STATE PERSONHOOD AND WORLD POLITICS

A personology of the South African state

DOCTORAL THESIS BY BIANCA NAUDE

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in the Department of Political Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Cape Town

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STATE PERSONHOOD AND WORLD POLITICS:
A PERSONOLOGY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE

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ABSTRACT

South Africa’s foreign policy decisions and behaviours are routinely referred to as “schizophrenic” by scholars and political commentators alike. A malady of the human brain, the World Health Organization (WHO) defines “schizophrenia” as “a severe mental disorder, characterized by profound disruptions in thinking, affecting language, perception, and the sense of self [that] can impair functioning through the loss of an acquired capability to earn a livelihood, or the disruption of studies”. If schizophrenia is a disorder of the human mind, then diagnosing a state with this disorder implies an acceptance of the argument that, indeed, “states are people too”. Yet, for all of the diagnoses of foreign policy schizophrenia handed to the South African state on such a regular basis, very few scholars have seriously contemplated the implications of state personhood for our understanding of politics among nations, and the importance of this approach to International Relations (IR) for research on state behaviours.

Pushing Alexander Wendt’s (1999) claim that “states are people too” beyond its present conceptual limits, this research undertakes a personology of South Africa as state-person. “Personology” is, in its simplest form, a science of persons: how they exist in relation to others, how they differ from others, and how their experiences of the world affect their cognitions and behaviours. Persons are more than just identities. Persons have emotions, they maintain relationships with significant Others, and they experience internal conflicts that spark certain defensive behaviours. Behaviours, in turn, take on specific patterns in individuals based on historical experiences of the external world, and on the individual’s internal configuration that predisposes it to certain courses of action that are again based in past experiences of the individual’s interactions with Others. In this sense, the project distinguishes between “identity” and “personality” as two interrelated, but distinct, components of personhood. While constructivist IR to date has contributed significantly to our understanding of state identities, considerations surrounding personality remain unexplored.

In the context of the above, the thesis asks the question “how do South Africa’s experiences of relationships with other state-persons shape its behaviour in international politics, and why do these behaviours take on these unique dynamics?” Departing from a re-examination of the South African state’s identity as both difference from and likeness to Others, the thesis incorporates insights from personality theory and psychoanalysis to propose a workable model for analysing state behaviours. Through an examination of significant events from South Africa’s recent foreign relations, the thesis considers both defensive mechanisms
employed by the state to protect its Self when faced with criticism from peers, and the reasons why these specific defences are employed in the way that they are employed. An understanding of the functions of narcissistic defences in individuals allows us to make sense of seemingly inconsistent, self-contradictory or incoherent behaviours beyond unexplored accusations of a disordered mind.

Persons communicate their Selves, and their experiences of the world, through carefully selected symbols – both linguistic and non-linguistic. The study of these symbols, or semiotics, has long been the purview of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which takes both linguistic and non-linguistic forms of communication as the foundations of social practice. Drawing heavily on the work of, among others, Foucault, Derrida and Lacan, CDA concerns itself with the social and political context of agency and structure, observable through the lenses of representation, manipulation, interpretation, that is embedded in the discourses of individuals or groups within societies. Discourse is produced with the aim of achieving something; this may simply include positioning the Self within society, communicating with Others to achieve the common aims of the group, or eventually, to change the external world in a way that corresponds to the individual’s inner image of its Self in relation to outside world. Informed by this understanding of discourse as the performance of the Self, and the means through which to satisfy internal desires, the project looks at ways in which the South African Self is narratively constructed and performed in relation to significant Others, and how South Africa attempts to shape the external world according to its own mentalistic images of itself-in-the-world.

**KEYWORDS**

International theory, state-personhood, identity, personality psychology, Self-Object relations, critical discourse analysis.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

If the old adage is true that it takes a village to raise a child, then it takes a community to write a thesis. There is no small amount of people to thank for their contribution to this project, and no one contribution is more or less important than another. While it would require another thesis to properly thank all the people who have played a part in this journey, I am grateful for every phone call, for the stimulating conversations and non-sense chats meant to distract my weary mind at the necessary intervals, and for the unlimited encouragement I received from every person in my life throughout the past three years. In a world that so often appears so cruel, the support I have received from the people around me is a testament to all the good still out there.

My greatest gratitude is to my mother, who patiently guided my five-year old self’s word-for-word re-reading of that story about the mermaid *ad nauseum*, preparing me for the (literally) countless words I would eventually read in the execution of this project, and to my father who continues to provide the security that makes a successful higher education journey possible at all. My debt to my parents for a lifetime of making all the right decisions on my behalf, even when I could not appreciate the value of these decisions, is one that I can never fully repay. I am equally indebted to the best brother and sister in the world, who masterfully mixed just the right parts of healthy sibling banter, unconditional acceptance and unrelenting friendship to provide a support network that is rivalled by no other.

I owe a special word of thanks to my partner, Wouter, who listened to every new idea with enthusiasm, and who empathized with every one of the many venting-sessions that accompany the writing of a thesis; though I am certain he had some doubts, he graciously allowed me to believe that I was always right, and refilled my wine glass at exactly the right moment to help me get over my frustrations and return to the more important parts of the research journey. He also makes a good stir-fry, and I am thankful for the dinners that made their way to the table on nights when I was too absorbed in my writing to nourish myself.

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me in the conceptualization, execution and writing up of this research – basically, for being the exact type of supervisor that I needed.

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Significant sections of this thesis have been presented at conferences in South Africa, the United States, and Finland; others have been published in revised form in academic journals or as chapters in edited book projects. I am extremely appreciative of the comments I have received on sections of this work, and for the suggestions from other scholars on how to improve my work. I am particularly grateful to the organizers and participants of the conference “Regional Challenges to Multilateralism” at the University of Tampere, and to the New York State Political Science Association for insightful comments and stimulating conversations about the work presented at these conferences. Thanks are also due to the Research Committee of the UFS’ Qwaqwa campus, and the Office of the Dean of the UFS Faculty of Humanities, whose financial support made it possible for me to attend these conferences. I am further thankful to the editorial teams at International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Affairs, and the South African Journal of International Affairs, as well as peer-reviewers for their invaluable insights, comments and suggestions.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa grouping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Department of Arts and Culture of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSM</td>
<td>Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union (including Great Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty</td>
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<tr>
<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCIS</td>
<td>Government Communications and Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIBSA</td>
<td>Dialogue forum consisting of Germany, India, Brazil and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GT</td>
<td>Grounded Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBSA</td>
<td>Tripartite dialogue forum consisting of India, Brazil and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICD</td>
<td>International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCMI-IV</td>
<td>Millon Clinical Multiaxial (Personality) Inventory – 4th edition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOP</td>
<td>National Council of Provinces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Council of the ANC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Negative Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Planning Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>Narcissistic Personality Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMG</td>
<td>Parliamentary Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Permanent Members of the UN Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Positive Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCT</td>
<td>Relational-cultural theory (psychoanalysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Program of the ANC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STIP</td>
<td>Social Theory of International Politics (Alexander Wendt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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INTRODUCTION: STATE PERSONHOOD AND WORLD POLITICS

A prominent scholar of South African foreign policy, and a former South African diplomat, recently remarked that as far as foreign relations go, South Africa is an interesting case to study. Indeed, of all the things South Africa is known for internationally – including its majestic landscapes, formidable fauna and flora, its “miracle transition” from Apartheid state to democracy and inspirational figure Nelson Mandela – the country is perhaps best known for its confounding foreign policy choices and international behaviours. From chaotic diplomatic interventions in the crises of its immediate neighbours – including its disastrous military invasion of Lesotho in the winter of 1998, and the failed policy of “quiet diplomacy” on Zimbabwe - to its patchy voting record on policies that concern international human rights at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the United National Security Council (UNSC), and the Human Rights Council, to successful mediation efforts in Burundi and its progressive politicians who played an instrumental role in the drafting of the Charter of United Nations (UN), South Africa’s is a dramatic presence in international affairs.

Among the most befuddling issues in South Africa’s more recent foreign policy history, is the country’s relationship with the UNSC which deteriorated significantly following UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on the Libyan crisis, and the country’s concomitant hostile relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Although arguments could be made that the UNSC and the ICC are person-like entities in themselves, South Africa’s attitude toward these institutions – as my analysis will show – is very much influenced by its relationship to the states of the global North who, in the South African mind, invented these institutions and who now dominate their governance. These attitudes, in turn, stem from historical experiences, and the emotions that they stir within the state continue to determine how the state approaches its relations with them.

1 Remarks by Yolanda K. Spies at the 2017 CEAPS Conference, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, 14 February.
2 Hereafter referred to as the UNGA or “the General Assembly”.
3 Hereafter referred to as the UNSC or “the Security Council”.
4 While it is acknowledged that neither Russia nor China is usually included in the term “global North”, and while the United States of America is not a State Party to the Rome Statute on the ICC, the South African state, in its foreign policy discourses, does appear to consider these institutions, along with the Bretton Woods Trio, to be inventions of the old Western powers. It is this lack of discretion that has earned South Africa the reputation of “schizophrenic state”. I elaborate on these apparent discrepancies in later chapters of this thesis.
Recent events surrounding South Africa’s relationship with the UNSC and the ICC serve as the starting point to this study, which pushes Alexander Wendt’s claim that “states are people too” (Wendt, 1999) beyond its present conceptual limits, and makes a study of the South African person – from its self-assigned identities, to its relationships with other state-persons, and eventually its characteristic dispositions and behaviours, all in an attempt to answer the question: “How do South Africa’s relationships with other state-persons shape its behaviour in international politics, and why do these relationships take on their unique dynamics?”

The remainder of this chapter is structured to first flesh out the brief introductory problematization and rationale of the study here presented, as well as the major research questions, aims and objectives, before proceeding to an overview of the most directly relevant literature on South African foreign policy and South African foreign relations. I then turn to some preliminary methodological considerations relevant to a personology of the state-person, reflecting on Wendt’s claim that “states are people too”, and the impossibility of separating state, government and party within a large-group like South Africa. The chapter concludes with a brief outline of each of the chapters of the thesis.

1.1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

On the 17th of March 2011, UNSC Resolution 1973 was adopted at a sitting in New York, following the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1970 on the Libyan civil war. South Africa’s vote in favour of the Resolution5 – in spite of abstentions by Brazil, China and Russia, as well as GIBSA counterpart Germany – surprised some and reassured others. In some respects, the vote served to reassure the international community of South Africa’s commitment to one of its central values – the respect for human rights and a commitment to finding peace and stability on the African continent – which had begun to draw questions following some seemingly inconsistent foreign policy decisions on international issues relating to human rights. For others, particularly for members of the African Union (AU) which, in 2005 adopted a united stance against what they believed to be a UNSC bias against Africa and the need for the reform of the Council – known as the “Ezulwini consensus” (AU, 2005) – the vote appeared contrary to South Africa’s self-proclaimed opposition to foreign intervention in African conflicts, and its support for the maxim of “African solutions to African problems”. While South Africa

5 Hereafter referred to as “the Libya vote”.
defended its vote on Resolution 1973, the French and British-led NATO invasion of Libya on the 19th of March 2011 resulted in a diplomatically uncharacteristic back-lash that few have been able to make sense of since.

The full weight of the tangibly intense face-off between South Africa and “the West” was evident at public lectures, addresses and meetings held by the Minister of International Relations, and her deputy, Ebrahim Ebrahim. The address of Deputy Minister Ebrahim to academics and diplomats at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) on the 22nd of July 2011 (Ebrahim, 2011a), which reflected on South Africa’s foreign policy and the international community’s engagement in North Africa following the Arab Spring uprisings, though perfectly diplomatic, could not conceal South Africa’s experience of injustice and betrayal by the international community. Seminars on this topic at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria focused on the tensions between the established powers of global politics (notably those occupying permanent seats on the Security Council) and the South African state. In the South African mind, the United Kingdom (UK), France and the United States of America (USA) acted in concert to formulate a purposely opaque resolution that would enable these states to achieve an illegitimate change of regime in Libya – at once to remove from power a notoriously stubborn and anti-Western leader, and to gain access to the country’s vast oil reserves. On another level, the NATO invasion of Libya entrenched South Africa’s view that colonialism had ended only on paper, and that the West continued to violate sovereignties wherever and whenever it could.

Following the disastrous Libya vote, South Africa abstained from voting on UNSC Resolution 2059 regarding the ongoing civil war in Syria, ostensibly because the Resolution was “unbalanced” (News24, 20 July 2012). This remark follows on an earlier remark by Ebrahim that South Africa would “support any decision of the Security Council that is balanced [but] that no military solution can solve the dispute” (SA News, 19 July 2012). While organizations like Human Rights Watch criticized the country for failing to take a definitive stance on the ongoing abuse of civilians by the Syrian government (Fabricius, 2011), South Africa – a country that claims two of its fundamental values to be the protection of human rights and the promotion of justice for all the victims of ill in the world – apparently remains

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6 The ambivalence inherent to the term is duly acknowledged, though I maintain the use of the term, often interchangeably with the term “the North” throughout the paper because these are the terms that the South African state employs in its discourse. While I return to an in-depth discussion of what South Africa considers to be part of “the West” and the “the North”, these terms for the immediate purpose imply the states of Western Europe and the USA.
bent on its pledge to oppose any UNSC decisions on Syria “to send a clear message that it ‘won’t be taken for a ride again’” (Ibid.) Freshly re-elected to a third term as non-permanent member of the UNSC, South Africa continues to push for the reform of the Council so as to award permanent seats to African member states (and one seat to South Africa in particular) which would, in the South African mind, allow the marginalized states of Africa some kind of control over the decision-making processes of the Council.

Parallel to, though not divorced from its tumultuous relationship with the UNSC, lies South Africa’s relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC).7 South Africa was one of the first states in the world to sign (17 July 1998) and ratify (27 November 2000) the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC, 2019).8 Like many of its African peers, South Africa was initially very supportive of the ICC, and of its work (Du Plessis, 2010:5-6) however, by May 2009, South Africa convinced alleged war criminal Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, not to attend the inauguration of former South African president, Jacob Zuma because an active arrest warrant from the Court would oblige the country to arrest the sitting Head of State if he were to enter South African territory. While the country faced immense pressure locally and internationally for what the world saw as yet another failure on the state’s part to take a definite stance on the issues of human rights abuses and impunity for war crimes, South Africa’s position on the ICC aligns with the both the AU’s common position on the Court (AU, 2009:2), and with the individual positions of African peers, who feel that the Court is an instrument of Western hegemony, that the Court is prejudiced against Africa, and that the Court – in concert with the UNSC – is undermining African efforts to establish peace in the war-torn states of the continent (Du Plessis, 2010:13-14).

South Africa’s relationship with the Court became ever more strained in June 2015, when the state failed to arrest al-Bashir, who had travelled to South Africa to attend a summit of the African Union in Johannesburg. Responding to criticism from the international community for its failure to arrest al-Bashir, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) objected that “[t]he manner that [South Africa] was treated around the al-Bashir incident is consistent with the cheeky arrogance that Africa has experienced in its interaction with the ICC” (ANC, 2015:175). While South Africa had, like many of its African peers, threatened to withdraw from the ICC since shortly after the assembly of the AU’s position on the ICC was made public in 2009, it did not follow through on this threat until the 19th of October 2016.

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7 Hereafter referred to as “ICC” or “the Court”.
8 Hereafter referred to as “the Rome Statute”.

when it submitted an instrument of withdrawal from the Statute to the UN Secretary General. South Africa’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute followed a ruling by the ICC that the country failed to honour its international obligations in failing to arrest al-Bashir upon arrival in Johannesburg in June 2015, in spite of a request South Africa had lodged with the Court prior to al-Bashir’s arrival in Johannesburg, to extend diplomatic immunity to the Sudanese Head of State to allow him to attend the AU summit.

Defending South Africa’s decision not to arrest al-Bashir, Head of the ANC’s international relations sub-committee, Obed Bapela explained that South Africa “would have been seen as lackeys of the West” (Mail & Guardian, 19 June 2015) if it had honoured its obligations under the Rome Statute to arrest al-Bashir. The ICC, Bapela added, appears to have evolved into “a way [for] the colonisers to punish the colonised” (Ibid.) The common denominator in South Africa’s issues with both the Security Council and the ICC, is the fact that South Africa feels somehow exploited, oppressed or taken advantage of by the states of the global North who, in the South African mind, hold more sway within these institutions. The country, moreover, feels that these states use this power to continue to exert political power over former colonies through unfair “targeting” of African states as an elaborate attempt to destabilize these states and effect regime change. Indeed, South Africa does not so much take issue with the UNSC and the ICC per se, but rather with the governance mechanisms of these institutions that tip the balance of the power scale in the favour of the old imperial powers.9 The same, of course, is true for the Bretton Woods institutions, which South Africa sees as tools for Western economic dominance over the states of the global South. What this demonstrates, is that South Africa has a tendency, from an outsider perspective, to act against the values and norms it has adopted as its own, often undermining the international processes and institutions that it had helped create, while offering up one of two justifications: either that the processes and institutions are tools of Western hegemonic states, who are biased against Africa and who seek to continue to oppress the continent; or that the processes and institutions themselves undermine South Africa’s international efforts.

In the context of the foregoing problematization, this research project seeks to propose an explanation for South Africa’s confounding tendency to actively choose to act against its self-defined national values of protecting the rights and dignities of all the world’s peoples, and of fighting for justice for victims of oppression and marginalization the globe over, in favour

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9 Although the United States cannot accurately be described as a “former imperial power”, there is in the South African mind, a blurring of the lines between “colonial” or “imperial”, and “Western”.
of sending the message that it does not bow the knee to (former) imperial powers. Viewed from any of the classical theories of International Relations (IR), South Africa’s propensity to act against its own interests, and indeed, sometimes choosing to harm its own image in international affairs, simply does not make any sense. From (neo)realist and (neo)liberal perspectives, it is puzzling that South Africa would posture so aggressively against the states of the global North, given the sheer size of their markets and their contributions to developing states in both Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA). Given the centrality of questions of identity to South African foreign relations, scholars have increasingly been turning to constructivist theories of IR to attempt to explain South African foreign policy – as discussed at length in the coming sections of this introduction. While constructivist literature does, to some extent, explain South Africa’s seemingly inconsistent behaviour in international politics at the hand of negative identities, the importance constructivists attach to international norms and practices means that the theory falls short of explaining why a state would violate the rules of the international politics game, harming its stature among peers. If, indeed, norms “constitute social identities and give national interests their content and meaning” (Adler, 2013:126), and if normative understandings of the world and actors’ places in this world indeed determine how actors will behave, then South Africa’s fairly regular “transgressions” of accepted and internalised norms provide the antithesis to constructivist explanations for state behaviours that are based in, and determined by, internal and external norms. While it is clear that troubled relationships with peers underlie South Africa’s international behaviours, we have no real understanding of the dynamics that shape these relations, and how they cause behaviours.

1.2. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

Within the context of the above problematization, the present research project seeks to arrive at a deepened understanding of the ways in which relationships among state-persons shape state identities and direct state behaviours. The overarching research question can thus be formulated as follows:

*How do South Africa’s experiences, or interpretations, of its relationships with other state-persons shape its behaviour in international politics?*
In answering this question, the analytical focus of this thesis will be on the phenomenological experiences of the state-person as constitutive of the South Africa Self, and the meaning that relationships with significant Others have for the South African state. The project does not limit itself to a relationalist research program, however, and proposes a broad, interdisciplinary inquiry of which the guiding research questions are identified below:

1. If we accept that behaviours are conditioned by identities that are socially constructed and reconstructed over time, how can an identity-centred analysis of state behaviours help us make sense of seemingly incoherent, if not altogether harmful, choices and actions on the part of a state like South Africa?
2. In as much as relationships are a foundational component of identity construction and evolution, how can a study of states’ experiences of relationships with other state-persons help us understand how and why states judge certain behaviours or actions as justified and necessary?
3. How do intersubjective, motive experiences of relationships between and among actors in the international political sphere, inspire in states feelings of a disconnection between inner, ideal worlds and the external world, and how do states cope with this incompatibility?

Ultimately, the project seeks to establish a workable model for analysing state behaviours based on insights from the psychology of personhood. Three research aims are identified as essential steps in achieving this objective:

1. To investigate the identity of the South African state, including the internal and external processes through which this identity is constructed;
2. To unpack South Africa’s relations with other state-persons in order to arrive at an understanding of the affects, cognitions and personal predispositions that direct the state’s international actions;
3. To explore the South African state’s experiences of the political world of which it is a participant, and the ways in which these phenomenological experiences cause a will to action to transform or maintain aspects of this external reality in harmony with its inner ideals.

It should be clear from these questions, aims and objectives, that the research here presented is not intended to be an analysis of South African foreign policy, but rather a theoretical reading of South Africa’s relations with other state-persons. This is an important point: since Rosenau’s seminal contribution to the field of Foreign Policy Analysis with the publication of his book, “The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy” in 1971, foreign policy analyses are typically conducted at the level of individual decision-makers within the state machinery. As I argue in
my literature review however, collectives or large-groups – *exempli gratia*, states – once formed, take on logics and organizing principles of that cannot be reduced to the individual cognitions, affects and actions of constituent members. While Holsti’s work on national role conceptions (1970) and their importance for foreign policy decision-making provide us with valuable insights into the ways in which state elites factor stable, shared ideas about the identities and roles of the state in the international political realm into their day-to-day diplomatic activities, scholarly work on national role conceptions in matters of foreign policy (Wish, 1980; Aggestam, 1999; Harnisch, Frank & Maull, 2011; Oppermann, 2012; Hermanns, 2013; Caffarena & Gabusi, 2017; Strong, 2018) nevertheless continue to accord a primal position to the private cognitions and affects of individual decision-makers within the state. As Breuning (2019) observes, “[r]ole theory scholarship […] seeks to understand decision-making from the perspective of the decision maker [placing] emphasis on the agency of human beings”.

It is, for this reason, important to delineate the level at which the analysis takes place, and to consider to what extent state, government, party, and citizen can be broken down into distinct entities. I explore what has been written on South Africa’s foreign policy identity here below, before considering methodological issues relating to the study of state-persons.

1.3. Perspectives on South African foreign relations

South Africa’s international relationships, exemplified by the introductory remarks in the previous sub-section, have long puzzled analysts and scholars, seemingly consisting of an unintelligible mix of dependencies and comraderies that simultaneously support and defy the age-old belief that interstate relationships are built around the achievement of national interests (see notably, Spence, 1996; Solomon, 2002; Landsberg and Monyae, 2006; Habib, 2009; Lipton, 2009; Neethling, 2012; Melber, 2014 and Nganje, 2014). Informed by an anti-imperialist worldview, many of South Africa’s foreign policy strategies appear to harm its self-defined interests in international politics (see, notably, Nathan, 2008).

Among the topics that continue to enjoy significant attention from South African foreign policy scholars, are the apparent incompatibility between South Africa’s alleged hegemonic aspirations in Africa, and its self-proclaimed commitment to a foreign policy agenda that prioritizes African states’ independence and self-reliance. Another topic of great interest to South African foreign policy scholars, is that of South Africa’s voting behaviour in the United Nations, which often betrays tensions between the state’s self-proclaimed
commitment to human rights, justice for victims of war-crimes and crimes against humanity, and the eradication of all forms of social injustice, and the country’s relationships with states and individuals that are internationally considered as violators of human rights, and perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Given the centrality thereof to South Africa’s foreign policy, the country’s economic diplomacy and its complex relations of interdependence with emerging economic powers like China and India also enjoy considerable attention from scholars.

It would be neither possible, nor exceptionally useful, to engage with all of these very divergent topics in a literature review for a study focused on identities and the relational dynamics that arise from these identities. For this reason, I will limit my review of literature on South African foreign policy to the topic of the South African identity – particularly South Africa’s foreign policy identity – and South Africa’s relationships with other state-persons. I will not provide a discussion of the machinations of South African foreign policy making, nor will I offer a descriptive overview of the country’s major foreign policy agendas. These topics are covered in great depth by South African foreign policy analysts (see, among others, the collected works in Carlsnaes and Nel, 2006; Landsberg and Van Wyk, 2012; Geldenhuys, 2015; Masters et al., 2015; Adebajo and Virk, 2018), and although very interesting, they do not promise to provide much insights for answering the stated research questions of this project. I do, however, address South African foreign policy scholarship’s reliance on substantivalism in this overview, as well as the issue of the lack of theorization on South African international relations.

1.3.1. Constructivism, identity and South African foreign policy scholarship

South Africa’s identity is a much debated topic – both within circles of domestic politics and in IR circles (see Cilliers, 1999; Klotz, 2000; 2006; Van Wyk, 2004; Nathan, 2005a; 2005b; 2008; 2013; Habib and Selinyane, 2006; Van der Westhuizen, 2008; Soko and Qobo, 2010; Geldenhuys, 2012; Olivier, 2012; Domson-Lindsay, 2014; Alexandroff, 2015; Naidu, 2015; Kotze, 2015; Le Pere, 2017; Qobo and Nyathi, 2016; Thakur, 2018). Such is the extent of the debate around South Africa’s identity, that Ivor Chipkin (2007) dedicated an entire monologue to the question, “do South Africans exist?” For all the debate surrounding South Africa’s identity in world politics, however, very few scholarly contributions have attempted to demonstrate what exactly this identity is, how it is produced, and what its functions in South
Africa’s international behaviours are. Among those contributions that do engage with South African identity in international relations, the general consensus appears to be that South Africa struggles with a kind of multiple identity disorder, torn between its commitments to neoliberal principles like democracy, human rights, the rule of law and international norms, and its commitments to the agendas of Africa and the Global South on the other.

Analyses of the South African state’s identity vis-à-vis other states’ identities in the international environment, particularly as pertains to the actual process of identity construction, belong to Audie Klotz (2000; 2006), Laurie Nathan (2005a; 2005b; 2008; 2013) and an article by Alden and Schoeman (2013). Other studies include one by Borer and Mills (2011), which aims to explain South Africa’s allegedly incoherent behaviour in international politics through an investigation of the international community’s expectations of the country post-1994, and the country’s response to these expectations; another, focusing on the endogenous processes constitutive of the South African identity – though not explicitly laying claim thereto – by Deon Geldenhuyys (2012), accounts for the political culture that underlies and shapes the outwardly projected identity of the South African state (see also van der Westhuizen, 2008; Smith, 2012). A constructivist reading of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy by Jo-Ansie van Wyk (2004), though not quite as conceptually thick as the aforementioned articles, does provide a neat historical overview of the evolution of South African foreign policy since 1994 from a constructivist paradigm (see also Olivier, 2012).

Among the most complete contributions to the topic, is an older article by Serrao and Bischoff (2009:370), which argues that South Africa’s identity is narratively constructed through a process of “othering”, where the Other is represented as “an existential threat to the Self; as inferior to the Self; as a violator of universal principles; or merely as different to the Self” (one reference omitted). This “other”, for Serrao and Bischoff, is not an external party, “but rather its own apartheid past”. It is against this context, the authors argue, that we should understand South African foreign policy: South Africa’s commitment to the human rights agenda in international affairs is an attempt to present itself as the opposite of Apartheid South Africa, while the state’s Africa Agenda is an attempt at constructing the “new” South African self as a state that stands in solidarity with the African people and their struggles. For the authors, South Africa’s foreign policy “ambiguity” resides in the state’s struggles to establish itself as a “good international citizen”, while appeasing African peers who had grown weary

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10 I am forced to make this inferential leap from Serrao’s and Bischoff’s article, only because they never really explain what this “positive approximation” to other African states contributes to the South African identity.
of the racist Apartheid regime. Ultimately, for Serrao and Bischoff, South Africa’s behaviour in international affairs is reducible to attempts to project a certain image to the outside world, and to balance competing demands from peers with this subjective image of its place in international politics.

If Serrao and Bischoff conclude that South Africa’s “claims” to push for the transformation of the international system are reduced to mere ideas by its material incapacity to effect any of these grand ideas – a foreign policy weakness, in the authors’ argument – then, I am rather unconvinced that South Africa’s foreign policy is “all talk and no action”. The growing importance of regional arrangements and the rising powers have certainly tipped the balance in favour of South Africa’s attempts at applying its limited resources to the purpose of bettering itself, and hopefully, the world (Serrao and Bischoff, 2009:378). More importantly, Serrao’s and Bischoff’s argument discounts almost in its entirety, the importance of exogenous factors in the construction of an identity – whereas South Africa’s identity is to some extent based on attempts to distance its new self from the former, distancing the South African self from external others fulfils an essential function in the construction of its identity.

Perhaps my greatest critique of scholarship laying claim to analyses of South African identity in international affairs is not so much that they fail altogether to consider the South African identity and its implications for foreign policy making, as it is that these analyses fail to compare this identity to itself – to study how the identity is constructed through social interaction, how it presented by the state, and how it “lives up to” the way in which the state presents it to the outside world. That is, existing studies ignore practices of reflexivity and the co-construction of the international political reality within which the state operates, and the effects that its identity-based behaviours have on this reality – whether intentional or not. Grounded, without doubt, in self-statements by the South African state and its political elite regarding the South African identity, South African scholars tend to take for granted self-assigned identity traits and characteristics without comparing these identity constructs against significant Others or even the South African Self (although most or all of the authors acknowledge that the South African identity is constructed against that of a significant Other –

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11 I am, again, left to infer an argument beyond that which is presented by the authors, though I am confident that my inferences are consistent with the general gist of the article, and that of other authors who have argued the same.
12 Veteran scholars of South African foreign policy, Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman (2013) make a similar argument.
none describe how, nor even which Others).

While the South African state’s self-descriptions are important sources for understanding how the state sees itself, it is important to remember that self-descriptions may be misleading – either purposefully or unconsciously. We should, therefore, take seriously South Africa’s identity claims, and compare them to outsider observations of the South African identity: how an actor sees itself is only one part of the equation; true understanding of a state’s phenomenology lies hidden in the degree of convergence or divergence between how the state sees itself, and how it is actually perceived by Others. As the coming analysis will demonstrate, a significant portion of important psychological processes and ego defences depend on (self)deception; if we take the South African state-person at face value, we miss out on the “fleshy” part of its personology that truly explains its relationships and behaviours.

On this topic, Guzzini (2000:148) laments interpretations of constructivism as “a general category out of which many researchers pick and choose their particular version without necessarily looking at the theoretical coherence of the final product [or] when a constructivist touch adds some facelift to some already existing approaches”. Simply stating that a paper employs a constructivist framework for understanding the South African foreign policy identity, reiterating the state’s self-proclaimed identity based on things it has said about itself, and then reciting a number of occurrences that seemingly support these identity-claims, is not constructivist research. The majority of those papers invoking a constructivist framework reduces the analysis to an investigation of the ideas and cognitions of a single actor, robbing the analysis of its spatio-temporal location in a complex, intersubjectively constructed system that functions according to sets of meanings attributed to, and imposed on, phenomenal occurrences:

[Constructivist] research not only addresses the nexus between material and ideal inputs and individual behaviour, but must first understand the agency in a more embedded way, understanding the historically evolving schemes of thought perception and action, as well as the distribution of capital, including the social, in carefully defined fields where agents meet (Guzzini, 2000:169, original spelling).

Identities, constructivists tell us, are determined in a big way by norms and practices, which

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13 On the point of a desideratum in scholarship on South African foreign policy theorization, as opposed to the general descriptive, evaluative and/or prescriptive “overviews” of South African foreign policy making that seems to dominate the South African IR-landscape, see Smith (2013).
have been a topic of great interest for scholars of South African foreign policy and have resulted in a significant number of papers dedicated to understanding the role of international norms in shaping the South African political space, as well as the South African state’s attempts to influence or determine international norms through its foreign policy endeavours (see Black, 1999; Nel and van der Westhuizen, 2004; Geldenhuys, 2006; 2008; Lipton, 2009; Neethling, 2012; Smith, 2016a; 2016b; van der Westhuizen, 2016; van Wyk, 2016). Concepts of sovereignty and non-interference, which I will expand to include debates about the legitimacy of the current international system – particularly that of the United Nations and its affiliated organs – as well as international governance structures, are highly contested issues in South African foreign relations that have received considerable attention from scholars over the past years (see, among others, Landsberg and Monyae, 2006; Flemes and Habib, 2009; Spies, 2009; Graham, 2010; Heine, 2010; Brosig, 2011; Masters, 2011; Zaehringer, 2013; Melber, 2014; Saunders, 2014; Mandrup and Smith, 2015; Qobo and Dube, 2015; Geldenhuys, 2016; Smith, 2016a; Jordaan, 2017).

As my introductory remarks to this chapter suggested, South Africa considers the current architecture of many of the most important global governance institutions to be illegitimate and geared towards promoting inequality and oppression in global affairs. In response, the state engages in acts of resistance against Western dominance in global affairs. These acts of resistance may not be openly antagonistic, but most often, are intentionally disruptive of the normal course of international politics within the everyday setting, and are deeply connected to the asymmetrical representations of reality that are arise from the relationships between the states of the global North- and South.14 Scholarship on “resistance” generally tends to focus on micro-level resistance movements, from the feminist to Marxist-Leninist unions (see, e.g., Sharpe, 1989; Parry, 1994; Doty, 1996; MaigauMETAsha, 2003; Given, 2004; Richmond, 2010; 2011; 2012). Although I have not found any real scholarly studies on resistance to colonialism and Western dominance by states in the international states-system,15

14 An excellent piece of scholarship on the dynamics of representation in the relationships between North and South, which I will not have the occasion to explore in-depth in this thesis, is a 1996 book by Roxanne Lynn Doty, entitled “Imperial encounters”.
15 There are, of course, many studies on popular resistance movements aimed at overthrowing colonial administrations in former colonies (see, eg. Fanon, 1967; Maddox, 1993; Kedebe, 2001; Jefferess, 2008; Sharma & Wright, 2008; Pile & Keith, 2009; Moses, 2010; Mishra, 2012; Domingos, Jeromino & Roque, 2019), and even resistance to Western intellectual hegemony (Slemon, 1999; Murdoch, 1992; Ayoob, 2002; Sefa Dei & Kempf, 2006) however, I am referring here to a different type of resistance, a resistance to Western hegemony that does not begin and end with colonialism and decolonisation, and that is perhaps best described as a new form of “structural resistance”; what I am referring to here, are the ways in which states resist inherited systems of Western design through everyday acts that aim to disrupt, halt or otherwise make international governance
and specifically none on the South African state’s attempts at resisting Western hegemony, some work from the field of large-group identity provides important preliminary reflections and state-level resistance to colonialism and Western dominance in global politics.

1.3.2. On state, government and party in South Africa

The South African case is an interesting one to study, particularly from the perspective of state and government. This is because, since the ANC’s rule commenced in 1994, there has been a quasi-fusion between party and state (see Brooks, 2004:7-9; Netshitenzhe, 2012:14; Southall, 2012:325; 336; Johnston 2014:178; Booysen, 2016:28-32). Entrenching itself as the “spokesperson” of the people, the ANC has played an exceptionally important role in shaping the South African identity after 1994. The extent of the fusion between party, state, and nation in South Africa is best captured in Netshitenzhe’s (2012:14) observation that

the history of the ANC is, in essence, that of the struggle of the South African people for self-determination to achieve a united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society – ideals that are now codified in the country’s Constitution and are part of South African society’s DNA […] most events of national importance in the country’s history are associated with the ANC’s own history.

This may well be the subjective viewpoint of a single scholar however, a cursory reading of the White Paper confirms the depth to which this ideological orientation is entrenched in the South African government and in its utterances even in relation to the state’s foreign relations. Indeed, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad in the foreword to the first volume of the *South African Foreign Policy Review* called for scholars to pay more serious attention to comparative analyses of ANC foreign policy in scholarship on South African foreign relations (Pahad, 2012:vii), while the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, in partnership with the Midrand-based Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), convened a seminar around the influence of the ANC on South African foreign policy making on the 2nd of November 2012. This seminar, according to a report produced from the proceedings of the roundtable, responded to a “gap in the understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy orientation”, which is due to a

unmanageable in an attempt at forcing structural changes to the international system. Given the importance of interpersonal conflicts to questions of “personhood”, I return to this point in my recommendations for future research on state personhood.
shortage in “analyses of post-apartheid South African foreign policy behaviour [that] take into account the influence of the ANC as a ruling party” (Nganje, 2012:4; original spelling). While the report attributes this shortcoming to “the heavy reliance on state-centric theories to analyse foreign policy … the limited knowledge and discourse on the historical antecedents of the ANC’s internationalism, as well as the opacity around the actual influence of the party on government decisions” (Ibid.), the problem, which Chris Landsberg alludes to in his presentation at the seminar (see Nganje, 2012:8) is probably more accurately that most traditions within the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) object to the conflation between state, government, and party.

Acting as respondent at the seminar, was Essop Pahad, a struggle hero and former member of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC who had, until 2008, served on numerous portfolios of the democratic South African government. On the role of the ANC in foreign policy making, Pahad remarked

it is a given that the thinking of the ANC as the governing party must always impact on South Africa’s foreign policy [however] the party determines the country’s foreign policy orientation … only in broad terms. The details and actual implementation are left to the government (Nganje, 2012:11).

What is noteworthy from Pahad’s remark, is that, although South African foreign policy decision making processes leaves “sufficient leeway for the government of the day to flesh out the details” (Nganje, 2012:13) surrounding the implementation of the policy, the ANC is responsible for proffering the major ideological direction of South African foreign relations. What this would suggest is that, although the diplomatic corps is constrained in some way by the intricacies of day-to-day tensions and negotiations between interest parties, the general approach to South African foreign relations stems mostly from the ANC’s worldview. This worldview is best summed up in Pahad’s response that

In addition to the identity of the ANC as a progressive, pan-Africanist, non-racial and anti-colonial movement, the influence of the communist movement on the thinking of the ANC also needs to be appreciated … the ANC embraced the Soviet Union as a pivotal force in the struggle against imperialism … It is worth underlining that Western powers have never been friends of the ANC because of what it stands for. In fact, they were forced to change their policies and abandon support for the apartheid regime only because of internal developments in South Africa
Of course, ANC policy discourses cannot be claimed to represent the sentiments and worldviews of the totality of South Africans in spite of the large support base the party enjoys within the general public. Comparing ANC policy documents to official government narratives, it is clear that official statements made by the government are much more muted than those that feature in the party’s discourses. It should be noted, nonetheless, that although the statements of the national government are admittedly more neutral, many or most of the same ideas can be traced in both narratives, often communicated in very similar tone. This is, in part, because of the dominant position that the ANC has held in South African politics since 1994, consistently occupying a majority of seats in national parliament, with the Executive composed almost exclusively of members from the ruling party.\footnote{On the composition of government in South Africa, and the ways in which government composition and party politics influence foreign policy decision-making, see Masters 2012, 20-41.}

Considering, moreover, the ANC’s preference for a policy of cadre-deployment to top government positions, it is almost logical that official discourses share much of the content of the ANC’s policy documents. This does not mean, however, that the ANC narrative is not also a dominant discourse of South African society.

1.3.3. South African foreign policy scholarship: between materialism and idealism

While there have been some very valid contributions to understanding the conundrum that is South Africa’s foreign relations, very little scholarly work has been done on exploring relationships between foreign policy decision-making and phenomenological experiences of international relations beyond descriptive self-comparisons of the actual policy, how it is formulated, and eventually, how it is or is not implemented (Le Pere, 2012:161-165). Although useful for understanding the temporal conditions within which foreign policy is made, materialism\footnote{The distinction between “substantialism” and “materialism” in Whiteheadian philosophy is noted. The present proposal will follow Wallack (1980) to use the term “materialism” as a blanket term for both substantialism and dualism as interrelated scientific concepts.} reduces interstate relations to the cordial exchange of goods and services without due consideration for the incorporeal processes that mediate relations, rendering the quasi-totality of scholarship on South African foreign relations is descriptive in nature, rather than explanatory (on this point, see Le Pere 2012:161-162; also, Smith 2013:534-540).
Because South African foreign policy scholars analyse the policies and events, they are able to describe South Africa’s spatio-temporal location in the world of international politics with absolute accuracy, but they fall short of explaining South Africa’s foreign policy choices. An exposition of policies and events are assumed to explain South Africa’s decisions and actions in international politics, because they provide background information on the context within which decisions are made and actions taken. The problem with this approach is one of tautology: the causal force that is meant to explain an event or a policy, is in itself an event or a policy and very little attention is paid to the processes that brought these policies and events into existence in the first place. The effect of this type of substantialist theorizing, is that of reductionism: relationships between states, “are reduced to the mechanics of states bumping into each other” (Adler-Nissen 2015:286).

South African foreign policy scholarship’s insular approach to the history of South Africa’s foreign relations may well lie with the contradictions inherent to post-Westphalian international politics: the discomfort of the state-actor as both permanent (state) and finite (government). In the South African case, the issue is one of a dissociative identity torn between the permanent state-society, and the various government administrations that have ruled over this multi-ethnic, multicultural, multilingual society. In most instances, scholars focus on the policies and behaviours of “the New South African government” to which certain traits and characteristics are attributed and (sometimes) compare them to the traits, characteristics, policies and behaviours of “the Old South African government” to show how they differ from or compare to each other. Some scholars neglect the “Old South Africa” altogether in their research (see e.g. Carlsnaes and Nel 2006:17-32; Frost 2006:81-91; Habib and Selinyane 2006:173-190; Nel 2006:108-120; Monyae 2012:139-151; Smith 2012:68-81),18 while the totality of South African foreign policy scholars change back and forth indiscriminately between South Africa as state and South Africa as government in their writings. A 1997 newspaper commentary by South African foreign policy scholars Gerrit Olivier and Deon Geldenhuys (cited in Muller, 1998:66) best sums up the general approach taken by analysts of the state’s foreign relations:

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18 I should note, here, that the edited volumes in which these contributions appear, are focused on post-1994 South African foreign policy, though some contributions appearing in these volumes do note the importance of South Africa’s historical heritance for its “contemporary” foreign policies. On this point, see also Smith 2013:533-44.
The South African foreign policy continuum, which existed since autonomy from British rule had come to an end with accession of the new ANC-dominated National Government of Unity in 1994 … for political and symbolic reasons.

The major issue with this view, is that it requires accepting that pre-1994 South Africa has ceased to exist, and has been replaced by post-1994 South Africa. The problem, of course, is that pre-1994 South Africa has not ceased to exist – it has simply changed. The “Old South Africa” and the “New South Africa” are not distinct entities. They are a single actor that has taken on different forms in space and time, and that has a history of relationships – positive and negative – with other political actors that continue to influence its perceptions and feelings about significant Others. Understanding South African foreign relations, thus, requires an understanding of the evolution of South Africa as political actor, and of its evolving relationships with significant Others. This cannot be achieved when we analyse policies and events in isolation from antecedent policies and events. South Africa’s present-day foreign relations do not exist independently from its historic relationships – they are determined by these relationships. South Africa, as state actor in international affairs, may inhabit a form somewhat different from its form prior to 1994, but its relationships with other state actors up to 1994 still determine how this evolving entity emerges into the present. In this view, an investigation of the historical relationships and processes that continue to shape South Africa’s identity should help us make better sense of South Africa’s relations with the global North, which includes the global governance institutions that South Africa perceives to have been designed and dominated by Western states (on this point, see Naude 2016:481).

1.3.4. International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis: An uneasy kinship

At the initiative of foreign policy analyst, Cameron Thies, the International Studies Association hosted a workshop at its 2010 annual meeting that had as its aim to bring together “scholars

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19 If a foreign policy analyst (personal correspondence with the author) recently remarked that this argument is “is a remarkably ill-informed, analytically clouded or naive statement … [because] decision making process[es] changed, the priorities change[d] - or were contested -- and the positioning of the DFA as a body in the overall FP process changed as well”, the analyst seems to be arguing that a state is nothing more than its government. If it were the case that states ceased to exist whenever government and party changed, then all states would cease to exist every five to ten years, to be replaced by a new state. This paradigmatic cleavage between IR theory and FPA strikes me as particularly curious, if not underexplored. Given that South African scholarship tends toward FPA rather than IR scholarship (see Smith, 2012), then this might help explain why South African foreign policy scholars pay more attention to the intricacies of statecraft than the dynamics of state personhood. I return to the important cleavages between FPA and IR in the coming sections.
from disparate research traditions” (Thies & Breuning, 2012:1) in an attempt to “weave tighter connections between [the] disparate research traditions” of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. Considering that FPA is widely accepted to be a sub-field of IR, the claim that these two concentrations constitute “disparate research traditions” may seem strange however, Thies and Breuning (2012:1) are correct to point out that well-known theories of FPA, like Role Theory, are in fact, little known theories to IR scholars. In an excellent contribution on the “domestic politics turn” in IR theory, Kaarbo (2015:189-190) observes that “[t]he disconnect between FPA and IR theory is not new […] FPA is not typically acknowledged as part of ‘IR theory’” despite the fact that FPA offers IR scholarship complementary insights into international politics. Why exactly this is the case, cannot be said with certainty. Perhaps, as Thies and Breuning (2012:2-3) argue, the cleavage lies somewhere between different paradigmatic inclinations surrounding the units of analysis (individuals versus states as systems), and different theoretical groundings (psychology versus sociology). Whereas IR scholars may be more interested in meta-level explanations of state behaviours, foreign policy analysts tend to take a more pronounced interest in the impact of domestic politics on foreign relations (Kaarbo, 2015:190-192). As Hudson (2005:2) contests:

States [in FPA] are not agents because states are abstractions and thus have no agency.
Only human beings can be true agents, and it is their agency that is the source of all international politics and all change therein.

This view is, of course, radically different to the view supported in this thesis, and in IR theory in general; that is, the view that states as collectives are both capable of agency, and that this agency is not reducible to the private actions of the individuals within the state. It is perhaps this (irreconcilable?) paradigmatic cleavage between FPA and IR that finally entrenches “the belief that FPA and IR are, and should be, separate enterprises” (Kaarbo, 2015:192), and that supports the idea that FPA is more closely related to the fields of Comparative Politics or Public Policy (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2012:5; Kaarbo, 2015:193).20 If Wendt (1999:11) remarked that “like Waltz, [he is] interested in international politics, not foreign policy” (cited in Kaarbo,

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20 I am further struck by the cleavages in methodological language used in FPA as opposed to the language routinely employed by IR scholars; particularly the concepts of explanans and explanadum, and “black-boxing”. “Black-boxing” seems to be a term more readily used in political science, than IR sense stricto. It is possible, of course, that these same methodological concepts are found in IR using different language however, the cleavage between FPA and IR does seem to extend beyond differences of opinion regarding levels of analysis and intellectual traditions.
2015:193), then I, like Waltz and Wendt, am interested in international politics, not the dynamics of foreign policy making and implementation. I do not, in this context, agree with Kaarbo’s (2015:195) conclusion that “FPA may indeed focus on agents’ choices and behaviors, but […] these behaviors [are] acts that constitute all international interactions”.

FPA’s emphasis on the foregrounding of individual actors in analyses of interstate relations, further raises a methodological problem. Contemporary research in FPA increasingly makes use of quantitative, mathematical methods to analyse how individual brains respond to rules and norms, and how these responses are manifest in foreign policies (see Hudson, 2005:20). This mathematical approach to imaging and understanding decision-making again brackets meta-level societal processes that cannot be measured using individual brains and responses, entrenching the conclusion that only human agents are capable of making decisions. While individual decision-making processes can provide meaningful information about the ways in which decisions are made in response to societal structures, they will do little to help us make sense of the “fuzz” that connects humans at a deeper level.

These contrasting initial research orientations notwithstanding, FPA and IR scholars (particularly constructivist and critical IR scholars) share an interest in state identities and national roles within the states system, along with discourse and ideas (see Kaarbo, 2015:191; 194). Some foreign policy analysts, moreover, have made attempts at studying small-group behaviour and the effects of “group think” on foreign policy decision-making (see, among many others, ‘t Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 1997; Vertzberger 1997; Walker & Schafer, 2006; Schafer & Chrichlow, 2010; Thies, 2013). Notwithstanding the important “levels of analysis” cleavage between traditional FPA approaches and the approach taken in this thesis, the research here presented does rely heavily on insights from the fields of psychology and psychoanalysis (albeit an approach via large-group psychology as opposed to the individual or small-group approaches favoured by foreign policy analysts).

Moreover, the thesis does not simply “take for granted that there is a single national identity or role that is shared between elites and masses” (Kaarbo, 2015:202), but attempts to demonstrate it and build on it. Indeed, if Kaarbo (Ibid.) asserts that in those IR theoretical studies “that do focus on identity construction, there is often little theoretical mechanism advanced for how multiple identities are aggregated”, then this thesis does attempt to demonstrate how this phenomenon manifests itself, and how it influences state behaviours. It must be noted, however, that the thesis conceives of “elites” as agents that are born from the collective, and whose mental mechanisms are shaped by the collective, rather than agents who
are vested with a rationality that is not bounded by the collective will, and that often leads elites to contest collective conceptions of state identities and roles (on this point, see Kaarbo, 2015:202-203).

The thesis further approaches the FPA tradition in its concerns with emotions and the ways in which emotional experiences influence state behaviours (though, again, I must note my emphasis on state behaviours, as opposed to elite behaviours), along with “national role conceptions” and the ways in which states behave internationally based on the ideas they hold about their place in the hierarchy of the international states system (see Hudson, 2005:18). While the thesis places an emphasis on collective processes rather than individual perceptions and reactions, it does nevertheless recognise the fact that domestic politics does play in on national identities, and resultantly, in state behaviours. Particular attention is given to the ways in which intra-group identity construction translates into international relations.

1.4. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PERSONOLOGY OF A STATE-PERSON

States are many things to many different scholars. Textbook definitions of states include qualifiers such as territories with defined borders, citizens, a government and institutions that establish and maintain order in society, a monopoly of legitimate force, sovereign power over the territory and subjects, and in some cases an ethnic or cultural identity – all physical attributes of statehood. On a metaphysical level, states are extremely complex collectives of people. Constituents of these collectives share identities – contested and malleable – but common to all who consider themselves part of that state. Part of how these identities are constructed, is shared stories, shared histories, shared narratives and shared symbols that act as a glue that binds together in a unit, the members of collective. And these identities determine how collectives act into aggregates of collectives – like the international state system.

1.4.1. “States are people too”

The “ontological status of the state” (Ringmar, 1996) and its constituent members is a contentious issue in IR scholarship (see Wendt, 1987, 1999; Ringmar, 1996; Jackson, 2004a, 2004b; Oprisko and Kaliher, 2014). In an introduction to a forum on the state as person in IR that appeared in the “Review of International Studies” in 2004, Jackson (2004a:255) laments
the fact that, in spite of the centrality of the state as actor in IR scholarship, few scholars have attempted to theorize state ontology:

Realists, neorealists, neoliberal institutionalists, theorists of international society, and even many Marxists were content to treat states as, in effect, big people, endowed with perceptions, desires, emotions, and the other attributes of personhood … even though they often admitted that – in Robert Gilpin’s words – “strictly speaking … only individuals and individuals joined together into various types of coalitions can be said to have interests” and therefore really be actors (one reference omitted).

Liberals, for Jackson (Ibid.:255-256) failed to adequately problematize state ontology because they “simply assume[d] states were actors”, even though they attributed only very limited capacity for agency to state-actors. Marxists on the other hand, circumvented the problem of the ontological status of the state by shifting their focus from state-personhood to the autonomy of social institutions (Ibid.:256), while constructivists have displaced a focus on the state-actor onto other actors, “such as ‘international organizations’ or ‘transnational activist networks’”, or Jackson (Ibid.) argues, they have focused their analyses on the influence of identity on state actions, “thereby implicitly assuming the state’s person-hood every bit as much as neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists do” (two references omitted). That is, until the publication of Wendt’s (1999) “Social Theory of International Politics” (STIP).

Since the introduction of the argument that “states are people too” in STIP, IR scholars have been paying more attention to the question of state-personhood, which Jackson (2004a:257-257) notes have very important implications for the study of IR for a number of reasons. From an IR theoretical perspective, Jackson argues, clarity on the meaning of the state as a person would help us better reflect on the role of the state in international politics – especially at a time in history when speculation is rife that “the state” is a fading social institution. From a social theoretical angle, clarity on the ontological status of the state would help us better reflect on the all-important notion of “agency” in IR – who has it, what does it mean, and what can be done with it? From a philosophical perspective, the assertion that “states are people too” and, more importantly, that they are the primary actors in the international system, forces us to reconsider what the role of actual human being is? And, from a moral and ethical point of view, who can – and should – be held responsible for collective actions?

Falling broadly within the “structure-agent” debate of constructivist theory, there is considerable discord concerning the primacy of either over the other: that is, while some
scholars consider the actions of the constituent members of the unit (the citizens to the state),
to be subordinate to the actions of the collective (Wendt, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2015; Jackson,
2004a, 2004b; Mitzen, 2006; Kustermans, 2011), others argue that the collective unit’s actions
can (and should) be reduced to the actions of its constituent members (Wight, 2004; Lomas,
2005; Ringmar, 2010). Given the contentiousness of the debate, it is important to acknowledge
an assumption that is of primal importance for the project and paradigmatically essential to
understanding the metaphysics underpinning the research. Drawing on Wendt’s “state as
person” argument, this project is informed by a view of states as unitary actors, irreducible to
the private cognitions, affects and intentions of its constituents, and therefore, capable of
embodying the necessary characteristics for it to be attributed “personhood”. While the impact
of the actions of constituent members of the collective is duly acknowledged as an important
variable of state action, the present project aligns itself with the argument that state actions
enjoy primacy over the actions of its constituent members

States, for Wendt, as well as Jackson (2004b) and Mitzen (2006), are real people in that
they possess an irreducible collective intentionality that cannot be controlled by any one of
their constituent members. Collective intentionality does not require a cognitive “sameness”
among the individual and the collective since it is sufficient for an individual member of the
corporate body to be committed to the final ideals of the group through perceived obligation or
accountability (Wendt, 2004:300-301). In addition, cognitive labour in the group context is not
only divided between those individuals that make up the group, but it generates a body of
knowledge that is impossible to reduce to a single constituent of the group (Ibid.:303-304). I
return to this particular argument in my literature review, where insights from large-group
psychology prove exceptionally useful. At this juncture, I wish to consider the implications of
the claim that states are people too for the way in which we study state-persons: Constructivists
have studied state identities, and the ways in which they are constructed, in much the same way
that we would study how individuals construct their own identities. However, identity is only
a small part of personhood; persons have memories, emotions, characteristic behaviours,
coping mechanisms, and personal defences too. In other words, people have personalities. And,
if states are people too, then state-persons have personalities too.
1.4.2. States have personalities too

If states are persons, then state-persons have personalities just like human-persons. But, is personality not just another word for identity? Distinguishing between identity and personality is a challenge because there exist considerable degrees of overlap between the two (see Glas, 2006; Marcia, 2006:577-578; Arciero and Bondolfi, 2009; Engler, 2009:2-6). One distinction that I have found useful, is offered by Martin and Bickhard (2013:2), who describe personality as “the unique combinations of temperament and action tendencies”, while identity is described as “anchored by physical characteristics, social positioning and circumstances, and autobiographical recollections, reflections and projects”. Tissaw (2013:31) further develops this distinction of “identity” (person in his terminology), as the abilities that an individual possesses, versus “personality” as the manner in which these abilities are applied. In both definitions, “identity” relates to certain characteristics that define the person, whereas “personality” relates to behavioural responses to relationships between the person and his environment. In the context of the South African state, then, the state’s identity can be defined through such characteristics as “African”, “multicultural”, “former English colony” and so forth, while its personality would be defined according to certain behaviours associated with the identity within certain situations, exempli gratia, South Africa’s voting patterns in the United Nations, discourses or statements about its relations with state-persons in the international arena and differentiated foreign policy implementation strategies. Perhaps the best distinction between the two, is found in Volkan (2014:18-19):

“Character” and “personality” … describe others’ impressions of the individual’s emotional expressions, modes of speech, typical actions and habitual ways of thinking and behaving …

“identity” refers to an individual’s inner working model – he or she, not an outsider, senses and experiences it (emphasis added).

To further clarify this distinction between identity and personality, McAdams (2008:248, one reference omitted) defines personality as

1) The individual’s unique variation on the general evolutionary design for human nature, expressed as a developing pattern of 2) dispositional traits, 3) characteristic adaptations, and 4) self-defining life narratives, complexly and differentially situated in 5) culture and social contexts.
In this schema, dispositional traits include openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism, as broad categories or dimensions used to describe personalities in psychology (McAdams, 2008:248; see also Engler, 2009:290-297). Characteristic adaptations would include, among others, motives, goals, plans, values and representations of Self and Others. Moreover, McAdams (2008:248) notes that individuals differ beyond these distinctive dispositional traits and characteristic adaptations in the “integrative life stories and personal narratives that [they] construct to make meaning and identity”. Identities are fluid concepts of Self-versus-Others that transform or metamorphose in accordance with changing social-, environmental-, psychological-, relational, economic and political situations that the individual encounters throughout his or her life (see McAdams, 2008:252), whereas personalities are enduring patterns of behaviour based on identity locations in space-time, and influenced by the affects that certain situations and relationships awaken in the individual.

1.4.3. Language, discourse and the social construction of realities

Discourse analyses draw on empiric evidence that is both tacit and explicit (Babbie and Mouton, 2006:495). As such, the focus is not solely on spoken words and physical gestures, but consideration is also given to unconscious sets of meaning attached to words and actions, the historical contexts within which discourses are located (including intertextual references to previous discourses) and self-evaluations or reflections on the Self throughout the discourse (Babbie and Mouton, 2006: 497-498). This interpretive method is supported by the research objective of discovering the phenomenology of the South African state’s international relations, and is a natural product of the constructivist paradigm within which the study is conceived and upon which it builds. Indeed, Fairclough (2003:3) reminds us that discourse analysis is an exploration both of language as semantics, and of the broader social functions of these symbolic utterances – their “constructive effect”.

Unlike simple textual analysis, or content analysis, however, discourse analysis travels deeper into the “nerve” of the text to reveal “the relatively durable social structuring of language which is itself one element of the relatively durable structuring and networking of social practices” (Fairclough, 2003:3). Thus, the functions of a discourse analysis are not only to identify structures and patterns of social life that are hidden within the fibres of language,
but also to arrive at an interpretation of the meanings made through the interactive processes (Ibid.:10) within which the Phenomenological Self is situated.\(^{21}\) Discourse analyses, moreover, allow us to view utterances against elaborate social theories, thereby grounding our own reflections on the manifestations of the Subject’s location of Self within the complex, constructed reality in scientific method. This “scientific grounding” of our reflections on social life furthermore facilitates the construction of analytical categories upon which to base our ontologies of reality (Ibid.:15).

The choice of discourse analysis as the method of interpretation of data for the purposes of this study is further motivated by the challenge inherent to the phenomenological study of the state as a person: Even if we accept the controversial claim that “states are people too”, the methodological challenge of accessing “state subjectivity” remains. How, indeed, does the researcher gain access to the subjectivity of a non-human person? Here, again, the research project forces us to abandon our entrenched definition of the subjective Ego as a human agent, and to consider the Transcendental Ego as a state of knowledge, rather than an object.\(^{22}\) Whereas it would be unreasonable to pretend the possibility exists to conduct ethnographic interviews with a state, and certainly problematic to interview officials as representatives of the unitary state, state discourses represent the only viable alternative source of data for a study of this kind.\(^{23}\) Thus, discourse analysis is not simply the most suitable method for this study. It is, in fact, the only reasonable method of data analysis in the absence of a human subject.

### 1.5. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

This introduction has provided a background sketch of the research here presented, including its aims and purposes, as well as an overview of important notions from extant scholarship on South African foreign policy, for the present project. Corresponding to what symbolic interactionist sociologist Blumer (1969) called the “sensitizing concepts” that guide the researcher through initial reflections on the subject matter, the next chapter reflects on contributions from IR constructivism to our understanding of state-persons and their

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\(^{21}\) The current thesis will not consider the Phenomenology of Self in great detail. The reader is referred to Husserl [1952] (1989); Jung [1951] (1979); Rauch and Sherman (1999); Hohwy (2007); Poellner (2007).

\(^{22}\) Note the capitalization of these concepts, in keeping with philosophical and psychoanalytic traditions. On this point, the reader is referred to Mueller (1922); Husserl (1999, 2010); also, Gentile (1922).

\(^{23}\) It is acknowledged that the same objections may be raised concerning the use of “state discourses” as one may raise concerning the conduct of interviews with state officials, thus, the proposal addresses this issue in greater detail in sections 1.4 and 3.
relationships with other state-persons within the international arena. This theoretical orientation places the study within constructivist scholarship of International Relations (IR), and elucidates the researcher’s axiological position in the research enterprise. The major assumptions and contributions of constructivism to IR scholarship are discussed in detail, particularly as these assumptions represent prominent epistemological and methodological orientations to the research project. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of recent turns in IR constructivism that are considered relevant to the study, including the affective- and relationalist turns, as well as the most recent insights for IR scholarship from the domain of psychoanalysis.

Chapter three reflects on discourse analysis as a method for studying both hegemonic discourses and tacit symbolism that represent the intellectual and emotional culture of collectives. Documenting the manner in which the study was conceptualized and carried out, the chapter provides an overview of the origins and evolution of exploratory research methods that take data as the departure point and make theoretical inferences from the data through theoretical sampling and the elaboration of categories identified from the data. The chapter further provides an overview of the empirical sources used in the execution of the study, motivating the choice of some sources over others, and considers ethical issues as well as possible limitations on the study.

Elaborating on the conceptual categories that emerged from the analysis of South African foreign policy discourses, chapter four considers the ways in which the South African state’s identity is constructed through a complex bi-dimensional process of differentiation from significant Others with which it identifies both positively and negatively. The chapter further considers how the South African identity is constructed through a process of difference from within, what Maja Zehfuss (2002) referred to as “difference à soi”. This is a particularly important complement to scholarship on South African foreign relations, because very few studies have demonstrated exactly how and against which significant others South Africa fashions its Self (the closest examples are Nathan, 2005; 2008; Alden and Schoeman, 2013). The important consideration here, as Klotz (2006) remarked, is the issue of race relations and South Africa’s experience of its colonial past as a violence inflicted on it by Europeans who have now become part of the South African Self.

Taking very seriously Wendt's claim that “states are people too”, chapter six attempts to establish behavioural patterns from recent South African events that are routinely dismissed as being “schizophrenic”, and asks what insights we may gain into the personology of the South
African state from the fields of psychoanalysis and personality psychology. Literature from psychoanalytic theory particularly, lists traits like entitlement, grandiose ambitions, and violent outbursts as characteristic of individuals with narcissistic personality organization, who maintain relationships with significant Others as a source of self-esteem. The idea here is not simply to slap a label on a state and reprimand it for “bad behaviour”, but to explain how certain behaviours serve as coping mechanisms that protect the ego from the harshness of reality, and how these narcissistic defences help mediate the incompatibility between an individual’s ideal inner worlds, and the external world that is an obstacle to achieving this ideal Self.

The conclusion summarizes the major points of the research project, from conception, through execution and ultimate implications for scholarship on South Africa foreign relations as well as constructivist IR scholarship. The chapter again considers limitations and caveats associated with the project and makes recommendations for future studies along the same veins. From the outset of this thesis, I wish to impress that although I will for the purposes of this study focus my inquiry wholly on state identity as operant of behaviour in international relations, I do not consider this identity-centric approach to be the sole explanatory account for state behaviour in the international sphere. While I do consider those concepts of Self-versus-Other held by individual state-actors in international relations to be the major determinant of behaviour in the international political sphere, it is not my intention to deny the impact nor importance of other, more material factors on state behaviour. In this sense, I find resonance in an essay by evolutionary psychologist John Tooby (2012:34), which reminds us that causality as a conceptual, scientific tool “guides us to think in terms of the cause … Yet for enlarged understanding, it is more accurate to represent outcomes as caused by an intersection, or nexus, of factors”.

This study does not, in the context of the above, lay claim to the status of a “Grand Theory of International Politics”; it is duly acknowledged that the explanation for South African behaviours in international politics here advanced, is but one of many valid explanations. Of course, material factors matter in international politics, especially for a state like South Africa that possesses less than optimal material resources to force favourable outcomes in international affairs. I am not denying this; instead, I am suggesting that resources are distributed according to socially constructed hierarchies, which are born from value judgments that state-persons make about themselves, and about others, and that cause certain affective experiences that again determine how state-persons behave. It is not the intention of the research to invalidate other contributions to the scholarship of South African foreign
relations. Rather, the aim is to complement existing theories where they currently fall short.
CHAPTER 2: WHAT THE SOCIAL WORLD IS MADE OF

Identities, affects and relationships in IR

Much has been made of constructivist theory since its meteoric rise in International Relations (IR) scholarship during the 1980s and 1990s. For Adler (2013:113), constructivism differs from positivist and materialist accounts of international relations in that constructivists view the world in process terms, *id est*, as a state of perpetual coalescence – constantly morphing into newer states of existence. This process approach, for Adler, stands in opposition to the static views of positivists and materialists, who study the world as *faits accomplis*. Unlike critical theorists, on the other hand, constructivists remain sensitive to an objective reality, mediated but not determined by human consciousness, and subject to laws that human beings cannot control. The existence of this objective “world out there” notwithstanding, Adler (Ibid.) notes, “the objects of [human] knowledge are not independent of our interpretations and our language, and are therefore social artefacts”. Whereas constructivist IR was born from a scholarly opposition to rationalism (also referred to as positivism) and sought to analyse international politics from the perspective of socially constructed norms and rights (for example, Alkopher, 2007; Tannenwald, 2007; Price, 2008; Reus-Smit, 2011), constructivist research today is largely centred around the exploration of social identities and their implications for international politics (Guzzini, 2000:149; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:392-393; Adler, 2013:113).

2.1. IDENTITY AND IR CONSTRUCTIVISM

For all the importance that constructivists place on identity in their research endeavours, however, IR theorists are surprisingly simplistic in their treatment of identity to explain social phenomena. Indeed, Richard Ned Lebow (2008b:474) notes the amusement of Rogers Brubacker and Frederick Cooper at “the irony that constructivist notions of identity now so much in vogue provide no insight into the process by which coercion is used to compel identification”. That is, while constructivists have provided us with a plausible explanation for why some states treat some state-persons nicely and others not so nicely, and why states sometimes cooperate, and defect from cooperation at other times, constructivists have failed to take seriously the complexity of identities, and the complex functions that identity construction
fulfil in social life – especially at the level of large groups, or states. As Lebow’s contribution demonstrates, the identity roles that state-persons choose to inhabit, and those that they assign to significant Others – positive and negative – fulfil a far more fundamental function in the ordering of social life.

2.1.1. From Hegel to De Beauvoir: Self and Other in IR theory

In an older but still highly relevant article that appeared in the European Journal of International Relations, “Self and Other in International Relations” (1996), Iver B. Neumann reconstructs and synthesizes the many intellectual roads that eventually led to an incorporation of collective identity formation as valid research questions into mainstream IR scholarship. Tracing the origins of the Self-Other conceptual pair to Hegel and Marx, Neumann (1996:141) notes that theorizing around identities in the social sciences broadly, has happened along four avenues. These include an ethnographic path that largely relies on insights from anthropology, a psychological path, a continental philosophical path, and an excursion via the “Eastern path”. For Neumann (Ibid.:166), the anthropological path, which draws heavily on Durkheim’s theory of the social division of labour where the delineation between the “in-group” and necessary “out-groups” serves the purpose of actively and perpetually producing identity, offered IR theorists the foundational insight that the creation of social boundaries through the ongoing establishment of borders between Self and Other is a “necessary a priori ingredient” of identity construction (Ibid.:167). For Neumann (Ibid.:143), the process of discovering which identity markers (diacritica) delineate the borders between Self and Other in international relations, is a research question and agenda all in its own right, “and not a question of conjecture”.

Practical advice for studying the establishment of borders between Self and Other in international relations, comes from the discipline of psychology – and specifically from Lacanian psychoanalysis, which, according to Neumann (Ibid.:145), overcomes difficulties with social identity theories that consider language as an “unproblematic vessel for the transformation of meaning from one bounded individual to another” by treating language “as relational rather than referential”. Citing Anne Norton (1988), Neumann (1996:145) notes the complex “ambiguous overlap” between Self and Other that calls into question the simplicity of identity as a difference between subject and object:
Individual identities are created not simply in the difference between self and other but in those moments of ambiguity where one is other to oneself, and in the recognition of the other as like (Norton, 1988:7, cited in Neumann, 1996:145).

Identities, thus, are constructed both through the acceptance and assimilation of aspects of the Other into the subject’s self-concept, and through the rejection of aspects of the Other that are opposed in this self-concept. This anthropological understanding of identity construction as an ongoing struggle to establish the Self in relation to Others, is for Neumann (1996:165) missing from Wendt’s constructivism. As he remarks, “Wendt explicitly brackets the way in which the struggle to delineate Self from Other in international relations must simultaneously be a struggle to pin down the identity of one among many possible and rivalling selves”.

Indeed, referring to a contribution by literary critic Tzvetan Todorov (1992), Neumann (1996:154; 165) argues that instead of simply focusing on value judgments of the Other as a means to establish identity boundaries, studies of Self-Other relations should proceed along three axes, being: an axiological level (value judgments about Self and Other); a praxeological level (distancing the Self from the Other); and epistemic level (awareness of ignorance about the Other). In addition, Neumann (Ibid.:156) reminds us that “Self-Other relations … are aspects of historically contingent ideas of self, which again are rooted in historically contingent ideas about time and space”. For Neumann (Ibid.:167), then, identity-centred studies of IR should place an emphasis on the ways in which boundaries between Self and Other are produced and maintained over time and across situations. Introduced to social theory by Simone de Beauvoir in 1949, the concept of “the Other” and the act of “othering” have become known as essential mechanisms in identity construction (Brons, 2015:69).

2.1.2. “Othering” as the production of boundaries between Self and Other

Othering is complex and serves many purposes: actors will identify positively with some aspects of other actors’ identities, and will seek to emulate these “desirable” qualities. This does not mean that the actor identifies positively with all aspects of the Positive Other’s identity – it may still be possible for the subject to reject some aspects of an Other with whom it identifies positively, criticizing this very same Other for their perceived faults. These processes of identification with-, and differentiation from significant Others, mould the subject’s identity in keeping with the subject’s concept of an “ideal Self”, but also creates the boundaries between
Self and Other that make it possible to conceive of individual identities. This is a significant concept: psychiatrists Giampiero Arciero and Guido Bondolfi (2009:27-28) note that the subject becomes aware of its existence – its Self – when it is refracted and mirrored back to the subject by society. The Self can only become aware of its own existence when it becomes aware of the existence of an Other, which in turn requires a boundary between Self and Other. “Othering” as a process through which these boundaries between Self and Other are produced, is therefore an essential part of the individual’s coming into existence (Arciero and Bondolfi, 2009:28).

From a psychoanalytical perspective, the process of othering happens repeatedly through every new interaction between subject and object, between Self and Other. Each new instance of othering involves the subject losing the Self, and finding the Self anew in the boundaries between Self and Object (Ibid.:28-29). Familiar experiences, and experiences that reaffirm established self-concepts, facilitate the return of the Self to the present space-time location through the production of boundaries, because the subject is able to consolidate the differences between the ideal Self, and the ideal world in which the Self wishes to live, with the external world. However, these types of affirmatory experiences are at least as rare as they are possible. Situations that deny the affirmation of the ideal Self, prevent the subject from finding itself in the external world, inspiring anxious feelings of a loss of Self. Arciero and Bondolfi (Ibid.:29) explain:

Success or failure, feasibility or impossibility on the one hand, but at the same time the viability, the impracticality of the world on the other hand; and then those things which are unexpected, ambiguous, new, mysterious, obscure, indefinable, vague. These are the things that enable or prevent oneself from returning to itself.

What is important to take from this discussion, is that identities are constructed through a bi-dimensional process of differentiation from- and identification with significant Others, where the individual distinguishes certain traits, characteristics and behaviours in Others that he or she considers either honourable and aspires to mimic, or deplorable and strives to avoid. The state-person, in this context, depends on Others to reflect back to it an image of its Self, which it can either identify with or reject, and which serve to produce essential boundaries between Self and Other. If Laffey (2000:431) has thus suggested that Foreign Policy is not merely influenced by identity, but that it is constitutive of identity, then the practice of Foreign Policy
represents the moment in which boundaries are produced between Self and Other in international affairs. Thus, the South African state comes into existence through its relationships with other state-persons from the society of states – the international states system – where interactions with other state-persons serve to produce those boundaries between the South African Self and Others that make its existence at all possible. Foreign Policy, in this conception, is not merely productive of identity, but productive of the subject in its entirety: it is the moment at which the state-person becomes aware of itself – the moment at which consciousness emerges. To this end, Neumann (1996:167) has cautioned that we should approach identities as multifaceted, cognizant that the active struggle to differentiate Self from Other means that identities are fluid and volatile.

The observation that identities are fluid and volatile, rather than ingrained or fixed as Wendt (1999) has suggested, serves to situate the following discussion within a broader, ongoing debate among constructivists - that is, the issue of “evolving” or “changing” identities (see notably, Zehfüss, 2002). The issue of changing identities is not an issue at all if one considers that the individual’s identity is an evolving self-definition anchored in volatile relationships and changing spaces. Identities must change. What does remain “relatively stable” (Wendt, 1992a:397) throughout the individual’s life, are those behavioural dispositions and traits that determine how the individual will act in a given situation, under certain circumstances and in relation to Others. Behavioural traits and dispositions, psychology tells us, form part not simply of identity, but of a more stable sense of Self – personality. Therefore, studies of states and their foreign relations – particularly those studies seeking to interpret, explain and predict state behaviour, should include an approach from within personality theory. And, because personality necessarily includes feeling and behaviours, this type of study should include an affect-theoretical account of behaviour. I return to this observation below, however, it is important to note that IR constructivism is not limited to studies of identity.

2.2. FURTHER CONSTRUCTIVIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF IR

The constructivist project is much more complex and expansive than simple concerns with issues of socially constructed knowledge, ideas about Self and Other, and debates about the primacy of either agent or structure over the other. In Adler’s (2013:123-128) view, constructivism encompasses a research program that explains state behaviours by looking at perceptions of power, path-dependent structural- and ontological evolution, and the
relationship between discourse, language and rationality. Constructivists do not, for example, consider interests to be determined either by forces or by ideas. Instead, they hold, interests are ideas in the sense that perceptions and interpretations of political reality determine what states see as strategically important. The feeling that a state is marginalized in international decision making, for example, would make the transformation of the international system a priority in the execution of that state’s foreign policy.

2.2.1. Reflexivity, power and legitimacy in IR constructivism

Guzzini (2000:149) highlights constructivist preoccupations with reflexivity – the practice of auto-evaluating one’s place in society, and subsequently adjusting one’s actions to conform to the rules of society. For Guzzini, reflexivity is best described as

corrections and all forms of self-censorship … concessions granted to a social world by the fact of having accepted making oneself acceptable (Bourdieu, quoted in Guzzini, 2000:169).

The significance of this understanding of the international political world is that it does not accept the current global order as “given”, but considers the global political environment as a system – produced in history and throughout history by the actors that participate in it, both through the use of hard and soft capital and through acceptance of the legitimacy of this system and its associated processes by all those involved therein. Systems are not closed circuits, however, and remain open to change or transformation when challenged by participants when the lack of consensus about the status quo forces the system and its actors in a new direction (Guzzini, 2000:164-172). In this context, constructivists consider the policies and institutional culture of a state, or the state-system, as a constraint on future decision making, inhibiting or halting change; conversely, changes in government, or a reorientation of

24 On “reflectivism” in IR, see Wendt (1987); Keohane (1988); Berejikian and Dryzek (2000); Guillaume (2007); Hamati-Ataya (2013); Adler-Nissen (2016); Fazendeiro (2016). Note the differential use of “reflexivity” among these authors, and the use of the term by, among others, Jackson (2001); Leander (2002); Widmaier (2004); Barder and Levine (2012); Sylvester (2012) and Guzzini (2013). In the case of the former, the question revolves around issues of actor-reflexivity and how that influences agency, while the latter are concerned with meta-theoretical issues of the IR theorist as participant-observer in international political phenomena. Reflexivity, for the purposes of this thesis, will refer to the actor’s self-evaluation of its place in the international political arena.

25 Guzzini’s use of the Bourdieusian “capital”, relating to the more commonly used power (hard and soft), is maintained for the purposes of this thesis. Issues relating to the concept of power are addressed duly in the following pages.
one state’s interests may inspire an altered attitude toward that state among other states – whether good or bad (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:403-411; Adler, 2013:123-128).

In addition to interests and reflexivity as major themes of constructivist research, Adler (2013:125) notes the more recent interest that constructivist scholars have taken in power, including non-material sources of power like hegemonic discourse and interpretations of authority (see also Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:318). What is interesting about constructivist studies of power specifically for the present study, is the attention that these scholars have given to representations and interpretations of legitimacy, authority and non-material force (see, among others, Williams and Neumann, 2000; Bially Mattern, 2005; Guzzini, 2005; Hurd, 2007). Here, I find Guzzini’s (2000:171-172) discussion of power analyses particularly useful.

Drawing on Bourdieusian sociology (Bourdieu, 1980; 1982), Guzzini considers power in terms of what it can do – “what we can do to others and what they can do to us” – and in terms of the responsibility that comes with that power – the possibility of responsibility. If Bourdieusian sociology contributes an understanding of the social world in terms of intersubjectively constructed and institutionalized practices that are produced and reproduced by actors within networks, and mediated by shared symbolic systems, then a Bourdieusian approach to analysing the functions of power within this social world offers an understanding of “socially constructed knowledge as a constitutive factor of social power [that makes] it possible to conceive of the relationship between power and consensus” (Guzzini, 2000:172, emphasis added). What this suggests, is that power should not only be measured and investigated in terms of what it could cause an actor to do or not do, but to investigate the actor’s willingness to accept the power-system within which it finds itself as legitimate, basing its own conceptions of Self on its evaluation of its own place in this system, and adjusting its behaviours accordingly.

The following analysis of South African foreign relations cannot, in this context, claim to account satisfactorily for behaviour simply by looking at the ways in which South Africa and other state-persons wield hard and soft power to influence actions. To truly explain how and why the state’s behaviour is influenced by Others, we need to look at the processes – both endogenous and exogenous – that move the state to accept that use of power as legitimate (and tailoring its behaviour and decisions accordingly), or that move the state to object to that use of power to try to influence its behaviour (resulting in certain behaviours or decisions that “go against the grain”).
In addition to the contributions here above expounded, some constructivist scholars\textsuperscript{26} have centred their research around the role of norms in international politics, including how understandings of “the norm” determine judgments about the legitimacy of certain actions, or how shared interpretations regarding morality and duty become institutionalized and entrenched in the actions of states and non-state actors. Others\textsuperscript{27} have investigated the extent to which the search for ontological security, issues of alterity, practices of exclusion, in-group/out-group dynamics, and networks all shape identity and, by extension, determine what actors view as interests. Adler (2013:127) further notes the contribution of constructivist scholarship to our understanding of sovereignty, which we no longer accept as stable \textit{faits accomplis}. Rather, scholarly contributions by Ruggie (1989; 1993), Wendt (1992a), Biersteker and Weber (1996); Hall (1999), Reus-Smit (2001), Wendt and Duvall (2008), Bellamy (2009), Kratochwil (2010), and others, have highlighted the transience of evolving conceptions, interpretations and applications of the principles of sovereignty in contemporary international relations. Of particular interest for the present study, are constructivist notions of boundaries between the “‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and how these boundaries are ‘produced, reproduced, contested, changed and naturalized’” (Adler, 2013:127, two references omitted).

2.2.2. On truth, reality and causality: Debates within constructivist IR

It would be a challenge to list the single greatest objection raised against constructivism (objections against Wendtian structuralism aside), however, a strong case could be made for the lack of a distinct methodology and research strategy as is illustrated in the ongoing meta-theoretical debate among prominent constructivists (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Zehfuss, 2002; Guzzini and Leander, 2006; Stenner, 2009; Adler, 2013; Wight, 2013). This debate is, in turn, attributable to a certain disagreement among scholars themselves about the subjects of study, as well as the types and depth of explanations offered by constructivist analyses (on this point, refer to Guzzini, 2000). The bulk of this debate is situated in the readiness, or reluctance, with which theorists come to accept that scientific deductions or inductions are neither reliable nor persistent. As Kratochwil (2006:23) iterates:

\textsuperscript{27} Barnett (1998); Lynch (1999); Hopf (2002); Rae (2002); Mitzen (2006); Checkel and Katzenstein (2009).
The conception of science as a set of ‘true’, atemporal, and universal statements clashes with the notion of science as a praxis, in which all insights are preliminary.

If the golden rule of positivist science has been to discover absolute truths about the world “out there”, then the interpretivist and humanist turns in social science have taken this burden off the scholar’s shoulders and have emphasized the transience and incompleteness of human knowledge. I will return to this point in due course however, the desire for objectivity and the assumption that any one scientist could legitimately claim omniscience are important themes in the ongoing IR debates. Within the constructivist camp, this is manifest in the search for the via media, or the sacred middle-ground between the substantivalism of positivist IR theories, and the idealism of postmodernism (see, among others, Smith, 1997; 2000; Hopf, 1998; Doty, 2000; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Hellmann et al. 2003; Behnke, 2006; Hynek and Teti, 2010). Yet, within constructivism, there is no agreement as to the amount of “truth” that any theorist could know about the world of international politics, nor what would even constitute such a “truth”. Declaring himself to be a scientific realist, Wendt (1999:39) in many ways distanced himself from the “thick” constructivism of, among others, Doty, Kratochwil, and Onuf. Whereas Wendt (Ibid.:92-139) is sceptical of theories that are “ideas all the way down”, Kratochwil (2006:30-42) protests

there are no simple givens for constructivists, such as ‘structures’ or ‘forces’ that are not again results of particular actions and ‘constructions’ that require further explanation [...] we cannot talk about ‘things in themselves’, but need descriptions; these descriptions are not neutral and somehow objective.

This exchange offers a glimpse into the difficulty with constructivist theory, if not modern theories of IR in the broader sense: how much reality do we need to incorporate into our research program in order not to lose ourselves in an abyss of nihilist absurdity? More importantly, what is “really real”? The “reality” issue in constructivist IR fits broadly into the agent-structure debate introduced by Wendt (1987) and Dessler (1989). In brief, the debate is built around different perceptions concerning the primacy of agents in the social world (ontology) over the social structures that govern social life (epistemology) or vice-versa (see Wendt, 1987:339; also, Adler, 2013:129). Another way to look at the debate is through the question of what causes agency – ideas or context (see Klotz and Lynch, 2006:356)? Meticulously documented over the years, the consensus appears to be that agent and structure
are mutually (re)constituted continually throughout history, and that both exert some influence over the other at some point (Klotz and Lynch, 2006:356).28

Some of my earlier writing has been dedicated to questions surrounding “reality” in IR (Naude, 2014) and as such I will not expand conceptually on the issues of objective and subjective reality.29 Instead, this study will focus on the phenomenological experiences of the South African state, spatio-temporally located, and the dynamics of its relationships with significant Others. It is nevertheless important to note the present study’s alignment with Hollis and Smith’s (1990) contention that constructivist interpretations of international political phenomena should consider both the naturalistic and hermeneutic dimensions of the phenomenon – id est, interpretations should consider both the objectively observable facts, and the phenomenological experience of the subjective agent performing the act (Adler, 2013:129). Not unlike Carlsnaes’ (1992) morphogenetic approach, and very much in keeping with Wendt’s (2015) quantum hypothesis, the thesis accepts that both agent and structure are constituted simultaneously at various intervals throughout history, thus subscribing to a process view of time.30 Answering the question of how the South African state-person is constituted will be a major task of this study. Constitution, in turn, implies some kind of action, and actions should logically be caused by some force – whether internal or external. As such, another aim of the study will be to explore how causal factors result in actions.

Causality has been a much-contemplated concept in IR theory, and has been at the heart of epistemological debates within the constructivist community (Kurki, 2006:189; Adler, 2013:130-131). Indeed, Klotz and Lynch (2006:359) remark that the emphasis constructivists place on change and transformation in international politics results in them being labelled as “champions” of agency. Instead of limiting studies to comparative historical analyses aimed at uncovering difference, constructivists explore the ways in which actors influence processes of change through the transformation of social structures by looking at the ways in which these actors employ language, why language is employed in that manner, and the effect thereof is

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29 For more on the point of reality in constructivist IR, see Wendt (1992b; 1998); Hollis and Smith (1996); Guzzini (2000); Palan (2000); Finnemore and Sikkink (2001); Zehfuss (2002); Guzzini and Leander (2006); Poulion (2007); also “Forum on ‘Social Theory of International Politics’”, International Organization 26(1):123-180, and an overview of the agent-structure debate in Adler (2013:128-130).

30 I will not have the occasion to discuss the quantum turn in this thesis, though I will make punctual references to process philosophy throughout. The reader interested in the relationship between Whitehead’s process metaphysics and quantum theory is referred to Finkelstein (1974); Folse (1974); Epperson (2004); Klose (2009).
(Klotz and Lynch, 2006:360). For Wendt (1998 and 1999), “cause” and “constitution” are distinct research foci, where merely listing the “properties of things” cannot be claimed to be explanations for events (Adler, 2013:130). In Wendt’s view, causal explanations should answer the questions of “how” and “why”, as opposed answering questions of “what”.

Drawing on philosophical realism, Kurki (2006:205) calls for a reinterpretation of “causality” to include causal mechanisms that are not simply limited to human action (efficient cause). Borrowing the Aristotelean approach Wendt introduced in his 2003 paper, “Why a World State is Inevitable”, Kurki (2006:206) argues that both material causes (physical matter) and formal causes (ideas and/or relationships) constitute reality. For Kurki, this approach signifies an important, and indeed much needed departure from “post-Cartesian” assumptions of push-and-pull causation that generally favours human agency as causal mechanism, almost to the exclusion of non-human causes. In simpler terms, Kurki’s model for studying causality in international relations allows us to uncover causes both in terms of human agency and material factors. In addition to efficient-, material-, and formal causes, Kurki (Ibid.:208-209) lists “final causes”, or the intentions of agents performing an act:

Final causality presupposes material causality of mind as well as a material world to act upon. It presupposes a formal relational social context (rules, norms, discourses) that “constrains and enables” the performing of intentions. An (efficient) agent and actions are also required to “actualise” intentions/purposes/goals (p. 209; original spelling and punctuation).

What I take from Kurki’s “reconceptualization” of the meaning of causality, for the purposes of this study are: first, that we can at any given time expect a nexus of causal mechanisms at play in the social world and that all of these causes contribute to the manifest phenomena that we observe; second, and perhaps most significantly, I take seriously Kurki’s mention of relationships between actors, but also between the actor and the material world within which (s)he acts and reacts.

2.2.3. Critical views on the post-colonial world

Critical- and post-colonial theories developed almost in tandem with the constructivist turn in IR, though it cannot be claimed that they belong to the constructivist school. In an overview of
The distinction between divergent critical approaches ranging from Critical Theory, to post-structuralism, to post-colonialism and eventually feminist- and queer theories of IR is noted. I will blanket all these approaches under the term “critical theory”, written in small caps as opposed to the capitalized form “Critical Theory”, after Robert Cox’s classification of critical theories of IR in his 1981 contribution, “Social Forces, States and World Orders”. See, on this point, Zehfuss (2013:147).
of resistance to domination, demands for accountability and assumption of responsibilities, and anti-colonialism in all of its guises and forms. In a departure from Critical Theory, post-structural theorists conceive of states as endowed with subjectivity, where the state as a collectivity of individuals is capable of purposive action, cognition and evolution (Zehfuss, 2013:153). Drawing on Foucauldian thought, post-structuralists further take a view of actors as constructed and reproduced in discourse, through the discursive practice of othering. For post-structuralist theorists (which Zehfuss considers to include Roxanne Doty and David Campbell), actors’ concepts about the outside world, including notions such as “violence”, “danger”, “power” et cetera, derive their meaning from the values that actors attach to them (Zehfuss, 2013:154). Meaning and identity, for Campbell (1998:23, cited in Zehfuss, 2013:154), “are [...] always the consequence of a relationship between the self and the other that emerges through the imposition of a [subjective] interpretation”. These interpretations, and the resultant representations of self and other, for Zehfuss (2013:154) most often marginalise others, enabling and authorising “courses of action that have serious effects”.33

To the extent that the liberal structures of global politics, designed and instituted by the Global North, marginalises those actors who do not share the liberal worldview, critical theorists accord much import to the notion of “control” in IR: the capacity of the states of the Global North to (de)legitimise the actions, ways of thinking and personal characteristics of anyone who does not conform to liberal ideas about the right and/or moral way of being, doing, seeing and acting (Zehfuss, 2013:154-155). In this sense, Zehfuss (2013:155) tells us, IR scholarship should aim to “challenge the system”, to resist historically exploitative structures in the social world, and particularly those (colonial) structures that have produced – and that continue to reproduce – the Global “North and South”. To this end, Zehfuss (2013:156), knowledge is less about “knowing”, than it is about change:

[W]e need to write ‘with less confidence that either we know or that knowing is actually the point’ (punctuation in original; one reference omitted).

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32 Zehfuss herself is, of course, critical of the anthropomorphizing of states, as she noted in the chapter (2013:153), and in earlier critiques of Wendtian constructivism. As I will explore in the coming sections on large-group psychology however, collectives do indeed take on organizing principles that endow them with autonomy and purposive agency, which finally sets them apart from their individual constituents.

33 Zehfuss’ notion of the marginalization of the other corresponds to what I have termed “negative identification” in this thesis, and is discussed at length in the relevant sections. I will therefore not discuss Zehfuss’ exploration of marginalization here.
This change, for critical scholars (and especially post-colonial scholars), should be a change aimed at dislocating Western hegemony, both in terms of the international structures that favour liberal Western modes of thinking, doing and being, and in terms of the intellectual hegemony that Western thought enjoys specifically in the field of International Relations. Western hegemony also extends to notions of race and racial discrimination, where the “otherness” of non-Caucasian people is often used as a tool for legitimising violence, exclusion and indifference (Zehfuss, 2013:157-161).

Much of what critical theorists concern themselves with in their scholarly efforts, have been touched on in the preceding discussion of IR constructivism: identities and the ideas that actors hold of themselves based on these identity-notions obviously also requires of constructivist theorists to interrogate the categories that make up identities – categories like race, difference and sameness, Westernness and Africanness, legitimate and illegitimate, good and bad et cetera. Here, the question arises whether critical theories are not a sub-set of constructivist theories – more critical in orientation, perhaps, and certainly aimed at providing deeper analyses of social questions, but constructivist none the less? As Zehfuss (2013:146-147) herself remarks, “criticism is the main way in which we attempt to attain warranted knowledge’, even within ‘normal science’; being ‘critical’ is not the exclusive domain of critical theory. What remains a matter of debate, therefore, is how exactly critical theory is ‘critical’ in a way that other theories are not” (two references omitted). While I am certain that Zehfuss would protest against my argument here, critical approaches are substantively perhaps aimed at traveling deeper into co-constructed realities and identities, but they are not radically different to the thicker constructivisms of, say, Kratochwil.34 Indeed, many critical theorists (Doty, Linklater, Ashley, and Zehfuss herself) are routinely categorised as “constructivist” in reviews of the state of the art in International Relations Theory.

Where critical theory does diverge significantly from constructivism, is in its meta-theoretical orientations and its agenda to effect change through intellectual engagement with the social world. Post-colonial theory, for instance, is geared heavily toward transforming exploitative and oppressive structures inherited from colonialism and reproduced by practitioners of diplomacy, foreign policy, and international relations (Zehfuss, 2013:156-165). If earlier I noted Zehfuss’ protestations that, perhaps, intellectual pursuits should not be aimed at the production of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, then my sentiments are that

34 See also Kratochwil’s critique of critical theory (Kratochwil, 2007), which Zehfuss does attempt to respond to in her overview.
sometimes knowledge for the sake of understanding is enough; the understanding we gain from the knowledge we produce can, and should, drive change in the interest of human progress, but change as an end in itself should not be the force compelling the human quest for understanding. To the extent that post-structuralism engages in scholarship surrounding the major questions raised by critical theory in the broad scheme without necessarily aiming to effect radical change through scholarly pursuits, this thesis is located within the post-structuralist stream of constructivist theory. It should be clear, however, that the objective here is purely to explain and understand South Africa’s international relations divorced from the normative-prescriptive enterprise of critical theories.

2.3. **NEW AVENUES IN CONSTRUCTIVIST IR RESEARCH**

In many ways, questions surrounding human nature and the functions of the human psyche have been central to IR theory since its birth in the post-War\textsuperscript{35} global configuration. Steele (2008:x), for example, notes that Neumann’s questioning around the role of emotions (notably fear), notions of glory, and the experience of humiliation as fundamental pillars of state agency could be traced to one of the earliest IR theorists – Thomas Hobbes, while Ross (2013) iterates the importance of human emotions in the work of realists Morgenthau and Niebuhr. It is clear, however, that approaches from within the field of psychology and cognate disciplines, were not taken seriously until the advent of critical IR theories. In a seminal contribution to critical security studies, Barry Buzan (2009:5, first published in 1991) notes the influence of the English school and Wendtian constructivism on his own thoughts regarding states’ experiences of amity and enmity, and the subsequent need for securitization. Similarly, Ned Lebow in 2006 called for a new IR-paradigm that focuses on the (human) “spirit”, and proposed a research program that would consider the social worlds of human agents capable of emotions like fear and desirous of acceptance and recognition (see also Lebow, 2008a). Whereas IR scholars have traditionally drawn heavily on the disciplines of economics, law and sociology, the paradigm shift that accompanied the introduction of critical- and constructivist approaches to IR theorization has meant an increased interest in the applications of extra-disciplinary knowledge.

\textsuperscript{35} Here, the term “post-War” is used to refer to the entire period after the end of the two World Wars, not simply the period after the end of the Cold War.
for mainstream IR.\textsuperscript{36} These interdisciplinary endeavours include forays into affect- and emotion theory, anthropology, ethnography and human geography,\textsuperscript{37} psychology and psychoanalysis,\textsuperscript{38} and quantum mechanics.\textsuperscript{39}

2.3.1. Affect and emotion in IR

While emotions have featured in the fields of FPA and political psychology for many years, the earliest mention of “emotion” as a subject for serious enquiry in IR theory may well be attributed to Neta Crawford (2000), whereas the introduction of political psychology to the field of IR appears to date back to Rose McDermott’s 2004 paper, “Political Psychology in International Relations”. Since then, questions surrounding the role of emotions and affects in interstate relationships have been enjoying increasing attention from IR scholars.\textsuperscript{40} While these studies offer exceptionally interesting insights into the phenomenon of emotions in IR, many focus their attention on the private affects of constituent members of collectives, ignoring the significance of group emotions.\textsuperscript{41} In addition, the lack of attention paid to emotions other than fear or humiliation, leaves the argument vulnerable to the assumption the state-persons are capable only of certain emotions (like fear or humiliation), and are therefore only part-person.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{36} Considering the important differences in approach and paradigmatic orientation, particularly as concerns the levels of analysis, and thinking around causality in IR and political psychology, comparative politics and Foreign Policy Analysis, I am not including these sub-fields under the broad umbrella of “mainstream IR”.

\textsuperscript{37} Stein (1986); Ashley (1987); O’Loughlin and Anselin (1990); Ruggie (1993); Linklater (2004); Agnew (2008); Lichterman and Cefai (2008); Thrift (2008); Vrasti (2008); Katzenstein (2010); Subotic and Zarakol (2012); Friedrichs (2015); McKay and Levin (2015); Stepputat and Larsen (2015).

\textsuperscript{38} Notably, conflict and trauma theories, personal and group psychology and neuropsychology, though I should note that the application of neuropsychology in IR theory remains problematic where neuropsychology encounters state-centric IR theorization. Post (1986; 1993; 2015); Steinberg (1991); Alford (1994); Vertzberger (1997b); Finlayson (1998); Stavrakakis (1999); Clarke (2002); Figlio (2004); Gerson (2004); Mercer (2005); Assman (2008); Erisen (2012); Jacobsen (2013); Jeffrey (2014); Tomšić and Zevnik (2016); Zevnik (2016). Becker (1991); Akrivoulis (2002); Wendt (2006; 2015); Kessler (2007); Der Derian and Foldy (2015); Tesar (2015); Alekseeva et al. (2016); Caso (2016); Hone (2017).

\textsuperscript{39} See, for instance, Steinberg (1991; 1996); Harkavy (2000); Robin (2004); Saurette (2006); Moisi (2007); Ross (2010; 2013; 2014); Crawford (2014) and Linklater (2014). An excellent contribution by Hutchison (2016), though particularly insightful, remains limited to experiences of trauma and how the emotions experienced by communities affected by trauma transform political entities, while another promising contribution to emotions outside of fear and hatred by Ross (2014), gets stuck in the realm of domestic politics and fails to contribute significantly to state-level analyses of emotion in IR. On this point, see Hutchison and Bleiker (2014:494-495).

\textsuperscript{40} I will not, for the purposes of this theoretical orientation, present an overview of the historical development of the “emotion turn” in IR. The interested reader is referred to Hutchison and Bleiker (2014).
If we embrace Wendt’s state-as-person thesis in the depth and breadth of the sense, then we are failing at our task when we single out select qualities of humanness for our research efforts. McDermott (2014:560) notes a further problem with essentializing emotions:

Too much work in political science has tended to lump discrete emotions under larger categories of positive or negative valence in ways that risk analytic confusion.

As Hutchison and Bleiker (2014:497) note, abstraction “run[s] the risk of homogenizing emotions, of lumping together emotional phenomena that are, in reality, far more complex and diverse”. Emotions are more nuanced and significant than simple anger or fear, and fulfil many more functions than studies have explored to date. Wherefore, then, the reluctance from IR theorists to expand on the range of possible affects and emotions at state level?

Hutchison and Bleiker (Ibid.:494-495) argue that the relative absence of emotion-approaches to IR scholarship may be attributed to the fact that emotion has, historically, been seen as a deviation from rationality and, for this reason, treated as negative. Naturally, if “emotional behaviour” is conceived of as “deviant”, then studies surrounding emotional behaviour would engage with deviances from the norm (see also McDermott, 2014:557-558). Assuming that the norm in post-War international relations is for states to cooperate with one another in genial manner, then deviant behaviours would be those that can be classified as angry, rude, humiliating, or otherwise belligerent or antagonistic. Reasons for the excessive emphasis that has been placed on deviant emotions are almost certainly attributable to the difficulty with actually studying state-level emotions in IR.

For the majority of scholars engaged in research on emotions in IR, the focus is on the individual decision maker and the effects of emotion on his or her cognition. Indeed, Mercer (2014:519-520) notes the reluctance of political scientists – among others – to embrace the concept of group emotion, seemingly because of the underlying belief that the necessary and sufficient conditions for emotion to be generated, are the presence of a physical body. Because groups do not possess physical bodies, the tendency among scholars from both the natural and social sciences is to reduce emotion to the individual constituents of large groups and to study how these private affects are translated into group behaviour. As Mercer (Ibid.:518) remarks:

The challenge to group-level emotion is not reification but reductionism: the belief that group-level emotion is nothing but the individual experience of emotion.
For Mercer (2014:520), emotions are “ontologically subjective entities” with psychological foundations rather than physical roots. Once we accept that emotion is not a property of the physical body, but rather a phenomenological experience of existence, we are able to conceive of emotions that transcend the individual and are shared within and among large groups. Here, once again, causality becomes an important consideration: for Mercer (Ibid.:521-522), experiencing emotion is no different causally to having an idea. That is, the same as we do not consider ideas to be caused by bodies, so emotions are not caused by bodies. The same mysterious processes that cause ideas, also cause emotional experiences.43

I should note that it is clear that Mercer’s intention is not to reduce the role of the individual in the experience of emotions to nil. In true constructivist fashion, Mercer (Ibid.:522) instead argues that the individual’s experience of emotion is determined by his or her social identity – what the individual has learned is pleasant or unpleasant, acceptable or unacceptable during the process of reciprocal typification. Similarly, the individual’s emotional experience of his or her social relationships, determine the strength and shape of his or her identity, creating dependencies and attachments that are both fuelled by emotional experiences of social interactions, and that reinforce emotional experiences of the social world. For Mercer (2014:522), “[e]motion makes identity consequential, and identity makes group-level emotion possible”. Groups share emotions because of their co-constructed identities, and group identities inspire emotional experiences in the individual. Mercer (Ibid.:523-525) lists four mechanisms that facilitate the fluid process underlying personal- and group identity:

1. Following research by Crawford (2000), Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead (2005) and Lebow (2008a), Mercer notes that affects are framed in cultural conceptions of the social. The impact of cultural interpretations on both emotion and cognition, for Mercer and others44, explains why an individual can feel with, and like, the rest of his or her in-group (see also Hutchison, 2016).

2. Relationships are based in emotional attachments to, most significantly, other members of the in-group. Because members of a certain group interact most frequently with Others from that same group, and because individuals are likely to care more about the opinions of the group, individuals within the in-group are likely to influence one another through social interactions. Because emotions

43 Mercer distinguishes between the phenomenological experience of emotion and the physical experience of pain or pleasure, though I should note that I find his undifferentiated use of the terms “emotion” and “feeling” confusing since the latter, to my mind, corresponds more closely with the physical experience of “feeling” sensations rather than the phenomenological experience of emotion.

44 Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010), and Chiao and Ambady (2007). On this point specifically, see Hutchison (2016).
cannot exist free from the individual’s social context, the affects and behaviours of the group cannot be reduced to its constituent members.

3. Research from the field of psychology has shown that emotion is contagious and that the desire to reach common goals and shared objectives pushes individuals to act in synchrony with other members of the group.\(^{45}\)

4. In as much as group identity shapes and influences individual identities, events that affect the group as a whole, or at least a significant part of the group, are likely to elicit shared emotional reactions among members of the group even if the individual was not directly involved in the incident. Based on the premise that identity determines interests, the group interest is also an individual interest and threats to either’s interest is an affront to both.

From the above, it is clear that individual affects and cognitions are structured by social context, and by the relationships the individual maintains with other members of the in-group. There is a dialectic between group identity, individual identity, individual affect and group emotion. Drawing on research by Smith, Seger and Mackie (2007) and Wolf (2011), Mercer (2014:526-527) explains that group emotions are often more powerful than individual emotions, because the shared emotional experience validates the feelings that are elicited in members of the group, serving to legitimize the experience for the individual. Private affects are less trustworthy, because the experience is subjective and thus the emotions have not been validated by any external party.

The significance of group-level affect is not limited to its impact on the individual members of the same group, however. Mercer (2014:528-529) postulates that group emotions influence the attitudes and behaviours of its constituent members toward another group – the “out-group”. Just as individual identities are constructed both through processes of identification with significant Others, and through differentiation from significant Others, so group emotions determine how the individual members within the group “feel” about members of another group. In addition, members of large groups will try to maintain a positive social identity by defending the actions and behaviours of the collective when these behaviours are condemned. The stronger the individual’s level of identification with the group, the greater the individual’s quest to maintain a positive image of that group.

\(^{45}\) Curiously, none of my readings on emotions in IR thus far have made any reference to work by sociologist Emile Durkheim on “collective effervescence”, despite the fact that this literature is widely referenced by scholars of genocide and mass-killing. This may be attributable to the fact that manifestations of collective effervescence are studied more prominently by anthropologists, or because Durkheim originally focused his work on collective effervescence among religious communities. Nevertheless, the absence of this important literature in affective approaches leaves a chasm in current scholarship on emotions in IR.
Mercer’s overview of emotion in IR is exceptionally rich and, as far as I have read, consistent with work from outside the field of IR (notably in emotion theory, human geography and sociology). Regrettably, however, Mercer only dedicates about one page of his paper to group emotions and the ways in which these emotions structure relationships with other groups. Indeed, Hutchison and Bleiker (2014:492) consider the greatest challenge to seriously incorporating emotions into the IR research program, “theorizing the processes through which individual emotions become collective and political”. For Hutchison and Bleiker (Ibid.:493), the key to the emotion-conundrum may well be to combine micro- and macro approaches to studying emotion in international politics. This would require approaching the study of emotions in IR both as an exploration of the ways in which specific emotions cause specific behaviours, and finding generalizable, abstract laws that explain the links between emotions and behaviours in international relations, without confounding complex emotions that play very distinct roles in the construction and maintenance of the state as ontological entity within a larger community of state-persons.

2.3.2. The science of relationships and social processes as causal mechanisms in IR

The study of relationships as causal mechanisms in IR is not altogether a novel approach. Jackson and Nexon in 1999 provided an overview of what they called “processual relationalism”, based on insights from an article by Mustafa Emirbayer (1997) which argued that “a focus upon processes and relations rather than substances will enable scholars to formulate better theories” (Jackson and Nexon 1999:292). Noting the propensity of IR scholars to approach analyses of states and their behaviours from a substantialist worldview, the authors argue that substantialist reification makes it difficult to explain change in international relations most importantly because substantivalism reposes fundamentally on the idea that “things” have fixed properties that make them “things”. Fixed properties are by definition unchanging, making it almost impossible to explain how entities that possess these fixed properties change or evolve over time (see also Adler-Nissen 2015:284-308). Constrained by this epistemological flaw, the explanatory power of substantialist perspectives are limited to descriptions of a prior state of existence supplanted by new states of existence without much capacity to account for how or why these evolutions take place. Of course, even substantialist descriptions of evolving ontologies are comparative in nature, and rely on processes to establish a relationship between one state of existence and another (Jackson and Nexon 1999:301).
Since Jackson and Nexon’s seminal contribution, there have been a few dozen more who have moved in the same general direction. Guzzini in 2000 drew on Bourdieusian field-theory to argue that state identities are overdetermined by intersubjectively constructed and institutionalized practices that are produced and reproduced by actors within networks, and mediated by shared symbolic systems. Recently, analyses of interrelationships between and among state actors, as well as non-state actors, have steadily been placing increased emphasis on the processes and practices that make up social relationships and through which the social subject’s experience of both the material and social worlds are mediated. Some of these approaches (Pouliot 2008:257-88; Adler and Pouliot 2011:1-36; Joseph and Kurki 2018:71-97) are grounded in practice- and network theories inspired by Bourdieusian sociology, while others take as their main research focus the relationships that actors maintain with significant others in the international community (Jackson, 2006:139-55; Go, 2013:25-55; Adler-Nissen, 2015:284-308; McCourt, 2016:475-85; Qin, 2016:33-47).

For relationalists (Jackson, 2006; Go, 2013; Adler-Nissen, 2015; Schneider, 2015; Zhang, 2015; McCourt, 2016; Qin, 2016), entities are embedded in the relationships and processes that structure their co-constituted realities. These processes are causally linked events that produce change without necessarily being attributed to the agency of any one specific actor. More importantly, relationalism departs from more substantialist constructivisms in that it does not consider actors as reflections of existing social structures by which they are shaped and to which they are subjected, but as creative agents capable of purposive agency, who act out of, and into these structures:

Relationalism treats “social interaction, social ties, communication, and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change” (McAdam et al. 2001:22; cited in Fischer, 2013).

In this sense, relationalists encourage an understanding of entities as perpetually produced and reproduced throughout history by events to which they are participants – active or passive – and which continue to shape their identities throughout the future. What is important to take from the relationalist turn in IR theories, is the notion that state identities are irrevocably embedded in their social locations and that identity is produced by the relationships that the state maintains with Others, as well as with the material world. While the constructivist premise that actors’ identities determine their interests and behaviours remains uncontested in this
paper, relationships as the major causal mechanism is an important qualifier to be added to the equation. The major task then becomes to explain the “processes of detachment and differentiation” from the social unit through which individual identities are constructed, and to explore how these are manifest in the actions of the individual (Hollway 2010:219).

Approached from a relationalist angle, policies and political events are periodic crystallizations of evolving relationships between states, and of processes that emerge from these relationships, but they are not the final destination of these relations and processes. To borrow a metaphor from Kraus’s (1998:22) companion to Whitehead’s “Process and Reality” (1978), policies and political events are the ripples on a pond visible to the naked eye when a stone is cast into the water, but these ripples are just the visual effect of a larger, ongoing process of water being displaced in space and time as the stone is absorbed into its capacity. Concretely, this translates into the idea that the states are, in and of themselves, infinite processes of entities coming into being. They are shaped by experiences of ongoing processes, and by interactions with other emergent entities. Along the way, they inhabit different forms or identities that cannot cease to exist; they are always a part of the entity. Whereas state-persons, in this context, may inhabit different forms at different points in time, their relationships with other state-persons continue to determine how these evolving entities emerge into the present and, importantly, how they act into the social world – perpetuating some institutions, and transforming others. In this view, an investigation of the historical relationships and processes that continue to shape the state’s identity should help us make better sense of its foreign relations.46

Of course, a major distinguishing feature of “human” as opposed to “animal” or “object”, is the capacity to use language to organize social life. People relate to the world – objects, other people, nature – through language. People define themselves in relation to others, and in relation to social structures, through language. People express their Selves through

46 It is important to here underscore my understanding of time as a circular process, where the present is simultaneously an incarnation of the past, upon which an added reality is superimposed, and a part of a number of possible futures. This view of time derives from Whiteheadian process philosophy, and is supported by insights from quantum theory. While I will not have the occasion to revisit this point in the thesis, the research rests on the premise that time is not linear, and that events, persons and discourses do not “end” as time goes on; events, persons and discourses are a part of the present, which again becomes part of the future, indefinitely situated in space like ripples on a pond. Unlike foreign policy analysts, then, I do not conceive of states as “changing”, perpetually modified whenever a new administration takes over government. Rather, my view of states is that they are permanent entities that morph into new forms, but that retain within their essence, all “earlier” forms of themselves. Earlier events, decisions, narratives, thoughts, feelings and cognitions all remain a part of the state, and constantly “feed” its present reality. The interested reader is referred to Seibt (2018), Desmet & Irvine (2018).
language. Here, language becomes an important methodological consideration for relationally-oriented social studies. Dillon and Reid (1999:9, cited in Lapid, 2001:4) best summarize this paradigmatic orientation in their assertion that “nothing is without being in relation”. In this sense, linguistic/semantic approaches to relationalism shift the focus of research from “things” to “actions” through descriptive techniques aimed at interrogating discourse as both a performance that shapes politics among states, and as microcosms of rhetoric and meaning. “Discursive relationalisms” (see e.g. Milliken, 1999; Jackson, 2006; Neumann, 2005; 2007; 2012; Krebs and Jackson, 2007; Goddard, 2008) thus, investigate how actors are relating to objects from their external environment, how they are acting in these environments, and how they are changing within these interactions. “In this way”, Fischer (2013) remarks, “relational modes of inquiry can help us to interrogate the causally consequential interrelation of discourses, transactions and actors” (one reference omitted).

2.3.3. The subjective Self’s relationship to Objects: IR’s psychoanalytic turn

A more recent development in scholarship of the political, is the incorporation of psychoanalytic perspectives into research on interstate relations, though the majority of the scholars currently publishing within this field hail either from the field of psychology, sociology or philosophy. Of course, the incorporation of psychoanalytic theories into research programs in the fields of sociology and anthropology is not unheard of: sociologist/anthropologist Norbert Elias (1939) drew heavily on Freud in his seminal contribution to the sociology of war, “The Civilizing Process”, while philosopher Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1926) drew on Jung in his contribution to sociology, “How Natives Think”. Within the field of anthropology, a “psychoanalytic stream” of research has materialized (Paul, 1989). This would suggest a paradigmatic inclination similar to object-relations theory in psychoanalysis. Yet, with a few rare exceptions (Weber, 1999; Stavrakakis, 1999; Jacobson, 2013 and 2017; Tomšič and Zevnik, 2016; Zevnik, 2016) psychoanalysis appears to cause political theorists some discomfort. What I am interested in here, is the psychological dynamics at work in the processes of relating, communicating, and acting. Once we have understood that

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47 This argument aligns with Aristotle’s concept of zoon logikon, man as an animal endowed with speech, reason and rationality (logos). On this point, see Tomšič and Zevnik (2016:2-7).

48 Einstein and Freud also famously corresponded on the psychosocial dynamics of war (see Einstein and Freud, 2000). An abridged version of these correspondences is available online from UNESCO at https://en.unesco.org/courier/mai-1985/why-war-letter-albert-einstein-sigmund-freud.
an individual exists in relation to Others – both as different from, and similar to, and once we know that this existence is made possible by language, we may move on to an interrogation of why Subjects relate to Objects in a specific way; how these forms of relating lead to certain actions; and what this reveals about behavioural patterns. Here, the work of psychologist Vamik Volkan proves exceptionally insightful.\(^{49}\)

Founder of the International Dialogue Initiative, and former member of the Working Group on Terror and Terrorism of the International Psychoanalytic Association, Vamik Volkan has written extensively on psychoanalysis and IR – specifically on psychoanalytic insights into conflict, terrorism, and diplomacy. Volkan’s work is particularly important for the present research, because it focuses on the psychological dynamics of large-groups, rather than individual psychology. Based on clinical observations of large-group psychology, Volkan (2014:8) “noted that shared social, cultural, political, or ideological processes are primarily in the service of protecting the narcissistic investment in what is commonly known as the large-group identity”. Investments in the construction and preservation of the large-group’s identity, Volkan (Ibid.) observes, provides group members with a sense of belonging, supporting individual self-esteem, and ensuring the survival of the group through intergenerational continuity. In some sense, Volkan’s work on large-group dynamics provides a psychological explanation for the reasons why individuals identify as, exempli gratia, “South Africans”, and why this identification with the group identity is important for individuals’ psychological health.

Much of the analysis to follow departs from the important psychoanalytic notion that identities require both enemies and allies (see Volkan, 1985; 1988), corresponding to what scholars of international security – drawing on Laing (1969) and Giddens (1991) – have termed the need for “ontological security” (Huysmans, 1998; McSweeney, 1999; Kinnvall, 2004; Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2008; Rossdale, 2015; Chernobrov, 2016). Differentiation from significant Others serves to protect the group’s identity – it maintains the borders between Self and Other that makes existence of the subjective Self at all possible. Under normal circumstances, these differences are healthy and even necessary. When the large-group is faced with a crisis, however, large-groups may “regress” to a stage where these differences become

\(^{49}\) Volkan’s oeuvre is as long as this thesis, and most of his work is directly applicable to the present study. While I make reference to many of his seminal works later on in the thesis, I will for the present purpose rely mostly on his most recent book, “Psychoanalysis, international relations, and diplomacy: A sourcebook on large-group psychology” (2014), which assembles into one rather manageable volume, the quasi-totality of the extremely interesting and important concepts he has advanced grappled with throughout his career.
demonizations, and where the suppression or extermination of individuals from outside the in-group becomes the focus of the efforts of constituent members of the large-group:

A particularly pernicious form of “malignant large-group narcissism” is observable when members of one large group share a spoken or unspoken belief that “inferior others” are contaminating their group’s superiority, and they feel entitled to use shared sadism in order to oppress or kill them (Volkan, 2014:8).

Story-telling serves an important purpose in both preserving memories of the events that define the large-group’s identity, and in preserving the borders that separate the collective Self from significant Others. During the early developmental stages, young children from the large-group assimilate into their self-concept “common symbols of identification” (Kris, 1975:468, cited in Volkan, 2014:20) like language, myths, heroes, martyrs and images of historical events that become part of the child and are “utilised to expand their internal worlds in relating to” significant Others. It is during this stage of development that adult members of the large-group who have internalized the trauma they have suffered at the hands of significant Others, “deposit” their traumas into the developing self-concept of children. These deposited traumas serve to keep the memory of a “chosen trauma” alive among members of the large-group, and continue to determine the ways in which groups identify with Others:50

There are even large groups that exhibit “masochistic large-group narcissism” [where] members may hold on to a sense of victimisation for decades or even centuries after a massive trauma at the hand of the Other, often in the service of feeling morally superior, openly or in a hidden fashion (Volkan, 2014:8; original spelling and punctuation).

Deposited traumas comprise feelings of victimization, humiliation, emasculation and guilt that “become like a shared ‘psychological DNA’” among group members, “creating a sense of belonging” (Volkan, 2014:23). But shared traumas also set tasks for future generations of the large-group:

Tens, hundreds of thousands, or millions of individuals deposit traumatized images due to the same event into their children and give them tasks such as: “Regain my self-esteem for me,”

50 For an exceptionally rich discussion of the intergenerational transmission of trauma within large-groups, see the collected essays in Fromm (2012).
“Put my mourning process on the right track,” “Be assertive and take revenge,” or “Never forget and remain alert.” (Ibid.; original spelling and punctuation).

Closely linked to “chosen traumas”, are “chosen glories” and the mythologized heroes of the large-group that overcame hardship during traumatic times, and led the large-group to freedom (Ibid.:25). Like chosen traumas, chosen glories link constituent members of large-groups together, and are deposited into the self-concepts of younger generations through the rituals, stories and other shared symbols of the group. When large-groups are faced with threats to their identity, they “regress” and reactivate these shared traumas and glories, experiencing an intense need to soothe their feelings of victimization, humiliation, emasculation and guilt. This “shared sense of entitlement to recover what was lost in reality and in fantasy during a collective trauma” (Ibid.:36), in psychoanalysis, is referred to as “entitlement ideology”, and becomes so ingrained in the psyches of group members that the need to overcome the suffering that has resulted from the chosen trauma becomes a part of the large-group identity:

Since a specific entitlement ideology is becomes a specific large-group marker, paradoxically the large group may experience anxiety if a historical process is offered to end the large group’s ceaseless mourning process (Ibid.:36).

From the preceding discussion of some of the applications of psychoanalytic theory for the IR research program, I take a number of important preliminary notions: first, that collectives – or large-groups, take on psychosocial dynamics of their own that are not reducible to the psychodynamics of the individual constituents of the group, although they are similar to the psychosocial experiences of individual human beings.51 As Volkan’s research on large-groups has shown, collectives can experience victimization, humiliation, emasculation and guilt, and these experiences – grounded in relationships with significant Others – determine how collectives relate to Others for generations to come. In fact, these experiences of past relationships become part of the collective identity of a large-group. Studying large-groups, then, requires a study of past traumas and glories that have been preserved through storytelling.

51 Large-group psychology, in this sense, seems to support claims that “states are people too” (Jackson, 2004a, 2004b; Wendt, 1999; 2004; Mitzen, 2006), and that states can be studied as human subjects. Whereas Wendt (1999; 2004) conceives of the state as an “organic human-like entity” (Markwica, 2018:46), my conception of the state aligns more closely with scholarly notions of the state as a corporate entity that experiences emotions, and that acts through the collective actions of the group of people that make up the state (eg. Lowenheim and Heimann, 2008; Sasley, 2011; Shepperd, 2013; Mercer, 2014), but that functions according to organizing principles distinct from individual psychology, and that is therefore not reducible to its constituent members.
and rituals, and that have been deposited into younger generations’ self-concepts.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, I take the notion that chosen traumas and chosen glories function both as identity markers, and as tasks for future generations of constituents of the large-group. A study of state identity, and identity-related behaviour, in this optic, requires a study of the chosen traumas and chosen glories that shape the state’s identity, that determine how states relate to significant Others, and that ultimately influence states’ actions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The preceding overview has served to situate the present study within the discipline of IR, and within ongoing constructivist debates. From the overview here presented, I take three guiding considerations about International Relations: First, as demonstrated by the brief overview of present scholarship on South African foreign relations, there exists an urgent need to consider the endogenous and exogenous processes through which the South African state constructs its identity. This would include an exploration of the ways in which the state constructs an identity through differentiation from significant Others, and via identification with significant Others, as well as consideration of the internal processes of identification with Self that, at once, calls into being and threatens the state identity. To do this, it is important to look at both positive and negative relationships that the state maintains with other state-persons in the international sphere, while trying to identify instances of the state constructing an identity by identifying with, and differentiating from, aspects of the Self. Here, performativity and representation become important biographical sources, offering glimpses into the state’s phenomenological experience of its existence.

Second, recent work in the constructivist vein has contributed an understanding of a collective Self that exists because of, and through, relationships. As the overview demonstrated, the relationships that the ontological Self maintains with significant Others play a vital role in shaping the identity of the state, which in turn influences its behaviour. Given the importance of relationships for understanding the state entity, the study cannot be limited to the South African state’s relationships with select state-persons, like the states of Europe or the US. To truly understand the South African state-person, the study needs to investigate the relationships that it maintains with both Positive and Negative Others, as I will demonstrate in the coming analysis. The state-person is constructed as much by and through its positive
relationships, as it is through negative relationships. The mere presence of “positive” or “negative” relationships is significant in its own right.

Third, the overview here presented highlighted the fact that relationships function according to, and in line with, emotions and affects. Speaking of a state-person implies the acknowledgement that states can experience emotions, which in turn determines certain behaviours. Behaviours are not given facts of nature – they are *caused*. Understanding the causes of behaviours requires understanding the phenomenal experience of the state-person. Accepting, moreover, the claim that we can speak of a state-person, we need to acknowledge that states can experience much more complex and nuanced emotions than simple anger, fear, humiliation or (the contested) empathy.
CHAPTER 3: LANGUAGE, DISCOURSE, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITIES

Research design and methodology

For Babbie and Mouton (2012:270), “qualitative research is especially appropriate to the study of those attitudes and behaviours best understood within their natural setting as opposed to the somewhat artificial settings of experiments and surveys”. Considering the research aims and objectives of coming to an understanding of the phenomenology of the South African state-person – how it conceives of itself in relation to its external world, how it experiences its relationships with other state-persons, and how it attempts to modify its external reality through discourse – a qualitative discourse analysis is the most obvious choice for the research project here executed. But the choice of this research design and methodology is, in many ways, also imposed on the project by the nature of the subject being studied. Although this paper accepts the contention that “states are people too”, and that state-persons take on patterns of cognition, emotion and behaviour that cannot be reduced to the constituent members of the group, it is true that the state-person cannot be accessed in the same way as a human person for, *exempli gratia*, ethnographic interviews and observations. What is available to the researcher, is policy documents, speeches and declarations, reports and transcriptions of meetings, and second-person accounts of certain events.

While this particular type of research means that the researcher has to sift through large quantities of data to find even a single sentence of some significance for the study, there is the benefit of less artificial manipulation of data generated for the study, because the subject (or participant) is not aware of being observed, questioned or documented, and so unlikely to act in any way differently to how it normally would have acted in a specific situation (see Babbie and Mouton, 2012:271). In this sense, the research could be considered to fall under the umbrella of “naturalistic inquiry” (Ibid.:270), where the researcher has access to both the natural environment in which the subject under investigation lives and acts, as well as to the “normal course of events” that the subject is confronted with on a daily basis. This “naturalist approach” to research, Babbie and Mouton (Ibid.:271) further explain, allows the researcher to study “social processes over time”; that is, the research is not limited to one or two events that occur within a two- or three-year time frame, but can cover any amount of years or even decades.
Most or all qualitative research departs from a somewhat phenomenological view of “human behaviour as a product of how people interpret their world [where] the task if the phenomenologist … is to capture this process of interpretation” (Bogdan and Taylor, cited in Babbie and Mouton, 2012:271). This type of inquiry requires of the researcher to not only attempt to “put himself in the shoes of his subject”, but also to aim to mobilize an understanding of the subject’s behaviours through the lenses of the subject’s “own beliefs, history and context” (Ibid). Often, this also requires of the researcher to produce “thick descriptions” of the phenomena under investigation, using the subjects’ own words. This is an important point on which I elaborate significantly under my discussion of the “coding” procedure used in the analysis of South African foreign policy discourses. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the research design for this project, corresponds to an individual case study, which Babbie and Mouton (2012:281) describe as “an intensive investigation of a single unit [that] take[s] multiple perspectives into account and attempt[s] to understand the influences of multilevel social systems on subjects’ perspectives and behaviours” (three references omitted).

A final observation on the research design, is that this project – like most qualitative research projects – employs an inductive approach to arrive at answers to the overarching research questions. Inductive approaches, Babbie and Mouton (Ibid.:273) remark,

begin with an immersion in the natural setting, describing events as accurately as possible … and slowly but surely building second-order constructs, a hypothesis and ultimately a theory that will make sense of the observations.

It should be clear that the analytical method employed in the analysis of data gathered for the purposes of the present research, is a form of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis, Slembrouck (2000, cited in Babbie and Mouton, 2012:495) defines as an analytical approach that is “concerned with language use beyond the boundaries of a sentence or utterance, concerned with the relationships between language and society, and concerned with the interactive or dialogue properties of everyday communication”.

3.1. DISCOURSE AS REPRESENTATIONS OF FACT

Responding to a conference participant’s question as to why the authors “wasted their time” studying discourse, Graesser, Millis and Zwaan in their influential 1997 article, “Discourse comprehension”, postulated that “discourse is what makes us human, what allows us to
communicate ideas, facts and feelings across time and space” (p. 164). Although communication is a quality of all animate creatures on earth, it is the unique way in which humans are able to use language – spoken and unspoken – to communicate with others that distinguishes them from, say, animals (see, e.g. Buckeridge, 2009:427-429). Analysing discourse allows us a glimpse into the mind of the subjects we study, especially when we are not able to extract specific information from the subject through, for example, interviews. For a study of the phenomenology of a state-person, written documents are the only sources of information available to the researcher. But written texts are important “documentaries” of discourses – they capture the ways in which the state-person places itself in time and space, and in relation to significant Others. In this sense, discourse analyses do not simply study texts or narratives, but

take into account the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterance, texts, genres, and discourses, as well as the extralinguistic social/sociological variables, the history and archaeology of an organization, and institutional frames of a specific context of situation (Wodak, 2008:2).

Discourse analysis is, in a word, the study of representations of fact. Informed by Foucauldian thought, Fairclough (2003:124) iterates that

Discourses not only represent the world … as it is seen to be … they are also projective, imaginaries, representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world, and tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions.

Of the routes taken in IR’s recent “psychoanalytic turn”, discourse analyses drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis are the most directly relevant for the present study, because of the intimate connection between language and psychology in his work. Significantly, Tomšič and Zevnik (2016:2) remark that in line with Saussurean linguistics, “a particular feature of the human mental apparatus [in Lacanian psychoanalysis] is inscribed in the same symbolic networks that help ground social reality”. An important observation, of course, is that Lacan’s work is well-known for its roots in Freudian psychoanalysis, where Freud’s thinking around the psychosocial dynamics of war and its impact on societies contributed the idea that social processes can, and indeed do, cause group neuroses. As Tomšič and Zevnik (2016:3) observe, “[f]or Freud, social structures are endowed with the power of causality, and what they cause is what contemporary discourse unsuitably calls ‘disorders’”. Lacan’s innovation, then, was to
connect Freud’s notion of social structures as causal mechanisms with the linguistic-semiotic structuralism of de Saussure, in a way that “drew attention to the logical and topological intertwining of the subjective and social reality” (Tomšič and Zevnik, 2016:3).

Language, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, is not merely a communicative tool for structuring social relations; it is also a tool for producing the subjective Self, and for internalizing outside Objects (Ibid.:5). What this implies is that, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, the boundaries between Self and Other (or between Subject and Object as a broader category that includes all animate and inanimate objects from the external environment) are exceptionally blurry – the Self is both distinct from, and part of, the outside world. As Tomšič and Zevnik (Ibid.:5) observe:

Lacan proposes a topology of political space modelled on aspheric spaces, where the divide between the inside and the outside is relativized and undetermined. The concept of the discourse … is the general name of this continuity.

Discourses, in this optic, are documentaries of the subject’s traversing of borders between Self and Object. Indeed, Klepec (2016:116) asserts that in the Lacanian tradition, “discourse is … another name for a social link”. What is important to take from this discussion of the social functions of language, the notion that discourse is the relationships between people in a social environment – what we are studying when we study the way that state-persons relate to one another, is discourse. In addition, I take from this discussion, the notion of discourse as a link between Self and Object – a performance of entities coming into being through their (linguistic-semiotic) encounters with one another. In the following analysis, then, we should look at the discourses of the South African state-person as documentaries of its encounters with the outside world, and we should look at what these discourses tell us about the way in which the state relates to Others through language, as well as the phenomenal consequences of these acts of relating.

3.2. **Empirical sources**

Whatever the disagreements between positivist researchers and their interpretivist counterparts, and whatever the source of discord between quantitative- and qualitative analysts, the golden rule in any type of research enterprise is that the nature and richness of empirical sources that inform the research determines the legitimacy and veracity of the final product.
The richer the data, the stronger the theory that will be generated from the data, irrespective of the type of data collected (Corbin and Strauss, 1990:419-423; Morse, 2007:230-235; Charmaz, 2014:23). Data could include anything from researcher observations to interviews and even documents. What matters is the depth of insights that the researcher is able to derive from the data, and the degree to which the theories generated from the data can be generalized for application beyond the study. Ultimately, the type and volume of data collected, along with the strategies used for the collection thereof, is determined by the accessibility of data and the researcher’s purpose after data has been collected. Whereas there exists some debate about the type and amount of data to be included in any qualitative study, I have found an observation by Morse (2007:233) to be particularly illuminating on the question of “what is data” in this specific study:

> [B]ecause the researcher can conceptually manage only relatively small amounts of data, data that are included in analysis must be significant, pertinent, informative, exciting and not mundane, obscure, irrelevant, or only tangentially related to the topic.

3.2.1. Documents as data

Documents are nothing more or less than texts – utterances made within a specific context, using carefully selected signifiers (words), and produced with a specific aim in mind. In the absence of a physical sample (humans, for instance), documents are often enough the only available source for a certain study (such as studies on the state, or historical analyses). Indeed, Charmaz (2014:45) reminds us that

> Documents comprise one type of text whose form, content, purpose, accessibility, visibility, utility, legitimacy, and consequences can raise intriguing questions […] Researchers often review documents but undervalue their potential for theorizing.

Extant documents are considered very valid data sources, because the document was created for very different purposes to those that the researcher will use it (Schmidt, 2008; Hewitt, 2009). This eliminates problems that ethnographers experience when interviewing participants, for instance, in that the participant will not tailor their responses to what (s)he imagines the researcher might expect to hear (see Charmaz, 2014:45). For Glaser and Strauss (1967:163), documents may be thought of as “voices begging to be heard […] equivalent to the anthropologist’s informant or the sociologist’s interviewee”. Prior (2008:822), and Charmaz
(2014:46), moreover, note that documents are produced for a specific reason, to achieve a specific aim, and draws on “particular views and discourses”. In this view, document analyses could – and should – go beyond the mere analyses of content, to include analyses of the specific context within which the document was created and of the audience it sought to address.

3.2.2. Foreign policy, or something like it: South Africa’s Foreign Policy documents

The logical starting point for any analysis of a state’s foreign relations, would be to consult the actual foreign policy. In the South African case, the search for policies on foreign relations is not incredibly difficult, since there have been only two policy paper produced since the birth of the democratic South Africa in 1994 – a White Paper (2011) and a Green Paper (1996). The research therefore departs from the 2011 “Draft White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Building a better world - The diplomacy of Ubuntu” (DIRCO, 2011).52 Although the validity of this data source is often questioned by scholars, for the reason that the document remains a draft because members of the South African parliament have not been able to agree to its adoption as official foreign policy of the country, the Paper does represent the closest possible semblance to a foreign policy document that South Africa has. Notwithstanding the tentative status of the White Paper, it has nevertheless provided a useful starting point for further research, contributing to the construction of initial categories for further analysis and comparison against other data sets.

A PowerPoint presentation (DIRCO, 2014b:2) on the White Paper that supported DIRCO’s briefing of the Trade and International Relations Committee of the National Council of Provinces on 11 March 2014 states that the White Paper dates back to 1996, presumably referencing the Green Paper on South Africa’s foreign relations, “A foreign policy for South Africa” (Republic of South Africa, 1996).53 While the paper offers very little insights into South Africa’s perceptions of significant Others, and the way in which the state experiences its relations with other state-persons, it is a particularly valuable historical source documenting authoritative narratives on the South African identity and its foreign relations that have survived the span of the 24 years since the dawn of democracy in the country. The contents of the Green Paper are referenced sporadically in the speeches of foreign affairs officials, establishing discursive themes of South African foreign relations. Indeed, in Foucauldian tradition, there could be no claim to a discourse analysis in the absence of references to narrative regularities

52 Hereafter referred to as the White Paper.
53 Hereafter referred to simply as the Green Paper.
and patterns:

[O]ur presumed ability to utter whatever we will, refers not merely to what is said, but instead to the reappearance of what has been said before (Hook, 2001:10).

Many of the speeches quoted in the Green Paper are no longer easily accessible to the general public, because they have either not been maintained in the government’s online archives, or the archives have moved and it is unclear where the speeches may now be accessed (if there even exists any record of these speeches at all any more). For this reason, the Green Paper, along with Nelson Mandela’s 1993 article, “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy”, could be considered important historical artefacts.

The most recent official document on South Africa’s foreign policy, is Chapter Seven of the 2012 National Development Plan (NDP). Described by Minister in the Presidency in charge of the National Planning Commission, Trevor Manuel (2012), as a “broad strategic plan [that aims] to set key targets for various sectors and to make recommendations on how these targets can be achieved”, the NDP is the product of consultations and deliberations by a panel of 26 (presumably technical) experts, appointed by former president Jacob Zuma to devise a strategy for lifting South Africans out of poverty and underdevelopment, and growing the South African economy (NPC, 2012:1). While insights from the NDP are interesting, the Plan’s general orientation toward domestic development means that it is necessarily distorts what is supposed to be a foreign policy perspective in such a way that the international relations strategy proposed in the NDP becomes de facto an inward-looking pursuit for domestic development. Nevertheless, to the extent that the NDP was drawn up in consultation with interest groups outside of government, including civil society and, in the case of the section on South African foreign policy, in consultation with foreign government representatives, it is an essential source to include in a study of foreign relations as a product of the collective actions of the South African people.

These sources are selected for three reasons: first, these are official discourses issued by the state, rather than speeches or declarations by individuals who may not be considered to be speaking on the part of the entire South African collective; second, these are, in the absence

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54 In spite of South Africa’s best attempts to rebrand its foreign policy after apartheid as “outward-looking”, a strategy that concretely resulted in the name change of the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South African foreign policy – especially under Jacob Zuma – has increasingly been described as “inward-looking”. See e.g., PMG, 2013; Alden, 2016:115; Louw-Vaudran, 2016:8; Parshotam, 2018:6.
of an actual foreign policy document, the sole official foreign policy documents issued by the state, and therefore the closest workable examples of a foreign policy; and third, keeping in mind Morse’s definition of sources in the previous section, these documents are selected because of the important and exciting insights that they offer on South African foreign relations. While these three documents constitute only a small part of the wider discourse on South African foreign policy, they represent a significant enough attempt at assembling into three single texts a number of important ideas that continue to characterize South Africa’s foreign relations.

Because it would be impossible to codify each of the 84 texts that make up the data set used for the study in the rigorous fashion required by hermeneutic discourse analysis, the Draft White Paper served as the foundational text from which theoretical categories for further elaboration were identified. Categories and themes extracted from this text were then triangulated for in the Green Paper and the National Development Plan, and further verified through pointed, iterative visits to additional texts. These critical readings of further texts then revealed whether emerging categories could be considered to be sufficiently representative of the major themes present in the wider body of state discourses, or alternatively whether a particular category promised to shed any further light on a piece of the theoretical puzzle, and thus whether these categories were worth elaborating in the analysis. Testing, in this way, for the “thickness” of the emerging theory, the researcher is able to determine whether theoretical sufficiency has been achieved – id est, whether these theoretical categories promise to answer research questions satisfactorily – or whether further conceptualization, data gathering and coding is required.

Although the Green Paper and NDP were initially codified in the same manner as the Draft White Paper, the exercise proved to be pointless. Issued only two years after the ANC took over government of the country, the Green Paper makes only minimal references to South Africa’s relationships with significant Others, and offers little insights into the state’s actual foreign relations beyond the conjecture of hypothetical future scenarios. Similarly, the National Planning Committee’s approach to the writing of the NDP appears to have been to free the state from some of the “ideological baggage” that has notoriously weighed down some other policy documents. Stripped almost completely of any ideological baggage, however, the NDP and its excessively technical terminology offers little insights into South Africa’s vision for the future of its foreign relations beyond some explicit strategies to be employed by diplomats to achieve domestic development aims through the state’s relationships with peers. These sources have, nevertheless, been included in the theoretical sample against which categories from the
Draft White Paper were compared for theoretical significance.

3.2.3. **Further sources: Speeches, declarations, strategic plans and annual reports**

Further sources included in the analysis comprise speeches and declarations by former presidents Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, as well as former ministers and their deputies, including most significantly Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Maite Nkoane-Mashabane, Aziz Pahad, and Ebrahim Ebrahim. In some instances, further official documents such as the Strategic Plans and Annual Reports of the former Department of Foreign Affairs, and its successor, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation proved useful for the purposes of testing emerging categories and theoretical concepts. These data were identified through a thematic search, based on the analytical categories identified from the initial data sets, and were analysed contextually as a means to triangulate findings. “Thematic searches” were approached in two ways. Where appropriate, discourses were selected and analysed according to the information they contained on South Africa’s relationships with other actors in the international sphere – divided loosely into those actors with which South Africa identifies positively (hereafter “Positive Others”), those with whom it identifies negatively (hereafter “Negative Others”). In other cases, discourses on specific events or phenomena from the country’s recent foreign relations were selected and analysed.

Given the near-futility of divorcing ANC ideology from the South African state and South African society, the ANC’s 1994 *Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa* (ANC, 1994) is also included in the analysis. The inclusion of this document provides complementary insights into the ideological underpinnings of South African foreign relations past and present, which extends to processes of identity construction. The inclusion of the document is further necessitated by the inevitable analysis foreign policy narrative emanating from ANC cadres, serving as senior officials within the South African government.

3.3. **Coding data for qualitative discourse analysis**

While “coding” is often thought of as a process by which qualitative data is quantified for analysis using computer software, as is the case with “Computer Assisted Qualitative Discourse Analysis” (CAQDAS), Saldaña (2016:292) defines “code” as “a researcher-generated word or short phrase that symbolically assigns summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data”. The purpose of these
codes, is to facilitate the categorization or sorting of themes, patterns or concepts according to meaning or explanatory value for the emerging theory. Although there are those who contend that coding “does not and cannot work” (Packer, 2011:80, cited in Saldaña, 2016:2) in qualitative analyses, codes are an important tool for capturing the essence of complex data, where conceptual linkages between data sets are not always obvious. “To codify”, Saldaña (2016:9) tells us, “is to arrange things in a systematic order, to make something part of a system or classification, to categorize”.

Although this study cannot be considered to employ a grounded theory (GT) methodology, I have found the coding techniques used in GT studies particularly useful. In writing up my approach to coding, thus, I rely heavily on the guidelines proposed by GT specialist Cathy Charmaz (2014), whose approach also features prominently in Johnny Saldaña’s (2016) respected “Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers”. Coding for GT involves an iterative, manual process of assigning conceptual codes line-by-line to transcribed texts. This method corresponds to what Saldaña (2016:119-120) terms “concept coding”, a process that assigns meaning to data through the attribution of a single word or a short phrase to lines of data, that “symbolically represents a suggested meaning broader than a single item or action” (p. 119). Concepts, according to Saldaña (Ibid.:119) can either take the form of nouns – studying “things”, or gerunds – studying processes”. As I have underscored, this research focuses primarily on the processes involved in the conduct and maintenance of South Africa’s relationships with its Self and with other state-persons, thus I have made use of “conceptual process coding” (gerunds), which “consist of smaller observable actions that add up to a bigger and broader scheme” (Ibid.:119).

Departing from a very general analysis of all observed events, actions or interactions, coding steadily becomes more pointed, and more abstract, until a few single explanatory categories are chosen for deeper investigation. Categories are composed of concepts, and “earn their place in the analysis” through repetitive appearances in the data, and in repeated relation to other concepts or categories (Corbin and Strauss, 1990:420). For Charmaz (2014:113), moreover, it is through coding that “you define what is happening in the data, and begin to grapple with what it means” (emphasis in original), while codes and categories provide the skeleton of the later analysis. A question that I have found particularly useful in moving beyond the initial coding to more pointed codification, is that posed by Glaser as a fundamental question to theory construction: “What’s happening here?” (Saldaña, 2016:22; Charmaz, 2014:34). This question is answered by looking at data on either of two levels, which can be formulated as questions:
1. What are the basic social processes?
2. What are the basic social psychological processes?

As a student of Glaser’s, Charmaz (2014) considers the focused coding phase to be subject to a singular process, which is significantly simpler than the three-level process prescribed by Corbin and Strauss in 1990. Charmaz’s Glaserian guidelines could be considered to be much simpler than the highly complex Straussian approach, and emphasizes the essential relationship between data and theory [that] gets the analyst off the empirical level by fracturing the data, then conceptually grouping it into codes that then become the theory which explains what is happening in the data (Glaser, 1978, quoted in Walker and Myrick, 2006:550).

I find great resonance in Charmaz’s explanation of coding as located in language, and reflective of the norms, values, views and predispositions that our linguistic *acquis* impose on our interpretations of reality – especially the reality from which our data is retrieved, and within which it is analysed (Charmaz, 2014:114). Because language mediates our interaction with “empirical reality”, of which our analyses form part, our definitions of- and explanations for what we observe reflects our own views. The key here, is to allow the data to speak for itself – and for the people who produced it (Ibid.:114-115). Because of our preconceived notions, however much we try to avoid imposing extant theories on the data, we may discover discrepancies in the data. Particularly, we may be faced with an event that contradicts months of inquiry and theorizing. The key then, is to find those alternative explanations for this anomaly, to compare it to our data, and to integrate it into the emerging theory (Corbin and Strauss, 1990:421; Charmaz, 2014:114-115). It is, in many ways, a challenge to revise one’s own thinking and to write an even stronger theory for a specific social phenomenon.

3.3.1. Constructing code from data, categorizing for theorization

The initial phase of coding for qualitative analysis comprises an interpretative break-down of data with the aim of gaining new insights about the data. During this phase, events, actions, and interactions “are compared against others for similarities and differences” (Corbin and Strauss, 1990:423) In addition, Charmaz (2014:114) asserts that, “during initial coding, the goal is to remain open to all possible theoretical directions indicated by your readings of the
Applying theoretical concepts to data facilitates theorization; its intention is not to make the data speak to the researcher where the researcher cannot creatively make sense of it (Walker and Myrick, 2006:553). Prior learning and acquired skills are not insignificant, however, as Dey (1999:251) remarks: “There is a difference between an open-mind and an empty head”.

Approaching the initial coding, Charmaz (2014:116) suggest asking the following questions:

1. What is this data a study of?
2. What do the data suggest? Pronounce? Leave unsaid?
3. From whose point of view?
4. What theoretical category does this specific datum indicate?

In looking for answers to these questions, Charmaz recommends looking for actions, or verbs. Categorizing actions rather than subjects, Charmaz holds, reduces the risk of stereotyping individuals, and assigning static labels that represent only a small part of who they really are and then “freezes [them] in time and space” (Ibid.:117). Working from the subject’s own words, moreover, allows the researcher to identify what is happening from the subject’s perspective – thus eliminating the risk of overinterpretation or misattribution bias (Ibid.:121). Once codes have been assigned to data, performing a “conceptual grouping” of similar actions with similar aims, allows the researcher to construct categories for sorting and later theorizing. It is important to note, however, that both codes and categories are provisional and subject to modification upon revisiting and as the emerging theory takes form. Keeping track of these evolutions in the research process is not only essential, but may add interesting analytical elements to the research (Lempert, 2007:245-264; Berks, Chapman and Francis, 2008:72; Charmaz, 2014: 162-164).

Referring back to the constructivist concepts that have informed the general orientation of this study, “socially constructed identities”, “relationships and social processes”, as well as “interpretations of reality”, could be considered the major phenomena under initial investigation. In constructing the initial codes to sort and compare data, thus, the intention was to look at the ways in which these concepts are, or are not, manifest in the discourses selected as empirical sources. Initial codes were constructed line-by-line using gerunds identifiable from, or comparable to, verbs found in the text (on this point, see Charmaz, 2014:121; 124-125). In choosing how to assign codes based on verbs from the text, I posed the question, “what is the state doing here, and what is it trying to achieve by doing this?” Approaching the initial
coding in this way, it became possible to identify not only those things that are stated explicitly, but also to interpret what the underlying motivations or causes are (Charmaz, 2014:125). Because codes are constructed using the subject’s words, initial codes are diverse and cover a range of topics in one line, which requires careful comparisons between codes to identify similar viewpoints or intentions.

Many of the categories identified from the initial coding phase were “run of the mill” events or actions: as could be expected, the White Paper spends a great deal of time defining national interests, strategizing actions that aim at achieving these national interests, and identifying material constraints that weigh in on the conduct of the state’s foreign relations. These categories were naturally not considered to be of any real interest for the study, and so were not interrogated further. Other categories that would normally have been considered “insignificant”, became important for the insights they offered into more significant categories. Among these, “descriptions of the political sphere” were important for the insights they offered into the way that the South African state experiences relationships and interactions with other state-persons from an affective angle. In some instances, it became clear that certain relationships were generally experienced as beneficial or supportive, while others were experienced as antagonistic or violent.

Another significant initial category, was that of “auto-evaluation”. Throughout the White Paper, South Africa engages in a form of self-evaluation, or self-appraisal, where the state makes certain assumptions about the expectations that it feels has been placed on it – both by the international community, and by the South African citizenry – and then evaluates its own performance in delivering on these expectations. It is clear that South Africa is particularly positive about its achievements since 1994, though we have to ask how objective the state is in its auto-evaluations, and which processes are involved in this type of narcissistic indulgence? This category became particularly important for the analysis, first, because it provided a matrix for evaluating South Africa’s performance in key policy areas in terms of the international community’s perceptions of this performance (real performance), against South Africa’s subjective perception of its performance (perceived performance); second, divergences between real and perceived performance pointed to incapacity on the state’s part to measure its real capacity to influence world politics.

For Charmaz (2014:127), initial, open coding is an essential ingredient in identifying important processes at work in the data, that may be implicit or even unconscious. In some cases, it may become necessary to code the codes themselves in order to identify the underlying meanings the codes. Coding data in a more specific way, to compare more explicit processes,
is known as “focused coding”. Much of the initial codes assigned to processes of identification confirmed the major premises of identity theories, *id est*, that identities are constructed through differentiation from *and* identification with significant Others, and that identities motivate interests. What emerged during the focused coding phase, was the ways in which these identity-centred interests manifest in policy actions. “Negative identification”, for instance, prompts negative emotions concerning South Africa’s relationships with significant Others from the global North, which translates concretely into “acts of resistance”, “modification of relationships”, and “expectations of compensation” for the perceived negative impact of these relationships on South Africa as state-person. In contrast, relationships with state-persons from the global South, with whom South Africa identifies positively, prompt feelings of safety and solidarity which concretely translate into the “construction of parallel political spheres” where the global North does not hold hegemonic power and does not exercise dominance over the states of the South. In addition to these categories, it became clear that South Africa justifies its foreign policy actions through “moral motivation”, while further interrogation revealed that foreign relationships serve as “validation” and “narcissistic supply” for the state.

Charmaz (2014:138) notes that focused coding functions to “synthesize, analyse, and conceptualize larger segments of data”. This phase of the analysis involves comparing initial codes to discern their meaning, their relations to one another and the understanding they bring concerning phenomena in the data by looking at what they reveal, and what they *imply* (Ibid.:140). These revelations and implications are then causally linked through further conceptual elaboration, and theorizing about the relationships between the categories based on further theoretical sampling.

### 3.3.2. Theoretical sampling and theoretical sufficiency

As categories emerge from the open- and focused coding stages and the data analysis, the researcher starts assigning properties to the category, thereby “fleshing” out the theory and accounting for variance. Considering that these categories are constructed from data but that it has been kept separate from theory, categories may lack certain properties and, as such, may not account fully for the observed phenomena. In this context, the researcher engages in “theoretical sampling” – a process of consulting literature relevant to the initial categories to identify properties and conditions for the category’s existence, and then returning to data to “find” these properties (Corbin and Strauss, 1990:420-421; Charmaz, 2014:192). At this stage, it may be necessary to engage in further data collection, or to eliminate from the emerging
theory those categories for which no verifiable data exists. This, for Corbin and Strauss (1990:421) ensures analytical consistency and representativeness of concepts, and serves to “saturate” the emerging theory by refining the categories and properties that make up the final theory (Corbin and Strauss, 1990:421; Breckenridge and Jones, 2009; Bagnasco, Ghirotto and Sasso, 2014:e6; Charmaz, 2014:192). Theoretical sampling could, moreover, result in the identification of further (significant) categories (Charmaz, 2014:193), and eventually, could serve to demonstrate the linkages between these categories (Ibid.:205).

Whereas this study departed from data collected after initial sampling (see Charmaz, 2014:197) – id est, the 2011 Draft White Paper, the 1996 Green Paper, and the 2012 National Development Plan – further data were gathered as the need was identified throughout the initial coding phase, for the purpose of fleshing out categories and defining their parameters (Ibid.:198). The expansion of emerging categories necessitated reading through statements, public lectures, speeches, and other official documents in an attempt to locate and contextualize intertextual references to themes identified from the initial data sets, and eventually, to devise a model for explaining social processes and their effects. Theoretical sampling results from abductive reasoning, which denotes a method of creative inference as to all the possible explanations for puzzling data (Ibid.:200). Abductive reasoning, in qualitative research, takes the form of “testing” all possible theoretical explanations for inconsistencies in the data, while remaining critical to the theory’s explanatory power within the context of the research project. Theoretical sampling stops, Charmaz (Ibid.:213) explains, when “you have defined, checked, and explained relationships between categories and the range of variation within and between your categories”.

“Theoretical saturation” does not refer to recurrent observables as might be the case with other research methods. Instead, Glaser (2001:191, quoted in Charmaz, 2014:213) explains saturation as “the conceptualization of comparisons of [recurring patterns] until no new properties of the pattern emerge” (see also, Mason, 2010). Of course, claiming to have explored all possible explanations for social phenomena – particularly in a study of states’ behaviour in international relations – is sure to raise plentiful legitimate objections. In this sense, I find resonance in Dey’s (1999:257) assertion that theoretical sampling, comparison and abstraction ends once the researcher feels that they have reached “theoretical sufficiency” (see Charmaz, 2014:215). While some avenues for research on South African foreign relations are left untouched, as is elaborated in the conclusion of the thesis, I am satisfied that the data gathered and analysed for the purposes of answering the research questions detailed in the introduction do not present any new insights at this stage. Considering that the themes and analytical
categories have been fleshed out significantly, the project is deemed to have reached a stage of theoretical saturation.

3.4. RESEARCH ETHICS

In the absence of animate participants to the study, and considering moreover that all sources are available in the public domain, no research ethics issues were encountered during the execution of the study.

3.5. LIMITATIONS

If abstraction and generalizability have historically been the defining characteristic of “good science”, then scholars like Amitav Acharya (2007; 2011; 2014), Amitav and Barry Buzan (2010), Robert Cox (2002), and Ann J. Tickner (2011), among many others, have been pushing the limits of scientific practice with the argument that theories of IR cannot, logically, claim to be universally applicable or even relevant (see, notably, Acharya, 2014). Whereas the discipline of IR was born in post-War US and British political science departments, Acharya (2014:649) reminds us that IR is in essence, a global discipline. For Acharya, a “Global IR” is founded on “pluralistic universalism: not ‘applying to all,’ but recognizing and respecting the diversity in us” (Ibid.) This pluralist universalism, for Tickner (2011:13, quoted in Acharya, 2014:650), is sceptical of absolute truth claims, and recognizes that history, and interpretations of history differ according to context.

In this optic, the thesis does not advance universal laws regarding state behaviours in general, but proposes an analytical model for future comparative analyses instead. As much as this research situates itself within International Relations Theory, it is a personality profile of one state and its relations, and its findings are applicable to that state only. The model used in the analysis does lend itself to comparative analyses of state personologies however, it is not within the limits of possibility to conduct such an analysis here. Similarly, the reconstruction of history per South Africa’s interpretation thereof, is just that: an interpretation. In no way am I suggesting that the views of history here discussed are objective truths, nor am I advocating for the universal adoption of this view of history. Instead, I am presenting a view of history and demonstrating how that view of the past continues to structure South Africa’s foreign relations.

Finally, as I have already remarked, this is not an analysis of South African foreign
policy, but rather a conceptual reading of South Africa’s foreign relations. A detailed
description of South African foreign policy, its implementation strategies, and the decision-
making mechanisms that determine this policy are not considered useful or relevant here. It
also does not fall within the ambit of the present research to present an evaluation of the extent
to which South Africa achieves its foreign policy goals, nor how these goals relate to the state’s
self-defined national interests. The overview of literature on South African foreign policy
scholarship in the introduction provides ample references to the excellent contributions that
have been made on this topic to date. Whereas the thesis does aim to contribute to theorization
regarding South Africa’s international relations, and while the insights from this study are
expected to deepen our understanding of South Africa’s international behaviours, the thesis
does not engage in policy prescription.
CHAPTER 4: (DE)CONSTRUCTING THE SOUTH AFRICAN IDENTITY

South Africa’s foreign relationships as productive of identities

The White Paper on South African foreign policy is an exceptionally rich source for studies on the South African state’s identity, because of the amount of Self-Other dichotomies embedded in the text. While other narratives provide important information on the actual foreign policy, and the strategies and tools used in the implementation of this policy, the White Paper is significant for its rich characterizations of Self and Other. For this reason, I commence my analysis with a thorough discussion of the text, particularly of the identity markers contained therein, and the conclusions we may draw from therefrom. I then proceed to a discussion of the manifestations of these identity constructs in South African foreign relations, demonstrating how these identities influence decisions and behaviours. The intention with this chapter, is to look at the ways in which South Africa perceives itself in relation to its significant Others, and will therefore not investigate how these perceptions compare with reality. I do consider the extent to which these perceptions of Self and Other correspond to one another in the following chapter, where evaluations of behaviours by third parties are indicative of personality traits rather than identities and identification.

As my review of literature on identity in IR has suggested, South Africa’s identity is a construct of difference and sameness – from within the phenomenal Self as much as it is from without. Understanding South Africa’s behaviour in the realm of the international, first requires an understanding of the state as an entity. Indeed, identity theorist Margaret Wetherell (2010:3) notes that subjective, phenomenal experiences of the world “translate into a felt sense of personal place, continuity and location and into accounts of ‘who one is’, which can be assembled and used as a guide to what should be done next”. A deepened understanding the phenomenal Self, then, does not simply promise a greater capacity to explain individual behaviours, but also promises an increased capacity to pre-empt future behaviours. If we understood the phenomenology of the South African state-person and its resulting behaviours better, then, we may also assume that we will be better placed to anticipate future foreign policy choices and courses of action.

The first question to ask here, is how does the South African state-person experience itself in relation to other state-persons, and how does this understanding of Self-and-Other help
explain South Africa’s experiences of international political reality – and eventually, its associated behaviours? To answer these questions, and recalling my discussion of Neumann’s notions of “identity markers” as the boundaries between Self and Others that allow persons to exist in the first place, it is necessary to identify boundaries between the South African Self and its significant Others, and to attempt to come to an understanding of how the state emerges from these processes of identification and differentiation.

4.1. **Identity Markers as Constitutive Boundaries Between Self and Other**

In its White Paper, the South African state describes itself as “a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial country” (DIRCO, 2011:4), and “an integral part of the African continent” (Ibid.:3). Its foreign policy, based on the principles of *Ubuntu* (a respect for all nations, people and cultures) and *Batho Pele* (people-centred), is considered to be “unique” (Ibid.:4) because it recognizes the interconnectedness of *people*, more than states and economies, and strives toward “the positive development of others” (Ibid). This particular approach to international affairs, the document tells us, is informed by South Africa’s long struggle for liberation from foreign rule, and from the resultant “founding principles” of the Democratic dispensation, as written up in the 1955 Congress of the People’s *Freedom Charter*, and the 1996 Constitution of the Democratic South Africa (Ibid.:6; 9). Considering this history, South Africa sees itself as a revolutionary counter-force to “colonialism” and other forms of oppression” (Ibid.:11) in all its incarnations. Indeed, the foreword to the Paper mentions the centrality of the 1955 Bandung Conference to South Africa’s worldview, and to the state’s foreign policy.

What is particularly interesting about these assertions, is that they establish binaries between South Africa and other state persons. Though not explicit, binaries between the South African Self, its “in-group” and “out-groups” are traceable in statements concerning the foundational events that have contributed to the construction of the South African identity. From the very first introductory remarks on the state’s foreign relations, we become aware of the inclusion of certain Others in South Africa’s “in-group”, and certain exclusions from this group – those Others who will make up the state’s “out-group”, as demonstrated in the following passage from the White Paper on South Africa’s foreign policy:

55 What South Africa here refers to as “colonialism” is perhaps best described as “imperialism”, though the word does not feature at all in the White Paper. The terms “colonialism”, “imperialism” and “apartheid” do appear to be used interchangeably throughout South African discourses. I return to this point in the following sections.
In terms of South Africa’s liberation history, its evolving international engagement is based on two central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity. South Africa recognises itself as an integral part of the African continent and therefore understands its national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity. Likewise, the 1955 Bandung Conference shapes our understanding of South-South cooperation and opposition to colonialism as a natural extension of our national interest. (DIRCO, 2011:3; original spelling and punctuation).

The assertion that South Africa’s “national interest [is] intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity”, a narrative that reappears *ad infinitum* in South African foreign policy discourses, echoes Nelson Mandela’s promise to African neighbours in his influential 1993 paper,56 “South Africa’s future foreign policy”:

> Southern Africa commands a special priority in our foreign policy. We are inextricably part of southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that of a region, which is much more than a mere geographical concept (Mandela, 1993:6).

Basing its identity in its historic relationships with Africa and the global South, South Africa ties its positive self-image to Others from the global South. This is, in effect, the pledging of an allegiance to Africa and the global South; the positioning of South Africa in international affairs as an ally of the South, and an opposing force to former colonial powers. What South Africa support in international affairs, is Africa and the global South and what it opposes, is colonialism. Whereas South Africa “sides” with Africa and the global South, it positions itself against the *perpetrators* of colonialism – which does not include Africa and the global South – thus, the global North.

Although I will elaborate on this significantly in the coming sections, we may for the moment, make the deduction that South Africa’s in-group includes Africa and the global South, while the out-group consists of the global North (specifically former colonial powers). In accordance with literature on group identity (Tajfel, 1970; 1974; Tajfel *et al*., 1971; Leyens, Yzerbyt and Schadron, 1994; Brewer, 1999; Zhong *et al*., 2008; Jackson, 2011; Aronson *et al*., 2015), South Africa identifies positively with members of the in-group – often seeking to

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56 South Africa’s entire foreign policy, in fact, appears to elaborate on the foundational premises and promises contained in Mandela’s Foreign Affairs article. This includes the African integration agenda (pp. 89-93), the transformation of the Bretton Woods institutions (pp. 96-97), the transformation of the United Nations Security Council (pp. 87-89).
highlight similarities between itself and Positive Others (POs) – while it identifies negatively with members of the out-group – whose dissimilarities to South Africa are often highlighted in its foreign policy discourses.

4.1.1. The South African Self as the moral opposite of the Colonial Other

From South African discourses on its relations with the global North, it becomes clear that the South African existence is based on a difference from Western Europe and the United States. Across its discourses on its relations with other state-persons, South Africa mentions a number of state-persons that would conform to Negative Others (NOs), being the United States of America, Canada, Western Europe and Israel, as well as the institutions designed and dominated by these NOs, like NATO, the “UN system and the Bretton Woods Institutions” (DIRCO, 2011:24), and the ICC.57 As diplomatic practice goes, South Africa is not necessarily openly critical of Others – even those with whom it identifies negatively – however, a contextual reading of the tone and signifiers used to describe Negative Others and South Africa’s relationships with these negative Others, offers us a fair glimpse into the state’s images of these NOs.

Whereas South Africa describes itself and its approach to international relations as “principled” (DIRCO, 2011:6, 20, 28), “moral” (DFA, 1996) “respectful” (DIRCO, 2011:4), “inclusive” (Ibid.:36), it describes Negative Others and their approach as “discriminatory” (Ibid.:13), “irrelevant”, “provocative”, “aggressive” (Ibid.:14) and “confrontational” (Ibid.:10). These types of characterizations of significant Others act as boundaries demarcating the beginning and end of the South African state-person in relation to Others. What we are effectively faced with here, is the narrative construction of the South African Self as the moral, social and political opposite of the states of the global North: “South Africa” is a uniquely principled, pluralist and transformative leader, liberator, revolutionary and servant of the oppressed, marginalized and exploited state-persons of the world. Unlike its Negative Others, it is not exclusive, oppressive, arrogant or destructive. It does not lie or manipulate. Indeed, presenting her vision for the future of South African foreign policy at a speech at the University of Pretoria in 2012, Nkoane-Mashabane remarked that

57 An important observation here, is that South Africa appears to be supportive of the United Nations system in its foreign policy discourses, on the surface contradicting my assertion that the state sees the UN as a product of Western dominance in global politics. I elaborate on the reasons for this contradiction in the coming sections.
South Africa’s foreign policy is based on, and our conduct in international relations is informed by, the fundamental values and principles enshrined in our Constitution, notably human dignity, the achievement of equity, the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism, non-sexism, democracy and a respect for the rule of law. In June 1994 the newly elected President of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson Mandela … recalled the decision by the Romans to destroy the city of Carthage in ancient times and likened the destruction of Carthage to the eventual destruction of our continent as its children were carted away as slaves, its lands became the property of other nations, its resources a source of enrichment for other peoples, and its kings and queens mere servants of foreign powers. Africa continued to be marginalised and underdeveloped (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2012; original spelling and punctuation).

This message by Nkoane-Mashabane stands almost in dialogue with earlier remarks by former President Thabo Mbeki (2000b) at the Millennium Summit in New York:

Scattered throughout the second millennium are terrible human-made moments of anti-human actions that brought great pain and misery to millions of people. Slavery was one of these. Colonialism was another … For many of us all this deliberate and savage violence against human beings represents history, things that have come and gone. We choose to forget them, allowing the dead to bury the dead.

As remarked in the introductory observations to this section, South Africa pits itself through discourse against the perpetrators of colonialism and oppression, as much as it sides with the states of the global South. The Colonial Other, in South African discourses, is narratively constructed as an aggressor: it came to Africa and imposed an inhumane system of discriminatory rule on the “peaceful” people of Africa through violent conquest. It took away African nations’ freedoms and liberties, enslaved them and exploited them. It humiliated them, degraded them, and robbed them of their human dignity. Therefore, the Colonial Other cannot believe in the “South African values” of “non-discrimination, equality, freedom and peace”.58 The exclusion of the Colonial Other from this positive identity further serves to construct the South African Self as morally superior to the Negative Other:

While the anti-colonial struggle could easily have been conducted as one against a racial group, it rose above these categories to embrace the principle of non-racialism: to see humanity as one

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58 This general narrative recurs sporadically throughout South African foreign policy discourses, especially those issued by the ruling ANC. See e.g. ANC 1994a; 2012:18-22; 2015:184-190. Also, Pahad 2004a and 2004b; 2007; Mbeki 2006a; 2006b.
and diversity as a source of strength … the liberation struggle by oppressed communities [against apartheid colonialism], even in the midst of bitter confrontation, developed moral values of human compassion and solidarity far beyond the narrow confines of its opposition to the apartheid social system (ANC, 2012:21-22).

What is important to highlight here, is that South Africa’s identity as the opposite of the Western Other is constructed through its victimhood of European imperialism, and that this historical experience continues to determine the dynamics of the state’s relationships with these Negative Others today. In this sense, Chipkin (2007:17-25) has observed that African identities are to a great extent based on resistance to colonialism and African nationalist struggles for liberation from colonial rule (see also Klotz 2006:68). While most studies on African nationalism emphasize the movement’s opposition to colonialism as a *raison d’etre*, Chipkin (2007:25-26) demonstrates that African nationalism is also constitutive of the modern African identity – what makes the African *African*, is both its relationship to the Colonial Other, and its non-relation to this Other.

We may, of course, question to what extent history continues to manifest in present-day relations between South Africa and the former colonial powers? Consider, for instance, how South Africa describes its experience of the world that it shares with the North:

Discriminatory global agricultural trading arrangements and protectionist policies continue to be an obstacle to the development of African agricultural production. Certain middle and regional powers have emerged as lynchpin states through like-minded alliances and power blocs. These new powers challenge the established political order and place pressure on international organisations to reflect new political realities or risk irrelevance. Vested power interests are opposed to the diminution of their power and may provoke rivalries and competition amongst the new powers (DIRCO, 2011:13-14; original spelling and punctuation).

In this passage, South Africa pits the “discriminatory”, “provocative” and “pressured” powers of global politics against the “like-minded”, “lynchpin” states of Africa, and other middle-, and regional powers. South Africa sees the global North as “diminishing powers”, who are threatened by emerging powers, and who seek to maintain an exploitative status-quo that benefits them, but oppresses Africa and the global South. These “diminishing powers” are, in addition to “oppressive” bullies, also constructed as a future burden to global politics that South Africa selflessly pledges to engage with in order to ensure that Africa gets its share of the diminishing Western wealth:
Notwithstanding Europe’s economic challenges, such as an aging population, high debt levels, and low-growth economies, South Africa will continue to encourage European partners to be engaged in the development of the African continent, meet their development assistance commitments, as well as push for the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) due to its detrimental effects on development in Africa (DIRCO, 2011:14).

It is clear, from this passage, that South Africa may still consider Europe to be of strategic importance for Africa’s development through development assistance, but it does not consider Europe to be a viable future ally, because it sees Europe as aging, indebted, and economically stagnant. This, of course, stands in opposition to the promise of future wealth and status that the emerging powers, mentioned in the previous passage, represent. The same “cash-cow” approach that South Africa takes to its relations with European states, is also evident in its approach to relations with the USA, though this specific relationship takes on another unique dimension when the USA’s political and economic dominance in global affairs enters the equation. Contextualizing its future relationship to the United States, South Africa remarks that

The USA will continue to remain a dominant political, economic and military power, with significant potential for South African and African trade, tourism, and investment. The economies of North America remain vital sources of investment and technology, and will remain prominent trading partners for South Africa and Africa … South Africa is the largest non-oil beneficiary under the Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) but ample scope remains for improving South Africa and Africa’s market share in the US market (DIRCO, 2011:33).

Considering the material importance of the USA, then, South Africa pledges to “continue to build its trade and investment relations with these economies [and to] continue to engage the USA and Canada to meet development commitments to Africa” (Ibid). The interesting thing here, of course, is that South Africa connects Canada to the USA, ostensibly because they are both economically powerful actors, geographically located toward the north of the American continent(s). What this connection is further telling us, is that Canada belongs to the “global North” club, which comprises South Africa’s Negative Others. The sterile statement that South Africa will “continue to build its trade and investment relations with these economies on the basis of institutional frameworks for engagement” (Ibid.), stands in stark contrast to the noticeably warmer and friendlier approach the state takes to Cuba, a Positive Other:
The special historical political relationship between South Africa and Cuba continues to provide the benchmark for mutually beneficial cooperation in areas such as health and education (DIRCO, 2011:34; emphasis added).

If one measured successful foreign relations on the basis of economic cooperation, then certainly South Africa’s relationships to Europe, the USA and Canada would be considered very fruitful, as a 2018 contribution on South Africa’s foreign relations by Daniel Large, entitled “South Africa and Britain: An emerging power and an old friend” would suggest. Reading South Africa’s foreign policy discourses for affect, however, it is clear that South Africa’s relations with the states of the global North are much less pleasant than diplomatic euphemism would suggest. South Africa does not consider its relationships with the states of the global North as “special”, nor does it think that these relationships set “the benchmark for mutually beneficial cooperation”. Relationships with the global North are pragmatic, but sterile. These “old” relationships of financial dependency are juxtaposed against the mutually beneficial relationships that the state entertains with Positive Others, and to whom South Africa is actively attempting to realign its loyalties:

An increase in political aspirations and the active role of middle powers in Latin America will enable partnerships and strategic coalitions to advance mutual interests … Mutual benefits exist in terms of sharing best practices in socio-economic development, mining, agro-processing, beneficiation of mineral products, science and technology, and infrastructure development (DIRCO, 2011:34)

South Africa’s desire to realign its loyalties with the emerging powers extend deeper than mere “bandwagoning” to derive maximum economic benefit from its foreign relations. My reading of South African foreign policy discourses reveals a number of “motive states” – emotional states of action-readiness – that arise within the State through its interactions with Others. “Affects” and “emotions” are more than simply “feelings”. Prominent emotion theorist, Nico Frijda (2010:47), defines emotion as a causal event, “a motive state with control precedence that clamours for action to achieve or modify one’s relation to some object […] or the world as a whole” (original spelling). The origin of the emotion lies in the individual’s interactions

with the environment, inspired by “events” that produce within the individual a “readiness for achieving a particular aim” (Frijda, 2007:27), for effecting a change in the Subject-Object relationship in accordance with the individual’s imagination of the “actual or anticipated consequences” of the event, and how the subjects imagines he or she might feel about this modified state (Frijda, 1987:6). Thus, emotion is an interpretation of reality and of the individual’s interactions therewith, that precedes any and all thoughts, ideas, perceptions, or actions, and that causes a will to action to modify, or to maintain, the individual’s relationship with his or her environment in accordance with the imagined consequences of an event thereupon. Emotion is, above all, a social experience of an outside world, and a social activity within this world.

From the foregoing analysis, we know that South Africa seeks to modify its relations with states from the global North, most notably, by realigning loyalties to the emerging powers of the global South. We further know that South Africa conceives of itself as the moral opposite of the Colonial Other, and that the state bases its Self-concept in its historical experience of victimhood suffered at the hands of European imperialism. If, however, emotions underlie actions aimed at modifying or maintaining the individual’s relationship to the outer world, then we need to further ask, “what does South Africa feel in its interactions with Negative Others?” Although South Africa never directly expresses emotions in its foreign policy discourses, it does use strongly emotion-laden words to describe its foreign policy context. Mbeki (2000b), at the Millennium Summit in New York, described the situation that people the global South find themselves in as “savage”, “degrading”, “desperate” and “humiliating”. Quoting former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, Aziz Pahad speech, “Rebirth of the African continent” (2004a) remarked that the US’s lack of generosity in terms of ODA is “particularly shameful”, noting that feelings of “despondency” does little to help fight off stereotypes resulting from the “sensational images of African conflicts, horrifying brutality, and harrowing pictures of dying children with begging bowls” that spreads faster each day with as internet technologies progress. In another speech on the occasion of the 9th African Renaissance Summit in Durban, Pahad (2007) quoted a 1998 speech by Thabo Mbeki, reiterating that

> [t]he time has come that we say enough and no more, and by acting to banish the shame, remake ourselves as the midwives of the African Renaissance (emphasis added).

Whereas South Africa describes relations with Negative Others as “volatile”, “risky”, “unstable” and “complex” (DIRCO, 2011:11; 12; 14; 16; 17; 19; 24, 35) it is the emotion words
attached to its experience of colonialism – which it does not consider to be truly abolished – that stick out most. As demonstrated by the preceding quotations, South Africa experiences “shame”, “humiliation”, “degradation” and “desperation” in its interactions with the global North. Indeed, Mbeki (2000) asserted the importance of ensuring “that the poor play their role not as recipients of largesse and goodwill, but as co-determinants of what happens to the common universe of which they are an important part”, effectively calling for agency to be restored to the emasculated people of the global South who have not had any control over their destinies since their colonization by European imperial powers. I return to this point in greater detail in the next section however, it is important to reiterate that identities are not constructed solely through differentiation from a Negative Other, but also through positive identification with significant Others, as introductory my review of literature on identities suggested.

If we were to truly claim an understanding of the South African subject, we need to also look at the ways in which the state constructs its identity through positive identification with Others, and to what extent the South African identity compares to the identities and characteristics of “Positive Others”. Juxtaposed against the antagonistic Colonial Other from South Africa’s international relations, are “Positive Others” (POs), which are explicitly mentioned in foreign policy discourses as being China, Russia, Cuba, Palestine, Libya, Saharawi, and Zimbabwe, and the collective states that make up the global South as well as the institutions that have been established under the initiative of these Others – exempli gratia – the AU, regional economic blocs like SADC, the G77 and BRICS (including the New Development Bank). As already hinted at, these relationships take on a considerably warmer and friendlier quality than the relationships that South Africa maintains with NOs.

4.1.2. The South African Self and the Positive Other

Unlike the belligerent Colonial Other, Positive Others are considered “selfless” (DIRCO, 2011:10), “ambitious” (Ibid.:7), “assertive” (Ibid.:13) and “influential” (Ibid.:29). These Positive Others have in common not only the fact that they can be considered less developed than many of the states of the “old industrialized North”, but also a historic relationship of loyalty to South Africa dating back to the era of Apartheid. Thus, although it may be surprising to find among the Positive Others European countries of Norway and Sweden, the ANC does in its 2015 Policy Discussion Document note the support these states had offered South Africa in the struggle for political freedom from the Apartheid regime (ANC, 2015:188). What is interesting here, is that South Africa describes Positive Others “exemplary” (Ibid.:161; 171),
“like-minded” (DIRCO, 2011:14; 25), “visionary” (ANC, 2015:189) and “heroic” (Ibid.:188), and uses many of the same terms that it employs to describe its Positive-Other, to describe itself. It is possible here, to formulate a number of identities that the state assigns itself and Positive Others, based on the signifiers employed by South Africa to describe itself and its POs, which stand in contrast to the identities that it assigns NOs: “principled-moral”, “inclusive-pluralist”, “tenacious-victorious”, “selfless-servant”, “visionary-leader”, “supportive-anchor”, versus “war-mongering-imperialist”, “aggressive-racist”, “dictatorial-bully”, “counter-revolutionary”, “manipulative-liar”. What is clear from this exposition, is that South Africa considers the qualities of its Positive-Others as admirable and desirable, and as such, seeks to affirm its own identity through its presentation of a Self that possesses the same qualities. These positive qualities are, of course, the binary opposites of the qualities that South Africa sees in Negative Others.

If, in the previous sub-section I demonstrated the subtle way in which South Africa narrates the Negative Other as “declining” and “diminishing”, the Positive Other is narrated as the opposite:

[I]ncreased population growth is apparent in the developing world, whilst the developed world population is decreasing and rapidly aging … The youth bulge in the developing world offers both social and economic opportunities in terms of larger markets, labour force and economic tax base … States with aging populations, however, will have to find ways to absorb a younger workforce. Given the rising perception that multiculturalism is failing, there is the attendant risk of increased pressures of xenophobia, racism and insecurity (DIRCO, 2011:12-13; original spelling).

In this passage, South Africa paints the developing world – the Positive Other – as “growing”, instead of “declining”, as “opportune” instead of “pressured” or “at risk”. The state then goes on to insinuate that “states with aging populations”, which it identified as “the developed world”, will in future be pressed to attract younger laborers – we must assume from the youthful population of the developing world – but that this move risks increased racism, xenophobia and insecurity. If South Africa has described itself and its Positive Others as “like-minded, inclusive pluralists”, then the Negative Other here is painted as inherently racist and exclusionary. What South Africa is saying here, is that the developing world is already

60 Compilation of terms adapted primarily from ANC, 1994a; 2015; DFA, 1996; DIRCO, 2010; 2011; 2012b; Ebrahim, 2011c; 2012a; Nkoane-Mashabane, 2014a.
multicultural, inclusive and pluralist, and that flows of people from outside the borders of developing states can be absorbed by these countries, but that the states of the global North, by virtue of their inherent racism, will struggle to integrate other races and cultures into their population. In the same way, South Africa narrates the Positive Other as “competitive” and “ambitious”, placing it in opposition to the “jealous”, “selfish” Negative Other:

Although the developed world continues to be the primary originator of innovation, there is increasing competition from the major emerging economies of the South. This is linked to an aggressive pursuit of intellectual property rights protection by originators to protect their global competitive advantage. This protectionism continues to be used against demands for technology transfer for development (DIRCO, 2011:14).

If the Positive Other, here, is described as “competitive” – and through insinuation – as “growing”, “emerging”, or “increasingly powerful and important”, the Negative Other is again described as “aggressive” and “protectionist”, while the assertion that the developed world is “using protectionist policies against demands for technology transfer for development” insinuates that the developed world is oppressive, jealous of its position of dominance over the developing world, and inherently selfish because it refuses to share its resources with the selfless South. Again, the global South is painted as a helpless victim of Western malice, where refuge from the harsh West can only be found in South-South solidarity:

Developing countries will continue to secure partnerships in order to ensure relevant technology transfers for development in critical areas, such as health and education (Ibid.)

Whereas South Africa describes its reality in relation to NOs as “complex”, “risky” and “volatile”, its descriptions of a future shared with POs is considerably more optimistic:

Structural changes in the global economy are opening up opportunities to position Africa as a significant player in the global economy. Africa is benefitting greatly from the demand for its natural resources as a result of the rise of emerging powers … Africa has a unique opportunity now to alter existing trading paradigms by restructuring its economies to support value-addition, industrialisation and intra-African trade (DIRCO, 2011:21; original spelling).

Indeed, the African vision for the future of world politics stands in stark contrast to the “winner takes all” world designed and run by the global North:
African Renaissance is our vision for Africa that, by the year 2025, it becomes a continent in harmony with itself and with the world, where every person has an opportunity to achieve his potential to the fullest in an environment of peace and security, where every citizen of every country is guaranteed human rights, and is assured of basic means of survival, self-respect and fulfilment (H.G. Geingob, quoted in Pahad, 2007).

As remarked in the previous sub-section, interactions between state-persons elicit certain affects within states, that awaken in these state-persons certain motive states of action-readiness that aims to either maintain the relationship, or to modify it. If South Africa feels its relationships Negative Others to be humiliating, degrading, threatening, savage and desperate, how does it feel its relationships with Positive Others?

More importantly, there is in South Africa’s narrative about its relations with Africa and the rest of the global South, an underlying tone of empowerment – the communication of a kind of ownership over its agency. Indeed, speaking to South African members of parliament about the AU’s Agenda 2063, Nkoane-Mashabane (2014b) almost triumphantly iterated: “This is what we have been doing since 1994. Prosperity, peace and friendship are critical to the attainment of the vision encapsulated in Agenda 2063”. The view is echoed in Nkoane-Mashabane’s exclamation during an address at the University of Witwatersrand on the 10th of April 2014:

Africa is determining its destiny of the next fifty years through Agenda or Vision 2063 which, once finalised, will be our long-term road-map towards the social and economic development of our continent, building durable peace, consolidating democracy, and defining Africa’s place and future in the world. *Africa is taking charge of writing its own narrative* (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2014a; emphasis added).

If realities are the products of human activity, then the reality created by the global North is volatile, risky, oppressive and exploitative, while the world created by the South is potentially one of harmony, respect, opportunity and fulfilment. Is the belief that the North is inherently incapable of creating an environment that is supportive, respectful, inclusive and harmonious not also a commentary on the North’s character as predisposed to conflict, oppression and marginalization rather than cooperation, harmony and respect? And does this commentary not suggest that South Africa sees the states of the global South as possessing the qualities that would encourage a more respectful, cooperative and friendly global political system? There is,
for me, an assumption of the global South as infinitely more tolerant, sharing, supportive and friendly than the global North, which underlies the supposition that a world run by the South would be “better” than a world dominated by the North.

What is very interesting about South Africa’s characterizations of Self versus Positive Others is that, while South Africa uses similar terms to describe itself and POs, and while it sees both itself and its POs as the moral opposites of Negative Others, South Africa does distinguish itself from POs in a nuanced manner that nonetheless establishes a subtle leader-follower relationship between itself and POs. South Africa does not simply describe itself as “progressive”, for instance, but as a “visionary, transformative liberator”, suggesting that while its shares progressive values with POs, South Africa feels that it has the capacity to actually effect transformation. Similarly, South Africa describes POs as “supportive”, but sees itself as a “leader”. The state is not simply “inclusive”, like its POs, but a “humanist”, and whereas POs are “competitive”, South Africa is a “unique, principled servant and mediator”. Through these “affirmations” of Positive-Self, the state effectively constructs its Self as an altruistic leader, ambitious victor and inclusive “champion” who fights for the rights of the poor and marginalized not only within its territorial borders, but the globe over. While South Africa thus holds POs in high esteem, it is clear that the state considers itself “unique”:

South Africa’s greatest asset lies in the power of its example. In an uncertain world, characterised by a competition of values, South Africa’s diplomacy of Ubuntu, focusing on our common humanity, provides an inclusive and constructive world view to shape the evolving global order (DIRCO, 2011:36).

Indeed, South Africa does not simply consider itself “one of” the states of the South, it sees itself as a leader appointed by destiny to free the states of the global South from all manner of ills – from the material poverty to moral shortcomings:

Since 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment. South Africa has risen to the challenge and plays a meaningful role in the region, on the continent and globally (Ibid.:4).

The analysis in the previous section demonstrated that South Africa considers itself the victim of Western malice across the history of its relationships with states from the West. Of course, this victimhood is shared with states of the global South – irrespective of their colonial history
and with the African continent in particular. In its own view, however, South Africa has also been assigned the role of protector and leader of the marginalized. Indeed, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, in its Strategic Plan 2015-2020 remarked that “South Africa’s national interest is … not framed in narrow nationalistic terms and recognizes the importance of others in the region and on the continent” (DIRCO, n.d.:21), where the Department’s vision is for the future of international relations is the promotion of “an African continent which is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and united, and which contributes to a world that is just and equitable” (Ibid.:17). Even in its engagements with its BRICS partners, South Africa pledges a commitment to “championing the Africa Agenda”:

We shall spare no energy in ensuring that the NDB [BRICS New Development Bank] commences with its operations in future. The bank will assist developing countries to implement identified projects and fund them on our own terms and conditions. In this regard, Africa will gain access to resources for the implementation of NEPAD priority projects such as infrastructure, information and communications technology, water and sanitation, industrialisation and beneficiation, among others (DIRCO, n.d.:4; original spelling).

In this assertion, South Africa assumes a self-appointed leadership role in advancing Africa’s collective developmental agenda within the activities of the BRICS bloc, pledging to spare no energy in securing the vital resources Africa needs to survive in dignity and to ensure that the New Development Bank61 awards essential development finance to African countries “on our own terms”.62 In this sense, South Africa appears to be fashioning itself as a sort of “Nelson Mandela” among peers from the global South – a veritable hero leading the South in their struggle for freedom from the abusive global North, and a moral compass guiding them in their fight for a dignified life. Yet, this idea of “exceptionalism” is at the root of much controversy surrounding South Africa’s relations with the global South, and with Africa in particular, and is often what results in accusations of “foreign policy schizophrenia”. In spite of its protestations to the contrary, the South African state-person is both its Positive and Negative Others: it is both a marginalized victim and an exploitative regional hegemon; both leader and bully.

The characterizations of South Africa’s significant Others here above elaborated act as

61 Hereafter, “BRICS bank”.
62 It is unclear whose “own terms” South Africa is referring to here, ostensibly speaking on behalf of the African continent while South Africa’s membership to the BRICS at no point required secondment from African states. I return to these observations in greater detail in the following section.
boundaries demarcating the beginning and end of the South African state-person in relation to positive Others: “South Africa” is a uniquely principled, pluralist and transformative leader, liberator, revolutionary and servant of the oppressed, marginalized and exploited state-persons of the world. Unlike its Negative Others, it is not immoral, racist, barbaric, arrogant or destructive. It does not lie or manipulate. It exists in relation to Others – positive and negative, and its judgments of which of their qualities are admirable or offensive. But identification is not limited to boundedness. As Neumann (1996:167) observes, “self and other are not only mutually constitutive entities, but also necessarily unbounded. The self and the other merge into one another”. Here, it becomes exceptionally interesting to look at the fusion between South Africa’s positive and negative Selves, acknowledging that the South African Self is at once a mirror of the ideal characteristics of the Positive Other, and the alien aspects of the Negative Other.

4.1.3. The South African Self as the Colonial Other

As globalization and the mobility of ordinary citizens erode the concept of the “nation-state”, few states can make any claims to racial, ethnic, cultural or linguistic homogeneity. This complicates identity-centred analyses of state-persons, because no one state-person can be said to have one identity; instead, state-persons inhabit many different competing identities at once. The South African state, though no exception, is a particularly interesting case to study exactly because of its many-layered identities and histories. Since 1994, South Africa’s narrative identity has been that of a “Rainbow Nation” – a cosmopolitan, diverse and heterogenous collective that lives in harmony with one another. The concept of the “rainbow nation” originated with Desmond Tutu (Baines, 1998), and was quickly adopted by prominent South African politicians, including Nelson Mandela, who employed it as a motto for the nation-building project that followed the ANC’s election into power. In his speech at his inauguration as President of South Africa in 1994, Nelson Mandela remarked

We have triumphed in the effort to implant hope in the breasts of the millions of our people. We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity - a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world (Mandela, 1994a).
Though the term is no longer used explicitly by any South African, including the national government, the Draft White Paper (DIRCO, 2011:10) mentions South Africa’s loyalty to the values and principles that were entrenched in documents such as the *Freedom Charter*, which emphasizes [sic] that non-racialism, non-discrimination, liberty and peace, democratic organs of self-government and equality are essential to achieve the common objective of a “South Africa that belongs to all who live in it, black and white” (Italicized text in original).

The National Development Plan (NPC, 2012:20-21) describes the South African identity in similar fashion:

We have welcomed people from distant lands, who have chosen to live among us … We are a community of multiple, overlapping identities, cosmopolitan in our nationhood.

As discussed above, this image of the South African identity as “multicultural”, “diverse”, “multiracial”, “tolerant”, “harmonious”, and “caring” stands in contrast with the Negative Other and is in keeping with how the state sees its Positive Others. However, it is important to remember that this identity of a “multicultural, multiracial, diverse, tolerant and caring South Africa” also stands in contrast with the identity of the “racist”, “oppressive” and “violent” apartheid South African state-person. Here emerges an interesting set of divergences and convergences of identity: South Africa now sees itself like its POs, but it acknowledges its former self as possessing traits of those state-persons that it now considers NOs. While the post-1994 South African image projected to the outside world is one of an inclusive, humanist pacifist, internal identities are fractured and conflictual. If the South African collective after 1994 has tirelessly worked to carve itself an identity as different from its apartheid heritage as day from night, South Africa has inherited a number of legacies from its apartheid predecessor that extend beyond institutions, policies and economic divisions. South Africa has inherited from its apartheid and colonial pasts, splinters of its Negative Others that it has been forced to integrate into its already fractured identity. To make this argument, I return below to South Africa’s views on apartheid and colonialism as two sides to the same coin, considering the ways in which domestic divisions act in on foreign relations, and considering the implications of racial tensions inside the country for its relations with other state-persons.
Pondering the question of nation-building shortly after gaining political power, the ANC (1997) remarked that

Colonial conquest in South Africa had two contradictory consequences. On the one hand, it brought together various different communities into one nation-state. On the other hand, this very conquest was used by the colonisers to try and prevent the unity of these communities into one nation (original spelling).

For all the political sensitivity that the topic calls into action, this difference is based largely on skin colour: the black African embodying the oppressed, exploited and marginalized Self, and the white European embodying the exploitative, cruel and inhumane Other (on this point, see also Degenaar, 1992; Maré, 1999; Pieterse, 2002).

Indeed, the glossary of terms annexed to the ANC’s 2012 Strategy and Tactics document, for example, defines “African people” as “(t)he indigenous inhabitants the country principally composed of the Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga, Swazi, Venda, Ndebele, Khoi and San” (ANC, 2012:67), while “black people” are described as “the people in our country who suffered the most from apartheid generally composed of Africans, Coloureds and Indians” (Ibid., original spelling and punctuation). Conversely, the document describes apartheid as “(a)n oppressive system based on white minority-rule over all other population groups – Blacks in general and Africans in particular” (Ibid.:67), where “most white settlers resolved to make this country their home” (ANC, 1997). For the ANC, thus, the “national question”, and the question of the National Democratic Revolution revolves around “the resolution of the antagonistic contradictions between the oppressed majority and their oppressors; as well as the resolution of the national grievance arising from the colonial relations” (ANC, 1997). The language employed in these discourses, is strongly reminiscent of the language used to describe the Negative Other in discourses surrounding South Africa’s foreign relations. Consider, for the purposes of illustration, the ANC’s statement on the struggle against apartheid and colonialism within the borders of the country, against their observations on global relations between colonizer and colonized:

African communities from the Cape to the Limpopo waged heroic resistance to colonial occupation. Despite being outgunned, they showed rare stoicism … At the same time, within the white community, individuals of rare foresight and integrity did realise that all the people of our country shared a common future (ANC, 1997; emphasis added).
And

The tidal wave of the movement for the scramble of the world was accompanied by the cruelest forms of human rights violations … Barbaric acts of genocide led to the extermination of millions … Our moral standing on (the) basic tenants (*sic*) for freedom and equality, especially in the face of racism and bigotry, ensured that progressive people around the globe, even colonial powers, supported the South African struggle for freedom and democracy (ANC, 2015:184-187; original spelling).

In these two illustrative passages, the “black African” replaces the “global South” as the victim of the “white European’s” exploitation and oppression. The European thus becomes the dichotomous Other of the African identity – the “immoral, barbaric and racist” Other to the “principled, heroic and progressive” African Self. The interesting thing is, that at the level of the collective – of South Africa as an undifferentiated large group with a single, unitary identity, the European Other is *part of* the African Self:

South Africa is a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial country that embraces the concept of Ubuntu … It has played a major role in the forging of a national consciousness and in the process of its democratic transformation and nation-building … These concepts inform our particular approach to diplomacy and shape our vision of a better world for all (DIRCO, 2011:4).

These sentiments are echoed in the National Development Plan (NPC, 2012:11):

We, the people of South Africa, have journeyed far since the long lines of our first democratic election on 27 April 1994, when we elected a government for us all. We began to tell a new story then … We have created a home where everybody feels free yet bounded to others … We are proud to be a community that cares.

As a unitary actor, the South African collective – black and white – constitute the binary Other to the European identity:

We notice with great concern and disquiet the emergence of racism … particularly in Europe. Given our own painful and destructive past flowing directly from the policies of apartheid, a democratic and non-racist government is morally-bound to do everything in its power to thwart and frustrate the efforts of those seeking to impose their evil, criminal and immoral ideology.
A democratic South Africa … is also bound … to assist in every way possible to eradicate the scourge of racism (ANC, 1994).

Here, the black and white constituents are undifferentiated members of the “democratic and non-racist” South African collective, which stands juxtaposed against the “racist… evil, criminal and immoral” European collective (on this point, see also Pieterse, 2002:4). At the group-level, distinctions between black African and white African all but dissolve into the overriding “we”-entity. Now, the borders that define the African Self in relation to the European Other, are replaced by the borders between the South African Self and significant Others within the international sphere. To resituate this observation within the foregoing discussion of literature from philosophy and psychoanalysis, the African Self represents the ideal form to which South Africa aspires. This ideal African Self stands in opposition to the flawed European Other, which becomes part of the South African Self through the process of establishment of the large-group identity. Integrated into the identity of “South Africa” through assimilation into the large-group, the European Other becomes the European Self – equal in entitlements to privileges enjoyed by the “South African community” as the African Self. It is important to here look at the processes through which this is achieved.

According to Baines (1998), there are two major strategies that government elites can employ to cultivate national identities. The first, civic nationalism, is a “tolerant and inclusive” strategy that encourages loyalty to a political community, political institutions and principles. The second, ethnic nationalism, “emphasizes the common descent or affinities of people with respect to language and religion”, and is most often exclusivist and discriminatory. While I question Baines’s assertion that “there remains serious doubts about the efficacy of civic nationalism in promoting a sense of national identity in South Africa”, Baines references Miller (1997), who proposes that a “multi-level nationalism … can reconcile national and communal identities (around) a shared public culture”. This type of “multi-level nationalism” would encourage a hybrid national community comprised of different elements “from all constituent cultures (who share an) allegiance to certain cultural common denominators … with which most South Africans can identify” (Baines, 1998).

Led by the ANC, the South African government has since 1994 been implementing a project of “nation-building and social cohesion”, where the objective is to “reduce and/or eliminate in a planned and sustained manner … inequalities, exclusions and disparities based on ethnicity, class, gender, nationality” (DAC, n.d.:1) The “nation-building” component of this national project is described as “the process whereby a society with diverse origins, histories,
languages, cultures and religions come together … as equals to work towards eradicating the divisions and injustices of the past” (DAC, n.d.:1). What is interesting here, is that parallel to the discursive construction of a South African nation that is “multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial” (DIRCO, 2011:4), “a community of multiple, overlapping identities, cosmopolitan in (its) nationhood” (NPC, 2012:21), we observe the equally active discursive construction of a South Africa with a “shared origin and history, values and symbols, and a shared national consciousness” (DAC, n.d.:1-2. On this point, see also Baines, 1998). This observation would appear to confirm Miller’s (1997) proposition of a multi-level nationalism, where utterly divergent cultural, racial, religious, linguistic and ethnic identities with the borders of the South African territory are effectively united under the umbrella of the “rainbow nation”. As Baines (1998) observes:

The secondary metaphor of the rainbow with its spectrum of colours suggests that South Africa is a multicultural society … the colours are not taken literally to represent particular cultural groups. Indeed, the rainbow nation rhetoric avoids direct reference to colour in the sense of race. Instead, the rainbow's colours are simply said to symbolise the diversity of South Africa's usually unspecified cultural/ethnic/racial groups (original spelling).

Although Miller’s is certainly an entertaining proposition, I find myself questioning the authors’ certainty that it is indeed possible to embark on a project of establishing differentiated-unity. Although the metaphor is said to reference the many different cultures, religions, races and/or ethnicities of which the nation is composed, its effect is one of blurring the boundaries between these different identities to produce a singular “rainbow”-entity. Indeed, reading the National Planning Commission’s vision for South Africa in 2030 (NPC, 2012:11-22) one is struck by the overwhelming presence of the “we”-entity, with minimal references to identity differences. The repetition of signifiers “we” and “our” functions almost as a mantra for the unitary South African entity:

Who are we? We are Africans. We are an African country. We are part of our multinational region. We are an essential part of our continent… (Ibid.:12; emphasis added).

The identity of this “we”-entity, Filatova (1997) and Kwaa Pra (1997) contend, is one of differentiated “Africanness” which, Baines (1998) points out, reflects the demographic character of South African social life. The irony of this statement, of course, is that “Africanness” supersedes “difference” in this identity-configuration, blanketing all South
Africans under the signifier “African”. For Johnston (2014:290), “Africanism” fulfils another function:

“Africanism” … is expressed pervasively in the alleged moral superiority of “African values” over Western ones … The most important repository of Africanism is, however, the insistent portrayal of Black Africans … as a “victim nation”.

In Johnston’s observation, “Africanness” is pitted against “Westernness”, or “Europeanness, or even “whiteness”, where “Black Africa” is both the victim of Western malice, and the victor in a game of morality. Indeed, Chipkin (2007:1) contends that African nationalism should be understood as “the preeminent form of resistance to colonialism and apartheid”. The bitter truth of the matter is that the South African identity exists only nominally, if at all. In Alexander’s (2013:129) words, “[n]on-racialism’ is the founding myth of the new South Africa”. In spite of the democratic government’s commitment to the construction of a unified “South African” identity, the feat has proven more than challenging. Indeed, significant sections of the South African community feel that the South African “nation” has failed “to achieve catharsis from the ills of the past (where) lack of honest and remorseful acknowledgment of the evils of the apartheid regime have continued to spur revolutionary pressures from the previously disadvantaged” (Gumede, 2015). Similarly, the National Development Plan (NPC, 2012:35) remarks that “(d)espite consistent progress since 1994, South Africa remains a divided society, with race still forming the main divide”. The myth and fallacy of the “rainbow nation” is perhaps best articulated by the ANC (1997):

[T]he notion that South Africans embraced and made up, and thus erased the root causes of previous conflict, is thoroughly misleading. April 1994 was neither the beginning nor the end of history. The essential contradictions spawned by apartheid colonialism were as prevalent the day after the inauguration of the new government as they were the day before.64

In this sense, I find resonance in Maré’s (2005:502) observation that South Africa has “had to create the new out of the fragments created by apartheid … the material traces and scars of the past, are pertinent”. For all of the South African government’s attempts to construct a collective “South African” identity, whether based on the prescriptions of multiculturalism or multi-level

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63 See also Johnston, 2014:290-292.
64 On this point, see also Alexander, 2013:124.
nationalism, and for all of the outward projection of South Africa as a unified nation to the international community, the South African identity remains exceptionally fragmented and fractured – characterized by the entrenched, racial divisions of its historical legacy from before colonial occupation to the present day. For struggle veteran Neville Alexander (2013:125), racialized identities are difficult to erase because “even though they are constructed (they) have a primordial dimension for most individuals, precisely because they are not aware of the historical, social and political ways in which their identities have been constructed”. Here, I find interesting Alexander’s observation that the ANC government early on in Mbeki’s tenure as president of the “New South Africa”, abandoned the “noble ideology of non-racialism” touted by the Mandela administration in the years directly following the country’s first democratic election. For Alexander, a defining moment in the “new” South Africa’s future came when Thabo Mbeki in 1998 opened a parliamentary debate on nation-building and reconciliation with the assertion that

South Africa is a country of two nations … One … is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal … The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the black population in general and the disabled (Mbeki, 1998 quoted in Alexander, 2013:126).

The black-white dichotomy of the South African identity should not be underestimated, precisely because of how it explains South Africa’s relations with other state-persons in the international sphere. South Africa’s politics are not colour blind – either domestically or internationally. Indeed, Alexander (2013:116-117) commences his reflections on the issue of “race” in the South African nation-building project with a discussion of colonialism in Africa, and the introduction of “race thinking” to Africa through colonial settlement – effectively underlining the centrality of “race” to (South) Africa’s relations with European states. As Alexander (Ibid.:117) remarks:

The paternalistic but nonetheless exploitative racial-caste system that characterized the pre-industrial political entities in what became the Union of South Africa constituted the ideological and social material from which the racist system of apartheid was fashioned.

It is not my intention, here, to engage in the debate about the South African national character in all of its intricacies; this is neither the focus of the research, nor a possibility in the context
of the present research. What is important to highlight here, however, is that the same racialized divisions that characterize South Africa’s relations with significant Others from the international sphere – both positive and negative – also play themselves out in the sphere of domestic politics. While the Negative Other – the white, colonial settler – is integrated into the South African identity through the processes large-group construction, where white South Africans become and undifferentiated part of the South African “Self” through their assimilation into unitary symbols like that of a “rainbow nation”, the Negative Other remains the binary opposite of the African Self. Whereas, in the realm of domestic politics, this phenomenon manifests as racialized difference between the “white oppressor” and the “black victim”, in the international sphere, these differences are operationalized in the South African state’s positive identification with the “victimized South” – an extension of the “African Self” – and in its negative identification with the “exploitative North” – the Colonial Other.

Recalling Volkan’s notion that the collective memory of shared glories and chosen traumas “set tasks” for future generations of the large-group, South Africa’s past experiences of relationships with significant Others cause in the state, a desire to engage in a certain action aimed at either preserving its outside environment, or changing it to make it more acceptable. If my major contention in the preceding analysis has been that historical experiences of the relationships between South Africa and its significant Others lie at the core of the state’s identity, I am brought to question how these identities determine South Africa’s foreign policy. As Doty (1996:4) remarks, “[a]nalysis examines not only how social identities get constructed, but also what practices and policies are thereby made possible”. While I look, in the following pages, at specific “foreign policy action items”, my concern is more with the underlying motivations for certain policy objectives than it is with the actual policy – how a state’s experiences of relationships with Others result in certain “modes of subjectivity” (Ibid.) that influence its decisions:

[H]ow questions examine how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects and objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions that create certain possibilities and preclude others (Ibid.)

65 The reader interested in a more in-depth discussion of race and South African society is referred to an excellent contribution by Ivor Chipkin, 2007; also, Alexander, 2013:115-201; Maré, 2014:140-156; Posel, 2014:19-40.
4.2. IDENTITY PERFORMANCES AND SA FOREIGN RELATIONS

On my reading, four interrelated policy avenues or action items can be identified from South Africa’s foreign policy discourses. Perhaps most obvious, is South Africa’s “global transformation agenda”, which aims to transform what South Africa sees as unfair global practices and institutions into what the country thinks are more just, equitable and favourable global institutions and practices. The state’s notion of what a “fair” global order would look like, is intimately linked to what the state feels the present global order (and its architects) are taking from it, which is again rooted in a historical experience of what Others have denied the state in the past, and what it is owed in return. This transformation agenda goes hand-in-hand with South Africa’s efforts to resist Western dominance in global politics, particularly in the setting of the UNSC and the Bretton Woods trio. Analogous to the global transformation agenda, and South Africa’s “global South Agenda” that, on the surface, fights for greater equality for the rights of the states of the global South – particularly for African states – in international politics, and that is to be achieved through the state’s final foreign policy action-item: construction of a “parallel global order” – a utopia of like-minded states from the South.

4.2.1. On historical debts, moral obligation and entitlement to restitution

Like any other state, South Africa seeks to maximize gains from its relationships with other states in the international community through the implementation of its foreign policy. In the first policy paper on South Africa’s foreign relations after the end of apartheid, the Department of Foreign Affairs declared that the objective of “(d)iplomatic relations and all related aspects should be a means to an end, namely to promote the well-being of the country and its citizens” (DFA, 1996). Fifteen years later, the foreword to the 2011 White Paper on South African foreign relations states that the country’s “international relations work must endeavour to shape and strengthen our national identity; cultivate our national pride and patriotism; address the injustices of our past, including those of race and gender; bridge the divides in our society to ensure social cohesion and stability; and grow the economy for the development and upliftment of our people” (DIRCO, 2011:3; original spelling), while the 2012 National Development Plan notes that the challenge of this era of globalization in which it finds itself, is “to take advantage of opportunities while protecting South Africans – especially the poor … contributing to higher rates of growth and development” (NPC, 2012:21).
In this way, South Africa defines its national interest as the effort to eradicate poverty through economic development, which is to be achieved through “strategic” trade relations, foreign investment, and the strengthening of cultural links with peers. In fact, the South African state considers domestic development vital to its existence. In its 1994 Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), the ruling African National Congress (ANC, 1994b:5) iterates the view that “(n)o political democracy can survive and flourish if the mass of our people remain in poverty, without land, without tangible prospects for a better life”. Speaking to members of US congress on the advent of the democratic South Africa’s re-entry into the international community, former president Nelson Mandela (1994b) similarly remarked that “as the images of life lived anywhere on our globe become available to all, so will the contrast between the rich and the poor … impelling the deprived to demand a better life from the powers that be”. For the young democracy, thus, domestic development is its fundamental mandate, permeating all spheres of public policy – including foreign policy.

It is clear from the above that South Africa considers as its national interest, reaching domestic economic development targets to better the lives of South Africans. In the realm of the international, South Africa leverages its relationships with other states to help achieve these domestic development targets, either through trade, foreign investments or aid. There is nothing particularly revelatory about this observation, however, I find exceptionally interesting the degree to which South Africa consciously or unconsciously, expects state-persons from the global North in particular, to be willing to offer up the resources to help the country achieve its “selfish” ends. Indeed, from my reading of South African Foreign Policy discourses, it appears that although South Africa expresses its gratitude to members of the international community for their solidarity during its struggle for liberation from the oppressive apartheid regime, the state does not consider the international community absolved of all obligation toward it. In fact, the South African state considers Negative Others morally responsible for the situation it finds itself in, and expects these Others to help it rise above its present situation of poverty, unequal status as international actor, and marginalization in world affairs. Indeed, the White Paper on South African foreign policy notes the origins of its worldview as rooted in its struggle history:

In terms of South Africa’s liberation history, it’s evolving international engagement is based on two central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity [that] shapes our understanding of South-South cooperation and opposition to colonialism as a natural extension of our national interest (DIRCO, 2011:3).
The assertion that “(t)he values that inspire and guide South Africa as a nation are deeply rooted in the long years of struggle for liberation” (Ibid.:10), is echoed in the National Development Plan (NDP), which considers of paramount importance for South Africans during the coming years, “(h)ealing the wounds of the past and redressing the inequities caused by centuries of racial exclusion (as) constitutional imperatives” (NPC, 2012:14; emphasis added).

Whereas scholars have addressed the extent to which the South African state blames the West for the negative legacies inherited from the colonial system, the state itself has been rather more reserved about making explicit this feeling of what is best described as resentment. The NDP’s allusion to South Africa’s colonial heritage is thus an interesting anomaly. While many of the discourses here analysed do refer to “years of struggle for liberation” in some form or another, the NDP is the only official policy document to expressly tie South Africa’s inheritance of poverty, underdevelopment, and persistent racism to colonial rule. In this regard, South African foreign policy scholar Gerrit Olivier (2012:187) has remarked that “a significant share of both the blame and the praise for the good and the bad of South Africa from 1652 to 1994 must be apportioned to the influence and legacy of European colonial rule”. While there can be no doubt that apartheid caused many of the lasting ills that the country continues to struggle with, it is intriguing to find that there exists a quasi-assimilation between apartheid and colonial rule in the minds of the South African collective. The clearest example of this assimilation between apartheid and colonialism, is found in the ruling ANC’s 2012 Strategy and Tactics document that, in its introductory paragraph, lauds earlier policy documents for encapsulating the transition from apartheid colonialism … and ensuring decisive and accelerated progress towards the eradication of the legacy of apartheid colonialism (ANC, 2012:2; emphasis added).

Concluding remarks to the second chapter of the document recall the ANC’s efforts to “challenge colonialism and its apartheid derivative” (Ibid.:20), while the glossary of terms annexed to the document provide a definition for “apartheid colonialism” as a “variant of colonialism that existed in South Africa where the coloniser and the colonised shared one country” (Ibid.:67; original spelling). It should be clear from these definitions, however accurate or inaccurate, that to the ANC and its supporters, the lines between colonialism and
apartheid are exceptionally blurry. To the ANC, colonialism is directly responsible for “mass poverty and extreme inequality, which were inherent to colonialism” (Ibid.:6).

I remarked above that the South African collective has built its national identity around the notion of existential suffering caused by European imperialism. This experience of existential suffering is passed on from one generation to the next through the retelling of collectivized stories that function as a “mental glue” that binds together members of the group and that conditions future actions around the quest to soothe their collective suffering. What this all suggests, is that contrary to its claims, South Africa’s actions in international affairs are not limited to meeting immediate material needs like eradicating poverty, growing the economy and ascertaining greater influence in world affairs. South Africa’s relationships with the states of the global North have historically caused it existential suffering, and a major aim of the state’s relations with the Negative Others, is to put an end to this suffering. In this optic, South Africa’s global transformation agenda should be seen as a set of actions informed emotional experiences of the world, and that carry a set of desired outcomes (on this point, see also Naude, 2016:487-488).

Colonialism and apartheid caused South Africa to feel emasculated, vulnerable, betrayed, marginalized and violated – each an affective experience that inspire in it an irrepresible “state of action readiness” (Frijda, 2007:27) to modify the event that caused these feelings, and to effect alternatives to the situation it finds itself in. The motive of state of “feeling vulnerable”, for example, results in a readiness to undertake actions aimed at “creating a more stable, unified and prosperous world to guarantee protection from harm”. Similarly, South Africa’s feelings of “emasculaion” are channelled into efforts to “encourage an enabling environment, transforming the international sphere [and] taking on a leadership role”, which in turn inspires feelings of importance and empowerment in the state. Furthermore, South Africa’s efforts to “transform the ‘power-based global system of governance’ into “a just, rules-based equitable global order [and to] oppose imperialism in all its forms”, are born from the affective experience of having been violated and betrayed by Negative Others.

Stressing that South Africa cannot, in spite of its Afrocentric, anti-West posturing, afford to alienate states from the global North, Olivier (2012:193-194) remarks that South Africa has nonetheless steadily been distancing itself from Western state-persons by wilfully shifting allegiance to partners from the global South in the pursuit of its ideologically-fuelled utopia without “the West”. South Africa’s anti-West posturing runs deeper than a simple realignment of foreign policy objectives with South Africa’s new identity as a truly African state, however. Some twenty years after the end of “apartheid colonialism”, the state continues
to feel marginalized in international affairs, considering the international political landscape as unchanged and thus reporting that it continues to feel itself a victim of exploitation:

The developing world, especially Africa, has a limited voice and participation in the decision- and policy-making processes … Vested power interests are opposed to the diminution of their power (DIRCO, 2011:12; 24).

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s strategic plan for 2015-2020, notes that South African foreign policy is implemented “conscious that the Global System of Governance is not efficient and representative of all the people and demographics of the world” and that the state’s “resolve to strengthen relations with strategic partners of the North in order to pursue the African Agenda and the Agenda of the South cannot be overemphasized” (DIRCO n.d.:3-4). Similarly, the ANC (2017:10) considers the global North guilty of continuing to oppress the South through the design of the present international order:

The slow pace of development in the South and on the continent has not been due to a lack of programmes, policies and political will, but due to the fact that the [global political and economic] playing field has not been levelled.

While the ANC’s 2015 NGC Discussion Document overtly references Marxist-Leninist thought in the contextualization of its particular orientation to international relations (ANC, 2015:160), the foreign policy White Paper does not fall short in allusions to a structuralist worldview. The preamble to the White Paper stresses the South African state’s endeavours to “address (the) challenges of underdevelopment, promoting global equity and social justice” through “the transformation of the global system of governance from power-based to a rules-based system in a just and equitable global order” (DIRCO, 2011:4-7). In its strategic plan for 2015-2020, South Africa contextualizes international trade relations as exploitative and unjust, stating that “poor countries are priced out of global markets due to high trade costs that hamper the economic potential of any of the poorest nations”, while “the increased interdependence between countries and people is a fact of global life which is not matched by efforts to strengthen global governance” (DIRCO, n.d.:16). In this regard, it pledges to “persist with its advocacy for a reformed system of global governance (that) must not be limited to the political governance institutions but should include reform of the global financial architecture”

66 On this point, see also Alden and Schoeman (2013:127-128).
The ANC has similarly pledged to continue to lead South Africa and other nations of the global South in their “vanguard role” (ANC, 2017:11) of transforming the global political landscape into one that is more “humane” (ANC 2015:159; 161; 166; 191).

Taken at face value, South Africa’s relations with states of the global North would seem to serve the purpose of developing the South African economy through beneficial, material relations with states of the global North in particular. In this same vein, South Africa’s desire to transform the current global governance architecture would appear to be motivated by a material desire for greater status and wealth, and perhaps even for greater power. Not only does South Africa expect to achieve its national development targets through its relationships with other states, but the country feels entitled to assistance from the countries of the North as an outstanding debt for actions undertaken during colonial expansion. However, my reading reveals that South Africa’s “international vanguardism” is not simply about seizing the proverbial means to lift its citizens out of their situation of poverty and marginalization. It is perhaps more importantly about claiming justice and restitution for what it feels history robbed it of during colonialism. Restitution for the injustices of colonialism would, from this optic, take two forms: first, there are material reparations for the perceived underdevelopment and impoverishment of the former colonies through the structural processes of colonial administration; and second, there is the restoration of those privileges attached to (state) “personhood” that South Africa felt it was robbed of during colonialism – privileges like ownership over agency, the power to decide over its own destiny and recognition of its status as an equal political actor to states of the global North.67

4.2.2. Reclaiming an imagined future

Here above, I discussed South Africa’s expectations of recompense from states of the global North for the material resources it feels robbed of by colonialism. I further observed that South Africa’s calls for restitution do not end with recompense for material losses, but that the state appears to further expect restitution for the existential injustice it feels it was subjected to by Colonial Others. What I find particularly interesting, is how this injustice is perceived to have robbed the South of the dignity it should enjoy as an ontologically equal political entity in the global states-system.

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67 On the quest for international recognition as a leitmotif of the foreign policy agendas of the states of the global South, see Nel (2010:953-954).
In an excellent contribution on the topic, Nel (2010:965-973) argues that, in addition to the ambitions of rising powers like India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) to effect redistributive change in international politics, these actors are driven by a deep need for recognition and respect from the traditional powers. The recognition and esteem of significant Others in international relations are, in part, productive of identity in states: in essence, it is the acknowledgment that an Other possesses the same human attributes, rights and privileges as the Self, and that they are by that token, worthy of occupying a place of similar status within the community of states. Throughout the era of colonialism, states of the global South were denied any claims to “humaneness” or the associated rights and privileges afforded to “human” powers (Nel, 2010:963 footnote 42; after Fanon, 1967:200). In this sense, my argument here aligns with Nel’s thesis that states of the global South are driven by the final motive to gain some kind of acknowledgment from states of the global North that they are, at an ontological level, equal entities with equal rights within the international system. However, Nel’s approach assumes that external validation would be enough to satisfy South Africa’s needs as an international citizen who has been subjected to “centuries” of oppression and marginalization.

If South Africa’s experience of international relations as “traumatic” requires not simply putting an end to its suffering, but undoing the past completely, then the suggestion that recognition and material redistribution would stick a band aid on a festering wound but would do little to end South Africa’s lived trauma. In this conception of a transformed global political environment, where states of the North recognize states of the South as ontological equals, the South remains passive recipients of a destiny designed by the North; agency, in this relationship, still belongs to the states of the North. And, if agency is a quality of personhood, then states of the South would be no closer to reclaiming personhood by simply receiving recognition. In this sense, Nel’s approach ignores the fundamental principle that identities are constructed, not given. External validation in the form of, for instance, recognition or respect, are only part of the equation. States of the South need to take ownership of their identities and grow into them; they need to inhabit a status of ontological equality. This is not to say that Nel’s argument is obsolete – far from it.

Former South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad in 2004 asserted the role that colonialism played in constructing a world of extreme inequality, asking “(w)hy are we faced with such a reality? … We will have to accept the legacy of slavery, colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and the Cold War contributed to Africa’s under-development” (Pahad 2004b). Thabo Mbeki similarly presented a reconstruction of history containing, in his opinion,
but a few of the many examples that demonstrate how over centuries, African resources … ensured that Europeans live a better life and enjoy the good things of life while the countries of Africa were pushed deeper and deeper into the mire of poverty and underdevelopment (Mbeki 2006).

These sentiments are mirrored in the present White Paper on South African foreign policy, which underscores the path-dependent roots of South African foreign relations:

Since the birth of democratic South Africa in 1994, the country has prioritised an Afro-centric foreign policy rooted in national liberation, the quest for African renewal, and efforts to negate the legacy of colonialism as well as neo-colonialism (DIRCO, 2011:7; original spelling).

What these narratives are doing, is stratifying the social sphere and establishing an order of “haves and have-nots”. Indeed, Sociologist Chandra Mohanty (2010:538) reminds us that “thinking with identity in struggles for social justice … requires this philosophical formulation of the politics of identity, specifically as it is located within the uneven geographies and economies of the present”. Poverty and underdevelopment are not simply experiences of the material world, but qualifiers of the South African state’s identity. If Mohanty (Ibid.:536) thus argues that “class is a way of narrating oneself”, then part of the South African identity is “poor” and “underdeveloped” which in turn signifies the occupation of an inferior social position. Of course, inferiority is a deeply relational concept that establishes a social hierarchy of comparative worth, though hierarchies of this kind are socially constructed and are not the result of some kind of inherent inferiority.

For South Africa, the global North created the global hierarchy of social worth when it sought to impose Western “civilization” on the “indigents” of the South. Whereas South Africa blames the North for engineering this hierarchy of comparative worth, it is curiously unaware of the ways in which it assigns itself an inferior social position based on its perception that “possessions” are indicative of worthiness. Stated differently, South Africa’s idea of “the good things of life” appears intimately attached to material possession. Underlying this idea that a life filled with material possessions is a better existence than a life without material possessions, is a feeling of living in human dignity. Nelson Mandela in 1994 sought to mobilize the United States as the leader of the developed world around the need for economic, social
and political development in Africa as a basic human right, and a requisite for human dignity when he addressed the US Congress:

What we speak of is the evolution of the objective world which inexorably says to all of us that we are human together or nothing at all … of the global creation of the conditions which will make it possible for all peoples to enjoy the right to full human dignity (Mandela, 1994b).

The redistribution of global wealth and power, in this context, is a matter of human dignity for South Africa. This quest to “assert human worth”, to build a world in which all human beings – not simply Europeans or North Americans – can live in “human dignity”, is a central theme of South African identity, and of South African foreign relationships by extension. If the foreign policy White Paper describes South Africa’s “Ubuntu” approach to politics as “reflected in the idea that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others”, where the “Diplomacy of Ubuntu” finds expression in “creating a better South Africa and contributing to creating a better and safer Africa in a better world” (DIRCO, 2011:4; 10), then the notion of a better world would be one in which all nations are considered “worthy of dignity”:

The false pre-colonial and colonial characterisations of Africans as either “child-like noble savages”, or worse, as “sub-human, barbaric, dirty, stinking savages”, can once again be seen as a reality … [our leaders have] called for an African reawakening to restore this legacy (Pahad, 2004a; original spelling and punctuation).

Residing in this call to arms for Africans to “restore their legacy”, is a cry for Africans to reclaim the dignity South Africa feels the continent was robbed of during colonialism. To this end, Mbeki (2006a) remarks:

[A]s Africans, our struggle is to engage in both the total emancipation of our continent from the social, political and economic legacy of colonialism and apartheid as well as to reclaim our history, identity and traditions and on the foundation that our ancestors built for all of humanity.

In Mbeki’s view, the total emancipation of the continent cannot be limited to economic development and can only be achieved through a rewriting of history to restore the African image to its ideal form. This emancipation cannot be complete until those systems and processes that decide the destinies of the world’s countries and people are transformed:
[Emancipation] cannot be achieved as long as we defer to our former colonisers the important matters that affect our countries and people … we will continue being the wretched of the earth as long as we are not free to make our own decisions about our own destiny (Mbeki, 2006a; emphasis added).

If, above, I argued that agency is a fundamental privilege of full personhood, and that the capacity to make and execute decisions about one’s own destiny is at the core of agency, then South Africa’s feeling of being excluded from international decision-making processes implies an experience of impotence at being forced to bend to the will and whims of the global North even today. Indeed, South Africa considers the present configuration of the United Nations Security Council as a “historical injustice perpetrated against Africa” while the continued “marginalisation of many countries in the global economy, particularly those in Africa” (Zuma, 2009) is seen as one of the “key challenges” facing the international community today. Reflecting this sentiment, the foreign policy White Paper pledges continued “efforts to comprehensively reform the architecture of global governance … to make them more effective, legitimate and responsive to the needs of the developing world” (DIRCO, 2011:24).

What becomes apparent here is that, to South Africa, the exclusion of the global South from decision-making processes at the international level, entrenches the historic narrative that non-Europeans are somehow less worthy of the trust of the international community, and incapable of making sound decisions about the safety, security and prosperity of the world’s states. The global South’s exclusion from critical decision-making bodies on the basis of their untrustworthiness to make sound decisions about the destinies of the world’s states, moreover, reinforces the stratified social structure where non-Europeans are accepted as “uncivilized” or “unsophisticated” in comparison to the “civilized and sophisticated” European. The transformation of the international political landscape is thus as much about reclaiming the human dignity that South Africa feels it had been robbed of, as much about rewriting global history to restore the image of non-Europeans to what South Africa feels it should be, as it is about recuperating the riches it feels it had been dispossessed of by colonial systems of administration.

In the context of the above, Mohanty (2010:538) remarks that calls for post-colonial social justice particularly from the states and the peoples of the global South do not necessarily seek to “erase legacies of racism, colonialism, and economic domination (but) it does perhaps mean that we can inhabit our histories and identities differently”. What is important for me to note in this observation, is that justice is not a passive concept of simply receiving reparations
for past ills, but that it is a process that requires of actors to become actively engaged in rewriting their futures. Identities are dynamic states of existence that are not merely co-constructed and worn like a robe by the actor, but that are inhabited and lived. Actors are not mere recipients of their identities, they are active creators of their identities. Therefore, actors cannot wait passively for Others to effect changes that allow them to adopt a new identity, but need to grow into their identities through self-validation to align their experiences of their phenomenal Selves with their ideal Selves. South Africa’s quest to inhabit an identity as ontological equal to the states of the global North, and thereby enjoying the full spectrum of rights associated with state-personhood, cannot be achieved through the passive reception of recognition from other state-persons; South Africa needs to experience itself as a dignified actor before it can exist in dignity.

If this section has answered some questions about South Africa’s relationships with state-persons from the global North, then it has left even more questions about South Africa’s relations with state-persons from the global South, unanswered. If, indeed, South Africa’s relationships with states from the North are about claiming restitution for the perceived ills of the age of imperialism, what are we to make of South Africa’s increasingly close relations with the emerging powers or African peers? At a recent conference on regional challenges to multilateralism, a Brazilian scholar of the BRICS was visibly puzzled about South Africa’s participation in this grouping when he remarked that he “doesn’t know, really, what South Africa is getting out of it”, while a Turkish scholar grappled with the question of “why South Africa was invited to join in the first place”? While the South African government has motivated its participation in the BRICS as a means to achieving domestic- and continental development goals, then non-South Africans are rather less convinced that South Africa is getting anything out of the deal, so to speak. I turn my attention to these questions, below.

4.2.3. South Africa’s global transformation agenda as resistance to a Colonial world

South Africa has been quite vocal about its desire to realign political- and economic relations with the globe’s emerging powers, and since joining the BRICS in 2010, it has done exactly this. For many analysts, South Africa’s motivation for joining the BRICS was economic – at that stage, China was experiencing an economic growth rate of around 8% and it appeared that the age of US hegemony was coming to an end (Gu, Humphrey and Messner, 2008:274-292; 68 “Regional Challenges to Multilateralism”, 13-14 September 2018, University of Tampere, Finland.)
69 Others have contested the notion of the decline in hegemonic power of the United States; see Beckley (2011) and Nye (2015).
(2011:419) notes that postcolonial resistance “is often discursive and aimed at peaceful change and transformation”. Approached from this angle, mine is not so much a postcolonial reading of South Africa’s international relations, as it is a reading of South Africa’s anti-colonial position in international affairs.

Resistance to Western dominance in world politics today is inseparable from the collective identities of the actors resisting the global political system inherited from imperialism. As Mohanty (2010:531) remarks, “ politicized identity has served as the constitutive anchor for collective struggles against oppression and injustice” in the anti-colonial movements of the global South. These politicized identities, Mohanty (Ibid.:532) explains, create solidarities against particular injustices that have transcended the spatio-temporal locations within which they were designed, to become lodged in the “uneven geographies and economies of the present”. The marginalized South, then, is united in solidarity with each other in their struggles to transform this unjust global order. These transformation struggles, in turn, are identity-based reactions to subjective experiences of the relationships between states of the global North and South. As Dube (2010:125) observes:

> Identities comprise a crucial means through which social processes are perceived, experienced and articulated … defined within historical relationships of production and reproduction, appropriation and approbation, and power and difference, cultural identities (and their mutations) are essential elements in the quotidian constitution (and pervasive transformations) of social worlds.

For Dube, importantly, identities are both produced by hegemonies within social relations, and productive of contestations of power. Identities are “not mere objects of knowledge”, Dube (Ibid.:137) protests, but should be thought of as “conditions of knowing” (emphasis in original).

It could, of course, at this point be asked whether postcolonialism has any sense in a world that has seen the political emancipation of the majority of the world’s sovereign states from colonial rule? To this question, I find illuminating a remark by Abrahamsen (2003:195) that ‘the “post” in postcolonialism signifies the end of colonialism and imperialism as direct domination [but] it does not imply [its end] after imperialism as a global system of hegemonic power’. That is, although colonialism and imperialism as direct dominance by one state over another have come to an end, the structural legacies of colonialism and imperialism continue to limit the agency of non-Western states in global politics. Indeed, discussing the place of
South Africa’s foreign relations in achieving the country’s national interests, former Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoane-Mashabane (2014c), asserted that “the quest for a better world is a struggle that must continue”. This struggle is one of resisting the marginalization of the global South in world politics. The marginalization of the South is necessarily a product of Western hegemony that was, in the South African mind, achieved through the (violent) subjugation of colonies and their peoples to Western rule, and the West’s success in crafting a global political- and economic order that tips the balance of the scale in favour of the West:

[...]he current configuration of the UNSC does not reflect the geo-political realities [sic] of the 21st century. It still reflects the geo-politics of 1945 after the end of Second World War, in which the Allied powers emerged a dominant force. When the UN was formed … the majority of the countries from the South were under colonialism. The UN is supposed to be a beacon of democracy and transparency where all its members are treated as equals. The current composition of the UNSC is undemocratic, unrepresentative and not transparent (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2012).

Here, Chatterjee’s (2005:487-496) redefinition of “empire”, and by extension, his redefinition of “imperialism” become particularly useful. For Chatterjee (Ibid.:495), a broadened definition of imperial annexation to include the “imperial prerogative” of deciding what types of exceptions to international norms and practices are granted to whom, helps us better understand the “forms of indirect and informal control that have become common in recent decades”. If Nkoane-Mashabane has asserted that the post-War global political order was established by the Allied powers who emerged from the Wars as dominant powers in world affairs, these nations (France, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and China) have since 1945 been determining both the institutionalized norms and practices according to which international political and economic relations are conducted, and the conditions under which exceptions to these norms and practices are granted. Indeed, Deputy Minister of International Relations, Luwellyn Landers in 2015 remarked that

The UN, which was established almost 70 years ago, remains mired in and framed according to the historical colonial paradigm, material conditions and maps. It has not changed its rules, structures and operations, whilst the rest of the world has undergone a damascian change.
The structural legacies of colonialism and imperialism manifest, in the case of present-day global politics, as “zero-sum relationships” (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2013b) within a system of political and economic governance that favours traditional powers, and marginalizes the rest. While it would be a fallacy to deny the economic- and financial motivations behind South Africa’s regional agendas, these motives cannot be divorced from the underlying motivation of undoing the injustices that South Africa feels had been forced unto them during (exploitative) colonial rule. In as much as poverty and underdevelopment – products, in the South African imagination of colonialism and the discriminatory design of the present global political and financial architecture – continue to plague states of the global South, the struggle for freedom from Western dominance (or, resistance to Western dominance) continues. In this regard, Nkoane-Mashabane (2012) remarks that once this “new world” is achieved – once Western dominance in global politics is relegated to the pages of IR history books – “the South will no longer be an opposition force in the international system organized in the fold of the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, for example”. From the above, we may deduce that the opposition of the global South to the present international political order is fundamentally a form of resistance to what South Africa experiences as marginalization and oppression that herald from the age of imperialism, but that was never abolished during the decolonization project.

It is difficult to define the differences between “struggle” and “resistance”, and scholarly studies on the difference between the two are few to none. Looking to the online history archive ostensibly managed by the South African government or contracted sources (SA History Online), however, it would appear that struggle and resistance played distinct roles in the South African liberation movement of the early 1900s to 1994. According to an entry labelled “Liberation Struggle in South Africa” (SA History Online, 2018), the term “struggle” under the umbrella of the ANC-led liberation movement in South Africa was associated more with armed violence, while “resistance” was associated with passive, non-violent opposition to the discriminatory policies of the Apartheid South African government. Whereas the ANC appears to have retained the use of the word “struggle” to denote any and all continued opposition to discriminatory or racist politics, it would appear that what South Africa ultimately describes as a continued “struggle against colonialism” in global politics, is more accurately described as “resistance to Western dominance”.

In an address to Members of South African Parliament on the African Union (AU)’s Agenda 2063, Nkoane-Mashabane (2014b) noted that the world, in pursuit of this equal, fair, representative, and just world, needs to overcome a number of challenges, among which:
1. the untransformed and undemocratic nature of the global institutions that govern the world;
2. the uni-polarity and unilateralism which undermine multilateral institutions, and [achieving] the multi-polarity required for Africa to have a greater voice in the world; and
3. continuing threats to international peace … whose objective, in many instances, is regime change and control over Africa’s natural resources.

These challenges, Nkoane-Mashabane asserted, would be overcome by – among others – 1) achieving African ownership, including finding African solutions to African problems; 2) becoming self-reliant to reverse and eradicate African dependency on, for example, aid for fiscal support; 3) African unity; and 4) remaining assertive in world affairs, and continuing to demand a permanent presence on the UN Security Council. South Africa, of course, believes that these feats will be achieved through the integration of African economies and polities under the Agenda 2063, and membership of the BRICS, IBSA, NAM et cetera. In this sense, regional cooperation is the political tool through which South Africa operationalizes its resistance to Western dominance.⁷⁰

4.2.4. South Africa’s utopia of Souths

It is important to observe that resistance to Western dominance in global politics is not an exclusively African pursuit. Whereas the Ezulwini Consensus unites the states of the African continent around this common vision for a transformed global order, South Africa feels that Africa shares both its history of colonial oppression, and its vision for a new global order with all of the South:

Enhanced South-South Cooperation is central to addressing challenges facing Africa. We also share a common interest with countries of the South of addressing challenges of underdevelopment as well as the economic and political marginalisation of our part of the world in the global system (Ebrahim, 2012b).

In her address at the University of Pretoria on South Africa’s foreign policy, Nkoane-Mashabane (2012) remarked that “(t)he G20 is … a reinforcement of our collective, multilateral effort to fast-track the reform of the global system, including the Bretton Woods

⁷⁰ On this point, see Alexandroff (2015:249-268).
institutions”, while former Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim, in his 2013 budget speech to national assembly, similarly observed that “India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) are both strategic platforms, which allow for South-South politico-economic cooperation to strengthen and counteract the global balance of forces” (Ebrahim, 2013a). For Deputy Minister Landers (2018), in fact, BRICS is the institutionalization of the principles set forth at the 1955 Bandung Conference:

In the same vein you will appreciate that Africans are part of the Global South comprising in the main by countries which were colonised and citizens who were subjugated for a long time. In this context I must indicate that the BRICS formation signifies a long standing tradition of solidarity that was firmly established 63 years ago, in April 1955 (original spelling and punctuation).

Along these same lines, former President Jacob Zuma in his 2013 message on the 50th celebration of the establishment of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) remarked that the Organization represented a platform for … those at the forefront of the struggle against colonialism to coordinate and intensify their cooperation to emancipate the continent from colonial subjugation [providing] a sense of purpose for the African people to restore their freedom, dignity and to strive for a better life for all Africans, hence [carrying] the hopes and aspirations of all Africans.

What is clear, here, is that South Africa seeks to transform what it considers to be an oppressive and exploitative global order, exhibiting the same qualities of colonial rule imposed on it during the age of European imperialism. In fact, we may accept that South Africa – in its international relationships, continues to feel itself subjected to Western dominance and so continues to “struggle” against this domination. Indeed, Lindiwe Sisulu, freshly appointed Minister of International Relations and Cooperation under the administration of newly elected President Cyril Ramaphosa, in her first budget speech to the national assembly remarked that South Africa “continue(s) to fight against injustice, because we have to. We who have suffered so much, can ill afford any suffering in any part of the world” (Sisulu, 2018). It would appear, from this assertion, that South Africa considers it its moral obligation to continue to struggle against the marginalization, exploitation and oppression of the people of the global South within the untransformed system of global governance. Here, of course, the question could be asked, “what does South Africa see as a transformed global order?” The answer comes, partly,
in the form the assertion that South Africa appears to be constructing a parallel global order, free from Western dominance – a “utopia” of like-minded states from the global South.

Within the context of South Africa’s politics of identity as a blueprint for understanding South African foreign relationships, regional groupings like the BRICS – who share South Africa’s values of solidarity, equality, mutual understanding, inclusiveness and mutually beneficial cooperation – represent a long-awaited alternative world to the West’s exploitative and oppressive system of global governance. Because countries of the South have historically been dependent on the great powers for essential development aid, it has been forced to accept the dictates of former colonial masters. However, the proliferation of regional agreements, and particularly the rise of the BRICS powers who are now able to offer development aid without (colonial) political conditions attached to it, represent an alternative world. This alternative world is free from imperial occupation, free from oppression and marginalization, free from discrimination. As, Landers (2015b) explained:

Whilst we continue with our fight to transform the UN structures, we will also simultaneously support and partner with like-minded countries of the South to develop alternative organizations, structures and institutions that are more fair and sensitive to the needs of the developing world. This includes IBSA, the BRICS, FOCAC (Forum for China-Africa Cooperation), NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) and the newly-established development banks.

It is important, here, to note that South Africa is not calling for the total dismantling of the existing global order. For all of its references to the Bandung Conference as a defining moment in the country’s foreign policy orientation, an interesting observation is that South Africa does not appear to support the “dismantling of the old structure of national sovereignty that was … identified by the leaders at Bandung as the unfinished agenda of the world-wide anti-colonial struggle” (Chatterjee, 2005:490). Indeed, South Africa’s global transformation agenda does not have the ambitions of completely destroying the existing international political and economic order, as Nkoane-Mashabane (2010b) remarked during a speech on the relationship between South Africa and the emerging powers:

Difference does not have to lead to disintegration and conflict. Cooperation is possible among friends and antagonists alike … Significantly, [states of the global South] share a common view that multilateralism and rules-based global governance mechanism is the best guarantor of stability, and provides a better framework for asserting our values and interests.
Instead, former Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim in 2014 explained that since 1994, one of South Africa’s primary foreign policy priorities was “to promote an international rules-based system through active and constructive participation in multilateral institutions and processes” (Ebrahim, 2014b). South Africa’s “desire for a more just, humane and equitable world”, Ebrahim continued, can only be achieved through “the collective efforts of all members of the international system acting together through multilateral institutions”. It should be clear, from this, that South Africa takes issue with certain aspects of the present international system, which it endeavours to transform. In this regard, South Africa sees the AU’s Agenda 2063 as a continuation of the Pan-African drive for self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity - in order to, amongst others; galvanize and unite in action all Africans and the Diaspora around the common vision of a peaceful, integrated and prosperous Africa, driven by its citizens and taking its rightful place in the world (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2014c).

Africa’s rightful place in the world, is one in which African states are able to take ownership of their agency to determine their own destinies free from the impositions of the old colonial powers who have historically dictated the types of actions African countries are allowed to take, and the types of policies they should be pursuing (on this point, see Nel, 2010). These include the policies prescribed by the Bretton Woods Institutions, and imposed through their structural adjustment programs (SAPs), as well as the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Criminal Court’s prosecution of Africans on referral of cases to them by the UNSC. Whereas the West may still feature in this ‘utopia’, their politics of oppression do not. There is, in this utopia of Souths, an almost complete absence of social hierarchy or social stratification. Indeed, South Africa’s is a desire to “transform the former model of cooperation based on a zero-sum relationship in favour of more equitable and sustainable global partnerships” (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2013b). As Deputy Minister Landers (2015a) explains, South Africa’s participation in formations such as G20, BRICS, IBSA, G-77 and others is guided by our desire for a World that is fair and equitable … we believe that transforming these is not only good for the institutions themselves, but will also provide testimony to the stated principle of sovereign nations participating in foreign relations as equal partners (emphasis added).
It is clear, here, that what South Africa seeks to achieve through its global transformation agenda, is to (re)construct the realm of the international so as to be inclusive and representative of all nations of the world – a world that privileges all people, not simply Europeans. This world is one that functions according to a horizontal power-hierarchy, and that is free from social stratification along economic lines – a veritably classless Marxist utopia. This utopian dream is perhaps best encapsulated in Nkoane-Mashabane’s (2010b) concluding remarks concerning South Africa’s relationship with the states of the South:

We are about peace and friendship. We are about collaboration, cooperation and building partnerships; not confrontation, competition or rivalry.

It is in this context of friendship, collaboration and partnerships with states of the South, that South Africa’s transformation agenda becomes operant: regionalism provides the platform from which to build this utopian world of Souths – a “safe haven” of sorts that offers those who seek it, protection from the hostile world that the North designed when it emerged from the World Wars as dominant global powers. Whereas South Africa insists that multilateralism remains central to its foreign policy, the truly multilateral platforms of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions and the International Criminal Court were, to the South African mind, “designed by the West, for the West”. In its quest to transform these institutions into the equitable and inclusive organs of global governance that they should be, South Africa ostensibly resorts to a form of “regionalized multilateralism” that gives states with a worldview and political aims similar to South Africa’s, the power of numbers to force a more favourable outcome to the demands of the South within the international. The question here, of course, is whether South Africa’s peers share the state’s vision for the future of global politics, and whether they are ready to offer up what South Africa is asking of them in its quest to achieve its dream for the future? Indeed, do South Africa’s peers see it the way it sees itself – as the Nelson Mandela of international politics?

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have, in this chapter, focused my analysis on the way that the South African state sees itself, and its significant Others – the identities that South Africa assigns itself and Others, and the processes that contribute to the assignment of these identities. Drawing on extant literature on identity, I have demonstrated that the South African identity is constructed both through a
process of differentiation from Negative Others (the global North, or the former imperial powers), and through a process of identification with Positive Others (the global South, comprising former colonies, emerging powers and any other politically or economically marginalized states). Positive and negative identification takes place based on historical experiences of relationships with significant Others, and in accordance with the emotions that these experiences evoke in the state. Emotions, in everyday relationships, serve the important function of inspiring a will to action, and ultimately cause actions. These actions are aimed at not only preserving identity-bound interests but, more importantly, serve to maintain or to modify the external environment within which the state functions, or even the identities assigned and assumed within this environment. In its crudest form, my analysis has answered how identities condition interests, and how interests determine courses of action in international politics.

What I am as yet unable to answer, is why certain emotions – founded in and connected to identities that are assigned according to relational experiences – cause certain actions, and not others. Why, for instance, does South Africa feel the need at all to modify its relationships with the global North, and to redesign the international political environment, just because these inspire negative emotions in it? The easy answer, of course, is that the state wishes to transform its negative emotional experiences into positive experiences. But, the question remains, why any actor needs to get rid of negative emotional experiences? Why can’t states “just move on” from negative interactions, and focus on creating positive interactions? The reason that we are left with so many “why” questions, is because identities are not processes – they are concepts. What we are, in effect, doing in our research is to focus our attention on delineating the concepts that emerge from social processes, when we are ultimately trying to explain the social processes themselves.

What we do know about identities, is that they are constructed and reconstructed over time, based on interactions among actors. These interactions are, again, regulated by a number of psycho-social processes. The missing piece of the puzzle, then, is an understanding of the processes at work in the constitution of “the person”, and in this person’s psycho-social life. As my introductory remarks have suggested, and as I will demonstrate in the coming chapter, personalities can be thought of as infinite processes of becoming a person – sets of interactions between Self and Other, sets of responses to these interactions, and sets of adaptations to the consequences and implications of these actions. Personalities encompass the identities, predispositions, behaviours and social conditioning of the person that allows them exist in the social space and, indeed, that determines why the person performs certain actions aimed at
achieving certain outcomes that ultimately allows it to exist in relation to Others.

Using identity-centred models to analyse South Africa as state-person in International Relations, allows me to make the following statement about the South African state-person: South Africa sees itself as the moral opposite of Negative Others and sees itself as similar to Positive Others, yet it differentiates itself narratively from POs through its presentation of the Self as somehow superior to POs. In our attempts to predict how South Africa will respond to international political initiatives, we may expect the state to oppose, with varying vehemence, the initiatives of NOs of the global North, and to increasingly attempt to align its allegiances with POs from the global South. Yet, South Africa’s foreign policy record, as demonstrated in the introduction to this thesis, contradicts these assumptions. How, then, do we account for South Africa’s seemingly antithetical foreign policy behaviours? And why do identity theories not help us answer this question? The answer, personality psychologists tell us, is that persons are more than just identities – they are complex beings, with unique psychological architectures, and unique predispositions that determine how they respond to everyday life. Egos are brittle and easily bruised. Personalities, and their characteristic behaviours, serve to protect these egos from harsh criticism and the severity of external reality. Anomalous behaviours are not all that anomalous when we understand how narcissistic defences help individuals mediate the incompatibility between their inner ideals, and external constraints.
CHAPTER 5: THE NARCISSISTIC STATE, A WOUNDED SELF

Personality theory and patterns of Self-Object identification in South African foreign relations

As my introductory remarks in chapter one on the difference between identity and personality suggested, personality can be thought of as a set of motives, responses and reference frames through which and in accordance with which the individual interacts and responds to the external environment, and with the people that are encountered in this environment. It is, in this context, important to underscore the emphasis that psychologists and psychoanalysts place on personality as the product of innate traits or characteristics, as well as social conditioning. In addition, personality is temporally qualified as enduring and stable over the greater course of the individual’s history, which stands in contrast to identity as a more volatile and immediate interaction with the world “out there”. To complete the definition of personality offered in the introductory pages of the thesis, Heim and Westin (2005:17) define personality as:

enduring patterns of cognition, emotion, motivation, and behaviour that are activated in particular circumstances. [It] represents and enduring way of thinking, attending to information, feeling, and responding (one reference omitted).

In addition, Stone (1993:4-5) notes that personality can be sub-divided into two “components” that refer to inherited traits (nature) and socialized behaviours as responses to the environment (nurture). These two components Stone refers to as “temperament” and “character”, where the former signifies biologically inherited qualities (not unlike Freud’s id, or Kant’s a priori knowledge), while the latter are qualities acquired during the early stages of psychological development as responses to situations that the individual is faced with.\(^{71}\) Additionally, Stone (Ibid.:6) distinguishes between “personality”, or “character”,\(^ {72}\) and “character traits” as a term used by the psychoanalytic community to refer to a particular set of defence mechanisms associated with individual personalities. To further elucidate this distinction, Stone (Ibid.)

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\(^{71}\) I will not engage with Stone’s notion of “façade” as a further qualifier of personality as I consider this to fall outside the scope of what is useful or even necessary for the present purpose. The interested reader is referred to the relevant section in Stone (1993:4-5).

\(^{72}\) It is important here to note that the earliest usage of “character” in psychoanalytic theory is today grouped under the umbrella term “personality”, though etymologically, these two terms have distinct meanings. For the sake of consistency, I will throughout the rest of this thesis, make use solely of the term “personality”. Refer to Stone (1993:4-6).
defines “character traits” as the “how of personality”, *id est*, “evolving coping strategies fashioned out of genetic, constitutional and environmental influences”.

The broad function of personality, then, is to provide a set of mediatory mechanisms to aid interactions between and among individuals in the social setting. In a sense, personality functions as a type of defensive barrier between the subjective Self and stresses from the external environment, where the objective is to protect and preserve the subject, while allowing it to interact meaningfully with Others. Wherever the personality falls short of mediating interactions between Self and Other within space-time, the individual may become subject to abnormal behaviours and emotions, including self-harming behaviours, behaviours that are harmful to others, impulsiveness. In addition, personality serves as mediator between inner- and outer realities within which the individual is situated, so that personality determines perceptions and memories of Self, Other and events. Interestingly, Stone (1993:7) comments on the spatio-temporal location of personality within the individual, where there are regions [of the brain] concerned with the storage of memories and with the on-the-spot comparison of incoming stimuli this “memory bank” that must figure importantly in shaping the emotional/behavioural patterns whose collectivity we call “personality”.

This observation is interesting for two reasons: First, it binds into an inseparable whole *affect* and *memory*, where memory influences affect (and identity by extension), and where affect determines memory. That is, memories are – at least partially – stored emotive experiences of the external world; while emotive experiences of the external environment will overdetermine the *zeitgeist* of the memory, thus reinforcing the postmodernist idea that reality *is* representation or interpretation. Second, the notion of “personality as memory” suggests support for the idea that in states, where identity is determined by collective, affective, experiences and where collective experiences are vehicled in time-space by *collective memory*, the state can take on the characteristics of an actual person with an actual personality. Again, it is prudent to note here that although the state as a collective cannot logically be said to possess a brain, it is

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73 Here, it may be prudent to underscore that personality and associated behaviours are both attributable to a set of predispositions, and social learning. While an individual will be predisposed to certain behaviours, social learning does impact significantly on the extent to which individuals act on these natural inclinations, and how they react to their external environment. I elaborate on this point in more technical terms in the following sections, though I should note that it would not likely be possible to determine exactly which proportion of behavior is innate, and which acquired through social learning.

74 I should note here that I prefer to use the term “uncharacteristic” in this context, however, I will deal with this point duly in the coming sections, where after I will employ “uncharacteristic”.
composed of millions of brains that participate interpsychically in a shared reality. I proceed below to an overview of the functions of personality, including the role that narcissistic defences play in the protection of the Self from the harshness of the external reality, after which I consider the major personality types, and the characteristic defences of each personality type.

5.1. Functions of Personality

In classical Freudian psychoanalysis, on which Lacan builds, the human mind is composed of three interrelated yet distinct “structures”, namely, id, ego, and superego. The id, for Freud, is an unconscious Self of which the subject is unaware. All wishes, desires, impulses and urges emanate from the id, which seeks immediate gratification or satisfaction of these primitive drives. The ego develops over time, in accordance with the individual’s interactions with the environment and with Others in the environment. During the developmental phases (refer to Myers, 2008:424-425; Engler, 2009:40-46), the individual learns to cope with reality. Constrained by the real world, the ego seeks ways to satisfy impulses and urges in a realistic manner consistent with reality. As Myers (2008:423) notes, “ego contains our partly conscious perceptions, thoughts, judgments, and memories”. At around the ages four and five, the superego emerges, which Myers (Ibid.:423-424) describes as “the voice of our moral compass (conscience) that forces the ego to consider not only the real but the ideal”. The superego, socialized into social norms and values, seeks to behave in the manner that is expected of the individual by society. The superego, moreover, judges actions and produces feelings associated with behaviours – good or bad. Thus, the id and superego act as opposing forces: an unconscious force that seeks gratification for certain drives and impulses, and a conscious force that constrains the id to fit in with the demands and expectations of the outside world.

Between these two forces, ego serves as mediator that seeks to satisfy id’s desires and drives in a manner that is acceptable and achievable in the “real world” (Ibid.). For all ego’s best efforts, the tension between unconscious desires and impulses, and the constraints of the social world on the satisfaction of these desires, may induce feelings of shame and guilt, anxiety, or other neuroses that impact on the subject’s capacity to perform optimally (and within social expectations). Faced with the reality that (s)he is imperfect, and that (s)he harbours unattainable or otherwise socially unacceptable desires, the subject develops certain “narcissistic defences” that protect the Self from the harshness of this reality. The manner in which any one individual will behave in his or her attempts to cope with reality will differ according to personality type, cultural context, temperament, learned behaviours et cetera,
however, *all individuals* have developed the same defence mechanisms as a survival strategy (Engler, 2009:50-51; Larsen and Buss, 2014:274-275). I list the types of narcissistic defences that individuals may adopt in their efforts to mediate their realities here below, before looking at the defences that different personality types prefer to adopt.

5.1.1. **Narcissistic defences: Protecting *ego* from the harshness of reality**

Narcissistic defences are learned “coping mechanisms” that help defend the Self against anxiety. Freud identified three types of anxieties that the subject may be exposed to throughout daily life, being objective-, moral-, and neurotic anxieties (Larsen and Buss, 2014:274). Objective anxiety refers to fear as a response to an objective, external threat. We know that states have historically experienced real fear of invasion of their territory by a hostile force, or other forms of interference in their affairs by both state- and non-state actors, and that they continue to experience these fears in spite of the institutionalization of inviolable rights to non-interference in domestic affairs and territorial integrity through the machinations of the UNGA, the Security Council, and the ICJ among others. These fears are legitimate affective responses to past events and credible threats by adversaries to violate a state’s sovereign rights in favour of, for instance, territorial expansion. Objective anxiety, in this case, is essential for self-preservation in that it urges the state to prepare to protect itself from external hostility.

Neurotic- and moral anxieties are somewhat less logical or mostly unreasonable perceptions of danger, shame or humiliation that stem from conflicts between *id*, *ego* and *superego*. Where neurotic anxiety is present, the subject is usually subconsciously or even unconsciously afraid that *ego* might lose control over *id*’s unacceptable desires and therefore perpetrating unspeakably shameful acts (Ibid.:275). Neurotic anxieties include fears of “blurting out” unacceptable thoughts, experiencing what is perceived to be unacceptable impulses or responses to stimuli, or acting on forbidden desires. If neurotic anxieties stem from an internal conflict over *ego*’s suppression of *id*’s socially unacceptable impulses and desires, then moral anxieties stem from a conflict over *superego*’s (skewed) perception of society’s (unattainably) high expectations of the subject, and *ego*’s constant realization that these standards cannot reasonably be met. Both moral and neurotic anxiety may result in low self-esteem and constant feelings of worthlessness or guilt (Ibid.:275). These feelings and perceptions may, in turn, inspire excessive attempts to auto-correct social “transgressions” by performing ever better, achieving ever greater heights and projecting an ever more perfect image to the outside world.
In an attempt to both protect the integrity of ego, and to reduce anxiety, the subject develops certain defence mechanisms. The earliest mention of narcissistic defence was in Freud’s observation of patients’ propensity to “repress” unacceptable thoughts, feelings or urges by purposely forgetting the negative connotations to an event, and focusing solely on the positive (Larsen and Buss, 2014:276). Anna Freud expanded on Sigmund Freud’s “defence of repression” to include further mechanisms that individuals employ to overcome anxieties and to protect the fragile ego. Larsen and Buss (2014:276-281) detail six of the most important defence mechanisms developed by Anna Freud (1936) and Otto Fenichel (1945), being denial, displacement, rationalization, reaction formation, projection, and sublimation.

1. A person in denial attempts to reduce anxiety by refusing to see the facts of the situation. Larsen and Buss (2014:277) note that denial may involve an individual dismissing criticism as irrelevant or unimportant, rather than internalizing the criticism and accepting that they are not living up to their own image of their ideal Self. Individuals in denial further tend to blame the outcome of an action on external factors, rather than accepting blame for the consequences of an error in judgment. Because denial allows the subject to absolve themselves of responsibility for an outcome, individuals in denial tend to engage in harmful behaviour.

2. Displacement is a defence mechanism that involves channelling inappropriate feelings or desires from the object that inspires this feeling or impulse in the subject, onto another, non-threatening target (Ibid.:277). Displacement may include the channelling of anger from an inappropriate target to a less threatening target, or redirecting fear of someone into fear of something that is more controllable or conquerable.

3. Larsen and Buss (Ibid.:280) describe the defence of rationalization as “coming up with an explanation for an event that is easier to accept than the real reason”. The logic behind rationalization is that it provides the individual with more emotionally acceptable reasons for a certain, undesirable outcome than having to accept that they are not living up to their ideal Self.

4. In some cases, individuals may act in the opposite way that society expects them to act under certain circumstances. Often, reaction formation involves exaggerated or excessive behaviours aimed at convincing the subject and its Others that it is not guilty of some unacceptable ideas, behaviours or desires (Ibid.). Reaction formation may correspond to the concept of “overcompensation” in layman’s terms, which may be described as trying so hard to appear one way to the outside world, that the insincerity of the behaviour alerts others to the fact that the person, their expressions and behaviours, are inauthentic and aimed at covering up true feelings or intentions.

5. Projection involves attributing one’s own flaws onto another person (Ibid.). By projecting unacceptable, annoying or distasteful qualities that are contrary to the image of the ideal Self onto another, the individual is able to displace self-directed hate or anger onto an external party. Most often, this defence results in what is commonly described as “double standards”, which describes
the propensity for individuals to chastise other people for possessing certain traits or exhibiting certain behaviours, without acknowledging that they themselves possess these traits or engage in these same behaviours. Baumeister et al. (1998, discussed in Larsen and Buss, 2014:281) explain that the “false consensus effect” allows individuals to bypass judgments of moral deficiency and negative exceptionalism by stimulating the belief that “everyone does or thinks that”.

6. Sublimation, finally, involves the channelling of unacceptable emotions or desires, into more socially acceptable activities. As Larsen and Buss (2014:281) explain, “watching football or boxing is more desirable than beating someone up”.

As I have noted, *all persons* adopt the narcissistic defences here above elaborated to some extent, at some point, in their attempts to mediate conflicts between *id, ego, and superego*. Evidence of narcissistic defence does not necessarily indicate some kind of abnormal psychology, but it does offer useful insights into behaviours that we have resignedly designated as “abnormal” or “schizophrenic”. We may, thus, expect to see evidence of each of the six defence mechanisms highlighted here in South Africa’s everyday actions.

5.1.2. **Personality types and their preferred narcissistic defences, or characteristic behaviours**

Personality psychologists have dedicated a significant amount of time to identifying and classifying certain stable and consistent dispositions or traits that are associated with certain personality types, and that influence how these personality types behave in specific circumstances. Traits, Larsen and Buss (2014:57) explain, can be described as “attributes of a person that are reasonably characteristic of the person and perhaps enduring over time” (emphasis in original). Traits, within the domain of personality psychology, can be approached either as internal causal properties, or as purely descriptive summaries.

Approaches to trait psychology that view traits as internal causal properties, assume that traits *cause* behaviours, and classify personalities according to the capacity to express certain behaviours rather than attributing traits based on observable behaviours (Ibid:58-59). This approach is problematic in as much as it tends to ignore the possibility of external causes of behaviours, *assuming* that behaviours can be explained by the individual’s predisposition to specific behaviours. While traits certainly predict behaviours, they do not always account satisfactorily for environmental factors that may *also* influence behaviours. For this reason, some personality psychologists view traits as descriptive summaries of *behaviours*, rather than causal factors in their own right. Approached from this angle, traits are used “to describe, in
summary fashion, the trend in a person’s behaviour” (Ibid.:59). General behavioural patterns may then be attributed to certain dispositions or traits associated with specific personality types that can be categorized according to dispositional and behavioural clusters – or “taxonomies of personality”.

Among the various personality taxonomies that have been proposed by personality psychologists over time, the “Five-Factor Model” (Norman, 1963, after Tupes and Cristal, 1961; Fiske, 1949 and Cattell, 1943) has enjoyed the greatest amount of consensus among personality psychologists (Larsen and Buss, 2014:76). The Model clumps together 22 descriptive terms for five groups of personality traits – extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and culture – and was devised from self-ratings of single-word trait adjectives, as well as ratings of sentence items using questionnaires (see Larsen and Buss, 2014:77). By way of summary, the Five-Factor Model facilitates the prediction of certain behaviours according to personality-based predispositions, based on observed behavioural trends by classifying individuals as either extraverted and outgoing, or introverted and reclusive. Individuals may further be typified as adventurous or cautious, which may indicate that they are more prone to engage in risky activities, or may try to avoid social exchanges. On another axis, individuals may be described as good-natured or irritable, or as jealous or not jealous. This may indicate that certain personalities are predisposed to be rude, or friendly; to cooperate with others, or to try to do things on their own without the help of others.

However significant the support of personality psychologists for the Five-Factor Model, the Model has been criticized (Lanning, 1994; Almagor, Tellegen and Waller, 1995; Goldberg and Saucier, 1995; Schmitt and Buss, 2002) for ignoring additional important personality traits, like conventionality, seductiveness, manipulativeness, thriftiness, humorousness, integrity, femininity, religiosity, risk taking, and egotism (Paunonen, 2002; Paunonen et al. 2003; see Larsen and Buss, 2014:85). A particularly important development in trait psychology, has been the addition of a sixth factor to Norman’s Five-Factor Model, being the “Honesty-Humility” factor (Ashton et al., 2004). Listed on one end of the honesty-humility spectrum, are adjectives like honest, sincere, trustworthy, and unselfish, while the other end of the spectrum lists adjectives like arrogant, conceited, greedy, pompous, self-important, and egotistical. All individuals rank somewhere between the extremes of these six personality traits – as either extroverted or introverted, agreeable or unpleasant, conscientious or casual, emotionally stable or labile, anxious or stable – and placing on one extreme of the scale does not necessarily indicate any form of maladaptation or abnormality.
To the extent that the Five-Factor Model is extremely broad in its classification, it provides little in the way of understanding how personality-dependent behaviours function to protect the *ego* from threats to its integrity, and so promises precious little further insights into South Africa’s behaviours within the realm of the international. I have, in this optic, found the fourth edition of the “Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory” (MCMI-IV) more useful for understanding personality types, their associated traits and behaviours. Millon (1990; 2011) proposed a diagnostic taxonomy of 15 personality spectra that range from adaptive to maladaptive, and that list behaviours associated with each of these personality types. This taxonomy is widely used by clinicians working with personalities and their disorders, and form the basis of diagnostic criteria for personality disorders contained in the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” (DSM) and the “International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems” (ICD).

What is particularly useful about Millon’s personality inventory, is that it lists the coping behaviours that individuals with a specific personality style are likely to adopt when dealing with threats to the *ego*. The unique psychological make-up of each individual will determine which coping strategies they prefer to adopt to deal with daily stresses; for example, an introverted, shy personality type may prefer to retire from social situations that cause them significant anxiety, or to submit to the wishes of significant Others in an attempt to avoid conflict, while an extroverted, sociable personality may seek out the company of significant Others in an attempt to soothe inner feelings of boredom or emptiness. It is important to note that any one individual’s personality descriptors may be spread out across the 15 spectra hereabove listed, however, the task is to ascertain to which of the personality spectra the majority of the individual’s behaviours and traits correspond most often, or most strongly.

From the analysis of the South African identity in the preceding chapters, including the interpersonal dynamics that characterize South Africa’s relationships with significant Others, it is possible to exclude at least 12 of the personality types listed in Millon’s inventory as possibly applying to the South African state. It is clear, from the analysis, that South Africa is confident rather than shy or retired; that it has a strong sense of its personal identity rather than an uncertain self-image; that the state is proactive, rather than passive and complacent; and that the state feels entitled to recognition and praise, rather than feeling itself undeserving and diffident. Following this process of elimination, South Africa seems to potentially fit five

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75 A slightly modified version of Millon’s full inventory is attached in Annexe II, for ease of reference. Modifications comprise the replacement of certain unfamiliar words with more familiar synonyms; sensitivity to the maintenance of the original meaning of these words was upheld.
personality types, being, sociable/histrionic; confident/narcissistic; suspicious/paranoid; nonconforming/antisocial; and assertive/sadistic. While South Africa appears to actively seek out friendships with Positive Others, it has been described by peers as “arrogant” and a “bully”. I have likewise observed that South Africa tends to overreact in anticipation of criticism, making it seem impulsive and disingenuous. In addition, South Africa appears highly mistrustful of the motives of Negative Others in particular, often coming across as hostile toward NOs. This suspicion is often the consequence of a tendency to exaggerate events, employing particularly dramatic discourse. The state has a tendency, moreover, to rationalize its own behaviours, often criticizing significant Others for their perceived flaws that South Africa itself possesses. It is, in spite of this particularly broad range of traits and behaviours, possible to eliminate three further personality types from Millon’s inventory.

Based on Millon’s detailed descriptions (Millon Personality Group, 2015b) of personality types, it is possible to exclude the paranoid personality type from the study because although South Africa is particularly suspicious of, and hostile toward, NOs, it does not appear to be suspicious of the motives and actions of SOs. The state’s suspicion of the global North is therefore a reaction to earlier experiences of relationships with these states, that may have been exploitative, violent, subversive or otherwise harmful to the country’s ego. While South Africa appears convinced that states of the global North conduct their relations with hidden agendas of regime change or neo-colonial exploitation, for instance, there is no evidence that South Africa “tests” loyalties of POs. In fact, South Africa is often faulted for its apparent failure to scrutinize more closely China’s involvement in Africa (see, e.g. Menell, 2010:55-60; Bond, 2013: 251-270; Rich and Recker, 2013:61-62; AFP, 2018). Perhaps most importantly, South Africa does not appear to have any particular desire for isolating itself from significant Others.

Although South Africa may appear to act impulsively, for example, when it withdrew from the ICC following a spat concerning the non-arrest of Omar al-Bashir, and whereas South Africa seems openly hostile toward the states of the global North for the past transgressions of imperial exploits, South Africa cannot be claimed to display abusive, brutal or divisive behaviour, nor is there any evidence that South Africa derives any pleasure whatsoever from intimidating, humiliating or coercing other state-persons in order to get ahead. Indeed, South Africa shows empathy toward significant Others, and it does not display cruelty, aggression or malice toward any significant Others – including NOs. While I have observed that South Africa does seem to expect some kind of restitution for past violations, and while my judgment has been that South Africa appears to be demanding a more horizontal division of power in
international affairs, the country does not necessarily desire a dominant position in global affairs. For these reasons, the assertive personality type does not entirely fit South Africa.

Whereas South Africa appears dramatic, volatile and impulsive in some of its behaviours – prompting accusations of schizophrenia – the state has a strong sense of Self, and does not appear to have any excessive need for reassurance from significant Others. Indeed, South Africa appears perfectly capable of praising itself for its self-perceived strengths and successes, which remain constant across time and situations. Although the state does appear to have a deep need for admiration and recognition from peers, it does not tend to engage in rash, showy activities aimed at maximizing its appearance of sociability and charm. Most importantly, South Africa appears to derive great pleasure from ruminations over its inner Self, suggesting that it does not shift its attention to significant Others in a bid to escape its own, inner emptiness. These observations point to the fact that South Africa’s cannot be described as a sociable personality type. What we are thus left with, are the confident/narcissistic personality type, and the nonconforming/antisocial personality type. While, on the surface, it would seem that these two personality types are easily discernible one from the other, the two personality types are very similar, even in their clinical presentation (see Bursten, 1989; Kernberg, 1989; Gacono, Meloy and Berg, 1992; Gunderson and Ronningstam, 2001). According to Millon’s personality inventory (Millon Personality Group, 2015a), individuals with the confident/narcissistic personality type

show little regard or even acknowledgment for the sovereignty of others … owing to a sense of entitlement emanating from their background of either overindulgence or neglect. [They] have a vulnerability to discomfort coming from any challenge to their entitled status, and generally believe that they do not have to earn their place, nor conform to expectations. Most thrive on continual attention from others as well as others’ willingness to serve their needs.

The confident/narcissistic personality type is often described as “arrogant, supercilious, pompous, and disdainful … flouting conventional rules of shared social living” (Millon Personality Group, 2015a). These individuals feel entitled to special treatment, though they do not tend to reciprocate these favours because they harbour a grandiose sense of Self, seeing themselves as “special, if not unique” (Ibid.), and therefore meritous of special treatment. On a phenomenological level, individuals with confident/narcissistic personalities are typically preoccupied with “self-glorifying fantasies of success, beauty or love”, and are “minimally constrained by objective reality” (Ibid.). More often than not, the actual successes and
achievements of these individuals are less impressive than the inflated way in which they are viewed by the individual. Because the confident/narcissistic personality sees themselves as exemplary, they tend not to see their own flaws or unacceptable behaviours, readily rationalizing or justifying shortcomings to place themselves in a better light. While the narcissistic person appears facile and cool, their confidence is easily shaken, resulting in outbursts of rage accompany feelings of shame and emptiness (Millon Personality Group, 2015a).

In much the same way as the confident/narcissistic individual, those with nonconforming/antisocial personalities actively seek out what they feel is their entitlement. [These] individuals often feel slighted by their circumstances and believe they must take in order to receive. They are impulsive by nature and uncaring about any damage they may inflict on others or themselves (Millon Personality Group, 2015c).

Individuals with nonconforming/antisocial personalities act hastily, and are “short-sighted, incautious and imprudent, failing to plan ahead or consider alternatives, no less heed consequences” (Millon Personality Group, 2015c). Because of their extreme self-centeredness, nonconforming/antisocial personalities are considered to be interpersonally irresponsible, intruding upon and violating the rights of others, and transgressing established social codes” (Ibid.). These individuals see themselves as unconstrained by social customs, conventional norms, and personal loyalties, and are prone to discharging unacceptable impulses directly, without sublimating them into more acceptable behaviours or activities. Nonconforming/antisocial personalities tend to have a very low tolerance for frustration, and a propensity for “unfettered self-expression” (Ibid.). The one major behavioural trait that sets nonconforming/antisocial personalities apart from confident/narcissistic personalities, is their propensity for not only transgressing norms and rules, but actively breaking the law. While South Africa has, on occasion, failed to respect legal obligations (exempli gratia, in failing to arrest Omar al-Bashir), the state tends to uphold and even expresses great respect for international law. This final distinction, then, places South Africa on the confident/narcissistic personality spectrum, and provides the basis for the final step in this personology of the South African state.
5.1.3. Narcissistic defences and South Africa’s recent foreign relations

Looking at South Africa’s (re)actions surrounding, for instance, UNSC Resolution 1973 and the subsequent NATO invasion of Libya, a number of these defences become clear: First, South Africa responded to criticism (Moore, 2011; Rossouw, 2011; Fabricius, 2015) of its affirmative vote on Resolution 1973 by appealing to the false consensus that “everybody did it”. As former Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim (2011b) exclaimed at a speech delivered at the University of Venda on the 2nd of August 2011:

> South Africa’s positions, it has to be said, we coordinated with Nigeria and Gabon, the present African non-permanent members of the UNSC. Our vote together with the African countries in the UNSC … constituted a support for the call by the League of Arab States on a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya in order to protect civilians.

South Africa’s vote on Resolution 1973 could, in itself, be considered a consequence of reaction formation on the South African part. On its vote in favour of the Resolution, South Africa insisted that it was motivated by a desire to prove its commitment to human rights to the international community, who had long been questioning the state’s support for what is widely considered to be oppressive regimes and ruthless dictators. As spokesperson for the South African mission to the United Nations, Nomfanelo Kota, expressed in an interview with the Mail & Guardian (Rossouw, 2011):

> We can’t bear responsibility for what is happening now. We knew people had different ideas and ulterior motives, but we had to vote in favour, otherwise we would have been accused once again [of neglecting human rights considerations] and it would be said that we are siding with [Gaddafi] (original spelling and punctuation).

While there were probably a number of other, less controversial issues on which the country could have proven its commitment to human rights, South Africa overcompensated for the international community’s perception that its foundational values of respect for human rights and human dignity are all talk and no substance by voting in favour of a Resolution that conflicted with another of its foundational values – that of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty and political independence. If South Africa has protested that it did not anticipate how Resolution 1973 would be interpreted to authorize a NATO military invasion of Libya, many Western diplomats echoed the view of a Pretoria-based diplomat who remarked that
“(e)veryone knows when you talk about no-fly zones you’re talking about the use of force and military intervention … The idea is not only to stop anyone flying in the area, but also to destroy all equipment that can be used to shoot at planes” (Rossouw, 2011).

As much as South Africa’s affirmative vote on Resolution 1973 points to a degree of reaction formation as a response to a perceived flaw in its character, which would cause feelings of shame or humiliation (on this point, see also Alden and Schoeman, 2013:126), the state’s response to the suggestion that its vote made it complicit in the NATO invasion of Libya, reflects the defences of denial and displacement. First, South Africa shunned responsibility for the outcome of Resolution 1973 by saying that its intention was never to support a NATO-led military intervention of Libya, and that any such outcome is a result of the big, bad West abusing the good faith of countries like South Africa who believed in the sincerity of the Resolution to assist in reaching a peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis:

In keeping with established multilateral diplomacy principles, South Africa trusted that resolution 1973 was going to be implemented in good faith and in full respect for both its letter and spirit, more especially it being obligatory within the UNSC resolution … our view on the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Libya is that we had made the assumption that whoever entered the Libyan space meant to implement UNSC Resolution 1973. Our analysis has since revealed that NATO’s military action has now taken precedence over finding a political solution to the crisis. As South Africa, we do not subscribe to a military solution for a political problem (Ebrahim, 2011b; original spelling and punctuation).

South Africa rationalizes the outcome of the implementation of Resolution 1973 in a manner that ignores the possibility that a military campaign may well have been necessary to prevent the loss of civilian lives, offering up the explanation that Resolution 1973 was endorsed by the US, UK and France only because these states saw it as a way to effect regime change, and because it finally legitimized a conspiracy to assassinate an African leader who presented an obstacle to their plot to “colonize” Libyan oil:

As we converge here this morning, we all know what has since transpired in Libya – with Muammar Ghadhafi massacred like a wild animal; his family on the run and, his supporters being eliminated. There is no denying the fact that today we have a Libya that has been mortgaged to the US, the UK and France. Libya now owes these three countries oil concessions – the very motivating factor that saw NATO receive a brief to attack pro-Ghadafi forces and supporters –
in order to make way for the new colonizers comouflaged as liberators (Ebrahim, 2011d; original spelling and emphasis).

If Libya had been “mortgaged” to “new colonizers”, then the member states serving on the Security Council who had facilitated this “mortgaging” in approving Resolution 1973 were complicit the mortgage. This, South Africa rationalizes away with the charge that the outcome of the vote was always going to be the same: the US, UK and France were always going to take over control of Libyan oil; Resolution 1973 just made it easier. While it is clear from these remarks that South Africa harbours much anger toward specifically the US, UK and France for the way in which Resolution 1973 was finally implemented, the state redirects its aggression onto the international system in general, and the United Nations in particular, charging that

The current situation in Libya is as a result of the failure to transform the global system of governance. Powerful States remain dominant and imposing over the powerless … We cannot continue like this! And allow institutions such as the UN, which were formed to preserve and guarantee peace, which were supposed to be the embodiment of humanity’s collective resolve to live in peace, to be used to as a military machine to effect regime change (Ebrahim, 2011c).

The US, UK and France may be considered particularly powerful adversaries, and South Africa may not be in a position to reprimand these states for betraying its trust however, the state seems confident that it will succeed in “paralys(ing) this militaristic approach to solving world problems” (Ebrahim, 2011c; original spelling). Channelling its rage into the transformation of the international system – that makes it possible for these countries to abuse their positions of relative power over weaker states in the first place – allows South Africa to overcome its humiliation at being overpowered by the US, UK and France, and to regain ownership of its agency. An interesting observation, that will be duly expounded below, is that South Africa’s narcissistic defences are complimented by attempts to reinforce its positive self-concept. Following directly on his defence of South Africa’s vote in favour of both UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973, Ebrahim (2011b) proceeds to a juxtaposition of the apparent shortcomings of the West’s (non)involvement in South Sudan, Burundi, the DRC, Zimbabwe and the Ivory Coast, with South Africa’s benevolent mediation efforts to find a lasting peace to the ongoing conflicts in these regions:

For us as peacemakers, pathfinders and bridge-builders - we know that when the heat is on, armchair critics have a field day pointing fingers in all directions. But when the dust settles and
peace takes root, they rush to claim the dividends of peace – forgetting all what they have said when the heat was on. On this, we need not look any further than:

who is rushing into South Sudan;
who is rushing into the DRC;
who is rushing into Burundi;
who is waiting in the wings to enter a peaceful Zimbabwe;
who is claiming the dividends of peace in Cote d’Ivoire; etc.

In the same breath, Ebrahim (2011b) replies to apparent criticism aimed at South Africa’s record serving on the Security Council, and particularly the view that the country consistently tries to “punch above its weight” in international affairs:

It must be made clear to all of us that we were not elected into the non-permanent category of the UNSC by 182 votes from the international community because they had run out of choices. Our record and performance in conflict prevention, resolution, management, including post-conflict reconstruction and development precede us – and we should not be shy to say this.

In this passage, Ebrahim seeks to both respond to the (perceived) view of African peers that South Africa would “mortgage” African neighbours to international powers in order to prove that it can sit around the Security Council table with the world’s biggest powers, and to reassure South Africa that it deserves its seat on the Security Council. In this case, South Africa’s reaction formation in response to perceived criticism functions to both convince African peers that the state can hold its own in the major decision-making bodies of international politics, and to soothe its own feelings of shame, humiliation and guilt at having miscalculated its vote on an important Resolution that ultimately resulted in a close ally being violated. These defences, stemming from the same threats to the integrity of the South Africa ego, are also observed in South Africa’s relationship with the International Criminal Court.

In a media statement dated 5 October 2015, DIRCO sets out the reasons why the South African state refused to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir when he attended a summit of the African Union in Johannesburg on the 14th and 15th of June 2015, in spite of an active warrant for the arrest of the alleged war criminal, and in conflict with the country’s obligations as State Party to the Rome Statute. Following a lengthy description of the submission South Africa had made to the ICC to allow al-Bashir on South African soil, protected from arrest by diplomatic immunities accorded sitting Head of State and Government under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Department abdicates its own responsibility for
failing to honour legal obligations as State Party to the Rome Statute onto the Court, which it accuses of ignoring due process and manipulating “diplomatic and political processes” (DIRCO, 2015b) in a way that violates South Africa’s rights:

[W]hat was interpreted by South Africa to be a diplomatic and political process, was morphed into a judicial process based on an urgent application by the Prosecutor of the Court for an order on the South African obligations to the Court. South Africa was unfortunately not afforded the opportunity to present legal arguments on this application, and hence it is of the view that the principles of justice were not adhered to … South Africa is of the view that a serious infringement of South Africa’s rights as a State Party has taken place and that the Court has acted against the letter and spirit of the Rome Statute.

For neglecting to arrest al-Bashir, South Africa was accused of two offenses: first, that it did not respect the binding constraints of international law and acted in violation of its domestic laws; and second, that the country failed to protect Sudanese civilians from war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by al-Bashir and those under his command, in spite of the country’s insistence that its founding values are those of a respect for human rights and the rule of law. These charges cast South Africa in a bad light internationally, but it would also have highlighted an intrapersonal conflict resulting from the state’s inability to act in a manner that embodies the characteristics and principles of its ideal Self. In an attempt to protect the ego, then, South Africa proceeded to rationalize its behaviours by attempting to cast doubt on the legitimacy of Court:

[T]he experience with the ICC left South Africa with the sense that … its fundamental right to be heard was violated … Also, there is an urgent need to assess whether the ICC is still reflective of the principles and values which guided its creation and its envisaged role as set out in the Rome Statute. The credibility and acceptability of the ICC to become the universally accepted institution for justice that will ensure the ideal of universality and equality before the law has not been realised and is under threat (Republic of South Africa, 2016).

This rationalization takes place in tandem with a reaction formation to withdraw from the Rome Statute, as a response to the perception that the Court is the obstacle that prevents South Africa from living up to the exacting standards set by the superego. Indeed, in its declaratory statement on the decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute, the South African legislative charged that
to continue to be a State Party to the Rome Statute will hinder it to achieve its foreign policy objectives as it will compromise South Africa’s efforts to promote peace and security on the African Continent and to play an essential part in international peacekeeping missions in Africa and in related peace processes (Republic of South Africa, 2016; original punctuation).

Although seemingly counterintuitive, withdrawing from the Court sets South Africa free from judgments about its incapacity (wilful or otherwise) to respect the Court’s authority – and the concurrent perception that the country is unable to live up to its own foreign policy imperatives of fighting impunity, championing human rights and achieving justice for victims of any form of abuse. If the state’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute entrenches perceptions that South Africa’s supposed commitment to human rights is all talk and no substance, then the country pre-empts these charges and attempts to restore its positive self-image by listing its diplomatic successes:

South Africa plays a significant role on the African continent and in various continental bodies … South Africa is involved in peace keeping missions in many African countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. South Africa is also actively involved in ensuring that the fragile peace process underway in Sudan and South Sudan holds, in the interests of the people of those sovereign states and other sovereign countries and the African continent. South Africa is regarded internationally as an honest and reliable peace broker with about 3000 South African troops involved in such peace keeping missions under the auspices of the AU and the UN (GCIS, 2015).

If South Africa’s defence of sublimation in response to the Libyan crisis channelled the state’s anger and resentment toward the US, UK and France into increasingly urgent insistence on the transformation of the UN Security Council, then the country’s response to the ICC episode channels anger and shame into the proposition of an alternative legal body to punish war crimes:

South Africa believes that countries should have strong national legal systems that can ensure accountability and prevent impunity from these crimes. Within the African Union, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights in Arusha … must play a crucial role in the fight against impunity. South Africa will work diligently to ensure that it is strengthened and its criminal chamber becomes operational as soon as possible (Republic of South Africa, 2016).

In both the Libyan and ICC episodes, South Africa’s response to the threats that criticism for apparently chaotic diplomatic actions posed to the integrity of its ego, was to channel
unacceptable rage and indignation into the more constructive, and socially acceptable activity of “transforming the global order” (and “constructing parallel utopias” for itself and friendly, like-minded states to participate in peacefully until the global order is transformed). It is possible, from the analysis here above, and that in the preceding chapters, to identify a pattern of behaviour in South Africa’s responses to threats to the ego. Introductory remarks to this chapter defined personality as “behavioural responses to relationships between the person and his environment” (intra, p. 107), based on ingrained Self-Other identity concepts. Behavioural patterns, therefore, derive from the personality of the state, and points to certain characteristic behaviours, defences, dispositions and temperamental inclinations. In the domain of personality psychology, personalities can be divided into three broad “clusters”, each displaying a defined set of characteristics or traits, and each prone to certain behaviours under certain circumstances.

5.2. South Africa as Narcissistic State-Person

As the terminology suggests, Millon’s personality inventory lists spectra upon which any one individual with a particular personality type will figure – displaying traits and behaviours like those listed either very mildly, or extremely strongly. The individual’s daily functioning, including the maintenance of interpersonal relationships, depends greatly on the severity of the impact of these characteristic behaviours on the individual and their significant Others. As Jerrold M. Post (2015:13) remarks:

At the extremity of the [narcissistic personality], it would be difficult for an individual to provide sustained leadership to an organization or a democratic society. But to be narcissistic is not necessarily to be ill.

South Africa may not entirely conform to the clinical description of an individual with narcissistic personality disorder which, according to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994:661; cited in Post, 2015:12-13), presents in individuals as

a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy behaviour), need for admiration, and lack of empathy … as indicated by five (or more) of the following:

1. has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g., exaggerates achievements and talents, expects to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements)
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love
3. believes that he or she is “special” and can only be understood by, or should associate with, other special or high-status people (or institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
5. has a sense of entitlement, i.e. unreasonable expectations of especially favourable treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e. takes advantage of others to achieve his or her ends
7. lacks empathy, is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others
8. is often envious of others, or believes that others are envious of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty behaviours or attitudes.

However, persons with narcissistic personality traits, do not necessarily have a personality disorder (Volkan, 2014:83; Post, 2015:12-13). Here, Vamik Volkan’s description of narcissistic personality organization becomes useful. According to Volkan (1980:135, cited in Post, 2015:13), the narcissistic individual

regard(s) himself as endowed with great power, physical appeal, and the right to assert his will. He gives the impression of ambitiously striving for brilliance in all he does. He seems to regard others – especially those not among his worshippers – as beneath his notice … Behaving as though self-sufficient in a superior way, he feels that he exists for others to admire.

Underneath this veneer of arrogant self-involvement and an excessive self-admiration, is an incredibly sensitive Self, that does not simply crave the admiration and approval of significant Others, but needs it to establish his or her self-worth. Indeed, Volkan (1980:135) remarks the narcissist is “constantly engaged with others on another level because he is object-hungry. He actually has feelings of inferiority and thus is overdependent on the approving attention of other(s)”. It is the narcissist’s pervasive self-doubt that drives him to constantly seek out the admiration of significant Others, while seemingly excessive self-admiration are mere attempts to cover up the narcissist’s deeply held fears of being unworthy of this praise. As Post (2015:18) remarks, “(t)he grandiose narcissistic self, with its unlimited dreams of glory, always rests on a sea of insecurity and doubt” (see also Hirsch, 1993:301). Another interesting observation by Volkan (2014:84), is that narcissistic grandiosity does not simply have to relate to excessively positive self-image – “I am the greatest human alive” – but may comprise an element of masochism too – “I am the biggest victim”.

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The development of narcissistic traits in any one individual can be traced to the mirror-stage of personal development, to the very first encounters between the Subjective Self and its external environment where boundaries between Self and Object are established, internalized and reproduced. Consumed by admiration for their infant’s beauty, brilliance and talents, the doting parent showers the infant with affection and praise which is internalized by the young child and “absorbed” as part of their self-image (Post, 2015:18). These positive self-concepts, in the healthy individual, serve to protect the ego from external threats, anxieties, or crises, and help navigate stressful encounters with reality. As Volkan (2014:83) explains:

A child with a healthy narcissism, in growing independent, loves himself not only when feeling loved by members of the family, but also when rejected by others. As an adult this person is capable of maintaining self-esteem when facing losses or traumas (one reference omitted).

Whereas the leap from individual narcissism to group narcissism may seem like an overreach, Volkan and Fowler (2009:215-216) draw on Kernberg (2003) to explain that groups develop identities along the boundaries of Self and Other when the constituent members of those groups perform shared tasks that contribute to the social life of the group. These investments in the group’s life delineate the uniqueness of the group (in-group) relative to other large groups (out-groups), and serve an important function in both protecting the identity of the large-group and in maintaining the positive self-esteem of the in-group’s constituent members (Volkan and Fowler, 2009:215). Healthy esteem, in large-groups as in individuals, may become corrupted when constituent members of the in-group become preoccupied with the “superior specialness” of the group, and the concomitant “inferiority” of out-groups – a process that Erikson (1966:601-621) called “pseudospeciation”. Volkan and Fowler (2009:215-216) describes this “exaggerated large-group narcissism” as

[a preoccupation] with the superiority of almost anything connected with [the] large-group identity, ranging from nursery rhymes and food, to established cultural customs, artistic achievements, scientific discoveries, past historical triumphs … even when such perceptions and beliefs may not be realistic.

According to the authors, Erikson’s concept of pseudospeciation manifests in the large-group either as the articulation of the illusion of having been “chosen” for greatness at the birth of time, or as the expression of a sense of victimhood that references “dramatic past trauma” or
“chronic oppression at the hands of an Other” (Ibid:216). This excessive large-group narcissism may develop into “malignant large-group narcissism” when constituents of the large-group come to believe that “inferior Others” from the out-group are threatening the integrity of the group’s identity (including its sense of superiority), and so adopt the idea that they are entitled to defend their group-identity at any necessary means – including the use of shared sadism (Volkan and Fowler, 2009:216) At its extreme, malignant large-group narcissism may result in the perpetration of unspeakable acts on constituent members of the out-group, as transpired in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994), Nazi Germany (1944-45), and Rwanda (1994). However, the gravity of large-group actions aimed at restoring and protecting the integrity of the group-identity depends on the size of the threat to the group’s identity, and so may not entirely develop into violence.

5.2.1. Overvaluation and the illusion of perfection: South Africa’s destiny for greatness

Praise for the child’s positive qualities, during the mirror-stage of personal development, fulfil an important function in protecting the fragile ego later in life. The development of positive self-esteem is both normal and essential for healthy adjustment to life’s stresses. Excessive praise – and the internalization of this excessive praise – however, may have a rather perverse effect on the individual in adulthood. Termed “overvaluation” in Freudian psychoanalysis (Post, 2015:37), adulation magnifies the importance of a trait or characteristic that is considered to be “perfect”. This overemphasis on the child’s exceptionalism translates into a sense of entitlement, because the child internalizes the idea that (s)he can reach perfection in all aspects of life, and that (s)he can reasonably expect to attain everything (s)he desires at any given time (Post, 2015:38). In this sense, “perfection” becomes part of the individual’s identity, as does the perceived expectation of significant Others for the individual to be perfect. The result is one of a deeply-rooted need for praise, where criticism serves almost as a negation of the narcissistic Self:

The excessive and overinflated praise such parents bestow on their proud creations leads inevitably to … an insatiable appetite for praise lest the underlying inadequacy be revealed. As a consequence, in the narcissistic individual, there comes to be an idealized self-concept or “good self” and an inadequate, devalued “bad self” (Ibid.).
In instances where children do not learn to cope with the frustrations of everyday life – including the normal impediments to the attainment of perfection – and where they become so accustomed to the gratification of all their desires, that they do not learn to delay gratification, these individuals fail to develop a realistic self-concept in adulthood, leading to unrealistic expectations of adulation from significant Others, exemption from criticism and appeasement (Post, 2015:38). Born from the “great expectations” of significant Others, narcissistic individuals define their Selves according to their achievements, and the commensurate praise they receive for these achievements, rather than their intrinsic worth as unique individuals with all their strengths and flaws. To the extent that approval and acceptance is contingent on the child’s success, narcissistic individuals feel constant pressure to succeed, to achieve great heights, and above all, not to fall short of the perceived expectations of significant Others. In this sense, narcissistic individuals become vehicles for the successes of significant Others, and their worth is determined by the extent to which they are able to achieve these successes (Ibid.:45).

South Africa’s perceptions regarding the international community’s expectations of it since 1994 are well documented (DFA, 1996; Nkoane-Mashabane, 2010a; DIRCO, 2011:4; Ebrahim, 2014b). In its 1996 Green Paper, the incumbent government (DFA, 1996) noted that “[m]any expectations about South Africa’s international role have been created, but at the same time many demanding responsibilities have been assumed”. Quoting a 1995 address by then-Deputy President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, to members of the South African diplomatic corps, the document places South Africa in international affairs:

A distinguishing feature of South Africa is the sustained interest of the rest of the world in the future of South Africa … However, the strength and persistence of the international focus on South Africa puts the South African Government of National Unity under pressure to contribute positively and constructively to the global community. The Southern African region expects a positive contribution from South Africa in terms of their own development … There are also expectations from Africa that South Africa should make a significant contribution towards peace and development on the continent (DFA, 1996).

This perception of the international community’s “high expectations” (see also Ebrahim, 2014b) of South Africa is echoed in the White Paper (DIRCO, 2011:4):
Since 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment.

Nkoane-Mashabane (2010a) invokes this same discourse in her budget vote speech to National Assembly:

> Our country finds itself today in a position of responsibility as a member of the international community. We are constantly reminded … that more is expected of us. For our country, our region and continent this is a responsibility we can neither shirk nor fail in. In rising to this challenge, we should never miss the opportunity to look back and learn from our successes and setbacks in our endeavour to remain focused on our goal for a better life. We must also frankly assess our capacity against the weight of rising expectations (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2010a).

What becomes clear, here, is that South Africa perceives certain “high expectations” from its significant Others about its performance in international relations. This perception of the expectations of the international community appears to have been born from the praise South Africa received for its peaceful transition from apartheid state to democracy in 1994, in many circles referred to as a “miracle” (see, e.g. Sparks, 1992; Guelke, 1996; Barber, 2000; Alexander, 2003; Nussbaum, 2003; Lazarus, 2004; Best, dir., 2013). Whereas the earlier Green Paper cautioned against South Africa’s overinterpreting the attention it was receiving from the international community for its “peaceful democratization”, the state appears to have fully internalized the “support and admiration” (DFA, 1996) it was receiving from the international community as a form of proof of its exceptionalism and uniqueness:

> South Africa’s greatest asset lies in the power of its example. In an uncertain world, characterised by a competition of values, South Africa’s diplomacy of Ubuntu, focusing on our common humanity, provides an inclusive and constructive world view to shape the evolving global order (DIRCO, 2011:36).

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76 Some might question the “peacefulness” of this transition (see e.g. Mandela, 1993:89; Alexander, 2003). Considering, however, the relative “peacefulness” of the South African transition to democracy as compared to, *exempli gratia*, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, I will maintain this qualifier for the purposes of this thesis.
Taking our place in the community of nations came with high expectations shaped by our peaceful transition referred to as the “South African miracle” and the iconic status of President Nelson Mandela as a master of reconciliation and forgiveness. In fact, our own peaceful transition from the brink of civil war is central to our approach to disputes and remains an example to the world of how a deeply divided country on the brink of disaster can build a nation through all-inclusive dialogue (Ebrahim, 2014b).

This “exemplariness”, South Africa ascribes to its “principled and independent foreign policy” (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2014a). These intimations reveal a (subconscious?) perception of superiority in the South African mind: South Africa’s “unique” approach to foreign relations is morally superior to other states’ approaches because it is not selfish or materialistic, but rather “humanist and inclusive”. I have likewise demonstrated in the preceding chapters that South Africa considers its own vision of a parallel world to be morally superior to the present architecture of international politics, designed “by the West, for the West”. Indeed, South Africa appears to have adopted a slogan for this morally superior parallel world:

“[A] better South Africa [and] a better and safer Africa in a better world” (DIRCO, 2011:10).

More than being an indication of South Africa’s grandiose concept of Self, these intimations point to a felt sense of responsibility to the international community to live up to their “high expectations” of South Africa as both an example, and a saviour. Considering how much South Africa reflects on these expectations, and its capacity to meet these expectations, it is further apparent that the state feels an intense need to meet these (perceived) expectations. This is all the more evident in the state’s almost desperate attempts to convince its significant Others (or itself?) that it has, indeed, met these expectations. The White Paper (2011:4), for instance, declares that “South Africa has risen to the [international community’s] challenge and plays a meaningful role in the region, on the continent and globally”, while Nkoane-Mashabane (2010a) has asserted that “since our freedom in 1994, we have accomplished many achievements in our country on the foreign policy front”. In a brochure on South Africa’s diplomatic milestones, the government similarly exclaims that “[s]ince becoming a democracy in 1994, South Africa has registered historic diplomatic successes” (DIRCO, 2016:2; emphasis added). An interesting question here, is whether South Africa sees its “successes” as positive affirmations of self-worth, or if defines its self-worth according to the degree to which these
successes satisfy the expectations of significant Others? While it would not be possible to answer this question in the present thesis, this may be an interesting avenue for future research.

In spite of South Africa’s most admirable attempts to convince significant Others of its achievements, of course, it is unable to live up to what is essentially self-imposed standards of perfection. As my introductory notes to this chapter demonstrated, any felt sense of inadequacy is met with defences designed to protect the ego and to preserve the South African state’s sense of self-worth. Criticism for personal shortcomings, in individuals with narcissistic personalities, is often experienced as an attack on the ego, invariably stirring feelings of shame and humiliation within these individuals, that inspire desperate acts to soothe the anxieties that accompany threats to the integrity of South Africa’s “good self”.

5.2.2. Narcissistic wounds and narcissistic rage: South Africa as perpetual victim

“The grandiose narcissistic self”, Post (2015:18) explains, “always rests on a sea of insecurity and doubt”. The narcissistic individual needs to achieve their great ambitions in order to maintain their sense of positive worth, but these achievements are all too often thwarted by a reality that the narcissist cannot control. When, inevitably, the narcissist’s dreams of glory and power are shattered by the natural constraints of the external reality, “it produces strong reactions” (Ibid.). These reactions may include either a break with reality and resultant delusions of grandeur, or narcissistic rage and potentially attempts at exacting revenge on the person(s) and/or institution(s) who are seen as being responsible for frustrating the narcissist’s dreams of success. The affective states driving this rage are those of humiliation and shame at not having lived up to expectations (Post, 2015:19; see also Kohut, 1985). Effectively, narcissistic individuals are less than equipped to deal with the gap between his or her grandiose dreams, and the reality of what can reasonably be attained.

What is important to note, is that the “underachievement” that causes the narcissistic individual to feel shame and humiliation, and consequently to act out in rage, is not necessarily an objective fact, but rather a subjective feeling of inadequacy (Post, 2015:33). While significant Others may consider the narcissistic individual to be perfectly successful, (s)he may feel that (s)he has not received adequate praise or recognition for his or her accomplishments, and consequently, that (s)he has been mistreated. “This narcissistic wound”, according to Post (Ibid.:33), “promotes a cold, bitter, narcissistic rage, producing a need to exact revenge on a system that is so blind and so corrupt”. As a narcissistic individual may feel mistreated by a system, or an institution, that does not give him or her the recognition that (s)he feels (s)he
deserves, so the narcissistic individual may feel that (s)he has been mistreated by a significant Other who, in his or her own mind, has withheld due praise for his or her accomplishments. This may lead the narcissist to reject the significant Other, and to inflict pain on the significant Other as retribution for the wrong (s)he feels has been done unto him or her (Ibid.:19).

In the previous sub-section, I demonstrated that South Africa views itself as special, and its vision for the future of international politics as morally superior to the global architecture designed by the states of the global North. What is further interesting to consider here, is how South Africa expects preferential treatment from the international community – not simply as a repayment for the debts incurred by former colonizers, as I discussed at length in the previous chapter, but as a kind of natural right that South Africa feels entitled to. Perhaps the clearest example of this expectation of favourable treatment, comes from South Africa’s demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and its apparent assumption that the Security Council would accord greater weight to the South African voice than those of other fifteen Members of the Council – including the Permanent Members. South Africa has, and indeed, continues to emphasize its “own understanding” of UNSC Resolution 1973 as the measure against which to determine the legitimacy of the ensuing NATO invasion of Libya:

[O]ur understanding of Resolution 1973 of March 17, 2011 was and is that: it authorized the use of all necessary measures to implement a no-fly zone aimed at protecting civilians from imminent attack, and sought to facilitate humanitarian assistance (Ebrahim, 2011b; 2011c. See also, Monyela, 2011).

Reiterations of South Africa’s own interpretation of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 are invariably accompanied by charges against “those who act as though they own the world” (Ebrahim, 2011c), who abused South Africa’s trust in the international community and who manipulated the mandate of Resolution 1973 in a manner that would allow them to effect regime change in Libya (Ebrahim, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 2012a; Monyela, 2011). This same scenario played out again less than five years later, when South Africa first protested that its own interpretation of its obligations under the Rome Statute, international law, domestic law, and the resolutions of the African Union was that it had the right to extend diplomatic immunity to Omar al-Bashir for his participation at the AU Summit in Johannesburg during June 2015, and then charged that the ICC, acting in concert with the UNSC, is biased toward Africa and that it was abusing South Africa’s rights as State Party to the Rome Statute, to request certain exemptions from its obligations to the Court.
If these institutions have universal rules and procedures in place, South Africa seems to expect its unique interpretations of these rules and procedures to be accommodated, even if this would mean indemnifying South Africa on special grounds, simply because it had requested so. While it may be perfectly normal for a state to request derogation of binding laws or treaties on certain grounds, South Africa’s (sometimes aggressive) indignation at institutions’ refusal to grant them exemption from rules and obligations, points to a degree of entitlement that is not commensurate with international norms and practices. As the international events under investigation have shown, South Africa tends to react with anger or even derision whenever it feels that its unique requests to other states and institutions are not honoured. These outbursts are not only affective reactions to the feeling of not being recognized as special, but they are also displays of resentment at what the state feels is mistreatment: not only does South Africa feel that it’s unique interpretations of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 weren’t accommodated by NATO and the UNSC P5, but it actively feels that it was defrauded and taken advantage of by ill-intentioned Others. Similarly, South Africa does not simply feel that it’s request for indemnification from the ICC arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir was denied by the Court, but it actively feels that its rights were violated by the Court who refused to consider its pleas.

In addition to the above, South Africa certainly seems to feel that it is due more recognition than it is given for its “admirable” foreign policy successes:

Much has been written about post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy but I believe that scholars often omit to recognise the realities that limit and sometimes even inhibit the conduct of an active foreign policy on the scale that we did, given our limited resources and the immediate pressing needs and expectations of the majority of our people during this relatively short period. We therefore have good reason to celebrate our successes as we pause to look back, because we have come a long way, and have achieved an extraordinary amount, despite the constraints and understandable reasons we could have heeded to do much less (Ebrahim, 2013b).

Claims to greater recognition for foreign policy successes does not simply demand praise from significant Others, but also call for greater respect for South Africa’s wisdom as an accomplished actor in the field of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Indeed, South Africa’s rage at having been betrayed by Members of the UNSC P5 and NATO, was replaced by an attitude of “told you so” as the situation in Libya deteriorated:
We all witnessed NATO-diplomacy of bombardments and arming of civilians; and, we have witnessed a war exported and imposed on a country. Of course we witnessed the landscape of the conflict change from protection of civilians to NATO’s mandate of effecting “regime change” … From where we sit, we wonder what is going to happen next, for we know Libyan politics are torn across tribal lines – with every tribe now wanting to lay claim to the dividends of a peace imported from the West. We definitely have not seen the end of the conflict in Libya (Ebrahim, 2011d).

If South Africa has insisted that it was against a military solution to the Libyan crisis, Ebrahim’s remark above communicates a certain degree of resentment for the escalation of the Libyan conflict into a civil war, along with a kind of moral one-upmanship of “we predicted it, you didn’t listen to us, now look at the mess we have on our hands”.Earlier in this chapter (p. 115), I remarked that South Africa responds to criticism, and the feelings of shame, guilt and humiliation that accompany criticisms by pointing out the shortcomings of Negative Others, and thereby re-establishing its moral superiority over NOs. Viewed through the prism of narcissistic wounds and narcissistic rages, however, these “character assassinations” of NOs also serve as rejections. Essentially, South Africa discards those signification Others who do not serve the purpose of making it feel good about itself, by making them redundant. This is done by first delegitimizing NOs, the institutions that they run, and the policies they ascribe to, and then advancing a hypothetical view for a future world in which the NO either does not exist, or has very little significance.

The relationships between narcissistic groups and significant Others are much more complex and fascinating than mere identification or rejection, as Volkan and Fowler (2009:216-217) explain. I mentioned earlier that large-group identities tend to unravel in the face of serious threats to the integrity of that identity – a process Volkan and Fowler refer to as “regression”. During regression, the natural boundaries between Self and Other – between in-group and out-group – become “highly psychologized”, and minor differences between Self and Other become exaggerated:

When a large group regresses, “minor differences” between the enemy groups become very major issues, since minor differences are experienced as unchangeable “borders” separating one large group’s identity from their enemy’s identity (Volkan and Fowler, 2009:217).

What might have been considered “unique quirks” that characterize the differences between Self and Other, are during regression viewed as mortal threats to the survival of the group that
need to be eliminated or neutralized. In the South African case, for example, regression would manifest as efforts to make the Self seem exceptionally righteous, laudable and sage, while at the same time demonizing the Negative Other. This exaggeration of minor differences, Volkan and Fowler (Ibid.) explain, is intended to “illustrate the uniqueness of a given large-group identity … to illustrate that [the group’s] identity is still is still visible and functioning”. While these exaggerations project arrogance and disdain of Others to the outside world, they are an ill-adjusted attempt to mask deeper feelings of inadequacy in the narcissistic group:

In the psychological reality of the large group, its members feel helpless, humiliated, suffer from complicated mourning, and express rage in hidden ways or openly. Thus, when efforts are made to exaggerate cultural customs, these customs do not exactly look like the original ones; they are now invested with rage and envy (Volkan and Fowler, 2009:217).

The exaggeration of minor differences is particularly evident in South Africa’s most recent relations with Negative Others: while it has been my contention throughout this thesis that South Africa has harboured feelings of anger toward Negative Others for what they perceived as violent subjugation to imperial powers during colonialism, this anger – as demonstrated earlier in the chapter – turned to rage following the NATO invasion of Libya, and the concurrent spat with the ICC over al-Bashir’s arrest warrant. Criticism for South Africa’s actions surrounding the Libyan crisis presented as threat to the South African identity, and caused a regression to the state’s self-concept, accompanied by an intensification of the normal identity markers between the South African Self and the Negative Other. This regression further spurred South Africa to reactivate the “chosen trauma” of colonialism and to act toward Negative Others as though it were actively (re)living the trauma of colonization.

When individuals regress, Volkan and Fowler (2009:217) explain, they tend to return to their earliest memories of the establishment of borders between Self and Other. In his 2011 public lecture at the University of Zululand, and very much in the midst of the Libyan crisis following UNSC Resolution 1973, Ebrahim Ebrahim (2011d) invoked the “African renewal” ideology of one of the ANC’s founding fathers, Pixley ka Isaka Seme, when he exclaimed:

Pixley ka Isaka Seme predicted that “one day a historian who, with the open pen of truth, will bring to Africa’s claim the strength of written proof. [He will] tell of a race whose onward tide was often swelled with tears, but in whose heart bondage has not quenched the fire of former years. He will write of a giant that is awakening! … As Pixley ka Isaka Seme said in 1906, our embracing of the Regeneration of Africa: “must therefore lead them (Africans) to
the attainment of that higher and advanced standard of life. The regeneration of Africa means that a new and unique civilization is soon to be added to the world” (emphasis in original).

Since the end of Mbeki’s administration, references to the “African Renaissance” had become increasingly sparse, if not altogether foreign. As earlier quotes from South African discourses suggest, South Africa appeared to have broken free from its earlier identity of “awakening African giant”, and to have assumed an identity as “accomplished international actor” instead – citing a myriad of personal successes and achievements along the way. Yet, Ebrahim’s 2011 address at the University of Zululand is oddly reminiscent of Mbeki’s African Renaissance discourses of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Mbeki, 1996; 1998a; 1998b; 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2003; 2006a). Indeed, Ebrahim here appears to concede that Africa has, perhaps, not yet attained “that higher and advanced standard of life”, that Africa is perhaps still viewed as a “second class global citizen”. Consider, by comparison, Mbeki’s (2006b) pronouncements at the launch of the African Leadership Initiative:

Something in our spirit was stolen in the aftermath of those tall ships cresting our horizon, driven by the wind and the power of what seemed to be an expression of Manifest Destiny. Something was surrendered, something was abandoned, something was drained from our blood, on the day that the proud leaders of Africa, became The Led … even now, when we once again hold title to the land, when we no longer wear shackles on our feet, when we are no longer marked according to what we are not - not white, not European, not capable, not equal, we are drifting still, we are searching still for that something we have lost.

For all South Africa’s protestations about its Negative Others being morally inferior to exemplary Positive Others, South Africa itself evidently harbours deep feelings of inadequacy and inferiority vis-à-vis the states of the West – products of an earlier narcissistic wound. There is, in Ebrahim’s remarks, a rare admission of defeat: (South) Africa has not, entirely, achieved “equal status” to the West on an ontological level. To appropriate Mbeki’s eloquent assertion here above, “something in the South African spirit was stolen in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis; something was drained from South Africa’s veins on the day that the West led the proud “leader” of Africa by the nose”. In the speeches and declarations surrounding the Libyan crisis and the ICC spat, there is a feeling of South Africa having returned, psychologically, to the memories of its experiences of Western deception, force and subjugation during colonialism –
a visceral emotional reliving of past narcissistic traumas. Indeed, Volkan and Fowler (2009:217) observe that individuals and groups in regression experience, in a sense, a “time collapse” by mixing perceptions, affects, conscious, and unconscious fantasies about present psychological problems with the same form of psychological problems from childhood … in a large-group regression is [usually] the reactivation of “chosen traumas”, a shared mental representation of a past historical event that has caused the ancestors of a large group to face drastic losses.

Although there are merits in South Africa’s feelings of emasculation at the hand of Western powers and their NATO campaign in Libya, to which they had made South Africa complicit by swindling them into an affirmative vote on Resolution 1973 that ultimately enabled the NATO bombardment of Libya, South Africa’s feelings of shame, guilt, humiliation and emasculation do not appear to stop in 2011; instead, they stem from a much deeper place, from a history of forced subjugation to, and humiliation by, Negative Others. As Volkan and Fowler (2009:217) explain, in large-groups, past traumatic events are accompanied by “shared shame, humiliation, inability to be assertive and even dehumanization”, where these feelings are “deposited” into future generations by elders through mythologized retellings of the traumatic event, and dramatizations of heroes and villains in the story being told – a process known as “transgenerational transmission of trauma” (Ibid.:218). Taking on elders’ “burden” to mourn their trauma suffered at the hands of enemies, trauma is kept alive across generations. This further influences the way that younger generations identify with Others from the out-group: traumatized Self-Object images are pushed onto the developing child, who may not come to identify negatively with an Other because of a negative emotional experience, but rather identifies negatively with an Other because of the negative views impressed upon it by an elder (Ibid.:217).

“Chosen traumas”, like the ones described here above, fulfil a very important function in promoting cohesiveness and a sense of belonging among constituent members of the large group through ritualistic anniversaries, and in this sense, contribute significantly to the group’s identity. In the face of threats to the group’s identity, however, chosen traumas may be reactivated and inflamed with the ultimate purpose of mobilizing the collective conscious around the goal of repairing and strengthening the group identity. The effect, most often, is a fuelling of entitlement ideologies, which include demands for restitution, and acts of retribution against common enemies (Ibid.:218). One thing that should be clear from the foregoing
5.2.3. Reparative-charismatic narcissism: Healing wounds to the Self through the Other

Significant Others, for the narcissistic individual, exist solely to fulfil certain functions. This is because the narcissist “does not see those around him as human beings with their own needs and feelings” (Post, 2015:14). Narcissistic individuals tend to view others as a means to an end – as a source of compliments and praises that make the narcissist feel good about him- or herself, and to reassure the narcissist of their own worth when he or she feels uncertain in him- or herself (Post, 1993:103). As Kernberg (1984:193) explains, narcissistic personality types “tend to be inordinately envious of other people, to idealize some people, from whom they expect narcissistic supplies, and to depreciate and treat with contempt those from whom they do not expect anything (often their former idols)”. The preceding chapter contains no shortage of examples of South Africa engaging in both the idealization of Positive Others, like China, Russia, or Cuba, and devaluing Negative Others from the West. I have also expanded significantly on South Africa’s relationships with Negative Others in the preceding subsections, demonstrating how the state both constructs its self-concept around the dissimilarities between itself and NOs, as well as the ways in which its behaviours surrounding conflicts arising from relationships with NOs demonstrate the state’s desperate attempts to hide its embarrassment and humiliation, and to recompose its positive self-image. In this section, I wish to turn my attention to South Africa’s relationships with Positive Others, and with African peers in particular.

Wounds to the Self may result in the development of either of two personality sub-types: the mirror-hungry personality, and the ideal-hungry personality (Kohut, 1971; Bacal and Newman, 1990; Post, 1993). Besieged by inner feelings of emptiness and worthlessness, mirror-hungry individuals crave the admiration and approval of significant Others, often seeking out ever-broader audiences to provide them with the “narcissistic supply” of praise and appreciation. Ideal-hungry individuals, on the other hand, attempt to establish a sense of self-worth through their association with idealized significant Others – in a sense, these individuals feel themselves “superior by association”, and so look to surround themselves with others who are unique, powerful, rich, beautiful or otherwise “better” than average people (Post, 1993:107). As Post (Ibid.:116) explains:
The weak ego boundaries of such individuals lead to a loss of individuality and a merger with the collective … and expanded “we” substitutes for a weaker “I”.

These concepts become particularly useful for explaining South Africa’s relationships with rising powers, among which China, Russia and India. In its foreign policy White Paper, South Africa motivates its participation in the BRICS project “whose members are reshaping the global economic and political order” (DIRCO, 2011:26), by referring to global perceptions of a relative decline in both economic- and political importance of the old, industrialized nations of the West, and the rise in power of the emerging economies:

The original projections for the emerging economies to become dominant global powers were estimated at around 2050. However … such projections have since been revised to 2027 … In this regard, there is general consensus that since its inception the BRICS formation has joined an array of inter-regional bodies that contribute to global diffusion of power. It is not an illusion that BRICS countries collectively and individually contribute to the tectonic shift due to amongst others the increased economic dominance of China and the re-emergence of Russia (Landers, 2018).

The BRICS – like other emerging powers from the global South, in the South African imagination, have the balance tipped in their favour in so far as the future distribution of power is concerned. And, if South Africa has declared its foreign policy objective to be that of “building a better Africa in a better and safer world”, where a “better Africa” is one that is able to compete in global politics as ontologically equal to Western states, then South Africa is “betting on the BRICS” as the vehicle through which to improve its status in world politics. It would, in the context of the above discussion of narcissistic personality organization, make no sense for South Africa to trust the “declining” states of the global North with its future reputation; South Africa needs to align with the rising stars of global politics to secure its privileged place in the future constellation of global politics – and to distinguish itself as one of the future “stars of global politics”. Regardless of what South Africa’s relations with key rising powers mean for securing the state’s future status, the state maintains that its major foreign policy focus remains Africa’s betterment. South Africa’s relationship with Africa, however, remains problematic.

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) in February 2018 hosted its Inaugural Conference for African Universities, Research Institutions and Diplomatic
Academies under the theme “African Diplomacy: Identity, Objectives, Realities and Futures in a Dynamic and Changing World”; whereas the first session of the two-day conference addressed the issue of the future of African diplomacy in the face of the fourth industrial revolution, the conference was dominated by the “Africa Rising” narrative, and centred around the question of Africa’s role in shaping its own future “in a world created and dominated by the West”. In his keynote address, Deputy Director-General for Public Diplomacy at the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Clayson Monyela remarked that South Africa’s approach to its foreign relations, including its African Agenda, is “geared toward de-Eurocentrizing South African foreign policy” and “cultivating an African foreign policy” (Monyela, 2018). This orientation, according to Monyela (Ibid.), is a reaction to the South African experience of the “aggression of Great Powers (who) are seeking to exploit Africans” in the conduct of international politics, as well as an attempt to phase out of South African foreign policy, the “Eurocentric norms” that the state had, apparently, adopted in the years following the establishment of the Democratic South Africa. This “Africanization” of South African Foreign Policy, is seemingly driven in parallel, by South Africa’s “African Agenda”, and its membership of the BRICS bloc.

If, however, South African diplomats at this conference asserted the state’s Afrocentric “Ubuntu” approach to its foreign relations, and particularly its relations with the African continent, the delegate from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs retorted the protestation, “where was Ubuntu when Dlamini-Zuma became president of the AU?” In the delegate’s view, the rest of Africa does not experience a “Pan-Africanist” attitude from South Africa in its orientation toward its relationships with African peers, while a delegate from South Sudan felt that “no country in the world can say that (they) have been practicing the spirit of Ubuntu to the label, because it will always be about (selfish) interests first (when) resources are limited”. Indeed, the 1996 foreign policy Green Paper warned, in almost premonitory fashion, that South Africa is expected to “interact with [Southern Africa] as a partner and ally, not as a regional superpower” (DFA, 1996), and that the state should caution against overly ambitious foreign policy initiatives and objectives. The Paper noted, in particular, that South Africa should be careful not to overinterpret the interest of the international community in the state’s affairs, and that the state should be cautious of inflating its own sense of importance (DFA, 1996). Yet, the National Planning Commission 16 years later found that

77 Remarks by a delegate from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs at the Inaugural Conference of African Diplomatic Academies, Think Tanks and Universities, at the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Pretoria, on 28 February 2018.
South Africa lost of the moral authority – as a power resource – that the country enjoyed in the period immediately after the 1994 election … Within the southern African region, there is the perception that South Africa is acting as a bully, a self interested hegemon that acts in bad faith among neighboring countries” (NPC, 2012: 237-8; four references omitted).

If, indeed South Africa is the altruistic protector of Africa and the global South that it narrates itself as, why do the countries it apparently serves feel that they are being bullied by South Africa? Why do African states experience their relationships with South Africa as asymmetrical, exploitative and pejorative, and are they being fair to a country that (genuinely?) sees itself as a selfless servant of the African continent?

As my analysis has suggested, South Africa’s sense of self-worth is derived from its association with “admirable” Others, which includes its African POs. While South Africa considers its African peers’ personal qualities to be intrinsically good, Africa’s material position in global affairs is a bit of an embarrassment for a state-person with dreams of unlimited power and glory. In a 2003 article, South African scholars Sally Matthews and Hussein Solomon study Western discourses on Africa and demonstrate how the continent is widely thought of as poor, famished, prone to illness and political mismanagement, and otherwise incapable of caring for itself – thus needing “Dr West” to save it from its cruel and inescapable fate (Matthews and Solomon, 2003:153-158). While South Africa’s “Africanness” may have been questioned up to the late 1990s, Matthews and Solomon highlight a number of Western insinuations that South Africa – now a “truly African state” – “is likely to go the same way as other African states, due to common inherent weaknesses” (Matthews and Solomon, 2003:155). The authors conclude that “pessimistic predictions concerning South Africa’s future seem to be informed by a suspicion that African states are inherently inclined towards debilitation” (Ibid.:156).

Whereas South African leaders have insisted that the country is “inextricably part of southern African and [its] destiny is linked to that of a region, which is more than a mere geographical concept” (Mandela, 1993:90; see also DFA, 1996; DIRCO, 2011:20), this star-crossed destiny also places on South Africa’s shoulders the burden of being associated with “a sickly, weak and ailing continent” (Matthews and Solomon, 2003:153-155). Indeed, if in the preceding chapter I highlighted the fact that South Africa’s foreign relations are considered a means to reaching domestic goals of not only rising from poverty and underdevelopment, but also of increasing South Africa’s standing and influence in international affairs – effectively
assuming a leadership role in global politics – then the contention that “South Africa’s … national interests are better safeguarded by not just focusing on [its] own national interests, but broadly on the interests of [its] region and [its] continent” (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2013a) reveals the underlying motivation for the African Agenda as one of raising South Africa’s image in international affairs through an association with “a better Africa”. Of course, the very notion that Africa needs to “be better”, stems from feelings of emasculation and humiliation during the age of imperialism – and from the continued marginalization of Africa in global politics that entrenches the message that Africa is somehow ontologically “less equal” than the rest of the world.  

Here, Volkan and Itzkowitz’s (1984) concept of reparative-charismatic leadership proves exceptionally insightful. Narcissists characteristically make for charismatic leaders, and are often highly efficient and much loved (Post, 1986; 1993; 2015:71-88; Volkan, 1980; Volkan and Fowler, 2009). This is because, in times of crisis “otherwise mature and psychologically healthy individuals may temporarily come to feel overwhelmed and in need of a strong and self-assured leader” (Post, 2015:79). As much as narcissism can give rise to destructive and even sadistic behaviour, as was the case with Adolf Hitler, Idi Amin, Muammar Ghaddafi and Saddam Hussein (Ibid.:20-36), it can also be constructive or reparative (Post, 2015:86-87; Volkan, 1980; Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1984). Reparative charismatic narcissists, Post (2015:86-87) explains, heal their own narcissistic wounds, filling up the feelings of inadequacy and helplessness that stem from their wounded Self by repairing wounds to the group’s narcissism and by overcoming threats to the group’s identity through his strong leadership. Just as some parents live vicariously through their children, so reparative charismatic leaders attempt to heal their own narcissistic wounds by repairing wounds to the large-group’s identity. The ultimate aim of the reparative charismatic narcissist’s effort to “uplift” Others, is to both bask in the “uplifted” Others’ adulations for his magnificent leadership, and to improve his own self-image through the improved image of these Others (Volkan, 1980:138-139):

The reparative narcissist … strengthens the cohesiveness and stability of his grandiose self by idealizing a group of others whom he then includes in an idealized extension of himself.

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78 Matthews and Solomon (2003:158-160) make a similar point, arguing that discourses are productive of power-structures, and therefore serve to entrench hierarchical divisions between former colonial powers and their African colonies.

79 The notion of “charismatic leadership” can be traced back to Max Weber (1922), and has enjoyed much interest from scholars of political psychology (see notably Willner and Willner, 1965; Tucker, 1968; Volkan, 1980; Sankowsky, 1995; Popper, 2000; 2002; Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006).
If South Africa thus insists that its foreign policy is geared toward dismantling the injustices of colonialism and fighting against continued forms of neo-colonial oppression, then the state is appointing itself as the global leader of marginalized and oppressed countries of the South, simultaneously assuming that other states of the South feel equally emasculated by their colonial histories and long for a saviour to relieve them of their suffering. Just as some parents live vicariously through their children’s successes, so South Africa attempts to overcome the pain from wounds inflicted on its ego during colonialism by “fixing” Africa, and tries to improve its own image through its association with “better”, “safer” and “more prosperous” African state-persons.

**Concluding Remarks**

Analyses of state-persons that stop with the state’s identity, are incomplete and risk branding behaviours as “schizophrenic” or “disordered” that are otherwise perfectly normal for someone with a specific personality type. All persons have preferred defences against threats to their egos, which is determined both by their historical experiences of relationships with significant Others, and by their personality type. While identities do matter, persons often act in ways that are unexpected or, to our minds, incommensurate with their self-assigned identities and priorities. When viewed from the perspective of personality theory, however – particularly theories regarding the behaviours that individuals adopt when faced with the everyday stresses accompany the harsh reality that persons cannot always actualize their inner ideals – there often are perfectly normal, acceptable explanations for seemingly incoherent behaviours. Although IR constructivism has laid the foundations for important preliminary steps toward understanding state-persons, we are guilty of oversimplifying the complexity of personhood. It is simply too easy to slap a diagnosis of “foreign policy schizophrenia” on a state-person like South Africa when the state’s actual behaviours do not suit our theoretical prescriptions for their expected behaviours.

In this thesis, I presented a complete analysis of the South African state-person, that included a look at both the identities that the state assigns itself and its significant Others, along with the policy directions that these identities prompt, as well as the unconscious, historically-grounded motivations for some of South Africa’s most puzzling recent foreign policy actions. Using Theodor Millon’s Clinical Multiaxial Inventory of fifteen personality types and subtypes, I demonstrated how South Africa’s actions in international affairs fit the characteristic
behaviours of persons with a confident/narcissistic personality. My analysis took into consideration, how the international community’s praise for South Africa’s past successes – notably its “miraculous” transition to democracy in 1994 – has created a perception of “high expectations” in the state, that both causes it to feel pressure to meet these high expectations, and that causes the state to feel humiliated or ashamed when it thinks that it did not perform to the standard that it is expected to perform at. These wounds to the state’s ego, I have shown, are accompanied by the defence of narcissistic rage, which simultaneously aims to discredit critical Others, and to reassure the state of its own magnificence. An understanding of the defences of denial, displacement, rationalization, reaction formation, projection, and sublimation, helps us make sense of South Africa’s actions and reactions surrounding the “Libya crisis”, and subsequent troubles with the UNSC – including its failure to act on the situation in Syria – and the ICC.

Whereas the previous chapter helped me to answer the question of “why South Africa’s relationships with significant Others take on their unique dynamics?”, this chapter has responded to the question of “how these relationships shape behaviours?” As noted, identity-centred analyses provide only part of the answer to these questions, but fail to tell us why state-persons judge certain behaviours or actions as justified and necessary, and how relations with other state-persons cause states to experience tensions between their inner, ideal worlds, and the external world. Combining the identity-model with a personality-model, made it possible for this project to investigate the internal- and external processes through which the South African identity is constructed, to explore the ways in which the South African state’s experience of the international political sphere causes it to engage in certain actions aimed at either maintaining or modifying its reality and, in this way, to finally come to an understanding of the affects, cognitions and personal predispositions that direct the state’s international actions.
STATE PERSONHOOD AND WORLD POLITICS:
CONCLUDING REMARKS

A lack of understanding of the unique characteristics, cognitions and behaviours of individual persons has, historically, had close on catastrophic consequences. Even today, behaviours and cognitions that do not fall within what is considered the norm are all too quickly diagnosed as symptoms of mental disorders. The stigmatization of mental disorders has a long and interesting history. Sufferers of mental disorders, during the Middle Ages, were thought to be possessed by evil spirits and were burned, imprisoned or chained to their beds or the walls of asylums they were banished to (Rössler, 2016:1250). With the dawn of the Enlightenment, patients with mental illness were no longer burned at the stake or imprisoned, but were still locked away in asylums and subjected to terrifying “treatments” like trephination, bloodletting and purging, and eventually, lobotomies (Foerschner, 2010; Rössler, 2016:1250). People diagnosed with mental disorders in the Nazi Germany – particularly those presenting with schizophrenia, were sterilized or killed (Rössler, 2016:1250; Torrey and Yolkene, 2010), while the diagnosis of “female hysteria” doled out to women with any number of symptoms, from irritability and anxiety, oedema, insomnia and fainting, to a loss of sexual desire or appetite, was only officially dropped as a diagnosis from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980 (Maines, 1999:23; Tasca et al. 2012:116).

For all the ills of the past, and for all the lessons we have learned from these ills, IR scholars are remarkably quick to accuse states of “schizophrenia” or a similar disease when they struggle to make sense of these states’ behaviours. South Africa’s foreign policy decisions and behaviours are routinely referred to as “schizophrenic” by scholars and political commentators alike. Yet, for all of the diagnoses of foreign policy schizophrenia handed to the South African state on such a regular basis, very few scholars have seriously contemplated the implications of accusations of mental illness on the part of a state for the scholarship of state personhood. Much of our incapacity to explain the behaviours of a state like South Africa, is due to our lack of understanding of the state-as-person in all its intricacies and complexities. States are more than their identities; states have emotions, personal dispositions and characteristic defence mechanisms that mediate their everyday interactions within the realm of the social, and that determine behavioural preferences or peculiarities.
Pushing the claim that “states are people too” beyond its present conceptual limits, this thesis presented a personology of the South Africa state-person. Personology is the science of how people exist in relation to others, how they differ from others, and how their experiences of the world affect their cognitions and behaviours. Persons maintain emotional relationships, rooted in personal histories, with significant Others that they either identify with positively or negatively. Interactions with significant Others spark emotions in people, that either motivate them to modify their relationships if these relationships cause them experience negative emotions, or to maintain relationships that cause them to experience positive emotions. The personal predispositions, or behavioural preferences, of individuals determine how they are likely to react to the everyday stresses of life, and of their interactions with Others. In this context, the thesis sought to answer the question, “how do South Africa’s experiences of relationships with other state-persons shape its behaviour in international politics, and why do these behaviours take on these unique dynamics?”, and ultimately aimed to arrive at a deepened understanding of the ways in which relationships among state-persons shape state identities and direct state behaviours.

Semiotics – the study of these symbol that individuals choose to communicate their Selves and their experiences of the world to Others, has traditionally fallen under the umbrella of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA takes both linguistic and non-linguistic forms of communication as the foundations of social practice, and concerns itself with the social and political context of agency and structure, observable through the lenses of representation, manipulation, interpretation, that is embedded in the discourses of individuals or groups within societies. Discourse, in this sense, could be seen as the tool through which state-persons seek to change their external environment, including how states narrate themselves-in-relation-to-others, thus positioning themselves within society, how they communicate with Others to achieve common aims, or eventually how they attempt to consolidate their external world with their individual’s inner world. Taking this view of discourse as the means through which states attempt to satisfy their internal desires, the research looked at the ways in which the South African state narratively constructs and performs its Self in relation to significant Others, and how the state attempts to shape the external world according to its own mentalistic images of itself-in-the-world. As a final step in the personology of the South African state-person, the research attempted to establish patterns of behaviour based from a two of South Africa’s recent foreign policy moments, aided by descriptions of the state’s behaviour by significant Others, and assessed these behaviours against existing models of personality to determine South
Africa’s character traits and behavioural preferences, especially when faced with threats to its ego.

As a component of the overarching research question here above articulated, the project asked three sub-questions, that accompanied three research objectives. First of these questions, was how an identity-centred analysis of state behaviours can help us make sense of seemingly incoherent or otherwise harmful choices and actions on the part of a state like South Africa? In answering this question, the thesis explored the identity of the South African state, including the internal and external processes through which this identity is constructed. The second sub-question, asked how a study of states’ experiences of their relationships with other state-persons can help us understand how and why states judge certain behaviours or actions as justified and necessary? This required unpacking South Africa’s relations with other state-persons, to uncover the affects, cognitions and personal predispositions that direct South Africa’s international actions. The last sub-question the thesis sought to answer, was how intersubjective, motive experiences of the international political sphere cause states to feel a disconnect between their inner, ideal worlds and the external world? And, how do states deal with the incompatibility between inner-, and external worlds? Answering this question required looking at the ways in which South Africa’s phenomenological experiences of the outside world cause a will to action to transform or maintain aspects of the external world to conform to its inner ideals.

6.1. STATE PERSONHOOD: AN ANALYTICAL MODEL

The stated finality of the research was to establish a workable model for analysing state behaviours based on insights from the psychology of personhood. While I will not reiterate the intricacies of the discourse analysis methods employed in the execution of this research, I will summarize the most important points to keep in consideration when executing a similar study. Per the sections of the thesis, I divide these up into “steps”, focusing first on the identification of the boundaries that separate Self from Other, and that ultimately make the existence of the state-person possible, and second, focusing on the identification of behavioural patterns that point to personal predispositions or personality types, which ultimately make it possible to explain why states deem certain actions most appropriate under certain circumstances. I conclude the chapter with some final reflections on future avenues of research in state
personhood in general, and on state personalities in particular – simultaneously addressing the most important limitations discussed in chapter three.

6.1.1. Identifying Self-Other boundaries

As my introductory remarks to this chapter suggested, any analysis of any person – human or non-human – first requires a thorough understanding of how the person experiences itself in relation to Others. This requires an understanding of how the person sees itself and its significant Others – the identities that are assigned to Self and Other – as well as the processes that contribute to the assignment of these identities. In accordance with Neumann’s influential 1999 article, “Self and Other in International Relations”, identities are the symbolic representations of the boundaries between a person’s Self and its significant Others, and they are constructed through processes of identification with, and differentiation from Others. Persons identify positively with those Others who, through their interactions, cause them to feel safe, happy, successful, confident or otherwise positive about themselves; they identify negatively with those Others who make them feel vulnerable, exploited, angry, threatened or otherwise uncertain about themselves. Relationships have affective histories, and persons base their judgments about Others on their past experiences of interacting with these Others. In our efforts to delineate state-persons’ identity markers, thus, we have to also consider the emotions that relationships with respective Others have historically evoked in the state, and how these emotions continue to determine the shape that interstate relations take on.

The South African existence is based on a difference from the states of the global North who have historically dominated and, in the South African mind at least, exploited the states of the global South. In spite of the fact that colonialism has, on paper, come to an end, South Africa continues to feel itself a victim of Western hegemonic aspirations in international affairs, and so continues to engage in what is often seen as stubborn resistance to everything that Negative Others are involved in, or that they initiate. Throughout its discourses, South Africa narrates itself as the moral, social and political opposite of the states of the global North. Though sometimes veiled in diplomatic euphemism, South Africa discursively constructs Negative Others as belligerent, racist, jealous and selfish, and by looking at the emotional connotations of the signifiers employed to narrate its relationships with these states, it becomes clear that South Africa’s interactions with the global North makes it feel belittled, threatened, oppressed, marginalized, and disrespected. In this affective context, South Africa seeks to
ameliorate its experience of international relations by realigning loyalties to the emerging powers of the global South, with whom it experiences positive emotions in interactions.

Historically, South Africa has enjoyed support from the states of the global South, with whom it shares a sense of camaraderie for their shared historic struggle against Western imperialism and the continued hegemony of the global North in international politics. To the extent that its relationships with the global South makes South Africa feel successful and hopeful for a prosperous future, South Africa ties its positive self-image to African peers, and peers from the global South. In its foreign policy discourses, South Africa effectively appears to pledge allegiance to African and the global South, narrating itself as an ally of the South in international affairs, and an opposing force to former colonial powers. Throughout its discourses on its international relations, it is clear that South Africa considers its Positive Others as admirable, and that the state seeks to affirm its own identity through its presentation of a Self that possesses the same qualities as these POs. These positive qualities are, of course, the binary opposites of the qualities that South Africa sees in Negative Others.

The image of the South African and Positive Others from the global South as “multicultural”, “diverse”, “multiracial”, “tolerant”, “harmonious”, and “caring” stands in contrast with South Africa’s image of its Negative Others as “racist”, “oppressive” and “violent”. Parallel to its self-assigned identity as diverse, tolerant and caring vanguard of the rights and dignities of the global South in international affairs, is the identity that South Africa occupied during its apartheid past, which corresponds with the negative identity it assigns to states of the global North, and which it has been struggling to integrate into its Self since the dawn of democracy in the country in April 1994. While the post-1994 South African image projected to the outside world is one of an inclusive, humanist pacifist, its internal identity remains fractured and conflictual. To overcome the intrapersonal conflict that arises from its inability to reconcile its positive- and negative Selves, South Africa attempts to narrate itself as the African that is both a victim of Western malice, and a victor in a game of morality. Whereas, in the realm of domestic politics, this phenomenon manifests as racialized difference between the “white oppressor” and the “black victim”, in the international sphere, these differences are operationalized in the South African state’s positive identification with the “victimized South” – an extension of the “African Self” – and in its negative identification with the “exploitative North” – the Colonial Other.

Based on existing theories of emotion, we know that affects drive people to take certain actions that will transform their external environments in a way that resolves the negative
emotions that they experience in their everyday interactions with Others, or to try to maintain those relationships that cause them to feel positive emotions. In the world of the state-person, this takes the form of policy actions, which aim to reconstruct the international political sphere in a way that makes state-persons experience maximum positive emotions, and eliminate the maximum negative emotions.

6.1.2. Examining the underlying motivations of identity-conditioned foreign policy actions

Affective experiences of relationships between state-persons act as motivational forces that set tasks for the future. These tasks may either aim to maintain certain relational dynamics, or they may be directed in a way that will transform these dynamics into a more acceptable or pleasant experience for either one, both, or all of the state-persons involved in the relational network. Because relationships construct identities, and because emotions determine whether relationships are experienced as pleasant or unpleasant – and eventually, whether states identify positively or negatively with one another – it is important to identify and understand the emotions that arise from the interactions between state-persons. As demonstrated, South Africa experiences the negative emotions of humiliation, shame, exploitation and threat in its relationships with states of the global North, and so its foreign policy actions are aimed at transforming these negative dynamics into more positive experiences. Conversely, South Africa experiences positive emotions like belonging, success, hope and support in its relationships with the states of the global South, and so its foreign policy actions are simultaneously directed toward maintaining, or even strengthening these positive dynamics.

Foreign policy actions aimed at transforming South Africa’s negative relationships with the global North, I have grouped together under the “global transformation agenda”, which includes subtle but disruptive acts of resistance against Western dominance in global politics, as well as a “restitution agenda” that ultimately aims to recover the agency that South Africa feels has been taken from the states of the global South in international politics – and that denies them the right to feel like dignified, “full persons”. Analogous to these action items, is South Africa’s “global South Agenda” that, on the surface, fights for greater equality for the rights of the states of the global South – particularly for African states – in international politics, and that is to be achieved through the “construction of a parallel global order” – a utopia of like-minded states from the South. While these agendas have very distinct desired outcomes, they
are interrelated and work together to achieve South Africa’s ultimate objective of “building a better and safer world”.

In a sense, these action-items (or agendas) – and their causal factors, *id est*, the affective relationships that determine how states experience the external world and eventually, how they identify with one another – can be taken as general “rules” that will govern South Africa’s foreign relations, and eventually, its behaviours within the realm of the international. We may, for instance, *expect* South Africa to support global South initiatives that aim to either oppose the efforts or initiatives of the global North in international governance, or that offer alternative political avenues, or choices, to the states of the global South. This is both because South Africa resists Western dominance over the states of the global South (and so, “choosing” the alternative route *shows* defiance), and because South Africa actively seeks to construct a utopia of friendly, like-minded Souths, where the rules of the West do not apply, and where the states of the South have ownership of their agency. Yet, South Africa’s foreign policy record is stained with anomalies – exemplified by the recent events surrounding the Libyan- and Syrian crises, as well as the International Criminal Court.

Although UNSC Resolution 1973 had been proposed by the Arab League, in concert with the UK and France, and although an argument could be made that South Africa’s vote on the Resolution could be seen as pro-African to the extent that the Resolution was meant to protect the lives of African civilians and to pave the way for the resolution of the conflict in Libya, South Africa’s responses to the finality of the Resolution and the resultant backlash were chaotic. Similarly, South Africa’s apparent inertia on the Syria matter could be seen as counter to the needs of the global South – of which Syria is a part – and fundamentally at odds with the state’s self-assigned identity as vanguard advocate for the protection of all the world’s people from violence and oppression. In the same way, South Africa’s position on the ICC does not stroke with its self-concept as soldier in the fight for justice for the vulnerable and violated in global affairs. In sum, South Africa’s *actual* behaviours diverge significantly from the behaviours we can *expect* from the state based solely on the identities the state assumes for itself, and that it assigns Others.

While South Africa’s *actual* and *expected* behaviours in international affairs differ in a confounding way, they are not altogether inscrutable. As observed earlier, persons are more than identities – and behaviours are determined by more than just identities. Within the disciplines of psychology and psychoanalysis, behaviours are attributed to sets of behavioural predispositions that persons with certain fixed personality types tend to adopt under specific
circumstances. In a sense, these behavioural predispositions are “preferred behaviours” that help them cope with the stresses of everyday life. While identities will certainly point to a number of psychological preferences, personality type provides an important piece to the behavioural puzzle.

6.1.3. Assessing state behaviours as mediatory efforts to soothe inner conflicts

Personality encompasses a set of mediatory mechanisms to aid interactions between and among individuals in the social setting, and that allows individuals to cope with the incompatibility between their desires or aspirations, and the limitations of reality. Narcissistic defences are learned coping mechanisms that help defend the Self against the anxieties that arise from the individual’s realization that they are unable to satisfy all of their wishes. These defences include denial, displacement, rationalization, reaction formation, projection, and sublimation. South Africa’s reactions surrounding the NATO invasion of Libya point to a number of these narcissistic defences. First, it responded to criticism of vote on Resolution 1973 by appealing to the false consensus that “everybody did it”. The vote, in and of it itself, could be considered to have been the product of reaction formation to the international community’s perception that the South Africa lacks commitment to the fundamental values of respect for human rights and dignity, which would cause the state to experience feelings of shame or humiliation. Second, South Africa responded to suggestions that its vote on Resolution 1973 made it complicit in the NATO invasion of Libya with denial, displacing its own responsibility for the debacle onto Negative Others. Third, South Africa is able to overcome its humiliation at having been outwitted by the US, UK and France by channelling its rage into the transformation of the international system, thus allowing the state to regain ownership of its agency. These narcissistic defences are complimented by South Africa’s attempts to reinforce its positive self-concept through a reiteration of its foreign policy successes.

Each individual has a unique psychological make-up – a personality type – that determines which coping strategies they adopt to deal with daily stresses. These personality types assemble a range of characteristic behaviours under one umbrella, based on the extent to which an individual relies on these behaviours to soothe their anxiety. Among the most popular personality inventories proposed by personality psychologists over time, is Theodor Millon’s Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI), which lists fifteen personality types – each presented with a list of its associated characteristic behaviours. From South African foreign policy
discourses, it is possible to identify a number of personality traits that define the state: The South African state-person is confident rather than shy or retired; it has a strong sense of its personal identity and is proactive, rather than passive and complacent. It is further clear that the state feels entitled to recognition and praise for its accomplishments. Although South Africa actively seeks out friendships with Positive Others, the state has been described by peers as “arrogant” and a “bully”. South Africa tends to overreact in anticipation of criticism, making it seem impulsive and disingenuous, while it is so mistrustful of the motives of Negative Others that it appears hostile toward them. In addition to its tendency to exaggerate events, South Africa employs very dramatic discourse. Based on these observations, South Africa’s behaviours best fit Millon’s “confident/narcissistic” personality.

Born from a parental obsession with the brilliance and uniqueness of their precious child, narcissistic personality types come across as arrogant and disdainful, often flouting social rules. These individuals feel entitled to special treatment, but make no attempts to reciprocate because they harbour a grandiose sense of Self and therefore believe themselves to be entitled to special treatment. Narcissistic personality types typically entertain fantasies of unlimited success, beauty or love, often inflating their actual successes and achievements. Because they see themselves as exemplary, narcissistic individuals tend to be ignorant of their own flaws or unacceptable behaviours, rationalizing away their shortcomings. While the narcissistic person may appear cool and careless, their confidence is easily shaken, resulting in outbursts of rage accompany feelings of shame and emptiness. This fragile Self is the product of an early wound to the individual’s ego, a product of an inability to reconcile the ideal Self with the flawed, actual Self that fails to live up to both the parents’ image of the child, and the individual’s own self-concept.

It is clear that South Africa perceives certain “high expectations” from its significant Others about its performance in international relations, which appears to stem from the praise South Africa received for its “miraculous” transition from apartheid state to democracy in 1994. Considering how much South Africa reflects on these expectations, and its capacity to meet these expectations, it is further clear that the state feels an intense need to meet these expectations. In spite of South Africa’s attempts to convince significant Others that it is able to live up to these expectations, the state is, of course, unable to live up to its self-imposed standards of perfection. As is evident from the analysis presented in chapter five of this thesis, South Africa tends to react with anger or derision whenever it feels that its unique requests to other states and institutions are not honoured. These outbursts are not only a reaction to the
state’s indignation at not being recognized as special, but also South Africa’s way of articulating its anger at, what it feels, is mistreatment.

As I remarked above, South Africa responds to criticism and the feelings of shame, guilt and humiliation that accompany criticisms, by pointing out the shortcomings of Negative Others, and thereby re-establishing its moral superiority over NOs. These “character assassinations” of NOs also serve as rejections – essentially, South Africa is discarding those signification Others who do not make it feel good about itself by making them redundant. This is done by first delegitimizing NOs, and then advancing a hypothetical view for a future world in which the NO either does not exist, or has very little significance. In both the Libyan and ICC episodes, South Africa’s response to the threats that criticism for apparently chaotic diplomatic actions posed to its ego, was to channel its rage and indignation into the construction of a parallel utopias for itself and friendly, like-minded states, pending the transformation of the existing global order into one that the state deems more appropriate.

It is important to once again underscore that a “narcissistic personality” is not equivalent to a diagnosis of a personality disorder. As discussed, narcissism can be quite healthy, and often can be very constructive. Reparative charismatic narcissists heal their own narcissistic wounds by repairing the wounds of his followers, overcoming threats to the group’s identity through his strong leadership. While the reparative charismatic leader plays a constructive role in the lives of his followers, this “benevolence” is not entirely selfless: the ultimate aim of the reparative charismatic narcissist’s effort to “uplift” Others, is to both bask in his followers’ admiration for his magnificent leadership, and to improve his own self-image through his association with “better” Others. Just as some parents live vicariously through their children’s successes, so South Africa attempts to overcome the pain from wounds inflicted on its ego during colonialism by “fixing” Africa, and tries to improve its own image through its association with a “better”, “safer” and “more prosperous” Africa.

6.2. AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As remarked in the section on limitations in chapter three, this thesis did not set as its objective to articulate universal laws regarding state behaviours in general, but focused on the characteristics and behaviours of the South African state-person alone. The model used in the analysis does lend itself to comparative analyses of state personologies, however, and so my
recommendations for future research on the topic will focus on the possibilities of comparative research on state personhood.

6.2.1. **Comparative personologies of state-persons**

Responding to my hypothesis that the South African state displays traits of a narcissistic personality, Alexander Wendt (personal correspondence with the author) asked “whether *all* states might be narcissistic rather than just the South African one [since] the very nature of the states system seems to encourage narcissism”? This is, of course, a very relevant observation, and experts on narcissistic personality disorder often point to the fact that the very nature of the narcissistic personality type, means that narcissistic individuals often end up in leadership positions (on narcissism and leadership, see De Vries and Muller, 1985; Post, 1993; Deluga, 1997; Maccoby, 2000; Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006; Higgs, 2009). While it would be difficult to answer the question with certainty in the absence of a full personality profile of other state-persons, I am *a priori* inclined to answer in the negative: states are individuals, and they have unique attributes, unique histories, unique relational dynamics, unique aspirations, and unique coping mechanisms for the frustrations of everyday life. There will certainly be other narcissistic-type personalities among the 193 state-persons in existence today, but there will also be sociable/histrionic personalities, or assertive/sadistic personalities, or conscientious/compulsive personalities, or non-conforming/antisocial personalities.

Sociable/histrionic states, per Millon’s Inventory (Millon, 2015), will have an image of themselves as highly sociable or charming, with a tendency toward dramatic or flamboyant behaviours and a penchant for attention-seeking behaviours. They may come across to Others as ego-centric, provocative, and fickle because of their extreme sensitivity to criticism. Assertive/sadistic personalities will appear aggressive or combative, and will be strongly opinionated or closed-minded. These individuals are typically ignorant of the impact of their behaviours on others, which is often hostile and destructive. State-persons with conscientious/compulsive personality types, will be exceptionally rule- and duty bound, with an unusually strong penchant for formality and correctness, and a deep desire to conform to social norms and expectations. These persons are likely to entertain allegiances with Others in a position of authority and power, and will come across to Others as rigid, stubborn, tense, and grim. The impulsive and unorthodox non-conforming/antisocial personality, in contrast to the conscientious/compulsive personality, tends to see itself as unfettered by social norms and
conventions, and may seem contemptuous of conventional values. They may appear insensitive, aggressive, and offensive to Others, if not altogether reckless.

While these descriptions of personality types may bring to mind a number of state-persons whose general traits and behaviours resemble those described above, it would plainly be wrong to pass a surface judgment on the personality type of each of these states based on these descriptions alone. As my analysis has demonstrated, an in-depth study of the state’s history, its self-concept, and its behaviours is needed to make a sound decision on the exact type of personality we are dealing with, and the internal processes that have resulted in the state-person adopting certain preferred behaviours or defences. As I had remarked in my chapter on identity, existence requires both Given the importance of having a clear profile of the person carrying out certain actions, and the reasons why they perform these actions, the study of state-persons and their personalities is both an exciting new avenue in the IR research program, and a field in which we desperately need to invest future scholarly efforts.

6.2.2. New analytical themes for scholarship of South African foreign relations

While I have touched briefly on the theme of South African vanguardism and acts of resistance in global politics, the theme remains underexplored. While scholars of South African foreign policy appear to agree that South Africa “deviant” behaviours in international affairs stem from the country’s troubled relationships with the states of the West (see, e.g., Alden and Schoeman, 2013:126-128; Olivier, 2012:177-195; Nathan, 2008:2), and while scholars seem to agree that this “anti-West posturing” is, to some extent, a performance of South Africa’s “new” African identity, few if any efforts have been dedicated to theorizing how these actions are expected to change the course of international politics. As my discussion has shown, South Africa performs certain actions with the very specific aim of achieving some objective – which, in the case of its relationships with the states of the global North, is that of changing the dynamics of these relationships and the social structures within which they are embedded. While my analysis has demonstrated some of the ways in which South Africa’s intentionally disruptive behaviours in international fora aim at transforming the state’s external environment, my analysis has not considered all of the state’s complex relationships and behaviours in detail. Future scholarship may, therefore, focus on the ways in which South Africa responds to political structures and dynamics that it experiences as negative or restrictive, and how the state attempts to transform these structures and relationships through tacit resistance. Another important question here is,
of course, whether South Africa actually achieves these aims, and whether the state can legitimately hope to achieve these aims? Is there any support for these initiatives, and how does the state respond when faced with a lack of support for what it feels is a necessary aim? These are all questions to need to be answered.

Relatedly, this thesis has not considered in great detail the impact of South Africa’s perception of “guilt” for the sins of the former apartheid government perpetrated against the states of the global South, and toward Africa in particular, on the state’s self-concept and its relationships with these states today. Although I have touched on this aspect of South Africa’s relations with African peers, I have not for instance, considered the extent to which this guilt causes the state to engage in certain behaviours and actions internationally as a form of repentance or a payment of debts that it feels it had incurred during the apartheid era. Where other scholars (Alden & Le Pere, 2004 and 2009; Nathan, 2004; Blumenfeld, 2010; Clark, 2016; Hamill, 2018; Mlambo, 2016) have found that South Africa’s reluctance to take on a dominant leadership role in Africa, for example, in economic terms or in terms of intervention in conflict situations, is explained by an unwillingness to be seen as the same hegemonic power it had been perceived to be during the apartheid era, South Africa’s references in its foreign policy discourses to a lived sense of guilt for its part in oppressing other African states under apartheid rule suggests that there is much more to be explored here.

At the “Regional Challenges to Multilateralism Conference” that was held in Tampere, Finland during September 2018, the issue of parallel political worlds became a golden thread that tied together the vast contributions of conference participants. The idea of a states-system consisting of multiple, co-existing political orders, each organized around unique principles and norms determined by the states who participate in these orders, is one that has been increasingly been enjoying the attention of scholars from the non-Western world, particularly those conducting research on the ways in which the emergence of the BRICS and similar groupings are changing the rules of the game of international politics (see e.g., Acharya, 2017; Mazarr, 2017; Juutinen and Käkönen, 2016; Stephen, 2014; also Féron, Käkönen and Rached, 2019). If South African scholar Yolanda Spies in 2010 wrote about South Africa’s foreign policy challenges in a “polypolar world”, Amitav Acharya (2017:276) warns that views “of the emerging world order as a return to multipolarity [are] misleading”. In Acharya’s view, we are not returning to a pre-War system of primary world powers and dominant political cultures; instead, we are seeing the emergence of “a world of multiple modernities, where Western liberal modernity (and its preferred pathways to economic development and governance) is
only a part of what is on offer” (Ibid.:277). As demonstrated in chapter four, South Africa itself appears to be actively engaged in the construction of a “utopia of Souths” as an alternative political order to what it sees as an oppressively designed “by the West, for the West”. Further research should focus on South Africa’s views of its place in the emerging global order – would it aspire to a position of dominance within this system – and on the views of South Africa’s peers on the country’s future status – indeed, is there any place for hegemonic aspirations in the emerging global order?

As remarked earlier in the thesis, the first reason why we may be missing out on deeper, theoretical debates surrounding the unspoken aims of South Africa’s foreign policy actions, is because scholarship on South African foreign relations is constrained by its obsession with materialism – an overreliance on actual, measurable policies, and an aversion to the immeasurable, which unfortunately includes theorization on state-personhood. Much of the problem, lies with the general emphasis in the South African research space, on the production of policy recommendations for use by government. The government, one must assume, has very little use for an analysis of its personality, because the analysis does not tell it what to do next; it is simply providing an explanation for behaviours that the state does not necessarily feel the need to explain. More useless than theory for the sake of theory, however, is the arbitrary attribution of a misinformed diagnostic label: what, indeed, is the South African government to make of its “foreign policy schizophrenia”? What, moreover, are other states to make of such a label? Other than offering an easy way out of a philosophical conundrum for scholars who have run out of answers, diagnoses of incurable schizophrenia do little to help make sense of the international stage and its actors.

A recent edited volume on South African foreign policy, edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Kudrat Virk (2018), which prides itself on offering a “comprehensive [analysis of] the main themes and geographical scope [of South African foreign policy] in a conceptually coherent manner” (Adebajo, 2018:1-2), though claiming to take a different approach to South African foreign policy analysis than its predecessors, offers an overview of recent foreign policy choices and action items, yet no new insights into the reasons why South Africa undertakes these actions. The volume is, like earlier volumes, a descriptive oversight of South Africa’s foreign policy, rather than an explanatory guide to understanding the policy and its directions. What we end up with, is yet another summary of DIRCO’s policy agenda, combined with an appraisal of the state’s successes and failures in meeting their self-defined policy targets. A lack of sensitivity to the unique, historical interstate dynamics that influence policy
decisions and that determine how these policies are executed, further results in an odd grouping together of relationships as disparate in nature as South Africa’s relationship to the countries of the African-Caribbean-Pacific Group (ACP) and to the European Union (Nkosi, 2018:428-448). The problem is, of course, that foreign policy agenda items may be grouped together under one portfolio within the foreign office to streamline administration, but that these action items have no relation to one another on a conceptual level. Future scholarly efforts may, in this context, be directed toward uncovering the affective underpinnings of interstate agreements to eventually determine how agreements fit into the state’s motivational framework.

Another, perhaps more interesting tendency in South African foreign policy scholarship, evident from this volume, is that the boundaries between scholarship and government are becoming increasingly porous, with an increasing amount of government officials producing what is meant to be scholarship on the state’s foreign relations, and an increasing amount of scholars being absorbed into the state’s diplomatic corps. While there is certainly space for collaboration between the academe and the diplomatic machinery of the state, the question to ask here, is just how objective we might expect a diplomat to be in his or her writing? Indeed, a contribution to Adebajo’s and Virk’s volume the Chief Director in charge of the UN portfolio at DIRCO (Mashabane, 2018:395-410) reads more like an apology for South Africa’s troubled engagements with the UN (and simultaneously a defence of South Africa’s foreign policy successes) than a real attempt at explaining why this relationship takes on its uniquely troubled dynamics, while the disjointed contribution by DIRCO’s Head of the Global Governance and Continental Agenda portfolio (Nkosi, 2018:428-448) reads like a memoir on the ANC’s early forays into foreign policy. While the EU may have a special economic agreement with the states of the ACP, there is no logic to an analysis of South Africa’s relationship with the EU-as-development-partner-of-the-ACP. Within this context, a relatively unexplored avenue for research in South African foreign policy is the effect that theory has on diplomatic practice, and the degree of influence the government exerts over the academe. Has the ANC’s cadre-deployment policy filtered into the academe, and what is the potential impact of government involvement on the future of research on IR and foreign policy in South Africa?
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| **Narcissistic injuries & present actions/identities** | Rooting FP in anti-colonial struggle; pledging solidarity w/ South | In terms of South Africa’s liberation history, its evolving international engagement is based on two central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity. South Africa recognises itself as an integral part of the African continent and therefore understands its national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity. Likewise, the 1955 Bandung Conference shapes our understanding of South-South cooperation and opposition to colonialism as a natural extension of our national interest. (Creation of first binary: South-South solidarity vs. Colonial antagonism)

In preparing the country to become a winning nation in the coming decades of the 21st century, our international relations work must endeavour to shape and strengthen our national identity; cultivate our national pride and patriotism; address the injustices of our past, including those of race and gender; bridge

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<tr>
<td>Utopian world</td>
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<td>Validation through expectations &amp; aspirations</td>
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PREAMBLE

**DIPLOMACY OF UBUNTU**

South Africa is a multifaceted, multicultural and multiracial country that embraces the concept of Ubuntu as a way of defining who we are and how we relate to others. The philosophy of Ubuntu means ‘humanity’ and is reflected in the idea that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others. It has played a major role in the forging of a South African national consciousness and in the process of its democratic transformation and nation-building. Since 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty
Validation through achievements
ID construction through differentiation
NM factor
Relationships ensure security
Identity motivates FP
Soothing narc. wounds through reparation/restitution
Addressing negative affect through transformation of relationships
Transformation agenda

Self-appraising Characterizing Self as leader; important Characterizing Self as “unique” Defining the world it wants to live in Defining Ubuntu Relating Self to Other Placing Self at service of Others Differentiating “unique” approach from “other” (failing) approach Defining FP Relating to Others Identifying with South Differentiating Self from “North” Describing “intl system” as “abused” and underdevelopment. South Africa has risen to the challenge and plays a meaningful role in the region, on the continent and globally. South Africa’s unique approach to global issues has found expression in the concept of Ubuntu. These concepts inform our particular approach to diplomacy and shape our vision of a better world for all. This philosophy translates into an approach to international relations that respects all nations, peoples, and cultures. It recognises that it is in our national interest to promote and support the positive development of others. Similarly, national security would therefore depend on the centrality of human security as a universal goal, based on the principle of Batho Pele (putting people first).
In the modern world of globalisation, a constant element is and has to be our common humanity. We therefore champion collaboration, cooperation and building partnerships over conflict. This recognition of our interconnectedness and interdependency, and the infusion of Ubuntu into the South African identity, shapes our foreign policy. South Africa therefore accords central importance to our immediate African neighbourhood and continent; working with countries of the South to address shared challenges of underdevelopment; promoting global equity and social justice; working with countries of the North to develop a true and effective partnership for a better world; and doing our part to strengthen the multilateral system, including its transformation, to reflect the diversity of our nations, and ensure its centrality in global governance.

SA has “won”, “overcome”, “triumphed”.

SA as Ubuntu
If SA is Ubuntu, then SA is “respectful”, “inclusive”, “tolerant”
SA is “supportive” of Others
Ref. to “exploitative” colonial dev?

South Africa as “selfless”: puts Others first, interests take back seat.

SA as humanist
SA values superior to “other” values – who is “conflict-prone other”?
SAFP as humanist policy, respects interconnectedness, interdependency
Relates FP to ID: FP is humanist, so SA
Why is this logical to SA? Are non-Africans less worthy of inclusivity?

SA FP aiming to transform relations w/ North, unhappy with present situation.
Experiences IR as discriminatory, biased, unequal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IR as means to an end</th>
<th>Tying FP to domestic priorities</th>
<th>Tying FP to inner ideals</th>
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<tr>
<td>ID through sameness and difference</td>
<td>Pledging loyalty to POs</td>
<td>Identifying w/ POs</td>
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<td>Validation through expectations &amp; achievements</td>
<td>Defining relations with North (weak)</td>
<td>Evaluating performance vs. in/out expectations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stating who is responsible for FP decision-making: DIRCO as major ideological influence</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

In a fast-changing and interdependent world, it is essential for South Africa to regularly make an evaluation of its foreign policy and to ensure that its national interests are maximised. Foreign policy is not an abstract matter separate from domestic policies and as such South Africa ensures that these inform its foreign policy.

Remaining loyal to the constitutional principles that have inspired South Africa since 1994, our foreign policy is currently based on the primacy of the African continent and the Southern African Development Community; commitment to South-South cooperation; the centrality of multilateralism; consolidating relations with the North; and the strengthening of bilateral social, political and economic relations.

In her Budget Vote Speech of 22 March 2010, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, reiterated the need for South Africa’s foreign policy to be “assessed against the weight of rising expectations”. She also reflected on the critical role of foreign policy in meeting domestic priorities.

South Africa is committed to pursuing a more focused and effective foreign policy. As principal adviser on foreign policy issues, the Department coordinates the implementation of South Africa’s international relations. To this end, the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) as an integral part of the Department will enhance South Africa’s international cooperation and implementation of development and humanitarian assistance programmes.

Furthermore, in the spirit of a more inclusive and open foreign policy approach, it is the intention to further engage key

Self takes precedence
Understanding FP requires understanding of endogenous ID

POs: Africa, SADC, South
“Commitment” to South = positive

“Consolidating” relations with NOs (North) = make stronger, more efficient

Is “domestic aspect” unique to Zuma administration? See 1996 discussion doc

FP to maximize national interest; tensions between humanist and realist aspirations?

Whose development, and why? Link dev. to desire for stability & security; also, influence/status?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation agenda</th>
<th>Stakeholders by establishing the South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) as a forum for interaction with the Department on foreign policy development and implementation, with the aim of creating dynamic partnerships for development and cooperation. The name change in 2009 from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation reflects the Department’s role in building deeper and more expansive relations and using these partnerships to advance South Africa’s national interests. This approach promotes foreign policy alignment with South Africa’s domestic and developmental needs, particularly to create a better life for all South Africans. South Africa’s foreign policy takes into account the ever-evolving global environment in which we operate in order to respond effectively to our domestic imperatives. Effective policy development is essential for the survival and prosperity of any country in the global system. Governments are faced with complex and ever rapidly occurring global inflection points and must make key strategic decisions that will determine a country’s future prosperity, standing and influence in the world. South Africa’s foreign policy responses continue to be shaped by its history and the evolution of its foreign and domestic policies since 1994. In this regard, South Africa contributes towards the transformation of the global system of governance from power-based to a rules-based system in a just and equitable global order. Since the birth of democratic South Africa in 1994, the country has prioritised an Afro-centric foreign policy rooted in national development.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seeks (ontological) restitution through foreign relations</td>
<td>More inclusive than…? NO, or Colonial Self?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narc. Wound: “underdeveloped”, wants to be “better”</td>
<td>Developing the continent and rest of South serves to achieve nat. interest aims, incl. “becoming a winning nation”, “achieving a better life for all” (*all still needs to be identified)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing negative affect through transformation of relationships</td>
<td>Changing intl order = opportunity for SA to improve “prosperity, standing and influence” in global politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressing desire to be more inclusive</td>
<td>FP = response to past (esp. colonialism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leveraging relations for eco. dev.</td>
<td>Power vs rules; emasculation &amp; retribution – SA overpowered, violated; needs justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soothing narc. wounds through achievements</td>
<td>Identifying w POs Differentiating from NOs Evaluating own performance since 1994 Ending marginalization through efforts to end poverty</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Validation through achievements</td>
<td>liberation, the quest for African renewal, and efforts to negate the legacy of colonialism as well as neo-colonialism. This resulted in major and ambitious African initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and support for the transition of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002. South Africa’s foreign policy was evaluated against the government’s priorities and objectives in the Fifteen Year Review of South Africa’s Foreign Policy for the period 1994 to 2009. This evaluation assessed progress made, but also identified shortcomings and challenges in order to enable the Department to contribute more effectively to government initiatives. The review highlighted the Department’s dedication to the eradication of poverty and to end the marginalisation of the poor, not only in South Africa, but throughout the world. South Africa has embraced multilateralism as an approach to solve challenges confronting the international community. In this regard, it took up a leading role in various multilateral fora, including SADC, the AU, NAM, G77+China, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations, championing the cause of developing countries and Africa in particular. As a non-permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 2007-2008 and for the period 2001-2012, South Africa promoted peace and security with emphasis on Africa and improving cooperation between the UNSC and regional organisations such as the AU Peace and Security Council. South Africa’s foreign policy takes cognisance of the socio-economic realities that continue to prevail in the country. South Africa remains deeply marked by its historical legacy, and economic disparities still prevail. South Africa’s economy Still experiencing intl politics as violation; wound still open – still feels trapped, enslaved. FP designed to free from enslavement AND ensure retribution by “dethroning” old powers – violation soothed through triumph, inflicting humiliation on violators POs = NEPAD, AU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validation (empowerment) through achievements</td>
<td>Appraising own performance Characterizing Self as “leader” Improving global governance insti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl. vanguardism</td>
<td>Scapegoating Constructing id</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-id: Good student of liberal democratic idealism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saving other to save Self?</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA soothes feelings of emasculation &amp; powerlessness through “global leadership” POs = NAM, G77+China, Commonwealth, UN</td>
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<td>NO = UNSC (needs to improve relations); Attributing blame for African instability on UNSC’s weaknesses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narc. wounds; need ontological transformation to soothe pain of “being less” than developed world</td>
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<tr>
<td>Describing Self</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Identifying with NOs? Or aspiring to be like NOs (materially)?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describing Self</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Identifying with LDCs?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identifying national priorities/interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discussing internal policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>continues to be characterised by great inequality. The developed component of this economy with its large capital-intensive firms, modern and outward-looking orientation has been best placed to take advantage of trade liberalisation and macroeconomic stability. Parts of the country have advanced physical infrastructure and sophisticated financial, ICT and telecommunications networks, comparable to that of the developed world. The underdeveloped section of the economy comprises the majority of the population, who are largely disadvantaged and unskilled. Sections of the country represent poverty comparable with that of Least Developed Countries. Despite increased spending in social services and a steady increase in GDP growth, South Africa continues to face both structural and social challenges. In this regard, South Africa has identified key areas which include education, health, rural development and land reform, creation of decent jobs, and crime prevention. The government is committed to narrowing the enormous gap between rich and poor through a set of comprehensive policy measures such as new industrial development programmes, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), skills development, and social grants. Although tangible but moderate economic growth and the stable internal and external macro-economic situation, unemployment remains one of the most pressing domestic issues. The opening up of the economy has reduced the importance of some sectors while boosting other less labour-intensive sectors. Annually, a growing number of unskilled youth are entering the labour market without access to economic opportunities. South Africa also continues to attract economic migrants.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Narcissistic wound |
| Self-id: victim, triumphant over traumatic past? Indicates trauma, need for soothing |
| Self-interested, but not incommensurate with what we would expect from a state in IR |
| Self as “advanced” &amp; “sophisticated” in parts; comparing Self to NO. |
| Aspects of NO desirable? |
| Self as “underdeveloped”, “disadvantaged”, “unskilled” |
| Links poverty to oppressive history; a luta continua – struggle not over. |
| Could this be indicative of projection in IR? Does SA impose its own “unequal” racialized society on IR? |
| Redress along racial lines? Racialized FP? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NM factor (narc supply)</th>
<th>Distinguishing Self from African Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Despite the complex economic challenges facing South Africa, it is nevertheless the most developed economy on the continent. South Africa’s investment and trade with African countries have increased dramatically since 1994, and South Africa is now the largest investor in Africa.</td>
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2. THE MANDATE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION

International relations are conducted against a long and rich history of diplomacy between states. Diplomatic norms and practices have been developed over the centuries across cultures and political ideologies, and are now widely accepted universally. In accordance with international law and practice, the conduct and coordination of international relations have been the responsibility of the foreign ministries and reflected in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. In line with this practice, the Constitution of South Africa, 1996, empowers the President, as head of the national executive, to formulate national policies and assigns cabinet portfolios. Thus, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation is tasked to formulate, promote, and execute South Africa’s foreign policy. The Minister assumes overall responsibility for all aspects of South Africa’s international relations in consultation with the President. The Department is the principal adviser on foreign policy, and lead coordinator and manager of South Africa’s international relations and cooperation. The Department and its Missions abroad carry out its mandate by:

- Aligning, coordinating, and managing South Africa’s international relations and related activities;
- monitoring developments in the international environment, including the provision of early warning to political principals;

SA as “attractive”

More resilient than Others, able to “take care of business”

SA as benefactor of African peers: Africa needs SA for development and prosperity
| Addressing past through reparation | Identifying values & interests | • formulating foreign policy options; |
| Seeking restitution through foreign relations | Attributing values & interests to past | • protecting South Africa’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; |
| Deontic motive | Describing past rel. | • conducting economic diplomacy; |
| | Rationalizing FP orientation | • conducting public diplomacy; |
| | Articulating nat. interest | • establishing and managing structures and mechanisms for achieving foreign policy objectives; |
| | Assigning Self leadership role | • managing development cooperation and partnerships; |
| | Articulating vision for future global Order | • advising on international law matters and acting as custodian for all South Africa’s international agreements; and |
| | Appraising Self / performance | • providing consular services. |

**4. SOUTH AFRICA’S VALUES AND NATIONAL INTERESTS: BORN IN STRUGGLE**

The values that inspire and guide South Africa as a nation are deeply rooted in the long years of struggle for liberation. As a beneficiary of many acts of selfless solidarity in the past, South Africa believes strongly that what it wishes for its people should be what it wishes for the citizens of the world. Its national interest can thus be articulated as people-centred, including promoting the well-being, development and upliftment of its people; protecting the planet for future generations; and ensuring the prosperity of the country, its region and continent. In pursuing our national interests, our decisions are informed by a desire for a just, humane and equitable world order of greater security, peace, dialogue and economic justice.

The values that inspired the creation of a free and democratic South Africa are enduring because they have transcended time and conflict. Equality, democracy and human rights were entrenched in documents such as the *Freedom Charter*, which...
| praise: narcissistic supply | Differentiating from NO | Characterizing Self (establishing binary opposition to NO) (De)racializing id. Assuming id as intl inspiration | emphasises that non-racialism, non-discrimination, liberty and peace, democratic organs of self-government and equality are essential to achieve the common objective of a “South Africa that belongs to all who live in it, black and white”. These values inspired thousands during the struggle years and have been entrenched in the founding provisions of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The Constitution, one of the most progressive in the world, affirms the aspirations of South African society to live in human dignity, equality, and freedom. Foreign policy, being an extension of national policy and interests, is an important component in South Africa’s strategy for development and social purposes. Creating a better South Africa and contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world encapsulates and conceptualises a South African foreign policy that enables the country to be a good international citizen. As the country engages with its region, continent and the international community, it seeks to build an environment in which it can realise its national socio-economic agenda as well as its political and security interests. Reflecting national interest, South Africa’s foreign policy recognises that states are interdependent and promotes cooperation over competition and collaboration over confrontation. In this context is committed to development partnerships around the world. It draws on the spirit of internationalism, pan-Africanism, South-South solidarity; the rejection of colonialism and other forms of oppression; the quest for the unity and economic, political and social renewal of Africa; the promotion of poverty alleviation around the world; and opposition to the structural inequality and abuse of power in the global system. South |
| --- | Differentiating from NO | Characterizing Self (establishing binary opposition to NO) (De)racializing id. Assuming id as intl inspiration | emphasises that non-racialism, non-discrimination, liberty and peace, democratic organs of self-government and equality are essential to achieve the common objective of a “South Africa that belongs to all who live in it, black and white”. These values inspired thousands during the struggle years and have been entrenched in the founding provisions of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The Constitution, one of the most progressive in the world, affirms the aspirations of South African society to live in human dignity, equality, and freedom. Foreign policy, being an extension of national policy and interests, is an important component in South Africa’s strategy for development and social purposes. Creating a better South Africa and contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better world encapsulates and conceptualises a South African foreign policy that enables the country to be a good international citizen. As the country engages with its region, continent and the international community, it seeks to build an environment in which it can realise its national socio-economic agenda as well as its political and security interests. Reflecting national interest, South Africa’s foreign policy recognises that states are interdependent and promotes cooperation over competition and collaboration over confrontation. In this context is committed to development partnerships around the world. It draws on the spirit of internationalism, pan-Africanism, South-South solidarity; the rejection of colonialism and other forms of oppression; the quest for the unity and economic, political and social renewal of Africa; the promotion of poverty alleviation around the world; and opposition to the structural inequality and abuse of power in the global system. South |
| Desire for recognition and praise: narcissistic supply | Characterizing Self as progressive, humane | Linking FP and domestic politics | Articulating vision for future world |
| --- | Expressing desire for recognition | Articulating FP aims and objectives | Characterizing FP |
| Personal accomplishment through foreign relations (narc. supply) | Establishing id. Binaries between Self/POs & NOs | Constructing Self & FP id | Juxtaposing Self/PO qualities vs. NO qualities |
| Deontic motive | NO’s world as oppressive & abusive | Construction of id in terms of binaries: |
| Obtaining validation through recognition: being seen as “good” citizen | | | |
| | | | |

| Anti-colonial values; Colonial Other = violent, conflict-prone |
| Constructs id as non-racist, inclusive, peace-loving, democratic and pro-equality; linked to idea that these values hail from 1994, appears to insinuate that NOs do not have these values |
| Sees itself as wunderkind of democratisation; is this based in intl praise, or an overestimation of achievements? |
| Constant need for these core values to be recognized and praised. Make the world better, actions to negate legacies of colonialism & apartheid: for recognition? |
| Wants a world in which it can achieve its interests; intl vanguardism = fundamentally selfish |
| Seeks recognition for achievements; validation and affirmation of Self. FP serves to validate Self SA needs POs to achieve its aims |
| SA as “internationalist”, “pan-Africanist”, shows solidarity with “struggling” peers, rejects the oppression of Colonial Others, fights for African unity & development, |
5. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: DRIVERS AND TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM

Drivers and trends constitute the forces that significantly influence world affairs and will therefore play an important role in determining how South Africa conducts its international relations. Successful foreign policy implementation requires that countries take into account the ever-changing environment in which they operate. Poverty and underdevelopment remain the most prevalent challenge facing our region and continent. Central to South Africa’s national interest is to address the challenge of eradicating poverty, developing its people and creating prosperity not only in South Africa but also in the region and continent.

We are in a period of convergence of a number of trends that are leading to major shifts in global political, economic and social/cultural dynamics: such as demographics; climate change. Therefore, in order for South Africa to be effective in meeting its challenges, it must shape its domestic and foreign policies to respond to global drivers and trends that are influencing the international system.

These influences have varying impacts in different parts of the world and include, without order of priority: demographics; realignment of new economic powers; new media and social...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifying FP challenges</th>
<th>Comparing growing South and declining North</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparing differential needs and aims in intl politics</td>
</tr>
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</table>

networks; innovation; environmental change; heightened demand for scarce resources; and changing nature of conflict and insecurity

**Demographics**

The *world population* continues to *grow* at a steady pace, with changes in population profiles that are concerned with population composition (e.g. age, race, gender and population size) and patterns. The *increased population growth* is apparent in the *developing world*, whilst the *developed world* population is *decreasing* and *rapidly aging*. These demographic changes are *putting pressure* on the sustainability of welfare systems, vital natural resources, infrastructure, services, and the labour market. The *youth bulge* in the *developing world* offers both social and economic *opportunities* in terms of *larger markets*, *labour force* and *economic tax base*. However, if skills development and youth employment remain unaddressed, this *creates* the risk of *social and political instability*. It is estimated that more than half of the world's population is urbanised; however, infrastructure lags behind population growth. Increased urbanisation continues to fuel an increase in the number of *megacities*.

The *tension* between population growth and labour demand continues to encourage migration flows. Economic migration, both documented and undocumented, present *major challenges* to states and communities that experience a measure of economic growth. *States with aging populations*, however, will have to find ways to absorb a younger workforce. Given the rising perception that multiculturalism is failing, there is the attendant *risk* of increased pressures of *xenophobia, racism* and *insecurity*.

PO “growing”
NO “declining”; bound to become a burden to youthful South

Negative as positive: pressure on resources, but not from developing world.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextualizing shifting pol. &amp; eco. allegiances</th>
<th>Realignment of economic power</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rationalizing BRICS membership</td>
<td>The rise of new economic powers is influencing a shift in the balance of the global distribution of power. As these emerging economic powers assert their positions and seek to increase their influence in global affairs, new economic and political groupings (BRICS) are formed. As a consequence, the primary forces of this driver include new global markets; redirection in trade and investment flows; globalizing labour market; realignment of economic alliances; increase in social divisions; new consumption patterns and production networks. Globalisation continues to shape the world at an accelerating pace. People, businesses and governments are linked across the borders of the nation-state. Trade, global finance, and migration have encouraged decades of economic growth. Global economic imbalances, the global economic crisis, climate change, and insecurity are bringing the vulnerabilities of globalisation to the fore. Global growth is characterised by growing inequalities with the social divide between rich and poor widening. The global economic crisis has accelerated the change in balance of economic and political power towards the emerging economies and it is expected that this trend will continue. The rules and institutions of the 20th century global economic and trading system are in a state of flux. This includes a reassessment of the role of the state, with alternative models of state intervention being tested. Underlying global imbalances may lead to further currency volatility and protectionist tendencies. Trading patterns are shifting to new markets, with a notable growth in South-South trade between the emerging economies. Regional and preferential trading arrangements are</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishing allegiance with new powers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Realigning FP to reflect “new” pol realities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criticizing globalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegitimizing Capitalist world</td>
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<td>Scapegoating</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expressing expectation of future balance of eco. &amp; pol. power</td>
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<tr>
<td>Introducing idea of “alternative models” of pol. action</td>
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<td>Regionalism = resistance to Colonial World</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegitimization of “Western” systems = legitimization strategy for “alternative world”</td>
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</tbody>
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Younger workforce attracted from South (different race), which threatens domestic workers and results in xenophobia, racism.

Rising powers changing int'l landscape
Shifts allegiance to new powers.
Emerging powers becoming “assertive”, “growing into their own”

Who is responsible for these issues?
Blame game?

Structuralist critique of capitalism:
failure to distribute wealth, contributing to further oppression/marginalization
POs: gaining power, progressing; NOs in relative decline

Delegitimization of existing global order lays foundations for necessity of construction of alternative world
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regionalism = resistance to discriminatory North policies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Restitution through foreign relations: reclaiming rightful place in IR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utopia of Souths</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Rationalizing shifting allegiances</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characterizing North</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defining North policies as obstacle to African development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delegitimizing NOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiating from NOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimizing alternative world</td>
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Proliferating, leading to increased intra-regional trade to the exclusion of others. Discriminatory global agricultural trading arrangements and protectionist policies continue to be an obstacle to the development of African agricultural production. Certain middle and regional powers have emerged as lynchpin states through like-minded alliances and power blocs. These new powers challenge the established political order and place pressure on international organisations to reflect new political realities or risk irrelevance. Vested power interests are opposed to the diminution of their power and may provoke rivalries and competition amongst the new powers. The process of globalisation has had major implications for cultures. The dilemma that has emerged across the world is the extent to which globalisation threatens existing cultures. In the 1990s, the dominant ideology was to recast the world in a neo-liberal paradigm. However, the new emerging powers have pursued alternative models of development consistent with their own cultural norms. **Innovation**

Scientific and technological innovation is a key driver of change. Businesses and civil society have been more successful than governments in harnessing its benefits. Rapid innovation in information and communications technology has transcended international boundaries and regulatory systems, empowering the rapid flow of information, ideas and capital across the world. Developments in the sphere of biotechnology can hold great benefits for humankind through the production of medicines and vaccines. Similarly, nanotechnology offers many benefits, while green technology has the potential to change patterns of production and consumption. However,
| Self-victimization / victim discourse | Differentiating N/S | these same innovations can be exploited with malicious intent with potentially destructive consequences. Although the developed world continues to be the primary originator of innovation, there is increasing competition from the major emerging economies of the South. This is linked to an aggressive pursuit of intellectual property rights protection by originators to protect their global competitive advantage. This protectionism continues to be used against demands for technology transfer for development. However, emerging economies may gain momentum by leapfrogging existing technologies and platforms by using their financial power to acquire high-tech companies of the North. Developing countries will continue to secure partnerships in order to ensure relevant technology transfers for development in critical areas, such as health and education.  
[end of page 14] |
| Seeking restitution through foreign relations | Characterizing NO | Competition for dominance over S&T, South becoming challenge to North’s power  
NO as “selfish aggressor”, actively prevents development of South by withholding tech innovation |
| | Attributing blame for dev. deficit | Overestimates capacity of emerging powers; FP designed to overpower North, dethrone |

**New media and social networks**  
Rapid technological change has created social media networks that are changing the manner in which societies operate today. The distribution of the power of information and media has brought elements of society closer together, created more interdependence. The information society continues to expand its reach to the developing world. Globalised social media and networks empower the individual, strengthening democratisation and transparency.  
New media technologies facilitate the proliferation of national and global social networks of individuals and organisations with shared interests. The convergence of information platforms, global mass media and social networking empowers the free flow of information and ideas which can have an impact on governance, economic activity and mobilization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim narrative</th>
<th>Characterizing policy environment</th>
<th>Rationalizing/sublimating</th>
<th>Scapegoating</th>
<th>Attributing blame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>across social, cultural, religious and national boundaries. Control of all this information is the next frontier as comprehensive information management is in its infancy and vulnerabilities are exploited by states, non-state actors and criminal networks, creating new transnational threats.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental change</td>
<td>Signposts of climate change include environmental degradation, desertification, melting of the icecaps, rising sea levels and more volatile and extreme weather patterns. Both natural and man-made environmental changes impact on all aspects of human development. These changes will increasingly hinder sustainable development and have a significant impact on the world’s social and economic systems. The negative impact on agriculture as well as food, water and energy security, will lead to instability, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Economic development and urbanisation exacerbate the impact on the environment through increased pollution, waste pressures and changes in biological diversity. The world continues to be unsustainably dependent on fossil fuels for its energy. Desertification is one of the greatest challenges to the developing world with a direct impact on the poor due to gradual loss of agricultural productivity increasing famine and malnutrition. The effects of a global food price crisis are felt most acutely in the developing world. Water is an essential but scarce resource that increasingly feels the pressure of population growth, urbanisation and environmental factors. Joint management of water resources continues to be addressed multilaterally but unequal treaties remain historical obstacles to the equitable use of water.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presents climate change as obstacle to sustainable development especially in developing world – developing world as victim of climate change SSA particularly vulnerable to climate change, characterized as ultimate, perpetual victim Who is responsible for climate change? Everyone part of the pb, or is it mostly the West? Developing world hit hardest by climate change</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

[end of page 15]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolving moral obligation</th>
<th>Scapegoating</th>
<th>Green technology and green jobs offer new opportunities for change. Environmental standards are increasingly globalised but tensions exist when the use of environmental measures limits development in the developing world.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blame attribution</td>
<td>Scapegoating</td>
<td>Heightened demand for scarce resources Countries dependent on oil will remain vulnerable to energy shocks and instability in oil-producing regions. Increased energy demands carry the potential of inter- and intra-state competition thereby heightening the risk of tensions over access to these scarce resources. This competition will have implications for global geopolitics as major powers seek to secure sustainable energy sources for their economic development. This scarcity has necessitated a reappraisal of alternative technologies such as nuclear, solar and wind. Additionally, a growing demand exists for mineral resources as the emerging economies compete with the established industrialised economies. There are opportunities and threats in increased demand for resources which allow supplier countries to leverage their new influence to affect supply and demand in the global economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative ID with NO</td>
<td>Rationalizing non-compliance to env. policies</td>
<td>Increased demand and limited supply of scarce resources is driving up commodity prices and fuelling a scramble for resources in Africa and Latin America. The raw material supply chain of the 20th century is under pressure to change as demand increases rapidly in Asia and established colonial linkages are challenged by the emerging powers. Demand also increases the leverage of supplier countries to introduce beneficiation policies and export quotas to stimulate local economic growth. Europe and America will increasingly focus on ensuring the security of supply of the rare earth materials necessary for the new wave of green technologies, of which known reserves are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking restitution</td>
<td>Painting self as victim of resource wars</td>
<td>Ties resource scarcity to colonial design of political sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through foreign relations</td>
<td>Differentiating “helpless” Self/PO from “greedy” North</td>
<td>Structuralist rhetoric: Environment historically overexploited by North, now South is punished for sins of a past they didn’t share in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships w/ POs</td>
<td>Rationalizing investment in nuclear power</td>
<td>Dependence creates vulnerability; those who own the means of production have the power to exploit those who are dependent on resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ensure security,</td>
<td>Pitting PO against NO</td>
<td>NOs at the source of resource conflict: POs have legitimate claim to resources for dev., but are challenged by “greedy” North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relationships w/ NOs</td>
<td>Identifying future sources of influence</td>
<td>Below identifies Africa &amp; LA as resource rich continents, thus Africa threatened by industrialized economies competing with emerging economies for resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>threatening</td>
<td>Characterizing colonial pol. architecture as “exploitative”</td>
<td>Africa and Latin America victims of neocolonial exploits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS &amp; regionalism =</td>
<td>Shifting allegiance to alternative world order</td>
<td>China challenging colonial master-slave relationship; China changing colonial intl. architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resistance to colonial</td>
<td></td>
<td>Africa has power to dictate eco. laws, breaking free from servitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction of</td>
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<tr>
<td>parallel utopia of</td>
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<tr>
<td>Souths</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative ID</td>
<td>BRICS as alternative partners</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegitimization of NOs &amp; their world for alternative world</td>
<td>Rationalizing need for alternative world</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilizing support for own agenda through blame attribution</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying NOs against POs</td>
<td>Identifying with POs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitting “greedy” NOs against POs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Identifying with POs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Concentrated in the emerging economies of Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa. The use of energy diplomacy and resource nationalism may lead to increased tensions between states.</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Changing nature of conflict and insecurity</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In recent decades, the incidence of inter-state conflict has decreased, although resource driven competition may lead to its resurgence. Due to disruptions in economic activity and political instability, intra-state conflict continues to frustrate sustainable development.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The historical concepts of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs are coming under legal scrutiny in the search for suitable responses for intervention. Increasingly, conflict perpetrated by non-state actors takes on the form of asymmetrical warfare. The commercialisation of state security, mercenaries and private security companies poses a challenge given the lack of international regulation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ever-growing dependence on information technology also creates vulnerability with respect to cyber warfare. Cyber attacks and criminal activity continue to increase amid an absence of global control of the internet. The accumulation of resources and wealth through organised crime and cartels allow criminal activity to disproportionately impact on the socio-economic and political landscape of countries. The activities of trans-national organised crime extend to drugs and human trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering and other forms of corruption.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| NOs = Europe & US | Greedy NOs need to maintain exploitative colonial structures to maintain wealth |
| POs = BRICS | |
| Criticizing shortcomings of “European” concepts of IR: Needs new rules for the game | |
| Possibly rationalizes defiance of UNSC/ICC resolutions | |
| Who is the major perpetrator here? Idea that dysregulation benefits a particular actor, who can make money off of war. | |
### 6. GLOBAL POSITIONING OF SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa’s vision for 2025 is to be a successful and influential member of the international community, supported by a globally competitive economy on a sustained growth path that has made significant inroads in addressing unemployment, inequality and poverty in South Africa, and contributing to the development of our region and continent. In a rapidly evolving global environment, South Africa will more frequently be faced with key strategic decision points. Its response to these will determine its success in the future.

The shift in the balance of power in the international system combined with the rapidly closing capability gap between developed countries and emerging powers create opportunities for South Africa. The convergence of trends has created an unprecedented opportunity for countries to maximise their influence by playing a leading role both on specific issues and

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**Feels unsafe & insecure, bases FP on responding to these emotions**

SA wants to be “successful”, “influential”, “competitive”

Also characterizes Self as “poor”, “unequal”

Why “help” region & continent? What is SA getting out of it?

SA’s “success” dependent on region; what is “success”? Praise from Others?

Shifting allegiances to future powers will allow SA to reach aspirations to greater power, wealth, status & influence
| Relationships = power | Rationalizing Africa Agenda | within their regions. This influence is a result of taking the policy initiative, building institutions and originating solutions. Playing this role in African continent has enhanced South Africa’s influence in international fora. The next strategic challenge is for South Africa to utilise this opportunity to take the initiative in shaping a new global order. Simultaneously, South Africa can benefit from diversification and deepened integration into the global growth markets. The trend towards regional integration is accelerating across the world. Globalisation and regional integration present the opportunity for significant gains depending on the level of integration into the global economy. This would support the diversification of South Africa’s trade links. South Africa should also take the opportunity to position itself to take advantage of the next group of high growth economies, including key economies in Africa and Latin America. South Africa should note that rapid industrialisation and increasing resource demand by emerging economies are set to fuel potential conflict around access to natural resources. The challenge remains for South Africa and the region to realise maximum benefit from its natural resources through infrastructure development, value addition and beneficiation. In this regard, it might be necessary to explore the possibilities of a number of structural reforms in order to make the most of the expected commodity super-cycles in the future. The broader business environment and supporting infrastructure will have to ensure future competitiveness. South African companies have been at the forefront of adapting technology to developing market conditions as well as the pioneering of new business models. This has enabled South | Motivation for “leading” Africa: become globally influential power, status-driven  
SA = global reformist, initiates change Africa as SA’s source of power & influence in intl. affairs (hegemon?)  
Use influence & power as regional leader to construct NWO  
Leaving Africa behind to share in wealth of emerging markets?  
SA benefits materially from regional integration; needs African markets for economic growth. What happened to altruism? SA both vanguard & bully?  
SA taking advantage of POs; not “just” Nelson Mandela of IR  
Cautioning against Chinese colonialism? |
| Nar. supply from Africa | Characterizing Self |  
Construction of parallel utopia | Motivating Africa Agenda |  
Articulating global power aspirations | Rationalizing eco. policy shift |  
Rationalizing regional integration strategy |  
Taking advantage of alternative markets |  
Cautioning against emerging economies & need for resources |  
Colonial Self |  
Relationships = wealth |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global power &amp; status minimize threats to leadership from peers</th>
<th>Expressing wariness of emerging powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessing potential for competition among peers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aspiring to become global power</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Characterizing South-South relationships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiating self from rest of dev world</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Africa to explore previously untapped markets in sectors such as mobile communications and financial services. South Africa should continuously explore opportunities to use similar leapfrogging strategies to open up market sectors. Although globalisation has presented many opportunities, it has also brought about many serious risks. The combined impact of climate change, rapid population growth, urbanisation, youth bulge and growing inequality in general exacerbates social stresses relating to food security, access to water, and increasing environmental degradation. These stresses have the potential to cause instability in our region. A number of regional trends could combine to result in challenges to South Africa’s regional leadership position. High energy prices and rapid growth rates could see the emergence of other regional economic centres, with aspirations for regional influence and leadership. The rapid development of a growing number of developing countries is also likely to result in increased competition among states to position themselves in order to maximise their international profiles and visibility. South Africa’s position of global influence not only depends on its regional positioning, but also on its ability to contribute to global solutions and policy innovation. The cohesion of the countries of the South may be eroded as certain key developing countries progress towards becoming developed countries. This group of developing countries are already differentiated, and differentiating themselves, from the rest of the developing world based on their capabilities and integration into global governance structures. The effect is that the capacity gap and influence has widened between these powers and the rest of the developing world, especially the LDCs. This has a potential impact on the solidarity of the South and the championing of the developing world agenda in

SA feels threatened by emerging regional powers, sees development as potential challenge to its “leadership position” in the region. Anticipates competition for power and influence

Cannot merely rely on status as regional power, needs to also position itself as global power. Asserting cohesion & solidarity of South

Tension between Self as “South” & aspirational Self embodying qualities of NO
### Moral dilemma: Africa Agenda vs. future

#### “Intl vanguardism” = selfish pursuit of power & status

- **Utopia of Souths**
  - Association w/ peers can reflect negatively on Self
  - Deontic motive; Selfish vanguardism
  - Relationships sources of insecurity & negativity – transform relations to assume aspirational Self
  - Regionalism = resistance to Western dominance

- **Tying SA destiny to Africa’s prosperity**
  - Rationalizing African integration
  - Prioritizing Africa to improve SA image
  - Characterizing African peers
  - Assuming leadership in Africa
  - Helping Africa develop & grow
  - Cautioning against ODA as neo-colonial strategy

- **AFRICA**
  - Our struggle for a better life in South Africa is intertwined with our pursuit of a better Africa in a better world. Its destiny is inextricably linked to that of the Southern African region.
  - Regional and continental integration is the foundation for Africa’s socio-economic development and political unity, and essential for our own prosperity and security. Consequently, Africa is at the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy.
  - South Africa must therefore continue to support regional and continental processes to respond to and resolve crises, strengthen regional integration, significantly increase intra-African trade, and champion sustainable development and opportunities in Africa.
  - South Africa will intensify its engagements in the AU and its structures in order for the AU to fulfil its role in building African unity and the social and economic development of the continent. South Africa will continue to champion the role of the AU as the primary organisation for coordinating continental positions with development partners and caution against Official Development Assistance (ODA) being used to impede African unity and solidarity. At the same time, South Africa will continue to advance common African positions through its structured bilateral activities and other international fora.

- **South Africa in need of a better life, so the entire world is assumed to need a better life**
  - Africa needs to be developed to ensure SA prosperity & security; “selfish altruism”.
  - Africa presented as “underdeveloped”, “unstable” & “crisis-prone”
  - SA as Africa’s leader; a beacon of hope for “helpless” Africa
  - AU needs SA to achieve its mandate; without SA, no development, unity, prosperity

- **LDCs presented almost as NO; negative attitude toward “backward” POs. Tension between aspirations & historic loyalties/obligations; Africa holding SA back from destiny**

- Continued “championing” of “developing world”, even after assuming role as emerging power, serves to enhance SA power in international fora: SA needs Africa to backup global power aspirations

- **South Africa**
  - Assumed identity as developed nation
  - Expressing conflict between aspirations & obligations
  - Recognizing that power & influence come from Africa

- **International fora. In this context, South Africa should continue to champion the solidarity and the concerns of the South. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that strong bilateral relations enhance the strength of South Africa’s international positions and influence in multilateral organisations and groupings.**
<p>| SA Self as Colonial Other (Colonial Self) | Replacing West | Peace, stability, and security are essential preconditions for development. Increased global competition for access to natural resources, as well as demographic pressures, and energy, food and water scarcities, will increasingly pose the threat of future conflicts. These challenges may be exacerbated by socio-cultural, ethnic and religious divides. The most effective response to these challenges lies in regional political and economic integration and addressing colonial legacies and neo-colonial influences. South Africa will therefore continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction. South Africa will continue to work with the AU to discourage unconstitutional changes in governments. It will also continue to support AU and UN initiatives to find just and lasting solutions to outstanding issues of self-determination and decolonisation on the African continent. South Africa subscribes to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. [end of page 20] The African Union is determined to reinvigorate peace and security initiatives, reinforced through the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In this regard, it is critical to strengthen the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and the AU Peace and Security Council, and its linkage to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Recognising the importance of the African Standby Forces (ASF) for achieving the African Union’s peace and security aims, South Africa will work with SADC and its member states to maintain the readiness of the SADC Brigade. Support for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) remains important to assist the continent consolidate democracy and meet universally accepted standards of participatory democracy. |
| Other (Colonial Self) | Rationalizing Africa Agenda | Regional policies (BRICS, AU, African integration) acts of resistance against Western rules, Western World |
| Absolving Self from moral critique: SA involved in Africa to prevent Western dominance &amp; exploitation | Constructing utopia of Souths | SA intervention superior to Western intervention; how? |
| |Replacing NO as major peacekeeping force | Struggle narrative: opposition to colonialism continues |
| | Leading African struggle for freedom/ autonomy | SA unlike NO; respects Others, does not interfere, colonize |
| | Characterizing Self | Supporting African initiatives keeps West out of SA’s territory; ASF, AUPSC, SADC Brigade, APRM all ensure stability and peace in Africa, with dual objective of avoiding destabilization that could affect SA, and keeping West out of Africa |
| Regionalism as resistance | Motivating policy shifts | |
| | Soothing narc. wound through Other (rep. char. leadership) | |
| | Pleading continued support for African initiatives | |
| | Helping AU | |
| | | |
| Regionalism as resistance to Western intervention | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narc. supply (African as embarrassment)</th>
<th>Helping Africa reach intl. standards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identifying ways to improve Africa</td>
<td>Structural changes in the global economy are opening up opportunities to position Africa as a significant player in the global economy. Africa is benefitting greatly from the demand for its natural resources as a result of the rise of emerging powers. However, this carries the risk of the continent remaining mainly a supplier of raw materials. Africa has a unique opportunity now to alter existing trading paradigms by restructuring its economies to support value-addition, industrialisation and intra-African trade. Both traditional and emerging powers are taking notice of these new opportunities and are therefore increasing economic and diplomatic activities on the continent. Despite starting from a very low economic base, in the next fifteen years the resource-fuelled growth in a number of African countries will create both opportunities and challenges for South Africa in terms of new markets and political influence. Likewise, other African economic growth centres are taking advantage of this potential. South Africa should therefore continue to develop partnerships with key countries on the continent as a mechanism for mutual advancement. The acceleration of Africa’s regional integration is imperative for its future economic competitiveness and its development and prosperity, consistent with the global trend towards regional economic integration. Essential in this regard will be the development of skills, infrastructure and interconnectivity, intra-regional trade, common markets, and the removal of trade barriers. Challenges include harmonising policies, addressing overlapping memberships, developing cooperative sovereignty, and the asymmetrical nature of the South African economy in comparison with that of the region. Africa must respond urgently to these challenges in order to avoid again being locked into structural dependencies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Double standard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resistance to Western dominance;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transformation agenda (demands for</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>restitution)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonial Self</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relationships as means to an end</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-image through association /</td>
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<tr>
<td>relationships construct ID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recognizing SA hegemony</td>
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</table>

Africa’s success is considered South Africa’s success – it reflects well on the country, increases status & stature in intl politics

Relationships not simply for goodwill and friendship; relationships advance selfish interests & contain threats

Emphasis on accelerated African development; urgent need for African image to be improved

Somehow emerging powers’ demand for African resources more acceptable than Western demand? Africa suffers from Western exploitation, benefits from emerging power exploitation Africa as colonial product: merely a supplier of raw materials
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utopia of Souths as resistance to Colonial World</th>
<th>Criticizing Africa’s lack of dev.?</th>
<th>[end of page 21] NEPAD is the socio-economic development programme of the AU that also represents a comprehensive vision for Africa’s renewal. South Africa, in cooperation with its African partners, should continue to support the implementation of NEPAD programmes, particularly those that strengthen cross-border infrastructure development, ICT, agricultural, tourism, capacity building and industrialisation. Future African economic prosperity and unity will be realised to the extent that the continent is able to rationalise and streamline the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as building blocks for African integration. Complementarities continue to exist in areas such as agriculture, energy, and water that will drive industrial development and regional integration. Failure to maximise the advantages that these complementarities offer will leave regions vulnerable to external interests. South Africa will therefore prioritise a constructive leadership role to accelerate and deepen integration in our region. The integration of SADC remains critical for the economic development of the region and for South Africa’s global competitiveness. Regional economic cooperation and integration offers an opportunity for regional industries to overcome the limits of small national markets, achieve economies of scale, and enhance competitiveness as a platform to participate in the global economy. South Africa therefore will advance a developmental integrated agenda in southern Africa that combines trade integration, infrastructure development and sectoral policy coordination that will correct imbalances in current relations. The region must be allowed to determine its own regional integration agenda and pace, without external interference. South Africa will continue to</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Self (selfish vanguardism to secure interests)</td>
<td>Motivating support for NEPAD</td>
<td>Support to AU ensures implementation of NEPAD reforms &amp; the achievement of SA’s African Renaissance vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopia of Souths</td>
<td>Implementing NEPAD &amp; achieving African renaissance</td>
<td>Need for Africa to become prosperous Africa a burden to SA?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narc. supply: SADC as source of status, power &amp; influence in IR</td>
<td>Realizing African future</td>
<td>SA dominance in Africa presented as positive: helps free Africa from Western dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projecting/ Absolving moral dilemma</td>
<td>Constructing African utopia</td>
<td>Self-Object id: Complementarity SA pushing SADC integration to achieve global competitiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifying w/ POs</td>
<td>Presents SADC agenda as anti-hegemonic policy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Resisting Western interference
Taking lead on SADC integration

Describing SADC strategy

Presenting SADC agenda as continental benefit

Presenting trade relations as support for continental eco. development
Capitalizing on African markets

place particular focus on cross-border infrastructure development, in collaboration with other development partners. The strengthening of governance and institutional capacity within SADC is an urgent and essential requirement to ensure the economic viability of the region. South Africa will continue to support the regional economic programme of SADC that provides for policy co-ordination and convergence, sectoral co-operation and market integration through the SADC Free Trade Area. The integration of SADC, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC) will advance political unity and economic strength of Africa. South Africa will strongly support the transformation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) into a vehicle for advancing and deepening developmental integration, particularly as an anchor in the SADC regional project. This transformation can only be achieved through the development of common trade and industrial policies, as well as strategies to build production value chains across all member states, underpinned by regional infrastructure development programmes. South Africa continues to strengthen trade and investment relations with countries across the African continent in support of the economic agenda of the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). This is underpinned by a strong bilateral country focus. Africa will remain an important export destination for value-added goods and services from South Africa. However, most imports from the rest of the continent to South Africa are restricted to a narrow range of primary goods.

Does not welcome guidance from outside in achieving integration aims; wants to find an African way, not follow the EU way

South Africa assuming responsibility for trade & FDI in Africa; almost like an African trade attache
<p>| Deontic motive                        | Narc. supply                                    | Differentiating SA products from POs Rationalizing eco. policies in Africa Presenting African eco. policy as beneficial to Africa Assuming leadership of African eco. affairs in intl. institutions Leveraging int'l rel to support African development Calling Africa to responsibility Explaining African bilateral relations Explaining ODA strategy in Africa Aligning int'l obligs with regional obligs Delegitimizing Western ODA SADPA replacing Western donors Claiming SA aid superiority | In this regard, South Africa is committed to building mutually beneficial trade relations through supporting the diversification of economies, and addressing trade barriers and capacity constraints. South Africa will implement policies that promote outward investment into the continent. South Africa will support Africa to take advantage of market-access arrangements such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD). It should continue to leverage its strategic relations with countries such as China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, the USA, as well as the EU, to assist Africa with its socio-economic development. Africa should also utilise its own resources in support of its own development needs. South Africa’s relations with individual African countries remain central to its foreign policy practice. It will continue to strengthen bilateral cooperation with African countries by engaging in sustainable partnerships for development, including through the promotion of trade and investment; the establishment of joint projects for infrastructure development; and the provision of technical assistance for institutional and policy development. South Africa will also pursue closer synergy between its bilateral and multilateral engagements in the region. South Africa will continue to engage internationally on aid effectiveness, increased global development assistance, and strengthening development partnerships. The South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) will be an important instrument to promote more effective development cooperation. It will therefore pursue bilateral cooperation with African countries as well as trilateral cooperation with international partners in support of African development. | SA industries superior to African industries | Implementing policies domestically to support investment in Africa (but, who really benefits)? Investment &amp; status? SA to help Africa develop, but also calling on Africa to “help itself” Structuralist rhetoric: “Trade, not aid”: South Africa as equitable partner, unlike West which is against development on African industries &amp; eco. growth Aid &amp; status? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationships w North to support dev. agenda</th>
<th>Using relations w North for African dev.</th>
<th>[end of page 23]</th>
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</table>
| Resistance to Colonial World Delegitimization strategy | Characterizing int'l pol. landscape Delegitimizing colonial pol. architecture | **MULTILATERALISM**

As the established global multilateral architecture has its roots in the post-Second World War context, it is no longer able to adequately respond to the challenges facing an interdependent world in the 21st century, which are complex and global in nature, threatening our collective wellbeing and placing increased pressure on the global system of governance. These challenges encompass issues such as human security, environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation, development, political and economic crises, human rights, disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As a result, unilaterism is no longer an option to address these challenges. Multilateral cooperation is more relevant than ever before in seeking equitable multilateral solutions to global problems. The United Nations (UN) system, through its universal membership and broad mandate, occupies the central and indispensable role within the global system of governance.

The developing world, especially Africa, has a limited voice and participation in the decision- and policy-making processes of the global trade, economic and financial institutions. This weakens the world’s response to the developmental agenda of Africa and the South. A continued over-emphasis by the developed world on issues of peace and security undermine efforts to deal with the root causes of poverty and underdevelopment. To address this imbalance, South Africa will promote the increased alignment between the developmental agenda of Africa and the South and that of global organisations. In this regard, South Africa will work in partnership with other African countries to forge a collective vision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resistance to Colonial World</th>
<th>Delegitimizing Western strategies Pitting alt. policies against Western policies Recognizing role of UN globally Victimizing Africa Delegitimizing Bretton Woods Delegitimizing global North Scapegoating Blaming North for South’s pts. Pitting SA’s proactive app vs. North’s passive app</th>
<th>Current pol system constructed by victors of WWs = “West’s world” Feels threatened, uncertain of future. Does it really experience these threats as real, or is this rhetoric aimed at mobilizing support for its agenda?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim narrative Demands for equality (justice &amp; restitution)</td>
<td>Blames global North for South’s problems; North’s policies not doing enough to help South Also expectation that North should help South; why should North formulate policies with South in mind? Turning back on institutions of global governance designed &amp; dominated by North, b/c not inclusive enough of South SA proactive; North passive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation agenda</td>
<td>Characterizing Self as “partner”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalism = resistance to Colonial World</td>
<td>Describing utopian alt. world; delegitimizing Col. World</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation agenda</td>
<td>Taking active role in transformation of intl order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to Colonial World</td>
<td>Explaining role in intl. fora/groupings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narc. desire for status, power</td>
<td>Describing utopian world</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narc. need to be seen as “altruistic”</td>
<td>South Africa’s foreign policy will continue to recognise the importance of multilateralism and a rules-based international system that is governed by international law. It will remain an active participant in the efforts to comprehensively reform the architecture of global governance, including the UN system and the Bretton Woods Institutions, to make them more effective, legitimate, and responsive to the needs of the developing world. South Africa must continue to support a development outcome to the WTO Doha Round and to achieve this, will continue to play an active role in the Africa Group, G77 and NAMA 11. Effective multilateralism rests on the political will of countries to honour their obligations under international law and commitments agreed to in multilateral institutions. The UN utilises its resolutions as one of its instrument to encourage and promote cooperation among Member States on a variety of issues. However, many resolutions of the UN, in particular those adopted by the General Assembly are not enforceable and therefore not implemented. The lack of enforcement poses a challenge to the effectiveness of the multilateral system to address global challenges. South Africa strongly supports the reform of the United Nations system in pursuit of greater equity in decision making, balanced against increased efficiency and effectiveness. Whilst pursuing equitable representation of Africa on the United Nations Security Council, South Africa seeks to become a permanent member itself. Meanwhile, South Africa will use non-permanent membership as a strategic opportunity to advance the interests of Africa and the South. It will also champion the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations, in particular the African Union.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SA narratively constructed as partner of Africa &amp; South, vs. North as “unresponsive” hegemon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NOs = UN, Bretton Woods; “unresponsive”, “unrepresentative”, “ineffective”, “illegitimate”</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>POs = G77, Regional groupings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feels violated by abuse of power &amp; non-adherence to common rules; pickets for transformation of system (cf. historical feelings of emasculation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soothes narcissistic wound (emasculation) by gaining a seat on SC: Gets retribution for past injustices by “fixing” Africa’s situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Also, seat on UNSC = power, status, influence; indicates preoccupation with these “qualities” – wants to be part of the “Club”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalism = resistance to colonial world</td>
<td>Rationalizing alt. world</td>
<td>An emerging trend is for like-minded countries to form groupings outside the formal multilateral structures in order to address specific issues affecting the international community. Groups such as the G20, Major Economies Forum, BASIC, IBSA and BRICS have grown in prominence and are focused on global issues related to political, security, environment and economic matters. South Africa supports the use of such groupings as an important mechanism for consensus building, whilst recognizing the centrality of the UN and ensuring that these groupings should strengthen the primacy of the UN. South Africa’s multilateral relations with the South will continue to find expression particularly through the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), the Commonwealth, the NAM, and the G77. South Africa is a strong proponent of multilateralism as a necessary intergovernmental response to managing globalisation and the deepening interdependence of national economies. The marginalisation of many countries in the global economy, particularly those in Africa, and the question of coherence in global economic policy-making are some of the key challenges confronting the international community in the context of an integrating global economy. In this regard, the G20 has become the premier global forum to coordinate an integrated and coherent global response to financial and economic crises. South Africa will seek to ensure the G20’s responsiveness to African developmental needs. It also uses its membership to advance the reform of the International Financial Institutions to give a stronger voice and greater representation to the developing world in the interest of a transparent, stable and equitable global financial system. [end of page 25]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiating Colonial World from Utopia of Souths</td>
<td>Motivating reg. memberships</td>
<td>Why does SA feel the need to rationalize membership? Stating ambitions to construct alternative world as potentially more responsive to needs of South POs = G20, MEF, BASIC, IBSA, BRICS (narratively constructed as “growing”, “focused” vs. “declining”, “chaotic” institutions of Col. World)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underlying fear of globalization; mistrust of Others &amp; dependence on them</td>
<td>Rationalizing memberships outside UN</td>
<td>Tension b/w UN loyalty &amp; alt-world agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM factor</td>
<td>Identifying with POs</td>
<td>POs = ACP, Commonwealth, NAM, G77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hero narrative Seeking restitution through FP</td>
<td>Stating fear of globalization, need to “manage”</td>
<td>Uses Intl. relations to soothe feelings of insecurity/uncertainty due to globalization PO id: marginalized victims; Africa is the “biggest victim” of failing global system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constructing Africa as biggest victim in IR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifying global problems</td>
<td>Self-appointed voice of Africa; and entire South</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Motivating G20 membership</td>
<td>Freedom fighter of entire world: struggle hero id (fighting for global democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Characterizing Self as hero of marginallized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validation through success of POs</td>
<td>Identifying with BRICS agenda Explaining BRICS membership IRO transformation agenda.</td>
<td>South Africa will actively participate in the BRICS, whose members are reshaping the global economic and political order. We will use our membership as a strategic opportunity to advance the interests of Africa in global issues such as the reform of global governance, the work of the G20, International trade, development, energy and climate change. South Africa remains committed to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, as well as being a responsible producer, possessor and trader of advanced nuclear technologies. It supports the inalienable right of nations to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Based on the Pelindaba Treaty, South Africa continues to support Africa as a nuclear weapons free zone. Following the successful hosting of UNCTAD, the World Conference against Racism (WCAR), the World Economic Forum, and the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD), NAM, CHOGM and the launch of the AU, South Africa remains willing to host high-level conferences, as a valuable diplomatic platform in support of multilateralism and global consensus. South Africa will continue to cooperate with the United Nations Organisation, Specialised Agencies, and other accredited international organisations present in South Africa to align their activities with the country’s domestic priorities. In this regard, there is a need to enhance its international representation through the candidatures and secondment of South Africans into strategic positions in key regional, continental and global governance institutions. As part of its commitment to ensuring peace and stability in zones of conflict, South Africa encourages multilateral options in seeking global solutions. South Africa also remains committed to the major international instruments for the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships as means to an end</td>
<td>Reiterating centrality of domestic polic in FP Enhancing status through high-profile posts in intl organizations</td>
<td>BRICS = means to achieve transformation/resistance agenda Rationalizing BRICS membership as strategic decision to advance Africa Agenda: cf. need not to be seen as hegemonic power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narc. need for recognition; preoccupation with power &amp; status</td>
<td></td>
<td>Status in IR: hosting international events as soft power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SA not aligning its own activities; world must structure their activities to SA priorities; Perhaps mistrust of hidden agendas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Addresses doubts re. commitment to human rights, R2P Lip-service?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipating &amp; addressing “fears” of Others</td>
<td>Iterating commitment to FP values</td>
<td>Promotion and protection of human rights and advocates a holistic approach that places equal emphasis on civil and political rights as well as social, economic and cultural rights.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Preoccupations with greatness Wealth = Self worth | Strategizing achievement of greater power & status; success | **ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY**  
South Africa’s future global and continental standing will be determined by how South Africa remains true to its enduring values, economic success, and the continued leadership role on the continent. The success of its economic diplomacy will determine the extent to which South Africa can achieve its domestic priorities. For South Africa to meet these priorities, its economy must be able to participate competitively in the global market place.  
South Africa’s integration into the global economy is laid out in the *South African Trade Policy and Strategy Framework*. The aim is to pursue national economic policy objectives and leverage opportunities that arise from global markets and increasing flows of global trade and investment. South Africa’s economic diplomacy will therefore be focused on providing guidance to government and the business sector on economic developments and markets, pursuing market access for South African products, attracting investments and tourism, removing barriers to trade, and supporting the development of larger markets in Africa. It should also enhance competitiveness of South African goods and services in the major global markets, while maintaining its international reputation as a stable and reliable supplier. **Central** to South Africa’s economic diplomacy is the pursuit of a fair and equitable rules-based international trade regime that accommodates the developmental interests of developing countries. In the context of the WTO Doha Development Round, South Africa must [end of page 26]  
Need to achieve equal status (material) as SOs (also need for ontological equality, eg. In UNSC etc.?)* |
| Seeks validation through recognition | Transitioning discourse Explaining Eco. diplo. Sources, aims & objectives | Why does SA feel the need to reiterate its commitment to its own values? Responding to critiques?  
Economic diplomacy motivated by need for status, power, influence in IR Needs success (esp. economic)  
Need to achieve equal status (material) as SOs (also need for ontological equality, eg. In UNSC etc.?) |
| Transformation agenda Justice & restitution | Rationalizing need for alt-world order | SA needs alt-world order to achieve domestic priorities; transformation agenda central to eco. diplo |
| Demands for justice & restitution for past injustices | Painting victimhood of Colonial rules & system Expressing fear of eco. exclusion & mistrust of IR, even POs | ensure that the outcome is beneficial to its economy and remedies the negative consequences of its classification in the Uruguay Round. Deepened regional economic integration and the proliferation of Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs), especially in Asia and Latin America, carry the risk of excluding South African goods and services from these markets. Economic diplomacy should therefore explore ways to strengthen ties with other regional economic groupings that allow for a more strategic integration process amongst developing countries. Economic diplomacy should further seek outcomes that deal more effectively with non-tariff barriers in all markets. South Africa’s development objectives require the negotiation of mutually beneficial sectoral co-operation agreements and investment treaties that support South Africa’s development policy space. Regional integration arrangements such as FTAs and RTAs provide the necessary environment for national companies to compete globally. As the majority of intra-African trade takes place within own regional trading blocs, it is necessary to stimulate inter-regional trade as stepping stones for deepening continental integration. South Africa will therefore support the harmonisation of policies and standards across the continent, as strengthened regional integration presents opportunities for regional industries [end of page 27] to overcome the limits of small national markets, achieve economies of scale, and enhance competitiveness as a platform to participate in the global economy. South African economic diplomacy in the region will therefore support an integrated development strategy for SACU, SADC and the continent that includes Spatial Development Initiatives, | Victim, reliving colonial injustice |
| Narc. suspicion | Delegitimizing existing fin. system Seeking alternative partnerships/agreements | SA mistrusts intentions of even POs Anticipating malice / threat of further marginalization Fear drives partnerships |
| Transformation agenda Seeking justice & restitution | Prioritizing integration to improve Africa’s image & status | SA feels itself victim of “oppressive”, “unfair” international system; drives construction of alternative order that is more sympathetic to its ambitions |
| Differentiating from POs Selfish vanguardism | Characterizing African peers Strengthening trade for more wealth, power | Is Africa’s lack of competitiveness & (material) power an embarrassment to SA? |
| Raising statues & influence through association w/ future economic powers | Explaining eco. diplomacy in Africa | Constructing South as future of eco. growth & power Piggybacking on South’s success Using relations w/ POs Pitting “dynamic” South against “declining” North | investment promotion into the region, region-wide industrial development linkages as well as the development of supply-side capacity that will enable countries in the region to diversify their economies and take advantage of opportunities for more dynamic and diverse exports. South-South trade is expanding rapidly and the major new sources of growth in the global economy are in the South. Common challenges and shared perspectives provide an opportunity for South Africa to strengthen our trade and investment linkages. South Africa will have to pursue value-added exports to the new emerging markets in order to deal with structural trade imbalances. The dynamism of the economic growth in the South should be harnessed to support the diversification and industrialization of African economies. Economic diplomacy will target foreign direct investment to South Africa and Africa as well as assist in the development of human, institutional, technological and infrastructural resources. Successful economic diplomacy requires a close partnership with government, business, and labour. A coordinated government-wide effort is essential to promote South Africa’s economic interests in the international arena, including the use of high-level engagements. South African Missions abroad are key in these endeavours and must be adequately resourced for these purposes. In particular, they can assist South African business aboard [sic] through advice, advocacy, and market access support. The Department must therefore improve its economic research capacity to strengthen its economic diplomacy. Within the partnership of government, business, and labour it is important that South Africa’s values, principles, and reputation are reflected in their conduct abroad. Government |
| Relationships as means to end | | | Relationships with POs help overcome historical injustices; utopia of Souths achieves justice & restitution for past injustices POs narratively constructed as “dynamic”, “growing”, “succeeding” vs. “failing”, “declining”, “threatened” & “irrelevant” NOs |
Preoccupations with power & status

Utopia of Souths Resistance to Colonial World

Relationships as means to an end

Relationships driven by need to be recognized / included

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POs</td>
<td>Associations w/ emerging powers = future power, influence, status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>Trade with POs allows SA to escape its status as “poor”, “underdeveloped”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asia is of increasing importance to South Africa and Africa. Power shifts in the global political and economic system have increased the relevance of the Asian region, with major emerging powers such as China and India increasing their global influence. The Asian region has been experiencing on average higher economic growth than other regions. Its growing economic importance is also reflected in South Africa’s changing trade patterns with Asia. The accelerating economic integration of Asia, with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the core, holds both opportunities and challenges for South Africa.

Asia has become South Africa’s largest trading region and an increasingly important source of investment, particularly China, India and Japan. South Africa must increase its value-added exports to this region in order to address its generally large trade deficit. South Africa should focus on identifying under-explored markets in the region that will provide new export opportunities. Asian markets are characterised by severe competition and proliferation of free trade agreements. South Africa therefore runs the risk of marginalisation and exclusion from supply networks, and will pursue a comprehensive trade strategy to improve South Africa’s competitiveness and anchor it in Asian markets.

Almost taking ownership of Africa; speaks on behalf of Africa about who/what is important to Africa

POs = China, India

Association w/ emerging powers = future power, influence, status

Asia represents alternative partners to “oppressive” North

Validation through relationships: SA considers itself a future global power and associates with “future leaders”

should provide sufficient intelligence on market conditions, as well as local cultural nuances that would assist business to better access those markets and act in a socially responsible manner.

[end of page 28]
| Transformation agenda | Cooperating with Asia to further national interest | Asia will play a meaningful role in contributing to South Africa’s domestic priorities through cooperation in space, science and technology, education and skills development, health, infrastructure, and mineral beneficiation. Tourism to South Africa will be further developed. Innovation and commercialisation of green technology could be a new area of cooperation in the face of the challenges of climate change. The political ascendancy of Asia will be increasingly reflected in the global system of governance, peace and security, and finance. This provides opportunities for South Africa to closely cooperate in multilateral organisations in order to reform the global architecture. A possible challenge to the solidarity of the South is the positioning of emerging powers to associate more closely with the traditional powers. |
| Resistance to Colonial World | Explaining Asia policy / strategy | [end of page 29] |
| Assuming greatness through relations with “giants” | Defining Asia’s role in transformation agenda | South Africa should not lose sight of the fact that there are also many middle powers in Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of Korea and Vietnam that are both partners and competitors. South Africa will leverage the fact that these countries share similar views on reform of global governance, solidarity and economic justice. South Africa will continue to work with development partners in Asia for the implementation of NEPAD programmes. |
| Validation through association | Expressing fear of POs aliging w NOs | South Africa should closely monitor unresolved issues in Asia such as territorial disputes, domestic political instability, as well as religious and ethnic extremism, and the risk of nuclear proliferation as these have the potential to disrupt economic relations and pose challenges for South Africa’s core values of democracy, human rights, and non-proliferation. South Africa must take note of the fact that the Indian Ocean Rim has become the world's major energy and resource supply route to the fast-growing Asian economies, and that the major

<p>| Idealizing Asian Other Transformation agenda | Identifying potential partners | Asia as essential tool to achieve transformation agenda; Asia allows SA to escape history |
| Relationships as narcissistic supply | Idealizing and villainizing POs | Jealous of new partners; does not want to “share” them with NOs |
| Self-validation by devaluing stronger other | Identifying with Asian Other | SA identifies w PO b/c of similar ideological orientations toward transformation of intl system &amp; opposition to Western dominance |
| Mistrust even “close” partners (paranoid traits?) | Devaluing Asian Other | Asian problems as threat to SA’s future; friendships only extend so far EU is NO, but shares “core values”, why is Asia PO? Does this suggest that “core values” are empty ideals? |
| | Differentiating from POs | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification w/ PO</th>
<th>PO = Palestine (NO = Isreal?)</th>
<th>SA sees Palestinian “struggle” as extension of SA struggle for freedom</th>
<th>Soothing narc. wound through healing Palestine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Char. Leadership</td>
<td>Protection eco. interests in ME (oil)</td>
<td>GCC PO/NO? Difficult to say how SA identifies w/ Gulf countries</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stating support for Palestine based on struggle history</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identifying w/ Palestinian Other Appropriating Palest. struggle</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Motivating shift to alt. energies</td>
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Global powers have a heightened military presence in the region. Consequently, a maritime security policy for Africa becomes essential.

**MIDDLE EAST**

South Africa’s foreign policy in the Middle East will have to take cognisance of changing and complex regional dynamics as well as competing interests of major powers. Political developments in the region continue to have a major impact on the global economy especially with reference to energy price stability and supplies. South Africa will remain consistent in its support for the peaceful settlement of disputes in the region, in particular the Middle East Peace Process premised on a two-state solution, and continue to pursue a diplomatic role based on South Africa’s successful political transition and solidarity with the Palestinian people. Through various mechanisms, South Africa will continue to support the developmental and humanitarian needs in Palestine.

It is important to engage the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries for the realisation of South Africa’s development priorities. The Gulf region has adopted an agenda for development and seeks to reduce its economic reliance on finite resource commodities. The diminishing oil and gas reserves necessitate the consideration of alternative oil suppliers as well as renewable energy for South Africa in the long term.

Middle Eastern markets remain small, but the growing population and oil wealth offer South Africa opportunities, particularly in agro-processing, construction and civil engineering, engineering technologies in gas to liquid energy production, and its advanced service sector. South Africa
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationships as means to an end</th>
<th>Using relations to achieve African Renaissance</th>
<th>should continue to source investments from the Gulf region’s Sovereign Wealth Funds as well as private investors, including in support of continental initiatives such as NEPAD projects.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Objectifying NO?                 | Defining relations with EU                     | **EUROPE**  
Europe will remain of *strategic interest* to South Africa. European enlargement has created the largest economic bloc in the world and presents a leading model of regional integration. The [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union) remains South Africa’s largest trading partner, with the region generating more than a third of South Africa’s total trade. It remains an *important* source of foreign direct investment and official development assistance into South Africa, as well as a primary market for tourism. Bilateral relations with European nations in general extend considerably beyond political, diplomatic and trade relations, finding expression through cooperation in areas of science and technology, arts and culture and shared values around democracy and human rights. |
| Defining EU as “source” of wealth | Describing EU-SA relations / Europe policy     | **Notwithstanding** Europe’s economic challenges, such as an aging population, high debt levels, and low-growth economies, South Africa will continue to encourage European partners to be engaged in the development of the African continent, meet their development assistance commitments, as well as push for the reform of the [Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)](https://europa.eu/health/food_policy/agriculture_en) due to its detrimental effects on development in Africa. |
| Devaluing NO                      | Devaluing NO                                    | South Africa will continue to leverage its [strategic partnerships](https://europa.eu/health/food_policy/agriculture_en) with the EU and its major member states to meet its domestic priorities, open up market opportunities, attract increased foreign direct investment, and support the AU’s peace and security initiatives. South Africa will also continue to cooperate and engage with European countries beyond the EU, such as Russia and Turkey, recognising their important role in regional |
| Rationalizing relations w/ EU     | Pushing for reform on behalf of Africa         | Sovereign Wealth Fund as alternative source of dev. assistance? |
|                                 | Using relations w/ EU to achieve domestic aims  | **“Interest” vs. “importance”**  
EU integration as “example” for African integration (however, SA say it does not want to follow any other examples?) |
<p>|                                 | Recognizing Russia, Turkey as “important”      | Cf. “Asia has become South Africa’s largest trading region” (p. 29; 35 <em>intra</em>) |
| Victim narrative Transformation agenda |                                 | Unlike “growing”, “dynamic” PO, NO is “aging”, “indebted”, “declining” Africa victim of EU “detrimental” policies |
| Relationships as means to an end |                                 | SA relationship with EU all about transforming global order &amp; intl. policies |
|                                 |                                 | Does recognition of Russia &amp; Turkey suggest “non-recognition” of EU Europe? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations as means to an end</th>
<th>Identifying with Nordic countries as POs based on history</th>
<th>and global politics. South Africa will build on its historical strong ties of friendship and mutual understanding with the Nordic countries to shift from donor cooperation to building long-term sustainable economic and scientific relations. South Africa and Europe will continue to enjoy strategic and multifaceted political, economic and social cooperation, which translates into close, substantial and fruitful relations. The focus on trilateral cooperation as a platform for advancing economic development in Africa, as well as support for the continent’s peace and security architecture will be maintained. Economic relations will continue including initiatives in support of the Africa Agenda. South Africa must ensure that the trading relationship between Europe and Africa must support the continent’s regional integration agenda as well as its development objectives. South Africa’s relations with Europe cut across the EU, the region consists of members of the G8, G20, permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC and regular engagement through both multilateral and bilateral interaction on all levels is essential. The Lisbon Treaty has introduced a more coherent and effective Common Foreign and Security Policy that impacts on Africa and South Africa. The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership will continue to drive future Africa-EU relations, based on the Joint Action Plan, which includes institutional and financial support for the AU and its institutions, as well as support for the African peace and security architecture. This provides both an opportunity and challenge for South Africa to engage with the EU to promote the African Agenda through its strategic partnership with the EU.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sacrificing Self to honor responsibility to Africa</td>
<td>Describing EU relations / policy</td>
<td>Nordic countries supported ANC in anti-apartheid struggle; also former colonies (eg. Finland); positive identification based on historical similarities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Leveraging EU relations to support Africa Agenda</td>
<td>Something disjointed about language used to describe these relations vs. relations with POs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serving development agenda through trade</td>
<td>SA’s relations with Europe necessitated by global political memberships, but not necessarily seen as beneficial or close</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rationalizing need for relations w/ EU</td>
<td>Needs Europe for African development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Responding to policies affecting SA/Africa.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relations as means to an end</td>
<td>Using relations to meet dom. aims</td>
<td>Characterizing US as “dominant” Rationalizing relations with US</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Differentiating between vastly different “Americas”</td>
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<td>AMERICAS AND THE CARIBBEAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Within the Western Hemisphere, the Americas and Caribbean span a vast geographical area that includes developed, developing, and least developed economies as well as regional and global powers. Stark contrasts exist among these countries, <em>inter alia</em>, in terms of territorial size, populations, economies, technologies, and military power. The diversity within this hemisphere necessitates a nuanced foreign policy approach and offers a wide range of opportunities for engagement that spans the whole spectrum of South Africa’s foreign policy priorities.</td>
<td>Using relations to meet dom. aims</td>
<td>Describing America policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa’s bilateral relations with the countries of the Americas and the Caribbean will serve as a firm foundation for advancing multilateral cooperation as well as to promote South Africa’s domestic priorities. South Africa’s total trade with the Americas will continue to be of great importance for its development trajectory with further potential for substantial growth in trade and investment. The core objective would be to leverage economic bilateral relations with countries in the Americas for partnerships to support sustainable economic growth, social development, and capacity building. Bilateral relations would therefore be used to enhance economic, scientific, technical, and business opportunities through structured bilateral mechanisms. The USA will continue to remain a dominant political, economic and military power, with significant potential for South African and African trade, tourism, and investment. The economies of North America remain vital sources of investment and technology, and will remain prominent trading partners for South Africa and Africa. South Africa will therefore continue to build its trade and investment relations with which “Americas”?</td>
<td>USA = cash; relations with USA &amp; Canada cannot be sidestepped because of US’s sheer size and political weight</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rationalizing relations by presenting them as “altruistic sacrifices” for Africa’s benefit.

SA almost acting as self-appointed ambassador of Africa to the US & Canada.

Immediate change of tone;
Rising powers enable transformation of SA’s political relations.
Brazil’s emerging power status deemed to be useful to SA.
PO = Brazil
Mult. Objectives = transformation of intl. pol. organizations.

PO = Cuba
If Cuba-SA relations are the “benchmark” of “mutually beneficial cooperation”, what does that say about SA-EU/SA-US relations?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transformation agenda</th>
<th>Resistance to the Colonial World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identifying with PO Characterizing Self &amp; PO</td>
<td>Latin America and Africa share similar development trajectories, characterised by resource-based economies and single-commodity exports as well as similar patterns of underdevelopment and poverty. This creates both opportunities and challenges for economic cooperation in the Latin American region. Mutual benefits exist in terms of sharing best practices in socio-economic development, mining, agro-processing, beneficiation of mineral products, science and technology, and infrastructure development. South Africa will utilise the SACU/MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement to foster complementarities in its industrial, agricultural and services sectors. South Africa’s geo-strategic location between Latin America and Asia provides the opportunity to position itself as a trade and transport hub between these two regions. In addition, contact with the African Diaspora in the region would serve to enhance relations with South Africa and the African continent, especially with respect to the Caribbean countries. The African Diaspora in the Americas, particularly in the Caribbean, continues to have significance for South Africa in light of their support for Africa’s liberation and a shared vision of an equitable world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delineating policy areas of SA-South Americas cooperation</td>
<td>[end of page 34]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining Self as “gateway” to China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situating Dept. in FP process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. TAKING DIPLOMACY FORWARD

In 2009, the Department of Foreign Affairs was renamed as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in order to respond in order to better align South Africa’s foreign policy and domestic objectives. This provided the Department with an opportunity to redefine its role in building deeper and more expansive relations and using these partnerships to advance South Africa’s national interests. Global issues shaping the environment in which South Africa operates are increasingly

PO = Latin America
SA identifies positively w/ “underdeveloped”, “poor” PO (also former colonies)

PO = Caribbean countries

Relations driven by ideological complementarities & support for SA’s agenda; Narc. supply.

If nat. interest is resistance & transformation, then domestic objective is also to transform the unequal geographies of present global relations
complex and multidimensional and require a coherent cross-sectoral approach and a coordinated response across all spheres of government, public enterprises, the private sector, labour, civil society, and other non-state actors. In order for South Africa to maximise the benefits from the successful implementation of its foreign policy, a coordinated approach is essential to address weaknesses of working in a compartmentalised manner.

In order to ensure proper implementation, the Department will strengthen and formalise the management and coordination of South Africa’s international relations. In this regard, the Department and its Missions abroad will enhance their role in providing strategic information on global developments to all stakeholders, providing strategic guidance on policy options, and managing and facilitating South African activities and engagements abroad in order to deliver tangible outcomes for the betterment of the lives of South Africans.

Coordination and consultation is essential with the growing number of stakeholders, Close cooperation with technical departments is critical for an integrated approach to international engagements. The Department will strengthen the Consultative Forum on International Relations (CFIR) as a vehicle to manage and coordinate the international activities of all stakeholders. The establishment of a South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) is also envisaged as a consultative platform for engagement with non-state actors.

Under the auspices of the Department, the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) will facilitate and manage development assistance in support of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives. Therefore, to enable effective coordination and to ensure policy cohesion and synergies in South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral interactions, the
establishment of a professional diplomatic service as well as these coordinating structures through the adoption of legislation will be pursued. Given dynamic changes in the global environment in which the Department operates, it will be critical for it to have the institutional flexibility to adapt its structure and operations to meet new challenges.

In a world of competing interests, public diplomacy is essential to actively project South Africa’s image, values and culture both domestically and abroad. The Department will broaden the use of available technologies and platforms, especially social media networks to communicate with stakeholders on South Africa’s international relations. Public diplomacy activities include outreach programmes to bring foreign policy to the people. The South African government will continue to contribute to institutional support and capacity building to other requesting states and in this regard, the Department will continue to provide training to foreign diplomats as a means of creating goodwill and understanding.

In conclusion, South Africa’s greatest asset lies in the power of its example. In an uncertain world, characterised by a competition of values, South Africa’s diplomacy of Ubuntu, focusing on our common humanity, provides an inclusive and constructive world view to shape the evolving global order.

[end of page 36]
## ANNEX II
Millon’s Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI-IV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONALITY TYPE</th>
<th>TRAIT DESCRIPTIONS &amp; ASSOCIATED BEHAVIORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retiring/Schizoid</td>
<td>Passive; complacent; intellectualization; unengaged; apathetic; impoverished; meager; undifferentiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eccentric/ Schizotypal</td>
<td>Distraught or insentient; estranged self-image; undoing; circumstantial; peculiar; fragmented; secretive; chaotic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shy/Avoidant</td>
<td>Fretful; distracted; aversive; alienated self-image; fragile; anguished; vexatious; fantasy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative/Dependent</td>
<td>Immature; submissive; inept self-image; pacific; inchoate; naïve; puerile; introjection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociable/Histrionic</td>
<td>Gregarious self-image; dramatic; dissociation; attention-seeking; fickle; flighty; shallow; disjointed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confident/Narcissistic</td>
<td>Haughty; rationalization; insouciant; exploitive; admirable self-image; expansive; contrived; spurious.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicious/Paranoid</td>
<td>Irascible; inviolable self-image; projection; mistrustful; defensive; inelastic; provocative; unalterable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncomforming/Antisocial</td>
<td>Autonomous self-image; acting-out; non-conforming; irresponsible; impulsive; debased; unruly; callous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertive/Sadistic</td>
<td>Precipitate; combative; eruptive; abrasive; hostile; isolation; dogmatic; pernicious (destructive).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pessimistic/Melancholic</td>
<td>Forsaken; depleted; fatalistic; woeful; asceticism; worthless self-image; disconsolate; defenseless.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggrieved/Masochistic</td>
<td>Abstinent; acquiescent; exaggeration; dysphoric; underserving self-image; inverted; diffident; discredited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skeptical/Negativistic</td>
<td>Embittered; contrary; displacement; irritable; discontented self-image; fluctuating content; cynical; divergent architecture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capricious/Borderline</td>
<td>Incompatible content; paradoxical; uncertain self-image; regression; split architecture; vasculating; labile mood; spasmodic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscientious/Compulsive</td>
<td>Constricted; reliable self-image; reaction-formation; concealed content; courteous; disciplined; compartmentalized architecture; solemn.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exuberant/ Turbulent

Impetuous; high-spirited; unsteady architecture; mercurial; scattered; exalted self-image; piecemeal content; magnification.

(Adapter from Millon Personality Group, 2015)