The Kavango-Zambezi Conservation Area (KAZA) and its dynamics in Zambia

Research Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of MSc in Environmental and Geographical Science

By

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) have emerged as one of the 21st century’s contemporary approaches to management of natural resources which span the borders of two or more countries. Robust arguments exist that boundaries hamper the conservation objectives of migratory species. On the basis of the claimed potential of TFCAs to reconcile the conservation and economic development objectives of nations through tourism, TFCAs have been widely embraced in Southern Africa as a model for governing shared resources. TFCAs in Southern Africa have been motivated by both ecological and socio-economic factors, TFCAs are also politically motivated. This study uses the lens of political ecology to understand the motivation of Zambia’s participation in the Kavango–Zambezi TFCA (KAZA TFCA). KAZA TFCA is one of the largest TFCAs in the world and is said to be home to the largest number of the remaining African elephants (approximately 120,000).

This five-country TFCA spans large rural landscapes that are a potential site for extensive tourism and currently provide livelihood opportunities for many poor rural households. This study assesses the investments of Zambia’s government in the KAZA TFCA. It uses the case study of Simalaha Community Conservancy in the Western Province of Zambia to examine the implications of the KAZA TFCAs on the local population in the conservancy. The research uses semi-structured interviews, field observations and secondary data to advance an argument that TFCAs do not always yield positive gains for both governments and local communities. Gains depend on several factors, such as level of development of a country, level of tourism development and the preparedness of a participating nation to invest in and benefit from a TFCA. The study establishes that KAZA is an unequal investment landscape, with Zambia being one of the lesser investors in the KAZA TFCA. In addition, the notion that the TFCA model embodies the poverty reduction objectives meant to benefit local populations is contestable as the KAZA on the Zambian side (Simalaha community) has not improved the welfare of the local people.
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<td>Community Based Natural Resource Management</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
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<td>DNPW</td>
<td>Department of National Parks and Wildlife</td>
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<td>GLTP</td>
<td>Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<td>IUCN</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

There is a growing body of work and policy debates on the formation and role of transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) in transforming the conservation landscape in Southern Africa. Governments support TFCAs in the form of monetary contribution, release of land for TFCA formation and in technical resourcing. However, while it is said that the Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA in Southern Africa is the largest TFCA in the world, there are no guarantees that it would bring development in Southern Africa as the proponents of TFCAs claim. Major efforts to align nature conservation policies have been drafted and protocols signed to pave the way for TFCAs in Southern Africa, but countries continue to have different priorities and legal positions on important conservation efforts and tourism development initiatives. Furthermore, the role and capacity of the state in promulgating and implementing nature conservation policies to ensure sustainable development remain questionable in Southern Africa.

In nature conservation programmes in Southern Africa, the state is often viewed as a weak institution which has failed to deliver on its mandate to conserve biological diversity (Ramutsindela, 2008). In relation to this, scholars have made many accusations against the state, including the view that states issue licenses to private companies and bankroll polluters. The state has further been accused of favouring and working with private sectors and donors in projects which degrade the environment (Brubaker, 1995; Ramutsindela, 2008). Thus, states have no capacity to regulate powerful polluters such as transnational corporations (TNCs). On the contrary, it can be argued that since time immemorial, environmental issues have always been at the heart of the state. In its quest to protect the environment, the state comes up with policies and legislation. Similarly, the Zambian government, like other states, enacted several pieces of legislation and policies which include: Environmental Management Act number 12 of 2011, National Policy on Environmental of 2007, Forestry Act Number 4 of 2015, Fisheries Act number 22 of 2011, and Water Resource Management Act Number 21 of 2011, among others.

All these instruments are essential in regulating the uses and access to resources in order to protect the environment. Thus, Peluso (1993) argues that states drive conservation efforts and have the
capacity, internal legitimacy and will to manage and control the resources within their boundaries. Ideally, this is reflected in different environmental management approaches which have been adopted in order to redress the problem of biodiversity loss and preserve important ecosystems, thereby preserving threatened wildlife. As discussed below, the conservation sector has witnessed changes in environmental management which have necessitated shifts in power relations among the stakeholders involved, including the state, donors and local communities, among others. The actors are involved in power struggles as they seek to control access and ownership of key natural resources such as wildlife, water and land, among others. Thus, these dynamics can best be understood through the lens of political ecology, for reasons discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation. In relation to the foregoing arguments, Durand points out that:

Any discourse on wildlife tends to be about social relationships…thus, in conservation power acts within social structures that both allow and restrict human agency. As individuals and groups take part in social relations by mobilizing their identity and other resources, they reshape, transform and reproduce the web of power (Durand 2019:23)

Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis was on fortress conservation, characterized by an exclusionary approach (Vaccaro and Beltran, 2013). This model entailed creation and expansion of more protected areas; it became common but most extensive form of environmental conservation (Adams, 2003; 2004; Johannesen, 2006; Hutton et.al, 2011). Central to this kind of conservation in Africa is the moral question of separating human beings from their natural resources which is the basis for their survival (Adams, 2004). This is because where it has been implemented the local people are displaced from their land and access to natural resources is restricted, leading to both economic and cultural losses (Dowie, 2009). In addition to this, Sinthumule (2019) argues that TFCAs tend to promote conservation and commercial enterprises while the local people’s needs are overlooked. Thus, this approach to conservation is viewed by some scholars as a manifestation of neoliberal conservation (Buscher & Dietz, 2005; Fletcher, 2010; Buscher, 2013).Given the inadequacies of fortress conservation models that include small geographical coverage, loss of ecosystems due to fragmentation continues to be a major challenge in Southern Africa(Western 2002; Adams 2004).Fortress conservation was also accused of favouring the interests of the elites at international, national and community levels alike (Duffy
This implies that the fortress conservation approach underplayed the importance of local community participation in conservation.

As such, this approach has been vulnerable to damaging critiques because it ignores the fact that local communities and wildlife have co-existed for many years (Dowie, 2009). It assumes that human beings are enemies of conservation, therefore the opening up of political borders for wildlife to roam freely results in the creation of borders between the local people and nature. Given this important practical lapse in the conceptual and practical design and execution of a protected areas approach to conservation, the approach is seen as a threat to the survival, human rights and wellbeing of indigenous people. In relation to the above, Murphree (2002:2) argues that “the old narrative of fortress conservation' was largely displaced by the counter-narrative of development through community conservation and sustainable use.” Hence the shift to community-based environmental conservation (CBC) in the 1980s and 1990s, where the state decentralized natural resource management and the local communities were in charge of controlling and managing the natural resources.

However, the local communities were seen to be ineffective in conserving wildlife and biodiversity and hence the need for a more robust approach to conservation, which separates local people from wildlife (Büscher, 2005). There has been a call for conservation approaches which do not only protect biodiversity but also alleviate poverty. Scholars have therefore called for an approach which draws conservation and development together (Jeanrenaud, 2002). This left the conservationists without any choice but to shift back to the barriers in place in the late 1990s. This gave back the power to control and manage natural resources to the states. In this case, states have the mandate to defend, control and manage threatened natural resources. Thus, conservationists and states endeavour to find approaches which simultaneously achieve conservation objectives and economic development. In this context, economic development is understood as the improvement in the living standards of the local people, improved infrastructure and increased revenue for the country, among other things, as a result of the growth of the tourism sector. As such, this kind of approach is thought to be a way of promoting sustainable development and reconciling nature with cultural, economic and social advancement brought about by increased
income through tourism (Ramutsindela, 2004). However, most of the countries’ natural resources are not border-bound but, rather, often transcend political boundaries.

Therefore, the argument for the establishment of TFCA has been that conservation of natural resources requires transnational management because the resources are not restricted by national borders, and their effective management requires international co-operation (Ferreira, 2004; Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008). Munthali (2007) describe Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) as a part or components of a larger eco-region that straddles the border between two or more countries, encompassing one or more protected areas as well as multiple resource areas for the use of communities and private landholders, managed for sustainable use of natural resources. Other scholars refer to peace parks as large conservation areas which straddle states’ political boundaries with the purpose of saving biological diversity, enhancing local community welfare and promoting peace and cooperation among the member states (Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016). Proponents of TFCA, or peace parks, argue that transboundary natural resource management is better at achieving the conservation objectives than isolated protected areas (Ramutsindela, 2014). Some scholars have argued that TFCA may not produce tangible results because they are too ambitious (Rusinga and Mapira, 2012) and “informed by a disparate array of discourses – anarchist, scientific, romantic, managerial and neoliberal – and bound up with an equally disparate range of environmental, economic and political agendas” (Wolmer, 2003:2). Based on claims of high capacities of straddling state boundaries as a means to achieve conservation objectives, as explained in Chapter Two, the TFCA approach has received strong endorsements in Southern Africa. Consequently, at the core of TFCA is the drive to transform international borders and transnational spaces into a borderless landscape (Fall, 2003; Noe, 2012; Ramutsindela, 2014). This will allow free movement of wildlife across political borders. Proponents argue that TFCA provide a holistic approach to managing complex drivers of biodiversity loss in Southern Africa and providing lasting solutions to diverse poor rural communities living close to the TFCA. Thus, unlike the protected areas approach, TFCA in Southern Africa represent a nexus for conservation and development (Ramutsindela, 2007).

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) influence member states to participate in TFCA based on the TFCA’s claimed benefits. While the
SADC largely sees TFCAs as a mechanism to influence its objectives in terms of conservation of natural resources and regional integration, PPF raises funds to form and manage TFCA in Southern Africa. Thus, through overarching regional conservation policy objectives and financing arrangements, both the SADC and PPF have a direct influence on the architecture and functioning of TFCAS in the region. As such TFCAs are increasingly being embraced by various actors in Southern Africa, ranging from states, political leaders, local communities, nature conservation officials, border officials, conservation and tourism organizations, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, the private sector Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), among others (Duffy, 2006; Adam & Hume, 2001). This is mostly in recognition of TFCA’s scales, which are capable of conserving biodiversity while at the same time achieving socioeconomic development and promoting a culture of peace (Hanks, 2003; Ramutsindela, 2004). Participating states invest huge portions of land among other investments. However, it is important to note that some parts of land reserved for conservation is already occupied by people. Therefore, the creation of and investments in TFCAs has implications for the local people. Although TFCAs are said to reconcile both conservation efforts and development, the benefits of conservation do not always trickle down to the local people (Ramutsindela, 2004) as seen in the continued poverty among the people living near the parks. As indicated above, the role of the state is cardinal because cross border resource management brings to the fore issues of sovereignty and national security (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016).

The adoption of transboundary solutions due to the transboundary nature of environmental problems, has led to the emergence of what Duffy (2006) refers to as global environmental governance. Global environmental governance shifts conservation responsibilities from the states to non-state entities and complex, non-territorial global networks of international financial institutions such as the World Bank international organizations and environmental NGOs (Duffy, 2006 Duffield, 2014). Thus, this approach has been criticised for only concentrating the benefits of conservation through tourism in the hands of a few elites. Similarly, Terborgh (2004) argues that conservation fails to achieve development due to political instability, power abuses and corruption, among others, by the government and international organizations. In relation to this, Zimparks (2011) argues that despite TFCAs gaining in popularity, their implementation on the ground remains difficult, especially in relation to delivering benefits to local people.
Therefore, for the local population to see and enjoy the benefits, conservation farming has been introduced in TFCAs. Incorporation of conservation farming is a 21st century entrant in TFCAs in Southern Africa. This is an idea that is spearheaded and implemented by non-governmental organizations, with the blessing of the state. This is because conservation farming is a quicker way of improving farm productivity, food security and profits among the poorest communities in these states. Conservation farming has been recommended as a solution to low agricultural produce and TFCA proponents1 have started to portray conservation farming as a ‘quick win’ in TFCA projects (Haggblade & Tembo, 2003; Haggblade and Zulu, 2003; Arslan, et al., 2014).

1.2 Problem statement

Over recent years, there has been an increasing coalition of interest in Southern Africa for management of natural resources that transcend political boundaries (Wolmer, 2003; Munthali, 2007; Ramutsindela 2007; Anderson et al., 2013). To this effect, huge amounts of international and national financing have been pumped into TFCAs. Investments have included human resource development and the signing of treaties and IDPs among the participating countries. As such, TFCAs have been presented as a win-win situation between conservation and the local populations (Murphy, 2010). TFCAs are also seen as a vehicle for economic growth, peace and security among member states. TFCAs are promoted as a way of eliminating conflict over natural resources and to cooperatively encourage sustainable economic development (Duffy, 2005).

Transborder management of resources requires a clear understanding among participating countries. In relation to this, Metcalfe and Kepe (2008:99) argue that “conservation of natural resources across borders requires governance across a tenurial mosaic of managerial units based on reconciliation of social, economic, and ecological objectives.” In addition, the implementation of TFCAs requires vast portions of land for wildlife mobility. Thus, some scholars have argued that large scale conservation promotes tourism, an economic argument that has raised the policy profile and popularity of TFCAs in the recent past (Anderson et al., 2013; Munthali, 2007; Ramutsindela 2007; Wolmer, 2003). Similarly, some scholars have posited that conservation of natural resources that transcend boundaries poses both a challenge and an opportunity for fostering security, stability, peace, international corporation and socio-economic growth (Ali, 2003; Hanks,

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In this regard, TFCAs are seen to reconcile environmental conservation and development agendas. Adenle (2012) argues that for developing countries in Africa, conservation and wise use of biodiversity is cardinal in fostering development. Some scholars have questioned the role and credibility of TFCAs in fostering local and national development in regions like Africa (Katerere et al., 2001; Wolmer, 2003; Duffy, 2006; Ramutsindela, 2007; Buscher, 2013).

Proponents of TFCAs argue that TFCA projects will lead to economic and social development, through job creation because tourism is cited as one of the fastest growing industries (Van der Linde et al., 2001; Sandwith et al., 2001; Hanks, 2003). However, in most parts of Southern Africa where TFCAs have been implemented, such benefits have not yet materialized (Anderson et al, 2013; Chenje & Johnson , 1994). A critical review of literature (Wolmer, 2003; Ramutsindela, 2004; Hughes, 2005; Duffy, 2016) indicates that TFCAs represent ‘green imperialism’ where nature is commodified and sold to the wealthy and powerful, under the guise of conservation. This works to satisfy the interests of a few elites in the tourism business, leading to what may be called privatization of natural resources out of the hands of the less powerful and often vulnerable local communities to a few networked and powerful elites. Thus, TFCAs have disadvantages the people for whom they are designed to save. In relation to this Ramutsindela (2004) argues that most of the rural communities situated adjacent to conservation areas live in absolute poverty, there are no indications of the promised benefits of conservation (Chiutsi and Saarinen, 2017). Similarly, Benjaminsen, et al., (2006) argue that conservation pushes the poor into absolute poverty by grabbing the natural resources on which they previously depended on. Dzingirai (2004) sees TFCAs as CBNRM at large, as a way of disenfranchising transfrontier communities by reducing their traditional access and control over resources. TFCAs shift the ownership of resources such as communal land on which community livelihoods depend to states and private business. Some scholars argue that TFCAs have made the rural communities more vulnerable by undermining the community based natural resources (Wolmer, 2003; Hutton, et al., 2005; Munthali, 2007). For Ramutsindela (2004: 62) TFCAs represent a form of:

Glocalization, where traditional scalar boundaries are muddled and, importantly, actors are able to function on multiple scales simultaneously. … he sees the growth of TFCAs in the region (Southern Africa) as born of …the quest for global stewardship over, and… growing
commercial interest in, biodiversity, and…facilitated by post-apartheid (postcolonial) political, socioeconomic and historical circumstances that cannot effectively be reduced to particular scales.

Therefore, TFCAs emphasize war, not peace. This is because areas earmarked for peace parks are not empty spaces but, instead, spaces filled with multiple networks that are equally interested in access and control of the resources in the area. This state of affairs leads to conflict and may result in violence and ‘bloodshed’ when the state uses excessive force to evict the occupants or original settlers. Furthermore, the exacerbation of inter-state differences induced by power imbalances and development status in the region, and harmonization of land use and legal systems across boundaries can easily become sources of conflict and controversy (Wolmer, 2003; Lunstrum, 2013).

Given the above policy and conceptual contradictions and dilemmas, it is clear that much research needs to be done to further understand the role and operationalization of TFCAs in Southern Africa. There is a need to understand the dynamics set in motion by the creation of peace parks in Southern Africa. Furthermore, in the wake of increasing adoption of TFCAs in the region, research needs to examine the nature and impact of investments that state and the private sector put in to exploit the claimed benefits of TFCAs. To fill these research gaps, this study examines the establishment of the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier conservation area and its dynamics on the Zambian component. It is important to understand the dynamics and implications of the Zambian government’s investment in the KAZA on the local people. This study will further analyse the nature and impact of investments made in the KAZA by actors on the Zambian component.

1.3 Research aim and objectives

The aim of the study is to investigate the motivations behind Zambia’s participation and its investment in the KAZA TFCA and the implications for the creation of KAZA on the local communities in Simalaha Community Conservancy in western Zambia.

The study is guided by the following objectives:

1. To document the motivation for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA
2. To understand Zambia’s investment in the KAZA.
3. To explore the implications of the KAZA on the local population in Simalaha area

Questions that guided the collection of data were:

1. Why is Zambia participating in the KAZA TFCA?
2. What has Zambia invested in the KAZA TFCA?
3. What are the implications of the KAZA TFCA on the local communities on the Zambian side?

1.4 The study site: The Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area

Figure 1.1 below shows the location and boundaries of the KAZA TFCA. The KAZA TFCA is situated in the Okavango and Zambezi River, where the borders of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe converge (TCC, 2006; Cumming, 2008; KAZA TFCA Master IDP, 2013), covering an area of almost 520,000km².

Figure 2.1: Location and boundaries of KAZA TFCA, Source: KAZA TFCA IDP, 2013
The area has a total of 20 national parks, 85 Forest Reserves, 22 Conservancies, 11 Sanctuaries, 103 Wildlife Management Areas and 11 Game Management Areas. Zambia boasts a spectacular array of mega fauna and several international tourist attractions such as the iconic Victoria Falls (Metcalfe, 2008; Adams, 2009). The rationale for creating KAZA is that it is home to thousands of species of fauna and flora, including more than 200,000 African elephants and is one of the largest TFCAs in the world. Therefore, KAZA re-establishes the ecological systems and corridors, which allow free movement of wildlife across human and politically imposed boarders (Cumming, 2011; Jones, 2008; Bennett, 2003). However, the free movement of huge population of elephants has occasioned human-animal conflicts among the people living close to the parks (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008).

However, it must be noted that Figure 1.1 above does not represent the permanent boundary of the KAZA, but it is subject to change, because the KAZA landscape is expanding as participating countries increase their land contribution to the KAZA TFCA. Botswana is a case in point. It has increased its boundaries and has become the largest land contributor, followed by Zambia (see Chapter Five). This is in line with the provisions of the KAZA treaty. The KAZA boundaries include communal land. The KAZA covers 40% of state protected area and 60% communal land. The ownership of communal land in some Southern African states is vested in the hands of the president, this gives states authority over communal land and the local communities have less power and do not participate in high-level decision-making meetings (SADC, 2007). In chiefdoms, the chiefs are the custodians of the land. The link between communal land and conservation is based on the understanding that communal land acts as a repository, due to its rich biodiversity (Ramutsindela & Noe, 2012). In addition, the geographical space of TFCAs emphasizes the realization of a claimed positive nexus between conservation and tourism development. It is therefore essential that conservation and socioeconomic objectives are mutually reinforcing and not conflicting (Cumming, 1999; Metcalfe, 1999; Metcalfe, 2008). Due to the fact that the community makes a significant contribution in terms of sharing its space with wildlife, it is expected that the benefits derived from their conservation efforts should be mutual and not conflicting (Metcalfe, 2008).
Prior to the establishment of the KAZA, information shows that there were activities such as stocktaking in the participating countries in order to account for the resources and assets each country had (see Chapter Five). There was also a need for research to determine the geographical boundaries of the KAZA in each participating state. Not only was there a need for political will, but donors wanted to see the financial commitment from the participating countries before making payments, and financial commitment was in the form of an annual subscription fee of 60,000 USD per year (see Chapter Four).

Furthermore, the KAZA establishment was preceded by cross border initiatives as far back as the 1990s. It began as the Transboundary Natural Resource Management initiative and the Okavango-Upper Zambezi International Tourism Initiative (OUZIT) in 1993. Here South Africa was actively involved through the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) that facilitated the creation of the Southern African Wildlife Sanctuary located in the present KAZA location. This initiative was in accordance with the SADC tourism sector project under the Regional Tourism Organization of Southern Africa (RETOSA) (PPF, 2006; Suich et al., 2004; Spenceley, 2008). However, OUZIT was later abandoned due to lack of support by the relevant governments, as well as its narrow scope, OUZIT only focused on expansion of the tourism sector and less attention was given to conservation. Later the “Four Corners” initiative was born. This name is derived from the fact that four countries – Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana - shared a colonial border (Spenceley, 2008). Coordination of this initiative was done by African Wildlife Fund (AWF) with funding from United States Agency for International Development (USAID). On 24 July 2003, a very important meeting took place, which defined the pathway of the KAZA. At this meeting, convened in Katimo Mulilo, the Ministers responsible for tourism in Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe (member states) agreed on the vision for the KAZA TFCA initiative (KfW, 2014). The Ministers of Environment and tourism in the member states met again on 7 December 2006, in Victoria Falls town of Zimbabwe, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding. An MoU is not a legally binding document but provides direction on the procedure to be undertaken when establishing a particular TFCA (SADC, 2007). Thus, MoUs set the institutional and political motion for the establishment of the KAZA TFCA (KfW, 2014). In signing this memorandum of understanding the countries committed (KAZA 2006) to:
1. Ensure co-operation at the national level among governmental authorities, communities, non-governmental organizations and the private sector;

2. Co-operate to develop common approaches to natural resources management and tourism development and;

3. Collaborate to achieve the objectives of relevant international agreements to which they are party.

The MoU’s objectives are as follows:

1. Foster transnational collaboration and co-operation among Member States in implementing ecosystems and cultural resources management through the establishment and development of the TFCA;

2. Promote alliances in the management of biological and cultural resources and encourage social, economic and other partnerships among the Member States and the stakeholders;

3. Enhance ecosystem integrity and natural ecological processes by harmonising natural resources management approaches and tourism development across international boundaries;

4. Develop mechanisms and strategies for local communities to participate meaningfully in, and tangibly benefit from the TFCA;


The KAZA TFCA deal was sealed by the signing of a treaty on 18 August 2011 in Luanda, involving the Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Linell et.al, 2019). The treaty was important for the KAZA TFCA because it is a legal requirement for commitments to be announced publicly and is binding enough to show the seriousness attached to it (SADC, 2007). A treaty represents a bond and shows that the countries involved have a common goal. Most importantly it shows the political will and commitment, because when the president signs, it becomes binding for the country and thus making it acceptable and not easily reversible. This relates to Murphy’s observation that the political commitment of the countries is important for the success of TFCAs (Murphy, 2008; Munthali et.al, 2018). Thus, the KAZA treaty was signed to ensure that KAZA agreement cannot easily be changed due to changes in government regimes.
Therefore, the treaties are signed in order to gain political support, without which implementation of TFCAs may be difficult.

Following the signing of the treaty, there was a need to adopt it. The adoption of the treaty differed from one country to the other. In relation to this, officials added that in some countries it involved going to parliament for ratification while in others adoption of the treaty falls within the mandate of the executive, meaning approval by the Cabinet is taken as ratification and was enough to adopt the treaty (Civil Society Organization 1, interview, 22 January 2018). In Zambia the treaty was adopted in 2011 by the Cabinet and taken to parliament, not to debate but to inform the parliament. Prior to ratification of the treaty there was extensive consultation, this was done because it had implication on the treasury of each country as each country needed to contribute the annual subscription fee therefore the treasury had to be involved (Civil Society Organization 1, interview, 22 January 2018). Further, there was need for tax exemption on donor money by the treasury of each country. There was also need for vehicles from KAZA to be exempted from paying tax when moving in any of the five member states.

Despite the treaty stating that the KAZA is supposed to take an integrated approach in natural resource management (KAZA, 2016). KAZA is dominated by the wildlife issues. This is because the entry point for KAZA TFCAs was wildlife. As such the KAZA technical committee, senior officials permanent, Ministers are all from wildlife departments and Ministries in charge of wildlife and tourism (See figure 1.2). Therefore, KAZA is more inclined to wildlife conservation as most officers working in the participating countries as liaison offices under the KAZA secretariat are mostly people who have been seconded from the wildlife sector (SADC, 2007). Thus, the KAZA in particular underplays forestry, fisheries and water resources, this signal a missed opportunity. This was confirmed by one government official who stated that the KAZA unit in Zambia sits under the Ministry of Tourism and Arts, because tourism is closely linked to wildlife and the main base for tourism development in Zambia is wildlife, therefore, wildlife is looked at as a tourist attraction (Civil Society Organization 1, interview, 22 January 2018). This is why the authority dealing with wildlife resource management sits in the ministry of tourism and
Arts. SADC reinforces the ‘wildlife coat’ 2of the KAZA because most times it is about ‘wildlife for fire’ it is rarely about the other resources. Therefore, the need for removal of ‘wildlife coat’ by technocrats which makes the mind shift very difficult, there is need for diversification of ‘mind-set’ this means including other resources which are equally important. Furthermore, the KAZA TFCA operations and goals are complex. They are about creating a tourism-based economy while addressing the community varied needs. This calls for a multi sectoral approach.

1.5 Strengthening participatory governance structures in the KAZA

KAZA is one of the largest and most complex TFCAs in Africa and, as such, its clear management necessitated states to cooperate with each other in order to form a structure which can smoothly govern the KAZA. Therefore, member states’ sovereignty is constrained by the creation and management of transboundary conservation areas (Lungstrum, 2013). As such countries can no longer make independent decision on the use of their resources. In view of this the KAZA TFCA has a structure which contains a decision-making organ, called the Ministerial Committee, comprising of ministers at the top and their role is to give political guidance and approval (KAZA TFCA Master IDP, 2013). These Ministers are mainly in charge of wildlife and tourism sector in their respective countries. The committee of Ministers is assisted by the committee of senior government officials who are Permanent Secretaries in charge of wildlife and tourism within the KAZA landscape. Views from government and civil society officials indicate that the committee of senior official sits to either approve or adopt requests made by the KAZA secretariat. Below the Permanent Secretaries is a body of Joint Technical Management Committee which is composed of directors responsible for wildlife and tourism (Master IDP, 2013).

The technical committee processes and clears documents before they are given to senior officials. This level of KAZA governance involves long detailed technical meetings that feed the upper two committees with technical and political messages on KAZA. The committee for Directors acts as a think tank of the KAZA. Below the Technical Committee is the KAZA secretariat. The KAZA Secretariat’s primary focus is to create the enabling environment for all stakeholders and partners.

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2 Terms used by civil society research participants to explain a singular focus of KAZA on wild animals. They use the term to express complaints that KAZA should not just focus on wild animals but should include other natural resources such as land.
to synergize towards the optimal realization of the KAZA objectives. The secretariat acts like ‘glue’. This ‘glue’ is required for collective mobilization of resources and capacity towards achieving the desired outcomes. It is also needed for coordination of activities among member states, thereby growing collective values towards sustainability (KFW, 2014). The KAZA secretariat includes liaison officers in each of the five participating countries whose role is to represent KAZA in those countries and also represent those countries to KAZA secretariat. The KAZA secretariat is hosted in Botswana. On the other hand, the SADC secretariat is also in Botswana. Although there are claims that Botswana offered to host the secretariat, it can be argued that the location of the two secretariats is not coincidental, it is a planned move meant for the powers to radiate between the two secretariats. Figure 1.2 shows the KAZA governance structure.

Figure 1.2: Organizational structure for KAZA TFCA, Source: KAZA, 2016

From the diagram above, it is clear that the KAZA takes a top down approach in its decision-making processes, which implies that theory is different from practice, as the KAZA decision and planning structure offers less meaningful participation of the people at the bottom (Spenceley,
2012). Given the above governance structure, it is clear that TFCAs alter the state’s exercise of its sovereignty over its people and borderland. As seen in figure 2 above, the states’ action is mainly influenced by the relationship with other participating countries and different actors. In other words, the state does not act independently. Therefore, it can also be argued that transboundary natural resources management have a tendency to transfer powers from individual states to collaboration by participating states, private sectors and the local people concerned, there by making individual states weaker (Strong, 1991; SADC, 2002).

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The content of this thesis is presented in seven interlinked chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter Two discusses the theoretical framework and analyses key issues. The chapter also reviews literature to highlight the evolution and complexity of TFCAs in Southern African states. In Chapter Three the methodology of the study is described. The chapter provides reasons why the case study was used, the strength and weaknesses of the case study method. The suitability of the case study to the research questions is also explained. Further, data collection methods, including document analysis and observations, are discussed. Thereafter, I explain semi-structured interviews as the main research technique used for primary data collection in this study. Furthermore, measures implemented during the research process to ensure internal and external validity of research outcomes are presented. In Chapter Four I analyse the motivation for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, before providing Zambia’s investments in the KAZA TFCA in Chapter Five. Chapter Six analyses the implication of the creation of KAZA TFCA on the local people using the Simalaha community as a case study. Finally, Chapter Seven provides reflections on the findings in chapters four, five and six. I conclude Chapter Seven by proposing directions for future research.
CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL ECOLOGY, THE STATE AND TFCAs IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the formation of TFCAs and the relationships and dynamics that obtain in TFCAs. The chapter reviews literature on political ecology to establish the conceptual basis for interpretation of the findings and analysis chapters. Biersack (2006) argues that the formation of TFCAs creates new relationships and dynamics between people, the states and natural resources. TFCAs create new challenges and opportunities to the population on the margins of state power and neo-liberalism (Elden, 2013; Ramutsindela, 2017). Local populations face significant challenges ranging from destruction of the crop fields by wildlife, and unequal distribution of the TFCAs benefits. These dynamics shaping the formation and management of TFCAs can be understood using the concept of political ecology.

The concept of political ecology is appropriate for examining the changing roles of the state and increasing power and influence of the private sector and land management dynamics in TFCAs (Duffy, 2006). Thus, this chapter discusses political ecology as a theoretical orientation of this study. The chapter analyses the practices of the state within a political ecology framework to understand how the state engages in the formation of TFCAs in Southern Africa. The chapter is divided into four sections. Section provides the overall goal and structure of the chapter, while section two presents the theoretical orientation of the study and in the third section I discuss political ecology of the state. In the fourth section, I present the participation of the state in TFCAs and draw conclusions on the chapter. I now turn to political ecology as a theoretical lens for this study.

2.2. Theoretical orientation of the study: Political ecology
Political ecology has been explained differently by various scholars, with some emphasizing political economy and others stressing political institutions and environmental and social change. Bryant (2015) describes political ecology as an attempt to understand “the political sources, conditions and ramifications of environmental change.” Bryant & Bailey (1997:190) suggest that “political ecology” in the broad context focuses on interactions between the state, non-state actors, and the physical environment, whereas debates in “environmental politics” are generally
concerned with the role of the state. This study adopts Bryant & Bailey’s conception of political ecology because contemporary nature conservation of natural resources through TFCA has become a global operation which involves a complex network of actors, including state and non-state actors, donor organizations, business organizations, NGOs, communities, academic institutions and think tanks in resource governance, rendering human-society-nature relations deeply complex and dynamic. Thus, political ecology facilitates close examination of processes that affect control, ownership, access and usage of natural resources, which include water, land, fish and forest among others (Robbins, 2012; Bryant, 2015). There are various aspects of political ecology, this study only focuses on the ones which are relevant to this study and they include neoliberalism, power, access and control over resources as well as networks.

Over the years TFCAAs have been linked to neoliberalism and, therefore, TFCAAs act as a platform through which neoliberalization of nature takes off. In line with this Büscher (2012) records the payments of ecosystem services in Maloti Drakensberg TFCA was based on neoliberal ideology. Neoliberalism in this context is simply understood as a process by which nature is subjected to market dynamics in order to expand and deepen capitalism (Ramutsindela, 2017) and is normally posited as a win-win solution to ecological challenges. In relation to this Büscher (2002:31) notes that 'market-based transactions' would 'reduce the need for state regulation' and become naturalised to guarantee 'measurable deliverables' and 'sharpened performance of conservation actors'.

Thus, neoliberalism favours the capitalist business interests of a few elites over poor people because the business elites seek to exploit nature, employ cheap labour and do not prioritize the interests of ordinary people. This has resulted into enclosure, exclusion, and dispossession of natural resources including land. In neoliberal settings, some states enter into agreements with business and investors with the promise of increasing capital and investments. Thus, commodification has reduced nature to a commodity, advertised and traded through international agreements, resulting in the emergence and neo-liberal practices through which industries have emerged to exploit it. Consequently, there has been a shift of ownership of nature from the state and public to individual hands that are mostly foreign investors and only a few local elites benefit from such transactions. Fringe benefits of nature commodification accrue to local and often poor populations in the form of low wage jobs and low value commodity supply opportunities and
corporate social responsibilities projects. This is usually the case in instances where the state choses to become a mere facilitator of private sector investments and hopes to create value for local populations through the ‘effects’ of wealth accumulation. Thus, for TFCAs to realise their full potential in Southern African states, there is a need for an equal amount of investment by the state and the private sector (see Chapter Five). Castree (2010; 2015) cautions that adoption of neoliberalism by the Southern African states without adapting it to their context, prevents them from achieving sustainable development objectives and reduces the potential of reducing poverty through TFCAs mere promissory note. Owing to the above, I argue that neo-liberalization creates a system which goes beyond capital penetration, favours arguments for economic supremacy and subordinates nature and social development goals of communities and the state.

Political ecology can also be understood as an interconnection between nature and society achieved through various forms of access and control and their implication for the health of environment and sustainable livelihood. For Sutton (2004) political ecology is seen as the study of day-to-day conflicts, debates, alliances, negotiations that results in definitive behaviour, and how politics affects or structures resource use and control over the resources. The creation of TFCAs provides new spaces that challenge state’s power to control the resources. In relation to this Bryant and Bailey (1997) social actors with asymmetrical political power are continuously competing for access to and control of natural resources. In TFCAs, one can argue that a double hegemony exists where the state vigorously pushes for private sector investments and where neo-liberal interests manifest through networked industries exploiting a commodified nature. This type of hegemony by and large works to exploit nature and local poor populations, creating hereto a favourable environment for neo-liberalism, anchored by control over resources. In addition, governmentalities tend to be practiced differently in TFCAs as borderlands create dynamic, environmental politics (Rosenbaum, 2016). In relation to this, Peluso and Watts (2001) argue that limiting of access and control to natural resources creates conflicts and struggles. This is not different from TFCAs, as the creation of TFCAs implies restrictions on access to and control of resources. Thus, such interactions and new relations can be understood and addressed using tools which political ecology provides. Political ecology is also cardinal in interpreting power and power relations by various actors. Thus, political ecology provides a tool box for questioning uneven power relations in TFCAs.
Thus, in this study, political ecology facilitated the investigation of the multiple networks which play out in conservation politics at various levels (local community, national, regional and global). At the centre of political ecology are different actors which include local communities, the state, civil society, international development agencies, and local financial institutions among others. It is in these network dynamics that power and influence are situated, flow and manifests. In bringing to the fore various power relations on multiple geo-political scales, political ecology provides a structure that allows close examination of interactions between multiple actors (Peet and Watts, 1996; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Houtum & Singh, 2002). Political ecology is said to be power laden and not politically inert; similarly, TFCAs are processes continuously driven by power relations (Peet & Watts, 1996; Robbins, 2004; Duffy, 2006). Thus, the interconnectedness of how ecosystems work can be interpreted and explained using political, social and economic meanings (Duffy, 2006). As such, political ecology can also be seen as an analysis of the complexity of social and environmental change as a product of intersecting and conflicting economic, social and ecological processes that operate at different levels. Therefore, the framework can be used to explain people-state-nature power relations and matrixes in TFCAs (Khani, 2010). In the next section I focus on political ecology of the state.

2.3 Political ecology of the state and TFCAs

The state is perceived and analysed differently by various scholars. For Peruzzotti (2015:1) state refers to a “specific institutional configuration that resulted in the establishment of a sovereign structure of political authority within a territory”. It consists of a cluster of constitutionally regulated agencies that have supreme jurisdiction over a delimited territory and population. This study adopts Ioris’s (2014:1) definition of the state as a “result of socio-natural interactions and multiple forms of contestation, from a critical politico-ecological approach.” Thus, political ecology of the state involves a reactionary and inherently contradictory approach to the co-management of environmental, political, and economic burdens by several actors (Mullenite, 2015:54). Vaccaro (2013) argues that through conservation the state extends its administrative control over its natural resources within its boundaries. Consequently, state’s decisions affect the functioning of the environment either positively or negatively. The state therefore performs several roles in relation to TFCAs. This study focuses on three roles of the state, which are negotiating
and producing socio-ecological and socioeconomic disruptions, protection and provision of land for conservation purposes (Mullenite, 2015) as well as ‘steward of the natural environment on which its existence ultimately depends’ (Walker, 1989: 32). With regards to TFCAs, the state plays a role in harmonizing policy, and imposing sanctions on offenders, for example, the implementation of the fish ban by Zambia and Namibia, providing land on which the TFCAs are established, is done for various reasons, including achieving conservation objectives and social-economic development aspirations (Linell et.al, 2017). The state achieves its objectives by taking advantage of its historical and contemporary role as reproducer of a consumption-based capitalist economy (Mullenite, 2015).

The practices of actors in TFCAs determine access to resources and create a dynamic set of relations that both include and exclude. Nuanced understanding of TFCAs cannot be robust if actors and elements are studied in isolation. Thus, political ecology provides a platform for understanding TFCAs, which involves different actors including community, donor agencies and the states, among others. These actors interact at different levels and scales. The actors involved also exercise different forms of powers. In these interactions, the state is seen to be important due to its capacity to enact and enforce laws which regulate the usage and access to resource by various actors involved (Singh and Houtum, 2002). In relation to this, Durand (2019) argues that in hierarchical societies conservation discourse entails social relations can be understood as a way of preventing the less powerful from accessing and utilizing valuables cardinal for human’s and ecosystem’s wellbeing. For example, during the apartheid era black South Africans were denied access to the national parks, which were the sole preserve of whites (Ramutsindela, 2008). Thus, political ecology provides a framework for examining the politics of TFCAs and management of shared resources (Duffy, 2006; Ramutsindela, 2017). However, Ioris (2014) maintains that the state’s actionsshould not be seen as a set of regulatory agencies but as complex structures and strategies reflecting the balance of political power and the growth of social antagonisms.

Owing to the forgoing theoretical propositions on political ecology, it is clear that the state plays a critical role in creating conditions that enable or disable other actors such as NGOs, local communities and the private sectors to access natural resources. Such monopoly of power by the state over resources, including land on which protected areas are established, is used to evict and
kill indigenous people in order to force them out of land earmarked for conservation purposes (Dowie, 2009; Ramutsindela, 2017). A case in point here is the Limpopo National Park (LNP) where about seven thousand (7000) people were relocated from the interior of the park against their will by the Mozambican state (Lunstrum, 2013; Ramutsindela, 2017). This act is not very different from the expropriation of land and resources for wildlife and marine conservation belonging to local people in Tanzania (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012). This clearly shows that at times the state abuses its power to intimidate and brutalize its own citizens, who are mostly the poor.

Similar to the earlier arguments, Biersack (2006) maintains that political ecology is a ‘power laden’ concept. Similarly, TFCAs are not apolitical as they are influenced by the state, financiers and societies within which they are created. The interaction of the trio is shaped by power, power relations and different interests. The main actors in TFCAs include PPF whose main purpose is to facilitate the formation of TFCAs in Southern Africa, conservation-based organizations including World Resources Institute, the Nature Conservancy, and WWF whose interest is explicitly bioregion-focused conservation strategies (Wolmer, 2003). I use Political ecology to examine how the state exercises control over their resources and its people leaving in or nearby conservation areas while participating in TFCAs. Given the arguments by Biersack (2006:3) and Robin (2012:14) on the impact of “action of political institutions” and “the importance of environmental change” and how these drive human-environment relationships, the use of political ecology in the study will help to examine the Zambian political system (the state) governance of resources and human beings in KAZA TFCA.

2.4 Participation of the state in TFCAs
Management of shared natural resources by African states is not a new practice, but one which occurred long before the introduction of peace parks. This is evidenced in border towns where co-existence of cultural and family ties have continued despite the colonial boundaries which did not account for cultural relationships and ecosystems. In addition to this, the communities are also well aware of the corridors for wildlife migration (Murphy et al., 2004; Van der Linde et al., 2001; Bennett, 2003). The corridors facilitate the movement of wildlife. For example, the creation of a TFCA for the Mozambique-South Africa border links St. Lucia Greater Wetlands Park, Ndumo
and Tembe Elephant Park in South Africa with Maputo Elephant Reserve in Mozambique. The creation of this TFCA facilitates the movement of elephants from South Africa to Mozambique through their ancient animal corridor (Duffy, 2006).

Historically, TFCA s arose as nation-states lost overriding controlling powers on national and regional economies at the dawn of liberalism policies in many parts of the world at the end of the Cold War. At this time, powerful on-state private sector actors and international organizations emerged as legitimate in global political and conservation endeavours (Duffy, 2007; Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016). The late 18th century saw the signing of a treaty between the King of France and the Prince-Bishop of Basel to protect the boundary, shared wildlife and forest (Chester, 2006). In the 20th century more formal agreements with the aim of enhancing peace and cooperation through nature protection were signed between the USA and Canada, which saw the establishment of the Waterton Glacier International peace park in 1926, this marked the first peace park in the world. It should be pointed out, as Whande (2007) notes that Southern Africa witnessed major changes in the 1990s when the apartheid era in South Africa, the civil war in Mozambique and South Africa’s occupation of Namibia reached an end. Owing to all this, peace parks were proposed as a model to foster reconciliation, peace and co-existence in Southern African states (Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016). This resulted in the birth of new forms of cooperation, collaboration and regional development, which could be driven by conservation (Duffy 2007). In Southern Africa Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (KTP) between South Africa and Botswana was the first TFCA (Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002; Ramutsindela, 2004), the establishment of this TFCA was sealed with the signing of an agreement in April 1999 (SADC, 2007).

The state used state departments to convene high level meeting to discuss the formation and structure of TFCA s. Thus, TFCA s bring to the fore the national agenda (Ramutsindela, 2007). This TFCA was only officially opened by the two presidents from both countries in May 2000. Since the establishment of the Kgalagadi, more efforts have been put in place to ensure that more TFCA s are established in Southern Africa. Thus, the formation of TFCA s draws together high-profile people in states such as heads of states, ministers, permanent secretaries among others. All these represent various national issues beyond conservation from their respective countries (Büscher, 2013). Further, TFCA s require a vast portion of land, which calls for debordering of the
international borders in order to allow wildlife to move freely and contribute to social economic development through tourism (Ramutsindela, 2007). Therefore, states play a key role in delineating boundaries on which conservation takes place (Ramutsindela, 2017). The creation of a transnational conservation space depends on the reconfiguration of the authority of the state. In peace parks, such a process takes place through memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and treaties that act as legal instruments to tame the authority of the state in TFCAs (Ramutsindela, 2017: 1008). Clearly, this shows that TFCAs are beyond national imaginaries, but are embedded in bioregional planning (Wolmer 2003; Ramutsindela and Noe, 2012).

The MoUs and treaties respect the sovereignty of the state and the legitimacy of the international border, but also serve as instruments by which the restructuring of the authority of the state is legitimized. The transnational space of peace parks limits the authority of individual states in that space, while at the same time introducing new obligations that the state should perform through treaties. Therefore, TFCAs are ‘non-Sovereign transboundary spaces’ (Ramutsindela, 2017). The creation of TFCAs is based on the actions of the state to create a united and borderless African continent and signals a desired return of most African leaders to the African ideals of the 1960s (Nkrumah, 1963).

Therefore, the earlier TFCAs in Southern Africa were in the form of Transfrontier Parks, with the emphasis on conservation of biodiversity (SADC, 2007). These TFCAs took a top-down approach, which is evident in the signing of the treaties by senior state officials. This reflects state governance and automatically leaves out the local people from decision making positions. Thus, the state took centre stage at national level while the local people were not informed, and in certain instances they only knew about the project upon seeing activities taking place in their area. Thus, the local people were not part of the decision-making process, but mere spectators. This has weakened the nations and facilitated the recreation of a colonial vision in African conservation (Rusinga, and Mapira, 2012) and eroded the countries’ sovereignty. In relation to this, some scholars argue that linking of conservation to underdevelopment creates room for the re-entry of former colonizers and external actors, thereby bringing about ‘sovereignty bargains’ (Singh and Houtum, 2002).

Furthermore, the state’s ability to regulate the use of resources is normally challenged in that most states in Southern Africa are weakened due to a lack of capital as such states confront influential
entities with capital often backed by private security arrangements. Therefore, in most TFCAs states do not influence spending because real power is held by the non-state actors, while states are ‘hollowed out’, limiting both its power and capacity to control access and use of resources. In this case, state power, institutional arrangements, national borders and legislation are less meaningful, rendering TFCA projects externally controlled.

Despite individual states’ lack of control in TFCAs, Southern African states are increasingly participating in TFCAs because of the claimed potential benefits which they may derive from them (see Chapter Six). There are many reasons for states’ participation in the TFCAs, including the individual expected gains as TFCAs are viewed by some states as a platform for lobbying support in the political, social, economic, and environmental sectors (Ramutsindela, 2004). Other reasons for states participation in the TFCAs include conservation of biodiversity, regional integration and regional peace. Peace parks are also perceived by the states as key in promoting tourism and modernizing conservation policy as this has potential of taking economic development to rural areas and alleviating poverty. Thus, states participate in TFCAs because they perceive TFCAs as a vehicle to reconcile development and conservation (see Chapter Four). Accordingly, PPF maintains that TFCAs entail the promotion of regional peace and stability among states, conservation of biodiversity which results into creation of jobs through tourism development. Thus, proponents of TFCAs claim that TFCAs enable human and animals to co-exist (http://www.peaceparks.org/tfca.php). This relates to Barnes (1998)’s observation that TFCAs have the potential to generate income in participating states by satisfying the growing demand for ‘adventure nature-based tourism.’

In addition, TFCAs in Southern Africa are closely associated with creation and functions of SADC, a Southern African state grouping that seeks to promote cooperation among member states. In order to achieve its goal, SADC affected a protocol on wildlife conservation and law enforcement in the late 1990s (SADC 1999). Among other things this protocol recommended the establishment of the TFCAs by member states. Not only did SADC support the already existing TFCAs spearheaded by the PPF but also endorsed and promoted the formation of new TFCAs. The member states did not contest this decision because they saw the need to participate in conservation of resources through creation of TFCAs. As such by 2002, SADC had officially sanctioned the
establishment of twenty-two (22) TFCAs across the region (Ramutsindela, 2008). Today, there are 18 TFCAs in the SADC region. Figure 2.1 below shows the TFCAs in Southern Africa.

Figure 2.1 TFCAs and TPs in Southern Africa, Source: (www.peaceparks.co.za)

Contrary to the earlier arguments the state loses its sovereignty to external forces including donors. Lunstrum (2013) uses the concept of articulated sovereignty to argue that donors do not in any way erode state power, because donor funding for TFCAs enables the state to create a physical presence through infrastructural and institutional development in places which could be otherwise inaccessible to the states due to inadequate transport as a result of limited financial capacity. Thus, states are motivated to participate in TFCAs due to donor funding which is channeled to conservation. Lunstrum (2013) also suggests that partnerships between the state and extra-territorial actors can help the state consolidate power in these often-peripheral areas. As Lunstrum (2013) and Duffy (2001) note, contrary to previous assertions that TFCAs reduce the sovereignty
of the state, through external funding the state is able to make more impactful contributions in these frontiers. Lunstrum (2013) suggests that partnerships between the state and extra-territorial actors can help the state consolidate power in these often-peripheral areas. However, is important to point out that states are at different levels of development and in the management of transboundary natural resources, states exhibit different forms of power (Ramutsindela, 2008).

In relation to this, most TFCA treaties and memorandum of understanding (MoU) uphold the state’s sovereignty. The 2002 Treaty of the GLTP is a case in point (Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016). While the treaties and MoUs of TFCAs legitimize the states, the authority of the individual states to control the TFCAs is limited, because they cannot exercise control over the resources in TFCAs (Ramutsindela, 2017). Therefore, states are seen to be part of the processes which limit their authority in TFCAs.

2.4. Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter highlights the three roles of the state in TFCA as follows: negotiating and producing socio-ecological and socioeconomic disruptions, protection and provision of land for conservation purposes as well as ‘stewardship of the natural environment on which its existence ultimately depends’ (Walker, 1989: 32). The state also plays a role in harmonizing policy and sanctions imposed on the offenders. Chapter Two argues that although the states participating in TFCAs are perceived to be sovereign, the reality remains that countries give up part of their sovereignty over part of the territory making up the TFCA, and the ensuring TFCA space becomes a shared territory under shared regulations and decision-making protocols. The chapter argues that TFCAs are a platform through which neoliberalism plays out, implying that the non-human world is subjected to market forces, resulting in dispossession of resources, disempowerment of local populations and environmental injustice caused by the irruption of the conservation effort of the economically powerful external actors. Thus, political ecology was cardinal in interpreting the state-people-environment and power dynamics in TFCAs. TFCAs also brings together an intricate of actors’ network who exert different forms of political power and compete for access to and control of natural resources. The following chapter provides the methodology of the study.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology used to meet the objectives of the study. The study took a descriptive and interpretive inquiry designed as a case study. In this study, methodology is understood as in-depth method and process through which data is collected and the philosophies underpinning the analysis and collection of the data (Creswell, 2009). The chapter begins by discussing the methodological approach used to understand the motivation of the Zambian government’s participation in the KAZA, its investments and the implications of the creation of the KAZA on the local communities on the Zambian side. It then outlines the study techniques and justifies the selection of KAZA and Simalaha (within the KAZA) as the case study. I conclude this chapter by providing an overview of the ethical issues.

3.2 Study approach

This section discusses the study design and methodological approach. The section also discusses the overall methodological approach, data collection instruments and data analysis and data presentation approaches.

3.3 Study design and argument for the case study

This study uses a case study as a qualitative approach to achieve its objectives (Stake, 2008; Flyvbjerg, 2011). Case study has been defined differently by various scholars, and for the purposes of this study Yin’s definition of case study has been adopted. Yin (1994:23) defines the case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” Using a case study contextual, complex phenomenon of the KAZA can be clearly understood. In relation to this, Baxter and Jack (2008) argue that a case study offers the tools for researchers to study complex phenomenon within their context. Case study allows for close examination of complex real-life issues within their context over a long period of time (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin, 2014). Thus, case study was suitable for this research because the KAZA experiences are complex reality issues, which needed to be explored within
their unique context in order to be understood. Furthermore, the case study enabled me to gather in-depth information because the participants provided context-based narratives. It also allowed me to do intensive analysis of the government’s investments in the KAZA TFCA and its implications for the local population (Stake, 2008; Creswell, 2009). In relation to this, Yin (2009; 2014) argues that case studies provide an in-depth exploration of multiple complexities of the uniqueness of a particular project, community, policy, institution and system in reality. This is because a case study seeks to “…describe, decode, and translate … naturally occurring phenomena in the social world” (Maanen, 1983: 9). A case study is a more interpretive paradigm, phenomenological approach and constructivism as a paradigmatic basis. Therefore, it is suitable for this study as it unveiled the Zambian government’s interest in the KAZA and its investments.

Furthermore, the case study is more appropriate for this study because it answers qualitative research questions by seeking to respond to the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ context-bounded research questions (Yin, 2003). Thus, more specific data on the KAZA was gathered when the participants addressed the “Why” and “How” question of Zambia’s participation in the TFCA through the KAZA initiative and when addressing the ‘what’ question of government’s investment in the KAZA. The study also gave detailed, but specific information on “what” implication the establishment of the KAZA has on the local community. A Case study was cardinal in uncovering the key role players in the KAZA project in order to determine the power relations, access and control over the resources. Thus, through detailed contextual analysis of existing institutional relationships and power dynamics among key partners and the local communities, a case study was useful for investigating KAZA TFCA as a contemporary way of conservation in a real-life context. In relation to this, a case study is said to function as “an empirical inquiry that investigated a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 1994; 2003: 13; Gerring, 2004). Thus, the case study enabled me to acquire a deep understanding of the link between participation in the KAZA, investment and the implications for the local communities. The KAZA TFCA and its related institutions and policies were treated as bounded entities shaping and influencing decisions, investments, outcomes and impacts of the KAZA TFCA investments and processes on the local population.
The KAZA is a complex project involving five states and several actors. Thus, for this research’s objectives to be achieved the research methods needed to be in line with the research questions. In relation to this Flyvbjerg (2011) argues that the selection of the method does not depend on the wellness of the method but on what is to be explored. Therefore, after careful consideration of the research questions and subject, I chose to use the case study. The choice of the case study research method was based on the understanding that the concept of TFCA is institutionally driven and its management is embedded in nuanced institutions, policies and local contexts.

Thus, enhanced understanding of natural resource management and development outcomes of TFCA should be grounded in interpretive and realistic research paradigms (Krauss, 2005). The interpretive paradigm is premised on the belief that reality should consist of people’s experiences and thus, adopt an inter-subjective epistemology and the ontological belief that reality is socially constructed. Accordingly, in this study people working in the KAZA through the civil society organizations, government representatives and local communities provided their different experiences based on their varied realities. Furthermore, Zainal argues that case studies are useful in “exploring and understanding of complex issues” (2007:1). This made a case study useful in understanding the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian component because it is complex as it involves different issues such as various role players exercising varied levels of power, authority and control over resources, the investments by different states/donors and how the states retains its sovereignty to control the resources amidst other donor agencies, different land tenure and governance among others.

For Stake (1994) and Yin (2003) the truth is relative and depends on ones’ perspective. Similarly, the condition of poverty or wealth in the KAZA is a lived reality and is relative. As such it was studied from different perspectives. I wanted to explore different levels of poverty or wealth experienced by the local communities in the KAZA region; and therefore, the case study presented a favourable environment in which to discuss the local people’s real life situations from different perspectives. This relates to Healy & Perry (2000)’s argument that realism concerns multiple perceptions about a single reality. In relation to this Walsham (1993) agrees that in-depth examination of the phenomenon of interest allows interpretivists and realists to attempt to derive their constructs from the field. Thus, case studies enable researchers to collect in-depth
explanations of social behavior and realities (Zainal 2007). Furthermore, a case study allows for analysis of a unit which provides a minimum level of study, thus the case study method allowed for intensive analysis of Simalaha and the KAZA on the Zambian component, the various role players at each unit in order to understand if the motivation to participate in the KAZA matches the investment efforts and what this meant at the lowest point level of the local community. Therefore, this method was chosen on the basis that it would facilitate a thorough understanding of Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, its investment and the implications of the creation of the KAZA on the local community.

3.4 Research techniques

In this sub-section, I discuss the methods of data collection. The section explains all the methods that were used to gather both primary and secondary data. In addition, the section presents secondary data sources and explains how challenges encountered during data collection were addressed to ensure research validity. In the following paragraph, I discuss semi-structured interviews.

3.4.1 Data collection technique: Semi-structured interviews

The research employed in-depth semi-structured interviews in order to achieve its objectives. Semi structured interviews are said to be a non-standardized tool used for data collection in qualitative research (Kajornboon, 2006). Semi structured interviews provided a systematic way of talking and listening to people in order to collect useful data from targeted individuals. Based on this kind of research, in-depth semi-structured interviews were selected in order to uncover important issues in the establishment and management of KAZA, as well as investments in the KAZA. This is so because semi-structured interviews are open in nature, they allow for open ended questions which may not be predetermined. Prior to doing field work, an interview guide was developed. This interview guide was used in the field during the interviews to provide order and direction to the discussions. Corbetta (2003) explains semi-structured interviews as “the order in which the various topics in a research are dealt with and the wording of the questions are left to the interviewer’s discretion” (2003: 270). Thus, semi-structured interviews offered an opportunity for both the research participant and I to seek clarification on the questions and the responses. Therefore, after
each question, further questions, were asked through probing, which enabled the respondents to provide more information which they may otherwise have left out (Gibson & Brown, 2009; Patton, 2015). Further, semi-structured interviews allowed me to interact formally and informally with the key informants who included government officials, Simalaha project staff, and local community members in Simalaha Community Conservancy who have been affected by the creation of the KAZA, traditional leaders and civic leaders (Corbetta 2003; Denzin 2005). Table 3.1 shows the number and organization of informants.

3.1: List of research participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of participant</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<td>KFW</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>December 2017</td>
<td>Civil Society organization WWF official 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 January 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 December 2017</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization Official 3</td>
<td>Panthera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>27 July 2018/19</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization official 4</td>
<td>WWF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 January 2018</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Government official 2, Ministry of Tourism &amp; Arts</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>26 July 2018</td>
<td>Local community farmer 3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>26 August 2018</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>27 July 2018</td>
<td>Local community farmer 7</td>
<td>Simalaha Community Conservancy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, 2018
Such interactions accorded me an opportunity to quickly reflect on the responses and ask more questions on government’s motivation for participation in the KAZA TFCA. Based on the responses, I also raised follow-up questions to clarify and validate the data. Clarity and validation sought after the field visit was done via phone calls, WhatsApp and through emails. I took notes from phone calls on certain issues while, WhatsApp messages and emails replies were used as text to fill identified data gaps. Follow-ups were done in order to get in-depth responses to what the government of Zambia had invested in the KAZA as well to gain insight into the implications of this participation and investment for the local communities. Semi structured interviews enabled the respondents to open up as much as possible, which allowed me to gather a lot of data. It is also important to note that some respondents were not as open and seemed unwilling to share information despite interrogating them, and thus I interpreted their non-verbal gestures. Further, the interviews were supplemented by field notes, observations and pictures were taken of some of the issues observed. All interviews conducted were recorded with the permission of the respondents.

The use of semi-structured interviews facilitated smooth discussions which enabled the participants to tell their stories (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). This led to collection of detailed data relevant to the research questions. This technique offered long narratives which complemented the study. Therefore, this technique became a basis for construction of reality that enables the researcher to better understand the participants’ actions thereby aiding in meaning making in the process of data analysis. This way of applying the technique is described as a site where interviewees and interviewers converge to construct meaning for a research project (Roulston, et.al, 2003).

3.4.2 Document and literature review

To supplement the above discussed data collection tools, other sources of primary data included minutes from KAZA related meetings, pre-feasibility study reports, IDPs implementation reports, regulations and KAZA memorandum of understanding and treaties among others were used. The documents reviewed acted as pointers during proposal formulation and fieldwork and formed a basis for testing the factuality of the data collected through interviews and observations. This was complemented and substantiated by reviewing institutional records on KAZA contributions to
national tourism development in Zambia, academic publications on the KAZA, consultant reports, organizational brochures, institutional reports, institutional magazines, Leaflets, newspapers, published and non-published material on KAZA, policy documents governing wildlife management in Zambia, newspaper articles and internet sources among others. The use of several technics enabled the inefficiency of one tool to be offset by the other, as well as collect all the necessary information useful to the research. Reviewing of published literature on the KAZA was cardinal in enabling me to understand the discourse of TFCAs in Southern Africa and trace the gap to be filled by this research (Gibson & Brown, 2009).

3.4.3 Seeing is believing - Observation as a method

Observation formed one of the key methods used in this study. Cowie (2009) defines observation as conscious noticing and detailed examination of participants’ behaviour in a naturalistic setting. This research adopts Kawulich (2012)’s definition of observation who defines it as a systematic description of the events, behaviours, and artefacts of a social setting. Observation creates an opportunity to obtain rich, detailed descriptions of the social setting in the field and record in the field notebook. While observing a researcher is able to view unscheduled events, improve interpretation, and develop new questions to ask the informants (Kawulich, 2012). Observations enable researchers to describe existing situations using the five senses, providing a ‘written photograph’ of the situation under study (Siame, 2017). Similarly, during the fieldwork in Simalaha active observation was another way of collecting and validating data. Through observation, I consciously noticed and examined participants’ behaviour. In the field, I also used observations to take note of physical changes in the KAZA. I observed changes in various villages in Chief Sekute’s and Senior InyamboYeta’s Chiefdoms and took note of local communities’ interactions with wildlife, local communities’ gardens, domesticated animals, wildlife, school, solar power at the primary school and water sources in Simalaha Community Conservancy. I also paid attention to body language, intonations, pitches and pauses to interpret what the respondents were communicating with the use of non-verbal language, and this is used to comprehend the verbal responses as advised by Creswell (2009) and Patton (2015). Observations were made during interviews, meetings and during field trips in the Simalaha conservancy and recorded in the note book. Pictures were also taken to enhance interpretation of the data collected. During interviews,
observations included taking note of ‘moves and actions. Thus, observation helped me verify the information given by the research participants.

3.5 Sampling process and sample size

This study used purposive sampling to select the research participants. As Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007) have noted, purposive sampling’s logic and power lies in the selection of cases that are rich in information and offers the greatest insight into the research objectives. Purposive sampling was used in order to select the participants based on their active involvement in the KAZA project on the Zambian component, knowledge of the project, and those affected by the KAZA in Simalaha. This was to ensure that only those with experience and stakes in the KAZA were included as the study population. The use of purposive sampling is recommended when researchers need specific information on a particular case which is of value to their project (Gubrium, 2010). Participants were drawn from various organisations and government departments as shown in Table 3.1 above. These research participants were only those directly involved and had prior Knowledge of the KAZA project. As shown in Table 3.1, there are basically five groups of people that participated on this study. The government officials provided information on reasons for Zambian government’s participation in the KAZA, the amount of investments and how this participation benefits the state. The traditional leaders were key in explaining the entry point of the KAZA TFCA (the establishment of the KAZA TFCA and their expectations) and their perceived impacts of the KAZA on their subordinates. More information on funding and the KAZA establishment was obtained from the civil society officials and the funding agency. Finally, from the local communities comprising of farmers, fishermen and local traders, I captured the lived experiences of how the creation of the KAZA has affected their lives.

Prior to beginning of field work, I visited an environmental NGO where I had a meeting with the director, with a view to getting more information on the KAZA and stakeholders involved in the KAZA project on the Zambian component. After a thorough explanation of the KAZA, the director introduced me to the KAZA office in Zambia. I later visited the KAZA office, which is situated at the Ministry of Tourism and Arts. The KAZA office did not only serve as a hive of the information on the KAZA development but was also key in identifying the key stakeholders in the KAZA project. They compiled a list of key organizations involved in the KAZA, each organization’s focal
point staff and their contact numbers and email addresses. This made it easier for me to contact these people through phone calls and emails. These people became representatives of their organizations during the interviews. Later the KAZA office introduced me to the Simalaha project manager who acted as a middle person between the Simalaha local communities, the Traditional Council (Kuta) and me. This enabled me to collect data in Simalaha without much difficulty, given the strict traditional procedures in the Lozi land. Through this process thirty (30) interviews were recorded as shown in Table 3.1 above. All the interviews were recorded with the consent of the participants. Below is Figure 3.1 showing the Kuta and researchers after the interview.

![Figure 3.1: The members of the Kuta and researchers after the interview, Source:Author, 2018](image)

It is also important to note that qualitative research has no predetermined sampling size, thus the research followed the concept of saturation as advised by Mason (2010). Thus, the reoccurrence of responses to the questions signalled saturation. Therefore, in context of this study the knowledgeable participants were interviewed till the saturation was achieved (Mason, 2010; Bernard, 2000).

### 3.6 Limitations of the case study method

Although case study approaches are sought-after in social research (Johnson, 2006), they remain a controversial approach with many critics (Zainal, 2007). Similarly, Yin and Zainal outline a
number of disadvantages to the case study approach (Zainal, 2007; Yin, 1994). Case studies are said to lack rigour. In relation to this, Yin (1994:21) notes that, “too many times, the case study investigator has been sloppy, and has allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions” This exposes the case study’s biasness towards verification which is also referred to as a tendency by the researcher to confirm own preconceived notions. Hence this method is said to lack objectivity thus rendering it non-scientific.

Case study also suffers from the weakness of generalizability. Generalizability is considered as the most prominent critique of the single case study method. Case studies are said to generalise based on one case, thus critics have argued that this lacks validity and cannot offer enough grounds on which conclusion can be generalised (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995; 1997; Zainal, 2007; Yin, 2014; Harrison et.al, 2017). In relation to this, Krusenvik (2016:6), maintain that, “one of the biggest concerns and most common critiques against case studies, is its lack of scientific generalizability”. The major problem is that the studies are highly specific, that is, they only relate to a particular context. Critics believe that, in fact, the study of a small number of cases cannot offer any grounds for establishing reliability or generality of findings (Krusenvik, 2016).

Willis (2014) argues that a researcher needs to be as explicit as possible about the degree of uncertainty about the validity of the data and nature of context that allows for generation, otherwise, a case study method may not offer anything beyond the particular case. Similarly, Ragin (1987) argues that case study approaches value understanding of complexity over generality. Further, to Ragin (1987) the case strategy is not able to cope with a number of cases sufficient to yield general results, but it can still give valuable insights. For Yin (1984) case studies are too long and difficult to conduct, normally the high volumes of data produced becomes difficult to manage and organise systematically and produce massive number of documents. For this study, I encountered several challenges in my use of case study approach. For instance, it was difficult to use the local language and I had to depend on local people to provide interpretation for me. The other challenge in understanding the bounded reality was the issue of gate keeping whereby the local KAZA staff wanted to choose all research participants. Noticing a high possibility for bias in the choice of who attends to the interview requests, I had to independently make request for about half of the participants, and this included most the claimed beneficiaries (mostly women) of the Simalaha conservancy.
3.7 Countering weaknesses of a case study method

Like any other scientific inquiry process, the case method has limitations. Below I explain how I handled these limitations.

3.7.1 Ensuring methodological validity: Generalisation based on case study findings

The prominent critic that one cannot generalise to a wider population based on a single case limits the case study as a scientific method. Yin (1994:10) addresses this by arguing that “case studies are able to yield propositions” enough to offer insights in understanding phenomena in different circumstances. Yin further addresses the generalisation critique that case studies “provide little basis for scientific generalisation” by stating that, this is not their purpose and that “cases studies, like scientific experiments are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes” (2009:535). In defending case studies, Woodside (2010) argues that the objective of case study research is not to generalize findings to a population but to prove theory. Siame (2017) also claims that case studies are generalizable to theoretical claims but not to populations or universes. I argue here that criticism of generalizability is of little relevance when the intention in this study is one of particularisation, the dynamics in the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian side with focus on Simalaha community. My aim in this methodological approach is to maximise on empirically-rich, context-specific, holistic accounts that a case study offers (Willis, 2014).

Therefore, prepositions and concepts contribute to literature on TFCAs ideas and generate new perspectives in theoretical debates. Thus, the value of the case research method is not in generalising to all other contexts but, rather, in achieving depth in studying the phenomena and generating concepts, ideas and principles that characterise a particular research phenomenon. In this thesis, insights from KAZA TFCAs can contribute to theoretical understanding of TFCAs in contemporary conservation. This is not to suggest that the study of the KAZA in the Zambian component will be applicable in studying TFCAs in all parts of the world and in different contexts, but insights from this study can be used to understand similar cases in other places. In relation to this, Flyvbjerg (2001; 2006) notes that case studies provide a learning and action taking basis guided by judgement and not application of abstract universal rules. Accordingly, Duminy et.al (2014:39) and Siame (2017) argue that the value of the case study method lies in the “power of a good example as a source of theoretical development.” As such a case can only offer lessons if it
is “relatable and transferable” enabling an experience-based learning (Duminy et al, 2014:23). Therefore, case studies should not be blindly adopted and applied in other places. There is a need for careful consideration of context before transferring the insights offered by a particular case.

### 3.7.2 Dealing with the tendency for a subjective bias

The rigor of the case study method is not in any way less strict than that of other scientific methods. Case studies exhibit their own different vigour. The case study method is advantageous over other methods for this particular study because of its ability to “close in on real-life situations and test views and theory directly.” (Flyvbjerg, 2006:235). When used in TFCAs, case study brings details of Zambia’s motivation to participate and invest in the KAZA, it also closes in on the implication of KAZA on the local people as they unfolded in practice (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Further, following conducting intensive in-depth case studies some researchers have dismissed their preconceived views, assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses as wrong and that the case material has signalled the revision of their hypotheses on essential points, resulting in what is known as ‘falsification’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998; 2001; 2006). The case study method presents data of real-life situations (Zainal, 2007) and is useful for testing ideas, principles and concepts based on what exists. As, such, the case study method is empirical enough as it is grounded in reality. This makes it suitable for this study because the establishment of the KAZA and its impact on the local communities is a real-life situation. Owing to this point of view, the proximity to reality, which the case study entails, and the learning process that it generates for the researcher is the basis for advanced understanding. As such, Flyvbjerg (2006: 236) emphasises:

> The case study method contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher’s preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry. On the contrary, experiences indicate that the case study contains a greater bias toward falsification of preconceived notions than toward verification.

The other way of overcoming the limitation is by triangulating the study with other methods in order to confirm the validity of the process. Triangulation is a technique which involves ‘crosschecking’ two or more sources of data or methods in order to confirm validity, accuracy and reliability of findings (Duminy et al, 2014; Stake, 2006; Zainal, 2008). Triangulation enables the
researchers to control bias and establish the validity of propositions and findings which is an essential component in research designing and data collection process. In this research other methods such as interviews, observation, document and literature reviews among others were used in order to validate the information.

Thus, in order to ensure factuality in interpretation of data, triangulation techniques are required (Stake, 2008). Triangulation also facilitates ‘pattern matching’ between the framing theory and the empirical observations and analysis of the case. Using the case study method, the researcher collects and stores multiple sources of evidence in a comprehensive and systematic way so as to uncover converging lines of inquiry, contradictions, themes and patterns (Fox-Wolfgramm, 1997). By using multiple sources of evidence, and incorporating converging lines of enquiry, the process of triangulation and corroboration (Yin, 2009) guarantees factuality and reliability of the case study. In the research process, I reflected on various views and observations, thereby allowing a reflexive process of knowledge generation, which was not limited to documentation and interviews.

To ensure that views were cross-checked, the interviews involved research participants from non-government organizations, government officials, civil society organizations, local communities and traditional leaders. This combined team of informants allowed for views to be cross-checked from various perspectives, pattern matching, identification of conflicting views and conflict pointers. All these views were scrutinised and treated equally. Similar questions were asked to different informants, this was done in order to identify gaps for further inquiries on issues that needed additional understanding.

Views from informants were subjected to the contents of project documents, minutes from the meetings, organizational brochures, KAZA Memorandum of Understanding, Treaties, physical infrastructure, newspapers, progress reports, and feasibility studies reports. Finally, additional triangulation of the data involved scrutiny of the transcribed material by selected research participants. After transcribing the first set of interview scripts, they were sent to key informants for review and scrutiny. In the second phase of the interviews aspects that seemed unclear were subjected to more scrutiny through follow-up phone interviews and through email and WhatsApp exchanges with representatives from civil society organizations and government agencies. In
relation to this Duminy et al (2014:36) argue that, these feedback processes and procedures are particularly useful to ensure factuality.

Further, as this study sought to deepen understanding of relationships between political, economic and social factors with the environment as a backdrop of the study site. The study makes contribution to methodological advancement in political ecology. The contested nature of changes as a result of the creation of Simalaha conservancy shows that case study methods gets the researcher close to lived reality and increases the understanding of how power works to create different forms of loses and benefits for different actors. For example, the case study method enabled me to critically engage with the creation of Simalaha conservancy and its role in facilitating the loss of farm land by the local people and the introduction of conservation farming in people’s backyards. The case study method allowed me to get closer to conflicted and contested claims of benefits and costs for different interest groups such as the local communities (Including traditional leaders, fishermen, farmers and traders), environmental organisations’ officials and government official among others participating in the KAZA on the Zambian component. Thus, the methodological approach allowed me to effectively succeed in politicizing environmental issues and phenomena in Simalaha conservancy. The methodological approach succeeded in generating data that allowed for effective analysis of the distributive role of power in terms of loses and gains in TFCAs.

3.7.3 The dense case study - The case as a reality

Case studies are known for their long, rich, detailed contradictory and complex narratives of real-life situations. Such narratives may be challenging or even impossible to summarise into clear scientific formulae, general propositions, and theories (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Thus, case studies tend to derail the research process. However, the huge volumes of data gathered enabled this study to present in-depth realities of intricate events and processes, the motivation of the government to participate in the KAZA, the government’s investment in the KAZA and the subsequent impacts on the local communities. The narratives focused on in-depth analysis of particular events key for Zambian government’s participation in the KAZA, the kind of investments in the KAZA and how these are impacting on the local communities. Interviews enabled me to interact with various stakeholders and key
informants in the KAZA TFCA, writing and getting feedback enriched the KAZA and the Simalaha case in particular. The case material was found to be rich and dense due to the nature of the inquiry. The dense case study was important as it enabled me to understand the KAZA and its dynamics on the Zambian component. This uncovered the power relations between the states, funding agencies, civil society organizations and local communities. Policy contradictions and action on the ground were also uncovered. In relation to this, Rorty observed that “the way to re-enchant the world is to stick to the concrete and provide rich narratives” (Rorty1985:173). Similarly, Nietzsche (1969) invites researchers to pay attention to “little things” in order to allow for the generation of unquestioned rich narratives. As such researchers should avoid summarising rich and dense cases Peattie (2001). Peattie maintains that:

> It is simply that the very value of the case study, the contextual and interpenetrating nature of forces, is lost when one tries to sum up in large and mutually exclusive concepts. The dense case study is more useful for the practitioner and more interesting for social theory than the high-level generalisations of theory. The case story is itself the result. It is a ‘virtual reality’ (Peattie 2001:260).

Owing to the above arguments the choice of Simalaha recovery area is based on its importance to Zambia as well as to the entire KAZA landscape. The selection of Simalaha is also based on the fact that the Simalaha project endeavours to achieve one of the KAZA’s main objectives of joining fragmented wildlife habitats in order to form an interconnected mosaic of protected areas and transboundary wildlife corridors for the facilitation and enhancement of free movement of wildlife across colonial borders (PPF, 2004). As such Simalaha project was given priority as it marks the first strategic step towards the creation of a wildlife corridor. This corridor will link Chobe National Park in Botswana to Kafue National Park in Zambia. Thus, once fully functional the Simalaha conservancy will restore ecosystem health and conserve biodiversity, thereby mitigating habitat fragmentation. This will also result into the revival of culture which was lost when the biodiversity in the area was depleted. It is also hoped that the reintroduction of wildlife to the area will boast tourism which will in turn bring revenue to the area resulting into economic growth and improved social services. This will translate to improved welfare of the local communities. Thus not only is Simalaha strategically positioned to act as an animal corridor but is culturally,
economically and socially important to the local people, hence the need to understand the KAZA through the Simalaha case.

Consequently, the choice to study the KAZA TFCA was due to the conviction that a relationship exists between the choice of the case and its value to generalize. As such, prior to proposal presentation and data collection, a thorough literature review on TFCA in Africa was undertaken to determine an advanced TFCA case that would provide me with sufficient materials for analysis. I reviewed reports and academic publications on TFCA in Southern Africa. Based on the literature reviewed, I chose to study the KAZA due to its uniqueness. Firstly, KAZA is said to be the world’s largest TFCA and the first to bring together five countries to conserve the common species in the KAZA landscape. Secondly, the KAZA boasts of being home to the largest population of African elephants in the world. Finally, the KAZA is endowed with multiple natural resources and rich cultural heritage which are positioned for global tourist attraction. Based on this, I was convinced that, the study of the KAZA would provide me with rich material for analysis. It would have been more interesting to look at the entire KAZA landscape. However, due to limited time and finances; I focused on the Zambian component of the KAZA

3.8 Limitation of interviews

The interview process encounters some challenges (Roulston, et al., 2003). The common challenges include failure to observe time and, in some cases, forgetting the appointment despite sending several remainders a day before the agreed day, answering phone calls and attending to other clients during the interview process, limited time offered for interviews and a tendency by some participants to hide information. Another limitation was that of communication breakdown due to language barriers, the Simalaha area in Western Province of Zambia is predominantly inhabited by the Lozi³ people, this group of people mostly speak Lozi While some community members could speak basic English, other informants could only speak Lozi, a language which the research neither speaks nor understands, this made it difficult for the informant and I to interact. Further, although not prominent some participants contradicted each other on certain issues such

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³ The Lozi people are a language group of more than 46 different ethnic groups primarily of western Zambia, inhabiting the region of Barotseland-
as the benefits derived from the creation of the KAZA TFCA similar to Susan’s observation (Susan, 1997), thus making the process of analysing data a challenging task (Kvale, 1996)

3.9 Remedies to challenges during the interview process

For the participants who could not observe time, too busy on phone and attending to other clients while the interview was in process, I exercised maximum patience until the interviews were successfully completed. Further, in order to achieve objectivity from the respondents, material promises, and reciprocity behaviour were not tolerated. In addition to this I will submit one research report to the Ministry of Tourism and Arts. Further, to overcome the challenge of language barrier, the field contact person acted as a translator for both English and Lozi. In order to ensure objectivity in the collection and interpretation of the data, I avoided being informed by my preconceived ideas on the subject. In doing so, I also ensured reflexivity and transparency. In relation to this Qin (2016) maintains that the researcher’s position may affect the outcome of the research. Further, households in the Simalaha Conservancy are mostly headed by the men. Thus, the men who participated on this research could not give chance to the women to participate in the interviews. However, the creation of TFCAs and the KAZA in particular affects the livelihood of men and women differently, therefore women were met separately, away from their homes and interviewed in order to fill this gap and also get gender balanced view on issues affecting them.

3.10 Data analysis: making sense of the data

Like any other qualitative study, this study ensured safety in the storage of data to prevent data from landing in the hands of unknown individuals. Transcribing followed within seventy-two hours after interviews, to enhance data and information capturing during the transcribing process, or else I could forget some data (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). The transcribed data was checked against the voice script in order to ensure accuracy and that no data was omitted. Later, unnecessary data such as greetings, laughter and jokes, among others, were removed in order to remain with content related to the research questions. Transcribing involved the process of listening to the interview scripts and writing. Transcribing guided me to uncover the various themes, this involved matching the themes from the interview scripts and documents to research questions (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015). All themes from each interview script were identified with the research
question and used to build on similar ideas. The themes identified included Conservation, Tourism, regional integration, SADC membership, implications on local communities and Government investments. These themes were collated in order to facilitate interpretation and analysis. In addition to this a field note book was used to record all relevant events and experiences that were observed and the responses of the participants. This accorded me an opportunity to reflect on the given responses, unfolding issues and enabled me to come up with new questions. Further, interpretation of non-verbal body language and field documents relevant to the study provided more data for the research. Furthermore, documents relevant to the research questions were also used to substantiate the data collected.

3.11 Ethical consideration and conclusion

Prior to embarking on fieldwork my supervisor wrote me a letter of introduction for use during fieldwork. This letter was shown to all organizations and individuals who participated in this study. The letter, seeking authority to conduct interviews with government officials, was submitted to the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Tourism and Arts, who forwarded it to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife for action. Authorisation to conduct research was given through the Department of National Parks and Wildlife established structure, and no written clearance was required. For other participating organizations the letter was presented directly to the research participants prior to beginning the interviews. For the local communities and traditional leaders in Simalaha Community Conservancy, no introductory letter was required. I was introduced verbally by the Simalaha Community Conservancy manager to the traditional leaders and local community members. In all the interviews conducted I explained the objectives of the study and participation was on a voluntary basis.

Anonymity was granted to those that sought it. Issues of confidentiality were treated with utmost respect whenever they were sought by the interviewees. I omitted the data that I thought would harm the participants in any way and some were presented anonymously. Prior to the interview the purpose of the interview was explained and some participants who wished to preview the interview guide were accorded a chance to do so. This was done in order for the interviewee to make an informed decision to either participate or not to participate. This is in accordance with the
etiquettes demanded by the fundamentals of good research (Kajornboon, 2006). Additionally, the principles which govern research at University of Cape Town were applied in this study.

3.12 Conclusion

The formation and operationalization of KAZA have been largely driven by political and community development objectives. This has led to the project being laced with the political ecology of nature conservation. The debates on KAZA are driven by both top-down and bottom up voices. Thus, studying such a socio-politically complex conservation project requires use of a nuanced qualitative approach that can allow me to get to the depth of state motives and activities on hand, and private sector and community development imperatives. Qualitative approach was used in this study to collect rich context informed descriptive data on the formation and operationalization of the KAZA. A qualitative approach to the study of TFCAs illuminates on debates that call for context specific study of nature conservation and rural development, and further uncovers the importance of understanding of concrete ‘little things’ in transboundary nature conservation projects and tourism development in contexts that are poverty ridden and governed through a hybridised regime- juxtaposed modern state authority on a very top-down traditional authority system. A qualitative approach was useful in tracking unique events; enlightening the experience and interpretation of events by actors with varied stakes and roles in the KAZA TFCA. Thus, this methodological approach provides an opportunity for all voices to be analysed and interpreted to generate nuanced understanding of the KAZA TFCA set up on the Zambian side. The rarely heard groups in TFCAs, including small scale farmers and fishermen, were reached and interviewed on issues that define the successes and pitfalls of the KAZA TFCA. The methodical approach enabled me to zoom in on specific minute events in Simalaha community Conservancy. Therefore, I found qualitative research to be more insightful when seeking answers to both the asked questions and those which were not thought of when designing the research. The approach allowed me to achieve triangulation as an important aspect of qualitative research methods. Thus, the methodological approach facilitated both the internal and external validity of the study. Having discussed the methodology, the next chapter discusses the motivation of the Zambian government to participate in the KAZA.
CHAPTER FOUR: MOTIVATION FOR ZAMBIA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE KAZA

4.1 Introduction
The KAZA TFCA treaty recognizes that KAZA as a regional development programme has the potential to contribute towards social and economic development, conservation of natural resources and regional integration among others. Thus, as highlighted in Chapter Two and also shown in Chapter Five, states participate and invest in the KAZA for various reasons. This is because states have individual needs and expected gains from TFCAs which include, enhancement of conservation of biodiversity, promotion of socio-economic development for rural community through tourism, thus they are seen as nodes of rural development. TFCAs are also seen as practical means of achieving regional integration, maintaining peace and security. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on Zambia’s motivation for participating in the KAZA TFCA. The motivations for Zambia’s participation are divided into five main themes: regional integration, being part of the global conservation agenda, regional blocs and TFCAs: KAZA-SADC relations, easing tourists’ movement through the KAZA Univisa: the dynamics and social economic development.

4.2 Regional integration
Regional integration was pointed out as one of the major reasons for Zambia’s participation in the TFCAs (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Regional integration is understood as a process by which nations in a geographical proximity use similar rules and institutions to enter into agreement for a common cause, it could be economic, environmental or political reasons among others (Vanheukelom & Scott, 2016). Thus, regional integration is said to be instrumental in resolving problems which straddle political boundaries and cannot be addressed by individual state (Vanheukelom & Scott, 2016). Therefore, TFCAs and the KAZA in particular offers an opportunity for actualizing regional integration through tourism. The claim here is that KAZA promotes dialogue and conversations among member countries and promotes innovations to ensure free movement of the people and wildlife in the region. In relation to this, one government official pointed out that, “there is power in unity, if countries talk to each other, they are likely to live in harmony and are less likely to be in conflict with each other.” (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). This relates to another government official who added that an interaction with member states leads to Peace and tranquility, eases movement of animals and both
human beings and goods from one country to the other thereby promoting cross border trade in the KAZA landscape (Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). Although peace has been closely linked to TFCAs none of the TFCAs in Southern Africa has Peace as one of its objectives in the treaty (SADC, 2007; Metcalfe and Kepe, 2008). Zambia’s participation in the KAZA TFCA is linked to the regional commitments (SADC, 2007). This links to views by civil society actors that the KAZA has the potential of promoting cross border trade, internationalization of businesses and improved balance of payments (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017).

Furthermore, some government officials and scholars argue that regional integration is about managing resources together, harmonization of laws, policies, practices and pronouncements (interview, Government official 3, 12 December 2017; Bilal & Vanheukelom, 2015). For example, the fish ban policy which used to be observed by Namibia and Zambia at different times is now synchronized and now the two countries endeavor to do it at the same period. Previously, Zambia implemented a fish ban from December to February on the other hand the implementation of a fish ban in Namibia was undertaken in September. This presented inconsistence in managing shared resources, and as such the implementation of the fish ban did not yield the desired results. For this reason, when Zambia was developing a fisheries management plan, Namibians were involved, and the Namibian communities participated in the meetings. As a result, the people put pressure on their government so that the government ensured that the fisheries departments synchronized the fishing bans (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017).

Eventually, the Namibian government adopted a fish ban and it is currently being implemented at the same time as Zambia’s (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In relation to this, interview data indicate that the synchronizing of the fisheries policy has led to an increase in the fish resource during the fish ban, as it is believed that breeding takes place during the period of fish ban (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017; Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017). However, even if the fish ban is implemented at the same time by both countries illegal fishing still occurs during fish ban. To confirm this, the local traders noted that even if it is difficult to trade during certain periods of the year because the government implements
a fish ban in the area, it is difficult for us to stop fishing because that is the source of our livelihood. Some local traders noted that:

During the previous fish ban we were caught by the scouts, our fish was confiscated and we are charged a penalty of K100” (Local trader1, interview, 28 July 2018).

During the last fish ban we were arrested by the police because we were caught with the fish, we were only released after paying a K300 (Local trader 2, interview, 28 July 2018; Local trader 3, interview, 28 July 2018).

The government of Zambia implements the fish ban through the Fisheries and Livestock department which is mandated to manage the fish resources. In the KAZA region the community scouts supplement government efforts in management of the fish and other resources, other government wings such as the Zambia Police, Department of National Parks and Wildlife among others also take part in enforcing the law. From the above narratives, illegal fishing in the KAZA region shows that despite the fish ban fishing continues and some fishermen go unnoticed. Further, the disparities in the penalties given to offenders reveal uncoordinated implementation of the law (Fisheries Act, 2011). Thus, there exist gaps between the law in theory and that which is practiced. The disparity in the charges given for the same offense is a clear sign that not only are the fishermen in conflict with the laws, but the law enforcers also do not adhere to the law provisions. Similarly, a government official pointed out that there are complaints from Namibia and Botswana that the animals are poached a lot when they cross over to the Zambian side despite (Government Official 8, interview, 25 July, 2018). This is recorded despite the harsh penalties given to the offenders when caught.

In relation to the above penalties, sentences and punishments on wildlife crimes are yet to be integrated and this continues to present challenges in implementing fully the KAZA Treaty on the Zambian component. For example, in Zambia, a sentence of 15 years imprisonment with hard labor is slapped on the person that is found in possession of ivory or ivory products such as bangles and bracelets among others without a permit, while in Namibia, being in possession of any worked-on Ivory is not an offence. By definition, worked on ivory means ivory just cut into pieces (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Therefore, in Namibia, if one is found in
possession of pieces of ivory or ivory ornaments, he/she is not convicted of committing a crime because the ivory is worked on. Such disparities call for harmonization of both policy and practice in member states added a government official (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In relation to this, data from government sources show that in the entire SADC region, Zambia has the toughest sentences, therefore, offenders would prefer to run to the neighboring states where the punishments are less stiff. Hence, the need for harmonization of rules, laws and regulations for effective joint management of resources (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017; Maboko, 2017). Government sources indicate that in order to curb poaching, joint patrols, sharing of information and intelligence, knowledge and skills on wildlife management among member states are being tried and implemented (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017).

Despite the efforts to harmonize and manage the KAZA region jointly, there exists “variation in the natural resources management regimes among the partner countries, as well as significant differences in tourism development efforts, policies, and practices across the KAZA TFCA landscape” (KfW, 2014). In relation to this, some scholars argue that it is difficult to harmonise policies let alone legislation, this is because each country has its own independent legal statutes, acts, and so forth (Sinthumule, 2018; Linell et.al 2019). In relation to this Rusinga & Mapira (2012) argues that there exist sharp differences in policies on engagement with international communities on security as well as developmental issues. Furthermore, there is no regulatory body or penalties to enforce policy and ensure that all the partners comply with the set agreements, thus countries are not motivated to abide. Furthermore, civil society representatives maintain that the countries remain divided on a number of things for example, each country does its own marketing of the KAZA, despite the introduction of the KAZA Univisa between Zimbabwe and Zambia (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018; see Chapter Four).

Tourism marketing remains divided and the money collected by each country remains in that country, there is no mechanism for sharing of the revenue collected. Although it is a positive step towards integration, implementation and management of the Univisa resources is not well coordinated. Similarly, civil society organization insist that despite scholars arguing that TFCAs have the capacity to drop colonial fences, enhance the movement of animals, human and goods
across borders (Hanks, 2003) practices in TFCA through the KAZA show that tourism reinforces colonial fences.

For example, Namibia markets its tourism industry in Germany, and it is easy for it to do so due to its historic background than Zambia (Civil Society Organization Senior Official 1 interview, 22 January 2018; Civil Society Organization Senior Official 1, interview, 24 November 2017).

Owing to the above discussion, it is clear that narratives on the KAZA point to the fact that harmonization of policy is not a straightforward task, but a complex one as the harmonization of policy in specific areas and on specific TFCA creates a bigger gap in other areas of the countries’ resource management. This is because when policy is harmonized in one area in a particular TFCA, it implies that, that area will be governed by multiple member state laws and regulations while other domestic protected areas outside that protected area (TFCA) will be governed by the national laws and regulations thus causing fragmentation in the governance of the resources. Therefore, harmonization of policy has an implication on the wider country’s biodiversity and enforcement of the national and international conservation protocols and practices.

Although government officials have maintained that regional integration does not take away countries’ sovereignty and that the idea of TFCA is protection of wildlife when they move across boundaries. This is also clear in the treaty that member states have the sovereignty and cannot lose their identity to regional integration (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017). Similarly, another government official maintained that the KAZA Treaty has not come to take away the individual member country’s intervention that have been happening, it has come to complement the natural resources management efforts of member states (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017). On the contrary, some scholars have argued that regional integration take away the country’s sovereignty as the funders influence the country’s decisions (see Chapter five). Similarly, other scholars maintain that TFCA are part of the global environmental governance schemes (Duffy, 2006).

Therefore, states through their regional cooperation are encouraged to participate in order to derive more benefits from schemes. In Zambia, the KAZA Project is more of a tourism issue than peace.
In terms of regional cooperation, the Univisa is a clear illustration of the efforts to ensure seamless flow of tourists but, nothing is mentioned on how the Univisa can be a source of regional insecurity. Further, it is established that marketing of the KAZA and Univisa seems to be done at national level and not as KAZA as a whole. This point to one major issue in TFCAs, countries and regions are usually at different levels of development and stand to benefit differently within the TFCA arrangement. In this case, Zimbabwe and other countries in the KAZA TFCA seem to have better tourism and development infrastructure than Zambia. There are no significant benefits from TFCAs to poor nations because the environmental governance scheme tends to advance the interests and control of the political and business elites on resources (Mbaiwa, 2003; Duffy, 2005; Spenceley, 2008; Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016 Lineel, 2018). Further, wealthier countries with well-developed infrastructure such as roads, accommodation facilities and better policies tend to benefit more than the poorer countries with less developed infrastructure and poor policies (Ramutsindela et al. 2012), here the Zambian component of KAZA is the case in point. In relation to this, it can be argued that the benefits of TFCAs are overshadowed by elements of corruption, inequality and aggressive behavior by the few elites who seek to protect their own interest and control resources.

4.3 Regional blocs and TFCAs: KAZA-SADC relations

In Africa, regional blocs such as Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), SADC, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) among others play a cardinal role in facilitating regional integration, easy mobility of people and goods, promotion of trade and tourism, international and regional investment, promotion of peace and security among others. It is important to note that there are diverse and specific functions for all the regional blocs, however, their main aim is to promote economic development and corporation (Ntara, 2016). Accordingly, SADC has been key in reinforcing regional integration by encouraging countries to participate in activities of common interest. SADC Member States have a long history of collaboration in various calls of mutual interest. Previously they united and offered each other military assistance, political and ideological ideas. Today the SADC countries are cooperating in natural resource management (Rusinga and Mapira, 2012). In relation to this, SADC encourage states to participate in TFCAs because TFCAs’ roles and functions sit within the SADC mandate of facilitating regional integrity, peace and security.
and economic development among others. Similarly, SADC supports sustainable management of the fish resources through its SADC protocol on fisheries signed by member states in 2001 (SADC, 2017). The protocol recognizes member state’s responsibility to effectively manage the shared fish resource and facilitates regional integration. By signing this protocol signals the willingness by member states to harmonize their fisheries related legislation and protect aquaculture. Accordingly, the findings show that one of the major reasons for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA is that TFCAs are part of the SADC agenda meant to promote socio-economic development through sustainable tourism development, creation of jobs and conservation of biodiversity among others (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Accordingly, by ratifying SADC protocol on Wildlife and Law Enforcement in 1999 Zambia exhibited its political will to participate and promote TFCA projects (SADC, 2007). Thus the legal basis for establishment, development and management of TFCAs is the SADC Protocol on Wildlife and Law Enforcement Article 4, 2 (f): “to promote the conservation of shared wildlife resources through the establishment of TFCAs.”

Member states have participated in the KAZA because it is in line with the SADC initiative of efficiently managing wildlife and conserving biodiversity in the region, using tourism and the auxiliary enterprises as a vehicle for improving the living standards of the local people (Terms of Reference: Consulting services for the mid-term review of the KAZA TFCA Project BMZ Project No. 2006 65 646 and BMZ Project No. 2009 66 788). SADC plays a major role in recruiting member states to participate in the TFCAs. In relation to this SADC (2007: 10) states that “SADC Secretariat facilitates, coordinates, supports and guides the processes of TFCA formation and implementation of TFCAs, it also encourages enabling conditions for TFCA to flourish in the region.” TFCA are also backed by other SADC protocols which include but are not limited to Protocol on Shared Watercourses, revised in 2000, the Charter of the Regional Tourism Organization of Southern Africa (RETOSA) of 1997, SADC Protocol on Development of Tourism of 1998 (SADC, 2007).

In line with this, one government official insists that Zambia is participating in the Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA) because the KAZA is a SADC approved programme (Government Official 3, interview, 22 January 2018). Another government official
stated that The KAZA programme is by and large a SADC driven issue within countries (Government official 2, interview, 12 December 2017). This was confirmed by a SADC report (SADC, 2007) which states that SADC is responsible for the facilitation of the formation and implementation of the TFCA in the Southern African region. It also helps member states access the required funding for the implementation of projects. This relates to one civil society official who maintained that “we fund the KAZA because we were requested to do so by SADC,” therefore, SADC is the strong driver behind KfW funding’ (Funding Agency official 1, interview, 24 November 2017). As such Zambia’s participation in the KAZA is inevitable as it fulfills its regional obligation thereby being involved in the environmental governance. In relation to this another research participant argued that in 2003, Zambia ratified the SADC Protocol on Wildlife and Law Enforcement in this protocol there are a number of interventions and among them is to encourage partner member states to collaborate where there is mutual interest (Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018).

Therefore, the established mutual gains for KAZA member states and SADC in general involve anticipated tourism development, job creation, protection of biodiversity resources and promoting inclusive socio-economic growth and development through tourism (Suich et al., 2004; Spenceley, 2008). In relation to this a government official added that the KAZA Project is recognized as a regional project by SADC and SADC is interested to see the reports of the progress of the KAZA (Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). KAZA TFCA’s has received recognition by SADC as the good practice that other countries can learn from, thus, the KAZA is effectively implementing the collaboration in order to safeguard the natural resources for both the member countries and the entire SADC. This relates to a government official who further argued that SADC has stamped and supported the TFCA’s as initiatives that can bring many benefits for the region in terms of economic growth and prosperity (Government official 4, interview 22 January 2018). Similarly, a senior government official added that SADC Protocol on Wildlife and Law Enforcement calls for collaboration in the management of resources therefore; SADC supports the joint management of resources in the KAZA landscape by and through partner countries (Senior Government Official 2, interview, 17 November 2017).
Owing to the above, it is clear that SADC promotes TFCAs as one of the crucial tools in fostering peace and tranquility in the region. SADC and other supporters of TFCAs have used the notion of peace as one of the aims for the establishment of TFCAs. Although peace has been closely linked to TFCAs, none of the TFCAs in Southern Africa has Peace as one of its objectives in the treaty or objective (Metcalfe and Kepe, 2008; SADC, 2012). There also exists a direct synergy between the SADC Secretariat and KAZA Secretariat. This is proved by the fact that the KAZA Secretariat, which is largely responsible for protocols, administration, facilitation and monitoring of KAZA activities and outputs is situated in Botswana, where the SADC Secretariat responsible for facilitation, implementation, fundraising for TFCAs has its headquarters. Thus, it can be argued that power on KAZA management radiates from SADC headquarters.

4.4 Conservation of biodiversity

The findings show that, the Zambian government participates in the KAZA because the objectives of the KAZA fit into the country’s vision for management of resources. Like other participating states, Zambia advances conservation objectives as the primary reason for its participation in the KAZA. As such Zambia is one of the largest contributors of land to the KAZA. This is because TFCAs have the capacity to cover large areas for conservation purposes. Accordingly, TFCAs have gained much popularity because they are seen to be promising to enlarge conservation spaces by dropping fences and achieve both conservation and development objectives (van der Linde, 2001; Bennett, 2003). Therefore, the KAZA is about conservation of biodiversity that ultimately ends up supporting socio-economic growth and development of the KAZA member states through enhanced tourism and other activities such as fisheries and agriculture as discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Six.

The concept of TFCAs is grounded in protection of biodiversity to generate socio-economic value for local populations and for governments. Thus, operationalization of the KAZA is hinged on initiatives to protect biodiversity while generating practical value for human beings. Research participants recount that the Zambezi River Basin is home to about 40 million people who rely on the river for drinking water, fisheries, irrigation, hydropower production, mining and industry, ecosystem services and maintenance, and other uses (Government official 6, interview, 12 December 2017; Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Similarly, data from
participants show that the natural resource base in the KAZA supports biophysical and socio-cultural systems which in turn support humanity in their millions (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018).

However, humans have a tendency of overexploiting resources, this has the potential to deplete the natural resources, cause suffering and threaten human existence. This is not different from the case of Simalaha where poaching as well as liberation wars led to the depletion of wildlife (Civil Society Organization Official 3, interview, 5 December 2017). In relation to this, data reveals that the growing population in the member states means more pressure on the natural resources as scramble for land and natural resources is becoming more prominent leading to competition for land between human beings and wildlife (Government official 1, Interview, 3 November 2017). This scramble implies that failure to plan for wildlife management will result into perishing of wildlife.

Consequently, the KAZA participating countries realized that the resources are owned jointly, and belong to no single member state, thus the need for joint management systems and strategies that transcend boundaries becomes very important (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). This is because nature is blind to political boundaries (Hanks, 2003; Zbicz, 1999). In relation to this, information shows that the KAZA Treaty is hinged on sustainability of the resources in the KAZA area. Thus, participants in the study summarize their interest in the KAZA “…we participate in the KAZA because we want to sustain the resource which transcend boundaries for current and future generation.” (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018). Furthermore, the realization that animals are not restricted by colonial boundaries which has little regard for the ecological connectivity and integrity (PPF, 2013) means that authorities and stakeholders need to invest in guaranteeing protection of wildlife in the region. This relates to views by government officials (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017) who’s argues that there is an immediate need to drop the colonial boundaries which abruptly disrupted both human and animal movement and ‘freedoms’ and jointly manage the resources which transcend political boundaries. This is confirmed by Hanks (2003)) who argues that traditional migratory routes have been disrupted by erection of colonial border fences in turn distorting the ecosystems.
In relation to this, proponents of TFCAs have condemned colonial boundaries for impeding conservation of migratory wildlife by preventing wildlife from roaming freely (Hanks, 2003; Ferreira, 2004; Munthali, 2007), therefore the immediate need to remove man-made constraints and allow for wildlife to roam freely, restore wildlife ecosystems and unite people who have long been separated by colonial boundaries (Murphy, 2010). Overall, the TFCAs proposes a holistic approach to ecological ills and economic challenges that affect most of the rural population (Murphy, 2010; De Villiers, 1999; Griffins at.al, 1999; Sandwith at.al, 2001; Hanks, 2003) by opening up the previously fenced animal routes which restrain animal movements. The focus has been on enlarging the conservation spaces as a way of conserving more species and changing the living standards of the local people living in the rural areas.

The KAZA TFCA is important in conserving native species like the African Elephants, Lions, Hynas, Rhinoceroses, Sitatunga, Buffalo, Waterbuck, Lechwe and the endangered African Wild dog and other species which may not be native but of good benefits to the region (Civil Society Organization Official 3, interview, 5 December 2017; Carlson et.al., 2004). Further, there is need to secure wildlife corridors for transboundary wildlife migration in order to improve biodiversity and wildlife population (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017). In relation to this rationale a representative of the civil society interested in the KAZA (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 19 December 2017) asserts that KAZA is all about creating connectivity for wildlife and animals in areas experiencing overpopulation are able to move to areas which are void. In relation to this civil society organizations contend that when boundaries were being put in place the focus was mainly on geopolitical issues and little or no attention was put on ecological connectivity (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). Thus, in order to create migratory routes for wildlife some government officials call for recreation of animal corridors (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). This relates to other participants who assert that there was no consideration to the fact that the animals need to move in time of stress, it could be in search of water, food, procreation, or security among others (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017).

This necessitated the need for the recreation of corridors to allow for the movement of animals from one place to another in order to reach certain dispersal areas (Government official 2,
This argument is in line with the vision of the early supporters of peace parks which was “to see the creation of protected areas across international borders to ensure preservation of Southern African biological diversity, reopen ancient wildlife migration routes and promote ecological systems…” (Peace Parks Foundation (PPF 2013:2). In relation to this, government officials argue that animals have natural routes, there are movements of different animals such as lions and elephants among others (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). With the KAZA in place, free movement of animals is slowly being realized as animals will be able to move from Chobe National Parks to Kafue National Park through the Simalaha conservancy.

This does not mean there are no challenges, as human settlements or incompatible land use continue to hinder the creation and sustainability of seamless biodiversity corridors in the KAZA areas. For example, “a rice field next to the national park or game reserve can fragment the ecological systems therefore countries need to talk to each other in order to recreate these corridors” (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). It should be noted that these areas are also subject to historically developed land uses and traditional governance regimes which are not easy to change. Thus, while progress is being recorded, research participants were unequivocal that more still needs to be done to ensure that biodiversity corridors are recreated or created and become functional. While research participants and proponents of TFCAs support the creation of animal corridors, some studies show that “corridors can also act as biological bridges for vectors and pathogens they carry” (Cumming, 2011; Ferguson & Hanks, 2010) thus transferring disease to areas where disease did not previously exist. Therefore, before creating the corridors there is need for assessment of disease in the areas to be opened.

The process of creating animal corridors is a complex one. It involves mapping, which is a participatory process (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 23 January 2018). In line with this idea, data indicates that (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017) people with prior knowledge of the area were identified who revealed the routes which were previously used by the animals and these areas were mapped. This was confirmed by one local farmer who stated that “I was one of the local people who participated in mapping of our area” (Local community farmer 1, interview, 26 July 2018). Some research participants stated that when the
areas are mapped, the people whose fields were in the animal corridors were encouraged to move their fields to other places where their fields would not be destroyed by wildlife (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 23 January 2018). Additionally, in order to encourage the local people whose fields were in the animal corridors to move their fields to other places, incentives in the form of crops and other inputs were given to those who agreed to move their fields (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 23 January 2018). Although the government and PPF officials maintained that people had voluntarily moved to recreate animal corridors and recreate ecological integrity in the KAZA, the movement of people from their original areas seemed to have been induced by new restrictions introduced by the KAZA project, and destruction of crops by wild animals in the area. This observation in Simalaha is similar to the findings by Milgroom, and Spierenburg (2008), Sinthumule (2018; 2019) in their research on the GLTP and the Greater Mapungubwe respectively, where a combination of new regulations restricted local people’s access to natural resources. The increased presence of wildlife forced the local people to accept their resettlement along the borders of the park.

The expansion of conservation areas through creation of animal corridors has resulted in the creation of wildlife sanctuary which has led to the erection of new fences in conservation areas. The Simalaha sanctuary is a unique conservancy, where double fencing is introduced to protect wildlife and ‘cage’ the people as seen in Figure 4.1. Double fencing here is observed where large fences have both wildlife and people in one space, but another layer of fencing is introduced to protect the fields from attacks by wildlife inside the larger fence. Thus, rather than live up to the TFCA proponent’s claims of ensuring co-existence in Simalaha, the conservation efforts in the area have led to the erection of special fences that separate wildlife from people’s livelihood sources (gardens). While PPF continues to claim that Simalaha is a case in point where wildlife and people have been made to co-exist through TFCA efforts, the reality is different.
This entails that the creation of the KAZA has also resulted in the erection of new fences where man and animals interact, this interaction has given birth to new problems including animal attacks on the crops of the local people living in the sanctuary (see Chapter Six). Further, there is also a promise that dropping of fences will reunite the previously separated population. This’ may not be an easy task and poses threats to national security as the question of sovereignty comes to the fore.

In relation to this Wolmer cautions that countries in Southern Africa have different laws and policies, as such they may not be willing to let their people or natural resources be governed by a foreign country (Wolme, 2003).

Furthermore, dropping the fences is a significant undertaking which goes beyond mere pronouncements and calling for more tourists. It requires a substantial amount of both financial and social capital and factoring in the consequences of such actions (Murphy, 2010), a thing that is yet to be actualized in the KAZA TFCA. Although the findings and proponents of TFCAs show that the primary purpose for TFCAs and Zambia’s participation in KAZA TFCA is conservation of species which results in social economic development. The critiques of TFCAs have argued that the countries’ underlying purpose for participating in TFCAs goes far beyond conservation. Conservation narratives are only used to obtain financial assistance (Ramutsindela, 2004). This is evidenced by the considerable financial backing provided to KAZA member states by big
international conservation and financial organizations, such as WWF, World Bank, KFW among others on account of conservation and tourism development as seen in Chapter Five. The TFCA conservation and poverty alleviation narratives provide a compelling argument for international financiers to TFCA and conservation initiative is portrayed as government driven and owned by the local communities.

However, the realities clearly show that this project is owned by outsiders. For example, the budget for Simalaha Community Conservancy is held in South Africa, and in most cases the funds are paid directly to service providers (Government official 1, interview, 16 August 2018). This implies that the local communities have no powers and cannot make decisions on how the funds can be utilized. Similarly, one local farmer in Simalaha Community Conservancy maintained that “the Simalaha Conservancy is a community project therefore the management of the project should be done by the community and not the royal family, this will enable local community have a sense of ownership.” (Local community farmer 2, interview, 27 July 2018). Further, the social development indicators in the affected areas remain static. For instance, there is no radical anti-poverty transformative agenda in the KAZA documents and reports. I argue here that it is highly likely that ‘taking down of fences’ to expand the conservation areas is also supported by TFCAs proponents and big international organizations as a way of masking their real intentions in conservation when their motives are to expand their territories in order to control.

In addition, the alarming notion of crisis or danger on which TFCAs are premised is a clear indication that TFCA’s main objective go beyond conservation. Countries were called to act immediately failure to which the world’s resources on which human beings are also dependent for their survival will go to extinct. The notions used “Environmental crisis” and “danger” are meant to alarm, render the States hopeless and instill fear in them, as such they will have little or no resistance but to participate so as rescue their resources. Therefore, the TFCAs initiatives are part of the global solutions to the framed crisis (Ramutsindela, 2014). Owing to this it can be argued that the creation of KAZA TFCAs is not necessarily meant to conserve the endangered species in SADC but as a way of recolonizing Africa by powerful groups, but this time dressing it up under the guise of conservation. This can be proved by checking the list of interested parties and investors and how local actors have minor roles. The key investors in the KAZA are not local people, they
do not source financing locally and their networks are global in nature. Despite the wide acceptance of TFCAs and the KAZA in particular due to the huge promises they offer, implementation of TFCAs is faced with numerous threats. Table 4.1 below shows some potential threats to TFCAs.

Table 4.1: Potential threats to TFCAs in Zambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential threats to TFCAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incompatible and uncontrolled land use resulting into overgrazing and encroachment among others. This hinders the creation and sustaining of a seamless biodiversity corridors in the KAZA areas. Can potentially cause fragmentation of habitats as well as complete destruction of habitats leading to wildlife depletion in TFCAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different levels of development, capacities and availability of resources may result into low benefits by less developed countries and more benefits to developed countries. For example, the Zambian component of the KAZA is poorly developed and in certain times of the year the roads become impassable. Thus the tourist arrivals in the country are very low. This can result into disengagement by countries that do not get the most benefits of TFCAs. Thus pose detrimental effects to the well implementation of the TFCA (Suich, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of TFCAs has prompted the removal of fences and improved infrastructure such as hotels, and roads. Resulting into rapid borderer movements and increase tourists arrivals. This has also attracted illegal activities such as smuggling and different kind of crime, commercial poaching, charcoal production, timbering, illegal immigration as well as terrorism which poses serious security issues (Rusinga and Mapira, 2012; Warmer, 2003; Civil Society Organization Official 3, interview, 5th December, 2017).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of animal corridors results into movement of wildlife leading to spreading of vectors, thus spreading diseases which may wipe both the animal and human population. Human-wildlife conflicts may result into loss of both animal and human lives thus impeding the smooth running of the TFCA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over dependence on donor funding. The government of Zambia has no component of KAZA funding in the national budget. As such the activities are supported by the donors (Government official 2, interview, 17th November, 2017). It is clear that TFCAs are mainly donor driven thus the continuity of the programme is threatened should the donors pullout. In addition to this donor funding does not necessarily address a countries’ needs because donors funding comes with conditionaries and are driven by the politics of the countries and the donors’ own priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrealistic expectations of the TFCA benefits by both the local people and investors may lead to frustration which may adversely affect the project. Mainly the local communities do not understand that the benefits from the wildlife investments may take a long time to materialize, they are not immediate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High poverty levels by communities living in the KAZA region on the Zambian component have the potential to frustrate the project. This is because if the people do not reap the expected results to alleviate poverty they may resort to poaching and other sustainable means of getting quick benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change is also cited as a potential threat to the KAZA TFCA. For instance the decline of water in Zambezi river due to climate change may cause cross border conflicts between Zambia and Zimbabwe due to competition for the little resource. Further, prolonged scarce of water may lead to death of wildlife thus defeating the main KAZA objective.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Author, 2018
4.4 Social-economic development

The findings show that the other major motive for government participation in the KAZA is to tap from the claimed socio-economic benefits offered by tourism. In relation to this a senior government official maintained that “Tourism sector is large and if well managed it can bring a lot of revenue. The aim of the five countries is to be the number one tourism destination in the world….” (Government Official 8, interview, 25 July 2018). It is widely argued by research participants from the government and TFCA proponents that participation in the KAZA will increase tourist arrivals, create job opportunities, boost business linkages and local tourism supply chain, and improve incomes for local households as well as improve balance of payment for government (Hanks, 2003). Respondents argue that claims on socio-economic benefits from KAZA are also held by SADC. In relation to this some scholars argue that the TFCAs provides a larger conservation space as it connects the previously fragmented spaces, this offers a great opportunity for tourism improvement as it accords the tourists a greater area for a better, diverse attraction and quality experience (Singh, 1999; Van der Linde, et al., 2001). Similarly, one government official notes that one of the main focuses of the KAZA and TFCAs in general is to build a tourism-based economy (Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). This relates to the Ministry of Tourism and Arts (2015) assertion that the SADC member states have identified tourism as an economic sector and a backbone for sustainable development in the KAZA TFCA area that will be used to transform lives of the local poor.

This links to arguments by senior government officials that tourism is a vehicle for economic development, and therefore “…we hope that people’s welfare will be improved, and poverty will be eradicated as a result of revenue generation through creation of employment” in the local area and beyond (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018). In relation to this a government official added that, the KAZA has the potential to attract a lot of tourists, boost tourism development and improve livelihoods for local populations and also improve balance of payments for government (Government official 2, interview, 12 December 2017). On the contrary, Hanks (2003) warn against unrealistic assumption of benefits from tourism. Countries should not unrealistically assume that by being part of the TFCAs then they are guaranteed of a boom in the tourism industry translating into increased tourist arrivals, more Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)
resulting into social-economic growth. There are also other factors to consider, including developing policies and infrastructure such as roads, lodges and bridges, among others and making the environment conducive and attractive to tourists (Suich et.al, 2005), otherwise the benefits from tourism remain untapped (Hanks, 2003). It is so idealistic and irresponsible for certain countries to want to reap the benefits of tourism without first investing much in the tourism industry.

Thus, the benefits of tourism are mainly enjoyed by countries whose infrastructure is well established. For example, Zimbabwe attracts more tourists than Zambia, due to its investment in pricing mechanisms and better infrastructure such as roads and accommodation facilities. Similarly, Namibia also has a better road network and pricing mechanisms compared to Zambia (Civil Society Organization senior official 1, interview, 22 January 2018) whose infrastructure is so poor and the roads in the KAZA region on the Zambian component become impassable in the rain season. Thus, Zambia is not expected to reap more benefits from tourism because its investment is equally low. In relation to this, one senior government official maintains that the KAZA on the Zambian side has nothing much to offer, therefore the tourist number has not increased in the area (Government Official 8, interview, 25 July 2018).

Other government officials noted that in Zambia wildlife is the main tourist attraction (Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). To confirm this, one government official maintains that the main base for tourism in Zambia is wildlife (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Thus, even tourism arrivals are prominent in wildlife areas. This is why tourism is mostly linked to wildlife. In relation to this Ferreira (2004) argues that in Southern Africa tourism is synonymous with the wildlife safari. Below are tables of tourist arrivals in the main national parks of the KAZA on the Zambian component from 2002-2017.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MOSI-OA-TUNYA</th>
<th>KAFUE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Tourists</td>
<td>Local Tourists</td>
<td>International Tourists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8,405</td>
<td>10,387</td>
<td>1,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9,689</td>
<td>6,594</td>
<td>1,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>12,635</td>
<td>5,127</td>
<td>1,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13,311</td>
<td>6,661</td>
<td>2,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>13,784</td>
<td>6,888</td>
<td>1,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>11,284</td>
<td>7,628</td>
<td>2,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9,218</td>
<td>11,355</td>
<td>1,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9,254</td>
<td>9,186</td>
<td>3,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9,632</td>
<td>8,387</td>
<td>1,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>12,297</td>
<td>4,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>8,841</td>
<td>9,777</td>
<td>3,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>8,480</td>
<td>9,403</td>
<td>7,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>14,576</td>
<td>4,251</td>
<td>3,537</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of wildlife and National Parks, 2017

Table 4.2: Tourists arrivals to Key KAZA National Parks in KAZA from 2002–2014
### Table 4.2: Tourists arrivals to Key National Parks in KAZA from 2015-2017

<table>
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- **TOTAL TOURIST ARRIVALS**: Total tourist arrivals to Key National Parks in KAZA from 2015-2017.
The figures above show tourists arrivals from 2002-2017. Data for Sioma Ngwezi National Park from 2002-2015 was missing. The officers only managed to find information on tourist arrivals from 2016-2017. Sioma Ngwezi National Park recorded 131 tourist arrivals in 2016 and 130 in 2017. Scant information on Sioma Ngwezi National Park signaled poor data management, which makes it difficult to track records and development in the area.

Source: Department of wildlife and National Parks, 2017
There was a general consensus by research participants that the creation of the KAZA TFCA has resulted into an increase in tourist arrivals in the area. However, the figures above show that there has been a gradual increase in tourism arrivals from 2003-2012 and a major increase in 2013, which could be attributed to the WTO meeting in 2013. There is a slight decline in 2014, which was recorded after the signing of the KAZA treaty. The table indicates that the gradual increase was recorded before the introduction of the KAZA. Despite Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, Sioma Ngwezi national park remains undeveloped and less attractive to tourists, as seen from tourist numbers in the area shown above. Therefore, there was no evidence to prove that the establishment of the KAZA has led to a significant increase in tourist numbers. In relation to this, one government official maintained that the creation of the KAZA has not resulted into increase in tourist arrivals. Some National Parks such as Mosi-oa-tunya and Sioma Ngwezi have little to offer, this is evidenced by the low number of tourists to Sioma Ngwezi National Park (Murphy, 2014). Therefore, it can be argued that, the investment in the KAZA region on the Zambian component is too low to transform the tourism sector into a money-spinning industry as seen in Chapter Five (Government official 8, interview, 25 July 2018).

As indicated above, tourism in Zambia mostly occurs in National Parks and game management areas. As in other Southern African countries, tourism in Zambia is synonymous with wildlife safaris (Ferreira, 2004). Game management areas are simply buffer zones for wildlife, as they border National Parks (Interview, Civil Society organization official 2, 23 January 2018). The game management areas are usually areas in which wildlife and human beings co-exist. Similarly, government official added that there are two types of tourism that take place in the natural and semi-natural areas. One is consumptive tourism, where a quota is issued for one to hunt animals for trophies (Interviews: Government official 4, 22 January 2018) and the second is non-consumptive tourism where lodges and hotels are developed and tourists come to view animals and then leave without killing them (Civil Society organization official 1 Interview, 23 January 2018). Representative from civil society organizations working on the KAZA indicated that Zambia benefits greatly from nature-based tourism and that mostly, it is in the National Parks (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 23 January 2018). However, traditionally, promotion of nature-based tourism in Zambia has tended to exclude local populations from nature (Civil Society Organization Official 2, interview, 23 January 2018).
In Zambia, natural resource management is based on two key approaches, namely, the community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) approach and the use of top down government institutions led by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife, formerly known as Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). The CBNRM seeks to generate dual benefits at community level. Firstly, CBNRM seeks to use community governance structures to act as agencies for protecting nature and supporting tourism. Secondly, protected wildlife generates revenue that directly benefits communities (Murphy, 2010). As such, in Zambia two fees are paid by hunters. These are trophy fees and concession fees. Trophy fees depend on the species to be hunted, while the concession fee is the annual fee paid by a hunting company (Civil Society Organization Official 2, interview, 23 January 2018). A government official noted during a personal interview that for hunting in communal land, 50% of the trophy fees is given to the community as communal benefits and 20 percent of the concession fees go to the community (Government official 2, interview, 2 March 2018). From the 50% that goes to the local community through the Community Resource Boards, 5% is given to the Chiefs (Civil Society organization official 2, Interview, 23 January 2018; Government official 3, interview, 2 March 2018).

This has resulted in Chiefs playing a key role in championing nature conservation and biodiversity as they have a direct vested economic interest. Furthermore, the local communities acting through community leadership structures like elders and village headmen, among others, decide on how to use their money for the public benefit. These approaches to resource management are incentives to enable local communities to actively participate in wildlife management activities. This has helped communities to develop a sense of ownership regarding wildlife and participate in the management of resources because they are able to see and manage the benefits from the wildlife that accrue to them. However, participants in the research indicate that these benefits are only available in areas with rich wildlife resources. In areas where the wildlife numbers are very low the benefits to the local communities are diluted and are insignificant (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 23 January 2018).

The funders of the KAZA have argued that the economic potential of TFCAs such as the KAZA are huge and what is needed is to get institutions to realize the potential (Funding Agency official 1, interview, 24 November 2017). The KAZA’s rich landscape has the potential to increase wildlife
and bring in more revenue through tourism (Funding Agency official, Interview, 24 November 2017). However, some participants argue that the tourism sector in Zambia remains underdeveloped, and thus does not attract the desired number of tourists (Government official 1, interview, 23 January 2018; Government Official 8, interview, 25 July 2018). In addition to this, some scholars have argued that the benefits of tourism have no significant impact on the locals because the profits from tourism accrue to private and corporate enterprises (Suich, 2005) and these are mostly owned by foreign investors or a few elites.

Furthermore, the participating countries work in isolation, as evidenced by the individual packaging of tourism products by each member state. In the case of Zambia, the Zambia Tourism Agency (ZTA) has not done enough to advertise the KAZA on the Zambian Component. In relation to this, civil society organizations stated that to tap more from the benefits of tourism there is a need for collaboration among countries in the region, as well as a need to develop new initiatives which will attract more tourists, generate benefits and make movement easier for tourists in the region (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 19 December 2017). Thus, the Univisa was introduced in order to facilitate the easy movement of tourists and boost the tourism industry, which would potentially lead to economic development. Zimbabwe and Zambia were the first countries to pilot the KAZA Univisa, which was introduced in 2013 (Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). This shows the willingness by the countries to support each other and use tourism as a vehicle for regional economic development (Noe, 2010).

Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the much-proclaimed benefits of tourism are not without their limitations. The tourism sector is fragile and directly affected by prevailing national and international conditions, which include but are not limited to weather, local politics, international politics, infrastructure, security related trends, public health concerns and changes in rates of economic growth, which in turn affect equity in benefit sharing, and tourism’s contribution to poverty alleviation (Scovronick and Turpie 2009; Suich 2008; Hanks 2003). Therefore, it is not enough to rely solely on TFCAs to expand the tourism sector and reap the benefits. There is also a need for countries to invest in infrastructure, pricing mechanisms, and marketing strategies and build local human capacity in order for the local people to contribute to building the tourism sector. In the case of KAZA Zambia, many threats such as perceived and actual political instability,
election cycles, and poor health care infrastructure systems serve as deterrents to international tourists. In a country where domestic tourism is poorly marketed and very underdeveloped, it is unrealistic to expect to reap maximum benefits from the KAZA’s tourism potential. Thus, the high stakes for Zambia, as noted in the KAZA documents, can be characterized as myths if the tourism sector remains underdeveloped. In the following sub section, I explain the background and conceptualization of the KAZA Univisa.

4.5 Easing tourists’ movements through KAZA Univisa: The dynamics

The claims for economic benefits to be gained through TFCAs in the KAZA are based on assumption of increased flow of tourism and generation of tourism related economic activities and transactions. This means the KAZA member countries needed to come up with initiatives to promote regional integration through nature and tourism. Some key informants likened the KAZA Univisa initiative to the European Schengen Visa, which calls for seamless borders in the member countries to facilitate the smooth movement of people, natural resources (animals) and capital (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). The discussion that led to the implementation of the KAZA Univisa dates back to 2013 when Zambia and Zimbabwe co-hosted the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) summit. (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). The partnering countries realized that cross borderer tourism in the KAZA region was hampered by requirement for a country specific Visa for tourists to cross from one country to the other (Ministry of Tourism and Art, 2015). Thus, the partnering countries were keen to develop a vibrant regional tourism industry through the facilitation of unrestrained passage of tourists across the international boarder in the KAZA region and eventually the entire SADC region (Ministry of Tourism and Art, 2015).

On the 13th March 2012 the question of how to enable the easy movement of tourists in the KAZA region came up at a committee of Ministers held in Kasane in Botswana (Government official 5, interview, 26 February 2018). At this meeting, the KAZA officials decided the easy movement of the participants at the WTO between Zambia and Zimbabwe could be achieved by establishing seamless movement across the borders (Ministry of Tourism and Art, 2015; Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). This meeting coincided with the ongoing consultancy on harmonization of Tourism and Natural Resources Management Policy in the KAZA TFCA whose
output was the introduction of the KAZA Univisa (Ministry of Tourism and Art, 2015). This was in accordance with the objectives of the KAZA TFCA under Article 5 of the KAZA Treaty on facilitation of easy movement of tourist across international borders (KAZA Treaty). This idea was shared with the heads of state of Zambia and Zimbabwe, who agreed to the suggestion and made a joint pronouncement endorsing the seamless loop for a period of two months (Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018).

Following the successful co-hosting of the 20th session of the General Assembly of UNWTO by Zambia and Zimbabwe in Livingstone and Victoria towns respectively in August 2013, it was agreed by the KAZA officials that the initiative be continued (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). It was from this background that the two heads of State of Zambia and Zimbabwe directed that the KAZA partnering countries, Zambia and Zimbabwe in particular should replicate the principle that governed the movement of tourists across the border during the UNWTO. This was to become standard across the SADC region (Ministry of Arts and Tourism, 2015). In relation to this a government official noted that the process of the KAZA Univisa pilot was kick started with the financial support from World Bank. This was the genesis of the KAZA Univisa (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018).

The KAZA Univisa is a 50 US$ Visa, and the entire Visa process was funded by the KFW (Funding Agency official 1, interview, 22 January 2018) including the purchasing of the stickers used on the KAZA Univisa. Given the limited resources, the pilot of the Univisa could not be done by all five participating countries (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). As such Zambia and Zimbabwe were the first countries to pilot the KAZA Univisa. During a personal interview, a government official added that it was easier for Zambia and Zimbabwe to undertake the KAZA Univisa pilot exercise because the existing immigration systems in Zambia and Zimbabwe are similar (government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). Similar legal migration regimes exist, and the two countries have also cooperated for many years and share a colonial boundary. Furthermore, the two countries had gained experience when co-hosting the UNWTO. An informant added that the two countries had to pilot the Univisa, in order to provide lessons when rolling out the idea to the remaining three countries (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). Zambia and Zimbabwe have piloted the Univisa since 2015 and have now been
called upon to streamline the KAZA Univisa into the normal immigration system of the two countries (Civil Society Organization Senior Official 1, interview, 24 November 2017). The integration of the KAZA Univisa into the normal immigration system of the two countries will enable tourists to get a Univisa at any international entry point of Zambia or Zimbabwe. This will not only be cost effective but also time saving (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In relation to this a funding agency official maintains that introducing the Univisa will attract more tourists to the area because it is convenient, less time consuming and cost effective (Funding agency official 1, interview, 22 January 2018).

Once the Univisa has been issued to tourists, they can enter Zimbabwe or Zambia and visit any place of their choice, rather than being confined to the KAZA region. Tourists are allowed a 24-hour trip to Botswana in Chobe National Park (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). The KAZA Univisa is valid for a period of 30 days in Zambia and Zimbabwe, with multiple entries between the two countries. During interviews, a government official (Government official 6, interview, 22 January 2018) stated that the introduction of the KAZA Univisa has led to an increase in tourist arrivals in the region. However, the revenue derived from tourism is not shared between the two countries, with the money received by each country remaining in that particular country. This makes it difficult in terms of the standardization of tourism products from both sides, as they operate as competitors, with each country seeking domination in order to attract more tourists. Generally, data on tourism in the KAZA remains unavailable or disaggregated (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017).

Despite the KAZA Univisa being a sought-after destination by many tourists wishing to visit Zambia and Zimbabwe, the issuing of the KAZA Univisa came to a halt in August 2017 in Zambia and in September 2017 in Zimbabwe, without any notice. This was because the two countries had run out of the required stickers (Funding Agency official 1, interview, 24 November 2017). This state of affair inconvenienced tourists, and they had to arrange for alternative measures, while some had to cancel their trips. The halting of the issuing of visas signals some inefficiency and elements of dependency of the KAZA on international financing and the limited localization of the initiative.
There are plans afoot to roll out the KAZA Univisa to other participating countries, namely Botswana, Namibia and Angola (Ministry of Tourism and Art, 2015). This is expected to boost the tourism sector and bring in more revenue. With regards to KAZA funding agencies (Funding Agency official 1, interview 24 November 2017), KAZA is the biggest TFCA and if well protected can attract more tourists and increase the revenue base. In addition to this, other research participants maintain that collaboration with other countries has the potential to boost the Tourism industry in the participating countries (Civil Society Organization Official 3, interview, 5 December 2017). However, some scholars have maintained that the size of the TFCA does not translate to a functioning tourism sector, economic growth or the wellbeing of the people (Suich, 2008), Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park is the case in point (Scovronick and Turpie, 2009).

Some government officials argued that the introduction of the Univisa between Zambia and Zimbabwe is helping to increase the movements of tourists between the two borders (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018). This is against the backdrop that no data is readily available to support the claims that KAZA has resulted in increased numbers of tourists to Zambia. Furthermore, some research participants emphasized that the Zambian and Zimbabwean components of the KAZA are not being advertised as one, but that each participating country advertises its own portion of the KAZA (Civil Society Organization senior official 1, interview, 22 January 2018; Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018).

In addition, some countries stand a better chance of benefiting from the Univisa initiative than others because tourism in the participating countries remains at different levels in terms of infrastructure and service development, as well as in terms of service costs in the tourism sector. Some KAZA participating countries like Namibia and Botswana have more tourism infrastructure in terms of private sector investment, while other partnering countries like Zimbabwe have invested in pricing mechanisms. For this reason, the perception is that it is cheaper lodging on the Zimbabwean side than the Zambian side (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). Zambia’s tourism industry remains underdeveloped due to poor infrastructure such as a poor road network and limited options in accommodation facilities, among others (Civil Society Organization Official 3, interview, 5 December 2017) as a result of less private and government investment in the tourism industry. In relation to this, a civil society representative
(Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018) added that the cost of doing business is said to be more expensive in Zambia than in other KAZA participating countries, hence the low private investment in the Zambian component. Additionally, the major tourist attraction and infrastructure development on the Zambian component of KAZA is mainly concentrated in Livingstone, and the intra-country movement of tourists is more expensive. For example, it is more expensive to travel from Lusaka to Livingstone than to land in Windhoek to go to Katima Mulilo. This has resulted in low tourist numbers and revenue earnings for Zambia (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). Zambia has not invested much in national airlines, which would have made the cost of local and direct flights cheaper. Consequently, in Zambia even local flights are very expensive (Zambia Daily Mail, 6\textsuperscript{th} December, 2017 https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/kaza-visas-step-in-right-direction).

Although Zambia is endowed with natural tourist attractions like the Victoria Falls, abundant wildlife and a rich cultural heritage, among others, its tourism sector remains relatively undeveloped and the cost of doing business in Zambia is very high due to cost obligations and this deters private investors from investing on the Zambian component. For this reason, the Zambian component lags behind in terms of infrastructure (Zambia Daily Mail 6 December 2017). Zambia has also not invested much in the marketing of its tourism products (Government official 4, interview, 22 January 2018). In relation to this some participants added that the KAZA participating countries made tourism an economic sector long before Zambia, and provided enough support in terms of infrastructure development for tourists within the country, as well as pricing, among others (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). They advertise in both electronic and print form on international media. However, Zambia rarely advertises on international media such as CNN, Algezira and the BBC, among others, which reach a large international audience, resulting in reduced tourist arrivals into the country. Poor marketing in Zambia’s tourism industry is due to low national budget allocations to the Zambia Tourism Agency (ZTA) which are not enough to support a meaningful marketing campaign, thus inhibiting Zambia from showcasing its tourism products to the outside world (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). For example, in 2017 the allocation for both national and international marketing was USD 600, 000.
This amount was too little to advertise internationally, compared to competitors in the region. While Zambia allocates such meager amounts, South Africa spent between US$80 million and US$200 million, while Botswana and Namibia spent US$8 million and US$12 million respectfully (Zambia Daily Mail, 6 December 2017). This entails that Zambia’s tourism sector remains a hidden treasure, which is largely unknown, and which will not attract great numbers of tourists and investors. While the KAZA Univisa is advertised internationally and mostly foreign tourists move between countries, free movement between countries does not apply to the local people. Despite the claim that local communities stand to benefits from the creation of TFCAs, benefits are not enjoyed by the local people (Sinthumule, 2018). In relation to this, Sinthumule (2019) notes that the border people are sidelined, thus the TFCA is not for the locals but rather a landscape devoted to nature conservation and commercial enterprises.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the main objectives of Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, which include: Regional integration, conservation of biodiversity and social-economic development. The chapter has also argued that the states’ participation in the KAZA goes beyond conservation objectives, as states view the TFCAs as a platform for lobbying financial support from donors. Thus, TFCAs are seen as a forum by which states acquire political, social, economic and environmental gains. However, the benefits from TFCAs are not easily materialized (see Chapter Six). In addition, the chapter maintained that the Zambian tourism sector has remained underdeveloped despite Zambia’s participation in the KAZA. This is evidenced in the low numbers of tourist arrivals in the KAZA region on the Zambian component. Overall, the findings show that most of the key objectives for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA including regional integration and social, economic development among others remain unachieved and many of the KAZA’s promises to remain unfulfilled. Above all, the study establishes that the motivation for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA is not as ambitious as other participating countries as the measures taken by the Zambian government seem disjointed and somehow mere claims. Harnessing benefits from the TFCA calls for the formulation of robust and integrated conservation and tourism development strategies that represent an integrated trans-local caricature of nature-tourism nexus development. Participation alone cannot make Zambia harness the benefits promised by KAZA.
CHAPTER FIVE: INVESTMENTS IN THE KAZA TFCA ON THE ZAMBIAN SIDE

5.1 Introduction

The countries participating in the KAZA TFCA are not a homogenous group but, rather, are at different levels of economic development, with infrastructure differing from one country to another. Therefore, the KAZA TFCA is an unequal investment landscape. This naturally raises concerns relating to inter-state inequity in the distribution of benefits (Katere, Hill and Moyo, 2001). This also implies that unification and consolidation of marketing and investment promotion of the TFCAs may not be an easy task. In this chapter investment refers to both monetary and non-monetary inputs which necessitate the effective -functioning of the TFCA. States invest differently in TFCAs, depending on the capacity and importance they attach to conservation and the potential benefits derived from it. This chapter focuses on investments on the Zambian component. Two broad views were articulated by the key informants. While some were of the opinion that the government of Zambia has invested enormously in the KAZA, others were of the view that the government’s investment in the KAZA was somewhat insignificant. These two conflicting views are analyzed below. This chapter is organized into three sections: the first attempts to analyze the investments in the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian component, the second presents data on the integrated development plan (IDP) as an investment and the third concludes the chapter.

5.2 Zambian government’s investments in the KAZA

Southern African countries backed by donor funding are increasingly embracing TFCAs based on their promise that they are capable of achieving high levels of both conservation and development through tourism (Thomson, 2013; Symons, 2017). In relation to this, there was consensus among the research participants that the government is supposed to be a major investor in the KAZA TFCA. In support of this, one government official stated that the Zambian government has contributed massive amounts of land, as evidenced by the fact that Zambia is home to the longest portion of the Zambezi River, and it is Zambia’s contribution to the KAZA which makes the KAZA the largest TFCA in the world (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In this regard, another official added that Zambia is one of the largest land contributors to the KAZA. Figure 5.1 below shows the participating countries’ land contribution to the KAZA.
Like the colonial administration that reserved huge pieces of land for conservation and tourism (Ramutsindela, 2004), the figure above shows a large piece of land set aside for conservation by states, with Zambia contributing 10,189,640 hectares, making it the largest contributor. However, it should be noted that recently Botswana has extended its KAZA boundary and is now the largest contributor, with Zambia becoming the second largest contributor. Other data sources from government show that government does not only provide the necessary vehicles, office space and accommodation to the employees but also the enabling environment and good will for the KAZA project to meet its objectives. (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018). In this instance an enabling environment entails the legal frameworks, policies and all the practices of the government which enable the project to operate freely and achieve its objectives. Through the Department of Wildlife and National Parks of the Ministry of Tourism and Arts with the support of PPF the government participated in the construction of access and internal gravel roads and
additional buildings and boundary fences at Sioma Ngwezi National Park headquarters in Sioma District, Western Province, within the Zambia component of the KAZA TFCA (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Despite these efforts Sioma Ngwezi National Park remains one of the least developed parks in Zambia and records a high level of poaching (Murphy, 2008). The findings also show that the government donated a good number of animals to the Simalaha Community Conservancy (PPF official 2, Interview, 25 July 2018).

The findings reveal that the government of Zambia invests in policy formulation, which governs the management of the land, water, wildlife, the environment and biodiversity conservation. This kind of investment entails hiring consultants to conduct consultative meetings, training of staff and the drafting of policy, among others. These consultants are sometimes paid by external funders (Civil Society Organization Official 3, interview, 5 December 2017). However, in Zambia, land laws are ill defined and do not provide real ownership to the local people (Jones, 2008). The land belongs to the chiefs, and the local community has no legal right to sell it (PPF official3, interview, 27 July 2018). Furthermore, investors are also not allowed to buy land in the KAZA region on the Zambia component, and can only rent it from either the chiefs or the local people (PPF official 4. interview, 27 July 2018). In relation to this Spenceley (2008: 294) argues that the state should “invest in policies that allow clear and strong property rights for investors, developers and local communities.” The current policies may discourage investors from investing in the area due to lack of security.

In relation to the above, Metcalfe (2006)’s policy study on the Zambian component of the KAZA reveals that the major weakness in terms of effective implementation of natural resources management on the ground is the sectoral and legal separation of Forestry, Fisheries, Water and Wildlife. This separation brings about differences in the access and control of fish, timber, water and wildlife resources. Metcalfe explains that:

The protected local and national forests are surrounded by communal land and provide valuable wildlife habitat but no policy integrates land, forestry, water and wildlife tenure or management....Three separate legal, policy and institutional environments pertains and the common property design flaws in this arrangement mean high transaction costs,
overlapping jurisdiction and assure a ‘tragedy of the commons’ on the ground… (Metcalfe, 2006:12).

Despite such contributions as shown above, the government’s investment in the KAZA receives less attention because government’s investments in projects such as infrastructure development to boost tourism is negligible, as such, infrastructure remains poor and the people living close to the parks continue to wallow in poverty, with the poverty level of Western province currently standing at 82.2 (CSO, 2016). This coincides with the views held by government officials who assert that “the government has been a silent investor in the KAZA project. This is because in most instances the efforts by the government are not recognized, and are mostly overshadowed by those of donors, thus leading people to think the KAZA project is donor driven (Government official 3, interview, 22 January 2018). In relation to this, a World Bank (2007) report shows that, although there is a gradual growth in the tourism sector in Zambia, the sector seems to be viewed by the government as one dominated by foreigners and hence does not translate to the economic growth of the country.

It is important to note that all KAZA participating countries are mandated to contribute to an annual subscription fee. In this regard, the findings presented two contradicting views on the government’s finances to the KAZA secretariat. While some maintained that the government of Zambia’s financial contributions have continued to flow in line with all its KAZA related obligations; for instance, each member state participating in the KAZA contributes an annual subscription fee of 60,000 US$ per annum. This money contributed by member states is used for operation costs of the KAZA secretariat (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). This view was challenged by other key informants who allege that most of the member states do not pay the annual subscription fee and Zambia is not consistent in remitting the annual subscription fee to the KAZA secretariat (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018; Government official 3, 22 January 2018; senior government official 7, 22 January 2018). It is also important to note that there are no penalties or punishments to compel the participating countries to comply with the set requirements or regulations (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017). However, discussions to introduce such penalties against countries which do not comply are underway. There is a suggestion that countries which do not
remit the requisite subscription fee should not benefit from any grant provided to the KAZA participating countries (Government official 3, interview, 21 September 2018).

The KAZA secretariat in Botswana is the body mandated to coordinate KAZA activities. In the first three years of the KAZA’s existence, no donor wanted to fund staff salaries (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). However, the German government offered to assist in the running of the secretariat in the interim, with member states taking over this role at a later stage. Money from donors should go into the running of projects. In support of this, information from key informants indicates that the contributions from member states do not only support the secretariat but also enable partner countries to develop a sense of ownership of the KAZA (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017).

Although the views expressed by civil society organizations suggested that the government invests in the workforce and paying of salaries and allowances for hired staff (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017), there was no significant evidence to support this claim. For example, there is only one officer who has been seconded by the government to the KAZA secretariat and one TFCA coordinator working on the KAZA TFCA, as well as other TFCAAs of which Zambia is a member. It is also not clear if the KAZA project is the reason why the government hired about three hundred (300) wildlife police officers to safeguard wildlife in Kafue National Park which is part of the KAZA. This is because the government’s recruitment of wildlife police officers in the Kafue National Park had been practiced before the KAZA project commenced. This entails that the government has not invested much in human resources in the KAZA. In the Simalaha, the work force is hired and paid by PPF, and these staff members are mainly hired on a contract basis and work at different levels, some at policy level and others at implementation.

Just like other TFCAAs, such as the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) where poaching is at a high rate, KAZA TFCA continues to record poaching cases (Ferreira, 2004). To support this, one civic leader noted that “there are complaints from Namibia and Botswana that animals are poached when they cross to the Zambian side” (Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018). This is recorded despite claims that the government has employed Wildlife Police officers to ensure that management of wildlife is enhanced. This is the kind of investment that is not much talked about,
but it is very significant in sustaining and making the KAZA TFCA a reality. However, these investments are not adequate enough to start yielding tangible benefits for the local people and other investment stakeholders. It is also known that the government of Zambia has not invested in marketing, infrastructure to support non consumptive tourism and claims on tourism benefits to be actualized. As such Zambia is seen as one of the least preferred tourism destinations as reflected in Chapter Four. I argue that investing in salaries and other indirect aspects of the tourism sector will not transform the tourism potential of the region as far as Zambia is concerned. There is a need to invest in direct components of tourism like air and road transport infrastructure, lodges and hotels, tourism supply chain management and favorable policies for attracting private sector investment and developing local people and skills development, among others. Thus, significant investment in tourism is required if Zamia is to harness the benefits from the tourism sector.

Findings also show that the government of Zambia contributes financial resources for marketing the KAZA. However, some participants maintained that the amount allocated to the marketing of KAZA is too little to reach the international audience (Civil Society Organization senior official 1, interview, 22nd January 2018), (see Chapter Four). Informants also observed that in relation to other participating countries Zambia has not invested much in the KAZA, as evidenced in the tourism sector, which has remained relatively underdeveloped (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017) (see Chapter Four). In relation to this, one civic leader stated that the Zambian government has “not invested much in the KAZA due to lack of vision by the policymakers” (Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018). “The policymakers have decided to ignore the potential benefits which the KAZA can offer if the government invests in it” (Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018). The KAZA is largely driven by funds from outside and this threatens the sustainability and real objective of the programme (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017; Government Official 8, interview, 25 July 2018). If member states are keen to reap the perceived benefits from KAZA TFCA, government support needs to be streamlined in the operations of the KAZA.

As mentioned above, the implementation of the TFCAs and KAZA on the Zambian component in particular is dependent on donor funding. In relation to this, Katerere, Hill and Moyo (2001) noted that large-scale conservation in Southern Africa has received generous funding from donors. This
raises the question of sustainability, should donor’s pullout of the project. The KAZA Univisa is a case in point. This KAZA Univisa was suspended due to non-availability of passport stickers. The research participants confirmed that this suspension was due to the transitioning of the financing for the printing of stickers from donor funding to national funding. The state did not budget for the KAZA Univisa, hence the abrupt suspension (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017; Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017), (see Chapter Four). TFCAs have been supported by politicians, big business men/women international actors: bilateral donors such as the German development agency (GTZ), KfW, the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation (SIDA), and USAID; multilateral agencies such as the European Union, the World Bank, and the World Conservation Union; and NGOs such as Conservation International and the Worldwide Fund for Nature. Most of these organizations work closely with the South African PPF (Swatuk, 2005; Hanks & Myburgh, 2015).

Although some scholars see donor funding as an opportunity to attract private investors, the KAZA landscape on the Zambian component has not shown much/any evidence of private sector investment despite the flowing of donor funds into the area (Lunstrum, 2011). In relation to this, one government official stated that there are various projects on the Zambian component of the KAZA, and these are supported by various stakeholders, including KfW, WWF, Panthera, the World Bank and Peace Park Foundation, among others (Government official 6, interview, 12 December 2017). By investing in the KAZA the stakeholders hope to see an increase in biodiversity in the region, as well as tourism development (Funding Agency official 1, interview, 22 January 2018; Civil Society Organization official 3, interview, 5 December 2017). As such these funding organizations indirectly control the use and access of resources. It was further observed that, the emphasis is not so much on the improvement of the local people’s livelihood as seen from the little support channeled to livelihood activities as discussed below.

Some informants noted that most of the funding received for implementation of the KAZA project by the Zambian component comes from KfW (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017), KfW has been the main funder for the KAZA project with the funding amounting to 35.5-million Euros since 2008(https://www.kavangozambezi.org). However, access to the financial documents was denied. Most of the funds raised go towards infrastructure projects and only a small percentage is allocated to community projects such as training of local farmers in conservation
farming, training of village scouts, provision of seeds to local farmers, provision of treadle pumps, energy saving stoves and enforcement of natural resource regulations (see Chapter Six). A government official also added that PPF has built three teachers’ houses and installed a solar pump at Mwandi Secondary School, the project has also installed solar to provide lighting at a community clinic (Government official 9, interview, 24 July 2018). Further, members of staff at Kasaya basic School confirmed that the school has received solar panel to supply electricity at the school (Government officials 10, interview, 24 July 2018) (see Chapter Six). However, access to documents on actual expenditure by the project was denied.

In relation to the above some scholars have observed that the international organizations have put in huge sums of money, technical support, machinery and human resources in the implementation of the TFCAs and the KAZA in particular (Ferguson and Hanks, 2010; Cumming, 2011). Furthermore, PPF, which is a strong supporter and implementer of TFCAs, is seen to be driving the TFCA project, and governments are basically hosting rather than driving the implementation of TFCAs. As confirmation of this, one government official stated that the budgets for implementation of the KAZA projects are held in South Africa by PPF and other donors involved (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Although this is done to ensure transparency and reduce the possible misapplication of funds, it erodes trust in member countries and reduces their decision-making powers due to lack of finances. Furthermore, the hiring of human resources is done by PPF. For instance, the TFCAs Director in Zambia who sits in the Ministry of Tourism and Arts is directly employed and paid (Salary) by PPF, the same applies to the officers working in the Simalaha conservancy (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). This threatens the continuity of the project should PPF withdraw its support. Similarly, Kokwe (1997) notes that the interest and motivation for supporting TFCAs by international institutions are different and may at times overlap as stated above.

Consequently some scholars maintain that while non-state actors, international organizations and donor agencies such as the World Bank, IUCN, KfW and WWF, among others, influence the states to pursue certain goals and agendas which are said to be good by financing organizations such as achieving biodiversity conservation and clean air, among others, as this is deemed acceptable internationally and scientifically justified (Fin-nemore, 1996; Adams et.al, 2003), these may not
be priority areas for member states. Therefore, non-state actors, international institutions, donor agencies and NGOs play a key role in dictating the states’ pathways and interests by providing international legitimation of state policies, these acts as frameworks on which the states policies are based. By internationally financing and introducing the Univisa, financing the KAZA Secretariat, it is arguably certain that the KAZA TFCA development pathways are determined by actors beyond the SADC region and the KAZA region.

Thus, the state does not necessarily control the use of its resources but act as a surrogate for non-state actors such as the big international organizations and a few local elites. They are forced to compromise on their autonomy and be answerable to the funders. This has weakened some countries and facilitated the recreation of a colonial vision in African conservation (Rusinga, and Mapira, 2012) thus eroding the countries’ sovereignty. In relation to this some scholars argue that the discourse and linking of conservation to underdevelopment creates room for the reentry of former colonizers and external actors, thus bringing about ‘sovereignty bargains’ (Singh and Houtum, 2002). Therefore, investment benefits rarely extend much beyond the actors who are directly involved.

5.3 Integrated Development Plan (IDP)

IDPs are central because they direct the investments to take place in the KAZA, by producing the land use plans and maps which guide investors and governments on the type of investments and areas to invest in. For example, the Simalaha Community Conservancy being implemented in South-West Zambia, is one of the projects stipulated/planned in the Zambia IDP. Owing to this, countries have also invested in the formulation of implementation documents such as policies and IDPs, among others. In this regard Moboko (2017) maintains that it is the responsibility of the Governments and other key stakeholders to harmonize conservation legislation, institutional and management practices in order to promote cooperation at local and regional level. This relates to one government official’s observation that the Zambian government, through the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, which was previously the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), together with other government departments participated in IDP formulation.
The first IDP was developed by Zambia in 2008 (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). A civil society official confirmed this by stating that Zambia was the first country to develop the IDP, which came about because the funders were biased towards Zambia (Civil Society Organization Senior Official 1, interview, 24 November 2017). In relation to this, one official added that Zambia was the first country to develop the IDP because it had a weaker organization structure and there was a need for connectivity in order to allow for the movement of wildlife (PPF official 2, Interview, 25 July 2018). Thus, Zambia’s IDP, as well as staff provided insights and valuable lessons for other participating countries in the development of their IDPs (Government official 1, interview, 3 November, 2017; Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). The country-specific IDPs became the basis for development of the Master Integrated Development Plan (MIDP). In relation to this KfW (2014:15) maintains that “harmonization of the five partner countries’ national IDPs and the major development needs of the KAZA TFCA as articulated in a number of planning documents and guiding frameworks was the foundation for the formulation of the MIDP. Below is a brief general background of IDPs.

There has been shift from traditional planning approaches to IDPs. Internationally, the idea of IDPs started gaining popularity in the 1980s as a response to fragmented and ad hoc project-based approaches (Gibbens, 2009). The emergence of IDPs in Zambia is underpinned by the planning theory in South Africa and its formulation was led by South African consultants (Garnett, 2017). Thus, IDPs draw on well-established planning theory propagated by progressive planning departments of South Africa’s Universities (The Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2000).

IDPs have been widely used by local authorities as a planning tool in order to balance development (Allebiosu, 2005), correct planning disorder and strike a balance between rural and urban infrastructure development (Mogaladi, 2007) so as to address spatial inequalities. Clearly the local authorities use the IDP to regulate the rapid growth of cities (Smith et al, 1998) and address the challenges encountered in marginalized areas. Over the years, there has been a strong drive by environmentalists for a holistic perspective of development which would reconcile competing interests and promote compatibility while at the same time creates synergy between conservation and development objectives. As such IDPs were identified as crucial in providing a guiding
framework for both conservation and development (Murphy, 2008). IDPs in TFCAs take a spatial planning approach with emphasis on supporting sustainable development in multi-use areas surrounding protected areas (named “interstitial areas”), and in the buffer zones of the Parks.

In TFCAs IDPs provide information on the approaches that governments intend to take in the management, use and conservation of natural and cultural resources in particular areas (Murphy, 2008; PPF, 2008). IDPs in this case are simply guiding documents for countries’ implementation of conservation objectives in the KAZA landscape. Buscher (2009) summarizes this by stating that IDPs act as a basis for the course of action to be followed. The IDP, by definition, looks at all the resources in the KAZA landscape (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017). The KAZA landscape has different land tenure systems comprised of private, communal and state land. The use of communal land in TFCAs is not new. Indeed, it has been used elsewhere for the repository of biodiversity purposes. The Simalaha Conservancy, whose purpose is to create the animal corridor and facilitate movement of animals from Chobe to Kafue National Park in Zambia is a communal area (see also Ramutsindela & Noe, 2012). In relation to this a government official maintains that the central idea of having IDPs is to harmonize the activities in order for development to be done in a coordinated manner (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). This relates to another government official’s argument that the uncoordinated development and unplanned land use may affect the ecological system of the KAZA landscape (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017). In this regard, some participants argued that the greatest threat to biodiversity conservation is that of habitat fragmentation (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Therefore, not only do IDPs support ecosystem management, they also support a bioregional approach to biodiversity conservation. Additionally, IDPs also help in packaging activities for easy mobilization of funds (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017).

Furthermore, IDPs stipulate how the various activities contribute to the overall goal of the KAZA (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017). Therefore, IDPs are needed in order to spell out the vision, the goals and the intended purpose for managing the KAZA landscape. There are six IDPs on the KAZA landscape. KAZA has the master IDP and each member state was encouraged to develop the country-specific IDP (Government official 2,
interview, 17 November 2017). In these IDPs issues of wildlife dominate (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). The development of all the IDPs in the five countries was based on the principle of a stakeholder consultative process. The process of IDP preparation involved soliciting for inputs from government, traditional authorities, CBNRM structures and the private sector through a series of workshops (Murphy, 2008). In relation to this a government official added that development of IDP is a multi-sectoral process, and all the stakeholders are involved, rather than having been developed by one section (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Interview data indicated that the Process of IDP formulation called for the establishment of the Core Planning Team which was assigned to compile a resource inventory either through literature or field visits. Stakeholders’ consultative meetings were also held in order to get stakeholders’ views on how they wanted their land to be used (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 24 November 2017). The output of the stakeholders’ workshop was a draft IDP which was sent back to the stakeholders for review and validation (IDP) before approval.

In Zambia, there was a Core Planning Team that spearheaded the IDP formulation process. The Zambia Core Planning Team for IDP formulation comprised of PPF and Department of National Park and Wildlife; however, were they needed experts in heritage, natural resources and fisheries, among others, and specialists in these fields were called in (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). This relates to one government official’s assertion that the process of coming up with the IDPs is participatory (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017). Views from government officials show that various stakeholders were involved, including the NGOs, business people, government departments and, most importantly, the local communities. One government official further stated that, in Zambia, the process of formulating the IDP was participatory and Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) now called Department of National Park and Wildlife was the lead agency (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017). In addition to this some government officials maintained that there was a lot of support from the local communities (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017; Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In relation to this another government official added that the local people identified key issues and solutions (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Chiefs were also consulted through their representatives, who they dispatched
to meetings. The consultative process received both financial and technical support from PPF (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). PPF mobilized for resources from other development agencies.

One government official noted that the local people came up with eighty-nine (89) projects, which were grouped into seven major projects and they include, the rehabilitation of Sioma Ngwezi National Park, the creation of Ngonye falls Community Partnership Park, creation of land use plans, and rehabilitation of Simalaha (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). A government official added that, ‘this clearly shows that the IDP is a people driven document’ (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). On the contrary, some studies have shown that the processes involved in IDP development cannot be driven by the local people because these people lack the technical knowhow, have weak social and intellectual capital to understand the TFCA processes (Spenceley, 2008). In addition to this fish sellers outside the conservancy revealed that they were not involved in the consultation process despite being directly affected by the creation of the KAZA. This is because the KAZA covers the Zambezi River where they buy their fish for sale sell (Local trader1, interview, 28 July 2018). This is not different from Greater Mapungubwe Transfrontier Conservation Area (GMTFCA) on the Botswana-South Africa–Zimbabwe where conservation and commercial enterprises are at the expense of the local communities (Sinthumule, 2019).

Similarly, Chiutsi and Saarinen (2017) established that lack of community engagement in the Sengwe community in the GLTP hindered local people’s access to benefits. In relation to this Katerere, Hill and Moyo (2001) argue that despite TFCAs’ emphasis on local communities and stakeholder participation, in practice the TFCAs implementation is rushed and less time is left for meaningful consultation with both stakeholders and local communities. As such the local communities do not fully understand how the project will function. Therefore, there is need to rethink community participation in TFCAs.

The master IDP acted as a pointer to the disparities in policy noted a government official (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). This relates to (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018)’s assertion that IDPs on their own could not harmonize policy because policy is a stand-alone document. However, to a certain extent the IDPs
can identify policy gaps and devise ways for policy harmonization (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). It is argued that the implementation of the KAZA activities is based on the IDP approved by the governments (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). On the contrary, Cumming (2011) notes that IDPs are not a reflection of the conservation objectives, but that their emphasis is more on administrative and management activities which are not clear on how conservation will be executed. Although Zambia was the first to come up with the IDP implementation has been very slow and this has been attributed to succession disputes and inadequate funding (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017).

5.4 Conclusions

The chapter has shown government’s investment in the KAZA TFCA. It has indicated that the government has not invested much in infrastructure development in the KAZA. The government’s major contribution to the KAZA is in form of land, but this kind of investment is not enough to yield the desired benefits from TFCA because the implementation of the KAZA requires huge financial capital. The chapter also established that although TFCAs are said to be driven by member states, in reality the KAZA TFCA is a donor driven project. The chapter further looked at IDPs as one of the investments by both government and donors. The following chapter presents the implications of the creation of the KAZA on the local people.
CHAPTER SIX: IMPLICATIONS OF THE KAZA TFCA ON THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES ON THE ZAMBIAN COMPONENT

6.1 Introduction

TFCAs have been accepted on the premise that they promise to benefit the local and mostly marginalized communities living close to the parks. However, TFCAs have been criticized for disadvantaging the local people by displacing them from their land using conservation narratives and using military tactics to deal with those labeled as poachers and militarizing protected areas (Duffy, 2015; Ramutsindela, 2016). TFCAs have been cited as responsible for causing accumulation by dispossession and commodification of nature there by making it inaccessible to the public (Huges 2005; Buscher 2013). As such Local are treated as threats to conservation initiatives ((Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016; Ramutsindela, 2016). This chapter provides an analysis of the impacts of the TFCAs on the local communities in the Simalaha Community Conservancy on the KAZA on the Zambia side. The chapter argues that despite the claimed benefits of the KAZA, the ordinary local population continues to live in abject poverty due to several factors including low government investment in the area. This chapter is organized into three sections the first section presents background of Simalaha, while the second section provides a discussion of the introduction of the Simalaha Community Conservancy and the local people’s participation. In the third section the effects of the conservancy on the local people are outlined.

6.2 Background: The case of Simalaha

Simalaha Community Conservancy is situated in the South-Western part of Zambia, in chief Sekute of Chundu Chiefdom and senior chief InyamboYeta of Sisheke (PPF, 2013). It covers an area of approximately one hundred and eighty-two thousand hectares (182,000 ha) (PPF, 2016). The idea of creating the Simalaha Community Conservancy came through Senior Chief InyamboYeta. Senior Chief InyamboYeta has been the board member of PPF since 2011 (Government official 1, interview, 16 August 2018). The idea of the conservancy was also shared with Chief Sekute and the two Kutas (Traditional leaders, 25 July 2018). The two chiefs have supported the creation of the Conservancy in their chiefdoms because they want to protect their cultural heritage as well as reap the benefits of wildlife conservation through tourism 2018. The Simalaha project has two elements, namely conservation of biodiversity and economic reasons through tourism (PPF official 2, Interview, 25 July). Historically, Simalaha Floodplains used to be
characterized by an abundance of wildlife, particularly water and wetland species like red lechwe, sitatunga, hippos and crocodiles, among others (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017; Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July, 2018; PPF, 2013). However, due to the liberation wars in neighboring countries, the wildlife has been drastically depleted (PPF, 2013; Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018; Traditional leaders, interview, 25 July 2018).

The process of registering the Simalaha Community Conservancy has already started and will be registered as ‘Simalaha Community conservancy Trust’. This is a compromise because the Trust is within the Zambia’s statute (Government official 1, interview, 16 August 2018). In Zambia the law does not provide for the Community Conservancy concept, which gives full ownership to the community, so therefore the Simalaha Community Conservancy at present has no legal backing, as it is a new concept in Zambia. Currently an instrument is being established which will declare this the Community Conservancy concept. Below are facts and figures pertaining to the Simalaha Community Conservancy.

Figure 6.1: Geographical location of Simalaha Community Conservancy, Source: Department of National Parks and Wildlife, 2018
Simalaha Community Conservancy boundaries, Source: Department of National Parks and Wildlife, 2018

Simalaha Community Conservancy is jointly owned by Senior Chief Sekute and InyamboYeta as shown in the figure above. Simalaha Community Conservancy is not an empty space, it is occupied by more than nine thousand people (9,000) and about one thousand five hundred (1500) people live in the Simalaha sanctuary (The people living in the sanctuary and the conservancy form different villages and are affected both positively and negatively by the activities in the conservancy and sanctuary). Below is figure 6.3 showing the villages of Simalaha on the Western Part.
The sanctuary is part of the conservancy. It is fenced, and this is where the animals reintroduced are kept before their numbers grow. Currently, over one thousand two hundred (1200) have been reintroduced. (Government official 1, 22 January 2018). In relation to this a government official added that the animals reintroduced to Simalaha have been gotten from Kafue National Park, Lusaka National Park and some animals were taken from private game ranches within and outside the country (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). This is not different from back to the barriers form of conservation because it also reinforces the building of fences. In relation to this, one government official noted that, this is not the first time the local people are living together with animals, the local communities were there living with the animals before the colonial boundaries were put in place, and so, our efforts is to reconfigure the lives of these communities like before the creation of colonial boundaries (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). When animals increase in numbers, the fence will be removed and the animals will be able to room freely (PPF official 3, interview, 27 July 2018; Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018; Government officials 10, interview, 26 August 2018).

In the KAZA region on the Zambian component the people living in the conservancy have been organized into Village Action Groups (VAGs). For instance, there are five VAGs in senior chief
InyamboYeta’s area in the Western Part of the Simalaha and the other five belongs to Chief Sekute in the Southern part of the Simalaha. The VAGs elect a Chairman (PPF official 1, interview, 27 July 2018) who performs advisory role on conservation. They also represent the communities to the working group, Board of Trustee among other committees. However, the groups are dominated by traditional leaders. Thus, the voice of the locals is not well represented. Figure one below shows the composition of the Simalaha Community Conservancy Association.

![Diagram of Simalaha Community Conservancy Association]

**Figure 6.4: Composition of the Simalaha Community Conservancy Association, Source: Author, 2018**

As seen from the above figure, it can be deduced that this kind of participation will not enable full participation and meaningful empowerment of the local communities. Thus, the need to establish institutions which will prioritize the voice of local people and enable them to represent themselves in decision making positions (Murphree, 2000). This will enable the local people to effectively manage their resources. On the contrary, TFCA proponents argue that TFCA’s are based on the community participatory models (Ramutsindela, 2004). Thus, before conservation programmes begin, the first priority is given to the local people. Like other TFCA’s in Southern Africa whose establishment has been dominated by government officials (Munthali, 2007), reality on the ground
shows that the KAZA project on the Zambian component also takes a top-bottom approach, as seen from the KAZA entry point. To confirm this one senior official added that the Western part of Zambia is predominately occupied by Lozi speaking people. They have a strong traditional leadership which follows a top-down approach, therefore “we approached their King (Litunga) first who helped to link PPF with the Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta, the vision for the Simalaha was also shared with Chief Sekute, and later the indunas from both chiefdoms disseminated the information to the local communities as stated above (PPF official 2, Interview, 25 July 2018).

In relation to this, one community member maintained that the control and management of the conservancy is in the hands of the royal family (Local community farmer 2, 27 July 2018). This is in line with the view of one community member who maintained that the resistance from the local people was not significant because the chief had already agreed to implement the KAZA project. “Who are we to reject the chief’s decision?” (Local community farmer 6, interview, 27 July 2018). Thus, the local communities had no option but to welcome the project. This clearly shows that the local people are on the receiving end, while important decisions are made by the traditional leaders and funders.

6.2.1 The Simalaha dream

The Simalaha project feeds into the KAZA plan of joining fragmented wildlife habitats in order to form an interconnected mosaic of protected areas and transboundary wildlife corridors for facilitation and enhancement of free movement of wildlife across colonial borders (PPF, 2013). As such Simalaha project was given priority as it marks the first strategic step towards the creation of a wildlife corridor. Simalaha is strategically positioned to provide a corridor which goes up to Kafue National Park from Chobe National Park. This corridor is going to link the Chobe National Park in Botswana and Conservancies in Namibia to Kafue National Park in Zambia, thus it forms part of the Zambezi Chobe dispersal area as stipulated in the Master Development Plan (PPF, 2016) and shown in figure 6.5.
Thus, once fully functional the Simalaha conservancy will restore ecosystem health, conserve biodiversity thereby mitigating habitat fragmentation. This will also result into the revival of culture which was lost when the biodiversity in the area was depleted. PPF (2013:3) further adds that, “…the community trust will be formed and will be a legal entity that can enter into agreements with private sector investors. It will also be responsible for managing wildlife and concessions as well as charitable arm that will ensure benefits are ploughed back into the community…” in addition to this, government official mentioned that the Simalaha community conservancy will equip the local communities with conflict management skills through training and other forms of capacity building (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017).

It is also hoped that the reintroduction of wildlife to the area will boast tourism, which will bring revenue to the area, resulting in economic growth and improved social services. This will translate to the overall improved welfare of the local people. Thus, not only is Simalaha strategically positioned to act as an animal corridor but it is culturally, economically and socially important to the local people, hence the need to understand the KAZA through the Simalaha case.
Simalaha sanctuary has been extended to create space for Buffalo restocking. Two hundred buffalos have been imported from Namibia for this purpose. On the 23 August the first ninety (90) buffalos were reintroduced to Simalaha sanctuary and the remaining one hundred and ten were delivered within a few weeks. This project is meant for the sustainability of the project because when the numbers of buffalos increase, they will be sold and the revenue generated will be used by the local community (Government official 1, interview, 16 August 2018).

The views from civil society organizations indicate that wildlife numbers are still very low at the moment because the project is in its initial stages, therefore the benefits to the local communities are minimal (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 19 December 2017). This relates to views from government official that at the moment a wildlife based economy cannot be built because the benefits from wildlife take long to materialize, maybe in five or ten years’ time, more tourists will be attracted to the area and the local communities will begin benefiting through creation of more jobs, supply to tourism investments and domestic tourism (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017).

6.2.2 Introduction of the Simalaha Project to the local community

As stated above, the idea of forming the Simalaha Community Conservancy by reintroducing the animals to the area was initiated by Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta. It was then shared with Chief Sekute. Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017) as such consultation meetings with the local communities through the Kutas (Council of traditional leaders) were held in 2007 and 2008 on the Zambian component of the KAZA TFCA. During the consultation process and sensitization meetings some local people expressed mixed feelings about the project due to a number of reasons. Some key informants maintained that:

I was skeptical because previously whites came under the pretext of helping the community but in the end, we realized that our land had been taken and the land titles had been issued. We have lost a lot of our resources due to the investors who come in the name of developing the area (PPF official interview, 27 July 2018).

When we first heard about the creation of the sanctuary our first reaction was negative because we did not know what type of animals were going to be introduced to the place
and how we were going to be living with the animals. Of course, they said the animals to be introduced were friendly, but we know that where there is prey there are also predators.... We have never stayed in such an environment before. As a school we feared for our children and the water which we needed to start sharing with the wildlife. (Government officials 10, interview, 26 August 2018).

The local communities feared that the project was not for them, it was for the whites and when the whites bring the animals, they will chase them out. (Local community farmer 4, interview, 26 July 2018).

Some people feared for their fields, as wildlife was going to attack their crops (Local community farmer 5, interview, 26 July 2018).

According to interview data from a government official, after intensive sensitization, the local people agreed to the reintroduction of wildlife to Simalaha project (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). As stated earlier the resistance by the local people was not high as the local Chiefs had already accepted the project. Therefore, the formation of the Simalaha is a people driven project and the local communities proposed to undertake the restocking of the Simalaha (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In 2010 PPF came on board to offer assistance to the local communities in sustainable natural resource management (PPF, 2013). With the support from PPF, and funding provided by WWF-Germany, Mava foundation, among others the Simalaha Nature Conservancy boundaries were determined, and kick started the fencing of the wildlife sanctuary (PPF, 2013). Additionally, the formulation of the Simalaha Community Wildlife Conservancy was cemented by signing of the Surveyor-General’s Maps by Senior Chief InyamboYeta and Chief Sekute was a milestone (PPF, 2013). On the 22 October 2012, Simalaha Community Conservancy was launched (KAZA, 2012). Another milestone was the establishment of a Project Steering Committee and a Working Group with representation from chiefdoms of Senior Chief Inyambo and Chief Sekute, DNPW, Forestry Department, the District Commissioners of the Sesheke and Kazungula Districts, as well as the Community Trusts from both chiefdoms (Ministry of Tourism and Arts, 2018).
On the other hand, some government officials argued that the local people are treated as equal partners in development in the KAZA TFCA and that no one should be termed as a beneficially. The argument holds that, the moment local people are considered as equal partners, they will be actively involved, but if termed as beneficiaries they will wait for handouts (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). As such the research participants argued that ‘The TFCA is a people-based concept’ (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Sources in government indicate that there is a need for buy in of the local community, right from the onset of the project. (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). One government official asserts that conservation can only be undertaken if it is beneficial to the local people. One cannot ask people to conserve when poverty is on the rise and people have no food (Government official 1, interview, 22 January 2018). To support this, civil society actors contend that conservation in TFCAs takes on a human face (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 19 December 2017).

Similarly, state representatives in the study indicated that people are involved at every stage of the TFCA KAZA projects (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). For example, when coming up with the IDPs, the people were involved in identifying problems and finding solutions. In relation to this, one chief rightly pointed out at a meeting to discuss the initiation of the KAZA in the study area that ‘KAZA should go to the people because these people have lived with wildlife and other natural resource for many years’ (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In this regard, one local community member confirmed that “I am one of the people who helped map the conservancy, I helped identify the permanent and temporal fish camps.” (Local community farmer 1, interview, 26 July 2018). The project officials maintained that at each stage of planning and implementation, the local people are involved. As such, a government official argues that local people on the Zambian component have been active participants and this is evidenced by the fact that there have been no forced removals on the Zambian component of KAZA; the local people co-exist with the wildlife and KAZA is managing to produce a new human-wildlife landscape in the KAZA areas (Government Official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). On the contrary, research data indicate that some local people relocated due to wildlife attacks on their fields (see chapter 4). This does not support PPF claims of voluntary relocation as noted by Witter (2013) and shown in the research on GLTP by Sinthumule (2019).
Although there are claims by key informants that the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian component takes a consultative process, the lack of consultation with the members of staff at Kasaya Primary School, as reported below, is a clear indication of the project’s failure to include the local communities to address the real needs of the school in the sanctuary. This practice continues to exclude marginalized people from accessing the benefits (Mbaiwa, 2015; Mogende & Kolawole, 2016). In addition, it defeats KAZA’s key purpose of involving the local people when managing resources that transcend political boundaries. Like other TFCAs such as the GLTP, a TFCA flagship in Southern Africa where there was a lack of community consultation (Wolmer, 2003) the local communities (Local traders) living close to the conservancy revealed that they were not consulted on the establishment of the KAZA and the Simalaha conservancy but only saw fences being erected (Local trader1, interview, 28 July, 2018; Local trader2, interview, 28 July, 2018; Local trader3, interview, 28 July, 2018). In relation to this (Katerere, et al., 2001) argue that “In practice…TFCAs have been pushed forward at a rapid pace without much time for consultation with communities and other stakeholders.”

6.3 Effects of the KAZA on the local people in Simalaha Community Conservancy

It should be noted that the Simalaha local community is not a homogenous group. It comprises of different groups of people, including women, youths, fishermen and farmers, among others. All these groups are affected differently by the creation of the Simalaha sanctuary, as shown below.

6.3.1 Effects of the KAZA on local farmers

The main livelihood activity in Simalaha Community Conservancy is farming. As such the local communities are trained in conservation farming. Conservation farming is not a new practice in Zambia, it has been practiced since the 1980s in seven of the country’s provinces (Haggblade & Tembo, 2003). Conservation farming promotes minimum or zero tillage (see Chapter Two). Unlike conventional farming, which requires the clearing of trees on a large piece of land, conservation farming entails small scale cultivation with maximum yield (Haggblade & Tembo, 2003). Thus, conservation farming relates to the KAZA project because it gives quick benefits or quick wins to the local farmers and it is said to free space for wildlife conservation. In order to achieve the best results local people in Simalaha are trained in conservation farming and the first training was in
By 2018, about one thousand and eighty (1080) people had been trained (PPF official 4, interview, 27 July 2018). This relates to views by government officials that communities are expected to benefit through introduction of alternative livelihood opportunities (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). As such, conservation farming responds to both food security and social instability associated to it (PPF, 2013). In relation to this, one civil society organization official added that the project has not only introduced conservation farming and gardening programs to make local people food secure but to also keep them busy, so that they do not engage themselves in poaching (Civil Society organization official 4, interview, 27 July 2018).

Despite the introduction of conservation agriculture in TFCAs, it was established that farmers continue to record low yields due to various reasons, including: declining investments in agriculture, unreliable rainfall, low and unattractive producer prices, poor extension support, poorly developed input supply markets, shortages and high prices of key inputs, declining soil fertility and insecure land tenure (Zimbabwe Conservation Agriculture Task Force, 2009).

The local people living in Simalaha sanctuary and conservancy in Mwandi and Kazungula districts expressed two different views on the effects of the KAZA on local farmers. While some confirmed that the project had equipped them with knowledge and skills in conservation farming by training them in conservation farming, others viewed the project as one which has come to disfranchise the local communities. Thus, the local farmers noted that:

I joined because the project was giving the farmers seeds such as maize and vegetable seeds. We were also given treadle pumps and training in conservation farming (Local community farmer 5, 27 July 2018).

The project mobilizes resources for training the local people in conservation farming (Local community farmer 2, 27 July 2018).

This project has provided us with treadle pumps and tanks, we are now able to cultivate bigger portions of land. I used to cultivate one lima, but now I have expanded my garden to almost two hectares as a result of the project (Local community farmer 5, 27 July 2018).

As stated above some of the participants, mostly small-scale farmers, confirmed that their lives had been improved due to the support given to them by the project in the form of water tanks,
treadle pumps, seeds and training in conservation farming, which has resulted in higher yields (PPF, 2013). Due to the support received from the project, local communities are also able to engage in vegetable gardening, thus making the local communities’ food secure and able to sell their surplus crops. Figure 6.6 below shows the gardens by the local communities.

![Figure 6.6: Local farmers’ garden, Source: Author, 2018](image)

The vegetables shown in the figure above are not community owned but belong to individual farmers who can sell, and the proceeds used as desired by the farmers. In relation to the above, one government official maintained that parallel programs have made the local people become food secure and they can now sell their surplus food to buy other items that they need. The government official further noted that:

We look at the welfare of the people, the livelihoods and their well-being…. (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018).
Similarly, another government official pointed out that it is important to note that the benefits from wildlife are not immediate, but long term, and therefore it is unreasonable to expect the local people to immediately begin reaping the rewards (Government official 3, interview, 12 December 2017), thus, the introduction of immediate benefits through conservation farming. Furthermore, some farmers have organized themselves in groups and are practicing fish farming by constructing dams using local material. Below is one of the fish dams constructed by community members.

![Fish Dam](image)

**Figure 6.7: Source: Local community fish pond, Source: Author, 2018**

The above fish pond is owned by over five farmers, each with his/her family. The fish harvested from this pond is shared among the farmers who own it. As can be seen from the nature and size of the pond, it is too small to provide enough fish for the local farmers to meet their household needs and no surplus is available for sale. Furthermore, management of the pond appeared to be poor due to a lack of training and resultant low skills levels in fish farming. Currently the project is not supporting or training the local communities in fish farming, although such initiatives are promoted by the project.

Despite the above benefits from KAZA TFCAs, some local farmers maintained that the project has made their lives more miserable than they were before. This is because, previously they used to farm on a large scale, thus producing more yield, whereas the current practice calls for small fields. In relation to this, one local farmer maintained that:
Previously we used to have a lot of produce because we could cultivate large pieces of land, and we were not fencing our fields but now the conservancy has reduced our cultivation area thus we cannot produce a lot and we are encouraged to fence our fields to prevent wildlife from attacking the field (Local community farmer 3, interview, 5 2018).

Owing to the above, it can be argued that confining the local people to small pieces of land near their houses shows that the local people are slowly losing their land access rights. This relates to Dzingirai (2004:1) observation that although “TFCAs raise the hopes of the local people, in reality they disenfranchise the local people by reducing their access and control over resources’ on large geographical spaces on which they previously depended” (Brockington, 2002). Fencing of their gardens and fields comes at an extra cost of labour and money, which worsens the situation for the rural poor who have to bear the burden. As such, poor farmers have resorted to cutting down trees to fence their fields, a practice which is unsustainable and widely condemned in the light of climate change.

Furthermore, the findings revealed that the introduction of wildlife to Simalaha sanctuary has led to the fields of the local people living in the sanctuary being destroyed. In relation to this Murphy (2008) argues that the increase in wildlife may negatively impact agriculture and human safety. One local farmer observed that people are fearful to go into the fields because of the risk of animal attacks. “My brother was killed by a hippopotamus and the project has not even compensated the family. My brother’s wife and children are now suffering because no one can help them.” (Local community farmer 3, interview, 5 January 2019). Figure 6.8 below shows a maize garden belonging to a local farmer that was destroyed by hippo.
If sold, projected income from the maize was estimated at ten thousand Kwacha (K10, 000). Thus, this destruction is a huge loss for small scale farmers, who depend on gardening for survival. This case was reported to the project, but no compensation was given. The fields of the local people living in the sanctuary are frequently destroyed by Zebras and Hippos. When this happens, the local people are not compensated and in most cases are advised to fence their fields off so as to prevent wildlife from entering them. However, most of these locals have no financial capacity to buy wire to fence off their fields. Thus, they resort to cutting down trees in order to fence their gardens, a practice which is not sustainable. As such most participants complained about the lack of compensation and inadequate support to enable them to fence their gardens. Some local community people maintained that:

The animals attacked our fields and no compensation was made. My one hectare of maize was damaged by the Zebras, I reported to the project people, but no compensation was made. If only they compensated us we would have raised money to fence the fields (Local community farmer 6, interview, 27 July, 2018).

In relation to this Metcalfe and Kepe (2008) argue that the local people living in sanctuaries or adjacent to parks are not given enough incentives to accommodate wildlife. Additionally, there is a tendency by conservation organizations using states as fronts to acquire large pieces of land on environmentally protected grounds (Ramutsindela 2007; Wolmer 2003). The vast land acquired is used for the creation or expansion of the TFCAs, thus resulting in the displacement of the local people. The land rights are normally transferred to private companies or the State (Dzingirai, 2004). The GLTP is the case in point where at least two thousand five hundred (2500) residents of
Shangaan people were displaced using conservation narratives (Munthali, 2007; Andersson, et al., 2013; Lunstrum, 2014). Local people are also threatened by wildlife which destroys their crops, livestock and human lives as the borders become more and more permeable thus pushing them into abject poverty.

Although the key officials in this research claimed that the introduction of the conservancy had led to food security and the sale of surplus produce, some local people expressed their dissatisfaction. These were mainly linked to market and transport for ferrying their crops to the market. The increase in the yield of their crops necessitated the need for the market to sell the surplus crops and vegetables. However, the market in the area is small, and is normally flooded as most of the farmers in the area produce similar crops and vegetables. As such some farmers maintained that:

Lack of market and poor road network are the major challenges we have. At times the tomatoes go to waste due to lack of transport. Previously 18 crates of my tomatoes went to waste due to lack of transport. We take our tomatoes to Sesheke which is 60km from here, however, the Sesheke market is also small, our tomatoes are at times not bought, therefore it tomatoes goes to waste (Local community farmer 6, interview, 27 July, 2018).

We would like to have a market, at the moment lack of a proper market has resulted into low prices of commodities, it is also difficult to sell because everyone does the same crop (Local community farmer 7, interview, 27 July 2018).

In relation to this PPF (2013:5) confirms that “Farmers are affected by market realities such as low market prices of some crops, especially when produced on a small scale, the implications being a persistent lack of food security, lack of income and very narrow livelihood options.” In response to the farmers’ grievances the project is looking into the market situation of the local farmers and has engaged a Dutch organization called Grounded. This organization will help farmers with inputs as well as buy crops from local farmers (PPF official 2, Interview, 25 July 2018; PPF official 4, interview, 27 July, 2018). However, Grounded is only interested in five crops, these being groundnuts, maize, sorghum, cowpeas and cassava this implies that the local people will continue having market and transport challenges with their garden produce.
6.3.2 Effects of sanctuary on fishermen and women

As mentioned above, fishing is also a source of livelihood in the sanctuary and, therefore, fishermen constitute another group of people found in Simalaha sanctuary. Thus, the creation of the sanctuary has an effect on them because the Zambezi River where they conduct their fishing activities flows right through the sanctuary. The creation of the sanctuary has come with restrictions on fishing activities, including the fact that methods of fishing are now strictly monitored by the project scouts. The fishermen can no longer fish freely as their methods of fishing are deemed unsustainable. Thus, the fishermen can no longer catch as many fish as they once were able to. The fish ban season is strictly enforced in the KAZA by the Fisheries Department, with the help of the scouts hired to safeguard the resources in the sanctuary by the KAZA project in order to create the right conditions for fish to reproduce (see Chapter Four). This means that during the ban, fishermen lose their only livelihoods. Thus, KAZA is failing by not introducing adequate alternative livelihood sources during fish ban periods in the area. Restriction on the usage of resources in TFCAs is not unique to the KAZA TFCA as it has been practiced in the Limpopo National Park, where hunting of small game for consumption was against the regulations of the park and stiff punishment given to those caught hunting (Milgroom and Spierenburg, 2008). Thus, the study confirms that the claim that TFCAs ensure the co-existence of people and wildlife has not yet materialized. The findings in both Simalaha and GLTP show local people to be on the weak side and lose out on local livelihood sources.

The fish ban also affects the local traders, who are mostly women. These women normally buy their fish from the fishermen and sell it at retail price at the market. The strict implementation of the fish ban and failure to provide alternative activities implies a loss of livelihood for these women and their children. Further, the women who mostly fetch water for their families struggle a lot to find drinking water in dry season. This is because during the dry season, the water in the shallow wells dry up and the only alternative is the Zambezi River. However, there are restrictions on access to the Zambezi River in the sanctuary. In relation to this one local farmer noted that,

…prior to the commencement of the project, we were promised dams by the project, but up to now nothing has been done, in dry season we suffer a lot because we cannot access the Zambezi river anymore (Local community farmer, interview, 28 August 2018).
6.3.3 Effects of the sanctuary on education in Simalaha

The government representatives claimed that conservation in the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian component has contributed to better education facilities. In relation to this, one government official maintains that “….we link conservation to education, because an educated society is a developed society” (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). As such, through KAZA, PPF built three staff houses and installed water tanks (Government official 9, interview, 24 July 2018) as seen in the figure 6.8 below. The project also promised to be implementing one project each year at Mwandi Secondary School. However, this has not been fulfilled. Figure 6.9 below shows a water tank and one of the houses constructed by the KAZA project at Mwandi Secondary School.

In addition, electrification of Kasaya primary school was done to enable the pupils in the surrounding community be able to study at night (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018). Another senior government official added that “as a result of the installation of solar at Kasaya primary school pupils can study at night and for teachers, pupils as well as parents are able to attach such benefits to the sanctuary” (Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July, 2018). There is emphasis on uplifting the living standard of people living near the parks, as doing this will enable the impact of KAZA to be felt by the local people and the failure to impact the local people is the failure of the KAZA project (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In relation to this, officials at Kasaya primary school confirmed that the project installed solar panels which provide electricity for lights in classrooms and the teachers’ offices (Government officials 10, interview, 26 July 2018). Below is figure 6.10 showing the solar installed at Kasaya School.
Despite the installation of solar panel at Kasaya Primary School, the officials at Kasaya revealed that the project’s assistance to the school was misplaced due to lack of consultation. The school officials maintained that:

Electricity in classes does not serve its purpose because Kasaya is a primary School and children do not come to study in the night, therefore the lights in the classrooms are not very useful, they are not meeting our needs, if they consulted us we would have asked them to put the electricity in the school offices and staff house (Government officials 10, interview, 24 August 2018).

The project keeps promising to the school, but they do not deliver, they promised to provide computers, accommodation, water and cement before commencing the project, but they never fulfill (Government officials 10, interview, 24 August 2018).

What we needed the most were staff houses, we have seven teachers against three houses. The remaining four teachers either stay in offices or make clay houses (Government officials 10, interview, 24 August 2018).
In relation to the above, Kasaya Primary School has for a long time had inadequate accommodation. There are only three teachers’ houses at the school and, as stated above, those who cannot find space in the offices make their own homes out of clay. This means that the real benefits from the project do not reach the local communities. Figure 6.11 below is one of the teachers’ houses made out of clay.

![Figure 6.11: A primary school teacher building her house out of clay, Author 2018](image)

Like in the KAZA TFCA where most of the promises to the local communities have not been fulfilled, Wolmer (2003:13) notes that plans for electrification, rehabilitation of the road network, water supplies and staff accommodation, and ‘strengthening park management capacity in Gonarezhou National Park remain unfulfilled. The story is not different in the GMTFCA (Sinthumule 2017; Andersson et.al, 2017).

### 6.3.4 Positive effects of the Simalaha sanctuary

Findings also reveal that KAZA TFCA has resulted in a cross-border learning and knowledge exchange. This relates to arguments by government officials who report that transboundary forums have been created to enable local communities to exchange information as well as to raise awareness regarding conservation of biodiversity across borders (Government official 2,
In relation to this, a government official added that Chiefs from participating countries now have an opportunity to implement exchange visits, learn from one another and support one another (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Through these visits, Chiefs are exposed to new knowledge and are able to learn better and more sustainable practices of wildlife conservation and management.

In turn, the Chiefs begin to champion the idea of cross-boundary wildlife management to their subjects (Council of traditional leaders 1, interview, 25 July 2018). Accordingly, the government official argues that if the KAZA project is to be successful the local people have to be involved and the benefits should reach to the lowest level of society (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). In relation to this, the government official insists active community participation in wildlife management is cardinal because, as humans are part of the destruction of the environment, therefore they should also be part of conservation success stories (Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018).

There are also claims that the KAZA on the Zambian side have not conducted forced removals. Other government officials added that the people who have moved have done so voluntarily and it is normally after realizing that they are being attacked by wild animals. These people are also advised to move from the wildlife corridors, and they are assisted with inputs and crops as startup capital in their new area (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017; Government official 5, interview, 22 January 2018). However, these narratives reflect facilitated relocation and not by choice as claimed by state officials. In line with this, Witter (2013:406) indicates that “the resettlement processes in Mozambique’s Limpopo National Park place in a displacement context wrought by conflict with wildlife, elephants in particular.” In relation to this, Ramutsindela, (2009) argues that the forced removal of the local communities in other TFCAs such as GLTP resembles a practice in colonial and apartheid eras.

The findings also show that KAZA TFCA has exposed conditions in these areas and placed on the world map the places like Simalaha, which were previously unknown to the outside world (Government official 2, interview, 17 November 2017). Furthermore, a government official contends that the creation of Simahala has created employment opportunities for the local people, especially the youth (Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). Interview data from
civil society and government representatives indicate that not only are the local people employed in the Simahala area, but also the entire KAZA for different types of employment such as Village scouts, occasional workers casual workers to slash grasses, manage bush fires in various periods of the year in the KAZA and this has enabled the local people become financially stable and less reliant on natural resources and illegal activities such as poaching (Civil Society organization official 2, interview, 19 December 2017; Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017). In relation to this, Hanks (2003) argues that TFCAs contribute towards an increase in tourist arrivals, create jobs, improve the living standards of the local people and develop the economy. In this regard, research participants also confirmed that the project had provided jobs to the local communities (Civic leader 1, interview, 25 July 2018; Council of traditional leaders 1, interview, 25 July 2018; Local community farmer 2, interview, 27 July 2018). At the moment the project has trained and recruited twenty-two (22) scouts, all of them are from local communities (PPF official 3, interview, 27 July 2018). In 2011 eighty (80) people were hired to fence the sanctuary while in 2018 fifty-two (52) have been hired to slash and fence the extension of the Simalaha sanctuary (PPF official 3, interview, 27 July 2018; PPF official 4, interview, 27 July 2018).

6.3.5 Negative effects of the Simalaha sanctuary

Although the Simalaha Conservancy has benefited the local community through conservation farming, gardening, employment, about one hundred and fifty-four (154) people (Scouts and casual workers) were employed (See section 4.4.3 of Chapter Six), construction of teachers’ accommodation, provision of energy serving stoves, electrification of schools and clinics among others as seen above. There are a number of negative effects as shown below.

Like the Shangaan people whose land rights were taken away (Munthali, 2007; Lunstrum, 2014), the findings show that the reintroduction of wildlife poses a threat to children’s rights to education in the sanctuary. In relation to this research, participants from Kasaya Primary School, which is in the sanctuary, revealed that the wildlife come close to their school as the property is not fenced, “At the moment we have a challenge of the Hippo that has entered the dam and they are affecting pupils’ attendance. About 30-40% of pupils cannot report to school because they are scared.” (Government officials 10, interview, 26 August 2018). This is because the dam is very close to the school. Consequently, the pupils’ performance has been adversely impacted and some pupils may
drop out of school. The matter was reported to the conservancy manager and the District Education Board (DEBS) but nothing has been done. The research participants at the school noted that “whenever we report, the response we get is that your school is in the sanctuary” (Government officials 10, interview, 26 August 2018). The hippos come close to the teachers’ homes and this has brought a lot of fear and insecurity. The teachers have been robbed of their peace. It was further discovered that the dam in which the teachers depend on for their water is where the hippo is found thus this has brought security and safety concerns among the teachers.

The findings also show that the scouts are trained in military skills (Civil Society organization official 2, 23 January 2018). During the operations people who are caught hunting are labeled as ‘poachers,’ brutalized and treated as such because they are seen as threats to TFCAs (Anderson et al, 2013). Anti-poaching measures have become ‘bloody,’ as evidenced in the exchange of fire between rangers and poachers. Similarly, one village member revealed that fishermen caught fishing in the sanctuary using methods deemed ‘unsustainable,’ such as the arrow, mosquito nets and others are brutalized by scouts (Local community farmer 3, interview, 26 July 2018).

The poachers now use sophisticated weapons and techniques. As such the States have also intensified in terms of using more sophisticated militarized and military actors, partnerships, techniques, and technologies (Lunstrum, 2014). Unlike Zambia, where game rangers are armed on their patrols, but shooting of poachers is mainly done in self-defense and sentences for poachers can be as high as 20 years (Government official 2, interview, 23 January 2018) Botswana implements a “shoot to kill policy” which has provided a model on how to deal with poachers (Henks, 2007; Ramutsindela, 2016). Similarly, in order for KAZA initiatives to be successful there is a need to empower the state and implementing agencies involved so that they are enabled to counter the poachers’ techniques. This entails acquiring more vigorous and violet forms of policing (Death, 2016). However, this model has been criticized for abusing human rights and contradicting the essence of peace parks (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016). It can be argued that militarization of conservation has pushed the local people from actively participating in conservation to being enemies of conservation. Conservation has created enmity between the implementing and enforcing agencies and the local people, for instance the Department of National Parks and Wildlife in Zambia is viewed by the local communities as unnecessary evil.
As seen from the forgoing arguments TFCAs are not very different from the previous forms of colonial practices which secluded the blacks from conservations areas using fences and military tactics. Like the former, TFCAs also use military tactics to prevent local people from trespassing. The state also criminalizes and brutalizes the local people and whoever is caught poaching, in some instances the people labeled as poachers are killed. This shows that the state is willing to go to extreme violet acts to protect biodiversity and push human beings away (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016). In relation to this some scholars argue that conservation is a form of social relationship in which the powerful strive to prevent the weak from accessing resources which are vital for a sustained livelihood (Durand, 2019).

Although there are claims that TFCAs create employment for the local people, as indicated above, the views of civil society organizations question the quality of jobs the local people get and there is no possibility that these jobs will lift people from poverty. In relation to this, field data indicate that the scouts employed to provide animal security get a salary of about $100 per month (Local community farmer 3, interview, 26 July 2018). This is too little for employees to cater for their basic needs given the high cost of living. The local people are rarely in executive positions thus they cannot make decisions and control what happens in the areas (Civil Society Organization Senior Official1, interview, 22 January 2018). The decisions on what to do in the areas are outside the mandate and capacity of the local people. Sometime, the local people are also not well and fully represented by the local leadership.

These jobs do not benefit many people, as seen from the quality of jobs and number of people employed. The jobs are too few compared to the demand and promise of the KAZA TFCA. In relation to this Munthali (2007) argues that States rarely employ adequate human resource to protect the resources. Further, some authors have criticized these kinds of employment for not making the local people financially independent as the remunerations are too low and render them more dependent on their employers. This is evidenced by poor conditions exhibited by the local people living in the conservancy, sanctuary and adjacent to the TFCAs (Chiutsi & Saarinen, 2017; Ramutsindela, 2004) as seen in figure 6.12. The figure below shows a house of one of the local community members.
In relation to the above, the study revealed that the local people take up jobs which have no decision-making powers, as well as low class jobs as mentioned above (Civil Society Organization senior official 1, interview, 24 November 2017) thus perpetuating poverty. Therefore, the idea of local people benefiting fully from the KAZA needs very careful scrutiny and consideration. Therefore, the establishment and management of the KAZA TFCA does not escape the critique of TFCA’s who have condemned the TFCA’s on the basis of their failure to involve the local communities in decision making processes, creating low wage jobs, grabbing land from local communities - thereby pushing them into absolute poverty -and giving more power to their financiers (Ramutsindela, 2004; Munthali , 2007; Dzingirai, 2004; Lunstrum, 2015; Duffy, 2016). In line with this, Simunthule (2019) contends that TFCA’s are not for local people’s wellbeing, they are mainly for biodiversity conservation and enriching commercial stakeholders while the cost is imposed on the local poor.

6.4 Conclusion

The chapter has shown that the introduction of KAZA TFCA and the Simalaha restocking project in particular has benefited the local communities by providing them with training in conservation farming, creating long term opportunities in eco-tourism and supplying seeds and treadle pumps, among others. However, the training as well as the seeds and pumps are only given to less than
50% of the total population in the conservancy while the remaining population continues to struggle. On the other hand, the reintroduction of wildlife has created new problems such as destruction of fields, thus pushing the local poor into absolute and abject poverty. Further, although the participation of the local community is integral to the success of the KAZA, the local people are not involved in meaningful participation as seen from the quality of the jobs given to them, which are mostly low paying with no decision-making powers. The Village Action Groups (VAGs) meant to represent the local communities are also dominated by the traditional leaders who may not represent the needs of the local people. As such the local people continue to live in poverty. Thus, the huge promise of TFCAs to the local community is yet to be seen in Simalaha.
CHAPTER SEVEN: REFLECTIONS ON THE KAZA TFCA

7.1 Introduction

Over the past 20 years, Southern Africa has seen the establishment of about eighteen TFCAs, among them the KAZA TFCA. However, KAZA’s recent existence does not reflect major improvements in the tourism sector in Zambia and the local people living close to the parks remain marginalised. Local people are even more disadvantaged as they cannot farm on large areas away from their homes, due to the fear of wildlife destroying their crops and being attacked by wildlife. Thus, the local people are encouraged to engage in conservation farming on small land on their backyard or near their homes. This is not only done in order to prevent their crops from being destroyed but also create more space for wildlife conservation.

This chapter provides the final reflections of the thesis, whose aim was to investigate the motivation behind Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, types of investment and the implication the impaction of the KAZA on local communities. The study used the Simalaha Community Conservancy as a case study to understand the role of TFCAs as a development mechanism that balances imperatives between nature conservancy and socio-economic development in Southern Africa. The chapter reflects back on the research objectives by linking literature reviewed to the findings and further highlights conceptual insights. The thesis used the lens of political ecology to understand the power relations among the actors involved. It dwelt much on the role of the state in resource management in the KAZA TFCAs. Political ecology was used in this study of TFCAs because it provided an understanding of the changing roles of the state in the face of global actors such as the international financing organizations and international conservation organizations among others. Political ecology was also used because it is cardinal in assessing control and access of the resources in TFCAs by various stakeholders, including states, local communities and international players among others. This chapter is divided into five sections including the introduction. Section two reflects on the rationale for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA, before highlighting the investments of the Zambian government in KAZA in section three, in accordance with the research objectives. Section four highlights the implications of the creation of the KAZA TFCAs on the local people. In section five the conclusion of the chapter is presented. Finally, the recommendations are given in the sixth section. In the following section I reflect on Zambia’s interests in participating in the KAZA.
7.2 Rationale for participation in the KAZA

TFCAs in Southern Africa are relatively new and are viewed as a way of balancing environmental conservation, socio-economic development and poverty reduction objectives. Countries around the world, and Southern Africa in particular, have different reasons for their participation in TFCAs. Proponents have pointed out conservation, tourism, peace, regional integration and economic development as key reasons for countries’ participation in the TFCAs (Bennett, 2003; Hanks, 2003; PPF, 2008). Thus, Zambia’s motivation for participation in the KAZA is not dissimilar to the regional objectives for joining TFCAs and includes conservation of biodiversity, regional integration, and social-economic growth through tourism development, which is cardinal for poverty alleviation, among others. Contrary to conservation narratives, some authors have argued that the participation of countries in TFCAs goes beyond conservation narratives. States participate because of the incentives which go hand in hand with TFCAs, such as donor funding, economic gains, environmental and political gains (Ramutsindela, 2004). Thus, the participation of states in TFCAs comprises a combination of both individual needs and potential gains (Ramutsindela, 2004, 2007). Given the motivation for participation in the KAZA, the government of Zambia sees the need, often ‘political’-to also participate and contribute towards the establishment /implementation of the KAZA TFCA like any other state actor in SADC.

As stated above, conservation of wildlife is one of Zambia’s motivations for participation and it is in line with the KAZA TFCA objectives. This is reinforced through the creation of KAZA and reinforces conservation through the creation of conservancies such as the Simalaha Conservancy. There has also been an introduction of ‘wires’ to ‘fence off’ certain areas and deprive local population of free movement and accessibility. The people can no longer move freely in the fenced areas for fear of being accused of poaching and they cannot easily access land-based resources such as water, fish, forestry and wildlife due to the restrictions associated with the establishment of the KAZA and enforcement by the scouts. This is not unique to the KAZA, other TFCAs including GTLP have also evicted local people from their land. While States are preoccupied by the above motivations when participating in the TFCAs, the creation of KAZA TFCA goes beyond that. It brings together different actors into play. Therefore, the creation of the KAZA TFCA
creates unique complex relationships and international cooperation among the state and non-state actors on sensitive issues which relate to taking down of colonial boundaries.

The actors involved exert different forms of power at various levels. The power of the states is embedded in legislation, financing and the professional discretion of state bureaucrats, while the non-state actors such as NGOs and conservation organizations’ power take the form of technical expertise and the financial capacity to fund the TFCAs. In this context the powerful NGOs are said to influence public policy in public interest, (Adams at.el, 2003). Similarly, the powerful states, and those with better infrastructure such as Zimbabwe tend to benefit more from tourism gains as a result of the creation of the KAZA than those with poor infrastructure like Zambia. It is important to note that the formation of the KAZA has resulted in the restoration of wildlife which was lost during the liberation wars. Over one thousand two hundred (1200) animals have been reintroduced to Simalaha Conservancy. However, the participation of Zambia in the KAZA has not resulted in social-economic development and the tourism sector remains underdeveloped, with low tourist arrivals on the Zambia component of KAZA.

7.3 Investments in the KAZA TFCA on the Zambian component
The second objective of this research was to understand Zambia’s investment in the KAZA. Accordingly, the government of Zambia has invested huge portions of land (see Chapter Five). This land comprises both communal and private land on which the KAZA TFCA is being implemented (Munthali at.el, 2018). Furthermore, the government also hires some of the human resources and builds the human capacity of workers to implement the KAZA on the Zambian component and provides some of them with salaries. It is also the responsibility of the government to pay for allowances such as travel for officers on official duties such as KAZA meetings. However, this kind of investment is not enough for the implementation of the KAZA, and, thus, PPF also hires staff to work in the KAZA and Simalaha Community Conservancy, in particular. The research established that despite Zambia being endowed with vast natural resources, conservation in Zambia remains least prioritized as evidenced from low investment levels by the government. Hence, it relies on funding from international organizations such as the KfW, WWF and World Bank, among others, with KfW being the major donor. These organizations have invested financial and technical support in the establishment and running of the KAZA TFCA.
Most of the support from donors goes through PPF or SADC. These organizations do not only fund but also regulates the usage of the funds and ensure that their interests of ensuring control through the use of direct or implied measures of power in the establishment and management of TFCAs is maintained (Duffield, 2007). Therefore, the KAZA TFCA is mainly a donor funded project with low prospects for project sustainability after donors pull out. This study established that fund allocation for KAZA TFCA, like any other TFCA to which Zambia participates in, does not reflect in national budgets. This means that, should the funders `withdraw their funding the project may come to an end. This then draws into question and begs microscopic interrogation of the efficacy of the objectives in the KAZA TFCA.

Further, the presence of big international organizations in TFCAs poses a threat to national sovereignty. This is because the financiers of TFCAs may provide the frameworks which may be the basis for the policies of resource management in poor countries. The absence of total sovereignty by the member states implies that states cannot make independent decisions but are influenced by strong external financial forces which may not have the local community at heart (Anderson et al., 2013). As such the countries are reduced to fronts and surrogates for the powerful and a few elites, thus the resources are not controlled by the member states but the financiers. Therefore, the states are in the pockets of the financiers (Wolmer, 2003).

7.4 What is in TFCAs for local communities?
Scholars have invested their time and resources in researching the effects of TFCAs on the local communities (Anderson et al. 2013). Accordingly, the third research objective for this study was to explore the implications of the KAZA on the local population. TFCAs are said to be the tourism driving forces, leading to social-economic development through the creation of jobs for the locals. However, this research revealed that TFCAs do not automatically translate into tourism growth and economic prosperity. Therefore, being a part of TFCAs does not guarantee tourism growth and local beneficiation. For poor countries like Zambia, in order for the tourism industry to flourish and create value for both the participating countries and local populations, there is a need to address other drivers of the competitive tourism sector such as good infrastructure, including provision of adequate transport infrastructure, water, ICT and energy, ensure novel marketing strategies, pricing strategies and put in place integrated tourism development policies, among others. These
factors are not well addressed in the KAZA TFCA, hence, the initiative does not create a competitive Zambia and local beneficiation remains very low. Thus, it can be argued that tourism mainly benefits those countries with a well-established tourism sector, while the less developed countries hardly see the benefits of tourism at all. As such the local communities see little or no benefits from the TFCAs proclaimed tourism benefits (Mogende, 2016).

There was a general consensus among all the government officials in this study that the TFCAs are people driven and take on a human face. On the contrary, this research established that TFCAs on the Zambian component take an undemocratic top-down approach, which does not include the local communities in decision making portfolios. Although the local chiefs are said to represent local communities, their participation does not guarantee full representation of the local people’s needs (see Chapter Six). In relation to this, one research participant insisted that, the location of the Simalaha project offices at the palace creates a barrier between the project and the local communities because local people find it difficult to get to the palace (Local community farmer 3, interview, 26 July 2018). In this regard, critics of TFCAs argue that TFCAs take a Top-down, market-oriented approach imposed on Africa by international bureaucracies as a solution to environmental problems (Wolmer, 2003; Anderson et al. 2013; Ramutsindela, 2014). The fact that TFCA formation is driven by foreign donors with the support of a few local elites (both state bureaucrats, traditional leadership structures and civil society), it can never be an independent and local people driven initiative. The funders provide guidelines on how their funds should be used and local elites champion the local agenda, usually without due consideration of vulnerable rural local populations. Thus, the elites create a form of elite control (Ramutsindela et al. 2011). Furthermore, most decisions are made at regional level where there is no local community representation, thus the local people become invisible (Duffy, 2006; Anderson et al. 2013). Accordingly, there is no room for the local communities to engage with the donors or make adjustments to suit their local needs. It can be argued that TFCAs have not given ample attention to strengthen the weak voices of the local rural communities and their ability to favorably participate in decision making positions and processes, thus most decisions made are less sensitive to the local needs. In relation to this Mark (1994) maintains that in conservation of resources, the less powerful are sidelined from accessing the resources by the powerful actors who control the management of resources by enacting laws which enable or disable access to resources.
Although there are claims that TFCAs bring hope to the local communities living adjacent to national parks by facilitating job creation as tourism begins to boom, this study shows no significant improvement in the livelihood of the local communities because the local people continue to be marginalized and some experience harsher conditions due to human-animal conflicts. In Simalaha, a place of social deprivation, the competition for natural resources such as water between newly introduced animals and local populations is rife and wildlife continue to destroy the fields of the local communities (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008) thus making them food insecure. Other critics have argued that TFCAs do not empower the local communities but, rather, disenfranchise them by restricting both their access and control over the resources which they previously had (Dzingirai, 2004). In relation to this by introducing conservation farming training in 2013 and encouraging people to restrict themselves to back yard farming. More than one thousand people in Simalaha Community Conservancy have been trained and are participating in conservation farming. It can therefore be argued that the local people in Simalaha Conservancy have been ‘swiftly and quietly evicted’ from their farming land to backyard farming. This is done to pave the way for conservation, to the detriment of food security for local populations. This makes these populations more vulnerable because the resources from which they derived their living are no longer accessible.

In addition, it has also been argued that linking poverty to conservation brings to the fore the idea of the donors using conservation to help in the alleviation of poverty. This donor figure does not necessarily result in reduction of poverty but, instead, conjures up images of colonial-masters trying to recolonize Africa in the name of conservation (Singh and Houtum, 2002). Further, there is more emphasis on enlarging conservation spaces through the creation of TFCAs than on finding ways of enabling local communities to benefit more from TFCAs. This shows that the donors are more interested in pushing forward their agenda of increasing their control over resources than improving the lives of the local communities. This is evidenced in the high poverty levels of the people living adjacent to the parks (Ramutsindela, 2004), including those who live in the KAZA TFCA in Western province of Zambia. The findings clearly dispute the claims by proponents of the alleged magical performance of TFCAs.
The study shows that community empowerment is inadequate in terms of enabling local people to live independently. Not only do local people lack both financial capital and the requisite skills to get involved in the tourism business, they also do not have ownership rights to natural resources and therefore depend on the often-low wage employment offered by the private companies who own the means of production (Ramutsindela & Noe, 2012). These jobs expose the local people to exploitation and render them dependent on the people providing them with wages. Where the locals do strive towards participating in tourism, the returns are very low. In relation to this, a study on tourism conducted by Suich (2008), in the KAZA region shows that locals own 50% of tourism related enterprises. However, the return rates, as well as local capacity building, remain low. This indicates that tourism does not necessarily translate to improved living standards of the local people (Scovronick & Turple, 2009). This is vividly true for the people of Simalaha. Therefore, for the local people to reap meaningful benefits from the KAZA, there is a need for true empowerment whose control should be locally based. The local people need both financial capital and capacity building in order for them to properly participate in the tourism business and receive true financial and social gains. Other benefits include employment opportunities, provision of agricultural inputs, provision of a good road network and energy, among others. However, even empowerment may not translate into immediate results for the local communities as the benefits derived from wildlife take a longer period to manifest.

This study revealed the gap between the promises of TFCAs to local people and the realities on the ground in the KAZA. There is no mention of how the local communities will radically connect with KAZA investment benefits, besides the mention of a trickledown effect to the poor in communities. The study shows that in Simalaha, any hopes based on the trickledown effect will remain over ambitious. In relation to this, Ramutsindela maintains that it remains unclear ‘how TFCA gains will ensue and be used to solve domestic problems’ (Ramutsindela, 2004:125). Furthermore, the KAZA has led to the creation of the ‘new state,’ which I refer to as the ‘KAZA State’. In this state the new approaches, regulations and policies to manage the common resources have been formulated. The ‘KAZA State’ has also adopted extreme measures to protect and defend wildlife, through the use of military tactics and shoot to kill (Ramutsindela, 2016). Furthermore, people caught hunting are labeled as poachers and punished as such, while in some instances such
people are even killed. It is important to note that despite the creation of the KAZA and efforts to harmonize policies, poaching in the KAZA region continues to be on the rise.

7.5 Concluding remarks
The research used a case study method to understand the motivation behind the government of Zambia’s participation and investments in the KAZA, as well as its implication on the local people. Political ecology provided a framework for understanding the research objectives, the complex relationships of actors involved in the KAZA TFCAs and power struggles over access to natural resources, including land and water. Over the past two decades, the countries have been increasingly embracing the TFCA’s style of conservation as this is seen to be reconciling both ecological and economic needs. The study showed that TFCAs are highly political projects and their successful implementation requires the political will of all involved. The KAZA TFCA is also a complex project as it involves five states with differing legislation, policies and implementing agencies. The establishment of the KAZA has largely been motivated by ecological reasons. Against this backdrop, KAZA region is said to be home to the largest number of the remaining African elephants (approximately 120,000). The study has indicated that countries participate in the KAZA for various reasons, including conservation, regional integration, peace and security, among others. It can be said that countries have different needs and expectations from the KAZA, due to their diverse levels of development. Accordingly, Zambia participates in the KAZA because its conservation plans are in line with the KAZA’s objectives. Other reasons for participation include regional integration, regional blocs and TFCAs: KAZA-SADC relations and social-economic development.

The study further established that the KAZA region represents an unequal investment project by member states. This is because the member states are at different levels of development, as mentioned above. Thus, they invest differently in the KAZA. Furthermore, the KAZA project is donor-driven and some countries, particularly Zambia, do not invest much in terms of infrastructure, including roads, in the KAZA, despite the potential benefits the KAZA promises. Therefore, the claim that KAZA TFCA is a member states owned, does not imply real ownership by states as the KAZA operations are driven by outside actors who finance the KAZA operations. These financiers of the KAZA TFCA have the decision-making powers. Thus, the creation of
TFCAs has shifted the role of the state to that of hosts rather than as equal partners in the implementation of the TFCAs.

KAZA’s implementation tends to marginalize the local communities. This is because the local people are not given decision making positions. Instead, the decision-making processes tend to involve technical bureaucrats, local elites and international NGOs and donor agencies, among others. Therefore, KAZA TFCA can be viewed as undemocratic global environmental governance which takes a top-down approach in its implementation agenda and excludes the local communities who are directly affected by the creation of the KAZA. Thus, real ownership is not in the hands of the local communities. Although some key informants and scholars claim that the creation of the KAZA TFCAs has led to alternative livelihoods such as conservation farming and gardening resulting into food security (Hanks, 2003; Government official 1, interview, 3 November 2017), this study revealed that the introduction of KAZA TFCAs has resulted in human-animal conflicts. It also found that the wildlife introduced to Simalaha conservancy destroy the fields of the people living in the conservancy, resulting in loss of crops, food insecurity and, in some instances, the local people are killed by wildlife. Thus, the KAZA TFCA produces new sets of problems and struggles. Furthermore, the KAZA does not offer a market for the few people who produce excess crops for selling. This means that the conservation programmes introduced by the KAZA project have so far not transformed the lives of the local people and most people living close to the conservancy continue to live in poverty. It can therefore be argued that TFCAs are a new form of the colonization of Africa, as opposed to improving the living standards of the local communities.

7.6 Recommendations

Based on the findings, the study has presented the following recommendations:

1. The KAZA TFCA should be owned and run by the member states and give meaningful participation to local communities. This requires capacity building of the local people as well as instilling intellectual skills and building financial capacity.

2. There is need for TFCAs to take a bottom-up rather than and a top-down approach in its management and operation. Thus, the Simalaha offices on the Zambian component should be shifted from the palace to the village to allow for free local level participation.
3. There is a need for the project to fulfill its promises, such as provision of water, paying the contract farmers and providing a market to the local farmers, among others, in order to win the trust of the local community.

4. Member states should invest more (funds and support) in the TFCAs so as to prevent the collapse of TFCAs should donors withdraw their funding.

5. There is need to invest more in the social sector. Education, health and environmental management need to anchor the success of the KAZA.

6. KAZA needs to expand its operational scope beyond wildlife to include other equally important resources such as water and forestry, among others.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE

QUESTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND NGOs

Section A: Interview participant profile

1. Name........................................................................................................... (Optional)

2. Name of organisation/Department...........................................................

3. Designation..................................................................................................

4. Number of years or months in the position.............................................

5. Briefly describe ways in which your organisation engages with the KAZA

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Section B: Knowledge and information on KAZA

6. Why and how is Zambia participating in the KAZA TFCA?

1. What is the motivation for Zambia’s participation in the KAZA?

2. How and when was the decision to participate in the KAZA made?

3. What is the lead institution in Zambia’s participation in the KAZA?

4. How is Zambia participating in the KAZA?

5. Why did Zambia come up with the IDP for the KAZA?

6. What is the strategic focus of the IDP for the KAZA?
7. Who funded the formulation of the IDP?

8. Did the formulation of the IDP involve government officials or consultants or both?

9. What do you expect to achieve from the IDP?

10. What has been achieved from the IDP?

11. To what extent are the objectives of the IDP been achieved?

12. Which other stakeholders are collaborating with the government of Zambia in the KAZA project?

13. Explain how the collaboration is structured and implemented.

14. What are the underlying motives for Zambia’s investment in the KAZA TFCA?

1. What is the government of Zambia investing in the KAZA?

2. Which other institutions are investing in the KAZA?

3. How did the land become part of the KAZA?

4. Were there any conflicts in the formation of the KAZA? What were the drivers of these conflicts? Give examples.

5. In cases where local people refused to have their land become part of the KAZA, what measures were taken/or are being taken? Have these dynamics reduced or increased?

6. How have the local populations benefited from the KAZA?

7. What infrastructure has been built as a result of the KAZA?

8. What is the motive for the investment?

9. How is the Zambian government benefiting from the investment in the KAZA?

10. Who does the government/private sectors/NGOs’ investment benefit?

11. What are the implications of the KAZA TFCA on the local communities on the Zambian side?

1. How does the investment in the KAZA affect the local people?
2. Where their resettlement of the local people when KAZA was being created?

3. How was it done? Any special actors?

4. What are the benefits of the investments to the local people?

5. What are the negative effects of the creation of the KAZA on the local people?

6. How are the local people involved in the operation of the KAZA?

7. What challenges do you face when dealing with local communities?

Questions for Land Owners

8. Are you aware that your land is part of the TFCA?

9. Given that your land is part of the TFCA, how would you like it to be used?

10. What are you benefiting from the TFCA investment?

11. What are the negative impacts of the formation of the TFCA?

12. Has your income increased or reduced, or livelihood become more secure or insecure due to the establishment of the KAZA?

13. Was this land grabbed from you or you gave or sold it to KAZA without any coercion?

14. If you were compensated, was the compensation satisfactory to you?

CAN I USE OR NOT USE YOUR NAME IN THE RESEARCH REPORT?

Thank you for the time