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A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE:

PAX AMERICANA, THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE
AND THE POLICING OF POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

Jeremy Wilkin

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of
Master of Arts in Comparative and International Politics in the
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February 2000
ABSTRACT

A central debate to have developed in recent International Relations scholarship revolves around whether the emergence of a unipolar international distribution of power will result in the formation of regional strategic vacuums into which organic regional powers can freely assert themselves. Addressing this debate within the context of Africa’s international relations, this dissertation aims to identify and characterise the relationship between the post-Cold War international distribution of power and the corresponding organic African distribution of power. This relationship is analysed specifically as it pertains to the construction of post-Cold War Africa’s regional hegemons. Organised around the case study of the 1996-7 Zairian / Democratic Republic of the Congo crisis, in which Laurent Kabila successfully overthrew Zaire’s seemingly omnipotent president, Mobutu Sese Seko, the dissertation focuses specifically on the relationship between the United States, South Africa and Uganda. Employing Robert Putnam’s ‘two-level games’ as its theoretical framework, the dissertation traces the evolution of the respective international and African win-sets towards post-Cold War African regional hegemonies. It further establishes a negotiating position premised upon a desired outcome for each distribution of power. For the former, that outcome is the perpetuation of its unipolarity; for the latter, it is the consolidation of recent democratisation processes. By demonstrating that sufficient synergy exists between the US and African negotiating positions, the dissertation is able to conclude that the relationship between these two distributions of power is predominantly one of mutual gain, simultaneously serving the interests of Pax Americana and the African Renaissance. Consequently, while the US has acted to impede the hegemonic aspirations of Iraq (1991) and Serbia (1994), it is actively promoting the regional hegemonies of South Africa and Uganda.
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# ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>ACRF</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for East and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Rwandan Armed Forces</td>
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<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution Macroeconomic Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAR</td>
<td>Kings African Rifles</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lords Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPR</td>
<td>Parti Populaire de la Revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordinating Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPDF</td>
<td>Tanzania People’s Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFM</td>
<td>Uganda Freedom Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNLA</td>
<td>Uganda National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>UNRF</td>
<td>Uganda National Rescue Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party</td>
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<td>UPC</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Congress</td>
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<td>UPDF</td>
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INTRODUCTION

One of the defining features of the post-Cold War international system has been the prominence afforded 'the region' as a locus of international relations. Motivated primarily by the on-going European integration-unification experience, policy-makers and scholars alike are increasingly viewing the region as the preferred arena for states to pursue their national interests. A central debate to have developed from this scholarship concerns the relationship between the post-Cold War international distribution of power and regional distributions of power as it pertains to the construction of post-Cold War regional hegemons. For since the advent of imperialism, the principal states of the international system have sought to control the dynamics of regional systems other than their own in accordance with their national interests. Given their superior positioning in the international hierarchy of power, these states are able to manipulate regional balance of power structures by affecting the process of power accumulation within their regional spheres of influence (Cantori and Spiegel,1970; Ojo,1985; Lustick,1997). Either the extra-regional power accepts the organic regional distribution of power, in which case it either abstains from intervention or acts to perpetuate its existence, or the extra-regional power disapproves thereof, and intervenes to constitute an alternative distribution.

This exercise of extra-regional intervention was a dominant characteristic of the Cold War. Both super-powers sought to secure regional systems in order to curtail the global influence of the other, a strategy which culminated in the subordination of all regional systems under either a United States or Soviet Union aegis (Binder,1958; Zartman,1967). Consequently, scholars are currently debating whether the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar international distribution of power will result in an ebb of extra-regional intervention, therein creating a strategic vacuum into which regional powers can freely assert themselves. Whilst some argue that the collapse of the bipolar international system shall eventuate into organically driven regional systems (Buzan,1992; Carpenter, 1992; Wriggins,1992; Krasner,1993; Waltz,1993; Mearsheimer,1994/5), others assert that the triumphant US-led Western alliance will continue to shape the development of
regional systems, albeit on behalf of the 'global village' (Haas, 1990; Rosecrance, 1991; Jervis, 1991/2; Huntington, 1993a; Walt, 1993)\(^1\).

This dissertation seeks to locate this debate within the context of Africa’s post-Cold War international relations. The central question raised concerns the nature of the relationship between the post-Cold War international unipolar distribution of power, i.e. the United States, and the corresponding organic sub-Saharan African distribution of power, headed by South Africa and Uganda respectively (Smith, 1997:3)\(^2\). This question is contextualised against the backdrop of the US’ post-Cold War experiences in the Persian Gulf (1990-1) and the Balkans (1994). In both of these regional systems, the US has intervened directly, albeit under the respective banners of the United Nations (UN) and NATO, in order to arrest Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and Serbia’s designs upon Bosnia-Herzegovina. The implications of the US’ actions are two-fold. First, in acting against Iraq and Serbia, the US has impeded the hegemonic aspirations of these two states, thereby negating the organic dynamism of these two regional systems. Second, the US’ employment of the UN and NATO as ordering devices within these two systems served to perpetuate the tradition of extra-regional intervention, with the result being that minimal, if any, regional policing capacity-building has been effected (Lustick, 1997).

In contrast to these two experiences, this dissertation argues that while the US continues the practice of extra-regional intervention within post-Cold War Africa, the relationship it has entered into with the African system is one which actively promotes the regional hegemonies of South Africa and Uganda. By employing the 1996-7 Zairian crisis as a case study, this dissertation demonstrates that the relationship between the two distributions of power seeks to advance Africa’s organic dynamism, and promote the policing capacity of South Africa and Uganda, along a trajectory informed dually by the discourses of Pax Americana and the African Renaissance.

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\(^1\) This debate has mostly been confined to the US’ post-Cold War engagement with Europe and the Korean Peninsula.
Fundamental to this dissertation is the theoretical framework through which the above relationship is analysed. As J. David Singer noted, “there are always several ways in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for the purposes of systematic analysis” (1961:77). The theoretical framework employed in this study is Robert Putnam’s ‘two-level games’ model, an analytical approach described by its author as a “metaphor for domestic-international interactions” (1988:433). The following section offers a brief overview of Putnam’s model and motivates its utility as a theoretical framework.

Theoretical Framework

The two-level games model, an International Relations (IR) theoretical framework premised upon a behavioural theory of social negotiation, is essentially concerned with the descriptive-explanatory tension inherent in Singer’s level-of-analysis problem. According to Singer: “the primary purpose of theory is to explain, and when descriptive and explanatory requirements are in conflict, the latter ought to be given priority, even at the cost of some representational inaccuracy” (1961:79). Consequently, whilst most sophisticated IR theories acknowledge the importance of the various levels of analysis (i.e. individual, state-society, and international system levels), they tend to employ only a single level of analysis, utilising the others solely for the purposes of explaining anomalies (Moravcsik, 1993:6).

Singer’s empirical demands find expression in the epistemological foundations of Kenneth Waltz’s theory of structural realism. According to Waltz:

Definitions of structure must leave aside, or abstract from, the characteristics of units, their behaviour, and their interactions. Why must these obviously important matters be omitted? They must be omitted so that we can distinguish between variables at the level of the units and variables at the level of the system (1983:79).

The dissertation shall hereafter refer to ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ as ‘Africa’. Such an approach is in keeping with the US foreign policy community, who group North Africa together with the Middle Eastern states,
Thus, even whilst acknowledging that structure “is not the only cause in play”, Waltz privileges an international system level of analysis, thereby prioritising theoretical gain above representational accuracy (1983:87). Waltz’s theoretical position is evident in his earlier work, *Man, the State, and War* (1959), in which he analyses the cause of war according to three distinct levels of analysis: an individual level, a state-society level, and an international level. Whereas he is able to find an independent variable exclusive to each of these three levels, he concludes that whilst the individual and state-society relations should be considered as the efficient cause of war, it is the anarchic condition of the international system which serves as the permissive and thus most significant cause (1959:232-38). As such, the theory of structural realism seeks to analyse, in Waltz’s view, international relations from the most empirically useful level of analysis.

Yet, as Paul Schroeder argues, structural realism “may make its theory of international politics simple, parsimonious, and elegant; [it is also], for the historian at least, unhistorical, unusable and wrong” (1994:129). Ironically, it is the parsimonious nature of structural realism which serves simultaneously as one of its great strengths and weaknesses. Proponents praise its ability to organise and compress grand history into a comprehensive theory (Buzan and Little, 1994; Kapstein, 1995), while critics call attention to the lack of congruity between structural realism’s representation of history and specific historical moments (Keohane, 1983; Schroeder, 1994). One group of critics, operating predominantly within the liberal and Marxist paradigms, have reversed the logic of structural realism, focusing almost exclusively on the state-society level of analysis at the expense of an international system level (Moravcsik, 1997:513). Whereas realist scholars would argue that the state responds primarily to external structural impulses, liberal and Marxist scholars retort that international relations are driven instead by domestic political, economic and social processes, thereby discounting the notion of an objective international system. As such, the theoretical debate between these two approaches pertains to the “explanatory mileage” scholars could expect from either perspective and not to the extent to which each represents reality (Kapstein, 1995:754).

due to the similarity of US interests in both regions (Clough, 1992:1).
Other scholars have taken issue with the epistemological foundations of the above debate, arguing that the long-held IR assumption of maintaining an analytical distinction between international relations and domestic politics produces a dubious reflection of reality, as only a limited set of real-world problems in international relations are suited to a uni-level analysis (Gourevitch, 1978:881; Moravcsik, 1993:6). James Rosenau drew attention to the correlation between domestic and international factors in his studies of conflict behaviour (1969; 1973), whilst Karl Deutsch (1957) and Ernst Haas (1958) asserted that both domestic and international forces would shape trans-Atlantic and European regional integration. Graham Allison's celebrated exploration of the inner workings of the 'black box' debunked realist assumptions of the state as a rational-unitary actor, exposing the tension within the United States' domestic political structures in response to the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis (1971), and scholars analysing foreign economic policy, such as Peter Katzenstein (1976; 1978) and Stephen Krasner (1978a; 1978b) have noted the importance of domestic factors upon a state's foreign economic policy.

Putnam's theoretical contribution falls under the above rubric as he argues that it is the entanglement between domestic and international factors that produces international activity; that utilising a uni-level approach generates only a "partial equilibrium" analysis (1988:430). However, he criticises past efforts at integrating domestic and international factors, arguing that the above literature "consists either of ad hoc lists of countless 'domestic influences' on foreign policy or of generic observations that national and international affairs are somehow 'linked'" (1988:430-2). Pushing the proverbial theoretical envelope, he urges IR scholars to move beyond the mere observation that international and domestic factors can affect each other and to "seek theories that integrate both spheres, accounting for the areas of entanglement between them" (1988:433).

Putnam's two-level games model is centred on a negotiator caught between two levels or tables, an international table at which s/he bargains towards a tentative international agreement, and a domestic table at which s/he seeks ratification from domestic
constituents based upon the satisfaction of domestic demands. These domestic demands constitute what Putnam refers to as a ‘win-set’, a variable he defines as “the set of all possible level one [international] agreements that would ‘win’ - that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents - when simply voted up or down” (1988:437). The negotiator is thus constrained simultaneously by two win-sets: that of his/her domestic constituency’s win-set as well as the win-set of the other negotiator’s domestic constituency (Moravcsic, 1993:4). As such, the two-level game recognises that the state is neither a rational nor unitary actor, and that the negotiator attempts to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously (Putnam, 1988:460). Although Putnam acknowledges that satisfying the demands of one level may serve to dissatisfy the demands of the other, he argues that “there are powerful incentives for consistency between the two”, such as the use of side-payments or synergy between levels (1988:434; Mayer, 1992).

Whereas Putnam’s model has been applied to several North-North and North-South case studies (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993; Paarlberg, 1997; Stephan, 1998), Africa’s international relations have yet to be analysed accordingly. Given IR’s tendency to focus on the relations between the great and super-powers, Africa does not enjoy significant attention within the discipline (Handel, 1990:3). As Stuart Croft observes, the “state of scholarship in IR has itself made a major contribution to the marginalization of Africa in a significant social science”; “the many [IR] paradigms have collectively and uniquely excluded Africa” (1997:607, 608). Nevertheless, the application of Putnam’s model to the international relations of Africa is supported by theoretical trends both within African studies and the social sciences in general. Firstly, the accumulation of power in post-colonial Africa has long been recognised as a product of both domestic and international factors (Ojo, 1985; Shaw, 1982). Secondly, the incorporation of both domestic and international levels of analysis compliments the contemporary African theoretical discourse. According to Christopher Clapham:

Any study which seeks to appraise the relations between African states and their external environment must thus go some way beyond the confines of any narrow conception of
international relations. The global system is certainly important, though here much must be taken as read. Equally important, and rather more in need of elucidation, is the nature of African states, which defines their approach to their external world (1996:7).

Clapham’s theoretical point of departure can be included within the broad ambit of post-structuralist critiques in that he attempts to restore historicity and agency to his subject. Accordingly, he argues that “the evident weakness of African states did not reduce them to a state of inertia, in which their fate was determined by external powers. On the contrary, it impelled them to take measures designed to ensure survival, or at least to improve their chances of it” (1996:4). Yet, Clapham is also aware of restoring agency at the expense of determinism. As Mahmood Mamdani warns, “abstract universalism and intimate particularism turn out to be two sides of the same coin: both see in the specificity of experience nothing but its idiosyncrasy” (1996b:11). Like Clapham, Mamdani calls for an analysis which incorporates both agency and determinism in order to “establish the historical legitimacy of Africa as a unit of analysis” (1996b:13).

Clapham and Mamdani’s theoretical orientation is indicative of the wider IR ontological agent-structure debate pertaining to the levels of analysis problem. According to David Dressler (1989:443), there exist two uncontentious truths about social life:

first, that human agency is the only moving force behind the actions, events, and outcomes of the social world; and second, that human agency can be realized only in concrete historical circumstances that condition the possibilities for action and influence its course... These truths impose two demands on our scientific explanations: first, that they acknowledge and account for the powers of agents; and second, that they recognise the causal relevance of “structural factors,” that is, the conditions of action.

As the individual and state-society levels of analyses stress the agency of international actors, and the international system level of analysis emphasises the structure of the system in determining the actions of international actors, the privileging of one level of analysis above another serves to privilege one side of the agent-structure dilemma (Wendt,1987; Dessler,1989; Dryzek, Clark and McKenzie,1989). Therefore, not only
does two-level games facilitate an analysis of the interaction between domestic and international politics, but it also reconciles the agent-structure debate as the inclusion of an individual, state-society and international system level of analysis facilitates both the voluntarism and determinism inherent in international relations.

As such, Putnam's model provides a useful theoretical framework through which to analyse Africa's post-Cold War international relations, and in this instance, the relationship between the international distribution of power and the organic African distribution of power.

Having established and motivated the theoretical framework to be employed, the chapter turns to its case-study, the Zairian crisis, in order to contextualise its analysis of the US-African relationship. The following section provides a brief synopsis of the evolution of the crisis from its beginnings in 1981 until December 1996, when the US-African relationship began to manifest itself.

**The Case Study:**

**The Changing of the Zairian Guard (part i)**

This dissertation is informed by the 1996-7 Zairian crisis in which Laurent Kabila, the leader of the rebel Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), successfully managed to oust Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire's seemingly omnipotent president of thirty-two years. Not only did this episode involve both the international distribution of power and the African distribution of power, but it also unequivocally demonstrated the strategic linkages between the United States, South Africa and Uganda as they pertain to the policing of post-Cold War Africa.
The Origins of the Crisis

In a recent post-mortem of Mobutu's regime, Hussein Solomon asserts that Zaire had become "the quintessential example of the current malaise affecting Africa" (1997:91). Ironically, the much publicised accounts of kleptocracy, the substantive accusations of corruption and nepotism, and the detailed reports of decaying democratic structures, economic stagnation and environmental degradation did little to dent Mobutu's hold on power. Yet when a conflict in a neighbouring state spilled over their 217-kilometre shared border, it was able to ignite a spark powerful enough to dislodge the seemingly omnipotent president. The catalyst of Mobutu's downfall has been traced to the 1981 promulgation of legislation withdrawing the citizenship of the Banyamulenge, ethnic Tutsis who had been living in Zaire for several generations (Solomon, 1997:91). Soon afterwards, the authorities in Kinshasa approved a policy aimed at driving the Banyamulenge off the land that they legitimately owned, a policy exploited by the Hunde, Tembo, Nyanga and Nande peoples of the Kivu province (Solomon, 1997:91). By 1993, the Kivu province was awash with violent clashes between these two factions (Solomon, 1997:92). Essentially a localised tension, Kinshasa's discrimination against the Banyamulenge was however quickly absorbed into the Hutu-Tutsi conflict brewing in neighbouring Rwanda.

Zaire's involvement in the events preceding and succeeding the Rwandan genocide stemmed partly from Mobutu's own strategic thinking and partly from geographic location. Following the October 1990 'Cockroach Invasion' of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Mobutu dispatched his crack Division Speciale Presidentielle unit to bolster the predominantly Hutu Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). Mobutu's motives were unambiguous: following the end of Cold War, Zaire's relationship with the United States had dramatically waned, and a show of solidarity with francophone Rwanda would serve to bolster Mobutu's standing in Paris (Prunier, 1995:101). For four years the Rwandan

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3 This act in itself was not unique, as the Banyamulenge had on numerous previous occasions been deprived of their citizenship, only to have it reinstated at a later date (Mamdani, 1996a:25).
4 As Gerard Prunier argues, the RPF's invasion of Rwanda was largely interpreted by France and francophone Africa through the lens of the Fashoda syndrome, an ontology which pits the French and the
crisis simmered, characterised predominantly by RPF offensives against FAR military bases, indiscriminate massacring of Tutsis and regional diplomatic initiatives. However, when Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana’s aircraft was shot down over Kigali airport on April 6, 1994, “Rwanda fell off the cliff” (Prunier, 1995:212). Within the following three months, 800 000 Tutsi were methodically murdered, and, fearing reprisals, approximately two million Hutu fled to neighbouring states, while a further 1.8 million Hutu were internally displaced (Prunier, 1995:265;312).

**The Mobutu Alliance**

Whereas Mobutu had initially brought Zaire into Rwanda’s conflict, the geographic proximity of the two states resulted in the aftermath of the genocide occurring on Zairian soil. Of the two million Hutu refugees who left Rwanda, 1.2 million settled in refugee camps in eastern Zaire where they were meticulously organised by the still active FAR and the feared Interahamwe militia, who were responsible for much of the Tutsi genocide. At this junction Mobutu grabbed the international spotlight. Supported by Brussels, Paris and a reluctant Washington, he paraded himself as the guarantor of stability in central Africa (Prunier, 1995:317-20). However, Mobutu was no neutral diplomat. He firmly favoured the old Rwandese regime and harboured many of his friends from the now displaced Hutu regime (Prunier, 1995:321).

In addition, he accelerated the localised discrimination against the Banyamulenge, promulgating new legislation in May 1995 that barred them from acquiring homes or land in Zaire. Seven months later, the Zairian Army Chief of Staff, General Eluki Monga Aundu, called upon the Hunde, Tembo and Nyanga peoples, joined by the Zairian army, FAR troops and the Interahamwe, to actively “expel the foreigners [Banyamulenge]” from Anglo-Saxon worlds against each other in a battle for complete domination of the other. As such, the RPF was viewed as an Anglo-Saxon military force, based in an Anglo-Saxon country (Uganda), and intent on destroying a piece of France (1995:102-107).


Approximately 140 000 refugees returned to Rwanda within two months (Prunier, 1995:313).

Besides harbouring his Rwandan colleagues, Mobutu also placed seventeen billion Rwandan francs looted from government coffers under his own guardianship (Prunier, 1995:321).
the land. Then, on October 7 1996, the Deputy Governor of Zaire’s South Kivu province declared the *Banyamulenge* to be a destabilising presence in the region, and ordered them to leave Zaire within a week, or “be hunted down as rebels”. Between September and October of 1996 alone, an estimated two thousand *Banyamulenge* were massacred by the *Interahamwe* and Zairian and FAR troops, while at least 15 000 had been killed over the preceding two years (Solomon, 1997:92; Mail and Guardian, 1996).

**The Kabila Alliance**

The Deputy Governor’s ultimatum did not result in the *Banyamulenge* fleeing as intended. Instead, it served to spur them into action. Within three days of the ultimatum they established the Democratic People’s Alliance (DPA), and allied themselves with the AFDL, itself an amalgamation of Kabila’s own Parti Populaire de la Revolution (PPR), the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Zaire, and the National Resistance Council for Democracy (Solomon, 1997:92; 94). However, whereas the AFDL fell under the political leadership of Kabila, Kabila himself was carried by the military might of the Ugandan-Rwandan alliance that had earlier secured victories in Uganda and Rwanda. Despite initial denials of their association with Kabila’s AFDL, Paul Kagame, who served as post-genocide Rwanda’s first Vice President and Defence Minister, later admitted that Rwandan troops and officers had led the campaign against Mobutu. “The plan to topple Marshal Mobutu,” he declared, “originated in Kigali”. According to Kagame, the first step of the campaign was to dismantle the refugee camps controlled by FAR troops and the *Interahamwe*. This was to be followed by the destruction of all Hutu militia structures. The third and final phase of the rebellion would centre on toppling Mobutu (New African, 1997:22). Indeed, reports from September to December of 1996 had

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8 Kabila had previously been fighting the Mobutuist state for thirty years without success (Mail and Guardian, 1997e).

9 The leaders of Rwanda and Uganda, Paul Kagame and Yoweri Museveni, had known Kabila when all three were exiles in Dar es Salaam in the 1970s (Lobe, 1997). In addition, Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia and Zambia also contributed either troops, military or financial aid towards the AFDL, while UNITA would join Mobutu’s forces (Mail and Guardian, 1997e; 1997f; McGreal, 1997e).

10 Despite these denials, Rwanda’s complicity was an open secret: Kabila’s rebels were recognised throughout Zaire as a Rwandan force, primarily as a consequence of the linguistic differences between the French-speaking Zairians and the English-speaking rebels (Solomon, 1997:93; New African, 1997:22).
restricted Ugandan and Rwandan involvement to the targeting of Ugandan and Rwandan rebels hiding in Zaire (Misser, 1996:12). While the Ugandan rebels had camped in Zaire since the mid-1980s, the Rwandan FAR and Interahamwe rebels had sought refuge in the post-genocide refugee camps in which they had been able to rearm for new offensives against Kigali’s fledgling government (Prunier, 1995:313-6). The first cross-border raids from the Hutu camps into Rwanda occurred in September 1994, prompting Kagame to caution Mobutu that Rwanda would exercise its right of pursuit and retaliate accordingly (Solomon, 1997:92).

As such, the RPF targeted these refugee camps, giving rise to media reports of a Tutsi retribution campaign. The FAR and Interahamwe responded by shepherding vast columns of Hutu refugees further into Zaire, numbering up to 250,000, in order to escape both the Rwandan cross-border raids and the repatriation efforts under way, further fuelling these media reports (McGreal, 1996). Although Uganda has yet officially to admit its active involvement in the conflict, hard evidence places Ugandan troops within Zaire, specifically at the battles of Kisangani and Lubumbashi, and veterans of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) have since claimed that they were part of a 1,500 strong Ugandan force fighting inside Zaire (New African, 1997:22). Later reports would restrict Uganda’s military involvement to the beginning of the rebellion, although it remained a primary sponsor of the AFDL throughout the conflict (Mail and Guardian, 1997d; 1997f).

The Crisis Brews

While the Kigali plan established a strategy based on three cumulative steps, the myriad of interests held by the various factions collapsed the agenda into one simultaneous assault. Mobutu however appeared an invincible foe. According to a 1994 analysis, his grip on power was almost absolute:

In a country as big as this, without roads or adequate river transport, it would take a massive mobilization of force on foot to constitute a power-threatening popular revolt. As
it is now, Mobutu’s opponents in Kinshasa are too afraid of the military to march in protest down the main boulevard (Shiner, 1994:46).

Despite these odds, the AFDL was able to make dramatic strides inland from its eastern base. Although confronted by the combined forces of the Zairian army, FAR and the Interahamwe, the AFDL were able to advance an estimated 310 kilometres between 21 October and 5 December 1996 (Solomon, 1997:92). The Zairian armed forces posed no real challenge to the battle-hardened Ugandan/Rwandan troops who had been fighting constantly and victoriously over a decade, first in Uganda and then in Rwanda. However, Mobutu was well aware that his troops were under-staffed, ill-equipped and better suited to bullying and terrorising the local population than waging war. As such, he had placed his faith in a Parisian intervention, a strategy that was neither unexpected nor unwelcome in the French capital (Solomon, 1997:93). Indeed, in keeping with their past neo-colonial practices, the French were already organising an international interventionist force to protect their man (Solomon, 1997:96).11

By December 1996, the Zairian crisis was well established. While the AFDL were making distinct advances towards Kinshasa, the imminent introduction of French-led foreign troops, already with Tutsi blood on their hands, threatened to intensify an already explosive situation. Whereas the French had previously dealt with domestic rebellions throughout francophone Africa, the Zairian crisis would pit them against two national African armies adept at waging war within Africa’s Great Lakes region. Already the crisis had resulted in heavy casualties, internal displacements and a regional refugee crisis (Solomon, 1997:96). It was against this backdrop that the relationship between the United States, South Africa and Uganda would manifest itself.

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11 As Solomon notes (1997:94), Mobutu was so confident in a French rescue that he refused to attend the Nairobi Summit organised by Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi.
Chapter Outline

The stated purpose of this dissertation is to identify and characterise the relationship between the post-Cold War international distribution of power and the corresponding organic African distribution of power as it pertains to the construction of post-Cold War African regional hegemons. Having established the theoretical framework to be employed, Putnam’s two-level games, and the context against which the relationship manifested itself, the Zairian crisis, this section details how the dissertation is organised.

Chapter One examines the vulnerability of the African process of power accumulation to extra-regional interventions and manipulations. The chapter commences with an overview of Charles Tilly’s ‘war made the state and the state made war’ thesis, which is herein presented as the generic process of power accumulation. Premised upon the dual processes of political penetration and war-preparation, the chapter demonstrates how the security dilemma drives the actualisation of Tilly’s thesis. The chapter then details how extra-regional interventions during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods have corrupted Tilly’s causal chain within Africa, replacing the security dilemma with first the native dilemma and then the insecurity dilemma. The consequence of the absence of the security dilemma and the introduction of these two alternatives, the chapter concludes, is an African state both dependent on and vulnerable to extra-regional actors.

Chapters Two and Three develop the respective win-sets of the US and the two African states as they pertain to post-Cold War African regional hegemony. Chapter Two focuses on the US win-set. The chapter centres on the development of a tension caused by Washington’s historical lack of interest in the African continent and the US’ ascendance in the international distribution of power during the last century. The chapter traces the evolution of this tension, beginning immediately prior to World War II and ending with the fall of the Berlin Wall. After discussing the pros and cons of a direct US engagement with the African continent, the chapter then identifies the preferred US win-set, namely strategic delegation, which is premised upon the Nixon Doctrine and most clearly

Chapter Three develops the African win-set, a win-set held mutually by South Africa and Uganda. Following on from Chapter One, the chapter commences by identifying that which drives the African win-set, the non-viability of the type of political penetration practised by the post-colonial state. The chapter then moves to discuss the specific manifestations of the insecurity dilemma as it affected South Africa and Uganda. For the former, this manifestation was the apartheid state, while for the latter, it took the form of the military regimes of Milton Obote and Idi Amin. The chapter then details how post-apartheid South Africa and post-Obote Uganda are attempting to replace the insecurity dilemma with the democracy dilemma. Although each have undertaken a separate and sometimes different path towards democratisation, their respective routes are nonetheless congruent. Consequently, this chapter argues that it is their respective needs to consolidate their respective democratisation processes that drives the African win-set. The chapter concludes by detailing each of these states' reaction to the Zairian crisis.

Chapter Four is concerned with the synergies between the two sets of win-sets. The chapter begins with a brief synopsis of the relations between these three states from the mid-1970s, when the US first directly engaged with the African continent, until the Zairian crisis. The chapter then demonstrates that while the Zairian crisis threatened the actualisation of either win-set, there existed sufficient synergies between Pax Americana and the African Renaissance to enable a positive relationship between the two win-sets. The chapter then details how the three states acted in concert to manage and contain the crisis, and how their relationship was cemented with the unprecedented US presidential African tour of 1998. The chapter concludes with a brief synopsis of the second Zairian / DRC crisis, which the dissertation argues does not refute the marriage of convenience entered into between the three states.
CHAPTER TWO

POWER AND THE AFRICAN STATE

The primary purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the effect that extra-regional actors have upon the process of power accumulation within the African region. ‘Power’ is herein defined as “the present and potential ability and willingness of one nation to alter the decision-making processes of other countries in accordance with its own policies” (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970:13). While power accumulation is essentially a state-centred process, the implications for the region are profound. Regional systems, like the international system, are organised around core states that have the power and position to play the role of a hegemon (Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild and Zartman, 1996:133). These core states, whether they be singular or plural, constitute their respective systems’ distribution of power as a direct consequence of their superior power status relative to all other states within that system (Bull, 1977:201; Waltz, 1983:93). The substantive difference between the international system and the regional system, however, is the ability of extra-regional actors to manipulate the process of power accumulation within their regional spheres of influence, thereby effecting sympathetic regional distributions of power. Consequently, the type of manipulation exerted upon the process of power accumulation by the extra-regional actor serves as an efficient indicator of the nature of the relationship existing between the international distribution of power and the regional distribution of power.

The chapter commences by exploring the organic process of power accumulation, that is, one not affected by extra-regional intervention. Next, the chapter explores how extra-regional intervention has distorted this process. While Africa is certainly not unique in this regard, the chapter is centred on its experience. Finally, the chapter explores how African states have responded to their distorted international and domestic environments, and how their response has increased their vulnerability to extra-regional intervention.
The Security Dilemma

The prevailing theoretical literature pertaining to power accumulation is dominated by Charles Tilly, whose ‘war made the state and the state made war’ thesis is afforded theorem status by his peers. As Ian Lustick contends, Tilly’s treatise "stands as the only way we know that a ‘great power’ can be constructed in the modern world (1997:659). For Tilly, who focused on state-formation in post-Westphalian Europe, power accumulation is the product of two complementary processes: political penetration and war-preparation (1990:70). The following section explores these two variables and how they affect each other.

In his influential *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz argues that the substantive differences between states are those of capability and not of function (1983:96). Irrespective of size, culture, ideology or locale, all states essentially perform the same tasks: providing protection to their citizenry in return for their revenue (Gilpin, 1993:15). These tasks are mutually dependent on the state’s ability to politically penetrate the society over which it purports to govern, an action defined as:

that ensemble of processes by which the political-administrative-juridical centre of a ... state (1) establishes an effective and authoritative central presence throughout its geographical and sectoral peripheries, and (2) acquires a capacity for the extraction and mobilization of resources to implement its policies and pursue its goals, however these may be determined (Coleman, 1977:3).

By establishing an authoritative presence throughout its jurisdictional territory - what Max Weber refers to as the "monopolization of legitimate coercion", the state is able to establish a monopoly on resource extraction (1978:904-5). Consequently, these two tasks are, as Norbert Elias notes, "two sides of the same monopoly" (1982:104). The revenues extracted from the landscape and populace serve to maintain the state’s monopoly on coercion, which in turn perpetuates the state’s monopoly on revenue extraction. Political penetration therefore serves as the state’s fundamental activity. Without resources the
state is unable to maintain its coercive and administrative structures and thus ceases to function (Skocpol, 1989:29). Consequently, scholars focusing upon state power turn their attention to the level of protection that the state is able to offer its citizens and the level of wealth from which the state can extract potential revenue. Military strength, gross national product and per capita income are yardsticks often used to quantify state power (Organski, 1968; Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972).

While the processes of political penetration deliver the ‘muscle’ of state power, the act of political penetration is itself driven by the security dilemma which emanates directly from the absence of an international hierarchy of authority (Layne, 1993:9). Anarchy, as all IR theorists agree, constitutes the central organising principle of the international system (Waltz, 1983:88). The most enduring depiction of the anarchical international system is Thomas Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’ doctrine in which he postulates that “during that time that men live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such is a war of every man against every man” (cf Williams, 1996:213)12. Realism, IR’s dominant theoretical paradigm, bases its conception of the international system upon Hobbes’ doctrine, from which it derives its most important assumption, that “state egoism in anarchy begets self-help” (Mercer, 1995:229)13. The absence of an international Leviathan, realists argue, leaves states with no guarantee that another shall behave in a manner not antithetical to its own interests (Waltz, 1983:88). Furthermore, the only material protection available to states is that which is provided by their own power capabilities. “Authority,” as Waltz argues, “quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability” (1983:88). Consequently, realists have proscribed that states pursue a national interest defined in terms of power maximisation (Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, 1994:35).

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12 Alternative conceptions of the international system are offered by Hugo Grotius and Emmanuel Kant (Bull, 1977:24-7).
13 Whereas the dramatic ending of the Cold War served to highlight many of Realism’s deficiencies, particularly its failure to predict the end of the war, the Realist paradigm continues to dominate the discipline. As Ethan Kapstein argues: “In the absence of [an] alternative, students of world politics will continue to use it as their cornerstone; in an important sense, structural realism continues to define the discipline” (1995:751).
Ironically however, the realist antidote for anarchy, being power, does little to lessen the insecurity of the international system. Instead the quest for greater security begets greater insecurity as John Herz famously noted:

Wherever such anarchic society has existed - and it has existed in most periods of known history on some level - there has arisen what may be called the ‘security dilemma’ of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, [states] are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the powers of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power is on (1950:157).

In addition to the dynamic character of the security dilemma, in that states are constantly required to accumulate additional power in order to feel secure, the currencies of power are constantly evolving. Whereas Vladimir Lenin asserted at the turn of the century that a standing army and police were the chief instruments of power (cf Skocpol, 1989:26), Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato proclaimed in 1970 that his country had become the first state to reach great power status on economic power alone, thereby negating the need for a military capacity (Bull, 1977:201). And while Hans Morgenthau responded to the 1973 OPEC oil embargo by declaring that militarily weak states with “monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic control of raw materials essential to the operation of advanced economies” were capable of becoming great powers (Keohane and Nye, 1977:11), Charles Kupchan has recently argued that trade and investment are presently more effective than territorial conquest as tools of state-craft, and that technology, information, and productivity have replaced land and labour as the key determinants of wealth (1998:51). Moreover, the impact of technological innovation, which has always been a constant determinant within the state’s power make-up, has gained increased importance in the information age (Snow, 1991:243; Rothkopf, 1998). Consequently, states can never
be assured of whether either their level or their currency of power constitutes a sufficient
deterrent for would-be aggressors.

For Tilly, the exigency caused by the security dilemma - the constant need to amass more power - drives the state continually to politically penetrate its society (1990:70). According to Tilly, the state’s compulsion to defend its resources and legitimacy from external threats (i.e. war-preparation) crystallises both the interests of the state as well as the interests of its population towards increased political penetration. Firstly, the threat of extinction drives the state to further penetrate the society over which it purports to govern in order to extract even greater resources so as to counter any external threat. As Tilly’s case-studies demonstrate:

A ruler’s creation of armed force generated durable state structure. It did so both because an army became a significant organization within the state and because its construction and maintenance brought complementary organizations – treasuries, supply services, mechanisms for conscription, tax bureaux, and much more – into life. ...From AD 990 onward, major mobilizations for war provided the chief occasions on which states expanded, consolidated, and created new forms of political organization (1990:70).

Secondly, the threat of subjugation by an external power serves to motivate the willingness of the population to contribute both finances and labour to the state. According to Emile Durkheim, war forces the population to close ranks and confront a common danger as “the individual thinks less of [him/herself] and more of the common cause” (cf Desch,1996:243). Albert Hirshman concurs, stating that external military threats make states more cohesive as the “exit” and “voice” options of the citizenry are replaced by the “loyalty” option (cf Desch,1996:243-4). And as Jeffrey Herbst wryly adds, threats to the individual’s survival overwhelm any concerns they may have had over increased taxation (1990:120). As such, the potential consequence of international anarchy facilitates the state’s strengthening of its two monopolies: resource extraction and means of coercion.
Thus, the relationship between war-preparation and political penetration is mutually reinforcing. The need to prepare for war drives the need to politically penetrate the society over which it purports to govern, and the increased power derived therefrom serves only to drive other states similarly, which in turn drives the original state’s need to again prepare for war. However, not all states are able to generate equal levels of power from their local polities. The factors which influence the levels of power the state is able to extract from its polity are comprised of geographical data, which includes the size of the territory and the physical nature of the landscape; material data, which refers to the presence of natural resources and the level of industrial capacity; and human resources, which pertains to the size, homogeneity, character and social cohesion of the population (Handel, 1990:68). For instance, Vietnam would be unable to match the human resources in terms of demographic bulk of its northern neighbour China.

Consequently, states seek to augment their autonomous power in one of two ways. The first is to increase the size of the state through either military or economic conquest (Gilpin, 1993:94-5; Kennedy, 1987:xxiii)\(^\text{14}\). The availability of additional geographic data, material data and human resources, and the efficient political penetration thereof greatly affects the state’s level of power (Gilpin, 1993:106). As Lustick argues, this is the major route undertaken by all great powers (1997:658). However, such a route is premised on the availability of greater relative power in the first place, hence it is referred to as ‘autonomous’ or ‘internal’ power (Handel, 1990:70).

‘Derived’ power constitutes the second mechanism through which states seek to amass additional power. Such power is accumulated principally through an association with another state or states, and takes the form of alliances as well as membership of international organisations (Handel, 1990:70). The literature recognises three types of alliances: an unequal bilateral alliance between a strong state and a weak one; an equal bilateral agreement between two weak states; and a multilateral alliance which includes a number of weak states coupled with at least one strong state (Handel, 1990:120). Of these

\(^{14}\) Although Tilly demonstrated that territorial conquest preceded economic expansion, Paul Kennedy has shown that the inverse is also true (1987:xxiii).
three types, equal bilateral alliances tend to dominate, especially in times of peace (Bull, 1977:202; Handel, 1990:156-7).

According to Handel, the substantive difference between strong and weak states concerns the ratio of autonomous power to derived power within the state's power store (1990:70). The stronger the state, the greater the amount of autonomous power; the weaker the state, the greater the amount of derived power. As such, organic distributions of power are driven by an autonomous process of power accumulation, which is reliant on the state's ability to politically penetrate the society over which it purports to govern, which is in turn driven by the state's need to defend itself from the security dilemma. The following section explores how extra-regional intervention has affected this causal chain within the African region.

Transcending Anarchy

Throughout its pre-colonial history, the Africa continent experienced an historical trajectory which closely paralleled that of Europe in terms of power accumulation (Shaw, 1982:363-8; Warner, 1999). In a manner concomitant with the milieu of Niccolo Machiavelli, Africa's pre-colonial state was forged through the dynamic process of military conquest: stronger states expanded at the expense of weaker states\textsuperscript{15}. The construction of the Tutsi and Tukulor empires, the Asante Kingdom, and the legendary military conquests of Shaka Zulu all stand as a testament to this process of power accumulation. In his study of the Sokoto Caliphate (present-day Nigeria) between 1500 and 1800, Joseph Smaldone notes the relationship between political penetration and war-preparation in pre-colonial Africa:

War was the principal instrument for the establishment and extension of political authority over subject people and foreign territory, and for the organization, maintenance, and reinforcement of that authority. The demands of perennial war evoked institutions to
subordinate the sectors of society crucial to the interests of the militarized polities. The permanent requirement to mobilize human and material resources for military purposes [i.e., taxation] intensified tendencies toward the monopolization of power and the elaboration of auxiliary institutions of social control (cf. Herbst, 1990:121).

However, the arrival of the European powers upon African shores dramatically transmuted the arena of Africa's international relations, affecting the region's process of power accumulation in three distinct phases.

The first phase occurred immediately prior to the colonisation of the African continent. While Europe's scramble for Africa only began in the late 1800s, there had been a continuous European presence upon the African continent since the 1500s when the Portuguese began exploring the Zambezi river (Herbst, 1989:674). The mere presence of these extra-regional actors presented a new source of power for the pre-colonial African state. While Africa’s pre-colonial states employed both autonomous and derived power, both of these were essentially autonomous to the African continent and its accompanying technologies. The presence of the Europeans therefore injected a new form of derived power into the African region based upon their superior technologies. As Phares Mutibwa recounts:

The next European to visit the court of the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, Henry Morton Stanley, became a celebrity with his dashing and adventurous journeys in Africa. It was he who, after speaking to the Kabaka about Christianity, became the bearer of the Kabaka's famous letter which appeared in London's Daily Telegraph asking Queen Victoria to send missionaries to Buganda to teach his people the Christian religion and 'Western knowledge'. At the time the letter was sent, Buganda was faced with the possibility of military incursions from Egypt and by a threat from Kabarega, king of Bunyoro, immediately to the north. Mutesa's overture to the British should be seen against this background (1992:1).

15 In keeping with the appropriate literature, the 'African state' is herein treated as a composite of all African states (Doornbos, 1990).
The second phase was that of colonisation, a phase which had a far greater impact on the African process of accumulation, irrevocably transforming it. Firstly, by colonising the African continent, the European metropoles were in effect transferring Africa’s security dilemma to the capitals of Europe: Africans were no longer responsible for the stability of their continent, Europeans were. However, the European response to this development was equally significant. The colonial powers convened the Berlin Congo Conference in 1885 at which consensus was reached regarding the internal divisions of the African continent (Herbst, 1989:674). Consequently, Africa’s security dilemma was dissolved by an extra-regional agreement.

The third and current phase of extra-regional intervention came into effect following the decolonisation of the African continent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and has been manifested primarily through the imposition of a “constraining network of antibelligerency norms” and the active intrusions in the regional system by extra-regional actors (Lustick, 1997:660). According to Lustick, these continued interventions by extra-regional actors in post-colonial regional systems have served to annul the anarchical context in which international relations are traditionally located. As he demonstrates in his study of the post-Ottoman Middle Eastern system, extra-regional intervention protects vulnerable regimes from collapse and impedes potential regional hegemons from flexing their relative capabilities (1997:660). His case-study of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is especially telling. Had that same invasion occurred during Tilly’s time-frame, Iraq would have defeated the weaker Kuwait and, by politically penetrating the annexed territory, would have accumulated the additional power the resources of the latter would have provided. However, the intervention of extra-regional actors (i.e. the US-led alliance) ended the hegemonic ambitions of Iraq and salvaged the sovereignty of Kuwait (1997:670-675). Accordingly he concludes:

To the extent that one accepts the argument that political violence on a grand scale is how all developing great powers have welded large populations and extensive valuable territories within a single administrative domain and a single market, one must expect that international norms and great power policies have been responsible for blocking the emergence of a great power in the Middle East by deterring or preventing state-building
wars from being fought to successful conclusions across existing Middle Eastern boundaries (1997:661-2).

Lustick’s conclusions are supported by the earlier research of Bruce Russett, who argues that “a [post-war] small nation was as safe without an explicit guarantee as with one” (1963:100). Moreover, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg have described extra-regional actors acting upon Africa’s regional systems as “post-imperial ordering devices”, actively preventing and outlawing force as a means of producing new states in Africa (e.g. Biafra and Katanga) (1982:20-1).

However, it must also be noted that African states have themselves sought to preserve the territorial integrity of national borders16. Despite the fact that Africa’s boundaries are inorganic and arbitrary, the continent’s leaders contend that the borders represent a “tangible reality” and that without a feasible alternative they should be retained (Herbst, 1989:676). Inherent in this desire to maintain the colonial partitions is the memory of colonial subjugation. As I. William Zartman asserts:

Having no power but only trampled rights, having fallen under the domination of stronger states, and having overthrown the colonial system largely by the manipulation of slogans and by default, Western African states attempt to reject international relations based on power and speak of a new era, one no longer characterized by the domination of the stronger over the weak. This Fanonistic revisionism, which in one form or another characterises most West African states’ views of international relations, depends on the creation and acceptance of a system of values that denigrates power, inhibits its use, and establishes rights. Because the existence of power, influence, and even domination cannot be denied, it must be disarmed into an accepted value construct that can govern action and explain events (1966:145).

The African position on territorial integrity is evident in the fact that since 1904, the internal map of Africa has hardly been altered through force (Herbst, 1989:674)\textsuperscript{17}.

The security dilemma is one variable that permeates the literature on power accumulation. It led to the formation of the nation-states of Europe, and drives the continuous need to accumulate additional power, through either political penetration or alliance-formation. Consequently, the absence of an African security dilemma has had a pronounced effect on power accumulation in Africa. Yet, as Tilly argues, the above variable constitutes only one side of the process, the other being political penetration. However, as the following section demonstrates, extra-regional intervention has equally affected this second variable.

### The Native Dilemma

As was discussed above, the security dilemma drives the act of political penetration, affecting the dual monopolies of coercion and resource extraction. While the colonial state fulfilled both criteria of political penetration, in that it effected both monopolies, the architects of the colonial state designed and executed a peculiar variance of this process. “Europe”, as Mamdani argues, “did not bring to Africa a tropical version of the late-nineteenth-century European nation-state” (1996b:287).

Having secured the internal boundaries of the African continent at the Berlin Congo Conference, the colonial architects faced a challenge peculiar to the colonial context, the ‘native dilemma’: how does a foreign minority govern an indigenous majority? (Mamdani, 1996b:18). Whereas the answer to the security dilemma was increased political penetration, the solution for this ‘native dilemma’ was ‘divide and rule’ or “decentralized despotism” (Mamdani, 1996b:18). Instead of galvanising the domestic population into a cohesive monolithic unit sharing a common association with the state (i.e. nation-building), the colonial architects divided and then further sub-divided the population.

\textsuperscript{17} The major exception to this trend was the establishment of Eritrea.
population. While each colony was subject to the legal order of its respective European metropole, it was only the 'civilised' members of the population, i.e. European colonial officials, settlers and 'civilised natives', who were governed in direct accordance with European laws. The second grouping, the 'uncivilised' predominantly rural 'natives', were further sub-divided along 'tribal' lines according to either ethnic or religious criteria, therein exposing or accentuating such cleavages between domestic populations (Thomas and Mazrui, 1992:159). Each 'tribe' was governed by a Native Authority in accordance with an invented customary law, a "monarchical, authoritarian, and patriarchal" ideological construct of the colonial architects (Mamdani, 1996b:22).

Decentralised despotism essentially served to ensure that the colonial administrators held the monopoly on coercion within each colonial polity. While each 'tribe' was ruled by a 'despot' whose power emanated from colonial association and customary law, ethnic-based decentralisation negated the possibility of 'tribal' mergers and the assembly of a force greater in number than that of the colonial presence. And the actualisation of the above monopoly served to protect and accentuate the monopoly on resource extraction already held by the colonial powers and the capital they represented. Julius Nyerere, who served as Tanzania's first president, notes:

The reality of neo-colonialism quickly becomes obvious to a new African government which tries to act on economic matters in the interest of national development and for the betterment of its own masses. For, such a government immediately discovers that it inherited the power to make laws, to direct the civil service, to deal with foreign governments and so on, but it did not inherit effective power over economic developments in its own country. Indeed, it often discovers that there is no such thing as a national economy at all. Instead there exists in its land various economic activities which are owned by people outside its jurisdiction, which are directed at external needs, and which are run in the interests of external economic powers (cf Mathews, 1989:40).

Given the extra-regional monopolies on both coercion and resource extraction, one of the immediate projects outlined for the post-colonial state by policy-makers and scholars alike was that of organic political penetration, a process intended to realise domestic
however, instead of driving Africa’s development and nation-building projects as intended, political penetration assumed another variant character, a character overwhelmingly dependent on extra-regionally derived power. The following section explores this variance.

The Insecurity Dilemma

Just as the colonial powers were able to perpetuate their extra-regional intervention upon the African security dilemma following decolonisation, so too were they able to continue their interventions upon the post-colonial process of political penetration. The ability of extra-regional actors to exert a material influence upon the post-colonial process of power accumulation stems directly from the nature of the legitimacy of the post-colonial African state. Implicit in the notion of statehood is the citizen’s acceptance of the legitimacy of the state (i.e. positive sovereignty), a status achieved through either a popular consensus of civil society or a coercive domination of society (Skocpol, 1989:25). Whereas the colonial state achieved its positive sovereignty through the coercive domination of society, i.e. decentralised despotism, the post-colonial state has not enjoyed a similar level of positive sovereignty (Thomas and Mazrui, 1992:39). For instead of facing a security dilemma, the post-colonial state confronts an ‘insecurity dilemma’, a differentiation described by Jackson and Rosberg below:

In the Anglo-American conception of the international system versus the nation-state, the most persistent image has been one of international discord versus internal order and civility. In contemporary Black Africa, an image of international accord and civility and national disorder and violence would be more accurate (1982:23).

Whereas the native dilemma fuelled the development of political penetration in the colonial state, the insecurity dilemma outlined by Rosberg and Jackson above has driven the post-colonial variance of this process (Thomas and Mazrui, 1992:160). The insecurity dilemma essentially revolves around the zero-sum character of political power in post-
colonial Africa (Mazrui, 1994:39). Unlike the European ‘prototype’ state, the post-colonial African state does not feature a significant indigenous private sector. The national economy is instead controlled by extra-regional actors with only the public sector available to the local population as an economically viable sector (Herbst, 1990:125, Young, 1988). Samuel Huntington (1989:18) contextualises the implications thereof as follows:

The exit from power of rulers who lose elections means that limits must exist on what is at stake in controlling government. If winning or losing was an all-or-nothing affair, those in power would have overpowering incentives to suppress opposition, to rig elections, and to resort to coercion to remain in power if it appeared they had lost an election. Hence government cannot be the only or even the principal source of status, prestige, wealth, and power. Some dispersion of control over these goods - what Dahl calls “dispersed inequalities” - is necessary. The most important issue here concerns economic power. Democracy is impossible if the government exercises complete control over the economy.

Consequently, the post-colonial state has been unable to augment its domestic legitimacy through a popular consensus lest those in power lose their political privilege. As such, coercive domination has presented itself as the best means possible of securing legitimacy. However, the colonial state was essentially powerless without the external support of the colonial metropole and the localised power of the Native Authority. The colonial African state was not intended to be a sovereign entity. The resources extracted did not empower the colonial state but were accrued by the European metropoles instead, enriching them directly. Indeed, the only real empowerment occurring within the colonial state was at the level of the Native Authorities (Mamdani, 1996b:21).

As such, the post-colonial state instituted a two-tiered programme of political penetration: firstly, to continue the ‘divide and rule’ policies of the colonialists in order to thwart a domestic threat (Mamdani, 1996b:288); secondly, to attract extra-regional support, i.e. derived power, in order to maintain a coercive presence (Clapham, 1996:19). For, as Clapham argues: “the option of an ‘autonomous’ independent state, not heavily reliant on any significant external relationship, was simply not available” (1996:39-40). Ironically,
the same extra-regional interventions which contain Africa’s security dilemma serve to fuel Africa’s insecurity dilemma. While the juridical framework which governs international relations posits that no territory can be changed through force, the conventions of international law recognise the state as the sole representative of the national polity. Lacking positive sovereignty, African states are instead buoyed by the “negative sovereignty” ascribed to them as members of the United Nations (Clapham, 1996:15). Moreover, those seen to represent the state can use their own domestic statehood as a bargaining counter with which to attract the resources necessary to perpetuate their domestic control (Barnett and Levy, 1991:370; Clapham, 1996:19). Inherent in this relationship between local state and extra-regional actor is the continued extra-regional control of resource extraction, as the following extract illustrates:

Between 1969 and 1976, fairly characteristic years in this respect, less than 1 percent of [Zaire’s] budgetary expenditure went into the improvement or support of farming. And why, after all spend more? So long as mining wealth could be sold for food imported to feed the Mobutist state – the bureaucracy and its clients, the towns, a few essential services, an army for internal use and a copious force of police – there could be no profit in helping peasants (Davidson, 1992:258).

Subsequently, the post-colonial state’s positive illegitimacy has been countered by its negative sovereignty, prompting Jackson and Rosberg’s thesis that the African state is empirically weak yet juridically strong (1982). Political penetration in post-colonial Africa does not intend to empower the state but to perpetuate the governance of those who enjoy the privileges of political power, such as Zaire’s mining wealth, instead (Shaw, 1982:361; Mamdani, 1988:1159; Doornbos, 1990:185; Osaghae, 1989:36). While the security dilemma is centred on the threat of subjugation by an external power, forcing the state to rely on its autonomous power, the insecurity dilemma revolves around the domestic contest for control of the state apparatus.

18 Clapham argues that there is a positive correlation between the African state’s deficiency of domestic legitimacy and its degree of external dependence (1996:21).
Having established how extra-regional intervention has corrupted the causal chain of power accumulation, affecting both the security dilemma and the processes of political penetration, the chapter now turns to discuss how Africa's organic regional distribution of power emerges and how it remains vulnerable to extra-regional intervention.

Continental Inequalities

The effects of extra-regional intervention have dramatically altered the process of power accumulation in the African region. Indeed, the term 'power' is one not readily associated with the African state. After nearly four decades of independence, the continent’s political units are more commonly referred to as "predatory, parasitic and weak" (Khadiagala, 1995:33). African states collectively occupy a lowly position in the international hierarchy of power, and are routinely excluded from the fora of the more powerful states, such as the United Nations Security Council and the G7 group of states (Clapham, 1996:3). Yet, within the context of inter-African international relations, power politics has tended to dominate the continental agenda (Orwa, 1984:14). The formation of the Casablanca and Lagos coalitions immediately prior to the formation of the OAU, and the counter-balancing initiatives of the Frontline States in opposition to South Africa's economic hegemony both feature as indisputable examples of this phenomenon. As such, one can identify an organic African regional distribution of power.

According to the literature, there are three distinct ways in which post-colonial African states accumulate additional power. The first of these is diplomatic prestige. Given the general absence of military and economic power on the African continent, scholars have noted the high value attributed to intra-continental diplomacy and the ideological views of Africa's leaders. As Zartman states: "The importance of ideological criteria for policy, the personal nature of perception and decision in policy-making, and the confusion between slogans and action -- all combine to give a position of influence to those states which can appropriate, manipulate, and monopolize slogans" (1966:62). David Johns concurs, arguing that diplomacy is a major, if not the only, source of leverage in African
politics, given the political, military and economic weaknesses of African states (1982:271). Nkwame Nkrumah’s embodiment of pan-Africanism, the identification of African socialism with Julius Nyerere, and the personification of democracy and non-racialism in Nelson Mandela all served to elevate the importance of their respective states within the continent’s diplomatic circles.

The exploitation of natural resources, especially strategic minerals and oil, serves as another route available to a few fortunate states to increase their relative power. Although the levels of wealth and power which may accrue from the exploitation of mineral deposits are volatile due to fluctuating world commodity prices, they no less provide an opportunity for some states to increase their relative power. According to Timothy Shaw (1975), a three-tier classification of African states can be constructed according to the type of economic activity that states engage in. Those states that exported oil and strategic minerals (Nigeria, Zaire, Algeria, Zambia and Angola) are accorded an ‘A’ rating, followed by the ‘B’-rated industrialised states (Kenya, Ivory Coast and Senegal). The remaining states, which are involved in the production of primary materials, are given a ‘C’ rating. The higher the rating, the more influence the state enjoys upon the continent.

Finally, scholars acknowledge the ability of extra-regional powers to intervene within Africa’s continental system and fabricate or accentuate state inequalities. Whereas Lustick and others have argued that extra-regional actors have frustrated the aspirations of potential hegemonic states, the inverse is also true. Extra-regional states have also aided the construction of local hegemonies. As Olatunde Ojo contends:

In the absence of a dominant [African] power two alternatives are open. One is a concert of the regional leaders: the Group I [A] states who, if they can agree amongst themselves are able to claim their wish is the African wish. The other alternative is for external actors to establish order either by occasional direct intervention or by creating, manipulating and supporting concerts of lesser powers against the regional leaders (1985:38).
The relationship between extra-regional actors and African states is, however, one of cooperation and not coercion. Modern imperialism, including neo-colonialism, feeds off the compatibility between external groups in the metropole and African domestic actors around a mutually beneficial ideology or resource (Shaw, 1982:363; Anise, 1989:157).

Of these trio of routes available to African states through which to ascend to the apex of the regional hierarchy of power, the former two suggest a more organic route than the latter. However, they are as vulnerable to extra-regional intervention as the latter route, which is explicitly premised on extra-regional intervention. As a post-Nkrumist Ghana and a post-Nyerere Tanzania have discovered, the possession of an ideological crown does not efficiently translate into empirical state power. While the appropriation of ideology may boost the standing of a particular leader, the ideology needs to be able to provide real material benefits to both the first state and subsequent converts (Clapham, 1996:106). As such, extra-regional advocates of a particular ideology will couple regional conversions with material benefits, while proponents of alternative ideologies will act to improve the material benefits associated with their preferred ideology (Handel, 1990).

Similarly, extra-regional powers are able to weaken those states that enjoy an abundance of mineral wealth through one of two means. The first is to fuel the insecurity dilemma by supporting a domestic rebel group, thereby forcing the state to employ more of its resources to quell the domestic rebellion. Secondly, extra-regional powers may through a variety of measures seek to isolate powerful states. To this effect, scholars have noted a myriad of ways in which extra-regional actors affect the process of power accumulation. Following the subordinate-systems literature, Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel document nine distinct ways in which extra-regional actors “participate” in regional systems. These are multilateral arrangements; bilateral arrangements; trade and economic investments; military intervention; subversion; colonisation; the United Nations; cultural and educational activities; and propaganda (1970:26). The United Nations sanctions imposed upon Libya, the granting of material aid to the Frontline States of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the encirclement of Soviet-allied
Ethiopia by Western-friendly African states during the Cold War all feature as examples of extra-regional intervention upon the post-war African system.

While extra-regional intervention continues, there are two fundamental differences which distinguish the post-Cold War international system from its predecessor. First, the transformation of a bipolar system to a unipolar one dramatically affects the extra-regional - regional relationship (Handel, 1990). Within a bipolar or multipolar system, the regional hegemon has more scope as it can play one extra-regional power off against the other/s, thereby extracting greater concessions. In a unipolar system, a regional state has less room to manoeuvre, as it needs to placate the interests of one extra-regional power. Second, whereas the bipolar conflict traversed the entire international system, security in the post-Cold War system is becoming increasingly regionalised (Holm and Sorensen, 1995:15). This is due to both the regional dynamics of each specific region, as well as the interests of the United States. These two parameters are utilised to inform the construction of the post-Cold War relationship between the international distribution of power and the organic African distribution of power.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated the effect that extra-regional interventions have had on the process of African power accumulation. Although numerous interventionist practices have been mentioned, the outstanding intervention has been the annulment of the anarchic condition in which international relations are traditionally located. Instead of a security dilemma, African states have been confronted with first a native dilemma and then an insecurity dilemma. The consequence thereof is the practice of alternative types of political penetration, which instead of empowering the African state against a potential external aggressor, serves to empower the state against an internal aggressor. Subsequently, the African state is both dependent on and vulnerable to extra-regional actors. Those states that possess either an ideology or a resource sympathetic to the extra-
regional power tend to enjoy a higher position in the regional distribution of power than a state which holds an unsympathetic ideology or no resource. Having established the vulnerability of African states to extra-regional interventions, the following two chapters explore the respective win-sets of the United States and South Africa and Uganda as they pertain to the construction of post-Cold War African regional hegemony.

\footnote{Examples of continued extra-regional interventions include the United Nations intervention into the Persian Gulf (1991), and the NATO interventions into the Balkans (1994,1999).}
CHAPTER THREE

THE AFRICAN PREDICAMENT

This chapter is concerned with the win-set of the United States, currently the primary extra-regional actor presiding in Africa. The role of extra-regional actors within regional systems forms a crucial element in our understanding of power formation as extra-regional actors are able to distort regional dynamics, capable of either promoting or frustrating the hegemonic aspirations of regional states. Africa’s regional dynamics in particular have experienced repeated intervention by extra-regional actors. Indeed, the very act of demarcating Africa’s internal borders was an extra-regional endeavour. Although post-Cold War US activity in Africa has taken many forms, from military intervention (Somalia, 1993), to absenteeism (Rwanda, 1994), and the President’s African tour (1998), it is possible to identify a single win-set which the US is pursuing in its relations with the African continent. The following chapter explores this win-set and the reasons behind its implementation.

The chapter commences with an overview of the dilemma facing Washington: that Pax Americana forces the US to directly engage with a continent in which it has no intrinsic interests. The chapter then traces how this dilemma has been settled during the pre-and post-war years until 1975, when Portugal suddenly declared its decision to decolonise its African colonies. The third section argues the pros and cons of a continued US engagement with post-Cold War Africa, while the fourth section explores the US’ ideal win-set concerning its African predicament. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the developing Zairian crisis for Washington policymakers.
The Unimportant Continent

The unprecedented tour of Africa undertaken by US President Bill Clinton in 1998 heralded a new chapter in the US’ relationship with the African continent. Not only did Clinton become the first sitting US president to undertake a comprehensive tour of Africa, but the visit also represented the culmination of his administration’s recent policy initiatives which produced the first coherent US African policy formulated since the end of the Cold War (Smith, 1998). Dubbed the ‘partnership for the 21st century’, the new policy is officially predicated upon two clear policy objectives: the full integration of Africa into the global economy, and the protection of the US and its citizens from “dangers” which may emanate from Africa such as weapons proliferation, terrorism, international crime, disease, and environmental degradation (Rice, 1998a). However, the partnership also represents the latest attempt by US policy-makers to reconcile the responsibilities of hegemony with Washington’s high level of disinterest in Africa, a tension which has consistently driven the US African win-set since World War II.

The basis of the predicament stems predominantly from the inattention that Washington has traditionally paid to Africa. The overriding image of the US’ relationship with Africa as portrayed by scholars and policymakers alike is one of apathy. As Crawford Young contends: “The permanent premises of American African policy have been few and simple. The most central has been the low level of significance of Africa in the hierarchy of United States external priorities” (1985:221). Clapham concurs, acknowledging that “any attempt to set out the parameters of the Afro-superpower relationship must start from an appreciation of the unimportance of Africa to ... the United States” (1996:135). Similarly, Chester Crocker, who served as the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1980 to 1989 described Africa as the “stepchild (if that) of American foreign policy” (1992:29). That Africa, relative to other regions, has unceasingly received the least amount of attention from the US foreign policy establishment stems from the lack of significant US interests in Africa. Unlike other regions, the strategic value of Africa is
viewed by US policymakers almost purely in terms of global significance and not in terms of any intrinsic value that the continent may hold for US interests (Anise, 1989:164; Clough, 1992:54).

Before 1945, the unimportance of the African continent within the US foreign policy establishment was effectively offset by the relative unimportance of the US for Africa. Africa was firmly enveloped within a European imperial framework, and the establishment of European sovereignty over the African colonies enabled the US to exercise its pre-war interests in Africa by proxy, thereby negating the need for a direct engagement between Washington and Africa (Williams, 1975, vi). However, the postwar transformation of the international distribution of power, i.e. the ascendancy of the US and the Soviet Union to the roles of superpowers and the subsequent demise of western Europe as the locus of international power, threatened to displace the comfort zone in which the US had previously operated its foreign policy in general, and its African policy in particular. As James Mayall observes:

If, as a result of a fundamental shift in the world balance of forces, the European powers could no longer act as the arbiters of war and peace, if they could no longer enjoy the traditional rights of great powers, why should they continue to shoulder the responsibilities? (1971:76).

The following section explores how the US resolved this conflict of interests during the post-war years.

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20 The most notable of these initiatives was the African Growth and Opportunity Act which was passed by the House on March 12 1998.

21 As such, it was not until 1955 that, with the exceptions of Ethiopia and Liberia, the US entered into a direct relationship with the African continent (Oluatay-Kodjoe, 1975:200).
A Problem Shared is a Problem Halved

The US and the Soviet Union emerged from World War II ready to recast the post-war international system in accordance with their shared beliefs, of which a dual commitment to post-war decolonisation and the transfer of colonial sovereignty to the United Nations appeared as central features (Mayall, 1971:86). The US stance on decolonisation was motivated by two factors: a political tradition of advocating national self-determination, as demonstrated by Woodrow Wilson's 'fourteen points' (1919) and the Atlantic Charter (1941); and the inverse economic correlation between open world trade and the discriminatory monetary and trading systems which were created by European colonialism, a view that was championed especially by Secretary of State Cordell Hull (Mayall, 1971:64; Van Evera, 1990).

However, despite their dual commitment to decolonisation, both superpowers appeared unwilling to engage directly with the African continent. While the UN Charter established *de jure* sovereignty for the UN over the colonies, it also preserved *de facto* control for European metropoles (Mayall, 1971:78). The superpowers were not prevented from securing their imperial claims in Africa by the colonial powers, as some scholars argue (Mathews, 1989). Instead, they mandated the European metropoles to act as agents of the post-war world order in Africa during the decolonisation process. However, superpower pressures for post-war decolonisation were rapidly subsumed by the growing rivalry between Washington and Moscow, and US policymakers were forced to review their earlier commitments to Africa's decolonisation. Subsequently, the Europeans were able to obtain not only US consent for their continued presence in Africa but also their active involvement in European – African relations (Mayall, 1971:87).

The reasons for the reversal of African policy were two-fold. Firstly, the US wished to build an anti-Soviet alliance with western Europe and, as such, did not want to alienate the metropoles by adopting an anti-colonial policy (Mayall, 1971:88-9; Schraeder, 1995). US support for continued colonisation was primarily manifested in the supply of military
and economic aid to the metropoles for the intended purpose of sustaining their colonial ties, as well as providing voting support for the colonial powers at the United Nations (Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1975:200; Miah, 1973:4; Young, 1985:221-2). Secondly, despite the Soviet Union's assertion that it was unwilling to export the Cold War to Africa, the employment of the European metropoles as agents of the West served once more to exempt the US from a direct engagement. As US policymakers were singularly focused on containing Soviet expansion, any non-Soviet activity which fell outside the geopolitical zone of conflict was viewed as unimportant, a foreign policy orientation that was exacerbated in Africa's case by the "technological underdevelopment, organisational incompetence and military weakness" of African states (Mazrui, 1980:118)\(^\text{22}\). According to George Ball, who served as Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy administration, Washington viewed Africa as an area of "special European responsibility", much as Latin America was seen by the Europeans as an area of US responsibility (Ball, 1968:240). For instance, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk referred to the Nigerian civil war as a "primarily a British responsibility", while US President Ronald Reagan alluded to Chad as falling under the French sphere of influence (cf Clapham, 1996:137; Young, 1985:222).

Decolonisation did little to alter the US-metropole-colony relationship for, as analysts have noted, metropoles were only able to decolonise if they could effectively neocolonise (Clapham, 1996:85; Martin, 1995:3). Although French attempts at neocolonisation were more pronounced and ambitious than British efforts (Utete, 1985), both metropoles still retained immense influence within their former colonies. The US was eager to nurture and sustain this relationship as it facilitated the continued delegation of responsibility for the African continent to its European allies. In addition, the strategy of utilising the European metropoles as African gate-keepers meant that the African states would remain tacit members of the Atlantic Alliance as long as the post-colonial framework was upheld. With a strong post-colonial framework in place, the US had no need, aside from

\(^{22}\) Only the geographic proximity of Africa's Horn to the Middle Eastern oil-fields was treated as a real strategic consideration by US policy-makers; whereas the mineral deposits of southern Africa and the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope did feature in US geopolitical strategic considerations, they were given a "subdued" position on the "roster of US policy interests" (Young, 1985:223-4; Jaster, 1982). In addition, the strategic value that Africa had held during World War II, specifically that of mid-way bases
presenting a diplomatic presence upon the continent, and the promise of aid, to take an active role within African affairs (Young, 1985:22; Crocker, 1992:29).^23

However, the comfort zone within which US-Africa relations were being managed was rapidly inverted during the mid-1970s, when Washington was forced to shift its relationship with Africa from indirect to direct engagement. Although there were various factors which precipitated US engagement, especially the Soviet Union’s Third World strategy and NSC 68, it was the 1974 coup d'état in Portugal and the ramifications thereof for the lusophone colonies that significantly altered the US-African relationship. The sudden abdication of Portugal from its colonial gatekeeper role served to puncture a hole in the US-metropole-Africa relationship. Without the presence of Portugal, Washington had no alternative but to assume its hegemonic responsibility and intervene directly in Angola in order to protect its sphere of influence. According to the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: “America’s modest direct strategic and economic interests in Angola are not the central issue. The question is whether America still maintains the resolve to act responsibly as a great power” (cf Clough, 1992:9-10). Indeed, US intervention in Angola was treated as the natural extension of the US national security doctrine of containment. Where the Soviet Union sought to advance its sphere of influence, the United States would act to suppress such expansion. By reducing communism to ‘anti-American’, the United States was able to define its own foreign policy simply as ‘anti-communist’, a policy viewed by US policy-makers as a “seamless document”, applicable wherever the threat of Soviet expansion existed, irrespective of a region’s intrinsic strategic importance to the United States (Bloomfield, 1988:208).

In attempting to fill the power vacuum left by Portugal’s departure, the US was merely continuing a historical trend in which an increasingly powerful US had been replacing the declining European metropoles in their colonial spheres of influence, an act which had

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^23 Attempts by Morocco and Tunisia in the early 1950s and Congo in the 1960s for US support were rejected. In the case of the former, the US sided with France over its two colonies, in terms of the latter, US policy-makers referred the matter to the UN (Mayall, 1971:114).
thus far taken place in Latin America, the Middle East, southern Europe, and south-east Asia (Schraeder, 1994:28). However, as was experienced in the above instances, the tendency for the US to pick up the European slack effectively terminated the critical distance that was previously enjoyed by the US in its relations with Africa. From the 1970s onwards, African states would be in a position to demand direct engagement from the US, often bypassing an existing post-colonial framework, and attempting to play the super-powers against each other (Clapham, 1996:139). As Senegalese President Leopold Senghor stated:

Americans ... want Africa to resist the East’s offensive but will not help it to do so ... They refuse to supply us with the modern weapons we need to defend ourselves ... We are asking our Western friends ... simply to help us in the same way the Marxist-Leninist states are helped by their friends (cf Young, 1985:223).

US attempts to extricate itself from Africa surfaced in the mid-1980s, when both superpowers began reducing their levels of activity in the Third World (O’Loughlin and Van der Westun, 1990; Clapham, 1996). Such reductions were most evident in the aid packages prepared for Africa by the US, which were consistently reduced during the 1980s. The 1986-7 US financial year alone saw the aid package intended for sub-Saharan Africa reduced by a substantial 34 percent (Hirschoff, 1987d:33-4). However, without the European metropoles acting in either a colonial or post-colonial position as agents of the West, the US had no alternative but to directly engage with the ‘unimportant’ continent. The responsibility of hegemony had forced the US to engage with a continent that held no intrinsic value and posed no threat. The ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of a continued post-Cold War direct US engagement with Africa are discussed below.

24 Ironically, the Soviet Union became embroiled in the Angolan civil war only after the United States began actively supporting the UNITA faction.
25 Other examples of the US’ direct engagement with Africa were the extensive foreign aid and military access agreements the US signed with those African states with which it had security alliances, especially Egypt, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998:310).
Engagement versus Disengagement

As the end of World War II catapulted the US into a position of hemispherical hegemony, the end of the Cold War propelled it to a position of global primacy. Consequently, the ending of the Cold War presented Washington with an immediate dilemma: whether to maintain its post-Cold War primacy or allow the international distribution of power to be gradually redistributed so as to reflect a multipolar system. Primacy certainly affords the US certain advantages, specifically that of establishing the rules of the international system, yet, as Robert Gilpin and others have argued, the costs of empire do eventually outweigh the benefits derived therefrom (1993; Snyder, 1991). However, following the victory of the US-led international coalition in the Gulf War, US policymakers were decided: Washington would pursue a Pax Americana (Layne, 1993:5). According to the Pentagon’s draft Defence Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-99 (DPG):

[The United States’] first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order posed formerly by the Soviet Union ... [Aside from the former Soviet Union,] there are other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic aims and a defence posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor (cf Jervis, 1993:53-4).

The US quest for post-Cold War unipolarity, as expressed in the DPG, serves to direct US attention towards its Cold War allies who now stand as those states most likely to challenge US primacy. The US’ new grand strategy is based on entrenching the high level of economic and security interdependency enjoyed by the West within Cold War US-led regimes (Layne, 1993:7). In addition, the resuscitation of the republics of the former Soviet Union, Russia and the Ukraine in particular, warrant extensive US attention due to the formidable military arsenals that these states have largely retained. Even before he assumed the US presidency, Bill Clinton noted the need to support the reformation and rebuilding of the former Soviet bloc. “I have two choices”, he stated.
"We can either focus on these problems, come up with a decent policy and aggressively pursue it, or wait for it to explode. Then the problems will swarm us and I might have to spend all my time on foreign policy" (Levgold, 1994:271).

Subsequently, the US' post-Cold War foreign policy was given substance in the form of the 'New World Order'. According to Clinton, who took his foreign policy lead from his predecessor, George Bush:

In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies. During the Cold War, we sought to contain a threat to survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions, for our dream is of a day when the opinions and energies of every person in the world will be given full expression in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in peace (Kissinger, 1994:805).

However, the African continent did present a peculiar problem to this vision as the euphoria of the post-Cold War victory coincided with the international cognisance that the problems of Africa "ran far too deep to be seriously affected by external tinkering" (Clapham, 1998:266; Clapham, 1996:51). Although attempts to recreate the African state along western lines were undermined by various factors, the extra-regional consensus shared at the end of the Cold War was that the African state itself was the main obstacle to the continent's development (Doornbos, 1990:183). US interventions demonstrated a particularly dismal record. Whereas African recipient states were predominantly selected according to strategic or ideological Cold War criteria, these states demonstrated "consistently worse growth rates" than those of other African countries (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998:310).

For the US proponents of isolationism, this record provides valuable ammunition. Whereas the manifestation of an isolationist streak in post-Cold War US foreign policy is not targeted solely at Africa, it is certainly exacerbated within the confines of the US' relationship with the Third World (Mandelbaum, 1996:19). The isolationist's argument is
once again predicated upon the lack of any substantial US interests in Africa. In outlining his future African policy as a 1988 US Presidential candidate, Bush reinforced this image, stating: “Perhaps most of all, Africa is important to us in human terms. Africa is now suffering from a severe economic crisis. It is the moral duty of the world’s wealthier nations to help Africa overcome this crisis” (1988:13).

In addition to domestic isolationist obstructions, there are also international impediments to Clinton’s world order. While Washington’s policymakers believe American hegemony to be benign, others may hold divergent opinions. As Christopher Layne argues: “The more the United States attempts to press its preferences and values on others, the more likely it is that they will react against what is, in their view, overweening American power” (1993:46). In Africa in particular, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent monopoly diplomacy of the West was “overwhelmingly greeted by African rulers with regret” (Clapham,1996:159; El-Doufani,1992). According to Cheryl Carolus, the THEN policy director of the African National Congress (ANC):

There is one danger that we’re worried about, though, in South Africa, and that is the danger of unipolarity – that you have one particularly powerful nation who has the capacity to impose its ideological orientation, its economic policy, in a way that could violate the integrity of nations. And we want to say to investors, please respect our national integrity in your endeavours to assist us in our development (1994:36).

As such, Michael Clough asserts that Washington should “declare, openly and honestly, that US interests in Africa are so marginal and the ability of the United States to play a useful role so limited that it is pulling back in order to let others who are more interested and able to take the lead on the continent” (1992:3). However, the reality is that there are no other interested extra-regional states (Gershoni,1996). France, which was the dominant extra-regional actor in Africa during the Cold War, is currently instituting measures intended to distance itself from francophone Africa. Besides redirecting its trade and investments away from the francophone states, France has also devalued the CFA franc by fifty percent, therein threatening the existence of the franco-African preferential monetary and trading area, *la zone franc*. As one analyst argues:
The devaluation of the CFA franc is likely to result in France's gradual (but substantial) loss of political, diplomatic, and economic power and influence in the francophone African states... In this regard, as Albert Bourgi cogently remarks, 'the devaluation of the CFA franc will ultimately have a cathartic effect, that of mentally decolonising the African leaders in their relations with France, thus finally cutting the umbilical cord which, for more than three decades, has tied them to their former metropole (Martin, 1995:20).

In addition, France has also been transferring its African responsibilities to the various European and international multilateral institutions and organisations, such as the EU-ACP Lome Convention's European Development Fund, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the United Nations (Martin, 1995:11). Although French troops had been dispatched to Rwanda, and were being readied to intervene on Mobutu's behalf, Paris was nevertheless downsizing its military presence upon the continent (Marchal, 1998:363). France's recent actions are nonetheless in keeping with a historical trend. As John O'Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten note: "No power has been able or willing to maintain international peace in Africa, probably owing less to the dynamics of the long cycle than to the intricate political problems of the continent and the low priority given the situation by the major powers" (1990:18).

Indeed, the decade immediately following the end of the Cold War appeared to mark an extra-regional power vacuum within Africa (Kovassi and White, 1993:40). According to Clapham:

"It is - at least for the present and probably for the future - barely conceivable that Western states could once again become involved in military 'adventures' in Africa, and that in turn makes clear that the security and even the existence of African states remains in their own hands; there is no longer any credible external guarantee (1998:267).

Moreover, the regionalisation of the global economy and the subsequent consolidation of the three major regional blocs, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the
European Union (EU), and the Pacific Basin or Asian Pacific bloc, has served to further dislodge the underdeveloped South from the global economy. Within these regional economic blocs, the developed states of the North have positioned themselves strategically to secure their immediate regional zones from the dangers of the new security agenda, especially mass migration flows. For instance, the US is attempting to develop and stabilise central and Latin America through NAFTA, whilst western Europe is seeking to develop and stabilise Central and Eastern Europe through the enlargement of the EU (Gilpin, 1987:327). As a result, Africa was rapidly losing the continental Leviathan provided by the presence of the extra-regional actors, a scenario which analysts argued would lead to the collapse of the “ramshackle grid of the African state system” and the demise of juridical sovereignty (O’Loughlin and Van der Wusten, 1990:18; Clapham, 1996:109).

Consequently, the most pressing compulsion mitigating a continued US engagement with Africa stems from the unrivalled position the US currently enjoys as the sole post-Cold War superpower, coupled with the extra-regional power vacuum developing on the African continent. The agenda of a great or super-power, as Hedley Bull and others have suggested, restricts a disengagement agenda (1977:206). As Robert Jervis contends: “Here, the problem is not that the United States is number one, as much as it is that some state has to fill this role in order to provide general or public goods” (1993:62). As such, the US finds itself generally alone in Africa. Whereas other extraregional states are seeking profitable investments on the continent, the US has been left to provide continental stability. As Samuel Huntington (1993b:82) writes:

Yet the fact remains that, as General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it, “One of the fondest expressions around here is that we can’t be the world’s policeman. But guess who gets called when suddenly someone needs a cop?” As Bosnia, Somalia, and many other places evidence, the answer to that question is obvious. And, given the nature of the world as it is, is there any remotely plausible alternative answer or

Footnote 26: For example, as Robert Gilpin notes: “Only continous American financial and other support has maintained Mexico’s economy. In effect, Mexico has become a ward of its powerful northern neighbor” (Gilpin, 1987:321)
better answer? If the United States is unable to maintain security in the world’s trouble spots, no other single country or combination of countries is likely to produce a substitute.

A continued US presence in Africa is therefore principally motivated by the need to fill a strategic vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the European metropoles. There are also several incentives motivating a continued US engagement with the African continent. Firstly, Africa is able to provide a rich source of political capital for the White House. Whereas the inadequacies of ‘external tinkering’ had been exposed, the end of the Cold War also coincided with a period of “the most far-reaching shifts in African political life since the time of political independence 30 years earlier” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:3). Between 1990 and 1994, thirty-five sub-Saharan states had undergone some measure of democratisation; according to Michael Bratton, sixteen of these states had completed full transitions to democratic rule (1998:76). For US policymakers, Africa’s moves towards democratisation could not be ignored. As Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared:

Our dedication to universal values is a vital source of America’s authority and credibility. We simply cannot lead without it. Our interests are most secure in a world where accountable government strengthens stability and where the rule of law protects both political rights and free market economies. That is why we have provided such strong support for courageous reforms in nations like South Africa, Mexico, and the new democracies of Central Europe (1996).

As such, the transformation processes underway in Africa provided much needed sustenance for both Bush and Clinton’s foreign policy agendas, especially in the form of South Africa’s political miracle and its symbol, Nelson Mandela.

Secondly, the US Department of Commerce was also beginning to notice the potential of Africa as an emerging market. Given the growing number of mercantilist measures being instituted by the major developed trading blocs, the US needs to create new markets in
order to continually grow its domestic economy. The focus on economics is particularly
telling considering the US’ position as a ‘high hegemon’. Peter Taylor (1996:23)
explains:

At the peak of their powers these three states [Netherlands, Britain and the US] did not
threaten the sovereignty of other states in the system. They were a different sort of state to
that portrayed in the traditional international relations literature. Theirs was a
sophisticated economic expansion rather than a crude war strategy to gain territory.
Instead of the political-military imperatives that are expected to dominate international
relations, these states had very definite economic agendas in which political elimination
of rivals were simply not relevant. They pursued political-economy imperatives.

Taylor’s ‘high hegemony’ is certainly relevant to the US’ post-Cold War agenda.
Christopher outlined economic security as the principal element of the Clinton
administration: “Our first foreign priority and our first domestic priority are one and the
same: reviving our economy” (McCormick, 1995:370-1). In this regard, Africa,
historically an insignificant US market, has recently shown tremendous growth rates as
an export market for US goods and services. As one South African entrepreneur
remarked: “Africa is a huge market; it may be turbulent sometimes, but it eats and uses
toiletries every day” (cf Vale and Maseko, 1988:279). As a result of the political and
economic liberalisation undertaken since the end of the Cold War, Africa has consistently
increased its trade with the US. US exports to sub-Saharan Africa grew by eighteen
percent alone in 1996, the second consecutive year that US trade with that region
outpaced the US’ global trade (Rice, 1988b). According to Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs Susan Rice (1998b):

Today, US exports to Africa exceed those to all of the former Soviet Union combined by
more than 20 percent. One hundred thousand U.S. jobs depend on exports to Africa. Yet,

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27 As J. David Richardson and Karin Rindall have noted about the US economy: “Export jobs pay 15
percent more than the average wage. Worker productivity at exporting firms is 20 to 40 percent higher.
These firms expand employment 20 percent faster than nonexporting firms and are 10 percent less likely to
fail. Small and medium-sized exporters do even better than large ones and account for 70 percent of all
sales abroad” (cf Bergsten, 1996:118)
the U.S. accounts for only 7 percent of global exports to the continent. As the huge, mostly untapped African market of 600-700 million people grows, and our market share increases, thousands of new American jobs will be created.

In addition to creating new employment and export opportunities for the US, the growth and development of African economies would lessen reliance on international aid and intervention, thereby also allowing the US to reduce its aid commitments substantially, a US policy objective dating back from Presidents Bush to Nixon (Clough, 1992:9; Bush, 1988:15).

Thirdly, despite the domestic challenge of the isolationists, the US needs an external focus. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry argue that foreign struggle had enormous domestic benefits for the US in that it fostered a ‘social bargain’ that effectively modernised and democratised US institutions. Through this ‘social bargain’, stimulated initially by a fascist (World War Two) and then a communist (Cold War) threat, the US built a strong modern state and economy, based on a national political cohesion. Consequently, they warn that without the threat of war, the US may “unravel these accomplishments and return the United States to the impasses of the 1920s and 1930s”, due to the erosion of the national political cohesion that maintained it (1995:364). Consequently, the US needs an external ‘enemy’ in order to sustain its own political penetration and subsequent state power. Such an orientation is clearly evident in Clinton’s foreign policy, which, as Christopher argued, is composed of three mutually reinforcing pillars. As James McCormick explains:

A strong economy would allow for a strong military, but not one that burdened the domestic economy. A sound economy and a sound military would enable the United States to conduct its foreign policy with greater credibility and legitimacy. And by promoting democracy, old threats would be eliminated, new threats prevented, and new markets for American products and American investments opened (1995:371).

As such, in order to satisfy both US domestic and international concerns, the US requires a foreign policy (including Africa) described by Christopher as a middle ground between
"inaction and American intervention" (McCormick, 1995:370-1). A useful analogy is provided by Layne:

America's optimal strategy is to make its power position similar to Goldilocks' porridge: not too strong, which would frighten others into balancing against the United States; not too weak, which would invite others to exploit American vulnerabilities; but just right - strong enough to defend American interests, without provoking others" (Layne, 1993:45).

Consequently, US policy-makers and scholars have turned towards a win-set of strategic delegation. This policy is described below.

**Strategic Delegation**

The need to reconcile the contradictory pressures of disengagement and engagement has served to steer the United States' post-Cold War African win-set towards the doctrine of strategic delegation, a strategy whose utility scholars are currently re-evaluating in order to resolve the current US foreign policy impasse between the proponents of isolationism and those advocating an internationalist post-Cold War foreign policy agenda (Weber, 1991; Layne, 1993; Chase, Hill and Kennedy, 1996; Jeurgens and Samhat, 1997)²⁸. According to Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy (1996:49):

The United States needs a policy towards the developing world that does not spread American energies, attention, and resources too thinly across the globe, but rejects isolationist calls to write it off. This is a realistic policy, both strategically and politically. Strategically, it would permit the United States, as the country that can make the greatest contribution to world security, to focus on supporting pivotal states. Politically, given the jaundiced view of Americans and their representatives toward overseas engagements, a strategy of discrimination is the strongest argument against an even greater withdrawal from the developing world than is now threatened.
Strategic delegation, which was most famously captured in the Nixon Doctrine, attempts to transfer the primary responsibility for stability in a specific region upon the states that constitute that particular region, thereby removing the extraregional actor from the frontline. Strategic delegation first surfaced in the United States’ arsenal as ‘multipolarity’ between 1945 and 1948, and from 1951 to 1961 (Weber, 1991:3). According to Steve Weber, multipolarity was one of two paradigms that governed the way in which the US shaped the post-war balance. Working on the premise that multipolar international systems were prone to peace and security, US policy-makers strove to construct security regimes which, in containing Soviet expansion, would also serve to foster long-term stability in the post-war international system (1991:1-3). Consequently, the US sought initially to develop in Europe an integrated defence community (i.e. NATO) to which the US would provide assistance only if necessary, thereby facilitating the removal of the US from the European frontlines (Carpenter, 1992:18-9).

Such thinking was reflected by US President Dwight Eisenhower, who, as the first Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR), declared: “If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defensive purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed” (cf Ambrose, 1993:506). As such, the US sought to create a security regime that would be able to manage intra-European relations independently. Whereas the US retained the military and economic capabilities that effectively underwrote the effectiveness of the regime, it effectively delegated initial responsibility for European affairs to the Europeans (Weber, 1991:4)°

US President Richard Nixon later revived and reformed the policy of strategic delegation in response to the growing expansion of communism in the Third World. The ‘domino theory’ differed to multipolarity in that it was foremost country-specific; whereas

°Although each of these scholars employ differing terminologies to describe their respective strategies, their conceptualisations find congruency with the basic tenants of the Nixon Doctrine.

°°Multipolarity was subdued by the rising prominence of nuclear strategy during the Kennedy years, which, under the paradigm of deterrence, dominated US strategy during the remainder of the Cold War (Weber, 1991:4).
multipolarity sought to develop the power capabilities of the region as a whole, the domino theory sought to empower specific pivotal states against the threat of communist expansion. However, instead of curtailing a complex US engagement, the domino theory led to the US’ strategic over-extension, particularly in Vietnam, which earned the strategy a bad reputation (Chase, Hill and Kennedy, 1996:34).

Another version of the Nixon Doctrine was the ‘two-pillar’ policy. Instituted most prominently in the Persian Gulf between 1969 and 1977, the ‘two-pillar’ policy purported to link the region’s dominant states, Iran and Saudi Arabia, into a common strategic framework. The British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and Egypt’s defeat in Arab-Israeli conflict of that same year created a strategic power vacuum in the Persian Gulf, which neither super-power was prepared to fill. Iran, which had been accumulating military muscle through oil sales, assumed the mantle of regional leadership, a position supported actively by the US and passively by the Soviet Union. However, so as not to create a balance of power backlash against Iran’s regional pre-eminence, the US sought to create common interests between Iran and the region’s other power, Saudi Arabia. Whereas these two states held divergent views concerning Israel, petroleum pricing policy, and the management of the region, their mutual wariness of Iraq facilitated their mutual membership in a US-constructed alliance. By delegating regional responsibilities between these two states, the US was able to stabilise and manage the region from Washington until the Iranian revolution terminated the US-Iranian relationship (Juergens and Samhat, 1997).

The clearest demonstration of this win-set towards Africa power is Washington’s 1996 revival of an African-constituted peace-keeping force, namely the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), an idea first proposed in 1978 (Young, 1985:220). According to the US State Department, the idea of the ACRF “is to work with the Organisation of African Unity and the European Union to help a group of African countries develop their own capability so we don’t face the ‘our troops or no troops’ dilemma”. An official from the State Department added that as neither the United States nor any European country was willing to commit troops to African conflicts, the fallback plan was to enable
Africans to do the job (State Department, 1996). Although similar initiatives have been successfully implemented in the Baltics (i.e. the Baltic Battalion), and Latin America, the ACRF has generally not been greeted with enthusiasm by African states (Schmidt, 1998:5). Although a smaller version of the ACRF does exist in the form of the OAU-sponsored Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to which the US is a major financial contributor, African states appear wary of the ACRF proposal for two reasons. These are that it may develop into a US interventionist tool given its US design and that the financial cost would be too great for African states to bear (Schmidt, 1998:5-9). Despite these two objections, African states are committed to an inter-African peacekeeping force. Besides ECOMOG, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) states have held three regional peacekeeping exercises involving twelve member states: Exercise Hungwe in Zimbabwe (1997) and Operations Morning Star and Blue Crane in South Africa in 1996 and 1999 respectively, to which the US has contributed funds (Mail and Guardian, 1999).

While the failure to implement the ACRF has frustrated the US' African policy, Washington nevertheless remains committed to this win-set. However, while US policymakers continued to market the idea to their African counterparts, events within Zaire threatened to push the US to either side of the interventionist polemic - direct intervention or absenteeism - of which neither were palatable to Washington. The following section explores the development of this dilemma.

The Zairian Crisis

Whereas Mobutu had been one of the United States' closest African allies during the Cold War, channelling US financial and military aid towards the Unita movement in Angola, the ending of the Cold War witnessed a sea change in US-Zairian relations. The

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30 The initial 1978 proposal was also rejected by African leaders (Young, 1985:220).
31 The US contributed $40 million during 1997 to ECOMOG's peacekeeping forces in Liberia (Schmidt, 1998:7)
1990 US Congress rejected a $4 million military aid proposal requested by the Bush administration, and approved a $40 million aid package on condition that it be funnelled exclusively through non-governmental organisations (Topouzis, 1991:6). According to US Congressman Stephen Solarz, Mobutu's kleptocracy had driven the standard of living within Zaire to a three decade low, a trend which was threatening regional stability, and as such, Mobutu could no longer be supported (cf Topouzis, 1991:6). Solarz's prediction came true, although it was Mobutu's ethnic discrimination against the Banyamulenge and not his economic policies which fuelled the rebellion.

While the ACRF would have sufficed as Washington's preferred mechanism for dealing with the crisis, the rejection thereof had left the US with two unsatisfactory choices: intervention or absenteeism. The US had previously intervened in Somalia in 1992 when President Bush had dispatched 25,000 US military and non-military personnel to that country charged with the immediate task of food and aid distribution (Deng et al, 1996:196). However, after an ambush on US troops by one of Somalia's militias in June 1993, which resulted in the death of three US soldiers, President Clinton aborted the mission (Deng et al, 1996:190). As Arthur Schlesinger explains Clinton's actions: "It is a political obstacle: how to explain to the American people why their husbands, fathers, brothers, or sons should die in conflicts in remote lands where the local outcome makes no direct difference to the United States" (1995:3; Burk, 1999).

To add to Washington's woes, the lesson learnt from Somalia proved to be an even greater political obstacle. Just as the American public would not accept the cost of US lives, neither would they accept Washington's non-intervention as was experienced during the Rwandan genocide (Solomon, 1997:95-6). The only recourse appeared to be a multilateral western initiative. However, even this strategy was impeded by the May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25, which proclaimed that US troops can only be deployed in circumstances wherein,

there [is] a threat to international security; defined as the need for immediate relief efforts, a democratic challenge, or severe violations of human rights; clear objectives for the UN
mission; and agreement by all involved that the intervention should take place. Moreover, sufficient money and troops should be available; a mandate appropriate to the mission must have been established; and an exit strategy must be in place (McCormick, 1995:371-2).

Consequently, Washington’s primary reaction to the unfolding crisis revolved around detailing the mandate for the intervention, the size of the force to be deployed and the costing of such an exercise (Solomon, 1997:95). Finally the US insisted, on November 14 1996, that a cease-fire be declared prior to the deployment of such a force, in effect favouring its absenteeism option (Solomon, 1997:95). Constrained by the experience of its past interventions, the Zairian civil war appeared to reduce the all-powerful US to a position of powerlessness.

Conclusion

The United States’ win-set outlined above revolves around its desire to maintain a critical distance from the African continent, a region which holds little intrinsic value for it. While the European colonial and post-colonial frameworks facilitated such an arrangement, in that the US was able to indirectly engage with Africa without assuming responsibility for continental stability, the post-Cold War international system offers no such protection. Moreover, as the only remaining super-power, the US alone bears the responsibility for international and continental stability. To balance the responsibilities of Pax Americana with its rewards, the US has opted for a win-set of strategic delegation, a doctrine which seeks to establish security regimes in every region that operate under a US aegis. As such, the US is able to utilise its resources efficiently and conservatively, thereby minimising the risk of over-extension. While strategic delegation has been implemented in the Balkans, Europe, Latin America, and Australasia, the African continent has thus far rejected such a regime as manifested in their refusal of the ACRF. Suffering simultaneously from what has been called the ‘Somali syndrome’ and the public outcry over its non-intervention in Rwanda, the US was politically paralysed over the events developing in Zaire. However, the ACRF represented only one manifestation of
strategic delegation, and is therefore treated as a 'starting offer' within the framework of the two-level game. Having established the US' negotiating position pertaining to post-Cold War powers, the following chapter develops the African win-set, a negotiating position held mutually by South Africa and Uganda.
CHAPTER THREE
TOWARDS THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE

This chapter is concerned with the win-set of the post-Cold War African regional distribution of power, represented by South Africa and Uganda. Although South Africa has long been considered as one of Africa's traditional three regional hegemons, together with Nigeria and the former Zaire (Mazrui, 1980), its pariah status as the apartheid state led to its continual rejection by the continent at large (Seegers, 1984). Uganda, on the other hand, has never been included in the company of Africa's leading states, and its dominance of regional dynamics therefore appears as an anomaly. Yet, as the influential news journal *Africa Confidential* notes, these two states stood at the apex of the continental hierarchy of power at the time of the Zairian crisis (Smith, 1997; Borzello, 1998:14). Although they are both unable to match the United States in terms of power, the relationship between the international distribution of power and the regional distribution of power is as informed by the win-set of the extra-regional actors as it is by the win-set of the regional actors.

The chapter commences by identifying the variable which drives the African win-set, namely the need to alter the type of political penetration practiced by the post-colonial state. The succeeding two sections then discuss in greater detail how the insecurity dilemma has been manifest in South Africa and Uganda, and the implications thereof for either polity. The following section develops a causal chain premised upon the discourse of the African Renaissance. This causal chain is presently being followed by both South Africa and Uganda in order to consolidate their respective democratic processes, and is herein presented as constituting their preferred type of political penetration. The chapter then explores the main obstacle impeding the realisation of this causal chain: the traditional inability of African states to drive the dynamics of their respective regions. This impediment is contextualised within the experience of the Zairian crisis, which is discussed in this chapter's concluding section.
Resuscitating the African State

One of the major corollaries raised by Tilly’s ‘war made the state and the state made war’ thesis concerns the viability of the type of political penetration practised by the state (Herbst, 1990:119). According to the corollary, those states that do not follow an ideal-type of political penetration are unable to sustain themselves as they fall prey to the dilemma they confront. As was discussed in Chapter Two, the type of political penetration practised by the state has depended on the type of dilemma it faces. The European ‘prototype’ state faces the security dilemma, the colonial African state confronted the native dilemma, while the post-colonial African state confronts the insecurity dilemma. Consequently, all have practised different types of political penetration. While the type of political penetration to emerge from anarchic Europe represents an ideal type for that specific context (Gilpin, 1993:116), the type of political penetration to develop from the colonial experience has also been recognised as the most viable form of penetration for that particular context (Mamdani, 1996b:286). However, the type of political penetration to emerge from post-colonial Africa has been constantly challenged as a viable political arrangement from the moment of continental independence (Davidson, 1992:163).32

Similarly, the African win-set pursued by both South Africa and Uganda is concerned with the viability of the type of political penetration practised by the post-colonial state. However, unlike the early critics whose challenge was largely speculative, the South African and Ugandan policy-makers are able to premise their objections upon the empirical experience of the near-collapse and collapse of their respective states. According to Zartman, a collapsed state is one whose “structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new” (1995:1). The experience of state collapse (including near-collapse) has

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32 Whether one accepts Goran Hyden’s “uncaptured peasantry” thesis (1980), or Mahmood Mamdani’s assertion that the post-colonial state failed to recognise and democratise the colonial mode of indirect rule (1996b), both arise from and attempt to resolve the failure of the post-colonial state to penetrate Africa’s civil society. The inability of the state to penetrate its society forms the basis of ‘Afro-pessimism’ (Mamdani, 1996b:285).
affected almost every state throughout the continent and has occurred in two distinct waves: first during the late 1970s and early 1980s and again following the end of the Cold War (Zartman, 1995: 2-3).

Indeed, the relationship between the Cold War and the post-colonial African state was a particularly profound one. Not only was the independent African state born during the Cold War, its type of political penetration was also significantly shaped by that conflict (Mayall, 1971). While the two superpowers sought the allegiances of African leaders in order to further their geopolitical pursuits, African leaders were similarly keen to use the superpower rivalry in order to advance their own personal or domestic objectives (Jackson, 1992: 2; Shraeder, 1995; Clapham, 1996: 139). The ending of the Cold War thus established a new reality for the African political landscape, one which was overwhelmingly greeted by African rulers with regret (El-Doufani, 1992). Almost expectedly, the post-colonial African state seemed to expire with the conflict that had sustained it (Clapham, 1996: 7). However, as Clapham corrects, “the end of the Cold War did not so much cause the crises of African statehood as ‘coincide’ with the failure of a conception of the state in Africa which had already become unsustainable” (Clapham, 1996: 159; Doornbos, 1990: 185 Zartman, 1995).

In the case of both South Africa and Uganda, the independent variable underscoring the state’s collapse has been identical: the insecurity dilemma which is perpetuated by the state’s employment of ethnicity as a tool of governance (Davidson, 1992: 291; Mamdani, 1996b). Ethnic-based governance was introduced to Africa by the colonial powers which utilised ethnicity to solve the ‘native dilemma’. By decentralising domestic populations along ethnic, racial or religious ‘tribal’ lines, each with its own customary law enforced by a Native Authority, the colonial state was able to efficiently govern with a minimal presence (Mamdani, 1996b). The value of ethnicity as a tool of governance was subsequently not lost on the post-colonial state; as power was employed to counter the security dilemma, so too was ethnicity utilised to confront the insecurity dilemma. The following two sections explore how ethnic-based governance was effected in South Africa and Uganda respectively.
The Apartheid State

Indicative of the wider continental trend, the post-colonial histories of South Africa and Uganda have been dominated by the manifestation of the insecurity dilemma in each of their respective polities. In the case of the former, the insecurity dilemma emanated directly from the racially exclusive statutes of the South African state. The Union of South Africa, which was declared in 1910, simply continued the political tradition of the colonial state, pursuing the colonial practice of divide and rule. Addressing the Rhodes Memorial Lectures at Oxford in 1929, South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts negated the assimilation of communities into a common type, arguing instead for “the fullest freest development of ... peoples along their own specific lines” (Mamdani, 1996b:5). The insecurity dilemma was however aggravated by the defeat of Smuts’ United Party (UP) in the 1948 general elections and the subsequent emergence of the apartheid state, a regime which established “the generic form of the colonial state in Africa” (Mamdani, 1996b:8).

Although synonymous with a network of statutes which served to separate whites and blacks “spatially and socially” the ethos of the apartheid ideology essentially revolved around the ethnic-centred cause of Afrikaner nationalism (Horowitz, 1991:10-11). The National Party (NP), which had triumphed in 1948, was essentially a “poor settler regime” whose outlined objectives concerned the realisation of economic parity between Afrikaans and English-speaking whites (Giliomee, 1989:116; Horowitz, 1991:10). However, as Heribert Adam argues, “apartheid racialized ethnicity and nationalized race” (1990:228). The creation of the ethnic state was overshadowed by the racial dimension of its character. While apartheid sought to stratify society into its collected ethnicities, it did so on the basis of race. Afrikaans and English-speaking whites were both classed by the law as whites; Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana and Tsotho-speakers were, inter alia, collectively viewed as blacks. The resultant ‘black’ opposition to apartheid was consequently met

33 Horowitz (1991:11) lists the following statutes as the principal elements of apartheid legislation: the Population Registration Act (1950); the Group Areas Act (1950); the Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination
with a ‘white’ response. For instance, following the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd declared: "I see the National Party today not as an Afrikaans, or English, or Afrikaans-English party ... I see it as a party that stands for the preservation of the white man, the white government in South Africa" (cf Barber, 1994:71).

However, like the colonial metropoles which could not sustain their colonies indefinitely, the NP’s variance of political penetration was equally fallible. According to one analysis of South Africa:

After 1970, the collapse of the South African state was a gradual process and it generated its own momentum. This momentum assumed new proportions during the 1980s when it became clear that any degree of voluntary control and obedience that the state could claim was becoming elusive. The economy plummeted into deep crisis because of the flight of capital, domestic economic pressure, international isolation, economic and diplomatic sanctions and arms embargo, increasing foreign debts, and loss of international creditworthiness. The war in Angola and Namibia and the destabilization activities in the region further aggravated the economic crisis of the state. Politically, a similar process assumed new proportions during the 1980s. The intensification of mass struggles, boycotts and stayaways, the increasing level of political mobilization, particularly among young urban black South Africans, the ungovernability of the townships, and increasing challenge to the homeland system by its inhabitants were factors indicative of the extent to which the impending collapse of the South African state was creating its own political momentum (Shezi, 1995:191-2).

Consequently, the NP announced a series of reforms throughout the 1980s, culminating in the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC), Pan-African Congress (PAC) and other liberation organisations and the release of political prisoners in 1990. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) followed in December 1991, which culminated in the first non-racial democratic elections of April 1994. Instead of re-perpetuating the insecurity dilemma under a new ethnic guise, as has been the experience

of Documents Act (1952); the Native Laws Amendment Act (1952); the Reservation of Separate Amenities
throughout the continent, the major political role-players effected a “negotiated 
revolution” which has subsequently been hailed as a “political miracle” (Adam and 
Moodley, 1993; Guelke, 1996). As such, the insecurity dilemma was largely arrested 
within the South African context before a full-blown ethnic-centred war could develop. 
The following section explores the Ugandan experience of the insecurity dilemma and 
illustrates the full pejorative extent of ethnic-based governance.

The Ethnic-Military State

The Ugandan insecurity dilemma differed substantially from that of South Africa. 
Although there are fundamental differences between the two polities, most notably the 
lack of a settler community in the former, it was the institution in which the insecurity 
dilemma was fostered which distinguished the two polities. Like the South African 
experience, the Ugandan insecurity dilemma was rooted in the legacy of its colonial rule, 
specifically in its practice of military conscription. Fearing the martial reputations of 
Uganda’s southern and western kingdoms, the colonial architects had recruited a colonial 
military force exclusively from the northern Acholi, Lango and West Nile regions of 
Uganda (Museveni, 1997:38-9). Significantly, the two men whose rivalry would drive the 
insecurity dilemma of post-colonial Uganda, Dr Milton Obote and Major General Idi 
Amin Dada, were northerners, being Acholis and West Nilers respectively.

The relationship between these two men was initially one of mutual gain. One of the first 
recorded encounters between them occurred six months prior to Uganda’s independence. 
Amin, who shared with Shaban Oploot the honour of being the highest ranked Ugandan 
in the King’s African Rifles (KAR), had led an ill-fated operation in Kenya’s Northern 
Frontier District in which an entire village community had been assaulted. Although the 
Kenyan authorities had demanded that Amin be tried for his actions, Obote, who was 
serving as Uganda’s pre-election prime minister, had persuaded the British, the regional 
colonial power, to pardon him. Obote, who had led his Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) 
Act (1953); the Natives Resettlement Act (1954); and the Bantu Self-Government Act (1959).
to victory in the pre-independence elections of 1962, became independent Uganda’s first Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in October of that year, while Amin was promoted to the rank of Deputy Commander of the Army by 1964 (Mutibwa, 1992:79-80).

However, their fates became intertwined after a 1966 motion by Uganda’s National Assembly to investigate allegations of gold-smuggling against both men. Again Obote intervened on Amin’s behalf, firstly by overturning a suspension order issued against his Deputy Commander, and secondly, by eventually suppressing the investigation (Museveni, 1997:38). Simultaneously fearing his own political future, since the UPC was splintering into conservative, radical and centrist factions, Obote called in the favour, enlisting Amin and his soldiers’ assistance in a coup. On 22 February 1966, Obote had his cabinet arrested, suspended the constitution, transferred all executive powers to himself, and promoted Amin to Army Chief of Staff (Rake, 1998:1079). To consolidate his new role as executive president, Obote relied exclusively on Amin to suppress all domestic opposition, a relationship which led to the expansion of the intelligence and armed services along the same recruitment lines as the British had established (Museveni, 1997:38). Their relationship however soon turned to one of distrust. Concerned at his over-reliance on Amin, Obote began establishing a countervailing force of Acholis and Langis within the military, while Amin, who had political ambitions of his own, rapidly recruited additional West Nilers into the military and surrounded himself with its elite (Mutibwa, 1992, 81; Khadiagala, 1995:36). As a result of these manoeuvres, the military rapidly lost its cohesiveness. As Museveni notes:

Although the Amin-Obote clique had initially had a general northern bias, by 1970 the army had degenerated further into specific tribal cliques to the extent that a junior officer refused to salute a superior unless he belonged to the same tribe. A soldier would use all sorts of tricks, including removing his military cap and pocketing it, in order to avoid saluting an officer from a ‘bad’ tribe. To compound these problems, the official army languages of Swahili and English were replaced by indigenous languages not understood by everyone (1997:40).
Amin finally ended their cold war, executing a successful coup in 1971 with the help of his West Nile core while Obote was abroad. The coup was initially received favourably; Amin paraded himself as a man of peace, "concerned above all with reconciliation and the securing of national unity, peace and prosperity", while Obote was remembered as the oppressor (Mutibwa, 1992:85). However, Amin, like his predecessor, questioned the loyalty of those around him, as Phares Mutibwa recounts:

Amin’s background – being a Kakwa-Nubian and a Muslim, and coming from West Nile – was to be crucial in the events that followed. One writer has aptly observed that ‘as he became older and acquired power, he considered himself first and foremost a Nubian/Kakwa, secondly a Muslim, thirdly a West Niler and fourthly a Ugandan. Consequently the closest people around him came in this order which was later repeated in his choice of senior operatives and agents (1992:81).

Inevitably Amin began to view all Acholis and Langi as potential opposition. His suspicions bred the infamy of his regime as 500 000 Ugandans were murdered during his eight year reign (Museveni, 1997:41). In 1979, following an aborted invasion of Tanzania, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), a rebel army of Ugandan exiles assisted by thousands of Tanzania People’s Defense Force (TPDF) troops, literally chased Amin out of Uganda (Rake, 1998:1080). By December 1980, a year after Amin was ousted, Ugandans returned Obote to power in a fraudulent election (Museveni, 1997:118). The second-time president however returned to a country without a state; Amin had left as his legacy the complete militarisation of politics (Khadiagala, 1995:36).

Without civilian institutions, the military became the sole arbiter of Uganda’s domestic realm. To make matters worse, the idea of a national army had disappeared during Obote’s initial reign. According to Mamdani: “There was not one but several armies; not one but several intelligence services. Each responded to a different centre of power... The national army was thus no more than an arithmetic summation of various competing semi-private armies” (1988:1157). Without the ability to impose the Weberian state upon the polity, Obote’s second reign was largely characterised by factional fighting within the UNLA, especially between the Acholis and the Langi, but also between other pro-Obote
and pro-Amin factions. In addition, Obote’s re-election produced three new anti-Obote guerilla movements: the pro-Amin Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) and the National Resistance Army (NRA). In a rare show of unity, several Acholi and Lango factions of the UNLA joined forces with the West Nilers of the UNRF, forcing Obote to flee to Kenya in July of 1985 (Rake, 1998:1080). By the end of Obote’s second reign, the devastation which had resulted from the insecurity dilemma was extreme.

Two wars and 20 years of corrupt and reckless rule has reduced East Africa’s most prosperous and promising country to a shadow of what it once was. Some 800,000 Ugandans were dead, 200,000 in exile, and hundreds of thousands displaced internally. The 15 million Ugandans who had survived the bad years were poorer than they had been in the 1960s. The country was burdened by a $1 billion foreign debt. And the road, rail, and power networks and the health and education systems, once among the best in Africa, were in ruins (Watson, 1988:14).

Despite these facts, or perhaps because of them, the NRA, which was led by Yoweri Museveni continued fighting, finally capturing Uganda’s capital on January 26, 1986.

Apartheid South Africa and the military states of Milton Obote and Idi Amin Dada represented the unsustainable character of post-colonial Africa’s zero-sum ethnic politics. Although each proffered distinctive manifestations of the insecurity dilemma, neither has been unique in its encounter of state collapse. Where these two states have differed from the continental experience is in the manner in which it has attempted its respective resuscitation. Whereas the popular continental solution to the ills of the insecurity dilemma has thus far been merely to replicate ethnic-based governance under a new ethnic guise, both South Africa and Uganda have sought to target the insecurity dilemma itself (Zartman, 1995:1; Mamdani, 1996b:288). The following section explores how these two states, led by the ANC and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) - the NRA’s political arm - are attempting to alter the post-colonial dilemma.
Reformulating the Insecurity Dilemma

At the heart of both South Africa and Uganda’s resuscitation efforts lies the discourse of the ‘African Renaissance’, an ideology associated with Thabo Mbeki, who succeeded Nelson Mandela as South Africa’s president after the June 1999 national elections. Although Mbeki stands as the present champion of the discourse, its ethos has permeated Africa’s political landscape since the dawn of continental independence in various guises, notably the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa’s Kampala Document (1991), in which Museveni featured as a central figure during the drafting process (Lardner, 1991; Maloka, 1999:30). Common to both ‘ideologies’ has been the identification of democracy as the only viable remedy for Africa’s post-colonial ills. In a speech entitled The African Renaissance, South Africa and the world, Mbeki declares:

What we have said so far is that both our ancient and modern history as well as our own practical and conscious deeds convey the same message: that genuine liberation, in the context of the modern world, is what drives the Africans of today as they seek to confront the problems which for them constitute a daily challenge. The question must therefore arise: What is it which makes up that genuine liberation? The first of these [elements] is that we must bring to an end the practices as a result of which many throughout the world have the view that, as Africans, we are incapable of establishing and maintaining systems of good governance (cf Hadland and Rantao, 1999:176).

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34 This dissertation does not purport to offer either a full description or an analysis of the African Renaissance. Instead it employs only those aspects of its discourse which have a bearing on the subject matter discussed herein. For an excellent analysis of the African Renaissance see Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko (1998) “South Africa and the African Renaissance” International Affairs. 74, 2

35 Indeed, Mbeki’s African Renaissance can be traced directly to another South African policy, namely the New Diplomacy, which was formulated in 1986 following the defeat of the South African Defence Force in Cuito Cuanavale, Angola (Evans, 1996).
'Good-governance', a modern acronym for democracy, is touted by these ideologies not only as a cure-all for the insecurity dilemma but for the security dilemma as well36. According to the Kampala Document’s “Security Calabash”:

The concept of security goes beyond military considerations. [It] must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights. Lack of democracy in which people freely participate in government, denial of personal liberties, abuse of religion, precedence given to military expenditures over other sectors of national life and the lack of proper administrative machinery for the control and management of public funds are some of the deep-rooted causes of insecurity (1991).

Although various differences are to be found between these ideologies, specifically due to the fact that the African Renaissance is “high on sentiment, low on substance”, a common causal chain can be identified within each (Vale and Maseko, 1998:277; Harvey, 1999:30). The chain is marked by four defining links, two of which are derived from the literature on democratic consolidation while the other two are specific to the African context (Giliomee, 1995:84).

The first link concerns the reconciliation of domestic communities, which had previously been in conflict with one another during the post-colonial period. While it was prudent for the European metropoles to dissolve Africa’s pre-colonial nations into ethnically defined constituent parts for the purposes of efficient governance, it is essential that a sense of nationalism be fostered for democracy to gain legitimacy as a political arrangement (Nodia, 1992:4). To this effect, South Africa and Uganda have instituted similar political mechanisms in order to reconcile their respective domestic communities and ‘de-ethnicitise’ the political realm. These mechanisms include an amnesty process for dealing with past atrocities, power-sharing arrangements at the highest level of the political sphere, and the promotion of individual rights above communal or ethnic rights

36 This argument is also advocated by proponents of the ‘democratic peace’; according to US Secretary of State James Baker, “shared democratic values can ensure an enduring and stable peace in the way the
(Hirschoff, 1987c; Novicki and Dennis, 1988; Watson, 1988; Du Toit, 1994; Adam, 1995; Mbeki, 1999).

These nation-building initiatives are dependent upon the second link of the causal chain: broad-based economic development. As Huntington and others have noted, the zero-sum nature of political power, premised as it is upon economic power, renders democratisation an unsustainable political arrangement (1989:18). While the type of European political penetration was effected in order to establish and maintain standing armies, broad-based development in Africa is needed to demonstrate the benefit of a democratic political arrangement. "Democracy," as Nelson Mandela articulated, "must also mean a life of plenty" (cf Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996: Article 3.3). In this regard, both South Africa and Uganda have noted the need for a new economic agenda premised upon 'trade not aid', interdependency instead of dependency. Asked about his first state visit to Washington, Museveni set forth the agenda as follows:

I didn’t discuss aid really, instead I discussed trade with [Reagan and Bush]. I don’t emphasize aid very much because I don’t believe aid can develop a country fundamentally. It can act as a catalyst if they give you some money - $50 million or so - you can use it to play some catalytic role, but strategically speaking, the option that can cause development is favorable trading arrangements (Novicki and Dennis, 1988:21).

Similarly, Mbeki notes the need to alter the ‘Africa as aid-recipient’ image:

The second of the elements of what we have described as the genuine liberation of the peoples of Africa is, of course, an end to the tragic sight of the emaciated child who dies of hunger or who is ravaged by curable disease because their malnourished bodies do not have the strength to resist illness. What we have spoken of before, of the restoration of the dignity of the peoples of Africa itself, demands that we deal as decisively and as quickly as possible with the perception that as a continent we are condemned forever to depend on the merciful charity those who are kind are ready to put in or begging bowls (cf Hadland and Jovial, 1999:178).

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balance of terror never could” (cf Russett, 1993:128-9).
Both states are presently pursuing economic initiatives premised upon the neo-liberal paradigm. In South Africa, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Macroeconomic Strategy (GEAR) in June 1996 champions an outward-orientated industrial economy (Ministry of Finance, 1996: Article 2.3). In particular, its objective of a restructured public sector so as to increase the efficiency of both capital expenditure and service delivery stands in stark contrast to the bureaucratisation-centred class-specific economic strategies which had previously failed the continent (McPherson, 1986:11). Uganda is also shunning the bureaucratic state. As Museveni notes, “our emphasis is to develop the private sector, because we know that it is the only sector which can develop our country sustainably, efficiently and cheaply” (1997:212). While an early analysis of the NRM criticised its lack of economic direction (Mamdani, 1988:1155), Museveni’s government has subsequently recorded an average growth rate over the last decade above six percent (Mills, 1999:9).

Atop the neo-liberal economic programmes adopted by both states in the above regard is the fundamental belief that development cannot be achieved on a national level; that a regional development campaign is the only way to attract the prerequisite investment necessary for economic growth (Van Nieuwkerk, 1995:245; Leistner, 1997:112; Rake, 1998:31). The idea of a regional development programme is premised upon the notion that the security, stability, and development of every African country is inseparably linked with those of other African countries, and that instability in one African state reduces the stability of all other African countries (Lardner, 1991:9). Such an emphasis constitutes the third and final link in the causal chain. In his address to the South African Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee on 14 March 1995, South Africa’s first post-apartheid Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo notes:

The promotion of economic development of the Southern African region is of paramount importance as the economies of the countries in the region are intertwined to such an extent that, for South Africa to believe that it could enter a prosperous future in isolation without taking neighbouring countries with her, would be unrealistic and hazardous” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996: Article 5.3).
Likewise, Museveni argues that: “The frustration of the realisation of the East African federation was no less than a treasonable act. I hope our generation of leaders will not make the same mistakes” (1997:18). To this effect, South Africa is an active and leading member state of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) while Uganda plays a similar role in both the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

Finally, both states champion African solutions to African problems. According to Mbeki, Africans must be their own liberators: “The African renaissance, in all its parts, can only succeed if its aims and objectives are defined by the Africans themselves, if its programmes are designed by ourselves and if we take responsibility for the success or failure of our policies” (cf Hadland and Rantao,1999:180). Such an approach finds relevant expression in South Africa’s rejection of the US’ ACRF initiative (Lippman,1997). Similarly, Museveni advocates organic remedies, most dramatically illustrated in his refusal to introduce a multi-party democratic system and to follow all IMF prescriptions, opting instead for a no-party democratic system in which individuals stand as independents and a mixed economy suited to Uganda’s needs (Hirschoff,1987a:38)37.

The causal chain pursued by South Africa and Uganda in order to resuscitate their respective states fundamentally challenges the insecurity dilemma at every level. Whereas the post-colonial state mobilised popular support on the basis of ethnicity, South Africa and Uganda are seeking to ‘de-ethnicitise’ their respective polities. While the post-colonial state sought to reward its ethnically constituted bureaucratic class for their support, South Africa and Uganda advocate an ethnically-diverse broad-based economic agenda which seeks to empower all citizens. Whereas the immediate material support of extra-regional assistance, notably in the form of juridical or negative sovereignty, virtually assured the perpetuation of African regimes and the insecurity dilemma, South Africa and Uganda are attempting to break the extra-regional ‘umbilical cord’ and foster

a sustainable development programme premised upon regional co-operation. Finally, whereas extra-regional models of governance, economic development and regional co-operation have normally been devised and implemented by extra-regional actors, South Africa and Uganda are attempting to devise and implement African solutions. As such, one can conclude that the discourse of the African Renaissance suggests a new variance of political penetration, one suited for to ‘democracy dilemma’.

In this regard, their resuscitation efforts, at least on a national level, have thus far been lauded. According to The Economist, Museveni and the NRM government have not only provided Uganda with its best government since independence, but have provided other African states struggling to develop their resources in the best interests of their people with a splendidly appropriate model (1990:15). Both states currently enjoy high levels of positive legitimacy. The ANC received 62.65 and 66.4 percent of the popular vote in 1994 and 1999 respectively while Museveni was directly elected to the presidency with 73 percent of the vote in 1996 (Reynolds, 1994:183; Borzello, 1998:14). However, the third link, regionalism, differs from the first two in that it is located in the regional realm and thus calls into question the ability of South Africa and Uganda to project their national interests on a regional level. The following section explores the potential hazards of the third link, regionalism.

**Driving the Region**

The four links of South Africa and Uganda’s resuscitation efforts are in and of themselves neither new nor novel. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania recognised the pejorative nature of an ethnically defined and divided polity at the dawn of independence and both succeeded in establishing a national consciousness that transcended ethnic identities\(^\text{38}\) (Deng et al., 1996:234-16). Broad-based economic development has also enjoyed a positive pedigree where it has been instituted. States such

\(^{38}\) To this effect Nkrumah promulgated an Avoidance of Discrimination Act which banned any political party, organisation or society that was constituted on a regional, religious or ethnic basis (Deng et al., 1996:75).
as Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi and Mauritius that have in the past adopted policies favouring agrarian-based peasant communities have outperformed those states that concentrated on developing their urban and bureaucratic constituencies, recording the continent’s best growth records (McPherson, 1986:11-2).

Regionalism has too been a constant feature of Africa’s political landscape. During the colonial era, the European metropoles implemented several regional initiatives which successfully served extra-regional interests (e.g. the West African Customs Union and the East African Community) (Ojo, 1985:142; Museveni, 1997:185). However, following the period of continental independence, the issue of regional-centred development has been largely paralysed by three factors. Firstly, while most African states have accepted the need for regional co-operation, three divergent views have emerged as how best to achieve such co-operation (Ojo, 1985:142). The first route advocates continental federalism, and was championed with little success by Kwame Nkrumah during the period of independence. The Casablanca bloc, as Nkrumah’s pan-African coalition became known, was countered by the Nigerian-led Monrovia bloc which favoured a functionalist approach and viewed continental union as a timely process (Abdul-Raheem, 1996:6). A third challenge to continental union stemmed from critics such as Nyerere who viewed regional unions as a more feasible objective than a continental union (Museveni, 1997:18).

A second factor which impedes regional co-operation pertains to the personal and national status to be derived from presiding over such a political arrangement (Shaw, 1982:383; Deng et al, 1996:157). Besides advocating a functionalist approach to regional co-operation, the Monrovia bloc were wary of Nkrumah’s personal ambitions concerning continental leadership (Orwa, 1985:14; Ojo, 1985:144). Furthermore, fearing the potential hegemony of anglophone Nigeria, a francophone Brazzaville faction developed within the Monrovia bloc (Ojo, 1985:144). Similarly, Obote chose to side with Nkrumah’s vision of continental unity as opposed to the regional federation proposed by Nyerere as he feared that the realisation of an East African federation would be presided
over by either Nyerere or Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya who were considered the two senior politicians of the region (Museveni, 1997:18).

Thirdly, the short-term material advantages which could be gained from either a regional or continental union were minimal relative to the rewards accruable from an extra-regional relationship. This argument applies equally to the fourth link. According to Clapham (1996:106), the value of inter-African relations depends on two variables. The first is the extent to which African states share similar interests which would enable them to act as allies instead of rivals; and the second, the effective material support that one African state could impart to another. While a variety of common interests pertaining to African states can be identified, notably an opposition to colonialism and apartheid, the second variable, that of material support, has served to frustrate most meaningful attempts at regional co-operation. Comparable to the strength of extra-regional actors, specifically the colonial powers, the Cold War super-powers and several multi-national companies, Africa’s generically weak states could not suffice as credible substitutes (Clapham, 1996:106-9). This ‘reality’ was particularly pertinent when contextualised within the realm of the insecurity dilemma, when African leaders required all the support they could attract in order to sustain their regimes.

Given these three factors, African leaders have opted to emphasize domestic sovereignty and territorial integrity at the expense of both continental or regional union. The ethos of non-interference in the domestic affairs of African states is demonstrated in the Founding Charter of the OAU which enshrines this strong respect for domestic sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Claude Welch comments: “The OAU seemed to function as a club of presidents, engaged in a tacit policy of not inquiring into each other’s practices” (1991:537). Consequently, while there gave been numerous attempts at supra-national development, the track record of regionalism within the continent has been predominantly disappointing (Leistner, 1997:112).

As such, the primary challenge facing both South Africa and Uganda has predominantly revolved around the issue of how to effect a regional development initiative, an objective
that has to be realised in order to sustain their respective democratisation efforts. As the literature on regionalism holds, regions are organised around a core state that has sufficient power to drive regional dynamics (Deng et al., 1996:133). The crux of the issue therefore centres on the power-capacity of South Africa and Uganda: do they possess sufficient power to act as the core or hegemonic state within their respective regions? Moreover, are these states willing to break certain conventions of inter-African relations, specifically the norms pertaining to the domestic sovereignty and equality of all African states, in order to realise their national interests?

Initially, no need was apparent for an answer to these questions. The Frontline States, which had established the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in order to minimise their economic dependence on apartheid South Africa reconstituted themselves as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1993 in order to harness the economic power of a post-apartheid South Africa for the benefit of the entire region (Cilliers, 1996:1; Leistner, 1997:118-9; Hamill and Spence, 1997:218)39. Similarly, Kenya and Tanzania joined Uganda in reviving the East African Community (EAC) in 1994 (Leistner, 1997:115). This apparent willingness of neighbouring states to commit to regionalism absolved both South Africa and Uganda from the need to flex any potential power capabilities and to contravene the OAU’s equality clause. Indeed, both states appeared unwilling to force themselves upon Africa’s regional dynamics. In January 1994, following a pay dispute in the Lesotho army, the mountain kingdom appealed to South Africa for assistance. South Africa refused to intervene unilaterally, and summoned instead a regional meeting of Southern African leaders, including South African president F.W. de Klerk, Nelson Mandela, Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, the Botswana and SADC president Quett Masire, and Lesotho’s deputy prime-minister Selmetsi Baholo (Geekie, 1994:8). The wariness South Africa felt about its potential hegemony was further illustrated in a 1996 Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Discussion Document, which cautioned South African foreign policymakers that the Southern African region expected South Africa to interact with it as a partner and ally, and not as a regional super-power (Article 3.4).

39 South Africa became a constituent member of SADC in 1994.
According to one analysis of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy: “The government was over-cautious, doing everything it could to avoid the spectre of the new SA continuing with the aggressive, militarist interventions patented by the apartheid regime” (Seymour, 1997:8; Vale and Maseko, 1998:272). Indeed, there were no immediate threats in the region. The member states of SADC were reasonably stable and the ‘political miracle’ was attracting international goodwill towards the region. Although numerous African states were experiencing varying measures of instability, South Africa’s intervention was limited to emotional appeals. As Mbeki declared in his 1996 *I am an African* speech: “The pain of the violent conflict that the peoples of Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, Burundi and Algeria is a pain I also bear” (cf Hadland and Rantao, 1999:158). Whereas the newly-established South African National Defence Force (SANDF) lobbied for a South African intervention in Rwanda, and while international calls were made for Mandela to prevent the execution in Nigeria of Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, neither of these interventions was effect (Prunier, 1995:281 ff 2; Omer-Cooper, 1998:955)40.

Similarly, Museveni played down reports that Uganda would export revolution to its neighbouring states. The day after his presidential inauguration, Museveni travelled to Zaire to meet with and placate the fears of Mobutu, Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania, Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, and Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda (Meynell, 1986). Furthermore, members of the left-wing Kenyan dissident movement Mwakenya were expelled from their Ugandan base, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) were barred from entering Uganda, and Museveni personally assured Habyarimana that Uganda would not assist Rwandan rebels. Finally, Zairian rebels camps which had been established in western Uganda were targeted and attacked (Watson, 1988:17).

These initial placatory acts by both South Africa and Uganda were largely rewarded by political goodwill from neighbouring state, thereby negating the need for a manifestation
of power. However, getting their neighbouring states to join the game was only the first challenge. Making sure that they would follow the rules turned out to be a much harder challenge. As such, in the months leading up to the Zairian crisis, both states would begin to demonstrate a new approach to African policy. This new approach is described below.

The Zairian Crisis

During the initial couple of years as an accepted member of the African society of states, South Africa practiced great restraint in exercising its hegemony over the continent's other political units. However, following the election of Mandela as Chair of SADC in September 1996, South Africa began pursuing a more active role within both continental and international fora (Seymour, 1997:8). Central to such an assertion is the state's aspiration of attaining a permanent seat in a reformed United Nations Security Council (Seymour, 1997:8; Vale and Maseko, 1998:278). However, this goal is complicated by the numerous other 'South' states competing for the seat. Nigeria and Egypt have already announced their candidacy, while other non-African rivals include India, Pakistan and Brazil (Seymour, 1997:8). In this context, South Africa needs to strengthen its own position as an international power, an objective premised upon its ability to resuscitate itself and the region. To this effect, South Africa began displaying an independent streak within the multilateral fora to which it belongs, specifically the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the United Nations (Seymour, 1997:8).

Consequently, when the Zairian crisis began gathering momentum in 1996 it became imperative for South Africa to become involved. The crisis was destabilising the region, spilling thousands of refugees throughout southern Africa and scaring off foreign investment to the region (Solomon, 1997:96; Mthembu-Salter, 1999:34). In addition, South Africa's ability to successfully mediate a peaceful settlement of the crisis would certainly bode well for its image as a continental and international power, thereby

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40 The exception to this trend was Mandela's call for sanctions against Nigeria following the above-mentioned execution, a declaration which was not greeted favourably by the OAU and other African states (Vale and Maseko, 1998:272).
attracting more currency towards its UN ambitions (Seymour, 1997:8). Moreover, disclosures over its arms sales to Rwanda were threatening its image as a 'peace-making through diplomacy' image (Mail and Guardian, 1997d)\textsuperscript{41}. South Africa chose to act through its Chair of SADC, calling for a SADC-sponsored settlement to the crisis. However, Zimbabwe rejected South Africa's call for a meeting of SADC member states on this issue, insisting that as it chaired the SADC Organ for Defence, Politics and Security it should be the one to convene such a process (Solomon, 1997:96)\textsuperscript{42}. As such, South Africa faced a political quandary: either it stepped down in the midst of Zimbabwe's objection or it challenged the equality norm of inter-African relations and utilised its power capabilities to achieve the result it wanted. However, as Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko contend, the paradox of leadership is that it requires followership, which, without equity, can only be "reluctant and forced" (1998:283-4). Fearing its unilateral actions would further destabilise the region, and that it had insufficient power to alter Zimbabwe's objection, South Africa opted for non-intervention (Solomon, 1997:96).

Uganda's involvement in the Zairian crisis stemmed directly from its own liberation wars and the Rwandan crisis of 1990-4. Following the Rwandan Social Revolution of 1959-62, many Rwandan Tutsis had fled to neighbouring states, including Uganda. Although they had never been accepted into Ugandan society, the 200 000 strong community had lived relatively peacefully alongside their hosts until Obote ordered their expulsion on October 1, 1982 (Prunier, 1995:68; Mamdani, 1996a:25)\textsuperscript{43}. While many fled to neighbouring states, including Rwanda, approximately 8000 Tutsi youth decided to join Museveni's NRA (Prunier, 1995:71). While these new recruits greatly bolstered the NRA's military campaign, their presence within the NRA following 1986 would become a major political

\textsuperscript{41} These arms sales were suspended in December 1996 (Mail and Guardian, 1997d).
\textsuperscript{42} Although the official reason given for Zimbabwe's rejection was one of protocol - the Zimbabweans felt that it should have been their prerogative to convene such a meeting as they were currently holding the Chair of the SADC Organ - a more compelling reason may be Zimbabwe's aversion to South Africa's regional leadership. During the 1980s, Zimbabwe's president Robert Mugabe emerged as the power-broker of southern Africa, with Zimbabwe serving as the leading member of the Frontline states. With the dismantling of apartheid however, Zimbabwe's status declined as a post-apartheid South Africa assumed the mantle of regional leader.
\textsuperscript{43} Obote's expulsion order was motivated by at least three factors. First, Museveni, who was leading the NRA's charge against Obote, had familial links to the Rwandan Tutsis; second, the denominational
obstacle for Museveni. Museveni has premised Uganda’s resuscitation upon the ‘de-ethnicitising’ of the political realm, of which power-sharing with other political parties stands as a primary strategy. However, these other parties challenged the inclusion of the the Rwandan “foreigners” within the NRA and NRM (Prunier, 1995:71-2). In particular, two Tutsis, Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, held prominent positions within the hierarchy: by 1989, Major-General Rwigyema held the titles of Commander of the NRA and Uganda’s Minister of Defence while Major Kagame was Acting Chief of Military Intelligence of the NRA (Mamdani, 1996a:26). Moreover, while the Tutsis constituted only eight percent of the Uganda’s new national army, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), they were a disproportionate presence within the officer corps (Prunier, 1995:71). Furthermore, the ‘good life’ available to the Tutsis in Museveni’s Uganda was not lost on other Tutsi refugees throughout the world who began converging on Uganda in greater numbers, alienating much domestic support for the NRM (Prunier, 1995:72).

At this time two events occurred, which led in turn to a controversial ending. First, Museveni rescinded on earlier promises to naturalise the Tutsi refugees as Ugandan citizens, began blocking the promotions of Tutsi in the UNLA, and dismissed Rwigyema from his two posts. Consequently, the Tutsi members of the NRA established a new home for themselves in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), “an offensive political organisation dedicated to the return of exiles to Rwanda, by force if necessary” (Pruneir, 1995:72-3). Secondly, the RPF began receiving communications from Rwanda that the time was ripe for an invasion from Uganda into Rwanda (Prunier, 1995:90-1). Using the UNLA’s military equipment, the RPF crossed the border into Rwanda on October 1, 1990 in a raid commonly referred to as the Cockroach Invasion. The invasion set off the Rwandan crisis which would culminate four years later in the Tutsi genocide and the RPF victory (Prunier, 1995:93). The controversy pertains to the role played by Museveni: whether he was ignorant of the invasion or whether he actively supported it (Prunier, 1995:97). Prunier is of the view that Museveni had to know of the invasion:

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differences between Obote’s Protestant UPC and the Catholic Tutsis; third Obote’s National Security Agency enjoyed a close relationship with Rwanda’s Hutu leadership (Prunier, 1995:69).
President Museveni and his security advisors knew, if not the precise date of the invasion, at least its general outline: first, because a conspiracy of this magnitude cannot be completely hidden; secondly, because the men who led it were among the President’s closest friends; and thirdly because the political activities of Rwandese exiles in Uganda (and elsewhere in the world) were public knowledge (1995:97).44

The Cockroach Invasion simultaneously solved two problems. The Habyarimana regime was practising the unstable variance of political penetration premised upon ethnic division and narrow-based economic development, a political arrangement which was fuelling regional instability (Prunier, 1995:86-7). In addition, the invasion effectively removed the Tutsis from both the NRA and Uganda, therein easing Museveni’s domestic political woes.

However, the Rwandan crisis did not cease with the defeat of the Habyarimana regime. Instead, the conflict continued within eastern Zaire, where Ugandan rebels had been established since the early 1980s. Furthermore, just as Habyarimana had been implementing policies which served to destabilise the region, so too was Mobutu, whose employment of ethnic politics coupled with his renowned kleptocratic behaviours contradicted the ethos of the African Renaissance. In addition, Museveni did have a personal score to settle with Mobutu. Following the NRA’s victory in Uganda, Mobutu had despatched troops to invade western Uganda, apparently at the behest of the Israelis, in order to show Museveni that he was the strongman of the region (Meynell, 1986a).

Having already established new regimes in Uganda and Rwanda, Museveni became intent on adding Zaire to his power-bloc (Borzello, 1998:14). Museveni’s enthusiasm was however countered by the French who viewed Uganda as an American satellite state whose design was the conquest of francophone Africa. A confidential newsletter originating from French government sources and entitled Considerable political and geostrategic interests are hidden behind the Rwandese heap of corpses, concludes:

44 Conveniently, Museveni was attending a conference in the United States at the time of the invasion (Prunier, 1995:97 ft 9).
The region cannot be left in the hands of an English-speaking strongman completely aligned to American views and interests. This is why since 1990 France has supported the late President Juvenal Habyarimana in order to fight the RPF. It did not work out, so now the only choice is to put back in the saddle the Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, the one man capable of standing up to Museveni (cf Prunier, 1995:278-9).

As such, the Ugandan-Rwandan coalition faced a potentially more powerful and tenacious foe than had already been encountered: a French-led international interventionist force. When it became apparent that the rebellion would have to defeat Paris, Museveni began actively seeking an accommodation with the Zairians so as to avoid a costly confrontation with the French (Mail and Guardian, 1997e).

Conclusion

That South Africa and Uganda independently thought to intervene within the Zairian crisis is testament to their standing in Africa's regional hierarchy of power. For, as Bull asserts, a system's leading powers assert the right, and are accorded the right by others, to take the lead in determining issues that affect the peace and security of that system (1977:202). However, while these two states asserted the right to intervene, Harare and Paris respectively refused to accord the right of intervention to them. Consequently, South Africa appeared to lack sufficient power to drive a SADC-sponsored settlement while Uganda, together with Rwanda, appeared to be relatively powerless against the extra-regional power of the French-led interventionist force.

While the African Renaissance had earlier seemed an attainable goal, obstacles originating from both within Africa as well as from extra-regional sources began to appear. After-all, the African Renaissance threatened a pattern of politics which had existed for more than a century, during both the colonial and post-colonial periods. While the effects of an inefficient type of political penetration were abundantly displayed throughout the continent in the form of civil wars and underdeveloped economies, the alternative of abandoning such a political arrangement did not appear attractive to those
who profited from it. However, just as the idea of the ACRF was tantamount to a ‘starting offer’, so too was the belief that the lead of South Africa and Uganda would be followed unopposed.

Towards the end of 1996, the civil war in Zaire was capturing world headlines. The US was under intense pressure to intervene as it had done in Kuwait (1991) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994), while South Africa and Uganda’s vision of an African Renaissance appeared to be fatally wounded. Approaching the Zairian crisis from an entrenched position only served to paralyse the parties. Yet, sufficient synergy existed between these two negotiating positions for a negotiated settlement to be reached from which both the international distribution of power and the organic Africa distribution of power could mutually gain. These negotiations are discussed in the succeeding chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

NEGOTIATING REGIONAL HEGEMONY

The 'two-level' game features two negotiators simultaneously constrained by two factors: first, what the opposing negotiator will agree to; and second, what their own domestic constituencies will ratify. Thus far the dissertation has identified and discussed each constituency's win-set. For the United States, the win-set is driven by the tension between Washington's traditional lack of interest in the African continent and the responsibilities of Pax Americana. This win-set is premised upon the strategic delegation of power and responsibility to a third party, preferably an African state. For South Africa and Uganda, their mutually held African win-set is shaped by the need to consolidate their respective democratisation efforts, and concerns their ability to persuade other African states to follow a similar process. For both parties, the crisis unfolding in Zaire in the latter months of 1996 threatened the actualisation of their respective win-sets. Paradoxically, however, the crisis also presented an ideal opportunity for both win-sets to be realised. This chapter traces how the synergy between the two win-sets facilitated not only the management of the Zairian conflict but also the satisfaction of each party's win-set.

The chapter commences with a brief synopsis of the relationship between these three states, dating from the 1970s when the US was forced into a direct engagement with the African continent, until December 1996. The third section outlines how the three states were able to act in concert in order to successfully manage and contain the crisis. The chapter ends with a summation of the current DRC conflict and the how the US, South Africa and Uganda are once again policing the crisis in concert.
Are These my Negotiating Partners?

An analysis of the relations between the three states reveals a most dynamic relationship. During the 1970s, these three states were unceremoniously united when African academic Ali Mazrui appeared before the US Congress in an attempt to secure sanctions packages against apartheid South Africa and the tyrannical regime of Idi Amin (Mazrui, 1991:352). Although the Carter Administration’s rhetoric was focussed on reforming the apartheid state, it favoured an engagement policy premised upon increased corporate activity, which Carter argued was “the only way” to achieve racial justice in South Africa (Schraeder, 1995:216-7). Carter’s 1981 successor, Ronald Reagan, too favoured a non-punititive approach. Adopting a policy of ‘constructive engagement’, Reagan argued that a US-South African partnership was vital to the containment of Soviet influence upon the African continent, specifically within the context of Angola (Schraeder, 1995:220). By 1986, however, apartheid had developed into an “apple pie issue” in the US’ domestic political realm, enabling Congress to veto Reagan’s constructive engagement policy, pass the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and implement full sanctions against South Africa (Hill, 1987).

Although the US did impose some measure of sanctions against Amin, they were largely negated by the US’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which provided the dictator with military aid and personnel (Hirschoff, 1987c:38). The 1980s saw the US act against another Ugandan tyrant, Milton Obote. Following reports published by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International, the US led an international outcry and denounced Obote’s regime (Pirouet, 1991:250). In sharp contrast to the British, from whom the US had traditionally taken their cues regarding Uganda, Washington downgraded its representation in Kampala from ambassadorial level to that of chargé d’affaires (Mutibwa, 1992:174). However, this punitive measure was short-lived. With the NRA close to victory, the US chose to support the military junta of General Tito Okello-Lutwa, who had seized power in a coup in July 1985. An NRA victory threatened to change the rules of African warfare. It would mark the first time that a guerrilla
movement, supported only by unarmed peasants and workers and lacking in external assistance, would claim a military triumph over a heavily-armed foreign-backed national army. The significance of this precedent was not lost on Washington, which actively sought ways of propping up the four-month old Okello regime. Subsequently, the US upgraded its diplomatic representation in Kampala to a full ambassador, and, together with its western allies, commenced channelling arms to the junta through ‘friendly’ African states and extra-regional states such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Israel (Mutibwa, 1992:173-4).

A decade later, in 1996, the US found itself facing an African distribution of power headed by these two states. By this time the US and South Africa were reconciled and enjoying a close relationship within which the US / South African Binational Commission instituted in 1995 stood paramount. Although differences did exist between the two states, notably regarding South Africa’s close ties with Cuba and Libya and its rejection of the ACRF initiative, these were not deemed sufficient to threaten the relationship. The US’ relationship with Museveni’s Uganda was, though mixed, overwhelmingly positive. While on the one hand Washington applauded Uganda’s economic growth and its opposition to the Islamic regime in Khartoum, it criticised its ‘no-party’ democracy stance (Albright, 1997; Marchal, 1998:367). Indeed, had the differences between the three states been more significant it is doubtful whether they would have impeded the outcome. During the height of the Cold War’s intrusion into Africa, the US discounted the ideological claims of African regimes as neither irrevocable nor incompatible with US policy interests. To this effect, Chase Manhatten President David Rockefeller is cited as stating that “Africans mean something special by socialism” (cf Young, 1985:222).

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45 This opposition emanated directly from Sudanese support for the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group operating in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. Subsequently, Uganda began supporting the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), that country’s major rebel group. Museveni had studied with John Garang, the leader of the SPLA at the University of Dar es Salaam in the late 1960s (Museveni, 1997:26).
From the African perspective, the US was viewed as a necessary ally for both South Africa and Uganda’s resuscitation efforts. Addressing South Africa’s National Assembly on 18 March 1995, Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo stated:

Although we believe our future will be closely linked to the development of the South-South concept, there are certain realities that we dare not ignore. The United States of America and the other G7 countries constitute the undeniable economic power base of the world today. These countries are essential to the economic well-being of the developing world, including South and Southern Africa (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996: Article 4.5).

Moreover, the US reluctance to involve itself in the everyday affairs of the region was particularly welcome, given the fourth link of the African Renaissance’s causal chain. And it was this fourth link, that of African solutions to African problems, which would serve as the foundation of the ‘contract’. The following chapter explores this synergy and the outcome it produced for the Zairian civil war.

**A Win-Win Situation**

A month after Kagame’s September 1996 declaration that Rwanda intended to launch counter-offensives into Zaire, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced the revitalisation of the ACRF initiative, the African peace-keeping force, which he earmarked for commencement by the end of 1997. Whereas Christopher’s timetable was configured in accordance with US intelligence pertaining to the ethnic strife developing in Burundi, it would be the events transpiring in Zaire that would capture world attention and catch Washington unprepared (Lippman, 1997). After its experiences in Somalia and Rwanda however, the US was effectively paralysed by the Zairian crisis: unwilling to intervene, unable to abstain. The solution to this impasse, as to its underlying African predicament, lay in the win-set of strategic delegation. Whereas the ACRF was presented as the United States’ preferred way to balance Washington’s intrinsic interests with the responsibilities of Pax Americana, it was but one manifestation of the doctrine of strategic delegation.
Significantly, the win-set was congruent with the fourth link in the African Renaissance's causal chain. Perhaps even more significantly, the doctrine offered life to South Africa's stillborn SADC proposal and Museveni's war.

While Pretoria had earlier indicated its willingness to facilitate a SADC-sponsored settlement, it was increasingly being marginalised from alternative African initiatives. At the Nairobi Summit convened in the first week of November 1996, the South African representative, Welile Nhlapo, had to wait outside the venue while the heads of state of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, together with the secretary general of the OAU, discussed the crisis (Brummer, 1996). And due to its anglophone background, Pretoria was not even invited to a francophone summit on the same subject (Solomon, 1997:95). However, the fact that South Africa had initially announced its intention to involve itself as a peace-maker, coupled with the organic power accruing from both its political miracle and the stature of Mandela, proved too inviting for Washington. While Pretoria had announced that it was willing to follow the lead of either regional or UN sources, the US succeeded in persuading South Africa to take a unilateral position (Brummer, 1996; Solomon, 1997).

In doing so, the two states were replicating an earlier arrangement, as Larry Bowman records:

If Vietnam had not brought forth the Nixon Doctrine, it could well be argued that South Africa would have produced it for the United States; the doctrine reiterates on a global scale little more than what South Africa has been begging the major powers to allow it to do in Southern Africa for more than a decade (1975:144).

Whereas their previous relationship had seen South Africa commit its military strength to fighting the Soviet-aligned Cuban-assisted MPLA in Angola, the current strategy tasked Pretoria with employing its diplomatic skills to bring a peaceful end to the civil war. The US' vote of confidence in South Africa paid immediate dividends. At a second Nairobi Summit in December, South Africa was charged together with Cameroon, Congo, Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe with finding an OAU-sponsored solution to the crisis
(Mutume, 1997). South Africa also appointed its own independent special representative to Zaire to join those representing Belgium, the US, the EU and the OAU (Mutume, 1997).

The strategic delegation of power to South Africa marked the second of the US’ two African initiatives. The first concerned the interventionist force being organised by Paris to defend Mobutu. Alarmed at the pejorative role played by France during the Rwandan genocide, Washington had pressured the French into abandoning their rescue mission in early December, thereby arresting Mobutu’s defence and securing a relatively easy passage to Kinshasa for the rebels (McGreal and Harrison, 1996; Solomon, 1997:96).

While a French intervention had thus far materialised as the only real threat to the advancing Ugandan-Rwandan alliance, its removal served to guarantee the downfall of Mobutu. With South Africa pursuing a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement, and the Ugandan-Rwandan alliance applying the necessary military pressure upon Mobutu, the US could concentrate on the management of both activities without having to intervene itself.

Similarly, South Africa and Uganda were free to pursue an African agenda, and not one imposed from above. Indeed, the agenda formulated by Uganda and adopted by South Africa differed substantially from the agenda favoured by the US. Specifically, the divergence centred on a time-table for democratic elections in a post-Mobutu state. While Museveni called for the establishment of an interim transitional authority and the construction of a rigid two year time-table within which to establish a level playing field for all political parties, culminating in a democratic election (Mamdani, 1997; McGreal, 1997b), the White House admitted that it “would have obviously preferred something on a faster track” (McCurry, 1997).

That these three states would co-operate to manage or police the Zairian crisis was not simply the consequence of their relative standings in the international and African systems. All three wanted Mobutu replaced with a democratic order which would pursue a neo-liberal economic paradigm, a political arrangement which would benefit both Pax Americana and the African Renaissance. Moreover, each held a vested interest in the
success of the Rwandan army, which was sponsored by Uganda, trained by the US and armed by South Africa (Mail and Guardian, 1997d, 1997e). The following section describes how the 'marriage of convenience' effected a positive result for all three parties concerned.

**Getting Results**

Initially, the United States' arrest of a Parisian rescue and its strategic delegation of power threatened minimal success. Deprived of his expected French rescue, Mobutu began earnestly organising his war effort, spending an estimated $50 million on new military equipment for the Zairian forces, hiring the services of Serbian and Ukranian mercenaries, and receiving military aid from Libya and UNITA, including air-strike capabilities (Mail and Guardian, 1997b; McGreal, 1997a). With his new arsenal proving effective, Mobutu rebuffed both the UN envoy and the African taskforce's request for negotiations, stating that he would only enter into talks once all foreign troops had left Zairian territory (McGreal, 1997a).

However, a mere three days later, on February 21, 1997, Mobutu rescinded his earlier position and approached Mbeki to effect direct talks with Kabila in Cape Town, South Africa (McGreal, 1997b). Mbeki and Mandela, the respective Deputy President and President of South Africa had proved their worth to the US. The day before Mobutu's special envoy held talks with Mbeki, Mandela had been hosting a regional summit on the crisis, a far cry from the November Nairobi summit when Nhlapo had wait outside the venue while the discussions were held. After meeting with Mbeki, the Deputy President discussed the proposals with US Vice President Al Gore, who was in Cape Town for the Bi-National Commission, and together they contacted Kabila with the details (McGreal, 1997b). While Mobutu had previously insisted on the removal of all foreign forces, he now advocated a full cease-fire to be followed by a negotiated settlement. However, Kabila was insistent that a negotiated settlement could be achieved without a cease-fire being effected (McGreal, 1997b). The differences between these two opposing
viewpoints would however be settled in Cape Town as Mobutu had failed to gain support for his initiative from his government (McGreal, 1997c). Indeed, the only consequence of Mobutu’s about-face was a renewed call from Paris for a UN-sponsored interventionist force. Again, the US employed its international clout and together with other European states, rejected the French demand (McGreal, 1997d).

South Africa continued its unilateral pursuit of a peaceful settlement. Mbeki met with Mobutu in Kinshasa on March 25 and detailed the diplomatic advances made concerning the cease-fire and the negotiations (McGreal, 1997f). Three days later, at an OAU-sponsored summit in Lome, Togo, Mobutu’s representatives again agreed to direct talks with Kabila, South Africa again being named as the preferred locale. Although Mobutu appeared to withdraw his insistence on a cease-fire, he did suggest that a government of national unity be instituted in which representation would be given to the AFDL (Mail and Guardian, 1997a). Kabila had earlier rejected such a proposal, stating that no representation of Mobutu would be allowed in a transitional authority (McGreal, 1997f).

The month of April was marked predominantly by rapid rebel gains. Since December 1996 they had advanced the 2000 kilometres towards Kinshasa, assisted by Mobutu’s war kitty running dry and the flight or surrender of the Zairian army troops. As Chris McGreal (1997g) observed of the rebel capture of Lubumbashi, Zaire’s second largest city and its greatest potential source of mining wealth on April 11:

It took relatively few rebels to capture a city of a million people. Most of the regular army units swiftly went over to the Alliance or discarded their uniforms and fled. A few officers went to expatriates for shelter, money or transport. The provincial governor and the city mayor swiftly changed sides. Yesterday, Thursday, they drove around with white flags on their cars, a sign of solidarity with the rebels

With the rebels camped on the outskirts of Kinshasa in the last days of April, the US stepped in to ensure that South Africa’s diplomatic efforts would not be for nought. The fight for the capital was always the bloodiest conflict within post-colonial Africa. Following the series of coups, African leaders had learned to always station their elite
troops around strategic state institutions and personalities (Gershoni, 1996:238). Moreover, most Zairian soldiers who had not surrendered had returned to Kinshasa where they were now massing. As such, the US was desperate that the potential Kinshasa bloodbath to be avoided and despatched Washington's envoy to Zaire, Bill Richardson, to complete the negotiated settlement. While both Mobutu and Kabila had agreed to direct talks at the Lome Summit, they had not agreed to a venue nor a common agenda (McGreal, 1997h). Richardson impressed upon Mobutu that he no longer enjoyed any international support and that he should accept the terms set out by the rebels, which amounted to a negotiated transfer of power. Similarly, Richardson passed a communication to Kabila through the US' ambassador to Angola that the rebel leader agree to a cease-fire, as Washington was prepared to defend Kinshasa (McGreal, 1997h). To the latter effect, at least 1000 troops from the US, France and Belgium had been stationed in neighbouring Brazzaville as a precautionary measure in the event that their nationals would require evacuation. However, as one journalist remarked after a guided tour of the US contingent's installations: "You have to be naive to believe that, with such an armada, the Belgians, Americans and French only want to evacuate their citizens" (cf Mail and Guardian, 1997a).

While Richardson convinced the two protagonists of the common agenda, Mbeki was organising a venue. Kabila refused to meet Mobutu in either Zaire or a neighbouring country, and Mobutu, who was suffering from cancer, produced a medical certificate barring him from travelling a specified distance from specialised medical treatment. Mbeki's solution was to hold the meeting in international waters off the Congo coast, a proposal favourably received by all parties (Powell, 1997). However, the SAS Outeniqua would be portside for three days while Mobutu and Kabila played for prestige points, with both refusing to board first. After unsuccessful attempts by Mbeki and Richardson to co-ordinate the whims of the two Zairians, an impatient Mandela finally ordered the two men on-board. Following an hour-long meeting, from which the Americans were asked by Kabila to leave, Mobutu agreed to resign and transfer power to an interim authority which would oversee democratic elections, and Kabila consented to a cease-fire (Powell, 1997). Mobutu would however fail to appoint an interim authority, as the
candidate selected for such a position refused the post, and Kabila unilaterally pronounced himself president of the newly renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on Saturday 17 May. Mobutu fled to Togo on the Sunday, and Kinshasa fell quietly on the Monday, due mainly to Mobutu’s Chief of Staff, General Mahele Lieko Bokungu, who ordered his troops not to resist the rebels but to maintain order until they arrived later that day (McGreal, 1997i). The rebellion was over.

The relationship between these three states was formally constituted in March 1998, when US President Clinton became the first sitting US president to visit Africa since President Jimmy Carter went to Nigeria in 1978, and the first president to visit southern or eastern Africa\(^4^6\). The majority of the African tour was significantly spent in South Africa and Uganda respectively (Smith, 1998b). Moreover, Washington used the platform provided by the tour to announce its new African policy, the “partnership for the 21st century” which builds upon the ethos upon which the marriage is founded. According to Susan Rice (1998a), the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs:

> We in the United States must adapt our approach to form a new engagement with Africa - a partnership for the 21st century. In the spirit of partnership, we must pursue our common interests and, in the spirit of mutual respect we will differ where we must. While only African leaders and African peoples can realize their vast potential, a genuine partnership dictates that America must play a pivotal role in the continent’s development.

Barely one year after Kabila’s victory, and two months after the Clinton visit, a new conflict would begin in the DRC, one which continues at the time of writing. However, as the following section holds, the new crisis does not repudiate the marriage, rather it affirms it.

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\(^4^6\) The presidential tour was preceeded by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s African tour in December 1997. Significantly, while Africa was the last destination to be visited by Christopher during his tenure as Secretary of State (1992-6), Albright made it her first.
Epilogue:
The Changing of Zairian Guard (part ii)

From the beginning of his presidency, Kabila began upsetting his backers. South Africa, which had considerable economic interests in Mobutu's Zaire, immediately felt the financial sting of Kabila's anti-Mobutu policies. On nationalising Sizarail, a South African, Belgian and Zairean joint venture that managed the Zairian rail system, Kabila declared: "We should move out all these people who were related to Mobutu and who were pillaging the country" (Brummer, 1997).

However, a greater tension would arise following assertions from Zairian / DRC opposition political parties and civilian organisations that Kabila was a puppet of the Ugandan and Rwandan bloc, an observation supported by the high level of Rwandan Tutsis and Banyamulenge within the DRC's political and military structures (New African, 1997:22). Although Kabila initially sought to suppress such assertions, he began to bow to pressures to lessen the Tutsi influence, announcing the expulsion of all foreign (ie. Rwandan and Ugandan) troops (Barrell, 1999:16). Moreover, he failed to deliver on his promise of 'acting against' the hundreds of remaining FAR and Interahamwe militia members who had survived the rebellion by hiding in southern Sudan. While hundreds of these Hutu soldiers had subsequently joined the LRA, others had returned to eastern Congo where they continued their campaign of terror against both the Banyamulenge and Tutsis living in Rwanda (New African, 1997:22; Barrell, 1999:16). As such, Uganda and Rwanda again found themselves in the same position they had occupied before the 1996-7 crisis; the only tangible difference was that Kabila had replaced Mobutu.

47 The nationalisation of Sizarail lost South Africa, whose interests were represented by Spoornet, an estimated $62 million in capital expenditure, credit and future earnings (Lummer, 1997).
48 Such assertions echoed the Ugandan opposition's backlash to the high-levels of Tutsis in the NRA and NRM.
Ironically, the first assault on Kabila’s presidency was arranged in the Central African Republic, where a conglomerate of Belgian mercenaries, ex-Khmer Rouge soldiers, ex-troops of FAR, and troops belonging to Mobutu’s Special Presidential Division were preparing to attack the “Black Khmer”, the Ugandan and Rwandan muscle of Kabila’s presidency (Smith, 1998c). However, the offensive would originate to the east of the DRC. Having effected a change in Zairian politics before, and knowing that they enjoyed the support of the US-led international community, Uganda and Rwanda replicated their actions of a 1996: they went back to war. Instead of Kabila’s AFDL, they now supported Ernest Wamba dia Wamba’s Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) (Powell and Barrell, 1999:16). Whilst the Ugandan-Rwandan alliance is at the forefront of the military campaign, South Africa is once again at the helm of diplomatic efforts to realise a negotiated settlement (Barrell, 1999a:3; Mthembu-Salter, 1999:34).

The substantive distinction between the two Zairian conflicts has emanated directly from Kabila’s personal experience of the ‘marriage’ and his appreciation of the new distributions of power, both international and regional. Consequently, he has sought support not from an extra-regional western power, as this would have been suppressed by the US’ international clout. Rather, he has looked to other African states for assistance. As such, there are at least nine African states and non-state actors embroiled in the fighting. While Kabila enjoys support from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, the rebel group is backed by Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Unita (Powell and Barrell, 1999). Consequently, this conflict has earned the reputation of being Africa’s “first world war” (Ottoway, 1999:16).

However, despite this divergence, this second conflict looks to be replicating its predecessor in its closure. Both sides have signed the Lusaka Declaration, a negotiated settlement to the conflict proposed by Mbeki in December 1998 (Herbert and Fabricius, 1999:2). Notably, the principles of the Declaration attempt to steer the DRC in

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49 Again there are substantial differences between the local actors and their foreign backers. While the former’s main objective is to democratise the DRC, the latter’s primary goal is that of securing the eastern Congo buffer zone. In addition, the RCD would divide itself into three distinct factions, a Goma and a
the same direction as that undertaken by South Africa and Uganda, articulating "the vision of an African Renaissance" (Dube and Green, 1999:1). And, at the time of writing, January 2000, the US is utilising its international power within the structures of the UN Security Council to consolidate the Declaration’s principles. Two years on, the marriage appears to be successful: the US is maintaining its distance, while the African states attempt an African solution.

Conclusion

Whilst the marriage entered into between the United States, South Africa and Uganda produced immediate benefits within the context of the Zairian crisis, it was the ramifications of their relationship for either party’s win-set in which the real benefits are to be found. The United States, which needed to strategically delegate power to an Africa ‘gate-keeper’ state could now count on two: South Africa and Uganda. Not only did these two states advocate complimentary ideologies to the US, but both states demonstrated their capacity and willingness to drive regional dynamics. In this, Clinton is fortunate. Reagan had planned to use Egyptian troops to fight his war against Libya in the mid-1980s. Egypt refused, and the US had to intervene directly (Anise, 1989:168).

In turn, South Africa and Uganda, each of whom had demonstrated independently their need to intervene in regional dynamics so as to achieve the African Renaissance, could now turn to their US ally for a dose of increased power, whether on a regional or international forum, if their present levels appear lacking. The US backing of South Africa had driven it to pursue on a unilateral basis a negotiated settlement; likewise, the US’ arrest of Paris’ interventionist force cleared the way for the AFDL to achieve its stated objectives. Moreover, the US was not averse to the its African partners devising African solutions to African problems. With access to US power, and their positive experience of the 1996-7 Zairian crisis, both South Africa and Uganda have since projected a more assertive influence upon the African continent.

Kisingani-based RCD, and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (mlc) (Powell and
CONCLUSION

The central question raised by this dissertation concerns the relationship between the post-Cold War international distribution of power and the corresponding organic African distribution of power as it pertains to the construction of post-Cold War African regional hegemonies. The United States, in its capacity as the post-Cold War global hegemon, has already suppressed the regional hegemonic ambitions of Iraq (1990-1) and Serbia (1994), thwarting their respective designs on Kuwait and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet, as this dissertation has demonstrated, the relationship between the US and the organic African regional distribution of power differs from both the Persian Gulf and Balkans experience. While the US continues the practice of extra-regional intervention within Africa, Washington is actively promoting the regional hegemonies of South Africa and Uganda.

The positive relationship enjoyed between the two parties, as has been argued, is premised upon the synergy between their complementary ideologies, namely Pax Americana and the African Renaissance. While both ideologies advocate liberal political and economic systems, it is the synergy between their respective win-sets towards post-Cold War African hegemonies which enables their positive relationship. For the US, its win-set is driven by the tension between Washington’s traditional lack of interest in the African continent and the responsibilities of global hegemony. Whereas this disinterest was effectively off-set by the European colonial and post-colonial frameworks during the pre-and post-war years, the end of the Cold War has coincided with the eventual demise of such frameworks. The European states are no longer prepared to police Africa, and as such, the responsibility for continental stability falls directly upon the shoulders of the post-Cold War global hegemon, the US. Indeed, the US’ quest for Pax Americana forces Washington to fulfil the role of the African Leviathan. The US win-set serves therefore to balance the responsibilities of Pax Americana and Washington’s traditional disinterest in a continent that holds little intrinsic value and poses no threat. Having pursued both direct intervention (Somalia) and absenteeism (Rwanda) unsuccessfully, the US has indicated a

preferred win-set of strategic delegation, premised upon the discourse of the Nixon Doctrine and manifested in the idea of the ACRF. According to this win-set, the US would seek to transfer primary policing responsibility to the African states themselves, with Washington assuming the role of extra-regional sponsor in conjunction with the OAU and UN.

The African win-set, a win-set held mutually by South Africa and Uganda, is driven by the need to consolidate the democratisation processes underway in their two states. Having suffered the debilitating effects of the insecurity dilemma, the African version of the security dilemma, both states have identified the post-colonial type of political penetration as a non-viable political arrangement. Consequently, both states are engaged in a congruent yet separate process of reformulating the insecurity dilemma in order to create a national and regional environment conducive to the consolidation of their respective democratisation processes. To this effect, both states are pursuing a win-set derived from the discourse of the African Renaissance. The win-set consists of a causal chain comprised of four links: nation-building; broad-based economic development; the development of regional responses to national interests; and the implementation of African solutions for African problems.

The 1996-7 Zairian crisis, the dissertation's case-study, provided the impetus for these two parties to negotiate the allocation of regional hegemony within post-Cold War Africa. For both parties, the Zairian crisis warranted immediate attention. Aside from the potential devastation inherent in the conflict, the crisis also threatened the actualisation of either party’s win-set. While the US had indicated a preference for an African solution, Washington had thus far been unable to effect its doctrine of strategic delegation, and was thus forced to choose between two unpalatable options. Unwilling to directly intervene, albeit under the aegis of the UN, and unable to abstain, the US was essentially paralysed by its own position of power. For South Africa and Uganda, the crisis threatened the articulation of the African Renaissance. Both African states had thus far proved successful at implementing nation-building and broad-based economic developmental policies on a national level. However, their individual abilities to fill the
power vacuum created by Washington’s hesitancy to play the continental Leviathan, and drive a regional solution to the crisis, was being impeded by Zimbabwe and France respectively.

Paradoxically however, while the crisis appeared to threaten the actualisation of either win-set, the crisis also presented an ideal opportunity for the synergy between the two win-sets to be realised. The US wanted to strategically delegate power to an African state, South Africa and Uganda both needed additional power in order to drive their respective diplomatic and military solutions. Acting independently, neither party could succeed. However, by acting in concert, all three states could achieve their own stated objectives. The US used its international clout to arrest a French intervention, therein removing the major obstacle to the Ugandan-Rwandan alliance’s military campaign, and persuaded South Africa to seek a unilateral diplomatic solution. Unable to counter-balance the US-South African-Ugandan coalition, Mobutu, Zaire’s seemingly omnipotent president of thirty-two years had little option but to surrender his reign to Kabila, the coalition’s preferred candidate.

While the marriage was entered into specifically in response to the Zairian crisis, the ramifications thereof for either party appear more long-term. The US has successfully distanced itself again from Africa while South Africa and Uganda have subsequently assumed a bolder and more assertive role within inter-African politics. Washington has balanced its tension over historical practices and the responsibility of Pax Americana, while Pretoria and Kampala are more empowered to pursue the African Renaissance. This win-win situation does however have its critics. The primary contention pertains to the resourcing of the marriage. Critics argue that the US is not contributing enough towards the marriage, and that South Africa and Uganda’s resources should be spent on alleviating domestic ills, rather than on regional policing. They add that the marriage is in fact too convenient for the US.

Indeed, the marriage is not a perfect union, and as it matures, several issues appear worthy of future research. Firstly, while the Zairian crisis served to fuel a shotgun
wedding, future developments may evoke differing responses from the parties. Consequently, future research could focus on the pulling and hauling between the two parties, and the eventual winners of future negotiations. For example, the US is still committed to the idea of the ACRF, towards which it is attempting to steer a resistant South Africa. Other areas of inquiry include Pretoria’s requests for cheaper US pharmaceuticals, and Uganda’s recent warming with Sudan.

Second, research could focus on the introduction of new actors on both a regional and international level. Regionally, the democratisation of Nigeria adds to its stature as one of the traditional hegemons of Africa, a fact neither ignored by Washington nor Pretoria (Shaw and Adibe, 1994; Battersby, 1999). Will the US attempt to bring Nigeria into the present marriage, will the other states accept Nigeria’s inclusion, or will a new marriage be entered into between the US and the regional actors? Internationally, the US currently stands unopposed as the global hegemon. Yet, as Gilpin (1993) and others have argued, the costs of hegemony erode the foundations of empire. As such, questions arise as to how the US would react to closer relations between South Africa and China, for instance. Would the US further commit itself to the marriage? Moreover, would South Africa seek to play Washington against Beijing?

Thirdly, the active extra-regional promotion of South Africa and Uganda’s regional hegemonies has served to fuel the creation of a counter-balancing African coalition, presently on display within the context of the second Zairian / DRC crisis. Already referred to as Africa’s first world war, this conflict is bound to have repercussions on future inter-African relations. Returning to Gilpin once more, he argues that international systems remain stable only if no state believes it to be profitable to attempt to change the system (1993:50). South Africa and Uganda are such states, and their attempts to reformulate the insecurity dilemma shall definitely affect the post-colonial conventions of both domestic politics and inter-continental relations. As such, questions arise as to the reaction of other African states thereto.
Finally, future research should focus on comparing the development of the US' numerous marriages throughout the globe. By strategically delegating its power throughout the globe in various forms of multilateral security regimes, Washington is attempting to minimise the costs of Pax Americana and therefore perpetuate its unipolar status. Given the divergence of regional interests, both of the US and of the multiple regions, a comparative study of extra-regional - regional relationships would facilitate a greater understanding of international organisation in the post-Cold War international system.

Aside from pursuing its stated objective, the identification and characterisation of the relationship between the US and South Africa and Uganda, this dissertation also demonstrated the utility of Putnam's two-level games as a theoretical framework with which to analyse Africa's international relations. The marriage of international and regional hegemonies cannot be viewed as simply the consequence of the international system exercising its structural constraints acting upon the domestic realm. Nor should it be analysed as a case of Innenpolitik, whereby the domestic realm dictates the international agenda. The marriage cannot be approached as either the consequence of the conspired co-ordination of private wills, nor as the result of the pre-eminence of a general will. Rather, this dissertation has established that the marriage is the function of all four ontologies. Two domestic win-sets engaging each other within the international realm, and the conspiring of two sets of private wills around the pre-eminence of a general will, namely continental stability. Complementing recent theoretical trends in both IR and African studies, two-level games has proved its utility as a theoretical framework, able to identify and characterise the relationship between the post-Cold War international distribution of power and the corresponding organic African distribution of power.
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