The politics of Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA in Botswana

Research Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MPhil in Environment, Society & Sustainability

By

Emmanuel Mogende
MGNEMM003

Supervisor: Professor Maano Ramutsindela

Department of Environmental and Geographical Science
University of Cape Town

November 2016
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude and deep regards to my supervisor Professor Maano Ramutsindela for his wisdom, guidance, patience and constant encouragement throughout the writing process. I have been privileged to work with Prof. Ramutsindela, a critical scholar who has significantly contributed to the scholarship of conservation in Southern Africa. This study would not have been possible without the financial support received from Canon Collins Trust and University of Botswana. I am also grateful to the respondents in this study. Without these people and their contributions, the study could have not been produced. I would also like to thank Tshiamo Kebualemang, a resident of Mababe village. Tshiamo Kebualemang’s help has been invaluable, particularly in sourcing data and keeping me in contact with Mababe residents.
ABSTRACT

Transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) are considered the latest evolution of a more holistic approach to transnational environmental management that brings together conservation and development agendas. As part of bio-political governance, TFCAs are ecologically, economically and politically motivated. Using a discourse analytical perspective of claims advanced for TFCAs in Southern Africa, this study explores how Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA has been motivated. The study questions the interests of Botswana government participation in the KAZA TFCA and examines the effects of the KAZA TFCA on local communities. This study employs a qualitative approach employing triangulation methods of data collection. KAZA is one of the largest and most ambitious transboundary initiative in the world that stretches across the political borders of five sovereign states. KAZA acknowledges that nature knows no boundaries hence conservation corridors should traverse political boundaries and borders of the state. Against this backdrop, the rationale for KAZA is to provide the large herds of elephants (approximately 120,000) in Botswana with access to large area of grazing land. The study demonstrates how the burgeoning elephant population is inextricably linked with border policing, tourism and conservation. KAZA considers participation and local community involvement in planning and decision making as legitimate for sustainable natural resource management. However, the current realities exist in contrast to these considerations. The study reveals that there is a disparity between theory and practice as KAZA is yet to deliver its promises to the local communities. The thesis asserts that it is critical to view KAZA as a complex, evolving and long-term initiative that will be interesting to follow in the future.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................................ i
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................ ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. v
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................ vi
ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................... vi
CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................................. 1
  1.1 Background ............................................................................................................... 1
  1.2 Statement of the problem ......................................................................................... 3
  1.3 Research aim and objectives .................................................................................. 5
  1.4 Research questions ............................................................................................... 5
  1.5. Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA) ............................... 5
  1.6 Outline of the thesis .............................................................................................. 7
CHAPTER TWO ................................................................................................................... 8
THE DISCOURSE OF TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVATION AREAS ............................ 8
  2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 8
  2.2 The birth of TFCA in Southern Africa ................................................................... 8
  2.3 Scientific rationale for TFCA ............................................................................... 12
  2.4 Political rationale for TFCA .................................................................................. 15
  2.5 Socio-economic rationale for TFCA ..................................................................... 18
  2.6 Communities, Community-Based Natural Resource Management and TFCAs 20
CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................................. 24
METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................. 24
  3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 24
  3.2 Research approach ............................................................................................... 24
  3.3 Interviews .............................................................................................................. 26
  3.4 Participant observation ......................................................................................... 27
  3.5 Document and literature review ......................................................................... 27
  3.6 Selection of respondents ..................................................................................... 28
  3.7 Case study area description ............................................................................... 29
  3.8 Data analysis ....................................................................................................... 32
3.9 Ethical consideration .................................................................................................. 33
3.10 Limitations of the study ........................................................................................ 33

CHAPTER FOUR .............................................................................................................. 36
LEGITIMISATION OF KAZA TFCA ................................................................................. 36
  4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 36
  4.2 Temporal development of KAZA TFCA .............................................................. 36
  4.3 Motivations of Botswana government participation in the KAZA ....................... 41
  4.4 The state of implementation ............................................................................... 55
  4.5 Actors involved .................................................................................................... 56
  4.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 60

CHAPTER FIVE ................................................................................................................ 61
KAZA TFCA AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES ..................................................................... 61
  5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 61
  5.2 Community involvement in KAZA .................................................................... 61
  5.3 Local level impacts of the KAZA and implications for the implementation of the KAZA ........................................................................................................... 65
  5.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 71

CHAPTER SIX .................................................................................................................. 72
INSIGHTS FROM KAZA TFCA ...................................................................................... 72
  6.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 72
  6.2 Rationale for KAZA TFCA ................................................................................ 72
  6.3 Place of local communities in KAZA .................................................................. 75
  6.4 Concluding remarks ............................................................................................ 77
  6.5 Recommendations ................................................................................................ 77

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 79
LIST OF APPENDICES ................................................................................................... 95
LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 TFCAs in Southern Africa.................................................................10

3.1 Map of KAZA TFCA..........................................................................28

3.2 Map of study area.............................................................................31

4.1 Documented wildlife dispersal areas in KAZA TFCA..........................41

4.2 Map of extended boundary of the Botswana Component.......................42

4.3 Institutional Structures of the Botswana component...............................54

LIST OF TABLES

4.1 Main institutions within the Botswana component and their roles............55
ACRONYMS

BDF- Botswana Defence Force
BOCOBONET - Botswana Community Based Organisation Network
CBC- Community Based Conservation
CBNRM- Community Based Natural Resource Management
DISS- Directorate of Intelligence and Security
DWNP- Department of Wildlife and National Parks
GLTP- Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park
IDP- Integrated Development Plan
IUCN- International Union for the Conservation of Nature
KAZA- Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area
KfW- German Bank for Reconstruction and Development
MEWT- Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism
MoU- Memorandum of Understanding
OKACOM- Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission
OUZIT- Okavango Upper Zambezi International Tourism Initiative
PPF- Peace Parks Foundation
TFCA- Transfrontier Conservation Area
RETOSA- Regional Tourism Organization for Southern Africa
SADC- Southern African Development Community
TBNRM- Transboundary Natural Resource Management
USAID- United States Agency for International Development
WWF- World Wildlife Fund for Nature International
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Over the last three decades there have been significant contributions by scholars to the discourse of conservation. This has “affected the way universal and national open deliberations about environment and development are held and issued them expanded political prominence” (Adams, 2009, p. xvi). Different approaches have been adopted by conservation movements worldwide in order to try to re-dress the problem of biodiversity loss. As a result, shifts in biodiversity conservation have been observed. From fortress conservation in the 1960s and 1970s to community-based conservation (CBC) in the 1980s and 1990s, and now back to fortress conservation in what scholars consider as the manifestation of neoliberal conservation in the twenty first century (Büscher & Dietz, 2005; Fletcher, 2010; Büscher, 2013).

Fortress conservation has undergone overwhelming criticism (Ramutsindela, 2004; Dowie, 2009). The main criticism of the protected area approach is that it has led to a complete physical, economic and cultural displacement of local communities who reside within and outside the vicinity of parks (Dowie, 2009; Lele et al., 2010). Furthermore, it is considered that this approach has often overlooked resource management by indigenous populations. This criticism prompted changes in conservation discourse and practice. The current approach tends to be more anthropocentric as conventional conservation has been criticised for being exclusionary (Jeanrenaud, 2002). Therefore, ‘conservation with development’ approaches have been advanced in most parts of the world thereby advancing the thought that conservation and development are inextricably linked (Jeanrenaud, 2002). Worldwide these approaches are considered to be in line with sustainable development discourse and presume to connect nature conservation with social and local economic advancement, through tourism (Ramutsindela, 2004).

Contemporary conservation initiatives acknowledge that natural resources such as water, forests, wildlife and vegetation have boundless properties, often traversing state borders. How to attain successful and sustainable nature conservation and manage these resources across political boundaries is a major challenge countries face. The common unit for negotiating transboundary issues between two or more states is the cross-national scale, hence the
emergence of transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs), popularly known as peace parks in the Southern African region.

Ecosystems are often intercepted by political boundaries therefore TFCAs are considered the latest innovation and a new solution to challenges of managing shared natural resources in order to safeguard the sustainability of cross-border natural resources (Hanks, 2003; Duffy, 2006). According to Ramutsindela (2007), TFCAs in Southern Africa symbolise the merging of conservation and development ideals. Judging from this, the initiative is regarded as an activity directed at accomplishing biodiversity protection in the area in accordance with worldwide commitments to the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity of 1992. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has adopted the protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement of 1999 as the essential stage for territorial participation and reconciliation in untamed biodiversity protection and management (Ron, 2007). Article 4(2f) of this convention confers responsibility on the SADC states “to advance the conservation of the shared wildlife resources through the foundation of trans-frontier protection regions” (p. 6).

The foundation of TFCAs in Southern Africa is connected with high expectations of economic advancement through expanded tourism and political stability through regional collaboration and protection of biodiversity (Hanks, 2003; Duffy, 2006; Ramutsindela, 2007; Milgroom & Spierenburg 2008). TFCA can be seen as an unwieldy concept encompassing lofty goals. This approach aims to improve or maintain sustainability of natural resources (the environmental rationale), alleviate poverty through tourism and promote equity in access to natural resources (the social or development rationale), and promote peace and security among states (political rationale).

It should be taken into consideration that African states managed their shared natural resources long before the advent of TFCAs. Now the state proves to be critical in the formation of TFCAs (Ramutsindela, 2007) serving as the focus for transfrontier conservation and thus bringing about a distinctly national agenda that goes beyond conservation. This creates a union of high ranking officials, such as state head, ministry civil servants and state conservation agencies in conjunction with the societal, financial and technical resources that the Peace Park Foundation (PPF) brings to the various Southern African states (Büscher, 2013). This suggests that the formation of TFCAs should be subjected to scrutiny. Ramutsindela (2004, 2007) argues that the motivation to participate in TFCAs reflect a
combination of individual state needs and the lure of expected gains, and a platform from which to lobby for support in the political, social, economic, and environmental sectors.

Negotiating shared natural resources implicitly involves contending with political borders, as well as boundaries of natural resource regimes. Thus the process of setting up and managing TFCAs brings together an array of state and non-state actors who are likely to have distinctive interests. Duffield (2007) argues that these actors attempt to maintain control through direct or implied measures of power in the establishment and management of TFCAs. In addition, these actors design and deliver economic and welfare functions of the state. In most cases the state adheres to and implements the donor agency’s interests at the expense of advancing local economic and social wellbeing. Barrett (2013) posits that the state is a critical player through which hegemons can attain their objectives. Bassett and Crummey (2003, p.12) support this point by arguing that “African governments play roles subordinate to these external agencies to whom they are beholden for funding and expertise”.

Given the magnitude of transboundary resources, it is no surprise that there are often complex resource management politics underlying shared resources in TFCAs. In most cases the complexities of a TFCA relate to the high expectations of the initiative, stakeholder involvement, and the unfolding process of establishing TFCA. While these expectations are used to evaluate the successes and failures of TFCAs, there are no systematic studies on how these expectations develop over time, i.e., from the initial stages of a TFCA to its full implementation. Recognising the absence of a lens through which to understand how the process of establishing a TFCA unfolds within the borders of a state, this thesis explores the questions and complexities of the establishment of the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA), with a focus on the Botswana component of this area.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The overarching motive behind establishing TFCAs is to conserve natural resources that transcend political boundaries (Wolmer, 2003; Munthali, 2007; Ramutsidela 2007; Anderson et al., 2013). TFCAs are also seen as a way of fostering economic growth and peace and security among partner countries (Hanks, 2003; Wolmer, 2003; Ali, 2011). In this regard TFCAs attempt to bring together development and conservation agendas. However, scholars have questioned the inspirations, targets, and impacts of TFCAs on conservation, social, and political domains (Katerere et al., 2001; Wolmer, 2003; Duffy, 2006; Ramutsindela, 2007; Büscher, 2013). Furthermore, some scholars have criticized both the authenticity and
adequacy of the system, calling attention to its impacts on natural resource dependent communities and the practicality of a tourism-based advancement model. Hughes (2005) and Büscher (2013) acknowledge that TFCAs are a form of green imperialism as publicly owned natural resources are privatised and nature is commodified, and that peace parks are a top-down, market-oriented intervention imposed on local communities.

Since the upsurge of peace parks in Southern Africa, the discourse of TFCAs has not been adaptive to local circumstances. More recent literature on TFCAs highlight that negotiations often take place without adequate consultation and participation of relevant social actors at multiple (regional and/or institutional) levels who are directly impacted by these top-down agreements and yet continue to remain marginalised (Anderson et al., 2013; Büscher, 2013; Lunstrum, 2014). Anderson et al. (2013) caution that the local communities living in and around these areas tend to be forgotten and that the voices already marginalised at national level are not being heard.

Although there is significant literature on TFCAs Ramutsindela (2007) asserts that most clarifications on the rise of TFCAs in Southern Africa are generalised from the encounters of Great Limpopo Transfronteir Park (GLTP) because of the prominence of GLTP and the far reaching asset base that is open to scholars in comparison with other TFCAs in the region. The ideological, political and economic rationales for TFCAs differ extensively and the approaches to fulfil the visions differ in practice among partner countries. The TFCA discourse portrays TFCAs as offering a win-win solution to environmental management but yet in reality they are more inclined towards fortress conservation which has dominated the conservation discourse from time immemorial. It can be argued that the establishment of TFCAs in Southern Africa is not spontaneous but a direct product of a well thought out neoliberal strategy by lobbyists, government and other actors (such as powerful international NGOs) to take absolute control of the management of wildlife in order to fulfil the political and economic interests of those in the tourism industry.

This study presents an opportunity to analyse the political environment and reasons of TFCAs in KAZA and to bring to the fore the development of the impacts of KAZA TFCA on local communities. By elucidating the process of the development of KAZA from the perspective of Botswana, it is my hope that this study will bring more understanding about the process of establishing TFCAs and the subsequent impact on local communities. The
study was motivated by the need to highlight the similarities and differences that emerge from TFCAs as scholars have acknowledged similarities in TFCA implementation.

1.3 Research aim and objectives
The main aim of the study is to understand the motivations behind Botswana government participation in KAZA and how this participation affects local communities in the Okavango Delta, Botswana.

The study is guided by the following objectives:

- To analyse the unfolding of the KAZA process
- To explore the consequences of KAZA process on local communities

1.4 Research questions
The study aims to answer the following questions;

- What are the reasons for Botswana government involvement in KAZA TFCA?
- How did Botswana government participate in the KAZA process?
- What are the socio-economic implications of the KAZA process on local communities in the Okavango Delta?

1.5. Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA)
KAZA TFCA stretches across the political boundaries of five sovereign states namely Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It is one of the most ambitious and largest TFCA in the world spanning an area of approximately 520,000 square kilometres (with Botswana contributing the major share, see Chapter Four) (http://www.peaceparks.co.za). KAZA merges 36 national parks, game reserves, communal land and wildlife management areas (WMAs) along the Chobe-Zambezi River basins. It encompasses renowned tourist destinations such as the Okavango Delta (a world heritage and ramsar site), Victoria Falls and Chobe National Park (CNP). The landscape of Kavango and Zambezi is characterised by Kalahari and Mopane wood- and grassland that is bordered by extensive floodplains along the Okavango, Kwando, Chobe and Zambezi rivers
One of the intriguing features of the KAZA TFCA is the African elephant found in the KAZA region\(^1\).

Just like other TFCAs, KAZA emerged with far reaching ambitions, including not only biodiversity conservation but also regarding the socio-economic development of grassroots communities living in and around KAZA boundaries and peace building. KAZA aims to become a ‘world premier tourism destination’ thus tourism is used as a vehicle to achieve biodiversity conservation, economic development and poverty alleviation in the Okavango and Zambezi river basins. Its mission is to “sustainably manage the Kavango Zambezi ecosystem and its cultural heritage resources on the best conservation and tourism model” (http://www.kavangozambezi.org). Tourism within KAZA border spaces is wildlife based with huge tourism potential (Suich, 2008). Therefore the tourism industry is meant to create jobs for rural communities located within the KAZA TFCA as a way to create incentives against poaching and the overexploitation of natural resources, as well as to reduce socio-economic pressure that may lead to violent conflicts.

The five countries meet physically as do the lives of approximately two million rural people residing in KAZA border spaces (Glatz-Jorde et al., 2014). One of the major features of TFCAs in Southern Africa has been the resettlement of local communities to pave the way for the establishment of transfrontier parks, as evidenced by GLTP. However, the KAZA TFCA is unique in the sense that local communities residing in the KAZA border spaces have not been required to re-settle but considered legitimate stakeholders who are to economically benefit from tourism and conservation initiatives. The rural communities directly and/or indirectly depend on natural resources therefore the conservation of KAZA conservation area is vital for their livelihoods. These natural resources include: water resources, thatching grass, edible and medicinal plants, reeds, firewood and wildlife (Glatz-Jorde et al., 2014). To exploit these resources sustainably, communities in the area are organised into various Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) ventures with minimal cross border cooperation. Most households in the KAZA area have limited education which can be attributed to poor human development in KAZA border spaces (Glatz-Jorde et al., 2014). There is no doubt that local communities of the famed KAZA are burdened by poverty and hardship. There is a paradox of poverty amid KAZA natural resource abundance. In terms of

\(^1\) KAZA is home to approximately 200,000 elephants with large herds of elephants found in Botswana and Zimbabwe (see also Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008).
land ownership, the KAZA socio-economic baseline survey indicates that the majority of land is under traditional rights (Glatz-Jorde et al., 2014).

1.6 Outline of the thesis

The contention of this thesis is presented in six chapters including this introductory chapter. Chapter two presents the theoretical content of TFCAs in which the analysis of critical issues is formulated. The overarching concept of TFCAs as presented in the literature will be discussed in order to highlight the evolution and complexity of TFCAs. The methodology of the study is described in Chapter three. The chapter describes the methods used to collect and analyse the data within the context of the theoretical framework. The study area, the Okavango Delta in Ngamiland District is presented as well. Chapters one, two and three help to frame the analysis presented in Chapters Four and Five, which explore the unfolding process of KAZA TFCA in Botswana and the motives behind Botswana government involvement in the KAZA TFCA. The latter attempts to analyse the implications of the KAZA process on local communities using Mababe village as a case study. Chapter Six brings together insights from the findings presented in Chapters Four and Five. The chapter also present several recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO
THE DISCOURSE OF TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVATION AREAS

2.1 Introduction
The past two decades has produced considerable scholarship on regional landscape conservation as a new form of transnational environmental management (Hanks, 2003; Wolmer, 2003; Ramutsindela, 2007; Büscher, 2013). Since natural resources transcend borders, the rhetoric of joint management of cross border natural resources has come to the fore. As such TFCAs have been identified as a major economic development strategy in Southern African region and are increasing in number and importance. They are seen as the latest evolution of a more holistic approach to transnational environmental management which integrates social, economic and ecosystem sustainability (Spenceley, 2008). This chapter examines the broader concept of TFCAs as presented in the literature. In section two, the evolution of TFCAs in Southern Africa is presented. The concept of bioregionalism which underpins the theoretical and conceptual landscape for TFCA is also attempted. This helps to frame the discussion for the third section which explores the ecological, political and socio-economic claims of TFCAs as identified within the wider literature of peace parks. The aforementioned perspectives pave the way for a critical analysis of the discourse of TFCAs, particularly as it applies to local communities in proximity to TFCA.

2.2 The birth of TFCAs in Southern Africa
The evolution of transboundary parks dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century. The first peace park to be established was between Canada and USA in 1926 known as Glacier-Waterton International Peace Park. By 1969, approximately 121 TFCAs were established around the world. In Southern Africa, the first transfrontier park to be recognized was Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (KTP) between South Africa and Botswana (Hall-Martin and Modise, 2002; Mayoral-Phillips, 2002; Ramutsindela, 2004). Since then, TFCAs in Southern Africa have been increasing in number and importance. To date, there are 18 TFCAs identified in the SADC region. However, they differ in terms of their level of development, and can be grouped into three categories namely: 1) TFCAs with a treaty; 2) TFCAs with a memorandum of understanding (MoU); and 3) TFCA at a conceptual stage (see Figure 2.1 www.peaceparks.co.za). Simply put, TFCAs involve merging formally isolated protected areas (mostly national parks), freehold, state and wildlife management areas and communal land across international political boundaries to be managed as a
bioregion (Sandwith et al., 2001; Munthali, 2007; Ramutsindela, 2009). Similar concepts, such as peace parks, TFP, TBNRM are used to refer to the concept of TFCA.

The notion of TFCA in Southern Africa finds its roots within the late South African business magnate and co-founder of Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) Dr Anton Rupert’s personal philanthropic obligations (Ramutsindela, 2007; Büscher, 2013). Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano and Anton Rupert, met in 1990 to discuss the merger of conservation areas that adjoined each, on the border of Mozambique and South Africa (Schoon, 2005). At issue was how African national borders came into being centuries ago and the impact of their establishment on wildlife. While there was concern over repositioning borders for the population, there was a strong belief that borders should be abolished for wildlife to roam freely.

Figure 2.1 TFCA in Southern Africa (Source: www.peaceparks.co.za)

There are many issues and perspectives that can be attributed to the enactment of TFCAs in Southern Africa. In a political sense, the abolition of apartheid, and the end of the Cold War fostered the creation of TFCA's (Ramutsindela, 2007; Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2016). The colonial and post-colonial events of South Africa, along with social, political and racial injustice served as the framework for border placement, according to Büscher (2013). He
contends that conservation and land were a strategy to splinter the society through segregation and socio-economic disparity. As “race, sovereignty and dispossesson” (Büscher, 2013, p. 29) between and within South Africa and Mozambique continued throughout the years, white elitist business conservationists, state influence and growing frustration of community-based conservation inaction urged for Southern Africa frontier conservation.

The unveiling of TFCAs in the early 1990s was also heavily linked with the “demand for socio-economic development to address the devastating effects of the wars of liberalization in the region, management of protected areas and the overpopulation of elephants in South Africa, and the lack of funds and capacity for biodiversity conservation” (Ramutsindela 2004, p.125). The expectations of the tourism sector serve as a reason for TFCA expansion into Southern Africa. Many contend that the expansion is a direct result of World Bank dominance, laissez-faire economic liberalism and the imposition of bi-lateral aid agencies’ initiatives (Wolmer 2003; Büscher & Whande 2007). Southern Africa has renowned tourist attractions that generate revenue from tourism (Draper et al., 2004). As a result it is expected that TFCAs will boost the tourism industry in the region by attracting international clients. Promotion of the tourist destinations is critical to the success of the tourist site, such as is the case with Southeast Zimbabwe, Victoria Falls, and Hwange. The TFCA intent is to invigorate an otherwise isolated, desolate or barren area and make it a highly regarded tourist destination, instead of a region for wildlife habitat (Duffy, 2000). PPF has since attracted big hegemonic conservation actors such as World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and Conservation International (CI) who channel funds and provide technical assistance in TFCA projects.

According to Wolmer (2003) the notion of TFCAs is rooted in bioregionalism, an environmental philosophy that advocates for regional landscape conservation (Sinthumule & Ramutsindela, 2014). Bioregionalism stems from a recognition and understanding of the interconnectedness between human and environmental systems which are no longer considered to be discrete and autonomous entities (Brunckhorst, 2000, 2002). Rather both are embedded in socio-ecological (sub) systems operating across various geographical and political boundaries and scales. The bioregional philosophy suggests that the conservation of the ecosystem should take into consideration the interaction between local populace and their immediate environment. Therefore, the interaction should be the basis of conserving natural resources within a region. In this case, negotiating shared natural resources involves
contending with boundaries of natural resource regime. In an era of intense debate regarding territorial borders, borders are presented as artificial; simply lines drawn on maps (Aberley, 1999) that define the territorial boundaries of states and acknowledge sovereign rights of countries. Hence, the state relies on territorially defined units as a means of cross border interaction. However, political boundaries are seen as an obstacle to the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems (Fall, 2005, 2011). It can therefore be argued that political borders serve a finite role in ecosystem conservation and are therefore becoming less significant in contemporary conservation.

The argument is that borders are physical features imposed by colonialism that disrupt natural processes. Elsewhere, Duffy (2001) contends that ecological boundaries do not follow political boundaries. Therefore, TFCAs promotes a ‘borderless’ notion in conservation (Hanks, 2003; Ramutsindela, 2009). The idea advanced is that natural boundaries must be used to demarcate boundaries for natural resource management. According to bioregional thinking, since natural resources transcend borders, political borders and transnational spaces are redefined into a borderless landscape (Sinthumule & Ramutsindela, 2014). This is because bioregional borders have been created naturally through ecological processes. This is achieved through establishing a bioregion. A bioregion is defined as “a place defined by its life forms, its topography and its biota, rather than by human dictates; a region governed by nature, not legislature” (Sale, 1985 cited in Wolmer, 2003, p. 262). TFCA’s appear to embrace international values and conservation ideologies, thus shunning the continent they were devised for (Ramutsindela, 2004). Proponents of bioregionalism fail to take into account that natural boundaries can often be fickle in nature as they are prone to change over time due to certain factors, such as climate change, which can shift the median of transboundary borders.

The evolution of the TFCA process is not without criticism. The TFCA concept has been considered to have impacts which are beyond the motives of biodiversity conservation and natural resource management. Wolmer (2003) queries the ecological, scientific, political and economic discourses behind transboundary developments in Southern Africa which are reminiscent of neoliberal economic management. Though the notion of bioregionalism seeks to focus on biodiversity conservation, Wolmer (2003, p. 262) believes that “it is informed by a disparate array of discourses-anarchist, scientific, romantic, managerial and neoliberal and bound up with an equally disparate range of environmental, economic and environmental agendas”. He notes that, TFCA’s are promoted as a winning combination of economic
stimulus and ecological preservation as well as strengthening investor interest throughout the African continent.

Elsewhere, Büscher (2010a) argues that TFCAs represent a manifestation of neoliberal governance of conservation and development, comprising consensus rhetoric, a political strategy of anti-politics and a marketing strategy that entails the “manipulation of abstraction in order to gain competitive advantage in the conservation/development market place” (Büscher, 2010b, p. 652). Büscher’s argument is that a discussion of neoliberalism is essential in understanding the rise of TFCAs as an idea and a new ‘telo’ in global conservation discourse (Büscher, 2010b, 2013). Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the discourse of TFCA is motivated by specific conservation elites that have their own vision with regard to the environment, society and its interactions which tend to be indicative of neoliberal philosophy. Such philosophy has its framework based on the ideology that capitalism is good, and is viewed as the foundation as to how the trans-frontier parks are managed. This would suggest a focal point of eco-tourism, funding for environmental services, and profit as a priority for management as well as public sector-private entity partnerships (Büscher, 2013; see also Duffy, 2006).

2.3 Scientific rationale for TFCA

Proponents of TFCA argue that ‘nature knows no boundaries’ (Zbicz, 1999; Hanks, 2003) therefore natural boundaries are a common point for transboundary natural resource. As previously mentioned, nature is not confined to political boundaries; therefore, it is argued that TFCAs are no less important in redeeming biodiversity conservation and community development (Myers et al., 2000). From an ecological point of view, international political boundaries are seen as disruptive to ecological processes. It is argued that political borders have distorted traditional wildlife migration routes and altered ecosystems due to erection of border fences (Sinthumule & Ramutsindela, 2014). In response to ecological crisis TFCAs are seen as critical in reversing this crisis (Ramutsindela, 2007). As a result, the concept of TFCA is adopted with an aim to reframe ecosystems by integrating protected areas, communal lands, state land and freehold land across borders focusing on bioregion as a unit of joint management (Hanks, 2003; Wolmer, 2003; Sinthumule & Ramutsindela, 2014). The overarching objective of TFCA is the conservation of biodiversity across geographical boundaries. According to Munthali (2007, p. 52) the main ecological reasons for establishing TFCAs are to: 1) protect internationally shared ecosystems; 2) to increase the area available
for wildlife and plant populations thereby reducing the extinction risk due to stochastic events; and 3) to re-establish seasonal migration routes.

From the perspective of management of natural resources, the onslaught of the current global ecological crisis is also identified as the by-product of an institutional crisis on either side of the border which has failed to adequately manage natural resources (Ostrom, 1992). Lemos and Agrawal (2006) argue that rigid (centralized, top-down) bureaucratic structures neglect to adequately address the complexity of social-ecological systems. As a result, TFCA are critical for management of shared socio-ecological systems. Proponents of TFCA claim that the areas present an opportunity to reframe institutional boundaries by implementing novel arrangements that encompass multi-scale and ecological interdependencies.

Proponents of TFCA argue that political borders have divided, fragmented and degraded ecosystem across geographical borders resulting in habitat loss. For instance, Botswana erected veterinary cordon fences between the 1950s and 1980s as a way of separating wildlife-cattle interaction (Keene-Young, 1999). This was meant to reduce and prevent the transmission of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) (Ferguson & Hanks, 2010). However, the veterinary cordon fences have blocked and disrupted the migratory routes of species (Bartlam-Brooks et al., 2011). Anderson and Jenkins (2005) contend that habitat fragmentation is a major driver of biodiversity crisis. The authors define fragmentation as “the conversion of large, continuous areas of habitat to smaller blocks that are separate from one another” (Anderson & Jenkins, 2005, p. 1). Habitat fragmentation may be a result of overgrazing, bush encroachment, deforestation by humans or elephants as well as infrastructural development (Cumming, 2008). Due to fragmentation, plants and animal populations have become isolated thus reducing genetic diversity of species in certain ecosystems (Bennett, 2003). This is likely to result in species being extinct because “smaller, localised populations will have greater propensity to decline to zero than larger initial populations” (Schoon, 2008:12)

The current scholarship on conservation biology acknowledges that fragmented habitats can be restored through establishment of ecological corridors (Bennet, 2003). Sanderson et al. (2003, p. 10) define a conservation corridor as a “biologically and strategically defined sub-regional space, selected as a unit for large conservation planning and implementation purpose”. Put simply, corridors are geographic spaces designed to connect ecosystems in which migratory routes are restored at various scale (Anderson & Jenkins, 2005). This means
that connectivity of ecosystems can happen both on a local and regional scale. On a local scale, migration routes are usually within protected areas. For instance, buffalos, elephants, wildebeest and zebra in northern Botswana migrate between the Okavango and Linyanti river systems to the Savuti marsh (Cumming, 1999, 2008; Bartlam-Brooks et al., 2011). Since protected areas are isolated, Dudley et al. (2011, p.87) points out that “the expansion of global protected area estate provides a unique opportunity to secure ecosystem services on the scale identified as necessary by the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment”. This happens on a regional landscape scale.

Proponents of TFCA argue that protected areas are insufficient to protect the full range of biodiversity and its associated processes (Anderson & Jenkins, 2005). Cumming and Jones (2005, cited by Cumming, 2008) estimated a 5% per annum increase for the elephant population with a potential to double by the year 2020. As a result, protected areas (within borders of a state) would not be sufficient to absorb the high elephant population. Cumming (1999, 2008) contends that much of the land available to help absorb this increase is the communal land since protected areas are surrounded by human settlements. However, local communities where corridors are to be created may not accept high densities of elephants without commensurate returns and benefits (Cumming, 2008). In light of this, cooperation with land owners needs to be sought for any successful implementation of wildlife corridors. Wildlife corridors on a regional landscape scale are seen as sufficient in ensuring ecological integrity and protecting large gene pools (Fall, 1999) thus leading to conservation of biodiversity. By reconnecting isolated protected areas across jurisdictional borders, TFCAs would be able to preserve more habitats and conserve a greater diversity of species (Bennett, 2003).

It is assumed that, the expansion of protected areas by removing fences and ignoring traditional functions of colonial borders will allow animal migration and dispersal through wildlife corridors thus ensuring that animal movement is not unidirectional. For instance the creation of KAZA will allow the congested herds of elephant in southern parts of KAZA to move to uncongested areas in Zambia and Angola thus increasing forage available to wildlife (cf Chapter Four; Hanks, 2003; Munthali, 2007; Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008; Andersson et al., 2013). Cumming (2004) contends that there is paucity of information regarding transboundary migrations of large mammals in the KAZA TFCA. Key questions arise as to whether reconnecting ecosystems will allow species migrations to resume. However, Cumming (1999) indicates that certain species are likely to benefit from the removal of
fences and the establishment of transboundary corridors. For instance, the connection between Chobe and Hwange National Park is said to benefit fourteen species.

Despite the ecological arguments advanced for TFCA, various challenges exist. Ramutsindela (2007) contends that broadening protected areas, spanning a border, does not foster a unification of social and political environments of a joint nation effort as political borders play a critical role for the state and its people. Cumming (2008) and de Garine-Wichatitksy et al. (2013) argue that creating corridors does not necessarily lead to improved conservation. Natural scientists suggest a danger to society exists if borders are opened. They believe that closed borders contain potentially dangerous pathogens which can migrate between nations. In essence, with closed borders, pathogens are in a contained environment (Thomson & Penrith, 2011; de Garine-Wichatitksy et al., 2012; Miguel et al., 2013). Agricultural research organisation such as Animal and Human Health for the Environment and Development (AHEAD) concludes the potential transmission of deadly disease is high and poses a risk to livestock. For instance, de Garine-Wichatitksy et al. (2013) acknowledge that buffaloes and cattle have similar ecological niches (that is habitat preference and similar diet). It is also noted that buffaloes play a role in spreading livestock (zoonotic) diseases (de Garine-Wichatitksy et al., 2013). Elsewhere, Cumming (2008) contends that the KAZA TFCA presents a risk of transmitting tsetsefly. The disease would impose a hardship on communities that are dependent on livestock for their economic sustainability (Thomson & Penrith, 2011; de Garine-Wichatitksy et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 2013). de Garine-Wichatitksy et al. (2013) note concerns about possible increase in human-wildlife conflicts particularly with regard to buffaloes and elephants. The authors note human-wildlife conflict may undermine conservation efforts of TFCAs. Also, issues about land access and ownership conflict with potential government revenue exploitation. Land tracts are re-classified from communal land to a protected wildlife sanctuary for the benefit of the tourist industry.

2.4 Political rationale for TFCA
From a political perspective, the literature on TFCAs prominently features the importance of peace building through regional collaboration and also presents an arena in which the dream of ‘African Renaissance’ can be attained. During the opening of the GLTP, the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, noted that the park “transforms the dream of an African renaissance into reality” (South Africa Government, 2002, p.1). The claim made by proponents of TFCAs is that when countries collaborate in conservation, nature can be used to maintain peaceful relations thus avoiding conflicts among partner countries (Ramutsindela,
The rhetoric of bringing down fences can be seen in this context where political boundaries are removed which provides opportunity for peaceful collaboration and relations among partner countries.

On the other hand, TFCAs are premised on the notion that people living within or on the edges of TFCAs will benefit from cross-border conservation projects. In the same way borders are political constructions; borders can be seen in the same manner as social constructors (Newman, 2003). Social boundaries exist in several forms with the most common being language, knowledge, race, class, gender, sectoral and geographical boundaries. It is argued that colonial borders have separated ethnic groups (Sinthumule & Ramutsindela, 2014). Ethnic groups continue to have chains of relations with people across borders rather than people within their country with whom they have no common religious or cultural linkages (Newman, 2003). For example, the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border separates the Barwe, Ndau, Manyika and Shangaan communities, while the South Africa-Zimbabwe border divides Shangaan and Venda communities (Duffy, 2001). These borders are also dividing the same linguistic communities. Instead of working with a top-down approach, there is need to look at these as micro-regions that allows communities, not the state on either border, to begin to relate in different ways. In other words, opening borders through establishment of these conservation areas will allow communities bordering the park to begin to work together as cross border communities through exchange visits (Griffin et al., 1999).

Mr Anton Rupert, the founder of PPF, legitimized the peace image fostered by TFCA and drew the involvement of other heads of states as honorary patrons of PPF. A portrayal of how the PPF utilizes its patrons is that of former South African President, Nelson Mandela. Surely a recognizable image around the world for bringing peace and justice in the new democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela without hesitation endorses the vision of peace in Southern Africa, which assures a high buy-in that anyone would expect regarding an endorsement (Buscher, 2013; see Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016). In opening the GLTP, Nelson Mandela said:

I know of no political movement, no philosophy, no ideology, which does not agree with the peace parks concepts as we see it going into fruition today. It is a concept that can be embraced by all. In a world beset by conflict and division, peace is one of the cornerstones of the future (Nelson Mandela, 2000).
This surely shows how instrumental Mandela was in promoting the peace vision in TFCAs (Ramutsindela, 2007; Büscher, 2013; Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2016). Peace parks are designed to transcend painful historical differences of the region, and establish a philosophy promoting goodwill, cooperation, and coexistence (Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2016). It is due to the promotion of peace that the PPF markets TFCAs as “the global solution” (www.peaceparks.org) to environmental problems, with a strong focus on their peace creating ability. I therefore argue that the PPF catchphrase the ‘global solution’ portrays a vision of completeness and flawlessness in association with the development and conservation of designated regions. I contend that peace parks are not a one size fits all approach.

Büscher and Ramutsindela (2016) aptly note that ‘the global solution’ or ‘telos’ of conservation is now facing severe pressure from rhino poaching and the aggressive militarisation response to it. The authors argue that poaching presents the greatest threat to the peace compelling rationale in Southern African peace parks. The GLTP is currently at the centre of rhino poaching and has over the years been the flagship of the PPF (Lunstrum, 2014; Büscher & Ramutsindela, 2016). Büscher and Ramutsindela (2016) argue that implementers of peace parks use violent tactics against people who are framed as poachers which contradicts the notion of peace and harmony that peace parks promote. Elsewhere, Lunstrum (2014) conceptualises the interconnection between the military and conservation as ‘green militarisation’ where military and paramilitary tactics are used in conservation. States have adopted new green surveillance technologies to monitor biodiversity in particular elephants and rhinos. These include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), thermal imaging, night vision, camera traps, Global Positioning System (GPS) and nanotech tracking devices, and the Smithsonian Barcode of Wildlife, amongst others (Duffy, 2016). Using Kruger National Park as an example, Lunstrum (2014) argues that the connection reflects a broader and intensifying pattern of militarisation transforming poaching from a conservation practice into a security issue (Lunstrum, 2014; Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016; Masse and Lunstrum, 2016). This narrative is however gaining momentum because of the link between poaching and terrorism for instance. There are people who think the rhino horn is a ‘white gold’ that is being used to support terrorist groups like Al-Shabbab (Duffy, 2016). Therefore, Duffy (2014) argues that poachers become the enemy in the global war for biodiversity. Elsewhere, Lunstrum (2014) argues that not only do they become the enemy to the nation-state but also to the state natural resources. This view of conservation and poaching can lead to “repressive, coercive and violent practices” (Duffy, 2014, p. 833) in addition to state
approved killing of poachers (Lunstrum, 2014). The militarisation of conservation is further augmented by the increase of security agents comprising national armies and at times private security companies are hired (Masse & Lunstrum, 2016).

2.5 Socio-economic rationale for TFCA
Advocates of TFCA promote TFCA as a practical investment strategy that bolsters regional economies, eliminates poverty, and fosters sustainable development through eco-tourism (Ferreira, 2004; Duffy & Moore, 2010). Ecotourism is regarded as a viable business which will provide sustainable livelihoods to historically marginalised communities in close proximity to peace parks (Sandwith et al., 2001; Ramutsindela, 2004, 2007). Büscher (2013) contends that tourism is seen as the holy grail that tries to link the goals of conservation and development. In May 2009, the president of Botswana, Dr Ian Khama together with other PPF patrons launched the boundless Southern Africa (BSA) initiative which aimed at promoting tourism and investment opportunities in TFCAs (Noe, 2012).

The forecast of tourist arrivals to 2027 indicates a gradual increase of SADC’s market share of tourist arrivals to Africa from 44% in 2010 to 52% in 2020 reaching 58% in 2027, according to the SADC regional infrastructure master plan (SADC, 2012). The analysis contends that sustained growth will support the tourism sector’s value to the SADC region’s employment rate, international monetary earnings and increased foreign direct investments (FDIs) (SADC, 2012). It is believed that for TFCA’s to thrive, contingent on the projected growth, it is imperative that a comprehensive infrastructure be implemented (SADC, 2012). The infrastructure will encompass transportation, energy, information, communication technology and water systems. In 2004, Suich et al. (2004) conducted a socio-economic baseline survey of the tourism industry in the KAZA region. The survey highlighted that the tourism industry has the potential to contribute to economic growth within KAZA countries through job creation, government tax revenues and revenue generation from parks. The authors estimated that the tourism industry created 5,500 jobs for local people yet it boosts premier destinations such as Okavango Delta, Victoria Falls, Chobe National Park and others. In addition, the authors found that although 45% of enterprises in the tourism industry were locally owned, they generated only 19% of total turnover. Suich et al. (2004) point out that an annual growth of 5-6% is expected in tourism industry, hence the political and economic motivation. Furthermore, the authors highlighted challenges due to levels of inequality and poverty in salaries and ownership of establishments by local community members.
Spenceley (2008) suggests that the success of tourism is dependent on the establishment of joint-venture partnerships (JVP) between local populations and the private sector for their empowerment through partial ownership, capacity building and equitable benefit generation. All TFCAs documents acknowledge the important role of the private sector thus encouraging public-private partnerships. For instance, Article 6.1f of the KAZA treaty proposes the facilitation of a healthy and competitive economic environment which promotes and enables public-private partnerships, private investment and regional economic growth. For the most part, the tourism sector has not been associated with adverse outcomes probably because of its economic benefits and community empowerment focused initiatives. However, there is accumulating evidence that there are adverse outcomes related to this industry. For instance, the tourism industry is usually dominated by foreign investors who are known to spend their profits in their native countries (Mbaiwa, 2003, 2008; Spenceley, 2008). This development is known to be detrimental to the economy of the host country. In addition, several studies have shown that tourism destinations mostly attract foreign clients and usually have high prices that are not affordable by the local population (see Mbaiwa, 2003, 2008).

As mentioned previously, TFCAs promote public-private partnership in order to sustainably manage natural resources through JVPs. Katerere et al. (2001) argues that these joint ventures and partnerships are inappropriately labelled when in reality they are nothing more than lease agreements to gain access to valuable natural resources. Communities sub-lease the resource use rights to a private safari company at a fee instead of a joint venture partnership agreement that promotes the merging of assets. Elsewhere, it has been noted that the JVP system is inadequate and a lack of cooperation exists between communities and safari hunting companies regarding entrepreneurship and management skills education. The trust lacks the ability to actively promote the tourism industry and is more of acting like a landlord instead of an owner (Mbaiwa, 2015).

Natural resources are to be preserved when their capacities are esteemed and estimated through business sector systems. TFCAs use marketing tools that are appealing to the consumer in order to attract private investment, legitimacy and prompt social change. Under the realm of neoliberalism, this is considered to be essential and normal. Capitalism is characterised by privatisation, the growth of international conservation NGOs such as CI, WWF and their increasing association with the state who in most cases do not engage the local communities (Brockington & Duffy, 2010; Corson, 2010). Corson (2010, p. 580) argues that “in biodiversity conservation specifically hegemonic practice now values nature-based
on its potential market price”. The modification of nature as a commodity, has evolved into, not just a focus on eco-tourism, but a financial operation overseeing compensation and private/public sector partnerships to foster preservation and private sector park management (Corson, 2010). Participating agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), IUCN, Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) and the World Bank have drawn criticism that TFCA’s conservation projects are often mismanaged at the expense of the communities its suppose to integrate thus making them a true neoliberal project. Transitioning nature into tourism poses difficulties for local residents, seeking to involve themselves in conservation.

2.6 Communities, Community-Based Natural Resource Management and TFCAs

TFCA and Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) advance the thought that development and conservation are interlinked thus making the initiatives two sides of the same coin. It is a question of scale, where CBNRM is implemented at a national level while TFCAs are at a regional level. Since they have the same requirements one would think that they can be brought together to succeed. However, there is a strong argument in the literature that TFCAs have replaced CBNRM in Southern African region. Therefore, it is imperative to take into account the place of local communities within the discourse of CBNRM and TFCA in Southern Africa.

CBNRM recognises that local communities must have direct control over the utilisation and benefits of natural resources in order to value them in a sustainable manner. The aim is to promote both nature conservation and local economic development (Garnett et al., 2007), the same rhetoric principles advanced by TFCAs. The CBNRM approach is designed as a sustainable, participatory development framework that involves local people in the development process of their communities. The underlying assumption of CBNRM is that local communities are likely to continue to conserve natural resources when they derive benefits from them.

Before the advent of CBNRM, the authority to manage natural resources, in particular wildlife has been the responsibility of central government. Taking into account the prevalence of uncertainty, complexity and dwindling wildlife resources and that state central policies are no longer adequate, many developing countries decided to adopt a collaborative approach to managing wildlife resources. In this regard the state has devolved power to intermediate state institutions such as the public sector (district councils, traditional
authorities), private sector and non-governmental organisations (community based organisations/community trusts) (Andersson et al, 2013). In addition, government parastatal organisations based at sub national level secure partnerships between Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and the private sector. For instance, Botswana Tourism Organisation (BTO) is tasked with the responsibility of awarding and evaluating tenders for partnerships between private safari operators and community trusts (Hoon, 2014; Mogende & Kolawole, 2016).

Elsewhere, traditional institutions are given the partial privilege to manage wildlife in the absence of district councils (Andersson et al, 2013). Traditional institutions include amongst others chiefs or headmen and village development committees (VDC). Andersson et al. (2013) write that though these institutions represent communities, “defending them from the state or any other institution seeking to benefit from natural resources found in communal areas”, in reality they are an arm of the state whose interests they try to protect (Ribot, 1999 as cited in Andersson et al., 2013). In Zambia, chiefs are land authorities controlling access to communal land by commercial investors (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008). Tourism site reduction in favour of commercial development is generating a negative perception of government leadership. It strips the population of necessary natural resources and capital. This accelerates the onset of inadequate conservation and localised poverty (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008).

Besides traditional institutions and district councils, non-governmental organisations through community based organisations/community trusts are entrusted with the responsibility of managing local resources within their immediate environment. For instance, there is CAMPFIRE committee in Zimbabwe (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2010; Andersson et al., 2013), CBNRM committees in Botswana (Mbaiwa & Thakadu, 2011) and conservancy in Namibia (Visser, 2014). These are legal entities meant to ensure rural peoples access to and management of wildlife. Beyond that they are supposed to represent and safeguard the interest of the communities in resource use and management. Literature indicates that rather than represent the interests of local communities, they however exploit resources to their own advantage (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008). CBNRM is crippled with corruption, misuse of funds and lack of capacity by the trusts. Board members appropriate funds which are supposed to improve the socio-economic wellbeing of local communities (Dzingari, 2004, Rihoy & Maguranyanga, 2010; Mbaiwa, 2012). In most cases benefits do not trickle down to individuals but rather households. In spite of community orientation, community based programmes continue to be state-centric in their implementation and have been critiqued for
not sufficiently including local communities as legitimate stakeholders in decision making processes (Rihoy & Maguranyanga, 2010; Hoon, 2014; Mogende & Kolawole, 2016).

Due to the limited success of CBNRM, TFCAs were born with the aim to rectify the weaknesses of community-based programmes. However, the creation of TFCAs in Southern Africa has not been participatory enough as local communities are not sufficiently or meaningfully involved. Communities usually start from a compromised position. Anderson et al. (2013) caution that the local communities living in and around these areas tend to remain invisible and disengaged.

Wolmer (2003) contends that the level of community engagement in the establishment of the GLTP, a TFCA flagship in Southern Africa, has been lacking. Elsewhere, Mayoral-Phillips (2002) points out that during the establishment and implementation of KTP the San community on the Botswana border were not involved nor consulted by the Government of Botswana. A study done by Dias (2012) in Kuando-Kubango uncovers that local communities are undermined and rejected as partners and recipients thus they are not mindful or made mindful of the KAZA venture. The avoidance of local communities in such activities keeps on empowering the elite making them the voice of the local populace and consequently making conservation an inconvenience to local communities.

Furthermore, the absence of local communities amid the foundation procedure, resettlement and the foundation of national parks countering the thought of TFCA has been observed in GTLP and KAZA (Milgroom & Spierenburg, 2008). Approximately 7,000 people are forced to relocate from Limpopo National Park to pave way for wildlife and tourism (Milgroom & Spierenburg, 2008; Lunstrum, 2010, 2015). The private sector enjoys the control over use and management of natural resources while excluding local communities in the process. This has resulted in restricted community use of their land and has been denied access to resources that are significant to their livelihood (Ferreira, 2004, 2006). In this case, TFCAs reduce communities’ traditional access and control rights over resources (Dzingirai, 2004). In the Mozambique sector of the park (Coutada 16), tourism development is fortified, thus resulting in relocation of communities from their indigenous land (Spierenburg et al., 2008). Such practices nurture complex issues of rights, proprietorship, governance and authenticity (Adams & Hutton, 2007). Furthermore, Anderson et al. (2013) observes that communities are often seen as a threat to conservation thus given labels such as poachers, smugglers and squatters. The authors further note that communities who were reclaiming their land or using
resources in GLTP have been labelled as squatters in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Ramutsindela (2009) argues that TFCAs tend to replicate the forced removal of communities that took place during colonial and apartheid periods.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the method in which the study was conducted in order to achieve the set objectives, including how data were collected and analysed. Methodology entails the detailed research methods through which data are collected and the more general philosophies which serve as the foundation for both the collection and analysis of data (Creswell, 2009). The chapter will start off by describing and providing the justification for the methodological approach used to understand the motivations for Botswana government participation in the KAZA and how they affect local communities. An overview of the study area is attempted. I conclude the chapter by paying attention to ethical issues and challenges I experienced during the research process.

3.2 Research approach
3.2.1 Study design
The study was designed to facilitate the understanding of the unfolding process of KAZA TFCA and its implications on the local populace. The study was also designed to understand the reasons behind Botswana government participation in the KAZA. As such, the study employed qualitative research approach as a basis for its methodology. A qualitative approach involves the collection of broad narrative data in order to gain insights into the phenomenon of interest, in this case the unfolding process of KAZA TFCA (Hatch, 2002; Creswell 2009). Qualitative research, according to Denzin and Lincoln (1994), is an analytical and practical pathway to a defined subject matter as well as a focus on processes and meanings happening naturally. Bryman (2012, p. 402) points out that “qualitative research tends to view social life in terms of processes”, therefore I find qualitative research to be the main approach to gain insights not only to the questions asked but also to those that I may not have thought of when designing the study. Furthermore, a qualitative research approach addresses specific situations that produce information when participants respond to the why, how and what questions (Hennink et al., 2011). The study seeks to understand why and how Botswana government participated in TFCAs through the KAZA initiative and what implications this has for the local populace. The establishment of TFCAs is neither a clear nor plainly identifiable process. It is complex and adapted to various settings, and also involves the interactions of multiple actors, ideas and discourses. Therefore, embracing a
qualitative methodology in this position is a sensible decision deemed fit. The qualitative approach helped the study in terms of: understanding the discourse of TFCA; identification of key role players in the discourse of TFCA in order to examine who has greater influence on KAZA formation; and studying the institutional structures of KAZA in relation to other TFCA and the impact this has for local community participation in KAZA TFCA.

In order to achieve the objectives of the study the research depended on in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants, participant observation and document review as the main tools for data collection. These methods were further complemented by informal conversations with government officials as well as some members of the Mababe community. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005), qualitative methods are used to engage and generate data for quantitative analysis in the explanatory stage. It can also subordinate or improve empirical conclusions. I chose these qualitative methods in order to uncover factors important for a thorough understanding of the unfolding process of KAZA that may have been unknown when the study was designed. Cresswell (2009) believes knowledge gained from participant observation, not only helps facilitate a better comprehension of collected data via methods such as interviews, but assists in structuring questions which will make it easier to comprehend the issue under investigation. This method of collecting data from multiple sources is termed triangulation (Patton, 2002). The reason for using the two techniques is to complement the limitations of each thereby enhancing the quality of information being solicited. Boeije (2010) suggest this approach not only helps the researchers in accumulating additional comprehensive pertinent data information, but confirms any discrepancies which may enhance findings.

3.2.2 Data collection

Data collection was conducted from June 2015 to February 2016 in three phases\(^2\). Originally, I had planned to spend June/July (approximately four weeks) conducting interviews in Gaborone, Kasane and Maun with government representatives who are involved in the KAZA but due to time constraints and fieldwork dynamics I was only able to do three weeks’ fieldwork from 22nd June 2015 to 14th July 2015. This was followed by one week of field work in Maun (the first week of December) and the last of which was in January 2016 (four weeks) with government officials in Maun and local community in Mababe. It is also

---

\(^2\) The three phases are basically periods spent in the field hence they were not designed to achieve any goals during data collection.
important to note that conducting the fieldwork in phases allowed for data analysis before the next stage. The staging assisted me in deciding if the data collected had significant analytical value. Based on this decision, I determined what data needed to be gathered during the next field trip.

3.3 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were the first point of interaction to elicit views and opinions from government representatives, NGO representatives and the locals (Creswell, 2013). The government representatives included those individuals who have worked with KAZA and are familiar or participate in the KAZA and conservation programmes in Botswana. On the other hand, NGO representatives involve those individuals working with NGOs that deal with rural development and conservation (most of which participate in the CBNRM programme). These people were asked to give information relating to motivations for Botswana government participation in KAZA; KAZA development and implementation process; and stakeholder involvement and consequences on local populace. Information solicited from the local communities related to their livelihoods; involvement in the KAZA; community awareness of KAZA TFCA; and changes likely to be caused by the establishment and implementation of KAZA. Attempts were made to contact potential respondents in advance via email and telephone calls from Cape Town. Prior to travelling to Botswana, appointments with potential respondents were already scheduled. The interviews took approximately between 15 and 60 minutes and were conducted in the respondent’s respective administration offices and public spaces nearby, such as cafes. At the community level, interviews were conducted at their homes in a more informal setting. Interviews were conducted using languages (Setswana or English) which the individual participants were comfortable with. In using semi-structured interviews, I followed a list of general questions hence interview guidelines guided the discussion. The interview guide allowed the same questions to be pursued thus increased the comprehensiveness of the data and made the data collection systematic for each participant (Patton, 2015). The interviews were audio recorded with the consent of the interviewees. Interviews were later transcribed verbatim. The Setswana interviews were transcribed and translated into English for easy analysis. Transcribed interviews were sent back to informants so that they could give their opinion on whether my interpretation of our interview was correct. This also led to the generation of new data that the informants might have left out during the interview.
During the interview process, additional questions were posed to the respondents through probing (Gibson & Brown, 2009; Patton, 2015). This allowed respondents to elaborate further on their brief responses (Gibson & Brown, 2009) which gave rise to effective interpretation of responses. At the end of the interview, I collected qualitative documents such as official reports, MoUs, treaties and minutes of the meetings, and speeches presented at the conferences for further analysis (Creswell, 2009, 2013). Record evaluation can show how agendas are pursued and the results achieved. Offering historical insight, texts may appear different from the data received from interviews. How the KAZA TFCA agenda came into being and the primary individuals and their responsibilities increased my interest even more. I looked further into how the KAZA operates and what outcomes might occur.

3.4 Participant observation

Participant observation serves to assist researchers to comprehend a respondent's point of view. It occurs in an environment that is relevant to the questions being posed (Creswell, 2009; Patton, 2015). Participatory observation settings in this study include local villages in the KAZA Botswana component such as Kasane, Maun and Mababe. Participant observation allowed me to reflect on the data after each interview and make informed decisions regarding which questions to focus on. While in this setting, I kept a research fieldwork notebook to write field notes and memos about what I observed recording all accounts and observations as field notes in a field notebook. This also allowed me to reflect on the research process itself, the issues that unfolded and allowed me to formulate new questions.

3.5 Document and literature review

In order to substantiate information gathered through interviews critical review of relevant official documents and related literature on TFCA was an important part of data collection process. Academic publications, policy documents, newspapers, KAZA documents and reports, consultant reports, and pre-feasibility studies which provided an in-depth assessment and review of the performance of TFCA in Southern Africa were critically reviewed. By using an inductive process, I was able to identify papers using the key terms: Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM), tourism, biodiversity conservation, protected areas, and community based conservation, environmental security, peace parks, TFCAs and KAZA. Furthermore, the papers selected were those that contained a significant analysis of TFCAs, KAZA and similar TFCAs in Southern Africa. The main focus of the literature review was to explore how much information about TFCAs has been studied and published. As a result, this enabled me to find out and fill the gaps that have been left out by other
scholars (Gibson & Brown, 2009). In addition, the literature review helped me to trace the discourse of transfrontier conservation in the SADC region.

3.6 Selection of respondents
Through purposive sampling, I decided on the participants that could best provide the needed information on the establishment and implementation of KAZA TFCA on the Botswana component (Creswell & Clark, 2007; Patton, 2015). Purposive sampling is recommended by Gubrium (2010) who argues that researchers in need of specific data can select a case that is relevant to their project. Therefore, in the context of this study, government officials (preferably those who work on conservation matters), rural development and conservation based organisations, NGOs and individuals were considered carefully based on my prior knowledge of their responsibilities, knowledge and participation in Botswana conservation programmes. This guaranteed that applicable data came from the designated target. Furthermore, the snowballing technique was also used throughout the data collection process, whereby I asked the respondent at the end of the interview if there were others who I could contact. Due to the interconnected networks between individual actors and organisations collaborating on the KAZA TFCA Botswana component and on conservation issues, the use of the snowballing technique was determined to be a proper choice.

Creswell and Clark (2007) note that by using non-probability sampling techniques there is no pre-determined sampling design that directs the number of respondents needed. Furthermore Mason (2010) argues that the sample size of qualitative studies adheres to the concept of saturation that is “when the collection of new data does not shed any further light on the issue under investigation”. Therefore, the participants were interviewed until the same issues raised by respondents recur (Mason, 2010). The two sampling techniques resulted in 35 (audio recorded) semi-structured interviews completed. From the 35 interviews 15 members were from Mababe community and this included the headman; representatives of board of trustees who are involved in day to day management of the trust; ordinary citizens; and escort guides within the community. The remaining 20 cohort comprised representatives from Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT), Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP), KAZA secretariat, academics, experts and NGOs personnel.

3 The list of respondents is presented in Appendix 1.
4 These are individuals who monitor activities in their controlled hunting areas (CHAs) and keep a recording of animals killed or spotted at specific locations within their Control Hunting Areas.
3.7 Case study area description

The Botswana part of KAZA as per the treaty is situated in the northern part of the country enclosing the Okavango Delta (a Ramsar site and World Heritage site) and Moremi Game Reserve in the west; the Chobe National Park including the Chobe-Linyanti River System in the East and Makgadikgadi-Nxai National park to the south (KAZA-TFCA, 2011; MEWT, 2013, see Figure 3.1.). The original boundary delimitation of the Botswana component of KAZA was approximately 78,200 square kilometres before the expansion of the area (MEWT, 2013; cf Chapter Four).

![Figure 3.1: Map of KAZA TFCA Treaty boundary (Source: MEWT, 2013)](image)

The study was carried out in the village of Mababe, located in the north-western part of Botswana in the Ngamiland District of Botswana. Mababe village is located within the periphery of Moremi Game Reserve (MGR) and Chobe National Park (CNP). The Ngamiland region is mostly enclosed by the wetland of international importance, the Okavango Delta (Figure 3.1). The Okavango Delta derives its water from the upland plains of Angola through the Kubango River which is joined by the Kuito River, and then criss-crosses the desert land of Namibia to later form the Okavango River. The river then empties itself...
into the low plains of north-western Botswana as alluvial distributaries thus forming an inland delta. The Delta is a pristine natural environment and was declared a Ramsar site in April 1997. In June 2014 it was inscribed as a Natural World Heritage site on UNESCO’s criteria vii, ix and x. The Delta is the source for socio-economic development of rural communities as well as the nation at large (Mbaiwa, 2011). The population of the Delta is approximately 137,593 (CSO, 2011) comprising different ethnic groups such as BaSarwa, HamBukushu, BaTawana, BaYei and BaHerero. The land tenure systems found in the Botswana component of KAZA comprises state land (20%) and customary tenure (80%) derived from tribal land (MEWT, 2013). The main activities which are important for livelihood options in communal areas include molapo or flood recession farming, pastoral farming and wildlife management, with both consumptive and non-consumptive utilisation (MEWT, 2013).

The Okavango Delta is rich in biodiversity supporting extensive large populations of mammals, migratory birds and fish, hence it is a popular tourist site referred to as a “world renowned tourist attraction”. As a result, the tourism and conservation of the Delta is ideal for studying TFCAs. In addition, Okavango Delta has over the years been subjected to Transboundary resource management through River Basin management in partnership with Angola and Namibia, thus its selection for this study.

Mababe community, which is home to almost entirely Basarwa has a population of 415 people (CSO, 2011). Historically, Basarwa resided in the now preserved reserve site, Moremi Game Reserve before being displaced in 1963 (Bolaane, 2004). Their main livelihood activities included hunting and gathering (Taylor, 2002). However, this has changed due to the restrictive regulations (land use management and wildlife regulations) which have been put in place (Mbaiwa, 2002). This has led to most of the Basarwa venturing into new economic activities like tourism which were not part of their traditional economic activities (Mbaiwa, 2002). The people of Mababe also practice arable agriculture but to a limited extent (Mbaiwa, 2002). However, their crops are often destroyed by elephants that make it difficult to earn a living. In 1989 Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) was established in Botswana and in 2000 the community of Mababe participated in conservation and tourism development through a CBNRM programme. At the core of the CBNRM

---

5 This comprises significant natural sites for conservation of biological diversity.
programme are CBOs commonly known as Community Trusts (CTs)\(^6\). Through the Mababe Zokotshana Development Trust (MZDT), the Mababe community was given a wildlife management area (WMA) NG41, which was designated for extractive wildlife utilisation. This initiative is based on the need for the promotion and empowerment of local communities, by linking economic and social development to natural resource management which is vital to TFCAs such as KAZA. The MZDT is currently in transition. Since their participation in CBNRM the community have benefited from hunting through sub-leasing their land to private safari hunting operators. However, in keeping with the wildlife resources management policies and laws of Botswana they are transiting from a combination of hunting (consumptive) and photographic tourism (non-consumptive) to solely photographic tourism. The transition is mainly due to the recent hunting ban by the government of Botswana in 2014.

3.7.1 Justification for case study area

Okavango Delta was chosen purposively and was influenced by many factors. First, the choice was subject to personal factors; I am a Staff Development Fellow (SDF) at Okavango Research Institute (ORI)\(^7\) and have been at the Institute for one year. Previous work as a research assistant to a PhD candidate at University of Cambridge (studying the politics of Conservation in post-modern Botswana) who was conducting research in the Delta has exposed me to the complexity of managing the Delta as a socio-ecological system. Local people, in particular the Basarwa communities have in the past been side lined in decision making or policy formulation when establishing protected areas (Magole, 2007) hence it is ideal to study the consequences of KAZA TFCA in Mababe which is a predominantly Basarwa community. This point is supported by the revised remote area dweller programme (GoB, 2009) who acknowledge that Basarwa have been experiencing discrimination for a very long period of time. In addition, the community of Mababe has been participating in CBNRM for a very long time therefore the researcher presumes that the older the Community Based Organisation (CBO) the higher the chances that the community in this area have knowledge and experiences regarding the ongoing activities. It should be taken into account that CBNRM is part of KAZA because the key objective of KAZA is to empower local communities to be the custodians of the resources so CBNRM is a subset; it is one of the key

---

\(^6\) These are legal entities meant to ensure rural people’s access to and management of wildlife (Kgathi et al., 2002).

\(^7\) ORI is an Institute for the study and conservation of one of the world’s largest and most intact inland wetland ecosystems, the Okavango Delta (www.ub.bw).
corner stones that forms KAZA, and also includes the TBNRM. Hence I assume that the issues central to this study manifest most strongly in this area.

Figure 3.2: Map of study area situated in the Okavango Delta (Source: Author)

3.8 Data analysis

Data analysis of qualitative data incorporates disassembling, segmenting, and reconstructing data to establish relevant findings, as a means to reaching a conclusion (Boeije, 2010). Before data is analysed, there is need to store data in a safe place. This ensures that unauthorised people do not have access to the data. From data storage, the research assistant transcribed the recorded interviews. After receiving the transcription outputs, I checked against the voice recording for accuracy. I was interested more in the content of the interviews therefore any part of the interview that contains linguistic details such as laughter was erased. Oliver et al. (2005) state that this method of concentrating more on content and less on absolute expressions is defined as denaturalized transcription. Thematic analysis is mostly applied when analysing qualitative data. This involves identifying emerging themes within the interview notes and documents that relate to the research question (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2015). Patton (2015) contends that themes are common ideas and patterns that the researcher observes repeatedly when collecting data. Responses from the interviews were collated into themes for interpretation and analysis. Therefore, the following themes were generated:
KAZA process; regional collaboration, regional peace and security; biodiversity conservation and sustainability and local community participation.

Furthermore, the study uses discourse analysis because it enables me to follow the evolution of social processes and organisations. As a result, it is practical for assessing KAZA and its impact on local communities. In addition, textual or document analysis is done in order to substantiate the information gathered during interviews, therefore documents were chosen based on their relevance to the objectives of the study and the research questions.

3.9 Ethical consideration

The research proposal was submitted to the University of Cape Town’s Faculty of Science Research Ethics Committee for scientific and ethical review. Upon receiving ethical clearance I applied for a research permit at the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT) in Botswana. It should be noted that researchers cannot undertake study in Botswana without a research permit. Consent was sought from respondents therefore written consent forms for the study were agreed to and signed before collecting information from the respondents. All participants were informed about the objectives of the study and the procedures to be followed. The interviews were anonymous and respondents were allowed to participate on a voluntary basis. Fearing retaliation, those individuals interviewed were assured that their comments would remain anonymous, confidential and not shared with anyone but would only be used solely for the purpose of academics. Furthermore, some government officials asked that their names should not be included in the research hence they remained anonymous in this thesis. Any controversial or inflammatory comments that could be linked back to an informant were altered, thereby eliminating any possibility of accusations being made. To ensure data security, I stored audio files on a password-protected and encrypted hard drive. Furthermore, transcribed text files were password-protected in my personal computer and the hard drive.

3.10 Limitations of the study

The study is not without challenges. As alluded to earlier, KAZA consists of five sovereign states including Botswana. Indeed, it simply would not have been possible within the time and financial constraints of this study to cover all the five countries. Thus it is for this reason that I focused on the Botswana side of KAZA. Despite this limitation, conclusions from the study were not comprised. As evidenced in this study, Botswana currently holds the largest elephant population in the five countries. This makes elephants in the Botswana side an
anchor initiative for KAZA. Since KAZA is a newly formed initiative, I found it difficult to access some of the material especially in regards to development and implementation of KAZA process hence more reliance on face to face interviews and limited material.

The limitation encountered in Mababe village was that community members were clueless about the KAZA initiative. The community members did not know what the initiative involved hence it was difficult to continue with the interviews. I then had to consult with my supervisor to seek advice on the way forward. In order to continue with the interviews, I had to change the approach; I had to explain to them what the initiative entails. Therefore, in order to steer the discussion towards my research objectives I had to tell them that KAZA is a large conservation area straddling five countries, enabling wildlife to move across boundaries and increasing the flow of tourists and asked them what they thought of the initiative.

Public sector servants expressed caution when interviewed for fear of being punished or penalised by government authorities. Since 2008 when President Dr Ian Khama assumed office, a new state security agent was formed called Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DISS)\textsuperscript{8}. DISS popularly known among citizens of Botswana, has been charged with unlawful surveillance of individuals. Individuals were detained, assaulted, abused and even murdered, according to media reports (\textit{Mmegi, Sunday Standard}) and the academia in Botswana (Good, 2010; Khumoekae, 2014). Furthermore, protected areas in Botswana have increasingly become militarized under the guidance of His Excellency hence people living adjacent to these areas fear for their lives. Thus the subject matter of this study is complex and political; the fieldwork I conducted occurred under repressive political conditions. Many respondents refrained from offering their own opinion while being interviewed. Some individuals recited the government’s viewpoint and others remarked that they do not know anything when asked about specific matters.

In addition, while some members of the community thought I was working for KAZA in order to collect data for them, some thought I was a representative of the DISS. They thought the President and Minister had sent me in order to spy on them. This can be attributed to a recent increase in military force in conservation areas in Botswana; hence society is overwhelmed by fear. It is in light of this, that confidentiality of information was always

\textsuperscript{8} On 1st April 2008, Botswanan President Ian Khama formed a new state security agency popularly known as DISS with the aim to investigate, gather, co-ordinate, evaluate, correlate, interpret, disseminate and store information on national security (Gwatiwa, 2015).
emphasized at the beginning of the interviews. I also had to prove that I was a student by producing my student identity card, research permit and my departmental letter from UCT.
CHAPTER FOUR

LEGITIMISATION OF KAZA TFCA

4.1 Introduction

As indicated in Chapter Two, TFCA emanate from the acknowledgement of the fact that transboundary natural resources require joint management. The idea of KAZA dates from the beginning of the last century. The elephant population in northern Botswana is a defining feature for KAZA TFCA. Therefore, the objective of KAZA to allow congested herds of elephants in Botswana to disperse up north in Zambia and Angola provides a compelling conservation argument (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008). It appears that large mammals dominate the agenda of the conservation area due to interests in photographic tourism resulting in violent policing of borders by the Botswana government. Ecotourism is seen as essential in speeding up development in the region as well as uplifting local livelihoods of marginalised communities. This chapter focuses on the unfolding process of KAZA as a TFCA (from its initial conception of the idea to the actual implementation) in the Botswana side. This chapter is organised into two sections. The first section provides details on the KAZA process, that is, the establishment, development and implementation of KAZA TFCA on the Botswana side. An analysis of the reasons behind Botswana government involvement in KAZA TFCA is attempted in the second section.

4.2 Temporal development of KAZA TFCA

The starting point for the formation of KAZA dates back to as early as the 1990’s. As part of their spatial development initiative, the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) proposed the idea of creating a Southern African Wildlife Sanctuary in a similar area where KAZA is located today (personal communication, Modise, 22/06/2015; Mlazie, 06/07/2015). In addition, the initiative was part of a SADC tourism sector project under the auspices of the Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa (RETOSA) (see Suich et al., 2004). The idea later developed into the formation of the Okavango Upper Zambezi International Tourism Initiative (OUZIT) in 1993. The aim of OUZIT was to take advantage of the region’s networks of protected areas, wildlife, cultural and natural resources to become a premier tourism hub (Spenceley, 2008). In an interview, Modise (22/06/2015) noted that:

*The focus of OUZIT was to be for tourism and it was advocating for mass tourism, they wanted to see everything up, the thinking at that time was that the focus should*
be tourism not conservation and that didn’t go very well with the governments of the day.

In light of the above statement, OUZIT initiative lost its momentum as a result of its poorly defined scope and lack of ownership by the governments of the day (personal communication, Modise, 22/06/2015). Subsequently, the effort to rekindle the idea was facilitated by the creation of the Four Corners Transboundary Natural Resource Management initiative in 2001 (personal communication, Modise, 22/06/2015; Mlazie, 06/07/2015; Mpho, 28/01/2016). At the time the initiative covered portions of Botswana (Ngamiland district), Namibia (Caprivi strip), Zimbabwe (Hwange District) and Zambia (Southern and western province) in what was described as the Heartland\(^9\) of Zambezi. The Four Corners TBNRM was coordinated by African Wildlife Fund (AWF) through a funded project by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (personal communication, Modise, 22/06/2015). The Four Corners initiative was aimed at enhancing adaptive collaboration in the management of transboundary natural resources in order to advance socio-economic development of local communities and biodiversity conservation (Metcalfe, 2005; personal communication, Mpho, 28/01/2016). AWF worked more closely with local communities residing in the heartland focusing more on biodiversity conservation and community based natural resource enterprise (personal communication, Mpho, 28/01/2016). In Botswana AWF provided support in the development of Santiwani lodge, a fully community based tourism venture owned by Sankuyo community (Metcalfe, 2005). Furthermore, the project was able to support the Botswana Community Based Organisation Network (BOCOBONET)\(^{10}\) to represent Botswana CBOs involved in natural resource management. BOCOBONET was assigned the responsibility to mobilise, enhance skills and capacities of local communities participating in CBNRM (personal communication, Tsholofelo, 24/06/2015; Mpho, 28/01/2016). It is through AWF that a regional community forum was established with traditional and civic leaders from local communities signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to collaborate adequately on biodiversity conservation matters (Metcalfe, 2005).

\(^9\) According to Metcalfe (2005, p. 12) a heartland “promotes and supports integrated land management for biodiversity conservation and livelihood development over large areas defined by habitat, seasonal and movement needs of key wildlife species”.

\(^{10}\) BOCOBONET is currently a defunct body. BOCOBONET was dependent on donor funding. As such the withdrawal of funding and lack of accountability weakened the organisation.
Although AWF brought local communities on board they had a fair share of shortcomings. For instance, the political sector was not actively involved in the initiative hence the ownership of the project remained under the auspices of AWF. Even though efforts were made by AWF to bring governments on board, they were unsuccessful. This is due to the fact that at the time the leadership for the initiative was provided by Zimbabwean government (Metcalf, 2005; personal communication, Tsholofelo, 24/06/2015). As a result, the Zimbabwean government was not deemed fit for leadership by other countries due to the socio-economic and political instability that the country was experiencing at the time. Countries believed that the initiative was donor driven and NGO led, hence were not satisfied with the AWF in-country consultation process (Meltcalfe, 2005). While Zambia became part of the four corners initiative, the governments of Namibia and Botswana did not accede to the proposal. It is for this reason that the Four Corners and OUZIT initiative did not reach its peak due to lack of political sector involvement. For any realisation of cross-border joint management, there is a need for political will, social acceptance and buy-in that transcends political boundaries.

In July 2003 the real impetus for the initiative came with the active involvement of the five governments. The former President of Namibia, His Excellency Sam Nujoma convened a meeting with the five ministers of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism from the five states in Namibia, Katima Molilo. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the OUZIT and Four corners heartland initiatives (personal communication, Modise, 22/06/2015; Gureja, 22/06/2015). President Nujoma called upon the countries to come together as governments and establish a transfrontier conservation area and be able to co-manage the natural resource that straddles their political boundaries (Metcalf, 2005; Suich et al., 2004; personal communication, Modise, 22/06/15; Gwapela, 14/01/2016). As a result, the ministers agreed in principle to “revitalise” the idea and “seize the golden opportunity to take complete ownership, to sharpen its focus so that it can complement the socio-economic development efforts of respective countries” (Nujoma, 2003 as cited in Suich et al., 2004, p. 4). Elsewhere Modise (personal communication, 22/06/215) succinctly attests that Nujoma wanted the governments to take responsibility of the initiative so that they can be accountable to their citizens. Therefore, a resolution was taken by ministers to establish ‘a world class TFCA and tourism destination in the Okavango and Zambezi river basins regions of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe within the context of sustainable development’. In
consequence the initiative was no longer NGO driven, but a government driven project. This
time there was political will, social acceptance and stakeholders buy in.

Prior to the signing of the MoU, partner countries through Peace Parks Foundation (PPF)
continued the practice of conducting pre-feasibility studies for the proposed KAZA area. PPF
is being recognized for advancing the idea of a transfrontier conservation area in Southern
Africa since 2005 and 2006. PPF, supported by the Rufford Foundation and WWF
Netherlands actively supported the efforts to establish KAZA, funding the prefeasibility study
commissioned for the proposed KAZA area (www.ppf.org). For this reason, a feasibility
study is considered as a precondition identifying current resource use, wildlife movements as
well as people-wildlife interaction (Büscher, 2009). Büscher and Dietz (2005, p. 5) point out
that “in this way, not only has the PPF direct political access by contributing a wide variety of
resources, they also have an edge in directing policy because they can influence part of the
content, as the resources they offer are directly being used by their officers in the various
departments to make decisions in the policy process”.

In late 2006, the idea of a conservation and tourism initiative was revitalized by signing the
MoU, committing the partner countries to work towards the establishment of the KAZA
TFCA (personal communication, Gureja, 22/06/15; Mlazie, 06/07/2015; Mtshambiwa,
13/07/2015). The signature of the MoU represented a form of de facto establishment. The
MoU operated as a framework document which guided activities, processes, operational
principles of KAZA TFCA and further negotiations by the governments as well as vertical
consultation in each of the countries. The signing of a MoU can be regarded as a first step in
a protracted, complex and ambitious process, the magnitude which has not been attempted in
other TFCA considering that it involves five sovereign states. The MoU facilitated the
formation of appropriate organisational structures such as a technical committee and working
groups. It further prepared the terms and conditions for an international treaty establishing a
transfrontier conservation area (personal communication, Mlazie 06/06/15; Masunga,
12/01/2016).

It was at a meeting in Namibia where countries crafted a draft treaty providing a platform for
national consultations with stakeholders. Present during the meeting was the German
Minister of Economic Development Dirk Nebel and Executive Secretary of SADC Dr Tomaz
Salomao (PPF, 2006; see also www.kavangozambezi.org). For Botswana, the former
Minister of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism Kitso Mokaila represented the country in
negotiations with other countries. The minister expressed dissatisfaction with the level of communication from other partner countries (Chwaane, 2007):

*It has not been easy to receive feedback on papers we have sent to member states for comment. This makes it difficult for us to conclude and finalise documents on certain issues.*

The establishment of KAZA is not without challenges. Taking into account the recent civil war in Angola, countries noted with great concern the presence of landmines in that country (personal communication, Modise, 22/06/2015; Mokaila, 25/01/2015). The land use in Angola was not compatible with conservation and development goals (personal communication, Mokaila, 25/01/2016). Mokaila commented that:

*Since Angola was ravaged by war for almost a decade, the country was concerned more about development and conservation was not their main priority.*

The success of the collaborative effort can be jeopardized by civil unrest or political instability in either nation. As with the establishment of GLTP the political instability and lack of funding in Zimbabwe was a concern. It should be taken into account that the economies of the countries differ considerably. When there is economic disparity amongst these nations, the potential exists for such tourism regions to become a target for unintended activities, such as illegal migration, goods smuggling, and narcotics trafficking and distribution. For example, while planning KAZA, concerns were raised regarding a potential increase in poaching, particularly in countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe (personal communication, Masunga, 12/01/2016). Botswana also noted with concern that opening borders to facilitate free movement of people and tourists will result in an influx of Zimbabwean illegal immigrants (personal communication, Masunga, 12/01/2016). This is mostly attributed to the socio-economic conditions of the aforementioned country. For instance, thousands of Zimbabweans are deported every month by the government of Botswana.

In 2011, the presidents of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Zambia signed an international treaty establishing the KAZA TFCA, a culmination of these historical events. The ratification of the treaty provided an enabling platform for KAZA TFCA to be recognised as a legal entity. In terms of the KAZA treaty (2011), KAZA aims to foster transnational collaboration among the parties to facilitate effective ecosystem management in
the area. Additional objectives are to encourage partnerships among the private sector, local communities and NGOs to manage biodiversity, to harmonize environmental management across borders and remove artificial barriers to the movement of wildlife. Due to Botswana’s international reputation for conservation, Botswana was chosen as the base for KAZA (personal communication, Mlazie, 06/07/2015).

4.3 Motivations of Botswana government participation in the KAZA
The reasons for participation in the KAZA TFCA by the Botswana government were in agreement with TFCA objectives, with biodiversity conservation being the primary motive. The motives for participation were grouped into three themes: biodiversity conservation, security, peace and collaboration and economic integration.

4.3.1 Biodiversity conservation
Just like other TFCAs, the ecological arguments are advanced for the establishment of KAZA. According to the Botswana IDP (MEWT, 2013; personal communication Mlazie, 06/07/2015; Sedie, 22/07/2015) the primary objective of KAZA is the conservation of biodiversity. Botswana has been hailed by other countries for its conservation efforts over the past years. This is attested by the country’s initiatives towards biodiversity conservation and protection which includes the declaration and funding of protected areas (PAs) and formulation of biodiversity policies and legislation. Botswana has devoted 38% of land for conservation (Hemson et al. 2009; personal communication, Flyman 23/06/2015; Masunga, 12/06/2016). A recent aerial survey report by Elephant Without Borders (EWB) has observed a decline in biodiversity in the Chobe complex as well as the Okavango Delta. The report indicates that certain species such as wildebeest, giraffes, kudu, lechwe, ostriches, roan, tessebe antelope and warthog species have declined by as much as 96% over the past 15 years in the Okavango Delta (Chase, 2011). The decline is mostly attributed to the expansion of human activities in fragile areas of the OD and poaching (both commercial and illegal bush meat poaching) activities. Furthermore, habitat fragmentation as a result of veterinary fences has blocked the free movement of wildlife thus hindering effective functioning of the ecosystem that supports the Botswana bioregion (MEWT, 2013). However, an increase of elephants (up by 8%) has been observed (Chase, 2011).

As such, Hanks (2003) notes that transboundary approaches can facilitate the conservation of migratory and/or a wide range of species. The KAZA is seen as one way of dealing with the

---

11 The headquarters of KAZA are located in Kasane.
high elephant population numbers in Northern Botswana specifically the Chobe National Park (CNP) in the Chobe District by providing an expanded area in order to allow elephants to move from high density areas to low density areas. Currently Botswana holds approximately 130,000 elephants in Northern Botswana which threatens the landscape, riparian vegetation, and populations of other flora and fauna species and has heightened human wildlife conflicts (Chase, 2011; Darkoh & Mbaiwa, 2014, Mogende, personal observations). In addition Botswana does not do culling and with the recent hunting ban, it is projected that the population of elephants will increase hence the likelihood that there will be no land to absorb this increase (personal communication, Masunga, 12/01/2016; Marotsi, 08/07/15).

One of the most important biodiversity related activities is the creation of biological or wildlife dispersal corridors to ease movement. It is believed that securing wildlife corridors for these elephants will result in an increase in elephant forage area as they will be able to move from areas of high concentration (CNP) to areas of less concentration such as Luiana National Park in Angola and Sioma Ngwezi National park in Zambia thus reducing the congestion of elephants in Botswana (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008; personal communication, Mlazie, 06/07/15; Masunga, 12/01/2016). In addition, by creating corridors KAZA is seen as a way of restoring wildlife ancestral routes. Clearing of landmines in the Cuando-Cubango Province of Angola will be detrimental to restoring the historical elephant migratory routes. It should be noted that Angola is the historical foraging ground for most of the elephants in Northern Botswana. To date, six priority wildlife dispersal areas (WDAs) are documented by the KAZA TFCA Master IDP (see Figure 4.1):

a) Kwando River WDA (links Sioma Ngwezi NP-West Zambezi Game Management Areas-Luenge Luiana NP)

b) Zambezi-Chobe floodplain WDA

c) Zambezi-Mosi-oa-Tunya WDA

d) Hwange-Kazuma Chobe WDA (Hwange-Kazuma-Chobe NP)

e) Hwange-Makgadikgadi-Nxai Pan WDA

f) Khaudum-Ngamiland WDA
Even though countries commit themselves to biodiversity conservation, Cumming (2011) argues that the IDPs developed by partner countries do not reflect on conservation objectives of the park and even the TFCA. Cumming (2011, p.5) observes that “plans deal at length with administration and management activities but does not expand on what these activities are expected to deliver in terms of conservation efforts”. This is the case with the Botswana IDP of KAZA (MEWT, 2013).

Figure 4.1: Documented wildlife dispersal areas in KAZA TFCA (KAZA TFCA Master IDP, 2014)

In its commitment to expanding conservation areas for KAZA TFCA, the treaty provides for the inclusion of additional areas within countries. In light of this, Botswana has thus taken a decision to expand its conservation estate in KAZA by including additional areas thus making Botswana the highest contributor of land for conservation in KAZA (personal communication, Otukile, 25/06/2015). The proposed extension includes communal areas to the west and south of the Okavango Delta, the Makgadikagdi Pans system and areas of cultural significance such as the Tsodilo Hills (MEWT, 2013). The inclusion of communal land as conservation areas in Botswana is not new (Mbaiwa et al., 2008). Communal lands are often considered to be rich in biodiversity therefore act as repositories of biodiversity outside Moremi Game Reserve and Chobe National Park (see also Ramutsindela & Noe, 2012). The government of Botswana pursues its goals of biodiversity conservation in communal areas through community based natural resource management in Wildlife
Management Areas (WMAs) (personal communication, Flyman, 23/06/2015; Otukile, 25/06/2015; see also Poteete, 2002). The area now covers a region in excess of 153,600 km\(^2\) approximately 30\% of the total area of the KAZA TFCA and nearly doubles the original area of approximately 78,200km\(^2\) (MEWT, 2013) (see Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: Map of extended boundary of the Botswana (Source: MEWT, 2013)

4.3.2 Security, peace and collaboration

Besides biodiversity conservation the rationale for establishing KAZA is rooted in environmental peace making discourse. In this narrative, nature is used as a mechanism to foster collaboration between partner states (Mackelworth et al., 2013). Botswana government supports the idea that good neighbourliness and relations can be achieved by states engagement at the supranational level (personal communication, Otukile, 23/06/2015; Mokaila, 25/01/2016). Ramutsindela (2007) argue that international boundaries are reconceptualised as theatres of opportunity for peace making rather than physical barriers and potential sources of disputes between nation states. Ali (2011) points out that environmental initiatives such as TFCAs can lower tensions and violent conflicts between countries and communities.
Botswana government officials acknowledge bio risks such as poaching in the Chobe and Okavango bioregion. Poaching is perceived as a threat to national security which has the potential to elevate conflict among partner countries and between the state and their citizens (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016; personal communication, Mokaila, 25/01/2016). According to Botswana statistics report (CSO, 2014) a total of 348 elephants were poached in Chobe and Ngamiland district in the period 2009 to 2013. Poaching is mostly attributed to high poverty levels of local communities surrounding protected areas in Northern Botswana (MEWT, 2013; personal communication Ives, 08/01/2016). Furthermore, the increasing demand for ivory tusks in Asian countries contributes to poaching in the region. An official from DWNP points out that poaching is carried out by treacherous gangs from Zambia, using AK47s, silenced rifles, pistols and improved radio connections (personal communication, Tsholofelo, 24/06/2015; Flyman, 23/06/2015 Marotsi, 08/07/2015; Gwapela, 14/01/2016; see also Henk, 2007). In July 2012, when two Namibian nationals were killed during an anti-poaching operation, the government of Botswana (GoB, 2012) issued a statement that the poachers were carrying:

*A loaded 12 gauge shot gun (serial no. 108466) made in Russia and a loaded 22 caliber rifles with telescopic sights and a knife.*

In recent years, poachers have had a tendency to poisoning predators and vultures. Senyatso (personal communication, 27/01/2016) explained:

*We have recorded an increasing number of cases of vulture poisoning. Poachers also carry along toxic chemicals such as temmik which they use to poison predators like lion, hyenas and vultures. They specifically target vultures so that there are no birds flying around the carcasses to alert the wildlife authorities and BDF anti-poaching units.*

According to Senyatso Botswana vultures are listed as either endangered or vulnerable (personal communication, 27/01/2016). Therefore, poaching does not only threaten elephant populations. Poaching has serious security implications (personal communication, Tsholofelo, 24/06/2015).

In an effort to fight poaching the state has pursued aggressive strategies both at the national and international level. The government of Botswana has adopted the violent shoot to kill
policy (personal communication, Gwapela, 14/01/2016). A local newspaper, Mmegi (2013), quoted Minister Tshekedi Khama declaring war on poachers:

When we meet poachers we do not negotiate. We just shoot. God will decide what to do with them. I am not apologetic about that.

During a recent fund raising event for rhino protection, Minister Tshekedi emphasised that they will continue with the shoot to kill policy in order to win the wildlife wars with poachers. He said (Matota, 2016):

So I promise that we cannot afford to lose any of the rhinos that are in this country. In fact poachers should start carrying their IDs so that we can notify their next of kin. Yes God will judge poachers but it is up to us to arrange the meeting.

The shoot to kill policy has created animosity between Namibia and Botswana. The Namibian government has over the years criticised Botswana’s shoot to kill policy. The Namibian government has argued that such a policy is lethal as it violates the right to life as poachers are denied the legal process to prove their innocence (Visser, 2014). It is alleged that during the past two decades, 30 Namibians and at least 22 Zimbabweans have been killed in Botswana’s anti-poaching operations (Mongudhi et al., 2016). This scenario led to a simmering relation between the two countries. The tension between the two countries is, however not confined to the shoot to kill issue. The two counties have had territorial disputes with regards to the ownership of Sedudu/kasikili Island that was found by the International Court of Justice to belong to Botswana.

Botswana Defence Force (BDF) and DWNP anti-poaching unit (APU) has been deployed in various parks of Botswana in an effort to protect wildlife (Henk, 2007; personal communication, Flyman, 23/06/2015; Marotsi, 08/07/2015). The BDF has been deployed to deal with poaching since 1988 when President Dr Ian Khama was the commander of the BDF (Henk, 2007; Hoon, 2013). The President of Botswana has vowed to continue using security agencies to protect wildlife. In an interview with Botswana Gazzette (2013), Dr Ian Khama stated that:

Recently, we have learnt with alarm of the senseless and tragic destruction of rhinos by poachers in South Africa, where last year alone more than 400 rhinos were killed by poachers, and poaching still continues to date. We are also aware that these poachers are now eyeing Botswana rhinos as their next target. It has come to our
attention that some have dispatched a covert expedition into Botswana to locate rhinos for poaching operations. We have responded by adopting measures which include the declaration of such individuals prohibited immigrants. We are and will continue to use our security forces to protect our rhinos and general wildlife. They should be warned that coming into Botswana to poach would be a very very high risk undertaking. This is a warning that in this country, wildlife protection is a national priority.

It should be noted that Khama as a conservationist and former commander of the armed forces, no doubt inspires a firm hand in wildlife protection. It has been rumoured that Tshekedi Khama has business interests in arms procurement and has reportedly supplied the BDF with arms and ammunition through his company Seleka springs (Dithlase, 2012; Motlogelwa & Civillini, 2015). The Ian Khama led government has thus increased its security agencies in protection of wildlife (personal communication, Tsholofelo, 24/06/2015). Currently the protection of wildlife is enabled by a wide range of security agencies including Botswana Defence Force (BDF), Department of Wildlife and National Parks Anti-Poaching Unit (DWNP-APU), Botswana Police Service (BPS), Botswana Prisons Service, Special Support Group (SSG) and Directorate of Intelligence Security Service (DISS). The security forces have a responsibility to defend Botswana sovereignty hence their involvement in anti-poaching campaigns and external peace and stability operations (personal communication, Tsholofelo, 24/06/2015; Mlazie, 06/07/2015). The military is active and visible in Botswana parks. They are seen patrolling wildlife on foot and in vehicles, aircrafts, and boats which have proven effective (personal communication, Tsholofelo, 24/06/2015 Mlazie, 06/07/2015).

The private sector has also joined hands in the fight against poaching. For instance, private concessions including NG26 and NG30 in the Okavango Delta have employed wildlife scouts to patrol the respective areas (personal communication, Ives, 08/01/2016). They use horse and foot patrols in the area and have camera traps in their concessions (personal communication, Anonymous, 09/08/2015). Despite the effort taken by Botswana to strengthen security in the parks and WMAs, poaching activities still continue albeit in reduced numbers. The Botswana government remains committed to zero poaching incidences (personal communication, Mlazie, 06/07/2015; Ives, 08/01/2016).
The military stance taken by Botswana has provided a model on how to deal with poaching (Henks, 2007; Ramutsindela, 2016). A number of outsiders have praised Botswana for taking such a stance. The major challenge for the law enforcement unit is that their jurisdiction ends at international boundaries as the KAZA treaty recognizes the centrality of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

At the international level, Botswana has joined forces with Namibia to address defence and security matters. The joint patrol exercises between the BDF and Namibian Defence Force (NDF) are a result of the Joint Permanent Commission (JPC) on defence and security between the two countries. In 2012 a platoon comprising BDF and NDF monitored and patrolled the Botswana/Namibian border both on foot and in vehicles. This collaboration has since continued, with initiatives to tackle among other things cross border crimes, poaching and livestock rustling. Visser (2014) points out that in the initial conception of KAZA TFCA security agencies were not adequately involved but currently through the establishment of defence and security working groups they are part of KAZA which has led to the region being militarised (Lunstrum, 2014; see also Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016).

One government official noted that KAZA and the presence of the military across the borders and parks are not going to help to combat poaching. The official lamented that:

_We joined KAZA with the hope that tourism will benefit communities as our own CBNRM has failed to deliver on the promises made. Communities have high expectations from KAZA but now look at what is happening in Botswana, hunting has been banned. This has dire consequences on conservation. Communities are directly or indirectly going to participate in poaching because it brings food to the table for the poor communities. There shall be bad blood between the state and communities. It will get worse before it gets better._ (Anonymous, 09/07/2015)

The government official points out that if efforts are not made to include communities in planning activities of KAZA, local communities will partake in poaching, thus real growth in tourism is needed.

Apart from poaching, climate change is likely to pose a threat to national security and the objectives of KAZA, considering that KAZA consists of international shared river basins. For instance, water resources, especially international shared basins in this case the Kavango and Zambezi water basins, can create a potential for tensions and conflict between partner
countries. The decrease in water quality and quantity coupled with evolving (and sometimes unpredictable) hydro climatic conditions pose considerable challenges for sustainability and cause increased contention and/or conflict between nations in the absence of adaptable administrative boundaries. This is more crucial for Botswana than Angola and Namibia because what happens in the upstream of Angola and Namibia may affect the Okavango Delta in the downstream (personal communication, Brooks, 13/01/2016). It is important to take into account that Botswana receives most of its water from Angola which is used for tourism in the Okavango Delta (personal communication, Motsumi, 08/01/2016). It is without doubt that Botswana which has a vibrant, booming tourism sector is said to be benefiting more than other riparian states. Although the Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM) is already in place to manage transboundary water resources, KAZA is regarded as providing additional protection to ensure that other countries do not pursue activities which cause harm to biodiversity and ecological integrity (personal communication, Marotsi 08/07/2015; Brooks, 13/01/2016). The label, peace parks, would increase the delta’s protected status within the transboundary biodiversity conservation area (personal communication, Brooks, 13/01/2016; Motsumi, 08/01/2016).

Furthermore, the partner countries operate under different policies and legislation in regard to environmental protection hence it is difficult to manage cross-border resources (personal communication, Mlazie, 06/07/2015; Masunga, 12/01/2016). For instance, fishing by Namibians along the CNP is viewed as unfair by Botswana fishermen (MEWT, 2013). Marotsi (personal communication, 08/07/2015) succinctly support this point by acknowledging that fishing has created tensions between fishermen from either country. He commented that:

\begin{quote}
We are currently experiencing tension between fisherman on the Botswana and Namibian side when it comes to fishing on the Chobe River. Our Namibian fellows are accused of overfishing and using different fishing nets which are said to be impacting on small boats. This is mainly due to different polices and laws in place. We just hope that KAZA could help in solving this tension.
\end{quote}

The implementation of KAZA has resulted in a significant move towards development of harmonisation of policies and legislation which is yet to be approved by the KAZA Ministers (personal communication, Mlazie, 06/07/2015). In this way, advocates of TFCAs argue that
this approach is useful because ecological issues, as well as management objectives are often the same and not distinguished by natural borders (Metcalf & Kepe, 2008).

4.3.3 Socio-economic development

In the period between 2006 and 2010 the tourism sector revealed an average growth rate of 10.7% per annum with 2.5 million international tourist visiting Botswana in 2010 (Spenceley & Snyman, 2016). The tourism sector contributes 9.5% to the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), second to the mining industry (CSO, 2014). In an attempt to diversify the economy, ecotourism has been hailed as a ‘new engine of growth’ by the Botswana government (personal communication, Gureja, 22/06/2015; Mpho, 28/01/2016). Expectations of economic growth through development of the tourism sector are high and the elephant population in Okavango Delta and Chobe National Park is the main attraction. In light of the above, KAZA is regarded by the government of Botswana as a ‘vehicle’ for economic development in which wildlife is seen as an asset to be utilised in realising the economic growth through non-consumptive means.

Tourism is regarded as an investment sector by the government of Botswana hence the call for an enhanced public-private partnership which will foster national and local economic development. The notion of public-private partnerships is not unique to Botswana. For instance, the public-private partnership model is evidenced by Botswana’s corporate partner, De Beers’, involvement with the government in the mining sector. Since 1990 the government has envisaged a greater role in the private sector to promote, develop and derive profits from tourism enterprise (personal communication, Tsholofelo, 24/06/2015; Ives, 08/01/2016). Map Ives (personal communication, 08/01/2016) an environmental manager of Okavango Wilderness Safaris (OWS) and the director of Botswana rhino project, stated that:

*Private sector operators such as Okavango Wilderness Safaris have expertise in tourism. The expertise for tourism development is not in government but the real expertise lies with the private sector. Therefore without private sector, there is no economy that will succeed.*

As a consequence, the tourism sector is led and driven by the private sector. This is reiterated by the Tourism policy of 1990. Tourism is promoted by a wide range of private companies in
the Okavango Delta, including Wilderness Safaris\(^\text{12}\) (operating as Okavango Wilderness Safaris), Ker and Downey, Desert and Delta and Beyond, Great Plains and Aberkrombie and Kent (personal communication, Ives, 08/01/2016; Monametsi, 19/01/2016). The private sector has been given wildlife concessions in interior and exterior areas of the Delta by the Botswana government (personal communication, Ives, 08/01/2016). OWS manages and controls 20 luxurious camps in the Okavango Delta ranging from premier, classic, adventures and collection camps. In national parks and game reserves the government through DWNP has leased some of the campsites to the private sector. For instance, OWS operates Mombo and Little Mombo camp which are located on Chiefs Island in Moremi Game Reserve (personal communication, Ives, 08/01/2016). The tourism policy (1990) aims to obtain on a sustainable basis, the greatest possible net social and economic benefits for Botswana from the tourism resources. The government recognises that by owning and operating tourism enterprises, the private sector will generate profits for the country and engage in joint venture partnerships with local communities. The companies have generated substantial income both at national and local level through payment of leases and taxes to the government (personal communication, Ives, 08/01/2016). Spenceley and Snyman (2016) point out that approximately USD 5.9 million has been generated by OWS for the government in the period 2009-2013 through lease fees and taxes. Furthermore, according to the company website, Wilderness safaris employ 2,500 people across the seven countries in which they operate (http://www.wilderness-safaris.com/about/media-and-press).

The private sector use marketing tools that are appealing to the consumer to attract tourists to the country. For instance, Okavango Delta is marketed within affluent consumer markets as pristine and undisrupted wilderness destination (Mbaiwa et al., 2008; personal communication, Ives, 08/01/2016). Ives stated that:

\[
\text{OWS has expertise on tourism more importantly tourism marketing. Going out and marketing the concept of “wilderness’ safaris” as an economic activity is vital. These guys have expertise in marketing, selling and operating. If you go to our lodges in the Delta, you see a very high standard of service, high standard of accommodation; a very high standard is maintained which are important in attracting tourists in KAZA.}
\]

\(^\text{12}\) Wilderness Safaris is a safari operator, operating approximately 2.5 million hectares of Southern Africa’s wildlife reserves. They operate camps and lodges in Botswana, Congo, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe (http://www.wilderness-safaris.com).
In the quest to attract international tourists, the private sector pursues a High Cost Low Volume (HCLV) marketing strategy (Tourism Policy, 1990). In essence, the principle is based on having fewer tourists with higher expenditures. The idea is that low density tourism will boost the economy. The motive for adopting such a principle is mainly for profit making by the private sector. The strategy in place is to make the Okavango Delta a flagship destination of KAZA TFCA so that it attracts top end, high tariff, low volume tourism that boosts the economy of the country while allowing other areas of KAZA to absorb mass tourism (personal communication, Ives, 08/01/2016, Anonymous, 09/08/2015). The HCLV strategy maximises the amount of time spent by tourists in Okavango Delta and other destinations in the country, thus increasing their overall expenditures. In essence they sell safaris in a package which will include accommodation, attractions and activities. For instance, rather than a tourist spending just three nights at one destination, OWS is able to sell seven to twenty nights, incorporating different locations in the delta, Kalahari and other destinations (Spenceley & Synman, 2016). Therefore, it can be argued that the private sector creates a powerful image of an extended wilderness where tourists can wonder and experience nature (Noe, 2012). The HCLV strategy is highly favoured by international conservation NGOs such as IUCN. The model is seen as compatible with conservation and development goals.

At one point there was a proposal by the German donor to have cameras in conservation areas such as Victoria Falls, CNP, OD whereby there will be a receiver in Germany that will be marketing the KAZA tourism (personal communication, Masunga 12/01/2016). The idea was that as people move around in Germany they will be able to see the beauty of the KAZA areas (personal communication, Masunga 12/01/2016). However, this raised concerns about the ethical implications of infringing the privacy of tourists and rural residents in these areas, hence Botswana did not agree to this concept. The right to privacy is enshrined in the Botswana constitution as well as international law.

Ecotourism as an investment sector presents a strategy to advance not only national development goals but also to promote the interests of local elite in the industry (Kgomotso, 2011). It is rumoured that the tourism industry is politically connected. Swatuk (2005, p.5) argues that “Botswana is governed by a small elite whose political and business interests are mutually reinforcing”. This is evidenced by the acquisition of shares by the Botswana elite in the lucrative industry in particular photographic tourism operators. A local newspaper Mmegi (Lawrence, 2014) pointed out that President Ian Khama has shares in Linyanti Investment, a
subsidiary of Wilderness Safari. Linyanti concessions cover approximately 1250 square kilometres of northern Kalahari in the Chobe district. In addition, two members who have close ties with the president are present in Wilderness Holdings structures. Parks Tafa, personal lawyer and Marcus Patrick Khama ter Haas, nephew to the president were appointed as non-executive directors to serve on Wilderness holdings board of directors (Ntibanyane, 2011). Other prominent figures including Judge Mpaphi Phumaphi, Lydia Saleshando (former deputy vice chancellor of University of Botswana) and Gilson Shaleshando (former president of Botswana Congress Party) have shares in the company (Ntibanyane, 2011). Mogende and Kolawole (2016) argue that the interest in photographic tourism in some quarters may have influenced the government’s decision to ban trophy hunting. Public-private partnerships have thus become a defining feature of neoliberal discourse.

In an effort to diversify the tourism product, the government of Botswana intends to add value to wildlife experience through cultural and heritage attractions. It is necessary to divert tourist visitation and consumption beyond the Chobe National Park, Moremi Game Reserve, and Okavango Delta (Saarinen et al., 2014). Of great importance is the value of the San/Basarwa heritage as a cultural resource (personal communication, Mlazie, 06/07/2015). The Basarwa culture and lifestyle is regarded as a way to diversify the tourism industry hence the inclusion of the Tsodilo Hills\textsuperscript{13} within the Botswana component of KAZA.

For Botswana to benefit from KAZA, it is essential that adequate infrastructure is put in place (SADC, 2012). These include the provision of adequate transport infrastructure, water, ICT and energy. Significant investments have been made by the government of Botswana to improve and extend tourism infrastructure as a means to increase tourist access to the country (personal communication, Mlazie 06/07/2015; Otukile 25/06/2015). Infrastructural developments planned to accommodate and boost tourism in Botswana include the planned expansion of Kasane International Airport and in particular the bridge over the Chobe/Zambezi river (personal communication, Mlazie, 06/07/2015). The Kazungula bridge is expected to connect Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe through a singular access point (Leechor & Fabricius, 2010). This is seen as a major asset for the region to improve the attractiveness of a regional travel circuit.

\textsuperscript{13} Tsodilo Hills are inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site and consist of rock art paintings by the Basarwa.
The development objectives as stated in the KAZA treaty is to facilitate cross border tourism as a means of fostering socio-economic development by becoming a premier tourism destination in the world. In light of this, KAZA offers tourism without borders through provision of a univisa to tourists. The intention is to create a KAZA univisa that enables tourists from the five partner countries to circulate in the region without constraints (personal communication, Mtshambiwa, 13/07/2015). It should be taken into account that the movement of tourists across borders is not unique. Private tour operators in either country have been facilitating tourism without borders before the advent of KAZA. One government official acknowledges that tourists from Victoria Falls will come to CNP for 3-5 hour game drives in the morning, followed by lunch at one of the hotels and then 3-4 hour boat cruises in the afternoon before heading back across the border. However, Mtshambiwa (13/07/2015) commented that:

Currently when a tourist comes to these countries they have to acquire visas from each country and that takes time because of the red-tape within the countries. The tourists end up going back without having visited for instance Okavango Delta yet it was their wish to experience the OD. So with the univisa in place we want to ease that red-tape and market the product as one so that when the tourist comes he stays in the region because there is more to experience. Tourists will now only have to purchase one visa.

The borderless notion of tourist destination attests to the willingness of the Botswana government to scale-up tourist destinations as a practical means of making tourism a vehicle for regional economic development (Noe, 2010). Currently the univisa is a pilot project between Zambia and Zimbabwe with strong support from the World Bank, and it is expected to roll to Botswana and Namibia. This shows that there is political will among partner countries to ensure coordination and cross-country cooperation in the tourism sector. The KAZA example shows that integration can proceed with a small number of countries if the willingness exists with public authorities with strong backing from interested constituencies (SADC, 2015). The uni-visa policy has implications for the policing of borders.

Suich et al. (2004) argue that there is still a potential to expand tourism in the KAZA region but most areas of high potential are already fully developed or are sensitive to further development hence appear to have reached their capacity to absorb tourists. There have been concerns, in particular regarding Chobe National Park, that tourism levels are at times
exceeding carrying capacity and that these high levels have negative impacts on the tourism industry and the environment (Moswete & Mogende, 2013). This is confirmed by the Chobe River Front Management Plan that was carried out by Ecosurv in 2010. According to the report, “tourism recreational demands on the CNP to meet tourism development in the surrounding areas, combined with the increased number of tourists that visit the park on day trips from Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe has led to an increased use and possibly overuse of the eastern section of the Chobe River Front in particular” (Parry et al., 2010, p. 2). In light of the above, KAZA in collaboration with the park management of CNP have provided artificial watering points to deter wildlife from the riverfront. Furthermore, they have constructed observation hides around these waterholes to enhance visitor game viewing experiences (www.kavangozambezi.org).

4.4 The state of implementation

The courses of action emanating from paper/policy (in this case Integrated Development Plans, IDPs) and meetings are usually presented as their legitimation (Büscher, 2009). The more practical implementation of transfrontier conservation in Southern Africa as pointed out by Büscher (2009) has focused on removal of border fences, relocation of animals and improving biodiversity conservation by enlarging protected areas dealing with and/or accommodating local communities. Translation between policy and practice is far from straightforward (Büscher, 2009). The IDP is meant to guide implementation of development projects in the Botswana KAZA component.

The pace of implementation has been slow in the Botswana component. During the Botswana Travel and tourism expo in Kasane the minister expressed his frustration about the slow progress made through KAZA. Tshekedi Khama indicated that:

*I am not impressed where KAZA is at. We have challenges. In Zambia it is poaching, in Zimbabwe it is funding. In Namibia they don’t have dedicated conservation areas, there is mixed land usage system. In Angola they are coming out of war. I wish I could be more positive. I wish KAZA would have gone a lot further than it has gone.* (Southern Times, 2016)

The slow pace of implementation might be attributed to vertical consultations, in particular the development of IDPs to ensure stakeholder participation in the initiative between and among the nation states. According to the Botswana IDP, KAZA has two central objectives 1) to conserve biodiversity; and 2) to contribute towards community development through
tourism (MEWT, 2013). This is being implemented through three programmatic areas: 1) Protected Area Management; 2) community areas; and 3) cross cutting (MEWT, 2013).

As highlighted above, KAZA was formally established in 2006 after the MoU signing but only started in 2011 due to several conditions that accompanied the KAZA process such as negotiations and consultations with relevant stakeholders before the signing of the treaty. The initial stage of implementation was dominated by the setting up of institutional structures and strengthening the KAZA TFCA secretariat by recruitment of personnel (personal communication, Gureja 22/06/2015; Modise, 22/06/2015). According to the KAZA secretariat this included: administration team, executive director, account personnel, and liaison officers. The first stage took five years from 2007 to 2011 (personal communication, Mlazie, 06/07/2015).

According to Mlazie (personal communication, 06/07/2015), the second stage of the project involved construction of staff accommodation facilities for wildlife law enforcement agents, Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) in Pandamatenga and Savuti wildlife camp so that they are able to manage, monitor and conserve the resource base. In other words, the second phase of implementation is concerned more with institutional strengthening so that they are motivated enough to contribute to biodiversity conservation. Therefore 12 houses have been completed in Pandamatenga and five are nearing completion in Savuti. The third stage of implementation will focus on the implementation of major conservation management programmes and community development and it is expected to start in 2017 to 2020. Mlazie (personal communication, 06/07/2015) notes that the phase three funding cycle will focus on high impact projects at community level and establishing three key wildlife corridors on the Botswana side as identified by the master IDP.

4.5 Actors involved

KAZA is made up of the secretariat, ministerial committee, committee of senior officials (COSO) and joint management committee (JMC). The ministerial committee is composed of the five ministers from each country and is responsible for policy and political guidance in the development and implementation of KAZA. This is where final decisions are taken by governments. The committee of senior officials comprises of permanent secretaries from the ministries responsible for land, wildlife and natural resources within their respective countries. The joint management committee comprises technical experts, that is, directors from different resource use sectors embedded in central government (see Table 4.1). The
JMC provides technical advice in relation to biodiversity, land, tourism, water and livestock to COSO who then advise the minister. The JMC reports to Ministry of Environment Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT), which is the TFCA coordinating office in Botswana. MEWT oversee implementation of IDPs and is chaired by the permanent secretary of MEWT. While technical officers can discuss and share information within working groups this body has no powers of decision making. The KAZA secretariat based in Kasane was established to be the administrative arm of KAZA therefore it facilitates coordination of different KAZA activities.

Figure 4.3: Institutional structures of the Botswana (Source: MEWT, 2013)

At district level, existing structures will be used to execute the Botswana priority projects. In Ngamiland, Okavango Delta management plan (ODMP) committee is tasked with the mandate to implement KAZA projects in Okavango Delta. The membership of ODMP is composed of representatives of resource use sectors such as water, fish, land, plants and range, wild animals, livestock, tourism and NGOs, CBOs, private sector and research institutions in the district (Magole, 2008). As an example of TFCAs the governance structure of KAZA is complicated, bureaucratic and makes decision making cumbersome. The
governance structure is top-down, thus dominated by governments. As a top-down initiative a question to ponder is whether TFCAs can successfully twin in with CBNRM with their bottom-up structure. In addition, the structure does not provide for meaningful active community participation in decision making and planning (Spenceley, 2008). As a young initiative, one would have expected the KAZA TFCA to have drawn lessons from lack of participation of local communities in other TFCAs in the region but it appears KAZA has not learned any lessons.

Table 4.1: Main institutions within the Botswana component and their roles (adapted from MEWT, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEWT</td>
<td>Manages and regulates issues of the environment, wildlife and protected areas and tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of local government and Rural Development (District councils)</td>
<td>Service provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Promotes arable and pastoral agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Lands</td>
<td>Manages state land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Water Affairs</td>
<td>Manages water resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawana Land Board</td>
<td>Manages tribal (communal) land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana Tourism Organisation</td>
<td>Tourism development and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Drives trade and investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organisations (NGO) and Community Based Organisations (CBO)</td>
<td>Promotes civic activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of challenges are encountered when establishing institutional structures within KAZA. Institutional structures are very easy to establish on paper but when it comes to practice it is challenging. For instance, structures have membership as mentioned above and the main challenge has been attendance by people who make these structures (personal communication, Mlazie, 06/07/2015; Modise, 22/06/2015). Mlazie points out that the people
who make these structures are mostly government officials who in most cases do not attend meetings. He remarks that:

*These structures mind you are formed by governments, three months you are in this KAZA structure after three months what happens you are promoted and transferred; a new guy comes in then this new guy takes time for him to understand issues and the concept, the ideas and to catch up so that he knows where we are going. As soon as the person catches up you know in government we move so that’s the key challenge, lack of consistency in the members that this structures.*

Another challenge pertains to the minister support in this initiative. Ministers are political figures who are elected by citizens of the respective country and as such ministers change from time to time and their support differs. One interviewer noted that the current minister Tsekhedi Khama does not believe in TFCA unlike the former Minister Kitso Mokaila who was very conversant with the issues of KAZA. It appeared that the minister did not attend the Ministers’ meeting in Kasane that was held in June 2015 yet he was the hosting minister. If ministers are not supportive of such initiatives, they are unlikely to succeed.

An influential actor group that is not from the region but does have a large presence in the region is that of donors and international development institutions (Büscher, 2009). As Büscher (2009) has shown, the vast majority of funds for infrastructure provision within TFCA areas have come from the donor community. Therefore, mention must be made of the agency funding KAZA TFCA, the German government through KfW. In total the German government donated €430,000 to facilitate the establishment and operations of KAZA. These funds have critically helped in the development of KAZA since 2008 (KAZA, 2011). The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) has infused a total of US$100,000 in the KAZA project. The capital was used in various activities which include: development of the KAZA website, completion of the Indicative Development Framework, development of the KAZA Treaty, delineation of the KAZA TFCA boundaries using geographical coordinates and preparation for the KAZA Treaty signing ceremony (KAZA, 2011). In addition, SDC supports international NGOs working in the KAZA region such as Conservation International (KAZA, 2011). According to KAZA (2011) Conservation International has been active in the KAZA region from as far back as 1992.

When asked about the influence of donors in the implementation of KAZA projects there seemed to be an agreement from respondents that donors are critical stakeholders as they
have the financial power which at times governments do not have. Respondents acknowledged that though they have financial power they do not in any way influence how projects are carried out in the respective countries.

4.6 Conclusion
The chapter focused on the unfolding process of KAZA TFCA and the motivations of Botswana participation in KAZA TFCA. The chapter indicates that KAZA TFCA is structured according to the influences of the beginning of last century when it was led and driven by international and regional NGOs that did not involve the governments of the day. The initiative is currently driven by governments and has attracted donor funding and support.
CHAPTER FIVE
KAZA TFCA AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES

5.1 Introduction
The analysis of the discourse of TFCAs on community development suggests that they have the potential to improve the livelihood of the already marginalised local people. Since TFCA is about scale, the potential for marginalisation of these communities appears to be greater (Anderson et al., 2013). Lack of community participation and lack of benefits accruing to local communities has proved problematic in the past for transfrontier conservation areas in Southern Africa. KAZA is characterised by bureaucratic institutions that makes decisions on behalf of local communities. Local communities who have interest in natural resources in KAZA do not have a voice in KAZA and yet the success of KAZA depends on the success of communities within. By success, it means communities having a voice in the decision making and accruing benefits from the process of their participation. KAZA is not yet known by communities in Ngamiland district suggesting that they have been excluded from the initial conception of the KAZA process. This chapter is organised into two sections: community participation in KAZA; and how the reasons for Botswana government participation in KAZA affect local communities.

5.2 Community involvement in KAZA
As in other TFCAs such as Mapungubwe and GLTP local communities residing in areas within the KAZA boundaries in the Ngamiland district were not consulted about the creation of KAZA TFCA and the inclusion of their village in the KAZA bioregion. During fieldwork, Mababe community members in Ngamiland were interviewed to solicit their views and knowledge regarding KAZA TFCA. The respondents included the headman, representatives of MZDT board of trustees, escort guides, VDC members and individuals in households (c.f Chapter Three). In total 15 community members were interviewed. Out of the 15 members interviewed, 13 residents did not know what KAZA entailed, that is, they had never heard of the KAZA concept and only two people knew about it\textsuperscript{14}. This translates to 87% of the people who had no knowledge about KAZA.

\textsuperscript{14} Molathegi, a VDC chairman came to know about KAZA at a workshop in Gaborone (personal communication, 17/01/2016) while the headman of Mababe Kebualemang was invited to the Botswana IDP stakeholder workshop held in Maun. The KAZA stakeholder workshop held in Maun was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Development and cooperation through KfW and the PPF.
The claim that TFCAs will involve grassroots communities is used in the formation of these initiatives. The KAZA stakeholder engagement strategy holds the premise that local communities should be given the opportunity to participate in planning the establishment and development of KAZA (www.kavangozambezi.org/kaza-stakeholder-engagement-strategy). However, results reveal that communities are not aware of KAZA. Tiny (personal communication, 18/01/2016), an escort guide commented that:

I really do not know anything about KAZA. It is my first time to hear about the concept. I am only familiar with CBNRM since we have a trust. Who is KAZA?

The conventional claim holds that the government adopted a more thorough approach to consultation with local communities (personal communication, Modise, 22/06/2015; Gureja, 22/06/2015; Mlazie, 06/07/2015). While this is true, the engagement consisted of discussions with national and district civil servants and authorities. However, there is no evidence that local communities were thoroughly consulted and are aware of the short and long term implications of this initiative (personal communication, Mtshambiwa, 13/07/2015). The results indicate that they have been ignored as primary stakeholders in the establishment of the KAZA yet they have interest in the resources within the KAZA boundaries. In Botswana negotiations often take place without adequate consultation and participation of relevant social actors (in this case local communities) who are directly impacted by these top-down agreements and yet continue to be marginalised (Mbaiwa, 2016; Mogende and Kolawole, 2016). This is illustrated by interviews with local residents. In an interview with one community member, the resident commented that:

I do not know KAZA. The government of Ian Khama, never consults people especially us, the Basarwa community. I do not know whether is because they regard us as a minority group or what. We live with resources and we bear the costs of conservation but we are never consulted. Right now he decided to stop hunting without consulting with us. We were able to sustain our livelihoods through hunting. In this country, the orders come from His Excellency.

In his 2014 State of the nation address, the President of Botswana announced the hunting ban citing that the decision was based on dwindling wildlife numbers. Furthermore, one resident succinctly critiqued the method of consultation adopted by the government of Botswana pertaining to natural resources:
If consultation took place like they always (government officials) claim, probably they did so with our chief or councillor at luxurious hotels in Maun. Consulting one person is not consultation. We have a kgotla\textsuperscript{15}; we expect them to come to the kgotla so that we air our views. We need to be briefed first; we should have a clear understanding of what is going on. They should also give us time as a community to think about the proposal before giving them feedback.

Botswana communities have no decision powers over natural resources. They only possess user rights and operate according to the rules set by government from time to time (Rihoy & Maguranyanga, 2010). This indicates that community is not sufficiently or meaningfully involved in the KAZA process. Dr Mtshambiwa (personal communication, 13/07/2015) the executive director of KAZA secretariat commented:

\textit{Communities are not participating in the management of resources. Resources are being managed by governments only. We have just talked about KAZA having structures like permanent secretaries but there is no structure at grassroots level where they can sit. Right now we only have informal structures so you need to create those formal structures that will be recognised that will take into account the type of contributions that local people can make. Also CBOs may come sit in those meetings but it does not have the voice.}

Furthermore, community working groups guidelines aims to ensure that information is effectively disseminated and exchanged with local communities. There should be a two-way flow of communication between KAZA secretariat and local communities. In Botswana, kgotla meetings are key fora which helps inform communities about such initiatives. It is through kgotla meetings that community members are able to question activities and institutions that implement such initiatives.

As it stands communities are represented by local elites (i.e., traditional authorities, village councillors) who are said to be part of the decision making process. This scenario presents a consultation process marked by the inclusion and exclusion of others. This is illustrated by the KAZA engagement strategy:

\textsuperscript{15}The kgotla system is a traditional institution and platform of governance in Botswana through which issues affecting rural community wellbeing are debated. Thus it is a regulatory mechanism for sustaining and motivating the social system.
In the case of local communities, the nodes of entry to be recognised by KAZA are the traditional authorities, that is, headman and chiefs or recognised community structures.

Such consultation runs the risk of tokenising participatory processes. Consultation is not merely tolerated but is actively sought from those who are affected by decisions. In such an instance, a trickle-down effect of information and resources is often assumed to be automatic by KAZA. Mlazie (personal communication, 06/07/2015) commented:

We actually taking key people particularly those that are part of the village structure and consequently we believe those are the people that will go back and trickle down the information to everybody else in the village.

Prior to the signing of the KAZA treaty the representatives of local communities in Okavango Delta were sceptical and not willing to endorse the signing of the treaty (Kolantsho, 2010). In July 2010 Minister Mokaila held a council meeting with community leaders in Ngamiland District, Maun in an effort to persuade the leaders to agree to the initiative. During a full council meeting the councillors had an opportunity to express their views. Some warned that the free movement of animals will increase poaching in the region that is already problematic while others mentioned security and Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) issues (Kolantsho, 2010). One member mentioned that he was concerned by the number of treaties being signed in the region16. This was also expressed by Idea Neo (personal communication, 18/01/2016) who feared that the treaties being signed would place more restrictions on natural resource use. Despite their different opinions, the councillors gave the minister the go ahead to continue with the negotiations with other countries about the KAZA (Kolantsho, 2010).

It should however be taken into account that traditional authorities do not represent the views of the entire community. Emphasis should be placed on the role of chiefs with regard to land management in post-colonial Botswana. The role of chiefs has changed over the years with regard to land administration (Sebudubudu & Molutsi, 2011). The enactment of the Tribal Land Act of 1968 has transferred the land ownership from the different tribes and chiefs to the state (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2011). The Tribal Land Act established “the land boards

---

16 Botswana has ratified several multi-lateral environmental agreements. These include: RAMSAR convention, UNCBD, CITES, United Nations Convention concerning the protection of world cultural and Natural heritage; Permanent Okavango River Basin Agreement 1994; SADC protocol on Shared water resources 2001; SADC protocol on development of tourism 2002; SADC protocol on wildlife conservation and Law enforcement 2003; SADC regional water policy 2006.
as the custodian of tribal land allocation, administration and recipient of any revenue from such land by its private users” (Sebudubudu & Molotsi, 2011, p.24) thus marking a departure from the chiefs land allocation era. Within this context, traditional authorities are regarded as ex-officio members to land boards. Ngwenya and Kgathi (2011, p.12) write that ex-officio members are “proxy watchdogs whose functions are to protect or propagate the government development agenda”. The government has control over the appointment of traditional leaders in Botswana thus making them an arm of government.

The voice of the community is often stifled or not even heard when conveyed through intermediaries. A problem exists when the intermediary, from the local community, may not truly convey community intent or alters their message in its entirety. Such processes assume homogeneity in residents of a community when it does not exist. Dishonesty and deceit can be shrouded by good intentions. What starts as a gesture of goodwill can change into something quite different when processed through intermediaries.

5.3 Local level impacts of the KAZA and implications for the implementation of the KAZA

As mentioned in previous chapters TFCA promotes tourism as the key to economic diversification. KAZA places greater focus on biodiversity and ecosystem services through tourism. KAZA raises high expectations from tourism arguing that tourism will generate income from international revenue, resulting in socio-economic benefits to local communities.

Prior to TFCA, local communities in Botswana have been involved in CBNRM programme since 1989. According to MEWT (2013), KAZA will build on the efforts of existing and ongoing initiatives by other role players in the area. So far the idea of KAZA TFCA has not brought much needed change to the livelihoods of local communities. The lack of evidence was justified by KAZA officials on the basis that KAZA is in its initial stages of implementation (personal communication, Modise, 22/06/2015; Mlazie, 06/07/2015). Gureja (personal communication, 22/06/2015) explained that:

>>Any development process does not occur over night. People are quiet quick to judge TFCAs with regard to community beneficiation. From 2003 until the MoU was signed a lot of behind the scenes negotiations was slow discussions between partner countries. From 2006 to 2011 which is a five-year period the treaty was signed. So what was happening in those five years and again KAZA is the most ambitious TFCA<<
in the world with five sovereign states, it took a lot of hard work and negotiating to establish and set up certain processes and some certain institutions. KAZA has now moved away from setting up institutional structures and planning to a little bit of implementation, so only the past four years has been a little bit of implementation.

Based on the above argument the analysis of this section will focus on project initiatives which are ongoing that KAZA hopes to build on as well as the socio-economic expectations of Mababe community from KAZA TFCA.

5.3.1 Biodiversity conservation

At a local level, biodiversity conservation is pursued through Management Oriented Monitoring System (MOMS). MOMS is a community based monitoring system that allows information on biodiversity to be collected in a user friendly, simple and practical manner (personal communication, Kebualemang, 18/01/2016). With the support of DWNP and Southern African Science Service Centre for Climate Change and Adaptive Land Use (SASSCAL), Mababe uses MOMS to monitor natural resources in NG41. Chief escort guide Kebualemang explains MOMS as follows:

*MOMS is used by our community escort guides. Escort guides usually patrol our concession to record wild animals that they see. They also record poaching incidences in our concessions.*

Community escort guides (CEGs) are regarded as community rangers who are responsible for conservation and preservation of natural resources. In essence, they enforce conservation rules set by the community. Tiny noted that during hunting they would escort hunting safari operators to ensure that they follow the hunting procedure. Another escort guide noted that since hunting ban, they no longer do patrols as they now do not see the need to conserve the natural resources (personal communication, 17/01/2016). The villager commented that:

*Why should we conserve these animals? We have been conserving and using natural resources sustainably from time immemorial not knowing that we are conserving them for the elites of this country. We protected these animals because we accrued benefits from them but now things have changed, we are starving. For whom do we really matter in conservation?*
Mababe CEG’s brings to the forefront the proposition that communities can enforce community conservation practices, if they take part in the decision-making process. The hunting ban is likely to have a detrimental effect on the KAZA objectives of biodiversity conservation at a local level as the Mababe community feel that they have been neglected in the decision making process regarding the hunting ban that was introduced in 2014. They threaten to poach as a form of resistance because they do not realise the benefits of conservation (personal communication, Anonymous, 19/06/2015). The results indicate that local people see the interests by the state and private sector being given more attention than their needs. For biodiversity conservation to be realised local people should be seen as key stakeholders in management of natural resources.

The area around Mababe is inundated with elephant populations. This means that residents interact with wildlife every day, sharing available resources within their immediate environment. Due to their interaction with elephants, human-elephant conflict (HEC) has been a major concern to the residents. It is likely that HEC will undermine the objectives of wildlife conservation by the government of Botswana. Residents acknowledge that elephants have over the past years destroyed their fields resulting in a change of livelihood. One resident explained that:

*Elephants have increased in Mababe. During hunting they would not come close to our settlement in fear of gun shots, now that they are not shot they are roaming around freely. They now inciting fear in our lives. If it happens that they destroy your small garden or house you can’t kill them. The conservation laws in this country protect animals more than the people.*

DeMotts and Hoon (2012, p.848) argue that the Botswana government has “no consideration of what it is like to live with the anxiety and pressure of wildlife damage”. According to MEWT (2013) compensation for damage caused by wildlife is selective and bureaucratic. This has led to alienating the local community’s attitude towards wildlife. DeMotts and Hoon (2012, p.848) argue that “compensation by government reasserts state control ownership masking inequalities in the name of a greater national good that hides costs of living with wildlife”. The Botswana IDP calls attention to the need to introduce programmes in HEC hot spots to mitigate their impact on the livelihoods of local communities. Residents hoped that transfrontier movement of elephants would ease the pressure that comes with the high elephant population.
Milgroom and Spierenburg (2008) acknowledge that uninformed communities may become concerned at rumours about the area they are living in being incorporated into a possible conservation region with suspicions of forced relocation to unsuitable or undesirable areas. One of the residents explained that:

*We have heard rumours that we might be relocated from Mababe to Shorobe and Maun surrounding areas. We heard that the government intends to make this area a conservation and tourism area maybe that is why they have not consulted us about KAZA.*

One local resident was worried about the number of treaties that Botswana signs in regards to conservation. He noted that:

*I am not happy with treaties being signed. Just recently the Okavango Delta was inscribed a world heritage site and now you talking about KAZA. I see a situation where we will no longer be allowed to harvest even wild fruits or thatching grass. Slowly but surely they are planning our relocation as they did with Basarwa at Central Kgalagadi Game Reserve.*

Indeed, it is without doubt that Mababe community fear that they could be relocated to pave the way for elephant migration routes. TFCAs have been accompanied by resettlement of local communities living within or on the edge of protected areas, in particular the GLTP (Milgroom & Spierenburg, 2008; Lunstrum, 2015).

**5.3.2 Security, peace and collaboration**

As previously mentioned in Chapter Four, poaching is considered a threat to wildlife security. Local communities in close proximity to conservation areas are regarded as a threat and a solution to wildlife conservation (Ramutsindela, 2016). Poaching is attributed to high poverty levels of local communities surrounding Botswana protected areas (MEWT, 2013). With their intimate knowledge of the area, members of the local communities are believed to be assisting poachers for meagre returns (MEWT, 2013). Local communities have been hunting almost their entire life therefore they possess tracking and hunting skills which they use to their advantage to assist poachers (personal communication, Anonymous 09/08/2015). The implication is that local people become suspects of poaching hence likelihood of being criminalised as poachers. One villager remarked:
Since hunting has been stopped and rhinos moved into the Delta, soldiers together with Directorate of Intelligence Services are all over. When they see you they think you are a poacher; they will aggressively interrogate you and escort you back to your house.

Local communities are also seen as useful in providing information and policing of wildlife resources in their concession (Ramutsindela, 2016). For instance, during their patrols, escort guides in Mababe record wild game sightings, rare species and monitor illegal wildlife offtakes (see Mbaiwa, 2008). They patrol NG41 and in a case where they come across a poacher, they can apprehend the suspect and report to DWNP (personal communication, Kebualemang, 18/01/2016; Tiny, 19/01/2016).

The military stance taken by Botswana to protect natural resources is likely to have detrimental negative effects on local communities living adjacent to conservation areas. The increased presence of security agencies deployed in 2010 is already felt by the local community. This has the potential to result in new forms of control over individual movement and access to natural resources. One Mababe villager commented:

> We have suddenly seen an increase of soldiers in our area. They patrol the area day and night. At one point I went to the bush to collect some fire wood and when I got there I could hear trees moving then I thought it might be elephants but when I was about to go back I saw two gentlemen (soldiers) who approached me and asked what I was doing in the area. We really do not know what they want or maybe they have been sent by Khama to protect his wildlife.

The above statement implies a new form of control resulting from a renewed relationship between conservation and the military. People no longer live freely as they used to.

5.3.3 Poverty alleviation through tourism

As previously mentioned, local communities including Mababe have been involved in the CBNRM programme since its formation. In order to realise the socio-economic benefits of CBNRM Mababe community through Mababe Zokotshana Development Trust (MZDT) have partnered with Johan Calitz hunting safari operator (personal communication, Molatthege; Tshiamo, 18/01/2016). The trust has sub-leased NG41 to Johan Calitz for which the company has been paying rental fees. MZDT has been generating a substantial amount of income from the wildlife quota that they sell to Johan Calitz, said one member of the board of trustees.
(personal communication, 18/01/2016). In return, the trust was able to employ members of the community as drivers, trackers, chefs and escort guides. The trust has also used the money to build houses for the poorest, give scholarships to the young, pensions to the old and purchase community vehicle. One elderly member acknowledged the role played by trophy hunting in their livelihood, when he said:

When there was hunting, we did not starve. Our children were employed by the trust and there was income in the family. Trophy hunting also encouraged us to conserve these wild animals though at times they are a nuisance. The trust through hunting helped us a lot than the government.

The ban in hunting by the government of Botswana has meant a precipitous drop in income (Saayman, 2015). The chairperson of the trust pointed out that the hunting ban has left the majority of residents unemployed. This means that MZDT are to convert from trophy hunting to photographic tourism. However, residents believe that photographic tourism does not generate sufficient income, unlike trophy hunting. They also note with concern that their area is not suitable for photographic tourism. As it stands, residents are over-exploiting natural resources in their immediate environment. Following the imposition of a hunting moratorium, the government is collaborating with CBO’s to readjust their management plans from hunting to photographic tourism.

At the time of conducting the study, there were no significant livelihood changes brought about by KAZA TFCA. However, residents expect some benefits from the KAZA initiative. The major benefits outlined by residents include employment opportunities, income generation, capacity building, and commercialisation of traditional products. Since the community is in a transition period from consumptive to non-consumptive tourism, residents acknowledge lack of entrepreneurial skills in photographic tourism. It should be noted that photographic tourism requires marketing skills that rural communities do not have. Tshiamo (personal communication, 18/01/2016) argued that tourists gravitate to prime areas with dense concentrations of wildlife, like in the western part of the Okavango Delta and Moremi Game Reserve. Therefore, they rarely visit peripheral areas like Mababe. In order to benefit from photographic tourism KAZA hopes to help communities like Mababe advertise lesser known destinations besides the well-known tourists’ hot spots.

Furthermore, KAZA aims to develop a community based enterprise development facility to serve as a financing mechanism for community businesses. For instance, USD10,000 SDC
seed money supported a basketry project for women in the Okavango River pan handle (Schuerholz, 2006). As such women in this area were able to market and sell their palm leaf baskets in tourism camps in the Okavango Delta. Schuerholz (2006, p.13) argues that “the transition from traditional crafts used at home to a commercialised operation was an economic success with a visible contribution to poverty eradication”. According to the KAZA master IDP (2014), the facility which will cost approximately USD 6,000,000 will be designed to benefit community based livelihood schemes such as agricultural schemes which address food production and food security and promote community based tourism.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the motives of Botswana participation in KAZA TFCA affect local communities on the ground. Even though the KAZA initiative expresses the need for communities to benefit and to be included, there has been a failure to inform local residents about the initiative. This is because KAZA is centralised hence decisions are taken by the state. Instead, local communities are represented by traditional authorities who may not represent the views of their members. The chapter has revealed that KAZA has not yet had any significant impact on the livelihoods of local residents, yet the sustainability of the initiative depends on the support from the local residents.
CHAPTER SIX

INSIGHTS FROM KAZA TFCA

6.1 Introduction

The establishment of KAZA has emerged with far reaching ambitions, not only in terms of biodiversity conservation. In the introduction to this thesis I question the interests of Botswana participation in the KAZA TFCA by using a discourse analytical perspective of TFCA rhetoric. The current literature on TFCA advances three main claims for the enactment of TFCA. Firstly, from an ecological point of view, TFCA are vital for biodiversity conservation and management. Secondly, proponents of TFCA link conservation with peace and regional integration. The third view suggests that TFCA have an economic rationale through ecotourism development that is deemed beneficial to local communities and regional economy. The discursive approach of rationalizing and justifying supports comprehending the variations associated with theory and TFCA practice. How policy is expressed and presented enhances the foundation and framework of the TFCA’s function and purpose. It also allows for a better understanding of how expectations of a state develop over time, from the initial conception to full implementation of the TFCA concept.

Based on the claims advanced, I deliberate on the rationales of TFCA against the unfolding of KAZA from the Botswanan perspective. I evaluate these claims by asking why and how Botswana participated in KAZA and with what implications for local communities. This chapter provides answers to the questions posed in this study and contributes to the general debate on TFCA. This chapter is organised into three sections. The first section provides insights from Botswana in relation to KAZA objectives. In section two, concluding remarks will be presented in respect to KAZA process. The last section provides recommendations based on the analysis of the study.

6.2 Rationale for KAZA TFCA

6.2.1 Restoring elephant ancestral migration routes?

The analysis of the discourse of KAZA on biodiversity conservation argues that elephant movements have been hindered by border fences imposed by colonialism. For instance, Caprivi border fence has terminated elephant movements across Botswana/Namibia border. Consequently, elephants tend to concentrate in a defined geographic space resulting in deleterious effects on the ecosystem. Considering these challenges, securing elephant
migration corridors remains a high priority in the KAZA agenda. Elephants are a flagship species that has attracted attention and support in the KAZA region (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008), with interest in their welfare growing stronger every day. The mega park that cut across Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe will provide access to large protected grazing land for congested herds of elephants (approximately 120,000) of the Chobe and Okavango bioregion. Not only would landscape connectivity help elephants but it would also ease pressure on the environment, thus benefiting other species (Bennett, 2003). From an ecological and economic standpoint, Cumming (1999) suggests that the distribution of elephants has an impact on the TFCA creation and expansion of avenues connecting in-place protected areas. Understanding elephant migration patterns is critical to its population management and environment, while reducing the potential for human-wildlife conflict in local communities in proximity to protected areas. Whether KAZA landscape linkages will restore ancestral elephant routes remains yet to be seen. However, within KAZA, wildlife and livestock production are in conflict due to the prevalence of animal diseases, in particular foot and mouth disease (FMD) that can be transmitted between wildlife and livestock (Ferguson & Hanks, 2010).

6.2.2 State security and poaching crisis

Apart from safeguarding biodiversity, KAZA encompasses security concerns because this initiative is considered to have impacts that are beyond the motives of biodiversity protection and natural resource management which relate to debates on national sovereignty (Wolmer, 2003). There is a growing consensus that poaching is a serious threat to state security. Wolmer (2003) contends that poaching can be a potential source of conflict among states. The government of Botswana considers elephant poaching a risk to its security and national economy. Although not a new threat, it hampers the prospects of borderless peace parks with peaceful regional relations. It is essential for regional cooperation to be in place to thwart poaching, as national borders are not effectively patrolled in the region. The establishment of KAZA present an opportunity to avoid conflict entrapment (Ali, 2007). This is essential in terms of reducing threats to international and diplomatic relations in the KAZA and SADC region. During the conceptualisation of KAZA, security institutions were not part of KAZA but they are now being called upon to protect resources in order to achieve biodiversity conservation. Though Botswana has long responded to poaching militarily (Ramutsindela, 2016), the state has strengthened anti-poaching efforts by deploying other law enforcement agencies to augment initiatives to curb poaching. As such controls to safeguard wildlife
within the border region remain intact through violent and military tactics (Lunstrum, 2014). The deployment of security personnel and stringent shoot to kill mandates support the biodiversity conservation vision of the state (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016). Death (2016, p. 129) contends that “the KAZA initiative will legitimate new, intensive and often violent forms of policing and counter poaching intervention that will empower new state structures and agencies”. Attempting to save elephants and rhinos from poaching through shoot to kill policy represents a contradiction to the discourse of peace parks (Buscher & Ramutsindela, 2016).

6.3.3 KAZA as a vehicle for economic development

Ecotourism development is seen as a necessary vehicle to achieve local economic development in KAZA. The rationale for ecotourism is that “nature can be conserved or saved precisely because of its market value to tourists willing to pay to see and experience it” (Duffy & Moore, 2010, p. 746). This is evidenced by the Botswana HCLV marketing tourism policy which targets a certain niche market. The move towards photographic tourism, a politically connected industry (Swatuk, 2005) in Botswana may be viewed as part of the process to develop new ecotourism products that international clients will be willing to pay to experience. The emphasis on international market “fits well with neoliberal approaches to regulating, organising and implementing conservation that include the extension of the market as the most efficient manager of natural resource” (Duffy & Moore, 2010, p. 748). The focus on elephant as a flagship species is primarily due to interests in photographic tourism which has high value. It is without doubt that elephants play a crucial role in promotion of Botswana tourism to international clients.

Botswana tourism destinations such as Okavango Delta have been framed in terms of it being a unique wilderness area, largely untouched by humans. It is without doubt that such framing would attract international tourists seeking an ultimate wilderness experience. Its brand would attract private sector investment for future ecotourism expansion. This will be achieved through public-private partnerships hence benefits are expected to trickle down to local communities. This is necessary since local communities do not possess necessary skills to venture into photographic tourism. However, the reliance on ecotourism as a means to achieve socio-economic objectives of KAZA does not take into account the injustices of the tourism industry between private investors and local communities (Mbaiwa, 2005, 2008). GLTP history suggests the deferring of local issues results from the transition from
sustainable resource use to the prosperity reaped from tourism and the private sector’s participation (Whande & Suich, 2009).

Botswana tourism has experienced a steady increase in growth over the years. According to Suich (2008), tourism in KAZA is expected to grow at 5.6% per annum, hence the political motivation. It is anticipated that KAZA initiative could help boost Botswana tourism. Infrastructural developments planned to boost tourism in Botswana include expansion of Kasane international airport and the Kazungula Bridge that is expected to connect Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe through singular access points. The provision of the univisa is also expected to increase the number of tourists vising the country. Suich (2008) contends that increasing the size of the industry does not necessarily contribute to the achievement of biodiversity conservation or poverty eradication objectives. This is evidenced by the study done by Scovronick and Turpie (2009) in Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. It could be argued that the upscaling of the tourism industry leads to enclave tourism as put forward by Mbaiwa (2005) in which there is revenue leakage and limited benefits for local communities.

6.3 Place of local communities in KAZA

The enactment of KAZA has profound implications on local communities in proximity to the conservation area. Proponents claim that TFCAs adopts a community participatory development model (Ramutsindela, 2004). However, the current arrangement pans out in contrast. The process of KAZA TFCA formation and policy process in Botswana has followed an exclusionary approach to participation in decision making.

Currently, there is limited knowledge about KAZA TFCA and its programme in the Mababe community. This signals that local communities were not involved in the formation and implementation of KAZA. The lack of community participation in TFCA has been observed in other TFCA initiatives such as GLTP and Mapungwe (Spierenbrug et al., 2007; Milgroom & Spierenburg, 2008; Lunstrum, 2010; Sinthumule, 2014). The KAZA socio-economic baseline survey reaffirms lack of knowledge and awareness of KAZA programmes in Zambia and Angola (Glatz-Jorde et al., 2014; see also Dias, 2012). This limits the fulfilment of empowerment and development of local communities. TFCA are viewed as undemocratic mainly due to the centralization of authority at national and international government committee levels (Duffy, 2006). It should be taken into account that the planning process was led and driven by bureaucrats thus undermining the contribution of primary resource users who occupy the designated land tract for TFCAs (Duffy, 2006). Often,
benefactors of such agreements are governmental and private funding sources. The institutional structure of KAZA does not cater for local communities as active participants in decision making and planning. While it is believed that working groups represent communities, uncertainty remains as to their influence in the decision-making process (Murphy, 2008).

With regards to livelihoods, KAZA is yet to bring significant changes to the livelihood of residents of Mababe. Since the moratorium on hunting, life seems to be difficult for the residents of Mababe though KAZA aims to reduce poverty through ecotourism. It is worrying that conservation efforts include ecotourism as a community development tool. Ecotourism is resource intensive thereby requiring necessary skills, experience and start-up capital that local communities do not possess. KAZA advocates that the vast majority of the population will benefit from public and private sector collaboration. The study contends that the policymakers lackadaisical approach towards the conservation-development strategy of the TFCA only fortifies the imbalance associated with the management and distribution of resources, as well as an unjust, unfair, socio-economic environment.

Evidence from the research suggests that the KAZA model intends to merge aspects of previous failed development and conservation initiatives such as CBNRM in the region. Taking into account that residents are not aware of KAZA, communities might not be able to see the relationship between KAZA and existing conservation activities in their village once KAZA projects start running. It should also be taken into consideration that the CBNRM programme in Botswana is centralised thus local communities do not have control over CBNRM initiatives (Hoon, 2014; Mogende & Kolawole, 2016). The extent to which communities are able to derive benefits from TFCAs depends on their national laws and policies. If they have strong laws and policies that recognize and support their tenure rights, they stand a better chance. Rather than view local communities as active participants in CBNRM and TFCA programmes, they are regarded as beneficiaries who are to observe the proceedings of the initiatives without questioning them. Therefore, KAZA is likely to further marginalise local communities who are already disempowered at a national level (Andersson et al., 2013). This overall picture shows the need for the KAZA secretariat and the government to reach out to the people and raise awareness. For KAZA to succeed in the long run, communities should have sufficient knowledge. This will encourage communities to embrace the activities with clear understanding and purpose. When the community is aware
of the KAZA concept, its future and how it benefits them, it lessens the possibility of confusion, misunderstanding, and revolt.

6.4 Concluding remarks

The study focused on understanding the interests of the government of Botswana in KAZA TFCA and how they affect local communities. Transboundary natural resource is central to many inter (national) political agendas as countries aim to secure adequate natural resources and avoid conflicts. As this study has elaborated, negotiations for TFCA can often be quite complex since it involves the cooperation between two or more states each with their respective institutional framework or legal/administrative systems for managing natural resources. Despite the underlying complexities of TFCA, high level political support is crucial in facilitating transboundary conservation initiatives as evidenced in the KAZA TFCA. The study has indicated that KAZA was formulated from existing nature conservation initiatives that date back to as early as the 1990s. The enactment of KAZA TFCA is ecologically motivated, with the health and vitality of elephant population in Botswana as its main focus. Moreover, the initiative intends to boost the tourist revenue through free movement of tourists across the five states. The study demonstrates how the burgeoning elephant population is inextricably linked with border policing, tourism and conservation.

The place and effects of the KAZA on local populations remain limited. KAZA remains unknown to local communities yet it has been in existence for the past 10 years. While KAZA policies call for the inclusion of local communities in decision making, KAZA has excluded local communities, who are thus unable to meaningfully contribute to the success of the KAZA initiative. The policy process tends to involve technical bureaucrats, local elites and international NGOs and donor agencies, excluding primary resource users, a trend that has underpinned the evolution of TFCAs. The thesis also concludes that it is important to view the KAZA as a complex and long-term project that develops in a constantly ongoing process that will be interesting to follow in the future.

6.5 Recommendations

Based on the findings the study recommends the following:

- The TFCA initiation and development should include preparing all affected communities from all involved countries to be ready to participate and benefit. The aim should be to avoid a situation where some or one country and its communities and other stakeholders are ready and others are not.
• Communities should be involved prior to establishment and should have the right to refuse TFCA establishment.

• Management of the TFCA should be attainable and not far-fetched. It must be realistic to obtain acceptance and participation from local communities. TFCA development is a long-range process with many benefits not immediately realized until years later.
REFERENCES


Khumoekae, R. 2014. The Scandalous murdering of democracy. Gaborone


Murphy, A. 2008. Living in the global commons-the case of residents of a national park in the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation (KAZA), Southern Africa.


### LIST OF APPENDICES

#### Appendix A: List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee no.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sedia Modise</td>
<td>Peace Parks Foundation, Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nidhi Gureja</td>
<td>Seanama Conservation Consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Michael Flyman</td>
<td>Department of wildlife and national parks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ingrid Otukile</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Senny-Nne Mahupeleng</td>
<td>Department of Wildlife and national parks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Osman Kontle</td>
<td>Kalahari Conservation Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chilule Mlazie</td>
<td>KAZA secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Balisana Marotsi</td>
<td>Department of Wildlife and National Parks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mtshambiwa</td>
<td>KAZA secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Map Ives</td>
<td>Okavango Wilderness Safaris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sekgowa Motsumi</td>
<td>OKACOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Gaseitsiwe Masunga</td>
<td>Okavango Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Chris Brooks</td>
<td>SAREP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Obert Gwapela</td>
<td>Department of Wildlife and National Parks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sokwe Monametsi</td>
<td>NCONGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kitso Mokaila</td>
<td>Former minister of MEWT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kabelo Senyatso</td>
<td>Birdlife Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Tiego Mpho</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bonatla Tsholofelo</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Department of Wildlife and National parks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mababe Residents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee no.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Kgosi Kebualemang</td>
<td>Headman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Tshiamo kebualemang</td>
<td>Chief escort guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Molathegi Matsamo</td>
<td>Village Development Committee (VDC) Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Board member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Tiny kebualemang</td>
<td>Escort guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Basimane</td>
<td>Resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Botshoko Obiditswe</td>
<td>Resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Foe Ditirwa</td>
<td>Escort guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Bafeletse Rothang</td>
<td>Secretary VDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Tebalo</td>
<td>Resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Idea Neo</td>
<td>Resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Board member MZDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Board member MZDT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Board member MZDT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>