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ABSTRACT:

The aim of this project was to explore the changing relationship between race, space and class in Cape Town during the 1980-2011 period by using the social polarisation vs professionalisation debate as the starting point. The previous working on this debate, as it pertains to Cape Town, took place prior to the availability of the 2011 census data and this project continued that work. Based on the data, the growth of high-income occupations continued, in the preceding decade, combined with considerable growth in middle-income non-manual occupations and an improved educational profile of the employed population. However, this project goes beyond that earlier work, by examining the changing racial composition of the relevant occupational groups in relation to the composition of the working-age population at each data point. The spatial or geographical analyses uses both a GIS platform to map the changing distribution of the races, occupational classes and the unemployed, as well as two segregation indices aimed at better understanding the city-wide impacts of those geographical changes. The GIS work uses concepts like suburb and ghetto, both of which are ubiquitous in urban studies literature, as a backdrop, but ultimately asks the following question regarding the spatial changes: What are the spatial implications of a deracialising and professionalising labour market? Ultimately, the findings show that despite the aforementioned deracialisation of high-income and middle-income occupations, Black Africans and Coloured remained most affected by unemployment. Furthermore, in spite of all these changes, Cape Town was still profoundly racially segregated in 2011.
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DECLARATION:

This work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution and quotation in this dissertation from the work(s) of others has been attributed, cited and referenced.

Signed by candidate

Signature: ____________________________  Date: ________________
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“For in Him we live and move and have our being.” (Acts 17:28 NIV)
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1 Introduction:

South Africa has a long history of racial discrimination that has shaped all aspects of life, including where people could live, what jobs they could take up and which public spaces they were allowed to use. While discrimination is not unique to South Africa, it is not always written into law. Legislation such as the Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), as well as the Labour Relations Act (1956) place limitation on residential choice and job opportunities. While these laws are no longer in effect, some have suggested that we are not in a post-apartheid, but rather a neo-apartheid era (Seekings, 2011). While the focus of this thesis is not directly centred on the aforementioned legislation, nor the question of whether we are living under neo-apartheid, these issues provide some background for the focus of this thesis.

It is against the backdrop of South Africa's history and the questions raised about how much has changed in the post-apartheid era that the focus of this thesis is to analyse the changing relationship between race, space and class in Cape Town, between 1980 and 2011.

The starting point for this project is the debate between the proponents of the social polarisation (for example: Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002) theory and those that argue in favour of the professionalisation theory (for example: Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). Simply put, the former posits that the labour market changes in recent decades, in large part due to deindustrialisation, have resulted in employment growth of low-income and high-income occupations. On the other hand, Hamnett (1994, 1996) has argued that, with certain exceptions, the changes are dominated by employment growth in highly-skilled (i.e. professional) high-income occupations and that any polarising effect is between the employed and the jobless.

Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) provide a useful background on the issue of professionalisation, but after building on their work, this project moves to interrogate the racial
and spatial characteristics of those changes.

Following this introduction, the first chapter focuses on the literature review with a focus on the aforementioned labour market debate, as well as literature on the spatial changes in post-Fordist cities. The labour market debate engages with the work of Hamnett and Sassen, as well as those who have built on those foundations. An argument is developed around the professionalisation theory, with the aim of interrogating whether that process identified by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) continued in the 2001-11 period.

The next chapter discusses the research design, methodological choices, as well as the details of the data used in this project. Particular attention is paid to the type of data that were required for this project, as well as the way that the spatial issues were conceptualised. The next four chapters focus on analyses and findings.

The first focuses on the polarisation-professionalisation debate. In addition to determining whether the previously identified professionalisation process has continued, the analyses also focus on the racial differences in the labour in order to determine who has benefitted from the changes. This includes a focus on the challenge of unemployment, which is a component of the professionalisation theory (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996).

The second findings chapter focuses on the distribution of the middle-class (this will be more clearly defined at a later stage), as well as the distribution of middle-class and mixed-class subplaces. The chapter includes a discussion of the applicability of certain spatial concepts to the South African context, as well as an analysis of the changing class and racial composition of the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. This analysis is conducted using subplace-level data from Community Profile Databases provided by Statistics South Africa.

The third findings chapter focuses on predominantly Black African and Coloured subplaces where the unemployment rates are particularly high, with the aim of asking whether
the concept of outcast ghettos might apply in Cape Town. It also discusses the changing composition of the formerly Black Africans-only and formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods around the city. As with the previous chapter, the Community Profile Databases are the source of the data.

The final findings chapter makes use of two segregation indices to measure city-level inter-racial and inter-class segregation, in order to determine the extent of post-apartheid desegregation, as well as to better understand the class characteristics of inter-racial segregation, and the racial characteristics of inter-class segregation.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW:

Over the course of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, an ever-increasing proportion of the world’s population have moved to cities due to the perceived or actual advantages of living there. Cities have increasingly been the centres of employment opportunity, the hubs of economic development and activity, the sites of great wealth and opulence, but also home to extreme poverty (United Nations, 2014).

In fact, some estimates have gone so far as to claim that close to, if not more than, half the world’s population were living in urban contexts by 2014 (United Nations, 2014).

2.1 Post-Fordist Changes in Cities:

In recent decades, the term ‘post-Fordist’ has often been used to define and/or describe the changes that have been taking place in cities around the world, with particular emphasis on the ways in which spatial divisions along class lines have developed and become exacerbated. The term ‘Fordist’ was coined to describe a form of advanced capitalism where mass production not only led to increased levels of consumption, but also enabled workers to earn better wages, which in turn fed the aforementioned consumption (Scott, 2014). In the USA, this expansion of the manufacturing sector not only led to increased wages and stable employment for many, albeit primarily for a White workforce, the aforementioned consumption also included many families being able to purchase homes, as well as the spread of car ownership (Gobillon et al., 2007, Wilson, 1996, Wilson, 2003, Wilson, 2012).

However, toward the later decades of the 20th century, some have argued that there have been significant shifts in many economies and job markets around the world, particularly involving the emerging dominance of the service sector, and related occupations, as well as shifts in knowledge and skills requirements. In many contexts these occupations have supplanted manufacturing, as well as increased flexibility in urban labour markets, in particular (Amin, 1994, Elam, 1994, Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002).
While these changes took various forms, it is the impact on the labour market that is of particular interest here. In Sassen’s (2000) discussion of labour market in a number of selected developed economies, she argued that one of the most significant shifts that corresponded with the decline of the manufacturing employment, was the growth of employment in service or non-manual occupations. While the expansion of the service or non-manual employment, in general, was of interest, its impact on the structure or occupational distribution of the labour market was also of particular interest. Sassen (2000) paid particular attention to the significance to the growth of employment in certain highly-skilled (or professional) high-income earning occupations. With regard to economic sectors she also focused on producer services, which she defined as being those services that were aimed at other firms and not necessarily at the general public. These included insurance, financial, banking, advertising, wholesale distribution, design, innovation and legal services. Here the argument differentiated between the growth of those occupational categories and the growth of social services (including medical and educational), as well as personal services (including domestic workers, laundromats, hospitality and entertainment); the majority of those services were aimed at members of the public, rather than other firms. One of the challenges when engaging with Sassen’s work (2000, 2002) has been that, at times she appears to conflate economic sectors with occupations, which others engaging in these labour market debates have differentiated between the two more clearly (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014). And, it is this occupational focus, particularly with regards to differences in skill and income levels in the labour market that is of particular interest in this project.

While the expansion of high-income occupations in the producer services drove the many changes in the economy, and therefore the labour market, the comfortable lifestyles of those in those occupations was aided by the expansion of personal services, which was the domain of lower-income earning and lesser-skilled occupations. Sassen’s (2000) conclusion then was to argue that this resulted in a polarisation of the labour market due to the
considerable growth in high-income and low-income occupations due to the expansion of service sector employment.

During the post-war Fordist era of the 20th-century, cities in the USA were seen as being epitomised by high levels of manufacturing productivity, consumption and wages, with growth that did not necessarily benefit everyone equally. The literature on changes in the urban USA have posited a number of explanations for the reasons that so-called ethnic minorities did not benefit from the employment growth in the post-war years and decades. Some of these explanations have included: the spatial mismatch hypothesis that saw spatial distance from employment opportunities as a significant cause, the notion of the gap between the skill levels of ethnic minorities and what was required by certain jobs, as well as the related concepts of a lack of social capital or experiencing social isolation from the kinds of networks that could aid in finding employment (Gobillon et al., 2007, Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt, 2000, Kasarda, 1989, Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, Wilson, 2009, Wilson, 2012).

Nevertheless, regardless of race, space and/or skills, the availability of employment in post-Fordist cities does not compare favourably to the preceding period. In fact, much of the literature on post-Fordist cities is focused not only on the ways that cities (and their populations) have changed, but also the impact that this has had on the labour market, income inequality and geography of those cities (Crankshaw, 2012, Graham, 2007, Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b).

2.1.1 A Polarising Labour Market?

2.1.1.1 Social polarisation:

One of the dominant voices in the debate around changing urban economies and labour markets, including the causes of those changes, is Saskia Sassen (1991, 1995, 2000, 2002). Sassen’s work on urban labour markets, which is of interest here, cannot be separated from the oft-discussed concept of the ‘global city’, which is also associated with her (Castree et al.,
Lemanski (2007) explains that this concept was popularised as part of academic discourse and including contributions from, among others, Friedmann (1986), Castells (1989) and Sassen (1991, 2000).

According to Sassen, this notion of the ‘global city’ emerged as a result of flows of money, information and people which were concentrated in certain locations around the world. Whereas, urban theorists had previously argued that the development and ubiquity of global telecommunications would negate the prior significance of cities, she argues that this is not the case. Furthermore, these cities cannot be understood in isolation, but should be seen as part of a global network of cities that play central roles in the managing and servicing of the global economic system (Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002). They play these central roles due to their population size, as well as their “political, economic, social and cultural infrastructure” that allows them to play a dominant role in world affairs (Lemanski, 2007: 448).

In the context of these global cities, Sassen posited that the shift away from manufacturing-dominated economies resulted in the loss of what she regarded as semi-skilled middle-income jobs – the same jobs that dominated post-war Fordist labour markets. As was typical of that Fordist era, due to the corresponding increases in productivity and consumption in the USA, portions of the population (i.e. mostly White families) became more financially stable and eventually move out of the inner-cities to the surrounding suburbs, where home and vehicle ownership was the norm (Gobillon et al., 2007, Wilson, 2003, Wilson, 2012).

In contrast to the middle-income jobs being lost due to the declining manufacturing sector, the employment growth in the service sector was seen as resulting in the growth of two job or occupation categories. On the one hand, there was an increase in professional high-income jobs that required tertiary qualifications and/or other specialised skills. Sassen (2000: 63) argued that the dominant reason for this development was the considerable growth in the number of people employed in what she referred to as “producer services” – these include
Insurance, Real Estate, Engineering, Legal Services, as well as Banking, Accounting and other finance-related services.¹

Sassen’s (2000: 63) logic is that one of the consequences of these changes is that the lifestyles of those employed in these high-income earning occupations led to an increased demand for “personal services” (e.g. Domestic Services, Hospitality Services, Beauty Shops and various types of Entertainment), as well as “social services” (e.g. Medical, Health, Education and miscellaneous services). Her argument was that a significant proportion of the jobs in the latter categories, especially among personal services, consisted of low-income jobs with minimal skill or educational requirements.

Sassen’s work focused primarily on those cities regarded as global cities, particularly, but not limited to Los Angeles and New York city. According to Sassen (1984, 1991) the growth in the number of low-skilled and unskilled jobs in post-industrial urban economies was attractive to and resulted in the arrival of large numbers of migrants to fill those roles. One of the criticisms of Sassen’s work has also been that the availability and willingness of a growing migrant population to fill those jobs not only led to those jobs becoming increasingly undesirable for locals, but their presence contributed to keeping the wage levels for those jobs extremely low (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). While the direct evidence to support some of these claims has been argued to be somewhat lacking (at least, according to: Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Hamnett, 1994), other have used Sassen’s theory to explain the kinds of changes taking place in other contexts.

Baum (1997), focusing on Sydney, as well as Chiu and Lui (2004), focusing on Hong Kong used data on the numbers of individuals employed in various occupational categories to

¹ Considering this discussion on high-income and middle-income occupations, it is perhaps worth noting that it is necessary to differentiate more clearly between class and income categories in the context of this debate. For the sake of this project, the definition used by Crankshaw (2008), where high-income Managerial and Professional occupations are seen as synonymous with middle-class.
demonstrate that, as the social polarisation hypothesis posits, there were significant decreases in the number of manufacturing jobs. Their data also show increases in the numbers of highly-skilled jobs (e.g. professionals, managers), as well as increases in the numbers of clerical and shop-related service jobs. While they have used this as evidence of social polarisation in their cities, their interpretation of their income data has been the target of critique because some jobs they claim to be low-income service jobs earn incomes that are similar to, if not possibly higher than, the manufacturing jobs in decline (Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004, Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009).

2.1.1.2 Professionalisation:

2.1.1.2.1 Hamnett’s critique of the Social Polarisation thesis:

Chris Hamnett (1994, 1996) provided an alternative explanation for how deindustrialisation has changed urban labour, in work that focused on London and other European cities, but also provided a critique of Sassen’s process and conclusions. There are four points in Hamnett’s work worth drawing on here.

Firstly, in his work Hamnett found that there was a polarizing trend in the labour markets, if not in the occupational distribution of the job markets, of the cities he focused on. He argued that the dominant change that was taking place was one of professionalisation. More specifically, he uses data on the changes in the occupational distribution to show that the fastest growing occupational categories (in terms of the numbers of people employed) are the managerial, professional and technical occupations (Hamnett, 1994, 2003).

Secondly, Hamnett’s analysis showed that it is worth differentiating between absolute change (i.e. the actual numbers of jobs) and relative change (i.e. the change in an occupational category’s proportion of all jobs available). The validity of differentiating between absolute and relative change can be seen in his data on changes in the numbers of jobs in different socio-economic groups (SEGs) or occupational categories – particularly the following grouped
SEGs: ‘Ancillary workers and artists’, ‘Foremen and supervisors, non-manual’, as well as ‘Junior non-manual workers between 1981 and 1991. While the absolute number of jobs in these grouped SEGs decreased by 3,504 jobs, in relative terms they increased from 37% to 39% of all jobs in the city (Hamnett, 1994).

The third point is the role played by migration. As discussed above, Sassen argued that the increase in the number of low-skill service jobs attracted increasing numbers of migrants to cities – in other words it preceded and was therefore the cause of increased migration. Hamnett (1994: 1427), citing the work of Soja and Scott (1986: 253) on Los Angeles, among others, argued that large number of lesser educated migrants (some undocumented) has provided an extremely large “floating pool of cheap unskilled labor [sic]”, thus making cheap domestic service for the wealthy that much more possible. In other words, whereas Sassen (1991, 2000) argued that the growth of low-wage jobs contributed to the influx of migrants to global cities, Hamnett (1994) argued that it was the influx of migrants that made the growth of low-income service-sector employment possible.

Hamnett (1994, 1996) also argued that the extent of welfare provision (or the lack thereof) also plays a significant role in determining the extent of the growth of low-income jobs, as well as the wage levels. The logic is that in countries with strong welfare systems, such as some of those in parts of Western Europe, enable those who are not employed to opt out of jobs where the wages are deemed to be unacceptably low (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). Hamnett (1996) therefore concludes that where welfare systems are strong, it gives lesser-skilled members of the working-age population to opt out of the labour market, which means that those low-income jobs discussed by Sassen (2000, 2002) would either not exist (i.e. those tasks would be subsumed by people in other positions) or the employers would be forced to increase the pay on offer for those positions.

Hamnett (1996) also argues that, whereas the social polarisation thesis argues for a
polarisation within the labour market between high-income and low-income earners, he argues that the major division (or polarisation, if one prefers) is between the fast-growing high-income earning occupations, on the one hand, and the unemployed. This increase in unemployment is the consequence of insufficient or limited growth in low-income occupations and/or the ability of people in a position to consider taking those jobs to opt out of the labour market because the provisions of the welfare system. Thus, unemployment growth forms an integral part of his professionalisation thesis and will also be addressed further in this study.

However, a point that is worth making here is that there is a potential contradiction in Hamnett’s discussion of the role of migrants in urban labour markets. On the one hand, he suggests that in certain contexts it is the growth of lesser skilled immigrant populations that have contributed to the expansion of low-income employment, yet he also suggests that in contexts where Sassen’s concept of social polarisation is not evident and there has been increased unemployment, it is the immigrant populations that experienced high levels of unemployment (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). So, the question is, whether, in his thesis, large immigrant populations contribute to an increase in low-income employment growth or whether they bear the brunt of increased unemployment. After all, he does distinguish between unemployment and those who are not economically active, and those who are relying on a welfare system would not fall into the former (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996).

The inclusion of unemployment means that Hamnett’s (1994, 1996) argument allows for a polarising effect even in a context where professionalisation is the dominant process. What this means is that where Sassen (2000, 2002) argued that the polarisation effect is happening in occupational distribution of the job market, the professionalisation theory suggests that the polarisation effect is happening within the labour market, which is another term for the working-age population (Statistics South Africa, 2010). What this means is that the polarising effect is between those who are employed, particularly those in middle-income and high-income occupations, and those who are either unemployed or not economically active (Borel-Saladin

It is also worth emphasising that while Sassen (2002, 2000, 1991) only sporadically mentions unemployment in her discussion on changes in the labour markets of so-called global cities, it is not as central to her discussion as it is in Hamnett’s work on professionalisation (Hamnett, 1996, Hamnett, 1994). Then again, when one considers that in the 60 years leading up to 2011 the monthly employment rate for the USA only crossed the 10% marked 11 times. On the other hand, there were 226 months when the unemployment rate was below 5% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).

An additional point worth mentioning is that while the evidence Sassen (2000) provides is evidence of what she refers to as increased income inequality (at individual and/or household levels) and this is not direct evidence of the particular income and occupational changes she claims in her social polarisation thesis.

2.1.1.2.2 Further development of the Professionalisation argument:

In recent years, Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin have also focused on the debate between Sassen’s theory of social polarisation and the professionalisation theory developed by Hamnett. While their work has primarily focused on South African cities like Cape Town (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw, 2012) and Johannesburg (Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014), as well as Lombard and Crankshaw (2017) who focused on the eThekwini2 municipality, it has also included critiques of the analysis and interpretation of data by Baum (1997) and Chiu and Lui (2004).

Baum (1997) focused his analysis on Sydney, Australia, whereas Chiu and Lui (2004) focused theirs on Hong Kong. Both of these projects drew conclusions in support of Sassen’s polarisation theory, but according to Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) the data from those

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2 Also known as the city of Durban.
cities contradict Sassen’s theory in a number of ways.

Firstly, in both Hong Kong (Chiu and Lui, 2004) and Sydney (Baum, 1997) there were absolute and relative increases in Managerial, Professional and Associate Professional Occupations. Additionally, in Hong Kong (Chiu and Lui, 2004), there were similar increases among ‘Service workers and shop sales workers’ and ‘Clerks’\(^3\), where in Sydney (Baum, 1997), those increases were only evident among ‘Sales and personal service workers’\(^4\). At first glance this appears to support Sassen’s idea of social polarisation because of the increase in non-manufacturing occupations, but that conclusion is brought into question when including the income data in the analysis (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009).

The second way in which these findings contradict Sassen’s (2000, 2002) theory of polarisation, is that includes the argument that increases in service sector employment leads to increases in both high-income employment (i.e. managerial and professional occupations) and low-income employment (i.e. the aforementioned clerical, service and sales occupations). However, when looking at the income data in the studies on Sydney and Hong Kong, there is little difference between the income ranges (Baum, 1997) or median incomes (Chiu and Lui, 2004) of the service, sales and clerical occupations, on the one hand, and manufacturing sector occupations. In fact, the differences are arguably not sufficient to regard the latter as middle-income occupations and the former as low-income (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009).

This critical focus on income categories was also applied by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) to data on Cape Town’s labour market and in so doing added another dimension to the professionalisation argument. In a table with the title “Percentage monthly income distributions of major occupational groups, Cape Town, 2001”, the authors (Borel-

\(^3\) The ISCO 2008 term for this major group is ‘Clerical Support Workers’.

\(^4\) The aforementioned non-clerical service occupations correspond with the ISCO 2008 classification referred to as ‘Services and Sales Workers’.
Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009: 657) show that the average incomes, as well as modal income categories for those occupations that proponents of the polarisation thesis (Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002, Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004) would regarding as low-income low-skill service-sector occupations (i.e. “Clerks”, as well as “Service workers, shop and market sales workers”) were on par, if not higher than those of the supposedly semi-skilled middle-income manufacturing occupations (i.e. “Craft and related trades workers”, as well as “Plant and machinery operators and assemblers”).

More specifically, the modal income category for “Service workers, shop and market sales workers”, the “Craft and related trades workers” and the “Plant and machinery operators and assemblers” was “R801-R1,600” per month. The modal income category for “Clerks” was “R1,601-3,200”. Focusing on the average incomes reveals an even more striking image. In 2001, the average income in the aforementioned “Clerks” was R4,255 per month, whereas “Service workers, shop and market sales workers” earned an average of R4,403 per month. In contrast to those figures, “Craft and related trades workers” earned, on average, R3,061 per months, whereas “Plant and machinery operators and assemblers” earned R2,413 per month.

When compared to the average incomes of those in elementary occupations (i.e. R1,488 per month) and the three major professional and managerial occupational groups (i.e. average monthly incomes of R7,167; R14,150 and R13,337), Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) argued that those clerical and service/sales occupations were more accurately regarded as middle-income occupations. In so doing they found that despite the loss of manufacturing-sector jobs, the growth of those non-professional and non-manual occupations resulted in a net growth of middle-income jobs between 1980 and 2001, which therefore could not be regarded as polarisation.

During the period 1980-2001 the number of people employed in Managerial, Professional, Technical and Associate Professional (hereafter ‘Managerial and Professional’)

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occupations collectively increased by 120,894, whereas the number employed in Clerical, Sales and Service (hereafter ‘Clerical, Sales and Service’) occupations increased by 91,341 and the unemployed population, as already mentioned, grew by 355,231. Considering this growth of Clerical, Sales and Service occupations, combined with the growth of Elementary occupations by just 72,678, it would make sense to consider Sassen’s (2000, 2002) polarisation. However, we should not forget that Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) demonstrated that whereas polarisation theory proponents tend to categorise service jobs outside the Managerial and Professional occupations as low income, those occupations in Cape Town would more accurately be described as middle-income occupations.

Therefore, when combining the increase in Clerical, Sales and Service occupations with the ‘Craft and related Trades workers’, as well as ‘Plant and Machine operators and assemblers’ we see that middle-income occupations increased by 82,325 during the 1980-2001 period. Also demonstrated that although the Clerical, Sales and Service occupations had increased significantly, this could not be income polarisation because the earnings of those in Clerical, Sales and Service occupations were very similar to those in middle-income Craft, Trade, Plant and Machine occupations (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009).

Based on their findings, it is clear that Cape Town underwent changes that, as Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) argued, has more in common with the professionalisation theory. After all, while there was employment growth at the poles of the occupational distribution, the greatest growth could be found in high-income occupations and unemployment, as well as nett growth in middle-income occupations. However, the question that needs to be addressed is whether this pattern continued after 2001.

However, none of these projects paid particular attention to the issue of unemployment. Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) stated that they were aware of the issue of unemployment but were not focusing on it at that time. Nevertheless, in a paper focused on
Cape Town, but prior to the Census 2011 data becoming available, Crankshaw (2012) returned to the question of professionalisation in the Cape Town labour market and included a brief discussion of unemployment in the city. He used data from the Community Survey that was conducted in 2007 to determine, among other things, whether the professionalising trend that was evident between 1980 and 2001 (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009) had continued. According to his analysis, Crankshaw (2012) showed that the growth among Managerial and Professional occupations accelerated after 2001, whereas the Clerical, Sales and Service occupations saw very little change.

Regarding unemployment, Crankshaw (2012) briefly mentions the unemployment rates for Cape Town according to census data between 1980 and 2001, as well as the Community Survey findings from 2007. In line with the professionalisation thesis, unemployment increased between 1980 and 2001, because decreasing slightly according to the aforementioned 2007 data. Furthermore, and in line with the spatial characteristics of inequality and unemployment in Cape Town that will be discussed at a later stage in this project, he shows that the neighbourhoods with the highest unemployment rates in 2001 were in formerly Blacks-only parts of the city.

2.1.2 Divided or Quartered Post-Fordist City:

2.1.2.1 General:

As stated from the outset, this study is not only focused on the changing relationship between race and (occupational) class/employment, but also the spatial characteristics of those changes in Cape Town. Fortunately, there is a considerable body of literature among geographers and sociologists aimed at understanding the changing geography of post-Fordist cities.

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5 When the term Black or Blacks is used, it is used as an inclusive term comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
This project draws on the work of Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen (Marcuse, 1997b, Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a), which focused on their concept of the ‘quartered city’. This idea is based on ‘ideal types’ of different sections or quarters of post-Fordist cities (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 1997, 2000b).

The concept of an ‘ideal type’, which can also be understood as a ‘mental image’, is most closely associated with the work of Max Weber, but can also be found in the field of economics. It is primarily a heuristic device aimed at understanding (social) reality and while it is intended to be a true reflection of reality, it is necessary to distinguish between the image and the thing itself (Scott, 2014).

The sections that follow each focus on the various quarters of the city, how they differ and how these ideal types can be used to understand the kinds of changes taking place in different cities. In particular, the discussion will draw on the analyses of Johannesburg (Crankshaw, 2008), Calcutta (Chakravorty, 2000), Rio de Janeiro (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000) and Brussels (Kesteloot, 2000).

While each of these researchers have drawn on the ideal types put forward by Marcuse and van Kempen, no existing ghetto or enclave should be expected to fit perfectly with the definitions in question, because none are ‘pure’, nor are any of them necessarily new, for centuries different societies/communities have had groups that were marginalised for some reasons of another (Marcuse, 1997a).

Furthermore, while in some contexts and certain parts of the city, race was clearly a factor in shaping the different quarters (e.g. ghettos and ethnic minorities in the USA), attention has to be paid to the possibility of other factors, especially class, that has played a role in differentiating between different quarters (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b). Similarly, based on the significant role that race played in shaping South Africa's social and political history,
avoiding any reductionist thinking that attempts to use race as an explanation for anything and everything was a priority in this project. After all, even if there is evidence of inequality and/or segregation between different races, the processes and/or reasons for it in a period cannot be identical in post-apartheid South Africa as they were when the provisions of the *Group Areas Act* and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966) and *Labour Relations Act* (1956) were still in effect.

While the city quarters discussed here are 'ideal types', it is still necessary to be cautious when applying a one-theory-fits-all way of thinking about urban divisions. After all, the conceptualisations discussed here have been developed while focusing on cities in the USA (and to a lesser extent, cities in western Europe) but the cities need to be understood as products of their own specific social and political histories. Furthermore, countries outside the USA or Western Europe often encompass developmental trajectories and levels, as well as political-economic histories and structure that differ significantly from those in The West (Chakravorty, 2000, Kesteloot, 2000). Examples of this could include: the impact of colonial and more recent political history/change (Chakravorty, 2000); the role and impact of migrants from neighbouring countries (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000); as well as, a city's ability (or lack thereof) to attract certain industries or economic sectors (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Ribeiro and Telles, 2000).

Additionally, in instances where cities in lesser developed contexts subordinate their local markets and development to the trends and expectations of global markets, they invariably find themselves in subordinate positions within those global markets and networks (Lemanski, 2007, Ribeiro and Telles, 2000).

In addition to the aforementioned sources, numerous authors have looked at urban change with a more explicit emphasis on the global south, with particular attention paid to the use of a post-colonial critique. Some of these include Oldfield (2002), Oldfield (2004), Parnell and Robinson (2012), Parnell (2014), Roy (2014), but many of these focus more on theorising,
with less emphasis on quantitative and/or empirical work that would speak to the arguments in this project. In fact, even those who engaged with the ideal types put forward by Marcuse and Van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a) in relation to contexts outside Western Europe and North America presented some data to support their arguments (Chakravorty, 2000, Ribeiro and Telles, 2000).

2.1.2.2 Citadels:

According to Marcuse and van Kempen’s taxonomy of city quarters, a citadel can be understood as a “spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population group, defined by its position of superiority, in power, wealth, or status, in relation to its neighbors, congregate as a means of protecting or enhancing that position” (Marcuse, 1997a: 229). Due to the protective or preservationist intention behind the formation of these areas, they are often fortified and/or insulated against intrusions by the poor or any other considered outsiders (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b).

In his discussion of the locations where cities’ elites tend to live, Crankshaw (2008) compares Johannesburg, South Africa’s largest and wealthiest city, with New York, USA. He cites Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000a) when he explains that whereas New York’s elite live in protected, downtown, high-rise ‘citadels’, Johannesburg’s elite prefer living on the edge of Sandton – a wealthy part of the city’s north, which has become the city’s de facto economic centre. While in some contexts, like Johannesburg, the favoured dwelling type might be standalone homes of a suburban type (Crankshaw, 2008), in other contexts they are likely to be found in gentrified parts of the city that combine areas of upper-income residence, as well as spaces set aside for office and/or commercial use (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b).

On the other hand, Ribeiro and Telles (2000) argue that the citadels in Rio de Janeiro are more like the ideal type described by Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000b, 2000a). In the city’s South Zone, which is close to the central city, the city’s elite has transformed it into “into
an exclusive citadel, fortified by Rio’s steep hills and an ominous public and private police presence” (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000: 86).

In terms of who is understood to be resident in these citadels, we would expect to find those at the pinnacle of a city’s social and/or economic life. These might include those with inherited wealth, members of company or organisation boards, as well as some of the highest income earners in professional and/or managerial occupations (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b).

2.1.2.3 Suburbs and Edge Cities:

In the second half of the 20th-century, urban USA was significantly shaped by the suburbanisation of people and jobs (Kasarda, 1989, Wilson, 2012). Before discussing the significance of this suburbanisation in the USA’s cities, it is essential to explain the difference between the definition of the term ‘suburb’ in those contexts, compared to the South African context. In South Africa, the term specifically refers to parts of the city that primarily fulfil a residential function within a city, whereas in the USA it is also a separate and therefore independent municipality outside the central city (Crankshaw, 2008).

While it is a fact that only Whites in the urban USA were able to move to the suburbs in the years following World War 2, there are disagreements on the mechanisms by which this happened. The various theories include that it was a consequence of racial income differences, racial prejudice, housing market discrimination, as well as different tastes in housing or access to information (Dawkins, 2004).

In his work focused on the urban USA, Wilson (1996, 2009) discusses the way in which Blacks were discriminated against in the housing market, including in terms of access to financing. During and following the Great Depression there were large numbers of foreclosures. Consequently, in the post-war years the federal government proceeded to underwrite mortgages with the aim of assisting citizens to become homeowners. However, this
process was selectively applied by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) in such a way that excluded areas that were considered financially risky – areas that happened to be populated predominantly by Blacks and other ethnic minorities. This process, also known as ‘redlining’, was common practice and displayed a clear racial bias and was only discontinued in the 1960s (Gobillon et al., 2007, Wilson, 2009, Wilson, 2011). In addition to this suburbanisation of households, there was also a process of employment suburbanisation that coincided with the deindustrialisation discussed earlier. Furthermore, even in cities where significant numbers of blue-collar, manufacturing jobs remained, many of those jobs also relocated to the suburbs (Kasarda, 1989).

In addition to these discriminatory practices, the independence of those suburbs meant that despite the rapidly growing Black urban population and the need for additional housing, those suburban municipalities could block any attempts at establishing public housing developments within their borders. Consequently, the options available to urban Blacks for much of the 20th-century were extremely limited. Nevertheless, towards the end of the century, some upwardly-mobile Blacks who had the means were able to move out of the inner-city ghettos, either to the predominantly White suburbs or to non-poor parts of the metropolitan areas that were mostly resident to Blacks and other ethnic minorities (Wilson, 2012).

Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000b) described the suburbs as those primarily residential sections of a metropolis city where single families own homes and where there are safe, quiet and green spaces suitable for children. Additionally, those who live there can do so because of the incomes they earn afford them the opportunity to do so. In the USA context, the suburbs are usually found outside the central city, but tend to form part of an expanding metropolis. They also tend to be, or least are regarded as, predominantly-White middle-class spaces (Wilson, 2012).

The move to the suburbs, in the USA, coincided with and was made possible by the
Fordist expansion of the middle-classes, particularly in the years following World War 2. One of the consequences of the growth of the class was that there was a considerable increase in car ownership, thereby facilitating the move to the suburbs, even if or when many jobs remained in or around the central city (Kasarda, 1989, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b).

At this point it is worth pointing out that an aspect of the suburb ideal type is that, as with various other quarters of the city, some have become totalised. This means that, for many, their everyday lives are or can be conducted within the quarter where they are resident without the need or opportunity to engage with other parts of the metropolis. Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000b) explain that in the 1990s, Garreau (1991) coined the term ‘edge city’ to describe the idea of the ‘totalised suburb’ that were taking shape around major cities in the USA. The concept of an edge city refers to a situation where the central city is no longer the dominant location for jobs, restaurants, offices and shops but where the surrounding suburbs have become direct competition for the inner city in these areas in addition to the original and primarily residential function (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a).

One of the authors that engaged with the ideal types discussed here, Chakravorty (2000: 56), discussed spatial change in Calcutta included the following claim:

“I, and I believe others in this volume, use a somewhat different analytical framework from the one suggested by the editors. This should not be surprising since the default model and hypothesis appear to be have been proposed, to a large extent, with the “western” city and economy in mind, especially its American variant.”

Some developments that have taken place in Calcutta since the latter half of the 20th-century have been developed in such a way that they have elements in common with both edge cities and the previously discussed citadels.

Chakravorty (2000) explained that some of the developments in question, like New
Calcutta and Salt Lake were specifically developed with the city’s upper-income earners in mind. It was intended that 78% of the New Calcutta residents be middle- to high-income earners in an area that included advanced offices and open spaces. On the other hand, Salt Lake was an area that pre-dated New Calcutta and had a smaller population than the latter. As was intended for New Calcutta, Salt Lake was successful in excluding visible signs of poverty of slums from the area, but a consequence of this is that the residents struggle to find reliable domestic workers to aid them in maintaining their lifestyles.

According to Chakravorty (2000: 71), New Calcutta could be expected to be a success for a number of reasons, including the fact that “it is close enough to Calcutta city for a relatively easy commute (for employment or services), and as a planned development it will bypass the city’s ills – poor infrastructure, slums, and poverty”. While the author explicitly stated that the ideal types of post-Fordist city quarters might not apply to contexts outside “western” cities, it is worth noting that these developments have something in common both suburbs due to the inclusion of open spaces and green areas. They also have similarities with exclusionary/fortified enclaves or citadels, which tend to be home to most middle- and high-income earners, explicitly exclude poverty and the include of technologically advanced office spaces (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a).

2.1.2.4 Ghettos (or Enclaves):

2.1.2.4.1 Classic vs. Outcast ghettos in the USA:

The growth of suburbs on the outskirts of some of the USA’s cities, as well as the movement of people and jobs out of those central cities in the later 20th-century, played a significant role in shaping the ghettos in the central cities (Kasarda, 1989, Wilson, 2012). However, these ghettos in the urban USA have undergone some changes in recent decades that have worsened the plight of those living there.

According to Marcuse and van Kempen (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen,
a ‘ghetto’ can be understood as an involuntary spatial concentration of a group of people (e.g. defined by ethnicity, race or religion) regarded as subordinate, or supposedly inferior, group created and/or enforced by dominant groups in a society. While the concept of a ghetto is not something new, more recent conceptualisations thereof have been significantly shaped, in the 20th century at least, by the establishment and development of Black ghettos in the urban USA. However, the literature on the USA’s ghettos has come to differentiate between so-called ‘classic ghettos’ and, a new formation, the ‘excluded ghetto’ or ‘outcast ghetto’ (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a). Before exploring how those ghettos have changed, it is necessary to define what is meant by the term.

According to Wilson (2012), the presence of African Americans in the USA’s cities, especially those in the Northeast and Midwest, were shaped by what he refers to as the First and Second Great Migrations from the rural South. The first began at the end of the 19th-century and lasted until the Great Depression, while the second took place between 1940 and 1970. The increasingly industrialised and capitalist urban labour markets attracted many to these cities, but also led to the development of slums in both historically poor neighbourhoods, as well as higher income neighbourhoods. Consequently, all these areas became increasingly undesirable for those households who could afford better, but this was usually limited to White households due to the limited means of other households, as well as the aforementioned discriminatory housing and banking practices (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Wilson, 2012).

In the USA, ghettos have primarily been populated by Blacks and/or other ethnic minorities have, for the most part, been located in the inner cities. In order to understand the extent of the disadvantages experienced by those living in the ghettos, one needs to include a discussion on the suburbanisation of households and jobs during the 20th-century, as well as the development of ‘edge cities’ (Kasarda, 1989, Wilson, 2012).
For now, attention should be paid to the differences between the classic ghettos and, the more recent, excluded/outcast ghettos. This new ‘outcast ghetto’ formation is home to those who are, in many ways, excluded from participation in the mainstream political, economic and social life of the cities in which they live (Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012). In fact, this new outcast ghetto has also been seen as a part of the city that has essentially been abandoned by those who are in control of the city, resulting in high levels of unemployment, as well as weakened internal cohesion, deterioration of cultural life and lives dominated by despair (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b).

According to Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000b), this idea of ‘abandonment’ can be seen in the changing relationships that the ghettos have with cities’ mainstream economies and labour markets. Whereas the USA’s ghettos have always been racially defined, they were previously tied into the cities labour market because their residents, of various classes were employed, and those who were not employed knew that was a temporary condition because they could expect circumstances to change from time to time.

However, macroeconomic changes, such as ever-increasing deindustrialisation, and its local effects, as well as the increased suburbanisation of employment opportunities contributed to the increasing unemployment, which impacted low-skilled workers most severely. These effects were compounded by the extent of African American migration and their concentration in the inner-city ghettos throughout the 20th-century (Kasarda, 1989, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Wilson, 2012).

One of the unfortunate ironies of the evolution of the outcast or excluded ghetto is that as they became more excluded from mainstream social and economic structures outside the, which Wilson (2012) refers to as ‘social isolation’, it also led to the erosion of social bonds within the ghettos (Marcuse, 1997a).

Nevertheless, Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000a: 256) conclude that the excluded ghetto
as they have conceptualised it was primarily a phenomenon of urban USA because its development was dependent on “a specific combination of ‘racial’, political and economic circumstances to produce”. More specifically, this type of ghetto is the product of a long history of discrimination against a particular group or groups, changing forms of urban poverty and limited or no state action to bring about positive change for the most disadvantaged.

2.1.2.4.2 Impoverished neighbourhoods in other contexts:

While the USA is certainly not the only context where ghettos or comparable environments are to be found, the ways they are conceptualised based on the USA’s cities tend to dominate some discussions of urban change and inequality. After all, the socio-political histories of many so-called Third World countries, as well as their relationships with global economic changes, differ from those in the USA and Western Europe. Consequently, the effects, both economic and spatial, could differ considerably from those in cities in The West (Chakravorty, 2000, Wacquant, 2008).

One idea that has significantly shaped this project, especially in terms of the spatial focus, is the idea that urban space can both reflect and reinforce inequalities (Moyo and Zuidegeest, 2018, Schensul and Heller, 2011). Therefore, when one discusses ghettos or comparable impoverished contexts in other parts of the world it is worth noting that, for many living in those contexts, “spatial segregation intensifies hardship” (Wacquant, 2008: 28).

In Rio de Janeiro, the city’s poor are to be found in favelas close to the city centre, as well as increasingly on the outskirts of the city. Ribeiro and Telles (2000: 86) argue that “favelas tend to be favored by persons without regular income precisely because of their proximity to the income sources in the central city”. This contrasts with the experiences of many in the USA’s ghettos who, since the late 20th-century have found that living in the central city has left them unable to benefit from the nearby income sources because they lacked the skills many of the fastest growing occupations required (Kasarda, 1989). On the other hand, some might
have the necessary skills, but might still be excluded from the networks that will allow them to access those employment opportunities (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996).

Additionally, it is worth noting that since Brazil’s population includes a considerable proportion of people of African descent and mixed race, both class and race are salient in understanding segregation and the related tensions that might go with it.

“The salience of both class and race in residential segregation and social tensions is illustrated by a 1992 incident where busloads of young people from Rio de Janeiro’s poor communities arrived in unprecedented numbers in Rio’s prestigious South Zone beaches. Their presence startled local residents…” (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000: 89)

These [and other] events brought to light the tenuous relation between the predominantly black poor and the white middle class in Rio, a problem which had been conveniently neglected in the past because of the distance that had generally separated the two groups.” (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000: 89)

Whereas in the USA, and even Rio de Janeiro, there were clear spatial divisions between the poorest slums and middle- or high-income earners, this kind of separation is not necessarily evident in all cities. For example, in Calcutta, while there are slums, where some of the city’s poorest reside, since the British colonial period, the city’s slums have been dispersed across each of the quarters, including in the English town. The reason for this is that, in a city where infrastructure has often been a problem, it was helpful to ensure that the slums (that could be a source of cheap but reliable domestic workers) were in close proximity to those who might employ them, or at least just a short commute away (Chakravorty, 2000).

While the residents of newer developments around Calcutta, such as New Calcutta and Salt Lake, might have been pleased that any visible signs of poverty were removed from their proximity, the separation from the slums made it difficult for many of those residents to find affordable and reliable domestic servants (Chakravorty, 2000).
2.1.2.5 Labour market outcomes in Impoverished contexts:

While Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000a) have argued that what they refer to as the excluded ghetto might be a phenomenon that is unique to the USA, it is worth asking whether there is in fact a comparable context in urban South Africa or, more particularly, in Cape Town. After all, there are factors here that are comparable to the factors that Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000a) argue produce the excluded ghetto.

In order to find points of contrast or comparison, it is necessary to acknowledge that South Africa has a long history of discrimination against certain groups. Often the focus might fall on the legislated forms of discrimination during the apartheid-era, including the *Group Areas Act* and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), which shaped where people of different races and ethnicities were allowed to live, as well as the *Reservation of Separate Amenities Act* (1953) that placed restrictions on the use of public spaces, services and/or infrastructure. While the legislated job market discrimination that was a product of the provisions of the aforementioned *Labour Relations Act* (1956) and others were repealed in the early 1990s, poverty and inequality have continued to be major problem in post-apartheid South Africa, including Cape Town context (Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen, 2010, Seekings and Nattrass, 2005)...

Various schools of thought have focused on the labour market outcomes of cities’ most marginalized residents living in ghetto contexts. While various causal mechanisms have been posited, there is a tacit agreement in a variety of urban literatures that ghetto environments are not in the best (socio-economic and other) interests of its residents.

One of the catalysts for this particular study, was a previous research project focused on understanding the factors that shaped the educational and occupational or class aspirations of first-generation university students at the University of Cape Town (UCT), as well as their decision-making processes. It was evident from the experiences of some in that study that
there was nobody in their family or even their neighbourhood who could help them understand the path they would need to follow to obtain the skills and/or education that could lead to the kinds of highly-skilled high-income employment their parents were not able to acquire (Solomon, 2013).

It was also clear that, for a number of them, an awareness of the potential negative impact of their surroundings on their educational aspirations and achievements shaped their decision-making, as well as the steps they took to realise those aspirations. Some families tried to move to better neighbourhoods, if they had the means, or at the very least they tried getting their children into better (possibly formerly Whites-only schools) outside the neighbourhood where they lived. One of the mothers also arranged private transport between home and school so her daughter could participate in extra-mural activities and avoid having to spend too much time moving through and/or interacting with others in their neighbourhood. Some of the young people in the study also encountered peers in their neighbourhood with a significant lack of educational aspirations: one was told that if she wasn’t studying she could’ve been working and already bought a car (Solomon, 2013)

These were not unique findings, but was in accordance with other research done previously in different contexts, including parts of the USA (MacLeod, 1987, MacLeod, 1995, Wilson, 2012) and the UK (Rizvi, 2004, Willis, 1977, Willis, 2004).

The work conducted by Willis (1977) focused on a town he referred to pseudonymously as Hammertown. He found that some of the youth he encountered, referred to as the ‘lads’ embraced what Willis referred to as a counterculture school culture among working class residents and families, because they have accepted that their future consists of generalised labour. In their opinion, all manual or semi-skilled occupations are regarded as the same and work is regarded as something that is both inevitable and unpleasant. Also, any notion of job or occupational choice was merely a middle-class construct that was not really an option for
working-class ‘lads’ like them (Willis, 1977, Willis, 2004).

Wilson (1989, 2009, 2012), whose work influenced some the work by Marcuse and van Kempen (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse, 1997b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b), argued that one of the main reasons that those living in ghettos experience poor labour market outcomes was because of the lack of connections to informal job networks that could be the means to finding viable employment opportunities. He referred to this phenomenon as ‘social isolation’ and posited ways that it could shape labour market outcomes of ghetto residents:

“… children will seldom interact on a sustained basis with people who are employed or with families who have a steady breadwinner.” (Wilson, 2012: loc 1053)

“The development of cognitive, linguistic and other educational and job-related skills necessary for the world of work in the mainstream economy is thereby adversely affected.” (Wilson, 2012: loc 1055)

Wilson (2012: loc 1083) also argued that comparisons between poor Blacks and Whites are problematic because the latter usually “reside in areas, which are ecologically and economically very different from poor Blacks”. While the evidence in this study will show limited unemployment among the city’s White population, the data will show that the socio-economic characteristics of the neighbourhoods that are home to low-income earning Whites differ considerably from those where Black Africans and Coloureds in similar occupations reside. It is also worth noting that the way social isolation has been conceptualised by Wilson (2012) and others (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996), it would suggest that in certain contexts, even where suitable jobs become available in close proximity to the that impoverished neighbourhoods, being excluded from job networks can prevent them from obtaining those jobs too. What this suggests is that in ghettos or similarly impoverished neighbourhoods low-skilled jobseekers are less likely to find employment due to their limited or lack of social connections to people who could connect them to potential employment networks (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, Wilson, 1996, Wilson, 2012).
Additionally, for those who might be inclined to pursue something occupations that require additional education or skills, the social isolation and poverty in which they find themselves, are likely to prevent them from finding the means and/or necessary information to enable them to pursue those aspirations (Kaufman, 2003, Solomon, 2013).

While the discussion of the different quarters could lead one to focus on each part of the city in isolation, they cannot be detached from the broader context in which these divisions have taken place, as well as the potential consequences. For example, Wacquant (2008) explains that any discussion of the marginalisation of those living in ghettos or similar contexts also needs to include a discussion of mass unemployment, the extent to which certain neighbourhoods (are permitted to) decay, as well as the stigma attached to those who find themselves relegated to live in those parts of the city.

2.1.3 The Changing Geography of Urban Economies:

While the spatial or geographical literature discussed thus far has focused on residential locales in post-Fordist cities, it is important to note that it is important to take into account the ways and extent to which the spatial distribution of employment opportunities have changed and the impact that this has on those living in different quarters of the city. After all, since the seminal work by Kain (1968), there has been considerable work on the so-called spatial mismatch hypothesis that focused on the challenges faced by low-skilled workers with no suitable employment opportunities in their proximity. In urban USA, it has been noted that in addition to the suburbanisation of residents, some cities have seen a significant movement of jobs out of the original city to the suburbs, thereby disadvantaging those who remain in ghettos of the central city (Gobillon et al., 2007, Kasarda, 1989, Kasarda, 1993, Wilson, 2012).

The suburbanisation of both jobs and people in the second half of the 20th-century resulted in significant changes in the USA’s urban landscape. This was made possible by, among other things, the introduction and/or expansion of urban modes of transport, including
freeways and increased private vehicle ownership (Gobillon et al., 2007, Wilson, 1996, Wilson, 2012).

While large numbers of Whites were moving to the suburbs in the late 20th century in the USA, inner-city Black residents were not following suit. The federal government drew Whites out into the suburbs in the post-war years firstly by underwriting their mortgages thus enabling them to become homeowners in the 1940s and by means of the federal transportation and freeway policies of the 1950s. On the other hand, Blacks and other minority groups were discriminated against in the housing market, as well as by financial institutions, because the central city neighbourhoods where they lived were framed as not being worth the financial risk. Consequently, most minority groups were excluded from those earlier years of suburbanisation (Gobillon et al., 2007, Wilson, 1996).

Along with this suburbanisation of large numbers of Whites in those early post-war years, the location of the manufacturing industry, which had not yet declined, was also changing. In a discussion on Chicago’s changing economic geography, Wilson (2003) described how numerous manufacturing establishments in the central city were either closing down or relocating to the suburban municipalities. Reasons for these changes included the aforementioned improvements to transport infrastructure, cheaper land, as well as lower crime rates. Furthermore, it was possible to purchase larger plots of land for new and larger developments in single transactions, as well as not having to deal with the possibility of having to demolish the existing old and/or unsuitable structures in the central city.

Similarly, Kasarda (1989) looked at data from 1970 and 1980 to look at the changes in the numbers of jobs by occupational group and location – the latter simply involved differentiating between jobs in the ‘central city’ and those in the ‘suburbs’. In each of the six
cities he addressed, there was a net decrease in the numbers of jobs available in the central cities and net increases in the suburbs. The characteristics of these changes differed from city to city, but what is of note is that all the cities saw net increases in the numbers of ‘managerial and professional’ and ‘technical and administrative support’ jobs in the central cities, as well as net decreases of ‘clerical and sales’ and blue-collar jobs in the central cities.

While it has already been mentioned that proximity to suitable jobs was not sufficient to ensure labour market success, it is clear that the residents of the central cities, who were less likely than Whites in the suburbs to have education beyond high school, would be further disadvantaged by the fact that they living in spatially dislocated neighbourhoods meant that they were unable to access many otherwise suitable jobs (Kasarda, 1989, Kasarda, 1993, Wilson, 2012).

On the other hand, while they might have been excluded from the early years of suburbanisation, working class and middle class ethnic minorities who had the necessary means “gradually abandoned” poor Black neighbourhoods in central cities for the suburbs, with the consequence that those left behind were increasingly isolated from employment opportunities and/or the networks that might enable them to find employment (Wilson, 2012: loc 5384). However, a question that has shaped this study is whether similar patterns are evident in Cape Town’s formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods and/or the majority-Black neighbourhoods in recent years (regardless of how they were classified during the apartheid years).

2.2 Racial Hierarchy/Inequality in South Africa’s Labour Market:

2.2.1 Skilled Migrants, World Wars and Rising Nationalism:

The focus for this project is on the period from 1980 to 2011. However, in order to

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6 Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, New York and Philadelphia.
understand some of the factors that shaped that period and the challenges that needed to be overcome, it is necessary to take a look at the development of the labour market since South Africa started industrialising. After all, as will become evident below, the racial preferences and discrimination in the labour market that might be associated closely with the apartheid-era legal framework, has its foundation in events that happened decades earlier.

According to McGrath (2004), when South Africa started industrialising in the 19th-century, that process was aided by the necessary craft skills that were provided by European migrants. Both World War 1 and 2 resulted in concerns about skills shortages, with the former leading to more newly urbanised, but lesser skilled Afrikaners entering the workforce. Additionally, during the years between the wars there was considerable concern about the so-called ‘poor White problem’.

World War 2 also resulted in some reform in the labour regarding the role of Black African urbanisation:

“In the mid- to late-1940s, the De Villiers and Fagan Commissions officially accepted the inevitability of African urbanisation and proletarianisation and their implications for skills development, though the government stopped far short either of political enfranchisement or effective education and training strategies.” (McGrath, 2004: 14)

However, this apparent reform was short-lived, with the 1948 elections resulting in a victory for the National Party, possibly at least in part due to the concerns of White combatants returning from the war to significant numbers of urbanised and employed Black Africans. Ultimately, those concerns would be allayed by the National Party’s implementation of their ‘grand apartheid’ vision. However, within less than two decades of that victory employers were raising concerns about the potentially detrimental effect of racial segmentation in the labour market, resulting in some attempts to ‘float the colour bar’ (Crankshaw, 1997, McGrath, 2004, Webster, 1986).
2.2.2 Economic Growth and the Floating Colour Bar:

As already mentioned, the role of Black labour was an important political and economic issue during the years between the World War 1 and 2, with one court case reaching the Supreme Court in 1923 because a "a mine manager was judged to have acted legally in ignoring the 1911 Mines and Works Act’s regulations on who could be employed in certain occupations by employing an African engine driver underground" (McGrath, 2004: 13).

Nevertheless, it could be argued that the apartheid government was a political victim of its economic success because:

“Economic growth and change brought changes in the class structure of South Africa which in turn shaped political conflict. Skill shortages in the late apartheid period led to the steady relaxation of the "colour bar" in employment, especially in the service sector. Growing numbers of African men and women moved into better-paid employment.” Seekings (2011: 535) citing Crankshaw (1997)

The aforementioned employer-led attempts to float the colour bar during the 1960s was due to their concerns about the efficacy of apartheid-era labour market segmentation, more specifically due to the shortage of skilled White artisans. Consequently, this resulted in increased efforts by employers fragment skilled trades, where possible, in ways that would allow for the promotion of Black Africans into the new "operative jobs" (Crankshaw, 1990, Crankshaw, 1997, McGrath, 2004, Webster, 1986).

While the government was eventually willing to permit some advancement of Black Africans into those semi-skilled operative jobs that were created by the fragmentation of skilled trades, under certain conditions, there was resistance from White trade unions. The government’s conditions for that advancement were as follows:

(a) there was a proper separation of the races in the workplace;

(b) no white worker would be replaced by an African worker;
(c) Africans were not placed in authority over whites; and

(d) African advancement took place with the consent of the white unions. (Crankshaw, 1997)

Despite the initial resistance from White trade unions, this arrangement ultimately benefitted White workers, because in order to float the colour bar and adhere to the government’s conditions, “employers were obliged to re-train and promote semiskilled white workers into more senior positions ahead of Africans” (Crankshaw, 1997: 46).

Nevertheless, it also benefited a portion of the Black African population, because the 1970s saw the emergence of a small, but growing Black African middle class whose upward mobility was made possible by their entrance into occupations previously reserved for Whites. Furthermore, this made it necessary to reform the “racist legislation that governed both education and employment” and as a result, in some parts of the country, like Johannesburg, “[by] the end of the apartheid period, a sizeable Black African middle class had therefore been established (Crankshaw, 2008: 1696).

The significance of this argument developed by Crankshaw (1997) is that, while this Black African middle class might have developed prior to the end of the apartheid era, it only benefited a small proportion of the Black African population and it was limited to certain routine, yet semi-skilled, non-manual occupations. Additionally, since the practice of floating the colour bar was still in place, these changes did little undo the considerable inequalities between Whites and other races.

Before going further, it perhaps worth interrogating what is meant by this term “middle class” or sometimes “middle class”? There have been numerous attempts to clarify what it meant by this term, the means by which the category should be defined and/or the theoretical underpinning of class differentiation. The various discussions have invoked both Marx and Weber, while other have focused on the subjective or political characteristics of the term. These
discussions have also interrogated whether the middle class or classes refer to middle income earners (Southall, 2016, Visagie and Posel, 2013, Visagie, 2013). However, since this project is engaged with an existing debate, when the term “middle class” is used in this project it will refer to those employed in highly-skilled high-income occupations, as indicated by Crankshaw (2008). Therefore, this term is not treated as synonymous with “middle income”.

2.2.3 Post-apartheid developments in Cape Town:

2.2.3.1 Changes in Cape Town’s Labour Market:

Research that has been conducted by Crankshaw (2012), as well as Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), has shown that the labour market in Cape Town has become increasingly skills intensive. In other words, an increasing proportion of the jobs available, require at least completed secondary education or more. As previously mentioned, their work focused on the debate between those arguing in favour of the social polarisation argument (Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004, Lemanski, 2007) and Hamnett’s theory of professionalisation (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996).

According to Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), when looking at the changes in occupational distribution in Cape Town between 1980 and 2001, the most significant growth in terms of the number of people employed in various occupational categories were those that required high levels of skill or education and which earned high incomes. They showed that of the 308,694 added to the labour market in Cape Town between 1980 and 2001, 135,243 were in highly-skilled high-income earning occupational categories such as ‘Managers, legislators & senior officials’, as well as ‘Associate professionals & technicians’. That said, it is worth keeping in mind that although these are the fastest growing occupational categories, they only make up 27% of the available jobs in 2001 (when we include ‘professionals’).

In addition to these highly-skilled occupations, Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) demonstrated that there were significant increases in the semi-skilled non-manual
occupational categories, such as ‘Clerical Support Workers’ and ‘Services and Sales Workers’. Over the period in question, an additional 54,211 jobs were added in these categories. In addition to these changes, they also demonstrated that Cape Town’s labour market had, on the whole, become increasingly education- or skills-dependent. For example, whereas only 26% of Cape Town’s employed population had completed secondary school or more in 1980, that had increased to 48% by 2001 (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw, 2012).

The significance of these findings is that the considerable growth in employment in highly-skilled high-income occupations, as well as the upskilling of the employed population are both in agreement with the professionalisation theory posited by Hamnett (1994). While Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) explicitly stated that they were not addressing the issue of unemployment at the time, Crankshaw (2012) briefly addressed it, but that was focused on the spatial distribution of unemployment.

This importance of secondary and/or tertiary education is, according to evidence from Branson et al. (2009), not limited to Cape Town. In a report titled The Demand for Tertiary Education, Branson et al. (2009) aimed to assess the relationship between years in education and labour market outcomes. More specifically, they wanted to calculate the returns on higher education, both in terms of earnings and the likelihood that they would find employment. Their findings demonstrated that there are significant advantages for those who have completed secondary and/or tertiary education, compared to those who have completed neither. They did this by drawing on data from the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) and the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) for the period between 2000 and 2007.

Their findings showed that those who had, at the very least, completed their secondary education were more likely to find employment than those who had not. More specifically, those with at least some tertiary education were two to three times more likely to find employment than those who had not completed their secondary schooling. On the other hand,
while those who had completed high school were more likely to find employment that those who had not completed high school, they were less than twice as likely. Apart from the increased odds of finding employment, there were also significant returns for those who have spent more years in education. They found showed that those who had completed their secondary school education could expect to earn up to 70% more, whereas those with a degree earned up to 3.5 times more than those with incomplete secondary school education. While these returns explain why it makes sense to pursue higher levels of education, the costs involved in that pursuit, as well as the poor quality of secondary education available to many, means that tertiary qualifications have remained inaccessible for many (Branson et al., 2009).

Unfortunately, many South Africans have neither completed their secondary education nor have they obtained a tertiary qualification. According to the ‘Education’ section of The South Africa Survey 2014/2015, Ndebele (2015) shows that of all persons aged 20 years or older in South Africa, only 39% had competed high school and 7% had completed a post-secondary qualification.

2.2.3.2 Racial Inequalities:

As already stated, data from a number of cities have shown a trend toward the increasing importance of higher levels of educational or skills for success in the job market (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Branson et al., 2009, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012, Hamnett, 1994, Kasarda, 1989). However, some members of marginalised groups in both the USA (e.g. ethnic minorities) and South Africa (e.g. Black Africans, Coloureds Indians/Asians under apartheid) have struggled to attain the necessary quantity and/or quality of education required to find employment in an increasingly skills-intensive labour market (Kasarda, 1989, Nattrass and Seekings, 2001, Ndebele, 2017, Wilson, 2012).

In certain cities in the USA, this has been exacerbated where the minorities in question are recent migrants to the city and their arrival has, at least to some extent, coincided with the
deindustrialisation causing a decline in the employment they hoped to pursue and/or the
suburbanisation of employment resulting in a spatial mismatch between where they live and
arguing that while African Americans, like other ethnic minorities, have often arrived in the city
with limited education, they have at times fared considerably worse when it comes to finding
employment. The explanation for this is that members of some other ethnic minorities benefit
from “ethnic solidarity and kinship networks” that play a significant role in facilitating some
degree of social mobility, particularly through self-employment (Kasarda, 1989: 42).

In the literature on cities in the USA, various theories have been formulated to explain
the poorer labour market outcomes of ethnic minorities. One of these is the so-called ‘spatial
mismatch hypothesis’, which essentially argues that those who live far away from jobs for
which they are suited, the less likely they are to find those jobs and fill those positions (Gobillon
specific mechanisms by which those who live in spatially dislocated neighbourhoods are
discriminated against.

While not disputing the idea that spatial factors and/or distance play a role, others have
argued that being socially isolated – that is, lacking sufficient social connections or social
capital – can play an even greater role in finding employment (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996,
Wilson, 2012). A study that focused on the Red Hook neighbourhood, in close proximity to the
New York harbour, demonstrated that even where job-seekers live in close proximity to job
which they are suited (in terms of education/skill), their lack of social connectedness to those
working in those jobs hinder their chances of find employment (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996).
Studies like this would suggest that it is a combination of social connectedness and physical
proximity that can significantly shape labour market outcomes and where those social
networks primarily consist of particular racial, ethnic or familial groups it can exacerbate

Due to the aforementioned apartheid-era legislation, inequalities in South Africa have, to a large extent, taken particularly racial dimensions; and, these inequalities have persisted into the post-apartheid era. However, the question has, at times, been raised regarding whether we are truly in a post-apartheid society.

Seekings (2011: 536) cites Pilger (2007) who said that “apartheid did not die”. Seekings goes further by stating that the apartheid-era inequalities have been replaced by so-called market inequities. When discussing the state of South Africa’s cities, he argues that we should perhaps be using the term ‘neo-apartheid’ and not ‘post-apartheid’, especially when one considers that an overwhelming majority of people still living in mono-racial suburbs and/or townships.

This is not to say that nothing has changed – there has been a shift in the social structure in terms of the relationship between race and class. This shift has been most evident among those in highly-skill high-income occupations and those with considerable wealth and/or business activities, which have become increasingly diversified, while the poorest clusters of the population are still primarily, if not completely, made up of Black\(^7\) South Africans. This has been possible due to better educational opportunities, as well as the combination of the so-called ‘affirmative action’ and ‘black economic empowerment policies’ (Seekings, 2011). Nonetheless, these market shifts, particularly the emphasis on neo-liberalism have, according to McDonald (2008: 42), made Cape Town "one of the most – if not the most – unequal cities in the world".

In a study focused on the persistent racial inequality and deindustrialisation in Cape Town, Crankshaw (2012) showed that both in Cape Town and in the Western Cape, as a

\(^{7}\) Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
whole, the proportion of Whites among professional and semi-skilled middle-income non-manual (i.e. clerical support services and sales) employment had decreased significantly. This was not primarily due to Whites losing jobs in these occupations, but rather that as part of the process of the labour market became more professionalised, other population/racial groups in have made significant gains in these occupational categories. Additionally, as the data analyses in this study will demonstrate, the job market growth was considerably greater than the growth of the White population in Cape Town.

However, a number of additional points are worth noting, from Crankshaw's work, which contradict previously posited arguments, in particular those put forward by Lemanski (2007). In that article, she suggested that the changes growth of highly-skilled occupations has primarily benefited Whites, thus exacerbating the inequalities inherited from the apartheid era. On the other hand, Crankshaw (2012) has argued that while Whites have benefitted from these labour market changes they were not the sole beneficiaries from the growth in highly-skilled employment. He argued that in Cape Town's labour market that was undergoing a professionalisation (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009) there was evidence of deracialisation among highly-skilled high-income occupations. Although Whites comprised the largest proportion of those in the professional occupations, albeit not an outright majority as of 2007, Black Africans, as well as Coloureds and Indians have made significant gains in those occupations (Crankshaw, 2012).

Crankshaw (2012) also showed that Whites no longer dominated in the middle-income earning semi-skilled white-collar occupations. Nonetheless, despite the increased representation of Black Africans and Coloureds amongst professionals, managers and technical occupations, Whites are still considerably over-represented in those occupational categories. Also, although the data presented supports the conclusion that the job market in Cape Town has become more professionalised, there is also evidence of increased unemployment and both of these are characteristic of Hamnett's theory of professionalisation.
(Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996).. Crankshaw (2012) also reiterated that the growing number of middle-income non-manual jobs require greater levels of literacy and numeracy skills than the declining semi-skilled middle-income manual occupations. A somewhat contradictory consequence of these changes is that, while significant income gains have been made by better-educated Black Africans and Coloureds in highly-skilled occupations, these have been eroded by growing levels of unemployment particular among those who do not have the necessary skills or education to find employment in the aforementioned semi-skilled and highly-skill occupations that were growing (Crankshaw, 2012).

It has already been shown that changes in Cape Town and South African society, specifically the labour market, have resulted in an increasing demand for higher educational or skill levels, relegating many who do not have the requisite skills to unemployment. However, one of the questions that remains, and which will be addressed in this study, is whether there’s evidence that people of different races with the same level of education have had similar levels of success in finding employment.

2.3 Racial Segregation:

2.3.1 Separateness in the apartheid’s ‘White cities’:

2.3.1.1 General:

In a chapter titled ‘Race, Class, and Inequality in the South African City’, Seekings (2011) discusses a number of characteristics of urban South Africa during the apartheid era that might be different to urban trends in other parts of the world and there are three points worth highlighting here. Firstly, for the most part the country’s towns and cities were generally regarded as ‘White South Africa’, with others permitted to be there under certain circumstances. Secondly, as has already been discussed, he explains that the aim of the apartheid government was not merely to separate the races, but to create and maintain a racial hierarchy that “took on a caste-like form” (Seekings, 2011: 533).
Thirdly, he explains that “residential segregation was especially thorough, and controls on urbanization unusually severe” (Seekings, 2011: 532). Under the *Group Areas Act* and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), the population was separated into racially designated ‘Group Areas’ and where necessary group were forcibly removed (i.e. especially during the 1960s and 1970s) from newly designated Whites-only neighbourhoods in order to make way for Whites. However, the aim to prevent interracial social interaction was also inscribed on the architecture of the city’s public spaces (Seekings, 2011).

In addition to this physical separation, there were stringent influx controls in place that were enforced by means of the ‘pass laws’ imposed on the Black African population. Consequently, the majority of the country’s Black African population were prevented from entering and remaining in urban centres unless they were employed, resulting in the majority of the country’s unemployed being kept out of the cities and relegated to lives of poverty in so-called rural slums (Seekings, 2011).

In addition to these controls, Black Africans were further disadvantaged in the western part of what was then the Cape Province* because there was a policy of Coloured labour preference in the region, aimed at accommodating the larger Coloured population in the region, which also supported the apartheid government’s idea of maintaining a racial hierarchy (Borel-Saladin, 2013, Lemanski, 2011, Oldfield, 2004, Seekings, 2011).

### 2.3.1.2 Looking at some of South Africa’s largest metropolitan areas:

Different cities in South Africa have experienced difference social and geographical trajectories both during and after the end of the apartheid period. Johannesburg, for example, has undergone considerable spatial change, both in terms of residential location and segregation, as well as the geography of its labour market and economy (the latter will be

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* The present-day Western Cape.
discussed in more detail at a later stage).

According to Beall et al. (2002), during the years following World War 2, Johannesburg was quite mixed, both in terms of race and class. But, this was not to last. In addition to the trend of northward suburban development, which was exclusively for White residents under the Group Areas, there were significant number of apartment developments around Johannesburg's Central Business District (CBD), in areas such as Hillbrow, Yeoville and Berea during the 1950s and 1960s.

On the other hand, the majority of the city’s Black African, Coloured and Indian/Asian residents were relegated to living in neighbourhoods situated south-west of the CBD such as Soweto, Eldorado Park and Lenasia, respectively. As with other parts of the country, some neighbourhoods previously not home to Whites were declared Whites-only and the residents were forcibly removed. These include, the formerly Indians-only neighbourhood of Pageview and the predominantly Black African inner-city township of Sophiatown, both of which saw its residents forcibly removed during the 1950s (Beall et al., 2002, Parnell and Pirie, 1991).

However, as early as the 1970s, the impact of the Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966) was beginning to crumble, particularly in some of the aforementioned neighbourhoods around the CBD. By this point, most of the city’s White residents who could afford to do so, had relocated to the northern suburbs. This residential move was later followed by an accelerated movement of commercial and economic activity away from the old CBD to Sandton and Rosebank and surrounds in the north (Beall et al., 2002, Beavon, 1998, Crankshaw and White, 1995, Crankshaw, 2008).

Although, the inner-city apartment districts previously exclusively for White use became increasingly racially integrated, the divide between Whites in the north and all other groups in the south and/or south-west remained somewhat intact for the remainder of the apartheid period. Perhaps the only exception to this north-south divide was Alexandria, east of Sandton.
in the north, which managed to survive forced removal during the apartheid period (Beall et al., 2002, Crankshaw, 2008).

2.3.1.3 Cape Town:

Whereas Johannesburg underwent a considerable reconfiguration prior to the official end of the apartheid period, due to the aforementioned northward developments, the same cannot be said of Cape Town. One of the major differences between Johannesburg and Cape Town, apart from the different demographics, is the latter’s topography. More specifically, the potential size and shape of the area that currently comprises the City of Cape Town is hindered by the False Bay and Atlantic Ocean coastlines, as well as the mountains that run the length of the peninsula. Ultimately, the White population remained concentrated along the coasts of the peninsula, as well as along the peninsula’s mountains (Bickford-Smith, 2001, Turok, 2001).

Contrary to popular belief, enforced segregation and forced removals in the greater Cape Town area predate the apartheid government (Field, 2001). According to Bickford-Smith (2001), as far back as the 1880s, parts of Cape Town were “by law” set aside for Whites only, whereas in others there were less formal forms of segregation. Additionally, at the dawn of the 20th-century there was talk of a “kafir invasion” at the Cape when Black Africans comprised 10,000 of the 160,000 residents at the time. Using the spread of bubonic plague at the time as a justification, many of the region’s Black African residents were forcibly removed to a compound at present-day Ndabeni. Another given reason was supposedly to prevent natives coming to harm by learning bad habits as a result of living in close proximity to Europeans and Coloureds (Bickford-Smith, 2001).

While only Black Africans were forcibly segregated by law prior to apartheid-era legislation, such as the Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), there was also some de facto segregation between Whites and Coloured was evident prior to the that watershed piece of legislation. For a number of decades prior to 1948, richer Whites were
purchasing larger plots of land in suburbs like Rondebosch and Kenilworth, whereas Coloureds, who could not afford to purchase in those areas were relegated to less affluent pockets of the city. During that same period, the Cape Town City Council also built houses for the poor of all races, but they ensured that those areas set aside for Coloured were not in the proximity of White areas (Bickford-Smith, 2001).

While it is clear that racial segregation was a reality in Cape Town prior to 1948, the years that followed resulted in the city’s map being radically redrawn. The Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966) was aimed at bringing an end to racially mixed suburbs and ensure, where possible, physical boundaries between the races (Crankshaw, 2012, Graham, 2007).

Whereas prior to 1948 there were some predominantly Coloured neighbourhoods found among White neighbourhoods, ostensibly to provide easy access to cheap labour, the apartheid government's vision of ‘total apartheid’ brought this to an end (Bickford-Smith, 2001, Turok, 2001). Some examples of these pockets of working-class Coloured neighbourhoods include Tramway Road in Sea Point, as well as Lower Claremont, which includes present-day Harfield Village (Bickford-Smith, 2001, Paulse, 2001, Swanson, 2001). As Turok (2001) describes it, the impact of the Group Areas legislation on Cape Town was devastating, because it destroyed “well-established” communities and forcibly moved them to newly established and somewhat older ‘townships’ or public housing estates on the Cape Flats.

One of the consequences of the greater degree of segregation in Cape Town was the need for workers to be highly mobile, whereas previously they were somewhat more evenly spread across the city (Bickford-Smith, 2001, Turok, 2001). Unfortunately, the need for mobility has resulted numerous penalties for the city and its residents. Firstly, the average commute time and distance increased significantly, thereby not only inconvenience the commuters, but also leading to greater congestion. Secondly, in order to make the commutes affordable for
low-wage earners travelling great distances, it was necessary for the city to absorb some of those costs by means of transport subsidies. Another indirect consequence is that those who live further away from employment opportunities, such as those living on the Cape Flats where they were forcibly relocated, face additional spatial or geographical obstacles when trying to find suitable employment (Crankshaw, 2014, Turok, 2001).

2.3.2 Post-apartheid Segregation or Desegregation:

2.3.2.1 Across South Africa:

Following the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, as well as the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other anti-apartheid movements much of the apartheid-era legislation was abolished. Among the legal steps that were taken was the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991, which was aimed at undoing the longstanding Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966). However, while this and other new pieces of legislation removed certain legal restrictions on where the majority of the country’s citizens could live, which schools they could attend and which beaches they could use, simply removing legislation would not reverse the effects of the apartheid era overnight (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Seekings, 2011).

The question of whether enough has been done to undo the spatial legacy of apartheid, is a continuously contentious issue being discussed in the media and, in recent years, the catalyst for numerous urban land and housing orientated social movements such as Abahlali base Mjondolo (Robins, 2008). In an article titled ‘The Slow Pace of Desegregation in South African Cities, 1996–2001’ Christopher (2005b: 2306) argues that the lack of significant political action can be linked to policy changes that took place in the 1990s. He argues that the “the adoption of the free-market Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy… effectively ended any attempt to implement far-reaching state-funded schemes to undo the apartheid city”.

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Although the debate around policy development and implementation is an important one, this project is focused on the data that reflects the changes that have or have not taken place in Cape Town. However, a question worth asking is whether South Africa as a whole has seen any significant desegregation? In the aforementioned article by Christopher (2005b), as well as the one that followed, which was titled ‘Further progress in the desegregation of South African towns and cities, 1996–2001’ (Christopher, 2005a), he addressed this very question. In order to do this, he uses the index of dissimilarity (one of the methods to be used in this project and that will be discussed in more detail in the methodology section) to measure the extent to which the different racial groups are evenly distributed across the country’s towns and cities.

As the title ‘The Slow Pace of Desegregation in South African Cities, 1996–2001’ suggests, Christopher (2005b) was arguing that during those early post-apartheid years the process of residential desegregation was rather slow and limited. Nevertheless, there are two important points worth making here. Firstly, he argued that the levels of White segregation, based on the dissimilarity index, remained extremely high during the intercensal period 1996-2001, indicating an extremely uneven spatial distributions of that population across the towns that were the focus of the study. Secondly, although there was some decline evident in the median index values for Black Africans, Coloureds and Indians, the extent of the decline was less than what was seen between 1991 and 1996. He also acknowledged there were some regional variations in the index values (Christopher, 2005b). Here it is worth reiterating that 1991 was not only a census year, but was also the year that the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (1991). This piece of legislation brought to an end the provisions of the Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), thus allowing those with the necessary means to live in any neighbourhood they chose, regardless of their race.

It is necessary to emphasise that these residential changes were dependent on people having the financial means, because the aforementioned lack of state intervention regarding
racial segregation meant that any residential desegregation would depend on the availability of mortgage finance. But, Christopher (2005b) adds that access to mortgage finance was hindered by the fact that many Black Africans, Coloureds and Indians lacked the necessary collateral and/or found that the neighbourhoods where they lived at the time were subject to some form of red-lining.

While, according to Christopher’s (2005b, 2005a) findings, Whites remained the most segregated, those results appeared to be somewhat contradictory. He found that although the White population was the most segregated, in terms of the dissimilarity measure, it was also the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods that were undergoing considerable desegregation. This very paradox is at the centre of why it was beneficial to make use of more than one method to analyse the spatial changes, or lack there, in Cape Town’s suburbs. Nevertheless, this desegregation of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods is at the core of the research conducted by Crankshaw on Johannesburg (2008) and Cape Town (2012).

In ‘Race, Space and the Post-Fordist Spatial Order of Johannesburg’, Crankshaw (2008) focuses primarily on the extent of the desegregation that had taken place in the formerly Whites-only Group Areas – both the more middle-class neighbourhoods north of the CBD, as well as the inner-city neighbourhoods and historically working-class neighbourhoods south of the CBD.

Crankshaw found that although there was some degree of desegregation in many of the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in the north, the greatest degree of change was to be found in the neighbourhoods that were closer to the CBD, such as the inner-city apartment districts discussed by Beall et al. (2002), as well as the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods south and west of the CBD. Those are also the White Group Areas closest to the apartheid-era Black African, Coloured and Indian Group Areas of Soweto, Eldorado Park and Lenasia (Crankshaw, 2008).
2.3.2.2 Cape Town:

In a 2001 article, Turok (2001) made the following statement about the extent of Cape Town’s spatial inequalities:

“There is a gulf between Cape Town’s poor townships and its affluent suburbs which appears to be widening in several respects. Institutional practices and market forces are tending to reinforce spatial divisions rather than to assist urban integration, and there has been little spontaneous movement of disadvantaged communities into well-located areas. Consequently, Cape Town remains one of the least-altered cities in the country.” (Turok, 2001: 2371)

This was clearly a bold statement about the extent of the city’s spatial inequalities, but Turok was not alone in his assessment. Lemanski (2007), similarly argued that the city had seen a lack of significant change to the spatial legacy of the apartheid era, which was at least in part due to the city’s intention to become a more globally connected and relevant city. This is a trajectory that, according to Lemanski (2007), almost inevitably leads to greater inequality and segregation.

In terms of the spatial inequalities, both Lemanski (2007) and Turok (2001) argued that the extent of the role market forces were being permitted to play in the city’s development, as compared to more concerted state interventions (Christopher, 2005a), was leading to apartheid-era geography being perpetuated, not transformed.

Lemanski (2007) argued that the city’s approach was leading to:

“… the creation of low-income ‘slums’ on the urban periphery (where land is affordable), far from economic activities, thus trapping residents into poverty and inhibiting their potential to contribute to the growth of the urban economy” (Lemanski, 2007: 454)

Similarly, Turok (2001: 2369) argued:

“The concentration of the new housing projects on peripheral sites in the south-east was discussed earlier. This is mainly because the national
scheme requires each unit to be built on its own plot and the small subsidy size limits the price that can be paid for the land…”

In apparent agreement with the claims made by Turok (2001) and Lemanski (2007), Crankshaw (2012: 857) stated while the growing Black\(^9\) middle class was moving into and contributing to the desegregation of the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods “low-skilled and unemployed Black residents… are increasingly concentrated in the old public housing estates, backyard rooms, and shack settlements of the Cape Flats”\(^{10}\). He rounds off this argument by stating that the new divisions that were developing in Cape Town were between middle-class formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods that were becoming racially mixed, on the one hand, and predominantly working-class Black\(^{11}\) neighbourhoods with high levels of unemployment.

Before delving further into Crankshaw’s findings, which also built on the work of Graham (2007), it is essential to make a methodological observation about this work. As with his research on desegregation in Johannesburg (Crankshaw, 2008), Crankshaw’s focus in his 2012 article was on the city’s formerly Whites-only Group Areas and not the entire city. The reason this is an essential point is that while this project will not necessarily dispute the findings by Crankshaw (2012), it will show that when the changes in these formerly Whites-only Group Areas are assessed alongside changes in other parts of the city and incorporated into analyses of changes in the city as a whole, it is possible to reach quite different conclusions about the degree of desegregation, or lack thereof, in Cape Town.

More specifically, the arguments put forward by Crankshaw (2012), Lemanski (2007) and Turok (2001) regarding the spatial inequalities evident in Cape Town have carried considerable weight in debate on this issue in recent years. However, neither Lemanski (2007) nor Turok (2001) present detailed evidence to support those claims. On the other hand, while

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\(^{9}\) Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
\(^{10}\) Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
\(^{11}\) Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
Crankshaw (2012) did present some evidence on desegregation, it was limited to the city’s formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. While the findings to be presented in this study will not necessarily dispute the findings on those formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, it will show that only focusing on the desegregation in those parts of the city has perhaps overstated the extent of that desegregation.

2.4 Cape Town’s Economic Geography:

2.4.1 Spatial Economy:

As has already been discussed, the literature on urban change has not only focused on changing residential geography, but also on the geographical characteristics of economic activity and therefore of the labour market. The reason for this is that, as already stated here, urban space not only reflects the inequalities that can be found in a city, it can also reinforce those inequalities (Moyo and Zuidegeest, 2018, Schensul and Heller, 2011). One of the major changes discussed in the literature thus far, has been the suburbanisation of large numbers of jobs, but especially many of the remaining manufacturing-sector jobs, as well as the lower-skilled service sector jobs in the urban USA (Kasarda, 1989, Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, Wilson, 1996, Wilson, 2012).

As previously mentioned, Johannesburg underwent considerable residential reconfiguration starting in the 1970s, when large number of the city’s middle-class Whites moved north to newly developed suburbs. While those northern suburbs were primarily residential developments at first, they were followed by malls, office parks, industrial developments and more. The region’s shifting economic geography resulted in northern suburbs like Rosebank and Sandton surpassing the old CBD in terms of economic activity and becoming the de facto commercial and economic centres of what would eventually become the City of Johannesburg (Beall et al., 2002, Beavon, 1998, Beavon, 2000, Crankshaw, 2008). The question that then needs to be addressed is whether Cape Town’s economy has seen a
comparable shift, including perhaps the establishment of a new *de facto* economic centre?

Using data from a 1996 Cape Metropolitan Council report, Turok (2001) argued that the city’s CBD and the Epping/Parow area, east of the CBD and en route to the northern suburbs, were individually the sites of more employment opportunities than any of the city’s other economic nodes. However, due to the city’s spatially unequal legacy, most of these people were commuting from elsewhere in the region on a daily basis. In fact, according to his calculation, more than 80,000 people were commuting from the Black African and Coloured Group Areas on the Cape Flats to the CBD each day, with a similar number commuting to the Epping/Parow area.

A similar study was conducted by Sinclair-Smith and Turok (2012), making use of data for the period 2001-05. The analysis centred on three proposition the authors gleaned from the existing literature on urban development patterns. Those propositions were:

Proposition 1: “Deconcentration is the dominant tendency, reflected in the relative and absolute decline of formal economic activity in the city centre.” (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012: 393)

Proposition 2: “Deconcentration is more pronounced for some economic sectors and functions than for others.” (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012: 394)

Proposition 3: “Decentralisation is stronger towards some places than others.” (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012: 395)

Whereas the previous paper looked at the numbers of jobs in various economic or commercial nodes, this study used data on the Regional Service Council levies to determine the total value of economic activity in different parts of the city and also differentiated between different economic sectors, such as: manufacturing, finance and business services, retail and wholesale (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012).

Their first finding refuted the first proposition, by showing that Cape Town was,
economically speaking, a monocentric city. This was based on the finding that the economic activity in the city centre comprised between a quarter and a third of Cape Town’s formal economy. Despite this monocentric structure, their findings supported the second proposition because a disproportionate proportion of new economic activity was located in the various suburban economic nodes about the city. Some of the suburban nodes that have benefited the most include: Bellville; Milnerton and surrounds (including Montague Gardens and Killarney Gardens); the corridor that includes Salt River, Paarden Eiland and Maitland; as well as, Pinelands and surrounds (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012).

Lastly, their findings supported the third proposition that suggested that decentralisation was moving in some directions and not others. More specifically, they found that new high-income housing developments, as well as both commercial and industrial developments continued to steer clear of the Cape Flats in the southeast of the city (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012). More specifically, there were numerous new developments on previously vacant land in Montague Gardens and surrounding areas, north of the city centre, as well as substantial office and retail developments in the Tygervalley area, east of the city centre. It is also worth noting that these developments are located in parts of the city that are in close proximity to formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods and/or previously undeveloped land (Graham, 2007, Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012).

Therefore, one could argue that private-sector developments of various types, including housing and commercial developments, in Cape Town have contributed to maintaining the legacy of spatial and social inequalities, by perpetuating the spatial dislocation between the formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods and the locations of significant economic activity and/or employment opportunities (Lemanski, 2007, Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012, Turok, 2001).

2.4.2 City Improvement Districts:

While these private sector developments have arguably contributed to perpetuating
spatial inequalities, others have argued that in certain circumstances the private sector has also been able to exercise undue influence on policy development and implementation, as well as the privatisation of the control of public spaces, through public-private partnerships like City Improvement Districts, or CIDs (Peyroux, 2006, Didier et al., 2012, Didier et al., 2013, McDonald, 2008).

According to Miraftab (2007: 602), the CID concept has its origins in “a model of urban revitalization popularized by New York City: business or city improvement”. The establishment of a CID depends on 51% or more of an area’s property owners voting to implement the model in their area and it is funded by the owners contributing to the costs involved in the additional private services (e.g. security companies) required to ensure the success of the improvement model.

While the debate around the pros and cons of CIDs, as well as the apparent influence of the private sector on public policy, is a complex and contentious one (not to mention the fact that it is beyond the scope of this project), what is worth noting is the distribution of these CIDs across the city. Since the establishment and management of these CIDs are so dependent on the financial contributions of the private sector partners, it should come as no surprise that the location of the Cape Town’s CIDs largely correspond with the spatial distribution of economic activity and the development of suburban economic nodes discussed by Sinclair-Smith and Turok (2012), which in turn corresponds with and arguably perpetuates the city’s spatial inequalities.

Some CIDs can be found in well-established areas of economic or industrial activity, such as Blackheath, Paarden Eiland, Parow Industria and Epping. On the other hand, others are in locations that include formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, as well as established or growing economic or commercial activity, such as Claremont, Sea Point and the city centre. Perhaps the only CID that might not fit either of these categories is the Athlone CID, because,
while it has established economic activity it is mostly surrounded by formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods (Geocentric Information Systems, 2009, Graham, 2007, Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012).

2.5 Conclusion:

As previously stated, the starting point for this project was the debate between the proponents of the social polarisation and professionalisation theories of urban labour market change. While different sides of this debate have been applied to different contexts, including the USA (Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002), cities in Europe (Hamnett and Cross, 1998, Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996), South African cities (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Borel-Saladin, 2012b, Crankshaw, 2012, Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014, Lombard and Crankshaw, 2017) and elsewhere (Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004). While the role and/or significance of migration was addressed in some contexts (Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004, Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996, Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002), limited attention has been paid to the issues of race and unemployment in South African cities in relation to this debate, with the latter being a core aspect of the professionalisation theory (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). This will be done by revisiting the data on Cape Town that was previously analysed (Crankshaw, 2012), but goes beyond that to include data from the 2011 census.

While various research, authors and theorists have engaged in trying to understand the spatial changes in post-Fordist cities, with particular attention paid to impoverished sections of these cities (Chakravorty, 2000, Kasarda, 1989, Kesteloot, 2000, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997b, Marcuse, 1997a, Ribeiro and Telles, 2000, Wacquant, 2008, Wilson, 2011, Wilson, 2012). However, directly addressing the spatial implications of a professionalising labour market is one of the gaps in the literature that this project aims to address. In order to do this, a combination of descriptive quantitative analyses, GIS mapping and segregation indices, that will be discussed in the following chapter, will be used.
3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY:

3.1 Research design

The catalyst for the direction of this project emerged from a previous project that focused on the educational aspirations and decision-making of a number of Coloured first-generation university students at the University of Cape Town (Solomon, 2013). The aim of that study was to determine and understanding the factors that shaped those students’ aspirations, as well as the factors that aided or hindered their pursuit thereof. Because their parents were not university they mostly lived in modest homes and neighbourhoods, where their parents were all too aware of the potential negative impact of their surroundings to their children’s educational performance and aspirations. For example, one of the participants in the study grew up in a neighbourhood where, in 2001, only 1 in 10 adults over the age of 20 years had ever completed high school. After all, it is widely accepted that space and location not only reflect but can also reinforce inequalities and hinder upward mobility (Schensul and Heller, 2011, Wilson, 2012, Willis, 1977).

Consequently, overcoming those potential hindrances was difficult and was only possible, at times, through means that were not open to everyone in their neighbourhoods. The strategies included getting into formerly Whites-only high school, paying for private transport to and from school to enable them to get the most out of their schooling experience; as well as to limit their opportunities to socialise in their neighbourhood; using internet access at parent’s work and the insight of a graduate family friend to gain the necessary information about higher education (Solomon, 2013).

Considering this background, as well as an awareness of the changes taking place in South Africa’s urban labour markets (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Branson et al., 2009, Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012), a question that surfaced pertained to whether residents in neighbourhoods like the ones where these
students were raised had undergone any socio-economic change, or whether the challenges of limited educational attainment, poverty and poor labour market outcomes had persisted?

Furthermore, by perusing the suburb and ward profiles the City of Cape Town (2001) had developed using data from Census 2001, a few peculiar patterns emerged. For example, according to the city’s profiles, formerly Black Africans-only neighbourhoods, which remained predominated by that group, showed higher poverty levels and unemployment rates than adjacent neighbourhoods that were predominantly Coloured, even where the greater proportion of the adults in the former neighbourhoods had completed high school or more (City of Cape Town, 2001)

Additionally, Crankshaw (2012) built on the work of Graham (2007) in order to demonstrate that a number of the city’s formerly Whites-only, and relatively affluent, neighbourhoods had undergone a degree of racial desegregation since the early 1990s.

However, a question that remained pertained to how the relationship between race, space and class had (or had not) changed in the city as a whole? In order to address this question, it was evident that it would be necessary to focus on the entire city, yet at the same time maintain suburb level (or similar) detail in the analysis in order to determine the extent of the changes, or lack thereof. It was also clear that no single method or analytical approach would be sufficient considering the complexity of the changes in question.

3.1.1 Conceptualising the Relationship between Race, Space and Class:

3.1.1.1 Race:

It is difficult to think of contemporary South Africa without considering the ways in which race has been used to shape and arguably continues to be used to shape this society, including the economic and political structures. The use of race as a means for *de jure* differentiation, discrimination and segregation is closely associated with the apartheid era. However, numerous examples discussed here have shown that racial difference had been in use for
decades (if not more) prior to the National Party’s election victory in 1948.

Nevertheless, an individual or group’s racial categorisation was a key determinant for life chances under the apartheid regime, as it determined where someone was able to live, which educational institutions they could attend, which public spaces or amenities they could use, where they were allowed to live, as well as the kinds of occupations they could enter (Crankshaw, 1997, Field, 2001, Seekings and Nattrass, 2005, Seekings, 2011).

Considering the generations whose life chances were negatively affected during that period, it should come as no surprise that the legacy of apartheid has persisted into the 20th-century, especially considering the limits placed on the scope of the economic and systemic change implemented during the post-apartheid period (Christopher, 2005a, Seekings and Nattrass, 2005, Turok, 2001). However, it is necessary to move beyond simply concluding that racial inequality in the post-apartheid period is solely due to the persistence of the discrimination of other labour market practices reminiscent of the apartheid-era. Instead, it is necessary to look more closely at both persistent educational inequalities and the changes in the labour market leading to a greater demand for education. In other words, while inequality in contemporary South Africa cannot be detached from apartheid-era factors, attention needs to be given to contemporary processes and shifts in society (especially the labour market).

Consequently, even when addressing social and spatial inequalities as recent as 2011, the race variables cannot be ignored. Questions need to be asked regarding whether there is any evidence that the racial hierarchy that the apartheid government aimed to implement and maintain has persisted in some way (e.g. income, employment and/or educational attainment), even after the legislation responsible for apartheid’s creation and implementation had been repealed. The focus in Cape Town, is specifically on the differences between the Black African, Coloured and White population, remaining aware this the order they are mentioned here was the bottom-up order of that apartheid-era racial hierarchy (Seekings, 2011).
The reason that less emphasis has been placed on the Indian/Asian population is not because their presence was inconsequential, but because, due to regional differences, they have consistently remained the smallest proportion of Cape Town’s population. Additionally, the results produced by certain analytical methods in this project, particularly pertaining to space and segregation, would produce less reliable or comparable results for extremely small population group (Massey and Denton, 1988).

Lastly, where census data included racial categories in addition to the Black African, Coloured, Indian/Asian and White options, those categories were not incorporated into the analyses. The reason for this was with the aim to allow for consistent comparison between datasets, especially since there is at least some uncertainty regarding who might have been included in those categories.

### 3.1.1.2 Class:

#### 3.1.1.2.1 Occupational Class:

In his monograph titled *Race, Class and the Changing Division of Labour Under Apartheid*, Crankshaw (1997) argued that one of the reasons that researchers focused on class and labour market dynamics during the late apartheid period appear to produce such contradictory findings, was that they were using different methods to define class boundaries. In a number of subsequent studies, such as the Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) study, the focus was on using “the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and the International Standard Classification of Industries (ISCI)”, which according to Borel-Saladin (2012a: 36) form the basis for the “South African Standard Classification of Occupations (SASCO) and the South African Standard Classification of Industries (SASCI)”.

Because of this focus on occupational class, it became necessary to focus on the data for the ‘working-age population’ also referred to as the ‘labour market’, which Statistics South Africa (2010: 149) defines as “persons aged 15-64 years”. However, since the SuperCROSS
and SuperTABLE software being used in this analysis has placed the age-related variables in 5-years bins (e.g. 15-19 and 20-24) it was necessary to make a minor adjustment and, for the sake of this project, regard the working-age population as those age 15-64 years.

Furthermore, whereas some like Seekings and Nattrass (2005) might have developed and/or made use of class categorisations that suited the arguments they were making, the aim in this study was to ensure continuity with those who have engaged with this professionalisation vs social polarisation debate in the South African context. Therefore, in addition to basing these analyses on the occupational categories found in the census dataset, which in turn were based on ISCO (International Labour Organization, 2007), the discussion will also make use of terms that refer to groups of occupations, as others have done in previous studies (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012).

An example of this type of grouping is ‘highly-skilled high-income occupations’, which comprise the following categories from the International Labour Office (2012) ISCO framework: ‘Managers’, ‘Professionals’, as well as ‘Technicians and Associate Professionals’. Where necessary, additional explanations and/or definitions will be provided in the footnotes.

3.1.1.2.2 Employment Status:

The importance of occupational class aside, a significant proportion of the working-age population is not included in those categories.

One such category, or collection of sub-categories, comprises those who are ‘not economically active’ (NEA). This category includes those who form part of the working-age population but are neither employed nor looking for employment opportunities. Included under the NEA category are those who are physically or mentally not able to be employed, scholars/students, discourage work-seekers, as well as homemakers (Dimant, 2016). While this diverse category is not central to the polarisation-professionalisation debate and will therefore not be subject to considerable analysis, the last category will be.
Lastly, there are those in the working-age population who at the time of data collection were categorised as ‘unemployed’. In order to be regarded as unemployed in the data, the individual in question had to fulfil the following requirements (Dimant, 2016: 266):

- They have not worked during a predetermined period prior to the data collection.
- They must have actively looked for work or tried to start a business in a predetermined period prior to the data collection.
- They were available to take up employment in the week in which the data collection took place.

If they had not actively looked for work in a predetermined period prior to the data collection, they were starting at a definite date in the future.

The significance of including the unemployment in these analyses is that growth in unemployment is an important of the professionalisation theory (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996) and have formed part of the polarisation-professionalisation debate on Cape Town in recent years (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001).

3.1.1.3 Race and Class:

During the apartheid period, as well as in the preceding decades, the occupations someone was permitted to enter were shaped by one’s place in the racial hierarchy, whether socially or legally defined (Crankshaw, 1997, McGrath, 2004).

While the colour bar was floated to varying degrees during the apartheid period and repealed during the transition period, the removal of legal obstacles did not guarantee that the legacy of labour market discrimination or inequality would disappear (Crankshaw, 1997, Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). In fact, different researchers focused on the labour market outcomes of the different population groups have produced results that point to evidence of limited change, with those differences sometimes linked to the differences in the quality and quantity of educational attainment (Borel-Saladin, 2012a, Branson et al., 2009, Crankshaw and...
However, one of the aims of this project was to contribute to these debates by including analyses using data from the 2011 census. While the most often cited statistic pertaining to employment status is the unemployment rate, the analyses in this project will include making use of the labour absorption rate. This can be defined as the percentage of the total working-age population (WAP), including those who are ‘not economically active’, who were employed at the time of the data collection. The analyses contained in this project include:

- Income distributions by race, disaggregated by grouped occupation categories.
- Income distributions by race, disaggregated by grouped levels of educational attainment.
- Employment rate by race, disaggregated by grouped levels of educational attainment.
- Labour absorption rate by race, disaggregated by grouped levels of educational attainment.

The aim, using these different analyses, is to focus on determining whether there is evidence that a racial hierarchy still exists in the labour market that cannot simply be written off as the result of educational levels and/or occupation.

3.1.1.4 Race and Space:

According to Schensul and Heller (2011: 78): “It is now widely acknowledged in urban sociology that space reflects and reinforces inequality” and go further by stating that “[nowhere] is this more obviously true and trenchant than in South Africa, where the social, economic and racial divisions of apartheid were spatially constructed.”

Racial differences and divides in South Africa are not merely social constructs, they were also inscribed on physical spaces. The maintenance of racial separation and a racial hierarchy
was a guiding principle in how cities like Cape Town were constructed in terms of public spaces and residential locations. Furthermore, physical constructions like freeways and railway lines were, at times, used as boundaries between those Group Areas (Seekings, 2011).

Analyses of the extent of desegregation in the early years of the post-apartheid period indicated that change was extremely slow, at least in part due to the limited state intervention to undo apartheid’s spatial legacy, as well as the limited means of much of the Black African and Coloured population to access the necessary finance to relocate (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001).

Then again, some research has shown that nationally (Christopher, 2005b) and, more specifically, in Cape Town, (Crankshaw, 2012, Graham, 2007) there has been some desegregation of formerly Whites-only Group Areas, up to and including 2001.

Considering this background, what evidence has the 2011 census data provided of any further progress in terms of racial desegregation, if any? Has the aforementioned ‘slow pace’ of desegregation remained problematically slow? Has the desegregation of predominantly and historically White neighbourhoods continued? If so, what of the formerly Black Africans-only and Coloureds-only Group Areas, have they seen any desegregation?

Alternatively, and this is one of the key spatial arguments to be made in this project, there is perhaps a pattern of spatial change in the data that has, to date, not yet been elucidated.

3.1.1.5 Class and Space:

Since the policy framework during and prior to the apartheid period determined which racial groups could enter different occupations (Crankshaw, 1997, McGrath, 2004), as well as that legislation like the Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966) determine where certain people could live (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Lemanski, 2007, Seekings, 2011), it is logical to expect that racially-defined spatial divisions also largely corresponded
with class divisions.

That being said, this type of scenario where both class and race correspond with spatial divisions is not unique to South Africa. This type of correlation among race/ethnicity/nationality, class and space has also been seen in the USA, Belgium, Brazil and India (Chakravorty, 2000, Kasarda, 1989, Kesteloot, 2000, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Ribeiro and Telles, 2000, Wilson, 2012). The literature on the USA has tended to argue that members of various ethnic minority groups who are upwardly mobile, eventually move out of the ghettos to the suburbs, resulting in spatial divisions that are not solely racially or ethnically defined, but are rather shaped by class (Kasarda, 1989, Wilson, 2012).

The desegregation of formerly Whites-only Group Areas has been determined to be the product of upwardly mobile Black Africans, Coloured and Indian being able to access the necessary means to relocate to those neighbourhoods (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Crankshaw, 2012). This would suggest that there is a similar process at work in Cape Town, as was found in the other cities mentioned here.

From a class perspective, the literature on urban USA tends to argue that the ghettos, that were previously solely defined by race or ethnicity, have also come to be defined by specific socio-economic characteristics. These include low levels of educational attainment, high rates of unemployment and high levels of poverty (Kasarda, 1989, Kasarda, 1993, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Wilson, 2012).

Considering this theoretical background, as well as the previous evidence on South Africa’s towns and cities, it is worth determining what the 2011 census data has to say about the relationship between space and class. Is Cape Town following a trajectory similar pattern to those described in the aforementioned literature, or is there perhaps a different pattern altogether?
3.1.2 Philosophical position and Logic of Chosen Methods:

According to De Vaus (2002: 7) “it is the logic of analysis that distinguishes survey research”, a logic where “variation in one variable is matched with variations in other variables”. Drawing on this logic, this project aims to focus on the contrasting and corresponding variation in certain variables for Cape Town, at both the suburb-level and city-level.

One of the key reasons for making use of quantitative methods is because, through the application of probability theory in the sampling methods used, it makes it possible for the findings to be applicable to the population from which the sample was selected (Bryman, 2012). That said, a qualitative method also allows us to generalise, not in a quantitative way, but in terms of a detailed understanding of how certain types of social processes or mechanisms operate (Sayer, 1992, Sayer, 2000).

However, in this project it was not necessary to engage in any sampling processes, at least in part because the detailed suburb-level analyses would not have been possible if a sample was used.

There is a long-standing gulf, in the social sciences, between those who primarily advocate qualitative methods versus those who advocate quantitative approaches. However, what is worth noting is, and what was taken into account in the design of this particular project is that both of these categories of methods and/or research approaches have inherent strengths and weaknesses or limitations. Furthermore, the distinctions between these categories involve distinctions regarding epistemologies, theoretical frameworks, and the methods (i.e. techniques) used in research (Sayer, 1992).

Quantitative research is, at times, portrayed as sterile and unimaginative, whereas qualitative research provides deep or rich data that assists in our understanding of everyday life and helps us make sense of behaviour, including the meaning behind it. This is because although quantitative methods are essential when trying to measure the extent or count the
number of certain phenomena in a sample/population, as well as in discovering statistical correlations, mathematics is an acausal language (Danermark et al., 2002, Sayer, 1992).

In the context of this PhD project, it is the ability of quantitative methods to reveal trends in a population that is of particular importance. After all, while it is clear that certain legal and social processes have been enacted that could potentially impact the city’s population, these methods make it possible to discover what kinds of changes have (or have not) taken place, as well as the extent to which the city’s population might be better or worse off, at least in terms of certain socio-economic criteria.

While the discovery of these trends or correlations should not be seen as synonymous with causal explanations, they could potentially shape future qualitative research aimed at understanding the causal mechanisms that have produced or generated certain social phenomena (Sayer, 1992).

3.2 Geographical Research Methods:

3.2.1 Conceptualising:

An often repeated idea about the importance of spatial analysis over the course of this project is that space not only reflects, but can also perpetuate inequality (Moyo and Zuidgeest, 2018, Schensul and Heller, 2011). This is widely held in urban sociology and/or urban studies. However, it has particular resonance in South Africa, where all aspects of social life, including access to and the use of space was limited and/or controlled by far-reaching legislature. This not includes the Group Areas Act and amendments (1950, 1957, 1966), that have already been discussed here, but also the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) that segregated public spaces, services and vehicles, among others.

Additionally, an array of research projects by sociologists and economists have focused on inequality (both in general and specifically urban) in South Africa, but a detailed spatial analysis of inequalities across the City of Cape Town has not been among them. While
Crankshaw (2012) focused primarily on the city’s formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, what was lacking was an analysis that both incorporated the rest of the city and addressed the extent to which it has (or has not) changed over time.

The benefits of including space in social analysis, using tools like GIS, are numerous, but the use of GIS is not without their critics. Some have, at times, argued that GIS is irrevocably positivist, however, even critical researchers have come to realise its potential as a tool of subversion (Warren, 2011). Nevertheless, the critiques of technological advancements, like GIS, in research are, according to Warren (2011), part of a on-going debates, occasionally contradictory, about the roles and/or impacts of technology.

Nevertheless, using GIS in social research could result in numerous benefits from being able to “examine multiple data sources at different points in time, space and place” (Steinberg and Steinberg, 2015: 19). According to Janelle and Goodchild (2011) there are five examples of spatial reasoning that could benefits social research projects:

- It can be used to identify changes in use of and regional differentiation of space(s)
- It can aid in identifying certain physical arrangements and/or spatial patterns, such as clustering
- It is possibly a useful tool for documenting changing spatial patterns over time
- It can be used for studying flows of people, particularly when focusing on spatiotemporal interactions
- It could be useful for hypothesis testing and/or other questions about spatial associations

Furthermore, Kavouras and Kokla (2011) explain this when considering which sources of data be mapped, by arguing that any non-geographic data can be associated with geographical references and/or data, which in turn opens up additional analytical possibilities.

There are numerous advantages to thinking spatially and using a Geographic Information
System (or GIS) in social research. According to Steinberg and Steinberg (2015: 16), it “enables you to visualize, communicate and implement based on a unique and integrated research process”. This visualisation could also reveal relationships in the data that otherwise (i.e. without graphic such as a map) might not be evident. This benefit has already been evident during this project when, using the dot density option to map data on individuals in 'Managerial, Professional and Technical in each race/population group, a certain pattern in the geographic distribution of those individuals became evident. This is a pattern that would not have been impossible to find without the map, but which was certainly made more likely with the incorporation of the ArcGIS software.

It is also worth noting that this finding not only revealed a pattern in the data, it also shaped subsequent questions to be asked of the data, as well as contributing to the search for additional techniques for advancing the data analysis.

3.2.2 Low-level geographical detail:

3.2.2.1 General:

From the outset of this project it was clear that space was going to form some part of the analyses of inequality in Cape Town, regardless of which socio-economic criteria were the focus of those analyses or the time period in question. However, what was not clear at the beginning was at which level of geographical aggregation the spatial analyses would take place and based on the options that presented themselves when the Community Profiles Databases (see Note 2) were accessed, the answer was not immediately obvious. Some of the options (and related or explanatory concepts), provided by Statistics South Africa (2010), were as follows

Magisterial district: “subdivision of the country for the administration of the judicial system as proclaimed by the Department of Justice.” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 111)
Municipality: “the area of jurisdiction of the third sphere of government, after national and provincial.” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 112)

Subplace: “second (lowest) level of place names.” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 116)

Main place: “first level of place names.” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 111)

Place name: “the civic entities below the level of municipality in the census geography hierarchy.” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 113)

Enumeration area: “the smallest geographical unit (piece of land) into which the country is divided for census or survey purposes. See enumeration area type” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 105)

There were a number of factors to consider. At the one end of the scale, both magisterial district and main place were too large. The reason for this is that neither of those would necessarily allow for the possibility of low-level geographical change and any one of them could arguably contain numerous former Group Areas that were designated for different population groups.

At the other end of the scale, making use of small areas orenumerator areas, but each of those would only have codes not names. Ultimately, the decision to use subplaces was influenced by the fact that even without seeing the location on a map, the names of the subplaces carry with them and could invoke social, political and historical significance. Stated differently, unlike enumeration areas, which are primarily used for census and survey purposes, subplaces more closely approximate the concept of ‘neighbourhood’ (Massey et al., 1996, Statistics South Africa, 2010).

Nevertheless, this decision was not without its challenging consequences. The most significant of these was the fact that geographic boundaries often shifted from one census to the next (Space-Time Research, 2016a). Therefore, while the same subplace might be found in consecutive censuses, the boundaries of the area with that name in 1996 might not
corresponded precisely with the boundaries of the identically named subplace in the following census. While there is likely to be considerable overlapping, the boundaries might not be identical.

However, even before looking at a detailed map the likelihood of shifting boundaries is evident in the fact that although the over area comprises the City of Cape Town remained unchanged between 2001 and 2011, there were hundreds more subplaces in 2011, than in 2001.

3.2.3 Selection of subplaces:

Before mapping the working-age population, it was necessary to deal with the different enumerator area (or EA) types. After all, if all EA types, such rural farms and industrial areas, are included it hinders the possibility of being able to detects patterns of change in residential locations or segregation. Consequently, the decision was taken to focus primarily on subplaces that are predominantly residential (i.e. they mainly consisted of ‘urban: formal’ and ‘urban: informal’ EA types). For example, in map 3.1, the dominant EA types of each of the subplaces are displayed, with those that were predominantly “urban: formal” residential areas in blue and those that were predominantly “urban: informal” residential areas in red\textsuperscript{12}.

\textsuperscript{12} This approach was used for mapping purposes only, when doing calculations on the population, all subplaces were included.
Once that selection was made, then questions about the characteristics of those subplaces, such as whether they perhaps comprised formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods or the unemployment rates were addressed.

3.2.4 Dimensions of Segregation:

Over the years there has been a lively debate around the idea of segregation, including
how to define and measure it. As part of this debate, there have been numerous proponents defending certain measures and/or techniques, while critiquing others.

Following years of debate regarding the efficacy of various segregation measures, Massey and Denton (1988) proposed an understanding of segregation that does not rest on a single measure. Instead, they argued that segregation should be understood as “a multidimensional phenomenon varying along five distinct axes of measurement” and proceeded to focus on 20 different measures across these five dimensions, which are (Massey and Denton, 1988: 281):

- **Evenness:** “… refers to the differential distribution of two social groups among areal units in a city.” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 283)
- **Exposure:** “Residential exposure refers to the degree of potential contact, or the possibility of interaction, between minority and majority group members within geographic areas of a city.” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 287)
- **Concentration:** “… refers to relative amount of physical space occupied by a minority group in the urban environment” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 289)
- **Centralization:** “… the degree to which a group is spatially located near the center of an urban area.” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 291)
- **Clustering:** “the extent to which areal units inhabited by minority members adjoin one another, or cluster, in space.” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 293)

In a more recent article titled “Measuring racial residential segregation at different geographic scales in Cape Town and Johannesburg”, Parry and van Eeden (2015) discuss an evaluation of these five dimensions of segregation conducted by Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004). As part of their evaluation of these dimension, Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004) argue that concentration and centralization are subcategories of the evenness dimension and do not differentiate between evenness and clustering. Nevertheless, they still draw a distinction between spatial evenness and spatial exposure/isolation. In agreement with this argument, the analyses of segregation in this study focused solely on these two aspects of segregation.

### 3.2.4.1 Evenness:
While the visual display of the data using ArcGIS is both revealing and striking, it was evident that it was necessary to be able to quantify the extent to which Cape Town’s population has remained segregated or become desegregated during the period in question.

The dimension of ‘evenness’ focuses on “differential distribution of two social groups among areal\(^{13}\) units in a city” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 283) and the minority group is regarded as been segregated when it is unevenly spread across the area in question. According to Massey and Denton (1988: 284) evenness is “maximized and segregation minimized when all units have the same relative number of minority and majority members as the city as a whole”.

To date, the dissimilarity index \((D)\), that was discussed by Duncan and Duncan (1955), has been particularly useful in this regard, has been the widely used and at times the only measure used by some. This index has come under scrutiny (Cortese et al., 1976, Cortese et al., 1978), while others have demonstrated some of its benefits in research conducted in South Africa (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Horn, 2012, Parry and van Eeden, 2015, Schensul and Heller, 2011, Schensul, 2008, Schensul, 2009) and elsewhere.

According to Duncan and Duncan (1955), the dissimilarity index can be understood as a measure of the average deviation of subplaces from the city’s overall racial composition. It is calculated using the following formula (Farley and Taeuber, 1968, Farley and Taeuber, 1974, Taeuber and Taeuber, 1976):

\[
D = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{1}^{k} | \frac{A_i}{A} - \frac{B_i}{B} |
\]

In this dissimilarity calculation \(A\) refers to the race or social category that is the focus of

\(^{13}\) For example, subplaces in the census data.
the calculation (e.g. Black Africans or Coloureds), while $B$ refers to the rest of the population. This reveals one of the limitations of the formula – it can only be used to calculate the dissimilarity between two specific groups, or one group and the sum of all other groups in the population. Furthermore, $\frac{A_i}{A}$ is the total of $A$ in the suburb or census tract $i$, divided by the total of $A$ in the population. One way of interpreting the result is that it is the “proportion of [A] who would have to change their tract of residence to make $q_i=q$ for all $i$” (Duncan and Duncan, 1955: 211).

One of the critiques of this index is that the results from this index are “affected by differences in the proportion of the minority in the population, thus preventing inter-city comparisons” or differences of the same city at different points in time, although this claim has been a point of contention (Cortese et al., 1976: 631). While the search for a method that allows inter-city comparisons continues, this objection to the use of this index was a useful catalyst for rethinking how this index might be applied. More specifically, whereas the total population is usually seen as the entire city, with the aim of using a single index to calculate a single measure that indicates the degree of segregation in a city, it became evident that there are in fact different populations within a city. This meant that applying this index to each of them separately (depending on the research question in focus) could reveal something about the extent and characteristics of the segregation that might have otherwise gone unnoticed if the index was applied to the whole population.

One last comment that needs to be made regarding interpretations of the dissimilarity index is discussed in a study of desegregation of towns and cities in South Africa. According to Christopher (2005a), studies focused on cities in the USA show dissimilarity results that can be regarded as integrated due to variations in spatial configurations, including the population sizes of areal units. It is worth noting that these guidelines come from a context that did not experience the sorts of legislated segregation seen in South African, but rather discrimination such as the redlining of certain areas or the denial of housing subsidies for members of ethnic
minority groups (Kantrowitz, 1969). This study will therefore proceed by using these guidelines when interpreting results for $D$.

### 3.2.4.2 Isolation or Exposure ($P^*$-type measure):

Like the index of dissimilarity, or $D$, the exposure index or $P^*$-type measure has also been the subject of considerable debate and critique. Nonetheless, it can be understood as contributing to our understanding of one of the dimensions of segregation. More specifically, the measure for residential exposure focuses on the extent of potential contact between people of different groups within their residential areal units of the city (Massey and Denton, 1988, Parry and van Eeden, 2015, Stearns and Logan, 1986). While the exposure and evenness dimensions are empirically connected, they measure distinct phenomena.

For example, members of one group can be relatively evenly distributed among residential areas of a city, but at the same time experience little exposure to majority members if they are a relatively large proportion of the city, a point well-elaborated by Blau (1977). Conversely, if they are a very small proportion, minority members will tend to experience high levels of exposure to the majority no matter what the pattern of evenness. Exposure indices take explicit account of the relative size of minority and majority groups in determining the degree of residential segregation between them (Massey and Denton, 1988).

The formula for calculating exposure or isolation is as follows (Massey and Denton, 1988):

$$x^{P*}y = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{x_i}{X} \cdot \frac{y_i}{t_i}$$

(Massey and Denton, 1988)

Here, $x_i$ refers to the number of individuals of group $x$ in the $i$-th areal unit, whereas $X$ is the total population of that group in all areal units. On the other hand, $y_i$ refers to the number of individuals of group $y$ in the $i$-th area (alternatively, $y$ could refer to the non-$x$ population).
Lastly, $t_i$ refers to the total population (i.e. $x + y$) in the $i$-th areal unit. One of the characteristics (or shortcomings, according to some) of this measure is that it is asymmetrical. In other words, $xP^*_y$ does not have the same result as $yP^*_x$. The use of this index to calculate isolation is possible when calculating $xP^*_x$ and not $xP^*_y$ (Massey and Denton, 1988).

Massey and Denton (1988) go on to explain that when focusing on the potential isolation or exposure for group $x$, then it is important to note that the sum of $xP^*_x$ and $xP^*_y$ is 1. In other words, it is possible to calculate the potential interaction between members of group $x$ and members of all other groups or subgroups (that are not members of group $x$) in a city and these would all add up to 100%. This utility of this characteristics of this particular measure will become more evident at a later stage in this study (Massey and Denton, 1988).

While the process to decide on the most suitable methods in this study was substantial, it was also necessary to give significant consideration to decisions about the suitability of the available data.

3.3 Data selection, accumulation and preparation

3.3.1 Secondary Analysis and Official Statistics:

Due to the historical and exploratory nature of this research project, as well as the quantitative approach, it was necessary to seek out existing official datasets. In the process of finding suitable datasets, various surveys were looked at, including the National Income Dynamics Survey and the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys. Some of the strengths of these surveys was the detailed design of the questionnaire and the variety of variables it included.

However, only the census datasets that included data for the full-count had the geographical details necessary for this project. Consequently, the full-count SPSS datasets for 1980 and 1991 were obtained, in addition to the data available using Community Profile Databases by means of the SuperTABLE and SuperCROSS software for the 1996, 2001 and 2011 census counts. The SPSS files were available from the DataFirst website, whereas the
SuperTABLE and SuperCROSS software and databases were available through the DataFirst offices.

Perhaps the most obvious benefit for this project was the cost and time involved in collecting data, but it also allowed for the possibility of a historical approach in this project. Although there is no guarantee that this expectation will be met, it is safe to assume that the quality of the data collected and collated in official datasets will be of a high quality. Furthermore, it is also possible that reanalysis of existing datasets could result in new interpretation of the data in question (Bryman, 2012).

Despite these advantages, there are potential challenges that also need to be overcome or dealt with. These potential disadvantages or challenges include, but are not limited to, lack of familiarity with the data, the complexity of the data and the absence of key variables (Bryman, 2012). De Vaus (2002) adds that when conducting secondary analysis certain questions might have been asked in ways that do not perfectly suit the intended research question, but sometimes adjustments need to be made especially where the only alternative is abandoning the planned research. Prior to arriving at the current research question, another version had to be abandoned when I realised that the data simply didn’t exist. Nonetheless, the research question was considerably reformulated in order to ensure that it was answerable with the existing data.

3.3.2 Datasets and Preparation:

3.3.2.1 General:

3.3.2.1.1 Overview:

The aim of this study was to use existing census datasets from the 1970s to 2011 to demonstrate the extent to which spatial and economic inequalities in Cape Town had shifted or persisted. While it was possible to obtain various datasets through the DataFirst centre and its website, through initial examination of pre-1980 datasets it became clear that the structure
and quality of the datasets was going to make comparative analyses difficult. Furthermore, since some occupational and residential shifts started taking place during the 1980s, it was ultimately only necessary to have one serviceable pre-1991 census dataset to ensure there was a data point prior to those changes. The search to find a first data point therefore shifted to 1980 and 1985.

3.3.2.1.2 Geography:

One of the challenges to be addressed is whether the available data has suburb or subplace level detail – after all, mapping the aforementioned social and racial inequalities at that level of geographical detail is the aim of this project. However, not all census datasets have geographical detail at the requisite level.

While the SPSS datasets available for the 1980 census have the requisite geographical detail, the later publicly available SPSS datasets do not. Nonetheless, subplace level data could be access using the Community Profile Databases on the SuperCROSS system accessible online and via the DataFirst lab on campus. One limitation of the SuperCROSS system is that the datasets are not fully integrated – for example, while certain household variables regarding type of structure and access to services might be integrated, it would not be possible to analyse those variables in conjunction with certain educational and/or occupational variables. This means that although low-level geographical detail is available, the way in which the data has been arranged and/or integrated limits the kinds of analysis that could be done.

However, fully integrated data at subplace level detail is available for analysis at the local Statistics South Africa offices and is available to be accessed, by appointment, by those wanting to use it for research.

3.3.2.2 1980:

Population Census was a count of all persons present on Republic of South African territory during census night (i.e. at midnight between 6 and 7 May 1980)\textsuperscript{a}. The detailed statistics it aimed to collect focused on various aspects of households (such as dwelling type and household goods) and individuals (including population group, employment status and religion).

3.3.2.2.1 Sample:

While the metadata available on the DataFirst website (2014b) does not explicitly confirm that the datasets available are a full-count, email correspondence between representatives of Statistics South Africa and DataFirst, respectively, confirm that this is in fact the case (Alberts, 2008).

3.3.2.2.2 Geography

The aim of this census was not only to provide detailed statistics of the population in 1980, but also to do so at a small area level (i.e. large scale). It therefore had the enumerators subdistrict (or ESD) as the “lowest level of geographic aggregation”, but also included suburbs, which was the closest to the chosen geographical scale/level for this project (DataFirst, 2014b: 5).

As suggested above, ‘subplace’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘suburb’. In fact, according to Statistics South Africa (2010) these terms are defined as follows:

Place name: “the civic entities below the level of municipality in the census geography hierarchy” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 113)

Main Place: “first (lowest) level of place names” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 111)

Subplace: “second (lowest) level of place names” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 116)
Suburb: “areas within a town or city proclaimed or set aside mainly for residing purposes […] See informal settlement and subplace.” (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 116)

In order to understand the differences between these geographical levels, we can consider Mitchell's Plain on the Cape Flats, which according to Turok (2001) was established and developed for Coloured residents in the 1970s and 1980s. In terms of the geographical levels in the census data, Mitchell’s Plain is an example of a “main place”. On the other hand, in the 2011 census there were 19 subplaces that comprised that main place. Some of the names of these subplaces include Tafelsig, Strandfontein, Rocklands and Westridge.

An additional challenge with the 1980 data was that prior to the 1996 data there were no ready-made GIS shapefiles available for spatial analysis of the data, but the spatial implications of the city’s inequalities were central to the way this project was conceptualised and it was essential to be able to demonstrate the spatial distribution of the data for 1980.

Since it can be (and has been) argued that all non-geographic data can be associated with geographical data (Kavouras and Kokla, 2011), it became clear that this was going to have to done manually. This was done by using Google Maps (maps.google.co.za) to locate the suburbs referred to in the 1980 census data and then match them with the names of subplaces in the 1996 GIS shapefiles, which were the earliest available GIS data available from Statistics South Africa.

3.3.2.3 1985:

While an additional pre-1991 dataset could have been useful, there were too many problems with this dataset to be useful for this project. Since the occupational data need to be disaggregated by employment status, there was some concern that this would be the case with the 1985 data too. However, this was not possible because the datasets did not include a ‘work status’ or ‘employment status’ variable, so there was no way of accounting for the possible that some unemployed individuals were included in the occupational data. This was
also a reason that Borel-Saladin (2012a) chose not to use the 1985 data. Furthermore, there was no income category variable, which was essential for the planned analyses.

Borel-Saladin (2012a: 40) also pointed out the following problem with the occupational data for 1985:

“There are several problems with these data. There appears to be a different number of occupational categories in the data set than in the codebook. There are only 28 or 29 occupational codes. In addition, the way the occupations have been grouped is quite dissimilar to how I have recoded the other sets according to the SASCO system.”

3.3.2.4 1991:

As already stated, certain changes to the composition of some suburbs and occupational classes had already undergone some change by 1991, even though the apartheid government was still in power.

Nevertheless, the 1991 census “was an enumeration of the population and housing in South Africa… [that] collected data on dwellings and individuals’ demographic, family and employment details” (DataFirst, 2014c: 2).

As with the 1980 data, the metadata available from DataFirst (2014c) does not explicitly confirm that the datasets including a full count, but this fact was confirmed by the aforementioned correspondence between Statistics South Africa and DataFirst (Alberts, 2008).

While the 1991 datasets were purported to include a full count of the population there were some problems with implementing the sample design. According to the metadata report from DataFirst (2014c: 4):

“As a result of the unplanned and unstructured nature of certain residential areas, as well as the inaccessibility of certain areas during the preparations for the enumeration of census, comprehensive door-to-door
surveys were not possible. The Human Sciences Research Council had to enumerate these areas by means of sample surveys. 88 areas country-wide were enumerated on this basis.

Based on the analysis of the 1991, as well as literature on the state of the city at the time, suggest that this sample design deviations like had a considerable impact on the count of the Cape Town population, more specifically the city’s Black African population.

According to Cook (2001), contrary to the limitations on the number of Black Africans permitted to be in the Western Cape since 1955, the 1983 announcement of a new settlement (that would become Khayelitsha) was a surprise. Furthermore, a 1988 survey indicated that there were 110,000-189,000 residents in Khayelitsha at the time, yet the 1991 census datasets suggest that there were only around 36,000 Black Africans living in the greater Cape Town area at the time.

This is arguably a consequence of the aforementioned sample design problems, which would have a significant impact on the accuracy of the 1991 data – not only in terms of race, but also in terms of other factors like employment and occupational distributions. It was at this point that the decision was taken to exclude the 1991 census data from this project.

3.3.2.5 1996:

South Africa’s 1996 census aimed to enumerate all persons, households and institutions present in the country on the census night, 9-10 October 1996. According to DataFirst (2014d) the enumeration took place between 10 and 30 October, although in some places it was necessary to continue as late as December of that year.

Whereas the SPSS data files for previous included the data for the full count, the 1996 SPSS files only included 10% samples, using a stratified sampling method according to provinces and districts. The files also included a weight variable that adjust for undercount as well as to inflate the 10% sample to match the population size (DataFirst, 2014d). In addition
to the SPSS outputs, 1996 was the first census where the full count was made available for analysis using the SuperCROSS or SuperTABLE software (Space-Time Research, 2016b, Space-Time Research, 2016a).

According to Statistics South Africa (2001: iii):

“The SuperCROSS software package is an Australian product that was first used by Stats SA for the dissemination of Census 1996 data. Access to the software was limited to those individuals and organisations that could afford to pay the licence fees.”

It provided a user-friendly “desktop cross tabulation analytics tool” that not only made it easier to handle large datasets, it also simplified processes of the “data aggregation, manipulation and dissemination” (Space-Time Research, 2016b).

The boundaries for lowest level of geographic aggregation was determined by the local authority in each area (DataFirst, 2014d). In addition to the benefits of using the Space-Time Research software, census 1996 was the first one for which ArcGIS shapefiles were produced and provided by Statistics South Africa that corresponded with the geographical levels available in the Community Profile Databases.

3.3.2.6 2001:

According to DataFirst (2014e: 4), the 2001 census “covered every person present in South Africa on Census Night, 9-10 October 2001 including all de jure household members and residents of institutions”.

As with 1996, the SPSS datasets were 10% samples that included weight variables that accounted for the undercount, as well as to inflate the 10% sample. The extent of the undercount was determined by means of a post-enumeration that took place approximately one month after the census count (DataFirst, 2014e).

Although enumerator area numbers and subplace names were excluded from the 10%
files, they were available in the Community Profile Databases available using the SuperCROSS software. Whereas it was necessary to pay a licence fees to access the 1996 data, when the 2001 data became available it was made available free of charge (Statistics South Africa, 2001).

As with the 1996 census data, ArcGIS shapefiles that corresponded with the geographic levels in the Community Profiles had been created and were made available by Statistics SA.

3.3.2.7  2011:

Census 2011 was intended to cover all persons present in South Africa on the census night in October of that year, as well as “all de jure household members and residents of institutions” (DataFirst, 2016).

As with the censuses in 1996 and 2001, the data was provided in two formats, which (DataFirst, 2015: 2) described as follows:

“A 10% sample dataset at the level of Province, District and Municipality plus spatial data at Small Area level.”

“A database of "Community Profiles" at the level of Province, District, Municipality, Main Place, Subplace and Ward. This database is in the proprietary software, SuperCROSS, which allows cross-tabulation and mapping of the data.”

Furthermore, as with the two preceding censuses, ArcGIS shapefiles were made available that corresponded with the geographic levels in the Community Profiles. Additionally, the 10% samples included a weight variables that made the necessary adjustments for undercount, as determined by the post-enumeration survey, and inflated the 10% (DataFirst, 2016).

3.3.3  Data Analysis:

3.3.3.1  Subplace level change:
The starting point for the analysis was to correctly disaggregate all data by subplace. This included the data for employment status, occupations, race, age and more. The reason for using the subplace as the starting point is that this allowed for various calculations by subplace, including the following:

- Unemployment rates
- Proportions of residents comprised by different groups
- Proportion of employed population in specific occupations

Where necessary is was also possible to calculate the absolute number of people in different categories in each subplace. This was necessary for at least two reasons. Firstly, the absolute number of people in different categories or social groups was necessary for the segregation calculations used in this project. Secondly, since the files associated with the shapefiles including the surface area per subplace it allowed for density calculations including:

- Density of working-age people
- Density of people employed in specific occupations

This level of detail, while painstaking and complex at times, was necessary to accommodate the numerous of spatial and other approaches used in this project.

### 3.3.3.2 City-level changes:

Once total for the various categories and/or social groups were calculated for each subplace for each of the years in question, it was possible to calculate totals for the city as a whole. Among other things, it allowed for the possibility of calculating city-level unemployment rates, proportions of the city’s populations comprised of different race groups, as well as proportions of the employed populations in different occupations, among other calculations.

### 3.4 Conclusion:

The purpose of this chapter was to delineate the various decisions made regarding datasets to be used, as well as the numerous methods used in the analysis. Due to the nature
of the topic of this study (i.e. the relationship between race, space and class/employment), no single method was sufficient to address this complex issue.

The primary debate at the heart of this study focuses on city-level occupational and/or employment change over time, but the spatial analyses (both in terms of the ArcGIS work, as well as the segregation measures) required low-level geographical detail (i.e. subplace level data).

Additionally, rather than being predominantly guided by the ideal types of city quarters discussed in the previous chapter (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 1997, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a) or historical categories that were borne out of the Group Areas Act (1966), such as formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods, the analyses and interpretations were primarily driven by the data.

The chapter that follows will address city-level changes in demographics, employment and occupational distributions, with the aim of determining the whether the social polarisation or professionalisation theories were most applicable in Cape Town. The next chapter goes further to interrogate the changing racial characteristics of the city’s occupational distribution, as well as the differences in unemployment rates (if any) between different race groups.

The subsequent chapter address the question of the spatial (i.e. residential) implications of the changes in the labour market. The first focuses on middle-class suburbia, whereas the last chapter addresses the concept of ghettos and its applicability in the Cape Town context.
4 RACIALLY UNEQUAL EFFECTS OF LABOUR MARKET CHANGES:

4.1 Growing Population and Labour Market:

Since the focus of this project is centered, to a large extent, on the labour market, it is worth starting with a look at the growth in more detail. The reason for the focus on the working-age population (here and throughout the rest of this thesis), is that the labour market data under discussion is limited to that portion of the population, so it makes sense to focus on that category at all times.

Nevertheless, the table below shows how the labour market has changed between 1980 and 2011, as well as disaggregating those who are employed, unemployed and not economically active. According the four census counts used here, the labour market, which according to Statistics South Africa (2010) includes all three of the aforementioned categories, grew from 1,016,163 in 1980 to 2,604,192 in 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment statuses of the WAP in Cape Town, 1980-2011</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Not Economically Active</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>614,452</td>
<td>27,587</td>
<td>374,124</td>
<td>1,016,163</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>888,412</td>
<td>216,979</td>
<td>578,093</td>
<td>1,683,484</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>939,508</td>
<td>382,818</td>
<td>648,577</td>
<td>1,970,903</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,294,236</td>
<td>405,981</td>
<td>903,975</td>
<td>2,604,192</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-2001</td>
<td>325,056</td>
<td>355,231</td>
<td>274,453</td>
<td>954,740</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2011</td>
<td>354,728</td>
<td>23,163</td>
<td>255,398</td>
<td>633,289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>679,784</td>
<td>378,394</td>
<td>529,851</td>
<td>1,588,029</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Absolute numbers of Employed, Unemployed and Non-economically active people in Cape Town, 1980-2011

Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1)
The majority of that growth comprised increases in the unemployed population (+378,394) and those who were not economically active (+529,851). Despite this, the employed more than doubled in the same period. More specially, it grew by 679,784 between 1980 and 2011, from 614,452 to 1,294,236. Due to the focus on the polarisation-professionalisation debate, much of the discussion going forward will focus on the economically active population (i.e. the employed and unemployed), with specific attention paid to its occupational and racial composition.

4.2 Polarisation or Professionalisation:

The starting point for this study was to engage with the debate between those who argue that urban job markets are becoming increasingly polarised (i.e. the school of thought built on the work of Saskia Sassen) and those who argue that they are undergoing a process of professionalisation (i.e. the theory posited in the work of Chris Hamnett, among others). Initially the aim was not to determine whether the previously-determined process of professionalisation (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009) had continued, but as the analysis progressed it became evident that any assumptions that that process had continued would need to be interrogated. After all, the question of whether the city has been professionalising or becoming polarised had already been the subject of previous studies, with the apparent conclusion that the Cape Town’s labour market had been undergoing professionalisation (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw, 2012).

4.2.1 Occupational Distribution of the Employed Working-age Population:

Determining whether the professionalising pattern previously identified by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) had continued in the decade following the 2001 census was central to this project and a starting point was to reproduce some of the results discussed in that 2009 study. The reason for this was not only to confirm those findings, but also to ensure that the corresponding categories were used through for ease of comparison. The analysis conducted
for this project was in agreement with their findings when focusing on the entire 1980-2001 period, but some differences became evident when looking at the 2001-11 period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Legislators, senior official and managers</td>
<td>33,169</td>
<td>57,041</td>
<td>65,402</td>
<td>145,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Professionals</td>
<td>53,651</td>
<td>94,884</td>
<td>84,621</td>
<td>104,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Technical and associate professionals</td>
<td>41,377</td>
<td>79,966</td>
<td>99,068</td>
<td>133,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td>80,937</td>
<td>102,992</td>
<td>132,284</td>
<td>186,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Service workers, shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>68,443</td>
<td>85,411</td>
<td>108,437</td>
<td>218,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>8,808</td>
<td>12,262</td>
<td>7,590</td>
<td>10,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Craft and related trades workers</td>
<td>42,718</td>
<td>113,536</td>
<td>110,781</td>
<td>151,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>151,136</td>
<td>74,653</td>
<td>74,057</td>
<td>64,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Elementary Occupation</td>
<td>116,297</td>
<td>185,233</td>
<td>188,975</td>
<td>277,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Occupation unspecified</td>
<td>17,916</td>
<td>82,438</td>
<td>68,290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.2: Absolute number of people employed in Major Occupation Groups in Cape Town, 1980-2011*

Based on the 2011 census data, all major occupational groups continued to grow during the period 2001-11, with the only exception being among “Plant and machine operators and assemblers”, which continued to drop during this period. The major occupational categories that saw the most significant growth, in terms of the absolute number of jobs added in the during the 2001-11 period were “Service workers, shop and market sales workers” (+109,953), “Legislators, senior official and managers” (+80,252) and “Elementary Occupations” (+88,807).
Table 4.3: Changes in the absolute number of people employed in Major Occupation Groups in Cape Town, 1980-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Legislators, senior official and managers</td>
<td>23,872</td>
<td>8,361</td>
<td>80,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Professionals</td>
<td>41,233</td>
<td>-10,263</td>
<td>19,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Technical and associate professionals</td>
<td>38,589</td>
<td>19,102</td>
<td>34,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Clerks</td>
<td>22,055</td>
<td>29,292</td>
<td>54,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Service workers, shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>16,968</td>
<td>23,026</td>
<td>109,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>3,454</td>
<td>-4,672</td>
<td>2,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Craft and related trades workers</td>
<td>70,818</td>
<td>-2,755</td>
<td>40,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>-76,483</td>
<td>-596</td>
<td>-9,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Elementary Occupation</td>
<td>68,936</td>
<td>3,742</td>
<td>88,807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1)

Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) argued that Cape Town saw a net increase of employment in middle-income occupations because the growing service-sector occupations such as “Clerks” and “Service workers, shop and market sales workers” were, on average, on par with and even slightly better paid than the declining manufacturing jobs. Therefore, it made sense to regard them as middle-income, not low-income, occupations.

While the Census 2011 dataset used for this study did not have detailed income data, but only income categories, the comparison between the incomes of different major occupational groups once again was limited to determining the modal income category.

The data depicted in Table 4.4 below, is reminiscent of the data discussed by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) in that “Sales and Service”, “Craft and related trades”, as well as “Plant and machine operator” occupations all share the same modal income category of “R19,201-R38,400” per annum. On the other hand, the modal income category of those
employed as “Clerks” is “R 76,801 - R 153,600”, which is also the modal income category of those employed as “Technicians” (i.e. a major occupational group more closely associated with managerial and professional occupations, according to ISCO). Nevertheless, this would suggest that both of the aforementioned non-manual occupations can be regarded as middle-income occupations, at the very least.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income distributions</th>
<th>Manager</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Technician</th>
<th>Clerk</th>
<th>Sales and services</th>
<th>Craft and related</th>
<th>Plant and machine</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1 to R4,800</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4,801 to R9,600</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R9,601 to R19,200</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R19,201 to R38,400</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R38,401 to R76,800</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R76,801 to R153,600</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R153,601 to R307,200</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R307,201 to R614,400</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R614,401 to R1,228,800</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1,228,801 to R2,457,600</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2,457,601 or more</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median (annual)</th>
<th>R76,801 to R153,600</th>
<th>R153,601 to R307,200</th>
<th>R76,801 to R153,600</th>
<th>R76,801 to R153,600</th>
<th>R38,401 to R76,800</th>
<th>R38,401 to R76,800</th>
<th>R38,401 to R76,800</th>
<th>R19,201 to R38,400</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median (monthly)</td>
<td>R6,400 to R12,800</td>
<td>R12,800 to R25,600</td>
<td>R6,400 to R12,800</td>
<td>R6,400 to R12,800</td>
<td>R3,200 to R6,400</td>
<td>R3,200 to R6,400</td>
<td>R3,200 to R6,400</td>
<td>R1,600 to R3,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Income distributions (percentages) of selected Major Occupation Groups in Cape Town, 2011

Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1)

By following the logic used by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), these major occupation groups can be collated into high-income, middle-income and low-income occupations. However, for the sake of engaging with the polarisation and professionalisation arguments, middle-income non-manual occupations, will be kept separate from middle-income
manual occupations. When reorganising the data according to this arrangement, the data for the changes in the absolute number of people employed in different occupations according to income and skill levels can be presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly-skilled high-income</td>
<td>128,197</td>
<td>231,891</td>
<td>249,091</td>
<td>383,296</td>
<td>120,894</td>
<td>134,205</td>
<td>255,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled middle-income non-manual</td>
<td>149,380</td>
<td>188,403</td>
<td>240,721</td>
<td>405,340</td>
<td>91,341</td>
<td>164,619</td>
<td>255,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled middle-income manual</td>
<td>193,854</td>
<td>188,189</td>
<td>184,838</td>
<td>215,797</td>
<td>-9.016</td>
<td>30,959</td>
<td>21,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-skilled low-income</td>
<td>116,297</td>
<td>185,233</td>
<td>188,975</td>
<td>277,782</td>
<td>72,678</td>
<td>88,807</td>
<td>161,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly-skilled high-income</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled middle-income non-manual</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled middle-income manual</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>-11.9%</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
<td>-14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-skilled low-income</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.5: Changes in the occupational distribution of the working population, in Cape Town, grouped according to skill and income levels, 1980-2011**

Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1)

Based on the findings in table 4.5 it is clear that, whereas between 1980 and 2001 the most significant growth was in the high-income Managerial and Professional occupations (+120,894), followed by the combined middle-income occupations (+82,325; i.e. the 91,341-9,016), there has been shift in the kinds of changes taking place since 2001. However, before focusing on the changes in the period 2001-11, it is worth reiterating that, whereas Sassen (2000, 2002) regarded non-professional non-manual occupations as both unskilled and low-income earning, Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) showed that ‘Clerical Support Workers’, as well as ‘Services and Sales Workers’ were in fact middle-income earners. Additionally, according to International Labour Organization (2007) many of these occupations require some degree of literacy, numeracy and communication skills that would benefit from having
completed high school.

In the decade following the 2001 census, employment in highly-skilled high-income occupations continued to grow considerably. However, there was marginally higher growth among semi-skilled middle-income occupations, particularly non-manual occupations.

During this period, an additional 195,578 middle-income jobs were added to the labour market. More specifically the 2011 census shows that there was an additional 164,619 people employed in Clerical, Sales and Service occupations, as well as an additional 30,959 people employed in Craft, Plant and Machinery occupations. This middle-income job growth was therefore greater than the growth among Managerial and Professional occupations (+134,205) and Elementary occupations (+88,807).

These findings concur with those of Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) who argued that the changes in the labour market were dominated by a professionalisation trend between 1980 and 2001. On the other hand, if one looks at the subsequent decade in isolation, it appears as though the trend has shifted, and the job market growth has become dominated growth in semi-skilled middle-income occupations, more specifically non-manual occupations. However, it would be a mistake to focus on the 2001-11 period in isolation, because when one focuses on the entire period in question (i.e. 1980-2011) the growth in the number of semi-skilled middle-income occupations (including both the manual and non-manual occupations) exceeds the growth of highly-skilled high-income occupations by just 22,804 (or 9%).

How then do these findings contribute to the polarisation-professionalisation debate? Firstly, as polarisation theory proponents would expect, the evidence does not point to the increased employment being found predominantly at the poles of the occupational distribution (Baum, 1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004, Sassen, 2000, Sassen, 2002), because middle-income occupations saw add more jobs to the during the period in question than either low- or high-income occupations. Secondly, while some might argue that the aforementioned expansion of
middle-income occupations also contradicts what professionalisation proponents might expect (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012, Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996) and are more reminiscent of the middle-income occupational growth found in the eThekwini metropolitan municipality between 1980 and 2014 (Lombard and Crankshaw, 2017), there are a number of caveats to consider.

Firstly, the growth of middle-income manual occupations exceeded the growth of middle-income non-manual occupations in eThekwini during certain intervals during the 1980-2014 period in question, with the latter eventually taking the lead in the final decade of the period. Cape town did not see comparable middle-income manual occupation growth. In fact, employment in those occupations decreased during the 1980-2001 period and when focusing on the entire period in question, manual labour growth was miniscule compared to that of middle-income non-manual occupations. In fact, the findings in table 4.5 show that in terms of job market share, those manual occupations lost 15% (from 32% to 17% during this period), whereas semi-skilled non-manual occupations gained 7% (from 24% to 31%).

Secondly, unemployment in eThekwini appears, at least on the surface, seems to have changed very little. According to Lombard and Crankshaw (2017), the unemployment rate was 15% in 1980 and had risen to 16% by 2014. On the other hand, the increase in unemployment in Cape Town is more reminiscent of what Hamnett (1994, 1996) argued would occur in a professionalising labour market. As shown in table 4.1, the unemployment rate in Cape Town increased from just 4% in 1980 to 24% in 2011, although it was as high as 29% in 2001.

Lastly, whereas the polarisation included the argument that occupational changes have included significantly increased demand for low-skilled workers, the professionalisation theory argues that changes in occupational distributions dominated by increased employment in highly-skilled high-income occupations have contributed to improving the skill profile of the employed workforce as a whole (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996, Sassen, 2000, Sassen,
2002).

### 4.2.2 Changing Education Profile of the Labour Market:

At this point it is worth revisiting the part of the polarisation-professionalisation debate that addresses the lesser-skilled and/or unskilled part of the labour market. As part of her polarisation thesis, Sassen (2000, 2002) argued that one of the consequences of the changes that occurred at the poles of the occupational distribution (i.e. in terms of both skill and income) attracted large numbers of lesser-skilled or unskilled migrants who saw those changes as the opportunity to find employment. On the other hand, Hamnett (1994) argued that employment growth in low-skilled low-income occupations were only present in those cities with large unskilled migrant populations and therefore concluded that those populations were the cause, not the consequence, of the growth of low-income employment, as well as that it was not evident in cities with smaller migrant populations.

He went on to argue that in contexts that did not have large unskilled migrant populations, it was more likely that the urban job markets would undergo professionalisation (i.e. the occupational changes would be dominated by significant growth in highly-skilled high-income occupations). What then would happen to those without the necessary education or skills to enter those skills-intensive occupations? Hamnett (1994) argued that they are likely to be unemployed or relying on the welfare system, where applicable (Hamnett, 1996).

In his work on the Dutch labour force, Hamnett (1994: 415) argued that Randstad "underwent an upward shift in the 1980s which is consistent with growing professionalisation". The question of skill and/or educational attainment in the labour market was previously addressed by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009). Using the same bands of educational attainment used in that study (including reproducing their results for 1980 and 2001), it is evident that education has become increasingly important in Cape Town’s labour market during the period under discussion here.
Figure 4.6 shows that the educational profile of Cape Town’s employed population has undergone significant changes during the period in question. Perhaps most noteworthy is that, while 76% of Cape Town’s employed population in 1980 had never completed what is now referred to as ‘basic education’ (i.e. primary and high school), this figure dropped to just 44% by 2011. This means that more than half of all jobs in Cape Town in 2011 required that the employee had completed high school. It is although worth keeping in mind that at least some of the employees in this category might have been employed for decades, so it is logical to assume that an increasing proportion of first-time employees are expected to have completed high school or more.

The increasing skills intensity of the city’s job market is also evident in the fact that in 2011, 57% of all employed had, at the very least completed high school. Included in that figure is the 35% of the employed population who had completed high school and the 16% who had at least one university degree. The remaining 6% comprised those who had completed various post-secondary certificates and diplomas; a figure that decreased from 10% in 1980. Perhaps the most revealing comparison, regarding the extent to which the job market has become skills intensive, is that in 2011 there was a greater percentage of employed persons with at least one university degree (i.e. 16%) that there were people who had just completed high school in 1980 (i.e. 14%).

Considering the professionalisation trend discussed by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), which would require specialised and/or technical skills, and the growth of Clerical, Sales and Service occupations in the subsequent decade, which would require numeracy and literacy skills required for information processing, this trend is not all that surprising (International Labour Office, 2012). From these results, it is evident that educational attainment has become increasingly important for labour market success during the study period. Stated differently, in order to find employment, it was becoming increasingly important to have, at the very least, completed high school.
Figure 4.6 Educational distribution of the employed population in Cape Town, 1980-2011

Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1)

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14 Totals might not add up to 100% because of rounding.
Thus, while the 2011 census data show that the changes in the labour market were dominated by growth in semi-skilled middle-income non-manual occupations, employment in the aforementioned highly-skilled occupations also continued to grow. Furthermore, the demand for skills continued to grow significant during the 2001-11 period. In fact, previous work addressing this question, such as the research by Branson et al. (2009) that used national data for the period 2000-07, has confirmed a correlation between increased educational attainment with both labour market success and better earnings.

In other words, the changes evident in the 2011 data do not necessarily contradict the Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) findings. Because, while the employment growth among highly-skilled high-income occupations was exceeded by the growth of middle-income non-manual employment, the growth of high-income employment actually accelerated during the 2001-11 period. More specifically, according to the findings in table 4.5, employment in high-income occupations grew by 120,894 during the 1980-2001 period and then increased by an additional 134,205 in just ten years after that.

Secondly, the continually increasing demand for literacy, numeracy and other more advanced skills in the labour market cannot be disconnected from the strong professionalisation trend of the preceding 21 years. Thirdly, and connected to the previous points, the characteristics of many of the fast growing occupations in the 2001-11 period, especially the clerical occupations, indicate that they would provide essential support for those in highly-skilled high-income occupations and that this growth can therefore be seen as a by-product of the aforementioned professionalisation trend (International Labour Organization, 2007, International Labour Office, 2012).

While this skills intensiveness is evident in the employed portion of the labour market, what about those who were unemployed (but in search of employment)?
While focusing on the portion of the labour market that is not economically active is unlikely to be all that revealing, because it includes full-time students, the disabled and others who are not searching for employment, the educational profile of the unemployed workforce is useful. The utility is that it provides an educational profile of the proportion of the economically active population who are not able to find employment.
The first noteworthy point when discussing the data depicted in figure 4.7 is that even among unemployed workers a trend is evident that points to increasing skills or educational attainment. However, the difference here is that the majority of the unemployment (albeit a decreasing one) have never completed high school. More specifically, while 95% of Cape Town’s unemployed population in 1980 had never finished high school, this figure had dropped to 70% in 2011.

Considering the findings regarding the ongoing professionalisation in Cape Town’s labour market, focusing on university graduates in the labour market is essential. As a starting point, it is worth noting that whereas in 1980 approximately 1 in 25 employed persons in Cape Town were university graduates, in 2011 the ratio was approximately 1 in 6. Additionally, while some might argue it is more likely for holders of certain degrees to find employment, Branson et al. (2009) did not draw this distinction when they found that those with degrees were more likely to find employment and were more likely to earn more than those without degrees.

4.2.3 Impact of Education Level of Unemployment:

The findings presented by Hamnett (1994) and Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) show that the education levels of the labour force increases in the context of a professionalising labour market. Additionally, arguments have been presented here that suggest that when changes in the labour market are dominated by considerable growth in highly-skilled high-income occupations, those who do not have the requisite skills or educational qualifications are going to struggle to find employment (Hamnett, 1994, Kasarda, 1989).

That said, it is worth asking about the extent of the unemployment problem among those with different levels of education. The findings in figure 4.8 once duplicate the bands of education levels used in the Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), however all those who have never completed high school (i.e. including those who have incomplete primary school) have been combined into one band.
The findings presented in figure 4.8 show that those with some kind of post-secondary educational qualification have fared noticeably better than those with less education. While unemployment increased in all educational bands, the unemployment rate among those with a ‘Post-school certificate/diploma’ was 9% and it was just 4% among those with a ‘University degree or NQF-level equivalent’.

Figure 4.8: Unemployment rate by level of education in Cape Town, 1980-2011

Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1)
On the other hand, the unemployment rate among those who had never completed their basic education (i.e. at most they had some secondary or high school education) was consistently higher than the rate for all education levels combined. This is not too surprising, especially when one considers the professionalisation trend that was evident over the period in question.

For example, the highest unemployment rate, across all educational levels and races, found in the data analysed here was 29% in 2001 and this dropped to 24% in 2011. However, when focusing on those with incomplete basic education, the unemployment rates in at those points in time were 38% and 33%, respectively. Whereas figure 4.6 showed the increased prevalence of higher educational or skill levels among the employed population over the period in question, the findings in figure 4.8 concur with that point by showing that over the period in question those groups in the population with higher educational attainment consistently experienced lower unemployment rates over the same period.

4.3 Occupational Distributions, Unemployment and Racial Composition:

4.3.1 Changing Racial composition of Cape Town’s Working-Age Population:

The literature discussed here has shown that, regardless of the context, people of different races and/or ethnicities have had different experiences and/or levels of success in urban labour markets. It has been evident in the discussions on Rio De Janeiro (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000), Brussels (Kesteloot, 2000) and numerous cities in the USA (Kasarda, 1989, Wilson, 2011, Wilson, 2012). This is certainly true in South Africa too, but here we also have to deal with the legacy of legislated inequalities in the quality of education available to different races, as well as job reservations that contributed to preserving the racial hierarchy of the apartheid era (McGrath, 2004, Seekings, 2011, Webster, 1986).

While Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) did not address the issue of how the professionalising labour market was being experienced by different races, Crankshaw (2012)
did and made an important contribution to this ongoing debate. After all, while some were arguing that changes to the labour market and the city’s geography were perpetuating apartheid-era inequalities (Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001), Crankshaw (2012) actually presented evidence to show the extent to which Black Africans and Coloureds have made gains in certain occupational categories.

However, before taking that debate further, it is necessary to better understand how the changing racial composition of Cape Town’s working-age population. Furthermore, as will become more evident as the analysis progresses, it is necessary to focus on both the absolute numbers of working-age population individuals, as well as their proportional compositions.

Table 4.9 summarises the changes that have taken place and shows that, over the period in question, Cape Town’s working-age population grew from 1.0 million in 1980 to 2.6 million in 2011. The most significant contributions to this growth were the growth of the Coloured (+554,867) and Black African (+885,645) populations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race vs WAP</th>
<th>BLACK AFRICAN</th>
<th>COLOURED</th>
<th>INDIAN</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>139,218</td>
<td>523,585</td>
<td>11,054</td>
<td>342,306</td>
<td>1,016,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>441,001</td>
<td>789,317</td>
<td>24,638</td>
<td>428,528</td>
<td>1,683,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>641,143</td>
<td>922,724</td>
<td>29,436</td>
<td>377,600</td>
<td>1,970,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,024,863</td>
<td>1,078,452</td>
<td>38,436</td>
<td>462,441</td>
<td>2,604,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-2001</td>
<td>501,925</td>
<td>399,139</td>
<td>18,382</td>
<td>35,294</td>
<td>954,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-2011</td>
<td>885,645</td>
<td>554,867</td>
<td>27,382</td>
<td>120,135</td>
<td>1,588,029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.9: Absolute change in the racial composition of the Working-age Population in Cape Town, 1980-2011

Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1)

A major contributor to the growth of the Black African population was the removal of apartheid-era influx controls that restricted their urbanisation prior to and in the 1980s. Additionally, since the poorest communities in South Africa were in more rural communities,
the growth of the city’s labour market who have been seen as an attractive prospect (Christopher, 2005b, Seekings, 2011). In contrast to the growth of these groups, the White population decreased from 428,528 in 1996 to 377,600 (i.e. -50,928) before peaking again in 2011 at 462,441.

When one considers the change in the racial profile of Cape Town’s working-age population, there have been considerable changes. For example, because the White working-age population saw very little growth during this period (i.e. +120,135), they decreased from 34% of the working-age population in 1980 to 18% in 2011 (see: figure 4.14). of the city’s working-age population because the other racial groups were growing that much faster.

![Figure 4.10: Working-age population by race, 1980-2011 (percentage)](image)

Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1)

At the other end of the scale, the growth of the Black African working-age population (+885,645) meant that, while they accounted for just 14% in 1980, they accounted for 39% of the working-age population in 2011. One question that might be raised at this point is how, if at all, this relates to the polarisation-professionalisation debate? Well, an issue raised by
Hamnett (1994) and which also formed part of his critique of the polarisation argument is that a large influx of lesser skilled migrants (whether from other countries or those moving from rural to urban) contributes to social polarisation. On the other hand, he also suggests that where this does not happen and where unemployment increases, those communities or groups bear brunt of increased unemployment. Either scenario, if found to be true in Cape Town, would seem to support the claims made by Lemanski (2007).

Nevertheless, some of the findings presented by Crankshaw (2012) already alluded to some paradoxical changes in the Cape Town labour market and this study aims to find out whether those patterns have continued, as well as what the spatial dynamics of those changes are?

While the reason for focusing changes to the racial composition of the working-age population in terms of absolute numbers and percentages might not be obvious at this stage, the latter will be useful when considering the racial composition of various occupational groups in order to determine whether certain groups are over- or under-represented.

So far, the analyses and related discussions have shown that whereas there is evidence of Cape Town’s labour market undergoing a process of professionalisation during the 1980-2001 period (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009), the changes in the occupational distribution between 2001 and 2011 appear to be dominated by expanding employment in middle-income non-manual occupations. However, growth in high-income occupations are continued and the upskilling of the employed population, a characteristic of professionalisation according to Hamnett (1994), also continued.

As previously stated, the aforementioned studies focused on Cape Town did not include data from the 2011 census. So, one of the issues being addressed here is how the racial differences in each of the major occupational categories (as depictured in the figure below) have come about. More specifically, the aim is to make sense of the intra-racial occupational
changes, or lack thereof, that have resulted in Black Africans being significantly over-represented in Elementary occupations, whereas Whites are over-represented among Managerial, Professional, Technical and Associate Professional occupations.

As a starting point, it is worth looking at the data on the racial composition of the major occupational categories, as well as the occupational distribution of the racial groups. In the figures below, it is evident that the racial compositions of the occupational categories in 2011, depicted below, the Black African working-age population is over-represented among Elementary and Unspecified occupations, but significantly under-represented among the Managerial and Professional occupations. Conversely, Whites are over-represented among Managerial and Professional occupations, as well as the Clerical, Sales and Services occupations.

Due to the previously discussed changes in the labour market, the focus on the coming sections will focus on the changes in the largest and fastest growing occupational categories.

4.3.2 Racial Composition of Highly-skilled High-income occupations:

Although the decision to engage with the polarisation-professionalisation debate has been quite clear throughout this project, a central aspect of this project has been to understand the racial and spatial characteristics of these labour market changes. While there was limited attention given to how different racial or ethnic groups were impacted in either Sassen’s (2000, 2002) or Hamnett’s (1994, 1996) work, some have made attempts to engage with the role of marginalised groups in Sydney (Baum, 1997) and Hong Kong (Chiu and Lui, 2004).

As stated earlier, Crankshaw (2012) raised this issue by addressing the question of who was benefiting from the professionalising trend in Cape Town’s labour market. While the evidence presented clearly indicated that Black Africans and Coloureds had made gains in both the high-income occupations, as well as the middle-income non-manual occupations, a few unanswered questions remained that will be addressed here.
For example, in a figure with the title ‘Percentage racial composition of employment in professional, managerial, and technical occupations in Cape Town, 1980 to 2007’, the evidence shows that during this period, the percentage of people employed in those occupations who identified as Coloured or Black African has increased considerably. And yet, Whites were still the single largest group. However, an issue that remained unclear was how the racial composition of those occupations compared to that of the working-age population.

Figure 4.15 aims to address this issue by presenting the racial composition of those employed in high-income occupations in Cape Town for 1980-2011 and compare that to the composition of the working-age population as a whole. As seen in the Crankshaw (2012) article, it is evident that both Black Africans and Coloureds made considerable gains in these occupations during period in question. For example, where Black Africans comprised 2% of those employed in high-income occupations in 1980 and Coloureds comprised 21%, that increased to 17% and 36%, respectively in 2011. It is also worth reiterating that this took place over a period where employment in these occupations grew from just 128,197 in 1980 to 383,296.
While those are arguably significant gains for both groups, findings that demonstrate that at least some Black Africans and Coloureds were able to benefit from the professionalisation trend in this labour market, it is worth keeping in mind that in 2011 Black Africans and

15 Managerial, Professional, Associate Professional and Technical occupations.
Coloureds comprised 39% and 41% of the working-age population, respectively. This would suggest that although gains were made by these groups in these occupations, both were comparatively-speaking underrepresented.

On the other hand, focusing solely on what percentage of persons employed in these occupations were White, it would appear as though they have incurred losses because they comprised 75% in 1980, but 45% in 2011. And yet, when one compares this to the fact that Whites, in 2011, comprised just 18% of the city’s working-age population, then it would appear that they were substantially over-represented in those occupations.

Nevertheless, it is apparent over the period of this study a growing number of Black Africans and Coloureds in Cape Town have benefited from the expansion of high-income employment.

4.3.3 Racial Composition of Middle-income Non-Manual Occupations:

A fundamental contribution to the polarisation-professionalisation debate made by Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) was that workers in the types of non-manual occupations that Sassen (2000, 2002) described as low-income occupations were earning incomes on par with, if not higher than, those in the middle-income manual occupations that were declining. They also argued that proponents of the polarisation thesis focused on Sydney (Baum, 1997) and Hong Kong (Chiu and Lui, 2004) misinterpreted data on income by categorising certain occupations as low-income, even where the incomes for those workers were only marginally lower than those in supposedly middle-income occupations.
As with the high-income occupations, it was helpful to compare the racial composition of these occupations with that of the working-age population as a whole. The finding presenting in figure 4.16 indicate that a pattern similar to the one presented by Crankshaw (2012) is

16 Clerical, Sales and Service occupations.
evident here too. For example, in 1980 Blacks Africans comprised just 7% of the workers in these occupations and by 2007 this had increased to 33%. For Whites, those figures were 50% and 25%, respectively. Despite of these changes, and in a similar way to the findings on high-income occupations, Whites continued to be over-represented in these occupations too (they comprised just 18% of the working-age population in 2011), whereas Black Africans, who accounted for 39% percent of the working-age population, were under-represented.

While neither of these occupations require the extensive knowledge and skills required for managerial and professional occupations, some of the occupations in these categories require a certain level of numeracy (e.g. ‘Tellers, Money Collectors, and Related Clerks’), literacy (e.g. ‘Secretaries (general)’), and interpersonal and/or communication skills (e.g. ‘Waiters and Bartenders’). Therefore, it could be argued that differences in educational attainment between the different races could account for some of these differences. However, as will be demonstrated in the section that follows, the data suggest that even when focusing on those within specific bands of educational attainment (such as those used thus far), certain racial groups are still less likely to find employment in these occupations.

4.3.4 Unemployment by Race and level of education:

The discussion so far has shown that Cape Town’s labour market has seen an overall upgrading of the employed population due to the increased importance of education, as well as an increase in unemployment, particularly among those who do not have the requisite skills for those the dominant occupational groups. Between 1980 and 2001, the employment growth was unambiguously dominated by the growth in highly-skilled high-income occupations and while those occupations did not dominate the growth in the subsequent decade that growth continued. Additionally, the overall upgrading of the skill levels, a cornerstone of the professionalisation theory (Hamnett, 1994) also continued.

The findings shown in figure 4.8, that skill or educational level impacted unemployment
rates is not only consistent with the professionalisation theory (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996), but is also consistent with the work of Kasarda (1989) that focused on urban USA. He also found that the most marginalised groups in those cities (e.g. recent migrants and/or ethnic minorities) that bore the brunt of the labour market changes brought about due to de-industrialisation and the related increasing skills demands.

Consequently, one of the aims of this study is to go beyond determining whether the professionalising trend has continued, but also to understand how those changes have been experienced by Coloureds, Black Africans and Whites. The previous section demonstrated that, although there has been some movement to more equitable racial compositions among middle-income non-manual and high-income occupations. The next issue to be addressed is to revisit the unemployment data presented in figures 4.8 (i.e. unemployment rates by level of education), but to differentiate between the rates for each of these racial groups.

As a starting point, it is looking at the unemployment rate and how it has changed over the study period for each of the population group. What is noteworthy from figure 4.17 is that in 1980 the unemployment rates for all 4 groups were below 10%. However, by 1996 there were substantial differences between the unemployment rates of each of these groups. While the unemployment rate across all groups was 20%, the rates for Black Africans, Coloureds and Whites were 38%, 18% and 5%, respectively. It is likely that the removal of influx control measures preventing Black African urbanisation, as well as the apparent attractiveness of a growing labour market, proved to be an attractive prospect for those living in difficult circumstances in outside the city (Christopher, 2005b, Seekings, 2011, Seekings and Nattrass, 2005).
Considering that census was just a few years after South Africa's first democratic elections and the passing of various laws aimed at repealing apartheid-era legislation, it is perhaps not surprising that the inequalities were evident. This is especially true when one considers that, as Crankshaw (2012) explains, educational institutions and the labour market had been deracialised. However, it would take a few more years for the Employment Equity Act (1998), aimed at promoting the employment of previously disadvantaged groups, to be implemented.

In the ensuing years, until 2011, there would be some fluctuation in the unemployment, but the census data suggests that the unemployment rate for Black African in Cape Town was consistently the highest, with the rate for Whites being the lowest. One of the questions that was raised during the course of this study, when encountering these apparent racial inequalities in terms of labour market success and (as will be addressed in the section that follows), type of occupation, was whether it was perhaps a product of unequal access to
education. After all, after the legislated inequalities in educational provision of the apartheid era (Hyslop, 1999), it could be argued that the legacy thereof might have persisted. Nevertheless, the data were disaggregated by race and level of education, with the unemployment rates for those with incomplete basic education displayed in figure 4.18 and those who have completed high school in figure 4.19.

![Graph showing unemployment rates by race and education level, 1980-2011](image)

*Figure 4.14: Unemployment rate for the those with incomplete basic education, by race, 1980-2011*

Source: South African population censuses (see: Note 1)
What is clear from these findings is that, even within these bands of educational attainment, Whites experienced the lowest unemployment rates and Black Africans the highest.
However, it is apparent that the differences between the unemployment rates experienced by each race decreases as the level of education increase. Nevertheless, despite educational attainment, in the context of a professionalising labour, some are still less likely, even unable to find suitable employment opportunities.

4.3.5 Occupations, race and skills levels:

4.3.5.1 Occupations and Associated Skill Levels:

Over the course of the analyses and discussions here, occupations have not only been categorised according to income level, but also according to the skills or education required for someone to be employed in those occupations. The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) used here not only provides a framework for different types of occupations, but also incorporates a framework for the skill levels that are associated with the various occupations. According to this ISCO framework, Professional occupations are
generally associated with skill level 4, whereas Technicians and Associate Professional are associated with skill level 3 and Managerial occupations tend to cross both skill levels. According to the International Labour Office (2012):

“Occupations at Skill Level 4 typically involve the performance of tasks that require complex problem-solving, decision-making and creativity based on an extensive body of theoretical and factual knowledge in a specialised field… The knowledge and skills required for competent performance in occupations at Skill Level 4 are usually obtained as the result of study at a higher educational institution for a period of 3-6 years leading to the award of a first degree or higher qualification…” (International Labour Office, 2012: 13)

“Occupations at Skill Level 3 typically involve the performance of complex technical and practical skills that require an extensive body of factual, technical and procedural knowledge in a specialised field… The knowledge and skills required for competent performance in occupations at Skill Level 3 are usually obtained as the result of study at a higher educational institution for a period of 1-3 years following completion of secondary education…” (International Labour Office, 2012: 13)

On the other hand, the middle-income non-manual occupations that have also seen substantial growth, particular in the years leading up to 2011, are typically associated with skill level 2, which can be understood as follows:

These occupations are described as follows, according to the International Labour Office’s International Standard Classification of Occupations:

“Occupations at Skill Level 2 typically involve the performance of tasks such as operating machinery and electronic equipment; driving vehicles; maintenance and repair of electrical and mechanical equipment; and manipulation, ordering and storage of information… Many occupations at this skill level require relatively advanced literacy and numeracy skills and good interpersonal communication skills.” (International Labour Office, 2012: 12)

When focus on the differences between the major occupational groups included, the ISCO framework indicates that people employed as ‘Clerical Support Workers’ require the
aforementioned literacy and numeracy skills process, manage and otherwise organise information in the course of their duties. On the other hand, while there is less emphasis on those skills for ‘Services and sales workers’ they certainly are required, in addition to the communication and other interpersonal skills that enable them to effectively communicate with employees, customers and/or members of the public.

Against the backdrop of the skill levels associated with these various occupations, it makes sense that the dominance of the growth in these middle-income non-manual and high-income occupations Cape Town’s labour market is associated with the type of upskilling evident in the employed population (as depicted in figure 4.6). Nonetheless, it is worth inquiring as to whether the occupational distribution within educational bands are comparable for the different racial groups under discussion here. After all, if they are not it would indicate that there are other factors, apart from level of skill or education, that are shaping labour market success and/or the type of occupation someone enters.

4.4 Conclusion:

While there is an array of findings in this chapter that reveal the nuanced changes in the city’s labour market over the period in question, there are a number of points that are worth reiterating.

Firstly, the findings discussed here concurred with Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), who argued that Cape Town underwent professionalisation between 1980 and 2001. However, the data from the 2011 points to a slightly different trend. On the one hand, employment growth in high-income occupations accelerated during the 2001-11, and yet the increase in middle-income non-manual employment was even greater. Consequently, when looking at the entire 1980-2011 period, there was very little difference between the number of jobs added to high-income occupations (i.e. +255,099) and middle-income non-manual occupations (i.e. +255,960). However, since the educational profile of the labour force, especially employed
workers, has continued to improve, the pattern of change still has more in common with the professionalisation, than the polarisation theory.

Secondly, Black Africans and Coloureds have continued to gain a greater foothold in both middle-income non-manual occupations, as well as highly-skilled high-income occupations. Nevertheless, when comparing the composition of those categories with the labour market as a whole, Whites continue to be over-represented in both. In contrast to these gains, Blacks Africans continued to experience the highest unemployment rates, followed by Coloureds. And that leads to the final point.

While unemployment decreased between 2001 and 2011, from 29% to 24%, it was still high, particularly for the aforementioned groups. Nonetheless, this high unemployment rate raises questions about Hamnett’s (1994, 1996) claims regarding the reasons for high unemployment rates and the role of large numbers of unskilled workers in the labour market. He argued that the large unskilled migrant populations in the cities that Sassen (2000, 2002) discussed were the cause of the polarised job market and that in contexts where the supply of unskilled labour is not as large, the result would be a professionalising labour market. He also argued that even when there might be large unskilled populations, strong welfare systems might give workers the ability to opt out of taking low-income jobs.

However, Cape Town’s labour market has a large and growing supply of unskilled workers in the labour market. Additionally, the limited welfare provision in South Africa, is insufficient to allow workers to opt out of low-income employment (Seekings, 2002). At the very least, this requires further investigation in order to determine the reasons for the lack of low-income employment growth in cities like Cape Town.
5 How has middle-class suburbia changed in Cape Town?

As discussed in the previous chapter, urban South Africa, including what is now known as the City of Cape Town, was shaped by policies that not only determined where people of different racial could live, but also which occupations they could enter. As Seekings (2011: 533) explained it, the aim was to construct and maintain a social and racial hierarchy that “took on a caste-like form”, which was also inscribed on spaces.

5.1 Interrogating the applicability of the concepts “ghetto” and “suburb” in Cape Town:

5.1.1 Apartheid-era Group Areas:

As a starting point to interrogating the of these terms, it is worth looking at the locations of formerly Black Africans-only, Coloureds-only and Whites-only areas of the city. Map 5.1 shows Cape Town’s former Group Areas, as identified by Graham (2007) and also used by Crankshaw (2012), and was produced using the 2001 census shapefiles and subplace names. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that the implementation of segregation measures was not necessarily final or completed. As the text Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (1991), there were amendments made to the Group Areas Act (1966) as recent as 1984.17

There are also a few additional observations that are worth highlighting here. Firstly, the formerly Whites-only areas were concentrated along the west coast, most of the peninsula (including both coasts), and close to the Table Mountain range, as well as east of the CBD toward the northern suburbs. They also avoid the so-called Cape Flats (south-east of the CBD), but there were a few located in the Helderberg region (i.e. Somerset West and surrounds). The proximity to the city centre and surrounding suburbs contradicts the type of suburbanisation

17 Furthermore, some apparent inconsistencies between the distribution of various racial groups, as well as the composition of subplaces, and the aforementioned groups areas could also be the result of shifting subplace boundaries. After all, the work conducted by Graham (2007) made use of the 2001 subplace boundaries, which would likely have shifted somewhat since the 1980s.
already discussed in some of the urban studies literature already discussed here (Kasarda, 1989, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Wilson, 2011, Wilson, 2012) and is an issue that will be raised again at a later stage.

Secondly, apart from a few formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods near the city centre, such as Bo Kaap on the western edge of the city bowl and the Woodstock and Salt River neighbourhoods just east of the city centre, most of the formerly Black Africans-only and Coloureds-only areas were located on the Cape Flats. As explained by Graham (2007), there are numerous locations around the city where physical barriers such as train tracks, freeways or industrial areas (such as Epping Industrial area, which can be found at the cluster of railway tracks just west of the centre of the map) were used to separate Whites-only areas from areas set aside for other racial categories. This is especially true of both the southbound and eastbound train lines (i.e. the grey lines in the map below).

Since the aforementioned Coloureds-only and Blacks-only neighbourhoods were created for those population groups who were regarded as socially and politically subordinate during the apartheid-era, these neighbourhoods are often associated with the ghettos concept already discussed (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Wilson, 2012). However, one of the issues that will be addressed in this chapter and the one that follows, is the applicability of that concept to the townships on the Cape Flats, as well as whether the changes that have taken place over the period in question means that they have become so-called excluded or outcast ghettos (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 1997, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997b).
Based on the geography of these former Group Areas it would seem as though the
priority was a physical boundary between Coloured and White neighbourhoods, as well as using Coloured neighbourhoods as a barrier between White and Black\textsuperscript{18} neighbourhoods. Some exceptions to this pattern (or examples of incomplete segregation) can be seen in Southfield on the predominantly-Coloured side of the railway line, as well as the Whites-only Zeekoevlei neighbourhood that was sandwiched between the marshlands and the Coloureds-only Grassy Park area.

Another exception is Langa, which is the oldest Black Africans-only township in Cape Town, and was surrounded by a Coloureds-only neighbourhood, the N2, the N7 and the Epping Industrial area. Thus, despite its apparent proximity to some Whites-only neighbourhoods and the CBD, there were significant barriers in place between it and the White neighbourhoods.

At this time, due to the apartheid-era legislation, the boundaries of race, space and class were being socially and politically engineered to coincide. However, this was achieved with varying degrees of success. As already discussed, efforts to float the colour bar in the labour market were being permitted to a greater extent, although in ways to ensure that the racial hierarchy was maintained (Crankshaw, 1997, Webster, 1986).

The previously discussed research by Graham (2007) demonstrated which parts of Cape Town had been set aside for specific racial groups. However, according to the text of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (1991) amendments to the Group Areas Act (1966) was still being made during the 1980s. Nonetheless, certain patterns in the city’s divisions were clearly evident, as show in the map above.

5.1.2 Suburbs, Ghettos, Neighbourhoods and more:

Over the course of this study, it became apparent that the ideal types conceptualised Marcuse, including his work with Van Kempen, (Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse and Van Kempen,

\textsuperscript{18} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
1997, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a) were potentially quite useful in trying to understand the ways in which the geography of post-Fordist cities have changed. Their concepts have been applied to a variety of contexts, including Calcutta (Chakravorty, 2000), Brussels (Kesteloot, 2000), Rio de Janeiro (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000), Johannesburg (Beall et al., 2002, Crankshaw, 2008) and Cape Town (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007).

It was also apparent that since these concepts were developed by scholars who studied the USA, the ideas are primarily shaped by the history of urban USA, therefore it was necessary to keep in mind that, since different contexts have specific social and political histories, questions need to be raised about the applicability of these concepts to Cape Town, as Chakravorty (2000) did in his work on Calcutta.

5.1.2.1 Suburbs:

According to Marcuse and Van Kempen (2000b) the suburbs they referred to primarily residential areas where single families own homes and where there are safe, quiet spaces suitable for children. Additionally, it is also worth reiterating that the suburbs in the USA are municipalities that are independent and geographically separate of the central city (Crankshaw, 2008). Based on this definition, the tendency to discuss formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in Cape Town, as comparable or synonymous with the concept of the suburb in the dominant urban studies literature, is at least somewhat problematic. Therefore, rather than attempting to fit the data into this taxonomy of city quarters, the term ‘neighbourhood’ will be used quite broadly to refer to primarily residential areas and any further categorisation will be shaped by the characteristics of the subplaces.

Prior to the formation of the Cape Town Unicity and the subsequent metropolitan municipality referred to as the City of Cape Town, the area comprised six independent Metro Local Councils. And, a number of the formerly Whites-only areas depicted in map 5.1 include
significant area around the city centre. Additionally, maps 5.2 and 5.3 depict the percentage of dwellings in each subplace in 1996 and 2011 that were formal dwellings, but exclude dwellings in blocks of apartments or flats, because of the above-mentioned definition of the suburb (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b).

Based on the inner-city and other locations of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, as well as the types of dwellings, then uncritically equating these neighbourhoods with the concept of suburbs discussed here is profoundly problematic. After all, that concept of the suburb is characterised by the dwelling types, as well as the location in relation to the central city and not solely the racial composition.
Map 5.2: Selected formal dwellings\textsuperscript{19} as proportion of all household dwellings, 1996

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3)

\textsuperscript{19} These include: Houses or brick/concrete block structure on a separate stand or yard or on a farm, Cluster houses in complexes, Townhouse (semi-detached house in a complex) or Semi-detached houses. It therefore explicitly excludes dwellings in blocks of apartments/flats.
5.1.2.2 Ghettos:

The ghettos concept has also been discussed extensively here and, while it is unavoidable when engaging in urban research, caution needs to be applied here too when uncritically using this concept. In the taxonomy of ideal types in the post-Fordist city collated by Marcuse and van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen,

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20 These include: Houses or brick/concrete block structure on a separate stand or yard or on a farm, Cluster houses in complexes, Townhouse (semi-detached house in a complex) or Semi-detached houses. It therefore explicitly excludes dwellings in blocks of apartments/flats.
2000a, Marcuse, 1997a), they defined a ghetto as an involuntary spatial concentration of a
group of people deemed to be socially, politically and/or economically subordinate. Some of
the ways that these groups have been defined over the course of human history include
ethnicity, race and/or religion.

Based on this definition, it makes sense that some might associate the formerly
Coloureds-only and formerly Black Africans-only neighbourhoods and township with the ghetto
concept.

5.2 What are the spatial consequences of Cape Town’s Deracialising and
Professionalising labour market?

As discussed in the previous chapter, and depicted in figure 4.15, the racial composition
of Cape Town’s middle class shifted considerably during the period in question, even though
Whites were still over-represented among those employed in these occupations in 2011.
These changes took place during a period when the number of people in these occupations
grew from 128,197 in 1980 to 383,296 in 2011, when those employed in these occupations
accounted for 30% of all employed persons in the city (see table 4.5).

Considering the discussion in the previous section, as well as the intention not to be
constrained by the previously-discussed ‘ideal types’ in the urban studies literature (Marcuse
and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a), it is necessary to define and
locate predominantly middle-class neighbourhoods in order to begin to understand how the
professionalisation of Cape Town’s labour market has impacted the geography of the city. As
the findings and discussions in the remainder will demonstrate, by not being limiting the
analyses and interpretations to the suburb-vs-ghetto framework, certain nuances in the spatial
distribution of the races and classes under discussion become apparent.

5.2.1 1996:

5.2.1.1 Distribution of middle-class residents:
When discussing the residential location and/or movement of middle-class residents in contemporary urban literature, some of the dominant arguments have emphasised the movement of middle-class residents from older inner-city neighbourhoods to the suburbs (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 2001, Wilson, 2009, Wilson, 2012). One definition that has been useful in this study comes from (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b), who describe suburbs as those part of the city where individual values own homes, which also include quiet and green spaces suitable for children.

Below, map 5.2 is a depiction of the distribution of the absolute number of those employed in highly-skilled high-income occupations. Considering the fact that the legislated residential segregation and labour market discrimination had been rescinded a few years prior to the census under discussion here, some might have expected significant numbers of these individuals to have left the ghettos and moved to the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. However, map 5.2 shows that, while the tallest columns (indicating the largest number of middle-class residents) appear to be in the southern and northern suburbs, the so-called Cape Flats also have a number of reasonably tall towers. While this map is, analytically speaking, not necessarily all that helpful, it provides a useful impression to start this discussion.

On the other hand, map 5.3 shows these high-income earning individuals as a percentage of all employed persons. Considering the fact that Whites still comprised 58% of these individuals (see: figure 4.20), it is not surprising that the subplaces with the highest percentage of high-income earning individuals can be found in those parts of the city that where we find the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods.
However, which of these might be regarded as middle-class suburbs? For the purposes of these discussions, those subplaces where the majority of the employed were highly-skilled high-income earners are to be regarded as middle-class suburbs.

5.2.1.2 Majority middle-class suburbs:

Map 5.4 depicts the distribution of these middle-class suburbs and, for the most part, they were located in those parts of the city that Graham (2007) identified as formerly Whites-
only neighbourhoods.21

Map 5.6: Majority middle-class subplaces in 1996 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas

Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)

These middle-class suburbs comprised 104 of the 405 subplaces in the 1996 census,

21 The racial group areas depicted in this map are those identified by Graham (2007) and used by Crankshaw (2012). Those parts of this maps and others that follow are used for presentation purposes and are used with Graham’s permission. Also, other calculations and mapping, such as those identifying middle-class suburbs and all presentations of unemployment rates and occupational data was calculated by the author.
but just 16% of the working-age population (i.e. 265,707 of 1,684,889). On the other hand, all these middle-class suburbs comprised just 41% of those employed in highly-skilled high-income occupations at the time (i.e. 96,248 of 232,413). This reveals that the majority of the city’s high-income earning individuals were resident in subplaces where this category did not comprise the majority. These subplaces will be discussed as a later point.

5.2.1.3 Diverse composition of middle-class neighbourhoods:

As previously mentioned, the dominant arguments in the literature, which are often focused on North American and/or European contexts, discuss these middle-class suburbs as predominantly-White spaces (Kasarda, 1989, Kesteloot, 2000, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Wilson, 2012). However, in those contexts, the population categories and/or ethnic groups with low proportions of high-income earning individuals are usually a numerical minority – for example, the international migrants in Brussels (Kesteloot, 2000) or various ethnic minorities in the USA (Wilson, 2012, Kasarda, 1989).

On the other hand, in the South African context, Black Africans (26%) and Coloureds (47%) collectively comprised 73% of the working-age population in Cape Town in 1996. Nevertheless, since they only comprised 40% (Black Africans: 8%; Coloureds: 32%) of high-income earners at the time, it is not surprising that most of these middle-class suburbs were predominantly White.

Map 5.5 shows the locations of the 95 majority-White middle-class subplaces, whereas map 5.6 shows the nine that were majority Black. In previously-discussed paper by Crankshaw (2012), the focus was on the desegregation that had taken place in the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in Cape Town up to that point. However, when we focus on these middle-class suburbs, particularly the size and composition we start to see the rather limited extent of the apparent desegregation that had taken place in those neighbourhoods.
Map 5.7: Majority-White middle-class subplaces in 1996 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas

Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)
In the 95 majority-White middle-class subplaces, the working-age population can be broken down as follows:
Figure 5.7 the finding that, although Black Africans and Coloureds had moved into these majority-White middle-class subplaces, they comprised very small amounts (in both absolute and percentage terms). More specifically, the columns show that in 1996 these subplaces were home to 12,621 Black African working-age people (or 3% of all Black Africans in the city), as well as 16,791 Coloureds (or just 2% of the total across the city).

As previously mentioned, as well as depicted in map 5.6, there were nine middle-class subplaces that were majority Black. While these subplaces were home to a negligible percentage of the city's working-age population of any race (see: figure 5.9), they were home to just over 3% of the city's middle-class Black Africans and Coloureds respectively (see: figure 5.10).
However, it is the location of some of these subplaces that could be indicative of a familiar pattern of change. In his discussion of changes in Johannesburg (Crankshaw, 2008) and Cape Town (Crankshaw, 2012), Crankshaw argued that the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods that had undergone the most significant change were those in close proximity to formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods.

The three subplaces in question were as follows:
▪ Mowbray (59% Black\textsuperscript{22}) in close proximity to Salt River and Woodstock which are formerly Coloureds-only subplaces
▪ Rondebosch East (57% Black\textsuperscript{23}) in close proximity to Athlone which is a formerly Coloureds-only subplace
▪ Acacia Park (54% Black\textsuperscript{24}) in close proximity Kensington and Factreton which are formerly Coloureds-only subplaces

5.2.1.4 What can we learn from mixed-class subplaces?

As mentioned when reviewing the urban studies literature, it is worth keeping in mind that when Marcuse and van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse, 2001) discuss the different quarters of the post-Fordist city, they are using ‘ideal types’. Furthermore, since so much emphasis is placed on the ghetto vs suburb comparison by them and others (Kasarda, 1989, Kasarda, 1993, Wilson, 2009, Wilson, 2011, Wilson, 2012), caution is essential in order to avoid falling into a binary mode of thinking about cities\textsuperscript{25}.

While the suburb has often been framed as a predominantly middle-class space (Kasarda, 1989, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Wilson, 2012), the data under discussion suggested that a more nuanced understand of suburbs was necessary to understanding the changes in Cape Town. Consequently, a decision was made to focus on what will be referred to as ‘mixed-class suburbs’, which are those subplaces where the those in high-income occupations do not comprise the majority. Furthermore, the selection was limited to those subplaces where the unemployment was below that of the city as a whole, which at the time was 20\%\textsuperscript{26}.

Of the 405 subplaces under discussion, 171 fit these criteria. Of those, only 15 had a majority occupational category, so for the most part there was a real mix of occupational

\textsuperscript{22} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
\textsuperscript{23} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
\textsuperscript{24} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
\textsuperscript{25} The author wishes to acknowledge the other quarters of the city (e.g. enclaves and citadels) discussed by Marcuse, van Kempen and others, but much of the emphasis is on the concepts “ghetto” and “suburb”.
\textsuperscript{26} The reason for this additional parameter will become clearer when discussing ghettos in the following chapter.
classes in these subplaces, the locations of which can be seen in map 5.11.

While, the locations of most of the middle-class suburbs coincided with formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, the distribution of these mixed-class suburbs is much less obvious. However, there is at least one point worth raising here. Many of these mixed-class subplaces that are located in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods are in close proximity to formerly

Map 5.13: Location of mixed-class suburbs in 1996 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas

Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)
Coloureds-only subplaces and those that are located in the latter category are in close proximity to the former. This is the same pattern that was found when focusing on the locations of the middle-class suburbs.

Additionally, when differentiating between those mixed-class subplaces that are majority-White (map 5.14) and those that are majority-Black (map 5.15) the aforementioned pattern appears to be evident once again, albeit with a few exceptions. While all the majority-White mixed-class subplaces were located in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, the same cannot be said of the majority-Black subplaces.
In terms of the composition of these mixed-class subplaces, those that were majority-White did not reveal much new information. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 already showed that the majority of the White working-age population (58%) and middle class (68%) were resident in the White middle-class subplaces at the time. Nevertheless, the 61 majority-White mixed-class subplaces in 1996 were home to 32% of working-age Whites (see: figure 5.14) and 24% of middle-class Whites (see: figure 5.15).
This then indicates that, at the time of the 1996 census, 90% of working-age Whites and 92% of middle-class Whites in Cape Town were resident in subplaces that were predominantly White. But what about those subplaces made up of a mix of occupational classes (but with below-average unemployment rates), that were majority-Black?

So far, figures 5.7 and 5.8 showed that very small numbers of working-age or middle-class Black Africans or Coloureds were resident in majority-White middle-class subplaces in 1996. Furthermore, there were so few majority-Black middle-class subplaces that the numbers in those subplaces (see: figures 5.9 and 5.10) were even lower.
However, according to this census, there were 110 subplaces that were not predominantly middle class and where the unemployment rate was below the Cape Town average at the time. Not surprisingly, these subplaces were home to very small portions of the White working-age (7%) or middle-class (5%) populations. However, when focusing solely on the Coloured population, the majority of the working-age (55%) and middle-class (67%) populations were resident there.

On the other hand, while there were significantly fewer Black Africans in these subplaces compared to Coloureds (both in absolute and relative terms), more were resident here than in any of the middle-class subplaces or the majority-White mixed-class subplaces.
The reason for including this concept of a mixed-class subplace in the discussion here is that it speaks to a concept that has not been given sufficient scope in the discussions on Cape Town’s geography. Turok (2001: 2371) discussed the “gulf between Cape Town’s poor townships and its affluent suburbs which appears to be widening”, Lemanski (2007) discussed the poverty traps in the slums on the city’s periphery.

The aim of including this mixed-class subplace concept is not to detract from the undeniable challenges of poverty and spatial dislocation in the city, but to acknowledge that there is a sort of transitional type of neighbourhood between the poverty traps in the slums and the more affluent suburbs (Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001).
5.2.2 2001:

5.2.2.1 Distribution of middle-class residents:

According to the figures in table 4.5, the number of people employed in highly-skilled high-income occupations grew by 17,200 during the 1996-2001 period, after growing by 103,694 during the 1980-1996 period. Furthermore, the racial composition also continued to change, the White portion of this category decreased from 58% in 1996 to 53% in 2001. On the other hand, the Black African (8% in 1996; 10% in 2001) and Coloured (32% in 1996; 35% in 2001) portions grew by 2%-points and 3%-points, respectively.

Map 5.20: Column chart of the absolute number of people in highly-skilled high-income occupations by subplace, 2001

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3)

Map 5.21: People employed in highly-skilled high-income occupations as a proportion of employed people by subplace, 2001

Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)
Despite these changes, the subplaces with the greatest number and/or percentage of persons employed in high-income occupations were still to be found in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, there were a number of formerly Coloureds-only and Black Africans-only subplaces in the greater Mitchell’s Plain and Khayelitsha areas (south and southeast of the airport), as well as on the northern edge of the airport where more than 20% or 30% of employed persons were in these high-income occupations.

However, the emphasis here is to better understand the composition and locations of those subplaces where the majority of the employed are in these occupations.

5.2.2.2 Majority middle-class suburbs:

As previously mentioned, the number and sizes of subplaces have changed from one census to the next. Therefore, simply counting the number of middle-class subplaces could be misleading. Consequently, one of the ways to understand the composition and population size of these middle-class subplaces, attention will be paid to changes in the percentage of the city’s working-age (or middle-class) population that were resident in those subplaces.

For the most part, map 5.20 that depicts the locations of middle-class suburbs in 2001 resembles the 1996 version (see: map 5.4). However, there are two changes that are worth mentioning. Firstly, there are a number of subplaces in the southern suburbs that were marked as middle class in 1996, but not in 2001. For example, in 1996, 53% of employed persons in the formerly Coloureds-only subplace of Fairways were in high-income occupations, but this figure decreased to 44% in 2001. Also, in the formerly Whites-only neighbourhood of Rondebosch East, 62% of the employed in 1996 were in high-income occupations, but in 2001 this figure was just 46%.

\[\text{NOTE: Both of these have become categorised as “Mixed Class” subplaces in 2001.}\]
Secondly, there are a number of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in the Kuils River area, northeast of the airport, that were not recognised as middle-class subplaces in 1996 but were categorised as such in 2001. It’s possible that a reason for this is that what was a single

Map 5.22: Majority middle-class subplaces in 2001 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)
‘Kuilsrivier’ subplace in 1996 was divided into at least 14 subplaces for the 2001 census.  

5.2.2.3 Not all majority middle-class suburbs are majority White:

According to the parameters used here, 202 of the 683 subplaces in 2001 were categorised as majority middle-class. As with 1996, the majority of those subplaces, 196 to be specific, were predominantly White and their locations can be seen in map 5.23, below. Without exception, these majority-White middle-class subplaces were located in the formerly Whites-only areas identified by Graham (2007).

On the other hand, of the six majority-Black middle-class subplaces, two were in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods not far from the University of Cape Town and, as previously mentioned, in close proximity to the formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods of Salt River and Woodstock.

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28 Unfortunately, these types of complications were unavoidable because the data was aggregated according to the subplaces used in each census.
Map 5.23: Majority-White middle-class subplaces in 2001 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas

Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)
While the locations of the middle-class subplaces, particularly those that were majority-White, were not all that surprising, the composition of these subplaces are quite revealing. Some findings on South Africa's largest cities have indicated that there has been some movement from formerly Blacks-only to formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012, Schensul, 2009), however,
the findings here would suggest that it would be a mistake to overestimate the extent of that movement.

The findings presented in figure 5.25 show how many of the city’s working-age population, by race, were resident in these neighbourhoods (both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of all in the city). What these figures indicate is that, although there was some desegregation, particular in subplaces that were close to or on the border between formerly Whites-only and formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods, they accounted for a very small percentage of the Black African and Coloured populations (figure 5.25). Even when focusing just on the middle-class population, only 13% of middle-class Black Africans and 7% of middle-class Coloureds (looking at both majority-White and majority-Black middle-class subplaces in figures 5.26 and 5.28).
Figure 5.25: Racial composition of majority White middle-class subplaces (working-age population), 2001

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

Figure 5.26: Racial composition of majority White middle-class subplaces (middle class only), 2001

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)
5.2.2.4 Further lessons to be learnt from mixed-class subplaces:

As already discussed, the 1996 census data on Cape Town has already pointed out that in this context there were large numbers of subplaces that were not predominantly middle-class, nor were their unemployment rates particularly high (i.e. they were not higher that the unemployment rate for the city at the time). Furthermore, some were majority-Black, others not. And, some were located in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods.

Once again in 2001, these mixed-class subplaces could be found in different parts of the city, but there are two characteristics that are worth noting here. A number of these subplaces could be found close to or on the border between formerly Whites-only and formerly Blacks-
only neighbourhoods. This pattern can be seen in a number of subplaces immediately north and east of the airport, as well as in a number of subplaces west of the airport that are in close proximity to the formerly Whites-only just below the lowest eastern slopes of the mountain.

Map 5.29: Location of mixed-class suburbs in 2001 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)

While these mixed-class subplaces will be discussed in greater detail when focusing on the 2011 data, it is worth noting that these were some of the more diverse subplaces in 2001,
as shown in the figure below.

Figure 5.30: Comparison between the composition of mixed-class and middle-class subplaces, 2001

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

When focusing on all mixed-class or middle-class subplaces, it is apparent that there is one racial group that comprises an outright majority, but there are a greater percentage of White in the mixed-class subplaces than there are Coloureds in the middle-class subplaces. At the very least this raises the question as to where the residential integration is taking place, because some of the dominant voices in this debate have focused on the middle-class suburb idea, without considering some space between it and the townships (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001). However, as already stated, this will be addressed in greater detail when focusing on the 2011 data, in order to determine whether these occurrences were still evident then.

For now, it is sufficient to differentiate between those mixed-class subplaces that were majority-Black and those that were majority-White, including focusing on their composition. As
they relate to city-wide total\textsuperscript{29}. When focusing on the findings in the figures below, what is most surprising is that there does not appear to be any significant change during the five-year period up to 2001, thereby lending further credence to Christopher (2005b: 2305) referring to the “slow pace of desegregation” during this period.

More specifically, figure 5.31 shows that 1% of working-age Black Africans, 3% of Coloureds and 32% of Whites in Cape Town at the time were resident in majority-White mixed-class subplaces in 2001. On the other hand, for the same type of subplace in 1996, the figures were 2%, 3% and 32%, respectively. Similar, when focusing just on the middle-class individuals, the figures for 2001 that are shown in figure 5.32 are nearly identical to those in 1996\textsuperscript{30}.

\textsuperscript{29} As was done in figures 5.25 to 5.28
\textsuperscript{30} The figures for 1996 were 5% of middle-class Black Africans, 6% of Coloureds and 24% of Whites.
When focusing on the majority-Black mixed-class subplaces, there appears to be marginally more change, and this is among subplaces that are home to considerably more people than the middle-class subplaces. For example, while the majority-White mixed-class subplaces comprised 154,527 working-age people (or 8% of the population), majority-Black mixed-class subplaces comprised 613,204 people or 31% of the working-age population.

Nevertheless, there are two points worth raising from the figures below. Firstly, 10% working-age Whites and 7% of middle-class Whites were resident in these majority-Black mixed-class in 2001, compared to 7% and 5% respectively in 1996. This points to a slight increase in the percentage of Whites living in these majority-Black subplaces that might not
necessarily be regarded as middle-class neighbourhoods.

Figure 5.33: Racial composition of majority-Black mixed-class subplaces (working-age population), 2001
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

Figure 5.34: Racial composition of majority-Black mixed-class subplaces (middle class only), 2001
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

5.2.3 2011:

An oft cited paper in this project has been ‘The slow pace of desegregation in South African cities, 1996-2001, by Christopher (2005b), not only because the question of segregation has been central to this project, but because the method used in that paper, the
dissimilarity index, was incorporated into this project\textsuperscript{31}.

Consequently, a question that was raised while focusing on the 2011 data was whether there would be any evidence of the pace of desegregation increasing during the subsequent decade. There is no simple answer to this question, however based on conversations that have occasionally arisen around the topic of this project, there has been less progress than some people might expect.

\textbf{5.2.3.1 Distribution of middle-class residents:}

While the employed population in Cape Town grew by 354,728 between 2001 and 2011, the number of people in high-income occupations\textsuperscript{32} grew by 134,205 during the same period. Map 5.35 shows the absolute number of people in high-income occupations per subplace and what is apparent is that, while those subplaces with the tallest columns remained in parts of the city that corresponded with the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, there are some comparable columns on the Cape Flats. Nevertheless, when looking at which of the subplaces had the highest percentage of people employed in these occupations, it was the formerly Whites-only areas and some of the adjacent formerly Blacks-only subplaces that showed the largest percentage of people employed in those occupations.

Nonetheless, compared to 2001, there appeared to be more subplaces east and south of the airport (i.e. the Mitchell’s Plain and Khayelitsha areas) with large numbers of high-income earners (map 5.35), even if they did not appear to comprise a significantly high percentage of the employed in those subplaces (map 5.36).

\textsuperscript{31} See: chapter 7 for more.

\textsuperscript{32} That is, those regarded as middle class in the context of this study, based on the usage of the term by: CRANKSHAW, O. 2008. Race, Space and the Post-Fordist Spatial Order of Johannesburg. \textit{Urban Studies} (Sage Publications, Ltd.), 45, 1692-1711.
While these do not aid all that well in terms of analysis, presenting the data in this way (regardless of which census was in focus) was a useful catalyst in the process of making decision about the data analysis processes. One example is the decision that was made to incorporate the issue of population densities into the analyses and this will be addressed in the next chapter.

5.2.3.2 Majority middle-class suburbs:

As with the previous years, one of the pivotal objectives tackled was to determine the middle-class subplaces (i.e. those where the majority of the employed are in highly-skilled
high-income occupations). After all, and this is worth reiterating here, one of the questions being addressed here is what the spatial implications have been for the professionalisation that the Cape Town labour market has undergone?

Map 5.37 depicts the distribution of the middle-class neighbourhoods in 2011 and from the outset there are two points worth raising when discussing this map. Firstly, and perhaps not surprisingly, most of these subplaces correspond with the formerly Whites-only areas identified by Graham (2007). Although there are a few exceptions to this, these will be discussed in greater detail when the focus narrows in on the majority-Black middle-class. The second point is that, as with previous years, there are hardly any middle-class subplaces on the Cape Flats, particularly not in areas in close proximity to the airport. For example, there are no middle-class subplaces in Khayelitsha (i.e. blue polygons southeast of the airport), nor in Mitchell’s Plain (i.e. red polygons south of the airport), nor in the Nyanga-Crossroads are (i.e. blue polygons southwest of the airport), nor the Elsies River and Matroosfontein areas (i.e. red polygons north of the airport).
5.2.3.3 Not all majority middle-class suburbs are majority White:

The majority of these middle-class subplaces were predominantly White and were all located in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods (see map 5.37), the anomalies highlight a previously-mentioned characteristics of the changes taking place in parts of the city.

Map 5.37: Majority middle-class subplaces in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas
Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)
Map 5.38: Majority-White middle-class subplaces in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas

Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)
Map 5.38 depicts the majority-Black middle-class subplaces and there are two points worth noting. As has already been alluded to, there were not many subplaces in 2011 that matched these criteria. On the other hand, there were 17 of these subplaces that corresponded with formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in different parts of the city. And, it is worth taking a closer look at a number of them.
Firstly, just a few kilometres from the CBD and in close proximity to a number of University of Cape Town campuses and residences, three formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods had become majority-Black middle-class subplaces by 2011. The three subplaces were Rosebank, Mowbray and Observatory each somewhat closer than the previous to the formerly Coloureds-only subplaces of Woodstock and Salt River.

While these changes, both the existence of majority-Black middle-class subplaces and formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods becoming majority-Black, could be seen as evidence of positive change, the significance of these shifts should not be overstated. For example, figures 5.40 and 5.41, show the limited proportion of the city’s Black African and coloured labour market that lived in majority-White middle-class subplaces. In fact, when focusing on the working-age population, just 3% of Blacks Africans and 2% of the Coloureds in the city lived in those subplaces (figure 5.40) and when the attention shifts to the majority-Black middle-class subplaces (figure 5.42) the proportions are 1% and 2% respectively.
Figure 5.40: Racial composition of majority-White middle-class subplaces (working-age population), 2011

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

Figure 5.41: Racial composition of majority-White middle-class subplaces (middle class only), 2011

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)
Even when focusing solely on the middle-class proportion of the labour market these subplaces do not comprise a significant proportion of that population (figures 5.41 and 5.43).

5.2.3.4 Further lessons to be learnt from mixed-class subplaces:

In 2011, as with 2001, a significant number of people were living in what has been referred to as mixed-class subplaces. More specifically, 899,402 working-age people (or 35%), compared to just 338,739 (or 13%) middle-class subplaces. The remainder were in high-unemployment subplaces, which will be the focus of the next chapter, but for now attention turns to these mixed-class subplaces and map 5.44 shows the locations of those subplaces in relation to the apartheid-era Group Areas identified by Graham (2007).
As with 2001, most of these subplaces are found in formerly Blacks-only subplaces that are in close proximity to formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, and vice versa. That said, there appear to be some subplaces in the Mitchell’s Plain area\textsuperscript{33} that are no longer mixed class (nor were they middle-class) and the same can be found in the Belhar and Blackheath areas\textsuperscript{34}. However, it is worth noting that the increase from 683 subplaces in 2001 to 921 in 2011, which was in part due to subplaces in the aforementioned areas being split.

\textsuperscript{33} Red polygons, south of the airport.
\textsuperscript{34} Red polygons, north and northeast of the airport.
However, certain patterns only become evident when differentiating between majority-White and majority-Black mixed-class subplaces. Map 5.45 shows the locations of the 106 subplaces that were majority-White mixed-class subplaces in 2011 and, although they spread across a number of divergent parts of the city they all have something else in common. Each subplaces was located in parts of the city that coincide with the formerly Whites-only areas.
Map 5.45: Majority-White Mixed-Class subplaces in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas

Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)

Furthermore, map 5.44 showed that there were numerous mixed-class subplaces in formerly Whites-only areas in close proximity to formerly Blacks-only subplaces yet many do not appear on map 5.45. In fact, it seems as though many of the majority-White mixed-class
subplaces are quite far removed from the Cape Flats and/or other formerly Blacks-only
subplaces. However, there are a few exceptions such as around the Kraaifontein\textsuperscript{35} area, Somerset West\textsuperscript{36}, as well as a number of areas closer to the city centre.

On the other hand, when looking at map 5.46, it shows the locations of 222 majority-
Black mixed-class, out of a total of 328 mixed-class subplaces. In a pattern reminiscent of the
patterns of desegregation patterns found in Johannesburg (Crankshaw, 2008) and the
previous work on Cape Town (Crankshaw, 2012), a significant amount of desegregation
among these mixed-class subplaces is happening in the formerly Whites-only areas that are
in close proximity to the formerly Blacks-only subplaces. Some of the areas where this is
particularly evident is in the southern suburbs, as well as northeast of the airport where one
finds the formerly Coloureds-only areas in Blackheath and Kuils River can be found in close
proximity to the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in Kuils River.

\textsuperscript{35} Red polygons, farthest northeast of the airport.
\textsuperscript{36} The cluster of red and yellow polygons in the farthest south-eastern area of the city.
As with previous years, there were a large number of mixed-class subplaces identified in Cape Town in the 2011 census. Out of the 921 subplaces in the census, 131 were identified as majority-White mixed-class subplaces and home to 167,596 working-age people, whereas 283 were majority-Black mixed-class subplaces and home to 731,806.
Even when focusing on the majority-White mixed-class subplaces, the proportion of working-age and middle-class Whites in these subplaces (figures 5.47 and 5.48) is considerably lower than in the middle-class subplaces (figures 5.40 and 5.41). For example, these majority-White mixed-class were home to just 29% working-age Whites and 25% of middle-class Whites.

On the other hand, figures 5.49 and 5.50 showed that in 2011 majority-Black mixed-class subplaces was a category that continued to be home to a significant proportion of working-age
and middle-class Coloureds. However, the same could not be said of the Black African population.

![Figure 5.49: Racial composition of majority-Black mixed-class subplaces (working-age population), 2011](image)

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

![Figure 5.50: Racial composition of majority-Black mixed-class subplaces (working-age population), 2011](image)

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

### 5.3 How has the composition of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods changed?

Despite the decision not to limit the analyses by fitting them into a framework that regards formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in Cape Town as equivalent to the concept of suburbs in the dominant literature, the fact is that this equivalence is in the literature on South African cities. Therefore, additional analysis was done to determine how these areas have changed.
Because Graham (2007) used the 2001 shapefiles and subplace boundaries when mapping the formerly Black Africans-only, Coloureds-only, Indians-only and Whites-only neighbourhoods, it was necessary to determine which of the 1996 and 2011 subplaces corresponded with those in 2001. In order to do this, the option to select polygons by location was used. This allows for the selection of polygons or shapes from one layer based on where it corresponds with selected polygons in another layer. In this instance the aim was to find the 1996 or 2011 subplaces with the 2001 subplaces that Graham (2007) identified as formerly Whites-only areas.

5.3.1 Racial composition:

An interesting point worth making, at the outset, is that in 2011, 84 of those 424 subplaces identified as corresponding with the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods were majority-Black subplaces. This is not too surprising, since Crankshaw (2012) demonstrated, using the 2001 census data, that there was substantial desegregation in some formerly Whites-only areas of the city. Additionally, in his work that had a national focus, Christopher (2005b, 2005a) argued that, where there was evidence of some desegregation, particularly the dissimilarity measures involving Whites, it was due to other racial groups moving into these formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods.

However, what is more pertinent is the composition of these neighbourhoods and how they changed in the post-apartheid period. Figure 5.51 shows the number of working-age Black Africans, Coloureds and Whites living in these formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in 1996, 2001 and 2011. It also what proportion of each race that represents. While the 2001 data show a minor drop, in absolute numbers\(^{37}\), across the board, all races showed an increase to some extent between 1996 and 2011.

\(^{37}\) This could be due to some subplaces being excluded because they fell across different Group Areas and were therefore excluded from the calculation.
That said, the most noteworthy contribution coming from both figure 5.51 (working-age population) and figure 5.52 (middle class only), is in assessing what proportion of city-wide totals were resident in these formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. More specifically, despite gradual declines over the period in question, likely due to the development and expansion of post-apartheid areas, 84% of working-age Whites and 84% of middle-class Whites were resident in these neighbourhoods. The findings in the next chapter will confirm this, but most of the remainder were resident in neighbourhoods that were never subject to apartheid-era legislation and/or not developed at the time.
Since there has been considerable discussion about the desegregation of these formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, these findings are important to demonstrate the limited proportion of the Black African and Coloured populations that have played a part in that desegregation. It is also with this last point in mind that the chapter focusing on the city-level segregation measures has been included to demonstrate the limited impact of localised desegregation on the extent of segregation across the city.
5.3.2 Class composition:

Although the formerly Whites-only areas in Cape Town were not segregated by occupational class, Whites have dominated employment in the high-income occupations through this period in question, as well as remaining over-represented in middle-income non-manual occupations throughout the period. So, with 84% of Cape Town’s Whites living in these neighbourhoods in 2011, it is logical to expect that the class compositions of these neighbourhoods would be impacted by the numbers of high-income earning Whites living there.

The class composition of these formerly Whites-only areas does not necessarily reveal anything new, but rather provide another perspective on a number of characteristics of Cape Town’s changing geography that other evidence discussed here has already revealed.

More specifically, in 2011, 165 of the 424 the subplaces that comprise these formerly Whites-only areas were mixed-class and 10 had unemployment rates higher than the city-wide rate, it is not too surprising that there were significant numbers of residents employed in middle-income or low-income occupations (see figure 5.53). However, these results show that more than half of the high income earners in the city were resident in these formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods in 1996, 2001 and 2011 (even though that proportion decreased gradually over the period in question).
Nevertheless, the fact that nearly half of those employed in high-income occupations were living outside these so-called White suburbs in 2011, will only make sense once the findings on the so-called ghettos has been address. Fortunately, that is the focus of the next chapter.

5.4 Conclusion:

This chapter has presented findings from two perspectives - firstly, the data-driven categories of middle-class and mixed-class subplaces, followed by the discussion of the composition of the formerly Whites-only subplaces.
When one focuses on the middle-class and mixed-class subplaces, it is apparent that the majority of the White labour market, regardless of occupation, is resident in the middle-class subplace. On the other hand, while fewer Whites were resident in the mixed-class subplaces, they were home to the majority of working-age Coloureds.

That said, when focusing specifically on the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, it was apparent that a considerable proportion of working-age and middle-class Whites were resident there throughout the period in question. And, while there was clearly evidence of an increased presence of Black Africans and Coloureds in those neighbourhoods, they accounted for very small proportions of either population. Nevertheless, there are a number of points worth reiterating here because of the contributions these results could make to the debate on social and spatial changes in post-Fordist cities.

Firstly, whereas the discussions about Cape Town’s geography has emphasised the stark contrast between slums, poverty traps and/or ghettos on one side and affluent suburbs on the other (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001), the presence of what has been termed mixed-class subplaces points to a more nuanced spatial profile for the city.

Secondly, the existence of majority-Black middle-class subplaces is also a positive development in terms of the social and spatial transformation of the city. However, there were very few of these subplaces and they too accounted for just 1% of working-age Black Africans and 2% of Coloureds. Nevertheless, this is something that was previously not identified in Cape Town.

Thirdly, the results here show that the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods are still predominantly White and although there has been some desegregation of those neighbourhoods, caution is necessary not to overstate its significance. After all, when one considers the Black Africans and Coloureds in those neighbourhoods as a proportion of the city-wide totals, the results were just 15% and 11% respectively, in 2011. Additionally, the
location of formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods that had undergone the most significant racial
desegregation were often in close proximity to formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods. This
is similar to a pattern that Crankshaw (2008) found in his work on Johannesburg.

Lastly, in each census count discussed here, these formerly Whites-only subplaces have
been home to more than half of all people employed in high-income occupations. Based on
that result and the emphasis on suburbanisation in the literature, as well as the idea that the
upwardly mobile would want to move to more affluent neighbourhoods (Kasarda, 1989,
and Van Kempen, 2000a), the assumption might be that many of the rest were resident in
areas that were never subject to apartheid-era legislation. However, as the next chapter will
demonstrate, a significant proportion of the middle-class have continued to live in what some
might refer to as Cape Town’s racial ghetto.
6 DOES CAPE TOWN HAVE OUTCAST GHELLOS?

As already discussed here, the literature on urban change, especially in post-Fordist cities, defines ghettos as involuntary spatial concentrations of a group of people (e.g. defined by ethnicity, race or religion) in a subordinate position in society (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a, Marcuse, 2001). While ghettos could be the product of legislation, at other times they are the product of discriminatory banking and/or financial practices in a supposedly free market (Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 1996, Wilson, 2009).

As already discussed, the so-called townships in the South African, which are sometimes equated with the ghetto concept, were created in order to accommodate migrant labourers in the years prior to the formalisation of the apartheid regime and/or to house those Black Africans, Coloureds and Indians who were forcibly removed from neighbourhoods that had been set aside for Whites only. This was done due to the implementation of the Group Areas Act (Field, 2001, Seekings, 2011, Swanson, 2001, Swanson and Harries, 2001, Thomas, 2001).

Seekings (2011) explained that the many of the country’s poor and unemployed were prevented from entering the urban centres, which were regarded as being ‘White’. The unemployment rates shown in figure 4.26 support the argument that, at least in the Cape Town context, this was not as high as South Africa as a whole (Holborn, 2012).

Nevertheless, despite the occasional association between South African townships and the ghetto concept in urban studies literature, the approach used in the previous chapter will be used here too. Rather than basing the analysis and discussion on the aforementioned association between ghettos and townships, the discussion remains more open-ended and aimed at understanding the spatial characteristics of the professionalisation that the Cape Town labour market has undergone.
Whereas the previous chapter focused on those subplaces that were predominantly middle class, followed by those that were referred to as mixed class subplaces, this chapter focuses on those parts of the city where unemployment was the highest at any given point in time. More specifically, because Cape Town’s unemployment rate fluctuated from one census to the next, the decision was taken to focus on those subplaces where the unemployment was higher than the rate for the city at the time.

6.1 Changing composition of the majority-Black subplaces with above average unemployment rates, 1996-2001:

In his work using indices to determine the extent of desegregation in South Africa in the early years after the end of apartheid Christopher (2005b, 2005a) argued that although legalised segregation had come to an end, there was little change in the extent of racial desegregation in those early post-apartheid years. One of his arguments (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a), which was reiterated by Crankshaw in his work on Johannesburg (2008) and Cape Town (2012), was that much of the desegregation was by the upwardly-mobile Black\textsuperscript{38} population to the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods.

As demonstrated in the findings discussed in the previous chapter, this was only part of the changes taking place. After all, while some of the formerly Whites-only neighbourhood are becoming more racially diverse, with some even becoming majority-Black subplaces by 2011, many Black Africans and Coloureds in high-income or middle-income occupations still lived in what some have referred to as the ‘racial ghetto’ or formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, in the process of engaging with the idea of the outcast ghetto, attention will once again turn to the ways in which Crankshaw (2012), Lemanski (2007), Turok (2001) and others they have cited have contrasted the increasingly racially diverse suburbs with the racially homogenous townships struggling under the intertwined burdens of poverty and

\textsuperscript{38} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
Without pre-empting the findings to be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, at this stage, it is sufficient to say that even in contexts where unemployment rates are high, there are some paradoxical findings regarding the composition of the populations in some of these subplaces.

6.1.1 Determining the locations of majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces in 1996:

As discussed in the previous chapter, a number of the majority-Black subplaces that were categorised as middle class (see: map 5.8) or mixed class (see: map 5.15) in 1996 were located in formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. However, here the focus is on majority-Black subplaces, with high unemployment rates\(^{39}\). And, one of the aims of this discussion is to determine whether the involuntary racial ghettos (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997a) might have become so-called outcast ghettos. The characteristics of this type of ghetto are that poverty is concentrated, unemployment rates are high, the residents are largely excluded from potential employment networks and the neighbourhoods have seen a significant exodus of the upwardly mobile (e.g. middle class) to the predominantly-White suburbs (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012).

The chosen starting point here was to determine whether, just five years after residential racial segregation was officially ended with the \textit{Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act} (1991), there was any evidence of significant movement by the Black\(^{40}\) residents in Cape Town. After all, during the apartheid era, their movement and residential location choices were limited by the legislation in place at the time. Map 6.1 shows the spatial distribution of the 231 majority-Black subplaces (out of a total of 405 subplaces). As can be seen in this map, very few of

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\(^{39}\) Since the unemployment rate fluctuated from one census to the next, the cut-off point for high unemployment was the unemployment rate for Cape Town as a whole at the time. In other words, the cut-off point was 20\% in 1996, 29\% in 2001 and 24\% in 2011.

\(^{40}\) Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
those subplaces were found in formerly Whites-only parts of the city. Not surprisingly, based on the findings already discussed here, many of those majority-Black, but formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods were located in neighbourhoods that bordered the apartheid-era racial ghettos.
More specifically, of the 231 majority-Black subplaces, nine were categorised as middle class and another 110 were mixed class\textsuperscript{41}, and all of them were discussed in the previous

\textsuperscript{41} As the discussion will unpack, the high-unemployment subplaces also include a variety of occupational class in their population, but what makes the mixed-class subplaces different is that the unemployment rates there were lower than that for the city at the time.
chapter. This means that there were 112 subplaces that were majority Black and where the unemployment rates were higher than that for the city at the time. However, before focusing on those subplaces, it is worth noting that, in 1996, the subplaces with the highest unemployment rates were to be found on the Cape Flats (see map 6.2).

Map 6.2: Unemployment rates by subplace, 1996
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3)

The unemployment rate in Cape Town in 1996 was 20%, so any subplaces where
unemployment exceeded that rate were identified and put into ArcGIS to produce map 6.3\textsuperscript{42}. For the most part, these subplaces are confined to formerly Blacks-only subplaces on the Cape Flats or near the city centre. However, there is one subplace in a formerly Whites-only part of the southern suburbs, not far from the False Bay coastline. That is Westlake, where a development putting a poor neighbourhood in close proximity to a middle-class or wealthier neighbourhood, was established in the post-apartheid years\textsuperscript{43}.

\textsuperscript{42} It is also worth pointing out that, in 1996, there were no subplaces where the unemployment rate exceeded 20\% and where the majority of the population was White.

\textsuperscript{43} For more on this neighbourhood: LEMANSKI, C. 2006. Spaces of exclusivity or connection? Linkages between a gated community and its poorer neighbour in a Cape Town master plan development. Urban Studies, 43, 397-420.
As previously stated, this census was just five years after the abolishment of legislated residential segregation and two years after the country's first democratic elections, so it is possible that the expected changes, as laid out in urban studies literature, would emerge in the ensuing years. However, since Christopher (2005b, 2005a) argued that desegregation, across the country, moved at a slow pace during this period it might not be worth expecting
that too much was different in the 2001 data.

6.1.2 Determining the locations of majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces in 2001:

By 2001, Cape Town’s racial composition had shifted significantly with Coloureds comprising 47% of the working-age population, the same as it was in 1996. However, the Black African portion of the working-age population grew from 26% in 1996 to 33% in 2001, whereas Whites declined from 25% to 19%. Thanks to the work of Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), it was clear that the labour market had undergone professionalisation since 1980. Also, the Black Africans and Coloureds had a greater share in both highly-skilled high-income employment (figure 4.15), as well as semi-skilled middle-income non-manual occupations (figure 4.16). However, those groups also suffered the highest rates of unemployment compared to Whites, regardless of the level of education (figures 4.17 to 4.20). However, the issue to be addressed here is what the spatial implications of those changes were.

Once again, the starting point is focusing on majority-Black subplaces, which can be seen in map 6.4. Even seven years after the first democratic elections and ten years after the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (1991) was passed, most of these subplaces were to be found in formerly Blacks-only areas and the few exceptions were in close proximity to them.
The unemployment rate peaked at 29% in 2001, but for Black Africans in Cape Town it was 50%. On the other hand, it was 25% among Coloureds and just 5% among the city’s White population. Not surprisingly, and in agreement with some of the literature on Cape Town, many of the subplaces with the highest unemployment rates, were on the Cape Flats, particularly in
the formerly Black Africans-only areas of Khayelitsha\textsuperscript{44}, as well as in the adjacent areas of Gugulethu, Nyanga and Crossroads\textsuperscript{45}. After all, those with the areas with large numbers of Black African and Coloured residents and those were the fastest growing populations at the time.

\textsuperscript{44} Southeast of the airport.
\textsuperscript{45} All are west to southwest of the airport.
When focusing on those subplaces with unemployment rates that exceeded the city’s 29% unemployment rate at the time, there are a number of subplaces scattered around different parts of the city, yet the largest clusters of these subplaces remained on the Cape Flats. More specifically, these subplaces could be found across the Khayelitsha area\textsuperscript{46}, as well

\textsuperscript{46} Blue polygons, southeast of the airport.
as the aforementioned Gugulethu-Nyanga-Crossroads\textsuperscript{47} cluster. Also, a number of the central and southern subplaces in the Mitchell's Plain\textsuperscript{48} area have already been categorised as mixed class and therefore are not included in this map, yet a number of the subplaces closest to the aforementioned formerly Black Africans-only areas had higher unemployment rates.

Considering the unemployment rates by race discussed at the beginning of this section, it is apparent that Black Africans were not only dealing with the worst unemployment rates at the time (at any level of education), but there were also large clusters of subplaces in or in close proximity to the formerly Black Africans-only areas where the unemployment rates were above the city-wide rate at the time.

\textsuperscript{47} Blue polygons, southwest of the airport.
\textsuperscript{48} Red polygons, south of the airport.
Map 6.6: Majority-Black subplaces with high unemployment rates in 2001 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas

Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)

Based on these patterns it would appear as though some of these cluster might resemble the ideal type of the outcast ghetto previously discussed (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a), as well as the impoverished racial ghettos described in some of the literature specifically focused on Cape Town (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001). However, when focusing on the composition of these
subplaces, there are, once again a number of counterintuitive findings that helped highlighting the problem of discussing Cape Town using a binary framework of suburb vs racial ghetto.

6.1.3 Changing composition of majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces, 1996-2001:

In order to facilitate comparisons between the composition of these subplaces in 1996 and 2001, the figures below present results for the same calculations for the two census counts side by side.

When focusing on the working-age population by race the results for 1996 (figure 6.7) and 2001 (figure 6.8), it is apparent that there has been an increase in the number of people living in this category of subplaces. For Black Africans, the figure increased from 389,775 to 583,575 and for Coloureds, 306,834 to 355,398. That said, since the Black African population in Cape Town increased by 200,142 during the period in question, the increase in the number of people in this racial group living in majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces accounts for nearly that entire increase. And, since this is only focusing on working-age population, it is evident that in-migration to the city has been a major contributor to this increase, but that nearly all Black Africans who came to Cape Town between 1996 and 2001 found themselves living in contexts with high levels of unemployment.

When one considers the potential impact of living in that type of environment, especially as it pertains to whether someone is going to be able to find employment through their networks, then this posits a potential hypothesis for the above-mentioned increase in the unemployment rates across all population groups in 200149, but especially among the Black African population, where the unemployment rate was 50% in 2001.

49 The unemployment rate increased from 20%, in 1996, to 29% in 2001.
Despite these increases in the number of Black Africans and Coloureds living in these majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces, as a percentage of the citywide populations the results had hardly changed between 1996 and 2001.

The findings presented earlier in table 4.5 showed that the number of people in high-income occupations increased from 231,891 to 249,091 during the 1996-2001 period. For Black Africans it increased from 17,692 to 24,671, whereas for Coloureds it increased from 75,406 to 88,305. While the growth of the Black\textsuperscript{50} middle class has been reported on

\textsuperscript{50} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
previously, such as by Crankshaw (2012), the contexts where some are resident continued to defy expectations in 2001.

The findings and discussion presented previously showed that the majority of the high-income earning Coloureds were resident in majority-Black mixed-class subplaces in both 1996 (67%) and 2001 (69%), but the same is not true of high-income earning Black Africans. Figure 6.9 shows that 65% of that group were living in majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces in 1996, compared to 60% in 2001 as shown in figure 6.10.

Nevertheless, the data indicate that a shrinking percentage of high-income earners in both the Black African and Coloured populations are living in these subplaces with high levels...
of unemployment. Logically, this does not necessarily mean that they are moving out of these subplaces, but possibly that they never lived there at all. Logic requires that, at the very least, we allow for the possibility that they grew up in other parts of the city or moved to the city when taking up their high-income earning jobs. Regardless of what the circumstances are that brought about their residence in other parts of the city, the data indicate that, between 1996 and 2001, a greater proportion of both high-income Coloureds and Black Africans were living in mixed-class or middle-class neighbourhoods. While this concurs with much of the literature discussed here, it does suggest that the change is a gradual process.

6.2 Composition of the majority-Black subplaces with above average unemployment rates in 2011:

6.2.1 Distribution and composition of Majority-Black subplaces with high unemployment in 2011:

Of the 921 subplaces in Cape Town in the 2011 census, 479 were majority-Black subplaces. Of those, the 283 mixed-class subplaces and the 34 middle-class subplaces have already been discussed, leaving 162 that were home to people in a variety of occupations and where the unemployment rates were higher that the citywide rate of 24%.

In the process of identifying the subplaces that fit that profile, map 6.11 was produced to show the unemployment rates by subplace. What is apparent in this map, even from just a cursory look, is that many of the subplaces with the highest rates of unemployment are on the Cape Flats, particularly those in close proximity to and beyond the airport. Some of these include subplaces that have already been the focus of discussion here, including: Gugulethu, Nyanga and Crossroads, which are immediately southwest and south of the airport; Mitchell’s Plain, which is farther south; as well as the Khayelitsha area, which is southeast of the airport.
This pattern becomes more apparent when focusing solely on those where the unemployment rate was higher than Cape Town’s 24% at the time. Map 6.12 highlights the locations of the 162 subplaces that were majority-Black and where the unemployment rates
exceeded the citywide rate\textsuperscript{51}. A number of the subplaces included here were in parts of the city with relatively small populations (compared to the numbers on the Cape Flats) and/or in areas that were established in the post-apartheid period. Some of these include the following: Joe Slovo and Du Noon in the Milnerton and Blouberg areas northwest of the city centre; Atlantis and Mamre in the far north; as well as a number of subplaces in the Strand, Somerset West and Gordons Bay areas in the far southeast.

On the other hand, the Cape Flats is home to a number of areas established during and even prior to the apartheid period and purposely set aside for Coloured or Black African residents. When looking at those areas and focusing specifically on those that were majority-Black with high unemployment rates, we find that in excess of 1.1 million working-age people were living in those subplaces, which is significant considering the entire city was home to 2,604,192 working-age people at the time. These numbers indicate that more than 2 in 5 working-age people in Cape Town in 2011 were living in subplaces on the Cape Flats where the employment rate was in excess of 24%.

\textsuperscript{51} There were two majority-White subplaces with unemployment rates higher than the citywide rate, but together they were home to just 17 working-age people according to the 2011 census data.
Map 6.12: Majority-Black with high unemployment rates in 2011 and outlines of apartheid-era Group Areas

Sources: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3), Graham (2007)

Nevertheless, when focusing on all majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces across the, the data indicate that the majority of working-age Black Africans (82%) and middle-class Black Africans were resident in these subplaces. These figures are marginally less than those from the 2001, which were 90% and 60%, respectively. Not surprisingly, considering the results and discussion about mixed-class subplaces in the previous chapter, the results for Coloureds,
45% of the working-age and 25% of the high-income earners, are considerably lower. Nevertheless, those results are marginally higher than those from 2001, which were 39% and 17%, respectively.

Figure 6.13: Racial composition majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces (working-age population), 2011
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

Figure 6.14: Racial composition majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces (middle class only), 2011
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

6.2.2 Understanding the paradoxical composition of the changing racial ghettos:

During the earlier exploratory phase of becoming more familiar with the data, it became apparent that some subplaces not only had significantly larger populations than others, but also that some of those heavily populated subplaces were, at times, among the cities smaller subplaces (in terms of surface area).
Initially, the significance of this fact was not apparent, but as the work progressed it would become increasingly apparent that ignoring these differences, especially of those more densely populated subplaces, could result in very different conclusions being reached about the class dynamics in a particular area. For example, map 5.36 presented the findings for persons in high-income occupations as a percentage of all employed persons in the subplace and the pattern that was evident was that the highest results were found in and around formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods around Cape Town. This is a familiar way of presenting this type of data and was used by Crankshaw (2012) to present data on persons employed in those same occupations.

However, a query that surfaced during the data analysis focused on whether there was some way to account for the differences in subplace population and surface area sizes. What might then be found when focusing on persons employed in these high-income occupations?

As a starting point, map 6.15 shows the population density (using working-age population only) of Cape Town’s subplaces in 2011 and it demonstrates that in some subplaces, albeit very small ones, the density is equal to as much as 62,695 working-age persons per square kilometre (or around 627 people per hectare\textsuperscript{52}).

The map also includes the outlines of the majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces and it shows that many of the subplaces with the highest population densities are in or in close proximity to those high-unemployment subplaces. This is particularly true of the subplaces surrounding the airport, as well as the Khayelitsha area southeast of the airport.

With the question of the outcast ghetto (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a), as well as the idea of a lack of access to so-called mainstream institutions (Wilson, 2011, Wilson, 2012) in the background, the focus turned to

\textsuperscript{52} That is, a square of 100m by 100m, or 1/100 of a square kilometre.
the employed population and those results are presented in map 6.16.

Map 6.15: Population density by subplace, as number of working-age persons per km², 2011

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 3)
Once again, the use of this approach reveals something that solely focusing on calculations such as the unemployment rate (e.g. map 6.13) could obfuscate. After all, there are subplaces identified in map 6.16 where the unemployment rate is higher that the citywide rate, yet one can still find a high density of employed persons, even if some might not be in very lucrative occupations. Furthermore, since the city's economic geography has stayed
relatively unchanged (Geocentric Information Systems, 2009, Didier et al., 2012, Didier et al., 2013, Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012, Turok, 2001) the unemployment in these areas are likely to see many leaving their neighbourhoods in the morning and/or returning in the evenings as they commute to and from work. So, at the very least they are aware of the numerous people in their neighbourhoods who are employed and who might be able to connect with potential employment networks.

Additionally, numerous majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces were also found to have concentrations of people employed in high-income occupations, comparable to formerly Whites-only and/or predominantly middle-class subplaces. Map 6.17 shows the concentration of persons in high-income occupations per square kilometre, by subplace.
6.3 How has the composition of the racial ghetto changed?

While some might choose to critique the discussion in this chapter thus far because it does not focus on a single part of the city, that is easy to define and locate, the findings here suggest that care should be taken to avoid fitting data and an interpretation into a predetermined and/or rigid theoretical framework. It also shows that some of the changes
taking place in those parts of Cape Town that might be referred to as townships or racial ghettos defy some of the expectations of the dominant literature in urban studies and are therefore worthy of further attention.

Nevertheless, the aforementioned literature cannot be ignored because those researchers have provided concepts and frameworks that have been useful to interrogate what is happening in urban setting around the world. Consequently, this chapter would not be complete without focusing on Cape Town’s racial ghettos.

6.3.1 Racial composition:

Based on the 2011 subplaces that overlapped with the apartheid-era Group Areas identified by Graham (2007), all the formerly Blacks-only areas were majority-Black subplaces in 2011. Considering the patterns discussed by Crankshaw (2012) regarding the movement from these areas to the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, something that was also argued by Christopher (2005a, 2005b) regarding other cities in South Africa, this was to be expected.

However, when focusing on the racial composition of these areas, there is at least one finding that, at least at first, might appear to be counterintuitive. According to the findings presented in figure 6.18, 78% of working-age Coloureds in Cape Town in 2011 were living in these formerly Blacks-only areas, but just 45% of working-age Black Africans. The reason for this is that there are parts of the city that, in the post-apartheid era, have been developed and/or expanded, but were never officially declared as set aside for any particular group. After all, it was not developed at the time.

Some of the areas that fall into this category including Masiphumelele, Imizamo Yethu, parts of the greater Khayelitsha area, Delft, as well as Du Noon and Joe Slovo Park northeast of the city centre. Also, it is worth noting that all the areas mentioned here were majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces in 2011, which suggests that at least some of the more recent arrivals to Cape Town (i.e. since the removal of influx control legislation) and some of those in
search of employment have taken up residence in these post-apartheid developments or expansions.

Figure 6.18: Racial composition of formerly Blacks-only subplaces (working-age population), 1996-2011

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

Nevertheless, when focusing on these formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods, it is apparent that a growing number of working-age and middle-class Black Africans (and Coloureds to a lesser degree) have been residing there. However, this accounts for a shrinking proportion of those populations.
Despite these changes, as recently as 2011, these formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods were still home 41% of middle-class Black Africans and 71% of their Coloured counterparts (figure 6.19).

6.3.2 Class composition:

One of the characteristics of the professionalisation-driven changes in Cape Town that has been discussed here is that while there has been a degree of deracialisation in high-income occupations (figure 4.11), as well as middle-income non-manual occupations (figure 4.12), Black Africans in Cape Town have continually experienced the highest levels of
unemployment, followed by Coloureds (see figures 4.13 to 4.16). It is because of this, as well as the limited movement of Black Africans and Coloureds out of the so-called racial ghetto, that 93 of the 265 subplaces identified as formerly Blacks-only areas in 2011, had unemployment rates above the city’s 24% rate at the time. Of the remained, eight were predominantly middle-class (i.e. the majority of the employed people in those subplaces were in high-income occupations).

Figure 6.20: Class composition of formerly Blacks-only areas, using absolute numbers of people employed in occupational groups and as a proportion of all employed in those groups in Cape Town, 2011

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

One of the comments toward the end of the previous chapter was that just 51% of all those employed in high-income occupations were resident in formerly Whites-only
neighbourhoods in 2011 and that this would make sense once the attention shifts to the so-called racial ghetto. The findings presented in figure 6.20 provide some clarity, because this figure shows that 35% of all high income earners in Cape Town in 2011 were living in formerly Blacks-only areas of the city. While pursuing a causal explanation for this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this particular project, this alone is an important finding, because it contradicts theory-driven expectations about the changes in post-Fordist cities (Kasarda, 1989, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012), as well as providing a broader understanding of the limited extent of the exodus of high income earning Black Africans and Coloureds from these racial ghettos. Furthermore, by revisiting the findings presented in figure 6.19 we see that the high income earners still resident in the racial ghetto accounted for 41% of Black Africans and 71% of Coloureds who were employed in high-income occupations at the time.

Additionally, when one considers the ideal type of the outcast ghetto posited by Marcuse and van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a), then the racial ghettos in Cape Town clearly do not resemble that concept. Yes, the evidence indicates that there are pockets with extremely high rates of unemployment (e.g. Delft where the working-age population was 48,816 and the unemployment rate was 49%), but this is not the whole picture. After all, when the so-called racial ghetto is home approximately 1 in 3 high income earners in the city, as well as 1 in 2 of those employed in middle-income non-manual occupations (see figure 6.20) then it does not fit the definition of an outcast ghetto.

6.4 Conclusion:

As previously discussed, the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (1991) did not necessarily bring about residential racial desegregation. Furthermore, the pace of desegregation in the ensuing years was slow, at least in part due to the limited government intervention to undo the spatial inequalities of the past (Christopher, 2005b, Seekings, 2011).
And, since they had little to no access to mortgage finance, many Black Africans and Coloureds were relegated to staying in Cape Town’s formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods. Consequently, the concentration of Black Africans and Coloureds in these neighbourhoods, as well as the aforementioned high unemployment rates are not surprising. That said, there are a number of counterintuitive findings coming out of this chapter that are worth repeating.

Firstly, while seeing large numbers of Black Africans and Coloureds living in majority-Black neighbourhoods was in line with expectation, based on previous work on the city, the socio-economic diversity of those subplaces was considerably greater than someone familiar with the literature on ghettos and/or the changing geography of Cape Town might have expected (Crankshaw, 2012, Kasarda, 1989, Lemanski, 2007, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Turok, 2001, Wilson, 2012).

However, as the discussion below will attest, these findings also contributed to differentiating between the contexts in which Black Africans and Coloureds in Cape Town were resident.

Firstly, the findings in the previous chapter already indicated the majority of the city’s working-age and middle-class Coloureds were resident in mixed-class subplaces, the findings in this chapter have confirmed that the majority of working-age and middle-class Black Africans in Cape Town were resident in majority-Black high-unemployment subplaces throughout the period in question. The extent of the presence of middle-class Black Africans, in particular, was counterintuitive because of the expectations that they might have been more significantly distributed across middle-class and/or mixed-class subplaces.

However, the most significant contribution from this chapter is not just that large numbers of people employed in high-income occupations can be found in these high-unemployment subplaces, but also that many have continued to stay in formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods. And, they have done so in large numbers. While high income earners as a proportion of
employed people in many of these neighbourhoods might obfuscate this point, when focusing on the density of high income earners and/or the absolute number of these individuals living in these neighbourhoods, it becomes much more revealing.

Therefore, these findings indicate that rather than simply being contexts of high unemployment, the formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods have a paradoxical composition that includes many people employed in middle-income and high-income occupations.
7 HAS THE “SLOW PACE” OF DESEGREGATION PERSISTED IN CAPE TOWN?

7.1 Racial segregation or desegregation (evenness dimension):

7.1.1 Segregation among the working-age population:

As already stated, Cape Town’s demographics are quite unlike any of the country’s other major metropolitan areas, because the proportions of Coloureds and Blacks Africans in the city have consistently differed significantly from the national averages. The proportion of the population consisting of Black Africans has consistently been below the national average, whereas the Coloured proportion is consistently above the national average. Nevertheless, these differences do not inherently have an impact on the results from the dissimilarity index. Once again, it is worth remembering that the range of the dissimilarity index is 0-100 and the higher the score the less a particular group is evenly distributed across the city compared to the rest of the population or another group (Castree et al., 2013, Christopher, 2005a, Massey and Denton, 1988, Massey et al., 1996).

In 1980, the segregation (in terms of evenness) between Cape Town’s three largest population groups was near perfect, with dissimilarity index results of between 88 and 91. Possible reasons that this was not 100 across the board is that the subplaces used in the census did not necessarily coincide perfectly with the borders between different Group Areas. Additionally, it is worth restating that the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (1991) indicated that there were amendments being made to the Group Areas Act (1966) has late as 1984.

As previously stated, one way to interpret these results are that the result of the dissimilarity index points to the proportion of the population in question that would need to be moved in order for the distribution across the city to be even. It is due to the technical limitations of the dissimilarity index involving extremely small population proportions that the results for
the Indian population are somewhat meaningless (Massey and Denton, 1988, Taeuber and Taeuber, 1976), in addition to the fact that when focusing on the occupational and demographic changes, the Indian/Asian population had very little impact on the overall changes in Cape Town.

Based on the table 7.1 below, it is clear that there was minimal difference between the inter-group dissimilarity results in 1980, which is not surprising since, by that stage, virtually the entire area that makes up the present day City of Cape Town had been segregated by race.

By 1996, even though Cape Town’s demographics had changed significantly, in both absolute and relative terms, it had a negligible impact on the inter-group dissimilarity results between Black Africans and other populations groups. This is not surprising, since the largest Black African and Coloured populations in the city at the time were found in the southeast and just the handful of neighbourhoods discussed earlier, were home to the majority of the city’s Black\textsuperscript{53} population.

This limited change regarding residential segregation was not unique to the Cape Town context. As already discussed, between 1996 and 2001 Anthony Christopher discussed what he referred to as the “slow pace of desegregation” in the country’s cities (2005b: 2305).

As previously discussed, much of the dominant literature on the changing geographies of cities at the very least mentions that those who are employed and perhaps upwardly mobile will leave the so-called ghettos, that were predominantly home to ethnic minorities, for the predominantly-White suburbs; I am using the North American terminology (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012). Since these dissimilarity results include the large numbers of unemployed, as well as the low-income earning portion of the working

\textsuperscript{53} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
population, focusing on the dissimilarity measures of those in middle-income and high-income occupations might indicate a move toward evenness, if this had occurred by 1996. The reason for this focus is two-fold. Firstly, one of the central foci of this project is to understand the spatial changes that took place as the city’s labour market was changing. Those high-income occupations are central to the professionalisation theory, in general, and in the Cape Town context the middle-income employment growth caught up with the high-income employment growth by 2011. And, secondly, the Cape Town literature discussed in this project has suggested that the professionalisation trend would lead to the Black\textsuperscript{54} middle class moving out of the townships and contribute, at the very least, to desegregation among those earning higher incomes. However, that will be done at a later stage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working-age population</th>
<th>Black vs Coloured</th>
<th>Black vs White</th>
<th>White vs Coloured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7.1: Dissimilarity Index between the three largest race groups (Black Africans, Coloureds and Whites), 1980-2011*

As already mentioned, this index has been subject to considerable critique, but one way that it has been understood is as a measure of just one dimension of segregation (Massey and Denton, 1988, Massey et al., 1996) and has been used extensively, including in south Africa (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a, Parry and van Eeden, 2015).

Reference has already been made to the work by Christopher (2005b, 2005a) that focused on towns and cities across South Africa between 1996 and 2001 and which refers to

\textsuperscript{54} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
the slow pace of desegregation across the country. So, what about Cape Town in 2011? Was there evidence of an increased pace of desegregation? Table 7.1 indicates that, while there was some evidence of desegregation during the 1996-2011 period, the indices for the segregation between each of the three largest population groups remained extremely high. For example, between Coloureds and Whites, as well as between Coloureds and Black Africans, the result was 80\(^\text{55}\). On the other hand, between Black Africans and Whites the result was 81.

This would suggest that, despite the considerable demographic changes, changes in the racial composition in the high-income and middle-income occupation, as well as movement of Black Africans and Coloureds into formerly Whites-only areas, very little change to city-level segregation measures can be found.

Considering those demographic and labour market changes, this index was applied to those employed in certain occupational group, with particular attention paid to the those most affected by the professionalisation trend (i.e. high-income and middle-income non-manual occupations).

7.1.2 Racial segregation among middle-income and high-income earners:

From the findings discussed in chapter 4, it is evident that in the addition to employment growing in both high-income and middle-income non-manual occupations, Black Africans and Coloureds gradually started comprising a larger percentage of persons employed in those occupations. It was this, combined with evidence of some desegregation in some formerly Whites-only areas that contributed to the arguments that Cape Town would become divided between racial diverse middle-class neighbourhoods and more homogenous townships with high levels of unemployment (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001).

\(^{55}\) Out of a maximum of 100.
However, the findings and discussions in chapters 5 and 6 have shown that, while there has been some movement of the Black\textsuperscript{56} population away from formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods there were still significant numbers of Blacks\textsuperscript{57} living in the formerly legislated Group Areas. Those findings also indicated that the spatial changes are more complex than a suburb-or-ghetto binary. Additionally, the dissimilarity results discussed in the previous section showed that the movements that have been seen have not had much impact on those results.

However, a query that surfaced during these analyses was whether the apparent minimal impact on the dissimilarity measure could be due to large numbers of unemployed and/or low-income earners in the Black African and Coloured populations. Consequently, the decision was made to focus the dissimilarity index on those in high-income and middle-income earners to determine the extent of the interracial desegregation (at least in terms of the evenness dimension) evident within those occupational groups.

Due to the professionalisation trend previously identified (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009), as well as the extent of the deracialisation of those occupations (Crankshaw, 2012) and the evidence of Blacks\textsuperscript{58} moving into formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, both of which are supported by the findings here it would be logical to expect lower dissimilarity results when focusing solely on those employed in high-income occupations. Table 7.2 contains the interracial dissimilarity findings for the working-age population shown in table 7.1, as well as interracial dissimilarity results focused solely on those employed in high-income occupations.

Before discussing these results, it is worth repeating that the evenness dimension of segregation can be understood as focusing on “differential distribution of two social groups among areal units in a city” (Massey and Denton, 1988: 283). On the other hand, Duncan and

\textsuperscript{56} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
\textsuperscript{57} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
\textsuperscript{58} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
Duncan (1955) explained it as the average deviation of subplaces composition from the overall composition of the city as a whole. In other words, for the dissimilarity index between Black Africans and Coloureds in 2011 to be zero, then those groups would have had to be 39% and 41%, respectively, of every single subplace across the city. This is because that was their relative contribution to the working-age population in Cape Town at the time.

There are a number of points worth raising from the table below. Firstly, someone might wonder why the dissimilarity results for those in high-income occupations in 1980 would be higher than that for the total working-age population. Since there were considerably fewer Black Africans and Coloureds in high-income occupations back then, as well as the fact that they would likely have clustered in certain neighbourhoods, they would have been even less evenly distributed across the city’s subplaces that the working-age people in those groups.

Nevertheless, when comparing the results for the working-age population and high-income earners, it is apparent that there has been marginally more desegregation taking place among those with higher earnings. This would suggest that, at least to some extent, the idea that the upwardly mobile among so-called previously disadvantaged groups would move out of racially homogenous ghettos or townships to the formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, whether the latter were the product of racist legislation or discrimination in the housing market (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Turok, 2001, Wilson, 2012).

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59 This could refer to ethnic minorities and/or migrants in the USA and/or Europe, as well as Black Africans, Coloureds and Indians/Asians in the South African context.
Table 7.2: Dissimilarity Index between each of the three largest race groups among the working-age population and those employed in highly-skilled high-income occupations, 1980-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working-age population</th>
<th>Highly-skilled high-income occupations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black vs Coloured</td>
<td>Black vs White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, since the dissimilarity index results have a range of 0-100, these results indicate that even when focusing solely on high-income earners, racial segregation remained high in 2011. That said, much of the literature discussed thus far have stated or implied that upward mobility would lead to desegregation and have suggested that the trajectory of change was that class differences, rather than race could become the main determinant of divisions within the city. After all, those who have worked on Cape Town pointed to a movement toward racial diverse middle-class suburbs and racially homogenous poor townships/ghettos (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Turok, 2001). On the other hand, while neither Wilson (1996, 2012), nor Marcuse and van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a), have claimed that race is no longer a factor, they have argued that change is being driven by class differences. Even when looking at the ideal types discussed in the literature here, many are primarily shaped or defined by class position.

In addition to the persistent growth of employment in high-income occupations, the growth in middle-income non-manual accelerated in the 2001-11 period (see: table 4.5).
Additionally, the findings in chapter 5 showed that throughout the period of this study there was a growing number of mixed-class subplaces, many of which were home to a significant number of people from different races, as well as large numbers of middle-income earners.

Since the findings in table 7.2 indicated that there was some desegregation among those in high-income occupations, the same question was applied to those in middle-income occupations. After all, while their choices regarding residential location choices would have been more limited than those in high-income occupations, allowance was made for the possibility that they could have been able to move out of the neighbourhoods with the highest levels of unemployment and/or poverty.

Table 7.3 shows that interracial dissimilarity among those in middle-income occupations was only marginally lower than that for the entire working-age population. More specifically, the difference between the results for the working-age population and those in middle-income non-manual occupations was just two points, regardless of the groups included in the calculation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working-age population</th>
<th>Black vs Coloured</th>
<th>Black vs White</th>
<th>White vs Coloured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semi-skilled middle-income non manual occupations</th>
<th>Black vs Coloured</th>
<th>Black vs White</th>
<th>White vs Coloured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3: Dissimilarity Index between each of the three largest race groups among the working-age population and those employed in semi-skilled middle-income non-manual occupations, 1980-2011

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

7.2 Class segregation (evenness dimension):

The discussion thus far in this chapter has focused primarily on racial segregation and desegregation, particularly in terms of the evenness dimension of segregation. That said, it has also focused on interracial segregation within occupational classes in order to determine whether there is evidence that people of the same occupational classes are less segregated. The evidence here would suggest that racial desegregation among those in middle-income non-manual occupations is marginal, at best, but that there was evidence of slightly more desegregation among those in high-income occupations.

However, another question was raised during the course of the analysis for two reasons, one empirical and the other theoretical. The question was: How does inter-class segregation

---

60 There was only a 2 point difference between the dissimilarity results for the entire working-age population and those in these middle-income occupations, with the latter being marginally less segregated.
compare to the results for interracial segregation?

The first reason for this, which was empirically driven, was that the subplaces with the largest percentage of employed persons in high-income occupations had a very different geographical to those subplaces where unemployment rates were the highest. Secondly, while the mechanisms might differ between theorists, the idea that class is becoming the organising principle for cities has been raised numerous times here. One of the ways this is believed to come about is that even where certain racial or ethnic groups have been concentrated in certain parts of the city, those that are upwardly mobile are likely to leave the ghetto or township (Crankshaw, 2012, Lemanski, 2007, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Turok, 2001, Wilson, 2012).

Table 7.4 shows the dissimilarity between a number of grouped occupations, including the unemployed over the period 1980-2011. The reason for these groupings is that the professionalisation trend identified in Cape Town has been driven by employment growth in high-income occupations but has also seen considerable growth in middle-income non-manual occupations. Furthermore, the significance of the unemployed is based on Hamnett’s (1994, 1996) theory that increased unemployment is one characteristics of a professionalising labour market.

There are a number of points worth highlighting from this table regarding how workers in these various occupational groups, as well as the unemployed, have been distributed across the city. Firstly, the highest dissimilarity results are between the unemployed and those in high-income occupations, although it is worth noting that there has been a marginal decreased over the period in question. From 68 in 1980, it fluctuated somewhat, before peaking at 69 in 2001 and later dropping to 60 in 2011. While this still points to a considerable degree of segregation, the drop can be explained by the deracialisation of high-income occupations, combined with
the numbers of Blacks\textsuperscript{61} in high-income occupations who were still resident in the formerly Black Africans-only or formerly Coloureds-only areas.

Secondly, the findings suggest that those employed in middle-income non-manual occupations are likely the most evenly distributed across the city, because the dissimilarity results between those occupations and a number of other have consistently been among the lowest, with the unemployed being an exception. For example, between these workers and those in high-income occupations, the results went from a high of 30 in 1980 to 26 in 2011, whereas with those in middle-income manual occupations it moved from 35 to 20.

Thirdly, across all, but one, of these relationships the results point to inter-class desegregation. As already mentioned, much of the literature discussed here suggests that greater spatial differentiation across class lines is what is expected in post-Fordist cities. The simple example is the move of upwardly mobile people from the ghettos to the suburbs (in the USA vernacular), with those with higher incomes and/or greater wealth isolated themselves in citadels or fortified enclaves (Kasarda, 1989, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012).

\textsuperscript{61} Comprising Black African, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results of Dissimilarity Index between Grouped Occupations</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 1</td>
<td>Group 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Highly-Skilled High-Income occupations</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Semi-Skilled Middle-Income Non-Manual occupations</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Semi-Skilled Middle-Income Manual occupations</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly-Skilled High-Income occupations</td>
<td>Semi-Skilled Middle-Income Non-Manual occupations</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly-Skilled High-Income occupations</td>
<td>Semi-Skilled Middle-Income Manual occupations</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4: Dissimilarity between major occupation groups, including the Unemployed, 2011
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

While there might be small-scale examples of this kind of class-based separation into different quarters, these city-level figures suggest that the dominant trend, however marginal the changes might be, is toward greater desegregation in class terms. Logically, these results should not be surprising considering the discussions on mixed-class and high-unemployment subplaces, including the diversity of occupations in the former and the large numbers of middle-income and high-income earners still found in the latter.

The most noteworthy finding is only observable when comparing these results with those in table 7.2. That table presented the interracial dissimilarity results for the period 1980-2011, by first presenting the results for the working-age population and then the results for just those in high-income occupations. The reason for pointing to revisiting the interracial dissimilarity results in table 7.2 when discussing the inter-class dissimilarity results in table 7.4 is that the interracial results, even when focusing solely on high-income earners were higher than the
results for dissimilarity between the unemployed and high-income earners. This would indicate that racial segregation, even just among high income earners, was greater than that between high income earners and the unemployed.

7.3 Potential Residential Isolation or Exposure to other Races and/or Occupations:

7.3.1 Interracial Isolation-Exposure:

At this stage the only segregation measure that has been discussed is the much critiqued, yet ubiquitous, dissimilarity index. However, that has only focused on one of “The Dimensions of Residential Segregation” (i.e. evenness) discussed in that article by Massey and Denton (1988). Another dimension they identified was referred to as exposure, which could be contrasted with isolation. According to Massey and Denton (1988: 287), the exposure dimension “refers to the degree of potential contact, or the possibility of interaction” between people of different groups within certain geographic areas of a city.

The decision to focus solely on these two dimensions of segregation is supported by the work of Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004). In an article focused on residential segregation in Cape Town and Johannesburg, Parry and van Eeden (2015) cite the aforementioned article when they explain that Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004) explained that whereas Massey and Denton (1988) identified five dimensions of segregation, they can arguably be collapsed into just these two dimensions.

Rather than focusing on the question of the evenness of the distribution of different groups, this index, which also has a range of 0-100%, can be understood as the measure of the probability that someone in group α might interact with someone in group β in their residential geographical area, which is the exposure measure, compared to the probability that someone in group α might interact with someone in the same group, which is the isolation measure (Massey and Denton, 1988, Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004, Stearns and Logan,
Table 7.5 shows the results of the isolation-exposure measure for interracial contact in 2011. Keeping in mind that, as shown in table 7.1, that the interracial dissimilarity between Black Africans, Coloureds and Whites fell in a very narrow range of 80-81. However, the range of isolation results was slightly greater. More specifically, when focusing on the entire working-age population, the probability that a Black African, Coloured or White person would encounter someone of the same race in their residential subplace was 80%, 79% and 67%, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Isolation-Exposure measure for interracial contact, 2011</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian/Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5: Isolation-Exposure Index between Cape Town’s various largest racial groups (Working-Age Population only), 2011

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

One way to understand this is that, as Crankshaw (2012) explained, there has been a gradual move of Black Africans and Coloureds into formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, as well as Black Africans into formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods, but no evidence of the opposite happening. Furthermore, this point is also one that Christopher (2005b, 2005a) discussed in his work on towns and cities across South Africa.

So, whereas there might have been an extremely uneven distribution of each of these groups across the City of Cape Town, as demonstrated by the dissimilarity indices, this limited desegregation of predominantly-White neighbourhoods means that they are, on average, more...
likely than the average Black African or Coloured person to encounter someone of a difference race in their neighbourhoods. After all, these findings further seem to concur with the finding that 95% of Black Africans and 95% of Coloureds lived in majority-Black subplaces, whereas 81% of Whites lives in majority-White subplaces.

7.3.2 Class segregation or desegregation:

7.3.2.1 Interclass Isolation-Exposure using Unemployment and Occupational class:

In his discussion of the changes to central-city ghettos in the USA, Wilson (2009, 2012) explains that one of the consequences of the exodus of upwardly-mobile minorities from the ghettos is that those who remain there are increasingly subject to what he refers to as social isolation, which he describes as limited exposure to continuously employed individuals and/or social networks that could aid in finding employment a similar dynamic, using different terminology is discussed by the work of Kasinitz and Rosenberg (1996), where they discuss the lack of what Bourdieu referred to as “social capital”, as well as the so-called excluded or outcast ghettos discussed by Marcuse and Van Kempen (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a).

Regarding the relevance and contributions of these calculations, the mechanics of this index, the fact that the sum of the probability of isolation and the probability of exposure is 100%, it allows for the possibility that the exposure can be broken down into its constituent components by race and/or class (Massey and Denton, 1988, Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004, Stearns and Logan, 1986).

As with previous findings presented here, the findings presented in table 7.6 are shaped by the categories that are central to the professionalisation theory, namely highly-skilled high-income occupations and the unemployed (Hamnett, 1994, Hamnett, 1996). However, since the findings on cape town showed that there was significant growth in middle-income non-manual occupations, particularly in the 2001-11 period, that group of occupations was included
in the analyses to follow.

Not surprisingly, based on the maps presented in chapter 5, when someone in a high-income occupation encounters another working-age person in their residential subplace, they have a 25% chance of encountering someone in a similar occupation and a 17% chance of encountering someone in a middle-income non-manual occupation. In contrast to this, they have just a 1 in 11 chance (9%) of encountering an unemployed person.\(^{62}\)

However, when focusing on the unemployed population a very different pattern emerges. Unemployed persons in Cape Town, in 2011, had a 21% chance of encountering another unemployed person in their neighbourhood. To put this in perspective, this means that, on average, when an unemployed person in interacted with people in their residential subplace, approximately every fifth person they encountered was also jobless and searching for employment. On the hand, the probability of exposure to someone in a middle-income or high-income occupation was just 14% and 8% respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exposure-Isolation measures between occupations, 2011</th>
<th>Highly-skilled high-income</th>
<th>Semi-skilled middle-income non-manual</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly-skilled high-income</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled middle-income non-manual</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled middle-income manual</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled low-income manual</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Economically Active</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.6: Inter-class Isolation-Exposure measures, 2011

Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

\(^{62}\) At this point, it is worth reiterating that because of the diverse composition of the ‘not economically active’ (NEA) category, it will not be discussed in detail. However, it is worth noting that there is just a 4% range in the differences in potential exposure to the NEA.
Throughout this project the findings presented have indicated that, even when people were in similar occupations or had the same level of education, people of different races faced different unemployment rates and/or access to residential locations. Consequently, the question of whether these class isolation-exposure measures were consistent between different races, was one that could not be avoided.

7.3.2.2 Interracial Isolation-Exposure by Occupational Class:

The GIS maps presented so far, as well as the dissimilarity and isolation-exposure calculations have shown that Cape Town remained significantly divided along racial lines in 2011. Therefore, it was posited that disaggregating the occupational data by race in order to explore the possibility of differences in interracial isolation/exposure results for difference occupational classes might add to the picture that was developing of the City of Cape Town in 2011.

In this section, the emphasis will be on certain portions of the economically active population, with particular attention to the same categories discussed in the previous section, because of the focus on the professionalisation trend that was identified.

As previously discussed, despite the deracialisation of the job market, Black Africans and Coloureds were to different degrees underrepresented among high-income occupations, yet somewhat overrepresented among the less skilled occupations and the unemployed. Furthermore, maps showing the spatial distribution of racial groups and occupational categories indicated that there had been limited movement by Black Africans into the city’s formerly Coloureds-only and Whites-only neighbourhoods. This trend confirms what Crankshaw (2012) and Graham (2007) discussed with regards to the City of Cape Town and what Christopher (2005b, 2005a) found at a national level.
Table 7.7 presents the results of interracial isolation-exposure calculations, but unlike table 7.5, it differentiates between the potential interracial exposure for people in high-income and middle-income occupations, as well as the unemployed. The first point worth noting is that, among both occupational groups and the unemployed, racial isolation is more likely than exposure to other races. While the probability of racial isolation might differ depending on the race and occupational class, from 60% to 88%, these results indicate that racial isolation, not interracial exposure, was more likely at various levels of Cape Town’s class structure in 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exposure-Isolation measures</th>
<th>Highly-skilled high-income occupations</th>
<th>Semi-skilled middle-income non-manual occupations</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian/Asian</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.7: Interracial isolation-exposure by occupational class, 2011
Source: Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

The fact that the difference between the racial isolation of the unemployed compared to those in Managerial and Professional occupations is greater among the Black African than the Coloured population could be explained by the fact that previous research on Cape Town (Crankshaw, 2012, Graham, 2007) and South Africa (Christopher, 2005b, Christopher, 2005a), as well as the maps in Chapter 5, show that, while the movement of the upwardly mobile population has been in one direction, from formerly Black Africans-only to formerly Coloureds-only and then to formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, it makes sense that the racial exposure is marginally better among the Black Africans in these occupational classes.
Firstly, whereas the unemployed portions of the Black Africans and Coloured populations were more racially isolated than those employed in high-income and middle-income occupations, among the White population the unemployed are marginally less isolated than the aforementioned occupational categories. Considering the aforementioned movement from formerly Black Africans-only to formerly Coloureds-only neighbourhoods, and then to formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods, it makes sense that more upwardly mobile Black Africans and Coloureds will be able to move to more affluent neighbourhoods. While no property valuation data is available here, this resonates with a similar finding discussed by Crankshaw (2008) on Johannesburg, where upwardly mobile Black Africans and Coloureds were moving in greater numbers to formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods that were previously predominantly working-class neighbourhoods.

Secondly, based on these findings, it would appear that Coloureds experience greater racial isolation than Whites, regardless of the occupational class discussed here. On the other hand, only those Black Africans in high-income occupations are less racially isolated than any of the portions of the White population discussed here. That said, according to the data depicted in Figure 4.11, Black Africans accounted for just 17% of those employed in high-income occupations.

7.3.2.3 Interclass Isolation-Exposure, by Race:

The notions of social isolation (Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, Wilson, 2012, Wilson, 2009) and the context in which it is likely to be experience, that is the excluded or outcast ghetto (Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a) are both associated with being cut off from so-called mainstream networks, which can be understood as the types of networks that can lead to employment or perhaps more positive aspirations. Additionally, since there is significant evidence that the City of Cape Town was
still significantly segregated along racial lines with unemployment concentrated in formerly Coloureds-only and formerly Black Africans-only neighbourhoods, the questions of exposure to people of different occupational classes could shape people’s aspirations and/or access to information about employment opportunities for those groups (Kasarda, 1989, Kasinitz and Rosenberg, 1996, Solomon, 2013, Wilson, 2012).

While the figures in the previous section focused on racial isolation, that in and of itself does not necessarily indicate that someone is cut off from networks that could connect people to mainstream institutions and job opportunities. Therefore, the findings presented in this section go beyond that racial focus, to focus on potential isolation or exposure to people of different occupational classes, but also incorporating race as a factor. Previously discussed findings have already shown that the Black African and Coloured populations have the highest rates of unemployment, so understanding the potential exposure for those groups to people of various occupational classes was of particular interest here.

Table 7.8 builds on the results in table 7.6, with the aim of interrogating whether there are differences between the potential inter-class exposure of people in the same occupations, but of different races.

Firstly, it is worth focusing on the findings regarding exposure to unemployed persons of any race. On average, unemployed Black Africans in 2011 had a 1 in 4 (25%) chance of encountering an unemployed person in their neighbourhood, whereas for unemployed Coloureds and Whites the chances were approximately 1 in 6 (17%) and 1 in 20 (5%), respectively. Before looking any further, this already presents the stark contrasts between the kinds of social environments in which unemployed persons of different races live, as well as the potential limits that could place on their access to employment networks.

\[63\] It is also worth keeping in mind that this takes all working-age persons into account and not just those who are economically active.
Furthermore, when one considers the considerable growth in high-income and middle-income occupations in Cape Town, including the effect that has had on the occupational distribution of the job market, it could be of potential benefit to have access to networks that include people in those occupations. After all, Wilson (2012) argued that in ghetto contexts that have seen a mass exodus of employed and/or upwardly mobile people the lack of sustained interaction with regular employed people has the potential to contribute to generating behaviour that is contrary to workplace expectations, in addition to the poor access to employment networks and limited career or educational aspirations. He includes the important of routine and being on time, as opposed to tardiness and/or absenteeism.

That said, exposure to people in those occupations for unemployed people in Cape Town also differed greatly by race. The results presented in table 7.6 showed that, on average, employed people had an 8% chance of encountering someone in a high-income occupation and a 14% chance of encountering a middle-income earner in their residential subplace. This amounts to a 22% (around 1 in 5) chance of encountering someone in one of those occupations. However, when differentiating between the three races in question, there is a 34% difference in the results for Black Africans and Whites, with Coloureds slightly above the results for the former. More specifically, unemployed Whites, on average, had a 31% chance of encountering someone in a high-income occupation in their residential subplaces and a 21% chance of encountering someone in a middle-income occupation. Just those results are worth noting, because it suggests that unemployed Whites were more likely to encounter someone in a high-skilled high-income occupation, than someone in a middle-income non-manual occupation. While he was writing about a very different context, these findings concur with the work of Wilson (2012: loc 1083), particular when he says:

“… simple comparisons between poor whites and poor blacks would be confounded with the fact that poor whites reside in areas which are ecologically and economically very different from poor blacks.”
### Table 7.8: Inter-class Isolation-Exposure measures by race, 2011

**Source:** Community Profiles Databases (see: Note 2)

And when shifting the focus to unemployed Black Africans and Coloureds, the results are considerably different. For example, at the other end of the scale, when one considers the chances that an unemployed Black African person in Cape Town would encounter someone in either of these occupational groups, it amounts to just 18% (i.e. 5% for high-income exposure plus 13% for middle-income non-manual exposure). In fact, the potential for inter-class exposure for unemployed Black Africans in Cape Town in 2011 was so poor that they only had a 43% chance (i.e. less than 1 in 2) of encountering any employed person in any occupation in their residential subplace.

While the literature discussed here, on the changing ghettos and other impoverished contexts (Kasarda, 1989, Kasarda, 1993, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000b, Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000a, Marcuse, 1997a, Wilson, 2012), has focused more on the potential
negative impact of poor employment network access for the unemployed, discussing those in other occupations does reveal something about the types of contexts people of different races are living in.

For example, although there has been considerable evidence presented here that, even in high-unemployment subplaces in formerly Black Africans-only or formerly Coloureds-only areas, there were an unexpected number of people resident there who were employed in high-income occupations. Nevertheless, two other points worth raising here is that, firstly, both Black Africans (at 15%) and Coloureds (at 18%) in high-income occupations were less likely to encounter another high-income earner than unemployed Whites (31%) were. Similarly, both of those sub-groups were also more likely to encounter an unemployed person (i.e. 16% and 11% respectively), than unemployed Whites were (5%).

Whereas the earlier quote from Wilson (2012: loc 1083) was focused on “poor blacks [sic]” and “poor whites [sic]” in the urban USA, these results would suggest that even unemployed Whites lived in neighbourhoods that were “ecologically and economically very different” from those where many high-income earning Black Africans and Coloureds were living in 2011. These findings certain are counterintuitive, especially considering some of the dominant theories and arguments in urban studies, but this would suggest that we still have lots more to learn about the seemingly paradoxical characteristics of the geographical distribution of Cape Town's population.

7.4 Conclusion:

As previously mentioned, high unemployment and racial isolation might lead some to conclude that some areas are starting to resemble so-called excluded ghettos, but other analyses that are still to be discussed point to a more paradoxical conclusion about formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods. That said, there are two points worth emphasising from this chapter.
Firstly, based on these findings, Cape Town has continued to be starkly segregated along racial lines, both in terms of the evenness and exposure dimensions of segregation. Previous work on Cape Town (Crankshaw, 2012) and the findings in this project have indicated that there has been some racial desegregation, especially in the former Whites-only neighbourhoods. However, the growth of the Black African and Coloured populations, as well as their concentration on the Cape Flats, meant that the aforementioned localised desegregation had very little impact on the city-level segregation results.

Secondly, the previous chapters showed that those employed in high-income occupations could be found across different parts of the city in different types of subplaces, including both formerly Whites-only and formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods. Considering the literature on how the upwardly mobile in cities in the USA tend to leave the ghettos for the suburbs, finding high income earners across all parts of the city is an unexpected finding. The lack of geographical mobility in conjunction with the upwardly mobility meant that, although there was some segregation between people of different occupational classes and the unemployment, it was not as high as the results for interracial segregation.

Lastly, Wilson (2012) argued that the context in which poor Whites and poor Blacks find themselves are considerably different in cities in the USA. He goes on to say that the latter are more likely to experience isolation from that exposure to what he refers to as mainstream institutions and related networks (e.g. potential employment networks). That idea certainly resonates with the findings regarding inter-class exposure, because regardless of the occupational class or employment status, Black Africans and Coloureds have consistently been less likely to encounter someone in a high-income occupation. Furthermore, for unemployed Black Africans and Coloureds, their chances of being able to access employment networks and/or opportunities in their neighbourhoods are significantly lower than that for unemployed Whites.
8 Discussion:

A combination of different methods has been used together in this project, with the aim of developing a better understanding of the changing relationship between race, space and class in Cape Town between 1980 and 2011.

8.1 Polarised Labour market, professionalised job market:

The starting point for this project was to engage with the debate between the proponents of the social polarisation and professionalisation theories, with a focus on building on the work of Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), as well as (Crankshaw, 2012), who determined that Cape Town’s labour market had undergone professionalisation. Since the latter project did not incorporate data from the 2011 census, that was central to chapter 4.

That said, the findings from the 2011 census indicated that the growth of employment in high-income occupations has continued and actually accelerated in the decade leading up to 2011. Whereas 120,894 jobs in these occupations were added between 1980 and 2001, an additional 134,205 were added in just the following ten years. Nevertheless, employment growth in middle-income non-manual occupations exceeded that in the 2001-11 period to the extent that in terms of numbers of jobs added during the 31-year period in question, marginally more jobs were added to these middle-income occupations. Nevertheless, the pattern seen here was still more reminiscent professionalisation, albeit somewhat tiered, for the following reasons.

Firstly, as already stated, employment growth in high-income occupations accelerated during the 2001-11 period. Secondly, while the combination of middle-income manual and non-manual employment points to an expanding middle-income, the educational requirements of the non-manual occupations particularly in terms of literacy and numeracy skills, appear to contribute to the on-going improvements in the educational profile of the labour force. Thirdly, rather than polarisation within the job market, the persistently high unemployment rates point
to a polarising effect in the labour market – more specially, between those who are employed and the rest of the labour market, consisting of the unemployed and those who are not economically active.

Nevertheless, the considerable growth of middle-income non-manual employment is something that will be worth watching in years to come, especially if it continues to expand as it has.

8.2 Persistent racial inequality in the labour market:

In addition to getting a better understanding of the structure and occupational distribution of the labour market, it was essential to understand who was benefiting from these changes. After all, Lemanski (2007) argued that it was primarily the White population who was benefiting from the labour market changes in Cape Town, yet Crankshaw (2012) demonstrated that Black Africans and Coloureds had made considerable gains in both middle-income non-manual and high-income occupations. He also briefly mentioned that these latter groups experienced high levels of unemployment.

Over the course of this project, there were numerous paradoxical and/or counterintuitive findings and the answer to this issue was one of those. On the one hand, Black African and Coloured employment in both middle-income non-manual and high-income occupations grew throughout the period in question. And yet, those groups not only remained under-represented in both of those categories (when compared to the racial composition of the labour market as a whole), but they also continued to experience higher unemployment rates than their White counterparts.

Furthermore, these differences in unemployment rates were not merely the product of differences in educational attainment, because differences of varying degrees were evident at all levels of education. This would indicate that there is a factor, beyond educational attainment, that is shaping the labour market successes of people from different races. Hypothesising
about possible causes is beyond the scope of this particular project, or the kind of data available through the census, but it is a worthy focus for future research.

8.3 Continuing racial segregation:

The issues of segregation and spatial analysis took this project beyond what is typically considered sociological research, into the realm of geographical work. Nevertheless, question of spatial inequality have been the focus of numerous sociologists (for example: Crankshaw, 2008, Crankshaw, 2012) and other social scientists (for example: Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012, Turok, 2001), apart from geographers. That said, the most salient finding regarding the spatial work was that Cape Town has remained a starkly racially segregated city.

Many Whites have continued to live in formerly Whites-only, with minimal desegregation of those areas, and Black Africans and Coloureds have continued to predominate the city’s formerly Blacks-only neighbourhoods.

With regard to the two dimensions of segregation discussed in this project, the distribution of different racial groups (even within occupational classes) across the city was considerably more uneven than the distribution of various occupational classes and/or the unemployment. For example, when using the dissimilarity index to measure the evenness dimension of segregation, the evidence pointed to greater interracial segregation among those employed in high-income occupations, than the segregation between the unemployed and those in high-income occupations.

Finally, the exposure dimension of segregation was useful to determine the chances that someone might encounter someone of the same/different race and/or occupational class in their residential subplaces. It was particularly useful because the mechanics of the formula measures phenomena that are distinct from, albeit related to that of the dissimilarity index. While all three racial groups discussed were, on average, more likely to experience racial isolation that exposure (regardless of occupational class), the findings on class exposure was
particularly enlightening. Wilson (2012) argued that, in the USA, poor Whites live in considerably different contexts, socially and ecologically, than poor Blacks. And, the findings on Cape Town concur with that sentiment. In fact, the differences in contexts between the races, for people of all occupational classes, was so different that the evidence would suggest that unemployed Whites in 2011 were, on average, more likely than high income earning Black Africans or Coloureds, to encounter someone employed in a high-income occupation in their neighbourhood.

8.4 Conclusion:

As previously stated, the findings contained in this project were a collection of both predictable and counterintuitive results. For example, it was not surprising that Black Africans and Coloureds experienced higher levels of unemployment, yet it was a particularly thought-provoking finding that this was evident at various levels of education.

As has been the case throughout this project, the concluding statement of this thesis also has a paradoxical element. The evidence presented here indicates that, over the course of the 1980-2011 period, Black Africans and Coloureds have made considerable gains in middle-income and high-income occupations and this has allowed some to move into formerly Whites-only neighbourhoods. However, the evidence indicates that 17 years into the post-apartheid era, Cape Town was still a starkly segregated city, with further evidence point to persistent racial inequalities in the labour market.
NOTES:

1. **Population censuses**: This project made use of population census data in the form of SPSS datasets for some analysis. The 1980 data included a full-count, but later datasets only included a 10% sample. Consequently, for the subplace-level analysis it was necessary to make use of the ‘Community Profile Databases’.

2. **Community Profile Databases**: These databases were accessible using the SuperCROSS and SuperTABLE software. It allowed for subplace-level analysis, as well as the possibility of disaggregating the data by different variables, such as race, employment status or age.

3. **GIS Shapefiles**: The GIS shapefile that corresponded with the Community Profile Databases were available for the 1996, 2001 and 2011 censuses. While shapefiles for the 1980 were not available, Google Maps was used to determine the location and shape of various neighbourhoods named in that dataset, in order to ensure that the correct 1980 subplaces corresponded with the 1996 shapefiles. Where necessary, the data for multiple 1980 subplaces were combined when necessary to fit a subplace in the 1996 shapefiles.
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