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The Legislator-Constituent Relationship in Southern Africa: 
The Extent to which Electoral Competitiveness, Electoral 
Systems and Role Orientations Affect Levels of Constituency 
Service conducted by Legislators

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This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature Date
Leah Shearman 8 February 2010
Abstract

The early 1990’s marked the beginning of a new era for Southern Africa when a number of single party states began the transition to multiparty democratic systems. Within this process, democratic institutions were established and then have since played varied roles in normalizing of democratic norms in their respective countries. The elites who make these institutions play a vital role in maintaining democracy within these countries. This study examines their perceptions and actions in order to get a better understanding of the quality of representation and as a result the quality of democracy.

More specifically the study examines how possible micro and macro level factors, such as electoral competitiveness, role orientations and electoral systems affect the level of constituency service performed by legislators in five Southern African countries (South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Kenya and Zambia). The majority of data used in this study comes from Module 3 of the African Legislatures Project. Electoral data was also collected from national electoral commissions and country experts.

The results indicate that as a whole the electoral system has an effect on the level of constituency service conducted by legislators. Role orientation does not appear to be a factor in legislator’s decision about the amount of constituency service they will perform. Electoral competition is a factor for number of countries in the study. However, the evidence shows that in some cases higher levels of electoral competitiveness actually induce legislators to perform less constituency service.
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Thank you Nancy and Tony for your never ending support and for the hours spent working through the editing of this piece. You have no idea how much I appreciate it.

The majority of data used in this study comes from the African Legislatures Project or ALP. ALP is a comparative study of legislatures and legislators in 20 African countries. I wish to thank the three co-principal investigators for ALP—Robert Mattes, Joel D. Barkan and Shaheen Moazaffar—for permission to utilize data from five of these countries for my dissertation. However, the responsibility for the analysis conducted and conclusions reached is mine alone, and does not represent the views of the three co-principal investigators or ALP.
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Acronyms

ALP – African Legislators Project
ANC – African National Congress
APC - Actual Past Competition
CFD- Constituency Development Fund
FPC – Future Perceived Competition
FPTP – First Past the Post
KANU - Kenyan National African Union
MP – Member of Parliament
PR – Proportional Representation
STV – Single Transferable Vote
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
Note on Privacy Issues

The data used in this study was taken from Module 3 of the African Legislators Project. The Module consists of confidential interviews of legislators in a number of Sub-Saharan African countries. In order to complete this study, additional electoral data was collected outside the parameters of ALP and later combined with data from the Module 3 dataset. Through the merging process a number of steps were taken to ensure the privacy of participating legislators. At no time were either names or constituency information combined with the main ALP module 3 dataset.
Chapter 1: Introduction
Problem

Since the early 1990s, many African dictatorships and authoritarian regimes collapsed to make way for democratic systems. Marked by elections, many hoped that this new era would provide African citizens with the opportunity to finally participate in political systems that were open and transparent. After these initial transitions took place, the next step in the process, consolidation, stalled in many states. The institutionalization of democratic institutions has been a slow moving process. As a result, it has become apparent that the existence of elections alone does not indicate the presence of democracy. Issues such as poverty, illiteracy and militarization have placed pressure on already fragile governments, making the full consolidation process much harder to achieve. As a result, many African democratic governments have been plagued with weak oppositions, high levels of corruption and weak public services. As governments struggle to deal with these problems, there are indications that if left untreated, the institutionalization and normalization of democratic norms could be stalled, making democracy as a legitimate political system vulnerable to erosion. (Przeworski, Alvarez and Limongi, 1996; 50)

As just alluded to, it is argued that there are in fact two major stages to the democratization process. The first consists of the initial transition that is most often defined as a period of time that contains the initial election as well as the creation of specific institutions used to facilitate the transition. The second stage is much more prolonged and of greater relevance to this study. It contains the further development and institutionalization of democratic institutions that facilitate the rooting of democratic norms and expectations within a society. (Przeworski, Alvarez and Limongi, 1996, 47; Schedler, 1998, 91) Thus, one needs to look at institutions such as legislatures and electoral systems and their relationship with the electorate to gauge the potential level of democratization. Furthermore, as institutions are made up of elites, the belief systems and expectations of those within these institutions need to be examined. If these elites are not democrats, then the long-term prognosis for democracy in these countries is debatable. (Higley and Burton, 2006; 181)

It has been noted that democratic consolidation “...hinges on the development of two different relationships, 1) representation of citizens by their chosen leaders, a relationship characterized by dialogue and accountability and; 2) tolerance, bargaining and compromise
among rival political groups” (Barkan, 2006, 137). This study examines the first aspect and rather than focusing on the electorate to determine the quality of representation, this study considers the legislators and their actions and beliefs within the representation process.

The relationship between a legislator and his or her constituents is an important aspect of the democratic process. As a potential facilitator of political participation, legislators play an important role in providing the government with its needed legitimacy. In newly democratized states, these relationships are especially important, as other modes of participation are often less developed. Thus if legislators choose not to interact with constituents, one could argue that a serious democratic deficit exists. Yet little research has been done about the nature of legislators’ relationships with their constituents in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, despite interest in the democratic consolidation process, little is known about one of its most important aspects. In the past, research on elite behaviour has most often focused on the actions of the executive. Given that legislatures are often perceived as being weak, there is scant literature on the one aspect of a democratic system that provides it with the most legitimacy, the constituency-legislator relationship. This study aims to help deal with this deficit. Thus, this project aims to determine the institutional aspects of democracies in developing states that influence legislators to spend time interacting with their constituents. By focusing on these aspects of the democratic process, we are looking at the overall quality of representation in developing democracies.

The concept of representation directs one’s attention to the attitudes of two separate groups; those that are being represented and those who are chosen to represent them. The expectations and attitudes of those who are being represented are what give legislators the legitimacy to make decisions on behalf of their constituents. (Eulau et al.; 1959, 743) In Sub-Saharan Africa, steps are being taken to get a further understanding of how the electorate perceives their role within the representational process, through projects such as Afrobarometer. This means that we now have one side of the story. This project aims to develop an understanding of the other side of the story. Thus, the focus of this study will be on the attitudes and expectations of representatives. Based on work from the African Legislatures Project (ALP), this study intends to examine the reported activities and belief systems of legislators across five Southern African countries (South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Kenya).
Research Question

The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of how legislators interact with their constituents. While it is recognized that there are a number of influences that may encourage them to act in a certain ways, the literature suggests that certain aspects of a political system will have larger influences than others. In this study, two major aspects will be examined, the electoral system and electoral competition. The following question is being asked;

1. To what extent does an electoral system and level of electoral competition affect the legislator’s relationship with their constituency?

The legislator’s perception of their relationship with their constituency will also be examined. This will be done through determining each legislator’s role orientation. Role orientations are groupings of legislators who perceive their role as a legislator in similar ways. These groupings are often based on similar perspectives as to how their relationship with the electorate should be approached. The role orientation literature argues that if groupings are true to the political landscape of the legislature in question, than the role orientation groups can be used to predict behaviour.

As a result of scarcity of resources in the countries of this study, it was determined that role orientation will be to be a central aspect of the study. It is hoped that by placing legislators into role orientation groups we might be able to predict future behaviour, if they were to receive increased resources.

Therefore, a further research question will be;

2. To what extent does a legislator’s electoral system, levels of electoral competition and role orientation have an effect on legislator’s level of constituency service.
Significance of the Study

In the literature based on Africa, there has been a tendency to focus on the legislature as a single unit of analysis. There has been little research on the single legislator within the representative process. In contrast, the relationship between legislators and their constituencies has been studied extensively in Western focused literature. This interest stems back to the notion that legislators are in some way directly responsible to those who elect them into office. (Serra and Moon; 1994, 201) The degree to which legislators are accountable to their constituents has also been debated quite substantially.

How a legislator individually interacts with their constituency has consequences on the quality of democracy for their entire country, especially in new democratized states in Southern Africa. This is largely the case because other channels for the electorate to interact with government are often not fully developed. In the literature, it is argued that civil societies in many African states are not yet strong enough to be effective supporters of the democratic consolidation process. Due to a lack of sophistication, civil societies have generally been unable to hold governments accountable. (Gyimah-Boahen, 2006) Consequently, legislators act as gatekeepers to political participation within the democratic process in many African states. If legislators choose not to hold a dialogue with their electorate or are unable to due to the resources restrictions, this can have large implications for political participation and therefore the quality of democracy.

Political participation means much more then solely voting. It includes collective action around policy issues, contacting political representatives, and direct actions like protests and demonstrations. (Bratton, 1999; 552) Without it, a democracy is unable to function. Therefore, in addition to monitoring the actual time legislators engage in constituency service this study looks at how legislators perceive their role as enablers of political participation and thus the entire democratic process.

Legislators across the continent face a similar challenge, a lack of resources. By focusing on legislators’ perceptions of their roles and beliefs about their purpose, one might be able to get a better idea of how legislators would spend their time if increased funding was given. This has important implications for the donor community. In recent years there has been an increased interest in legislative strengthening. This has meant that multiple programs have been
set up across the continent by both multi and bilateral organizations. As an example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has increased its number of parliamentary strengthening programs from four in 1994 to 50 in 2005. (UNDP, 2008) The results of a study like this one would be extremely useful to practitioners, as it could provide the basis for project design.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
There is not an extensive literature on African legislatures or more specifically African legislator behaviour. According to Barkan, between 1995 and 2002, only 22 of the 87 articles in the Journal “Legislative Studies Quarterly” dealt with the legislative process outside of the United States. Of the 22 articles, none dealt with Africa. Rather, much of the literature on legislator behaviour both in and outside legislatures is based on the American and European experiences. (Barkan, Joel D., L. Ademolekun and Y. Zhou, 2004; 212)

Therefore when examining past literature, one is forced to turn to works focusing non-African experiences. This being said, this study is based on the assumption that since Southern African state’s democratic institutions are theoretically based on those developed in Western Europe and the United States, many aspects of the institutions will in some way influence the behaviour of elite actors. Therefore, literature based on the Western experience is important in trying to understand elite behaviour in new democracies. The literature focused on other parts of the world, such as Latin America and Asia, also use Western based research as its foundation. However, it often takes the stance that the subject states are exceptional. In addition, literature that has focused on African legislators has tended to treat the legislature as a single unitary actor. Often it has failed to look at legislators as individual actors within the democratic process. (Barkan, 1979; 267)

The first section of this literature review covers the concept of representation and its relationship between constituency work. The literature on representation is vast and there is most certainly a lack of space to cover all aspects of the field. The focus will thus be on how levels and types constituency work can help determine the quality of representation. In the next three sections, this work will give an overview of some of the main influences of legislator behaviour outside the legislature. The focus will be legislator role orientations, electoral competition and electoral systems.
Constituency Work and Representation

Many studies have been completed which measure the levels of constituency work completed by legislators and examine how these levels of constituency service relate to the quality of representation within a specific state. There are a number of reasons for the interest in this area. Most directly, interest stems from the conclusion that policy work performed by a legislator is often the one of the least important components of the electorate’s decision in re-electing an incumbent, largely because voters lack the necessary knowledge of the legislator’s policy positions. (Serra and Moon, 1994; 200) Therefore, there has been a search to find out what aspects of the legislator’s job help them in their re-election bid. This has become increasingly important, especially within the United States where there is evidence that suggests that incumbents have a large advantage over their competitors.

More generally, it is argued that legislators, along with other actors such as civil society, play a role in linking citizens to their government in both established and developing democracies. This in turn gives the government the legitimacy to carry out its day-to-day activities. The legislator’s role as a linkage device is especially important in Southern Africa and in many other developing countries, as often actors that typically provide linkage, such as civil society, are less developed. (Barkan, 1979)

Role Orientation

According to the role orientation approach of explaining legislator behaviour, legislator’s behaviour is a function of their legislative role orientation. These role orientations establish themselves as a result of a number of socialization experiences. (Clarke, Price and Krause; 1975; 522) Legislators develop role orientations towards the many actors they deal with in their job including constituents, fellow legislators, bureaucracy and interest groups. It has been argued in the literature that the amount of time legislators spend doing constituency work should be a function of their role orientation. For an extended overview of this literature please refer to Saalfeld and Muller, 1997.
This set of literature was initially based on the work of the Edmund Burke, who differentiated between “trustee” and “delegate” roles. Burke argued that in the “trustee” role, legislators assume that they have sufficient autonomy to act on behalf of their constituents. In effect, their propensity is to deliberate and act in favour of the greater common good and national interest, even if it means going against the short-term interests of their own constituencies. (Loewenburg and Patterson, 1979; 179) This is in contrast to the “delegate” role, whereby legislators perceive themselves as mouthpieces for their own constituencies. In effect, they perceive themselves has having little or no autonomy from those who elected them. (Lowenburg and Patterson, 1979; 179)

Since Burke developed these conceptions, the scope of literature on role orientations has developed into a robust field. This topic received a surge of interest during the 1950s and 1960s. A number of pieces stand out as the main drivers of this surge, probably the most important work being, *The Legislative System* by Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Bachanan and LeRoy Ferguson. This work was based on an exploratory study that focused on the behaviour of 474 representatives from four American states (California, New Jersey, Ohio and Tennessee). Within this work further aspects of roles were distinguished. The first was the representational role focus. Representational role focus is concerned with a legislator's attitudinal orientation towards a particular geographic entity of representation, be it the constituency, province, region, country as a whole, or some combination of these spatial entities. (Heinz Eulau et al; 1959, 752-3) The second aspect of roles discussed was the representational role style. In other words, the importance a legislator places on one or more of several possible influences which might affect his behaviour as a representative. (Heinz Eulau et al.; 1959, 749-50) The article also points out that the legislator’s choice of area focus will also be influenced by the democratic political system. Their separation of a legislator’s spatial focus and their role orientation style was one of their main contributions to the set of literature. By separating these two concepts, they allowed for a better understanding of elite actions, as different role styles may be used in similar spatial orientations.

To understand further a legislator’s representational role style, Eulau and his associates broke down where a style may be created. They determined that roles were defined by three fundamental types of “norms” or aspects; *consensual aspects, purposive aspects, and representational aspects*. *Consensual aspects* included written prescriptions such as
constitutions, statutes, or rules of procedure as well as other unwritten norms of the legislature. In other words, aspects of the institutional structure that forced legislators to act in certain ways. *Purposive aspect* dealt with how legislators perceived the function of their activities. In other words, what they perceived is the ultimate purpose of their activities, such as parliamentary activity and constituency service. As a result, this study is using levels of electoral competition to determine how legislators may perceive their own electoral safety. Based on this work, it is assumed that these perceptions of electoral safety will affect legislator behaviour. Finally, they distinguished a *Representational aspect* which helped legislators determine the method or process used to achieve their long term goals. (Eulau et al. 1962, 11-12)

Ultimately, these differentiations have allowed us to breakdown aspects of legislator orientations to give us a further understanding of not only actions within the legislature itself, but also their relationship with their constituencies. These differentiations are especially important to the purpose of this study as they theoretically back the idea that institutional settings not only affect a legislator’s outlook towards their own conception of their purpose as a legislator, but also have a direct impact on the way they choose to interact with others actors.

Following the surge of interest during the 1950’s and 1960’s on representational roles, this area of scholarship saw a decline in attention. The reason for this decline was due to a weariness of conceptual confusion that was normally associated with early role theory. More importantly though, role theory, up until this point, could not explain legislator behaviour. It was only in the late 1980s and early 1990s scholars returned to this topic with the aim of using it in a more functional way. (Saalfeld and Müller, 1997, 9)

Donald Searing’s study on British MPs during the early 1970s, later published in his book *Westminster’s World: Understanding Political Roles* in 1994, was the keystone work for the revival. Searing based his analysis on a set of surveys done on 521 backbencher MPs, which aimed at determining how they divided their time between activities both inside and outside the legislature. Searing (1994) argued that backbenchers and those holding leadership positions have very different types of role orientations, and therefore they should be examined at separately. Additionally, backbenchers are largely able to choose their role orientation, yet at the same time their options are moulded by certain aspects of democratic institutions. (Saalfeld and Müller, 1997, 9)
In his work, Searing argues that there were in fact four separate role orientations; *Policy Advocate, Ministerial Aspirant, Constituency Member* and *Parliament Man.* (Searing; 1994, 252) As the focus of this study is the legislator’s relationship with their constituency, we will briefly focus on Searing’s *Constituency Member* categorization. Within the *Constituency Member* categorization, Searing recognized two further sub-categorizations; *welfare officers* and *local promoters.* *Welfare officers* are concerned with the services provided to individual constituents. They are often increasingly likely to spend more of their time participating in individual casework as well as spend more time holding “surgery”. This is in contrast to *Local Promoters*, who see their role as to meet the collective demands of their entire constituency. (Studler and McAlister; 1994, 387). While these groupings may not be transferable to most other legislatures due to historical and present realities facing the British legislature, they provide other researchers with a better understanding of how the nuances of parliamentary life can drastically alter how a legislator may perceives their role not only within the institution they are a part of but also the people they are meant to represent within this institution.

It is these works that have really formed the basis of the literature that focuses on legislature role orientation today. Two approaches have been used in this literature. The first creates typologies and attempts to fit legislators into these, while the other approach casts doubt on the utility of using the defined categorizations. (Gallagher and Holliday; 2003, 108) While much of the work has focused on legislatures in the Western Europe and the United States, there has been a recent increase in the amount of work being done on role orientation elsewhere. The majority of these studies have attempted a more quantitative approach by using survey and direct electoral data. The bulk of literature has focused on such countries as Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Studler and McAllister, 1996; Clark, Price and Robert Krause, 1975; Wood and Young, 1997).

New work on New Zealand and other states that use a PR electoral system is of relevance to this study. In the past, studies on role orientation have most often taken place in states with a FPTP majoritarian electoral system, leaving a vast gap in the literature on the topic. This new literature has begun to close the gap. It is these works that provide the basis for the measurements methods used to measure electoral competition in PR states for this study. It should also be noted that a number studies have also taken a more qualitative approach. In these studies, researchers conducts a number of in-depth interviews with legislators as well as shadow
them in their day-to-day work. (Massicard, 2005; Ong, 1976) The focus of these studies are often how political culture affects legislator choices. As the focus is often state level political culture, studies such as these have less relevance in comparison to the ones already discussed above.

**Electoral Competition and Legislator Behaviour**

In order to explain certain levels of constituency service, a group of authors have focused on the electoral competition legislators face in relation to the time and resources legislators they spend in their constituencies. There is little agreement in the literature as to the strength of the relationship between interparty competition and levels of constituency work. The work that has been completed on this topic has tended to focus on levels of the interparty competition in the United States in relation to resource allocation decisions made by legislators. This has been the case especially since in the 1970s, when the United States and many other Western nations began to see a marked increase in the levels of constituency work done by incumbents despite no evidence that voters had become more aware of their presence. (Fiorina; 1981, 544) Evidence in this set of literature quite often points to the psychological reasoning, as little correlation between constituency work and substantial electoral gains can be found.

In Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina’s work “The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence”, they argue that one of the largest reasons legislators in the United Kingdom and the United States participate in constituency service was to increase their perceived “Personal Vote”. They found that legislators in marginal seats were much more likely to participate in high levels of constituency service, as it was perceived that the additional votes gained from this service could make a difference between a win and a loss in the next election. (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987, 77-88) Since this publication, other pieces have also had similar findings. (Norton and Wood, 1990) This being said, others have argued that the relationship is weaker than previously assumed. (McAdams and Johannes 1998; Studler and McAllister, 1996; 1993, Searing, 1985) McAdams and Johannes argue that legislators place too much emphasis on constituency work when trying to understand individual legislator electoral margins. Rather the actions of the opposition parties, incumbent and opposition spending, ideological capability and voter assessment of the incumbent head of state played the same and if not a more important role in determining electoral margins. (McAdams and Johannes, 1998)
Whether constituency service plays the most important role in electoral gains or a smaller one, its significance is undeniable. More importantly, through the research we can conclude the legislators perceive that it can impact their electoral margins. Whether it does or not, in trying to understand legislator’s impetus for participating in the activity it is a factor that cannot be denied. Thus electoral margins play an important part in this study to allow the determination of perceived electoral safety.

One of the most important pieces of literature is a work done by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. The work was based on interviews of incumbent congressmen and well as their non-incumbent opponents in 116 congressional districts. In addition, interviews were done with constituents from the chosen districts. These interviews were conducted immediately after the 1958 congressional election. (Miller and Stokes; 1963, 46) The aim of the study was to gain a further understanding of the policy preference congruence between representatives and constituents in three policy areas; the approval of government action in the welfare field, foreign affairs, and the civil rights movement. (Miller and Stokes; 1963, 48) In effect, the extent to which beliefs and issues within the district effect that actions of representatives in the capitol. (Miller and Stokes; 1963, 48) While the focus of this work was to determine how actions of constituency members effected the choices made by legislators in the capitol it came to a number of important conclusion about the representative-constituent relationship. They argued one of the ways that constituents are able to control the actions of their legislatures was through possible non-re-election. This in turn forced legislators to keep abreast of the general views of their constituents. Therefore, interaction with constituents provided a method to increase ones chances of re-election.

It is a conclusion such as this that has provided the basis for this study. The idea that legislators will be encouraged to participated in a relationship with their constituents to maintain their seat is central. To further test this theory, the study will look at how electoral margins may affect varying levels of constituency interaction. By making the assumption that there is a connection between electoral outcome and the legislator-constituent relationship, we can test whether the relationship changes with different electoral outcomes. Following the testing of this interaction, this study will also look to electoral systems as a possible influence to the legislator-constituent relationship. The following section is general break down of the literature on this topic.
Electoral Systems and Constituency Service

There is a vast literature on electoral systems and how they affect the institutions and actors they interact with. Within it, there is a wide literature that touches upon the possible effects of electoral structures on levels and types of constituency work in single states. Much of this literature is predicated on the idea articulated by H. Eulau and his colleagues in “The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke”; that the system in which a representative is elected in and works within helps them determine not only what their representational focus is on (whether it be the local district, region or state) but also helps the representative determine what style they will choose to interact with the public. (Eulau et al. 1950; 745)

It is often argued that FPTP majoritarian electoral systems as well multi-member systems such as single transferable vote (STV) provide the most incentives for legislators to participate in constituency service. This is in relation to closed party list systems that provide limited incentives for members to engage in such constituency based activities, and limited opportunities for citizens to contact 'their' representatives. (Norris, 1998, 208) However, after further examination of more specific literature on this topic there seems to be little agreement as to the extent to which electoral systems actually affect legislator’s propensity to participate in constituency service.

Most of the literature focuses on the differences between FPTP majoritarian and STV in multi-member districts systems. No state in this study uses the STV system, so therefore arguments as to why this system is best at encouraging constituency service will not be covered. The next section will go over some of the arguments as to why a FPTP majoritarian system leads to higher levels of constituency service. Following this, the overview will then turn to a number of cross national studies on this topic that provide a number of important insights.

Those who argue that FPTP majoritarian systems encourage the most legislator-constituent interaction often base their arguments on the fact that in this system a single legislator is responsible for a single constituency. Therefore, if a constituent approaches the legislator, they are unable to “pass the buck” to any other constituency representative. (Gallagher and Holliday, 2003, 108) In Britain, supporters of their electoral method (FPTP majoritarian)
have even gone as far as seeing the connection between MPs and their constituencies in sacrosanct terms. The “sacred trust” and “inalienable bond” is often touched upon. (Crewe, 1985 in Gallagher and Holiday, 2003, 108) Proponents of this system argue that without having a single representative from each constituency there is little incentive for legislators to deal with their constituents. While this argument has been made in a number of works, there is less evidence in cross-national data to support the fact that electoral systems alone force legislators to participate in specific levels of constituency service. In these studies, electoral systems are often used as one of the many factors that lead to specific levels of constituency service, not the sole predictor.

Party ballots, where electors place a vote for a single party on either a constituency or at a national level, is the ballot type in which there are the least constituency level expectations of legislators. Whether the party lists are open or closed, candidates have little connection to a specific geographic location unless the party has designated such an entity. However, magnitude and size of areas may vary considerably between parties within the same country.

Large cross national studies have had varying results, some indicating the relevance of electoral structures on levels of constituency service, while others have not found a relationship. One of these studies was done by David M. Wood and G. Young, “Comparing constituency activity by junior legislators in Great Britain and Ireland” (1997) that compared levels of constituency service between British MPs and Irish legislators. What was discovered was that Irish MPs actually spend more time doing constituency service in comparison to their British counterparts.(Wood and Young; 1997, 226) This is especially interesting as Ireland’s electoral system is proportional representation and STV. Thus, due to the literature, one would expect that Members of Parliament from Britain to participate in higher levels of constituency service, however this was not the case. They argued that political culture and constituent expectations had a larger effect in determining levels of constituency service.

Another cross-national study completed by Vernon Bogdanor during the mid 1980s found that there was not a relationship between electoral systems and levels of constituency service. Rather he found that there were large levels of variation but the main determinants of levels of constituency service were availability of avenues for redress for constituents, strength of local government, and level of knowledge of citizens. (Bogdanor, 1985, 299)
The states in this study fall into perceived extreme categories when it comes to constituency service. Malawi, Kenya and Zambia all have FPTP majoritarian systems where relative to all other systems legislators are expected to participate in the highest levels of constituency. South Africa and Mozambique both use a PR system, where legislators are only expected to develop connections with a specific geographical area if they are assigned a constituency or are nominated at a regional or local level. As a result, legislators who originate from a PR system are expected to participate in the least amount of constituency service comparatively to legislators from other systems. This study will test these assumptions.

According to Pippa Norris (2004) there are certain aspects of electoral systems that play a role in influencing legislator behaviour. (230) The following section is an overview of these aspects. The first aspect is argued to be ballot structure. Ballot structure refers to the way in which voters express their choices on the ballot, whether a voter selects a person or party when they go to the polls. Within the literature two separate ballot structures are argued to encourage legislators to participate in higher levels of constituency service.

The first, and probably the most common, are candidate based ballots, where a candidate would find their name on the ballot alongside their party name, depending on whether they were running as an independent or not. It is argued that candidates may have incentives to provide particularistic benefits to their constituents. ¹ For example legislators may be more inclined to participate in casework by helping individual constituents or by delivering local services to his or her constituency. (Gallagher and Holliday; 2003; 108) These types of actions are aimed at strengthening their personal support within the local community. In this study Kenya, Malawi and Zambia use this type of system.

The second ballot type which may lead to higher levels of constituency service are preference ballots.² In this case citizens exercise a preference vote, otherwise known as an open or non blocked vote. This strengthens the chances that particular candidates from the list will be elected and, therefore, changes their rank on the party list. (Norris, 2004; 231) No state in this study uses this style of electoral system.

¹ This style of ballot would be used in a single member district; citizens in each constituency cast a single ballot for an individual candidate. The winner of the poll would be elected into office through either a majority or a plurality of votes.
² Most often used in open-list multimember districts electors cast a single ballot for a party. Often electors will be asked also if they have a preference for a particular candidate.
The second aspect of electoral systems that shape the way in which legislators perceive constituency service is the candidate selection process. Two aspects of party politics may help predict levels of constituency service by legislators, the first being the general level of centralization of the party and the second being if primaries take place within the party and at what level. The basic reasoning behind this is that when candidates are selected at the lower levels of the party they then have increasing responsibility to the grassroots party support. This in turn encourages them to develop a personal vote within either their local constituency or an area demarcated by the party itself. (Norris, 2004; 232) This rings true for both candidate based ballots as well as party list ballots.

What we can conclude from this group of work is that while a number of assumptions about how electoral systems and level of constituency service may have been made, further cross-national analysis needs to be done. While certain aspects of an electoral system may encourage legislators to act in a certain way, their does not seem to be conclusive evidence to show that certain electoral systems will lead to certain levels of constituency service.
Chapter 3: Research Design
The following chapter provides definitions of the concepts used, hypotheses associated with each of the concepts and methods used for measurement.

The variables outlined include;

1. Dependent Variable
   a. Constituency Service
      i. Number of Days Spent in the Constituency while Parliament is in Session
      ii. Percentage of Time Participating in Constituency Service

2. Independent Variables
   a. Electoral Competitiveness
      i. Actual Past Competitiveness (APC)
      ii. Perceived Future Competitiveness (PFC)
   b. Electoral System
   c. Role Orientation

3. Constants
   a. Seniority of the Legislator
   b. Legislator Age
   c. Party Membership
   d. Geographic Proximity to the Constituency

In advance of more detail on these variables and the hypotheses associated with them, information about the source and structure of the data used to create the variables will be outlined. This study utilizes data gathered by Phase III of the African Legislatures Project (ALP). It takes the form of responses from interviews with a representative sample of legislators in a five different African countries using a structured questionnaire. The Table 3.1 provides details on the countries examined in this study, as well as information relevant to the interview process.

The eventual aim of the African Legislatures Project is to conduct 50 interviews from each of the sample countries. However, due to time restrictions, full samples were not available
### Table 3.1: Interview Period and Sample Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Interviews</th>
<th>Number of Legislators in Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>March – June 2009</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>March - August 2008</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>July 2009 – June 2009</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

when this study was completed. Therefore, a total of 210 questionnaires are examined. The following is a table that details information about the states that will be examined;

### Table 3.2: Parliamentary Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name of the Lower House</th>
<th>Size *</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Parliament of South Africa</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>National Assembly of Malawi</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>FPTP Majoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>National Assembly of Zambia</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>FPTP Majoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Parliament of the Republic of Kenya</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>FPTP Majoritarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Elected members only

**Dependent Variable**

**Constituency Service**

In the literature a number of different conceptions of constituency work are used. Especially in American literature, there is a tendency to use the term in a narrow context, often only referring to “Casework”, whereby legislators look at individual cases brought to them by one of their constituents who are looking for help dealing with bureaucracy or other large entities such as big business. Casework can refer to individual cases or to cases that affect a larger group of people. (Johannes, 1983; 532) However, the common assumption about all casework is that members within the constituency brought the issue to the attention of the legislator.
Constituency work in the broader sense refers to any work undertaken by a Legislator or his staff outside of a parliament that directly deals with citizens. (Park, 1988; 225) This can take place either in the constituency itself or at the legislator’s office in the parliamentary capitol. It ranges from specifically casework to working with local legislators within the constituency. Due to the broadness of this definition, a wide range of actions are considered part of this activity.

For the purpose of this study, the broadest conception of “constituency work” will be used. This was done for a number of reasons. First of all, it is recognized that most legislators that participated in the study face limited resources. It is also assumed that limited resources may reduce a legislator’s ability to travel to the constituency to participate in constituency service, therefore, the conception used here also includes any interaction that a legislator may have with a constituent in the capitol as well. This was done to ensure that despite limited resources, all legislators had the ability to participate in some form of constituency service.

Based on the available data there is two ways of measuring levels of constituency service. For the first method, legislators are asked to indicate how much of their time typically per month they spent in their constituency when Parliament was in session. The second method is a measure of the total percentage time legislators report participating in constituency service.

**Independent Variables**

**Electoral Competitiveness**

For the purpose of this study, electoral competitiveness is defined as a candidate’s prospect of being elected to office in the next election. (Schlesinger, 1991; 102) There are a number of different methods for measuring it. In this study it will be measured in two ways. The first will focus on the level of competitiveness each legislator faced in the previous election, based on past electoral margins of victory, “Actual Past Competitiveness” (APC). The second measure of competitiveness is based on the perceived level of competitiveness for the upcoming election, “Perceived Future Competitiveness” (PFC). This measure will be based on a legislator’s response to the questionnaire. There are two main reasons why these conceptualizations and measurement methods of electoral competitiveness are used. First, the data was available. The nature of African politics and comparative politics make a multivariate approach difficult to achieve. This is largely
the case because data on the relevant topics may vary by country. Second, this information is individually relevant. Unlike descriptions of the nature of the opposition or party voting within Parliament, where it is hard to determine how this general information individually affects each legislator, electoral information is based on individuals. Therefore, it makes it possible to gauge how varying levels of electoral competitiveness affects individual legislators. Furthermore, it is assumed that this is the most tangibly information available about levels of electoral competitiveness to legislators.³

It is not possible to use the same method to measure APC across all five sample states, as the structure of electoral systems dictate that alternative measurement methods must be used for each system. In the case of the FPTP majoritarian systems, levels of competitiveness will be determined by looking at the electoral margin of victory at the election prior to when the interview was administered. In cases where a legislator had a relatively low margin of victory, they are considered as having faced high levels of electoral competitiveness. In cases, where the margin of electoral victory was higher, they will be considered to have faced lower levels of competitiveness. An ordinal scale of safety is created, based on the work of Heitshusen, Young and Wood (2005), where each legislator is placed into three distinct categories based on their margin of victory in the last election. The following table gives a breakdown of the measurement thresholds used to categorize legislators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage difference between number of votes received by the winner and the runner-up</th>
<th>Measurement of Electoral Competitiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ 20%</td>
<td>Safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%-20%</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-10%</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ In other studies electoral, margin of victory is an dependent variable as it was assumed constituency work would lead to an increase in electoral gains. This will not be the case for this study, as the question on electoral margin was gathered in relation to the election prior to the surveys being conducted. Therefore, electoral margin cannot be looked at to determine the effectiveness of constituency work at increasing a personal vote. This will only be possible after the next election.
In order to include legislators from PR electoral systems an alternative measurement of electoral competitiveness was created. Once again an ordinal scale of safety was created, based on the work of Heitshusen, Young and Wood (2005). When legislators are placed higher on the party list, it is assumed that they have overall higher levels of electoral safety, and therefore, face lower levels of electoral competitiveness. In the case of legislators who are further down the list, they are assumed to face higher levels of electoral competitiveness and therefore lower levels of electoral safety. As a result, each legislator’s APC was based on their placement in the party list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Placement on the Party List at the Time of the Last Election</th>
<th>Measurement of Electoral Competitiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top Third</td>
<td>Safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Third</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom Third</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4 : Electoral Competitiveness Categories Based on a Legislator’s Placement on the Party List at the Time of the Last Election

The party lists being used to determine electoral competitiveness originate from the election directly proceeding the interviews. While it is possible to obtain current party lists, as it has become apparent that they are updated throughout the electoral cycle.\(^4\) In FPTP majoritarian systems, electoral safety is most effectively obtained by looking at election results from the election period prior to when the examination of electoral competitiveness is being made. In order to maintain continuity in measurement through both electoral systems, only party lists from the time of the last election are used. In cases where a legislator was not on the party list during the last election, it will be assumed that if there had been additional positions on the list the legislator in question would have taken one of these spots. Thus for the purpose of this study they will be placed at the bottom of their party list. Therefore, they will always be categorized in marginal seats.

Heitshusen, Young and Wood (2005), base their measurement system of electoral competitiveness on a pure PR system, where each party only has a single national list. As South

\(^4\) As the party lists were not available for Mozambique, it has not been confirmed whether this is also the case on FRELIMO and REMAMO lists.
Africa uses an alternative system, where parties may have two lists, national and provincial, the method for determining the level of competitiveness was changed slightly to accommodate this difference.

The South African Parliament has 400 seats. 200 of these seats are elected through party lists at a national level. The second 200 seats are elected through party lists at the provincial level. Based on the population of each province, each province elects a proportion of the 200 seats. As a result, at a provincial level, parties compete for seats within their province’s allocation. It must be assumed that this system has implications on levels of electoral competition. As a result, the calculations used to determine level of electoral competitiveness for each legislator took this system into consideration. In cases where parties were allocated less than 5 seats, on either a National or Provincial list, the top competitiveness category, “Safe”, was removed. Therefore, legislators could only fall into one of two categories, “Competitive” or “Marginal”.

Electoral data was obtained through a number of different means. The primary approach was through the websites of the electoral commissions from each of the sample countries. When the data is not available directly through the internet, the electoral commissions were contacted directly (Kenya). In the case of Malawi, Kimberly Smiddy has kindly provided the needed electoral data.

The next method for measuring electoral competition, “FPC”, is based on responses given by the legislators during their interviews. In four of the five countries the following question was asked; “How would you rate your own electoral prospects in the [Year] election?”

In the literature, there is evidence to suggest that the perceptions of electoral safety have an effect on the behaviour of legislators both inside and outside the legislature. (Clarke, 1979)

The decision to include a measure of perceived electoral competition was made due to the timing of the interviews within the election cycle. An assumption is being made that previous electoral results will have varying levels of influence on perceptions of electoral safety depending on the time in the election cycle the interviews were completed. In situations where an election is imminent, it is being assumed that previous electoral results will play less of a role. This is because other variables such as internal party politics may play a larger role, especially if a electoral system has parties with highly competitive nomination processes. (Norris, 2004; 182)

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5 In Zambia this question was not asked. As a result this section of the study will not include Zambia.
The next table details the timing of the interviews in relation to their respective forthcoming elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.5: Interview Dates and the Election Cycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country(1)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009 – June 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EISA Website (www.eisa.org.za)

(1) All five countries have parliamentary terms of five years

As you can see from the above table, the interviews were done at multiple times during the election cycle. This means that we can expect variables to influence legislator’s perception of electoral safety at varying levels across countries.

A decision was made to use the same competitiveness categories as the previous method of measurement to enhance continuity. The following table provides a breakdown of how the responses were categorized;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.6: FPC Breakdown based on Original Question (Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, Mozambique)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not planning to stand again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I should retain my seat by a comfortable margin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I should retain my seat by a close margin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things are too uncertain to tell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am concerned I might lose my seat by a close margin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am concerned I might lose my seat by a large margin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It should be noted that “I am not planning to stand again” is being categorized as safe. While this initially might sound counter intuitive, the purpose of these categorizations is to provide an indicator of the possible “fear” of non-re-election. Those who know already that they are not planning will to run again are expected to have “no fear” similarly to their counterparts who are in safe seats. As a result those who indicate that they are not planning on running again in the next election are placed into the safe category.

By the time that South African legislators were interviewed for the project, a number of small changes were made to the instrument to enhance multi-country relevance. The question relating to perceptions of electoral competitiveness was modified. As a result, the responses more closely relate to South Africa’s electoral system, PR. The following table is a breakdown of how South African results are placed into the competitiveness brackets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Competitiveness Bracket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am not planning to stand in the next election</td>
<td>Safe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was in a safe and electable position on the party list</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things are too uncertain to tell</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was in an unelectable position on the party list</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was not put on the list (No legislators fell into this category)</td>
<td>Not coded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to a number of circumstances, a number of the interviews were completed before the March 2009 elections and some were completed after. Within the dataset there was not a differentiation between the two groups. The data from both groups will be treated similarly. In South Africa, “I am not planning to stand in the next election” was also a response. Legislators who opted for this response were placed into the safe category. In addition, “I was no put on the list” was also a possible response. No legislator used this response and therefore a categorization is not given.

It is expected that the level of electoral competitiveness across both measurement methods and electoral systems, will affect the level of constituency service in similar ways. Therefore the following statement is the first hypothesis;
H1: A positive relationship will exist between the levels electoral competitiveness and the levels of constituency work reported by legislators. As electoral competition increases, an increase in constituency service should be registered.

In the FPTP electoral system, the increased levels of competitiveness is expected to encourage legislators to participate in more constituency service, as they may perceive that it could lead to a higher “Personal Vote”. This in turn would work towards securing their re-election in the next election. As has already been noted, a number of studies have been done to determine the effectiveness of the constituency service at creating a better personal vote. The results are inconclusive, however, there is evidence to suggest that in many cases the perception it can play an important role in a successful bid for re-election, is strong enough to lead to heightened levels of constituency service. (Swindle, 2002; Norton and Wood, 1997; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987)

In the case of legislators from a PR system, it is expected that those who face higher levels of competitiveness and are thus lower down on the parties list will have less responsibilities not only in the party but also the legislature itself. Therefore, one might expect that they have more time to spend actively participating in constituency service.

Role Orientation

This section of the study is based on literature that argues a legislator’s behaviour can be gauged by their role orientation. Role orientations are developed through a number of socialization experiences. (Clarke, Price and Krause; 1975; 522) While authors have concluded that orientations are able to guide behaviour, there is little consensus as to how many orientations there are. This study will use three broad role orientations, nationally orientated, locally orientated and a middle orientation. Due to the various political systems and historical backgrounds of the countries in the study, it was concluded that broader, more inclusive categorizations would be most appropriate for a cross-national comparison. The individual orientations are conceptually based on the following parameters; A nationally orientated legislator would perceive their focus to be the national constituency rather than just their local
constituency. Additionally, the legislator would likely believe that the national good is of higher importance to the needs of the local constituency. Locally orientated legislators, by comparison are expected to have slightly different expectations and beliefs. They could perceive themselves as the mouthpieces of their constituency. This means that their focus would be the needs of this group rather than the national constituency. While it is recognized that it is impossible for representatives to receive and follow direct and explicit instructions from their constituents, a representative might still psychologically commit to the local role. Grazia points out, that role orientation should be seen as psychological positioning. (Grazia, 1951; 124) Therefore, in order to gauge a legislator’s role orientation, the initial step should be to gauge their relationship with their constituents.

In other cross-national studies, some researchers have decided to provide a “party orientated” category. (Heitshusen, Wood and Young, 2005) In this study, a similar orientation will not be examined. After initial analysis of the Malawian and Mozambican data, it has become clear that while there may be a definite differentiation of concepts within the literature, the line is much less clear among legislators. More commonly, legislators did not separate national interests and party interests. Therefore when asked, a number of legislators stated that party interests were national interest and therefore the two could not be separated. While this in itself provides evidence that parties may be extremely powerful in orientating legislators, at this point in time further research needs to be conducted on this topic. The structure of the questions and the scope of this study prevent the further deconstruction of this concept. Therefore, a party orientation will not be used.

It should also be noted that while these categorizations resemble those initially set out by Edmund Burke, they are in fact stray slightly from his original conceptions. Burke’s orientations, delegate and trustee, focus on how legislators believe their mandate should be executed. (Loewenburg and Patterson, 1979, 179) This study does not aim to do this; rather, the aim is to gain the legislator’s spatial orientation. Rather than focusing on the way in which legislators choose to make their decisions, this study aims to determine what they perceive their primary constituency to be. Rather, this spatial orientation will then guide them in making their decisions. This leads to the next hypothesis;
H2: A relationship will exist between legislator role orientation and reported time spent doing constituency work. Locally orientated legislators are expected to participate in more constituency service relative to their counterparts who are nationally orientated.

It is expected that legislators who are locally orientated will spend a larger proportion of their time participating in constituency service. While resources restrictions are expected to reduce the overall amount of time legislators could possibly spend in their constituencies, it is expected that it will not be so restrictive that legislators would be completely prevented from participating in constituency service altogether. As a broader definition of constituency service is being used, it is expected that legislators will likely participate in constituency service from the capitol in addition to the constituency itself, resulting in a broad range of options to engage in constituency service. A further hypothesis is as follows;

H3: A relationship will exist between electoral system and legislator role orientation. PR electoral systems (South Africa and Mozambique) will have a relatively higher number of legislators who are nationally orientated relative to the FPTP majoritarian systems (Zambia, Malawi and Kenya).

It is expected that majority of legislators originating from states that use a FPTP majoritarian system will be locally orientated. There is much evidence to suggest, that FPTP majoritarian systems inherently encourage legislators to participate in constituency service in order to increase their re-election odds in the forthcoming election. (Norris, 1997; Gallagher and Holiday, 2003) Thus, legislators in FPTP majoritarian systems are inherently linked to a constituency not only for their election prospects but also more generally, it is expected that their focus will more likely be on their constituency, relative to those elected through the PR system.

Legislators who gain their seats through a PR system are expected to be relatively more nationally orientated. Despite the fact that it may be common practice for parties to assign constituencies once the legislator is elected to office, they are less likely to directly relate their previous personal electoral success on a specific region. Also, due to the nature of PR systems and their effect on the structure of parties, it is expected that legislators will inherently have much stronger connections to their party. As one of the main assumptions regarding legislators
is the fact that their primary objective is to be re-elected, it is expected that legislators from these systems may place party work as a higher priority.

In order to create the categorizations for role orientation a scale is created based on a number of questions relating to how legislators interact with constituents. The following tables provide a breakdown of how each question’s responses are coded into their respective orientations;

| Table 3.8: In your opinion, which of each of the following jobs is the most important part of being an MP?(Important) |
| MP Response | Orientation Category |
| Debating Bills and Passing Laws | National |
| Making Public Policy by Writing Laws | National |
| Overseeing the Executive | National |
| Bringing Development to your Constituency | Local |
| Representing Constituents Views in Parliament | Local |
| Assisting Constituents with their Problems | Local |
| Soliciting Funds for your Constituency | Local |

This first question regards what a legislator believes is the most important aspect of their job. A range of possible responses are provided.

| Table 3.9: For you personally, which one do you find to be the MOST rewarding? (Rewarding) |
| Response | Orientation |
| Debating bills and passing laws | National |
| Making public policy by writing laws | National |
| Overseeing the executive | National |
| Bringing development to your constituency | Local |
| Representing constituents’ views in parliament | Local |
| Assisting constituents with their problems | Local |
| Soliciting funds for your constituency | Local |
The second question used to create the orientation scale is quite similar, but focuses on what the legislator perceives as the most rewarding part of the job. The same possible responses are provided. This has meant that the same categorizations are used for both questions.

In Zambia, question two (Rewarding) was not asked. This has meant that role orientation is determined using just question one (Important). However, for all the other countries both questions were used. A reliability test was run with an Alpha score of .497. While this score is not as high as one might like, it is sufficient. Other combinations of variables relating to role orientation were also tested, however, no combination of variables had an Alpha score this high.

In a number of cases, legislators indicated varying orientations between the two variables used to create the scale. In order to prevent the loss of a significant amount of data, a decision has been made to create a middle category.

**Electoral System**

The next section will focus on the possible affect of a macro level structure on the behaviour of legislators, the electoral system. Over the last two decades electoral system design has garnered much interest again, as newly democratized states wade through the possible options when opting for a system. As political scientists have created a taxonomy of electoral systems relating to their effects on the political system in which they are a part, it is no secret that different systems will affect the structure of institutions and the behaviour of actors. It is expected that certain electoral systems will have certain “psychological affects” on legislators and therefore effects on larger issues such as political representation and accountability. (Norris, 2004; 230)

Ballot structure, the centralization of the candidate selection process in parties, the size of multimember districts as well as legislator term limitations are the main aspects of electoral systems that are expected to influence legislator behaviour. (Norris, 2004; 230) This study is focusing on ballot structure. The main reason for this is a lack of variance across the study countries for many of the other possible factors. Across all five countries legislators have 5 year terms. (EISA, 2009) This means that across all five countries, changes in term length are nonexistent and therefore term length cannot be seen as a possible factor for variance within legislator behaviour. In terms of multimember districts, all three FPTP majoritarian systems use
single member constituencies. For the PR states, South Africa and Mozambique, national party lists are produced and legislators are elected through seats based on the proportion of votes the party received nationally or provincially. Constituencies are only given later to individual legislators; however, their electoral prospects are not directly connected to this geographic location. As a result, electoral prospects are not tied to any multimember constituencies in any of the sample states.

**Ballot Structure**

Overall, the nomination process across the sample countries is diverse even at a micro-level, making cross-national comparison difficult. As a result, ballot structure is main aspect of the electoral system that is being examined in this study. However, before we turn to the statistical results, lets first look at the structure of the electoral systems in each of the sample countries. The following table provides some basic aspects of each of the electoral systems used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Number of Districts</th>
<th>Number of Elected Seats</th>
<th>Number of Seats Nominated by the President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya(1)</td>
<td>FPTP Majoritarian</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>FPTP Majoritarian</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>FPTP Majoritarian</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Up to 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Based on 2007

**Malawi**

Malawi uses a FPTP majoritarian system, whereby in each race a winner is determined in each district by gaining the most votes relative to all other competitors. This electoral system has been used in parliamentary elections in Malawi since 1966, then Nyasaland. According to Reynolds and Sisk (1999), the electoral system was never fully considered, nor was the consequences of the choice. The electoral system choice was not dealt with during the democratic transition negotiations between the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) government and
the Alliance for Democracy - United Democratic Front (AFORD-UDF) opposition. It was concluded during these negotiations that the choice of electoral system was not a priority issue and furthermore that the historical choice, FPTP majoritarian, could be easily maintained. (146)

Zambia

As in Malawi, Zambia uses a FPTP majoritarian system. It was inherited from the previous regime. Initially only based on 125 districts, the house now has 150 seats. Halving 25 of the existing districts created these additional seats. This process created a situation whereby the distribution of the population between districts is quite uneven. In the most extreme case, the largest district has over seven times the population of the smallest. (Reynolds and Sisk, 1999; 150) Since its induction as the electoral system of choice, Zambia has continued to use a FPTP majoritarian system despite a number of calls to change to a PR system during the early 1990s.(Reynolds, 1998; 152)

Kenya

Similarly to Zambia and Malawi, Kenya uses a FPTP majoritarian system. Despite an extended period of one party rule under President Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi between 1969 and 1992, where elections continued to take place, the electoral system has not changed since independence. Throughout this period parties other than the Kenyan National African Union (KANU) were not permitted to take part. This meant that elections more closely resembled primaries seen in some multiparty systems. (Barkan, 1993; 86) Since 1992, a number of multiparty elections have taken place.

Mozambique

In Mozambique unlike in the first three countries already discussed, the decision to use the electoral system of choice was in fact calculated. Towards the end of a long civil conflict within Mozambique, it became apparent an electoral system was needed that not only protected against further divisiveness within the society but could also be feasibly setup in a country
ravaged by years of civil war. In terms of encouraging further divisiveness, it was thought that PR could provide the best solution. The proponents of PR argue that it is in fact the most appropriate system for pluralist societies, like Mozambique. They argue that there are a number of reasons for this, but most importantly, that it allows for the election of all political entities into the legislature, including political spoilers. This in the long run, enhances the likelihood that all groups will support the overall legitimacy of the entire system. Additionally, it is argued that a PR system, is most likely to encourage a power sharing or a consociational democracy. (Reynolds, 1999; 57) In terms of the logistics, it was also deemed impossible to conduct a census and demarcate the boundaries of electoral districts prior to the election, making PR the only possible choice. (Barkan, Densham and Rushton, 2006; 927)

Overall, the Mozambican legislature has 248 legislators. They are elected through 11 districts corresponding to the 10 provinces and the city of Maputo. Expatriates in Europe and Africa return one member each. The number of seats allocated to each district is determined afresh for each election based on the proportion of voters registered in each by the national electoral commission. (EISA, 2009)

South Africa

Much like Mozambique, South Africa faced similar structural problems that prevented the main actors within the transition to vie for any other system to PR. However, the system is not a pure PR system. Rather it is two tier system, where 50% (200) of the seats are allocated through contesting parties based on their total of the national vote using the Droop quota system while the other 200 seats are allocated on the same basis by the 9 geographical regions. (Reynolds and Sisk, 1998; 63)

Based on the literature, one should expect see varying affects of the electoral system on legislators’ relationships with their constituencies. As a result, this study’s hypothesis relating to this topic is as follows;

H4: There will be a relationship between electoral system and levels of reported constituency service. Countries using a FPTP majoritarian electoral system will have
relatively higher levels of constituency service compared to countries using a PR electoral system.

As was noted above in the literature review, there is little consensus in larger cross-national studies as to the extent in which electoral systems can be used to determine a legislator’s level of constituency service. (Wood and Young, 1997; Bogdanor, 1985) However, the same results are not expected here. The main reason being that these studies are often conducted over a number of different electoral systems, including the myriad of PR systems seen in Europe. While the systems may vary in structure slightly, many of the same incentive structures still exist. This study will be looking at the two electoral systems on drastically different incentive structures, FPTP majoritarian and PR. Thus varying levels of constituency service are expected.

Based on smaller studies, this study expects to find that legislators from FPTP majoritarian systems will spend more time participating in constituency service in comparison legislators from PR systems. This is due to the fact that legislators are more likely to perceive that participating in constituency service may lead possible electoral gains. (Norris, 1997) As the assumption is that legislator’s main purpose is to maintain their seat, it must be assumed that they will be more likely to participate in constituency service if they face higher levels of competitiveness.

Control Variables

The following section provides details on a number of factors that are believed to also influence legislator’s level of constituency service and role orientation. The variables include; seniority of the legislator, legislator age, party membership and geographic proximity. For a portion of the analyses, these variables are held constant.
The literature indicates that senior members are more likely to be electorally secure and hence may not be as motivated to engage actively in constituency work compared to less senior members. (Wood and Young, 1997) Following an initial examination of the Zambian data, there is evidence to suggest seniority does play an important role in affecting how legislators interact with their constituencies. Rather though, it shows that senior legislators interact more frequently with their constituents as their seniority increases. At this point in the study, it is being hypothesized that this may relate to access to resources, however this cannot be tested at this time. Seniority of the legislator will be controlled for. This control variable will be measured by number of years the legislator has been elected into office.  

Legislator Age

It has been hypothesized that younger legislators may be assigned to constituencies that traditionally face higher levels of electoral competitiveness, as it may be perceived that younger legislators have the energy needed to participate in levels of constituency service needed to win. Also, as Wood and Young point out, younger legislators may be more amenable to pursuing higher levels of constituency service for the purpose of furthering their own political career rather than just for the purpose of re-election. (Wood and Young, 1997; 220) Therefore, legislator age could also play an important role in determining the level of constituency service. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, legislator age will also be held constant. In four of the five countries each legislator was asked their age, in Zambia however, they were placed into age brackets. In order to allow for analysis and continuity between the variables, the median age from each of the age brackets was used to indicate Zambian legislators’ ages.

Party Membership

Due to the nature of African politics and more specifically government resource distribution, it can be assumed that legislators from the ruling party may have access to greater funds. As the pressure increases from within many African societies to redistribute funds, leaders often expect to have the ability to distribute through partisan means. (Sandbrook, 2001; 68) This in turn could allow legislators from governing parties to participate in higher levels of constituency service relative to their counterparts in opposition parties as funds are more likely to

6 Legislators who were appointed to their position were not included in the study.
be available for activities such as this. Therefore, a variable was created that placed legislators into a “governing party” or “opposition party” category.

**Geographic Proximity to the Constituency**

In the past it has been found that geographic proximity has a positive relationship with levels of constituency service. In Wood and Young’s work on British and Irish legislators it was concluded that legislators who are required to travel a further distance to their district are likely to spend more time participating in constituency service. Wood and Young explained this phenomenon using a number of possible justifications. Firstly, as the total cost of traveling to their constituency is relatively higher than other areas, legislators are more likely to use their time more effectively when they actually get to their constituency, resulting in higher overall levels of constituency service. (Wood and Young, 1997; 226) This could also hold true for the countries within this study. However, it is dependent on whether constituency service is seen as the primary priority once they arrive in their constituency. Based on the data from this study, it has become apparent legislators in a number of the sample countries do not participate solely on constituency service when they return to their constituency. In addition to constituency work, it is not uncommon for legislators to also participate in party work as well. For the purpose of this study, it is being hypothesized distance may play a role but this is further dependent on what legislators perceive the main purpose of traveling back to their constituency to be.

Wood and Young also argue that constituencies further from the capitol may be more culturally separate from the core resulting in a need for legislators to spend more time with their constituents to reinforce the fact that there are qualified to represent them in the capitol. (Wood and Young, 1997; 226) This preposition has special relevance in Sub-Saharan Africa where the majority of countries are highly fractionalized due to ethnic and cultural differences. One could expect that legislators who represent constituencies where a minority group may be situated further from the capital might be expected to participate in higher levels of constituency service.

In order to measure geographic proximity, an existing variable measuring the total distance between the capitol and legislators’ constituencies was recoded to reflect a new proximity measure. The following categories were created; when a legislators traveled less than 50 kilometres to his or her constituency than it was categorized as 0. When legislators travel
between 51 and 200 kilometres to their constituency they were given a value of 1. When legislators traveled 201 kilometres or more they were given a value of 2. The basis for this categorization is that theoretically, a distance of 50 kilometres easy to achieve on a daily basis. A distance between 51 and 200, while possible would be slightly more difficult. Any distance above 200 kilometres would require special trips planned for the purpose of returning to the constituency.
Chapter 4: Descriptives
Constituency Service

This study uses two measures of constituency service. The first measures the average number of days a month a legislators spends in their constituency and the second measures the percentage of time legislators report participating in constituency service. When asked about the number of days they spend in their constituency, legislators are asked to differentiate between periods in which Parliament is in session and out of session. The following two tables provide a breakdown of number of descriptives relating to the two measures of days spent in the constituency. While only one is being used during the analysis section (in session travel), it was thought that a brief examination of both side by side would be beneficial.\(^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1: Number of days spent in the constituency - Descriptives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As expected, the amount of time spent in the constituency is relatively lower during the period in which Parliament is in session than out, across all four countries where the data is available. Surprisingly, South African legislators report spending more time in their constituency when parliament is out session relative to their counterparts in other countries. Based on the literature, one might expect them to spend less time than their counterparts who come from countries that use a FPTP majoritarian electoral system. At this point in time no definitive explanation can be given; however, it might be explained by two possible particularities to South

\(^7\) This data was not gathered in Zambia
Africa. The first being the overall level access to funds that might facilitate travel to the constituency. An indicator of this possible explanation is the percentage of legislators who have access to an offices paid for by either the legislature or their party. In South Africa, 84% of the sample have access to an office in their constituency that is paid for. This is relative to Mozambique, Kenya and Malawi, where only 14%, 50% and 2% respectively had access.

A possible further explanation is the fact that there is a tendency to allocate legislators their home area when assigning constituencies.

When parliament is in session, the amount of time spent in the constituency remains relatively constant through South Africa, Kenya and Malawi. Mozambican legislators appear on average to spend even less time in their constituency than their counterparts. 81 percent of Mozambican legislators did not travel at all to their constituency during this period. This result could be expected based on the electoral system and legislator’s limited access to funds from the legislature and party for travel.

The decision to utilize data measuring number of days spent in the constituency when parliament was in session over out of session was based on the quality of the data available. There appeared to be more missing data for one reason or another in the variable measure activity out of session.

While initially it was believed that the total time spent in the constituency would be the best indicator of levels of constituency service, it became apparent from further analysis that while legislators may be returning to their constituency, they may not be participating in constituency service when they are there. In the case of Malawi, Kenya and Zambia, this measure of constituency service appears to be valid, as it can be shown that when legislators return to their constituency they participate in activities that can be constituted as constituency service. However, this changes when we look at countries that use a PR electoral system, Mozambique and South Africa. As you can see from the following graph, just over 30% of legislators in Mozambique indicate that their primary activity when they return to their constituency is participating in political party activities. Based on the definition of constituency service used in this study, this does not qualify. Therefore, one cannot make the assumption that when a legislator is spending time in their constituency they are participating in constituency service.
As a result, while using the total amount of time spent in their constituency maybe a good indicator in the case of Zambia, Malawi and Kenya it is not a good indicator for Mozambique and South Africa. Therefore, the amount of travel to the constituency is a necessary but not sufficient indicator for levels of constituency service. As a result it will not be used as the sole indicator of constituency service in this study. Alternatively, legislators were asked to give a breakdown of their time, by indicating the percentage of time they spent doing a number of activities, including constituency service.

The following table provides information regarding this variable. Data was available for all five sample countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2: What percentage of your time is devoted to each of the following? Constituency Work – Descriptives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There seems to be a similar pattern between both measures of levels of constituency service, as Mozambique has considerably low levels of constituency service relative to other countries. Surprising though, is the high level reported by Malawian legislators relative to legislators in the other sample countries. They indicate that they spend just under 50 percent of their time doing constituency service, yet the amount of time they spend in their constituency both when Parliament is in session and when it is not, is not considerably higher than their counterparts in other countries. This could be an indication that quite a bit of their constituency service might take place in the capitol rather than their constituency. However, this cannot be confirmed.

**Electoral Competitiveness**

Different patterns emerge when examining the two measures of electoral competitiveness. The following graph shows the distribution of APC by country.

![Graph 4.2: Actual Past Competitiveness by Country](image_url)

South Africa’s distribution of APC appears to differ substantially relative to the distributions in the other sample countries. There is a much higher proportion of legislators who fall into the “Marginal” category relative to other countries in the study. Upon further examination of the data there appears to be two main reasons for this. First of all, 25 percent of legislators were either not on the list at all, or placed so far down the list they were outside their
party’s threshold. This means that they were all placed in the “marginal” competitiveness category. What can be ascertained from these discrepancies between the party lists and the legislators at the time of the interviews is that there seems to be a high turn around within the South African Legislature. The list themselves, also seem to have little value once the election has passed. An individual’s placement on the list at the time of the election holds little bearing as to whether they will be called to replace an existing legislator if one chooses to step down or is forced out. A number of legislators quite far beyond their party’s threshold became replacements. In some cases, they may not have been on the list at all. This could mean that those next on the list are being overlooked. This finding has a number of serious implications for the quality of representation in South Africa. If voters are going to the polls with the expectation that party lists are to be respected, meaning that those on the list will be placed in office based on the proportion of votes received, one must question the quality of the entire representative process. While it is expected that some movement will occur as legislators retire or die, the extent to which it is occurring indicates that party lists are not being used for their intended purpose.8

Based on the graph above, one might make the supposition that South Africa faced a much higher level of electoral competitiveness during their respective election. Due to the electoral system itself, the distribution of legislators on lists is not the best indicator of the level of overall competitiveness within system. Between elections there is movement in party caucuses as legislators resign and are replaced from those further down the list. This means that as more legislators are replaced, the party will have a higher proportion of those in the marginal category. This may project the idea that the overall level of competitiveness is higher than observed at the time of the last election. This means that no conclusion can be made about the overall level of competitiveness in the South African system based on this data.

Despite South Africa’s exceptional distribution of electoral competitiveness, the other three countries have similar patterns. With just over 50 percent of all legislators in the “Safe” category, the remaining legislators generally fall evenly into the other two remaining categories, “Competitive” and “Marginal”.

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8 Note that this was the case the three largest parties in South Africa. The sample did not include enough legislators from other parties to make observations of this sort.
To determine the overall level of competitiveness experienced in elections, the level of variance as well as the mean within the total percent difference was also looked at. Please note that only FPTP majoritarian countries are presented, as the actual difference of percentage of votes between the winner and first runner up is being examined. The same analysis is not possible for South Africa and Mozambique due to their electoral systems.

The following table breaks down the levels of electoral competitiveness across the three relevant countries;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.3: Electoral Competitiveness: Mean and Variance of the Percentage Difference between the Winner and First Runner-Up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this table, it appears that all three countries faced similar levels of competitiveness during their respective elections. This is despite the fact that the mean percentage difference between the winner and the first runner up is relatively higher in Kenya than Malawi and Zambia. This is largely because the standard deviation is also relatively higher. This indicates that while the average percentage difference was higher there was also a higher level of variance within the scores.

Based on the data in this section, one might expect to see slightly higher levels of constituency service in Zambia and Malawi relative to Kenya. This means that when a country has a higher number of constituencies with competitive elections one should also see relatively higher levels of constituency service as a national average. In reality however, the distribution of levels of constituency service across Kenya, Zambia and Malawi did not follow this pattern. Of all three countries, Zambia had the lowest mean with 27.67 percent, with Malawi and Kenya having means of 46.33 percent and 40.24 percent respectively. This discrepancy may indicate that there is only a small likelihood of a relationship between these two variables, “APC” and level of constituency service.
The following graph details the distribution of “Perceived Future Competitiveness” across the four countries in which the data was available. You will notice that across all four countries, except Mozambique, legislators’ perception that their seat was safe in the next election was relatively high. This is quite surprising given the distribution “Actual Past Electoral Competitiveness”.

This data indicates 66.7 percent of South African legislators place themselves in the safe category. This may be due to the changes within the political situation in South Africa. This is a drastic difference between earlier measures of electoral competitiveness (APC).\(^9\) Between the election in 2004, where the electoral lists were taken, and the present time, there has been a drastic change within the African National Congress (ANC) whereby power has shifted within the party itself. This may explain why those at the lower ends of the party list during the 2004 election now perceive themselves to be in safer positions.

Malawi also has an interesting pattern whereby 4.4 percent of legislators indicated that they are not planning to run again in the next election. The basis for much of the research on electoral competitiveness and its effects on constituency service is the assumption that the main goal of legislators is to be re-elected in the next election. With such a high percentage of

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\(^9\) This data placed 72% of all legislators into the marginal category of competitiveness.
legislators indicating that they are not planning to run again in the next election, it has become apparent that this assumption needs to be questioned in the future.

A relatively high percentage (72.9%) of legislators in Mozambique placed themselves in the competitive category. At this point in time no definitive explanation can be given for this. However, it is being hypothesized that this may be due to the nomination process. In cases such as Mozambique, legislator’s may perceived themselves as being electorally insecure when political parties might have relatively more control over the process. In order to further deconstruct the relationship between the nomination process and perceptions of electoral safety, reported nomination processes are briefly examined. It is being hypothesized that the candidate selection process does play a role in dictating legislator behaviour. Data collection issues have prevented an in-depth deconstruction of this concept. In the case of Zambia, the question regarding the nomination process was not asked. In the case of South Africa, the question was slightly changed to also inquire about the legislator’s placement on the party list. Upon a further examination of the data, it became clear that legislator’s responses most often just mentioned their placement on the list and failed to give any further information. The other two FPTP majoritarian countries and Mozambique used a multiple choice response. As a result, the information is only available for these three countries. That being said, the following table details the distribution of legislators across the nomination processes by country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No primary/ no nomination/ it was automatic because I was an incumbent/ stood as an independent</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive primary election (where there were at least two candidates in the same party)</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination by local branch</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination regional branch</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination by National Party</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is interesting to note that relative to other methods of nomination, legislators indicate that competitive primary election is the main nomination process used across all three countries. That being said, it appears to be more widely used in the Kenya and Malawi relative to Mozambique. However, nomination by regional and the national party branches tend to be used extensively in this system relatively to Kenya and Malawi. The literature indicates that legislators nominated by lower regional levels of a party apparatus should be closely connected to that region. It is assumed that this will lead to higher levels of constituency service by those legislators, in order to maintain personal connections with the region that gave their initial political mandate. In contrast, Mozambique actually has the lowest average level of constituency service across all five countries. Based on this table, no connection can be made with regard to regional party nominations and levels of constituency service in the case of Mozambique as national party nominations are relatively higher. National party nominations have the opposite effect when it comes to inducements for constituency service, as the legislator’s primary constituency remains the national party body itself, rather than the public.\(^\text{10}\)

According to this data, Malawian legislators face the least amount of competition, with 34.1 percent of legislators indicating that they did not go through a nomination process. Based on this data it is hard to tell the overall level of competitiveness within the nomination process, as it appears that nominations through the regional and national level seem to be relatively more common in Mozambique and Kenya. The true level of competitiveness would only be available through ascertaining the pool of qualified candidates, which is not available. However, one might make the assumption that for those who were nominated, the overall level of competitiveness may be perceived as relatively lower when compared to those who went through a competitive primary election. Depending on the level of competitiveness and the basis for the nomination, it could be assumed that constituency levels might correspond. However, further research is needed to confirm this.

A further explanation for varying levels of PFC may lie in the overall role of parties in the national political system. There is evidence to suggest that political parties play a much stronger role in the determination of legislator behaviour in Mozambique in relation to the other

\(^{10}\) The only time a national party nomination could encourage constituency service, is when the party itself is regionally based. In this case, the legislator may based their future political success on the further maintenance of that nomination in future elections, especially in PR systems, by heightening their interaction with the said region during their term. This may especially be the case in Southern Africa, where clientalistic relationships with those not only in the party but also in constituencies are often perceived as important to the maintenance of office.
sample countries. Most notably when legislators were asked about how they made decisions about what positions they will take in Parliament, 35.9 percent of Mozambican legislators indicated that their party leader or the political party itself is the most important influence. This is relative to Malawi and Kenya where the percentage decreases substantially to 12.2 percent and 12.5 percent respectively. The high level of political party influence, may act to increase the uncertainty for legislators hoping to secure a bid for the next election.

**Role Orientation**

The following graph provides the distribution of orientations across all five sample countries. Note that no Zambian legislator was placed into the middle category, as the determination of orientation was solely based on the single question relating to what legislators believe is the most important aspect of their job.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Locally Orientated</th>
<th>Middle Category</th>
<th>Nationally Orientated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>75.6%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Graph 4.4: Distribution of Role Orientation by Country**

Across all five countries, we see a higher percentage of legislators falling into the locally orientated category than the nationally orientated category. This could be an early indication that electoral system does not play as large a role in influencing role orientation as was expected. In
contrast, this may be a result of a dominant political culture in all of the sample states that encourages legislators to be more closely related to the constituency as a result of high poverty levels rather than direct electoral implications. This possible explanation could directly explain a high percentage of locally orientated in PR electoral systems where electoral prospects are only tied to local areas when legislators are nominated through a local party branch. However, further research is needed.

Despite all five sample countries having a higher percentage of locally orientated legislators over nationally orientated or the middle category, states which use a FPTP majoritarian electoral systems seem to have proportionally higher percentages of legislators fall into the locally orientated grouping over countries that use a PR system. In neither South Africa or Mozambique is the percentage of legislators who fall into locally orientated category above 50 percent. This is in contrast to the distribution in Zambia, Malawi and Kenya, where the percentage of legislators does not fall below 50 percent. In Malawi and Zambia, the percentage is especially high where 75.6 percent of Zambian legislators are locally orientated and 68.1 percent of Malawian legislators are also locally orientated. This differentiation could be an indicator that while the effect of an electoral system may not be as strong an influence as initially thought it still has implications for the distribution of role orientation.

**Electoral System**

This first graph shows the distribution of percentage of time reported participating in constituency service across the two electoral systems in the study. Note that in this initial step of analysis, the variable measuring percentage of time is divided into even categories, allowing for easier analysis.
Based on the data, we see the separate patterns emerge between the two electoral systems, indicating a possible relationship between electoral systems and levels of constituency service. In the PR systems over 60% of the legislators spend between 20% to 39.99% of their time participating in constituency service. This distribution within the PR countries is similar to expectations. In the FPTP majoritarian system, legislators seem to be more evenly distributed across all categories. This result was not expected, as it has been indicated the legislators from this electoral system consistently participate in higher levels of constituency service. Overall, this indicated that alternative micro-level factors play a larger role in influencing legislator behaviour in FPTP majoritarian systems. There are also a number of other indicators that micro level variables are more important.

Note the category with the highest percentage of legislators is the same across both electoral systems. This could be an indicator that an alternative explanation is needed beyond incentive structures created by the electoral system. It could be hypothesized that external influences are preventing legislators in FPTP majoritarian countries from participating in constituency service, for example access to funds.

A further indicator that an alternative explanation is needed is the overall distribution across this electoral system, more specifically the large range and variance. In terms of range, the FPTP majoritarian system has an 85% difference between the lowest and highest level of constituency service, relative to the PR where there is only a 65% difference.
When percentage of time participating in constituency service is taken out of its categories the level of variance provides crucial details with regard to constituency service in FPTP majoritarian systems. A level of variance was measured. In the FPTP majoritarian system std. deviation was 18.81 relative to the PR system what had a smaller std. deviation of 15.16. As the level of variance appears to be relatively higher for the FPTP majoritarian system, it appears that alternative explanations beyond electoral systems for need to be examined. Incentive structures of the electoral system alone do not provide enough draw for legislators to participate in high levels of constituency service.

Despite inconsistency between expectations and the distribution of constituency service in the FPTP majoritarian system, there is evidence to suggest there is a separate relationship between electoral system as a whole and level of constituency service, the mean level of constituency service in each electoral system. In the case of the FPTP majoritarian countries the mean percentage of time participating in constituency service, is 38.5%. In the case of the PR countries, the mean for constituency service was just 23.8%. This difference of just under 15 percent indicates the possibility of a different pattern between the two systems.

Control Variables

Seniority of the Legislator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>7.66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mean number of years legislators are elected is expected to vary depending on the number of years the sample country has been participating in elections. As mentioned earlier, Kenya went through a period in which a single party controlled the state. During this time elections still took place despite that only those from the ruling party were able to participate.
Multiparty elections have been taking place since 1992, however legislator elected through the single party system were still able to run for office in the new system, thus explaining how a legislator could be elected into office for 38 years. (Barkan, 1993; 86) This situation explains a much higher mean in Kenya as well.

### Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>47.76</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>56.12</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>47.21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>49.08</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Across all five countries the distribution of age is quite similar. Additionally, levels of variance also appear to be stagnant across all of the sample countries. This is not unsurprising based on the variable itself.

### Party Membership

![Graph 4.7: Party Membership by Country](image)
Kenya’s distribution is most likely explained by the fact that the complete sample of legislators is yet to be interviewed. When all 50 legislators are interviewed the distribution between the ruling party and opposition parties will most likely even out. However, this cannot be confirmed at present.

Geographic Proximity

[Graph 4.8: Geographic Proximity by Country]

The distribution is quite similar across all five of the sample countries. It is expected that countries with landmasses larger relative to the other countries within the study will have a higher percentage of legislators traveling further distances. As can be seen from the graph, this is exactly what happened, with South Africa and Mozambique legislators being more likely to travel more than 151 km to their constituency.
Chapter 5: Analysis
Electoral Competitiveness and Constituency Service

This first section of analysis will examine electoral competition and its possible relationship with constituency service within the context of the following hypothesis;

**H1:** A positive relationship will exist between the levels electoral competitiveness and the levels of constituency work reported by legislators. As electoral competition increases, an increase in constituency service should be visible.

In order to get a full understanding of the possible relationship, two measures of electoral competition will be examined, APC and PFC. In addition to using two separate measures of competition, two measures constituency service also be used. Two sets of analyses were completed. Both were done by country in order to minimize the possible affect of the electoral system. The first set of analyses was bivariate, as constant variables were not included. The second set of analyses was multivariate as “age”, “legislator seniority”, “proximity to the constituency” and “party membership” were held constant. The analysis between APC and constituency service was not completed in Mozambique as the data was not available.
Based on the results of the bivariate analysis there does not appear to be a relationship in any of the sample countries between either measure of constituency service and APC. However, when the multivariate analyses are performed a single moderate relationship is discovered between percentage of time reported participating in constituency service and APC in Malawi. The relationship is negative, meaning that as competitiveness increases legislators appear to be spending less of their time participating in constituency service. This result is contrary to expectations.

While no definite conclusion can be made about the results from Kenya, the multivariate results here are an indication that if the sample size was larger there could possibly be a relationship between the number of days spent in the constituency and APC. Once again though, the direction of the possible relationship is contrary to what is expected, legislators could be spending less time in their constituency as competitiveness increases.

Now the study will turn to the analysis associated with FPC and levels of constituency service. The earlier analysis was conducted on data that was thought to have guided legislator’s perceptions of their own electoral safety. The following group of analyses is conducted on data measuring how legislators perceive their chances of re-election in the forthcoming elections. In

\[11\] The acceptance threshold for significance was increased as a result of the small size of the sample.
order to get a general understanding of the relationship between the two variables, the first set of analyses were conducted without the constants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Days Spent in the Constituency when Parliament is in Session</th>
<th>Percentage of Time spent participating in Constituency Service</th>
<th>Number of Days Spent in the Constituency when Parliament is in Session</th>
<th>Percentage of Time spent participating in Constituency Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>.348***</td>
<td>.076*</td>
<td>.612***</td>
<td>.273**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>-.114*</td>
<td>.112*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-.018*</td>
<td>.247***</td>
<td>-.158*</td>
<td>.198*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.065*</td>
<td>-.114*</td>
<td>.084*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.1, **p<.5, *p<.9

A number of relationships are registered when FPC is tested with both measures of constituency service. There is a strong relationship between FPC and the number of days spent in the constituency in South Africa. It is the only country were a strong relationship is measured. In Kenya, the moderate relationship is measured in the bivariate analysis but it is later weakened with the introduction of the constant variables. So why are strong or even moderate relationships only being measured in South Africa and not the other sample countries? At a micro level there could be a number of explanations for this. First of all, in South Africa legislators are assigned constituencies once they are elected into office. Quite often these constituencies are where the legislator comes from as well. This creates a connection between the party, the legislator and the constituency and explains a high level of travel to the constituency when Parliament is both in and out of session. Furthermore, in comparison to other countries within the study legislators are much more likely to have a constituency office paid for by their party. Since South African legislators’ have access resources that facilitates travel to the constituency, then can then return to their constituency when they perceive higher levels of electoral competition. This is likely not
the case for legislators in the other sample countries, and therefore explains the lack of relationships.

Based on the analyses of electoral competition, both APC and PFC, a number of important conclusions can be drawn. It appears that electoral competition plays a limited role in influencing legislators in their decision on how much constituency service they will participate in. Other than in South Africa, it appears that higher levels of competitiveness, both perceived and actual, may in fact induce legislators to spend less time participating in constituency service.

Role Orientation and Levels of Constituency Service

In order to examine role orientation and its relationship with the level of constituency service, the type of statistical analysis was changed slightly to take into account the nature of the data. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was run on a country by country basis in order to make sure that macro level factors such as the electoral system did not affect the results. In an attempt to make sure that the best measure of constituency service was used, the two variables were utilised, number of days in the constituency when parliament is in session and the percentage of time spent participating in constituency service.

As mentioned in earlier sections, there are three distinct role orientations, locally orientated, nationally orientated and a middle orientation. In Zambia, only two orientations were recorded. The purpose of this analysis is to test the following hypothesis;

H2: A relationship will exist between legislator role orientation and reported time spent doing constituency work. Locally orientated legislators are expected to participate in more constituency service relative to their counterparts who are nationally orientated.
South Africa

Table 5.3: South African ANOVA Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Locally Orientated</th>
<th>Middle Category</th>
<th>Nationally Orientated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Days Spent in the Constituency (eta = .241)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>9.1389</td>
<td>9.3889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>8.48078</td>
<td>7.15794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Time spent Participating in Constituency Service (eta = .363)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>34.50</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>13.006</td>
<td>8.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the results it has been determined that role orientation in South Africa does not have a significant effect on the number of days legislators spent in the constituency when parliament was in session \[F(2,19)=.584 \text{ p}= .567\].\(^{12}\) This is not unsurprising after reviewing the mean number of days spent in the constituency when parliament is in session by each role orientation. More specifically when comparing between the locally orientated legislators ( \(=9.14\)) and the middle orientation ( \(=9.39\)), where both are quite similar. In order to make sure that all possible measures of constituency service were included in the analysis a second test was completed using the total percentage time spent participating in constituency service. Once again, with \(p<.05\) it was established that role orientation did not have a significant effect on the total percentage time spent participating in constituency service \[F(2,21)=1.59 \text{ p}= .389\].

\(^{12}\) \text{alpha=.05}
Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.4: Kenyan ANOVA Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Days Spent in the Constituency (eta = .274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Time spent Participating in Constituency Service (eta = .394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Kenya the analysis indicated that role orientation does not have a significant effect on the number of days legislators spend in their constituency when parliament is in session [F(2,32)=1.35, p=.283]. The same analysis was completed with the alternative measure of constituency service (percentage of time). It was determined that role orientation does not have a significant effect on the total percentage of time spent participating in constituency service [F(2,32)=2.98, p=.065]. However, “Nationally orientated” legislators appear to spend considerably less time participating in constituency service than their counterparts who fall in to the “local” or “middle category”, indicating that if the sample size was larger there is a possibility that a significant effect could be registered.

---

13 alpha=.05
In Malawi it was determined that role orientation does not have a significant effect on the number of days spent in the constituency when parliament is in session \[F(2,41) = .938, p = .400\]. When percentage of time spent participating in constituency service was examined, the same result was found, no significant effect \[F(2,44) = 1.505, p = .233\]. Similarly to Kenya, the results indicate that role orientation may have a slightly larger effect on percentage of spent participating in constituency service, however, this not for certain as the results of the analyses are not significant.
Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.6: Mozambique ANOVA Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Days Spent in the Constituency (eta = .328)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Time spent Participating in Constituency Service (eta = .143)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the results from Mozambique, it was determined that role orientation does not have a significant effect on the number of days legislators stay in their constituencies when parliament is in session \([F(2,28)=1.687, p=.203].^{14}\) It has also been established that role orientation does not have a significant effect on the percentage of time legislators spend participating in constituency service\([F(2,38)=.398, p=.674].^{15}\)

---

14 alpha=.05  
15 alpha=.05
In the Zambian questionnaire, legislators were not asked about the number of days they spent in their constituency when parliament was either in or out of session. As a result, analysis was only completed on the percentage of time legislators indicated participating in constituency service. Despite this, it has been concluded that role orientation is not a significant factor in legislators decision to determine what percentage of time they will devote to constituency service \([F(1,42)=1.415, p=.241]\).

**Electoral System and Levels of Constituency Service**

Based on the level of measurement of electoral system, it was determined that one-way ANOVA is the best way to analyze this section of the data. The following hypothesis is associated with these variables;

**H4: There will be a relationship between electoral system and levels of reported constituency service. Countries using a FPTP majoritarian electoral system will have relatively higher levels of constituency service compared to countries using a PR electoral system.**
Based on an alpha level of .05, it was concluded that the electoral system in which legislators originates is a significant factor in the number of days in which they spend in their constituency when Parliament is in session \[F(1,145) =12.55, p=.001\]. This means that depending on the electoral system legislators on average spend different amounts of time in their constituency when parliament is in session. On average legislators from a FPTP electoral system spend four more days per month in their constituency in comparison to legislators who come from a PR system. The reported percentage of time spent doing constituency service was also examined. While directly not comparable, it has been concluded based on the p value, that the electoral system is an even stronger influence on the percentage of time legislators report participating in constituency service \[F(1,208)=33.21, p=.000\].

**Electoral System and Role Orientation**

The following hypothesis is being tested in this section of the analysis;

**H3: A relationship will exist between electoral systems and legislator role orientations.** In the PR system, it is expected that a proportionally high number of legislators will be nationally orientation. This is in contrast to the FPTP majoritarian system where it is expected that a proportionally high number of legislators are expected to be locally orientated.

According to the Cramer V correlation coefficient there is a moderate relationship between electoral system and role orientation \[r = .255 \text{ sig.}=.002\]. This indicates that the literature arguing that electoral systems influence the belief structures of legislators appears to relevant in the Southern African context. The fact that earlier analysis indicates that there does not appear to be a relationship between role orientations and the levels of constituency service possibly shows that role orientations in fact influences other aspects of legislators perception of their role outside their relationship with their constituency. Further research is needed on this topic before further conclusions can be made.
Conclusion

The last set of analyses will test the validity of the entire model by taking the independent variables (electoral competition, role orientation, age, proximity to the capital, party membership and seniority) and performing linear regression with the each measure of constituency service. While earlier tests looked at the independent relationships between each of the independent variables and constituency service, the purpose of performing these tests was to determine the relative explanatory powers each of the independent variables.

Table 5.8: Multiple Regression Analysis Result – Number of days on Average spent in the Constituency when Parliament is in Session

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System – PR</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC– Marginal</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>2.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC – Competitive</td>
<td>.263</td>
<td>2.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC - Safe</td>
<td>.357</td>
<td>3.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC - Marginal</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC - Competitive</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>-.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC - Safe</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>-.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Orientation - Local</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Orientation – Middle Category</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>1.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Orientation – National</td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>-.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>1.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislator Seniority</td>
<td>-.073</td>
<td>-.884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance – 0-50 kms</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>1.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance – 51-200 kms</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance – 201 kms and above</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Membership – Opposition Membership</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>-.191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

=.252, , Sig = .001, Adjusted , F=2.743
In order to perform these tests the categorical variables were turned into binary variables. Legislator seniority was recoded from number of years in office to $0=1-5$ years and $1=6$ and greater years. This was done to make a distinction between those who had remained in office for more than one term. Age was originally captured as a continuous variable, however it was recoded to $0=0-50$ years old and $1=51$ and older.

As a result of the relatively small size of the sample, the adjusted will be used to determine the overall strength of the model. Accordingly, this combination of independent variables can account for 16 percent of the variance within the dependent variable measuring the average number of days spent in the constituency when parliament is in session. Within these results we can make a number of important conclusions. We can conclude that between the two measures of electoral competition, APC appears to have the most influence over the number of days legislators spend in their constituency relative to FPC. It also appears that the distance needed to travel to the constituency also plays a role in determining the amount of time the legislators spends there. However, as the distance between the legislator and their constituency increases, distance becomes a reduced factor in predicting the amount of time legislators will spend in their constituency.

Surprisingly, it appears that party membership does not explain any variation in levels of constituency service, despite earlier results. This is an indicator that as a whole level of APC seems to be a stronger predictor. The number of days spent in the constituency by South African legislators was generally high as a result of a number of reasons. This situation could possible provide an explanation as to why the electoral system in general does not act as a good predictor for the number of days spent in the constituency. If other PR systems were to be included within this study, it would not be surprising of the relevance of the electoral system increased.

The next table provides the results of analyses conducted on “percentage of time spent participating in constituency service and the group of independent variables.”
Table 5.9: Multiple Regression Analysis Results – Percentage of Time Spent Participating in Constituency Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System – PR</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>2.654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC – Marginal</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td>2.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC – Competitive</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td>2.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC – Safe</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>2.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC – Marginal</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC - Competitive</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>3.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPC – Safe</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>3.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Orientation – Local</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Orientation – Middle</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role Orientation – National</td>
<td>-.140</td>
<td>-1.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.068</td>
<td>-.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislator Seniority</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>-.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance – 0-50 kms</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance – 51-200 kms</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance – 201 kms and above</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>-.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Membership</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= .269, Adjusted = .208, F=4.428, Sig=.000

This is an stronger model overall with the independent variables accounting for 20.8 percent of the variance in legislator’s reported percentage of time spent conducting constituency service. APC appears to remain the main predictor of levels of constituency service between the two measures of electoral competitiveness, however, it also appears that if a legislators perceives that they are in a competitive seat this could also be a strong predictor of levels of constituency service. Surprisingly, “age” and proximity to the constituency” seemed to have reduced in importance to the model.
Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion
The next section will take the form of a discussion piece based on results of this study and how it relates to existing literature. As already noted before, the nature of literature on legislative behaviour in Africa has tended to focus on legislatures as a single unitary actor, often failing to focus on legislators as actors in their own right. (Kim, Barkan, Turan and Jewell, 1984; 8) That being said, along with the data used in this study, the existing literature can provide extensive guidance as to possible factors affecting individual legislator behaviour beyond what has already been examined in this study. This section will turn to some of the broader literature on African legislatures to further examine how the results garnered in this study relate to wider research.

A number of strong conclusions can be made. First, it appears that an electoral system is a factor in amount of time legislators spend participating in constituency service. This means that structures incorporated into the electoral systems used within the sample countries have impacts on the overall level of constituency service legislators participate in. Since, PR electoral systems do not create an electoral relationship between a constituency or district and an individual legislator it is not surprising that in the PR countries levels of constituency service were relatively lower levels of constituency service. This being said, the distribution of constituency service within each electoral system indicates that further investigation is needed to get a complete understanding of how legislators determine what level of constituency service they will engage in. Furthermore, the results of analyses on micro level factors and levels of constituency service indicate that the reasoning used to come to the study’s initial hypotheses are not sufficient in providing a complete explanation for the varying levels of constituency service across the sample states.

Discrepancies tended to centre around hypotheses based on Western literature. As a result a general conclusion is being made about the relevance of this literature towards Southern African legislators. Based on the results, it has become clear that factors initially thought to have affected legislators in certain ways may in fact lead to contrary behaviour. For example, while it is apparent that electoral competition can affect levels of constituency, it cannot be concluded that higher levels competition lead to higher levels of constituency service in all cases. In the sample countries APC and PFC appear to have different relationships, if having a relationship at all, with levels of constituency service. For example in Kenya and Malawi where it appears that high levels of APC may in fact encourage legislators to participate in lower levels of
constituency service. Rather than concluding that individual political cultures across the five sample countries explains these discrepancies between the literature and the results in this study, further explanations can be drawn out of existing literature.

It is no secret that African legislatures are often highly under resourced. This means that certain approaches to resource management often lead to certain behaviour by legislators. It has been argued that one of the largest influences of certain behaviours is who controls the parliamentary budget. If the legislature determines its own budget, they are much more likely to allocate themselves sufficient salaries and provide for adequate parliamentary staff and resources. Whereas if the executive has sole responsibility for this role, a pattern emerges where the institution tends to be underfunded, forcing legislators to go elsewhere for basic resources. This in turn shifts power away from the legislative branch as a whole and places the power back with the executive. (Barkan, Ademolekun and Zhou, 2004; 229)

It must be assumed that legislators who are forced to go to alternative sources for funds are much more likely to be politically swayed by other actors. This is also especially pertinent in Southern Africa, where aspects of neopatrimonial regimes are quite common. Defined as regimes where a leader maintains their control of rule through the maintenance of clientalistic relationships rather than through ideology or law, neopatrimonial regimes are surprisingly common. (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; 458) There is evidence to suggest that legislators tend to be highly susceptible to the development of this style of interaction with many of the actors they interact with, ranging from the executive to local dignitaries within their constituencies. (Barkan, 1995) Burnell discusses this style of relationship between Zambian legislators and the executive. He argues that passive behaviour towards the executive became entrenched in legislator’s behaviour during the country’s Second Republic, where one party rule was active. Since then, there has been a move to increase the independence of the legislature, however, due to legislator’s requirements to provide services to their constituents they are forced to maintain a close relationship with the executive. This is based on the fact that a legislator’s chances of securing spending for their area vary with their relationship with senior ministers and the President. (Burnell, 2003; 59)

This situation were legislators may be forced to develop close relationships with the executive provides a good explanation as to why legislators who perceive electoral uncertainty in Malawi and Kenya may spend less time participating in constituency service. Without their own
means necessary to participate in constituency service they may be forced to spend more time in
the capital participating in other activities that would more likely allow for the acquisition of
funds to allow for constituency service or more basically campaign funds. Furthermore, if
campaigning is organized through the party, legislators may find it to be more beneficial to spend
time in the capitol to participate in party work in order to gain favor, so that party campaign
funds are likely channeled to their constituency, enhancing their chance of reelection.

In addition to the pressure from the capitol to develop clientalistic relationships due to
resource allocation issues, it is apparent that there is considerable pressure from the
constituencies to provide goods for constituents. This pressure may in turn discourage legislators
from returning to their constituencies if they lack the funds necessary to provide for constituent
expectations. Southern Africa is one of the poorest places on earth. Between the five countries in
2008 the average GNI per capita was 1,542 USD, with South Africa being the outlier with a
score that was over five times higher than the next on the list, Zambia. (World Bank, 2009) This
means that basic social services are often hard to come by, especially in more rural areas. With
limited access to resources, legislators have the ability to affect the pattern by which resources
are allocated at local levels through such work as constituency service. Furthermore, this means
that perceptions by constituents maybe twofold. First, they may be regarded as a representative
of their needs in the capital, a more traditional role associated with modern democracy. Second,
legislators may be perceived as agents that have ability to extract resources from the capitol and
redistribute them within their constituency. (Barkan, 1984; 77) Perceiving a legislator in this way
increases the overall pressure for legislators to pursue increased levels of resources in order to
fulfill constituent expectations. There is evidence to suggest that high levels of pressure to
produce both public and private goods for their constituents may in fact decrease a legislator’s
propensity to participate in constituency service as a whole. Within the questionnaires, a number
of legislators indicated that they chose not to return to their constituency due to high expectations
placed on them by constituents. Even if legislators are able to afford to return, they may chose
not to if they lack resources to provide services to their constituents once they get there. A
number of legislators indicated the pressure to provide funds for school fees and funerals was an
overriding reason why they chose not to return to their constituency on a number of occasions.
Rather, they perceived that spending overall less time in their constituency would have less of an
effect on their future election prospects than visibly returning to the constituency and not providing goods expected by constituents.

It has been concluded that based on the analysis conducted within this study that further research needed in a number of areas. The completion of ALP will provide a number of answers to questions raised within this study. On a basic level, incomplete datasets created issues with the data in regards to South Africa and Kenya. Upon completion, a number of questions could be answered. That being said, it is doubtful that the overall conclusion will differ significantly. It is believed that the type relationship between electoral competition and level of constituency would continue to vary in the sample countries. That being said, a focus needs to be placed on financial factors and the overall distribution of power between the executive and legislature to get a better understanding of legislator behaviour outside the legislature. The access to resources is integrated with the issue of the distribution of power. As executives in Southern Africa tend to hold much of the power, it should be no surprise that legislators’ resource base should also be affected. This study was able to provide evidence that factors traditionally associated with legislator behaviour outside the legislator have limited relevance in Southern Africa. Furthermore, it has started to provide the foundations of research geared towards discovering the relationship between executive dominance of the legislature and legislator’s behaviour in their constituencies.

**IX.I: Recommendations**

Based on these results a number of suggestions can be made to donors about program design. First and foremost, programs need to focus on providing legislators with the basic funds needed to allow them to effectively perform their jobs. The failure to do so, will in many senses forced them to turn to alternative sources of funds. This in turn disturbs the natural distribution of power between arms of government. By ensuring basic resource access, a large step can be taken toward maintaining the separation between the executive and the legislature. There are a number of way in which this can be done. Just one is the widespread implementation of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs), which as has already started in many recipient countries. Programs such as this one allow for the greatly needed disassociation of individual constituency development with the executive.
Beyond disassociating constituency development with the executive, CDFs are expected to lead to higher levels of constituency service. This has two positive implications. First, by using such funds, donors have the possibility of increasing the effectiveness of legislators as agents for development within their constituencies. Second, CDFs can facilitate travel to the constituency as well as work in it and correspondingly enhance the overall quality of representation. Ultimately, this has positive implications for the overall quality of democracy.

In the case countries using a PR electoral system, South Africa and Mozambique, the results of this study indicate that further effort needs to be made to encourage legislators to perform constituency service. As already argued early in the study, other methods of communication and representation, such as civil society and media, are often less developed in many African countries. Legislators possess a unique role in providing linkage between the county’s electorate and the government. If they choose not to interact with the government, one must therefore question the total quality of democracy within the said state. Therefore it is recommended that instruments be put in place to provide further inducements to perform constituency service.
Bibliography


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