AN ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF THE Ciskei, 1848 - 1900

JACK LEWIS

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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN.

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CHAPTER 8

FROM PROPHECY TO DISILLUSIONMENT

I The Struggle Within the Chiefdoms

Maqoma, once he had declared his faith in Sarhili and Mhlakaza, immediately went onto the offensive against Sandille. He sent messages to Sandille designed to undermine the position of those homestead heads who opposed the movement. He asked Sandille:

"Are you a Chief and led by black men? Who are Tyala, Xokwana, Umxamisa, Umqhoti that they should cultivate against the orders of Kreli and Mhlakaza and induce you to do the same? What other Chiefs have been likewise led? Show your authority and put these men to death and discontinue your cultivation." (1)

Brownlee, considering Maqoma's motives, thought that he wished simply to ruin Sandille and then turn against him. (2) While it might not have been as straightforward as this, there is no doubt that obedience to a supreme chief was the key ideological shift on which the cattle-killing hung. If that centralisation could be achieved the power of Sandille would decline and that of the chiefs responsible for the realignment of forces would increase. Maqoma and Mhalla both emphasised the unacceptability of Colonial domination and the importance of Sarhili:

"I am not going to war with the Government but my being kept in this part of the country is sufficient provocation for me to throw assegais at the Government." (3)

The movement and all actions associated with it were, for Maqoma, carried out on orders from Sarhili which he felt obliged to obey.
He expressed his convictions that:

"Kreli was his Chief and that he was under him and that he would continue to do as Kreli ordered him."

(4)

Later, when Brownlee decided to remove from the list of paid councillors certain influential Ngqika of Sandille's location who had supported the movement, he specifically dwelt on the dual motivation of many of the participants; belief in the prophecy and allegiance to Sarhili:

"It may be said that most of these men followed the delusion in consequence of a conviction of its truth, but the fact cannot be lost sight of ... that when Sandille opposed it some of the men named ... stated that Kreli was Paramount, and that they would obey him in preference to Sandille ..." (5)

(emphasis added)

Even with Maqoma there was not unanimity on the prophecies. While his son Namba supported him, Kona, another son, opposed the movement. Increasingly Namba represented Maqoma in his dealings with Sarhili and Sandille, while Kona withdrew with those people who adhered to him to Kama's location.

This polarisation which occurred within every section of the Xhosa created conditions for a minor civil war in the Xhosa chiefdoms. The bitterness of the conflict was to divide people with long-lasting effect into 'believers' and 'unbelievers'. In the words of William Gqoba:

"The community was split in two ... father fell out with son, brother with brother, chief with subjects, relative with relative. Two names emerged to distinguish the two groups. One group was named amaTamba (the Submissive), that is Nongquwase's converts. The other was called ama-Gogotya (the Unyielding)..." (6)
Between November 1856 and February 1857 this polarisation intensified. It drew in other groups such as the Thembu and saw the final disintegration of the failed project of drawing the Xhosachieftaincies closer together into near civil war in a desperate attempt to make the movement 'pay' regardless of who might suffer as a result.

The first signs of the new direction assumed by the movement came from Sarhili. As early as October 1856 it was reported that he was actively engaged in seizing cattle from Mfengu and others who had not obeyed his orders to kill them. (7) Sarhili was apparently redistributing such cattle to those who had killed their cattle and had not cultivated their gardens.

This type of appropriation was to become an important part of the movement after the failure of the February deadline for the materialisation of the 'New People'. In the interim the raids served to undermine the position of those groups which did not follow the prophecy. It must be appreciated that the extent of this division did not only affect chiefdoms as a whole and groups of homesteads as homogeneous units. It actually split up and divided the homestead units and households themselves:

"The feeling of animosity between the believers and the unbelievers can now hardly be kept within bounds, it has even gone so far as to separate families, at least in two cases which have come under my notice; one son had to leave the kraal of his father and brothers with his property, and in another case the grown up sons expelled their father with his cattle because he refused to kill them." (8)

One of the features of the movement was that those who did not support it, continued to live as before amongst their fellows. They were obviously now subject to intense insecurity. In locations such as Kama's or Siwani's, where the chief did not support the movement, the people gathered round a key believer figure, geographically separating themselves from non-believers.
The exact opposite occurred where 'non-believers' had to survive in a 'believing' chiefdom.

Thus in Kama's location, by mid-January 1857, there remained 76 homesteads which still cultivated their land and which did not kill their cattle. However, at least 77 homesteads remained under Mate which killed their cattle and withdrew from cultivation. Twenty-six of the homesteads that adhered to Mate relocated themselves on new sites further away from Kama. (9)

In Sandille's location there were no more than 150 to 200 families (i.e. households) that could be assembled by the unbelieving councillors Tyala, Soga and Matana by the end of January. This despite the fact that Sandille never did finally expel all the unbelievers from his Great Place, but allowed them to retain a token presence. When the unbelievers approached Brownlee about a place of refuge, he advised them to join their homesteads together for mutual defence but said he could not allow them to congregate outside the Ngqika location (10).

After preparations began for the fulfilment of the prophecies, the Ngqika unbelievers felt so insecure that they moved from the location to the Stutterheim Post on the Kabusie. (11) Maclean, who was still convinced that the chiefs intended war on the Colony, ordered Brownlee to evict them. He thought they might be part of a skilful 'Trojan-horse' operation to position some forces within the Colony. (12)

Sarhili experienced some of the same trouble which had occurred in the other chiefdoms. It has already been mentioned that Sarhili had doubts about Mhlakaza's powers. It appears that unbelieving councillors of Sarhili also challenged Mhlakaza directly. In October it was reported that Ngubo, a confidant of Sarhili, had been involved in a 'great row' at Mhlakaza's kraal:

"he got up in a great rage and talked the prophet and his daughters (sic.) to a standstill and then left, telling them they were humbugs ..." (13)
There were other powerful unbelievers in Gcalekaland. The most noteworthy of these was Xito, a chief who was resident near the Bashee River. Mhlakaza ordered that Xito should remove to the site of his father's kraal before the prophecies could be fulfilled. (14) After much resistance Xito agreed to make the move. In late December 1856 it was announced that Xito was to be the medium of communication with the 'New People', because they wished to talk through a man of rank and not through a 'plebeian'. Xito was deputed by Sarhili to go and communicate with the 'New People' and to acquaint the other chiefs with what he heard at a meeting of all chiefs to be convened at Mhlakaza's kraal.

Xito refused to carry out the command until he had visible proof that the people and cattle were actually forthcoming. (15) This was agreed to and Xito was to see the 'New People'. To detect any trick that might be played on him, Xito sent a messenger, an unbeliever, to survey the area before he proceeded there. This became known to Mhlakaza who accused Xito of insulting the 'New People' by doubting their word and placing an unbeliever in their road. Further because Xito refused to simply call the meeting of chiefs as ordered, the 'New People' refused to hold any communication with him. (16)

This is one of the most authentic sounding reports of the many somewhat fantastic manoeuvres reported to the magistrates at this time. It seems to supply clear evidence that there was an attempt to call a council of chiefs to discuss the future of the movement. Xito now became the main force opposed to the movement in Gcalekaland, forcing Sarhili to take the burden of 'New People' on his own shoulders.

With the failure of this attempted meeting of the chiefs, Sarhili issued orders to all chiefs to begin to finish off the killing of cattle. The result was a great increase in the number of cattle being killed and hides being sold in early January. Brownlee describes the following exchange he observed:

"A party of 20 men returning from selling their hides met a party of six carrying hides and leading a
horse also loaded. The party with the hides were accosted with derisive shouts of triumph, and were told "we knew you would yield, your holding out was useless. Pass on, you are unbelievers and unclean. Don't come near and defile us ..." They then shouted at Brownlee and his company:

"Go on you liars and deceivers, you may now ride horses, but soon you will ride to the devil on them ..." (17)

In an interesting comment on the selling of the hides of slaughtered cattle Gqoba quotes Nongqawuse as having said that anyone may dispose of the carcass of a slaughtered ox by barter, but should "nevertheless engage its soul, in order that on its coming back to life it should be his property ..." (18)

By January there had therefore been three distinct waves of killing, the first at the commencement of the prophecies in April and May 1856, which died down; this was followed by a renewed wave of killing after Sarhili's messages to Mhalla in October and then again following the incident with Xito in January 1857. The extended period of time over which the main prophecies were made to run, proved the correctness of Brownlee's assessment in August 1856 that:

"time is what we require ... there is still the hope that so many will remain true to us that Umhlakaza will not think it expedient to change his policy till his first converts begin to doubt the truth of his assertions ..." (19)

Many of the 'believers' from Phato's and Mhalla's locations were now facing their second season without having cultivated. They were only surviving on the slaughtered cattle of their neighbours and on grain purchased from those who had cultivated. (20) They were thus rapidly depleting the reserves of grain.

It has been seen that Maqoma, Phato and Mhalla were prepared to acknowledge Sarhili, but for this acknowledgement of Sarhili to
form the basis of the cattle-killing movement it would be expected that Sarhili would have made some plans to inaugurate a new regime.

There are several indications that suggest that Sarhili had thoughts in this direction. Yenywa, a senior councillor of Sarhili in charge of one of his cattle kraals, stated that in early August, shortly after the crisis of confidence in Mhlakaza, Sarhili sent a messenger to Moshoeshoe to inform him of the prophecies. (21) What resulted from this only became clear later, but at the time Sarhili stated that:

"he has a friend who would stand by him and with whom he had already made arrangements for moving into his country in case of need ..." (22)

The whole question of communication with Moshoeshoe is complicated by the fact that Moshoeshoe's complicity and indeed culpability in the movement was a favourite theory of Maclean and he might be expected to have found the evidence he desired to prove it one way or the other.

Nevertheless it is impossible to ignore the evidence that there was some connection between Sarhili and Moshoeshoe. The idea that Sarhili contemplated moving up into the vast and relatively open country between himself and the Sotho is born out by subsequent developments in which Sarhili became involved in Thembu internal struggles which, with his Thembu allies, nearly provoked a war with the Thembu mainforce, who stood in the way between him and the Sotho.

If this can even be partially accepted then the political conflicts associated with the cattle-killing, which have been examined, gain a more explicable motive. That a large organised war with the Thembu to relocate the main body of the Xhosa did not occur could well have been because so many were in a weakened and starving condition by the time the prophets were eventually called to account for themselves.
What further indications are there that Sarhili might have thought it possible to salvage political gains from the cattle-killing? First there is some evidence that Sarhili intended to, and did, preserve a large number of cattle. We know that Gcaleka cattle reserves had been enormous - from the numbers taken by Smith in 1847 and again by Cathcart in 1852 in their punitive raids against Sarhili.

Soga claims that Sarhili had at least five feed kraals at various points in his territory. Two of them he reported as containing over 1000 head of cattle each and the others, while still numerous, contained a smaller number. (23)

At the time of Sarhili's message to Moshoeshoe in October to inform him of the prophecies, reports were received from an unnamed informant who told Maclean:

"It is also true that Kreli has sent away many of his cattle to a distance. Those people also who live near the prophet have not slaughtered to the extent that those have done who live at a distance, say fifty or sixty miles off ... among the Gcalekas generally ... there will be a large number of Cattle left - I would say nearly one half, for there was by no means the same previous loss by lung sickness as there was down here" (i.e. in British Kaffraria J.L.) (24)

It was an often repeated observation that the extent of killing was far greater with the Ngqika, Ndlambe and Gqunukwebe than with the Gcaleka. Herbert Vigne, for example, reported that just prior to the first date set for the appearance of the 'wonders' on the 31st January, a trader, who had returned from beyond the Kei, observed that the "Gcaleka have not killed one half as many cattle as here." (25)

One reason for the greater extent of killing in the Ciskei could have been the greater intensity of the conflicts in the fractured Ciskeian chiefdoms compared to the relatively united Gcaleka.
Obviously retaining a number of the cattle would also have been politically advantageous and necessary if any mass removal of the Xhosa was contemplated.

That such a move was contemplated is suggested by three independent sources of information that all confirm Sarhili's stated intention of moving into the country of his unnamed 'friend'. A Thembu living on the way to Moshoeshoe claimed that no messengers had ever been sent by Moshoeshoe to Sarhili, but that messengers had frequently crossed the Orange River from Sarhili to Moshoeshoe asking for land which Moshoeshoe invariably refused. (26)

Secondly, Maclean claimed to have uncovered the reply made to Sarhili's messengers to Moshoeshoe in October, which broadly corroborates the information of Maclean's Thembu informer concerning Moshoeshoe's attitude towards giving land to Sarhili. It thereby also confirms that Sarhili did investigate the possibility of moving up to Moshoeshoe:

"Moshesh replied that he had no land to give away - that even if he had, he would not feel disposed to give it to a thieving people like the Kaffirs, for living so near and not being so well supplied with cattle and food as his people were, they would continually commit theft on them ..." (27) (emphasis added)

Thirdly, there is evidence that Sarhili sent out messengers to Sandille and Mhalla purporting to show an alliance between Sarhili and Moshoeshoe. A messenger from Sarhili arrived at Mhalla's after first visiting Sandille and stated:

"Moshesh sends to Kreli "My new cattle and people have been given out - are you ready? On return of this messenger I will move down and join you", Kreli answers - "I am ready" and forwards this news to Sandille, Macoma and Mhalla ..." (28)
If this report is correct it indicates that Sarhili wished to convey to other chiefs some form of alliance with Moshoeshoe. These three statements are of the greatest significance. Taken together with Sarhili's earlier statement they indicate that Sarhili did indeed entertain thoughts of removing to a new territory neighbouring the Sotho enclave. The obstacles that prevented such a move from becoming a reality were from the outset well-nigh insurmountable - the Thembu and Sotho presence in the Glen Grey and Herschel areas and the opposition of Moshoeshoe to crowding on his eastern border. It is a measure of Sarhili's desperation that he was prepared even to consider it.

The fact that he did consider it now seems likely, but as we have stressed, this only serves to explain the motivations of the political struggles associated with the cattle-killing - in short the tactical or strategic use to which it might have been put once underway. This cannot of course be too radically separated from the course of the cattle-killing itself. If Sarhili really did have such political ambitions, the cattle-killing served to get rid of some of the political obstacles to carrying them out. In many ways Sandille was a more serious obstacle to a mass relocation of the Xhosa than either the Thembu or Moshoeshoe. Such political ambitions could therefore have been the cause of prolonging the cattle-killing which might otherwise have been stopped, or have climaxed at an earlier point, as indeed it often showed signs of wanting to do.

It is possible that the Sotho who arrived at Hohita, Sarhili's Great Place, in January seeking refuge from Moshoeshoe were people who had been expelled by Moshoeshoe because they had acted on the prophecies against his orders. These refugees, it was rumoured, were 'unbelievers' who fled before the storm when the 'New People' arrived in Moshoeshoe's country. (29)

After the refusal of Xito to support Sarhili he assumed final responsibility for the completion of the cattle-killing. Sarhili sent messengers to Sandille to kill the remaining cattle and
goats. Between 4th January and 6th January about 3 head of cattle were killed at each kraal that still possessed any.

On the 6th January 5,000 to 6,000 people assembled near Butterworth in anticipation of the final fulfilment of the prophecies. However, they were to be disappointed, because the appearance of the 'New People' was put off to the next new moon in February. (30)

On the 9th of January 1857 Sarhili repeated the message for completion of killing, this time eliciting the response from Sandille that they must first see the promises fulfilled because there were so few cattle left, and most other Ngqika chiefs hid behind Sandille's stance on this. (31)

Sandille's unfavourable reaction to Sarhili's announcement of the imminent realisation of the prophecies brought with it the final confrontation between 'believers' and 'unbelievers'. At a seven hour meeting attended by 1,200 people at Sandille's Great Place, there was a fierce altercation between Tyala and Mbenguza and his ally Baba, which resulted in a final parting of the two groups amidst threats and accusations of treachery. (32)

Almost in contraindication to the final dawning of the prophecies, reports began circulating throwing doubts on the veracity of the prophet's words. Messengers were returning from Mhlakaza saying that nothing was to be seen. (33) Such reports were received not only by Sandille but by Mhalla and Phato as well. (34)

The only place where the movement made important gains in January was in Thembuland. Earlier Anta in the Windvogelberg had received a message from the Thembu regent, Nonesi, that her people were listening to Mhlakaza's prophecies and that she could not restrain them; they were slaughtering their cattle in great numbers and not sowing. (35)

The Thembu under Joyi and Mqaqeni across the Bashee were not killing, but those under Gasela, Fadana and Qesha were. In those
parts of the Thembu chiefdom where killing was going on, the same splits were occurring as elsewhere. Sarhili was already reported to be talking of a strike against Mqaqeni to capture cattle. He had a grievance against Mqaqeni because of a dispute arising out of his marriage to one of Mqaqeni's sisters. (36)

The Thembu connection was to prove a vital battleground as the internal conflict intensified in the wake of the collapse of the prophecies. The prophecy also spread to Mpondomise territory near the coast. (37) Faku, in Pondoland had also sent messengers to investigate, but had strictly forbidden any action.

The perception of these neighbouring chiefs sheds light on the motivation of the movement. At a massive meeting convened by Joyi and Nonesi in February, Joyi expressed his incredulity at the following which Sarhili and Nhlakaza had gained amongst their sections of the Thembu. In a long speech he concluded:

"What have you to do with the House of Kauta? What have you to do with the House of Gaika? What are the Ama Xosa to you that you run after strangers? Did not my father Gubencuka and my brother Umtirara always treat you well; protect you from all your enemies and fight all your battles and cause you to be feared by the surrounding nations? Is it not enough that you should have listened to the lies of the Ama Xosa tribes, and got yourselves into difficulties by joining Umlanjeni's war, by which you lost nearly all your country? Mercy, have mercy on me ... on Nonesi, have mercy on the orphans of your late Chief Umtirara, and come back to us your legitimate Chiefs ... I now command you let the cattle which have escaped live in peace and take care of the little corn which remains that the Ama Tembu may not be entirely scattered, and become servants to Kreli, for you are not sure that his service will be quite so pleasant as you seem to fancy!" (38)
From the perspective of chiefs opposing the movement they saw an attempt to gain control over their people and bring them under Sarhili. While their assessment is obviously prejudiced it may not, in this instance be inaccurate.

In keeping with the nature of the movement up to this point, Sarhili began to entertain doubts about the project just as things were coming to a climax.

Attempts were again being made to organise a meeting of chiefs at Butterworth. Sarhili was apparently in a determined mood and wished either to "see the New People or put a stop to the whole thing" - a trader at Butterworth reported. (39) In evidence of this mood he pointed to a slowing down of the trade in hides which before had been at anything from 50 to 200 per day and was now no more than 15 or 16 per day. He claimed that he had personally heard Sarhili state that "he himself had seen few wonders that were to appear." (40)

That Sarhili was in this mood is confirmed by a speech he is reported to have made less than a week later at a beer-drink at Hohita. He reportedly said:

"I have undertaken a thing of which I now entertain my doubts, but I am determined to carry it through. I have a perfect understanding with the other chiefs. I am Paramount and they are my councillors. No one opposed me when I first undertook what I have undertaken, I consider therefore that they have approved of what I have done. I have sent to Sandille, Macomo, Phato and Mhalla and our views are one. I have no cattle left, but I cannot starve, there are still cattle in the land and they are mine, I will take them when I require them. I have done nothing against the British Government, but should the Government attempt anything against me, I have dogs that will bite. I have now no encumbrance, but formerly when there was war I was anxious for
the safety of my flock. Now I can fight, or conceal myself without anxiety, and if I am involved, all will be alike involved, for we are all without cattle." (41)

As if to compensate for Sarhili's waning convictions, in the second week of January reports of a new prophet medium emerged in Mhalla's location. She was a young girl called Nonkosi and she began having visions very similar to those of Nongawuse. She prophesied from a pool on the Mpongo river, emphasising that the cattle-killing had to be carried on until all the cattle were destroyed, or else no new cattle would be provided. (42)

The Mpongo prophet was directly under Mhalla's patronage, but there is no evidence to support the contention subsequently constructed by Maclean that Mhalla or his councillor Kwitchie told her what to say. (43) She was particularly emphatic on the need to abandon witchcraft. (44)

The arrival of the Mpongo prophets certainly reinforced the call by Mhlakaza to await the new moon for the fulfilment of the prophecies and in the interim to complete the final destruction of all cattle, grain and goods and the casting off of all 'unbelievers'. (45)

The result was an enormous growth in the number of cattle being killed. In the Ndlambe location Mhalla was killing cattle at the rate of four or five a day. He even killed those cattle that formed the herd set apart at the time of the death of his father Ndlambe, that were supposed to die a natural death. (46) Between January 20th and 31st activity in support of the prophecies reached a new height.

Where before people killed as a sacrifice, one beast at a time with intervals in between - now they slaughtered in droves. (47) It even seems as if special 'agitation and propaganda' groups wandered from homestead to homestead telling of the new wonders to sustain action on the prophecies. (48)
On the 30th January a large crowd began assembling at Butterworth to hear the word of the prophet on when the prophecies would be fulfilled. By Saturday a crowd of 5,000 had gathered. Once again a message came from the prophet that all were to kill and that at no kraal were more than four head of cattle to be kept. Mhlakaza directed that all doors of the huts were to be made fast. At the end of the next week there were to be two days of darkness and on the third day all the cattle would rise. The sun would also rise in the west, the sea dry up or recede, the sky descend till it might be touched by the head and that there would occur an earthquake, during which the cattle would make their appearance. (49)

New corn pits were to be prepared to receive grain and new milk sacks made to hold the milk that would be provided by the resurrected (and immortal) cattle. The rising was to take place on the 4th, 5th and 6th of February.

Thus only at the beginning of February, after more than a year of prophecying by Mhlakaza, and his forerunners, was a fully worked-out commitment made to the masses. While people dispersed, Sarhili remained at Butterworth "that he may see Hintsa's cattle and Great Place re-appear at Butterworth where they formerly were." (50)

Symptomatic of the uneveness of the process of destruction of cattle, particularly in Gcalekaland, Brownlee observed that the Gcaleka believers were divided into two groups: those who had by that stage killed their last remaining cows and goats and those with three or four left. (51)

In the first weeks of February Sarhili sent out messages confirming Mhlakaza's orders and urged all to complete the killing of their cattle. The selling of skins stopped because the last remaining ones were used to make milk sacks.

During these crucial weeks there were strong attempts by the chiefs to control all cattle movements. Phato, who was geographically
closest to the Colony, was entrusted with seeing that no cattle crossed the Keiskamma. (52) They were to prevent such movements regardless of whether the people accompanying the cattle had passes issued for them by the Colonial magistrates or not. The question of the movement of cattle was crucial in the period of internal strife that followed the failure of the prophecies.

By the end of January Maqoma had only 5 head of cattle left, and all were soon to be killed in anticipation of the events of the 6th February. Mnalla had only 2 head left. In Phato's location "you could travel for miles without seeing a single head" (53). Oba, who had only begun killing much later than the others had only 15 head of cattle left out of more than 100. (54)

In the intervening period after the meeting at the end of January most chiefs retained representatives with Sarhili. The leading representatives were mostly the young sons of the Chiefs - Dilima (son of Phato), Namba (son of Maqoma), Fundella (a son of Botomane), Dulaze (son of Qesha), etc. (55)

At the end of the week when the prophecies were to be fulfilled it was announced that a final postponement of eight days was necessary before the cattle and people would emerge. (56) The prophet specified that each man could retain only one cow and one goat. In the intervening period the assembled chiefs all proclaimed that:

"their eyes were opened. They could now all see that Mhlakaza's words were true, they had themselves seen the New People, in great numbers, both mounted and on foot and even the unbelievers now admitted that all was true." (57)

Dilima and the other witnesses of the truth of the prophecies sent messages to their locations confirming the truth of the prophecies. He claimed that he heard and saw the 'New People' and that the order to kill was not Sarhili's but that of the 'New People' themselves (58). The only discordant note was struck by Namba who had loyally supported Maqoma from the beginning. He
said that he was dissatisfied because he had heard and seen nothing at Mhlakaza's, who denied he was responsible for what was going on. (59)

The effect of the final postponement on Sandille was devastating. Alternatively fraternising with and rejecting members of the 'unbeliever' group, he finally expelled all 'unbelievers' from his kraal. (60) Sandille at the same time admitted that nothing had been seen by the chiefs across the Kei. (61) In response to the postponement Sandille revealed the utter uncertainty he felt about what was actually likely to happen. He told Brownlee:

"Whatever the other Chiefs may do, or whatever the body of this people might do, he would take no part in war, and if after the expiry of eight days, he found that war was to be the result of Umhlakaza's predictions he would at once join me, for though he had killed his cattle, it was not with the design of making war on the Government, but simply because he believed in the predictions of Umhlakaza." (62)

This frank admission by the most important Ciskeian chief not fully in favour of the movement, indeed the one whose position was most directly threatened by it, is of undoubted significance. The question of war was undecided for Sandille as was the type of conflict that was to be unleashed. In Maqoma's locations the type of conflict was already in evidence: "The people" observed Brownlee, "are doing all in their power to bring about a collision with the unbelievers ..." (63)

II Disillusionment and its Effects

At the end of the eight days, when it was obvious that nothing was to occur, at least at this stage, Sandille left his homestead and returned to the neighbourhood of Tyala and his 'unbelieving' councillors. This was seen by the supporters of Mhlakaza as a desertion of Sarhili. They nearly came to blows, with the
'believers' asking Sandille why he had deserted Sarhili, when Sarhili had always stood by him:

Sandille's reply to the 'believers' was that he had "intended no compact with Sarhili but had been induced by Sarhili to ruin himself and his people." (64) Some chiefs saw doom staring them in the face. Xoxo (Sandille's brother) said that the "Xhosa are ruined and their chieftaincy is gone." (65) Others reacted by flight. Ten of Sarhili's senior councillors fled to Thembuland with what cattle they had.

Brownlee gave an example of the position of one of these senior councillors. Genqa reputedly had 600 cattle before the killing. He was married to a sister of Sarhili and she was his fourth wife. Although he was not a convinced supporter of the movement, Sarhili induced him to kill through the influence of his sister. The chief Buru went personally to observe Genqa killing his cattle. Obviously, if such a wealthy man were seen to be sacrificing his cattle it would influence many others to do the same. At the end of the cattle-killing he still had 20 milch cows left, but with his extensive family, this was insufficient to save them from starvation, and he fled. (66)

In late January Sarhili sent a message to Mhalla to say that, in the event of nothing 'coming out', he intended plundering the Mfengu and all non-killers and hoped Mhalla would do the same. (67)

Although many people did manage to get their few remaining cattle out of danger of attack, others were less fortunate. A group of Mfengu who were purchasing cattle had 66 head and 14 goats confiscated by Tyali, the son of a prominent councillor of Sarhili living on the wagon road to Butterworth in Mhalla's country. (68) In anticipation of a general attack on 'unbelievers' and Mfengu, 28 Mfengu fled from Mhalla's kraal to the Crown Reserve with 150 head of cattle. (69)

With the "Great Disillusionment" that followed the failure of the
prophecies the chiefs faced their greatest crisis of confidence. Increasingly they were faced by the starving masses of their people.

"Mhalla's kraal is visited every day by numbers who come to tell him they are starving 'by his orders'." (70)

From Maqoma's location Lucas reported that even the firm believers who were still killing their cattle, did so not because they still believed the cattle would rise but because:

"They are dissatisfied with the conduct of the Chiefs, who made them kill their cattle, and they have not up to the present time told their people that they have been deceived ... they say they will kill all the cattle that remains, and then go into service in the Colony." (71)

Many feared that it was useless to retain those cattle that they still had, because the chiefs were bound to claim them. It was easier to kill them and go into the Colony on a labour contract straight away. (72) Apart from the ideological crisis, the chiefs were also faced with the reality of the mass removal of their people into employment in the Colony.

Faced with this dual crisis, the chiefs responded in three ways. First, and most importantly, they attempted to gain cattle to sustain themselves and their followers by attacking the unbelievers and Mfengu. Secondly, they tried to revive belief in the prophecies of Mhlakaza. Thirdly they approached the Colonial State for emergency relief and assistance.

The attacks on those who still possessed cattle were the most systematic and organised attempts to salvage the situation after the collapse of the prophecies.

By late February leading non-believers, led by Siwani and Undai, came to Gawilir and complained that they were losing their stock by
thefts "and it was impossible for anyone with cattle to move, as the opposite party were always on the watch ..."(73)

The greatest scope for attacks on unbelievers was obviously in areas where unbelievers had congregated around those chiefs like Siwani who had opposed the movement. These people also had large numbers of cattle - in their case sent to them by those who retained doubts about the prophecies.

Bangai, the young son and heir of Seylo, conducted numerous raids on the kraals of unbelievers. (74) Mfundisi, a leading believer, attacked the cattle of Gcaleka unbelievers west of the Kei. He sent 16 head of captured cattle to Mhalla. (75)

In February, March and April 1857 the formation of raiding parties to confiscate cattle from unbeliever groups seemed to promise a way out of the impasse. It also explains why the really large movement of labour out of the Ciskei began only after June 1857.

To try to check the stealing of cattle, Maclean published a Government Notice on 3rd March 1857, imposing the death sentence for "all persons caught attempting to commit or having committed, robbery with arms in their hands ..." and that "all Kafirs found robbing in the Colony or elsewhere, will be fired upon ... His Excellency therefore urges upon the chiefs the necessity of warning their people of the charges they will incur if they become marauders ..." (76)

This proclamation was strictly enforced. In April summary death sentences were passed on 12 men convicted of having stolen cattle. Maclean in a vain bid to justify these ruthless proceedings claimed that in Ngqika's time, a person stealing from a garden could be summarily executed without legal process. (77) This distortion of Xhosa legal norms was really only an afterthought intended to satisfy his master, Sir George Grey.

Mfundisi, undeterred by Maclean's warnings, attacked the Mission Station under Birt on the Nahoon, and Mjuza took more than 100 cattle. (78)
It was also reported that Mhlakaza himself was involved in an attack on an "immense herd of cattle" that was being driven into Siwani's location. (79)

Dilima formed a party of 40 armed and mounted men and 200 men on foot, and went in search of any cattle he could find. (80) The attitude of the chiefs was voiced by Maqoma, who informed Lucas that if he seized the cattle of any 'unbelievers' attempting to leave his location with their cattle, he would have no blame in the matter:

"I will not give the fine to Government, I know the fines I promised to give and this is not one of them." (81)

After confiscating 38 head of cattle which were being driven on the Kei road from Mhalla's location to the Crown Reserve through Maqoma's location, Namba told Lucas that:

"the cattle were not Government property, and that all Kaffir cattle would be seized if the owners tried to remove them from the location." (82)

This and other incidents led to the stopping of the salaries which Maqoma and Namba had received up to that point. (83)

In this situation of impending insurrection against the government only Sandille now stood out. He sent messengers to all the surrounding chiefs telling them to oppose rebellion and that the promises of the prophet would never be fulfilled. (84) Although Sandille had nominally rejoined his councillors who opposed the movement, the non-believing councillors under Tyala still held a separate meeting on the current situation.

When the force under Dilima again attacked the homesteads of Mjuza, he gained unexpected assistance from Sandille who sent Tola to assist him and also "Fingoes and all people who had cattle." (85) By mid-March the mass of people were still holding on, hoping for some resolution of the crisis which would have saved them from being forced onto the Colonial labour market. As Gawler
saw it:

"Half of the tribe wishes to leave Umhalla, and the other half is starved, but the first must have safe hold of the Government before they take the step - in the mean time Government influence is decaying and numbers suspect themselves deserted." (86)

Gawler had plans for assisting those who still had cattle to 'take hold of the Government'. He proposed to "erect a revolution in Umhalla's country, aiding the well-disposed and bringing all under control suited to the present crisis." (87) He listed the following "influential non-killers and well-disposed chiefs", who he proposed would be paid as 'headmen' - Smith (a son of Mhalla), Undai, Tangxu, and Bulungwa. He also named 20 assistant headmen who were to serve under them.

The councillors of Mhalla may be "dispensed with" wrote Gawler, though Mhalla himself "if thought advisable, may be paid as a 'dummy'". The new 'chiefs' would be 'Government men' who Gawler thought would support the Colonial State and act ideologically and militarily in its support "at any time and without argument." (88)

In mid-April Gawler, with all the above-named councillors and heads of homesteads and about 1 500 followers, moved to the German camp at Berlin, thus formally splitting the Ndlambe chiefdom. (89)

Although Gawler's proposals were not taken up at once, they in fact represent exactly what occurred in stages in all the chiefdoms over the next eighteen months. Thus by the end of 1858 most of the important chiefs who had supported the movement were in jail on Robben Island for various offences they had allegedly committed; not during the time of the movement itself but during this period following the failure of the prophecies.

Siwani continued to fear an imminent attack both by Bangai and his Ndlambe supporters and by Phato who had previously defended the principle of "attacking his own dogs!". (90) In the Ngqika
locations attacks were planned on the homesteads of leading 'unbelievers' such as Soga. Soga sent his cattle to Anta's location and although Sandille could render him no further assistance he could see to it that they were not attacked en route. (91)

The need to acquire stock to give to the starving masses drove certain chiefs to intensify these punitive raids:

"In the country west of the Kei (i.e. British Kaffraria J.L.) I have heard of eight deaths from collision between captors and defenders of cattle and this is only the beginning of a worse state of affairs." (92)

Maclean estimated that at least 20 Gcaleka "defenders and attackers of cattle" had died in clashes over the ownership of the remaining cattle. (93)

Despite these exertions people began leaving Sandille's, Maqoma's and other locations in a flood. In April alone Lucas sent 673 people into the Colony on labour service contracts. (94)

Attacks on Mfengu attempting to move stock continued with increased intensity. (95) Gawler's new settlement of Ndlambe around Berlin became a focal point for refugees who fled from raiding parties. The climax of Maqoma's campaign to halt cattle movements out of the location came with his attack on Vusani, a headman who formed part of Gawler's private police force.

Vusani had informed Gawler of the hideout of Nqono who had been responsible for executing much of the cattle-raiding carried out by Mfundisi's people. According to Gawler, this led ultimately to Nqono being shot while "resisting arrest". Vusani was also responsible for confiscating cattle which it was alleged had been stolen. During one such raid by Vusani one of Maqoma's people was killed. For these reasons he was much hated by Mfundisi and Maqoma.
The attack on Vusani was led by one Zazini from Maqoma's location and all Vusani's property was confiscated and some was brought to Maqoma. Maqoma openly defended his right to attack those who, like Vusani, attacked and molested his people. (96) Since the suspension of his salary in April, Maqoma felt freed from the constraint that receiving payment from the Colonial State had imposed and felt able to act on his own without looking over his shoulder. Maclean sent a messenger to Maqoma ordering him to appear before him for interrogation, but Maqoma sent a highly disparaging message back which brought Maclean post haste to see Maqoma. In a state of high dudgeon Maclean demanded that Maqoma repeat to him the message he had sent. Maqoma calmly replied that he had desired the messenger to state that:

"he did not see how Maclean could suppose such a person as Maqoma was still in existence. Considering that he was almost dead with hunger, his money having been stopped by the Government, how could he have strength to visit Maclean; he was now nobody, what could Maclean wish to see him about?" (97)

Maqoma went on to attack bitterly the treatment he had received from Lucas who was "not the kind of man as at first represented to him; that, old as he (Maqoma) now is, he had never in his life been subjected to the usage he had received personally from Mr Lucas, letting alone the manner in which his people have been treated." (98)

Although Maclean took no direct action, shortly thereafter on the 29th August, Maqoma and two aides were arrested by the members of the Colonial Police on a charge of illegally entering the Colony. (99) After Maqoma had repeatedly asked Lucas for permission to enter the Colony to go and see one of his wives and was repeatedly refused, he expressed his determination to go into the Colony anyway. His arrest under the 3rd Section of the Colonial Act No. 23 of 1857 requiring all Xhosa to have a pass to enter the Colony was a formality. (100)
He thus became the first among the Xhosa chiefs to be arrested as a consequence of the cattle-killing and the Colonial State's desire to exploit it for the maximum potential disruption of the Xhosa chiefdoms.

As for Sandille, he did his best to protect people from raiding activities. The only raiding that he participated in was to assist Brownlee against some of Sarhili's people living in his location. He took 11 horses from Gunya, a Gcaleka, on the Thomas River and burnt all the huts of Gunya's homestead. (101) The horses he surrendered to Brownlee, but Gunya was forced out of the location. Later Sandille was involved in persecuting Seku, described as an "uncle" of Sarhili. He burnt his homestead and those of all people adhering to him. (102) These initiatives by Sandille indicate that he was acting with some vengeance against supporters of Sarhili in particular.

The end of the raiding activity was brought about by the most ambitious raids which were undertaken by the Thembu Chief Vadana. His activities were used to justify a large patrol of the Frontier Armed Mounted Police (F.A.M.P.) into Thembuland.

Early in August Warner, in Thembuland, reported a combined attack by Vadana and some Gcaleka on the Chief Darhalla in whose territory Vadana was located. This was the most concerted and purposeful raid to be carried out. The object, as Warner saw it, was the occupation of Darhalla's land by Vadana and the Gcaleka. (103)

Vadana had been the leading Thembu 'believer' and was thus closely allied to Sarhili. (104) Warner also suspected the involvement of Maqoma in this raid because of a marriage relation between them, but this is uncertain. What is true is that there were many Nqiqika and Gcaleka living in Vadana's and Darhalla's country.

The Gcaleka who participated in this raid were from Sarhili and not those that resided there. Warner relates the complete indecision of the opposing Thembu chiefs and their inability to take action. They were uncertain that the people would stand with
them if they intervened against Vadana because of the "peculiar
dread with which the common people hold the Believer party, thus
weakening their resolve to resist." (105)

The Colony responded to this raid with a Commando organised by
Currie, the commander of the F.A.M.P., and one of the most
notorious enemies of Xhosa interests. This raid led to the final
cessation of raiding as a response to the cattle-killing, the
capture of Vadana, and ultimately to the expulsion of Sarhili over
the Bashee River.

Vadana, in what was claimed to be a 'voluntary' statement after
his capture by Currie, shed some light on the motivation behind
the raiding. Vadana told how, after he and his people had killed
all their cattle they tried to buy grain. This grain was attacked
and stolen by Kula, one of the police of the Thembu magistrate
Warner, while on the way to Vadana. He responded by raiding Kula
(reminiscent of Maqoma's raid on Gawler's policeman Vusani), and
taking 79 head of cattle which he distributed to his people to
eat. Sarhili sent a party which captured 11 head of cattle from
Mahango - another paid man of Warner. Vadana then sent a message
to Mahango saying:

"I did not want to fight for the white man's cattle,

it was the black man's I intended to have." (106)

Like Maqoma, Vadana strongly objected to the Colonial magistrate's
police interfering with and robbing his people when they entered
the Colony. When he again attempted to buy corn from traders his
trading party was attacked by people from Darhalla's location. At
this point Vadana and another Thembu chief, Qesha, decided on a
joint attack against Darhalla and sent a large force against him.

They took over 200 cattle and killed some of Darhalla's people in
the process. Vadana sent seven of the cattle to Sarhili as
tribute and the remainder were distributed for the support of his
people.

He named eight prominent men of Sarhili who had raided the cattle,
taking up to sixty head of cattle at a time. That a mood existed which bordered on civil war is indicated by the missionary Mullins who was with Darhalla at this time. He reported that Sarhili was launching raids against those who had resisted his authority in Ndlambe territory, taking off cattle in large groups of "100 or more". (107) According to Mullins, Oba, Yeliswa and Anta were preparing for attacks to be made on them. He does not specify by whom, but presumably by Vadana and Sarhili. After his capture in August 1857, Vadana told Currie:

"Kreli still believes in the prophet, his people go to the place to see when the dead will rise. I do not believe any longer. Hunger has changed my belief and therefore I began to steal." (108)

The raiding activity was to provide the Colonial State with the opportunity it needed to arrest all those chiefs and others who had actively supported the movement. In a series of actions by the F.A.M.P., many chiefs and councillors were taken prisoner. The most prominent amongst them was Maqoma, the circumstances of whose arrest have already been described. He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.

Also arrested were Xoxo (Sandille's brother), Phato, Delima (Phato's son), Mhalla (Ndlambe), Nati, Mpasa (brother of Sarhili), Stokwe (Mbalu), Tyali, Vadana, Qesha, Bangai (Mdushane) and Qasana (alias Mfundisi), along with 349 others. (109) These influential leaders were sentenced to terms of 5 to 21 years imprisonment for offences sometimes as vague as the alleged "intent to steal". (108) Mhalla was sentenced to five years.

The procedures adopted at these trials were highly dubious. Grey himself admitted that "although Macoma has been acquitted of the murder of Fusani, he is morally responsible for the murder ... " and ordered the court to reconsider its verdict of not guilty. Phato received 5 years for receiving stolen goods, after being first found not guilty and the Court then being required to reconsider it's decision.
The other major development to come out of the raiding activity was the invasion of Gcalekaland by Currie's police with Thembu assistance in March 1858, and the expulsion of Sarhili over the Bashee River. (110) This injustice sponsored by Sir G. Grey, created the vacant area which was shortly to become Fingoland and have such a crucial bearing on the remainder of the 19th century Ciskei.

The second main line of defence against the failure of the prophecies was not to admit that they had in fact failed. As Vadana indicated, many Gcaleka still believed in the possibility of the prophecies being fulfilled.

As late as the end of May 1857 reports were being received of influential people joining in the killing of cattle. A brother of Toise, Mgangu, a son of Gaseila and a son of Sonto were all said to have joined the movement, apparently not having previously sacrificed cattle. (112)

By late February 1857 wives who had deserted their husbands at the height of their expectations of the revelations, were beginning to return. (113) At the same time Dilima and other young chiefs were busily trying to revive belief in the prophecy. Dilima, Nrawe (councillor of Mhalla), Qelo and Namba all went to see Mhlakaza to find out what instructions he had for them. (114)

The delay in the appearance of the 'New People' was ascribed by Mhlakaza to Dilima as being because of "some misunderstanding between the chiefs of the New People." (115) This news was greeted with scepticism by Sandille, who only confirmed his complete opposition to any further action. Maqoma appears to have been interested in Mhlakaza enough to send further messengers to him.

Mhlakaza elaborated by saying that there was a "difference of opinion between the people of the Impongo and those who have appeared at Mhlakaza's as to who should lead during the rising, but this has now been settled by the removal of the Impongo people
to the Qora ... and as soon as matters are finally settled between the progenitors of Gcaleka's and Gaika's tribes, they would make their appearance ..." (116) This appears to be the last communication made by Mhlakaza.

Feeling that the responsibility for what was happening might be shifted to her, one of the two young prophetesses on the Mpongo announced that "the Umpongo is merely a side branch dependent on the main station." (117) However the Mpongo prophets continued conveying revelations for at least a month after all hope of action on the prophecies had faded. (118)

Brownlee wrote that the chiefs were still "contemplating their final downfall, while many who go to the Colony still believe and have taken with milk sacks which they made for the promised cattle." (119)

Belief in the prophecies prospered in small groups where it had not previously been dominant. The Ngqika chief Feni began killing cattle at the urging of his mother when an unexpected outbreak of lung-sickness occurred among his cattle. (120)

Mfundisi, one of the main organisers of the movement with Mhalla, suggested that a deputation of chiefs be sent to the prophet at the Mpongo to ask "why she did not do something to relieve the destitute?" (121)

Lucas reported a revival of cattle-killing in Maqoma's location, the objective of which, he thought, was to provide sustenance for the people until the next season and thus halt the exodus of people from the location to the Colony. (122) They might have met with some success in this; as has been seen, the migration of people was not higher than 65% of the population at the most. The rest might well have been sustained throughout 1857 and part of 1858 by judiciously eating the remaining cattle.

In June 1857, Hawkes reported that:
"believers of the prophet are complying with his instructions to make holes in the ground, which are to be covered up for some time, and when examined will be found to contain grain ... They are also directed to burn the grass in their gardens, so that corn may come up in its place, and that (the grass, J.L.) in the country, as the cattle of the unbelievers are grazing there and prevent the dead cattle from rising ... (123)

All this activity was sufficient to cause the arrival of a new prophet at the kraal of 'Tsimbi' in Gcalekaland who had some influence with Sarhili. He is reported to have ordered the return of all Gcaleka from their places of refuge in Thembuland, Pondoland and the Colony. (124)

It is clear therefore that action on the prophet's revelation did not disappear with the initial failure of February 1857 or even with Mhlakaza's subsequent death. Throughout 1858 attempts were reported of revivals of the movement from Kama's location and in parts of Thembuland. (125) Brownlee reported as late as October 1858:

"cattle-killing has been begun among the Tambookies though hitherto not generally or extensively, the killing being confined to oxen; a new prophet has arisen, who gives out that Mhlakaza's predictions are true, and will be accomplished ..." (126)

Even later, in April 1860, it was reported to Maclean that a prophet had arisen among the Bomvanas in the Transkei, whose sayings were "like that of the late Umhlakaza delusion." (127)

If these after-effects of belief in the prophecies are taken into account, it may be seen that they endured from their origins in the summer of 1855 through to 1860 before finally disappearing, leaving behind them the most disastrous five years of instability and disruption of the Xhosa chiefdoms.

The final aspect of the response of the Xhosa chiefs as the failure of prophecy was to seek assistance from the Colonial
State. The way the chiefs went about this was of great significance in defining how the Xhosa were ultimately to overcome the legacy of the cattle-killing.

As if in admission that they had suffered an ideological defeat, Brownlee reported that:

"Sandille and his brother Dundas have both purchased and wear European clothing, a thing which neither of them would ever before be induced to do ..."

(128)

The recantation of 'Dundas', who was one of the most ardent supporters of the movement was significant. Together with Sandille, he was primarily concerned with preserving his pay from the Colonial State on which they were both now more dependent than ever.

Sandille told Brownlee that he would like to "resign his authority into the hands of Government ... and that he wished in fact to act as a Policeman under the Government ... (129)" His words were prophetic! However at the time Brownlee felt that he was motivated only by a desire to get his salary free from any of the responsibilities still attached to it, especially that of suppressing stock theft.

Not all the chiefs supported attempts at the revival of the prophecies. Pre-eminently among those who did not, Mhalla and Phato seemed to favour switching their efforts immediately to achieving concessions and assistance from the Colonial State. Phato was the first to embark on this course and it is to this that he owes his relatively light sentence. He cast off his son Dilima saying that "he does not care what part he takes." He acknowledged that:

"He had committed a great mistake in receiving messages from Kreli and his prophet, and thanked the Government for having sent a magistrate here and professed himself willing to go to Ft. Murray whenever the Government called him." (130)
Phato's recantation was probably genuine and he did his best to shield his most prominent councillors, hoping to satisfy the Colony with the sacrifice of Dilima who was so involved in attacks on Siwani and Kama that his position was beyond saving from Colonial retribution.

Mhalla by contrast had a more ambivalent approach. Privately he acknowledged to Mfundisi in May 1857 that the prophet on the Mpongo "was nothing" and that "he would rather encourage the people to leave the country, as it was clear that they would gain nothing by remaining." (131) However it took him four months to acknowledge as much to Gawler.

In September 1857 he sent to Gawler saying simply:
"I have yielded. I am a Government man, see now that I am; my people are not gone to Faku, they are not gone to Moshesh, they have entered under the Government - Faku has plenty of food - Moshesh has plenty of food, more than the Government. I say so because food is not bought in Faku's country; it is not bought in Moshesh's country - people enter there and serve and are given food, but it has to be bought in Government country, and yet we like the Government best! We do not go to Faku, we do not wish to go to Moshesh - we will die of hunger near the Government!" (132)

With bitter irony Mhalla recognised the overwhelming grasp that the Colony had come to exercise over his people, and that flight to the Colony was now more attractive than flight to the Mpondo or the Sotho kingdoms. The Ndlambe, with all the Xhosa, were destined to enter ever more firmly into the orbit of the Colonial State economic activity - on terms dictated by the Colonial State. They therefore had to accept it's logic - that food was from then on to be bought through labour!

Mhalla declared that all his actions had been based on sincere belief in the prophet:
"I have fallen - I fell because it was said that my forefather Rarabe would appear and my father would appear and my mother would appear and my brothers would appear and that I should not grow old." (133)

He requested food for his family and for the old people who were starving and enough seed so that all who wished to cultivate might do so.

Gawler immediately tried to take advantage of Mhalla's mention of Moshoeshoe and Faku and wrote back encouraging him to send his people there, obviously in the hope that he might get rid of the Ndlambe population of the Ciskei permanently. Mhalla, only when faced with this dire possibility, sent to Gawler saying:

"I am a Policeman of the Government, Umhalla says so ...... (134)

Gawler need not have worried, for the Colonial State had every intention of seizing the opportunity presented by the partial de-population of the Xhosa territory to seize yet more land for the Colonists.

Sarhili was the last to acknowledge defeat. In February 1858, a month before Currie's raid against him he sent to Maclean:

"Kreli craves for assistance from Government as he is starving ... He wishes Government to forgive him for having listened to Mhlakaza." (135)

Despite his weak position he spoke out about the chiefs who had been arrested:

"Kreli says he does not know why the Kaffir Chiefs have been apprehended as they have done no more than he himself ..." (136)

Sarhili's mood at the time is well illustrated by his response to the news of the Indian Rebellion which took place in 1857. This event influenced the Cape because troops were demanded from there for duty in India. Among those who departed was the unlamented
Major Gawler. Sarhili is represented as having commented:
"Our ancestors that refused to rebel, rebel now in India, they give our enemies the English so much to do that they called their troops, which were in our country to India to help them. What a great pity it is that I at present am not able to help our black brothers, on the other side of the sea, but I hope that shortly I will be in a position to do so ..." (137)

Thus at the end of the period of disillusionment all the chiefdoms had been disrupted and divided. The Gqunukwebe were split between Phato and Kama; the Mdushane between Siwani and Bungai; the Mbalu between Stokwe and Santo; the Ndlambe between Mhalla and his sons Mackinon and Smith; the Ngqika between Sandille and Maqoma's sons, Namba and Kona. Many had died and thousands had migrated. The chiefdoms had suffered a profound ideological defeat.

To many Colonial officials this seemed to be the very "revolution in their circumstances" of the Xhosa that Brownlee felt was needed if Colonial rule was to supplant the chiefs, and agriculture supplant pastoralism as the mainspring of the domestic economy of the conquered people.

The first steps in this direction were taken by reinforcing the position of those who had supported the unbeliever party. A whole generation of paid Government 'policemen' and 'headmen' replaced the 'paid councillors' of Grey's original plan.

Brownlee was the first to point out that:
"The Chiefs originally had a voice in the nomination of paid councillors; men were nominated for stipends according to their rank in the Tribe, though otherwise I would have set them aside, and named more worthy persons." (138)

The time had certainly arrived for a mass 'setting aside' of those who the Colonial officials considered 'unworthy' and their replacement with people who, if not more worthy, were certainly
more firmly under the grip of the Colonial State. 74 councillors who had received pay under Grey's original scheme were dropped by Brownlee. A small police force directly under Brownlee's command was created. (139) This process was repeated in other locations.

Reports from the magistrates urging the Colonial State to take advantage for the Colonists of the temporary migration of so much of the population were sent in from all sides. Reeve from Middle Drift in Kama's location advised:

"the time has come when we should act to take advantage of the general move. The land formerly occupied by the families who have taken advantage of the demand for labour in the Colony is ... the most rich and productive portion of this location ..." (140).

He proposed the relocation of Kama and his son to a "more suitable" part of the location, and the filling up of the vacant land with the settlers and "school people" from the mission.

Warner, the magistrate with the Thembu (and certainly the most opinionated and wordy man on the frontier) wrote in glowing terms of the "providential failure of the Umhlakazian combinations against the Colony, having produced such an extra-ordinary and unexpected revolution as regards our relations with the native tribes ... that any regulation for their management may be safely introduced." (141)

The 'regulations' which he had in mind were European settlement in a large part of the Thembu location "with the consent of the chiefs, which I think might easily be obtained ..."; the replacement of Xhosa or Thembu law with Colonial Law "by degrees"; the replacement of the judicial functions of the chiefs by the magistrates and the minimising of their political role.

The views of Brownlee, Reeve and Warner fell on the fertile soil of Sir George Grey's imagination. He, however, was looking for something more spectacular than their rather mundane suggestions. This was provided by Maclean who took up the struggle in favour of
the unprovoked expulsion of Sarhili from his country and its occupation by the Mfengu. This was the sort of scheme which was grandiose enough for Grey to sympathise with. It stands as perhaps the most cynical of all Grey's exploits and was performed as an act of political policy when no real or imagined military threat existed. The reasons for Sarhili's expulsion over the Bashee were made resoundingly clear by Maclean.

"The removal of Kreli would break up the unity of the Tribes for it would render the Chiefs in Kaffraria independent and a greater seeker after his interests, whereas if Kreli is to be permitted to re-occupy every Kaffir will look to him, hold himself as one of a nation under him ... but by this (removal) and the breaking up of their nationality there would be greater chance of changing their habits ..." (142)

The expulsion of Sarhili created the open country over the Kei which was to become Fingoland. As the immigration of Mfengu to the Transkei is of such pivotal importance in understanding the subsequent economic developments in the Ciskei, it is worthwhile emphasizing that the creation of the Mfengu enclave in the Transkei finds its origins in the aftermath of the cattle-killing. As Maclean, with great perspicacity observed, the expulsion of Sarhili will:

"do away greatly with the chance of combination between the Fingoes and Kaffirs against us, a chance not at all impossible to occur a few years hence, when the Colonial and Crown Reserve settlements become over-crowded." (143)

The expulsion of Sarhili over the Bashee in March 1858 was followed up with Government Notice No. 18 of July 1858. In terms of this notice, issued scarcely 12 months after the failure of the prophecies, 200 farms of 1 500 acres each were proclaimed for European settlement on either side of the East London - King William's Town road, thus excising 300 000 acres out of what were
In pursuing this land grabbing line of policy the Colonial State was ensuring the urgent and necessary maintenance of some form of political organisation amongst the dispossessed. A form of political organisation which, given the lack of any other model, inevitably had to be based on the political and ideological tradition of the Xhosa chieftaincy. While economic relationships underwent a thoroughgoing transformation, the basis was in fact being laid for the retention, within a modified framework, of the political and ideological form of the Xhosa chieftaincy within the Xhosa and Mfengu communities.

While some missionaries crowed that the deportation of the chiefs had given "the nationality of the Kaffirs the last stab", they soon found the real dialectic more complex than their narrow dogma allowed. (144)

How this political and ideological tradition of the Xhosa chieftaincy was adapted to serve the new economic base which supported it, as well as a detailed consideration of the transformation of the economic base itself, will form the burden of the subsequent chapters.

Perhaps it is well to leave the last word on the history of Xhosa resistance to Colonial domination to Maqoma, who expressed a sentiment that was to persist in the thoughts of many black intellectuals and indeed in the masses well into the 20th century. He told Maclean:

"that he was well aware the Government over the sea had the same (favourable J.L.) feeling it always had, towards all Kaffirs whether believers or unbelievers, School people or Fingoes; the injustice he complained of was that practiced by Government in this country and especially the Civil officers in this province. If he, Macoma, had only been educated and could write, he would represent things in their true light ..." (145)
(1) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 15th January 1857.

(2) Ibid.


(5) G.H. 8/32, Brownlee to Maclean, 23rd May 1857.


(8) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 4th January 1857.

(9) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 10th January 1857. Return of Number of Kraals cultivating and those not cultivating and that have joined "Mates" party.

(10) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 5th February 1857.


(15) A number of notable people stressed the importance attached to visual proof of the presence of the 'New People' and their cattle; among these at different times, Sandille and Cobus Congo.

(17) Ibid.

(18) W. Gqoba in Jordan, A.C., op.cit. p. 74.


(20) G.H. 8/31, Lamant to Maclean, 2nd June 1856.


(22) G.H. 8/29, Vol. II, Maclean to Grey, 19th October 1856, and Maclean to Grey, 27th October 1856, where Gocweni, son of Matomela is stated as being the messenger to Moshoeshoe.

(23) Soga, J.H., op.cit. p. 123.


(26) G.H. 8/31, Information received by Maclean, 11th January 1857. Sanders regards it as unlikely that Moshoeshoe had never even been in touch with Sarhili, op.cit. p. 234.

(27) B.K. 89. Communication to Maclean, 8th November 1856. Gocweni, son of Matomela is again named as the messenger. In the face of these two pieces of information concerning Moshoeshoe's attitude, it is suprising that Maclean subsequently spun the yarns about Moshoeshoe that he did.
(28) G.H. 8/31, Gawler to Maclean, 3rd January 1857. Similarly Sarhili sent a messenger to Kama urging him to withdraw his orders to cultivate, saying "the cattle are already beginning to rise in Moshesh's country". See G.H. 8/31, Reeve to Maclean, 7th January 1857.

(29) G.H. 8/31, Information received by J. Maclean, 11th January 1857.

(30) G.H. 8/31, Information received from beyond the Kei by Maclean, n.d.

(31) G.H. 8/31, Maclean to Grey, 9th January 1857; BK 89 Secret Information received by Maclean, 9th January 1857.

(32) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 13th January 1857. See also Brownlee, C. op. cit. p. 150.

(33) Ibid.

(34) G.H. 8/31, Lamont to Maclean, 2nd January 1857.


(36) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 13th January 1857. Brownlee refers to a rumour that the prophecy was initiated by Mqaqeni in order to be avenged on Sarhili for disgracing his sister.

(37) G.H. 8/31, Information received by Maclean, 14th January 1857.

(38) C.O. 2949, Vol. 2, Warner to Richard Southey, 24th February 1857. (Emphasis in original). It is of some significance that in Joyi's speech and in others made on that day no mention is made of impending war with the Colony. Although Joyi referred to his loyalty to the Government, his main concern was potential loss of control over his followers.
(39) G.H. 8/31, Information received by Maclean, 17th January 1857.

(40) Ibid.

(41) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 25th January 1857. If any further proof were needed that Sarhili did not intend to start a war this was surely it. His fears of attack by Grey were certainly justified. This report is probably from the same unnamed trader who reported Sarhili's change of attitude.

(42) G.H. 8/31, Information received by Maclean, 16th January 1857.

(43) Cape of Good Hope Printed Papers, G. 5 - 1858. "Papers Indicating the Nature of the Plans formed by the Kaffir Chiefs..."

(44) G.H. 8/31, Gawler to Maclean, 14th January 1857. See also Information received by Maclean, 8th February 1857.


(47) 'Mullins Diary', Unpublished Ms. Cory Library, Grahamstown. The Diary is one of the best sources for the rate of killing in this month. See entry Saturday 10th January.


(49) B.K. 89. Substance of a statement made to the Chief Commissioner ± 5th February 1857. See also G.H. 8/31, Maclean to Grey, 5th February 1857.

(50) Ibid.
(51) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 2nd February 1857.

(52) G.H. 8/31, Information received by Maclean, 3rd February 1857. See also Brownlee to Maclean, 4th February 1857.

(53) G.H. 8/31, Information received by Maclean, 8th February 1857.


(56) G.H. 8/31, John Crouch to Maclean, 9th February 1857.

(57) B.K. 89, Information received by Maclean, 11th February 1857.


(59) G.H. 8/31, Lucas to Maclean, 14th February 1857.

(60) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 8th February 1857.

(61) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 11th February 1857.


(63) Ibid.

(64) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 21st February 1857.

(65) Ibid.

(66) Ibid.

(67) G.H. 8/31, Gawler to Maclean, 26th January 1857.
(68) G.H. 8/31, Statement by Mfengu who crossed the Kei to Maclean, 14th February 1857.


(70) G.H. 8/31, Gawler to Maclean, 24th February 1857.

(71) B.K. 82, Lucas to Maclean, 30th May 1857.

(72) G.H. 8/32, Reeve to Maclean, 4th June 1857.

(73) G.H. 8/31, Gawler to Maclean, 24th February 1857.

(74) G.H. 8/31, Reeve to Maclean, 24th February 1857.

(75) G.H. 8/31, Gawler to Maclean, 3rd March 1857.

(76) G.H. 8/31, Government Notice King Williams's Town, 3rd March 1857.

(77) G.H. 8/31, Maclean to Grey, 23rd April 1857. Although it seems that these sentences were commuted, as Grey subsequently claimed "no capital sentence has yet been carried into execution upon any native prisoner in Kaffraria, during the whole of the recent disturbances ...". See G. Grey: 'Cape of Good Hope Proceedings and Findings of the Court' ... etc. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, 1858.

(78) G.H. 8/31, Gawler to Maclean, 6th March 1857.


(80) G.H. 8/31, Vigne to Maclean, 7th March 1857.

(81) G.H. 8/31, Lucas to Maclean, 7th March 1857.
(82) B.K. 82, Lucas to Maclean, 23rd March 1857.

(83) B.K. 82, Lucas to Maclean, 21st April 1857.

(84) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 24th February 1857.


(86) Ibid.

(87) G.H. 8/31, Gawler to Maclean, 12th March 1857.

(88) Ibid.

(89) G.H. 8/31, Maclean to Grey, 16th April 1857.


(91) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 4th April 1857.

(92) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 11th March 1857.

(93) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 7th March 1857.

(94) G.H. 8/31, Lucas to Maclean, 30th May 1857.

(95) G.H. 8/32, Gawler to Maclean, 20th June 1857.

(96) B.K. 82, Lucas to Maclean, 18th July 1857.

(97) B.K. 82. Transcript of interview between Maclean and Maqoma. 12th August 1857.

(98) Ibid. Lucas had actually struck Maqoma and Maqoma struck him back before his aides intervened.
(99) G.H. 8/32, Vol. II, Maclean to Grey, 29th August 1857. The Colonial Police, known as the Frontier Armed Mounted Police, were established in 1853. Subsequently they converted into the Colonial Cape Mounted Riflemen. For the role of these forces, see Young, P.J. : Boot and Saddle, Maskew Miller, Cape Town, (1955). Especially Chapter 9 - "The Dream of Nongquase".

(100) G.H. 8/31, Lucas to Maclean, 29th August 1857.

(101) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 3rd July 1857.

(102) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 11th August 1857.


(105) Ibid.


(109) B.K. 10, Lt. Governor Miscellaneous Correspondence "Return of Kafir Chiefs Undergoing Transportation in Robben Island". See also G.H. 17/4, 21st January 1862.

(110) B.K. 65, Taylor to Maclean, 26th April 1856.

(111) C.O. 2968, Warner to Southey, 9th March 1858.

(112) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 28th May 1857.
(113) G.H. 8/31, Hawkes to Maclean, 22nd February 1857.

(114) G.H. 8/31, Information received by Maclean, 28th February 1857.

(115) B.K. 89, Information communicated to Maclean, 28th February 1857.

(116) G.H. 8/31, Brownlee to Maclean, 1st March 1857.

(117) G.H. 8/31, Gawler to Maclean, 28th February 1857.


(119) G.H. 8/32, Brownlee to Maclean, 16th May 1857.

(120) G.H. 8/32, Brownlee to Maclean, 7th May 1857.

(121) B.K. 89, Gawler to Maclean, 18th May 1857.

(122) B.K. 82, Lucas to Maclean, 30th May 1857.

(123) B.K. 80, Hawkes to Maclean, 17th June 1857.


(125) B.K. 65, Chalmers to Maclean, 1st September 1858.

(126) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 12th October 1858.

(127) B.K. 89, Information received by Maclean, 15th April 1860.

(128) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 24th August 1857.

(129) Ibid.

(130) G.H. 8/31, Vigne to Maclean, 23rd September 1857.
(131) B.K. 89, Memorandum of information communicated to Maclean, 18th May 1857.


(133) Ibid.

(134) Ibid.

(135) B.K. 89, Statement made by 'Posse' messenger from Sarhili to Maclean, 2nd February 1858.

(136) Ibid.


(140) B.K. 86, Reeve to Maclean, 29th April 1857.

(141) C.O. 2968, Warner to Southey, 19th January 1858.

(142) B.K. 415, Maclean to Grey, n.d. February 1858.

(143) Ibid.

(144) Liefeldt, Berline Missionberichte 1858 : 20.

(145) B.K. 82, Interview Maclean and Maqoma, 12th August 1857.
CHAPTER 9

THE GROWTH OF COMMODITY PRODUCTION

I Theoretical Considerations

We have seen that the cattle-killing was responsible for a massive growth in commodity production. This growth in production encouraged increased investment in ploughs, wagons and sheep, all of which were part of the process of entry into commodity markets by black producers.

In assessing the extent of commodity production in the 1857-58 boom the necessity of adopting a detailed breakdown procedure in examining market statistics was emphasised. By this was meant that market statistics must be related to the number of production units, the number of harvests involved (is the crop which is being marketed the product of one or two harvests?) and the likely nett return to each production unit and the per capita value of the product. Only after a set of market statistics has been analysed in this way can any statement be made about the likely effects on the 'prosperity' of the community of such participation in the commodity markets.

However, as was also pointed out above, it is necessary to go further than this purely empirical critique of the significance of market statistics in historical research. It is also necessary to pose the question of the nature of the relationship of the mass of production units or households to the Colonial economy and to view the commodity market as a particular aspect of this.

It was earlier suggested that a distinction may be made between a surplus on the market and a 'real' surplus above subsistence requirements. Any part of the total product brought to the market functions as a surplus in the strictly economic sense. However,
many households marketed crops that were not surpluses above their subsistence requirements. That producers should have been motivated to sell part of what they required for subsistence (usually soon after the harvest) can have been caused only by their being subjected to pressure to sell, such as having to pay taxes or by the need to purchase commodities which had become necessities and for which they needed money.

If producers in the Eastern Cape were selling part of their subsistence requirements, this could mean only two things; either they were acquiring money elsewhere with which to purchase food at a later stage, or they were experiencing a nett decline in living standards.

In fact the two propositions are not mutually exclusive. Money was acquired by many households through wage labour and very often a decline occurred in living standards. However these effects were not evenly spread. They differed from household to household. In the years following the cattle-killing one of the most important shifts that occurred in the structure of the production units was the break up of the homestead grouping with a greater emphasis on the single family in production. In this way each family or household achieved a different blend or mix of productive factors in the overall composition of its productive activity. This, of course, makes it extremely difficult to generalise about the position of groups of households in broad categories such as 'small', 'middle' and 'big' which have sometimes been used to distinguish strata of the peasantry in other social formations. (1)

In British Kaffraria the effect of commodity production on the mass of households was to cause a clearly discernible differentiation and polarisation of the communities. But this differentiation was not a static phenomenon. A decline in the fortunes of a household to such an extent that they had to leave the district might only see them rise again if they entered into a favourable relationship as a tenant on a Colonial farm. A minority, who acquired ploughs and wagons and concentrated on enlarging the sphere of marketable production in their total
product, were in a quite different position. Many of these households, after initial success, also found their position beginning to deteriorate as a result of poor harvests, drought, insufficient labour and limited access to land. Between those who left and those who prospered were many who incorporated wage labour and commodity production into their overall productive activity, and who fought a constant battle against low yields, cash shortages and declining levels of subsistence.

In examining the history of production in the Ciskeian districts, it is necessary to distinguish between these different strata and to relate them together to determine their numerical position in the overall structure of production, their relative contributions to the total product and the differential effects on nett and per capita income.

It would be wrong to generalise from statistics taken from one year and perhaps a comment from a magistrate in another year (and perhaps from another district!) that the conditions for most of the households were 'prosperous' for any particular period. Rather, the trends in productive activity have to be looked at cumulatively for a specified period as a whole. In this regard it is particularly important to realise the effects of 'good' and 'bad' years for agriculture conducted on small allotments and dry land. Under such conditions agriculture remains extremely vulnerable to the weather. Certain households, stratified objectively by access to means of production and labour, were also further polarised by the differential effects of drought and other less severe climatic variations.

In dealing with the East European and Russian peasantry some useful models have been presented by various authors. Here we will examine the work of Witold Kula (on Poland) and Theodore Shanin (on Russia) for their relevance in analysing household productions in the Eastern Cape. (2)

Kula, in his discussion of the Polish peasantry in the 16th and 17th century is primarily responsible for recognising the
connections between total product, commodity product and subsistence product. (3) In brief, Kula found that fluctuations in the marketed part of household production under feudalism were greater than fluctuations in overall product. That is, a drop in overall product caused a proportionately greater drop in marketed product. Similarly an increase in overall product caused a proportionately greater increase in the marketed portion of the product.

Kula also made the important observation that as the number of acres decreased, the size of the overall product per household decreased to such an extent that in poor years many peasant households were not able to produce sufficient for subsistence or self-maintenance. This led to many households going undernourished and also to a lowering of the threshold of what constituted a 'bad year'. In his analysis of the short term dynamic of the peasant household Kula has provided a convenient way of representing the economic performance of the peasant household.

**Figure 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVERALL NET PRODUCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHADED AREA: COMMODITY PRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODUCT CONSUMED FOR SELF-MAINTENANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME (YEARS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kula allowed that the trend in production was to decrease the extent of commodity product in bad years and by its effects on the peasant households to increase the occurrence of 'bad years'. This is represented in figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that in a 'bad' year the proportion of commodity product contracts more than the relative fall in total product. It also shows that the total product may decline so that it is less than the amount conventionally required for self-maintenance. In good years the product is large and the price obtained on the market declines. Because the subsistence product is a relatively fixed amount this simply encourages the peasant to market more in order to realise sufficient money for commodity purchases. However because of the nature of the relationship between the peasant household and the feudal lord's demesne, the peasant could forego commodity purchases in bad years and therefore forego bringing any part of the product to the market. This was the peasant's defence against the effects of bad years when the total product could decline to below the amount conventionally required for subsistence.

Kula recognises that even under feudalism the assumption of a fixed and stable quantity for self-maintenance or subsistence is unrealistic. As he puts it:

"This diagram (Figure 1, J.L.) represents a serious inaccuracy. In actual fact, it would be accurate if the peasant did not go undernourished. Since this undoubtedly occurred very often, even in an average year, we have to conclude that the level of consumption for self-sustenance was not in all likelihood as stable as appears from the diagram" (4)
If this assumption is problematic for a peasant household under feudalism, it is impossible to sustain for a household incorporated into a broader capitalistic economic system. Whereas the peasant household under feudalism can withdraw into its shell (as Kula put it) this is impossible for a rural household incorporated into a capitalist system. In good years the household production unit may still continue to market the maximum product thus forcing the price down. However in bad years the household production units very often market a proportionately greater part of their total production. This is because of the need for cash imposed by taxation and necessary commodity purchases. Bad years also cause more of the labour of the household to be used for earning wages to make up the shortfall in consumption requirements, than for domestic production.

In both 'good' and 'bad' years it therefore becomes possible for the proportion of the product sold on the market to determine a variable amount of the product to be available for self-maintenance. When the total nett product declines, households, instead of withdrawing from the commodity markets, cut down on the amount required for self-maintenance. This variable amount retained for self maintenance can be represented as in Figure 3.

**Figure 3**

![Diagram](image)

From Figure 3 it can be seen that a large increase in the total product may lead to a small increase in the amount retained for self-maintenance, (because of a drop in prices) but a sharp drop
in the total product leads to a drop in the amount of product retained for self-maintenance without a proportional decrease in the commodity product. If this result is reproduced over a sufficient number of years the self-maintenance norm will also decrease and the productive community as a whole will experience a decline in its standard of living. It may thus be seen that the dynamic of household production under a predominantly capitalist system is very different from the feudal system.

Under capitalism it may still be true that (as under feudalism) the household production unit aims for a target money income, but the need for payment of taxes and purchase of commodities with money is much greater. The possibility under capitalism of wage labour to supplement domestic income increases the intensity of the relationship of the household with the larger economic system. The importance of this observation is that it is precisely in the declining levels of subsistence and the loss of an increasing part of the labour of the household to wage work to make up the shortfall, that the subordination of the household production units to the capitalist mode of production is apparent. (5)

In this chapter the changing dynamic of reproduction of the productive unit as a result of participation in commodity production will be examined. Kula's emphasis on the fact that commodity production by household units may be and, frequently is, associated with a declining standard of living rather than with the existence of any real 'surplus' will be seen to be particularly useful, when adapted to the context of Colonial economy of the Cape.

Banaji has shown that the process of expansion of commodity production implies that labour power itself is increasingly a commodity. (6) He has argued that, in India, many households were being proletarianised between the 1850s and 1880s because of their inability to pay the government assessment of their taxes. Those who were not becoming fully proletarianised were sinking into
indebtedness to local capitalists who effectively owned the product of the harvest and gave back to the small producer what they considered sufficient for subsistence, after taking the rest for service of the debt.

Under these conditions Banaji found that in a poor year of low yields, over 50% of the crop was put on the market with many small producers even selling their cattle to meet cash requirements. (7) By contrast in good years:

"He was obliged to bring forward to market a larger amount of produce than in ordinary seasons to meet this additional demand (for revenue) and by thus forcing sales, prices were lowered and more and more produce had to be sold in order to raise the money required ... until the market became so glutted and prices so low that many households would either sink further into debt or alienate their means of production in distress sales. This is how even a year of general abundance could, like a year of famine, accelerate both the proletarianisation of the small producer and the rate of expansion of the monied capitalist." (8)

In the Eastern Cape the indebtedness of the households did not achieve the same prominence at this stage as in India. The most important difference stems from the fact that the form of development of capitalism did not take the form of the financial domination of merchants and money lenders, but the development of a Settler Colonial State and Settler agriculture on large farms which opposed the small (parcellated) agriculture of the Xhosa and Mfengu household units.

Apart from quickening the pace of proletarianisation, the effect of the expansion of commodity production was to encourage the polarisation or differentiation of the communities. Polarisation occurred around all the factors which affected the productivity of the households. The differentiation of the household production units was implicit in the very forces which stimulated commodity production.
In examining the Russian peasantry between 1910 and 1925 Shanin has suggested a typology which distinguishes between aggregate shifts upwards or downwards of groups of peasants and the polarisation or levelling of individual households within such groups. (9) Shanin has based his work extensively on the work of Chayanov. In his *Theory of Peasant Economy* Chayanov emphasised what he called the 'labour-consumer balance' which established an equilibrium level of income for a peasant household based on consumption needs and the composition and size of the family. (10)

Whether the family can achieve a balance between consumption and production was determined for Chayanov purely by factors internal to the household. Chayanov does not therefore sufficiently consider the intervention of external economic and political forces which operate directly on the household - such as for example the influence of commodity markets and the growth of wage labour within the structure of household production. He thereby failed to see how capitalism could develop compatibly with the maintenance of household production. Some of these shortcomings carry over into the work of Shanin. Nevertheless Shanin's typology is of great use in formalising the possible trajectories of the differentiation process. In figure 4 below the basic form of his typology is presented.

**Figure 4** (11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(i) Aggregate Shift Upwards</th>
<th>(ii) Aggregate Shift Downwards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.S.U. occurs when the 'wealth' of the peasant households increases in terms of total product per household and per capita.</td>
<td>A.S.D. occurs when the 'wealth' of the peasant households decreases in terms of total product per household and per capita.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(iii) Polarisation</th>
<th>(iv) Levelling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polarisation occurs in association with, and may be the cause of, either A.S.U. or A.S.D. Polarisation occurs when some households increase their wealth while others lose wealth or are extinguished altogether.</td>
<td>Levelling occurs in association with, and may be the cause of, either A.S.U. or A.S.D. Levelling occurs when the gap between the wealthiest and poorest households narrows.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The great advantage of Shanin's typology is that it clearly distinguishes between movement in the overall position of the households in an area or district and the movement and position of individual households in the group. It thus allows us to focus more closely on the factors determining these movements and the interaction between the two types of movement. In speaking about household production in South Africa it is thus possible to move away from vague generalisations about the simultaneous appearance of 'wealth' and 'poverty' and to formalise our knowledge about the precise relationship between them, and for their relative weight in each period to be examined.

Shanin added a subsequent typology of household mobility which is wider in its scope than merely polarising and levelling tendencies. These type of mobility are described in figure 5 below.

Figure 5 (12)

(i) Centrifugal Mobility  (ii) Centripetal Mobility

![Graph](image1)

(iii) Multi-Directional Mobility  (iv) Cyclical Mobility

![Graph](image2)
With centrifugal mobility there is a tendency for established households to move into the class of larger farmers or decline and ultimately become proletarianised. Centripetal mobility means that large rich households declined while poorer ones improved their position. Multi-directional mobility means that both of the previous tendencies operated simultaneously. Cyclical mobility occurs when the degree of accumulation and production varies at different points in time without displaying a final direction.

Shanin's typologies tend to be schematic and suffer from the problem of all such typologies in that they encourage the classification of data rather than the analysis of the specific causes of particular communities displaying the characteristics that they do (however they may be classified). Nevertheless a well-constructed typology has analytical value and can enhance the force of more general theoretical exploration of the class forces at work in the social formation.

Shanin distinguishes six specific factors which, at the empirical level, may determine the operation of a particular trend in productive activity. For the Russian peasantry he observed the following factors:

(i) accumulation of advantages and disadvantages
(ii) land re-division by the commune
(iii) emigration (a) of the wealthiest
     (b) of the poorest
(iv) Extinction of households
(v) partitioning or merger of households
(vi) biological life cycle.

Shanin found all of these factors at work in the polarising and levelling tendencies among the Russian peasantry.

What is important for the present analysis is that the tendencies outlined in Figure 5 sketch out a dynamic of household production based on the interaction between households. Some of these
tendencies as well as some of the empirical factors mentioned above have already been observed in the analysis of the cattle-killing. Certainly extinction, partitioning and merging of homesteads and households were all very important in stimulating production. As will be seen, emigration and migration of households were important in determining the growth of commodity production.

Shanin may be criticised for providing an analysis based solely on the interaction between peasant households and the tendencies of accumulation. It would be an error to leave out of consideration the political, ideological and economic forces at work which do not stem from the interaction of households. In the case of Settler colonialism and the Colonial State it is vital to situate these propositions within the context of the dissolution of the lineage mode of production and the growth of the capitalist mode. (13)

The importance of these theories for this study is that they provide a simple typology for comprehending the internal movements of communities and individual households. These typologies are useful in order to correctly describe these movements and to be able to understand their contribution to the growth of the capitalist mode of production.

II The Growth of Commodity Production - The Differentiation of Communities

The cattle-killing and the lung-sickness brought together all the elements necessary for an explosion of productive activity. It has been indicated how much of the extension of production that occurred between 1856 and 1857 was a direct result of the cattle-killing, combined with the important motivating effects of the insecurity engendered by Grey's proposals for the introduction of surveyed allotments of 2 acres each for all Mfengu groups. (14)
It must be appreciated that the changes in the allocation of productive resources to agriculture, the increase in the acreage under cultivation and the adoption of new techniques were not ephemeral. These things had come to stay. The stimulating effect of the cattle-killing had come at the end of a long period of decline and impoverishment of the mass of homesteads. Wage labour, money and a wide range of commodities had already been incorporated into the productive and social organisation of many Xhosa and Mfengu homesteads in the 1840s and 50s.

After the cattle-killing the 'official opinion' of the Colonial State was that the former Ngqika, Ndlambe and Gqunukwebe locations were 'empty of population'. The Colonial State therefore seized the opportunity to make concessions of land to the Colonists. It has already been mentioned that 200 farms of 1500 acres each were given out along the East London to King William's Town road. It is as well to note that the eager recipients of this land were very often people who were, or subsequently became, politically important - for example: Dick, the long-serving magistrate of King William's Town from 1879; Gordon Sprigg, a future Prime Minister of the Cape; the Rev. Birt (long-time defender of 'native' rights); the junior Ayliff and the Bishop of Grahamstown. (15)

Apart from the establishment of these 200 farms for the Colonists, immediately after the cattle-killing the conditions under which land was occupied by Africans began to change. These changes were tremendously varied. On the one extreme the Colonial State promulgated regulations which allowed blacks to become purchasers and lessees of Crown Land. At the other extreme there were many refugees from the cattle-killing who returned to their former locations and entered into new productive relationships there. Between these options many people who had fled the locations began to 'squat' on unoccupied farms in the Colony.

The conditions under which land is occupied constitutes a crucial determinant of the production process. The complexity of the
The different conditions under which land was occupied may be listed as follows:

(a) purchase of Crown Land
   leasehold of Crown Land
(b) surveyed quit-rent tenure with title
(c) unsurveyed quit-rent tenure without title
   ("communal" tenure)
(d) lease of private Colonial land
   (rent paid in labour, kind or cash)
   squatter occupation of private or Crown lands
(e) surveyed lots or mission stations with quit-rent and title.

Each of these conditions of occupation of land represented a specific form of the basic relations of production governing the domestic household production unit. The different forms of tenure provide a convenient breakdown of the mass of households in the Ciskei in order to examine in detail the development of production in the various communities.

(a) The Purchase and Leasing of Crown Land

In February 1858 the Government announced new "Land Regulations" for British Kaffraria. (16) In terms of these regulations Crown Land could be purchased by white Colonists in British Kaffraria at 1 pound per acre in 80 acre sections. Land could also be leased from the State for a period not exceeding 5 years at a rental of one shilling and sixpence per acre per annum, with an option to purchase during that time. The minimum size of a piece of lease land was to be 80 acres. There was no limit to the number of lots that could be purchased or leased.
Blacks were to be allowed to purchase land from the State on
slightly different terms. Sales could only take place to such
people as "the Chief Commissioner may deem fit and proper persons
to hold such grants in freehold." The price per acre was to be
one pound. The minimum area to be purchased was 20 acres. Only
those who purchased a minimum of 40 acres were allowed to lease a
maximum of 40 acres. The rent on the lease land was to be one
shilling and sixpence per acre per annum, with an option to
purchase. The permission of the Chief Commissioner was required
for any sale of land purchased and the owner of land would
require the approval of a magistrate before any other person was
permitted to reside on the land other than the registered owner.

The Colonial State was clearly not taking the chance that black
land-ownership would become too extensive. These regulations
were quite restrictive and precluded many potential buyers from
land-ownership. Nevertheless the impact of these new proposals
was immediate. In 1858, 184 blacks purchased land under these
regulations amounting to 3,081 acres. 22 of them leased a
further 880 acres of land. Table 1 indicates the growth of black
landownership under these regulations between 1858 and 1864.

Table 1: Black Land Ownership and Land Leases from the Colonial
State 1858-1864 (17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1858</th>
<th>1859</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1862</th>
<th>1863</th>
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<tr>
<td>PURCHASES</td>
<td>NO. ACRES</td>
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<td>3081</td>
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<td>2272</td>
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<td>6894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>NO. ACRES</td>
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<td>400</td>
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<td>1373</td>
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<td>3961</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2672</td>
<td>368</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

While only 54 Colonists purchased land under the 1858 regulations,
by 1864 they owned 11,173 acres of land, making a holding of
approximately 205 acres each on average. By comparison black
landowners held 31.6 acres on average in 1864.
Later in the 1870s and 80s a great deal more land was to be purchased by black landowners. There is every indication that the people who purchased land were intent on working it for a profit and intended to maximise their return on the investment. Typically the kind of people making these purchases are described as having:

"a wagon and two ploughs, a member of a mission station who has been in the habit of cultivating wheat, oats, beans as well as kaffir-corn and wheat ..." (18)

By as early as 1861 a man like Charles Pamla had acquired 500 acres of land near Keiskamma Hoek, owned 450 sheep, 800 head of cattle and 8 horses. (19) While he was probably the largest black landowner in the Crown Reserve, others prospered on a more modest scale.

In fact many more people applied for land than actually received any. There were over 1 000 black applicants up to 1864, of which, as can be seen from Table 1, only 508 were successful. From an examination of the register of title deeds in the Surveyor General's archives, it is possible to get some idea of the size of the more significant holdings.

From these records it can be seen that at Keiskamma Hoek 1 144 acres were purchased by 33 purchasers, 18 of them purchasing more than 40 acres each and thus qualifying to acquire lease land as well. The remaining 15 purchasers had an average of 27 acres each. (20) Some large families purchased land in groups, for example the Dingiswayos, the Mtis, Sumtunzis and Figianas all owned over 100 acres each. By pooling resources a large family could bring more land under cultivation and also exploit it more intensely.

In the Debe Valley of the Crown Reserve, 34 purchasers bought 824 acres, more or less evenly distributed in 20 acre lots. Here again a few individuals stand out. Pre-eminent amongst them was Feltman Bikitsha who purchased 50 acres. There were also present
family groups such as the Mavasos who held 80 acres together, and the Shosha family who owned 126 acres between them.

This pattern was repeated in every area of the Crown Reserve and King William's Town district where land was to be purchased; there being several smallholders of about 20 to 30 acres of land and a few more wealthy families or individuals who managed to purchase from 40 to 750 acres of land. These groups of landowners were not concentrated together. Every village or settlement had some landowners scattered in its vicinity. In some areas they were more prominent than in others, but their impact in all areas of the Crown Reserve and King William's Town districts cannot be doubted.

As far as can be calculated from the Surveyor General's records only 148 of the 508 owners of agricultural land recorded in Table 1 held more than 40 acres, the minimum required to qualify for leasing land from the State. Thus it can be seen from Table 1 that the 106 people who leased lands by 1864 were in fact 71% of those entitled to do so. The purchasers and leasers of land under the 1858 regulations formed a highly influential group. The presence of private landowners had a distinct influence on the neighbouring Mfengu locations. Apart from their economic importance, names like Figlana, Pamla, Kaye and Bikitsha were to be of growing political importance for the rest of the century.

In addition to land sold under the 1858 regulations, land auctions were held through which a total of 29 552 acres of land was sold during 1862. It is difficult to determine exactly how much land was purchased by blacks. It seems that about 50 purchases of land were made by Africans, varying in extent from 10 to upwards of 450 acres. (21)

Although larger purchases of farms by black landowners were to become more common in the 1870s and '80s, at this time the only area where larger land-ownership of more than 100 acres appeared generally was in the Peddie District. This occurred through a controversial scheme thought up specifically as a 'reward' to the
most prosperous of the larger Mfengu farmers of Peddie. In terms of a special Government notice, 25 agricultural lots of approximately 500 acres were to be sold by public auction which was to be "restricted to the competition of approved Fingoes, at a minimum price of 5 shillings per acres." (22)

These farms were considerably bigger than those bought in the Crown Reserve and King William's Town under the 1858 regulations, varying in size from 300 to 500 acres. However the land in Peddie could not compare with the quality of that in the Crown Reserve. The objective of the scheme was stated as being to:

"give the most wealthy and better informed natives an opportunity of becoming landed proprietors, and in that case there would be little doubt of their future loyalty." (23)

The scheme was controversial for two reasons. First there were those who felt that 'European' colonists were being unfairly discriminated against because competition was to be restricted to Mfengu. (24) Then there were those who were afraid that, if competition were thrown open to whites as well, then all Mfengu would also have to be allowed to compete and the State would lose its veto over the occupancy of the land. The wrangle over the proposed 'Mfengu auction' brought out very clearly the fact that the Colonial State did not intend that there should be a 'free market' for land outside of the proclaimed locations. The 1858 regulations and the 'Mfengu auction' made it clear that a discriminatory land policy was to be applied in order to give the State the final say as to where blacks could buy land and reside.

The auctions proposed were particularly significant for another reason. The magistrate at Peddie conducted a detailed census of 25 applicants who applied for permission to compete in the auction for land. This census reveals a lot more about the economic position of the sort of person involved in these and other purchases.
Of the 25 applicants four had four wives, while all the rest had one wife. Nevertheless the families were large with an average of nearly 7 children per family. They were all therefore older, well established, large households. Fifteen (60%) possessed wagons. All but one possessed a plough and 5 had 2 ploughs. They had an average of 9.8 cows and 9.12 oxen each, or nearly 19 head of stock per household. In these terms, therefore, they represented the wealthiest part of the Peddie community. They were expecting to pay from 75 pounds for a 300 acre farm to 125 pounds for a 500 acre farm.

The group of officially sanctioned applicants did not by any means represent all of those with cash who wished to buy a farm. As Edye informed Southey:

"there are many more equally respectable who are desirous of becoming landed proprietors" (25)

In the event, therefore, it must have come as a shock when buyers were found for only 18 of the farms offered. The main reason for this was the extremely poor quality of some of the lots offered for sale. Nevertheless the 18 farms sold accounted for 8 874 acres and brought the total number of acres of land privately owned by blacks to at least 30 597 by 1865.

To the group of large landowners should be added the chiefs and sons and daughters of chiefs who were given farms by Sir George Grey as the final pay-off for the loss of their former class power.

A list naming all the children of chiefs was prepared. Those included were "George" and "Emma", son and daughter of Sandille; Samuel, William and John Wesley Kama, sons of W.S. Kama; Bobozayo, son of Anta; Tabai, son of Mqayi; "Duke of Wellington", son of Tshatshu; Namba and Kona, sons of Maqoma; Maqoma's grandchildren; and a son of Phato. Altogether 15 chiefs and children of chiefs were granted "300 acres of good land" each. (26) Eventually much more than this was granted. Kama himself received 3 000 acres and his sons 1 500 acres each. By 1864 grants to 15 chiefs and their children amounted to 19 585 acres or 1 305 acres each. These
relatively large grants were to become of some political importance in the 1870s and it is important to include them in the total of land privately owned or controlled by blacks. With these grants included, a total of 50,182 acres were privately held by blacks by the end of 1864.

The specific changes in the fortune of these large landholders will be examined later. For the moment it is important to see that they were part of a process whereby the richest strata of the Xhosa and Mfengu households moved out of the locations and established themselves directly in the domain of the Colonial capitalist economy. They demonstrated the tendency for both the largest and smallest of the households to emigrate, though for dialectically opposite reasons. The large land-owning households therefore formed part of a sharp polarisation of the locations that occurred in the 1860s with the expansion of the scale of commodity production.

In contrast to black land-ownership, it is important to see how white land-ownership within British Kaffraria expanded in this period, consolidating the presence of Colonial agriculture in the immediate vicinity of the black locations. The 200 farms of 1,500 acres each originally proclaimed in 1858 were supplemented with 40 additional farms of that size in the area between East London and King William's Town. In addition 23 farms were given out in the Ngqika location in the vicinity of Stutterheim. (27) This, along with the original grants, boosted the number of Colonial grantees in British Kaffraria to 307, occupying a total of 623,100 acres.

The implications of such large Colonial land-ownership, in the midst of the remaining Xhosa and Mfengu locations, with regard to the development of squatting, tenancy and wage labour should not be underestimated. In 1860, soon after the farms in the Ngqika district had been given out, Brownlee found a total of 103 people resident there. Several farms which had the most blacks living on them were already extensively cultivated with up to 50 acres of land ploughed up. (28) It is likely that a large part of this cultivation was already being undertaken by tenants.
Finally, Grey's plan to settle Colonists in British Kaffraria was completed with the arrival of the German military immigrants who settled around East London. By 1864, they numbered 2,026 and occupied 17,653 acres of land.

From the growth of Colonial and African land-ownership it can be seen that the land losses associated with the cattle-killing were fatal for the homestead-based production units that had previously predominated. The title to the farms which Grey created out of the Ndlambe and Gqunukwebe territory required that the Colonists occupy their farms and maintain constant military preparedness. Their physical presence ensured a high degree of interaction between the Colonists and the black locations neighbouring them, the introduction of a local demand for labour, better access to commodity markets and a further stimulus to the emergence of new forms of tenancy, share-cropping and labour rent and leasing.

(b) Surveyed Quit-Rent Tenure with Title

In Chapter 6 Grey's plans for the survey of Mfengu locations were discussed. It was seen that there was extensive opposition to his proposal of a 2 acre allotment per household. This was undeniably inadequate, especially for those who had acquired ploughs and were expanding their arable agriculture.

It was seen that the strong Mfengu response to the market opportunities created in 1856-58 by the cattle-killing was also motivated by the political insecurity engendered by Grey's proposals. Under the threat of the 2 acre surveyed allotment, they proceeded in 1857-58 to bring the largest possible area under cultivation, in the belief that effective occupation and utilisation of a larger area of land would guarantee them possession of it.

The effects of political and economic conjunctures in encouraging the increase of the area under cultivation and the consequent
enlargement of production will be repeatedly observed in relation to most communities in the 1860s and '70s. This observation has the greatest significance in understanding the growth of commodity production by black landowners and tenants in the Ciskei. It raises the question of whether the production of large surpluses for the market was a response to some critical political conjuncture of the time, (that may have coincided for a while with favourable market opportunities) rather than a response to the commodity markets themselves. This is strongly suggested by Moyer's observations in respect of the introduction of surveyed allotments:

"When the surveyors were about to delimit a particular location, individual chiefs encouraged their followers to cultivate as much as possible, in the belief that this would influence the surveyors to give them more garden land; their belief occasionally proved true ..." (29)

With the end of the post cattle-killing boom, the Colonial State returned to its twin objectives of collecting all locations into concentrated villages and laying out surveyed allotments. However the question of the extent of the allotments had still not been settled.

In the face of the large area of land brought under cultivation between 1856 and 1858 and the opposition of all important chiefs to the 2 acre allotments, Grey had to give approval for grants of 4 acres to each household. In addition it was allowed that where a larger area was already under cultivation this should be given to the occupier. (30) This was extended to the Victoria East District where it was proposed that lots could vary from four to ten acres in extent. (31) On each arable lot a quit-rent of 10 shillings per annum was payable.

Work on the surveys began in 1858 and continued intermittently until 1860, when it ceased for a while because of lack of funds, before being taken up again. Dissatisfaction did not abate with the actual implementation of the survey. In 1860 the people of
Healdtown sent a deputation to the magistrate to complain of the overcrowded state of the location and the inadequacy of their lands. Commenting on the truth of their complaints the magistrate commented:

"If it were not for many who had accumulated a little wealth and purchased land in British Kaffraria I am sure I cannot say what they would have done for pasturage ..." (32)

From one village at Healdtown as many as 26 households had applied for "certificates of good character" to enable them to purchase land in British Kaffraria. It is clear that the ability to acquire land in British Kaffraria provided a limited outlet for the wealthier strata in the Mfengu locations and this reduced the pressure on available land for those remaining in the locations. However the effect of land purchases was in many cases not a simple emigration of the wealthiest strata. In fact many of those who purchased land still retained whatever arable land they had held in the locations. This was the cause of some tension and resentment between the new landowners and the location people.

Maclean received a complaint from the two men of Socitshi's village near Keiskamma Hoek in the Crown Reserve that some of the Christian landowners had been instigating the missionaries to try and stop the people of the locations carrying on their "customs and dances, especially in regard to male initiation ceremonies". To this the men of Socitshi's village took strong exception:

"The complaints made against our customs are from native men who have purchased land and who profess to be Christians - they are scattered over the country, and are not living on the land they purchased, but within Socitshi's location. They are however not all of one mind on the subject, for some of them pass our kraals while we are dancing, and say nothing against it but stand and look on ...

This intriguing statement suggests that the relationship between the purchasers of land and the people of the locations was a lot
more complex than it at first appears. Owning land privately as well as having access to a surveyed allotment in the locations had distinct advantages. The greatest of these was that it gave access to the commonages of the locations for pasturage. In many cases therefore, where headmen and others of similar stature had purchased land it became an additional source of political influence within the locations. Most of the headmen were in fact amongst the landowners. (34)

The tensions between landowners who retained a position in the locations and the ordinary location households reflected the deteriorating situation in the locations of Victoria East, Peddie, Ft. Beaufort and the Crown Reserve. Henry Calderwood, who was the longest serving Colonial Official over the Mfengu, was convinced that simply to remain on the land and support a family, "an erf of six or eight or even ten acres is not more than sufficient". (35) Even that, he continued, would have to be supplemented with "occasional labour ... considering the nature of the ground and the seasons." As far as this official was concerned therefore, the need for wage work to supplement domestic production was inherent in the structure of black agriculture from the outset of the growth of commodity production.

Reporting on conditions in Peddie in 1859, Calderwood found that the land was being utilised so extensively that:

"there is difficulty of preventing trespass. The land is now so cut up by cultivation that it is most distressing to see the amount of waste by trespass and the bad feeling it gives rise to ..." (36)

In Healdtown, Fort Beaufort district, where commodity production had probably achieved the highest degree of penetration into all households, it was reported that:

"troubles are coming upon them, one of the headmen who is the most influential man among them, complains loudly at the division of land into Townships in consequence of which, he states, he is compelled to hire pasturage for his oxen." (37)
The feeling that extra land was necessary to supplement the inadequate pasturage of the Mfengu location and to provide for expansion was producing tension in all districts. On behalf of the villages on the Tyhumie, the headman Tebi made strenuous attempts to purchase about 1,000 acres of land as a grazing farm, despite the fact that it was probably going to be given to his location anyway. Explaining his attitude, Tebi told the magistrate that grazing was so short and the stock so crowded that the fear of the land going to someone else was sufficient to make him feel he must have title to it. (38)

Once the surveyors had visited a particular area, the head of the household had to be registered as the owner of a particular lot. This led to some direct opposition to the acceptance of the results of the survey. In Mhlambiso's location ten men refused to take up the garden lots pointed out to them because they said they would not be able to feed their families on them. The magistrate in the Crown Reserve, commenting on this resistance wrote:

"The gardens are in one and three acre lots, the one acre is very good land. The three acre lots are rather poor, some perhaps bad - but we have given out gardens to other men quite as bad - without complaint." (39)

This disingenuous comment in fact reveals one of the most serious flaws of the survey scheme. It confined some households more or less arbitrarily to inferior soil and inhibited them from making co-operative arrangements amongst themselves to ensure optimal usage of the best pieces of land. The survey had the effect of emphasising the difference in productivity between good land and poor land. The survey itself, therefore directly encouraged the polarisation of the households by allowing greater productivity by a minority of households which secured choice pieces of land.

The people were well aware of this disruptive effect of the imposition of the survey. This was revealed by the frantic attempts to expand production so as to include all the available good land, which it was hoped would then be included in the area
to be surveyed. Herbert Vigne reported to Maclean:

"Many are now ploughing far beyond what will be their boundaries, thinking that just the picked bits on the banks of the streams will be given to them. I hear they are ploughing in different places, thinking or intending that the surveyor shall make up the amount of acres from these different spots ..." (40)

This was a variation on the general tendency to increase the area under cultivation which reveals well the contradictions which the survey introduced into the organisation of agricultural production. The survey therefore brought a new element of economic polarisation into the relationships between households and the structure of production in the surveyed locations. By introducing the survey the Colonial State was integrating the communities affected much more closely with the developing capitalist mode of production, causing some households to sink down and lose productive capacity and others, by contrast, to make sometimes startling gains. The effect of the survey was to encourage what Shanin called in his typology 'centrifugal mobility' of the households. (41) The most important reason for the strongly centrifugal effect of the survey was that while it encouraged more land to be brought under cultivation the capacity to productively utilise the increased arable area was not evenly distributed between households. To bring more land under cultivation depended on two factors - the amount of family labour available and the use of ploughs instead of hoes and picks. As will be seen, these two factors were far from evenly distributed between households.

Superficially it might be supposed that a rigidly enforced survey would have a radically levelling and centripetal effect on the mass of households. This was not the case because the way in which the survey was carried out allowed full scope for the polarising tendencies to assert themselves.

From the time that surveying first commenced in 1858 in Fort Beaufort and Peddie, through until 1877 (by which time 9 001 lots
had been surveyed and 6,367 titles issued in different locations. Only 2,880 titles were actually taken up. (42) 754 of those taken up were at Healdtown which was one of the only areas to respond favourably to the imposition of surveys, leaving only 2,126 households which actually took transfer of (what was meant to be) their property in the rest of British Kaffraria. The reason for this was obviously the general opposition to precisely the one thing the survey would tend to cause - an arbitrary freezing and equalisation of landholding.

The other reason for not taking transfer of the allotment was the high cost involved. This was the reason most often presented by the people when the harassed magistrates were asked to enquire into the matter. Depending on the size of the allotment, the surveying fee and costs of issuing the title could be as high as 3 pounds. (43) The Rev. Birt reported from Peelton that the cost of taking transfer of the 4 acre allotments there was working out at 42 shillings and that in the light of the bad harvests of 1862-63 it would be impossible for most to afford it. (44)

The mechanics of the survey involved the positioning by the surveyor of flags and piles of stones as beacons marking off the exact extent of the land to be allotted to each household. This was often done with scant regard to the suitability of the land for agricultural purposes. The titles were not taken up because the distribution of land under the survey conflicted with the real tendencies of accumulation within the communities and the real inter-relationship between households. By not taking up titles it was much easier to ignore the flags and beacons of the surveyors and carry on much as before. It can thus be seen that the effects of the political and economic insecurity created by the threat of the survey was in fact more important than the effects of the survey itself.

Nevertheless the survey did have the important result of raising the quit-rent. Whereas before only 10 shilling was payable, now 2 shillings and 6 pence extra was required for the building lot in the villages. This increased the incentive to acquire cash through
the sale of agricultural produce and intensified the demand for land. Under these conditions in the early 1860s the Mfengu locations all appeared to be chronically 'overcrowded', as households tried alternatively to cushion themselves against the effects of the survey and to take maximum advantage of it. The harvests of the 1857 and 1859 seasons were unexpectedly good - featuring large cultivation combined with good seasonal rainfall. Inevitably these conditions soon brought the would-be producers up against the constraint of the market. In 1861 it was reported from the Crown Reserve that:

"the people have no market for their crops, all they are offered by the shopkeepers in the reserve is from four to five shillings per muid for their corn." (45)

People who, two seasons previously, had been expecting 20 shillings per muid of 180 lbs were now getting only a quarter of that. The effect of the decline in grain prices was, inevitably, to bring wage labour into the productive activity of more and more households.

In the face of the poor prices available in the 1860-61 season, 150 men left the Victoria East district to work on the Colonial farms. (46) In Peddie district by March 1861, out of a total of 2 624 households, the heads of 472 households, or 18%, were "absent in the Colony" on service contracts. (47) With the collapse of the grain market and the need to pay the quit rent of 12 shillings and 6 pence many of the smaller and poorer households had no other source of income. With a grain price of 5 shillings for 180 lbs a household would have to market 454 lbs of grain just to meet its tax obligations. This would have been well beyond the productive capacity of many households. By December 1861 magistrates were complaining:

"The Fingoes show much tardiness in paying the rent, advancing as a reason that the scarcity of cash in this district prevents their doing so immediately ... they inform me that they take such produce as wool and grain to the shops in order to obtain
money to pay their rents but are given articles of clothing etc. instead." (48)

The difficulty in paying the tax resulted in many defaulting on their payments and falling into arrears. At Healdtown, one of the most 'prosperous' of Mfengu locations, the problem was no less severe than it was elsewhere. Healdtown should have realised 447 pounds 10 shillings per annum in tax revenue. From a high of 365 pounds 10 shillings collected in the good year of 1858, the revenue declined to 262 pounds 12 shillings and 6 pence in 1859 and eventually hit a low of 221 pounds 17 shillings and 6 pence in 1863. (49) Only about 52% of the registered owners of allotments were therefore actually paying the taxes imposed on them. In Peddie, in 1861 the number not paying tax was over 40%.

The situation further deteriorated for many households as a result of the extremely severe drought which started in the 1861-62 season. This drought, like those that succeeded it, followed the pattern of uncertain rainfall in the Ciskei as a whole. Each period of drought has had a different significance depending on the circumstances at the time. By the 1860s, with the shortage of grazing, the difficulty of trekking with cattle and sheep to areas of more favourable pasture, and dependence on grain and wool sales for a cash income, the effects of drought were very severe. The drought of 1861-62 was described in the following dramatic terms in the Colonial Press:

"The fearful consequences of those memorable days - 23rd November to 25th December 1961 - had fully developed in the failure of the crops throughout the country and the pasturage being parched up, grave fears were entertained for the horned cattle ..." (50)

The drought in the mid 1860s caused many poor households, which had survived adequately in the transitionary phases up to that point, to face near extinction. (51) It also encouraged those with money and resources to acquire additional land through land purchases.
The drought therefore accelerated the centrifugal tendencies in the locations. This was experienced even in the most progressive of districts such as Fort Beaufort. Verity reported from there that:

"The drought has had the effect of causing many of the people to leave the locations, some of them having removed into the Country Districts to seek employment, while others of the more wealthy have obtained passes from me to proceed to British Kaffraria to purchase land." (52)

An unexpected result of the survey was the creation of a class of landless people, who were accommodated in the villages but who did not have an arable lot allocated to them. In Fort Beaufort the survey provided allotments for 716 households. This left 83 households, who were resident on the commonage, for whom no land was provided. (53) In Victoria East the situation was even worse. There, 300 households were not provided with land. (54) The reason given was that these people were recent immigrants. There was no more suitable arable land that could be given out sufficiently close to the site of the villages.

The survey, taxation and drought all served to increase the polarisation of the communities. From the mid 1860s it becomes increasingly difficult to treat the surveyed locations as undifferentiated entities. In fact the key to an understanding of their subsequent development is to understand the nature and extent of the polarisation that had taken place under the impact of the growth of commodity economy. As was indicated earlier, to get to the heart of the manner in which the centrifugal tendencies worked (in conjunction with a general downward aggregate shift for the community as a whole) the unequal capacity of the households to expand production due to the unequal distribution of productive factors has to be examined. It is possible to gain a more detailed picture of the nature of production in the early 1860s by an examination of some of the available census data.
Table 2 (i) Increase in Population of Mfengu Locations Peddie District - 1857-65 (55)

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<th>YEAR</th>
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<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>WIDOWS</th>
<th>CHILDREN</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17 528</td>
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Table 2 (ii) Increase in Production and Assets of Mfengu Locations Peddie District 1857-65

CULTIVATION - ACRES

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<td>10 956</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1 825</td>
<td>13 773</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>5 211</td>
<td>2 615</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>8 231</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>10 892</td>
<td>5 440</td>
<td>25 567</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>11526</td>
<td>6 269</td>
<td>17 078</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>9 784</td>
<td>1 025</td>
<td>10 809</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>19 125</td>
<td>10 927</td>
<td>22 642</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 (iii) Increase in Production and Assets per Capita and Per Household; Mfengu Locations Peddie District 1857-65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLDS PER PLOUGH</th>
<th>ACRES PER HOUSEHOLD</th>
<th>CATTLE PER HOUSEHOLD</th>
<th>CATTLE PER CAPITA</th>
<th>SHEEP PER HOUSEHOLD</th>
<th>GOATS PER HOUSEHOLD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Peddie district was divided up into the two mission stations, D'Urban and Newtondale, and 9 villages each with its own headman and assistant headman. Each of these 11 locations constituted a distinct area and one way of gaining some idea of the significance of the data presented in table 2 (i), (ii) and (iii) is to examine the distribution of the various variables between the locations.

In 1857 the two mission stations accounted for 70 households or 2.5% of the total. However, they owned 19 (or 27%) of the ploughs and 14 (or 22%) of the wagons. Outside of the mission stations some locations had no ploughs at all, while one had 1 plough to every 15 households, which was considerably better than the 1 to 38 average for the district as a whole. Those locations with most ploughs produced the most cash crops of high value such as wheat, oats and oat hay.

Kaulela's location with 13 ploughs and 194 households (1 to 14.9) had 4.3 acres per household under cultivation, slightly better than the average of 4.0 acres for Peddie as a whole. The total of 834.2 acres under cultivation there included 24 acres of wheat - the highest for any location. In Fundukubi's location, where there was only one plough to every 105 households, the area under cultivation fell to 3.9 acres per household and no wheat and oats were cultivated. Other locations had an average of 3.9 acres per household under cultivation without any ploughs and also had no high value 'cash crops'. The large cultivation which occurred at the time of the cattle-killing may be said to have been achieved without ploughs - using only hoes and picks - making it an all the more remarkable achievement.

The correlation between the acquisition of ploughs and the polarisation of households around the production of crops like wheat, oats and hay as well as maize and sorghum emerged in the first rush of production in the late 1850s. It remained a crucial index of the polarisation of households from then on. The use of global averages in trying to ascertain the effect of ploughs on production, disguises the true extent of the divergence between the
larger producers and those who, for want of labour and a plough, were unable to expand their cultivation significantly.

By 1860, as a result of investment encouraged by the 1857-59 boom, the number of ploughs had increased by 84 from 70 to 154. At the same time, in the face of falling prices, the total number of acres under cultivation fell from 10,959 in 1857 to 8,231 in 1860, a decrease of 25%. The increase in the number of ploughs and the decrease in the extent of cultivation points very strongly to a dominant centrifugal tendency in the community as a whole. That is, an upward movement in the position of a minority of households in the context of an aggregate shift downwards for the community as a whole.

By 1860 the number of acres under wheat, beans and oats had increased from 95 in 1857 to 402, an increase of 323%. The increase in the number of ploughs brought more land under cultivation by a minority of households, especially land devoted to the higher value crops. It thus contributed to the polarisation of the community.

Sheep were also a growing source of cash income. Whereas there were only 1,825 sheep in 1857, the number had increased to 5,440 in 1860. This large increase indicates the extent of real investment, (as opposed to national growth of flocks) that occurred at the time. The number of sheep per household nearly doubled - from 1.3 to 2.3. However once again it will be seen that the ownership of sheep was not evenly distributed between locations. In 1860 Zulu's locations held 89% of the sheep and had 7.5 sheep per household while all the other locations had comparatively insignificant numbers.

The polarising effect of the uneven distribution of sheep and ploughs in particular locations and households could still have the effect of raising the total product of the community as a whole. It is only where strong centrifugal forces are at work, which impoverish the smallest and poorest households while
allowing others to prosper, that it is possible to have an aggregate downward shift in which polarisation is occurring.

In examining the effects of the incorporation of regular commodity production into the activity of the households it must be remembered that a quantitative growth in the value of the commodity product relative to the total product may produce qualitative changes. If the number of households which experience a growth in the value of their commodity product becomes great enough, then this must produce an aggregate shift upwards for the community as a whole, as long as the other households are able to maintain a stable relationship between their commodity product and the product retained for self-maintenance. Where a majority of households are not able to retain a stable relationship between their commodity product and the product retained for self-maintenance, and begin using part of the product 'normally' retained for self-maintenance as commodity product, then an aggregate shift downwards will occur, regardless of how great the increase in the total product is. In fact, depending on conditions, it becomes possible for households experiencing a drop in their material position to nevertheless contribute towards an increased commodity product for the community as a whole. It may thus be seen how important it is to differentiate between shifts in the position of the household and shifts in the position of the community as a whole.

In the Peddie community the evidence definitely shows that the factors that encouraged commodity production between 1860 and 1865 became much more widely spread. By 1865 the population had increased by 22.5% from 13,584 to 17,528 and the number of households increased to 3,187. The total acreage under cultivation increased to 10,804, the number cultivated per household thus remaining constant at 2.3. However, the number of ploughs increased dramatically from 154 to 320, improving the ratio of ploughs to households from 1 to every 16 households to nearly 1 to every 10 households.
The effect of this increase was once again to increase the proportion of the cultivated land devoted to the more valuable crops, wheat, barley, oats and oat hay. In 1860 only 402 acres (4.8%) of total acreage was devoted to these crops. In 1865, 1 025 acres (9.4%) of the total acreage was given to them. Thus, although the average acreage per household remained the same there was a wider spread of ploughs and therefore wider cultivation of high-valued crops.

Despite these increases, 2 867 households did not possess ploughs and did not bring much, if any, wheat into their production. The vast majority did not grow any of the high-valued crops and had to draw their commodity product from their production of the basic consumption crops maize and sorghum to raise money for taxes and necessary commodity purchases. The increase in acreage of basic consumption crops under cultivation seems to have been just enough to meet the increase in population. The population had increased by 22%, and the acreage of maize and sorghum increased by only 20%. It is therefore clear that growth in production of basic consumption crops was barely keeping pace with the growth of population and no large expansion occurred in the production of these crops.

The 1865 census found that 83 613 bushels of maize and sorghum were produced in the 1864-65 harvest. In 1865 the magistrate at Peddie reported to the Cape Native Affairs Commission that 35 000 bushels of corn were sold from the Mfengu location in Peddie from this harvest. This would have left 48 613 bushels retained for domestic consumption. At approximately 56 pounds per bushel of maize this would leave 2 722 328 lbs of grain retained to feed 3 187 households. (56) This would make barely 854 lbs per family for the year. Basing annual consumption for an average household of between 5 and 6 persons at twenty 200 lb bags (4 000 lbs) of corn it is clear that if only this much of the total product was retained, most households could not meet consumption requirements from their own production. (57) The commodity portion of the product was 41.8% of the total product.
Allowing a high price of 10 shillings per muid in 1865, the commodity product for that year would have been worth 5,444 pounds 10 shillings (58) to the district as a whole. This would provide 1 pound 14 shillings to each household as an annual income from the sale of grain. After taxation of 12 shillings and 6 pence this would have left only 1 pound 1 shilling and 6 pence per household or 3 shillings and eleven pence per capita. It may now perhaps be more clearly understood why the same magistrate informed the Native Affairs Commission that a third of the people in Peddie took some casual or contract work in the towns or on Colonial farms.

Even allowing for some overestimation on the part of the magistrate of the amount of produce sold, it is clear from the size of the total product, (which was probably calculated accurately), that there would have been an insufficiency of grain to meet all consumption requirements. Even allowing a generous margin for error it would obviously have been extremely difficult for many households to meet their cash requirements and retain a normal amount for subsistence.

Market opportunities were restricted to the licensed traders in the various districts. Those with wagons could trade more widely and could transport grain to the central markets in King William's Town from Peddie, the Crown Reserve and other areas. There is evidence however that unlicensed traders entered these districts to buy grain. Many sheep farmers in the surrounding colonial farms found it worthwhile to meet consumption requirements by coming to the locations to purchase. (59) This was strenuously opposed by the licensed traders whose price fixing arrangements were undermined by this informal trade. These itinerant traders and farmers encouraged the marketing of small quantities of grain. They also paid for grain with sheep, thereby encouraging the acquisition of sheep.

Commenting on the growth of Xhosa and Mfengu flocks, a witness to the Native Affairs Commission said "the increase in their flocks is so extraordinary as to beat European flock masters out and
The Peddie locations marketed 18,814 pounds of wool in 1865, the yield of 1.7 lbs of wool per sheep being comparable with the Colonial average. (61)

There is evidence that some households built up flocks at the expense of cattle holdings. In a case tried at Keiskamma Hoek in 1861, it was revealed that in 1850 'Isaak', originally of Sandille's location, sent 11 cattle to Mlindwa, a Mfengu residing with Siwanis, for safe-keeping and for Mlindwa to subsist on. Mlindwa sold an ox from this cattle some time after 1856 for 4 pounds and bought 8 sheep. The 8 sheep had increased to 60 by 1861. 'Isaak' was now demanding the return of the cattle and sheep. (62) This case indicates that some people who had sufficient cattle in their possession sold off some and invested in sheep.

To gain a more exact picture of the polarisation that occurred between the cattle-killing and the removal of many Mfengu to the Transkei in 1866, it will be useful to look at the detailed census rolls for the Mfengu location at Ox-kraal, Queenstown district. Being placed in a large location and well-connected with Colonial merchants it was one of the most 'prosperous' of all Mfengu districts. The results of the census are presented in Table 3. By examining the census roll it is possible to determine the exact distribution between households of the various factors represented in Table 3.

### Table 3: Census of Mfengu Residing in the Ox-Kraal Location (63)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>BOYS</th>
<th>GIRLS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>HORSES</th>
<th>CATTLE</th>
<th>SHEEP &amp; GOATS</th>
<th>WAGONS</th>
<th>PLOUGHS</th>
<th>TOTAL ACRES CULTIVATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>513</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>2,926</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>2,644</td>
<td>10,659</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>2,889.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is necessary to determine the effect of the growth of commodity production on the distribution of arable land between households. Table 4 presents a histogram of the distribution of acreage under cultivation by 513 households in Kamastone location. The salient features of the histogram are summarised in Figure 6 below.

TABLE 4: Acres Under Cultivation at Ox-Kraal Location - April 1861

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE (Acres)</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
<th>VALUE (Acres)</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8.90</td>
<td>8.96</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>94.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>14.22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>94.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>13.06</td>
<td>27.28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>95.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>36.83</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>96.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>51.83</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>96.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9.16</td>
<td>60.99</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>97.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>69.98</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>98.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>73.26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>98.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>80.66</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>98.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>86.11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>98.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>90.59</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>99.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>91.36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>99.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>93.89</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>99.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of distinct values - 26
Number of values counted - 513
Minimum - 0
Maximum - 70
Mean - 5.63
Median - 4.00
Mode - 4.00
Q1 (Approx Lower Quartile) - 2
Q2 (Approx Upper Quartile) - 8
Interquartile Range - 3 to 7
FIGURE 6

ACRES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>70</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Q1 Approx. Lower Quartile - 2
Q2 Approx. Upper Quartile - 8
Interquartile Range 3 - 7

From Table 5 it can be seen that the distribution of sown acreage was highly skewed. Figure 6 represents this distribution graphically. It is clearly revealed that 25% (the lower quartile) of the 513 households had 2 or less acres of land under cultivation, while 25% (the upper quartile) had 8 or more acres under cultivation. In-between 50% of the households had between 3 and 7 acres under cultivation.

In terms of acreage sown, the middle 50% of households had 1,090 acres or 37.7% of the total area under cultivation. By contrast the top 25% accounted for 1,638 acres or 56.9% of the total cultivated area. The bottom 25% accounted for only 5.5% of the total area under cultivation. The dominant position of the larger cultivations is thus clearly revealed. As the full extent of the cultivatable area in this location was already in use, the only
way in which expansion of arable holding could occur was at the expense of another household's arable acreage which would therefore decline. (64) From this result it is absolutely clear that approximately 25% of the households which had significantly higher than average cultivation would have been able to produce, acre for acre, a much larger total product with a proportionately larger commodity product.

The actual position of the large cultivators is more fully revealed by correlating the number of acres against other variables which affected the extent of production. In Table 5 the relationship between acreage under cultivation and the ownership of ploughs is examined.

**TABLE 5: Acres & Ploughs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRES</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>25%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to 2</td>
<td>1 3 5 8 10 12 14 16 19 28</td>
<td>0 3 17 21 9 29 9 10 2 7 9</td>
<td>0 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 7</td>
<td>8 10 12 14 16 19</td>
<td>0 3 17 21 9 29 9 10 2 7 9</td>
<td>0 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 to 14</td>
<td>21 24 30 40 70</td>
<td>21 24 30 40 70</td>
<td>21 24 30 40 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46 94 126 88 22 66 27 16 4 9 7 1 1 3 1 1 1 513</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSEHOLDS</td>
<td>46 94 126 88 22 66 27 16 4 9 7 1 1 3 1 1 1 513</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLoughs</td>
<td>0 3</td>
<td>17 21 9 29 9 10 2 7 9 1 1 3 2 - 1 124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In looking at this correlation a number of extremely interesting observations begin to emerge. In terms of acreage sown, the 50% (approximately) of households that cultivated between 3 and 7 acres accounted for 47 (37.9%) of the ploughs. The upper 25% that cultivated 8 or more acres accounted for 74 (59.5%) of the ploughs. The concentration of the majority of the ploughs in the upper range of acreage sown is quite high and is absolutely to be expected. Nevertheless a proportionately large number of ploughs were held by those with a relatively smaller acreage under cultivation. The significance of this may be more fully realised by observing that of the 25% (approximately) of the households that had 8 or more acres under cultivation, 46% did not possess a
plough. It may therefore well be asked how they managed to cultivate 8 or more acres without a plough? Conversely, why did 47 households which did have a plough only cultivate between 3 & 7 acres if they had the technological capacity to cultivate more?

In fact it is likely that many of the households which cultivated extensively but did not appear in the census to own a plough, may have used a hired plough or shared a plough with a relative. This in itself is significant enough, but it emphasises the question of why some people who possessed ploughs cultivated to a lesser extent than others who did not possess a plough.

The obvious answer would appear to be the amount of labour at the disposal of the households. Where more labour was available a larger area could be cultivated. Ploughing is not the only labour process involved in cultivation! Sowing, weeding, the protection of the crop from birds, the protection of the unfenced lands from human and animal trespass, and harvesting have also to be allowed for. A large household would require slightly more extensive cultivation simply to provide itself with sufficient food for its own consumption. However for every extra acre cultivated the size of the potential saleable surplus was increased. The only way in which the total yield could be increased was by enlarging the acreage. This had, indeed, always occurred and it was expected that a polygamous household with 2 wives, for example, would cultivate more or less twice as much as a household with one wife.

With the introduction of ploughs, a household with 2 or more wives could put proportionately more land under cultivation, as the hardest part of the drudgery of cultivation was ploughing. With this taken care of by a plough and a team of oxen, only such larger households would have had sufficient labour to undertake all the other processes necessary for enlarged production.

The basic histogram of the distribution of wives is given in Table 6. In Table 7 the basic distribution of wives between the households is correlated against the number of acres under cultivation.
From Table 6 it can be seen that, like all other groups, the majority of the adult males at any point in time have only one wife and that a sizeable number of the young adult males will be unmarried. Altogether those with 2 or more wives constitute 183 (35.67%) of the total number of households, leaving 330 (64.3%) with no wife or only one wife. This in fact shows a relatively high rate of polygamy. Significantly, it also conforms with the estimates of the rates of polygamy found in our earlier discussion of the Mfengu before the cattle-killing. (65)

**TABLE 7 : Acres Cultivated and Number of Wives per Household**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRES</th>
<th>Q1 = 25%</th>
<th>MIDDLE 50%</th>
<th>Q2 = 25%</th>
<th>TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to 7</td>
<td>1 3 5</td>
<td>8 10 12 14 16 19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 4 6</td>
<td>9 11 13 15 17 20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS | 46 94 126 88 22 66 27 16 4 9 7 1 1 3 1 1 1 | 513 |
| NO. | 1 1 11 61 85 48 7 24 11 5 1 | 1 | 254 |
| OF | 2 3 10 25 29 12 30 10 4 2 4 2 | 1 1 1 | 134 |
| WIVES | 3 4 2 6 2 9 4 7 1 3 2 1 | 1 42 |
| 4 | 1 2 2 2 1 | 8 |
| 5 | 1 | |
| TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS IN GROUP | 140 236 | 137 513 |
From Table 7 it can be seen that of the 140 households in the lower quartile of acreage sown (that is households with 0 - 2 acres), 72 (51.4%) had only 1 wife, 51 (36.4%) had no wives while there were only 17 polygamous households with 2 or more wives forming 12% of the total. In terms of the number of wives, 28.35% of all monogamous households were in this group, while a majority - 68.9% - of all households without a wife fell in this lower quartile. By contrast, of all those households with more than one wife only 9.2% fell in the lower quartile.

It will be remembered that three households in the lower quartile of acreage sown possessed ploughs. From this result it is already clear that there was a strong positive correlation between the number of wives and the extent of acreage sown. Because so few of the households in this group possessed ploughs, however, it is difficult to assess fully the significance of the effect of household size as a determinant of acreage sown. The 4 errant cases of households with 3 wives which fell into this group were most probably old households for which cultivation was carried on by younger members of the family.

The middle 50% of the households having between 3 and 7 acres each, had a higher proportion of polygamous households. Of the 236 households in this group 20 (8.5%) had no wives, 140 (59.3%) had one wife and 76 (32.2%) had two or more wives. As can be seen the majority (62%) of the households with 2 wives cultivated between 5 and 7 acres, while only 39% of those with one wife were able to cultivate more than 4 acres.

Altogether 55% of all households with one wife fell in this group, while 41.5% of all households with more than one wife fell amongst those with between 3 - 7 acres under cultivation. Taking the lower quartile and the middle 50% together, it can be seen that 95.9% of households without wives and 83.46% of households with one wife were included in this group. By contrast, only half of all the polygamous households were included in those households cultivating up to 7 acres of land.
In the upper quartile of the 137 households cultivating 8 acres or more of land, 92 (67.15%) were polygamous. 50% of all the polygamous households were found in this group. Of the 137 households only 2.18% had no wives, 30.65% had one wife, 40.14% had two wives, 20.43% had three wives, 5.8% had four wives and there was one case (0.72%) which had five wives.

In terms of the number of wives, altogether 4% of all households with no wives were found in this group, while only 16.5% of all households with one wife were included amongst the largest cultivators with more than 8 acres. By contrast, 50% of all polygamous households were included in this category. It is clear from this examination of the data presented in Table 7, that to achieve a significantly higher extent of cultivation than that achieved by most households it was most often necessary first to have a large household. The increase in size of household, in terms of the numbers of wives, was strongly correlated with increasing the extent of cultivation. It was only in the larger households where more labour was available to cope with the work involved in more extensive cultivation, that the investment in a plough led ultimately to more extensive cultivation. The reason that 37.9% of the plough owners only managed to bring 3 to 7 acres of land under cultivation was that very many of them (59.3%) had only one wife. As their households expanded, the possibility increased of being able to bring more land under cultivation and to make more economic use of their plough.

This does not mean that smaller households did not purchase ploughs, as it has been seen that many did. But the mere possession of a plough was not sufficient to ensure extended cultivation; adequate labour was also essential. If labour was not to be hired or acquired through work parties, then purely family labour remained the only source.

A clearer idea of the amount of family labour available is given by taking the children into account, as children were vital assistants in many of the operations involved in a full agricultural cycle. Young children (boys) assisted in turning the
oxen around in ploughing, and girls and boys were involved in keeping the crop free from attack by birds and in preventing livestock from straying into the cultivated fields.

The basic histogram of the distribution of children is presented in Table 8. Table 9 shows the distribution of children in a household against the number of acres cultivated for those households which had ploughs only. (66)

**TABLE 8: Histogram of Children - Ox-Kraal Location - April 1861**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>20.85</td>
<td>20.85</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>98.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9.94</td>
<td>30.79</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>98.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>12.28</td>
<td>43.07</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>98.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>13.84</td>
<td>56.91</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>99.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10.91</td>
<td>67.82</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>99.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10.72</td>
<td>78.54</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>99.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>86.54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>99.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>93.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>95.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>97.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean - 3.3
Median - 2.5
Mode - 0

Number of distinct values - 17
Number of values counted - 513
Maximum - 18
Minimum - 0

Approx. Q1 - 1
Approx. Q2 - 6
Interquartile range 2 - 5
Table 8 shows that 158 households (30%) had between 0 - 1 children and 47.75% had between 2 - 5 children in their household. 22.5% of all households (110 in all) had 6 or more children. The most frequent number of children, excluding those households which had no children, was 3.

In Table 9, the way in which the number of children affected the extent of land under cultivation for those households that had...
ploughs is examined. Of the 44 households in the interquartile group, that is those with between 3 and 7 acres under cultivation, 33 (75%) had above the average number of 3.3 children. However in the upper quartile, 60 (83.3%) of all the households in the group had above the average number of children.

This clearly shows that an above average family size was strongly associated with the ownership of a plough for all groups. However, an examination of Table 9 shows that of those in the interquartile group with above average family size, 29 (87%) had between 4 and 8 children in their households while only 4 cases (12.1%) had more than 8 children. In the upper quartile, of all those households with an above average number of children, 11 cases (18.3%) had more than 8 children and another 18% had less than 8 children. It is clear therefore that there was a much greater concentration of larger households in the upper quartile.

Allowance must of course be made for numerous factors in considering the effect of the size and composition of the household on the supply of labour. Age was an obvious variable. It has already been indicated that advanced age might have accounted for households with 2 or 3 wives having 2 or less acres under cultivation. Similarly the age of children might have affected their suitability and readiness to participate in certain kinds of work. A household with a large number of very young children might have found a dis-incentive in this to extending cultivation in a particular season although with the passage of time the situation might have changed. By taking into account the size of the household as a determinant of agricultural production and productivity the possibility is left open for upward mobility of households which were able to grow in numbers. This mobility may, however have been of a cyclical nature, tending to lead to the decline of the household once it passed a certain optimum stage.

Having raised the question of the expansion of the size of household as a determinant of production, it is important to remember the social obstacles to acquiring a wife, or an
additional wife, that still prevailed. Wives could be acquired only through the normal medium of a bride price transaction. This mechanism was still governed by the usual Xhosa practice whereby the father and mother of the bride had a dominant say in the arrangement of the marriage. Thus it was possible, and frequently occurred, that richer and older men acquired an additional wife. It was thus mostly these men that were in a position to have sufficient labour to consider expanding household production. However they did not ever constitute much more than 30 to 35% of the total number of households. (68) So far as the effects of commodity production are concerned therefore, the households were stratified by the principles which governed their own growth which determined the extent of their capacity for commodity production.

With the growth of commodity production it was the people with more than one wife who acquired ploughs and those with large families that expanded production. The way in which the capacity to expand production was distributed in each community conformed broadly with its basic pattern of household growth and decline. The ability to sustain a large family and acquire an extra wife depended as much on the relationship between households as on a household's relationship with the Colonial economy. Where all available land in a location was already being used it was those with influence in the determination of land usage who were able to gain access to additional acreage, (both in surveyed and unsurveyed locations).

From this analysis it can be seen exactly how the patriarchal kinship structure of the lineage mode of production interacted with the condition necessary for significant production. This facilitated the more extensive engagement of some households in commodity production and limited or excluded others altogether. Polarisation of the community was therefore concommitant with the spread of commodity production.
It is possible in a similar fashion to examine the distribution of sheep and cattle in the Ox-Kraal community and it is important to take advantage of this data as a base for future comparisons. In Tables 10 and 11 the histogram of the distribution of sheep and cattle respectively are given.

**TABLE 10: Histogram of Distribution of Sheep - Ox-Kraal April 1861**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>20.27</td>
<td>20.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 5</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16.37</td>
<td>36.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>24.36</td>
<td>61.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>15.98</td>
<td>75.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>84.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>89.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>91.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 100</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>96.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 - 150</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>98.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 + 7</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>99.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean - 20.7
Median - 7.0
Mode - 6 - 10

Number of values counted - 513
Maximum - 840
Minimum - 0

Approx. Q1 - 2
Approx. Q2 - 20
Interquartile range Approx. 3 - 19
TABLE 11: Histogram of Distribution of Cattle, Ox-Kraal Location
April 1861

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>27.87</td>
<td>27.87</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td>36.45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>92.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12.08</td>
<td>48.53</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>92.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>53.60</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>93.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>60.22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>96.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>68.21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>96.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>73.28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>97.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>75.42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>97.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>78.73</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>97.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>81.26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>98.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>86.71</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>98.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>87.68</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>98.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>88.65</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>98.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>89.62</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>99.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>90.59</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>99.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>91.56</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>99.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of values counted: 513
Number of distinct Values: 31
Mean: 5.77
Median: 2.5
Mode: 0
Minimum: 0
Maximum: 40
Total number of cattle: 2644

Q1 = 0
Q2 = 8
Interquartile range = 1 - 7
Table 10 shows that sheep and goats were extremely unevenly distributed between households. 20.27% of households had none and 16.37% had only between 1 and 5 sheep and goats. The bottom 36.34% of households had been unable to acquire more than 5 such small stock. The modal frequency was in the 6 to 10 group, with 24.6% of the households achieving at least this much. 76.98% of all households had less than 20. The top 23.02% of households had flocks ranging from 21 head to a maximum of 840 head. The dominance of the larger flock owners is supported by the observation that the 7 households which possessed more than 150 head each had a combined total of 2,218 head (20.8%) of the total number of sheep and goats in Ox-Kraal. The 9 households which each had between 100 and 150 head, together accounted for 1,100 head (10.31%) of the total. The top 16 flock owners therefore possessed 30% of the total flock.

Table 11 reveals that cattle were even more unevenly distributed than were the sheep and goats. Over 25% of households had no cattle, while 25.72% had between 1 and 3 head. Altogether 75.4% of the households had between 1 and 7 cattle, but the majority of these had only between 1 and 3 head. Altogether, the middle 50% of households owned only 956 or 36% of the cattle, while the largest 25% of the households owned 64% of the cattle.

From this analysis of the data given in Table 11 it is clear that not many households could raise a team of oxen to pull a plough. Shortage of oxen for a trek team was another factor which inhibited more extensive cultivation by a plough owner. If the owner of a plough was dependent on hiring oxen for ploughing, he would have had to wait until the owner of the oxen had first ploughed his lands before being able to hire them. If rainfall was very scarce it often happened that the ground had become too hard for ploughing by the time the household got the oxen and it was therefore only possible or economic to put a small area under cultivation. Limitations on the number of stock also meant that only the largest households could afford, from their own resources, to pay the 3 to 8 head (or more) that might form part of the 'lobola' for a bride. Similarly only the few large
households would have been able to sell cattle in order to acquire sheep. The effect of the uneven distribution of cattle was, therefore, once again to emphasise the unequal distribution of all the most important factors determining the ability of a household to enlarge the commodity portion of its total product - at least without sometimes drastically reducing the part held over for subsistence consumption.

The mode of development of agriculture in the 1860s in accordance with the size and composition of the household, ensured that the initial effect of commoditisation of production was to polarise communities along the lines of the existing pattern of larger (and older) households and the smaller households of younger men.

By the mid 1860's most Mfengu communities had reached the outer limits of their potential arable land and the pattern of polarisation apparent at Ox-Kraal was typical of the communities in Victoria East, Fort Beaufort, Peddie and the Crown Reserve (69). The way in which the survey was ignored and titles not taken up supports the view that most communities adapted the arrangements imposed by the Colonial State to their own requirements.

In concluding this overview of the surveyed locations it is important to point out that the survey was not confined to Mfengu locations. Those of Toise and Tshatshu were also partly surveyed. The terms on which the survey was conducted were not as good as elsewhere. The villages laid out were exceptionally large, consisting of 200 households each. The arable land was to be divided up into 3 acre lots. The quit-rent imposed was however slightly less, being 10 shillings per annum, 7 shillings and 6 pence for the arable land and 2 shillings and 6 pence for the building lot. No resident was intended to be allowed to have more than 2 horses, 8 head of cattle and 16 goats and sheep on the commonage. (70)
If these regulations and similar regulations proposed as part of the survey in the Mfengu locations had been strictly enforced there would indeed have been a radical levelling of the population. The fact that they were not enforced, however, was probably as much as for any other reason because 75% of the households did not have that much stock. The large holdings of the minority of large households easily passed, if not unnoticed, then at least without seriously embarrassing the formula worked out by the Colonial State. The political dependence of the Colonial State on strategic allies (almost always drawn from this larger household group) as headmen and assistant headmen was also a growing reality, and to undermine their prestige and influence would have undermined the tenuous hold of the Colonial State over the locations as a whole.

(c) Unsurveyed Quit-Rent Tenure (Hut Tax) Without Title
('Communal' Tenure)

The basic patterns analysed in detail in Section II above were heavily influenced by the imposition of the survey or the perceived threat of its imposition. Similar trends, although less extreme, were also to be found in the unsurveyed districts of the Ngqika and Ndlambe.

The growth of production in these areas was, if anything, even more influenced by the structure of the household, because here the homestead groupings remained intact to a greater extent. The lack of equivalent detailed census data for these areas is to some extent compensated for by a greater abundance of observation and comment by the Colonial 'Special Magistrates' whose sole responsibility was with sections of these communities. In Table 12 below the growth of population from 1858 to 1864 is presented.
TABLE 12: Growth of Population Ciskei: 1858 - 1864 (71)

31ST DECEMBER 1858

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HUTS</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>CHILDREN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KAMA</td>
<td>2286</td>
<td>2159</td>
<td>2901</td>
<td>4451</td>
<td>9511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHALLA</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1549</td>
<td>2873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANDILLE</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>1283</td>
<td>2581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOISE</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>2188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIWANI</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>1069</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>2217</td>
<td>4506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYALI</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>1173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSHATSHU</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>1844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBA/ANTA</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>5943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6265</td>
<td>5943</td>
<td>7172</td>
<td>12831</td>
<td>25946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31ST DECEMBER 1864

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KAMA</th>
<th>GONUBIE</th>
<th>SANDILLE</th>
<th>TOISE</th>
<th>K.W.*</th>
<th>OBA/ANTA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUTS</td>
<td>3456</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>3748</td>
<td>3592</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>12665</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEN</td>
<td>3446</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>4049</td>
<td>4470</td>
<td>1127</td>
<td>13938</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOMEN</td>
<td>4635</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>3856</td>
<td>4543</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>14609</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHILDREN</td>
<td>8889</td>
<td>1710</td>
<td>7990</td>
<td>10456</td>
<td>2135</td>
<td>31180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16970</td>
<td>3394</td>
<td>15895</td>
<td>19469</td>
<td>3999</td>
<td>59727</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes Toise, Siwani, Tyali, Tshatshu.
** Includes Mhalla.

The population of the unsurveyed locations increased between December 1858 and December 1864 by 43.44% from 25 946 to 59 727. If to this is added the 14 652 population of the Crown Reserve which was a contiguous part of the King William's Town District, then the entire black population of the Ciskei not resident in the Colony, was 74 379. This is almost the same as it had been at the time of the 1848 census, however this population was now confined to an area about half the size (and quality) of the territory they occupied in 1848. In between they had lost the Amatolas, the Waterkloof (which was now in Fort Beaufort district as Colonial farms), large parts of the East London district and parts of present day Stutterheim. The shrinking land area, ever more heavily burdened with population, would have struggled in the best of circumstances to support them. Nevertheless the sheer force of numbers was in itself a great stimulus to increasing agricultural production.
After the 1850 war the Ngqika and Ndlambe tribes still occupied 2,450 square miles of territory. Their land losses in the war of 1850-53 must have been in the region of 1,000 square miles. The Crown Reserve which was set up for Mfengu occupation comprised 600 square miles alone. (72) In 1858 the population density was 1.5 people per square mile excluding the Crown Reserve. Including the Crown Reserve the population in 1858 was 37,314 with a density of 12.23 persons per square mile.

In 1864 the 600 square miles of the Crown Reserve accommodated 14,652 people at a density of 24.5 per square mile. If the area available to the Ngqika and Ndlambe had remained the same, at 2,450 square miles, the population density would have been comparable at 24.5 people per square mile. However, as we have seen, by 1864 white grantees of farms, lessees and other purchasers such as the German settlers occupied a grand total of 663,093 acres in British Kaffraria. This amounted to 1,036 square miles. The territory left to the Xhosa and Ngqika therefore was only 1,414 square miles. With a population of 59,727 in this area there were then 42.2 persons to the square mile.

Much of this land bordering the Kei river was extremely hilly and inaccessible, and of poor agricultural potential. The actual density was much greater than the average density of 42.2 would suggest. In the areas of best land, such as Kama's location, the population density was 106 per square mile. In King William's Town district it was 56 per square mile and with Anta and Oba 47 per square mile (73). The extremely low density of the Gonubie district of 8.5 was because of the complete unsuitability of the area for agriculture. Generally speaking it can be seen that the locations were heavily populated.

Along with the growth in population occurred a growth in other important economic factors. In Table 13 below, the growth of cattle, ploughs, sheep and wagons is shown for each location and each year 1859 - 1864.
### TABLE 13: Accumulation of Cattle, Sheep, Wagons & Ploughs 1859-1864 (74)

1. **CATTLE - AT 31 DECEMBER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>KAMA</th>
<th>MHALLA</th>
<th>SANDILLE</th>
<th>TOISE</th>
<th>SIWANI</th>
<th>PHATO/K.W.T</th>
<th>TYALI</th>
<th>TZATZOE &amp; OBA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>3961</td>
<td>1175</td>
<td>3232</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>1398</td>
<td>2807</td>
<td>528</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12945</td>
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2. **SHEEP AT 31 DECEMBER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>KAMA</th>
<th>MHALLA</th>
<th>SANDILLE</th>
<th>TOISE</th>
<th>SIWANI</th>
<th>PHATO/K.W.T</th>
<th>TYALI</th>
<th>TZATZOE &amp; OBA</th>
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3. **PLOUGHS AT 31 DECEMBER**

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<th>SANDILLE</th>
<th>TOISE</th>
<th>SIWANI</th>
<th>PHATO/K.W.T</th>
<th>TYALI</th>
<th>TZATZOE &amp; OBA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>97</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>111</td>
<td>108</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Between December 1859 and December 1864 ploughs increased from 143 to 675. This was an increase in the number of ploughs per household from 1 per 55.4 households in 1860 to 1 per 18 households. Sheep increased from a total of 4,381 in 1860 to 36,303 in 1864. This represented a phenomenal increase of over 700% in four years. Where there was less than 1 sheep per household in 1860, by 1864 there were 2.9 sheep per household. Although the ratios were less favourable in the King William's Town district at around 1.7 per household, in Sandille's location there were 3.9 sheep per household. By contrast the King William's Town district locations had one plough to every 11.47 households while Sandille's location had 1 to every 31.3 households. Kama's location was slightly better than average with 1 plough to every 15.2 households.

It can be seen from this that, as in the Mfengu locations, rapid advances had been made in those factors which boosted the commodity portion of the total product. Because of the relatively large areas involved certain locations had adapted themselves more to sheep farming than to crop production because they were more suited to it.

In 1858, while the population of the locations was still depleted after the effect of the cattle-killing, Grey instructed Maclean to extend to the Ngqika and Ndlambe locations the policy of collecting
all residential sites into villages. This was to be along the lines of 'villagisation' already commenced in the Crown Reserve and the other Mfengu locations. Except for the two small locations of Tshatshu and Toise no mention was made of the introduction of a survey.

Brownlee, always sceptical of sudden changes, pointed out that locating people in villages without the use of irrigation on the lands would be very difficult. Good crops on dry land could only be obtained in the upper parts of the district, but the arable land there was of small extent, he explained. (75) For the rest of the location the good land lay in narrow patches along the bottoms of the valleys. If villages were formed this would necessitate most of the people having to travel eight or nine miles daily to and from their gardens. Conversely wood was scarce in the higher upper parts of the location and villages placed near the arable land would find themselves unacceptably far from sources of fuel. (76)

Brownlee's report on villagisation indicates how carefully the physical distribution of homesteads was organised with respect to arable lands, pasturage and sources of fuel. As was emphasised in our treatment of the pre-Colonial Xhosa social formation, the question of the distribution of homesteads and the availability of adequate land for them had an important bearing on the setting up of new homesteads. The non-availability of residential land with access to good garden land often stimulated struggles by younger men to expand the territory in the old way, using the old lines of economic and political struggle.

At the same time as the collection of homesteads into villages was being carried out, it was announced that a "hut tax" of 10 shillings per annum was to be introduced. 1858 had been a poor season and Brownlee thought that most people would not be able to raise sufficient crops to pay the tax. In an important report he wrote:

"The soil in this district is generally of much inferior nature. In the grazing ground the soil is
also thin and liable to droughts, the subsoil and sandstone being in the most parts not more than 24 inches from the surface. Many of those who have nothing and who are compelled to move (through villagisation J.L.) will abandon the District, as they have not the means to break up new ground for the coming season, and many of those who move though they may struggle through the difficulties of another winter and be able to put a crop in the ground will be utterly unable to pay their hut tax ...

For the majority of the locations it was a severely depressing situation. After the cattle-killing came drought, villagisation and taxation. Of the 1858 harvest Brownlee wrote:

"In the last season though the crops at the beginning promised to give a good return, they have proved almost a complete failure in consequence of drought and general inferiority of the soil, the people will thus like last year have an insufficiency of seed ... want will therefore be extended during another year." (77)

Despite the obvious negative consequences of villagisation on production Brownlee proceeded in the execution of his instructions. In July 1858 a Government Circular was received by certain magistrates informing them "sufficient time having been allowed for the settlement of natives of your Districts in Villages" the taxation of all the owners of huts was to commence at the rate of 10 shillings per annum. (79) The circular required the magistrates to submit a return of all huts registered for taxation in their district. (80)

The result of this 'accumulation of disadvantages' was a radical levelling of the population with a strong downward shift for the majority of the population. Drought and extremities of all sorts were destroying all results of accumulation over the years. The only effective factor that then differentiated households was
their position in the kinship structure. Those large households which could still deploy labour were able in the 1858-59 season to attempt to claw their way out of depression by breaking up and cultivating land as extensively as they could. Those who could not rely on their own resources of labour had no choice but to emigrate to find land elsewhere, in the Mfengu locations, the mission stations, or on the Colonial farms.

To offset the outflow of households which could no longer survive in the harsh conditions prevailing in the late 1850s and early 60s, a new class of people began returning to the district who were to have the greatest influence on the future development of production. These were people who had spent some time in the Colony and had been able to acquire some cattle and sheep through receiving wages in kind. During 1859 the population in the Ngqika district increased by 3,741 to 6,322. Brownlee ascribed this influx to:

"Fingoes and Kaffir squatters from the Reserves, as well as from the return of Kafirs from the Colony. Many of these had been long in the Colony and returned with stock ..."[81]

These people generally were the first to pay their taxes, the first to begin the cultivation of wheat and other crops, to purchase ploughs and to have oxen trained to work them, and to acquire sheep. It must be emphasised that those who succeeded in reorganising their production in these ways were not any of the returned workers who went to the Colony in 1857 after the cattle-killing. They were those who had managed to accumulate some stock and those who had been away for some time - even from before the cattle-killing. Among the new large households that were to emerge Brownlee reported:

"a number of wealthy Kaffirs who had been for many years on the farms of Messrs Southey who had received notice to quit and being unable to rent land elsewhere in the district of Graaf Reinet, had resolved to return to Kaffraria ... Many of the Kaffirs who had long resided on Government land in
Beaufort West, (for 20 or 30 years) in consequence of their flocks having increased to such an extent that they found the land insufficient, resolved to come into this Province ..." (82)

The efflux of people through the cattle-killing created the opportunities for the refugees from the wars of 1835, 1848 and 1853 to return in triumph. Thus was established the first layer of a new large, agriculturally based, commercially orientated group of households capable of producing fairly large surpluses for the market above their subsistence requirements. It was only a matter of time before their numbers were added to by the returning refugees from the cattle-killing and the process thus extended and deepened. It may be concluded that by 1864 many of the 36 000 sheep in the district belonged to a few very large flock owners who established themselves initially on the Colonial farms and then reintroduced themselves to pride of place in the Ngqika locations.

It is possible to see in this two-way flow of population how the Colonial economy was beginning to exercise a determining influence over the restructuring of production. The process of accumulation was being restructured to give dominance to those who were most successful in incorporating the presence of the Colonial economy into their own productive activity. Stock acquired as wages provided a base from which to acquire a plough, sheep and trek gear. Once production was successfully undertaken, the Colonial markets and traders existed to dispose of the surplus and allow another cycle of production. But this was a process fraught with difficulties and which many were able to achieve only in very small measure.

A Uitenhage farmer told a parliamentary select committee that "the increase of the stock after being with a master a couple of years is worth to them three times the amount of wages they receive ... some of them become quite rich, owners of a wagon and even as many as 1 000 sheep." Bowker, a successful Albany farmer told the same committee that "I have not one man (of eighteen) in my service who
The eventual return, in about 1863-64, of refugees from the cattle-killing who had served 5 year contracts saw a large increase in population in those years accompanied by a sudden surge in the numbers of sheep from 5,945 to 10,740 in the Ngqika location and 18,632 to 25,914 overall. This was, wrote Brownlee, due to:

"arrival of a number of families from the Colony; one man brought with him 700 sheep and 400 goats."  (84)

It is possible to obtain a more exact idea of the differential impact that the sojourn on the Colonial farms had on those returning to the locations. Brownlee investigated those returning to Maqoma's old location during June and July 1860. He found 34 men, 30 women, 41 boys and 38 girls had returned in this two month period. They had brought with them 2 guns, 21 horses, 45 cattle, 75 goats and 10 sheep. At one end some of the young and unmarried men had no livestock to their names. All married men had at least one head of mixed stock (either horses, cattle, sheep and goats). Of the total mixed livestock of 141 head, 3 of the men possessed 20, 21 and 25 head each. This gave them 46.8% of the total livestock that came with the returning workers. Only 12 of the men possessed more than 5 head of livestock, leaving 22 with less than 5. Of the 12, eight were returning from the Colony while the others were from Kama's and Toise's location. (85)

In the years 1859-1861 there was an almost self-conscious movement to break up ground that had not previously been under cultivation. It must be remembered that since 1848, when the Ngqika were settled in their location along the Kei River, they had been in an almost continuous state of war and uproar which effectively prevented much potential arable land from being cleared for cultivation. In March 1860 Brownlee reported:

"The people are beginning to break up new ground so that they may extend their cultivation next year." (86)

Due to the drought conditions a new problem began to emerge in the Ngqika locations. The shortage of wood was causing a fuel crisis.
and a shortage of material suitable for the building of cattle kraals. The poorly constructed kraals could not properly contain the stock, which constantly broke out during the night, causing havoc in the gardens which they trampled. This led to much litigation, claims for damages, and resentment. However this just aggravated the basic cause of resentment which was the poor condition of the land which could never sustain a large agricultural population. There were, reported Brownlee:

"constant quarrels among the people about land and many of them have their gardens on such poor soil that their returns are not good ..." (87)

One of the causes of the lack of available firewood was the destruction of forests to form garden sites. In Siwani's location where this was widely occurring, Kayser was told, when he enquired why the forests were being encroached on, that the people were too crowded and had no other ground for their gardens. (88)

This combination of natural, social and political forces led, after an initial levelling, to the increasing polarisation of the community as the effects of economic integration with the Colony became more intensely felt. This occurred through a centrifugal movement of the households with the majority experiencing a strong downward shift in their position. This downward shift was not something ineluctable. Rather it was accompanied by strenuous attempts by many to break into new methods and agricultural practices, but they were frustrated by lack of resources and labour, the poorness of the soil and by drought. After a few years of losing wheat crops to rust and drought, even the most determined would become disheartened.

The contradictions of the development of commodity production in the Xhosa households were nowhere more clearly visible than in the struggle over the 'hut tax'.

The lack of success in collecting the hut and horse tax in the whole of this period is clearly revealed in the statistics for hut and horse tax for the period 1860 to 1865 in Table 14 below.
### TABLE 14: Hut and Horse Tax 1860-1865 (89)

#### HUT TAX

<table>
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<th>COLLECTED</th>
<th>DEFICIENCY</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>pounds</td>
<td>s d</td>
<td>pounds</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>800</td>
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#### HORSE TAX

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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>pounds</td>
<td>s d</td>
<td>pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
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<td>50</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
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As can be seen, the amount actually collected consistently fell short of the amount that should have been collected. At best, Brownlee was short in hut tax by 17.3% in 1862; at worst, by 56.3% in horse tax in 1864. The horse tax was introduced at the same time as the hut tax. It was a sort of 'super-tax'. In the 1848 census of the Nqgika and Ndlambe it may be seen that the ownership of horses was consistently associated with a high rating in respect of household size and numbers of cattle. Despite the expectation that horses would be owned by people who would be able to raise the 2 shillings and 6 pence per annum tax on them, this, as is obvious from Table 14, was often far from the case.

The immediate explanation for the shortfall in taxes raised might of course be thought to be in straightforward resistance to taxation imposed by a colonising conqueror, a common enough phenomenon anywhere. However it soon became clear that this was not the only or even the main cause.

Early in 1862 Brownlee wrote explaining why he had only been able to collect 50% of the tax in 1861. He spoke of the 'poverty' of the people and the 'lack of work opportunities' for those who could not raise the tax (96). The 1860-61 season had in fact been one of the few better-than-average years since 1857 and a fairly good harvest was achieved. Brownlee reported that those attempting to sell grain were not getting more than 3 or 4 shillings per bag at the most. Thus to raise 10 shilling tax, a household would have to raise 3 or 4 bags or between 400 and 700 lbs of grain, far beyond the possible absolute surplus yield of the majority of small households. Such a high proportion of the total product being marketed could only be achieved at the expense of reducing the portion of the product kept for domestic consumption - the characteristic mark of a community experiencing a downward aggregate shift.

The Colonial State's response to this situation was to empower the magistrates to make arbitrary confiscations of stock or other moveable property to be sold to meet the tax debt of the
Brownlee's difficulties were intensified by the failure of the 1861-62 crop. In a little known chapter of Colonial excess Brownlee began, in his own words,

"To burn out those who are in arrears and compel them to leave the District and take up service. Up to this time I was unable to adopt this extreme measure as there was no demand for labour."(92)

The demand for workers on the neighbouring farms was poor, as was the demand for workers everywhere in the Colony. The Colony was, in fact, in the midst of a depression after the collapse of wool prices following the boom of the 1850's (93). Nevertheless, Brownlee's efforts led to his recovering 110 pounds and 5 shillings of the arrears from 1861 - bringing his tax collection up to nearly 50% of what was expected. By following such methods he achieved, in 1862, his best rate of collection failing to extract only 17.2% of the total owing.

The drought of 1861-62 continued into the drought of 1862-63. Brownlee saw that famine loomed for many and made efforts to increase the numbers going into the Colony for employment. He suggested that labour bureaus be opened and advertisements be placed in the Colonial newspapers informing farmers and others that labour could be obtained on application. He hoped in this way to "draw off the destitute from Kaffraria." (94) It may thus be seen that migration, proletarianisation and the extinction (at least temporarily) of some households was the result of taxation, indebtedness and Colonial domination. Inevitably 1863 was a bad year for tax collection, with 32% of the tax outstanding.

From Tamacha in Siwani's location it was reported that demand for work in the Colony was on the increase. Many were without food.

"The natives of this location come in numbers every day to this office to apply for passes to proceed to purchase corn. The headmen who bring them generally state that they are starving and have no means of subsistence ..."(95)
Aware of the pressures being brought to bear on them by the Government to collect the tax, the magistrates resorted to the only alternative measure they had – confiscation of stock.

Simply forcing people out of the district when there was no work for them was self-defeating as they were then likely to leave the district permanently, and thus erode the tax base of the district. Confiscation of stock was therefore the only measure which the Colonial State could effectively enforce. During June 1863 Brownlee reported that he had collected 125 pounds of the hut tax by seizing and selling goats and sheep. (96) 40% of the hut tax collected in 1863 was thus derived from stock confiscations. In Siwani's district the same methods of tax collection were employed. The clerk in charge reported that:

"Most of the natives have not got much stock to their names, some have had all that they had seized for hut tax last year. The headmen state that the people are not unwilling to pay, but that they have not the means of paying the Hut Tax." (97)

Even this last resort had its drawbacks. Unless stock was to be transported for sale to King William's Town, they realised "not one half of their value" when sold locally (98). A considerable number of stock must have been seized to make up for arrear taxes.

In 1863 - 64 the run of bad years since the cattle-killing (with the exception of 1860-61) was broken and 1863-64 was in fact an exceptionally good year for agriculture. Across the Kei, Sarhili's people were reported to have "raised crops equal to two years consumption." (99) Yet despite the high yields obtained Brownlee registered his worst tax collection year ever, obtaining only 437 pounds out of an expected 1 000 pounds, leaving 56.3% in arrears for 1864. The reasons for this are instructive.

The high yields forced down prices from the traders to such an extent that it was still very difficult for most households to raise their tax purely through the sale of grain. (100) It will be easily understood that many households would have had other
objects of consumption in mind for the hard won cash they had been able to realise, other than meekly handing it over to Brownlee! Nevertheless the low prices obtained were classical conditions for a falling level of prosperity for the mass of households.

Many households were in arrears for 3 or 4 years and any payments they made were regarded as arrear payments, thus swelling the arrears for 1864. Recognising the urgency of the situation, Brownlee proposed that the headmen should play a greater role in the collection of hut tax. (101) 1863-64 had been a good season and this released many households from dependence on their livestock for survival. Brownlee promised that:

"As soon as they have gathered and traded their corn it is my intention to go round and apply a little pressure in enforcing the payments now overdue ..." (102)

Maclean had by this time realised that coercion alone was insufficient to effectively extract the tax. In a circular to all magistrates he said that, from 1865, the headman of each village would be allowed, in addition to his pay, 3 pence on the payment of 5 shilling for each hut where the tax was collected half yearly, and 6 pence on the payment of 10 shillings where the tax was collected yearly. This allowance was therefore at the rate of 5% per annum. (103) However this innovation did not stop him from delivering a stinging rebuke concerning Brownlee to the Colonial Secretary Brownlow, for his poor performance in tax collection, in which he compared Brownlee unfavourably with Captain Bisset who presided over Kama's location. Goaded by the rebuke and frustrated by the difficult conditions and poverty of the district, Brownlee wrote a lengthy defence of himself.

Brownlee pointed out that in districts such as Kama's, which were in close proximity to rich Colonial agricultural districts like Victoria East, Fort Beaufort, Albany and Bedford there were many advantages which the more easterly districts did not enjoy. Firstly the market for grain was much larger, especially in the Colonial towns like Alice, and the prices obtained there were
higher. The armed forts separating the Colony from British Kaffraria provided nearby markets for eggs, milk and butter, for which the people in the Ngqika district had no market. Most importantly, daily and seasonal labour close to home was available both on the farms and in the towns where casual wages could be as high as 1 shilling per day. It was thus quite possible to raise the tax without having to rely on the sale of grain. In Kama's district there was also firewood and thatch which were extensively sold to the Colonists as a supplementary source of income. (104)

These supplementary sources of income from petty trading and from casual work were of great importance in explaining why the people of Kama's location had more money to pay their taxes. But above and beyond all these factors there was one overriding reason for the difficulty which the collection of taxes met:

"According to the returns the people of my District appear to be as well off for stock as those of other Districts, but this stock is by no means equally distributed among the Gaikas. There are a few wealthy men ... who have from 100 to 300 head of cattle besides flocks of sheep and goats - and a number of the same class who have from 30 to 60 head besides sheep and goats. This distribution of stock leaves the mass of people entirely destitute and they have nothing but their grain for subsistence and the payment of their taxes. Corn, when they are able to sell it, brings about 5 shilling a bag and in many cases a woman or man will have to travel 20 miles with a bag of corn on their heads for which they will receive 9 pence or 1 shilling and then have to travel back again for 20 miles and thus raise the tax." (105)

Nothing that could be added could so eloquently explain the reason for the difficulty with which the tax was raised and the hardship it imposed on many people. The domination of cattle and sheep by a wealthy elite owning the majority of these valued resources led naturally to the expansion of their agricultural activity and the
acquisition of political and social influence over the headman, his assistants, and even over the magistrate himself. While these rich households progressed, acquired wagons, ploughs and horses, the majority of people were in a firm downward spiral; a spiral only explicable in terms of the impoverishment that comes with conquest and the vast appropriations of land and cattle from the Xhosa and the subsequent effects of incorporation into the economic system of the Colony.

These trends were more stark for the Ngqika over whom Brownlee presided, but the basic pattern was the same in the locations of Kama, Siwani, Toise and Tyali. The difference was only that certain of these groups, Kama's especially, had greater access to wage income thus suppressing the obviousness of the impoverishment that had occurred. It is also true that the group of wealthy and even moderately well-off households was no doubt bigger in those areas, but not sufficiently so as to reverse the aggregate shift downwards experienced by the mass of households in the 1860s.

For those that did achieve a breakthrough in increasing agricultural productivity, the 'progress' in accumulation and the readjustment of economic activity was immediate, self-conscious and dramatic. The young Chief Oba was investing the whole of his income in the purchase of sheep. (106) In Siwani's location the 'progressive' accumulators were also in evidence. There were, reported Kayser:

"A considerable number of Siwani's old councillors who are well off and a few have ploughs and wagons and oxen." (107)

Those who could, purchased land. In one case the purchaser of 160 acres for 360 pounds paid 150 pounds in cash. However all the accumulation and productivity that a few could achieve could not nearly offset the negative effects of Colonial domination for the many.

In a survey of agricultural conditions conducted by the Commission on Native Affairs in 1865 Brownlee estimated that 1 000 bags of corn and 100 bales of wool were sold in the Ngqika district in the
1864-65 season. At 5 shillings per bag this would have been worth 250 pounds. Not at all a large amount for a district with 3,574 households and a population of 14,594 in 1865. (108)

Despite the relatively greater success of tax collection in Kama's district, Captain Bisset's response to the questionnaire submitted by the Commission reveals that in 1865 over 330 men from the Middledrift district (which incorporated Kama's location) were employed on Colonial farms as herders at a wage of from 5 to 10 shilling per month. (109) Many more were employed casually and seasonally in shearing and other tasks. These districts had amongst them the first migrant workers who required regular cash incomes to sustain their households. In the more distant Ngqika districts migrations of longer periods were required. It appears that, lacking the option of daily work, many Ngqika were more inclined to suffer a declining standard of subsistence than to face the hazards of life on the Colonial farms.

Although the overall advances in production were less in the Xhosa districts, all the evidence suggests that they followed the same overall pattern as in the Mfengu districts; a sharp polarisation of the community caused by the simultaneous effects of accumulation by some households combined with a decline in the production of other households.

(d) Squatting and Tenancy on Private and Colonial Crown Lands

The other side of the coin of the polarisation of the Mfengu and Xhosa locations was the growth of African occupation of farms owned by the Colonists. When the centrifugal effects of polarisation led to the emigration of households, these households most often moved into the Colony in search of land on which to settle. They entered into agreements with farmers or they unilaterally occupied land where the farmers were non-resident. As a condition of grant, all the owners of the farms given out by Grey in 1858 were required to be resident on the farm. As early
as November 1858 Brownlee, returning from the Colony, found "many of them settled in various parts of the Colony. Numbers of these are Fingoes and Kaffirs who hold certificates of citizenship and hire land from the farmers or cultivate land paying as rent one half or one third of the crop." (110)

Often such relationships developed from what had started out as a 'service contract' binding a man to be a worker on a farm. Many of these 'contracts' were entered into by the masses who left the Ciskei after the failure of the cattle-killing and some of them developed from this into such tenancy agreements.

The distinctions that must be made between tenants and squatters has already been mentioned. (111) In Chapter 5 three types of tenancy were distinguished - in which the rent was paid through labour on the farmer's lands, or through giving up part of the crop to the farmer or in cash. In any of these cases the tenant might have used either his own implements or the implements provided by the owner. Obviously the tenant's degree of independence was much greater when he owned his own implements.

Squatting, in this period can be taken as referring to cases where the land was occupied without the consent or knowledge of the owner. Squatting became particularly important when it was directed or encouraged as a political movement by a chief or headman.

Squatting as opposed to other forms of tenancy, because of its potentially political character, always caused more notice and importance to be given to it than its real economic significance warranted. The Colonial State called all residence of blacks on Colonial land 'squatting' without making any distinction as to the type of occupation involved. The Thembu agent Warner was an early and persistent crusader against 'squatting'. He recognised that the influx of people into Thembu locations could not be controlled where there were no titles limiting the number of arable lots, as the Thembu locations had particularly large commonages. Something had to be done, Warner argued, or "we shall soon have half of Kaffirland squatting within the limits of the Tambookie location." (112)
The most significant squatter movement in this period occurred in the Winterberg and Waterkloof areas of Fort Beaufort district. It will be remembered that the area around the Waterkloof was that from which Maqoma's people had been expelled just prior to the outbreak of war in 1850 and many Ngqika had never given up hope of reoccupying it.

The Colonial farmers in the vicinity agitated intensely against the increasing numbers of blacks occupying land in the district. The farmers most active in this were those with large flocks who suffered losses through an increase in stock thefts. At a meeting of farmers held late in 1858 a comprehensive resolution was drafted calling on the Government to exercise complete control over the Waterkloof range to prevent the influx of people onto State land and unoccupied Colonial farms there. They urged the government to exercise strict control through a pass law requiring all blacks to be contracted to an employer before they left the Ciskei. (113)

The magistrate at Fort Beaufort, feeling that the complaint of the farmers reflected badly on him, prepared a report showing that much of the squatting complained of was caused by the farmers themselves who, he claimed:

"have been in the habit of discharging their servants sometimes for capricious motives; these then suddenly thrown upon their own resources too often take to the bush, which abounds in this Division, from which they sally out, when impelled by hunger and prey upon the flocks of the men, perhaps who discharged them ..." (114)

He also claimed that many of the farmers were allowing unregistered tenants to stay on their farms in contravention of the law.

The result of the Fort Beaufort farmers petition was the promulgation of Government Notice No. 17 of 1859, which prohibited grantees of farms from receiving rent from "unregistered Natives" or allowing them to 'squat' on their farms. It required that the
only persons who could stay on a farm were "those who have been
duly registed as servants". (115) This was the earliest measure
to outlaw 'squatting' and it was not successful. By 1863
Strongfellow reported from Fort Beaufort that there were 3 230
Xhosa and Mfengu resident on the farms in the district. (116)
'Squatting' was to prove a habitual and thorny problem for the
rest of the century. The illegal squatters and the legal tenants
were to grow into a large and important sector of the black
agricultural community.

Squatting and tenancy were closely associated with the downward
shift which we have observed in the Ciskeian locations. It was a
response to the overcrowded conditions with little opportunity for
agricultural expansion and consequently increased rapidly between
1858 and 1865. The Commissioner on Native Affairs heard from
Albany district that:

"The natives squat on Government land principally and
many natives obtain garden lots and grazing land by
paying or giving their services to farmers." (117)

Evidence was also led to the Commission of "farming on the half"
(paying half the crop as rent) in Somerset district, and the Civil
Commissioner of Victoria East reported large numbers of Xhosa and
Mfengu were on the farms near the Mancazana. "Most of them" he
told the Commissioner "hired small patches of ground and the right
of grazing their stock from the farmers". (118) They paid 3
pounds per annum for each family. He estimated that a man with
300 people on his farm could realise 500 pounds per year as rent.

If such high rents were being paid in cash the households would
have to be producing grain to great extent or gaining cash
elsewhere through wages to meet their obligations. One can
understand the sort of pressure that must have prevailed in the
locations when households were prepared to pay rent to the farmers
so much higher than the 12 shillings and 6 pence per annum
quit-rent in the locations.

Most of the tenancy agreements were found in the districts which
included the locations eg. Victoria East, Peddie, Fort Beaufort and the immediately neighbouring districts such as Bedford. From Bedford evidence was led that on one farm there were "90 Fingoes and Kaffirs .. who pay the owner 25 pounds per annum, on another farm 163, on another 263." (119) From Queenstown it was reported that 6 farms were occupied altogether by Africans with up to 50 people on one farm. (120) For the older Colonial districts it was reported that in Graaff-Reinet there were 10 tenants for every farmer.

If tenancy arrangements and squatting reflected the deteriorating situation in the locations, it was also related to the growing place of wage work for most households. The number of workers registered with Colonial farmers increased steadily between 1860 and 1865. There were 6 005 registered workers in December 1862 and by December 1864, despite the slump in Colonial agriculture, there were 7 554 (121). The return compiled for a Parliamentary Select Committee gives some details of the distribution and the wages these workers received.

The areas absorbing most workers were Albany, Albert, Alexandria, Aliwal North, Bedford, Peddie, Queenstown, Graaff-Reinet and Somerset. These districts each had over 500 registered contract workers in them. There must, of course, have been many more who were employed casually or permanently but were not officially registered.

Most of the workers were contracted for one year, after which the contracts had to be renewed if they were to stay on. Wages varied greatly. In Albany in 1864 workers were registered as receiving from 10 to 15 shillings per month, or cattle of that value, providing an annual wage of 6 to 9 pounds. That was a fairly high range and depending on how much had to be spent on food and clothing a worker could hope to buy sufficient sheep to begin a small flock on the proceeds of a year's wages. In other districts wages were not so high. In Albert the top wage was 10 shillings per month with many being paid 1 shilling per month. In
Graaff-Reinet wages as low as 3 shillings per month for a one year contract were registered. The highest wages were from areas further away, such as George, where a top wage of 1 pound and ten shillings per month or 18 pounds per year was registered. What type of work was done for these high wages, which occurred in other districts as well, is unfortunately not stated but it might have been for ploughmen. Females and children received generally 5 shillings or less for a month's work.

At an average wage of 7 shillings per month the 7 554 workers from Thembul and British Kaffraria employed in the Cape Colony in 1864 would have earned at least 2 644 pounds. Many brought in wages in stock, but it is nevertheless clear that the value of wage work was rapidly approaching the value of income earned from agriculture for the Ciskei as a whole. For people desperately short of cash to meet their consumption requirements for clothing, the purchase of sheep and other livestock and the payment of taxes, wage work was assuming an ever more important place.

The mid 1860s were a period of slump and depression in the Cape economy. While wages remained relatively stable this was caused by the resistance of many workers towards going to the more distant districts. The effect was that some farmers still complained of a shortage of workers, which caused increased resentment of the tenants and squatters who they felt should be forced to work.

A letter from some Colonists to the Colonial Press expressed their view on the need for workers:

"Your memorialists do not regard the overcrowding of the Natives in the villages as an evil, being of opinion that such a state of things will compel them to seek for work and to remain in service."

(122)

The editorial of the same issue called for forced labour and the "drafting off of such a portion of the young able-bodied men to be put to useful labour by police detachment." With opinions such as these being expounded it was clear that action would be taken to
reduce tenancy and increase work contracts by those leaving the Ciskei.

(e) The Mission Stations

The effects of the cattle-killing were felt on the mission stations as they were everywhere else. Up to 1857 there were 4 mission stations in the Ciskei occupying 10,717 acres. With Grey's support for the different mission societies the number increased to 8 and by 1860 they occupied 30,637 acres, after which no further increases took place. The area occupied by the mission stations was 47.8 square miles, nearly equal to the area of Tshatshu's and Toise's locations combined. All of the land given to them was selected for its suitability as arable land and good pasturage.

The population increased rapidly. Prior to the cattle-killing there were 2,523 people on the 4 stations. By 1860 there were 8,004, making just on a thousand people on each station. The mission stations had a strong effect on the areas surrounding them. They accounted for a disproportionate number of the ploughs and wagons in each district. By 1860 there was 1 plough for every 10 households on the British Kaffrarian mission stations and one wagon for every 14 households. This was substantially higher than for any other type of district - Mfengu or Xhosa, surveyed or unsurveyed.

The missions are important because they mark the one type of tenure in which the extreme polarisation so characteristic of the others was not to be found. This does not mean that equality prevailed on the missions. It means that the mission communities were able to increase the total product of the households more uniformly and the commodity product rose as a proportion of that. The communities as a whole experienced an aggregate shift upwards with a levelling tendency which narrowed the gap between the
households. In this way the mission stations became a leading source of market orientated production.

However the large grants were not received entirely magnanimously from the Colonial State, nor were the mission stations totally exempt from the tendencies and problems we have observed elsewhere. One of the leading campaigners for the mission stations was the Rev. Birt of Peelton.

He was utterly opposed to the way in which the Colonial State was undertaking the survey of mission and other lands and wrote to Maclean in 1860 that 4 acres "even in this generation will not be very abundant". (123) Birt was also involved in stimulating people in opposing the 4 acre survey allotment by breaking up and cultivating more land. In trying to gain more land for the people of Peelton he:

"told the people to cultivate as much land as they could ... for that I was quite sure that the Government did not wish to restrict them to the 4 acres and I am encouraging them all that I can to cultivate to the extent of their means ..." (124)

Despite the advances made by the people on the mission stations, many who were without sufficient money to purchase grains in poor years were just as vulnerable as those in the locations. After the poor harvests of 1858-59 Birt noted the "extreme poverty induced by the famine." (125) Many of the people had to find work and fortunately for them several alternative resources were available. Some cut thatch and firewood which they were able to sell to the arriving German colonists or on the market in King William's Town. Others used their ploughs and oxen on the neighbouring German land. When they could not raise crops to sell, they could still sell eggs, poultry, butter, and whatever pumpkins they could spare, on the markets available to them.

Not all the missions were as well-situated as Peelton. In most cases there were substantial numbers of non-Christians amongst the mission populations. However the presence of mission education
and the strong pressure for consumption of commodities for domestic use by the missionaries (especially clothing and square houses rather than round ones, with at least a table and chair etc) all encouraged the greatest effort to be made in expanding commodity production to meet these requirements.

At the Mgwali station in Sandille's location, far from any significant Colonial centre, the Rev. Tiyo Soga told the 1865 commission on Native Affairs that 54,900 lbs. (305 muids) of corn was sold by 59 families (approximately) on the station. This would have given each family at least 1 pound and five shillings income from grain sales if the grain was sold locally. With 11 wagons on the station there was no reason that the grain should not have been taken to King William's Town where it would have realised double the amount. 18 of the families had ploughs, giving only 3 households per plough - a ratio equal to that found in the best Mfengu districts. It was only when the ratio of households to ploughs rose to about this level that it can be stated with reasonable certainty that all households used a plough for cultivation. The spread of new techniques was then great enough to cause a definite aggregate shift upwards for the community as a whole.

In examining the various communities that made up the Ciskeian population from 1858 to 1865, it has been seen that there was a distinct polarisation between households in the context of an aggregate downward shift for the communities as a whole. Arable agriculture had, by the mid 1860's, begun to displace pastoralism as the dominant productive activity. The uneven distribution of land and cattle (and now sheep) which had prevailed for many years became increasingly apparent, as the inherent inequalities which had to some extent been submerged in the old homestead structure now came to the fore.

In the next chapter the intensification of these contradictions in response to the political demands of the Colonial State and the development of the Colonial economy will be examined.
Classically, this description of the differentiation of the peasantry is found in Lenin's Development of Capitalism in Russia, Collected Works Vol. 3, (1964) p. 312.


Kulu, W. op.cit. pp. 66-75.

p. 425.

Marx, K. Capital Vol. I, Penguin (1976). pp. 1019-1022. Lenin has similarly shown the conditions under which a rural proletariat may be formed out of the poor peasantry possessing small allotments. c.f. op.cit. p. 231.


Ibid. p. 367.

Ibid. p. 368.

Shanin, T. op.cit. p. 50.

Littlejohn, G. 'Peasant Economy and Society' in B. Hindness, and P. Hirst, (eds.), Sociological Theories of the Economy, Macmillan (1977) p. 120.

Shanin, T. op.cit. p. 51.

Ibid. p. 119.
Kautsky, K. 'The Agrarian Question', summary translation by Banaji, J. in *Economy and Society* Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 5. Kautsky specifically observed the effects of capitalist development on the Russian peasantry. "The growth of capitalism in the towns is by itself sufficient to transform completely the peasants established way of life, even before capital has itself entered agricultural production."

See Chapter 6.

H.A. 70/19, April 1867, "A Return Showing the Number, Situation and Extent of the Several Grants of Land in British Kaffraria prior to its incorporation within this Colony."

Government Notice No. 3 of 1858, Land Regulation for British Kaffraria.

Compiled from B.K. 109, "Population Returns for British Kaffraria."

DSG/B.K. - 16, Surveyor General's report on "Tsekwa."

B.K. 27, Taylor to Maclean, November 1861.

DSG/B.K. - 46, Surveyor General's records.

B.K. 12, Surveyor General, 1855-56.

C.O. 3026, Government Notice No. 51 of 1861, 26th February 1861.

S.G. Al3-61, Peddie Crown Lands.

H.A. 43 No 107 of 1961, Edye to Southey, 14th March 1861.

H.A. 43 - No 107 of 1861, Edye to Southey, 6th November 1861.
(26) C.O. 3168, Maclean to Corey, Comment by Grey, 15th August 1859.

(27) B.K. 72, Brownlee to Maclean, Report on Grantees in the Ngqika Location, 7th April 1860.

(28) Ibid.


(30) C.O. 2969, Colonial Secretary to Southey, 21st April, 1858.

(31) C.O. 2970, Deputy Surveyor General to Southey, 15th August, 1858.

(32) C.O. 3010, Verity to Southey, June 1860.

(33) B.K. 26, Statement by Dukwana and Nyovani to Maclean, 16th April 1860.

(34) B.K. 26, Fielding to Taylor, 19th June 1860.

(35) C.O. 2989, Calderwood to Southey, 7th April 1859.

(36) Ibid.

(37) GH 17/8, Stringfellow to Brownlow, 30th May 1860.

(38) B.K. 25, Campbell to Maclean, 7th June 1859.

(39) B.K. 27, Campbell to Maclean, 9th August, 1858.

(40) B.K. 25, Vigne to Maclean, 10th December 1859.

(41) Shanin, T. op.cit. p. 179. See above p. 12.

(43) Cape Native Affairs Commission (1865). Evidence of Rev. Davis.

(44) B.K. 92, Birt to Maclean, 13th November 1862.

(45) B.K. 27, Wild to Maclean, 22nd June 1861.

(46) C.O. 3026, Calderwood to Southey, 14th February 1861.

(47) C.O. 3026, Tainton to Southey, 31st March 1861.

(48) C.O. 3046, Shepstone to Southey, 26th December 1861.

(49) H.A. 60/143, Return of Fingoe Hut Tax collected in the division of Fort Beaufort 1863.

(50) The King William's Town Gazette, 12th January 1863.

(51) C.O. 3046, Edye to Southey, March 1862.

(52) C.O. 3064, Verity to Southey, February 1863.

(53) H.A. 60/143, Return of Fingoe Hut Tax collected in the division of Fort Beaufort 1863.

(54) C.O. 3028, Calderwood to Southey, 9th October 1861.

(55) C.O. 2969, Return of Census of Fingoe Tribes in Lower Victoria, 31st December 1857.
C.O. 3026, Return of Census in District of Peddie, 31st December 1860.
C.O. 3046, Return of Census in District of Peddie, 31st December 1861.
A2-65, Census of the Cape Colony - 1865.

Childs on pp. 175 - 176 gives the equivalent lbs weight per bushel of certain basic crops as follows:

- 1 bushel of wheat = 60 lbs
- 1 bushel of maize of sorghum = 56 lbs
- 1 bushel of barley = 50 lbs
- 1 bushel of oats = ± 39 lbs


For the estimate of twenty 200 lbs bags of grain as necessary for the consumption requirements for a family of 5.8 people. The average family size in the 1860s was probably a bit smaller.

The average price of grain on the King William's Town Market in January, February and March 1865 was between 4 shillings & 5 pence and 6 shillings & 6 pence per 100 lbs. A muid of 180 lbs would fetch 11 shillings. See The Commercial Advertiser and Agricultural Gazette January - March 1865.

B.K. 28, Wild to Brownlow, 9th July 1862.

King William's Town Gazette and Kaffrarian Banner, 23rd October, 1865.

Childs, N.T. op.cit. p. 172. He found the average amount of wool per sheep to be "just under 2 lbs."

B.K. 27, Case tried by Wild at Keiskamma Hoek, 2nd December 1861.

C.O. 3026, List of Fingoes, desirous to be removed, residing in the Ox-Kraal location. Census by Special Magistrate T. Shepstone 9th April 1961. Arithmetical errors in the original have been corrected.
(64) The 1865 Census revealed that 2,256 acres were under cultivation, a reduction of 634 acres on the amount cultivated in 1861.

(65) See Chapter 6 above.

(66) The reason for restricting the cross tabulation to only those households which had ploughs is in order to shed more light on the basic question of why some households who had ploughs did not cultivate more extensively than they did.

(67) The total number of households in Table 9 is 119. The total number of ploughs is in fact 124 (See Table 5 above p. 461). However 5 households in fact had 2 ploughs each. Therefore the number of households owning ploughs was 119.

(68) See Table 6 above p. 463.

(69) There is extensive Census data on the Mfengu locations in the Crown Reserve covering the years 1857 - 1865 and for Victoria East over the same period. To present this data here would be repetitive. See G.H. 8/27; H.A. 16/57; C.O. 3046; C.O. 3064 for Victoria East and Population Returns British Kaffraria B.K. 109, Govt. Notice No. 13 - 1859, No 186 - 1860, No 145 - 1862, No 19 - 1863, No 19 - 1864. There is good evidence from Keiskamma Hoek hut tax records that the distribution of polygamous and non-polygamous households was very similar to Ox-Kraal. Taking the month of November 1865 as a sample month. 84 men paid hut tax in that month, 62 paid tax on one hut; 17 on two huts; 4 on three huts and one on four huts. While Ox-Kraal had a slightly higher proportion of polygamous households than reflected in this sample the results are strictly comparable. The percentage rise comparison for Ox-Kraal and Keiskamma Hoek is as follows. (For Hut Tax registers see B.K. 153)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Single Wife</th>
<th>2 Wives</th>
<th>3 Wives</th>
<th>4 or More Wives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>Keiskama Hoek</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
<td>20.23%</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Ox-Kraal</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>30.53%</td>
<td>9.11%</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As percentage of married men only.

(70) B.K.89, Special Magistrate in Tshatshu's Location to Maclean, 8 March 1861 and Deputy Surveyor General's Report, Toise's Location 1st February 1861.

(71) For sources of British Kaffrarian population data see note 69 above. In 1860 the locations of Toise, Siwani, Tyali and Tshatshu were amalgamated into the King William's Town district. 'Gonubie' district is a continuation of Mhalla's old district. By 1865 many (especially about 2 000 Mfengu) had began to move out of these districts causing a sharp drop in population. This will be dealt with fully in the next chapter.


(73) Compare these population densities with those given by Lacey from the 1936 Census. Ciskei, 1 259 square miles, population 120 200, density 95.4 per square mile, which made it the most densely populated of any non-urban area between the Kei and the Natal! As can be seen, certain areas had in the first half of the 1860's already even exceeded this density. See Lacey, M. Working for Boroko. The Origins of a Coercive Labour System in South Africa. Ravan Press, Johannesburg (1981) p. 38.

(74) See note 69 above for sources.

(75) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean n.d. 1858.
Brownlee's assessment was supported by Keyser in Siwani's location who said there would be "insufficient quantity of good arable ground close to the villages". B.K. 80, Keyser to Maclean, 17th May 1860.

B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 6th May 1858. Emphasis added.

B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 9th July 1858.

B.K. 114, Circular No. 8 of 15th July 1858.

Unfortunately the Hut Tax Registers for the Ngqika locations for this period have not yet come to light. They would be a very valuable source for determining the rate of polygamy (amongst other things).

B.K. 72, Brownlee to Maclean, 17th November 1859.

B.K. 72, Brownlee to Maclean, 17th November 1859.

S.C.A. - 64, Evidence of Human and Bowker.

B.K. 73, Brownlee to Maclean, 21st March 1864.

B.K. 72, Brownlee to Maclean, Return July 1860.

B.K. 72, Brownlee to Maclean, 19th March 1860.

B.K. 72, Brownlee to Maclean, 4th August 1860.

B.K. 80, Keyser to Brownlow, 28th April 1865.

B.K. 73, Brownlee to Maclean, 9th September 1865.

B.K. 73, Brownlee to Maclean, 31st January 1862.

Ibid.
(92) B.K. 73, Brownlee to Maclean, 1st March 1862.

(93) du Toit, A.E. op.cit. p. 226. Mentions the trade depression and fall in wool prices in passing. It is remarkable that more attention has not been paid to this depression which was particularly severe in the Cape Colony. See also de Kock, M.H. Economic History of South Africa, Cape Town. (1924) p. 103.

(94) B.K. 72, Brownlee to Maclean, 4th November 1862.

(95) B.K. 80, Kayser to Brownlow, 15th January 1863 and Kayser's reply to Brownlow's queries on tax collections 23rd December 1861.

(96) B.K. 73, Brownlee to Maclean, 28th January 1864.

(97) B.K. 80, Kayser to Brownlow, 7th February 1865.

(98) B.K. 73, Brownlee to Maclean, 17th May 1865.

(99) B.K. 73, Brownlee to Maclean, 17th June 1864.

(100) B.K. 73, Brownlee to Maclean, 16th December 1864. See also B.K. 30, Campbell to Brownlow, 18th November 1864: "The only means the people have of paying their taxes is through the sale of their corn and the price at present offered by traders is so very low that they are bringing back their corn expecting a better market".

(101) Ibid.

(102) B.K. 73, Brownlee to Brownlow, 17th May 1865.

(103) B.K. 114, Circulars Maclean to Magistrates, 19th September 1984.

(104) B.K. 73, Brownlee to Brownlow, 17th May 1865.
It is possible by reference to the Hut Tax register to get some idea of the rate of polygamy at this time. In November 1865 Brownlee collected tax from 70 men. 21 (30.4%) had 1 hut; 37 (52.8%) had 2 huts; 6 (8.6%) had 3 huts; 4 (5.7%) had 4 huts; 2 (2.8%) had 5 huts. It is completely safe to say that a man with 2 huts had 2 wives etc. as huts used other than for accommodating a wife and family, eg. for storage, cooking or guests were not taxed. (See Hut Tax Registers B.K. 154). However it must be remembered that the Hut Tax Register shows only a sample of the population at any given point. The high rate of polygamous households that paid the Hut Tax, tends only to prove that it was these households that could best afford to pay it. In the 1848 census of the Ngqika district the breakdown of wives per household for the 5765 of Sandille's tribe was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2725</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean = .94  Number of Distinct Values = 8  
Median = 1.00  Number of Values Counted = 5765  
Mode = 1.00

From the above histogram taken from the analysis of the 1848 census it may be seen that taking 3 898 married men only: 69.90% had 1 wife, 22.96% had 2 wives; 5.36% had 3 wives; 1.02% had 4 wives; 0.12% had 5 wives; 0.70% had 6 wives and 0.15% had 7 wives. It is perhaps of some importance that in 1865 more people with more than 1 wife were paying the tax than those with one wife only.
(106) B.K. 73, Brownlee to Maclean, 22nd April 1865.

(107) B.K. 80, Kayser to Maclean, 20th June 1860. Emphasis added.


(109) Ibid.

(110) B.K. 71, Brownlee to Maclean, 16th November 1858.

(111) See Chapter 5.

(112) C.O. 3026, Warner to Southey, 7th January 1861.

(113) C.O. 2971, Proceedings of a meeting held at the residence of Mr J. Sweetman (field cornet) Winterberg, 4th November 1858.

(114) C.O. 2971, Strongfellow to Brownlow, 30th November 1858.

(115) B.K. 109, Govt. Notice No, 17 of 1859.

(116) C.O. 3064, Strongfellow to Brownlow, 15th July 1863.

(117) Commission on Native Affairs, 1865. Evidence of Hudson, Acting Civil Commissioner, Albany.

(118) Ibid. Evidence of Liddle, Civil Commissioner, Victoria East.

(119) Ibid. Evidence of T. Leppan.

(120) Ibid. Evidence of J.F. Zeiler.

(121) H.A. 64/270, Return of Contracts Registered with Kaffrarian workers, 1862-1864.
(122) Commercial Advertiser and Colonial Gazette, 11th July 1865.

(123) B.K. 91, Birt to Maclean, 4th October 1860.

(124) Ibid.

Birt had earlier incurred the wrath of the Grahamstown Journal for telling a meeting of the Aborigines Protection Society in London that there was an urgent need for intervention by England to stop the country which was emptied during the cattle-killing from being "wrested from its rightful owners as other vast tracts had been." See Grahamstown Journal. 24th July 1858.

(125) B.K. 91, Birt to Maclean, 20th May 1859.
CHAPTER 10

THE BRIEF RESPITE: THE GROWTH OF THE COLONIAL ECONOMY: MFENGU EMIGRATION AND THE DRIFT TO REBELLION, 1866-1879

I The Colonial Economy

In assessing the period 1866-1879 two key elements must be kept in mind. Structurally, it was in this period that the Colonial capitalist economy invaded the domestic household production units of the Xhosa and Mfengu in depth. Conjuncturally and politically, the period ended in widespread rebellion in 1878 which cost the domestic household economy nearly all it had, and saw the expulsion of the Ngqika from the Ciskei.

In-between these two points, there was a period of improved agricultural conditions in the Ciskeian locations. In this chapter the factors underlying this improvement will be examined. It will be argued that the improvement which occurred was the product of specific political and demographic factors, rather than an outcome of any beneficial effects of commodity production per se. It will be shown that the ground won between 1865 and 1875 was rapidly lost again when the favourable factors were reversed.

By 1865 several interacting forms of the basic relations of production of household production units had emerged. In the previous chapter the different position of private land purchasers, lessees of Crown land, tenants on Colonial farms, and surveyed or unsurveyed locations, were discussed. Overall, the tendency within all these different forms was towards the incorporation of both commodity production and wage labour into the annual domestic production cycle.
How these tendencies developed in response to the growth of capitalism in Colonial agriculture and in the rest of the Colonial economy, and the development of new class forces adapted to the transformed nature of production in the households, will be examined in this chapter. Particular attention will be paid to the part played by the Colonial State in this period. It will be shown how it broadened its character as a state specialised in the work of Colonial conquest, by adding the more thoroughly capitalist characteristic of a state set on organising and controlling a proletariat in a form suitable for the contemporary level of development of capitalism itself.

By the mid 1860s the basic problem in the development of the Colonial economy was apparent to the Colonists themselves. In fine polemical style the 'Kaffrarian Recorder' claimed:

"want of capital by Kaffrarian farmers was the principal reason for the backwardness of Kaffrarian agriculture. What are farmers doing? Looking after a few thousand sheep, depending on shearing sufficient wool to pay for the necessaries they require, and content to let the richest and best land in Southern African remain as it was when the savages owned it ..." (1)

The 'want of capital' of which the press complained was of course not only want of fixed investment, but a shortage also of labour with which work necessary for the improvement of Colonial farms could be undertaken. In the few years after the cattle-killing, the Colonial farms had absorbed some 30 000 workers. The majority of them were on short contracts, but sufficient (up to 20%) were on 5 year contracts - long enough to make a real difference to the viability of Colonial agriculture. In Table 1 below the values of the main exports of the Cape from 1860 to 1880 are given. The importance of the 1870s as a period of expansion is clearly evident.
In this period the wine industry suffered its final failure on world markets. Although in the wool industry the value of total sales was maintained in the 1860s and increased rapidly in the 1870s the price tended to decline and continually increased volumes were required to sustain the nett value of wool sales. The dramatic increase in the number of sheep on the unfenced Colonial farms which required constant attention from many herders was a major factor behind the chronic labour shortage on the farms.

The opening of the Suez Canal and onset of European economic depression in the mid-1870s had surprisingly little immediate impact on the exports of the Cape Colony, and the Colony only began to feel the effects of the global depression of trade in the early 1880s. It was thus possible for the Colonial State to begin the expansion of the transport infrastructure of the Colony in the 1870s, despite the unfavourable condition of world trade.
The development of a railway network in the 1870s strongly promoted the development of East London. In Table 2 the value of imports and exports handled through East London is given.

**TABLE 2: Exports and Imports through East London 1866-1882 (3)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SHIPS</th>
<th>VALUE - POUNDS STERLING</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
<th>WOOL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IMPORTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26 957</td>
<td>77 720</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51 117</td>
<td>33 169</td>
<td>32 311</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>552 033</td>
<td>131 800</td>
<td>92 787</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>1 152 610</td>
<td>303 991</td>
<td>300 507</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>2 115 930</td>
<td>438 776</td>
<td>401 478</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from Table 2, East London developed very rapidly and the export trade was almost entirely supported by wool. East London had a negative trade balance that increased rapidly with the discovery of diamonds. The export value of diamonds did not balance the increased value of imports, especially of capital goods, in this period. Between 1870 and 1882 the value of imports into the Cape rose from 2.3 million pounds to 9.3 million pounds. (4)

If exports failed to keep up with imports, the money required to finance the capital expenditure needed to make these levels of exports possible placed the Colony firmly in debt. In 1865 the Colony simply did not possess the transport infrastructure capable of moving such large quantities of commodities to East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town and in the early 1870s a transport crisis developed. There was greatly increased demand for Colonial wool, ostrich feathers and hides, and orders were piling up on the desks of the Merchant Houses of Port Elizabeth and East London, which could not be met because of a lack of adequate harbour and transport facilities. The transport bottleneck was thus threatening the mercantile interests of the Colony. (5)
To overcome this situation the Colonial State began increasing its role in building an economic infrastructure for the Colony. In 1871 100 000 pounds was authorised for the development of the harbour at Port Elizabeth. In 1872 the first railway line in the Eastern Cape was begun with a short route between Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage. In 1873 the Molteno government approved 25 000 pounds to begin a 'Border' line from East London to Queenstown via King William's Town. (6) The effects of the 1875 to '78 drought wiped out many of the wagon transport riders because of the deterioration of the oxen required to pull the wagons. By the late 1870s the need for rapid completion of the major rail links to overcome the transport crisis was urgent. (7)

In 1874 a single comprehensive Railway Bill was passed, voting 4.75 million pounds for the development of railways from Uitenhage to Graaff-Reinet, from Cradock to the Bushmans River, and for the continuation of the East London to Queenstown line with branch lines to King William's Town and Grahamstown. The cost of the Eastern railway system including its two branch lines was 1 397 000 pounds.

Purkis, in his excellent study of the significance of the railway development for the Colony, has described these estimates approved by the Cape Parliament as "inaccurate and rushed affairs". The final cost of the Western line exceeded its budget by 15%; the Midlands line by 29%; the main Cradock by 74% and the Eastern line by 76%. (8) The total cost of railway construction, by 1885, was to amount to a massive 12 730 050 pounds. For this money the Cape gained over 1 500 miles of railway.(9)

The whole of this development was financed by loans. 12 312 792 pounds was raised in London at 4 1/2% and 417 258 pounds in the Cape itself at 5% interest. The loans were to be paid from the Cape general revenue and the interest from the customs dues levied on all imports. The total Cape loans raised between 1873 and 1885 for all capital projects including railways was 21 672 161 pounds. (10) Imports maintained a steady rate of increase and were, up to 1880, more or less equal to the value of exports. Customs revenue
from import tariffs was therefore rapidly increasing and the Colony was able to raise funds to meet its foreign debt interest payments from this source.

The condition of the general revenues was not as healthy. In Table 3 below the Revenue and Expenditure of the Colony from 1865 to 1882 is presented.

**TABLE 3: Revenues and Expenditures Cape Colony 1865-1882 (11)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>POUNDS REVENUE</th>
<th>POUNDS EXPENDITURE</th>
<th>POUNDS SURPLUS</th>
<th>POUNDS DEFICIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>865 762</td>
<td>870 089</td>
<td>13 327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>898 826</td>
<td>885 197</td>
<td>13 629</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>593 245</td>
<td>648 732</td>
<td>55 487</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>836 174</td>
<td>764 915</td>
<td>71 259</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>2 078 220</td>
<td>2 159 658</td>
<td>81 438</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>2 246 179</td>
<td>2 272 275</td>
<td>26 095</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>3 541 720</td>
<td>3 742 665</td>
<td>200 945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>4 835 189</td>
<td>5 472 263</td>
<td>637 074</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>4 893 399</td>
<td>5 520 797</td>
<td>627 398</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increase in internal revenue associated with the growth of diamond production and, to a lesser extent, wool production was more than offset by the increase in expenditure by the Government. This was because most of the customs revenue, always an important source of revenue, was pledged to service the foreign debt and also because of additional expenditure incurred in suppressing the rebellion in 1878-79. At the same time as expenditure was steadily rising in the late 1870s, the revenue base of the Colony was being adversely affected by drought and the uncertain state of the world economy. In 1878 wool exports had dropped back to the level of 1868 as a result of world economic depression. (12)
With the Colony increasingly in debt, it was absolutely essential not to waste a penny on unnecessary Government establishments. Wherever possible posts were to be cut down and rationalised. At the same time a very large work force had to be obtained to build the railways at the lowest cost. These tight economic conditions form the context in which the political and economic growth of the Colony, and of the place of the Xhosa and Mfengu communities within it, must be seen.

The expenditure of 5 1/2 million pounds on the rail line from Queenstown to East London and the branch lines to King William's Town and Grahamstown provided a huge input for the economy of the 'Border' region. The migration of workers to the railway works raised afresh the question of control over black workers. For the Colonial employers the migration of black workers to the farms had always been a subject of controversy. They wanted them to work, of course, but they did not want a 'free market' in labour. From the outset the Colonial State sought to exercise political control over black workers. This was pursued at two levels. Firstly by trying to find and support a stable class of collaborators within the remnants of the tribal structure. Secondly by passing various pieces of legislation which gave the Colonial police and magistrates arbitrary power over blacks.

Serious disagreements between the Colonial State and different segments of Colonial agricultural interests arose over what exactly ought to be done to facilitate the supply of labour and to control it. In 1857 the first effective pass law was introduced and it was widely used in controlling the movement and destination of the many thousands of people who entered the Colony in 1857 in search of work. (13) At the same time an Act was passed allowing for the issue of 'Certificates of Citizenship' to "Colonial Fingoe and certain other subjects of Her Majesties to prevent them from being mistaken for Kafirs and thereby harassed and aggrieved." (14)

The effect of this Act for Mfengu has already been described. In a special opinion the Attorney General of the Cape admitted that a certificate of citizenship was really nothing other than a pass,
for the affected person had to carry it on his person at all times (a special tin box to be worn around the neck being supplied by the State for this purpose!). It had to be produced on demand to prove that the bearer was indeed exempt from carrying a pass. However a 'Colonial Fingoe' (i.e. a Mfengu residing in Peddie, Fort Beaufort or Victoria East Magisterial district) could, with his certificate, move himself and his stock around from place to place without anyone having the right to challenge his ownership of his possessions or to ask where he had obtained them or where he was going. It was therefore definitely better in this crucial respect than being classed as a 'Native foreigner', as were all the residents of British Kaffraria, who enjoyed no such privileges.

Not everyone was happy with the way the pass law operated. Many abuses occurred. Farmers and missionaries issued passes, sometimes for payment, and then again sometimes confiscated passes and demanded payment for the issue of new passes. To get around the restrictions of the pass laws many people hired, for half a crown, a 'Certificate of Citizenship'. (15) This saved those who wanted to move stock through the Colony from having to answer questions or submit to the demands of any passing Colonists. The more unfortunate of these hirers forgot the name of the person who had given them the certificate and so were caught out.

More terrifying than such possibilities, for Sir Walter Currie the virulently racist head of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police, (F.A.M.P.), was the prospect that, by 1862, many of those who entered in 1857 would be entitled to 'Certificates of Citizenship' by virtue of 5 years residence in the Colony. This, he told the 1862 Parliamentary Select Committee on Passes would mean that:

"when they get these certificates of citizenship (they) will be permitted to wander unmolested from the frontier to the Cape." (16)

In fact Sir Walter need not have worried because only about 20% of those who entered the Colony after the cattle-killing, were committed to five year contracts. Currie's motive was really to try to scare the Select Committee into recommending the abolition
of the Certificate of Citizenship altogether, so that all blacks could be 'molested' equally. He had previously recommended, to an enquiry in 1859, a uniform pass system with passes issued only for the purpose of gaining employment. (17) By 1865 more than 10 279 Certificates of Citizenship had been issued in the main Mfengu districts of the Colony. (18)

The attitude amongst the Colonists who upheld the position adopted by Currie was expressed in its most naked form in Theal's "The Kaffrarian." In the issue of the 9th July 1864 the editorial fulminated:

"farmers complain that they cannot obtain Kaffir labourers, that those who they formerly had have deserted from service in a body; while at the same time their flocks were being unmercifully preyed upon by strolling native vagabonds who will not work ... the Natives are now demanding wages for daily labour which the majority of the poor whites in the country would be only to glad to obtain, and even at these prices they are seldom to be had." The editorial is remarkable for the invective with which it put forward a view that the value of a black man's labour power ought, on account of his race and economic position, to be lower.

"The laws are made to weigh heavily on the white man and to let the native go free ... While every article of food that the white man imports, every article that he wears is exorbitantly taxed, while the government manages to get from the white man every penny he can possibly pay, it lets the native off with a trifling hut tax ... the native need not work. Why should he work when he can live in idleness (cultivating his little patch of maize) or by theft? The white man, whom civilization has taught to consider dwellings, clothing and regular food necessary to existence is forced to work ..." (19)
Despite the tightening of the pass laws and the conditions for the issue of Certificates of Citizenship, the Colonists continued to be very dissatisfied. Several committees of Parliament called for more and tighter pass laws, and harsher laws against cattle theft. The border agricultural lobby was, after the Port Elizabeth merchants, the most organised force in Cape politics. One of the more notorious commissions sponsored by it was set up to investigate the "ruinous losses sustained by farmers and the expediency of amending the law with regard to certificates of Citizenship and Passes issued to Natives". (20) The Commission received evidence from the usual band of border representatives, W.M. Bowker, Meurant and Ayliff, and several petitions from farmers in Bedford, Queenstown and Graaff-Reinet all complaining of stock theft. They blamed the laxity of the pass system and the Certificate of Citizenship and unanimously called for the introduction of a uniform pass law. Illustrative of the ideology of many Colonial farmers, who still remembered the slave era with nostalgia, was the evidence of H.J. Louw of Adelaide who said:

"I think the tread mill would be a good remedy. I remember when I was a boy, living in Cape Town in the old slave time, my father had occasion to send some of his servants to the tread mill and I found that they were always the better for it afterwards." (21)

In 1864 the farmers' lobby was successful when Act No. 16 of 1864 was passed for "The Better Repression of Thefts of Sheep and Cattle." Any person convicted of stealing any stock was to serve a minimum of 3 years, (2 years if a confession was made). In addition the value of stolen animals and damages could be recovered from the accused, after committal, up to the value of 40 pounds. Finally it confirmed in Colonial Law the principle of holding a homestead or household responsible for stolen cattle traced to it.

After this happy news the Border agricultural lobby received a not unexpected setback. Since Sir P. Wodehouse had replaced Grey as Governor in 1859 he had been battling against strong Colonial
sentiment for the incorporation of British Kaffraria into the Cape Colony. There was no real justification for their being separated. Colonial opinion, especially on the border, and the whites in British Kaffraria itself, strongly wished to retain the martial law system under which British Kaffraria was ruled by a Lt. Governor. (22) This issue generated a lot of heat and gave the Colonial Press a chance to vent its spleen in castigation of the "selfish interests" behind the proposed merger.

Wodehouse suffered some ego-denting defeats in the limited Cape Parliament when Bills authorising the merger were twice defeated. The Cape Parliament was opposed to merger because they feared being forced to absorb the expense of a rebellious population over whom they still had imperfect control. In the end Wodehouse succeeded in getting Westminster to pass an act ordering the Cape Parliament to amalgamate with Kaffraria. The result was that in 1865 British Kaffraria was formally incorporated into the Cape Colony and two extra parliamentary divisions were created out of King William's Town and East London districts.

However a difficult problem had been created by the incorporation of British Kaffraria because the Cape Colony now, for the first time, had a large African population in the Eastern Cape which virtually outnumbered the whole of the rest of the population. Initially Colonial Statutes were extended wholesale over the new divisions in any cases where they had not applied before. When it came to the pass laws and the Certificates of Citizenship it was not so easy. How could a pass law be applied to a person who was a resident of the Colony and who should be regarded as a British citizen? The anomaly was resolved in Act No. 22 of 1867.

This Act revoked all previous Pass Laws, starting with Ordinance 49 of 1828, Acts 23 and 27 of 1857 and 23 of 1860 and stipulated that subject to the requirements of Act 17 of 1864 "all Kafirs belonging to any Native Location in King William's Town, East London and Queenstown shall, unless provided with a certificate of citizenship, be taken as a Native foreigner and if found out of his location without a pass (and without a certificate of
citizenship) will be tried and convicted as a Native foreigner."
The residential qualification for anyone not then in a location, who came into the Colony after the Act was passed was reduced to 7 years. It allowed that any "Native foreigner" entering the Colony without a pass was to be imprisoned for 1 month with hard labour and spare diet and fined 100 pounds.

The Act was clearly ambiguous. The Xhosa incorporated into the Colony were now Colonial subjects, but would be treated as foreigners and imprisoned if without a Certificate of Citizenship. Everything depended on whether the Colonial State really intended extending citizenship to its newly acquired subjects. As it happened - it did! In a circular dated 7th December 1867 the Colonial Secretary informed the magistrates in the various locations that they had all been appointed officers for the issue of Certificates of Citizenship. They were told that:

"His Excellency has been pleased to decide that all Kafirs or Tambookies resident within the locations prescribed by the Act shall be held to merit the possession of the Certificate, except such as may have been convicted of crime ... within the last three years. You are therefore, hereby authorised and requested to grant certificates to all Kafirs and Tambookies ... who may apply to you for them ... I am to request that you will explain to each native to whom you grant one that it is to supersede the necessity of his obtaining a pass when he desires to proceed anywhere within the Colony ..."

A batch of Certificates was enclosed, with orders to proceed quickly with their issue. For the first and only time in Colonial history a repressive measure against blacks, such as the Pass Law, was actually revoked and legal disabilities lifted. (23)

The abolition of the Pass Laws, coming hard on the heels of the incorporation of British Kaffiraria, was a severe blow to the agricultural interests among the border farmers. It seemed to
indicate to them that, in the new dispensation of the Colony, they were going to be an expendable casualty. The 1865 - '66 season had been an uneven one. Some areas had achieved fair crops, but throughout much of King William's Town and Tamacha districts, as well as in the Ngqika locations, crops had been very poor. Shortly after the incorporation of British Kaffraria the first of many petitions dealing with stock theft was received by the Government. Farmers in the Chalumna division of East London blamed the increase in cattle theft on the abolition of British Kaffraria. (24)

Such accusations of stock theft had been heard before. In the 1830s and 40s exaggerated claims of stock theft and the commando system were both used to bring on wars, the objective of which was the acquisition of land. Now they had the land, they wanted the labour to go with it, and smarting under a political setback, they resorted to accusations of stock theft to pressure their political representatives into action.

In his reply to the petitions of the Border farmers, the Colonial Secretary Southey adopted a philosophical tone, reassuring them that "the position of the natives was not changed in any way by the unison of the two Colonies." The complaints of stock theft were "the almost inevitable consequence of the existence of a large native population spread over a perfectly unenclosed country of which a portion only has been turned into private property." (25)

To his amazement Southey received a reply in the form of an ultimatum signed by 67 farmers demanding that unless the Government did something to stop cattle theft they would revive the commando system of raiding African homesteads in search of cattle. (26) They complained bitterly that now that Certificates of Citizenship were to be issued to all and no pass was required to enter the Colony (since they were already in it!) the farmers were to be the losers of stock and labour.
Not waiting on any reply from the Government, a meeting in King William's Town on the 27th July 1866 attended by more than 250 farmers resolved to form the "Mutual Protection Association." In a resolution adopted by the meeting it was decided to revive the commando system unless the Government increased the police force in the border districts within 14 days. It was also resolved that no member of the Association was to permit "Native Squatters not his bona-fide servants" on his farm. "All servants to carry their certificates of contract upon his person and shall be warned that he must show it whenever required to do so by any white man." (27) The meeting further decided on mutual legal aid for any member who might be prosecuted for taking the property of any black man who he decided had stolen from him.

The Colonists were clearly in a rebellious mood. Their attitude was based on the dwindling supply of labour that they were receiving. Meanwhile, all Southey could master in reply to this dissatisfaction was that in a period of transition the ruling class must expect, and cope with, discontent:

"the people of the Colony are passing through a time of trial, calling for the exhibition on the part of the upper classes of much forbearance and charity." (28)

However, the police requested by the Colonists were provided and by October 1866 the King William's Town jail, which could accommodate 45 prisoners, had 77 in it - all for stock theft. (29)

Despite all the protestations, the issue of Certificates of Citizenship went ahead. By March 1868 Brownlee reported to Southey that over 2 200 had been issued in the Ngqika location alone. (30) By 1873 the Civil Commissioner of King William's Town reported that the whole male population (including the Ngqika location, Toise, Tylai and Siwani in Tamacha and Kama at Middledrift) had been issued with certificates, nearly 9 000 in all. (31) Almost wistfully he commented, "under the protection of these, I presume, they are at liberty to visit any part of the Colony whatsoever, mounted or on foot." (32)
The Colonial State's reason for introducing the act were partly legalistic and partly economic. Pass laws, while they did inhibit stock theft (because all stock accompanying a person had to be registered on the pass) also inhibited the supply of labour, especially in the Western districts. With growth of the railways in the 1860s and '70s (the Cape Town to Wellington line was completed in 1863) and the opening of the diamond fields at Kimberley in 1869-70, the Eastern Cape agricultural and mercantile interests were no longer the dominant force in the development of the Colony.

Rather than pass any specific measures to suit agricultural interests, the Colonial State favoured inducements to encourage workers to seek employment on the railway works. From 1872 when railway works were still comparatively small, work was offered on the Port Elizabeth to Uitenhage line at the rate of 1 shilling and 6 pence per day with rations of 2 lbs of mealies, sugar and coffee. (33) Compared to this the farms offered at most 10 to 15 shillings per month. The position of the farms as a source of employment deteriorated as wages on the railway works increased. By 1875, with the passing of the Railway Bill in 1874 which launched large scale constructions, the Government was offering labour recruiters 3 shillings per man recruited. (34) They were authorised to offer two year contracts on the Eastern line and 1 year contracts on the Western line. Starting wages of 2 shillings per day and rations for 6 months, rising thereafter to 2 shillings and sixpence per day were offered. However the circular added "if men cannot be otherwise secured 2 shillings and sixpence per day and rations may be conceded from the commencement as the necessity for men is urgent ..." In addition an inducement bonus of 3 pounds on completion of 1 years work, 5 pounds on completion of 1 1/2 years and 7 pounds 10 shillings on completion of 2 years work was offered.

In response to this circular Tainton, the magistrate at Tamacha, replied "you should not be kept in ignorance of the great difficulties we have contended with in carrying out your wishes with regard to the labour question." (35) Despite the generous
terms, he recruited only 44 men whereas the railway works required thousands. In desperation the Government once again raised the level of wages in 1876 to 3 shillings per day, plus rations, on the Midlands and Western lines, but maintained the rate of 2 shillings and 6 pence per day on the Eastern Line.

The raising of wages on the railway works had a particularly detrimental effect on the supply of workers for the farms. Farmers bodies were being formed with the particular intent of finding ways to increase the supply of labour. In their frustration they hit out particularly against the growing number of black tenants who hired land on Colonial farms. However, agricultural interests even in the 'border' districts were divided. The mere fact that there were many landowners who found it more profitable to rent out their land to black tenants than to attempt to work the land themselves is proof of this. However the divisions ran deeper than this. Many of those who rented out farms were rich land speculators who never had any intention of working their farms and of making a productive investment there. They were people who were in fact more closely allied to banking and finance interests in Cape Town than to the mercantile and agricultural interests of Port Elizabeth. Their view of proletarianisation was inevitably broader, taking into account their interest in the railway development that was then underway, than that of the increasingly isolated Border farmer.

The question of Colonial farmers who leased land to black tenants was to have a crucial bearing on the labour supply situation. In one of the very first reports in the "Blue Book on Native Affairs" which appeared annually after the establishment of the Department of Native Affairs in 1874 the magistrate at Tamacha reported:

"the great number of Native Tenants, so called squatters, residing on private property. These people are not faithful to their landlords ..." (36)

The lack of 'faithfulness' of the tenants towards the stock of the Colonists soon became a major grievance of the border farmers. They seized upon 'stock theft' and 'drunkenness' as the two great
evils which had to be combated. In reality the object of their campaign was the tenants themselves. The organised section of the Colonial farmers wished for legislation against black tenants occupying any land in the Colony outside of the existing locations, as this dried up their sources of labour. But it was not everyone who wished to see such actions. The land speculators who made a good return from leasing out their farms were perfectly satisfied.

The Colonial farmers who occupied their farms were determined to see in the existence of tenants and 'squatters' the source of all their ills. In July 1874 an angry meeting of Chalumna farmers resolved that:

"squatting grants ... the facility to lazy vagabonds of living on plunder and game, making labour for the support of a family unnecessary and that it is slowly but surely placing the squatter in exclusive possession of the country Districts." (37)

The meeting went on to specify that "squatting" (in which term they indiscriminately included the greater number of tenants) was caused by the abolition of the personal occupation clause in the grantee titles and the "indiscriminate issue of tickets of citizenship." But what Colonial farmers were really interested in was its affect on the labour supply:

"Squatting, by enabling a multitude of lazy Natives to live without work is withdrawing a great number of hands from the labour market, is alarmingly increasing the rate of wages, obstructing the operation of the farmers and injuring the commerce of the Colony to the serious loss of the industrious population." (38)

The meeting called loudly for the abolition of 'squatting'.

Such meetings were common at this time and represented clearly the decline in importance of the border districts in the politics of the Colony. Their voice did not so much go unheeded, as it simply lacked priority over the other more clamorous lobbies. While an
increase in the supply of labour from Africans was universally desired by the Colonists, it was desired for different purposes by differing interests with widely divergent abilities to pay.

From 1865 to 1876 the need for labour on the farms became steadily more acute. The once homogeneous farming lobby of the 1850s and '60s became increasingly divided. The formation of the Kaffrarian Farmers Association in 1874 gave organisational shape to the interests of those farmers intent on capitalising their agricultural operations. It differentiated them from the absentee landlords and speculators who had no direct interest in the farms they had acquired at the time of Sir George Grey's handouts to Colonial grantees. The Association distinguished, in the words of one of its spokesmen, between "capitalising farmers" and the "class characterised as lazy useless farmers". (39) Within the latter category could be classed absentee landlords who as a group found it more profitable to rent out their land than invest in it themselves.

Important changes were occurring in Colonial agriculture which were to have a great effect on the demand for labour. As wool prices recovered from the setback of the mid 1860s there was a great interest in the fencing of farms both on the perimeter and into enclosed grazing camps. The Kaffrarian Farmers Association claimed that many of their members were fencing their farms. In 1872 a Select Committee of Parliament reported on the desirability of passing a Fencing Act to provide State assistance to farmers wishing to enclose their farms. (40) The bill was vociferously supported by the Border lobby in Parliament. There was some opposition by owners of very large farms who could not meet the cost of fencing even with assistance.

The advantages of fencing were enormous. An enclosed farm could carry up to 50% more sheep than an unenclosed one because the sheep could be left in the camps at night without being kraaled. Nightly kraaling caused much grass to be trampled and destroyed. The yield of wool increased by about 1 lb per sheep. The cost of fencing and subdividing a farm of about 2 000 acres would be about
440 pounds (using figures supplied by the Select Committee). This was a substantial investment and farmers who contemplated investing so much in their farms became all the more vociferous about any incidents of theft of sheep or cattle that occurred. (41)

Throughout the 1870s reports were received that there was a demand for agricultural workers by "some of the more enterprising farmers for fencing, dam building and the like. Hitherto farmers have not been able to make improvements as they have not felt that they could compete with the Government owing to the high wages offered by it to induce men to labour on the Railroad." (42) This situation itself encouraged many farmers to lease their farms out to blacks willing to pay high rents for them.

The farmers of Fort Beaufort, led by the self-styled 'Sole Commander of the Burgher forces', James Sweetman, led a constant resistance to the presence of tenants and squatters in the Blinkwater. In one of his letters he claimed that:

"For land that is not honestly worth more than 25 pounds or 50 pounds per annum rental they get from the natives from 150 pounds to 200 pounds per annum, each individual paying from 5 pounds to 10 pounds annually." (43)

With the great inducement to acquire tenants that undoubtedly existed, and the difficulty of acquiring wage workers because of competition from the railways, it is not surprising that tenancy grew quickly in the 1870s.

The Colonial State was well aware of the economics of tenancy. When the Kamastone Mfengu in Queenstown wanted to acquire additional grazing for their stock, the Colonial Secretary Southey wrote:

"If they are so anxious to have this land they can club together and purchase the lease when it is put up ... they will then have to work in order to get the money to pay for the lease instead of at present laying about in idleness. As a body they can afford to give a higher price than the European farmer." (44)
The Colonial farmers were not convinced of Southey's logic. A few years later when the Ox-Kraal Mfengu wished to purchase lands the 'Superintendent of Fingoes' there reported:

The Native has no chance in competition with Europeans. In particular with regard to the ground in question as I know it has been said by Europeans, "I will have that ground no matter what I pay for it and make the confounded Niggers pay my rent in impounding." (stock that trespass on his property J.L.) "(45)

The black tenants on Colonial farms were seen by these farmers as depriving them of their labour and, coincidentally, as the main cause of stock theft. In the mid 1870s the Kaffrarian Farmers Association was continually sending in lists of farmers alleging to have lost large numbers of sheep and cattle through theft. The Association claimed that theft was so chronic in the border region as to make farming unprofitable. (46) Commenting on the labour shortage, the Magistrate at King William's Town wrote:

"This condition of circumstances is greatly to be deplored, my own opinion is, that the high rate of wages given for native labour at the Railway works must have the effect of inducing farm servants to leave their employ and seek higher wages. In some cases too the increase in the quantity of stock belonging to native servants who have grazing rights given as part of renumeration compels the employer to part with his servant ... as the farm will not support the flocks of both the master and his servant." (47)

In Fort Beaufort, where a great deal of tenancy agreements had emerged, Sweetman took up the cudgels with renewed vigour. The tactic was to link the presence of tenants who were independent of any special Colonial supervision, to a resurgence of 'heathenish practices', 'drunkenness' and of course, stock theft. His letters to the Department of Native Affairs all had the following tone:
"The noted Blinkwater and Waterkloof strongholds which is so admirably adapted for the concealment of stolen property is almost entirely in the possession of natives, who are fully in enjoyment of their own heathenish laws and customs which is not only a disgrace to a civilised Government but the disgraceful scenes which take place shock the feelings of common decency ..." (48)

And the sentiment was echoed across the border districts and in the Colonial press.

The racist nature of the campaign against the tenants cannot be doubted. So far as stock theft was concerned many among the Colonials were aware that to some extent the practices of the farmers themselves were to blame. Richard Tainton, the Special Magistrate at Tamacha, King William's Town District, and as staunch a supporter of Colonial interests as any, observed:

"farmers withholding wages from herds by accusing them of having lost sheep. The herd, after being laid off retaliates by stealing sheep." (49)

Similarly from Bedford it had long been reported that:

"Natives have often had to institute legal proceedings for the recovery of their wages, and not always with success, for numerous witnesses are generally ready to support a counter claim or criminal charge preferred by the employer." (50)

It was true that much stock theft occurred. The high commercial value of good sheep (about 15 shillings), the value of the wool, and the ease with which it could be moved all served to make them ideal targets for theft. The accumulation of sheep was the easiest and surest way of escaping the economic pressures prevalent in the locations. It is natural that many, especially among the younger households, would have found judicious stealing of Colonial stock a morally acceptable way to aid accumulation and far preferable to heavy manual work on the railway line. Tainton clearly saw the real causes of stock theft when he wrote:
Stealing from farmers ... is not a moral thing, but economic and political ... There are among them those who regard the European generally as a common enemy, on the look-out to commit aggression and encroachment on their lands and privileges and are therefore fit subjects at all times for what they consider lawful plunder. Theft from a European is not considered to be a crime - it is looked upon more in the light of a capture and more-over an act deserving of merit ..." (51)

In fact there was very little concrete evidence against the tenants on Colonial farms as a group. The high incidence of stock theft which did prevail was caused by deteriorating conditions for many households in the existing Xhosa and Mfengu locations which lacked adequate subsistence from their small arable lots and had insufficient stock with which to pay taxes. (This problem will be explored in detail below.) An examination of the criminal records shows that in Fort Beaufort in 1876, for example, 79 cases of stock theft were tried involving several hundred head of stock. Only 46 were traceable in any way to people having land in Fort Beaufort district, at the Blinkwater or Waterkloof area; the rest were committed by other people passing through the district. However this was of scant concern to the farmers. The real motive of their campaign was the desire to get the relatively independent agriculturalists to become workers on Colonial farms. "Stock theft, drunkenness and heathenish practices" were all ideological and polemical attempts to justify the passing of special discriminatory legislation against the interests of black agrarian ambitions. For the Colonial farmer the real problem was that black tenants "scorned the idea of going to service to gain an honest living." (52)

The Colonial farmers were intent to push on until they were satisfied. In 1876, meetings were held calling for action to be taken and to express support for an "anti-squatter" bill then before Parliament. Forwarding a motion from one such meeting, the magistrate at Fort Beaufort commented:
"The want of labour is severely felt by farmers in this district, and one of the issues to which they attribute this want is in their opinion due to the fact that numbers of Kafirs are armed with Certificates of Citizenship which are made to do duty for their numerous friends as well as for themselves - and that these are the very persons whose labour is best adapted to the wants of the farmers. It is very much to be deplored that Natives are allowed to come amongst us with the privilege of enjoying their own laws and customs which are so disgusting and which ought not to be tolerated by any civilized Government." (53)

The transparent way in which the Colonial farmers sought to use racist arguments and false accusations to justify their use of political power to pass discriminatory legislation against the interests of black tenants may be clearly seen. The use by the Colonists of access to political power to secure the growth of capitalism in agriculture culminated in the passing of Act No. 6 of 1876, an Act "To provide for the better and more effective supervision and management of Native Locations ..."

The Act provided for the appointment of "Inspectors of Native Locations" over any area designated to contain a "Native Location". The Inspector was to keep complete records of all population and stock and provide a quarterly statement of these for all locations in his area. He was also to have certain judicial powers over the inhabitants of any location, but these were not clearly specified. The Act defined a location as "any number of huts or dwellings exceeding five within an area of one square mile occupied by any of the native races ... such occupants not being in the bona fide employment of the owner of the land upon which such huts or dwellings are situated." From this definition it can quite clearly be seen that provision was being made for State control and supervision over people who had up to then been free of Colonial interference and for the most part subject only to the ordinary laws of the Colony. The Act allowed
for a hut tax not exceeding 10 shillings per annum to be paid and required the branding of all stock of persons registered in such a location.

The Fort Beaufort farmers called a meeting to express their thanks to "all those gentlemen who have endeavoured to pass the 'Squatter Bill'". The meeting added that "farm labour is yearly becoming more difficult to obtain, so much so that it causes severe losses to the farmers." (54) They also took the opportunity to suggest an amendment to the Act "prohibiting the hire of land to Natives unless he can prove that he is in a position to make an honest living." The Kaffrarian Farmers Association immediately became active in having various areas proclaimed under the Act and in December 1877 various Inspectors of Native Locations were appointed in King William's Town District, East London and Fort Beaufort.

The Act was not, however, a complete triumph for the agricultural interests of the border region. It was a compromise measure. The Colonial State was more interested in promoting a general proletarianisation to suit the needs of railway building and the diamond mines than in accommodating the specific requirements of the Eastern sheep farmers and merchants. Increasingly agricultural and mercantile interests had to tie their own path of development to that of mining and financial capital. As Purkis put it:

"The limitations of mercantile power were to be critically relevant when the State drew a new economic map in British Capital." (55)

Of course the question has to be posed as to what was the cause of the labour shortage experienced by both the Colonial farmers and the railway works. In the next section this question will be considered in detail with reference to the real political and economic conditions prevailing in the various Ciskeian locations between 1865 and 1880.
II The Response of the Households

In considering the difficulties experienced in obtaining adequate labour for the railway works, Purkis has suggested that:

"An account of black bargaining in the labour market may suggest an additional dimension to studies of that response which has focussed primarily on developments in the peasant economy." (56)

Purkis, basing his thinking on the "productive boom" in "peasant" agriculture identified by Colin Bundy in the 1860s and 70s, has described the role of wage labour in the "peasant" economy as "discretionary" rather than "necessary".

"Wage labour in the 1870s was an additional investment for peasant families, rather than an unfavourable alternative to peasant agriculture." (57)

In fact this explanation rests on a far too simplistic acceptance of Bundy's view of a "peasant boom" in this period. Here it will be argued that what Bundy has taken as a "boom" in agricultural productivity representing a qualitative improvement in the position of the mass of households was, in fact, the result of particular political and demographic circumstances that followed on the settlement of land left vacant after the cattle-killing. As will be discussed in detail below, from 1865 to 1875 40 000 Mfengu moved from the Ciskei into the Transkei, thousands more Thembu moved into Emigrant Thembuland, and over 10 000 Xhosa and Mfengu moved onto the Colonial farms as tenants.

During the whole of this period huge migrations of population were underway. The effect of these dramatic migrations was to create, in many of the old locations in the Ciskei, space for the poorer households to acquire additional arable land and some stock. This movement of population coincided with a period of good rainfall, increased demand for agricultural produce and a recovery in wool prices in the early 1870s. All these factors contributed quite naturally to the great difficulty experienced by the railway works and the farmers in attracting sufficient workers to meet their own expanding requirements.
The labour shortage, it is argued, was brought about by the combination of these political and demographic circumstances which made a re-distribution of population possible. Just as the political circumstances of the cattle-killing precipitated the first expansion of household production, so the re-distribution of populations that followed in the wake of the cattle-killing made a second wave of expansion of production possible. Like the first wave, the basic pattern of distribution of productive capacity between households that was investigated in detail in Chapter 9 above was retained. The mass of poor households remained poor. What they achieved in this period was to make themselves more fully dependent on regularly turning a portion of their total product into commodities. By so doing they were in fact making themselves more vulnerable to pressure exerted by the Colonial economy, more dependent on money, and they were therefore coming closer to the proletarianisation of at least some members of many households.

To ascribe the notorious labour shortage of the 1860s and 70s to the agricultural prosperity of the black households alone, as has Purkis, following Buny, is to imply a deeper thesis concerning the structure of production in the locations, the relationship of the mass of households to the market and the distribution of wealth amongst the households. It is to imply that there was a "rise" in the material standards of the mass of households in response to the market opportunities presented by the growth of the Colonial economy and an improvement of the position of most households within it. It will be argued here that this was not the case. There was in fact no reversal of the trend, which we have previously observed, of polarisation between households which was the product of 60 years of Colonial war and conquest.

There occurred in this period a large emigration from the Ciskeian locations, fostered by the overcrowding that was prevalent there. The households remaining were thus able to occupy the vacant land. In terms of the theoretical framework provided by Shanin, outlined in Chapter 9 above, a discernible levelling resulted which saw the evening out of some of the extremes that
characterised the polarisation of the households from 1857 to 1865. Many households which had been unable to secure adequate arable lands and pasturage were now able to do so and this, naturally, had a beneficial effect on agricultural output.

As soon as the elements of the favourable conjuncture fell away, as soon as drought set in, as it did in 1875, and as the effects of the great emigration began to be absorbed and all available land was once again being utilized, the situation began to change. By early in 1878 the Colonial State was receiving reports from King William's Town that:

"in a short time I anticipate a continuous movement of the natives in search of work." (58)

From Middledrift it was reported that the magistrate recommended:

"a reduction in the rate of wages for labourers as the failure of the crops must cause most of the Natives to seek service." (59)

Soon after this the contracting of workers at high specified wage rates was scrapped, work seekers being told simply to report to the site engineer at the works where they would earn the wage rate offered. An official commented:

"This course has been adopted by the Government in anticipation of a large spontaneous supply of Native labour consequent upon the general scarcity existing on the border." (60)

From January 1875 to December 1876 the number of contracted workers on the railway lines increased from 2 641 to 4 758. By 1877 there was a total of 8 600 workers from the Ciskeian districts and some Transkeian districts, out of a total work force on the railways of 11 000 workers. (61) The end of the 1870s saw the end of the constant emigration from the Ciskeian locations to occupy land both on the Colonial farms and the Transkei, which movement over the 10 years 1865 to 1875 prevented the emergence of a work force from the poor of the locations. As the Kaffrarian Watchman succinctly put it:

"Routes hitherto used to escape labouring for the whites, such as squatting and stock theft were to
be closed and labourers sent to the West and the Midlands." (62)

In addition to the 8,600 on the railways, 2,984 people, including many children, were sent to the farms. (63) They were to receive 5 shillings per month for the first year (a 50% reduction in the minimum wage of 5 years earlier) 7 shillings and sixpence in the second year and 10 shillings in the third year. (64) Many more were taken on outside of the official labour contract system. In order to understand how this came about it is necessary to look in more detail at the population migrations of the late 1860s.

The period 1865-1879 saw a slowing of the downward aggregate shift for the various communities and a modest improvement in the average condition of the households. This was a contradictory movement. There was an increased trend towards the emigration of households into the Colony or onto vacant Crown Lands as tenants or squatters. Emigration of households from the long established Ciskeian locations (as opposed to the migration of a single representative of a household) was the dominant response to the polarised situation of the Ciskeian locations in the 1860s which threatened many households with economic collapse. (65) At the same time a small but distinct strata of larger producers was emerging. They were not distinguished by commodity production as such, for this was common to all strata, but by the greater extent of their total product and particularly by the ownership of large numbers of sheep and of the cultivation of wheat. The improved agricultural conditions strengthened the position of their households and widened their sphere of influence.

It was shown in the analysis of the Ox-Kraal Mfengu in Chapter 9 above, that what determined the ability of a household to produce more extensively was its size. (66) The acquisition of a plough tended to be associated with households that were larger than average and were capable of bringing more land under cultivation. While some smaller-sized households did acquire ploughs, their small size prevented them from making extensive use of them, and they only brought an average amount of land under cultivation. The dominance of the large households served to emphasise and
continue some of the pre-existing lines of struggle between older and younger men. As larger households tended to be associated with older men and with polygamy, those households, which in the 1860s and 1870s were able to acquire an extra wife, were emerging as the dominant force in the expansion of commodity production.

As in earlier times, the tendency was strong for a small and poor household to arrange a marriage between one of its daughters and an older and richer head of homestead. This commonly occurred and it remained an important way in which cattle could be acquired by an otherwise struggling household. The Rev. W. Govan informed Maclean that:

"Young and attractive women are often talked by elder women into marrying an old polygamist who has cattle on the grounds that 'not withstanding (the marriage) she may have the man of her choice." (67) (emphasis added)

The preservation of this dynamic meant that much of the political influence that the older households had always enjoyed was maintained under the impact of surveys, taxes, Colonial magistrates and (most importantly) the growth of commodity production. Such households were in a position to acquire more land of good quality through their association with the Government paid headmen.

In this way the effective imposition of Colonial rule in the 1860s and 70s and the generalisation of commodity production amongst all households, while it caused a break with the old mode of production, did not mark a break with the control exercised by large households in previous times. However the agency and locus of the control shifted in crucial ways and assumed a different class character than in the days of the supremacy of the chiefs. The way in which this class formation was fostered will be examined in detail below. What is of importance here is to see that at the economic level the polarised situation in the locations which underlay this development also fostered the conditions which led to mass emigration.
The overcrowded condition of the Mfengu and Xhosa locations in the mid-1860s and the domination of these limited areas by a few, key, large households intensified the search for ways of escaping from these pressures. Emigration to vacant or under-utilised land was an obvious alternative. In the mid-1860s the overcrowded conditions of the locations were effectively preventing the wider spread of ploughs, the expansion of sheep flocks, and the diversification of cultivation into wheat and oats.

As early as 1859, it had been reported from Peddie that there was a desire to move over the Kei into the area vacated by Sarhili and the Gcaleka after the cattle-killing. (68) In 1860 the magistrate at Fort Beaufort felt that the only way in which the congested conditions around Healdtown could be relieved was by emigration to the Transkei. (69) In 1861 the headman Zazela at Healdtown was actively campaigning in favour of the removal. (70) In Victoria East the headmen Lusipo and Yuba officially requested permission to settle in Transkei. (71)

Initially these efforts by prominent headmen sparked some resistance from the people. For some it seemed as if these headmen were encouraging the move to be able more effectively to establish their control over the distribution of land. The resistance came from those who had experienced some benefit from the survey of land then being undertaken. In the light of subsequent developments it is important to note that the people did not object to the idea of a move, but to the fact that it would be at the cost of losing the land they currently held. (72) As the depression and drought of the years 1862-65 deepened so resistance gave way to overwhelming support for the migration across the Kei.

While the idea of a migration across the Kei gained popularity among the Mfengu, the Governor, Wodehouse, at first intended to settle the country vacated by the Gcaleka with Colonists. When this failed (because of opposition from Whitehall) he decided to offer the Thembu and Ngqika the opportunity of removing from British Kaffraria to the Transkei. Wodehouse had to contend with
intensified demands from the Colonists for grants of land. There were high expectations that large tracts of the Transkei were to be given out to Colonial farmers. When the impracticability of this became clear to Wodehouse he thought that if parts of the Colony and British Kaffraria could be cleared of Mfengu, Xhosa and Thembu inhabitants, the land vacated by them could be given out as Colonial grants.

The story of the final emigration of part of the Thembu to the Transkei (where they formed the so-called 'Emigrant Thembu' under Matanzima), the declining of the Ngqika under Sandille to do so and the mass emigration of the Mfengu in their stead is filled with intrigue and scheming on the part of the officials of the Colonial State. (73) J.C. Warner, the magistrate with the Thembu, urged the Governor to move the Thembu from the Queenstown district to the Transkei. Wodehouse received permission from Cardwell, the Secretary of State for Colonies, to go ahead. In January 1865 he instructed both Brownlee and Warner to formally propose the transfer to the Ngqika and Thembu.

Warner held discreet private consultations with the Thembu regent Nonesi and then misleadingly informed Wodehouse that she had agreed to a complete Thembu withdrawal over the Kei. Brownlee, however, held a large meeting with a delegation from Sandille. The terms offered by the Governor were attractive in some respects. The chiefs and headmen would continue to receive their pay, the hut tax would be abolished; Sandille and the other chiefs would again be recognised as supreme over their people. Sandille in his reply gave some indication of how things had changed within the Ngqika chiefdom:

"We are satisfied with the land in which we live, though it is sour. We have no cattle; our cattle are our gardens. The chief reasons for not going over is, that many of my people will not go with me, and those that are going will join Krili, and I will be there a common Kaffir. It is true, I have cried over my former country at the Tyumie and the Keiskama ... I am a long time on this side (of the
Kei). The Governor speaks of hut tax ... He says "This tax shall cease there." Just as well it may cease here, but when it cannot be, I shall be satisfied. If the Governor cares for my chieftainship, then he can just as well give it to me here ..." (74)

With this, all talk of a Ngqika migration to the Transkei ceased. Because of Warner's misleading reports, however, plans went ahead for a Thembu move to the Transkei. It soon became apparent that the decision on the move was far from unanimous. The Colonial State, which was not committed to a policy of Thembu removal from Queenstown, was reluctant to use force to ensure the move because it would certainly have resulted in a large rebellion. The refusal of the Ngqika to move gave the lead for many chiefs in the Glen Grey area to dig in their heels and also refuse to move. By June 1865 it was apparent that Nonesi and all her generation of older established chiefs would refuse to move. The only people who took advantage of the move offer were the younger generation of chiefs, including Nonesi's grandson Matanzima. (75)

The movement of Thembu to the Transkei was therefore a movement of generational expansion for the Thembu and not the 'land swop' envisioned by Warner and Wodehouse. As a Thembu spokesman told Warner after the event:

"Those who have crossed the river are young men who had no huts and no land here, and wanted some."

(76)

While this should not be interpreted literally, it is indicative of the inferior position occupied by those households which emigrated.

When the ploughing season arrived in September and October 1865 every available acre of arable land in the Thembu location abandoned by the emigrants was ploughed up to make sure that no land could be said to be vacant or unutilised. (77) This was a blow for Wodehouse who had now gained no extra land for European occupation.
As soon as homesteads were abandoned, others moved in to occupy their places. The whole situation left the acting Colonial Secretary Southey laughing up his sleeve, for he had predicted that this would happen and had opposed the move on those grounds. (78) Wodehouse was incensed by what had in all probability been a conscious diplomatic ploy by Nonesi to mislead Warner (who was eager to secure the Thembu withdrawal) and to secure both the new territory in Transkei and the old locations in Glen Grey. Thus was Emigrant Thembuland, the power base of the Matanzimas, born.

In a fit of pique Wodehouse ordered the magistrate at Queenstown to inform Nonesi that none of the chiefs remaining in the Colony would be recognised as having any authority. Henceforth all Thembu were to be subject to Colonial law and no chiefs were to hear any cases or appropriate any fines. In reply Nonesi denied absolutely that she had ever agreed to go across the Indwe. Those who went had acted for themselves, she said. When Griffiths, the magistrate at Queenstown, warned Nonesi that no vacated kraals were to be occupied, all the chiefs at the meeting went out of their way to emphasise that there were no such empty kraals. In retribution two senior headmen were sacked for having campaigned against the removal. In a significant reply to Griffiths, Carolus one of the sacked headmen, emphasised:

"that there were headmen and Chiefs before the government paid us, and there will be headmen and Chiefs still, even if they are without pay." (79)

The upshot of this situation was that Sir W. Currie of the F.A.M.P. was sent to find out if the Mfengu would take up the country refused by the Ngqika. The response was overwhelming. Mfengu sentiment had been building up very strongly in favour of the move since 1862. From Ox-Kraal, Kamastone, Fort Beaufort, Alice, the Crown Reserve and from within the Ngqika locations Mfengu made ready to depart. Only from Peddie was the exodus less dramatic. The effect of the migration was to produce a complete change in the Mfengu and Xhosa locations of the Ciskei. In Table 4 below the change in the population in all districts covered in this study is given, together with the percentage decrease in population immediately after the move, and the subsequent increase in total population to 1879.
TABLE 4: Total Population Increase and Decrease of Various Ciskeian Locations to 1879 (80)

4.1 PEDDIE (a) *

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<td>15 559</td>
<td>1969</td>
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4.2 HEALDTOWN LOCATION, FORT BEAUFORT (b) *

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<td>2 947</td>
<td>3 011</td>
<td>4 504</td>
<td>2 398</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3 VICTORIA EAST (c) *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1863</th>
<th>1868</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VICTORIA EAST</td>
<td>4 807</td>
<td>4 328</td>
<td>2 833</td>
<td>3 022</td>
<td>5 990</td>
<td>1 495</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 KING WILLIAM'S TOWN (d) *

4.4 (i) Total all Locations (Keiskamma Hoek, Crown Reserve, Tamacha, Middledrift and Nggkia Locations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1864</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KING WILLIAM'S TOWN</td>
<td>75 103</td>
<td>62 187</td>
<td>97 628</td>
<td>12 916</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 (ii) Nggkia Locations (Sandille and Anta and Oba)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1864</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nggkia</td>
<td>19 894</td>
<td>17 968</td>
<td>27 201</td>
<td>41 048</td>
<td>1 926</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* see footnote (80)
4.4 (iii) Breakdown of Population - All Locations Excluding the Ngqika Location in (i) above

**TAMACHA**
(comprising Toise, Siwani, Tshatshu and Izeli Mfengu)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1864</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1864 to 1865 %</td>
<td>1865 to 1880 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>19 469</td>
<td>17 967</td>
<td>20 609</td>
<td>33 795</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 828</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MIDDLEDRIFT**
(Kama)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1864</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1864 to 1865 %</td>
<td>1865 to 1880 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>16 970</td>
<td>10 155</td>
<td>13 815</td>
<td>12 857</td>
<td>6 814</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 701</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEISKAMMA HOEK**
(Crown Reserve Mfengu)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1864</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1865 to 1880 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>14 652</td>
<td>15 184</td>
<td>12 405</td>
<td>9 928</td>
<td>5 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4. (iv) Total Population Tamacha, Middledrift and Keiskamma Hoek

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1864</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1871</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1864 to 1865 %</td>
<td>1865 to 1880 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>51 091</td>
<td>43 307</td>
<td>46 829</td>
<td>56 580</td>
<td>7 784</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 273</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From Table 4 it can be seen that there was a large movement out of all the Mfengu locations, varying from 44.9% in Heal dtown to at least 11.2% in Peddie. By 1875 the population in the Victoria East locations, which had decreased by 34.5% between 1863 and 1868, had exceeded the levels it had reached prior to the migrations, while in Heal dtown it had nearly returned to the same level. In Peddie by 1875 the population was still 11.2% less than its 1865 level, but most probably immediately after the migration it would have been less than this.

In the King William's Town district as a whole (see table 4.4 (i)) there was an immediate decline in population of 17.2% followed by an increase from 1865 to 1875 of 57%. This increase was concentrated in the Xhosa locations, most prominently in that of Sandille, where a 128% increase was reflected. In the Tamacha sub-district there was an increase of 88%. These increases could well have been associated with the return of much of the population scattered on Colonial farms at this time. To what extent this increase in the Xhosa locations was a predisposing factor in the rebellion of 1878-79 will be discussed below.

In the Keiskamma Hoek (Crown Reserve) sub-district which was mostly under Mfengu occupation a decrease in population from 1865 to 1871 may be observed. The subsequent decrease from 1871 to 1880 is ascribable to the administrative transfer of control of part of the Keiskamma Hoek district, occupied by Mbanhla and his more than 3 000 followers, to the Victoria East district. In fact, in terms of densities, by 1880 the Crown Reserve was probably also approaching the level of population prior to the emigration.

As population returned to its previous levels of congestion and overcrowding in these locations, so the historically favourable conditions for the expansion of production that had existed between 1865 and 1875 began to disappear. With the onset of drought in 1875, combined with the increasing population of the locations, it was no longer possible for many households to extend their cultivation. The thinness of the veneer of 'prosperous
years' was exposed and many households which were in essence small, and without accumulated reserves of cattle and sheep, had to rely on wage labour.

III The Economic Impact of Population Migration

The reduction in population so suddenly created caused those who remained to increase efforts to extend their arable land activity. Temporarily unutilised land was land available for Colonial appropriation, (as had been clearly demonstrated in the wake of the cattle-killing). Every effort had therefore to be made to show that despite the migration of a large part of the population the land was being fully utilised. Critical conjunctures such as this had a powerful influence on the productivity of the different locations.

The outflow of population created the possibility for many households to expand their cultivation. In Chapter 9 above it was shown that in Ox-Kraal location and elsewhere there was a group of households which possessed ploughs but did not make as extensive use of them as was possible. Now that internal barriers to the expansion of cultivation were removed, the acquisition and use of ploughs was a more attractive proposition. Similarly a large amount of grazing was available to be utilised by those who had not previously had much stock.

To gain a more accurate picture of the influence of emigration on productivity a table is given below depicting how growth of livestock and other agricultural assets such as wagons and ploughs correlated with the fluctuations in population. In Table 5 the number of cattle, sheep, goats, houses, wagons, ploughs and (where possible) the size of the harvests is given.
TABLE 5: Assets of Various Ciskeian Locations 1861 to 1875 (81)

5.1 Peddie

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>INCREASE 1865 to 1875 %</th>
<th>DECREASE 1865 to 1875 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS</td>
<td>3 187</td>
<td>2 829</td>
<td></td>
<td>358 11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRES OF MEALIES/SORGHUM</td>
<td>9 784</td>
<td>9 677</td>
<td></td>
<td>107 1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRES OF WHEAT ETC</td>
<td>1 020</td>
<td>464</td>
<td></td>
<td>556 54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ACRES</td>
<td>10 804</td>
<td>10 141</td>
<td></td>
<td>663 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSHELS OF MEALIES/SORGHUM</td>
<td>83 613</td>
<td>48 899</td>
<td></td>
<td>34 714 41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSHELS OF WHEAT</td>
<td>2 833</td>
<td>1 446</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 388 49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BUSHELS</td>
<td>86 447</td>
<td>50 344</td>
<td>36 103 (a)</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHEEP</td>
<td>10 927</td>
<td>12 512</td>
<td>1 585 14.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBS WOOL</td>
<td>18 778</td>
<td>10 978</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 800 41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOATS</td>
<td>22 642</td>
<td>17 307</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 335 23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATTLE</td>
<td>19 125</td>
<td>30 799</td>
<td>11 674 61.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLOUGHS &amp; HARROWS</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>505 157.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* see footnote (81)
### 5.2 Fort Beaufort (Healdtown MFengu)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1868</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Households</strong></td>
<td>935</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>756</td>
<td></td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acres of Mealies/Sorghum</strong></td>
<td>2498</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2402</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acres of Wheat</strong></td>
<td>136</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>198</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Acres</strong></td>
<td>2539</td>
<td>2634</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bushels of Mealies/Sorghum</strong></td>
<td>8991</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>192</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bushels of Wheat</strong></td>
<td>445</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2282</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1837412.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Bushels</strong></td>
<td>9436</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2473</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sheep</strong></td>
<td>14016</td>
<td>10406</td>
<td>8768</td>
<td>10731</td>
<td>17000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LBS. Wool</strong></td>
<td>22425</td>
<td>2227</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28492</td>
<td></td>
<td>6067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cattle</strong></td>
<td>3535</td>
<td>3561</td>
<td>2382</td>
<td>2425</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td></td>
<td>3465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ploughs</strong></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wagons</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All figures for acres sown and yields are for the years 1865-1875.
### 5.3 VICTORIA EAST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1863</th>
<th>1868</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>INCREASE</th>
<th>DECREASE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1861 to 1875</td>
<td>1861 to 1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSEHOLDS</td>
<td>1 041</td>
<td>1 030</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>1 147</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ACRES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 294</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BUSHELS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26 572</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHEEP</td>
<td>11 006</td>
<td>15 313</td>
<td>12 936</td>
<td>14 459</td>
<td>29 522</td>
<td>18 516</td>
<td>168.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOATS</td>
<td>11 276</td>
<td>10 147</td>
<td>6 427</td>
<td>7 648</td>
<td>8 105</td>
<td>6 489</td>
<td>176.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATTLE</td>
<td>3 673</td>
<td>3 560</td>
<td>2 678</td>
<td>2 985</td>
<td>10 162</td>
<td>3 171</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLOUGHS</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAGONS</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

### 5.4 KING WILLIAM'S TOWN

#### 5.4 (i) Nggika Location (Sandille)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1864</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1869</th>
<th>INCREASE 1864 - 69</th>
<th>INCREASE %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOUSEHOLDS</td>
<td>4 049</td>
<td>3 574</td>
<td>6 953</td>
<td>2 904</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATTLE</td>
<td>11 027</td>
<td>10 194</td>
<td>12 562</td>
<td>1 535</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHEEP</td>
<td>14 636</td>
<td>11 463</td>
<td>16 466</td>
<td>1 830</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOATS</td>
<td>21 811</td>
<td>21 276</td>
<td>24 811</td>
<td>3 000</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLOUGHS</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5.4 (ii) Total all Locations (Keiskamma Hoek, Tamacha, Middledrift, Nggkia Locations) 1875 Only:

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOUSEHOLDS</td>
<td>16 237</td>
<td>SHEEP</td>
<td></td>
<td>295</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRES UNDER MAIZE</td>
<td>43 780</td>
<td>GOATS</td>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRES UNDER WHEAT</td>
<td>2 952</td>
<td>CATTLE (draught)</td>
<td>37 358</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ACRES</td>
<td>46 732</td>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td></td>
<td>84 277</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSHELS MAIZE/SORGHUM</td>
<td>390 440</td>
<td>TOTAL CATTLE</td>
<td>121 635</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSHELS WHEAT</td>
<td>35 067</td>
<td>PLOUGHS</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 637</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BUSHELS</td>
<td>425 507</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
### Tamacha Locations (Toise, Siwani, Izeli, Mfengu)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1864</th>
<th>1865</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>1879</th>
<th>1864 to 1879</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1864 to 1879</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOUSE-HOLDS</td>
<td>3 592</td>
<td>3 531</td>
<td>3 424</td>
<td>3 397</td>
<td>6 078</td>
<td>2 486</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>19 469</td>
<td>17 967</td>
<td>28 229</td>
<td>28 003</td>
<td>33 795</td>
<td>14 328</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRES MAIZE/ SORGHUM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ACRES WHEAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>330</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ACRES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14 126</td>
<td>14 028</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSHELS MAIZE/ SORGHUM</td>
<td>208 108</td>
<td>129 491</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSHELS WHEAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 262</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>209 370</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHEEP</td>
<td>7 519</td>
<td>62 904</td>
<td>61 896</td>
<td>16 938</td>
<td>9 419</td>
<td>125.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATTLE</td>
<td>13 285</td>
<td>38 079</td>
<td>37 799</td>
<td>30 799</td>
<td>17 514</td>
<td>131.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOATS</td>
<td>15 632</td>
<td>28 101</td>
<td>26 001</td>
<td>6 222</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 410</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLOUGHS</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>1 228</td>
<td>1 207</td>
<td>1 209</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>286.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 1865 and 1875 the amount of territory available expanded because of migration. The migration allowed for a massive expansion of agricultural productivity on the part of households which had previously been restricted because of the dominance of the established large households, with their large acreage under cultivation and large numbers of cattle and sheep. From 1865 the available pastureage and good arable land could absorb the increasing cattle and sheep holdings and foster the acquisition of ploughs by a new generation of accumulating and expanding households. This favourable conjuncture lead to a boom and a period of prosperity for many households. It would indeed only be remarkable if such favourable circumstances had not led to a boom!
There is no doubt that many wealthy Mfengu took advantage of the opportunity to acquire fresh pasture and arable land in the Transkei. If it was the younger Thembu who formed the bulk of the emigrant Thembu, it was the older, well-established Mfengu who led the way to Butterworth. By 1874 the Government Agent in "Fingoland" took the first detailed census of the newly-settled population. He found 43,971 people there. (82) The community was certainly an exceptional one. With 6,494 married men, it had a ratio of 1 plough to every 3.3 families. Cattle holdings were below average at 0.8 per capita, but sheep flocks had expanded enormously. There were 182,860 sheep, an average of 28.15 per household, and 50,240 goats.

Back in the Ciskeian locations a major readjustment was taking place. From Alice it was reported that the:

"Places of those leaving for Transkei are taken by the younger men." (83)

At the same time it was observed that many of those who left hired out surveyed allotments to others. About 310 allotments in Victoria East were being hired for about 3 pounds per annum each by people who previously had no land, or inadequate land. (84) In this way, as the emigrants left, many larger households which had up to then been unable to extend their cultivation as much as they would have liked, now found the opportunity to do so. From Healdtown the superintendent reported:

"the plan of allowing the people to hire the Erven of those who have left the settlement answers well as by this means I have been able to collect a good amount of quit rent, at the same time it is a great assistance to the people who hire them, as their 4 acre allotments are very small on which to support their families."(85)

In Table 5 the basic structure of the boom period may be discerned. Between 1865 and 1869 there was a rapid decline in all factors followed by a very marked upsurge which peaked in 1875 before beginning to decline sharply to 1880. Thus at Healdtown, Fort Beaufort there were by 1875 still 18.1% fewer households than
there had been in 1861. In 1868 there had been 48.2% fewer households than in 1861. Although the number of households declined so sharply, the average acreage under cultivation in 1875 actually showed a 2.4% increase over the acreage cultivated in 1865. This meant that on average each household had increased its cultivated area by over half an acre from 2.7 to 3.3. This was only possible through more extensive use of the plough and the numbers of ploughs increased by 275% between 1861 and 1875 from (56 to 210). It is particularly important to observe the 45.6% increase in the area devoted to wheat in Fort Beaufort. The number of acres devoted to winter crops like wheat was still small, being only 198 acres. This shows nevertheless that there was a small group of households which were able to achieve two crops a year, wheat and maize. This was to prove an invaluable protection against summer drought for these households and give them an added edge over others. It would however obviously be incorrect to think that it was possible for households to achieve two crops a year. Only a small minority were able to do so.

More marked even than the expansion evident in cultivation was the growth of livestock. At Healdtown the number of sheep after having dropped from the 1861 figure by 37.4% in 1868, began to rise and by 1875 amounted to 17,000, exceeding the 1861 figure by 21.3%. Apart from an inexplicable drop in 1865, the amount of wool produced grew accordingly, reaching 28,492 lbs in 1875. This represented a yield of 1.6 lbs per sheep. From this yield it was possible for each household with an average number of sheep (about 22) to achieve a return of 36 lbs of wool. The sale of this wool was crucial to the 'prosperity' of the boom experienced in these years. The sale of raw wool, for which there was little domestic application by the producers themselves, was a steady source of cash and took the pressure off arable agriculture to provide part of the commodity product needed to realise essential cash requirements. Cattle increased by 98% over the figure for 1861, boosting the number of cattle per capita from 0.6 in 1861 to 1.55 in 1875.
A similar pattern with possibly even greater intensity was observable in Victoria East. The number of households declined by 44.3% between 1863 and 1868. By 1875 it had only just surpassed the level it had reached in 1861. Ploughs increased by 300% from 65 in 1861 to 260 in 1875, improving the number of households per plough from 16:1 to 9:1 in this period. Sheep increased by 168.2% from 11,006 to 29,522 over the same period, making this the leading sheep holding district. Cattle holdings increased by 176.7% from 3,673 to 10,162 in 1875 giving 1.69 head of cattle per capita.

Table 5 also provides some idea of the setback that occurred with the onset of drought in 1875. In that year in Victoria East only 26,572 bushels of grain were produced. This provided the increasing population with approximately 1,297 lbs. of grain per household for the year, a yield of about 3.5 bags per acre. However as land holdings were by no means equally distributed, the drought would have had a differential impact on the households. Those with above average land holdings and large flocks of sheep were in a far better position to survive on the land without being forced to migrate in search of work. The drought thus supported the polarisation of the households and the similar structure of inequality between households that has been observed prior to 1865.

The effects of the drought are equally observable in Peddie and Fort Beaufort. At the latter place almost no staple grains were harvested in the summer of 1875. However those households that were engaging in the cultivation of wheat were able to utilise the winter rainfall, and, as shown in table 5.2, they realised 2,282 bushels. This would have provided about 178 lbs. of wheat per household. Wheat production contributed to the polarising effect of drought as only a few households participated in this production. Similarly in Peddie, although less seriously affected by the drought, production declined to 41% of its 1865 level. This represented a decline in yield from 1,464 lbs. per household, to 967 lbs., an amount clearly insufficient for a years subsistence.
In Sandille's location the number of cattle per capita remained constant, being 0.55 in 1864 and 0.46 in 1869, despite an increase of 13% in the number of cattle, because of rapidly increasing population. The number of ploughs also increased by 40%, although they still remained few, and the growth of population in the location outstripped the rate at which ploughs were being acquired. However, in the Tamacha locations of the chiefs Siwani, Thsatsu and Toise, growth comparable to that in the Mfengu areas was being achieved. Although the decrease in population was far less in these districts, it was also a factor. Table 4.4. (ii) showed a population decrease of 7.7% between 1864 and 1865 in the Tamacha district. Thereafter population expanded dramatically, reaching 33,795 by 1880 with at least 6,078 households, an increase of 88.1%. This was caused by the expulsion of all Ngqika from their location, after the suppression of the rebellion, in 1879.

Despite the greater population, the number of sheep increased from 7,519 in 1865 to 62,904 in 1875, an increase of 736%. This gave each household in 1875 a flock of 18 sheep (on average). The number of cattle also increased. Whereas there were 0.73 cattle per capita in 1865, this improved to 1.34 per capita in 1875. The number of ploughs increased enormously, from 313 in 1865 to 1,209 in 1879, improving the ratio of households to ploughs from 11.3:1, to 5:1.

Although the 1875-76 season marked the beginning of drought elsewhere, in the King William's Town district better rains seemed to have fallen and fairly good yields were achieved. In 1875, in the Tamacha locations in King William's Town district (see Table 5.4. iii) 208,108 bushels of maize and sorghum were reaped. If this had been evenly distributed it would have provided each of 3,424 households with 3,403 lbs of grain for a population of 28,003. From this it is clear that in good years these locations could feed themselves. To raise money for hut tax and commodity purchases, it would only be necessary to sell some wool from the 62,904 sheep to realise the necessary amount.
The supply of grain did not leave much margin for losses experienced because of drought. The yield per acre in 1875 was 845 lbs or about 4.7 bags. On 4 acres, most households were realising about 3,379 lbs, or not quite the twenty 200 lb bags of grain that Houghton and Walton considered necessary for consumption requirements of a family of 5.8 people. In the 1875-76 season there was a decline in yields compared to the 1874-75 season because of the "lateness of the rains". (86) The maize and sorghum harvest yielded 129,491 bushels or only 2,134 lbs per household. This was a decline of 37.7% in the total crop and would have allowed only 258.3 lbs per person. The households, even at the height of the 'boom', were not experiencing a superfluity of grain.

Under the drought conditions which prevailed from 1875 households began to consume their numerous sheep and goats for subsistence. It is apparent that this occurred in Tamacha district and, as shall be seen, there is supporting evidence for the Mfengu districts as well. In Tamacha the number of sheep, which had been increasing rapidly to 1875, began to decline. When the drought hit Tamacha and King William's Town districts in the 1876-77 season it precipitated a drop of 44,960 or 72.6% in the number of sheep. The 16,938 sheep that remained in 1879 was still far more than there had been in 1865, but Tamacha in 1879 had a population of 33,795 compared to 17,967 in 1865. Similar reductions occurred in the number of goats and cattle. By 1875 therefore the decline had set in.

It was particularly in times of drought and uncertain rainfall, that those who had invested in ploughs were able to survive better than those who had not. When conditions were optimal, a plough and trek oxen could be used by several households. When rain was scarce, the owner of a plough was at an advantage. He could immediately make use of whatever small showers of rain occurred to plough his ground and to plant. By the time he was finished, the ground of neighbours who relied on his plough was too hard to be ploughed up. Those without a plough therefore had to greatly
curtail cultivation - or in bad cases desist from cultivation altogether. As households became more dependent on the use of a plough the effects of drought on those who did not own one became worse.

In Peddie, in 1875, despite the large increase in the number of ploughs only 29% of all households had them. One plough had to suffice for more than 3 households. Similarly in Fort Beaufort only 27%, and in Victoria East 22%, of all households owned their own plough. Interestingly, proportionately the greatest number of ploughs appears to have been in the Tamacha locations, where 35.5% of all households had a plough. However it is clear from this that great potential existed for the polarisation of households around their ability both to grow a winter crop (for which ploughing and harrowing were necessary) and to continue cultivation despite much reduced rainfall.

In assessing the growth of the size of the total product of the households, it must always be kept in mind that the basic polarisation, which we have found to be the concommitant of the increasing share of the commodity portion of the total product, was maintained. In this period, under the impact of the particular circumstances created by the movement of population to the Transkei (and to the Colonial farms), the size of the total product increased. This had the effect of halting the growing polarisation of the households. Under the conditions prevailing, between 1865 and 1875, the downward aggregate shift of the households was halted. As more households began to benefit from the use of the plough, increased sheep and cattle holdings, and an increase in available acreage, there was a distinct aggregate shift upward for the community as a whole. This was followed by a distinct downward shift from 1875 as the effects of drought began to be felt.

The structure of production underlying this change was still based on a highly skewed distribution of resources. It is possible that in certain areas a levelling of the households could be observed.
However such levelling by no means reversed the effects of the previous polarisation of the households. As shall be seen, growth at the upper end of the scale of household accumulation probably outstripped the gains made by those at the lower end.

IV The Distribution of Productive Factors. An Analysis of the Healdtown Mfengu, Fort Beaufort District in 1869

It is fortunately possible to gain some idea of how the factors of production were distributed between the household production units at this time. An examination of the census roll of the Healdtown Mfengu of Fort Beaufort in 1869, after the population migration had occurred, reveals much data essential to an understanding of how the growth in ploughs, cattle and sheep holding was distributed.

As shown in Tables 4 and 5, in January 1869 there were 513 households and a total population of 3,011 people in Healdtown. They possessed 2,425 cattle, 10,731 sheep, 96 ploughs and 28 wagons. The cattle amounted to 0.8 per capita, and the sheep to 20.9 per household. There was one plough to every 5.3 households. The reduction of population between 1865 and 1868 had been 44.9%. Healdtown may be regarded as typical of all the Mfengu districts such as Victoria East, Peddie and Keiskamma Hoek.

The Healdtown Mfengu community was divided into 7 villages each with its own headman. The villages varied in size, ranging from 21 households to 124 households. The community showed a constant incidence of polygamous households. In 1861, out of 935 households, 9.1% were polygamous. In 1869, 54 or 10.5% of the households were polygamous, 47 households had 2 wives, and 7 had three. There were 45 unmarried men or widowers. The rest, 414 households, all had one wife only.
To start with, the households must be differentiated according to size. In Table 6 below, the basic distribution of households according to size is given.

**TABLE 6: Histogram showing the Number of People per Household.**
Healtdown Mfengu - January 1869

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>94.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM. %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>98.2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>99.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MEAN** = 5.87  
**NUMBER OF DISTINCT VALUE** = 17

**MEDIAN** = 6.00  
**NUMBER OF VALUES COUNTED** = 513

**MODE** = 3.00

**Q1** = 3.00  
**INTERQUARTILE RANGE** = 4 - 7

**Q2** = 8.00

From Table 6 it can be seen that the households were clearly differentiated or polarised by size. Nearly 25% of all households had between 1 and 3 people in them. These households contained 298 people and comprised 9.8% of the total population. The middle 50% of households had between 4 and 7 people each. Altogether they accounted for 1 420 people, or 47.2% of the population. The
largest, 25% of the households, had 8 or more people each. These large households accounted for 1,293, or 42.9% of the population. Some 25% of the households thus contained nearly as many people as the remaining 75% of the households.

The clear weighting of the population into the larger households indicates the importance which must have been attached to eventually becoming the head of a large household. The economics of the reproduction of the household production unit still favoured the growth of the family as the main supplier of labour inputs into its productive activity. Given a distribution of this kind, the potential existed for smaller households, (those with less than 8 members) to expand. There was evidently a degree of cyclical mobility among households as younger units expanded and acquired land and stock, while older and larger units eventually began to decline and break up. In the period 1865 - 1875 the demographic situation favoured the economic expansion of the smaller households as a result of the emigration of many large households to the Transkei and the Colonial farms as tenants.

As would be expected, the polygamous households, with a mean size of 8.9, were larger than the average for the community as a whole. Altogether 54 polygamous households accounted for 483 people. Over 64% of the polygamous households had 8 or more members, and they comprised a quarter of all the households with 8 or more members. While there was therefore a clear tendency for the polygamous households to be among the larger units, it is also observable that the majority of the larger households were monogamous. Polygamy was therefore ceasing to be the key differentiating factor that it had been until then.

In Table 7 the basic distribution of cattle is given.
TABLE 7: Histogram Showing the Distribution of Cattle
Healdtown Mfengu - January 1869

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL</th>
<th>CUM.</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL</th>
<th>CUM.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>94.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean = 4.727  Number of distinct values = 25
Median = 3.000  Number of values counted = 513
Mode = 0.000  Maximum = 37
Minimum = 0

Approximate quartiles
Q1 = 1.00
Interquartile range = 2 - 6
Q2 = 7

From Table 7 it can be seen that 22% of all households had no cattle and 8.2% had only 1 head. The bottom 30% of the households therefore had 1 or no cattle. 44% of the households had between 2 and 6 cattle each. The top 25% of the households had 7 or more cattle. The 226 households with between 2 and 6 cattle accounted
for 843, or 34.8% of the total number of cattle. Altogether 74.3% of the households could account for only 36.4% of the stock. The top 25% of the households, by contrast, owned 63.5% of all the cattle.

In real terms this meant that the majority of households could not muster enough cattle to put together a team of oxen to draw a plough. Only 25% of the households had more than the 6 cattle, and therefore could possibly have had the number required to make up a span for ploughing. This could explain why the number of ploughs rarely increased beyond about 25% of the number of households. The highly skewed distribution of stock was clearly a brake on the acquisition of ploughs. It would have increased the cost of hiring a plough and oxen to uneconomic levels. Table 8 below investigates the relationship between the ownership of cattle and of ploughs.

**TABLE 8: Analysis of Cattle Stock Holdings of 96 Households with Ploughs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATTLE</th>
<th>0 - 1</th>
<th>2 - 6</th>
<th>7 - 10</th>
<th>11 - 20</th>
<th>20 +</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOUSEHOLDS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 8 it is shown that 67.7% of those households with ploughs were in the upper quartile of cattle ownership, with more than 7 or more head to their credit. There was a strong correlation between the acquisition of a plough and the ownership of sufficient stock to pull it.
For any household that wished to acquire a plough to increase agricultural output, a strong incentive also existed to acquire cattle. Cattle had always occupied an important place both as a source of food, (mainly through milk), and as a store of value and wealth. They now increasingly acquired an additional economic value in working ploughs and pulling wagons. This value did not supplant the traditional role of cattle. It reinforced the importance of the 'bride price', and the social function of cattle in this transaction, because this was a very important way in which cattle could be acquired. The increasing value of cattle as an asset in agricultural production therefore encouraged the maintenance of large families. In Table 9 below, the relationship between the number of cattle and the size of the household is examined.

**TABLE 9: Cross Tabulation of Size of Household and Number of Cattle Owned**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEOPLE</th>
<th>CATTLE</th>
<th>0 - 1</th>
<th>2 - 6</th>
<th>7+</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8+</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>155</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 9 it may be seen that there was a strong correlation between the size of the household and the number of cattle it possessed, (correlation co-efficient equal to 62.945). At the one extreme, of the 188 households with between 1 and 4 people, 47.9% had 0 - 1 cattle, and only 14.9% had 7 or more. At the other extreme, of the 135 households with 8 or more people, 43.0% had 7 or more cattle, and only 12.6% had 0 - 1 cattle, while 44.4% had between 2 - 6 cattle. Of the 190 households with between 5 and 7
people, 50% had between 2 and 6 cattle, while approximately 25% had less than this and 25% had more. The most frequent situation was a household with 5 to 7 people and 2 to 6 cattle. Some exceptional aspects of the distribution of cattle are revealed in Table 9. 28 small households, (with 1 to 4 people), had more than 7 head of cattle. 17 large households, (with more than 8 people), had only 0 - 1 head of cattle. In terms of cattle per capita, these extremes were respectively very well off, and very poor. However, together they accounted for only 8.8% of all households. The correlation between size and cattle holding is supported by the fact that nearly 44% of the 132 households with more than 7 cattle were in the group 8 or more people. Conversely, 58% of the 155 households with 0 - 1 cattle were in the group with 1 - 4 people.

The correlation between the size of the household and the number of cattle indicates that accumulation was still linked to the generational cycle. The gradual expansion of the household led to the acquisition of cattle, ploughs and sheep. Of the 96 households with ploughs, only 16.1% comprised between 1 and 4 people, 44.1% had between 5 and 7 people, and 39.8% had 8 or more people in their households. As with other variables, there was a strong association between the size of the household and the number of sheep. In Table 10 below, the basic histogram of the distribution of sheep is given. In Table 11 the correlation between the number of sheep and the size of the household is shown.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL</th>
<th>CUM.</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL</th>
<th>CUM.</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
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<th>CUM.</th>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>97.5</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>83.8</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>84.0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>98.2</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>85.2</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>160</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>99.2</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>170</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Mean = 20.918
Median = 10.000
Mode = 0.000

Number of distinct values = 60
Number of values counted = 513
Minimum = 0
Maximum = 513

Interquartile range = 4 - 25
TABLE 11: Cross Tabulation of Size of Household and Number of Sheep Owned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEOPLE</th>
<th>SHEEP 0 - 3</th>
<th>SHEEP 4 - 26</th>
<th>SHEEP 26+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8+</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expansion of sheep holdings that had occurred since 1860 was of exceptional importance. Of all factors, sheep were the easiest to acquire and accumulate. Their wool provided a reliable annual cash return. More than any other factor, therefore, sheep were responsible for the upward aggregate shift of the 1860s and 70s. The average number of sheep per household was 20.91. Nevertheless the high mean number of sheep should not obscure their highly unequal distribution.

As Table 10 shows, the most frequent count was 0, and more than 50% of all households had 10 or fewer sheep. Sheep ownership was particularly concentrated in a few large flocks. The top 25% of households, which owned more than 26 sheep each, accounted for 7,809 or 72.77% of all the sheep, the 25% of households which owned 0 - 3 sheep each, accounted for only 0.87% of the total, while the middle 50% of the households accounted for the remaining 26.35%. Clearly sheep were highly unevenly distributed. This may of course have been due, in part, to the rate of natural increase in a larger flock. However it was also connected to the difficulties experienced by small households in accumulation. While sheep were responsible in large measure for the general aggregate shift upward, for this variable at least the upward shift was still associated with the polarisation of the households.
The polarisation evident in the distribution of sheep seems to have been associated, as with other variables, with the size of the household. In Table 13 it is shown that of the 188 households with between 1 and 4 people 43.1% had 0 to 3 sheep, and only 12.2% had over 26 sheep. Of the 135 households with over 8 people only 17.7% had 0 to 3 sheep, while 38.5% had more than 26 sheep. In the medium sized households with between 5 and 7 people, 52% had between 4 and 26 sheep, while 26% have more than that and 21% had less.

It is important to examine to what extent the differentiation of households apparent in the Fort Beaufort census revealed a structural polarisation of the households, or merely revealed different points in a development cycle that most households would follow. If larger households were wealthier, and household size was at least a strongly predisposing factor for greater levels of accumulation, then it might follow that as the senior members of a household got older and the number of children increased, they also increased their levels of accumulation.

The evidence from the Healdtown census does tend to support Shanin's conclusion that there was a "positive correlation between the size of a peasant household and its wealth" and that the larger households had more resources in per capita terms than the smaller ones. (87) Whereas the mean number of people per household was 5.8 overall, the 155 households shown in Table 9 having 0-11 cattle had on a mean average 4.6 people; the 226 households with from 2 - 6 cattle had on average 6 people and the 132 households with 7 or more cattle had an average of 7 people per household. This therefore confirms the existence of the correlation between size and cattle holding. However it is important to see that there were in each group significant divergences from this trend, symptomatic of the highly uneven manner in which cattle and other resources were distributed.

Amongst those households with 0 - 1 cattle, there were 45 households of above average size (i.e. with 5 or more people), one with 12 members and another with 19; in the group with 2 - 6 cattle
there were 79 households with more than 6 people, including 20 with more than 10 people. Households in this position clearly had a distinctly below average number of cattle per capita, despite their above average size. While it is clear that size and age were predisposing factors, that provided labour and other resources necessary for production, successful accumulation depended on other factors beside this. It is therefore difficult to adopt a "development cycle" approach to explaining the observable stratification. It would appear rather that 'mature' households, while more preponderant in the group owning most of the cattle, sheep and ploughs, were also well represented amongst those with small cattle and sheep holdings and without ploughs.

This becomes more apparent on a closer examination of the effects of polygamy on cattle holding. 27 polygamous households actually fell into the group with 0 - 6 cattle, while 26 fell into the group with 7 or more cattle. Of the seven households with 3 wives, 3 had only six head of cattle, while 4 had 7 or more. This type of distribution shows that size and maturity were subject to other determining factors.

To adequately investigate the extent to which there was a generational development cycle, it is necessary to have an age pyramid showing how the population was distributed by age. It should then be possible to see what percentage of the largest (and therefore usually the oldest) households fell into the group of above average accumulators that has been identified in the analysis of the distribution of cattle, sheep and ploughs etc.

The only data that was discovered pertaining to age, came from the records of the Tamacha magistrate, who when issuing Certificates of Citizenship to the adult males of Siwani's location between 1869-1871, recorded an estimate of their ages. There is no reason to suppose that the age distribution of adult males would have differed significantly between the people of Tamacha and those of Healdtown. In Table 12 below the distribution of adult males in Siwani's location is given.
In Table 12 it can be seen that 56% of the adult male population was below 30 years of age. The older households may therefore reasonably be defined as all those with heads of household over 30 years of age. If a 'development cycle' approach is to be used in explaining the distribution of resources then it should follow that the highest levels of accumulation would be found in those households whose heads were over 30 years of age and which had expanded in numbers beyond a certain critical point. In the example drawn from Tamacha such older (and therefore presumably larger) households constituted approximately 44% of the total. If, as in Tamacha, 44% of the households in Healdtown were headed by men over 30 years of age, this would have amounted to 225 of the 513 households resident there.

In Table 9 above, an examination of the column percentages reveals that of the 132 households with 7 or more cattle in Healdtown, 21.2% had 1 - 4 people, 34.8% had 5 - 7 people and 43.9% had more than 8 people. As commented above, the result supports the view that accumulation increased with size. However the richest 132 households in absolute terms would only have accounted for 58% of the estimated number of older units derived above. There would have remained, on this estimate number, 93 older and larger
households not counted amongst those who achieved a significantly higher level of accumulation. In Table 9 above, 77 of these households can most plausibly be accounted for by those households with 8 or more people and less than 7 cattle. The remaining number could constitute older units in the process of disintegration. An examination of the actual distribution of cattle across the larger households in relation to their likely proportion in the population suggests that any cyclical theory would have to explain the large number of cases which apparently did not follow any discernable cyclical trend.

Given this relatively large number of older and larger units that in fact had a below average level of accumulation it can be concluded that size and age were facilitating factors only. To place the explanation on a higher level, it may be said that the automatic association of size, age and higher levels of accumulation was more characteristic of the old lineage mode of production which was rapidly giving way to new social relations of production, based on commodity production and wage labour. The extent to which evidently large households were failing to achieve such higher levels, indicated the extent to which commodity production and wage labour had become the major determinant of the economic polarisation of the households.

Large holdings of sheep and cattle, and the ownership of a plough were assisting in the formation of a small class of larger households, the levels of accumulation of which were qualitatively higher than the rest. This group might have accounted for at most 25% of the households. They could look forward to land purchases and leases of Crown and private land to accommodate their increasing stock and to producing marketable surpluses. A further 20% may have been able, in good times, to survive off their stock and by arable farming. However they had no reserves against adverse conditions and could be quickly reduced to poverty. A small proportion of this group, perhaps 5%, would be able to join their more fortunate brethren in increasing their levels of accumulation. The role of wage work with payment in stock cannot be underestimated here. The remaining 50% of the
households were mostly small, without cattle and sheep, and were virtually unable to take much advantage of the favourable conditions that prevailed between 1865 and 1875.

Sufficient advantages from the high production achieved in this period filtered down to the smaller, less well-endowed households to allow them to feed themselves and meet essential requirements. The majority of the households were never in a position which could be considered 'prosperous' even by traditional Xhosa standards. It was observable that, in the Ciskei at this time, there were many households which tackled their agricultural activities with an enthusiasm which belied the image of a negative approach to agriculture propounded by the modern myth of 'peasant conservatism'. However, this enthusiasm was increasingly channelled within the confines of the capitalist mode of production.

The demands of the growth of commodity production encouraged the intrusion of aspects of capitalist relations of production within the locations. This was expressed in the polarisation of the households with extremely variable levels of accumulation which increasingly entrenched the position of the larger households and fostered the growth of the headmanship as the political expression of this dominance. In the next section these two aspects of the 'prosperous years' will be examined.

IV The Political Conjuncture and the Relationship Between Households

The growth of tenancy and squatting in this period was one of the most important ways in which many households were absorbed into the capitalist economy of the Colony. If the Ngqika and other Ciskeian Xhosa groups did not move to the Transkei in large numbers, the same dynamic of household expansion was apparent in their movement on to Colonial farms. The growth of tenancy and squatting both on Colonial farms and on Crown Lands was greatly stimulated after 1867 by the withdrawal of the restrictive Pass Laws previously applied to the Xhosa in British Kaffraria.
The growth of squatting and tenancy should be seen with the purchase of Crown land as a single process of expansion and emigration from the locations. The economics of this migration determined, even more than in the case of migration to the Transkei, that it was, initially, a rich man's movement. Tenancy provided a means for the expansion of the larger households. The problem of defining a "tenant" or "squatter" is a hardy perennial. In this period the tenants referred to were not primarily share-croppers, farming on the halves, or paying labour rent for their land. They were paying in cash. This makes them tenants in the conventional sense of the word, who should be clearly differentiated from any of the above.

'Squatters' should be taken as referring only to the illegal occupation of vacant Crown or private land. This was in fact very rare and only gained notoriety in parts of Fort Beaufort and near the Kei mouth. However any unwanted tenant was instantly labelled by the Colonial press, official, and farmer alike as a "squatter". The word, therefore, has a definite ideological context. The Magistrate at Victoria East, while pointing out the importance of tenancy at the time, nicely expressed this linguistic confusion in the interests of polemics, when he wrote:

"It is notorious that the tenant or squatting system has obtained largely in this district, in fact in some instances entire farms have been in the possession of so-called tenants, but more correctly speaking squatters, to the serious injury ... of the neighbouring farmers." (89)

The growth of tenancy extended in three directions. Firstly into Fort Beaufort and Victoria East districts around the Waterkloof and Schelmkloof enclaves. Secondly into the area between the boundary of the King William's Town and East London Districts along the coast to the Kei. This land had formed part of the old Ndlambe district. Thirdly into the area above the Kabousie River adjoining the Ngqika location.
Describing the land between East London and the Kei, Liefeldt saw: "Thousands of square miles are vacant or inhabited by squatters or natives who have rented farms or parts of farms from the proprietors. This class of natives is decidedly on the increase." (90)

The agitation of the Fort Beaufort farmers against the extensive hiring of farms to African tenants has already been described. This agitation had culminated in the appointment of Inspectors of Native Locations, under the Native Locations Act of 1876, in certain districts, to place African tenants under some form of Colonial supervision and to restrict their continued expansion. Up to the time of the appointment of the Inspectors, it had been extremely difficult to estimate the total numbers of tenants on Colonial farms. (91) The individual returns submitted by the Inspectors in 1877 allow an accurate picture to be built up of the condition of tenants in all those districts adjoining the main Ciskeian locations. It is noteworthy that these invaluable sources have not, as far as can be determined, been referred to in the literature before. In Table 13 below the population and property of the key tenant and squatter areas is given. In Table 14 the economic position of these households is examined in per capita and per household terms.
TABLE 13: Population, Stock and Assets of Tenants Living on Colonial Farms
In Areas for which Inspectors of Native Locations were Appointed
In 1877 (92)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>HUTS</th>
<th>CATTLE</th>
<th>SHEEP</th>
<th>GOATS</th>
<th>HORSES</th>
<th>WAGONS</th>
<th>PLOUGHS</th>
<th>GUNS</th>
<th>ANNUAL RENTAL PER HUT L. s. d.</th>
<th>NUMBER OF FARMS OCCUPIED</th>
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<tr>
<td>FORT BEAUFORT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BLINKWATER</td>
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<td>378</td>
<td>2 687</td>
<td>2 106</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1 0 0</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>690</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>1 845</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KING WILLIAM'S TOWN</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UPPER KABOUSIE</td>
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<td>167</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>2 411</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 10 0</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAHOON - KEI RIVERS</td>
<td>2 133</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>3 087</td>
<td>2 148</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>2 5 0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONUBIE - NAHOON</td>
<td>2 299</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>3 560</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>1 124</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2 10 0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7 725</td>
<td>1 627</td>
<td>11 255</td>
<td>9 488</td>
<td>3 618</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 14: Stock and Assets of Tenants Living on Colonial Farms per Capita and Per Household in 1877

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>CATTLE PER CAPITA</th>
<th>CATTLE PER HOUSEHOLD</th>
<th>SHEEP PER HOUSEHOLD</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLDS PER WAGON</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLDS PER PLOUGH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BLINKWATER</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>5.57</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>WATERKLOOF</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>7.66</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
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<td>KING</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILLIAM'S TOWN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER KABOUSIE</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>14.44</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST LONDON</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NAHOON - KEI RIVERS</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONUBIE - NAHOON</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>6</td>
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The total population of 7,725 people amounted to about 10% of the Xhosa population of the Ciskei at this time. These households were unusual in some ways. The number of cattle per capita was exceptionally high, and by comparison much higher than was to be found in any of the locations. With nearly 1.5 head of cattle per capita the average of these households would have placed them in the top 10% of households in the Sandille and Tamacha locations.

Over 15% of all households possessed a plough. While this is not as high as in some of the locations, it is important to consider the nature of agricultural activities on these farms. Because of the high rents being paid there was far greater pressure on tenants to produce a cash surplus. Households on the farms usually co-operated in their cultivation and herding. This co-operation was ensured because very often the lease of the farm as a whole was organised by one leading member of a group of households acting on behalf of the others.
Commodity production played a larger part in the agriculture of tenants than in the locations.

The organisation of this tenant agriculture may be illustrated by the case of Mgoba. He hired a farm on the Gonubie River from J.J. Edwards for 80 pounds per annum. He was told not to have more than 5 households on the farm but he soon had 20, which he said was necessary if he was to be able to pay the rental. The magistrate commented:

"He has 27 families, approximately 150 people, 120 cattle, 30 sheep, 120 goats, 4 ploughs on a farm of 1 700 acres, very rugged and stony, not very suitable for agriculture. I must remark that 80 pounds is probably twice as much as any European farmer would offer for the place".

This reveals both the incentive held out by the cash tenants and how they organised their production. Despite there being over 27 families on the farm there were only 4 ploughs, which they must have used co-operatively. (93)

For some farmers, tenancy was a way of acquiring labour and tenancy agreements gave way to share-cropping or labour rent. The Inspectors noted several cases where "men worked for the proprietor when required instead of payment." In East London some farms were leased by the Government to individuals who initially occupied them entirely with their own stock. Fourteen leases were recorded for 17 574 acres of land. (94)

Three of these leases were for 80 acres each. The rest were from 1 300 to 1 800 acres of land for 5 to 10 years. The lessees were required to pay amounts varying from 120 pounds per annum for a 1 700 acre farm, to 8 pounds & 10 shillings for an 80 acre lot. In comparison, some of the Colonial landlords did considerably better than this for land of inferior quality. Go, a Ngqika and protege of Charles Brownlee, leased a farm of 1 804 acres for 54 pounds a year. People capable of taking on such leases on their own can be considered as small capitalist farmers. While not all
the tenant households referred to in Table 13 could be included in this group, some of them certainly could.

The Inspectors of Native Locations were required to register all stock belonging to tenants. They encountered considerable resistance. At Whittlesea Inspector Evans was confronted by one Jan Kuta who berated him when required to register his stock:

"I hire a farm from Mr J. Mills and consider myself in the same position as any farmer in the district."

He would not allow his stock to be registered unless European stock was registered as well. The registration of stock by the Inspectors did not proceed smoothly. In the resistance displayed by the tenants to this aspect of Inspectors' duties, there was apparent an expression of a new consciousness, which might be indicative of their position in the Colonial economy. Evans was also told by other tenants at Whittlesea:

"Why is this law made for coloured people and why are the white people not brought under the same law?"

The questioning turned into resistance as many people refused to bring forward their stock for registration. Inspector Booth found, at Blinkwater, that a particularly rowdy party had been organised for the day on which he had told the people he would be registering stock, which effectively prevented him from doing so. When confronted about the intentions behind his appointment and the registration, Inspector Booth had to resort to claiming that the Act was "for their benefit and protection as well as that of the white man." (96)

Not all the opposition to the Native Locations Act came from those most directly affected. In an interesting letter, which sheds some light on the place of the tenants in Colonial agriculture, a farmer wrote to the Fort Beaufort Advocate:

"If the labour is to be all driven away how am I to get my shepherds, cattle herds and men to assist me in working the farm."
He saw the object of the Act as "to drive all Natives off private property and onto Government land." The tenants, he explained:

"were our greatest grain producers, thousands of bags of grain are produced by them annually. They exchange with us ..." (97)

With the enormous expansion of sheep flocks in the Colony it could well have been advantageous for many sheep farmers to have tenants to produce grain for their workers and themselves, relieving them of the burden of growing any grain at all. (98)

The motive behind this movement onto the Colonial farms stemmed from the need of that part of the location community that had already achieved considerable expansion of stock and arable agricultural activity. They were thus comparable with the purchasers and lessees of Crown land from the 1850s and 60s. Not all of them survived. By the late 1870s a reflux of population back to the locations had begun, which was in part responsible for the swelling of population there between 1875 and 1879. Reports were received that many tenants:

"have applied ... for permission to remove from where they are at present to a Government location ... because the rent charged by Government is so very much less than that charged by private landowners." (99)

Long before this things had begun to turn sour for the purchasers and lessees of Government land outside the locations.

From Keiskamma Hoek (in the old Crown Reserve) in 1869 it was reported that there were 3 classes of people occupying lots.

Firstly, those who had paid rent on their leases wholly or in part in the past, but who were now struggling because of stock and crop losses due to drought.

Secondly, those who removed to the Transkei with cattle and property and who sublet their property.

Thirdly, those who had no prospect of paying.
Of these the magistrate reported:

"the greater number appear to me to have taken advantage from an easy mode of possessing themselves for a time of a choice piece of land, cultivating it while they could and abandoning it when in dread of being pressed for payment." (100)

In the perception of this official it was clear that even in the larger and more market orientated strata of the households there were many for whom increased productivity was conjunctural. They had become landowners in the wake of the expansion of production at the time of the cattle-killing. Faced with the low prices they received for their grain in the economic slump of the 1860s many of them collapsed. By 1867 there was in the key Ciskeian districts of East London, King William's Town, Fort Beaufort, Peddie and Victoria East a total of 8 369 pounds owing to the State for land rent that had not been paid, some of it outstanding since 1859. (101)

After the incorporation of British Kaffraria into the Colony in 1865, applications were received for a further 10 034 acres of land under the 1858 land regulations. (102) These applications were all approved - bringing the total of land purchased and leased from the State to 31 847 acres. Most of this land was along the Kabula River in the Keiskamma Hoek district. Thus at the same time as some households were withdrawing from land purchases outside the locations, others, from within the locations, were seeking to extend themselves beyond its confines. The average size of the allotments acquired was 41.12 acres, which was considerably higher than the amount of land usually purchased in the 1850s. The result was an increase in the number of purchasers up to 1875, and also a corresponding increase in unpaid rent on land leases.

Starting in 1876, the State increasingly took steps to recover land that was in arrears. In September 1876, for the first time as far as could be traced, a Government Notice was published under which "Sections of Crown Land in the Divisions of King William's Town held under the Kaffrarian Land Regulations reverted to the
Government." (103) Of 101 lots affected by the announcement, 85 were Xhosa or Mfengu tenants. The amount of land repossessed from them was 4,218 acres, most of it situated near the Debe Valley, the Kabula Valley, and Mnxesha. Altogether, by the end of 1877, approximately 6,500 acres of land that had at one time been held by African landowners had been repossessed. (104) This represented 20% of the approximately 32,500 acres held by purchasers and lessees of Crown Land.

Drought and adverse conditions affected the purchasers and lessees of Crown land, and tenants on Colonial farms, as much as any household in the locations. Many of those who abandoned their holdings returned to their original locations. Most of them had never broken their association with their locations, either as stock-owners using the commonage or as landholders leasing out their allotments, and it was a relatively easy matter for them to return.

The growth of tenancy and land purchases all had a stimulating effect on the larger households in the locations. By giving them additional resources it enabled them to increase their sphere of influence, and thus supported the emerging political role of the headmen. One additional form of land occupation in the Colony, and a major force in the spread of tenancy, was the acquisition of a farm by a chief through purchase or lease on behalf of a group of his supporters. These purchases provide a case study of the rise and fall of a group of tenants or land purchasers.

The most famous case of such a purchase was the acquisition made by the Ngqika Chief Oba. In August 1873 he negotiated to buy a farm from a Mr Webb at the junction of the Tyhumie and Keiskamma Rivers in Victoria East district. The 2,000 pound price agreed was considered by many to be considerably over-inflated. (105) Oba's stated intention was to settle "with the greater part of his tribe on the farm and to collectively meet the purchase price". At first Oba met with some encouragement, but this quickly changed to disapproval from the State and officials.
Oba was full of hope at the beginning of his venture. He possessed a farm of 300 acres given as part of Grey's unilateral settlement to all chiefs and some of their sons and daughters. Using the income from that farm, Oba collected together 116 families with whom he moved onto the farm he had purchased in Victoria East. By November 1874 he had managed to pay Mr Webb the full purchase price for the farm. (107)

The spirit in which this venture was undertaken is very revealing. In response to the opposition of Stevenson, the 'Clerk in Charge' of the Government office in the Windvogelberg, where Oba's location was situated, Oba was motivated to set out his motives and understanding of the purchase. It is worth quoting him at length because it reveals very well the change in attitude, particularly amongst the younger generation, (Oba was about 30 at the time) to the Colonial economy and the domination of the Colonial State. He told Stevenson that:

"He does not wish to come into collision with Government ... he is not flying from the Government authority, he is going to be under it; and that he is going to fulfill an agreement made by himself with Mr Webb to pay 2 000 pounds for Mr Webb's farm ... The Government will guide him, the laws which apply to the white man will apply to him, and if he violates any law, it will be for the Government to punish him as it punishes other law breakers. He therefore asks the Government to allow him to complete the bargain without molestation." (108)

Oba was arguing for the right to carry through the deal and be an equal under the law. He did not want anyone appointed to oversee his affairs, which he felt he was able to supervise himself. In the Colonial mind this could mean only one thing - that Oba wished to re-establish his own authority over the people on his farm and ultimately subvert the white Colonial domination. At the time however, nothing was further from his intentions. Oba wanted only the right to respond to the new economic and political dispensation in a way that was feasible for a man of his class.
Only someone with the rank of a chief could inspire the confidence necessary to organise the large co-operative effort required to purchase a farm for 2,000 pounds. While his ancestral rank provided the legitimacy for the project, the motive was purely economic — to survive (and perhaps to prosper) in the capitalist economy of the Cape Colony.

Oba's plans to escape the limitations of the location did not end in success. After a few successful years, things began to go wrong. In 1875 he purchased an additional farm from one Bezuidenhout for 3,300 pounds, "a sum greatly in excess of its value". (109) He paid Bezuidenhout 1,300 pounds in cash, (indicating just how successful he had been), but Bezuidenhout managed to destroy the receipts and denied the payments. By the end of 1877 Oba owed nearly 2,000 pounds to Bezuidenhout, and 65 pounds to a trader who had established himself on his original farm. The drought hit Oba and his people very badly, and in 1876-77 they lost most of their stock, and their crops failed.

Early in 1878 a writ of execution was issued to cover Oba's debts, and his original farm "Glen Stuart" was confiscated. All the people resident on the farm were removed to a temporary camp. Oba got his wish to be treated as an equal under the law. He was declared a bankrupt and the Magistrate at Victoria East informed him that:

"he is no longer a Chief, having failed as a farmer
he must expect no consideration from the Government
upon whom he has no claim and that he must work
for his living as all men have to do ..." (110)

Oba never actually joined the rebellion which broke out in late 1877 in the Transkei, and subsequently in the Ciskei, because of all these proceedings. About 150 of Oba's men did join the rebels, and Oba much regretted not having himself joined. In a speech at a meeting at Sheshegu location Oba condemned his fate at the hands of the English, regretted he had not joined Sarhili in rebellion, and said that the missionaries were "the curse of the people." (111)
Oba was not alone among the chiefs in acquiring farms through the collective efforts of those who adhered to them for their mutual benefit. In 1874 Delima, the popular and charismatic son of Phato, was negotiating to purchase a farm on the Keiskamma river. The Colonial State, already alarmed at Oba's success, outrightly forbade him to do so. (112) Tainton opposed Delima's attempts because "the whole of the farms situated on the Keiskama are occupied by Natives exclusively, with one exception." (113) Tainton feared that Delima's presence there would give leadership to these people. However this did not stop Delima from hiring a large farm for 115 pounds per annum rental. A bond for the 115 pounds was signed by 30 councillors of Delima, and his father. While Delima, who had only recently been released from Robben Island, was not permitted to reside on this farm, there was nothing preventing the councillors and others, who were all in possession of Certificates of Citizenship, from doing so.

Kona Maqoma led the Ngqika expansion into the upper Kabousie River area to escape the desperate conditions prevailing in the locations. In 1869 he bought a farm of 2,439 acres in the area. In 1875 he wished to mortgage this farm for 300 pounds to enable him to buy the adjoining farm. (114) Most of the chiefs who had been granted farms by Sir. G. Grey filled them with their supporters who needed arable land and pasturage. Kona had 800 acres on the Kabousie, and over 300 households lived on this farm and his other farms. (115) They each paid 10 shillings per annum to Kona. Similarly, Sandille's son 'Edmund' had a farm near Fort Cox, which had over 120 tenants on it. (116)

The desire to purchase a farm, to provide an outlet for the expansion of the households pent-up in overcrowded locations, prompted Sandille himself to try to purchase a large piece of vacant Crown Land between Izeli and Burns Hill. He told Rose Innes that "he was getting old and felt the cold in the country he occupied, there being no firewood and wood for huts. He wished to take his tribe with him." (117) While Sandille's request did not take him very far in regaining lands that he had lost, another of Maqoma's sons managed to purchase a farm in Fort Beaufort.
In April 1875 the magistrate reported, in some alarm, that Tyini Maqoma with his followers had purchased a farm at the Blinkwater, "close to the former strongholds of Schelmkloof and Waterkloof." (118) He became even more alarmed when Sandille rode to the Blinkwater with 15 mounted and armed followers to inspect the purchase, and was reported also to be interested in purchasing a farm there.

The lead given by the chiefs was copied by other groups, who came together and collectively hired or occasionally purchased farms, particularly between East London and the Kei, and in Fort Beaufort around the Waterkloof and Blinkwater areas. Most of the households involved in these purchases were richer homesteads that needed room to expand, and could not survive the restrictive conditions in the locations with the constant battles over land and pasturage. By 1876 there were, in the upper reaches of Fort Beaufort, 6 large farms comprising over 12 000 acres, entirely occupied by Africans.

The presence of a settled population with much cattle and sheep outside of the locations, inevitably attracted many of the young, poor and impoverished in the locations to come and settle amongst them. Many young households seeking to establish themselves joined the tenant communities. The presence of this generational and wealth polarisation amongst the tenants was observed by the anti-tenant activist Sweetman who, observed:

"Young men who have wives and perhaps one or two children and who are squatters among the older branches of Natives, without any means of supporting themselves and who must steal to live or else be a burden to their friends." (119)

In this way a mixed population at different levels of development in accumulation of property and commitment to commodity production was emerging on the Colonial farms and Crown lands. Colonial agriculture was deeply divided over the question of the admissibility of large scale tenancy by Africans. Firstly there were those outside of the Kaffrarian Farmers Association circles
who did not see tenancy as a problem and who looked on the problem of creating a proletariat in more general terms. As was indicated previously, this group was increasingly politically ascendant in the Colony. Secondly, given the inaccessibility of many of the areas and farms which were taken over by African tenants, many of the landlords were unable to make a productive investment in their farms at that stage. Tenancy represented the best return they could hope to get.

Thirdly, some farmers saw a useful division of labour in the tenancy arrangements whereby the African tenant grew grain and other food crops, leaving the Colonial farmer free to concentrate on sheep farming. Tenancy was therefore objectively viable during this period and despite supervision imposed by the 1876 Locations Act there was not much talk outside of the 'border areas' of prohibiting tenancy altogether.

The existence of tenancy with its higher levels of rent (compared to the hut tax) and greater access to pasturage and arable land did a lot to encourage the commoditisation of a greater proportion of the total product of the households in this period. As the total product was itself expanding between 1865 and 1875 this created the conditions for a period of relative 'prosperity' for many households.

The use of the plough became more general. At the same time there emerged more clearly a class of larger producers who were able to base their accumulation on the cash incomes received through the sale of grain and wool. They were set off from the majority, for whom commodity sales were necessitated by the need to pay taxes and make small purchases of consumption goods. Nevertheless for both those for whom the commodity product formed only a small part of the total product and for those for whom it was the object of production, the division of labour and organisation of production had changed fundamentally. By 1875 Tainton reported from Tamacha that:

"I believe a great improvement is taking place ... A few years since, all cultivations was done by the
women whereas now it is entirely done by men and boys. A family not possessing a plough hires from those who have one and pays for the use of it with oxen, 5 shillings per acre. Keeping the lands free of weeds is still supposed to be the work of women, but in scarcely one instance will it be found that the woman is working without her husband sharing the work or paying others to assist ..." (120)

The reference to payment of others to assist in cultivation points out a change that was of growing significance in the locations. There is evidence that wage labour within the locations, which first emerged after the cattle-killing, continued. In a case before Tainton's circuit court in Tamacha, Baliswa sued Mzimasi "to recover the sum of 7 shillings and sixpence for wages and 2 shillings and sixpence for food, Baliswa's wife having undertaken to "scuffle Mzimasi's garden", with Buliswa assisting to clean the garden. They were not paid and the case was decided for the plaintiffs. (121) In another case Mboikye, a tenant of a farm on the Nahoon River (East London), hired Noleti to hoe his land at 9 pence per day. Noleti worked for forty days on the land and was paid only 8 shillings. He sued successfully for the balance of the 1 pound and 2 shilling he was owed. (122) Rose Innes reporting (as part of a campaign against the sale of liquor in the locations) from King William's Town claimed that:

"If a man has any work to be done and requires the assistance of others, he has only to announce that brandy will be supplied and his neighbours willingly come to his aid ... in this manner cattle kraals have been built and gardens weeded and huts erected ... it is a means by which any manual labour can be expeditiously performed ..." (123)

The existence of people who performed such services and people for whom they were performed is undeniable. These developments suggest an increasingly polarised community in which the Colonial capitalist economy was transforming relations of production,
producing a small scale, and at times sporadic, version of capitalist relations within the locations themselves.

An examination of the Civil Notebooks for the Tamacha district reveals many other cases where monetarisation had fundamentally changed or transformed the meaning of existing aspects of the relations of production, making them more like small scale and localised versions of capitalist relations. Most importantly the hiring of arable land became a regular occurrence. Up to 1 pound and 10 shillings a season was commonly paid for the hire of part of an arable lot and many of these cases ended up in litigation when the rent was not paid. (124) The traditional practice of loaning cattle continued but the loan had to be repaid with interest. People also borrowed cash from money-lenders putting up their cattle as security, which cattle were claimed through the courts if necessary. (125) When a beast was slaughtered, there were seldom large communal feasts. The meat was sold by the slice. The skin of the slaughtered beast was sold for 5 shillings for the making of a kaross. In return the skilled preparer of skins and kaross maker would expect to be paid for the finished article.

As conditions began to deteriorate from 1875 onwards, it was the majority of smaller households who found themselves unable to find sufficient cash for their needs. Even during the good years, the small producers were increasingly liable to the depressing effects on prices of large harvests. Successful production did not always ensure 'prosperity'. The majority of households with under 10 sheep and only 3 cattle had to rely on their grain to provide the larger part of their commodity product. In 1868, after a particularly good harvest it was reported from Peddie:

"The people are not able to dispose of their produce to advantage, grain does not realise more than 2 shillings per 100 lbs and that can only be sold in very small quantities, the markets being overstocked; neither can they sell their stock without great sacrifice as they are only offered for good slaughter-oxen that ought to fetch 6 pounds
or 7 pounds on the markets the small sum of 3 or 4 pounds."

Large households with more than 20 or 30 sheep at least, could obtain their commodity product almost entirely from the sale of wool, leaving the whole of their grain crop for domestic consumption if necessary. The majority of small households could not do this. When the seasons turned against them they faced ruin and starvation. Those with large flocks could survive off their flocks if necessary. Those with small flocks rapidly consumed all they had. Observing this situation in 1877, Liefeldt wrote from the Ngqika location:

"the natives are still selling their sheep, one or two at a time at very low rates, viz 8 to 10 shillings each ... for the purpose of purchasing grain ... disputes about garden land do not cease, many of them resulting in blows ..."(127)

With the onset of drought the differentiating effect of plough ownership became more acute. Cultivation was highly intermittent in the 1876-77 season and the subsequent season. Only enough moisture fell to allow the actual owners of the ploughs to put in a crop. In the drought of 1875-1879 rain often fell intermittently with one or two showers over 3 or 4 weeks. These conditions particularly favoured those owners of ploughs and oxen who were able to take advantage of these conditions. (128)

This polarisation of the locations and the intrusion of monetary relations into many aspects of household production greatly enhanced the position of the Government appointed headmen, who were linked to the larger households, in the exercise of their patronage.

With the return of population, after the exodus following the cattle-killing, between 1859 and 1863, the old structure of paid chiefs with a limited number of paid councillors was superseded. They were replaced by a system of Government appointed and paid police and headmen. The appointment of such headmen was first
mentioned in 1856 and was one of the contributory causes of the cattle-killing. Only those chiefs were recognised who had been conspicuously loyal to the Colonial State. By 1863 the number so employed had grown quite large. Toise, Tshatshu, Siwani, Tyali, Anta and Kama were all chiefs who had achieved prominence by consistent adherence to the wishes of the Colonial State. In addition to these a total of 327 paid headmen had been appointed, each with responsibility for a particular "village". (129) Their number was added to as more of the population was moved into the villages.

Headmen were divided into three classes. First class headmen received up to 24 pounds per annum, second class headmen received 12 pounds per annum and the majority, who were styled third class headmen, received 6 pounds per annum for their services. After a while, the system of appointed and paid headmen started gathering a momentum of its own. Third class headmen lived in hope of becoming second class men and second class men of becoming first class men, and all were in hope of doubling their salaries.

There was a conscious policy on the part of the Colonial magistrates of appointing as headmen people with some link to the chiefly hierarchy, who in any case enjoyed a local following. They were, from the outset, all tied to the Colonial State, which dangled the carrot of the prestige and patronage of officially sanctioned powers (made important through the lack of any alternative structure) and brandished the stick of swift retribution, demotion and being cast out if they withheld perfect compliance with Colonial overlordship.

Such occasions, on which sanctions were applied against a headman who had become recalcitrant, often led to spectacular promotions. When the important first class headman Mjuza was dismissed he was replaced with a third class man, Nowane. The magistrate wrote:

"Nowane is to be promoted ... at a salary of 24 pounds per annum. He is a steady man and respected by the people and has always shown a deference and alacrity in attending to and carrying out the
orders of the Government in a manner that is highly commendable. You are probably aware that Nowane is a half-brother of the Chief Umhalla and in practice I have found men of his position serve our purposes best." (130) (emphasis added)

This indeed was the essence of the system of appointed headmen - that they should serve the Colonial State as a transmission belt for Colonial domination over the masses. The system which started here was to evolve through the 19th century and was ultimately formalised in the Native Administration Act of 1927.

The growth of the headmanship into a position of economic and political power was thus a gradual process, not something that could be done by a simple substitution. This is perhaps the crucial point to grasp. The Colonial State was not simply substituting its own appointee into a job whose definition and content remained essentially the same. The headmen were specific creatures not only of the political domination of the Colonists, but of the economic conquest of the old mode of production by Colonial capitalism. The headmen were intended to serve the interest of this system. Something of the flavour of this process of substitution was conveyed by the long-serving magistrate at Tamacha, Richard Tainton who wrote:

"As the power of the Chief declines it passes into the hands of the headmen who receive their instructions direct from the Special Magistrate. They being thus placed beyond the restraint of their chief, feel their independence and that their interests as Government Servants, which position they highly appreciate, are furthered by the extent of the efforts they put forth to carry out such measures as are entrusted to them, even if they be in direct opposition to the expressed wishes of the chief ..."(131)

The system of headmen imposed by the Colonial State ran directly counter to the power of legitimate chiefs who still wished to exercise authority over the households in accordance with their
perceptions of the old mode of production of the Xhosa social formation, which was rapidly becoming a thing of the past. Although Maqoma, Seyolo, Phato, Mhalla and others were jailed on Robben Island and released in the late 1860s (only Maqoma was rejailed in 1873) there were many among their senior councillors and followers who held the same expectation as Tainton and the physical presence of their chiefs did not deter them from holding such views.

In the 1860s and 70s the magistrates wished to assist the growth of the headmen into a stable class of allies of the Colonial State. There was no uniform set of duties for which the headmen were responsible. Under Act 10 of 1876 the Governor was empowered to make any regulations deemed necessary for the Government of the locations. In terms of this Act most magistrates developed their own ad hoc rules. In response to an official inquiry instituted by Brownlee, E.A. Judge, the magistrate at Queenstown, submitted the following list of responsibilities which he considered to rest with the headmen generally.

1) The fair and equitable distribution of land suitable for cultivation.
2) The condition upon which fixed and permanent improvements could be disposed of.
3) The prevention of the spread of contagious diseases amongst cattle.
4) The destruction of the plant known as Xanthium Spinosum or Burr weed.
5) The protection of survey beacons.
6) The prevention of the practice of burning the grass.
7) Ensuring the compulsory education of children under the age of 14 years, in the case of people living on mission stations.
8) The suppression of immoral rites and practices.
9) To see that all persons bringing any stock into the headman's section, or driving any stock through it, were provided with proper passes for the same.
10) Responsibility for the collection of hut tax.
11) To arrest anyone reasonably suspected of having committed any crime in the headman's section.
12) To settle amicably all matters of dispute not involving any criminal charge, that might come before him. (132)

From this list of duties it is apparent that these headmen were given much scope within which to exercise their new influence and patronage. In particular the allocation of garden land, the collection of hut tax and the control over the movement of stock, gave the headman considerable personal discretion as to how actively he enforced the letter of his master's wishes.

Of particular importance were the duties of the headmen in regard to the movement of stock. Their duties in this regard were defined by the Cattle Removal Act, No. 14 of 1870. This Act required that a certificate for the removal of stock beyond ten miles from their normal place be obtained, stating the date, the name of the owner, the number and description (in detail) of the stock to be removed, the name of the place from which they were being removed and to which place they were being sent and the names of the drivers of the stock. This certificate was to be issued by any official of the State or any landowner and had to be produced on demand. Any discrepancy between stock in a traveller's possession and that stated on the certificate could lead to the impounding of the stock. These requirements therefore removed the one important improvement that black people had enjoyed with the issue of the Certificates of Citizenship.

This was a very comprehensive measure and was clearly aimed at black citizens, because the Act was only to apply to certain districts over which it was proclaimed. Its provisions would have required tight control and observation of the movement of stock at the local level. Obviously the co-operation of the headmen would be essential and it presented the headmen with the greatest opportunity to aid the ambitions of their fellows by non-reporting of suspect cattle movements. As shall be seen,
there is evidence that the headmen were fully aware of the opportunities their position now offered them.

The Special Magistrate at King William's Town gave a good description of how the sale and transport of stock was affected by this act.

"On application for a note to sell any cattle I require them to be produced here and the headman has to attend also. He then has to declare what he knows about them and is informed that he will be responsible should any enquiry be made. If cattle are to be removed from one place to another no pass is granted until they have been certified by the headmen and the description minutely taken down and in most instances the cattle are produced here ..."

[133]

Liefeldt also claimed that he strictly enforced the Cattle Removal Act, requiring every person removing stock more than 10 miles from his place of residence to have a pass for such stock. [134]

In this period the headmen were still an unstable group. Two aspects of the headmanship indicate the independence that it began to enjoy. The headmanship was in the first place linked to the rest of the households of the headman's village and more especially to the successful accumulators amongst them. The headman could not act independently of the real circumstances of the households. Secondly, the headmanship was seen by the incumbents as a hereditary portfolio in which a son of a headman would expect to take over from his father if the latter died or was incapacitated. This very soon became the practice.

The second aspect was really another facet of the first, i.e. the emergence of the headmanship as a hereditary portfolio underlined the fact that it was closely interrelated with the rest of the households of the location. References continually occur in which, on the death of a headman, requests were made for the appointment of one of his sons as his successor. In 1877 when
Rose Innes recommended the appointment of 'Mema' son of the deceased Headman Nxopo, he described this as "the general practice". (135)

This could give rise to obvious factional disputes with sons of an aged headman disputing the succession. The building up of strongly opposed factions became a common feature of the headmanship right from its beginnings. On the death of headman Gala in the Ngqika locations, his younger son Mhlasa assumed his place in the absence of his elder brother Hili. On his brother's return a dispute arose about the headmanship. In the end both were recognised as headmen, Mhlasa at 9 pounds per annum and Hili at 6 pounds. The dispute continued with growing intensity over the discrepancy in pay, which favoured the younger son. Liefeldt ultimately reversed the salaries of the two brothers in order to appease what he saw as popular feeling on the matter. (136) As this small incident reveals, the choice of paid headmen was not totally in the magistrate's hands. In fact there were certain households whose most senior members had to be appointed because of their dominant position in the location. There were others who despite repeated misdemeanours could not easily be dismissed.

It is not surprising that many of those appointed as headmen had their own perceptions of how to respond to the conflicting demands of their place in the Colonial State apparatus. Fielding, at Middledrift, where he had the most co-operative headmen, observed:

"If a headman is found neglecting his duty, he is either fined or dismissed. Paid headmen in a District give great assistance if they are kept in order, and there is no difficulty in obtaining them at one pound per month. The headmen are responsible for every act that takes place, and he and his family form a party for good and keep the evil- disposed in check. Numbers of them are daily growing in wealth ..." (137)

Typically a headman was dismissed for being "not impartial in his dealings, not reporting matters which he knows of and not supporting Quit Rent collection." (130)
Headmen were continually being fined small amounts, for example 2 shillings and sixpence or 8 shillings and 4 pence, for "neglect of duty" which covered such things as allowing people to cultivate and build on the commonage and the non-registration of cattle being removed from the location. Clearly the headmen were fully aware of what they were about, and the noticing or not noticing of minor infringements of the law could be of crucial assistance to households who benefited from the headman's co-operation.

In Tamacha district Tainton encouraged the headmen to settle civil cases. All cases could come on appeal to him if either party was dissatisfied with the headman's decision. This increased the power of the headman and it was only a short step from here to receiving court fees, retaining part of any compensation payment ordered by the court and ultimately to the trying of criminal cases as well. Anyone who considered an appeal against a headman's decision would remember that they might require his co-operation in the future! A report from Keiskamma Hoek confirmed that this was occurring. The magistrate found:

"That some headmen had been setting up a little court of their own, in their respective locations, fining people and reaping the benefit of these fines."

(139)

Judge, writing on conditions in Glen Grey in 1879 found:

"there are several petty chiefs, who are also Government headmen who seem to over-estimate their own importance and try to get others to do the same of them."

(140)

It is not entirely clear that they were in fact 'over-estimating their importance'. When Mabanhla at Middledrift became unable to carry on as headman, his son Bovani was immediately appointed as his successor. (141) In Middledrift there were signs of an increasingly organised approach by the headmen. 35 headmen from Kama's tribe petitioned Fielding for an increase in pay "in consequence of the rise of prices of provisions and other articles required by themselves and their families." (142) The Mfengu headmen enjoyed even greater powers than their Xhosa counterparts.
Men like Mabandhla, Joseph Williams and Jafta were supreme within their own locations. They were all conspicuously well-off and could afford to extend considerable patronage over the poorer households of the location. Chalmers, recommending the Izeli headmen's petition for a salary increase of 5 pounds per annum, wrote:

"These headmen are entrusted with certain responsibilities and duties, such as collecting Hut Tax and giving all information relative to the state of the villages under them. The revenue derived from the Izeli district since January 1870 is 700 pounds 16 shillings and 1 penny and its collection had been through the assistance of the headmen." (143)

Inevitably, supporting and facilitating the hut tax collection was an important function of the headmen. It was made all the more crucial by the introduction of Act No. 2 of 1869, "making provision for the collection of Hut Tax." This Act allowed for the seizure of property in the event of non-payment of hut tax. With the introduction of this Act, the headman gained the power to overlook unpaid hut tax for longer or shorter periods of time. He could, and did, exercise patronage in terms of this Act. Indeed the necessity of his doing so was emphasized by Chalmers at Tamacha. He pointed out the uneven distribution of stock, and reported that he had frequently come across cases of households which had "no property liable to be seized, as there are many instances of natives having no stock." (144) While Chalmers recommended forced service on the roads or other works as an alternative to payment of taxes, it is safe to assume that many of these households would have expected, and received, the assistance of the headman in overlooking their arrears.

Everywhere there were large arrears of hut tax. Considering that this was a period of relative 'prosperity' the arrears require some explanation. Liefeldt reported in 1869 that he was collecting only 30 or 40 pounds per month instead of the expected 145 pounds. To remedy this situation he proposed to seize stock
from those who had not paid. (145) In Tamacha, in 1865, nearly 1000 pounds of hut tax was unpaid. (146) Despite the good years between 1865 and 1875, by the latter year arrears had reached at least 2418 pounds in Tamacha district. (147) The reason for this was that many people resisted paying simply for ideological reasons and others for the purely economic reason that they had not the cash to pay. Generally at least 20% of the hut tax went uncollected.

Only in Keiskamma Hoek and in the Middledrift locations were results much better, with nearly all the tax being collected. There was some correlation between the ownership of sheep and the payment of taxes. Most households tried to rely on the sale of wool or sheep to meet the tax. From Glen Grey it was reported that "they are dependent upon the sale of their wool for money to pay their hut tax." (148) In districts with a highly uneven distribution of sheep this had obvious limitations. Sometimes, however, headmen resorted to the use of the force of the Colonial State to collect hut tax. In January 1875, 20 men of Sobi's location were fined 10 shilling each "for refusing to obey the orders of the Headman Sobi to pay their hut tax because Sobi reported Tyatangu for practising rain-making at his village." (149)

Sobi, like all headmen, was caught in the dual allegiance to the State and to the people he lived with. His allegiance to the latter was defined by his class position amongst them, and his allegiance to the former by a mixture of opportunism, deception, fear and brute necessity. Most headmen aimed to keep the State off their backs whilst continuing to draw the salary and enjoy official recognition, and to maximise their position in terms of the complexities of status, power and patronage within the location itself. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the Ngqika location under Sandille. A consideration of his position will illuminate the struggles of the time that culminated in the Rebellion of 1878.
The creation of a class of collaborators, which seemed to promise such a fair solution to the Colonial problem of how to extend authority over the conquered people, met with one major obstacle - the presence in the Ciskei of Sandille. His stature and authority was enhanced by the removal and final ruin of Maqoma, Mhalla and Phato - Great Chiefs, superior to him in years and reputation and equal in rank. Sandille was now undisputed leader of the Xhosa in the Ciskei. By his diplomatic vacillations in the cattle-killing he had avoided arrest and imprisonment and the Colonial State had no grounds for deposing him. More than to anyone else, the period 1865-1879 belongs to Sandille, and saw him at the height of his power.

Like other chiefs, Sandille desired to escape Colonial overlordship and his chance came in an unexpected way. In 1868, as part of the general cost-saving campaign by the State, it was announced that Charles Brownlee was being transferred from the Ngqika location to the district of Somerset. In his place Thomas Liefeldt was installed as 'Clerk in Charge' of the Government office in the Ngqika location at about half Brownlee's salary.

Brownlee has given his own sentimental account of his departure from Tembani, his headquarters in the Ngqika location for over 12 years. This was a low point in Brownlee's career, he felt overlooked in not having been appointed Chief Magistrate at King William's Town. His sentiments are probably best expressed in the words attributed to the venerable councillor Tyala, spoken at the large gathering assembled to say farewell to him:

"What we want to know is - is there an instance in which a man of your position was promoted in the manner in which you state you are promoted? Who was ever sent to the Colony to be a magistrate from being a Gaika Chief?" (151)
To which Brownlee added a silent "hear hear". But, as Brownlee himself recognised, Sandille was elated. Brownlee's removal undoubtedly was a great relief for Sandille and it destroyed at a stroke the large network of informers that only Brownlee, who had lived in the area all his life, could command.

In the interval between 1867 and 1877 when the Ngqika location was included under the jurisdiction of the newly created district of Stutterheim, the only source of information concerning the 30 000 people of the Ngqika district was from the clerk Liefeldt. After the initial difficulties that beset him when he first took over, Liefeldt consistently covered up the true state of things in the location. The truth only emerged with the transfer of authority from Liefeldt to Wright, the newly appointed magistrate at Stutterheim ten years later.

On assuming his duties in 1868 Liefeldt found that:

"it was the general opinion and hope of the Gaikas that by making an effort, they might find themselves freed from much of the constraint imposed upon and tyranny (so called by them) exercised over them by the Government." (152)

In fact there was a general boycott of Liefeldt's office, "Sandille having forbidden any of his tribe from attending at the office on any purpose whatsoever." (153) This also effectively prevented Liefeldt from collecting the hut tax.

In response to this situation he wrote a very confused report in which he claimed that Sandille's power was broken and at the same time acknowledged that in cases of assault, adultery, rape, theft and land matters the people preferred to go to Sandille. (154) In fact Sandille had a big advantage over Liefeldt, he could (illegally) try cases and execute his judgement for which he received some payment (in the form of a share of the fine in cattle that was usually imposed). Liefeldt, being only a clerk, had no power to try criminal cases. If any plaintiff referred a case to him, he had to take down all the particulars and forward the whole case to King William's Town. This involved plaintiff,
defendant, and witnesses, together with the exhibits, in making a trek of up to 70 or 80 miles and back. Clearly there was every reason simply to take the matter to Sandille.

Liefeldt thought he had broken Sandille's injunction against attendance at the Government office, and regained his authority with the completion of the issue of the 'Certificates of Citizenship' which was entrusted to him. The hundreds that thronged his office at Tembani to receive their certificates convinced Liefeldt that he had broken the boycott. The Ngqika were naturally eager to have them, having suffered under the British Kaffrarian pass law and were well aware of the advantages bestowed by the certificates, having long engaged in the practice of hiring certificates from Mfengu. It is no doubt true that, not wishing to have a confrontation with Liefeldt, Sandille surrendered on one or two occasions certain cattle he had appropriated as court fees and fines in the settlement of disputes and cases that he was not legally entitled to try. These contributed to Liefeldt's conviction that he was truly in charge, and that Sandille's power was broken.

In his report of October 1868 Liefeldt gives some indication of what was actually happening. It is known that in 1868 about 1,500 young men were initiated into adulthood along with one of Sandille's sons. (155) There was now stronger pressure than ever on Sandille to make some provision for them in the location. Sandille was therefore engaging in the sort of struggle which chiefs in constrained circumstances had always done - sideling the old councillors and wherever possible deposing them and confiscating their cattle, and favouring new councillors from amongst his supporters.

Liefeldt's remark that Sandille's councillors were a "gang of witless characters brought to influence by himself" indicates clearly that Sandille had managed to get rid of many of those older councillors who had been so prominent in restraining him at the time of the cattle-killing. (156) The record of events was not, however, to support Liefeldt on the "witlessness" of the new councillors. Sandille was now firmly supported by the younger
generation who wished to secure their own future, and was thus bound to go some way to meet their expectations. Liefeldt observed the steps being taken against the older councillors, and the operation of Sandille's court and commented:

"Some of the older natives have an innate adherence to and dread of the chief, and will rather submit to the punishments inflicted upon them without a murmur than come to report the grievance to me."

(157)

Liefeldt, exercising that dissimulating disingenuousness that only anxious Civil Servants are capable of, admitted, in his reports, his lack of authority in the location, while at the same time claiming complete supremacy:

"The greater part of the tribe clearly see the benefits of declaring themselves British subjects and are heart and soul on the Governments side, but do not openly avow it, or too freely show it."

(158)

Ten years later as the "greater part of the tribe" was preparing to go "heart and soul" into rebellion, Wright, the magistrate at Stutterheim who was then in charge of Sandille's location wrote:

"I had not been long in charge when I found that I had little or no power except such as I might exert through Sandille, and that even the headmen although receiving salaries from Government were not willing to act on my orders without first referring to Sandille, thus showing the extent to which the authority over his people had gradually slipped into his hands."

(159)

Brownlee subsequently recalled that from the time of his departure as Ngqika magistrate, Sandille was actively engaged in re-organising the location and regaining his position:

"Sandille rapidly regained most of the authority he had lost. Men who had steadily ignored his authority and who had long stood by the magistrate, at once on his (i.e Brownlee J.L.) removal
considered it necessary to make their peace with Sandille by paying court to him, for they remembered that, in 1851, almost the first action of Sandille after the outbreak, was to reverse all decisions which had been given by the Gaika Commissioner during the four previous years." (160)

Neither Brownlee nor Liefeldt, in their submissions, indicate why the older men who had previously ignored Sandille now sought him out, or quietly accepted the deprivation they had to suffer. Sandille had the support of thousands of young men of the location. It was the pressure of this rapidly swelling younger faction which, when combined with the drought of 1875-77, was ultimately to lead to rebellion, ruin and death for Sandille.

In fact Liefeldt represented little obstacle to Sandille and he was able to contain the growth of the headman's position and adapt it to his own requirements. Between 1867 and 1877 Sandille enjoyed his greatest power and the height of his chieftainship.

In 1869 Liefeldt undertook an extensive journey around the locations, visiting all areas and meeting most people of importance. He took a fairly careful census (see Tables 4.4 (ii) and 5.4 (i)) and also produced an original map of the location, (see Figure 1). (161) Although nominally organised into 'villages' most of the people in Sandille's location were in fact in loose groups of homesteads. Because of the high density of population, (at least 34 per square mile, but in fact much higher than that because large parts of the location were uninhabitable), homesteads had to be less spread out than was ideal for the placement of arable lands and stock.

Liefeldt's tour of inspection revealed 82 "lessor locations treated as villages". Each 'village' had a paid headman appointed over it. The 'villages' consisted of an average of 9 homesteads. The 'village' headmen were selected from these heads of homesteads and each homestead had about 6 households. On this basis there were 738 homesteads and over 4,400 households. Liefeldt's
FIGURE I

SKETCH OF DISTRICT UNDER TITLELOT, INCURRED WITH SANDILLS, 1884.

SANDILLS LOCATION
UPPER KAGGELOW CROWN LANDS
AT PRELIMINARY SURVEY

Granite 10 District
(Memorial of Shareholders, Owners, Buyers, and Dwellers)

Huguenor Road
Railway Station
Forest

Scale 10 Miles to an Inch

SANDILLS LOCATION

TRANSEKIAN PINEGROVE

European Grantees

LEUPANO

September 1887.

T. P. Cas. (Ind.)
estimates are of some interest. In Table 5.4 (i) the number of households is given as 6,953. This figure is taken from the Census of 1869 and is the number of adult males. Every adult male was counted as a household. At a rough approximation there could have been up to 2,453 unmarried young men in the location, which would have indicated a potentially explosive situation politically. The rapid increase in population, and particularly of young adults, posed severe problems in providing them with suitable sites for the establishment of homesteads and arable lots.

Between 1867 and 1879 Liefeldt had to change his list of paid headmen six times. In 1869 there were 5 paid councillors of Sandille who received 18 pounds per annum each, 13 'first class' headmen at 12 pounds per annum, 12 'second class' headmen at 9 pounds each, and 40 'third class' headmen at 6 pounds per annum. This made an establishment of 71, including Sandille. In addition, Liefeldt also had 42 policemen who were directly under his command. Fearing impending staff cuts, because of the Government's desire to curb expenditure, Liefeldt recommended that while any of the paid headmen might be removed, the police could not be spared. (162)

In August 1871, after poor hut tax returns had been received, Liefeldt decided to alter the list of paid headmen "as a means of securing more assistance in the collection of hut tax". (163) He proceeded to sack 16 of the headmen and to demote most of the rest, hoping to bring his new appointees more securely under his control. Liefeldt's report on the performance of the headmen indicates that there was considerable movement of population between the areas of the various headmen. In 1876, eighteen months before the outbreak of the rebellion, he was forced to change his list of headmen twice.

Of course the true reflection of the effectiveness of the headmen was the collection of the hut tax. While Liefeldt claimed that hut tax collection was highly effective, the reverse appears to have been the case. In 1869 he estimated the hut tax to be collected at 1,750 pounds, which would have meant that 10 shillings
was to be paid by the 3,500 "hut owners", (households). In that year he only managed to collect about 480 pounds (164). After that Liefeldt alone, of all the magistrates, failed to render an estimate of his expected tax collection. In 1871 and 1872 no tax was collected at all. With the strict application by his police force of the law on seizure of stock, 637 pounds was collected in 1873 and this rose to 991 pounds in 1875. At its height, tax collection was never more than about 56% of the amount owing, compared to a collection rate of 70 to 80% elsewhere. (165)

Sandille began gradually to assume more of his old judicial powers and this became more obvious with the departure of Brownlee. In 1873 he initiated a strong revival of the custom of 'isizi', or death dues, whereby a portion of the stock of any person at his death was taken by the Chief. As many of the older, richer, heads of households were dying off at this time it was a most opportune move. (166) In terms of Sandille's responsibilities to his younger supporters and new councillors this move would have enjoyed considerable popularity, for it gave him the means to exercise patronage over the poor of the location.

The increasing prominence of Sandille was observable to all (except perhaps Liefeldt). Whereas in the 1850s and early 60s the people had tolerated the missionaries in their political and proselytising functions, now Rose Innes saw clearly:

"The great reaction which has taken place within the past few years with reference to the Gospel. Whereas before they were a willing people, now they may be said as a nation to have turned a deaf ear to its pleadings." (167)

Whereas previously itinerant missionaries had formed "out stations" in the areas around the main mission stations, where they found they could always gather a congregation on a Sunday, now they found that:

"it is no unusual sight now to see sheep-shearing and hoeing, ox-racing and hut making, kraal building and spans of oxen going to the Qacu forest for bushes to mend the cattle pens on that one day in
seven which ought to bring earth into closest
communion with heaven." (168)
For the Xhosa, clearly, present earthly communion was more
important than heavenly reward.

Sandille's authority was most clearly displayed over the question
of stock theft, still as much a matter of controversy in 1869 as
it had been in 1809. Sandille bluntly told Liefeldt that the
Government expected chiefs and headmen to put down stock theft,
but deprived them of the power to do so. His hands were being
tied by the magisterial system. His people, he told Liefeldt,
think very little of imprisonment for stock theft when their
(stolen) stock is thriving at home. (169)

Sandille skilfully used this argument to try to pressure the
Colonial State into recognising the full legitimate powers of his
chieftainship. He argued that unless he was allowed to
appropriate cattle as fines, he could not have sufficient power to
suppress stock theft. There is no doubt that in connection with
other types of crime he was already appropriating stock in fines.
He only declined to do so for the benefit of the Colonists. He
returned continually to this theme, and in a dramatic conflict
with Liefeldt in 1874 over the question of stock theft, told him
with admirable sarcasm:

"Did the Government not say "Multiply sheep"? We
have done so. How? We have stolen them! Give us
our old law, give us spoor and we will trace it,
failing which we will pay, as was our custom from
childhood. You say stealing is enormously on the
increase. Why? Because Government favours it. A
thief takes 50 or 60 sheep or 8 or 10 cattle, he
hides them away, he is convicted, he gets a few
years work, eats bread and meat, is punished with
clothes and a blanket! His stock, private and
stolen, is meantime increasing - he is released, he
is comparatively a rich man! Does Government hope
to put a stop to stealing in that manner? Could
the man have earned the stock in the same period
by honest labour - NO! Let us have our old law; we did not know it was dead, the Government told us so. Eat the thief up, totally, leave him nothing, then stealing may stop; now, never ... What did I say when Government sent me a message on the same subject before? I said the same words. Government replied "the people must now be judged by English law." English law requires the person of the thief only, and not his property ..." (170)

As Sandille was not known as an orator, this well-constructed statement (from the "witless characters" in Sandille's council!) suggests a man increasingly confident of himself and his powers. The bitterly sarcastic tone of the statement is a valuable indication of the state of relationships between the Ngqika and the Colony at this time.

The political conditions existed within the Ngqika locations, and in the Tamacha district, to foster rebellion. To complete the picture required only the reverses suffered in the 1875-1877 drought particularly in sheep and cattle holdings (see Table 5.4. iii above). In July 1877 many reports were received of general crop failure and real hardship through drought. (171) Because the drought was punctuated with intermittent rains, however, its effects were uneven - affecting some locations more than others. The high-lying areas were worst affected. The best statement of the consequences of the drought came from Herschel where it was reported in July 1877:

"Owing to the very late rains of 1876 few of the Natives ploughed to the extent they had been in the habit of doing, and many not at all. Some who sowed late found the ground so dry that the seed did not germinate. Scarcity was feared and 1 600 more passes were granted between January and June 29th than in the corresponding months of any previous year. However the harvest was better than expected and they are selling mealies and Kafir corn to the traders at about 15 shillings per muid, several of whom have large stocks of grain. There
will not be more than half of the usual quantity of grain gathered this season which may be generally sufficient for food but not for beer or sale, as freely as in other years." (172)

This observation may be interpreted as meaning that while some people had no harvest at all, and others only half their normal harvest, because prices were relatively high at 15 shillings per muid, many were selling grain that they would require later for consumption purposes. These households, and of course those with no grain at all, were being forced to turn to the railway works or Colonial farms in search of work.

From all districts the reports were similar. In Keiskamma Hoek, while those villages whose arable land was situated on the east slopes achieved fair crops, others received nothing and had to rely on purchasing grain. (173) From Middledrift (Kama's location) it was reported that the livestock was sufficient to ensure that the people did not starve, but no crops were reaped. (174) Kama's people were selling their sheep to obtain money for grain in such quantities that "even sheep offered at 10 shillings per head, worth fully 15 shillings each, could find no buyers at Middledrift last week." (175) The people were selling or eating the fruits of previous accumulation. In Sandille's location itself, Liefeldt estimated the crop at "just above half the amount usually raised" and noted that, as in Herschel, "some parts have been fruitful and others perfectly barren. Were they not to sell, I think there would be sufficient for all requirements." (176)

By phrasing it in the negative in this way Liefeldt made it clear that the people were to sell. The reason why, he supplied himself. The critical grain scarcity in other adjacent areas had driven the price up to as high as 27 shillings per muid, whereas not more than 10 or 12 shillings was usually obtained. These high prices were tempting people to sell. As has repeatedly been emphasised, the Ciskeian household in the 1860s and 70s was not a peasant household that could "withdraw into its shell" when the going got rough. It was increasingly integrated with the growing
capitalist economy of the Colony as a whole. Such sales, which were really unavoidable, reduced the amount of grain available for domestic consumption.

The Tamacha district was less severely affected by the drought in 1877. As the drought extended into 1878 Dick (who had replaced Tainton who had been killed in the rebellion) reported:

"the effects of the drought which has prevailed during the last three years has reduced their prosperity considerably." (177)

By the end of 1878 he described the effects of the drought as having led to a:

"very large diminution of the wealth of the natives ... small stock in particular have disappeared almost entirely and their herds of cattle are greatly reduced." (178)

This is borne out by reference to Table 5.4. iii above. It is thus clearly shown that the precarious position of most producers quickly drove them from what passed for a period of relative 'prosperity' to one of poverty and starvation.

The response of most households to the grain scarcity was to live off their stock - both as a source of food and a source of cash. It was reported from Anta's location that:

"All the hammers (sheep) have been slaughtered or sold off and at ridiculously low prices - goats have been kept for milking - ewe sheep are now being killed and sold at ruinous prices. Cattle, I estimate are being slaughtered and sold at the rate of 30 to 40 per day - sheep at over 50 to 60 per day. A sheep (when slaughtered) lasts an average family 1 day, and a beast for 3 to 4 days, as they receive any amount of gratuitous assistance in polishing off the flesh from outsiders. This causes a great sale of cattle at low prices. 50 to 60 shillings are received for an ox." (179)
With the money obtained from the sale of cattle and sheep, people were daily coming into the town of Cathcart and purchasing bread. Up to 600 loaves were being sold daily as well as 3 or 4 bags of flour. The result was that a "great number" were applying for passes to go in search of work.

The coming of the rebellion had been foreseen by Richard Tainton, who was one of the leading Colonials to be killed in it. In August 1876 he wrote an impassioned appeal to Brownlee informing him of impeccable information that he had received that "war is being agitated." (180) This contradicted the conclusions which Brownlee had reached after he had been told earlier by Sandille that:

"I am the Chief of the Gaikas, If I say the Gaikas are not to go to war, no one will dare say they shall; if anyone should presume to do so it will be at his peril." (181)

Brownlee, who had already come under adverse criticism, did not want to believe rumours of a rebellion and delivered a ministerial rebuke to Tainton (via Rose Innes) questioning his judgement in such matters. (182)

Far from lying low, Tainton wrote back, the day after receiving his official rebuke, saying that Sandille had recently addressed a crowd and told them that the "English people are in a fix, they are granting pensions now ... the Englishman is evidently trying to gain the confidence of the people by these means, little thinking that heaven and earth are met this year." (183) Sandille said that while all was ready for war, it would not begin until "the white man gave them an opportunity, as the Kaffirs wished to throw the blame of a war between the races on the English and make them the aggressive party." (184)

To this somewhat obscure oration Tainton added more pertinently:

"They are agreed not to put up with what they consider our oppression any longer ... If we believe that the Ordinary Kaffir is satisfied with our rule, we are living under a delusion, the
Kaffir has at one time been subdued but never conquered and he has always viewed his hunting grounds now dotted over by the houses of the white man with a jealous eye, and now he is armed feels the time is fast drawing near to try and recover the territory he says Sir G. Grey unjustly deprived him of while in a starving condition and not able to resist." (185)

Tainton lived just long enough to see himself proved right and Brownlee finally discredited! His information has a ring of truth to it. As magistrate at Tamacha with Siwani, Toise and Tyalli he would have had many excellent sources of information on proceedings at Sandille's kraal. That the loss of territory after the cattle-killing is brought up as the motive for rebellion is highly plausible. However the occupiers of the land taken at that time were nearly as many Mfengu as Colonists. It was therefore not surprising that it was ultimately against the Mfengu, and particularly against such leaders of the migration to the Transkei as Veldtman Bakitsha, that rebellion led by Sarhili began late in 1877. As Tainton in his last report stated:

"Sympathy does to a great extent exist amongst all the native tribes in favour of Kreli and his people, as the war is not considered to be between the English and the Kafirs but between the Kafirs and Fingoes." (186)

According to the popular version of the outbreak of the rebellion it began as a consequence of an argument at a beer drink at Ngcayecibi's homestead on the 3rd August 1877 near Butterworth (Fingoland). Brownlee's inept handling of this local event, by moving the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (F.A.M.P.) to Butterworth, precipitated a Gcaleka attack on the police on the 22nd August. It had been as Sandille had predicted - that the war would not come until the Government was shown to be the aggressor. (187)
Initially the Ngqika in the Ciskei were not involved in the rebellion. However a pattern soon emerged in which eminent Gcaleka participants and their followers took refuge with Sandille. Thus the Ngqika were drawn into the fight. When refugees arrived at Sandille’s, the F.A.M.P. launched hot pursuit raids into the Ngqika location to kill or capture them. Wright, the new magistrate at Stutterheim, met with Sandille and was told:

"Why does the Government treat me like this when I am taking the part of a neutral in this war? When refugees come to me why does not the Government demand them from me instead of sending in pursuit?"

To which Wright replied:

"Government holds the right of pursuing their enemies even among independent tribes, much more so among the Gaikas who are subjects." (188)

This culminated in the arrival from across the Kei of Kiva, a brilliant Gcaleka guerilla fighter who had been harassing the enemy. Wright was again sent to Sandille to find out if he was prepared to give Kiva up. Sandille replied:

"Kiva is here. I have sent to him to know what he is doing; when I get the word of the tribe regarding Kiva, I will come and tell you." (189)

Sandille wished the Government to hold back any punitive raid in search of Kiva until a meeting had been called, and the tribe had given its verdict on whether to surrender him or not. He asked for one day's postponement of any action by the Government. In response to Wright's query as to why everyone in the location was bearing arms, he was told by Sandille:

"It is the usual thing, we learnt these things from the Government who are constantly drilling their men under arms." (190)

The meeting of the tribe was duly held. Wright arrived and was told by the old councillor Tyalla that the tribe had decided:

"Kiva is to return from where he came. Messengers are to go at once to Kiva with the word of the tribe to this effect. Sandille was sincere in
saying he wished to sit still. Fingoes had crossed the Kei and seized cattle. Gaikas followed the Fingoes and recaptured the cattle and burnt huts. Sandille wished the Government would keep the Fingoes quiet." (192)

In the first week of January sporadic clashes had occurred between Mfengu volunteers, under F.A.M.P. command, and the Gcaleka and isolated groups of Ngqika. Sandille distanced himself from these exchanges. Wright, on instructions from Brownlee, told Sandille that if he had nothing to do with it, he must separate himself from such people, come away from them and "give himself over to Government". This was to be part of Colonial policy in crushing the rebellion. A general order was given to all Ngqika who did not wish to participate in the war, to "at once separate themselves from the disaffected." (193)

The general insurrection began in the Ngqika location with the seizure of 274 cattle and 2,600 sheep and goats from a Mfengu party at Emgwali Mission station on the 31st December 1877. Sandille's son Matanzima was prominent in this action and in other subsequent attacks.

Fort Cunynghame became the meeting place for those who wished to remain under Colonial protection. Altogether 1,447 men registered. Some of those registering were with the rebellion and had put the cattle in charge for safe-keeping. The non combatants had with them 9,911 cattle, 20,175 sheep and 5,646 goats. The final tally of "loyal Gaikas" registered at Fort Cunynghame and at Emgwali Mission station was 1,722 men with 11,023 cattle, 25,582 sheep and 6,702 goats. (194) Wright closed his report on the registration with the reassurance that:

"they have been told employment will be given to natives on the Railway works. This was merely an introduction to the subject which I shall take care shall not be lost sight of." (195)

With this development Sandille, could no longer afford to separate
himself from the fortunes of his people, a fact Wright and Brownlee must have been well aware of when they demanded he register himself as a non-combatant. (196) Sandille was forced into the fighting by the Government's policy of splitting his people into "loyal" and "rebellious" factions.

With a force of over one thousand men Sandille fought bravely between January and May 1878. Sometime late in May, possibly the 29th, with a party of 30 men, he was shot. Wright was informed on the 8th June by J.F. Cuming that:

"Sandille and Dukwana were shot at the same time along with others in the bush above the Isidenge. The Fingoes stripped Sandille of his blankets and bag and left the body, not knowing that it was that of Sandille. His followers afterwards came and carrying it away buried it. He was buried near where he was shot. The Reds are beginning to shave their heads in accordance with the custom when the Chief is dead." (197)

Altogether 3 680 Xhosa were killed in the war and 45 336 cattle captured. (198) Not even 2 000 prisoners were taken, showing the ferocity with which the rebellion was crushed. The fatality rate was very high, with nearly half of all Xhosa combatants perishing. Among the dead were Sandille, Kiva and Seyola. The majority from Siwani's and Kama's locations were actively in support of the rebellion, proving that the two leading collaborating chiefs lacked political support. By a strange coincidence, all the important collaborating chiefs died of natural causes between the years 1878 and 1879.

Maqoma's son Tyini, Maphassa's son Gungubele, Sandille's sons Gonya, Mdthanzima, Guma, Mlinduzwe and Ndimba who had all fought, were captured. They were subsequently tried for high treason in King William's Town on the 23rd October 1978. Only Tyini Maqoma was sentenced to death. Gonya was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and the others all received lesser sentences. Tyini was subsequently reprieved, after a petition for commutation of
sentence was received - heavily supported by the influential Boucher family and by Rawstone, the previous Colonial Secretary.

Thus by 1880 all significant chiefs from the great generation of the Xhosa resistance, and the transformation of their society from 1829 to 1879, were dead. The economic collapse of 1875 to 1879 had revealed the fragility of the ten 'prosperous' years from 1865 to 1875. The decision of the Colonial State on the future was clear:

"Those who had abused their privileges and having not only neglected their opportunity of improvement, but having for no cause whatever gone into rebellion, such men should now forfeit any claim they might have had to live in the location or to receive an allotment of land. They (must) take service and live as servants until they accumulate sufficient property to hire land and again become masters." (199)

This statement reveals an interesting perception. It did not exclude the possibility of black land-ownership. Indeed it seems to recognise that black landholding was an integral part of the Colonial economy. However it had to be either as a worker or a farmer that blacks would be engaged as part of capitalist relations of production, and not as a community of households and homesteads with their own economic and political interrelationships amongst themselves.

The Ngqika location was abolished, its lands being given out as farms to Colonists and incorporated into the district of Stutterheim. Brownlee was the strongest advocate of the expulsion over the Kei of the Ngqika and all those who had been in rebellion. Smarting under the palpable failure of his judgement and the knowledge of his imminent dismissal from the cabinet, he blindly attacked the Xhosa.

"their habits and manner of life debar them from full privileges of citizenship which are the heritage of
all - without distinction of race or colour - who have adopted civilised habits and who have transposed their allegiance from their Chief to our Government. We have a favourable opportunity for introducing a change. By depriving all who have been in rebellion of their Certificates of Citizenship and issuing no more certificates except to such as by their good conduct and adoption of civilized habits manifest their fitness to enjoy the privileges of citizenship." (200)
(1) Kaffrarian Recorder, 15th August 1863. The Kaffrarian Recorder and its successor The Kaffrarian were both based in East London, were edited by Theal, and produced, without doubt, some of the most racist copy to be seen in the Colonial Press.

(2) Rush, D.W. 'Aspects of the Growth of Trade and the Development of the Ports in the Cape Colony 1795-1882.' Unpublished M.A. Thesis U.C.T. (1972) p. 42. The sharp decline in wine exports was due to the final withdrawal of the Imperial Preference. 'Other' exports included Ostrich feathers and mohair, which were booming. The exports of hides and skins included under this heading were worth 157 293 pounds in 1868 and 305 575 pounds in 1880. See ibid.

(3) Ibid. p. 45 and p. 185.

(4) Ibid. p. 41.


(6) Ibid. p. 140.

(7) Ibid. p. 142.

(8) Ibid. p. 167.

(9) Ibid. p. 267.


This, however, was not because of the rebellion as it will be seen that exports through East London, the area most closely affected by the rebellion, retained their previous share of the total exports. The big cutback in production was on the big Midlands sheep farms.

Act No. 23 of 1857 "An Act far more effectively preventing Kafirs from entering the Colony without passes." See Laws and Regulations of British Kaffraria. (Cape Town) 1869.

Ibid. Act No. 24 of 1857.


Ibid.


H.A. 64/1270. Return of certificates of citizenship issued since the coming into operation of Act 17 of 1864. Act 27 of 1857, which defined the operation of Act 24 of 1857, was repealed by this Act which incorporated the whole of the previous two Acts and refined them by stipulating that only appointed officers could issued certificates of citizenship. It also made a certificate more like a pass by requiring it to be renewed annually by an issuing officer on pains of losing the 'privilege' of citizenship. Most importantly, it raised from 5 to 10 years the length of residence in the Colony required to qualify a non-Mfengu for citizenship, but those who gained citizenship under the old Act were not affected.
(19) The Kaffrarian. 9th July 1864.

(20) S.C. A2 - 64.

(21) Ibid. Evidence of H.J. Louw.

(22) With the end of British Kaffraria in 1865 Maclean was sent to Natal. He did not last long there, returning to a farm near East London where he died in 1874, just managing to see Brownlee become the first Secretary for Native Affairs in Molteno's first responsible government. Unfortunately for him he was denied the pleasure of witnessing Brownlee's ineptitude and his incurrence of the wrath of both Molteno and John X. Merriman.

(23) It is worth stressing the real effects of the general issue of the certificate of citizenship on the free movement of blacks. It was of course still a discriminatory measure, as White Colonists were not required to carry on their person a certificate proving they were allowed to be where they were. Nevertheless, it was not a pass law, because possession of it was nearly universal for blacks resident in the Colony, it did not have to be endorsed or signed, and, most importantly, the holder was not accountable to anyone to prove his ownership of the stock or horses in his possession or to disclose his origins or intended destination. c.f. van der Horst op.cit. p. 123, who equates the certificate of citizenship with a pass.


(26) H.A. 67/109, Sweetman et al to Southey, 23rd July 1866.
(27) H.A. 67/109, Report of a meeting held in King William's Town, 27th July 1866.

(28) H.A. 67/109, Southey to W.P. Hutton et al, July 1866.

(29) H.A. 67/125.

(30) C.O. 3140, Brownlee to Southey, 28th March 1865. See also C.O. 3163, Liefeldt to Colonial Secretary, 6th February 1869.

(31) N.A. 171 Cole to Brownlee, 26th April 1873.

(32) Ibid.

(33) Tam. 7/1, Circular 13th February 1872.

(34) Tam. 7/1, Circular of the Office of the Commissioner of the Crown Lands and Public Works to Special Magistrates 1875.

(35) Tam. 9/2, Tainton to Commissioner of Public Works, 5th November 1875.

(36) Tam. 9/2, Tainton to Rose-Innes, 9th March 1874.

(37) N.A. 398, Resolutions of a Meeting of Chalumna farmers, East London division, to the Secretary of Native Affairs, July 1874.

(38) Ibid.

(39) N.A. 172, Secretary Kaffrarian Farmers Association to Secretary Native Affairs, September 1874.

(40) 10-1872, Select Committee on Fences Bill. The Committee produced a useful appendix on the cost of fencing to enclose a farm of 7 500 acres.
The Kaffrarian Farmers Association submitted a memorandum to Brownlee, in September 1874, of alleged stock losses of certain of its members in that year. 10 Farmers on the Gonubie and Nahoon Rivers claimed to have lost 533 sheep, 4 oxen and 4 horses, worth 549 pounds. They claimed that reported losses of farmers in the same area in 1873/74 amounted to 1412 sheep, 16 goats, 1 calf and 11 horses worth 1226 pounds 3 shilling and 9 pence. See N.A. 172, Kaffrarian Farmers Association Memorandum to Secretary of Native Affairs, September 1874.

N.A. 172, Rose Innes to Brownlee, 14th October 1874.

N.A. 174, Sweetman to Wrench, 27th March 1876.

Tam. 9/2, Tainton to Rose Innes, 9th March 1874.

C.O. 3104, C.C. Bedford to Colonial Secretary, December 1866.
(51) Tam. 7/1, Tainton to Rose Innes, 31st December 1875.

(52) N.A. 174, Sweetman to Wrench, 14th May 1876.

(53) N.A. 399, Resolutions adopted by a meeting of Upper Blinkwater farmers, Fort Beaufort district and Magistrate's comments thereon, 6th June 1876.

(54) N.A. 399, Meeting of Fort Beaufort farmers at Winterberg Spruit, 6th July 1876.


(57) Ibid. p. 385.

(58) N.A. 178, Dick to Rose Innes, May 1878.

(59) N.A. 176, Fielding to Rose Innes, 20th February 1877.

(60) Tam. 7/1, Circ. No. 95 Department of Public Works, 22nd February 1876.


(63) N.A. 401, Stevens to Ayliff, 8th September 1878.

(64) The employment of labour was regulated in terms of Government Notice No. 222 of 1878 which stipulated these wage rates.

(65) Similarly Judy Kimble has distinguished between labour migrancy, where migration occurs "specifically to obtain certain goods which would further enable them to participate in agricultural commodity production", and which is
therefore "oscillating migration between two modes of production", and the "ebb and flow" of homesteads that also occurs within the chiefdom over the question of resources. See Kimble, J. 'Towards an Understanding of the Political Economy of Lesotha. The Origins of Commodity Production and Migrant Labour.' 1830-1885. Unpub. M.A. Thesis, National University of Lesotho, 1978, p. 163 and p. 237.

(66) Shanin, quoting the United Nations Department of Social Affairs (1953) to the effect that "the poor have more children than the rich is a well established fact, hence there is an inverse relationship between family size and socio-economic status" commented, "The Russian peasantry failed to appreciate such fruits of modern demographic thought. For them the reverse held true."

(67) B.K. 92, Rev. W. Gowan to Maclean, 31st October 1862. Similarly Warner wrote to Southey "young girls, scarcely arrived at the age of puberty, being sold to men old enough to be their grandfathers and to which the girls are completely opposed and would never voluntarily submit." See C.O. 2040, 24th December 1861.

(68) C.O. 2988, Edge to Southey, 24th January 1859.

(69) C.O. 3010, Verity to Southey, June 1860.

(70) C.O. 3028, Calderwood to Southey, 9th October 1861.

(71) C.O. 3027, Calderwood to Southey, 14th February 1861.
"It is currently believed by the people that the chiefs had asked the Government to give them and their people land over the Kei and they would give back the land surveyed for them." There was much opposition to this move. See also Calderwood to Southey, 20th February 1861.
This particular story has been told best by A.E. du Toit in his 'Study of Native Policy 1847-1866' (Archives Year Book, 1954) pp. 207-229 and will not be retold here.

Holden, W.H. The Past and Future of the Kaffir Races. London, (1866). Report of a meeting of the Ngqika and Charles Brownlee, 16th March 1865. From the King William's Town Gazette. The Gazette in its issue of the 23rd March fully appreciated the reasons behind Sandille's refusal when it wrote: "No man of wealth among them would be safe ... it is no wonder therefore, that the wealthier members of the tribe should hesitate to remove to a position where their properties and lives would be in constant jeopardy."

Averill H.A. 'Conflict and Confrontation: A Study of Colonial Pressure on the Native Lands on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony 1874-1883', Unpublished M.A. thesis, Queens University, 1970. p. 42. The chiefs who moved with Matanzima were, Gecelo and Ndoda. Matanzima was the ambitious right hand son of Mtirara who refused to recognise the authority of his brother Ngangelizwe. He was overshadowed by Nonesi and had, prior to emigration, no land he could call his own.

Holden, W.H. op.cit. p. 401

Du Toit, A.E. op.cit. pp. 219-220.


It is only with the utmost difficulty that reasonable estimates of total population have been found for the Peddie, Victoria East, Fort Beaufort and King William's Town districts. Sources relied on were the 1865 and 1875 census of the Colony, the last two British Kaffrarian census of 1864 and 1865 and the invaluable returns of the Inspectors of Native Locations, first published as A100-80. Returns of Inspectors of Native Locations under Acts Nos. 6 of 1876 and 8 of 1878. As the 1875 Census and the returns provided by the Inspectors rank as the most accurate census work conducted in the Cape Colony in the 19th century, figures produced by comparing these sources are probably accurate.

(a) Source: Population Census Cape of Good Hope 1865 and 1875.

(b) Source: C.O. 3163, Verity to Colonial Secretary, 16th February, 1869. 1868 and 1869 Census of Healdtown Locations produced by Superintendent Verity. 1875 estimate produced from the population census of 1875 and the returns of the Inspector of Native Locations A100 - 80 17th March, 1880.

(c) 1861, 1863, 1868, 1869 Taken from Census of Victoria East Fingo Locations produced by T. Cumming, Superintendent of Fingoes, C.O. 3163; C.O. 3140; C.O. 3064; C.O. 3026. The figure for 1875 derived as for Healdtown in note (b) above.

(d) 4.4. i 1864 and 1865 figures are from British Kaffrarian Government returns. 1869 is from C.O. 3163 by T. Liefeldt. This is from a physical count and is accurate. The 1875 Return is an estimate produced from the returns of the Inspectors of Native Locations Returns of 1880. The total population of the King William's Town District revealed by the 1875 census was 97 628 (see table 4 ii) In 1880, after the removal of the Ngqika
Location in 1878 as a result of the rebellion of that year, the population was 56,580 (see table 4.4 ii). The difference of 41,048 should approximately represent the population of the Ngqika location prior to 1878. 1871 population returns for Tamacha, Middledrift and Crown Reserve from GH 17/8 "Return Showing the number of Native Locations in the Districts of King William's Town and the approximate number of inhabitants."

(81) The sources for Table 5 are exactly the same as those for Table 4. Where additional source material is used this is indicated. The excellent returns of the Inspectors of Native Locations (which do not appear to have been consulted in any detail in any previous study of these areas) were invaluable in the construction of these tables.

5.1 (a) 1,150 lbs of Cotton was picked in Peddie in 1875.
(b) includes 1,104 Angora goats.
(c) 8,020 draught cattle.

5.4(iii)(a) Data for 1875 and 1876 from R. Tainton, Magistrate at Tamacha in Tam 9/3 Tainton to Rose Innes, 23rd December 1976 and Tam 9/2 Tainton to Rose Innes, 23rd December 1875.

(82) N.A. 152, Capt. Mathew Blyth to Southey, 2nd May 1874. Although Ayliff and Whiteside in their History of the Abambo, Transkei (1912) p. 6), claim that the "younger fingoos" moved into the new district, they do not refer to Blyth's census, or other data which supports this opposite view.

(83) C.O. 3140, Cumming to Southey, 29th January 1868.

(84) C.O. 3140, Cumming to Southey, 14th February,
N.A. 175, Return of Inspector of Native Locations, B. Booth, 12th June 1877.
N.A. 176, Return of Inspector of Native Locations, J.M. Stevenson, 29th October 1877.
N.A. 399, Return of Inspector of Native Locations, B. Booth, 13th May 1877.

(93) N.A. 185, Dick to Secretary of Native Affairs, 22nd October 1880.

(94) N.A. 173, Return of Native Lessees of Government Land in the Kei Division of East London, 1875 N.D.

(95) N.A. 176, Judge to Brownlee, 25th October 1876.

(96) N.A. 175, Booth to Wrench, February 1877.

(97) Fort Beaufort Advocate, 16th February 1877. Letter from G.K. Jacobs.

(98) A similar view has been expressed by Ballard and Lenta in their critique of Colin Bundy's view of 'peasant productivity' in Natal. Ballard found that Africans were producing a lot of grain because they were not producing sugar, which the colonists were. They deliberately left grain production to African producers in order to concentrate fully on sugar. See Ballard, C. and Lenta, G. 'The Role of the Peasantry in the Agricultural History of Colonial Natal 1844 - 1909: A reassessment', Unpublished paper, Dept. of Economics, University of Natal, Durban. p. 13.

(99) N.A. 180, C.C.E.L. to Ayliff, 10th May 1879.

(100) C.O. 3146, Bisset to Taylor, 20th April 1869.
(85) C.O. 3163, Verity to Southey, 16th February 1869.

(86) Tam. 9/3, Tainton to Rose Innes, 23rd December 1876.


(89) N.A. 180, Hodges to Ayliff, 8th October 1878. On another occasion Hodges wrote "Lloyd's farm adjoining Aberdeen is largely occupied by natives on a sort of tenant system, in other words they are squatting on this farm ... and this system obtains generally." See N.A. 179, Hodges to Ayliff, 14th June 1878.

(90) N.A. 152, Liefeldt to Rose Innes, 28th November 1874.

(91) The census of 1875, meticulously prepared and executed in many respects, was unable to register an acceptably accurate return. Under the heading "Squatters, sub-Lessees and Vagrants" it managed to account for 2 044 morgen occupied and 5 135 cattle owned by such people in the Colony as a whole.

(92) N.A.175 Return of Inspector of Native Locations, J A Tapson, 30th April 1877
(101) H.A. 72/172, Statement of Land Rent Outstanding on the 31st March 1867.

(102) H.A. 7019, Return of Grants of Land. For a detailed discussion of these regulations see Chapter 8 above.


(105) N.A. 171, Cole to Brownlee, 12th August 1873.

(106) N.A. 176, Hodges to Ayliff, 9th July 1877. "The farms bought in Oba's name upon which they live is a tribal or partnership purchase and each man who is a shareholder or who subscribed towards the purchase money, claims with the consent of the registered proprietor (Oba) the right of occupation ..."

(107) N.A. 172, Cole to Brownlee, 3rd November 1874.

(108) N.A. 171, Stevenson to Rose Innes, 1st September 1873.

(109) N.A. 176, Hodges to Brownlee, 17th August 1877.

(110) N.A. 180, Hodges to Ayliff, 8th October 1878.

(111) N.A. 179, Hodges to Ayliff, 31st October 1878.

(112) N.A. 172, Tainton to Rose Innes, 31st October 1874.

(113) N.A. 398, J.A. Warner to Brownlee, 15th July 1874.

(114) N.A. 173, Liefeldt to Rose Innes, 14th May 1875.

(115) N.A. 176, Knopf to Rose Innes, March 1877.
(116) N.A. 176, La Trobe Lonsdale to Rose Innes, 20th March 1877.

(117) N.A. 172, Rose Innes to Brownlee, 26th October 1874.

(118) N.A. 173, Wrench to Brownlee, 19th April 1875.

(119) N.A. 174, Sweetman to Wrench, 27th March 1876.

(120) Tam 9/2, Tainton to Rose Innes, 31st December 1875.

(121) Tam 4/1, Circuit Court Civil Notebook, 25th February 1879.

(122) Tam 4/2, Circuit Court Civil Notebook, 24th April 1879.


(124) Tam 4/1, Civil Notebooks, Mgoqi vs Yenye, 6th March 1879.

(125) Tam 4/2, Civil Notebooks, 21st April 1879.

(126) C.O. 3140, Tainton to Colonial Secretary, 26th November 1868.

(127) N.A. 155, Liefeldt to Rose Innes, 19th December 1877.

(128) N.A. 155, Liefeldt to Rose Innes, 22nd November 1877.

(129) C.O. 3064, Secretary Kaffrarian Government, Returns furnished to 31st December, 1862.

(130) Tam 7/3, Dick to Rose Innes, 21st August 1879.

(131) Tam 9/2, Unpublished addition written for the B.B.N.A. for 1874, Tainton to Rose Innes, 31st March 1875.
N.A. 171, Vol. 3, Judge to Brownlee, 3rd May 1873. See also N.A. 173, Fielding to Rose Innes, 17th July 1875, which speaks in very similar terms to those expressed by Judge.

Tam 7/3, Dick to Rose Innes, 21st April 1879.

N.A. 172, Liefeldt to Rose Innes, 9th July 1874.

N.A. 176, Rose Innes to Brownlee, 18th April 1877.

N.A. 174, Liefeldt to Dick, 17th July 1876.

N.A. 172, Fielding to Rose Innes, 8th July 1874.

N.A. 176, Lonsdale to Rose Innes, 11th January 1876.


N.A. 180, Judge to Ayliff, 22nd August 1879.

N.A. 173, Fielding to Rose Innes, May 1875.

N.A. 173, Fielding to Rose Innes, 18th July 1874.

C.O. 3168, Chalmers to Rose Innes, 5th November 1870.

C.O. 3168, Chalmers to Southey, February 1870.

C.O. 3163, Liefeldt to Southey, 5th and 6th February 1869.

B.K. 23, Taylor to Southey, 11th September 1865.

A76 -79, Return Relative to Native Locations in the Division of King William's Town and East London p. 9.

N.A. 180, Judge to Ayliff, 27th September 1879.
(149) Ibid.

(150) C.O. 3140, Thomas Liefeldt was appointed Clerk in Charge with Sandille from 11th June 1867, the office of "Gaika Commissioner" previously held by Brownlee having been abolished. At the same time the posts of the Superintendents of Fingoe locations in Fort Beaufort, Victoria East, Peddie and Queenstown were abolished. Richard Tainton was transferred from Peddie to Tamacha as a result.


(152) C.O. 3140, Liefeldt to Southey, 10th October 1868.

(153) C.O. 3140, Liefeldt to Southey, 8th May 1868.

(154) C.O. 3140, Liefeldt to Southey, 10th October 1868.

(155) C.O. 3163, Griffith to Col. Sec. Personal letter, 24th November 1869. It was the practice for young men to wait to be initiated together with the son of a chief or some other extremely notable councillor.

(156) C.O. 3140, Liefeldt to Southey, 10th October 1868.

(157) Ibid.

(158) Ibid.

(159) Stutterheim Magistrate, Civil Record Books, C3/186. Wright to Brownlee, 22nd February 1878. Wright was appointed magistrate of Stutterheim in November 1877. On the 14th November 1877 he wrote to Liefeldt "By the proclamation defining the District of Stutterheim I find you are included, you will therefore for the present act accordingly and report here."
Brownlee, C. op.cit. p.299. Despite the obvious partiality induced by his feelings at being sent to Somerset and his resentment of Liefeldt, the observation is accurate.

C.O. 3163, Liefeldt to Southey, 4th October, 1869.

C.O. 3163, Liefeldt to Southey, 4th December 1869.

C.O. 3184, Liefeldt to Southey, 24th August 1871.

C.O. 3163, Liefeldt to Southey, 5th February 1869.

A76 - 79, Return of Revenue derived from Hut Tax in the Gaika Locations from the 1st January 1871 to the 31st December 1878.

N.A. 171, Liefeldt to Rose Innes, 1st October 1873.

Indicative of this were the natural deaths of Toise on the 4th April 1878, Siwani on the 12th September 1879, Kamas sometime in 1877 and Anta in June 1878. Many of the cohorts of this older generation of chiefs, who were all in their 50s or 60s, would quite probably also have been dying off at this time. This fact was of course also significant for the changing composition of Sandille's inner council.

N.A. 172, Rose Innes to Brownlee, January 1874.


C.O. 3163, Liefeldt to Southey, 24th April 1869.

N.A. 152, Liefeldt to Brownlee, 28th November 1874.

Reply of Sandille and councillors.

N.A. 175, Tapson to R.M.E.L., July 1877.

N.A. 175, R.M. Herschel to Brownlee, June 1877.
(173) N.A. 176, Lonsdale to Brownlee, 3rd July 1877.

(174) N.A. 176, Fielding to Brownlee, 27th June 1877.

(175) N.A. 176, Fielding to Brownlee, 4th January 1877.

(176) N.A. 176, Liefeldt to Brownlee, 4th July 1877.

(177) Tam 9/2, Dick to Rose Innes, February 1878. In the last report he wrote before his death Tainton had observed that "To a certain extent regression is observable". See Tam 9/3, Tainton to Rose Innes, 17th January 1878.

(178) Tam 9/2, Dick to Rose Innes, September 1878.

(179) N.A. 177, Liefeldt to Meurant, 19th March 1878. See also Meurant to Ayliff, 14th June 1878.

(180) Tam 9/3, Tainton to Brownlee, 12th August 1876.

(181) Ibid. Resume by Tainton.

(182) Tam 9/3, Rose Innes to Tainton, 18th August 1876.

(183) Tam 9/3, Tainton to Rose Innes, 19th August 1876. The pensions to which Sandille referred were those allowed to Katyi, the widow of Maqoma, Bikwane, widow of Mhalla, and other chiefs and their dependents released from Robben Island.

(184) Ibid.

(185) Ibid.

(186) Tam 9/3, Tainton to Rose Innes, 17th January 1878. (From notes prepared by Tainton before his death and written and despatched by his clerk at that date).
(187) This is also the general view put forward by Spicer.

(188) Stutterheim Magistrate file C3/186, Wright to Brownlee, 25th December 1877.

(189) Ibid. Wright to Brownlee, 8th January 1878. Sandille was not fighting in December 1877 as claimed by Spicer.

(190) Ibid.

(192) Ibid.

(193) Ibid.

(194) Stutterheim Magistrate C3/186 Wright to Brownlee, 11th January 1878.

(195) Ibid.

(196) Brownlee, C. op.cit, pp. 299 - 301.

(197) Stutterheim Magistrate file C3/186, J.F. Cumming at Emgwali to Wright, 8th June 1878. This version contradicts Brownlee's version that the body was brought to Schermbrooker's Camp where the latter identified and buried it.


(199) Stutterheim Magistrate C3/186, Wright to Brownlee, 13th January 1878.

(200) N.A. 178, Brownlee to Ayliff, 24th July 1878.
When Sandille told Brownlee in 1865 that "we have no cattle; our cattle are our gardens", he touched a truth so deep that, despite all that has been written about the Xhosa, it is still seldom understood. (1)

Sandille was, by 1865, already painfully aware that the integrity of the mode of production which constituted the basis of his chieftainship and the Xhosa social formation, was all but destroyed. In earlier chapters it was argued that this mode had certain very particular characteristics that gave it its unique structure. (2) The basic condition which placed households, homestead, chiefs and the land in a uniquely ordered relationship, could not be tampered with, without transforming the functioning and character of the mode of production itself. In earlier discussion it was shown that cattle ownership fulfilled the unique role of providing the basis for the ordering of these relationships; now that "our cattle are our gardens", things could never be the same again.

Arable agriculture had replaced pastoralism as the key element in the relationship between households. In conformity with this shift, the place of the chief gave way to that of the Government approved headman. The "headman" was a specific creation which grew out of the new relationship between the elements of the mode of production. It expressed politically the place of cultivation in the new dispensation. As the headmen drew their pay and owed
allegiance to the Colonial State, so the households were linked to the Colonial capitalist economy through the commodity and labour markets. The households were no longer economically based primarily on stock ownership. The primary economic focus was now on cultivation and the ability to acquire and utilise arable land.

In Chapter 3 above, the concept of the articulation of modes of production was examined. It was suggested that this concept must be understood with reference to the process of transition which determines the particular combination of productive elements that characterises any social formation. The articulation of modes of production was therefore the outcome of a particular course of transition from one dominant mode of production to another. The most appropriate theory of transition which could be discerned in the literature dealing with social formation dominated by colonialism was one which conceived of transition as occurring on two levels and in two related stages.

Firstly, in the case of the Xhosa social formation, the process of transition began with the more or less rapid breaking of the capacity for self reproduction of the lineage mode of production. Subsequently, as the new organisation of production that was required by the dominance of the capitalist economy of the Cape Colony emerged, a process of transition began in the ensemble of political and ideological structures and practices which had supported the class structure of the superseded lineage mode of production.

In subsequent chapters it was shown through the examination of the cattle-killing and succeeding historical developments how commodity production, private ownership of land, taxation and wage labour were introduced. In addition the displacement of the chiefs and the emergence of headmen was examined at each stage of the process. It has been shown, therefore, how both levels of transition were operative between 1848 and 1880. At each stage it has been emphasised that the struggles of the mass of the household had a critical impact in shaping the transitionary
process. However the basic consequence of the break up of the old mode of production has been found to be an aggregate shift downward in the level of material consumption i.e. in the amount of produce available for self-maintenance, by the households. This aggregate shift was consistent with the existence of a small group of households which maintained significantly higher levels of accumulation. The persistence of this group accounted for the highly polarised distribution of basic productive resources which was found to be characteristic of most communities. This aggregate shift downward was only halted, and to some extent reversed, for a brief period between 1865 and 1875 when a particularly favourable conjuncturer emerged.

In this chapter the decisive aggregate shift downward that occurred between 1880 and 1900 will be examined. This shift, it will be argued, must be seen in terms of the underlying weakness created by the breaking of the old lineage mode of production, the breaking up of certain distinctive relationships which characterised it, and the particular terms on which rural households were incorporated into the capitalist mode of production. In this period many households struggled against declining levels of subsistence. This struggle involved both the pursuit of land and other means of production so as to expand the agricultural base of the households and a struggle for more favourable terms of entry into the dominant capitalist system itself. This latter aspect involved the struggle to retain the rate of wages at the historically high level that had been determined during the favourable years for the households from 1865-1875. This dual struggle accelerated the second level transformation of political and ideological relations and facilitated the entrenchment of the position of the headmen, and the development of a distinct dominant faction in the locations, around support for their position.

Between 1880 and 1900 the nascent class structure of the Ciskeian locations developed greater rigidity. Control over access to land by the headmen led to its unequal distribution between households. Similarly the uneven distribution of other means of
production such as ploughs and trek oxen and the possession of sufficient labour, all became rigidified into a distinct system. Increasingly the key question regulating access to, and possession of, means of production depended on a household's political relationship to the dominant power structure based around the headmen in the locations.

At the same time the households were subject to the effects of the capitalist economy of the Colony. Both the market for labour and the commodity market exerted a strong influence on most households. The majority of households were increasingly dependent on the returns from wage labour, and were very conscious of the need to maintain as high a level of wages as possible. They also wished to be able to buy commodities from the Colony at prices that represented a fair exchange for whatever grain they were able to sell. However, Colonial employers of labour and the traders and other representatives of mercantile interest would have none of it. The employers wished to lower the wage rate to a level at which it provided only a very inadequate level of subsistence. The traders engaged in that old form of mercantile theft - buying cheap and selling dear.

Within the confines of the locations the majority of poor households were confronted by the power structure represented by the headmen. The latter represented an indigenous structure of exploitation linked to that of the Colonial economy and the Colonial State. The headmen were supported by the economic differentiation or polarisation of the households. The majority of poor households were thus confronted with a doubly exploitative structure. In the first instance, the hostile economic environment of the Colonial economy and secondly, the inequality inherent in the condition of household production in the locations. Exploitation within the location was based on the manipulation by the headmen of the contradictory interests of different households due to their differential levels of accumulation and consequent polarisation. Exploitation in the locations consisted of the utilisation of a given political power
structure, centered on the headmen, to gain or withhold economic advantages which had a crucial bearing on production, in return for payments in cash or kind.

An appreciation of these changes, which defined an entirely new economic system, has had, unfortunately, to be expressed in highly abstract and theoretical language. It is seldom that contemporary observers leave their subjective understanding of such changes behind. It is therefore very fortunate when a contemporary observer actually notes, in terms far clearer than any theoretical formulations allow, the very changes that are under discussion. In 1889, ten years after the Rebellion, Chalmers (the magistrate at King William's Town) expressed the depth of the changes that had occurred since 1848. Explaining the difficulty of finding any informants who could tell him the whereabouts of the Xhosa Chief Phalo's* grave he wrote:

"The advance of Civilization among them, with all its advantages and all its vices, has completely changed their mode of living, their habits, customs, and subjects of conversation, so that the natives of today are a totally different people to those of even the last generation, and take little or no interest in their past history. I refer to Colonial Natives. Before the advance of civilization and Christianity among them, their inexhaustible subject of conversation was the history of their Chiefs and of their tribes, their wars and their hunts. Now these subjects are seldom if ever handled by the present generation who have become supplied with new and altogether different topics of conversation arising out of the new state of things which has been brought upon them by civilization and Christianity." (3) (emphasis added)

* Phalo, the father of Rarabe and Gcaleka, (c1710-1775)
Nothing reveals with greater clarity the depth of the changes that had come about. Where conquest first forcibly changed the mode of production, the economic demands of the conquerors soon began to change the political and ideological relations of the old mode of production, to conform with the new structure of production. When new political and ideological relations emerge which support the form of domination of the capitalist economy over the mass of households, so that the political domination of the Colonial State over the conquered masses is assured, then the phase of 'transition' is over. There then exists an 'articulation of modes of production', which is a stable form of relationship at the economic, political and ideological levels between the dominant capitalist mode of production and the subordinate social relation of the conquered peoples that have been incorporated in its structure. This does not mean that struggle against such domination will cease. On the contrary it will intensify, but primarily on the basis of challenging the dynamics of the capitalist system itself, and not on the basis of the old mode of production.

II  The Great Downward Shift 1880-1900

The drought of 1875-1878, the first serious one since 1865, made it clear that where cultivation had taken the place of cattle, the people at large were inevitably more prone to disastrous economic setbacks. Whereas cattle could migrate in search of pasture, people dependent on returns from cultivation were bound to their locations. When the seed failed to germinate, or the ground was too hard even to allow much ploughing, and the pasture was dried up, the people were bound to suffer. Such setbacks inaugurated a downward aggregate shift for the locations as a whole which ended in the proletarianisation of many households and a decline in the value of labour power in the Colonial economy.

The sustained aggregate shift downwards in the levels of subsistence maintained through production in the locations, rolled
back the frontiers of living conditions for the mass of rural people. An understanding of the drop in real standards of living and the amount of food available for domestic consumption is crucial to an understanding of the low wage structure for black migrant workers that has prevailed in the 20th century.

So far from there being any 'prosperity' in the locations, the majority of households were living on the knife edge of dire poverty. Given the polarised condition of stock ownership, and of access to and ability to utilise arable land, most households lacked the resources to withstand any adverse conditions that might prevail in agricultural enterprise. The twenty years 1880 - 1900 are very largely a catalogue of such 'adverse conditions'.

Between 1880 and 1900 almost every misfortune, drought, blight and pestilence, struck the Eastern Cape, and often the worst effects were in the overcrowded locations. In twenty years, the only time during which generally favourable conditions for agriculture prevailed was between 1886 and 1890. It should therefore not be surprising that the mass of rural households dependent on a return from agriculture suffered a declining standard of living. It is also possible that the overgrazed pasturage and the generally overcrowded conditions of the stock helped precipitate, or at the least worsened, the effects of disease amongst the stock. Ecological deteriorations had by 1900, begun to seriously affect the productivity of the soil and veld.

Reference to natural conditions that prevailed is insufficient to explain the economic reverses suffered in this period. It is necessary to place any specific factors such as drought and disease in the context of the structure of differentiation between the households in the locations. It has previously been shown that the two key determinants of the productivity of a plough (apart from the necessary draught power to pull it) were access to sufficient labour to tend an increased acreage and the retention of sufficient moisture in the soil to allow for effective ploughing.
Many of the droughts in this period were not an absolute cessation of precipitation. They were periods of very sparse and intermittent rainfall. In such times the owners of a plough were able to turn over the soil when it still retained some moisture. They were then able to sow and if the occasional showers persisted, at least a small crop would result. For those who did not own a plough and, in good seasons relied on hiring a plough, the soil was too dry for them to use it by the time the plough owner was finished with his own cultivation. Such households would then fall back on the hoe and thus be able to bring only a small area under cultivation. These households would achieve hardly any crop at all. As it has been shown that no more than 25 to 30% of households had their own plough in any location, the differentiating effect of plough ownership was intensified in times of drought.

The drought also had the effect of intensifying the conflict between the large stock owners and those households with very few stock, and no, or insufficient, access to arable land. This conflict was in fact an expression of the distinct positions occupied by those larger households which had long secured good arable land and which had five or more head of cattle, and small households which were very often without cattle. In the droughts of the 1880s and 90s households were increasingly forced to attempt cultivating winter crops, such as wheat and oats, because it was found that winter rains persisted even in seasons when the summer rains failed. The problems of growing winter crops on a larger scale first brought the conflict between the utilisation of land for pasturage or for arable purposes, sharply into focus.

The owners of stock had traditionally allowed them to wander at large in the winter months, feeding off the stubble in the maize and sorghum lands. However cattle allowed to wander in winter, when wheat was being grown, caused a lot of destruction. Explaining the difficulties of growing winter crops a magistrate wrote:
"The Natives do not take advantage of the season for sowing wheat etc. The reason for this is principally that they are also owners of stock and that from the end of their harvest (April, May J.L.) until the season comes round again for sowing mealies ... they allow their cattle to run at large ... so that if any of them sow wheat, they find that it is only time, labour and money lost, as their wheat crops are sure to be totally destroyed as soon as they come up, by their neighbours cattle." (4)

Similarly Verity, magistrate in Victoria East, was told by a meeting of headmen that:

"In order to cultivate (wheat) between the Kaffir corn and mealie seasons it is necessary to fence, and that the expense incurred thereby would be inadequate to the gain ... they are unwilling to abandon their own established custom of allowing the stock to roam at large between the seasons ..." (5)

For those who, despite the difficulties, succeeded in growing winter wheat there was a considerable advantage. As one Inspector of Native Locations explained in the 1882 season:

"The dry weather of the past two months has seriously affected the prospects of those who cultivate only maize or Kaffir corn; but I am glad to be able to state that those who sowed wheat will have a fair if not full crop of this cereal ..." (6)

Only those households with ploughs, harrows and enough labour to protect the valuable crop could undertake the cultivation of wheat.

Not only did the utilisation of the land for pasturage and arable purposes begin to conflict, but the use of land for residential purposes also began to be in the way of the stock. As the available sites in the prescribed "villages" filled up, households had increasingly built their huts wherever they pleased and the ground for some distance around each hut or kraal became unfit for pastoral purposes. Increasingly, the conflict was not only
The struggle which Dick clearly observed in 1893, had been intensifying since at least 1880 and was inherent in the increasingly rigid polarisation of the distribution of stock and land in the locations. Many of those that were rich in stock were also owners of private land outside the locations on which they conducted their cultivation. It was common for the black private landowners, with the connivance of the headmen, to depasture large numbers of stock on the location commonages. They thus came into conflict with the poor of the locations, who, owning few or no stock, had nothing to lose by seeing cultivation extended further into the commonage.

After the rebellion, the Colonial State officially recognised the shift that was taking place in agriculture in the locations from pastoralism to cultivation. In 1879 Parliament directed, by a resolution, that an investigation be conducted into ways of stimulating "Agricultural and other labour" by Africans in the locations and of increasing the flow of workers to the Colony.

The respondents to this enquiry were the magistrates and missionaries in the Ciskei and Transkei, and some of them provided good evidence of the changes that had been introduced in the day to day life of the households and in their productive activity. One, in particular, touched on an extremely important point with great relevance to the rapidity of proletarianisation in this period:

"Living in connection with trading stations, they long ago have given up a great deal of work, being in olden times the lot of women, who had to make dishes and plates and pots and other useful household goods. All this work has been given up, as they can be supplied with tinware and ironware, made for them by Europeans. It is the same with their clothing. When the old Kafir women spent a great deal of her time in making clothing and ornaments - showing a certain skill in this labour - the woman today is satisfied by buying what
Europeans are providing for her ... Men and women were picking formerly their gardens, being employed by this work for a considerable long time. Since the plough has been introduced, this work is done by the young men ... and I assure you sir - I have it by attentive observation and by inquiries - that the Kafirs got richer crops by their old system than by using the plough ... I cannot but say their connection with the white man has deprived them of many good things, especially many good employments formerly carried on among them, and a very few of them have got up to this time a blessing, an advance by their connection with the white population. The result of this fact is ruin in many respects." (14)

The transition to arable agriculture had been an immensely disruptive process for most households. It was, indeed, only a small minority who could count any "blessing" or "advance" from the process. The growth of the importance of arable agriculture in the production of the households along with the abolition of most forms of craft skills, had the effect of reducing the amount of labour required for the reproduction of the households. As Samir Amin has shown, elsewhere in Africa the destruction of such skills constitutes a real step backwards for the communities concerned. (12) He correctly argues that increased pressure on the land (a phenomenon that was so much in evidence in the last decades of the 19th century in the Ciskei) was not solely a result of population growth and the loss of land. It was also the result of the destruction of craft employment and services which had absorbed a large part of the surplus labour in the old mode of production. By the 1880s the needs previously supplied by such crafts had to be paid for with money. The effect was not only to intensify the exploitation of arable land, but to increase the number of people dependent on agriculture for subsistence and at the same time to create pools of unemployed, or under-employed people on whom concerted pressure could be brought to bear through taxation, to force them to work in the capitalist economy.
The increasing competition for arable land ensured that the headmen and magistrates were constantly settling cases involving even the slightest infringement of the right to arable land. Land of the poorest quality was brought under cultivation, and Dick, at Tamacha, expressed amazement that the ploughmen working such land, "could have succeeded in steering safely through such obstacles as are seen in their lands such as rocks, stumps etc." (13) The result of bringing poorer land under cultivation was declining yields per acre. The shortage of land of good quality served to emphasise the political function of land allocation. It was an important factor in the growing political power exercised by the headmen who made such allocations.

It was the intensity of the competition for land in the face of the limited supply that placed such great importance on the role of the headmen in land allocations. By 1884 Dick reported:

"The locations are all becoming densely populated, and in addition are very heavily stocked, the consequence is that unless the commonage or grazing ground is brought into use as garden land, the newcomers and freshly married men are not able to cultivate, ... the land although held in common by the tribe is very unequally apportioned, each man or family having claimed or cultivated as much as they pleased when land was plentiful, so that some have about 40 acres of garden land while late comers cannot find a pumpkin plot ..." (14)

As the importance of cultivation grew for the households, so the quality of labour in production became more crucial. Much of the agriculture conducted was not of a high standard. This was due to a variety of factors of which four were most important:

1) the inferior quality of much of the soil, either in regard to its low fertility or being too strewn with rock and roots;
2) the lack of careful seed drilling, the seed mostly being broadcast over the furrows created by the plough;
3) lack of capital to purchase harrows and other implements with which to ensure maximum utilisation of the land;

4) lack of fencing.

The lack of harrows was considered a particularly serious problem, especially in the farming of wheat, as the amount of seed successfully germinating was greatly reduced by not enclosing the seed sufficiently after ploughing. In the largely Mfengu district of Victoria East where the standards of agricultural practice might be expected to be above average, the magistrate observed:

"The people have a good many American ploughs, but they have no harrows, and they simply turn over a sod with the plough and sow the grain in the furrow. I have pointed out the loss sustained through this manner of cultivating their grounds, and suggested the purchase of harrows by joint stock companies, their use to be common among the shareholders. At Auckland the people hire a harrow from a farmer ... They do not fence their fields, and have to employ their children in herding the stock to prevent trespass on the cultivated ground." (15)

The condition of agricultural production, the poor soils, lack of capital, and other disabilities were producing rural unemployment and under-employment. As long as sufficient grain could be obtained for subsistence purposes, this did not automatically mean that households, or members of households, would become proletarianised. However the effect of drought and disease, in this context, lowered the levels at which people subsisted. Where drought reduced the harvest below a certain critical point many hundreds of people found themselves forced onto the labour market. In 1880, when drought was intense, the magistrate at Victoria East wrote that:

"I am constantly signing passes for men proceeding to the Colony in search of employment." (16)
The description provided by Fielding, the magistrate at Middledrift, in 1881 has an ominously modern ring to it:
"the men of the district are providing for the future by seeking for employment all over the Colony, and I anticipate that few but old men, women and children will remain at the villages and be supported by their absent relatives. There must be want to a certain extent, as the last years crops, although somewhat better than usual, were but sufficient to partially release the people from accumulated debts to the Government and on their private accounts ..." (17)

The significance of indebtedness will be examined in greater detail below. The important point to observe is that significant numbers of workers were only forthcoming from the locations when available subsistence fell to next to nothing. Short of that, most workers displayed a marked preference for suffering a declining standard of living, rather than going to work for low wages. In the Ciskei there was no neat shift from a "discretionary" disposition to the labour market, giving way to "necessary" wage work i.e. - work necessitated for survival as opposed to work for the purpose of obtaining cash for other than subsistence purposes. (18) Migrant labour, when it occurred, was from the outset occasioned by necessity - the point was only that as workers, the early migrants wished to retain wages at as high a level as possible.

The key to an understanding of the nature of the last two decades of the 19th century in the Ciskei lies in an appreciation of the extent of the opposition that existed amongst the poor, the unemployed and the under-employed, to any lowering of the wage rate that had been set by the Government public works ever since the time of Sir G. Grey. Workers expected to earn 1 shilling and 6 pence or more per day, and struggled desperately against all attempts to reduce this to the level of farm workers' wages which were 10 to 15 shillings per month. It did not require much sophistication fully to appreciate the significance of the 100%
difference between the two rates of wages. The railways and other public works had set a precedent to which potential workers readily responded; they soon showed that they literally would rather starve than be forced to accept 10 to 15 shillings a month on the farms.

Most potential workers resisted leaving their homes purely to find subsistence through wages. Up to the 1880s, wage work had been closely associated with major disruptions of the economic life of the locations, such as occurred in the cattle-killing. At the same time there was an expectation that wages would be a lever to begin accumulating cattle. To say that there was an expectation that wages would provide for more than mere 'subsistence' does not mean that, for those who engaged in it, it was 'discretionary'. Subsistence is, after all, a relative and subjective term. There was therefore a strong resistance to working purely to find 'subsistence' i.e. a bare minimum for survival through wages. The resistance to working purely for subsistence purposes was based on the relative benefit of staying at home or going to work. Where the wages offered were low and distances to be travelled and contracts entered into were long, many preferred to stay at home and suffer a declining standard of living in the locations. (19)

This latter course had the advantage of sustaining the wage so that when wage work had to be done it would at least be remunerative. The struggle to sustain the wage rate of at least 1 shilling per day had been apparent since the cattle-killing and Grey's 'public work' schemes. After the cattle-killing, attempts were made in 1857 and 1858, to reduce wages on the public works to 6 pence per day and food. These attempts were met with desertion, strikes and a general lack of fresh conscripts prepared to work at that rate. The building of railway lines in the 1870s in the Cape Colony, at the time of the great migration to Transkei, had ensured that wages were pushed up to 2 shillings per day and more. The nature of conditions for most households was made clear by Dick who informed the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs that:
"A good harvest generally tends to a tightened labour supply, while a poor or scanty harvest drives hundreds in search of employment." (20)

From the outset of regular migratory labour in the 1880s it was economic compulsion, far more than any desire to satisfy the needs of accumulation, that drove people to work. Conversely, it was the desire to retain the value of their labour power that led many to withhold it from the labour market.

Anyone dealing with the Archives of the Department of Native Affairs in the late 19th century will not find them short of references, in the reports of its officials, which offer evidence that at first appears contradictory, and for which no explanations were initially offered. Typical is this extract from the magistrate at East London:

"The labour difficulty is as great as ever ... the farmers also complain loudly that they cannot get labour, but this is chiefly, I believe, owing to the fact that better wages are offered at the ports ... the natives in some portions of the Division are beginning to feel the want of food ..." (21)

(emphasis added)

The constant appearance of this condition of a farm labour shortage and a scarcity of food in the 1880s can only lead to the conclusion that people were rather prepared to suffer a drop in their standard of living than to work for 10 or at most 15 shillings a month.

The growing proletarianisation of the households was accelerated by the drought of 1884-1886. While the seasons between 1880 and 1883 were uneven, 1884-1886 saw the most decisive drought of the 19th century. The effects of this drought have not been appreciated in the literature to date, but it should be seen as a critical event in the creation of a proletariat from the mass of poor households. It severely depressed economic conditions for those few with cattle and significant arable potential, and contributed largely to the downward aggregate shift in this period. The timing of the drought was important, coming as it did
on the eve of the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand. It is also in this drought that the complex attitude of the Xhosa to the labour market may be clearly observed.

The crops harvested in 1884 in Victoria East and other districts were described as "disastrous". (22) Hot winds shrivelled what crops there were. Pasturage was also badly affected. "Grass seems to be almost a thing of the past", wrote a distressed Inspector of Native Locations. (23) People began to sell their cattle and sheep for food. A few, with large herds, were able to sell off part only of their stock and with the proceeds to hire grazing elsewhere for the remainder. (24) By May 1884 even the prickly pears in Victoria East were beginning to wither.

As the drought intensified the price of grain soared. The pasturage deteriorated and with it the condition and quality of the cattle. The people therefore received less money when they sold stock to buy ever more expensive grains. In 1884 the winter wheat crop was also a failure and no relief could be expected. By September, households were paying one head of cattle for a bag of mealies, and even then buyers for cattle who would have had nowhere to depasture them were consequently hard to find. (25) The drought persisted into 1885. The magistrate and Inspectors of Native Locations observed that "the people are getting poorer and poorer every day." (26)

From Keiskamma Hoek and Tamacha in King William's Town district it was reported, in 1885, that the crops were a "complete failure, the pasturage scanty and burned up and water so scarce that excepting at the large rivers nothing but puddles remains." (27) Many families were reduced to a state of destitution, with neither stock nor food of any kind, and were forced to subsist on roots and herbs. (28) Many people who, at the beginning of 1884 were considered "well off", were now living in a condition of semi-starvation:

"Those wealthier people who had money with which to hire grazing saw their stock through 1884 in this way. When the drought intensified, they were left
penniless, their stock depreciated in value and good grazing became simply unobtainable at any price ..."(29)

In the King William's Town district in 1885 thousands of head of stock perished. Losses were particularly severe in the Middledrift sub-district. Those cattle that did not die were pledged to the traders (storekeepers) for grain. This turned out to be the most important way in which food was obtained throughout 1886, in what was known as "Iminyaka wendlala", the year of hunger. Dick described the operation of the system:

"The principal and most important measure of relief, however, consisted in the purchase on credit of quantities of grain, ... there can be little doubt but that this timely, if scanty supply has saved many poor creature from extreme want. The system of purchasing food on credit, although to a certain extent forced upon them ... is not to be commended. In the first place the traders with one or two exceptions charged an exorbitant price for their goods, and secondly the terms of credit, generally three months, were too short to allow of any returns from the harvest, the cattle that were pledged for these amounts are now being seized, so that the parties who pledged them are in a worse position than if they had sold outright in the first instance. In that case they would have bought for cash, and their purchasing power would have increased by the difference in the cash price of grain and the price they had to pay in order to obtain credit ..." (30)

Similarly in Victoria East the Inspector of Native Locations reported:

"I am glad to say that Messrs. John Thomas and Co. of this town have come forward and assisted people with several hundred bags of Mealies and Kaffir Corn, giving them a credit of eight months to repay it in ..." (31)
As Dick made clear, not everyone had eight months grace before their stock became liable to seizure for the debt. The large indebtedness of most households introduced a new element into the pressures bearing down upon the residents of the locations. Indebtedness was not unknown before, but never had it been so general or for such large amounts. As early as 1883 the people of Siwani's location had opposed the opening of any additional shops, because there were, in the opinion of the residents, sufficient shops and the people were already heavily indebted to them. Further shops, it was argued in a petition that was circulated, would only place more credit at their disposal, increase their liabilities and bring them into difficulties. (32)

Some idea of the extent of indebtedness that prevailed by 1886 was given in a report from Middledrift:

"Over six hundred head of stock were registered in this office on account of two firms alone, and when it is known that every trading station in the District did business on the same principles, and that the same prevailed in the Tamacha and Keiskamma Hoek districts, the extent to which private enterprise afforded relief will be understood" ... (33)

'Private enterprise' of this type was little better than usury and was bringing more and more people into the Colony in search of work. From Keiskamma Hoek it was reported that:

"It would not be far short of the truth to state that nearly every beast now in the possession of the natives here is pledged in some way either to the traders or for debts incurred amongst themselves."

(34)

Consequently from Keiskamma Hoek alone over 4,800 passes were issued most of which were for the purposes of seeking employment.

The attitude of work seekers became startlingly clear. They would stay at home until there was no more food, and then move to wherever work could be found at a good rate of wages, diligently
avoiding any low paid work on the farms of the 'border' districts. Verity, at Middeldrift, specifically observed that when work was offered by the Government in road building at 6 pence per day (i.e. 12 shillings per month, or approximately equal to the farm wage of 10 to 15 shillings per month):

"not a single native from this district is known to have availed himself of the offer, able bodied men and youths preferring to remain in idleness and semi-starvation at home." (35)

The wage offered of 6 pence per day was thought by the men of the locations to be 'a huge joke.'

The 1880s and 1890s were a critical period of struggle on the labour market. The people of the locations perceived clearly enough that the Government was attempting to drive them to work. They wished, mostly, to gain a living from the land. What they needed was more land. Withholding from the labour market was the one real bargaining card left to them. At the beginning of January 1884 the railway contractors working on the Molteno line came to Middledrift to recruit 300 workers. They offered 3 shillings per day. A meeting was called in the location to discuss the matter, but not a single worker subsequently came forward. (36) Later in 1884 the Jaggersfontein Diamond Company tried to obtain 300 workers on six months contracts at the same wage and was similarly unsuccessful.

The reasons given to the Government Clerk, King, for the refusal to work was that experience had shown them that on the diamond mines and the railway compounds they had to buy their food from special shops, which overcharged, and that all sorts of other deductions and charges were made from their wages. At the end of a month's work the worker was handed only "a few shillings". (37) From this it would seem clear that a definite perception of the importance of the determination of wages and working conditions prevailed in the minds of the potential recruits in the locations, who carefully weighed every offer. They were prepared to use the physical base of the locations to resist bad conditions and low
wages. They could however, only do this at the expense of the very standard of living they were trying to protect.

By 1885, after another year of drought the resistance had, for the moment, to give way and workers left the locations in large numbers.

The effect of the drought of 1884-1885 was intensified by the Government's refusal to allow people to trek with their stock in search of grazing. (38) Bottled up in their locations they slowly starved. Dick at Tamacha was the only magistrate to protest against these oppressive restrictions placed on the people. Early in 1886, Dick, surveying the condition of the households, recognised the decisive downward shift that had occurred.

"The droughts of the last three or four years have caused severe losses in all kinds of stock, and it is sad to know that a people who a few years ago were fairly wealthy in all kinds of stock are now reduced nearly to the condition of paupers ..."(39)

The locations had, by 1886, come through 8 years of uneven harvest, intermittent drought - culminating finally in severe drought. The shift of emphasis from pastoralism to arable agriculture and the consequent competition for land and its unequal distribution had created a surplus of labour. Many households, which, because of lack of sufficient land of good quality and insufficiency of implements, could not meet their consumption requirements through cultivation, added to the extent of rural under-employment. The effects of drought and the loss of most of the stock, through death or debt, led to an increase in the number of proletarianised households.

There remained, however, a deep-seated resistance to proletarianisation which manifested itself in a refusal to work and a willingness to suffer declining levels of subsistence. This refusal was based on the estimation that the level of subsistence that could be sustained through working (given the attendant mishaps to which workers were vulnerable) was not much higher than
that which could be obtained in the locations. By 1898 the reality of this struggle had penetrated to the Government officials in the locations. In that year Bousefield reported from East London:

"food supply is bad, the only grain harvested this year was Kafir corn and that is about finished. Imported mielies can be bought at from 7 shillings and 6 pence per 100 lbs; although food is scarce, the majority of natives refuse to work, and as long as they have a mouthful of food will not work ..."  
(40) (emphasis added)

Where people did go out to work, it was ever further afield in search of the highest possible wages, while the local demand for labour went unsatisfied. From Kwelera location it was reported:

"Most of the able bodied natives are out in employment at different parts. Locally labour is not plentiful, the natives preferring to work further afield, where a higher wage is obtainable ..."  
(41)

From these impressions it may be concluded that the emergence of labour migrations over long distances was associated with very strong attempts by the people of the locations to sustain the wage rate. These attempts to regulate the level of wages in the capitalist sector through the subsistence base provided by the locations, depended to a large extent on the particular conditions of production that prevailed in the locations. The close of the century from 1898 to 1900 was to see the re-emergence of severe drought, in conjunction with strong attempts by the Witwatersrand gold mines to lower the rate of wages. (42) In East London, King William's Town and other districts the people determined to grit their teeth and refuse to accept 'cheap labour' rates. The magistrates and Inspectors of Native Locations watched in disbelief as the struggle intensified:

"A number of natives did not reap a single bag this season. Those that have a little food are lying about their huts, and will not work so long as any food remains. I have impressed upon them the necessity of everyone starting work at once to earn
money to hire cattle to plough their lands, when the drought breaks up ... There need be no starvation as there is a great demand for labour all over the country ... but they stand out for higher wages and will not work under 1/6d per diem and their food ..." (43)

While the resistance held out spasmodically, and was particularly in evidence at the end of the century, long distance migration had become the dominant reality for the members of most households. Declining levels of subsistence were ultimately to lead to the emergence of regular wage work as a permanent feature of household subsistence patterns.

The effects of the Colonial economy on the households were to remain persistently negative no matter what agricultural conditions prevailed. The breaking of the drought in the 1886-87 season was to bring fresh trials upon the beleaguered households. Excellent rains, combined with extensive ploughing of all available arable land and considerable attempts to ensure a winter crop in 1886, led to bumper harvests. The harvest of 1886-87 was superb and it was, briefly, known as "Iminyaka Ndybo", the year of plenty. The result of the unexpectedly large harvest was that the price of grain brought to the traders for sale plummeted. Dick observed:

"I do not think there has been such a heavy yield for more than 10 years ... but extremely low prices are ruling for all descriptions of stock and grain. The bewilderment of the native mind in regard to the difference in the price of grain now as compared with last year, must be seen to be realised. Why they should receive four shillings per bag for grain which last year they had to pay from forty to fifty shillings for is a problem in the law of supply and demand which is painfully beyond their comprehension to solve." (44)

Far from being "beyond their comprehension" the people observed, only too acutely, the injustice of the "law of supply and demand".
In consequence they decided to keep the grain that they could not sell at a reasonable price, make huge quantities of beer from the sorghum and have a long celebration of the harvest. Herein lies one of the origins of the so called "liquor problem" which so exercised the minds of liberals in the late 1890s. (45)

Needless to say the labour market which had obtained several thousand men per year from the Ciskei in 1880-1886 was suddenly reduced to a mere trickle. The shortage was not to last long. There was a deep bitterness and frustration with low prices of grain and this took an increasingly political shape. From Peddie it was reported:

"the natives have this year discarded wheat to a great extent, as a good proportion of them labour under a mistaken idea that they do not get such good prices for it as Europeans, simply because they are natives." (46)

The result was that while there was plenty of grain, there was a shortage of money. Cash was urgently needed by most households to pay off debts to the Government for taxes and to traders for grain and commodities purchased on credit during the drought, and to pay debts which poorer households owed to richer ones. The attitude, first apparent in Peddie, of refraining from the commodity market in the face of low prices spread to other districts. In the 1887-88 season it was reported from East London that:

"The natives generally are not ploughing and sowing so largely this season as they have in the past. They say they have sufficient grain on hand for food and that at the low prices at present obtainable it does not pay them to grow for the market ..." (47)

Having experienced the effects of large harvests on prices, the incentive to produce was being steadily eroded. At the same time there were increasing numbers of households incapable of increasing production because of lack of arable land, seed, ploughs and labour. Magistrates who had so eloquently described the effects of large harvests on prices persisted in ascribing
reduced cultivation to "laziness". Many households were clinging to levels of subsistence which were often staggeringly low. This capacity for resistance exasperated the magistrates. Wrote the magistrate at Port Elizabeth:

"The scarcity of labour is the subject of complaint from all sides; ... the native will not work while his moderate wants can be supplied ..." (48)

Not only was the market for grain depressed, but the market for all kinds of stock was equally so. Those wishing to sell were forced to hawk their stock around from district to district and even then often found a buyer only at half the value of the stock or less. (49) The decision to sell stock was often not voluntary. It was necessitated by the years of drought, the shortages of seed and the accumulated debts of the households.

Withdrawal and withholding from both the commodity and the labour markets could only be a temporary strategy in the struggle to sustain wage rates and maintain commodity prices. The operation of economic forces within the locations and the sustained effects of the Colonial economy, together with demographic and natural factors were working against the households. Many had to continue to sell grain to realise cash. The effect of low prices was to force households to part with more grain than they would otherwise have sold. This situation was aggravated further by many traders who began to refuse to give cash for grain, insisting instead on payment in kind. The sale of grain was ceasing to be a source of cash. (50) In consequence, in 1888 at the height of the "good years" 7 381 people left the King William's Town District alone, over 2 000 of whom were proceeding to employment. (51)

The 1889-1890 harvest was drastically lower than that of the three preceding years. The following year the harvest was a failure. Some households still had grain stored in pits which was rapidly broken out when conditions of scarcity once more returned. In 1890 the number of men leaving the Middledrift district in search of work had risen to 2 423. This represented nearly one person
from each of the 2,455 households in the district. In 1891 the number of workers leaving Middledrift had risen to over 3,000, and 2,500 left the Tamacha district on fixed contracts. From Victoria East, which had a total population of 3,393, nearly 1,000 men went to work on railway construction. These workers were still expecting, and were promised, 2 shillings and 6 pence per day on the railway works and diamond mines. Those involved in sheep shearing were contracted for 6 or 7 shillings per 100 sheep sheared. (53)

While wages remained relatively high on the diamond fields, on the burgeoning gold mines and the railway works, local agriculture remained depressed and unable to compete. Venables, a Field Cornet and farmer in East London, told the magistrate Fleischer that he had to use "some persuasion" to get tenants on his and other farms to work, even when he offered 1 shilling per day. (54) Farmers were generally still offering young boys 6 shillings and men up to 15 shillings per month. (55) All the Field Cornets in East London agreed that there was an expectation amongst workers of 2 shillings to 2 shillings and 6 pence per day, and that until the rate of wages on the mines and railway works was reduced they would not be able to get workers. However at least one of the Inspectors of Native Locations was moved to comment:

"It is difficult to conceive how a man can live honestly and support a family on 10 shillings a month. I trust I am not exceeding my duty in adding that I have noticed that those who pay their servants the least expect the most of them ..." (56)

This sentiment was echoed by Liefeldt, the Inspector of Native Locations at Victoria East, who felt the only way to ensure the supply of labour for agricultural work was to increase the wages. (57) A rich farmer, W.H. Atwell, told Liefeldt that he had no difficulty in recruiting 800 men over 3 months of harvesting at a rate of 2 shillings and 6 pence per day. Middledrift, which had, during the lifetime of the Chief Kama, been considered a "model" location (measured primarily in terms of the amount of hut tax collected) emerged as the largest supplier of labour in the King
William's Town District. In 1891-1892 nearly 8 000 people left
the district either in search of employment or on fixed
contracts. (58)

As workers began discovering the pitfalls of long-distance labour
migrations, there were those who were prepared to opt for the
relative security of working within a day or two's walk from home,
in a known social environment, which still held out the prospect
of the acquisition of stock and the use of the farmers' grazing.
It was frequently reported that desertions from the railway works
were common because of ill-treatment, the non-payment of promised
wages, and the expense of buying provisions from the concession
stores which still overcharged tremendously. (59)

Despite these setbacks, by 1893 reports were eagerly listened to
of conditions in the Transvaal on the gold fields, as prospective
workers weighed up the risks of making the long trek north. With
the opening of the railway line to the Witwatersrand from the Cape
late in 1892, more and more workers began to make this journey.
The opening of the railway coincided with a period of further
rapid deterioration in the locations.

Poor rains and plagues of locusts, followed by flash floods, did
severe damage to crops in all districts in the 1892-1893 season.
The Field Cornets in the East London district reported by late
1982 "that a scarcity of food exists is an undoubted fact ..."
(60) The traders were again, as in 1885, asking up to 45
shillings for a bag of mealies. Because of the effects of Red
Water disease on the stock and the need to sell cattle for grain,
both for consumption purposes and for seed, many households did
not possess a single head of stock for long periods of time. The
high price of mealies made wage work the only possible way of
gaining a bare minimum of subsistence. From Victoria East,
Liefeldt reported that there was only a very small amount of grain
left, most households not having a single bag of mealies or
sorghum and very few having more than five bags. (61) The
consequence was that by late 1893 young men were beginning to
leave in large groups for the gold fields.
In Victoria East it was reported that:

"Nearly all the young men have gone to Kimberley and Johannesburg and continually send money by post office orders to their parents and families for the purpose of buying grains." (62)

The remittance economy had, by 1893, truly arrived. The ensuing years favoured its rapid growth. The 1895-96 season, wrote Dick, "threatens to be one of the very worst experienced since 1884, known as the year of famine ..." (63) Now another tune began to be heard in the locations. Labour recruiting agents in the King William's Town District found that they could not obtain a single man, because there were no able-bodied men who had not already gone to work. (64) A lot of money was arriving at the Post Office at Tamacha and fraudulent claims for money became common. Dick was required to provide "certificates of identity" before money orders could be cashed.

While this compulsion to work existed many thousands trekked to the centres of employment. However the reports of their experiences there soon became a major disincentive to further such migrations. The returning migrants complained of appalling conditions on the Witwatersrand and the many attempts to cut wage rates previously agreed upon. They were robbed, arrested under the Pass Laws, had 'fines' illegally extorted from them by police, were subject to rackets in the issuing and charging of vaccination certificates and were defrauded of ticket fare on the railways. (65)

Pass officials operated a 'protection' racket, renting passes at 2 shillings per month. If a worker failed to pay, his pass was confiscated and he was liable to arrest. On the railways, ticket sellers overcharged and failed to issue proper tickets, pocketing the money themselves - the workers then having to pay again when discovered without a ticket. The effects of these reports circulating in the locations began to worry the magistrates, who by this time appreciated the strength of worker resentment to such conditions. The magistrate in Victoria East wrote anxiously.
"A large number of natives from here have gone to the Johannesburg gold mines under contract and as by these means many are able to find work, I should be sorry if anything serious should be believed which would ... lead to their refusing employment in that direction ..." (66)

For a short while a distinct reluctance to go to the gold mines, reminiscent of the spirit of the 1880s, was evident. From Keiskamma Hoek it was reported:

"previously large bodies of men used to go to the Transvaal gold mines, native labour agents having no difficulty in securing them in batches of one hundred for that purpose, but lately they have been afraid to engage themselves ..." (67)

The incidence of crop failure, locusts, and rinderpest between 1896 and 1900 was rapidly to ensure that no matter what people believed about conditions on the gold mines, they would have to work there. In 1896 the locusts were particularly severe and people were forced to sell their stock to buy food. From East London it was reported:

"The natives are selling their stock to buy food. Some who ploughed early are living on pumpkins ... but many others are badly in want, which is the means of making them leave their homes and go in search of work ... The young men are leaving in batches every week for the Gold Fields ..." (68)

Despite the opposition to the bad treatment the men received on the mines it was reported that, in 1896, 2,346 men left Keiskamma Hoek and about 4,000 left the Middledrift district in search of employment. More than 8,000 left for employment from King William's Town as a whole, many of whom went to Johannesburg:

"from where they remitted to their friends here considerable sums of money." (69)
The rinderpest had already broken out in the Transvaal in 1896 and its arrival in the Cape was anticipated. Anticipated or not, there was little that could be done to contain it when it did arrive suddenly in July 1897. In East London at least 75% of all cattle died from rinderpest. (70) The rinderpest, by removing those few cows that poor households depended on for their supply of milk, caused starvation and misery. From Fort Jackson it was reported:

"The children are beginning to look thin and haggard, as milk can only be obtained from goats, which are being bought at from 20 shillings to 30 shillings each." (71)

Not even the goats remained unaffected by the general blight. Large numbers died from foot-rot and gall-sickness that set in amongst them.

In 1898 at least 8 000 men left the King William's Town district officially. "A great many more" observed Dick, "now travel by rail and men proceeding to the Transvaal seldom bother about procuring passes." (72) People journeyed to all possible centres of employment. Of the 1 988 men who left Middledrift officially in 1897, 588 went to Johannesburg, 317 to Cape Town, 266 to Port Elizabeth, 75 to Kimberley, 274 to Graaff-Reinet and the remainder to other agricultural centres in the midlands and Western Cape. (73) Men continued to travel to the Witwatersrand gold fields despite a 30% reduction in wages which occurred in 1897 after the formation of the Native Labour Supply Organisation. (74) This clearly indicated that the resistance, which was still possible in the mid 1880s and early 1990s, was completely impossible by the end of the century.

Drought and pestilence had an unequal effect on the households. Whereas small households contending with rinderpest, locusts and droughts could well have been left without a single asset, the larger ones still retained some stock, which had a natural resistance to disease, or had been successfully inoculated. (75) In Healdtown it was found that:
Some have lost their all, others who could boast of two or three spans of cattle have not a fourth of that number left." (76)

The people made enormous efforts to continue cultivation during the rinderpest epidemic. Some combined their few remaining oxen and ploughed with them until they dropped dead in the yoke. Many others were forced to return to the hoe to cultivate their lands. (77)

From 1880 to 1890 the mass of households in the locations experienced the effects of the contradiction between small agricultural allotments and the limited land base for expansion open to them. This contradiction could only lead to impoverishment. It was the clear intention of the Colonial State that this process should be allowed to continue to its conclusion - the proletarianisation and immiseration of blacks in South Africa. The struggle against proletarianisation, and more especially low wages, had itself contributed to lowering the level of subsistence in the locations, which had rapidly become impoverished. Even the most 'liberal' of the magistrates clearly saw, and welcomed, the implications. In 1891, Dick had written:

"They will cling to the life which consorts so well with their ideas and so will continue crowding the locations until the land will sustain no more and then the surplus population will be compelled by the sheer force of the law of self-preservation to go out and earn their living by the sweat of their brow ..." (78)

The struggle to maintain the rate of wages that had previously prevailed in the 1850s, 60s and 70s was a class struggle, conducted by a semi-proletarianised rural population striving to sustain their standard of living. That they failed to do so had great consequences for the development of the South African economy, for it lowered the material and so-called 'moral' value of a black person's labour power. (79) It assisted in the determination of a very low minimum of nutrition and basic
comforts which rapidly became the historically accepted norm for
the employment of black workers in the 20th century. The
struggles of the 1880s and '90s described above were thus of the
utmost significance for the future economic development of South
Africa.

III State Intervention and Economic Relationships Between
Households

It would be wrong to give the impression that drought and
pestilence were, in the context of the inherently poor
agricultural prospects of most households, the sole cause of
proletarianisation. State intervention played a part in this
process.

With the rebellion and drought of 1879 large arrears of unpaid hut
tax and quit-rent had piled up. In Middledrift district alone, by
1881 there was 5 893 pounds and 10 shillings outstanding, and by
1882 there was 9 000 pounds of unpaid hut taxes in the Tamacha
district. Since the passing of Act 2 of 1869 the magistrates had
the power to seize stock from households in arrears with their
payments. In his last six months as Ngqika magistrate, Charles
Brownlee had made wide use of these powers, and they had been
intermittently used in the 1870s by Liefeldt.

The magistrate, Dick, in the Tamacha district was determined to
take action against the large number of defaulters. Throughout
1883 he issued summonses and confiscated cattle. To redeem their
cattle, households had not only to pay the arrear taxes, but also
2 shillings and 6 pence as court messenger fees for the issuing of
the summons. By December 1883, he had collected 5 540 pounds, the
"greater portion" of which was obtained through confiscations. (80)

The effects of the downward shift in the aggregate position of the
households was clearly revealed in a sudden and unexpected
obstacle to this method of tax collection. Dick found that:
"many young and able bodied men pleaded inability to pay, and having no stock to seize, their taxes remain un-paid. The men have huts and gardens for which they pay nothing, to the exclusion of better men ... and while contributing little or nothing to the revenue they are the principle cause of the scarcity of labour ... I have every reason to believe that the class alluded to exist in considerable numbers in nearly every large location." (81)

It is clear from this that taxation and proletarianisation were very closely linked. It was through the effects of taxation on the poor households, usually of newly married men, that large numbers of workers could be obtained. But first they had to be made to pay. The enforcement of taxation ensured that living standards declined more sharply for the poor. While it was always possible for households to suffer declining levels of subsistence in the struggle to resist proletarianisation, it was not possible through this essentially passive struggle to obtain cash. The sale of stock, often at ruinously low prices, to obtain cash for taxation placed the life support of some households in great jeopardy.

The extensive use of summary legal process to obtain arrear taxes rapidly developed into a political problem. Fielding, Dicks counterpart in the Middledrift district, did not share his enthusiasm for the use of summary process as a means of obtaining taxes. He wrote:

"there is a great difficulty in the way. In seizing stock you are just as likely to seize animals belonging to any other person as from those you desire to do so ..." (82)

As many stock were held on loan by poor households from richer ones, this situation often prevailed.

Act 37 of 1884 confirmed the powers of specially appointed Hut Tax Collectors to seize stock in lieu of payment of hut tax, which, if
not redeemed within 14 days, were to be sold (any balance to be
returned to the owner). All through the desperate years of
drought from 1884 to 1886 the magistrates, far from granting
concessions in the payment of taxes, were empowered to proceed
more rigorously than ever in enforcing payment of taxes. In 1886,
at the height of the drought, the Reverend Ross of Pirie mission
station told Dick:

"The name of Government is being made to stink in the
nostrils of the people by the acts of some of its
officers in carrying out and executing stock
seizures ..."(83)

An article in the Kaffrarian Watchman confirmed:

"The complaints of Natives against the collectors in
connection with the summary seizing of stock are
almost of painful frequency, and scarcely
suppressed threats which are beginning to be heard
to every side, bode little good to the collectors
themselves or the future peace of the country ..."
(84)

At the beginning of 1887 a deputation was sent to Dick requesting
a postponement of the final date for payment of the arrear taxes.
The Secretary for Native Affairs denied this request. (85) The
people had every reason to protest, for in the aftermath of one of
the worst droughts in memory, Dick had 21 special messengers
employed serving writs to attach cattle and other property. Dick
was perfectly aware that many households had sold almost all their
stock during the drought and retained only one or two cows for
milking. (86) The collectors went so far as to take bags of grain
which had been purchased for over 30 shillings, thereby literally
taking the food from the mouths of the people. (87) In addition,
as Fielding had expected, it frequently occurred that cattle was
wrongfully attached:

"Stock is passed from one to another to evade payment
... but this does not, I maintain, justify a
collector in seizing or attaching the property of
one man for the debts of another ... and it is this
that exasperates them ..." (88)
The people objected to the provision of Act 20 of 1878 which allowed the Hut Tax Collector to charge a 5 shilling grazing fee on any cattle seized. In Middledrift district, one De Beer, who was solely employed in making cattle seizures, was actually illegally charging people 5 shillings in cash in advance for the grazing costs, whereas the law stipulated that the money should be recovered from the sale of the stock. (89) Even Dick and Chalmers regarded this as unjustified. In October 1885, out of 187 payments of hut tax received only 15 were voluntary. However the majority of the people managed to redeem their stock before it was sold, only at the expense of incurring further debts to traders or to richer neighbours.

The effects of taxation pursued the households relentlessly. The laws governing the use of summary process to recover taxes had been tightened up by Act 37 of 84. In addition, Act 20 of 1878 had introduced a 10 shilling House Duty. The dual operation of hut tax and house duty created a good deal of confusion. The hut tax was in fact a land tax and was the equivalent in the locations of the more conventionally named quit-rent, paid in surveyed areas such as Healdtown. (90) The House Duty Act of 1878 introduced a 10 shilling tax "on the united value of two huts within a radius of fifty yards from the centre of the principal hut." The minimum tax payable by each household with arable lands was therefore 1 pound per annum. A polygamous household with two arable allotments would have to pay 10 shillings on each arable lot and 10 shillings house duty. Because of the rebellion and drought it had been impossible to recover the taxes, but from mid 1885 strenuous efforts were made to claim all money owed. Whereas in Tamacha, in 1885, Dick had been loath to remove a household's last cow, by 1898 use of summary procedure had extended so far as to lead to the attachment of "even the very cooking pots" before arrears were accepted as irrecoverable. (91) Land was removed from the possession of households which had not paid their rent and was re-allotted. Although the magistrates had no power to actually expel households from the locations, they brought great pressure on those who through poverty, ill fortune and lack of
political connections were unable to pay. Taxation and proletarianisation were therefore closely linked.

However the effects of taxation, by placing great emphasis on the acquisition of money, also stimulated other developments in the locations. When the grain price fell in 1886 and 1887, the households had to find a lucrative outlet for their grain which they could not sell to the traders except at ruinously low prices. Consequently many took to brewing that part of their harvest which they wished to dispose of into beer and selling it in the locations. There was a limit to the number of ad hoc beer drinks that could respectably be held. To cope with the increased amount of beer available for consumption, those occasions at which beer was normally drunk, such as at the end of the male and female initiation ceremonies, weddings etc. were eagerly seized upon. The period of celebration associated with them was lengthened to allow for the consumption of more beer.

This very quickly led to complaints from farmers that prolonged festivities affected their scanty labour supply. In 1891, Dick recommended to Ayliff the curtailing, through prohibitive legislation, of "the continuing of the period of the novitiates probation" (in male and female initiation ceremonies) in order to cut down on the time consumed by these ceremonies. (92) In due course an "Abakweta and Intonjane Dances Prohibition" Act No 19 of 1892, was passed by the Cape Parliament which quickly drew the thanks of the Colonial farmers. Field Cornet Liddle in East London, where the Act had been strictly enforced by the vindictive magistrate Fleischer, wrote:

"I am thankful that the Intonjane Dance Act has been enforced in this District, as this business has been a very great hindrance to the farmers obtaining labour, more especially young boys." (93)

The opposition to the "Abakweta and Intonjane Dance Prohibition" Act provided a political focus in the locations. It fell to the headmen to voice the opposition of the people to the Act. A series
of meetings was held in most locations in the Ciskei, and Dick wrote anxiously:

"The people as a whole - both Kaffir and Fingoes - are deeply moved at the idea of the Dances being stopped, and their professed intention is not to submit to the law ..." (94)

There was general disbelief that the Government was serious in its intentions. Leading headmen spoke of rebellion or flight rather than submission. Dick pointed out that pressure of the Government on the people was very great at that time and this new measure could be the last straw needed to precipitate a major conflict:

"the natives are being sharply reminded of the presence of government by the numerous prosecutions under the Location Act, Forest and Vagrant Acts which may lead many of them to think they were being thrashed with scorpions ..." (95)

On the 6th June 1894, 34 people were actually arrested for participating in prohibited dances and were subsequently convicted by the magistrate at East London. (96) Petitions were organised appealing for the abolition of the Act; the feelings of the petitioners being that "without these customs, we remain deaf and dumb, as if we were slaves, our lives being an intolerable burden to us ..." (97) The author of this petition, one Mnyeliso, was the son of the headman. He was described by the magistrate as a "well-known agitator". However the Government was able to persuade the headman, W. Kama, to call a meeting at which he explained that it was not the ceremonies that were outlawed, but only the dances and beer drinks associated with them. For good measure King at Middledrift saw to it that no passes were granted for the purpose of getting palm leaves and white clay which were necessary adjuncts of the ceremonies. (98)

In deference to the opposition that it received, the Prohibition Act was allowed to fade quietly away, but it exemplifies the role of the headmen in this period. They had become the key organising force in the locations. Without their support there was little that any individual could do, either economically or politically.
While in some instances the headmen would recognise the popular mood, politically they believed that obedience to the Colonial State was their only course of action.

In 1889, some of the chiefs who had been imprisoned after the Rebellion were released and allowed to settle in the Transkei. There they began to agitate for the recognition of their status. As these chiefs had connections in the Mdushane (Siwani), and other locations in the Ciskei this greatly perturbed the headmen. A deputation told Chalmers in King William's Town that the chiefs, especially Sandille's son, were:

"evidently working to resume the Chieftainship among the natives and that they see great future mischief and danger in the course being pursued."

It was proposed to send a delegation of headmen to the chiefs to advise them:

"in plain terms that they are no longer chiefs and that the people do not wish to recognise them as chiefs, but acknowledge themselves to be subjects of the Government." (99)

Chalmers, in a spirit of exultation, wrote that this unsolicited action proved that "we have loyal men who will neither countenance nor encourage any intrigues against the Government by either their deposed chiefs or by their countrymen, and that these loyal men are a great power in our hands and ought in every way to be encouraged ..." (100) The headmen were clearly very important politically to the Colonial State. They were conscious that they had taken over the functions of the chiefs, and that with the help of the Colonial State they would be able to prevent the legitimate chiefs from re-emerging. While the headmen exercised some of the powers associated with the chiefs, they were in fact an entirely new creation of the changed economic and political circumstances of the times.

The power exercised by the headmen was not based purely on their political relationship with, and the support of, the Colonial State. It rested on the control they exercised in the allocation
of land. In 1890 Verity, the Clerk in Charge at Tamacha, wrote to the Civil Commissioner in King William's Town, commenting on a land dispute brought to him on appeal:

"Headmen in tribal locations have exercised the right of allotting lands for thirty-five years. I am unable to say who gave them that authority." (101)

It was almost with a sense of shock that the Government realised to what extent effective control had passed into the hands of the headmen. Verity's remark worked its way up the channels to the Secretary for Native Affairs in Cape Town, who ordered an enquiry into the powers exercised by the headmen, in the allocation of lands in particular, and their general functions. At the same time a directive to all magistrates was issued ordering that the practice of allotment of lands by headmen "be at once checked and discontinued ..." (102)

The response of the magistrates was highly revealing. Their leading spokesman, Dick, wrote that giving effect to "this injunction in the exact terms in which it is conveyed would ... be productive of much discontent in the minds of the people ... arising principally from its impracticability ..." (103) Dick chose to interpret the Secretary for Native Affairs orders as meaning only that the headmen should be prevented from assuming functions which would "practically give them control of their people without reference to government or its offices." This did not mean that they could not or did not exercise control. As Dick plainly stated, it only meant that such control should not conflict with the interests of the Colonial State. Dick had, himself, earlier provided evidence that control was to be found with the headmen.

Since 1886 the Colonial State had been seeking ways of reducing expenditure because world depression at the time had reduced revenue and the State had incurred large railway debts. One such way seemed, to the bureaucrats in Cape Town, to be to cut back on the number of paid headmen. Dick and the other magistrates were
quick to disillusion them. Dick in particular was against any reduction, and carefully recalled the origins and position of the headmen:

"By judicious offers of salaries or gratuities to the principal men in the tribe, they were induced to receive Magistrates among them and forego the right of hearing and determining cases at their kraals. Without the payment to these Amapakati and principal men, it is extremely doubtful whether the object could have been achieved as they constituted a formidable power in the tribe ... It is the bulk of these men who now comprise the list of headmen in the district and whose retrenchment is under consideration." (104) (emphasis added)

Dick clearly saw that the headmen represented a continuity, (albeit in changed circumstances) between the class structure of the old Xhosa social formation and the contemporary class structure of the households under Colonial domination. While the objective conditions in terms of which the power of the dominant households was shaped had changed, so that ownership of ploughs and cattle, hiring and loaning of cattle, land and implements were now the dominant reality, the substance of that power remained. Dick was supported by Chalmers who wrote with almost passionate conviction that:

"most of the headmen who now figure as such in the Tamacha and Middle Drift districts are the remnants of the machinery whereby we have achieved such great success in native matters; they are the men through whose instrumentality and loyalty to us in the past we have succeeded so well in completely undermining and overthrowing the highly dangerous power and influence of the chiefs. We must not forget that it is entirely through the instrumentality of these men that we have secured to ourselves the entire management of the native tribes. My advice therefore to the Government is to leave well alone. It is still through the
instrumentality of the headmen, and will be so for a long time to come, that we shall retain a proper hold on the native population ... They are a strong power in our hands and we must not do anything to alienate them from us, otherwise we may force them to be as strong and bitter a power against us as they have hitherto been for us ..." (105)

The number of headmen had grown consistently. By 1886 there were 8 headmen in Keiskamma Hoek, 34 in Middle Drift and 65 in Tamacha district. (106) Of the 107 headmen in King William's Town District as a whole, at least 48 were appointed before 1860. They were from amongst Sir G. Grey's original appointees at the time of the cattle-killing. The rest had been appointed at various times, usually as successors to their fathers who had been the original incumbents.

The number of households under the control of a single headman varied considerably. In the Ntinde location, Tamacha district, they averaged 36 households each and the headmen received between 3 and 4 pounds per month for their services. In Siwani's location each headman was in charge of about 66 households; the largest location, under the Headman 'Doni', had 167 households. (107)

The great scarcity of arable land of good quality increased the importance of the headmen's role in its allocation. The power to decide on the allocation of land was the base on which the power of the headmen was built. Dick distinguished four categories of cases in which allotment of land occurred:

(i) to newcomers;
(ii) to newly married young men who were the sons of residents;
(iii) to residents who claimed to have a right to inherit land on the death of the former possessor;
(iv) to residents who claimed an extension of their lots. (108)

A fifth category commonly occurred in which a decision was called for in a case of land loaned in whole or part by its possessor to someone else. In such cases the refusal to relinquish possession
often occurred. Once the headmen enjoyed the right to make these crucial decisions, it was a small step to expect from each applicant a certain payment for the successful completion of an allotment.

Many examples of this may be cited. The magistrate in Glen Grey, enquiring into the conduct of headman Mankai Tabata, wrote:

"I am aware that often people do make payments to the Headmen for acting in land disputes. A common charge would be 7 shillings for any service etc. performed, although sometimes only 2 shillings & 6 pence was charged ..."(109)

Bovani Mabanhla, the powerful (and popular) headman in Keiskamma Hoek, was well-known for charging for land allocation. The deposition made against Mabanhla by one Malgas clearly reveals the possibilities inherent in the position of the headmen.

"I arrived here last year (1884) when they were reaping the Kaffir Corn. I don't belong to these locations and have no right here; I did not report myself at the office; I went to Bovani Mabanhla and asked him to give me land; he pointed out a measured land and said I must pay 3 pounds. I paid him the 3 pounds ... I believe the land was surveyed for Maqadaza, whom Bovani drove away and is now across the Kei. Bovani also gave me another land that Mata used to plough. Bovani is now demanding 2 pounds 17 shillings & 6 pence from me for this second land. I refused and demanded the Government receipts for the first 3 pounds I paid him; he sees I have a good crop of Kaffir Corn, and he is driving me away ..." (110)

While the charges against Mbanhla were never proved they pointed to the ability of the headmen to profit from their position. One of the most convincing cases of the utilisation of land allocation to extract money from the household involved Headman Mayi Neku,
Tamacha district. Charges were laid by John Raunga against Neku. The charges, accepted by the Court on sworn statements from witnesses, were that it had been Neku's rule for many years to enforce payment from residents and newcomers in his location "for the privilege of cultivating government ground." 18 witnesses, including Raunga, testified to having paid from 5 shillings and 6 pence to 1 pound 4 shillings for their land to Neku. (111)

In addition it was charged that Neku had regularly held enquiries into civil and criminal cases and inflicted fines which he appropriated for himself. Examples given by numerous witnesses included a fine of a sheep for fighting; 5 shillings in a marital dispute; a sheep, a goat and a young ox in a libel case and so on. In addition Neku gave permission for the cutting of wattles in a crown forest, which was a contravention of the Forest Act, in return for 2 bottles of brandy.

Once the headmen had begun to make charges for the allocation of land it was only a small step to the institution of their own courts. In December 1892 charges were brought against headman Mdito, Tamacha district, for convicting a man on a charge of rape. Mdito was offered two goats, a kid, a shilling and a young ox by the family of the accused to try the case. Dick, in calling for the dismissal of Mdito commented:

"As there is a growing tendency on the part of headmen generally to constitute themselves as Judicial tribunals, I am of opinion that a severe example should be made." (112)

The opposition of the Colonial State to the exercising of judicial and other powers by the headmen reflected the persistent feeling amongst senior officials that they did not really control the locations on a day to day basis. Realising their reliance on the headmen, they were reluctant to let the one formal instrument of power they did possess, namely the courts, slip from their hands as well.
The peculiar position occupied by the headmen, standing as they did between the mass of households and the Government, led to the politicisation of the post of the headman itself. This was expressed in the development of intense disputes over the headmanship and the emergence of "factions" supporting rival claimants for the position. In 1897 a group of residents of Cata's 'village', near Keiskamma Hoek, petitioned the Secretary for Native Affairs requesting the removal of their headman Zazine. They set out the requirements of a "good headman" as they saw it:

(i) That he enjoy the confidence of both Government and the people;
(ii) that the headmen should be independent of the people in regard to their livelihood in order to prevent them from falling into the hands and under the influence of designing persons;
(iii) that headmen be impartial and "possess at least some power of reasoning and common sense." Headman Zazine was, concluded the petitioners, "devoid of all the qualifications above mentioned." (113)

The petition was organised by Solomon Jama, a rival claimant for the post of headman and his henchman John Tele.

In all of these early factional disputes, competing claims to arable land were found to be the underlying factor in the conflict. Where there was a church presence in a location the dispute often took the form of a clash between rival church groupings. These conflicts could become particularly intense when church allegiance coincided with Xhosa and Mfengu splits. In Sinxo's location, Middledrift, the headman Sinxo was excommunicated from the Church of England because of his divorce in 1897. He joined the Baptists and about 30 other families also left the Church of England at this time. He started a school with the assistance of the Baptists. The Church of England congregation, who still formed a majority in the location, then began encroaching on the land of Sinxo's followers. The Church of England preacher, Malgas, was a Mfengu whereas Sinxo was Xhosa
Gqunukwebe). Malgas held services in Sinxo's territory, which was regarded by the latter as provocation. Sinxo was successfully winning over Church of England members. In order to break Sinxo's hold on the location, Malgas and the magistrate, Verity, decided to apply for a survey of his followers' land without consulting Sinxo and brought forward allegations that the latter made charges for the allocation of land. Sinxo wrote a letter to Malgas expressing his outrage at his actions:

"You have written there (Cape Town, J.L.) asking to Government, begging Amagqunukwebe land, saying you have Church ground which is separate ... Where here is the Church ground? By which authority have you gone to ask Amagqunakwebe land? Are the Church Ministers the preachers of the word here, or are they here to rob the people of their privileges ..." (114)

The headman's control over land allocation, both of arable land and on the commonage; his ability to overlook illegal practices ranging from illicit beer sales to stolen cattle and the (illegal) operation of his own Court, all put considerable power in his hands. If the power of the headmen emanated simply from the manipulation of political position it would not justify seeing the headmen as part of a distinct class within the locations. It is undoubtedly true that the headmen were, in the first instance, dependent upon their political authority in any economic appropriations they were able to exact from the people. However political and economic power cannot be artificially separated. Patronage built up support for a headman. Because land was unequally distributed, the control of land allocation operated both to reproduce the economic polarisation of the household and to place political power in the hands of the headmen.

An example of this process may be seen in Victoria East where headman Nqosha had been allowing squatters (cataza = 'fowl lifters') into his part of the location and settling them on the commonage, where they carved out arable lands from the pasture.
These people had become his clients. Nqosha had many fields and his clients, who owed him a personal debt of gratitude, worked his fields for him. They also organised large beer drinks where much beer was sold as well as dispensed gratuitously. Headman Nqosha described the 'catazas' as his 'fence' and warned that "he who pulls down his fence must beware of the consequences." (115) The presence of this group enjoying the special patronage of headman Nqosha inspired resentment and attempts to unseat him, one of which culminated in court action being taken against Nqosha. The type of coercion used by headman Nqosha was the most common form in which a headman could exercise power - his ultimate sanction being to drive a household out of the location altogether.

The headmen were almost always recruited from the economically dominant strata in the locations. Together with other households of similar substance they controlled the affairs of the location so as to ensure the preservation of their pre-eminent position. However to do this the headmen were required to have at least some support from the less privileged groups. By extending patronage to such groups the headman was assured of active support when he needed it. If unpopular decisions concerning land allocation were made, charges levied, and other appropriations exacted, he could be sure of not encountering much opposition so long as his followers remained loyal. In so far as the headmen extended patronage to some groups amongst the poor households, they also came into conflict with other members of their own class who aspired to the position of headman themselves and who would not infrequently make promises to those excluded from the incumbent's favours to recruit their support in any campaign to unseat the headman. Thus, provided the headmen are not seen as representing the larger households in an undifferentiated way, and the possibilities for utilising the headmen to advance the position of some of the poor households is realised, it is necessary to see the headmen as part of a distinct class, representing the polarised condition of the locations.

The headmen had long realised the necessity of their controlling
land allocation. In 1882 William Kama, the most senior headman in Middledrift district, tried to draw a distinction between "Government headmen" who were headmen "only for the purposes of collecting taxes and tracing the spoor of stolen cattle", and "real headmen": Kama tried to get Government headmen to resign their posts and to recognise him alone in all land allocation. (116) The magistrate Fielding bitterly opposed granting to Kama any power to settle cases or increasing his power in land allocation. The Secretary of Native Affairs saw the difficulty posed by Kama's move in undermining the authority of the Government headmen. In return for Kama writing a letter acknowledging the Government's authority, the Secretary for Native Affairs decided:

"as Kama desires to have a little power in his country, I have agreed to allow him to settle small matters of disputes to garden lands, and other small matters." (117)

It might have seemed like "small matters" to the Colonial State, but the right to decide over land matters was what the headmen were seeking, and was the material relationship which determined their position in the location.

The headmen were not alone or isolated in their position in the location. They were part of a complex set of social relationships which bound together richer and poorer households and reflected the polarised nature of the locations. These relationships were based on the reciprocal obligations which stemmed from debts incurred between households. The existence of debts between households established clear distinctions between borrower and lender. Debts were most often not short term loans of cash, although this did occur. They were usually longer term loans of cattle and sometimes land.

From the earliest cases on record it was apparent that debt played a major role in the economic life of many households. Those debts which ended in litigation in the magistrate's court provide an important insight into the nature of relationships between richer and poorer households.
In a typical case heard by Dick in 1888, Soxentsa sued Longweni for four head of cattle. In 1879, after the rebellion, Longweni asked Soxentsa for the loan of a milk cow "as his children were starving". Soxentsa consulted James Mpuzana who recommended the loan and was witness to it. The cow loaned had produced four calves. Because he was now short of food Soxentsa was demanding the return of his cattle. (118) This was a case of non-repayment of loan (or Ngoma) cattle. The dispute concerned how many of the calves had died, and how much money had been given by the defendant to the plaintiff for the hides of the dead cattle. As a result of the bad conditions for sustaining herds that prevailed from 1880, those who had been in a position to loan cattle at one time often suddenly found themselves in dire need of them. The sudden recall of loaned cattle could have serious consequences for the household giving up the cattle and this could have affected the extent of migrant labour.

Such loan agreements were very common. While there was often no immediate reward to the lender, he was the recipient of the goodwill of the borrower. However, it did often occur that cattle loans increased the efficiency of cattle husbandry and that a household with particularly large cattle holdings had insufficient manpower to effectively look after the herd. There still remained in the locations those households who owned many cattle and for whom a loan agreement was a form of payment for the work of looking after part of a large herd. A description of such an arrangement was given by Humand:

"He asked me to come and fetch some young oxen to breed and take care of. I found the oxen were still calves ... and none had been castrated ... When they were castrated and healed I took them away ... It was distinctly understood that I was taking them at his risk to look after and break in for him and for this service I was to have the use of them for ploughing etcetera. When one ox died of the Lung sickness he got the price of the hide 6 shillings and 9 pence. In that year he also took home the 3 other oxen." (119)
As relationships more frequently assumed a monetary aspect it encouraged the monetarisation of all services performed in the locations. Where households did not possess a cow they would buy milk on a regular basis from someone who agreed to supply it. Often the milk would be given on credit and when the debt was left unpaid it would end in litigation. (120) The usual price was 3 pence per day. People with oxen and ploughs frequently hired them out and often had to sue to reclaim the hire charge. 12 shillings was the usual hire fee for 4 trek oxen, needed for 2 to 3 days to plough a four acre allotment. (121) Fence making around gardens or cattle kraals was performed for a wage of up to 1 pound. In times of famine those with grain offered this in return for such labour. (122) The supply of wattles for hut building was also monetarised. The enforcement of the Forest Acts made it increasingly difficult to obtain timber. It had to be bought from wood-cutters who had a special permit, often obtained through bribing the headman. Wattles for a hut would cost up to 2 pounds 15 shillings, which resulted in debts and litigation. (123) As debt relationships more frequently assumed a monetary aspect, the monetarisation of all services performed in the locations was encouraged.

With increasing proletarianisation came a further breakdown of the homestead structure, increasing the individualisation of the households. Wage work and the accumulation of cattle went hand in hand. This served to increase the independence of younger households, who could acquire cattle through wages rather than loaning them. The effects of wage labour on accumulation were illustrated in several disputes. David Thomas sued his stepfather Thomas Mzimase for cattle and cash that he had left with him while working in East London between 1872 and 1883. (124) In another case, Nikani was sued by his father for 5 head of cattle. This case is of particular interest because it shows the interaction between marriage transactions and wage work. Nikani had worked in King William's Town in 1880 and 1881. From his earnings he had contributed 3 pounds 10 shillings to his sister's wedding. In return he was allotted a cow from the dowry cattle. He received a
cow, a horse and 10 sheep from the dowry of his younger sister who subsequently married. By deft dealing with his previous cow and a foal obtained from the horse, he managed to obtain a red cow, a calf and a grey mare. These increased so that Nikani had by 1890 acquired nine head of cattle as his own. When his father moved residence Nikani took the opportunity to hive off with his wife and children. His father was now suing for the return of the dowry cattle plus the increase therefrom as they were rightly his. (125) The use of kinship links to establish a small herd was still common, but kinship groupings were subject to strong centrifugal forces which speeded up the rate at which they broke up.

Debts and obligations between households for cattle and services affected the extent of proletarianisation and divided households into distinct strata. This was also visible in regard to land cases, where the headman's role was more prominent. They were able to offer assistance to people whom they wished to help. A woman had a 'poor soil' garden. On the death of her husband she managed to obtain one of headman Madwabu's gardens to cultivate. Illustrative of the manner in which headmen not only extended patronage, but also withdrew it from those who were most vulnerable, when Madwabu died the new headman insisted that she give up one of the gardens. (126) While headmen could extend assistance to households, they could also take away land from people who were out of favour. Thus headman Mpindwe received 3 shillings from Sibunwana for allowing him to cultivate some land that had belonged to a Mfengu who left for the Transkei. When Sibanwana was involved in a dispute with relatives of Mpindwe he tried to take away Sibanwana's land. (127)

The question of the headman's power to confiscate land came to the fore over the experience of many migrant workers who went away on 1 year contracts or longer. The headmen often took advantage of cases where the head of the household was absent, to re-allocate a portion of the absent man's land. This occurred particularly where the land lay fallow while the man was away. In the case of
Gqayi vs Headman Nguntsele, Gqayi stated that for many years he had had a garden in Nguntsele's village. In the drought of 1885 he took his cattle to the coast where they died of disease. He had no cattle and had to use a hoe to cultivate and so only used a portion of his land. He share-cropped with Infeke, but in 1886 because of shortage of food he left for work on the railways. While he was away Infeke died and the Headman Nguntsele took possession of the land and gave it to a relative of his. (128)

If land was not used and the head of the household went out to work, the wife and children would survive by working on someone else's land. The headman would take advantage of this circumstance to re-allocate the land to another household. The men on returning would try to recover the lands, but usually without success. (129) There is therefore definite evidence that the headmen had the ability to take advantage of whatever circumstances arose, to take away land and allocate it to someone else.

Sometimes headmen were very explicit about their actions, when pushed into court. Faleni, who had no land, was working for the headman Awa on some land which Awa had repossessed from a person who had accumulated three lands "wrongfully", part of which Awa wanted for himself. (130) Faleni saw the opportunity to claim the land for himself and brought an action against Awa. Dick, who always tried to accommodate the headmen, simply ordered that Awa should find a land somewhere for Faleni, but did not try to contest his right to the confiscated land.

The debts incurred by households could also rob them of some of their land. Melane pledged his garden to Vusani in return for a loan of 1 pound and 10 shillings. When he could not repay the loan, Vusani, with the assistance of headman Buswana, managed to take possession of Melane's land. There is a good deal of evidence to show that by the 1890s some households were losing access to their lands because of the actions of headmen in taking advantage of situations arising from debt, migrant labour and poverty.
In 1890 the Colonial State officially delineated the powers and duties of the headmen as follows: (131)

(i) Every headman was to be nominated by the adult males of his location and the nomination to be confirmed by the Government before it became effective.

(ii) All disputes were to be referred to the magistrates, and all crime reported, the headmen to assist in obtaining evidence against the accused.

(iii) No criminal cases were to be decided on any charge whatever by any headmen.

(iv) The headmen were to receive no fee from any person for any service rendered.

(v) Headmen were to have no power to make any apportionments of land, whether to newcomers, or by way of redistribution. Such apportionment was to be made by the Officers of the Government or by their directions.

(vi) The headmen were not to have the power, under any circumstances, to deprive any one of any land of which such person was in occupation, unless under the direct instruction of a Government Officer.

The headmen had also to control all arrivals and departures from the locations, reporting all such movements to the magistrates; to assist in the collection of tax; enforce forest regulation; report all manufacture of beer in excess quantities. Finally the headmen could be summarily dismissed for the infringement of any of the above instructions, or any other instruction issued by Government.

The headmen were intended by the officials of the Department of Native Affairs to be entirely subservient and passive tools for carrying out its will in the locations. It has already been seen that, up to 1900, many headmen were contravening these regulations on almost every point. Headmen actively promoted their own interests, which were those of the larger households as a whole, and protected and granted favours to their political supporters. Dick had said earlier, when it was desired to prevent the headmen from allocating land, that he interpreted any instruction to this
effect as meaning only that the headmen should not act contrary to Government interests. In fact, the regulations, by incorporating the phrase, "or by their directions" (vide iv above) clearly allowed for the continuation of the de facto practice of the headmen having, for all practial purposes, effective control over the allocation of land.

Between 1890 and 1899 encroachment on the commonages, under the supervision of the headmen, continued apace. Eventually, in 1899, the Government was forced to recognise that a key aspect of its policy - that headmen should not allocate land - was a failure. Regulations were published in terms of Section 29 of the Native Locations Act of 1884 which officially reversed the prohibition on headmen allocating land contained in the 1890 regulations for headmen. It was stipulated that:

"It shall be the duty of the headmen of each location subject to the approval of the Inspector (of Native Locations J.L.) to allot to each inhabitant of such locations, whose name appears on the Hut Tax register, arable land sufficient for the requirements of the households of such inhabitants." (132)

The new regulations were, however, not totally favourable to the headmen. They also stipulated that anyone who enlarged his allotment without permission would be guilty of an offence. It was conceded that this would only apply to future land extensions and all land then under cultivation would be deemed to have been properly allotted. The regulations were also aimed at preventing headmen from interfering with the land of migrant workers - giving them a specific option of leaving their land in the charge of a friend or relative and preventing its appropriation by anyone during their absence.

The recognition of the right of headmen to allocate land simultaneously confirmed their ability to make exactions for the services they rendered. While they would have to wait until the
passing in 1927 of the Native Administration Act for any judicial power to be officially conferred on them, the right to allocate land is what they had been fighting for. One of the first recorded instances of a headman using his new powers involved Joseph Mfenge who was charged with contravening section 2 of the 1899 regulations because he had ploughed on the commonage of Peuline Mission Station "land not allotted to him by the headman Joseph Tele." (133)

Mfenge was a former tenant of chief W.S. Kama. When he left Kama's farm he was given permission by Kama to plough two lands on the commonage, which had formerly been ploughed for Kama's benefit by some of his dependents. There were many other lands granted in this way on the commonage. Mfenge testified that Tele was now objecting because he wished to deprive him of the land and allot it to members of his own following, and that he had already done so in respect of other old households which had land on the commonage. The crux of the dispute was therefore over the control of Mfenge's land. Initially the magistrate upheld Tele. Mfenge managed to hire a lawyer and take the case to the Supreme Court, where a verdict in favour of Mfenge was returned, because he was protected by that clause of the 1899 regulations which regarded all existing land allocations as having been properly made. He did not need the authority of the present headman to retain his lands.

Not all headmen were compliant. It has already been seen that headmen like Kama would oppose the Colonial State where this was in their own interests and that headmen were prominent in opposition to the Abakweta Dance Prohibition Act. But it was also from within the ranks of the headmen that more significant opposition emerged. The most important example of a headman who used his position to oppose the Colonial State was that of Bovani Mabandhla. Mabandhla, as has been seen, was on a par with other headmen when it came to making exactions from the households for his services. Nevertheless he perceived that the authority of the Colonial State was being used to pressure the people to work for low wages and he was a leading supporter of the wage struggles of
the 1880s and '90s. In 1893, at the height of the labour boycott, he told the magistrate, Bell, in response to the latter urging him to "drive the young people from your kraals and force them to work", that "there is no work for the young men ... When I produced two hundred men they could not be engaged as the Government talked of contracting them for a year ..." (134) Bovani was opposed to labour migration and wished high paid work to be provided in the vicinity of the location, as had occurred with the building of the Eastern railway line.

Earlier in 1885 Mabandhala had tried to start a branch of the 'Empire League':

"for the purposes of initiating an agitation for the transfer of the natives to the Control of the Imperial Government." (135)

Such was Bovani's reputation that most of the headmen in Keiskamma Hoek participated in a meeting on the 26th of March 1885, at which it was resolved "to promote meetings of a similar nature in other native centres." Another meeting was scheduled for April, and an invitation sent to Samuel Kama to attend, but he refused "on the grounds that he was a paid government Headman". (136)

A meeting was held on the 4th April at Ntaba-ka-Ndoda in the Keiskamma Hoek district, "the whole tenor of which was ... calculated to unsettle the native mind and encourage a spirit of antagonism against the Government." (137) Speeches were made by prominent figures such as Matale and Socisha condemning the Colonial Government. Bovani, it was said, personally rode all over the district inviting people to this meeting. An indication of the support enjoyed by Bovani is given by the response of Dick's informers, Mhlambiso and Samuel Kama, when they were called upon to give statements indicting Bovani Mabandhla. They both came to see Dick, who headed the investigation, and "begged that they would not be called upon to appear in the case against Bovani." (138) Dick noted that their attitude, and weak excuses for not being able to testify, suggested extensive support for Bovani's position. Bovani was subsequently dismissed from his
As has been seen in previous chapters, since 1858 several hundred pieces of land had been purchased in the Ciskei in lots varying in size from 4 to 80 acres. A number of larger purchases of over 100 acres had also been made, in addition to a few of over 1,000 acres. The majority of the landowners were scattered in small concentrations throughout the King William's Town district, where they formed "landowner villages." Together with some of those households which hired land in the Colony and the landowners on the mission stations, they formed the main element of the small commercial farmer strata.

They had, as has previously been argued, close relationships with the locations. The landowner settlements had a great shortage of pasturage. It was therefore common for stock owners on private land to depasture their stock on the large commonages of the locations, thereby contributing to the intensification of the conflict over land utilisation. Agriculture on the mission stations and in the landowner settlements had evolved differently from that of the locations. Despite the greater productivity of
landowner agriculture, they did not escape the general downward shift of the period and certain specifications intensified its effects.

Both the landowners and the residents on the missions stations suffered from the careless way in which the original surveys had been undertaken. The result was that much unsuitable land had been laid out for arable purposes. The people had therefore of necessity to re-organise themselves on the land. Reviewing the situation of the surveyed lots on the mission stations Dick found that:

"Gardens have been cultivated without reference to the survey and as in some instances a number of gardens are absorbed in one surveyed lot, while other gardens are cut through in different ways, the difficulties of allotment ... cannot be overrated" (141)

In 1881 there were 772 surveyed lots on the 6 mission stations in the Ciskei, as well as 6 Mfengu villages that had been surveyed and on which a perpetual quit-rent was payable. The survey was in many instances so badly conducted, and the land provided as the official allotment so poor in quality and badly laid out, that the grantees were forced to re-organise themselves on the land. In 1888 Dick found:

"After Allotment many of the Grantees were dissatisfied with their lots, and after vainly trying for some years to raise a crop, finally abandoned them and cultivated on the Commonage. This is particularly the case at Mount Coke and Peelton. The garden lands were at such a distance from the site of the villages, and so removed from the supervision of the owner that in order to protect them from trespass and pilfering it was ... decided that the grantees should be allowed to reside near their gardens." (142)

The result was that although nominally private land ownership had been instituted, in fact the communities re-organised themselves
and the status quo ante continued to prevail.

A commission was appointed in 1883 to investigate land matters in the King William's Town and Stutterheim districts. (143) It found that large amounts of quit-rent had not been paid, because "the owners felt little disposed to pay quit-rent for land they could not profitably use." Of the 772 surveyed lots on mission stations and in surveyed villages, 119 had never paid quit-rent, while only 23 were fully paid up, all the rest owing arrears of up to 20 years. (144)

The Commission found that there were a total of 17 private landowner settlements. (145) A clear polarisation was observed between those households with more than 10 acres of land and those with smaller holdings. Those with more than 10 acres of land were all fairly prosperous and had paid up their quit-rent and house duty. However on the mission stations where surveyed allotments were generally less than 10 acres, a large amount of arrear quit-rent had accumulated. The Commision found that:

"the garden lots of four to six acres in extent are too small to enable a man to maintain a family from its produce, except where the soil is exceptionally good, and that some of them were laid out, especially at Peelton, on inferior ground requiring much manuring to make it yield any good crop ..." (146)

If land owning households struggled to survive on less than 10 acres, it can only be imagined what difficulties prevailed in the locations where the vast majority of households had less than this. However the commission was aware of other advantages of a political nature attached to private land ownership. The Commission was of the opinion that:

"this system of tenure should be encouraged, as it is calculated to act as a bar to rebellion, it being a well known fact that few, if any natives possessing land of their own, joined in the late rebellion."
The only exception to this rule was one of Sandille's sons ... (147)
In fact individual tenure for black farmers was seen by the Colonial State as the main way, in Teal's words, "of liberating the better class of them from some of the restrictions under which they have been living." (148) The result of the Commissions enquiry was the extension of land available to blacks for purchase under Act 37 of 1882, The Agricultural Lands Act.

This Act allowed the Government to grant to "approved applicants" surveyed allotments on perpetual quit-rent, in lots of not less than 70 morgen and not more than 250 morgen. (149) Between 1883 and 1894, 139 land sales were registered at different places in King William's Town and East London in terms of this Act. Altogether 2 012 morgen (4 024 acres) of land was purchased in lots ranging from 10 to 40 morgen. (150) That black private land ownership continued to grow, however slowly, is evidence that the class of small commercial farmers was still active and expanding despite the difficult agricultural conditions which prevailed.

Under the original British Kaffrarian land regulations 508 households had purchased land. Between 1864 and 1892 a further 186 purchases occurred. Land purchases therefore accounted for no more than approximately 700 households in the Ciskei. (151) The private ownership of land went hand in hand with the consumption of manufactured goods and the landowners were clearly set apart by their life style and aspirations. A good example of this was the Figlana family. James Figlana owned 293 acres of land at Burnshill. The family was described as "considerable landowners, registered voters .. of the most civilised class of natives, exhibited not only by industrious habits, but by the comforts with which they have surrounded themselves ..." (152)

While a very clearly demarcated class of successful commercial farmers existed amongst the private landowners, the problems they faced as a community were in fact much the same as those faced in the locations. In 1885 the sons of Mfengu landowners on the
Nxalowa stream (near Keiskamma Hoek) petitioned the Colonial State for permission to remove to the Transkei, "to be located under a Headman until we can purchase land." They explained:

"Our fathers about the year of 1859, purchased each about 20 acres of land; about the year 1868 the lots were surveyed over and a large tract was appended to the village commonage. It was then that we first experienced the insufficiency of land. We are over 100 families and when we are pressed to hire arable land from the land owners they charge us 1 pounds 10 shillings per acre ... Being in a state of poverty we prefer being located under a headman ..." (153)

Many of the land owning communities dated back to the first land surveys of Mfengu settlements in the 1860s. The subsequent introduction of smallholding German settlers had a detrimental effect on these communities. A group of Izeli landowners told Dick in 1882:

"Nothing occurred until the Germans came out when we noticed that surveys were being made which were repeated at different times. The survey commenced about 1860, a little after the Cattle Killing. We did not raise any protest against the survey as, first, we were Government people, and the land belonged to the Government and secondly there was lots of room for us and our cattle, as we were not then told that the commonages would ever be closed against us. The trouble began on account of the Germans impounding our stock. .. within the last six months the Germans in all directions have impounded our cattle on every occasion. They say they will force us to leave the land so they may get it for themselves. We are nearly ruined by these constant impoundings and the people are so angry at the provocation that I am afraid blood will be shed and lives lost ..." (154)
The results of the survey of mission stations and some Mfengu settlements in the 1860s was to give rise, as in the locations, to the proletarianisation of some households. Because of the small commonages and lack of flexibility in the division of the land, the landowner settlements became overcrowded even more rapidly than the locations. As Dick observed:

"once the lots had been allotted, no new comer could obtain a garden unless he cultivated on the commonage - and this is what actually occurred ..."

(155)

For the landowners the restrictions of their commonage caused them to retain fraternal links with the locations and utilise the more extensive commonages there for pasture.

On the Colonial farms a drastic reduction occurred in the number of households hiring land. The Location Act of 1892 provided for penalties and licensing fees to be paid on all households in excess of 6 on any farm. The result was that the Colonists had to increase rents if they wished to continue to make a profit from the lease of their farms. As agricultural conditions were so bad for much of the time, many households could not meet the increased rentals. The reduction in the number of "Private Locations" between 1892 and 1896 is shown in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1: Number of Private Lessees of Land Abolished 1892-1896 (T56)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>LOCATIONS ESTABLISHED SINCE ACT 37 OF 1884 CAME INTO FORCE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF LOCATIONS ABOLISHED SINCE ACT 33 OF 1892 CAME INTO FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALEXANDRIA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBANY</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEDDIE</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALICE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORT BEAUFORT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KING WILLIAM'S TOWN</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST LONDON</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td><strong>110</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen from Table 1 the 1892 Locations Act was effective in reducing the number of households living on Colonist land. It contributed materially to the congestion of the locations, as households evicted from private land were forced to try to find a place in the locations.

East London saw the greatest disruption of the relatively settled communities on the farms. Within a few months of the 1892 Locations Act being passed 12 farms which had been leased to black tenants were cleared of their occupants. These farms had supported 81 households with 825 cattle. Many of those forced to leave, did not know where to go; others returned to the King William's Town Locations and to the Transkei. (157)

In Victoria East, Liefeldt reported that W. Agett, the owner of the farm, "Gcato" had given notice to all his tenants, who were leaving because they could no longer afford to pay the rent. (158) The result was that groups of people began to appear wandering around the location trying to find a headman or magistrate who would allow them to settle on the commonage. From Fort Beaufort it was reported:

"Repeated attempts have been made to come into the location by people with their families and stock, under the plea of servants or to work on the halves. It appears they have been obliged to remove owing to the Locations Act of 1892, the farmer not feeling disposed to pay the annual license for them, they must seek some other place of abode, which is no easy matter for natives having stock". (159)

While a shortage of farm labour persisted, the 1892 Location Act did have the effect of redistributing tenants over a wider area. Where tenants had previously pooled their resources and shared ploughs, oxen and labour, now many were forced to work as agricultural labourers.
For all sections of the Ciskei agricultural communities the closing years of the 19th century were a time of hardship. The forces that were working towards the emergence of a migrant proletariat were both external, from the Colonial State, and internal, in the political and economic structure of the locations. The households assumed an increasingly proletarianised character, with wage labour forming an essential part of their subsistence. There can be no doubt that the emergence of the migrant worker was the product of specific historical circumstances and struggles. However the pattern of proletarianisation was not only the outcome of the operation of objective forces, it was also the result of deliberate policies pursued by the Colonial State, and the resistance to this policies evinced by the mass of households in these locations.

(2) See Chapter 1 above.

(3) N.A. 206, Chalmers to Rose Innes, (Under Secretary Native Affairs), 24th April 1889.

(4) G33 - 82, Blue Book on Native Affairs, Chalmers to Rose Innes, 31st December 1881.


(6) N.A. 190, Dorrington to Chalmers, January 1882.

(7) N.A. 203, Dick to Hemming, 7th July 1885, Report on Izeli commonage.


(9) Tam 9/4, Dick to Chalmers, 5th November, 188C.

(10) N.A. 182, Swart to Rose Innes, 17th November 1880.

(11) C8 - 81, Correspondence on Encouragement to Natives to Engage in Agriculture and other Labour, C.T. Nauhaus to J. Rose Innes, 24th November 1879.


(13) G3 - 84, B.B.N.A, Dick to Rose-Innes, 15th January 1884.

(14) Ibid. See also G12 - 87, B.B.N.A, Dick to Chalmers, 13th January 1887.

"The consequence is that while some have from twenty to fifty acres, numbers have to be content with from three to ten acres."
(15) G3 - 84, B.B.N.A, Stewart to Rose Innes, 10th January 1884.

(16) N.A. 182, Faure to Rose Innes. 17th November 1880. See also N.A. 140, John Landrey to Judge, 31st December 1880


(19) N.A. 211, Dicks. Reply to circular No. 12 of 1891 to U.S.N.A.

(20) Ibid.

(21) G3 - 83, B.B.N.A, Fleischer to Rose Innes, 30th December 1882.

(22) N.A. 200, Inspector Native Locations Green to Stewart, February 1884.

(23) N.A. 200, I.N.L. Chapman to Stewart, April 1884.

(24) N.A. 200, I.N.L. Green to Stewart, 13th April 1884.


(26) N.A. 200, I.N.L. Chapman to Stewart, 19th December 1884.

(27) N.A. 203, King to Hemmings, 30th May 1885.

(28) N.A. 204, Green to Stewart, August 1885. See also G2 - 85, B.B.N.A, Hemming to Rose Innes, January 1885.

The bulk of the people, however, refused the terms offered by government: To obtain food the native sold his cattle at very low prices."

Rob Davies has consequently emphasised the "coercive apparatuses necessary to produce rural Africans as wage labourers. See Davies R.H., Capital, State a White labour; in South Africa 1900 - 1960. Humanities Press, New Jersey, (1979). p. 53. However Davies is amongst that school which was, in focussing on capitalist development in a somewhat abstract way, ignoring the real effects of rural social relations.
(43) N.A. 246, Ellis to Fleischer, 30th September 1898.

(44) G12-87, B.B.N.A. Dick to Chalmers, 13th January 1887.


(46) G12-87, B.B.N.A. Dell to Rose Innes, 1887.


(48) G7-92, B.B.N.A, Fleischer to Rose Innes, 1st February 1892.

(49) G12-87, B.B.N.A, Bryne to Rose Innes, 13th January 1888.

(50) G-88, B.B.N.A, Bayes to Rose Innes, 30th December 1887.


(52) G4-91, B.B.N.A, King to Holland, 5th January 1891.

(53) N.A. 211, King to Holland, 18th November 1891.

(54) N.A 209, Venables to Fleischer, 20th November 1891.

(55) N.A. 211, Willow to Fleischer, November 1891.

(56) N.A. 209, Sgt. Hallifax to Fleischer, 6th November 1891.

(57) N.A. 214, Liefeldt to Boyes, 1st February 1892.

(58) G7-92, B.B.N.A, King to Holland, 7th January 1892.

(59) N.A. 209, Sgt. Ellis to Fleischer, 21st March 1891.

(60) N.A. 217, Field Cornet at Braakfontein to Fleischer, 31st December 1892.
(61) N.A. 200, Liefeldt's reply to Circular No. 3 of 1893, 28th August 1893.

(62) Ibid.

(63) G5-96, B.B.N.A, Dick to Garcia, 10th January 1896.

(64) Ibid.

(65) N.A. 241, Inspector of Native Locations, Fort Jackson, to Webb, 24th May 1897.

(66) N.A. 239, Baker to Rose Innes, 14th January 1896.


(72) G31-99, Dick to Garcia, 24th January 1899.

(73) Ibid.


(75) Attempts were made to utilise inoculation against Rinderpest. Its effects were very uneven. Over 27% of all inoculated cattle still died and many suspected that this was because of the inoculation rather than the Rinderpest. There was thus strong opposition to inoculation. See N.A. 242, Dick to Garcia, 23rd March 1897.
(76) G42-96, B.B.N.A, Booth to Chalmers, 30th December 1897.
Note: E.B. Chalmers was magistrate of Fort Beaufort District from 1891 to 1898. He should not be confused with W.B. Chalmers who was Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner of King William's Town district from 1881 to 1883 and again from 1886 to 1890.


(78) N.A. 211, Dick to Rose Innes, Reply to Circular No 12 of 1891.

(79) Marx in Vol. I. of Capital developed his theory of labour power as a commodity. If the capacity to work is a commodity, then - like all other commodities - it must have a value. This value, Marx realised was determined by the amount of labour that went into creating that labour power in a manner similar to that by which value is imparted to any other useful object. However what determines the amount and quality of labour in the production of labour power has, unlike any other commodity, a moral, social and historical element. If workers live in huts, they will as a rule only be paid sufficient to maintain them in huts. If, on the other hand, it is accepted by society that they must live in brick houses with water-borne sewage then they must be paid accordingly. See Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Penguin, (1976) p. 274.

(80) G3 - 84, B.B.N.A., Dick to Hemming, 15th January 1884.

(81) Ibid.

(82) G3-84, B.B.N.A, Fielding to Hemming, 4th January 1884.

(83) Tam 9/7, Dick to Chalmers, 10th November 1886.

(84) Tam 9/7, Dick to Rose Innes, 22nd November 1886.
(85) Tam 9/7, Dick to Chalmers, 11th January 1887.

(86) Tam 9/7, Dick to Hemming, 13th October 1885.

(87) Tam 9/7, Dick to Rose Innes, 22nd November 1886 and Tam 8/19, Dick, Rough memo, 29th September 1885. When in 1886, the headman Sebe opposed the collection of House duty, Dick wrote that he ought to be excused as "he is an old man and extremely stupid", see Tam 9/7 Dick to Chalmers, 27th January 1886.

(88) Tam 9/7, Dick to Rose Innes, 22nd November 1886.

(89) N.A. 203, King to Chalmers, October 1885.

(90) N.A. 206, Verity to Chalmers, 12th January 1889. "The term 'Hut Tax' is quite a misnomer - Natives living in an unsurveyed location pay 10 shillings per annum for the land they cultivate, which the Government terms "Hut Tax", and 10 shillings a year for House Duty, which the natives regard as hut tax." (emphasis added)

(91) Tam 9/7, Dick to Chalmers, 4th November 1885 and Tam 9/9, Dick to Garcia, April 1890.


(93) N.A. 209, Liddle to Fleischer, 21st March 1892.

(94) N.A. 211, Dick to Rose Innes, 26th February 1892.

(95) Ibid.


(97) N.A. 234, Petition of Mnyeliso and 32 others, 24th April 1897.
In 1930 Beinart and Bundy have found that the Independent Industrial Commercial Workers Union was still agitating in the rural areas against this Act. See: 'The Union, The Nation and the Talking Crow: The Language and Tactics of the W.C.U. in East London', U. London, ICS Seminar Papers.

(99) N.A. 206, Chalmers to Rose Innes, 4th June 1889.

(100) Ibid.

(101) N.A. 207, Verity to Holland, 1st May 1890.

(102) Ibid, Holland to U.S.N.A, 30th September 1890.

(103) Ibid, Dick to Holland, 27th September 1890.

(104) N.A. 205, Dick to Chalmers, 14th October 1886.

(105) N.A. 205, Chalmers to Rose Innes, Sept 1886.

(106) N.A. 205, King to Chalmers, 14th September 1886.

(107) N.A. 205, Return of Headmen, Tamacha District, King to Chalmers, 31st December 1886.

(108) N.A. 207, Dick to Holland, 27th September 1890.

(109) N.A. 209, Magistrate Glen Grey to Rose Innes, 23rd July 1892.

(110) N.A. 203, King to Hemming, 27th April 1885. Enclosure B. Deposition made by Malgas before C.A. King, 22nd April 1885.

(111) N.A. 206, Enquiry into charges against Mayi Neku. 26th September 1889. The under Secretary for Native Affairs, Rose Innes, noted on Dicks report of the above enquiry; "It appears ... that it has been the general practice of Headmen
to try both civil and criminal cases and to allot land for payment." In fact the former was contingent on the latter.

(112) N.A. 223, Dick to Rose Innes, 15th December 1892.

(113) N.A. 242, Petition Addressed to the S.N.A. Cape Town by the "Native Residents of Cata, King William's Town," March 1897.

(114) N.A. 260, Rose Innes, Report on Correspondence to G. Sprigg, Prime Minister, 16th September 1898.

(115) N.A. 220, Bell to Rose Innes, 20th September 1893.

(116) N.A. 190, Fielding to Chalmers, 11th April 1881.

(117) N.A. 190, Fielding to Chalmers, 22nd July 1882.

(118) N.A. 190, Fielding to Chalmers, 22nd July 1882.

(119) Tam 4/9, Tyatanga vs. Humanda, 27th August 1890.

(120) Tam 4/26, An action to recover 8 shillings and 9 pence for milk supplied at 3pence per day.

(121) Tam 4/18, Case Tried before Dick, 30th October 1889.

(122) Tam 4/8, Ubnsu vs. Qukenya, 2nd July 1890.

(123) Tam 4/19, Tsewa vs. Lungoyi, July 1890.

(124) Tam 4/26, David Thomas vs Thomas Mzimase, 7th December 1894.

(125) Tam 4/19, Ncambaxa vs. Nikani, 14th September 1890.

(126) Tam 5/1, Ngengwa vs. illegible 16th October 1891.

(127) Tam 5/1, Sibanwana vs. Mpindwe. 10th November 1891.
(128) Tam 5/1, Gqayi vs. Nguntsele, December 1891.

(129) Tam 5/1, Moni vs. Nxunyeni, 25th October 1893, Yamtso vs Tafeni, n.d; Sentse vs. Kandwevu, 1899.

(130) Tam 5/1, Faleni vs Awa, 29th November 1892.

(131) Circular No 1 of 1890 Office of the U.S.N.A., 18th April 1890. In Chapter 9 above, we quoted the de facto powers and duties of the headmen as implemented by certain magistrates. These were however ad hoc arrangements and did not have legal standing. The proposed headman, together with other senior males in the location would simply inform the magistrate that so-and-so had been 'nominated'. The magistrates would only intervene in the case of a dispute; in which case the final say rested with the Department of Native Affairs.

(132) Government Notice No. 642 of 1899, Cape Town, 5th August 1899.

(133) N.A. 260, Verity to Garcia; Cape Times report 26th January 1900, Report of the case of Regina vs Mfengu.

(134) N.A. 220, Meeting of Magistrate Bell and Bovani Mabandlha et al., Alice 25th April 1893.

(135) N.A. 203, Hemmings to Rose Innes, 26th March 1885. Hemmings information was supplied by Ebenezer Mhlambiso, a paid headman who declined to attend Bovani's meeting.

(136) It will be remembered that the same Kama had previously attacked Government headmen and tried to win for himself sole rights in land allocation. His attitude to Mbandhla's overtures indicates the narrowly opportunistic motivation for wishing to gain control of land allocation.

(137) N.A. 203, King to Hemming, 27th April 1885.
(138) Ibid.

(139) N.A. 203, Mbovane Mabashla to Rose Innes, 21st May 1885.

(140) Tam 9/7, Dick to Hemming, 12th June 1891.

(141) Tam 9/4, Dick to Rose Innes, 12th November 1880.

(142) Tam 9/7, Dick to Chalmers, 1888.

(143) Gll9 - 83, Commission on Land Matters, King William's Town and Stutterheim Districts.

(144) N.A. 185, Return of Quit-Rent Outstanding on Surveyed Mission Station Land and Surveyed Villages, compiled by Louis Gerradi, 30th May 1881.

(145) Mnxesha; Debe Valley; Middledrift; Beaconfield lots; Ghego Sections; Ncera Sections; Near Fort Cox; Rabula Sections; Wolf River Sections; Keiskama River Sections; Lengwe Sections; Chulu (River) Sections; Nqolorqulo and Quowana Sections; Ghoka Sections; Iznoka Sections; Gwengue Sections; Izeline Valley Sections.

(146) Ibid. p. 13.


(148) Tam 9/4, Theal to Rose Innes, 11th July 1881.

(149) The Agricultural lands Act repealed 11 other Acts and regulations under which land had previously been sold to blacks, Act 19 of 1864, Act 5 of 1870, Act 14 of 1878, Act 10 of 1881.

(150) Q.R.R. V.198 and V.132.
(151) See Chapter 8, Table 1 above and N.A. 211 Return of Quit-rent Properties held by Natives, K.W.T. Division, 21st December 1892.

(152) N.A.206, Chalmers to Gerradi, 5th June 1889; See Also G-88 B.B.N.A. 1898, Report of Louis Gerradi.

(153) N.A. 203, Hemming to Rose Innes, 28th April 1885, forwarding petition of sons of Nxalowa landowners.

(154) Tam 9/6, Minutes of a meeting of a deputation of Izeli location held in Special Magistrates Office, Monday 23rd October 1882.

(155) Tam 9/7, Dick to Chalmers, 13th March 1888.

(156) N.A. 335; Return Showing the Number of Native Locations established under Act 37 of 1884 and abolished under Act 33 of 1892 in accordance with a Motion adopted by the House of Assembly, 16th June 1896.

(157) N.A. 217, List of Natives in East London District who are obliged to Move in Accordance with the Provision of the Location Act, 12th May 1893.

(158) N.A. 206, Liefeldt to Boyes, 31st August 1888.

CONCLUSIONS

"The historian is known by the causes which he invokes"

Each historian has to confront the past from the standpoint of the present. Apart from the truism that a certain chronological lapse of time separates the historian from his object, the concerns of the current moment necessarily colour the perceptions that a historian brings to bear on the past. The particular standpoint that emerges in any given study is, however, not so much the result of ad hoc judgements of the historian, as it is the outcome of the particular methodological position that has been adopted.

In this study an attempt has been made to work within the framework of historical materialism. Central to this problematic is the concept of the 'mode of production'. This theoretical construct should identify the main classes and the main lines of class struggle, in any given epoch, of a particular social formation by reference to the nature of the productive systems or economies that prevailed.

It is at once clear that the concept of a 'mode of production' cannot be treated economistically as referring only to production. In this thesis it was used in a far wider context than that, for it situates the role of the economy in the totality of the reproduction of society. The reproduction of society refers to the renewal and persistence of particular structures and relationships as an integral part of the mode of production (1).

The specification of the mode of production of a particular social formation describes the underlying relations which produce particular structures, (such as the form of separation of the direct producers from the means of production) as well as the manner in which these relations and structures persist over time. The dynamics of reproduction of a mode of production involve particularly the political and ideological relations of the social formation which stand in a specific relationship to the economy.
This study has focused on the historical determination of social classes in the context of Colonial domination of indigenous pre-capitalist social formations. It began from the premise that the particular struggles which form the manifest record of the imposition of Colonial domination in the Eastern Cape could only be understood through an analysis of the social classes in contention in the Colonial settler and the Xhosa social formations. It was therefore necessary to develop in some detail a theoretical understanding of the dynamics of the mode of production of the Xhosa social formation.

The Xhosa social formation had what may broadly be called a lineage mode of production, the reproduction of which entailed the continual expansion of the domain of the chiefdom. The characteristic historical pattern of the Xhosa since the 16th century had been one of the expansion of the chiefdom through the incorporation of fresh territory and the establishment of new chiefs in such territory. This dynamic of expansion was seen to be the result of struggles engendered between the entrenched heads of large households and the junior males who were denied access to political power and to economic independence by their elders. This generational conflict was the basic form of class struggle in the Xhosa social formation.

The origins of this struggle in the lineage mode of production required that, at certain points in the development of a particular chiefdom there would exist a highly polarised distribution of resources (i.e. cattle, land, etc). This polarisation would be at its most intense shortly before a group of households broke away under the leadership of a new chief whose aspirations they supported. Their reward for such political support would be the choice of residential and garden sites in the fresh territory occupied by the new chief, privileged access to the chief and his court, and thereby the acquisition of cattle which enabled the acquisition of wives and other indebted adherents and the enjoyment of the autonomy of their own homestead free from domination by elders of their father's or grandfather's generation.

The presence of the Colonists effectively blocked the ability of
the Xhosa social formation to expand in the normal way. The result of this was to cause an intensification of struggle within the Xhosa chiefdoms. This struggle was for the maintenance of adequate territorial resources for the chiefdoms and focused on the maintenance of Xhosa occupation of the Zuurveld, lands which the Xhosa had occupied since the 17th century and from which they were finally driven in a major military encounter in 1835. This and the subsequent wars of 1848 and 1850 had a very substantial debilitating effect on the Xhosa homesteads. Cattle and land were lost in large quantity to the Colonists and the remaining assets of the chiefdom were increasingly unevenly distributed.

The Xhosa census of 1848 is an invaluable tool for historical analysis which both provides data for a more detailed discussion of the pre-colonial Xhosa social formation, and directs attention to the importance of the existing stratification of the households and the homesteads which affected the subsequent form of its subordination to the capitalist mode of production. (2)

In 1848, where the present study begins in earnest, there were, in the important Ngqika division of the Xhosa under the Chief Sandille, 1090 homesteads, comprising 5765 households and 20928 people. The basic inequality in the distribution of resources can best be shown with reference to cattle. In Tables 1 and 2 the distribution of cattle per household and cattle per homestead is given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>31.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 5</td>
<td>2838</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
<td>637</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 160</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of Values Counted: 5765
Max. 160
Min. 0
Mean: 3.93
Median: 2.00
Mode: 0.00
TABLE 2: Histogram of Cattle per Homestead

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>CELL %</th>
<th>CUM %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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Number of values counted 1090
Max. 288 Mean 20.55
Min. 0 Median 14.00
Mode 5.00

The extent of differentiation is clearly apparent when households are looked at individually. 31.5% had no cattle and 80.7% had 5 or less cattle. If many of those without cattle are accepted as young or unmarried, the importance of cattle loans for marriage purposes may be seen. It is also clear that those in a position to make such loans, or to take in as adherents young men needing cattle, would be found in that 20% of the households with more than 6 head of cattle. A cross tabulation of the number of wives with the number of cattle revealed that of the 1173 polygamous households, 57.93% fell into the top 20% of households with more than 6 head of cattle.

A comparison of Table 1 and Table 2 reveals how the homesteads, by incorporating poor households, softened or contained the uneven distribution of cattle between households. The average homestead had 20.5 head of cattle. However even within the homestead structure extreme unevenness could be observed. Cattle per capita in the homesteads varied widely. At one extreme 18 homesteads had no cattle. At the other, one homestead had 12.5 head per capita. The average cattle per capita was 0.83. The skewness of the
distribution is revealed by the fact that the poorest 25% of all homesteads had fewer than 0.4 per capita, the middle 50% had between 0.4 and 1.09, while the top 25% had from 1.09 to 12.5 head per capita. It is clear that there was, on all indices by which the distribution of resources is examined, a minority of wealthy households which dominated a few key homesteads. The mass of people were living with very few resources and were dependent on those who controlled the cattle and land.

From the outset of contact with settler Colonialism, therefore, there was a distinctly uneven distribution of resources between households and homesteads in the Xhosa social formation. This initial premise, from which our study began, stands in sharp contrast to the work of other writers in this area, particularly the seminal work of Colin Bundy, whose The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, was a landmark in studies of black agriculture in the 19th and early 20th centuries. (3)

Bundy's work awakened new interest in the history of black agriculture in the Reserves in the 19th and 20th centuries. It also suggested a new perspective from which this history could be viewed - drawing largely from models of 'underdevelopment' popular in the 1970s. Bundy suggested that the agricultural degeneration of the reserve areas should be linked to the development of industrial (mining) capital in South Africa and that a period of agricultural 'prosperity' had, in fact, preceded this degeneration.

There is no doubt of the important place that this hypothesis holds and the stimulation it gave to further research. (4) However, as the conclusions reached here differ widely from those presented in Rise and Fall, it will be useful to examine the basic thesis presented by Bundy and contrast this with the findings of the present study.

A beginning had already been made in the conceptual and empirical assessment of the basic thesis of Rise and Fall in a review article by Frederick Cooper.
Cooper correctly argues that Bundy was seeking to refute the view held by both liberal and conservative South African historians, that the present impoverishment of the Reserve areas of South Africa was due to the "backward" farming practices of black agriculturalists and their unresponsiveness to improved methods. He sought to show instead, in Cooper's words, that:

"Africans had in fact responded with alacrity to the growth of a market in foodstuffs in the Nineteenth Century, a response which included technical innovation - adoption of household production to the use of the plough - and crop diversification as well as expansion of output. This trend was reversed after the gold mining industry developed its voracious appetite for cheap labour and the produce market finally made capitalist forms of production on white-owned farms economically viable." (5)

This summary stresses the important points of the basic thesis of *Rise and Fall*; that there was an initial period of prosperity after Colonial domination had been established over the indigenous people of the Eastern Cape; that this prosperity was based on a positive response towards the 'market' and that the decline of this 'prosperity' was inseparably associated with the rise of industrial capitalism in the shape of the gold mines. The 'rise' of the 'peasantry' was located in the Eastern Cape between 1840 and 1870 and for Bundy the basic pattern of this expansion of 'peasant' productivity was then extended into other areas, notably the Transkei and Natal just at the time when the process was beginning to falter and reverse in those areas where it had originally begun. For Bundy:

"Mfengu, Thembus, Gcalekas, Ngqikas and others demonstrated in the fifties and sixties how effectively peasants could adjust to the new circumstances. In general terms the adoption of the plough and other implements and new crops and methods, increased productivity so that Africans
could respond to the imposition of taxes and the desireability of trade goods by disposing of a surplus." (6)

Bundy's periodisation of the phenomenon of 'peasant expansion' embodies also an explanation of the subsequent 'decline' of the 'peasantry'. After 1870, with the discovery of mineral deposits, the balance of political and economic power in the Colonial State began to shift from mercantile capital to mining capital. While the former desired a "prosperous peasant sector" to sustain trade, the latter desired only labour power. (7) This shift, Bundy argued, ultimately caused a change in government policy designed to ensure the immiseration of black agriculture, the ultimate expression of which was the 1913 Land Act with its stringent 'anti-squatter' provisions.

It is this corollary of the thesis of Rise and Fall, that the decline and impoverishment of the black rural areas was in some sense 'caused' by the development of mining capital, which needs serious examination.

In contrast to the findings of the present study, namely that the Xhosa social formation was, at the time of its incorporation into the Colonial State in 1848, highly polarised and stratified, Bundy (and other writers such as Wolpe) have assumed that the pre-capitalist mode of production maintained a "rough egalitarianism in relation to land and cattle". (8) They have not therefore sought to identify the consequences of Colonial conquest for the existing contradictions within pre-capitalist modes of production, and the effect of these contradictions in shaping the economic and political response to Colonial domination.

To analyse the 'reshaping' of indigenous class structure the concept of an 'articulation of modes of production' was introduced. This concept is intended to systematise the analysis of the interaction of the Colonial capitalist economy and the Xhosa lineage mode of production. Without a theoretical and historical understanding of the polarisation between production
units and the pre-capitalist mode of production dominant in South Africa and in our case, in the Eastern Cape, it is impossible to understand the nature of class struggle and the organisation of production for the entire second half of the 19th century. Cooper diagnosed the same inadequacy when he observed that the:

"pre-capitalist class structure must be understood more fully, and so must the precise manner in which colonial rule and the extension of capitalism reshaped them ..." (9)

As has been shown, Xhosa society was in fact highly stratified. Cooper is therefore entirely correct to insist that it is necessary to study the manner in which Colonial rule 'reshaped' the relationships which sustained this pattern of stratification.

It was argued that the concept of 'articulation' must be developed with reference to the process of transition from one mode of production to another. In the Colonial context transition has to be seen in the context of conquest and the imposition "from without" of a new economic system, or at least the elements of one. This imposition from without, by force of arms, fundamentally distinguishes the process of transition in the Colonial context from the process of transition more commonly associated with the development of capitalism out of feudalism in Western Europe.

In the present work it is suggested that conquest was defined by an effective interruption of the capacity for self-reproduction of the productive units in the conquered social formation. That is, the productive units of this social formation were no longer able to function outside of the context of the economic and military pre-eminence of the dominant Colonial economy and State, which could tax or otherwise appropriate product, labour and land. This capacity in practice led to the effective disruption of the necessary conditions for the reproduction of the lineage mode of production.

It was observable, and the 1848 census provided direct evidence, that the effects of conquest and dispossession of the Xhosa marked
a great impoverishment of the levels of subsistence for most households and homesteads. This impoverishment was symptomatic of a distinct break with the old mode of production. If the conditions necessary for the functioning of the old mode were now permanently disrupted, the restoration of economic prosperity could not be achieved through it. There were therefore, at the economic level, strong forces at work within the Xhosa productive units tending towards a change in structure and techniques of production, namely towards the production of commodities for sale on the market created by the Colonial economy. This process of change and adaptation in production was the first level at which the transition was analysed.

The process of transition, however, also involves the transformation of the ideological and political relationships between households. These relationships were intimately bound up with the reproduction of the lineage mode of production. It is suggested here that these relationships were the object of a second level of transformation. The political and ideological relationships of the old mode of production began gradually to change in conformity with the new economic relationships in household agriculture.

In the Xhosa example both of the phases of the transitional process were particularly clearly evident. This was nowhere more so than in the cattle-killing, which has here been analysed in terms of an economic, political and ideological crisis of the mode of production. The cattle-killing at the same time contributed to the depth of the break with the lineage mode of production and prepared the way for vital developments affecting the productivity of household agriculture in the 1860s and 70s in the Ciskei and Transkei.

The concept of the articulation of modes of production therefore refers, for us, to this process of the dual transformation of the mode of production, which continues until new forms of relationship between the key social classes emerge which support
the incorporation of the subordinate Reserve economy into the structure of the dominant mode. The old mode of production ceases to exist as a discernible theoretical entity. Its presence is felt in its effect on the structure of the dominant capitalist mode, whose specific character was determined in the course of its interaction with the pre-capitalist mode.

The idea that the pre-capitalist mode of production was subject to a determinate transition is nowhere evident in the analysis presented in Rise and Fall. Rather it is seen as being subject merely to a deterioration, after an initial period of improvement, considered only in terms of the growth of commodity production and the sale of a 'surplus' on the market. The question of the changing structure of these societies, and the effects of this structure in facilitating both commodity production and proletarianisation, is not posed. (10)

In Rise and Fall commodity production was seen to grow out of a relatively untouched 'egalitarian' pre-capitalist mode into which social differentiation was only subsequently introduced, and then mainly as a product of the later development of mining capital. In contrast to this, in the present study the growth of commodity production was seen in the context of the unequal ability of the households to undertake such production as a result of the structural differentiations of the households. The impoverishment of the majority of households through the effects of conquest intensified the inequalities between households. To survive, the households had to increase the output of arable agriculture and this led many that could afford it to purchase ploughs and other equipment and to participate wherever possible in agricultural markets to gain cash for their produce.

However, the residual effects of the class structure of the pre-capitalist mode of production ensured very great differences in the ability of individual households to participate in the produce markets of the Colonial economy. The capacity to expand production was very unevenly distributed across particular communities. The extent of this unevenness was such as to ensure
that many, indeed most, households did not in fact experience any substantial 'rise' or increase in their general level of consumption compared with the levels which had previously been maintained. However, small groups of more prosperous households were scattered all over the Ciskei and these formed the nucleus of a class that was to be of increasing political importance to the Colonial State.

On examining Rise and Fall it immediately strikes the reader that the 'prosperity' of the 'peasantry' in the Eastern Cape was not a uniform phenomenon. In the preface Bundy insists that "within the emergent peasantry an important internal dynamic was its propensity for stratification." (11) Here he conceives of the 'peasantry' as a continuum, with the large 'peasants' becoming landowners and farmers, and at the other end small or marginal 'peasants' becoming separated from the means of production, without enough land to subsist on "almost as soon as the peasantry emerged as an identifiable element in the political economy ..."

What of those in-between the two extremes? There is no doubt that Bundy intends them to be included in the definition of the South African 'peasantry'. The vast majority were, in his interpretation, functioning effectively in a market economy in which:

"an adapted form of prevailing subsistence methods provided hundreds of thousands of Africans with a preferable alternative to wage labour on white Colonists terms in the form of limited participation in the produce market ..." (12)

There is no attempt in Rise and Fall to investigate what the implications of the tendency to stratification were for this participation in the market. As if in recognition of the difficulties of maintaining the co-existence of both prosperity and stratification, there are, in Rise and Fall, many references which simultaneously describe the peasantry as 'prosperous' and then as "marginal men ... managing in good years to survive, but in poor years having to seek work." (13) How these 'marginal men'
arose out of the 'prosperous peasantry' of the 1850s and '60s is not stated.

In *Rise and Fall* the relative economic and numerical strength of the various strata of the 'peasantry' at various points in time is not evaluated. Typically one is faced with assertions such as "the relative success of a minority was won while the majority experienced privation and poverty." (14)

In the present study an attempt has been made to clarify the consequences for the commodity market participation of the uneven distribution of productive resources between households, and the effects of such participation in supporting this uneveness. The main tool of analysis has been the census data produced by Colonial officials at various times. This may be classified into two main groups: official general censuses and censuses of specific communities taken at various times. Amongst the latter group particularly detailed information on the Ox-kraal and Healdtown Mfengu was uncovered which was subjected to an extensive analysis. For the Xhosa greater reliance had to be placed on general census data, but the frequency of the early censuses up to 1865 made possible the establishment of trends with a fair degree of accuracy.

The analysis of this data has revealed that in both the Xhosa and Mfengu communities an extreme uneveness or polarisation of ownership of essential productive resources prevailed. 7,590 households had on average less than 5 head of cattle, and in no community did more than 39% of households own a plough. The distribution of cattle as well as sheep revealed that large herds and flocks were in the possession of a small number of key households and as much as 70% of livestock was owned by 25% of the households in some areas. (15) As much as 25% of the households had no livestock at all.

In considering arable production, the criterion most often used in *Rise and Fall* to investigate 'peasant prosperity' is the disposal of a 'surplus' on the market. Nowhere, however, is the concept of
a 'surplus' clarified. From the context in which it is used in *Rise and Fall*, it is apparently intended to mean a surplus above subsistence requirements, i.e. product not needed for consumption.

If market statistics, such as quantities of grain sold, are to be useful it is necessary that they should, as far as possible, be broken down in such a way as to relate them back to the condition under which the product in question was produced. Certain questions should be asked of the data. How many actual producers contributed to the overall result? What was the average contribution per production unit? Over what seasonal time period was the produce in question produced? (i.e. was it part of last season's production and part of this season's? etc.) What were the political circumstances at the time of the particular data cited? What effects did drought and other circumstances have on price? Most important of all, in the light of all of the above, what was the proportion of the marketed product to the total product?

The Polish economic historian Witold Kula particularly emphasised the importance of relating the marketed or commodity product to the total product. (16) The amount of product retained after the commodity product is sold represents what is left over for self-maintenance. Once the commodity product is considered in this context it is immediately obvious that it is quite feasible for a household production unit to sell, or turn into commodity product, a greater proportion of the total product than is consistent with sustaining a fixed level of consumption. Kula points out that it is incorrect to assume a fixed level of subsistence requirements. In fact the amount retained in the household fluctuated fairly widely. While this amount could be larger than usual, Kula was acutely aware that under feudalism the product retained for consumption often declined to such an extent as to cause malnutrition, hunger and actual starvation.

Something very similar to this was happening to the Xhosa and Mfengu households. The 'surplus' that they marketed, was for many of the producers not a surplus 'above subsistence', but a purely
'economic' surplus on the market, which derived from the sale of part of what was normally required for domestic consumption. That this was in fact occurring is strongly suggested by the analysis of grain sales during the cattle-killing period 1855-1858. This period saw a sustained demand for grain at exceptionally high prices of up to 27 shillings per muid (180 lbs).

In Rise and Fall there is, for example, reference to 30,000 bushels of grain produced by the Healdtown Mfengu in 1858 of which 15,000 bushels was sold. (17) In 1858 there were approximately 800 households at Healdtown and a total population of 3,834. (18) Assuming a bushel of maize or sorghum to weigh 56 lbs., the total product would have been 1,680,000 lbs. (19) If half was retained for domestic consumption this would have allowed only 1,050 lbs. per family. This was clearly inadequate for a year's consumption by a family of five. That this was so, was indicated by the movement of many Mfengu into the Colony in search of work because they had sold so much of their grain during the time of starvation following the cattle-killing. As has been mentioned, the majority of households would not have been able to rely on livestock for subsistence purposes. The Keiskamma Hoek Rural Survey suggested that adequate nutrition over a year required the consumption of 4,000 lbs. of grain by a family of five. (20)

For the majority of small households participation in the produce market often meant giving up part of what was necessary for subsistence requirements. Only those households which were able to expand the size of their total product were able to increase the portion given over to commodity product without incurring on their normal consumption requirements. Unlike a feudal peasant who could "withdraw into his shell" when market conditions were unfavourable, the Xhosa and Mfengu households were forced to acquire money because of the constant demands made on them for quit-rent and so-called 'hut tax', by increasing indebtedness to traders, and exactions made by headmen and chiefs for providing access to land and other services.
In the basic thesis of Rise and Fall, that peasants produced "agricultural surplus (over subsistence requirements) sufficient to meet the demands of the state as well as their own rising consumer needs", it is indeed strange that the concept of a 'surplus' is treated in such an undifferentiated way. (21) At least one source quoted in Rise and Fall had in fact observed the real meaning of rural household participation in the commodity markets. In 1927 Dr James Henderson undertook a survey of Victoria East District (where he was Principal of Lovedale College). Henderson was trying to demonstrate the marked decline that had occurred in the economic condition of the locations over the fifty years since 1875. He noted that in 1925 the households in Victoria East apparently sold 1064 bags of grain despite the obvious poverty that existed and the 46% decline in returns from agriculture which had occurred since 1875. In a highly significant observation on this fact, Henderson noted:

"In reality, in the majority of cases, the grain sold was no surplus, being obligations and debts. The population as a whole indeed, in the course of the year, bought probably as much as seven times this quantity that was sold." (22)

In this study it has been shown that this was not a phenomenon that emerged only in the 20th century, but that it was present from the outset of regular commodity production after the cattle-killing in 1857. In selling part of the grain needed for subsistence requirements, the households were left with only two options - either wage labour to earn money to re-purchase grain, or a declining level of domestic consumption. It has been a major finding of the present study that many households actually preferred a declining level of consumption, rather than wage labour at rates of pay which they considered to be too low. Many households held out against wage work, despite food shortages in the 1880s and 1890s, in the hope of thereby raising the wage level to the historically high level reached in the 1870s during the great railway-building boom in the Cape. The difficulty of obtaining workers and the 'labour shortage' so often mentioned in the Colonial Press, may in fact have encouraged the perception of
'peasant prosperity'. In fact it was a manifestation of class struggle against impoverishment.

In a detailed study of the different conditions under which land was occupied in the Ciskei from 1857 to 1865 it was observed that 508 households purchased land, about 1,450 households were accommodated on the 8 mission stations and a further 2 to 3 thousand households occupied lands on Colonial farms. Altogether no more than 5,500 households were accommodated outside of the locations where the vast majority of the population was situated.

It was in these relatively small groups outside the locations that significant increases in agricultural productivity were at various times recorded. However, it was shown that in each case there were factors at work which supported an aggregate shift downward for each of these groups. On the mission stations land was so badly surveyed that many households had to move off their allotments. In the areas where land was purchased from the State a shortage of commonage for cattle and sheep was a persistent problem, and the unavailability of land for the sons of such households led to a reflux of people to the locations. The households on the Colonial farms were highly polarised. They were subject to high rental demands which led increasingly to households leaving the farms and returning to the locations.

Within the locations themselves it was possible to explore in some detail those factors which had a positive effect in allowing households to increase the size of their total product. Most important amongst these was the possession of a plough and sufficient labour to utilise the additional acreage which could be brought under cultivation with it. These factors were critical constraints in the ability of a household to increase production. It was found that in no Ciskeian community did more than 39% of the households possess a plough. This had a critical effect in times of reduced rainfall and drought, when those households dependent on hiring a plough found themselves forced back to the hoe, or ceasing cultivation altogether.
Mere ownership of a plough, however, did not of itself ensure increased cultivation. Analysis of various census data showed that those who owned a plough but had small families could not, in fact, enlarge production. While this observation alone might be thought to support a 'cyclical' theory of the determination of the level of production, an additional factor needs to be considered, namely access to sufficient land of good quality.

This critical factor was governed by the headmen whose political authority in the locations rested on the effective power over allocation of land, which they enjoyed. The connection between the power of the headmen and the allocation of land saw the emergence of new political relationships between households that had nothing to do with the old political and ideological relation of the Xhosa social formation.

It is all the more remarkable that the connection between the stratified condition of the households and the growth of the political power of the headmen is not drawn in *Rise and Fall*, for Bundy had evidence of its existence. From the Report and Proceedings of the Thembuland Commission of 1882, Bundy suggests, "we can examine 700 men and their families who qualified ... for small farms of from one to fifteen morgen (2.1 to 31.5 acres) ... Their material circumstances were modest enough in absolute terms, but relative to those of their parents or grandparents, are a measure of the changes that had taken place in the Xhosa economy ..." (23) However, three cases only from the "upper reaches of the scale" are then quoted revealing men who owned over 20 or 30 head of cattle, over 50 sheep, ploughs, wagons and private land. No further reference is made to the other 697 cases in the census.

An analysis of cattle and sheep ownership amongst this Thembu community in fact reveals that 31.6% of the households had no cattle at all while 24% had between 1 and 10 head. (24) Only 10% of the households had more than 20 head. Similarly 49.5% had no sheep. Many households are indicated as sharing access to a plough. Even taking this into account, 54.35% of all households
did not own, or apparently have access to, a plough. The three cases quoted in *Rise and Fall* are in fact representative of only 10 or 15% of the households. A clear majority of the households do not appear to have been so obviously better off than their grandparents, and this in a leading 'peasant' type community.

More important than the typical pattern of stratification which was apparent, were the reasons for calling the Thembuland Commission in the first place. Amongst other reasons, it was called because Gacelo, one of the Thembu chiefs who had accompanied Matanzima in 1865 in crossing from Glen Grey to settle in emigrant Thembuland, had alienated so much land to rich Mfengu kulaks like Bikitsa, Pamla and others, that the poor and the young amongst his followers were up in arms. Gacelo took the politically risky step of confessing to the Commission that, while still independent between 1865 and 1879, he had wrongly sold large tracts of land to certain rich households. He was now requesting the Commission to compensate these households with land elsewhere so that those needing land amongst the poor households of his followers could gain access to this land which was rightfully theirs. The very calling of the Commission was therefore testimony to the contradiction between the headman, the large households and the majority of smaller households.

In fact stratification was essential to the structure of the locations. It reflected, and grew out of, the contradiction between the developing capitalist economy and the Colonial State which placed all sorts of restrictions and limitations on the locations, and the old dynamic of homestead expansion. As the homesteads broke up, and each household had to fend more and more for itself, so the inherent differentiation in this structure became more apparent.

From the findings presented above it may be seen that under the impact of Colonial conquest and the development of a capitalist economy based on trade and agriculture, and subsequently on mining, the majority of households experienced a sustained decline in levels of accumulation of stock and agricultural productivity.
Despite criticisms of the viewpoint that a period of early prosperity existed amongst African households, it is true that a short period of relative prosperity did follow on the cattle-killing. However it is vital to see that this prosperous period, which can be exactly located from 1865 to 1875, was the outcome of a particular combination of political and demographic factors, far more than any positive response to the market as such. In fact the expansion of production which occurred in this period derived more from stimulation given by political and demographic circumstances to the dynamic of expansion of the old and failing pre-capitalist mode of production, than from the effects of the growing capitalist mode.

The circumstances may briefly be outlined as follows. After the cattle-killing and the near civil war which erupted between the Gcaleka (Xhosa) in the Transkei and the Thembu, the Frontier Armed Mounted Police drove the Gcaleka and their chief Sarhilii over the Mbashee River. For some time the land between the Kei and Mbashee stood vacant. The Governor, Sir P. Wodehouse, wanted to give this land to the Colonists. However he was prevented by the Secretary of State for Colonies from doing so. Eventually, in 1865, about 30,000 Mfengu from the Ciskei crossed into the Transkei and settled in the former Gcaleka territory around Butterworth. By 1874 there were nearly 44,000 people in 'Fingo Land', most of whom had come from the old Ciskeian locations.

The population decrease after 1865 was spread across all the Ciskeian locations. It was at its greatest in Healdtown, where 44.9% of the population left for the Transkei; averaged 34.5% in Victoria East, and was at its lowest in Peddie, where, nevertheless, at least 11.2% of the population departed. While it is not possible to go into the full economic ramifications of the move, a brief example from Healdtown may be given. By 1875 there were, in Healdtown, still 18.1% fewer households than there had been in 1861. Although the number of households declined so sharply, the average acreage under cultivation in 1875 actually showed a 2.4% increase over the acreage cultivated in 1861. This meant that, on average, each household had increased its
cultivated area by over half an acre from 2.7 to 3.3 acres. This was accompanied by an increase in the number of ploughs from 56 to 210, an increase of 275%.

Most of those who moved over into the Transkei were part of the more prosperous, larger households. They took with them their extensive flocks and herds and ploughs, but left behind them plenty of arable land and pasturage on which the smaller, poorer, households could expand their productive activity. The movement sustaining this expansion was initially motivated by the well-founded fear that if the Colonial State saw unutilised lands, it would seize them, as it had done to the Xhosa after the cattle-killing, and overtly attempted to do to the Thembu in 1865. The result was an organised drive to acquire ploughs and expand production by those who remained in the Ciskei, in order to retain effective occupation of vacated land and thus not to provide the Colonial State with any excuse to dole it out to the German immigrants or other Colonists.

There was, indeed, a general increase in returns from agriculture in this period. However, this increase in no way reversed the stratified and polarised nature of the locations. On the contrary, most of the increases in production occurred in accordance with the existing pattern of stratification. Some smaller households did manage to expand but as the population of the locations increased the effects of the expansion were not sustained. Reference to an 1869 census of the Healdtown Mfengu revealed that, virtually at the height of the productive boom, 61.2% of the households still had between 0 and 4 head of cattle. The distribution of small and large stock remained stratified according to the size of the households. As the middle ranking households with between 4 and 7 people expanded, they began to reproduce the same bottlenecking of ownership of most of the cattle and sheep and absorption of the best arable land which had previously existed.

The 'boom', because it was subject to the existing patterns of accumulation within the locations, was inherently short-lived. It
was based not so much on a general increase in productivity - the more intensive exploitation of limited land resources - but on the expansion of agricultural activity over a greater area by a reduced population. When these conditions were reversed, both by drought and by the effects of the 1878 rebellion, which increased the population in the Ciskeian location, the period of general increase in the size of the total product of most households came to an abrupt end.

In the 1870s crops were plentiful and land was available for expansion because of the great migration of 1865. At the same time the Colonial State was spending millions of pounds on the construction of railways, which needed labour. The result was to drive up the level of wages, for those seeking work, to 2 or 3 shillings per day on the railways, compared to 10 or 15 shillings per month on most on the farms.

When crops again became scarce, and wages started to fall, most households fought a desperate battle to sustain the value of their labour power. They preferred to stay at home and suffer declining levels of consumption rather than to receive low wages with which they could do nothing more than feed themselves and their families. The sources on the late 1870s and 1880s are littered with references to the existence of starvation conditions, and simultaneously to a sustained labour shortage at the lower rates being offered. The experience of a declining level of domestic consumption was not new in itself. Many households had experienced the effects of the good harvests of the 1870s when the price of grain fell so low that they had to sell nearly all their product in order to raise money to pay taxes.

By the 1890s drought and disease had lowered the total product to such an extent that starvation threatened. While wage rates still fluctuated, the trend was down - in line with the depreciating cost of reproduction of labour power. This was the reality for the majority of households. It was a reality which had been implicit in the effects of conquest on the Xhosa social formation.
It may thus be seen that the basic thesis of *Rise and Fall* stems from a mis-specification of the causes and extent of the increase in agricultural productivity observable between 1865 and 1879 and the failure to notice that this trend was reversed as soon as the favourable conditions created by political and demographic circumstances began to alter. It may be argued with justification that it was these factors, rather than a positive response to the market as such, which lay behind the increased intensity of productive activity which so much impressed Bundy.

When the circumstances did change radically after the 1879 rebellion and the subsequent droughts, then the impoverished condition of the majority of households became evident. Thus by the beginning of large scale and deep-level gold mining in the 1890s, with its increased demands for labour, poverty was already endemic in most Ciskeian locations.

Potential recruits to the mines fought a desperate but losing battle in the 1880s and '90s against wage cuts in an attempt to maintain the high wage levels of the 1870s. However, when the Chamber of Mines finally did cut wages in 1897 it produced no diminution of the number of workers from the Eastern Cape, for it coincided with the rinderpest epidemic, which deprived most households of their few remaining cattle.

The origins of poverty and low agricultural yields in the Ciskei and elsewhere, have to be sought not by examining the 'interests' of mining capital per se, but in the effects of Colonial conquest on the class structure of the Xhosa social formations. The incorporation of the rural household production units as a regional element within the emerging capitalist economy of South Africa in the 19th century led mining capital to utilise, in a relatively unplanned and haphazard fashion, the degraded condition of the rural reserves to recruit a migrant labour force.

The particular blend of political and economic control exercised within the rural locations by the dominant classes over the
conditions of production and subsistence of the majority of poor households greatly facilitated the emergence of the migrant labour system. The relationships of mutual support, as much as the antagonisms between households, which provided the social fabric of the black rural areas was, and is, an essential ingredient in the continued 'conservation' of the fragile productive capacity of black agriculture in the Reserves.

It has been the contention of this thesis that such production and all the economic relationships which depend upon it, form a vital part in understanding the origins and present persistence of migrant labour. The most suggestive conclusion that can be drawn from the present study, is the deep conviction that the position of social strata dominant in the Reserves did not depend on the external 'creation' of a special cadre, but that - on the contrary - such a cadre grew up out of the real economic contradictions produced by the transition of the pre-capitalist mode of production to a regional element incorporated into the broader capitalist economy.

Today there are still three quarters of a million black rural smallholders in the 'Bantustans'. The political economy of their productive activity is still scarcely understood. While the broad forces compelling migrant labour are well enough known, the role of the dominant class within the reserves and their relationship to the predominant domestic economic activity is but little investigated.

The investigation of the role of such class forces in influencing the overall class struggle in South Africa requires that a deeper understanding of the power base of these class forces should be developed. It is hoped that the present study has provided an historical basis from which such an investigation can proceed.
This view of the mode of production as part of the global structure of the social formation stems from the French school of Marxist anthropologist and theorists and has been explicitly acknowledged in this thesis. While it is not the only usage in what has become a complex theoretical field, the particular solution to the problem of 'base and superstructure' present in the work of this school seems particularly applicable to the analysis of pre-capitalist modes of production.

C.O. 6155, Census of the Gaika and Tsambarie. A complete analysis of this census is forthcoming.


See Bundy, op.cit. p. 13.

Bundy, C. op.cit. p. 44.

ibid. p. 239.

(10) It is an interesting historical curiosity, that one of the first authors in the 20th century to look at the historical origins of proletarianisation did see its development, however crudely, in terms of a transition in the structure of a rural society. Kingon, writing between 1915 and 1920, saw the effects of the cattle-killing of 1856, the rinderpest of 1897, the East-coast Fever of 1912-14 and the interspersed droughts, as having a consequence similar for the Xhosa to that which the ‘black death’ had for the communal relations of pre-feudal England in the 1300s.


(11) Bundy, C. op.cit. Preface.


(13) Ibid. pp. 54-56.

(14) Ibid. p. 87.

(15) See, for example Chapter 3, Tables 10 and 11.


(17) Bundy, C. op.cit. p. 35.
(18) G.H. 8/27, Calderwood's returns of 1855 showed 759 households. As the population was increasing rapidly after the cattle-killing, and had reached 930 households by 1861, it can safely be stated to have consisted of at least 800 households in 1858.


(20) In a survey conducted in September 1929 by Dr. James Henderson, Superintendent of Lovedale, it was found that an average family in Victoria East consumed 21 pounds of mealies per day. This would amount to 7,644 pounds per year. There seems to be some indication that the 16 families surveyed by Henderson were of above average size, each unit consisting of over 8 people. See Wilson, D. 'Economic Survey of a Native Village', The South African Outlook, January 1931.

(21) Buncty, C. op.cit. p. 238.


(23) Buncty, C. op.cit. p. 88.

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B.K. 415, Miscellaneous Correspondence 1848, 1853-64.
B.K. 10, Lt. Governor, Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1852-64.
B.K. 74, Magistrates with certain chiefs, Maclean to Mackinnon, 1849-1852.
B.K. 1,2,3,4, Letters received by High Commissioner, 1855-58.
B.K. 7,9, Letters dispatched by Chief Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, 1856-1866, 1852-1859.
B.K. 11, Letters dispatched to Secretary to Lieutenant Governor, 1856-63.
B.K. 69,72,73, Ngqika Commissioner, 1853-56,1859-60,1862-66.
B.K. 80, Agent with Sewani, 1856-66.
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B.k. 86, Special Magistrate with Kama, 1856-58.
B.K. 89, Special Magistrate King William's Town, 1852-65.
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B.K. 109, Government Notices.
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B.K. 140, Chiefs, Councillors and Headmen, Allowances and Pensions.
B.K. 27, Surveyor General 1855-56.

1.2 Government House

This file contains, inter alia, copies of letters received by the Chief Commissioner, British Kaffraria, forwarded to the Head Commissioner, and the quarterly reports of the Chief Commissioner.

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