Protection and Pragmatism: an exploration of the mentalities of workers in the private security industry

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The quest for ‘security’ and the practices aimed at creating this on a literal and a figurative level is a common human striving. The people whom we task and entrust with providing this security are increasingly part of a combination of both public police and private security agents. Whilst the public police have been the focus of a large body of research, the volume of research in the field of private security is relatively thin. Given the robust growth of the private security sector in both developed and developing countries, combined with the relative dearth of research involving fieldwork in the private security industry, this research aims to fill a part of this knowledge gap. Specifically, this dissertation aims to address an even less-investigated research question - that of how the providers of private security think about and undertake their work of creating ‘security’. In other words, it explores their mentalities. This exploration of the mentalities of those who provide private security will be undertaken through an exploratory case study, using the concept of nodal governance as the framing analytic. This case study focusses on a suburban security company operating in the southern suburbs of Cape Town, South Africa.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. An overview of the private security industry

There is a variety of international and nationally-based research that focusses on the private security industry. Much of this research points to the need for greater and more effective regulation (see for instance, Berg & Nouveau, 2011; Kempa & Singh, 2008; Johnston, 1992; Loader & White, 2015; Stenning, 2009; and White, 2010). Other studies (see for instance, De Waard, 1999; and Van Steden & Huberts, 2005) focus specifically on the size and scope of the industry by providing quantitative data to illustrate the proliferation of private security services throughout the world. Still others focus on the overlap between the public police and private security and elucidate the implications that flow from this overlap. (See, for example, Berndtsson & Stern, 2011; Diphoorn & Berg, 2013, and Shearing & Stenning, 1981).

Whatever the focus of the research, one aspect of the private security industry that stands out is its burgeoning growth. Both global and local estimates speak to ever-increasing numbers of private individuals and business who are utilising the services of private security as opposed to sourcing their security needs from the public police.

From a global perspective, Abrahamsen and Williams (2010) cite statistics drawn from various scholars across the (first and third) world. A picture emerges of an industry that experiences exponential year-on-year growth in terms of the amount of money it generates:

Worldwide the private security industry is valued at over $139 billion, and its growth is forecast to continue at an annual rate of 8% to reach $230 billion in 2015. (Securitas, Annual Report, 2007: 13 in Abrahamsen & Williams, 2010: 19).

On a local level, statistics drawn from the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the Private Security Regulatory Authority or PSIRA - (the regulatory body that oversees the industry in South Africa) records that in 2007, there were a total of 776 316 registered security officers in South Africa (PSIRA, 2007 in Kempa & Singh, 2008: 343). According to the Minutes of the
PSIRA AGM Report of 2014/2015, that number increased to 1 979 969. This represents an increase of 155% in the number of registered security officers in South Africa over that period.¹

This is within the context of the South African economy that has been contracting over the past two years, to the point where the country is currently facing a recession and a negative growth rate of 0.7% as recorded over the first three months of this year. (Trading Economics, 2017).

Whist these statistics are not completely current (they range between 2006 - 2015), they are provided here as an overview of the steep trajectory of the industry on both a global and a local level. As mentioned, the industry is burgeoning, both in terms of the number of personnel employed, along with the revenues it accumulates.

It is within this context, that is, at the intersection of a shrinking economy alongside the concomitant incremental growth of the private security industry that this dissertation is situated.

In many respects, the literature reflects an industry that has been vilified and disdained (White, 2010), with the notable exception of Stenning (2009). Many people view the buying of security as a ‘grudge purchase’ in an industry comprised of ‘operators’ of dubious repute whose overriding motive is to provide security for profit and who exclusively provide their services to those who have the financial means to pay for it. In addition, those who sell private security are often viewed as capitalising on the public’s fear, whether real or imagined, of falling victim to one of a multitude of depredations that are grouped under the umbrella term of ‘crime’. This is particularly salient given that the contemporary landscape of crime is becoming increasingly complex and delineated by multiple matrices of risk. Furthermore, research has found (Loader & White, 2015) that many actors in the private security industry have themselves bought into this negative conceptualisation of the ‘doing’ of their work in this industry, feeling morally ambiguous about the work that they do and engaging in ways to both ameliorate this ambiguity and to strengthen their sense of purpose (Loader, Goold & Thumala, 2014; Thumala, Goold & Loader, 2011).

This study aims to explore the mentalities of those who work in the private security industry and to examine and discuss the nature and extent of the conflue

1 Registered security personnel comprise two categories, that is, personnel who are active (employed) and those who are inactive (unemployed). The figures quoted here include both categories
study’s findings in relation to the scholarly literature that has focussed on the way private security actors ‘do’ the work of providing security; and how they think about their work.

1.2. Statement of the research question and its contribution

Besides a few studies that focus on the way private security think about what they do, that is, studies that examine their mentalities (See, for instance, Berg, 2010; Diphoorn, 2013; 2015; 2016; Manzo, 2010; Kempa & Singh, 2008; Rigakos, 2002), not much has been written on this topic. Several scholars who have researched the private security industry point out that this area has been under-researched (see, for example, Brodeur, 2010; Diphoorn, 2013; and Singh & Kempa, 2007). Given the ‘thinness’ of research in this industry, coupled with the proliferation of private security when viewed both locally (see, for example, Berg, 2010) and transnationally (see, for example, De Waard, 1999), this research aims to fill a part of this knowledge gap. It aims to do this through an exploration of how the providers of private security think about what they do. In other words, it explores their mentalities in relation to their work.

The relative paucity of research on the private security industry is further foregrounded when it is compared to the voluminous research that has been conducted on the public police - both nationally and internationally. Many scholars (see, for instance Brodeur, 2010; Marks, 2004; Shearing, 1992) have mirrored Stenning’s assertion that “…it is now almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public police which is not, somewhere and under some circumstances, performed by the private police…” (2000: 328).

It is in this context of the nature and extent of the overlap between what the public police and private security do when providing security, that Stenning makes a pithy observation: His 2014 review of Global Policing (Bowling and Sheptycki, 2012) juxtaposes the empirical reality of the nature and extent of private security, with an apparent concomitant conceptual blindness to it. In other words, he foregrounds the reality of private security as ubiquitous, in contradistinction to the lack of conceptual background that is manifested by the relatively small body of literature devoted to it, and illustrates this juxtaposition using Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) book as a case in point.
Furthermore, Singh and Kempa (2007) echo Stenning’s (2000) statement that illustrates the overlap of the division of labour in relation to the public police and private security, adding that: “the culture of private policing agents has been far less fully studied than those of public police officers” (2007: 297).

My study adds to the body of knowledge about the private security industry as it not only focusses on the under-researched area of the mentalities of those who work in the industry from a global perspective, but because it does so within the South African context. Private security in South Africa demonstrates some marked differences when compared to the private security industry in other parts of the world:

I learned then and there that [security] was an essential part of South African life - a social practice, perhaps a ritual, that is inherent to every type of social activity…That…security is ingrained into the daily practices of South Africans….The simple act of driving a car turned into an exhaustive series of enforced security measures… (Diphoorn, Ph.D. Thesis, 2013: 3-4).

Security is a substantial part of the national weltanschauung. It is within the context of the primacy of place that occupies the collective South African consciousness when thinking about and operationalising their ‘safety and security’ needs that this study is positioned.

1.3. **Methods used to answer the research question**

The data for this study was gathered using two types of qualitative interviewing within the spatial and temporal bounds of a case study. I opted to use nodal governance (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) as the analytical framing of this research, as this framing gave me the scope to analyse the mentalities of the providers of the private security industry without superimposing a normative framework upon the data. This was done to minimise the risk my ‘contaminating’ the data through the imposition of any specific framework of meaning on my part.
The bulk of the data was collected through interviewing ten providers of private security services within a suburban security company operating in the southern suburbs of Cape Town. This data was augmented with information collected through several informal conversational interviews conducted over the course of a day-long ‘ride-along’ with one of the company’s armed response officers and afforded me the opportunity to stop and talk to the guards stationed at several of the company’s sites. Both the formal and the informal interviews took place over a four-week period.

1.4. Overview of the rest of the dissertation

Chapter Two maps the scholarly literature on the private security industry. It addresses three broad areas of enquiry. The literature is firstly mapped on an international level, before narrowing down to focus on literature pertaining to certain countries in Africa and then focusing on South Africa as a specific case.

Chapter Three sets out how the study was implemented and the research design that I employed to answer the problem statement (the research question). Much like Chapter Two, it is structured from a broad to a narrow focus. That is, it commences with a discussion of the paradigm within which the research is positioned, to the instruments used to collect the data, along with how this study will arrive at its conclusions. In addition, this chapter also examines the advantages and limitations of the research design, along with a discussion of the key ethical implications that flow from this type of research.

Chapter Four comprises a presentation and discussion of the research findings. It foregrounds several themes that recurred throughout the interviews. The thematically arranged descriptions and narratives gathered throughout the interviews weave together several strands of meaning that, once transcribed and analysed, create a picture of the mentalities of those who work in the field of private security in a localised, community-based context of Cape Town’s southern suburbs. In addition, Chapter Four questions the feasibility of extrapolating global North literature that focuses on what private security ‘could and should’ look like and seeks to juxtapose
this normative narrative with a global South perspective (albeit a comparatively small slice of the ‘research pie’) as represented by the findings of this study.

Chapter Five concludes the dissertation by presenting an overview of the research findings. It will also examine the implications that these findings have, in and of themselves, and on portions of the literature on private security. In addition, these findings are used as a platform upon which some questions and possible solutions will be formulated, with a view to pursuing potential avenues for further research on this topic.

1.5. Conclusion

My objective in this chapter has been to furnish an outline of the research through providing a synopsis of what each chapter comprises. In the following chapter, I map the literature on the private security industry. This mapping is initially focussed on the international literature, then on an African perspective, prior to narrowing the focus onto the academic literature on private security in South Africa.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will map the scholarly literature on private security by signposting the contributions of the major writers in the field. The literature will address three broad areas of enquiry: Firstly, I will focus on how private security is performed and the mentalities that underpin this performance. Secondly, I will map the ways in which private security relates to other bodies that have a stake in the provision of security through networks and partnerships. The third area of enquiry will focus on issues on regulation of the private security industry and on topics such as accountability, governance and legitimacy of the industry as a function of regulation. I will organise the literature thematically under these three areas of enquiry.

The literature will be mapped on an international basis prior to it being mapped on a national basis. This will be done for two reasons. Firstly, I aim to provide a broad ‘aerial view’ of the overall map of the literature from an international perspective, narrowing the focus onto some literature that pertains to Africa and then specifically to South Africa, where my research is based. The second reason for mapping the literature on the private security industry in South Africa separately to the rest of the world is to highlight several salient theoretical and empirical differences between the private security industry in South Africa as compared to other parts of the world. (See, for instance, Berg, 2010; Diphoorn, 2013; Singh, 2005; Kempa & Singh 2008).

2.1. AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1.1. Private security performance and mentalities

As mentioned in Chapter One, when compared to the literature on the public police, the scholarly focus on private security (a focus that only spans the last four decades) is relatively thin. Seminal works that focus on the nature and extent of private security and its implications for a broad range of societal issues such as considerations around legal issues, accountability issues, policy formulation and the impact of private security on human rights, raised these types of issues in the 1980’s. (See, for instance, Shearing & Stenning, 1981; 1983; South, 1988).
In this section, I review the literature on private security written by scholars who have viewed the industry from an empirical perspective. The overarching theme is that of how private security is operationalised and answers this question by looking at the doing of private security in various contexts. It focusses on an intra-organisational level, that is, within the bounds of private security companies in and of themselves. It is in this context of the performance of the provision of private security that an examination of the mentalities highlights the actors’ ways of thinking about and doing private security work. The term “mentalities” is used here within the conceptual framework as articulated by, amongst others, Bayley and Shearing (2001), Berg (2010), Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Stenning (2000).

One of the ways in which the mentalities of the providers of private security has been studied is through an ethnographic lens. As Brodeur observes: “…there is little fieldwork on private security, although there are reports replete with data on the size of the market, its profit margins, and economic projections” (2010: 259). Given the relative dearth of ethnographic studies, a point highlighted by Marks (2004), amongst others, those that have looked at private security by engaging with it through the medium of intense fieldwork that typifies ethnography, provide an ‘intimate’ view of how private security is thought about and done.

For instance, Rigakos (2002) provides an ethnography that examines the “doing” … of security work from the perspective of line officers” (Rigakos, 2002: 3, italics in original). Rigakos’ work provides a ‘slice of life’ in that it examines the everyday practices, views and meanings (in other words, the mentalities) that the employees create around their work as private security officers. An example:

It also gets to your head when you spend twelve hours of your day patrolling underground lots and shitty stairwells across the city, you only see crap and you get crapped on by the dealers, the druggies, the prostitutes…You know, you’re on patrol and people think you’re just a wannabe [policeman], or a fucking racist, and it gets to you (Rigakos, 2002: 141).
Manzo (2004) also foregrounds the mentalities of private security actors in the performance of their duties in shopping malls, one of several ever-expanding areas of “mass private property” (Shearing, 1992: 423) that are ubiquitous in many countries.

In addition, several scholars have focussed on the technologies and resources employed by the providers of private security. For instance, Brodeur (2010) maps the myriad types of technologies offered by the private security industry and provides examples, such as video technology and x-ray booths…razor wire and body sensors, animals trained for the purposes of locating contraband at borders and airports, and alarm systems. Brodeur also tracks the exponential growth in market share of these technologies, and notes a marked spike in their proliferation post-9/11 (2010).

Similarly, Stenning tracks the rise of “techno-domination” (1994: 153) in the private security industry and notes the distinction between the technologies available to the public police versus those of private security as being that:

The principal difference between public and private police …lies in the much greater resources available to private police to acquire intrusive technology, and the much greater incentives and opportunities they have to use it (Ibid.).

Further, Shearing and Stenning’s (1983) seminal research focusses on how these intrusive technologies (and the mentalities that are associated by private security with them) have had a marked deleterious effect on human rights.

Other scholars have quantified the size and the scope of the private security industry. For instance, Van Steden & Huberts, (2005) and Morré (2004) have quantified the size and scope of the industry in western countries and in twenty-five European Union (EU) member states respectively. De Waard (1999) also quantifies the proliferation of private security on a transnational basis. He provides an overview of the size and scope of the private security industry across twenty-seven countries. His quantification of the private security industry on a multinational basis is rated by him as being “The most reliable of the international surveys on the number of public versus private police” (Brodeur, 2010: 270). Whilst the numbers may differ according to who maps it, the point is that the business of private security is an ever-growing industry.
2.1.2. Private security as it relates to others

In this second area of enquiry, I focus on the literature that examines and discusses how private security actors interact with other actors (under both the provision of the state and in relation to non-state providers). As mentioned, this body of literature focuses on how the actors in the private security industry relate to other bodies who have a stake, in some form, in the provision of security. It examines the interactions on an inter-organisational platform and thus addresses issues on the level of the partnerships and networks that comprise these relationships.

A substantial body of literature exists which specifically speaks to the overlap of the public police in relation to the providers of private security (see, for instance, Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Rigakos, 2002; Shearing, 1992; Stenning, 2000). This overlap is constituted in multiple ways. In other words, to use Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) categorisation, the overlap is multifaceted, as it operates on the platform of the similitude of the mentalities of the actors in both these fields, as well as the technologies and resources employed by both. Indeed, there are two mentalities prevalent in the field of the governance of security: “proactive prevention [and] reactive punishment” (Johnston & Shearing, 2003: 16), with the result that: “the governance of security is messier than it once was” (Ibid., 17).

Given that the literature speaks to the myriad areas of similitude between the public police and private security, Stenning’s (2000: 328) assertion that: “…it is now almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public police which is not, somewhere and under some circumstances, assumed and performed by private police in democratic societies”. Thus, there are many actors who perform the work of ‘security’, however, multifaceted and nuanced in meaning the term ‘security’ tends to be and notwithstanding the difficulties scholars focusing on security governance experience in articulating a precise definition of the word security (Zedner, 2003). The point is that there are a multitude of actors who undertake the function of policing; where the definition
of policing is aligned with that of Shearing’s (1992), namely, that: “Policing…refers to the preservation of the peace, that is, to the maintenance of doing things where persons and property are free from unwarranted interference so that people may go about their business safely” (Shearing, 1992: 399-400).

It is the configuration of a complex network or web of relationships between many state and non-state providers of security that gives rise to what Shearing terms “the pluralist conception” (Shearing, 1992: 425) regarding the provision of security. Similarly, this “pluralisation” (Shearing, 1992: 421) of provision reflects a theoretical and empirical shift away from the state as being the sole or even the apex actor in the provision of security (Johnston and Shearing, 2003).

Stenning’s 2009 study further refines the concept of the pluralisation and overlap that exists between the public police and the private security industry. His quotation indicates that it is almost a ‘given’ that this overlap exists; and that other factors supra to it render the public police versus private security binary as superfluous and redundant. (Ibid., 25).

Indeed, the proliferation of those who seek to provide security is also a function of the increased level of both intra-national and supranational crises, whether they be environmental (in the case of climate change), or mass migrations of refugees or the threat of terrorism and pandemics - all are examples of the multiple threats to security and crises that have become not only national, but supranational issues. The ‘shrinking’ of the world as a function of the increased porosity of national and international borders and the exponential growth of technology are among the key drivers resulting in the multi-layered expansion of crises that need to be policed (Management Summary: The Police in Evolution, 2006: 11). The extensive literature on the “pluralisation” (Shearing, 1992: 421) of both sets of actors’ roles in the performance of policing and governance, again highlights the mutable and amorphous nature of the boundary between what the public police do, versus what the actors in the private security industry do, particularly given the increasingly complex nature of the harms that have evolved and the geographical terrain wherein these harms play out.
Further, Crawford (2006b) in his elucidation of consumers who have the buying power to subscribe to the ‘club goods’ mentality through their choice of security provision, illustrates another example of the nature of private security as being a part of a network of actors who all have some stake in the provision of security. ‘Club goods’ refers to the buying power that essentially gives (affluent) consumers in the security market the freedom to assemble a package of security (drawing from a combination of state and/or non-state bodies) that is tailored to fit their specific set of needs. This ‘bespoke’ security solution grants those who can afford it membership to a club, one that excludes those who cannot afford to pick, choose and purchase private security in this way. Put differently, the notion of the public good of private security is circumscribed given the economic barriers to entry into this club in that one’s membership depends on one’s socio-economic status.

As mentioned earlier, the ‘plural’ nature of security has key implications for human rights. One of the main implications is that of the exclusionary nature of private security. In this vein, Leman-Langlois and Shearing (2009) map the challenges that the increasing security armoury - in both a literal and a figurative sense - presents to the protection of human rights. They also outline strategies to bolster these rights in the face of this increasingly ‘securitised’ landscape.

In line with a focus on the social as opposed to the economic implications that flow from the pluralisation of security provision, Jones and Newburn (1998) examine the relational implications that result from the provision of security delivered by both the public police and by private security in the United Kingdom (UK). They look at the forms and degree of partnerships and cooperation (and lack thereof) between private security and the public police. Their research furnishes further evidence of the increasingly permeable boundaries between public policing and the private security industry and examines the degrees of connection (and disconnection) of the broad range of organisations that constitute the remit of policing.

Several other scholars have also examined and discussed the relational dynamics between the public police and private security. For instance, Manzo, (2010) and
Berndtsson and Stern’s (2011) research foreground two predominant relational modes between the public police and private security: “…a model that emphasises either a competitive or a collaborative relationship” (Diphoorn & Berg, 2013: 1). However, the latter propose a different relational model to make sense of the public police/private security relationship, one that proposes that the public police/private security dyad contains elements of both competition and collaboration. This research focuses on patterns of policing partnership in South Africa and will be unpacked in greater detail under the South African literature section of this chapter.

In sum, “The idea that the public police no longer (if they ever did) have a monopoly over policing provision has now become a truism” (Bayley & Shearing, 1996:22 in Stenning 2009:22) has become an overarching tenet throughout the literature on the provision of security.

Dupont (2004) adds to the pluralisation conversation and eschews the problematisation of the binary distinction of the state versus the non-state in the provision of security. Instead, in *Security in the Age of Networks* (2004) he refines the concept of plurality within the field of security by focussing on the range of networked configurations that provide security and that draw on both state and private auspices and actors. In other words, his position illustrates the existence of a range or network of actors who provide policing and security governance from the perspective of a “nodal framework [of] the governance of security” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003:151). This demonstrates that the scholarly literature on private security is heading off in a new direction - one that explores the networks of relationships that exist between private security and other players (both state and non-state) in the field of the provision of security.

2.1.3. Regulation of the private security industry

This third area of enquiry focuses on the literature that addresses the issue of how the ‘node’ (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) of private security is regulated within itself, and, in addition, how is it regulated in relation to other bodies that
have a stake in the provision of security. This will comprise a discussion of the body of literature that focuses on a synthesis of the first two areas of enquiry in that it addresses questions, it examines regulation on both an intra- and an inter-organisational level.

This section will also include an examination of and a discussion around the reality of the degree of regulation of the industry in various countries and from various theoretical, analytical, operational and empirical viewpoints. The nature and the extent of regulation of any industry has several implications for how accountable that industry is, and to whom it is accountable. Accountability as a function of the regulation of the private security industry will thus also be examined in this section. Many scholars have focussed on regulatory issues when mapping the private security literature. The regulatory lens foregrounds normative issues pertaining to how and what shape the regulation of the industry should take. White (2010) defines regulation in relation to the private security industry along two dimensions, those he terms the “reformers” and the “re-legitimators” in this way:

For the reformers [those who seek to ‘clean-up’ the industry] regulation provides a mechanism through which to shape the activities of the private security industry. For the re-legitimators, [those who seek to align private security with the state] regulation provides a mechanism through which to capture the much-needed resource of legitimacy from the state, thereby enhancing the attractiveness of their services in the security sector market place (White, 2010: 17).

Further, Braithwaite argues that: “Efficacious regulation should speak to the diverse objectives of regulated firms, industry associations, and individuals within them” (1992:4). Given the often-tremendous degree of power - both symbolic and literal - (Stenning, 2009) vested in those who are mandated either through state or non-state auspices to maximise social order and minimise harms in the lives of citizens, the issue of the regulation (and its implications) forms an integral part of the literature on private security.
Looking to the literature on the nature and extent of regulation of the private security industry on an international platform, White, 2010; Button, 2007b; and Prenzler and Sarre, 2007; trace the trajectory of the regulation of the industry in the UK, Europe and Australia respectively. They map the processes resulting in an increasingly regulated private security industry in these places that comprise both global North and global South domains. All three of these scholars emphasise the importance of regulating processes through state legislation; where state legislation is used to create a ‘best-practice’ model through adherence to legislated industry governance standards.

In contradistinction to this trend of increasing regulation as described here, Manning asserts that the United States (US) exhibits a different trend: “There is very little perceived competition, tension or concern about the growth or size of private policing in America… They are legitimate but relatively unregulated” (Manning, 2006: 111 in White, 2010: 183). Manning attributes this to “…the deeply embedded capitalist free-market ideology which seems to permeate most aspects of American life, including the domestic security sector” (Ibid.). He thus highlights the correlation between de-regulation and a neoliberal ideology and practice where the market takes primacy over all else in relation to issues of regulation. This primacy of the market has key implications for those who work in the South African private security industry. These implications will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five.

Further, Zedner (2006) focusses on the implications that flow from a regulatory framing of private security in commercial terms, wherein profit trumps people’s civil rights. Her framing of an ‘unholy alliance’ of a state that ‘pimps’ out private security as hired guns to those who can pay for it highlights the deleterious impact on the rights of the individual that a strictly transactional, business model tends to foster. Other scholars have also focussed on regulatory factors and their implications, given the ever-broadening spectrum of both the responsibilities and the spaces wherein private security is tasked to operate. (See, for instance, Button, 2003; and Shearing and Stenning, 1983).
In sum, the nature and extent of the regulatory practices of various countries can be plotted along a ‘continuum’. The myriad social, economic and political implications that flow from these calibrations of regulation of the industry all give rise to questions that are salient within these spheres of human existence.

The regulation of the private security industry in South Africa will be discussed further in this chapter, along with a focus on some key implications of the current status of regulation of the industry in this country. This will link with an examination in Chapters Four and Five of the effects of regulation on the people of South Africa, in addition to the effects on those who work in the industry.

2.1.4. Governance in relation to the private security industry

Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Wood and Shearing (2007) both define the concept of governance as a system designed to order the flow of events in peoples’ lives with the objective of providing maximum security and a concomitant minimisation of the risk of harms befalling people. These scholars posit a system of “nodal governance” (Johnston & Shearing, 2003: 145) to accomplish this objective. This concept of governance will now be discussed, along with two others that still have traction in the contemporary security governance landscape. These three frameworks that conceptualise governance are broadly outlined here to provide a picture of the role and reach of the state (and, by extension the reach of the state-mandated public police) and the implications that each system has for the private security industry.

2.1.5. The legacy of Thomas Hobbes - The state as the only actor

Hobbes’s *Leviathan* (1651) remains a tenacious symbol of the abiding notion of a centralised (that is, a state-centred) hierarchically-ordered configuration of security governance. In addition, it underscores the longevity of the belief that a state-centred configuration of governance is in some way preferable to, or superior over, a polycentric (Ostrom, 1961) or plural configuration; that is, one in which many actors (both state and non-state) participate in the provision of
security. The monocentric model views the public police as the sole arbiters and enforcers of law and order and as the only legitimate organ through which the state can ensure the safety of its citizenry.

2.1.6. **State-anchored pluralism - the state as the apex actor**

Following on and in line with the above, Loader and Walker (2007) argue that whilst security can, indeed, should be “pluralized” (Stenning, 2009: 22) in that it incorporates both state and non-state actors, the state can, indeed, should be the primary actor in this configuration of security governance. They argue that as the primary actor, the state’s role and reach involves “the democratic state [having] a necessary and virtuous part to play in seeking to realize the good of security…” (2007:4). Their conceptualisation of a state anchored pluralism (Ibid.,195) places the state at the front and centre of the ordering of the governance of security. The position taken here is that the state has the capacity to achieve public goods in the provision of security.

2.1.7. **Nodal governance - the state as one actor amongst many**

Other scholars who have looked at the provision of public goods, such as Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, (1961) do not dismiss the state, they merely view the state as one of many actors in the provision of both tangible and intangible goods and services. In other words, the view of plural providers of security governance is one that is characterised by the devolution of power to other actors in a participatory and decentralised fashion that maximises accountability and responsibility whilst minimising the potential for abuse of ultimate power flowing from an omnipotent (state) actor.

This notion of local provision of security dovetails with the nodal concept of governance as also postulated by, for instance, Bayley and Shearing (2001) Berg (2015) Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Wood and Shearing (2007). Broadly speaking, the nodal concept has some deep roots in Hayekian theory. Whilst an exposition of the fullness of Hayek’s theory is outside of the scope of this dissertation, suffice it to say that “knowledge...never exists in concentrated or
integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of knowledge which all the separate individuals [in a society] possess” (Hayek, 1945: 1). This idea of knowledge (whether in the ambit of economics, or in line with this dissertation, in relation to the provision of security) as being a composite and a function of the many as opposed to the exclusive domain of a single entity (such as ‘the state’) is foundational to some of the key tenets of nodal governance as being key to the efficient and effective provision of security. Further, Burris, Drahos and Shearing (2005) focus on this subject and provide case studies that illustrate the varying degrees of democracy and transparency that may or may not accrue to this nodal configuration.

Put differently, a centralised system of governance embodied by the state is too far away (literally and figuratively) from the localised needs of particular communities in specific contexts to be able to adequately and efficiently meet those needs. In broad terms and in relation to private security, this translates into the state not being able to accurately assess the needs of localised communities regarding their security needs, let alone being able to resource them. It is as a solution to this sense of a monolithic and cumbersome state that: “[The] nodal account recognizes networks, partnerships, markets and states as sources of governance and locates such sources within a field of organizational nodes” (Wood & Shearing, 2007: 11).²

2.1.8. Legitimacy and (in)security in relation to the private security industry

Issues of legitimacy that accrue to the private security industry considers how each of the themes presented in this literature review speak to the industry’s ‘lawfulness’ from the viewpoint of the providers of private security in relation to themselves, to the public police and to the general public. Put differently, issues around the degree of legitimacy that the providers of private security have

² Nodal governance is the analytic framework within which this dissertation is positioned. In addition, the underlying tenets of the nodal position in relation to the governance of security governance form both the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of this work.
in relation to one other (that is, between security companies), secondly, between the providers of private security and the public police and lastly, between that private security industry and the public are the next focus area.

The research of Prenzler and Sarre (2007) and White (2010) are two examples of literature that examine legitimacy in the private security industry, an industry that was initially vilified and looked down upon, and rose to occupy a position of equality with the public police through being conferred with the “element of statehood” (White, 2010: 180). These authors view legitimacy as a function of industry regulation. This alignment with and endorsement by the state harks back to both Hobbes and state-anchored pluralism as outlined in the previous discussion on governance. In the former, the state has \textit{a priori} legitimacy because it is the state. In the latter, that is, the notion of the state as anchor, there exists a positive correlation between state endorsement and legitimacy.

Some of the questions to be considered in relation to this theme are highlighted through the literature: What confers legitimacy on the actors in this industry? This question can be asked in relation to each of the preceding themes: For instance, given the “pluralization of security provision” (Stenning, 2009: 22) - do the public police confer legitimacy on the private security industry? Or is the position the other way around? Or when focussing on the global North literature, is legitimacy in the industry a function of a democratic meeting of broad-based community needs and the subsequent fulfilment of public interests that may flow from it? (Loader and Walker, 2007). Or is it a function of the regulatory structures that seek to professionalise the industry with the objective on placing it ‘on par with’ the legitimacy enjoyed (in certain countries) in relation to the state and the public police? (White, 2010).

A section of the literature that focusses on legitimacy of the private security industry is informed by research that asserts that the actors in this field feel compelled to ‘justify’ their position in relation to their work. In a study undertaken by Löfstrand, Loftus & Loader (2015:1), the research findings indicate “that the occupational culture of security officers enhances self-esteem by infusing security work with a sense of purpose” and that they “… Employ a
range of strategies to deflect scorn and reframe their work as important and necessary”. It is within this context that Loader and White (2015), Loader, Goold and Thumala (2014) and Thumala, Goold and Loader (2011) examine the various ‘legitimating practices’ that the providers of private security engage in to increase their esteem both in their own eyes and in the eyes of society. Their research indicates that the mentalities of the actors in the private security industry is characterised by a “physical taint”, a “social taint” and a “moral taint”. (Löfstrand, Loftus & Loader, 2015: 3, italics in original).

Loader and Walker (2007) further demonstrate the correlation between legitimacy of the private security industry and the state by linking it with the proposal that private security can and should be a public good driven under the auspices of the state. Furthermore, Loader, White and Thumala (2014) argue that viewing security provision in a commodified way, as something that is bought and sold in relation to the sole driving force of market factors, is only one part of a bigger picture. The latter view the “buying and selling of security [as being] a morally charged and contested practice of governance” (Loader, White & Thumala, 2014: 469). They argue that the common method of analysing private security industry is predominantly understood through a focus on economics. They propose that this sole focus on the market of private security provision through an economic lens fails to address issues of the “unease and ambivalence” (Ibid., 470) that adheres to both the buyers and the sellers of private security as illustrated by the legitimating practices referred to in the previous paragraph.

Loader and Walker’s (2007) thesis that the provision of private security can be mobilised for the good of all in society is one that can (and should) be imagined, and can (and should) be operationalised. One of the key questions asked by these authors is: “Can one create institutions [private security companies] with the capacity to regulate the trade in protective products not just ‘for efficiency’ (Radin, 1996:108), but in order to give effect to and protect the full range of social and political values upon which markets for security impinge?” (Loader, Goold & Thumala, 2014:485).
In short, Loader and White (2015) posit that private security can and should be democratically provided. The position they take in their 2015 paper highlights their belief that a market economy is not a sufficient condition for the provision of private security, as economics prevents vast swathes of (poor) populations from accessing the goods and services provided by private security.

This concludes the review of the literature that focusses on private security from an international perspective. The following section of the literature review will narrow the focus through mapping the literature that pertains to Africa.

2.2. AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE, WITH A FOCUS ON SOUTH AFRICA

2.2.1. Private security performance and mentalities

The focus will now shift to the global South literature, with a specific focus on the African perspective. As mentioned at the outset of this Chapter, this will comprise a separate section of the literature review given the salient differences between the way security is performed in Africa in comparison to how it is performed in the rest of the world (see, for instance, Diphoom, 2013).

Kempa and Singh’s (2007) research on the mentalities of the providers of private security in South Africa describes those mentalities as being characterised by a coercive, exclusionary and racist way of thinking and doing that illustrates the exclusion of most of the population in favour of the inclusion of the few. This coercive, exclusionary and racist mentality is underscored by further studies by these scholars (Singh, 2005; Singh and Kempa, 2007) wherein the ubiquitous, plural nature of private security in South Africa along with a mentality that they describe as militaristic is examined and discussed. The military mentality is one that they view as orientated towards punishment, coercion and racism.

As we have argued, between the two [public policing and private security] there are elements of both convergence and complementarity; together, troublingly, they add up to an increasingly coherent security regime that both reflects and amplifies some of the most disturbing aspects of the marketised political economy of our day (Singh & Kempa, 2007: 316).
They further discuss the negative implications that this mentality has for the freedom and fundamental rights of the individual (especially those who are poor).

Further, Kempa and Singh (2008) focus on the issue of what policing means in post-apartheid South Africa, and they track the developments from the viewpoint of the resources (both human and inanimate) and the technologies utilised under the relatively young South African democracy post-1994. As mentioned, they argue that the literal and figurative threat of the use of coercive and punitive techniques in the governance of harms parallels much of the human rights abuses that occurred under the political hegemony of the pre-democratic Nationalist Party government in South Africa. The trend of the private security industry in South Africa to ‘regress’ to restriction, punishment, limitation and proscription in the governance of harms speaks to a coercive mentality that is operationalised through the employment of resources and technologies (Marks, 2004; Singh, 2008). This mentality is further elucidated in Singh’s (2005) paper, in which she highlights the use of coercive practices in the governance of harms in addition to the shaping of behaviour to conform with the hegemonic, normative narrative of what constitutes societally-sanctioned ‘good orderly conduct’ (Marks, 2007; Singh, 2005).

Berg (2010) further articulates the relationship between the space to be governed - that is, the context wherein private security performs its operations; in relation to the ways in which they think about what they do as impacting upon and informing how they go about doing it. In other words, her 2010 paper illustrates how different resources and technologies used in different contexts inform the mentalities of the providers of private security in different ways. Her paper delineates three different South African contexts wherein private security operates within the remit of “governing security” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 12) and demonstrates how the different range of resources and technologies that flow from these mentalities inform the way in which the provision of security is accomplished. Put differently, the mentalities of the providers of private security are informed by a way of thinking and doing that is often context-dependent.
The upshot of this is that the mentality of private security is oftentimes a function of who is to be policed as much as where this policing takes place (Berg, 2010).

Diphoorn (2013) provides an ethnographic view of the way armed reaction officers in the private security industry undertake what she describes as their “performances” (2013:234) and the meanings they ascribe to what they do and how they do it. In addition, Diphoorn examines how (predominantly white) affluent South Africans construct the dominant theme of crime as being perpetrated by a criminal who is typified as black, male, young and poor. The notion of the social construction of reality is foregrounded in her work as a self-perpetuating notion that is not a fixed immutable reality, but is woven into the narrative of the lives of middle- and upper-class South Africans and is perpetuated through a series of literal and figurative iterations. This is further elaborated through her assertion that: “…race is a social construction that is generated, moulded, and reified through social practices” (2015:4).

2.2.2. Private security as it relates to others

Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) highlight the theoretical and empirical realities of the providers of private security through what they term the “global security assemblages” (Abrahamsen & Williams 2011:122) that have been formed to protect key national resources on the African continent. Their case studies illustrate how the binary between state and non-state providers of security no longer has overriding theoretical traction nor the state/non-state binary the prevailing empirical reality. Instead, they look at the range of actors who form part of the complex of the provision of security. Albrecht and Moe (2014) expand on this notion of a complex of security provision through their focus on a conceptual framing of the provision of security in terms of “hybridity” (2014:1) wherein they trace the contours of the complex web formed by state and non-state actors in this landscape. Both sets of authors cited here focus on Africa. They do so in the context of “limited statehood” (Börzel & Risse, 2015:1) and states that are characterised as fragile and/or failing on the
African continent (Börzel and Risse, 2010; 2015) from the standpoint of governance.

In addition to the global South literature on the topic of the blurring of the state/non-state boundaries as examined and discussed by Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) and Albrecht and Moe (2014) there are several key scholars who speak to the state/non-state overlap and the consequent theoretical and empirical reality of “the contemporary pluralised landscape” (Diphoorn & Berg, 2013: 1). It is to this topic that I now turn.

2.2.3. Plural policing in South Africa

Many scholars have focussed partnerships and plural policing configurations in South Africa. Some seminal works are those of Baker (2002), Berg (2004), Bénit-Gbaffou (2013), Marks (2007) and Minnaar (2005). All focus on the nature and the extent of partnerships in policing though an examination of the various partnerships (or lack thereof) between agglomerations constituted by coalitions between the public police, private security and/or civil society. In relation to the empirical reality of the overlap between what the public police and the private police ‘do’ in that private security “increasingly also engages in law enforcement duties in public spaces” (Berg, 2010: 289), the state of the partnership appears to be somewhat fractious at times:

...against the backdrop of the existing high levels of crime in South Africa where the state law enforcement and policing agencies are understaffed…and overworked, it stands to reason that any assistance …[that] the private security industry can render would be welcomed. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case in South Africa (Minnaar, 2005: 85).

In addition, Diphoorn and Berg (2013) focus on the nature and extent of the links between private security and the South African Police Services (the SAPS) and they characterise the types and degrees of cooperation and coordination that exists between private security and the public police. Diphoorn and Berg (2013)
identify and discuss various relational modalities that exist between the providers of private security and the public police and map the six stages that typify the evolution of the relationship between the public police and private security as proposed by Stenning (1989). They conclude that: “A main difference between…forms of partnering concerns the policing mentality that steers these practices” (Diphoorn & Berg, 2013: 15). This again speaks to how perception (both of oneself and the other) is key in shaping the way private security is both thought about and operationalised.

In summary, many scholars have focussed on the negative effects that the mentalities that prevail in the private security industry have on (especially) the poorest and most vulnerable members of South African society. This last section has sought to highlight the similarly deleterious effects of the various agglomerations of power that comprise plural policing. Put differently, it examines the threats that these alliances, regardless of their particular governance configuration; pose to human rights.

It is to issues of regulation of the private security industry in South Africa that I now turn.

2.3. Regulation of the private security industry

In relation to an examination of how the node as postulated by Johnston and Shearing (2003) of private security is regulated within itself, and how is it regulated in relation to other bodies that have a stake in the provision of security, Berg and Nouveau (2011) map three phases of regulation of the private security industry in South Africa. They track the evolution of industry regulation from the “The first phase - apartheid-era regulation” (2011: 25) through to the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 (‘The Act’) that was promulgated post-apartheid. In so doing, they map out the regulatory recalibrations pre- and post-apartheid by tracking the changes in legislation of the industry in South Africa within the pre- and post-1994 context and the concomitant changing political dispensation.
The Act as it currently contemplated speaks to a state-centred set of rules regulating the private security industry. This normative ‘top-down’ legislation exemplifies the state’s position as an ‘anchoring mechanism’, in as much as it provides a set of instructions for how private security will be regulated under state auspices. This positioning of The Act has several implications, the main one as outlined here:

A major implication of this legislation that maps out the regulation and governance of the private security industry in South Africa has several knock-on effects that are not conducive to fostering and protecting the public good. This means that The Act views private security as a commodity that can be bought and sold, and it is relatively silent on the notion of private security as a public good that encompasses the key concepts of the equitable provision of security that is responsive to the needs of the people it serves. In other words, the current state of regulation and governance of the private security industry in South Africa as contemplated by The Act is succinctly summed up thus:


In summary, the regulation of the private security industry in South Africa, as contemplated by the legislation and the promulgation of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) is founded upon and operationalised through economic drivers. Whilst one of the major implications of the industry regulator as being market-driven and market-focused has already been discussed in the previous paragraph, there are several others that have a marked impact on the mentalities of the providers of private security in South Africa. These effects will be unpacked and discussed in tandem with the research findings and a discussion of these findings in Chapter Four of this dissertation.
2.3.1. **Weighing up legitimacy of the saps versus that of private security**

As discussed earlier in this Chapter, the literature in relation Europe, Australia and the UK (see, for example, Button, 2007b; Prenzler and Sarre 1998 and White, 2010) flows from state-sanctioned regulation, wherein the enactment of regulation and governance activities aim to bring a former disdained industry into a space where they are ‘legal’, and essentially, where they ‘belong’. In other words, legitimacy denotes a sense of ‘lawfulness’ and of ownership of praxis and agency within the remit of the provision of private security to the extent that it is endorsed by the state (White, 2010).

However, the situation in South Africa is somewhat different, in that the SAPS are ‘legitimate’, regardless of their ‘uselessness.’ Several scholars, such as Bradford et al., (2014), Minnaar (2010) and Shaw (2002) have focussed on the nexus between the SAPS’s legitimacy as being a coefficient of their effectiveness. In other words, in South Africa the test of the public police’s legitimacy is not the measured according to their ability to manifest justice or parity, it is their effectiveness as crime fighters that counts.

Berg (2010), Cooper-Knock (2016), Diphoorn (2013) and Marks (2007) have also addressed the question of what legitimacy in relation to the governance of security in South Africa looks like. These authors examine whether the resources and technologies that are employed by private security, such as their weaponry, their uniforms and insignia, and their emulation of the other trappings of the public police furnish them with a sense of legitimacy, particularly in relation to these being the necessary accoutrements (in their eyes, as much as in the eyes of others) in their role as crime fighters.

Further, the lack of legitimacy of the police in post-1994 South Africa is illustrated by Cooper-Knock (2016). Citizens who fall prey to crime are apt to view the police as being the ‘last port of call’ (recall Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) description of the public police’s reactive (as opposed to a proactive, risk-orientated mentality) when dealing with the aftermath of crime.
Diphoorn (2103) also speaks to issues of legitimacy as being key to the mentalities of those who work as providers of private security. Indeed, one of the themes of her 2013 ethnography is that the private security industry is constantly negotiating and re-negotiating its space in respect to its clients, the state and with the various non-state bodies with which it interfaces. The sense of a constantly-changing terrain that shapes the mentalities of those who work in the industry is summed up in the closing lines of her thesis, when she asks an armed reaction officer what he actually does. His response is telling:

I just try to help people, but it’s not easy. All this crime, this violence. It’s pretty damn dark, and there is not a lot of light to guide us. We do what the police do, but we’re not them. We are somewhere halfway (Diphoorn, 2013: 277).

However, in the South African context, the question is whether the SAPS have ever enjoyed a broad base of legitimacy in relation to those whom they are mandated to police. This in turn begs the question of whether private security providers are seen as more, or less, or equally legitimate in relation to the SAPS.

2.4. Conclusion

My objective in this Chapter has been to provide an overview of what scholars have written on the topic of private security from a global perspective. Thereafter I narrowed the focus down to literature pertaining to private security on the African continent, before bringing the focus onto the South African literature in particular.

The following chapter, Chapter Three, looks at the methods and the means of data analysis I employed to answer the research question.

Thereafter, in Chapter Four, I will present and discuss my research findings flowing from the data array that was formulated on the back of the collection and analysis of the raw data.
Chapter Five concludes this dissertation and will examine issues related to factors conducive to how plural policing arrangements may be reconfigured as public goods; where the public police no longer have the monopoly on policing. Secondly, it will examine and discuss some key effects that the current state of private security may have on moulding the mentalities of those who work in it. Thirdly, it will look at some normative issues with respect to the accountability that currently accrues to the private security industry, and it asks what changes could be made to ensure a more democratic dispensation regarding the provision of private security.
3. RESEARCH METHODS

3.1. AN OVERVIEW

This chapter is divided into six sections. In the first section, I will discuss the paradigmatic lens through which I have chosen to answer the research question. A paradigm, or worldview, is described as an “accepted model or pattern” that represents the “deepest set of beliefs about how the world works.” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2004). A paradigm embraces a particular epistemological position, that is, a ‘way of knowing things’; in addition to a particular ontological framework, that is, ‘what the nature of the world, or reality, is’.

The second section will comprise a discussion of the analytical framework within which this research is situated, that is, the analytic of “nodal security governance” as espoused by Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Dupont, 2004; and Wood & Shearing, 2006; amongst several other scholars.

In the third section, I will outline the research design by providing a broad outline of how the research was implemented.

The fourth section provides an examination and discussion of the methods that I have employed to answer the research question. In short, two types of qualitative interviewing techniques will be detailed in this section; along with a justification for the employment of these specific variants of qualitative interviews.

The fifth section will examine and discuss some of the key challenges and limitations that accrue to this type of research, coupled with a discussion of the ways in which I have attempted to ameliorate the impact of these factors on the quality of my research findings.

In the sixth section, I provide an examination and discussion of the ethical considerations to which this research gives rise, along with a focus on the steps I employed to ensure that I have complied with a sound set of principles qua the ethics of research carried out with human beings.
3.2. THE RESEARCH PARADIGM

As mentioned in the introduction, the use of one specific lens as opposed to the use of other paradigmatic lenses when undertaking research has key implications for the production of knowledge within the ambit of scholastic research. Traditionally, the binary notion held that the quantitative method of knowledge production was the research paradigm employed within the natural sciences, whilst the production of knowledge through research in the realm of the social sciences was undertaken through the qualitative paradigm (Bryman, 1988). In other words, the traditional characterisation of the ‘opposing’ paradigms emphasised a difference between quantitative, positivistic, deductive methods of knowledge production employed by researchers in the natural sciences; as opposed to the qualitative, interpretivist, inductive methods of knowledge production that are largely associated with research in the social sciences (Bryman, 1988)

A detailed mapping of the above discussion reaches into the realm of the philosophy of science and is outside the purview of this dissertation. Suffice it to say that in this dissertation I make use of the qualitative method of knowledge production. Given that the qualitative method is employed to answer the research question, in this section I aim to discuss specific variants of the qualitative method of data collection and analysis as the research paradigm that I view as being the ‘best fit’ to address the questions (and elicit the responses) that this dissertation seeks to answer. In addition, in this section, I will provide a substantiation for my use of the qualitative paradigm in this dissertation.

3.2.1. The qualitative method

The qualitative method of research takes the view that there is an inextricable and recursive link between the researcher (the observer) and that which is researched (the observed). In other words, one of the fundamental underlying presuppositions of the qualitative paradigm is that knowledge production is a
function of the co-creation of meaning between the observer and the observed in a recursive, re-iterative system of feedback (Bateson, 1973).

Seeing through this paradigmic lens leads to several key epistemological and ontological implications about the nature of reality. Lincoln and Guba (1985) make the point that realities are mutable, they are not fixed and they are predicated on the creation of meaning through the interaction of the researcher and the research participant. The qualitative paradigm views reality as a construction between the observer and the observed, and seeks to produce knowledge in an inductive, case-by-case process that allows for meanings to be generated and interpreted within the social realm. In the interpretivist position, Willis (2007) delineates this co-creation and production of a shared reality and constitutes the research framework and method of inquiry that this dissertation adopts. Thus, a key implication of framing research within the qualitative paradigm is that the emphasis is on an understanding of the worldview of the other.

This places reflexivity at the centre of my research effort, in that my objective as researcher is to maximise my chances of understanding the worldview of those who work in the private security industry through a series of processes that include description, exploration and reiteration through asking questions; using two types of interviewing processes. Furthermore, “In the postmodern view, there is no “objective” reality independent of our subjective experiences” (Babbie, 2010: 28). Given that this statement is a foundational tenet in relation to the generation of meaning in this research, its implications will be examined and discussed throughout this chapter.

3.3. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMING OF THIS RESEARCH

3.3.1. An overview of the concept of Nodal Governance

I have opted to choose nodal governance as described by Johnston and Shearing (2001; 2003) as the analytical framing in this dissertation. One of the main theoretical tenets underlying the analytic of nodal governance, postulates that a
nodal orientation towards governance is that of communication, collaboration and participation through a systemic interchange of tangible (objects or material) ‘things’ and intangible entities (such as information). Within this framework and in the context of this dissertation, nodal governance does not take the view that the governance of security and the provision of policing must necessarily be provided in a ‘top-down’ configuration by the state, nor that it is indeed the exclusive prerogative of the state. Instead, the concept of ‘nodality’ views the state as one actor amongst many qua the provision of policing and the “governance of security” (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 13).

Johnston and Shearing (2003) assert that nodes have particular mentalities (that is, ways of thinking about what they do), they employ specific technologies and perform particular practices within various institutions in order to achieve their aims and objectives. For instance, and in relation to the private security industry as viewed through the conceptual lens of nodal governance and policing, the mentality may be similar or dissimilar to that of the public police. The technologies that private security employs may include surveillance mechanisms such as closed-circuit television (CCTV), firearms, handcuffs, and conducted energy weapons, (commonly known as tasers) to fulfil their mandate of protecting their clients’ person and property.

Whatever the properties that accrue to a specific node, the point is that a nodal system of government eschews the notion of a sovereign (the state) normatively being at the apex of the constellation that provides security. Thus, although the state may be at the apex of the provision of security (in certain countries and/or at certain temporal junctures), this is an empirical question, rather than a normative ‘given’. What I wish to highlight here is that the provision of security may, in fact, be typified by a flat configuration of interconnecting systems that are comprised of many nodes as opposed to a hierarchically structured matrix with the state as apex actor. Again, this is an empirical question.

In other words, theoretically and empirically speaking, nodes are not necessarily homogenous entities when compared to one another. For instance, and using the
concept of “security governance” (Johnston & Shearing, 2003: 13), some nodes are ‘strong and powerful’ whilst others are relatively ‘weak’. Their strength or weakness can be measured as a function of the resources that accrue to that specific node. For example, economic or political power may accrue to certain nodes more than to other nodes. However, the strength of a node is also dependent on the strength and number of its links to other nodes. In addition, Burris, Drahos and Shearing (2005) illustrate how weak nodes can ‘co-opt’ stronger nodes with the aim of creating power and legitimacy.

An example of this in terms of the provision of policing, would be a suburban neighbourhood watch partnering with a suburban private security company, who in turn partners with a community policing forum that functions under the auspices of a local branch of the SAPS. A salient point here is that a “polycentric” (Berg, Ph.D. thesis, 2015) system of governance adheres to power and praxis as being spread horizontally across a nodal configuration so that it can deal more effectively with problems on a localised, as opposed to a centralised, level of security governance. In other words, within this analytical framing, the police are important actors in the provision of safety, however, they are not the most important or most powerful actors. Instead, they are one amongst many different sets of actors that collaborate and participate in that node in the provision of safety. It is a ‘flat’, participatory style of governance. Put differently, policing, security and governance is no longer the sole prerogative of the state - there exist a myriad of non-state actors. To wit: “States are not the only nodes where power can be concentrated” (Wood & Shearing, 2007: 102).

In relation to my research, the companies that comprise the private security industry in South Africa are part of a nodal constellation in a networked configuration of stakeholders, all of whom have an interest in the provision of policing and the maintenance of order in South African society. One of the key reasons that I chose to opt for a nodal framing is that it is conducive to an analysis of the nature of the mentalities of the providers of private security without allowing a normative framework to affect my research findings. Put differently, my adoption of a nodal framing facilitates the ‘seeing’ of the node
of private security unhindered by the strictures of a rule-bound set of expectations of what that node ‘should’, normatively speaking, look like.

3.4. RESEARCH DESIGN

As mentioned, this section will elucidate the systematic outline I developed for the study, and outlines the research ‘vehicle’ I used to systematically collect my data. In other words, I will outline the research design along with the reasons for having chosen the case study as being the best ‘fit’ to fulfil the objective of exploring the mentalities of the actors in the private security industry within the company that I have selected to study.

3.5. THE CASE STUDY

The attributes of the qualitative case study as a research design through which to gather data provided the best ‘fit’ in relation to the research question that I sought to answer. The reasons for this choice included an appraisal of the following objectives in this research: I chose the case study as my research aimed to focus in an in-depth manner on the mentalities of the actors in one private security company. It was thus a “single-case” design (Yin, 2009) in that one security company was the focus of the research, in addition to its being an embedded case which gave it its spatial and temporal delineation. In other words, an “embedded” case (Stake, 2000: 130) is delineated both in terms of the timeframe in which the research data is collected, in addition to the area or space that constitutes the research site. In terms of the spatial aspect of the case study, it was delineated with the unit of analysis being each personnel member whom I interviewed who worked at one private security company in the southern suburbs of Cape Town. In terms of the temporal delineation of this case study, the process of conducting the interviews spanned several months in 2017.

Stake differentiates between three types of case study: “intrinsic, instrumental, [or] collective” (2000: 121-3). Given that my research objective in this dissertation is to explore the mentalities of private security providers to understand how they view their work in terms of the meanings they ascribe to what they do within their occupational remit, and in terms of Stake’s classification, my case study was an intrinsic one. As Stake
explains: “I call a study an “intrinsic case study” if the study is undertaken because, first and last, one wants a better understanding of this particular case” (2000: 121, italics in original).

In addition, Yin (1984) describes three categories of case study, namely: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory case studies. This case study sought to explore the ways the actors in a private security company thought about their work of providing security without framing it within a set of presuppositions. Stake asserts that: “A case study is both a process of inquiry about the case and the product of that inquiry” (2000: 121). Thus, as the case takes shape through an analysis of the data, it starts to take shape regarding its spatial and temporal boundaries, befitting its primary unit of analysis - the individuals who work as providers of private security services. Simultaneously, through the process of data-gathering and analysis the case is the product of the observations of the mentalities of those who were observed by me. To wit: “The purpose of a case…is not to represent the world, but to represent the case” (Stake, 2000: 142). The case study allows for the data to unfold in such a way that the ‘type’ of case study is often only determined at the end of the research. In other words, the data shapes the case study, and not the other way around.

Further, Lund (2014) makes the distinction between the following two questions which inform the design and analysis of the data gathered through the use of the case study. Both of these questions served to focus my attention on the objectives I had formulated through the choice of the case study as the research method in this work. They also highlighted the purpose of using this research method by keeping me mindful of the operational, methodological and conceptual clarity needed to carry out the research. Firstly, the question Lund (2014) asks is: “What is the case?” Secondly, he asks: “What is this a case of?” The answers to the former question is that it is a case of a private security company; and to the latter, that the case is one of an exploration of the mentalities of people who work in the private security industry.

The qualitative case study was chosen as a better fit than, for instance, a survey or a series of focus groups, because of the nature of the research question and the depth of the responses that the questions invited. A survey or a schedule of closed ended questions would not, I submit, have yielded the nuanced and “thick” (Geertz, 1973) data that I
received by allowing people to reflect on their answers and the thoughts and feelings that the questions engendered in terms of their responses.

This method of gathering and interpreting the data furnished me with a deep and nuanced sense of the mentalities of those who work in the private security industry. Whilst quantitative data collection is often viewed as objective in that it is deemed to be less likely to be contaminated by researcher bias and personal interpretations, the qualitative paradigm allows for maximum expression on the part of the participants and the maximum opportunity to obtain an in-depth view of the mentalities of workers in the private security field. To this end, the participants were drawn from a cross-section of the personnel who operate at different tiers within the company so as to obtain as broad a data array as possible.

3.6. RESEARCH METHODS

Two types of qualitative interviews were used to collect the data for this dissertation: The standardised open-ended interview; and the informal conversational interview.

3.6.1. The standardised open-ended interview

I used this interview format to when interviewing the participants in this study. These interviews were between 45-90 minutes’ duration, and were audio-taped, transcribed and analysed thematically by me. They were conducted on the premises of the private security company, in a room that was shielded as far as possible from the general control/operations room to minimise the noise and distraction factors. As mentioned in chapter three, I selected a cross section of employees in the company with different job designations and different key areas of responsibility with the aim of obtaining as broad a range of responses as possible.

The strength of this variant of qualitative interviewing is that all Respondents were asked the same questions in the same sequence so that all interviewees were given the opportunity to respond to the same questions as the rest of those
in the sample. The interview schedule (Appendix C) provided a framework to ensure that the questions asked by me were conducive to obtaining the maximum information pertaining to the research questions, whilst also allowing the participants the opportunity to elaborate and explore avenues not explicitly framed by the questions. The exploratory nature of the questions I posed allowed the participants to speak about their lived experience within the broad framework of the standardised open-ended interview, without a firm delineation of their experience in relation to specific aspects of their work. This allowed for the themes to develop in an organic fashion and to approximate a conversation of many voices, with many thematic threads woven through it. The research question is broad for this purpose - it does not seek to frame the participants’ views within a particular context in relation to the work that they do as providers of private security. In other words, the justification for this broad approach was that I aimed to desist from framing the participants’ answers to the semi-structured questions in any pre-determined, specific way in relation to their mentalities as providers of private security.

Probes were used for two reasons. Firstly, to invite the interviewees to expand upon their answers or to explore their responses further. Secondly, they were used in a recursive pattern of feedback between the interviewer and the interviewee. This feedback loop facilitated a clarification of the Respondents’ answers to be checked for meaning. This was key for controlling for any bias on my part as the interviewer to ensure that I was recording their meanings unfiltered through my worldview. In other words, I wanted to ensure that it was their mentalities that I was getting a picture of as opposed to framing their meanings within any preconceived notions of mine.

3.6.2. The informal conversational interview

This type of interview is generally loosely structured and takes place in spaces and at times where the atmosphere is not spatially or temporally structured for the gathering of data in an organized, sequential fashion.
I made use of this type of interviewing when I accompanied an armed response guard in the course of his daily duties for the day. This ‘ride-along’ allowed me the opportunity to gather information from him and from other employees we visited at various sites mandated by this company’s customers to secure.

However, whilst this interviewing format is loosely structured around a conversation, I kept the questions focused on topics that relate to the research question. The strength of this conversational style of data-gathering is that the guard with whom I rode along for the day, in addition to the other guards to whom I spoke at the various sites, were mostly forthcoming and open to responding to my questions. This was perhaps attributable to the space in which these conversations were conducted, that is, outside of the bounds of the company’s office environment.

Notwithstanding, I anticipated a weakness around this form of gathering data, in that I may have ended up with information that does not shed much light or provide much quality data on my research question. However, this was mitigated through my stance as the interviewer in that I endeavoured to remain open and non-directive whilst simultaneously being able to gather pithy information through astute observation and a conversational style.

3.7. DATA ANALYSIS

A contextualised thematic analysis was conducted on the raw data that I transcribed from the interviews. This thematic analysis was broadly based on Braun and Clarke’s (2014: 1947-1952) six stage method that takes one through the process of turning raw qualitative data into research findings though the identification, analysis and finally the writing up of themes from the transcribed interviews.

The operationalisation of these six phases included transcribing the interviews followed by reading the transcribed material several times to obtain a sense of overall themes that comprised the data array. A reading and re-reading of the Respondents’ narratives and descriptions were grouped into broad themes. These themes were then coded and re-read
to check for accurate categorisation and for sub-themes. This whole process was re-iterative and recursive. During the interview process, I checked in with the Respondents using probes, both to mine further data, and to ensure that what I was hearing was indeed aligned with what the Respondents were sharing with me. These probes were often responded to with a level of thoughtfulness that allowed this symbolic or figurative level of the Respondents’ mentalities to be thought about and elaborated upon. This in turn lead back to further empirical data being offered by the Respondents, and so on in a recursive, re-iterative process of meaning-making, much like the process of the development of different aspects of a ‘pre-digital age’ photograph.

The final phase comprised taking the data array, thematically arranged into research findings and wrote them up, using the Respondents’ own words as far as possible, and obviating duplication of data; whilst being mindful of the interrelatedness of certain aspects of the themes that were highlighted.

### 3.8. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES

#### 3.8.1. Whose lived experience is being explored?

I endeavoured to be mindful and self-reflexive when gathering data to obviate, as far as possible, the pitfalls inherent in the intersubjectivity between the researcher and the researched within the qualitative paradigm. In other words, and as mentioned earlier in the Chapter, my objective was to ensure that the data reflected the mentalities of those whom I was interviewing, as opposed to having the stamp of my worldview on it. This meant that I worked in such way as to steer clear of framing the Respondents’ answers within the context of my lived experience, as opposed to through theirs. This required vigilance and the ability to step into the other’s shoes. As mentioned, a nodal framing facilitated this ability to ‘see’ the other, free from any normative meta-narrative being placed upon the observations.

I operationalised this checking for the meaning inherent in the interviewees’ answers (as opposed to the imposition of my meanings on their responses) by
bearing in mind my two-fold role: Within this conceptual paradigm of enquiry wherein reality is viewed as being intersubjective (Willis, 2007) and thus co-created, the researcher will be both inside and outside the boundaries of the case: ‘Inside’ the case in the sense of the co-creation of reality through the very act of interrelatedness, and simultaneously on the outside as the researcher.

3.8.2. Race and gender differences - a barrier to obtaining quality data?

My concern was that my being a white woman interviewing predominately black and coloured males in a male-dominated industry may curtail the quantity and quality of information that the Respondents’ chose to share with me. This challenge was particularly pertinent given that the research was carried out in South Africa, where the discourse of race holds a central position in the construction of this country’s social, political, economic and historical narrative. As Diphoorn asserts in “The Bravo Mike Syndrome”, “…race is a social construction that is generated, moulded, and reified through social practices.” (2015: 4). The question for me was whether the research participants would allow me to gain authentic and deep insight into the mentalities that informed their daily practices in the field of private security, given the differences in our respective demographics.

However, when I examined the data array upon completion of the data collection phase of this study, I was gratified by the range and depth of the responses that the interviewees chose to share with me. I believe that the Interview Schedule and the use of well-placed probes, coupled with my being attuned and genuinely interested in the process and content of the interviews and what was shared with me, mitigated this issue.

3.8.3. Whither generalisability?

Another key limitation of this research is that its generalisability is circumscribed, given that it is a single case study of a single private security company. In addition, the number of people interviewed (albeit that the interviews yielded in-depth data) may be construed as a limitation. However, given the proliferation of similar security companies in the southern suburbs of
Cape Town (Berg, 2010). In research undertaken in the field of private security in the South African metropoles of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria (Tshwane) and Durban Minnaar (2002) demonstrates the similitude of the ways things are done across the spectrum of South African cities in the field of private security. Given this, I believe that the issue of non-generalisability and the concomitant lack of research reliability is partially ameliorated.

In addition, my research aim was not limited to making an empirical finding. It was also undertaken with the objective of contributing to the existing body of literature on the mentalities of those who work in the private security industry.

3.9. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Interviews are interventions. They affect people. A good interview lays open thoughts, feelings, knowledge, and experience, not only to the interviewer, but also to the interviewee. The process of being taken through a directed, reflective process affects the persons being interviewed and leaves them knowing things that they didn’t know - or at least were not fully aware of - before the interview (Quinn Patton, 2002: 405).

Given this, steps were taken to ensure the figurative safety of the interview space in the following ways:

The Informed Consent Forms for both the standardised open-ended questionnaire and the informal conversational interview (see Appendix C and D respectively) emphasise the fact that the interviewees’ identities would not be disclosed and that the information they shared would be kept in strict confidence. In addition, I stressed that all interviewees were at liberty to terminate the interviews at any point if they wished to do so. Fortunately, from the standpoint of gathering as much data as possible, none of them exercised this option. However, some interviewees did share information with me that they requested be kept “off-the record” to protect themselves from any reprisals that they feared may flow from some of the information shared.

Given that private security personnel operate within a system (both under state and non-state auspices) that deals with the governance of security and the minimising of risk and
harms to those to whom they are contracted to serve, the issue of illegal incidents and dealings alluded to (and indeed canvassed) by some of the interviewees came up. However, the research objective, in terms of the framing of the questions of both types of interviews largely meant that the data fell outside of the ambit of the legal sphere. However, where the information shared may have had legal consequences should it be exposed in the public domain, I made the commitment to the interviewees that this information would not be used in this research. I maintained confidentiality on both an intra-organisational level as well as on an extra-organisational level.

3.10. CONCLUSION

My objective in this chapter has been to furnish an outline of the research paradigm that I have employed in this study, along with methods and the means of analysis employed to answer the research question. In addition, I have sought to highlight both the strengths and the limitations that accrue to this study; with a focus on capitalising on the strengths of this design along with an effort to ameliorate its limitations. This chapter has also addressed the ethical considerations and implications that accrue to this type of research, to control as far as possible for any adverse consequences for the Respondents in this study.

In the following chapter, I will present my research findings flowing from the data array that was formulated on the back of the collection and analysis of the raw data.
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

My objective in this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, I will present the research findings, grouped thematically, secondly, I will provide commentary on the findings as delineated under each of these themes, to illustrate how each of these themes speaks to elements that comprise an overall picture of the mentalities of those who work in the field of private security. The themes foregrounded in this chapter will offer readers an opportunity to obtain a sense of what it is like to ‘do’ private security in a middle-class socio-economic milieu in the southern suburbs of Cape Town in 2017. This chapter additionally illustrates areas of confluence and/or divergence between the existing literature and my research findings.

Whilst the themes are presented under separate headings, the Aristotelian axiom of ‘the whole being greater than the sum of its parts’ has bearing here, as each of the themes presented contains more points of confluence as opposed to trajectories of divergence. In other words, seemingly discrete narratives can be viewed as parts of a greater conversation with similar points of reference regarding the mentalities of the people whom I interviewed. In addition, I found that the Respondents’ mentalities spoke their lived experiences in ways that traverse and intersect several disciplinary fields - the predominant ones being related to security governance, social psychology and economics. This was salient in that it mirrored the complexity of the Respondents’ daily lived experience in the private security industry as being multi-faceted and nuanced. In this way, the research findings, when transcribed and analysed, provided what Geertz (1973) termed ‘thick description’.

As mentioned in the Introduction to this dissertation, a mentality is defined as a way of thinking about something, a ‘philosophical’ stance towards people, places and things that manifests as and translates into the daily praxis of providing private security. As described in Chapters Two and Three, the analytical framework within which the data is positioned is that of a nodal paradigm of security governance as articulated by, amongst others, Johnston and Shearing, 2003. Within this analytic, all programmes of security (that is, nodes) that have a stake in the provision of security have four basic attributes, namely: “mentalities, institutions, technologies and practices” (Johnston & Shearing, Ibid., 13, italics in original).

The data that I present and discuss in this Chapter will serve to demonstrate how the node of private security is informed by particular ways of cognition and praxis in relation to the
mentalities that accrue to the actors in the field of private security. I also demonstrate how the ways that the actors think about what they do, informs their doing of the work, and vice versa. This recursion between thinking about and doing the work of private security informs both the intra-organisational mentalities and the attitudinal position adopted by these actors in relation to other institutions.

A marked sense of ambivalence and ambiguity in the narratives and descriptions that recurred throughout the interviews illustrated the complexity of the mentalities of those whom I interviewed. Their responses sometimes appeared contradictory. However, when the research findings are viewed in totality and in the context of the lived experience of these workers, narratives that at first appeared to be contradictory start to emerge with a marked sense of clarity. To use Diphoorn’s words, the work of private security engenders mentalities that in many respects are “neither one nor the other, but something combined and in between, something “twilight” (2013: 277). It is this ambivalent, ambiguous character of many of the narratives presented here that I aim to highlight, examine and discuss.

In addition, the Respondents’ narratives spoke to two levels of experience. Firstly, their responses fleshed out their reality of the daily work of providing private security on a literal level. The second level, the level of the symbolic and the figurative, was accessed using probes as an invitation to the Respondents to express the meanings on a deeper level.

In this way, the process of narration, description and meaning-making all contributed to the formation of a ‘picture’ of the mentalities of these Respondents in relation to their work.

4.1. PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC POLICE AND PRIVATE SECURITY

This theme highlighted the nature of the partnerships between private security and the public police and how the Respondents characterised this relationship. The narratives and anecdotes that described how private security view their relationship with the public police placed the police simultaneously in a ‘better than, and worse than’ position in relation to themselves. In terms of how the police were ‘better than’ them, what was highlighted in the narratives was that ‘better than’ could to taken to mean several things. However, the meaning that the Respondents described most often throughout their
narratives was that the public police were construed as being ‘better off than’ the providers of private security in the material sense. However, the sense of material safety that these Respondents attributed to the public police led to several key symbolic implications as foregrounded by their further responses. When probed on the ways in which they perceived the public police to be ‘better off’ than the providers of private security, these narratives are richly telling in their candour:

Respondent 5 recounts the following:

So me I have seen many murders, you know, around here there is many gangsters ’cos I live in [names a suburb close to another that is known for high levels of social dysfunction manifesting in drug abuse, crime and gangsterism in the context of overwhelming poverty] so all the gangsters they come here to where I live. Then there is also people that drink and smoke [methamphetamine, known locally as ‘tik’] so that they fight and end up dead. We sometimes don’t want to help because like I say it can cause problems for us by the police. (Interview 5, armed response officer, February 2017).

Respondent 3, echoing similar sentiments, remarked that:

When we see a murder - we just call the police - ’cos then they [the SAPS] ask us why has the person died and they were alive just now? Only if the people are fighting then you can try and stop that fight, but if there is someone and you can see he is dead or bleeding and not moving then you [private security] better not do anything. Rather call the police otherwise you can make problems for yourself and for the company because they [the SAPS] think maybe you had something to do with it [the death]. So, you just call the ambulance and the police must take it from there. (Interview 3, armed response officer, February 2017).

What is striking here is how the narratives and the mentalities around the public police/private security interface are characterised by a sense of uncertainty and insecurity in two ways. Firstly, and in line with the work of Minnaar (2005) and Rigakos (2002) the
very organisation that is mandated by the state to govern security and maintain public order - the public police, are viewed by these Respondents as oppositional, indeed, often as hostile to the point where, according to this Respondent, it was very possible that the public police would implicate private security guards in an individual’s death. Secondly, the following vignette illustrates ambivalence in the face of feeling under resourced in relation to the SAPS. The context was a discussion around his carrying a firearm:

…it’s not a good thing. The guys from [names a suburb notorious for high levels of gangster-related violence and deaths] they want a firearm. They call it a ‘waapie’ [weapon]. Some days when my boss forgets to sign for my firearm - he must sign for it to say I’m having it, then if he forgets to sign for the firearm, I feel free because then I can know that I don’t have to be a target for those guys that want to kill securities [security guards] for their firearms. So, then I feel free at those times. (Interview 3, armed response officer, February 2017).

After sharing about the danger of being killed for one’s firearm, he expresses the following in an ostensible contradiction to his above narrative:

But I am ok. They [would-be criminals] see me with a firearm and they’re scared of me. (Interview 3, armed response officer and supervisor, February 2017).

This vignette about the firearm foregrounds the ambivalent attitude he has towards carrying a firearm: One the one hand, he feels safe when he has it, as it can be used to ward off would-be criminals.

The theme of being (more) under-resourced and (more) over-burdened than the public police. In the words of an armed response officer:

…when there is an alarm I get scared… the criminals will target me and if they take my firearm, then I will lose the firearm license…Many, many security guys get killed for their firearm…If you don’t run but try to fight
them, then you can easily be killed, and for what? (Interview 3, armed response officer and supervisor, February 2017).

In sum, the relationship between the public police and private security from these Respondents’ perspectives, ranges from difficult to downright dysfunctional, and is circumscribed by ambivalence and uncertainty. These findings are similar to the findings of Rigakos (2002), in that the partnership is circumscribed by uncertainty.

The following sub-theme will examine and discuss communication by focussing on two types of partnerships: Firstly, between private security and the public police and secondly between private security and civil society in general.

### 4.1.1. Communication

The sub-theme of communication as part of characterisation and description of the relationship between themselves and the SAPS, is illustrated in this anecdote:

I had an incident recently where a car was broken into…it was about 17H25. So, when I phoned SAPS to hand the incident over to them, the lady that answered said, “How can you phone me now with this? We are busy handing over now” [to the next shift]. (Interview 4, control room operator, February 2017).

This Respondent works as a dispatcher in the control room monitoring incoming and making outgoing calls to the company’s guards. In addition, she monitors the surveillance cameras that give her multiple views of the company’s sites - both the private sites and within the boundaries of the local Improvement District that this company is mandated to keep, in the words of Respondent 6: “safe, secure and clean.” (Interview 6, February 2017).

The lack of clear and comprehensive communication between members of the public police and the providers of private security described here highlights
more than the paucity of quality communication. It speaks to the quality of the relationship between two organisations whose mandate is to provide security and the way in which this relationship is experienced by these private security actors. Respondent 1 succinctly sums up the public police/private security partnership and the mentalities that private security have formed around this often-uneasy partnership:

I must say that the cooperation we get from SAPS is not good. I am not only speaking about a specific police station in this area, but other private security companies also find that…it’s the same problem they face. (Interview 1, Owner, February 2017).

The challenges around effective and clear communication extended to the public and not just in relation to the SAPS. For instance, when I asked one of the control room operators whether there were any parts of her job that she disliked, she replied:

Communication…lack of communication. Like if a member of the public calls and says, “I need an ambulance service” but they don’t give me the details of where the ambulance needs to go and they just start yelling at me that this is your job, just do your job!’ How can I do my job properly if I don’t have all the information I need? What frustrates me is when people call in and they start to shout - they don’t understand how it works.” Perhaps tellingly, this Respondent added that she felt a member of the public would never speak to a member of the public police as “rudely” as she was often spoken to. (Interview 4, control room operator, February 2017).

This Respondent’s anecdote is indicative of both a relationship where private security is the ‘victim’ - disdained by the public and the public police alike. There is a great deal of literature that highlights the private security industry as being vilified and disdained. (See, for instance, Berg, 2004; Diphoorn, 2016; and White, 2010). As can be gathered from the above narratives, my findings
bear marked convergences with the literature regarding the challenges inherent in the relationship between the public police and private security.

4.1.2. The inefficiency of the SAPS

This issue was brought up by all ten Respondents I interviewed, and by those I spoke to informally.

The police, if you call them for assistance, they will come maybe seven to eight hours after; and they will say they didn’t have a van available or some other story, but you cannot rely on the police because they don’t care. They just leave you so you don’t get any support from them…so we at [company name], we must do it ourselves. (Interview 5, armed response officer, February 2017).

And,

I would work for the police because the job is easy and they are not serious. When you go to the station, the people [members of the public] are waiting there, and the police can take one or two hours to help you with a small thing. When I was a foot patroller - I liked to take a suspect to the police station at say 4.30 or 5.00 pm. My boss would ask me: “why are you taking so long?” But when the police do shift change at that time of night they can take one hour, two hours, three hours, even more. So I can take the suspect there and sit there nicely in the warm offices and my boss can’t say anything because if he asks why I am taking so long I can say oh well, I was with the suspect at the police station [laughs]. (Interview 3, armed response officer, February 2017).

This was an interesting sub-theme as it was juxtaposed with an intriguing paradox in the sense-making of how private security view themselves both intra- and interpersonally. They view themselves simultaneously as better than the police, as they are driven by competitive market forces to service their clients...
efficiently and effectively; whereas the public police are not driven by the market at all, according to these Respondents because they “don’t have clients like we do” (Interview 6, control room operator, March 2017). However, their narratives also repeatedly highlighted the ways in which they construed themselves as being worse-off than the public police.

What emerged in relation to the theme of private security’s relationship with the police (and indeed with members of the public at times) was that, despite their predominantly negative view of the police, the desire to ‘be’ the police and all that that entails on both a symbolic and a literal level was a recurrent sentiment woven throughout their narratives.

When making sense of this, this Respondent’s rationale for the lack of cooperation and coordination between the SAPS and private security companies is described in these words:

…in my time [as a member of SAPS] private security were seen as more of a hindrance than as a helping hand, For want of a better word, we used to look down on private security. (Interview 1, owner of company, February 2017).

When I probed as to how they made sense of this ‘disconnect’ regarding communication, co-operation and coordination with the SAPS, the prevailing sense was the providers of private security that had internalised this to mean that they are ‘not as good as’ the police; even in light of their overriding view of the public police as being inefficient and incompetent.

Here again there is a convergence between the literature and my findings regarding how private security frame themselves in relation to the SAPS. (See, for instance, Manzo, 2010).

4.2. AGENCY, PRAXIS AND LEGITIMACY
A branch of the literature looks at the “legitimating practices” that private security staff engage in, illustrating their need to justify and to defend their position in the arena of the governance of security. This research also looks at the coping mechanisms they employ within the ambit of their work. See, for instance, du Toit (2015), Loader and White (2015) and Loader, Goold and Thumala, (2014). One of the dominant themes that underpins these studies finds that: “the occupational culture of security officers enhances self-esteem by infusing security work with a sense of purpose.” Furthermore, that the providers of private security: “… Employ a range of strategies to deflect scorn and reframe their work as important and necessary” (Löfstrand, Loftus & Loader, 2015: 1).

“We do what the police do, but we’re not them. We’re somewhere halfway” (Diphoorn, 2013: 277).

The sense of “being halfway”, as described by an armed response officer was a sentiment that was echoed throughout the narratives told by the security personnel I interviewed. There was the abiding feeling of having to ‘stake one’s claim’ both internally and in terms of warding off competitors (and thus hold onto market share) whilst simultaneously bolstering one’s sense of purpose and of being important and useful assets in the broader landscape of the governance of security.

Put differently and using Bourdieu’s (1992) terms, the objective of these actors, based on their narratives and anecdotes, is to shift out of a space of (literal and figurative) insecurity through the acquisition and retention of both “symbolic capital” and “social capital” in one’s own eyes, and in the eyes of others.

Respondent 4 illustrated this point thus:

People think that if you work in this industry you are not educated. They say things like “I pay your tax.” No, I work and I pay tax just like they do…. I put myself through college and I am educated…when I first experienced that, I mean the way some people talk to you when you are in this industry…I felt bad, like I was ashamed or something like that. But like I
say that was way back. Now I’m used to it. (Interview 4, control room operator, February 2017).

This interviewee was one of the few who had undergone training in another field prior to entering the field of private security. Many of the others whom I interviewed had either entered the field after completing their schooling (up to whatever level they had attained) or had entered the industry, “because it is easy to find jobs here.” (Interview 10, guard, March 2017).

This theme of praxis, agency and legitimacy existed on both an intra-personal and on an inter-personal level regarding the sense of being on ‘shifting occupational ground’, as it were. Insecurity and the sense of not knowing where one stands in the broader scope of the governance of security is repeatedly highlighted through the responses to the both the formal interviews and in the conversational milieus. This manifested in the Respondents’ narratives as an injunction, either addressed openly or alluded to, of the need to ‘fight’ to hold on to a sense of self in the face of the disdain of the public and in relation to the public police.

In the face of this, the company’s owner was instrumental in assisting his staff to strengthening their sense of who they are in relation to their work as evidenced in the following vignette:

…it immediately puts the security officer on the back foot and makes them insecure… if the security guard can’t speak your [the client’s] language then they often immediately feel uncertain and see themselves as inferior to you [the client] …I’m there most of the time and I see what happens. These people don’t greet the guy, [the guard] and I’ve seen it, not once, not twice, but a hundred times…. And I say listen, just because it’s a white woman in a fancy car that doesn’t mean she doesn’t need to respect you. (Interview 1, security company owner, February 2017).

In addition to the need to fight for one’s legitimacy and agency as a provider of private security, on an internal level, there is also the external economic driver, namely the private security market. As Respondent 6 articulated:
We sometimes don’t want to co-operate with other security companies, because, say the suspect moves on into a suburb controlled by another [private security] company then they [the other private security firm] make it look like it is their arrest and that they did the work when it was us that did all the work, really. (Interview 6, control room operator, February 2017).

Respondent 3’s words add to this sense of the desire to maintain the company’s competitive edge:

We must do [names the suburb] Improvement District and all the other sites that we have, but I must supervise all of that. The Improvement District is a good one because I am one of the guys that knows the area the best because I started here seven years ago, so I know the area very well. I like this area so when people see [this area] they must see us, not the police. They don’t see the police, they see us. …Because the police…there can be a crime committed, say we arrest a guy for housebreaking but the police can take maybe longer than two hours to get there and then by that time we cannot stay with the guy for all that time, so we have another guy to wait with him so that he can check that the guy does not get out of his handcuffs before the police come. But it is good that the police take so long because then all the clients know that the police here in this area are useless and that it is no use to even call them because they take so long, so they call us first. (Interview 3, armed response officer, February 2017).

In fact, several interviewees asserted that the local police precinct’s ‘uselessness’ was good for business in the sense that it ensured that their contracts - in this case the Improvement District contract - would be extended and renewed, given that their standards of service were, in their view, far superior to that of the police.

The flip-side of this feeling of doing a superior job in comparison to the public police, highlights the narrative of feeling disrespected and undervalued by the public, in the words this Respondent:
If they [potential offenders] are at one of our sites then they are on private property - that is our client’s place, so we have to tell the troublemakers or the vagrants to move away from that place. The problem is that my job is too hard because most of the time those people are high and you are normal, so they swear at you and talk bad to you but you just must keep calm and quiet and not make the whole problem worse. But ja. [yes], it is hard to get sworn at by these people sometimes. They don’t respect you. (Interview 5, armed response officer, February 2017).

Weaving another strand into this theme, one of the guards who was stationed at a residential complex to which this company is contracted and with whom I spoke on one of our stops during the ride-along, provided his own vivid description of the sense of the (ill)legitimacy of the private police and conveyed the sense of powerlessness and impotence he felt through the following summation:

Well, the problem is that we are like barking dogs…we can bark but we can’t bite. (Informal conversational interview, patrolling guard, 23 March 2017).

He then went on to say that whilst the police are legitimate, that is, they can ‘bite’ as they hold the state-sanctioned mandate to govern security through the use of coercive force (Bittner, 1970) to impose some type of sanction on someone who has broken the law, they often will not do so:

The police arrive…like four hours after we have called them [to an incident] and everything has calmed down by then. They write up a short report and then they go around the corner, they throw it [the report] in the dustbin. (Informal conversational interview, guard, 23 March 2017).

This sense of the discretionary meting out of sanctions on the part of the public police is further described: Armed Response, upon detaining an alleged offender for stealing at a factory informed the SAPS, who arrived at the scene, but decided not to prosecute the alleged thief. The reason they gave for deciding not to prosecute had something
to do with a law under which a suspect caught in possession of stolen goods could not
be prosecuted if the value of the goods totalled R100 or less (which was apparently
the case here). Although this Respondent felt that the goods’ value was clearly more
than R100, she desisted from raising her objections to the police, and accordingly
defferred to their judgment. When I probed further, her response was:

Well, it’s the police who are telling me this, and they must be right - even
though I know they are wrong. (Interview 6, control room operator,
February 2017).

What emerges from these interviews are various themes around practices of a
perceived discretionary meting out of justice and application of the law on the part of
the police.

The feelings of uncertainty and a lack of feeling secure is manifested throughout these
interviews on two levels. Firstly, what emerged throughout the Respondents’
narratives was a tentativeness about the scope of the work, particularly when
juxtaposed against the occupational ambit and state-sanctioned occupational reach of
the public police. Secondly, a recurrent theme emerged of the relative dearth of
resources (both literally and figuratively) to fulfil that remit.

As Respondent 9 observed:

We get taught about the law, but it’s not easy to know when to make an
arrest or not, and when we should leave it to the police. (Interview 9, guard,
March 2017).

In sum, the Respondents viewed the public police as being the final arbiters of whom
to prosecute and under what conditions they will undertake to do so. Whilst this is the
case in terms of the law, it underscores the idea of the public police as being the only
‘legitimate’ arbiters of the law and of having the authority to decide whether to
prosecute and open a case against a suspect or not. Private security guards are an
afterthought, which is an irony given that it is they who usually hand over a suspect to
the police after the harm (either to person and/or to property) has been committed, as
they are the ones who, more often than not, are called to a crime scene at the outset (see, for instance, Cooper-Knock, 2016) on this last point in relation to the reactive nature of the SAPS in contrast to the proactivity of private security as viewed from the perspective of the consumers of private security in KwaZulu-Natal).

However, add to this the fact that English is not the first or second language of the Respondents, a certain occupational landscape begins to take shape: one that is fraught with a sense of uncertainty with respect to the law, a sense of being ‘less than’ in relation to the SAPS, a shaky edifice in relation to the training that they have received in order to do this work and the ever-present threat of danger. These responses all speak directly to the issue of being in a precarious position as a provider of private security, in that the occupational remit is maximise order and to minimise harms, but the foundation upon which this work is carried out is circumscribed by insecurity and uncertainty.

Respondent 6 recounted a situation where a suspect was arrested upon suspicion of theft, and the police decided that they would not open a case. The decision not to do so was unclear to this private security staff member involved in this situation. However, what was made clear was that some form of deterrent was intended to be used against the suspect, presumably to circumscribe the chances of his committing further infractions. This was to be done through negative reinforcement - the use of pain. The deterrent was summed up in a request, allegedly asked by a policeman:

Can’t you just take him around the corner and give him a hiding? My response officer said No. At the end of the day the criminals have mos [of course] got rights. They can make a case against us and say the security did beat me up…SAPS is just plain lazy to do their jobs. And we don’t assault people and the criminals have more rights than others these days. (Interview 6, control room operator, February 2017).

Again, the themes of a sense of powerlessness and a lack of legitimacy arise - in the governance of safety and security hierarchy, private security providers appear to be subordinate to the police in several ways. These narratives provided myriad examples of
the public police having the authority and the ability, ratified by their privileged position as arbiters of justice appointed under state auspices.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, in South Africa, the SAPS legitimacy is directly proportional to their ability to fight crime successfully. However, my findings diverge from the literature as espoused by, for example, Bradford et al., (2014), Minnaar (2010) and Shaw (2002) whose research illustrates that, in South Africa, the test of police legitimacy is not ability to manifest justice or parity that counts, it is their effectiveness as crime fighters.

In contrast to this, my research findings point to the Respondents as viewing the public police as legitimate for a different reason. They are indeed seen as legitimate, but not because their effectiveness in fighting crime. They are legitimate because they work for the state, regardless of their degree of (in)competence. Private security in South Africa, although they see themselves as more efficient and effective than the public police, are not as legitimate as the public police because they lack, according to these Respondents that “sought-after element of statehood” (White: 2010: 183). In sum, the SAPS are ‘legitimate’, regardless of their ‘uselessness’:

…these days to them [the SAPS] it’s just a job, it’s not a calling. There’s no passion for the work anymore these days. Like I say the police are 80% bad. There are only a few good ones. There will be two or three guys that are good, but they are usually the old guys. I don’t call it a police service…it’s a police circus. (Interview 2, operations manager, February 2017).

In summary and in relation to this theme around agency, praxis and legitimacy, the Respondents’ narratives illustrated their feelings of insecurity and uncertainty in relation to their scope of practice and how each interaction (both in relation to the public police and to the public in general) would play out. Diphoorn (2016) turns the notion of the binary between the victim and the persecutor (or perpetrator) on its head, as it problematises the notions of power, control, and punishment as being the prerogative of the ones who order the sequencing of events in the social realm. Diphoorn describes how
the armed guard whom she observed became the victim as opposed to the persecutor in a particular scenario. Not only is he subjected to the abusive treatment detailed above by a member of the citizenry, he is also upbraided for not being successful in his apprehension of the perpetrator and is further vilified for his ‘incompetence’.

4.3. **PRAGMATISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF A PARADOX**

One of the strongest themes that arose recurrently, was that of the primary motivating factors that led to these individuals entering the field of private security in the first place. The driving force appeared to come down to pragmatic exigencies. For example, many of the Respondents spoke about the difficulty of getting quality medical care and education for their families. In addition, and on a more basic level, many spoke of being grateful to receive a salary on time at the end of each month worked (Interview 9, guard, March 2017) and were grateful not only that they were paid timeously, but also that they were paid in full. (Interview 8, guard, March 2017). Some spoke of ex-employers in the industry who would not pay them in full for some infraction - real or imagined - on the part of the employee, (Interview 4, control room operator, February 2017).

Still others spoke of how the market was being undercut because of the lack of regulation of foreigners who were prepared to work in the private security field for lower wages than South African citizens were, and the deleterious effects of this wage undercutting.

> It’s bad money because they [foreigners] will work for less and for longer hours. (Interview 10, guard, March 2017).

In sum, the sentiment that ran through these narratives was one of the physical struggle for survival:

> South Africa is a tough place and the crime is bad. But I need to be able to feed my family, so even though the job is hard and can be dangerous and the hours are long, I can’t be without a job. (Interview 5, armed response officer, February 2017).

And,
The salary is ok - they [the company] provide a provident fund, UIF (Unemployment Insurance Fund); and funeral expenses are covered; but it’s hard because we don’t get medical aid. Medical expenses are too expensive. We will have to go to the cheapest doctor and to the hospital, but the [state] hospital where I stay is not good. I live in [a suburb that falls outside the demarcated area of a “white” (read, “good”) hospital. So, I will cheat and I give a different [false] address so that I can use a good hospital, because the hospital where I live is bad. I don’t want to go there because the gangsters, when they shoot each other or say the one guy is stabbed and has to go to hospital, then the gangsters will just come into the hospital and shoot him dead. It happens there a lot so I don’t want to go to that hospital. That is why I cheat ’cos I don’t want to take a chance. (Interview 3, armed response guard, February 2017).

This Respondent would rather provide a false residential address and run the risk of misrepresenting himself (and deal with whatever consequences may flow from that) than risk his life, and that of his family by going for medical treatment to the ‘bad’ hospital.

**The public police are ‘better-off’ than private security workers**

The police, as government employees, enjoy benefits and perks that the providers of private security do not. This was summed up succinctly:

The advantage of working for the government is that there is a lot of things like the medical aid, the bond, the car insurance…stuff like that. The way they work and the perks, if private security could have these things, if they could include these things, it could be ok to us [to work in the private security industry], you see? (Interview 5, armed response guard, February 2017).

Various answers abound as to why these individuals viewed the public police as an attractive employer, and they are all succinctly summed up in Respondents 5’s narrative, as he elaborates on the advantages of working for the public police:
Because it’s a job. Because I need to be able to feed my family. Because my kids need to have uniforms to go to school, otherwise they will be told to leave the school if they don’t have the right uniform. (Interview 5, armed response guard, February 2017).

It appears that, in the South African context, the practical exigencies are paramount throughout these responses. Remuneration and job security are seen as being ‘thin’ in the private security industry in relation to the SAPS. However, what this Respondent’s narrative also highlights is that practical considerations, like having a job, appear to be one of the primary motivating factors driving these individuals to enter the field of private security, and to stay in this field.

Thus, one of the strongest themes that runs through all the interviews is that, however negative their perceptions of the South African public police are in terms of their lack of efficiency, accountability and responsibility to other bodies (in this case to this private security firm), there is a paradoxical yearning to ‘be’ them. Not only in the literal sense, but in the figurative and metaphorical sense. That is, and using Bourdieu’s (1992) term, the “symbolic capital” that private security sees as flowing from the SAPS being the state-authorised governors of security. The police are held in the imaginations of private sector security workers as legitimate, as they are ‘The Police’ and endorsed under the auspices of the South African government. It is as if no matter how many scandals fall at the door of the police, no matter how little they are deemed to hold firm to their credo in terms of undertaking and manifesting their mandate to provide security to the people of South Africa, the sentiment runs deep that it is better to work for the state in the field of the governance of safety and security than within the ambit of private security, given the vagaries of the commercially-focussed and economically-driven market arena.

Pertinently, this motivation to work for the SAPS is not driven by a desire to fulfil the mandate of the provision of security as a “thick” public good (Loader & Walker, 2007: 167). Rather, the mentality that predicates private security’s motivation for doing security is an eminently pragmatic one. It revolves around the key exigencies of material survival - namely, better perks and better working conditions for
themselves and thus, the chance to be better providers of material resources for their families.

These narratives are indicative of the lived experiences of people who are far removed from any mindfulness around what Loader, Goold & Thumala (2014: 1) refer to as “The moral economy of security”, that is, a model that would seek to ‘humanise’ the private security industry with the objective of lowering workers’ moral dissonance around “selling goods and services [and experiencing this] as “morally troubling” (Ibid.,469). The implication is that, were the market for the buying and selling of private security to become, in Loader & White’s term, “civilized” (2015: 1) with the provision of private security then being refashioned as a public good as opposed to a good that can exclusively be accessed by those who can afford to pay for it. This conceptual and empirical divergence between these research findings and this branch of the private security literature will be examined and discussed now. It is now to these matters, namely, the research findings under this final theme of pragmatism and its implications in relation to the literature that I now turn.

4.4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRAGMATISM AND THE PARADOX OF SECURITY

What is increasingly evident throughout the presentation of these research findings is that they contain a ‘meta-narrative’, in that the Respondents’ mentalities are informed by a sense of ambivalence and ambiguity that underpins all three themes discussed here. In addition, these feelings of ambivalence and ambiguity have key implications on how these workers perform and think about their work. Put differently, ambivalence and ambiguity are key characteristics of their mentalities. I will now focus on this sense of ambivalence and ambiguity relation to the Respondents’ mentalities in relation to the SAPS.

Each time I asked the question, “Given the opportunity, would you want to join the SAPS?”, the answer was in the affirmative. This answer appeared incongruent with the predominantly negative view held about the police by these Respondents, as was amply
illustrated by the narratives and descriptions throughout the research findings. Again, there emerges a seemingly paradoxical position in the mentalities of the providers of private security in relation to the SAPS that can perhaps be summed up through the analyses of the Respondents’ narratives along these lines: The police are useless, they are corrupt, they don’t care about the public. This is succinctly summed up:

the police hey, they just sit and get ‘fat’ in their jobs and they get paid for doing that. (Interview 3, armed response officer, February 2017).

However, given the opportunity all Respondents asserted (mostly with alacrity) that they would join the SAPS if given the opportunity.

It is through the thematic lens of pragmatism, as expressed by this study’s Respondents, that the rest of this Chapter is framed, as it is here that one apprehends the extent of this ambivalence and ambiguity, and the emergence of a paradox can be viewed as the culmination of the ambivalence and ambiguity of the research findings. In addition, I will narrow the focus of the literature onto those studies around the mentalities of those who work in the private security industry, given that my research is situated in Cape Town, South Africa.

4.4.1. A paradox?

What is the aetiology of this paradoxical ‘love-hate’ relationship with the police, where they are deemed to be ineffectual at best and corrupt at worst…why would these private security workers want to join the public police?

It is this paradox that provides the counterpoint to the literature on private security, as my research findings stand in sharp contradistinction vis-a-vis an appreciable amount of literature emanating largely from the United Kingdom. One of the main proponents of this theme of the question around a “civilizing model of regulation” (Loader and White, 2015: 1). In this paper, they propose:
A regulatory architecture where buyers and sellers [of private security] are cast not only as economic actors but also as moral actors, revealing new avenues through which to encompass private security within the democratic promise of security (Loader and White, 2015: 1).

And,

…the market is a contested space in which public and private motivations jostle and collide with each other, and where commodities are judged in terms of their perceived effects on a complex conception of the public interest, which promotes not only the prevention of market failure but also the promotion of good citizenship (2015: 4).

In these two excerpts Loader and White (2015) call upon the private security market to ‘clean up its act’ on two fronts:

Firstly, it calls on the sellers of private security to reframe themselves “not only as economic actors but as moral actors” (Loader and White, 2015: 1). In other words, it challenges the sellers of private security to purge the market of practices that bring it into ill repute. Put differently, the market needs to be ‘cleaned up’. These factors include, inter alia, a tighter regulatory structure that cleanses the security market of unprincipled private security providers who are there to profit from others’ misfortune and to maximise their profit through whilst doing so.

Secondly, Loader & White (2015: 1) look to the buyers of private security services and underline the need for these services to be “cleansed” and “communalised”. Put differently, they proffer a proposal wherein private security is reconfigured as a public good - one that may be accessed in equal measure by all people and communities across all social-economic strata of society. It is thus reframed and reimagined as a democratic public good, a service that the population as a whole can benefit from, as opposed to a private good that is only accessible to those who have the money to purchase it.
However, my research findings illustrate that the “jostle and collide” to which Loader & White (2015: 4) refer above, has a very different meaning for the Respondents in my study, in that it is circumscribed by and largely limited to the struggle for job security. For these Respondents, the ultimate objective is to survive, not to attempt to “civilise the market” along the lines contemplated by Loader and White’s 2015 paper. The narratives described in this dissertation speak to the competition between their private security firm and other suburban firms for market share, and the quest for legitimacy though being effective, all in the service of better job security and (perhaps) enhanced career prospects. This is where the efforts of those whom I interviewed are directed: Not in the effort to clean up the market through cleansing it of unscrupulous operators, nor through the process of democratising security with the objective of assisting to reconfigure it as a public good. Put differently, the Respondents in my study want to survive the market, which is a far cry from seeking to “civilise” it as envisaged by Loader and White (Ibid.).

Thus, the research findings speak to a different set of objectives: These workers feel that their jobs may be more secure if they are good at their jobs, as then the company for whom they work will see that they are doing a good job which may increase their chances of continued employment, so that they can continue to fulfil basic human needs such as having access to adequate food, shelter and electricity for themselves and their families.

In sum, these narratives, descriptions and anecdotes speak to a struggle to secure scarce resources at the level of basic human survival needs. They provide a sobering illustration of how widely divergent the mentalities of the providers of private security are when juxtaposed with proposals that address the amelioration of moral ambiguity of selling security services or ways of reconfiguring the market so as to civilize it as contemplated in Loader & White’s 2015 paper. Instead, as stated, these interviews foreground a more basic human need - the need to survive.
4.4.2. The ‘civilizing imperative’ versus ‘the need to survive’ - a tale of two contexts

Whilst Loader and White’s proposal as articulated in their 2014 and 2015 journal articles is eminently laudable, it is, in the context of the research findings in relation to the people whom I interviewed, somewhat of a “pipedream”. It is within this context that Loader and White’s postulation of a “civilizing model of regulation” (2015: 1), when viewed in terms of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1942) so far up the pyramid as to be virtually out of sight to the private security worker trying to make a living amid the current social, political and economic milieu of South Africa. Again, and using Loader and White’s 2015 journal article as a counterpoint, wherein they assert that,

While we appreciate that these observations [of the civilizing factor at work] are rooted in the United Kingdom case, this combination of economic and moral agency can certainly be found in other markets… (2015: 4).

In summation, when these research findings are contextualised within South Africa, descriptions and narratives that at first appear to be characterised with marked elements of ambivalence and ambiguity are in fact neither of these things, within the context of the mentalities of those whom I interviewed. Put differently, certain elements of the mentalities of the providers of private security that initially struck me as paradoxical start to make sense once the background and context of these actors in this are fully appreciated. This is especially evident in the juxtaposition between the way these Respondents view their occupational lot regarding the way the public police are both imagined and experienced by them.

One of the strongest themes that runs through all the responses in the interviews is that, however negative the Respondents’ perceptions of the South African public police are in terms of the SAPS’s lack of efficiency, accountability and cooperation with other bodies (in this case in relation those who work in this private security firm), there is a paradoxical yearning to ‘be’ them. Not only in
the literal sense, but in the figurative and metaphorical sense to which the interviewees referred. The police are held in the imaginations of private sector security workers as legitimate, as they are ‘The Police’. It is as if no matter how many scandals fall at the door of the police, and no matter how little they are deemed to hold firm to their credo in terms of undertaking and making good on their state-endorsed mandate to provide ‘security’ for all the people of South Africa, they are legitimate, despite their ‘uselessness’.

In addition, there is an air of resignation around the lack of commitment that those interviewed attribute to the (lack of) work ethic of the police. And so, in the face of this, the paradox intriguing as it may first seem, is ultimately completely understandable. The police are slated for their lack of adherence to and manifestation of the “serve and protect ethic”. However, the concomitant sentiment amongst the Respondents is that, should they land a job in the police services in South Africa, they would adjust their ‘better’ private security governance work ethic to fit with that of the police as they envisage it.

As Respondent 2 commented:

And also, how can it [the SAPS] ever be called a police service? It can’t be a service, there is no ‘service’ there.” (Interview 2, operations manager, February 2017).

In all, the research findings presented here speak to the primacy of market forces as the motivators for service excellence in the provision of private security, as opposed to a mindfulness of moral ambivalence as described in Loader, Goold and Thumala (2014). Nor do these findings illustrate a drive towards a regulatory paradigm aimed at “civilizing” the market as contemplated in Loader & White’s 2015 paper, one that would comprise a “new democratic promise of security” (2015: 1).
On the contrary, the research findings presented here speak to the daily struggle to survive on primarily the physical and secondarily the level of mental (psychological) survival.

4.5. CONCLUSION

Chapter Four presented and discussed this study’s findings and elucidated several themes that were drawn out in the examination and analysis of the data. It did so by illustrating the mentalities of the Respondents using their own words, to capture the ‘immediacy’ of their views in relation to the work that they do, and how they think and feel about this work. Several points of confluence and divergence with the literature on private security were illustrated.

The final chapter of this dissertation will provide an overview of the research findings alongside an examination of some of the questions that flow from it. It will also include a brief discussion of what private security as a public good might look like from a normative perspective within the context of this study’s findings.

5. CONCLUSION

5.1. This concluding chapter provides an overview of the research findings. In addition, it examines and discusses several key implications of my findings and poses some questions around what forms the democratic provision of private security might take in South Africa, where the majority of those who are most in need of private security are economically barred from accessing this service. Finally, it provides a set of contours and processes that explore what may be more effective and democratic ways of providing private security in South Africa in the light of the research findings presented in this study. It does so through asking, *inter alia*, three key questions:

Firstly, how can and should public goods be provided by plural policing arrangements where the public police no longer have the monopoly on policing? Secondly, it will
examine and discuss some key effects that the current state of private security may have on moulding the mentalities of those who work in it. Thirdly, it will look at some normative issues with respect to the accountability that currently accrues to the private security industry, and it asks what changes could be made to ensure a more democratic dispensation regarding the provision of private security.

Further, through providing an overview of my exploration of the mentalities of the providers of private security, some of the main concerns and aspirations of those who participated in this study illustrate the foundation upon which their mentalities are constructed. Perhaps these concerns, aspirations (and, indeed, questions) may provide some grist for the mill in terms of further research in this field.

5.2. Some observations and questions arising out of this study

In summary, what my research has found is that private security is more effective than the public sector (they’re often called to a crime scene - potential or after-the fact - before the SAPS are, if indeed the SAPS are called at all). They view themselves as more legitimate, a view that is often also held by the general public, (see, for instance, Cooper-Knock, 2016). This legitimacy derives not from any moralistic or civilising values as Loader and White (2015) and Loader, Goold and Thumala (2014) hold. Instead what informs their praxis within the remit of the provision of security is that they perceive themselves as more effective than the SAPS. However, the paradox is that although the SAPS are looked down upon for their inefficiency, they are also envied for their “element of statehood” (White, 2010: 183). It is this ‘state-ness’ that makes the public police appear, at least in the eyes of the Respondents in this study, more legitimate, albeit that the public police are deemed to be useless. Importantly, they are envied because they appear to have better job security, better working conditions and a wider range of job perks.

Within the context of Loader & White’s 2015 paper on the recalibration of the private security market through their dual proposals of “cleansing the market of dishonourable sellers and/or communalizing the market for disempowered buyers” (2015: 5, italics in original), some key questions arise. For example, what shifts in theory, underlying
conceptualisations and regulatory practices might the private security industry be tasked to undertake to make the provision of security a commodity that is a public good reaching into the lives of all people, instead of being a luxury commodity? Can a market for private security make the requisite shifts to ensure that security service providers act in the public interest by rendering services that are characterised by transparency, accountability and equity?

Currently, The Private Security Regulatory Industry Act No 56 of 2001 (The Act) looks at accountability from a normative, state-centred regulatory position. Could it build in accountability and facilitate private security actors in taking responsibility to achieve a flatter, more equitable structure that delivers job security and transparent and equitable employment practices across the broad range of organisations that have a stake in the provision of security? An important consideration is whether this would be within the state’s remit to do so, as it currently is? If not, to whom might this duty be devolved and effectively actioned to improve the status quo regarding the provision of democratic and effective private security services that protect the workers in this industry?

Perhaps a regulatory system that is recalibrated so as to build in local expertise with centralised knowledge may be a positive shift in terms of reimagining private security as a public good. In light of these considerations, Berg and Nouveau (2011) propose a regulatory model that provides a different configuration of regulation that may be more conducive to moving away from an hierarchical ‘top-down’ regulatory structure to one that is modelled on a nodal system, where both state and non-state actors participate in the creation of regulatory systems allow for the ‘building-in’ of capacity for the democratic, efficient and transparent provisions of security that are currently outside of the ambit of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Act No. 56 of 2001:

Given the plurality of policing of public spaces, and in fact in the private realm as well, perhaps there should be a focus on the functions of policing rather than on the institutions of policing. In this way. Instead of having discrete regulatory bodies for each institution, one could have regulatory bodies or even one overarching regulatory body with representation from state and non-state institutions, aimed at specific functions, no matter who is engaged in this function. (Berg & Nouveau, 2011: 30).
In the South African context, Shearing (2003) recounts his example of how security was provided to the socioeconomically disadvantaged people of Zwelethemba on the outskirts of the Cape Town metropole. An empirical example of the reconfiguration of regulation of private security proposed by Berg and Nouveau (2011) is that of the example of Zwelethemba as described in Johnston and Shearing (2003) wherein Shearing participated in a system of the provision of security that is built on local knowledge and capacity and provides security as a public good in an equitable, transparent and effective way. The Zwelethemba model is an illustration that points to and demonstrates that the provision of private security in the Global South (looking to the South African example in this case) may not be so easily transferable from Loader’s Eurocentric or global North “civilising” (2015: 1) model onto Africa in general and in the South African context specifically. Shearing’s (2003) work details the provision of security that is predicated upon democratic tenets and framed within his nodal concept and operationalisation of security governance. Broadly speaking, and following on from this model, the research of Albrecht and Moe (2014), and of Berg, Nakueira and Shearing (2014) when looking the provision of security in certain countries on the African continent again illustrates the utility of a nodal framing of the provision of security across a landscape populated by both state and non-state security providers.

Another way of recalibrating the current state-focused ‘top-down’ system where the state remains the apex actor in the provision and implementation of security (Loader & White’s 2007 concept of state-anchored pluralism as described in Chapter Two), is that of Policing Commissions (and other types of enquiries of a similar ilk) - where the public have a platform on which to voice their concerns and their ideas as to what they feel would work for them in their communities regarding the provision of security. In the case of the Khayelitsha Commission of 2013/2014 the SAPS were deemed, by the people they are mandated to police, as ineffective and lacking legitimacy. Policing Commissions provide a platform for conversations between (amongst other parties) the citizens who live in a geographical space; in tandem with those whose remit is to police them. Again, what is key here is that local resources and local knowledge are employed to address the multitude of problems experienced by the people who live with the daily consequences of a police force that is ineffective and in whom the public have lost a large measure of confidence.
5.3. **How does this relate to the research findings in this study?**

The very same questions and problems faced by the poor in South Africa, who ironically have the least access to private security whilst having the greatest need for it, and whose lived experience is largely circumscribed by the social morbidity and myriad depredations that flow from poverty; are those questions and problems that this study describes as informing the mentalities of the providers of private security. All three themes mapped in the research findings in Chapter Four speak to issues of job security and the overriding injunction to be employed (whatever the ‘cost’ to self and family) in order to survive. This fundamental need is juxtaposed with the exploration of several normative issues of what private security perhaps ‘should or could look like’ through a regulatory lens based on principles that view private security as a “‘thick’ public good” (Loader & Walker, 2007: 144) and again highlights the ‘disconnect’ that is precipitated by a first world solutioning of third world concerns.

It is at this intersection that my findings diverge from the literature as espoused by Loader and White’s 2015 proposals, and a key finding that flows from my research emerges: The provision of private security in the Global South (looking to the South African example in this case) may not be so easily transferable from Loader’s Eurocentric or global North model onto the global South in general and, in particular, in the context of South Africa. This study foregrounds the need to find African solutions for African problems, and on the level of this study, to find South African solutions to South African problems. As mentioned, this points to the usefulness of adopting a nodal framing that better contextualises the concerns of private security when viewed from the perspective of Africa.

Put differently, my findings illustrate the lack of viability that results from an attempt to address global South contexts within the framework of global North normative dominance. This highlights the necessity of understanding private security in South Africa in the light of its unique context. In addition, my choice of the nodal analytic as the research framework is conducive to this understanding, given that the nodal
framework eschews and is not circumscribed by a set of pre-existing normative postulates.

In sum, the mentalities of those who provide private security highlight how tenuous their hold on maintaining a baseline of foundational human needs is. Given the findings as presented in this study, and in addition to the questions posed earlier in this concluding Chapter, these are the questions that need to be asked: How can job security in the South African private security industry be maximised? What needs to be done to alleviate the social comorbidity that arises from institutionalised poverty such as that in South Africa, where fifty percent of the population live below the bread line? This statistic was reported on television (News Night, 2017). What protective factors can be built into vulnerable and poverty-stricken communities to facilitate a more robust socio-economic scaffolding to mitigate against poverty and the problems that flow from it? These are the communities where ninety percent of this study’s Respondents live.

Indeed, the questions posed here are equally applicable to an examination of the equitable and transparent provision of private security to the poor; as they are to the equitability and transparency of the regulation and governance of the private security industry. Given this context, perhaps the place to start is to ask the workers in the private security industry (particularly those who are at the highest risk for the myriad social, economic and political harms and thus constitute some of the most dangerous and the most vulnerable urban spaces in South Africa) what they believe will work in their communities. This embraces a nodal, polycentric (many-centred) ‘from-the-ground-up’ approach which can be augmented by a ‘top-down’ that is, from the state, approach. The point here is that the provision of job security that serves the interests of the private security as a public good does not necessarily lie in an ‘either-or’ solution, but in fact in an ‘and-and’ set of solutions culminating from numerous conversations and inputs from myriad state and non-state actors.

5.4. A concluding thought

Given the argument I present on the back of my research findings in terms of finding South African solutions to South African problems, the irony of concluding this dissertation with a quotation from the policing scholar Robert Reiner, who lives and
works in the global North, is not lost on me. However, his words encapsulate the nexus of the issue and they speak to the heart of this study: “All the policing classics tell us that policing cannot deliver peace if deep social cleavages militate against it” (Reiner, 2015: 324).

The aim of this study is to illustrate just how deeply these social cleavages cut, along with the profound effect these cleavages have on shaping the mentalities of those who work in the private security industry in a suburban private security firm in Cape Town, South Africa.
REFERENCES


*News Night*, 2017 [TV]. eNCA. 22nd August, 19:00.


APPENDIX A

PARTICIPANT OVERVIEW: FORMAL INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Security Personnel</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>First Language*</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Guards (Static and Patrolling) Guards:</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Black, Coloured, White</td>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Response Officers:</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Black, Coloured, White</td>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Control Room Officers:</td>
<td>Male &amp; Female</td>
<td>Black, Coloured, White</td>
<td>Xhosa, Afrikaans</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Management:</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner:</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PARTICIPANTS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Participants should preferably be proficient in English at Grade Eight (8) level.
APPENDIX B

LIST OF FORMAL INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview 1</th>
<th>Private Security Company Owner/Manager</th>
<th>February 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview 2</td>
<td>Operations manager</td>
<td>February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 3</td>
<td>Armed response officer</td>
<td>February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 4</td>
<td>Control room operator/dispatcher</td>
<td>February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 5</td>
<td>Armed response officer</td>
<td>February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 6</td>
<td>Control room operator/Dispatcher</td>
<td>February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 7</td>
<td>Control room operator/dispatcher</td>
<td>March 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 8</td>
<td>Guard (patrolling)</td>
<td>March 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 9</td>
<td>Guard (static and patrolling)</td>
<td>March 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview 10</td>
<td>Guard (static and patrolling)</td>
<td>March 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. All Respondents (2-10) are employed by and work for the same private security firm.
2. Respondent 1 is the owner/manager of the firm.
APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE:

Standardised Open-Ended questions

1. What is your job title?
2. What does a typical workday look like for you?
3. How did you get this job?
4. How long have you been working at this security company?
5. Is there anything that you enjoy the most about this job?
6. Is there anything that you dislike the most about this job?
7. Did you have any training before you started this job?
8. Did the training you received, if any, help you to do your job?
9. Have you had any on-the-job training, either at this company, or at any other private security company you may have worked for in the past?
10. If you have not received training, would you go if a training course was offered to you to attend?
11. What happens if you or one of your colleagues makes a mistake at work?
12. Do you get feedback on your work performance - what you are doing well, and areas in which you could improve?
13. Who gives you this kind of feedback?
14. Do you have problems with other colleagues in this job?
15. If yes, are problems sorted out?
16. If there are problems at work, who helps you to sort the problems out?
17. Are you satisfied with the working conditions of your job, such as the number of shifts you work per month, or the hours of the shifts that you work?
18. Do you talk to anyone you work with about work problems you may face?
19. Who would you talk to about any personal problems you may face?
20. Who would you talk to about any financial problems you may face?
21. Do you have regular meetings with your supervisor/s?
22. If no - would you like to have regular meetings with your supervisors?
23. Do you talk at these meetings?
24. If yes - do you feel that the issues you raise at these meetings are taken seriously? If no, why do you not talk at meetings?

25. Do you have meetings with anyone else, other than your supervisor, in the company?

26. If yes, do you find these meetings helpful to you?

27. If no, what could you do to make these meetings more helpful to you?

28. Is your job dangerous?

29. Other than training, do you feel that you are given enough resources - for example, the proper uniform, proper shoes, enough clothing for night shifts and in the winter months?

30. Do you need to carry a firearm when you do this job?

31. If yes, how do you feel about carrying a firearm?

32. Do you carry any other weapons or equipment that can help you to protect yourself in your job?

33. Who do you call for back-up if you are in a potentially dangerous situation?

34. Does back up arrive quick enough for you?

35. Have you had to deal with members of the SAPS (South African Police Services) in the line of duty?

36. If yes, how do you feel about your relationship with the SAPS?

37. If you were offered a job at another security company would you take it?

38. If you were offered a job in the SAPS would you take it?

39. If yes, why? If no, why?

40. Do you have any perks in your job - for example: pension fund, medical aid or bonus pay?

41. How long does it take you to get to work?

42. Who pays for your transport costs to and from work?

43. Are you able to change your shift hours if you need to?

44. If you could change one thing about your job, what would you change?

45. Is there anything else you want to tell me about your job, that you have not spoken about yet in this interview?
APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW SHEET:

Informal conversational interviews

I used this list of questions during the ‘ride-along’ with the armed response officer, both with him and with the employees with whom I spoke at the various sites we visited. This list facilitated my staying on topic and steering the conversation back on track when we went off topic:

1. How often do you visit each of the company’s sites during a single shift?
2. Do you feel that your clients respect the service you provide for them?
3. How would you describe your relationship with the general public (other than your clients) if you deal with them?
4. If you look back over the last month, approximately how many times have you involved the SAPS (South African Police Services) in an incident to which you have had to attend?
5. How would you describe your relationship with the SAPS?
6. What is the procedure if you receive a call from your control room?
7. Do you feel that the control room operator gives you enough detail about the situation you are being called to sort out?
8. If not, do you feel free to request further information?
9. If you arrive at a scene and you feel you require back-up to deal with the situation, who do you call for back-up?
10. Is there any further information that you would like to share with me that you haven’t shared yet?