From Development Aid to Development Partnerships – the End of Coloniality?

*Critical discourse analysis of DFID’s development partnership with South Africa*

Mia Strand / STRMIA003

A minor dissertation submitted in *partial fulfillment* of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy in African Studies

Faculty of the Humanities
University of Cape Town

February, 2018
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: Signed by candidate Date: 16.02.2018

Words: 23,845 (excluding cover, abbreviations, abstract, footnotes, bibliography and appendices)
Acknowledgements

This thesis would like to acknowledge the help and guidance of my two supervisors, Professor Harry Garuba and Professor Horman Chitonge. The final product is highly influenced by their advice, academic expertise and confidence in my work. Another special thanks to Dr. June Bam-Hutchison for her kind guidance and invaluable insights. I particularly want to thank my friends and family, without whose continued support, occasional distraction and persistent motivation the completion of this thesis would be impossible.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the continued efforts of decolonial writers, literature and movements. This thesis is not doing them justice, but realises the need for unrelentingly questioning categories, borders and discourses sustaining colonial hierarchies.
Abbreviations

ANC – African National Congress
AU – African Union
BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis
DFID – Department for International Development
ECA – Economic Commission for Africa
EU – European Union
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
GPDOP – Global Partnership Department Operational Plan
IFF – Illicit Financial Flow
IMF – International Monetary Fund
MDG – Millennium Development Goal
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation
SANDP – South African National Development Plan
SANT – South African National Trust
SAOP – Southern Africa Operational Plan
SAP – Structural Adjustment Programme
SAT – Southern Africa Trust
SDG – Sustainable Development Goal
SSN – South South North
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
US – United States
WWII – Second World War
Abstract

Development aid discourses have been criticised for perpetuating othering and coloniality. The discourses have been argued to produce and reproduce conceptual creations of a distinguishable ‘us’ and ‘them’ through binaries of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’, and they have been stated to uphold lingering colonial and racial hierarchies where the former colonial powers remain preeminent and subjugate the ‘Global South’. This decolonial critique of development aid discourses and their perpetuation of asymmetrical relationships between donor and recipient has led to the emergence of development partnerships. This discourse emphasises the levelling of the playing field, and mutual cooperation to achieve common development goals. The development partnership discourse thus appears to challenge the othering and coloniality inherent in former development aid discourses. In 2015, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) ended their ‘traditional’ bilateral aid programme to South Africa and implemented a ‘development partnership’ in its place. DFID’s development partnership discourse has previously been criticised for denying mutuality, however, and for perpetuating racialised hierarchies. The question is therefore whether the discourse surrounding DFID’s development partnership with South Africa is perpetuating othering and coloniality, or whether it is establishing a relationship built on mutual interests and cooperation.

This research paper analyses two DFID policy papers setting out the planning of the partnership approach, and four transcripts of interviews with representatives involved in the implementation of the development partnership. By applying Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) the thesis analyses linguistic aspects of the discourse that serves to uphold certain power structures by defining decision-making. The CDA particularly focuses on the science, narrative and perceived ‘truths’ about development, the recontextualisation of its particular language and the interconnectedness with other discourses that continue to sustain and reproduce the discourse. The research finds a more nuanced approach to development, as conceptualised by the representatives involved in the implementation of the partnership, and that it is challenging the ‘imperial gaze’ inherent in development aid discourses. However, the analysis also reveals clear examples of othering and coloniality. This is evident through linguistic distancing through notions of time, relying on particular binaries, and referring to a naturalised development trajectory which denies lived experiences and subjugate South Africa as a country. The suggestion of mutuality therefore appears to be just a façade, and the development partnership discourse is rather emphasising difference and justifying colonial hierarchies.

Keywords: discourse; development partnership; coloniality; othering; DFID; South Africa.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... 2
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. 3
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ 4

Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Identification of problem and research questions ........................................................................ 7
1.2 The rationale for the study ........................................................................................................... 9
1.3 Analytical approach ................................................................................................................... 9
1.4 Chapter outline of the thesis ....................................................................................................... 11

Conceptual Clarification and Theoretical Framework ..................................................................... 12
2.1 Othering .................................................................................................................................... 13
  2.1.1 Three aspects of othering ...................................................................................................... 13
    2.1.1.1 Distancing through space ................................................................................................. 13
    2.1.1.2 Distancing through time .................................................................................................. 14
    2.1.1.3 Distancing through knowledge production ...................................................................... 15
  2.1.2 The dichotomies/binaries ...................................................................................................... 16
  2.1.3 The discourse of ‘othering’ ................................................................................................... 17
    2.1.3.1 Media, novels, art, documentaries, education and policies ........................................... 17
    2.1.3.2 Colonisation to development: denial of co-humanness to denial of coevalness .......... 18
  2.2 Imperialism and Coloniality ...................................................................................................... 18
    2.2.1 Imperialism ....................................................................................................................... 19
    2.2.2 Coloniality ........................................................................................................................ 19
    2.2.3 Coloniality in South Africa ................................................................................................. 21
  2.3 Development aid and partnerships ............................................................................................. 22
    2.3.1 The history of development aid ........................................................................................ 22
    2.3.2 Problematising development aid discourses ..................................................................... 24
      2.3.2.1 Apolitical aid .................................................................................................................. 26
      2.3.2.2 Binaries, the imperial gaze and knowledge production ............................................... 27
      2.3.2.3 Colonial aid .................................................................................................................. 28
    2.4 Filling the gaps ....................................................................................................................... 29

Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 29
3.1 The properties and outline of the study ...................................................................................... 29
  3.1.1 Research question(s) .......................................................................................................... 30
  3.2 Data collection .......................................................................................................................... 31
3.2.1 Selection of DFID policy papers and representatives for interviews .................................. 31
3.2.2 Data collection process ................................................................................................... 32
3.3 Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 34
3.4 Limitations ......................................................................................................................... 35
  3.4.1 Generalisations, selectivity and bias .............................................................................. 35
  3.4.2 Working with civil servants ......................................................................................... 36

The Case Study and Results .................................................................................................. 37
  4.1 The UK Department for International Development ....................................................... 38
  4.2 South Africa and development ......................................................................................... 39
  4.3 The UK and South Africa’s relationship ............................................................................ 40
  4.4 DFID’s development partnership discourse ...................................................................... 41
  4.4.1 The policy papers ......................................................................................................... 42
  4.4.2 The interview transcripts ............................................................................................. 43

Analysis and Discussion ..................................................................................................... 44
  5.1 The social problem of colonial partnerships and persistent poverty ............................... 45
  5.2 Obstacles: the prevalence of development discourses ..................................................... 46
      5.2.1 The development partnership network ....................................................................... 47
      5.2.2 The science of development partnerships .................................................................. 48
      5.2.3 The discourse analysis .............................................................................................. 50
         5.2.3.1 Structural analysis: recontextualisation of the discourse ....................................... 51
         5.2.3.2 Interactional analysis: the ‘truth’ of development strategies ..................................... 52
         5.2.3.3 Interdiscursive analysis: development partnerships for whom? .............................. 54
         5.2.3.4 Linguistic analysis: dominant, different and resistant genres ................................. 55
            5.2.3.4.1 Partnerships for mutual cooperation ................................................................. 56
            5.2.3.4.2 Capacity building and ownership of development ............................................ 57
            5.2.3.4.3 Depoliticisation and dehistoricisation ............................................................. 58
      5.2.4 Conclusion on the subchapter .................................................................................... 58
  5.3 The ‘need’ for hierarchies and underdevelopment ............................................................. 59
  5.4 Main findings .................................................................................................................... 60

Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................. 61

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 64

Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 71

Appendix A: Interview discussion guide ............................................................................... 71
Chapter I

Introduction

1.1 Identification of problem and research questions

This thesis explores whether the discourse of the United Kingdom’s (UK) Department for International Development’s (DFID) development partnership with South Africa is perpetuating coloniality and othering. Coloniality is the continuation of certain discourses and practices characteristic of imperialism, which refers to the policies, actions and knowledge involved in extending a country’s exercise of economic and cultural power and dominance over another country or territory. In this sense, coloniality can be conceptualised as an ‘invisible power structure’ that upholds colonial hierarchies and relations of domination and exploitation even in a ‘post-colonial’ world (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:48). Othering is the conceptual creation of a distinguishable ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the subsequent distancing between the two through space, time and knowledge production. The act or process of othering, hence, relies on the principle that some people are part of an ‘in-group’, whilst ‘others’ are not. These ‘others’ are characterised by their difference, and in contexts of colonialism, have been defined by notions of their ‘Southern’ uncivilised, backward, cultural and traditional nature in comparison with the West: civilised, progressive, scientific and modern (Said 1978; Fabian 1983; Foucault 2002).

It has been stated that development discourses perpetuate othering. Included in this are discourses that portray the ‘Global South’, and particularly African individuals, populations and countries, as ‘underdeveloped’ and therefore in need of Western assistance and intervention to survive and progress (Escobar 1995). The discourses function to portray African countries as the ‘incomplete’ form of the ‘developed’ West, which has been used to justify colonialism, projects of imperialism and coloniality. On this topic, some scholars have argued that coloniality functions in a way that value some lives more than others and upholds the discrimination, extraction and dehumanisation of individuals based on their race, origin of birth and skin colour decades after colonialism has officially ‘ended’ (Lugones 2010; Grosfoguel 2008). Subsequently, the development aid industry and discourses have been criticised for hiding political motivations and for devaluing some forms of knowledges such as lived experiences. This, some have argued, perpetuates colonial power relations in post-colonial settings (Ferguson 1994a; Escobar 1995; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012; Sharples et. al. 2014; Cheru 2009). I shall refer to this as the decolonial critique of development aid.
In response to this decolonial critique there was a noticeable shift in the character of development aid discourse, which emphasised a levelling of the playing ground and the need for the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ worlds to ‘work together’ to eliminate poverty and inequalities through *development partnerships* (Lie 2015). This appears to challenge the othering and coloniality inherent in former development aid discourses by referring to an ‘equal’ and mutual relationship where the two ‘partners’ work on ‘common challenges’ (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1998). At the forefront of adopting this development discourse we find DFID, which introduced the concept of ‘partnerships for development’ in their first White Paper of 1997 (DFID 1997; Noxolo 2006). The implementation of these development partnerships, however, only began after 2011 when the UK Secretary of State claimed it was time for change and the building of international development based on partnerships (DFID 2011).

One of these development partnerships was with South Africa, a former British colony, and in 2015 the UK ‘traditional’ bilateral aid to South Africa ended and was replaced by a ‘development partnership’. The shift in discourse signalled a move towards ‘working together’ to tackle development objectives, which affected both countries (DFID 2014a). Prior to this, DFID’s concept of development partnerships had already been criticised for upholding unequal ‘power relations between donor and recipient’ and perpetuating ‘racialised hierarchies’ (Noxolo 2006). This suggests that the promise of mutuality might be a façade. Instead of providing a new discourse from unequal development aid, the development partnership discourse might be perpetuating othering and coloniality. This is what this research paper sets out to investigate.

To be able to qualitatively and critically analyse the development partnership discourse, this research project provides a case study of DFID’s development partnership with South Africa. The research question proposed is therefore: *to what extent does the official discourse surrounding DFID’s development partnership with South Africa perpetuate coloniality and othering?*

Supporting this are the following under-arching research questions:

- What theories, knowledges and histories of development does the development partnership discourse rely on?
- How has the development partnership discourse been recontextualised?
- Do development discourses need coloniality and othering?
1.2 The rationale for the study
Previous research has shown that, through the perpetuation of othering and coloniality, development aid discourses have justified and legitimised Western intervention in African countries. It has been seen to do so through an emphasis on a particular history and trajectory of development, where some countries and governments are seen as more developed than ‘others’ (Escobar 1995; Rist 2008). Drawing on Escobar, this study takes a decolonial approach by attempting to uncover hidden and silent power structures that are perpetuated through development discourses and, subsequently, development policies. It investigates power structures that appear to value some lives more than others and which, through the coloniality of power, knowledge and being, impacts ‘subaltern’ lives in the ‘Global South’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). It is useful to ask the above questions because, as Moyo stated, we live in a culture of aid (2009:16), and because the term ‘development’ has become a central organising concept in the global political economy (Ferguson 1994a). Moreover, the development partnership discourse is critiqued as failing to provide the mutuality it is suggesting (Noxolo 2006).

The above questions examine to what extent the discourse perpetuates coloniality and othering, and hence justify unequal development aid relationships. I critically analyse the ‘science’ this discourse relies on and how it is recontextualised in other discourses and fields to investigate how the coloniality and othering can be challenged. This is to show how deconstructing concepts, categories and notions we take for granted, such as development aid, can reveal the possible ways in which certain discourses perpetuate hierarchical power structures (Afonja 2005). In this way my research can contribute to important insights in the continuation of coloniality today. The current movements of #RhodesMustFall, #BlackLivesMatter and even #MeToo prevalent in media and social movements across the world expose the continued significance and urgency of challenging the status quo, which in many cases continues to exploit and subjugate people.

1.3 Analytical approach
By applying a decolonial approach, this paper is already assuming some form of coloniality of the world. To be able to deconstruct the discourse of development partnership and study the extent to which this may perpetuate coloniality and othering, we need to examine what is included, as well as

---

1 The coloniality of power, knowledge and being refers to ways in which the former colonial powers remain on top of the hierarchy, influencing and dominating culture, politics, intersubjective relations and knowledge in the rest of the world (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). The concepts are further elaborated in Chapter II.

excluded, from the prevalent discourses (Afonja 2005:4). To do this, I shall apply Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

CDA is a problem-oriented approach to study complex social phenomena and critically investigate notions, concepts and ‘naturally occurring’ language, which is often taken for granted, but which can produce and reproduce particular understandings, or discourses, of the world (Wodak and Meyer 2001). As emphasised by Foucault, language and culture has manifested in ‘the existence of order’ in what we know as knowledge, and the categorisation that follows distinguishes between the ‘same’ and the ‘other’ (2002:xxiii). To examine the extent to which DFID’s development partnership discourse perpetuates coloniality and othering CDA allows one to analyse aspects of the discourse that may serve to uphold certain power structures by defining decision-making (Hajer 2005). The intended outcome of this investigation has been to conduct an analysis as ‘revealing and relevant’ as possible, and so I have studied and thoroughly read the use of language and its local ‘meanings’ (van Dijk 1993:275).

I critically analyse two DFID policy papers on the planning from 2014 and four transcripts of interviews with representatives involved in the implementation of the development partnership approach from 2017/18. As Fairclough has argued, texts and language are ‘trapped’ in and at the same time produce and reproduce discourses; hence they can bring about change and affect what people believe and understand (2003:8). Drawing on Fairclough, it follows that the policy papers on the development partnership discourse and the people involved in its implementation can influence public opinion on the development path of South Africa, the role of DFID and the relevant significance of development partnerships in that ‘path’. Thus, this study examines how the development partnership discourse construes and constructs the world through representations, telling distinctive stories and presenting certain ‘truths’.

Throughout the paper I talk about and refer to knowledges as it acknowledges and supports a ‘pluriversal’ world, replacing a so-called ‘universal’ world relying on certain truths that are in fact produced through Eurocentric discourses and the coloniality of knowledge (Grosfoguel 2008:11). The paper also places certain words and terms such as ‘developing’, ‘subaltern’, ‘Global South’, ‘backwards’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ in quotation marks as I want to avoid reiterating certain categories and binaries I am to highlight and challenge. I will not, however, place othering and coloniality in quotation marks as this would lead to a cumbersome read. Finally, for lack of space and time, I will in this thesis not consider some important themes such as capitalism, representation, the practices of

---

3 Eurocentric discourses and the coloniality of knowledge refers to the continued Western hegemony of knowledge production and the devaluation of knowledge and theories produced from the ‘Global South’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012).
coloniality and neo-colonialism (with the exception of a few examples in the theoretical framework and case study), and the intersectionality of gender, class, sexuality and ability.

1.4 Chapter outline of the thesis

**Chapter II** outlines the theoretical framework surrounding othering and coloniality. It draws primarily on the work of Said, Fabian, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Grosfoguel, and provides clarification on the concepts of distancing through space, time and knowledge production, and coloniality of power, knowledge and being. It further elaborates on the concept of development aid and partnerships, and through the work of Ferguson, Escobar, Rist and Cheru explores how it has been problematised as upholding binaries, othering and coloniality. These frameworks are used in order to more successfully delve into and analyse the posed social problem of othering and coloniality in the development partnership discourse. Finally, the chapter highlights certain gaps in the literature that this research paper aims to fill.

**Chapter III** explains the choice of research methods and provides a detailed account of CDA, data collection, analysis and limitations attached to the study, which includes subjectivity and elite research.

**Chapter IV** presents some background to the case study of DFID’s development partnership with South Africa, focusing on the history of DFID, South Africa’s development and the relationship between the UK and South Africa. It explores the partnership through DFID policy papers and interview transcripts with relevant actors involved in the implementation, and looks at some preliminary results.

**Chapter V** consists of the analysis and discussion, where I through a CDA framework influenced by the work of Fairclough, study the extent to which one may identify aspects of coloniality and othering present in the development partnership discourse. This chapter provides a thorough analysis of the theories, histories, other discourses and recontextualisation that appear to support the discourse. It critically analyses the language in DFID’s policy papers and interview transcripts, and relates this to the concepts of othering and coloniality introduced in Chapter II. It finds that despite a change in language, the development partnership discourse is upholding particular binaries and perpetuating a depoliticisation and dehistoricisation of development.\(^4\)

---

\(^4\) Depoliticisation refers to the ways in which events, policies and actions are framed as something disconnected from political will or interests (see Ferguson 1994a), and dehistoricisation refers to the ways in which policies, agents and actions are framed as something disconnected from certain historical events and lineages (see Fabian 1983).
Finally, Chapter VI provides some concluding remarks on the analysis, and calls for continued interrogation into relationships, interactions and discourses that perpetuate colonial hierarchies to discover ways in which practice can influence discourses that promote co-humanness and coevalness.

Chapter II

Conceptual Clarification and Theoretical Framework

As the concepts of othering and coloniality are central to this thesis, they require some clarification. Moreover, in order to highlight the problems associated with development aid and development partnership discourses this chapter aims to present the key conceptual debates. This chapter accordingly outlines and investigates the concepts of othering, coloniality and the notion of development aid. This research project embraces a decolonial epistemic perspective which, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, involves unveiling ‘epistemic silences hidden within Euro-American epistemology’ and its inherent hypocrisy and deceit (2012:51). As I come back to later in this chapter, decolonial theorists have argued that one of the main ways in which coloniality manifests in Africa today is through the Western hegemony of knowledge production. ‘The West’, and ‘Western’ is in this thesis a generalisation referring to the geographical places of North-West Europe and North America, and their respective governments, and what is known as the former colonial powers. A decolonial approach, then, involves making visible and challenging the ‘global designs’ that sustain the subordination of Africa and ‘subaltern’ subjects (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:70). 'Subaltern' is in this research project referring to populations and individuals that have lived experience, either personally or through generations, of colonial power structures imposed under colonialism or now coloniality. It is referring to individuals that find themselves on the ‘oppressed side of power relations’ and ‘the colonial difference’ (Grosfoguel 2008:14). Nevertheless, we cannot underestimate the Western knowledge hegemony, and Amadiume points out that even African scholars and academics are often ‘dependent on a Western episteme’ because they do not propose an ‘alternative body of knowledge’, but are rather building their arguments on European scholars’ and ‘European-produced Africans’ (1997:3). The task of this thesis is to flesh out some of the vague concepts mentioned above, and to assess the extent to which this coloniality, othering and knowledge hegemony is performed in DFID’s development partnership discourse.
2.1 Othering

Pan-Africanist John Henrik Clarke stated that ‘the aim of the powerful people is to stay powerful by any means necessary’ (cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:56). The world has always been distinguished between the powerful and the less powerful, and it is difficult to imagine a society that has not been characterised by hierarchy and some form of discrimination. According to Fabian, however, the Enlightenment era as conceptualised in Western ‘universal’ history, marked a shift where this hierarchisation became included in the production of knowledge to be able to continue to justify unequal power structures (1983:26-31). According to Escobar, modernity introduced the ‘cultural project of ordering the world according to rational principles from the perspective of a male Eurocentric consciousness’ (2007:182-3). This is where I believe institutionalised othering emerged, where it remains apparent in official policy and practices of institutions belonging to Western donor states. As emphasised by Escobar, this othering represented a ‘totalising project’ aiming to purify orders and categories and subsequently crystallised the separation between an ‘us’ and ‘them’ (2007:183). It distinguished individuals according to race and origin of birth, and used differences to justify violent colonisation, the ‘civilising’ mission, and more recently, I argue, the current state of affairs evident in the development aid industry. This chapter explores this hypothesis, commencing with an introduction and examination of the concepts of othering and the history of its application.

2.1.1 Three aspects of othering

In the periods following the Enlightenment othering has been practiced in different ways and in different aspects of life and power structures. The three main aspects identified here is the distancing through space, as outlined by Edward Said (1978), distancing through time, as recognised by Johannes Fabian (1983), and finally the distancing through knowledge production, which is identified by Michel Foucault (1972) and Ramón Grosfoguel (2008). In this section the three concepts, which can also be identified as the cultural, historical and knowledge hegemonies, will be explored accordingly.

2.1.1.1 Distancing through space

Othering refers to the creation of the notion of ‘us’ and ‘them’, as well as the distinction between the two, which has typically been used to subjugate and degrade one over the other. As emphasised by Said, what he coins as ‘Orientalism’ and othering are never far from ‘the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures’ and a ‘collective notion’ which identifies ‘us’ Europeans versus or against all ‘those’ non-Europeans from a ‘different’
geographical space (Said 1978:7). There is a distancing through space where the ‘other’ is represented as something far away, exotic and different from the modern and enlightened West (1978:54). According to Escobar, this has extended to the invention of the ‘Third World’, which is seen as physically detached from the Western modern civilisation, and by creating distance and difference this world only exists ‘out there’ (1995:7-8). Similarly, there has been, according to Said, a Western and European cultural hegemony in which the West has been able to and is currently managing and producing ‘the Orient’, or generally the Other (Said 1978:3). The cultural hegemony of Western ideas about other cultures and places further perpetuates this view of ‘Oriental backwardness’ and ‘European superiority’ (Said 1978:7).

2.1.1.2 Distancing through time

Similar to his argument about imaginary geography, Said points out that much of what is associated with time references and concepts such as ‘long ago’ and ‘the beginning’ are in fact poetic and made up (Said 1978:55). To this Chakrabarty has added that with the advent of modernity there has been a secularisation and linearization of time in which some stories and cultural understandings of time do not adhere and therefore have no place (1992:19). In his critique of anthropology as a discipline, Fabian offers an analysis of how its uses of time have been the strongest force of separating the subject from the object (1983). Agreeing with Said and Chakrabarty, he argues that time has been secularised, linearized, invented and naturalised to ‘modernise’ and to affirm difference between ‘us’ the subject and ‘them’ the object (Fabian 1983:2-16).

According to the decolonial scholars, radical naturalisation, or dehistoricisation, of time has been fundamental to the universalisation of history and theories, and being able to articulate universal maxims, such as ‘equal treatment of human culture at all times and in all places’ (Fabian 1983:16-17). Fabian’s critique is that this naturalisation has led to the possibility of placing some people or countries on a development trajectory of being ‘modern’ and ‘futuristic’ or ‘backward’ and ‘stagnant’ (1983:16-17). He goes on to state that this allowed for the categorisation of difference as distance, and has placed societies on a metaphorical ‘temporal slope’ where one is either upstream or downstream (Fabian 1983:16-17). This discourse which attributes a telos to the so-called ‘Third World’ has, as Fabian emphasises, contributed ‘above all’ to the justification of the colonial mission and enterprise, where a significant instrument was the strong belief in a natural or evolutionary time (1983:17).

Thus, these scholars state that the power of constructing temporality has contributed to a historical hegemony. As with the cultural hegemony abovementioned, this refers to the Wests
domination and authority over history-making and writing and how most ‘scientific’ theories come out of the West (Grosfoguel 2008). This has, especially within the development industry, perpetuated an image of a ‘progressive’ and ‘innovative’ Europe and America, and a ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’ ‘Global South’. As emphasised by Chakrabarty, the South and the colonial subject has been ‘split’ from the ‘modern’ through the ‘historical construction of temporality’ (1992:13). The ‘subaltern subject’ can only be represented and spoken for by a transition narrative that defines them as ‘others’ with lack and failures in comparison to the West, and this narrative will always ‘privilege the modern (i.e. ‘Europe’)’ (Chakrabarty 1992:18-19). The naturalisation of time has worked as a distancing device that Fabian calls the ‘denial of coevalness’. ‘Coeval’ refers to belonging to the same time, epoch, age or duration, and coevalness is therefore the assumption that we share a similar time. The denial of this is the systematic tendency to place subjects, or objects of research, in another time than the researcher whilst defining those very temporalities as expansive and exclusive (Fabian 1983:26-31). This remains prominent in development aid discourses, where the intervention of ‘the West’ has been justified by the thought that the ‘pagan was always already marked for salvation’ whilst ‘the savage is not yet ready for civilisation’ (Fabian 1983:26).

2.1.1.3 Distancing through knowledge production

Foucault accentuates that power and knowledge are two sides of a single process: knowledge is ingrained in current power relations and that knowledge is, thus, power (1972). He argues that there has been hegemony in the production of knowledge and a claim of a ‘unitary body of theory’ which disqualifies, omits and devalues certain knowledges, which he terms subjugated knowledges (Foucault in Gordon 1980:81-3). The subjugated knowledges have, throughout history, been buried, disguised and illegitimated (Foucault in Gordon 1980:83). There has been and is a Western monopoly on knowledge production, and Mudimbe argues that even African analysts use categories, concepts and theories that ‘depend on a Western epistemological order’ and Western ways of knowing (1988:x). This domination has often been referred to as Eurocentrism, and the thought that European-produced knowledge is the only source of truth and universality (Grosfoguel 2008:11).

What we define as knowledge is influenced by discourses. Discourses are understandings of the world and ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ and produce meaning (Foucault 1972:49). Discourses in which the world is perceived in specific ways, and that consolidate, establish and implement power relations (Foucault in Gordon 1980:93). An example is a Marxist discourse, understanding the world divided between a metropolis and periphery, between a ruling bourgeoisie which controls production and an oppressed proletariat which produce goods and
services for the profit of the bourgeoisie (Parkin 1979). Because current discourses often continue to be from the Western man’s point of view but at the same time assume an objective and neutral point of view (Grosfoguel 2008:13-17), they subjugate and render ‘subaltern’ histories and knowledges as invaluable and ‘cultural’ (Said 1993). They ‘order’ and categorise the world into a hierarchy where the Western, white, cis-het, rich, man is on top and where the ‘subaltern’, black, queer, poor, non-binary gender and disabled womxn is at the bottom as the ultimate othered subject. The hegemony has ‘valued Western experiences’ and ‘neglected any other form of lived experiences and expressions’ (Grosfoguel 2008:19). Through the Western hegemony of knowledge production the histories, experiences, bodies and minds of the people of the ‘Global South’ have been devalued, omitted and destroyed, and thus further othered.

2.1.2 The dichotomies/binaries

At the centre of these three aspects of othering, and the degradation and subjugation of the ‘subaltern’, is a classification of human beings according to ‘invented racial categories’ based on dichotomies such as superior/inferior, rational/irrational, modern/traditional, civilised/primitive, and developed/underdeveloped (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:52). This classification of people and populations through binaries is what othering refers to, and in relation to the development aid industry and discourses the latter dichotomy of ‘developed/underdeveloped’ has become synonymous with ‘the rest’ (Hall 2006).

The reason for this need to categorise and create binaries is something that has been widely questioned. A common answer has been the need of an ‘opposite’ to be able to define oneself (see Clifford 1986; Feierman 1993; Said 1978). The creation of binaries and the distancing through space, time and knowledge production assist in defining oneself and ‘help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close and what is far away’ (Said 1978:55). As emphasised by Feierman, ‘Without the native, without the slave, the bondsman, or the barbarian, the central values of the West are difficult to imagine’ (1993:185). This dichotomy has also been useful in justifying different treatment of different people such as during colonialism and imperialism. An example was under the apartheid regime in South Africa where Mamdani has pointed out the way that the authorities separated the white and black population by categorising the former as ‘citizens’ of rule, and the latter as ‘subjects’ to be ruled. The fact that only white people were enfranchised and enjoyed the other privileges of citizenship functioned to perpetuate the status quo (Mamdani 1996; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:53).
2.1.3 The discourse of ‘othering’

2.1.3.1 Media, novels, art, documentaries, education and policies

The practice of othering and distancing through space, time and knowledge production is prevalent in various forms and various discourses. We experience them in our everyday life through news media framing, through art and novels, through education and in foreign policies. Firstly, the media is an essential platform when it comes to manufacturing consent amongst a population (Herman and Chomsky 1988). Bleiker et. al. (2013) identify how news media is actively ‘dehumanising’ certain people in the way they present their suffering in masses and not with individual stories. Similarly, Myers et. al. (1996) notes how different the American framing of the news coverage was of the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia. In Rwanda the perpetrators were depicted as these barbaric, blood-thirsty savages whilst in Bosnia they were described as strategic, tactic and civilised (1996:29). This news media framing was perpetuating a picture of Africa as a ‘timeless and placeless realm of ‘tribal’ conflict’ and according to Myers et. al. furthering American fears of African ‘others’ (1996:21).5

Moreover, this depiction of ‘subaltern’ and African people and populations as uncivilised, tribal and in need of Western guidance and leadership is even more prominent in art, novels and documentaries. Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (1969) remains the prime example, depicting people in the Belgian-Congo as savages within the civilising discourse of the ‘dark’ African continent. The novel, originally published in 1899, sparked responses such as *How to write about Africa* by Kenyan author Binyavanga Wainaina (2005). He sarcastically points out how Africans are commonly portrayed as colourful and larger than life, but empty inside with no depth to their stories and spending their time starving, tribal dancing or warring (Wainaina 2005). Just by looking at documentaries on African countries and the continent, you can see that people have no place in it. They are rather usually the number one threat to the African wildlife and should therefore be taught in nature conservation by Western experts.

Similarly, Ake emphasises how the education system, and the development theories promoted through it, was predicated on an evolutionist vision that was about Westernisation, resembling the colonial development model (1996). Scientific knowledge, according to Ake, is not only othering African people but also African knowledges and minds, and social science in particular is playing a fundamental role in ‘keeping us subordinate and underdeveloped’ (1979:ii). This is also visible in Western foreign policies, particularly development aid. To justify and explain why a certain African country and its population need monetary assistance, they are portrayed as backward,

---

5 There has also been cases of othering within the continent and South Africa in particular, and Els points out how the news media played a role in creating a xenophobic environment before and during the events of violence against ‘non-nationals’ in Alexandra in 2008 (2013:47).
isolated, uncivilised and economically stagnant (Ferguson 1994b:176). As emphasised by Mudimbe, there has been an ‘invention’ of a certain Africa (1988). This to fit the Western story of a continent needing their investment, trade agreements, aid and intervention, or what can be seen as continued imperialism.

2.1.3.2 Colonisation to development: denial of co-humanness to denial of coevalness

With the ‘decolonisation’ period beginning after the Second World War (WWII) and the subsequent deconstruction of the colonial states, the rhetoric of the Western world leaders changed. Countries and populations in Africa, Asia and Latin America were suddenly referred to as being of the same world; in contrast with former depictions of them living in the separate First and ‘Third world’ (Rist 2008). As will be emphasised in the coloniality of being below, even before that it had been what Maldonado-Torres refers to as the naturalisation of war and the ideas of natural differences, which ‘render some subjects or populations not only dispensable but excessive and necessarily eliminable,’ (2008:xii). This equates to a denial of co-humanness (Wynter 2003; Lugones 2010:742), and can be linked to the denial of coevalness, as explained by Fabian above (1983). As articulated by Rist, the relationship to the other ‘moved from extermination during the sixteenth-century Conquest, through exploitation (and contempt) during the nineteenth-century colonization, to end in integration within the framework of ‘development’’ (2008:74). When applied to a contemporary setting, it is my task to assess whether the current development discourses remain trapped within a colonial discourse whose objective is to ‘justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction’ (Bhabha 1983:22). It is the abovementioned practice of othering and categorisation of difference that has made it possible to justify, legitimise and continue colonisation and imperialism in the past, but also what we call coloniality through the development aid industry in the present. This research paper also wants to explore whether the development partnership discourse is signalling a move from the typical denial of coevalness to mutuality.

2.2 Imperialism and Coloniality

‘Even though colonialism has ended, imperialism reigns supreme’ (Mamdani 2017 Lecture, The University of Cape Town).
2.2.1 Imperialism

Imperialism, according to Said, is ‘the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory’ (1993:9). Colonialism, on the other hand, stems from imperialism but has the additional ‘implanting’ of settlement. When thinking of imperialism and colonialism historically we often picture the ‘age of empire’ where, at its height, a handful of European countries dominated roughly 85 per cent of the earth’s surface (Said 1993:8). This period lasted for about 500 years and whilst its forms ranged from colonies to commonwealths, protectorates, dominions and dependencies, all may be categorised under the term ‘imperialism’. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, imperialism and colonialism were seen as grand ‘civilising missions’ (2012:52). However, as Cesaire articulated, the ‘fundamental European lie’ has been just that; the claim that colonisation was a vehicle for civilisation (1955:84). Then, as now, the justification for intervention and investment in the name of development in countries in the ‘Global South’ was and has been the latter’s need for help, assistance or civilising. Cheru has argued that the imperial project has been ‘financed by the dominant Western powers to serve Western needs’ (2009:275). Whilst Cheru fails to account for the increasing role of China in African development projects and the issues this may pose for a further imperialism, these authors appear to refer only to former Western colonisers as agents of coloniality. As Said asserts, the lingering of imperialism today through economic, social, political and ideological practices (Said 1993:9), is what often is referred to as coloniality.

2.2.2 Coloniality

The continuation of colonial forms of domination and imperialism is what several Latin-American scholars have called coloniality. This means that former colonial powers have remained on top of the world hierarchy and even though most ex-colonies have gained their respective ‘independence’, the idea of a post-colonial world is a lie (Quijano 2007). Rather, colonial relations of exploitation and domination are sustained by an ‘invisible power structure’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:48). Through colonial power matrices the ‘Global North’ is able to maintain their superiority and the subordination of the ‘Global South’ and the ‘subaltern’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:48). Although we find many different conceptualisations of these matrices, I will in this paper mainly work with three different categories that I believe encapsulate the most important aspects; the coloniality of power, the coloniality of knowledge, and the coloniality of being.

---

6 See Mohan (2013) on an elaboration of China’s role as a development donor, and Carmody (2010) discussing whether this represents a new colonialism.
Firstly, the coloniality of power refers to the way in which these ex-colonial powers continue to influence and define ‘culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production’ kept alive in various ‘aspects of our modern experience’, including people’s self-image (Maldonado-Torres 2007:243). Within these aspects we find the control of economy, control of authority, control of gender and sexuality and control of subjectivity and knowledge (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:49). Arguably, this includes policies like loan conditionalities, which have become part and parcel of development aid and monetary assistance. All in all, the coloniality of power points to the hierarchisation of the world where the ‘Global North’ remains on top, continuing to dominate and exploit the ‘subaltern’ African nations, populations and individuals (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:8).

The coloniality of knowledge has partly been explored above through Foucault’s concept of the Western hegemony of knowledge. It refers to the way in which the European knowledge model have monopolised knowledge globally since the seventeenth century and how it renders ‘subaltern’ voices, experiences and knowledges as non-valuable and ‘cultural’ (Said 1993; Foucault 2002). ‘Eurocentric knowledge’ and its claim to objectivity, neutrality, and universality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:8), is according to Nabudere not only produced for its own sake. He argues that it has been established as such for the purpose of ‘knowing the natives’ through anthropology and taking control of ‘their territories, including human and material resources’ for the benefit of former colonising states (2006:8). This hegemony of knowledge and self-proclaimed ‘universality’ of ‘Western ideas’, which characterises the control of subjectivity and knowledge domain, have articulated and deemed ‘subaltern’ and African subjectivity as inferior and characterised by a ‘catalogue of lacks’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:49). In addition to the devaluation of their histories and knowledges, the epistemological colonisation has also interfered, changed and omitted African ‘modes of knowing’ (Amadiume 1997; Escobar 2007). Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that this has been the ‘worst form of colonisation’ because it has created ‘epistemological mimicry and intellectual dependency’ (2013:38).

The third and final concept this thesis utilises is the notion of coloniality of being. This has been conceptualised by Maldonado-Torres as the lived experience of ‘subaltern’ individuals within a colonial power structure. This lived experience is characterised by a non-being, where the ‘primary expressions’ of the coloniality of being are invisibility and dehumanisation (Maldonado-Torres 2007:257). Maldonado-Torres builds much of his arguments on what he refers to as the ‘radical point of departure’, which is Fanon’s infamous damné (see Fanon 1961). Through the naturalisation of differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ within the colonial power matrix and its inherent racial hierarchy, some individuals have been seen as more human than others, and it has been argued that the lived experience of the colonised has often been characterised by rape, violence, disease, death...
and mourning (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:8). South African woman rights activist Ellen Kuzwayo, in her book *Call me Woman*, talks about the loss of land, rights, traditions and values. She describes her own experiences with military raids of her township Sebokeng and argues it ‘is as though a state of war has been declared against the entire black population’ (1985:258). Fanon maintains that ‘the black is not a man’ but rather in a ‘zone of nonbeing’ (1952:1-2). So what then is the black woman?  

Within this narrative of coloniality we also find the control of gender and sexuality, and Oyěwùmí argues that colonialism altered the way in which a family should look like and the power and freedoms of women in society (1997).

### 2.2.3 Coloniality in South Africa

One of the core claims of decolonial thought is the particularity and exceptionality of colonialism and coloniality in Africa. In his book *Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa: Myths of Decolonization*, Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that if one turns to the economic dimension of colonialism, the slave trade may be seen to signify a particular, extreme and direct exploitation of labour and resources (2013:7). The othering and creation of binaries that have supported colonialism has also been exemplary when it comes to the African context, where a recurring dichotomy evident in the colonial discourse has been the ‘civilised’ versus ‘savage monsters’ (Myers et. al. 1996). Said argues that whilst the Orient has been categorised as an Other, Africa has been seen as outside this categorisation altogether, and has been spoken about as non-definable and sub-humans (1978).  

Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that if we look at the example of South Africa and the history of both colonialism and later apartheid, the politics of identity and enforcement of binaries through enduring racialised language has been more prominent than any other place on the African continent (2013:149). The apartheid regime in South Africa excluded black people from being citizens and belonging to the country as emphasised above (Mamdani 1996; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:53), and the binaries of ‘us’ and ‘them’ were ‘primary’ words relating directly to an in-group and out-group of people enjoying and not enjoying rights (Manganyi 1973:5). The political system was built on racism as the superstructure and applied ‘the most brutal repression’ to make sure the African majority did not realise national aspirations and revolt (Simson 1973:423). However, it is important to highlight that apartheid was neither exceptional, nor just Dutch nor Afrikaans, but

---

7 See Lugones (2010) on the coloniality of gender and the further othering of women.
rather remnants of the British colonial system and the Afrikaner government trying to catch up with British colonisation (Magubane 1996; Mamdani 1996:7).  

2.3 Development aid and partnerships
This research project is exploring the extent to which coloniality and othering, as conceptualised by decolonial theory, is evident in DFID’s development partnership discourse, and its accompanying policy in South Africa. To adequately provide answers, suggestions and ideas it is therefore important to outline what I mean by development aid in this context. By a common distinction today poor countries are seen as ‘developing’, ‘less developed’ or ‘underdeveloped’. Development is constituted as the progression towards ‘modern industrial capitalism’ or the improvement in standard of living or quality of life and the subsequent ‘alleviation of poverty’ (Ferguson 1994a:55). As formulated by Glennie, development aid is funding that ‘seeks to make a difference in the short, medium and long term, fostering economic growth and reducing poverty’ (2008:16). Moreover, it is constituted by a relationship between a donor and recipient (Lie 2015:723). This thesis focuses on bilateral aid (which is aid from one country to another), from the UK to South Africa, and the changing discourse, which has seen a shift from speaking about development aid to development partnerships.

2.3.1 The history of development aid
On the 20th January 1949 United States (US) President Harry Truman held his first official inaugural speech. This addressed four points, where the first three included support for the United Nations (UN), the Marshall Plan and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Rist 2008:70). The fourth and final point was the expansion of technical and monetary assistance to poor, or ‘underdeveloped’, countries all over the world. Development was not a new concept, and as pointed out by Frank, it had been around for centuries when speaking of society progressing and a population becoming more democratic and affluent (1966). But it gave new meaning to the concept by relating it to ‘underdevelopment’, where underdeveloped was synonymous with ‘economically backward’ (Rist 2008:71). The binary was thus created. ‘Underdeveloped’ people were characterised as victims of disease, with primitive economic life and their poverty was a ‘handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas’ (Truman in Rist 2008:71). Whilst development was

---

previously seen as something that inevitably happened, it was now framed as something that, with the right strategies, could be sped up (Rist 2008:73).

The theories and theoretical frameworks that have underpinned development aid have both varied and at the same time been quite constant. At the core of development aid discourses is the goal of alleviating poverty. When in 1948 the World Bank defined poor countries as those with ‘an annual per capita income below $100’, suddenly two-thirds of the world was characterised as ‘poor’ (Escobar 1995:23). Because the problem was one of ‘insufficient’ income, the solution that followed was ‘clearly economic growth’ (Escobar 1995:24). This became known as modernisation theory; the assumption that economic growth equals development. The ‘underdeveloped’ countries became grouped together as the ‘Third World’, and posited as opposite to the developed ‘First World’ (Rist 2008:74). Within the ‘Third World’ concept, these states were characterised as the ‘incomplete’ form of the modern, progressive Western model of development (Martinussen 1997:38). What could get them there was development aid. As emphasised by Glennie, the idea was that; ‘More aid equals less poverty. More aid equals more schools and hospitals. More aid equals fewer children dying of preventable diseases. More aid equals more roads and infrastructure to support developing economies’ (2008:2).

With the modernisation theory model and the implementation of development strategies ‘adequate institutions’ had to be established, and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to play a role in this mission (Escobar 1995:40). From the 1970s and 1980s these two institutions, led by the US and European powers, implemented Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which were attached to development aid and loans tied to conditionalities of policy reform (Dollar and Svensson 2000). This conditional aid meant that the ‘underdeveloped’ countries had to make sure certain policies were put in place in order to get aid and loans. Policies that were characterised by privatisation, liberalising of markets and trade, and cuts in government spending (Ismi 2004:8). A study of more than 220 reform programmes found that more than a third of the programmes failed (Dollar and Svensson 2000:896), and because of the ‘disastrous’ effects of the conditional policies where more than $178 billion was transferred to Western commercial banks from the ‘Third World’ countries, the 1980s has been known as the ‘lost decade’ (Ismi 2004:9). As Glennie continues, ‘In reality, in many African countries aid has meant more poverty, more hungry people, worse basic services for poor people and damage to already precarious democratic institutions’ (2008:2).

As a response to this reality, economists like Amartya Sen and Mabbub ul Haq contested the notion of development as being purely measured by levels of economic development on the one
hand, and democracy on the other, and advanced the idea that human development was to improve human capabilities and welfare (Martinussen 1997:37). Although the discourse still emphasised the importance of national economic growth and increased incomes, it broadened the indicators to measure development. This ultimately, and about ten years later, influenced the creation of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which aimed to eradicate poverty by 2015 (Killick 2005:670). To be able to reach this goal, an extended strategy which highlighted the ‘many dimensions’ of poverty was drafted, and in addition to economic growth were the recognition of improved education, gender equality, health and developing a ‘Global Partnership for Development’ (UN 2001:58). Building on this was the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), extending its focus on tackling climate change and innovation (UN 2015:1). The resolution has been signed by all 193 UN member states and is in many ways dictating the development agenda across nation states and development organisations today. One of the areas that have been highlighted with ‘critical importance’ is partnerships for development (Zapatrina 2016:39).

Recent years have seen the concrete planning and implementation of these development partnerships, and some even talk of a ‘partnership era’ (Fraser and Whitfield 2009:76). In both Germany’s 2017 Marshall Plan for Africa and the European Union’s (EU) 2017 Africa-EU and Southern Africa-EU Partnerships, the strategies of development partnerships are highlighted (BMZ 2017; EU 2017). Similarly, the UK has launched a Global Partnership Department responsible for managing the implementation of development partnerships with philanthropic foundations, other bilateral donors and ‘emerging powers’ including India, China, Brazil and South Africa (DFID 2014b). Across the development sector there has been increased focus on participation, ownership and partnership, where donors are trying to change asymmetrical relationships with recipients, and which has ‘radically transformed the orchestration of aid’ to mean more power with the aid recipient (Lie 2015:723). However, the emerging development partnership discourse has also received critique of continuing conditionalities, drawing on racialised hierarchies and exclusion, thus not living up to its promise of mutuality (Lie 2015; Noxolo 2006; Abrahamsen 2004).

2.3.2 Problematising development aid discourses

Problems with the development industry and development aid discourses have recurrently been recognised, analysed and discussed. People are now questioning the motives of development aid donors as they see the amount the African continent is losing to illicit financial flows (IFF) and tax havens, amounting up to $60 billion a year (see Sharples et. al. 2014; Global Financial Integrity 2015). This is reflected in the news media too, and The Guardian writes that Western development
aid is hiding ‘sustained looting’ (Anderson 2014). According to a report by several non-governmental organisations (NGO), Western nations such as the UK are allowing their companies to exploit Africa’s resources whilst painting pictures of their generosity in helping the poor people of Africa through development aid (Sharples et. al. 2014).

These unofficially recorded IFFs have been termed ‘rational asymmetric development’ (Asongu 2015:9-10), and it is estimated that Sub-Saharan African countries lost a total of $814 billion between 1970 and 2010, an amount that exceeds foreign direct investment (FDI) of $306 billion and official development aid of $659 billion for the same years (Ajayi 2015:55-6). This has allegedly occurred via tax avoidance by multinational corporations, where an African Union (AU) and UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) report on this ‘capital flight’ points out that South Africa is the third highest reporting country in Africa with almost $88 billion in cumulative IFFs from 1970-2008 (AU/ECA 2015:93). The same AU/ECA report highlights that the South African government found a multinational corporation avoiding taxes worth $2 billion by claiming its business in the UK and Switzerland (2015:27). As this was related to UK offices, it raises questions as to whether the facilitating of tax evasion by the UK involves their development aid to South Africa as the NGO report indicates.

In academic literature the main criticisms of development aid have been that aid is in fact very political and tied to Western interests (Ferguson 1994a; Cheru 2009); that theories around development are imperialist and perpetuate othering (Escobar 1995); and that development aid is in fact upholding coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). Extreme views have stated that this may be characterised as a ‘recolonisation’ (Federici 2000:19). In this section I explore these arguments accordingly, and finally point out gaps in the literature.

Ferguson points out that development has become the norm and that the concept’s significance can be compared to that of ‘civilisation’ in the nineteenth century. We do not question the core idea or justification for such concepts as they ‘form the very framework within which argumentation takes place’ which makes them ‘virtually impossible to reject’ (Ferguson 1994a:xiii). Ferguson might be right in that development in our time has become a ‘central organising concept’, but the fact still remains that even from its onset there have been critics of development aid’s justification and core ideas, or what is henceforth referred to as discourse. It is important to distinguish between discourse and practice, however, and although some of this chapter highlights the practice of development aid, it is important to recognise that this practice is supported, justified and underpinned by a particular discourse.

---

9 See Sharples et. al. (2014:2) for a full list of the different NGOs.
2.3.2.1 Apolitical aid

In his book *The Anti-Politics Machine*, Ferguson argues that even though it is framed contrarily, development aid is in fact very political (1994a). He uses the example of Lesotho, a land-locked country inside South Africa’s borders, and argues that the development apparatus in the country supported by foreign aid is not in fact a ‘machine’ to alleviate poverty. Rather, it is a machine for expanding and reinforcing the exercise of Western, and in this particular case the US, ‘bureaucratic state power’ (Ferguson 1994a:255). The framing of ‘underdevelopment’ is often naturalised, not considering the country’s history or politics. In Lesotho, poverty has been reduced to a technical problem. Development aid agencies do not take into account the political character of the state and reduce the structural and political causes of poverty to individual attitudes and values (Ferguson 1994b:178).

This framing is deceiving. It completely diminishes the historical backdrop of colonisation, exploitation and unfair trade relations, and at the same time removes political agency of the development aid donors and influence from projects of poverty alleviation. Similarly to Ferguson, Cheru argues that the development aid history has always been political, highlighting that because the African national project was seen as synonymous with ‘communism’ there were cases when liberation movements were overthrown or removed with Western assistance, whilst the new neo-liberal regimes promoting capitalism were supported and sustained by foreign development aid (2009:277). This is also emphasised by Rist, pointing out that the ‘development path’ has made it possible to ‘keep various liberation movements under control’ (Rist 2008:75). Thus, the depoliticisation and depiction of development aid as apolitical has been argued to be hiding the inherent ‘Western interests’ in geopolitics. Not only do the development agencies and donors benefit from the salaries and output attached to development work, monitoring and expertise (Ferguson 1994a:269), but there is also a possibility of entrenching and expanding institutional state power of the donor country (Ferguson 1994a:256). When supporting African government policies such as exporting cash crops and ‘boosting’ production, this marks a way in which for the ‘sponsor’ of development to break into ‘otherwise inaccessible markets’ (Ferguson 1994b:180). The debt structures and conditional aid flows as outlined above from the US and European nations have, according to Cheru, been a strategy designed to keep African countries ‘in bondage’ (2009:277).
2.3.2.2 Binaries, the imperial gaze and knowledge production

Correspondingly, Ndlovu-Gatsheni upholds that the ‘consultancy culture’ of development aid is turning African individuals into objects of study and ‘native informants’ which are later processed into theories about development and policy documents in Western academies (2012:58). As has been emphasised earlier in this subchapter, what we see as the introduction of development aid signalled a change from ‘Global South’ and ‘Global North’ countries being in different worlds to existing in the same world or family as emphasised by president Truman in 1949 (Rist 2008). However, this depiction still maintains the ‘developed’ first world countries as the knowing parent and Africa as the child in need of help and guidance. This is evident in Truman’s words when he says ‘we’, or the American people, can help the ‘least fortunate’ help themselves and ‘relieve the suffering of these people’ that are ‘victims of disease’ and handicapped by their poverty (Rist 2008:71-2). This is also pointed out by Campbell, who looks at how development aid NGOs portray African nations as starving children that need their Western saviour to survive (2011). These depictions ‘embody colonial relations of power that contrast an adult and superior ‘Global North’ with the infantilised and inferior ‘Global South’ (Campbell 2011:9). The development aid rhetoric has pursued a binary approach, which has perpetuated the othering and difference of ‘developing’ nations, populations and people. This is further emphasised by a study of public perceptions on development aid discourses in the UK, finding that the discourse is reinforcing negative constructs of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Glennie et al. 2012:23). This ‘helplessness’ of poor countries on the African continent needs to be addressed by economic developments that are ‘controlled’ by the West, helping the underdeveloped people ‘help themselves’ (Truman in Rist 2008:71).

Looking at statements like this, the question arises as to whether development aid can avoid being imperialist. There is a danger, or perceived danger, that development projects will always be a case of some agency entering a certain area, informing the programme of action. It appears difficult for development aid discourses to escape the language of the ‘modern’ and ‘developed’ countries or organisations alleviating the ills of a ‘backward’ and ‘underdeveloped’ place in the ‘Third World’. This has been referred to as the imperial gaze. Tamale speaks of framing African cultures and sexualities as different and inferior to justify policies that were imperialist and racist (2011:28-9). The thought is that the ‘laws of development’ are the same everywhere and thus the trajectory of industrialisation and modernisation that happened in Europe have to be reproduced elsewhere (Rist 2008:74). This is also emphasised by Ake, arguing that development theories have been imperialistic, founded upon a vision that assumes the European capitalist development experience and therefore completely ignores the particularities of African cultures and countries (1996:118).
2.3.2.3 Colonial aid

What comes of this is the realisation that ‘development’ cannot be understood outside current power structures and reduced to apolitical and ‘simple real-life problems’. Development aid discourses are shaped and touched by broader questions of epistemology, representation, power and identity construction, and is in this way either upholding or resisting coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012:49; Escobar 1995:162). This, in relation to development partnerships, shall be investigated in Chapter V. Moyo, in her book Dead Aid, argues that instead of alleviating poverty, development aid has created more poverty and what has supposed to ‘help’ African countries has rather been ‘an unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster for most parts of the developing world’ (2009:17). Moyo contends that aid is not working (2009:38). What she appears not to consider is whether it is in fact working, only from a donor point of view?

One argument that has been presented by Cheru is that what has been accepted as ‘development’ in African states have in reality been an imperial project which serves Western needs (2009:275). He points out that the development model, which made its entrance post-independence, has resembled the ‘colonial development model’ in that it does not pass on participation or accountability but rather makes local communities dependent on the donor (Cheru 2009:275). Through development aid and its conditionalities, African governments have been ‘forced’ to dismantle parts of the African state for the ‘proper functioning of the market’ (Cheru 2009:277). Conditionalities such as the SAPs, that have required states to cut social spending in order to service debt has been a common anecdote. This signals that policy-making is ‘wrenched out of the hands of the African state’ and so Cheru argues; ‘this is recolonisation, not development’ (2009:277). However, Cheru’s argument can in part be dismissed, for it fails to recognise the agency of African governments and development efforts, as well as decolonising movements in general. However, Moyo might be right to some extent when she argues that the billions of aid has ‘hampered, stifled and retarded’ Africa’s development (2009:23).

Similarly to Cheru, Federici holds that Africa is currently being recolonized; although in his view, it is an intellectual colonisation connected to the knowledge hegemony that has previously been discussed (2000:19). It also refers to how through targeted aid the development agencies ‘determine what can be studied, written, and voiced in the continent’ (Federici 2000:19). Escobar points out how the development aid industry’s continued emphasis on a modernisation discourse is perpetuating an imperialism in representation and functions as a mechanism of truth production (1995:162). It reflects ‘structural and institutionalised power relations’ (Escobar 1995:162), which has been argued as being colonial. As we have seen in the above subchapter, Ndlovu-Gatsheni
argues that this coloniality of knowledge has been the worst form of colonisation because it has created intellectual dependency (2013).

2.4 Filling the gaps
As seen from the above subchapters, the argument has already been made that development aid is upholding certain power structures and coloniality through lopsided trade, conditionality and the dominant representations of apolitical aid and the naturalisation of underdevelopment (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012; Ferguson 1994a). The case has also been made for how the development industry produces and reproduces certain images and stories of lack, distance and difference when it comes to ‘subaltern’ countries, populations and people, or practice othering (Said 1978; Escobar 1995), which has justified Western intervention (Rist 2008). What has not been adequately considered and debated, however, and what this research paper is aiming to uncover and investigate, is the extent to which one might identify othering and evidence of coloniality within current development partnership discourses. As we move into an age where the language of development partnerships replaces the ‘traditional’ bilateral aid discourses, and programmes, it is imperative to analyse in what ways this development aid discourse may also be perpetuating, or whether it is challenging, the othering and coloniality outlined above.

This is something that is missing in the current decolonial literature. Although some analysis have explored the ‘problematic’ issues of development partnership as a concept (Noxolo 2006; Abrahamsen 2004), there is no comprehensive analysis of the development partnership discourse and its implementation, and whether it is perpetuating othering instead of mutuality and egalitarian relations. Neither does the existing literature provide a decolonial reading of the development partnership approach. This study is an attempt to merge decolonial critiques with the case of development partnerships, which shall be done in the chapter that follows.

Chapter III

Methodology

3.1 The properties and outline of the study
This thesis provides a case study of DFID’s new approach to development aid in South Africa, namely the approach of the development partnership. Through a CDA of the two DFID policy papers on the
planning of the development partnership, as well as the transcripts of interviews with four representatives involved in the implementation of this partnership approach, the research examines the potential for coloniality and othering present in the development partnership discourse.

Discourse analysis refers to the ‘attempt to study linguistic patterns in units that extend the clause or sentence’ (Roth 2005:317). It denotes the underlying meaning of particular use of language and narratives. We have seen that coloniality can be ‘invisible’ and structural in its nature, and hence may be difficult to recognise. Similarly, othering and the framing of difference between an ‘us’ and ‘them’ come in different forms, and the distancing through time, space and knowledge production might not be obvious at first glance. CDA presupposes the ‘nature of social power and dominance’ and aims to examine and understand how ‘discourse contributes to their reproduction’ (van Dijk 1993:254). This is the lens I take going forward in this research project.

There are several ways of conducting CDA, and there is no right or wrong way of going about it. This particular study makes use of Fairclough’s CDA framework as it is relatively straightforward. As he points out, discourse analysis is not about reducing social problems and life to language, but rather it offers a strategy to understand social life and problems better, by deconstructing the discourses and ways in which we explain the world (Fairclough 2003:2). This research paper is grounded in a social constructivist approach, which assumes that what we know, see and understand is socially constructed (Stetsenko and Arievitch 1997:160). The goal of discourse analysis is therefore to reveal the sociocultural aspect of language, concepts and knowledges we take for granted, and challenges the idea that understanding is ‘value-, context-, culture-, and history-free’ (Stetsenko and Arievitch 1997:163).

This chapter firstly introduces the social problem and research questions this thesis explores and attempts to answer. It then describes and explains the reasoning behind the data collection methods, answering the questions of who?, how?, and why? Furthermore, the chapter outlines the CDA approach, and finally reflects on some limitations to the study and research methods.

### 3.1.1 Research question(s)

This research project arises from concerns around the coloniality and othering prevalent in development aid that is channelled from the ‘Global North’ to the ‘Global South’ as has been outlined in the previous chapter. The social problem the project wishes to examine and study is therefore the coloniality and othering inherent in development aid discourse and practice; and investigate whether the planning and implementation of a development partnership challenges this
social problem. The main research question for this thesis is therefore; to what extent does the official discourse surrounding DFID’s development partnership with South Africa perpetuate coloniality and othering?

Under-arching research questions are:

- What theories, knowledges and histories of development does the development partnership discourse rely on?
- How has the development partnership discourse been recontextualised?
- Do development discourses need coloniality and othering?

My aim is thus not to research whether development aid is imperialistic and colonial per se, as this has been studied and expressed more in-depth elsewhere (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012; Escobar 1995; Rist 2008). My aim is rather to explore whether and how the development partnership discourse is perpetuating, and subsequently upholding, coloniality and othering. I wish to investigate whether DFID’s development partnership is presenting a naturalised, or depoliticised and dehistoricised, story of development as has been argued to be the case in development aid discourses mentioned above. I want to examine the prevalence of a discourse of othering within development aid and partnerships, and assess how this justifies and legitimises intervention, investment and infiltration from the ‘Global North’ to the ‘Global South’. The aim is to investigate whether the planning and implementation of the new development partnership approach is providing a new discourse of development which translates into less coloniality and othering, and more ‘mutual’ cooperation, or whether it is merely providing a new narrative because the ‘traditional’ development aid discourse is starting to become unveiled and obsolete.

3.2 Data collection

3.2.1 Selection of DFID policy papers and representatives for interviews

As this study is specifically looking at policy discourse and the research is policy related, reviewing DFID’s policy papers is essential. I have chosen the 2014 Southern Africa Operational Plan, which is henceforth referred to as the SAOP (DFID 2014a), and the 2014 Global Partnership Department Operational Plan, which is henceforth referred to as the GPDOP (DFID 2014b). This is because these two policy papers represent and outline the planning, objectives and rationales of DFID’s development partnerships in general and to South Africa in particular. These official documents provide good insight into the UK government department’s aims, intentions, policy changes and assumptions, which are further outlined in the next chapter. It represents what DFID themselves
want to communicate to the UK population and the rest of the world, and it is therefore the best place to start when studying the department and their official development partnership discourse. This sample is also drawn because of its practical advantages. It is close at hand, public and readily available, and the content will not change over time (Bhattacherjee 2012:69).

The second sample is transcripts of interviews with people working with and receiving funding from the DFID partnership approach in South Africa. As pointed out by Fairclough, texts for discursive analysis can, just as official policy papers, be transcripts of spoken interviews (2003:3). To understand the social effects of discourse it is necessary to study ‘what happens when people talk or write’ (2000:3). This sample was chosen to get a detailed and in-depth understanding of the implementation of the development partnership, as written information on this is minimal. It is also to get the version of the ‘other’ side of the partnership approach, and how it affects the recipient. The representatives are from the team leading DFID’s Development Partnership with South Africa, the South African National Treasury (SANT), the NGO Southern Africa Trust (SAT) and the NGO South South North (SSN), who are all involved with the implementation of DFID’s development partnership, and will thus be part of the discourse. Henceforth I refer to these actors as the DFID, SANT, SAT and SSN representatives.\(^\text{10}\) The representatives were chosen by a method known as purposive sampling, on the basis that they have substantive familiarity with the subject, have credible opinions and expertise on the phenomenon (Bhattacherjee 2012:69). As with the policy papers that are scrutinised, this sample was accessible due to their convenient location and the limited time and resources of the study.

By analysing both the policy papers and the interview transcripts I attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of the development partnership discourse and the way it functions. Most CDA’s only make use of one or several versions of a text, whilst this study make use of different actors to consider the recontextualisation and significance of the development partnership discourse.

3.2.2 Data collection process

As the policy papers were already transcribed and readily available, the research began with organising interviews with the relevant actors in the implementation process of the development partnership. By contacting DFID South Africa I was put in contact with the representative who agreed to meet me in Pretoria for an interview. As I had already sent the interviewee the discussion guide I received written answers for these that I could use to construct new and more specific

\(^{10}\) Although consent was granted to use them, names and titles have been excluded for ethical reasons.
questions for the interview. The interview took approximately one hour and was semi-structured, building on a series of questions in general interview schedule form, where the sequence of questions varied, it allowed participant interference and some questions were replaced by follow-up questions relating to the responses (Bryman and Teevan 2005:71). The questions were based on gaps and interesting findings in the existing literature, questions arising from the archival research and information needed to paint a more holistic picture of the case study. Similarly, but by phone, I conducted interviews with the SANT, SAT and SSN representatives, who were all snowball sampled by referral from my DFID contact. These followed the discussion guide as utilised for the DFID interviews and can be found in Appendix A. All interviews were recorded and later transcribed word for word to ensure that the language was true to the interview. To be able to attain consent for the interviews and for using the material for this research project, I sent the transcripts back to the interviewees for approval. I would then, particularly in the case of DFID and SANT, receive an edited version in return that was approved for use. An outline of the interview questions and some preliminary results are presented in the next chapter.

When the transcripts were approved and ready for use, I began the discourse analysis by reading through the two policy papers and the interview transcripts. I coded the significant terms such as ‘developing’, ‘progress’, ‘traditional’, ‘weak’, ‘need’, ‘constraints’, ‘behind’. I then wrote down all the ways in which the texts referred to South Africa, the South African government and South African individuals. From my own reading of the texts, findings from Chapter II of othering and coloniality in development aid discourses, Fairclough’s CDA framework and the interpretive policy analysis strategy outlined by Winkel and Leipold (2016:113), I had already identified the discourses, genres and dominant narratives that I wanted to look out for. This included the naturalisation of a development trajectory and the use of binaries. This was in addition to what Winkel and Leipold call ‘exclusion strategies’ which refers to the silencing of and non-referral to particular voices and histories (2016:113).

Finally, I ended up with nine categories that I wanted to explore. These were:

- the use of binaries;
- the presentation of universalities;
- the maintenance of predictable characterisations;
- the establishment of power and expertise;
- denoting who and why the texts were written for;
- referral to the new development partnership approach;

---

11 I therefore refer to two different interviews with DFID, the 12th and 13th October 2017.
- the emphasis on *business and trade*;
- focus on *capacity building*; and
- the highlighting of *good governance*.

I then compiled the findings in a document and structured them by category. These categorisations then assisted me in analysing the discourses that have become dominant in the planning and implementation of DFID’s development partnership with South Africa. There is currently no particular way to measure coloniality and othering. Furthermore, as the dynamics are of a structural nature, a way in which to measure these concepts is not a straightforward task. From the deconstruction of the mechanisms of othering and coloniality in Chapter II, however, the above categories would paint a broad picture of their prevalence in the development partnership discourse.

3.3 Analysis

The analysis is concerned with ‘generating findings’ from the evidence collected throughout the study (Spencer et al. 2003:200), and this research project employs critical discourse analysis where the main analytical framework is developed from Fairclough’s five steps of using CDA as a method in social scientific research (2001). It is also influenced by argumentative discourse analysis, and recognises that language ‘should be related to particular practices in which it is employed’ (Hajer 2005:447). The five steps include (i) focusing on a social problem with a semiotic foundation; (ii) identifying obstacles to solving this problem through analysis of different aspects; (iii) considering if the network of practices ‘needs’ the problem; (iv) identifying possible solutions to the obstacles; and (v) reflecting critically on the four steps above (Fairclough 2001:125). The three first steps are applied systematically in Chapter V, and the fifth is incorporated into the four first steps. Because of limited space and time, step four of identifying solutions have been left out. Rather, this thesis is calling for further research on ways ‘forward’.

The first step refers to the conceptual problem of coloniality and othering in development aid discourses, as was recognised in Chapter II, and how the development partnership discourse appears to be perpetuating this. The second denotes the actual discourse analysis, and Fairclough presents three categories that need to be investigated through a thorough and comprehensive study of the language used in the policy papers and interviews; ‘the network of practices’ and the practice of the actors that the development partnership is connected to. This includes other bilateral donors and international organisations; the relationship of the language to other elements such as the theories, knowledges and practices upholding the discourse; and the main discourse analysis of the
semiosis in the development partnership discourse, which again is divided into (a) structural analysis, (b) interactional analysis, (c) interdiscursive analysis, and (d) linguistic and semiotic analysis (Fairclough 2001:125).

The structural analysis examines the recontextualisation and prevalence of the development partnership discourse in other discourses such as media and education. Secondly, the interactional analysis highlights how language creates influence and examines the presentation of particular universalities and truths throughout the texts. Thirdly, the interdiscursive analysis focuses on the context in which the discourse is set and considers historical, political and social events that might support or challenge the development partnership discourse. The linguistic analysis is highlighting the dominant, resistant and different genres protruding from the CDA of the policy papers and interview transcripts. Furthermore, the third step of Fairclough’s framework assesses the necessity of coloniality and othering in upholding the development partnership discourse. Finally, I outline the main findings of the CDA.

3.4 Limitations

So far in this chapter I have outlined my research questions and presented my research methods. As emphasised in the previous chapter, the significance of this research emanates from a desire to fill the gaps in the existing development aid and partnership literature and provide evidence to evaluate the underlying intentions of the partnership. It analyses the official discourse of the planning and implementation of DFID’s development partnership approach to South Africa, on which there exists limited literature and research.

It is also important to emphasise the limitations of this study and its research methods. No methodology is perfect and the methods will always be influenced by the objectivity of the researcher. As stated by Bhattacherjee, qualitative analysis is ‘heavily dependent on the researcher’s analytic and integrative skills’ and it is influenced by the researcher’s predispositions and personal contextual knowledge (2012:113). In the following paragraphs I outline four common limitations to the qualitative research methods I have applied; generalisation, selectivity, bias and working with civil servants.

3.4.1 Generalisations, selectivity and bias

A familiar limitation with case study research and qualitative methods is that they do not allow for generalisations. Although the aim of this thesis is identifying patterns in the discourse surrounding
DFID’s development partnership with South Africa, it would be beneficial if the research outcomes could be applied to broader ‘international’ trends within the development aid industry and conclude on development partnerships in general. As pointed out by Gee, even an ideal discourse analysis would only paint in detail ‘a small part of the full picture’ (2011:121), and this is what this research project is doing. Nevertheless, this research can provide insights on a particular discourse upholding coloniality and othering, and it can provide guidelines for further studies aiming to understand power structures.

Discourse analysis in qualitative research requires a ‘close reading’ of a small sample of texts (Krippendorff 2004:17). This means that the researcher has to be very selective when it comes to choosing the texts to analyse within the sample frame. This will likely result in some information being left out, and due to limited time and resources only parts of the comprehensive existing literature on development aid and partnerships have been read and applied. Selectivity have also influenced the analysis, in regards to what I have chosen to highlight and not highlight from the policy papers and interview transcripts, and how much meaning I have ascribed certain aspects. The analysis portrays my own pre-made conceptions, where there is possibility of a biased and subjective outlook. This is considered below.

The fact remains that I am trapped inside Western discourse, language, and knowledge production. As I am conducting a discourse analysis I simultaneously find myself inside discourse, which should also be analysed. As humans interpret the world through certain languages, theoretical approaches and symbols to give it meaning, it is necessary to acknowledge that discourse analysis is in fact ‘an interpretation of an interpretation’ (Gee 2011:122). This is difficult to escape, and my analysis is inevitably impacted by my positionality and subjectivity as a white, privileged, Western, cis-het woman. However, this research project use evidences and critical skills to produce some form of ‘objective’ and reliable knowledge that provides insights into the development partnership discourse.

3.4.2 Working with civil servants

Another particular limitation with this research project stems from the choice to conduct interviews with government officials. This is emphasised in the literature on elite research and interviews, highlighting the challenge of scheduling interviews, the importance of well-prepared discussion guides and the ways in which context and the political arena affects the responses of government officials, which may change over time (Aberbach and Rockman 2002). From the fieldwork, I found that the transcripts often required editing after the interviews, which says something about the
limits to what government officials are permitted to say and not say. This was also evident when it came to the interview discussion guide, where particular questions were skipped, avoided or omitted. Often, this related to questions centred on colonialism, historical references, Brexit and more current political events such as corruption in South Africa. It is important to highlight these limitations, as they are findings in and of themselves. One has to be cognisant of employment conditions of the participants and as the researcher I was aware if the necessity to work on the interviewees’ terms and conditions, to ensure the research does not become exploitative. This case study is very specific, and therefore has to consider its particularity when it comes to context and practice. This is therefore something I explore further in the following chapter.

Chapter IV

The Case Study and Results

So far I have outlined the main conceptual debates surrounding othering, coloniality and development aid and partnerships. I have introduced my methodology and CDA approach, and explained my data collection methods. As this research project bases itself on a particular case study, this is important to explore on its own, and this chapter is dedicated to just that. A case study is often associated with qualitative methods and research is normally intensive and detailed about one case in particular. It frequently employs several collection methods, and a ‘multiplicity of perspectives which are rooted in a specific context’ (Lewis 2003:52). Whether a study is qualitative or quantitative, decisions have to be made and justified about the sample selection as the researcher cannot possibly study and record everything that might occur (Ritchie et. al. 2003:77). For quantitative research the common sampling method is based on probability. In this qualitative research, however, I have conducted non-probability sampling by deliberately selecting DFID and their development partnership with South Africa as a ‘unit’ to reflect the emerging discourse of development partnerships (Ritchie et. al. 2003:78).

This research paper further assesses particular characteristics by exploring whether DFID’s development partnership with South Africa is perpetuating coloniality and othering. The partnership approach pursued by the UK government in South Africa serves as an ideal case study due to its convenience, historical relevance and the expertise of the participants. Firstly, studying DFID’s relationship with South Africa is convenient as the study is being carried out in South Africa, based at the University of Cape Town, and because this allows for more fieldwork in accordance with the
limited time and resources. Secondly, the UK’s history of colonialism in South Africa, as we will see below, makes them more suited to exploring the potential for coloniality within their development aid system. Finally, as pioneers of the partnership approach to development, DFID acts as an expert on new development aid approaches and its role as the third largest provider of aid in the world increases their significance (ICAI 2017). This thesis can therefore provide guidelines in studying development partnership discourses, which represents an emerging trend in development approaches. It can also provide insights into how coloniality and othering is being perpetuated in the development industry more generally.

To properly understand the development partnership discourse and its interconnectedness with the global system Fairclough emphasises the importance of considering the social context of the texts that are under analysis (2001:129). This chapter therefore outlines the relevant historical and social context surrounding DFID, development in South Africa and the relationship between the UK and South Africa. It looks at the events leading up to the development partnership to make sure contextual considerations can be made in the analysis and discussion. It furthermore explores the two DFID policy papers and interview transcripts being analysed, and introduces some preliminary results.

4.1 The UK Department for International Development

There have been several UK Government departments preceding DFID responsible for aid and development, and historically the British aid program has been ‘rooted in colonial history’ (Barder 2005:3). The Colonial Development Act of 1929 stated that financial assistance and funds were allocated if the projects resulted in gains for the UK, and it did not permit aid for social services (Barder 2005:4). After social unrest in the 1930s the new Colonial Development Act of 1940 extended the purpose to include the welfare of colonial subjects (Barder 2005:4). After WWII and Truman’s speech on underdevelopment, aid to the colonies increased and a longer commitment established to support development in the colonies through schemes of agriculture, public works and social services (Barder 2005:4). The years following the war changed the views of foreign aid and its role. With the ‘success’ of the Marshall Plan and the thought that the ‘combination of capital and technical assistance’ could rapidly transform economies, economic development became the solution to world poverty and underdevelopment (Barder 2005:4-6). Aid was seen as good not only because of its intrinsic value, but also because it encouraged and promoted trade. Since then, much emphasis has been attributed to the effectiveness of aid, conditionalities to aid, and meeting British interests through aid (Barder 2005:6-8). The Conservative Thatcher government of 1979 meant an
increase in trade related aid and bilateral aid projects supporting British businesses abroad (Barider 2005:9).

DFID was established in 1997. This marked a shift in the department’s extended responsibilities and the re-articulation of policies, which came with the shift from a Conservative to Labour Government (Barider 2005:14). The new responsibilities included ensuring a coherent policy on development across the Government and new policies saw a shift in emphasis from market economic reforms to focus on debt relief, poverty reduction and governance reform (Barider 2005:14). However, the introduction of the ‘New Labour discourse’ also meant continued focus on trade and economic reform (Barider 2005:13). Today DFID’s vision is to build a ‘safer, healthier, more prosperous world for people in developing countries and in the UK too’ (GOV.UK 2017), and their development objectives are largely in line with the UN’s SDGs as outlined above. The aid budget is spent on tackling what they define as the ‘great global challenges’ which are strengthening global peace, security and governance, strengthening resilience and response to crises, promoting global prosperity and tackling extreme poverty and helping the ‘world’s most vulnerable’ (HM Treasury 2015:3). In 2015, African countries received about 55 per cent of all UK bilateral aid and has ‘consistently been the largest recipient’ of DFID development aid since 2010 (DFID 2016a:31). The 2016 referendum resulting in the decision of the UK leaving the EU, henceforth referred to as Brexit, marked another shift in development aid focus and opportunities. In their new Economic Development Strategy, a key message of the strategy is to advance economic development in the poorest countries as a ‘hallmark of building Global Britain’ (DFID 2017:4, emphasis added). According to several news sources this reflects the ‘freedom’ from EU rules on trade and funding for private sector projects (Rumney 2017; Gosby and Whitehead 2017), and is clearer on being in the UK’s own interests (Gulrajani 2015).

4.2 South Africa and development
Although South Africa is recognised as a middle income country and an ‘emerging power’ by DFID (2014a), the World Bank recognises that 16% of the South African population lives in poverty, or less than $1.90 a day, and the country have one of the highest income inequality rates in the world (World Bank 2017). After the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa, which was founded on institutional racism, there was an agreement made between the African National Congress (ANC), the incumbent National Party government and the new influencing advisors such as the World Bank built on the development discourse. It was also quickly adopted by the post-1994 ANC government, who titled their first five-year plan The Reconstruction and Development Programme (Crush
1995:xii). This signalled a move away from the former Marxist and socialist approach that characterised the ANC in exile, typified by the Freedom Charter, and in the second term of President Thabo Mbeki the strategy was highly neo-liberal with policies calling for privatisation, foreign investment, trade liberalisation and an enabling business environment (Besharati 2013:11). Despite both successes and shortcomings of the different strategies employed, the South African government appears to have aspired to become a ‘developmental state’, and the ANC Polokwane Conference which saw the rise of current President Jacob Zuma was a ‘revival of leftist and anti-liberal sentiments’ (Besharati 2013:12). This can be related to anti-Western strains within the ANC and the hard-line strategy Zuma has adopted towards Western powers that according to him ‘plot to control South Africa’ (The Economist 2017, Bauer 2017). The South African National Development Plan (SANDP) 2030 recognises that the country can play an important role in influencing the other BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), and African countries in matters of development, integration and trade (NPC 2012:235). This reflects a wish to positioning South Africa as an important development player in the world and seeking to ‘reform the global governance order’ (Hornsby and Black 2016:268).

Despite some of the apparent anti-Western strains within certain player’s rhetoric, however, one of the largest development aid donors to South Africa has been their ex-colonial power, the UK. The development aid is primarily given to education and health sectors, and between 1994 and 2013 the UK provided more than £66 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Hornsby and Black 2016:279). DFID’s development aid to South Africa has historically been focused on trade agreements, education and water projects. In 2014 the department stated, that even though South Africa is an ‘emerging power’ and major economy with a positive ‘trajectory’, the issues the country face ‘cannot be addressed effectively at country level alone’ (DFID 2014a:6). Similarly, the report recognises ‘strong evidence of need’, particularly when it comes to economic growth to reduce unemployment, violence against women and children and public sector accountability (DFID 2014a:9). The question therefore remains to what extent South Africa’s relationship with the UK may be called a colonial relationship.

4.3 The UK and South Africa’s relationship

The UK is, according to Hornsby and Black, South Africa’s ‘most pivotal and enduring traditional ‘partner’’ (2016:268). This is not surprising as already in 1806 the British Empire colonised the Cape Colony, which was the area around modern day Cape Town. Although they met some resistance from, particularly, the Zulu, Xhosa and Afrikaner groups, parts of South Africa were British colonies.
until 1909 when they were granted some autonomy as the Union of South Africa, although South Africa only gained control of diplomacy and foreign policy in 1926 (Hornsby and Black 2016:270). After the WWII where South Africa entered on the side of the British, the National Party implemented the apartheid order institutionalising racial segregation, ensuring that black people did not attain full citizenship rights (Mamdani 1996).

Although the UK intended to portray itself as an important anti-apartheid player, the reality is that it maintained close ties with the apartheid government, undermined anti-apartheid efforts to isolate South Africa, and sustained robust trade and investment with and in the country (Hornsby and Black 2016:270). In fact, the UK was the ‘most important source of foreign capital’ and the biggest lender to South Africa during the apartheid regime, and British banks in South Africa were accused of ‘redirecting ‘black’ savings into the ‘white’ economy’ (John 2000:416). As emphasised by Hornsby and Black, the relationship between the UK and South Africa during the apartheid era was driven by how the latter had provided for economically benefitting trade and investment in the UK, and it had served the ideological and ‘geo-strategic’ importance of preventing communism to flourish in Africa (2016:272). The UK has eventually ‘been woven into South Africa’s social, economic and political history’ (Hornsby and Black 2016:272).

After the demise of the apartheid regime and the British hosting of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, trade and investment between the two countries persisted. Between 1998 and 2008 the UK was South Africa’s third biggest source of resources and imports, and South Africa is the UK’s largest trading partner on the continent (Hornsby and Black 2016:278). The UK has historically been the biggest foreign investor in the country and is South Africa’s largest source of FDIs (Hornsby and Black 2016:278). Trade is centred on financial sectors and natural resources, and in 2013 the value of this relationship was €4.1 billion (Hornsby and Black 2016:277). There are, therefore, close economic and political links between the UK and the South African government, and the relationship has continuously been built on national interests, at least of the former. As pointed out by Hornsby and Black, despite some anti-Western rhetoric and strengthened trade and foreign policy agency, South Africa is still quite constrained by trying to preserving the bilateral relationship with the UK which makes up a crucial part of investment, aid and trade to and in the country (2016:283).

4.4 DFID’s development partnership discourse

In 2013 there was a clear shift in the development aid discourse when the UK Government stated that they would cease all direct bilateral assistance to South Africa and from 2015 rather build a ‘regional and global development partnership’ that would go beyond the borders of South Africa
(DFID 2014b; DFID 2017). Their reasoning was that South Africa had become classified as a middle income country and ‘has its own resources’ for development service delivery (DFID 2014a:6). According to DFID the aim with this partnership is to help the country and government ‘translate’ investment into better lives for the poorer population, and work together on international development objectives which affects them both (DFID 2014a:6). The planning of this development partnership is outlined in two policy papers, the GPDOP and the SAOP. To achieve its objectives, the programme is implemented through partnerships with SANT and their Capacity Building Project, with SAT and their different projects on influencing policy-making, climate change and capacity building, and with SSN and their climate change advocacy and policy work. These policy papers and transcripts from interviews with SANT, SAT and SSN representatives are explored in depth below, and some preliminary results are presented.

4.4.1 The policy papers

The planning, objectives and aims of DFID’s development partnership with South Africa can be located in two policy papers. The GPDOP is available through the UK’s National Archives and is an eighteen page long paper that sets out the general context, vision and objectives, headline results, delivery, monitoring and transparency of DFID’s development partnership approach with other bilateral donors, philanthropic foundations, and ‘emerging powers’ including India, Brazil, China and South Africa. The paper states that the department’s main objectives are to ‘influence change in the international system’ through different forums such as the G20, managing major partnerships, developing knowledge and policy on development goals and modernising ODA (DFID 2014b:3). Similarly, the SAOP is available from the archives and is a nineteen pages long paper that through introducing the context, vision and objectives, results, delivery, value for money and transparency outlines DFID’s development partnership with South Africa. The vision is to address poverty and inequality in South Africa, and ‘enable’ the South African government, business and civil society to translate their ‘own much greater investment into better lives for poor people’ (DFID 2014a:6). Both of the papers begin with an introduction that explains DFID’s general objectives, approach and aims. These are to ‘build a better, more prosperous world for us all’ through growing business environments, improving aspects for women and girls, humanitarian assistance, driving value for money, set global development goals and work with new partners (DFID 2014a:4; DFID 2014a:2). As these papers suggests, the aim of the development partnership is to support ‘the delivery of DFID’s objectives through the international system’ (DFID 2014b:4).
From analysing the nine categories outlined in the above chapter, it was found that the policy papers aim to establish expertise and influence with DFID as a development organisation, they perpetuate the conceptual binary of developed/developing, and that they present particular development challenges as universalities and truths. For example, both policy papers seem to claim some influence in knowing the ‘right ways’ for South Africa to develop. The papers establish development expertise by arguing some policies are critical, and that humanitarian assistance remains DFID’s responsibility (DFID 2014a:4; DFID 2014b:2). When it comes to the binaries, the Introduction alone refers to ‘developing’ countries three times, each time in the context of DFID providing some assistance in the form of ‘helping’, ‘improving’ or ‘investing’ (DFID 2014a:4; DFID 2014b:2). Finally, the papers are highlighting certain development ‘truths’, again by referring to is and are and ‘right ways’ of spending, but also to ‘internationally agreed’ principles and objectives for aid and effective development, key human rights issues and continuously insinuating there is one successful way of ‘developing’ across all countries (DFID 2014a:4, 18; DFID 2014b:2).

4.4.2 The interview transcripts
To be able to get insight into the implementation of DFID’s development partnership with South Africa I conducted interviews with four representatives involved with the development partnership programme, which are outlined in the above chapter. The interviews followed a semi-structured question guide and thus continuously changed, however some questions remained consistent.12 For example, questions included, ‘what are your main objectives and goals?’, ‘what would you say are South Africa’s main ‘development challenges’?’, ‘what do you believe should be the role of Western donors and organisations such as DFID when it comes to South Africa’s development?’, ‘how would you describe your relationship with DFID/the Southern Africa Trust/the South African government/South South North?’ and ‘how did the transition to development partnership influence your work?’

From the initial fieldwork and analysis of the interview transcripts, I found a consistent emphasis on capacity building work, on development ‘truths’, and mutual cooperation. For example, all transcripts highlight capacity building as part of their work, and ‘enable’ and ‘support’ the South African government to better deal with development challenges of inequality, poverty and climate change. Secondly, particular development ‘truths’ are presented through language of is and are, such as focusing on economic development, the importance of the SDGs and international benchmarks to measure development. The discourse is replete with notions that emphasise South

---

12 See the complete discussion guide in Appendix A.
Africa’s ‘progress’. Finally, all representatives involved with DFID’s development partnership highlight ‘mutuality’ of cooperation, interests or collaboration. They are generally positive about the partnership and argue it is cooperative and participatory, insinuating they have ownership of their development work.

Chapter V

Analysis and Discussion

‘What if our language does not simply mirror or picture the world but instead profoundly shapes our view of it in the first place?’ (Fischer and Forester 1993:1).

So far this research project has outlined the conceptual debates and argued for a qualitative CDA to adequately address the problem of coloniality and othering in development discourses. It has introduced the case study and outlined some preliminary results that show that the development partnership discourse is to some extent perpetuating coloniality of knowledge and othering. Like the quote above, I believe in the power of language and discourse in shaping our reality and understanding of the world. This influences the importance of analysing the development partnership discourse, and subsequently this chapter sets out to further examine and analyse the discourse surrounding DFID’s development partnership with South Africa, replacing the ‘traditional’ bilateral aid programme that was in place from 1994 to 2015.

The bulk of this chapter is devoted to the language and semiosis found in the policy papers and interview transcripts, setting out the planning and implementation of the partnership approach. More specifically, what is investigated is the portrayal of binaries and hierarchy of countries, the story of progress and development, ‘universal’ knowledge and strategies on development and the relationship between donor and aid recipients. It also examines what is omitted in the discourse, and therefore silenced, in the attempt to measure the extent to which elements of coloniality remain entrenched in the way South Africa is presented and depicted. The chapter investigates whether the discourse related to the planning and implementation of DFID’s development partnership with South Africa characterises a move away from coloniality and othering in development aid discourses as outlined in Chapter II, or whether it translates into the ‘mutual’ cooperation that the policy outwardly states. As we have seen in Chapter III, CDA aims to understand how discourse contributes to the reproduction of social power and dominance (van Dijk 1993).
Therefore, the guiding questions of this chapter are whether the development partnership discourse perpetuates coloniality and othering? Or does it challenge the coloniality of power, knowledge and being? Does the discourse rely on mutuality instead of othering? How is the discourse recontextualised? Finally, what theories, knowledges and histories are supporting the development partnership discourse?

Chapter III outlined Fairclough’s five steps to CDA that have influenced the analysis below. The outline of this chapter is as follows: the first section (5.1) looks at the social problem of coloniality and othering which appears to be perpetuated by the development partnership discourse, and the never-ending ‘challenge’ of poverty and ‘underdevelopment’. The second subchapter (5.2) focuses on the prevalence and strength of the development partnership discourse, and is divided into four sub-subchapters; the development network (5.2.1) looks at how the development partnership approach is interconnected with other governments and organisations; the science of development (5.2.2) examines the theories, knowledge and histories upholding the discourse; and the actual discourse analysis (5.2.3) which through four further sub-sub-subchapters outlines the most important results from the analysis. Here we find the prevalence and re-contextualisation of the development aid discourse (5.2.3.1); the universality of development strategies and certain dominant representations that become truths (5.2.3.2); the context in which the development partnership discourse is perpetuated, including for whom and why it is produced and reproduced (5.2.3.3); the semiosis that is particular to DFID’s development partnership approach (5.2.3.4), which are partnerships for mutual cooperation (5.2.3.4.1), capacity building (5.2.3.4.2) and the non-existent semiosis of political and historical influences on development (5.2.3.4.3). This brings us to the third step of the analysis (5.3), namely looking at whether the current social order of development partnerships ‘needs’ coloniality and othering. The fourth and final step systematically summarises the main results of the analysis (5.4).

5.1 The social problem of colonial partnerships and persistent poverty

According to the decolonial lens, the world remains characterised by colonial power structures, where former colonial powers continue to be at the top of the hierarchy and subsequently benefit from interactions with the ‘developing’ ex-colonial world (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). In line with this claim, when looking at the language contained in the two policy papers on the partnership approach the dynamic outlined is evident. DFID is establishing expertise and power of knowledge when it comes to development aid and development strategies. The policy paper language implies that DFID remains very much in charge of their partner countries’ and South Africa’s development ‘trajectory’,
evident in the continued emphasis on the ‘right ways’ to develop and DFID’s ‘international expertise’ (2014a:4-6; 2014b:2). Thus, the planning of the new approach is arguably perpetuating a coloniality of knowledge.

Correspondingly, the insinuated promise of mutual cooperation, ownership and policy influence has been criticised as attempting to underplay political motivations for aid, Western extraction and imperialism. According to Noxolo, the introduction of the word ‘partnership’ is a linguistic attempt to hide European paternalism (2006:257). In actuality, it hides the ‘gendering and infantilisation’ of DFID’s development discourse that perpetuates ‘racialised hierarchies and denies mutuality’, which is exactly what it is promising to deconstruct and provide (Noxolo 2006:254). The overarching ‘problem’ of ‘underdevelopment’ and global poverty is not something that will go away in the near future, and because Western governments and organisations are seen as the experts to solve this, this coloniality and othering of development discourses are something that we need to investigate. In fact, according to the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report from 2016, based on the 1990’s development model as outlined in Chapter II, more than 766 million people live on less than $1.90 a day, and more than 2.4 billion people lack access to improved sanitation (UNDP 2016:29-30). Related to the case study, DFID claims that poverty is increasing in Southern Africa, and South Africa is rated as one of the most unequal countries in the world (2014a:5).

Nevertheless, as we have seen in the above preliminary results, there are some signs of a changing relationship between donor and recipient in the DFID development partnership with South Africa, and the DFID representative argues that ‘the relationship has moved to one of more equal partnership than donor-aid recipient’ (Interview 13th October 2017). It is therefore vital to examine whether the critique of development partnership discourses outlined above is true, or whether DFID’s development partnership does in fact challenge the coloniality and othering prevalent in ‘traditional’ development aid discourses. Discourses and understandings of the world order which help suppress more than half of the world’s population.

5.2 Obstacles: the prevalence of development discourses

Step two of Fairclough’s framework refers to the comprehensive analysis of obstacles to solving the problem. This requires looking at the prevalence of language, concepts and characteristics in the discourse, and the reproduction of the discourse itself. Thus, the objective of this subchapter is ‘to understand how the problem arises and how it is rooted in the way social life is organised’ (Fairclough 2003:209). In an attempt to understand why a certain understanding and discourse of
development ‘at some point gains dominance and is seen as authoritative’, while other understandings are silenced or discredited (Hajer 1993:44). However, the CDA also aims to investigate possible challenges to the problem, and analyse how these arises inside and outside of the discourse.

As described in Chapter III, within this step we find further categories and analytical strategies that need to be considered to paint a holistic picture of the construction of the discourse and what understandings it produces and reproduces. When analysing discourse, it is important to recognise the dominance and prevalence of certain linguistic patterns, actors, portrayals and concepts, but it is just as important to recognise that which is downplayed, omitted and excluded. This subchapter therefore investigates the development network and the science upholding the development partnership discourse, how the discourse is related to other practices, how it establishes particular truths, the context and intention of the discourse, and the dominant, resistant and different genres and discourses which protrudes within the partnership discourse. My research finds that although the discourse is challenging the image of Africa associated with the ‘imperial gaze’, it is still relying on depoliticised and dehistoricised theories, knowledges and histories of development. This, I argue, functions to produce histories that naturalise the colonial order of the world, and the discourse of DFID’s development partnership with South Africa. These justify and legitimise unequal development projects and relationships.

5.2.1 The development partnership network
The policy documents and interview transcripts with government officials chosen and conducted for this discourse analysis are located in ‘one practice within the network of practices which constitute government’ (Fairclough 2001:129). What is important to acknowledge, however, is the interconnectedness of governments and development aid departments with other governments, multilateral agencies and international organisations. Historically we can see from Chapter II that the development network is led largely by Western nations and international development organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the UN and the OECD.

The language of the policy papers on the new development partnership approach suggests that there has been an expansion in the networks, relations and ‘partnerships’. This is particularly evident with other bilateral donors, additional UK government departments, philanthropic foundations, businesses, and what DFID calls the ‘emerging powers’ (DFID 2014b:4-9). The World Bank, the IMF, the UN and the OECD, are explicitly mentioned in the policy papers. With regards to the latter, however, DFID’s development partnership approach is arguably changing the make-up of
the development network by expanding it to include South Africa, Brazil, India and China (DFID 2014b:7). These ‘emerging powers’ are according to the DFID representative ‘countries which play an increasing role in the growth and stability of other developing countries’, in addition to being ‘increasingly influential on global public goods’ (Interview 12th October 2017). According to DFID policy, this is what makes South Africa a ‘key ally’ for the UK in achieving development objectives (DFID 2014a:6).

The important question is whether the development partnership discourse is in fact contributing to a negation of ‘lopsided’ donor-recipient relationships and whether it challenges the coloniality of power (Lie 2015:724). What could be challenging the coloniality of power in the development network is expanding it to previously excluded actors, and the SAOP emphasises that a ‘successful response’ to the many development issues in South Africa requires reinforcing partnerships with South African institutions, civil society, organisations and the South African government (DFID 2014a:6). By working as ‘partners’ with SANT, SAT and SSN the development network appears to be expanding and allowing for more ‘local ownership’ of development.

5.2.2 The science of development partnerships
A prominent discourse such as the one on development partnership is alongside a network of practices constituted by a network of theories, knowledges and histories, as outlined in Chapter II. Discourse analysis is concerned with ‘the way knowledge is produced within a particular discourse through the use of distinctive language’ or the use of particular theories to explain and make sense of the world (Spencer et. al. 2003:200). In this section I analyse what science the development partnership discourse relies on and examine whether it challenges the othering and coloniality of knowledge as found in the ‘traditional’ development aid discourse.

A prominent story of development aid discourses, as pointed out in Chapter II, is the natural, depoliticised and dehistoricised history of ‘underdevelopment’. Although the language is not as crude, there is a perpetuation of a particular naturalised development trajectory in the development partnership discourse. There is a particular story line, as described by Winkel and Leipold. This is when agents create a particular narrative that interpret events in correlation with the policy discourse they want to convey and justify (2016:113). Through this, the partnership discourse continues to refer to a particular ‘development trajectory’ where countries are urged to ‘leave poverty behind’ and make sure populations are not left ‘behind’ (Interview 13th October 2017; DFID 2014a:2; DFID 2014b:4). Moreover, it states that South Africa still has a ‘long way to go’ in order to reach a particular status in the development telos (DFID 2014a:5). This creates a distancing in time,
which according to Fabian has been the strongest force of separating the subject from the object (1983). As we have seen in Chapter II, by categorising and placing societies on a ‘temporal slope’ where one is either at the forefront, on your way, or ‘stuck’ in the ‘back’, there is an emphasis of difference as distance, which was evident in the discourse that justified the colonial mission. South Africa is continuously referred to as an ‘emerging power’ (DFID 2014a; DFID 2014b), insinuating they are at least on ‘the way’ towards this ultimate stage of development. There is a continuation of the development trajectory, which places countries in a different time. Using the conceptual framework of the decolonial theorists abovementioned, one can interpret this as a naturalisation of time, which does not take into account the political and historical influences on this ‘difference’. In fact, the policy papers and interview transcripts depoliticising and dehistoricising South Africa’s poverty and inequalities by not mentioning the way in which historical events of colonialism and political structures of capital flight and trade relations have influenced the perceived lack of development. This silence is further discussed in the Linguistic Analysis below, as we have seen the goal of discourse inquiries and analysis is to reveal that understandings are not context-, culture- and history-free (Stetsenko and Arievitch 1997).

Similarly, we find that DFID policy is replete with language that refers to people, populations and countries as ‘the most vulnerable people, ‘poor people’, ‘the poorest’, ‘developing countries’, ‘poor countries’, ‘fragile and conflict areas’ (DFID 2014a:4-6; DFID 2014b:2-11; Interview 13th October 2017). To use Said’s terms, this places them on an invented geographical distinction (1978:5). The effect is that it categorises the difference between the rich, Western and ‘developed’ societies in the North, and the poor, ‘subaltern’ and ‘developing’ societies in the South, which has a clear othering effect. Even though this might not be intended, these subtle categorisations and distancing in space and time often result in the depicted lesser worth of some people, populations and countries (Said 1978:7). As pointed out by Glennie et. al., the framing of paternalistic concerns of ‘us’ helping ‘them’ in development aid discourses is sometimes used as a reason to distance the ‘problems’ of the ‘poor’ world (2012:23). Subsequently, as pointed out in Chapter II, the news media and other practices perpetuate the depiction of poverty and famine in ‘developing’ countries through pictures of ‘undifferentiated’ masses without personal characteristics, hence dehumanising people and individuals (Bleiker et. al. 2013). Referring to people as ‘poor people’ and ‘the poorest’ depicts them as an undifferentiated mass without individual histories, experiences and personal characteristics (Campbell 2011). Ultimately, this distancing through time and space denies mutuality of the aid donor and recipient, and points to Noxolo’s aforementioned argument, that the very word ‘partnership’ is hiding European paternalism and perpetuating racialised hierarchies (2006). The development partnership discourse is arguably upholding othering by relying on particular
representations that justifies foreign intervention. In fact, this paper later argues that development discourses ‘need’ othering to survive.

Although the economic growth model seems to be spearheading the development partnership approach, and the SAOP emphasises that ‘sustained economic growth’ will lead to a reduction in poverty and ultimately ‘progress’ towards development (DFID 2014a:5), the MDGs, SDGs and the ‘international’ human rights continue to accompany development measurements and requirements. Noxolo points out how the MDGs and later the SDGs have provided accounts of ‘universality of rights and needs’ after globalisation became a key theme (2006:260). When talking about South Africa’s development progress, the DFID representative says that the country ‘did well against a number of the MDG targets’, and that the MDGs are one of the important measures when it comes to development (Interview 13\textsuperscript{th} October 2017). This ‘universality’ of the development goals is also emphasised from the recipient’s point of view. For example, the SSN representative pointed out that the SDGs were an important framework to follow (Interview 20\textsuperscript{th} December 2017). Even though the interviewee is curious of the motivation ‘by which these agendas are being tagged and channelled’, he believed the SDGs provided ‘a nice kind of frame’ for development aid (Interview 20\textsuperscript{th} December 2017). It seems that, together with the economic growth model, these goals continue to dictate the development agenda across countries and contexts. Moreover, as they are constructed by a largely ‘Westernised’ and ‘Europeanised’ mandate one could argue these goals also uphold a Western knowledge hegemony on development aid. From the above analysis the study therefore finds that the development partnership discourse continue to rely on similar theories, knowledges and narratives as development aid discourses, and is in this way perpetuating othering and coloniality of knowledge. The particular language of the planning and implementation of DFID’s development partnership approach is further explored in the following sub-subchapter.

5.2.3 The discourse analysis

Turning now to the main part of the analysis: to critically analyse the particular language of the development partnership discourse evident in the policy papers and interview transcripts with relevant actors. This section investigates how the discourse is preserved and maintained by assessing the use of certain words and signs, and what is omitted. I investigate how the discourse is recontextualised, universalised, intertwined with other discourses, and what kind of semiosis is dominating the development partnership approach.
5.2.3.1 Structural analysis: recontextualisation of the discourse

Fairclough highlights the importance of recontextualisation when analysing discourses (2001:130). It is easy to isolate texts and events when analysing their importance and influence, but often this will be very limiting in providing a holistic understanding of the creation, strength, and survival of certain discourses. This is because discourses are neither produced nor reproduced in a vacuum. Recontextualisation refers to the way in which discourses and elements of social practices are appropriated, relocated and transformed in other discourses, therefore strengthening its validity, universality and authority (Fairclough 2003:32).

The development aid and partnership discourses’ social practices, concepts and language, as emphasised above, are entrenched and highly prevalent in other practices and discourses related to economic policy, political views and cultural practices. There has been a recontextualisation that upholds the strength of the discourse and the ‘underdevelopment’ narrative across disciplines, theories and understandings of the world like we saw with media, education and foreign policies in Chapter II. The following section assess what linguistic devices are used in the aim to ‘help countries to lift themselves out of poverty’ (DFID 2014a:4).

Another key point is the way that an aid recipient country, like South Africa, may adopt a certain colonial discourse. Indeed, there is evidence that indicates how the South African government and NGOs’ continue to frame and perpetuate the development partnership discourse. Something we need to consider is South African interest in the development partnership with the UK, as well as their own development discourse upholding this othering and knowledge hegemony. In addition to the trade and investment outlined in Chapter IV, there are benefits to categorising one’s country as ‘developing’ and ‘poverty-stricken’. In order to receive monetary assistance in the form of development aid ‘evidence of need’ must be presented and conceptualised, and the argument that the country cannot deal with this on its own.

An example of this was with the representative of SANT, a government official, who states that South Africa ‘definitely needs help from outside’ (Interview 1\textsuperscript{st} December 2017). Even though this research project focuses on the Western knowledge hegemony and othering of ex-colonial countries by the development discourses, one cannot ignore the othering from within the African continent and countries.\textsuperscript{13} The SANDP continuously refers to ‘developing’ countries, ‘lack’ and ‘barriers’ to growth (NPC 2012), and these characteristics are thus recontextualised in the South African national development discourse. Amadiueme would argue that this ‘othering’ from within

\textsuperscript{13} See Sharp and Boonzaier (1994) on the role-playing and modifying of identity according to context and instrumental value, using the example of the Nama in South Africa.
reflects the perpetuation of Europeanised education, cultural globalisation and even academia coming out of the African continent (1997). Through the all-encompassing nature of the hegemonic knowledge production, we are all trapped within a Eurocentric discourse relying on particular ‘truths’ as we have seen above in the science of development. An example of this is how the SAT representative continuously refers to the SDG agenda of leaving no one ‘behind’ (Interview 16th January 2018), and the development ‘universalities’ appear to influence the NGO development discourse. In fact, the SANT representative continues, arguing that DFID can help them with thought leadership, which includes ‘ideas, models, theories, processed and innovations that help to shift our mind-sets to be more effective’ (Interview 16th January 2017).

Contradicting this depiction, however, is the SSN representative’s argument that there are few examples of the South African government focusing on the SDG agenda (Interview 20th December 2017). Similarly, the SANDP recognises the influence of colonial legacy on geography in South Africa (NPC 2012:260), as well as the Presidency of Zuma and the politics of anti-Western positions within the ANC arguably presents a challenge to the UK and DFID’s influence on South Africa’s development.14 The SAT representative emphasises that they produce their own knowledge and data that they rely on for their development projects (Interview 16th January 2018). Although the discourse of DFID’s development partnership is widespread and prevalent, there is resistance to the ‘science’ of the development discourse from the South African government and NGOs.

5.2.3.2 Interactional analysis: the ‘truth’ of development strategies

Winkel and Leipold argues that the ‘art of policymaking is to establish a dominant political ‘truth’ that in turn legitimizes societal intervention strategies’ by the means of policies (2016:111). The interactional analysis thus refers to how language creates influence and looks at how the policy papers and transcripts from the interviews promote certain knowledge and establishes ‘political truths’ (Fairclough 2001). For example, as we have seen in Chapter II and the science of development partnerships above, dominant representations of developing nations have been certain ‘lacks’ and persistent poverty. Hence, the so-called ‘development aid industry’ can be seen to have ‘predictable linguistic characteristics’ which presents it as natural, apolitical, without socially responsible agents (Escobar 1995 and Ferguson 1994a). By presenting these narratives a certain way they become the ‘political truth’, or, a politically motivated account of a particular state of affairs,

14 See Matthee (2016:14-5) on South Africa’s shifting foreign policy in favour of a closer relationship with Russia and China in particular.
where the language used suggests that DFID is sustaining their expertise and legitimacy in the coloniality of knowledge on development partnerships.

When analysing the DFID policy papers on the development partnership approach in South Africa and the transcripts from interviews with involved actors, representations of certain universalities and politically motivated accounts appear. Particularly by looking out for words such as ‘ought’ and ‘should’ and their synonyms, and the domain of ‘is’ and ‘are’ (Fairclough 2001:131). The SAOP establishes some truths about development in South Africa and the region, highlighting that ‘sustained economic growth in the region is constrained by lack of access to energy and food, water insecurity and climate shocks’, and that lesson learning and regional co-operation ‘are also essential for dealing cost effectively with common issues facing the continent’ (DFID 2014a:5, emphasis added). It continues by saying that certain strategies ‘are critical to sustained and shared economic growth’, and that contributing factors to continuing inequalities in the region ‘are: weak and inefficient governance, inequality and lack of opportunity for women and girls, poor access to energy, and poorly diversified economies’ (DFID 2014a:5, emphasis added). By saying things is and are in particular ways, the papers establish politically motivated accounts and legitimises political action by DFID on these regional constraints. This is emphasised in Chapter II, looking at how development aid discourses have justified Western intervention by the thought that the ‘subaltern’ subject ‘lack’ certain ‘critical’ things to achieve development which the West could help out with (Chakrabarty 1992; Fabian 1983).

Similarly, and more plainly, the policy papers appear to establish expertise and legitimacy by arguing that ‘DFID is focused on spending in the right ways, on the right things, in the right places’ (DFID 2014a:4; 2014b:2). This insinuates there is only one way of doing development and that DFID are in the possession of knowing this right way. The use of ‘is’ and ‘are’, and saying there are some ‘right things’ to spend development aid funding on, depicts certain truths and universalities about development more broadly and South African development in particular. The continued referral to ‘internationally agreed principles for aid and development effectiveness’ and ‘global development goals’ also points to the universality of a certain development, not leaving room for questions or contextual particularities. This may be seen as upholding coloniality of knowledge and power by not allowing any room for questioning DFID’s expertise and the universality of ideas. As these policy papers are meant to influence ‘effective’ change and development, the need to universalise is not surprising, and the SSN representative questions how you as a development agency can suggest anything without sounding like you are imposing an agenda (Interview 20th December 2017). The interviewee continues; ‘how do you politely infer that there is an opportunity for change?’ (Interview 20th December 2017). Heron identifies colonial continuities in the practice of
development work through the depiction of African individuals needing saving and Western intervention (2007:35-6). And as I have emphasised above, Tamale points out how framing African cultures as different and inferior justified imperialist policies (2011).

5.2.3.3 Interdiscursive analysis: development partnerships for whom?

One way of locating the contextuality and interdiscursivity of the policy papers and interview transcripts is investigating what the texts are aiming to convey and for whom and why they are produced. Interdiscursive analysis, therefore, refers to how the development aid discourse relates to other discourses and the context in which it is set. As the policy papers are written and produced by DFID, it is not surprising that the main messages are about their development goals and objectives of reducing poverty and inequalities. They are political texts with the aim to make a ‘persuasive case’ about their development partnership programme (Fairclough 2001:133), and we find that the justification of government spending on development partnership programmes and their objectives are linked to at least two other discourses. These are: a national interest, and a trade and business discourse.

Although the DFID policy papers do not mention this, the people interviewed were quite direct in stating that the development partnership was indeed in the UK’s national interests. For example, DFID highlights that the development partnership is ‘an important contribution to the UK’s future role, including promotion of core international values and our national interest’ (Interview 12th October 2017). The interviewee also points out that aid spending in the national interest is the ‘right thing to do’, insinuating there is no alternative (Interview 13th October 2017). This is strikingly reminiscent of the Colonial Development Act of 1929 as pointed out in Chapter IV, which specified that funds were allocated only to projects that would result in gains and benefits for the UK. The emphasis on national interest can also be linked with the current political context where the election of Donald Trump as President of the US, and Brexit in the UK has signalled a move towards official political rhetoric emphasising national self-interests and xenophobia over international cooperation (Inglehart and Norris 2016:7). This is also emphasised by the SSN representative, saying that in recent years they have seen more clear linkages between bilateral donors’ national interest and what they are funding in the development aid sector (Interview 20th December 2017).

Secondly, the development partnership discourse appears to be interlinked with a discourse on trade and business. As we have seen above, South Africa is the UK’s largest trading partner in Africa and the UK is South Africa’s largest source of FDis (Hornsby and Black 2016). It thus might not come as a surprise that the DFID policy papers emphasise trade and trade expansion as critical for
economic growth and development (DFID 2014a:5), and the DFID representative points out that ‘effective international trade’ is one of their mutual interests and international priorities (Interview 13th October 2017). This is supported by the fact that SAT is highlighting international trade in their work, although focusing on trade being beneficial for the informal sector as well as the big companies (Interview 16th January 2018). Looking at the context of the papers this focus can be explained by the fact that the policy papers were published under the 2010-2015 Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government, where there are patterns of ‘right-wing’ governments historically placing more emphasis on trade and investment in relation to aid, as covered in Chapter IV. As pointed out by SSN, there is currently a shift towards aid for trade (Interview 20th December 2017), and the 2017 Economic Development Strategy highlights trade with new developing country partners as a priority of ‘building Global Britain’ (DFID 2017:4-5).

Moreover, the new development strategy has coincided with ‘Brexit’, and the rhetoric and politics of the ‘Leave campaign’, which focuses on trade expansion and business investment, and the ‘freedom’ from EU rules on trade with ‘developing’ countries (Rumney 2017). As the interviews revealed, it does indeed appear that the development partnership discourse is sustaining a coloniality of power. It is through the discourse of development partnership pushing for more trade and business that will benefit the UK government. Backstrand argues that sometimes the case of development partnerships is a ‘relocation and diffusion of authority from government to public-private’ networks of implementation, thus providing even less autonomy and power to the recipient country (Backstrand 2006:290). Contradicting this, the DFID representative argues that Brexit has had no influence on the implementation or direction of the development partnership to South Africa (Interview 12th October 2017). Something that would be interesting to explore further is whether it was a coincidence that the decision to end aid to South Africa was the same year as the agreement with South Africa to double trade (DFID 2014a; Vines 2013). Could one argue that the development partnership is only providing a new terminology to further and legitimise more specific focus on trade and investment, and expanding the development discourse to include businesses as seen above?

5.2.3.4 Linguistic analysis: dominant, different and resistant genres

As this study seeks to analyse whether the development partnership discourse is perpetuating othering and coloniality inherent in development aid discourses by looking at DFID’s approach with South Africa, the particular language and semiosis are fundamental. As emphasised in both the above chapters, discourse is related to how one perceive and produce particular understandings of
the world. The emergence of the discourse of development partnerships as opposed to aid can be understood as a way of accommodating what DFID refers to as a ‘changing world’ (2016b:20), and the GPDOP points out that the ‘context in which DFID operates is changing rapidly’ (DFID 2014b:2).

The next section considers two additional dominant genres within the development partnership discourse, namely mutual cooperation and capacity building. These represent what Gardner and Lewis would call ‘resistant’ or ‘different’ genres within the discourse, which can contribute to change, problematizing and overturn of ‘dominant paradigms’ (2000:16). Finally, it dedicates one subchapter to what is not said, or silenced, in this particular development partnership discourse.

5.2.3.4.1 Partnerships for mutual cooperation

We have seen in Chapter II that the representation and construction of the world has changed from being different categories of human as colonisers and colonised, to living in different worlds and finally being the complete or incomplete form of development. However, through CDA of the interview transcripts and policy papers it appears that the ‘partnership’ is signalling another shift. The observed shift is to a relationship characterised by mutuality, as mutual agents together tackling this ‘universal challenge’ of poverty and inequality.

SANT recognises that the development partnership can help South Africa in ‘significant ways’ and that it in fact ‘strengthens’ and ‘enables’ institutions to better do development programmes and projects (Interview 1st December 2017). As emphasised by Abrahamsen, development partnerships are often presented as ‘a way of giving recipient countries ownership of their development programmes’ (2004:1453), and the development partnership discourse seems to be living up to this. The SSN representative argues that DFID is ‘being very careful to toe the line between even making suggestions to particular approaches that South Africa could take’ (Interview 20th December 2017), and the SAT representative claimed that they have more freedom in terms of ‘implementing our own strategies’ (Interview 16th January 2017). Similarly, the SANT representative emphasises that the partnership contributes to them having greater influence on priorities and programmes, and that it is more collaborative and participatory than the former approach (Interview 1st December 2017). When it comes to knowledge sharing and cooperation, the SAT representative says that one of their main responsibilities is producing knowledge and data from below before setting out a development agenda, and that DFID values this knowledge they bring to the development projects (Interview 16th January 2018).
The above findings point to some resistant discourses emerging from within the development partnership discourse itself, denying what the decolonial theory would call the coloniality of power. It is also challenging the ‘imperial gaze’ by not telling the NGOs what to do. Hence, the partnership discourse is also representing a more ‘collaborative’ relationship between Western donors and ‘developing’ countries on the African continent, which has been seen to be affecting the type of projects conducted, the people undertaking those projects, and the language with which Africa, and the ‘Global South’ is depicted.

5.2.3.4.2 Capacity building and ownership of development

Alongside ‘mutuality’, what appears to be at the forefront of the development partnership discourse is the focus on capacity building. Although the definition of capacity building is widely discussed and contested (Kaplan 2000:517), it is clear from the discourse analysis that it refers to helping another country help itself. DFID argues that they invest their development aid in order to ‘help countries to lift themselves out of poverty and leave poverty behind’ (DFID 2014a:4). In general we find DFID’s emphasis on helping developing countries ‘build’ particular environments, institutions and ‘enable governments’ (DFID 2014a). It refers to DFID’s work to ‘strengthen bodies’, and the ‘support to national efforts’, all to ‘help’ countries ‘solve their own development challenges’ (DFID 2014a:4-6). The SANT, SAT and SSN all work in ‘capacity building’ projects meant to enhance the capabilities of public sector officials and provide institutional capability building to better deal with development challenges (Interview 1st December 2017; 20th December 2017; 16th January 2018).

This indicates an empowering approach, and Martinussen points out that capacity building in relation to development aid originated in the 1960s and 1970s as a variation of human development and as an attempt to reduce ethnocentrism (1997:41). It is about supporting a country in becoming independent in tackling its own development challenges, and insinuates that it will eventually lead to complete withdrawal of the donor and partnership country. Nevertheless, one should caution against the view that this approach wholly escapes the coloniality of knowledge, one that assumes that DFID knows what needs to be done whilst South Africa does not. Similarly, by saying they will help ‘enable government’ (DFID 2014a:6), and support the South African government ‘to address its own poverty’, indicate they are ‘teaching’ the sovereign and independent government on what Foucault refers to as governmentality: the problems and answers to ‘how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being
governed, how to become the best possible governor’ (Foucault 2001:202). As UK colonial history has time and again been about choosing leaders or dictating how to govern (Mamdani 1996:7), this focus on good governance signifies both coloniality of knowledge and power, as well as othering by insinuating the South African government needs assistance in the governance of its own country.

5.2.3.4.3 Depoliticisation and dehistoricisation

As emphasised in Chapter III, it is important to consider both the dominant and the excluded or silenced discourses, genres and styles. As I have pointed out in the above subchapters, the development partnership discourse is perpetuating a general depoliticising and dehistoricising of development in general and South Africa in particular. The reliance on particular development aid theories, knowledges and historical context, as we have seen above, upholds not only a Western hegemony of knowledge, but also the ‘truth’ of a naturally unequal world which devalues, omits and silences African coloniality of being and colonial experiences. By not mentioning alternative theories and histories of development, the development partnership discourse is furthermore perpetuating the knowledge hegemony and justifying lopsided donor-recipient relationships. The fact that some are more developed, more powerful and richer than ‘others’ is naturalised and the impact of centuries of extraction of resources, slave trade and unfair trade is simply silenced.16

5.2.4 Conclusion on the subchapter

Although within DFID’s development partnership approach there are elements of substantial change and a paradigm shift, the discourse is simultaneously perpetuating the kind of language that has historically justified and legitimised colonialism and slavery. We can see from the analysis that the representatives involved in the development partnership implementation depend on DFID and international standards, development measures and ‘expertise’ for monitoring and explaining development in South Africa. Therefore, from this, one may assert that the development partnership discourse does continue to perpetuate a coloniality of knowledge on development aid and with it comes the portrayal of the ‘universality’ of development agendas and challenges in the ‘Global South’. The discourse continue to rely on a naturalised history of development and places South

16 For a broader conceptual debate on silencing particular historical events, see Trouillot on the ‘unthinkable’ Haitian revolution which has been silenced as it did not fit the particular historical narrative we depend on to explain the world (1995:70-107).
Africa on the dehistoricised development trajectory, which has historically been used to deem some countries ‘incomplete’ and characterised by lacks.

The development discourse appears to be expanding to include businesses and increased trade, and the questionable intention and motivation behind this encourages some further research. This is linked with the emerging national interest discourse, where Western governments are more transparent about the link between development aid and national interests. The naturalised trajectory supports the recurrent representation of some people and countries as less developed, civilised, modern and sometimes even less worth or human, and this continue to justify development aid and partnership interventions defined by coloniality and othering. The question remains whether it is possible to imagine development aid discourses that does not perpetuate this coloniality and othering.

5.3 The ‘need’ for hierarchies and underdevelopment
This thesis set out to explore whether the development partnership discourse of DFID’s development approach to South Africa is perpetuating coloniality and othering. It also wanted to investigate the ‘science’ the discourse relies on, how it has been recontextualised and finally if we can imagine decolonial development discourses and or if they need coloniality and othering. This section will examine the latter, and Fairclough points out the importance of considering whether the social order ‘needs’ the problem one is analysing (2001:134). I will argue that it does. The above analysis shows that the emphasis on the ‘evidence of need’ combined with DFID’s argued development ‘expertise’ is needed to justify and legitimise the development partnership and DFID’s intervention.

The fact is that there would be no development industry without ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘developing’ countries. Without the story of development where some countries are further ‘behind’ on the trajectory, trying to achieve certain ‘development goals’ to become more like the ‘developed’ countries, the development industry would not be legitimised, and the ‘international system’ would have to be reimagined. Although the development partnership discourse appears to be moving towards greater ‘mutual’ cooperation, it perpetuates the binaries. Without the argument that South Africa is characterised by its status as ‘developing’ with certain lacks and defined by a strong evidence of need that cannot be tackled alone, there would be no point of the UK’s development aid or partnership programme. Othering and coloniality of knowledge are thus necessary for the survival of the development aid and partnership industry. Development partnership discourses, like
development aid discourses, therefore do not allow for mutuality. The development partnership discourse ‘needs’ the problem of coloniality and othering.

Another argument that is worth considering is that the coloniality of power ‘needs’ the development aid industry and discourses. As has been pointed out in Chapter II, since colonialism the world has been characterised by a colonial hierarchy. This is a power structure where the Western ex-colonial powers have remained on top of the hierarchy, are deemed superior to the ex-colonised ‘Southern’ countries, which have remained on the ‘bottom’ defined by inferiority (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). As pointed out by Foucault, to understand and internalise things into unconscious knowledge there is a need to empirically ‘order’ things (2002:xxii). As emphasised in Chapter II, there is a need for an opposite to define oneself, and without the native, slave and bondsman, the ‘central values of the West are difficult to imagine’ (Feierman 1993:185). You cannot understand what ‘modern’ means without knowing and defining its opposite ‘traditional’. The current colonial order of the world could not be justified or legitimised without a ‘naturalised’ history of development where asymmetrical trade relations, extreme amounts of IFFs, resource extraction and the money maker machine the development industry has been and continues to be (Tamale 2011:34), are seen as simple side-effects of the global, altruistic and critical mission to alleviate poverty.

5.4 Main findings

From the above analysis the main results can be divided into three categories. Firstly, the development partnership discourse is perpetuating a naturalised development trajectory, and dehistoricises and depoliticises the ‘story’ of development and ‘underdevelopment’. By silencing the impacts of colonialism and current capital flight, the discourse is framing South Africa’s status as ‘developing’ as something natural, where instead of dealing with continued colonial hierarchies and extraction, the solution is national policies of economic growth and Western bilateral development aid. Secondly, although it implies mutuality and a change in the relationship between donor and recipient, the development partnership discourse is making use of binaries like ‘developing’, referring to ‘lack’ and dehumanising representations such as ‘poor people’ and ‘the poor’. The discourse is perpetuating othering and distancing through time and space, and is subsequently justifying lopsided power relations and a coloniality of power, similarly to how we have seen colonialism was framed as civilising missions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). This framing has also been recontextualised in other discourses such as news media, hence becoming hegemonic. Finally, I have found that the imperial gaze inherent in development aid discourses is being challenged from within the partnership discourse itself. By focusing on the production of new knowledge and data in
Southern Africa, allowing for ownership of development strategies and providing ‘mutual’ cooperation as emphasised by the recipient representatives acknowledged in this research, the development partnership discourse is opening up the development network, challenging the science of development and the imperial gaze. As emphasised by Gardner and Lewis, this can contribute to the change and overturn of ‘dominant paradigms’ (2000:16), and we might see practice influencing discourse.

Chapter VI

Concluding remarks

This thesis departed with the problem statement that probed whether the official discourse surrounding DFID’s current development partnership with South Africa is perpetuating othering and coloniality. Drawing on decolonial theory that has become prominent in some circles today, othering, has been characterised as the linguistic distancing through notions of time, space and knowledge production, and subsequently, the establishment of difference between subjects by invoking the language of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This othering often relies on race and origin of birth, and posits some individuals and populations as being more valuable than ‘others’. Coloniality has been explained as the continuation of colonial forms of domination, such as through the language and policies that echo colonial attributes, and has been referred to as the coloniality of power, knowledge and being. I have cited literature that claim that Western powers maintain their superiority over the ‘Global South’ through the coloniality of power.

In order to examine the extent to which this is evident in a contemporary example, the study relied on a CDA applied to two DFID policy papers and four transcribed interviews with actors involved with the implementation of the partnership. This CDA has particularly focused on the ways in which the development partnership discourse is supported by a particular ‘science’ and how it is interconnected with other discourses. I asked for whom and why the discourse have been produced and how it has been recontextualised in the operating of other sectors in international and domestic contexts.

The assessment revealed a more nuanced approach to development, as conceptualised by representatives of South African NGOs and government involved in the partnership and DFID staff. The analysis suggest that the development partnership discourse, as a shift from the discourse of
development aid, is challenging the ‘imperial gaze’ and the implementation of partnership projects appears to be signalling a move towards a more ‘mutual’ and less colonial donor-recipient relationships. However, through the language and semiosis analysis, and using examples of othering and coloniality in development aid discourses pointed out in Chapter II, this research was able to locate clear examples of othering and coloniality. This was evident in the way that South Africa would still be referred to in a way that naturalised its development trajectory. The development partnership discourse was also seen to rely on particular binaries to sustain itself. Therefore one may assert that the mutuality principle is not as mutual in practice as the term development partnership suggests. I elaborate on these findings in three parts.

Firstly, the CDA found that the history of South Africa’s development, and development more broadly, is naturalised, or more correctly, dehistoricised and depoliticised. The development partnership discourse is perpetuating a particular history of development through its silence on the history of colonialism and extraction, the current geopolitical relations and the evidence of exploitation and capital flight. The silence also extends to the impact the UK have had on unequal ‘progress’ and ‘development’ in South Africa. Hence, it may be seen to be justifying and legitimising the ‘natural’ coloniality of power and colonial/racial hierarchies (Grosfoguel 2008:12). The development partnership discourse is continuing the view of a development trajectory where political interests and the effects of history attached to it is diminished and silenced. It has also been argued that the ‘science’ upholding the development partnership discourse ought to be viewed with caution, as there are evident terms that perpetuate a coloniality of knowledge as, on the one hand, they continue to frame Western development strategies and theories as ‘universal’, whilst at the same time, do not acknowledge alternative knowledges of development within their official development approach. Thus, in a sense, rather than what the discourse is saying, what is not being said is what is perpetuating coloniality and othering.

Secondly, the discourse of DFID’s development partnership with South Africa, instead of signalling a move towards a relationship based on mutuality, is perpetuating othering. By using binaries and referring to South Africa as ‘developing’, on the ‘trajectory’ and of people and governments as being left ‘behind’, it is upholding a difference and distance between an ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is placing South Africa and the South African population on Fabian’s metaphorical ‘temporal slope’ and magnifying difference. The discourse is negating mutuality by insinuating that some countries and people are ‘complete’ whilst others are only ‘on their way’ to becoming complete or ‘developed’. This framing of difference justifies Western intervention in the ‘Global South’, which has been framed as subordinate, and perpetuates a view of the world where some are
more valuable and more human than ‘others’. It is instead of moving towards mutuality, perpetuating a *denial of coevalness*, to use Fabian’s term (1983).

Finally, the research project has found that whilst there is indeed a perpetuation of othering and coloniality, there is also some resistance coming from within the discourse, challenging and problematising the ‘inherent’ imperial gaze of development aid discourses. Although the development partnership discourse perpetuates the Western hegemony of knowledge and relies on particular ‘universal truths’ about development aid and partnerships, the actors involved in the partnership are challenging and problematising this trend. By letting the local NGOs have more decision-making power and produce their own knowledge DFID appears to be deconstructing the hegemony of knowledge production and the imperial gaze. By emphasising the need for pursuing own strategies and producing own data, the recipients of the partnership are pushing the discourse to open up to different realities and measurements, and challenging the *universality* of development knowledge. The development partnership discourse is being challenged from within which suggests ways in which coloniality and othering may be changing towards a more ‘mutual’ development partnership.

The call for decolonisation remains a pressing one among decolonial scholars. This study suggests that one way to pursue this would be to trace the extent to which othering and coloniality is evident in contemporary discourses and policies, using tools such as CDA. I found that there remain elements in the development partnership discourse that continue to reproduce certain binaries that were instrumental in colonial projects of knowledge production and conquest. I have shown ways in which these processes may be recontextualised in new settings, and in different discourses, such as those attached to news media, art and education. By being able to identify these emergent patterns, one may be in a more strategic position to redesign policies into countering coloniality and othering. We find ourselves in a context of Trump, Brexit and Western powers establishing power by clearly setting their national agenda first and pursuing xenophobic foreign policy discourses. Simultaneously, we find ourselves in the context of #BlackLivesMatter, #RhodesMustFall and #MeToo, emerging liberation and decolonising movements challenging the power structures in society, which are claimed to be ‘invisible’. We therefore seem to be at a turning point where we can decide what practices will influence discourse, where one place to start is interrogating colonial relationships of exchange, and promoting ones that can produce more equity and self-determination, perpetuating depictions of co-humanness and coevalness.
Bibliography


Afonja, S. (2005) Gender and Feminism in African Development Discourse, Indiana: Indiana University Institute for Advanced Study


BMZ (2017) Africa and Europe – A new partnership for development, peace and a better future, Bonn: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development


DFID (2014b) Operational Plan 2011-2016 Global Partnerships Department, London: Department for International Development


Fanon, F (1952) Black Skin, White Masks, France: Editions de Seuil


Anthropology, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 15-29


Moyo, D. (2009) *Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux


UN (2001) Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration. Report of the Secretary-General (A/56/326), New York: The UN General Assembly


Appendix

Semi-structured interviews with, when, where:
DFID Development Partnership Unit Representative, 12th and 13th October 2017, Pretoria
SANT Representative, 1st December 2017, Pretoria and Cape Town
SSN Representative, 20th December 2017, London and Cape Town
SAT Representative, 16th January 2018, Pretoria and Cape Town

Appendix A: Interview discussion guide

1. Can you briefly outline your most important work in South Africa?
   a. What are your main objectives and goals?
2. How will you define development?
   a. What would you say are South Africa’s main ‘development challenges’?
   b. What measurements and data do you use?
3. Do you believe South Africa need help or assistance from outside to reach this development?
   a. What do you believe should be the role of Western donors and organisations such as DFID when it comes to South Africa’s development?
   b. Can you tell me about DFID’s development partnership?
4. How will you define capacity-building?
5. What are the most effective institutions for development in South Africa?
6. How would you describe your relationship with DFID/the Southern Africa Trust/the South African Government/South South North?
   a. Will you say the relationship changed with the transition to development partnerships?
   b. How did the transition to development partnership influence your work?
   c. How closely does DFID monitor your work and the money flow?
7. What civil society organisations do you work the closest with?
   a. How were these chosen?
8. What do you think should be the role of the private sector in influencing development policies?
9. How do you foresee the future of the development partnership?