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A Principled Engagement? Non-collaboration and the Teachers’ League of South Africa in the Western Cape, 1990 - 2003

Paul Ross Hendricks

A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Education, University of Cape Town, July 2010
Abstract

This thesis investigates the Teachers’ League of South Africa’s (TLSA, League or Teachers’ League) ideas and practice of non-collaboration. It seeks to ascertain whether these ideas and practices continued after the organisation merged with several public sector unions in the National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (NUPSAW) at the end of the last century. The thesis tracks the emergence and changing dynamics of the TLSA from the early decades of the twentieth century, as it developed and grew in the Western Cape, a region that was its nerve centre and where it was most active. There is a focus on the endeavours of the League to adapt and grow during the political and educational tumult of the 1990s, a period characterised by negotiations, reconciliatory and consensual politics that centred on nation building, and which was unreceptive if not clearly hostile to the organisation’s non-collaborationist stance.

The thesis employs an historical approach to contextualise the development of the League’s non-collaborationism, and to elucidate the impact of South Africa’s changing political, economic and educational landscape on the organisation. Extensive interviews were conducted, therewith giving a voice to the writing of history from below, embracing the experiences and perceptions of League members and the teacher activists who interacted with them before, but more so during and even beyond the 1990s. Documentary material of the TLSA and its umbrella body, the Unity Movement, dating back to the 1940s, provides the key primary sources for the study, while secondary information on the development of South Africa’s political economy and the liberation movement offers valuable insights and alternative perspectives on the TLSA and Unity Movement.

The thesis endorses the notion that appearances are at times intermingled with the opposite of what is being perceived, and thus challenges assumptions that the League’s policy of non-collaboration was fixed and timeless. Instead, the thesis seeks to uncover the incongruities, nuances and complexity of this distinctive quality of the organisation, in an attempt finally, to elucidate its transformative potential in the present period.
Declaration

I declare that A Principled Engagement? Non-collaboration and the Teachers’ League of South Africa in the Western Cape, 1990 – 2003 is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used and quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Paul Ross Hendricks

July 2010
Dedication

This study is dedicated to my parents Vivienne and Arthur Hendricks for instilling the importance of education and the development of a deep social consciousness. I hope this work contributes to the achievement of a better society for which many have sacrificed.
Acknowledgements

I owe an enormous debt to a range of people who in far-reaching ways contributed to this study. Their contributions, both direct and indirect, proved enormously valuable.

I am first and foremost profoundly indebted to my loving mother and late father who over the years and despite extreme odds, were at all times, selfless and untiring in their encouragement and support. Behind my parents are my brothers and sisters Michael, Vicky, Karen and Robin, who continuously prompted and enquired into my progress – it was greatly appreciated.

The late Ivan Abrahams merits special mention, for he was instrumental in opening up this area of study for me. I will always remember him as a discerning and forthright person who was selflessly committed to the quest for liberation. Without him, this journey would not have begun in the first place.

My supervisors Professor Crain Soudien and Associate Professor Rob Siëborger have been central to this study: their constructive criticism, advice, patience, and encouragement, shaped this thesis in significant ways. Neville Alexander, too, at the very start, played a key role in opening up the discussion on non-collaboration, a gesture which gave impetus and direction to the study.

To the range of people who gave of their time to be interviewed and who were always supportive, I am infinitely grateful. I was hugely fortunate to have had access to Ursula Fataar, Elma Carollisen, Robin Kayser, June Udemans, Louis Roelf, Ivan Fife, Brian Isaacs, Rita Hartel, Norman Abrahams, David Kapp and Shaun Viljoen, all of whom generously passed on archival material that proved extremely valuable in filling in the gaps and clarifying a range of issues related to the Unity Movement and its affiliates.

I have been extremely privileged to benefit from friends and colleagues who at different times, sometimes without them knowing it, gave invaluable input into this study. A special word of gratitude goes to Brian Isaacs who from the outset provided critical support on a variety of fronts and was at all times encouraging of the study. Sharon Kleintjies proved
true to form, and from the very beginning, was both a summer and winter weather friend. Reliable as always, Robin Kayser shared his knowledge on the Unity Movement and provided key documents that clarified the politics and early history of the Unity Movement. He also systematically checked my footnotes. During a trying period, Vivienne Lalu provided valued guidance and advice, and she painstakingly unravelled and checked the referencing system of the study. For those early and at times lengthy discussions that crystallised many political and theoretical ideas and issues, I’m beholden to Heidi Grunebaum. For formatting the thesis and ensuring the presentation was up to standard, and, moreover, for her patience at various times throughout the writing of the thesis, Lindia Trout deserves special mention. I also wish to thank, in particular, Judy Scheepers and Naseera Salim for their patient and meticulous transcribing of many lengthy interviews.

I’m especially indebted to colleagues and friends who on various occasions were willing to proof read sections of this dissertation. They include Sharon Kleintjies, Karen Dreyer-Stempels, William Leith, Neville Morgan, Toyer Nakidien, Robin Kayser, Elizabeth van der Heyden and Patricia Coates. A particular word of gratitude must go to Rhoda Hendricks who methodically proof read the entire thesis – an arduous task she was kind enough to voluntarily undertake.

I wish to acknowledge two research-funding sources from which I benefitted financially: the Spencer Foundation and Mellon Fellowship. Without these sponsors this study would not have materialised when it did.

A long list of friends, colleagues and activists, whether they were aware of it or not, provided support, advice and encouragement in a multitude of ways. They include James Marsh, Lindia Trout, Vivienne Lalu, Toyer Nakidien, Rita Hartel, Bernice Abels, Lorna Rensburg, Neville Morgan, Donovan Ward, Francois Cleophas, Clive Kronenberg, Jon Jusa, Elma Carollisen, Milton Van Wyk, Judy Scheepers, Tanja Bosch, Josh Ogada, Patrick Johannes, Desmond Sauer and Vanessa Manne amongst others.

Finally, to the many interviewees who passed on in the course of this study: your unyielding spirit lives on – ‘Let us live for our children.’
## Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>All African Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-CAD</td>
<td>Anti-Coloured Affairs Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>APDUSA</td>
<td>African People’s Democratic Union of South Africa</td>
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<td>APO</td>
<td>African People’s Organisation / African Political Organisation</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>Anti-Segregation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>Azanian People’s Organisation</td>
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<td>BAD</td>
<td>Bantu Affairs Department</td>
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<td>BCM</td>
<td>Black Consciousness Movement</td>
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<td>CAC</td>
<td>Coloured Affairs Council</td>
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<td>CAD</td>
<td>Coloured Affairs Department</td>
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<td>CAG</td>
<td>Concerned Action Group</td>
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<td>CAL</td>
<td>Cape Action League</td>
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<td>CAFEF</td>
<td>Cape Flats Education Fellowship</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATA</td>
<td>Cape African Teachers’ Association</td>
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<td>CATU</td>
<td>Cape African Teachers’ Union</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Critical Outcome</td>
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<td>CONSAWU</td>
<td>Confederation of South African Workers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<td>COSAS</td>
<td>Congress of South African Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSA</td>
<td>Communist Party of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPNU</td>
<td>Coloured People’s National Union</td>
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<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Cape Peninsula Students Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTFC</td>
<td>Cape Teachers’ Federal Council</td>
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<td>CTMWA</td>
<td>Cape Town Municipal Workers’ Union</td>
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<td>CTPA</td>
<td>Cape Teachers’ Professional Association</td>
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<td>CTA</td>
<td>Cape Teachers’ Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBAC</td>
<td>Disorderly Bills Action Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>Department of Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>DETU</td>
<td>Democratic Teachers’ Union</td>
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</table>
DA    Democratic Alliance
DP    Democratic Party
DoE   Department of Education
DoL   Department of Labour
EPSSSU Eastern Province Senior Schools’ Sports Union
ERS   Education Renewal Strategy
ESSET Ecumenical Service for Social-Economic Transformation
FCCA  Federation of Cape Civic Associations
FI    Fourth International
FIOSA Fourth International of South Africa
FOSATU Federation of South African Trade Unions
GEAR  Growth Employment and Redistribution
GNU   Government of National Unity
HoA   House of Assembly
HoD   House of Delegates
HoR   House of Representatives
HWU   Health Workers’ Union
LO    Learning Outcomes
LLL   Life Long Learning
LP    Labour Party
MK    Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation)
NACTU National Council of Trade Unions
NAPTOSA National Professional Teachers’ Organisation of South Africa
NASGB National Association of School Governing Bodies
NECC National Education Crisis Committee / National Education Coordinating Committee
NEPI  National Education Policy Initiative
NEUM  Non-European Unity Movement
NEF   New Era Fellowship
NEUF  Non-European Unity Front
NLL   National Liberation League
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NQF</td>
<td>National Qualifications Framework</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Native Representative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Sports Congress</td>
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<td>NTB</td>
<td>National Training Board</td>
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<td>NTSI</td>
<td>National Training Strategy Initiative</td>
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<td>NTUF</td>
<td>National Teacher Unity Forum</td>
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<td>NUE</td>
<td>National Union of Educators</td>
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<td>NUM</td>
<td>New Unity Movement</td>
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<td>NUPSAW</td>
<td>National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBE</td>
<td>Outcomes Based Education</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan African Congress</td>
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<td>PSCBC</td>
<td>Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent Teacher Association</td>
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<td>PTSA</td>
<td>Parent, Teacher, Student Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADTU</td>
<td>South African Democratic Teachers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACOS</td>
<td>South African Council on Sport</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIC</td>
<td>South African Indian Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAQA</td>
<td>South African Qualifications Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SASSSA</td>
<td>South African Senior Schools’ Sports Union</td>
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<td>SGB</td>
<td>School Governing Body</td>
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<td>SOs</td>
<td>Specific Outcomes</td>
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<td>SOYA</td>
<td>Society of Young Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPEF</td>
<td>South Peninsula Education Fellowship</td>
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<td>SRC</td>
<td>Students’ Representative Councils</td>
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<td>TAC</td>
<td>Teachers’ Action Committee</td>
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<td>TARC</td>
<td>Train Apartheid Resistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEPA</td>
<td>Teachers’ Educational and Professional Association</td>
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<td>TLSA</td>
<td>Teachers’ League of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCT</td>
<td>University of Cape Town</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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<td>UM</td>
<td>Unity Movement</td>
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<td>UMSA</td>
<td>Unity Movement of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UWC</td>
<td>University of the Western Cape</td>
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<td>WCPTSF</td>
<td>Western Cape Parents’, Teachers’, Students Forum</td>
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<td>WECTU</td>
<td>Western Cape Teachers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPSA</td>
<td>Workers’ Party of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPSSSU</td>
<td>Western Province Senior Schools’ Sports Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPPSSU</td>
<td>Western Province Primary Schools’ Sports Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WOSA</td>
<td>Workers’ Organisation for Socialist Action</td>
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Introduction

We stand on the threshold of a New Era. Many there are of us who will go forth and never return. In this long and arduous struggle some must fall by the wayside. … I exhort you, I urge you, I enjoin you to enter into the struggle against the common foe.

... the poetry of history does not consist of imagination roaming at large, but of imagination pursuing the fact and fastening upon it ... to know what really happened long ago in that land of mystery which we call the past. ... The dead were and are not. Their place knows them no more, and is ours today. ... once, on this earth, once, on this familiar spot of ground, walked other men and women, as actual as we are today, thinking their own thoughts, swayed by their own passions, but now all gone, one generation vanishing into another. ...

This thesis examines the non-collaborationist politics of the Teachers’ League of South Africa (TLSA) - also referred to as the League or Teachers’ League - within South Africa’s political transition from an apartheid to a post-apartheid state. It focuses on the endeavours of the organisation to adapt and grow in the tempestuous and foggy political and educational climate of the 1990s, while pursuing its well-established role of informing the oppressed ‘black’ populace of what it saw as imminent dangers emerging in education. The merging of this custodianship with a distinct brand of hard-nosed non-collaborationist politics was the hallmark of the League from the time it joined the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) in the mid-1940s till the 1990s, when non-collaboration assumed a different character. This articulation between context, political theory and practice would characterise the League’s non-collaborationism.

3 The term black refers broadly to those classified ‘coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘African’ under both the apartheid and post-apartheid state.
4 From the mid-1940s the TLSA’s politics stood in strong contrast to those of the recognised teacher organisations, specifically those servicing ‘coloured’ teachers. This included, notably, from the late 1940s to the 1960s, the Teachers’ Educational and Professional Association (TEPA), from 1967 until the 1990s, the Cape Teachers’ Professional Association (CTPA), and during the 1990s the ‘racially’ inclusive National Professional Teachers’ Organisation of South Africa (NAPTOA) and the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU). The latter two organisations rivalled the League during the ‘90s as they had received recognition from the Department of National Education (DNE) and were party to policy developments in education under the post-apartheid government. In this dissertation the term ‘coloured’
The TLSA formed part of a wider grouping of organisations that constituted the federated NEUM, which was established in December 1943, and comprised principally the Anti-Coloured Affairs Department (Anti-CAD), All African Convention (AAC) and the Anti-Segregation Council (ASC). These affiliated organisations, formed at different times and in different places, had distinct constituencies. The AAC, for example, was established in 1935 in response to the Hertzog Bills which removed the African vote from the common voters’ role and placed it in a Native Representative Council (NRC). Initially controlled by what were then conservative elements, such as the African National Congress (ANC), African People’s Organisation (APO) and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the AAC was captured by a radical grouping in the early 1940s. Under this leadership it called for black unity to oppose segregation. The Anti-CAD, on the other hand, was founded in 1943, and included a spread of mainly ‘coloured’ organisations which comprised local branches or committees throughout the Cape and further afield. Its origin emanated from wide-ranging opposition to the government’s call for a segregated Coloured Affairs Council (CAC) or separate Coloured Affairs Department (CAD). The TLSA would become the premier affiliate of the Anti-CAD. As the ‘Indian’ constituency was not represented in the NEUM, because of the SAIC’s unwillingness to join the new federation, a radical group within the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) formed the ASC, which joined the anti-segregationist Unity Movement (UM) in 1945.5

As a consequence of its firm and, at times, uncompromising and combative non-collaborationist politics, the NEUM came to occupy a contested place in academic writings. Because the League formed a prominent part of the NEUM and later, from 1985, the New Unity Movement (NUM), it too was targeted and subjected to protracted criticisms directed

denotes ‘so-called coloured’, and signifies a rejection of this imposed and later internalised racial category. The terms ‘race’ and ‘racial’, in a similar vein, are viewed as unscientific and have been placed in inverted commas.  
5 The Unity Movement or the Movement, unless otherwise stipulated or where the context makes it clear, refers broadly to its constituents: the Anti-CAD, AAC and ASC. This includes after 1961 when the NEUM split, the African People’s Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA) and its external wing located in exile the Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA). Other structures such as the fellowships, specifically the New Era Fellowship (NEF), Cape Flats Education Fellowship (CAFEF) and South Peninsula Education Fellowship (SPEF), as well as the Federation of Cape Civic Associations (FCCA) and later the New Unity Movement (NUM), also comprised the Unity Movement.
at the Movement. This body of critique has coloured the UM and resulted in it being largely
dismissed in academia in contrast to the disproportionate attention bestowed on the ANC
and its ally, the South African Communist Party (SACP). Illustrating this point, Benita
Parry, writing in the field of postcolonial studies, declared that the Movement had been
effectively relegated to a footnote in history,\(^6\) while Neville Alexander likewise claimed
that it has received but cursory attention from writers in South African history.\(^7\)

Exemplifying this negative attitude towards the Unity Movement, Martin Legassick
provides only one disparaging if not indifferent sentence to the Movement’s formation in
his lengthy book, *Towards Socialist Democracy*, which examines the history of socialism
in South Africa.\(^8\) On the other hand, writers who have recognised the UM, have often been
scathing in their criticism. This criticism has not always been based on a rigorous
evaluation of what the Movement is all about and emanates from an incomplete or, on
occasion, mischievous reading of the organisation’s work. Roy Gentle in his thesis *The
NEUM In Perspective*, for example, starts from the misleading notion that the UM
leadership was or claimed to be Trotskyist, and sweepingly concludes that they were petty-
bourgeois, sectarian and anything but Trotskyist.\(^9\) In addition, Robin Kayser’s work on the
Unity Movement has been branded ‘partisan’ and the author dismissed as a member of the
NEUM and an erstwhile African People’s Democratic Union of Southern Africa
(APDUSA) activist.\(^10\) While the latter accusations are simply not true, these detracting
comments not only marginalise and misrepresent the Movement, they seriously undermine
scholarly contributions to its history and the broader historical discourse of organised
resistance in South Africa.

Critical, but more balanced, accounts of the NEUM may be found in Neville Alexander’s article on non-collaboration in the Western Cape from 1943 to 1963, Bill Nasson’s legacy of the Unity Movement, Linda Chisholm’s foray into the educational tradition of the Unity Movement, the author’s thesis on the TLSA in the mid-to-late 1980s, and more recently Alan Wieder’s two books on teachers in the Western Cape and the teaching and political life of Richard Owen Dudley.11 These writings attest to the important contributions of the Unity Movement and the TLSA to South African politics and education. This thesis is a further contribution in this vein of writing. It re-assesses some of these contributions and works in those spaces where there are gaps or shortcomings. Chisholm, for example, in an otherwise incisive and broad overview of the Unity Movement, errs on two accounts. She, firstly, ignores key aspects of the League teachers’ work in the sports and civic movement, and, secondly, fails to explore Unity Movement activity beyond the mid-1980s, claiming that many of its organisations and forums had ceased to function by then, and that this signalled ‘a profound defeat’.12 As a result of this oversight it is often imagined that the League had effectively disappeared from the educational radar by the 1990s with the emergence of mass-based teacher unions.

Wieder in his book *Voices from Cape Town Classrooms* implicates himself in the last mentioned thinking by ending his interviews with four prominent League teachers in the mid-1980s before switching his attention to younger militant non-League teachers who were active in the 1980s and 1990s. By doing this he suggests that League members were either absent from or marginal to these struggles. He also fails to correct this impression in his book on R.O. Dudley (known famously as R.O.), a leading Unity Movement and TLSA figure who remained active in the educational arena well into the 1990s. Overlooked in


12 Chisholm, claims that forums established by the NUM and TLSA prior to 1976 had disbanded by 1985 (Chisholm, ‘Making the pedagogical more political, and the political more pedagogical: Educational traditions and legacies of the Non-European Unity Movement, 1943-1985’, p.260).
particular by Chisholm and Wieder, was the launch of the New Unity Movement (NUM) in 1985 and its pivotal role in reinvigorating the League and spurring it to re-emerge as a public organisation in 1992, therewith ending nearly thirty years of operating underground. These are a few misrepresentations the thesis seeks to address, in a bid to more fully comprehend the contribution of the TLSA and its non-collaborationism to the development of resistance politics in the Western Cape and South Africa.

**Research methodology: constraints and possibilities**

The study is premised on a social historical approach to South African politics and education, employing interviews, archival and library research. One of its primary aims is to write a history from below, capturing personal experiences, observations and insights with the intention of inserting back into history voices previously excluded; voices, as Nasson notes, who ‘would otherwise never surface in the historical record’ and which provide ‘reservoirs of untapped new evidence’. With this in mind, extensive interviews were conducted with TLSA members and teacher activists to elicit and explore the variety of ways they interpreted and practised, or were critical of, non-collaboration before, during and after the 1990s.

Oral testimony, by its very nature, is fraught with controversy, since this method of sourcing information is susceptible to lapses in memory and is predisposed to bias. Eric Hobsbawm, for instance, avers that it is ‘a remarkably slippery medium for preserving facts’ since ‘memory is not so much a recording as a selective mechanism and the selection is, within limits, constantly changing’. It is the tendency to revise memory that is most

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14 A range of face-to-face interviews, many of which involved multiple sessions, were conducted with TLSA and non-TLSA members (see Bibliography, pp.376-377). These respondents, importantly, were formidably versed in League and UM politics. The interviews explored members’ experiences in the TLSA, specifically in relation to non-collaboration, prior to, during and beyond the 1990s. Non-members were questioned about their ‘thoughts on’ and ‘relationship with’ the organisation and other affiliates of the Unity Movement where League teachers were active, relative to the period and themes covered by the study. Considering the lengthy time-span but also specificity of the study, interviews were tailored according to respondents’ understanding of and experiences with the TLSA and its sister-affiliates. Other pertinent issues also shaped individual interviews.
concerning, for it alerts one to the way people consciously reconstruct images of the past relative to the needs and expectations of the present. This temporal factor, of how the present relates to the past, is significant for the process embarked upon in this study, and is applicable to many League participants interviewed, who still carried strong identities and traditions associated with their organisation despite having formally dissolved it. John Tosh aptly reminds that “memories, however precise and vivid, are filtered through subsequent experience. They may be contaminated by what has been absorbed from other sources … they may be overlaid by nostalgia … or distorted by a sense of grievance”. Wieder has correspondingly drawn attention to the sensitivities, subtleties and political dimensions of the debate on oral history and memory in South African historiographical discourse, particularly as it pertained to teachers in the Western Cape, while Drew captured the essence of the discussion when she declared: “In contemporary South Africa, the past is very much part of the present, not only in terms of the legacies which have shaped the present but in terms of the acute controversies which have arisen over conflicting interpretations of the past”.

A crucial aspect of evaluating oral accounts involves gathering a broad spectrum of sometimes conflicting voices as opposed to creating the impression of one version of the past. Eliciting multiple views of the past, or as Hutton puts it, the ‘past as it was experienced’, is central to this study, which is constructed in such a way as to encourage respondents to speak from personal recollection unencumbered as far as possible by organisational pressures or dictates, so as to invoke their ideas and thoughts on relevant issues.

17 TLSA members until 2004 were still keeping the organisation’s traditional branches intact within the Education Sector of the National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (NUPSAW).
21 See S. Field, ‘I dream of our old house, you see there are things that can never go away’: Memory, Restitution and Democracy, in S. Field (ed), Lost Communities. Living Memories: Remembering forced Removals in Cape Town, Cape Town: Centre for Popular Memory, University of Cape Town, 2001, p.123.
22 Hutton, p.xxv.
In adopting the above strategy, the author has endeavoured to show that the League encompassed many representative voices at different times and in different places, and that no single history can be told of the organisation but rather many histories - a multifarious one - or ‘microhistories’. This multi-perspectival approach to history opens possibilities for divergent interpretations, ‘new disclosures’ and ‘political contestation’, consistent with the scholarly tradition of the Movement, which although polemical, placed great emphasis on radical critique. It, moreover, lends itself to the conception of ‘collective memory’ and the exploring of ‘group consciousness’, since it offers a way of exploring ‘how’ and ‘why’ the League’s politics influenced the thinking and practice of a cross-section of teachers and activists that went way beyond the organisation’s membership.

The documentary record of the TLSA and Unity Movement is not unproblematic either. As a result of the dearth of extant academic writings on the League during its radical phase from 1944, significant secondary sources informing this study include writings on the liberation movement, particularly socialist tendencies in South Africa, and those texts dealing with the development of the South African political economy. A rich archive of TLSA and Unity Movement literature exists, the chief sources being The Educational Journal, League booklets and pamphlets, literature published under the auspices of the fellowships, particularly the Cape Flats Education Fellowship (CAFEF), the Federation of Cape Civic Associations (FCCA), AAC, Anti-CAD, NEUM, and the NUM. The bulk of this information was accessed through personal papers of members and former members of the TLSA and Unity Movement, various aligned and non-aligned political activists, and

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official archives, while a large portion of these primary sources was collected by the author over a period of time stretching back to the 1980s.26

A precautionary comment on the politics surrounding the Unity Movement and its relation to the official archive is necessary. A foremost concern is the fact that UM and TLSA literature including oral accounts, are as yet not available to researchers.27 The implications of an incomplete record are manifold. Of greatest significance is the substantial gap left by the absence of minutes and general correspondence. These are critical primary sources as they would provide for a more comprehensive examination of the continuities and discontinuities of League policy, strategy, tactics and related organisational issues.

The lacuna in the documentary material of the TLSA clearly affects the writing of the history of the organisation, since lasting organisational contributions, which the Unity Movement was and remains, form a vital part of the unfolding process of knowledge production or ‘how knowledge is produced’ and, more to the point, ‘how knowledge of the past is produced’.28 For this reason, Soudien’s caveat on the archive is pertinent and instructive, for he points out that the public record ‘is systemically structured to silence the voice of the marginalized’,29 whilst more substantively and persuasively, Premesh Lalu

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26 Ursula Fataar, who kept her late husband, Alie Fataar’s, papers in safe keeping, allowed the author access to The Educational Journals of the 1940s and 1950s. The Torch, the newsletter of the NEUM, was accessed at UCT’s African Studies Library and the National Library of South Africa. Robin Kayser also passed on a substantial body of information on the early years of the Unity Movement, in addition to other relevant material. The League’s journals of the 1960s and the 1970s were obtained from Ivan Fife and Brian Isaacs’ personal collections. Isaacs also assisted in filling in the gaps of the author’s collection of TLSA journals. He moreover gave the author access to the 1999 to 2003 NUPSAW minutes. June Udemans, Michael Williams, Louis Roelf and Rita Hartel passed on valuable League and NUM material from the 1990s. Documents from affiliates of the Unity Movement, such as the fellowships, particularly the SPEF, were sourced from Dawood Parker and David Kapp. Shaun Viljoen and other members of the Movement also made available documentation on the FCCA. Information on non-racial sport was sourced through various contacts. Frank van der Horst, for instance, shared documentary material from his personal collection on the South African Council on Sport (SACOS).

27 There was much discussion on where the NUM and TLSA should locate their archival material. The UMSA archive (BC 925 UMSA/Tabata Collection) is found at the University of Cape Town (UCT), while the NUM has opted to place its material at the University of Fort Hare. The UMSA archive comprises mainly the private collection of I.B. Tabata, which has been added to over the years and is incomplete. The Alie Fataar collection, for example, became part of the UMSA archive in 2007.


alerts researchers to the entrenched dangers of the ‘colonial archive’, which for him ‘authorizes, and at best, shapes its discourse’. Although archives present a plethora of political, methodological, theoretical and meta-theoretical concerns that exceed the scope of this study, they nonetheless remain key repositories for accessing essential primary sources, without which a history of organisations such as the League will remain hidden.

**Theoretical considerations**

The history of the left or socialist school of thought in South Africa and the Western Cape in particular, is a fractured yet rich and engaging one. The League and the Unity Movement’s contributions are eminent examples of this historical discourse. While the revisionist-liberal debate of the 1970s between Martin Legassick, Harold Wolpe, Fredrick Johnston, among others, and Monica Wilson, Leonard Thompson, and Herbert Adams et al attracted prominent attention, the radical works of leading NEUM members during the 1950s were ignored by professional historians because of their anti-liberal and anti-capitalist polemics. Known works of the radical school before the 1970s, were the writings of Eddie Roux and Ray and Jack Simons of the South African Communist Party (SACP). These works formed the basis for many of the revisionist writings. The radical discourse in South African historiography and the prominence of the NEUM and TLSA in

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31 The archive engenders key questions around the processes of ‘how’ and ‘why’ only certain documentary material came to be in the possession of official archives and specific collections, and thus what has maybe been excised, censored and forgotten. Indeed, the issue of how archiving is connected to politics, hegemony and most importantly memory and its correlative ‘the forgetting of what is to be kept safe’, as Derrida puts it, is relevant to this study (On Derrida’s insights regarding the archive see C. Hamilton, V. Harris, J. Taylor, M. Pickover, G. Reid, and R. Saleh (eds), *Refiguring the Archive*, Cape Town: David Philip, 2002, p.54).


34 The most prominent writings were Willem van Schoor, *The Origin and Development of Segregation in South Africa* (1950); Isaac Bangani Tabata, *The Awakening of the People* (1950); Dora Taylor alias Nosipho Majeke, *The Rôle of the Missionaries in Conquest* (1952); Hosea Jaffe alias Mnguni *Three Hundred Years* (1952), and Ben Kies, *The Contribution of the Non European People to World Civilisation* (1953). See Saunders, pp.135-139.

it is therefore indubitable. Given these key factors, it is considered appropriate to examine the League and its non-collaborationist politics within the framework of the broad socialist school of thought, to enable thereby a critique that draws from a continuum of left perspectives, and, which, to varying degrees, are consistent or at odds with the organisation’s outlook.36 The author has not confined himself to this framework however, and where necessary draws from a broader spectrum of political and theoretical ideas.

A plurality of radical thought has been blended for this thesis. This eclectic approach contests the notion that history and society is reducible to either economics or psychology, and instead conceives of it as an organic whole with intricate relationships.37 It moreover rejects the teleological and monolithic interpretation of history associated with the Soviet school of thought:38 the former referring to the idea that inevitable laws govern the evolution of society and that history is predetermined and moves in a single path, the latter, that everything in society can be reduced to economic explanation and that there is antagonism between two classes only. Advocated, rather, is an approach that conceives of history as constituting conflict and progress as part of an incomplete modernist project for emancipation.39 Societal change, from this perspective, is viewed as undergoing historical evolution that is not linear and predetermined with an inevitable goal, devoid of ‘reverses’, ‘deviations’, and ‘breaks in continuity’,40 but embodying complex relations between

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38 Soviet Marxism was associated with Stalin’s version of Marxism. Various Communist Parties adhered to the Russian or Stalinist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.


40 Carr, p.116; Sherman, p.9; Amin, p.97.
economic and social processes that occur within specific historical conditions where human agency create possibilities to influence the direction of history.\(^{41}\)

Equally contested is the notion that history can be reduced to interpretation, where all views are reconcilable and equally valid and objective truth is discarded as unattainable. Hobsbawm, for one, termed the interpretive approach ‘fictitious’, for throwing doubt on the distinction between fact and fiction or ‘what is true and what I feel to be true, [since] my own construction of reality is as good as yours or anyone else’.\(^{42}\) Amin, following Gianni Vottimo, condemned this discursive stance as an ‘abandonment’ ‘of the will to construct a different social order’, which for him started with ‘a radical critique of the present’.\(^{43}\)

Within the South African context the interpretive approach found resonance in the post-1994 reconciliatory language of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which in terms of its ‘truth-finding mandate’, had as its object to settle the past within the framework of the present, where restorative justice, reconciliation and national unity were prioritised.\(^{44}\)

The TRC, in an effort to promote general understandings of ‘transformation’, ‘redress’ and ‘nation building’, constructed a discourse of ‘cooperation’, ‘peace’, ‘forgiveness’, and ‘oneness in diversity’. The intent was clear, to offset a language of ‘conflict’ and ‘racism’ which apartheid wrought in order to bring about positive change, and so create a ‘convivial’ and ‘consensual’ society, one without enemies.\(^{45}\)

Taking issue with this conciliatory language in her critique of postcolonialists such as Homi Bhabha, Benita Parry argued that this compromising approach was a disavowal of the ‘antagonistic’, the binary of opposites that constitutes a hostile struggle between the subjugated and the oppressor,\(^{46}\) for one favouring ‘a competition of peers’ in an ‘agonistic’\(^{47}\) sense. A non-conflictual discourse, Farred argued, had the effect of rendering the anti-apartheid struggle a matter of

\(^{41}\) Sherman, p.20; Amin, pp.103, 104.
\(^{43}\) Amin, pp.113, 114.
\(^{47}\) Ibid., pp.62, 63.
interpretation or ‘how one reads, or misreads’ history,\textsuperscript{48} therewith opening possibilities for ‘complicity’ in which ‘cooperative relations’ replace the prevailing history of ‘racial’ antagonism in South African historiography.\textsuperscript{49} Parry, much as Farred, noted the postcolonialists’ drift towards the suppression of adversarial relations and resistance, and the advocacy of ‘ambivalence’ in the representation of history, evidenced by their deployment of open-ended categories such as ‘hybridity’, ‘reciprocity’, the ‘in-between’ inter alia, not ‘class struggle’, ‘property relations’ and so forth.\textsuperscript{50} She thus posed the extremely penetrating question of whether the narrative of past and still existing conflict has been displaced with one of complicity, where the dispossessed and exploited are viewed as equally responsible as the perpetrators for their subjugation?\textsuperscript{51} The theoretical discourse on consensual politics, complicity, collaboration and non-collaboration thus forms an interconnected web which is inextricably part of constructing the history of resistance in South Africa.

Notwithstanding the problematic invoked by Marxists in relation to postcolonialism, it is the author’s opinion that the latter, given its capacity to draw on a wide, though contested range of theory,\textsuperscript{52} offers possibilities for writing a history of resistance. This is evident in the postcolonialists concern with ‘subaltern groups’, the ‘victims of the postcolonial state’,\textsuperscript{53} and their efforts to ‘create alternative public spheres’ by asserting the ‘primacy of a politics of difference and struggle’.\textsuperscript{54} It is also apparent in their preoccupation with ‘historical acts of memory’ and their preparedness to retrieve the contributions of ‘often

\textsuperscript{49} Farred, pp.113-116.
\textsuperscript{51} Parry, ‘The New South Africa: The revolution postponed, internationalism deferred’, p.183. See also Farred.
anonymous participants’ of anti-colonial struggles and independence movements.\textsuperscript{55} Indeed, it is through these emancipatory impulses that postcolonialism shares ‘mutual sites of concern’ with Marxists, giving impetus to the latter’s claim to be a living philosophy, which in Sartre’s words, is ‘continually being adapted and adapting itself’.\textsuperscript{56} Considering these inter-related theoretical factors, an integrated theory which places emphasis on historical change, human agency and emancipation has been employed to examine the League’s emphasis on political and educational struggle, particularly its central thesis on the liberatory role of the teacher.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{Scope of the study}

This thesis adopts an historical developmental approach which has as its main intent the investigation of the ideas and practice of non-collaboration, and whether these endured beyond the organisation’s lifespan when it merged with several public sector unions to form the National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (NUPSAW) at the end of the last century.\textsuperscript{58} The historical approach attempts to contextualise the development of the League and to elucidate how the changing nature of South Africa’s political, economic and educational landscape impacted the organisation. The emerging and changing dynamic of the TLSA as it developed and grew in the Western Cape, the region which was its nerve centre, is tracked from the early decades of the twentieth century. The early era, when the core of the League’s politics particularly its policy of non-collaboration was formed and refined, is pivotal to the second part of this study, which examines the theory and practice of the organisation during the ebb and flow of South Africa’s transition in the 1990s. Chapter 1 outlines the early history of the League from 1913 until the mid-1960s, when in the wake of Sharpeville and after the banning of its first tier of leadership, it opted to work underground. The chapter sketches broadly the organisation’s early history before and

\textsuperscript{55} Young, p.61.


\textsuperscript{58} Despite the union’s unitary structure the League was allowed to operate and organise as the NUPSAW Education Sector.
particularly after the split between the younger radical TLSA members and the conservative African People’s Organisation (APO) leadership in the early 1940s. The emergence of the politics of non-collaboration and its conceptual connection to the NEUM’s Ten-Point Programme, and how the TLSA implemented this policy, are examined. Lastly, the effect of the state’s repressive machinery on the organisation’s activities during the late 1950s and early 1960s is detailed.

Chapter 2 focuses on the TLSA’s underground years from the 1960s to the mid-1980s and early 1990s. The involvement of its members in the non-racial sports movement, particularly school sport, in the fellowships and in the FCCA is discussed. The chapter demonstrates how the guiding politics of the boycott and non-collaboration were sustained in these structures. It also, at a broader level, attempts to offset the thinking that TLSA teachers were dormant or inactive in the twenty-to-thirty year period after the organisation went underground in 1963. Interwoven into the examination of these initiatives are the shifting political and educational measures the government introduced to navigate its way through the political, social and economic turmoil of the late 1970s, the 1980s, and the tense negotiation environment of the early 1990s.

The interface chapter details the first half of the 1990s. It marks the period in which the League re-emerged and began once again to propagate its politics to the broader public. Covering the period from the mid-1980s, this chapter provides an overview of the League’s engagement with the government’s Education Renewal Strategy (ERS) and the educational reforms implicit in it, as well as the April 1994 election and the question of parliament. It also provides the basis for understanding the strategic choices the League was to make vis-à-vis the national education policy reforms at the start of post-apartheid South Africa.

Chapter 3 introduces the substantive section of the thesis. It examines the emergence of teacher unionism and the TLSA’s response to this development. Traced from the formation of the Western Cape Teachers’ Union (WECTU) in the mid-1980s, to the emergence and growth of SADTU in the 1990s, is how the League grappled with the new mass-based politics of teacher unionism, particularly the apparent contradictions of SADTU’s use of
strike action, while it simultaneously sought recognition from the different ‘race’ based education departments. Examined, too, are the internal dynamics of the organisation as it attempted to recruit and promote its ideas in a new and unpredictable environment where the popularity of ANC politics had, from the mid-1980s, displaced that of the Unity Movement, thus creating new and demanding challenges for the League. The chapter concludes with an examination of the TLSA’s interventions in the conflict-riven teacher politics after 1994, when the Department of National Education (DNE), in collaboration with teacher unions, implemented rationalisation measures that resulted in the loss of thousands of experienced teachers to the profession.

Chapter 4 traces the League’s use of non-collaboration within the context of the new South Africa, and explores how the organisation wrestled with the flood of educational reforms introduced under the new integrated education and training system. The chapter focuses on the National Qualifications Framework (NQF), Curriculum 2005, and School Governing Bodies (SGBs), as key reforms with which the League engaged. The organisation positioned and analysed these reforms within the unfolding South African political economy, as the government moved from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. Laced into the chapter are the discussions, opinions and experiences of League and non-League teachers who were involved in education at the time. Added to this is an assessment of the policies pursued by the TLSA at the schools where historically it had an influence, to ascertain to what degree these institutions of learning represented examples of democratic education.

Chapter 5 deals with the TLSA’s non-collaborationism in relation to the conciliatory politics permeating the union movement at the end of the 1990s. It focuses on the period when the government’s education and labour legislation compelled teachers to become unionised. As the organisation found itself enveloped by the politics of unionism, the concerns it had to confront when it formally disbanded and joined the union movement are discussed. The knotty issues, with which members were confronted as they sought to uphold and promote the TLSA’s non-collaborationist ethos in the initial years under the banner of the NUPSAW, form a significant part of this chapter’s narrative. These
challenges included preserving the League’s identity as embodied in the organisation’s branch structure, annual conference, Legal Aid Bureau (LAB) and *The Educational Journal*. The chapter concludes by looking at whether the non-collaborationist politics and educational outlook of the League remained relevant in the new millennium.

The concluding chapter synthesises the issues focused on in the dissertation. These include the central theoretical and practical implications of non-collaboration for the TLSA during the 1990s, and, when in reincarnated form, it constituted the NUPSAW Education Sector.
Chapter 1
From accommodation to non-collaboration:
The Teachers’ League of South Africa (TLSA), 1913 – 1963

The deception of the people is an art of government which has been practised by every
ruling class since the dawn of society. Oppressors have used whips and chains; they
have used torture, bullets and prisons. But their most important weapon has been the
enslavement of the mind.¹

To get the people out of the morass it was necessary to sever the link that bound them
through their leaders to their oppressors. It was necessary to cut the chain of
collaboration. Here is where the boycott proves itself a most effective weapon. It is the
hammer and chisel that snaps the chain.²

The Teachers’ League of South Africa (TLSA), also known as the League or the Teachers’
League, was a product of its time. In much the same way as E. H. Carr could declare the
Russian Revolution to be ‘rooted in specifically Russian conditions’,³ so the Teachers’
League was shaped by circumstances peculiar to South Africa. A mix of political and
socio-economic factors that were uniquely South African would accordingly impact the
organisation at different times in its historical development. Dynamic international forces,
too, proved critical to the formation of the ideas and practices of the TLSA and ultimately
shaped its identity. The organisation for that reason cannot be clearly understood without
outlining its early history and how the emerging societal forces, particularly the political
element, came to bear on it both before and after it embarked on the ‘new road’ of non-
collaboration in 1944.

Given these considerations, this chapter examines the evolving political and educational
ideas of the TLSA during the first fifty years of its development. It covers the era before
but more so after it adopted non-collaboration, which at different times and, or, in different
contexts was defined in stark but also nuanced terms as a principle, policy, method or
strategy for social change. To avoid an ahistorical and static definition of the central

² I.B. Tabata, Boycott As Weapon Of Struggle, Cape Town, June 1952, p.26. Tabata and Kies were leading
figures within the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) to which the Teachers’ League of South Africa
(TLSA) affiliated in 1944. Their contributions encapsulate largely the vision and method associated with non-
collaboration.
concept driving this study, these categorisations will be employed interchangeably when engaging the TLSA relative to non-collaboration.

Born within the political milieu of the early twentieth century, the TLSA was a child of the African Political Organisation (APO), founded in 1902. The APO’s leadership, schooled in nineteenth century English Cape liberalism, largely accepted the socio-economic inequalities and western standards of ‘civilisation’ that offered the limited space of a qualified non-racial franchise. In many respects, the APO leadership bore the hallmarks of the time, principally as pragmatists who accepted the ‘reality of the period’, of white supremacy and with it an imposed ‘coloured’ identity. The organisation’s pro-English outlook was, however, paradoxical, based on an assumed acceptance of white domination on the one hand, where the ‘coloureds’ relatively privileged position compared with the African population depended on the upholding of white rule, but where this same identity was used to mobilise and unify the heterogeneous ‘coloured’ community in demand of their rights. A central concern of the APO at the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, was to uplift the ‘coloured’ community particularly the skilled strata and emergent petty bourgeois elite by working within the system, using passive methods of non-cooperation such as dialogue, petitions, and deputations.

Abdurahman, the charismatic spokesperson for APO from 1905 until his death in 1940, was its main intellectual, organiser, and driving force. Having cut his teeth in the battles around the extension of the ‘coloured’ franchise, which resulted in the Cape Province and Natal

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7 Goldin, pp.32, 33.
8 See Adhikari, pp.25-29; Goldin, pp.32, 33; Hommel, p.172.
9 Lewis, p.27.
applying it in a qualified form and the Orange Free State and Transvaal removing it with the Act of Union of 1910, Abdurahman continued to mobilise this constituency in order to prevail upon the ruling South African Party (SAP) of Louis Botha the right of Africans and ‘coloureds’, the black population, to political rights accompanying the franchise.\(^{10}\) Despite his efforts, Abdurahman found black unity elusive, as the APO reflected the geo-political and economic conditions of its time, compelling it to forge a distinct ‘coloured’ identity.\(^{11}\) Within the framework of this limited and exclusive view, the APO sought to eliminate the colour bar from the constitution and therewith gain the re-admittance of blacks into white parliamentary politics. To achieve re-enfranchisement, however, ‘coloureds’ had to demonstrate their ‘civilised’ attributes and thus worthiness, Abdurahman declared.\(^{12}\) For him, the most exemplary representatives capable of securing this social advancement were the ‘coloured’ elite, many of whom were teachers.\(^{13}\) It was from this political and strategic vision related to the franchise that the TLSA was formed in Cape Town, May 1913, under the leadership of Harold Cressy, the principal of Trafalgar High School in District Six.

On 23 June 1913, the TLSA was inaugurated as a non-political professional teachers’ organisation representing and composed of exclusively ‘coloured’ teachers.\(^{14}\) The TLSA and APO shared common aims and tactics. Within a context of exclusion and deteriorating conditions, principally the growing segregationist and discriminatory measures eroding the political aspirations and socio-economic opportunities of the ‘coloured’ community,\(^{15}\) and which battered even more severely African political rights, the TLSA’s central aim was to address the professional frustrations and injustices ‘coloured’ teachers experienced and to advance the educational development of this community and their integration into the white dominated society.\(^{16}\) As the APO lodestar on the educational front, the early League,

\(^{10}\) Hommel, pp.34, 35. In Natal unlike at the Cape the franchise was not extended to Africans.
\(^{11}\) See Hommel, p.35. Also Lewis, pp.58, 60.
\(^{12}\) Lewis, pp.60, 61, 63.
\(^{14}\) Lewis, pp.75, 76; Adhikari, p.171.
\(^{16}\) Lewis, pp.75, 76; Adhikari, p.119.
numbering no more than eighty members,\textsuperscript{17} endeavoured to achieve its aims in an incremental way through discrete negotiations and consultation with the Cape Education Department, a method it termed \textquote{persistent, strenuous but dignified agitation}.\textsuperscript{18} For the next three decades, the organisation employed a cautious and diplomatic approach in an endeavour to win piece-meal reforms.\textsuperscript{19} In this milieu of conservative politics, the League gave theoretical support to non-racism and to the equality of all persons. In practice, however, it prioritised the fostering of solidarity amongst \textquote{coloured} teachers with the aim of finding accommodation within the existing system on terms that allowed them relative privilege.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, in order to remould the \textquote{coloured} working class to fit the image of bourgeois respectability, and thereby prove its worthiness of sharing equal rights with whites,\textsuperscript{21} education was advanced as the most effective means of instilling skills to achieve economic success, eliminate social problems, and inculcate commendable values of citizenship.\textsuperscript{22} The question of citizenship for all \textquote{coloureds} was central for Abdurahman. While the organising of teachers was critical to the educational development of the \textquote{coloured} community and their eventual assimilation into white middle class society; it was also key to the numerical strengthening of the \textquote{coloured} franchise in order to pressure the ruling SAP to extend the \textquote{coloured} vote.\textsuperscript{23} This political gain, in turn, it was believed, would benefit the teaching fraternity in \textquote{coloured} communities,\textsuperscript{24} battling as they were against the frustrations and injustices of low wages, inadequate teacher training and schooling facilities, victimisation by school managers and other professional and educational disabilities.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{17} The League started out a small organisation and by the mid-1930s drew only a quarter of the \textquote{coloured} teachers to its ranks. Thereafter it grew rapidly, by 1943 claimed a membership of 1500 teachers, and henceforth was more representative of the \textquote{coloured} teaching profession (Adhikari, pp.49, 60, and 61).
\textsuperscript{18} Adhikari, p.119.
\textsuperscript{19} Lewis, p.76.
\textsuperscript{20} Adhikari, pp.85-90; Chisholm, p.91.
\textsuperscript{23} Adhikari, \textit{The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940}, pp.25, 26.
\textsuperscript{24} See Ibid., p.27; Goldin, p.33.
\textsuperscript{25} Adhikari, \textit{The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940}, pp.27-35.
To promote the organisation, enhance professional solidarity amongst ‘coloured’ teachers, and facilitate communication between the Executive and the membership, especially in areas beyond the Western Cape,\textsuperscript{26} the League published its official organ \textit{The Educational Journal}, from May 1915 onwards. To further entrench its identity, the organisation in 1918 adopted the aphorism ‘Let Us Live for Our Children’, a motto that remained inscribed on the cover of its journal to encapsulate, rather ambivalently at first,\textsuperscript{27} the vision and philosophy of the TLSA at different periods in its history. This distinct inscription, as with the organisation’s journal, remained a distinguishing feature of the League. By the end of the decade, the organisation had established itself as a ‘racially-defined’ entity, with its own characteristic and enduring symbols.

To advance the cause of ‘coloured’ teachers and their community, the TLSA sought to develop a genial and co-operative relationship with not only the Cape Education Department but also the white dominated South African Teachers’ Association (SATA), for the latter represented ‘the measure against which the Education Department and society at large would judge the organisation’.\textsuperscript{28} While it edged closer to the white community, the TLSA detached itself from the African section of the population, fearing that by ‘coloureds’ identifying too closely with Africans they would reduce the possibilities of future concessions from the state and harm their chances of assimilation.\textsuperscript{29} In this respect, the League differed with the APO, which had a fraternal relationship with the main representative of the African people, the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) that had been established in 1912.\textsuperscript{30}

Notwithstanding organisational differences in their approach to the African community, the TLSA and APO leadership largely agreed politically. Their conservatism placed them at

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p.89.
\textsuperscript{27} Adhikari notes that the motto did not reflect the \textit{a priori} organisational concern of the League, which in fact was more focused on the improvement of ‘coloured’ teachers’ service conditions (Adhikari, \textit{The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940}, p.83).
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p.94; Lewis, p.75.
\textsuperscript{29} Adhikari, \textit{The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940}, p.171.
\textsuperscript{30} SANNC appealed solely to Africans, its key task the promotion of national unity amongst Africans in order to transcend tribal barriers. The APO and SANNC leadership had much in common both in their moderate aims and passive methods of achieving them (Lewis, pp.78, 79).
variance with the more radical voices of the time, most recognisably the Industrial and
Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) formed in Cape Town, 1919. Embracing ‘coloured’
and African workers in the 1920s, the ICU was the first ‘racially’ integrated organisation in
South Africa and as such had a strong presence in the Western Cape.\footnote{Goldin, p.164.}
Its radical politics and general militancy stood in strong contrast to that of the APO, which was perceived as
little more than a ‘coloured’ branch of the South African Party (SAP).\footnote{Khan, p.24.}
Although the APO shared common platforms with and occasionally gave support to the ICU, it refused to
formally align itself with the union.\footnote{Lewis, pp.101-105.} Instead, it launched its own short-lived Federation of
Labour Unions in 1919, and abandoned the idea of working class solidarity capable of
cutting across ‘racial’ divides, a move which not only sharpened ‘coloured’ African
divisions, but also exposed the organisation’s exclusivist agenda.\footnote{See Goldin, p.36.}
In fact, APO renamed itself the African People’s Organisation in 1919\footnote{Ibid., pp.34, 35; Lewis, p.89.}
to emphasise its commitment to the social and economic upliftment of ‘coloured’ people, many of whom were being ousted
from semi-skilled and skilled occupations by whites and from unskilled jobs by lower paid
African labour. The organisation’s revised programme accentuate differences between
black organisations in the Western Cape and consequently undermined possibilities for
unified opposition to the state’s segregationist policies.

Throughout the 1920s, the SAP and Pact (Nationalist-Labour) government pushed for
political, industrial and economic legislation to deepen segregation amongst the black
majority and to entrench white domination.\footnote{The Pact government replaced the SAP as the government of South Africa in 1924. It comprised a formal alliance between the National Party (NP) and Labour Party (LP). In class terms, they represented an alliance between sections of agricultural and industrial capital, together with a layer of organised white labour.}
In this politicised environment, the League attempted to remain aloof and ostensibly ‘apolitical’.\footnote{Adhikari, The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940, pp.57, 58.}
Its language of moderation, diplomacy and support of reforms, however, increasingly drew the organisation into the
government’s segregationist plans, plans which subjected the ‘coloured’ community to a
subordinate position in society relative to whites, and where Africans were excluded. The
organisation acceded to, for instance, amongst other policies, the 1922 Apprenticeship
Act, the Juvenile Advisory Board, differentiated syllabi for Africans and ‘coloureds’, the barring of ‘coloured’ student teachers from the prestigious Training Institute, and most remarkably an inferior professional status for ‘coloured’ teachers, by conceding to a lower wage in comparison to white teachers. In practice, the League’s exclusivity proved highly political, for it presented no active opposition to the government’s segregation policies.

More problematic, was the League’s endorsement of Hertzog’s ‘New Deal’ and his civilised labour policy, which aimed at the political, industrial and economic incorporation of ‘coloureds’ with whites whilst alienating Africans. It moreover courted the APO breakaway African National Bond (ANB), a section of the ‘coloured’ elite which had become disillusioned with the SAP and were drawn to Hertzog’s promise to institute separate ‘coloured’ representation via his 1924 Coloured Persons Representation Bill (CPRB), and to improve ‘coloured’ education. This optimism however was soon dashed.

By the latter part of the 1920s, it became clear that the Pact government was more concerned with the protection of white workers not black labour. A series of industrial Acts testified to this: The Wage Act of 1925, Mines and Works (Amendment) Act of 1926 and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. All of these prohibited the undercutting of white labour by ‘coloured’ workers and disqualified Africans from skilled labour. The ‘coloured’ elite, too, found themselves competing with poor Afrikaners migrating from the countryside to the cities, thus clearly demonstrating the government’s preference for ‘white

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38 The Apprenticeship Act deprived the vast majority of mission trained ‘coloured’ youth from pursuing trade apprenticeships. Its revised minimum education requirement of Standard 6 and a graduation age of 26 prevented the vast majority of ‘coloured’ youth from pursuing apprenticeships for trades. This was owing to most mission schools only providing education up to Standard Four, whereas for white students attending state-aided public schools this minimum criterion was far more reachable (see Adhikari, The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940, p.53; and Lewis, p.88).


40 Goldin, p.37; Lewis, pp.126, 127, 131, 132. Hertzog promised to extend the franchise to ‘coloureds’ in the Northern provinces, and declared ‘coloureds’ to be separate from Africans and worthy of a share in white privilege.


42 Ibid., p.52.


44 Goldin, p.42; Adhikari, The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940, p.54.
skin’ colour not black skills in the job market.\textsuperscript{45} The much vaunted Coloured Education Report of 1927, which had so captivated the League, also failed to materialise, as it was found to be financially unattainable, thus delivering a grave blow to the League’s assimilationist ambitions.\textsuperscript{46} Critical for the black ‘elite’ and working class was the collapse of the American Stock Exchange in 1929, for it augured the onset of the great depression and compounded the affliction of the colour bar policies.

The depression of the early 1930s hit the black community in the Cape particularly hard, as it aggravated job losses and unemployment. ‘Coloured’ teachers felt this economic fallout acutely, as opportunities for professional advancement diminished.\textsuperscript{47} By the mid-1930s, for example, ‘coloured’ teaching posts in urban areas dried up as more students entered teaching to avert the worst of the economic downturn, specifically the drudgery of manual labour as whites occupied increasingly semi-skilled and skilled jobs.\textsuperscript{48} Employment opportunities for the ‘coloured’ elite consequently contracted significantly.

To aggravate matters, the 1930s also saw the voting power of ‘coloureds’ eroded by the NP, which had secured a majority in the 1929 election with the support of the ‘coloured’ ANB. Indeed, the NP had strengthened its voting base by first granting adult suffrage to white women from the age of 21, while it denied the same right to ‘non-white’ women, and, second, removed the property, income and educational franchise qualifications for white men, thus granting adult suffrage for them too.\textsuperscript{49} This reform effectively doubled the ‘white’ vote in the Cape and caused the corresponding decline in the value of the ‘coloured’ vote.\textsuperscript{50} Age and pigmentation became the sole qualifications for full citizenship.\textsuperscript{51}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{45} Adhikari, \textit{The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940}, p.54.
\bibitem{46} Ibid., p.52.
\bibitem{47} Lewis, p.180.
\bibitem{48} Adhikari, \textit{The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940}, pp.54, 55. Because whites dominated semi-skilled and skilled jobs, the alternative to teaching was menial employment. ‘Coloureds’ were further divided by the 1920s labour legislation, which on the one hand reduced the number of ‘coloured’ workers but on the other raised the wages of those employed and protected them from competition with African labour (M. Simons, ‘Organised Coloured Political Movements’, in H. W. van der Merwe and C. J. Groenewald, \textit{Occupational and Social Change among Coloured People in South Africa}, Wynberg: Juta, 1976, p.213).
\bibitem{49} Goldin, p.39.
\end{thebibliography}
grim socio-economic conditions of the early 1930s, what had been the ‘coloured’ electorate’s strength was rendered dispensable.  

Immobilised by the conservative politics of their leadership, which had effectively lost ground on the franchise, disenchanted, skilled and semi-skilled ‘coloureds’ turned their backs on Abdurahman and his moderate tactics of working with white political parties. On the educational front, too, the League’s stress on professionalism as opposed to adversarial political action, rendered it equally culpable for failing to advance ‘coloured’ interests.

The above factors would seriously affect the TLSA, and signs of dissension within its Western Cape branches started surfacing from the mid-1930s. This became pronounced when the new 1934 Fusion SAP-NP government enacted the Hertzog Native Bills, also termed by those who faced their full brunt, the ‘Slave Bills’. The legislation’s intent was clear: to neutralise the threat the African majority posed for the ‘all white’ NP by strengthening the white population’s political and economic hold on the country. The vision was threefold: to eliminate the limited African franchise in the Cape, control the influx of Africans into the urban areas, and finalise the land area occupied by Africans.

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53 Ibid., p.54. It should be noted that despite the APO’s ‘coloured’ exclusivity, Abdurahman between 1927 and 1934 organised several Non-European conferences that included representatives from the ICU, ANC (formerly SANNC) and South African Indian Congress (SAIC) to oppose the 1924 Labour-National Party Pact and the 1929 National Party government’s racial policies. These however produced no tangible outcomes.
57 Lewis, p.175.
The genesis of the boycott and non-collaboration

Hertzog’s Bills evoked widespread condemnation from sections of the African and ‘coloured’ population, spurring opposition to the proposed legislation with the establishment of the All African Convention (AAC) in 1935. Constituting the biggest and most representative gathering of African representatives held up to that point in South Africa, the Convention included the APO, ANC and South African Indian Congress (SAIC). Employing a diplomatic approach, the AAC’s intervention ended in a compromise that relegated the Cape African franchise to a separate advisory Native Representative Council (NRC). Defeated, the AAC opted for the next line of offence and proceeded to participate in the NRC elections. This decision created sharp discord within its ranks, between the radicals and conservatives. The Western Cape committee of the AAC, a left-wing group represented by Isaac Bangani Tabata, Jane Gool, Dr Goolam Gool and others, denounced the NRC and called for it to be boycotted as part of a non-collaborationist strategy, while the APO, ANC and Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) advocated working within the ethnic structure. While these differences weakened the AAC, the radicals’ politics was groundbreaking for the time in which they found themselves, as they rejected the government’s efforts to co-opt black leaders into ‘racial’ political structures. In fact, their non-collaborationist politics marked a distinct break from the preceding politics of moderation embodied by the ANC and APO. With the ANC threatened by the militant politics surfacing in the Convention, it convinced the federation to meet triennially, thus nullifying any threat the AAC posed to the Congress status as the

59 The Fusion government tabled two parliamentary bills in 1935: the Representation of Natives Bill and the Native Trust and Land Bill. The first bill halted the Cape African franchise and called into existence a Natives Representative Council (NRC) with advisory status on so-called Native issues. The second restricted African landholding rights to scheduled areas.
60 The December 1935 National Convention from which the AAC emerged was attended by approximately 400 delegates representing 150 organisations (Kayser, p.10).
61 The NRC assigned propertied Cape Africans to a separate voters’ role, allowing them to elect three white members of Parliament and two white Provincial Councillors. In addition, extra land was promised for the reserves, the powers of chiefs and headmen reinforced, and legal rights to the purchase of land formalised (R. Fine and D. Davis, Beyond Apartheid, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1990, p.49).
64 Drew, p.299.
chief representative of the African populace.\textsuperscript{65} This strategy also served to neutralise the radicals temporarily.

Within ‘coloured’ politics, a concurrent development to that of the AAC unfolded, following the call by the APO and Coloured-European Council to form a Coloured National Convention in response to the Wilcocks Commission findings of 1937.\textsuperscript{66} The Convention, following the Commission’s report, noted the harmful effect segregation had on the ‘coloured’ community, particularly its part in exacerbating the deteriorating political and socio-economic status of ‘coloureds’ from 1910. The Convention thus rejected all forms of segregation.\textsuperscript{67} Consternation arose though when the Commission was used to validate the implementation of segregatory measures in public life,\textsuperscript{68} and Malan of the ‘purified’ National Party called for the Hertzog Acts to be extended to ‘coloureds’.\textsuperscript{69} These events not only caused disquiet amongst the ‘coloured’ elite, they further highlighted and brought into question the APO’s conservative politics. These factors would prove a catalyst for the emergence of new radical organisations advocating black unity that cut across class and sectional lines. The National Liberation League (NLL) and the Non-European Unity Front (NEUF), formed in 1935 and 1938 respectively, were two such formations. Their leadership comprised mainly teachers,\textsuperscript{70} many of whom were linked to leftist elements from the CPSA, the Trotskyist Fourth International Organisation of South Africa (FIOSA) and the Workers’ Party of South Africa (WPSA). These left-wing formations had a tremendous influence on the NLL and the NEUF, as they effectively mobilised around the black population’s common lack of political rights and civil liberties, which they saw achievable.

\textsuperscript{66} Lewis, p.169. The Wilcocks Commission was called into existence by government in 1934 to report on the plight of the ‘coloured’ population since Union. Abdurahman was part of the Commission. Although it completed its work by 1937, the Commission’s Report only became available in February 1938 (Lewis, p.160). Ibid., pp.159-170.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{The T.L.S.A.: An Outline History For Students}; Adhikari, \textit{The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940}, p.64; Lewis, p.175.
\textsuperscript{69} Adhikari, \textit{The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940}, p.77; Lewis, p.175.
through building a more inclusive and adversarial democratic movement. They therefore advocated the creation of a united front of black organisations. For the CPSA, this meant emphasising the People’s Front as the first step towards that goal. Neither the ANC nor the APO joined the NLL and NEUF, since the latter formations were anti-imperialist, and prone to militancy in striving for broader black unity to defeat segregation. International events, however, proved decisive and altered the two organisations’ stance markedly, resulting in them, because of the dominance of the CPSA in their ranks, opting to support the war effort on the side of the Allies and Smuts by the early 1940s. This shift placated the NLL and NEUF’s initial militancy, as they assumed a more moderate position, which closely resembled the policies and tactics of the APO. The discarding by both organisations of their sustained opposition to the segregatory policies of Smuts, who by 1943, when the war had swung in the allies’ favour, had moved to reintroduce segregation, proved their downfall. In fact, Smuts’ renewed segregatory talk, opened the way for the radical non-collaborationist Trotskyist elements to seize the political high ground. These individuals were to play a pivotal role in altering the politics of the TLSA from the early 1940s. But how did this dissident left group emerge? Who were they? And, what was the nature of their politics?

71 Drew, p.300.
72 Ibid., p.325; No Sizwe, One Azania One Nation: The National Question in South Africa, London: Zed Books, 1979, p.54; Khan, pp.25, 26, 28. Cissie Gool a CPSA member and later Councillor for the City of Cape Town took a leading role in the founding of the NLL and became its president. The CPSA advocated the Comintern’s People’s Front, a policy originating from its opposition to the rising fascism in Europe during the early 1930s. Intended to ‘break the class alliance of peasants, workers and finance capital’, by splitting the poor peasantry from the rich ones and the petty-bourgeois elements from big business, the People’s Front rested on or aimed at a ‘colour blind’ proletarian united front. In the South African context, this translated into the CPSA courting the white working class, many of whom comprised poor Afrikaners, to realise their mutual interest with black workers in their struggle against the common enemy of South African fascism (A. Drew, Discordant Comrades: Identities and Loyalties on the South African left, Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2002, pp.167, 168, 178).
73 Khan, p.25; Lewis, p.183. The NLL leadership was contested between the more radical Goolam Gool and the reformist Cissie Gool factions. The latter eventually seized the reigns of the NLL and NEUF (see Lewis, pp.193, 194).
74 The CPSA abandoned its opposition to the war when Russia was invaded by Germany (B. Hirson, ‘Colour And Class: The Origins of South African Trotskyism’, Revolutionary History, Vol.4, No.4, Spring 1993, pp.45, 46; Fine and Davis, pp.44, 45).
75 Lewis, p.205.
76 The Trotskyists were concentrated in the Workers’ Party of South Africa (WPSA) and the Communist League of South Africa (CLSA). Their importance to the TLSA will be elaborated on later.
The most prominent radical voices to emerge in the late 1930s were those of the New Era Fellowship (NEF). Founded in Cape Town in 1937, the NEF was a radical discussion and debating society, which had an internationalist outlook and comprised many political currents. Identifying a range of global and local issues in the world around it on which to build its ideas, such as the Hertzog Acts, the Wilcocks Commission report, the effects of the great depression, and rising fascism in Europe, the NEF was not short of political foci. Willem van Schoor, a young League teacher, delivered the first NEF lecture, which was on ‘Imperialism’. One of several prominent teachers within the Fellowship, along with a few AAC radicals, van Schoor’s peers by 1941 included Goolam Gool the NEF’s chairperson, Ben Kies the vice chairperson, Solly Edross its organising secretary, and others. Denouncing the policies of the APO and its support for white political parties and capitalism, the NEF argued that the political solution in South Africa lay not in ‘racial’ sectionalism but working-class unity and the solidarity of the oppressed Non-European people, all those striving for universal citizenship rights and equality before the law.

The NEF broke fundamentally from what it saw as the political collusion and conservatism of the preceding period, measurable in particular by their stance on the war. Arguing that the oppressed could support neither the Allies nor the German-Italian-Japanese Axis, its position stood in firm opposition to other left groups at the time, notably the NLL-NEUF and CPSA, with their support for the allies. The NEF endorsed the Russian revolutionaries Lenin and Trotsky’s firm opposition to the First World War, which had cleaved in two the Second International, resulting in the formation of the Comintern (Communist

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77 The NEF subscribed to the tradition of the salons of the French Revolution where the foremost thinkers debated what they intended publishing. On a Saturday night University lecturers were invited to present on a range of topics at the New Era Fellowship. Thereafter rigorous discussion and debate would ensue (Interview with I Abrahams, 1 June 2005).

78 The currents included an initial nucleus of UCT students, young TLSA members who differed with the conservative leadership, APO members sceptical of Abdurahman, NLL and NEUF members, anti-collaborationists in the AAC, and ANC members, among others (Mokone, pp.20, 21).

79 Mokone, p.20.

80 Interview with R.O. Dudley, 7 September 2005.

81 Lewis, p.213.

82 See Lewis, p.181.

83 Ibid., p.181. Non-European meant those striving for a common citizenship or those who had been deprived of full political rights (Interview with R.O. Dudley, 7 September 2005).

84 See Mokone, p.4.

85 Mokone, p.21.

International) or Third International in 1919. For Lenin, Trotsky, and those of their ilk, the
war was an ‘imperialist’ one, and essentially, about ‘whether the British or German group
of financial plunderers [would] receive the most booty’. This perspective resonated for
the radicals in the NEF.

But it was not only the distant voice of the revolutionary avant-garde in Europe that
reverberated in the NEF, it was the radical politics of the locally based Workers’ Party of
South Africa (WPSA), a product of the schism in the anti-Stalinist Lenin Club, one of
several radical clubs to emerge in Cape Town at the time. The WPSA attracted to its
ranks key black activists, most notably, Isaac Bangani Tabata, Jane Gool and Goolam Gool
who by the 1930s were opposing the CPSA-aligned Comintern with its anti-Trotskyist
stance. Supportive of Trotsky, the WPSA established contact with him and were
immensely influenced by his revolutionary ideas, in particular the centrality of the agrarian
and national questions in the South African struggle. Adopting the Bolshevik slogan
‘Land and Liberty’ and therewith the view that the national struggle led to socialism, the
struggle for national liberation was viewed as the first step towards the attainment of a
socialist society for the WPSA. To achieve this goal, the Workers’ Party proposed a united
front based on a common minimum programme upon which the national political
movement had to be built and to which its leadership would be bound. Advocated, too, was

87 Imperialism is defined here as a phenomenon where capitalism had grown into a world system.
89 The Lenin Club was a radical discussion group in Cape Town and was formed in July 1933. It was aligned
to the Trotskyist International Left Opposition, the forerunner to the Fourth International formed in 1938. The
Lenin Club comprised essentially individuals who had been purged from the CPSA, socialists of the
Independent Labour Party, fringe communist groups and immigrants from Eastern Europe (see B. Hirson,
pp.73-75; Kayser, pp.6, 7).
90 The Lenin Club’s rupture gave way to the formation of the ‘majority’ WPSA and the ‘minority’ Communist
League of South Africa (CLSA). Other radical clubs included the October Club, Anti-Fascist League, NEF,
Friends of the Soviet Union League and community organisations that had been taken in by the radical
politics of the time. These ranged from debating societies to sports clubs.
91 After Lenin’s death in 1924, Trotsky was exiled from the Soviet Union. Stalin who then headed the Soviet
Union and the Comintern conducted a purge of the Bolshevik party. News of the events in Russia reached the
outside world by the early 1930s prompting schisms throughout the international left. In 1940, an alleged
Soviet agent murdered Trotsky in Mexico.
92 Both the CLSA and WPSA wrote to Trotsky. He only received the WP thesis however.
93 See Kayser, pp.8, 9. Lenin, in his 1905 treatise Two Tactics Of Social Democracy In The Democratic
Revolution, adopted the slogan ‘Land and Freedom’ where he emphasized the importance of the bourgeois
revolution in the proletariat’s quest for socialism (see V.I. Lenin, Lenin Selected Works, p.125).
the need to conduct an independent struggle free from the ideological influences of the ruling class or any political ties to it, for as the WPSA organ put it, ‘no one who is linked up with the government can be an honest, outspoken leader of any emancipatory movement’. Consequently, the petitionist politics of Abdurahman and the ANC’s J.T. Jabavu were rejected for roughly the same reasons that Rosa Luxemburg had denounced Bernstein’s revision of the ideas of Karl Marx. Instead, state authority had to be confronted through raising the possibility of building autonomous working class or black organisations, the WPSA contended. In this context, non-collaboration, arguably, represented a form of ‘dual power’, a concept drawn from the writings of Lenin, Luxemburg and later Gramsci.

In order to disseminate its ideas, the WPSA published a regular bulletin, The Spark, from 1935. The publication derived its name from the Russian Bolshevik newspaper Iskra (The Spark). To recruit the more radically minded in Cape Town, the Workers’ Party established the Spartacus Club, named after the club to which the German Marxist Rosa Luxemburg belonged. Through lectures and cultural evenings, the Spartacus Club attracted persons from the numerically small Cape Town middle class black community, many of whom were or were to become teachers. They included Kies, Cadoc Kobus, Sol Jayiya, Alie Fataar and later Richard Dudley among others. In Cape Town, the WPSA remained a

94 Kayser, p.12.
95 The Spark, November 1937, p.8. See also, The Spark, March 1938, p.4.
96 N. Alexander, ‘Non-collaboration in the Western Cape, 1943-63’, in W. James, and M. Simons (eds), The Angry Divide, Cape Town: David Philip, 1989, p.182. Luxemburg opposed Bernstein’s thesis, which presented the possibility for capitalism to be reformed. She argued that his position led inevitably to prolonging the life of capitalism and was thus a deviation from the socialist path. (see R. Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution, New York: Pathfinder, 1988, pp.49, 50).
97 Drew, ‘Mobilization and Racial Capitalism in South Africa, 1928-1960’, pp. 299, 532. Because the black population was composed of a majority of working class and migrant workers who supplemented their income with subsistence farming, there appeared for the WPSA a convergence between colour and class, a social formation that formed the basis of a revolutionary alliance of workers and peasants in the mould of the Russian revolution (Ibid., p.298).
98 D. Forgacs (ed), A Gramsci Reader, Selected Writings 1916-1935, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988, p.77; P. Frölich, Rosa Luxemburg, London: Pluto Press, 1994, p.252. Lenin was highly critical of ‘dual power’ in relation to the Soviets, particularly as it was employed by the Mensheviks during the pre-revolutionary phase (see V.I. Lenin, Lenin Selected Works, p.371).
99 Kayser, pp.8, 9; Hirson, ‘Colour And Class: The Origins of South African Trotskyism’, p.94; R. Kayser, Interview with Richard Dudley, Cape Town, 30 September 1999 (audio recording); R. Kayser, Interview with Alie Fataar, 2 September 1999 (audio recording) (courtesy R. Kayser).
small organisation of about twenty members,\(^{100}\) with its impact on the national liberation struggle far exceeding its size. By the early 1940s when developments on several fronts altered the political environment noticeably, specifically the political culture within the TLSA, this impact became manifest.

From 1937, NEF and WPSA members became increasingly active in the TLSA, and during the early years of the war they began exercising a strong influence on the membership.\(^{101}\) The moment favoured the TLSA’s ‘Young Turks’, as they were called, who were able to capitalise on the dour socio-economic conditions of the time,\(^{102}\) as well as the uncertainty of the war, which during the initial years favoured the Axis powers. Threatened by a potential Japanese invasion of India and thereafter Southern Africa, Smuts retreated from his segregationist policies in a bid to secure the support of the black population,\(^{103}\) while the Allies attempted to win support world-wide with war slogans such as ‘Fight For Freedom’ and ‘War Against Fascism’.\(^{104}\) The colonised people, recognising the political reveilles of the Allies as relevant to their own struggles, employed them for their own anti-colonial endeavours.\(^{105}\) Alert to these tensions, the NEF radicals inside the League, such as van Schoor, Kies and Fataar, who had been elected to the TLSA executive in the early 1940s, intensified their critique of the war and the conservative APO old guard leading the organisation.\(^{106}\)

Matters came to a head between the moderate and radical factions of the League in 1943, when five members of its executive accepted positions on the United Party instituted Cape Coloured Permanent Commission (CCPC), later known as the Coloured Advisory Council

\(^{100}\) R. Kayser, Interview with Alie Fataar, 2 September 1999.
\(^{101}\) Mokone, p.21; Adhikari, *The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940*, p.70.
\(^{102}\) Ernstzen, pointed to conditions in the fourth year of the war, such as the rapidly rising prices of all commodities and shortage of essential commodities as an added catalyst for the black population’s overwhelming response to the Anti-CAD’s campaign (E. Ernstzen, ‘The Last Ten Years Of The Liberatory Movement’, *Discussion*, Vol.1, No.2, Cape Town: A Forum Club Publication, 1951, p.7).
\(^{103}\) Interview with R.O. Dudley, 11 August 2005 (audio recording).
\(^{104}\) Ibid.
\(^{105}\) I.B. Tabata, *The Awakening Of A People*, Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1974, p.46. In South Africa, during the early years of the war, when the Germans and Japanese were routing the allies, Smuts put a stay on segregatory measures for ‘coloureds’. However, when the fortunes of the war changed, the United Party changed its position.
The radicals immediately saw this as a renewed assault on the remaining political rights of ‘coloureds’ and a ploy to establish a separate voters’ roll for them, while the ‘coloured’ populace viewed Smuts as having reneged on his earlier war promise to ‘end’ ‘the days of segregation’.

The five CAC men on the TLSA executive were forthwith denounced as ‘quislings’, ‘Judases’, and ‘traitors’ for voluntarily collaborating with the government with the intent of foisting on their people an ‘undemocratic’ and ‘unrepresentative’ institution. An intense and protracted battle for control of the organisation ensued between the radicals and moderates, with the latter holding on to secure their executive seats at the 1943 conference. The moderates, however, had achieved a pyrrhic victory, for it left an indelible schism within the League, which, in turn, pointed to the consciousness of teachers having been visibly transformed. This attitudinal change was amplified by the fact that the radicals had effectively organised a much wider movement to oppose the CAC and Coloured Affairs Department (CAD) – the Anti-CAD.

The Anti-CAD committee, essentially a product of the NEF, resembled the AAC in its federated form, as it constituted members from left organisations such as the WPSA, FIOSA and the CPSA. Organisationally, it included a spread of mainly ‘coloured’ formations that formed local Anti-CAD branches or committees throughout the Cape and further afield. The presence of the Claremont branch of the TLSA was noteworthy, for it indicated that the embryonic ideas of the Anti-CAD had permeated the teacher structure. Enormously popular, the Anti-CAD swelled into a movement of over eighty affiliated

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107 Adhikari, *The Teachers’ League of South Africa 1913 – 1940*, p.71. The CAC were appointed ‘coloured’ representatives from all four provinces of the Union. A special ‘coloured’ division in the Department of the Interior was also established (see Mokone p.23).


109 Khan, p.52.

110 The radicals formed the Teachers’ Vigilance Council (TVC) headed by the Post-Conference Vigilance Committee (PCVC) and established their own journal *Educational Talks*. They used these structures to prepare for the 1944 conference.

111 The NEF organised a lecture titled ‘The CAD – The New Fraud’ from which the Anti-CAD committee was formed on 11 February 1943. The committee comprised persons from the NEF and AAC, most notably, Dr G. Gool, Miss H. Ahmed, A.J.B. Desmore, B. Kies, E.C. Roberts, Rev D. Wessels, I.B. Tabata, S. Edross, A. Fataar (Mokone, p.25).


113 Khan, p.46. A radical group of teachers at Livingstone High school had already captured the Claremont branch of the TLSA. They included people such as E.C. Roberts and A. Fataar.
organisations.\textsuperscript{114} Although principally aimed at destroying the CAC, it at the outset adopted a broader programme for full democratic rights,\textsuperscript{115} whilst its leadership cut across ‘racial’ divides embracing all who opposed the CAD.\textsuperscript{116} The movement furthermore broke fundamentally with the reformist traditions of the APO and ANC and established the boycott as a key method of struggle,\textsuperscript{117} along with the principle of non-collaboration – the refusal to work the machinery of one’s own oppression. In line with this political thrust, the Anti-CAD employed the boycott against ‘racial’ institutions and those it deemed collaborators.\textsuperscript{118} To maximise its efficacy, the boycott was applied on the economic, social and political levels.\textsuperscript{119}

Ben Kies, a young teacher and the main theoretician within the Anti-CAD, articulated the movement’s central thesis in his first conference address on 29 May 1943.\textsuperscript{120} The content of his lecture reflected the ideas of the WPSA.\textsuperscript{121} Kies’ central message to the teachers was salutary. As a pivotal part of the intelligentsia and leadership in a Leninist ‘vanguard’ sense,\textsuperscript{122} he summoned the teachers ‘to think completely differently and act completely differently’.\textsuperscript{123} For him, teachers had access to learning, were part of the intelligentsia, and were crucially positioned within their communities, since: ‘They do not have to go to the people. They belong to the people and the people are all around them’.\textsuperscript{124} In West African terms, teachers ‘had mouth’ and ‘knew book’,\textsuperscript{125} whilst in the Gramscian sense, they were organically linked to the working class. For Kies, therefore, teachers had to take on the

\textsuperscript{114} Mokone, p.25.  
\textsuperscript{115} The Torch, 29 April 1952, p.2; Khan, pp.47, 48.  
\textsuperscript{116} Mokone, p.25.  
\textsuperscript{117} Gentle, p.47.  
\textsuperscript{118} Drew, Discordant Comrades: Identities and Loyalties on the South African left, p.244.  
\textsuperscript{119} The Torch, 25 March 1958, p.2; Khan, pp.123-126. The economic boycott embodied the refusal to purchase goods or solicit the services of anyone associated with the CAC/CAD, whilst the social boycott aimed at publically ostracising ‘quislings’ and ‘collaborators’ through not having any social or personal contact with them. Politically it meant opposing the racial institutions and those individuals operating them.\textsuperscript{120} The first Anti-CAD conference was held from the 29th to 30th May 1943.  
\textsuperscript{121} R. Kayser, Interview with A. Fataar, 2 November 1998 (audio recording) (courtesy R. Kayser); Gentle, p.49; Drew, Discordant Comrades: Identities and Loyalties on the South African left, p.244.  
\textsuperscript{123} Interview with R.O. Dudley, 7 September 2005.  
\textsuperscript{124} Kies, p.15. Teachers from black communities were very much part of the working class in the late 1930s and 1940s, and comprised the ‘first generation of intellectuals from working class families’ (Drew, ‘Social Mobilization and Racial Capitalism in South Africa, 1928-1960’, p.426).  
\textsuperscript{125} February, p.22.
responsibility of walking in the footsteps of those who went before them, and who had set the trend for the achievement of the French and Russian revolutions. The Kies message was significant, coming at a time when many teachers inside the TLSA continued to adhere firmly to the isolationist belief that education was above politics. The address urged these teachers to break with that tradition and to remove the reactionary leadership as the first step to fulfilling the important task of organising the oppressed. The teacher as intellectual would thereafter be the lynchpin of the Anti-CAD movement.

In his address, Kies emphasised what he termed the ‘Real United Front’, by which he meant building from the bottom up a mass base of all the Non-Europeans along with the ‘white’ working class. This united front, he argued, was an essential counterpoint to the ‘divide and rule policies’ of the ruling white supremacists - the herrenvolk. The latter expression, along with other terminology, such as ‘quisling’ and ‘collaborator’, is traceable to the 1930s and ’40s anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist resistance movements in Europe. The Anti-CAD nomenclature not only showed the internationalist outlook of its leadership, it furthermore alluded to what they saw as an emergent fascism in South Africa, and accordingly, the urgency to forge a counter movement, the united front. It was this stress on unity that led to the formation of the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) a few months later – a development which was to strengthen the resolve of the radicals inside the TLSA at the time.

The emergence of the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM)

The formation of the Anti-CAD, assisted as it was by WPSA, FIOSA, NEF and a resurgent AAC ‘Call To Unity’, provided the basis for a preliminary unity conference on 16

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126 Kies, pp.14, 15. Dudley argued that the ‘teachers as a vanguard’ thesis was a metaphor Kies used, and ought not to be read literally (Interview with R.O. Dudley, 7 September 2005).
127 Khan, p.71.
128 Ibid.
129 Kies, The Background Of Segregation covered the key issues on imperialism. These included its effect on South Africa, the issue of leadership and the role of intellectuals, the National Question, and the importance of the united front.
130 Kies, pp.13, 14.
131 Ibid., p.2.
132 Trotsky advocated the building of a united front to counter rising fascism in Europe.
133 Tabata, The Awakening Of A People, pp.48, 56, 57.
December 1943. Dispelling the notion of ad hoc unity, one which was based on specific issues at particular times, the conference resolved to advance what it termed ‘principled unity’, a unity that was binding on the three pillars that came to constitute the federated NEUM\(^{134}\) - the AAC, Anti-CAD and later a breakaway from the SAIC the Anti-Segregation Council (ASC).\(^{135}\) This united front, according to the majority of its constituents, was the basis of a national movement that favoured ‘equality and freedom for all’.\(^{136}\) It dispensed with the ‘racially’ exclusive and sectionalist organisations that existed up to then.\(^{137}\) The aims of the anti-segregationist united front were encapsulated in a Ten-Point-Programme (TPP) of basic democratic rights, a ‘Charter of Liberty’ for full citizenship.\(^{138}\) The Charter, while new to South Africa and \textit{sui generis}, had a lineage stretching back to the political programmes of earlier international struggles,\(^{139}\) most notably that of the Russian social-democrat Plekhanov.\(^{140}\) The TPP in conception, therefore, was a transitional programme, which, it was argued, could not be met within a capitalist framework in South Africa.\(^{141}\)

Viewed as the minimum demands of the democratic movement below which no constituent body should bargain,\(^{142}\) the TPP included: the right to the franchise, education (which encompassed free and compulsory schooling for all), property and privacy, freedom of speech, movement and occupation, and social equality (of ‘race’, class and gender);

\(^{134}\) See ibid., p.59.
\(^{135}\) Initially the SAIC, much the same as the ANC, was set to join the NEUM but withdrew in the face of developments around what was termed the Pegging Act (which sought to restrict Indian property-ownership in the Transvaal and Natal) with which they reached a compromise with government. The SAIC therefore balked at the non-collaborationist strategy of the Movement. A more radical group within the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), an affiliate of the SAIC, formed the ASC, which joined the UM (see Lewis, pp.221, 226).
\(^{140}\) Drew, \textit{Discordant Comrades: Identities and Loyalties on the South African left}, p.151. Drew also points to the behind the scenes influence of the WPSA in the formulation of the TPP.
\(^{142}\) Mokone, p.34.
revisions of land law, civil and criminal codes, taxation and labour legislation in keeping with the initial six points.\textsuperscript{143} Importantly, and consistent with the WPSA, all socio-economic disabilities were understood to flow from the central political demand of the franchise.\textsuperscript{144} That South Africa was located within the world capitalist system where the dictates of profit were uppermost and secured through the super-exploitation of black labour, indicated the ideological influence of the Workers’ Party in the formulation of the TPP.\textsuperscript{145} The programme’s minimum criteria safeguarded the Movement against the threat of ‘betrayal’,\textsuperscript{146} and it provided practical direction for members in their ‘day-today-struggles’ or ‘short term demands’ as well as the achievement of their ‘long term aims’,\textsuperscript{147} that of securing national liberation or ‘bourgeois democratic rights’ as the first step in the direction of socialism.\textsuperscript{148} For Tabata, the NEUM was an ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘anti-capitalist’ movement involved in ‘class struggle’\textsuperscript{149} where the historic task of achieving its goal fell on the working class and peasant majority in unity with the intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{150} The language of class struggle, socialism or Marxism was never voiced publically, though,\textsuperscript{151} and certainly not in TLSA literature, for two main reasons: class struggle was subordinated to the broader and inclusive national struggle,\textsuperscript{152} and repressive legislation, especially after

\textsuperscript{146} New Unity Movement, \textit{Anniversary Bulletin Unity Movement 50 Years Of Struggle}, p.26.
\textsuperscript{147} Kies, ‘The Basis Of Unity’, p.11.
\textsuperscript{148} Tabata, \textit{Apartheid Cosmetics Exposed}, p.27.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{152} The main reason for this formulation, was because the Unity Movement argued that no national bourgeoisie existed amongst the oppressed (see Kayser, ‘Land and Liberty!: The Non-European Unity Movement and the Land Question, 1936-1976’, p.16). Also, the achievement of bourgeois democratic rights implied the right to alter the laws of the land as far as the Movement was concerned, and therefore could not be met by the regime. The achievement of full democratic rights would therefore lead to the resolution of the land and hence the class question, it contended (see ibid., p.17). Consequently, the national and class struggles were conflated.
1950, meant the language of Marxism or socialism could only be expressed privately amongst a trusted inner core.\textsuperscript{153}

As the NEUM embraced various organisations, including relatively conservative ones, it was up to the leadership, the ‘Young Turks’, Tabata, Goolam Gool and Kies among others to give political direction to the movement.\textsuperscript{154} In the leadership’s quest to achieve their programmatic aim, non-collaboration was employed as a central principle, policy and method or strategy of the Movement.\textsuperscript{155} The ambivalence around the definition of non-collaboration gave rise to intense debate within left circles as to what the differences and similarities were between non-collaboration and the boycott and consequently what it meant tactically and strategically for the struggle.\textsuperscript{156} These differences and their accompanying tensions remained unresolved and surfaced periodically.

In Tabata’s view, non-collaboration emerged from the need to break the ‘slave mentality’ of the oppressed in order for them to assert their humanity.\textsuperscript{157} Elaborating on the concept, Drew indicated that in practice and consistent with its Marxist roots, non-collaboration meant pointedly:

the refusal by the oppressed black population to work the instruments of their own oppression, that is, segregated and inferior political institutions. In the WPSA’s view, those quislings who worked within these institutions represented essentially petit bourgeois rather than explicitly working-class interests. Hence, the WPSA saw non-

\textsuperscript{153} Interview with Alexander, 1 December 2006; Drew, ‘Social Mobilization and Racial Capitalism in South Africa, 1928-1960’, p.432. After the introduction of the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act the NEUM and particularly the TLSA avoided using language in its literature that might implicate it with communism or socialism. It thus tentatively used language associated with racial or class conflict.

\textsuperscript{154} The reason for this was that only they ‘grasp[ed] the programmatic problems that exceeded anything previously formulated’ (C. Rassool, ‘The Individual, Auto/biography and History in South Africa’, Cape Town: Unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2004, p.312).

\textsuperscript{155} Non-collaboration was viewed at different junctures as constituting a principle, policy and or strategy. It is employed interchangeably in Unity Movement literature. See, for example, New Unity Movement, \textit{Anniversary Bulletin Unity Movement 50 Years Of Struggle}, and Mokone, \textit{Majority Rule}. Whereas Tabata referred to non-collaboration as a policy in \textit{The Awakening Of A People} (see for example pp.63, 68 and 119), Jaffe presented it as ‘our basic policy, our fundamental method of struggle ...’ (H. Jaffe, \textit{The First Ten Years of the Non-European Unity Movement [Excerpts from a lecture delivered in December, 1953]}, Athlone: Cape Flats Educational Fellowship, 1953, p.22). See also \textit{The Torch}, 22 April 1952, p.2.


Class struggle was clearly integral to non-collaboration, and as such, its primary objective involved exposing the oppositional nature of the oppressed interests relative to that of the ruling class. It also served to thwart class collaboration within national liberatory organisations and alliances, therewith demonstrating the importance of autonomy of thought and action in forging working class independence.\(^\text{159}\) In addition, the influence of Lenin’s writings on imperialism and the anti-colonial struggles in Africa, India and Asia made non-collaboration distinctly anti-imperialist.\(^\text{160}\) From its inception, the policy kept the ANC, SAIC and CPSA out of the Unity Movement notwithstanding the fact that Rev. Z.R. Mahabane the former president of the ANC had become the Chair of the NEUM, and the CPSA participated in the Anti-CAD. Instead, the ANC and CPSA gave support to the NRCs,\(^\text{161}\) and the CPSA consistently put forward candidates to represent ‘Africans’ in a ‘Whites-only’ parliament.\(^\text{162}\) For these acts of compliance the Unity Movement criticised the CPSA in particular, whom they termed ‘collaborators-with-a-red-cap’,\(^\text{163}\) arguing that white liberals and radicals exercised inordinate power over the ANC petty bourgeois leadership.\(^\text{164}\) The organisational differences would endure as permanent features of the liberation movement.

The boycott was an uncompromising tactical weapon in the non-collaborationists arsenal and was deployed specifically to expose perceived collaborators, and to make unworkable ‘inferior’ or ‘bogus’ bodies and institutions amongst other ‘ruling class schemes’.\(^\text{165}\) Whereas non-collaboration was described as a permanent political attitude, the boycott was practical; a specific application of non-collaboration employed ‘at specific times’ and ‘on


\(^{161}\) Tabata, *Apartheid Cosmetics Exposed*, pp.23, 82.

\(^{162}\) Ibid., pp.23, 24, 82, 83.


\(^{164}\) Tabata, *Apartheid Cosmetics Exposed*, pp.23, 24, 82, 83; Hommel, p.95.

specific issues’, and was devised to undermine ruling class policy that attempted to divide the oppressed according to class and colour. It also critically fulfilled the vital connecting function of developing the unity and the independence of the oppressed as foremost tenets of nation building. Tabata concretised the boycott in his influential text, *Boycott As Weapon of Struggle*. In this work, he argued that its application as a political tactic was well founded ‘as it brought political education to the people and lifted them out of their lethargy’ but that in the arena of schooling it was not viable. Formulated during the school boycotts of the early 1950s, to be elaborated on later, Tabata argued that children had to be educated ‘in the cause of liberation itself; [because] they must acquire the intellectual equipment even though only segregated schools are open to them’. When employed against the CAC leadership within TLSA ranks in the early 1940s, the boycott actively demonstrated the radicals’ resolve to oust the ‘quisling-intellectuals’.

By mid-1944 the CAC teachers within the TLSA realised they could not fend-off the relentless onslaught of the radicals and abandoned the organisation to form the Teachers’ Education Professional Association (TEPA). TEPA received immediate recognition from the Cape Education Department as the only official ‘coloured’ teachers’ organisation in the Cape Province. Within the APO, which had also been penetrated by the Anti-CAD, the moderate elements too, deserted to form the Coloured People’s National Union (CPNU) under the leadership of George Golding. Triumphant, the ‘Young Turks’ tabled several constitutional amendments at the League’s July 1944 conference. They barred CAC members from joining the organisation, committed themselves to the attainment of equal education for all ‘races’, demanded equal pay for all teachers, and advocated unity between teachers’ organisations. Most importantly, they added clause 2(c) which committed the organisation to ‘coordinate the struggle in the educational field with the struggle for full education’. 

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166 Tabata, *Apartheid Cosmetics Exposed*, p.26; Hommel, pp.93, 94.
170 Ibid., p.19.
171 Lewis, p.224.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., p.223.
democratic rights’ and, moreover, to achieve this by ‘cooperation or affiliation with organisations fighting for full democratic rights for all non-Europeans’. These decisions proved historic, as the League henceforth proceeded to propagate its politics as part of the Anti-CAD and the NEUM from 1945. Through these structures, the boycott was resolutely applied against the CAC, rendering it from the outset stillborn and by 1950 defunct.

The NEUM organised itself along federal lines to strengthen the intra-‘racial’ relationship between organisations in the movement. It hoped through focussing on ‘political matters, and common disabilities’ to resolve the separate ‘racial’ identities imposed on the oppressed by merging their disparate struggles in common unity. Political education was viewed as indispensable ‘practical work’ and integral to transforming people’s consciousness in this coalescing process. It showed that change and emancipation were real possibilities. An impetus for the federal form was the fact that a substantial section of the black population was already organised within its own structures, providing a ready-made mass based constituency. Within this broad front, the NEUM advocated as a central strategy the teacher-worker alliance. The ideological role of the teacher in the liberation movement hereafter was deemed unequivocal, since in this emancipatory equation, according to the NEUM, teachers were

Now, more than at any time, the oppressed people need the teachers. Freedom will never be ours unless our teachers can give us generation upon generation of young men and women, fired with a passionate desire to dedicate their lives and talents to the cause of our emancipation. And freedom will never be ours until the teacher stands shoulder to shoulder with his fellow-worker in the field and factory, with no false barriers of pride and superiority to keep them apart.

The ideological role of the teacher in the liberation movement hereafter was deemed unequivocal, since in this emancipatory equation, according to the NEUM, teachers were

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174 For highlights of the constitution see The Educational Journal, July 1944, pp.9, 10. See also Lewis, p.224.
175 When the League affiliated to the NEUM in 1945 it had a national membership of 2 000 (Lewis, p.233).
178 Jaffe, The First Ten Years of the Non-European Unity Movement, p.19.
179 This was a strategic alliance, unlike the worker-peasant one, which flowed from the WPSA and was the theoretical bedrock of the NEUM.
180 The Torch started appearing from 25 February 1946 and continued until the early 1960s.
181 The Torch, 11 March 1946, p.4.
the carriers, the ‘vectors’ as it were, of progressive anti-segregatory ideas. These ideas were rooted in the counter hegemonic strategy of what Maurice termed, ‘education for social change’. Dudley put the ‘vector theory’ plainly:

In starting as a teacher you have to depend upon people who have already gone along that road, and so you are not the one who thinks out things as original ideas, you are heavily dependent upon people who have gone along that road, and you are encouraged actually to see the rationality of it, the importance of it. So without you actually having become the origin of those ideas you then convey those ideas to others who suffer, and so you’ve got to explain as best you can ... to people who need to have these ideas in order [for them] to understand the nature of their oppression.

To ensure the success of this approach, the centrality of political theory to the NEUM cannot be overstated. Kies was emphatic about this in his 1945 address to the NEUM:

“Theory is important. Your political theory means the way you sum up things, where you consider the interests of the oppressed to lie. This determines your direction; it determines the type of demand you make and the type of organisation you admire or follow or join; it determines your political activity.” Beyond this, he also noted that ‘The ignorant cannot lead’. With this mindset, League teachers embarked upon educating and informing the oppressed and others of their views on politics and education. It was this impulse that drove them to ‘take the nation to school’ and indeed ‘Build the Nation’, through a process of ‘removing blinkers and prejudice’ that artificially separated people, and ‘teaching that all people belong to one human family and are of the same quality’.

**The application of non-collaboration and the boycott**

The war had transformed South Africa into a modern industrial economy: manufacturing had overtaken mining and correspondingly stimulated the increased migration of people from jobs in the agricultural industry to those of the cities. Parallel to this economic shift

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182 Interview with R.O. Dudley, 7 September 2005.
183 Edgar Maurice of the TLSA presented a paper on the ‘The Role of the Non-European Teacher in the Liberatory Movement’ to the Forum Club, formerly FIOSA, where he set out to explain what was then a very new area of concern to the left (E. Maurice, ‘The Role of the Non-European Teacher in the Liberatory Movement’, *Discussion*, A Forum Club Publication, Vol.1, No.5, June 1952, p.8 and pp.5-15).
184 Interview with R.O. Dudley, 7 September 2005.
186 Kies, *The Background Of Segregation*, p.16.
188 Lewis, p.227; O’Meara, *Forty Lost Years: The apartheid state and the politics of the National Party,*
was the growth of the black population’s political consciousness, noticeable in the expansion of organised worker unions in the Western Cape and by increased strike action in the Witwatersrand.\textsuperscript{189} Adding to this economic and attitudinal transformation were international events, specifically the intensifying anti-imperialist struggles in the colonised countries of Africa and Asia, the most prominent being the 1949 victory of the people’s war in China.\textsuperscript{190} Buoyed by international and local dynamics, as well as its new-found radicalism, the League’s success was notable in these years. The organisation brought under its wing nearly half the ‘coloured’ teachers in the country, effectively penetrating remote villages and towns. In the Cape Province, the hotbed of NEUM politics, a strong network of TLSA branches proliferated.\textsuperscript{191} A teacher who entered the profession and joined the organisation at the time recollected:

\begin{quote}
By the time I got into ‘the school of education’, through the Teachers’ League, and I’m talking about a whole process, a period of development and a period of change, and a period of new ideas and attitudes that formed, if you want to in the great phrase of Nehru, it was the period when ‘the battles of the minds of people’ were already taking shape and that’s one of the most exciting periods in history.\textsuperscript{192}
\end{quote}

Very little distinguished the ANC from the NEUM during these years in terms of their numerical strength,\textsuperscript{193} and the Movement’s ideas spread into many of the communities of the Western Cape, resulting in, ‘hardly any young intellectual enter[ing] political life but through the portals of the NEUM’, Alexander declared.\textsuperscript{194}

In 1948, the NEUM called on the oppressed to boycott the national election,\textsuperscript{195} arguing that no significant difference existed between the UP and Herenigde National Party because both advocated policies of ‘racial’ separatism. The CPSA opposed this thinking and put

forward candidates who ‘braved a NEUM boycott’, whilst the CPNU encouraged the ‘coloured’ community to vote for the UP. Once again, the liberation movement was divided on the boycott as it had been in the late 1930s, when the Hertzog Acts were promulgated. Alert to the concerns of the white electorate, the NP used as its main campaigning platform the intensification of ‘racial’ separation to protect white interests, in particular its working class constituency.

The NPs narrow victory at the polls altered the South African political landscape irrevocably. It also created disarray on the left. In its quest to fulfil the mandate given to it by the white electorate, the NP set itself the colossal task of introducing legal segregation, à la ‘apartheid’, in all spheres of society. With organisations in the liberation movement at variance with each other and essentially on the back foot, the NP moved to extend train apartheid to the Cape Peninsula in August 1948. The Anti-CAD and local committee of the NEUM promptly joined hands with other organisations in the resistance movement and formed the ad hoc Train Apartheid Resistance Committee (TARC), in an effort to demonstrate their unity of purpose, prove their non-sectarianism, and affirm their intent to build mass resistance against the government’s separatist ambitions. This they proposed to achieve through mass defiance, by boarding ‘whites-only’ coaches and flouting the racist laws. The TLSA was integral to the TARC initiative, with the Anti-CAD representatives forming the bulk of the Committee’s leadership. FIOSA (by then the Forum Club) the CPSA and a range of trade unions and other organisations completed TARC.

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197 White workers jobs in the post war period came under increasing pressure from black workers migrating to the cities and towns. Growing black urbanisation meant white workers rates were under-cut by cheap black labour. Malan’s National Party, aware of this threat to the white worker’s economic position, offered protection to them by promising a more stringent colour bar apartheid to further marginalise the black population. This he achieved through mobilising a wide alliance of white class interests that allowed it to capture a slim parliamentary majority (see D. O’Meara, Volkskapitalisme: Class, capital and ideology in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, 1934-1948, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983, p.240-247; O’Meara, D. Forty Lost Years: The apartheid state and the politics of the National Party, 1948-1994, pp.64-67).
198 Despite the NEUM not favouring ad hoc campaigns, which highlighted one or other aspect of oppression and not the whole system, it nonetheless joined as one of the organisations constituting TARC.
200 While the NEUM intended linking the opposition to train apartheid to its TPP, lack of support resulted in it going into a united front with other organisations (Drew, Discordant Comrades, p.269).
member of the TARC executive, along with fellow TLSA teachers, was at the forefront of defying the train apartheid law.\textsuperscript{201} He recounted an event that ended rather humorously:

They could not arrest you unless they told you exactly what law you were breaking. Then they devised a means whereby they would report us to the department. And, so on one occasion, Fataar, Vernon Fowler and myself were summoned by the Superintendent General of Education to appear before him. ... They told us we had set a bad example for our children by breaking the laws of this country, because we were aware of the fact that these things were set aside for persons of a particular colour and what have you. ... and the SGE used to tell us that we expect you to obey the rules and regulations under which you are employed ... then we would indicate to them [the deputy and SGE] that this idea of ‘race’ is a falsehood, that it is not something that can actually be proved, and that we are not prepared to teach children the reasons for this sort of thing because they are false, and so on. Then the SGE said to us, yes, but you are in our employ for twenty-four hours of the day. So Vernon Fowler turns around and says: ‘so you want us to lie to the pupils for twenty-four hours a day?’ ...\textsuperscript{202}

These League teachers, evidenced by Dudley’s episode, were well versed on their civil and professional rights, and thus brazen in their engagement with the educational authorities. Whether this was the case with all teachers is questionable, if not highly unlikely.

Although the train resistance campaign attracted huge support, divergence between the NEUM and CPSA on implementation or what constituted sufficient numbers to ensure the campaign’s success, halted collective action.\textsuperscript{203} While Jaffe blamed the CPSA for recruiting the liberals to TARC thus creating a political fall-out with the Anti-CAD,\textsuperscript{204} other members emphasised organisational disagreements as the main reason for TARC collapsing after only six months.\textsuperscript{205} Indeed, Kenny Jordaan of the Forum Club branded it the ‘TARC Debacle’ and blamed the Anti-CAD leadership for its collapse.\textsuperscript{206} Gamiet, taking Jordaan’s

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item According to Ursula Fataar, high school students were also actively involved in defying the train apartheid laws. She attended Livingstone High at the time (Interview with U. Fataar, 24 November 2005).
\item Interview with R.O. Dudley, 7 September 2005. See also Wieder, teacher and comrade: Richard Dudley and the Fight for Democracy in South Africa, pp.75, 76.
\item While the CPSA called for the immediate boarding of ‘white-only’ coaches to defy the train apartheid law, the NEUM argued that the 450 volunteers who had stepped forward to implement the plan were insufficient and that greater numbers of people were required if the campaign was to be a success. The issue was far too big and too important for the oppressed to encourage displays of ‘individualistic heroics’ that would end in ‘miserable defeat’, the NEUM argued (Mokone, pp.465, 466).
\item The delaying tactics and intransigence of the Movement in the campaign was the cause of its failure they contended. They moreover took exception to the Anti-CAD’s post hoc claim that the ‘people’ not the ‘leadership’ was the cause of the campaign’s failure (see Jordaan, ‘The Train Apartheid Resistance Debacle’, pp.14, 15; Drew, Discordant Comrades, p.269).
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\end{footnotesize}
view further in the Forum Club’s *Discussion*, claimed that the defeat on train apartheid would be the precursor to subsequent defeats for the liberation movement, since the NP ‘emboldened’ by its success, could proceed ‘more confidently with its plans’. He thus pessimistically concluded: ‘A dismal chapter in our history was closing’.\(^{207}\)

After the failure of the TARC, a new era of repression dawned, hallmarked by the intensification of apartheid and the outlawing of dissident organisations. In this respect, the Suppression of Communism Act (1950) was significant as it sought to stifle and snuff out the activities of the liberation movement.\(^{208}\) The statute temporarily neutralised the CPSA and it dissolved in 1951. Although it operated clandestinely from 1953, the Communist Party’s prohibition sent a clear signal to other left formations. For the League, it meant along with other precautionary measures, that contributors to its journal would start adopting pseudonyms to mask their identities.

Adopting a more cautious approach in their practice, the Anti-CAD-TLSA in the Western Cape selected their battles and strategically distanced themselves from actions such as the 1951 civil disobedience campaigns of the Franchise Resistance Action Committee (FRAC) and the ANC’s Defiance campaign of 1952. Based in the Cape Province, FRAC responded specifically to the Separate Registration of Voters’ Bill, which threatened to place the ‘coloured’ vote on a separate voter’s role.\(^{209}\) Although the franchise was a primary site of struggle for the NEUM, it refused to participate in the FRAC due to the campaign’s principal confinement to the ‘coloured’ population, its inclusion of collaborationist organisations such as the CPNU and TEPA, and because of the prominence of CPSA persons with whom it had by then sharp political differences following the TARC affair.\(^{210}\) A central objection though stemmed from the Movement’s contention that the ‘coloured’ vote represented a *de facto* ‘dummy’ vote.\(^{211}\) The NEUM’s non-collaboration covered


\(^{208}\) The definition of Communism included any related doctrine that aimed to bring about political, socio and economic change through promoting ‘disturbance’ or ‘disorder’ or ‘encouraging hostility between Europeans and non-Europeans’ (Mokone, p.67).

\(^{209}\) Gentle, p.55.


\(^{211}\) Mokone, p.71; Lewis, p.270.
virtually all facets of why it should not participate in the FRAC campaign. The ANC’s Defiance Campaign of 1952 was equally snubbed by the Anti-CAD as adventurist for not striking at the heart of the racist system – the demand for full democratic rights.\textsuperscript{212} FRAC had a short life, and soon went into decline with the collapse of the Defiance Campaign in the Western Cape.\textsuperscript{213} TLSA teachers, a key constituent of the NEUM, evidently saw no merit in forging temporary alliances or tenuous united front actions in the 1950s to counter the NP’s systematic unleashing of its apartheid laws.

Exceptionally critical of political formations in the liberation movement, the Unity Movement was assailed by leftists for what they termed its ‘political inertia’ or ‘abstention’ from mass struggles. This reluctance to challenge specific segregatory measures,\textsuperscript{214} and so ‘expose the tyrannical face of the regime’, was its failure they argued.\textsuperscript{215} For them, the NEUM’s approach embodied a principled ‘all or nothing’ attitude, which if not met, in that it did not directly challenge the ‘fundamentals’ of South African society as understood by the NEUM leadership,\textsuperscript{216} resulted in the deprecating tag of ‘adventurist’ or ‘sectional’.\textsuperscript{217} Consequently, according to Alexander and Drew, the NEUM did not distinguish between struggles for reforms or working class struggles on the one hand and reformism or reformist leadership on the other.\textsuperscript{218} Why was there this oversight? Left critics of the Movement such as Arthur Davids and others in the Trotskyist Forum Club, point to the NEUM confusing their principles and tactics, of conflating non-collaboration with the boycott. For Davids, this misreading caused ‘theoretical confusion’ within the NEUM, most starkly evident in it misinterpreting smaller struggles as unimportant relative to the

\textsuperscript{213} Lewis, p.268.
\textsuperscript{215} Interview with N. Alexander, 1 December 2006.
\textsuperscript{216} Alexander, p.187.
\textsuperscript{217} Lewis, p.242.
‘fundamental’ struggle for full democratic rights. The upshot, he suggests, was that although the NEUM was interested in assuming ‘political power’, it did not explain how exactly the oppressed would seize control of the state apparatus, given its boycott of smaller struggles. These struggles, Davids declared, were critical to building mass resistance and ‘creating a national organisation capable of [achieving] ... that democratic programme’. The NEUM therefore, he added, voluntarily handed over the leadership, which it should have assumed, to collaborationists because it shied from ‘episodic agreements’ with them.

The teacher corps, which encompassed the largest section of the Anti-CAD’s social base, came under specific attack from the left, who singled them out as the central reason for the NEUM’s abstentionist behaviour. In a Forum Club debate with Edgar Maurice, Kenneth Jordaan argued that the Movement’s leadership had seriously erred by placing teachers at the vanguard of the struggle, and contrary to their deep-seated belief in the radical potential of this constituency, they were actually ‘building on shifting sands’. The nub of Jordaan’s argument was that the changed economic status of teachers lay at the heart of the problem. For him, a shift in teachers’ consciousness had occurred from the pre-war years when they formed part of the working class, up to the post war period when they had graduated from this class. In this period teachers had become largely conservative, having abandoned their ‘former militancy and their ideas of liberation’ he stated. The altered social status and thus consciousness of this social layer, he put down to their acceptance of ‘bribed off’ ‘salary increases’. This, Alexander asserted, explained why teachers’ were unwilling to disport themselves on the streets and avoided participation in

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219 See for example on this issue Mokone (Mokone, p.69).
220 Davids, p.47.
221 Ibid., p.43.
222 For Davids this included ‘Pass Laws, Train Apartheid, Ghetto Bills, attacks on civil liberties’ and so forth (Ibid., p.43). See also Z. Gamiet, ‘A Declaration to the People of South Africa from the Non-European Unity Movement’, Discussion, Vol.1, No.1, Cape Town: Forum Club, December 1951, pp.25, 27.
223 Davids, p.24.
224 Jordaan was responding to Maurice’s paper ‘The Role of the Non-European Teacher in the Liberatory Movement’ (see Maurice, p.14). Gamiet, Jordaan and others of the Forum Club debated Maurice on the paper he delivered. Though the two former FIOSA members differed on whether teachers should ‘spearhead’ the struggle, they were both highly critical of the revolutionary role assigned to teachers by the NEUM (Ibid., ibid., pp.12-14). Regarding the increase of teachers salaries after the war, see Lewis (Lewis, p.235).
225 Maurice, pp.13, 14.
anti-segregatory campaigns, campaigns which, Simons noted, endangered teachers’ hard
won government jobs that afforded them a particular ‘status’ and ‘livelihood’ in a society
which offered limited possibilities to educated people of colour. It was this conservatism
that suffocated the creative impetus of non-collaboration Alexander noted, transforming it
into no more than an oratory and literary device to ‘assassinate’ those who dared disagree
with the NEUM leadership. The rhetorical attacks, which the NEUM was renowned for,
thus favoured this social base its critics averred, rendering non-collaboration a more
divisive than unifying policy.

Notwithstanding these critiques, the TLSA was selectively confrontational when employing
its non-collaborationist strategy against the apartheid authorities. This it demonstrated with
immense energy when the NP announced its intent to celebrate the Tercentenary of van
Riebeeck’s arrival in 1952, an event which was to be centred in Cape Town, the so-called
‘founding city of the white nation’. The TLSA had a concentration of members in Cape
Town and was quite prepared to enter into ideological battle against the apartheid regime.
Responding promptly to the news of the festival, which was announced as early as October
1950, the League’s executive made its opposition to the festival known, and urged branches
to enlighten ‘members’ and the ‘public’ at large on the ‘historical facts’ surrounding the
‘celebrations’. For the organisation, the Tercentenary was nothing short of a public
spectacle to advertise the history of white domination. Roundly opposed by a wide range of
organisations, the event temporarily unified the liberation movement in a boycott of the
carnival. With the Cape Education Department expecting public schools to participate in

227 Interview with N. Alexander, 1 December 2006.
230 Alexander, p.188.
233 Even TEPA refused to attend the celebrations despite its contention that the arrival of van Riebeeck was an event of historical import (L. Witz, Apartheid’s Festival: Contesting South Africa’s National Past, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2003, p.151).
234 Witz, p.151.
the celebrations, \(^{235}\) League activists seized what appeared to be the ideal opportunity to inform and demonstrate to the oppressed the practical significance of its non-collaborationist ideas. Mobilisation for what the organisation punted as a decisive battle to ‘win the minds’ of the oppressed people, \(^{236}\) began well over a year in advance of the day the event was to reach its climax on 6 April 1952. \(^{237}\) What was called the festival of ‘300 years of South Africa. We build a nation’; \(^{238}\) *The Educational Journal* and *The Torch* branded the ‘Festival Of Hate’; \(^{239}\) and the lead article in the TLSA’s January 1952 journal enjoined members to strain “every nerve and muscle to keep the children and the adult population from the Celebration and to explain to both groups, in terms that they can understand, why they cannot identify themselves with a festival dedicated to the perpetuation of their enslavement”. \(^{240}\) When twenty-five Athlone schools refused to participate in the festival therefore, the League supported them fully and encouraged teachers to dissuade pupils from buying van Riebeeck memorabilia. \(^{241}\) League members also intervened directly to propagate the boycott of the festivities. \(^{242}\) Behardien recalled the effect of their campaign at the college where she lectured:

> We decided no, no, no we are not going to allow our students at Wesley to participate in this damn thing. So, in our League meetings, we told the parents why we are boycotting it; because their children were at school, and we told the students why we are boycotting it. So came the day of the Van Riebeeck festival outing, they [the students] were all going down to the foreshore... a bus was coming for them and they all had to line up in front of the college... One girl, one student came out ready to go to the Jan Van Riebeeck festival, you know, I could have crowed, I went down the stairs fly-y-ying, I was so happy, anyway, that was the end of that expedition; they couldn’t go with one student. It was very bad, Mr. Cragg [the principal] raved and ranted and he wanted to know why the students [were absent], and they were sitting there mum; they were not saying a blooming word. And we were so thrilled that the thing had come off, because we had worked so hard. We [had] handed out pamphlets and those kinds of things. \(^{243}\)

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\(^{237}\) The TLSA’s journal started publishing articles on the historical background to the landing of van Riebeeck and the period ushered in by the arrival from March 1951 (see *The Educational Journal*, March 1951, pp.4-7; April 1951, pp.6-8; May-June 1951, pp.7-9; Nov-Dec 1951, pp.6, 7). See also R.O. Dudley, ‘Forward’, *Three Hundred Years*, Cumberwood: APDUSA publication, 1988.  
\(^{238}\) Rassool and Witz, p.4.  
\(^{239}\) *The Educational Journal*, November-December 1951, p.7; *The Torch*, 8 January 1952, p.3.  
\(^{241}\) *The Torch*, 18 September 1951, p.6; Witz, p.150.  
\(^{243}\) Interview with Behardien, 24 August 2005.
The Tercentenary boycott proved a huge success for the League and its policy of non-collaboration. Triumphant, the organisation put the campaign’s success down to the ‘unity’ and ‘political awareness’ of the Non-Europeans, and the vital contribution of teachers. The NEUM’s confidence in their teacher constituency appeared vindicated.

Developments beyond the Tercentenary provided the NEUM with an opening to merge its ‘intellectual agenda’ with ‘public political protest’. Timed to virtually coincide with the festival, the release of two distinctive publications fusing history and politics, and which utilised the symbolic significance of the event, appeared that year: *Three Hundred Years* by Hosea Jaffe, who wrote under the pseudonym ‘Mnguni’; and *The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest* written by Dora Taylor under the pen name ‘Nosipho Majeké’.

In conjunction with van Schoor’s seminal work two years earlier, *The Origin and Development of Segregation in South Africa*, which connected the history of segregation with the rise of capitalism-imperialism, these three anti-liberal histories, while failing to ‘sustain a consistent theory of class and class struggle’, nonetheless employed the method of Marxism. As distinct political works originating from within the liberation movement, they were without peer for their time, compelling Nasson, when commenting on ‘Mnguni’ and ‘Majeké’, to confidently claim that ‘there had been nothing quite like their books.

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246 The efficacy of the boycott and non-collaboration was underlined in Willem van Schoor’s 1952 Presidential Address. He noted specifically the teachers role in ‘enlightening the people’ and ‘raising their political level’ against the odds of what he termed heavy state propaganda and huge material rewards for those participating in the celebration (*The Educational Journal*, July-August 1952, pp.1, 2). See also *The Educational Journal*, May-June 1952, p.14. For a sense of those who withdrew from the event and some of the incentives offered but rejected, see Witz (Witz, p.171).
before’. Jaffe set himself the audacious task of reinterpreting from 1652 South Africa’s history in a bid to re-equip the oppressed to emancipate themselves. This mission was summed up in a short introductory sentence to the book where he declared: ‘To know the past is already a step forward in knowing the road to liberation’. Armed with the insights of a countervailing history, ‘where the very methods which maintained the status quo produced the forces and the means to abolish it’, non-collaboration exemplified for Jaffe a ‘liberatory reaction’ that capacitated people to transform their world. The Educational Journal underscored this message in two reviews of Three Hundred Years and through frequently advertising the book.

In similar vein to Jaffe’s rewriting of history, but not as broad in scope, ‘Nosipho Majeke’ reinforced the non-collaboration theme. She portrayed the missionaries as responsible for instilling an ideology of subordination amongst the dispossessed people through appropriating the mantle of trusteeship over them. Breaking this chain of trusteeship, Majeke declared, involved the dispossessed severing their links with the ‘handmaidens’ of the colonisers, the self-appointed leaders who duped the oppressed into accepting segregationist policies. Speaking directly to the Festival in the repressive climate of the early 1950s, she declared the immediate task was ‘to strip the tinsel and velvet from those puppets who strut the stage of history from van Riebeeck onwards’ and to utterly reject

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255 Mnguni, Three Hundred Years, Cumberwood: APDUSA, 1988, p.176.

256 Ibid.

257 The Educational Journal, April 1952, pp.8, 9; September 1952, pp.9, 10; November-December 1952, pp.1, 2.

the ‘racial’ myth of the ‘Malanazi’ past,\textsuperscript{259} which the Tercentenary brought into sharp focus and projected as momentous.

For mainly financial and security reasons only a few copies of ‘Mnguni’ and ‘Majeke’’s works were printed and circulated amongst League teachers to inform their history lessons.\textsuperscript{260} As ‘standard bearers of a dissident historiography’, these teachers exerted an influence way beyond their numbers Nasson claimed.\textsuperscript{261} Assisted ironically by the NP’s separatist goals to demarcate the Western Cape a ‘coloured’ labour preference area,\textsuperscript{262} into which apartheid schooling had to fit, the Unity Movement’s teachers asserted their presence in the schools of the oppressed by capitalising on state subsidised mass schooling for ‘coloureds’ which had taken off from the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{263} A ‘racial’ bias, however, enveloped these institutions, entrenching ‘race’ divides that remained an enduring feature of Western Cape communities and the schools embedded in them. This ‘racial’ compartmentalisation was challenged by NEUM teachers in at least three ways: first, by accepting African students at ‘coloured’ schools, second, encouraging sporting and cultural interactions between schools, and third through conducting adult education and literacy programmes in African townships.\textsuperscript{264} In addition, the League through two organisational developments advanced ‘racial’ integration. On a professional level and amongst

\textsuperscript{259} This term indicated Mokone’s conflation of Malan and Nazism (Mokone, p.66). See also The Educational Journal, March 1952, pp.1, 2.
\textsuperscript{262} The ‘coloured’ labour preference policy emerged formally in the mid-1950s. Through this plan the NP endeavoured to prevent the movement of Africans from the ‘homelands’ to the Western Cape under what was termed ‘influx control’. The policy protected and bolstered the participation of ‘coloureds’ in the labour market at the expense of Africans, and implicitly preserved the Western Cape as one part of South Africa where whites would be numerically dominant (R. Humphries, ‘Administrative politics and the coloured labour preference policy during the 1960s’, in W. James and M. Simons (eds), The Angry Divide, Cape Town: David Philip, 1989, 169). See also Goldin, Making Race: The Politics and Economics of Coloured Identity in South Africa, pp.86-88, 97, 98.
\textsuperscript{263} Harold Cressy and South Peninsula High, two known TLSA schools, were built in 1950. Other schools where the League had a presence were built soon after. These included Alexander Sinton High, Wittebome High, Heathfield High and others. The TLSA also strengthened its hold on Livingstone High and Trafalgar High. See The Educational Journal of April 1955, pp.13, 14.
communities, it was central to the formation of the Cape Teachers’ Federal Council (CTFC), comprising the Cape African Teachers’ Association (CATA) and the TLSA, and the building of Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs).

The Cape Teachers’ Federal Council

From the time it joined the NEUM, the TLSA sought to develop a close working relationship with teacher organisations nationally. After an aborted attempt at initiating the provisional Federal Council of Non-European Teachers’ Associations (FCNETA) in 1947, the League struck up a close working relationship with the Cape African Teachers’ Association (CATA) when the latter affiliated to the AAC. This relationship was formalised in 1951 when CATA accepted a TLSA invitation to establish the Cape Teachers’ Federal Council (CTFC). The goal was to establish teachers’ organisations across provinces, and to move towards forming one national structure in accord with the TLSA’s 1944 constitution. This realignment of teacher organisations came with its schisms however, and the conservative Cape African Teachers’ Union (CATU) under I. D. Mkize split from CATA in 1953.

The CTFC provided a critical rallying point for teachers who faced the direct onslaught of the apartheid regime’s Christian National Education (CNE), a policy that separated education along strict ‘racial’ lines. Within this NP controlled framework, unlike that of previous governments, schooling was viewed as integral to state policy. This vision was affirmed by the 1951 Eiselen Commission’s recommendation that African or ‘Bantu’ education be removed from the aegis of missionary societies and churches and centralised

265 The FCNETA operated for two years before it collapsed (see Cape Teachers’ Federal Council, ‘Official Minutes of the Second Joint Conference Sitting Cape African Teachers’ Association and Teachers’ League of South Africa’, 25th and 26th June 1954, St Saviour’s Hall, East London).
266 Ibid. A new radical leadership emerged within CATA by 1948, and formally aligned it to the AAC.
270 Molteno, p.89.
271 The term ‘Bantu’ replaced Native in the government’s lexicon of racial terminology. From this, the notion of ‘Bantu culture’, ‘Bantu language’, ‘Bantu people’ and the ‘Bantu community’ arose.
under government control.\textsuperscript{272} Before the passing of the Bantu Education Bill, however, the De Vos Malan Commission was appointed in 1952 to similarly look into ‘coloured’ education. The CTFC branded this imposed ‘racial’ design, the ‘divide-and-rule’ plans of Eiselen-De Vos Malan.\textsuperscript{273}

The kernel of the Eiselen and the De Vos Malan commissions, the harnessing of cost cutting labour, constituted the TLSA’s central thesis on Bantu Education. This van Schoor focussed on in his presidential address of 1952 and 1953.\textsuperscript{274} Here he argued that fundamentally the mainstay of the apartheid system was economic interests, ‘the exploitation of Non-white cheap labour’\textsuperscript{275} for the benefit of capital.\textsuperscript{276} The prime motive for apartheid, and into which ‘non-white’ education had to fit, was to yield profits for the \textit{herrenvolk}, he contended.\textsuperscript{277} There was no need for a ‘literate’, ‘skilled’, ‘cultured’ and ‘technically trained’ ‘non-white’ work force according to van Schoor, because the real purpose of Eiselen-De Vos Malan was to align education with the state’s economic imperatives by ensuring the oppressed were ‘indoctrinated’ to accept their social status of inferiority – a ‘slave mentality’.\textsuperscript{278} This political and economic arrangement, Tabata endorsed in his \textit{Education For Barbarism}, where he argued that Bantu Education came with dire political consequences for the majority of the nation’s youth and indeed for the


\textsuperscript{273} See \textit{The Educational Journal}, July-August 1953, pp.2-4. Also \textit{A Manifesto To The Cape Coloured People: The Coloured Education Commission, The Threat To The Education Of Our Children}, Cape Town: TLSA pamphlet, June 1953. The CTFC made explicit their views in their annually organised joint conferences, reported meetings in the TLSA journal, and CATA’s \textit{The Teachers’ Vision} and later from 1955 \textit{The New Teachers’ Vision}.

\textsuperscript{274} \textit{The Educational Journal}, July-August 1952; July-August 1953. Van Schoor’s presidential address clearly set out the organisation’s perspective on Bantu Education. This was echoed and elaborated upon frequently in \textit{The Educational Journal} and it coincided with CATA’s outlook.


\textsuperscript{276} These for van Schoor were ‘the mine owner, farmer, secondary industrialist, urban commercial capitalist and White aristocrat of labour’ (\textit{The Educational Journal}, July-August 1953, p.4).

\textsuperscript{277} \textit{The Educational Journal}, July-August 1953, pp.4, 5; \textit{The New Teachers’ Vision}, April-June 1955, p.15.

\textsuperscript{278} \textit{The Educational Journal}, July-August 1953, p.4; July-August 1952, p.5; May-June 1954, pp.6, 7; July-August 1954, pp.16, 17. CATA and the TLSA saw the reinforcing of tribalism, under a Native Affairs Department (NAD) and Coloured Affairs Department (CAD), where schools would be divided along lines of ‘race’ to ensure black youth were prepared to be submissive and pliable for the cheap labour market (see \textit{The Educational Journal}, July-August 1952, pp.4, 5, 11; March 1954, pp.2, 3).
nation. For him, apartheid ‘tribalized’ education was not only out of step with international trends and thus ‘anachronistic’, it also put out of reach the modern industrialising world for the nation’s children. Bantu Education therefore stunted the intellectual development of black youth rendering them unable to access the modern world of knowledge as equals, he claimed. This, in turn, he contended, blocked them from becoming fully-fledged members of society with access to full citizenship rights. Based on this perspective, the struggle against Bantu Education and De Vos Malan was directly connected to the main struggle for full democratic rights, the TLSA was to argue.

Teachers who ‘remained indifferent to the struggle’, in this war on the oppressed, the CTFC asserted, were the ‘direct allies of the herrenvolk’. For them, this professional layer had a vital contribution to make. They had to reject the collaborationist TEPA-CATU ‘professionalism’, eradicate prejudice and ‘racialism’ amongst themselves and the oppressed, and undertake to raise the people’s ‘political consciousness’ through ‘building the people’s movement for emancipation’. Tasks of this nature, the League declared, were ‘not only political work’ but ‘educational work of the highest magnitude and in the noblest tradition of the struggle for liberation’. The key challenge for the TLSA-CATA, however, was how exactly were they going to achieve this goal given the fact that they did not have the means to seriously challenge, in Althusser’s terms, the state’s ‘Ideological Apparatuses’?

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280 For Tabata, mining and agriculture in the post war period was being challenged as the primary driver of the economy by the rapid growth nationally and internationally of secondary industry, in particular ‘automation’. This indicated, for him, that a more skilled work force would be necessary to sustain the future South African economy. Bantu Education therefore created contradictions for the ruling class that it could not resolve within the rigid framework of its apartheid policies he suggested.
289 Ibid.
Leading with its strength on the educational and cultural fronts, the NEUM, having developed a refined theoretical analysis of the South African social system, produced a series of seminal texts to ideologically fortify its cadres and others within its orbit in order to clarify the burning questions of the time. This intervention Jaffe dubbed “the most sustained, intense and widespread political education of the oppressed people ever conducted in South Africa, and on the available evidence, in Africa”. Aside from the ‘Mnguni’ and ‘Majeke’ publications, and the regular insights produced from 1949 in the TLSA’s journal which presented insightful research in education, the works of van Schoor *The Origin and Development of Segregation in South Africa* (1950), Tabata, *Boycott as Weapon Of Struggle* (1952), *The Awakening Of A People* (1954), *Education For Barbarism* (1959), Kies, *The Contribution Of The Non European Peoples To World Civilisation* (1953), and Maurice, *The Colour Bar In Education* (1956), to mention the most prominent texts, stood out as penetrating contributions at a time when a stream of repressive legislation was being imposed on the black populace.

These works, while local in focus, endeavoured to break with the insular and inward looking ‘racial-cultural’ tendencies fostered by apartheid, and sought to position South Africa within the framework of broader international discourses and struggles. The Kies treatise, for instance, aimed at debunking the ‘racial’ myth of the superiority of a ‘Western’, ‘European’ or ‘Christian’ civilization, arguing that ‘the colonial and semi-colonial world’ made proportionately a far more significant contribution to world-civilisation and the advancement of humankind. Maurice, similarly, linking the global and local, tracked the changing history of colour prejudice and the colour bar in education. Staying within the framework of previous NEUM writers, he identified the colour bar as an outgrowth of international capitalism, which in the colonial context unequivocally benefitted the

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293 See in particular *The Educational Journal* of August 1949 and August 1955.
hegemonic white group. His analysis concluded that only political victory over the *herrenvolk* would bring the ‘abrogation of the colour bar in education’.

Aside from the TLSA and CATA branches, the NEUM’s ideas were filtered through a range of organisations on the ground. The most pronounced and influential in the 1950s were the fellowships, which extended the work of the NEF and will be discussed in the next chapter, the Society of Young Africa (SOYA) formed in 1951, and the Cape Peninsula Students’ Union (CPSU) among others. On a cultural level, too, League teachers continued to organise their annual Ash Shield choral competitions and physical education demonstrations, with the intention of developing a healthy social relationship between schools. Events of this nature proved huge attractions, and by the late 1950s League teachers were central to the formation of a provincial and later national mass based school sport structure.

Throughout the 1950s, concerted interventions had been made by the TLSA-CATA to counter Eiselen-De Vos Malan schooling. It was however via the CTFC boycott of school boards and school committees and the establishment regionally and further afield of

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296 Ibid., p.96.
297 SOYA was a discussion and debating society for youth and migrant workers in the Movement. For insight into SOYA, see Drew, ‘Social Mobilization and Racial Capitalism in South Africa, 1928-1960’, pp.483-492.
298 The CPSU was based in the Western Cape with a handful of young activists its main driving force. It brought out *The Student*, which it published throughout the 1950s. Along with SOYA it folded by the early 1960s under state repression.
299 The Ash Shield started in 1923 and was a continuation of the old League’s annual inter-school choral activities. It was advertised regularly in the organisation’s journal until the end of the 1950s along with the Physical Culture competitions. Behardien elaborated on the latter competitions which were held in Rosebank, Rondebosch from the late 1940s to the end of the 1950s (Interview with Behardien, 24 August 2005).
301 The League and CATA opposed the School Boards, which they viewed as the local administrative levers to implement Eiselen-De Vos Malan schooling. Cameron in his thesis indicated that the basic strategy of government was to ensure the African population pay directly for their education. The central contribution for Bantu Education from the state fund was therefore fixed at ‘R13 000 000 (£6½ million)’ with further expenditure having to be met by the general tax paid by Africans (M. Cameron, ‘The Introduction Of Bantu Education And The Question of Resistance: Co-operation, Non-collaboration or Defiance? The Struggle For African Schooling With Special Reference To Cape Town, 1945-1960’, Cape Town: Unpublished M.Ed dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1986, pp.48, 104). See also *The Educational Journal*, July-August 1954, p.11.
Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs), that the TLSA made noticeable headway in uniting teachers, parents and students behind their educational demands.\textsuperscript{302}

To ensure the implementation of its CNE policy, the government attempted to draw parents into managing their own children’s education. This they sought to achieve through local school boards and committees. According to the League, these government organs had as their real intent the dragooning of parents into operating the machinery of their own oppression,\textsuperscript{303} by raising funds and ensuring teachers accepted the Eiselein system.\textsuperscript{304} While the League and CATA called for the boycott of these structures, which will be elaborated on later, they simultaneously built PTAs as alternative people’s organs to counter what they saw as the Eiselein-De Vos-Malan wedge to divide teachers and parents.\textsuperscript{305} The PTAs served several primary unifying purposes for the CTFC: they welded parents and teachers into one independent organisation, bonded schools more closely with their feeder community, integrated the PTAs of CATA and TLSA branches in an effort to break the apartheid divisions foisted on people, and promoted the ‘ideas of liberation and the ideals of the democratic movement.’\textsuperscript{306} This organisational link between teachers and the community is exemplified by Parker’s experience in the PTA:

\begin{quote}
[The] PTA contributed to my own development. A, it taught me how to work with people; it taught me what the problems were, the political problems facing the oppressed. We realised that the classroom is but a microcosm of the larger macro situation: the issues that were rampant out on the streets or in the community would find its way into the classroom, whether it’s illnesses or malnutrition or whatever it is, teachers had to attend to it. Secondly, it not only taught me how to work with people ... it also taught me important organisational skills ...
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{302}PTAs were attached to branches of the TLSA and CATA and were not restricted to schools. They were viewed as part of the NEUM network, to incorporate the teacher into various community activities, and parents into the educational and broader political movement (\textit{The Educational Journal}, April 1954, pp.1, 2).

\textsuperscript{303}Interview with A. Slingers, 27 July 2005. CATA likened participation on school boards and school committees, ‘the very pillars of Eiselein Schooling’, to ‘put[ting] the rope round our own necks and so hang ourselves’ (\textit{The New Teachers’ Vision}, April-June 1955, p.17).

\textsuperscript{304}R.O. Dudley, ‘Control Of The Parent’, \textit{The Educational Journal}, August 1955, p.39. In terms of the new educational financial structure, the statutory school bodies taxed parents to enable government to economically spread subsidised mass based schooling for the black population.


\textsuperscript{307}Interview with D. Parker, 10 June 2006; \textit{The Educational Journal}, November-December 1961, pp.6, 7. Alexander also noted that his activism was ‘nurtured in the TLSA through mainly the PTA movement’ (Interview with N. Alexander, 1 December 2006).
For a short period in the mid-to-late 1950s, the PTAs were a ‘vibrant’ and ‘viable’ movement, and in certain areas they proved more successful than others did. As Alexander recalled: “We had in Paarl where I worked quite a bit, with Ronnie Britten and Mrs Richards, we had a huge, a huge PTA by the standards of that time. And I mean she could mobilise a thousand people in the town hall without any difficulty under the PTA banner”. The Elsies-River PTA also proved hugely influential, headed as it was by Dan Neethling and Neville Hartel, among other prominent TLSA members. Held together by a few core activists when attempts at building unity was consistently frustrated by a ‘state machine that balkanised people’, PTAs were essentially fragile structures as structures born in struggle are. Notwithstanding their limitations, PTAs nonetheless proliferated and reached into the countryside and urban areas wherever CATA and TLSA branches were found, creating in the process a formidable web of resistance by the late 1950s. By the early 1960s, however, the PTAs went into decline due mainly to intensified political repression.

From unity to disunity: resistance and repression

Although the issue of unity remained a principal concern for the liberation movement in the 1950s, distinct differences on how to oppose Eiselen-De Vos Malan schooling surfaced between the CATA-TLSA on the one side, and the ANC-CPSA on the other. Whereas the ANC’s campaign involved a total boycott of schools or Bantu Education in a mass withdrawal of children from schools, and the establishing of alternative ‘cultural clubs’,

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308 Interview with N. Alexander, 7 December 2006; The Educational Journal, May-June 1954, p.7. At the fourth annual general meeting of the CTFC on 21 December 1954, it was reported that TLSA branches had formed over twenty PTAs to which their activities were directed (The Educational Journal, January-February 1955, p.10). In early January 1957, a PTA conference attended by 200 parent delegates and representing 31 PTAs was called by the TLSA to reject the Coloured Education Commission on the basis that it was in line with the Eiselen Commission. Parents, teachers, TLSA branches, CATA, CTFC, the Transvaal Coloured and Indian Teachers’ Association (TICTA) and South West African Teachers’ Association attended the event (see The Educational Journal, January-February 1957 pp.1, 2, 4, 6-11). For more on the PTAs see The Educational Journal, September 1959, p.9.

309 Interview with N. Alexander, 7 December 2006 and 1 December 2006. To corroborate Alexander, see the report of Mrs Richards to the TLSA conference of 29 June 1956 (The Educational Journal, July 1956, p.17).


311 Interview with D. Parker, 10 June 2006; Interviews with N. Alexander 1 and 7 December 2006.


313 In December 1954, the ANC launched its Bantu Education Campaign.
the NEUM rejected this strategy as ‘folly and adventurism’. Instead, it called on teachers to stay at their posts, be agents of change in the classroom, and not abandon their pupils to quisling teachers. Tabata emphasised this opposition to the boycott of schooling in his earlier mentioned pioneering text, an argument SOYA echoed when it declared it ‘cowardly’ to ‘shift the burden of the struggle from our backs onto the backs of our children’. The Unity Movement alternatively popularised the boycott of ‘school committee’ elections across the country. While the ANC regarded the NEUM’s opposition to the boycott of schools to be a sign of their reluctance to fully oppose Bantu Education and thus reactionary, its alternative People’s Education campaign proved unsustainable resulting in parents eventually sending their children back to government schools. The CTFC’s boycott of school boards and school committees received wide publicity and support. It also consequently incurred the wrath of the state. The outcome of the campaign was the banning of the CATA journal, and the transfer and dismissal of a range of the organisation’s teachers from their posts in the Eastern and Western Cape. By mid-1955, nine executive members and officers of CATA had been summarily dismissed, including the President N. Honono, General Secretary, Z.K. Mzimba, Treasurer J.L Mkentane and the Editor L. L. Sihlali. Soon thereafter, the TLSA too was hit, with its

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315 Cameron, p.67; *The Educational Journal*, March 1955, p.3.
317 *The Torch*, 3 May 1955, p.4. The ANC had resolved to withdraw children from schools from 1 April 1955 (Cameron, p.175).
319 Cameron, p.203.
320 The desire by parents to have their children receive an education out-weighed eventually the boycott of schools or school committees (see Cameron, pp.198, 199; Hyslop, pp.71, 78-80).
321 Cameron, pp.197, 198; *The New Teachers’ Vision*, April-June 1955, p.10; *The New Teachers’ Vision*, July-September 1955, p.23. Hyslop also noted the success of the campaign. He indicates that the education officials struggled to get parents in Langa to elect committees, and by September 1955, of the 19 African schools in the Peninsula, only 6 elected committees (Hyslop, pp.84-86).
322 CATA teachers were transferred from one post to another (*The New Teachers’ Vision*, January-June 1956, pp.10, 11). *The Teachers’ Vision* was banned after the January-March 1955 issue and re-emerged later as the *The New Teachers’ Vision*. For reports on the intimidation and the dismissal of CATA teachers from 1954, see *The Teachers’ Vision*, October-December 1954, pp.5-15. Also, any CATA teacher who criticised the Education Department faced charges of misconduct and ultimately dismissal (Kayser, ‘Land and Liberty!: The Non-European Unity Movement and the Land Question, 1936-1976’, p.87).
president van Schoor and *The Educational Journal* editor Kies, receiving notices terminating their services.\(^{324}\) Five Anti-CAD members were also indicted for misconduct.\(^{325}\) The TLSA furthermore found itself barred from using school premises for meetings.\(^{326}\) Another blow to the Movement was the five-year ban placed on its national organiser Tabata in 1956 under the Suppression of Communism Act, restricting his movements to parts of the Western Cape.\(^{327}\) The TLSA and CATA rallied in the face of adversity.\(^{328}\) For them, the government’s actions signalled not only its desperation to silence ‘the vocal section of the oppressed’, it pointed to ‘the growing strength of the oppressed in their principled struggle’, where the boycott and non-collaboration was pivotal.\(^{329}\) Buoyed by this outlook the two organisations contested the dismissals legally. Supporting each other they proceeded with a multipronged educational campaign to muster support for their members’ reinstatement, and to inform teachers of their rights, while at the same time advancing their organisation’s ideas and vision in the public eye.\(^{330}\) Their stance received wide support from the Transvaal Indian and Coloured Teachers’ Association (TICTA),\(^{331}\) branches of SOYA, a wide spectrum of Parent Teacher Associations,\(^{332}\) and

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\(^{324}\) Van Schoor was accused of making anti-white statements in his presidential address, with Kies implicated for publishing the address. These actions according to the Cape Provincial Administration and Native Affairs Department, were calculated to ‘impede, obstruct and undermine’ their administrative activities (*The New Teachers’ Vision*, January-June 1956, p.5).

\(^{325}\) *The Educational Journal*, July 1956, p.5.

\(^{326}\) *The Educational Journal*, October 1955, pp.1-3; July 1956, pp.4, 6, 11.

\(^{327}\) Tabata voluntarily took on the role of national organiser for the NEUM. His banning order prohibited him from attending gatherings and confined him to the magisterial districts of Cape Town, Wynberg, Simonstown and Bellville (*The Educational Journal*, April 1956, p.5). The interdict against Tabata made him the first person to be banned under the Act for that length of time (Kayser, ‘Land and Liberty!: The Non-European Unity Movement and the Land Question, 1936-1976’, p.89).


\(^{329}\) Ibid., p.29. The School Boards had to serve the dismissal notices on identified teachers, thus implicating them, as government bodies, fully in the sacking process.

\(^{330}\) See *The New Teachers’ Vision*, July-September 1955, p.15; *The Educational Journal*, March 1956, pp.1-6, 8-10, 12-14; April 1956, pp.6, 7, 9; May-June 1957, p.3; September 1957, p.7; October 1957, pp.4, 5; April 1958, p.5; May-June 1958, pp.6, 7; Cameron, p.200.

\(^{331}\) TICTA had come under the influence of CATA and TLSA politics in the 1950s. Its President N. Rathinsamy was a key contact in the Transvaal (see *The Educational Journal*, March 1956, p.4; January-February 1957 p.6).

\(^{332}\) *The Educational Journal*, April 1956, p.6. The Peninsula Parent, Teacher Association organised a mass protest meeting attended by over 1500 people against the dismissals at the City Hall in Cape Town (*The Educational Journal*, March 1956, pp.4-6).
students from particularly Trafalgar High, Söhnhge Training School and Nqabara Secondary School, where Kies, van Schoor and Honono taught respectively.\textsuperscript{333} Kies and van Schoor were not reinstated in the profession and, along with other Anti-CAD members, they received a five-year banning order.\textsuperscript{334} Despite their proscription, the two figureheads retained their executive positions within the League up to 1963. CATA on the other hand was unable to ‘secure the reinstatement of all its dismissed teachers’, nor was it able to win them all back to membership.\textsuperscript{335} It was furthermore prohibited from holding conferences.\textsuperscript{336} The repressive measures of the ‘all-powerful’ state, as van Schoor made a point of emphasising,\textsuperscript{337} heavily curtailed the League’s leadership, leaving many members anxious and fearful.\textsuperscript{338} Presenting a stoic front, the organisation nonetheless sustained its active opposition to the government’s ‘racial’ fragmentation of education during the late 1950s. Defiant, it organised opposition to the 1956 Coloured Education Commission report,\textsuperscript{339} the Separate Universities Act of 1959,\textsuperscript{340} and, moreover, claimed a resounding

\textsuperscript{333} The Educational Journal, March 1956, p.3; Hyslop, p.89.
\textsuperscript{334} The banning order was served on Kies first, prohibiting him from 1 April 1959 attending meetings or gatherings in South Africa and South West Africa for five years (The Educational Journal, April 1959, p.4; ‘Banning Of Mr B. M. Kies’. Athlone: Anti-CAD Meeting Resolution, 12 April 1959). The same regulations applied to van Schoor, Viljoen and Murison from 18 December 1959 (Non-European Unity Movement, ‘Non-European Unity Movement Statement On The Banning Of NEUM Treasurer, National Anti-C.A.D. Secretary and TLSA President’, Cape Town; Non-European Unity Movement pamphlet, 19 December 1959; Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Report of the Executive Committee for the period July, 1959-June 1961’).
\textsuperscript{335} Cameron, p.201; The Educational Journal, July-August 1958, p.11. Although CATA successfully challenged the dismissals, the state immediately re-imposed charges, which were not legally disputable (The Educational Journal, October 1957, pp.1, 2, 9; Hyslop, p.89).
\textsuperscript{336} The Educational Journal, July-August 1958, pp.1, 10, 11.
\textsuperscript{337} Van Schoor elaborated at length on the powers of the state in his presidential address of 1958 (The Educational Journal, July-August 1958, pp.5-8).
\textsuperscript{338} Wieder refers to police surveillance of other leading TLSA members after the Kies and van Schoor.bannings (Wieder, teacher and comrade: Richard Dudley and the Fight for Democracy in South Africa, pp.90, 91).
\textsuperscript{339} The League viewed the Coloured Education Commission report as confirmation that government intended aligning ‘coloured’ education with the Eiselen system in the form of a ‘colourised’ counterpart to Bantu Education (The Educational Journal, May-June 1956, pp.1-4, 19, 20, 22; July 1956, pp.7-9, 13). The TLSA in collaboration with the PTAs organised three regional conferences against the Commission’s report and a large PTA conference at the beginning of 1957 to mobilise parents in opposition to the Report’s recommendations (For a report on the regional conferences see The Educational Journal, October 1956, pp.4-6. For details of the 1957 conference, see The Educational Journal, January-February 1957, pp.1, 2, 4, 6-11).
\textsuperscript{340} The TLSA rejected at the outset exclusive racial universities, what it termed ‘University Apartheid’ (see Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Report of the Executive Committee for the period July 1959-June, 1961’). The University of the Western Cape (UWC) was consequently defined by the League an inferior tribal ‘bush’ college and not a free open university.
victory for non-collaboration when it called for the boycott of the April 1958 elections.\textsuperscript{341} The poll resulted in an 80% boycott of the Congress Alliance affiliate, the South African Coloured People’s Congress (SACPO) ‘white’ candidate Abe Bloomberg who stood as a ‘coloured’ representative.\textsuperscript{342}

What proved a massive blow to CATA and the League were the disagreements which wracked the Unity Movement in the late 1950s. These tensions manifested themselves on many fronts; chief among them were the political and those relating to doctrine. They encompassed differences within and between NEUM structures\textsuperscript{343} around the question of the durability of the federal structure,\textsuperscript{344} the urban rural division,\textsuperscript{345} the language question, and most significantly the land question. The issue, which received foremost coverage in \textit{The Educational Journal}, was the language debate, pitched between V. E. Rylate or Hosea Jaffe of the Anti-CAD and A. C. Jordan of the AAC.\textsuperscript{346} The former argued for the primacy of English whereas the latter underscored the importance and value of indigenous languages or multilingualism in forging nation building.\textsuperscript{347} The Land question proved most controversial and divisive, pitting the Tabata section of the AAC which advocated the ‘new division of the land’ or ‘the right to buy and sell land’ against the predominantly Anti-CAD contingent of Jaffe and Kies, who argued for land redistribution.\textsuperscript{348} Matters came to a head

\textsuperscript{341} \textit{The Educational Journal}, January-February 1958, p.4; \textit{The Torch}, 1 April 1958, pp.1, 3, 6, 8; Interview with I. Abrahams, 22 June 2005. The Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1956 removed ‘coloureds’ from the common voters role, thereafter they could only vote for white national and provincial representatives.


\textsuperscript{344} Kies and Jaffe differed on this issue, according to Joe Rassool, with Kies supportive of the continuation of the Federal structure (see Rassool, ‘Notes on the History of the Non-European Unity Movement in South Africa, and the role of Hosea Jaffe’, p.6).

\textsuperscript{345} Fataar, \textit{Falsification of History: The Role of the Unity Movement in Liberation}, p.6.

\textsuperscript{346} Jaffe’s position did not necessarily reflect the Anti-CAD position, as Kies, for example, supported multilingualism as opposed to ‘moedertaal’ (mother-tongue). ‘Moedertaal’ denoted for Kies the attempt by the apartheid regime to divide people according to culture and therefore language (For Kies and the TLSA position see \textit{The Educational Journal}, August 1955, pp.47, 48, 51).

\textsuperscript{347} Jaffe and Jordan debated the language question in \textit{The Educational Journal} from November-December 1956 to May-June 1958. As the editor of the journal, according to Jordan, refused to publish his response to Rylate’s two articles that appeared in the TLSA’s journal of April and May-June on \textit{Nationalism and Language}, Jordan set out his view in the booklet \textit{Still On The Language Question} in 1958.

\textsuperscript{348} For insight on this issue, see Fataar, \textit{Falsification of History: The Role of the Unity Movement in
at the 1958 AAC conference when the NEF and Anti-CAD walked out. In the period that followed, the Anti-CAD accused the AAC of capitulating to African nationalism, thus opening the way to collaboration with *herrenvolkism* and imperialism. The AAC countered, claiming that it had not deviated from the NEUM’s political programme, and branded the Anti-CAD ‘petit-bourgeois ... revisionists’ who ‘denied the reality of colour oppression’ and who failed to recognise the ‘progressive’ anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist impulses of African nationalism. Collaboration or complicity with the ruling regime was central to this internal conflict. These differences surfaced in the TLSA too, creating tensions between it and CATA as well as differences within the latter organisation. Discussion at the 1959 TLSA conference confirmed these tensions, hallmarked as it was by strong opposition to African nationalism. Within the TLSA, Fataar, who was closely associated with the AAC, had a proposal moved against him continuing in the position of General Secretary in 1958. Although the motion was

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Sastri Mda the General Secretary of SOYA (Cape Town branch) had been reprimanded for using Marxist rhetoric at a meeting against University Apartheid (see T. Karis and G. M. Gerhart, ‘Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964’, pp.201, 366; ‘Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Report of the Executive Committee for the period July 1959-June 1961’).

See Foundation members of the Non-European Unity Movement and members of the Head Unity Movement, ‘What has happened in the Non-European Unity Movement’, Cape Town, February 1959; National Anti-CAD Committee, ‘National Anti-CAD Statement on Alleged Meeting of Head Unity Committee of NEUM’, Athlone, pamphlet, 5 May 1959. See Giyosi on the question of nationalism (Giyosi, p.6).

The AAC countered that individuals amongst the ‘self-styled foundationists’ practiced double standards by consorting with the liberal bourgeoisie (see All African Convention Committee [Western Province], ‘The Wreckers Of Unity At Work: Who is the National Anti-CAD Committee’, Cape Town, 23 June 1959).


See Cape African Teachers’ Association, ‘Minute of the ‘Extended CATA Executive Meeting”, 27-28 September 1958, where Jaffe’s influence on the Head Unity Committee (HUC) and disagreements on point 7 of the TPP were raised as divisive issues. Also, Z.K. Mzimba, ‘A Leadership in Flight: The Tactics Of Retreat’, Umtata, 28 May 1959. In the latter case, Mzimba as General Secretary of CATA was expelled from the organisation for refusing to carry out a directive of the executive to communicate with the Native Affairs Department. He viewed this as tactically incorrect and a violation of non-collaboration. Mzimba supported the Anti-CAD position within the NEUM. See also Drew, ‘Social Mobilization and Racial Capitalism in South Africa’, 1928-1960, p.478.


defeated, the following year Fataar stepped down from the position after thirteen years of sterling service. R.O. Dudley replaced him.356

The outcome of these sharp differences was a split in the NEUM in the early 1960s. This divide was deepened by broader political developments, which came into effect in the wake of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) anti-pass demonstrations at Sharpeville and Langa on 21 March 1960, events, which triggered a state of emergency a month later, and the banning of the ANC and PAC, amongst a range of political activists.357 The NEUM too was targeted, and by October 1961 leading figures in the Movement had been banned, many of whom were foremost TLSA teachers, including its General Secretary RO Dudley, the Vice-President E. L. Maurice and G. L. Abrahams of the Central Executive.358 1963 proved another watershed moment in the Movement’s life with the League hosting its last public conference in June of that year, while The Torch closed after the consecutive banning of its editors.359

With political organisations unsure of their fate, the Anti-CAD opted to go underground while ex-CATA and TLSA teachers among other NEUM cadres established the African People’s Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA) in 1961. Thereafter Tabata, Jane Gool, Honono and other APDUSAN members left for exile to form the Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA) in 1964.360 Notwithstanding the fact that both sections of the NEUM subscribed to the Ten-Point Programme, their strategies were fundamentally


357 69 People were killed and 180 wounded at Sharpeville. Later in the day marchers to the Langa police station were also shot, with conflicting reports on the number of people killed (see Goldin, Making Race: The Politics and Economics of Coloured Identity in South Africa, p.114).

358 These included its former General Secretary A. Fataar, J. S. Meissenheimer, J. Gool, F. Landman who were proscribed under the Suppression of Communism Act, and C. Pieterse and V. Wessels who had also received banning orders under the Riotous Assemblies Act (Educational Journal, October 1961, pp.6, 7, 8).

359 The editor of The Torch Joyce Meissenheimer and her replacement Joan Kay were banned. By then, too, most of the contributors to the paper had been served banning orders and were effectively unable to continue their political activities.

different. Whilst the Anti-CAD, composed of essentially TLSA members, contended that the political space had contracted thus preventing possibilities for overt political activity, APDUSA continued to organise underground and publically, with UMSA committing itself to armed struggle.\(^{361}\) Caught in these dynamics, the TLSA and under the acting presidency of Reverend Dan Wessels decided to operate clandestinely from 1963 onward.\(^{362}\)

With the intensification of state repression and the subsequent ideological breakup of the Unity Movement in the early 1960s, an undisclosed number of teachers departed for Commonwealth countries leaving a void in the educational wing of the Anti-CAD. The exodus of these members in the face of the onslaught on the liberation movement drew sharp criticism from within the Unity Movement.\(^{363}\) Alexander, an erstwhile TLSA and APDUSA member, who was imprisoned on Robben Island for fostering armed struggle as part of the Yu Chui Chan Club / National Liberation Front,\(^{364}\) declared that the ‘non-collaborationist discourse’ had suited the teacher corps, whose ‘desertion’ by ‘voting with their feet’ demonstrated overtly their ‘petty-bourgeois’ class consciousness.\(^{365}\) APDUSA also singled out the Movement’s teachers for criticism, specifically their fear ‘of losing their special privileges in society’.\(^ {366}\) Within the League, too, there were hardened attitudes towards teacher desertion. Abrahams, for one, remarked that on a trip to Canada he flatly refused to meet with former NEUM expatriates:

\[\text{I said sorry, they left the Movement, they deserted, what is there that I can talk to them about? I can’t talk to them about South Africa; are they going to tell me how to run the political struggle in South Africa? … And today still, if somebody comes knocking on} \]

\(^{361}\) UMSA’s approach to armed struggle differed with that of the ANC’s Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), formed in 1961. Whereas the UM viewed the ANC strategy as limited to forcing the apartheid regime to negotiate, it placed emphasis on an army and the political mobilisation of the oppressed (Kayser and Adhikari, pp.13, 14).

\(^{362}\) Willem van Schoor was under five years house arrest and had a banning order placed on him forcing him to resign from the TLSA and other organisations of the NEUM. The League rejected this ruling and continued to recognise him as the elected President. Dan Wessels therefore assumed the position of Acting President of the organisation (I. Abrahams, ‘Transformation: The Quest for Quality Education’, Presidential Address, Cape Town: The Teachers’ League of South Africa, 1996, p.3).

\(^{363}\) Interviews with U. Fataar, 24 and 30 November 2005. There seemed to be a distinction between Unity Movement members who went into exile in Africa, and many of those who left for western countries. In fact, TLSA members, such as Henry Thornicroft, Alridge Adamson, Joe Culverwell and Alie Fataar, would become prominent figures in the Zambian and Zimbabwean education systems in the 1960s and 1980s, and would effectively take the TLSA’s ideas beyond the country’s borders (Interviews with E. Carollisen, 21 October 2005; U. Fataar, 24 November 2005 and R.O. Dudley 26 October 2005).


\(^{365}\) Alexander, p.189.

\(^{366}\) Hommel, p.154.
let’s say the door there on upper Bloem Street, and it’s a chap who left for Canada years ago, the people they [are] not welcome.\textsuperscript{367}

League teachers, who remained, however, ensured that the organisation’s voice was sustained through its journal and by continuing their political activities in civil society. They also continued to denounce as ‘defeatist’ and collaborationist any attempts to circumvent the demand for full citizenship rights by accepting reforms or concessions from the ruling regime.\textsuperscript{368} In its inimitable style, the League condemned as collaborationist the call of the Congress Alliance Cape People’s Congress (CPC), formerly SACPO, for a Coloured Convention in 1961, as it viewed the assembling of ‘coloured’ organisations as a prelude to negotiating a national consensus with the government.\textsuperscript{369}

The TLSA’s decision, with the Anti-CAD, to beat a rapid retreat in the early 1960s had serious strategic and political consequences. Firstly, it opened the political space to conservative teacher organisations such as TEPA and the successor to the CPNU, the Cape Teachers’ Association (CTA) to assert themselves.\textsuperscript{370} Laying claim to representing the interests of ‘coloured’ teachers, these two organisations amalgamated in 1967 to form the Cape Teachers’ Professional Association (CTPA),\textsuperscript{371} which had as its central strategy, like TEPA, the undermining of non-collaboration by working for incremental reforms from within the Education Department, as a recognised teacher organisation.\textsuperscript{372} Secondly, conservative ‘coloured’ politicos found the space favourable, and formed in 1964 and 1965 the Federal Coloured People’s Party (FCPP) and the South African (or ‘Coloured’) Labour Party (SALP). Thirdly, and most significantly, the government introduced in relatively quick succession the Coloured Affairs Department (CAD) in 1963, the 1965 Indian Affairs Department, and the National Education Policy Act of 1967 for white education, therewith completing the ‘racial’ separation of education in accordance with its CNE philosophy. Fourthly, in the political sphere government pushed through the Coloured Persons’

\textsuperscript{367} Interview with I. Abrahams, 22 June 2005.
\textsuperscript{368} \textit{The Educational Journal}, July-August 1967, pp.1, 2; April-May 1968, pp.1, 2, 6-10. See also \textit{The Educational Journal}, May 1965, pp.3, 4; October 1965, pp.1, 2.
\textsuperscript{369} Anti-Coloured Affairs Department, ‘To Those Who Are Calling for A Verwoerd Convention Or A Three-Day Strike’, Anti-CAD Open Letter, 8 May 1961. See Hommel, p.150-153; also Giyosi, p.11.
\textsuperscript{370} Lewis, p.271.
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid., p.273.
\textsuperscript{372} Ibid.
Representative Council Act resulting in the formation of the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council (CPRC) and the Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act of 1968, thus finally rendering the Cape ‘coloureds’ disenfranchised.\textsuperscript{373} Trying times befall the TLSA, and some members thrown into disarray by events opted to leave teaching. Aside from those who immigrated, Edgar Maurice, for instance, refused to manage Harold Cressy High under the CAD and resigned as principal of the school.\textsuperscript{374} Most League teachers however, heeding the call of the organisation, remained at their posts to continue their ideological work inside the classroom.\textsuperscript{375}

With the liberation movement browbeaten by the state’s crackdown\textsuperscript{376} and the TLSA organisationally incapacitated, many of the organisation’s members shifted their political activities to alternative structures within civil society where they had located themselves from the 1940s and ‘50s. These members’ attempts to advance the ideas of the TLSA and the Unity Movement, specifically the strategy of non-collaboration, will be explored in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{374} A. Wieder, \textit{Voices from Cape Town Classrooms: Oral Histories of Teachers Who Fought Apartheid}, Cape Town: Department of Education of the University of the Western Cape, 2003, p.45.
\textsuperscript{375} See for example \textit{The Educational Journal}, May 1965, p.2; July-August 1967, pp.1-3.
\textsuperscript{376} The regime had banned the ANC and PAC by the mid-1960s and uncovered most underground cells in the country. The resistance movement overall had been quelled by these repressive actions.
Chapter 2

The underground years: The impact of the Teachers’ League of South Africa on non-racial sport, the fellowships and the civic movement, 1950s – 1990s

Chernyshevsky says: ‘All the races have sprung from the same ancestors’ and with him we recognise individual differences, but also, and more important the basic physical and mental identity of human beings. Broad differences in human physiognomy there certainly are, but they are small and insignificant if compared with the finer differences of individuals due to the history and social position of each human; nor can these broad and relatively unimportant differences obscure the fundamental sameness of man and man, man and woman.¹

Seldom, if ever, before in our history was what teachers said and did, in the classroom and outside the classroom, so vitally or potentially important: because it is an epoch which is now being shaped, and teachers are – despite all the many bureaucratic, humiliating and vicious regulations and other restrictions - ideally placed to help in shaping it for democracy.²

By the 1950s, a non-racial and non-collaborationist outlook had gained ground in many Western Cape schools and communities reserved for the disenfranchised; a development prompted in the main by organised resistance to the raft of segregatory and later apartheid legislation. The presence of the Anti-CAD, Teachers’ League of South Africa (TLSA), Cape African Teachers’ Association (CATA), Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs), fellowships, and other affiliates of the Unity Movement (UM), such as SOYA (Western Cape) and the Cape Peninsula Students Union (CPSU),³ to mention a few initiatives, testified to the potential, if not pervasiveness, of non-collaboration in the region. Even the sharp differences between the NEUM and African National Congress (ANC), along with the restrictions placed on the Cape Teachers’ Federal Council (CTFC) affiliates CATA and TLSA, and the emergent differences in the Unity Movement on the language and land questions, albeit debilitating for the TLSA, added to and fuelled the political climate where debate and discussion formed

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¹ ‘Editorial Comment’, Lectures, Hazendal: Cape Flats Educational Fellowship, 1953. A central contention of the fellowships, as NEUM affiliates, was to dispel the notion of ‘race’ as a scientifically valid criterion for categorising people. The concept of non-racism flowed from this perspective: non-racism as the negation of ‘race’ and ‘racism’. The interconnection between non-collaboration and non-racism is central to this chapter.

² The Educational Journal, June 1964, p.3. The pivotal role of teachers in spreading the ideas of the League beyond the classroom is a central feature of this chapter.

³ The CPSU was an affiliate of the Society of Young Africa (SOYA), a youth structure of the NEUM.
an enriching feature of Cape Town’s political life. Political alignments and realignments in other parts of the country also affected the Western Cape, the launch of the ANC’s Freedom Charter (1955) and the formation of the breakaway Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959 being the most pronounced. These developments heightened political awareness, and, in turn, impacted schooling in the region, as numerous teachers were active in these initiatives.

School sport, the fellowships or cultural societies and the civic movement were key areas where TLSA activists became increasingly prominent after the organisation went underground in the early 1960s, following the Langa-Sharpeville upheavals, the subsequent state of emergency, and the banning of political organisations and leading cadres. This chapter sketches the influence of the boycott and non-collaboration in these crucial areas of civil society, from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s. Although the League was not overtly involved in these initiatives, its members were at the forefront of shaping the anti-establishment policies of these bodies. These teachers’ political work, specifically their non-collaborationist worldview, extended well beyond the classroom, in accordance with TLSA thinking.

**League teachers and the beginning of the non-racial sports movement**

The politics of the Teachers’ League of South Africa (TLSA) had by the end of the 1950s, to varying degrees, permeated key schools of the disenfranchised in the Western Cape: Trafalgar High, Livingstone High, Harold Cressy High, South Peninsula High and others, were the most notable. Its influence could be gauged in particular by the

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5 Interview with F. van der Horst, 8 December 2006.
6 The PAC-led anti-pass law demonstrations of 21 March 1960 in Sharpeville resulted in the killing of 69 people and the injuring of 180 others. In Langa in the Cape, as well, violence erupted at the police station with an undisclosed number of people killed and many others maimed and wounded when the police opened fire on the crowd. To stop the rebellion spreading the NP declared a state of emergency and mass meetings were prohibited. In April of that year, the ANC and PAC were banned and many political activists arrested and banned.
7 These would include Luckoff High, Athlone High and Alexander Sinton High amongst others.
boycott of the 1952 van Riebeeck festivities at these schools.\(^8\) It was not happenstance then that in this political environment, a counter-culture embedded in community sport would arise. As van der Horst a prominent non-racial sports activist recollected:

>This was the rich tradition where I came from. We stayed in Cape Town, interacted with the All African Convention, Society of Young Africa, lived in the milieu of the Anti-CAD and the TLSA in Cape Town, and were ideologically sustained by the All African Convention; it was virtually an interactive process all the time. And we got involved in debates and went to the New Era Fellowship every Saturday night, to go and engage in debate. To us who were new at the time, it was a tremendous learning experience ... they really provided a stimulating intellectual and political climate, it was really a mind-opening exercise ...\(^9\)

A product of this ferment was the formation in 1956 of an independent school sports organisation, the Western Province Senior Schools’ Sports Union (WPSSSU), pioneered mainly by TLSA teachers.\(^10\) The Western Province Primary Schools’ Sports Board (WPPSSB) was also established in 1956.\(^11\) Similarly, in the Transvaal and Eastern Cape, Reggie Feldman and Harry Hendricks, two prominent League figures, were instrumental in the formation of the Transvaal High School Sports Association (THSSA) and the Eastern Province Senior Schools’ Sports Union (EPSSSU) in 1959 and 1965 respectively.\(^12\) In Natal, too, similar events were underway. These developments culminated early on in the formation of the South African Senior

\(^8\) See Chapter 1, pp.49, 51; also The Educational Journal, April 1952, p.2; September 1988, p.5.
\(^9\) Interview with F. van der Horst, 8 December 2006.
\(^10\) Henry Hendricks, or better known as Harry Hendricks, of the TLSA was WPSSSU first president. Other TLSA members included Johnny de Bruyn, Richard Rive, Roland Palm and others (courtesy F. Cleophas, May 2009); Cleophas and Van Der Merwe, p.708.
\(^11\) According to Cecil Blows, a high school athlete at Trafalgar High in the mid-1950s, the first South African Athletics championships was held in Kimberley in 1954. The Western Province team, then, included the League teachers’ Harry Hendricks who was the designated manager, and the coach Richard Rive (C. Blows, A round table discussion with sports activists at Alexander Sinton High School, n.d. 2004; Interview with C. Blows, 13 June 2006). With the success of the event, Blows further elaborated, high schools and primary schools organised separately, resulting in the formation of the Western Province Senior Schools’ Sports Union (WPSSSU) in 1956, and the Western Province Primary Schools’ Sports Board (WPPSSB) (Ibid.). The WPSSSU founding high schools included Trafalgar High, Livingstone High, Harold Cressy High, South Peninsula High, Wittebome High, Luckoff High, Vasco High, Luckhoff High and the training schools Hewat Training College, Söhinge Training School, Battswood Secondary and Training School. Towards the end of 1956 Athlone High, Alexander Sinton High, Belgravia High, Gordon High and Kensington High joined WPSSSU. By 1966, the union had 33 high schools affiliated (Additional and corroborating information courtesy of F. Cleophas, May 2009).
Schools’ Sports Association (SASSSA) in March 1961, comprising units of the Western Province, Natal and Transvaal. The South African Primary Schools’ Sport Association (SAPSSA) was eventually also established in 1965, consisting of twelve affiliates. Once established, SASSSA and SAPSSA grew exponentially, with other provincial units joining soon after, attracted by the success of organised school sport. According to Archer and Bouillon, by the 1970s SAPSSA and SASSSA represented, conservatively, 200,000 schoolchildren throughout the country and because of their multi-code (sport) character, promoted inter-sport contact that guaranteed the survival of non-racial values.

In roughly a decade, the basis for an anti-establishment non-racial mass based school sports movement had been established nationally. The TLSA’s influence was tangible, as a key aspect of SASSSA embodied challenging racist policies in education, consistent with the TLSA and Cape African Teachers’ Association (CATA) mission, to

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14 N. Rathinsamy from the Transvaal was SASSSA’s first president with Feldman the secretary.
17 Multi-code meant there were many different sports affiliated or attached to SAPSSSA and SASSSA, such as athletics, soccer, rugby, netball and so forth.
capture the ‘minds’ of the youth.\textsuperscript{20} Not overtly political, given the repressive climate, the emergent sports movement adopted an implicit non-racial outlook and therewith rejected ‘racial’ categorisation.\textsuperscript{21} With the sport’s field an extension of the classroom,\textsuperscript{22} a key value inculcated was that:

Sport must not only be used for personal benefit but also be a means to demonstrate … interest in and concern for all South Africans, who all form part of one nation, and who are all entitled to fair, just and equal treatment and opportunities in the land of their birth.\textsuperscript{23}

By 1959, a more discernible political voice in sport emerged in the form of the South African Sports Association (SASA), followed by the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) in 1963. While SASA campaigned for equal non-racial representation in sport and initiated the call for the isolation of South African sport,\textsuperscript{24} it was SANROC with Dennis Brutus at the forefront, a former teacher and TLSA member, which profoundly unsettled white South African sport. SANROC’s central campaign encompassed isolating South African ‘white-only’ sport through an international boycott with the idea of having it expelled from the Olympic movement.\textsuperscript{25} It immediately drew the wrath of the state, and its leadership, facing banning orders, imprisonment and harassment, were forced into exile. In 1967, SANROC re-emerged in London. There it became the bane of South African establishment sport, as it quickly organised a strong anti-apartheid network in support of its objectives.\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{21} Interview with F. van der Horst, 8 December 2006.

\textsuperscript{22} According to Blows the TLSA’s influence in the sports movement was palpable in this period (Interview with C. Blows, 13 June 2006; see also Petersen, p.121).

\textsuperscript{23} Rathinsamy, Braam, Thompson and Sallie, p.10. The other core values in school sport were, respect for one’s opponents, modesty in victory, gained by fair means, and the acceptance of defeat (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{24} SASA called for the expulsion of the South African Olympic Committee because it was in contravention of the Olympic Charter, which banned racial discrimination in sport. This opened the way for the international isolation of South African sport and eventually its expulsion from the Olympic movement (Archer and Bouillon, p.191).

\textsuperscript{25} Archer and Bouillon, p.192.

\textsuperscript{26} Brutus was the chairperson of SANROC. Other members included Samba Ramsamy, Chris De Broglio and John Collins and several South African expatriates.
By 1970, after an extended battle with the international sporting community, SANROC succeeded in having South Africa expelled from the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Thereafter, the boycott of apartheid sport gathered immense worldwide support, headed by SANROC and later, from 17 March 1973, its internal wing, the South African Council on Sport (SACOS).

The emergence of the South African Council on Sport (SACOS) and the sports moratorium

The formation of SACOS came after a decade of political lull, following the major liberation organisations having been banned or forced underground to evade detection by the security forces. Filling the political void, it adopted a non-aligned identity, catering for activists from across organisations in the liberation movement. Fulfilling a unifying role, SACOS became known as the sporting wing of the liberation movement. As Feldman, a high profile sports administrator asserted: “SACOS has always been a people’s organisation. That was our strength. That’s why I emphasise, we were a struggle organisation, we were not just an ordinary sports organisation”.  

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28 Significantly, the boycott was not isolated to the Olympic sports, and it proved even more damaging for South Africa’s traditional sporting competitions of rugby and cricket. Two events stood out in the late 1960s, the postponement of the 1967 All Black tour of South Africa and the Basil d’Oliveira affair of 1968, when the apartheid regime disallowed d’Oliveira, a former South African cricketer of colour, to tour South Africa with the England cricket team. Overseas, the 1969 Springbok tour of the British Isles proved a disaster with the South African team facing continuous public ridicule and mass demonstrations. In 1971, similar protests disrupted the Springbok tour of Australia. See also J. Naughton, ‘No Normal Sport In An Abnormal Society’: Apartheid, The Rise of Non-Racial Sport and International Boycott Movements 1958-1990, in Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa, London: Leicester University Press, 1997, p.138.
29 SACOS gained recognition from and became an associate member of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, the United Nations Committee Against Apartheid and the Federation Sportive & Gymnique Du Travail. SACOS thus became the sole representative for non-racial sport in South Africa. Interestingly, while SACOS officials were refused passports and travel visas, the support they received internationally, due to the boycott, ensured them relative security from government repression (Archer and Bouillon, p.232).
31 Ibid.
As with the formation of organised schools sport, TLSA members were central to the formation of SACOS.\textsuperscript{33} Affirming their contribution in shaping SACOS policy, a leading sports official and political activist had this to say:

People always queried: ‘Why was it that Western Province became so powerful in sport?’ Or, ‘why was it that this [the Western Cape] became the heart of SACOS in fact?’ It was because of the influence of the Western Province Senior Schools’ Sports Union, because of the influence of the Teachers’ League, the teachers in the Western Province. And, no matter how many, how much, people would like to deny it, that was the fact of the situation. Because the Teachers’ League was very much a powerful force, still within the schools, even though people might not even have been members of the Teachers’ League. The fact of the matter was that they were very much a part of the ethos and the development of that ethos.\textsuperscript{34}

As education and politics were indivisible for the League, so sport and politics were inseparable for those in SACOS, and they were well aware that sport on its own could not eradicate apartheid, and that focusing on sport \textit{per se} meant catering for a select group only, not the majority of people.\textsuperscript{35} In fact, apartheid policies in themselves, by ‘racially’ separating people, politicised sport. This factor was the chief reason why South Africa was isolated internationally in the first place. And, it was this political reality that enabled SACOS and SANROC to sustain the call for a moratorium on all tours to and from South Africa, and for the boycott of all official government institutions to be upheld until all apartheid statutes were removed.\textsuperscript{36} The outcome of their campaign was the adoption of the Commonwealth Glen Eagles Agreement of 1977, debarring South African and international sports people competing with each other.\textsuperscript{37} The Dutch slogan: ‘Speel Niet Met Apartheid [Do Not Play With Apartheid]’\textsuperscript{38} epitomised international support for SACOS and SANROC’s campaign to isolate South African sport.\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[33] Interview with F. van der Horst, 8 December 2006. SASSA affiliated to SACOS in 1977 and SAPSSA in 1978. At its peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s, SACOS membership totalled two million nation-wide and composed twenty-six nationally representative sporting affiliates (van der Horst, p.26).
\item[34] Interview with P. Meyer, 3 February 2005.
\item[35] Archer and Bouillon, p.313.
\item[36] Ibid., p.50.
\item[38] A sticker circulated in non-racial sports ranks.
\end{footnotes}
Multinational Sport and the Double Standards Resolution (DSR): from apartheid to apartheid-capitalism

In an attempt to break the sports boycott, the National Party introduced its multinational policy, or what it termed ‘normal sport’, in 1970. This it extended to local school and club level in 1976, in an effort to show the world its commitment to change. To regulate this process, however, the government introduced a permit system to make sports facilities accessible to the disenfranchised, most of which were located in areas demarcated ‘white’. SACOS rejected this concession, and demanded all amenities and facilities be open to all citizens. WPSSSU and a few other codes, for example, declared bluntly that they ‘refuse to humiliate and degrade themselves’ by applying for a “racial permit to use a venue like the Green Point Stadium that is situated in a so-called ‘white’ group area”. SACOS received huge support for its position, and communities went as far as building their own facilities rather than request permission to use segregated ones. Where no feasible alternative existed, however, affiliates used segregated facilities under protest.

For SACOS, the government’s multinational policy was but a ruse, ‘a repackaging of all the sports policies that had gone before’ in order to retain the fundamentals of apartheid: that South Africa comprised many nations that must play sport separately. It also saw the underlying dangers of the new policy, namely, to lure what it termed

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40 The new minister of sport Piet Koornhof introduced a reformed multi-racial sports policy in the early 1970s to enable sport competition at national level and later at club level under the ‘permit system’.
42 South African Council on Sport, SACOS Third Biennial Conference, Cape Town, 1979, p.36. What appeared an anomaly was the WPSSSU use of the Green Point track for its athletics events, which at the time was covered by a blanked permit given to the South African Rugby Union (SARU) affiliate the Western Province Rugby Union (WPRU). As ‘The Track’, as it was called, was the traditional home of the WPSSSU from the late 1950s, the union continued using it when the permit system was introduced in 1970, as all available venues were segregated or required a permit. As Blows put it, it was a matter of ‘adapt and stay alive’. From the early 1970s, the Athlone stadium became the preferred venue even though it was designated for ‘coloureds’ only (telephonic discussion with C. Blows, 28 July 2009).
43 The infamous Dan Queque Stadium inaugurated in 1975 in the Eastern Cape was one such example. Also, interview with Frank van der Horst, 8 December 2006; Petersen, pp.127, 128.
44 Goodall, p.45.
‘black collaborators’ to participate in multinational sport in ‘white’ group areas in order to give legitimacy to separatist sport, and in this way make a case for breaking the sports boycott. Throwing its weight behind non-racial sport, the League attacked the Coloured Affairs Department’s (CAD) for enforcing the prohibition of mixed sport in schools. It also condemned the ‘racially’ motivated 1972 rugby tour of Europe, and asserted: “few sporting events have shown such scant regard for dignity and humanity as the ‘Federation’ rugby tour of England and Holland by ‘Coloured’ performers”. To nullify the threat multinationalism posed to non-racial sport, SACOS responded with its Double Standards Resolution (DSR).

Formulated in 1977 in the aftermath of the 1976 student uprisings, a watershed moment in South African history of resistance, which ended the relative political lull of the 1960s, the DSR barred non-racial sports persons from playing multinational sport. This policy immediately opened a more uncompromising phase in the non-racial sports movement’s quest to deracialise South African sport. Resonating in particular with the vociferous SACOS constituency in the Western Cape, a region immersed in the tradition of non-collaboration, the DSR was viewed as largely the product of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the Unity Movement’s non-collaborationist influence in the sports movement. The Resolution drew clear lines between establishment multinational sport and non-racial sport in order to clarify confusion, where, according to SACOS, “many black sportspersons were fooled into believing that their struggle for non-racial sport had finally borne fruit … lured by offers of better facilities and sponsorship … [whilst] the conditions in the ghettos of the oppressed worsened”. Proponents of the DSR were unequivocal in their position on the non-participation or association of people committed to non-racial sport with sport that

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47 South African Council on Sport, SACOS Third Biennial Conference, Cape Town, 1979, p.54.
51 Roberts, p.44; Booth, p.483.
52 Booth, p.483.
practised, perpetuated or condoned ‘racialism’ or multi-nationalism.\textsuperscript{54} The TLSA’s support in the late 1970s for the DSR, was clear:

Multi-racialism, and multi-nationalism and all the other tricks inspired by the enemies of true progress must be dismissed with the loathing they deserve. There is no reason why we should be prepared to accept anything less than the only honourable basis for sports relationships between human beings. We must proclaim and emphasise our complete lack of interest in ‘gradually accustoming’ the citizens to change, in ‘working from within’ racial bodies, and all the other excuses of those who sell out, and treat them with contempt.\textsuperscript{55}

In keeping with this outlook, and within the heightened oppositional context that followed closely on the heels of 1976, when a range of organisations had been banned,\textsuperscript{56} SACOS coined its rallying slogan ‘No Normal Sport In An Abnormal Society’, condensing into one phrase its refusal to restrict its actions narrowly to the interests of SACOS members.\textsuperscript{57} Instead, it proclaimed the willingness of non-racial sports people to represent the silent majority of black South Africans, those whose living conditions rendered them unable to play sport.\textsuperscript{58}

Connecting its agenda to the organised workers – trade union - movement, SACOS, via mainly SASSSA in 1980, mobilised its constituency in solidarity with the burgeoning labour movement,\textsuperscript{59} and came out in support of the striking Red Meat and Wilson Rowntree workers’ by calling for a boycott of these products. Simba chips had experienced the same treatment the year before.\textsuperscript{60} Williams affirmed the centrality of SASSA to the campaign: “If you take the Red meat boycott, you take the Simba boycott, and all the other boycotts that were about,”\textsuperscript{61} it was initiated at senior schools,

\textsuperscript{54} Transvaal Council on Sport, \textit{Are You Practising Double Standards?} Transvaal Council on Sport, 14 September 1977; Roberts, p.27.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{The Educational Journal}, October-November 1977, p.7.
\textsuperscript{56} The Black Consciousness movement was banned in 1977, along with a range of affiliated organisations and persons in the liberation movement.
\textsuperscript{57} Archer and Bouillon, p.312.
\textsuperscript{58} See also South African Council on Sport, ‘Addendum to the minutes of the SACOS General Meeting’, September 12-13, 1981; Archer and Bouillon, p.312.
\textsuperscript{59} Derek Naidoo delivered the paper ‘Sport and the Worker’, \textit{SACOS-Sport and Liberation Conference}, 20-21 August 1983 (see \textit{Eastern Province Herald}, ‘Sport seen as tool against worker unity’, 24 August 1983).
\textsuperscript{60} Simba chips subsidised the South African Grand Prix to the sum of R110 000 and only offered SASSSA two boxes of chips for a cricket tournament. This offer affronted the non-racial sports movement and triggered the boycott of Simba chips (South African Council on Sport, \textit{SACOS Third Biennial Conference}, Cape Town, 1979, p.65).
\textsuperscript{61} There were also the 1980 bus and schools boycotts.
or school level, where those products were sold in abundance and then carried into the home”.

Actions of this nature, and the fact that SACOS only accepted funding from companies which supported non-racial sport, demonstrated its radical if not leftist orientation. These factors, when translated in financial terms, however, meant limited sponsorship for the sports movement, which in turn placed immense constraints on its activities, most of which were undertaken on extremely tight and at times inadequate budgets.

Undeterred, SACOS pushed ahead with its principled agenda and intensified its politics. Amending the DSR in 1979, to include the isolation of persons serving on ‘racial’ organisations, most notably the Coloured Representative Council, Bantu Boards, Indian Councils, Local Management Boards and similar bodies, SACOS branded those participating in these structures ‘collaborators and opportunists’, in the same way as the CAC and NRCs in the early 1940s were denigrated by the NEUM as ‘puppet’ organisations – bodies that had no real power and were simply the cat’s paw of government. Because of its more radical stance, Norman Middleton, the SACOS president, was forced to resign owing to his membership of the Coloured Representative Council (CRC). The Cape Teachers’ Professional Association (CTPA) leadership, who were seen to endorse ‘racially’ separated bodies, were also singled out by SACOS as ‘quislings’. Accusations that teachers advancing SACOS politics fell foul of their own principles by occupying posts in ‘racially’ separatist education departments, received a curt response:

We said no, no that’s different. When I work for a boss, the boss pays me, I don’t have to follow the boss’s dictates .... I work as an independent person. When I go away, I’m not him, I stand my own political ground and for my own non-racial viewpoint. The same with a teacher: here you are working for a boss, but you don’t support and believe in the boss.

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62 Interview with I. Williams, 23 September 2005.
63 Goodall, p.46.
64 Roberts, p.28; The Cape Times, ‘SACOS condemns “whitewash”’, 22 August 1983. See also papers delivered at SACOS conferences: I. Rensburg, Dummy Councils, 11-12 September 1982; D. Zinn, the President’s Council Proposals, 11-12 September 1982; A.E. Fortuin Homelands Policy and Non-Racial Sport, 11-12 September 1982.
66 Petersen, p.126.
67 Interview with F. van der Horst, 8 December 2006.
This oppositional discourse and practice gave sustenance to non-collaboration, radicalising the non-racial sports movement, thereby purging it of elements aspiring to be or linked to establishment sport or government. The DSR practice spread from 1979, infusing areas of social activity where the permit system applied. Members in the non-racial fold were thus forbidden from sending their children to private white schools, visiting international hotels, slated for joining and forming clubs at universities promoting multinational sport, while those working within organs of the regime, such as the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) or advocates of big capital – particularly the Urban Foundation, were heavily criticised. The non-racial sports movement no longer placed opposition to apartheid at the centre of its campaign but racial capitalism. This emphasis on ‘class’ became an intricate part of SACOS’ policy from the early 1980s when the organisation engaged the government’s multi-faceted reformist programme, its ‘total strategy’.

The NP’s reforms constituted two central planks. The one sought to offset the rising concerns of big capital in its push to meet the needs of modern capitalism, through privatisation and deregulation, the other aimed to thwart the rising expectations of the

68 The formation of the South African Tertiary Institutions Sports Association (SATISA) in 1985 created an alternative sporting structure at universities, such as the University of the Western Cape. See also South African Council on Sport, ‘The Role of the Non-Racial Sports Person in the Liberatory Struggle’, in SACOS-Sport and Liberation Conference, 20-21 August 1983, p.5.


74 Davies, ‘Capital, State and Educational Reform in South Africa’; P. Kallaway, ‘Privatisation as an aspect of the educational politics of the new right: critical signposts for understanding shifts in educational policy.
liberation movement and its allies inside and outside the country. The strategy embodied essentially a ‘carrot and stick’ approach, using repressive measures to quell unrest internally, particularly after the 1976 and 1980 school unrests, and co-option to win over sections of the disenfranchised - the aspirant black middle class – who stood to benefit economically from the reforms. In education, business requests for the government to liberalise schooling was met with the NP granting white private schools permission to admit a select few black students. By 1986, this had changed significantly, to the degree that private schools could open their doors to all ‘races’ and receive financial support from the state.

The opening of private schools to black students was not viewed favourably by SACOS. Rather, it saw the move as a ploy to give credence to the government’s multi-racial / multi-national policies. The private Diocesan College (Bishops) 1982 rugby tour to Hong Kong and Taiwan confirmed for SACOS the government’s intention to use ‘mixed’ sport in private schools to break international isolation. The sports organisation consequently decried parents who sent their children to these schools and declared them irresponsible ‘middle class types’ who had been taken in by the false concessions offered to them at the expense of the vast majority of the poor who were


This expectation was fuelled by the growth of the independent black trade unions from the early 1970s, the Soweto uprisings of 1976, the school and consumer boycotts of 1980, the liberation of Southern Africa, most notably, the Portuguese African empire, the independence of Zimbabwe and other political developments. See N. Alexander, ‘Education and Social Change’, in Sow The Wind, Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1987, pp.84, 85.


See Davies. Also, Kallaway, ‘Privatisation as an aspect of the educational politics of the new right: critical signposts for understanding shifts in educational policy in South Africa during the eighties’.

Davies, pp.363, 364.

Government’s Financial Relations Amendment Bill of 1981, approved attendance by black students of private white schools provided a school maintained its ‘white character’ so as not to be in violation of the group area – in terms of the Group Areas Act - in which it was located. From 1986, private schools were opened to all ‘races’ without government intervention, while at the same time receiving financial assistance from the state (see P. Kallaway, ‘Privatisation and the Educational Policies of the New Right’, in G. Moss and I. Obery, South African Review 5, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989, pp.156, 157; Kallaway, ‘Privatisation as an aspect of the educational politics of the new right: critical signposts for understanding shifts in educational policy in South Africa during the eighties’, p.521).

denied basic human rights.\textsuperscript{81} In circles outside of non-racial sport, Randall similarly contended that private schooling was intricately tied to the system of institutional inequality.\textsuperscript{82} He noted that from the late 1970s, these liberal schools helped expand the power base of the middle class through broadening admission policies to blacks.\textsuperscript{83} SACOS, through the DSR, would debar this ‘comprador’ constituency from its ranks. As Peter Meyer explained:

> It [the DSR] was mainly directed in fact at middle class parents ... because of the fact that they have a greater means [at their disposal] rather than at working class people. It was never directed at working class people, because working class people in any case would not have been able, for example, to send their children to [these schools].\textsuperscript{84}

Those parents who sent their children to private schools SACOS dubbed ‘collaborators and lackeys’ of the ruling class, who created the impression South Africa was an ‘open’ society, whilst condoning policies of divide and rule that perpetuated racism.\textsuperscript{85}

Snubbing the private schools proved relatively straightforward for SACOS; penetrating the African townships was another matter. In this mission, SASSSA’s attempts at organising African schools were continually foiled,\textsuperscript{86} and it struggled to bypass the Department of Education and Training (DET) separatist policies, especially its prohibition on mixed inter-school competitions.\textsuperscript{87} As the majority of SACOS affiliates refused to comply with the permit system, they remained hamstrung by the legislation. This eventuated in SACOS being labelled a predominantly ‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’

\textsuperscript{81} South African Council on Sport, ‘Students at ‘White’ Schools Under Racial Permit’, pp.2-4.
\textsuperscript{84} Interview with P. Meyer, 3 February 2006.
\textsuperscript{85} South African Council on Sport, ‘Students at ‘White’ Schools Under Racial Permit’, p.4.
\textsuperscript{86} According to Blows, attempts were made to include athletes from schools in Gugulethu in the inter-schools’ athletics’ events, and have them compete under the auspices of a club to pre-empt DET interference. This however failed when on one occasion the police turned the buses transporting the athletes to the event back (Interview, 13 June 2006). The author remembers the participation of Gugulethu athletes (wearing powder blue gear) in the WPSSSU Champion of Champions athletics event at Athlone Stadium in the 1980s. Similar attempts at organising African township sport were undertaken in other parts of the country. These met with measurable success (Interview with F. van der Horst, 12 December 2006). One such success was at Paballelo High in the Northern Cape where, according to a report, SASSSA made significant inroads (see Eraser, ‘Non-Racial Sport In Paballelo’, \textit{eraser}, No.2, September 1989, p.36).
The race-class tensions embedded in the DSR were clear indicators that the policy was a two-edged sword, on the one hand, it kept out comprador or collaborationist elements, but on the other, it hindered the organising of non-racial sport. This dual feature of the DSR would eventually become SACOS’ Achilles heel.

A changing political landscape: The Double Standards Resolution challenged

The shifting political environment, within which the TLSA operated in the 1980s, was to prove central to shaping the nature of its politics in the 1990s. Hereafter follows a brief summary of the Western Cape’s changing political landscape during the decade after 1976.

Swept along by the state’s strategy of reform and repression, the resistance movement crossed a major threshold at the start of the 1980s when a plethora of political formations cutting across ideological persuasions crystallised in the Western Cape. While certain organisations emerged spontaneously after the 1976 revolts, others arose in response to the government’s Wiehahn and Riekert commissions, and the constitutional ‘New Deal’. The latter reform sought to accommodate the ‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’ sections of the disenfranchised in a tri-cameral arrangement, whilst the former was set up to regulate and control the expanding black working class. On the educational front, the 1976 and 1980 student uprisings shored up a politically diverse range of youth organisations in the townships. The trade union movement, rooted as it was in the worker uprisings of the early 1970s, and which by the 1980s was directed

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90 The Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions’ reforms of 1979 granted statutory recognition to trade unions for African workers’ whereas the latter sanctioned the settlement of urban Africans.
91 The new constitution extended the franchise in a tri-cameral parliament to the ‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’ populations but not ‘Africans’. This qualified franchise the TLSA rejected (The Educational Journal, September 1984, p.16).
mainly through the BC-aligned Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA),\(^{93}\) and the independent Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU),\(^{94}\) re-IGNITED workers’ struggles. These events led in a short period to the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)\(^ {95}\) in 1985, the National Council of Trade Unions’ (NACTU) of 1986,\(^ {96}\) and a spread of independent trade unions. The launch of the socialist leaning National Forum (NF)\(^ {97}\) and New Unity Movement (NUM)\(^ {98}\) in 1983 and 1985 respectively, the African Nationalist Congress (ANC)-oriented United Democratic Front (UDF)\(^ {99}\) in 1983, and later the Mass Democratic Movement MDM in 1988, completed in broad strokes the liberation movement’s political make-up in the Western Cape by the late 1980s.

Although the above organisations collectively opposed the apartheid regime, ideological tensions marked their political relations. Differences between socialist groupings such as the TLSA-NUM and the larger more popular UDF and MDM formations were sometimes sharp, in particular after the 1985 student uprisings,\(^ {100}\) from

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\(^ {93}\) CUSA was formed in 1979 and had as one of its largest affiliates the National Union of Mineworkers’ (NUM). NUM’s affiliation in 1985 to COSATU was a great loss to CUSA.

\(^ {94}\) FOSATU at the end of 1984 had a membership of 118,950 with 8 mostly industrial unions affiliated to it.

\(^ {95}\) The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was established in November 1985, and constituted 34 unions with 450,000 paid-up members and 565,000 signed-up members. One of the largest union’s in Africa the National Union of Mineworkers’ (NUM) made up the federation’s core membership with Elijah Barayi of NUM its first president. COSATU initially launched itself as an independent union but in July 1986 adopted the Freedom Charter therewith indicating its political allegiance.

\(^ {96}\) COSATU’s nearest rival was NACTU and was formed in October 1986 through the merger of CUSA and AZACTU (Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions). It claimed a membership of 450,000 signed-up members. NACTU subscribed to the Black Consciousness Movement not the Congress movement.

\(^ {97}\) The National Forum (NF) was launched 11-12 June 1983 in Hammanskraal to oppose the ‘New Deal’. It comprised the Black Conscious orientated AZAPO (Azanian People’s Organisation) and the socialist inclined Cape Action League (CAL). The unifying document of the NF was the Manifesto of the Azanian People.

\(^ {98}\) The New Unity Movement (NUM) was launched in April 1985 in Cape Town. The NUM, like the NEUM, committed itself to the Ten-Point-Programme and the policy of non-collaboration. The TLSA aligned itself with the NUM, and R.O. Dudley a former deputy head at Livingstone High school and a prominent TLSA member became its first president.

\(^ {99}\) The United Democratic Front (UDF) was also established to oppose the new constitutional dispensation and was launched in Mitchells Plain Cape Town on 20 August 1983 as a broad front of autonomous organisations.

which the UDF gained much mileage. By 1985-86, for example, the latter had established a firm foothold amongst the youth, whose militant actions included the contentious slogans of ‘liberation before education’ and calls to render the townships ‘ungovernable’. In exile and consistent with its history, however, the ANC made clear its intent to negotiate. The politics of this period is examined in the next chapter, suffice it to say that the unbanning of the organisations of the liberation movement and the release of Mandela in 1990, set the scene for negotiations between the NP and ANC, elevating the latter to the pre-eminent position within the liberation movement. With increasing visibility and international support, the ANC by the late 1980s and early 1990s experienced an unprecedented growth of membership. Caught in the maelstrom of African Nationalism countrywide, the Western Cape, the once traditional locale of left-wing politics, in particular of the Unity Movement, had its politics eclipsed by that of the Congress movement. These fluid political and ideological dynamics would seriously impact the TLSA and the non-racial sports movement.

Notwithstanding, or more because of SACOS’ non-alignment, the organisation found itself mired in the political tensions of the liberation movement, as it housed members from a cross-section of political formations. What specifically caused these tensions and what were its repercussions for SACOS? In terms of the first part of the question, sharp political differences surfaced within the non-racial sports movement by 1988, reaching a climax in 1990, around the boycott, DSR and non-alignment. At the one end, a vocal group within SACOS adhered firmly to the DSR, at the other, MDM (UDF, COSATU) members argued forcefully that the boycott of establishment facilities was stunting development in the sports organisation. Indeed, while people

102 Negotiations had been secretively underway from the mid 1980s. This will be elaborated in the next section of the thesis ‘Engaging the politics of reform’.
working in government institutions were branded ‘stooges’ by SACOS, the UDF declared that it wanted to ‘win them over’. Regarding state institutions, the trade unionist Alec Erwin, delivering a paper at the SACOS second M.N. Pather Memorial Lecture in December 1987, provocatively argued that the organisation needed to become mass-based. For him, the use of multinational facilities was not the issue any longer, but rather and more pertinently, ‘how’ and not ‘where’ non-racial sport should be organised. Usurping establishment institutions, not the boycott of them, would be far more effective, he suggested. Roberts, and others, thereafter unleashed a scathing attack on SACOS, accusing it of being inflexible, sectarian and confined to a small leadership of predominantly ‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’ members who resided mostly in the Western and Eastern Cape. They, moreover, declared SACOS policies dated, narrow, undemocratic and out of touch with developments in the workers’ movement. The DSR was NUM inspired, tantamount to ‘ultra-leftism’ and not in synchrony with the broad mass democratic movement, they added. As the MDM was at the forefront of the liberation movement, and given the fact that the bulk of SACOS sports people belonged to it, they argued, SACOS should align itself with this

105 Booth, p.488.
113 Carrim, ‘SACOS: Towards Player Control’? pp.40-42; see Goodall, p.82.
tendency.\textsuperscript{114} By 1988, these critical voices coalesced within SACOS to form the NSC,\textsuperscript{115} to, as they stated, ‘organise the unorganised’.\textsuperscript{116}

Holding to its non-aligned position of ‘a broad coalition of pro-non-racial forces’,\textsuperscript{117} SACOS received the support of political organisations outside of the Congress movement,\textsuperscript{118} particularly the NUM\textsuperscript{119} and TLSA.\textsuperscript{120} Forming loosely a united front, the pro-SACOS lobby opposed what they saw as a looming ‘sell-out’ in non-racial sport, fomented by the NSC. For the pro-SACOS organisations,\textsuperscript{121} specifically the TLSA-NUM,\textsuperscript{122} the drive for unity with multinational sport was at the heart of the NSC’s formation. The NSC’s agenda within SACOS added up to nothing but ‘divisive white-anting’ the TLSA said,\textsuperscript{123} and for the NUM, ‘Trojan horse’ tactics.\textsuperscript{124} Orchestrating unity in sport, for both organisations, had as its main intent to strengthen the hand of the ANC in negotiations.\textsuperscript{125} Notwithstanding this growing dissension in its ranks, SACOS maintained that conditions had not altered within the country to merit a

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{114} See Carrim, ‘SACOS: Towards Player Control’?
\textsuperscript{115} National Sports Congress, \textit{NSC News}, National Sports Congress Western Cape Newsletter, March 1990. SACOS position on negotiations seemed ambivalent, since left organisations such as the NUM, which opposed negotiations, supported SACOS. This alignment gave clout to the NSC statement.
\textsuperscript{116} National Sports Congress, \textit{NSC News}, National Sports Congress Western Cape Newsletter, July 1990. SACOS maintained that non-alignment was a foregone conclusion – a pre-requisite of the IOC and not negotiable. South African Council on Sport, \textit{SACOS: Western Cape 18\textsuperscript{th} Annual General Meeting}, 20\textsuperscript{th} October 1991, p.15.
\textsuperscript{117} A.E. Fortuin, \textit{SACOS and the NSC}, 1989, p.4. SACOS maintained that non-alignment was a foregone conclusion – a pre-requisite of the IOC and not negotiable. South African Council on Sport, \textit{SACOS: Western Cape 18\textsuperscript{th} Annual General Meeting}, 20\textsuperscript{th} October 1991, p.15.
\textsuperscript{120} See for example \textit{The Educational Journal}, March 1988, pp.9, 10; September 1990, pp.12, 13; December 1990, pp.6, 7; April-May 1991, pp.13, 14.
\textsuperscript{121} SACOS had the support of the socialist oriented organisations such as the NF, NUM, Cape Action League (CAL) (later to become WOSA), AZAPO and NACTU.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{The Educational Journal}, December 1990, p.7.
\textsuperscript{124} New Unity Movement, \textit{Bulletin}, March 1990. Initially, the NSC had intimated its intent to further SACOS sport in the townships. However, by the end of 1989 it had been summarily expelled and declared a rival organisation. For SACOS, the NSC’s intention was seditious: to win over members, establish an oppositional organisation and negotiate unity with multinational sport.
\end{footnotesize}
change of strategy, a perspective that resonated with the League and like-minded organisations. The second part of the question, posed above, is now pertinent, notably: ‘what were the repercussions of these tensions for SACOS?’

The demise of the Double Standards Resolution

With negotiations for a political settlement underway, and a divided non-racial sports movement evident, establishment sport saw the possibility for international readmission through forging unity with its erstwhile foe, and made overtures to the NSC, heralding it the new representatives of non-racial sport. The political climate favoured this conciliatory move, for although negotiations did not translate into fundamental change for the disenfranchised, it had altered perceptions and attitudes of people in the country. In fact, it signalled a victory for their struggles and actually raised expectations. The NP’s repealing of the Population Registration Act in 1990 and the Group Areas Act in 1991, as well as the ANC’s suspension of the armed struggle affirmed these perceptions.

Political events were to rapidly overtake SACOS, as the unfolding reforms spurred the international community to review its moratorium. The fact that unity in sport was yet to be achieved and apartheid remained intact, were no longer key criteria for isolating South African sport for international mediators such as the Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa (ANOCA). Moreover, and importantly, the National Olympic Sports Council (NOSC) (the former NSC) had aligned itself to the ANC, and was seeking unity with establishment sport; whilst SANROC’s representative, Sam

126 Not all of SACOS agreed with this perspective, and the Western Province Council on Sport (WEPCOS) executive stood down, as it believed one school of thought was dominant in the region (Western Province Council on Sport, SACOS Western Cape Region: 18th Annual General Meeting, 20 October 1991, pp.17, 18).
130 Goodall, p.84. The media also played a large role in deepening these perceptions.
Ramsamy, who had switched allegiance to the NSC by the late 1980s,\textsuperscript{132} was promoting unity in sport.\textsuperscript{133} Business, too, was playing an instrumental role in facilitating unity.

The coincidence of the above factors clearly indicated to the international community that the intent to unify sport was assured, and in accord with talks to end apartheid. These developments rendered the sports boycott, for them, \textit{passé}.\textsuperscript{134} SACOS disagreed, and it attempted to stave off South Africa’s readmission to international sport, based on what it called the need for ‘principled unity’\textsuperscript{135} and \textit{de facto} unity in sport. SACOS’ objections, however, were rendered obsolete when the IOC declared South Africa eligible to participate in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics.\textsuperscript{136} By then, according to Booth, most international federations declared the boycott had worked and sport had triumphed over racism.\textsuperscript{137}

Unity proceeded on various fronts, and by 1993 near one hundred South African sports codes enjoyed international recognition.\textsuperscript{138} SACOS, along with the League and NUM, branded this unity ‘a sham’.\textsuperscript{139} By then, however, most of the sports’ bodies had rewritten their constitutions after making promises to assist disadvantaged sportspeople.\textsuperscript{140} At school-sport level, the nursery of SACOS, and where League teachers’ strength resided, unity too was secured, with senior schools’ holding its last athletics event in 1994.\textsuperscript{141} The United Schools Sports’ Association of South Africa

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Goodall} Goodall, p.84.
\bibitem{Ganga} This perspective, Jean-Claude Ganga president of ANOCA made abundantly clear in his categorical message to SACOS, when he stated: ‘the train is leaving the station and you will either be on it ... or you will be left behind’ \textit{(The Educational Journal}, April-May 1991, p.13).
\bibitem{SACOS} See Goodall, p.88. SACOS’ stance on principled unity was premised on the notion of principles such as total equality, merit selection, democracy and accountability. Only once all the vestiges of apartheid had been removed could unification proceed, it argued.
\bibitem{PE} \textit{People’s Express}, February 26, 1992. South Africa also hosted the Australian and New Zealand rugby teams in 1992.
\bibitem{Booth} Booth, p.491.
\bibitem{Ibid} Ibid., p.75.
\bibitem{Booth1} Booth, p.492.
\bibitem{Muslim} \textit{Muslim Views}, ‘Mass-based schools sport on its knees’, March 1999.
\end{thebibliography}
(USSASA), the successor to SASSSA and SAPSSA, abandoned the DSR and the multi-code mass-based participation of its predecessors, replacing it with the single-code approach of organising sport. Voluntary school sport under SACOS had ended, leaving many SACOS sports people disgruntled and later embittered. The voice of a former sports teacher and administrator is worth noting:

Unfortunately, they chose to go the way the whites had organised, and that seriously disadvantaged black kids, in that money was an issue. It was left to the schools; you have a township school, a township school can’t pay so you pull the kid [remove the child from participating] ... the people who had the power in USASSA were blacks who had sold out ... [we] nationalised the school ethic, [visiting athletes from other provinces stayed with families in the community]. When USASSA took over, kids were put into hotels ... the USSASA contingent were usually just white kids.

Clearly, for this teacher, unity in school sport did not bring significant change. With the non-racial sports movement having forfeited the boycott - the main political instrument for exerting pressure - transformation could no longer be enforced. Consequently, conflict in sport, as in education, would remain unresolved well beyond the inauguration of the new South Africa and sports unity.

While from the 1950s the efforts of non-racial sports activities played a significant role in sustaining the TLSA’s politics of non-collaboration, so, too, were the Unity Movement’s fellowships and cultural societies central to the honing of non-collaboration as a means of resisting the ‘race’ and class manifestations of apartheid.

The fellowships and cultural societies
To be tracked from hereon is the role embarked upon by the fellowships and the cultural societies in sustaining the TLSA’s non-collaborationist ideas and practices in the public domain from the 1950s to the 1980s. A strategic decentralising and expansive initiative on the part of the UM, soon after the rise to power of the National

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142 Petersen, p.131. School athletics, for example, no longer had entire schools supporting its events. Instead, schools sent only a handful of athletes to compete at inter-schools’ athletics meetings.
143 All costs for the year were subsidised from the income of the inter-schools’ athletics events at the start of the year, in which virtually every school participated. Students therefore did not have to pay to compete locally or inter-provincially.
144 Interview with A. Liebenberg, 14 January 2006.
145 Booth, p.492. See Archer and Bouillon, p.231.
Party, the fellowships had, as their primary intention, to advance the central rationale of the New Era Fellowship (NEF). This centred on raising the political consciousness of people, and providing the space for the training of cadres in order to prepare them for eventual leadership in the Movement. The early forerunners were the Athlone-based Cape Flats Education Fellowship (CAFEF) and the Southern Suburbs South Peninsula Education Fellowship (SPEF), formed in 1951 and 1954 respectively. Fellowships were also established in Claremont, Wynberg, Langa, Kuils-River, Paarl, the Strand, amongst other places nationally, with mostly the same aim. These forums, embedded as they were in the sprawling communities of the Western Cape, co-existed fraternally in a harsh apartheid environment where they sought to provide political sustenance for the resistance movement. TLSA teachers were central to the fellowships, and although this professional stratum has been criticised for their bourgeois conservatism, they contributed significantly to sustaining the ideology of the UM inside and outside the schools of the disenfranchised. As with the schools, the fellowships became arenas where pupils and teachers were politicised; where they learnt the political practice of naming and isolating ‘quislings’ and ‘collaborators’, developed their ‘intellectual horizons’ and where they could acquire knowledge that had a social purpose and was not solely academic. A knowledge, which Abrahams of the TLSA tersely termed: ‘the knowledge of the public platform’, ‘the knowledge of the political struggle’. CAFEF lectures, to make the point, covered a range of topics that included The Land Question, The Social Value of...

148 CAFEF was located in Athlone and SPEF initially in Grassy Park. The latter relocated by the 1970s to the Athenaeum in Newlands.
152 Rassool, p.442.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Interview with D. Parker, 10 June 2006.
156 Interview with I. Abrahams, 4 June 2005.
Music, Mathematics and Philosophy and more, with TLSA teachers presenting papers on Drama and Society, Literature and Society, Race and Education\(^{157}\) and a host of others. This counter-hegemonic project held at its core the ideas of non-racialism, non-collaboration and anti-imperialism.

During the repressive years of the 1960s, with the shutting down of political spaces, the fellowships took a series of heavy blows from the state with the widespread banning of political organisations and individuals. The NEF, the Unity Movement’s premier fellowship collapsed in this period, and the League lost pivotal members when its leadership along with others in the UM was either banned\(^{158}\) or forced into exile.\(^{159}\) Under this state of siege, many League members directed their efforts into the fellowships. Through their covert underground activities, these members were able to sustain the organisation’s urban branches; the same could not be said of its rural constituency however, where the TLSA had considerable presence. Here its members were more visible and thus vulnerable to the special branch. Most of these TLSA branches consequently went into dormancy and eventually collapsed.\(^{160}\) In the more densely populated urban areas, TLSA members secretly continued their political and pedagogical work, meeting clandestinely at members’ homes, whilst operating publicly through the schools sports movement and the fellowships. Located in the southern suburbs, SPEF was one such forum, and it continued to organise a range of activities throughout the 1960s,\(^{161}\) 1970s and into the 1980s.

\(^{157}\) These lectures were presented by TLSA people in the order mentioned: Frank Grammer, Alie Fataar and Stella Petersen. They were all members of the Livingstone High School staff (see Cape Flats Educational Fellowship, Lectures, Hazendal: CAFEF, 1951; Cape Flats Educational Fellowship, Lectures, Hazendal: CAFEF, 1953).

\(^{158}\) Banning orders were served on TLSA teachers hitting Livingstone High particularly hard. These included Victor Wessels, Richard Dudley, George Abrahams, Alie Fataar, Neville Alexander, and others. At Trafalgar High Appolis (Polly) Slingers and Cosmo Petersen, two prominent League teachers, were dismissed from teaching.


\(^{160}\) Genadendal, Worcester and a few other rural areas were the exception.

\(^{161}\) Choral competitions and an annual lecture were organised in the early 1960s. In 1963 SPEF hosted, for example, its second annual research lecture The Historical Outlook – Towards A Concept of World History on 23 July 1963 at the Civic Centre in Claremont (typed pamphlet). Another ‘research lecture’ was
Directing SPEF’s programme was Dawood Parker, an associate TLSA member and SPEF’s main organiser and leading light from virtually its inception,162 and a coterie of TLSA teachers. Although it catered for a broad layer of people from various occupations,163 SPEF gave special attention to high school students. Holding to high academic standards in order to offset what they saw as the obvious ‘debasement’ or lowering of the education of the disenfranchised,164 SPEF and CAFEF organisers provided a space where lectures and debates covered different parts of the school syllabus.165 Shaun Viljoen, a student at Harold Cressy in the early 1970s explained his first experience of CAFEF. He recollected vividly the inter-schools’ debate on Shakespeare, a standard setwork piece and a favourite of CAFEF: “the hall was packed, I remember, it was fascinating that there were so many high school students, and there was a real debate, panel presentations and discussion afterwards, it really made a big impression on me, all these people, students from other schools doing the same thing - debating”.166 SPEF’s winter schools were also particularly well attended.167 Jean Pease recalled:

We had a winter school in June for three weeks; I mean we got lots of students from the black townships who came to the winter school. It gave us an opportunity also to get involved in some of those schools, because sometimes we went to teach after the winter schools: when we go into those schools to teach and give extra lessons and so on. Like Fezeko, Fezeko High, Langa High ... And hundreds of students came to the winter school, even in the rain, and the kids used to really pour in there. And we’d organise teachers to come in and really give them, give some really in-depth catching-up on their work, because these kids were usually way behind in

Delivered in the late 1960s on behalf of Richard Dudley by Nigel Jeftha and Dawood Parker at St Saviour’s hall, Claremont. Later in the decade, these activities branched out to include a range of social-cultural events (Information courtesy of Dawood Parker). This was in keeping with SPEF’s constitution, which spelt out ‘how’ it intended retaining the educational aim of its predecessors. It therefore strove to provide facilities for debate and discussion on subjects of interest to members; encourage the pursuit of knowledge in the sciences and humanities; and provide financial assistance to deserving students intent on furthering their studies (South Peninsula Education, Fellowship Constitution, March 1954).

162 Interview with D. Parker, 10 June 2006.
163 Interview with J. Pease, 1 September 2006.
165 Interview with S. Viljoen and R. Omar, 2 October 2008; Chisholm, p.257.
166 S. Viljoen (Interview with S. Viljoen and R. Omar, 2 October 2008).
167 There were winter, spring and summer schools.
their syllabus or they didn’t have a teacher in physics, biology or things like that. And we’d try and get books to them and so on.  

In the harsh climate of legislated racism, where parents were short-changed financially, SPEF ably assisted students through a bursary fund, established for those intent on furthering their studies. To further counter the debilitating social-cultural effects of apartheid, youth were also exposed to alternative activities to broaden their worldview, to see themselves as part of a much broader community.

The fellowships invariably linked most if not all their activities to politics, and it served the Unity Movement constituency in two significant ways. On one level, while these forums encouraged the exchange of ideas, ‘of sharing a world view with a new generation, a Unity Movement world view’, on another they were apposite sites for enlisting a new younger layer of cadre. Abrahams explained:

So under the guise of delivering, let’s say a talk on music or art or literature or … reviewing the set works, set work books, they were able to recruit persons into the Unity Movement, into the Teachers’ League. In other words, you would listen to somebody making a contribution at the fellowship, then go to him (sic), and say to him, man, don’t you want to become a member of the fellowship, but the fellowships were Unity Movement, so automatically the chap who becomes a member of the fellowship becomes a member of the Unity Movement.

Once identified, select students were drafted into more overt political and cultural programmes and eventually into closed study groups under relatively strict security conditions. In this way, the Unity Movement sought to sustain its ideas during, what Slingers termed, the ‘grim’ and ‘sullen’ years of the 1960s and early 1970s.
The effect of these interventions was that by the 1970s, when the repressive machinery of the state had silenced virtually all political opposition in the country, and the only public face of the TLSA was its journal, the fellowships still held forth. Indeed, Rafiq Omar a student at Harold Cressy at the time could confidently state: ‘these were the first fora that existed where there was open public discussion of political issues, there were just no other’.\textsuperscript{175} Having moved on from the tentative steps of the early 1960s, the fellowships had become for the younger generation forums of enlightenment, where world and local literature, film and politics came under the spotlight, and, where the dialectic of the local and the global became the norm for regular participants.\textsuperscript{176} A TLSA teacher in the 1970s and an organiser within SPEF put it this way:

They had excellent discussions at the Athenaeum using [as examples] political movements outside of South Africa and then drawing the lessons. ... It was a way of learning international politics and how it related to South African politics. So, I think one learnt a lot of South African politics comparing it with all these structures. It gave a platform, whether it was a Hamlet or whatever was being discussed. It gave a platform for political discussion, quite open and quite radical political discussion. It drew a lot of young people, it drew a lot of people from different walks of life .... \textsuperscript{177}

This inter-play between the local and international had as its central intent to subvert the isolationist strategy of the apartheid regime, and to inform and give inspiration to the cadres of the underground resistance movement. To make the point, in the mid-1970s, SPEF hosted a lecture on South Africa’s invasion of Angola - after the fall of the ruling regime in Portugal - and the subsequent independence of Angola and Mozambique.\textsuperscript{178} Similarly, and which were well attended, were talks on Vietnam and

\textsuperscript{174} Interview with A. Slingers, 14 September 2005.
\textsuperscript{175} R. Omar (Interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 2 October 2008).
\textsuperscript{176} While songs of Joan Baez, Buffy-Saint Marie and writings of Pablo Neruda, Bertolt Brecht, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Frantz Fanon and films on international struggles were drawcards, so too were local poets, such as Dennis Brutus, Arthur Nortje and Wally Serote. The content of the fellowships and cultural societies’ programmes may be garnered from interviews and discussions with participants and from perusing pamphlets and posters of the 1960s and 1970s (courtesy of Dawood Parker, Shaun Viljoen and David Kapp). See also Chisholm, p.257.
\textsuperscript{177} Interview with J. Pease, 1 September 2006.
\textsuperscript{178} Mozambique and Angola were Portuguese colonies that gained political independence in 1974 after lengthy wars of liberation. South Africa’s invasion of Angola was repelled by the MPLA with the assistance of Cuba.
later the Iranian revolution and Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{179} These discussions,\textsuperscript{180} as well as those on ‘racialism’ and the homelands,\textsuperscript{181} reflected an approach that carried a distinct Marxian worldview, based on a class perspective critical of African Nationalist movements, such as Pan Africanism and the then prominent Black Consciousness Movement (BCM).\textsuperscript{182} One of the youth in that period, who was drawn to the fellowships and later the TLSA for precisely this reason, noted:

I mean at the time, when Black Consciousness was very popular, their analysis seemed very limited, in terms of addressing not just a specific issue here, but in terms of addressing issues of exploitation and oppression over a long historical period and on a global scale, which is what the Unity Movement perspective seemed to do in my terms ... it [BC] didn’t address the particular form that class exploitation took in this national context, and that one has to take into account. And we saw that the programme of the Unity Movement took that into account, in addressing this issue; the race contradiction, and the race problem but with a view to transcending that and addressing the fundamental contradiction, which is a class contradiction, that it was not limited in that sense. So, it was really that political perspective that drew me to the organisation.\textsuperscript{183}

In fact, the League took Black Consciousness (BC) to task in a series of articles in \textit{The Educational Journal} titled \textit{Black Consciousness A Reactionary Tendency}.\textsuperscript{184} Bypassing BC’s association with Freirian thinking\textsuperscript{185} and indeed its own roots of psychological liberation, the League critiqued BC as a ‘sectarian’ American import, which erred on the side of being ‘anti-white’ and lacking in class analysis.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{179} While the fellowships regularly drew between 40-50 people, during periods of heightened political activity halls were fully packed.
\textsuperscript{180} S. Viljoen (Interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 2 October 2008).
\textsuperscript{181} Chisholm, p.257.
\textsuperscript{183} R. Omar (Interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 25 September 2008).
\textsuperscript{184} \textit{The Educational Journal}, March, April-May and June 1976. \textit{The Educational Journal} argued that BC in the United States and South Africa disingenuously played into the hands of the ruling class’ divide and rule strategy. On South Africa, it criticised the racial ‘black’ exclusivity of the BC, which ignored imperialism and economic exploitation as the actual cause of oppression. The article was originally written by Neville Alexander under the nom de plume Mildred Poswa. He claimed a breach of trust resulted in the article, which appeared as a series of articles in \textit{The Educational Journal}, becoming a ‘strident name-calling indictment of the BCM’ (N. Alexander, ‘Black Consciousness: A Reactionary Tendency?’ in B. Pityana, M. Ramphel, M. Mpumlwana, L. Wilson (eds), \textit{Bounds of Possibility}, Cape Town: David Philip, 1991, p.240. \textit{The Educational Journal} articles should have read \textit{Black Consciousness A Reactionary Tendency}?).
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{The Educational Journal}, March, April-May and June 1976.
Well aware of the pervasiveness of BC and its effect on the student body politic, the League was critical of the 1976 students uprisings, arguing that students alone could not effect fundamental change, and that their actions were destined to end in a ‘blind alley’. Instead, students had to align themselves with their parents in the workers’ movement if they wished to effect proper change. For the TLSA, this meant struggling programmatically for the attainment of ‘full citizenship in a single, undivided, democratic South Africa’. Criticised by leftists as failing to see the student revolts as a manifestation of non-collaboration, the League nonetheless interpreted the uprisings of the students to be a flagrant rejection of the ‘tribalised’ policies of ‘Eiselen-De Vos Malan’, which the organisation, along with CATA, had vehemently campaigned against from the 1950s. Slingers, a TLSA and SPEF member who was dismissed from the teaching profession in 1966 for his political activities, phrased it thus:

> The eruptions of ‘76 certainly, I think, wasn’t something which happened without, I think, indicating the work which the Teachers’ League, perhaps not consciously, but the work that they had done over almost two decades in the schools and in the broader organisations, particularly in the Western Cape, if you want to. It wasn’t something which stood outside of that work. ...

Returning to the founding ideas of non-collaboration, with its core concern to emancipate the minds of the colonised, he continued:

> This battle for the minds of people, this process of struggle, and the rejection of what the rulers were trying to do [meant] the 1976.... student revolts was a great, great, great occasion to see some of the things that you attempted to do, to teach, beginning to get to a point of maturation, finding some form of expression ...

TLSA members like Slingers, who saw the nexus between the 1950s and 1976 and who were located in the fellowships, gave support to the students embroiled in the revolts,
notwithstanding their criticism of the student uprisings. A youth member in CAFEF recollected:

The ‘76 itself, I remember Victor [Wessels] being extremely concerned, supportive of the young people’s taking to the streets and what happened to them on all kinds of levels, getting involved in the defensive [their defence] … On ‘76 itself, I think everybody was just taken by surprise but also just gelled into some kind of action. How do we support? We don’t necessarily support the kinds of actions, but these are what the students are doing, this is what is happening to them, how can we support?\(^{196}\)

If 1976 was a watershed in education that magnified the widening gap between students and teachers, as Molteno\(^{197}\) and Kane-Berman\(^{198}\) suggest, in the fellowships in the ‘sturm und drang’ (storm and stress) of debate and discussion, which made no concessions to simplicity and demanded the skills of argument,\(^{199}\) the senior cadres, most of whom were TLSA teachers, held the high ground. A SPEF member who was part of the younger layer recollected:

There was also this culture that what they have to say you listen to in great awe and trepidation, and you dare not open your mouth and say something silly, because ... the Dudleys of this world and the Polly Slingers will put you down, and you are not going to forget that for a very long time. So you dare not say anything, you just felt there was nothing worth contributing. Just their mannerisms was enough to make you feel that you were not, not in their league, but that you were not going to be in their league for many-many years, you’ve got to read many-many books. That’s what Dudley always instilled in us, you’ve got to read a helluva lot of books before you get to debate with me and discuss with me.\(^{200}\)

This didactic approach, premised as it was on an extensive knowledge base and experience, was a hallmark of TLSA schools, and the hold teachers exercised over their students ensured that these schools were not swept along by the tide of the 1980 school boycotts.\(^{201}\) Indeed, these schools were sometimes criticised as ‘petty-bourgeois’ by

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\(^{196}\) S. Viljoen (Interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 25 September 2008).
\(^{197}\) Molteno.
\(^{200}\) F. Bardien (Interview with W. Leith and F. Bardien, 26 July 2005).
\(^{201}\) B. Nasson, ‘Political Ideologies in the Western Cape’, in T. Lodge and B. Nasson (eds), ‘All Here and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980’s’ *South Africa Update Series*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1991, p.219. League teachers saw the confrontational activism of students as politically short-sighted and more a case of ‘action for the sake of action’ (see Wieder, p.115. The author remembers, as a student at Livingstone High School, that awareness programmes were organised. Moreover, that the SRC was reluctant to commit the student body to join the protests, unlike other schools. This created tension amongst students at the school when it came to the exams, with some writing and others not.
those boycotting, and their teachers branded ‘armchair politicians’.

These schools however defied standard interpretations of the 1980 school boycotts, as described by Molteno. His article on the 1980s student struggles suggests that staff were generally in opposition to, or were coerced by, their students to support the boycott. Gilmour takes issue with this generalised perspective, where he notes that this ‘factual error [the divide between teachers and students]’ was not only unfair on teachers who opposed apartheid, it also undermined ‘the contributions of progressive teachers to the struggle’. League teachers evidently formed part of the latter group, by virtue of their longstanding and expressed opposition to Christian National Education (CNE) and the machinations of the apartheid regime.

Organisationally, the oppositional character of the League gradually re-asserted itself after 1976. While this period posed a dilemma for the TLSA, it is through Abrahams’ lens that another picture emerges. For him, the dynamics of the period ‘reinvigorated’ the organisation. This ‘reinvigoration’, notwithstanding accompanying tensions that Wieder alludes to, stemmed from TLSA members’ influence over sections of the student representative councils (SRCs) at the schools where they had a hold. At a regional level, this influence could be traced to the students’ co-ordinating structure, the Committee of 81. Here, by forging an alliance between students, workers and community structures in a united front approach to struggle, the Committee evinced TLSA thinking - a thinking supportive of workers’ struggles, which

\[\text{\textsuperscript{202}}\] ‘Armchair politicians’ is employed in the context of the refrain that for the TLSA mass struggle was an anathema (see B. Nasson, ‘Political Ideologies in the Western Cape’, p.219).


\[\text{\textsuperscript{205}}\] Ibid., p.368.


\[\text{\textsuperscript{207}}\] See A. Wieder, pp.108-132.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{208}}\] Interview with I. Abrahams, 10 October 1995.


\[\text{\textsuperscript{210}}\] Interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 25 September 2008.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{211}}\] Interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 25 September 2008.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{212}}\] F. Molteno, ‘Students Take Control: the 1980 boycott of Coloured Education in the Cape Peninsula’, pp.17, 18.
at the time included the Wilson-Rowntree, Fattis and Monis and Red Meat strikes. This action, to emphasise the point, had the full support of the schools’ sport movement, where League teachers and the non-collaborationist ethos had substantial sway. This patent shift by the 1980 students from those of 1976 was indicative of the students’ conscious attempts to align themselves with the rising workers’ movement. It also testified to the influence of League teachers and others on the left.

The fellowships and the united front

As the TLSA in various ways made its presence felt, along with newer more prominent organisations in the early 1980s, fellowships like SPEF with its TLSA contingent, showed themselves positively disposed to the idea of forging a united front with other political organisations.\(^{213}\) To this end, SPEF participated in the Disorderly Bills Action Committee (DBAC),\(^ {214}\) and the programmes of the socialist oriented Cape Action League (CAL).\(^ {215}\) These gestures of unity were short-lived however, due to political and personal tensions between the Cape Flats Cultural Society (formerly CAFEF) and SPEF.\(^ {216}\) Neither the TLSA nor the constituents of the previous Anti-CAD, therefore, joined the united front National Forum with its sizable BC membership,\(^ {217}\) or the UDF with its brand of ANC multi-class popular front politics. For sections of the UM, and at the heart of the matter, was that unity for unity’s sake was not acceptable. On this critical and delicate matter, The Educational Journal was emphatic:

> We cannot be so naïve as to believe that everyone who says that Botha and the Nationalist Party must go supports the aim of a non-racial democracy in South Africa!... our political miseries acquaint us with strange bedfellows ... Where ever they do gain a foothold they steer organisations in a direction dictated by

\(^{213}\) Interview with J. Pease, 1 September 2006; Interview with D. Parker, 10 June 2006.

\(^{214}\) The DBAC was a broad political alliance formed in August 1982 to oppose the Koornhof Bills. An ideologically diverse group, the DBAC represented over sixty civic organisations, several sports and cultural bodies and a handful of radical trade unions in the Western Cape (B. Nasson, ‘Political Ideologies in the Western Cape’, p.221); D. Kapp (Interview with D. Kapp, R. Hartel, Z. Scholtz, 28 December 2008). This was also mentioned in the interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 25 September 2008.

\(^{215}\) See Cape Action League, Solidarity, Cape Town: CAL, April/May 1984. CAL emerged from the DBAC.

\(^{216}\) Differences in the fellowships surfaced in the late 1970s, which appeared to be tactical and personal in nature (Interview with D. Parker, 27 May 2006; Interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 25 September 2008). Terms such as ‘Parkerites’ and ‘SPEFites’, testify to differences that appeared to be more personal than political (D. Kapp, [Interview with D. Kapp, R. Hartel, Z. Scholtz, 28 December 2008]. Also, interview with D. Parker, 27 May 2006).

\(^{217}\) Hendricks, p.16.
imperialism: towards a neo-colonial settlement, with a ‘black middle class’ teaming up with the present rulers ... An even superficial examination of the line-up in the ‘united democratic fronts’ shows just how heavily infested these organisations are with imperialist lackeys. ... We have to recognise the need for principled unity always and not be deflected from our course by a sense of desperation reflected in a ‘unity at all costs’ ... The liberatory movement cannot hope to go forward without a programme of principles, demands and strategies in which the ruling class can have no direct or even indirect influence ... ²¹⁸

This perspective dominated the TLSA from this juncture on, and became the main rationale governing its forging of alliances.

Having reached their high point by about 1979,²¹⁹ the fellowships lost their lustre as the 1980s progressed.²²⁰ The reasons for this were four-fold. Firstly, they were surrounded by youth formations of rival political tendencies that were boldly asserting their politics: voices that eventually converged in the formation of the UDF and NF. Secondly, by the 1980s, the Federation of Cape Civics Associations (FCCA), a Unity Movement structure, had been established and many of the youth who normally would have joined the fellowships were organising independently within this community-based structure. In addition, the launch of the New Unity Movement (NUM) was imminent, and lastly, and this is significant, by the mid-80s, the state’s reforms and co-optation methods had visibly failed, particularly the tri-cameral parliament, fomenting widespread boycotts and upheavals in schools and civil society, confrontational actions that were stark demonstrations of non-collaboration in militant form.²²¹ Reacting to this state of growing civil unrest, government unleashed the co-component of its ‘total strategy’, its coercive machinery, and barred political gatherings under a blanket state of emergency. By then, however, another avenue for League teachers had opened in the form of the Federation of Cape Civic Associations (FCCA). It is to this voluntary community initiative that we now turn to track the trajectory of the TLSA, but more so that of its members during the early to late 1980s.

The Federation of Cape Civic Associations (FCCA)

The FCCA, a product of the cultural societies in the Western Cape, more specifically the Cape Flats Cultural Society (CFCS),\textsuperscript{222} was established in May 1979. The civics of ‘Federation’, as it became commonly known, were open adherents of the UM’s philosophy. In fact, two of the founder civics, the Gleemoor Civic, formed in 1926, and the Elsies River Ratepayers and Vigilance society, established in 1944, participated in the NEUM’s third Unity Conference of 1945, with the former, one of the founder constituents of the Movement. Other civics with the same politics emerged later.\textsuperscript{223}

While civics or ratepayers and residents associations had operated conservatively within the confines and limitations of segregation, concerning themselves almost exclusively with securing basic amenities, the FCCA sought to break with this tradition. It placed at the forefront of its campaigns, much the same as the other UM affiliates had, the quest for full democratic rights. For the FCCA, the neglected living standards of the oppressed were inextricably part of the fight for full and equal citizenship rights based on a universal franchise.\textsuperscript{224} Without direct political representation on all organs of the state, it asserted, there would be no improvement in the day-to-day living conditions of the majority of people. According to Victor Wessels, therefore, a foremost Cape Teachers’ Federal Council (CTFC) and TLSA member before his dismissal from the profession in the 1960s, and one of the main driving forces behind the formation of the FCCA: “All our disabilities flow from our lack of political rights. It is because we are not citizens, do not enjoy the rights and

\textsuperscript{222} Gleemoor Cape Flats Civic Association, 75\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary Brochure, Cape Town, November 2001, p.15.
\textsuperscript{223} The Heideveld-Vanguard and Belgravia Civic, for example, hived off from the Gleemoor Civic as part of the FCCA initiative (see Gleemoor Cape Flats Civic Association, 75\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary Brochure, Gleemoor Cape Flats Civic Association, 2001, p.15). Other civics were also established in similar ways, while the more conservative ratepayers’ associations were taken over by Federation, such as the Fairways Property Owners and Tenants’ Association which became the Fairways-Parkwood ‘Ward 16’ Civic Association, and the Lansdowne Ratepayers and Tenants Association which became the Lansdowne Civic. Federation had affiliates in the Southern and Northern Suburbs, as well as the Cape Town areas, and were strong in the rural and peri-urban areas. The basic policy of these civics was non-collaboration (see for example the Heideveld-Vanguard Civic Association, Constitution, October 1983).
\textsuperscript{224} The universal franchise, according to the Unity Movement, was based on “the right of all people to elect and be elected to parliament, provincial and divisional councils without reference to ‘race’, colour, creed or sex” (New Unity Movement, Anniversary Bulletin Unity Movement 50 Years Of Struggle, Wynberg: NUM Publication, 1994, p.56).
powers of citizenship, that we have civic disabilities”. These political rights had to be uncompromisingly fought for Federation contended, and it made concerted efforts to link civic and political demands. As Williams, an Associate TLSA and Ward 16 civic member pointed out:

We made demands, remember we were a civic organisation and we had to do the work of a civic organisation but in the process of doing that – politicising. So, it wasn’t just ‘we want a road here a streetlight there’, we also put the reason why we didn’t have these things. So the politicisation took place while ‘we didn’t ask, we demanded those things’. A lot of our campaigns were one of making demands on City Council, for example, in Parkwood ‘you put up the structures you fix the structures, the people are complaining’ ... We would write a letter to say we make these demands because of this, and at meetings we would then politicise people using those lack of services.

Another important dimension to the Federation, were its links to and co-activities with the fellowships. A League and leading Heideveld-Vanguard Civic member’s insight is noteworthy:

So we were doing civic work, not only to do civic work but to politicise. And at the same time, what we were doing in Heideveld, was recruiting, people, like Jerome from the school where we taught, as League members, to the civic, to be active in the areas, and then to the fellowships. The same philosophy was applied, in some ways, to the civic. We were really interested in drawing out those young people from the areas that had leadership potential.

In keeping with this strategy, individual civics frequently organised cultural and educational events, and the Civic News, the Federation’s newsletter, covered not only local concerns but also a range of contemporary national and international issues. Although labelled ‘the letter writing civics’, Federation utilised multiple forms of protest to achieve their goals, depending on the specific objectives at the time. Actions included: petitions, letters to town or city councils, public meetings, using the

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226 ‘Ward 16’ included Parkwood Estate and Fairways. The previous conservative Fairways Ratepayers’ Civic like the Lansdowne Ratepayers’ Civic and others were ousted and replaced by the Federation civics.
227 M. Williams (Interview with M. Williams and A. Haupt, 30 December 2008).
228 S. Viljoen (Interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 2 October 2008).
229 These included book reviews, films, lectures and social events. Certain Civics also had active youth groups. FCCA’s civics, moreover, drew their membership from areas outside their municipal boundaries.
230 Articles in the Federation of Cape Civic Associations Civic News, carried a range of current political, social-cultural and economic issues.
231 D. Kapp (Interview with D. Kapp, R. Hartel, Z. Scholtz, 28 December 2008).
print media and broadly circulating its newsletter. In this way, the FCCA with its individual affiliates, where many TLSA members were located, set about what it termed ‘educating the people about the nature of their oppression’ and the significance of employing the strategy of non-collaboration. These two points coincided with the League’s outlook, and are elaborated upon hereafter.

Federation, along with the non-racial sports movement, led boycott actions at two levels. At local municipal level, FCCA and TLSA members directed the boycott against those persons who occupied positions on the local management committees, whom they disparagingly termed the ‘hired lackeys’ who worked the ‘dummy bodies’ of the state - the implementation levers of government’s separatist ‘own affairs’ policies. As Haupt, the chairperson of the FCCA at the time put it:

If you look at the management committees, they were there but they were an advisory consultative body. They couldn’t decide and, say, send out workers to Parkwood to fix up the houses there, it will have to come from the City Council. So we never worried with them because they were dummies, they were there, put out there, to represent so-called non-white interests ... So they were the facade to say, ‘listen-here these people have representation’, but [actually] they had no power.

Through deploying non-collaboration and the boycott, Federation aimed to discredit the local committees in the eyes of the disenfranchised communities, whilst demanding direct representation on the committees of City Council. The rationale was simple and above all politically motivated, since, for them: “These are the councils that citizens use in terms of the full franchise. We have the right to serve on them and to use their services”. By focusing its attention on these structures, FCCA strove to expose the actual source of local government power and hence where the disenfranchised

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234 New Unity Movement, Anniversary Bulletin Unity Movement 50 Years Of Struggle, p.57.


238 Federation of Cape Civic Associations, Civic News, 5 October 1980 (Federation of Cape Civic Associations, Federation of Cape Civic Associations 10th Anniversary Brochure 1979 to 1980, p.8).
communities should aim their grievances, be it on housing, rent increases or expropriation of land and other local issues.\textsuperscript{239}

Regionally, the Federation-League axis headed opposition to the President Council (PC), the Koornhof Bills (KB) and the tri-cameral parliament.\textsuperscript{240} These bodies, with their ‘reform from within’ approach to dismantling apartheid,\textsuperscript{241} entrenched separate ‘divide-and-rule’ policies based on ‘race’ and ethnic-cultural division that effectively denied the rights of citizenship in a single non-racial democracy, Federation declared.\textsuperscript{242} On this basis, it and the TLSA called for the boycott of the ‘New Deal’, ‘fraudulent’ elections to the ‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’ parliaments in August 1984.\textsuperscript{243} Denigrating the Labour Party and others participating in the elections as ‘conmen’, ‘collaborators’ and ‘stooges’,\textsuperscript{244} the two UM bodies branded the tri-cameral elections another attempt by the government to dupe the oppressed into accepting a separate and inferior position in society,\textsuperscript{245} where Africans were consigned to the ‘brutal system of the homelands and migrant labour’.\textsuperscript{246} The question of landlessness and political oppression – of segregatory and later apartheid laws and acts - were intertwined historically, Federation and the League argued.\textsuperscript{247} They therefore posited the

\textsuperscript{241} \textit{The Educational Journal}, January-February 1983, p.4.
\textsuperscript{242} Federation of Cape Civic Associations, \textit{Federation of Cape Civic Associations 10\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary Brochure 1979 to 1980}, p.13.
\textsuperscript{245} \textit{The Educational Journal}, June 1984, pp.1-4.
\textsuperscript{246} Federation of Cape Civic Associations, \textit{Civic News}, June-August 1984; see \textit{The Educational Journal}, September 1982, pp.1, 2; June 1983, pp.1, 2.
\textsuperscript{247} These would include the Group Areas Act, Urban Areas Act, Native Lands and Trust Act, Influx Control Law, Pass Laws and numerous others (see Federation of Cape Civic Associations, \textit{Civic News}, April 1980). Federation ran articles on the pass system, forced removals, rent increments, expropriation of
inseparability of the franchise for full and equal citizenship from the demands for: the redistribution of land, living wages, free trade unions, one unsegregated system of education, and an equal share in the wealth of the country.\textsuperscript{248} Accepting anything less, FCCA declared, was a betrayal – a ‘sell-out’.\textsuperscript{249} For it, and this is crucial, the franchise or political rights was a pre-condition for the creation of a society that was not exploitative and was free from the domination of ‘foreign capital and foreign monopoly’.\textsuperscript{250} Here, for the first time since the NEUM’s disintegration in the early 1960s, the Unity Movement’s programme was openly declared. This political development was not coincidental, and less than a year later, in April 1985, NUM launched publicly, with the Ten-Point Programme and non-collaboration the twin pillars of the organisation.\textsuperscript{251} R.O. Dudley, a former member of the Workers’ Party of South Africa (WPSA), NEF, Anti-CAD, NEUM and a prominent TLSA member, who also worked in the fellowships and Federation, was its first president.

Ideologically, the Federation-TLSA alliance gave support to the rapidly growing labour movement, and in a series of articles in the \textit{Civic News} and TLSA journal, they expressed solidarity with workers’ struggles.\textsuperscript{252} This was not atypical of the Unity Movement, as oddly suggested by certain critics.\textsuperscript{253} In fact, it must be noted that this study, because of its specific focus, cannot do justice to the UM-TLSA’s organic links with the trade union movement in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, where key members played leading roles in the National Union of Furniture and Allied Workers’ of South Africa (NUFAWSA), Building Workers’ Union (BWU), Cape Town Municipal...
Workers’ Association (CTMWA) and other unions. These unionists had the support of the UM Trade Union Committee in the 1950s and 1960s. Edward Kapp, an associate League member, who remained active in the union movement at its highest level until his retirement, intimated, for example, how they in NUFAWSA, as Federation had in the civic domain, ‘cleaned up the union’ by forcing out collaborationist ‘Coloured’ and liberal elements ensconced in official positions within the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) unions. Not yet thoroughly documented, aside from David Kapp’s foray into this area, these narratives of UM unionists are still ‘locked away’ in their memory.

Returning to the early 1980s, and in keeping with its support for workers’ struggles, Federation gave impetus to CTMWA’s campaign for a living wage, and in the 1980s proactively endorsed the bus boycott through lodging formal objections and

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254 Interview with E. Kapp, 2 December 2008. For example, Jonas Bosch, a TLSA member, who was dismissed from the teaching profession in 1956 for his political views and practices, was employed as a manual worker for the Cape Town Municipality where he joined the CTMWA and assisted the radical elements in ‘cleaning up’ the union. Because of these activities, he was dismissed from the Cape Town Municipality in the mid-1960s and placed under house arrest for five years. He nonetheless continued to play a pivotal role in the CTMWA along with Unity Movement figures such as Johnny Erntzen and Henry Kannemeyer and others until the mid-1980s. Bosch also worked amongst the automobile workers, which explains Federation’s involvement with the Leyland workers’ in the early 1980s (see New Unity Movement, Obituary of Jonas Fred (Jonie) Bosch, 18 March 1990; New Unity Movement, Anniversary Bulletin Unity Movement 50 Years Of Struggle, pp.47, 48).

255 The Trade Union Committee, a subcommittee of the Unity Movement, operated through individuals such as Jonas Bosch, Irwin Combrinck, Victor Wessels, Dullah Omar, Steven Dublin, Ben Kies, Dawood Parker and the fellowships.


257 D. Kapp, An Analysis of the Political Adult Educational Practices during the Furniture Workers’ struggle in the 1960s in the Western Cape, p.1.


259 Federation of Cape Civic Associations, ‘Letter on the Objection Against Busfare Increases’, From the FCCA to the Heideveld-Vanguard Civic, 29 July 1981. Federation the following year was at the forefront of organising the Busfare Action Committee (see Federation of Cape Civic Associations, Letter to organisations of the Busfare Action Committee, 26 August 1982; Federation of Cape Civic Associations, ‘Circular to all affiliates’, 26 August 1982).
organising alternative transport in the form of lift clubs for commuters. The Wilson-Rowntree, Red Meat, and Fattis and Monis striking workers, moreover, received support from Federation, and it called for a boycott of these companies’ products. Through direct representation on strike committees, Federation with other organisations in the resistance movement buttressed these struggles. Consistent with the united front approach, Federation along with these groups, during 1985, a period of heightened militancy and repression, called for a consumer boycott of “the shops of ‘M.P.’s in the dummy parliament, and other stooges ... be they ‘black’ or ‘white’”. This action was extended to big business and multinationals for their support of the state of emergency. The pro-government posturing of business, Federation declared, meant it was ‘firmly tucked away in P.W. Botha’s pocket’. Siding with the workers’ movement, Federation placed itself squarely in the anti-capitalist if not socialist camp without explicitly stating it, or, as it were, pinning its colours to the mast.

Ostracising all elements connected to the state, Federation, on the educational front, exposed what it termed the ‘eyes and the ears of government in the schools’, the CTPA. These ‘misleaders’ imbued the new constitution and thus tribalised apartheid education with legitimacy and credibility, it asserted. Rather, the FCCA and League demanded one system of free, compulsory education for all people in one undivided

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260 Due to the hike in busfares, a boycott of bus transport was organised (Federation of Cape Civic Associations, *Civic News*, July-August 1981). Federation’s cívics arranged lifts from central pick-up points for people who travelled by bus (author’s recollection).


To achieve this, Federation advanced TLSA thinking, and gave support to schools becoming bastions of ‘education for liberation’, where the student-teacher-parent triad was deemed central to unifying the educational struggle with broader worker and community struggles. Hence, in the heat of the 1985 students’ uprising, when strenuous efforts were being made to defuse the students’ indefinite boycott of classes, what Bundy termed ‘immediatism’, and *The Educational Journal* more disapprovingly dubbed ‘kamikaze politics’, Federation along with the non-racial sports movement, the fellowships and organisations across the political spectrum, called for students to return to class. There was unanimity amongst these 155 organisations. For them, the boycott was but one weapon in the arsenal of the oppressed, one that should be used strategically for short periods to demonstrate strength, unity of purpose, and importantly to raise people’s levels of consciousness and organisational capacity. As it still operated clandestinely underground for fear of government reprisal, the TLSA was not amongst the organisations mentioned in the pamphlet. Its politics, however, found resonance in the collective statement of the signed organisations. Owing to the TLSA’s absence from the public arena however, it remained unknown to large sections of teachers and students in this period; a state that would prove debilitating for the organisation.

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271 *The Educational Journal*, December, 1985, p.3.
272 Let Us Return To Formal Academic Classes Let Us Continue The Struggle Inside And Outside The Schools, Athlone, pamphlet, 28 January 1986. Federation pointed out that despite its admiration for the students ‘courage, discipline and inventiveness’; it despaired ‘at their chronic lack of organisational skills’ (Federation of Cape Civic Associations, *Civic News*, June-August 1985).
273 Let Us Return To Formal Academic Classes Let Us Continue The Struggle Inside And Outside The Schools.
274 The TLSA’s position echoed the sentiments of the signed organisations (see *The Educational Journal*, December 1985, pp.3, 4).
275 Hendricks, p.40.
Organisational conflict: the Federation of Cape Civic Associations, Teachers’ League of South Africa and the United Democratic Front

The protracted student boycott of 1985 vindicated the TLSA and Federation’s stance on the significance of the student-teacher-parent pact. Not only did the boycott cleave the students, splitting those who wrote the final examinations from those who did not, it also fractured the community solidarity that had prevailed through most of 1985,\(^{276}\) therewith crippling what Freire optimistically called ‘the new emancipatory vision of community and society’.\(^{277}\) A serious part of this fracturing, and a setback for the liberation movement, was the deep suspicion and mistrust that followed in the train of the boycott, and which permeated the relationship between TLSA teachers and UDF activists. Consequently, while the NUM had called for unity amongst organisations in the liberation movement under the mantle of ‘Fight The Real Enemy’\(^ {278}\) before the boycott commenced, a few months later, attitudes had hardened markedly, with TLSA teachers admonishing the UDF for spurring youth to destabilise schools.\(^ {279}\) Dudley, early in 1986, conveyed the position of the NUM and TLSA on this matter in a crisp fashion: “popular support cannot be traded against the correctness of your political stance, the correctness of your political actions. I know for example that the UDF in pursuing its politics of utilising what we call pressure politics has regarded the school pupils as being usable material, to put it this way”.\(^ {280}\) Placing students at the forefront of confrontation with the state was an anathema for the League, as students were expected to prepare themselves intellectually for the battles ahead, and in any case, could not decisively influence the course of struggle, unlike workers. The popular movement, such as the UDF, conversely viewed the youth as the ‘shock-troops’ of the

\(^{276}\) Parents and institutional heads differed on whether students should write the final exams. This resulted in schisms within communities. Moreover, in 1986, in the aftermath of the boycott, certain schools promoted students, while others did not. This created tensions within and between school communities. Additional internecine differences related to the boycott also divided communities and schools.  
\(^{279}\) Hendricks, p.33.  
struggle.\textsuperscript{281} Political divisions, some of them deep-seated, subsequently manifested themselves, creating animosity that continued well into the 1990s.

These inter-organisational conflicts were not altogether new in the early 1980s. In fact, and as mentioned earlier, attempts were made before the UDF’s formation to stitch together a broad common front in the form of the DBAC, of which Federation was a part. This unity collapsed relatively soon, however, before any joint action could be undertaken, with factionalism besetting the DBAC. In this case, differing interests between liberal elements such as the Black Sash, NUSAS and the Western Cape Traders’ Association, on the one side, and those representing workers and community organisations, on the other, proved untenable.\textsuperscript{282} More pointedly, disagreements between Congress and socialist oriented activists, on the question of tactics and strategy prevailed, heightening tensions between the FCCA and the UDF-aligned Cape Action Housing Committee (CAHAC).\textsuperscript{283} While these two civic bodies organised in different areas and used different methods of protest, with CAHAC being more confrontational, it was on the question of non-collaboration that differences were most stark. A major contention, according to Kannemeyer, a leading activist in Federation, was CAHAC’s willingness ‘to work through the mancom’s [management committees]’. He went on to say: “they would march on the mancoms as well, unless the mancoms of course guaranteed that they would side with them. ... Many of the mancoms’ members, I dare say, joined them, joined them in a sense that they saw merit in CAHAC”.\textsuperscript{284} This accommodationist practice further tarnished the UDF and NUM relationship, notwithstanding the fact that they had shared platforms earlier against the tricameral parliament. The accusation levelled at the UDF was forthright: “they accommodated liberals; they accommodated reactionary church elements and so on. They accommodated people who were associated with outright collaborators”.\textsuperscript{285} The arrival of the UDF seemed to blur once distinct lines between collaboration and non-

\textsuperscript{281} Lodge, ‘Rebellion: The Turning of the Tide’, p.66.  
\textsuperscript{282} Nasson, ‘Political Ideologies in the Western Cape’, p.221.  
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., p.220.  
\textsuperscript{284} Interview with H. Kannemeyer, 8 June 2009.  
\textsuperscript{285} Interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 25 September 2008. The UDF received money from various businesses, such as Urban Foundation and were prepared to work with CTPA elements. See \textit{The Educational Journal}, January-February 1984, p.3.
collaboration, giving rise to the vexed question of whether what constituted an instrument of oppression in the 1940s, when non-collaboration was instituted, had altered significantly by the 1980s? Debate ensued within the Federation’s civics, particularly amongst the youth and the older guard on this very question, unveiling significant differences.286 R. Omar, a League member, who was part of the youth in FCCA, explained an important aspect of the tensions in this way:

The Unity Movement didn’t have a viable political programme, in terms of what it wanted to achieve politically. So, there was no explicit statement about what the Unity Movement saw as its political purpose. It was clearly not aiming at attaining power in the short term. But what was its political programme, what was its political objective? There was no statement of that. I mean all we were doing was organising people. ... and hopefully with self-organisation of people on the kind of basis that we thought was correct; you provide the basis for transformation sometime in the future? ... So, that’s all we had to go on and we thought the organisation should have a clear political strategy: “this is what we are trying to achieve and this is how we are trying to do it. Maybe we are not being successful but at least this is what we’re trying to do”, instead of just organising with no clear political goal in mind. Some people would say we’re trying to achieve the demands of the Ten-Point Programme and so on, but that was far too vague. And we thought that if the organisation didn’t recognise that as a political organisation, it needed to do that, or else what’s the point of working in the organisation.287

For the more senior cadres in Federation, the youth were under the influence of the ‘two stage theory’288 of the ANC.289 The upshot of these differences was a sloughing-off of thirty to forty younger members, certain of them TLSA cadres, a substantial segment, numerically speaking, of the Federation and NUM. This stripping away of the younger layer, proved debilitating for certain civics in Federation290 and in particular for the TLSA in the 1990s. Interestingly, in the aftermath of this exodus, many of the youth joined rival UDF or ANC structures, while others did not. The latter remained critical of the Congress movement for reasons ironically consistent with the TLSA and NUM. A member of the younger layer at the time, for instance, maintained that he held firmly to the NUM critique of the UDF, since for him, the latter organisation was

288 The ‘Two Stage Theory’ posited the anti-apartheid struggle to be the first stage in the oppressed’s quest for liberation; the second being the struggle for socialism.
290 Gleemoor Civic in particular lost a substantial part of their youth as a result of differences in Federation (Interview with L. Roelf, 2 September 2005).
unable to ‘address serious economic issues’, which the Unity Movement had given primary attention to as part of its Ten-Point-Programme and socialist vision.\textsuperscript{291}

The strength of the Unity Movement remained in the ideological realm of political and educational ideas, which by the late 1980s, despite the government clamping down on oppositional organisations, it continued propagating on a broad front via the FCCA and NUM. By then however, it must be said, Federation had lost significant civic and political clout, with the resurgent ANC-oriented MDM, and COSATU capturing much of the limelight.\textsuperscript{292} The non-collaborationist outlook nonetheless persisted, with the TLSA a key proponent in advancing the strategy in the last decade of the twentieth century. By then, however, the organisation was traversing a very different political terrain, one characterised by consensual politics, negotiations and collaboration. It also had to confront a new set of teacher politics to which it was unaccustomed - a politics hostile to teacher professionalism and far more accepting of militant unionism and its mode of engagement. It is within this ebb and flow of the late 1980s and 1990s, that the vicissitudes of the organisation and its application of non-collaboration will be examined in the forthcoming chapters of this study.

\textsuperscript{291} S. Viljoen (Interview with R. Omar and S. Viljoen, 25 September 2008).
\textsuperscript{292} During the Emergency rule, the only organisation that could continue with mass mobilisation was COSATU. From the end of 1989, however, more organisations started participating in mass marches (A. Jeffrey, \textit{Forum On Mass Mobilisation}, Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1991, pp.24, 25).
Engaging the politics of reform: education and the 1994 election

When ... the twin-violences of ‘law and order’ prove insufficient to dupe or suppress those in revolt against it, then decadent and despotic privilege invariably invents a myth - if not a mythology - by means of which it seeks to contain and, if possible, bind afresh the unprivileged. ... With varying degrees of subtlety and cynicism, all human experience is re-interpreted or re-hashed to fit in with the requirements of the myth.¹

If parliamentarism served the proletariat to a certain extent as a training school for revolution, then it also served the bourgeoisie to a far greater extent as the school of counter revolutionary strategy. Suffice it to say that by means of parliamentarism the bourgeoisie was able so to train the social democracy that it is today the main prop of private property.²

The League, as part of the Unity Movement (UM), consistently spurned participation in government structures at national and local levels and or negotiations between the liberation movement and the ruling regime. The last concerted attempt to draw the unfranchised into a form of parliamentary politics, when PW Botha’s government introduced its constitutional reforms as part of a ‘total strategy’ to re-envision apartheid, failed visibly.³ These reform measures had as their central goal to show the international community the National Party’s (NP) willingness to reform apartheid and open the political space to previously disenfranchised groupings, owing to the anti-South African sentiment abroad, in particular sanctions, the sporting and cultural boycotts amongst other actions isolating the country. The reforms’ chief intent was to blunt opposition at home and abroad in an effort to ameliorate local and foreign business concerns regarding South Africa’s deepening economic crises.⁴

¹ B. Kies, *The Contribution of the Non European Peoples to World Civilisation*, Cape Town: The Teachers’ League of South Africa, 1953, p.7. Kies in this essay argued against distinguishing Western or European from non-European civilisations. He posited instead the concept of one civilisation, the ‘civilisation of homo sapiens’. The work was consistent with the internationalist and non-racial ethos of the Movement. These themes will emerge in this section of the dissertation.
² L. Trotsky, *The Lessons of October*, London: Bookmarks, 1987, p.73. The question of parliament was a key concern to the left in the run up to and during the election of 1994 and is taken up in the second part of this chapter.
³ The proposed new constitution, based on a qualified franchise, expanded voting rights, in what the NP termed a tri-cameral parliament that excluded Africans. The latter were consigned instead to homelands that were presented as viable independent African countries. See also Chapter 2, pp.84, 85 and 106 on the resistance movement’s response to the NP’s constitutional reforms.
The election, however, instead of defusing black anger, invoked nation-wide uprisings\(^5\) as anti-election lobbyists galvanised to boycott it. Their success can be measured by the fact that less than 20 percent of registered voters appeared at the polls,\(^6\) while those who did participate were denounced derisively as collaborators in black communities. These acts of defiance, aside from severely embarrassing the government,\(^7\) rendered unworkable its ‘new deal’ and demonstrated the growing strength of the liberation movement in this period. Most importantly, it showed starkly how deep-seated and pervasive the ethos of non-collaboration had become in the resistance movement inside the country. Alexander,\(^8\) writing in the late 1980s, could therefore confidently claim that non-collaboration had become so integral to the struggle for national liberation and emancipation that any suggestion of talks with the government increased the political temperature of black youth and disenfranchised workers.\(^9\)

Despite the regime’s attempts to co-opt and win over sections of the black population, particularly the middle class elements,\(^10\) which it interspersed with public and secretive repressive measures to break popular resistance internally, a multitude of political, labour and youth organisations were spawned in response to the new constitutional reforms.\(^11\) By the mid-1980s, therefore, an escalating culture of resistance and confrontational politics punctuated by distinct revolutionary expectations dominated the political landscape.

\(^{1980s}\) In addition, it was experiencing growing business, foreign investment and Western government disenchantment, which had to be addressed in order to ‘restore foreign confidence’ (O’Meara, p.329).

\(^{5}\) O’Meara, p.326.


\(^{7}\) Bell and Ntsebeza, p.203.


\(^{9}\) Black Local Authorities (BLA) were set up in townships throughout the country under the Koornhof Bills, as an alternative to the full franchise. Viewed as far too inadequate by the communities they represented, they were boycotted, violently at times, as government ‘stooges’ by what the state termed ‘vigilantes’ (N. Haysom, ‘Vigilantes and militarisation of South Africa’, in J. Cock and L. Nathan (eds), War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa, Cape Town: David Philips, 1989, pp.192, 193).


\(^{11}\) On the emergent political and worker organisations, see Chapter 2, pp.84, 85, 101, 102. Youth organisations formed in the early 1980s included the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), Students of Young Azania (SOYA), Azanian Students Movement (AZASM) and Western Cape Youth League (WCYL) among a range of others.
The above developments proved explosive, and came to a head with the educational uprisings in the Western Cape in 1985, in response to the imposition of the state of emergency in the Transvaal and Eastern Cape, during June of that year. A series of national states of emergencies, implemented from July,\textsuperscript{12} underscored the impact and indeed threat the rapidly mounted challenges posed to state authority.\textsuperscript{13} The state’s heavy-handed repression signalled on the one hand, the failure of the government’s ‘total strategy’ reforms,\textsuperscript{14} but on the other, proved largely effective in quelling popular resistance and halting anti-establishment activities of political and community-based organisations.\textsuperscript{15} This strategy appeared to augur the defeat of non-collaboration. Whether this was the case on all fronts, particularly in education after the 1980s, is central to this study.

To complete the context and to get better insight into the changing terrain of the 1980s and early 1990s, it is instructive to note developments on the international front that impacted in immense and unforeseen ways the southern African continent. Such a decisive development was Mikhail Gorbachov’s ushering in of the restructuring policies of Perestroika and Glastnost; policies which brought to an end the socialist experiment in Eastern Europe and the cold war by 1989. The collapse of these countries’ economies coincided with the rise of the United States as the dominant global power, reinforcing thereby the Thatcher-Reagan ideology of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism. Liberation movements internationally, particularly those that looked to the previous socialist regimes for material and ideological support, were hard hit by this shift in global power relations. In South Africa, its effect on the ANC created intra-organisational tensions between advocates

\textsuperscript{12} The state of emergency was imposed first on 21 July 1985 and extended to the Western Cape on 25 October of the same year. It was lifted in March 1986 but re-imposed in June 1986.
\textsuperscript{13} Hendricks, p.24.
\textsuperscript{15} Conceived by the militarily minded ‘securocrats’ in government, the repressive ‘counter-revolutionary’ and WHAM ‘wining hearts and minds’ strategy, of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ war tactics, decisively broke resistance inside the country. In fact, the emergence of vigilantes, municipal police and special constables (kits-konstables), from conservative sections of the black community, to replace security forces in the widely spread townships of the Western Cape and beyond, had as its main purpose to divide anti-government forces (Swilling and Phillips, pp.142-144; L. Nathan, ‘Troops in the townships, 1984-1987’, in J. Cock and L. Nathan (eds), \textit{War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa}, Cape Town: David Philips, 1989, pp.76, 77; Bell and Ntsebeza, p.185.
of insurrectionary seizure of power and those who favoured a negotiated settlement.\textsuperscript{16} The latter, who were predominantly in exile, proved more formidable owing to their stronger international networks and prestigious leadership core,\textsuperscript{17} and dictated the line of the organisation.

Reading the changing international terrain and noting the growing moderate force within the ANC and its close links with its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the liberal ‘modernisers’\textsuperscript{18} within the ruling regime, who had shortly before risen to prominence, responded and engaged their largest ideological foe in talks. This they thought politically wise, cognisant of their eroded political credibility and divided social base but military and administrative advantage, to push for and negotiate from a position of strength, and possibly outmanoeuvre the ANC and its allies in the liberation movement.\textsuperscript{19} They had also taken to heart, crucially, liberal capital’s concern of finding credible black allies, way beyond the tricameral parliament, capable of delivering powerful black support for business interests.\textsuperscript{20} In this milieu of negotiation and compromise, the NP and ANC elites deemed it imperative, no longer ideologically constrained, to consider more pragmatic options appropriate to the new reality.\textsuperscript{21}

Negotiation politics was not new to the ANC, as Chapter 1 indicates, and indeed was an accepted part of its strategy for liberation since its inception.\textsuperscript{22} This openness to negotiations, the NP and business as well as the TLSA, NUM amongst others on the left were astutely aware of. Adam and Moodley, Van Zyl Slabbert, Gumede and others, describe the negotiation process as it unfolded in exile, and Mandela himself writes about

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} The ANC’s senior leadership in exile included notables such as the ANC president Oliver Tambo and other leading figures in the organisation, such as the younger echelon of Thabo Mbeki, Essop Pahad, Ronnie Kasrils, Pallo Jordan among others.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Bell and Ntsebeza in their assessment of the NP counterpose what they term the ‘tradionalists’ with the ‘modernisers’ (Bell and Ntsebeza, p.194).
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Gumede, p.30.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} O’Meara, p.362.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} See also Bell and Ntsebeza, p.212.
\end{itemize}
his experiences.23 As the TLSA and UM’s non-collaborationism separated it historically from the ANC and other groupings in the Congress movement, they were outsiders to the negotiation process. Nonetheless, mindful of the changing political terrain unfolding in front of it, the TLSA tentatively entered the changing political and educational fray once again in March 1992 as a public teachers’ organisation, intent on restoring its image and profile as a fighting entity.

Educational reforms

The unbanning of the liberation movement in 1990 and the negotiations that started publicly a year later marked the moment when the ruling apartheid regime, faced with a changing and unpredictable political terrain, decided to make significant administrative adjustments to its longstanding Christian National Education (CNE) policy, which by then had virtually lost all semblance of legitimacy. This strategy, introduced in the aftermath of the 1985 to 1990 struggles in education, sought to offset emerging alternatives that had arisen during the later part of the 1980s. People’s Education had emerged as such an alternative in March 1986. It went on to form the dominant narrative in education up to the early 1990s, despite its ambiguities and shortcomings,24 with the National Education Coordinating Committee (NECC) the chief representative of the movement.25

The prime mission of People’s Education was to counteract the popular ‘liberation before education’ ethos, which had engulfed the school/classroom boycotts of 1985-1986, in order

25 People’s Education emerged from the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee’s (SPCC) call for a meeting with a range of organisations in the liberation movement at the first National Consultative Conference (NCC) at the University of the Witwatersrand in December 1985. The aim was to reclaim the terrain of education and schooling for liberation purposes and to install an alternative approach to education, termed People’s Education. At the second NCC in Durban, March 1986, the NECC was formed. It became the organisational vehicle to advance the concept of People’s Education.
to rescue the disenfranchised schools from threatening collapse.\(^{26}\) To make it more credible and give it greater impetus, proponents of People’s Education emphasised its radical pedagogical dimension through merging the political struggle with that of teaching and learning, to so present it as an effective counter to Bantu Education.\(^{27}\) While the League did not differ with this educational outlook, this was not its principal concern. Of greater concern, was the relationship between the NECC, People’s Education and the ANC’s agenda of compromise and negotiations.

The notion of People’s Education or as it was more commonly known ‘People’s Education for People’s Power’, identified early on as a NECC-ANC initiative\(^{28}\), proved ambiguous and gave rise to different interpretations.\(^{29}\) Left groupings, particularly the TLSA, questioned the concept’s ideological bent.\(^{30}\) A foremost disagreement with the ANC’s concept of ‘people’s power’, was its association with the Freedom Charter’s concession to separate ‘races’, cultures, and thus multi-racism and multi-culturalism.\(^{31}\) The latter two concepts will be elaborated on briefly later in this chapter. The critical point to note, however, was that the voice of the ANC resonated on the education front through its representative, the NECC.\(^{32}\) It was the same voice which along with COSATU played a pivotal role in securing the unity of establishment and anti-establishment teacher bodies in the late 1980s, which the next chapter will spell out. From the TLSA’s point of view, the NECC and COSATU were guilty of subverting or ‘muddying the water’ of non-collaboration by allowing known collaborators to join the liberation movement as co-liberators. The political atmosphere of the late 1980s and early 1990s was clouded with doublespeak and deception for the League, as comparable developments unfolded in sport,


\(^{28}\) See Hyslop, p.174.


\(^{30}\) Hartshorne, p.341.

\(^{31}\) E. Steenveld (Interview with E. Steenveld and S. Williams, 30 April 2000); Hendricks, pp.44-60.

\(^{32}\) Hartshorne, p.341.
with unity talks between elements in the non-racial fold and establishment sport running concurrent with reconciliatory gestures in education.\textsuperscript{33}

In propagating its politics, the TLSA faced battles on a number of fronts. Foremost, was that after thirty-years of operating underground its ideas on non-collaboration were largely unknown to the majority of teachers swelling the ranks of the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU). For teachers who were aware of the League, the organisation’s 
\textit{Educational Journal} came across as exceptionally hostile towards ANC-oriented organisations such as SADTU,\textsuperscript{34} which, at the time, was clearly hegemonic in education. In addition, the TLSA’s association with left-wing socialist politics rendered its thinking suspect following the collapse of the Eastern bloc’s socialist experiment at the end of the 1980s.

Consequently, in a period of consensual politics and alternative policy formulations in education and other sectors, the League found itself isolated; operating as it was in the public eye but in the dark shadow of the political negotiations underway. It moreover seemed to present no clear and tangible alternative to SADTU, which in the spirit of the time, along with other like-minded organisations in the liberation movement, continued to present ‘People’s Education’ as a feasible option to CNE,\textsuperscript{35} while it also proactively pressurised the state to redress inequality and redistribute resources to areas of greatest need, specifically schools servicing the disenfranchised.

An outsider to the Congress movement-led groundswell and the early policy-making processes at the turn of the 1990s, the League nonetheless monitored events closely. Meanwhile, the NECC moving with resolve sponsored the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) to develop policy options that reflected a social democratic vision of education for a new democratic society. These options, NEPI asserted, had to be guided by

\textsuperscript{34} These included the United Democratic front (UDF), Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) and NECC amongst others.
\textsuperscript{35} Chisholm and Kgobe, p.18.
the principles of ‘non-racism, non-sexism, democracy, a unitary system and redress’. The League showed limited interest in NEPI’s mission since it was viewed to be the education wing of the ANC enmeshed in the negotiation process. The TLSA’s non-collaborationist perspective contrasted with other commentators on education, who saw the NEPI proposals and other initiatives such as the National Education and Training Forum (NETF) as an attempt to “resolve the education crisis, restructure the education system, and formulate a policy framework for the long-term transformation of education and training in South Africa”. The Department of National Education (DNE), however, reading the rapidly changing political landscape, responded decisively and released its trump card, the Education Renewal Strategy (ERS) policy document in June 1991 for public discussion.

**The Education Renewal Strategy (ERS)**

Formulated to meet the requirements of a future negotiated constitution, the DNE’s ERS report opened intense discussion on what an alternative education policy meant. Although the report was criticised on several levels by educationists and organisations in the

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37 *The Educational Journal*, April-May 1994, p.5. The League declared that NEPI’s proposals would be unable to transform education, as the proposals were envisaged to be implemented within the negotiated framework of a future South African capitalist system. The negotiated settlement would not be able to address the crisis in education nor the fundamental needs of the oppressed people, the League argued (Ibid., pp.8, 9).

38 C. Ryan, ‘Equitable Education – Can The NETF Deliver?’ *People Dynamics*, Vol.12, No.1, Nov/Dec. 1993, p.41. The NETF was formed in August 1993 and constituted a membership of twenty-six stakeholders in education, including business, government, tertiary institutions and teacher organisations. Guided by the government and NECC’s proposals in education its primary task was to look into education and training.

39 The DNE dealt with general education policy for all racially classified groups in respect of norms and standards that included; finance, syllabuses, examinations, certification of qualifications, salaries conditions of employment and professional registration of teachers. The SA constitutional dispensation of 1984 stipulated that education was an ‘own affair’, with five education departments responsible for education outside of the homelands.

40 In February 1991 De Klerk announced that a single non-racial education system would be established, but that it would be implemented in the context of a yet to be negotiated constitutional dispensation (J. Hofmeyer and P. Buckland, ‘Education System Change in South Africa’, in McGregor R. and A. (eds), *McGregors Education Alternatives*, Cape Town: Juta and Co., 1992, p.28). The ERS reflected the growing strength of the liberal faction within the NP and its educational structures. The emphasis on free association, diversity and devolution of power in the ERS testified to the growing liberal elements within the NP asserting themselves against the traditionalist conservative guard who held substantial power, and who were not intent on surrendering it.
liberation movement, measured it showed minor changes when finally presented in January 1993 as the DNE’s blueprint for change. Confident of the power it still wielded, the white-controlled House of Assembly (HoA), prior to the release of the final version of the document, authorised the legal institution of the educational strategy in schools under its jurisdiction and unilaterally implemented parts of the report. A central feature of the ERS was the DNE’s emphasis on a non-racial unitary system of education to replace the previous bureaucratic and fragmented one. The new system purported to be anchored in regional departments, and had as a central intent the facilitation of greater community or local participation through a decentralised approach to governance. In the run-up to the 1994 election, the League was preoccupied with the ERS, and it concentrated much of its efforts on analysing and critiquing the nature and implications of the report for education.

Unlike SADTU which placed emphasis on mobilising teachers in demand of their rights, the League responded systematically to the implementation of the aforementioned educational reforms through a series of articles in its journal, including at least three discussion pamphlets that appeared within a period of seven months. The organisation conducted an in-depth examination of the ERS, among other reforms in education emerging at the time, to expose the effects it would have on the oppressed community. Its

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42 The ERS report of 1993 was the final proposal put forward by the DNE after a series of ERS documents which it had developed since 1991. The South African state released three other documents outlining its policy directions for education and training, viz., Education Realities in South Africa, Department of National Education (DNE) (June 1991); A Curriculum Model for Education in South Africa, Discussion document, Committee of Heads of Education Departments (November 1991); Investigation into a National Training Strategy for the RSA, National Training Board (NTB)/Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) (1991). One should therefore not view the ERS in isolation from these documents as it formed a combined strategy.
44 Nineteen departments of education existed across South Africa, creating a large bureaucracy based on the principle of separate development - apartheid - where education was separated along ‘racial’ lines. One national department governed the norms and standards for all other eighteen (provincial and other racially defined) departments.
45 Three pamphlets, discussion documents as the League termed them, appeared from February to August of 1993. Although this study focuses only on the League and its members’ responses to the ERS, the report encompassed formal and non-formal education as it impacted university, technikon and schooling, particularly secondary schooling. Pre-primary and primary education did not receive as much attention in the report relative to the other levels of education.
investigation into the ERS covered mostly the political, social and economic issues embedded in and pertinent to the report, and it linked the educational restructuring process to the escalating crises in education, but more particularly to what it saw as the collaborationist process unwinding in the form of the negotiations on the political and economic fronts.\textsuperscript{46} The organisation responded specifically to the issues of non-racism, as defined by the ruling party, multi-culturalism, the semi-privatisation of schools or Model C schools, rationalisation and teacher retrenchments. These issues were interlinked and intersected with the ERS proposals for the League. It made a concerted effort to situate the alterations in education within the changing political and economic structures of South African society and the world economy; an economy which was experiencing a deep recession manifested in acute unemployment and poverty.\textsuperscript{47} What follows is a summary of the organisation’s response to the reforms and the dilemmas it posed for the League.

The ‘race’ issue: the ERS and Model C

Implicit to the ERS and reflecting its interpretation of non-racialism, was the introduction of fee-paying schools. In terms of this policy innovation, the salaries of teachers would be paid by the state while parents via management councils determined the school’s admission policies and contributed to its maintenance.\textsuperscript{48} Although the ERS gave support to the principle of free basic schooling, it envisaged universal schooling as a process that would continue to the end of the primary phase. Thereafter, schooling would continue to be public and therefore state supported, but at a considerably lower level, requiring parents to carry much more of the financial cost through fees.\textsuperscript{49} This approach contained the framework for


\textsuperscript{48} The open schooling system was based on the devolution of responsibilities to schools (see Department of National Education, \textit{Education Renewal Strategy}, Pretoria, 1992, pp.80, 81). White parents voted on the feasibility of opening the schools to other racially classified groups, which according to the education ministry had to constitute 72% of a total of 80% of the white parent population.

the formerly white schools to become ‘open’ and what has come to be known as Model C schools.\textsuperscript{50} The League opposed the unilateral imposition of the Model C policy at the outset, for it saw in it the implementation of the ERS.\textsuperscript{51} It also perceived the Model C as a strategy to salvage the jobs of white teachers at the HoA schools,\textsuperscript{52} due to these schools drop in enrolment. In this respect, it was not far off the mark, as some of the HoA schools had been admitting students of colour since the late 1980s to stabilise their dwindling numbers.\textsuperscript{53} The restructuring of education, specifically of former white schools, thus affirmed the latter practice, legally compelling them to open their gates to other classified groups.

For the League, the emergent reforms in education were ‘short term changes’ aimed at the re-arrangement and restructuring of the system whilst preserving and even strengthening white privilege.\textsuperscript{54} This was vindicated when the open door policy of Model C schools translated rapidly into parents from the disenfranchised communities, who could afford it, enrolling their children at the open schools, as they were perceived to be better resourced, and offering a better quality of education than the community schools. This migration caused tensions in the disenfranchised communities as differences between the ‘standards’\textsuperscript{55} and ‘quality’\textsuperscript{56} of historically resourced and under-resourced schools came to

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{The Educational Journal}, December 1992, p.3; April-May 1992, pp.1, 3; April-May 1993, p.6.
\textsuperscript{52} Interview with I. Abrahams, 10 October 1995.
\textsuperscript{53} M. Bot, \textit{The Blackboard Debate: Hurdles, Options and Opportunities in School Integration}, Johannesburg:
\textsuperscript{54} Teachers’ League of South Africa, \textit{Short Term Changes In Education}, Cape Town: TLSA Conference, April 1993.
\textsuperscript{55} The notion of standards for disenfranchised parents became a key incentive in a business environment where black education was perceived to be producing matriculants poor at language, mathematics, and science, in an environment of growing numbers of underemployed and unemployed (Bot, 1990, p.28; E.B Fiske and H.F. Ladd, \textit{Elusive Equity: education reform in post-apartheid South Africa}, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, p.55).
\textsuperscript{56} Quality Model C tuition vis-à-vis education in disenfranchised community schools became a central argument for the move to schools previously white. Preserving quality education at Model C schools meant they applied selection criteria that included entrance tests combined with subjective measures and in certain cases remedial assistance, to offset the apparent threat integration posed to the former white schools’ standards (Bot, pp.iv, 43).
constitute an important terrain of dispute in the early 1990s, with ‘race’ and class comprising central issues in the wider community.\textsuperscript{57}

A central rationale driving the ‘open’ school initiative was ‘racial’ integration as propounded in the ERS.\textsuperscript{58} The League challenged the notion of ‘openness’ propagated by Model C proponents. It firstly rejected proportional representation, based as it was on ‘race’, that ensured white students remained in the majority at Model C institutions,\textsuperscript{59} and which gave the impression of harmonious integrated schools.\textsuperscript{60} Secondly, and more critically, it opposed the ERS proposal of decentralisation and devolution of autonomy to community or individual institutions within the framework of a single education authority.\textsuperscript{61}

The organisation saw in the ERS the NP’s federal proposal which it presented at the negotiating table, where parliament would protect the socio-political rights of individuals and the community.\textsuperscript{62} This context of regionalism, the TLSA contended, allowed white communities to retain their economic status, and to dictate ‘the admissions, medium of instruction, and curriculum policies of their schools’.\textsuperscript{63} This preservation of separate exclusiveness was perceived by the organisation as giving emphasis to ‘common values’, what it termed ‘eiesoortigheid’ and ‘andersoortigheid’ (one’s own ‘special identity’ and

\textsuperscript{57} See for example the letter to \textit{Weekly Mail \& Guardian}, ‘What parents say to change’, 25 November to 1 December 1994; also Carrim and Sayed, pp.21-24. Interview with E. van der Heyden, 25 August 2005.
\textsuperscript{58} Department of National Education, \textit{Education Renewal Strategy}, pp.16, 17.
\textsuperscript{59} The racial identity of HoA schools remained the same, since only 26% of white parents who voted for their schools to be opened would accept more than 40% black pupils into their schools (Bot, p.vi). Moreover, according to Piet Clase Minister of Education for the House of Assembly (HoA), if a school intended remaining registered with the white education department the majority of students had to be white (Bot, p.111; See Fiske and Ladd, p.51).
\textsuperscript{60} Interview with N. Jeftha, 5 May 2000. Chisholm, similarly, indicated that “parents could vote to: privatise; open the school to other ‘race’ groups providing the schools remained 51 per cent white and ‘the ethos and character’ of the school was retained; or close” (L. Chisholm, ‘Legacy and resource base – Conflict in education – New policies’, in G. Moss and I. Obery (eds), \textit{South Africa Review 6: From ‘Red Friday’ To Codesa}, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992, p.286).
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{The Educational Journal}, December 1993, p.4.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{The Educational Journal}, March 1993, pp.2, 9; Teachers’ League of South Africa, \textit{The Political Context}, pp.3, 4.
one’s ‘differentness’ from others), where culture substituted for ‘race’.\textsuperscript{65} It accordingly saw direct parallels between multi-culturalism and multi-racism, since for it the multi-cultural approach ensconced the conventional idea of ‘race’ as a natural phenomenon, a product of what Dirlik called ‘historical inequality’.\textsuperscript{66}

The League’s rejection of multiculturalism encompassed the ‘use of indigenous languages’ as ‘media of instruction’.\textsuperscript{67} For the League, multilingualism, what it termed ‘moedertaalonderwys’ or (mother-tongue instruction) also had ERS endorsement,\textsuperscript{68} and was being promoted by the apartheid ideologues to subject people of colour to an inferior status,\textsuperscript{69} in a milieu where English was dominant. Conflating multilingualism with multi-racism\textsuperscript{70} and multi-culturalism,\textsuperscript{71} the League punted English as the medium of instruction in schools so as to expedite the achievement of a non-racial school system.\textsuperscript{72} After thorough research on global trends, it later argued against the imposition of English on learners whose home and community language was mother tongue, on grounds that it disadvantaged and ‘discriminated against’ them.\textsuperscript{73} Instead, it asserted, ‘the learning-teaching environment should be bilingual or multilingual from the pupils’ third year or so at school’.\textsuperscript{74} In the Western Cape, this meant that all educators had to be proficient in ‘English and Xhosa, or English Xhosa and Afrikaans’, it declared.\textsuperscript{75}

In keeping with its non-racial tradition, the League advanced the notion of ‘universalism’,\textsuperscript{76} or in Hobsbawm’s terms ‘the history of humanity’,\textsuperscript{77} that ‘there is only one race, the human

\textsuperscript{65} The Educational Journal, March 1993, p.4.
\textsuperscript{67} Department of National Education, The Education Renewal Strategy, p.16.
\textsuperscript{68} Department of National Education, The Education Renewal Strategy, p.15.
\textsuperscript{69} The Educational Journal, September 1956, pp.5, 6. For the League, it was not Afrikaans as a language that was rejected, but its misuse. See also The Educational Journal, July-August 1988, p.2.
\textsuperscript{70} Multi-racism or the view that many ‘races’ exist, was the converse of non-racialism for the TLSA.
\textsuperscript{71} This may be deduced from the 1994 presidential address (I. Abrahams, ‘South Africa: Socio-Economic Patterns of the Future’? Presidential Address, Cape Town: Teachers’ League of South Africa, 1994, p.5).
\textsuperscript{73} The Educational Journal, July-August 1998, p.8.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} The Educational Journal, April-May 1993, p.6.
race... [and] that South Africa is one nation, one people, undivided’. To ‘unmask’ the ‘deceptions’ of the ruling class and to ‘debunk its racist myths’, would remain, as in the 1950s and 1960s, a central strategy of the League’s non-collaborationism. The particular configuration of ‘race’ and culture in South Africa continued to play a pivotal role in how the organisation engaged education.

**Making compromises**

A confluence of factors changed the League’s original rejection of Model C schools. Principal was the increasing migration by sections of the disenfranchised to the open schools. This was expedited by the desegregation of residential areas that accompanied the scrapping of the Group Areas Act, Population Registration Acts and the revoking of the Separate Amenities Act of 1990 — political changes which put pressure on the admission policies of those schools still resisting integration. Noting the turning of the tide, including from some of those in its own ranks, the TLSA relented, as Abrahams recounted:

“Eventually you could no longer, sort of, hold the tide back ... the movement had become a wave of people leaving schools classified ‘non-white’ into the Model C schools”.

Despite its shift, the League was mindful of the fact that schools affected by the ERS were those in the minority, primarily those represented in the racialised tricameral parliament, whereas neither the homeland nor the DET schools were affected. As a former president noted:

Opening the schools meant that the urban schools were open. But the schools outside the urban areas were in fact still closed ‘racial’ schools ... In the rural areas, you don’t find

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80 League members also started sending their children to the Model C schools (Interview with R. Jakoet, 6 August 1999 and interview with M. De Leeu, 1 February 2005).
81 Interview with I. Abrahams, 24 March 2000.
mixed schools, they still classified schools. You see this is a very short artificial thing ... to make people believe that schools are open.  

That government was perpetuating its ‘divide and rule’ strategy via the ‘open’ schools policy and not addressing inequalities would remain of prime concern to the League.  

This will be taken up in the Chapter 4.

Remnants of apartheid education: the class question and non-collaboration

Despite dropping its guardedness about Model C schools, the League’s resistance to the early 1990s educational reforms sharpened on other fronts as the continuities of ‘economic and social segregation’ became overt. The ERS’ endorsement of school-leaving exit points alarmed the organisation, for it signalled the end of the state-funded learning-phase and the moment parents had to assume financial responsibility for their children’s further schooling. It, moreover, evoked for the organisation the “De Lange Commission and its predecessors the Eiselen-De Vos Malan Commissions, which all had as their objective finding ways and means of creating a ‘werkgereed’ (ready for work) society of oppressed persons”.

The economic differentiation, according to the League, would be the intensification of class differences, where the academic route to tertiary education would be reserved for the ‘privileged, wealthy few... thus reinforcing the creation of a system of education along social class lines inside the much-vaunted non-racial system’. Of primary concern to the TLSA was the issue of class collaboration: the hiving off of a section of the oppressed community who would ‘become a class ally of the white minority group’ and who would

83 E. Steenveld (Interview with E. Steenveld and S. Williams, 30 April 2000). See also Teachers’ League of South Africa, Short Term Changes In Education. And, Chisholm, ‘Legacy and resource base – Conflict in education – New policies’, p.286.
84 Teachers’ League of South Africa, Short Term Changes In Education.
85 Interview with M. Hodges, 5 May 2000.
assist it in retaining its hegemonic position.\textsuperscript{89} In this scenario, privilege would be extended through the Model C option. As Donaldson observed, Model C schools experienced less difficulty retaining and acquiring what they and many parents perceived as good teachers, owing to their governing bodies’ ability to supplement teacher departmental salaries with bonuses and other ad hoc benefits.\textsuperscript{90} For Fiske and Ladd, this arrangement benefited high fee-paying schools in particular, by enabling them to employ the quantity and quality of teachers necessary to achieve a higher pass rate.\textsuperscript{91} As Hanmer incisively put it, “high fees meant well-equipped schools, extra teachers, extra facilities, and so... Low fees, or attempts to eliminate fees altogether, [meant] the schools suffered immediately or directly. There was a direct relationship between the ability of parents to pay and what they got in the schools for their children”.\textsuperscript{92}

**Educational reform privatisation and the economy**

A crucial part of the ERS was that it set in motion the norms and standards for a future South Africa where the government would in specified areas gradually relinquish responsibility for the provision of education, making way for privatisation to incrementally become the cornerstone of the education system. Recognising this in the ERS a TLSA member remarked:

> The ERS was already predicting ... that is, prescribing the spending per head in education.... There would be ratios; pupil teacher ratios, classroom sizes, it was working out the economics and budgets of the future ... predicting what it would cost if the state had to pay for all the education, ... that there was no way the state could find the money, even into the year 2000. So it was then that they set out to plan inside of that document ways and means of privatising, basically privatising the schools.\textsuperscript{93}


\textsuperscript{90} Donaldson, p.329.


\textsuperscript{92} Interview with T. Hanmer, 25 August 2005.

\textsuperscript{93} Interview with N. Jeftha, 5 May 2000. The ERS put forward a Learner: educator ratio in terms of a financing scenario for school education of ‘35:1 (primary school phase) and 32:1 (secondary school phase)’ (Department of National Education, *Education Renewal Strategy*, p.112).
The cutbacks in education and thus the semi-privatisation of schooling was the catalyst for schools charging higher fees and stifling equalizing possibilities.\textsuperscript{94} This commoditisation of education underpinned the ERS for the League.\textsuperscript{95}

The organisation equally slated the ANC’s \textit{Policy Framework for Education and Training} released in January 1994, for it saw little difference between the ERS and the ANC’s education and training policy for a post-apartheid South Africa. The organisation decreed: “In both the NP and ANC blueprints the assumption is either that by Standard 7 - age 15 or 16 - children are mature enough to make choices ... Both blueprints are oriented towards preparing large numbers of children for the labour market”.\textsuperscript{96} It moreover found evidence of the ANC Economic Department head Trevor Manuel, approving ‘user charges’ for ‘clients’\textsuperscript{97} in a future schooling system.\textsuperscript{98} Well aware of the financial dynamics, and that education consumed the largest slice of state expenditure,\textsuperscript{99} it was not coincidental that Steenveld’s 1993 presidential address focused almost entirely on the South African economy and its implications for education. He clearly saw the state of the economy as one of the key uncertainties affecting educational provision in a future South Africa.

A key driving force behind the government’s stringent reforms in the public sector in the 1990s were the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB).\textsuperscript{100} Having studied these financial institutions’ policies in relation to developing countries, the League

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\textsuperscript{94} The education inequality was put down to: “Nine years of mainly state-financed schooling (in most cases from Grade 1 to Grade 9) 95% (and) three years of partly state-financed schooling (in most cases from Grade 10 to Grade 12) 75%” (Department of National Education, \textit{Education Renewal Strategy}, pp.118, 135).

\textsuperscript{95} E. Steenveld (Interview with E. Steenveld and S. Williams, 30 April 2000); \textit{The Educational Journal}, April-May 1992, pp.1, 2; April-May 1993, p.3.


\textsuperscript{97} The term ‘client/s’ is often used in the ERS as a substitute for parent/s, and reflected the use of business terminology when considering education policy.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{The Educational Journal}, June 1993, p.15.


ran a series of articles in *The Educational Journal* exposing their negative effects.\(^{101}\) Its analysis placed squarely at the door of the IMF and World Bank the South African government’s rationalisation and retrenchment initiative.\(^{102}\) These cut back measures, the League argued, were evident in the ERS with its emphasis on ratios and right-sizing, and thus by implication retrenchments.\(^{103}\)

The TLSA vehemently opposed retrenchments. Instead of dismissing teachers, Ivan Abrahams of the TLSA argued they had to be supported and affirmed.\(^{104}\) That teacher salaries accounted for the largest part of the education budget, and were a prime area for cost cutting,\(^ {105}\) did not dissuade him from resolutely contending that teachers were ‘the single most crucial resource that can deal with the crises in the schools’.\(^{106}\) Critical of the ANC, NEPI and NETF for undermining this vital part of education, he called on school communities to pressurise the government into finding ways to deal with the immediate crisis in education through means other than retrenching teachers.\(^ {107}\) While the League maintained its non-collaborationist rejection of the emergent educational reforms in education, the high ground it assumed would be eroded when the financial incentives of these self-same reforms roused the interest of teachers who had long service records in the profession.


\(^{102}\) *The Educational Journal*, April- May 1993, p.11; S. Williams (Interview with E. Steenveld and S. Williams, 30 April 2000).

\(^{103}\) Interview with N. Jeftha, 5 May 2000. The ERS put forward a Learner: Educator ratio in terms of a financing scenario for school education of ‘35:1 (primary school phase) and 32:1 (secondary school phase)’ (*Education Renewal Strategy*, Department of National Education, p.112).


\(^{105}\) On the proportion of the budget allocated to teachers’ salaries in this period see Chisholm (Chisholm, *Towards Educational Redistribution In South Africa: Policy Options*, pp.2, 6).


\(^{107}\) Retrenchments, for the League, were the effect of the state’s attempts to save money in education (*The Educational Journal*, April-May 1993, p.11). This perspective was based on the ERS report (Department of National Education, *Education Renewal Strategy*, pp.107, 108).
Theory and practice: TLSA teachers and the Voluntary Severance Package (VSP)

The commitment of League teachers to their profession was seriously tested when the government presented a lucrative financial retirement package to long serving teachers, in an effort to prevail upon them to leave the schooling system. The League immediately saw the package deal as ‘an attempt to get teachers to dismiss themselves from their posts’.\(^{108}\) The TLSA’s journal provided a comprehensive breakdown of the procedures and guidelines conceived by the education department for teacher retrenchments, and the implications of this strategy for the teaching profession.\(^{109}\) To counter the cutback measure, the League called on parents, teachers and students to resist the downsizing action and to obstruct those collaborating in its implementation:

> Teachers must unite on their staffs to compel those principals who will be willing to do the department’s dirty work not to identify teachers for retrenchments or to fill in the necessary forms. And teachers and parents must unite to oppose and counter the role of those school committees that will be willing to assist principals and inspectors to identify teachers who will then be forced to retire.\(^{110}\)

The League, moreover, joined SADTU and other organisations to protest against the imminent teacher retrenchments and the unilateral restructuring of education.\(^{111}\) On these grounds it engaged in a series of public protest actions.\(^{112}\) This will be elaborated on in the next chapter.

Despite the organisation’s stated opposition to the education department’s package, a handful of League teachers, nonetheless, applied for it. Much the same as differences arose within the organisation when members sent their children to Model C schools, tensions

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\(^{108}\) *The Educational Journal*, April-May 1993, p.10; Interview with T. Hanmer, 25 August 2005. The HoR were intent on eliminating at least 200 posts in this fashion (Chisholm and Kgobe, p.13).

\(^{109}\) A teacher declared in ‘excess’ implied that their services were terminated in terms of the pupil-teacher ratio, and the curriculum needs of the school. The teacher concerned would be construed as exceeding the schools staffing requirements and therefore deemed redundant. The League warned its readership that posts occupied by teachers who decided to opt for the retirement package would not be filled by the education department but abolished, leaving many newly qualified teachers battling to find teaching posts.

\(^{110}\) *The Educational Journal*, April-May 1993, p.11.

\(^{111}\) On 5 May 1993 it shared a platform with student and teacher organisations, Parent, Teacher, Student Associations (PTSAs) and the Mass Democratic Movement at the Good Hope Centre, where Abrahams spelt out the organisation’s opposition to the rationalisation process including the retrenchment of teachers, closure of Teacher Training colleges and privatisation of schools (*The Educational Journal*, April-May 1993, p.3). League teachers were also active in the burgeoning PTSA movement, such as the Southern Suburbs PTSA Forum. This will be commented on in the next chapter.

emerged around the voluntary severance package (VSP). Lategan’s words on the matter are noteworthy:

At the time I was unhappy about some people leaving because it was still a time when we had lots of people in the system, the Teachers’ League, and we could have still made a difference, that was when we were dealt quite a cruel blow … I wasn’t very happy with them … I mean, we [those members] could have become the principals …

De Leeu was similarly disappointed by the withdrawal of TLSA teachers from schools: “it was a sad day, it was a sad time to think of it … the thing is that people should have refused that voluntary severance package …” The president of the League at the time, however, had a different view:

There were many members of the organisation who took the packages, right, and we couldn’t now disqualify members because of them having taken packages … because in many cases they took packages because eventually they found if they didn’t they would be declared in excess.

The TLSA did not officially address the matter of the VSP within the organisation, and left individual members to exercise their personal discretion. Thus, while it was clearly informative in analysing the ERS, it was unable to curtail its members exiting the system. As a consequence, the organisation lost its foothold in the oppressed schooling communities at a crucial time when ‘possibilities’ presented potential benefits for the organisation. In this critical period of ‘social change’, the departure of a few of its experienced members from schools where they had influence would later critically affect it.

Despite the depletion of its in-service teachers, the TLSA managed to retain a large percentage of its members who had left the teaching profession, many of whom continued to serve the organisation in their retirement. In fact, many retired members, no longer curtailed by the demands of the schooling system, appeared to intensify their political and pedagogical work. These members were to continue to serve the organisation well into the dawn of the new South Africa.

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113 Interview with A. Lategan, 13 December 2005.
114 Interview with M. De Leeu, 1 February 2006.
115 E. Steenveld (Interview with E. Steenveld and S. Williams, 30 April 2000).
The 1994 Election

The League’s boycott of the 1994 election, an event it considered premature and fraudulent, was rooted in the Unity Movement’s policy of non-collaboration. Although in principle the non-collaborationist position was shared by most left formations, they differed amongst themselves on whether to boycott the election. Discussed in broad strokes below is the TLSA’s engagement with the party politics engulfing the country at the time, including the feasibility of the organisation’s political and educational alternative to it, which, along with the NUM, it sought to present to the South African population. In terms of this evaluation, it is important to note that not all TLSA members were beholden to the NUM, nor did those who were, follow it uncritically.

From the time the NUM and TLSA became aware of the ANC talks with the NP in the late 1980s, up to the Kempton Park settlement that culminated in the election of 27 April 1994, they publically declared their rejection of the peace process. The rationale for the TLSA’s election boycott was systematically spelt out in four editions of its journal. A central argument that informed the NUM and League’s anti-election position was their contention that most people were unaware of what they were voting for. The two organisations’ contended that the negotiated settlement had determined the framework and content of the vote:

This election will not be about who can vote or who will be voted for, but what the South African electorate will be expected to vote for. It is as clear as daylight that the April election is primarily to endorse what has been decided at these negotiations.


118 The anti-election position of the League and NUM did not mean they opposed election politics or parliamentarianism.


121 Letter written to a daily newspaper by N. Maharaj of the NUM (The Argus, ‘Not What We Have Struggled For’, 7 December 1993). The League was also aware of the protocols in the interim constitution with which the future 1999 constitution had to comply (The Educational Journal, January-February 1994, p.4).
For both organisations’, therefore, not only had the negotiated settlement proscribed the outcome of the election, but the vote itself fell short of granting the full franchise and hence equal citizenship as encapsulated in the Ten-Point Programme. The ANC’s consent to minority rights and therewith a regional-cum-federalist type government, as formulated in the ‘sunset clauses’, raised the spectre, for the NUM and TLSA, of a qualified or conditional vote: one that had a predetermined outcome. The compromise effectively secured power sharing for five years within a consensus-based Government of National Unity (GNU), and was deemed a reneging on majority rule by those on the left. A leading NUM member underscored this point in a letter to The Argus: “Negotiations have merely succeeded in allaying the fears of the so-called minorities to ensure that their ill-gotten privileges under apartheid will not be threatened”. For the TLSA only nation building based on the vision of a non-racial state and majority rule would truly embody a new South Africa. Along with a broad but numerically small section of the left, the League presented itself as the torchbearer of the original demands of the liberation movement. To this end, it embarked on an educational campaign to inform the ‘masses’ of why they should not vote.

125 The Argus, ‘Not What We Have Struggled For’, 7 December, 1993. Aside from protecting group rights at national level, the compromise ‘guaranteed 30 per cent of the seats in select local government structures for minorities’, and “afforded minority representatives in municipal councils a ‘formal veto over redistributive budgets’’ (Marais, South Africa Limits to Change: The Political economy of Transition, p.92).
127 The Educational Journal appeared to use this epithet as a substitute for the politically oppressed people. The TLSA and NUM campaign involved, ‘knock and drop’ pamphleteering, placard demonstrations and public meetings (Interview with N. Jephta, 5 May 2000).
Land, non-racism and the election

A fundamental concern of the liberation movement was the issue of land or the land question. For the NUM and TLSA, the Constitution’s proposed Bill of Rights counteracted the ability of a future ANC government to implement a land reform programme. The entrenchment of private property in the Bill of Rights, they argued, nullified any redistributive potential of a new government, and would thus not address past and deep-rooted inequalities associated with colonialism and landlessness.

As with the land issue, the League saw the demand for a non-racial society being compromised in front of its very eyes. It expressly opposed what it saw as a highly racialised election, one which the media punted as non-racial. Here, was the immediate evidence to vindicate its boycott campaign it argued, and through which it attempted to harness support. It singled-out, in particular, the ANC and NP’s use of personalities in the ‘coloured’ community to gain the ‘coloured’ vote, which political figureheads like the former UDF spokesperson Allan Boesak and the Labour Party leader, Allan Hendrickse personified.

The TLSA and NUM’s opposition to the ‘racial’ character of the election, ironically, was turned on them when commentators branded their boycott politics a manifestation of ‘coloured’ consciousness. Hermann Giliomee, a leading academic and political figure for the South African government in the initial 1988 Dakar talks with the ANC, asserted,

128 See the Freedom Charter, Ten-Point Programme, Azanian Manifesto, and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) position on this.
131 The TLSA also pointed to Mandela’s promise to the ‘Cape Coloured’, ‘Cape Malay’ and ‘Muslim Community’, and saw it as a racist ploy to win ‘coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘Muslim’ votes in the Cape. The profiling of individuals such as ‘beauty queens’, ‘ex-beauty queens’ and ‘sportspersons’ because of their ‘social coloration’ had as its main intention the securing of votes, the organisation asserted (The Educational Journal, March 1994, pp.14, 15).
132 The Educational Journal, December 1993, p.6. Allan Hendrickse was the leader of the ‘coloured’ Labour Party that participated in the tricameral parliament. The League and NUM. regarded him as an arch ‘collaborator’ and ‘quisling’. The Labour Party split in the run-up to the election and was assimilated by the NP, ANC and other political parties.
133 F. Van Zyl Slabbert, The Other Side Of History: An anecdotal reflection on political transition in South
with what appeared to be little understanding of the tradition of the Unity Movement (UM), that the NUM boycott politics represented nothing more than traditional ‘racial’ perceptions associated with abstentionism.  

Other dissenting perspectives on the Unity Movement’s non-racial outlook included Simons, Adhikari, Alexander and Sandwith, all of whom alluded to the questionable nature of the Unity Movement’s long-standing non-racial tradition. Adhikari, for example, challenged the Unity Movement’s claim to be the traditional custodian of the non-racial ethos, asserting that before the 1960s its leadership was prepared to make tactical concessions to ‘racial’ identity as a precursor to achieving the preliminary goal of national liberation.

Alexander, on the other hand, asserted that the Unity Movement erred in not going far enough to consolidate non-racialism, which he argued, remained at the level of rhetoric:

Non-racialism was the main sort of ideological pride and force of the Unity Movement in particular. … We didn’t [however] reinforce the non-racial ethos. The result is that we spoke about it ... so it was always just a rhetorical flourish, an ethos for the middle class, and never deep rooted enough ... that was the mistake the movement made, the whole movement, not just the Unity Movement.

Alexander’s diagnoses resonated in part with that of Sandwith, who similarly observed that although the NEUM was explicitly non-racial and attempted to dispense with the category of ‘race’ altogether, the TLSA and Anti-CAD were in fact organisations’ of

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134 While the NUM and TLSA gave support to the notion and practice of non-racism, its ranks in the 1990s were composed of predominantly ‘coloured’ middle-class intellectuals. Consequently, the NUM and League’s opposition to the election was viewed by their political critics as the traditional voices of the elite among the ‘coloured’ community, since ‘among the coloured intellectual elite there is a long tradition, dating back to the 1930s, of non-collaboration in politics’ (Cape Times, ‘Coloured abstention a crucial factor in polls’, 9 December 1993).

140 Alexander, A discussion on identity with cultural activists.
141 Sandwith, p.3.
‘exclusively coloured members’. She, however, like Adhikari, ignored the crucial and deliberate anti-racial practices of the Unity Movement in the ways it sought to work against ‘race’ and ‘racial’ identification. For example, the main spokesperson of the AAC I.B. Tabata, a founder member of the Anti-CAD (the so-called ‘coloured’ section of the UM) was, to make the point, officially classified as African under the apartheid system. The TLSA-CATA membership, too, were often indistinguishable, especially within the Cape Teachers’ Federal Council (CTFC) of the 1950s. A leading CATA member C.M. Kobus, for instance, who taught in Elsies-River in the 1950s, was also an ex officio member of the TLSA, and V. Wessels of the Anti-CAD worked in the TLSA and CATA. The odiousness of the ‘racial’ categorizing of people to the Unity Movement must not be underestimated, and to impute a ‘racial’ agenda to the organisation, as Adhikari does, is to misunderstand it significantly.

To the Teachers’ League, the continuity of apartheid racism not only persisted, but intensified in the election period, primarily because of racialised campaigning. The NP’s unpredicted victory in the Western Cape confirmed the racialised environment of the region, and evoked dismay and consternation from commentators, one of whom interpreted it as ‘crude racism as to why coloureds voted overwhelmingly for the National Party’. Nelson Mandela’s first state of the nation address, furthermore, spoke directly to the ‘racial’ tensions in the region. The Argus and the Educational Journal made much of Mandela’s commentary, particularly his attempt to placate the fears of ‘whites’, which seemingly ignored the predominantly black electorate from mainly working class communities who had voted him into office. This racialised climate confirmed, as Wolpe and Dudley would have it, continuities with the apartheid era, and gave credence to the

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143 A discussion with E. Carollissen, 23 January 2008. This integration of membership points to a demographic mix within the TLSA, which Adhikari and Sandwith fail to notice.
observation that an ‘interiorising’\textsuperscript{148} of ‘race’ and class had taken place and that the ‘class struggle and the struggle against racism’ were ‘parts of one struggle’.\textsuperscript{149}

Apart from challenging the ‘racial’ised tone and content of the election, the League questioned the democratic claims made for it. \textit{The Educational Journal} pointed out that the political party, not the voter, decided finally on representatives to Parliament.\textsuperscript{150} Instead, it and the NUM, suggested, by way of opposition, that a stronger form of participatory democracy was required. With this in mind, they appeared to invoke Lenin’s seminal text \textit{State and Revolution}.\textsuperscript{151} Though neither of the organisations made clear and unequivocal pronouncements on the matter, they evidently rejected the newly introduced Westminster system of appointing parliamentarians according to party political affiliations. The election would benefit none other than the ‘Herrenvolk’ in their efforts to ‘maintain, even intensify, the present politico-economic-social education set-up’, the League stated.\textsuperscript{152}

\textbf{The left and parliamentarism}

There was general concurrence among left organisations, the SACP aside,\textsuperscript{153} that the negotiated settlement was a betrayal of the interests of the black working class.\textsuperscript{154} Whether or not to participate in the election, however, was a thorny issue which produced sharp disagreement among them, with certain groups interpreting the achievement of the vote a victory for the working class and the liberation movement. To boycott the election, for them, was a tactical error, for they believed the ruling class had been compelled to concede


\textsuperscript{150} \textit{The Educational Journal}, March 1994, p.7.


\textsuperscript{153}The SACP was part of the tri-partite alliance and therefore part of the negotiated settlement.

\textsuperscript{154}Left organisations of the liberation movement noted that no fundamental alteration in the political economy of a future South Africa had or could have been negotiated, and thus saw the negotiated settlement as a sell-out. The League claimed: ‘that to vote in Election ’94 would be a betrayal of those ideals for which the real freedom fighters have struggled and some died’ (\textit{The Educational Journal}, March 1994, p.8).
to the franchise for all South Africans. The anti-boycott movement, however, was divided. Some opted to stand as independent political parties in the election, while others supported a critical vote for the ANC.

The NUM/TLSA, Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and Qibla, took a different position; they came out publicly against the election. Hosea Jaffe of the NUM, for example, opposed participation in parliament. Vociferous in his denunciation of those socialists who intended entering parliament, Jaffe contended that socialists who participated in the new parliament (and those who attempted to) were colluding with imperialism. He conveyed the NUM’s rationale for the boycott of the election and parliament:

To go into that structure under the particular, peculiar conditions existing in South Africa: this half imperialism half colony ... is collaboration with imperialism and nothing else. ... it is just not a matter of strategy or tactics, it is the application of the principle of the class struggle ... we’re helping the oppressed people to be fooled by this thing. It is a fraud, the South African government is not a legitimate government, the South African parliament is not a legitimate parliament, the local authorities that will be set up are not legitimate ... the real situation requires a real Marxist analyses of what you’ve got on hand here, and not general theories about international capitalism ....

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155 T. Bell of the International Socialist Movement (ISM) and N. Alexander of the Workers’ Organisation of Socialist Action (WOSA) among other left formations at the 1995 University of the Western Cape (UWC) conference endorsed the position that the election was a victory for the working class.
156 Left organisations participating in the election included the Workers’ List Party (WLP), which was an amalgam of the Independent Socialist Movement (ISM) and WOSA, and the Workers’ International to Rebuild the Fourth International (WIRFI).
157 These were left formations such as the Comrades for a Workers’ Government (CWG), Marxist Workers’ Tendency (MWT) and International Socialists of South Africa (ISSA). A critical vote for the ANC meant for these organisations that they supported in a united front the defeat of the NP at the polls and the election to government of the ANC. These groups believed that the working class would be better positioned to challenge an ANC government to deliver on workers’ demands.
158 Qibla, a militant Muslim organisation based mainly in the Western Cape, was formed soon after the Iranian revolution of 1978. It had a close working relationship with the PAC during the apartheid era but parted ways with the Africanist organisation when it decided to participate in the election. Qibla opposed the election because it believed that the new South Africa would not deliver on social justice, which they felt would be guaranteed by a predominantly Muslim government.
159 H. Jaffe, ‘Local Government’, A panel discussion with Hosea Jaffe and Kevin French, Socialism ’95, University of the Western Cape, April 1995 (audio recording).
160 Imperialism here refers to the Leninist concept, meaning a phase in the development of world capitalism (see Lenin, Lenin Selected Works, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, pp.231-233).
161 Jaffe, ‘Local Government’, A panel discussion with Hosea Jaffe and Kevin French, Socialism ’95. Jaffe in the journal Think, qualified his interpretation of South Africa’s relationship to the world or global imperialist economy. He argued that the South African economy was not independent but part of and open to the world capitalist economy. South Africa, according to Jaffe, had a ‘duplex political economy’, which meant a ‘“white” imperialism atop a ‘black’ colony, in one geopolitic’ (H. Jaffe, ‘South Africa: Neo-Colony or Imperialism or Both?’, Think, December 1996, p.19).
Socialists who opposed the boycott, argued fiercely that the election platform presented a prime opportunity for them to propagate and inform the public, primarily the black working class, of their socialist vision.\textsuperscript{162} Alexander, for one, taking exception to Jaffe, particularly his curt accusation that those socialists who participated in the election were ‘collaborators’, retorted:

socialists participate in parliamentary elections under certain conditions, it’s a tactical question, it’s not a question of principle ... whether you liked the compromise which came about or not, birth is dirty ... this parliament is our version of a bourgeois democratic parliament, with all the warts on it. ... Once we are clear about the function of, or what revolutionary socialists do in a bourgeois parliament, why they use it for propaganda, revolutionary propaganda, etcetera ... the next question is: “What are communists doing in government ... are they communists?” My answer is ‘no’ of course, they cannot be. Communists don’t participate in bourgeois parliaments, they don’t enter into bourgeois government. We have to build the organisations of the working class including the revolutionary socialist party of that class ... outside of parliament and that’s the centre of gravity of all our activities.\textsuperscript{163}

The polemic on ‘parliamentarianism’ remained a vexing issue for socialists, creating tensions between those who were prepared to participate and those who did not.\textsuperscript{164} Abrahams put the League’s official position bluntly: “The system of government that will emerge after the April 1994 election will be as great a fraud as that which resulted from the elections for the tricameral parliament in 1984”.\textsuperscript{165} Overlooked by the TLSA and NUM, however, was that the Bolsheviks participated in what Lenin claimed, was the ‘most counter-revolutionary parliaments’ and, in fact, viewed it as ‘indispensable to the party of the revolutionary proletariat ....’.\textsuperscript{166}

Rather than draw on historical revolutionary precedents, the NUM and League pointed to the continuities in the post-1994 economy to support its stance on parliament, since for them economic matters played a primary role in society; with class struggle the main

\textsuperscript{162} Kevin French of the Independent Socialist Movement (ISM) conveyed this position at the socialist conference at UWC, April 1995 (K. French, ‘Local Government’, A panel discussion with Hosea Jaffe and Kevin French, Socialism ’95, University of the Western Cape, April 1995 [audio recording]). The International Socialist Movement (ISM), formed in April 1995, did not participate in the 1994 election.\textsuperscript{163} N. Alexander, ‘Socialism and Parliament’, A panel discussion with Terry Bell, Neville Alexander and Phillip Dexter, Socialism ’95, University of the Western Cape, April 1995 (audio recording).\textsuperscript{164} Anticipating success at the polls and possible parliamentary seats caused further discord, since they disagreed amongst each other on whether they should enter parliament.\textsuperscript{165} I. Abrahams, ‘South Africa: Socio-Economic Patterns of the Future?’, Presidential Address, Cape Town: Teachers’ League of South Africa, 1994, p.16.\textsuperscript{166} Lenin, Lenin Selected Works, p.543; see also I. Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed Trotsky: 1921-1929, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp.62-65.
agency of historical change.\textsuperscript{167} They, accordingly, saw the liberation movement’s ideals being significantly compromised through the ANC’s willingness to ‘co-govern’ the capitalist economy by conceding to power sharing. It was this emphasis on the economy and class collaboration that directed the TLSA in this period.

**Economic policy and educational reform**

A central plank in the ANC’s election campaign was its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP),\textsuperscript{168} an interventionist strategy to correct apartheid’s imbalances in a post-apartheid South Africa.\textsuperscript{169} For the SACP, and left elements within the ANC, the RDP was consistent with their long-term socialist project,\textsuperscript{170} but for others on the left outside the SACP, it was anything but socialist and hence a serious compromise.\textsuperscript{171} They, as with the NUM and TLSA, viewed it as a betrayal of a future and potentially more equitable South African economy.\textsuperscript{172} To the TLSA and WLP, for example, the RDP was hamstrung by the apartheid debt, an odious debt,\textsuperscript{173} which the GNU had committed itself to repaying.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{168} The ANC adopted the RDP in January 1994 as a broad socio-economic rehabilitation strategy to rectify the imbalances of the apartheid past. The RDP originated from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) as a discussion document termed ‘COSATU proposals for a reconstruction accord’. It went through a series of drafts and amendments by the Alliance before it was eventually accepted.
\textsuperscript{169} The RDP was to bring about reconstruction through government intervention in education, health, housing and welfare. The SACP argued for the RDP against what it perceived as the threat of big capital, including elements within the ranks of the ANC-led alliance who accepted the logic of neo-liberalism (*New Nation*, “A new terrain of struggle”, 11 November 1994 and *New Nation*, ‘Can the conference advance the national democratic struggle? 28 October 1994).
\textsuperscript{173} South Africa’s debt was not declared odious by government or foreign creditors in international finance. It was therefore not repudiated or cancelled according to the Doctrine of Odious Debt.
\textsuperscript{174} *The Educational Journal*, December 1993, p.6. The apartheid government had borrowed money on an increasing scale to finance the structures of apartheid. The GNU consequently inherited a debt of near R200 billion (Marais, *South Africa Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition*, p.220). For the WLP the capital and interest payments on this debt were about 30% of government expenditure (Workers’ List Party,
These developments presaged, the League argued, a poor outlook for education.\textsuperscript{175} In fact, it argued that the ANC’s education policy, which was embedded in the RDP, seemed little different to the NP’s Education Renewal Strategy (ERS).\textsuperscript{176} On one level, it claimed, the ERS introduced the opening of schools to all ‘racial’ or demographic groups, but on another, in proposing the introduction of fee payment – user fees - for public schooling from Grade 10, it sought to effectively exclude children. The RDP, the League reiterated, was a deceptive attempt to: “lure unsuspecting, uncritical ‘reformers’ into believing that in the move towards industrial democracy a Standard Seven education, followed by a selective, elitist secondary schooling, is what liberation adds up to for the children of the ‘new South Africa’”.\textsuperscript{177} Hanmer detailed the League’s prognosis for the new educational dispensation after 1994:

They never got past, just as the negotiations never got past, ‘the past’... And the type of society growing out of the new dispensation, remained basically the same. There were political changes, there were administrative changes; but the basic nature of the economy, the basic nature of the social and political relations remained unchanged ... They had an enormous effect upon the various aspects of education that was being addressed by the Education Renewal Strategy...and there were a number of things that were comparatively new, but all of it on a framework which remained substantially unchanged. Economic power and so ultimate power remained in the hands of capitalists, they happened to be mainly white, and dictated to a large degree by international interests of the World Bank and the IMF...\textsuperscript{178}

Hanmer’s view succinctly summed up the TLSA’s analysis at the time.

The TLSA’s alternative: a critical reflection

Important as the NUM and the League view expressed above was, they were unable to articulate it in terms that offered a viable alternative for South Africa. The challenge was to

\textit{The Red Paper On The RDP, its History and a Solution}, 1994, p.10). The League also noted the loans government had taken from foreign funders, and likewise highlighted South Africa’s foreign debt repayments. It argued that the conditions of the loan meant higher prices for day-to-day essentials. The organisation moreover pointed out that every country which received the loan had been plunged into crippling debt (\textit{The Educational Journal}, December 1993, p.12).


\textsuperscript{176} The ERS report of 1993 was the final proposal put forward by the NP after a series of ERS reports which it had developed since 1991.

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{The Educational Journal}, June 1994, p.2.

\textsuperscript{178} Interview with T. Hanmer, 25 August 2005.
put in front of the public of South Africa a manifesto for the changing circumstances in which the country found itself. Instead, they invoked the Ten-Point Programme and did not present a sufficiently clear alternative to counter the electioneering positions of their mainstream rivals. As David North contended in response to Eric Hobsbawm’s paper on counterfactual (what if?) history:179 “After all, history must concern itself not simply with ‘what happened’ but also – and this is far more important – why one or another thing happened or did not happen, and what might have happened”.180 The TLSA similarly, can be scrutinised through the lens of ‘counterfactual history’ to ascertain where it erred.

Though, ideologically committed to an anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist alternative that was socialist and prioritised the interests of the poorest layer of the population,181 the League’s brand of socialism created consternation on the left. In its journal of April-May 1996, the organisation wrote positively of what, to all intents and purposes, may be interpreted as the socialist experiment in the Soviet Union oriented Eastern bloc countries:

> Millions of people who were deceived into abandoning the socialist experiment regret having done so and have actually expressed in elections their longing to resume it.
> Hundreds of thousands still carry the experience and know-how they gained through leading the experiment. The path has been trodden.182

This was problematic, for the Soviet Union remained for many left critics, anything but a workers’ state.183 Hirson, for instance, described it as Stalinist.184 Suggesting confusion in the League The Educational Journal confirmed in its June 1992 edition (as indeed did The Bulletin of the NUM of September 1992), its solidarity with Yugoslavia, referring to it as

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179 E. Hobsbawm in his paper entitled: ‘Can We Write the History of the Russian Revolution?’ averred that history must start from what happened and that the rest is speculation (E. Hobsbawm, On History, London: Abacus, 1999, pp.322-324).
‘...the most promising socialist experiment attempted thus far in Europe’. This support for Serbia and a unified Yugoslavia against American imperialism, drew strong criticism. A UM dissident, Y.S. Rassool, for example, accused the Educational Journal and The Bulletin of betraying the ideals of the Unity Movement. For Rassool, the UM had always been non-Stalinist and had abhorred Stalinism as a primary point of departure. In fact, as late as 1990, the APDUSA Views, an affiliate of the NUM in Natal, came out strongly against Stalinism in an issue titled In Defence Of Socialism! Against Stalinism! This anti-Stalinist perspective distinguished the UM from the SACP-dominated Congress movement, which the tenor of the article in the Teachers’ League’s journal called into question, thereby creating ambivalence around what the TLSA and NUM viewed as a viable alternative.

The League faced the same ideological conundrum which the left was confronting internationally. The crisis for the left seemed to centre around the dispute about which variety of socialism would present a credible alternative to capitalism, in a climate where it appeared globally to be on the retreat, and where elements of resistance were weak. In

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189 Later, in a widely distributed article on the history of the UM, Rassool took issue with Jaffe’s role in the federal structure, particularly his influence on the NUM in the 1990s, which seemed to be the source of the organisation’s position on Yugoslavia. (Rassool, ‘Notes on the History of the Non-European Unity Movement in South Africa, and the role of Hosea Jaffe’). This document appears high-up on the list of articles when accessing information on the NEUM via the internet.

190 See P. Bond’s article in the Mail & Guardian, ‘Zapatistas offer alternative to neo-liberalism’, 28 June to 4 July 1996.

191 W. Hutton and A. Giddens (eds), Global Capitalism, New York: The New Press, 2000, pp.214, 215. Alex Callinicos contended that the weakness of the South African left was located in what Trotsky called the ‘subjective factor’, which for him (Trotsky) embodied a crisis of ‘ideas’, ‘will’, and ‘imagination’
the global capitalist milieu of the 1990s, as described by Hutton and Giddens, what constituted a viable socialist route was a major source of difficulty for the left. Indeed, in leaning towards Yugoslavia and the Eastern European countries, the TLSA and NUM called into question the consistency and theoretical clarity of their position.

On the educational front, beyond positing broad educational demands, the TLSA similarly appeared to struggle to articulate a vision of how it intended achieving a future democratic education system. This was especially apparent in the papers delivered at its 1994 conference, which had as its main theme the TLSA’s vision of a future South African education system. None of the papers appeared to engage with the possibilities of how to change education, that is, educational institutions or the educational environment at schools and colleges. The papers presented instead a vision of features of a distant education dispensation, but little which could help and provide guidance for working in the current setting. The League appeared to be wedged in a polemical discourse which had become its hallmark during the underground years.

The circumstances of post-1994, however, were to force the TLSA towards a reassessment of some of its traditional positions. In this respect, interesting new perspectives and shifts emerged. These shifts, albeit initially negligible, are described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

The implication of the boycott

A consequence of the TLSA and NUM’s boycott of the 1994 election was that they surrendered the opportunity to present at a national and international level their political and educational views. The election, whatever its shortcomings, was an important political and pedagogical moment that could have been used to generate publicity for their politics and educational policies. The space to broadcast their ideas to a broader public and the


\[192 \text{ Hutton and Giddens, pp.214, 215.}\]
possibility of recruiting more teachers and activists clearly existed. Instead, the TLSA sold itself short on the ground, and in so doing, in the long run too.

While the League’s anti-election position appeared politically firm, its members were decidedly more ambivalent. One member, for instance, remarked that though he abstained from voting, he did not discourage others from participating in the election. Yet another felt the boycott of the election to be erroneous. Asked about whether occupying seats in parliament would be collaborationist, he responded firmly: “You can’t say that by sitting in parliament you [are] collaborating. ... you are fighting now, you are opposing those very people … So I don’t think that is really a viable argument ... parliament is merely a place where you continue the fight”.

The election period evidently marked an important stage in the TLSA’s political and educational life. The historical juncture presented the League with opportunities to grow numerically and to engage competing political forces, if its intention was to become a serious contender, in the educational arena. Considering the rapidly changing political landscape of the mid-to-late 1990s, this meant interacting with converging but sometimes-disparate voices, discourses and practices of a range of constituencies in education.

Within a political environment of reconciliation and consensual politics, the TLSA with its dwindling membership and weakening monetary resource base, not to mention a sometimes unyielding anti-collaborationist perspective and modus operandi, found itself stretched when attempting to intervene on the national educational front. It was at this moment that the League was found wanting. The educational reforms that came in the wake of 1994

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193 The importance of recruitment, in the wake of the League’s anti-election campaign was noted in *The Educational Journal*, November-December 1994, p.16. The consequence of the TLSA not recruiting new members, are examined in Chapter 7.

194 Hanmer noted, for instance, that *The Educational Journal*’s boycott position did not necessarily reflect the views of all TLSA members and that the League did not instruct its members to abstain from voting (Interview with T. Hanmer, 25 August 2005). The author is able to corroborate Hanmer’s statement, for he recalls in April 1994 Ivan Abrahams, the then president of the organisation, informing him that if he wished to vote, he could do so despite being a member of the TLSA.

195 Interview with L. Roelf, 13 June 1999.

196 Interview with C. Liebenberg, 24 May 2005.

197 Ibid.
became a litmus test for the organisation, as they were to test its capacity and endurance. This challenge is examined in the forthcoming chapters.
Chapter 3

Did the union arrive?

The fact that economic interests play a decisive role does not in the least imply that the economic (i.e., trade-union) struggle is of prime importance, for the most essential, the most ‘decisive’ interests of classes can be satisfied only by radical political changes in general.¹

The bold confrontation and heightened political awareness that characterised the student uprisings of 1976, 1980 and 1985 ended the last vestiges of consent the National Party (NP) government thought it could still muster from amongst the black youth. With the dynamics of these events unfolding in education, attention shifted to schools specifically, which had become sites of opposition to the apartheid state. Caught in this volatile milieu, teachers found themselves invidiously positioned between the rising militancy and expectations of the students, and the bureaucratic state machinery that employed them. It was at this moment, when teachers were being called upon by the oppressed youth to discard their quiescent role, that they had to make a choice; they could either, as Ben Kies stated in 1943, ‘break with the past’ and ‘blot out the shame’ cast upon the profession, or submit to the minority government’s dictates.² The first organisational reaction to this call in the Western Cape emerged in May 1980 when teachers, responding supportively to the student boycott of that year, formed an ad hoc initiative, the Teachers’ Action Committee (TAC).³

From the outset the TAC rejected the collaborationist approach associated with conservative teacher organisations such as the Cape Teachers’ Professional Association (CTPA),⁴ and voiced opposition to the educational and political system, through actions that drew on the support of teachers at the Department of Education and Culture (DEC) schools.⁵ In a rudimentary but direct way, the Action Committee’s oppositional stance

¹ V. I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done? Peking: People’s Publishing House, 1978, p.58. Lenin, in this work, argued for the building of a revolutionary vanguard party to advance the struggle for socialism in Russia. The vanguardist concept was actualised in the formation of the Bolshevik Party, which seized power in October 1917.
³ Teachers’ Action Committee, TAC Newsletter, June 1980.
⁴ Kihn, ‘Players or Pawns? Professionalism and Teacher Disunity in the Western Cape 1980-1990’, p.84.
⁵ TAC’s membership comprised approximately 1200 teachers from 100 schools.
exemplified the sharpening ideological divide between the traditional and new emergent teacher professionalism. As a fledgling initiative, however, TAC fell short in key areas, the most important being its lack of decisive leadership and organisational capacity: qualities it needed to either have in place or honed over a period of time. Hamstrung by these limitations, TAC failed to rally sufficient teachers behind its cause, more particularly because its constituency lacked substantial community support and significant enough input from the teaching profession. This was starkly demonstrated when TAC’s teachers, who had been embarking on a ‘tools-down’ in solidarity with student demands, succumbed in under a week to threats of insubordination, misconduct and dismissal from principals and inspectors. The use of industrial or ‘worker’ actions to achieve its goals, militant and confrontational as it was, contributed significantly to TAC’s rapid demise. It had misread the moment, and in particular, how threatened and conservative many teachers actually were. Nevertheless, what these events did indicate, was the potential of a small but formidable band of teachers to organise and confront the regime, unlike the established conservative teacher associations that shied from conflict.

Having learnt from the TAC experience, and bolstered by the graduates from the classes of 1976 and 1980, a young politically conscious layer of teachers catalysed by the sharpening political and educational crisis, specifically the militant student uprisings of 1985, launched the Western Cape Teachers’ Union (WECTU) on 29 September 1985.

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8 Molteno, 1980: Students Struggle for Their School, p.84.
10 See Molteno, 1980: Students Struggle for Their School, p.84.
12 Deduct, Cape Town: University of Cape Town Education Faculty, October 1985, p.11.
14 Fifty-five schools formed WECTU out of an interim structure then called the Concerned Teachers’ Coordinating Committee. At its launch, a thousand teachers joined WECTU and by the end of 1985, it had a signed-up membership of 2000. These were mainly high school teachers from as far afield as Paarl and
The union gained immediate support from a politically motivated coterie of radicalised teachers and activists, many of whom had cut their teeth in the political and community organisations that had proliferated from 1980 and before then. Formed to unite progressive teachers in the Western Cape, and to provide them with the organisational means to defend teachers and students, WECTU was thrust into the turmoil of the time.\(^{15}\) It was here, in the heat of struggle, that its teachers showed their mettle, and fashioned a new form of militant professionalism through galvanising broad opposition to the state’s heavy-handed repression. This it accomplished through substantive community support, which proved formidable. And, when punitive measures were taken against teachers at the height of the schools’ boycott for refusing to adhere to departmental orders,\(^{16}\) WECTU was able to effectively rally this constituency in support of these teachers.\(^{17}\) These actions, having met with huge success, demonstrated in a short space of time the union’s capacity to intervene on behalf of teachers against the dictatorial measures of the state.\(^{18}\)

While WECTU showed its ability to fulfil a supportive role in the midst of the turmoil of the school boycott, the union’s organisational aim to establish teacher unity remained a prime focus.\(^{19}\) To achieve this goal, WECTU found itself having to negotiate a series of political challenges that came not only from the state, but from within the liberation movement itself, as tensions started manifesting between the union and other teacher organisations, as well as within its own ranks, among, broadly speaking, Congress and non-Congress aligned groups. These tensions, as they pertained to the TLSA and its policy of non-collaboration, are examined below, and form a prelude to the larger discussion on non-collaboration and teacher unionism in the 1990s.

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\(^{15}\) See Kihn, ‘Comrades and Professionals: Teacher Ideology and Practice in the Western Cape, 1985 to 1990’, p.333.

\(^{16}\) Teachers were charged with fines, transfers, demotions, suspension and in the final instance dismissal.

\(^{17}\) See Western Cape Teachers’ Union, WECTU Newsletter, No.3, January 1986; Western Cape Teachers’ Union, WECTU Newsletter, No.4, March 1986; Western Cape Teachers’ Union, WECTU Newsletter, No.5, May 1986; Western Cape Teachers’ Union (Athlone Central), Teachers Make Stand, pamphlet, October/November 1985.

\(^{18}\) Most teachers suspended or dismissed were reinstated in January 1986 (see Western Cape Teachers’ Union, WECTU Newsletter, No.6, June 1986, p.3).

\(^{19}\) See Western Cape Teachers’ Union, WECTU Newsletter, No.11, February 1988, pp.3, 4. Also the Western Cape Teachers’ Union, WECTU Constitution, 1985.
Teacher politics and political differences

The Western Cape, from the mid-1980s, was beset by ideological disputes between adherents of the Charterists, Africanists, Black Consciousness (BC), Unity Movement and socialist schools of thought. This historically derived politics, as this thesis has shown, was the main reason for the Western Cape possessing, as Nasson puts it, “an ‘exceptionalist’ political constituency and culture”.20 Drawn into this ideological mêlée, teacher unionism in the Western Cape mirrored these internal rivalries.21 The nature of the political differences, and how they crystallised during the late 1980s, was to influence the process of teacher unity,22 and profoundly affect the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU), the product of that amalgamation.23 Larger political manoeuvrings also fuelled these tensions, as the Charterist persuasions moved to supplant the Unity Movement and BC in the Western Cape. To make the point, whilst the TLSA had been influential in the region for decades, by the mid-to-late 1980s the presence and activities of WECTU and DETU (Democratic Teachers’ Union) had altered this position markedly. The two unions were products of their time, and much the same as with the TLSA and Cape African Teachers’ Association (CATA) in the 1950s, the racialised education system characterised the newborn unions, with WECTU constituting teachers from mainly the ‘coloured’ Department of Education and Culture (DEC) schools, and DETU ‘African’ Department of Education and Training (DET) teachers.

In a similar vein to the 1950s Cape Teachers’ Federal Council (CTFC), the forging of teacher unity in order to break the historically entrenched ‘racial’ divides and so ‘overcome’ the ‘conflict and contradiction’ teachers faced, was a priority for the two teachers’ unions.24 By late 1987, these concerns were uppermost on the agendas of two

22 Teacher unity was mooted in 1987 when teacher organisations broadly sympathetic to the liberation movement decided to embark on a process of establishing a national teachers’ organisation.
23 The formation of SADTU was the outcome of the teacher unity process of the late 1980s chapter.
organisations, and they pursued the ideal of teacher unity.\textsuperscript{25} For the League, this was not altogether new territory, and despite its mission from 1943 to ‘work towards the unity of all teacher organisations in South Africa’,\textsuperscript{26} the organisation, for mainly political reasons, detached itself from these proceedings. Maintaining a critical distance, the League through its independent media, kept readers abreast of developments in education, conveying to the public its perspectives on teacher unionism and in particular, the \textit{modus operandi} of the organisations involved in the unity process.

Apart from WECTU and DETU, the recognised teacher organisations operating in the Western Cape included the CTPA (Cape Teachers’ Professional Association), CATU (Cape African Teachers’ Union), TASA (Teachers’ Association of South Africa), PENATA (Peninsula African Teachers’ Association) and the SATA (South African Teachers’ Association).\textsuperscript{27} These more conservative associations worked within the state education system and contributed consistently to official committees concerned with policy, conditions of service, curriculum planning, and other matters in education.\textsuperscript{28} The self-declared moderates and accommodationists within these teacher organisations, those who consciously worked the organs of government, were viewed as collaborators and agents of the state by the anti-establishment teacher bodies. The League, for example, had a history of political hostility towards the CTPA, because of its historical links to the Teachers’ Educational and Professional Association (TEPA) and the tricameral parliament.\textsuperscript{29} These ideological differences would accentuate the political character of the emergent teacher trade unions and the teacher unity process. It would, above all, play a significant role in shaping the TLSA’s relationship to WECTU, the teacher unity process, and eventually SADTU.

\textsuperscript{27} Recognised teacher organisations were those registered with the racially separate education departments.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{The Educational Journal}, June 1992, p.10.
League teachers, importantly, were not averse to WECTU when it launched, and a few decided to join the union and participate in its activities. They did this with the understanding that it was a broadly progressive body ‘attracting teachers from various tendencies’ in the liberation movement, whilst also offering, strategically, room for them to exert influence. The effect can be gauged by the inclusion of ‘non-collaboration’ in the WECTU constitution. A union member recalled her branch’s support for the non-collaborationist perspective; this she claimed came from the presence of Unity Movement (UM) teachers:

Within WECTU there were people with strong Unity Movement backgrounds who initially thought WECTU could also be a vehicle, that’s why you had that definitely as a policy, non-collaboration … I can remember in our branch, people felt very strongly about it …

During 1986 and the early part of 1987 the non-collaborationist view held sway in WECTU. However, change occurred relatively soon thereafter when political differences manifested within the teachers’ union. An official of the League at the time recollected:

People from the Teachers’ League who went in, began to say to us: “Man, there’s something. We don’t know what’s happening, but we’ve been inside of politics for a long time to know that there’s (sic) certain things we’re listening to, that are beginning to sound to us as though these people have got a political agenda, …it’s not just an open teachers’ organisation but it’s a teacher organisation that is eventually going to go in a very definite direction”.

This tension was symptomatic of far deeper ideological differences, which, with time, became increasingly evident as Unity Movement, ANC and other ideologically oriented teachers sought to shape and even direct the fledgling union. Voicing concern regarding these differences, a WECTU member recollected:

In meetings … we made it very clear that unless this thing is independent of any particular party in the liberation movement … we’re not going to be able to mobilise all teachers, all educators; we’re only going to be able to mobilise people who are pro-ANC, and for the moment of course that may even be the majority, but it will not always be like that.…. 

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30 Interview with I. Abrahams, 10 October 1995.
31 Interview with M. Sassman, 16 August 1992.
33 P. Meyer and P. van Voore indicated that a range of political thought existed inside WECTU (Interviews with P. Meyer, 12 April 2005 and P. van Voore, 26 April 2006).
34 Interview with N. Alexander, 14 December 2001.
By late 1987, the fragile unity that existed inside the teachers’ union eventually ruptured, and League members began to withdraw in response to the Congress influence that had become for them increasingly pronounced, and, which they argued, ‘wouldn’t allow for any other view’.\(^{35}\) As one member put it:

> It is good to organise teachers. But when you ally yourself, as they did, immediately to the Freedom Charter, which was of the ANC’s making, then you already interfere with the political independence of the constituents of that organisation. ... You now want to impose, through that Charter, prescription to that Charter.\(^{36}\)

The League, however, it seemed, did not suggest an alternative united front strategy,\(^{37}\) as a few activists in WECTU were advocating,\(^{38}\) and neither its members nor its literature alluded to this possibility. It appeared at the time, therefore, as if a united front approach militated against the TLSA and its deep-rooted non-collaborationism.\(^{39}\)

As an alternative united front approach failed to emerge, WECTU was drawn ineluctably into the maelstrom of teacher unity.\(^{40}\) In keeping with broader political moves towards unity between ideological opponents,\(^{41}\) WECTU strategically opened itself to talks with the establishment teacher organisations,\(^{42}\) such as the CTPA. The League immediately condemned these conciliatory overtures of the union as collaborationist. In contrast, WECTU activists aligned to the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the ANC, saw benefits in accommodating CTPA members. A WECTU teacher explained:

> It would be seen as a victory to win them over [the CTPA members] … because those people were a big bloc on just about every staff. And, so, the difference was in WECTU that you could, that you wanted to bring these collaborators, these former collaborators or these so-called collaborators, bring them into the fold, and reshape them and remould them, which is totally opposed to what a Unity Movement would do. A Unity Movement wouldn’t touch people like that, you wouldn’t sully yourself by being associated with people like that.\(^{43}\)

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\(^{36}\) Interview with N. Jephta, 5 May 2000.


\(^{38}\) Interview with N. Alexander, 14 December 2001; Interview with P. Meyer, 12 April 2005.


\(^{41}\) See previous chapter, pp.117-119.

\(^{42}\) Interview with B. April, 25 April 2000. Jakoet concurred (Interview with R. Jakoet, 6 August 1999).

\(^{43}\) F. Bardien (Interview with W. Leith and F. Bardien, 26 July 2005).
Not all WECTU members though were in agreement with this sentiment, and a few attempted to thwart the unity talks.\textsuperscript{44} These however were dissident voices, and not in line with WECTU’s main thrust, which was supportive of the conservative teacher organisations and their move towards the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM).\textsuperscript{45} This dramatic shift, in particular that of the CTPA, was motivated by the ANC oriented organisations such as the National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC) and indeed the ANC itself.\textsuperscript{46} The 1985-86 student and community struggles were also central to this organisational drift in political allegiance, which instead of impeding the teacher unity process, radicalised the conservative teacher organisations, eventuating in the CTPA pledging its support for the MDM in 1987.\textsuperscript{47} A year later and under the guidance of the Congress movement and internally through the UDF and related organisations, the CTPA adopted the Freedom Charter.\textsuperscript{48} The hitherto maligned teacher professional body henceforth found itself incorporated into a broad anti-apartheid coalition. Viewing these extra-ordinary developments from afar, the League declared indignantly that ‘collaborationist organisations’ had found new allies in the ‘anti-apartheid resistance movement’ and were in effect functioning ‘under the protection of the UDF’.\textsuperscript{49}

With teacher unity firmly underway by 1988, all regional inter-organisational disputes were foreclosed, as the ANC, All African Teachers’ Organisation (AATO) and the World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) moved in to facilitate the amalgamation process.\textsuperscript{50} This culminated in the Harare conference of April 1988, \textsuperscript{51} and

\textsuperscript{44} Interview with A. Liebenberg, 14 January 2006; Kihn, ‘Players or Pawns? Professionalism and Teacher Disunity in the Western Cape 1980-1990’, pp.182, 183.
\textsuperscript{45} The MDM was an ANC-aligned formation, which emerged towards the end of the 1980s.
\textsuperscript{46} See Kihn, ‘Players or Pawns? Professionalism and Teacher Disunity in the Western Cape 1980-1990’, pp.183-185. On the NECC, see the previous chapter, pp.119-121.
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{South}, ‘CTPA to “broaden membership”’, 3 to 7 July 1993; Moll, ‘The South African Democratic Teachers’ Union and the Politics of Teacher Unity in South Africa’, p.194.
\textsuperscript{49} E. Steenveld (Interview with E. Steenveld and S. Williams, 30 April 2000).
\textsuperscript{51} Approximately a year and a half later, these events reached fruition. According to O’Meara the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) as part of the August 1989 Harare Declaration
Despite the absence of the non-Congress aligned organisations, and many of the ‘white’ teacher structures, teacher bodies across the political spectrum embarked on a process of unification. With the conference unanimously adopting the instituting of a national and regional interim teacher unity structure, the formation of the National Teacher Unity Forum (NTUF) would ensue in 1989, representing eleven umbrella and regional teacher bodies. The funding of the conference, as with the resourcing internally of the more popular mass based organisations, played a significant part in the launch of the new national teachers’ structure. Highlighting this issue, a League member, who recalled vivid reports of the Harare gathering, responded with dry sarcasm to the expressed success of the conference: “They had this huge meeting, because I remember them coming back with these photos, and I said, ‘gosh, you guys spent a lot of money hey, you had a nice holiday’”. Despite detractors, teacher unity seemed secured, with the principles of ‘one, national non-racial teachers’ organisation’ and ‘non-collaboration’ with the apartheid state a fait accompli. The fact that these tenets formed the cornerstone of the NTUF, however, did not interest the TLSA, since as far as it was concerned the collaborationist organisations had received renewed credibility through the teacher unity process. Critical of the facilitative role COSATU had played to ensure teacher unity transpired, the NUM in 1988 distributed a hard-hitting pamphlet where it admonished the federation:

ratified the ANC’s negotiation programme, which then won wide international approval before being put to the United Nations (D. O’Meara, Forty Lost Years: The apartheid state and the politics of the National Party, 1948-1994; Randburg: Ravan Press, 1996, p.401).
53 Teacher Unity News, A NEUSA, TASA, SONAT joint initiative, November-December 1989, p.1. Hartshorne noted that the unity process did not have ‘universal support’ because it was confined mainly to the COSATU, MDM, Charterist mode of politics (Hartshorne, p.319). A range of teacher organisations attended the Harare conference (Moll, ‘Towards one South African teachers’ union’, pp.113-119).
55 Interview with N. Alexander, 16 December 2006.
56 Interview with N. Jephta, 5 May 2000.
58 Interview with I. Abrahams, 24 March 2000. Kihn points to the pivotal role of COSATU in the teacher unity process during the late 1980s (see Kihn, ‘Players or Pawns? Professionalism and Teacher Disunity
COSATU believes that teacher organisations which to a greater or lesser extent have turned their backs on the state apparatus ... can get together with the collaborationist CTPA and other UTASA [United Teachers’ Association of South Africa] organisations. Under the political pressures building up in S.A. reactionary teachers’ organisations are desperate to gain credibility and show that they are solidly behind the teachers’ movement, after deliberately working the system in collaboration with the state. ... CTPA members have ‘mined’ the education department for promotion posts and top salaries. 59

Aside from decrying teacher unity, these remarks had no effect, and SADTU launched on 6 October 1990 as an alternative to the professional teachers’ organisations. The new union’s formation posed a host of challenges to the TLSA specifically, and its brand of non-collaboration, as it presented new and different ways of organising and mobilising teachers. 60 Most important, was that SADTU’s arrival marked the end of the League’s pre-eminent status as the only nationally based non-racial teachers’ organisation in the liberation movement. What follows is the NUM affiliate’s political and educational engagement with SADTU in the early 1990s.

The TLSA and the emergence of the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU)

The unbanning of the liberation movements and the formal instituting of the negotiation process, what Wolpe dubbed ‘the principle mode of politics from 2 February 1990’, 61 palpably altered the South African political and educational landscape. Although negotiations between the ANC and representatives of government and business had begun years earlier, 62 encompassing the Dakar talks of 1987 and the 1989 Harare Declaration,


62 See previous chapter, pp.117, 118.
among other political initiatives and events of the late 1980s, these events would form the immediate backdrop to the League and its members’ political and pedagogical thoughts and practices. The fact that the political terrain had changed meaningfully for the organisation and that it recognised it was facing a different set of historical and political circumstances to those of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, was made abundantly clear in 1992. In that year, the TLSA hosted its first public annual conference in twenty-nine years, its 52nd, at the Savio Hall in Lansdowne, from 30 March to 3 April, to mark its re-emergence as a public teachers’ organisation.

Historic, as the occasion was, and indicative of its political nous, the League’s return to the public domain lacked the fanfare characterised by SADTU’s launch, which received far greater publicity. In terms of numerical size this was understandable, as SADTU at its inception had a membership of approximately 100 000 teachers, drawn from a range of teacher organisations in different parts of the country. A few months later on 20 April 1991, SADTU Western Cape was also launched at the University of the Western Cape. The union’s birth came with its casualties though, and the CTPA immediately suspended its membership, as it preferred proportional representation in the new unitary structure. It later affiliated to the moderate federal teacher structure NAPTOSA (National Professional Teachers’ Organisation of South Africa), a rival to SADTU.

From the outset, the League was exceptionally critical of SADTU’s politics and mode of organising. These were mainly because the union presented itself as the first national


democratic non-racist and non-sexist teachers’ union in South Africa, and, owing to its numerical size, projected itself as the most representative and progressive teachers’ organisation nationally. Of far greater significance to the League though, was SADTU’s allegiance to COSATU, and thereby the ANC and SACP. As the League, in line with the NUM, was alert to the widespread influence of the ANC’s negotiations with the NP, it contended that events on the educational front were running concurrent with the reconciliatory process:

We of course understood (why) ... thousands and tens of thousands of teachers would go into a structure like SADTU which they sort of saw as opposing the old order of things, embodied in SATA and SAOU [Suid Afrikaanse Onderwysers Unie] ... but we questioned the leadership and their motives. We saw all these activities on the economic and political front round unions and also in education as orchestrated by certain elements, especially within the ANC, in order to improve their bargaining powers at the conference table.68

The League was not alone in this assessment. Other activists in education similarly saw the new teacher union’s politics as dovetailing with those of the ANC. Dan Habedi, for instance, openly accused SADTU of being part of a ‘well conceived plan to achieve ideological hegemony for the charterist camp’,69 while Govender highlighted not only the union’s fraternal relationship with, but also its ‘loyalty’ to, the ANC-led alliance.70 Although the union disputed charges of this nature and proclaimed itself politically non-aligned,71 yet quite prepared to ‘take political positions’,72 for the League, SADTU was clearly under the influence of populist politics.73 A leading member of the TLSA asserted:

SADTU I think was an opportunistic formation at the time ... the ANC high command saw this ... an opportunity to get all those groupings under one umbrella and to bring them into ‘our’ fold and bring them under ‘our’ sway. ... in a period of behind the scenes negotiations ... to actually get the teachers into a fold and to bring them voting power.74

68 Interview with S. Williams, 23 April 2000.
72 Sanger, p.36.
73 The Educational Journal, March 1991, p.10; June 1992, p.10. A longstanding difference the League had with the Congress movement was its inclusive multi-class or ‘populist’ character. This, it argued, opened the movement to liberals and other opportunistic elements.
74 Interview with N. Jephta, 5 May 2000.
The issue of opportunism in relation to collaborationism and the union movement, in this instance, had a precedent in the polemic between the Marxist Rosa Luxemburg and Eduoard Bernstein. In her rebuttal of Bernstein, for example, Luxemburg made the trenchant point that opportunism within the dynamics of class struggle, had the tendency to ‘push the labour movement into bourgeois paths’, and to ‘paralyze’ ‘the proletarian class struggle’ by co-opting the trade union leadership. Gramsci’s notion of ‘passive revolution’, had similar resonance, for he unveiled how revolutionary potential was emasculated through segments of the working class movement being absorbed into traditional political organisations, to obviate threats aimed at altering fundamental social relations.

League teachers perceived SADTU’s emergence in a similar collaborationist vein, where through negotiations and compromise with government, the teachers’ movement would be derailed and emasculat. The TLSA therefore denounced the union’s leadership with acerbity: “Can we afford to waste further decades in acts of futility? Can we risk the further retardation of the real struggle? Should we not wake up NOW and send these misleaders and betrayers packing?”

The acute difference between the League and SADTU’s politics became more evident when the union sought recognition with the ‘racially-defined’ apartheid education departments. While for Randall van den Heever, a former leader in the CTPA, and the General Secretary of SADTU, recognition implied ‘co-operation and mutual respect’,

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75 Eduoard Bernstein in 1897-98 published a series of articles in the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) newsletter in which he argued that socialism could be achieved by gradually reforming the capitalist system through consumers’ co-operatives, trade unions and by the gradual extension of political democracy. Based on this thinking, Bernstein argued that the SPD should transform itself from a party advocating social revolution into one of social reforms. Luxemburg opposed Bernstein’s formulation of ’evolutionary socialism’ in her article Reform or Revolution (1899-1900), arguing that his position was an attempt to justify and prolong the life of capitalism and was hence a deviation from the socialist path. Flowing from this premise, Luxemburg asserted that Bernstein’s theory was fundamentally reformist and therefore neither Marxist nor socialist (see R. Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution, New York: Pathfinder, 1988, pp.49, 50).


79 SADTU wanted wider recognition from the 18 racially defined education departments, particularly the DET, as it was the largest department. The agreement would allow SADTU to broaden its membership and to negotiate on behalf of those teachers despite racial divides (South, ‘Sadtu now wants wider recognition’, 12 to 16 September 1992). See also New Nation, ‘Venda recognises Sadtu’, 21 to 27 August 1992.
where disputes could be resolved ‘by means of negotiations’,\textsuperscript{80} for the League, this argument was ‘facile and spurious’ as it gave ‘recognition and credibility’ to ‘officials’ and popularised the ‘process of negotiation’.\textsuperscript{81}

Having agreements with the ‘racially-defined’ education structures, SADTU maintained, ‘was merely a stepping stone to a single education department’ for it meant that ‘in the interim, it can fight for better pay and working conditions for teachers divided into ethnic departments’.\textsuperscript{82} This incremental approach of the union, according to the League, was perilous, for the ‘question of negotiations with the department held always with it the danger and the possibility and the reality of collaboration with the department’.\textsuperscript{83} Abrahams, speaking to the \textit{South}, was more forthright: ‘We believe that if you begin bargaining with the departments of education you eventually end up bargaining with the government’.\textsuperscript{84} Yusuf Gabru, chairperson of SADTU Western Cape in 1990, on the other hand, defended the union’s negotiations with the education department, and argued that the League misunderstood the political matrix of trade unionism:

\begin{quote}
I think that to talk then, or to get the department to recognise SADTU, which it didn’t do in any case, I don’t think that is collaboration. I don’t know if you can draw the parallel with workers in the factory, the boss owns the factory, we’re all anti-capitalist but we fight and negotiate for higher wages, it’s not collaboration, it’s a victory if you get higher wages, it’s a victory if you get better conditions. You don’t abolish capitalism in the process, not that I would mind if it’s abolished, but you can’t say you’re not going to co-operate with the bosses because they are capitalists.\textsuperscript{85}
\end{quote}

Gabru’s contention seemed to coincide with the educationist Kevin Harris, who argued that larger teacher unions concerns ‘were more of a reformist kind’, as they intended achieving the ‘best possible deal for teachers’ under the prevailing circumstances.\textsuperscript{86} Lenin’s 1902 treatise \textit{What Is to Be Done?} anticipated this argument. For him, workers seeking to ameliorate their conditions of work, or those fighting for financial benefits against the employer, conducted what he termed an ‘economic struggle’, which was an elementary yet

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{The Educational Journal}, March 1991, p.10.
\textsuperscript{83} Interview with T. Hanmer, 12 August 2005.
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{South}, ‘TLSA stands firm – 50 years on’, 12 to 16 June 1993.
\textsuperscript{85} Interview with Y. Gabru, 10 March 2006.
\textsuperscript{86} K. Harris, \textit{Teachers and Classes}, London: Routledge, 1982, p149.
essential component of trade unionism.\textsuperscript{87} Taking the issue further, George Novack claimed that trade unions provided the educational space for the working masses, for it was here that they learnt ‘their first lessons about the nature of capitalism, begin to clarify their class consciousness, [and] take their first steps toward class organization’.\textsuperscript{88} Building on this argument, and taking issue with the non-collaborationist approach in the workers’ movement, Fine and Davis, much the same as Gabru, argued that negotiations with the employer was essential for trade unions, and that only ‘the most extreme syndicalists could forego’ this tactic.\textsuperscript{89}

Despite the reformist methods implicit to trade unionism, the League’s point of departure on this matter was unequivocal, and it shunned the ameliorative strategies and tactics the teacher union adopted. For them, the altruistic and transformative role assigned to the teacher was far more important, and was inseparable from the liberation movement:

\begin{quote}
Teachers in the Teachers’ League never fought for teachers’ rights in retrospect. ... They never fought for promotions, they never fought for increases of salaries, they would never have dreamt of going on strike for higher salaries, because they saw their role as being the educator force of the liberatory movement, not to see to their own personal benefits. ... there were so many people poorly paid, I mean what right did you have to make demands for your own personal improvement economically?\textsuperscript{90}
\end{quote}

Statements and related attitudes like these distinguished League teachers from their union counterparts, as it exemplified the manner in which they sought to construct a separate identity for themselves as progressive educators and intellectuals of \textit{their}, the oppressed, community. It was here, as Tabata would have had it, teachers or intellectuals had a choice; they could either, ‘place themselves at the head of their people and launch a struggle against the government or side with the rulers against their own people’.\textsuperscript{91} This Gramscian conception of the teacher, the ‘organic intellectual’,\textsuperscript{92} or Giroux’s equally engaging

\textsuperscript{87} Lenin, pp.140, 141. Lenin also distinguishes between revolutionary and trade union consciousness (Ibid., pp.148, 154-174).
\textsuperscript{89} R. Fine and D. Davis, \textit{Beyond Apartheid}, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1990, p70.
\textsuperscript{90} Interview with Respondent A, 13 April 2000; Interview with B. April, 25 April 2000.
\textsuperscript{92} The ‘organic intellectual’ or the ‘new intellectual’ of the working class, implied the ‘development of its (the working class) own political leaders’ and ‘its own organizers’ (G. Vacca, ‘Intellectuals and the Marxist Theory of the State’, in A.S. Sassoon (ed), \textit{Approaches To Gramsci}, England: Writers and Readers, 1982, pp.63-65.)
‘transformative intellectual’\textsuperscript{93} foreshadowed the principled role League teachers assumed in the 1990s. This role cast League teachers as custodians of the oppressed, whose mission, amongst others, embodied the responsibility of ‘empowering individuals and groups within oppositional public domains’.\textsuperscript{94}

In the early 1990s, this ‘oppositional’ undertaking translated into the organisation’s teachers opposing the union leadership’s militant actions, which they felt, was endangering the education of the oppressed people’s children – ‘our children’. Ensuring that the disenfranchised community’s offspring received the best progressive education possible under the extant conditions, was ‘much greater than bargaining for better conditions of service and pay’, the organisation declared.\textsuperscript{95}

From the League’s side, then, SADTU appeared shortsighted and not entirely committed to the interests of the disenfranchised community. Indeed, the most contentious issue for the TLSA and its members was the use of trade union methods of protest in education, exemplified by ‘chalk-downs’, ‘go-slows’, ‘strikes’, and other actions:

SADTU scheduled meetings during school hours ... there were some of the policies and some of their decisions that I was diametrically opposed to, which I thought was very anti-educational. ... The salary question, teacher strikes, here comes somebody with ‘sent voor die oë’ [coins (money) in front of one’s eyes] ... there was a whole batch of us, a lot of us, who didn’t even dream of promotion.\textsuperscript{96}

To highlight its position in the face of the teachers’ strike of August 1993, the organisation widely circulated a pamphlet titled, \textit{To Strike Or Not To Strike}.\textsuperscript{97} The pamphlet set-out to explain in a tabulated step-by-step, format why SADTU’s actions were out of step or non-conducive to education, and why the terrain of schooling differed starkly with the industrial, commercial, mining or farming sectors, where workers produced a commodity

\textsuperscript{93} The ‘transformative intellectual’ for Giroux involved intellectuals who worked with a cross-section of people and were not restricted to ‘intellectuals who take the working class as the only revolutionary agent’ (H. Giroux, ‘Schooling as a Form of Cultural Politics. Toward a Pedagogy of and for difference’, in H. Giroux and P. McLaren (eds), \textit{Critical Pedagogy}, New York: State University, 1989, p.152).

\textsuperscript{94} Giroux, ‘Schooling As A Form Of Cultural Politics. Toward a Pedagogy of and for difference’, p153.

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{The Educational Journal}, March 1991, p.10. SADTU went on an 8-day strike in August 1993, following on the 1-day strike at the end of May. It demanded an end to rationalisation and a 15% increase for teachers \textit{(The Argus}, ‘The chalkdown cheques’, 26 August 1993).

\textsuperscript{96} Interview with Respondent A, 13 April 2000. B. April expressed similar sentiments (Interview with B. April, 25 April 2000).

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{The Educational Journal}, July to August 1993, pp.7-9; Teachers’ League of South Africa, \textit{To Strike or Not To Strike}, TLSA Discussion/Statement pamphlet, 1993.
and could withdraw their labour and so inflict a concomitant loss of profits for the employer.

Although the League came out against the teachers’ strike,\(^98\) in principle it did not oppose strike action as a legitimate weapon for workers and teachers in their quest ‘to redress social evils and secure just demands’.\(^99\) At issue for the organisation, rather, was the quality of the union’s leadership, whose sincerity and understanding of struggle it questioned. Thus, apart from SADTU’s ANC allegiance, the most glaring issue, the League declared, was the poor planning and discordant nature of the events leading up to and surrounding the August strike, which for the organisation, left pupils unattended and negatively affected parents and communities.\(^100\) In keeping with its educational philosophy, the League posited that in a society where parents are the breadwinners, the school is ‘a place of safety for children’, and ‘when teachers are on strike’, ‘children are placed at risk’.\(^101\) League teachers, accordingly, saw themselves as fulfilling the pedagogical role of \textit{loco parentis} and duty-bound to the children entrusted to them.\(^102\)

While the TLSA wedded the political and educational sides of the struggle, SADTU sought to merge the political and economic, consistent with its trade-unionist outlook, which prioritised workers’ interests.\(^103\) As such, negotiations and strike action, to ensure teachers’ demands were met, was central to improving the quality of teaching and learning, the union maintained. However, given the divisive effects boycott actions had on the disenfranchised communities in the 1980s,\(^104\) SADTU’s leadership made a concerted effort to explain to

\(^98\) The TLSA claimed to have arrived at this decision after deliberations with its members and sounding out parents and pupils (\textit{The Educational Journal}, September 1993, p.3). The national teachers’ strike of August 1993 was the first of its kind for teachers in the Western Cape. In terms of the politics that had guided the TLSA over 50 years, this development in education was new. \(^99\) \textit{The Educational Journal}, September 1993, p.3. \(^100\) Ibid. \(^101\) \textit{The Educational Journal}, July-August 1993, p.9. \(^102\) Ibid. \(^103\) J. Erntzen, ‘Should teachers organisations be trade unions?’ in C. Millar, S. Raynham, A. Schaffer (eds), \textit{Breaking ‘the’ Formal Frame}, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.309. \(^104\) WOSA (Workers’ Organisation for Socialist Action), similarly, in a widely distributed pamphlet, cautioned against prolonged strike action by SADTU, since: “Teachers should also remember that indefinite strike action is never an option. ... Teachers should remember that strike action brings to the surface the contradictions between their needs and those of the parents” (Workers’ Organisation for Socialist Action, \textit{Education Crisis 1993}, WOSA pamphlet, p.8). Yet other sections of the liberation movement opposed
communities the rationale for teachers embarking on strike action. Basil Snayer of SADTU, for example, in a radio interview before the union’s August strike, elaborated: “The state reneged on a number of promises it made, and therefore after negotiations, after protests, after marches, etcetera, etcetera, SADTU has felt that the only way to convince the state of the correctness of our position is by means of the strike”. This appeal, however, seemed to not muster widespread support in working class communities, as parents’ concern for their children remained uppermost.

Although the League’s sense of community resonated for many parents, its non-collaborationist stance did not meet with the approval of many teachers. As Leith pointed out:

> The TLSA was a professional organisation, and a non-collaborationist organisation ... They don’t get involved in the day-to-day work of teachers and the conditions of service. ... and along comes a movement out of WECTU and the other unions that sprang up all over the country, coming together organically ... [and] challenges the state, and [demands that] ‘we want our work conditions to improve’. No teacher could argue with that, ‘we want our pay increase’, and this that and the other ... the League couldn’t offer anything like that.

By the League placing emphasis on teachers’ professional responsibilities, it appeared to downplay the rapidly changing education and economic situation teachers found themselves in. Teachers deteriorating working conditions, and with it their increasing ‘proletarianisation’, embodied in the state’s demand for ‘increased efficiency’ and tangible ‘results’ or outcomes, appeared to be neglected by the TLSA. These shifting conditions had important ramifications for teachers, for it would influence the demands they made and the actions they embarked upon. Alexander explained:

> it [education] gets sold ... The fact that the state pays for it does not mean it’s not a commodity … that education has a sort of dual aspect to it, is of course true, but you

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SADTU’s mass action, such as AZASM, which claimed that although it ‘was supportive of SADTU’s demands it was not in agreement with SADTU’s strategies’ (New Nation, ‘Azasm is against Sadtu’s strategies’, 26 June to 2 July 1992).

105 B. Snayer, ‘Rationalisation in schools’, A panel discussion with B. Snayer and G. van Harte of SADTU’s Regional Executive (Radio Good Hope, Workers on Wednesday, n.d. August 1993); see also South, ‘Teachers are going to bite!’ and ‘Honour Your Promises – Sadtu’, 20 to 24 August 1993.

106 Parents’ phoning-in to the radio programme Workers on Wednesday were critical of teachers abandoning their classes (Radio Good Hope, Workers on Wednesday, n.d. August 1993); South, ‘Sadtu caught between parents and teachers’, 14 to 18 August 1993; The Weekly Mail & Guardian, ‘Unexpected opposition to strike’, 20 to 26 August 1993.


108 Harris, pp.71-73.
cannot highlight [professionalism] the one as though the other didn’t exist … and therefore if the conditions of education are such that the children and the teachers … cannot carry out their tasks properly, [and] a strike seems to be the correct type of action to take - it has to be taken. 109

TLSA teachers were not unaware of these shifts and their impact on teachers, and they attempted to reconcile strike action with political and pedagogical work. Reflecting this state of mind, Roelf stated:

Teachers are not supposed to boycott except of course if they want to show … ultimate action. Then they boycott for one day, possibly even for two days, and if need be then maybe three days. But then they must stop and go back into the classroom; because our most important duty is towards the child, because the child is going to be the future leader; the child is normally the social force of society for tomorrow. 110

In practice, a semblance of ambiguity towards SADTU’s methods of struggle appeared evident, notwithstanding the TLSA’s adversarial and at times antagonistic views of the teacher union and COSATU. This became noticeable when in May 1993, a coterie of League teachers stood in solidarity with their striking union colleagues, in keeping with the organisation’s official position for members to support whatever action their school staff decided upon. 111 Clearly, League teachers could not be defined en bloc as doctrinal or unshifting in their opposition to trade unionism, and one has to be mindful of the fact that many of them had established histories of working alongside teachers and activists from a broad spectrum of political thought in the sports and civic movement, amongst other grassroots structures. This history militated against an inert mindset on the part of these teachers. Hodges, to emphasise the point, indicated that she identified with the union’s social base and its goals:

all the people within our fold and in SADTU were from the disadvantaged community ... we all needed to stand together, we all needed to have a common goal, ... to liberate ourselves while trying to educate our children, trying to educate ourselves as well ... and I don’t believe that the people in SADTU didn’t have that vision of liberation. 112

Yet another member stated: “I’m not opposed to SADTU at all as a union, I think that is a progressive thing … there was a place for a union ... The Teachers’ League, and I felt this

110 Interview with L. Roelf, 13 June 1999. Jakoet also saw teachers as ‘integral to the formation of the character of the child’ and ‘crucial to the formation of the psyche of the nation.’ (Interview with R. Jakoet, 6 August 1999).
111 South, ‘TLSA stands firm – 50 years on’, 12 to 16 June 1993. This was also the TLSA’s directive to its members during the class boycotts of the mid-1980s.
112 Interview with M. Hodges, 5 May 2000.
long ago, should have become a union ... so I wasn’t opposed to them ....” These League members could not be categorised as simply anti-SADTU, or anti-trade union in outlook, and their views of solidarity, although abstruse at the time, were encouraging of linkages between teachers and working class movements around common concerns in the quest to forge unified actions.114

**Political and tactical alliances**

In the twilight of its rule, and in a bid to secure white privilege, the National Party (NP) moved to reform education through a decentralising model. Though the government declared that restructuring would alleviate the crisis in schooling, the reforms exacerbated it, as the move involved the withdrawal of funding from schools and the consequent reduction of teaching staff,115 leaving under-resourced schools confronting the threat of further overcrowding.116 The approaching crisis spurred school communities across the Western Cape to mobilise against the education department’s rationalisation programme, and for a brief period parents, teachers and students organised collectively and transcended their political differences.117 Once again, League teachers found themselves absorbed in Parent, Teacher, Student Associations (PTSAs), much the same as they were in the PTAs of the 1950s and PTSAs of the 1980s, while the organisation itself formed an ad hoc alliance with traditional adversaries against what it termed the government’s ‘war on education’.118 On 5 May 1993, and for the first time since re-emergence, the TLSA represented by Ivan Abrahams, shared a platform with SADTU’s Shepherd Mdladlana, Archie Vergotine of the CTPA, Allan Boesak of the ANC and representatives from various PTSA and student organisations in a mass meeting at the Good Hope Centre.119 The TLSA’s participation

113 Interviews with L. Roelf, 13 June 1999; I. Abrahams, 27 March 2000; N. Jeftha, 5 May 2000. These members supported the need for teachers to be organised in an independent union or teacher structure.
114 See Harris, *Teachers and Classes*, p.149.
115 See the previous chapter, pp.122-124, 129-133.
116 The education crisis hit a peak when announcements on education related deficit cuts surfaced. The central issues were teacher cutbacks, withdrawal of substitute teachers, teachers’ salaries and poor conditions of work, amongst other matters.
117 The author was active in the Southern Suburbs PTSA.
119 See *The Weekly Mail*, ‘Teachers unite’, 7 to 13 May 1993 and *South*, ‘Education crisis’, 8 to 12 May 1993. The League’s participation was conditional. It made public its dissatisfaction with the meeting having to be
however was conditional, based as it was on the organisation’s opposition to the retrenchment of teachers, the closure of teacher training colleges, and the imminent privatisation of schooling.

The mass meeting was a huge success for the participating teacher formations, and Abrahams’ incisive address was well received.\textsuperscript{120} Significantly, through this action the League demonstrated its willingness to enter into alliances and mass struggles. It also indicated that non-collaboration was far less predictable than many of its critics and indeed even certain of its members thought. This became particularly evident when the organisation took stock of its action in the wake of the rally.

What appeared a setback for the TLSA, was that the ANC seemed to have benefited immeasurably from the event, with Boesak garnering substantial support from a section of the teachers who were captivated by his sloganeering - ‘now is the time’. Boesak’s Democratic Party\textsuperscript{121} reveille sparked derisory remarks in \textit{The Educational Journal},\textsuperscript{122} and the TLSA’s participation in the mass meeting produced heated internal debate as to whether or not it was politically beneficial to the organisation.\textsuperscript{123}

These internal differences demonstrated the distance the League still had to travel to address the ambivalences within its ranks when it came to overt political action that involved other organisations. While certain members were supportive of sharing platforms with rival organisations and embarking on independent and joint placard demonstrations and pamphleteering,\textsuperscript{124} others voiced discontent at what appeared to be displays of collaboration. Apparent amongst sections of the TLSA was a reluctance to consider the possibilities the transitional context of the early 1990s heralded: of growing worker

\textsuperscript{120} The author attended the meeting.
\textsuperscript{121} The Democratic Party was a liberal parliamentary organisation.
\textsuperscript{122} \textit{The Educational Journal}, June 1993, p.2.
\textsuperscript{123} The author’s recollection as a TLSA member at the time.
\textsuperscript{124} The author’s experience within the organisation.
confidence and political space for teachers to challenge the state’s repressive measures in education.\textsuperscript{125}

The League had evidently not discarded its cautious mindset, and was not yet open to significant change, despite a section of its leadership moving in that direction. This hesitancy meant that even though the League signalled it was going through a process of change, by entering the public arena and participating in mass struggle, it was still perceived to be hemmed in by its identity as a professional teachers’ organisation and hence conservative, ‘petit bourgeois’ and ‘on the fringe of the trade union movement’.\textsuperscript{126} To add to this predisposition, within deeply religious working class communities, League members were viewed on occasion with misgiving as ‘communists’ and ‘atheists’,\textsuperscript{127} an impression that was reinforced by NUM literature, such as \textit{The Rôle of the Missionaries in Conquest}, where missionaries were portrayed as willing agents of colonisation and imperialism.\textsuperscript{128} These features were considered, according to Nasson, ‘unattractive’ and ‘weakening’ characteristics of Unity Movement politics,\textsuperscript{129} and League members sometimes found themselves alienated from the very sections of the teacher and parent community they historically claimed to represent, to the degree that they were outnumbered often when going up against people from an opposing political camp. As a member recollected:

\begin{quote}
The League with the Movement wasn’t a popular organisation. I was used to being alone … it was just that you knew you had to do certain things … you felt worse if you didn’t do anything. So that was the kind of choice that you had to make … ‘let the whole staff vote against me’ or ‘get two people in favour of my proposal’ or ‘am I going home’ knowing that I didn’t do my duty as a League member. The choice wasn’t difficult to make at the time.\textsuperscript{130}
\end{quote}

While this comment is informative of League teachers’ hardy attitudes, it alluded also to an issue the organisation was compelled to give careful consideration to in the 1990s - its dwindling membership.

\textsuperscript{125} See Hartshorne, pp.320, 321.  
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., pp.323, 324.  
\textsuperscript{127} Interview with B. April, 25 April 2000. The League and particularly the NUM’s perceived Marxist-socialist ideas resulted in them being labelled ‘atheists’, ‘anti-religious’ and ‘anti-Christian’ by religious and partly religious people within the oppressed community.  
\textsuperscript{128} N. Majike’s, \textit{The Rôle of the Missionaries in Conquest}, Cumberwood: APDUSA, 1986.  
\textsuperscript{130} Interview with Respondent B, 23 July 2000.
An organisation in crisis

Although numerical size was not of primary concern to the League during its clandestine years, on re-emergence it became acutely aware of the dearth of young teachers in its ranks and the attendant dangers of regeneration. A range of factors contributed to why the League found itself in this situation. Three stand out prominently. Firstly, owing to the relative secrecy and obscurity as an underground organisation, the TLSA had not attracted large numbers of younger teachers to its ranks. Secondly, and owing to its selective recruitment strategy, the organisation had become increasingly ineffectual from the mid-1980s when mass politics rendered obsolete its traditional mode of recruiting on an individual basis through a long process of initiation and reading. As one teacher noted, “... they hand picked their people; if you made the correct noises then you were allowed to come to their gathering, or meeting or what. It wasn’t open ...” Another recalled: “It almost seemed to me ... that the TLSA was an organisation in which, when you arrived into it, you were already changed, and politicised and moulded in their image ...” The League, according to these accounts, seemed to have adopted a Masonic identity.

The League’s position on the ‘bush colleges’, which was part of its non-collaborationist policy in higher education, was a third factor that militated strongly against it not having a large youth component. The League argued that the ‘bush’ colleges, such as the University of the Western Cape (UWC), were a product of the Separate Universities Act, and integral to the NP’s ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy. UWC and similar institutions were consequently branded ‘tribal’ universities by the TLSA. For this reason, the organisation refused to grant bursaries to students wishing to study at these institutions, and only those studying at the University of Cape Town (UCT) qualified for financial assistance. Ironically, many

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131 The author recollected this discussion at the TLSA conference of 1995.
132 C. Liebenberg made the connection between the TLSA’s underground practice and its small membership as one of the primary reasons for younger teachers not having had contact with or heard of the organisation. Teachers or student teachers who had interacted with League members after 1960 were mainly those approached individually or who had contact with TLSA members (Interview with C. Liebenberg, 24 May 2005).
134 Interview with M. Sassman, 16 August 1992.
135 Interview with Y. Gabru, 10 March 2006.
students who were part of SPEF had attended UWC, and many teachers who studied there, became members of the TLSA. The line between collaboration and non-collaboration blurred in this instance, and an erstwhile member of the League and SPEF could rightly declare: ‘If you had to get a permit to go to UCT, then what was the difference?’

The impact of the League’s selective policy on potential members was not lost on the leadership in the mid 1990s, as they were astutely aware that because of the organisation’s policy towards the ‘bush’ colleges, it had ‘lost a generation of youth’ who ‘were never exposed to Teachers’ League ideas.’ Considering the emphasis the organisation placed on recruiting persons with ideas similar to or approximating theirs, the unwillingness of the TLSA to even distribute its literature at UWC, which ordinarily or preferably, formed the basis for recruitment, was perplexing if not self-defeating. As Abrahams on reflection noted:

We actually discouraged students ... actively discouraged students from going to the bush. So, when the students went to the ‘bush’, they went there despite the stated opposition of their teachers. So, really, they felt that once they went there, they turned their backs on the teachers that had been their political mentors at those high schools. You virtually cut the umbilical cord, and you went there knowing full well that you now couldn’t come back to say hello...

Almost a generation of student youth who had graduated from the ‘bush colleges’ in the 1960s, 1970s and the 1980s, in consequence, knew very little about the TLSA. This generational gap created a serious deficit for the organisation, compounding the challenges it confronted when it emerged as a public organisation again. The most immediate and pronounced were: ‘disadvantages of ability to organise, small membership, low income’, while at the same time it faced ‘organisations with a huge membership such as SADTU and CTPA’, which was an attraction to teachers.

Whereas the boycott of UWC reaped negative returns for the League, more damaging for the organisation was that SADTU benefited from this. In fact, younger teachers coming

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136 Interview with J. Pease, 11 September 2006. A quota system that permitted only a select number of black students to study at UCT applied until the 1980s.
137 Interview with I. Abrahams, 10 October 1995.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
from these institutions gravitated to the union *en masse*,\(^{140}\) therewith marginalising the League. This was debilitating for the organisation, as it competed for members within the same anti-establishment teacher constituency. Abrahams was once again incisive:

> Your younger layer of teachers aren’t really interested in the Teachers’ League, an organisation cannot live on its past, it must offer people something in the present. It must have policies and programmes that are attractive to teachers ... teachers who came out of the colleges in revolt, and schools in revolt. And if you didn’t have policies in line with that period of revolt then they were going to go elsewhere... \(^{141}\)

Identifying the conundrum, as Abrahams did, was one matter, addressing the issue another. The challenge was near insuperable for the League, since in order for it to strategically engage the politics of the 1990s it had to deal with popular perceptions and practices intricately related to its political identity and history. The political-historical bind the League found itself in, became quite evident when the NUM in its 1989 newsletter ran an historical overview *Bush colleges or Universities?* Here, in bold print, the NUM reaffirmed its 1960 assessment of UWC and similar institutions, declaring: “The bush college cannot be transformed without first transforming and liberating the educational system. The educational system cannot be transformed and liberated without first liberating the entire country from oppression and exploitation”.\(^{142}\) Recognising an altered political landscape did not, therefore, translate immediately into a corresponding shift in politics, educational policies and practice.

To add to this challenge, when the organisation started campaigning in the public domain again, it had at its disposal and could draw on only minimal resources, since it had a limited range of influence and lacked the capacity to mobilise on the scale SADTU was able to at its inception. Instead, it re-entered the public domain rather discretely and quietly, to the extent that Gabru would say, ‘I can’t remember the TLSA launching a campaign... I cannot remember them actively recruiting people’, ‘you had to go and look for the TLSA, it

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\(^{140}\) Govender indicates that SADTU experienced phenomenal growth amongst the younger generation of black teachers between 1993 and 1995, recruiting 80 000 of them (Govender, ‘Teacher unions, policy struggles and educational change, 1994 to 2004’, p.273).

\(^{141}\) Interview with I. Abrahams, 10 October 1995.

wouldn’t come to you’.\textsuperscript{143} The validity of this comment can be gauged by examining the organisation’s activities in the years soon after its re-emergence.

**Working in the public domain: informing and recruiting**

To rebuild its public image as an independent and combative non-collaborationist entity, the League embarked on a multi-pronged strategy from the early 1990s to profile itself and recruit teachers from select schools and community structures. In so doing, the organisation utilised its independent media, in conjunction with its branches.\textsuperscript{144} It also, in addition, formed a Recruitment and Communications Committee (RCC) of in-service and retired teachers.\textsuperscript{145} Showing immense eagerness, the RCC addressed approximately 100 schools between 1994 and 1995,\textsuperscript{146} with certain schools receiving frequent visits to consolidate and service recruits. To attract potential members, the League regularly updated teachers on developments in education,\textsuperscript{147} specifically on the threat teacher retrenchments and the closure of teaching colleges posed for education.\textsuperscript{148}

Recruitment, however, proved extremely taxing for the League, particularly as its returns proved negligible. Liebenberg recollected:

> We had to, as it were, recruit again from the beginning, and I can tell, I was one of them, who went all over the place, went as far as Vredendal. These young teachers new nothing about the Teachers’ League, the one or two who did remember something about the Teachers’ League, were children of old TLSA people ... there was not that positive response, ... we could succeed in capturing a few people but on the whole, it was almost, one could say, a futile exercise.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{143} Interviews with Y. Gabru, 10 March 2006.

\textsuperscript{144} *The Educational Journal*, November-December 1995, pp.10, 11.

\textsuperscript{145} The recruitment committee informed teachers in predominantly DEC schools, where it felt its ideas would be better received, about the organisation’s history, its aims, and what it could offer prospective members (see report on recruitment in *The Educational Journal*, November-December 1995, p.10-11). A range of schools were visited, from Mitchells Plain to Worcester, Saldanha, Paternoster, George and Pacaltsdorp (Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Minutes of Executive Meeting’, 15 December 1994; *The Educational Journal*, November-December 1995, pp.10, 11).


\textsuperscript{147} An example of what would be discussed with teachers would be the three Education Bills passed in 1995–the National Qualifications Framework Bill, the South African Qualifications Bill, and the National Education Policy Bill.


\textsuperscript{149} Interview with C. Liebenberg, 24 May 2005.
Alert to these difficulties, and in an endeavour to overcome them, the organisation at its 1995 conference, decided to open its ranks to members outside of (South African Council on Sport) SACOS and NUM-related organisations. Reaching this decision proved arduous, as once again, non-collaboration came under the spotlight. This time the debate was intense, and the conference divided on the issue of who would qualify for membership. To resolve the matter, a secret ballot of those members present was conducted. Clearly, unremitting tensions around the interpretation of non-collaboration, and how the organisation should operate in the new political environment continued, curtailing in practice any major organisational shifts that could eventuate.

Continuing with its recruitment drive, the League through what it called its ‘Visibility Project’, sought to garner support for its ideas and practices. To achieve this, the organisation’s branches extended their sphere and range of influence outside of formal education-related activities by organising cultural competitions with schools and community organisations, in much the same way as they had in the 1940s and 1950s. Members also involved themselves in the Council for Black Education and Research Trust COBERT) and the Trust for Christian Outreach and Education (TCOE) between 1994 and 1996.

The TLSA’s branches generated a range of activities in the mid-1990s. These included a programme for primary school teachers that incorporated an in-service reading project, an

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150 The last internal session of the TLSA’s annual conference was a lengthy and heated debate that resulted in the chairperson, I. Abrahams being replaced because of intense disagreements on the interpretation of non-collaboration and the way forward (the author was present). See Teachers’ League of South Africa, Some Options On How The TLSA Should Operate In The Current Education And Schools’ Environment, Internal discussion document, July 1995.
152 See Chapter 1, p.58.
153 TLSA members through COBERT assisted with the teaching of Afrikaans, English Literature, Mathematics and General Science thrice a week to students from the Eastern Cape and other areas (The Educational Journal, November-December 1995, p.10). These sessions were located mainly within the area of Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET), where bridging courses were offered to students who needed to qualify for high school (Discussion with Louis Roelf, 12 January 2008). League teachers, moreover, participated in the ‘Making Democracy Work Workshop’, and the ‘African Literature Conference’, hosted by COBERT in 1995 (Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Minutes of Executive Meeting’, 15 December 1994; The Educational Journal, November-December 1995, p.10).
154 League members were involved in the programmes of the TCOE in Langa, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha between 1994 and 1996 (The Educational Journal, July-August 1995, p.13).
initiative that was extended to first and second year teacher trainees. The Athlone Branch of the TLSA also produced a variety of media profiling the organisation, and published AL, a branch newsletter, which contained articles for the broader public. The Elsies-River branch, too, brought out its publication Classroom Reflections, which focused on pedagogy, appropriate teacher conduct and classroom practice. Each branch, moreover, organised social gatherings and consistently held monthly meetings to keep members abreast of educational developments. In addition, the organisation arranged Art and Writing competitions and an inter-school Argus quiz for primary schools. To co-ordinate matters, officials met regularly in Executive and Action Committee meetings to plan League activities.

The League, going even further, indicated it was supportive of broader struggles that went beyond immediate educational matters, and it expressed active solidarity with other left oriented initiatives. Ivan Abrahams, for instance, raised the organisation’s banner alongside activists calling for the release of the prominent Black Panthers’ figure Mumia Abu Jamal outside the American embassy in August 1995. These types of actions showed

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155 Teachers’ League of South Africa, AL, Vol.1, No.1, June 1995 (Athlone Branch). Many teachers were from the Athlone and Mitchells Plain areas.
156 The author assisted in the production of media. See also Teachers’ League of South Africa, Some Options On How The TLSA Should Operate In The Current Education And Schools’ Environment, p.2.
157 Two editions of AL emerged. It opened discussion on non-collaboration, the boycott and various other issues in education and sport.
158 The author assisted with the illustrations for the publication (see Teachers’ League of South Africa, Classroom Reflections, TLSA: Elsies-River Branch, 1994). See also Teachers’ League of South Africa, Some Options On How The TLSA Should Operate In The Current Education And Schools’ Environment, p.3.
159 Teachers’ League of South Africa, Why You Should Become A Member Of The TLSA, TLSA pamphlet, 1998.
160 The Educational Journal, November-December 1995, p.10. In August-September 1995, eight schools participated in the TLSA’s inaugural quiz in the Athlone area, which was won by Athlone North (Athlone Community News, ‘Athlone North clear winners in news quiz’, 14 September 1995). In 1996 and 1997 Turfhall Primary were the winners of the quiz, with Sunnyside Primary the runners up (Lynne Roscoe, A telephonic discussion on the TLSA quiz in the 1990s, 13 April 2008. Lynne Roscoe taught at Sunnyside Primary during the 1990s and was the teacher representative for the school). Inter-school Argus quiz competitions were also held in the Kensington-Maitland, Factreton and Silvertown-Kewtown-Bridgetown areas. See Teachers’ League of South Africa, Some Options On How The TLSA Should Operate In The Current Education And Schools’ Environment, p.2.
162 The demonstration was against the pending execution of Mumia Abu Jamal, a high profile member of the Black Panthers’ who was on death row for allegedly murdering a police officer in 1981. The author was present at the demonstration.
demonstrably the beginnings of a concerted effort by the TLSA to project itself in a far more assertive manner and to dispel narrow interpretations of its non-collaborationism.

A less-known component of the League but which was integral to the organisation’s identity as an oppositional and independent formation committed to teachers’ rights, was its Legal Aid Bureau (LAB), established in 1950.\textsuperscript{163} The LAB’s central aim was to ‘advise, protect and defend teachers in cases of political victimisation’.\textsuperscript{164} It would therefore take on the cases of TLSA and non-TLSA members, and had financially assisted those teachers it represented through an internally run Defence and Provident fund.\textsuperscript{165} Composed of members who had no special expertise or formal legal training, LAB members acquired their knowledge through study and experience,\textsuperscript{166} making them a self-sufficient and resourceful unit.

The introduction of the Education Labour Relations Act (ELRA) in 1993 provided the LAB with much impetus, for it guaranteed employees the right to legal aid.\textsuperscript{167} Because of this reform, LAB members were permitted to resolve disputes on behalf of teachers, unlike in the past when, as a non-recognised teachers’ body, it could not directly represent its members and thus depended on a network of legal contacts for advice. Accompanying the ELRA was the formation of the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC),\textsuperscript{168} which brought teachers’ organisations in line with worker unions. The League, however, owing to

\textsuperscript{163} The Legal Aid Bureau was established after the October 1950 executive meeting of the TLSA. It comprised five executive members and a co-opted member to oversee teachers’ cases. It established a Defence Fund to which members contributed annually (\textit{The Educational Journal}, October 1950, p.2).

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{The Educational Journal}, October-November 1970, p.7.

\textsuperscript{165} Interview with J. Udemans, 17 December 2004.


\textsuperscript{167} Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Teachers and Education Labour Relations In Practice’, Legal Aid Bureau, 1995.

\textsuperscript{168} The ELRC was established on 23 March 1994. Many of its bargaining policies were renegotiated with representative teacher unions after the 1994 elections. Thereafter it became the \textit{bona fide} negotiating chamber where government together with the recognised teacher bodies discussed policies to be implemented in education nationally, such as conditions of service, new salary grading, post levels and salary scales. The ELRC’s chief function though, involved resolving disputes between employers and employees. The main teacher organisations represented in the ELRC were SADTU, NAPTOSA and the SAOU (Suid Afrikaanse Onderwysers Unie). All teachers, whether members or not of a teachers’ organisation in the ELRC, are subject to the council’s decisions.
its policy of non-collaboration, refused to become a member of the ELRC, for it was a state structure.

The League’s unwillingness to participate in the labour relations council though, meant its members were denied access to certain procedural disputes with the education department.\(^{169}\) As this was seriously disadvantageous to its members, the organisation in 1996 contested these exclusionary measures, claiming that it was in conflict with the country’s constitution and the Labour Relations Act. Its intervention proved successful, and the Educators’ Employment Act was amended to make provision for ‘unconditional representation of non-parties to the ELRC’.\(^ {170}\) The League’s interpretation of non-collaboration demonstrated again how yielding the policy actually was. The LAB, it must be said, won much prestige within the organisation and even the education department for this victory, as it showed that it was an astute and combative unit. On this score, Lawrence proudly recollected his experience as a member of the LAB:

> I joined Mr Hanmer in the Legal Aid Bureau; and I took on the first cases, and I’m on record as having at least a dozen cases and not having lost a single case. And, the Western Cape Education Department ... tried time and time again to get the upper hand over us, and never ever succeeded. We won some spectacular decisions against them \(^ {171}\)

The LAB’s work, however, while held in high esteem internally, seldom received wide publicity, and only a few teachers became aware of this arm of the TLSA. It seemed, once more, as if a veil of anonymity and secrecy shrouded the organisation, stifling therewith possibilities for growth.

The heightened activities and changes within the League, following its re-emergence, did not translate directly into significant growth for the organisation during the later part of the 1990s. What contributed undoubtedly to this stunted growth was the formation of SADTU,

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\(^{169}\) Examples of these were in unfair labour practice, where non-unionised teachers were not allowed the use of the arbitration process, only participation in a dispute meeting and mediation. Both could involve a great deal of time without any guarantee of an outcome. Also, teachers facing misconduct by the education department were excluded from the right to nominate someone to serve on the tribunal or board of appeal. These same teachers were required to pay a higher monthly levy towards the running cost of the ELRC as opposed to unionised members.


\(^{171}\) Interview with C. Lawrence, 22 February 2005.
an organisation the TLSA could not rival in membership regionally or nationally. It was, however, able to challenge it strongly in the field of political and pedagogical ideas. This contestation unfolded dynamically during the mid-to-late 1990s, as elaborated hereafter.

**Comprador unionism and the three Rs: rationalisation, redeployment and retrenchments**

Overall, and notwithstanding its pro-active campaign, the TLSA’s practical response to the transition of the 1990s was slow, rendering it almost marginal within the unwinding skein of political and educational developments. Not only did the organisation lack the personnel and administrative capacities to respond to the pace of political events nationally, its non-collaborationist practices were considered by many if not most people, at odds with the changing post-apartheid era. For example, the League did not see it fit to join the ELRC and balked at South Africa’s 1994 election, branding it a fraud and a betrayal of the liberation struggle, however, it could not ignore the effects of the negotiated settlement and the resultant democracy nationally and internationally. These effects would play themselves out in concrete ways as South Africa’s strategic geo-political location and its adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, a self-imposed structural adjustment programme, to replace the social democratic Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which sought to unlock the country to potential investment, trade and an array of cultural influences. In addition, the ascendancy of neo-liberal capitalism, and the concurrent diminishing of socialism internationally, following the collapse of the Eastern European bloc in the late 1980s, saw the left-wing’s agenda recede rapidly. In this global context, the ANC reading these changes, decided to opt for a government of national unity that included elements of the former apartheid state.

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173 Neo-liberalism was the guiding philosophy of the GEAR strategy. By South Africa adopting this strategy, it showed that it intended becoming part of the global economy and was willing to open its local markets to global competition and international foreign investors. This meant, in turn, that it would apply fiscal disciplinary measures and cut the financing of the public sector in order to move towards the restructuring and privatising of state assets. By accepting these economic prescriptions, the GNU showed it was positively disposed to neo-liberalism in South Africa.
174 The ANC, NP and Inkhata Freedom Party dominated the Government of National Unity.
The effect of the above events on educational reform was manifold, but essentially and fundamentally linked to discourses of efficiency, effectiveness, cuts in social spending and the role of markets. This approach to education stood in direct opposition to the liberation movement’s goals, and in particular to the TLSA’s longstanding vision of ‘free, compulsory and equal education for all children’. The strategic shift by the government away from this longstanding educational ideal is taken up in the next chapter. Notable though, was that the GEAR policy, in effect, would place a ceiling on government spending, with emphasis shifting to ‘deficit reduction, government right-sizing, tariff reduction, privatisation, and productivity-linked wage rates’.

In the Western Cape, this gave way to the provincial government slashing spending on education, health and housing, in 1996 and 1997. This was not unprecedented in education, but in fact a continuation of the 1995/96 budget cutbacks. These austere measures would directly affect the teaching fraternity, and by the late 1990s, teachers’ pedagogical tasks assumed daunting proportions, as they battled to retain their posts, while simultaneously trying to manage a new and changing curriculum.

Although the League and SADTU had often shared platforms to oppose the NP government’s rationalisation measures in the pre-1994 years, SADTU’s allegiance to the COSATU-SACP-ANC tripartite alliance, particularly after April 1994, created constant tensions between the two organisations. By way of example, the reluctance of the COSATU leadership to campaign against the government’s free market strategies brought strong criticism from the TLSA, NUM and other leftists. Their critique was directed largely at the federation’s growing corporatism and its compromised independence.


180 Corporatism may be defined as a regulatory tool employed by the state to conceal union-employer conflict. It aimed to ameliorate the economic crises by controlling trade-union behaviour through incorporating its leadership into organs of government.
These attacks became particularly virulent, when, as with the Education Renewal Strategy (ERS), the GNU’s educational reforms sought to offset the deep disparities in the education system through a process of redress. To achieve this ideal, of what it termed ‘equity’, government embraced a process of ‘right-sizing’ over a five-year period within and between provinces. This it set in motion with the support of the teacher unions, through two ELRC agreements: Resolution 4 of 1995, which set the teacher to learner ratios at 1:35 in secondary schools and 1:40 in primary schools, and its replacement Resolution 3 of 1996 that advanced the notion of equity via a process of teacher redistribution based on teacher-pupil ratios. These agreements presaged the forfeiting of jobs of thousands of teachers nation wide. The League, quick to react, contended that the ELRC agreements constituted an attack on teachers and would result in massive upheaval and instability in schools, since the chief factor capable of effecting redress resided in the teacher constituency. Teachers, it argued, were pivotal to the delivery of ‘quality’ education; their removal would serve only to “denude the schools of their most valuable asset - those at the cutting face of rebuilding the nation, those upon whom reconstruction and development in the true sense absolutely depend”.

The League in its didactic and polemical style proceeded to wield a non-collaborationist stick and admonished the teacher organisations in the ELRC, and in particular SADTU, for disingenuously collaborating in the restructuring process through conceding to the ‘application of uniform teacher:pupil ratios’. For the League, the strategy would negate

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183 Whittle, p.22.
184 The severance and redeployment procedures or ‘right-sizing’ were set out in Resolution No.3 of 1996 of the ELRC (Ibid.; Mail & Guardian, ‘New deal wipes out education imbalances’, 10 to 16 May 1996).
equity and result in ‘downsizing’ not ‘right-sizing’ in education, and thus worsen not ameliorate the imbalances inherited from the apartheid era, least of all deliver on free compulsory education up to matric.\textsuperscript{188} The rationalisation measures of the GNU, the League contended, were central to the cutbacks in education,\textsuperscript{189} formulated at World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) level.\textsuperscript{190} This was not expedient polemics on the part of the League, for its argument found resonance amongst educationists, who also cited South African policy on teacher:pupil ratios following WB directives.\textsuperscript{191}

The League then proceeded to slate SADTU’s redeployment strategy, which the union presented as an alternative to the government’s interpretation of rationalisation.\textsuperscript{192} Redeployment for the union meant moving teachers from advantaged ‘resourced’ to disadvantaged ‘least resourced’ schools to achieve redress in education.\textsuperscript{193} It hoped in this way to deflect the government’s teacher retrenchments.\textsuperscript{194} SADTU’s option though was defective logistically and politically, since its equity plan ‘to attract teachers to impoverished areas’, was a late realisation and essentially reactive, for it hinged on a reshuffling process to salvage teachers jobs.\textsuperscript{195} The plan was premised on the fact that state spending per head on primary and secondary school education was highest in the Western

\textsuperscript{190} The League identified cutbacks in funding as the main reason for rationalisation (The Educational Journal, November-December 1994, p.1). It therefore continued to lambaste the IMF and WB as well as the government’s ministry of Finance, Trade and Industry that had ‘imposed upon the country stringent conditions for it to qualify for loans’ (The Educational Journal, November-December 1995, p.2).
\textsuperscript{192} SADTU saw rationalisation as a means to achieve full integration and equity, which for them was the basis of transformation (South African Democratic Teachers’ Union, SADTU Bulletin, 14 April, 1996; Mail & Guardian, ‘New deal wipes out education imbalances’, 10 to 16 May 1996).
\textsuperscript{194} SADTU Bulletin, 14 April 1996; SADTU’s view of rationalisation, which it defined as a means to redress historical imbalances, seemed in conflict with the Western Cape Education Department (WCED). It accused the Western Cape MEC for Education, the Nationalist Party Martha Olckers, of deliberately conflating rationalisation with mass retrenchments and instilling fear in teachers (South African Democratic Teachers’ Union, SADTU Bulletin, 14 April 1996).
Cape, a region that along with Gauteng and the Northern Province were judged resourced areas. For SADTU, therefore, the redeployment of teachers to poorer provinces was a means to attain redress through redistribution. This conception of equity the League rejected as erroneous.

The NUM affiliate opposed the redeployment strategy for two reasons: firstly, it claimed redeployment would cause ‘racial’ antagonisms, since the process actually meant retrenching teachers and thus playing off HoA, HoR, HoD schools against the former DET schools. It consequently snubbed SADTU’s claim that ‘the move could lead to increased racial integration in schools’ as well as the National Department of Education’s (NDE) argument for ‘upsizing’ historically deprived areas, where “traditionally, white, coloured and Indian schools tended to be overstaffed, while many black schools, particularly in rural areas, were drastically understaffed”. Its position seemed vindicated when forced ‘racial’ integration met with stiff resistance from teachers. The Cape Times, for instance, reported that “simmering discontent [prevailed] in township schools, where communities felt ‘excess’ white and coloured teachers were being forced on them at the expense of unemployed black teachers”. The League, capitalising on these events, declared the redeployment strategy flawed in intent and implementation:

‘... establishing a non-racial system based on equity’ was quickly slated by the victims of this brand of ‘equity’ as an attempt to move outsiders into their schools. After all, they had been (mis)led to believe that ‘equity’ would be to their benefit! ... One can also understand the unwillingness of redeployees to step into posts at schools where they will not be welcome, wanted or needed. So, who is to be redeployed to which school into which posts?"
Alternatively, the organisation asserted, ‘more’ teachers would be required in an equitable education system.\textsuperscript{203}

Secondly, the League claimed that teacher redeployment would not be a workable solution, since the government’s main intention was to save money through fiscal discipline ‘without substantially increasing the budgetary allocation to education’.\textsuperscript{204} Redeployment, for the organisation, had far more sinister implications, since redeployed teachers would continue to incur costs for the government and not reduce its expenditure, particularly as teachers’ salaries constituted the largest portion of the education budget.\textsuperscript{205} Thus, for the League, “if the wizards in the education ministry redeploy retrenched teachers elsewhere, this would mean continued employment and payment of such teachers and thus negate the budget cuts ordered by those who give the instructions - the WB-IMF”.\textsuperscript{206} This was a distinguishing feature of the League’s analysis in this period, since for it, government intended apportioning according to what it could afford,\textsuperscript{207} through, as Marais put it, ‘reprioritising its departmental budgets’.\textsuperscript{208} Government, in effect, sought redress not by increasing but through a ‘decrease’ or ‘cut’ in spending on education, the League argued.\textsuperscript{209} In schooling, this translated into policy embracing increased teacher-pupil ratios and teacher workloads without sacrificing teacher productivity, efficiency and ‘without adding new resources’.\textsuperscript{210} In general terms, this implied, doing more with less.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Mail & Guardian, ‘New deal wipes out education imbalances’, 10 to 16 May 1996.
  \item The Educational Journal, July-August 1994, p.12. A key factor in the League’s contestation of government’s educational policy was whether it had the financial ability through the RDP, to deliver on important developmental and social concerns such as housing, health, education and welfare among other social necessities. The League realised in the first few months of the ANC-led government taking office, that the RDP proposals could not affect government’s proposed reforms in education (The Educational Journal, November-December 1994, p.1.).
\end{itemize}
Considering this grave economic context for education, the League took issue with SADTU’s endorsement of government’s budget, embodied by its backing of rationalisation and redeployment. This meant for the organisation that the teachers’ union was wilfully collaborationist, and “speaking for the ruling classes and the exploiters of this country’s wealth - and not for the victims of the Bengu policy. ... [Indeed] All efforts on their part to claim that they do this in the name of ‘equity’ amount to hypocrisy and dangerous cant ...”

The League’s argument hit home when the vast majority of teachers rejected redeployment. A Mitchell’s Plain teacher expressed her views on the matter:

Redeployment is totally unrealistic. A stable family unit is the cornerstone of any community. Because 50 percent of teachers are married, redeployment will result in a splitting or uprooting of many families. With no guarantee of spouses being able to find replacements in other parts of the country and most families unable to cope on one salary, most affected teachers will be forced to opt for retrenchment.

This was one example of the widespread opposition to redeployment, a process the media dubbed a ‘muddled and ill-conceived policy’ based on dubious research.

The League’s stance on redeployment seemed further vindicated when the WCED introduced the Voluntary Severance Package (VSP) to encourage teachers to volunteer for early retirement as an alternative to redeployment. Rehana Rossouw of the Mail & Guardian put it aptly: “the first step towards redeploying teachers is an offer of a voluntary severance package to allow those who prefer leaving the service to do so, creating room for excess teachers.” This move constituted a glaring attempt by the department to attain its

212 Mrs Shereen Witten, Hazeldene Primary, Portlands, Mitchell’s Plain, cited in Chalkline, ‘Teachers speak on redeployment’, 12-26 June 1996.
214 An agreement was reached in the ELRC with teachers’ organisations to allow those teachers who were not willing to be redeployed to have the benefit of opting for the VSP, subject to the education department’s approval. Various criteria were presented to teachers by the education department to induce them into accepting the VSP, ranging from age to health-related reasons, their teaching subjects becoming dispensable, or because they had sufficient years of service (sic) which allowed them to qualify for a substantial monetary package.
215 Mail & Guardian, ‘New deal wipes out education imbalances’, 10 to 16 May 1996. Details of the VSP were circulated to schools (see Western Cape Education Department, Circular 0051/1996, 21 May 1996, Cape Town: South Africa).
rationalisation targets and to stay within its reduced budget.\textsuperscript{216} As expected, the vast majority of teachers identified in excess opted for the VSP as opposed to redeployment,\textsuperscript{217} notwithstanding the fact that they could not return to the profession.

The outcome of the VSP was that the most marketable and best-qualified educators, specifically teachers with scarce skills such as in mathematics, the sciences and accounting, exited the system.\textsuperscript{218} Crystal High and Livingstone High, for example, fell into this category with the latter losing thirteen of forty-nine staff members.\textsuperscript{219} The effect would have devastating and long-lasting consequences for disadvantaged schools. Moreover, redeployment failed to save money for the government, and in its first phase of implementation there was an increase in expenditure, with the VSP totalling conservatively R1 billion in government expense, as opposed to the R600 million initially projected by the NDE.\textsuperscript{220} The upshot of the redeployment process was that by August 1996, over 3000 teachers in the Western Cape had applied for severance packages,\textsuperscript{221} with 17000 teachers having made application nationally by October of the same year.\textsuperscript{222}

The NDE’s rationalisation strategy did not apply to in-service teachers only, as prospective teachers were also targeted. To this end, teacher colleges were instructed to reduce their first year intake by half,\textsuperscript{223} a move that pointed to their impending closure.\textsuperscript{224} Rallying in

\textsuperscript{216} Mail & Guardian, ‘New deal wipes out education imbalances’, 10 to 16 May 1996; Whittle, p.130. A sum total 12000 teachers were expected to be ‘retrenched’ or rendered superfluous in the province by the year 2000.
\textsuperscript{217} Teachers identified for redeployment at schools were those declared in excess of the school’s establishment.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.; Interview with B. Isaacs, 14 December 2004.
\textsuperscript{220} V. Govender et al, Conflict and Development in Education Policy’, \textit{Quarterly Review of Education and Training in South Africa}, Vol.4, No.3, 1997, p.10. Part of the reason for the increase in expenditure was that principals of schools scooped almost a million rand each by opting for the VSP. \textit{The Argus} of 9 September 1996 put the VSP benefits for principals on the headline page in bold print: ‘1 in 4 School Heads Quit: Cape teachers lash out as 440 principals take R1-m payoffs’. \textit{Chalkline} also commented on ‘high-ranking teachers with long years of service receiving handsome severance packages, some worth in the region of R1 million’ (\textit{Chalkline}, ‘Veteran teachers in line for handsome packages’, 12 to 26 June 1996).
\textsuperscript{221} Cape Times, ‘Principals, teachers to be part of school “axe team”’, 2 August 1996.
\textsuperscript{222} Mail & Guardian, ‘17 000 teachers take retrenchment option’, 25 to 31 October 1996. By the end of 1996, 6 000 teachers were to have lost their posts.
\textsuperscript{223} The Educational Journal, November - December 1995, p.1.
support of the students and staff at these colleges, the TLSA contended that the “newly introduced policy of free compulsory education up to Grade 9 necessitated a significant increase not decrease in the teaching corps”. Drawing attention to this reality, the Weekly Mail & Guardian reported:

> chaos greeted the beginning of the school year in Cape Town this week as Western Cape schools opened ... specialists in the province expressed their concerns about the lack of direction from the department on how to implement the new policy of free and compulsory primary education for all. ... schools were urged to accept new enrolments until they reached a specified pupil-teacher ratio – 40:1 for primary schools, 35:1 for high schools.

These developments underlined the League’s assessment that government intended to reduce spending in education under the pretext of equity.

The exiting of teachers with the commensurate increase in student numbers, translated relatively soon into overcrowded classes, and before long teachers were being accused by government of non-delivery in education, and not meeting the challenge of productivity and efficiency. Blade Nzimande, General Secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP), was a point in case. He, in a talk radio programme, and following on Deputy President Thabo Mbeki’s assertion that teachers were reneging on their duties, declared that teachers who were not performing be “flushed from the system”. Jonathan Jansen, an educationist and co-panellist, having observed the devastating effects of the redeployment and rationalisation policies, retorted:

> Now when teachers suddenly find themselves having to teach more classes than they ever have before, when they find themselves under stress because they [are] not sure if they [are] still going to be in the system in the next year etcetera, etcetera, that leads to teachers finding themselves working under very, very difficult conditions. And I think we also need to ask, to what extent have our policies, for better or for worse, contributed to the demoralisation of teachers, to the lack of delivery etcetera? ... because by putting the emphasis on teachers not delivering, you release the state from its...
Jansen in a later article took this perspective further, and asserted that the government was guilty of passing the issue of poor delivery in education to school communities. His contention seemed to find support within TLSA circles, for he was invited to address the watershed 2000 conference where the TLSA formally merged with the National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (NUPSAW).

Confronting Teacher Rationalisation: The Teachers’ League and the Western Cape Parents’, Teachers’, Students Forum

While the TLSA, through its media, denounced the national and provincial education departments and those teacher organisations complicit in rationalisation and redeployment, its members actively immersed themselves in the establishment of PTSA structures in various parts of the Western Cape to counter the threats restructuring posed for poor school communities, those excluded during the apartheid era. In a short space of time, school communities mobilised en masse under the banner of the Western Cape Parents’, Teachers’, Students Forum (WCPTSF or the Forum). At its inception, the Forum constituted a range of political voices that cut across political cleavages. This political mix however did not deter the League, and it expressed support for the ‘groundswell of opposition to the government’s retrenchment plans’ and the rapid proliferation of PTSAs that gathered under the banner of the WCPTSF.

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230 This conference could be viewed as the last general meeting of the TLSA. By then it had disaffiliated from the NUM and joined NUPSAW (see P. Hendricks, ‘Engaging Apartheid: The Teachers’ League of South Africa in the Western Cape, 1985-1989’; Cape Town: University of Cape Town, Unpublished M.Ed. dissertation, 2002, p.65).
As they had in WECTU, the PTAs and the PTSAs movements, League members opted to work inside the Forum and not organise independently under the organisation’s banner. The rationale for this, Peter Meyer the then principal of Harold Cressy High, put cogently:

The League found itself in the position where it had to support another structure not necessarily of its own creation, but a structure that certainly was not adopting an attitude or a position which was going to lead to an acceptance of ... rationalisation, ... retrenchments ... teacher redeployment etcetera, ... [This] was always something which was opposed by the League. ... The League itself certainly was no way going to not ... align itself, through its members, through their involvement ... in the Western Cape Parent, Teacher, Student Forum...

While League teachers contributed to building the Forum as an independent anti-establishment initiative to counter the teacher cuts, this did not immunise them to the pressures of the VSP. Brian Isaacs, a TLSA member at the time explained:

The only leading person from the Teachers’ League of South Africa that spoke at meetings was Mr Ivan Abrahams. And he opposed the teachers leaving the system. But many of their members ... I don’t know whether it was just an age thing, where they were in their 50s late 50s, they saw this as the way in which, ‘we are never going to be offered this package again’, and they took it and they left ...

On one occasion, Isaacs confronted a serious dilemma, a co-spokesperson within the Forum, who was also a member of the League, had decided to accept the severance package. He elaborated:

I remember that I had to speak on a platform with him at Harold Cressy, and I was almost not going to share the platform, because I couldn’t believe that here was a man who belonged to the Forum, and belonged to the TLSA, speaking against rationalisation, but he is taking the package. Now I couldn’t come to terms with that. He had already made up his mind that he could understand why people took the package but at the same time, he was saying he was against rationalisation …

Although not opposed to rationalisation and redeployment in principle but rather in the form or method of implementation, the WCPTSF’s main concern, as with the League, was the pupil:teacher ratios (PTR’s) the department was using as a yardstick for rightsizing. As opposed to an outright rejection of restructuring and equity, therefore, the Forum called for a moratorium on rationalisation and continued to highlight the fact that parents were not party to the discussions on transformation in education and that the agreement

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236 Ibid.
237 Cape Times, ‘Teachers sold out by leadership’, 28 May 1996; Whittle, p.120. The WCPTSF’s leading banner read ‘No Consultation, No Rationalisation’.
between the state and teacher organisations in the ELRC was therefore unlawful. In a short space of time, and which reflected its popular support and the heightened opposition to rationalisation and redeployment, the Forum organised one of the largest marches to parliament on 23 May 1996, of approximately 20 000 to 30 000 parents, teachers and students, dubbed the ‘Mother of All Marches’. Its aim was to hand over a petition of 130 000 signatures at parliament showing opposition to the rationalisation of teachers. Not even an eleventh hour meeting called by President Nelson Mandela with a few principals of the Forum could avert the mass march. This firm stand showed the influence if not strength of the non-collaborationist ethos at the time.

League people gave unqualified support to the mobilisation action, despite their usual opposition to conducting marches during school hours. A TLSA member and the principal of Livingstone High, R. Hendricks, explained the reasoning behind this about turn: “we all marched because of rationalisation, and if by show of numbers we could convince the government that it has to look anew at its resources and its money - its financial contribution to education - then that would have been an achievable goal”. The SADTU leadership condemned the march as the work of reactionary elements bent on resisting equity and the new ANC-led government. In a hard hitting pamphlet circulated at the event, SADTU accused the WCPTSF of being racist and elitist by pandering to reactionary elements, specifically the privileged ‘white’ and ‘coloured’ schools and the National Party. The Forum’s leadership, who were aware of the political contradictions and

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238 See also Cape Times, ‘Teachers sold out by leadership’, 28 May 1996; Chalkline, ‘Parents must be part of transformation process’, 12-26 June 1996; The Plainsman, ‘Urgent demand for education master plan, 19 June 1996. The Forum attempted to take the Education Department to court based on the failure of the ELRC to consult educators who were not members of teacher organisations in the Council (See Teachers have rights too, ‘Equal Rights For All Educators’, Vol.1, No.5, September 1996). Also, according to the National Policy Act of 1996, the Minister of Education was obliged to consult with not only teachers but parents and students (Whittle, p.122). Although the Forum had a strong legal case, it was not able to source sufficient funds from affected schools to proceed with the interdict (Interview with B. Isaacs, 14 December 2004).

239 Letters written to the Forum and its response to the invitation indicate that the President attempted to pre-empt the Forum’s march (Interview with B. Isaacs, 14 December 2004; also discussions with Forum members).


242 South African Democratic Teachers’ Union, SADTU Bulletin, 23 May 1996. The SADTU leadership placed an advertisement in the Cape Times of the morning of the march, which came out against the Forum’s
underlying ‘racial’ tensions in their ranks, acknowledged the fact that the march drew the
support of different and sometimes conflicting schools of thought:

I remember the Nationalist Party trying to make capital of the thing, they flew a plane
overhead with a thing trailing ‘they support’ [the teachers]. Helen Zille, the rich school
up there, they supported. Schools came as far afield as Worcester you know; PAGAD
supported. I think at that point there was widespread recognition that this
[rationalisation] is not good.243

The news media honed in on the mixed composition of the march and provocatively printed
an article titled Teachers’ march throws up ironies,244 highlighting SADTU’s spurning of
the event and the NP’s attempts to muster support for itself. Central to the Forum’s
problem, and which gave weight to the ANC and SADTU’s negative reaction to the mass
action, was the virtual absence of participating Xhosa-speaking schools in the Forum’s
mobilisation campaign. Leith, a prominent spokesperson of the Forum commented on this
dilemma:

I remember Fazlet Bell, Evarard Weber and Brian took time off to go into the township
schools, black township schools, to try and recruit and spread the message and so on. At
some schools they were simply refused entry, as simple as that: ‘don’t come here, you’re
not affiliated to SADTU and the ANC go away’. At some schools, they were able to go
in and talk to people, but the message wasn’t well received.245

Many SADTU teachers however defied the union leadership and participated in the mass
march. A leading member of SADTU recollected: “Most of the Elsies-River region’s
teachers took part in the march – the SADTU people. Even some of the Bonteheuwel
people, even some of the Mitchells Plain people who were SADTU took part in the
march”.246 She furthermore elaborated on the split that developed in the union regarding its
members’ response to rationalisation, and intimated that teachers who participated in the
mass march were singled-out and reprimanded by the union’s leadership. Everard Weber of
the WCPTSF, and a League member, penned an article titled Teachers sold out by
leadership, where he accused the union’s top echelons of not consulting with its members,
who, he claimed, had ‘dissociated themselves from their leadership because proper

244 Cape Times, ‘Teachers’ march throws up ironies’, 24 May 1996.
245 W. Leith (Interview with W. Leith and F. Bardien, 26 July 2005). See also Whittle, p.120.
246 Interview with P. Van Voore, 26 April 2006.
mandates were never collected’. He also criticised the ultimatum SADTU put to its members: to either accept the voluntary severance package, and redeployment or face ‘misconduct’ and possible sacking.

Despite the sharp contradictions within SADTU, the League failed to present an alternative pole of gravity to dissident teachers in the union movement. Instead, it continued to lambaste the union as collaborationist. This attitude seemed to permeate the Forum too, as tensions within the structure vis-à-vis the SADTU members’ surfaced. In fact, the Forum became increasingly antagonistic towards SADTU and vilified the union for being a signatory to national and regional agreements with the education department. It also appeared, Leith averred, as if certain League elements wanted to ‘purge the Forum of all SADTU people’. A core group of teacher activists however entrenched themselves within the PTSA structure and kept the triad - parent, teacher, student - formation on an independent course despite internal dissent.

Demonstrating the confrontational side of non-collaboration, a series of volatile face-to-face encounters between Forum teachers and representatives of the WCED transpired in the wake of the mass march. This became particularly explosive when the department’s officials attempted to address public gatherings or school communities to explain the rightsizing process. The Forum gave Brian O’Connell, the head of the Western Cape Education Department (WCED), specific attention. He faced the brunt of more than a few anti-departmental actions, which ended in him abandoning or cancelling meetings on occasion. The perpetrators of these disruptions were identified by the media as the

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247 *Cape Times*, ‘Teachers sold out by leadership’, 28 May 1996. Whittle captures the complexity of the relationship between the Forum and SADTU. He points out that despite the ‘recriminations’ between the two organisations’ leadership, many SADTU members ‘actively supported the Forum’ (Whittle, p.121).

248 *Cape Times*, ‘Teachers sold out by leadership’, 28 May 1996.

249 W. Leith (Interview with W. Leith and F. Bardien, 26 July 2005) and P. Van Voore, 26 April 2006 confirmed this general criticism of SADTU.

250 W. Leith (Interview with W. Leith and F. Bardien, 26 July 2005). Issues centred on whether or not to meet with COSATU and SADTU representatives. In this setup, SADTU teachers were increasingly marginalised within the WCPTSF. The Forum’s efforts however should not be downplayed, and it nonetheless met with SADTU and COSATU on the matter of rationalisation and the possibilities of collective action. The author was present at some of these discussions.

251 *The Argus*, ‘Teachers’ meeting abandoned’, 25 July 1996; *Cape Times*, ‘Education chief forced to abandon speech’, 25 July 1996. O’Connell, on one occasion, had his house besieged when he failed to turn-up at a public meeting in the Northern Suburbs (Discussion with WCPTSF activists).
‘Teachers’ League’, which it linked to the ‘far left-wing’ of the ‘New Unity Movement’.\textsuperscript{252} Brian Isaacs, a TLSA member and the principal of South Peninsula High, emerged as a leading voice for the Forum,\textsuperscript{253} and Abie Fortuin, a longstanding League member and principal of Scottesdene High, along with other Unity Movement teachers, who were also part of the WCPTSF, stood out as defiant figures against the education department’s redeployment decree.\textsuperscript{254}

For a brief period, a symbiotic relationship existed between the Forum and the TLSA, and inasmuch as the Unity Movement affiliate played an influential role in the PTSA structure, the Forum in turn shaped the League’s outlook. Indeed, it could be said that The Educational Journal served as much as a mouthpiece for the WCPTSF as it did for the TLSA. This was no more patent than when, in an unyielding endeavour to ensure the implementation of its rationalisation process, the WCED in June 1996 instructed schools to institute right-sizing committees comprising members of school staffs and principals or inspectors, to identify teachers in excess.\textsuperscript{255} The move, as Ganief Hendricks a labour law specialist pointed out, was to sanction right-sizing committees in an endeavour to remove the adversarial process, and so distance the state ‘from a sensitive issue that will best be handled by structures closer to the ground’.\textsuperscript{256}

This in-house identification and excising process was immediately rejected by the WCPTSF, and it derogatively stigmatised right-sizing committees as RATCOMs (rationalisation committees), and called for them to be boycotted, to “force the education department to ‘do the dirty work’”.\textsuperscript{257} The League equally scorned those serving on right-sizing committees, and branded them ‘collaborators’, since for it: ‘self-retrenchment by teachers would let the education authorities off the hook, their dirty work done by willingly

\textsuperscript{252} Cape Times, ‘Education chief forced to abandon speech’, 25 July 1996. Lategan who attended a few of O’Connell’s briefing meetings explained TLSA teachers involvement in the disruption of these meetings (Interview with A. Lategan, 4 January 2006).

\textsuperscript{253} See The Argus, ‘Defiant teachers disrupt meeting’, 26 July 1996.

\textsuperscript{254} See Cape Times, ‘Equality The Word’ (pic), 19 September 1996. These included teachers who belonged to the African People’s Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA).

\textsuperscript{255} Whittle, p.131.

\textsuperscript{256} Teachers have rights too, ‘Cushioning the blow’, Vol.1, No.1, February 1996.

\textsuperscript{257} Cape Times, ‘Principals, teachers to be part of school “axe team”’, 2 August 1996.
collaborating teachers’. South Peninsula High, a school closely associated with the TLSA and the WCPTSF, contested the cutback measures imposed on it and refused to accede to the department’s requests. Its principal recollected the staff’s response to the rationalisation measures the WCED attempted to foist on the school:

We pushed the stance that we [are] not identifying [teachers in excess]. ... Then they threatened the principal and teachers with disciplinary action, and that if we did not submit the information, they would charge all of us with misconduct. We then consulted ... Ganiel Hendricks, ... and he said that ‘if you don’t submit, … they can charge you’. So we submitted the information ... Mr Peter Snyders, ... [the] circuit manager, came in, ... I called the staff together ... I said: “remember people under Hitler also said they’re doing their job, and this is dirty work and I don’t want anything to do with it”’. ... So, smugly, he walks around the staff handing out the letters. The staff responded: ‘They said, Mr Snyders you had better get away here!’ ... Now you can imagine the trauma …We then challenged the department. We said: ‘We are lodging a grievance against this’ ... And the teachers stayed on at the school for almost three years … and that enabled us as a school to make the necessary adjustments.

Although South Peninsula High was able to contest the rationalisation of its staff and managed to retain teachers, for most schools no alternative seemed feasible to the education department’s uncompromising attitude of unilaterally redeploying teachers. Leith summed-up the cumulative effect the battle against rationalisation and redeployment had on teachers and the PTSA structure:

We couldn’t sustain the support we had, and part of the reason was ... we just got tired of struggling. People are not going to go the way we worked. For example, in schools ‘en dan moet jy nog elke jaar, elke dag of elke wiek, en gaan struggle en gaan struggle’ [where you are expected every year, every day, every week, and continually, all year, to go to meetings and to ‘struggle’ and ‘struggle’] and we had an election in ‘94, and freedom is supposed to be there, and things are supposed to be better ..

Most damaging for the schools was that the institution of right-sizing committees negatively affected teacher morale at schools, creating divisions on staffs, whilst alienating teachers from each other, as subjects were identified; posts were declared redundant and

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259 Whittle, p.133.
261 *The Educational Journal*, March 1996, p.12. The cutting of posts meant the removal of certain subjects at schools. The most noticeable losses were the arts and the so-called practical subjects, such as woodwork, home economics, vocational guidance, library classes, needlework and physical education.
more-and-more teachers were dismissed. In the context of the late 1990s, retrenchments not redeployment became unequivocally *ipso facto* for teachers.\(^{262}\)

The right-sizing of teachers between 1996 and 1998 did not result in the equalisation of Parent-Teacher Ratios (PTRs) or cut costs in education, instead, the quest for equity created new inequalities as school fees increased incrementally and private schools grew exponentially,\(^{263}\) therewith disqualifying poor working class children, who could not afford this tuition, from receiving quality public education. The vicissitudes of this process is elaborated upon in the next chapter. The emergent inequalities in education would underscore the League and the Forum’s contention that redeployment and rationalisation were virtually one and the same measure.

While League members continued to operate in the WCPTSF, where the focus was on educational issues predominantly, a few other members were instrumental in the formation of the Concerned Action Group (CAG) in January 1997. CAG coalesced around a broad alliance of political and community organisations opposed to the cutbacks in the public sector.\(^{264}\) Noticeably absent however were organisations associated with the tripartite alliance.

Ivan Abrahams, the convener for CAG, was its chief spokesperson and the president of the Teachers’ League at the time. Once again, League members found themselves in the company of like-minded individuals and organisations, this time in a broadly defined non-collaborationist front characterised by an anti-privatisation and anti-imperialism ethos.\(^{265}\)

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\(^{264}\) The CAG coalition comprised the New Unity Movement (NUM), Workers’ Organisation for Socialist Action (WOSA), Qibla, Islamic Unity Convention (IUC), WCPTSF, Health Workers’ Union (HWU), National Union of Leather and Allied Workers’ Union (NULAWU), People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), Islamic Unity Convention (IUC), TLSA, Federation of Cape Civic Associations (FCCA), District Six Restitution Trust (DSRT) and the Stop Olympic Bid Committee (SOBC).

The coalition campaigned against the government’s macro-economic GEAR policy, which it linked to the cutbacks and austerity measures in the public sector. As part of this strategy, it utilised the community radio stations and print media to propagate its ideas, and organised a successful mass rally on 15 March 1997 at the Grand Parade in central Cape Town, a historic landmark where the Unity Movement had organised many of its early 1940s demonstrations against the segregationist policies of the United Party. CAG for a short period mobilised people, who became aware of it, around government reneging on its election promises, specifically in education, health, pensions, social services, housing and the issue of crime.

Sustaining the CAG initiative proved taxing, and after two years the coalition faded from the political landscape, as logistically it became increasingly difficult to hold the disparate groups together. By this time, also, the TLSA was undergoing serious transformation, with a leadership comprising a narrow band of predominantly retired teachers having to make life-altering decisions on the future of the organisation. The choice was either to disband or to strategically integrate the League into the independent union movement. The final chapter will detail the challenges of this venture. The next chapter examines the League’s response to key educational reforms that emerged after 1994.
Chapter 4

Educational reforms post-1994: equity, redress and the persistence of class

… schools should not be allowed to become incubators of little monsters aridly trained for a job, with no general ideas, no general culture, no intellectual stimulation, but only an infallible eye and a firm hand. Technical education too helps a child to blossom into an adult - so long as it is educative and not simply informative, simply passing on manual skills.¹

The dawn of the post-apartheid era presented the League with another challenging episode. Two years after its public re-emergence, it was abundantly evident that the organisation’s uncompromising politics, particularly its policy of non-collaboration, as manifested in its boycott of the 1994 election, had not been well received by the masses – those it claimed to represent. While popularity was not a central concern to the organisation, more telling was the African Nationalist Congress’s (ANC) landslide victory, in which the vast majority of the population cast their vote.² Even more of a setback was the National Party’s (NP) success in the Western Cape, a feat secured by winning the ‘coloured’ vote.³ The politics of non-collaboration had clearly received a vote of no confidence nationally and even more so in the region. The League with the NUM, nonetheless, held stoically to their non-collaborationism,⁴ a strategy that had guided them for near 50 years, with the self-assurance, based on their analysis of the country’s political, social and economic conditions, that once the post election ‘thrill of anti-apartheid triumph’⁵ had subsided, they would be vindicated. The Movement, accordingly, continued to criticise the new interim Government of National Unity (GNU), including its esteemed President Nelson Mandela, and called on people to oppose government’s policies, wherever they fell, or appeared to

¹ D. Forgacs (ed), *A Gramsci Reader, Selected Writings 1916-1935*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988, p.64. Gramsci’s early writing on education engaged with the issue of the working class and intellectual autonomy (Forgacs, pp.53-55). The gender specific language of Gramsci’s writings reflects on the one-hand language conventions but also the influence of patriarchy on Italian leftists during the early twentieth century.
⁴ The policy of non-collaboration was re-emphasised in the preamble to the Ten-Point Programme (TPP) of 1996 (see R.O. Dudley, *The Ten Point Programme of the Unity Movement: A Historical Note*, March 1996).
fall, short of the demands of the liberation struggle. This rearguard action was not popular in the new political atmosphere of reconciliation and nation building, where the ANC, the largest constituent in the GNU, held overwhelming legitimacy as the party of liberation in many quarters.

This set the scene for the latter part of the 1990s, a period that was to prove taxing for the League, an ailing organisation given, as mentioned in the earlier chapters, its limited resources, diminished support base, and the age of the bulk of its members. The organisation’s policies and the politics of its members, particularly its leadership, were to be sorely tested in this period under what it termed a ‘neo-colonial’ dispensation, where, considering the voter pattern, many people believed the new liberal democratic government was the custodian to actualise the vision of the liberation movement. In this milieu of ‘hope’ and ‘possibility’, the politics of resistance and non-collaboration seemed rather pessimistic and out of step, if not out of touch with the country’s new reality. In fact, after the visible failure of the alternative socialist experiment in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the socialist initiative on the whole, of which the TLSA and NUM historically formed a part, was deemed to be discredited and in decline, while the ideology of the market was seen to be ‘bullish’ and on the ascent. Moreover, business had played a key role in the negotiated settlement, and capital was viewed as supportive of, if not the mid-wife to, the ‘democratic breakthrough’ that augured the profound change in the distribution and shape of the new South Africa.

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6 The other significant political parties in government were the National Party (NP), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Democratic Party (DP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) amongst a range of smaller parties that had won seats in Parliament.
8 Neo-colonialism for the NUM meant ‘the continuation of the imperial-colonial system by other means, by new means – the neo-colonial method perpetuating capitalism imperialism by other means’ (R.O. Dudley, Presidential Address, 12th Annual Conference of the New Unity Movement, 13 December 1996, Cape Town).
9 Lodge, p.2. The liberation movement was defined here as a social alliance between the ANC, SACP, COSATU and the constituents of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM).
11 Lodge, p.2.
From the League and the NUM’s viewpoint, however, business or capital or more expressly for them ‘capitalism-imperialism’ had in the run-up to and during the election, moved more assertively to the fore and strengthened its control over the new state. As Adam, Slabbert and Moodley declared: ‘Policy makers in Washington, Bonn and London are generally delighted with the South African transition’, since, they claim, ‘South Africa is locked ever deeper into the global economic rules and dictates’. For the TLSA and NUM, therefore, the GNU was a mix of new collaborators who as ‘site managers’ were answerable finally to foreign powers. These global forces, they predicted, would affect the local economy and service delivery in critical ways. How the League navigated its way through this politically and ideologically hostile terrain, specifically the area where education policy was rapidly unfolding, is central to this chapter.

The above developments considered, South Africa’s first democratic election, a symbolic and momentous event in twentieth-century world history, opened the country, as the last state to attain official democracy on the continent, to a new post-cold war and prospective postcolonial political era. Having reconciled the historically antagonistic ideologies of African and Afrikaner nationalism, thereby averting a possible civil war, or ‘racial armageddon’, as Jordan put it, South Africa was elevated to an ‘exceptional state’ in the eyes of the world. A major challenge, however, hovered over this ‘exceptional state’. How would it sustain this image - an image attained initially through secret talks and political negotiations? Foreshadowing this question, as it were, and thus operating with

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12 Dudley, Presidential Address.
14 Adam, Slabbert and Moodley, p.162.
18 Lazarus; Farred.
vision behind these negotiations, on the education and labour fronts, amongst others, and largely unseen, were parallel developments in a multitude of fora. Here, in these spaces, groups of activists, experts and specialists from academia, business, organised labour and government, drafted policy proposals in anticipation of a new post-apartheid society.

Despite differences within these groups, between elements from government, business and the liberation movement, a range of documents were produced that came to constitute the germ of future policies. Within the education sector, from the late 1980s and early 1990s, negotiations had begun pertaining to the rights of teachers by recognised and non-recognised teachers’ organisations inside the country, in conjunction with ANC elements in exile and those favourably disposed to them. These were discussed in Chapter 3.20 In curriculum development, policies promoting the integration of education and training, formerly held apart by apartheid, became the prevailing debate.21 The TLSA and NUM, amongst a range of left organisations, refused to participate in these discussions and negotiations, which they perceived to be forums of consensus making and part of the collaborationist politics of the time.22

Once in office, the newly elected GNU endorsed the process to amalgamate the previously fragmented, and the formerly separated training and education sectors,23 to phase out the old order’s agenda.24 Two primary challenges to integration arose. Firstly, the education (DoE) and labour (DoL) departments were kept administratively separate,25 and, secondly,

\[ \text{20 See Chapter 3, pp.154-158.} \]
\[ \text{21 The apartheid education system had 19 departments of education and 10 departments of manpower, which were racially divided and inequitably subsidised by government. This was one level at which integration occurred. There were many more interpretations of integration.} \]
\[ \text{22 See Interface Chapter, pp.120-122.} \]
\[ \text{24 The national minister of education Sibusiso Bengu was appointed in 1994, and on taking office received an Implementation Plan for Education and Training (IPET), based on the work of twenty Task Teams commissioned by the ANC’s Centre for Education policy Development (CEPD). A resource and not a blueprint for change, the IPET document had insufficient standing on implementation and was unable to assist in overcoming certain critical challenges facing integration.} \]
the interim constitution retained education as a provincial function and training a national concern. These conflicts and resultant tensions were indicative of many others to arise between provincial and national government. Although administrative and legislative factors undermined integration, the central rationale for combining education and training remained, namely, to achieve redress and equity in order to correct the apartheid inequalities in education and training, and to facilitate broader access to employment opportunities. Whether education and training would actually lead to the attainment of equal opportunities for those it was intended to benefit, was of immediate concern to the TLSA.

Within schooling, the discourse of social equality came to frame the policy proposals for educational reform. The central issue was whether learners would be provided with the full repertoire of skills to enable them to ‘understand, negotiate their way through and contribute to the society in which they live’. Examined hereafter is the anti-collaborationist perspective the League and its members brought to curriculum reform in the post-1994 era, particularly the organisation’s critique of the government’s redress and equity driven policies.

**The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)**

The TLSA described the RDP plans to reform education through integrating education and training in order to provide equal opportunities to all, as nothing more than ‘a great deal of sham, bluff and bluster’. Characterising the South African state and more specifically the GNU as an ‘alliance between old and new collaborators’, the League averred that South Africa continued to be hamstrung and dependent on western nations, and that in the post-

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28 Generally associated with social justice, equity implies, in this instance, a strategy that involved the distribution of resources and services to achieve general equality.


1994 period, it was the ‘new servant of imperialism and colonialism’.

Speaking from its broad ‘anti-imperialist’, ‘anti-neo-colonialist’ and ‘non-collaborationist’ understanding of the politics shaping the new South African state - the state as ‘an organ of class rule’, or the embodiment of ‘the irreconcilability of class antagonisms’ in the Leninist understanding of it - the organisation was, or appeared to be, undeviating.

Because of its particular characterisation of the South African state, the League argued that the educational reforms were given fresh impetus by the April election, an election it declared a ploy to make South Africa safe for the IMF and World Bank, or ‘Western capitalism and imperialism’. The effect of these financial institutions on education became a focal point for the organisation, since the financing of education was central to delivery on educational change. It advanced the argument that the RDP had insufficient funds to support the reform of education. Government, however, felt differently, and declared expenditure on education, for 1993 to 1994, sufficient and already considerably high. The first budget of the GNU came under scrutiny from the organisation, and it highlighted the government’s business orientation, contending that the emphasis on the market actually explained its hesitancy to deliver on social services.

The Educational Journal of June 1994 put the League’s position unequivocally:

… the new government has had to take over lock, stock and barrel a society that is cruelly dominated by exploitation by both local and foreign private enterprise tycoons. So severe is this exploitation that the new government has no hope of breaking the real chains that hold people in bondage. To make the claims set out in the RDP is not only unrealistic; it is dishonest and flies in the face of the harsh truths of our situation.

While the League strove to expose the GNU’s budgetary promises for the RDP as hollow, it simultaneously on the schooling front distributed a pamphlet disputing the claim that the 1994-1995 monetary allocation for education had been increased. For it, this apparent

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increase had been offset by: ‘Increased costs of textbooks, stationery, and other resources’. It declared, moreover, that financial constraints and inept management had rendered government unable to press ahead with its policies of redress as promised to the South African population in the run up to 27 April. The League was not far-off the mark, and although government claimed RDP funding was to emanate from several foreign and domestic sources, and discussions around a firm fiscal policy strategy were taking place, the RDP White Paper, in effect, restricted the growth of the public sector and endorsed privatisation. The 1995-96 education budget, too, represented a cut in spending, which the organisation contended parents would be forced to finance.

The League’s position was clear. Within the climate of fiscal restraint, the newly inducted GNU had no choice but to reallocate existing financial resources within provinces, in order to move towards equity in the financing of education. RDP goals, in other words, were achievable only through austerity measures. This was elaborated on in Chapter 3. The net effect of this fiscal disciplinary measure, according to political commentators and educationists, implied that the allocated resources to education, ‘to ensure that the

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39 Teachers’ League of South Africa, *The Funding of Education: Parents will have to pay!* TLSA pamphlet, February 1996.
40 For the TLSA the rationalising of the fiscus was compounded by government’s mismanaging of taxpayers money. It contended that government was not spending in appropriate areas such as health, education and other areas of social concern (Teachers’ League of South Africa, *The Funding of Education: Parents will have to pay!* TLSA pamphlet, February 1996).
41 The TLSA contended that the GNU had miscalculated the costs for the RDP and that this rendered it incapable of delivering as intended (*The Educational Journal*, June 1994, p.2). A central aim of government in the post-1994 period was to reduce its expenditure in an attempt to save financially. It cut away in social services and the teacher rationalisation strategy furthermore exemplified cost saving measures in education.
42 Republic of South Africa, *Reconstruction and Development Programme White Paper Discussion Document*, Cape Town: Office of the President, September 1994, pp.16, 17. RDP funding sources were to include using foreign loans to rebuild the country, according to minister of finance, Derek Keys (*The Weekly Mail & Guardian*, “Keys budgets for the RDP”, 24 to 30 June 1994.)
44 Lodge, p.30.
45 Teachers’ League of South Africa, *The Funding of Education: Parents will have to pay!* TLSA pamphlet, February 1996.
47 Chapter 3, p.184. See also Chisholm, ‘The Foundations of Reconstruction and Development of Education and Training’, p.96. Minister without Portfolio Jay Naidoo conceded that the RDP lacked sufficient funds to address the country’s developmental needs and thus the transformation process (*South*, ‘RDP lacks dramatic punch’, 16 to 20 September 1994.
48 Marais, p.187; All political parties in the GNU agreed on the need for fiscal discipline (*Mail & Guardian*, ‘The year of RDP delivery’, 15 to 21 March 1996). See also Singh, regarding the GNU’s commitment to
promises of the struggle (People’s Education) were secured’, would be insufficient. These austerity measures were to be felt particularly in the Western Cape, and according to the TLSA’s president:

... the monetary allocation from the central budget was not increased much, but the pro rata allocation to each of the nine provinces was changed. Formerly favoured provinces, like the Western Cape and Gauteng (formerly the PWV region) have suffered cuts – the Western Cape by R560 million – and formerly disadvantaged provinces have been granted increased allocations.  

Instead, the organisation insisted that ‘more’ money be allocated to education, since the reprioritisation of the budget by taking from those with more resources would be insufficient to correct the disparities in this critical area. For educationists who were of similar mind to the TLSA, financial constraints translated practically into ‘symbolic’ policy, to ensure government gained (and retained) political legitimacy, to compensate for its inability to implement stated policies.  

In highlighting the economy as a measure for ascertaining the potential for educational reform, the League saw little room for significant change, since the economic forces, which had shaped the policies of the pre-1994 state, continued to hold sway in the post-1994 period. The organisation would describe the relationship between the new state and the education system a ‘bogus democratic education atop a neo-colonial state’. This perspective echoed Jaffe’s conceptualisation of South Africa in the 1990s, as a state integrally ‘part of’ and ‘open to’ the world capitalist system. South Africa, for Jaffe, had a ‘duplex’ or two-tiered political economy, similar in form to the new state’s relationship to the education dispensation, with a black colony subordinate to a ‘white’ imperialism. For

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54 Jaffe’s conceptualisation of the South African state is elaborated on in the Interface Chapter, p.141. Jaffe viewed South Africa as much a victim of imperialism as an imperialist entity, since South African companies had business interests in neighbouring countries and further afield. This meant that any collaboration with the
the TLSA and NUM, the reformed post-1994 education system would therefore be a ‘hoax’ or a ‘sham’ as it could not be transformed fundamentally. Consequently, the TLSA and NUM continued to hold to a strong anti-collaborationist perspective that effectively prohibited them from participating in government structures.

Other left formations, however, thought more strategically about their interventions in the new democracy. The SACP and COSATU’s embrace of the transition from the politics of resistance to restructuring, epitomized one section of the left’s new approach of constructive engagement.\(^{55}\) This shift became most noticeable when a formal agreement established between the state, organised labour and capital or big business, termed the ‘reconstruction accord’ or the ‘social contract’,\(^ {56}\) was endorsed by the SACP.\(^ {57}\)

For independent left-wing organisations, such as WOSA, on the other hand, the tripartite alliance strategy was a reconciliation pact that masked conflicting class interests.\(^ {58}\) Despite its anti-collaborationism, WOSA made a strategic decision in 1995 to utilise ‘some of the state institutions and certain methods of organising and applying pressure’, which hitherto it had tended to ignore and even considered reactionary owing to the stigma of collaboration with the apartheid regime.\(^ {59}\) Avoiding the danger of class collaboration involved, for this left formation, ‘much discussion, constant vigilance and a stubborn commitment to principle and to the renewal of revolutionary socialist theory’.\(^ {60}\) The League disagreed with such sentiment. Indeed, members who dared to venture into the Western Cape Education Department (WCED) as subject advisors were ostracised and made to feel

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South African state, by managing its apparatuses, particularly financial institutions and multinational businesses, involved collaborating with imperialism.


\(^{58}\) Workers’ Organisation for Socialist Action, The Social Contract, WOSA popular pamphlet, 1993. The social contract was, for that reason, considered damaging to the workers’ movement and leftists operating in worker organisations (Callinicos, Between Apartheid and Capitalism: Conversations with South African Socialists, p.151).


\(^{60}\) Ibid.
uncomfortable. At the same time, it balked at joining the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC or Council). The League’s refusal to engage with state apparatuses, however, was not as clear-cut as it had been during the apartheid era, and it made strategic shifts that involved, and could be defined as, ‘non-participation in’ but not ‘non-engagement with’ state apparatuses. This was not the same boycott position it had determinedly exercised during the apartheid era. Its Legal Aid Bureau (LAB), for example, was successful in making application for recognition to the ELRC in order to defend its members, while still rejecting the opportunity to become a member of the Council. This reflected clearly its predilection to steer clear of participating in state structures yet engage with organs of government; a position it adopted despite its 1995 conference resolution to become more open to working ‘within’ state structures. The 1995 resolution, which took on more of a symbolic rather than real significance, nonetheless signalled that the organisation, to a degree, had conceded to a changed political landscape, and that space did exist to manoeuvre and propagate political ideas. This new landscape created ambivalences amongst League members, specifically about whether accepting departmental positions or participating in forums on curriculum development was acceptable.

These uncertainties created tensions in the League, as a few teachers deemed it timely to participate in forums related to educational reforms, some of which stemmed from work related projects. Overall, though, the TLSA refused to be party to managing or implementing plans that might improve or enhance the credibility of the education department. Instead, the organisation opted to critique the changes in education via its own media, and seldom and only where necessary, engaged the education authorities, either officially or through the public media. It is with these strategic considerations in mind that the TLSA’s critique of the NQF and later OBE and the SGBs are examined below.

61 Interview with M. Hodges, 5 May 2000. At least two League members entered the education department as subject advisors (Interview with M. Hodges, 1 October 2008). The author recalls a member being criticised for accepting a subject advisory post in the WCED.
62 The ELRC was seen as the space where the decision to retrench teachers by leading teacher trade unions had taken place.
63 See Chapter 3, pp.177, 178.
65 Interview with M. Hodges, 5 May 2000 and 1 October 2008. Hodges, for example, participated in a Peninsula Technikon project with the WCED on the teaching of science. This will be elaborated on later in the chapter.
Integrating Education and Training: The National Qualifications Framework (NQF) and the outcomes-based concept

The NQF, formulated to integrate South Africa’s previously separated education and training sectors, was partly a response to international trends aimed at dissolving barriers between education and training. The NQF broke new ground when it was promulgated in 1996, given that integration, which lay at the core of the NQF, was a relatively new phenomenon for South African education and training, emerging as it had from the policy debates in the early 1990s. Key contributors to these discussions were COSATU, the business sector within the National Training Board (NTB), 66 and likeminded policy makers in Australia and England. 67 These stakeholders were instrumental in the conception of the National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI), an initiative which Jansen described as the most significant to emerge at the time, given that it formed the foundation of curriculum and assessment thinking in the South African context. 68 With its focus initially on labour and training, the NTSI effectively bound the education sector, including schools, into a competency (outcomes) based education (CBE) framework. 69 Quick to grasp these developments, the League covered the issues pertaining to educational reform, particularly the integration of education and training, in two consecutive articles in its journal. 70

Thrust into a daunting project of clarifying for its readers the new developments in education, the League went about explaining and analysing the primary intention of the NQF. In deliberating on this task, it had to take into consideration the framework’s aim to

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66 The NTB, which constituted stakeholders from business and labour, was commissioned in 1991 by the government to begin the investigation into the transformation of the education system (see Jansen, ‘The race for education policy after apartheid’, p.15; L. Chisholm and P. Kgobe, ‘Gearing up for an Integrated Education and System’, in L. Chisholm, S. Motala and S. Vally (eds), *South African Education Policy Review*, Sandown: Heinemann, 2003, p.17. Cosatu was a key participant on the discussions to integrate Education and Training with the NTB’s National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) from 1993.


70 *The Educational Journal*, June 1994, pp.5-8; July-August 1994, pp.5, 6, 11, 12.
end sharp differentiation between education and training and therewith begin the process of addressing the inequalities of the divided society apartheid bequeathed. This strategy of integration, NQF proponents contended, would be achieved through connecting all levels of learning within a single system, to make learning accessible at various levels. The framework’s strength resided in its providing a framework for local initiatives, for classrooms and training centres.\textsuperscript{71} In its initial stages, a great deal of uncertainty shrouded the NQF, and it was difficult to predict the exact form the framework and thus the South African education system would take.\textsuperscript{72} The League, mindful of these uncertainties, nonetheless sought to unravel the implications of the framework for education.

The NQF was to provide the initial, post-1994, testing ground for the TLSA’s educational philosophy, which it had forged under apartheid conditions. Unwavering, it responded promptly to these new developments through mainly \textit{The Educational Journal}. The South African Qualification Authority (SAQA),\textsuperscript{73} the overseer of standards for the NQF received less attention from League writers. Aware that the main rationale for integrating education and training was to address the previous education system’s academic bias and its neglect of training, the League did not oppose integration on principle. Instead, it commented positively on the potential of combining the theoretical dimensions of education with skills training.\textsuperscript{74} Abrahams, for instance, interpreted the integrated objectives as ‘commendable’, and underscored the fact that these ‘ideals’ were a significant shift away from training under Bantu Education and the De Lange proposals.\textsuperscript{75} Notwithstanding its ‘technicist’\textsuperscript{76} and

\textsuperscript{72} McGrath, ‘Education and Training in Transition: Analysing the NQF’, p.177.
\textsuperscript{73} The South African Qualifications Authority Act SAQA) was one of the first pieces of legislation passed by the new democratic government - Act number 58 of 1995. SAQA was envisaged as an enabling body to co-ordinate the work of relevant bodies in each field of education and training. To ensure acceptability and credibility the NQF had to have national certificates in keeping with SAQA (see Republic of South Africa, \textit{South African Qualifications Authority Act, No.58 of 1995}, Pretoria, 28 September 1995).
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{The Educational Journal}, June 1994, p.6; September-October 1995, p.12.
‘behaviourist’ or prescriptive features,\textsuperscript{77} League members definitely saw the potential of the qualifications framework. One such member openly expressed her optimism towards the changes underway in education:

Well it didn’t have the Christian National aspect to it. Not Christian, definitely, not National either, I mean it’s not the Calvinistic approach to education, that CNO had, it’s a broader approach ... It’s a system which makes provision for people irrespective of their skin colour, and I don’t think there’s an attempt to, drum or indoctrinate religious concepts at all, it’s a move away from that ....\textsuperscript{78}

Yet another League teacher noted

I was actually quite thrilled initially ... it will help people economically to be able to put a qualification to their life experiences ... I was quite impressed with the literature and what I’d seen, and participated very actively in the workshops and running workshops and so on.\textsuperscript{79}

Mokgalane and Vally,\textsuperscript{80} and the SACP’s, Blade Nzimande, likewise endorsed the qualification structure as a means of achieving equity. The latter stated:

The NQF provides space for the recognition and articulation into the system of educational competencies and qualifications not necessarily obtained while studying in an educational institution so that those achievements gained during training at the workplace, for example, can enable an individual to re-enter the system at a suitable point and further their studies if they wish to, in the formal system.\textsuperscript{81}

On closer inspection, however, the League soon detected contradictions between the intent and the potential outcome within the qualifications framework, and it homed in on them.

What the League’s investigation uncovered, was the near inseparability of ANC and NP curriculum policies,\textsuperscript{82} a consensual arrangement in education and training which echoed developments on the political, business and economic fronts.


\textsuperscript{78} Interview with Respondent A, 13 April 2000; E. Steenveld and S. Williams also acknowledged the NQF as a movement away from apartheid fragmentation (Interview with E. Steenveld and S. Williams, 30 April 2000).

\textsuperscript{79} Interview with M. Hodges, 5 May 2000.


\textsuperscript{81} L. Ngakane, ‘Can we afford the luxury of ivory tower degrees’, \textit{The Argus}, July 14 1995.

Although the NQF was deemed an outcome of democratic discussion,\(^{83}\) the League spotlighted the considerable contribution of business\(^{84}\) and labour\(^{85}\) to the integration approach.\(^{86}\) The centrality of the National Training Board (NTB)\(^{87}\) and its National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI), reaffirmed for it the strong influence of this sector on education. Other key players influencing policy development included the Education Policy and Systems Change Unit (EDUPOL), Private Sector Education Council (PRISEC) and markedly JET (Joint Education Trust).\(^{88}\) The first White Paper on Education and Training (WPET) made abundantly clear the influence of these role players on education policy.\(^{89}\) This collaborative process concerned the TLSA most, and will be examined hereafter.

**Responding to the challenges of the new educational environment**

South Africa’s integration into the global economy after 1994 meant it had to embrace the emergent concepts of competence and outcomes,\(^{90}\) a decision which placed immediate demands on the South African education system. Foremost, was that workers and learners were expected to adapt to a relatively new globalising social milieu, one which demanded that they optimise their response to the needs of a competitive environment.\(^{91}\) Alert to these

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\(^{85}\) The League acknowledged the National Union of Metal Workers’ of South Africa (NUMSA) input, as encapsulated in the Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL), which had been incorporated into the Adult Basic Education and Training programme (ABET) (Level 1) of the NQF (*The Educational Journal*, September-October 1995, p.3).

\(^{86}\) *The Educational Journal*, June 1994, pp.5-8; September-October 1994, p.4; September-October 1995, p.4. Ivan Abrahams at the Athlone Branch meeting, September 1994 (author’s notes).


\(^{88}\) Jansen, ‘Setting the Scene: Historiographies of Curriculum Policy in South Africa’, p.5; Jansen, ‘The race for education policy after apartheid’, p.21. The private sector placed within the public debate a range of proposals calling for more vocational and entrepreneurial education as opposed to formal academic education, in line with the demands of the economy (Jansen, ‘Setting the Scene: Historiographies of Curriculum Policy in South Africa’, p.5).


\(^{91}\) B. Fenton, ‘Hands-on: The NQF and learning’, *People Dynamics*, March 1996, p.33. This mindset can be further deduced from Lindewe Ngakane, a correspondent with the *Argus*, who noted that the concerns of economists in South Africa was that its labour force was ‘under skilled and therefore unattractive to investors
developments, the TLSA responded relatively quickly to them, and The Educational Journal ran a series of articles on the NTB and NTST,\(^{92}\) while Abrahams delivered an incisive presidential address on the integrated approach and its broader global implications for South Africa’s education.\(^{93}\) His comprehensive lecture brought into sharp focus the change happening in the country’s education system. For him, the changing world economy demanded multi-competencies based on ‘sound academic’ education, specifically, ‘language skills, mathematics, science and technology’ to achieve greater productivity.\(^{94}\) These international developments would bring new challenges for education, the League noted, and it went to great lengths to explain and dissect the implications of these changes, specifically that of integration.

Firstly, the League argued that the education ministry favoured training over cognitive academic skills. The discarding of the NEPI proposals in favour of the NTB plan,\(^{95}\) confirmed this for the organisation, as it meant the education ministry’s focus was on labour’s demand for a competency-based approach to education and training and not on the input of academics and educationists in the development of policy. Abrahams noted that the contribution of the education sector had been marginalised, and that labour and business who have the option of investing in countries where multiskilled labour is a reality and not an objective’ (L. Ngakan, ‘Can we afford the luxury of ivory tower degrees’, The Argus, 14 July 1995).

\(^{92}\) These started appearing from June 1994 already.


\(^{94}\) Abrahams seemed to echo Kraak’s analysis of South Africa’s local ‘fordist’ production system. Kraak noted the preconditions South Africa would have to fulfil for it to become part of the global ‘post-fordist’ production age, since for him this was the character of the global economy. In the area of education, these cutting-edge developments demanded teaching methods that generated a highly skilled, multifunctional and motivated work force. South Africa, Kraak contended, had a variant of fordism, namely, ‘racial fordism’. This system for him was a handicap to South Africa as a global competitor, as it necessitated shifting a large section of the South African work force and industry to a conceptual way of working. Post-fordist production emphasised flexibility and innovation. It required a highly skilled and motivated workforce that was responsible and could operate independently on the shop floor. This marked, for Kraak, a shift in education and training, from methods based on narrow skilling for a single task, to multi-skilling. Kraak noted that under fordism, labour was divided, deskilled and strictly supervised by a hierarchy of management. The introduction of new computer technologies however, meant broadening the educational foundation to develop abstract, problem-oriented skills (see Abrahams, ‘South Africa Post-April 1994: Who Benefits?’; also A. Kraak, ‘Human Resources Development and Organised Labour’ in G. Moss and I. Obery (eds), South African Review Six, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992.

\(^{95}\) The Educational Journal, September-October 1995, p.3. Alliances were formed between student groups and university-based academics to form the National Education Policy Initiative (NEPI). NEPI published eleven focused reports in 1992 that covered principally the formal schooling system not really the training system. The union movement was partly involved in this initiative and contributed to the work on adult basic education and human resources development.
were now determining the agenda for education. Claude Jacobs, a lecturer at the former Hewat Teachers’ Training College, also intimated his disappointment at colleges being side-lined during the policy making process: “The people who ... put together the NQF were essentially people from labour and people from the technikons ... I definitely know that colleges as such were not really involved ... I believed they should have been involved”. For the League, the education sector needed to be part of the education and training policy discussions to ensure the concerns of educators were heard. The irony, however, was that the League itself was not willing to participate in these policy discussions, for it would involve a contravention of its policy of non-collaboration.

Secondly, there appeared to be a dislocation between policy and implementation, for the League. This rupture flowed from the fact that compulsory-funded schooling ended at Grade 9 in the NQF, which compelled parents to subsidise their children’s further schooling. In this context, most of the youth would be skilled for immediate employment, and not as versatile workers, the organisation argued. The outcomes model, it therefore contended, was misleading, as it would direct human resources towards the needs of labour in order to fulfil economic imperatives. As a matter of fact, early policy debates centred predominantly on the vocational component of the NQF and its implications for non-formal education, adult basic education and training (ABET), and literacy. The early days of the NQF, then, did not support the maximum development of people, rather their underdevelopment, the organisation posited. For it, the ‘quality’ of qualifications deemed

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96 Interview with I. Abrahams, 10 October 1995.
97 Interview with C. Jacobs, 18 June 1999.
100 The Educational Journal, November-December 1994, pp.3-8.
relevant to enter the rapidly changing technological world of work, where ‘yesterday’s skills might be considered today’s deficit’,\(^{102}\) revealed that a low skill and not a post-fordist perspective prevailed. In fact, for the TLSA, the exit-point feature of the NQF actualised the vocational education approach found in De-Vos-Malan, De Lange and the ERS.\(^{103}\) As a member pointed out:

> [the NQF] ties up with the ERS, the Education Renewal Strategy, [since] ... those people who are exiting at Grade 9 level ... they must immediately be able to go into the factories and the workshops ... they must be ‘werkgereed’.... while they are at school, you must encourage some kind of training in the industries...  

It was this insight into the vocational bent to integration that gave impetus to the TLSA’s negative interpretation of the NQF:\(^{105}\)

> the majority of the children would not reach the heights of the FET and higher education. They wouldn’t, because of the way the thing was structured and because of the economic position of the majority of the people. I can’t divorce the economic situation of the pupils from the educational prospects ... unfortunately, they are going to be weeded out because of the economics of the situation...  

Aware of the dire economic situation of most schools, the League warned that the new qualifications framework, with its exit-point at Grade 9, would exacerbate an extant crisis by encouraging the exiting of students from schools. This it claimed, was essentially no different from the apartheid formulation of vocational training, or as Kraak termed it, ‘occupationalism’, a process that prepared ‘young people for single tasking in specific occupations rather than for adult life in general’.\(^{107}\) The short-term ‘extrinsic’ demands of

\(^{103}\) *The Educational Journal*, November-December 1994, p.4.  
\(^{104}\) E. Steenveld (Interview with E. Steenveld and S. Williams, 30 April 2000).  
\(^{106}\) Interview with Respondent A, 13 April 2000.  
the labour market were taking precedence, the League contended.\textsuperscript{108} Instead, it added, the education system had to be overhauled.\textsuperscript{109} The NUM’s \textit{Bulletin} clarified this position:

\begin{quote}
A vocational orientation of education should continue to reside in those institutions and in apprenticeship courses. Primary and secondary schools should continue to give learners knowledge, the ability to reason and comprehend, expertise and skills in a variety of the areas of life. Knowledge and skills in some of the languages spoken in the country of birth, mathematics, the sciences and technology should be core subjects in school curricula. Schools should also continue to offer sport, cultural activities and cater for other interests that give pleasure and enjoyment. \textit{Life does not revolve only around work} [My emphasis].\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

In a similar vein, Gramsci,\textsuperscript{111} for instance, critiqued schools’ overemphasis on vocational education for working class youth,\textsuperscript{112} while Trotsky, in his day, similarly condemned the beneficiaries of the system - those intent on subjugating working class youth:

\begin{quote}
the bourgeoisie cannot reveal its political face to the young people. It cannot say: there you are, the twelve or thirteen year-old son of a worker; you have been born into the world in order that, after serving an apprenticeship to some trade, you may go into a factory and there to the end of your days create with your sweat, blood, and marrow, surplus value for the lords of life, the bourgeoisie, who, from this surplus value, will create its bourgeois culture, its luxury, its art, and learning for its children.\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

A discerning radical perspective evidently prevailed within the League,\textsuperscript{114} one that viewed the emphasis on narrow skills training for occupation restrictive to intellectual development.

Thirdly, once decoded, it became apparent that the legislation to integrate education and training, as embodied in the NQF, not only implied addressing the historical deficiencies bequeathed by the apartheid economy, it also advanced the notion of productivity to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{109} For the League, this meant that the content, methodology, aims and purposes at all levels of education needed to be redefined (\textit{The Educational Journal}, September-October 1994, p.6).
\item \textsuperscript{110} New Unity Movement, \textit{Bulletin}, April 1997, p.17.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Forgacs, p.63.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Gramsci held that: ‘All young people should be equal before [it] culture’ (Forgacs, p.63).
\end{itemize}
promote South Africa as a competitor in the global economy. The argument for integration was compelling for South Africa in the immediate post-apartheid era, when educational reforms, evidently shaped by economic and international forces, were ‘constituted as progressive and holding the promise of a better future’. This put the League at an immediate disadvantage, beholden as it was to its ideas of anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism and socialism, which seemed out of kilter with global developments, if not quaint and antiquated. Its politics, which were favourably disposed to the oppressed, stood in direct contrast to the globalised ‘hi tech’ technology and the high quality production systems punted by those in government and big business, who were supporting global developments at the time. To the League, the NQF seemed increasingly a compromised settlement favouring the interests of capital at the expense of the holistic development of the child – ‘our children’.

Fourthly, the principal challenge to the League when it faced the new education dispensation, was the policies the GNU had adopted to expedite economic growth, an educational policy strategy linking the economy and human resources development. This approach to education was not new, and in fact reactivated the contentious modernisation and human capital theories prominent in the 1950s and 1960s. The educational critiques of these schools of thought, stemming from the 1970s, were neglected, however.

115 NQF proponents intended achieving this through improving worker skills (The Educational Journal, September-October 1995, pp.3, 4).
117 Modernisation theory promoted the western capitalist way of life in the era of the ‘cold war’. It was the intellectual and academic strategy to win the ‘hearts’ and ‘minds’ of post-colonial territories, or to win allies from Third World countries: Africa, Asia, South America and others. A variation of modernisation theory, neo-classical economics, emerged in the form of neo-liberalism in the 1980s (see J. Graaff, Poverty and Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.14, 15).
118 Human Capital theory advanced the notion that improving individuals or workers’ skills levels, will ultimately improve the country’s economic performance. For South Africa this translated into the education and training system being designed to improve the productivity of the workforce and hence the competitiveness of the South African economy. The assumption is that unemployment and low standards of living flow from the inability of workers to keep up with technological change. In this context, socio-economic development or economic production and growth is dependent on the productive role of education, where knowledge is valued according to its potential economic outcome. This thinking, moreover, advanced the argument that investment in human capital and technology will increase productivity generally and improve the living conditions of the population.
Embracing the assumptions of modernisation,\textsuperscript{120} and in its attempt to achieve a degree of parity with developed countries like the United States, Britain and Australia, South Africa acceded to fiscal disciplinary measures in keeping with neo-liberal trends. Indicating its preparedness to endure deficit cuts, particularly in the public sector, the South African government started moving towards privatising education services and devolving control and responsibility to local levels.\textsuperscript{121} As in other African countries,\textsuperscript{122} then, where appropriate human resource skills were cultivated to develop their economies, policy makers in South Africa proposed that education be predominantly donor-driven,\textsuperscript{123} or financially supported from sources other than the state. This, importantly, was consistent with the ESAPs that accompanied IMF and World Bank interventionist strategies. As such, the GNU’s adoption of GEAR, the League contended, was nothing short of acceding to a ‘home-grown’ structural adjustment policy that reflected an acceptance of international financial institutions’ policies,\textsuperscript{124} in a vain attempt to reduce expenditure in the social realm, pay the debt accrued under apartheid, and so generally appease foreign investors.\textsuperscript{125}

\begin{itemize}
\item Modernisation theory assumed that third world countries had to ‘catch up’ with first world countries (America, Germany, Japan and others). The process involved ‘new’ nations replicating, in the twentieth century, what the ‘old’ ones did in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Modernisation theory constituted one way of explaining how this process happened.
\item The 1960s and 1970s saw this same rationale applied to post-independence African education in an attempt to develop their economies. South Africa, similarly, as Nieuwenhuis noted, not only inherited a highly-unequal education system, it also faced “problems of high population growth, urbanisation, cultural disruption and discontinuity, a shortage of high level manpower and skilled workers, low productivity levels and a shortage of financial and other resources” (F. Nieuwenhuis, \textit{The Development of Education Systems in Postcolonial Africa: A Study of a Selected Number of African Countries}, Pretoria, HSRC, 1996, p.141).
\item Nieuwenhuis, pp.2, 13, 14, 128, 129, 151.
\item \textit{The Educational Journal}, March 1997, p.11. GEAR’s central intention was to increase the annual economic growth rate, which was regarded by commentators on policy as insufficient for the GNU to generate jobs and investment (see Sayed, ‘Post-apartheid educational transformation: policy concerns and approaches’, pp.260-262).
\end{itemize}
While the League at no point spoke of modernisation or human capital, these concepts were implicit in its response to developments in education. *The Educational Journal*, for instance, noted that economic policies post-1994 followed far more firmly IMF and WB prescriptions, and would consequently obstruct redress initiatives. This oppositional or counter hegemonic discourse of the TLSA, coincided broadly with other oppositional voices in education and civil society. These collective voices epitomised what Laclau and Mouffe called ‘transformed commodity relations’, where instead of the new society engendering predictable outcomes, it unintentionally engineered new forms of resistance. Within the flux of the rapidly changing educational environment, the League emerged as one such entity, opposing mainstream market related thinking.

**Emphasising class downplaying ‘race’**

Considering the above dynamic, the NQF added up to, in effect, for the League, class hegemony superseding ‘race’. This shift from ‘race’ to class in the TLSA’s analysis was significant, for it indicated that the issue of class, class compromise and class collaboration remained at the core of League and Unity Movement thinking. Thus, for the League, it sought and found in the NQF, much the same as it had in the ERS, the influential hand of business for a select middle class few, who stood to benefit from the system through educational advancement. In fact, it was this very class that the South African state had already started weaning from sections of the black population in the early 1980s in support of ‘free enterprise’. This initiative by the state to direct the black middle class towards business was farsighted, Chisholm claimed, for its central intent was the ideological wedding of the formerly disenfranchised to the values of capital, by integrating them more...
comprehensively into society as key political and economic players. This initiative was to be energised in the late 1990s by the cultivating of a “‘patriotic’ (African) bourgeoisie” under the rubric of ‘black economic empowerment’ (BEE), with ANC endorsement, and consistent with government’s rationale to improve the living standards and opportunities of the African poor. These shifting ‘race’ and class interests cemented the TLSA’s perceptions of the NQF and the integrationist strategy. Thus, while the NQF gave support to notions of equity and redress, compatible with the liberalisation of education to ensure improved class-‘race’ relations, a peaceful transition, the survival of the free enterprise system, and the accompanying supply of human resources, it simultaneously spawned the development of a ‘comprador’ middle-class within the ranks of the oppressed, the League declared. This group, it argued, would benefit substantially from the outcomes of the NQF.

Abrahams in 1995 commented:

Now in the NQF remember the cut-off point is Grade 9, Std 7, and then the streaming ... Now do you think that children from well-off parents are going to follow that path or are they still going to follow the path that eventually is going to take them into the universities and into the technikons? So, in fact you are going to have the emergence of the ‘Ivy Leagues’... your really posh schools that are going to produce the academics, who are going into the universities, who are going to become the consultants ... 

In schooling, the shift from ‘race’ to class or economic differentiation, manifested itself tangibly in the development of a business culture, which became most visible in the new en vogue terminology associated with ‘small business’, and ‘self-employment’ amongst other expressions, the TLSA claimed. For Steenveld, therefore, an ‘entrepreneurial mindset’ had become hegemonic in South African education. This outlook, for him, had displaced intrinsic aspects of education associated with values, culture, intellectual and academic development, or in more technical terms, as Waghid termed it, the ‘non-instrumental’

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130 Chisholm, ‘Redefining Skills; Black South Africa in the 1980s’, p.398.
135 Interview with I. Abrahams, 10 October 1995.
138 Interview with E. Steenveld and S. Williams, 30 April 2000; The Educational Journal, September- October 1995, p.4.
virtues of education, that of ‘rational reflection and imagination’.

Instead, an extrinsic economic and business orientation that exemplified a job-oriented approach to educational interests, ‘which instrumentalises learning and objectifies learners (and teachers)’,

seemed prioritised.

The introduction of the outcomes-based approach in schooling took effect two years after the introduction of the NQF when the education ministry introduced Curriculum 2005. This curriculum reform had its roots in the early 1990s CBE discourse as formulated by labour, government and industry.

An ambitious policy venture, it triggered unprecedented curriculum controversy, particularly as classroom teachers were not involved in its conceptualisation or in decisions about its adoption. Caught partly off guard, as most schooling communities were, the League responded ambivalently to the curriculum change. Its insights on the NQF would colour its engagement with the new curriculum, as central themes pertaining to the NQF emerged in relation to C2005.

**Curriculum 2005 and the outcomes-based approach to education**

The launch of C2005 in March 1997 spawned a series of articles in *The Educational Journal*. It also triggered rigorous discussion on the second day of the TLSA’s 1997 Conference. Here, and in its journal, the organisation attempted a searching investigation of what was termed in many quarters a ‘radical’ if not ‘revolutionary’ paradigm shift that

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144 Ibid., p.8.
146 The 1997 TLSA Conference was from 1-3 April. The author was present. See also *The Educational Journal*, March 1997, p.10.
was to transform education, specifically schooling. Central to the League’s interpretation of the ongoing reforms in education, was the relationship between the new curriculum, Outcomes Based Education (OBE) and the NQF. Thus, while a distinction was drawn between outcomes-based education that drives systemic reform and outcomes-based education as an educational philosophy governing classroom activity, it was the NQF that gave a lead to curriculum change, and provided the foundation for a core national curriculum in which academic and vocational skills could be integrated. This correlation educational commentators and official documentation corroborated, after all, the OBE discourse in schools, unlike the OBE in workplace training, was not subject to SAQA approval. For the League, Curriculum 2005 formed an integral part of the NQF-OBE relationship, as it was the means to achieve the goals of outcomes-based education. That C2005 was a manifestation of OBE seemed to hold currency, in spite of varying interpretations of their relationship to each other and different understandings – that ranged from radical to conservative – of OBE. Notwithstanding the TLSA and many academics’

reservations, teacher organisations like the largest teachers union SADTU, openly defended OBE. This, for the most part, was because of the curriculum’s acclaimed transformational powers, premised as it was on the assumption of Life Long Learning. Nonetheless, despite the contentious politics surrounding C2005, it was introduced in 1998 for Grade One, with Grade Seven postponed to the following year owing to implementation delays.

Focussing on the conditions under which OBE was introduced, The Educational Journal stopped short of rejecting the curriculum reform, a position that marked a significant shift in its once firm oppositional attitude on this front. For example, while the first article in the organisation’s journal lambasted Curriculum 2005 as a ‘recipe for disaster’, owing to the gravity of the teacher cuts accompanying the rationalisation process from particularly 1996, its subsequent texts were more measured and carried detailed information outlining the new policy.

This ambivalence towards the new curriculum was clearly articulated by members, with certain of them contending that given favourable conditions, OBE or C2005 could be implemented successfully. As Roelf, of the League, put it: “OBE can be a good thing provided you have the ... libraries fully equipped, and you had the classrooms, and you had small classes, then OBE can work ... Your room should be especially equipped for that kind

157 W. Spady, Outcomes Based Education: Critical Issues and Answers, Virginia: The American Association of School Administrators, 1994, pp.1, 2. Spady, who was hailed ‘The father of OBE’, punted ‘Transformational OBE’, in opposition to traditional OBE or ‘Transitional OBE’, and was conceived of as a different OBE to others in other countries. South Africa’s OBE was designed for its own circumstances. It involved the integration of concepts in a cross-curricular approach, which embraced not only the structure of the curriculum but also the methods by which instruction was to be delivered and assessments made (Department Of Education, Building A Brighter Future: Curriculum 2005. Questions and Answers for learners, educators, parents and governing bodies, Pretoria, 1997, pp.7, 32). LLL was developed to allow students to continue learning beyond formal schooling.
of thing”. The League’s official stance was that the curriculum would work in well-
resourced Model C schools, given that they were achieving and setting the standard. The
organisation therefore did not on principle oppose OBE, nor by the late 1990s, Model C
schools either. Indeed, its argument was that all children should have access to resourced
schools, as a democratic right. As with the NQF, the League appeared sympathetic to the
vision of change happening in education, and it posited that South Africa needed a ‘new
system of education with fresh approaches to teaching and learning’. Indicating that it
was indeed positively disposed to the new curriculum, the organisation’s journal declared:

It should be stated quite clearly that the principles underpinning these changes are ones
that many true educators in South Africa have always upheld. For these educators the
‘new’ vision of the education department merely vindicates their continuous striving
after excellence in the classroom.

It went on to describe the curriculum change in the April-May article as ‘excellent’,
‘exceptional’ and a potentially ‘exciting new road to learning’. Indeed, regarding OBE it
declared: ‘There might be little wrong with the philosophy underpinning the concept ...’, and more persuasively, ‘we believe that the OBE approach is the way forward ...’ While
these statements were qualified, it adequately illustrates a softening of the TLSA’s once
stern anti-establishment and non-collaborationist stance, and a willingness to explore viable
curriculum alternatives. This did not imply that all members within the organisation agreed
with this sentiment, and while its discursive interventions appeared optimistic, sections of
its membership were of another opinion. This came sharply to the fore when Hodges, an
Elsies-River branch member, who had been working on a collaborative project involving
the Peninsula Technikon, the WCED and Kings College in England presented a paper on
the project’s findings to the 1998 TLSA Conference. Facing strong criticism from
elements within the League, for firstly sharing the platform with the WCED, and secondly,

160 Interview with L. Roelf, 12 September 2005. Jacobs echoed this perspective (Interview with C. Jacobs,
21 December 2004).
162 See The Educational Journal, April-May 1997, p.3.
163 See Interface Chapter, p.128.
164 The Educational Journal, April-May 1997, p.3; November-December 1997, p.3.
165 The Educational Journal, April-May 1997, p.3.
166 Ibid., pp.4, 5.
167 Ibid., pp.3, 5.
168 See Hartel, p.44; Interview with M. Hodges, 1 October 2008.
169 Interview with M. Hodges, 5 May 2000.
presenting their project’s findings in a manner that appeared to favour the new curriculum, and more controversially large classes. Hodges was left considerably upset by this encounter. For her, some members of the League seemed to elevate the ‘political’ to the neglect of the ‘educational’, and ‘by fixing themselves on to the political question, they do not see a good idea when it is presented to them’. This encounter demonstrated the variances of opinion within the League, which it had to give careful consideration to, when formulating policy on the new curriculum, a critical area of education.

**Outcomes Based Education (OBE) and Curriculum 2005: a critical view**

At the outset, the League decreed the projected six-year plan to phase-in the entire curriculum from the foundation General Education and Training (GET) to the Further Education and Training (FET) phases, far too ambitious and lacking thorough research. As one member put it: “I looked at what was happening in Scotland and England. And, those countries took eleven years to implement it, in the first couple of stages in their schools. We wanted it in the whole country, with no research ... and no plan”.

Contrary to the DoE view that variations of the OBE system had been introduced successfully in a ‘number of enlightened countries and societies’, the TLSA contended that the international models on which OBE was fashioned were ‘foreign’ and therefore unsuited to the South African educational landscape. For it, the new curriculum was largely a replica of what first world resourced countries had initiated, and a ‘quick fix’ solution. It cited the New Zealand model, which had greatly influenced South African policy makers, owing to its combination of general and vocational education, as having

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170 Ibid. Hodges and her co-researchers presented a case for teaching science to large classes, which communicated inadvertently support for the teaching of large classes (Interview with M. Hodges, 1 October 2008). Certain members took exception to the presentation. The author was present at the conference.
171 Interview with M. Hodges, 5 May 2000.
172 Ibid.
174 Interview with M. Hodges, 5 May 2000.
serious shortcomings, particularly in the areas of content, cost and the type of education provided.\footnote{The Educational Journal, November-December 1997, p.6. On the influence of international models see Jansen, ‘Setting the Scene: Historiographies of Curriculum Policy in South Africa’, pp.8, 9; Meerkotter, ‘The state of schooling in South Africa and the introduction of Curriculum 2005’, pp.58, 60. The New Zealand and Australian OBE models, not those from Scotland and England, were followed by South Africa until 2002, with their influence in the Revised National Curriculum Statement quite strong.\footnote{The Educational Journal, November-December 1997, p.9.}}

Mindful of these developments, the TLSA was wary of the political and economic rationale driving the curriculum. It was alert to the fact that the national education department was under pressure to show that political transformation was underway, and that it was consequently dispensing with CNE and moving speedily towards equity and redress,\footnote{Chisholm, The Politics of Curriculum Review and Revision in South Africa, p.4.} via, as Chisholm termed it, ‘the pedagogical route out of apartheid education’.\footnote{The Educational Journal, November-December 1997, p.9.} The urgency of this mission became evident within the context of the approaching 1999 election, where the ANC in particular, was intent to show in a highly visible way, its political commitment to transforming the legacy of the past through education.\footnote{D. Wilmot, ‘The development phase of a case study of outcomes-based education assessment policy in the Human and Social Sciences learning area of C2005’, South African Journal of Education, Vol.25, No.2, 2005, p.72; G. Kruss, ‘Teachers, Curriculum 2005 and the education policy-making process’, in W. Morrow and K. King (eds), Vision And Reality: Changing Education and Training in South Africa, Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1998, p.99.} In the Western Cape, the only province where the NP held political control, the education department was as resolute to implement the new curriculum, to prove it was better organised and worthy of re-election to office.\footnote{Meerkotter, ‘The state of schooling in South Africa and the introduction of Curriculum 2005’, p.57.} An overt political rather than an educational agenda seemed the main impetus behind the introduction of OBE.\footnote{Harley and Wedekind, ‘Political change, curriculum change and social formation, 1990 to 2002’, pp.198, 199, 207; Chisholm, ‘The state of curriculum reform in South Africa: The issue of Curriculum 2005’, pp.268, 269.} Given these developments, the League perceived the haste to implement the new curriculum an expedient endeavour, and in effect diversionary. According to Hanmer, the real intent was to draw people’s attention away from key social concerns and to give them ‘something else to chew on’, and, hence, not ‘address the major problems ... the provision of resources’. This was ‘the most critical thing required’ at the time, he contended, not a ‘new methodology ... and a new rearrangement of subjects’.\footnote{Interview with T. Hanmer, 31 August 2005.}
Centring its attention on the social milieu not OBE or C2005 exclusively, the League directed its energy to the social and economic factors stifling the curriculum’s implementation. This was important for the organisation, as these factors impacted the ability of teachers to deliver on the new curriculum, and, in turn, determined whether schools disadvantaged by the apartheid system would benefit from this reform measure. To this end, it probed into the budgetary allocation supporting the curriculum, for it held that this was fundamental to educational reform.  

What the League’s immediate investigation revealed was a loan debt that was significantly larger than the allocation for both the primary and secondary education budget. This financial arrangement, the League asserted, meant that less money would be available to resource schools and other parts of the public sector. In consequence, government would be unable to achieve parity between historically disadvantaged and advantaged schools, it stated, and without parity - the equalising of the educational terrain - no progress in education was possible. To substantiate this argument, the organisation pointed to the bleak teaching conditions in working class communities’ schools, and thus the parlous state of learning and teaching, which it claimed, in many cases, was non-existent. It put this across directly and explicitly:

The majority of our children in the townships and rural areas across the country have the odds stacked against them. Their school/learning environment is inadequate and in many cases militates against their achieving academic success. Furthermore, their primary learning environment, the home, often falls far short of the kind of environment that can facilitate development and the learning process.

Drawing on the School Register of Needs Survey by the National Department of Education (NDE) to verify its position, it declared further:

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185 The Educational Journal, April-May 1997, p.2; Abrahams, ‘New Education Initiatives: Progress or Retardation?’, p.6. The GNU’s 1997-8 budget reflected ‘a loan debt nearing R350 billion’, 3 billion more than the allocation for education.
186 Abrahams, ‘New Education Initiatives: Progress or Retardation?’, p.6.
188 Ibid., p.4; The Educational Journal, September-October 1997, pp.1-3.
Large numbers, many thousands, have no water, or flush toilets, or electricity, or textbooks; more than a million pupils have no desks, 100 000 teachers no chairs and there is at present a shortage of more than 80 000 teachers and 57 499 classrooms.190

For the League, there were definite socio-economic continuities that linked the apartheid and the post-apartheid periods, and therewith curriculum reform. Within this context, the concept of ‘mimicry’ adds clarity. This was most evocatively demonstrated by the racialised voice of a Grade 1 teacher at Chumisa Primary school in Khayelitsha in 1998, who bemoaned the fact that ‘the needs of schools such as Chumisa [had] not been taken into account’. She went on to say: “I must say that I think it is a white person who had this idea. It was obviously someone who had no idea what problems we face in black schools”.191 In a similar vein, SADTU noted, that because OBE was primarily ‘resource based’, persistent inequalities would prove a major barrier ‘to the implementation of C2005’.192 On the other side of the line, as it were, teachers in well-resourced schools contended that they had always been implementing OBE. A teacher in one such school confidently stated: “No drastic changes will be necessary. Working with a smaller class means I’m in a position to get to every child – so what will happen here is only a shift in emphasis”.193 These disparate experiences pointed to the mimicking of ‘racial’ identities; therein reinforcing notions that the former disenfranchised schools had to ‘catch-up’ with their ‘white’ peers in resourced schools. In the context of C2005, the policy image of the new ‘creative’ teacher-cum-facilitator seemed to conflict with their lived everyday identities or realities,194 thus reaffirming Jansen’s contention that symbolic not real change had transpired.195 These factors along with other domestic and social ones196 lay at the heart

190 The Educational Journal, September-October 1997, p.3.
195 This is particularly compelling owing to teachers having ‘developed a false clarity ... between what they claim to know’ of C2005/OBE, and the way ‘they externalise that understanding in the classroom’ (Jansen, ‘Image-ining teachers: Policy images and teacher identity in South African classrooms’, p.244); see also Jansen, ‘Explaining non-change in education reform after apartheid: political symbolism and the problem of policy implementation’.
196 These included for the League, the lack of books, computers and nurturing parental support, where a large percentage of parents were illiterate and innumerate. Social factors included gangsterism, drug abuse, and high absenteeism (The Educational Journal, November-December 1997, pp.4, 5, 10).
of the League’s scepticism towards the curriculum, since for it OBE would only aggravate existing inequalities.  

**Correcting the problem: teachers and Curriculum 2005**

A well-trained body of teachers capable of implementing and sustaining a new curriculum would go a long way to resolving the inequalities in education, the League stressed. Aside from addressing the shortage of teachers within the system, the majority of in-service teachers were not adequately trained, and therefore were ‘ill-qualified’ to implement the curriculum changes, while most schools were ‘ill-equipped’, from what the organisation could ascertain. The 1998 report on the National Teacher Audit, would equally sketch a drab picture of teacher education in South Africa. The report singled out the content of many teacher education courses as ‘outdated ... with little intrinsic intellectual merit or practical value to the student teacher’ and that ‘teacher education providers had not set up [effective support] systems’. Although the education department attempted to correct the situation on the ground, by familiarising teachers with the curriculum through short, monthly workshops, its focus was short-term and chiefly concerned with the immediate needs of teachers rather than developing their depth of understanding. This approach, Wilmot described as a ‘restricted’ vision of professionalism, to meet the demands of a prearranged curriculum. This training was far from satisfactory for the TLSA, and a foremost concern of the organisation was the quality of the training teachers had to undergo, and, moreover, the manner in which it was conducted. Having observed this tutoring process, Jacobs of the Athlone Branch stated:

> If you want to introduce something new, then you have to make sure people are au fait with what they are able to teach. And before you can teach something, you must actually understand it. And we had cases where subject advisors admitted publicly that they knew less than teachers about the OBE they were supposed to teach them. Now in a situation like that there is no way that a system can be successful... 

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198 Ibid., p.4. 
199 Hartel, p.32. 
200 Teachers were expected to attend afternoon sessions once a month to update their skills and acquaint themselves with the methodology of the new curriculum. 
202 Interview with C. Jacobs, 18 June 1999. Alexander in his address on OBE at the Athlone Technical School, similarly pointed to this dilemma (Alexander, ‘Outcomes Based Education (OBE)’, A discussion with
The organisation’s journal put the teachers’ dilemma starkly: “Will they be able to assume the multiple roles required of them instead of continuing with the chalk-and-talk mode and will anybody be able to manage all the required strategies in a class of fifty-plus pupils?”

An alternative to what the department was offering, the League said, was ongoing and intensive in-service training for teachers to enable them to cope with the demands of the new curriculum. This concern was echoed in teaching circles, since where teacher trainees usually spent ‘four years at college and four years at university to be trained ... now ... [they] are expected to implement OBE effectively with four days of training’.

Singling out the technical and pedagogical aspects of OBE, the League contended that the ‘majority of teachers will be sorely tried to interpret and implement’ it. On the central ‘constructivist’ tenet of Curriculum 2005, therefore, which emphasised learner-centeredness, and encouraged the practice of pupils taking responsibility for their own learning, the organisation was blunt. Sidestepping the philosophy itself, which has its origins in the discourse of human rights, children’s rights and the Freirian-inspired People’s Education movement, the organisation’s journal said that it was perilous to shift the responsibility of learning to learners where massive social – home and community - problems disadvantaged working-class children. It contended that in a climate where the culture of learning had been compromised and teachers were under valued, teachers would be pressured to abdicate their responsibility to their students. Given the large classes in

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Neville Alexander and Anne Schlebusch (Western Cape Education Department), Western Cape Parents, Teachers, Students Forum (WCPTSF) seminar, Athlone Technical College, 4 September 1999 (audio recording).


204 Ibid.


207 Constructivist theory worked from the epistemological premise of the constructed nature of knowledge. The new school curriculum, based on constructivism, therefore encouraged learners to construct their own knowledge in a heuristic way through, for example, asking questions, thinking critically and independently and learning from their environment through discovery.


211 Ibid, pp.4, 5.
the vast majority of schools, the League foresaw the grave danger that went with the superficial administering of assessments. Capturing the essence of the dilemma, a League teacher noted:

> For a system like OBE, a teacher becomes an administrator and a teacher. But the administration is almost as much work as the teaching. So, therefore, you expected to do two jobs, but you are expected to do it with double the number of children almost, which means you are expected to do four times the work you originally expected to do. And that for me does not make sense. That’s why they shouldn’t be surprised if teachers [go]... off with stress  

The experience of Grade I teachers confirmed this perspective. At Belhar Primary, for example, a teacher described how she had to oversee a class of 49 pupils, while ‘implementing a whole new system with no facilities and only two days of training’. She furthermore elaborated on how she had to purchase the required items, as pupils’ parents could not afford them. Researchers in the field, at the time, also observed that the learner population, along with their expenditure on learning materials, which the department did not provide, had increased dramatically from 1995 to 1999, with even the adviser to the minister of education Thami Maseleku appealing to parents to help pay for textbooks. These conditions placed immediate strain on the availability and accessibility of learning resources for teachers and learners, motivating the League to declare that the notion of learner-centeredness was poorly thought-through and thus suspect.

What proved a key pedagogical challenge for the League, and what it certainly found perplexing, was the inordinate emphasis placed on outcomes based ‘skills’ training. For League teachers in particular, those who had been in the teaching profession for many years, skills training was simply, as it were, ‘old wine in new bottles’, as the teaching of skills had always been an integral part of their repertoire:

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212 Ibid, p.5.  
213 Interview with C. Jacobs, 21 December 2004.  
215 Ibid.  
216 Vally noted that from 1995 to 1996 the total expenditure on learning materials, specifically text books, was R95 million, while 1997-1998 it was 80 million (S. Vally, ‘The Crisis in Education’, A discussion with S. Vally, N. Alexander, P. Van Voore and C. Davids, Workers’ Organisation for Socialist Action (WOSA) Education Commission, Community House, Salt River, 24 June 1999 (audio recording).  
I’m not opposed to teaching skills; I think we’ve been teaching skills all our lives ... the only thing is that we did not call it that - skills. If we taught reading then we taught reading skills, vocabulary skills ... listening skills, comprehension skill(s) (sic).

For League people teaching in the social sciences, the imposition of the skills-based approach created a conundrum. They questioned, as did academics of similar mind to them, the focus on skills training for students. Jenkins, operating in the domain of history, and here the point should not be lost, termed the emphasis on ‘skills’ development in history a ‘technicist fallacy’, since for him, students were expected to learn discrete skills in an unhistorical manner. Legassick, similarly, while not critiquing the attainment of skills, placed emphasis on content, and suggested that history should be taught in the context of the past - a chronological frame - to provide an understanding of change and the role of human agency. He declared that the design of the new South African curriculum hindered the subject being taught and learnt in this way, as the focus was on primarily isolated skills and was thus removed from a ‘coherent historical context’ as well as devoid of ‘specific historical content’.

In the teaching of English, and making the skills vis-à-vis content dilemma more tangible, Johan Muller reaffirmed the notion of demonstrable outcomes to the press: “it doesn’t ‘say learn Hamlet’. It says: ‘the learner must be able to do x, y and z without prescribing what book you use to do that’”.

Within this newly proposed interdisciplinary and non-subject specific context of teaching and learning, where C2005 Learning Areas presented the template or framework, and teachers were expected to

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219 Interview with L. Roelf, 13 June 1999.
221 Ibid. Skills that students or historians develop, for Jenkins (Jenkins, ‘The Discursive Turn: Tony Bennett and the Textuality of History’, p.15), referred to the technical aspects associated with history such as the collecting, categorising, summarising, writing or interviewing abilities among others. Jenkins however viewed history more inclusively as theoretical processes that students needed to acquire, and that interpreting the past, required examining influences such as values, ideas and ideological baggage writers of history brought to the writing of history.
223 Learners in the new curriculum had to show proficiency in demonstrable skills, what they must be able to do at the end of the learning process, rather than the acquisition of detailed knowledge of content.
225 Eight Learning Areas (LA) replaced the traditional subjects of the previous system. The outcomes were divided into two main categories; Critical outcomes (CO) and Specific outcomes (SO). Each Learning Area had its own SOs. Critical outcomes on the other hand were competencies all learners were expected to master across Learning Areas: for example the ability to measure. As it covered all LAs it was deemed critical.
source the content, the League was extremely dubious about the efficacy of the skills-based approach to teaching.

This misgiving was magnified when the organisation engaged the technical language of OBE, what Berlach, when examining Australia’s OBE model, termed ‘jargon-impregnated’. The League observed that the ‘new talk’ or terminology made prominent by OBE was obfuscating, despite the DoE reassuring teachers that the aim was to ‘uncomplicate and simplify the general terminology of learning’. While on the one hand, Grade One teachers found the WCED workshops enabled them to ‘interpret the obscure language of Curriculum 2005’, on the other, as with the NQF, the OBE language proved problematic, embodying as it did unfamiliar concepts related to the design of the curriculum. This included terms such as ‘specific outcomes’, ‘performance indicator assessments’, ‘notional time’, ‘range statements’ and others. This ‘intimidating new discourse’, as Jansen phrased it, confounded some League members, as one intimated: ‘if you can tell me the difference between an objective and an outcome I will be very happy, nobody can tell me that, so they use, you know, woolly language’. Yet another League teacher commented: “the whole process, the language ... is so obscure I think it just totally mystifies education and it disempowers teachers. So, I don’t know how progressive it can be”. This technical aspect of OBE brought into question, for the League, the integrity of OBE, the NQF, and government’s equity programme. After all, and as Berlach once again observed in a far better resourced OBE context: ‘Jargon can so easily be mistaken for

Outcomes had to be assessed through demonstration, and thus observed to ensure integrated learning was happening.

230 Department Of Education, Building A Brighter Future: Curriculum 2005, Questions and Answers for learners, educators, parents and governing bodies, p.34.
234 Interview with M. Hodges, 5 May 2000.
substance – it can sound so impressive, promise so much, but deliver so little’. Indeed, the OBE language, much the same as with the NQF, corresponded closely with the discourse of the ERS and De Lange. For, as Badat points out, both apartheid reforms were concerned with providing policies for education of equal quality for all South Africans, irrespective of ‘race’.  

Outcomes Based Education and the class question

Well aware of the market-dominated environment in which OBE was launched, of user fees and the semi-privatisation of schooling from Grade 9, where parents carried a significant portion of the financial responsibility for their children’s schooling, OBE’s potential to entrench class division was inescapable for the League. To this end, it warned its readership that the curriculum stood to reinforce the socio-economic structures that divided the ‘have-lots’ from the ‘have-nots’. OBE’s talk of ‘equity’ was tantamount to mere ‘lip service’ and ‘political trickery’, the League claimed. Similarly, educationists at the time noted that OBE proponents in South Africa, while aware of the equity, redress strategy, were intent on meeting the industrial and commercial demands for growth and development. This translated, for Kruss, into educational transformation focusing specifically on preparing the ‘right’ kind of workers for future human resource needs where ‘knowledge’ defined in terms of ‘competencies’ was to be largely ‘vocationally’ oriented.

236 Berlach, p.6.
240 The Educational Journal, November-December 1997, p.10. On the question of the reproduction of social relations between school and class structure see Bowles and Gintis (Bowles and Gintis, p.130; also Althusser, pp.260, 261).
It was this emphasis, of OBE, on skills ‘training’ and thus vocational education, mentioned earlier under the NQF, which concerned the TLSA. Linking education and work in an education-economy bind, where it was presupposed that as in human capital theory education would yield returns for the individual and society, and thus greater productivity for the nation, the League was left far from convinced. It was exceedingly more aware of the deleterious effect the new resource-dependent OBE would have on working class schools, whereas conversely for well-equipped Model C schools, it held benefits. However, due to the fact that the majority of schools were found in under-resourced communities, and OBE was unavoidable, the TLSA encouraged teachers in these schools, where a far greater demand was being placed on their ingenuity, energy and time, to set the ‘highest possible standards’ and to work towards delivering a ‘good general education’.

**Methodological possibilities: merging the ‘old’ and the ‘new’**

To assist teachers more concretely, *The Educational Journal* advised them not to completely discard the traditional methods of teaching. This it propounded despite OBE advocates claiming that the outcomes-based approach was the counterpart to all the bad elements of apartheid education. Instead, the League admonished OBE proponents who opposed traditional teaching methods of rote learning that were content-orientated and utilised memorisation, and claimed that the education authorities presented a false and generalised picture of educators who employed the traditional approach. It argued that this method had not prevented progressive educators from achieving commendable results.

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247 *The Educational Journal*, November-December 1997, p.11. Educationists envisaged an extended view of a professional, one capable of performing several roles, which included *inter alia* a mediator and assessor of learning, as well as a curriculum and learning support materials developer (Wilmot, ‘The development phase of a case study of outcomes-based education assessment policy in the Human and Social Sciences learning area of C2005’, p.70).
in the past, and advised teachers to combine the traditional teaching methods with fresh approaches to teaching and learning.\textsuperscript{251} A League teacher explained:

\begin{quote}
You need a hybrid system ... what you had before wasn’t totally and completely useless. You had to come on board with a system that took some of the very good elements ... get rid of CNO ... and incorporate the more progressive elements from a world perspective into the syllabus and modify your OBE methodology, and do the things you must do ...
\end{quote}\textsuperscript{252}

This sentiment had resonance in the education sector, and Emilia Potenza, writing for \textit{The Teacher}, similarly advised teachers to make links between C2005 and their past practices and so incorporate both approaches.\textsuperscript{253} Meerkotter, too, was critical of the \textit{uncritical} rejection of the previous paradigm.\textsuperscript{254} For the League, memorisation and knowledge of content remained vitally important: “It is hardly possible to engage in creative, innovative and critical thinking on a subject without a very sound knowledge of the facts informing the principles of that subject”.\textsuperscript{255} In much the same way, a teacher stated:

\begin{quote}
The skills are necessary; it’s important for children to look at different sources critically, but the children are not expected to acquire a body of knowledge, and you can’t in the final analysis be critical unless you have acquired a body of knowledge.
\end{quote}\textsuperscript{256}

This approach resonated for League teachers, who placed primacy on the development of ideas – through acquiring appropriate content and knowledge – which they deemed integral to the learning process. Unwavering in its pedagogical outlook, the Teachers’ League encouraged teachers to go beyond the curriculum, the limitations of the classroom space, and pupil to teacher ratios, and to be innovative in their teaching in order to instil in their students knowledge of learning, study and research.\textsuperscript{257}

Looking beyond the immediate correcting of teacher training, the League argued that ‘many thousands’ of “extra teachers and schools [were] needed to carry out structural reform ... [in order to] wipe out [the] historical ‘backlogs’”.\textsuperscript{258} To buttress its argument, the organisation declared that thirty-four thousand extra teachers would be necessary by the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{251}{Ibid., p.8.}
\footnotetext{252}{Respondent C, 16 January 2005.}
\footnotetext{253}{\textit{The Teacher}, ‘Reports for OBE’, March 2000.}
\footnotetext{254}{Meerkotter, ‘The state of schooling in South Africa and the introduction of Curriculum 2005’, p.60.}
\footnotetext{255}{\textit{The Educational Journal}, November-December 1997, p.8.}
\footnotetext{256}{F. Bardien, (Interview with W. Leith and F. Bardien, 26 July 2005). Also, interview with E. van der Heyden, 25 August 2005.}
\footnotetext{257}{\textit{The Educational Journal}, November-December 1997, p.8.}
\footnotetext{258}{\textit{The Educational Journal}, April-May 1997, p.2.}
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year 2000 to achieve universal primary education at a class size of 40:1.\(^{259}\) The shortage of quality, fully trained and motivated teachers to inculcate a culture of teaching and learning, was the foremost priority confronting education, the organisation maintained.\(^{260}\) Hanmer, put the matter in this way:

Most of the schools in the country, attended by most of the children in the country, are poor schools. They need more resources, and primarily more and better trained teachers. So that getting rid of teachers by the tens of thousands, it’s not an exaggeration, was hardly a prescription for improving the quality of education. And introducing OBE has got nothing to do with trying to solve this major problem... \(^{261}\)

The teacher union’s leadership were inexcusably culpable in the reduction of the teacher corps, the TLSA averred. And along with them were the former unionists, who as new departmental representatives and advocates of C2005, now ‘share[d] institutional interests’.\(^{262}\) These parties were out-and-out complicit in the rationalisation of teachers, the organisation avowed. Indeed, the department’s retort that “whilst it is desirable to improve the learner-educator ratio in the medium term, the fact is that other priorities must precede this”,\(^{263}\) added to the League and other teacher entities’ deep distrust of the DoE and SADTU. This vindicated the organisation’s non-collaborationist view, and it berated the erstwhile unionists who had sought careers in the education department as expedient, since for it, they were self-seeking, and after ‘the greater security and cushiness of better salaries.’\(^{264}\) On this matter, Leith of the WCPTSF was forthright:

You see there are people in the bureaucracy, and in crucial positions at crucial levels that can influence, and these people are intent and they have bought into OBE ... And then you say to yourself, ‘maar jy was ‘n teacher, kom hier na ons skole toe, kom kyk’ (but you were a teacher; come to our schools, come and look). None of that ... So, you have people within the bureaucracy, it’s within their own interest and their own career mobility to push these things, to push for change. It doesn’t matter how it’s going to work, they don’t consider these things ... Without having any sense of implementation; how it’s going to work on the ground, who’s going to have to haul the coals out of the fire... \(^{265}\)

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\(^{259}\) Abrahams, ‘New Education Initiatives: Progress or Retardation?’, p.16.

\(^{260}\) Teachers’ League of South Africa, *Equity And Redress*, TLSA pamphlet, April 1999.

\(^{261}\) Interview with T. Hanmer, 31 August 2005.


Non-collaboration and the centrality of the teacher to curriculum reform and more broadly educational transformation thus remained an enduring feature of the League in this period.

**An alternative to Curriculum 2005**

Holding to its modernist outlook that ‘our children’ deserved nothing less than the best education; the TLSA continued to speak out against the narrow skills based approach of vocational-oriented education, which it argued OBE espoused. Instead, the League advocated a broad philosophical outlook where:

> education should aim at developing the whole person ... and oppose curriculum and syllabus programmes that attempt to move away from sound academic development towards the overly practical. ... The function of schools at all levels is to develop a well rounded young person who will be employable and can also relate to and enjoy all the enriching aspects of life.

League teachers and schools critical of the official OBE discourse, formulated, in the Gramscian sense, a counter hegemonic one that elevated the ‘intrinsic’ value of education. This discourse, however, while lauded in many circles as educationally acceptable, preserved at its core the transmission and acquisition of ‘high-status’ knowledge embodied in a broad curriculum taught at higher grade level. Indeed, a constant refrain of a principal at one League school, when teachers had a choice between offering a standard grade or higher grade option to students, was ‘give them roast beef not fish and chips’. However, as Soudien points out, ‘all knowledge … is open to critique’, and ‘high-status knowledge’, or if one invoked Bourdieu’s notion of ‘cultural capital’, brings with it ‘exclusionary impulses’ for those who do not have access to it. Here, Carnoy is germane, for he notes that a large majority of children in third world contexts “are brought into school in order to fail” and to be taught that they are not good

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267 See p.213, 214.
270 B. Isaacs, South Peninsula High (author’s experience).
While the TLSA was well aware of this fact, and consciously countered it with their own brand of academic excellence, for critics of this perspective, the distinction the organisation drew between vocational and academic or general education bore the hallmarks of elitism. Allan Liebenberg, for example, was scathing of the academic ethos certain League schools advanced. He criticised them for catering for a minority of students, those with the potential to qualify for access to particular high status tertiary institutions: “I think generally for the Unity Movement a technical college is not an option, university is, and it’s not just any university, it’s UCT … Not ‘bush college’, that’s not a university, that’s a ‘bush college’ …” He elaborated:

If you are an elitist in terms of vocational training, you want this person to become a heart surgeon or whatever, you’ll spit on that … but when you are in the township when it’s a matter of bread and butter [it’s different] … for me, the elitist is the crème de la crème, the cream de grandeur right at the top. I’m not focused on that I’m focused on the people on the ground right at the bottom.

Liebenberg’s caustic point of departure found common ground with Christie’s contention that schooling curricula geared towards university entrance enjoyed near unquestioned dominance, notwithstanding the fact that most students in the system did not attain this. Liebenberg’s argument that the schooling system was exclusionary and disadvantaged non-academic students, who were by far in the majority, translated, for him, into TLSA schools perpetuating the system through employing highly selective entrance criteria, by giving preference to academically strong students. However, inasmuch as the purported selection criteria applied by certain League schools were well known, it was lacking in substantial proof.

Not as well known though, was that the ‘selective’ practice of many TLSA schools was rooted in the Unity Movement’s abiding ethos that a radical middle class intelligentsia was ‘of key significance to political struggle’. Indeed, the cultivating of an ‘elite cultural

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273 Ibid.
274 Interview with A. Liebenberg, 17 December 2005.
275 Ibid.
milieu”, as Chisholm described it, alienated certain students at TLSA schools, where the selection and grooming of some, who were university material, excluded others. For Liebenberg, and alluded to by Soudien, it was that the League sanctioned an academic proclivity within the schooling system for the disenfranchised, from which it recruited and garnered organisational strength. This alleged elitism of the organisation, for certain educators, demonstrated insensitivity to the fact that most township children failed to reach Grade 12, owing to the schooling system’s emphasis on academia. These were not the only critical voices, and Alexander, likewise, noted that the League subscribed to an Anglocentric British view of education; of what a good student or scholar should be. For him, League schools encouraged an ‘Oxbridge’ approach to education, which was ‘too removed from the real conditions of the life of the people’, from what most people could achieve. Options were essential, to avoid demoralizing people and stymieing their development, he declared.

A range of voices seemed to reproach the League for promoting a school-based exclusivity, despite its ideological critique of apartheid schooling. Hard hitting as this assessment is, it is prudent to also note Alexander’s caveat to this accusation. In a Radio 786 discussion, he contextualised the coexistence of the TLSA’s elitism and its counter-consciousness:

... I want to make the point that I don’t think it was merely elitism, I think behind it there was a very strong sense of egalitarianism, a very strong sense that through social revolution we would bring about an egalitarian society in which everybody would have access to exactly that high status knowledge, and whether that was a worthwhile goal...

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279 League schools were known to be academically successful and Livingstone High and Harold Cressy High were the highest feeders of UCT from the disenfranchised community in 1978 and 1983 (Chisholm, ‘Making the pedagogical more political, and the political more pedagogical: Educational traditions and legacies of the Non-European Unity Movement, 1943-1985’, pp.245, 250.
280 Interview with A. Liebenberg, 17 December 2005; also 14 January 2005.
281 Soudien, The City, Citizenship And Education.
283 Interview with A. Liebenberg, 17 December 2005 and 14 January 2006.
284 Wieder, Voices from Cape Town Classrooms: Oral Histories of Teachers Who Fought Apartheid, p.57.
285 Ibid.
286 N. Alexander (“Education: the ongoing crisis or ‘A tale of three cities’”, A discussion with Crain Soudien, Neville Alexander and Ciraj Rassool, Prime Talk, Radio 786, 30 October 2002 [audio recording]).
This meant in concrete terms for him, that:

behind that stance of the progressives and the radicals ... was the assumption that
through revolution, through social revolution, we would create conditions of equality,
we would have created an egalitarian society in which everybody would have equality of
opportunity, in which everybody would be encouraged to attain to that high status
knowledge.  

Speaking on this issue in his presidential address of 1997, Abrahams declared that the
TLSA viewed education to be an instrument “with which to achieve socio-economic change
that will advance the standard of living of all citizens of the country”. Certainly, teaching
as they did, to standards that they thought the education system was denying the oppressed
children, the Teachers’ League was uncompromising on education. For teachers in the
organisation, teaching embodied:

dedication to education, an education as part of a social process, which also sees a
democratic situation, a democratic society. It’s a clear dedication to children and what is
important in order to give children the very best opportunity to live widely, generously
in society and not focus their minds on a very narrow end, but to broaden their minds, to
make them critical, to assist them to access information, to access quality. It’s quality,
quality, quality all the time ...  

It was this that set them, or seemed to set them, apart from those who did not agree with
their views. The League, in other words, did not consider the notion of education “of an
‘educated’ person” to be elitist. Yet, tensions between intent and outcome, theory and
practice, continued with regard to perceptions of the League. The organisation equally had
that perception of government policy in the post-1994 period. The TLSA’s bottom line, it
appeared, was that all students should be afforded the opportunity to learn and achieve to
their fullest potential. The introduction of fee-paying schools and the growth of private
schools in the late 1990s, scuppered this vision. Instead, a two-tiered system of schooling
emerged, institutionalised by the South African Schools Act (SASA) of 1996. The
implications of this divided schooling system and the TLSA’s response to it, are to be dealt
with next.

287 Ibid.
288 Abrahams, ‘New Education Initiatives: Progress or Retardation?’, p17.
289 Interview with T. Hamner, 31 August 2005.
290 See C. Soudien, Using Oral History to Recover Teacher Voice: A Critical Look at Voices from Cape
Town, A Review. School of Education University of Cape Town, (Internet source), 2003, p.5.
291 Abrahams, ‘New Education Initiatives: Progress or Retardation?’, p.17.
School Governance: introducing organs of democracy

In its bid to create an equitable system of education and improve the quality of educational provision, government embarked on a process to transform school governance. A key part of this transformational project involved offsetting the highly centralised bureaucratic approach of the apartheid regime, by devolving power to people on the ground in order to meet the aims of redress and equity. The new government sought to achieve this goal through employing a decentralised model, and to facilitate thereby, at a local level, the formalising of self-management structures.\(^{292}\)

The envisaged decentralised plan first made its appearance in education policy discourse in the draft White Paper on Education and Training (WPET) of September 1994.\(^{293}\) A year later, and confirming this shift away from the previous apartheid setup, the DoE appointed the Hunter Commission to review the organisation, governance and funding of schools. The report advocated redesigning the distribution of education resources along with a plan for the democratic governance of schools.\(^{294}\)

In response to the report, the first white paper (March 1995) and thereafter a second one (February 1996) were tabled. The South African Schools Bill followed in April 1996 as a forerunner to the South African Schools Act (SASA), which was assented to in November 1996. Monitoring these developments closely, *The Educational Journal* carefully tracked the emergent school governance process. Starting with a detailed analysis of the draft WPET,\(^{295}\) the League produced two comprehensive articles on the content of the Hunter report,\(^{296}\) and ran a series of articles from 1998 to 1999 explaining the


\(^{294}\) *New Nation*, ‘State and parents have role in education’, 8 September 1995.

\(^{295}\) Of primary concern to the League was the funding of schools and the retention of state-aided Model C schools (see *The Educational Journal*, November-December 1994, pp.10-15).

legislative powers of these Governing Bodies. In November 1998, it also released a pamphlet clarifying its position on School Governing Bodies.

Well aware of the heterogeneous nature of schooling, the League clearly understood the limitations of school governing bodies, dependent as these structures were on the socio-economic status of the school community in which they were located. As these inequalities were deeply embedded, it presented immediate and demanding challenges for the formerly disenfranchised school communities. As Hendricks pointed out, it meant ‘the community takes care of every aspect of school life, [including] the finances’. This, for her, would lead to the perpetuation of inequalities, ‘because the community is not enabled, if it’s a poor community. ... Its finances would be very limited’.

Decentralisation and with it the formation of governing bodies was, nonetheless, key to educational reform for the new government, for this inclusive and participatory process had as its objective the democratisation of school governance, in accord with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Consistent with this strategy, school governing bodies were to be composed of the principal, elected representatives of parents, teachers and non-teaching staff and, in secondary schools, learner representatives. The central values and principles underpinning school governance, would include ‘non-racism, non-sexism, a unitary education system, equity, efficiency and democracy’, with transformation and redress the central rationale driving the process. Given these empowering qualities, governing bodies were expected to assist in correcting the backlog in apartheid schools and to democratise

297 Governing Bodies were established in terms of the South African Schools Act (SASA). The TLSA referred to Governing Bodies as School Governing Bodies or SGBs. They will be cited as such when used by the League.
302 Adams and Waghid, pp.25, 26.
them in much the same way as the Parent Teacher Associations (PTA) movement of the 1950s and the Parent, Teacher, Student Associations (PTSAs) of the 1980s had. Its other mission, according to Lewis and Motala, was to facilitate economic growth.

The League’s response to the introduction of school governing bodies indicated once again that the organisation was undergoing change, concurrent with the transformation happening within the country. A close reading of League texts confirms this change in attitude towards government policy. Thus, while The Educational Journal had been strongly polemical in its opposition to the previous regime’s CNE, its discourse in the post-1994 period, specifically on the NQF, OBE and Governing Bodies, marked a distinct move away from its former acerbic oppositional tone that pitted it overtly against government. Instead, a more circumspect tenor was evident, with the League conceding that government had accomplished measurable success in proscribing certain discriminatory practices stemming from apartheid. Amongst League teachers, too, a definite shift in discourse was evident. A member intimated that one could not equate the Department of Education (DoE) with the previous ‘coloured’ affairs department, as education was no longer ‘racially’ administered. With this changing mindset, the organisation’s members decided to participate in the school governing bodies. This decision had historical precedence. Udemans explained:

> Just as we had done political work in the PTSAs ... we took a decision that we were going to go into the school governing councils and then try to establish an umbrella body, and that umbrella body would not be a government structure, and we would be able to do political work better in that umbrella body.

In addition, The Educational Journal was surprisingly silent on PTSAs after 1994, and at no stage presented these schooling structures as viable alternatives to Governing Bodies,

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308 Interview with J. Udemans, 27 October 2005.
309 Ibid. In the Eastern Cape, attempts were made by NUM and TLSA members to establish a school governing body umbrella structure similar to the existing PTA/PTSA one. Their efforts, however, were hampered by SADTU (Interview with J. Udemans, 27 October 2005).
which, for example, the WCPTSF had. Indeed, only one League-oriented school retained their PTSA and SRC, in line with the TLSA’s suggestion that the Governing Bodies fulfil an executive role and defer decisions and actions to the PTA/PTSA. Putting its position on school governing bodies beyond doubt, the organisation declared:

While there are ways of improving the skills and understanding of many SGBs, their operation will improve most when there is free, compulsory education for all children up to Grade 12 ... These are the changes that parents, teachers and learners have to struggle for, while at the same time doing everything possible to improve the operation of SGBs [my emphasis].

The League’s once confrontational and unyielding style of engagement seemed for once muted in the vital area of school governance. This marked a significant shift by the organisation, since ordinarily it would have been supportive of PTSAs as oppositional and independent community structures, representing marginalised voices. This move appeared even more glaring when viewed against the Unity Movement’s policy of non-collaboration at the time, since the NUM held firmly to the position that “we must build independent organisations with our own liberatory ideas, democratic aims and comradeship”, and that there be ‘non-participation in the instruments which are used to oppress us’. The sanctioning of statutory Governing Bodies, and the neglect of PTSAs, thus signified a strategic compromise on the organisation’s traditional position. This repositioning proved more pragmatic than principled, since, as one League member put it: “You can’t not want to recognise them, they’re statutory bodies, so they’re there. If you are not going to recognise them [Governing Bodies] you are not going to recognise the

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310 See the Kraaifontein Parents’, Teachers’ and Students’ Forum, *The New Schools Bill: An Attack on the Education of the Poor School Communities*, KPTSF pamphlet, November 1996; see also L. Scholtz, ‘Governing Bodies! Where To?’ Western Cape Parents, Teachers, Students Forum, February 1998. Scholtz delivered the paper on behalf of the WCPTSF at Bellville South Primary school on 14 February 1998. While the WCPTSF raised the issue of PTSAs as historically representative of the democratic organs of the people, it did not oppose SGBs.

311 South Peninsula High retained their PTSA and SRC (as opposed to the Representative Council of Learners RCLs), which operated alongside the SGB. The secretary of the WCPTSF was the principal of South Peninsula High. The acceptance of SGBs by formerly TLSA schools may point to the fact that the League had lost its hold on these schools.


313 Ibid.


This pragmatism became more evident when the organisation decided to actively assist members and other teachers gain better insight into the functioning of school governing bodies, which many school communities had found perplexing and difficult to engage.  

Hanmer, who was instrumental in the League’s Legal Aid Bureau, explained:

I’ve been more concerned with the way in which school governing bodies, in some cases, functioned and attempted to take on roles which they were not empowered to. Or, where they took decisions which were irregular and weren’t following the prescriptions that were there to monitor the process of appointments and promotion posts and the rest of those things, rather than the day-to-day functioning of a school governing body ... This was always the position we took, particularly when difficulties arose in regard to the way in which school governing bodies functioned or attempted to function in respect of teachers on a staff, who took up a position or were being ‘got at’ because of some incident or other and needed to be assisted. Positions needed to be clarified.

As part of its intervention, the League assisted teachers to follow the correct protocols when they applied for teaching posts. The Educational Journal, for example, sought to equip the teacher constituency by carrying informative articles on school governing bodies. Here, significantly, it explained the differences between school governance or the participatory process involving parents and teachers, and management - the day-to-day teaching and learning that the principal and teachers had to take responsibility for. This involvement the organisation deemed crucial, as it sought to counter malpractices and safeguard members’ interests.

Increasingly, League members as parents or teacher representatives of staffs, found themselves drawn into Governing Bodies, and taking on positions at various levels in these structures. Encouraging of this intervention, the League attempted to ensure its members

317 Xaba, p.313; Adams and Waghid, p.27.
318 Interview with T. Hanmer, 31 August 2005. All new teacher applicants, unless SGB posts, had to apply via the Education Department. Suitable candidates were then forwarded to the SGB at a school, which decided upon candidates and submitted their choice to the WCED for confirmation. The process of teacher appointments was set-out in the SASA (see The Educational Journal, June 1999, p.9). As a teachers’ organisation, the TLSA was allowed official observer status at various stages of the selection of candidates to posts. It had the right to point out irregularities and malpractices where members experienced them (see The Educational Journal, June 1999, pp.9, 10).
319 The Educational Journal, June 1999, pp.9, 10.
321 The Educational Journal, June 1999, p.10; Interview with L. Roelf, 15 September 2005. Roelf, for instance, indicated he had to speak to the staff at Thornton Primary where the Athlone branch of the TLSA met on a monthly basis. Roelf was the chairperson of the branch.
322 Interview with J. Udemans, 27 October 2005.
and others involved in schooling, were conversant with the governing bodies’ legal provisions, and, as it were, enabled, since for it the ‘most effective means of ensuring redress in the short term and equity in the longer’ was the ‘rigorous involvement of parents in the School Governing Bodies’. Holding firmly to its original 1950s programme on PTA’s, which called for the parent constituency to be a central pillar of schooling, the TLSA presented itself as favourably disposed to parents holding the majority vote on school governing bodies. As Alexander at the pre-launch of the regional Association of School Governing Bodies declared: “We were fighting against an undemocratic state and we insisted at that time that parents and not the state, should be the main determiners as it were of what happens at school”. The role of parents in the new school governance structure was therefore critical, he averred, since: “parents are the centrepiece of such governing bodies. It is obvious that unless the parents drive the Governing Bodies we may end up with a system that is merely ornamental, i.e., a system that is not in fact democratic ...”

Even the WCPTSF, critical as it was of Governing Bodies, noted:

The representative organisational form of the previous independent PTSAs became the new statutory bodies. There had been a progression. The involvement of parents and students especially are guaranteed and protected by the law. Where there was no PTSA school communities had to form representative bodies to represent the various parties. This is something we have won. One of the democratic gains of our struggle on the education terrain had been solidified.

For the education community more widely, as well, the introduction of school governing bodies was: “a struggle won, creating new opportunities for all stakeholders in schools and the broader community to jointly map out the future of education ... [where] matters

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323 Teachers’ League of South Africa, _Equity And Redress_, TLSA pamphlet, April 1999. Governing Bodies, for the League, was the avenue through which parents could exert pressure on governmental organs for the equitable provision of resources.

324 See Chapter 1, pp.58-60.

325 See _The Educational Journal_, June 1999, p.9. Governing Bodies for ordinary schools constituted seven parents, two educators of the school, one non-teaching staff member, two learners in the eighth grade or higher, and the principal or his / her nominated representative.

326 N. Alexander, ‘Parent Involvement in the Control and Content of Education’, Paper delivered at the Association of School Governing Bodies meeting, Garlandale High School, 7 February 1998. The Association of School Governing Bodies was to become a legislated umbrella body with regionally-based school governing bodies. The Western Cape branch launched at the end of 1998.


328 L. Scholtz, ‘School Governing Bodies or Dummy Bodies?’, A panel discussion with Martin Jansen, (National Association of School Governing Bodies) and Lionel Scholtz, (Western Cape Parents, Teachers, Students Forum), hosted by the Workers’ Organisation for Socialist Action, Community House, Salt River, n.d. 1998, (audio recording).
affecting their lives is assured – and legally guaranteed”. The League was all too aware of these voices and it added its own to them: “SGBs can and indeed should be used in a way that will advance the struggle for a quality system of education for all the children of South Africa, irrespective of their ‘colour’, creed, class and gender”. Clearly, the conception of SGBs had resonance for the TLSA, and initially it saw the structures as legitimate and appropriate organs in which political work could be undertaken. This decision, however, was accompanied by tensions, and will be elaborated on below.

**School Governing Bodies: remodelling the Model C school**

Accepting the *bona fide* existence and the political potential of Governing Bodies, as the League had, placed it in an invidious position, as legislatively Governing Bodies had been imbued with House of Assembly, Model C-type, school committee powers, preserving therewith certain exclusionary measures. On the other hand, Nzimande, the chairperson for the Parliamentary Committee for Education, was far more optimistic, and claimed that the South African schools Act (SASA) had “consigned to the dustbin of history the existence of racially and ethnically based schools in South Africa” and that it had created the “framework for a non-racial, non-sexist, and equitable public schooling system”.  

Alert to the dangers posed by this development, the League saw in the new governing legislation, the merger of the NP’s ERS and the ANC’s education policy. It moreover foresaw the entrenchment of the Model C-type school and thus the preservation of both ‘race’ and class as measures that would exclude the majority of students. Foremost, for the organisation, was that culture, language and religion would continue to mask ‘race’ as an entrée requirement for schools. An arrangement that was confirmed, it contended, in the 1995 National Education Policy Bill (NEPB) already. In addition, the League, amongst

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333 Ibid., p.12.
334 Ibid., p.6.
other educationists, noted the Constitutional Court’s consent to the right of people to establish education institutions based on common culture, language or religion, provided it was unfettered by ‘race’. This constitutional guarantee to transform schooling, the organisation argued, would be insufficient to address socio-economic and historically embedded patterns of segregation and inequality. While this may be viewed as negative politicking on the part of the TLSA, an accusation often levelled at it, SADTU also noted that racism in schools was extremely common, intense and most disturbingly ‘normal’. Chisholm, too, commented that in this period schools had remained mono-racial, and that where integration did take place, re-racialising based on culture, language and class amongst other forms of hidden discrimination had persisted.

Notwithstanding the ‘racial’ features of the emergent schooling system, in the eyes of the League it was of secondary concern. Instead, the organisation fixed its gaze on the economic divide in education, and its effect on poor school communities. For the League, ‘race’ and class remained intractable, and the removal of the one implied the elimination of the other. This correlation between ‘race’ and class did not mean the League subscribed to the reductionist notion, as Chaudhury put it, of ‘the economy ... embodying the essence of all social phenomena’, but that it drew its perspective largely

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337 South African Democratic Teachers’ Union, *The Educator’s Voice*, ‘Racism rears its ugly head at schools’, March 1999; *The Educator’s Voice* article was based on a study of ninety schools nationally - ten schools in nine provinces - that were undergoing a process of racial desegregation.


340 Of prime importance to the League was the Hunter Report, which had endorsed the system of independent (private) and public schools, and consequently the separation of schools on the basis of class (*The Educational Journal*, November-December 1995, p.12; April-May 1996, p.5. See Department of Education, *Report of the Committee to Review the Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools*, Pretoria, 31 August 1995, p.44).


from given conditions, where statistics revealed the majority of schools to be uni-racial and poor.\textsuperscript{343}Highlighting the interconnectedness of social phenomena, Sivanandanan declared that ‘all inequality – whether of race, class or gender – are symbiotic of each other, live off each other and are sustained by each other’.\textsuperscript{344}In a rapidly modernising capitalist state, as South Africa was after 1994, the TLSA considered it far more prudent to give attention to the financial side of education, and henceforth kept its readers abreast of the funding models as they emerged in the White Papers on Education and Training (WPET) and later SASA. One such feature was ensconced early on in the first draft WPET\textsuperscript{345}and thereafter in the Schools Bill. Both these documents signalled that public schools would become fee-paying entities.\textsuperscript{346}The new regulation, although considered favourable to the poor,\textsuperscript{347}effectively devolved to schools the financial responsibility of municipal services and other related specifics, necessities which had to be secured largely from school fees and fundraising activities.\textsuperscript{348}

This development confirmed, for the League, its contention that there would be no real increase in expenditure for education,\textsuperscript{349}and that affordability would become the main criterion for attending schools, where school governing bodies would take over the legal

\textsuperscript{343}Chisholm, ‘The state of South Africa’s Schools’, p.217.
\textsuperscript{346}\textit{The Educational Journal}, July-August 1996, p.5. Crouch argued that South Africa required a budgetary growth of 30% to provide education for all. This for him was unachievable. He advocated an incremental withdrawal of public funding as parents incomes gradient increased (Crouch, \textit{Equity and Efficiency in Public Education Expenditure in South Africa: Analysis of Recent Evidence}, 1994 (mimeo), p.22). Suggested was that schools take financial responsibility for certain administrative costs (see Department of Education, \textit{The Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools (Education White Paper 2)}, Pretoria, February 1996, pp.19-23).
\textsuperscript{347}Two international advisers, Colclough and Crouch, were contracted to the DoE to advise on the funding model for schools. They argued that by allowing schools to charge fees, a mechanism would be provided to enhance inadequate public resources whilst maintaining support for state schools among privileged classes who were no longer defined by race. The thinking was that children from families below a decided national threshold be exempt from school fees (see Fiske and Ladd, \textit{Elusive Equity: education reform in post-apartheid South Africa}, pp.136, 137).
\textsuperscript{349}The League, having reviewed the Hunter Report, was aware of its findings. Primary, was that the real value of spending on education was set to decline, and that no real increase in expenditure was likely during 1995/96 (Department of Education, \textit{Report of the Committee to Review the Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools}, Pretoria, 31 August 1995, pp.72-77; \textit{The Educational Journal}, June 1996, p.6); see Chapter 3, p.182.
responsibility for collecting and administering funds. Two types of students would be accommodated in the new schooling set-up the organisation predicted: schools catering for children from low-income households, and the previous Model C schools, where economically better off parents would send their children. This development, it insisted, implied that the ‘remodelling of Model C schools’ had been actualised, and that despite the removal of the Model C title from the Schools Bill, all schools, including ‘the schools inside the ghettos’ would become fee-paying Model C schools. Scholtz of the WCPTSF, in a public discussion on Governing Bodies, would articulate this development in relation to the Schools Act:

There are no public schools in South Africa. Anyone who looks closely at, and this is important ... looks closely and honestly at the Schools Act, will immediately realise that these public schools are merely a modified version of the Model C type of school, which the National Party granted to ‘white’ parents during the twilight of their rule ... The parents [of all children at ordinary public schools] will become responsible to maintain the schools financially through these democratically elected governing bodies. These democratically elected bodies, governing bodies, are the instruments through which the government is imposing a Model C status on poor school communities ...

The pre-eminence of financial considerations was glaringly evident in the new schooling policy. In fact, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), showed not only a cut in real terms of school equipment, stationery and textbooks, but also the slashing of the subsidisation of water and electricity, school security, maintenance and repairs costs. South Peninsula High, for instance, informed its parents that the school would have to cover water and electricity costs unlike the past, and that its annual allocation from the

350 Education Statutes, South African Schools Act 84 of 1996, pp.49, 50; The Educational Journal, July-August 1996, p.5. This implied that each SGB would set the fees for the respective school and take the responsibility of administering it.
352 The Educational Journal, July-August 1996, pp.3-5, 16.
354 Scholtz, ‘School Governing Bodies or Dummy Bodies?’ (audio recording).
355 From 1995 to 1998, there was not only the increase in learners attending schools but also the corresponding decline in non-personnel expenditure per learner (Department of Finance, 1998 Medium Term Expenditure Review, Pretoria: Budget Office, October 1998, p.15).
356 The METF detailed the current trends in the education system. It reviewed existing policies and provided detailed argument for a number of programmes or initiatives required to improve the quality of education and achieve stability in the budget process.
357 This trend continued in 1998/99 (see Department of Finance, 1998 Medium Term Expenditure Review, p.15).
WCED was to be cut well below its budget of the previous year. This cost-cutting measure, the principal indicated to parents, had forced the school, much the same as other community schools, to raise school fees in order to off-set cuts in subsidy. Yet another school, Grassy Park High, was forced to increase its fees from R60 in 1994 to R250 in 1999, while in the same period its staff and monetary allocations had dropped significantly despite the increase in its student roll. The challenge with regard to the norms and standards for the funding of public schools the League elaborated upon in its journal, for it directly affected parents.

The extra school tax parents were compelled to pay, the TLSA and educationists branded a ruse, as its real intent was to pass the responsibility of the financing of education on to economically poor schooling communities. Jakoet of the TLSA put it bluntly:

Look at what you putting on to teachers and parents ... all you doing is putting what should be government, state responsibility ... on to teachers, school managers and the parents of the children. Parents who are already paying their taxes. It is taking volunteerism to new heights.

Despite its critique, the League did not call for any form of action against the imposition of the Model C or semi-privatisation of schooling. Instead, it was to the WCPTSF that this responsibility fell, where a handful of TLSA members remained active. Consistent with its more confrontational style, the Forum called for the ‘spirit of democracy’ to be upheld and for poor school communities to be given the opportunity to vote on whether their schools should be fee-paying Model C entities, in much the same way as white parents had been

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358 South Peninsula High, Letter sent to South Peninsula High parents, 14 September 1999.
359 Ibid.
360 A survey conducted at Grassy Park High by the WCPTSF to ascertain the effects of rationalisation on school communities (see Western Cape Parents, Teachers’, Students Forum, Questionnaire to Determine the Effects of Rationalisation on School Communities, Grassy Park High, 5 May 1999). The decrease in non-personnel expenditure from 1995 was set to continue in the 1998/99 budget (Department of Finance, 1998 Medium Term Expenditure Review, p.21).
361 The Educational Journal, November-December 1999, p.5. According to the TLSA, the textbook allocation had been cut from R850 million for 1995-1996 to R200 million in 1998 (see ibid., pp.5, 6).
363 The Educational Journal, April-May 1998, p.10. This included the Education Rights Project (ERP), National Association of School Governing Bodies (NASGB) and the WCPTSF among others (Radio 786, ‘School Fees and the Privatisation of Education’, A discussion with William Leith (Western Cape Parents, Teachers, Students Forum), Martin Jansen (National Association of School Governing Bodies) and Salim Vally (Education Rights Project), Wise-Up, Wednesday 30 November 2002 (audio recording).
See also Adams and Waghid, p.31.
afforded the opportunity in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{365} If parents voted overwhelmingly against financing their own schools, and the DoE refused to take financial and social responsibility for them, and where a school ‘cannot operate normally anymore, the parents must close it’, the Forum said.\textsuperscript{366} In pursuit of its campaign, the WCPTSF in early 1998 organised a march on the WCED titled ‘The Death of Public Education’.\textsuperscript{367} It also attempted to organise public meetings in various communities to profile the matter in the public domain.\textsuperscript{368} These attempts however failed to draw sufficient public support, and eventually the campaign lost momentum and floundered. The outcome of the initiative pointed to, it needs saying, the extent of teacher demoralisation by 1998, following the protracted battles against rationalisation and redeployment, and the fact that many teachers were confronting directly the challenges of the new curriculum. It was also significant that the teacher unions and the new ANC government, which carried unequivocal teacher support, sanctioned the new policies. But, and this is contentious, had the call to have poor communities vote on whether they accepted the ‘remodelling’ of their schools been initiated two years earlier, the result may have been vastly different.

Clearly, school fees were a major point of contestation, and government found itself awkwardly positioned. In its drive for equity, it introduced a policy prohibiting school governing bodies from excluding learners who could not pay fees,\textsuperscript{369} through partial or full fee exemption as prescribed by the Schools Act and attendant legislation.\textsuperscript{370} A foremost

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\textsuperscript{365} Scholtz, ‘School Governing Bodies or Dummy Bodies?’ (audio recording).
\textsuperscript{366} Scholtz, ‘Governing Bodies! Where to?’ February 1998, p.15. This statement had an immediate precedent, as earlier in the year poor school communities in Kwazulu-Natal had closed their schools in reaction to the new financial demands placed on them.
\textsuperscript{367} Forum members carried a coffin draped with fabric on which the words ‘The Death of Public Education’ appeared. They placed the coffin in front of the door of the WCED and spread red paint around the coffin before burning papers to show their rejection of the DoE policies (the author was present).
\textsuperscript{368} One such meeting was held at the former Hewat Training College in Crawford.
\textsuperscript{370} Education Statutes, \textit{South African Schools Act 84 of 1996}, p.51. The attendant policies, in keeping with SASA and its agenda of achieving equity, barred schools from refusing children admission and waived school fees where family income merited it. A norms and standards funding document was later introduced in 1998, which spelled out the conditions for fee exemption (see also \textit{The Educational Journal}, November-December 1998, p.10). In fact, where parents had been exempt from paying fees but were forced to do so by the SGB, they could appeal to the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Education (\textit{The Educational Journal}, January-March 1999, p.4). See also J. Potgieter, P. Visser, J. van der Bank, M. Mothata, J. Squelch, \textit{Understanding the South African Schools Act}, Pretoria: Department of Education, 1997, pp.40, 41). Partial exemptions were also granted at the discretion of the governing body, and conditional exemptions, under
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concern for the League, in this milieu, was that the fee exemption would not achieve equity, since the majority of parents were either too poor to pay school fees or where they could, their contributions made little difference to the school budget.\textsuperscript{371} Indeed, financial constraints meant school governing bodies expended immense energy focusing on finances, because they needed ‘to raise revenues’ in order to ‘function as schools’.\textsuperscript{372} Consequently, as Martin Jansen of the National Association of School Governing Bodies (NASG) pointed out:

> the real issue is the inability of parents to afford to pay school fees and other education-related expenses. And so what the school governing body does for most of the time in most of its meetings is to discuss finances; because most of them especially those who draw from disadvantaged communities find themselves in difficult financial situations and they spend most of the time discussing finances and how to actually squeeze from parents that last little bit of money...\textsuperscript{373}

This was debilitating for poor schools’ governing bodies, C. Liebenberg emphasised:

> What power of management did they have? All that they had to manage from what I could see ... were fundraising efforts; to determine the fees that people, should pay - that is now the parents. And if, if the revenue from fees were sufficient maybe they could appoint ... an additional teacher ... from the pockets, as it were, of the parents.\textsuperscript{374}

This arrangement added up to nothing more than the ‘impression’ or ‘illusion’ that parents have rights, according to a New Unity Movement (NUM) affiliate.\textsuperscript{375} Thus, for poor school communities, the majority of schools, the Schools Bill (Act) represented ‘a defeat’, the Forum bluntly declared.\textsuperscript{376}

In effect, the self-financing of schools not only disempowered poor schools, it signalled a gain for the former Model C schools, for while privileged schools could pay for more which families could plead special circumstances - either relating to a parent's ability to pay fees or ability to collect information about income. However, where parental incomes were more than thirty times the fee, parents could not qualify for exemption (see Roithmayr, \textit{The Constitutionality of School Fees in Public Education}, p.6). Furthermore, SGBs were legally empowered to enforce the payment of school fees provided the majority of parents had formally accented to fee payment at a school.

\textsuperscript{371} \textit{The Educational Journal}, April-May 1999, p.6.
\textsuperscript{372} M. Jansen, (‘School Fees and the Privatisation of Education’, A discussion with William Leith [Western Cape Parents, Teachers, Students Forum], Martin Jansen [National Association of School Governing Bodies] and Salim Vally [Education Rights Project], \textit{Wise-Up}, Radio 786, Wednesday 30 November 2002 [audio recording]).
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{374} Interview with C. Liebenberg, 24 May 2005.
teachers, poor schools could not, eventuating in the widening polarisation between these schools. Yusuf Gabru, put the matter in context:

It [the new school governing regulations] keeps working class schools poor, because in the past, because of the Group Areas Act, you had people - talented people, privileged people, doctors, lawyers within a working class community. Now they’re able to move out and they are able to take their kids with them and their experience and skills ... the parent goes with the pupil and that impoverishes the schools more.

Allan Liebenberg, the principal of a high school in the working class area of Steenberg, was of like mind, and berated the fee-paying policy: “we declared school fees to be an abomination, which is fuelling the widening gulf between rich and poor schools in terms of what children are being provided with. We blame the government for that ... We are aware of parents who pay R70 000 per annum in school fees, we’re also aware of schools that do not have a budget larger than R1000 for the year”. The exiting of the more economically stable elements from the schools that served the former disenfranchised, left these schools with the poorer section of the community, creating what Soudien termed a ‘sink-hole syndrome’ – where poor schools became the dumping grounds of the larger system.

Acutely aware of this, the League observed how from the inception of Model C schooling, wealthier schools had been able to exercise choice by accessing resources at various levels. One of these, it added, was the ability to recruit additional staff on SGB contracts secured from school funds, and the fact that higher school fees translated effectively into the acquisition of substantially more resources, and with that, a qualitatively better education. 

Over-and-above school fees, additional and recurrent costs deepened the predicament of poor parents. Vally of the Education Rights Project (ERP) explained:

if you consider transport to school, and school uniforms, and a whole range of miscellaneous secondary fees, like learning support materials etcetera, which the state is meant to provide but quite often doesn’t, those costs compared to school fees make-up

378 Interview with Y. Gabru, 10 March 2006.
379 Interview with A. Liebenberg, 17 December 2005.
381 Ibid.
383 Ibid.
the bulk of the amount of money parents are asked to fork out for the education of their children.\textsuperscript{386}

Evidently, for the League, it was the ‘environment’ in which Governing Bodies operated that was most problematic, not the ‘nature’ of these structures \textit{per se}.\textsuperscript{387} Thus, while it critiqued school governing structures, the League refrained from opposing them and pushing for the formation of alternative PTA or PTSA structures, as it had in the 1950s and 1980s. Instead, it was left to elements within the TLSA’s ambit, such as schools and individuals, to counter government’s schooling policy. This was most evident when specific schools came out against the new categorisation and financing of schools, which was based on the new norms and standards funding policy to deal with the skewed distribution of resources in schooling.\textsuperscript{388}

The new funding policy received immediate media approval, as it sought to reduce the chasm between resourced (privileged) and under-resourced (disadvantaged) schools.\textsuperscript{389} A central feature of the policy was the establishment of the quintile system,\textsuperscript{390} consisting of five categories of public schools based on their socio-economic and physical-resource needs, with the poorest receiving seven times more in state funding than the richest. To avoid borderline schools being incorrectly categorised, the WCED increased the categories to eleven.\textsuperscript{391} Efforts to increase the quintiles, however, did not address the anomalous categorisation of schools and many former HoR and HoA schools ended-up in the same

\textsuperscript{386} S. Vally, (‘School Fees and the Privatisation of Education’, A discussion with William Leith [Western Cape Parents, Teachers, Students Forum], Martin Jansen [National Association of School Governing Bodies] and Salim Vally [Education Rights Project], Wise-Up, Radio 786, Wednesday 30 November 2002 [audio recording]).

\textsuperscript{387} Teachers’ League of South Africa, \textit{The Rôle of School Governing Bodies}, TLSA pamphlet, November 1998.


\textsuperscript{390} The system worked on a distributive model that allocated funds across five levels or quintiles.

\textsuperscript{391} The categories ranged from A (poorest) to K (wealthiest) schools, with each comprising 9% of the province’s schools. The funding per pupil per year was to range from R196 (A) to R28 (K). The wealthiest schools were not categorised. Schools were expected to provide information including: their material needs, the parents’ income, the ‘race’ of pupils, the number of working class children enrolled, the number of cars the family owned, among other criteria such as the condition of school buildings. Where schools refused to comply, they were placed in the lower categories (\textit{The Educational Journal}, November-December 1999, p.5).
Schools that refused to submit the relevant documentation were penalised and placed in lower categories, resulting in them also being classified incorrectly. A TLSA school, aligned to the Concerned Parents’, Teachers’, Students – a branch of the WCPTSF - demanded equal and free education for all from Grade 1 to Grade 12, and refused, in the tradition of non-racialism, to comply with the DoE request to racially classify its student population. It was summarily relegated to category J.

The League was disparaging of the norms and standards funding policy, and lambasted it as ‘at best a feeble effort’ to achieve equity. The redistributive policy was guaranteed to exacerbate the plight of the poor, the TLSA declared, despite the policy constituting part of government’s broader economic strategy to attain redress. The organisation highlighted Asmal’s affirming of Bengu’s policy on Governing Bodies as a prime example of the continuities of bad policy, since its aim was to preserve school governing bodies as independent initiators of finance, and with it the flawed idea that school communities were agents of transformation. The deputy Principal at Crestway High put the issue starkly:

I work at a place where the budget, the annual budget, that’s everything to make the place work as best we can, is roughly 400 to 450 thousand rand a year. Just up the road from us, there’s a school with an annual budget of 4 million. Now it’s very difficult to conceive that these two places can have the same outcome [and hence be equal], if there is such an enormous gap in the resource base of these two places.

Once again, the education ministry was doing what it had in the teacher rationalisation and redeployment process, the League stated; it was ‘juggling’ with a diminishing education

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392 While on the one hand, neighbouring schools whose learners came from the same socio-economic background were categorised differently, on the other, schools in the same category had learners who experienced vastly different socio-economic conditions. Category J, for instance, comprised Marist Brothers, Wynberg Boys’ and Wynberg Girls’ Junior, SACS High amongst others of the former HoA schools along with Heathfield High, Mohammedeyah Primary, Grassy Park Primary and others of the former HoR schools (Concerned Parents’, Teachers’ and Students fax correspondence from Harold Cressy High, 28 September 1999).

393 Harold Cressy High, fax correspondence to the Concerned Parents’, Teachers’ and Students, 28 September 1999.

394 South Peninsula High was put in category J (R45 per pupil) because they refused to comply with the Department’s request to complete its questionnaire. It submitted a blank form to the WCED, and wrote across the cover page that they were a non-racial school and that education should be free and compulsory from Grade 1 to Grade 12 (See South Peninsula High, Letter sent to South Peninsula High parents, 14 September 1999).


397 Ibid., p.6.

budget to avert the schooling crisis. Rather, vast additional resources and lasting solutions had to be found, the organisation said. These had to be based on an increase in funding, and progressive education planning, not the redistribution of limited and reduced resources, which fell within the policies of the IMF and World Bank, it claimed.

The way forward

Retention its support for educators and learners in poor schools, who remained profoundly challenged, and continuing to laud those teachers ‘dedicated’ to attaining results irrespective of the odds, the League placed a high premium on matriculation results. Because of this, League schools were well known for their academic achievements, a practice which continued into the post-1994 period. These schools were alert to the fact that although matriculation examinations were one of the most distressing effects of the new democracy, it comprised the only recurring indicator of learner and school performance in the educational system, and as such constituted an uncontested selection mechanism for learners entering higher education and the job market. While far from perfect, the matric model meant life opportunities centred generally on doing well at school, since as Jansen reminded the public, ‘life chances of millions of children depend crucially on knowledge and access to knowledge revealed through academic performance measures’.

However, while the TLSA placed stress on this type of academic performance to ensure disenfranchised learners were adequately equipped for life beyond school, it also used the matric results to castigate government’s education policies and the educational system

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399 The Educational Journal, November-December 1999, p.5.
401 The Educational Journal, November-December 1999, pp.6, 2.
408 See Chapter 2, pp.92, 93 and pp.238-239.
as a whole. This it employed strategically, understanding full well that the matric results represented one measure of the magnitude of the crisis in education.\textsuperscript{409} A longstanding League member explained:

The poor performance of some schools starts-off right at the beginning, where children come from poor homes, poor social background, little access to anything that could be regarded as educational, and are always lagging behind because of these handicaps. And then they are made to choose subjects which are regarded as easier, less demanding, and then they choose subjects on the standard grade rather than on the higher grade. So the whole process goes right through. And then there’s a big cry about the poor results in matric, but they wouldn’t have been that if it had been any different lower down. So you know, that has always been our view, that if you talking about matric results, you’ve got to talk about the education process and the things, the factors that contribute to results all the way through ... \textsuperscript{410}

Placing a large part of the education crisis at the door of budgetary constraints, the League contended that the cut in school staffs, and parents having to pay exceedingly high school fees, had contributed immeasurably to the appalling matric results.\textsuperscript{411}

While the TLSA resolutely decried the education system, critics accused it of being Janus-faced, as its theory and practice seemed contradictory. League schools, it was said, employed exclusionary criteria, for they were ‘quite prepared to exclude, to close their school gates to learners who were not academically orientated’.\textsuperscript{412} In addition, whilst they catered for a substantial layer of working class children, they also applied school fees to regulate access and admission, and, in so doing, skimmed off a select few from the community.\textsuperscript{413}

The organisation seemed to face the same dilemma postcolonialists allude to, and which is extremely pertinent here, notably, of implicating itself in a “discourse in which even as it challenge(s) the colonial claim to political domination it also accept(s) the intellectual premises of ‘modernity’ on which colonialism was based”.\textsuperscript{414} This paradox, of critiquing...

\textsuperscript{410} Interview with T. Hanmer, 31 August 2005.
\textsuperscript{412} Interview with A. Liebenberg, 17 December 2005.
\textsuperscript{413} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{414} P. Chatterjee, ‘Caste and Subaltern Consciousness’, in R. Guha (ed), Subaltern Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.30; see also H. Bhabha, ‘The Other
the system whilst also conforming to it, was clearly visible to League detractors. One such person argued that unlike the more exclusive approach of the League, schools should be ‘nodes of care’, embracing rather than rejecting or ejecting learners. The ‘township’ school, which he headed, was one such institution, he claimed, which despite the odds, had a policy of caring for the weakest elements in the community. Altruistic and necessary, as the latter project was, its sustainability was decidedly uncertain in a climate of recurrent costs and huge educational backlogs, which according to the 1998-1999 national budget, stood at a total sum of R24-37 billion.

What were the alternatives for the League, and what was its long term and medium term strategy? Answered in part earlier, towards the end of the discussion on the curriculum, and when scrutinising redistribution, it was apparent that the League appeared reluctant or unwilling to elaborate on a radical model of redistribution of what were ‘elaborate resources locked into middle-and upper-class communities to which all contributed and all are entitled to have’. Instead, it said, the redistribution of funds from former white schools to the schools servicing the formerly disenfranchised would be insufficient to enhance education available to historically disadvantaged schools. It consequently reserved its primary critique for: the DoE, those teacher organisations in the ELRC that had in effect officially discarded the policy of free compulsory education, through backing school fees and other forms of financial self-management possibilities, and the ANC government’s reneging on its Freedom Charter vision ‘to open the doors of learning to all’. These entities, it maintained, were integrally tied to international forces that promoted the

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420 The Educational Journal, April-May 1999, p.5.
privatisation and commodification of education and prevented the government ending ‘racial’ and economic exploitation and poverty.\footnote{The Educational Journal, November-December 1999, pp.2, 6.}

Apart from the League’s insights on the reforms in education in the late 1990s, a clear strategy from the organisation towards the end of the twentieth century was wanting. Aside from the Concerned Action Group (CAG) initiative,\footnote{See Chapter 3, pp.195, 196.} where the organisation for a very short period developed a prominent public profile through the efforts of Ivan Abrahams and a handful of members, its voice remained largely one of educating and directing people through its texts, not organising and leading opposition as it had in the 1940s and 1950s. This was a significant shortcoming, for as Carollisen, a stalwart of the League in the 1950s stated: ‘people need a lead; people want a way out, and you not there; you not in the forefront’.\footnote{Interview with E. Carollisen, 21 October 2005.} Instead, the organisation subscribed to, it may be suggested, a form of left-wing politics that gave primacy to the notion of imputing political consciousness into a subaltern community, to create what may be deemed the possibility for the attainment of a socialist consciousness,\footnote{See Chaudhury, ‘In Search of a Subaltern Lenin’, pp.237-251.} and eventually socialism. In this largely discursive sense, and within a rapidly changing educational landscape, the TLSA seemed to hold to a specific ideological agenda.

Clearly, for the organisation, non-collaboration remained an active and a central tenet, notwithstanding its nuances, tensions and apparent revisions. This political outlook was to colour if not dictate the historic decision the Teachers’ League was compelled to take in response to labour legislation that demanded it either merge with several public sector unions or dissolve in 1999. The implications and abiding challenges of this decision are to be scrutinised next.
Chapter 5

Invoking the Union: *Quo Vadis TLSA, Quo Vadis Non-Collaboration?*

Now is the time to see the Trade Union question in its entirety, in its widest perspective, not simply as an economic struggle but as fundamentally a political struggle. It must be seen against the background of the National Liberatory Movement of all oppressed peoples.¹

Eventually when trade-unionism spread to cover all important industrial and commercial concerns, governments stopped burying their heads in the sand, ostrich-like and decided it was far better to co-opt them by buying over the leadership of the workers. This policy has paid rich dividends ever since. ..... The working-class leaders who now serve as paid servants of the bourgeoisie soon constitute themselves into a bureaucracy whose immediate interests are different from those of the workers. They become instruments for the maintenance of an exploitative system which subordinates labour to capital – wage slavery.²

The TLSA’s engagement with the reforms unfolding in education in the late 1990s was cut short by developments in the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC). Aware of the changes on the education and labour fronts, but not necessarily the intricacies of negotiations in the corridors of government, the League was caught off-guard when the larger teacher unions inside the ELRC, along with government, moved concertedly to change key policies, with the intention of broadening their influence amongst teachers generally. These developments were to seriously impact the teaching fraternity and only hit home for the League when it realised, too late however, that it also would be critically affected by these change of policies. Given the decisive nature of these reforms for teachers and the organised teacher fraternity, this chapter explores the repercussions of these changes for League teachers and the organisation internally at the time. It also endeavours to crystallise the effects the policies, and certainly the politics emanating from the ELRC and broader society, had on the League’s besieged but enduring policy of non-collaboration at the beginning of the new millennium.³

The nature of the relationship between teacher unions and the state altered markedly in the post-1994 period, relative to what it had been during the 1980s and early 1990s.

Accompanying the recognition of trade unions, as inscribed in the 1996 South African Constitution, was the right for workers to join trade unions, and therewith, unlike in the past, the right to collectively bargain and strike.\(^4\) A significant counterpoint, enshrined in the Labour Relations Act (LRA), was that while workers had the right to strike, management equally had recourse to lockout workers.\(^5\) This measure included a number of procedural and substantive limitations regarding strikes and lockouts,\(^6\) along with other policies. The LRA’s primary goal though was the reduction of strikes to overcome established employer/employee conflict,\(^7\) and so institute a long-term beneficial partnership between capital and labour.\(^8\) Legislated and instilled from the beginning of the new democracy, then, was a co-operative relationship between the state and organised labour based on a policy of co-determination.\(^9\) This policy stood in stark contrast to the more uncompromising anti-establishment ethos of the trade union movement of the pre-1994 era.


\(^7\) The LRA flowed from the constitution. It spelt out in detail the working framework for both unions and employers (see Khanya College, Summary of the Labour Relations Act, Johannesburg: Community Division, 1996, pp.1, 2, 11, 12, 13; Department of Labour, ‘The main principles of the LRA’, Know Your LRA, 1 May 1997).

\(^8\) Three institutions were created to facilitate the goals of reducing industrial relations conflict, eliminating unfair discrimination and redressing past discrimination in the workplace. These were, the National Economic and Development Labour Council (NEDLAC), the Labour Court, and the Council for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The CCMA allowed for conciliation, mediation, and arbitration in cases of labour dispute; it also certified any impasse in bargaining council negotiations before a union could undertake a legal strike. In the area of dispute resolutions, the CCMA settlement rate was a vast improvement on apartheid labour relations (see E. Milton, ‘Dispute Resolution in South Africa: History, Challenges and Successes’, in S. Parbhoo and N. Govender, D. Khosa, E. Milton, L. Moloi, S. Modise, T. Chaulk, CCMAil, Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration, Newsletter (Internet), April-June 2004, pp.16-18). Other labour policies were also promulgated in this period. These included the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, implemented in December 1998, which established a 45-hour workweek as well as minimum standards for overtime pay, annual leave, and notice of termination; and the Employment Equity Act that prohibited unfair employment practice and required employers to prepare affirmative action plans to ensure that black African, women, and disabled persons were adequately represented on the workforce.

\(^9\) Through co-determination, also referred to as a ‘social contract’, unions were to have a joint say over economic policy at national, sectoral and company level.
The effect of the contractual arrangement between capital and labour was tangible, with the drop in strike action in the late 1990s testifying to the efficacy of the co-determinist policies, what left-wing activists and analysts referred to as ‘strategic unionism’.\textsuperscript{10} Within COSATU, these leftists took umbrage at this compromised arrangement, for they saw it as an about turn by the federation, given its declared socialist agenda. For them, COSATU’s actions were indicative of support for the politics of co-determination, and hence the belief that economic growth was the answer to the social needs of the masses,\textsuperscript{11} not policies on employment and poverty eradication.\textsuperscript{12} Catchpowle and Cooper termed the GNU’s accommodationist strategy, a model employed earlier in western developing countries, ‘neoliberal corporatism’.\textsuperscript{13} For them, this strategy had at its core the voluntary subordination of class interests to national interests, which in practice meant the acceptance of neoliberal free market policies by the trade union leadership,\textsuperscript{14} or as Williamson phrased it, ‘promoting working-class interests within the framework of capitalism’.\textsuperscript{15} This leadership, Catchpowle and Cooper claimed, had conspired with government to restrain union radicalism and quell class conflict.\textsuperscript{16} What became increasingly evident, was that class collaboration dominated the strategy and tactics of the trade union and workers’ movement.\textsuperscript{17} Alexander, a prominent left voice and previous Unity Movement cadre, contended that there was no middle road for the workers’ movement in South Africa’s transition, and that the imperative, what may be termed a non-collaborationist approach, was to ‘hold to the simple rule of the road: Keep left!’\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Catchpowle and Cooper.
\textsuperscript{17} N. Alexander, ‘Lest we forget our fallen values’, \textit{South African Labour Bulletin}, Vol.19, No.5, November 1995, p.78; see also Catchpowle and Cooper.
\textsuperscript{18} Alexander, p.78.
Within this milieu of shifting class allegiances, teacher unions were almost inevitably caught up and complicit. SADTU’s collaboration with the new ANC government was a point in case, and has been traced in Chapter 3 from when it formed an intimate part of the tri-partite alliance as an affiliate of COSATU. Unwavering loyal, the teacher union supported the ANC in the 1994 and 1999 national elections: a development that goes a long way to explaining the ANC’s landslide victory in 1999, and the rationale behind the new placatory labour relations. Teacher unions consolidated this relationship through having representation on joint policy-making forums with government and business. This they achieved through principally the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC), the South African Council for Educators (SACE) and the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC). They also had two representatives in the Department of Education (DoE) to ensure the collaboration and the sharing of ideas, specifically with regard to the curriculum and its implementation, occurred.

This union-state collaboration, according to Govender, Catchpowle and Cooper, proved beneficial to the union leadership in South Africa, with many of them opting for leading positions in government. Indeed, prominent unionists in COSATU after 1994, notables such as the National Union of Mineworkers’ (NUM)’s Cyril Ramaphosa, COSATU’s Sam Shilowa and significantly SADTU’s presidents Shepherd Mdladlana and Willie Madisha, amongst others, became distinguished figures within the ANC. The former NUM chairperson, to underscore the point, swung over to take a position on the main board of the Anglo American Corporation, thus breaking completely with the workers’ movement. Even lower down, on the more hard-nosed public sector negotiations front between the unions and government, the latter was able to co-opt from the union’s ranks, key negotiators to fight their battles. The Sunday Times of 4 February 2001, for instance, carried a bold heading ‘Team that tamed the unions’, where it reported on how the Public Service and Administration Director- General, with the help of recruits from the private-sector and

19 See also Chapters 3 and the Interface.
20 The ELRC had as its aim to establish a more harmonious state-union relationship, in an attempt to nullify the disruption to schooling and hence the process of teaching and learning.
21 Govender, p.267; see also Chapter 4.
22 Govender, pp.267, 268; Catchpowle and Cooper, p.13.
trade unions, ‘strong-armed public sector unions into ... [a] deal that will finally allow
government to lay off excess civil servants’.24 The susceptibility of union negotiators, once
convinced of government’s rationale for retrenchments, to switch sides against the very
workers they represented, exemplified the shift in political outlook of many COSATU
unionists.

The tale of collusion between the state and teacher unions was not unique to South Africa
however, but an international phenomenon.25 Despite this wide-reaching precedent, the
TLSA was contemptuous of these liaisons, and viewed them as collaborationist. It
consequently stayed out of the ELRC and other government structures set up formally to
engage with teacher unions. The League however was paddling against the tide, as
nationally the conditions were of reconciliation, compromise and collaboration in keeping
with the ethos of nation building and unity - a mainstream current that was the antithesis of
refusal, conflict and non-collaboration. This transitional politics asked new questions of the
New Unity Movement (NUM) affiliate: questions that probed the relevance of non-
collaboration in the new dispensation, in particular, but also more generally, of those
organisations advocating it as a method of struggle.

Considering the changed political landscape, and the shifting politics of unionism, non-
collaboration appeared more than ever to be in direct opposition to trade unionism.26 While
critics of the Unity Movement have highlighted this conflict, the Movement’s official
policy was not anti-trade union, as the earlier part of this study and the opening statements
to this chapter, referencing Gool27 and Tabata,28 have sought to illustrate.29 However, it is
true to say that the trade union question posed a conundrum for the Unity Movement,
embodying as it did a two-edged sword, with benefits and pitfalls for workers. This was
implicit in Gool30 and Tabata’s31 contributions on this vexing question. Both evoked two

25 Govender, pp.267, 268.
27 Gool, p.6.
28 Tabata, ‘Recognition and Registration of Trade Unions – is it yes or no?’, p.65.
29 See the Anti-CAD resolution on Trade Unions in The Educational Journal, March 1954, p.10; also Chapter
2, pp.107-109.
30 Gool.
key issues when engaging trade unionism: the fusing of the political and economic struggles, and the centrality of the union leadership in ensuring workers’ organisations remained independent of ruling class influence, by them holding unwavering allegiance to the workers they represented. These issues were inter-related and central to the union question and the issue of non-collaboration for the Unity Movement, and thus the TLSA.  

Although teacher unionisation was a thorny issue for TLSA members, the organisation was not opposed to it on principle. Rather, at issue, was the quality of the union leadership, and their political and ideological agenda, given their predilection, the League claimed, to place party politics above the interest of the child. This tension, particularly around the question of leadership and their political affiliations, was to prove decisive for the TLSA when it found itself confronted by the trade union question once again, fifty-three years after it had also sought affiliation to the union movement. The historical context of the post-apartheid 1990s, however, was vastly different to that of the pre-apartheid 1940s.

Unlike the 1940s, when the application of non-collaboration was arguably more clear-cut, the League at the end of the 1990s, found itself per force immersed in the trade union question, not voluntarily, but for reasons beyond its control: for reasons that in effect stemmed from the dire shortage of in-service teachers in its ranks. This development was critical for the organisation, for it threatened its continued existence. After all, the vectors of the organisation’s ideas, its teachers, were central to transmitting the Movement’s politics and educational philosophy, and in particular, its non-collaborationism. Examined hereafter, are the crucial challenges this constituency confronted at the beginning of the new millennium.

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31 Tabata, ‘Recognition and Registration of Trade Unions – is it yes or no?’
32 See Chapter 1, pp.38, 39.
33 See Chapter 3, pp.167-169.
34 See Chapter 3, p.167.
35 The Educational Journal, July 1946, pp.11, 12.
36 See Chapter 1, pp.41, 42.
Unionism imposed

Overcome by the politics of reform engulfing education and labour at the end of the twentieth century, the League found itself with little alternative but to reinvent itself. This transformation, inescapable as it was, took form when the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC) in 1998 passed a resolution that demanded teacher unions have a minimum membership of 20 000 to qualify for entry to the ELRC. For teacher unions that failed to make the grade, this meant amongst other prescriptions, that their members pay a monthly levy of 1% of their salaries. The League, at the time, had a membership of between 1000 to 1500 teachers, placing it a long way from meeting the required quota for the ELRC. This invidious position left its teachers liable to pay the extra rates. For small teacher organisations, such as the League, this development posed a serious threat to future recruitment, for the policy heightened the possibility of it not being able to attract members and it even losing members. The situation was bleak if not dire for the organisation, and its choices were few: it could either ‘close shop’ or merge with a representative teachers’ union and become part of the ELRC; or, alternatively, join a public sector union outside of the education sector and seek representation in the PSCBC. Simply put, the TLSA could either join a conservative federal teachers’ structure, such as the National Professional Teachers’ Organisation of South Africa (NAPTOSA) and maintain its identity; disband and have its teachers join SADTU; link up with a public sector union to retain its voice or educational philosophy if not identity as before, or retain its status as a small teachers’ organisation with a dwindling membership. Debate ensued within the organisation for a short period of time.

Well aware that the larger unions were attempting to draw non-unionised teachers to their ranks, and in so doing amplify their voice and influence in the teacher sector and the ELRC; the odds were stacked against the League. Opting for the least painful route, the

37 The one percent levy meant teachers paid a monthly rate of R60 as opposed to R2.00 to the ELRC.
38 Interview with I. Abrahams, 22 June 2005.
39 League members consequently had dual membership, as members of the TLSA and Health Workers’ Union.
41 The first meeting to discuss the options were held at Livingstone High, 13 July 1998 (see The Teachers’ League of South Africa, The TLSA And Membership of the ELRC, TLSA pamphlet, July 1998).
organisation requested that its members join the Health Workers’ Union (HWU), which had representation in the PSCBC, and so bypass the levy. The political independence of the HWU - its non-party political identity – was favourable for the organisation.\footnote{Teachers’ League of South Africa, \textit{To All TLSA Recruitment Members}, Circular to all TLSA members, 26 July 1998.} Nakidien put the issue plainly: “We opted for the Health Workers’ Union as opposed to NAPTOSA ... SADTU wasn’t even an option because of the political alignment. SADTU was politically-aligned, Health Workers’ was not, and we were not prepared to join a union that was politically aligned”.\footnote{Interview with T. Nakidien, 5 November 2008. Nakidien was the last treasurer of the TLSA and the NUPSAW Education Sector’s first treasurer. He held this position up to 2004.} Securing dual membership for TLSA members, it ought to be noted, was largely the work of Norman Maharaj, an executive member of the HWU and the NUM at the time.

The woes of the TLSA did not pass with the securing of dual membership however, and events took another turn when the HWU was compelled to align itself with nine independent unions in the public sector under the independent and unitary structured National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (NUPSAW).\footnote{Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Increase In Monthly Membership Fee To R15,00’, Letter to TLSA members, 28 May 1999. NUPSAW came to constitute sectors from the health and the legal professions.} This unexpected development arose when the PSCBC also upped its threshold to 20 000.\footnote{See Teachers’ League of South Africa, \textit{Overview Of Conference 1999} (30-31 March), TLSA Executive Report, April 1999; Interview with E. Mfingwana, 10 February 2009.} Given this shift in alignments, the League had no choice but to follow suit and join the new union structure.\footnote{Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Circular To Members’, 17 October 1999; Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Increase In Monthly Membership Fee To R15,00’.} A necessary prerequisite for this merger though was that the League had to disaffiliate from the NUM, owing to NUPSAW’s political independence.\footnote{Teachers’ League of South Africa, \textit{Overview Of Conference 1999} (30-31 March); Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Circular To Members’, 17 October 1999; Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Increase In Monthly Membership Fee To R15,00’.} This was a difficult decision for many League members to accept. They had little choice, however. Liebenberg put it succinctly: “it was the only road we could follow, otherwise the League would have gone out of existence completely, because we didn’t have the membership numbers to be accepted and registered as a teacher union”.\footnote{Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Minutes of Executive Meeting’, 28 June 1998.} While the organisation had to
make significant compromises, NUPSAW viewed this addition to their structure in a positive light:

They did see potential, they did see there was something about us ... and they also wanted to bolster their numbers. The fact that we were in education was a bonus for them, in terms of the intellectual capital. They could see that there could be a positive spin-off ... that is why the old guard were accommodated. Strictly speaking the old guard [as retired teachers] shouldn’t have been anywhere close ... what I can say is that they had a great respect for the education people.49

Retaining the retired League teachers and their services through granting them honorary membership, came with its own dynamic, for it meant the old guard was able to preserve their influence in the newly-formed Education Sector structure, particularly in the early years. That the older members were favourably disposed to the turn of events was not surprising, and Steenveld confidently declared at the TLSA-NUPSAW: Education Sector Conference of 28 March 2000,50 that the vision and philosophy of the organisation was more important than the name, and that members should strive to ensure it became a reality in the public service sector.51 There were however differences in the organisation regarding the merger. In contrast to Steenveld’s strident declaration, one of the younger members, unsettled by the way the merger came about, particularly the forcefulness of the old guard in their push for amalgamation, questioned why the issue was debated in branches and not bigger all-members meetings, ‘where people [would know] what other people have to say’. She also felt the process was a ‘very, very rushed thing’.52 But what aggrieved her particularly, was the comment Steenveld made from the floor on the first day of the conference:

The things that were said at the last conference ... Things like, the League was always ‘an armchair organisation’, things like that. Now why, I asked somebody during lunch, one of the older members, why didn’t you tell me that ten years ago, then I could have left then? ... But you’ve let me fight that, especially that accusation, that was something that we were accused of many times. And we vehemently fought against it, opposed it,

49 Interview with T. Nakidien, 5 November 2008.
50 The TLSA-NUPSAW: Education Sector conference was held at the Peninsula Technikon in Bellville Cape Town, 28-30 March 2000.
52 Interview with Respondent B, 23 July 2000. The author is aware of at least two meetings where the issue of a merger arose. One was at Livingstone High, 13 July 1998 and the other at St Matthews Church, Harfield, Claremont, 1998 (see The Teachers’ League of South Africa, The TLSA And Membership Of The ELRC, TLSA pamphlet, July 1998).
showed that it’s not true, and here a very member of the League can say it. I don’t think that’s fair. Convince me, I mean they’ve convinced me to join the League; ... 53

At the heart of her argument, it seemed, was not personal or ideological differences but discontent about the lack of communication from the organisation’s leadership:

So, I don’t think it would have been such a problem to say honestly “look this is how we read the situation, our backs are against the wall, it doesn’t mean that we are selling-out”. ... And, I’m sure that they’re doing these things honestly. ... But I think they’re also desperate before they die, probably because of all the work they’ve put in, that they would want the organisation to move forward and stay relevant. And I think some of us are to blame, when they begged us to take up positions we didn’t want to, because they were so competent. 54

It is perplexing as to why this member would have been out of touch with developments on the merger considering that it occupied a major part of the agenda at the TLSA Conference of 1999. 55 In fact, pamphlets had been circulated to members regarding these developments. 56 What was evident, however, was that a segment of the League’s membership was not favourably disposed to the merger. 57 The member cited, therefore, in all probability, reflected the opinions of others similarly-minded in the organisation at the time. As events unfolded however, and the merger became a fait accompli, members had no alternative but to accept the NUPSAW route.

The retention of the TLSA’s longstanding identity and vision within the Education Sector of NUPSAW would become the next important frontier. Key for League members was the preservation of the organisation’s philosophy, 58 and expanding its membership and influence in the rapidly changing political and educational landscape. Jakoet, the first chairperson of the Education Sector explained:

... we needed to get through to young teachers. We needed to be able to be around to offer a platform for debate and discussion and for sharing ideas ... at the time, the major concern was that those lines needed to be open. ... the officials of the old League, most, in fact all of them, were retired. And, I mean ... they wouldn’t be around forever. So, you needed to have some kind of, if not a nursery, somebody else to carry on the struggle, if

54 Ibid.
55 See Teachers’ League of South Africa, Overview Of Conference 1999 (30-31 March).
56 The author has examples of these pamphlets/letters in his possession.
57 Interview with R. Jakoet, 7 March 2009. The author was present at a few of the discussions on a merger.
you will, at that level. And that was why it was felt that it was rather urgent that you
didn’t lose that ... continuity.\footnote{Interview with R. Jakoet, 7 March 2009.}

Abrahams, one of the leading organisers, and a critical part of the old guard, was forthright
on the importance of continuity for the former TLSA:

> if things have changed outside of the organisation, then the organisation must change its
> thinking and its ideas in order to acquaint itself, not accommodate, but to show an
> awareness. Otherwise, you are not going to influence people and the reason why you are
> in politics is in order to influence people and to give people direction.\footnote{Interview with I. Abrahams, 23 January 2006.}

Considering these challenges and concerns, the merger nonetheless proved fortuitous, as
one of the key benefits to joining the union was that it “gave the League the opportunity to
participate in an organisation [NUPSAW] which had a large number of teachers who had
joined individually rather than through any organisation ... [thereby creating] potentially an
area of recruitment”.\footnote{Interview with T. Hanmer, 12 August 2005.} In fact, NUPSAW had three full-time paid recruitment officers with
whom the former TLSA could liaise to augment its work in that critical area.\footnote{Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Minutes of Executive Meeting’, 9 December 1999.}
Moreover, \textit{The Educational Journal}, one of the key recruiting devices of the organisation, stood not
only to gain from a wider readership,\footnote{Teachers’ League of South Africa, \textit{Overview Of Conference 1999} (30-31 March).} but to benefit from NUPSAW funding.\footnote{The TLSA’s Executive requested national funding for the organisation’s journal (see Teachers’ League of South Africa, ‘Minutes of Executive Meeting’, 9 December 1999). This request was acceded to by NUPSAW (Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009).}
The League certainly could not but see the potential for growth in the new union.

\textbf{Non-collaboration and the politics of National Union Public Service and Allied
Workers (NUPSAW)}

A strategic advance for the members of the TLSA, especially for those who were
favourably disposed to the merger, was the preservation of non-collaboration: Hanmer
expounded:

> NUPSAW is an independent union and it is not affiliated, in the obvious, to COSATU,
> which is directly linked to the ANC, and to that extent, it stands outside and is able to be
> critical of the actions, policies, positions held by other unions and by the ANC, because
> of its independence. To that degree, it is an organisation with a policy of non-
> collaboration with the ruling party, the ruling party within the government... \footnote{Interview with T. Hanmer, 12 August 2005.}
Another member likewise stated: “NUPSAW is a workers’ union. And they distance themselves completely from ... COSATU and the objectives of COSATU, like the teachers [SADTU] in them ... so I would say the spirit [of non-collaboration] is still there”. These views reflected the positive attitude of certain League members to their amalgamation with NUPSAW. However, to what degree were they correct on the pivotal issue of preserving non-collaboration? Abrahams was dubious. He contended that NUPSAW’s political independence had attendant liabilities:

NUPSAW is a sort of independent trade union, you can belong to any political organisation ... [but] they would resist the ANC in the same way they would resist the Unity Movement. So, if you came there with a Unity Movement, with what they could identify as a Unity Movement ideology or a Unity Movement, say, practice, like the question of non-collaboration ... there would be opposition to it.

It was however not only on the question of non-collaboration that the League encountered problems, but on broader political issues too. NUPSAW, for instance, did not organise its conferences as the TLSA had, since ‘their conference was purely reports back: treasurer’s report, the president’s statement etcetera’ with ‘monthly meetings [involving] purely discussion of trade union business’.

In fact, for Abrahams, ‘there wasn’t anything political inside of NUPSAW’, a concern he echoed at the Education Sector Executive meeting of 11 December 2003. Isaacs however felt differently, and contended that the pro-worker and anti-ANC attitude that prevailed in NUPSAW was indicative of the strength of the League’s politics in the union. Whether NUPSAW’s anti-establishment politics was a result of TLSA influence, was tenuous. Instead, NUPSAW’s politics had a source that to all intents and purposes was independent of the TLSA. For instance, the union’s founding principles were based on workers’ rights, political independence and anti-capitalism, while its leadership regularly espoused a socialist viewpoint. As Mfingwana, chairperson of the union noted:

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66 Interview with C. Liebenberg, 24 May 2005.
67 Interview with I. Abrahams, 23 January 2006.
68 Ibid.
70 Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009. Isaacs was the first secretary of the NUPSAW Education Sector, a position he still holds.
we are part of society, political decisions influence workers, worker issues; therefore, we would take up issues of a political nature ... not for failure of trying, but again you will not necessarily see us in papers [newspapers] and all that, not because of a fault of ours. ... We might create the impression we are not into politics and all that ... we are immune; we’re not saying that as NUPSAW ... people must understand that we are not neutral when it comes to politics.72

In fact, NUPSAW was said to be more militant than most other unions,73 and in 2000 and 2001, it refused to sign agreements with government on wages and conditions of service.74 On the question of the three-year salary increase offered by government to public sector workers in 2001, NUPSAW General Secretary, Success Mataitsane was adamant, and refused to accept government’s salary proposal.75 Not only that, he accused the two COSATU unions that signed the deal – the National Educational Health and Allied Workers’ Union (NEHAWU), and the Democratic Nurses’ Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA) - of conniving and ‘taking instructions from the government’.76 Whether this pointed to TLSA influence in NUPSAW is speculative, as the organisation (the TLSA) was not known for its militancy but rather ‘rational approach’ to struggle.77

That NUPSAW adopted a predominantly trade union ethic, which channelled workers’ struggles towards a strict trade union consciousness, by placing emphasis on ameliorating working conditions for workers, was also misleading. Instead, NUPSAW followed a route much the same as the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) had twenty years earlier,78 one which favoured a strong worker oriented shop-floor structure, where the accountability and the mandating of worker representatives set the basis for developing a

72 Interview with E. Mfingwana, 1 October 2009.
73 Ibid.; Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009.
77 R. Hartel (Interview with D. Kapp, R. Hartel and Z. Scholtz, 28 December 2008).
firm working class leadership. Consistent with this thinking, NUPSAW focused on issues directly related to the work place, notably, economic demands associated with concrete examples of class struggle. Through a process of sharpening differences between workers’ and employers’ interests, the union facilitated, what Kelly called, the development of a ‘class consciousness’ that had ‘anti-capitalist potential’. The prospect for a socialist outlook to develop, therefore, as Lenin would have it, appeared to exist. For him, it was at this juncture, when workers’ and employers’ interests clashed, that the former ‘came face to face with their main enemy – the capitalist class’, and it was in ‘combat with this enemy’, he further claimed, that the ‘worker becomes a socialist’.

NUPSAW, theoretically then, it could be argued, was radically oriented. Considering the union’s character, as defined above, the League’s politics readily found a home in it. However, whether the organisation’s non-collaboration was influential inside NUPSAW, was another matter. In fact, it is notable that on a national scale, the collective strength of the former TLSA existed predominantly in the Western Cape, a reality which set the groundwork for the formation of the Education Sector. With TLSA influence clearly concentrated in the Western Cape, the League’s voice, initially at least, would have been low-key inside the union structure. This was more so, given that only a very small remaining group of the TLSA were able to meet under the auspices of the NUPSAW Education Sector in the region, whilst teachers in the other nine regional branches nationwide met mainly inter-sectorally, where judiciary, health and educational issues were integrated. So, aside from a small coterie of ex-League teachers, and a handful of committed recruits, the League’s presence and influence in NUPSAW could be read as marginal, giving weight to Abrahams’ remark that the organisation was far too weak to be a

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82 Interview with I. Abrahams, 23 January 2006.

83 Interviews with E. Mfingwana, 10 February 2009 and B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009.
serious challenger inside the union. In addition to this weakened state, the TLSA also had to contend, as will be shown, with organisational and logistical challenges of its own.

**On becoming a union: merging the politics and economics of education**

The TLSA found itself in an ambivalent position once it merged into the new union. On the one hand, it could freely propagate its politics in and via the Education Sector, but on the other, within the general body, it had to consider members’ allegiances to a broad spectrum of political organisations. Under these conditions, the League’s political ideas and practices within the union had to be tempered, for it had to maintain a balance between solidarity with broader workers’ struggles in order to bridge the gap between sectoral interests, while retaining its political agenda and focus on education. On an organisational level, then, circumstances had changed significantly for TLSA members, as preference for the pursuit of inter-sectoral interests and hence worker unity became prioritised. The watchword, and central to these new union dynamics, to which the League had to orientate itself, was the NUPSAW motto – The Workers First! From this point onward, for the erstwhile NUM affiliate, the challenge in the union movement centred less on the proposition that social change was ‘primarily a matter of ideological struggle, of changing people’s ideas’, and more about involvement in worker – trade union – politics. As the Education Sector secretary stated:

> the TLSA could not [any longer] only look at what happens to the students, it actually also had to take into account its members and also issues such as salary and the service conditions of teachers. And I think, it then, also became aware that if you are going to compete with other unions, you are going to have a look at that ... because members are interested in that ...

The TLSA’s commitment to its newly-adopted union constituency was to be tested relatively soon, when in 2001 it faced its first teachers’ strike as the Education Sector.

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84 Interview with I. Abrahams, 23 January 2006.
87 Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009.
88 Ibid.
Reluctant in the past to embark on strike action, Education Sector members showed their union temperament at a watershed meeting at Spes Bona High in Athlone:

People like Ivan Abrahams, I can recall, agreed with the fact that we have to put in our bit, that we support the strike [and] that it had to do with decent salaries for teachers. But of course always concerned about the fact that it cannot be a strike that is going to last forever, that it is a short-term thing and once you’ve got the most out of it, you need to return to the classroom. And not say, ‘well we are going to stay out till of course we get the salary that we demand’ ... of course ... you [also] couldn’t have the situation where people say ‘oh you just talk a lot, you are not prepared to have salary deducted’.

For this member, strike action showed that the former League teachers were prepared to make a qualitative shift in support of economic demands. As Chapter 3 indicated, strike action was not an anathema to the TLSA. Rather, and because of its internationalist outlook, the League’s leadership would have been familiar with Luxemburg’s writings on trade union strikes, where she presented it as the bridge between the economic and political struggle, since: ‘Between the two there is the most complete reciprocal action’. That Luxemburg resonated with the Unity Movement, can be gauged by Gool and Hassim of the Anti-CAD, who also emphasised the inseparability of the political and economic struggles.

A de facto part of the workers’ movement, League members now found themselves immersed in labour policies and politics. Whether League politics could once again emerge, this time within NUPSAW, was a challenging prospect for TLSA members, for it required them to adapt and to exercise patience. This they ardently undertook in an endeavour to preserve the organisation’s identity, through retaining their structures and organisational practices. Examined hereafter is the League’s merger into NUPSAW and its implications, in particular, for the policy of non-collaboration.

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89 See Chapter 3.
90 Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009.
91 Ibid.
The continuities and discontinuities of the Teachers’ League of South Africa

The Annual Conference

A key part of the League’s history and tradition was its Annual Conference. This yearly event was to become the first significant casualty of the merger, owing to the remnants of the TLSA branches in the other parts of the country folding into the NUPSAW unitary structure. Beginning in 1913 with the TLSA inaugural conference, and continuing after 1943 when the organisation embarked on its ‘new road’, the TLSA gained political and educational vigour from the collective gathering of its leading intellectuals, apprentice intellectuals and spread of members nationally. ‘Conference’, as it was termed, imbued the organisation with a sense of numerical strength and a glimpse of the richness of ideas emanating from its ranks. Aside from the organisational gathering constituting the bar by which the body annually measured its intellectual capacity and prowess, it was also the place to demonstrate to new and prospective members its leading cadres’ political and educational aptitude.94 Conference was therefore a valuable induction into the culture and politics of the organisation for new and potential members, and allowed, importantly, members to gain a national picture of the organisation and a sense of the major issues confronting them in education. Crucially, it allowed individuals and branches to network and share ideas on politics, tactics and strategies, of what did and did not work. The loss of this vital limb of the organisation was a considerable setback for exponents of the League. In its wake, regional meetings of the Western Cape branches, with the Eastern Cape branch, were organised at the end of each term; it was all the Education Sector could muster under the circumstances. Positive developments were to appear relatively soon on the horizon however, and in 2003 NUPSAW acceded to proposals to revive the Annual Conference, which it was also prepared to fund.95 For the Education Sector, this was a positive sign, as it indicated its pre-eminent standing in NUPSAW, above all, it held out the prospect of greater autonomy in the future.

94 The open session of the TLSA conference allowed all interested persons to attend. The closed sessions were for members only and dealt with organisational matters, including decisions related to the political educational and business side of the organisation.

The Branches

As the branches in the Western Cape were the last vestiges of the former TLSA structures on the ground, the old guard rallied to their defence and seized control of these structures. The intent, undoubtedly, was to ensure their continuation within NUPSAW. This they sought to achieve through establishing NUPSAW sites at schools, facilitating the election of school representatives as shop-floor stewards, and by making other necessary organisational changes. In this way they strategically retained the former TLSA branch and executive meetings, the latter constituting representatives from the various branches. The following extract from the TLSA Executive meeting of December 1999, suggests that its leadership anticipated the eventuality of the merger and the subsequent turn of events, and were thus prepared for it:

The President posed the question: What does the Executive Committee of the TLSA become? What functions do the officials fulfil? The GS [General Secretary] said that at the meeting on 20th November it was decided that the schools would be regarded as sites, which would be grouped together as branches. The branches would report to the General Council of NUPSAW. Members of the Executive agreed that the General Council would have to be streamlined. Branch representatives should come together as a co-ordinating committee which would be the equivalent of the present Executive. The co-ordinating committee would send representatives to the General Council.96

Aware, clearly, of the future changes and the accompanying uncertainties, the League entrusted its teachers in the seven branches with the responsibilities of sustaining and advancing the ethos of the organisation, and thereby, in particular, that of non-collaboration. A large part of this mission involved logistics, especially the task of co-ordinating members at sites in their respective geographical areas, with the branches’ principal function to continue their monthly meetings with representatives from the surrounding schools.97 To accommodate its new members, the former League branches made strategic adaptations and decided to hold their meetings at schools in the afternoons soon after they dismissed. For example, the Athlone branch moved from Thornton Road Primary, where it met once a month on a Monday evening, to Alexander Sinton High, and the Grassy Park branch, which met at Grassy Park High, relocated their meetings to South Peninsula High, before finally moving to Battswood Arts Centre in Grassy Park.

97 See for example: Letter to members of the Grassy Park branch of the NUPSAW: Education Sector, 9 May 2000.
It must be added, and this is significant, that the Education Sector did not alter the League’s traditional structure. In other words, new areas or potential nodules of growth were not cultivated by the Sector. While there may have been a range of reasons for this decision, the key ones are noteworthy. Firstly, it suggested a lack of confidence by new members in their abilities to establish branches, and secondly, it indicated the reluctance of the old guard to break from the traditions of the past and relinquish partial control of the Sector, and in that way open it to expansive possibilities. Alternatively, it signalled a lack of capacity, of resources, to grow the Sector, notwithstanding the stated will to do so. All three factors, others not excluded, may have prevailed at the time.

As League members did not significantly change their branch structures, they sought to prosecute their political and pedagogical philosophy, as in the past, by organising along established lines. In this sense, they upheld Hobsbawm’s dictum that ‘the past is essentially the pattern for the present’.\(^98\) This was affirmed when the old guard who were at the helm directing matters, ensconced in their traditional role, prioritised the politics of the curriculum and schooling, much if not all of which was critical of government policies. This they undertook largely, ironically, to the neglect of union matters, which was the basis for many of its newer members having joined NUPSAW. A member recollected:

> They did misjudge the situation where you have to look at the working conditions of teachers if you want members to join you. ... maybe the old guard had the attitude “listen here man, the service conditions of teachers - that’s not important at this stage. What is of paramount importance is that resources be put into the schools for the education of the children. And if that happened, then the next step is that the service conditions of teachers will be improved”.\(^99\)

For Brian Isaacs, the old guard had failed to realise that its concern with the political and educational development of children, went hand-in-hand with improving teachers’ working conditions. He explained:

> you can’t have a situation at the school where a teacher union starts talking about salaries and here you sit in NUPSAW meetings and say ‘no that is not our concern, our concern is about the students’. They are going to say ‘no but I don’t want to belong to an organisation like that because working conditions of teachers are important ...’\(^100\)

\(^99\) Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009.  
\(^100\) Ibid.
Nakidien, too, identified the changed consciousness of the teachers as key: “If their salary wasn’t affected, if their time, their free time, then it [meetings] didn’t matter. If you look at the strikes, what were they striking about?”

Certainly, teachers’ working conditions and their remuneration had become central areas of concern and contestation: concerns which League members did not prioritise. In this respect, they did not heed what Erntzen noted many years earlier when speaking to teachers intent on forming a union, notably, that there were obvious daily issues worker formations were obligated to undertake on behalf of their members. These for him, while mindful of the long-term political and economic solution, encompassed fighting for short-term or daily demands of members, such as ‘conditions of service; salaries; benefits and other day-to-day matters’. These issues seemed sidelines by a part of the old guard, as they determinedly continued to fulfil their traditional roles in the Sector’s branches. They subsequently, at times, locked horns with the new in-service teachers who sought change. William Leith for instance recalled:

> in some sense, some of them would want to adopt this Unity Movement approach. They want to intimidate you, want to manipulate you, because they have this body behind them. ... Well I fell-out with the old fuddy-duddies ... They [the other members] were intimidated by the old fuddy duddies ... I don’t go there to be a trouble-maker, but if there is an issue to be raised then you raise it, don’t sit quietly and be intimidated by these people.

This member eventually stayed away from meetings because he started feeling increasingly uncomfortable. He represented the attitude of many teachers who were not wanting to join SADTU, and who were in search of a politically independent union.

On the other hand, what appeared far more common, was that many teachers who joined NUPSAW, did so to avoid the one percent levy. Most of them, it would appear, were not interested in the Education Sector’s monthly meetings. By way of example, although many teachers on the Alexander Sinton High school staff were of NUPSAW, a large percentage of them did not attend union meetings despite these meetings being held at the school. This was illustrative of many other branches too.

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103 Ibid., p.308.
105 Interview with T. Nakidien, 5 November 2008.
Education Sector is instructive in this regard, noting the problem to be the failure to elect site-stewards at branch level, eventuating in the non-participation of sites in the workings of the organisation.\(^{106}\) It appeared as if site-stewards responsibilities were largely usurped by the retired teachers, who seized this role in the absence of in-service teacher representation. Rugaya Jakoet explained why this happened:

> It was as a result of the school sites not taking off as they should have. And that whoever was there, whoever the people were to establish a strong enough site there, that kind of spade work and whatever was required wasn’t done. At most it was left to one or two people on the staff who were interested and who would end up battling ... \(^{107}\)

Recounting her frustrations at the school where she taught, she explained:

> I’ve tried to call meetings at my own school ... The other NUPSAW members at our school - you couldn’t get them to attend a meeting. The general teacher apathy [prevailed] ... teachers are politically apathetic creatures; when there’s an issue they all get psyched-up and they rally around, when there are kind-of peaceful times you won’t get them really. ... So, there I was on my own, so to speak, I would just continue to attend whatever meeting there was ... \(^{108}\)

Given these events, it became evident that although the Education Sector had increased its membership, and that the potential for further growth was obvious, it had not translated into an increase in committed members, those willing to build the Education Sector and advance the ideas of the TLSA. This was a dilemma for the fledgling Education Sector, as teachers seemed more concerned with ‘perks’, ‘discounts’ and ‘insurance policies’ and such benefits.\(^{109}\) Noting these grievances, League members who were aware of and sympathetic to the expectations of teachers in the Sector, attempted to intervene and make recommendations.\(^{110}\) This, however, appeared to have little or no effect, and a glance at the minutes of the Sector of July 2002, two years after its launch, reveals an acute despondency amongst officials from most of the branches, with reports of declining attendance and


\(^{107}\) Interview with R. Jakoet, 7 March 2009.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.

\(^{109}\) Letter written to the NUPSAW: Education Sector on the possible resignation of a member from Summit Primary, 28 August 2001. The letter, written by an Education Sector representative, conveyed the concerns of a Summit Primary teacher, and was indicative of members’ expectations at the time. It highlighted, notably, “too little ‘activity’ by NUPSAW” regarding ‘agitation for better service conditions and salary increases’; ‘the absence of organisational input’ or showing interest in its members through, by example, ‘visits by officials, lectures, talks etcetera’ (N. Jeftha, ‘Letter to the general secretary of NUPSAW Education Sector’, 28 August 2001).

considerable difficulties in persuading in-service teachers to attend meetings regularly. \footnote{111} Recognising these problems, the Athlone branch proposed regional meetings once a school term, in a bid to consolidate branches and sites. \footnote{112} By 2003, this proposal became a reality in the Education Sector.

Time was running out for the Sector however, and many of its members had begun to move across to rival unions that appeared more visible in the schools and more able to offer services and other benefits to teachers. The National Union of Educators (NUE), \footnote{113} an affiliate of NAPTOSA, was one such organisation. Alert to this migration of membership, the Education Sector singled out the superior resource base of the rival unions, particularly the group benefit schemes they offered members, as the prime reason for this movement by its members. \footnote{114} In this regard, they were correct, since the NUPSAW Education Sector could not near match the established unions such as the NUE or SADTU in the realm of resources and financial clout. Considering members’ contributions comprised the main source of union funding, \footnote{115} SADTU’s membership of 200 000, a growth achieved mainly between 1996 and 1999, \footnote{116} for instance, outstripped NUPSAW by far with its combined membership of 60 000 in 1999. \footnote{117} A spin-off of this disparity, was that the Education Sector’s organisers received far less pay than other unions, \footnote{118} and it struggled to employ additional administrative staff to service teachers. To add to this predicament, the Sector had no education office through which it could liaise with members, and it was obligated, in a period when the allegiance of teachers was being aggressively sought, to look to the regional NUPSAW office to communicate essential information to members and so adequately service them. \footnote{119} This service, however, according to the Education Sector, was

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\footnote{111} NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector Executive meeting’, South Peninsula High School, 1 July 2002.
\footnote{112} Ibid.
\footnote{113} NUE, an influential affiliate of NAPTOSA, was formed in 1997. Its formation was the culmination of a merger process that started in 1995, encompassing the former ‘white’ Transvaal Teachers’ Association (TTA), South African Teachers Association and ‘coloured’ Transvaal Association of Teachers (TAT). It brought together teachers from the Gauteng, Eastern and Western Cape (Govender, p.273).
\footnote{114} NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector meeting’, South Peninsula High, 31 March 2003.
\footnote{115} Ibid., p.275.
\footnote{116} Govender, p.274.
\footnote{117} NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector Executive meeting’, 30 September 2002.
\footnote{119} NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector Executive meeting’, South Peninsula High,
far from satisfactory, and in a bid to stop the exodus of teachers from the union, the retired members volunteered to assist in the office.¹²⁰

Apart from the former League’s inadequate resource base, it was further handicapped by not having representation in the ELRC owing to its relatively small membership and its non-collaborationism. The Education Sector consequently found itself subject to labour legislation curtailing teacher organisations not represented in the negotiation chamber, and was unable to represent its members fully at selection meetings of applicants for teaching posts. Livingstone High, for example, had to redo its nominations of candidates for certain posts when the CTPA representative objected to the presence of NUPSAW at the school’s selection meetings.¹²¹ More damaging, was the exiting of a large number of Douglas Road primary school’s teachers who left NUPSAW because they were not represented at selection meetings of candidates for promotion posts.¹²² While this was a setback for the Education Sector, it proceeded to challenge this ruling of the ELRC.¹²³ In essence, however, the Sector remained weak in relation to its rival unions, who because of their superior numerical size were able to entrench their influence in the policy-making arena and increasingly expand their services to members.¹²⁴ Conditions did not favour the former League, and though its history and politics of non-collaboration was a distinctive mark of its radicalism in the past, in the new period, where membership numbers, monetary income, fixed resources and paid personnel were critical, it proved their undoing.

Clearly, a formidable and recognisable trade union consciousness, where economic demands were a priority, directed educators. This was a new era for teachers, and they were caught in a post-apartheid euphoria which Farred titled “the hegemony of

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¹²³ NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector Executive meeting’, South Peninsula High School, 31 March 2003; Interview with R. Jakoet, 7 March 2009.
'reconciliation', one which had largely demobilised or ‘immobilized’ activists. The ethos of the time was not lost on the leadership core of the Education Sector:

I think members felt victory had been won; they had secured their victory and things would improve dramatically for them. They could now concentrate on their teaching and it wasn’t necessary to attend these meetings. ... I think there was this feeling that “yes, we need to belong to a teachers’ union so that they can negotiate on our behalf, but it’s not necessary for us to be actively involved”. And I think it didn’t only happen in teachers’ organisations it happened in all other organisations with this kind of belief that you had achieved your freedom and that the government was now going to look after people ...

This observation was not extraordinary, and according to McKinley, even former militants in the tripartite alliance had demobilised because they had lost track of what their strategic objectives were. The new period, as it were, had effectively interrupted and short circuited the expected follow-through or the next step in the struggle for many politically conscious people - the move from a ‘national consciousness’ to a ‘political and social consciousness’. It appeared as if the achievement of political independence and the arrival of the new South African democracy no longer required activists to agitate for further change, least of all radical transformation, which remnants of leftist organisations such as the TLSA were still propounding.

For the Education Sector, this changing terrain and shifting consciousness, contributed significantly to younger in-service teachers shying-away from attending meetings. In consequence, a significant portion of the Sector’s work fell to the former League old guard, who were unfamiliar with the trade union environment. Considering their age, this group of retired teachers were no longer capable of responding rapidly to the demands of union work, which they would have been far more able to a few years earlier. These same members, nonetheless, were still willing to loyally distribute The Educational Journal and keep the Legal Aid Bureau (LAB) operating. These two parts of the Sector are examined hereafter.

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127 Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009.
129 Fanon, p.163.
The Legal Aid Bureau

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the LAB’s record of accomplishments stretched back to the early 1950s. Over this period, it had developed into an effective combative legal unit, an identity that prevailed and continued into the new millennium. As Clive Lawrence, a leading member of the LAB and, later when the League became part of NUPSAW, the LRAB (Labour Relations Advice Bureau), stated:

Our reputation was so high [in the WCED]. ... you had comments like this ... and they would say straight-out: ‘CTPA the other teacher organisations, not one of them defends their teachers the way we are going to’. ... We defended every single one of the guys whose case we took on, even when they looked like they were absolutely lost causes. We won every one of them. We had such a standing there... 131

Undoubtedly, the legal arm of the Education Sector remained one of the key strengths carried forward from the League’s early days, and was virtually the only wing of the organisation that formally entered the DoE structures. The only exception was the PSCBC, where the union had a presence as a whole. 132 The LAB was the face of the Education Sector in the Department of Education, and LAB members not surprisingly, placed tremendous import on success in this arena - the veritable den of government. It became a combative space where LAB members tested their intellectual and legal abilities against government representatives on their home ground and within the ambit of their own laws. Moreover, the legal front was also an area the former League members felt they could rival, and outshine the other unions, notwithstanding the odds. The oppositional stance of the LAB, with its refusal to accept ‘plea-bargaining’ on behalf of its clients and thus accede to a compromised settlement with the Education Department, as other unions often did, 133 represented in no unclear terms non-collaboration in practice. 134 For LAB members, plea-

130 Members interviewed speak mostly of the LAB not LRAB. Minutes of meetings and pamphlets however refer to the LRAB, which took effect once the TLSA joined NUPSAW in keeping with union protocol. The LRAB members were: I. Abrahams (convenor), L. Adriaan, T. Hanmer, B. Isaacs, N. Jeftha, C. Lawrence, E. Steenveld, P. Volkwyn and C. Walker (see NUPSAW Education Sector, ‘Dispute and Alleged Misconduct Hearing Procedures: What Members Should Know’, Information pamphlet, 23 October 2002).

131 Interview with C. Lawrence, 22 February 2005. Isaacs and Nakidien corroborated this (Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009; and interview with T. Nakidien, 5 November 2008).

132 The major constituents in the PSCBC were: COSATU (46% of the vote), Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) (28,4%) and the Independent Unions where NUPSAW was dominant (24%) (NUPSAW Education Sector, ‘Report on NUPSAW Western Cape Regional Congress’, 29-30 July 2000).


134 Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009.
bargaining was beneficial to the employer, since the teacher concerned had to sign an admission of guilt to short cut the hearing, leaving the person concerned with a blemished professional record. The Education Sector consequently opposed plea-bargaining on principle.\textsuperscript{135} No doubt, the former League members left no stone unturned in their investigations, and went to great lengths to ensure their reputation and identity as uncompromising and hardened fighters, endured.

The LAB remained, however, largely unknown to the broader teacher fraternity, even to NUPSAW teachers themselves. The main reason for this was due to the fact that aside from internal meetings, where its work was discussed on occasion, the LAB’s activities were restricted to the Western Cape, and its successes were seldom advertised. This virtual anonymity was the LAB’s and indeed the Education Sector’s shortcoming. A member of the Sector noted:

They just felt you couldn’t on an ethical basis disclose what the whole process was all about. ... That they’d won important cases and they didn’t have to mention names of people. But I think they could have given the substance: “At a particular school this is what happened, this is how we fought it. On the basis of this, and that’s how we won”. So, people would then know, in my circumstance, I’ve got a similar situation, and I can now approach the LAB. I think, the LAB, they were trying to be very humble, and they didn’t want to sort of indicate the time that they spent on actually listening to teachers and getting advice from lawyers ...\textsuperscript{136}

The LAB’s achievements, as a result, were hardly known to new recruits, and its work went largely unseen.

\textit{The Educational Journal}

Despite altered circumstances, \textit{The Educational Journal} changed only marginally in design and content. While a new dimension to its repertoire was its articles on teacher unionism, noticeable too was that its language had become less polemical and abstruse. More obvious was the change to the cover of the publication though, which identified it as the official organ of the NUPSAW Education Sector. The philosophy and vision of the League, encapsulated in its motto ‘Let Us Live for Our Children’, with the symbolic image of the

\textsuperscript{135} NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector Executive meeting’, South Peninsula High School, 30 September 2002. SADTU, according to the Education Sector, regularly plea-bargained, since the union formed part of the Department of Education’s (DoE) machinery (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{136} Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009.
‘Lamp of Knowledge’, remained inscribed on the cover of the journal. A great deal of effort went into ensuring that continuity prevailed when it came to *The Educational Journal*, and it continued to perform the interlocutory role between the Education Sector and the public. Indeed, of all the symbols of the TLSA, the Sector’s leadership stressed the preservation of its journal. For them, it was an essential and significant feature, which symbolised the continuity of struggle, since for them, as Benjamin insisted, ‘the enemy has not ceased to be victorious’; and rather than compromise politically on its journal, the proponents of the TLSA held firmly to the maxim of *aluta continua*. With this resolve, League members argued inside NUPSAW that *The Educational Journal* had two important plusses and was hence still viable: one, it was not restricted to teachers, and two, the income derived from its members’ subscriptions could readily finance the publication. The argument carried weight, for NUPSAW not only assented to the publication continuing, it opted to fund the journal as well, therewith broadening its readership and influence in the new structure. An important part of this arrangement included keeping on board the journal’s editor, Helen Kies. Around her remained a small circle of core writers who had strong links with the TLSA and the NUM. This collective, with its legacy rooted in the 1940s and even earlier, and whose discourse had become more homogenised after the 1960s, sustained the TLSA and NUM ideology in the writings of the Education Sector.

With the old guard maintaining their grip on *The Educational Journal*, only minor alterations were made to the publication. This had specific repercussions for the Education Sector, affecting the content and accessibility of the journal. Foremost, was that the Sector missed out on the possibilities of engaging teachers outside of its traditional fold, specifically teachers from different social backgrounds in other parts of the country. What seemed to be overlooked, was the fact that the new context had brought with it altered

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141 This is not to say that invitations were not extended to member to contribute articles to the journal (Interview with R. Jakoet, 7 March 2009).
sectoral interests and thus a new and growing readership; one that was far wider and diverse than before, and, importantly, not necessarily mother-tongue English speakers, either. While historically the TLSA’s journal focused predominantly on ‘educational issues and was written by experienced educators’ who emanated from ‘a distinct intellectual tradition’, \(^{142}\) by the turn of the millennium its writing team’s language, although far simpler, did not accommodate sufficiently enough all teachers. In fact, comments that it was not teacher-friendly and ‘too philosophical and abstract for many members’ continued. \(^{143}\) In addition, its format remained textually dense and devoid of images, and, interestingly, even its Rosmead Supermarket advertisement held forth and withstood the test of time.

The continuity of *The Educational Journal*’s politics were most evident in its content. Thus, in a new era where teachers were confronting a revised curriculum and seeking guidance to understanding it, and where issues of methodology and classroom discipline were current and of serious concern, particularly in working class schools, the Sector’s journal held largely to its tried and tested conventions. For example, besides *The Educational Journal*’s comprehensive coverage of the Chisholm Review Committee’s overview of Curriculum 2005 where specific revisions to C2005 were proposed, \(^{144}\) issues which pertained to the new curriculum (mentioned earlier) were for the most part disregarded. This neglect was more by default than design, Jakoet intimated. She claimed that it was not for lack of trying that a more hands-on and didactic contribution failed to materialise. She elaborated: ‘Readers are invited to make comments and also to submit material for publication ... we invite people to write or give comments or to submit [an article], we do, but it doesn’t come in’. \(^{145}\) The upshot of this state of affairs was that the publication’s emphasis remained focused on critique and ideological countervailing.

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\(^{144}\) Kadar Asmal, the Minister of Education, established the Review Committee under the convener-ship of Professor Linda Chisholm on 8 February 2000. The Committee undertook the substantive review of the new curriculum and its implementation. The report was covered comprehensively by the NUPSAW Education Sector journal (*The Educational Journal*, September-October 2000, pp.3-5 and *The Educational Journal*, November-December 2000, pp.3, 4, 13).

\(^{145}\) Interview with R. Jakoet, 7 March 2009.
interspersed with news on NUPSAW activities, in particular the vicissitudes of negotiations in the PSCBC. Reports on workers’ struggles, were also linked continually to untrustworthy union leaders, and the travesties of capitalism and imperialism, with articles on political economy, history and non-racism continuing to feature prominently. The journal, moreover, continued to lay the failure of delivery in education and other parts of the public sector at the door of budgetary constraints, connecting it constantly to the government’s Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, and its emphasis on expediting economic growth in accordance with the World Bank (WB), IMF and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These institutions, it maintained, were responsible for South Africa’s economic woes, as they curtailed welfare spending and approved of austerity measures and privatisation, specifically the massive export of capital from the country.

It was precisely the export of capital, the journal argued, which stifled the country’s economy and distorted its budgetary allocations. Thus, while the budget for education was the largest area of public expenditure, placing South Africa at the top end of international spenders on education, The Educational Journal contended that this was not necessarily so, and that the education budget was actually insufficient given the GNP’s size in relation to the population. In step with educationists who saw an inadequate and reduced budget to be the foremost cause of the increasing malaise in education, the Sector’s journal declared the national budget figures for education ‘misleading in the extreme’. On neo-colonialism and non-racism respectively, The Educational Journal

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147 The Educational Journal, April-May 2000, p.4.
150 Ibid., pp.1, 2.
151 Seeking, p.302.
carried a lengthy series on ‘Europe’s Intrusion into Africa’,\textsuperscript{155} and regular articles under the headings ‘A Non-Racial South Africa’, the ‘Concept of One Human Race’ and ‘Racialism in South Africa’s Education System’.\textsuperscript{156} These texts affirmed the League’s unrelenting anti-establishment and non-collaboration tradition. The down-side of this ideological broad-side though, was that it did not concurrently present clear concrete possibilities or directives for teachers in the classroom; an approach it had last undertaken in the 1950s, when a wider collective contributed to the organisation’s journal.\textsuperscript{157}

Where \textit{The Educational Journal} did cover developments in schooling, however, it was mostly around the politics of the new curriculum and related policies, such as the Revised National Curriculum Statements (RNCS)\textsuperscript{158} and the introduction of the Further Education and Training (FET) phase of schooling.\textsuperscript{159} Sceptical about the postponed implementation date of the RNCS for FET,\textsuperscript{160} the ‘showpiece’ of OBE, the education Sector branded the delay, which was officially announced at the Baxter theatre, ‘A Production Without a Script or Cast?’ It declared further and indignantly that the FET was an ‘artificial and essentially cynical operation’.\textsuperscript{161} Employing a rhetorical language, the Sector called for parents, teachers and students to mobilise, via their School Governing Bodies (SGBs), against the government’s implementation of FET. This reform, it said, was financially weakening schools and debasing education,\textsuperscript{162} because in reality it was an abandonment of the demand for free and compulsory education from Grades R to 12.\textsuperscript{163} Regarding OBE \textit{per se}, the

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{The Educational Journal}, April-May 2000, pp.1, 2; April-May 2001, pp.6-9; June 2001, pp.10, 11; July-August 2001, pp.6, 7; September-October 2001, pp.4, 5, 13.
\textsuperscript{157} Adhikari, ‘Fiercely Non-Racial? Discourses and Politics of Race in the Non-European Unity Movement, 1943-70’, p.415; see for example \textit{The Educational Journal}, January-February 1952, pp.5, 6; March 1952, pp.5, 6; September 1952, p.8; July-August 1954, pp.18, 19; September 1955, pp.18-20; March 1956, pp.10-12; October 1956, pp.4, 5; March 1957, pp.5-7; October 1957, p.5.
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{The Educational Journal}, September-October 2001, pp.6-8; November-December 2001, pp.6, 7.
\textsuperscript{159} \textit{The Educational Journal}, September-October 2001, p.9; June 2003, pp.6-10; November-December 2003, pp.2-4.
\textsuperscript{160} The planned introduction of the NCS for the FET phase, starting with Grade 10, was postponed from 2004 to 2006.
\textsuperscript{161} \textit{The Educational Journal}, June 2003, p.10.
\textsuperscript{162} The Education Sector contended that the FET would not meet the standards universities demanded, given that the latter were already setting their own entry examinations. Moreover, that the high schools would be financially weakened, owing to them not being able to count on the financial support of the Grade 8 and 9 parents.
\textsuperscript{163} \textit{The Educational Journal}, November-December 2003, p.4.
organisation continued to deride it as a ‘known catastrophe in most schools’, making ‘learning difficult for learners and teaching a mystery for educators!’ It moreover viewed it as an inadequately thought-through directive foisted on teachers and learners under conditions unfavourable for the delivery and attainment of quality education. By underlining these unfavourable conditions impacting the implementation of OBE, the Education Sector, it ought to be noted, did not debunk the curriculum’s underlying philosophy, and therefore did not employ the non-collaborationist strategy as it had against Christian National Education. Abrahams explained:

We were opposed to Christelike Nasionale Onderwys because it was a programme implemented by the apartheid National Party as part of its ideology. Now, if today we said that OBE is similar, that its purpose is a similar purpose, and we are therefore opposed to OBE on those grounds, then you would implement the policy of non-collaboration and undermine it, but I don’t think in our writings we’ve actually said that.

The former TLSA mouthpiece, instead, stayed fixed on the plight of the teacher core, which it continued to argue, was central to the delivery of quality education.

In line with its concern for teachers, *The Educational Journal* denounced the WCED’s unilateral scrapping of leave for teachers in 2001, and encouraged teachers to ignore the WCED pronouncement on Leave. Rather, teachers had to continue to apply for Leave it decreed, since the employer was reneging on its agreement on this issue in the PSCBC. A few months later, however, SADTU and other teacher organisations in the ELRC, conceded to the new Leave regulation. NUPSAW immediately announced it was not party to the ELRC deal, and condemned the teacher unions for assenting to the new conditions of Leave, branding them in established non-collaborationist language as ‘sell-outs’ for agreeing to the new regulation.

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165 See Chapter 4 on Outcomes Based Education.
166 Interview with I. Abrahams, 23 January 2006.
167 The WCED unilaterally converted teachers annual leave of 10 days into their normal school vacation (see Western Cape Education Department, *Circular 0024/01*, Cape Town: 6 March 2001 and *The Educational Journal*, April-May 2001, p.10).
168 *The Educational Journal*, April-May 2001, p.10. The NUPSAW Education Sector based their position on the reneging by the employer, in this case the WCED, of resolution 7 of 2000, which it contended could only be changed through renegotiation.
Defending the teacher corps, the Sector also came out against policies that laid teachers vulnerable to accusations of misconduct,\(^\text{172}\) and it offered ‘support’ for teachers prejudiced by the department.\(^\text{173}\) The LRAB thus judiciously undertook cases of alleged misconduct,\(^\text{174}\) and on occasion published them in the organisation’s journal to affirm its support for teachers.\(^\text{175}\) The Sector, taking seriously its custodial duties, contended in a vein similar to Kallaway, that the teaching profession had been ‘systematically drained of expertise’ where committed teachers found it ‘increasingly difficult to work with confidence in a system that places unfair burdens on them’.\(^\text{176}\)

*The Educational Journal* asserted its legacy most emphatically and visibly on the issue of the continued restructuring of teaching posts at the end of 2002. Reminding its readers of the restructuring process from 1993, especially the ANC and SADTU’s complicity in the loss of near 20 000 teachers from the profession since 1996,\(^\text{177}\) the Sector’s journal once more admonished SADTU for signing an agreement that would result in the loss of 340 teaching posts in the Western Cape. While SADTU declared it had in fact agreed to redeployment not retrenchments,\(^\text{178}\) six other unions including NUPSAW, along with concerned teachers and principals, rejected the agreement.\(^\text{179}\) As in 1996, *The Educational Journal* dubbed what transpired a budgetary decision, since it involved reducing the major cost item in the education budget – ‘teachers’.\(^\text{180}\) And, when the DoE in an overt rescue attempt opted for a huge loan of R40 million per year for three years from the Western Cape Health Department budget to offset the loss of posts, and to reinstate them as ‘ad hoc’

\(^{174}\) Cases were taken on merit and not on one’s union allegiance (Interview with R. Jakoet, 7 March 2009).
\(^{176}\) P. Kallaway, *Cape Times*, ‘Key to future is teacher education’, 8 March 2005.
\(^{180}\) *The Educational Journal*, January-March 2003, p.5.
posts, NUPSAW rejected it outright.\textsuperscript{181} It denigrated the loan from the health sector as immoral, given the parlous state of health in the province,\textsuperscript{182} and demanded that the ‘ad hoc’ posts become permanent.\textsuperscript{183} It moreover called for promotion posts to be reinstated and the retrenchment of teachers to be stopped forthwith.\textsuperscript{184} Restructuring nevertheless continued into and beyond 2003, with the WCED arguing forcefully that it was prudently re-allocating posts to impoverished schools.\textsuperscript{185} This reshuffling, the Education Sector, along with like-minded groups in civil society, condemned in the press,\textsuperscript{186} through public meetings\textsuperscript{187} and in the case of NUPSAW, \textit{The Educational Journal}.\textsuperscript{188} As a new era dawned for the official organ of the TLSA, it appeared the more things changed, the more they remained the same.

\textbf{Finances}

Probably the most telling of all factors pointing to the TLSA’s continuity was the retention of its credit base. On merging with NUPSAW, the League did not close its banking accounts, deciding rather to keep them active to finance the Education Sector according to the discretion of its members.\textsuperscript{189} In fact, TLSA financial reports continued to be tabled at Executive meetings of the Sector.\textsuperscript{190} Preserved as well was the bursary fund, which was put at the disposal of NUPSAW members’ children who wished to further their studies.\textsuperscript{191} Even the termination of the position of Treasurer, as it constituted a national structure and not a sectoral position, did not prevent the Education Sector from establishing a finance

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., p.6.
\textsuperscript{182} \textit{The Educational Journal}, April-May 2002, p.12.
\textsuperscript{183} \textit{The Educational Journal}, January-March 2003, p.9.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., p.9.
\textsuperscript{185} P. Attwell, Western Cape Education Department (WCED) press statement sent to A’Eysha Kasiem of the Cape Times, 2 December 2003. \textit{Cape Times}, ‘Teaching posts to increase and not decrease as claimed, says department’, 4 December 2003.
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Cape Times}, ‘Teaching posts to increase and not decrease as claimed, says department’.
\textsuperscript{187} Concerned Teachers, ‘Minutes of Concerned Teachers held at South Peninsula High on 17 November 2003’, December 2003.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{The Educational Journal}, January-March 2003, pp.5, 6, 9.
\textsuperscript{189} NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector Executive meeting’, South Peninsula High, 1 October 2001.
\textsuperscript{190} See for example NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector Executive meeting’, Harold Cressy High School, 9 April 2001; NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector Executive meeting’, South Peninsula High School, 1 October 2001; and NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector Executive meeting’, South Peninsula High School, 11 December 2002.
\textsuperscript{191} Interview with T. Nakidien, 5 November 2008.
committee of five members to effect a TLSA Memorial fund. In addition, and significant, was that NUPSAW directed funds to all its Sectors, in order to assist them with the running of their own affairs. In the case of the Education Sector, NUPSAW funding covered the printing of *The Educational Journal*, sectoral meetings, and other organisational matters. The outcome of these developments was that the League remained financially intact and solvent, and it continued to function as a legitimate and legal entity. This arrangement allowed the Education Sector, in the interim at least, to secure partial autonomy and allowed the League’s identity to be preserved inside NUPSAW.

**Constraints and Opportunities**

Retaining four vital cogs of the TLSA armoury: its branch structure, the LAB or LRAB, *The Educational Journal* and its financial arm, bode well for proponents of League politics and the organisation’s policy of non-collaboration, notwithstanding the Education Sector’s disaffiliation from the NUM. However, while these factors suggest the retention of the TLSA’s identity, there was a vital area where the former League activists lost ground. This became most evident when NUPSAW, due to the threshold in the PSCBC having been raised to 50 000 members, was forced to link up with thirty-two independent unions to form the Confederation of South African Workers’ Union CONSAWU in 2003. Established as a counter to COSATU by a range of independent unions, CONSAWU’s main aim was to retain the autonomy of each constituent union. This arrangement favoured NUPSAW and in particular the Education Sector, as it allowed the unitary structure to remain influential in the PSCBC yet be part of a larger independent workers’ union, despite its conservative social base. Although CONSAWU’s conservative politics was unsettling for many NUPSAW members, this was not a massive setback or even a unique situation for leftists. Lenin, for one, took issue with left-wing proponents in his day for shirking this all-important site of struggle for workers. He argued that entering the trade union movement, including ‘reactionary’ unions, was not, as was thought by his left contemporaries, preposterous, but rather a necessary strategy in order to draw workers – the

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193 Interview with E. Mfingwana, 10 February 2009.
working class – away from what he termed ‘opportunist’ leaders, ‘the agents of the bourgeoisie’.\textsuperscript{195} CONSAWU embodied a comparable site of contestation, and it presented left elements such as the former League cadres with a similar challenge, one that the Education Sector was well aware of. Indeed, its officials argued that despite the political odds, potential existed to exercise influence in the new confederation.\textsuperscript{196}

Again, events were largely beyond the control of League activists, and they were compelled to tactically and strategically, as it were, ‘unwind the skein’ of ‘their’ own history,\textsuperscript{197} and carry the League’s politics into NUPSAW and CONSAWU. But how were the former League members hoping to achieve this nigh insurmountable task? Reading the demands of the time, its leadership again manoeuvred strategically to preserve the organisation’s ideas and identity.Confirming this shifting mindset and connecting it to the changing post-apartheid conditions, Abrahams was succinct and instructive: “NUPSAW in itself, because it regards itself as an independent trade union doesn’t collaborate with the ANC ... but it works within government structures, so the policy of non-collaboration today I would say has changed, even since 1994”\textsuperscript{198} This had specific implications for the Education Sector’s strategy of non-collaboration vis-à-vis NUPSAW and even more so CONSAWU. This Isaacs made clear:

\begin{quote}
If you don’t form those numbers you cannot be in the Bargaining Chambers, then you’re going to lose members; and members will go to the other unions. So in the true sense of the word you’re collaborating with apartheid organisations. But on the other hand, in order to do battle with COSATU, how can you do battle if you are not there - is that collaboration?\textsuperscript{199}
\end{quote}

To overcome this impasse, he added further:

\begin{quote}
If you are talking about liberating South Africa, you are going to have to convince people about your argument. You can’t say I’m just going to ignore people; you ignore them at your own peril ... because if the members know they are not in the bargaining chamber they’re going to join your enemy, that’s the dilemma that you have.\textsuperscript{200}
\end{quote}

Non-collaboration, clearly, could not be inserted intuitively into the union movement of the post-1994 South Africa.

\textsuperscript{196} NUPSAW, ‘Minutes of NUPSAW: Education Sector meeting’, South Peninsula High, 30 June 2003.  
\textsuperscript{198} Interview with I. Abrahams, 23 January 2006.  
\textsuperscript{199} Interview with B. Isaacs, 1 February 2009.  
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid.
Despite the detours and strategic considerations accompanying what were necessary compromises for the Education Sector, League members took encouragement from the changing historical conditions at the beginning of the millennium, which they felt were starting to favour their politics. For them, their oppositional ideas were visible worldwide and were taking on various forms of opposition to global oppression. They were not alone in this thinking either, and Parry, reflecting on the legacy of the Unity Movement, claimed its ideas continued “in the critiques ... of the neo-liberal doctrine and free market practice to which the new South Africa state is ideologically committed and practically bound”. Indeed, non-collaborationists could garner inspiration from the burgeoning anti-neoliberal globalisation mass protests that struck Seattle (1999), Genoa (2001) and Cancun (2003), while gatherings at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, from 2001 to 2003, presented a significant counter-point and alternative to the neoliberal World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. These radically-oriented developments, at the dawn of the new millennium, from which ex-League members took inspiration, collectively and boldly challenged the neo-conservative mantra associated with Margaret Thatcher’s decree that ‘There is no alternative’. Instead, it posited the counter axiom - ‘Another world is possible’.

International developments appeared to favour the non-collaborationist movement, and worldwide campaigns against neo-liberalism found resonance for the Education Sector. Cognisant of the burgeoning social movements on the international front, a League member astutely noted: ‘we made the point long ago that the policy of non-collaboration was also anti-imperialist. And that still is strong’. The Educational Journal in the same vein, at the

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203 The World Social Forum (WSF) met in Porto Alegre in Brazil during the month of January from 2001 to 2003, at the same time as its capitalist rival the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Switzerland. The WSF’s intention was to bring together annually diverse, non-governmental and non-partisan groups interested in engaging in concrete actions for the building of a more democratic and fair world.
204 F. Houtart, ‘Another world is possible’, Le Monde diplomatique, November 2003, p.15.
205 Interview with I. Abrahams, 23 January 2006.
turn of the millennium, gave support to the emergent anti-globalisation protests. These events were not geo-politically distant for the Education Sector, and the formation of the Cape Town Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) in 2000, to counter the Unicity’s plan to broaden and expedite the privatisation of social services, gave impetus to the Education Sector’s anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism. This anti-neoliberal sentiment the Education Sector’s journal circulated amongst but also beyond teachers, thereby ensuring that, as Rassool noted, ‘a massive initiative in public education’ continued, and that the potential for enlarging the non-collaborationist view endured.

Evidently, currents of the Unity Movement and TLSA were unremitting and persisted well past the 1990s, thus putting into question Wieder’s assertion that the Unity Movement represented a ‘defeated argument’ that still had signs of life. Instead, one should ask: Were the ideas and the politics of the Movement, particularly non-collaboration, ever actually defeated? The answer, as this chapter has endeavoured to reveal, is found in the capacity of non-collaborationists, such as those in the League and later the Education Sector, among others, to adapt and have their ideas remain relevant and influential in ‘localised’ initiatives and structures. This, in fact, they continued to do, while, importantly and strategically, remaining cognisant of and engaging with the broader political, educational and economic dynamics unfolding around them nationally and internationally.

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A Principled Engagement?

We have a responsibility towards the present generation and future generations of youth. We also have a responsibility towards millions of people living in miserable conditions. Our criticisms of government do not relieve us of our responsibilities and the commitment, dedication and firm resolve needed from us in the quest for quality education for all children and an improvement in the quality of every person’s living standards.¹

Correct ideas are a necessary means for successful organization and struggle … Theory inspires the struggle and the struggle in turn will enrich theory.²

This study aimed at recovering the theory and practice of the TLSA’s non-collaborationist politics in the Western Cape before but more so after 1990. By adopting an historical developmental approach, it has shown how the organisation’s political and educational identity was shaped over more than half a century. Integral to this identity was the shifting nature of the TLSA’s non-collaborationism. These shifts, be they on occasion marginal and abstruse, proved over a period of time significant, for they effectively resulted in the TLSA assuming stances in practice that were sometimes more flexible than the popular representations of the organisation suggest. Given its firm adherence to non-collaboration or principally its opposition to various forms of complicity, the capacity of the League to adapt and even reinvent itself at the end of the twentieth century, evokes the question: ‘How was it able to achieve this?’

An enquiry into the versatility of the League’s policy of non-collaboration is not straightforward, as it involves engaging not only the ideological dimensions but importantly, if not more so, the changing conditions the League perforce had to face at different junctures in its development. Cognisance has to be taken of the fact that non-collaboration emerged in the post-depression years of the late 1930s and early 1940s, when South Africa was recovering from a deep recession that had set capitalism back. In addition, the country’s ruling class was facing a rising ideological alternative in Russia and

¹ I. Abrahams, ‘Transformation: The Quest for Quality Education’, * Presidential Address, Cape Town: Teachers’ League of South Africa, 1996, p.22. The League continued to urge its teachers to deliver a quality education as part of the struggle for social change or liberation. This non-collaborationist outlook, as this chapter makes clear, remained a central part of the League’s strategy.
² Forum Club, ‘Editorial’, *Discussion*, Vol.1, No.4, December 1951, p.2. The link between political theory and practice was a central concern and challenge for left formations. This chapter attempts to draw explicit connections between the theory and practice of non-collaboration as detailed in this thesis.
Europe, and was on the brink of entering a world war, whilst it simultaneously was attempting to formalise segregation. This era, with its distinctive features, stood in strong contrast to the 1990s, which had witnessed the collapse of the socialist experiment, the rise of neo-liberalism and globalisation, the phasing out of apartheid, and with that the enfranchisement of the black majority under an African National Congress (ANC)-led government.

Considering these vastly different contexts, it is important to note that both the proponents and opponents of the Unity Movement have made much of non-collaboration and its continuities. While the former has sought to entrench the continued relevance of the policy, the latter (predominantly the ANC, South African Communist Party and those under their influence) have dismissed it as negative and outdated. A closer inspection of the League’s non-collaboration, however, reveals a mix of continuities and discontinuities, particularly in the political and educational realms. While the thesis carries numerous examples of both phenomena, these have been condensed below to explain the nuanced nature if not complexity of non-collaboration, in an attempt finally, to elucidate its transformative potential in the current period.

**Non-collaboration: continuities and discontinuities**

The impression of the League’s non-collaborationism as ideologically set and changeless, is deeply rooted in its history. This perspective has its origins in the NEUM’s (UM) theoretical standpoint, which, following especially Kies’ landmark address to the NEUM conference of 1945, and Tabata’s injunction that ‘we have to fight ideas with ideas’, placed emphasis on political theory, or more specifically the notion that correct political practice derived from sound political theory. The Forum Club and Communist Party of

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3 See Chapter 1, p.42.
South Africa (CPSA), among others, assailed this perspective in the 1950s, for it reinforced the UM idea that the ‘fundamental’ struggle for full democratic rights came at the expense, if not avoidance, of smaller struggles for reforms. This ‘all or nothing’ approach to struggle, these leftist critics asserted, had disarmed, divided and ultimately weakened the resistance movement. As a result, the NEUM was characterised, rather sweepingly, as ‘armchair’ politicians, ‘petty-bourgeois’ intellectuals and ‘abstentionists’, without taking cognisance of its permutations or heterogeneous character. This all encompassing view of the NEUM, and in particular its teachers, has held currency ever since, notwithstanding their participation in the popular struggles of the 1950s, such as the anti-Van Riebeeck Tercentenary celebrations, and their forging of the Cape Teachers’ Federal Council (CTFC) and the Parent Teacher Association (PTA) movement. In fact, their participation in these struggles lent credence to the argument that unless the Movement was in the leadership of struggle it tended to absent itself.

The abstentionist label was accentuated in the 1960s when the League went underground and disappeared from the public eye. Due to this clandestine strategy and sometimes virulent criticism of other political organisations in the liberation movement, the TLSA’s presence in the mass struggles of the 1970s and 1980s was perceived as negligible if not non-existent. This rendered it not only marginal to what were historic events at the time, but further entrenched the abstentionist label.

Neglected by critics of the TLSA, however, were its members’ and former members’ leading roles in organising activities and informing communities of political and

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6 See Chapter 1, pp.45-49.
7 See Chapter 1, pp.47, 48. As Chapter 1 points out, The Forum Club and CPSA blamed the NEUM for the collapse of the 1948 Train Apartheid Resistance Committee (TARC) campaign, and criticised it for boycotting the Franchise Resistance Campaign (FRAC) and the Defiance Campaign of the 1950s.
8 In this phase, as Chapter 2 describes, *The Educational Journal* was the organisation’s only public face while its members operated in the non-racial sports movement, fellowships, the Federation of Cape Civic Associations (FCCA) and other structures of civil society.
educational developments. This has been elaborated upon in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In fact, it was because of these interventions that the Unity Movement’s politics was sustained and was able to filter into the resistance movement in the 1980s. The National Forum (NF), Cape Action League (CAL), and the launch of the NUM, exemplified this influence. In the domain of teacher politics as well, Kihn could boldly claim that the TLSA ‘provided the soil on which WECTU (Western Cape Teachers’ Union) grew’, while Wieder suggests that the same soil nourished the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU).

Overlooked wholly by critics of the League, too, was that many of the organisation’s members spared whatever reticence they might have had and openly immersed themselves in a range of political and organisational work when South Africa’s transition arrived. Their willingness to interact with rival organisations and individuals within the liberation movement was clearly noticeable. In 1993, for example, and despite reservations regarding ad hoc alliances, the League aligned itself with its main adversaries, notably, SADTU and the Cape Teachers’ Professional Association (CTPA), to oppose teacher retrenchments and rationalisation. Open to profiling itself publically after nearly thirty years of operating clandestinely, it shared platforms with these organisations against the National Party’s (NP) endeavours to restructure education in the twilight of its rule. In an earlier period, the League would have balked at any such alliance, particularly with the CTPA, given this organisation’s history of collaboration with the apartheid regime. Clearly, the gravity of the issues at hand were far more important to the TLSA.

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10 The civic, educational and sports structures where many League teachers were active served as ideological conduits through which they moved and exercised their politics.
13 As Chapter 3 notes, TLSA members involved themselves in organising inter-schools’ competitions between primary schools, literacy classes, which the League offered in collaboration with Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), PTSA activities, which often drew them into further activities; and, moreover, the Legal Aid Bureau (LAB), which represented League and non-League teachers in legal disputes.
14 See Chapter 1, pp.35, 36, 44, 45.
Showing its preparedness to seek out like-minded cadres and organisations in the post-1994 period, TLSA members were at the forefront of assisting with the establishment of the Western Cape Parents’, Teachers’, Students Forum (WCPTSF) to oppose rationalisation in education. Although the WCPTSF was comprised predominantly of activists outside of the ANC’ fold, it included SADTU members critical of the union at the time. In 1997, the League’s alliance politics was taken further in the Concerned Action Group (CAG), and although the coalition did not include the tripartite alliance constituents, it nevertheless showed the organisation’s willingness to work with a range of individuals and organisations outside of the NUM.

Inside the League, as well, a more accommodating attitude towards other political ideas prevailed, and in fact, not all of the TLSA’s members subscribed to the NUM, and many were certainly non-aligned. This political spread in membership was not new, and from the inception of the NEUM, groups within its ranks, such as the Fourth International Organisation of South Africa (FIOSA), differed with its leadership on the interpretation of non-collaboration and the boycott.\(^{15}\) A League person such as Willem van Schoor, for instance, the organisation’s longstanding president from 1951 to 1963, was a FIOSA activist until 1948. Jaffe too, who became one of the Movement’s leading theoreticians, initially sided with the Fourth International before switching to the NEUM.

Considering these permutations within TLSA ranks, when the 1994 election arrived, it was not surprising that members had varied opinions on whether to vote or not, notwithstanding the organisation’s boycott of the event. And, when the League fused with the politically independent National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (NUPSAW) in 1999, dissenting voices questioned the merger or, more specifically, the nature of the amalgamation, for the move appeared to be a break from the organisation’s established ideological moorings.\(^ {16}\) In this instance, the organisation demonstrated its resilience and

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\(^{16}\) The heterogeneous character of the League was perceptible on other fronts too. It was willing to accommodate teachers at Model C schools who had previously been snubbed. Striking also was its
resourcefulness, and opted for an independent route. This shift was not maverick behaviour nor remarkable as may be thought, since the League was not principally opposed to trade unionism, and, moreover, working class independence or non-alignment with government structures was in accord with the Unity Movement’s founding principles. That League teachers were politically unbending and ignored the fluidity of the time and that their understanding of non-collaboration was doctrinaire was evidently, at best, tenuous.

Hardened perceptions of TLSA politics as rigid and unchanging, nonetheless, persisted. This, ultimately, proved debilitating and an impediment to the League in the ideologically tense environment of the 1990s, when it needed its ideas to be heard if it wanted to gain once more a firm foothold in the community it claimed to represent. To succeed in this mission, the organisation had to re-establish a presence in key geographic areas in order to attain the effectiveness it once firmly held during the 1940s and 1950s. This political and educational high ground had all but disappeared by the 1990s, resulting in younger teachers, who were students during the 1970s and 1980s, having grown-up largely unaware of the TLSA. To add to this deficit, the organisation still seemed steeped in the political ethos of a bygone era, whereas the majority of teachers, who had been organised under the banner of the union movement, were responding to the dynamics of the time, of mass mobilisation and negotiations. In fact, the trade union consciousness, which had engulfed teachers, was foreign to the League, and it grappled to come to terms with the militant actions of teachers who had allied themselves to the organised working class. This was clear in the League’s critical disposition towards teacher strike action, which initially it saw as counter-productive in schooling. Instead, League teachers viewed themselves as custodians of the community, and contended that the classroom was the starting point for countering the ideological effects of the system, and that schools were sites to nurture, care and protect children while parents battled to make ends meet.

preparedness, following the 1995 annual conference, to work not only outside but also within state structures to engage the education authorities. And, when the organisation came out in stated opposition to the retirement packages in 1993 and 1996, League teachers nonetheless opted for them.

17 See Chapter 1, pp.38, 39; and Chapter 5, pp.265, 272.
That the TLSA’s non-collaborationist policy was more adaptable than initially thought, is set out in Chapter 5, where it details the rationale for the organisation transforming itself into a teachers’ union. This transformation was not painless for the League, for primarily two reasons. Firstly, League teachers were politically and professionally motivated and less concerned with day-to-day issues of unionism. Secondly, and which is related to the first, League members struggled not only to recruit teachers to NUPSAW but to retain their membership, mainly because teachers saw their demands for better working conditions and job security realisable in the larger teacher unions of SADTU and the National Professional Teachers’ Organisation of South Africa (NAPTOSA). Both these unions were well-resourced and had far greater capacity than the NUPSAW Education Sector to represent and protect their members. Based on this strength, SADTU and NAPTOSA were able to ensconce themselves in the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC), which the League because of its non-collaborationism, had refused to join.

Although this thesis has challenged assumptions of the League’s non-collaboration as subject to categorical and timeless laws, the, at times, unyielding practices and statements of the organisation and its members affirmed if not deepened this perception. In this regard, Kincheloe, commenting on the power of perception, aptly notes that ‘people act on what they perceive ... perceptions have consequences, they move events, they shape lives’.18 This rang true for the League, for the organisation failed to recruit a sufficient body of members during the late 1990s to offset having to dissolve and join NUPSAW in order to continue its educational work. Even then, it battled to win and secure members.

Evidently, the League and those adhering to its non-collaborationism, including its critics, carried with them strong identities and traditions which in the 1990s were démodé but had to be overcome. Clearing this hurdle, however, was a drawn-out process of internal debate and discussion. Consequently, while some of the leadership read the moment as one

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demanding change, organisationally or as a collective they had to be patient and bide their time. The result was grave, as Abrahams recollected:

the Teachers’ League was too slow in becoming a union ... It should have established itself as a union right at the beginning, and as a counter-union, and then recruited people into the union. That’s the position that I held within the Teachers’ League ... right from the time that we emerged, I argued that we were going to have major problems if we didn’t become a union. But because of the delay, because you had to convince your comrades that the Teachers’ League should become a union, it missed out really.19

At the heart of the matter was the issue of unionism and collaboration for TLSA members. Although more could be said about these events in the 1990s, given the level of engagement on the question of non-collaboration inside the League and the NUM,20 many of these discussions were discrete and closed to the public, and thus cannot be properly accounted for or examined without access to correspondence and minutes of meetings.21 Nevertheless, and to which the above tensions attest, a large part of the League’s kismet in the 1990s was in effect tied to its past. This Hanmer acknowledged when he astutely noted:

An organisation is governed by the history of its ideas and its participation in political activity. … It’s not a new organisation starting fresh ... it’s an organisation which comes with a whole package of experience, political participation and analysis and all the rest of it. And that makes it the organisation that it is.22

With this perspective in mind, it is important to note that two distinct qualities characterised the TLSA’s policy of non-collaboration. One variant was explicit and openly antagonistic towards any form of complicity with institutions, movements or individuals connected to government’s ‘racial’ structures; and the other, the ‘class’ component, whilst de-emphasised under apartheid rule, proved far more enduring. This feature was to emerge

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19 Interview with I. Abrahams, 1 June 2005.
21 The author is aware of these discussions through engaging with various NUM and TLSA members. The previously cited NUM papers were subsequently passed on to him, thus confirming these debates.
prominently during the heady days of the 1990s as both a bulwark and lodestar for the organisation.

**Class and the continuities of non-collaboration**

Extending as it did from the days of the Workers’ Party of South Africa (WPSA), the class character of the TLSA’s non-collaboration remained pivotal for the organisation. South Africa’s transition to democracy provided the fertile ground for this political feature to surface more visibly, for while the new Constitution and Bill of Rights offered the legal framework to counter past ‘racial’ disparities, they did not provide the same space for addressing deeper socio-economic inequalities. As Chapters 3 and 4 point out, the quest for ‘redress’, ‘equity’ and ‘social justice’ was disrupted by massive debt repayments, fiscal austerity, the marketisation of education and cuts to this sector and other social services. At the centre of this disruption was the state’s GEAR policy, which had as its prime intent to bind South Africa to the global market as part of an agenda to reform the country’s economic system.

For the League, GEAR meant that despite the rhetoric of democratic rights, the state was effectively shedding its responsibility of providing free education through acceding to budgetary cuts. The net effect of this slashing of the budget, the TLSA contended, was the short-circuiting of fundamental educational change, including any articulation between education and other social spheres such as health, housing and social welfare which aimed at eliminating inequalities. Instead, inequalities were to be exacerbated through, for example, the introduction of user fees in schools - a tax which transferred much of the cost of education to parents - leaving schools serving impoverished communities with the onerous burden of financially managing their own affairs. Affirming the League’s analysis, Spreen and Vally enumerate how the coupling of the ‘rights to education’ with the ‘rights in education’, the right to quality education and opportunities, intensified inequalities in

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Graeme Bloch, as Fiske and Ladd and Chisholm before him, confirmed this growing economic gap:

The differing social capital of poor and rich children is one of the strongest reasons for inequalities and relatively weak outcomes in poor communities and schools. At every turn, the networks, assets, capabilities and social capital available to poor communities are subject to stress and pressure leading to their ongoing exclusion. The cycle of exclusion and marginalisation is reproduced and deepened through the schooling system itself, with the most negative effects on poor schools and pupils who can least afford it.

Evidenced by these education analysts are not only how ‘race’ but significantly class relations and class formation served as real and decisive signifiers of the deepening crises in education.

Locking on to the widening economic divide emerging in South Africa, the League highlighted the effect of these class inequalities on what was a central concern of the organisation since 1944, the issue of full and ‘equal’ citizenship rights, or what others have termed ‘democratic’ or ‘common citizenship’. As in pre-apartheid and apartheid South Africa, the post-apartheid state continued to deny socio-economic rights and therewith full citizenship to the majority of people, the TLSA maintained. Abrahams put the matter concisely in his presidential address of 1994: “Even if all people have the vote and thus an equal opportunity to send representatives to parliament; even if a Bill of Rights sets out to protect them equally, their lives are not equal and thus they do not enjoy equality in citizenship rights and privileges”.

In educational terms, this meant that while participation via, for example, School Governing Bodies was promoted to encourage democratic

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24 Spreen and Vally cite the 1998 Poverty and Inequality hearings, 2001 national School Register of Needs Survey and the South African Human Rights Commission report of 2004, to mention three indicators. These highlighted how the deteriorating conditions at schools and the growing poverty levels not only blocked access to education and schooling but also grievously curtailed and prevented learning and teaching (Ibid., pp.354, 355).


citizenship, only those who could afford to pay benefited from this right. In curriculum development terms, it meant that the resource-dependent Curriculum 2005 advantaged teachers in schools that were not lacking essential resources, such as text books and libraries, and were not operating on a diminishing funding base that presented intractable challenges. The disconnect between ‘policy as text’ and ‘reality as lived’ clearly rendered citizenship rights challenging deliverables in the new South Africa.

In this milieu of widening inequalities, the class element in the TLSA’s non-collaboration policy stood out as a distinct feature of its analysis, which, in turn, had decisive implications for its practice. As John Saul put it, ‘class analysis and class struggle’ are important political markers, for they are ‘both central to human emancipation and essentially non-co-optable either by liberalism or reformism (my emphasis)’.

‘Race’ and class remained indivisible theoretically in the Unity Movement’s and the TLSA’s critique of the post-apartheid educational reforms, particularly in the way they challenged assumptions of democracy, consensual politics and policy making as ‘by its very design’ representative of the interests of the majority of the people. However, inasmuch as the League claimed to speak for the majority of the people, its analysis and actions were not well received, and in effect were out of step with overwhelming public opinion at the time; an opinion which sought to put to rest the legacy of apartheid and had the backing of the new democratic government. The TLSA was nevertheless resolute, and set itself the immense task of piercing this shield of popular opinion to expose the defects of the new education system. It worked from the premise, as much as Motala and Vally did, that the eagerness to overcome legislated racism, ‘shielded the policy making process from


It was here, by refusing to accede to popular sentiment, and in opposing the globally dominant political and economic neo-liberal orthodoxy approved by the state, that the League’s non-collaborationist thinking and practices yielded key lessons. While these have been presented and commented on in this thesis, the outstanding feature of the TLSA’s anti-collaborationism was its robust critique of taken-for-granted statist solutions to the deep inequalities permeating society and education, where, as Bloch observed, ultimately, the state had to take responsibility for public schooling.

For the League, the state had not been transformed into a true democracy post-1994, and was de facto subject to foreign and local capital or ‘capitalism-imperialism’. This neo-colonial deal rendered the South African state unable to deliver on basic social rights, the organisation declared. As the political economist Hein Marais, likewise noted: ‘Today, they [states] bow before the prerogatives of capital’, and as such are, “redirecting resources away from developmental or welfare functions and toward the private sector – as active agents in the deeper polarisation of societies”. Opposition to this market-driven statist strategy, Michael Neocosmos argued, involved social theory and politics moving beyond ‘what exists’ to ‘what could be’ or ‘what should be fought for’. A similar vision inspired the TLSA at the turn of the millennium. This *The Educational Journal* voiced in concise and no uncertain terms:

> the only solution to the problems facing South Africa would be to change the political and economic system in this country completely; indeed, to assist in engineering the

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34 See Bloch, p.109.  
35 See Chapter 4, p.199.  
36 Ibid.  
socialist transformation of the economy ... All of us can be assured that we as Nupsaw will remain an independent Workers’ Union and that ‘we will never sleep with the government’.  

Clearly, the abiding ethos of class struggle continued to be an indelible feature of the League’s discursive and practical politics even after it had disaffiliated from the NUM and joined NUPSAW. Moreover, non-collaboration as a theory and strategy of social change remained firmly embedded in the organisation’s efforts to achieve what it viewed as democratisation, equal citizenship and educational transformation in South Africa.

Within the above matrix, the role of the teacher for the TLSA (within NUPSAW) remained ‘one factor in an array of forces’ that had the potential to ‘reach deep into the whole structure of society’, not as ‘defenceless functionaries of the system’, but rather as a crucial part ‘of transforming the education system and indeed South African society’. For the NUPSAW Education Sector, as it was for the League from 1944, South Africa needed more than ever ‘highly trained socially-conscious teachers who can become agents of change’. It is in this dynamic oppositional sense, where agency and historical change is prioritised as part of a broader class project for emancipation, embracing the ‘universals of justice, freedom and equality’, that the TLSA’s non-collaborationism continued to embody a policy, strategy and principle of engagement.

42 Ibid.
43 Neocosmos, p.114.
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