



AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNANCE ON EFFECTIVE PROGRAMME
MANAGEMENT – A CASE OF NAMIBIA MASS HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT – A CASE OF NAMIBIA MASS HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

By

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A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice (GSDPP)
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (DEVELOPMENT POLICY & PRACTICE)

February 2018

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis work to my late Grandmother, Mukwanayuma S.P Heelu, for instilling in me, the value of education and hard work.

To my late partner, Ananias M. Shigwedha, for believing in me and my potential. The two remain my greatest source of strength and motivation.

I also dedicate this work to my beautiful kids, Anna and Pandeni. May this work motivate you to do greatness.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My gratitude goes to my research supervisors Professor Rajen Govender and Dr Laurine Platzky for their guidance and support throughout this research process.

I would further like to thank the entire teaching staff and administration of the Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice for their wonderful support.

A special acknowledgement goes to the informants who agreed to participate in this research project despite the sensitivity around the subject matter.

And lastly, I would like to thank my fellow students, the MPhil Class of 2017, for the comradery spirit and sisterly/brotherly support throughout this journey.

Martha Wilhelm

February 2018

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ACRONYMS

MHDP	Mass Housing Development Programme
MURD	Ministry of Urban and Rural Development
NHE	National Housing Enterprise
NDP 5	Fifth National Development Plan
TIPEEG	Targeted Intervention Programme for Employment and Economic Growth
NPC	National Planning Commission
PMS	Programme Management Structure
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
SDFN	Shack Dwellers' Federation of Namibia
N\$	Namibian Dollars
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
DfiD	Department of International Development
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
CEO	Chief Executive Officer

ABSTRACT

Namibia has been praised for having rigorous policy frameworks that address various national development challenges. Over the years, the country has introduced various policy initiatives to address the housing challenge in the country. However, implementation of such policies and programmes faced various challenges resulting in suboptimal outcomes and consequently, a situation where such programmes are abandoned, and new ones are introduced with little learning from past experiences. This paper, analysed the role of governance on effective programme management using a case study of Namibia's Mass Housing Development Programme. The findings highlight governance challenges, as one of the key contributing factors to failing programmes.

A qualitative approach was employed in gathering data using face to face in-depth interviews with the informants who represented the target population in the study. The paper contributes to the body of knowledge on the importance of governance which public policy and programme makers can draw lessons from for effective programme implementation.

Key Words: Governance, Oversight, National Housing Enterprise, Ministry of Urban and Rural Development, Programme Management, roles, responsibilities, accountability.

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

Studies have shown that governance is one of the key determinants for effective public policy and programme implementation. The ability to critically assess and address governance challenges or impediment is key if public policy initiatives are to achieve the desired results. As Fukuyama, F., (2013) framed it, governance refers to the ability to make and enforce rules for programme delivery. Using the case study of Namibia's Mass Housing Development Programme, this paper will analyse the role of governance in ensuring effective programme management for positive policy outcomes.

1.1 Background and Country Context

1.1.1 Socio-Economic Development

Namibia is one of the most sparsely populated countries in southern Africa with a size of about 824 000 square kilometres and a population of about 2. 1 million (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2011). The country celebrated 27 years of Independence in March 2017, having suffered from colonialism through the hands of German and South Africa -apartheid.

Namibia is believed to have a functional democracy, strong political will, and drive towards economic and social development. The country ranked 125th on the Human Development Index out of 188 countries, moving from 0.556 in 2000 to 0.640 in 2015 (Republic of Namibia, 2017). In 2009 the country was classified by the Bretton Woods Institutions as Upper Middle Income, but it has one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world, at 0.5972 (Human Development Report 2009). As a nation, Namibia ranks high in peacefulness according to the 2016 Global Peace Index. In the fifth National Development Plan (NDP 5) the government recognises this stability as setting a foundation for "strong and sustainable economic

development” (NDP 5,2017). According to Andrews, M., (2014), many governments that comply with significant parts of the current good governance agenda do not see improved outcomes or functionality, leading to what he calls the ‘what you see is not what you get’ problem in poor countries. This, Andrews believe can be attributed to the focus on governance as a means and not an end approach. Namibia scores high on various measures of governance and accountability including Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness measure – compared with other upper-middle-income countries. Yet, this relatively good governance has not translated into significant advances in other areas of human development, Donnenfeld, Z., and Courtney, C., (2017).

Namibia’s relatively positive socio-economic development (high-income status and high level of peace and security) is masked by extreme inequalities in income distribution, standard of living, and quality of life. The country features one of the most unequal distributions of wealth with a national Gini coefficient index of 0.572 characterised by a rural/urban and inter-regional divide, Fifth National Development Plan (NDP 5), (2017). Poverty rates have declined significantly since independence, but it is still 27 percent in rural areas (9.6 percent in urban); 66 Namibia Statistics Agency, (2015). The country faces challenges related to expansion of the economy, generating jobs, reducing income inequality and imbalances in access to services. The country has an unemployment rate of 34 percent while youth unemployment stands at 39.2 percent, Namibia Statistics Agency, (2016). According to the Namibian Labour Force Survey, (2013), approximately 60 percent of Namibians are aged 35 years or under. Andrews, M., (2014) argued that the quality of governance should be measured by how well governments have produced, facilitated, and otherwise influenced outcomes that enhance civic welfare. This means, the ends or outcomes of governance as well as how well processes through which authority is exercised generate the outcomes that enhance civic welfare i.e. the means or process of governance.

Other challenges facing the country include access to land and food security which stems from Namibia’s historical unequal ownership patterns of land as well as the increasingly adverse effects of climate change (manifested through recurring drought for the past five years and flooding, exacerbating rural-urban migration and a rapid growth in peri-urban settlements). The

northern parts of the country are more favourable for crop cultivation than the southern parts. Cattle farming take place in the north and central regions while in the drier southern parts of the country only sheep and goat farming are common. Namibia is endowed with rich deposits of uranium, diamonds, and other minerals, as well as rich fishing resources yet the country has not managed to distribute this wealth to its citizens to address the poverty and inequality problem.

1.1.2 National Efforts in Addressing Some Socio-Economic Challenges

Namibia has been praised for having some robust policies and strategies with substantial budgetary investments. Over the past years, the Government introduced several policy initiatives to address various developmental challenges around poverty reduction, unemployment as well as to address the housing crisis in the country. However, many of these initiatives failed to deliver on the intended outcomes. One example of these policy initiatives, was a four-year special job creation programme known as the Targeted Intervention Programme for Employment and Economic Growth (TIPEEG) launched in 2011 at a total N\$ 14.7 billion budgets. This Programme was aimed at creating about 187 000 direct and indirect jobs between 2011 and 2014 NPC, (2011) introduced to address a shocking unemployment rate of 51.2 percent in 2010 (Namibia Labour Force Survey, 2008). The main purpose of TIPEEG was to effectively reduce the high unemployment rate in Namibia mainly through expediting implementation of Government programmes and projects with the potential to create vast numbers of direct and indirect job opportunities for the unskilled youth population of the Namibian society.

The programme had five priority sectors one of which was on housing and sanitation N\$ 1,8 billion for 35076 jobs (TIPEEG 2011). The TIPEEG did not achieve the intended results. In 2012, the programme was reported to have created 33 965 job opportunities since its launch in April 2011 at total cost of N\$ 5.2 billion (56 percent of the total budget allocated to the Programme over the two years), Hashoongo P. J (2013). According to the National Planning Commission (2014) by 30 September 2013, only a total number of 83 315 jobs were created in all TIPEEG projects (44.6 percent of the 187 000, six months before the programme ended). Of the 83 315 jobs created, the housing sector was the lowest, creating only 28.5 percent (35 076 jobs) despite a 1,8 N\$ billion investments.

One of the factors highlighted to have contributed to poor programme outcomes is weak monitoring of projects, it was reported that there was no clear mandate of who is responsible for enforcing the recruitment criteria and following up on project progress (NPC 2014). In its current fifth National Development Plan (NDP 5) the Government recognises challenges related to institutional capacities to deliver effective public services. One of NDP 5 focus areas is to enhance good governance, accountability, and performance management to ensure efficient public service delivery, minimise wastage of public resources and curb corruption to realise return on investment in sectors such as education and housing to mention but a few (NDP 5, 2017).

Given the above background, the need to investigate possible factors that may be contributing to the poor performance of government policy initiatives is key if future interventions are to bear positive results. One underlying issue around this phenomenon is that there seems to be a general lack of accountability by those entrusted with project and programme management. This points to a question on the role of governance and oversight in mitigating some common avoidable failures and by doing so, ensuring accountability by those entrusted with the responsibility of implementation. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the role of governance in effective project implementation using Namibia's MHDP as a case study.

1.2 Problem Statement

Namibia is faced with a challenge of providing affordable housing to its citizens, particularly the poor. As per the Namibian Housing Policy (2009), the Namibian housing sector challenge is characterized by limited financial support for the low-income groups as well as limited capacity to meet the demand for land and housing development.

To address the housing problem, in 2013 the then President of the Republic of Namibia launched an ambitious housing delivery programmed called the *Mass Housing Development Programme* (MHDP). The overall objective of the programme was to construct about 185 000 houses by the year 2030 with a total budget of 45 billion Namibian dollars. The programme was

implemented through the National Housing Enterprise (NHE), a state-owned enterprise, established with a sole purpose to provide home ownership through credit facilities in the form of housing loans to low- and middle-income households. The NHE is under direct supervision of the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development. The project implementation faced numerous challenges ranging from a lack of required capacity to execute the programme, corruption allegations over tender allocation and selection processes, poor quality houses and inflated construction costs, among others. This resulted in unaffordable prices to the target beneficiaries resulting in majority of completed houses being empty and unoccupied. For example, upon visiting some of the completed houses, the then Country's President equated some houses to cubicles and structures from the apartheid era, saying to the Chief Executive Officer of NHE, *"You recruit people from South Africa to come build houses like this for us. What is that? It is because you don't even come here. If you came here, you would have rectified this. I am angry with you."* Shinovene, I, and Herman A, (2014). In addition, the Minister of Urban and Rural Development (at the time), upon inspecting several housing units completed in one town, found the houses to be "humanely uninhabitable," and ordered that they be demolished and be replaced with better quality structures, New Era Newspaper, (2017).

Due to the above challenges and more, the programme failed to build the required annual housing units. Consequently, in July 2015 the government revoked the NHE's mandate to implement the multi-billion-dollar mass housing programme citing the needs to revise its Blue Print (New Era Newspaper 2015). According to the Mass Housing Development Programme's Blue Print, a Programme Management Structure (PMS) was to be established to manage and coordinate the various components of the programme. The PMS was expected to put in place an overall operational guideline for effective program implementation including a program reporting, monitoring and evaluation system. The programme had seven components each with implementing agencies who were expected to develop "a detailed implementation plan and strategy pertaining to specific sub-program activities that fall within their jurisdictions," according to the programme's Blue Print, Republic of Namibia, (2013). All program implementing agencies were to be held accountable and operate within strict legally enforceable contractual arrangements. In addition, needs, desirability, and affordability analyses were to be conducted before any project was executed with the view to establish the purchasing power and

the dwelling types required in respective markets. It was further foreseen that legally enforceable contracts were to be signed with all institutions involved, stipulating clear performance standards and consequences for failure to deliver, Republic of Namibia, (2013).

The above principles suggest that the programme implementation and management modalities were robust enough, raising the question for this study, *what went wrong?* This thesis will examine the role of governance in effective programme management and possible contribution to the poor performance of the MHDP.

1.3 Research Question

This paper will analyse the governance structure of the MHDP implementation, its effectiveness and functionality. It explored the extent to which the implementation and management modalities as stated in the Blue Print document was effective to ensure successful implementation of the programme (see annexure B). The extent to which the governance structure provided the required strategic leadership, oversight, and ensured accountability over the programme is also analysed. This is important because, as the Australian National Audit Office, (2014) put it, *“those charged with governance in public sector agencies have a responsibility to provide the leadership, strategies and oversight to deliver on the policies of the government of the day”*.

The primary objective of the paper is to:

Analyse the role of governance on the performance of the Mass Housing Development Programme. The research paper seeks answers to the following major questions:

- What was the Governance structure for the Mass Housing Development Programme?
- To what extent did the Governance structure provide the required strategic leadership, oversight, and ensured accountability by all responsible parties involved in the programme’s implementation?
- What was the level of political commitment towards the MHDP?

- Was the Programme Management Structure, functional and effective?
- What instruments were put in place to ensure accountability by all identified stakeholders?
- Was there an M&E mechanism at both levels (NHE (technical) and MURD policy management)?
- Were there sufficient institutional (both NHE and MURD) capacities (qualified and experienced staff and financial resources available) to deliver the programme?
- Was there performance management system in place for the staff involved?

Getting answers to these questions was helpful to the researcher to obtain an overall understanding on possible factors that may have contributed to the poor performance of the Mass Housing Development Programme. This further aided in coming up with practical recommendations for decision makers and public administrators in taking appropriate measures to ensure successful implementation of housing delivery in Namibia and other national development programmes.

1.4 Delimitation or Scope of the study

Generally, governance and oversight mechanisms cut across various levels in programme implementation. These include:

a) Internal Oversight

- Internal governance and control which includes issues of staff supervision and performance monitoring, as well as disciplinary systems for reporting, responding, and tracking complaints etc.
- Executive control (Cabinet committees, line ministries) through measures that demonstrate high-level commitment to the issue.

b) External Oversight

- Legislative (parliamentary oversight i.e. standing and portfolio committees)
- Oversight by independent bodies (e.g. office of the ombudsman, Anti-Corruption Commissions, Office of the Auditor General etc).

- Civil society oversight (civil society organizations, media etc).

For this paper and in the interest of time, the focus will be limited on the internal oversight governance. The respondents to the research questions are limited to key individuals that were directly involved in the implementation of the MHDP, specifically, the members of the programme governance structure.

1.5 Assumptions

The researcher is of the view that pin-pointing some of these factors which hinders policy initiatives from achieving positive outcome makes a positive research contribution to the body of knowledge helpful to policy makers and implementers.

The researcher made the following assumptions on this paper:

- That the research methodology and approach used will ensure valid and reliable data collection.
- That the respondents will fully cooperate and provide honest answers.
- That the respondents will understand the questions asked and provide accurate information.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The current housing problem is proving to threaten the peace and stability that the Government of the Republic of Namibia pride itself for. Mclean Hilker, L., (n.d) argued that a "surging" youth population or "youth bulge", combined with high unemployment and rapid urbanization, is leading to increased violence and insecurity, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Of current, Namibia has seen and observed protests by the public and expression of lack of confidence in how the Namibian Government is addressing the housing crisis. An empirical example in this case is the group of young activists called the Affirmative Repositioning group

that held riots and occupied land illegally in the elite suburbs to build houses of their own, Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED) as quoted by Institute for Security Study, (2017).

The study contributes to the body of knowledge on the importance of governance which policy makers can draw lessons from for effective programme implementation instead of abandoning or introducing new ones with similar limitations.

1.7 Outline of the Thesis Paper

This thesis is structured and divided into six chapters:

Chapter 1: presents the research introduction focusing on the significance of governance and oversight onto effective programme management, background on the country's context, the research objectives, key questions and problem statement, the scope of the research paper, assumption as well as the significance of the research.

Chapter 2 lays out the country context about the housing situation and or challenge, past and ongoing national initiatives well as the housing regulatory framework.

Chapter 3: presents on the literature review of the research project, highlighting the theoretical frameworks on programme management and housing delivery in Namibia and other countries within the African Continent.

Chapter 4: lays out the research design, methodology and approach used to gather data.

Chapter 5: presents and discuss the research findings based on the methods used in data collection, thus aiming at providing answers to the research questions.

Chapter 6: Summarises all the sections, mainly focusing on drawing the conclusion of the research paper. The chapter also offers some practical recommendations to policy and decision makers on factors that could improvement policy implementation through effective programme management particularly on housing delivery in Namibia.

CHAPTER 2

2. UNDERSTANDING THE HOUSING SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

2.1 A National Housing Crisis

According to John, M., and Beat, W., (2017), there are two main factors that prohibit Namibia's housing programmes to have the desired impact on housing provision and stemming informal settlement growth. The first is that, the programmes tend to focus on the provision of finished houses at prices that are unaffordable for most low-income residents. Second, that the scale of the national housing programmes has been insufficient to effectively address the demand for land and housing by low income migrants.

According to a national Consumer Price Index report, (2014) by the First National Bank of Namibia, revealed that house prices in Windhoek were 30 percent more expensive than in Cape Town, which is believed to have the highest real estate prices in Africa. The housing prices in Namibia, particularly in Windhoek are generally believed to be driven by demand and supplier, in that the demand for houses surpasses the supply of serviced land. The Municipalities would auction off serviced land to the highest bidder, the beneficiaries to this are usually property developers, South African Companies, and high-ranking Government officials such as Ministers who would build houses and apartment for rental income, Kalili, N., (2014). It is for this reason that people believe politicians are comfortable with the status quo because they are benefiting the most and changing the regulatory framework regarding land and property acquisition, including rental control is not in their interest. This situation has resulted in high house prices which constraint the low-income earners from affording and accessing housing.

The housing crisis mostly affects the youth and low-income category earners. Majority of the young people in Windhoek cannot afford to buy houses, leading them to rent at exorbitant prices. There is also a mismatch between the existing housing initiatives and the needs of those they are serving. For instance, the houses provided by the National Housing Enterprise (NHE) are not intended for the young professionals because their salaries are considered high. At the same time, commercial banks do not provide home loans to these young individuals because

their salaries do not qualify for such facilities. In Namibia, the youth make up 60 percent of the total population. Majority of these young people fall in the age category of 15-34, Namibian Labour Force Survey, (2013). Young people are the pillar of any country's economy and not having access to basic needs such as land, in this case, urban land to build houses for shelter, deprives them of opportunities to make meaningful social and economic contributions. This could also be a potential source of political crisis and conflict in the country like what happened in Egypt in 2011. According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, (2017), in its report titled "*Africa at a Tipping Point*", many of today's youth feel devoid of economic prospects and robbed of opportunities to participate in decisions related to the future of their own continent. The report further argued that, this is a test to democracy, which although free and fair, has failed to translate into job opportunities for the educated youth on the continent. This is the same sentiment shared by the Namibian youth and their patience with the Government has run out, particularly about housing provision.

The situation is particularly worse for Windhoek, Namibia's capital city, which is grappling with increasing urban population, especially in informal settlements. The challenge to the City of Windhoek is particularly on provision of (affordable) housing to not only urban dwellers in informal but also formal settlements, particularly the middle-income earners. The urban population is 46.7 percent of total population and the rate of urbanization is reported to be around 4.16 percent¹. The City has made efforts in containing this figure, noting that it becomes extremely difficult to manage when or if it goes beyond a 30 percent. According to the report by the Bank of Namibia (2011) the largest backlog of housing is in the lowest income sectors, with monthly incomes of N\$ 0 to N\$ 1,500 (estimated at 45,000), and incomes between N\$ 1,501 and N\$ 4,600 (estimated at 30,000). In 2013, the national housing backlog was estimated at 110 000 housing units at a growing rate of about 3 700 units, Vinson, H., (2013). This backlog in housing deliveries is attributed to insufficient serviced land and the difficulties in acquiring the same.

Table 1: National Housing Backlog

¹ http://www.indexmundi.com/namibia/demographics_profile.html
the Namibia Demographics Profile 2016

Income Category (N\$)	House Prices Ranges	Percentage of population	Backlog
10 501 +	255 5 000	5.6 percent	706 (0.1 percent)
4 601 - 10 500	171 000	6.4 percent	4 201 (0.8 percent)
1 501- 4 600	51 000	28.4 percent	29 554 (7.0 percent)
0 -1 500	23 000	43.3 percent	27 249 (9.5 percent)

Source: Kalili et al (2008)

Housing service to those at the bottom of income category (N\$ 0-1 500 and 1 500 - 4 600) is usually provided by the Community Self Help groups (e.g. Shack Dweller Federation Association) whereas, the top two (N\$ 4 601 – 10 500 and 10 500 and above) are catered for by the national state-owned enterprise, the Namibia Housing Enterprise, Private Developers, and estate agents as well as commercial banks for those who can qualify for a bond or home loan. The low-income earner who resides in informal settlements faces numerous challenges ranging from limited income which prevent them from accessing land for housing, secure tenure, basic services such as water, electricity, and sanitation to mention but a few.

According to national housing study carried out by the Bank of Namibia (2011), more than 73 percent of Namibians do not have access to credit facilities offered by the financial service sector and consequently cannot afford to buy urban land and decent housing. Meanwhile the prices of houses continue to skyrocket due to increase in input costs and the mismatch between the rapidly rising demands for houses versus low housing outputs delivered by housing developers in the housing market annually. A Consumer Price Index report by the First National Bank (2015) shows that Namibia is followed by Ireland with housing inflation of 15 percent, Turkey (percent), Dubai (12.5 percent) and the United Kingdom (10.5 percent) while South

Africa was ranked 14th with 8 percent, Kalili, N., (2015). Furthermore, inflexibility in the current land tenure system exacerbates lack of right to land ownership and development of it by holders.

Table 2: Housing Market Analysis

Monthly Income N\$	Number of Population	Percentage of the Population
10 501 +	104 329	5.7 percent
4,601 - 10 500	131 784	7.2
1 501 - 4 600	640 615	35 percent
0 -1 500	951 771	52 percent

Source: Kalili et al for the Fin Mark Trust (2008)

As can be seen in the above table, about 52 percent the population earns as little as zero to 1 500 incomes per month while a 35 percent earns a maximum of about 4 600 per month. It is this situation that worsens the housing crisis in Namibia as majority of the population cannot afford housing services. The Namibia Statistics Agency reported in its Housing and Income Expenditure Survey, (2009/2010) that only about 12.2 percent of people living in shacks have Grade 12 education level compared to 42.3 percent of people that lives in formal housing. In addition, only 27.8 percent of those living in shacks have access to electricity compared to 71.6 percent of overall. The Survey also indicated that only 41 percent of Namibians lives in modern houses commonly found in urban areas, Hailulu, V., (2013). This presents a huge challenge to the government and its local authority in proving the necessary services including land for housing.

2.2 The Impact of the Current Housing Situation

The housing crisis has over time caused public frustration, resulting in several initiatives by Government to address the situation. One such recent initiative is the formation of the Affirmative Repositioning group which consists of young people who started off by actively occupying land illegally. The group, which was established in 2014 first started occupying land in one of the rich suburbs in the capital city by clearing land to build their own houses. The group mobilized the youth across the country to stand up to what they called “capitalist greed and economic rape” by the elites, Amupanda, J, (2014). Again, in November 2014, the group mobilized thousands of youth to participate in a nationwide land mass actions where youth submitted land application, about 14 000, to the City of Windhoek and other local authorities around the country (Tjihenuna, T., and Haidula T., 2014). The group gave the City of Windhoek an ultimatum of two options: that either the authority co-operates and face antagonistic actions from the youth, meaning occupying land by force. Consequently, and just before deadline given to the Government to provide feedback on application, the Namibian President together with other top Ministers including the Prime Minister agreed to meet the youth group to strike a deal on the matter. A meeting was held where the Government agreed to a pilot project that will service identified land in a few towns in the country namely; Windhoek, Walvis Bay and Oshakati. The Government announced to embark on a programme to service 200 000 plots of land countrywide, as well as clearing urban land identified to be serviced between the period 29 July and 5 August 2016 (Shinovene, I., 2015).

In January 2017, the Group leadership issued the government with a notice of withdrawal from the mass urban land servicing programme (MULSP) citing failure to meet the agreed targets and observe the urgency of the housing crisis, as well as lack of consequences against those believed to have failed to implement the programme (Kambala, George, K., Dimbulukeni, N., Amupanda, J., (2017).

2.3 Namibia's Housing Legislative, Policy, and Regulatory Frameworks

The following are some of the relevant national strategic frameworks that makes provision for housing delivery in Namibia. The highest regulatory framework that governs land ownership in Namibia is *the Constitution* which makes provision (Article 19) that all persons shall have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all forms of immovable and movable property individually or in association with others and to bequeath their properties to their heirs or legatees..., Willem, O, (n.d). The second policy framework is the country's long-term planning framework for development – *Namibia Vision 2030* which recognises and set priority, as part of its poverty reduction and promotion of a healthy human settlement, of providing access to adequate shelter, sanitation, and water for 60 percent of the low-income population by the year 2025. The framework projects a 100 percent access to acceptable sanitation by 2030 in urban area and 50 percent in rural areas, Republic of Namibia, (2004).

The Vision 2030 is implemented through a five-year planning framework, called the **National Development Plans** (NDPs). The 4th National Development Plan (NDP4) which was under implementation at the time of the MHDP, Government undertook to have a robust and effective housing delivery programme where affordability is the key feature of the programme. Specifically, the plan aimed for 60 percent of households in Namibia living in modern houses from about 41 percent in 2009/2010 by the end of the NDP4 (2016/2017), Republic of Namibia, (2013).

The forth policy framework is the National *Housing Policy 2009*, which was approved by the Cabinet in 1991 and reviewed in 2009 The Policy guarantees the right to housing to every Namibian citizen especially for the formally disadvantaged communities, Shileka, A., (n. d). It was introduced to make provision for resource allocation towards the development of infrastructure and facilities in order that every Namibian is given opportunity to acquire serviced land suitable for human settlement. The third is the national *Housing Development Act* which according to the Namibia National Housing Policy (2009) established National Housing Advisory Committee, the housing revolving funds by Regional Councils and Local Authorities, and the Build Together Committees for Regional Councils, Local Authorities, and resettlement areas to provide low cost residential accommodation within their respective areas.

Furthermore, there is a *Local Authorities Act of 1992* (amended) which makes provision for establishing housing schemes by a municipal or town council with the approval of the portfolio Minister. These housing can further establish funds known as the Housing Fund which is to be used for construction, acquisition or maintenance of any dwelling, the cost incurred in connection with the administration of any housing scheme and for any other purposes as approved by the responsible line ministry (Namibia National Housing policy, 2009).

Finally, is the *Flexible Land Tenure Act 2012* introduced to make provision for registration of untitled land to create a market for housing in communal areas with the objective of promoting the provision of housing finance.

In the Mass Housing Blue Print, the Government recognise the needs to review various legislative, policy and regulatory framework to enable government to smoothly and speedily deliver housing without much bureaucratic and other impediments, Republic of Namibia, (2013).

2.4 Namibia Housing Institutions: Roles and Responsibilities

The following institutions or actors play a key role in housing delivery in Namibia. They are:

2.4.1 *The Ministry of Urban and Rural Development (MURD)*

Per the Namibia Housing Policy of 2009, “the role of the Government is to ensure that the housing development process is inclusive for all and that those households excluded from the market and conventional housing development mechanism are given the opportunity to access land, housing and services as well as creating an enabling environment for a vibrant housing market”. This role is executed through the MURD which has the mandate to coordinate and manage decentralization in Namibia which entails transferring power from central government to regional and local government in a unitary state, providing advisory services, technical support, and capacity building. In addition, to develop policy guidelines and procedures, evaluating institutional readiness of Line Ministries and Sub-National government and legislation harmonization as well as to introduce good governance principles. Furthermore,

the ministry is responsible for coordinating and facilitating rural development activities, policies, and legislation to ensure sustainable rural livelihoods, reduced poverty, improved living conditions and shelter, mitigate rural-urban migration as well as ensuring appropriate town planning and establishment, infrastructural development, and land use management; and to ensure effective discharge of all prescribed functions through support services (MURD, 2017).

2.4.2 The City of Windhoek

The City of Windhoek, as per the Local Authority Act of 2002 is mandated to provide among others, land delivery services through its Department of Urban Planning and Property Management. The Department mainly deals with the planning of the City of Windhoek and is responsible for the land delivery process as spelled out in its vision: "innovative urban management to create a quality living environment for all generations" , City of Windhoek, 2017).

2.4.3 The National Housing Enterprise (NHE)

The NHE is a state-owned enterprise, established by the NHE Act of 1993, created with a sole purpose to provide home ownership by providing credit facilities in the form of housing loans to low- and middle-income households. In addition, the NHE also provides affordable housing through interest rate subsidy and management of a Government-capitalised housing subsidy fund to low income people in Namibia. The NHE collaborates with the local authorities and regional councils to ensure that is availed and serviced at affordable prices and provide for poverty-stricken cases in Namibia. In collaboration with regional councils, the NHE implements a rural housing development programme and undertakes housing development projects in urban centres of Namibia (NHE Act, 1993). The NHE strives to promote home-ownership by being a customer-driven institution that provides housing solutions to alleviate the national housing need. NHE core business is providing housing needs to low and middle-income inhabitants of Namibia and financing of housing for such inhabitants. The NHE lends to borrowers whose monthly income is above N\$ 1,700. The scheme is predominantly for Government employees

who earn less than N\$ 20,000 per month. The maximum loan amount is N\$ 500,000 to acquire a fully constructed house by the NHE (Mushendami, P., and Kandume, K., (2008).

2.4.4 The Shack Dwellers' Federation of Namibia (SDFN)

The SDFN is a community-based saving organisation consisting of a network of 605 saving schemes with 20400 members throughout the country. Community savings is used to secure land, and to leverage additional government contributions, enabling the groups to build over 3488 houses and secured land for roughly 6230 families (SDFN 2017). The organisation assists its members to obtain land and infrastructure for housing purposes from the local authorities by providing loans in a range of N\$ 8, 000 to N\$ 26, 000. The loans are repayable within a period of 11 years at an interest rate of 0.5 per cent per month.

A review of various relevant materials indicates that all the above entities (public, private and community) experience a similar challenge which is limited financial resources to build low cost houses, lack of serviced land and institutional capacity to manage and implement related programme. It is for this reason that the unavailability of serviced land is considered one of the biggest challenge to housing delivery in Namibia (supply issue) and as such, the Mass Housing Development Programme was a viable solution.

2.4.5 The Housing Financing Institutions

There are four types of commercial banks providing housing finance in Namibia; First National Bank of Namibia, Standard Bank of Namibia, Nedbank, and Bank Windhoek. These banking institutions typically lend to the affluent market, clients with monthly earnings of Namibian Dollar (N\$) 6,500 and above (Mushendami, P., and Kandume, K., 2008).

2.5 The Namibian Government's Initiatives on Housing Provision

The following are some of the past and ongoing housing provision initiatives by the Government of the Republic of Namibia, implemented through various entities highlighted above. They are:

2.5.1 The Build Together Programme

The Build Together Programme was the first housing initiative introduced by Government through the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development in 1992. The programme was aimed at providing shelter to low and ultra-low-income earners in the country. In 1998, the project was decentralised to the regional councils and local authorities (The Namibian Newspaper 2013). The programme provided home loans to people whose monthly incomes are less than N\$ 3 000 or less with the construction of houses and with the upgrading of services, community facilities, and purchasing of construction materials (Herbert, J., 2016). The programme also assists people in the middle-income category who have no access to credit from financial institutions or who are considered credit risky. The maximum loan amount was N\$ 40 000, and the interest rate varies from four to seven percent over 20 years. Through this programme, a total of 9,609 houses were constructed nation-wide leaving a total of about 17,329 people benefitted in 2013, Herbert, J., (2016).

The programme experienced several challenges which hampered its progress. These includes; lack of affordable serviced plots; poor administration and corruption, payment capacity; poor understanding and commitment; and high number of beneficiaries; lack of technical staff; and slow progress, prohibitive cost, and low quality of house construction as well as cumbersome and outdated planning. Hence the programme was not able to make a dent on the housing issue and for this reason, the Government had initiated its review. The result was an introduction of the Mass Housing Programme.

2.5.2 The Targeted Intervention Programme for Employment and Economic Growth (TIPEEG)

As stated in introduction chapter of this paper, in 2011, the Government of the Republic of Namibia introduced the Targeted Intervention Programme for Employment and Economic Growth (TIPEEG), a second mass volume deliberate initiative by government to address the housing challenge. This Programme was aimed at creating about 104 000 direct and indirect jobs between 2011 and 2014. It was allocated a total budget of N\$ 9, 1 billion (NPC 2011). The main purpose of TIPEEG was to effectively reduce the high unemployment rate in Namibia mainly through expediting implementation of Government programmes and projects with the potential to create substantial numbers of direct and indirect job opportunities for the unskilled youth population of the Namibian society. In specific terms, TIPEEG aimed to create 100,000 jobs by 2014 mainly through spending on public works and infrastructure. The programme had five priority sectors one of which was on housing and sanitation N\$ 1,8 billion for 35076 jobs (TIPEEG 2011). As stated earlier TIPEEG did not achieve the intended results.

2.5.3 The Mass Housing Programme

Realising that none of the above two initiatives delivered the desired results, in 2013, the then President of the Republic of Namibia launched an ambitious housing delivery programme called the Mass Housing Programme. The project was divided into two pilot phases. Phase one, was planned to run for two years, targeting all the 14 regional capitals in the country at an estimated cost of N\$ 2.7 billion. About 9,000 housing units are expected to be built while 10,200 plots are expected to be serviced between February 2014 and August 2015(NHE 2017). The programme consists of seven sub-programmes:

- i. Land use planning, design, and service infrastructure sub-programme
- ii. Construction and delivery of credit-linked housing sub-programme
- iii. Informal settlements upgrading sub-program
- iv. Social/subsidy housing sub-program
- v. People Housing Processes (Community Self-Help Housing) subprogram

- vi. Rural Housing and sanitation sub-program
- vii. Strengthening the legislative, regulatory and policy environment and capacity building sub-program ((MURD 2013)

The Programme's Blue Print clearly states how to achieve the affordability aspect, through the adoption of a housing price and production management and control model that sets thresholds within which all contractors and professional service providers will set their costs with the aim of making house prices affordable (MURD 2013). To achieve this, first, the implementing agency of the programme (the NHE), was to establish a formal partnership with a national Roads Contracting Company; secondly, to utilize cost-effective alternative building methods, materials, and technologies; and the third model was that Government will subsidise a selected group of people in the low-income group who are unable to qualify for credit facilities rendered by the financial service sector. The fourth model was through expansion or increase of housing stock which will lead into the reduction of market prices for houses. In addition, a report by DfiD (2015) states implementation difficulties, labour exploitation, mismanagement and corruption and higher prices as indication of the programme's poor performance. There are no official statistics of the total houses built so far but as stated earlier, at the time the programme's mandate was revoked from the executing agency, the total houses constructed were 1 468 of which, only 221 were handed over to identified beneficiaries (Jonas, M., 2015).

2.5.4 The Mass Urban Land Servicing Programme (MULSP)

Following the agreement between the Government and the Affirmative Relocation Activists, in 2015, this project was announced. A technical committee consisting of ministers, Mayors, and CEOs of local authorities under the leadership of the Minister of Urban and Rural Development was established to guide and steer the implementation of MULSP. Three towns have been selected for the pilot phase of the project, which include Oshakati, Windhoek, and Walvis bay (MURD, 2017). However, earlier this year, the AR Activists issued the Government with a notice of withdrawal from the project due to slow progress and commitment to implement from the Government. To date, it is not clear if any plots were allocated to the youth for housing

construction under this programme. The activists dubbed the project as “lip service” by the Government, a ploy to silence the youth activists.

CHAPTER 3

3. UNDERSTANDING HOUSING PROVISION IN AFRICA WITHIN PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES FRAMEWORK

3.1 Housing Challenge in African Cities

Groves, R., (2004), argues that all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) face formidable housing problems due to poorly developed housing institutions and markets, huge backlogs, and weak policy response. The housing provision challenge by these cities is worsened by other development challenges ranging from poverty, conflict, HIV/AIDS, malnutrition, and hunger and as such, the problem of providing adequate shelter should be seen within this context. In addition, Groves, R., (2004), highlighted the uniqueness of these cities challenges particularly due to their colonial histories, which to a large extent has influenced land ownership and allocation. This is particularly true of countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa, and Namibia who inherited a Roman-Dutch law which embodied capitalism, the notion of exclusive private property ownership and racial segregation implemented through spatial separation which has proved very difficult to reverse. Even after independence, many of these cities, particularly Namibia's efforts to redress such legacy through various policies remain a challenge. Groves, R.,(2004) further added that SSA countries' housing policies need to be seen within the context of urbanisation and the nature of urban development, in that, although their urbanisation maybe modest by global standards, due to limited urban base, these cities experience some of the highest urbanisation in the world.

A 2015 report by the Department of International Development (DfiD) titled “Urban Infrastructure in SSA...”, indicates that urbanisation in SSA cities is of concern as it outstrips cities' capacities to provide developable land, affordable housing, and access to services and basic infrastructure and calls for effective planning and appropriate regulations to manage the urbanisation process. The report recognises the need for a sound structure of institutions and capable individual institutions as prerequisites for successful infrastructure provision and

Government's significant role as the authority responsible for such provision in partnership with other national stakeholders. Further, the role by parastatals in providing urban infrastructure has been recognised along their challenges regarding limited finances. It is reported that majority of these parastatals in SSA have a high Debt: Equity ratio, and that this is not the most appropriate institutional arrangement to fund such services, DfiD, (2015).

Furthermore, according to DFID, 2015, housing policies in SSA tend to follow a supply-driven approach contrary to what donor organisations such as the World Banks promote, a market-based approach to enabling policies i.e. strengthening institutions to oversee and manage the performance of the housing sector, regulating land, and housing development, developing property rights. The report further compared some housing initiatives adopted by countries such as Angola, Namibia, Ethiopia, and South Africa and shed light on some factors that inhibited their outcomes. In the case of Angola, using its National Urbanism and Housing Programme that was launched in 2008 to build around 1 million houses, the programme is reported to have only managed to deliver about 70 000 housing units. The programme experienced problems ranging from basic service provision, maintenance of the building transport to areas of employment etc. For Namibia's Mass Housing Programme, the report noted, implementation difficulties coupled with mismanagement, corruption, and prices above the range that the target beneficiaries could afford, as contributing factors to its poor performance. In the case of Ethiopia's Integrated Housing Development Programme which was launched in 2005 to build about 400 000 units, and managed only to build about 171 000 units, challenges highlighted includes affordability of the units by low-income earners, distance to employment opportunities which placed financial strain on beneficiaries, DfiD, (2015).

The key point illustrated in this report is that, a supply driven approach to housing delivery (large scale through big projects with ambitious delivery targets) leads to houses that target beneficiaries cannot afford and are too expensive for the cities to provide.

This situation is not unique to SSA countries only, according to Olayimola, L., Adeleye, O., and Ogunshakin, L., (2005), Nigeria experience the same challenge in that, not only does the Government faces financial constraints which affect its performance level, the houses built were usually very expensive which put them beyond the reach of the low-income group, neither did

they meet the requirements of the people. In addition, Olayimo, L., et al (2005) argues that the Nigerian government housing projects were embarked upon without effective programme of action and appropriate institutional arrangement for their execution, which manifest in failure of such programme. Corruption and lack of accountability, inefficiency and ineffective administration machinery in Nigeria were also pointed out as some of the problems believed to have contributed to housing programme failure, according to the above- mentioned authors. It is thus not surprising that this literature review reveals that the new trend to housing development encourages governments to shift away from direct house construction and rather focus on creating an enabling environment for the housing sector development.

Bruce, K., et al, (2003), argues that although the production is a necessary component of affordable housing policy, the lack of income remains the principal barrier to successful programme delivery. This was further validated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) cited by Bruce, K., et al, that annual analysis found that 80 percent of the problem is not housing inadequacy or overcrowding, but affordability and as such, advocated for policies that could aid people to increase their incomes to lessen the hardship.

3.2 Understanding Governance, leadership, Accountability, and their Roles in Effective Public Programme Management

3.2.1 Leadership

This research paper aims at demonstrating the role of governance in effective programme management. The following theoretical framework is helpful in identification and understanding of possible contributing factors to the poor outcome of Government's initiatives and in this case, the MHDP, from the governance and oversight perspective.

Fadel, M., (2014) further cited Crosby and Bryson in Morse (2007)'s definition of effective public leadership as a type of leadership that evokes collaboration and concerted action among diverse and often competing groups for the public good where challenges are complex, stakeholders are many, values are conflicting, and resources are limited, is vital for effective implementation. Fadel, M., (2014) added that public leadership and public governance are pillars

of and preconditions for public policy implementation and the application of implementation competencies foster effective public leadership and good public governance that result into successful implementation of public policies and sustainable development. Fadel, M., (2014) argues that governing in the absence of effective leadership is challenging and negatively affects achievement of the desired development goals. Leadership challenges and poor governance coupled with implementation competencies in the processes of public policy implementation has been identified as among the most contributing factors to persistent failure in public policy implementation and development irrespective of the good administrative/management practices that maybe adopted (Fadel, M., (2014). According to Hunter and Marks (2002) cited by Fadel, M., (2014), many public policy failures are compounded with poor governance and leadership challenges.

3.2.2 Governance

Andrews, M., (2014) and Fukuyama, F., (2013) both argued that there is little clarity on the concept of governance, hence many definitions for it exists, and that is due to the relative newness of the concept. Andrews, M., (2014) deduce clarity on governance from thinking of it in the nation state as 'the exercise of civic authority by governments to influence outcomes of broad civic interest'. Andrews' definition borrows from that on corporate governance which Tirole, J., (2001) defines as the design of institutions that induce or force management to internalise the welfare of stakeholders. Governance in this context is therefore defined as process by which specific agents exercise delegated authority to affect the welfare i.e. solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities, of the principals allocating the authority, the principals being the citizens (Andrews, M., (2014). The definition by Kooiman, J., (2003) further amplifies this notion in the context of political and public administration, characterising governing as interaction in which public and private actors participate with the aim of solving societal problems.

Andrews, M., (2014) argued that although exercising of delegated authority by government to garner and allocate resources, built capacities, regulate behaviour via law or force, convene and coordinate private and non-profit agent, could foster incentives for effective service

delivery in government and accountability and responsiveness in public institutions. This is not sufficient in assessing the quality of governance as they are simply processes or mechanisms put in place and in no way, indicates whether governance is good or bad. Instead, Andrews asserted that governance functionality (*end*) must lead to thinking about governance forms (*means*) and not the other way around. In a nutshell, how well government have produced, facilitated, and otherwise influenced outcomes that enhances civic welfare as well as how well processes through which authority is exercised generates the outcomes that enhance civic welfare is what Andrews, M (2014) advocates that the quality of governance be assessed on.

Furthermore, Fukuyama, F., (2013) views on governance resonates those of Andrews, M., (2014), although with some reservation. He argued that there is significant literature focusing on public reform coming out of institutional economics, public administration, and from the communities of practice surrounding development agencies seeking to improve governance. This approach, Fukuyama, F., (2013) argument sought to conceptualise governance in a principal-agent framework, aimed to control corruption and bad administration through manipulation of incentives. However, Fukuyama, F., (2013) argued that focusing on the procedural definition of governance may not actually correlate with the positive outcomes expected from government and public administrators. Good procedures and strong capacity are not ends in themselves, government ought to do things like provide quality schooling and public health, public security which requires alternative measures of governance quality, a measure of final output. Still, as attractive as output measures sound, there are drawbacks in that approach according to Fukuyama, F., (2013), for instance that, outcome measures cannot easily be divorced from procedural and normative measures.

In the context of this paper, the author does agree with Andrews's view point on governance as it emphasises a focus on an *end* i.e. the outcome and not just *means* or *processes*. At the same time, and for this paper, the *means* are equally important to simply understand their influence in the programme outcomes of the case study being analysed, especially because in Namibia, empirical evidence points to issues around application and or enforcement of *means*. Hence, Fukuyama's view point on measuring governance resonates in that outcome measures cannot easily be divorced from procedural and normative measures and that the absence of any

of the two has damaging effects. Fukuyama, F., (2013) define governance as government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services.

Still on governance, Van der Waldt, G, (2008) argues that governance is that structure that binds all organisations and that some organisations that have relatively mature project applications and methodologies in place, governance structures are established on a more permanent basis. Van der Waldt acknowledged a trend towards the importance of governance by oversight entities such as project offices and sound accountability practises, emphasising accountability. The word governance as defined by the Oxford Dictionary cited by Van der Waldt, (2008) refers to "the act, manner or function of governing". The concept is further defined as "regulating the proceedings of an entity" and has various application in both public and private sector settings. It can be used in different context such as corporate governance, international governance, national governance, and local governance. In a private sector setting corporate governance refers to and includes mechanisms such as a board of directors. Since governance relates to accountabilities and responsibilities of management, it is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented. In simple terms, it thus refers to the rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which decision-making powers are exercised (Newman, J., 2001) cited by Van der Waldt (2008).

At a national level, governance is defined as the interaction between a government and its citizens according to Van der Waldt (2008) citing Pollitt, C., and Bouckaet, G., (2003), Ingraham, W., and Lynn, E., (2003) and Wamsley, G., and Wolf, J., (1996), as processes and institutions through which the function of governing is carried out.

Hobday, M., (2000) on the other hand, defines institutional or departmental governance function as the provision of strategic leadership, oversight, and accountability while ensuring that an organisation has clearly articulated their vision and mission which enhances the organisation's public image. Lewis, P., (2003) elaborated on organisational governance that it describes how an organisation is directed and controlled referring to structures, grouping and coordinating mechanism established within that organisation in partnership with external bodies to manage or oversee the entity's programme. In addition, roles and responsibilities, the scope of power and authority to be exercised by management, as well as policy frameworks and boundaries established for decision making, Lewis, P., (2003). Vann der Waldt, (2008) asserted

that effective governance is crucial for the growth, sustainability, and credibility of an organisation and that to be successful, organisation should have a clear understanding of roles and authority of various levels of management.

Bevir, M., (2011) argues that governance is about establishing the conditions of a relationship between two or more contracting parties, (principal - agent relationship) and that the outcome of the contracting relationship will be depended on the governance framework and rules as well as the mutual intent towards the functioning of the relationship. It is about steering and not managing or supervising. Bevir, M., (2011) defined corporate governance as concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. Further, it encourages the efficient use of resources and equally requires accountability of the stewardship of those resource. The aim is to align as nearly as possible, the interest of individuals, corporation, and society according to Sir Cadbury (Heritage Institute, 2000) cited by Bevir, M., (2011).

3.2.3 Programme Management

The term programme and project management has quite often been used interchangeably. Some project management practitioner and academic communities view programme management as part of, or an extension of, project management, Pellegrineli, S, (2011). According to P2M, 2008 as cited by Pellegrineli, S, (2011), there is a thin line between features attributed to both terms, for instance, a very large project is sometimes explicitly conceived of as a programme form in the sense that managing a mega-project has much in common with managing a programme. Pellegrineli, S (2011) therefore defined programme management as a mechanism for coordinating and directing related projects. Further, the American Project Management Institute Body of Knowledge, (2008) refers to programme management as a group of related projects managed in a coordinated way to obtain benefits and control not available from managing them individually. The UK Association for Project Management Body of Knowledge went further on that definition, referring to programmes as the coordinated management of related projects, which may include related business as usual activities that together achieve a beneficial change of a strategic nature for an organisation (APM, 2006,). Pellegrineli, S., (2011) argues that while with project management the focus tends to be on

outputs and deliverables, programme management is about outcomes or desired goal as the difference between the two concepts.

Project management is about planning and organizing resources towards the completion of an event, a task, or a duty. This is often done for projects that are essentially one-offs, and the resources that are used to complete such a project consist of both finances and people. Project oversight, on the other hand is the watchdog that makes sure a project gets done according to plan, and following the timeframe, budget, and steps needed for it to be done, Axiom Technology Group (2015). The importance of these two concepts lies in the fact that while project management involves the creation of lists, processes, budget allocations, and other project components that the company deems is required to implement the project. It is a continuous process during the life cycle of the project and should overlaps with project oversight along the way right after a project has begun. According to Axiom Technology Group (2015), the latter is considered as the checker of the processes and progress of such a project. The use of this in a project is to not only to keep things in line and the project moving forward as smoothly as possible, but also as trouble-shooter and adjuster of certain processes that could be improved along the way.

Riphagen, D., (2009) asserted that programme oversight is about good governance and that governance sets the stage for a successful programme or project. In addition, Riphagen, D., (2009), differentiated roles and responsibilities in programme management and implementation. For example, the role and responsibility of a project or programme Sponsor includes setting the programme's vision and objectives, appointing a Steering Committee or in the case of state-owned enterprises, a Board of Directors, provides oversight and governance and monitors its execution to ensure its success or positive outcomes. On the other hand, the Programme Manager's role is to execute the programme and set its scope, schedule, and related budget. In addition, the role and responsibilities of a Steering Committee or Board of Directors assist the Sponsor with his or her duty in providing programme governance. This includes providing high level business and technical guidance to the Programme Manager to ensure that the programme delivers positive results. A key ingredient highlighted for programme management is an effective

relationship between these three role players. Riphagen, D., (2009) further reiterated the importance of continuous monitoring and control in that it helps prevent surprises in programme outcomes and ensure timely intervention.

3.3 Enhancing Housing Programmes Performance and Service Delivery

Bruce, K., et al (2003) argued that even the best housing strategy will fail to accomplish its goals if it is not effectively implemented. The authors gave examples of well-intentioned housing programs in countries such as the United States that produced poor outcomes because of poor administration. The authors further cautioned policymakers to critically assess the implementing organizations' operational capacity and ability before launching new programs regarding whether they possess the right skills and experience needed to fulfil their new responsibilities effectively, sufficient staff and resources, as well as whether the program is designed to provide incentives for effective administrative performance.

Successful execution of any programme requires clear accountability and performance tracking throughout the process. A McKinsey article argued that though its challenging managing performance in public sector as opposed to the private sector, organisations that make performance management a priority has had improvements in their performance, enhancing their ability to deliver their public service objectives (McKinsey & Company, 2010). A report by McKinsey Global Institute argues that global affordable housing delivery is held back by similar issues; including a lack of empowered leaders, competing priorities, an absence of effective delivery mechanisms, minimal pressure to perform, large capability gaps, and limited collaboration with external stakeholders, Jonathan, W., Sangeeth, R., Jan, M., Nicklas, G., and Shirish, S., (2014). The authors further reiterate that effective performance management should characterize the program throughout its life cycle which entails a clear outline of key milestones, steps to be taken to reduce risks, as well as addressing likely constraints. This should further include proper monitoring as well as clear accountability mechanisms to allow the programmes room to adapt to foreseen challenges. The performance of the housing authority or government entities have bearing on housing programs outcomes. Jonathan, W., et al., (2014) argues that Governments can help speed up the delivery of affordable housing by addressing bottlenecks

caused by inefficient administration processes, setting goals and tracking performance. The authors further suggest that a governance model that incorporate a broad range of stakeholders and engage consumers at multiple points, is key if social housing programmes are to meet the needs of the target beneficiaries, Jonathan, W., et al., (2014).

The report further recognises the challenge within which many local governments are operating in to deliver key public services relating to weak institutional and governance structures. Transparent and accountable local governments. This results in a situation where some agencies or service providers become prone to corruption and misappropriation of funds. The consequence of this is poor programme outcomes and quality of services, which erodes public trust in the accountability and merits of government. Good governance is enforced through accountability. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), (1996) defines accountability as a process that involves the development of objective standards to enable the ultimate owners of an organisation to assess their performance of the duties that have been allocated to individuals and units within the organisation. It has three important components, a clear definition of responsibility of each actor or entity; reporting mechanisms and system reviews; and it rewards for good performance and sanctions against non-performance, UNECA, (1996). Accountability can involve external bodies, for instance where control is exercised between a principal, like a government department or ministry, and an agent or state-owned enterprise UNECA, (1996).

3.4 Conclusion

To conclude, Seong-Youn Choi, Hyunsun, C., & Woo-Suh, P., (2009) argues that when governance is applied to housing, especially affordable housing, the negotiation by multiple stakeholders is the key element for improved policy outcomes and agreed governance principles and that for such to be sustainable, they must be made operational and evaluated by multiple stakeholders on a regular basis. Leadership and good governance as well as robust implementation competencies has a positive impact on public policy implementation and attainment of policy initiative outcomes.

CHAPTER 4

4. RESEARCH DESIGN, APPROACH, AND METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter lays out the research design, methodology and approach used as part of the data collection process. This includes in-depth interviews, document and literature reviews and analysis, as sources for data gathered. The chapter further details how the data collected was analysed, how the issue of validity and the reliability was ensured, as well as key ethical issues. The issue of target population and sampling method used for this research paper is also discussed herein.

4.2 Research Design and Approach

This research paper, follows a qualitative method, utilising a case study approach to allow detail understanding from a practical point of view, onto the role of governance in ensuring effective programme management, the MHDP. Neuman, L., (2006) defines a case study as a detailed analysis, investigation or exploration of a social phenomenon bounded by time, activity, and space. A combination of both the primary and secondary data sources were employed. Heber-Biber, N., and Leavy, P., (2006) as quoted by Mbunge, T., (2015) states that a qualitative method is aimed at gaining complex knowledge directly from people with certain attributes or life experiences while Gerring, J., (2007) argues that a qualitative approach is often associated with case studies as a result it is relevant for this research. The researcher believes this approach aided in getting a thorough contextual narrative in describing the situation around the programme by getting insights from the key informants who were directly involved in the programme's implementation.

This included one on one in-depth interviews with informants on the performance of the MHDP's governance structure – described in section 4.3. The secondary data analysis included a review of the policy frameworks regulating the housing sector; including national housing

programs; project related documents and reports as well as related articles by various sources including media; and an analysis of performance of the MHDP's.

4.3 SAMPLING

4.3.1 Target Population

The sample was drawn from the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development, the Namibia Housing Enterprise (current and former senior employees), representatives of the NHE's Board of Directors (current and former) as well a representative from the Cabinet committee that was tasked with overseeing the programme's implementation. The researcher aimed to get data from people who have been or are part of the strategic decision making or members of the governance structure for the implementation of the Mass Housing Development Programme.

4.3.2 Sampling Method

The paper used a purposive sampling method as informants were chosen based on their involvement in the programme's implementation. According to Denscombe, M., (2010) purposive sampling operates on the principle that information is obtained by focusing on a relatively small number of instances deliberately selected based on their known attributes. Purposive sampling works where the researcher already knows something about the specific people because they are seen to give the most valuable data, Denscombe, M., (2010).

4.3.3 Sample Size

The sample (consisting of nine informants) size is structured as follows:

- a senior representative of the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development
- a senior representative of the current NHE's Board of Directors
- Two representatives of the previous NHE's Board of Directors (senior board members)
- Two former senior managers of the NHE
- Two current senior managers of the NHE

- A representative of the Cabinet Committee

The above informants were chosen based on their direct involvement in the programme implementation and strategic positions they held, which implies a high-level decision-making power. It should be noted that the tenure for the Board of Directors that was providing governance over the NHE and the time it was mandated to implement the MHDP has ended in July 2016. However, since the company is still working with MURD to complete unfinished activities of the programme, albeit not having that mandate any longer, the researcher interviewed two (2) representatives from the company to get their perspectives.

As far as getting informants from the MURD is concerned, the Accounting Officer only provided consent for interviewing with one informant only, due to the sensitivity of the programme. Although the interviewer had initially planned to interview other relevant stakeholders in the country such as the Namibia's Shack Dweller Association who are involved in general housing provision in the country, due to time constraints, the interviews could not take place. This does not necessarily have any implication on the quality or validity of data gathered as attempts were made to make sure that the right people (who were directly involved in the implementation of programme) were identified and the findings in Chapter five reveals that stakeholders such as Namibia's Shack Dweller Association was not part of the implementation process.

4.4 Data Collection

Data has been collected using a combination of secondary and primary sources.

4.4.1 Primary Data

To collect data, face-to-face interviews were held with the identified key informants who have been involved in the implementation of the programme (within the MURD, NHE – the technical staff, members of the Board of Directors, constituting the governance structure of the Mass Housing Development Programme. The semi-structured interviews allowed the

participants to speak more openly and widely on issues probed by the researcher (Denscombe, M., 2011). Not all questions were designed and phrased ahead of time. Some questions were created during the interviews, to allow both the interviewer and the person being interviewed the flexibility to probe for details or discuss issues. Jolley and Mitchel, (2001) commended qualitative research's ability to get to the bottom of the subject by probing and follow up questions that the researcher may pose during interviewing.

4.4.2 Secondary data sources

In addition to the primary data sources, a comprehensive review of relevant housing policy documents including the Blue Print on MHDP as well as related articles and papers has been undertaken. The researcher also made use of projects' progress reports from both the NHE and MURD. According to Cohen, L., Manion, L., and Morrison, K., (2005) Secondary data is data collected by someone other than the user. Common sources of secondary data for social science include censuses, surveys, organizational records, and data collected through qualitative methodologies or qualitative research. Secondary data analysis saves time that would otherwise be spent collecting data and, particularly in the case of quantitative data, provides larger and higher quality databases that would be unfeasible for any individual researcher to collect on their own. Secondary data is essential especially in capturing past changes and or developments.

4.5 Data Analysis

Information collected via the above-mentioned methods (interviews and secondary data sources) have been analysed through logical analysis. According to Bishop L., (2007), logical analysis is an outline of generalized causation, logical reasoning process that makes use of flow charts, diagrams, descriptions, and pictorials to represent findings. The data collected through both methods was analysed to inform arguments on the role of governance and oversight over the performance of the MHDP.

4.6 Validity

Van der Wal, E., (2004), explain validity as aiming to understand how well an instrument has been in measuring the matter it intended to measure while reliability looks at the accuracy and consistency that a measuring instrument has been in dealing with the subject at hand. According to Denscombe, M., (2010), the issue of validity is more a credibility issues to demonstrate that data collected is accurate and appropriate. To address the accuracy and the appropriateness of data, the researcher triangulated data by using data from the interviews and from all informants. Furthermore, to enhances the validity for the data collection methods, the researcher ensured that feedback given during interviews was well constructed to give less room for ambiguity. The researcher further recorded, upon consent from informants, the interview conversations. This has been achieved through proper and thorough planning of the interviews and questionnaires, which the researcher had rehearsed and cross-checked before the conduction. Punch, K., (2009) also points out that the issue on validity of interview response and questionnaires can be ‘countered by careful design, planning and training’.

4.7 Ethical Issues

Before the interviews were conducted, the researcher formally sought the permission of the informants to participate in interviews. Cohen, et al., (2005) argues that although researchers know who has provided the information or are able to identify participants from the information given, they will in no way make the connection known publicly; hence the boundaries surrounding the shared secret will be protected.

Below is a brief description of how some key ethical issues relevant to the context of this research will be handled:

- Information given to participants: The informants were given background information and the main aim of conducting the interview.
- Participants right of withdrawal: The researchers asked for permission from top management of the two institutions to allow where necessary, their staffs to take part in the research.

- Informed consent: The researchers asked for permission from top management of the two institutions to allow where necessary, their staffs to take part in the research.
- Anonymity: Informants' names will not be used in the research paper. (names of participants are withheld).
- Data collection and storage: Prior to the interview, informants were asked for their permission to allow the interview to be noted down by the researcher.
- Feedback to informants on final research paper: Informants, (especially, Permanent Secretary of MURD) will be given a copy of the final paper should they wish to have one.

CHAPTER 5

5. RESULTS PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

This section presents, and analyses data collected through face to face interviews with identified informants on this research project. The researcher employed a combination of semi structured and in-depth interviews where a set of open-ended questions were developed and used during the one-on-one interviews with informants. This approach enabled the researcher to engage informants systematically and in an open-ended atmosphere on a subject or case study that is considered sensitive and complex. The researcher recorded all interviews using a mobile phone, and in addition took notes, which were transcribed and studied for understanding and narrative formulation. To analyse the data, the researcher adopted a thematic content and narrative analysis which helped in identifying broad themes based on commonality among issues discussed and deduce meaning of such. The researcher developed a narrative with information given by the informants and at the same time cross checked the information for similar positions, divergences, or differences in terms of what is believed to have happened during the programme implementation, i.e. the Mass Housing Development Programme.

5.2 Description of informants in the study

The interviews were conducted during the period of January 9 – 19, 2018. A total of nine people was interviewed. The interviewees sample was drawn from institutions that constituted the governance structure of the Mass Housing Development Programme staffs (current and former) from the National Housing Enterprise, the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development and Board Members (former and current) of the NHE. Respondents participated willingly and freely, answering all questions to their fullest extent whenever possible. All informants gave full consent to the researcher to record the discussions.

The following is a description of all informants. In order to ensure the informants' confidentiality, their names are withheld and as such referred to using numerical values as follows, informant 1, 2, 3...9 for identification purpose.

- Informant 1: a representative of the Urban and Rural Development
- Informant 2: a senior manager from the NHE.
- Informant 3: a senior manager from NHE (former).
- Informant 4: a senior manager from the NHE (currently employed)
- Informant 5: senior manager from the NHE (former).
- Informant 6: a senior NHE's Board Member (former).
- Informant 7: a senior member of the NHE's Board of Directors (former).
- Informant 8: a senior member of the Cabinet/Ministerial
- Informant 9: a senior NHE Board member (current).

5.3 Data presentation and analysis process

The primary objective of this thesis was to analyse the role of governance on effective programme management particularly using the Mass Housing Development Programme. The research paper sought answers to the following major questions:

- i. What was the Governance structure for the Mass Housing Development Programme?
- ii. To what extent did the Governance structure provide the required strategic leadership, oversight, and ensured accountability by all responsible parties involved in the programme's implementation?
- iii. What was the level of political commitment towards the MHDP?
- iv. Was the Programme Management Structure, functional and effective?
- v. What instruments were put in place to ensure accountability by all identified stakeholders?
- vi. Was there an M&E mechanism at both levels (NHE (technical) and MURD policy management)?
- vii. Were there sufficient institutional (both NHE and MURD) capacities (qualified and experienced staff and financial resources availed) to deliver the programme?

viii. Was there performance management system in place for the staff involved?

Asking these questions was necessary for the researcher to obtain an overall understanding on some of the factors that have contributed to the poor performance of the Mass Housing Development Programme. As stated in Chapter 4 (methodology) the informants were chosen purposively due to their involvement (in different capacities) in the implementation or knowledge about the programme. However, to validate that, the researcher asked all respondents to state whether they were familiar with the Mass Housing Development Programme and specific roles in the programme's formulation and or implementation. The interview questions were structured around four categories. The first set of questions were assessing the informant's understanding of the concept of governance; followed by a category of questions about the informant's familiarity with the Mass Housing Development Programme. Category three questions sought clarity on the governance structure, its role and functionality as well as the relationship between or among members of the structure. The last set of questions (category) looked at the implementation modalities of the Mass Housing Development the second last and last category of questions helped the researcher to zoom into some of the implementation challenges experienced during the implementation process. The following is a presentation and analysis of the data gathered.

5.3.1 Understanding of the concept Governance

To begin the interview, the interviewer asked all respondents to demonstrate their understanding of the concepts of governance and oversight within the public policy and programme management framework. This was necessary to make sure that the respondents shared the same understanding of the topic and speak within the same context relevant to the research topic. All nine informants demonstrated a clear understanding of the concept of governance within the context of the research subject.

5.3.2 Familiarity with the Mass Housing Development Programme.

Informants were asked to state whether they are familiar with the Mass Housing Development Programme. This paper is based on a case study and the data gathered provides a narrative of the actual events or situation regarding the programme implementation. As such, it was important to make sure that the informants have actual knowledge about the programme based on their experiences or involvement in its implementation. The table below summarises the informants' responses.

Table 3: Familiarity with the Mass Housing Development Programme

Informant	Answer (yes or no)	Explanation of involvement
Informant 1	<i>Yes, I am familiar with the Mass Housing Development Programme</i>	<i>I was involved in drafting of the MHDP Blue Print and have been involved in its implementation</i>
Informant 2	<i>Yes, I am very familiar with the Mass Housing Development Programme.</i>	<i>I was part and parcel of its formulation process working for an employer who was the executing agency. The programme is a brainchild of the Former President of Namibia (H.E Hifikepunye Pohamba) he dreamt of creating a legacy on housing for Namibian people. At its inception, the housing backlog was recorded at 100 000 units and the President wanted to address that.</i>
Informant 3	<i>Yes, I am familiar with the Mass Housing Development Programme.</i>	<i>I was involved in its implantation. My boss was involved in the drafting of its Blue Print. The NHE was appointed as its executing agency, initially for</i>

		<i>everything including land servicing and houses constructions.</i>
Informant 4	<i>Yes, I am familiar with the Mass Housing Development Programme.</i>	<i>I was not part of the formulation process but was part of the stakeholders who were consulted. That time I was working at one of the Local Authorities.</i>
Informant 5	<i>Yes.</i>	<i>I was instrumental in the birth of the Mass Housing Development Programme. I was instructed to put together a committee to drive the drafting of the programme's Blue Print.</i>
Informant 6	<i>Yes, I am, to some extent.</i>	<i>The Blue Print was drafted by the NHE's CEO.</i>
Informant 7	<i>Yes, I am very familiar with the Mass Housing Development Programme.</i>	<i>I was involved, in fact, from its conception. The programme is coming from a paper done by the Bank of Namibia in 2011 which looked at housing challenge in Namibia. The paper then highlighted some recommendations on how to address such. The President of the country then, saw this as a policy matter that needed to be addressed and hence the Mass Housing Programme was introduced.</i>

Informant 8	<i>Yes, I am familiar with the programme.</i>	<i>The understanding is just that, through our National Development Plans (NDPs), we always identify some priorities. I think housing through all NDPs has always been a priority linked to sanitation. There have been acute needs for housing in the country. The former President, Hifikepunye Pohamba was then saying that, if housing is a problem but we do not seem to be finding a right solution or not implementing the set programmes, let us look at what we can drive through NDP 4 to be translated into results. “I will drive that programme myself, to get a momentum.” This is how the programme came up.</i>
Informant 9	<i>I am familiar with the Mass Housing Development programme as a Namibian citizen.</i>	<i>When I was appointed as a member of the NHE’s Board of Directors, its mandate of implementing that programme was already revoked.</i>

As can be seen in the above table, all nine informants interviewed responded affirmatively to being familiar with the Mass Housing Development Programme, albeit in different capacities. Respondents were either directly involved in its development, formulation and its implementation, or as an employee of an institution that had a stake in the implementation of the program.

The researcher also sought clarity on the involvement of stakeholders in the Mass Housing Development Programme’s conceptualisation and implementation. Five of the nine

informants indicated that the initial consultations during the formulation of the Mass Housing Development Programme mainly involved central government institutions, among others. This included: the Office of the President, the Ministry of Finance, the National Planning Commission, Bank of Namibia, Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Attorney General, Ministry of Works and Transport, the Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development (know called the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development), as well as the Local Authorities and Regional Councils. One informant indicated that consultations were done with other stakeholders outside of central government and these included: representative of Non-Governmental Organisations and Civil Society, such as the Build Together Programme and the Namibia's Shack Dwellers Association. On the other hand, another informant was not sure if these Civil Society Organisations were consulted. The remaining two informants could not say who was involved in the consultations as stakeholders.

Stakeholders involvement in a programme of this nature is key, particularly when it comes to identifying the target beneficiaries including their needs and affordability capacity/purchasing power. One informant explained the reason for not extending the consultation to other external stakeholders beyond government was because the government had all the information it needed in terms of what needed to be done. The informant asserted that: *"They [government] were clear on the main challenges. When we did the paper on housing challenges in 2011², we had extensive discussions with local authorities"*. The State Service Commission of New Zealand (1999) warns that policy development can be out of touch with actual conditions in the community and encourages Governments or policy makers to embrace consulting community to get on the ground information before embarking on implementation.

It appears that the planning and development of the Mass Housing Development Programme was more driven from the central government, with little or no involvement of other stakeholders particularly the target beneficiaries. This resulted in a situation where houses were built in various towns but were unoccupied as the target beneficiaries could not afford them or some were not equipped with sewerage systems. This was echoed by Informant 1 who stated that the problem statement was broadly defined regarding identification of beneficiaries

² Bank of Namibia (2011) Housing in Namibia, Has the situation changed 21 years after independence?

including the financing needs. Furthermore, Informant 1 elaborated on some major problems that were experienced during the programme implementation due to lack of proper coordination, consultation, and communication such as unavailability of serviced land where houses were to be constructed, which in the Blue Print is a responsibility entrusted to the Local Authorities.


5.3.3 The Governance Structure

In order to assess the role of governance on effective programme management of the Mass Housing Development Programme, the researcher sought clarity on the governance structure, its role and functionality including the relationship between or among its members.

Van der Waldt, G, (2008) define programme governance as a mechanism that focuses on performance, results, and outcomes by establishing decision making structures, as well as accountability and responsibility mechanisms in public institutions to oversee projects or programme implementation. Oversight and management interfaces during the execution of the programme along with monitoring. This definition is applied in analysing how governance and oversight was exercised in the management of the MHDP.

Based on information gathered from the informants, the following hierarchical structure illustrates the governance that oversaw the implementation of the Mass Housing Development Programme.

Mass Housing Development Programme’s Governance Structure



At the top of the structure is the President of the country who is described as the champion of the Mass Housing Development Programme. The President’s drive was to address the housing crisis in the country while creating his own legacy of housing delivery to the Namibian people. This was explained by Informant 2 who said, “the Mass Housing Development Programme is a brainchild of the former President, H.E. Hifikepunye Pohamba, who dreamt of creating a legacy on housing delivery for the Namibian people”. This was further supported by Informant 8 who quoted the President saying, “I will drive that programme myself, to get a momentum”.

The second tier of the hierarchy is for the Ministerial Committee set up by the President to provide policy advice over the formulation and implementation of the Mass Housing

Development Programme. The membership of this committee according to the informants, consisted of: The Ministry of Urban and Rural Development (also the Committee's Chair), the Ministry of Finance, the National Planning Committee, and the Presidential Affairs. Informant 8 stated that the function of this committee was to make sure that the programme's Blue Print is implemented as envisaged and assess any problems that may come along the way. There was some divergent understanding on the committee's members as some informants (Informant 4) indicted that the President was the chair of the committee and not the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development as stated by others. Informant 9 did not comment on the governance structure claiming not to have been part of the implementation process. The Ministerial committee was described as the second ultimate decision maker in terms of programme implementation according to Informant 6.

The Ministerial Committee set up a third tier in the structure consisting of the Permanent Secretaries from the same ministries stated above. The Permanent Secretaries Committee provided technical advice to the Ministerial Committee. This committee was also chaired by the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development's Permanent Secretary. As with the membership of the Ministerial committee, there were stronger variations in the opinions of informants on this committee's membership. For example, Informant 6 claimed that the NHE was an ex officio member, who only attended some meetings upon invitations. Informant 8 on the other hand believed that the NHE was part of this committee and that if they were not attending the meetings as a member, this was never brought to the attention of the Ministerial committee. *"People have a tendency of complaining later when things failed when they had an opportunity to avoid such(sic),"* said Informant 8, who refused that this issue can be used as a contributing factor to why the governance structure did not function.

Informant 8 also mentioned the City of Windhoek (a local authority) and the Shack Dwellers Association as members of this committee, while Informant 1 highlighted that Local Authorities were not represented on the governance structure and as such, this had implications on ensuring availability of some of the requirements of the Blue Print i.e., the provision of serviced land, supposedly by the local authorities. Informant 5, who described himself as having been instrumental in drafting the programme's Blue Print and a senior manager of the executing agency at the time, described this technical committee as a "strange" structure developed by a

consultant, appointed as a Special Advisor or Programme Coordinator of the Minister of Urban and Rural Development. According to Informant 5, the Special Advisor was responsible for putting up a structure that was disconnected placing the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development in the driving seat from a technical point of view as opposed to providing guidance and oversight over programme implementation. Informant 5 cited that this is where things started going different from the plan. Informant 1 also had a different understanding which implied that the NHE (executing agency) was not part of this committee and that they reported directly to the Ministerial committee. It would appear, based on Informant 1's narration that, the NHE accounted through various reporting lines, sometimes through the Permanent Secretaries' committee, other times directly to the Ministerial committee or its Board of Directors.

The forth tier in the hierarchy representing the NHE which is an executing agency of the Mass Housing Development Programme as mandated by the Government through its line Ministry of Urban and Rural Development. Along the governance structure is the NHE's Board of Directors, appointed by the Minister of Urban and Rural Development to provide strategic guidance to the agency/entity to ensure good governance. This is a permanent governance structure and its functions go beyond a specific programme implemented by the agency (NHE).

The following section highlights how this structure functioned through exercising its power in overseeing the programme's implementation.

The functionality of the governance structure was assessed based on how it operated in carrying out its duty of overseeing the implementation of the programme as outlined in the Blue Print. In assessing this, the researcher sought information on the roles, responsibilities of various parties, the extent to which such roles were understood as well as the relationship between and among the members of the structure. The researcher further analysed the level of political commitment towards the programme and the possible effects it had on the implementation. The idea was to get data that demonstrates how the structure influenced the Mass Housing Development Programme's outcome.

Generally, based on the information gathered from the informants, the governance structure did not function effectively. There were divergent narratives by informants; including

the understanding of how the members of the structure were supposed to interrelate. Informant 1 (a representative of the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development) stated that the NHE would sometimes provide progress reports directly to the Ministerial Committee or together with its Board of Directors. The Ministerial Committee would refer the reports back to the Permanent Secretaries committee for verification or validation before it endorses such and the Permanent Secretaries' would seek clarity from the NHE, through the CEO. Informant 1 shared that the governance structure did not work well due to divergent expectations among and between members of the structures that were not well understand nor stated right from the onset before implementation commenced. According to Informant 1, there was a different understanding on what was to be done as articulated in the Blue Print. Informant 2 also indicated that the governance structure did not work well and that things were done in a hurry due to the election, such that there was little time availed to take care of contractual and management arrangements.

Informant 5 indicated that there was a confusion on how the programme was to be managed and a lack of policy cohesion among members of the ministerial committee and as such, members could not agree on a lot of issues including on the mandate given to the NHE to implement the programme. Informant 8 who represented the Ministerial Committee argued that this committee did not function well because the terms of reference tasked them to undertake functions that were not legally enforceable. For instance, while the Permanent Secretaries' Committee was expected to oversee the allocation of construction tenders, the NHE, as an executing agency, was mandated to undertake that function using its own tender rules and regulations. *"That was part of the weakness in the governance structure that hindered the committees from putting in place some necessary mechanisms for good governance."* So, the NHE as per the mandate given to it, took the government's directive to contract houses construction using its own rules. We then later realised that maybe this should have been looked at and make sure that the programme sponsor's[Government]," rules were applied in the implementation of the programme," said informant 8. This, according to Informant (8) pursued a different business model which was not in sync with the programme's intended outcome i.e. construction of low cost houses for ultra-low-income earners. According to Informant 6, the governance structure did not function well, because the committees were not meeting regularly. The Informant further expressed that whenever the committee met and needed progress reports, the NHE would invited at very short notices for this purpose. As informant 6 puts it, the CEO

was almost seen as if he was working full time for the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development, and that the Board of Directors' Chairperson only got invited to meetings occasionally, accompanying the CEO. *"The Power and authority over the Mass Housing Development Programme rested with the NHE and the Ministry, the Board of Directors was not part of this"* said Informant 6.

To further illustrate that the structure was not functional, Informant 6 indicated that, there were no clear articulations of roles and responsibilities especially between the executing agency and the line ministry. This has led to a situation where the Special Advisor to the Minister was giving instructions to the NHE on what to do and what not to do and that in many cases, the Ministerial Committee was not aware of this situation. The CEO would be asked to submit reports on programme implementation status, but no one would read them, claimed Informant 6.

Furthermore, the President who was the Champion of the programme was described to have been 'silent' or 'absent' in overseeing the programme implementation. According to Informant 6, the top level was 'very weak' and did not function nor carry out its role. Therefore, the Ministerial committee did whatever they felt like doing. *"He (the President) initiated the programme but the committees he set up, failed to direct the programme implementation. The committee felt comfortable to shift blame to the NHE,"* said the informant.

It can be deduced that; the governance structure did not exercise its function effectively in ensuring the Mass Housing Development Programme. *The Mass Housing failed due to lack of governance by the ministerial committee,"* said Informant 6. Informant 7, also shared similar sentiment expressed by Informant 6, especially in terms of the functionality of the structure; stressing that although the structure was in place, roles and responsibilities were not well articulated. *"There were multiple lines of authority and the NHE Board of Directors had little control over the situation,"* said informant 7.

To illustrate the impact of the governance challenges narrated above, Lewis, P., (2003) elaborates that an organisational governance ought to describe roles and responsibilities, the scope of power and authority to be exercised by management, as well as policy frameworks and boundaries established for decision making. It appears that in the case of Namibia's Mass Housing Development Programme, despite having a basic governance structure in place, there

was a lack of understanding of roles and responsibilities, the exercise of power and authority as narrated by the Informants above.

This ambiguity negatively impacted the credibility of the executing agency which led to its mandate to implement the programme being revoked. Young, R., (2007) also argues that programme governance is about clarifying what outcomes are being pursued, the necessary organisational adjustment to create a conducive environment, including its capacity and commitment towards implementing such a programme. Beyond the executing agency, Young, R., 2007, adds that equally important is a sponsor to be responsible for the achievement of the programme's outcome, putting in place the right implementation mechanisms, monitoring and adjusting when necessary, ongoing projects. In the case of the Mass Housing Development Programme, although structurally, a basic governance mechanism was in place, the roles and responsibilities of each player was not known and there seem to have been little efforts made to rectify such a situation especially from the sponsor (the government), which is demonstrated by the way members of the ministerial committee carried out their function if at all.

The relationship between and among members of the governance structure was assessed by analysing how individuals worked together or coordinated the implementation of the programme. Generally, the Informants described the relationship as not good at all and made references to various disagreements between members of the Ministerial committee, the Board of Directors, and its line Ministry (Urban and Rural Development), the President and the Management of the NHE, as well as the line ministry and its implementing agency. For example, Informant 5 claimed that the members of the Ministerial Committee differed among themselves in terms of how and who should be the implementing agency of the Mass Housing Development Programme.

It seems that there was no trust among members of the Ministerial Committee towards the NHE, such that, the former ordered the latter to cancel/withdraw some tenders awarded to contractors (about 20 notices of suspension of work were issued to contractors) because they did not approve the procurement process followed i.e. the use of NHE's tendering process, Ndjebela, T., 2015). The Ministry of Urban and Rural Development claimed that the agreements signed between NHE and contractors did not comply with certain qualification criteria set out nor did they meet the requirements of NHE's own tender (Ndjebela, T., (2015). As indicated in Chapter

1, the Board of Directors refused to take blame for the way things were handled and claimed that government was involved in the entire implementation process (Ndjebela, T., (2015). This resulted in a situation where the Ministry of Finance, as one of the members of the committee refused to release funds to pay contractors and consequently, the implementing agency was forced to borrow money from financial institutions to pay contractors. This lack of funding has been identified by most of the informants as a major contributing factor to the poor outcome of the Mass Housing Development Programme.

There was a general admission that the governance structure did not function due to numerous factors. One of the biggest problems about the governance structure according to Informant 6 was that the Ministerial committee members never worked together but technically fought all the time and some did not feel that they have been part of the process from the beginning. *“From the first meeting I attended until I resigned as a Board Member, there was never an agreement among the ministers in terms of programme implementation. One Minister for example, would say, the programme was wrong from the beginning because the NHE was not supposed to use its own procurement rules”* said Informant 5. The absence of teamwork among members, shared respect and trust among different policy makers, administrators, implementers and branches of government, had detrimental effects on the implementation of the programme. Informant 3 also described the relationship between the NHE employees and the Ministry employees as not good and certain people within the ministry felt that the executing agency was pushing them. The Informant claimed that the NHE staff was accused of *“sabotaging the President’s effort”*, hence they were under pressure to expedite the implementation process. Informant 7 shared that there was suspicion between the executing agency staff and its ministry employees which resulted from the way the executing agency undertook the procurement process. *“The relationship was cordial but not warm,”* said the informant.

The Mbale District, local government of Uganda (2016) argues that one of the factors that hinders effective public policy initiatives implementation is ineffective governance among politicians and government officials. The ineffectiveness of governance is usually attributed to issues such as weak coordination and trust, as well as the lack of cooperation among different government departments or political representatives (Mbale District, local government of Uganda (2016). In the case of the Namibian Mass Housing Programme, several key factors

undermined the governance of the project. This included the lack of consultation and involvement of all relevant stakeholders in key decision making, such as the implementation mandate, and a lack of funding. These factors resulted in some members of the governance structure questioning everything or not owning the process undertaken.

5.3.4 The level of Political Commitment Towards the Programme and Personal Interests

Political commitment is a pre-requisite for the success of any development policy initiative. The level of political commitment was analysed by looking at the support provided by the top political leadership towards the programme implementation; acknowledgement of the housing challenge in Namibia by top leadership; the willingness to address the development challenge perceived public pronouncement on the level of commitment; and action taken to rectify implementation challenges.

There were mixed testimonies gathered from informants in this regard. For example, Informant 5 stated that there was a lack of political commitment and personal interest by some members of the ministerial committee. Informant 2 on the other hand expressed that the political commitment was only there during the programme initiation stage at the beginning of 2015 when the former President, who was the Champion of the programme, was leaving office. *“It appears that the new leadership (the new President and Minister of Urban and Rural Development) did not share the same affection towards the programme,”* said Informant 2. The Informant further shared that due to personal interests over the programme, the members of the ministerial committee colluded to stop the programme implementation when they themselves or their people did not get any opportunity to benefit from such. *“When the programme was introduced, everyone flocked to the Ministry of Trade and Industry to open their construction companies with the hope to get some of the programme’s tenders. Our office was inundated daily, with former liberation struggle fighters asking that the NHE give them tenders,”* said the informant.

Informant 3 also shared similar sentiment as expressed on political commitment, that new President had his own agenda or ideas regarding the Mass Housing Development Programme.

“He hardly spoke about it even the new guys [the President and Minister of Urban and rural Development] did not own the programme, they had their own Harambee Prosperity Plan³ to drive and that was unfortunate” said Informant 3. To further illustrate on the lack of political commitment from the new government and lack of efforts in rectifying implementation issues, informant 3 asserted, *“the new Minister came in with the idea that the programme was a mess and needed to be cleaned up. In a period of about three months, the programme implementation was stopped and NHE’s mandate was revoked.”* Informant 4 believed that the political commitment existed mainly because the programme was the brainchild of the Former President who wanted to address the housing crisis in the country. Informant 9 also believed that there was a strong political commitment, having engaged with political leaders including the minister of Urban and Rural Development at the time⁴, however, the country is faced with a multitude of development challenges. The poor level of commitment in this regard can also be looked at by the extent in which the Programme’s Champion (the former President) commanded the governance structure (Ministerial Committee) to carry out its task of ensuring effective implementation of the programme. In this regard, informant 6 described the programme’s Champion as weak and failing to hold the governance structure to account. *“He knew all the problems, most probably heard about the infighting between members of the Ministerial committee but did not do anything about it,”* said the Informant. Informant 7 expressed that, even if the commitment towards the programme was there, the environment was not conducive for smooth programme implementation and as such, one could not expect a good programme outcome.

As referred to by informants, representatives of the executing agency at the time of the programme implementation, expressed a lack of political commitment, especially by the members of the ministerial committee tasked to provide guidance and oversight over the programme’s implementation, towards the Mass Housing Development. This was demonstrated by the refusal to release the budget. Informant 3 shared that, some members of the ministerial

³ An acceleration plan of the fourth National Development Plan (NDP 4) towards prosperity for all Namibian people.

⁴ There has been changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development, a new Minister has been appointed as of February 2018.

committee did not want the programme to be implemented during the time of the former President. They would argue, *“this should have waited and perhaps we could keep ourselves busy finalising development of the Blue Print and as such, there was a deliberate delay on programme implementation”* said the informant. There was a perception that the MHDP was a “hastily” political decision imposed on the officials (NHE and MURD) without sufficient time to undertake any feasibility studies or consulting the target beneficiaries to gauge their needs, Shinovene, I., and Adam, H., (2014). There is a tendency by politicians to build political legacies during their time in power. This mostly leads to a situation where, every five years or ten, depending on how long a politician is in office, development new and mostly, overly ambitious development initiatives are introduced. This does not give sufficient time to the public bureaucracy to effect policy initiatives implementation, which include redressing challenges experienced. *“Development takes time and good development takes even more time”* said Tom Mcfarlin. Based on this, perhaps this explains why the level of commitment (as described above) or weak or non-existing.

One informant further claimed that the new government did not share the same affection for the Mass Housing Programme such that, after three or four months when they took office, the programme was discontinued. Studies have shown that political and leadership commitment and support is critical for successful implementation of development programmes and that the absence of that has negative implication on the programme’s outcome. A paper by the Mbale District Local Government of Uganda (2016), gave an example of how lack of political support and commitment in Uganda led to failures of important development programmes, indicating that each new government withdrew programmes of its predecessors soon after assuming power.

5.3.5 The Programme Implementation and Management Modalities

The Mass Housing implementation and management modalities are analysed based on the provision established in its Blue Print. The researcher wanted to determine the extent to which such provision have been effected and the role such might have played on the outcome of the programme implementation. These provisions include but not limited to the following:

In the Mass Housing Development Programme's Blue Print, it is stated that a Programme Management Structure was to be established to manage and coordinate the various components of the programme. To ensure effective programme management, all agencies or responsible parties were to develop a detailed implementation plan and strategy for activities under their dominions. All involved institutions were also to enter into legally enforceable contracts clearly articulating performance standards and applicable consequences for failure to deliver on such. The PMS was to develop an operational guideline for smooth program implementation including, requirement and procedures for local authorities to give land for housing construction; a reporting, monitoring and evaluation system; and a stakeholder engagement and communication plan was to be developed. It was also stated that all, implementing agencies were to be held accountable and operate within strict legally enforceable contractual arrangements that will be concluded before implementation. One more critical aspect that was to be taken care of by the PMS was an analysis of needs, desirability and affordability ahead of programme implementation aimed at establishing the purchasing power and the accommodation types (low or medium, and or rental accommodation) required in such a market, critical to the success of the programme.

All Informants, apart from Informant 9, confirmed that the PMS was never established as envisaged in the Blue Print and as such many programme management mechanisms that were to be ensured through this structure were never put in place as a result. Informant 1 shared that, the Blue Print was mainly a statement of high policy intent and so, although it has made provision for certain things such as the development of an implementation strategy and plan, never took place. *"It should be said perhaps that is where some problems experienced emanated from,"* said the informant. Furthermore, the informant blamed the failure to put in place such instruments on limited time and pressure to implement. *"There was no gestation period between project conceptualisation and implementation to take care of some of these things. In this process, with all good intentions, mistakes and errors were made, which we are now paying for (money and time) But yeah, you only know what works once you try,"* said the informant.

Informant 2 also confirmed that the PMS was never created and that there were a lot of “missing puzzles”. For example, a Memorandum of Agreement between the NHE and MURD in which expectations, roles, and responsibilities of the two parties were to be articulated was never agreed upon. As a result, expectations differed between the implementing agency and the custodian ministry. This sentiment was further shared by Informant 4 who indicated that, certain things were not done as provided for in the Blue Print. *“There was a lack of proper monitoring and evaluation and quality assurance. If the PMS was established, things like this could have been avoided,”* said informant 4. Informant 5 blamed this situation on a Special Advisor to the Minister who is believed to have changed the programme implementation modality from what was initially envisaged in the Blue Print without consultation with other key stakeholders. Informant 7 shared that the PMS was never created because *‘speed was of essence’* and so, in trying to do everything as quickly as possible, establishment of this structure was overlooked. *“I believe if we had taken a bit of time to put this structure in place and make sure that roles and responsibilities are articulated and agreed, that ownership aspects are sorted out and that all stakeholder are engaged, the programme outcome could have been different,”* said the informant.

Based on the above, it could be concluded that in the absence of a PMS, there were no instruments put in place to ensure accountability by all identified players. This also means that there was no reporting, monitoring and evaluation system developed and perhaps this explain the situation where the quality of some houses was only discovered to be of substandard at the time they were supposedly ready for handover to beneficiaries. For example, in 2014 a Property Developer who partnered with a South African company, received a N\$ 441 million Mass Housing tender to build 1 595 houses in one of the towns (Shinovene, I., and Adam, H., (2014). The developer finalised a set of about 89 units whose quality was criticised and angered then Namibian President who criticised the houses design for being like structures from the “apartheid era” looking like cubicles. If there was a proper oversight, project management and monitoring, including accountability mechanisms, employed during the implementation of the programme, such things could have been prevented. Another empirical example in this case is that, in March 2017, the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development, upon inspecting several housing units completed in Walvis Bay before handover to beneficiaries, found the houses to be “humanely

inhabitable.” Consequently, the Minister ordered that such houses be demolished (Shinovene, I., and Adam, H., (2014).

Bruce, K., et al, (2003) emphasized the importance of holding implementation agencies accountable for performance as well as the need to clearly defining performance measures and systematic performance monitoring if implementation is to be strengthened. In this regard, there was a general feeling expressed by informants that people were not held accountable. For example, Informant 9 asserted that in Namibia, generally, the culture of holding people to account is non- existent and that non- performing individuals get shifted to other public institutions instead being fired or suspended.

Informant 2 claimed that the former President was too soft or lenient and as such failed to hold people accountable when things were not going well. *“There was no political firmness to direct the ministerial committee for instance, to release funds towards the implementation,”* said the informant. Informant 8, representing the ministerial committee, also confirmed that there was a huge lack of accountability both at the technical and political level. *“I am not sure what the understanding of the committee members was pertaining to accountability. The President was not briefed to be able to ask the right questions but also, sometimes as a President you are not always told the truth. However, people can also say, you may be misled but what did you do when you discovered the truth? You have a responsibility to hold people to account. The terms of reference did not specify how accountability was to be ensured by the governance structure,”* narrated the informant.

Regarding how the monitoring and oversight of project implementation was undertaken, Informant 3 shared that the NHE’s technical team together with the Special Advisor to the Minister and with some Cuban Engineers plus two staff members from the line ministry, would visits various construction sites for inspection of constructed houses, looking at the standards agreed and specifications. The informant asserted that it was unfortunate that the President was not happy with the design (one door type, which the President considered a health hazard) of the completed houses even though this is what the government had approved. The Informant further claimed that apart from the fact the designs were affordable, the entity has been building such

houses for many years and that there was nothing wrong with them. Such institutional characteristics has been highlighted as one of the factors that limit what can or cannot be done as part of the programme implementation, such that entities refuse to change the way they do business or simply innovate as they claim their ways of doing business has always worked (Mbale District, local government of Uganda (2016). Informant 1, a representative of the line ministry, admitted that there was no agreement on standards and specification before construction commenced and as such, issues were only being discovered during inspection by the Head of State. The informant also shared that some houses that were being demolished were constructed with alternative technology, approved based on technical advice from the Special Advisor. However, such materials (technology) was found not suitable for Namibia's environmental conditions. Furthermore, the informant admitted that the line ministry probably did not provide the required oversight and strategic leadership to the executing agency over the programme implementation and as such, the entity did things their way.

The Mass Housing Development Programme's implementation is currently on hold. The government is in the process of wrapping up the unfinished business commenced through the NHE which includes disposing of some of the constructed houses that could not get owners, mainly due to affordability issues or the absence of basic services such as sewage systems. There has been a general challenge regarding communication on the status of the programme implementation and the public would normally pick up issues when reported in the media. In the Blue Print, a provision was made that the PMS, once established, will develop a stakeholder engagement and communication plan. Since the PMS was never established, this plan was also not developed. The executing agency, according to Informant 2, claimed this as one of the biggest problems with the programme in the sense that there was no public education to provide members of the public with information on implementation or clarify on some allegations made against it and reported by the media. As an executing entity, they were given a moratorium to not respond to issues pertaining to the programme implementation, as claimed Informant 2.

The success of programme implementation also depends on the capacity of those tasked with implementation including financial allocation for its execution. In this regard, informants were asked to comment on the institutional capacities of both the executing agency and the

custodian line ministry. The capacity assessed in this regard is both the financial personnel to implement the Mass Housing Development Programme.

According to Informant 1, there were capacity issues (financial and technical expertise) at both the executing level and the line ministry, demonstrated by the poor definition or problem statement. This resulted in a limited understanding of the target beneficiaries, where they are (location) and their needs, including their purchasing power. The capacity issue was also demonstrated by poor monitoring and oversight at project sites by both the NHE and line ministries at project sites which resulted in a situation where some completed houses were of poor quality and had to be demolished. Further, the informant shared that local government and authorities lacked the required financial resources to service the required land for construction and provide the necessary municipal services, such as sewage. This has created a situation where, in some towns, houses were completed but were not equipped with basic municipal services and as such could not be sold. This is since, generally, there was no integrated planning to identify the required capacity at all levels.

Informant 2 argued that the NHE had sufficient technical capacity (recruited extra personnel to oversee projects implementation) coupled with an established institutional system. The informant however, indicated that at the Government level (line ministry) there were capacity constraints (only one staff was allocated to jointly monitor programme implementation with the NHE). *“The person could not even travel to all sites [for project monitoring and oversight] all over the country alongside with the NHE team,”* said the informant referring to the line ministry’s staff. The Informant further claimed that, the fact that the Government, after the NHE’s mandate was revoked, asked that the NHE help to sell the completed house is proof that only the entity had that capacity. In terms of financial resource, the entity is said to have struggled as Government could not avail the necessary financial resources for payment to contractors. This sentiment was also shared by Informant 3 and further that, capacity could have been strengthened (increase in personnel) had there been sufficient financial resources. The Informant also pointed out that the Ministry only had one official with limited technical expertise who supported the NHE with inspections at sites.

Informant 4 highlighted the lack of financial resources as one of the main contributing factors to the poor programme outcome. The informant also believe that the executing agency had the right technical capacity, (a department that mainly deals with sales and marketing, technical as well as a legal department for transfer and registration of properties). Informant 6 also stated that the executing agency had the required technical capacity, demonstrated by the experience and qualification of the Chief Executive Officer who the informant had testified to have interviewed for this job.

Informant 8 believe that capacity was not an issue at any level and the NHE, as it has been in existence for a long time. As a matter of fact, the informant did not agree with capacity as a contributing factor to the poor programme outcome but rather the lack of accountability by all those that were entrusted with overseeing the programme's implementation. *"People blame capacity when things go wrong. Nobody was held accountable in this process because no one could prove that somebody did something wrong. The NHE, despite understanding the housing problem for the low-income category people in Namibia, they went ahead to build houses that were priced highly knowing very well that the people cannot afford such,"* lamented the informant.

The Mass Housing Development Programme was to be realised at a total budget of about 4.5 billion Namibian dollars. However, when implementation kicked off, it is confirmed that government struggled to make funding available (albeit other factors such as the lack of ownership by some members of the governance structure) for project execution as there was no funds available in the national coffers. The Mbale District, local government of Uganda (2016) argued that a government's programme expectations always beat the capabilities of government and cautioned against this phenomenon that policy initiative proposals should only be accepted and approved if decision-makers are convinced that it has the resource required to implement them. In relation to this phenomenon, Mbale District, Local Government of Uganda (2016), further argued for the need to put emphasis on policy initiatives design to ensure that the planned actions represent a realistic and viable means of attaining the intended outcomes.

5.4 Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, an attempt was made to provide answers to the main research question on the role of governance on the performance of the Mass Housing Development Programme. Based on the four main sets of questions, particularly the last three, which were, a. the programme governance structure; b. the functionality of the structure; c. the level of political commitment and d; the programme implementation modalities, there is a clear demonstration that the Mass Housing Development Programme's outcome was poor. This resulted from a general failure of its structure and basic programme management principles including, an unrealistic timeline within which the programme, considering its magnitude, was implemented. There was not sufficient time allocated to its planning to ensure that critical issues or mechanisms were put in place to ensure smooth implementation. In addition, there was ambiguity in roles and responsibilities and poor political commitment (later) and procurement issue towards the programme.

CHAPTER 6

6. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This concluding chapter summarises the findings of the paper, contribution to the body of knowledge and recommendations. In drawing up a conclusion on this research paper, the researcher looked at the extent to which data gathered aided in answering the research questions and whether the research objectives have been attained. In addition, the paper concludes by highlighting what can be learned from the findings and how such can be used to inform public policy initiatives planning and implementation to maximise their returns.

6.2 Summary and Conclusion

In the first chapter of this paper, a summary of Namibia's challenge on providing affordable housing to its citizens, particularly the low-income earner is highlighted. The chapter also highlight efforts by the Namibian government to address the situation but with minimal positive results. The analysis in this paper used the Mass Housing Development Programme as an empirical example to illustrate how governance among other factors affects the implementation of public policy initiative's and their overall outcome. A qualitative approach was employed in gathering data using face to face in-depth interviews with the informants who represented the target population in the study. The researcher developed a set of key questions to provide answers to the following issues:

- i. The Governance structure for the Mass Housing Development Programme and the extent to which it provided the required strategic leadership, oversight, including ensuring accountability by all responsible parties involved in the programme's implementation.
- ii. The level of political commitment towards the MHDP.

- iii. The functionality and effectiveness of the Programme Management Structure, including:
 - a. instruments that were put in place to ensure accountability by all stakeholders;
 - b. whether there was an M&E mechanism put in place for programme management; and
 - c. the institutional capacity of both the NHE and MURD (qualified and experienced staff and financial resources availed).

The paper focused on the internal oversight governance and the respondents were individuals that were directly involved in the implementation and the members of the programme governance structure. The findings of the research paper obtained from both primary and secondary data sources reveals that the Mass Housing Development Programme failed due to several factors which relates to governance impediment among others. Below is summary of findings based on the research questions:

- i. What was the Governance Structure for the Mass Housing Development Programme?

A governance structure has been illustrated highlighting roles and responsibilities of the members. The aim was to examine if the structure provided the required strategic guidance, advice, and oversight over the implementation of the programme. In a nutshell, this structure did not function in the way it should have to ensure successful implementation of the programme. There were divergent narrations of understanding by informants regarding the understanding of how the members of the structure were supposed to interrelate.

- a. At the top of the structure, was the former President of the country at the time and champion of this programme, who was criticized for failing (described as having been silent, very weak, or absent in overseeing the programme implementation) to hold the

ministerial committee accountable despite being aware of the lack of cooperation and commitment among the committee members.

- b. The second tier of the structure was described as a second ultimate decision maker over the Mass Housing Programme implementation. It was entrusted to make sure that the programme's Blue Print was implemented as envisaged and assess any problems that may come along the way. It was dysfunctional, and individuals lacked an understanding of their roles and responsibilities or they if they did have that understanding, they were not committed to the process. The committee was further criticized as lacking policy cohesion which led to disagreement on how the programme was to be implemented and by who, i.e. who ought to have that mandate.

- c. The third tier, a technical committee provided advice to the ministerial committee while at the same ensuring monitoring and oversight over the implementation. It could not be established how this committee functioned especially because the NHE, was reporting directly to the Ministerial committee. Informants claimed this committee would validate or verify progress report queries from the ministerial committee. One would assume, the progress reporting is first dealt with at this level before the ministerial committee and expects the NHE to be a member of this committee. Findings revealed conflicting testimonies over the NHE membership to this committee. There were no basic standards of operating procedures in terms of how these committee were to functional and relates to each other to deal with programme implementation issues systematically.

- d. The forth tier represented the NHE as an executing agency and alongside, there is the NHE Board of Director. There were no clear articulations of roles and responsibilities especially between the executing agency and the line ministry, including the Board of Directors when it came to the Mass Housing Development Programme's implementation. The implementing agency did not own the programme but merely carried out the task of implementation as instructed by the line ministry. The agency claimed they did not have any decision-making power over the programme. The Board of Directors equally felt

powerless to provide the necessary oversight over its agency due to multiple lines of authority. In addition, it was alleged that the decision over the programme implementation was put in the hands of a consultants (a foreigner) who was appointed as a Special Advisor to the Minister. Experiences have shown that entrusting public policy and programme implementation in the hands of people who may not possess the necessary knowledge of local context can have negative impacts on the outcome. The Special Advisor is believed to have developed a different implementation plan different from what was elaborated in the Blue Print, with little consultation with other stakeholders.

As Young, R., (2007) put it, good governance is about creating a conducive environment, clear roles and responsibilities and the ability to navigate through challenges and bottlenecks for effective programme implementation. The ambiguity in the understanding of roles and responsibilities of each members of the structure had rendered the governance structure dysfunctional and ineffective in its roles. The credibility of the implementing agency was compromised which led to its mandate being revoked. It is therefore clear, that both the government and the implementing agency, including the Board of Directors, failed in their roles to direct the Mass Housing Development Programme. The relationship among members of the structure was also described as 'sour,' with a lack of trust, preventing them from working together or have unity of purpose, addressing the housing challenge in Namibia. There was a general weak coordination and consultation of key stakeholders. For example, the Local Authorities were tasked with providing serviced land, yet they were not a member of this governance structure.

ii. The Level of Political Commitment Towards the Mass Housing Development Programme and Personal Interests

Studies have shown that the extent to which public policy and programmes succeed or fail depends on political factors at play during its implementation. The politicians introduce or pronounce vision statements which get translated into policies or programmes

by the technocrats, including their implementation usually governed by rule and regulations. As such, political commitment is a necessary ingredient for the success of any development policy initiatives.

The political commitment towards the Mass Housing Development Programme was described as weak coupled with personal interest by some members of the governance structures. The political commitment was only demonstrated at the initiation of the programme. However, during implementation little efforts were made to demonstrate such a commitment, for example, through holding responsible parties accountable. It is alleged that the programme was introduced to create a political legacy for the former President. The programme was described as an overly ambitious, reactive political decision and introduced it in a rush, as the President had little time in office to create this legacy. This has resulted in a situation where technocrats had little time to put in place all necessary mechanisms for implementation. This could explain why some members of the governance exhibited limited commitment towards the programme, as they needed more time to take care of implementation modalities.

In addition, it was further alleged that the new political leadership did not share the same ‘affection’ towards the programme, hence immediately when they came in office in 2015 the programme implementation was stopped with the NHE’s mandated revoked. According to Ikechukwu, U., and Chukwuemeka, E., (2016), policy ideas are let fall when newly designated politicians and other appointees oppose them. The new President had a separate agenda and hardly expressed interest in the Mass Housing Development Programme and as such, efforts were not made to understand and address the implementation bottlenecks.

iii. The Programme Implementation and Management Modalities

Another key question in this paper was what caused the poor performance of the Mass Housing Development Programme, when in principle the Blue Print detailed a robust implementation and management modality. In a nutshell, the Mass Housing Development Programme implementation and management was not necessarily undertaken as provided

for in the Blue Print. This was an essential element of the programme and has severe negative implications on the programme outcome. The findings in this regard reveals that, the Programme Management Structure was never established. It was expected that the structure would undertake the following functions:

- a. One of the key functions of this structure was the development and implementation strategy and plan, a critical tool for effective programme implementation. Neither the strategy or a plan was developed, which Informants highlighted as source of major problems experienced. Everybody did what they felt they needed to do as there was no guiding strategy or plan of action of follow.
- b. Develop an operational guideline for smooth program implementation including, requirement and procedures for local authorities to give land for housing construction. Because the structure was not established, operational guidelines were not developed, neither procedural requirement for local authorities to avail serviced land. As a matter of fact, the understanding of this role by the local authorities was not ensured neither was there financial resources allocated for the Local Authorities to implement such a responsibility. The result was that, the NHE struggled to find land for housing construction. In towns where land was availed, it was either not serviced or sometimes not viable for housing construction. In some cases, construction took place, but the houses were not equipped with the basic municipal services, leaving such houses unoccupied and left open for vandalism by community members, New Era Newspaper (2016).
- c. Development of a reporting, monitoring and evaluation system was not done. Programme implementation was monitored abstractly. The NHE appeared to have project staffs, sometimes accompanied by a staff from the line ministries, who monitored construction at various sites in the country. However, there was no mutual understanding of or agreed standards and specifications prior to construction. There were disagreement and unhappiness especially from the government side over the type, size, and quality of some houses. There was also no systematic way of reporting on progress, as indicated

above on how the governance structure functioned. It is alleged that the committees did not meet as regularly as they were supposed to, and that meetings normally were called for based on issues reported in the local media. There were also confusion or lack of clarity on who reported to who especially between the NHE and its Boards of Directors, the technical committee and ministerial, including the Special Advisor, who was believed to be in a steering role regarding giving programme implementation directions.

- d. Another key element of programme management, a stakeholder engagement and communication plan were to be developed but this too was never realised. A stakeholder engagement and communication plan are key in ensuring that all stakeholders including the public are fully kept abreast on programme implementation and progress achieved. This helps in managing expectation and avoiding frustration from lack of information. Regarding the Mass Housing Development Programme, there was no strategy on engaging or communicate with stakeholders. The only people who knew what was happening were those directly involved. The public was mainly hearing about the programme through the media and a lot of it was speculation on unverified information sources.
- e. It was also stated that all implementing agencies were to be held accountable and operate within strict legally enforceable contractual arrangements. The findings reveal that there was accountability mechanism established. For example, a Memorandum of Understanding between the NHE and the line ministry was drafted but never agreed upon and signed. In the absence of this agreement, it can be understood why it was difficult to hold anyone to account. When mistakes were being detected with completed houses, both the NHE and the line ministry shifted blame to each other, a clear indication that there was no clarity on who ought to do what between the two. The importance of defining expectations regarding performance is critical in holding implementation agencies accountable, Bruce, K., et al., (2003).
- f. A need, desirability and affordability assessment were another aspect that the PMS was supposed to have undertaken to establish the purchasing power and the accommodation

types (low or medium, and or rental accommodation) required in various towns. This was not done. The result was construction of houses that were either too expensive, too small or whose structures were not pleasing. This indicates that the target beneficiaries were not known, and their needs were not understood before houses were constructed. There was no consultation to determine any of these critical factors. The UN's Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing has called for a paradigm shift from housing policies based on the financialization of housing to a human rights-based approach to housing policies. The report states that housing policies for low-income groups must be developed in consultation with the target beneficiaries, who have a better understanding of their needs. The design of the Mass Housing Development Programme was flawed from the beginning due to failure to consult and involve the relevant stakeholders.

- g. One of the main problems with the Mass Housing Development was unavailability of financial resources for its execution. Albeit other challenges such as refusal of some members of the governance structure, ministerial committee to releasing funding, the government had little available funding in its coffers for programme implementation.

When assessing the technical capacity, the researcher also looked at factors beyond the academic qualification and years of experience as described possessed by the implementing agency. Public implementers capacity can be judged by their ability to navigate through challenging situation, i.e. managing expectation of various stakeholders, be it personal or political, and ensuring application of basic programme management principles. In this regard, the implementing agency, including that of the Board of Directors, proved to have lacked such capacity and rendered themselves to be a 'victim of circumstances' and 'arm stringed' by the ministerial committee. When an institution lacks this capacity, devastating effect can be expected, for example the loss of credibility and or reputation which is what happened to the NHE and resulted in their mandate being revoked. This capacity goes beyond one's level of education, it is about soft skills.

Equally, the line ministry's capacity, beyond financial means was questionable. The fact that a consultant can be allowed to influence the direction of programme implementation is worrisome. In addition, the Minister, who chaired the ministerial committee failed to reach consensus among members of the committee and as such, the committee was dysfunctional and could not carry out its function. The ambiguity on understanding of roles and responsibilities by the committee also points to capacity challenges of the chair. The McKinsey Global Institute mentioned effective leadership as one of the factors affecting delivery of affordable housing delivery Jonathan, W, Sangeeth, R., Jan, M., Nicklas, G., and Shirish, S., (2014). Mulyanyuma, A., (2016), argues that there are number of institutional challenges such as internal conflict, as an example, that affect policy and programme management and implementation. Policies are managed through a set of institutions; i.e. "set of informal and formal rules that structure interactions between organizations and between individuals" (Mulyanyuma, A., (2016). Douglass North refers to this situation as "institutional constraints" that prohibits individuals from doing and sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities." The ability of programme implementers and administrators to manage such is critical for effective implementation.

To conclude this section, the literature reviewed helped in explaining factors that may have contributed to the failure of the Mass Housing Development Programme. As Fadel, M., (2014) put it, leadership inspires collaboration and concerted action among diverse and often competing groups for the public good. Leadership and governance helps in navigating through complex challenges and managing expectation of various stakeholders for effective programme management, Fadel, M., (2014). The failure of the Mass Housing Development Programme resulted from a weak or dysfunctional governance structures that failed at ensuring basic programme management principles. The ambitious nature of the programme also compromised its successes. Although the first phase was mainly a pilot phase, the amount of resources allocated were huge for basic trial and error. The lack of integrated planning and consultation with all relevant stakeholders doomed the programme success right from the onset.

6.3 Recommendations

Namibia has been praised for having rigorous policy frameworks that addresses various national development challenges. However, implementation of such policies and programme faced various challenges resulting in suboptimal outcomes resulting in a situation where such programme gets abandoned and new ones are introduced with little learning from past experiences. This paper highlighted governance challenges, as a key contributing factor to the poor performance of the Mass Housing Development Programme.

The paper contributes to the body of knowledge on the importance of governance which public policy and programme makers can draw lessons from for effective programme implementation. The paper is also useful and timely in the sense that the Mass Housing Development Programme's implementation is currently on hold and its Blue Print is being reviewed. It is hoped that this paper can help the government to avoid or address some challenges highlighted herein before the second phase of the programme begins. In view of the above, the following are some key recommendations to note grounded around the four key issues addressed in the research paper:

- a. Firm leadership and governance is key in effective programme management and implementation. Leadership should create an enabling environment for programme implementation. This include clarifying roles and responsibilities and enforce accountability.
- b. Integrated planning - the importance of informed and well-coordinated programme planning is a key a determining factor of programme success. This is an element that was not paid attention to in the case of Mass Housing Development Programme which was rather a reactive and made hastily initiative.
- c. Consultation and engagement with all stakeholders especially the target beneficiaries whose needs are being addressed is critical to develop products that are tailor made to their needs.

- d. Address implementation issues rather than re-introducing new programmes. The culture of abandoning programmes and re-introducing or launching new ones with similar intentions to previous failed programmes is a huge governance failure. What would be helpful is to employ corrective measures to improve the implementation of such instead of reintroducing similar initiatives. This further requires holding people accountable by taking stern actions against poor performance.
- e. Reporting, monitoring and evaluation have been weakness in the implementation of the Mass Housing Development Programme. A robust monitoring and evaluation helps in identifying issues in a timely manner to allow for timely interventions.
- f. Political decisions should be informed by data to determine the viability of proposed interventions. This include the necessary financial resources and capacity of the institutions to implement them.
- g. There should be no compromise on implementation and management modalities and political pressure should not be used as an excuse for failing to put such in place.

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ANNEXURES

ANNEXURE A

INTERVIEW GUIDING QUESTIONS

Dear Informant

I am doing a research as partial fulfilment of a Master of philosophy in Degree in Development Policy and Practice. I have some questions that will assist me to derive my conclusion on the topic chosen.

General Knowledge about the MHDP

1. Are you familiar with the MHDP?
2. The MHDP has Blueprint that guides its implementation. Were you involved in formulation?
3. Who else, do you know (stakeholders) was involved in the Blue Print's formulation?

Understanding the Programme Governance Structure

1. What is your understanding of Governance and oversight in the context of public programme/policy management?
2. What was the governance structure of the MHDP? How did it function? Was it effective in its duty?
3. How was the relationship between members of the governance structure?
4. As an NHE employee/ board member, what was your role in the implementation process of the programme?
5. What would you say was the level of political commitment towards the programme?

Programme Implementation and Management Modalities

1. The Blue Print makes provision for an establishment of a Programme Management Structure. Was it ever effected? If yes, who were the members? How did it function? Was it effective in its duties?
2. The Blue Print further makes provision for development of the programme's implementation strategy and plan by all implementing agencies for the various sub program activities. Did this happen and to what extent were these strategies/plans implemented?
3. What instruments were put in place to ensure accountability by all identified stakeholders?
4. Was there an M&E mechanism at both levels (NHE (technical) and MURD policy management)? E.g. regular reporting on programme implementation?
5. How often did NHE had to report/brief/consult the MURD on the status quo/implementation/decision making of the programme?
6. What exactly was reported, milestones regarding project implementation or were challenges and obstacles also reported/flagged?
7. Were there sufficient institutional (both NHE and MURD) capacities (staff and financial resources availed) to deliver the programme?
8. Was there a needs assessment to determine the right size and shape of the houses as well as the purchasing power of the target beneficiaries ever undertaken?

Challenges During Implementation

9. There were lots of media report on the way the programme was being implemented, a lot of it negative. Both the former President and the Minister were quoted in numerous local paper expressing disappointment with the turn of events, the size, shape and quality of houses built. Or that Did not meet the requirements of NHE's own tender procedures, that some of the agreements were against public policy and interest.
 - Do you think, as a board member, the board did its job in steering MHDP's implementation?

- How would did the programme turned out in terms of its performance / achieving the intended outcome?
- To what extend could the turn out of the programme implementation have been rectified? e.g. demolishing of some completed houses? Tender allocation etc?
- Has the MURD been part of the implementation process from the beginning? If not, when did they step in?
- To what extent did the MURD, as the custodian of the MHDP, NHE Board, provided the required strategic leadership, oversight, and ensured accountability over the NHE?
- What was NHE expectation of the MURD and vice versa?

10. At some point, it was reported in the media that the NHE Board was not happy with the way Govt blamed NHE for the poor outcome of the programme. The Audit Committee Chair, was quoted as having made clear to the Govt that the mass housing was not unilaterally implemented by the NHE, but that government was involved in the entire process to date.

- *In your view, what part/role did and should Govt have played compared to what role they did play in the programme implementation*

11. In your own opinion, what do you take as success factor from the Mass Housing Development Programme and failures

12. What would you say, between the NHE and MURD did work or not work? Do you think things went wrong on the programme?

13. What's the status of the programme? What is the way forward?

Annexure B

EXTRACT FROM THE SUMMARY OF BLUEPRINT ON MASS HOUSING DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE IN NAMIBIA- Implementation and Management Modalities

12.1.1 A Program Management Structure (PMS) will be established to manage and coordinate the various facets of this program composed of the representation of the Directorate of Housing, NHE, and other expert management service providers as the need may be.

12.1.2 The seven sub-programs will be managed by implementing agencies as outlined in Section 7 above. Each implementing agency will develop a detailed implementation plan and strategy pertaining to specific sub-program activities that fall within their jurisdictions.

12.1.3 The Property Management of the NHE will be strengthening to manage all rental accommodation facilities that will be built under this program.

12.1.4 Formal and legally enforceable contracts will be entered with all institutions involved setting clear performance standards and consequences inter-alia.

12.1.5 PMS will put in place overall operational guidelines for smooth program implementation. This will include the requirement and procedures for local authorities to give land for this program implementation

12.1.6 A program reporting, monitoring and evaluation system will be put in place by the Program Management Structure

12.1.7 A stakeholder engagement and communication plan will also be developed by the PMS.

12.1.8 All program implementing agencies will be held accountable and operate within strict legally enforceable contractual arrangements that will be concluded beforehand;

12.1.9 Needs, desirability and affordability analyses will be conducted before any project is executed with the view to establish the purchasing power and the accommodation types (low or medium, and or rental accommodation) required in such a market.