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**THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A RADICALISED STATE-
the Two-Level Game of Zimbabwe's Relations with the IMF
(2000-2007)**

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A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award
of the degree of Master of International Relations.

DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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ABSTRACT:

The suspension of Zimbabwe from the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 2001 has been justified as resulting from loan repayment arrears and failed macroeconomic policies. This dissertation argues that these justifications oversimplify the relationship between the Fund and Zimbabwe in the 2000s. As such, three factors are essential for a more comprehensive analysis into the country's foreign policy- the state type, the impact of bargaining between factions of different ideological underpinnings (internationalists vs. nationalists), and land reform. The socio-economic context of neo-colonialism and the negative impact of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) on the domestic level, and comprehensive economic sanctions on the international sphere forged a radicalised state. The Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP) became the conduit through which economic redistribution occurred and the structural cleavages it created were significant in defining the political 'rules of the game'. We argue that foreign policy analysis of a radicalised state specifically necessitates a closer look at the symbiotic synergies between domestic bargaining and international negotiation. Through the lens of Putnam's Two Level games hypothesis, we conclude that there were four main factors that determined the country's foreign policy towards the IMF and the failure of the negotiations- there was a prioritisation of domestic political considerations over external conditionalities; there was an incompatibility of 'win-sets' between the IMF and Zimbabwe; that comprehensive sanctions reduced the IMF's bargaining space; and domestic ideological divergence between neoliberal 'internationalists and radical 'nationalists' undermined the negotiations.

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Introduction

1) Background statement and Motivations of study

In 2000 the Zimbabwean government launched into a massive and controversial ‘fast track’ Land Reform and Resettlement Programme¹ (LRRP), which aimed at redistributing and correcting land imbalances which had been a ubiquitous feature of post-colonial Zimbabwe. According to official estimates, a total of 11 million hectares, including the best arable land, were transferred from about 4,000 mostly large-scale white commercial farmers to about 300,000 small indigenous farmers². This was the largest, and most controversial, property transfer in Zimbabwe's post-independence history.

This programme presented a *fait accompli* for countries in the region. For close to a decade subsequent to the LRRP, the socio-political, economic and foreign policy priorities of the Zimbabwean government, civil society elements and the business community in the country and region either adapted, were reformulated or changed entirely. Of significance was the supposed irrationality of LRRP's manner of execution, the ‘mismanagement’ of the economic free-fall that followed: Thabo Mbeki's ‘quiet diplomacy’ manner of engagement and the rhetorical stand-off between the Zimbabwe and Western powers (most notably the USA and Britain). The politics of land reform has always been highly political in Zimbabwe and the 2000s served to highlight the extent to which it has shaped both political and economic policy (both domestic and foreign). After the liberation war of the late 1970s, the LRRP presented, without a doubt, a significant watershed in the political culture of the country.

Although much literature has attempted to explain the LRRP, its manner of execution and its impact on the domestic political landscape in the country,³ very few have looked at the way in which it shaped the content and substance of the country's *foreign policy*. In any analysis

¹ This LRRP (2) was the second phase of consolidated land redistribution since independence, the First Phase being from 1980-1989.

² Sachikonye, L. 2003. *From ‘Growth with Equity’ to ‘Fast Track’ Reform: Zimbabwe's Land Question*, in *Review of African Political Economy*. Volume 30, No. 6. (War and the Forgotten Continent) June 2003. Pp. 227

³ In particular see Thomas, 2003; Richardson, 2006; and Sachikonye, 2003.

of a state's foreign policy, it remains significant to investigate the domestic political, economic and social factors, and their effect on a particular foreign policy. The controversial Land Reform and Resettlement Program (LRRP) that was undertaken by the Zimbabwean government has stimulated a multitude of commentary and analysis. What has been markedly absent in the literature is a meaningful analysis into the effects that the LRRP had on the content and substance of Zimbabwe's foreign policy. In other words, if foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policies,⁴ how did the government justify, explain and project the ideas behind its 'radicalisation'? That domestic politics and international relations are intermingled and that both affect each the other is hardly disputable. The agrarian reform had a lasting effect not only on the domestic political economy of the country, but also flavoured its relations to other states. To illustrate, it resulted in soured relations with many western countries (most notably the United States, Britain and Australia) and with the International Financial Institutions of the IMF and the World Bank. Zimbabwe removed itself from the Commonwealth, was suspended by the IMF and became the target of an international sanctions regime⁵. It therefore remains significant to analyse *how* foreign policy changed since the commencement of the LRRP. We therefore argue that the best approach to understanding the seemingly contradictory international diplomatic stances of Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2007 towards the West in general and the IMF in particular are best analysed through the lens of Robert Putnam's Two-Level Games theory.

The interest of this project is not an exclusive evaluation of the LRRP as a phenomenon. Rather it will detail how 'fast-track' land reform changed the domestic politics of the country, that is,- reshaped the rules of the game within which various political and interest groups competed; and *more specifically*, the manner in which these changes affected the country's foreign policy objectives and interactions with the international community. These changes relate specifically to the fault-lines that resulted between two domestic factions- those we term the 'internationalists' and the 'nationalists', and the way their competition translated onto the international political playing field.

⁴ See- Stavridis, S. and Hill, C. 1996. *The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: West European Reactions to the Falklands Conflict*. Berg Publishers. Oxford.

⁵ These comprised of targeted travel bans for individuals in the government, but most significantly was the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA)

Condemnation and praise for the land reform was swift from many corners of the international community. Within these choruses there emerged a clear divergence of opinion. Much of the condemnation emanated from the Western developed countries and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the vanguard of which was the United States and Britain. Their main critiques were premised on the lack of respect for the rule of law, property rights, what they considered to be the undermining of human rights and the defaulting of loan repayments. However, many countries in the developing world stood in solidarity with the Zimbabwean government and its LRRP. In particular, many African countries (particularly those in SADC) saw the land reform in Zimbabwe as justified and necessary.⁶ Many developing countries thus premised their support (and in some cases lack of condemnation) of the LRRP on principles of non-interference, Pan-African solidarity, anti neo-colonial rhetoric and through the recognition that land disparities, directly resulting from colonisation, in many of their countries remained an issue that required resolution. Some semi-developed countries also voiced their support, most significant of these being China.

The rationale and implementation of the LRRP necessarily has to be contextualised within the rubric of two fundamental issues. First is the domestic political unrest and pressure which the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF) increasingly found itself under with the emergence of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), various civil society elements (such as the National Constitutional Assembly for example) and growing disenfranchisement of the liberation war veterans. The second has an international dimension, particularly the influence of the IFI's and the negative effects of their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that were implemented in the 1990s. An analysis into the transformation of relations between this national-international dichotomy necessarily has to remain cognisant of the socio-political and economic dynamics in both spheres. As will be argued later in the dissertation, domestic pressures and deteriorating relations with international actors like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) led to the creation of a Zimbabwean situation that Moyo and Yeros (2007) term an 'interrupted revolution marked by a radical agrarian reform and a radicalised state'.⁷ The nature of such 'radicalisation' found expression in increased authoritarianism, the hyper-politicisation of the question of

⁶ As will be detailed later, this was particularly because of the prescriptions of the Lancaster House Agreement.

⁷ Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. 2007. *The Radicalised State: Zimbabwe's Interrupted Revolution*, in Review of African Political Economy. No. 34. Pp. 103

land re-distribution and increase in anti-imperialist and neo-colonial rhetoric on the domestic plane. On the international sphere, it saw a cooling of relations between USA-British⁸ nexus and the IMF on the one hand, with the Zimbabwean government on the other. Tentative questions that arise therefore include: how did the land reform and the resultant realignments (radicalisation) between domestic actors harden the stance of the state towards the IMF and vice versa?

The two broader premises that will be argued form the basis for the difference in the outcomes of Zimbabwe's negotiations (on the international sphere) between the IMF include:

- 1) ideological differences regarding universalistic neo-liberal socio-political prescriptions and conditionalities attached to SAPs and;
- 2) the resurging conflict between 'internationalist' liberal values and 'nationalist' forces⁹ as contextualised within the rubric of neo-colonialism.

One of the results of the radicalisation and fast-track agrarian reform was a rapid decline in agricultural productivity, which in turn led to a rapid decline in foreign currency earnings and reserves. The effects of a rapidly deteriorating economy were exacerbated by an extremely costly military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo¹⁰. The immediate effect of this was that the country fell into arrears with the IMF. As the Fund noted-

Zimbabwe first incurred arrears to the IMF in mid-February 2001. On September 24, 2001, the country was declared ineligible to use the general

⁸ Although it must be noted that it would be presumptive to paint the USA and Britain as having exactly the same agenda towards their relations with Zimbabwe, this paper thus focuses specifically on their role and influence over the IMF rather than as individual countries.

⁹ The 'nationalist' and 'universalist' terms are borrowed from Moyo and Yeros' conceptualization. The 'nationalist' Left they argue is characterized by its advocacy of delinking from the world economy, that is, the progressive 'nationalization' of the law of value. As such, it recognizes that nationalism is a necessary but insufficient ideological force in the periphery. The 'internationalist' Left, on the other hand, shuns nationalism, especially in the periphery, and defends competitive insertion in the world as a means of growth and redistribution. It also commits itself to the institutions and procedures of bourgeois democracy, to civil society organizations with external patronage, and especially to urban movements, at the neglect of their rural counterparts.

~See, Moyo and Yeros, 2007. *The Zimbabwean Question and the Two Lefts*. Historical Materialism. Volume 15. Pp. 173-4.

¹⁰ For a detailed analysis, see: Nest, M. 2001. *Ambitions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. African Affairs. Volume 100.

resources of the IMF and removed from the list of countries eligible to borrow resources under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). As of June 12, 2002, Zimbabwe's overdue obligations totalled SDR¹¹ 101.9 million (about US\$132 million), including SDR 57 million (about US\$74million) to the IMF's General Department, and SDR 44.9 million (about US\$58 million) to the PRGF Trust.¹²

Of significance to this paper is also the acknowledgement of the role and influence that the transatlantic developed countries have within the IMF. A central argument presented in this project is that inter-state diplomacy (i.e. between Zimbabwe and Britain/USA) found as one of its mediums, the IMF.

2) Theoretical Antecedents and Conceptualisation

Conceptualising foreign policy.

Holsti (1995) sees foreign policy as a set of “ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes or actions of other states, in non-state actors (e.g. international institutions) in the international economy or in the physical environment of the world.”¹³ From the onset it remains pertinent to highlight that foreign policies are designed to first and foremost safeguard the national interest, encourage a country’s security and survival, autonomy and sovereignty in the international system, to attract foreign aid, to reflect a particular ideological standpoint and pursue the particular goals of that country. At their disposal countries have an arsenal of instruments with which to pursue their foreign policy goals and objectives. These can be cooperative or aggressive in nature and include, *inter alia*, military force or threat thereof, diplomatic channels and negotiations; propaganda and terrorism; economic sanctions or incentives. What also remains

¹¹ Special Drawing Rights

¹² IMF Press Release. *IMF adopts declaration of Non-cooperation for Zimbabwe and Suspends Technical Assistance.*[Online] <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2002/pr0228.htm> (accessed 04 August 4, 2009)

¹³ Holsti, K.J. 1995. *International Politics: A Framework of Analysis*. 7th Ed. Prentice Hall. Engelwood Cliff. Pp. 83.

significant is the acknowledgement that foreign policies are neither static nor universal. A country's foreign policies may change over time, prioritising different goals and objectives or changing them altogether. The climate of the international system and the global political economy have an impact on differing aspects of any country's foreign policies, as they attempt to re-align themselves within this ever changing environment. An illustration is the shift in the foreign policy focus of the United States towards Africa after the end of the Cold War, going from a policy of communist containment and proxy wars, to one of promoting the values of neo-liberalisation through aid packages.

Although much literature has been generated on the process of foreign policy formulation in Africa in recent years¹⁴, the task itself is problematic. Many African countries have been unable to build up any firm tradition or established pattern of interests behind their foreign policy. Within the literature, however, two broad categories dominate: there is the school that focuses attention on the premise that most African states' foreign policies are influenced mainly by the global political economy, conceptualising these within the rubric of the *dependency theory*¹⁵. It is argued that the African countries continue to perpetuate neo-colonial and structural core-periphery relations within the global system. In other words, many African countries find themselves constrained in their foreign policy objectives in that their interactions with developed countries are increasingly 'reactive' rather than 'proactive' in nature. Adar and Ajulu (2002) detail that within this structural systemic paradigm, African foreign policies exhibit two main features: "in the global context compliance constitutes their main *modus operandi vis-a-vis* the donor countries... [and] on another level the African elite class continues to promote their neo-colonial core-periphery relations."¹⁶ With regards to the Zimbabwean case, much of its foreign policy initiatives since independence have been informed by a number of principles, including *inter alia*, anti-imperialism, self-determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Pertaining to the issue of

¹⁴ Wright (1999), Shaw and Okolo (1994), Aluko (1977)

¹⁵ This theory is premised on the notion that there is an unequal relationship between poor underdeveloped countries in the 'periphery', and the rich, developed capitalist states at the 'core' of the international system. Resources flow from the former to the latter, enriching the core whilst simultaneously impoverishing the 'periphery'.

¹⁶ Adar, K and Ajulu, R. 2002. *Southern African States' Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy making Process: An Introductory Contextualisation*, in Adar, K and Ajulu, R (eds) Globalisation and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa. Ashgate Publishing. Rhodes University. Pp. 2

compliance to the prescriptions of many donor countries, the Zimbabwe case shows the contrary. Much of the conflict with Britain, the United States and the IMF resulted precisely from the rejection of their ideological, political and economic conditionalities and prescriptions. Another critique of this 'dependency' approach is its assumption that foreign policies and diplomacy occur between states that are unitary and rational actors. Furthermore, not only do core-periphery relations concern states, but non-state actors also play an increasingly significant role. The formulation of foreign policies and their objectives in developing countries also results from domestic bargaining between the state and other actors, and between the donor countries and International Financial Institutions.

According to another approach, many correlate African States' foreign policies with African presidents, maintaining that the post-independence 'big men' personalised the state institutional functions to the extent that there can be no clear distinction between the state and the ruler- the *psychological-perceptual school*¹⁷ which argues that African foreign policies derive from the president and the presidency.¹⁸ Clapham (1977) further details that government leaders saw foreign policy as a realm into which they could escape when the pressures of domestic politics became too great. Foreign policy gave a leader vital access to acquire the resources necessary to grease the wheels of patronage. Instead of reflecting broader concerns or aims, African leaders used foreign policy to pay off domestic opponents. In this view, foreign policy reflects an extension of domestic patrimonial relationships.¹⁹ Added to this, Khadiagala and Lyons (2001) write, "in environments where the structure of participation and contestation, particularly political parties and legislatures, declined appreciably, the charismatic leader became the source, site, and embodiment of foreign policy.... From this exalted vantage point, foreign policy making emerged as a tool for leaders to both disarm their domestic opponents and compensate for unpopular domestic policies."²⁰ This analysis of African foreign policy formulation is reflected in the Zimbabwean case study, where as we shall see later, foreign policy increasingly became the conduit through which the differences between the political and economic ideological stances of the IMF and

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Ibid. See McKay (1966), Anda (2000)

¹⁹ Clapham, C. 1977. *Sub-Saharan Africa. In Foreign Policy Making in Developing Countries*. Christopher Clapham (Ed). Saxon House. Farnborough.

²⁰ Khadiagala, G and Lyons, T. 2001. *Foreign Policy Making in Africa: An Introduction*. In Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (Eds.) *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. Boulder. Lynne Rienner. Pp. 5

the country became articulated (through the Office of the Presidency.) Added to this, the labelling of opposition forces as ‘puppets of the West’ to the international community by the ruling party served to disarm and undermine the MDC’s credibility domestically and regionally.

These studies however fail to appreciate the value of other variables that may influence African foreign policy. In many post-colonial countries, the power structures and decision-making procedures lie within the ruling party and not the government. As Wilson and Black (2007) argue, “a state’s foreign policy is not simply about power and resources: these may be important, but foreign policy also includes history, memory, values, structures, and legacies.”²¹ Each state will therefore be influenced by a different set of experiences and histories, which will crucially shape how it sees itself and its role in the world. In this view, foreign policy is about more than just promoting interests or protecting political power: it is also about representing and directing the public imagination.²² This point remains particularly resonant in the Zimbabwean case. The portrayal of the ‘fast track’ land reform programme and the subsequent sanctions regime imposed against it, according to the government, was not only a domestic issue, but also reflected a broader continental case-study of the war against neo-colonialism. The government tried to redirect the ‘public imagination’ both at home and abroad by arguing that the inherent economic problems faced by the county resulted from external machinations of Western countries. By making the Zimbabwean case a developing world, or periphery problem, the government could then gain support for its foreign policy stance from other developing countries. Hudson (2005) adds to the debate by detailing that “analysts still need to study their subjects in multifactorial, multilevel, and multidisciplinary ways”²³. Because foreign-policy analysis deals with humans and humans possess agency, any comprehensive analysis of a state’s foreign policy needs to draw on the insights of psychology, cultural studies, and anthropology. Ultimately therefore, foreign policy output is a function of the interplay of numerous [factors and] actors.²⁴

²¹ Quoted in Youdem J. 2007. *Why Look East? Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy and China*. Africa Today. Vol. 53. No. 3 (Spring). Pp. 4

²² Ibid

²³ Hudson, Valerie M. 2005. *Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations*. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1:1-30.

²⁴ See- Allison, G. 1971. *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Little & Brown, Boston.

Why Two-Level Games Theory? Reviewing domestic and international co-dependence/interplay.

By formalising Robert Putnam's Two-Level Games hypothesis and applying it to the Zimbabwean case, this dissertation will seek to explain how the LRRP shaped the country's foreign policy concerning the breakdown of negotiations with the IMF for the extension of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility-Exogenous Shocks Facility (PRGF-ESF). Putnam argued that the intersection between domestic politics and international diplomacy requires a two-level framework of analysis. Interstate negotiations on the international level (Level 1) influence and are constrained by considerations and bargaining between different actors on the domestic level (Level 2), and vice versa.

Why and how then is Putnam's Two-Level games theory better than other analyses into the symbiotic synergies between domestic and foreign policies? Exactly how important are domestic factors, actors and developments in determining foreign policy? Our analysis is concerned with a radicalised state, one in which matters of state strength and autocracy, electoral legitimacy, socio-economic competition and regime legitimacy are more pronounced than say in a stable, liberal-democratic state. Therefore the domestic interactions between the state, civil society and the main political parties provides a better starting point for understanding the country's foreign policy objectives. As Robert Keohane (2006) acknowledged, we need "better theories of domestic politics, decision making and information-processing so that the gap between external and internal environments can be bridged in a systematic way."²⁵

In effect, Putnam challenges the neorealist assumption that states are coherent and unitary actors by highlighting that the domestic factions that bargain internally will affect the outcomes of international negotiations and policy. He notes that as a general rule, "the group with the greatest interest in a particular issue is more likely to hold the most extreme position on that issue,"²⁶ and on the national level the domestic groups will pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and that politicians seek power by

²⁵ Quoted in Stephan, H. Power, M. Hervey, A and Fonseca, R. 2006. *The Scramble for Africa in the 21st century: A view from the South*. Renaissance Press. Cape Town. Pp. 225

²⁶ Putnam, 446

constructing coalitions among these groups. On the international level, national governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising any adverse consequences resulting from foreign developments. Fundamentally therefore, the central decision-makers in the country cannot ignore the two games. Putnam clarifies this position through the image of ‘game boards’, which he describes thus:

Each national political leader appears at both game boards. Across the international table sits his foreign counterparts, and at his elbows sit diplomats and other international advisors. Around the table behind him sit party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key interest groups, and the leader’s own political advisors. The unusual complexity of this two-level game is that the moves that are rational for a player at one board (such as raising energy prices, conceding territory, or [radical land reform]) may be impolitic for the same player at the other board. Nevertheless there are powerful incentives for consistency between the two games.²⁷

How then is this image of significance to the Zimbabwean case study? This paper argues that leaders within the ruling ZANU PF government were caught squarely between these two game boards. On the international plane, the country was constrained by inability to meet its loan repayments to the Fund, by adverse trading regimes in the global political economy, through the legacy of neo-colonialism, and by the difference in political ideological and rhetorical stances²⁸ between itself and the US/Britain nexus. This centred particularly on the issue of aid conditionalities, sanctions and multilateral pressure. Of particular significance

²⁷ Ibid, 434

²⁸ As we shall argue later in the paper, firstly the influence of these two countries on the IMF is significant in that their dispute with Zimbabwe found expression through convincing the Fund to take a harder line with the country. Secondly, by ideological difference we refer to the portrayal of the US and Britain as proponents of neo-colonialism and charged with interference in the domestic political economy of the country. The ZANU PF government justified this assertion by highlighting that these foreign countries had sponsored surrogate forces in the country to destabilise and bring about regime change. Furthermore, the US’ repeated call for democratisation, respect for human and property rights, electoral openness, and so forth were contrary to the domestic practicalities and situation on the ground. Domestic bargaining between actors organised around by the cleavages created by the LRRP also took place along the same fault-lines.

was the way in which political differences led to economic sanctions from the Western donor countries.

Our point of departure is the acknowledgement that any assessment of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international relations must stress *politics* and the key actors. At the national game board, different factions confronted the government. The first was a business elite and civil society grouping that called for democratisation and economic liberalisation (the internationalists). The second was a nationalist group in opposition to the business elite, which supported the economy's nationalisation and the LRRP (led by the ruling party and the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association). The third was a significantly powerful political opposition party- the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and its allies that were in opposition to the government. The government was also faced with labour riots and strikes caused by the failing socio-economic situation in the country- particularly the rising unemployment and inflation and so on that resulted from the failures of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1990's. The essence of this paper is therefore to illuminate how the country's leadership dealt with and bargained with these competing factions whilst simultaneously, actively defending itself (and the LRRP) and remaining a significant player on the international arena. In other words, how did domestic factors and pressures, combined with international pressure create to a radicalised foreign policy towards the IMF (and the West)? What were the two-level games of this radicalised state?

The literature regarding the interplay between domestic and international policies and their co-dependence is plentiful, but many analyses fail to go beyond the acknowledgement that there are 'domestic influences' on foreign policy, or provide concrete or systematic observations of *how* or in what way the two interact. One line of theorising arose from analysts of regional integration and their emphasis on functional spillovers between domestic and international developments. Ernst Haas (1958), for example, detailed the influence of parties and different interest groups on the different decision-makers involved in the European integration project.²⁹ As Putnam critiques however, such analyses had as their

²⁹ Haas, E. 1958. *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces*. University of Notre Dame Press.

dependent variables the evolution of supranational institutions rather than a focus on particular policy prescriptions.³⁰

In recent years, much of the debate surrounding interstate relations has been dominated by the structural or neo-realist school. Because nation states are the key unit of analysis and that relations between states are characterised by a quest for power, neo-realists see a distinction between *high politics* of military and state security and the *low politics* of domestic economic and social affairs. Thus, by viewing states as unitary actors, this approach sees the role and importance of domestic actors and constraints that determine and shape interstate relations relegated to the analytical background of process rather than as significant independent variables in their own right.

The 'bureaucratic school' of foreign policy analyses in relations between states, spearheaded by Graham Allison (1971) focused more on the "intra-national games, the overlap of which constitutes international relations."³¹ Although he acknowledged that bureaucratic politics and interests matter in international relations, Allison fails to detail the nature of this 'overlap'. Keohane and Nye (1977) conceptualise the relationship between domestic and foreign policy through what they term 'complex interdependence', which refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.³² They identify three characteristics of this complex interdependence as firstly, the existence of multiple channels that connect countries (interstate, trans-governmental and transnational), an absence of hierarchy among issues on the agenda of interstate relationships, and lastly that when complex interdependence prevails, "military force is not used by governments towards other governments within their region"³³. Although this approach was helpful in identifying the nature of interdependence between state and non-state actors, it fails to show *how* the domestic forces affect the *states'* foreign policy. As they acknowledge, within complex interdependence "the distinction between domestic and foreign issues remains blurred."³⁴ Putnam also critiques this approach by highlighting that the emphasis on the role of domestic

³⁰ Putnam, 1988. Pp. 431

³¹ Allison, G. 1977. *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Little, Brown and Company. Boston. Pp. 149

³² Keohane, R and Nye, J. 1977. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Little, Brown and Company. Boston. Pp. 8

³³ *Ibid*, 11

³⁴ Keohane and Nye, 25

factors increasingly slipped out of focus, particularly as the concept of international regimes began to dominate the sub-field.³⁵

Another significant contribution that shed light on the influence of domestic politics on diplomacy and foreign policy was George Kennan's 'Long Telegram' to the US State department in 1946. It explained Soviet behaviour during the Cold War in terms of its domestic affairs, arguing that "the party line is not based on objective analysis of the situation beyond Russia's borders [...] it arises mainly from the basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before the recent war and exist today."³⁶

Significance of 'Win-sets,' 'ratification' and 'side-payments'.

Significant in Putnam's analysis is the conception of 'win-sets'. The win-set for a given domestic constituency is the set of all possible international (Level 1) agreements that would win- that is, gain the majority votes/support among domestic constituents (Level 2). Putnam concluded that 1) *larger win-sets at Level 1 make agreement more likely, ceteris paribus*; and 2) *the relative size of the respective domestic (Level 2) win-set will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain*. In other words, chances of success of international agreement between states/institutions etc. are determined by how many points of common interest exist between them. Secondly, the size of the domestic win-set affects which constituents get what size of the international (Level 1) bargain pie. As we shall see later in the paper, the conception of win-sets will help us detail the differences in the country's foreign policy towards the IMF (and by extension, the United States and Britain). One of the main arguments posited will be that the sizes of the win-sets in both cases were different, and ideological considerations played a significant part.

'Ratification' pertains to the decision-making process and outcomes on the domestic level (Level 2) which are required to endorse or implement agreement at the international level (Level 1). In essence, the agreement between two countries or organisations is subject to the constraint that the respective parties must ratify the said agreement. Domestic bargaining must therefore lead to ratification of any international agreement. However, although

³⁵ Putnam, 431

³⁶ Kennan, G. 1946. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942-1952/54*. Washington DC. US GPO. (1961-1979.) Pp. 699

conventional conceptions of domestic ratification may indeed seem peculiar to democratic countries (e.g. the constitutionally required two-thirds parliamentary majority vote etc) the process itself need not be democratic in any normal sense. The bargainers on the domestic level may be bureaucratic agencies, parliament, interest groups, public opinion, political parties, labour unions etc.

Because the domestic negotiations in an environment of many divergent actors is more difficult than international negotiations, it is significant to take note here of the strategic use of 'side-payments'. By acknowledging that the size of a particular win-set affects the manner in which the gains of the international bargain are distributed domestically, it remains significant to show how those differences are managed. Frederick Mayer (1992) attempted to overcome this difficulty by showing how the existence of side-payment opportunities may help reopen the portions of the bargaining set blocked by domestic factions.³⁷ In other words, domestic factions that wish to block ratification of a said agreement can be paid-off or compensated for their support. The Zimbabwean case study will highlight that with regards to the negotiations with the Fund, many of the domestic factions that were opposed to it (particularly the security hierarchy and business elite allied to the government) were given the side-payment of economic exploits from the military intervention in the DRC and increased trade with China. Rather than argue for aid receipt from the IMF, the government effectively used these side payments to bolster its domestic bargaining position. Secondly, it remains pertinent to mention that the sanctions regime that had been imposed by the United States had affected many in the business sector. Many in this faction allied to the opposition were also co-opted into the government's drive to delink itself from capital emanating from the core countries and pursue the 'Look East' policy. Although many in the business sector remained on an ideological level firmly in the internationalist camp and opposed to the government's nationalist policies, on a practical level they welcomed support for the government's economic foreign policy towards China.

³⁷ Mayer, F.1992. *Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments*, in International Organization. Volume 46, No. 4. (Autumn 1992)

3) Research Questions and Limitations

Our central concern is why did the foreign (economic) policy of the ‘radicalised’ state of Zimbabwe lead to negative negotiation outcomes with the IMF between 2000 and 2007? We argue that, it is over-simplistic to conclude that loan repayment defaults were the main or only reason for the breakdown in relations and its suspension from the loan facility, particularly considering that in the same period countries in similar balance of payment arrears did not face suspension³⁸. A better framework of analysis emerges when we consider the influence of the United States and Britain on IMF decision-making; the nature of domestic developments and bargaining; the ideological standoff between supporters of the LRRP (nationalists) and those we term ‘internationalists,’ and the impact of the Zimbabwean government’s disagreement with the US and Britain over property rights and the political conditionalities attached to aid.

Research questions-

This dissertation seeks to locate the *determinants* of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy between 2000 and 2007 within the ambit of the two-level games thesis. In doing so we effectively ask *what* the foreign policy towards the IMF was, and analyse *why* it took such a radical hue.

The two main questions to be addressed are:

- **In what way did the LRRP affect Zimbabwe’s foreign policy towards the IMF and the West between 2000 and 2007?**
- **What other factors explain Zimbabwe’s suspension from the IMF in 2001 besides loan-repayment arrears?**

³⁸ These countries include- Argentina (2001-2005), the Dominican Republic (2004-2005), Ecuador (1999-2000), Pakistan (1998-2001), the Russian Federation (1998-2001), Serbia (2000-2004), Ukraine (1998-2000) and Uruguay (2004). These countries had, albeit inconsistent, sovereign debt-restructuring negotiations with the Fund.

~See- Diaz, C; Zamora, J and Dominguez, A. 2008. *The Role of the IMF in Recent Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Implications for the Policy of Lending into Arrears*. Banco de Espana Occasional Papers 0805. Online- [<http://ideas.repec.org/p/bde/opaper/0805.html>] Accessed 12 July 2009.

In addressing these questions, two sub-questions must be answered, namely:

- How did domestic bargaining affect the foreign policies of Zimbabwe towards the IMF?
- What were the domestic determinants of foreign policy in ‘radicalised’ Zimbabwe, and in the IMF?

4) Synopsis of the study

The first chapter provides a contextual background to the central research problem, provides a detailed literature critique regarding differing approaches to foreign policy, and ultimately highlights why the Two-Level Games approach is the best. It further identifies the conceptual framework within which the paper is placed. The second chapter analyses the country’s different phases of land reform and details the nature of Zimbabwe’s radicalisation within our given timeframe, highlighting the significance of our main independent variable (land reform) in delineating the domestic actors. It identifies the internal and external actors and influences involved in the ratification of the negotiations. After providing analysis into the relevant players and the domestic situation in the country, this chapter concludes by linking the domestic politics to foreign policy. The third chapter is the crux of the dissertation as it provides our main case study. It applies Putnam’s theory to Zimbabwe and the IMF. It analyses the domestic bargaining and highlights the influence of external factors that characterised both sides. It concludes by showing why negotiations for resumption of the use of the PRGF failed. Chapter four is the final chapter and gives a summary of the concluding findings of the project.

1. Introduction

Land reform in post-colonial Zimbabwe has always been a highly political subject, whether packaged in nationalist or technocratic rhetoric. The literature on the politics of land reform is immense, but three phases of land reform since independence can be identified. The first is the early independence years from 1980 to 1989, the period of structural adjustment and afterwards from 1990 to 1999 is the second, and the third is the 'fast track' reform period from 2000 onwards.³⁹ Although this last phase is of interest to this project, outlines of the first two are provided. The section on the 1980s is to provide the context for the land reform processes of the 1990s. The main objective of this section as a whole is to identify the main actors, civic and government groups that formed along different fault-lines that resulted from the fast track land reform. In doing so we can better evaluate and understand the interactions and domestic bargaining between them and the bearing that they had on the different foreign policies of the state.

2. The political economy of land reform in Zimbabwe.

Land Reform in the 1980s- "The Constitutional Yoke"

Like many newly independent countries, Zimbabwe committed itself to undertaking major political and economic restructuring. The task included restructuring a deeply divided society, attempting to change an inherited colonial political economy, democratising the inherited post-colonial authoritarian state, post-war reconstruction and addressing a very polarised and racially imbalanced land ownership policy. Land inequalities played a significant role during and after the liberation war, and for many academics, politicians and a significant segment of the rural population, land reform was perceived to be one of the paramount reasons for fighting the war. This was clearly reiterated by the president Robert Mugabe's analysis of historic linkages on

³⁹ See- Sachikonye, L. 2003. *From 'Growth with Equity' to 'Fast Track Reform: The Land Question in Zimbabwe.* Review of African Political Economy. Volume 30, No. 96. Pp.227-248

land struggles dating from King Lobengula's war against British encroachment in 1893, to the First and Second Chimurenga⁴⁰ and as the "core issue and imperative of the Third Chimurenga".⁴¹

At independence land inequality was clearly visible. An estimated 6,000 white commercial farmers occupied almost 16 million hectares of land; 8,500 small scale black farmers occupied 1.5 million hectares, and an estimated 700, 000 indigenous communal farming households subsisted on 16,4 million hectares, of which 75% was in the drier and less fertile agro-ecological regions IV and V.⁴² The main objective of land reform in the 1980s was to promote land equity in property rights in order to attain political stability, to promote national self-sufficiency, to enhance small farmer labour productivity to optimise the self provision of food and basic needs, and most significantly, to encourage less skewed income distribution.⁴³

The largest obstacle to the equitable attainment of these goals lay in the constitutional provisions of the Lancaster House agreement of 1979. The constitution hampered the state's abilities to tackle land reform in two ways. Firstly, the 'willing buyer, willing seller' principle enshrined in this constitution ran counter to successful land reform as it protected the interests of the white, large scale commercial farmers and prevented the government from acquiring enough land to satisfy the demands of the majority rural black population. Secondly, as we shall detail in the next section, it simultaneously ensured that within the structures of the government itself, there were political gatekeepers tasked with the mandate to protect settler capital through the reservation of white seats in parliament. In addition to safeguarding the economic interests of the minority white capitalists, the constitution further reduced the space for political and racial

⁴⁰ 'Chimurenga' is a Shona word meaning revolution or rebellion that is continuous. The First Chimurenga is seen as the country's first war of independence and was also known as the Second Matabele Uprising (1896-1897). The Second Chimurenga, also known as the Rhodesian Bush War or Zimbabwean liberation war (1966-1979) was the principal decider of the succeeding new nation and state of Zimbabwe in 1980. The Third Chimurenga was given to the era of land occupations and reform led by ZANU-PF and the so-called War Veterans which began in 2000.

~see Muzorewa, G. 2009. *Chimurenga Armed Struggles*, in The International Encyclopaedia of Revolutions and Protest. Immanuel Ness (Ed.) Blackwell Publishing. Blackwell Reference Online. [http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/book?id=g9781405184649_9781405184649] Accessed January 20, 2009.

⁴¹ Mugabe, R. 2001. *Inside the Third Chimurenga*. Government of Zimbabwe Press. Harare. Pp. 92

⁴² Sachikonye, 228.

⁴³ Moyo, S. 2000. *The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in Zimbabwe 1990-1999*. Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol. 26, No. 1. Pp. 7.

reconciliation. Luc Huyse (2003) shed interesting light on this subject by detailing how after independence, most politically active whites continued to see themselves as existing outside of the new nation-state. Satisfied with the false sense of economic security safeguarded by the constitution, many white capitalists perpetuated prejudices and destructive social relations that resulted from the maintenance of pre-independence privileges.⁴⁴ Prior to the Lancaster conference, Western governments had attempted to reassure the white commercial farmers by proposing a fund which, *inter alia*, would guarantee compensation abroad if property rights were abused, which at one stage was an estimated \$2 billion.⁴⁵ According to the Patriotic Front delegation that represented the liberation forces, western governments also gave assurances of financial assistance and funding for post-independence land reform. By 1996 however, only 44 million pounds of the ‘hundreds of millions’ had been forthcoming,⁴⁶ and it remains important to ask whether this alleged backtrack by the donor countries is the root cause of the failures to implement equitable land reform that would have been satisfactory to both the newly resettled and commercial farmers.

An additional problem that the new government faced concerned regional political and economic pragmatic considerations. Refusal to ratify the Lancaster House Agreement to end the war, or any immediate undermining of the constitution soon after independence would have sparked fears that a “radical, revolutionary or vengeful Zimbabwe would give South Africa’s apartheid regime the ideal argument to destabilize the post-colonial states in the region”⁴⁷. A point given credence by the destabilisation of Mozambique by apartheid South Africa sponsored RENAMO in the 1980s. Economically it therefore made sense for the government to allow flexibility towards the white community who were extremely important economic players. With the economy performing well and social-economic obligations being met in the country (rising employment, increasing enrolment in schools and subsidized health care) there was also not much popular pressure on the government for land reform in the early years of independence. Therefore, lack of political will on the part of the government added to the perpetuation, for the

⁴⁴ Huyse, L. 2003. *Zimbabwe: Why Reconciliation Failed*, in Bloomfield, D. Barnes, T and Huyse, L. (eds.) 2003. *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Stockholm. Pp. 37

⁴⁵ Thomas, N. 2003. *Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4. Pp 697

⁴⁶ Ibid. See also- McGreal, C. 2002. The Trail from Lancaster House, *Guardian*, 16 January.

⁴⁷ Huyse, 37

most part, of the land inequalities of pre-independence. In this time-period the pace of land reform remained very slow- only 52,000 households had been resettled on 3.5 million hectares of land, of the targeted 162,000 to be settled on 9 million hectares.⁴⁸

This however is not to argue that the debates around land reform were rendered dormant or disappeared completely during this period. On the contrary, land reform became an interesting area of academic debate and analysis and a number of differing views emerged. One argument disagreed with the resettlement model of land reform, and based much of its critique on the argument that the redistribution of large-scale farmland would lead to a dramatic decrease in productivity and substantially erode investor confidence.⁴⁹ Evidence however corroborated the contrary in that substantially improved yields and productivity were recorded in most resettlement areas. Significantly, the British Overseas Development Agency (ODA) in a 1986 report acknowledged that the “majority of families settled had benefited considerably through the provision of increased opportunities for income generation and the availability of services such as health and education.”⁵⁰ A particularly significant proponent of this line of reasoning and an increasingly influential trade union in the whole land question at this time was the Commercial Farmer’s Union (CFU). The dominantly white CFU lobbied successfully for the slowing down of the resettlement initiatives and capitalised on the divisions within the newly formed government. As Taylor (1999) details, “the government appeared unable or unwilling to redistribute land to peasant communities (the explicit promise of independence) in part due to resistance from the CFU and its supporters.”⁵¹

A second argument made by Sam Moyo (2000) focused on the influence of race and its impact on the very conceptualisation of land reform. He argued that the dominant conceptual frameworks within which the land questions are debated-

⁴⁸ Muzondidya, J. 2009. *From Buoyancy to Crisis: 1980-1997*, in Raftopoulos, B and Mlambo, A (Eds.) 2009. *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History From The Pre-colonial Period to 2008*. Weaver Press. Harare. Pp.172

⁴⁹ Palmer, R. 1990. *Land Reform in Zimbabwe: 1980-1990*, in *African Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 355. Pp. 171.

⁵⁰ Cited in Sachikonye, 230

⁵¹ Taylor, S. 1999. *Business and Politics in Zimbabwe’s Commercial Agricultural Sector*, in *African Economic History*. No. 27. Pp. 186

...evolved from settler-colonial ideology... and are based on three myths: first that land rights held by white minorities over land they expropriated enjoys social and political legitimacy; second, that the large-scale farms owned by whites are efficiently used both in terms of scale of area used and yields per unit of land; and third, that freehold tenure and existing private land markets are effective and absolutely superior to other forms of tenure such as leasehold and customary (so-called communal) tenure.⁵²

The issue of social and political legitimacy regarding colonially expropriated land returned to the forefront of domestic politics from the late 1990s, and became a significant justification for the ZANU-PF government's 'fast-track' land reform program and shall be analysed in the next section. The efficiency of land use by large-scale farmers was exaggerated, as much of the agricultural farmland in the 1980s either lay dormant after the war or was neglected by farmers who concentrated on the most productive sectors of their farms. The basis of the 'willing seller, willing buyer' clause of the constitution gave the government the right-of-first-refusal on underutilised land and compelled the purchase of such land payable in foreign currency. The post-war economic boom also saw a massive increase in the price of land and this further hampered efforts by the government to purchase land for resettlement.

Significantly, this underutilisation of land prompted an increase in the number of 'squatters' on many farms and was the site of sporadic clashes between the police and isolated peasant communities who were frustrated with the slow pace of resettlement. Moyo (2004) goes as far as to argue that the peasants in this time-period were far more radical than the state with regards to land occupations, as the former were not restrained as stringently by the constitutional arrangements of the Lancaster Agreement.⁵³ The last part of his critique resonates with the capitalist path to land reform, which was promoted by the CFU. It involved the slowing down of redistribution in favour of improvements in the communal areas based eventually on individualised holdings. Essentially the union argued that a relative maintenance of the status quo would be a mutually beneficial way of settling land issues. They argued that by

⁵² Moyo (2000), 7

⁵³ Moyo, S. 2004. *The Land and Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe*. Paper presented at the conference on 'Agrarian Constraint and Poverty Reduction: Macroeconomic lessons for Africa', Addis Ababa. 17-18 December 2004.

accommodating the commercialisation of the communal areas, the interests of the large-scale white farmers would not be threatened. Significantly, towards the end of the 1980's this resulted in a growing agribusiness sector and an emerging indigenous farming bourgeoisie and bureaucracy, with an estimated 70 percent of the population in Zimbabwe dependent on agriculture for subsistence and income in the 1980s and one quarter of all wage employment was in the agricultural sector. Taylor's (1999) analysis into the relationship between the CFU and the government is instrumental in highlighting the influence of this body within the agricultural sector of the country. Domestically, he argues that the recalcitrance of the CFU and the white farming community in the face of the government's stated land reform goals is understandable as an issue of economics: the apparent violation of property rights embedded in the government's plan was anathema to capitalist farmers. Internationally, the CFU also enjoyed "a measure of foreign influence, or at least it is able to rally, if indirectly, foreign governments and donors to its cause in cases where CFU interests may conflict with those of government"⁵⁴. This is most clearly illustrated in the case of land reform. By presenting a moderate, market-driven approach to land ownership, the CFU rallied to its cause outsiders from within the donor community and among the IFIs. During this period therefore, the influential actors that emerged concerning the land question were the CFU, which held a significant influence on government agricultural policy; an emerging black bourgeoisie produced by the post-war economic boom and growing agribusiness sector and a state constitutionally and financially restricted in its scope to deliver meaningful land reform.

Land Reform in the 1990's- "Adjusting to Structural Adjustment and liberalisation"

The 1990s were characterised by a number of factors that deflated the strong post-war boom and led to economic decline. Domestically, a series of severe droughts drastically reduced agricultural productivity and eroded exports. Internationally, the suspension of an IMF stand-by loan facility in 1984 led to an eight-year standoff with the IFI and affected the support of other donors. In 1988, the then British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher justified the lack of development-oriented finance as due to the fact that Zimbabwe "did not have an IMF

⁵⁴ Taylor, 190

programme.”⁵⁵ In 1991, the government adopted the IMF/World Bank Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) that would prove to have perhaps the most severe destabilising economic and political consequences for the country.

If the post-colonial African state was characterised by dependent external linkages to developed countries, then the implementation of SAPs further entrenched that dependent relationship. The negative effects of SAPs in Zimbabwe have been widely documented⁵⁶. The economy shrank from 4 percent to 0.9 percent in 1991, and only marginally improved to 2.9 percent in 1998/1999. This resulted in massive retrenchment particularly in the civil service, shrinking of local government autonomy, which was exacerbated by reduced public spending, and it saw the deregulation of prices and removal of subsidies on basic consumer goods. The removal of state support in education and health care particularly were most detrimental to the poor population as it undermined the country’s reproductive labour. In the rural areas, ESAP resulted in de-industrialisation of the agricultural sector and thus drastically reduced agricultural output and peasant earnings. Ultimately, this exacerbated the national and rural income inequalities, a phenomenon made worse by the increased pressure on rural agricultural resources resulting from the massive de-urbanisation that followed. This massive return of retrenched urban workers to the rural areas in turn brought underlying social tensions concerning racial inequality and land ownership back into the forefront of domestic politics.⁵⁷ The pressure put on agricultural resources also came from the fact that 1991-1992 saw one of the worst droughts that the country had had. A snapshot of the political economy of liberalisation and land ownership inequality in the 1990s was a bleak one- retrenchment and removal of health and education

⁵⁵Quoted in- Stoneman, C. 1993. *The World Bank: some lessons for South Africa*, in Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 58. Pp 89.

⁵⁶ See particularly- Gibbon, P. 1996. *Zimbabwe*, in Engberg-Pederson, P. Gibbon, P. Raikes, P and Udsholt, L (eds.), Limits of Adjustment in Africa: The Effects of Economic Liberalisation 1986-1994. Copenhagen and Oxford. Centre for Development Research in Association with James Currey, pp. 347-397.

~Stoneman, C. 1991. *The World Bank Demands its Pound of Zimbabwe Flesh*, in Review of African Political Economy, no. 53, pp. 94-96;

~Stoneman, C. 1993. *The World Bank: Some Lessons for South Africa*, in Review of African Political Economy, no. 58, pp. 87-98.

~Bracking, S. 1999. *Structural Adjustment: Why it wasn’t necessary and why it didn’t work*, in Review of African Political Economy. Vol. 26, No. 80. (Bringing Imperialism Back In.) June 1999. Pp.207-226

⁵⁷ Moyo, 2004

subsidies pushed people to revert back to agriculture for subsistence, whilst at the same time a drought season, reduced government extension and expensive credit severely limited the scope for meaningful subsistence. When one adds to this mix the disgruntlement of the rural population regarding the highly unequal land distribution demographics, the stage was thus set for confrontation between the indigenous population, the white commercial farmers and the constitutionally restricted government.

As Muzondidya (2009) details, the land occupations thus expanded in form and content during this period, and led by chiefs and local war veterans, “sporadically invaded not only private land, but also state land.”⁵⁸ Whilst in the post-war boom years land reform was not the main priority in terms of policy implementation, the socio-economic situation under structural adjustment meant the state could ill afford not to engage with it meaningfully. The dominant political alliances in the state had managed to effectively demobilise the radical elements in the governments ranks (most notably the war veterans and left-leaning elites) as they sought to maintain its inherited neo-colonial structure and pursue liberal market-based economic and land reforms. Significantly, in 1990 the constitutional provision on private property expired, and in 1992 the government introduced the Land Acquisition Act (No. 3 of 1992) which sought to do away with the ‘willing seller-willing buyer’ principle and “empower the government to compulsorily acquire land for resettlement”.⁵⁹ Whilst the government sought to resettle 110,000 families on 5 million hectares, very little progress was achieved, primarily due to resistance from the commercial farmers and inefficient resource allocation by the government.⁶⁰

Agrarian reform as an economic project is essentially political in nature, and involves a myriad of actors who simultaneously facilitate and impede the process. In Zimbabwe during the early parts of the 1990s, vocal opposition to economic inequality from the indigenous population came from both the rural and urban constituencies. Whilst the former focused on the distribution of the means of production (land), the latter pushed for the indigenisation of foreign owned

⁵⁸ Muzondidya, 190

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰ When the government designated 1,471 farms for acquisition in December 1997, they received 1,393 objections of which 510 were upheld.

~see Zimbabwe. 2003. *Report of the Presidential Land review Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr Charles Utete*. Harare. Government Printers. August 2003. Pp. 20

companies and greater black participation in the economy. Significantly, the aims of both constituencies were not mutually exclusive, as the de-racialisation of foreign owned companies was directly linked to the de-racialisation of the ownership base of commercial farmland. This period saw the formation of a significant number of civil society pressure groups that tried to push government and white capital to radically redress the skewed economic relations in the country. A conglomeration of black lobby groups, including the Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC), the Zimbabwe National Farmers Union (ZNFU), Women in Business, the Zimbabwe Transport Organisation (ZTO) and the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), was formed in 1990 towards this end. Their limited success however saw them being eclipsed by the Affirmative Action Group (AAG) in 1994 which spearheaded a more aggressive approach to indigenisation of white capital through pressuring the government, creating businesses to obtain funding, political support and other policy concessions for black business development.⁶¹

Although the aspiring black bourgeoisie directed their frustrations and resentment at the government, they reserved the brunt of their criticism on white capitalists and commercial farmers whom they accused of institutional racism. Race once again became the defining lens through which inequality was viewed. A series of strikes and attempted boycotts organised by various civil society groups in 1994 showed the government that the issue of racial economic inequality had to be addressed and could no longer be glossed over through the post-war politics of reconciliation with the white elites. Through exploiting the power of popular nationalism and the government “managed to harness and redirect this anger towards whites by appealing to notions of exclusive black nationalism.”⁶² Many of the problems in the country, including the rising unemployment and a weakening economy were blamed on the whites as the government shifted its approach towards a more radical, exclusive stance. It gave peripheral support to some of the groups that saw groups used race as an agency for individual accumulation. The organised opposition to the status quo by these black elites was exploited by the government and resulted in what Jocelyn Alexander (2006) observed as, “the critical shifts in the stakes, terms and alliances marking Zimbabwe’s unfolding politics, resource distribution and ownership.”⁶³ It is in the 1990s that we see the government’s gradual shift towards radicalisation.

⁶¹ Mazondidya, 191

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Ibid, 192

In the urban areas, the steady decline in real wages corresponded to the increasingly militant agitations of civil society groups and trade unions. The unrest was characterised by recurring strike actions and protests against the state. The latter half of the 1990s were characterised by a politics of co-optation and confrontation between the state, civil society groups (particularly the trade unions) and the indigenous black elites at their helm in the urban areas, and between landless peasants in general and war veterans in particular, and white commercial farmers in the rural areas. The widening rift between the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the government illustrated the antagonistic relationship between the trade unions and the state. The most effective challenge to the seemingly unchallengeable authority of the state came in June 1996 when a wide public-sector strike was organised which lasted eight weeks and almost ground the country to a halt. The state reacted in a way that was to characterise its relations with opposition to its rule for the next decade- by reverting back to the authoritarian tactics of the Rhodesian government. It arrested civil society leaders, declared the strikes and protests illegal, and refused to negotiate. As protests increased, government repression intensified- the Labour Relations Act was amended in 1992, effectively curtailing worker's right to strike and the Presidential Powers Act (No. 1 of 1986) was occasionally deployed to suspend strikes directed against the state.⁶⁴

Whilst initially, groups such as the IBDC were co-opted by the state and supported as vehicles against white capitalist interests, the formation of the MDC in September 1999 redrew the battle lines, pitting a vibrant new political party with roots in labour and trade unions against the government. In the face of declining legitimacy and an opposition with the organisational capacity to mobilise the urban workforce against the state, the government brought the issue of land reform back to the forefront of the national discourse. On the one side of the spectrum were civil society movements focused on labour, constitutionalism and democratisation, whilst on the other were the nationalistic forces rooted in the political discourse of anti-imperialism and broader Pan-Africanist rhetoric and portrayals of the struggle in Zimbabwe. Suzanne Dansereau (2003) for instance highlights these struggles as first and foremost struggles for democratisation in the country, of an entrenched elite resisting dislodgement by an opposition party⁶⁵. For her, the struggle in Zimbabwe during this period was between competing elites mobilising two opposing power bases. The first group employed the rhetoric of the liberation struggle. The

⁶⁴ Ibid, 196

⁶⁵ Dansereau, S. 2003. *Liberation and Opposition in Zimbabwe*, in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. Vol. 21, No. 2. (May 2003). Pp. 173

second comprised of a labour movement that gradually moved away from its alliance with the ruling party, and in association with other groups turned to outright opposition. Whilst it may be over-simplistic to characterise the diverging forces and movements in the country during this period as static and defined clearly as bifurcated forces (urban vs. rural or workers vs. peasants), viewing the nature of these relationships within the context of land reform provides a more cogent analysis.

The constitutional referendum pioneered by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), the MDC and the ruling ZANU PF held in 2000 was particularly instructive in highlighting the fault-lines in the country's political sphere. An important clause in the proposed constitution provided for the British to be responsible for compensation for the land confiscated by the state. The rejection of the referendum and defeat of ZANU PF marked the first major defeat of the ruling party. As a result, the state reverted back to authoritarian tactics against the opposition, but most significantly, it shifted the power dynamics in the party itself by creating a stronger alliance with the militaristic war veterans. The latter spearheaded the occupation of farms across the country and although these were not the first land invasions in independent Zimbabwe, they were different in form and context as they had the explicit support of the government. It is interesting to point out that the strengthening of the alliance between the state and the war veterans and the practical manifestation of the land occupations may have taken a different turn had the International Donor Conference on Land, organised by the government in 1998 had had a different outcome. The conference hoped to raise Z\$1.5 billion to finance a five-year land resettlement plan. The governments of the US and Britain "refused to fund the program on the grounds that it would not alleviate poverty and failed to respect property rights."⁶⁶ Facing external pressure from the international community and the MDC, and internally from the war veterans, the ruling party resorted to radical land reform to regain legitimacy in the eyes of the majority through the fast track land reform.

From an ideological perspective, we argue that from the onset, the discourses that the opposing parties in the country adopted stemmed from two seemingly exclusive bases. The civil society and labour grouping that formed the brunt of the opposition to the state in the 1990s (along with student bodies, churches and NGOs) had as their core ideology, the post-Cold War global

⁶⁶ Raftopoulous, B. 2009. *The Crisis in Zimbabwe*, in Becoming Zimbabwe: A historic from the Pre-Colonial Period to 1998. Mlambo, A and Raftopolous, B (eds.) Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Weaver Press. Cape Town. Pp.212

discourses of democratisation. They particularly campaigned around issues of human rights and constitutionalism and their ultimate aim was that of regime change and removal of the ruling party from power. We term these the internationalists. The supposed universalistic prescriptions of liberal political and economic norms became the rallying point for the opposition. By arguing vehemently for structural change in the political economy of the country through extolling the principles property rights, corporate media and freedom of speech, and particularly a human-rights moralism that is detached from its social context, the internationalists subscribed to the notions of democratisation espoused by the liberal Western discourses. In line with their objectives, the MDC further portrayed an urgent need for external intervention and supported the sanctions regime imposed on the country. This is significant, as Moyo and Yeros (2007) argue, because the chosen political strategy of the internationalists was not to “mobilise and capacitate the working class for sustained ideological and political struggle against the state... It is to rely on externally imposed sanctions as a means of undermining the land reform, the economic recovery, and thereby the ‘tyrant’.”⁶⁷ We contribute by contending that in the context of a radicalised state, the calls for the appreciation of the rule of law are a necessary but insufficient basis for state contestation. Essentially, what is needed is the recognition and understanding of how the rules of the political game are re-evaluated, contested, manipulated, invoked or ignored by a ruling party bent on the maintenance of state power. Although it is beyond the scope of this project, it is interesting to note that this single-focus issue of contesting solely for the capture of the state is characteristic of many opposition parties in Africa. This significantly undermines their efforts essentially because they exclude themselves from the political rules of the game that the incumbent government creates.

In contrast to the internationalists, the ruling party and its allies (most notably the War Veterans, the security forces, much of the rural population and to a less pronounced extent their regional counterparts in SADC⁶⁸) argued from a different ideological platform. Their stance was rooted in Pan-Africanism, anti-imperialism, radical nationalism and an exclusive patriotic history that privileged their role in the liberation struggle and prioritised the centrality of land reform. We term these the nationalists.⁶⁹ Importantly, this group was effective in portraying the opposition

⁶⁷ Moyo and Yeros, 2007. Pp. 175

⁶⁸ Excluding Botswana which has always been vocal about its opposition to the ruling party's domestic policies, particularly because much of the internal displacement caused by deteriorating economic conditions saw many Zimbabweans migrate to Botswana, putting pressure on their own service delivery objectives.

⁶⁹ Also refer to the footnote on Page 4.

and their allies and ‘puppets of the West’ as they were financed by Western NGOs, international civil society groups and white commercial farmers whose land had increasingly coming under threat from the government-sanctioned War Veterans.

3. The Radicalised State (2000-2007)

From the late 1990s the political and economic landscape of Zimbabwe changed dramatically. The LRRP notwithstanding, the country also saw the expansion of the indigenous black bourgeoisie, saw a militarisation of the security forces against the general public (particularly “illegal” urban dwellers and miners), and to a comprehensive state intervention in the market through price controls, *inter alia*. In stark contrast to early post-independence Zimbabwe, the country assumed a defensive international relations posture and as Moyo and Yeros (2007) point out, two political questions that “have historically galvanised periphery capitalism- the agrarian and the national- were returned to the forefront of political life.”⁷⁰ As acknowledged in the previous chapter, if foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy, then it remains pertinent to examine these two questions and examine the nature of the state between 2000 and 2007.

Following from the destabilizing role played by the widely discredited neo-liberal SAPs in worsening the socio-economic environment in the country, the increased calls for amicable land reform and from the emergence of the MDC as a viable alternative to the ruling party, the political landscape of the country became volatile. Through the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, the government had inherited a bona fide neo-colonial state- it led to the adoption of a new constitution, which most pertinently, required the recognition of the sanctity of the institution of private property in the means of production (see Section 16 of Constitution: Freedom from Deprivation of Property.) This provision was to be safeguarded not just by the constitution but also through a mechanism that required that there be 20 reserved parliamentary seats for white settlers in the new House of Assembly and 10 in the Senate, a provision that could only be changed by a 100 percent affirmation vote in the House of Assembly⁷¹. These

⁷⁰ Moyo and Yeros, Pp.103

⁷¹ Sibanda, A. (1991) *The Lancaster House Agreement and the Post-Independence State in Zimbabwe*. Discussion Papers, Paper No.9, Zimbabwe Institute for Development Studies, Harare. Pp. 3

~ also see Akokpari, J and Nyoni, T. 2009. *Reassessing the Politics of Neo-colonialism and African Solidarity: Contextualizing Thabo Mbeki's Quiet Diplomacy on Zimbabwe*, in *Afrika: Journal of Politics, Economics and Society*. Volume 1, March Issue.

reserved seats were only abolished in 1997. According to Ncube and Nzombe (1991), the key purpose of these reserved seats was to enable Britain to control the political and economic direction of the state. More significantly, they argue that:

The entrenchment of the reserved white parliamentary seats for seven years and the protection of private property for 10 years were clever imperial manoeuvres. The imperialists [colonial settlers] gambled that after ten years the black government would have been so co-opted into the capitalist system and would accordingly not be willing to interfere with the capitalist system and private property mostly owned by foreign multinationals (MNCs) individuals and white locals.⁷²

It is therefore significant that 1997 saw the end of this constitutional provision and thus opened up the resurrection of the land question. In addition to all the other domestic pressures that the state faced, it is in the late 1990s that we see the beginning of the state's radicalisation. This period also saw the state's rebellion against neo-colonialism and represented its slide towards radicalisation- marked by its interventionist role in the economy, the suspension of SAPs and most pertinently, the listing of 1, 471 farms for expropriation.⁷³ Concerning the land question, this radicalisation prompted subversive and hostile responses from the Western powers, IMF and World Bank and their domestic internationalist counterparts, as its manner of execution strayed from the neo-liberal prescriptions of reduced state intervention in the market.

Deconstructing the 'radicalised' state: cleavages and fault-lines

From the onset, it therefore remains relevant to clarify the notion of state 'radicalisation'. By virtue of its definition, the term implies a state whose *modus operandi* represents a shift from what is perceived as in line with the ideals of the status quo. In contemporary political literature, the term has become synonymous with extremism and has gained wide currency particularly in the post- 9/11 political analysis. We seek however to present a more focused and thus more relevant definition. This dissertation agrees with Moyo and Yeros' (2007) conceptualisation of

⁷² Ncube, W. and Nzombe, S. (1991) *Continuity and Change in the Constitutional Development of Zimbabwe*, in Preben Kaarsholm (ed.) *Cultural Struggle and Development in Southern Africa*. Baobab Printers. Harare. 167-181

⁷³ Moyo and Yeros, 104

the 'radicalised' state, in which they portray Zimbabwe as a country that underwent an interrupted revolution⁷⁴, one in which the state adopted increasingly extreme political and socio-economic ideas and goals, and convinced itself that the attainment of these goals justified its extreme methods. In their assessment the authors develop three main issues with regards to the notion of Zimbabwe's radicalisation. Firstly, they identify the revolutionary situation in which state radicalisation reached its climax (2000-2003); secondly they analyse state-society relations in the rural areas (as site of the land reform programme); and lastly they argue that a period of normalisation occurred between 2003-2005, although it remained "incomplete, contradictory, polarised and coercive."⁷⁵

Significantly, they distinguish between a number of terms which have been at the centre of descriptions and analyses about Zimbabwe, namely as a totalitarian regime (or as they term it, a bourgeoisie dictatorship) and a failed state, and clarify their conception of a radicalised state. The former pertains to a situation where although democratic norms and procedures are suspended and where the state bureaucracy is bolstered, property rights remain largely intact. Failed states on the other hand see the abrogation of formal state procedures and institutions, the collapse of the central state and see property rights increasingly come under threat. The common denominator between these two concepts is therefore that the social contradictions and conflict that they create have "no progressive potential."⁷⁶ The radicalised state on the other hand presents a peripheral state that has actively and rapidly rebelled from neo-colonialism through its domestic and ultimately foreign policies. The crux of the authors' argument therefore is the nature of this progressiveness which sets the Zimbabwean situation apart from bourgeoisie dictatorships or failed states. A particularly salient point that they raise is that the political economy of Zimbabwe *cannot* be understood on an idealised model of a bourgeoisie democracy. It cannot be viewed through a model that is located at the centre of the capitalist system and has resolved the agrarian-national questions, which are central to the discourse of state-society relations in the developing world. The inability to decisively and equitably address the political

⁷⁴ This pertains to "a situation in which society is highly mobilised and in conflict, both among its socio-political formations and between them and the state. Moreover, it is a situation in which bourgeois institutions come under fundamental threat, *in a progressive way*. In this context, property rights and formal democratic political norms and procedures (human rights) are either threatened or abrogated and basic bureaucratic structures and hierarchies are themselves threatened or suspended."

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 104

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 105

economy of land and land reform in many peripheral countries has invariably led to social, economic and ultimately political crises.

What then was the nature and content of this radicalisation in the country? On a practical level the main elements of the state's radicalisation found practical manifestation through the abrogation of agrarian property rights, increased socio-political conflict and the partial suspension of formal democratic norms and procedures. The ideological fuse to this powder keg came in the form of the rapid radicalisation of nationalism (or radical populism) which gave momentum and credence to the land reform program. In response to the external pressure of imposed sanctions from the United States⁷⁷ and other donor countries, and to increased domestic pressures from the MDC and their alliance partners, the government radically changed the focus and goals of their domestic and foreign policies. Essentially, the policy changes that were radically revised by the government were in investment policy, monetary policy, fiscal, land, trade and foreign policy⁷⁸. Although these will be analysed in detail in the next chapter, it suffices to mention here that their changes were markedly different from the period prior to and during the adopted Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). Furthermore, they were the main areas of contention between the government and the IMF, and drew the brunt of criticism from both internal and external analyses.

The centrality of the land reform in the post-colonial state of Zimbabwe can hardly be disputed. Although there have been mixed assessments of the impact of radical land reform, one can identify a number of observations. Firstly, the land reform brought racial inequality back into the forefront of political and economic discourses in the country. The land reform program effectively "broke the back of white land ownership in the country and transformed the legacy of the colonial land dispensation."⁷⁹ Whilst in 2000 approximately 4500 white farmers owned 11 million hectares of land and produced seventy percent of commercial agricultural output, by

⁷⁷ The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) was passed by the US Senate in 2001. *This law stipulates that "The US Secretary of State shall instruct the United States executive director to each international financial institutions to oppose and vote against: 1) any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit or guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe, or 2) any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the government of Zimbabwe to the US or any IFI.* (Quoted in the New African, August/September 2007, Pp.118)

⁷⁸ Each will be analysed in detail in the next chapter.

⁷⁹ Raftopoulos, 216

2007 there numbered approximately five hundred.⁸⁰ Secondly, a significant majority of previously disadvantaged communal peasantry and poor indigenous farmers benefitted from the LRRP as “new petty-commodity producing establishments accounted for 93.7 percent of the new farming establishments”⁸¹ and thus gained a meaningful stake in the economy. The LRRP however was not positive on all fronts as hundreds of thousands of farm workers were displaced and were excluded from the benefits of the programme by the war veterans and security forces, whilst the occupations led to a decline in employment levels. Categorised as ‘enemies of the state’ along with white farmers, they were subject to some of the worst election violence between 2000 and 2002⁸². Furthermore, many of the beneficiaries of the land reform often found themselves constrained *inter alia*, by a lack of access to financing, deteriorating infrastructure and the breakdown of specialised production systems. In addition, regarding its heterodox policies, the contrast between the ideology of anti-imperialistic self-determination and the practical contradictions on the ground has been wide. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, the state has largely been hampered by its failure to widen its social base and extend its popular support. Secondly, its capacity to provide meaningful safety nets for the people most affected by the deteriorating economy lagged far behind realistic levels, as planning capacities of the state bureaucracy have been inadequate for the task. The socio-economic realities of deteriorating health care, tertiary education and ‘brain drain’ have meant that crisis management in the face of sanctions, rather than meaningful development and the support structures that bolster it, has been the *modus operandi* of the ruling party.

4. Conclusion

Although the need to redress land imbalances at independence and throughout the 1980s was a pertinent issue, the process itself failed to reach its stated goals and was not a major priority for the government. The constitutional yoke that resulted from the Lancaster House Agreement hampered land reform and fervent calls for distribution from an indigenous minority were muted by a booming economy. The introduction of ESAP in the 1990s created pressures for the majority of the urban and rural population alike and the declining economic situation, coupled with the withdrawal of the state from social safety-net provisions, coalesced the numerous groups who increasingly agitated for intervention from the state. This situation culminated in the

⁸⁰ Matondi, P. 2008. *Shaping and Stewarding Replacement amidst Uncertainty of fast track land reform in Zimbabwe*. Unpublished Paper. Harare.

⁸¹ Moyo, 2000

⁸² Raftopoulos, 217

divorce between the ruling party and the ZCTU who, along with other groups, created and spearheaded the formation of the MDC, who presented the first real political challenger to ZANU PF. Its slide to authoritarianism and radical policy decisions alienated the state from many in its support base. Furthermore, the land issue returned to the forefront of the national discourse and was harnessed by the state, with the redistribution of land became its main vehicle for regaining its legitimacy. Most significantly for our purposes, the fast track land reform programme also served to delineate a number of different actors that competed for legitimacy and power in the country's political space. Internally these were civil society and labour groups, constitutional movements, white commercial farmers and the MDC on the one hand, and the ruling ZANU PF, war veterans, security forces and those in the business elite who had benefited from the patronage of the state. The external groups that sought influence in the crisis through allying themselves with the internationalists were a number of international donors and NGOs, most notably USAID, a coalition of developed countries including the United States and British governments and by proxy the IMF. Those who supported the incumbent government included the Chinese government, SADC and the African Union. Foreign policy during our period was therefore a result of the interplay and bargaining between these different actors. Although foreign policy is the sole mandate of the state, it remains significant to show how these different groups informed the character of its foreign policy.

1. Introduction

In attempting to provide an interest-group explanation of government agricultural policies, Robert Bates (1981) argued that agricultural policies are essentially a bi-product of political relations between governments and urban constituents⁸³. His main premise for this claim was that whereas urban consumers and producers have considerable influence on the political system, those who live in the rural areas have been relatively marginalised due to their inherent difficulties in mobilising effectively for collective action and through co-optation by wealthy farmers. Whilst this may have held true in the first decade of the country's independence, in Zimbabwe from 2000 onwards, the converse held as true. The influence of the urban constituents and the capacity of the wealthy commercial farmers to co-opt the process of land reform were drastically undermined as a direct result of the radicalisation of the state. Empirically, it was the rural constituents, who through the somewhat haphazard leadership of the war veterans, and principally through the ruling party and its exploitation of radical nationalism, who became the principal interest groups in the land reform process. Because at its core, the main policy changes undertaken by the government ran counter to the logic of the Western dominated neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, from the onset it became clear that it was on a collision course with the pro-liberalisation IMF. We locate the *determinants* of Zimbabwe's foreign policy during this period within the ambit of the two-level game thesis. In doing so we effectively seek to ask *what* the foreign policy towards the IMF was, but also analyse *why* it took upon such a radical hue.

Although negotiations between Zimbabwe and the IMF were somewhat consistent during the 1980s and 1990s⁸⁴, the onset of the land reform and the widening of the arrears to the Fund led to the country's suspension from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 2001. We argue that it is over-simplistic to claim that this suspension was based solely on the country's inability to meet its repayment obligations, particularly considering that in the same

⁸³ Quoted in Skalnes, T. 1989. *Group Interests and the State: An Explanation of Zimbabwe's Agricultural Policies*, in *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 27, No. 1. Pp. 87

⁸⁴ The country however was suspended in 1995 due to a persistently high government deficit.

period countries in similar balance of payment arrears did not face suspension.⁸⁵ Central to our analysis in this section, we question the impact of IMF structural adjustment programs on political instability and on regime or polity characteristics, aimed towards regime change. In other words, what were the *political* variables that underscored the relationship between the country and the Fund since the inception of the land reform programme?

Most criticism levelled against the IMF has concerned the issue of conditionalities attached to the aid they provide,⁸⁶ and the ‘one-size-fits-all’ programs to countries whose political and economic structures vary greatly. The reputed orthodoxy of IMF programs is rooted in the dominant Western neo-liberal economics mainstream, and selects its adjustment measures “from a standard list of monetary and fiscal restraint, external liberalisation and devaluation.”⁸⁷ Heterodox solutions to balance-of-payments problems thus fall under heavy scrutiny to determine their compatibility with this orthodoxy. Such an acceptability-set for IMF programs is thus a bargaining advantage for the Fund, as “a program presented by a national government seems to stand a higher chance of approval...if it contains measures on that list, and a high probability of failure if it does not.”⁸⁸ However, unlike international treaties, agreements with the IMF do not carry the same reputational consequences if breached. How then do we analyse reasons for defection or distinguish between voluntary and involuntary defection, or breaches to any negotiated agreement? We begin by adopting

⁸⁵ These countries include- Argentina (2001-2005), the Dominican Republic (2004-2005), Ecuador (1999-2000), Pakistan (1998-2001), the Russian Federation (1998-2001), Serbia (2000-2004), Ukraine (1998-2000) and Uruguay (2004). These countries had, albeit inconsistent, sovereign debt-restructuring negotiations with the Fund.

~See- Diaz, C; Zamora, J and Dominguez, A. 2008. *The Role of the IMF in Recent Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Implications for the Policy of Lending into Arrears*. Banco de Espana Occasional Papers 0805. Online- [<http://ideas.repec.org/p/bde/opaper/0805.html>] Accessed 12 July 2009.

⁸⁶ ~See particularly- Mlambo, A. 1993. *Towards an Analysis of the Role and Impact of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa*, in Zambesia. Vol. 20, No. 1.

~Moore, W and Scarritt, J. *IMF Conditionality & Polity Characteristics in Black Africa: An Exploratory Analysis*, in Africa Today. Vol. 37, No. 4, The Human Condition and Structural Adjustment in Africa (4th Qtr., 1990), pp. 39-60

~Nelson, S and Wallace, G. 2005. *Conditional Credibility: Explaining the Impact of the IMF on Democratisation*. Cornell University. New York. Paper Presented for the 2005 American Political Science Association meeting, September 1-5, Washington DC.

⁸⁷ Kahler, M. 1993. *Bargaining With The IMF: Two-Level Strategies and Developing Countries*, in Evans, P. Jacobson, H and Putnam, R (eds.) Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. University of California Press. Berkeley. Pp.365

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 366

Miles Kahler's (1993) image of the IMF as a country, with similar internal and external political considerations that constrain and determine its bargaining strategies. Following an account of how 'domestic' politics impinge on international behaviour between IMF and the country and on the broad available strategic options on either side, we seek to identify the reasons for the negotiations failure. Furthermore, this case study will tease out the complexity of two-level games that Putnam identified- that moves that are rational for a player on one board (e.g. radical land reform), may be impolitic for the same player on the other board (e.g. resulting in loan facility suspension, sanctions etc).

2. Zimbabwe's foreign policy towards The IMF

Domestic Policy and Win-Sets: the IMF's Level 2

As acknowledged earlier, any two-level theory of international negotiation must be rooted in a theory of domestic politics, that is, a theory about the power and preferences of major actors at Level 2. Our analysis is focused on the negotiations between Zimbabwe and the IMF regarding its 2001 suspension from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)⁸⁹. In contrast to the General Resources Account (GRA) this programme "focuses on each country's poverty reduction and growth priorities and as long as macroeconomic stability is maintained, seeks to respond flexibly to changes in country circumstances and pro-poor priorities"⁹⁰. It is also centred on two important elements- broad public participation and country ownership (through country specific Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) and good governance. PRGF-supported programs are designed to cover only areas within the primary responsibility of the IMF, unless a particular measure is judged to have a direct, critical

⁸⁹ Zimbabwe fully settled its arrears to the GRA in February 2006. However, cooperation remained weak and Zimbabwe still has substantial arrears to the PRGF-ESF Trust. The Executive Board decisions with respect to the suspension of Zimbabwe's voting and related rights in the Fund, its ineligibility to use the Fund's general resources, and arrears to the PRGF-ESF Trust remain in place. According to the Fund, "because GRA and PRGF arrears are subject to separate legal frameworks-the former under the Fund's Articles of Agreement and the latter under the PRGF-ESF Trust Instrument-the clearance of GRA arrears by Zimbabwe has no effect on the application of the Fund's procedures for the treatment of outstanding arrears to the PRGF-ESF Trust. Zimbabwe, therefore, remains excluded from the list of PRGF-eligible countries."

~See IMF. 2001. Press Release 01/40- *IMF Declares Zimbabwe Ineligible to Use IMF Resources*. Online- <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2001/pr0140.htm> Accessed June 24 2009.

⁹⁰ IMF. 2009. *Factsheet- The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility*. Online- <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm> Accessed- 12 December 2009

macroeconomic impact. Areas typically covered by the IMF include advising on prudent macroeconomic and financial policies and related structural reforms such as exchange rate and tax policy, fiscal management, budget execution, fiscal transparency, and tax and customs administration.

The organisational and political dynamics of the IMF mimic those of a country in a number of ways and allow for an analogy to a government, “with its division between spending ministries, and auditing or controlling ministries.”⁹¹ As Kahler (1993) identifies, a Managing Director (MD)⁹² must win ratification of a program from the Executive Board of the IMF, which will in turn apply the principle of uniformity of treatment to most programs, scrutinising them carefully to detect radically better deals for one country or class of countries than others⁹³. The internal politics of ratification however are more important than the organisational determinants of the IMF. Reverting to our analogy of the IMF as a mini-state, we see that it has its own conflicts between those with an interest in lending and those with an interest in checking those tendencies. The Executive Board of the Fund represents a complicated set of national constituencies and only the largest economies have their own representatives of the Board.

All members of the IMF have a quota, which is roughly correlated with their weight in the world economy. This quota determines how much a member must contribute to the Fund’s resources upon joining, how much it can borrow and its percentage of votes on the Executive Board. This system significantly skews the relative influence of developed members over developing members, with voting weights ranging from the United States with just over 20 percent of the votes, to the smallest members with just over one percent. Thus, the effect of weighted voting is that “the dominant coalition is that of the industrialised countries, particularly the G-5: the US, Japan, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.”⁹⁴ Although the system of special majorities that requires more than a simple majority of votes on certain issues helps to encourage bloc voting (developing countries etc), it increases the veto power the US and its European allies. As such, the industrialised countries not only hold immense

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² The Executive Board consists of 24 Executive Directors- the five most powerful members each appoint a director whilst the Funds membership appoints the rest.

⁹³ Ibid

⁹⁴ Ibid, 367

influence on the Executive Board, but also in the selection of the Managing Director⁹⁵ and decisions pertaining to resource allocation within the Fund.

Most significantly, Kahler (1993) points out that “board members signal to the MD and staff their qualms about program design and their wishes for the future direction of Fund relations with particular countries.”⁹⁶ Secondly, the process of ratification of a country’s program with the IMF is thus a constant process of discussion between the IMF’s most powerful members. Concerning its own domestic (Level 2) games therefore, the key role of the MD or ‘chief of government’ is to read the preferences of these key constituencies correctly, whilst at the same time expanding the scope and scale of IMF activities. The most salient example of this occurred in the late 1980s and through 1990s when the preferences of the industrialised countries regarding IMF programs focused on tighter conditionalities. This was precipitated by the debt crisis of 1982 in the former, and was in tune with their post-Cold War democratisation projects in the developing world in the early 1990s.

In order to effectively analyse the domestic and international interplay between our cases, we must ask what qualifies as the ‘win-sets’ that the Fund considers acceptable in their negotiations? In other words, what is set of all possible international (Level 1) agreements that would gain the majority votes/support among the Fund’s domestic constituents (Level 2)? The IMF provides short-term loans to countries facing balance-of-payments crises in order to help stabilise their economies till they can settle their external accounts. The logic of these arrangements is to ensure that countries do not revert to devaluation, protectionism, import restriction and other measures deemed to be detrimental to free global trade and investment flows.⁹⁷ The national authorities in close cooperation with the IMF design a policy program supported by IMF financing, and continued financial support is conditional on effective implementation of this program⁹⁸. We can thus surmise that successful

⁹⁵ In February 2000 the Board elected Horst Kohler as its Managing Director, the former president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 368

⁹⁷ Helleiner, G. 1983. *The IMF and Africa in the 1980s*. Princeton University Press. Princeton. Pp. 7

⁹⁸ IMF. 2010. *Why the IMF was created and how it Works*. Online.
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm>. Accessed January 8 2010

ratification of any adjustment program or loan extension⁹⁹ is dependent on three general prescriptions. Firstly, that the program is in line the preferences of the principal or most influential members of the Fund. Secondly, that any country drawing from the Fund must adhere to certain conditionalities which may be economic or political in nature. Lastly, that the extent to which the drawing country has liberalised its economy is satisfactory. These are the stated broad ‘win-sets’ of the Fund.

The unstated ‘win-sets’ however are tied into issues of democratisation and human rights conditionalities, and to the influence of the most powerful of the Fund’s members. Although the IMF has no confessed interest in human rights or political freedoms, it remains significant that these political variables are an instrumental feature of the democratisation projects of the principal members of the IMF. In essence, issues of good governance, in line with the neoliberal discourse, are an integral determinant of sovereign lending. In a study on the determinants of IMF sovereign lending, Jah and Saggar (2001) concluded that there is indeed a measure of arbitrariness in the way the institution lends to different countries. They found that unimpaired access to private financing of payments imbalances is generally available to some important countries in the world economy, but not to all countries and not under all circumstances.¹⁰⁰

As we shall see, the influence of the largest contributors to the Fund (for our purposes we will focus on the United States) is a particularly significant factor affecting international loan agreements. The reasons for this include that in the 1980s critics argued that the Fund had become overtly political. As Kahler (1993) argued, “lending decisions were forced through by creditor countries, in particular the USA, with the clear objective of preventing specific debtor countries from defaulting and thereby damaging the interests of the large commercial banks that still had significant loans outstanding to them”¹⁰¹. The Fund’s defence that this was justified in order to ensure systemic stability became increasingly illegitimate as the

⁹⁹ To clarify, the negotiations we are concerned with regard the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility-Exogenous Shocks Facility Trust (PRGF-ESFT) and not the General Resources Account (GRA).

¹⁰⁰ Jah, R and Saggar, M. 2001. *The Determinants of Sovereign Borrowing from the IMF*, in Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. 36, No. 36. Pp. 3467-3471

¹⁰¹ Bird, G. 2001. *A Suitable Case for Treatment? The Ongoing Debate about the IMF*, in Third World Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 5. Pp. 828

banks themselves adjusted to the crisis by provisioning, by reducing their developing country exposures through the secondary market, and by expanding other lines of business.

Domestic Policy and Win-Sets: Zimbabwe's Level 2

For any developing country, negotiations over adjustment programmes are often politicised and the process provides an interesting corroboration of our two-level games hypothesis. Kahler (1993) highlights how this politicisation occurs along three dimensions. The first regards *ideological* resistance to IMF prescriptions: i.e. objections to the Fund's economic model, market-oriented prescriptions or its overriding emphasis on balance-of-payments adjustment rather than other goals such as growth or equity. This line of resistance became a prominent feature in Zimbabwe because the political sphere was largely organised along ideological lines and divided between the pro-market opposition and the pro-nationalisation ruling party, and particularly the government's prioritisation of income redistribution over fiscal restraint. The second line of resistance is linked to the first and occurs along the *nationalist fault-line*.¹⁰² This pertains to sensitivity to notions of sovereignty and opposition to any apparent subordination of national policy to external forces and the government's fear of being portrayed as an agent of industrialised countries or international capital. In the Zimbabwean case, mobilised nationalist appeals directly affected negotiations and became the screen behind which the ruling party justified radicalisation in defence of the country's economic interests. These *economic interests* form the third dimension of resistance and focus on the groups whose political or economic well-being are likely to be affected by the agreed policy changes. As we detailed earlier, organised labour and the urban popular classes were affected most severely in the short term by ESAP through, *inter alia*, the decline in real wages and dismantling of subsidies. Significantly therefore, "the resistance of these sectors of the economy often figure into the calculus of politicians who survey the [domestic] Level 2 bargaining required for implementation, if not formal ratification, of an IMF program."¹⁰³

Jeffery Herbst (1990) detailed not only the negative effects of structural adjustment on the state, but also on the impact that it had on the state *type*.¹⁰⁴ Significantly, he showed that the

¹⁰² Kahler, 370

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Herbst, J. 1990. *The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa*, in World Development. Vol. 18, No. 7. Pp. 949-958

major instruments of structural adjustment (such as devaluation and public sector reform) threaten to “change not only the constituencies that African leaders look to for support but the way in which leaders relate to their supporters.”¹⁰⁵ The retreat of the state from the market and removal of subsidies, and the formation of the MDC in the Zimbabwean case, changed the composition of the different constituencies. In a broad sense, the cosmopolitan urban population became the main bastion for the opposition and bore the brunt of the authoritarianism of the ruling party. At a basic level, the client-patron relations that the government had initially reserved for the emergent black elite in the midst of the failing economy in the 1990s became severely restricted by the reductions in the size of the state in the economy. The curtailment in its ability to provide patronage made the state much less flexible in dealing with the subsequent political crisis. Because land reform became the vehicle for loosening the pressure valves of increased political competition and decreasing legitimacy, only a heterodox economic policy could be adopted by the government to correct the economic and political distortions created by ESAP. The priorities of the radicalised state thus reverted from focusing on free-market fundamentals, to prioritising radical land reform and the majority rural peasant farming constituency. This was in stark contrast to early post-independence Zimbabwe, where the white commercial farmers remained largely undisturbed and the indigenous urban elites and party loyalists were recipients of state patronage.

By detailing these political consequences of structural adjustment, we can identify what therefore constituted the ‘win-sets’ for the government. Firstly, we must acknowledge that the degree to which a political elite expects to face regular tests (such as contested elections) will influence its acceptable set of outcomes in a negotiations with the IMF. Fundamentally, the provision of financial and technological support to land reform, and the protection of economic interests (particularly those of the ruling elite), was of paramount importance to the government. The main proviso to this however was ideological. Through the adoption of policies that fell within the discourse of anti-imperialism and a rejection of the neo-liberal economic dictates of its so-called Western ‘enemies’, the government could attempt to regain its legitimacy in the eyes of its main constituency. Its radical nationalistic rhetoric also served to bolster the perception by its regional neighbours and LDC allies that sanctions and international condemnation of the land reform program were biased against a country seeking to defend its sovereignty from foreign interference. Secondly, the elites who would have the

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 949.

most to lose from a successful regime change perspective (the ruling party, those business elites linked to ZANU-PF, the military security forces high command etc) necessarily had to ensure that any negotiation that threatened their hold on power would be rejected, or undermined by pressuring involuntary defection.

In the previous chapter we differentiated between the different competing groups in Zimbabwe's domestic political economy (Level 2), which we identified as falling under the umbrellas of 'internationalists' and 'nationalists'. The bargaining between these two groups consisted of a constantly shifting negotiation strategies and delivery of important side-payments on both sides. We now turn to these elements.

Incorporating the Two-Level Game and the Impact of Side-Payments on the negotiations.

Given the prescriptions for eligibility to receive support from the PRGF, we can see that whilst the IMF's stated reasons for Zimbabwe's suspension as the latter's debt arrears, a deeper analysis cannot exclude the impact of the LRRP. The neo-liberal economic logic of IMF policies dictates that there are certain market fundamentals that are requisite for poverty reduction and economic growth, contingent particularly on a country's economic emersion into the global economy. What remains markedly unique about the Zimbabwean case however, was the manner in which it handled the nexus between its domestic political and economic contradictions, and external pressures from the international political economy. In analysing the two-level games of the country's negotiations with the IMF, we necessarily must remain cognisant of these contradictions. In the previous chapter we saw the context within which the Zimbabwe 'radicalised' and it is through the lens of this state type that we can see how the win-sets between the two failed to sufficiently overlap.

In its yearly Article IV report, the IMF produced a laundry list of causes for Zimbabwe's economic decline, including loose fiscal and monetary policies, a fixed exchange rate highly out of sync with "street prices," and price controls¹⁰⁶. The large-scale redistribution of one of the pillars of the economy through the land reform; the declining economy resulting from massive loss of production, and resultant capital flight and loss of investor confidence

¹⁰⁶ Richardson, C. 2006. *Learning from failure: Property Rights, Land Reform and the Hidden Architecture of Capitalism*, in Development Policy Outlook. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. No. 2. Pp. 1.

necessitated the heterodox economic planning that the country undertook. Moyo and Yeros (2007) identify six policy changes that clearly highlight the change in the state-society domestic relationship, and in the external relationship between the government and the IMF. Firstly, in *investment* policy the government heavily regulated banks and redirected credit to the agricultural and mining activities. In *monetary* policy, it introduced price controls, set interest rates and foreign exchange with the aim of supporting priority imports and exports whilst defaulting on foreign debts¹⁰⁷. In *fiscal* policy, it subsidised commodities such as basic foods, fuel and electricity. In *trade* policy, it imposed import and export controls focused on essential commodities, diversified trading to partners in the East under its 'Look East' policy and reinforced parastatals to regulate trade. In *land* policy, it continued to nationalise land under its LRRP. In *foreign policy*, the government maintained its antagonistic stance towards the United States and Britain in particular through its anti-imperialistic rhetoric and portrayal of itself as a country defending its sovereignty in the face of malicious machinations from the West. In doing so, it actively opposed the liberalisation agenda of the WTO and shifted its strategic economic and technological alliances to the Asian countries (especially China) and away from dependence on the West.¹⁰⁸ These policy changes formed part of a heterodox plan that the government adopted and represented a combination of reactionary strategic planning, increased authoritarian control and little tolerance for dissent, and mostly took the form of incoherent crisis management. In line of these changes, and regarding Putnam's assessment that, *ceterus paribus*, the larger the win-set then the likelihood of agreement becomes higher, was there, in effect, a significant overlap between the win-sets of both the IMF and Zimbabwe?

- **External Conditionalities vs. Domestic Priorities**

As Carolyn Jenkins (1997) recognised, "there are two remarkable features of post-independence economic policy-making in Zimbabwe: the very limited nature of the changes made by the new government in 1980, and the complete reversal of policy announced in

¹⁰⁷ Repayments resumed in 2005 in the interests of normalisation of relations with the Fund.

¹⁰⁸ Moyo and Yeros, 2007. Pp. 106-7

[2000]”¹⁰⁹. What remains starkly evident from this about-turn is that the overlap of win-sets of both the government and the IMF was drastically reduced. In other words, the positions of both ensured that there would be few areas of common interest between the coalitions on both Level 2s. The conditionalities that the country needed to accept were incompatible with the political priorities of the ruling party and its nationalist counterparts. Firstly, as detailed before, land reform and radical nationalism was used as an attempt to regain legitimacy when they faced political opposition. For them to accede to orthodox exchange rate and fiscal transparency initiatives, for example, would have been imprudent as support for the regime, at an elite level, was principally based on patronage relations and corruption was endemic¹¹⁰. A particularly salient point that bolsters this analysis regards the military intervention in the DRC and the resultant strategic side-payments that went to the military and security high command. Two explanations for the intervention are evident in the literature- that the intervention was necessitated by Zimbabwe’s role as the Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation,¹¹¹ and the view that it was motivated by “the ruling elite’s desire to obtain lucrative supply contracts and mining partnerships, as well as to protect existing investments.”¹¹² Domestically, commercial links between the ruling ZANU PF and the political and military elites, “indicated some degree of systematic use of official positions for private gain.”¹¹³

Frederick Mayer (1992) argued that both their interests and the rules of the domestic political game, determine how domestic factional interests manifest themselves in international bargains. Regarding Zimbabwe, it can reasonably be argued that if there was dissension in the security hierarchy, then commercial exploits would have been a sufficient side payment to co-opt those oppositional elements. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, the historical relationship between the military and the ruling party had always been strong since the

¹⁰⁹ Jenkins, C. 1997. *The Politics of Economic Policy Making in Zimbabwe*, in Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 35, No. 4. Pp. 575

¹¹⁰ The inflexibility of the state in this regard was illustrated by the firing of then Finance Minister, Simba Makoni, who was vocally pro-devaluation.

¹¹¹ See SADC. 1996. *Communiqué from the 1996 Extra-Ordinary SADC Summit to Launch the SADC Organ*. Online- <http://www.sadc.int/archives/read/news/231> Accessed 06 July 2009.

¹¹² Nest, 469

¹¹³ Ibid

liberation struggle, with many government officials having served in the armed forces and the hierarchy remaining largely the same in the armed forces. Secondly, in the face of the deteriorating economic situation in the country, financial incentives would have held more sway than calls for democratisation. Lastly, the co-optation of the military and security apparatus served to provide three additional benefits for the government: bolstering its regional standing through decisive action in defence of a SADC member, revitalising its national identity and radical nationalism, and encouraging the security hierarchy to remain loyal to the ruling party and undertake its coercive mandates. In this way, a significant faction that was essential for the maintenance of the regime was therefore effectively co-opted into the rules of the domestic political game. Tellingly, whilst IMF sanctioned Zimbabwe for its war expenditures, it continued to lend to Uganda, whose troops supported the rebels in the Congo.

The most severe contradiction resulting from the deep structural change¹¹⁴ precipitated by land reform and state radicalisation was the persistent violence between the state (through its monopoly over the use of force) and those in opposition to it. Authoritarianism¹¹⁵ and coercion, particularly during the elections of 2000 and 2002, remained the *modus operandi* of the ruling party¹¹⁶ and diverged widely from the good governance prescriptions of rule of law and human rights. The dominant analyses into the state's coercion in the literature have emotively tended to view it as a moral issue, or measured it against the norms of democratic theory. As acknowledged, Zimbabwe during our timeframe was neither a democratic nor a failed state. Rather than view state repression in our period as simplistically right-or-wrong, we portray it within the context of radicalisation. In other words, the suspension of the rule of law and employment of coercion by the state were neither arbitrary nor random, but were strategically employed because radical land reform in a neo-colonial setting could *not* have

¹¹⁴ In terms of state-society relations, land ownership and income redistribution.

¹¹⁵ As exemplified by the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) of 2002, which severely curtailed freedom of assembly and require journalists and media companies to register with the government-controlled Media and Information Commission (MIC).

¹¹⁶ See ~ International Crisis Group. 2002. *All Bark, No Bite- The International response to Zimbabwe's Crisis*. Africa Report. No. 40. Harare

~Rotberg, R. 2000. *Africa's Mess, Mugabe's Mayhem*, in Foreign Affairs. Vol. 79, No. 5.

occurred within the confines of liberal-democratic prescriptions¹¹⁷. Radical large-scale land redistribution cannot occur in a peripheral context where property and human rights take precedence; the two are essentially oxymoronic and mutually exclusive. To whom, to what extent and how do you distribute land if property rights remain intact? We do not seek to justify nor condone the abuses perpetuated by the state, but rather seek to operationalise its authoritarian coercion as a fundamentally strategic feature of its discourse of exclusionary politics. As Putnam noted, in domestic bargaining, “the group with the greatest interest in a particular issue is more likely to hold the most extreme position on that issue.”¹¹⁸

Many contemporary authors, like Phimister and Raftopoulos (2004), have sought to analyse state action in this period by construing it to be a simplistic contest between authoritarianism and human rights. A recurring argument is that ZANU PF has been able to “represent the fundamental human and civic rights questions placed on the Zimbabwean political agenda... as marginal, elite-focused issues driven by western interests and having little relation to urgent problems of economic redistribution.”¹¹⁹ This remained a major area of contention between the internationalist groups, whose civil society trappings necessarily acknowledged universal prescriptions and standards of governance. In doing so they found alliances within the international community, particularly the US and Britain, and the need for regime change was portrayed as essential if democracy and stability was to be achieved.

¹¹⁷ Paris Yeros expanded on this point thus- “Zimbabwe is similar to other cases in South America, namely Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, which have also undergone similar socio-political convulsions in the last decade. These have all been driven mainly (save for Venezuela) by rural social movements with a radical nationalist agenda, aiming to recuperate natural resources, redistribute wealth, and reaffirm national sovereignty; and all have given way to “radicalised” states which have internalised the new radicalism. In these cases, we are dealing with a new (or revived) form of politics, which is certainly populist but also “anti-systemic”. It is anti-systemic in that it has re-politicised economics, racial inequalities, regional asymmetries, and North-South relations, after a long period of neoliberal reforms. Moreover, it is a populism that is confrontational, challenging directly established forms of domestic representation and external diplomacy. In this sense, it is also a populism that is very different from the other populisms in Africa and South America, either of a right-wing or a centre-left variety.”

~see Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. (forthcoming). *After Zimbabwe: State, Nation and Region in Africa*, in S. Moyo, P. Yeros and J. Vadell (eds.), The National Question Today: The Crisis of Sovereignty in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Pp. 2

¹¹⁸ Putnam, 446

¹¹⁹ Phimister, I and Raftopoulos, B. 2004. *Mugabe, Mbeki and the Politics of Anti-Imperialism*, in Review of African Political Economy. Vol. 101. Pp. 393

- **Ideological divergence and sanctions**

Not only was the domestic heterodox economic policy stance of the ZANU-PF government markedly different to the prerequisites of the IMF, but the ideological differences also played themselves out on the international sphere (Level 1). The fast track LRRP created a diplomatic impasse between government and Britain, and US respectively. With the former, it came in the context of the new Labour government under Tony Blair's refusal to fund or to accept responsibility for the land reform, and crucially, its financial and diplomatic support for the MDC. Relations with the US reached their lowest point with the passing of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA)¹²⁰ in Congress. This Act essentially empowers the US to use its voting rights and influence (as the main donor) in multilateral lending agencies such as the IMF, (and including the World Bank, and the African Development Bank) to veto any applications by Zimbabwe for finance, credit facilities, loan rescheduling, and international debt cancellation. The US cited Zimbabwe's human rights record, political intolerance and absence of rule of law as the main reasons for the imposition of sanctions. The significance of these sanctions lay in the fact that although the US Congress passed it, it uses International Financial Institutions as the vehicles through which it carries out its mandate. This aspect of the IMF's Level 2 highlights why their reasons for Zimbabwe's suspension are at their core unconvincing. In other words, if the primary objective of the PRGF are to alleviate poverty and stimulate growth, and if the IMF is an apolitical institution, then it follows that a greater role could have been played in facilitating the land reform and factoring it into their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. It follows that if they had apolitically spearheaded and financed the post-land reform recovery, they have increased their win-set by ensuring that repayments of the arrears happened on their terms.

Interestingly, whilst the country was implementing IFI-led reforms in the early 1990s, there was no need to sanction its repression (against land occupiers and squatters on state and private farmland). However, with the suspension of the structural adjustment program and its implementation of the land reform into the 2000s, and its military intervention in the DRC, "all the economic and political conditionalities began to be invoked, beginning with the

¹²⁰ Also refer to Footnote 74.

suspension of balance of payments support by the World Bank, and followed by a range of formal and informal sanctions.”¹²¹

It remains significant therefore to detail *how* the US exercises its influence on the Fund, and to examine whether this influence was brought to bear on the negotiations between the IMF and Zimbabwe. On an abstract level, the primary ideological difference between the neo-liberal IMF and radically nationalistic ZANU-PF government was the incompatibility of their key principles. While one prioritised openness, good governance and market liberalisation, the other preferred protectionism, authoritarianism and state control of the levers of the economy. On a practical level however, how did these ideological differences become manifest in relations between the Fund and the country? How were they rhetorically and institutionally translated? If IMF conditionalities vary depending on the political-economic structure and conditions in the borrowing country, does anything other than repayment arrears explain Zimbabwe’s suspension in 2001?

Hawkins (2006) posited that a principal-agent relationship occurs between states and international organisations, as the former often delegates authority to independent agents like the IMF.¹²² What are the benefits of such delegation? The most significant benefit would be increased efficiency for the organisation. Once authority has been delegated however, problems may arise. In the literature, *agency slack* is the term used to describe independent action against the wishes of the principal. *Shirking* occurs when an agent puts in only minimal effort on its principal’s behalf. *Slippage* occurs when an agent shifts policy away from its principal’s preferred outcome and towards its own preferences¹²³. Although it is the mandate of Executive Board of the Fund to ultimately ratify programs, it is inevitably its teams of professional economists who are the agents. They are responsible for negotiating with debtor countries and thus set the agenda that the Executive Board has to approve. A more difficult question however is who is (are) the principal(s)? The quota/weighted voting

¹²¹ Moyo and Yeros, 2007. Pp. 184

¹²² Hawkins, D.G. 2006. *Delegation under Anarchy: States, Organisations and Principal-Agent Theory*, in Hawkins, D. Lake, D. Nielsen, D and Tierney, M (Eds). Delegation and Agency in International Organisations. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Pp. 6

¹²³ Ibid, 7

system invariably means that some members exercise more influence on the Fund than others¹²⁴. The US ED is the most powerful director, controlling 16.79% of the Fund and giving them sole veto power.¹²⁵ According to Woods (2003), a senior analyst in the Fund, they “virtually never present a recommendation which risks US disapproval’ - if it is a sensitive issue it is normally run by the US Treasury first.”¹²⁶ This leverage enjoyed by the US is a stark contrast to the vastly smaller influence wielded by Zimbabwe (even as a member of the G77 voting bloc). It thus served to strengthen the bargaining position of the IMF in that when payment defaults became an insufficient reason for suspension, then the ZIDERA act was evoked as binding and limited their space for compromise. Thus in the context of principal-agent relations, the leverage enjoyed by the principal (the US) ensured that the agent (IMF) could ill afford agency slack, shirking or slippage.

- **Level 2 players on both game boards: the internationalists vs. the nationalists**

An important characteristic of the government’s anti-imperialistic foreign policy rhetoric was regimes ability to locate it within the wider debate in international political economy concerning the ideological conflict between international norms and nationalist politics. In much the same way that classical imperialism generated a range of dependency theory and neo-colonial responses; contemporary economic globalisation and the increased “internationalisation of the state”¹²⁷ has seen a resurgence of nationalistic, localised social movement responses. In the literature, debates about nationalism and internationalism are often posed in simplistic ‘either-or’ terms. Critics of nationalism accuse nationalists of reliance on exclusivist or identity politics, whilst advocates of nationalism accuse

¹²⁴ See- Rapkin, D and Strand, J. 2006. *Reforming the IMF’s Weighted Voting System*, in World Economy. Vol. 29, No. 3.

¹²⁵ Breen, M. 2008. *The Political Economy of IMF Conditionality*. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. University College Dublin. Dublin. Online- <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRAD/Resources/Breen.pdf>. Accessed 19 July 2009

¹²⁶ Woods, N. 2003. *The United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence Within the World Bank and the IMF*, in US Hegemony and International Organizations. Oxford University Press. Oxford. Pp. 15

¹²⁷ See- Held, D. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Cambridge, Polity Press.

internationalists of idealism and implicit imperialism.¹²⁸ Practically however, nationalism is a profoundly international ideology, driven in part by international factors. Similarly, internationalism inescapably hinges on the national as much as international developments. However, the way in which one distinguishes itself from the other on a domestic political level is what is of interest to us. In the Zimbabwean case this *nationalist fault-line* debate also brought into question issues of nationality, rights, justice, exclusive race relations, and citizenship. The transnational alliances that the opposition and its neo-liberal civic movement roots forged, and the mobilisation by the ruling party against them, created tensions that played themselves out on the international arena- pitting developing countries in SADC (South Africa in particular) against the US and Europe on many forums.¹²⁹

Neoliberal economic thought cannot be separated from its political underpinnings, of which the discourse of good governance and rule of law are most resonant. It is within this discourse that the internationalists became a meaningful opposition to the ruling party. On the government's Level 2, two strategies were employed to limit the influence of the internationalists: the first an active exclusion from the political space, the second was its adoption of the nationalist-liberation movement discourse as the official position of the state. Its exclusion from political competition included, *inter alia*, using the police and war veterans to disrupt rallies and meetings held by the opposition. Through state controlled media, anti-colonial propaganda, music, documentaries, and the glorification of the liberation struggle were propounded whilst at the same time independent newspapers and radio stations were shut down under the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). The government's actions ran counter to internationalist ideals (e.g. free speech etc.) and democratic state-society relations. The MDC and its allies (NGOs in particular) internally coordinated the resultant international pressure directed at the state. From the perspective of the IMF, these essentially political issues came to inform their rationale in negotiating with the country in that conflict between the opposition and the government came to be classified

¹²⁸ Goodman, J. 2002. *Nationalism and Globalism: Social Movement responses*, in The International Scope Review. Vol. 20, No. 8 (Winter). Pp. 1

¹²⁹This was best illustrated by Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa's summation to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown regarding the controversy surrounding whether or not Mugabe should attend the 2007 EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon: "if Zimbabwe is barred from the summit then the rest of Africa would boycott."

(Quoted in *New African*. Winter 2007/2008, No. 462. London).

as “impediments to economic growth and stability.”¹³⁰ As Moyo and Yeros (2007) posit, when the reality of mass land occupations and radical nationalism clashed with their economic blueprints, these internationalists closed ranks with reaction and sanctions.”¹³¹ Under sanctions, the government resumed its nationalist fault-line defence by portraying the IMF and the MDC as agents of west, as seeking to undermine its sovereignty and sought to regain its legitimacy as ‘defenders of the revolution’¹³².

Nationalist ideologies, as Anne McClintock (1993) has written, “are contested systems of representation enacted through social institutions, and legitimizing, or limiting people’s access to the rights and resources of the nation-state.”¹³³ As a group that opposed Zimbabwe’s radical nationalism, the internationalists, spearheaded by the MDC became natural allies to the United States, Britain and by proxy the IMF’s regime change policies. Their exclusion from ‘the rights and resources of the state’ thus prompted their calls for sanctions against the country.¹³⁴ These economic sanctions (ZIDERA in particular) added leverage to the IMF and limited the scope for meaningful engagement with the Zimbabwean government. By maintaining sanctions, calling for greater economic reforms and liberalisation on the Level 1 (international negotiation), whilst simultaneously allying themselves to the liberal forces in the country and supporting their human rights and rule of law agenda on the Level 2 (domestic), the IMF and its principal effectively reduced any win-set overlap which may have existed. The removal of sanctions thus became an important factor in the negotiations as the nationalists viewed them as imperialist manoeuvres to pressurise the state. More significantly, the comprehensive sanctions undermined the land

¹³⁰ IMF. 2001. IMF Country Report 01/13- *Zimbabwe: Recent Economic Developments, Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix*. (January 2001). Online- <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr0113.pdf>. Accessed 28 July 2009

¹³¹ Moyo and Yeros, 2007. Pp 180

¹³² ~See- Chirimambowa, T. 2008. *Anti-Imperialism and Schizophrenic Revolutionaries in Zimbabwe*, in *Concerned Africa Scholars*. Bulletin 80. (Winter 2008). Pp. 43

¹³³ Quoted in Lazarus, N. 1993. *Disavowing Decolonisation: Fanon, Nationalism and the Problematic of Representation in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse*, in *Research in African Literatures*. Vol, 24. No. 4. Pp. 70.

¹³⁴ SADOCC. 2004. *Tsvangirai Warned not to call for further sanctions*. Southern Africa Documentation and Cooperation Centre. Online- <http://www.sadocc.at/news/2004-372.shtml>. Accessed 16 April 2009

reform programme by limiting credit lines from international and regional banks like the ADB, and restricted access to agricultural imports.¹³⁵

This presented a significant example of the effect of domestic bargaining on foreign policy and negotiation. Whilst sanctions became the central policy of liberal imperialism internationally and the central strategy of the domestic opposition, the ZANU PF government diverted its strategic economic relations to the East to counter sanctions, and its radical nationalism remained unchanged. The extent of the ideological cleavage between the ruling party and opposition was reflected through Mugabe's characterisation of the MDC in 2001:

The MDC should never be judged by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent high-density lumpen elements. It is much deeper than these human superficialities; for it is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule. MDC is as old and as strong as the forces that control it; that converge on it; that drive and direct; indeed that support, sponsor and spot it. It is a counter-revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday.¹³⁶

Significantly, the 'Look East' policy that the government employed shifted the focus and trade away from the US and Britain, and saw China becoming the biggest foreign direct investor in the country by 2007. With its historic linkages to ZANU PF from the liberation struggle and its policy of non-interference with the internal affairs of its allies, China's support of the government and the land reform were significant. Firstly, the government could afford to renege or 'defect' on tentative agreements with the IMF simply because it enjoyed a much larger win-set overlap with China¹³⁷. Both countries saw radical nationalism as a key ideological tenet and had a mutually beneficial strategic alliance. Geo-politically China countered US and European dominance in the country, whilst Zimbabwe gained the

¹³⁵ The shift away from the West and the IMF to China as the main foreign direct investor in the country significantly empowered the state to continue with the land reform.

¹³⁶ Mugabe, 2001. Pp. 88.

¹³⁷ See Ailing, 2005.

financial support it could not get from the IMF. A hearing in the US House of Representatives adds credence to this point. It states, “while the International Monetary Fund is considering ... a possible expulsion of Zimbabwe, and the South African Government has agreed to negotiate a bailout of the Zimbabwe economy under the condition that the Zimbabwe ruling party resumes cooperation talks with the MDC, and makes necessary democratic and governance reforms... Chinese influence is undoing the progress that has been made in Africa. The details of the Chinese... involve mineral and other trade concessions in exchange for economic help.”¹³⁸

3. Conclusion

Zimbabwe’s suspension from the IMF’s PRGF has been viewed and defended as resulting from the country’s inability to repay its outstanding loans. A deeper analysis through the lens of Putnam’s Two-Level games however reveals that there were a myriad of factors that contributed to the decision and that loan repayment arrears is too simplistic. The requisite prescriptions that the IMF use as their basis for extending credit are specifically couched in the discourse of good governance, human and property rights and respect for the rule of law. On a practical level the resulting contradiction between these conditionalities and the domestic priorities of the radicalised state proved them to be incompatible. In the context of the LRRP, the government could not afford to reverse its nationalist stance as a large measure of its legitimacy hinged upon indigenisation. On an ideological level, it stood in contrast to the domestic opposition, through whom its international allies sought regime change. Furthermore, the ideological divergence between the government and the MDC; and the government and the IMF was clearly highlighted by the imposition of sanctions. Once it became clear that Zimbabwe was pursuing an alternative road to development and economic redistribution that fell outside of the prescriptions of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, the most influential members of the Fund (the US and European Union) exercised their leverage through comprehensive sanctions measures. In effect, negotiations were bound to fail and because the IMF purports to be an apolitical multilateral institution, the claim that suspension was simply a matter of repayment became the only gambit available in its defence. The

¹³⁸ US Government, 2005. *Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Human Global Rights and International Operations, of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives*. 109th Congress 1st Session. Washington. Serial Number 109-74. Online- <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/22658.pdf> Accessed 5 February 2009.

internal bargaining between the two ideological camps also increased the likelihood of the government's (both voluntary and involuntary) defection on the international negotiation. Aligned to its nationalist rhetoric, the state portrayed the opposition and those against the LRRP as imperialist proxies. In doing so, it defended the land reform; justified its radicalisation, and significantly 'Looked East' for financial and ideological support. The different win-set sizes of the IMF and of the government on these issues is why the negotiations failed. Secondly, the size of the domestic win-set in Zimbabwe affected the opposing constituents in different ways. The opposition was effectively excluded from domestic political space and from negotiations with the IMF and so had to look to NGOs and external Western support; whilst China paid the cost-of-no-agreement for the government by increasing aid, economic links and trade. Finally, side-payments played a significant part in maintaining the political status quo, through the co-optation of the military and security hierarchy in its exploits in the DRC.

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CHAPTER 4- Concluding Findings

Zimbabwe's foreign policy between 2000 and 2007 reveals the significance of domestic politics on its content and substance. Three features that became the cornerstone of its foreign relations were land reform justification, radical nationalism and sovereignty. Although both internal and external considerations are important in foreign policy making, its relations with the IMF showed how domestic political considerations played a significantly larger role. Its domestic policy also reflected the national socio-political and economic structures, which underlie the relationship between the antagonistic social forces that constituted the country's socio-economic system. The country's foreign policy towards the Fund has largely been portrayed as being 'irrationally' antagonistic and its eventual suspension in 2001 is often explained as resulting solely from its inability to repay its loans, specifically regarding the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Analyses into the justification of the IMF's position have largely construed the political effects of the LRRP and the resultant heterodox economic policies as the main reason for these repayment arrears.

Over and above the economic counters, neoliberal political discourses of good governance, property rights and rule of law have dominated the literature, of which in this case most have been lacking in analytical usefulness. By separating these neoliberal aspects of democratic theory from Zimbabwe's socio-historical context, and applying them without rigorously inquiring into the nature of the domestic socio-political bargaining and ideological cleavages created by the LRRP, a gap is revealed in the literature. Firstly, Zimbabwe was a neo-colonial, radicalised state, one in which the 'good governance' prescriptions of property rights etc. necessarily had to be suspended in order for a correspondingly radical redistribution of land to occur and the polarised income inequality to be addressed. The state's radicalisation was further exacerbated by the resultant socio-economic cleavages and contradictions, which inevitably spilt onto the political arena.

What has largely been neglected in these analyses of the country's foreign policy in the 2000s has been the nature of this radicalisation and impact of the fast track LRRP in creating cleavages in the country that affected its international relations. Whilst Zimbabwe's foreign policy has been carried out by the state, the formulation of those policies has not exclusively been the domain of the ruling party. Firstly, the negative impact of the Lancaster House

provisions on land and structural adjustment on constituents across class divides solidified opposition to the state- in both ideological and practical ways. On a domestic level, these cleavages became manifest in the resultant political competition (between those subscribing to and perpetuating neo-liberal political and economic ideals, and those defensively propounding a radical nationalism in resistance to those ideals) over the control of the state and the definition of the rules of the political game. On the international plane, this ideological divergence was characterised by antagonistic rhetorical exchanges and relations with predominantly western powers, whom the government accused of imperialist motives and creating a regime change agenda that would undermine the principle of sovereignty. In essence, domestic pressures from below (in the form of the opposition) and foreign pressures from above (in the form of sanctions and suspension from the PRGF) over the LRRP served to forge an anti-imperialist, vehemently nationalist, radicalised state. Because of the uniqueness and magnitude of the land reform, and the structural convulsions that resulted from it, analysis into the domestic determinants of its foreign policy cannot be understood through the lens of a bourgeoisie democracy. Putnam's Two-Level games model provides the best framework through which we can get to the core of our foreign policy analysis. This dissertation identified the actors on the different levels, and analysed the context and outcomes of the bargaining between them.

The country's relations with the IMF regarding the PRGF suspension became an arena in which the conflict between the internationalists and the nationalists played itself out. Firstly, the contradiction between external conditionality and domestic political considerations created an incompatibility of win-sets. Secondly, the imposition of ZIDERA by the US leveraged its position in the IMF, effectively blocking any manoeuvring space that it may have had in its negotiations with Zimbabwe. Thirdly, Zimbabwe's Level 2 bargaining, between opposition MDC and the ruling party, and the practicalities surrounding the LRRP became more of priority for the government than the Level 1 game. This was exacerbated by the 'Look East' economic policy that the state undertook. From a purely pragmatic view, although the cost-of-no-agreement with the Fund was high, the 'cost of agreement' would have been higher for the ZANU PF government. Acceding to conditionalities and reversing (or attempting to reverse) the LRRP would in effect have de-legitimised the government, particularly in the face of comprehensive sanctions, and regime change would have succeeded. The diplomatic, financial and economic support provided by China in particular

was therefore essential for the country to continue with its land reform. This support also largely reduced the effect of international economic sanctions and countered some of the leverage that the IMF enjoyed. Any meaningful understanding of foreign policy is thus contingent on a comprehensive sensitivity to the bargaining of different domestic actors and on the external influences of those bargains. This remains particularly relevant when one is dealing with a radicalised nationalist state.

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