
Eighth, the reward and sanction model requires citizens to have high levels of trust in the political actors. Hetherington (1998) demonstrates that trust, or lack of it, shapes voters’ attitudes towards incumbents and basic democratic institutions. Voters with relatively high levels of trust are likely to believe that rent seeking by politicians can be controlled through the threat of electoral defeat (Ferejohn, 1986). They expect that replacing the incumbent who performs poorly can lead to the implementation of better economic policies. In nascent democratic regimes, a low level of political trust may inhibit voters from employing sanctioning strategies that are critical of the economic voting model. If the trust is low, voters who supported an incumbent party in the previous elections may be unwilling to elect the opposition, even in the case of poor economic outcomes (Duch, 2001). These theoretical considerations can be helpful in explaining the failure of economic voting in Mozambique. Mozambicans demonstrate low levels of trust in opposition parties and relatively high levels of trust in the president and the ruling party. Levels of trust in political institutions range from a high of 75% with regard to the president and his office, and 64% for the ruling party to a low of just 24%.

Finally, the political parties in Mozambique did not pursue different (economic) policies and the debate did not centre around choosing between a market economy or a centrally planned economy or whether the state should intervene in public life. In the 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections, the campaigns were centered on personalities, reconstruction processes, ethnicity, regional asymmetries and war and not on alternative economic policy. The FRELIMO campaign focused on the past of RENAMO and the war that destroyed most of the social-economic infrastructures. FRELIMO based their electoral campaign on promising the community services and goods, notably in the form of social services. This is perhaps the most common electoral promises made by African politicians, particularly as they venture out of the capital. They promise to provide better roads and social services to those who vote for them. For instance in Zambia, Cameroon and Uganda, citizens fear they will be deprived of these services if they do not vote for the winning candidate (Van de Walle, 2002:12).

In contrast to FRELIMO, Afonso Dhlakama and RENAMO have aggressively sought to use the ethnic factor, regional asymmetries and political freedom to their advantage. In Dhlakama’s discourse during the campaign, his rhetoric was simple: he spoke very rarely of “Mozambican”, and in his speeches he did not refer to “Mozambicans” but rather to “Macua” or “Muanes” particularly in the central and northern parts of
Mozambique. In others words, he called people by their ethnic identity, which had been barred from the nationalist discourse for years (Cahen, 1998). The campaign approach of RENAMO is similar to those used by other opposition parties in other African countries. In fact, in many African countries election campaigns have been conducted almost entirely on the basis of personal and ethno-regional appeals for support. Ottaway (1998:311) has argued that the political transformation that occurred after the end of the cold war, which is characterized by an absence of ideology, left ethnicity as the main factor for mobilization of party support. The absence of ideological or programmatic differences left ethnicity as the major characteristic by which various parties could differentiate themselves.

Apart from the ethnic discourse, Afonso Dhlakama also reminded the voters about villagization programmes, reeducation camps, marginalization of traditional leaders and the lack of political freedom during the one party system (Pereira, 1999; Harrison, 1996; Vines, 1996). In general, Dhlakama adopted a vague populism during elections and his campaign was characterized by general promises of a better future; a similar approach used by many of the opposition parties in other African countries.

Ideological differences have been minor across parties, and debates about specific policy issues have been virtually nonexistent. Although opposition parties may criticize the government’s management of the economy or the implementation of structural adjustment programmes, party platforms diverge little and campaign speeches rarely discuss policy issues.

Under these conditions economic voting does not work as a measure of political accountability (incumbent and opposition) while in office or parliament. However, from the findings on economic voting in Mozambique presented above, the inference can be made that once democracy is consolidated, the memory of the one-party era and transition period fades, electorates in Mozambique will closely follow the patterns of economic voting observed in established democracies.
7.6. Conclusion

The evidence produced in this chapter supports to some extent the economic voting theory, particularly current pocketbook, current sociotropic, and economic and government performance assessments. With regard to FRELIMO support, the factors that play a role are: perceptions of the country’s present economic conditions, the economic regime performance index and the role of the State in the economy. Those who perceive their country’s economic conditions as good and who approve of the reduced role of government in the economy are more likely to support FRELIMO. However, those who are satisfied with the government’s economic performance are less likely to identify with FRELIMO. This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis.

Economic coefficients do not play a role in explaining opposition support. All variables introduced in the model are insignificant predictors of support for opposition parties. This means that Mozambican voters do not take into account economic factors when choosing to support opposition parties.

With regard to independence, only current personal economic conditions matter. This means that those who felt that their personal economic situation had become worse were more likely to identify with independence.

Economic assessment coefficients are much better predictors of support for government than for opposition support and non-partisanship, explaining 5% of variance. In relation to opposition support, they only explain .005 of variance and with respect to independence they explain more or less 2% of variance.

In Western democracies government performance is typically assessed in economic terms, as reflected both by individual economic well-being and by national macro-economic conditions. However, in incomplete democratic regimes such as Mozambique this is not the case. Regime performance is typically assessed in political terms, as reflected both in individual political well-being (freedom of association, freedom of speech and freedom of movement) and by macro-political conditions (the state’s capacity to enforce the law and guarantee security and stability, fight corruption and respond to citizen’s needs). Rather than simply using an economic assessment, voters in
incomplete democracies seem to make their political decisions based on political goods. A full understanding of party preference requires us to go beyond economic models, social cleavages and cultural models, and make use of key insights from political and cognitive awareness approaches to voting. In the following chapter these approaches will be examined as well as the impact of the political evaluation model on party preference in Mozambique.
CHAPTER VIII: THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

8.1. Introduction

An election may serve as a referendum not only in terms of economic performance, but also in relation to the government’s political performance. The popular standing of the incumbent suffers from bad political performance, but benefits from good political performance. Decisions to vote for a particular party (or candidate) may reflect important choices about political goods such as political freedoms, government trustworthiness, positive presidential performance, democratic responsiveness and other political issues. This chapter will examine the impact of political factors such as these on partisan identification in Mozambique, focusing specifically on citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy works, their perception of the extent of democracy and government performance, and their trust in the political institutions or leaders. Other factors to be examined are state performance items (law enforcement index, indexes related to access to and capacity of public goods, and trust in political institutions). It is expected that attitudes related to political goods will have an important impact on partisan identification.

The same procedures that have been used previously will be employed: the analysis will be run in three steps: first bivariate correlations between political assessment indicators and partisan identification will be done, then a multivariate logistic analysis with all the political evaluation items will be done and finally those variables lacking statistical significance in the previous model at \( p \geq .05 \) will be dropped. As in the previous chapters, the tables will only present political evaluation performance variables that are statistically significant. A positive coefficient on the variables indicates consistency with the hypothesis tested. By contrast, the negative sign in each coefficient indicates the rejection of the hypothesis. Non-significant effects mean that the two variables are not at all connected. At the end of the first column, the sample size (n) and the total explained variance (Adjusted R square) of the model are presented for each dependent variable. The column contains the standardized regression coefficients (Beta). The levels of significance are placed in parentheses. All effects that are statistically significant are highlighted.
8.2. Results

8.2.1. Political regime performance and satisfaction with democracy

In new democracies there is a tendency to vote according to the supply of particular political goods from current regimes. Voters take into account the way democracy works when they go to the polling station. They will reward political incumbents for provision of political goods, but punish them if they fail to deliver political goods. In every country where public opinion on the topic of democracy has been tested, the levels of satisfaction with democracy (that is, with “the way that democracy actually works”) are lower than levels of support for democracy (that is, as a preferred form of governance) (Bratton et al., 1999). To distinguish between support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy, Bratton et al. (2005:81) argue that the former refers to an abstract normative preference and an absence of constraints of one's favourite political system. The latter refers to an empirical assessment of the concrete performance of an actual elected regime. Because satisfaction with democracy is the more exacting standard, it almost inevitably lags behind support for democracy.

What about Mozambique? The Afrobarometer survey traced satisfaction with democracy by asking a standard question: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Mozambique?” The respondents are offered the opinions of “very satisfied”, “fairly satisfied”, “not very satisfied”, “not all satisfied”, “Mozambique is not a democracy” and “don’t know. Mozambicans gave ambivalent answers to this question. Just over half of the respondents (54%) were either “very” satisfied (16%) or “fairly satisfied” (38%) with the way democracy works. Thirty-four per cent were either “not very” satisfied (26%) or “not at all satisfied” (8%). Eleven per cent did not provide an answer and 1% believed that the country was not a democracy.

Placed within an African context, interesting cross-national variations can be observed. At the top of scale are countries like Kenya, Namibia and Mali, where more than 60% of adults are satisfied with the way democracy works. At the lowest end is Zimbabwe (33%), indicating a lack of institutionalization of democracy in Zimbabwe. Satisfaction with democracy in Mozambique is about on a par with the African average (54%).
Graph 8.1 indicates the results of satisfaction with democracy in Mozambique, while Graph 8.2 presents satisfaction with democracy across 16 African surveyed countries:

**Graph 8.1: Satisfaction with democracy in Mozambique**

![Bar chart showing satisfaction levels in Mozambique](image)

Question: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Mozambique? Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 survey, 2002

**Graph 8.2: Satisfaction with democracy across 16 African countries**

![Bar chart showing satisfaction levels across African countries](image)

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 survey, 2002

How can these findings be interpreted? One plausible explanation is that, during the transition period different actors such as political, religious and local leaders and the media presented the people of Mozambique with a realistic discourse about the challenges the country would face with a multiparty democracy and how important it was to accept this challenge in order to maintain peace. Up to the present time the multiparty democracy has been able to maintain peace. Secondly, the Mozambican
government has not completely failed to fulfil their campaign promises regarding political and economic goods. Thirdly, Mozambican citizens are starting from a very low base of satisfaction with previous regimes and they may not have had enough experience with the new political regime to develop a mature and balanced assessment. Once Mozambique has been able to maintain political stability for some time, people will have more experience with the new political regime and if democratic institutions fail to respond to the people’s demands in terms of political and economic goods then the people will most probably start to express low levels of democratic satisfaction.

Does satisfaction with democracy play a role in partisan orientation? It appears that there are partisan differences whether or not people are satisfied with the way democracy works. More FRELIMO supporters are to be found among those who are “satisfied” with the way democracy works in Mozambique (66%) than among those who are not satisfied (50%). There is a weak relationship between “satisfaction with democracy” and FRELIMO support, but no relationship between satisfaction with democracy and support for the opposition and independence. 78

8.2.2. The extent of democracy

A young democracy like Mozambique can be considered as a transitional democracy. Many transitional countries are “neither dictatorial nor clearly headed towards democracy” (Carothers, 2002:9). The most recent Polity Country Report for Mozambique (2003) awards a score of 6 (on a range of -10 to +10). This implies that Mozambique is not quite a full democracy. The trend has stabilized following a dramatic leap in the mid-90s. How well do these findings match up with the Afrobarometer results? Afrobarometer estimates the extent of democracy by means of the following standard question that has been posed in several continents: “How much of a democracy is Mozambique today?” Those who believe Mozambique to be fully democratic tend to classify Mozambique as a consolidated democracy. Twenty-nine per cent of respondents said that the country was fully democratic, 38% said that it was a democracy with minor problems, and 15% said that it was a democracy, but with major “problems”, 10% did not answer this question and 3% believe that the country is not a democracy (see Graph

78 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .007; p=<.002; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b .018; p=<.519; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b .024; p=<.329.
8.3). This finding seems to support the Polity Country Report for Mozambique (2003) results.

On a comparative basis, the extent of democracy in Mozambique is 16% higher than the average of other African countries (51%). Kenya (76%) and Mozambique (67%) present the highest level of extent of democracy across African countries. Nigeria presents the lowest level of the extent of democracy across the African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer (see Graph 8.4).

**Graph 8.3:** The extent of democracy in Mozambique

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Don't know: 10
Do not understand question: 5
A full democracy: 29
A democracy, but with minor problems: 98
A democracy, with major problems: 15
Not a democracy: 3
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Question: “In your opinion how much of democracy is Mozambique today?”

**Graph 8.4:** The extent of democracy across 16 African countries

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 survey, 2002
RENAMO has criticized FRELIMO for not establishing deep-rooted democratic values and democratic institutions in Mozambique, arguing that FRELIMO is a Marxist party and their leader has a Marxist philosophy. Under these circumstances frustration with an inadequate democratic environment might lead voters to punish the government by withdrawing support. The question is to what extent the nature of democracy in the country predicts partisanship in Mozambique. It appears that FRELIMO supporters are more likely to be found amongst those respondents who perceive Mozambique as a “full democracy” (67%) as opposed to those who do not perceive Mozambique as a democracy (55%). There is a strong relationship between the “extent of democracy” and identification with FRELIMO, a weak and negative relationship with opposition support, and no relationship with support for independence.79

8.2.3. Delivery of political freedoms

Freedom is one of the most valued aspects of democratization. In young democracies with strong legacies of authoritarianism, the delivery of political freedom may become one of the key issues of an election campaign, political debate and electoral behaviour. Mozambicans might ask the following questions as they go to the polling stations: How much freedom has been gained from the collapse of the one-party system? Who is responsible for my freedom? Which party will increase my political freedom in the future?

With regard to political freedom, Mozambique has ratified numerous African Union conventions and protocols including the following:

- African Charter on Human and People’s Rights—including protocols on the establishment of the Africa Court on Human and People’s Rights, and the protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa
- African Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child
- African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

Are these conventions and protocols proof of an increase of political freedom in Mozambique? Are Mozambicans feeling the results of these convention and protocols in

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79 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .101; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.082; p=<.001; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.011; p=<.658.
their daily lives? Macro-indicator studies carried out by different international research institutes provide a complex picture about political freedom. Freedom House (2006) gives Mozambique a score of 3 for political rights on a scale of 1-7, where a score of 1 indicates a high degree of freedom. The World Bank Indicator (2005) for Voice and Accountability shows quite a static picture for the time between 1996 and 2005 but with a slightly positive trend. The Global Integrity Report for Mozambique (2006) rates voting and citizen participation as “strong”, although actual voter turnout for the 2004 national elections was low–around 40% compared to 69% in 1999.

The analysis can be taken further by examining the environment in which civil society organizations operate. The Global Integrity Report for Mozambique (2007) gives “moderate” rates for the environment in which civil society organizations (mainly those working on corruption) and trade unions operate.

What does the Afrobarometer tell us about political freedom in Mozambique? Does it match macro-indicators provided by Freedom House for instance? To assess the extent of political freedom in Mozambique, the Afrobarometer posed standard questions which have been used in different public opinion surveys around the world. It asks respondents, “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or statement B. We are going to compare the present system of government with the former system of mono-party rule. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same. A. Freedom to say what you think; B. Freedom to join any political organization you want; C. Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured”. Each item is scored as “much worse”; “worse”; “same”; “better”, “much better”, “don’t know”.

The results seem to reveal that Mozambicans now enjoy far higher levels of political rights and civil liberties than under the former socialist one-party regime. Most of the survey respondents think that the present regime has brought about increases in freedoms in terms of speech (80%), freedom how to vote (74%), freedom of association (73%) and freedom from being arrested (49%). Nevertheless, although Mozambicans perceive political freedoms to have increased, many people in Mozambique still show high levels of political intolerance. A CEP 2001 survey demonstrated low levels of tolerance for criticism of the government. Indeed, nationally many more people believe that a person who “spoke badly about the government and system of government should
not enjoy the right to vote, demonstrate, work in the civil service, talk on television or radio or teach in school”.

All the variables mentioned above were combined to develop a composite measure of popular perceptions of political freedom. From these items, it was possible to extract a single unrotated factor with an eigenvalue of 1.87 that explained 46.7% of the variance common to all four items. The reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) = .747. The items load on the factor as follows: free to join political party (.846), free to say what you think (.711), free to choose who to vote (.681), and free from being arrested (.430).

Graph 8 5: Delivery of political freedoms in Mozambique

Question: “We are going to compare my present system of government with the former system of Mono-party rule. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same. A) Freedom to say what you think, B) Freedom to join any political organization you want, C) freedom from being arrested when are innocent, D) Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured”.

RENAMO has tried to sell itself to the voters as the party that brought democracy to the country, and its campaigns have focused on negative aspects of FRELIMO rule, like the lack of political freedom in the country after independence. By contrast, FRELIMO has glossed over this issue and only stressed that they would respect the Constitution. Thus the question arises whether perceptions of the delivery of political freedom affect party preference in Mozambique. This study has found that FRELIMO supporters are much more likely to be found among people who believe they now have greater freedom to join political parties (62%) than among those who believe otherwise (29%). There is a
weak positive relationship between “perceived political freedom” and support for FRELIMO, but no relationship with opposition support and independence.80

8.2.4. Perception of corruption

Corruption is generally defined as the misuse of public authority or as transactions between private and public sectors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs (Heidenheimer et al., 1989; Heidenheimer, 1996; Johnston, 1996). This definition does not, however, distinguish clearly between political and bureaucratic corruption. It establishes the necessary involvement of the state and state agents in corruption, without any notion as to the level of authority where corruption takes place.

In a more strict definition, political corruption involves political decision-makers. Political or grand corruption takes place at the high levels of the political systems. It is when the politicians and state agents, who are entitled to make and enforce the laws in the name of people, are themselves corrupt. Political corruption takes place when political decision-makers use their political power to sustain their power, status and wealth. Thus, political corruption can be distinguished from bureaucratic or petty corruption, which is corruption in the public administration, at the implementation end of politics (Amundsen, 1999; Blake et al., 2006; Bayart et al., 1997; Brinkerhoff, 2000).

Some believe that democracy has introduced new social problems, like corruption and organized crime, and ethnic tension. Many Mozambicans have experienced corruption in their daily lives. For instance, a survey of 1200 people conducted by Etica Mocambique (2001) reveals that corruption is high in Mozambique. Of the respondents, 45% said that they had been victims of corruption during the six months preceding the survey. Of those, 31% paid bribes of less than $6, 45% paid between $6 and $60, and 22% had to pay between $60 and $600, which is a substantial amount of money in Mozambique, where the GDP per capita is only $300. The most common demands for money were in the sectors of health (30%), education (27%), and the police (21%). Bribes are not just financial--almost 5% of respondents said that they had been required to sleep with a government official (Etica, 2001). In most cases, the corruption takes

80 FRELIMO: Kendall’s-Tau-b .085; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.001; p=<.978; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b-.054; p=<.064.
place on an administrative level, that is, bribes are paid to obtain something to which the person was entitled—in one case, to obtain an anesthetic during an operation. Others were given preferential treatment, such as a place in school or a pass mark in an exam (on corruption see also Hanlon, 2002b, 2002c; Austral, 2005; Mosse et al., 2006a, 2006b; Mosse, 2006).

The issue of corruption can be divided into two groups: perceived corruption, which refers to the opinion of the respondent about the corrupt practices of various leadership groups, and actual corruption experienced, i.e. this is measured by means of a behavioural measure of how frequently the respondent has personally experienced a corrupt act by an official and participated in it. The Afrobarometer also traced the level of corruption in the political institutions by asking standard questions based on the perception as well as actual corruption based on people’s experience in daily life, for example, “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? A. The president and officials in his office; B. Elected leaders; C. Government officials; D. Police; E. Border officials (e.g. customs and immigration), F. Judges and magistrates; G. Local businessmen; H. Foreign businessmen; I. Teachers and school administrators, J. Religious leaders; K. Leaders of NGOs or community organizations.

To track actual (as opposed to perceived) corruption the following question is asked: “In the past years, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to: A. get a document or a permit; B. get a child into school; C. get a household service (like piped water, electricity, or phone), D. cross a border (like customs, or immigration post); E. avoid problems with police (like passing checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest), F. anything else”. The responses were scored as: “never”, “once or twice”; “a few times”, “often” and “don’t know”.

Graph 8.6 reveals the perceived corruption of various leadership groups. Among various leadership groups, police (42%) and border officials (30%) are seen to be the most corrupt followed by teachers or schools administrators (26%). Perhaps surprisingly, government officials are viewed more positively than the uniformed forces; just one-quarter see significant corruption amongst government officials (20%) and one-fifth think that elected leaders (17%) or judges (16%) are corrupt. Just over one in ten respondents think that the Presidency is subject to corrupt behaviour (14%).
When it comes to tracking actual corruption, remarkably few respondents admit to having done any of these things. At the high end, 7% admit to paying the police in order to avoid problems; 6% admit to paying government officials in education sectors in order to get their child into school and 5% admit to paying for getting documents/permit and household services (see Graph 8.7).

Graph 8 6: Perceived corruption in Mozambique

Question: “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? A. The president and officials in his office; B. Elected leaders; C. Government officials; D. Police; E. Border officials (e.g. customs and immigration); F. Judges and magistrates; G. Local businessmen; H. Foreign businessmen; I. Teachers and school administrators, J. Religious leaders; K. Leaders of NGOs or community organizations”

Graph 8 7: Actual corruption in Mozambique

Question: “In the past years, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to: A. get a document or a permit; B. get a child into school; C. get a household service (like piped water, electricity, or phone), D. cross a border (like customs, or immigration post); E. avoid problems with police (like passing checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest), F. anything else”
The perception items were used to create a single variables label *Perception of Corruption Index*. From seven items it is possible to extract a single unrotated factor with an eigenvalue of 3.751 that explains 53.6% of the variance. The reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) = .889. The items load on the factor as follows: government officials (.874), elected leaders (.853), president and officials (.776), police (.706), judges and magistrates (.670), teachers (.620) and border officials (.571).

These findings differ from those presented by Hanlon 2002b, 2002c; USAID, 2005; Mosse et al, 2006a, 2006b and Mosse, 2006. For instance, in the 2005 USAID commissioned study on corruption it was concluded that corruption has been spreading rapidly over the past 20 years and has “…reached alarming levels and potentially poses a risk to democratic government”. The assessment reported corruption at all levels including the political and economic elite. However, the Afrobarometer survey does not necessarily coincide with this view that Mozambique is a haven of corruption. The question thus arises how should the Afrobarometer findings be interpreted in this regard? The researcher believes that the discourses in the media and NGOs might have influenced the perceptions of the people. The media and NGOs are seen to be crucial in helping to tackle the problem.

In the election campaign, RENAMO has appealed to voters for clean government and has depicted FRELIMO as corrupt, with a legacy of mismanaged state funds. Having recognized they were not able to fight on the corruption issues, FRELIMO stressed their commitment to introducing new types of accountability mechanisms to reduce corruption in public institutions. As a result voters might use only one corruption indicator to punish the government for poor performance in this regard and look for alternative leaders of political parties that could reduce the level of corruption in public institutions. Does perception of corruption play a role in party preference? Findings indicate that FRELIMO supporters are much more likely to be found among those who perceive that all the country’s judges and magistrates are involved in corruption (74%) than among those who think that judges and magistrates are less involved in corruption (57%). There is a weak relationship between “perceived corruption” and support for FRELIMO, a negative relationship with independence, and no relationship with opposition support.81

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81 FRELIMO: Kendall’s-Tau-b .044; p=<.050; Opposition: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.016; p=<.486; Independent: Kendall’s-Tau-b .068; p=<.002.
8.2.5. Leader’s performance and responsiveness

8.2.5.1. President’s performance

The literature on voting behaviour in stabilised democracies indicates that the president’s performance is often operationalized by a question on approval of the president and is strongly related to voter choice and mass behaviour (Fiorina et al., 2003; Zaller, 1998). Elections have a heavy retrospective, current and prospective component, reflecting the electorate’s judgement of whether the president has performed acceptably on the fundamental dimensions of social welfare and economy. Even in divided governments or governments under a dual executive, whose power fluctuates in response to the institutional rules, voters evaluate the performance of the president or prime minister (Lewis-Beck, 1987). Lewis-Beck (1987) shows that under conditions of cohabitation, with a partisan division of the power between two offices, evaluation becomes more sophisticated and voters perceive that the prime minister, not the president, is responsible for the economy. Therefore, in the 1995 presidential contest, voters directed their economic evaluations at the Gaullist party of the prime minister, not the Socialist party of the president.

President performance is seen to affect voter choice. When approval rate is very high voters reward the president for “good performance”, but if the approval rate is low voters punish the president for “poor performance”. What about Mozambique? As many Africans, Mozambicans might not be able to list the names of their members of parliament or their governors or ministries but they all know the names of their president and the main opposition leaders. This might be as a result of a long period of personal rule rather than legal rational systems where leaders tend to change at regular intervals, in addition to the fact that more permanent “big men” dominated the landscape of post-colonial Africa. African leaders also like to develop a personality cult. To build a personality cult, African leaders use the media to report their

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82 A recent study conducted by Fiorina et al. (2003:186) demonstrates that judgements of presidential performance mattered less in 2000 in America than in earlier elections. The weaker effects do not appear to be a result of the sheer length of the good times, nor of Alan Greenspan getting all the credit. Gore’s vice-presidential status may have played some role, but in the end the choices of the Gore campaign seem most prominent. All else being equal, the weaker relationship made a difference of about eight percentage points as compared to the 1988 election when another vice-president followed a successful president. The weaker impact of the fundamentals turned a prospective landslide into a virtual tie.
movements and their own personal achievements, rather than give credit to the achievements of the governing bodies.

Apart from manipulating the media, T-shirts and posters will feature the president, and stadiums, schools, roads and hospitals will be named after the president, as well as photographs of the president appearing in all public spaces of the country and in school books--from primary to university level (Thomson, 2000). The leaders of the main opposition have also used similar approaches, particularly those who emerged from civil war movements. In areas that were under the control of the rebels during the civil war, school and cultural events are named after the rebel leader’s name. Nobody will be left in any doubt who actually runs the country and who is the leader of main opposition party. Elections in many African countries are more about leadership performance, name, style, and behaviour than political parties’ policies and voters learning about leadership performance by means of daily experience, talking with others (families, friends and colleagues) and taking note of the media. This makes it easier to make judgements about the president’s performance.

Graph 8.8 depicts the level of approval of the president of the country. The vast majority (81%) of Mozambicans seems to be satisfied with the president’s performance whereas 11% are not. When compared with the remaining 16 African countries of the survey, approval rates of the president of Mozambique are 13% higher than the average of the other 16 countries (63%) (see Graph 8.9).

**Graph 8.8: Performance: President of Mozambique**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Approve</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disapprove</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their job over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?”
In its election campaigns FRELIMO's presidential candidate has portrayed himself to voters as a strong leader. He has reminded voters that the country needs someone with experience in dealing with the complexity of state, regional and international issues. He has portrayed his political adversaries, particularly the RENAMO candidate, as guerrillas with no experience in managing public institutions or dealing with international or regional issues. By contrast, RENAMO has argued that its presidential candidate (Dhlakama) was able to end the war and negotiate the integration of RENAMO soldiers into Mozambican society. RENAMO also pointed out that their candidate was the only guerrilla leader in Africa who was able to end a war in just a few days.

To what extent do perceptions of presidential performance affect party preference in Mozambique? FRELIMO draws its support from those who approve of the president’s performance (62%) as opposed to just 32% of those who disapprove of the president’s performance. There is a stronger relationship between views of the president's job performance and support for FRELIMO, but no relationship with regard to opposition support or independence.83

83 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .099; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b .029; p=< .335; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b .050; p =< .059.
8.2.5.2. Incumbent’s performance

A large part of the business of running a country is about administering the machinery of the state. This machinery is not administered solely by the president but also by the body of individuals who operate and manage various institutions and public bodies. Whether government is effective and efficient will thus depend on the capability, honesty, legitimacy and accountability of those in government. During election times, the electorate will look not only at the performance of the president, but also at the performance of other government leaders. At provincial or regional levels voters might evaluate the performance of ministers, national directors, the chairman of the national assembly, parliamentarians, governors, provincial directors, district administrators or local mayors. To trace the level of satisfaction that Mozambicans have with their leaders, the Afrobarometer survey asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs since the new government took office, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? A. President Joaquim Chissano; B. your Member of Parliament; C. your mayor or district administrator; D. provincial governor”. The responses were coded as “strongly disapprove”, “disapprove”, “approve”, “strongly approve” and “don’t know”.

Using factor and reliability analyses, one single indicator could be constructed and was labeled the Incumbent’s Performance Index. From these items, it is possible to extract a single unrotated factor within an eigenvalue of 1.38 that explains 46.1% of the variance common to all three items. The reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) = .711. The items load on the factor as follows: provincial governor (.761), local mayor (.673) and national assembly (.590). This index will be used in a multivariate analysis.

The Afrobarometer revealed that 76% approve of their provincial governor’s performance (see Graph 8.10), and 60% approve of the performance of their directly elected member of parliament (see Graph 8.11). The Afrobarometer survey showed public approval of the performance of the mayor to be the lowest, although still positive (52%).
To what extent does the performance of the incumbent play a role in party preference? It was found that support for FRELIMO is stronger among those who approve of the governor’s job performance (64%) as opposed to 52% of those who disapprove of the governor's job performance. There is a strong relationship between “incumbent’s performances” and support for FRELIMO and a weak negative relationship with regard to independence and no relationship with regard to opposition support.  

In a democracy the people themselves do not govern, but their elected representatives in parliament govern on their behalf. Democracy is a form of indirect governance of

84 FRELIMO: Kendall’s-Tau-b .100; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.008; p=<.794; Independent: Kendall’s-Tau-b-.099; p=<.000.
people in which people delegate their representatives to represent their concerns in
different political forums, in this case in parliament and other political institutions.
Representatives should act as “delegates” who reflect the opinion of the majority in
their electorate or various groups, including their constituencies, but vote according to
their own conscience, taking into account the best interests of the nation.
Representatives must be accountable to those who delegate them to represent their
interests. Ministers ought to be individually and collectively responsible for their
actions to parliament, and through parliament, to the people, who, if dissatisfied with
their performance, can vote them out of office. Individual ministers must account to
parliament for their actions and for the actions of the public servants under their
control. They should resign if they, or their department officers, make substantial
errors.

Parliamentarians should also be responsible to citizens by establishing different types of
mechanisms that ensure a certain amount of horizontal accountability to their
constituencies who reward and punish parliamentarians for their performance.
However, this reward and punish model for poor parliamentarian responsiveness
seems to apply more in countries like the United States and United Kingdom where
representatives are elected on a constituency basis.

In general, how are African representatives elected? In general, African countries have
adopted proportional representation or more direct “first past the post” constituency
systems as a way for selecting public representatives to parliament. With the third
democratic elections imminent there are many in the legal fraternity who believe it is
time for a change in the way parliament is selected. In Mozambique candidates for
parliament are chosen through a party list system, by province. This tends to result in
deputies having stronger allegiances to their political parties than to the constituents
they nominally represent. Public hearings on legislation or countrywide consultation
by parliamentary subcommittees to gauge the opinion of the public on important

85 Within the framework of accountability theory, there are only two reasons why elected representatives would faithfully serve the interests of
their constituents to the best of their ability. The first is that the representative might have a normative reason for doing so. They could view
public service as a vocation, honestly believing that they were chosen to do the people’s work. Or they might just happen to hold views and beliefs
that are in accord with the majority of their constituents, so that they work towards the public interest simply by pursuing policies that they
personally find preferable. The second reason a representative might serve the public interest is instrumental. This is the motive most commonly
imputed to politicians, for example when they are assumed (in both formal models and in the vernacular) to value re-election above else. In this
instrumental sense, representatives will perform well in order to maintain their hold on public office, or as a means of attaining higher office.
legislative questions are few. Under these circumstances voters might feel it is difficult to use the reward and punish model during election times. During elections times Mozambican voters might make use of the limited information that they have in terms of their representatives to decide if the political parties that those representatives represent should be punished or rewarded for their job.

To measure leadership responsiveness the Afrobarometer asked the questions: “How much do leaders listen to what people have to say? How much do leaders look after the interests of people?” The responses were coded as “never”, “some of the times”, “most of the time”, “always” and “don’t know”. Graphs 8.12 and 8.13 reveal low levels of responsiveness of leadership in Mozambique. Only 27% of leaders seem to listen to what people say or are acting in the best interests of the ordinary citizens.

Graph 8.12: How much do leaders listen to what people have to say?

[Graph showing the distribution of responses to the question: How much do leaders listen to what people have to say?

Question: "How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like parliamentarians or local councilors, try their best: to listen to what people like you have to say?"

Graph 8.13: How much do leaders look after the interests of people?

[Graph showing the distribution of responses to the question: How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like parliamentarians or local councilors, try their best: to look after the interest of people like you?"

Question: “How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like parliamentarians or local councilors, try their best: to look after the interest of people like you?”
Compared to other African countries, Mozambican leaders seem to be more responsible than other leaders in Africa (see Graph 8.14 and 8.15). These results suggest that accountable governance in Africa may still be far off.

**Graph 8.14: Average of leaders who listen to what people have to say across 16 African countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Some of the time</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 survey, 2002

**Graph 8.15: Average of leaders who look after the interests of people across 16 African countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Some of the time</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 survey, 2002

The question that arises is whether leadership's responsiveness affects voter choice in Mozambique. The cross-tabulation reveals some differences in terms of leadership responsiveness items and party identification. FRELIMO draws its support among those who have positive views about the elected leaders’ responsiveness: 78% of those
who declared that elected leaders look after the interest of ordinary people and 77% of those who believed that elected leaders listen to what people say support FRELIMO. Support for the opposition/independent is different: its draws from those who have negative views about the elected leaders' responsiveness. A correlation analysis shows that the item of looking after the interests of ordinary is strongly associated with FRELIMO and weakly associated with the opposition, and that there is a strong negative association with the independent. What about the item of listening to what people say? Again, the findings show that there is a strong relationship between the “listen to what people say” item and FRELIMO, and a weak association with the opposition and a strong negative association with independent.

8.2.5.3. Trust in the president

The large number of political parties in new democracies cannot claim to be mass organizations. Instead, they place considerable emphasis on the personal appeal of their leaders, rather than on their organization or political programmes. During election campaigns, voters choose leaders who can provide for their clients rather than political parties who can implement the best policies for the country. In other words, elections reflect a choice between persons. That is, voters' impressions of candidates personality and character often receive as much attention and analysis as do the programmes and legislation that these candidates advocate.

The results reveal that the majority (75%) of Mozambicans interviewed trust the president while 21% don’t, 4% of the respondents did not provide any answer (see Graph 8.16). In terms of the other African countries surveyed, the level of trust in the president is about 22% higher in Mozambique than the average of the 16 African countries (53%). Among the 16 Afrobarometer countries in Round 2, Tanzania presents the highest level of trust and (78%) Nigeria the lowest level of trust in the president (see Graph 8.17).

86 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .122; p=<.000; opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b .066; p=<.009; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.157; p=<.000.
87 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .146; p=<.000; opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.017; p=<.451; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.123; p=<.000.
How does trust in the president affect partisan orientation in Mozambique? Support for FRELIMO is more likely to be found among those with high levels of trust in the president (68%) than among those with low levels of trust in the president (51%). Trust in the president is strongly related to support for FRELIMO and has a weak negative association with support for the opposition and independence.88

88 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .157; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.063; p=<.015; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.093; p=<.000.
8.2.6. State performance

8.2.6.1. Law enforcement

Democracy is also about the ability of the state to enforce the law. Law is an essential tool for governance and the management of political institutions in multi-party systems. Effective law enforcement plays a crucial role in any state's legitimacy. Where the rule of the law applies, individuals and organizations know where they stand and rules are not waived or enforced unequally (Rose et al., 2002:44).

As in many African countries, in Mozambique the legislative framework for the rule of law is adequate but the institutional capacity to implement it is weak. The 1990 Constitution guarantees all the important basic rights related to liberty and property. However, the institutions necessary to enforce these rights are, in practice, exceedingly weak. The justice sector, comprising the ministry of justice, the attorney general’s office, the courts and the police is one of the weakest sectors in Mozambique. The Global Integrity Report for Mozambique (2007) rates the rule of law as “weak” with law enforcement rated as “very weak”. It comments that “the problem is not a lack of laws, but the laws are not applied”. The Bertelsmann Country Report (2006) points out that “…the possibility that Mozambique will develop into a ‘society of fear’ cannot be totally disregarded. This is all the more likely considering the impunity of growing criminal activities by organized crime networks and the ineffectiveness of the policy and justice systems”. The USAID-commissioned Corruption Assessment Report for Mozambique (2005) concludes that “…the key problem in the judiciary is corruption. It manifests itself in the buying and selling of verdicts, the exertion of political control over judicial outcomes, ‘losing’ evidence or case files…, intimidation of witnesses, and freeing of key suspects”. In other words, citizens cannot rely on justice being done because of the inefficiency, corruption and bias found in the justice system. Political institutions that are supposed to enforce the law are controlled by powerful people with strong links to the political elite. That is, powerful people benefit from the government’s inability to enforce the law and the poor generally suffer.

Do Mozambicans concur with the Global Integrity Report and the Bertelsmann Country Report with regard to the implementation of law and order? In order to assess this issue,
the Afrobarometer asked the following question: “How likely do you think would it be that the authorities would enforce the law if a person like yourself: A. committed a serious crime; B. did not pay a tax on some of the income they earned and C. obtained household services without paying?”. The responses were scored as “very likely”, “likely”, “not very likely”, “not at all likely” and “don’t know”.

In contrast to other studies, the Afrobarometer results seem to challenge many of the secondary sources on the issue of law enforcement in Mozambique. When it comes to crime, 84% of citizens believed that ordinary people who committed a serious crime will face the full force of the law, whereas only 13% said that top government officials would fail different outcomes (see Graph 8.18). With regard to income tax, 75% believe that the Mozambican government has the ability to enforce the law if ordinary citizens do not pay their taxes, while 19% do not believe that the elite would be taken to task for tax evasion (see Graph 8.19). What about obtained household services without paying? Still on the positive side, 59% think that authorities could enforce the law if a person benefited from services without paying, whereas 23% of respondents did not agree (see Graph 8.20).

**Graph 8.18: Enforce the law if committed a serious crime**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very likely</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all likely</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: “How likely do you think would it be that the authorities would enforce the law if a person like yourself: A. committed a serious crime; B. did not pay a tax on some of the income they earned and C. obtained household services without paying?”
Question: “How likely do you think would it be that the authorities would enforce the law if a person like yourself: A. committed a serious crime; B. did not pay a tax on some of the income they earned and C. obtained household services without paying?”

When compared with the other countries in the survey, Mozambique’s mean score on the government’s ability to enforce the law against crime committed by ordinary citizens is 10% higher than that of the other African countries. With regard to tax evasion, the Mozambique mean score is the same as for the other countries. The view that the Mozambican government’s ability to enforce the law if people do not pay household services is 15% lower compared with the mean score of the other countries surveyed (see Graph 8.21).
Based on these items, a single indicator was constructed called the Law Enforcement Index. It is possible to extract a single unrotated factor within an eigenvalue of 1.76 that explains 58.9% of the variance common to all three items. The reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) is .795. The items load on the factor as follows: did not pay tax (.930), obtained household services (.675) and committed a serious crime (.670).

RENAMO has criticized FRELIMO for not applying the law to everybody, arguing that the courts and their institutions that are supposed to enforce the law are actually controlled by FRELIMO. Under these circumstances frustration with poor or inadequate policing and the inability of the government to enforce the law might lead voters to punish the government for poor performance. FRELIMO support is more likely to be found amongst those who believe that authorities are not likely to enforce the law if ordinary people commit a serious crime (66%) than amongst those who believe that the government would enforce the law (62%). Thus, there is a weak relationship between views on law enforcement and FRELIMO support, a negative and strong relationship between this and support for independence, but no relationship with regard to opposition support.89

89 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .082; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b .024; p=< .291; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.100; p=<.000.
8.2.6.2. Access to public goods

Competitive multi-party elections should induce government to perform better than it would in the absence of such elections. Multi-party elections require maximizing accountability and performance because they help voters control their representatives. Leaders must perform if they want to maintain power. Voters can use retrospective evaluations based on their day-to-day experience with new political institutions to evaluate how FRELIMO has performed with regard to services. To evaluate the services provided by the government, such as provision of identity documents or voter registration cards, access to places in primary school for a child, or household services, the Afrobarometer survey posed the following question: “Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? A. An identity document (such as a birth certificate, driver’s licence, or passport); B. A place in primary school for a child; C. A voter’s registration card for yourself; D. Household services (like piped water, electricity or telephone); E. A loan or payment from government (such as agricultural credit or a welfare grant); F. Help from the police when you need it.” Each item was scored as “very easy”, “easy”, “difficult”, “very difficult”, “never try” and “don’t know”.

According to the results, overall it seems that Mozambicans believe that government performance regarding public services is satisfactory, with specific reference to voter registration cards (79%) and providing places in primary school for children (59%). However, Mozambicans are not satisfied with the government services that are provided in terms of obtaining loans, household services, help from police and obtaining an identity document (see Graph 8.22). From these items, it is possible to extract a single unrotated factor within an eigenvalue of 1.21 that explains 40.23% of the variance common to all three items. The reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) = .635. The items load on the factor as follows: place in school (.764), an identity document (.695) and voter registration cards (.376).
Do perceptions of ease of access to public services play a role in partisan identification? FRELIMO supporters tended to be among those who found it easy to obtain identity documents (68%) compared to those who found them difficult to obtain (59%). A positive perception of the ease of access to public services is strongly related to FRELIMO support and has a weak negative relationship with independence and no association with opposition.\(^{90}\)

### 8.2.6.3. Trust in political institutions

The concept of political trust is complex. Political trust can be analysed on several levels. On the top level, it concerns citizens’ attitudes toward the overall political community, namely the nation of which the citizen is a member. Next, it concerns citizens’ attitudes toward the regime, such as democracy; or it concerns citizens’ attitudes toward government institutions, such as parliament and government agencies. Finally, political trust also involves citizens’ judgments and attitudes of political actors, that is, individual politicians (Norris, 1999b). In this study, “political trust” refers to people’s attitudes toward government institutions (e.g. ruling party, opposition, the national government, the parliament, and local government).

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\(^{90}\) FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .100; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b-.008; p=<.749; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b-.099; p=<.000.
Voters’ trust in political institutions and leaders also shapes voter behaviour. Political trust is typically conceptualized as an indicator of the basic ethical qualities of public officials, the efficiency of government, and the correctness of its decisions (Hetherington, 1998:791). Distrust in government can be viewed as expecting a relatively high level of shirking or rent seeking on the part of elected officials (Duch, 2001).

To measure the amount of trust that Mozambicans place in various political institutions, the Afrobarometer survey posed the following question: “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? A. President; B. Parliament; C. The electoral commission; D. Your district administrator; E. Your local council; F. The ruling party; G. Opposition parties; H. The military; I. The police; J. Courts of law”. The responses were scored as “not at all”, “a little bit”, “a lot”, “a very great deal” and “don’t know”.

As Graph 8.23 shows, the most trusted political institution in Mozambique is the ruling party (64%) followed by law courts (59%), National Assembly (54%), provincial courts (52%) and the National Electoral Commission (51%). The least trusted political institutions in Mozambique are the opposition parties (23%).

Instead of treating these variables as if they were separate behaviours, a larger composite index was constructed and used in bivariate and multivariate analyses of partisanship as one single dimension, called Trust in political institutions index. From these items, it is
possible to extract a single unrotated factor within an eigenvalue of 3.04 that explains 50.6% of the variance common to all six items. The reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) = .858. The items load on the factor as follows: provincial courts (.837), National Assembly (.806), National Electoral Commission (.805), local court (.620), police (.579) and army (.566).

Compared to the other countries surveyed, the level of trust in the National Assembly, ruling party and courts of law is relatively higher than in the other countries. More precisely, Mozambican’ level of trust in National Assembly is 15% higher than the Afrobarometer average (43%). Trust in the ruling party and courts of law is respectively 20% and 10% higher than the Afrobarometer average (44% and 59%) (see Graph 8.24). Trust in local government bodies Mozambique is 15% lower than in the other countries (the Afrobarometer average being 37%) and trust in the opposition is 3% lower than in the other Afrobarometer countries that registered an average of 20% in this regard.

Graph 8.24: Average of trust in political institutions in 16 Afrobarometer countries

The question thus arises to what extent trust in government officials affects partisan identification in Mozambique. FRELIMO draws its support from those with a high level of trust in the National Assembly (77%) rather than from those with low levels of trust in the Assembly (44%). Trust in political institutions is strongly related to support for FRELIMO, has a weak negative association with opposition support and is strongly negatively related to independence.91

91 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .198; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.074; p=<.001; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b-.140; p=<.000.
8.3. Predicting identification with FRELIMO

Recent studies have shown that the party system in emerging democracies does not always adequately reflect the economic voting or various cleavages of society (White et al., 1997). In other words, political assessment factors may play a more important role than economic or cleavages voting in determining electoral behaviour. The political assessment evaluation model assumes that individuals make a voting decision based on previous political gains and losses that have occurred under the incumbent. The goal of this section is to assess the extent to which political assessment evaluation factors affect FRELIMO support. In this regard the following hypotheses will be tested:

- Regime performance. Identification with FRELIMO is positively related to positive regime assessment (e.g. satisfaction with democracy, the extent of democracy, levels of delivery of freedom).
- Leaders' performance. People satisfied with their leaders' performance (e.g. presidential performance, government leader’s performance, representatives' responsiveness and trust in the president) are more likely to support FRELIMO.
- State performance. Identification with FRELIMO is positively related to positive state performance assessment (e.g. law enforcement, access to public goods and trust in political institutions).

In order to establish which political factors are relatively more important than others in determining FRELIMO support, a multivariate analysis was conducted. The findings are presented in table 8 after dropping insignificant political assessment evaluations variables from the preliminary analysis. With the exception of the corruption indicator, the findings are fully in line with expectations. The coefficients regime performance (the extent of democracy), leaders’ performance (presidential performance, representatives’ responsiveness) and state performance (law enforcement and trust in political institutions) are positive and statistically significant in predicting identification with FRELIMO. This means that respondents who perceive Mozambique to be a full democracy, and those who strongly approve of the presidential performance, and those who believe that their representatives are responsive to citizens’ demands and those who believe that the government has the capability to enforce the law and those who show high levels of trust in political institutions are more likely to show support for FRELIMO. On the other hand, and contrary to the researcher’s expectations, corruption
indicators are positively related to FRELIMO support. This means that rather than dropping their support because government is not fighting corruption effectively, the respondents will nevertheless still identify with FRELIMO. All variables explain .116% of variance.

Table 8.1: Political evaluation and its effect on partisan identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime performance</th>
<th>FRELIMO</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The extent of democracy</td>
<td>.166 (.0003+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery of political freedom</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived corruption index</td>
<td>.195 (.000+++)-.235 (.001+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader's performance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President performance</td>
<td>.140 (.022++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government performance index</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative responsiveness index</td>
<td>.323 (000+++)-.347 (000+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State performance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>.170 (.007+++)-.230 (.001+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access and capacity public goods</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in political institutions index</td>
<td>.344 (000+++)-.207 (.002+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 log likelihood: 1731.806, 504.280, 1600.985
Cox & Snell R square: .086, .000, .062
Nagelkerke R square: .116, .001, .088
Constant: -.2.047, -1.558, .916
N: 1.359, 1.392, 1374

Predictor variables: Satisfaction with the way democracy works in Mozambique was measured by asking respondents, “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Mozambique?” The response is scored as follows: 4=very satisfied, 3=fairly satisfied, 2=not very satisfied, 1=not at all satisfied, 0=Mozambique is not a democracy. Views on the extent of democracy are measured by asking respondents, “How much of a democracy is Mozambique today?” (measured on a 4-point scale.) Attitudes to delivery of political freedoms are measured by asking respondents to compare the current political context with former ones with regard to A) Freedom to say what you think, B) Freedom to join any political organization you want, C) Freedom from being arrested when innocent, D) Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured (measured on a 4-point scale). Perceived corruption is measured by asking respondents, “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” “The president and officials in his office, A) Government officials, B) Elected leaders, C) President and officials, D) Police, E) Judges and magistrates, F) Teachers and school administrators, G) Border officials” (measured on a 4-point scale). Presidential performance and incumbent representatives’ performance or responsiveness is measured by asking respondents if they approve of how their leaders have performed their job over the past year, A)President, B) Provincial governor, C) Local mayor, D) National Assembly (measured on a 3-point scale). Trust in the president of the country and trust in political institutions is measured by asking respondents, “How much do you trust each of the following? A) President, B) Local court, C) The National Assembly, D) The National Electoral Commission, E) Police” (each item is scored thus: 3=Very much, 2=A lot, 1=A little bit, 0=Not at all). A law enforcement belief is measured by asking respondents, “How likely do you think would it be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person like yourself: A) committed a serious crime?, B) did not pay a tax on some of the income they earned?, C) obtained household services (like water and electricity) without paying?” Each item is scored thus: 4=Very likely, 3= Likely, 2=Not very likely, 1=Not at all likely. The access public services index is measured by asking respondents, “How easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services? A) A place in primary school for a child, B) A voter registration card for yourself, C) Identity documents (each item is scored thus: 4=Very Easy, 3=Easy, 2=Difficult, 1=Very difficult). The dependent variable “identification with government” was coded: 0=Else; 1=FRELIMO. P<.001***, P<.01**, P<.05*. Entries are level of significance. Standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented outside of entries. A dash (-) indicates that the relationship is insufficiently strong and significant to be reported in a final, reduced model. The analysis presented in this table is based on the weighted dataset.
8.4. Predicting identification with opposition parties

The initial hypotheses employed for predicting support for the incumbent party are inverted when looking at opposition support. Negative political assessments are thought to have a significant impact on party preference with regard for support for opposition parties.

- Regime performance. Identification with the opposition is negatively related to negative regime assessment (e.g. satisfaction with democracy, the extent of democracy, levels of delivery of freedom).
- Leaders' performance. People dissatisfied with their leaders' performance (e.g. presidential performance, government leaders' performance, representatives' responsiveness and trust in the president) are more likely to support opposition parties.
- State performance. Identification with opposition parties is negatively related to negative state performance assessment (e.g. law enforcement, access to public goods and trust in political institutions).

How well do “punishment” assumptions predict support for the opposition? The results in table 8 show that the multivariate logistic reveals poor performance of political assessment evaluation indicators in predicting identification for oppositions. The results are not fully in line with the hypothesis. The all political coefficient variables are statistically significant predictors of opposition support. In other words, voters in Mozambique do not take into account the political assessment evaluations factors when choosing an opposition party to identify with.

8.4. Predicting identification with non-partisanship (or independence)

Turning to independence, the results in table 8 show the following situation: those who believe that there is less corruption in political institutions, those who have a poor perception of their representatives’ ability to look after their interests, those who believe that government has less ability to enforce the law and those who distrust political institutions were more likely to identify with independence. All variables explain .088 of variances.
The question is why do political assessment factors have such weak effects in predicting support for opposition? Why do disaffected voters with incumbent political performance assessment not turn to RENAMO? Why is FRELIMO support associated with a positive perception of corruption? There are several reasons that explain the above findings. First, the opposition parties, particularly the main opposition (RENAMO), faced a big challenge to prove that they were able to manage the modern politics and administration. However, RENAMO (since 1992) has not convinced many Mozambicans, particularly those who manipulate public opinion that they are able to deal with modern politics and administration. There is a popular perception that RENAMO still needs to gain some maturity in terms of governance. Secondly, not only does the opposition debate the weaknesses of the incumbent party in terms of state performance, but they also experience some measure of in-fighting and discuss issues that are not relevant to the voters. Throughout their criticism of the ruling party, they have little to propose in terms of how government performance and policies can be improved.

With regard to the findings on corruption, it should be noted that the debate among the various parties on the issue of corruption becomes vague during elections and the two main parties are not clearly differentiated in their views in this regard. The two main political parties (FRELIMO and RENAMO) have adopted political frameworks advocating the promotion of strong institutions that can fight corruption through accelerated reform in political institutions and certain justice sectors in order to fight corruption. The political manifestos of the two main parties and the discourse in terms of how they will fight corruption are very similar. It is thus hard for voters to be mobilized in terms of corruption issues and may represent a silent cleavage that will never come to the fore in a political system. The lack of substantive debate and consensus on corruption issues can be traced back to the media that doesn't appear to prioritize this issue, particularly during the elections. Critical debate and analysis of corruption issues are lacking. In fact, the media, particularly those media institutions controlled by the government, tend to point out the positive achievements of government and underline the weaknesses of the opposition rather than reminding the public of the ruling party’s failures. The systematic bias of positive news coverage in favour of the incumbent party means that voters are not likely to be mobilized to vote for the opposition since the media tends to disregard poor government performance.
In addition, among the various political goods, voters might pay more attention to those political issues that matter most to them. In the case of Mozambique, corruption does not seem to play a key role when voters decide to identify with political parties. On the other hand, it is very common for the general public to believe that corruption is an important issue that needs to be tackled. They also commonly believe that it is better to have FRELIMO rather than the opposition in power even though they are corrupt since the opposition are no better than the ruling party and just like the ruling party will look for opportunities to control the state apparatus in order to access wealth.

8.6. Conclusion

The evidence produced in this chapter suggests that political performance assessment does predict partisan identification in Mozambique, particularly when we look at attitudes regarding regime performance (the extent of democracy, delivery political freedom, leader’s performance), president’s performance, representative responsiveness index and state performance (access to and capacity of public goods and trust in political institutions).

With regard to FRELIMO support, views on political performance, leader’s performance and state performance are correlated with FRELIMO. That is, those who perceive that Mozambique is a full democracy, those who perceive that there are high levels of corruption inside political institutions in Mozambique and those who strongly approve of presidential performance, and those who perceive that their representatives are responsive to citizens’ demands and those who show high levels of trust in political institutions are more likely to show support for FRELIMO.

In terms of support for the opposition, political assessment variables fail to predict this support. In other words, none of the political assessment variables are statistically significant predictors of opposition. This finding suggests that Mozambican voters do not look out for political factors when choosing opposition parties.

With regard to independence, regime performance, leader’s performance and state performance, these are negatively correlated with non-partisanship. Those who do not believe there is corruption in the political institutions in Mozambique, those who have a
poor perception of their representatives’ ability to look after their interests, those who believe that government has little ability to enforce the law and those who distrust political institutions are more likely to identify with independence.

With regard to the political assessment coefficients, support for FRELIMO and independence for opposition support is easier to predict. The models explain approximately 12% of variance in FRELIMO support and 9% of variance in independence. With regard to opposition support, the model explains approximately 0% of variance.

A necessary precondition for economic and political voting is that the voter understands the state of the economy or political situation, and links economic or political performance to government policies. Living under different types of political and economic regimes, experiencing different ways of selecting leaders, having new types of political institutions and benefiting from political freedom may increase voter awareness of how new political institutions work in comparison to old systems. Awareness is a key component of rationality. That is, an individual’s voting decisions are profoundly affected by the information they have, regardless of whether it is limited or not. Citizens can and often do use a limited amount of information to make the same decisions they would have made if more informed. Thus, to fully understand the source of partisan identification we need to go beyond a study of social, cultural and political cleavages and the economic model and make use of key insights from cognitive awareness theories. In the next chapter, the cognitive awareness or political intermediation model will be tested to see how it can be used to explain party preference in Mozambique.
CHAPTER IX: THE INFLUENCE OF COGNITIVE AWARENESS

9.1. Introduction

In a society like Mozambique with low and highly unequal levels of access to formal education and news media, cognitive awareness may play a key role in the explanation of voting decisions. Cognitive awareness in this context refers to the political resources and skills that prepare citizens to deal with the complexities of politics and reach their own political decisions without reliance on affective, habitual party cues or other surrogates (Dalton, 2004; Zaller, 1992). However, as Zaller (1992) notes, cognitive awareness has been one of the most understudied aspects of the voting decision:

Most of the time, when scholars attempt to explain public opinion and voting behaviour, they build models that implicitly assume all citizens to be adequately and equally informed about politics, and hence to differ mainly in their preferences and interests. In other words, they build models that ignore the effects of political awareness. (p. 18)

This chapter takes Zaller’s words into consideration by analysing how cognitive awareness influences partisanship in Mozambique. Specifically, this chapter examines the impact of cognitive awareness on partisan identification in Mozambique. First, the extent to which cognitive awareness (formal education, exposure to news media, political discussion and interest in public affairs) directly affects partisan identification in Mozambique will be assessed. Then the extent to which it indirectly affects the way that people use other social, economic, political criteria in deciding how to vote will be examined.

An example of a direct effect of cognitive awareness “causing” partisanship might be where one political party projects a more cognitively sophisticated set of policies and appeals, or focuses on a set of issues (e.g. corruption, unemployment, poverty, crime) that are generally emphasized by more cognitively sophisticated voters. Alternatively, in a one party-dominant system like Mozambique where the state exercises tight control over the public broadcaster and government-owned newspapers, the news media might
simply favour the ruling party in terms of what news they present or how they present that news.

An indirect effect means something quite different. There are two possible types of indirect effects. First, the impact of cognitive awareness on partisanship could flow through some other variable (which intervenes in the causal link between cognitive awareness and partisan identification). For example, increased media use might shape people’s evaluations of government performance which, in turn, shapes partisan identification. However, in this chapter the interactive effect will be tested where more sophisticated voters use different criteria to less sophisticated voters when it comes to deciding which political parties to support.

In order to assess the importance of cognitive awareness on partisan identification in Mozambique, the different aspects of cognitive awareness (exposure to news media, education, political discussion and interest in public affairs) will be examined, and the bivariate correlations between these factors and partisan identification. Secondly, the aspects of cognitive awareness which are most important will be examined through a multivariate analysis explaining party identification. Thirdly, the multivariate analysis will be extended to include the other variables that have been reviewed in the previous chapters to see whether cognitive variables still retain an independent impact on partisan identification. Finally, the multivariate analysis is extended to test for interaction effects between cognitive awareness and other variables.

The tables will only present variables that are statistically significant. The columns contain standardized regression coefficients (Beta). The levels of significance are in parentheses. All effects are highlighted that are statistically significant, indicating that the null hypothesis can be rejected. The negative or positive sign in each coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. Non-significant effects mean that the two variables are not at all connected. The first column reflects the sample size (n) and the total explained variance (Adjusted R square) of the model on each dependent variable.
9.2 Results

9.2.3. Exposure to news media

The news media (such as the press, radio, television, cinema, and so on), have became the place through which people in the Western world receive most of their information about the world. Media institutions perform cognitive functions of both analysis and assessment. They contribute to policy discussion and resolution, not only in so far as they set the public agenda or provide platforms for politicians to make their views known to the public, but also in judging and critiquing a variety of political viewpoints in circulation (Negrine, 1994). Citizens who read newspapers, listen to the radio or watch television acquire skills and resources needed to become politically engaged. Voters with high levels of news media exposure develop competencies that enable them to understand the workings of the political system and to learn how to evaluate the information critically provided by the political parties.

In Mozambique the news media has been involved in shaping public debate on issues such as corruption, poverty and unemployment, education and health systems. The new Constitution of 1990 and the Press Law of 1991 opened spaces for media independence and a more pluralistic media landscape in Mozambique. In the last 15 years the country has changed from having only limited state-owned print and electronic media to a media sector with more than 300 publications and media organizations (Macuane, 2006; Maia, 2002; Namburete, 1995). According to GABINFO (2001, 2006), 254 newspapers, magazines, faxed newspapers, provincial/district newsletters and booklets were registered between 1992 and 2006. These included 172 registered newspapers and news magazines. However, only a few of these newspapers or magazines are based outside of Maputo; the written press is largely limited to greater Maputo, although there are some important publications in the urban centres of Beira (Diário de Moçambique, Autarca and Púngué) and Nampula (Wampula Fax, Lúrio). Among the press media the most important are:

- Noticias - main daily, has government shareholding
- Diario de Mocambique - private, daily
- Demos - private, weekly
- Zambeze - private, weekly
• Domingo - has government shareholding, weekly
• Savana - private, weekly
• Fim de Semana - private, weekly

Apart from the print media, there are also 79 radio and television stations operating in Mozambique. These include state, private and community-owned media. Most (57) of these are community radio and community multimedia centres. There are just two community television stations, five national religious radio stations, seven commercial radio stations, four commercial TV stations, one public radio station, and one public TV station (UNESCO, 2006). Among the radio and TV stations the most important are:

• Televisão de Mozambique (TVM) - state-run
• SOICO TV (STV) - private
• TV Miramar - private
• Radio Mozambique - state-run, operates national Antena Nacional network and provincial and local channels in Portuguese, English and many indigenous languages
• Radio Cidade - state-run, youth-oriented FM network
• Radio Miramar - private
• Nove FM - private
• Radio-Televisão Klint (RTK) - private
• Radio Maria Mozambique - Roman Catholic

In addition, there are also foreign radio services including the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Radio France International (RFI), Radio Diffusion Portugal (RDP)-Africa, and the Voice of America (VOA) that reach all major population centers and report local news via Mozambican-based part-time reporters. The BBC and the RFI carry news in Portuguese but broadcast most of the day in English and French (UNESCO, 2006).

Television dominates the media environment in urban areas, with state-run TVM, the only national network, and private STV topping the ratings. Portuguese state TV’s African service, RTP Africa, and Brazilian-owned TV Miramar are widely-watched.
Despite the existence of different radio and television stations, the state-run Antena Nacional radio is a prominent source of news and information for many Mozambicans. Private FM stations operate only in urban areas. Printed media have little influence in the countryside because of high levels of illiteracy.

To measure access to mass media in Mozambique the Afrobarometer posed the following question: “How often do you get news from the following sources? A. Radio, B. Television, C. Newspaper.” Each item is scored: “every day, a few times a week, a few times a month, less than once a month, never, don't know.” The results reveal that while the demise of the one-party state in the early 1990s expanded access to new sources of knowledge and information, the Afrobarometer 2002 survey indicates that access to such media, especially privately-owned print media, remains low and very uneven. As is likely to have been the case for many years, Mozambicans’ main source of news and information is still radio: an overwhelming majority (72%) of respondents said that they get news from the radio on a regular basis (“every day or a few times a week”), with more than half (52%) getting news “everyday” (Graph 9.1). However, only 14% of respondents get news from television on regular basis or newspapers (11%), on a regular basis. These findings do not differ from those presented by Maia (1996). According to De Maia, the broadcasts of Radio Mozambique and the activities of the Mass Communication Institute (ICS) cover between 70 to 80% of the country (De Maia, 1996:155).

**Graph 9.1: Mass media consumption in Mozambique**

Question: “How often do you get news from the following sources? A. Radio, B. Television, C. Newspaper. Each item is scored: 4= Every day, 3= A few times a week, 2= A few times a month, 1= Less than once a month, 0= Never, 9= Don’t know”.

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Mozambicans lag far behind other African countries in terms of the access and use of television and print news (see Graph 9.2). In comparison to results from Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 16 countries between 2002 and 2003, Mozambicans’ levels of regular use of news from radio lags 15% behind the Afrobarometer country average (91%). Regular use of television (24%) and newspaper news (33%) is below the Afrobarometer country average (55% and 56% respectively).

So, to what extent is party preference directly shaped by exposure to the news media? While 58% of all Mozambicans identify with FRELIMO, they are not evenly distributed across different levels of media use. Frequent television news consumers are far less likely to identify with FRELIMO (42%) than those who never get news from television (61%). Television news use is negatively associated with FRELIMO support, and positively associated with independence, but not associated with opposition support.92

On the other hand, regular radio news listeners are far more likely to support FRELIMO (63%) than those who listen less to the radio news (53%). Frequent radio news listenership is positively associated with FRELIMO support but negatively associated with independence. It also has no association with opposition support.93

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92 FRELIMO: Kendall’s-Tau-b .099; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.005; p=<.835; Independent: Kendall’s-Tau-b .110; p=<.000.
93 FRELIMO: Kendall’s-Tau-b .092; p=<.000; Opposition: Kendall’s-Tau-b .042; p=<.072; Independent: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.113; p=<.000.
Finally, regular newspaper readers are only slightly less likely to support FRELIMO (57%) than those who never read the newspaper (61%). There is a positive association between newspaper use and independence, but no association with FRELIMO and opposition.\textsuperscript{94}

So from examining the bivariate associations, it appears either that radio stations (which are largely state controlled) are successfully communicating explicitly pro-government messages (naked propaganda) or focusing on content favourable to the government (agenda-setting), and thus persuading their listeners to support FRELIMO. The relatively more independent television news services and newspapers seem to be doing just the opposite. However, final conclusions on this can only be drawn once we control for other factors like, ethnicity, region, religion, generation, rural-urban differences, formal education and economic and political performance evaluations.

9.2.2. Levels of education and their effect on party preference

One of the central claims of the cognitive model is that formal education has a powerful impact on formation of public opinion (Sniderman, 1991; Converse, 1972; Popkin, 1991) and on evaluations of the economy, political institutions and party preference (Dalton, 1984a, 1984b, 2004). People with higher levels of education are said to be more able to understand the complexities of politics and make political choices (Dalton, 1984a, 1984b, 2004; Dalton, 1988; Inglehart, 1977). Education increases skills and knowledge and induces a continuing quest for knowledge through reading and mass media (Bratton et al., 2005; Dalton, 1984a, 1984b, 2004). According to Bratton et al. (2005:40-41), education builds a wide range of skills: how to read, write, and calculate and how to critically evaluate information provided by the mass media.

According to the literature, educational differences are one of the key factors that contribute to the creation of the two types of citizens: “sophisticated” and “unsophisticated” citizens (Sniderman et al., 1991; Duch, 2001; Duch et al., 2000; Gomez et al., 2001; Gomez et al., 2006). According to Sniderman et al. (1991):

\textsuperscript{94} FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b .034; p= <.192; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.026; p= <.262; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.057; p= <.037.
Political sophistication is a bundle concept. It packs together related, if distinguishable properties including a tendency to pay close attention to politics, to have ready at hand banks of information about it, to understand multiple arguments for and against particular issue positions, and to recognize interrelationships among those arguments. (p.21)

Empirical research in both consolidated democracies as well as countries that have experienced rapid socio-economic development has shown that education is often strongly associated with party preference and evaluations of economic trends and political institutions (Dalton, 1984a, 1984b, 2000, 2001, 2004). In general, the quality of voter decisions seems to depend on their level of education. Highly educated voters are seen to be able to make complex decisions at election time and they are able to use different channels of information. They are more able to form stable opinions on policy issues, arriving at concrete assessments of the performance of leaders, and resisting manipulation more than the less educated voters. Less educated voters might use families or friends to get information about political party programmes.

With the end of the 16-year conflict in 1992, the education system, and in particular primary education, has been expanding rapidly. In 1992 the net enrolment rates for EP1 (Grade 1-5) was 34.2% for girls and 43.8% for boys. In 2006, the net enrolment rate for girls and boys rose to 67% and 71% respectively. In 1992, EP2 (Grade 6-7) net enrolment was as low as 15.9%. In 2006 it rose to 51% for girls and 68% for boys.

Despite this investment few Mozambicans have completed primary and secondary school. According to the 2002 Afrobarometer survey, 47% of all adult Mozambicans that were interviewed lacked formal education,95 and 42% had primary school education (see Graph 9.3). A very small number had secondary (9%) and post-secondary (3%) education. According to Mattes et al. (2007), this is a reflection of the legacy of Portuguese colonialism that limited African people to primary education in Catholic schools.96 Only Europeans, Asians and a few “assimilated” Africans were able

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95 The “no schooling” Graph combines the absence of formal education with informal education, including Koran schooling; “post-secondary education” combines post-secondary qualification with other (IP SOMETHING MISSING HERE) than university, some university, university completed, and post-graduation. “Primary education” combines some years of primary and completed primary education; and secondary education also combines some years of secondary and completed secondary education.

96 After independence, most skilled Portuguese workers left the country due to FRELIMO’s nationalization policy, leaving the public administration without qualified human capital. To keep government institutions functioning, the FRELIMO government imported skilled
to attend secondary and high schools.97 The situation was further exacerbated after independence by 16 years of brutal civil war which destroyed much of the existing educational infrastructure.98

Graph 9.3: Levels of education in Mozambique

Question: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?”

When compared with the results of Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys, Mozambicans’ access to formal education is about 23% lower than the Afrobarometer survey average (80%) (see Graph 9.4). Mozambicans have some of the lowest levels of formal education in sub-Saharan Africa, although the levels of formal education of Malians (42%) and Senegalese (31%) are much worse.

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97 Assimilated natives were those who had been socialized in western culture. Most of these were “coloured,” children of unions between Portuguese fathers and Mozambican women.

98 The existing school infrastructure was destroyed and everyone who was 17 years and older had to do compulsory service in the army. By the end of 1980, RENAMO guerrillas controlled two-thirds of the country, leaving the government confined to provincial capital cities. In these cities the few school vacancies were reserved for the most successful students. Other students lost their vacancies in favour of younger students or were transferred to alternative night schooling. While night schooling attempted to be more inclusive, it often could not function due to constant electricity cuts in many cities. Some cities had no electricity for as much as six months.
The question is whether educational differences play a role in partisanship in Mozambique? People with secondary education (more educated Mozambicans) are slightly less likely to support FRELIMO (50%) than those with no education (58%). Education is not associated with FRELIMO and independents, but it is weakly and positively associated with opposition support.99

9.2.3. Interest in public affairs and its effects on party preference

It is well known that interest in public affairs is one of the main factors that feeds cognitive skills and civic awareness that allow citizens to make sense of the political world or their communities.100 According to Berglund (2002:7), citizens who are interested in politics are more involved and aware of political events than citizens who are not interested at all. How then does political interest relate to partisanship? Cognitive awareness or mobilization implies that people who are interested in politics will be less likely to identify with political parties and will want to form opinions on their own without external cues. By having a strong interest in public affairs, voters acquire resources and develop political orientations without a need for party orientation.

99 FRELIMO: Kendall’s-Tau-b .001; p=<.979; Opposition: Kendall’s-Tau-b .059; p=<.039; Independent: Kendall’s-Tau-b -.008; p=<.764.
100 Interest in politics can be traced back to The peoples’ choice (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; see also Campbell et al., 1960:252), in which questions about “interest for the current campaign” and “concern about outcome of the election” were used to measure involvement in politics.
When respondents were asked, “how interested are you in public affairs?” A high proportion of Mozambicans (70%) claimed to be “somewhat” or “very interested” in public affairs, with 37% saying “very interested”. Almost 25% of Mozambicans responded that they were not interested in public affairs at all and 6% did not answer this question (see Graph 9.5). Political interest is higher in urban areas, in the central provinces and among men (Pereira et al., 2003:5). FRELIMO support is moderately higher amongst those who are interested in public affairs (66%) compared to the non-interested (50%). There is a strong positive relationship between interest in public affairs and FRELIMO support, but a weak and positive relationship with opposition support and a strong negative relationship with independence.  

Graph 9.5: Interest in public affairs in Mozambique

Compared to the other 16 Afrobarometer countries, Graph 9.6 shows the level of interest in public affairs in Mozambique (72%) is to some extent about the same as that shown by the Zambians (72%), South Africans (73%) and Zimbabweans (73%). These levels fall slightly below the Afrobarometer country average (80%).

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101 FRELIMO: Cramer’s V=.120, P=<.000; Oppositions: Cramer’s V=.068, P=<.010, Independents: Cramer’s V= -.154, P=<.000.
9.2.4. Political discussion and its effects on party preference

There are scholars who argue that voters do not need complex information to choose a political party. They can either learn from others (e.g. friends, families, neighbours and colleagues) or use “heuristics” or information “shortcuts” to make competent decisions with limited information (Popkin, 1991; Fiorina, 1990; Sniderman et al., 1991). By discussing politics with others, voters acquire resources and develop political orientations without the need to rely on the news media or formal schooling. Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) argue that discussion of politics with others is more influential than the media (e.g. newspapers). This is because interpersonal networks have greater coverage and they are based on high levels of trust among network members (see also Berelson et al., 1954).

The transition process from authoritarian rule to a multiparty democracy has allowed Mozambicans to discuss the subject of politics with friends, colleagues and families more freely. To measure the extent of political discussion in Mozambican society, the Afrobarometer asked respondents the following question, “Please tell whether you personally have discussed politics with friends or neighbours during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the opportunity?” Beyond formal education and news media use, relevant political information also passes through other, alternative social contexts, such as interpersonal discussion of politics. Yet while 72% say they are...
interested in public affairs, just 35% say they discussed politics with friends or neighbours in the previous 12 months. While 40% say they never discussed politics, 21% say they “would do it if they had the opportunity” (Graph 9.7).

Graph 9.7: Discussing politics with friends in Mozambique

Question: “Please tell whether you personally have discussed politics with friends or neighbors during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance?”

Compared with the results from Round 2 Afrobarometer surveys (Graph 9.8), Mozambicans lag well behind the average (61%), in terms of interpersonal discussion of politics. Mozambicans are less likely to engage in interpersonal discussion than other Africans. While Nigerians (75%) are more likely to discuss politics with friends or neighbours, 32% of Senegalese are likely to engage in interpersonal discussion “often”.

Graph 9.8: Discussing politics with friends across 16 African countries

Source: Afrobarometer Round 2 Survey, 2002
Does political discussion affect partisan identification in Mozambique? FRELIMO support is slightly stronger amongst those who regularly speak about politics with friends and neighbours (61%) than amongst those who never do (56%). Discussing politics with friends is not associated with FRELIMO, but weak and positively associated with opposition and negatively associated with independence.102

9.3. What has to be taken into account to analyse the effect of political intermediation?

The bivariate results suggest the following tentative findings. FRELIMO support is lowest among newspaper readers and television viewers, those with higher levels of education, and those who regularly talk about politics. However, the effects of cognitive awareness are not uniform. FRELIMO support is higher among frequent radio listeners and among those who are interested in politics. Opposition support is lower among those with formal education and interest in politics. Support for independence is lowest among frequent radio listeners and those who are interested in politics.

These tentative conclusions raise a series of interesting questions. Are these radio effects due to blatant state propaganda, or agenda setting via the radio? Why does interest in politics benefit FRELIMO, but discussion of politics does not? Interest and discussion usually work in the same direction. Which of these variables are the best predictors of partisanship in Mozambique?

With regard to political information there are several competing hypotheses that need to be taken into account when analysing its effect on partisanship, a number of which are linked to voter ability to make judgments. The cognitive model distinguishes between more sophisticated and less sophisticated voters. Politically sophisticated voters are more likely to use economic pocketbook and prospective assessments because they are more likely to link government policy and their own personal conditions and prospects.103 In other words, more sophisticated respondents may differ markedly from less sophisticated ones in their average assessments of economic or political conditions. Thus, systematic

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102 FRELIMO: Kendall’s- Tau-b:037; p=<.124; Opposition: Kendall’s- Tau-b :074; p=<.002; Independent: Kendall’s- Tau-b -.070, p=<.004.
103 Political sophistication, as employed in this thesis, is rooted in the psychology of cognitive complexity. The two key elements of cognitive complexity are differentiation—the ability to use multiple distinct evaluations dimensions to process information and interpret events—and integration—the ability to make intellectual connections between diffuse objects and ideas (Neuman, 1981; Tetlock, 1983; Gomez, 2006).
differences in economic or political assessments by levels of interest in public affairs and exposure to the media may influence patterns of attribution in the electorate (Gomez et al., 2001; Gomez et al., 2006). But cognitive factors and information intermediation might also have an impact whereby different voters will focus on different factors when choosing between parties.

To provide a clear assessment of the effects of cognitive awareness, a multiple logistic regression analysis was used. The analysis will proceed in three stages. In the first stage, all cognitive awareness predictors will be entered simultaneously and their direct effects observed on partisan identification. In the second stage, all social cleavages will be simultaneously entered—cultural and political, economic evaluation, and political evaluation performance variables, along with cognitive awareness variables—to obtain a global assessment of the direct explanatory power of these predictors. In the third stage, interaction terms between the index of cognitive awareness and measures of social cleavages, cultural and political values, and economic and political evaluations will be generated. All variables that are not statistically significant predictors of partisanship will be dropped at $p \geq .05$ in order to arrive at the most parsimonious model.

9.4. Direct effect of political intermediation variables

The first model examines the direct impact of cognitive awareness, which consists of exposure to mass media, formal education, political discussion and interest in politics, on the three dependent variables—identification with FRELIMO, identification with opposition parties, and independence. Table 9.1 illustrates the logistic regression model after dropping all variables that are not statistically significant at $p \geq .05$.

The results largely confirm the tentative findings reported above based on the bivariate associations. Taken together, cognitive awareness variables introduced in the model account for 5% of variance. After controlling for the simultaneous impact of all cognitive awareness-related items, those with high levels of exposure to radio news are more likely to identify with FRELIMO, but those who frequently watch television news are less likely to support the governing party. Those who are interested in politics are more likely to support FRELIMO.
Cognitive awareness explains only 2% of the variance in identification with opposition parties. Only political discussion is related, with those who talk about politics more likely to identify with an opposition party.

Significantly, cognitive awareness is a better predictor of independence than support for government or opposition parties, explaining just under 8% of variance. Frequent radio news listeners are less likely to be independent, but frequent television news viewers are more likely to be so. At the same time, those who are more interested in politics are less likely to be independent.

Table 9.1: Cognitive awareness analysis and its effects on partisan identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognitive Awareness</th>
<th>FRELIMO</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Independents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>134 (.000++)</td>
<td>-.188 (000++)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>.269 (.005++)</td>
<td>.255 (000++)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discussion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.250 (.005++)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in public affairs</td>
<td>.320 (.000++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.430 (000++)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>FRELIMO</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Independents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No formal schooling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary schooling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary schooling</td>
<td>1381</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are level of significance; standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented outside of entries. A dash (-) indicates that the relationship is insufficiently strong and significant to be reported in a final, reduced model. The analysis presented in this table is based on the weighted dataset.

It should be noted that neither newspaper readership nor formal education are important predictors, whether the dependent variable is FRELIMO, opposition, or independence.
This finding implies that newspaper readership and formal education do not directly affect the partisan calculations of ordinary Mozambicans.

9.5. Direct effect of political intermediation variables with larger inclusive model

Next a comprehensive model of party identification was estimated that combines cognitive awareness with all the other theoretical families of variables discussed in the previous chapters. Since this model will be interpreted in the next chapter, only the estimates for the cognitive awareness items will be examined. The key question here is whether the apparent impact of cognitive awareness reported above holds up once the impact of structural variables, cultural values, and economic and performance evaluations are included. It appears that this inclusive model broadly confirms the results reported above, with a few exceptions. Within the context of a broader set variable, radio and television become less important predictors of identification with FRELIMO. Other than that the impact of cognitive awareness remains. In other words, controlling for a very wide range of other variables does not remove the significance and strength of the correlations reported in the simpler model (see Table 9.2).
Table 9.2: Multiple indicators and their effect on partisanship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social cleavages</th>
<th>FRELIMO</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.195(.000+++)</td>
<td>-.676(.004+++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>-.730(.003+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.68(.025++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>.883(.000+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.162(.000+++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.1162(.000+++)</td>
<td>.805(.000+++)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural values</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communitarian values</td>
<td>.172(.001+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command econ. vs.</td>
<td>-.123(.027++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of ref. high vs.</td>
<td>.256(.000+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept the hardship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.480(.000+++)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognitive awareness variables</th>
<th>FRELIMO</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.256(.000+++)</td>
<td>- .645(.000+++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political discussion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in political affairs</td>
<td>3.882(.000+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 log Likelihood: 1184.756, 396.396, 835.192
Cox & Snell R Square: .105, .047, .156
Nagelkerke R square: .142, .048, .223
Constant: -.1457, -.3.386, 1.979
N: 1220, 1174, 1.132

Predictor variables included in the model: sociological variables, cultural values variables, economic evaluation variables, political evaluation variables and cognitive awareness variables. The dependent variable “identification with FRELIMO” was coded: 0=Else; 1=FRELIMO; with the opposition coded as: 0=Else; 1=Opposition; and with independents coded as: 0=Else; 1=Independents. P<.001++, P<.01++, P<.05+. Entries are level of significance; standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented outside of entries. A dash (-) indicates that the relationship is insufficiently strong and significant to be reported in a final, reduced model. The analysis presented in this table is based on the weighted dataset.

9.6. Indirect effect of political intermediation variables.

Cognitive awareness thus plays a role. But is its impact really a direct one? Do, in fact, more cognitively sophisticated voters (as indicated by television news viewers, political discussion and formal education) tend to support opposition parties or remain independent of all parties? Are radio listeners seduced through subtle manipulation of the news agenda to support FRELIMO? Or, do these results mask the fact that more cognitively sophisticated voters tend to use different criteria in deciding how to vote, or that television and radio news stimulate voters to look at different criteria?

In order to assess these questions, an index of cognitive awareness was created based on just three variables: television news, radio news exposure and formal education. To make sure that this construct was both valid and reliable, factor and reliability analyses were used. Factor analysis confirmed validity and reliability. From these items, it is possible to extract a single unrotated factor with an eigenvalue of 1.548 that explains 51% of the variance common to all three items. The reliability (Kronbach’s Alpha) = .736. The items load on the factor as follows: getting news from the television (.833), getting news from the newspapers (.764), and education (.521). Then each respondent’s
score on this index was re-coded as either 0 to 1, depending on whether they fell below or above the mean, with scores of one indicating a high level of cognitive awareness.104

Secondly, variables were created to see how cognitive awareness interacts with a small number of theoretically important variables. This is to see whether higher levels of cognitive awareness make voters less likely to rely on social and demographic cues or cultural values, and more likely to rely on their economic and political evaluations in deciding which political party to support.

It was found that the addition of the interaction variables made virtually no contribution to the power of the overall model of partisan identification (see Table 9.3). With the interaction variables, the models account for between 6% and 26% of variance in partisanship in Mozambique. This result does not differ from the results of the direct effects model. However, many of the interaction terms of cognitive awareness do have statistically significant and substantively important effects. These can be seen in the social cleavages variables (ethnicity), sociopolitical values (support for communitarianism and economic reform preferences), economic evaluations (national economic prospects), and political evaluations (the extent of democracy). Similar interaction effects can also be observed between regular radio listenership and economic evaluation (personal and national economic prospects or retrospective).

104 Converse (1966) and Zaller (1989, 1991, 1992) divide voters into low, medium and high levels of cognitive awareness on the basis of their reported political knowledge, political interest, media exposure and level of education (Converse, 1966; Zaller, 1989; Dalton et al., 1984; Inglehart et al., 1976; Bratton et al., 2005). In constructing the cognitive dimension, Dalton (1984) builds upon work by Inglehart et al. (1976) using education as indicator of skills and general interest in politics as indicator of “political cognition”. Regarding political involvement, Inglehart et al. (1976) do not apply political interest as Dalton does, they use participation in political discussion. Mattes et al. (2003) constructed the concept of cognitive awareness based on the following indicators: formal education, media exposure, cognitive engagement, political information, awareness of democracy, understanding democracy as political procedure and understanding democracy as socio-economic substance (see also Bratton et al., 2005).
What do these results imply for partisanship in Mozambique? It means that certain values (support for communitarism--avoid gaps in the society) are far less likely to have an impact on FRELIMO support among cognitively sophisticated Mozambicans, while other values (economic reform preferences) are more important. Evaluation of the country's economic prospects become more important for the cognitively aware while assessment of the state of democracy becomes less so. Similarly, frequent radio listening FRELIMO supporters are also more likely to base that support on personal and national economic prospects than infrequent radio listeners.

Ethnic considerations (Sena-Ndaw affiliation) are less important determinants of opposition support among cognitively sophisticated voters. Finally, communitarian values and personal economic prospects become more important determinants of independence among the cognitively mobilized. Regular radio listeners, in contrast, are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social cleavages</th>
<th>FRELIMO</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sena-Ndaw</td>
<td>3.009(.006+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid gaps vs. health difference ok</td>
<td>.343(.000+++)</td>
<td>.337(.000+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reform preferences</td>
<td>.397(.000+++)</td>
<td>.288(.052++)</td>
<td>.285(.003+++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic performance assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country prospect assessment</td>
<td>.336(.000+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country retrospective assessment</td>
<td>-.396(.038++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal retrospective assessment</td>
<td>.424(.009+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal prospective assessment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.339(.054++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political performance assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The extent of democracy</td>
<td>.192(.028++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative responsiveness index</td>
<td>.647(.000+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.391(.013++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive awareness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics affairs</td>
<td>.412(.000+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive awareness index</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.353(.025++)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive awareness*Sena-Ndaw</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-328(.037++)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. Awareness*Avoid gaps vs. health difference</td>
<td>-.800(.000+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.733(.001+++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. Awareness*Economic reform preference</td>
<td>.936(.000+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.898(.000+++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. Awareness*Country prospect ass.</td>
<td>.622 (.050+)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. Awareness*Personal prospective ass.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.725(.000+++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. Awareness*The extent of democracy</td>
<td>-.786(.022++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. Awareness*Representative responsiveness index</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio*Country retrospective ass.</td>
<td>.418(.052+)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio*Personal retrospective ass.</td>
<td>-.595(.001+++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio*Personal prospective ass.</td>
<td>.506(.024++)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.576(.006++)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What do these results imply for partisanship in Mozambique? It means that certain values (support for communitarism--avoid gaps in the society) are far less likely to have an impact on FRELIMO support among cognitively sophisticated Mozambicans, while other values (economic reform preferences) are more important. Evaluation of the country's economic prospects become more important for the cognitively aware while assessment of the state of democracy becomes less so. Similarly, frequent radio listening FRELIMO supporters are also more likely to base that support on personal and national economic prospects than infrequent radio listeners.

Ethnic considerations (Sena-Ndaw affiliation) are less important determinants of opposition support among cognitively sophisticated voters. Finally, communitarian values and personal economic prospects become more important determinants of independence among the cognitively mobilized. Regular radio listeners, in contrast, are
less likely to look to their personal economic prospects when deciding whether to remain independent of all parties.

9.7 An integrated analysis with interactions also included

As we have seen, the voting literature consists of competing theoretical perspectives (i.e. social cleavages, cultural values, economic evaluations, political evaluations and cognitive awareness) that usually constitute separate strands of research. The social cleavages approach emphasizes the impact of social structure, suggesting that a person’s vote is largely shaped by or is even a function of the person’s position in the social structure. A cultural values approach assumes that voters seek out and choose political parties and candidates whose stances, rhetoric and deeds are most similar to their own deeply held values. Economic and political approaches emphasize that voter’s decisions are determined by their assessment of economic and political performance. Finally, the cognitive awareness model emphasizes that the nature of voters’ decisions is shaped by the cognitive skills they possess, the amount of information they have, and the source of that information.

Although these different voting approaches or perspectives seem to have divergent implications, they are not incompatible. They can be integrated into a single theoretical framework. A comprehensive model of all these approaches will be tested and then an attempt will be made to develop an integrated theory of partisanship in Mozambique. First, a full model will be re-estimated by beginning with all the variables discussed in this chapter. Then all indicators that are statistically insignificant will be dropped and then the model is re-estimated until there are no insignificant variables in order to estimate the most accurate Adjusted R squared and to develop the most parsimonious model possible.

In order to assess the ability of each theoretical family of variables to explain partisan identification, the Adjusted R2 of all significant variables in each block is recalculated. The objective here is to test which theoretical approach presents the most powerful model of partisanship in Mozambique (as indicated by the bloc Adjusted R Squared). Lastly, the actual standardized correlation coefficients are examined to interpret the nature of partisan identification.
The results of this analysis reveal the following. The logistic regression analysis in Table 9.4 below reveals that cognitive awareness (.160) provides the strongest explanation of support for FRELIMO, followed by political performance evaluations (.071) and economic evaluations (.032). Among all the five theoretical assumptions tested in this study, social cleavages have the weakest explanatory power in predicting identification with FRELIMO (.000).

With regard to which specific variables determine FRELIMO support, the findings reveal that cognitive awareness has an important impact, even after taking into account social cleavages, sociopolitical values, and economic and political performance evaluations. The coefficients for the attitudes variables and their interactions with the cognitive awareness index are statistically significant predictors of partisanship in Mozambique, which means that highly informed voters rely much less than poorly informed voters on communitarian values and much more on their economic reform preferences when considering supporting FRELIMO.

With respect to radio usage, similar patterns can be observed, suggesting that frequent radio listeners are less dependent on the country’s economic retrospective and personal retrospective economic assessment when they choose to identify with FRELIMO support.
Table 9.4: The strength of model to predict FRELIMO Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variables</th>
<th>FRELIMO Adj. R Square</th>
<th>FRELIMO Cumulative Adj. R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social cleavages</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural values</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid gaps vs. health difference ok</td>
<td>.347 (.000+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reform preferences</td>
<td>-.397 (.000+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic performance ass.</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country retrospective ass.</td>
<td>-.396 (.038+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal retrospective ass.</td>
<td>.424 (.009+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political performance ass.</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The extent of democracy</td>
<td>192 (.028++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative responsiveness index</td>
<td>.647 (.000+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive awareness</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in political affairs</td>
<td>.412 (.000+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive awareness index</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. awareness*avoid gaps</td>
<td>-.800 (.000+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. awareness*economic reform preferences</td>
<td>.936 (.000+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. awareness*representative respon. index</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. awareness * country prospect ass.</td>
<td>.622 (.050+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. awareness *the extent of democracy</td>
<td>-.786 (.022++)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio* country retrospective ass.</td>
<td>.418 (.052+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio* personal retrospective ass.</td>
<td>-.595 (.001+++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio*personal prospective ass.</td>
<td>.506 (.024++)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predictor variables included in the model: sociological, cultural values, economic evaluation, political evaluation and cognitive awareness; and interaction analysis between cognitive awareness index and all these variables. The dependent variable “identification with FRELIMO” was coded: 0=Else; 1=FRELIMO; the opposition was coded: 0=Else; 1=Opposition, with independents coded as: 0=Else; 1=Independents. P<.001+++; P<.01++, P<.05+. Entries are level of significance; standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented outside of entries. A dash (-) indicates that the relationship is insufficiently strong and significant to be reported in a final, reduced model. The analysis presented in this table is based on the weighted dataset.

In sharp contrast to FRELIMO support, social structure (.028) provides the strongest explanation of support for opposition parties. But all other influences being held constant, high informed voters depend less on ethnic (Sena-Ndaw) affiliations when considering opposition parties.
Table 9.5: The strength of model to predict opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Cleavages</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Adj. R Square</th>
<th>Cumulative Adj. R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sena-Ndaw</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethicinity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reform preferences</td>
<td>.288(.052++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural values</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid gaps vs. health difference ok</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic performance ass.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political assessment</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive awareness</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive awareness index</td>
<td>3.353 (.025++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. awareness*Sena-Ndaw</td>
<td>-.3238(.037++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predictor variables included in the model: sociological, cultural values, economic evaluation, political evaluation and cognitive awareness; and interaction analysis between cognitive awareness index and all these variables. The dependent variable “identification with FRELIMO” was coded: 0=Else; 1=FRELIMO; with opposition coded as: 0=Else; 1=Opposition and with independents coded as: 0=Else; 1=Independents. \( P < .001+++ , P < .01++ , P < .05+ \). Entries are level of significance; standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented outside of entries A dash (-) indicates that the relationship is insufficiently strong and significant to be reported in a final, reduced model. The analysis presented in this table is based on the weighted dataset.

The focus now shifts to finding out what the integrated approach can tell us in terms of the factors behind independence. Based on the results presented in Table 9.6, it appears that similarly to FRELIMO support, independence is explained by cognitive awareness considerations (.159), but then followed by political performance evaluation coefficients (.041).

Reflecting on how the variables introduced in the model predict independence, the findings do not differ from the FRELIMO support findings. Increased levels of awareness lead to voters relying more on communitarian values and less on economic reform preferences when deciding whether or not they want to support any political party at all. Cognitively sophisticated voters are more likely than frequent radio listeners to base their independence on their personal prospects.
Table 9.6: The strength of model to predict independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independents</th>
<th>Adj. R Square</th>
<th>Cumulative Adj. R Square</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social cleavages</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid gaps vs. health difference ok</td>
<td>-0.337 (.000+++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reform preferences</td>
<td>0.285 (.003+++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid gaps vs. health difference ok</td>
<td>-0.337 (.000+++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic reform preferences</td>
<td>0.285 (.003+++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic performance ass.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal prospective ass.</td>
<td>0.339 (.054+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political performance ass.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The extent of democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative responsiveness index</td>
<td>-0.391 (.013++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cognitive awareness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics affairs</td>
<td>-0.605 (.000+++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive awareness index</td>
<td>3.353 (.025++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions analysis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. awareness*Sena-Ndaw</td>
<td>-0.3238 (.037++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. Awareness*personal prospective ass.</td>
<td>0.725 (.000+++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. awareness* avoid gaps</td>
<td>0.733 (.001+++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog. Awareness*economic reform preferences</td>
<td>-0.898 (.000+++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio*personal prospective ass.</td>
<td>-0.570 (.006+++)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predictor variables included in the model: sociological, cultural values, economic evaluation, political evaluation and cognitive awareness. The dependent variable “identification with independence” was coded: 0=Else; 1=Independence. P<.001+++; P<.01++; P<.05+. Entries are level of significance; standardized regression coefficients (beta) are presented outside of entries. A dash (-) indicates that the relationship is insufficiently strong and significant to include the independent variable in a final, reduced model. The analysis presented in this table is based on the weighted dataset.

9.8. Conclusion

This chapter started by asking to what extent does cognitive awareness affect partisanship in Mozambique. Does formal education, exposure to mass news media, interest in public affairs and political discussion shape partisan identification in Mozambique? The analysis reveals that several aspects related to cognitive awareness (exposure to news media, political discussion, interest in politics and formal education) do, in fact, have a significant impact on partisan preferences. However, the analysis also strongly suggests that the effects of cognitive awareness on partisan preferences are interactive rather than direct. Frequent radio listeners are less likely to look to recent national economic trends or their personal retrospect to identify with FRELIMO compared to those who are not regular radio listeners. People with a higher level of cognitive awareness rely much less on communitarian values and much more on their economic regime preferences when deciding to support FRELIMO. Cognitive awareness interactions also affect support for opposition parties and independence. Voters with high levels of cognitive awareness are less likely to use ethnic affiliations
when they support opposition parties, and more likely to look to their personal economic prospects when deciding to remain independent.

It is important to note that even with the inclusion of the cognitive awareness variables, support for FRELIMO and independence can be better predicted than for opposition support. The models explain 26.4% of variance in FRELIMO support and 22.4% of variance in independence. With regard to opposition support, the model explains .057% of variance.
CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION

“Which factors determine party identification?” is a vital question for understanding African electoral politics and answers to this can make an important contribution to the comparative literature on partisanship and electoral behaviour. Although much research has been conducted to answer this question in Western democracies, North America and post-Communist countries, many scholars in Africa have neglected to provide answers to this question. This study has attempted to provide some answers in this regard and thereby hopes to add to the body of knowledge in the field of African electoral studies.

The question of whether ethno-regional or performance-related factors play an important role in shaping support for political parties in Mozambique was considered whereby partisan identification of Mozambicans was examined from a number of perspectives. These perspectives included social cleavages, the cultural values hypothesis, economic and political assessment approaches and the cognitive awareness approach. Data from the Afrobarometer Survey Round 2 was used to examine this question.

To avoid any misunderstanding, it should be noted that this thesis is not about voting behaviour, but rather about the sources of partisan identification. There is data on partisan identification which can be correlated to other variables, but there is no similar data on actual voting behaviour although it is known that partisanship is strongly linked to voter choice. Moreover, the Afrobarometer Round 2 was not designed to explore partisanship or electoral behaviour in depth. It was designed to measure African attitudes to democracy and market reforms. Thus, a fuller and more conclusive analysis of either partisan identification or electoral behaviour in countries like Mozambique requires additional data from pre- and post-election surveys, as well as panel and cross-national surveys that take into account factors like the following: party leadership and party images, locality and constituency campaigning, voters’ and families’ partisanship and electoral behaviour history, the time of the voter decision, campaign issues, voter engagement with election campaigns and knowledge of party policies.
It should also be noted that several factors related to the political context, the unfamiliarity with survey tools and sensitive political questions may affect any research study. According to Mattes (2007:3), the ideologies of anti-colonial movements and ensuing post-independence governments of both the left and right have left a range of bitter political legacies that to this day question the role of, and shrink the space for, independent and open intellectual inquiry. These same ideologies, according to Mattes, have bequeathed a great deal of skepticism and suspicion among citizens towards the positivist systematic empirical methodology of behavioural social science. This seems to be an appropriate description of Mozambique. From the pre-colonial period through to the post-colonial period the existence of systematic independent and open intellectual inquiry on public opinion or political attitudes was mostly nonexistent, whether conducted by universities or civil society organizations.

The Mozambican political system today is best described as transitional. It is characterized by a hybrid of political values: on the one hand, an “authoritarian” style of government and government monopoly of political spaces, on the other hand the existence of multiparty elections, some political freedom and some independent news media. Under these circumstances, according to White et al. (1997), respondents in some cases may be too afraid to answer honestly, fearing retaliation from authorities (see also Bratton et al., 2005) and thus reluctant to express freely their voting decisions during election times (West, 1998; Harrison, 1996).

However, several tests were conducted to see whether fears prevent voters from expressing opinions and revealing their partisanship. The findings do not support this thesis. On the other hand, other studies in Mozambique (De Brito et al., 2005; West, 1998; Harrison, 1996) seem to confirm how difficult it is for Mozambican voters to express their views on voting and to express opinions on sensitive political issues. According to West (1998), the 1994 elections were a “ checkerboard”: areas that were held by RENAMO voted for RENAMO and areas held by FRELIMO voted for FRELIMO. That is, voters in these areas were afraid of reprisals if their district or their village was seen as having voted against the powers that be. In other words, voters may have often voted for the party they most feared, or the party that could hurt them if they failed to support it. Harrison (1996) presented a similar theory to explain the significance of multiparty elections in Mozambique. According to him, voting was more a duty than a right. For example, people vote under orders, to avoid the suspicion
of the neighbourhood chiefs, or to mark one’s presence along with everyone else. Voting in Mozambique was also important, not merely for a choice of leader or an endorsement of the peace process begun in Rome in 1990, but as an attempt by the state to reintegrate, through the act of voting, a national citizenry. Voters were not merely expressing their support for a party, they were also investing some political credit in the state itself as the focus for a legitimate contestation of power (Harrison, 1996:19). Therefore, the reader is urged to keep all these factors in mind when reading the results reported in this study.

The link between different factors (e.g. social cleavages, sociopolitical values, economic and political evaluation indicators) and partisanship was analysed within the context of multivariate models of electoral behaviour. By treating social cleavages or sociopolitical values as independent variables alongside others that have been found to be significant determinants of partisanship, the impact of each of the variables could be controlled and therefore the best predictors of partisanship in Mozambique could be selected.

The results of the study revealed that partisan support for the ruling party in Mozambique is driven by popular evaluations of the performance of the incumbent; secondly, partisan support for opposition parties is difficult to predict. Thirdly, cognitive awareness distinguishes voters who use economic reasoning for choosing among political parties from voters who revert to social or cultural identities and values. Finally, this study did not find any important effects of region, rural vs. urban location, religion, generation, gender or class on party identification. This challenges widely-held assumptions about the impact of these factors either in Africa and/or new democracies.

One of the most important findings of this study was the important role that cognitive awareness plays in differentiating distinct bases of partisan choice. This study points to the fact that cognitively aware voters make better informed and more performance-based decisions than disengaged voters. When the people are informed, they help to move African politics from the realm of cultural identity to the realm of competing policies - the mechanics that tend to shape partisan identification in other democracies.

How powerful is the model as an explanation of partisanship in Mozambique? There are two ways to answer this and depends on whether scholars use partisanship as a dependent or independent variable (and the vast majority of electoral studies use
partisanship as an independent rather than a dependent variable). When partisanship is an independent variable scholars expect the power of a model of voting to be much greater than a model of partisan identification.

Compared to other studies that use partisanship as a dependent variable, the models in this study can account for between 6 and 26% of variance in partisanship in Mozambique. More precisely, they explain 26% of the variance in identification with FRELIMO, 22% of variance in independence and 6% in predicting opposition support. These findings are stronger than those presented by Norris et al. (2003) in South Africa and relatively similar to the results produced by Ferree et al. (2007) in Malawi (where explanatory power ranges from 15 to 22% of variance in explaining partisanship). However, they are less powerful than those presented by Ishiyama et al. (2006). The overall explanatory power of the study by Ishiyama et al. (2006) ranges from 35 to 79% of variance in predicting partisanship in sub-Saharan Africa.

With respect to North America and Europe, the models presented by Dalton et al. (2007) regarding social learning in established, transitional and consolidating democracies are stronger than the models presented in this study. Dalton et al.’s models account for 47% of variance in partisanship.

10.1. Major findings and contributions to electoral studies in Africa and elsewhere

What do these findings imply for larger issues of African politics, and for electoral politics in new democracies in the developing world? The answer depends on whether these findings can be extrapolated from Mozambique and applied to the rest of Africa, let alone to other countries. Thus, major findings in and contributions to the field of the African electoral research will be presented below rather than reiterating the findings of this study variable by variable. To begin with, the methodological contribution will be presented and then the theoretical frameworks of the major findings will be outlined.
10.1.1 Methodological contribution

The methodology used in this study is based on the analytical techniques commonly used in Western democracies, North America and more recently in post-Communist countries and Latin America. One contribution that this study makes is to bring studies on Mozambique and Africa in general into the larger electoral debate. This study also breaks new ground by using cross-national quantitative data rather than qualitative analyses usually used by scholars in Mozambique and other African countries (e.g. De Brito, 1996; Pereira, 1997).

The cross-national data included responses to a range of questions ascertaining the socio-demographic characteristics of the Mozambican population, their values, their economic and political situations and their levels of access to information. From this type of data, and building on the Western models, this study was able to replicate five of the most used electoral behaviour approaches (related to social cleavages, cultural values, economic voting, political performance assessments and cognitive awareness). Few scholars in Africa use the same approach in partisanship or electoral behaviour studies, even for instance, those studies carried out by Mattes et al. (1999b), Norris et al. (2003), Seekings (2005), Ishiyama et al. (2006), Posner et al. (2002), Schulz-Herzenberg (2006), Youde (2005), Battle et al. (2007), Ferree et al. (2007), and Cheesman (2007) whose studies are also based on the Afrobarometer or cross-national dataset. Studies by Seekings (2005) and Schulz-Herzenberg (2006) focus on the stability of partisanship in South Africa that test different electoral behaviour theories to determine what factors explain partisanship or voter choice in South Africa.

By contrast, Ishiyama et al. (2006) applied both the literature from the West and from newly developing democracies to understand partisanship in sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, this study has examined the intensity of partisan attachment, rather than which political parties voters in Africa prefer or the factors that determine the level of support for the governing party, which are the main focus of studies by for instance Norris et al. (2003), Mattes (1995), Mattes et al. (1999b), Youde (2005), Battle et al. (2007) and one of the researcher’s earlier studies.
In this study there is a move away from other studies in Africa by placing less emphasis on the most widely applied theories of voting behaviour in Africa, i.e. the social cleavages approach (Norris et al., 2003; Frere et al., 2007; Cheesman, 2007; Battle et al., 2007), and more on incorporating other frameworks derived from both literature in the West and new Eastern European democracies. Thus explanations related to sociopolitical values, economic and political evaluation factors and cognitive awareness are used which are largely neglected in African electoral research. This study tests different types of economic voting assumptions (pocketbook vs. sociotropic, current or retrospective vs. prospective assessments) and cognitive awareness assumptions (direct and indirect effects) to determine partisanship in Mozambique, along with a few studies in South Africa (Mattes et al., 1999), Zambia (Posner, 2001) and Ghana (Youde, 2005).

However, these studies introduce economic voting assumptions, but do not make use of cognitive awareness assumptions (direct and indirect effects) in their studies. Studies carried out by Mattes (2004) and David et al. (2004) with regard to cognitive awareness are mainly concerned with the different channels which supply South African voters with their political information (Mattes, 2004) and how the media covers the election process (David, 2004) rather than testing how political information has a direct or indirect effect on voter choice in South Africa.

With regard to the social cleavages approach, this thesis has made a methodological contribution by including class, religion, and age and gender factors in the analysis. These factors have been largely seen to influence electoral behaviour in Western democracies, but have been ignored by many scholars in Africa (a notable exception is research undertaken in South Africa). African scholars have assumed that voting behaviour can be explained in terms of social cleavages, and that these in turn can be reduced simply to ethnicity or, in some cases, region of origin and levels of urbanization. Ethnicity has therefore become an automatic explanation of party support, which is often used in the news media without in-depth examination of electoral behaviour (e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Atieno-Odhiabo, 2002; Omolo, 2002).
10.1.2. Theoretical implications

Concerning the theoretical implications, what do the results from this study on Mozambique reveal about democratic politics in Africa, the West and post-Communist countries or Latin America? In many African countries, the main criterion according to which socio-political groups define and identify themselves is rooted in ethnicity rather than in class. It is through ethnic identification that competition for influence in the state and in the allocation of resources takes place, instead of it being a contest between the “haves” and the “have-nots” as in most Western societies. Ethnic tension usually results from the perception of inequitable access to resources among groups and the fear of political marginalization.

Although it may be the case that structural cleavages such as ethnicity explain partisan affiliation less now than in the past, scholars studying electoral democracies in Africa point to the enduring relevance of ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa, where ethnic ties based on kinship and family, language and dialect, tribal customs and local communities, as well as shared religious faiths, have long been regarded as playing a critical role in party politics (Norris et al., 2003; Horowitz, 1985; Palmberg, 1999). The role of ethnicity in structuring voter alignments is important in that, as Horowitz (1985) argues, in countries where ascribed ethnic loyalties are strong, “deeply driven along a preponderant ethnic cleavage—as in many Asian and African states—[there is a tendency] to throw up party systems that exacerbate ethnic conflict” (p.291). This is not meant to imply that Africa is a continent of societies with no status differentiation, which was and remains obviously false, but that it was not considered a salient issue. Only in heavily industrialized or urbanized states and regions, such as in South Africa, is class-based political mobilization a significant factor.

The findings in this study partially support this claim. Although the single social cleavages and full inclusive model without interactions analysis results did not fully support the notion that ethnicity determines partisanship in Mozambique, the inclusion of the interaction analysis demonstrated the opposite. Ethnicity becomes a significant predictor of opposition support rather than support for FRELIMO or independence. That is, voters with a high level of cognitive awareness depend less on ethnicity (Sena-Ndaws) when considering opposition parties.
Does this result reveal evidence of ethnic cleavages? Or does it reveal ethnicity as a channel of political information? Taking into account the country’s political context, it seems fair to argue that ethnicity is a channel of information rather than a social cleavage. People born in a given ethnic group and place are expected to be different from other ethnic groups not because of cleavages or because of the origins of their leadership, but as a result of cultural differences. People who live within an ethnic group share common cultural attributes that affect their political and social attitudes and behaviour.

How can we confirm that ethnicity is a channel of information rather than a social cleavage? Speculating on the issue, this study offers a possible explanation. First, Mozambique is a multi-ethnic society without a dominant ethnic group. This context creates an incentive for political parties to try to “catch all” ethnic groups rather than focusing only on one ethnic group. Second, despite FRELIMO and RENAMO being seen as parties which represent particular ethnic groups (FRELIMO as a party of the Changana-Ronga and RENAMO as a party of the Sena-Ndaw), both parties expanded their alliances across different ethnic groups in the country. FRELIMO leaders were able, based on patronage networks within political parties and State apparatus, to accommodate elites from different ethnic groups (Lundin, 1996; Vaux et al., 2006). In addition, it is not the mere existence of ethnic divisions that enables ethnicity to be manipulated by political mobilization, but also social receptivity, political opportunity, organizational capacity, leadership, ideological profile and programmes, communications and symbols (Barany, 2002). In Mozambique some of these prerequisites are there, such as ethnic divisions, political opportunity, leadership, some organizational capacity and symbols. But there is no social receptivity. The Afrobarometer results reveal that very few Mozambicans feel that they are treated unfairly by the incumbent government, suggesting that there are no ethnic grounds that can be mobilized to influence political opinions. These findings support Claggett et al. (1982) who argue that political strategies provide initial “mobilization along ethnic lines, but whether ethnicity becomes an enduring political cleavage depends on whether it is rooted in a receptive social base in a plural society” (see also Zielinski, 2002; Piombo, 2004).
A significant body of research on Western democracies and Africa has also suggested that electoral behaviour is determined by the urban vs. rural settings, regional cleavages, class, religion, gender and age (De Brito, 1996, 2000a, 2000b; Ajulu, 1999; Gyimah-Boadi et al., 2003). These scholars place emphasis on rural vs. urban and regional cleavages. Voters enter the polling station with pre-existing rural or urban or regional identities or interests.

Voting behavior in Mozambique, and elsewhere in Africa, has also been explained in terms of regional differences (e.g. Ajulu, 1999), or urban/rural characteristics (e.g. Pereira, 1997, Gyimah-Boadi et al., 2003). If this assumption is right, these social cleavages are expected to be reflected in voting decisions, but it seems not. None of the variables, even those variables that were significant in a single or inclusive model without interaction analysis such as region and age, are significant predictors of partisanship in Mozambique, whether the dependent variable is in support for FRELIMO, opposition support or independence (see Chapter IX).

The results have also failed to reveal the class/party relationship found in Western democracies (e.g. Rose et al., 1969, 1970, 1986, 1990) or a religion/party relationship (e.g. Knutsen, 2004; Morier-Genoud, 1996). Yet, they give support to the declining correlation hypothesis between religious affiliations and voter choice in Western democracies, consociational democracies and development democracies (Franklin, 1992; Baloi, 1996). Regarding age factors, the results do not support the well represented argument that emphasizes generational voting and the life-cycle theory of voting (Knutsen, 2003; Rose et al., 1990).

Why then did the analysis not detect any influences of rural/urban and regional cleavages in party identification in Mozambique? This study offers a possible explanation. First, FRELIMO abandoned its policy of “villagization” and marginalization of central and northern party elites which impacted negatively on people in rural areas and the central and northern part of the country. The policy of “villagization”, the marginalization of the central-northern part elites and the fight against elements of peasant social organization, such as “traditional-feudal power”, and “negative customs” (polygamy, bride-price, premature marriage, etc.), had a destructive impact on the cohesion and social balance of rural communities in the central and northern parts of the country (see also De Brito, 1996; Roesch, 1992, 1993). By
abandoning its “villagization” programme and opening the party to the marginalized groups of the central and northern part of the county FRELIMO seems to have reconciled with the rural, central and northern population. Second, the FRELIMO government is increasing investment in rural areas as well as in the northern part of the country, particularly in education and health and the building of roads and bridges. The increased investment in rural areas as well as in the central and northern parts of the country seems to have reduced the perception that people living in the urban environment or Maputo enjoy better living conditions than those who live on the periphery of the cities and in the rural areas.

Third, FRELIMO developed new clientelist networks with rural elites, particularly traditional leaders who used to be key RENAMO mobilization actors in the rural areas. The role played by traditional leaders in Mozambique was seen as one of the main factors that explained RENAMO’s victory in rural areas during the civil war and in the 1994 and 1999 elections (Harrison, 2000; Pereira 1996). Finally, RENAMO cadres do not have the means to mobilize urban voters, although urban people seem to be dissatisfied with the FRELIMO government. Recent economic reforms (removal of subsidies and the devaluation of the currency) introduced by FRELIMO have had a negative impact on the life of urban dwellers. At the same time, it is in the city that the numbers of poor people have increased tremendously over the past years. For the people who used to benefit from a social welfare system which included housing subsidies and free water and electricity, the termination of these privileges has created some disillusionment with FRELIMO.

Cultural values are one of the most prominent influences on voter decisions in Western democracies (Inglehart, 1990). However, the paradigms that dominate the study of electoral politics in Africa have largely neglected the role of values cleavages. In Mozambique the combination of political transformation and economic liberation has lead to significant cultural change. The changes involve the transformation of a corporatist type of authoritarian party-state into one characterized by pluralism and democracy. Economically the changes involve transformation from a centralized and collectivist mode of production to a market economy and individualist way of production. However, the evidence shows that even after accounting for social cleavages, economic and political performance evaluations and cognitive interaction
Considerations, the effects of these sociopolitical values on partisanship in Mozambique are still evident, particularly for FRELIMO support and independence, but not for support for the opposition. Taking into account the interactions considerations, these findings reveal that voters with high levels of cognitive awareness depend less on communitarian values and economy reforms when considering supporting FRELIMO or independence.

Reflecting on the influence of economic conditions, despite arguments to the contrary (Downs, 1957), studies have found that voters do not evaluate economic conditions through their own pocketbooks. That is, in considering political parties or candidates, voters tend to focus less on personal circumstances and more on national economic conditions, thereby engaging in what has been termed "sociotropic" voting (Kinder et al., 1989). Some argue that voters can make present, retrospective, or prospective economic assessments (Fiorina, 1981).

Evidence from several studies in Western democracies indicates that citizens are more likely to base their vote on financial considerations than on broad national concerns (Sanders, 1999). Reasoned pocketbook assessments should thus also be possible in developing democracies such as Mozambique, since citizens there can likewise judge their personal experience with poverty, unemployment and hardship in terms of the economic reforms under the incumbent government.

If poverty and unemployment are so high in Mozambique and the argument for economic voting based on "reward-punishment models" is right, we would expect economic voting assumptions to influence voter choice. This study finds evidence of economic voting predicting partisan identification in Mozambique. The effects of economic performance evaluations coefficients matter more than politics in explaining partisanship, particularly when interaction coefficients are added to the model. Voters with a high level of awareness are also more likely to look to their personal economic prospects. On the other hand, voters who frequently get news from the radio are less likely to make either personal or national economic retrospective assessments than those who never or rarely listen to radio news.

Cognitive mobilization produces voters who orient themselves to politics on their own. The process of cognitive mobilization has increased the number of voters who have the
conceptual ability and political skills necessary to fulfil more critical voting criteria or the issues-voting criteria (Dalton, 1996). Does cognitive awareness play a role in predicting partisanship in Mozambique? The results of this study support the intermediary assumption of the cognitive awareness theory (e.g. Huckfeldt et al., 1987, Sniderman et al., 1991) rather than notions that it has a direct impact on it. As already described above, the study found interaction effects relating to cognitive awareness and some social cleavages, sociopolitical values and economic performance evaluations coefficients in determining FRELIMO support or independence, but not for opposition support. Similar evidence can be found for radio interaction coefficients and economic performance evaluations coefficients (economic retrospective and personal retrospective assessments) in determining FRELIMO support and independence, but not support for opposition parties.

However, these findings cannot sufficiently answer all the issues with regard to partisanship or electoral behaviour in Mozambique. Despite the limitations of the data and the political context, this study contributes methodologically and theoretically to the body of knowledge in this field, and opens up new pathways that scholars can use to improve our understanding of how partisanship is influenced in Mozambique in particular and Africa in general.

Typical studies on electoral behaviour or partisanship in Western democracies and post-Communist countries, as well as in Asia, have failed to look at Mozambique and Africa in general from a comparative perspective. The focus in this study is comparative. Such an approach can assist in an understanding of politics in Mozambique and contribute to an analysis of the Mozambican experience adding a new perspective to the large body of electoral and partisanship research. The results presented here reveal that the mechanics that drive voters in other countries to identify with political parties, including both stabilized and non-stabilized democracies, operate also to some extent in Africa.

Overall, the question of how and why people develop partisanship will continue to be a crucial piece of the puzzle in understanding politics in new multi-party democracies in Africa, Latin America, Asia and post-Communist countries. As more and more African states hold free and fair elections, and data on these elections become available, we should take the opportunity to conduct comparative analyses among African states, and integrate them with other electoral behaviour research around the world. In addition,
future research could also address other dimensions of attitude and behaviour not tackled in this study or for that matter in most of the electoral behaviour studies in Africa. These could include the effect of political socialization (the influence of parents, communities, colleagues, friends, schools, group membership) on partisanship and electoral behaviour in general, campaign issues (analyses of elections manifestos and campaign speeches) and their effect on voter choice, the impact of electoral institutions, and the size and stability of the party system, the effect of macroeconomic indicators (such as unemployment and inflation) to mention just a few.

Any analysis on partisanship and electoral behaviour cannot be based only on national elections. In Mozambique, as in many African countries, researchers have overwhelmingly focused on national elections. In addition, since most Mozambican studies are qualitative, studies need to supplement these qualitative studies with quantitative methods such as cross-sectional surveys and panel studies, and develop new methodological approaches that can contribute to an understanding of voter choice in Mozambique. This is important because survey data are not well suited to the task of examining the process by which voters make political decisions and how people deal with new information, and whether and how that new information changes attitudes. Yet this is precisely what most democratic processes are about. Politicians, the media and secondary organizations provide information to citizens, who then decide whether to form a preference, change an existing preference, or keep the preference they already hold (Kuklinski, 2001). According to Kuklinski (2001), researchers must construct methodologies that try to understand the complexities of voter decisions rather than wait only for survey data. Therefore further research on electoral behaviour in Africa could also address the issues of methodology.

10.2. Implications of findings for the future of multi-party competition in Mozambique, and strategies to support democracy in the country

This study replicated the empirical tests of five voting behaviour theories to investigate their utility in predicting partisan identification in Mozambique. According to Bratton et al. (2004), however, good theory should also provide ideas for policy and practice. The results of this study show three things. Firstly, voters’ decisions in Mozambique do not simply reflect social cleavages, and election results do not only reflect ethnic and cultural identification, but rather they reflect satisfaction with actual performance in office. This
might encourage parties to practise patronage and clientelism rather than rely solely on the institutionalization of the rule of law, government accountability and democratic responsiveness. Secondly, voters' decisions are also based on their evaluation of government performance, particularly economic performance, indicating the emergence of accountability. Party preference reflects the attribution of responsibility for political performance. This responsibility will be the chief mechanism through which individuals will hold actors accountable for their conduct. This would heighten chances for democratic governance, as elections would serve as “referenda” on party performance, rather than reflecting demographic distribution, or ethnic or racial consensus. Finally, the findings of this study show that once democracy and economic reforms are consolidated in Mozambique and the memories of the one-party era and transition period fade, voters in Mozambique in particular and in Africa in general will more closely follow the patterns of economic voting observed in established Western democracies.

These findings can help to find strategies that will support multi-party competition in Mozambique. As a first step, there should be increased investment in training programmes and capacity-building at schools for citizens, education systems, and communities as well as for civil society organizations and the mass media, particularly independents ones. This is important because, despite the fact that Mozambique has successfully passed through the transition from a one-party state to a democracy with equal citizenship, there is a major deficit in citizenship knowledge and understanding among Mozambicans. Democracy depends for its survival upon the commitment of its citizens to keep the government accountable, to safeguard their rights and fulfil their responsibilities. Active citizenship requires citizens who are well equipped with knowledge and understanding of the constitution of the country and the workings of institutions that strengthen democratic governance.

There is thus a need to increase training programmes that cover issues of citizenship, the rule of democratic processes, the function of elections, the issues of accountability and responsiveness and the role of political institutions. At the same time, the training programmes should also help citizens to develop critical skills that involve not only the acquisition of political knowledge but learning how to be effective in public life through increased knowledge of and commitment to the political, legal and social institutions of one's country. This should be geared to the development of competencies in thinking
and acting in political arenas, both governmental and non-governmental in nature. Participatory skills can empower citizens to influence public policy decisions and to hold their representatives accountable in government.

In addition, the functioning of the media in countries that have emerged from long periods of one-party systems is fundamentally different from their role in any Western democracy. In the FRELIMO revolutionary model, exclusive party-state ownership, tight political control, institutionalized censorship, informal party directives, and unbounded propaganda made the media the instruments of the FRELIMO government's ideological mass persuasion. The government effectively controls the media through nomination and appointment of the media nomenclature, that is, chief editors and other senior decision-makers. Often these types of media published information that had been prepared by specialized party agencies for propaganda purposes. Thus the main instruments of media control were used to control relevant information, censorship, self-censorship, and journalist’s clientelist dependence on the media nomenclature. In the media during the one-party era, self-censorship became a commonly accepted and internalized norm among journalists, chief editors and intellectuals.

With such tightly controlled media it will be difficult to build accountability and responsiveness in political institutions and promote elections as referenda in terms of government performance in Mozambique. The most important challenges currently faced by democratic political elites, media entrepreneurs, and journalists are to make the Mozambican media more independent, pluralistic and democratic. The quality of the information an individual is able to access will greatly influence his or her ability to participate in the political process. In other words, journalists have a responsibility towards their fellow citizens to provide correct and well-analysed information.

In addition, lively and independent media are essential components of the complex system of checks and balances that characterize democratic societies. An independent and diverse mass media will have more editorial autonomy, and protection from interference with editorial news decisions than any media under the control of the government. Establishing and protecting the media will enable citizens to take a stance, reach well-founded decisions and make free choices.
Furthermore, the reward and sanction model requires the existence of alternative political parties and the promotion of high levels of trust in political actors (Hetherington, 1998). Only with viable alternatives can voters feel free to punish the incumbent and elect the opposition. However, in new democracies many opposition parties have little credibility. In such countries incumbent parties may be the only experienced leadership that the nation has. Voters, lacking an experienced set of alternative candidates, may find it difficult to utilize electoral tools in an authentic evaluative manner that could lead to the defeat of an incumbent. Instead, citizens may hold the incumbent to low standards of performance, concluding that poor incumbent performance is preferable to risking rewarding governing incompetence. This seems to be the case in Mozambique. The political systems in Mozambique have opposition parties with the following characteristics:

- Weak bureaucratic organization, including unreliable membership data and poor funding base
- Lack of human resources
- The dominance of informal relations such as patronage and clientelism as well as strong personalism
- Lack of intra-party democracy and regular communication within the party hierarchy
- Dysfunctional hierarchies
- High degrees of factionalism
- Weak formal links to citizens
- Lack of contact with citizens
- Lack of strong ideologies and articulate policies
- Predominantly Maputo-based and operating in a difficult environment characterized by a high level of poverty and lack of trust by the citizens (Pereira et al., 2006).

Unfortunately, instead of reflecting or articulating the interests of social groups, the political system in Mozambique, as in many other African countries, appears to reflect faultiness, fissures and fads among political elites. Using the argument of Bratton et al. (2004), one can state that many of these political parties are vehicles to promote personal bids for power. An examination of their actual strategies (as opposed to their rhetoric)
reveals that the goals pursued by party leaders vary from grabbing a few crumbs of the “national pie” to gaining a role in the everyday operation of government.

With these types of opposition parties, the “reward and sanction model” is impossible in Mozambique. These opposition parties are not able to perform their duties such as conducting election campaigns, maintaining contact between leaders and activists between elections, mobilizing public support on issues and so on. To improve this situation a strategy has to be adopted which would include training opposition parties in terms of how to use the mass media in order to communicate their messages, which types of language to use and how to take public opinion into account in their electoral manifesto or political discourse. In addition, opposition parties should also be trained in policy design, and the building of internal political structures, promoting vibrant branches and mobilizing members, increasing financial resources by ensuring better procedures for the collection of membership fees and methods of strengthening their links with citizens and promoting intra-party democracy.

Despite being one of the key pillars in democracy, the development of political parties appears to be largely missing in the debates on sustained and reliable support for the democratization process across Africa. Observation on international support for the democratization process in Africa shows that the international contribution to capacity building of political parties is invisible or development cooperation has focused on almost everything in the political arena except the promotion and support of political parties in Africa. Western development agencies and African political parties have been “reluctant bedfellows” and relatively few organizations have been explicitly engaged in such programmes. Among the few who support political parties are the US Agency For International AID (USAID), The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), The British Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) and a number of organizations from smaller European countries, particularly the Swedish International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD).

There is a need to develop capacity building programmes for political parties, particularly opposition parties. If we do not concentrate on the training of opposition parties to enable them to develop policy and strategies that mobilize support in society, many of them will respond to electoral defeat by mobilizing ethnically homogenous
communities (Cheesman et al., 2007). According to Cheesman et al. (2007), it is plausible that this strategy of relying on their ethnic support isolates these groups from power and also increases their resentment at their exclusion. This may foster underlying tensions between the “included” and the “excluded” which, if not dealt with, could prove divisive in the future.

Finally, the functioning of a reward-punishment model requires strong, transparent and independent electoral institutions. In a country where political institutions are highly politicized it is important to start to strengthen electoral bodies, political parties and civil society organizations in order to be able to guarantee independence and transparency. Training programmes could focus on strengthening the electoral legislative framework, voter education, the promotion of voter registration and vote counting (including dispute resolution), as well as ways of funding and budgeting for the electoral process, accountability mechanisms (including general coordination and supervision) and media.
APPENDIX (A): THE AFROBAROMETER SURVEY IN MOZAMBIQUE: PROCEDURES

Afrobarometer is a joint enterprise of Michigan State University (MSU), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD, Ghana). The objective of the Afrobarometer Project is to collect, analyse and disseminate cross-national, time-series attitudinal data for up to a dozen new democracies on the African continent. In the last few years, the Afrobarometer has conducted different surveys on political, economic and market reforms in Africa, particularly in the countries which belong to the network and which are in transition process. Last year, in cooperation with the Centre for Population Studies and the Unity of Opinion Service and Democracy at Eduardo Mondlane University, Afrobarometer conducted a national survey on political, economic and market reforms in Mozambique. The philosophy of the Afrobarometer surveys is to concentrate on activities of concern to ordinary people in their everyday lives. The surveys are concerned with how people are reacting to the political, economic and market reform around them.

The Afrobarometer protocols apply to each country that is part of the Afrobarometer network, defined according to the principle of sample design in Mozambique. The sample was designed as a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in a given country. The distribution of the Mozambican sample was based on the 1997 census distribution of the population and habitation per province, urban and rural. Selections of the district, Wards and Enumeration Areas (EAs) were then carried out based on the 2000 Mozambique Master Sample of the Statistic National Institute (central statistical office) which has 1510 EAs. Out of these, 760 are rural while 750 are urban. The master sampling was designed to be used for different demographic and socio-economics surveys. To draw a representative cross-section of the voting age population, we designed a random sample using a multi-stage, stratified, area cluster approach. The goal was to give every adult citizen an equal chance of selection for an interview, meaning that we asked the same schedule of questions to a small sub-set of population who were selected to represent the adult population of Mozambique as a whole.

This objective was achieved by strictly applying random selection methods at every stage of sampling, including the selection of enumeration areas, households and respondents. The area stratification increases the likelihood that distinctive ethnic or language groups are included in the sample. The urban-rural stratification is a means of ensuring that these localities are represented in their correct proportions.

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105 The Sampling design has four stages. A first stage to stratify a randomly selected primary sampling unity. A second stage to randomly select sampling start points; a third stage to randomly choose households; a final stage involving the random selection of individual respondents.
The first-stage stratification and random selection was that of the Primary-Sampling Units (PSUs) from a sample frame. The primary sampling units are the smallest, well-defined geographic units for which reliable population data are available. In Mozambique, this was Census Enumeration Area (EAs). The total number of Primary-sampling Units selected for the whole country was determined by calculating the maximum degree of clustering of interviews one can accept in any PSU. Between eight to twelve interviews were taken in each PSU.

In Mozambique, one hundred and fifteen (115) EAs were selected as the ideal sample for the Afrobarometer survey, with 58 of them covering rural areas and the remainder being urban areas. A second stage of random selection was choosing a starting-point. The starting-point was required so that the interviewer knew where to start. The Afrobarometer manual designed different methods that could be used to define the start-point. However, the local context determined the methods that were used106. For instance, in Mozambique the start-point was selected at random, and twelve households around the start point were chosen according to the following method thereafter. :

In urban areas, the starting-point was selected by using a numbered grid and choosing a random point on the grid. For rural areas; the starting-point was chosen by chance, varying the type of starting-point by choosing a hospital, street corner, water source, sports centre or school. Once the starting-point was defined, the route for each team member to follow was drawn in the “sketch”. The interviewers and supervisor all had previous knowledge of the route to be followed. This facilitated well the localization and controlling of interviewers.

A third stage of random selection was that of the households from the selected PSU/EAs. Households were defined as single housing units/groups of persons living together and eating from the same pot. By this definition, a household did not include persons who were currently living elsewhere for purpose of studies. Nor did a household include domestic workers or temporary visitors (even if they ate from the same pot or slept there on the previous night). In multi-household dwelling structures (like blocks of flats, compounds with multiple spouses, or backyard dwelling for renters, relatives, or household workers), each household was treated as a separate sampling unit. For instance, on average, an enumeration has between 120 and 150 households in urban areas and 80 and 100 in rural areas.

For each EA, a map showing location of households and major population points was obtained from the Department of Cartography. However, the utilization of these proved fruitless because recent maps did not exist, some maps for particular localities dated back to 1968. Official names are not the same as local names. This situation is common all over the country with names used during the colonial era still being used at present. As a way to solve these problems, the coordinator or fieldwork supervisor in cooperation with the local administration selected an alternative site.

106 It should be noted that in many African countries the distribution is extremely diverse across the areas. Hence start point had to be defined at local level by a fieldwork supervisor.
The method for selecting households was as follows:

The fieldwork supervisor chose any random point (like a street, a school, or water source). The four interviewers were instructed to walk away from this point in the following random directions: Interviewer 1 walked towards the sun, Interviewer 2, away from the sun, Interviewer 3 at right angle to Interviewer 1 and Interviewer 4 in the opposite direction. Each interviewer used the day code to establish an interval number for household selection. The day code introduces randomness into the interval. Basically, the interviewers had to take into account the date of the particular day to select the household to be interviewed. For example, if the date was the 9th day of the month this number would be the separating interval in terms of the number of households between the two households to be interviewed. If it were the 12th day of the month the spacing would be 3 households, the sum of the two digits.

Once the household was selected, what remained was the selection of eligible individuals (age 18 years and above) chosen randomly within the household. To ensure that women were not underrepresented, the Afrobarometer sets a gender quota: an equal number of men and women are included in the overall sample. To accomplish this quota, the gender of respondents was alternated. Each interviewer determines from the previous interview whether a man or a woman was to be interviewed. The interviewer then listed (in any order) the first names of all the household members, even those not presently at home but who would return to the house that evening. From the list, the interviewer should randomly select a subject by asking a household member to choose a numbered card from a blind deck of cards. If the person selected refused to be interviewed, the interviewer replaced the household by continuing the walking pattern.
APPENDIX (B): DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES

In the absence of an electoral survey I will use Mozambique Afrobarometer 2002 data to analyse the source of Partisan identification in Mozambique. The Afrobarometer survey provides different variables, which can be usefully employed to operationalize social structures, value changes, economic perceptions, political perceptions and cognitive awareness:

Social Structures

The social identity variables will be operationalized based on the following items and questions:
Gender is scored 1= Male, 2= female. Urbanization is scored 1=urban, 2=Rural. Religions is scored 00=None, 01=Islam, 02=Catholic, 03= Protestant (Mainstream: Methodist/Anglican/Presbyterian), 04=Protestant (Evangelical/Pentecostal), 05=African Independent Church, 06=Traditional religion, 07= Hindu, 08= Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God), 09=Atheist (Do not believe in a God), 99= Don’t know. Ethnicity is a very complex phenomenon and understood in this study as the social construction of identities based on linguistic, regional or religious backgrounds. This study will approaches ethnicity as a cultural and linguistic concept. The measure of ethnicity was gauged by the question: “Which Mozambican language is your home language?” The responses are scored 101=Makwa, 102=Sena, 103=Ndaw, 104=Nyanja, 105=Changana, 106=Chope, 107=Bitonga, 108=Makonde, 109=Chuabo, 110=Ajua, 111=Portuguese.

Generation will be operationalized based on the following question: “How old are you on your last birthday?” Class will be operationally defined in terms of occupation which is scored: 0= Never had job, 1= Farmer (produces only for home consumption), 2= Farmer (produces both for own consumption and some surplus produce for sale), 3= Farmer (produces mainly for sale), 4= Farm worker, 5= Fisherman, 6= Trader, Hawkew/ Vendor, 7= Merchant, 8= Official/lawyer/accountant, 9= Supervisor/Inspector, 10= Clerical worker, 11= Miner, 12= Worker/ Manual worker in the informal sector, 13= Domestic worker, 14= Teacher, 15= Civil servant, 16= Armed services, police/security personnel, 17= Student, 18= Housewife/workers in the household, 19= Disabled, 20= Retired, Others (specify-Post code), 99= Don’t know.

Sociopolitical Values

I shall now touch on the type of community I would love to have in the country. Which of the affirmations would you say is closest to your opinion? Chose between A and B. Q62. A) Each person should put the well being of the community ahead of their own interests. B) Everybody should be free to pursue what is best for themselves as individuals. Each item is scored: 1=Agree very strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree very strongly with B, 5=Agree with neither, 9= Don’t know.
Q63. A) It is alright to have large differences in wealth because those who work hard deserve to be rewarded. B) I should avoid large gaps between rich and poor because they create jealousy and conflict. Each item is scored: 1=Agree very strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree very strongly with B, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don’t know.

Q86. Excluding weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? 1= Never, 2=About once a year or less, 3= About once in several months, 4= About once a month, 5= About once a week, 6= More than once a week, 9= Don’t know.

Q35. There many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternative? A) Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office. B) A council of chiefs or elders makes all decisions. C) The army comes in to govern the country. D) Elections and National Assembly are abolished so that the president can decide everything. Each item is scored 1=Strongly disagree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree, 9=Don’t know.

Q38. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? Statement A) democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, Statement B) In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable, Statement C) For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government I have.

**Market vs. State attitudes**

Market vs. State is represented by different questions which asked the respondent to make an evaluation of State intervention in the economy and liberalization. The questions were: Q.12 Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? Statement A: A free market economy is preferable to an economy run by the government. This statement is scored as (3). Statement B: A government-run economy is preferable to a free market economy. This statement is scored as (2). Statement C: for someone like me, it does not matter what kind of economy system I have. This statement is scored as (1). Don’t know. This statement is scored as (9).

Q16. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. A) It is better for everyone have a job even if this means that average wages are low. B) It is better to have higher wages, even if this means that some people go without a job. Each item is scored 1=Agree very strongly with A or 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree very strongly with B, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don’t know.

Q.18 Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. A) All civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country. B) The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay some of them off. Each item is
scored 1=Agree very strongly with A or 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree very strongly with B, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don’t know.

Q.20 Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.
A: The cost of reforming the economy is too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies. B: In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardship now. Each item is scored 1=Agree very strongly with A or 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree very strongly with B, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don’t know.

Economic Evaluation Model

The Afrobarometer survey provides different variables, which can be usefully employed to operationalize economic perceptions: a measure of optimistic vs. pessimistic views about the respondent’s financial future; a measure of whether the respondent’s and the country’s economic conditions have improved or worsened over the past years; a measure of the extent to which the respondent’s household is experiencing difficulties by asking the follow questions: Q1. Let’s begin by talking about economic conditions. In general, how would you describe: A) The present condition of this country? B) Your own present conditions? The responses for each item are scored as follows: 5=Very good, 4=Fairly good, 3=Neither good nor bad, 2=Fairly bad, 1=Very bad, 9=Don’t know.

Q2. In general, how do you rate: A) The economic conditions in this country compared to those in neighbouring countries? B) Your living conditions compared to those of other Mozambicans? The responses for each item are scored as follows: 5=Much better, 4=Better, 3=Same, 2=Worse, 1=Much worse, 9=Don’t know.

Q3. Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago? A) Economic conditions in this country? B) Your living conditions? The responses for each item are scored as follows: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t know.

Q4. Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse? A) Economic conditions in twelve months time? B) Your living conditions in twelve months’ time? The responses for each item are scored as follows: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t Know.

Economic and Government Performance

Judgements on the government’s economic performance are represented by questions asking the respondent to make evaluations of past and current economic systems. The questions were:

Q21. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement A or statement B.
A) The governments’ economic policies have helped most people; only a few have suffered; B) In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardships now.
Each item is scored 1=Agree very strongly with A or 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree very strongly with B, 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don’t know.

Q22. We are going to compare my present economic system with the economic system a few years ago. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now that they used to be, or about the same. A) The availability of goods, B) People’s’ standard of living, C) The availability of jobs opportunities, D) The gap between the rich and the poor. Each item is scored as follow: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=About the same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t know.

Q23. As you may know, the government has reduced its role in the economy. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way this policy works? Each item is scored: 4= Very satisfied, 3=Fairly satisfied, 2=Not very satisfied, 1=not at all satisfied, 0= The government has not reduced its role in the economy, 9= Don’t know.

Q45. How Ill or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? A) Managing the economy, B) Creating jobs, C) Keeping prices stable, D) Narrowing gabs between rich and poor, E) Reducing crime, D) Improving basic health services, G) Addressing educational needs, H) Delivering household water, I) Ensuring everyone has enough to eat. Each item is scored: 1= Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9= Don’t know.

Political Evaluation

Attitudes towards the political regime are based on different questions asking the respondent to make political evaluation of the way democracy, political parties, and the election process works, and if democracy is always preferable in Mozambique ,as well as questions on respondent’s level of trust. Respondents were asked a series of question about the current regime and other types of political systems. For this study I will use different questions used by Afrobarometer to measure political regime attitudes. The questions were: I would like to hear your views about how this country is governed. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.Q36. We are going to compare my present system of government with the former system of Mono-party rule. Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same. A) Freedom to say what to you think, B) Freedom to join any political organization you want, C) freedom from being arrested when are innocent, D) Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, E) The ability of ordinary people to influence what the government does, F) Safety from crime and violence, G) Equal and fair treatment for all by government. Each item is scored 1= Much worse, 2= Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t know.
Q37. In your opinion how much of democracy is Mozambique today? The response is scored 4= A Full democracy, 3= A democracy, but with minor problems, 2= A democracy with major problems, 1= Not a democracy, 0= Do not understand the question.

Q40. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Mozambique. The respondent is scored as follows: 4=Very satisfied 3=Fairly satisfied 2=Not very satisfied 1=Not at all satisfied 0=Mozambique is not a democracy, 9=Don’t know.

Q43. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? A) The President; B) The National Assembly; C) The Independent Electoral Commission; D) Trust the Provincial Court; E) Trust local authority; F)The Ruling Party ; G) Opposition Political Parties; H)The Army I) The Police

Q50. How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like parliamentarians or local councilors, try their best: A) To look after the interest of people like you? B) To listen to what people like you have to say? 0= Never, 1= Some of the time, 2= Most of the time, 3= Always, 9= Don’t know.

Q51. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? A) The president and officials in his office, B) Elected leaders, C) Government officials, D) Police, E) Border officials (e.g customs and immigration), F) Judges and magistrates, G) Local businessmen, H) Foreign businessmen, L) Teachers and School administrators, J) Religious leaders, K) Leaders of NGO's or community organizations. Each of these items is scored: 0= None, 1= Some of them, 2= Most of them, 3= All of them, 9= Don’t know.

Q52. How likely do you think it would be that the authorities could enforce the law if a person likes yourself: A) Committed a serious crime? B) Did not pay a tax on some of the income they earned? C) Obtained household services (like water and electricity) without paying? Each item is scored: 4= very likely, 3= Likely, 2= Not very likely, 1= Not at all likely, 9= Don’t know.

Q53. Comparing the current government with the former Mozambican government before elections (under one party-system), would you say that the one I have now is more or less: A) Able to enforce the law? B) Effective in delivery of services? C) Corrupt? D) Trustworthy. Each item is scored 5= Much more, 4= More, 3= About the same, 2= Less, 1= Much less, 9= Don’t know.

Q58. Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government? A) An identity document (such as a birth certificate, driver’s license, or passport), B) A place in primary school for a child, C) A voter registration card for yourself, D Household services (like piped water, electricity or telephone), E) A loan or payment from government (such as agricultural credit or a welfare grant), F) Help from the
police when you need it. Each item is scored: 4= Very Easy, 3= Easy, 2= Difficult, 1= Very difficult, 8= Never try, 9= Don’t know.

Cognitive Awareness

The Afrobarometer survey presents different questions that can help us to analysis the impact of cognitive factors on assessments of economic and political institutions. These questions were: Q. 25 Here is a list of action that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. A. Discussed politics with friends or neighbors. B. Attended a community meeting. C. Got together with others raises an issue. D Attend a demonstration or protest march. E. Used force or violence for a political cause. Each item is scored: 4= yes, often; 3= Yes many times; 2= Yes, once or twice; 1= Not, but would do it if had the chance; 0= No, would never do this; 9= Don’t know.

Q. 26 How often do you get news from the following sources? A. Radio, B. Television, C. Newspaper. Each item is scored: 4= Every day, 3= A few times a week, 2= A few times a month, 1= Less than once a month, 0= Never, 9= Don’t know.

Q. 27 How interested are you in public Affairs? 0) Not interested; 1= Somewhat interested; 2= Very Interested; 9= Don’t know.

Q. 84 What is the highest level of education you have completed? No formal schooling; In formal schooling only; Some primary schooling; Primary schooling completed; Some secondary school; Vocational/technical training; Post-secondary qualification; Other than university; Some university; University completed; Postgraduate; Don’t know. Education is scored 00=No formal schooling, 01=In formal schooling only, 02=some primary schooling, 03=Primary schooling completed, 04=Some secondary school, 05=Vocational/technical training, 06=Post-secondary qualification, other than university, 07=Some university, 08=University completed, 09=Postgraduate, 99=Don’t know.
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