A ‘Brazilian Way’?

Characteristics and Challenges of Brazil’s Development Assistance in Africa

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Abstract

Brazil development cooperation in Africa has been increasing significantly since the beginning of the new millennium. This paper examines both characteristics and challenges of such cooperation, with regards to the centuries-old linkages that tie the two shores of the Atlantic and the historical impact that Africa has had on Brazil. The main focus is on development cooperation in the continent after Lula’s election in 2003, highlighting both domestic and international factors that allowed this cooperation to rapidly increase, while analysing the ongoing Brazilian crisis undermining it. The final consideration is that Brazil’s development cooperation is characterized by the duality of national interests on one side, where it is seen as an important tool of foreign policy, and its humanitarian aspect together with the empowerment of local populations on the other. This paper concludes by arguing that a ‘Brazilian way’, indeed, exists.
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Chapter 1 Background

1.1 Introduction

“We have to build a relationship where partnership means full partnership. Brazil should have something to gain, but the Africans should also have something to gain...People need to know that Brazil truly wants to be different” President Lula da Silva, 2010

Brazilian presence in Africa has increased significantly in the past few years, with the country becoming one of the major external powers present in the continent.\(^1\)

Brazil was the last country in the Western world to abolish slavery in 1888 and the exchanges with the African continent up to that point were extensive: the two sides of the Atlantic shared a common colonizer in Portugal and the water that divides them became the hottest spot of the infamous slave trade. Although after this date relations declined significantly, the culture of the slaves left a lasting and decisive imprint on the future shaping of the country. Especially in those regions of Brazil where the slave presence was stronger (North and North-East and particularly Bahia) an entirely unique culture grew, and is still alive and strong, with its own food, traditions, dances and even religions.

In the 1950s and 1960s there was a rapprochement among the two, which was strengthened after the Lusophone countries in Africa obtained independence from Portugal in the 1970s. However, the political and economic relationship was still superficial and the real turning point only came during the presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), most commonly known simply as ‘Lula’. In fact, it was only after his election that Brazil started to have a significant impact on the continent. When Lula became president, Brazil was in the process of lifting millions of people out of poverty, the overall macroeconomic situation was improving and the country was emerging as a new global power. Without damaging relations with established powers like the USA, Lula shifted towards Africa as part of an overarching strategy that focused more on the Global South. During his first term in office Lula travelled to more than 21 African countries and the number of Brazilian

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embassies in the continent increased from 18 to 37, exceeding those of the United Kingdom. Since then the investments and the number of cooperation projects in Africa under the Brazilian flag have risen dramatically and the continent is now the second recipient of its aids after Latin America.

During Lula’s first term, Brazil’s involvement in Africa, although already growing fast, did not reach the same level it would during his second term. It was only then that large parts of the Brazilian population began benefitting from the numerous social projects that, concurrently with the rapidly growing Brazilian economy, gave Lula a level of popularity unprecedented in Brazil. In order to understand Brazil in Africa, Rose’s theory of Neo-Classical Realism will be utilized.\(^2\)

To explain the country’s behaviour in Africa requires an analysis at two different levels, one regarding Brazil’s position in the international system and its material power capabilities on the one hand, and on the other specific conditions at the domestic level. This theory lays fundamental importance on the specific characteristics of the leaders, which fits with our need to understand the attitudes towards Africa of both Lula and the current president Dilma Rousseff. In fact, Neo-Classical Realism argues that a country’s foreign policy needs to be understood both through its objective material capabilities as well as a leader’s perception of such capabilities, which may not reflect objective reality. To properly understand the dramatic increase in Brazil’s involvement with Africa it is also vital to take into account the country’s domestic situation and the great evolution its society is living through. During Lula’s first term, the Brazilian economy, even though moving in a positive direction, had not yet experienced the great growth that was about to come in the second term. Moreover, Lula’s social programmes, particularly the “Fome Zero” (Zero Hunger) with its various initiatives, had not yet yielded the full magnitude of its effects. It was also during his second term that Brazil’s presence in Africa reached new peaks. Even though Brazilian presence in the continent is still more restricted than those of countries like India and China the South American giant is carving its space in Africa, and it could do even more in the near future. For a vast array of characteristics, and because of its peculiar history, the Brazilian contribution to the continent presents unique and interesting features and unprecedented

political claims. It is also the only South American country that is currently playing a major role in the continent. Brazil contends the uniqueness of its model of development assistance, stressing its role as a development partner through horizontal cooperation of which the final goal is the empowerment of local countries and communities rather than being a provider of aid. Brazil focuses on an approach that ties together political diplomacy, commercial interests and development cooperation; in particular, the link between the last two seems to be a unique characteristic. Mutual benefits are often emphasized together with non-conditionality and a demand-driven approach where Brazil responds to the needs of its partners. As we pointed out already, Brazil is trying to replicate processes used domestically to alleviate poverty and promote development in Africa. Signs seem to point in the direction of a correspondence between the new rising Africa with a global Brazil. The new Brazil emerging at the dawn of the third millennium shares many geographical, climatic, social and economic features with Africa; such similarities were giving good possibilities to investors. In fact, trade and investments augmented at a very fast pace in the first years of the 2000s, and as for the development cooperation, Brazil was and still is a recipient and it is very new as a donor. Brazil’s focus in Africa is primarily on humanitarian cooperation, agriculture, social development issue-areas (notably health and education) and last but certainly not least technical cooperation. Fuelled by its South-South cooperation framework, Brazil presents itself as a partner that was, and still is, facing the same problems as Africa has and to which it can offer its expertise, engendered as it is in a developing country environment and motivated once again by the idea of solidarity. This cooperation is presented also as the opportunity of giving back to the continent that played such an important role in the establishment of the Brazilian nation. Amongst the most important institutions that carry developmental projects in the continent there are the biomedical and health institute Fiocruz and the Agricultural Research Institute EMPRABA, both state-

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financed. In the agricultural and in the health sector Brazil is an expert of tropical conditions and in the last few decades it implemented forefront projects such as the “More Food Program” and its nationwide campaign that significantly reduced the impact of AIDS in the country also through the availability of free anti-retroviral drugs and contraceptives for the whole population.\(^6\)

Brazilian development assistance is playing an important role even in the energy sector: despite the abundance of resources, many Africans (and particularly those living in rural areas) do not have access to electricity or other forms of energy. Once again referring to its domestic policies, in this case the “Luz para todos” (“Lights for all”) program, Brazil is investing in the production of both non-renewable and renewable energies with particular regards to the latter. In addition, Brazil became oil-sufficient in 2006 with the discovery of the so-called ‘Lula oil field’ in the South of the country and its trying to help African countries to become self-sufficient, particularly given the country’s expertise in term of biofuel production. The joint venture that Brazil established with Angola, BIOFUEL, is a perfect example of the commitment in this field.

Even though the country is infamously known for its huge inequality gap several Brazilian projects offering social protection, particularly those that fall in the “Fome Zero” program, are now being replicated in a number of African countries, even though they have not been in usage for a significant amount of time to allow a proper evaluation of their effectiveness. Considering its reiterated claims of fairness, brotherhood and peer to peer relationship based on shared history and culture mix with a new diplomacy, Brazil’s intention is to grow its international importance in the context of the Global South and to fulfil the needs of the country’s economy: all these motives seem to be behind the country’s growing presence in the continent.

1.2 Brazil in the international aid architecture

Historically, development policies have been a Western-controlled realm; however, in recent years profound changes have been on their way and Brazil has become more and more important in the world aid composition. On the home front, a sizeable number of people approve the involvement of Brazil and the important role that is playing while others

\(^{6}\) Stolte C., November 2012, *Brazil in Africa, just another BRICS country seeking resources?* London:Chatam House pp. 13-14

point out with concerns that the country still have tens of millions of people living in poverty.

The World Bank and the IMF (particularly the latter) are criticized by Brazil, which sees them as a device of Western imperialism. As a matter of fact, there have been plans to change the way those institutions act. Nonetheless, Brazil finds itself in a particular position as its recent growth puts the country in an increasingly complex situation, trying to protect both its own interests and those of other developing nations. In fact, the country is now shifting from its position as a G-77 member to a new, more independent international approach and as for its relationship with the UN, Brazil has since long been attempting to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council.

Brazil does not consider itself a ‘donor’ and denies that status, instead referring to itself as a ‘Southern development partner’ in a mutually beneficial relationship and labels this trend ‘cooperation’ rather than ‘assistance’. The country can collaborate with traditional donors although the ‘donor hierarchy’ can play a negative role in such relationships, which are made more difficult also by the hardship of finding the analogous entity on the Brazilian side given the lack of properly established structures that provide funds for development, as it will be pointed out later on. Brazil explains its development assistance with the rhetoric of horizontality and friendship, which became particularly famous under Lula’s presidency; however, this self-proclaimed altruism does not necessarily exclude national interest in a sort of dual relationship.

Another tangible proof of Brazil’s South-South cooperation is represented by the cancellation of debts that many African countries had, such as São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Tanzania and Mozambique.

However, not everything is bright and shining as there are challenges and difficulties that

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10 Gonçalves F., 2011, Comparing South-South cooperation policies, Rio de Janeiro : URJ page 16 <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/a164fdda-71c7-4a7a-804b-92a8ba2ed41c.pdf>
such model needs to overcome. Even though the Brazilian Cooperation Agency or ABC was created in 1987 to improve stricter coordination amongst various institutions working in the development field, different bodies are in charge of different aspects of development, fragmented in a wide number of ministries. Brazil still does not have an efficient central coordinating body for its development assistance and, given the money is coming mainly from taxpayers there is the need for more transparency in this regard, as Brazil itself is a country that is still facing numerous domestic challenges. Furthermore, there are no adequate mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness of the development assistance. At the same time, Brazil’s means are not infinite and they might be already overstretching their capacities, aggravated by the current domestic economic situation (Brazilian GDP is predicted to shrink by more than 3% in 2016)¹¹ and the tense political environment at home, where Dilma Rousseff does not have the same level of support and the authority that Lula had. Finally yet importantly, competition with other players in the continent adds up to the aforementioned challenges.

1.3 Research aims & questions

This study aims to assess the claims of a distinctive Brazilian approach to development cooperation in Africa by exploring the following questions:

- What is the nature of Brazilian development cooperation in Africa?
- Are there distinctive social, political and practical characteristics that warrant claims of a distinctive ‘Brazilian way’?

Relatedly, the study will also explore the challenges – both internal and external- that have played a role in Brazil’s engagement in the continent and that will affect the future sustainability of Brazil’s development assistance to Africa.

1.4 Research methodology

This is a qualitative study which uses both primary (mainly government documents) and secondary sources (academic literature and previous studies, international agency reports on development aids, conference proceedings and media articles) that will give an overview

of the Brazilian development cooperation in Africa, taking in consideration other emerging models, with an eye to its possible future evolution.

1.5 Theoretical framework

This study applies the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism to analyse Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa. This phrase was first used by Gideon Rose in 1998 and it is a combination of classical realist and neorealist ideas; neoclassical realism is ‘an approach which combines elements of system, structure and domestic politics, of material and ideational factors’. It gives importance both to external and internal variables: in regard of the firsts, a country’s foreign policy is driven by its place in the international system and its relative power capacities. Furthermore, neoclassical realists give decisive importance to political leaders and elites as what counts is their perception of such relative power, thus the influence of ideas on decision is significant. This last concept in particular becomes fundamental to understand Lula’s input in Brazil’s expansion in Africa and the role that development cooperation is playing as a tool of foreign policy. Hence, neoclassical realism gives great attention to individuals as the state is constituted of individuals. Building on the neorealist idea of an anarchical international system, a state reacts to such uncertainties by expanding and modelling the external environment in relation to the size and ambition that the relative power capabilities allow them to do so. Accordingly, states will increase or scale down their international involvement depending on the domestic situation. In order to understand the trend that Brazil development cooperation undertook in the last few years under the presidency of Dilma Rousseff (and with all the political and economic troubles that the country is experiencing) the domestic factors assume fundamental importance. Linking the importance of individuals with that of the domestic environment, leaders determine and plan foreign policy on the basis of their

13 Ibid. page 130
estimate of relative power capabilities, however always conditionally dependent upon domestic conditions.  

1.6 Limitations & delimitations

While a brief history of African-Brazilian relations will be provided, the research will be mainly confined to the study of the Brazilian presence in the continent after 2003, the year of Lula’s election. The geographical focus will be limited to Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to answer the research questions, reference will inevitably be made to how the ‘Brazilian model’ compares to the development models of India and China. This is not, however, a comparative study as such and therefore the focus remains on Brazil, and no claims are made to provide an in-depth overview or assessment of Indian and Chinese engagement in Africa. Data for the years after Lula’s terms are scarce, which made it more difficult to provide a proper evaluation of Brazil’s development assistance to Africa after 2010.

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16 J. Taliaferro, S. Lobel and N. Lipsmann Neoclassical realism, the state and foreign policy, page 25
### 1.7 Chapter outline

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Chapter 2: Brazil in Africa, from past to present

2.1 Introduction

In order to place Brazil’s development cooperation in the right context, there is the need of properly understanding the background of the country’s presence in the continent. Brazil started having extensive relations with several African countries in the 16th Century, which reflects nowadays in Brazil’s geographical involvement and give the country a significant advantage compared to other states whose ties are more recent. Concurrently, a brief analysis of Brazil’s trade and investment with Africa is needed to be able to contextualize the country’s development assistance, as the two fields are inextricably related.

2.1 Brazilian-African relations: from the discoveries of the Americas to the 1990s

Brazil’s new involvement with Africa really took off in 2003 with Lula’s election, which brought Africa back to Brazil’s agenda, with the country rediscovering its African side. However, the two shores of the Southern Atlantic share a history that goes back to the centuries when the Portuguese started their empire in the 15th Century.

In 1492 Cristopher Columbus, who had sailed from Spain in search of a route to get to Asia, discovered the Americas, the New World, for Spain. Frictions among countries in the first years of expansion outside the European continent were already on their way. Two years later Portugal and Spain signed the Treaty of Tordesillas, in which the world was divided in a duopoly, splitting also Latin America. Considering the ignorance at the time about the geographical boundaries of the newly discovered land, the treaty, updated in the following centuries, worked fairly well and opened the way for the successive creation of the Brazilian colony. During the 15th century Portugal began establishing its presence in the huge territory of the future Brazilian nation, fending off French and English colonization attempts,

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17 World Bank-Ipea, 2011, Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth Brazilia: Ipea, pp. 26-28

establishing its first cities and ports and beginning the cropping of sugar cane. Native Americans were initially used to work in the plantations but they were soon replaced by slaves brought from Africa. During the 16th century, Portugal established its colonies of Angola, Guinea, Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe while it held only a few posts on the coast of Mozambique. In the same century, the Atlantic Slave trade assumed huge proportions: the total number of slaves brought to Brazil from Africa is estimated by most sources to have been between four and five million. Most slaves that arrived in Brazil came from West Africa (prominently Bantu people) but also from other regions of the continent; the Portuguese paid tobacco, gold and cachaca (sugarcane liquor) in exchange for slaves. Initially slaves were used in the sugar cane and mining industries, until the mid-17th century when these started declining. It was not the case for the trade: slaves started to be used in farms and later in coffee plantations, which ensured the trade to still be strong in the middle of the 19th century.

At the same time, not all the Africans going to Brazil were slaves: a number of diplomatic missions from the Kingdom of Dahomey stopped in Brazil between 1750 and 1800, establishing the first official Afro-Brazilian relations. Between 1641 and 1648, the Dutch occupied Angola until a Brazilian-Portuguese expedition retook control of the country: 1648 was crucial in the beginning of the relationship between the African continent and the Latin American country, which strengthened over time at the expense of Portugal. Angola became increasingly dependent on Brazil, which after its independence controlled the traffic between the two sides of the Atlantic: this situation would continue until the end of the 19th century. In the same years of Brazilian independence, significant efforts were undertaken to make Angola a formal province of Brazil; however, such a move was seen negatively not

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19 Metcalf A., 2005, Go-betweens and the colonization of Brazil 1500-1600, University of Texas Press, page 12
20 The World Bank-Ipea, 2011, Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth Brazilia : Ipea, pp.27-28
21 Ibid.
22 The World Bank-Ipea, 2011, Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth, Brazilia : IPEA pp.27-28
only by Portugal but also by other colonial powers, which resulted in an article being placed in the independence treaty which made sure that such a union would not happen. \(^{23}\)

In the same years huge changes occurred in Brazil. In 1807 Napoleon invaded Portugal and the royal family fled to Rio de Janeiro, which became the de facto capital of the Empire: the result of this relocation was that a number of institutions necessary to run a state were moved to Brazil. \(^{24}\) With the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 the royal family had to upgrade the status of the country, which was now no longer a colony but itself part of the empire, with the same status of Portugal. The seeds for independence had been planted: a series of events precipitated the political detachment from Europe and after a brief war in 1822-23 Brazil became a sovereign nation in 1822. The trade continued for the next few decades but in the 1880s slavery had become an outdated and obsolete institution: a great number of black Africans had already been freed and the country started to attract large numbers of immigrants thus ending the need for slaves. The institution was finally abolished in Brazil in 1888, the last country in the western world to do so. With the end of the slave era, African-Brazilian relations reached their lowest point which lasted until the 1950s.

In the years following the end of slavery up to the revival of Afro-Brazilian relations in the midst of the 20\(^{th}\) century, African Brazilians found themselves in the lower ranks of society, ill-equipped compared to the rest of the population and excluded from any command position. Afro-Brazilian culture was not studied and the country did not address, for the most part, the legacy with its past, making Brazil unprepared for the new phase of its relations with the black continent. \(^{25}\)

The two shores of the Atlantic fell silent for almost a century. After the end of World War II, the new conditions made possible a slow rapprochement: Brazil, which for a long time had confined its international relations to Latin America and the Western Powers, started moving in the direction of Africa that was now getting rid of its colonizers and establishing new, independent states. With regards to its African culture, a revival began in the second

\(^{23}\) The World Bank-Ipea, 2011, *Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth*, Brazilia : IPEA page.28


\(^{24}\) Cardoso L. 2008, *The transfer of the court to Brazil 200 years afterwards*, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, page 6 < file:///C:/Users/Davide/Downloads/Dialnet-TheTransferOfTheCourtToBrazil200YearsAfterwards-3263794.pdf >

\(^{25}\) The World Bank-Ipea, 2011, *Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth*, Brazilia : IPEA page.29-31

half of the 20th Century. At the time, African influences on Brazilian society had been mostly excluded from intellectual circles and there were no diplomats of African ancestry in the whole country that could have assisted in this new phase of rapprochement. Prior to the Second World War, landmarks of African culture in Brazil such as Capoeira and Candomble were banned and there were also significant attempts at ‘whitening’ (branqueamento) and diluting the ‘blackness’ of society through miscegenation and by increasing white European immigration. Overall, Brazil was still largely influenced by the hierarchical structure of the slave period. At the same time, movements for black rights in the US and other parts of the world during the 1960s and 1970s contributed to a growing awareness of the country’s African history and culture after decades of denial. Today, according to the 2010 census, around 8% of the population of Brazil identified themselves as “preto” (black) with African as the main ancestry while more than 40% identified themselves as “pardo” (mixed) with a significant African ancestry.

In the years 1961-64 Brazil witnessed the important experience of PEI (Independent Foreign Policy) where the public was interacting constructively in the foreign policy of the country during the presidency of Jânio Quadros e João Goulart. Brazil finally had a specific foreign policy for Africa: one of the central points of the PEI was the idea that it was possible to establish relations with any nation thus including those of the Soviet bloc and the new African States as the country tried to carve its own international space. This new rapprochement, however, was quite ambiguous: Brazil was defending in the international organizations the right to freedom of the African people and the ongoing independence processes, while in practice it was careful not to irritate France and Portugal. Brazil was still referring to the Portuguese colonies as an extension of Portugal in Africa but it was often one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations as soon as a new state was formed in the continent. This process was slowed down with the military coup of 1964, as different presidents took different stand with the African continent.

26 The World Bank-Ipea, 2011, Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth, Brazil : Ipea pp.29-30

< Http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0017063 >

Different attitudes by military rulers are once again the mirrors of in-country conditions. During the years of the so-called Brazilian miracle (1968-1973), which mostly occurred during the presidency of Emílio Médici, the country was politically oriented towards a policy of anti-communism and supported both the white minority rule in the Southern African countries and Portugese colonialism. However, this happened in a pragmatic way and more specifically following a diplomacy of national interest, during which economic ties with the continent were significantly strengthened. In fact, the years 1972-73 witnessed a great number of visits by Minister Mário Gibson Barbosa. With the presidency of Geisel and Figueiredo, the approach becomes less political and more pragmatic. In fact, Brazil distances itself from the apartheid regime and from Portugal’s colonialism: the immediate recognition of Angolan independence on the 11th of November 1975, the same day the Portuguese left the country, is a landmark in Afro-Brazilian relations and in the same year the first Brazilian companies started operating in Africa. The 1980s witnessed a deteriorating situation on both sides of the Atlantic with the debt crisis on one side and the wars that were ravaging Africa on the other. Nonetheless, in 1983 João Batista Figueiredo became the first Brazilian President to visit the continent. In 1987 the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) was created by the Minister of Foreign Affairs; it was the first time that the country had a unit whose focus was solely on development.

The 1990s again witnessed a downsizing in relations amongst the two sides. On the African side, proxy wars from the Cold War days were over; however, the continent was now hosting bloody civil conflicts in many regions. On the Brazilian side, there was a shift towards North-South relations with the country aiming to take part in the increasingly globalized world that was changing the international structure; at the same time more emphasis was placed on Latin America and MERCOSUR. In the late 1990s-early 2000s President Fernande Henrique Cardoso created a more active policy towards Africa, particularly in his second term that was later significantly expanded by his successor Lula.

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2.2 Lula’s era and the new millennium

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, was elected President of Brazil in 2003, holding this position for two terms until 2010. These years witnessed an unprecedented Brazilian involvement with Africa, making the country one of the main actors in the continent, as part of a major change in Brazil’s foreign relations. The election of Lula meant a huge increase in the relations between Africa and Brazil in the different fields of trade, investments and development assistance.

Lula’s years coincided with unprecedented positive social and economic conditions; in fact in these years Brazil’s GDP grew at a very fast pace while many of the social projects mentioned in the previous chapter were significantly reshaping society, reducing the inequality gap, the levels of poverty and unemployment.

In regards to the foreign relations with Africa, a fundamental shift occurred during Lula’s presidency. Brazilian ‘Africanity’, now publicly acknowledged, became part of a more pragmatic involvement of the whole country with the black continent, as the first two trips of the president to Africa, respectively in 2003 and 2004, showed. Lula was accompanied by a vast number of advisors, entrepreneurs, ministers and businesspersons, a clear indication that this was not to be a ‘cultural’ tour as many in Brazil would have imagined. 31 The idea of the ‘culturalist’ approach has been subsided by the idea of ‘giving back’ to the continent that holds such an important place in the shaping of the Brazilian nation. Concurrently, this new involvement became a matter of increased public concern, with debates across the country in different fields, from universities to public offices and media coverage.32

On the practical side, the Brazilian State was now giving operational support to private and state-owned companies with the objective of reinforcing its importance in the international framework.33 National companies in Africa became the forefront of the Brazilian presence in the continent and gained growing influence as a mean of bilaterally reinforcing political ties

between the two shores of the South Atlantic. In the same years, Brazil’s international importance, particularly among the countries of the South, was on the rise. Brazil’s attitude in the Doha Round of negotiations was an important display of the new role the country was taking. Brazil’s undeniable and globally recognized success regarding its effective handling of social issues, the growing respect it was gaining, and the economy’s unprecedented growth all provided Lula with the material opportunity to project the country into the African continent. In an international system where the countries from the South were (and still are) increasing their power, Brazil now had both the authority and the means it previously lacked, while in Lula it had a leader ready to exploit the situation.

Referring to the neoclassical realist paradigm, we can say that Brazil now had the relative power to grow its external influence and a leader who had the interest and ambitions for such a task. Domestic conditions linked with a leader whose view of Brazil in the international system set the stage for the country’s expansion in Africa. As will be shown later, the material conditions for this foreign expansion during Dilma’s years, who also does not have the same interests and perceptions of Brazil’s foreign policy as Lula, are failing to materialize while the country is ravaged by the economic and political crisis. As a result there has been a consequent scale down of the Brazilian involvement with Africa.

Outside of the development assistance field (which is the focus of this study and will be thoroughly explored in the next chapters), Brazilian presence in the continent is mainly manifested through trade and investments. As it will be observed, both of them enjoyed a significant increase during Lula’s years, together with development cooperation. It is impossible to isolate development cooperation by itself, without considering the other major areas of interests that Brazil has in the continent. What follows is a brief overview of both in the new millennium.

2.3 Trade

During Lula’s years, Brazilian trade with Africa grew more than six-fold and, after a steep decline in 2009 due to the global recession, started growing again the following year. 34 As of

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34 Stolte C., November 2012, Brazil in Africa, just another BRICS country seeking resources? London : Chatam House, pag.2
2012, the trade balance still leans in favour of Africa while Brazil was the fourth among trade emerging partner in Africa after China, India and South Korea.

Exports from the continent consist for the most part of natural resources and oil; this trend would give, at a first glance, the impression that Brazil is following a similar pattern to that of other emerging players in Africa. However, this would be a misconception: Brazil is, in what represents one of the main differences to the other new players, self-sufficient and extremely rich in natural resources. The discovery of new, vast deposits in the South Atlantic in 2006 solved once and for all the country’s needs for oil, which confirms the idea that these patterns of investments are more a legacy of policies from the past (particularly those implemented in the years after Africa’s independence) than part of a precise plan. This most certainly does not mean that imports of natural resources from Africa will cease completely (Brazil will still need some minerals that it lacks in sufficient amount) but it would be obvious to expect a significant downsizing in the next few years.

As for the imports to the continent, Africa represents a market for Brazilian manufactured and semi-manufactured goods and agricultural products, being the ideal destination for those goods that could not be sold in the First World due to their relatively poor standards.

Figure 1. (George Edward 2014) shows the trend in imports and exports to and from Africa in the years 2004-2013. Both the imports and the exports from the continent reached a peak in 2008 before diminishing considerably as a consequence of the global crisis. As of 2013-14, they reached again the pre-crisis levels.

**Fig 1. Brazil’s exports (left) and imports (right) with Africa**

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35 Ibid., pag.3  
In the last decade the amount of trade between Africa and Brazil grew considerably, as a part of the bigger strategy of rapprochement between the two sides of the Atlantic. Quite interestingly, most of the trade is still confined to a small number of countries of which the Lusophone states are a significant minority, contrary to what might have been expected. Figure 2. (George 2014) displays Brazil’s main partners in the African continent.

**Fig 2. Brazil’s trade partners in Africa**
2.4 Brazilian investments in the continent

Brazilian’s investments in Africa follow a somewhat different pattern to that of trade; in fact, they are more concentrated in the Lusophone countries and a large share of them is present in Mozambique and Angola. The latter in particular, already an important trading partner, shares a long history with Brazil, which was also the first country to recognize its independence; concurrently, it is still the main recipient of its investments in the continent. Significant Brazilian financing in the country greatly contributed to the process of reconstruction after the end of the Civil War in 2002; as for South Africa, it is the second main destination for Brazilian investments.39

These investments are carried out by two kinds of companies: the major ones, present in the continent since the 1970s, and SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprise), which became involved in Africa only recently. The four main Brazilian companies in the continent are Itau (banking), Petrobras (oil), Odebrecht (construction), and Vale (mining), with most of the activities focused on civil construction, energy and resources40. Other important enterprises are Queiroz Galvao, Andrade Gutierrez and Camargo Correa, all three mainly involved in construction as well as in fields such as engineering and energy.

As it happens for other areas such as agriculture and medicine, its shared geological and environmental features provide Brazil with a considerable advantage: the two sides of South Atlantic were in fact united millions of years ago, which means that mining and drilling conditions are similar.

One of the main characteristics of Brazilian investment is the hiring of local work force, in contrast to the Chinese way of doing business in the continent; just as an example, Odebrecht is the private business that employs the highest number of Angolans in the country.41

In recent years, Brazilian SMEs started getting involved with the African continent. Once again, it must be noted that Angola is the country that hosts the highest number of them;

however, they are present in a significant number of countries and are involved in fields such as clothing, electronic and automotive parts, constructions, and food. These companies received significant attention from the Brazilian Agency for Promotion of Exports and Investments (APEX) while the development of the presence of small and medium enterprises in the continent has been one of the main objective of the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) dialogue forum since its beginnings. Figure 3. (World Bank – Ipea 2011) shows the distribution of Brazilian corporations in Africa.
Fig. 3: Brazilian corporations in Africa, 2011
2.5 Motivations for Brazil’s increasing presence in the continent

Such a sudden and sustained Brazilian presence in the continent has created a debate among scholars about the motives behind such an increase. There is consensus about the fact that this is a bilateral change that begun on both sides of the Atlantic, given the improving socio-economic conditions that Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing and that this new relationships is multifaceted and complex. Once again, the combination of these factors needs to be seen through the lenses of Neo-Classical Realism and to consider domestic factors, Brazil’s increase importance in the international arena, and the role played by its respective leaders.

Evidence seems to point in the direction of a tridimensional approach even though the boundaries between the different elements are blury. In this regard, it is important to highlight the fragmentation of Brazil’s foreign agenda in a multitude of actors, both traditional (such as the Ministry of External relations or Itamaraty) and non-state ones, mixed together with economic investments, which make the decision making process splintered and complicated.42

Bearing in mind the difficulties of identifying these different dimensions, Brazil’s renewed presence can broadly be seen as driven by political, economic and ideological motivations. Political in the sense that it is a means for the country - historically weak in the international scene - to gain power and leverage, economic given the increase of trade between Brazil and African countries, and technical as a way of exchanging expertise and skills.43 Another way of seeing these same three dimensions is through the triple concepts of solidarity dimension (as a continuation of home social policies), diplomacy of prestige (as a means of improving Brazil’s global importance and recognition) and business diplomacy, the latter different from the Chinese one only in means and quantity as a sort of ‘soft imperialism’.44

Nonetheless, Brazil is still seen as relatively ‘altruist’ in contraposition to the presence of...

42 Milani C., March 2014, Brazil’s South-South co-operation strategies: from foreign policy to public policy, Johannesburg: SAIIA Occasional Paper No. 179, page 5

43 Ibid. page 5

China and Europe and partially of India, with the merit of adding new elements to the current African picture.  
Brazil’s foreign policies are a continuation and an expression of domestic policies, but this alone is insufficient to explain the new direction adopted by Lula; this is where the country’s search for political autonomy comes into play.

In regards to its political motivations, Brazil is trying to update its international profile through the elevation of its status to that of ‘champion of the South and developing nations’. Such an aspiration is sustained by the domestic policies in full swing during Lula’s second term, where an unprecedented level of popularity and economic growth gave him the necessary means to pursue his ambitious foreign policy. Brazil has been developing a ‘double-axed’ diplomacy, maintaining good relations with established powers - the US in particular - while trying to increase its international weight. In this second regard, Brazil is using multilateralism and its status of regional power in Latina America in order to grow its importance and overcome its international lack of strength.

Lula brought important innovations, particularly the measure to which the President directed his efforts to extend Brazil’s importance as a global player whose status is towed by its South-South development cooperation. Indeed, Lula made Southern relations the first concern of Brazil’s foreign policy.

The growing importance of Brazilian diplomacy in the continent was marked mainly through Lula’s travels and the increasing number of embassies in Africa, concurrently Brazil pardoning approximately one US $ billion worth of debt to African countries must be seen as a similar signal. Brazil is balancing itself between its need of Africa in order to project globally its weight as an emerging power, and the African renaissance of the new millennium that gives new opportunities to investors.

Strengthening ties with Africa represents Brazil’s best hope to minimize its economic dependence on the developed North through the internationalization of the country’s

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45 Ibid. pp.222-225
companies and economy. In fact, many Brazilian companies in Africa have linked themselves to Brazil’s development cooperation initiatives. However, the business side seems to represent a minor role in this major shift while Brazil’s search for grandeur still holds the sceptre of ‘most important cause’. The confirmation of this hierarchy is the fact that Brazil itself, as we have already mentioned, is one of the world’s main producers of raw materials, particularly oil; more significant on the economic side is Africa as a market for Brazil’s goods.

Last but certainly not least is the ideological aspect of the growing Brazilian presence in Africa, which is a perfect representation of the country’s commitment to the precepts of South-South cooperation. The country’s South-South cooperation has been permeated by the rhetoric of similarity and solidarity among developing countries although the institutionalization of such policy is still at its genesis. Simultaneously, the end of the ‘culturalist’ approach and the beginning of the idea of moral debt – legitimizing Brazil-Africa relations with more public involvement- is taking place, together with the emergence of the rising Africa coinciding with a more global Brazil in a convergence of favourable moments.

However, the extent of the understanding by the public of this new involvement should not be overestimated. Large parts of the society still have no understanding, attach little value and basically no interest to Africa, which is still imagined by most people as a land of plagues and genocides that should be avoided.

One of the pillars of Brazil’s new foreign policy towards Africa has been the shift from non-interference to non-indifference, or ‘active solidarity’. This concept has been part of Lula’s party (PT, the Portuguese acronym for the Workers Party) since the 1980s and it explains much of the commitment taken by the President to fight poverty, hunger, and social inequalities both at home and abroad. Such guidelines, particularly implemented by Lula’s

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foreign minister Celso Amorim, legitimize foreign intervention for reasons of social justice, which seems to fit in Brazil’s framework in Africa.\(^{53}\)

However, there could be more than these three main motivations. The economic self-interest is undeniable, coupled with the aim of increasing power and legitimatization through an enhanced reputation and an improved international weight. In addition, humanitarian values are important as they assist in the search for affirmation and represent an important aid to Brazil’s expansion. However, to these impulses could be added the security interest: Brazil’s considerable efforts in Haiti are now being replicated in Guinea-Bissau. Brazil is securing the borders of its sphere of influence and Guinea-Bissau plays a fundamental role in maintaining and securing the eastern borders of the newly acquired area of interests.\(^{54}\) Such a view would reinforce the idea of a Neo-Classical Realist approach, with Brazil trying to secure its control over its newly acquired sphere of interest in Africa.

Beyond political, economic and ideological motivations it needs to be stressed once again how individuals played such a fundamental role in Brazil’s expansion. Lula’s vision of a Brazil with a significantly increased international weight was balanced by internal evolvements, where Brazil witnessed some of its best years economically speaking, while externally the country was gaining an unprecedented popularity for its efforts in addressing inequality and social issues. However Dilma Rousseff, from the very beginning of her mandate and while enjoying similar conditions took a very different approach.

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\(^{54}\) Milani C., 2016, *Cape Town workshop*
Chapter 3: Brazil and development assistance

In order to understand Brazilian cooperation in Africa there is a need to situate it in the broader context of international aid. In this chapter there will be a brief overview of the concept of international aid from its inception to the present, including the rise of South-South cooperation and its differences with the traditional model. In the last part, the characteristics of Brazil’s cooperation will be outlined.

3.1 Introduction: A brief history and conceptualisation of international aid

Development assistance is a complex and multifaceted concept whose definition is far from simple. In this chapter we will refer to it as the financial and technical cooperation provided by governments and agencies in order to support the development of another country in various fields (social, political, economic, etc.). Relocations of these financial and technical means can happen in several ways and can include both public and private spheres. The origins of international aid can be tracked down to the 1920s when a few European countries started providing regular aid to their colonies and beyond; the first official aid act was passed in the English parliament in 1929. Before World War II, colonial powers were investing strongly in infrastructure and at the same time big American foundations like Rockefeller and Ford were making funds available.

In the 30’s there was already an ideological struggle between two different schools of thinking: the first one was for the usage of aid to improve economic growth at a macro level while the other was for the improvement of the living conditions of the poor. Until after colonies gained their independence, aid was aimed mainly at economic growth guided by the idea that the new states had to reach the same levels of development of rich countries. Right after the end of the Second World War the United States became the world’s biggest donor with the Marshal Plan that helped to rebuild Western Europe. In the first phase of the Cold War the idea was that aid from ex-colonial powers and the role they were playing would have been taken over by the newly established international organizations like the

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United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as soon as the newly independent countries were formed.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was founded in 1961 in order to stimulate cooperation and economic progress. The same year, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), an international forum that includes many of the largest funders of aid, officially became part of OECD. As of 2016, 34 countries are part of OECD.

In the 1960s there was a major shift in the level of international commitment as a few countries that did not have a colonial past (Sweden for example) started to allocate a small percentage of the national budget to develop aid programmes in a few selected countries.

In the same years a second major shift occurred with the appointment of Robert McNamara in what is a benchmark in international aid: as the head of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981, he pushed towards a more precise approach aimed at poverty reduction and the use of donor-funded initiatives targeting health, education and basic services. The idea that investments in infrastructure and at the macroeconomic level were not bringing the expected results became widespread, and the general opinion focused more on combating poverty.

In the 1980s there was another major shift: the global economic decline was ravaging, caused by the major oil crisis of the 1970s, and most developing countries found themselves in a deep recession with huge debts to pay. The donor countries changed focus once again, now intervening more at the basis of the recipients’ economies and lending money to pay off their debts. These were the so-called Structural Adjustments Programs (SAPs).

With the end of the Cold War and the affirmation of democracy in a great number of countries, the amount of development projects increased steadily, offered by both government and non-governmental organizations and private philanthropists. However, most developing countries were still oppressed by debts; particularly those that received funds from the IMF or the World Bank found themselves in worse conditions than those that received funding from commercial banks. The latter in fact had renegotiated the

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57 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 2016, OECD
< http://www.oecd.org/dac/developmentassistancecommittee dac.htm >
amount of the debts and cancelled a big part of them; it was only in 1998 that the IMF and World Bank took a similar direction.\textsuperscript{58}

3.2 Southern donors and the traditional model

Traditionally, international aid is a Western based concept. In the traditional aid framework, the two main kinds of players are the donor and the recipient. International aid has always been seen with the perspective of the donor as the active part and the recipient as the passive one. Only recently there has been a realization that recipients are in fact not passive but respond to external impulses and create a series of complex interactions. It is possible that these responses to the aid flow constitute an initial, indirect assessment of the effectiveness of these projects.\textsuperscript{59} Recipients’ behaviours have a direct consequence on the effectiveness of the aid and on the donor as well. Aid from the first to the second is usually classified in two categories: bilateral and multilateral. Bilateral comprehends direct flow from one country’s government to the other, while multilateral includes assistance gathered from different donors and allocated through international agencies.

The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD defined Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 1972 with these words:

‘Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount).’\textsuperscript{60}

Financing from the private sectors and NGOs are excluded from this definition.


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. pp 7-12

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., pp.7-12
ODA was born from the idea of helping less developed countries, through various degrees of assistance, in order to enable them helping themselves. However, these aids always come with significant conditions and terms attached; some of these may have been logical, such as anti-corruption measures, others may have involved more controversial ones, such as austerity or significant changes in domestic policies. An overview of DAC’s flows framework is illustrated in Figure 4. (OECD-2016).

**Figure 4: Overview of DAC’s flows**

The improving conditions of a number of countries, including the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), started a transformation in the international aid system. Some of these countries were involved in international development projects at least since the ’50s but their global weight, as well as their aid projects, reached significant levels only in the last few years. This growth is indissolubly tied to the growing importance that these countries are gaining in the international arena while the recipient countries are becoming more and more dependent on trade and investments from these nations.

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<http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/documentupload/Evolution%20of%20ODA.pdf>

Although there are several countries that are part of this ‘revolution’, we will be referring here only to China, India and Brazil. None of these countries is part of the OECD-DAC, which has caused significant concerns and criticism from those countries and from international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank. These emerging donors bring a new development assistance model with characteristics that differ significantly from those of the traditional ones and it needs to be reminded that these countries were and still are themselves recipient of international aid.

The South-South development cooperation (SSDC) possesses characteristics significantly different from traditional aid model. One of the main criticisms that developing countries have of the traditional model is the conditionality that comes with aid, often seen as a neo-colonial tool. For SSDC non-interference and respect for national sovereignty is one of the core values, together with the principles of equality, solidarity and reciprocity. SSDC involves different forms and elements, such as the sharing and transfer of knowledge, technology, training and financial means, among others. SSDC rejects the term donors, with the countries part of this framework instead referring to themselves as partners. In fact, this new development framework has horizontal partnership as one of its main characteristics, both in an ideological and practical sense; as previously stated, technical cooperation and, particularly, knowledge exchange are some of this model’s trademark characteristics.

There are three main issues formulated against SSDC, which are also the main differences with the traditional model:

- the different terms of the grants, given by the distinct conception of debt sustainability;
- the relative lack of conditionality as part of a non-interference approach, which allows certain countries (and particularly China) to interact with non-democratic states;
- the involvement of some of these countries is designed on the idea of mutual benefits with a significant amount of the aid targeting infrastructural projects rather than tackling poverty.


64 What is South-South cooperation? 2016, United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation <http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html>
The principle of non-interference with a recipient’s national politics is the topic that generated the most heated debate. A good example of this critique is the relationship China has with Zimbabwe and Sudan. In fact, China has been accused of selling weapons (particularly small arms) used by militias during the Conflict in Darfur, while selling significant amounts of military hardware to Zimbabwe. However, even in this regard China has partially shifted its policies recently, as happened with South Sudanese independence when China sent combat troops to South Sudan together with a UN peacekeeping force, an unprecedented event that had never occurred before. China also demanded stricter conditions from Zimbabwe’s dictator Robert Mugabe.

Much criticism is directed towards the economic model that is being exported, even more than the support for the so-called ‘rogue states’. Particularly the People’s Republic of China or PRC (together with other countries) created the fear that together with their aid policy would come a leftist and anti-American ideology. It has also been pointed out that, given many of the countries receiving aid from the new donors have recently received significant cuts in their existing debts owed to traditional donors and institutions, new loans without proper conditions would harm these economies as they would find themselves entangled in a new debt insolvency scenario. Other concerns regard the lack of environmental and labour standards.

The fear that countries that recently reduced the amount of their debt would find themselves in the ‘trap’ of Chinese (and others) aid does not have any justification. There is actually no proof that this aid is increasing the debt situation given the unsuitable conditions of the loans.

Among the key improvements of the emerging model are the focus on infrastructure and general cut in business costs which raises production and gives a significant boost to trade and the financing sectors. Development agencies constitute a fundamental part of BRICS’ foreign relations as the forefront of their countries’ expansion in new territories; it is no coincidence that most of the agencies are situated in the ministries of foreign affairs. The

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disadvantage of being linked with these ministries lies in the fact that these agencies consequently have to rely on diplomats and encounter significant bureaucratic and economic complications.67

Such model benefitted also from the economic crisis that hit the Western countries in the last few years. However, since 2013 some of the protagonists of SSDC, particularly South Africa and Brazil, entered a negative economic trend which raised doubts about the sustainability of such model, considering the problems that still affect these ‘middle class’ countries. In addition, these complex mechanisms are for now working without clear direction and with a significant lack of unified efforts.68 Another important issue is the fact that all these agencies are constantly understaffed: as of 2013, the Department of Foreign Aid at the PRC’s Ministry of Commerce had a staff of 100 workers while the Brazilian ABC could count with a personnel of 160 that work on a huge number of different issues and geographical locations.69 These challenges are fronted individually by the emerging donors, which do not have enough bilateral apparatus to allow them to share knowledge and experience. However, some of these countries are trying to solve the issue with the increasing process of institutionalization of the development cooperation; a great number of actions are also in progress. The ECOSOC (United Nations Economic and Social Council) Conference of Southern Providers that took place in New Delhi in 2013 is a good example, while a number of international platforms were born in the last few years, among them the IBSA dialogue forum between India, South Africa and Brazil and the Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC).

At the same time, it is also very hard to quantify properly the size and impact of this cooperation as none of these countries has an evaluation system. There is also cloudiness in the conditions of some of their aid programs and scarcity and dispersion of the relevant data. Even on this matter, traditional and emerging donors diverge: the first consider assistance all the programs that help development while the latter include only non-concessional ones. At the same time, the concept of development assistance includes

different programs depending on the country; just as an example, China excludes humanitarian assistance from its figures. All these differences and gaps make very difficult any comparison between the BRICS and the DAC countries in this sense.

Moreover, aid programs have been conceived as a philanthropic act where the richer donors are seen as the generous protectors that uplift the poorer and less lucky nations; however, with the intrusion of developing countries into the group of the donors this charitable motivation loses its strength. At the same time, it might seem a contradiction that countries that are still recipient of a great amount of aid now have their own foreign development programs.

At the forth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness that took place in Busan, South Korea, in 2011, emerging donors agreed to sign a declaration with the traditional ones for a new global partnership. In the document, which recognizes the increasing complexity of development cooperation, the different characteristics between the South-South cooperation and the North-South cooperation are acknowledged, although it is stressed that the two different models have the same aims and objectives. Negotiations were very hard and intense and showed how difficult it is to bring together such different models.

It would be wrong to assimilate these new donors as they act on different lines and follow different protocols; at the same time BRICS aid are often complementary to the traditional ones as they focus on different areas. Among the key characteristics of these countries’ financing, China seems to be at the antipode of the DAC while India, as Brazil, categorizes its model as a non-hierarchical one where horizontality is constantly stressed, together with the idea of mutual benefits between partners. In congruence with what we previously stated, the concept of conditionality is rejected, as it would erode national sovereignty. The differences among BRICS aids’ are a combination of the heredity of the past mixed with their own countries’ characteristics and policies. What follows in Table 1 (Mwase and Yang 2012) is a brief overview of Chinese, Brazilian and Indian development assistance.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key agency</strong></td>
<td>Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC)</td>
<td>Indian International Development Cooperation Agency (IIDCA) was proposed in 2007 but has not been established.</td>
<td>No such agency yet, but discussions to establish one are continuing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Ministry</strong></td>
<td>Ministry of External Relations</td>
<td>Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)</td>
<td>Department of Aid in Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Agencies</strong></td>
<td>EMBRAPA, FIOCRUZ, FARMANGUINHO S, SENAI, SEBRAE, CAPES, FINEP, CNP.</td>
<td>EXIM Bank, Indian Council for Cultural Relations, and other respective Ministries</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Exim Bank; China Development Bank and other agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Form</strong></td>
<td>Loans and grants</td>
<td>Grants, credit lines, interest-free loans and other concessional and non-concessional loans</td>
<td>Grants, credit lines, interest-free loans and other concessional and non-concessional loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modality</strong></td>
<td>Mostly through multilateral channels. Co-financed projects and technical assistance</td>
<td>Mostly project-oriented with the exception of Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan, debt cancellation, and humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Mostly projects, in-kind, technical cooperation and debt relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official aim</strong></td>
<td>South-south cooperation; mutual economic development, and strengthen cultural relations</td>
<td>South-south cooperation, regional stability and access to markets and resources, and strengthen cultural relations</td>
<td>South-south cooperation and access to markets and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country focus</strong></td>
<td>Latin America and African countries (especially)</td>
<td>Immediate neighbourhood (e.g., Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma and Nepal), and Africa</td>
<td>Widespread though large amounts concentrated in a few</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Brazil as a new development partner

Among the still inadequate mechanisms of evaluation of aids, Brazil’s ABC is arguably the most advanced amongst the BRICS, and it is a fundamental tool in the country’s foreign policy towards Africa. There are some similarities and significant differences between the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD and the ABC. Both entities administer the flux of money that benefits projects in developing countries although in the Brazilian case these refer to all non-conditional grants.

In Brazil there are, as of 2010, more than 100 different federal offices and institutions, spread towards several ministries and agencies, which are directly involved in developmental projects. In a series of meetings between these different institutions an official definition of Brazilian international cooperation was given:

‘the totality of investments made by the federal government of Brazil, exclusively considering free grants, in developing countries or given to international institutions with the objective of contributing to the international development, the latter with the meaning of strengthening the capacities of these international organizations and of those countries with the aim of improving their socio-economic conditions.’

Brazil defines its development assistance through the values of solidarity, horizontality, demands-driven policy, sovereignty and national ownership. The differences between Brazil and the OECD/DAC are highlighted in Figure 5. (Milani 2016)

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74 Ibid., pp. 11-19
For the years 2005-2009, the total amount of Brazilian cooperation was of 2.9 billion reals (1.4 billion US dollars at the time); the amount of financing per year almost doubled from 2005 to 2009. Data regarding Brazil’s cooperation are public, however, they are not up to date. Table 2 (IPEA 2010) is the most detailed report available regarding Brazilian cooperation for the years 2005-2009 and the most precise estimation of such cooperation. Data for the following years is not available yet.

3.4 Final evaluation

In conclusion, the rise of the SSDC model, with its different terms and conditions, has made the established donors less appealing. The non-interference approach appears very inviting to the recipient countries. Moreover, the willingness of the recipients to embrace SSDC is putting considerable strain on the established system and demonstrates the inefficiencies and often unrealistic nature of its demands. On the other hand, some of the criticism directed towards the new model is based on real problems concerning workplace security and environmental standards. However, what is happening in many instances is simply the replication of the same conditions enforced in their own states in the recipient countries. It
is also impossible to detach this shift from the major political changes occurring in the world, where Western powers are losing ground to the developing countries of whom BRICS are the main representatives. A great amount of this criticism seems dictated more by the fear of these new global players rather than reality. In any case, this contrast between the two models can have important positive repercussions as the traditional donors will have to find a middle ground and adapt their conduct in order to meet the needs of a changing world aid architecture.

Table 2: Brazilian cooperation for development, 2005-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>% on the total</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>% on the total</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>% on the total</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>% on the total</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>% on the total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% on the total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian cooperation</td>
<td>487,094,38</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>2,534,109,90</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>16,310,158,61</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>16,253,977,58</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>43,521,155,00</td>
<td>12.02</td>
<td>79,107,405,83</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarships for foreign students</td>
<td>23,068,150.15</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>25,896,723.71</td>
<td>9.54</td>
<td>28,311,102.13</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>38,615,410.38</td>
<td>11.46</td>
<td>22,236,963.48</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>178,148,539.84</td>
<td>9.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical cooperation</td>
<td>1,402,255.19</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>15,046,398.49</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>18,256,035.71</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>3,097,322.93</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>48,872,380.00</td>
<td>13.49</td>
<td>125,894,247.65</td>
<td>8.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions to international organizations</td>
<td>12,105,225.36</td>
<td>77.86</td>
<td>23,731,175.98</td>
<td>84.32</td>
<td>22,842,352.87</td>
<td>74.18</td>
<td>249,862,951.19</td>
<td>74.18</td>
<td>245,579,564.01</td>
<td>68.35</td>
<td>1,082,700,249.40</td>
<td>75.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>158,105,452.99</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>277,208,407.83</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>291,896,450.23</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>286,859,868.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>362,210,023.08</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>1,426,250,442.73</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4: Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa

Brazil’s increased presence in the African continent would not have been possible without the shifting of the political and macro-economic conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa since the beginning of the new millennium. Bearing in mind that development cooperation constitutes a fundamental tool of foreign policy, it would not be possible to appreciate the magnitude of such involvement (and remembering that Brazil is neither alone nor the biggest in this ‘new’ Africa) without a background on the conditions of the continent.

4.1 The African context

Africa, the ‘last frontier’: the positive trend of the last decade have given the hope that the continent might be on the track of a much needed period of stabilization and growth. Even though the situation differs greatly from country to country, overall, this new tendency, concurrently with the financial difficulties that have hit the Western Powers, has given unprecedented possibilities to new actors in the continent, all of them present in different measures, with different instruments and objectives.

In fact, it was only with the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new millennium that Africa, or at least big areas of it, started to alleviate the endemic problems that affect it, even though some undemocratic rulers and conflicts are still present in a number of countries. After 2000, a reversal of this tendency brought a steady increase in the Gross Domestic Production (GDP) level - although in very different measures - across Sub-Saharan Africa while these economies were also hit lightly by the 2008 crisis, in a continent still dominated by primary production.

Keeping in mind the great differences across the continent, the economy of Sub-Saharan Africa after independence can be divided in three broad phases:75

1) The years 1960-80, where most Sub-Saharan countries enjoyed an important growth (at least at macro-economic level) right after their independence with an annual GDP growth of 4.8%;

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2) The years 1980-2000, during which a series of factors, both internal and external from the continent, brought to a significant decline and left most economies in disarray. Increase in world interest rates and oil prices and the decline of prices for exportations, together with instability in the continent, hit hard the economies of the new African countries. International organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank took advantage of the situation imposing the so-called SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programs) which included element of neoliberalism such as privatization, devaluation of the currency, cut in government spending and others. The effects were nefarious and contributed to a steady decline in economic growth and the weakening of national economies across the continent. The 1980s became known as the “lost decade” for Africa, while the annual GDP growth was of 2.1%;

3) The new millennium, which saw most Sub-Saharan economies restarting to grow, with an annual GDP growth of 3.9% as of 2007. The increase in exports and in the price of commodities towed the growth, thanks also to the rise of other emerging economies (particularly the BRICS) and their high demands. The significant increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and aid contributed to the positive trend at the beginning of the new millennium. Finally yet importantly, money sent by Africans working outside of the continent to support their family played a significant role as well. 76

Simultaneously, most African governments, aware of what had happened in the 1980s, kept a tight control on national debt and inflation while fiscal revenues improved across the continent. The positive trend that the continent is currently experiencing has become known by the term “Africa rising”. However, on the dark side, many are the problems and challenges still present in the continent. The poverty level remains extremely high and the growth seen in the last few years has been very unevenly distributed, aggravating the pre-existing situation of inequality. It has to be kept in mind as well that the phenomenon is not uniform across the continent, with some countries performing much better than others. Finally, the price of commodities and resources, which were amongst the protagonists of such growth, has been decreasing since 2012.

It is in this context that new countries have found a way to play an important role in Africa.

76 World Bank, 2015, Global economic prospects – sub-Saharan Africa, pp.2-5
4.2 A changing Africa, new players, different motives

The notion of emerging partners can be explained with a double significance: it refers to countries whose economies have recently experienced a sustained growth and whose involvement with the African continent, even though it might be not as new, became significant only in the last decades.  

When we talk about emerging donors in Africa we are referring principally to China, India, Brazil, South Africa and, at a lesser extent, Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and others. Once again, we will refer here to the first group. These new actors are all in pursuit of different objectives at different levels, in a sort of new scramble for Africa. Private and governmental investments, diplomacy, trade, FDI, and development assistance are all used and implemented in varying measures by China, India, Brazil as a mean of expanding their reach; in fact these countries passed from a negligible presence in the continent up to a major one as they are right now in the last two decades. It is no coincidence that the theme for the 5th international BRICS summit, held in Durban in 2013, was indeed the African continent.

The most significant from the aforementioned countries, both for the amount of its presence and the heated debate that followed it, is China.

When we talk about China in Africa we are looking at a multi-faced relationship that flows through very different channels. In the last two decades, the increasing Chinese presence in Africa has been driven primarily by the needs of PRC’s growing economy, particularly regarding raw materials and oil and with the objective of securing a market for Chinese low-cost products. At the same time, China moved in the direction of strengthening its diplomatic power and gathering consensus through South-South relations and, at a lesser extent, by the need for securing food production.

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The imports from the continent, as mentioned, are mainly made up of oil, followed by iron ore, metals, and smaller amounts of food and agricultural products. It is no coincidence that the main Chinese partners in the continent, Angola, Sudan, Nigeria and South Africa, are all rich in resources. In fact, the Chinese presence in Africa is very uneven, being high in some countries (particularly the aforementioned ones) and significantly smaller in others. As for the Chinese FDI in the continent, its main focus is again on oil and agricultural land, repeatedly dividing observers between those that accuse PRC of being resource driven while others sustain that these investments significantly help African countries in their growth. It also has to be considered that these relations changed greatly with the economic crisis of 2008, the falling prices of natural resources and China’s economy that, although still in expansion, is not running at the same pace it used to.

Nonetheless, in 2013 China became the main trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa and Xi Jinping estimated it at more than 200 billions of dollars during a visit to Senegal in 2014\(^{80}\). As mentioned before, Chinese imports focus mainly on natural resources while the exports are made up for the most part of manufactured goods. The presence of Chinese goods in the continent has made low-cost products available for a large part of the population while it has concurrently damaged local industries that cannot cope with similar prices.

Initiatives such as the Forum on Africa China Cooperation (FOCAC), the triennial meeting between China and African states are a fundamental instrument in reinforcing the ties between the two sides. China has been offering a unique kind of commercial diplomacy, offering loans, cheap labour and great amounts of money to African states in exchange of favourable extraction rights, such as it happened in Angola and Niger.

At the same time, PRC has been promoting a non-interference approach in the domestic affairs of African states in what is one of the main differences to the Western approach, which allowed the country to work with non-democratic states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, as previously discussed. It seems that even the non-interference approach is evolving, as it is the multifaceted Chinese presence in the continent, which is possibly looking for a more stable and durable foothold in Africa. Undoubtedly, Chinese presence and its investments significantly contributed to the great economic growth that Sub-Saharan

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Africa experienced from the early 2000s and in the inclusion of the continent in the world economy.\(^81\)

Finally yet importantly, in the weighing of the Chinese perception across the continent, the Chinese political involvement during the Cold War has great significance, where it sustained national liberation movements and some of the parties that still hold the power, as it is the case of SWAPO in Namibia.

South Africa, India, and Brazil started a new trilateral cooperation strategy, the IBSA dialogue forum, established in 2003, which acts as a means to promote cooperation as well as sharing information and prospects between the three nations. Their role as regional powers can be seen as being facilitators or managers that help integrate the region in which they exercise their power with the pursuit of a more multilateral policy.\(^82\) These countries act as links or bridges between the different blocks or elements of the international system and the prominent position that they hold in their respective regions of influence give them the opportunity to acting independently. These three nations came to this agreement by bringing together different histories, cultures, economies, and plans for the future.

Even though South Africa is not an external player, it has been acting like one, competing with foreign actors in the continent while promoting its role of natural leader of Africa, given the size of its economy, infrastructure and the stability of the country and considering that it is the only Sub-Saharan nation with a significant international weight.\(^83\) Its position, right in the middle between South America and Asia, also gives SA (South Africa) the role of a bridge amongst the three continents, with the advantage of being able to project its power on the African hinterland. South African companies have been carrying the nation’s banner in different countries with their expansion in fields like technology and telecommunications and exporting manufactured goods.

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On the other hand, SA is, like the other two countries that compose IBSA, facing significant social and economic problems on its own soil while it does not have the same economic strength (let aside the size and population) of Brazil and India. Concurrently its attempt to expand its hegemony through the SADC countries have not been, to this date, very successful.

India and Africa share a long history. In addition, several parts of the African continent were colonised by the British, as was India. In opposition to the Chinese migrants, Indians have lived in Africa for centuries, coming both as slaves and as immigrants; nowadays India is the most populous democracy and the second most inhabited country in the world. Its position and its ongoing problems with its neighbours, particularly Pakistan, still precede Africa in its foreign policy;\(^84\) India cannot claim the same power over Africa that China has. Nonetheless, its importance has been greatly increasing in the continent, with particular regard to trade growth and the mounting presence of Indian businesses.

Different actors from India have different goals, in a blend of government engagements with other players, often without a clear coherence of objectives.\(^85\) Like other emerging powers, Indian presence in the continent is very uneven, with Mauritius still holding the lion’s share in particular regard for the FDI. Even though India lays significantly behind China, its growth in the last few years has nonetheless been impressive. Concerning its development cooperation, India has been pushed by the will of moving from being a recipient to an active development player with a greater international weight. The country’s development policy is based on the grounds of economic and technical cooperation; the latter particularly has its best expression in the human resources and capacity building development, also considering the long history of Africans studying in India with the country offering qualified, affordable education, and its leading IT.\(^86\) Trying to consolidate developmental efforts, the Indian government established in 2012 the Development Partnership Administration that should unify the different entities acting in this direction. Indian development cooperation


seems to have the double purpose of increasing the country’s weight at an international diplomatic level (particularly its seeking of a permanent seat at the UN Security Council) while improving the image of India around the world.

The rest of the chapter will specifically focus on Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa through an overview of its main projects. Figure 8a.-8b. (World Bank- Ipea 2011) give an overview of the geographic locations of such projects while Figure 9 (Labmundo 2016) gives an estimation of the expenditures for Brazilian projects. It can be noted how Africa is not the main recipient of Brazilian cooperation, with Haiti holding firmly the first position. As for the cooperation in the African continent itself, Portuguese speaking countries enjoy a much more consistent presence of Brazilian cooperation.
Fig. 6a: Brazil’s cooperation project in Sub-Saharan Africa, executed, ongoing and under negotiations, 2000-2011

**SENEGAL**
- National Biodiesel Program and horticultural development
- Technical training on cattle management for beef and milk production
- Support for sickle-cell anemia Program
- Rice Experimental Center (also serves Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Mauritania)

**CAPE VERDE**
- Support for horticultural development
- Strengthening health care management
- Establishment of National Technical School for Health
- Development of National Institute for Public Health
- Institutional strengthening of the Employment and Vocational Training Institute (IEFP)
- Support for National System of School Cafeterías
- Malaria prevention and control
- Support for implementation of the human milk bank
- Education for All: mainstreaimg of children with special needs
- Institutional strengthening of the Pharmaceutical and Food Regulatory Agency (ARFA)
- Housing for All: Support for institutional development for water management
- Restructuring of Praia Tele Center
- Support for institutional development for water management
- Support for the sustainable development of cocoa farming

**SIERRA LEONE**
- Fight against HIV/AIDS
- Training of health attendants for women, children and newborns
- Training on processing of manioc, irrigations and fish farming

**BURKINA FASSO**
- Strengthening the goat and sheep industry

**TOGO**
- Support for agricultural modernization
- Support for professional training in engine mechanics
- Institutional strengthening for combating sexual abuse of children and youth

**SAO TOME E PRINCIPE**
- Training of teacher
- Support for family and agriculture and rural development
- Literacy and school feeding program
- Institutional strengthening for water management
- Technical support for the implementation of the minimum wage
- Urban development
- Fight against tuberculosis, endemic diseases, DST, HIV/AIDS
- Technical cooperation for courts and police
- Implementation of a vocational training center

**GUINEA-BISSAU**
- Strengthening of National Popular Assembly
- Establishment of National Health Institute
- Strengthening of the national civil registry
- Establishment of vocational training institute
- Establishment of training school for malaria prevention
- Youth leadership for the development of good social-educational practices
- Strengthening of the health system for the victims of gender-based violence
- Olé Brazil: technical cooperation in soccer

**MALI**
- Strengthening horticultural and family agriculture
- Experimental station for the production of cotton (Cotton 4 project)
- Vocational training center (SENADII) (Under negotiation)
- Support for urban development
- Caixa Econômica Federal, Unicamp, University of Sao Paulo, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, and Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

**GHANA**
- Support for development of alternative sources of energy (biofuels) and manioc farming
- Support for center for caju nut development
- EMBRAPA Center
- Fight against HIV/AIDS
- Structuring of national system for the treatment of sickle-cell anemia

**BENIN**
- Support for pilot cash-transfer program modelled on Bolsa Família
- Cotton 4 Project: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali
- Transfer of social technology to Odoom school
- Support for sickle-cell anemia program / Development of agriculture and cattle raising

**NIGERIA**
- Technical assistance to airport authorities and firefighters
Fig. 6b: Brazil’s cooperation projects in Sub-Saharan Africa, executed, ongoing and under negotiations, 2000-2011

- **Congo**
  - Strengthening of cocoa production
  - Farming en la African pal. (Dendro)
  - Modernization of the sugarcane sector
  - Protection of marine turtles with emphasis on developing cultural awareness
  - Fight against HIV/AIDS

- **Equatorial Guinea**
  - Support for development of policies affecting women and breastfeeding infants
  - Youth professional development
  - Support for family agriculture and manioc farming
  - Strengthening rice farming

- **Gabon**
  - Support for breeding of cattle for milk and meat production

- **Cameroon**
  - Malaria prevention and control
  - Support for fish farming
  - Fight against HIV/AIDS
  - Establishment of vocational training center (under negotiation)

- **Angola**
  - Pilot project for eradicating sickle-cell anemia
  - Establishment of Vocational Training Center (SENAI)
  - Support for national Agricultural Research Center
  - Support for implementation of the vegetable sanitary service
  - Schools for all
  - Support for creation of an inventory of cultural heritage of Brazilian origin
  - Development of master’s program in health

- **Namibia**
  - Urban development Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF)
  - Management of solid waste
  - Agricultural production of manioc, tropical fruit and vegetables

- **South Africa**
  - Technical cooperation
  - Namibia
  - Urban development Caixa Econômica Federal, CEF
  - Management of solid waste
  - Agricultural production of manioc, tropical fruits and vegetables

- **Uganda**
  - Training of soccer coaches

- **Kenya**
  - Exchanging of best practices on budget planning
  - Technical assistance on environmental protection
  - Training of soccer coaches
  - Development of handicrafts production
  - Fight against HIV/AIDS

- **Tanzania**
  - Training and skills development for health workers
  - Post-harvest support for cau nuts and horticulture
  - Development of fish farming
  - Fight against HIV/AIDS

- **Zambia**
  - Training and skills development of health workers
  - Support for the production of biofuels
  - Fight against HIV/AIDS
  - Implementation of vocational training institute (under negotiation)

- **Botswana**
  - Fight against DST/HIV/AIDS

- **Mozambique**
  - Agricultural development, technology platform for agricultural innovation, family agriculture (traditional creole seeds), training in agriculture conservation and technical support for agriculture and cattle raising.
  - Support to research on agriculture.
  - Fiocruz field office (health) and construction and implementation of pharmaceutical factory
  - Fight against HIV/AIDS and training for production of anti-retroviral drugs.
  - Institutional strengthening of pharmaceutical regulator and introduction of the popular pharmacies program
  - Implementation of the National Polytechnic Institute of Health Nutrition and Food Program: Brazilian-Mozambican cuisine and support for development of national nutritional program
  - Rehabilitation of Machipanda Forestry Center
  - Support for implementation of the national archive system
  - Support for development of strategic public sector management
  - Professional training in tourism and hospitality
  - Institutional strengthening of MNOQ
  - Technical support for agriculture and fish farming
  - Support for urbanization in Maputo
  - Training of primary and secondary education teachers and support for higher education through distance learning
COOPERAÇÃO BRASILEIRA NO MUNDO

Capital brasileiro destinado à cooperação, em 2010, em milhões de reais

Fig. 7: Brazilian cooperation in the world, as of 2010, in millions of Reals

Fonte: IPEA, 2013.
4.3 Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa

Brazil’s development cooperation in the African continent focuses firstly on the Portuguese speaking countries, which are the recipients of the majority of Brazilian projects. As for other areas of Brazil’s engagement with the continent, the sharing of a common language and culture as been the main driver in the geographical distribution of such projects.

Brazil’s cooperation with Africa is particularly active with regards to knowledge exchange, health and tropical medicine, food production and tropical agriculture, vocational training, social protection, and higher education. The following is a brief overview of these areas with a few major examples in order to highlight the practical characteristics of such cooperation.

4.3.1 Partnership vs conditionality: the knowledge exchange

The government of Lula did not issue an official policy statement for its international development cooperation or any guides regarding the official framework, conception, goals and plans in this regard. However, as we have been mentioning before, one of the main features of Brazil’s development assistance is the shift from the idea of donor to that of partner.

Celso Amorim, former Minister of Foreign Relations during Lula’s era, in an interview in the occasion of the Fifth seminar ‘Conversation above Africa’ said that the motivation for Brazil’s involvement with Africa, even more than its geographical proximity, the common challenges, the strategic and economic reasons, is that ‘Africa lives in Brazil. It lives inside us’. Lula’s government implemented a series of actions favouring the country’s gaining of international autonomy in regard to its foreign policies in order to reaffirm national interests while acting jointly with other nations from the South. Another fundamental measure that Brazil undertook as a way to safeguard its own interests and those of other countries of the Global South is the resorting to multilateral organizations as a mean of limiting the might of more powerful countries, thus reducing their domination and preventing them from embracing unilateral actions. This sort of alliance and collaboration

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88 Freitas Santos R., Cerquiera R., 2015, South-South cooperation: Brazilian experiences in South America and Africa História, Ciências, Saúde – Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro, v.22, n.1, page 2
with other developing nations is both the result of the ideological background of the ruling PT (Workers’ Party) and of pragmatic calculations as a way to obtain better terms in the international framework.

The technical cooperation exchange is one of the main features of the country’s horizontal cooperation: the sharing of lessons and success among developing nations, as it be will be explained in this chapter, highlights the ‘developmentalist’ direction that Brazil’s international cooperation has been taking since the beginning of the new millennium. The absence of conditions is one of the most significant differences in the model of cooperation between the Global South and developed countries, bolstering the basis of sovereign equality. Brazil’s projects in Africa focus on a wide variety of fields, primarily agriculture, health and vocational training, while in recent years, energy has become another significant point of contact between the two continents. The following will be a brief overview of such exchanges, with short but precise descriptions of the most important projects in each area, highlighting both triumphs and shortcomings. Figure 8. (Leyte, Suyama, Pomeroy 2013) displays the budgetary distribution for ABC by sector in the years 2003-2012.

**Fig. 8: ABC’s budgetary distribution per sector (2003-August/2012)**
4.3.2 Food production and tropical agriculture

In the last 20 years Brazil’s food production increased at a very fast pace and the country was able to solve its scarcity of resources in this sector. As of 2010 Brazil was the third biggest exporter of food in the world, surpassed only by the EU and the United States; particularly the growth in crop production in the last decade has been impressive, rising by more than 300% while beef exports decupled in a decade. In regard to poultry, sugar cane, and ethanol, Brazil is the main producer in the world. During Lula’s presidency Brazil undertook a series of projects aiming at increasing social inclusion and reducing poverty linked to agricultural productivity, with particular focus on family-based agriculture.

Brazil is exporting its expertise in the field to the African continent; one of the most significant of such projects is the C-4, which refers to the four cotton-producing countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali. The capacity building aspect played a significant role since the beginning of the experiment in 2009: the initiative aimed at strengthening the production of those countries with the transfer of Brazilian technology and expertise, using Brazil’s developed crops with the final aim of improving the farmers’ life and conditions.

The involvement of local stakeholders and different fragments of the cotton production chain was fundamental in order to transfer knowledge to the local population successfully. The project lasted until 2012 and encountered significant difficulties, some of which are political, such as the change of president in Brazil, with the cut to expenditures, and the military coup in Mali added to an excessive turnover of the workforce from the four cotton countries, the lack of infrastructure and communication and the excessively slow time of implementation. Despite all these difficulties, the experiment obtained significant achievements in the rise of crops, with the production per hectare tripling, the creation of an efficient network, the gaining of international credibility and praise, the establishment of a series of technical courses with the transfer of equipment and knowledge to the C-4.

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89 World Bank-Ipea, 2011, Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth Brazilia: Ipea, page 50

90 World Bank-Ipea, 2011, Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth Brazilia: Ipea, page 54
countries and the creation of permanent facilities.\textsuperscript{91} In 2014 the second part of the experiment started, with the addition of Togo, aiming to a new increase in production and the further transfer of capacities and materials to the locals.\textsuperscript{92}

Other important initiatives implemented by EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agriculture Research Corporation) are the Agricultural Innovation Marketplace and the technical training offered through the CECAT (Embrapa Studies and Capacity), a specialized center that offers training courses in a series of African countries. \textsuperscript{93} Figure 9. (Labmundo 2016) shows the amount of Brazilian projects in Africa.

\textsuperscript{91} ABC 2013, South-South cooperation: C4 study case, \hspace{1cm} < http://tcdc2.undp.org/GSSDAcademy/video/pdf/Brazil%20Cotton.pdf >

\textsuperscript{92} Embrapa, 2014, Cotton Four + Togo < https://www.embrapa.br/en/cotton-4-togo >

Figure 9: Brazilian agricultural projects (dark green) with Embrapa’s participation (light green)
4.3.2.1 Topical agriculture in trilateral cooperation: the ProSavana project

The ProSavana project is an extremely ambitious private-public trilateral project that involves Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique, and that focuses on the Nacala corridor in Mozambique. It is one of the biggest large-scale agricultural projects in Africa and it was based on the assumption that the Nacala region shares geographical and climatic characteristics with Brazil’s Cerrado, an enormous savanna that was transformed in a highly productive area in the past decades. The idea was to transfer Brazilian knowledge to change dozens of millions of acres of mostly inaccessible, scarcely inhabited and partially forested land into a highly productive area of cultivations of soybean, maize and sugar cane for exportation and production of biofuels. The reality proved to be very different: the Nacala region is much more densely inhabited than expected and the local farmers strongly opposed to what they consider a land-grabbing on a massive scale, firmly refusing the statement that this project would come with no major social impact. As of 2015 the project seems hampered without having achieved any tangible result.

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94 World Bank-Ipea, 2011, Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth Brazilia : Ipea, page 50
96 Roman K. & Okada A., 2015, The role of Japan in Overseas Agricultural Investment: Case of ProSAVANA project in Mozambique, An international academic conference 5-6 June 2015, Chiang Mai University Conference Paper No. 82, pp.8-9
4.3.3 Vocational training

The National Service for Industrial Training (SENAI) has been active in Brazil since the ‘40s obtaining great results; in Africa, projects promoted by SENA have been ongoing since the beginning of the millennium. SENA has been promoting a significant number of initiatives in different countries, including (but not limited to) Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé and Príncipe. SENA’s expertise and quality is known worldwide and it offers courses in fields as different as mining and clothing, IT and chemistry, environment and civil construction.

One example of SENA’s work is the Brazil-Angola Vocational Training Center that qualified 3000 workers in 7 years (1999-2006) in a series of fields such as mechanics, construction and IT. The institute was then transferred to the National Employment and Training Institute of Angola. Concurrently, SENA is providing training for Brazilian corporations in Africa that employ local workforce: in 2008 Vale required SENA’s collaboration in order to train needed skilled workforce for their carbon mines of Moatize, Mozambique. In 2011 SENA’s projects started in Kenya in order to educate future trainers of vocational courses. SENA achieved proven results: trainees enjoyed greater work opportunities and the initiatives benefitted both urban and rural populations without any racial discrimination. On the other hand, one main point of criticism has been that such initiatives have so far been benefitting males much more than females; nonetheless these projects achieved promising results across the continent.

4.3.4 Health and tropical medicine

Brazil has gained worldwide recognition in the health sector for its many initiatives on the home front and particularly for the creation of a national free system, the studies about HIV retro-viral and the free distribution of condoms to the population (which caused a significant reduction in the disease’s incidence in the country) and its many health

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98 World Bank-Ipea, 2011, *Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth* Brazilia : Ipea, page 63  

99 Ibid., pp.61-63

cooperation projects. As it happens with other fields, Brazil’s health development and technical cooperation is dispersed between a variety of different institutions, with the ABC struggling to keep everything under control.\(^{101}\) In fact, three ministries (Ministry of Health, ministry of Education, Ministry of Science) host health programs together with the Osvaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ, a public health institution) and the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) among others. Brazil’s health diplomacy is one of the main instruments used to promote the country internationally, given also its characteristic of involvement with worldwide organizations in order to deal with national problems, thus reinforcing the idea of its health cooperation as a soft power tool to promote the country’s interests and influence in the international debate.\(^{102}\)

Until 2008, the Brazilian health approach focused on small projects; however, from that date on the target was redirected towards some structural plans, with long-term objectives, a more prominent local participation and capacity development. Many of these projects focus on training individuals and institutions and on the empowering of the pharmaceutical field; HIV/AIDS in particular receives the greatest attention with projects that go from free donation of anti-retroviral to the construction of pharmaceutical facilities and technical support.\(^{103}\)

These structural projects span different countries, mostly the Portuguese speaking ones, and particularly Angola, Cape Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Ghana, and Mozambique. In Mozambique, FIOCRUZ, collaborating with the Mozambiquan government, completed the construction of a plant for the production of drugs to treat HIV and other generic drugs\(^{104}\). This project has been the most expensive Brazilian health initiative to date in the African continent, with a cost of approximately $10 million.\(^{105}\) The first phase included the dispatch of free drugs from Brazil to Mozambique, concurrently with the training of local


\(^{102}\) Ibid.

\(^{103}\) Ibid.


workforce. In the second phase, the plant officially started production in mid-2013. This is the first public pharmaceutical institution in Africa and it will help around 2.7 million people affected by HIV in Mozambique. 106

4.3.5 Energy

As previously written, Brazil differs from other emerging powers in Africa by the fact that the country is self-sufficient in the energy field. Brazil declared oil autonomy in 2006 and the discovery of huge oil fields in the South Atlantic in 2007 swept away any remaining doubt in this regard. Concurrently, in the previous decades Brazil had been investing strongly in the production of alternative energy sources and particularly biofuels that proved fundamental also for their much lower impact on the environment; the country is currently the second biggest producer in the world behind the USA. 107

Sugarcane and soybeans are at the base of Brazil’s production of ethanol and biodiesel, which are significantly cleaner than those produced using wheat or corn and do not consume eatable products. 108 Given that it is not easy to export them, the production of biofuels takes place for the most part in the same regions where the plants are cropped, helping the local populations significantly. 109

Brazil’s biofuel diplomacy is an important feature of the country’s cooperation with Africa. The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), together with the Ministry of Agriculture, has been at the centre of the promotion of this diplomacy, promoting projects in a range of African countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Botswana, focusing mainly on ethanol but also on biodiesel and others. 110

110 Ibid., pp72-73
The Brazilian government started a collaboration with the West African Monetary Union (UEMOA) in 2007 with the signing of a memorandum for the practicability of energy production in the member countries; in 2011 a study in Senegal was completed regarding the country’s energy crisis and its dependence on just one energy source.

The Brazilian giant multinational PETROBRAS has ongoing projects in several African countries and is cooperating with Angola and Mozambique in the production of biofuels, with the double objective of benefitting these and neighbouring African nations while improving its international authority in the field. As for the extraction of resources the company has long been active in Nigeria and Angola and it is present (among others) in both the East and the West Coast\textsuperscript{111}; in the latter PETROBRAS is searching for light oil displaying the company’s objective of exploring for possible reserves in both deep and ultra-deep waters.\textsuperscript{112}

In Angola the collaboration between Sonangol, the national and state owned oil company, the Angolan group Cochan and the Brazilian company Odebrecht saw the birth of the BIOCOM project, a joint venture with an investment of 750 million of US dollars that produces sugar, electric energy and ethanol. It is one of the major national agribusiness companies, the first of its kind in Angola and its impact on the local population is significant.\textsuperscript{113} BIOCOM is known for the advanced technologies that it utilizes and is currently one of the most developed projects for agricultural production in Africa. Just to give a few numbers Biocom utilizes 10,500 ha of cultivated area, with a totally mechanized process. 94% of the workers are Angolan, with the other 6% being Brazilians technicians present there to transfer knowledge to the locals. The production facilities are expected to be working as of June 2015\textsuperscript{114} with the peak of production to be reached by 2019/20.


\textsuperscript{113} BIOCOM Press Office, Release site \texttt{< http://www.biocom-angola.com/sites/default/files/release_site_en.pdf >}

4.3.6 Social protection

Brazil gained international recognition for the many social projects that it has implemented since the beginning of the millennium. The most comprehensive of these projects is Fome Zero (Zero Hunger), launched in 2003 by Lula; the program itself contains a series of projects, such as the famous Bolsa Família, that aimed at eradicating extreme poverty and reducing the inequality gap in Brazil; these initiatives obtained remarkable and worldwide recognized success.

In regard to Brazilian social projects in Africa, there are not yet sufficient means of evaluation of their effectiveness; however, they constitute an important part of the potential assistance that the country can give to the continent. The main actor in charge of such projects in Africa is the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development (MDS), which is directly involved through the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development since 2007. It needs to be remembered, as the previous Table 9 shows that during the 2003-2007 period social protection accounted for only 3% of the ABC’s budget allocated to social projects. Even though the boundaries of social projects are not well defined this is a good indicator of the relatively small importance of these projects in the country’s cooperation with Africa. As for its work, MDS’ focus on development cooperation consists mainly of seminars, workshops, trainings, field visits in Brazil, sharing of information, and technical assistance. Regardless, the financial and human means are quite limited, which gives an important role to the triangular and multi-stakeholders partners and initiatives. In any case, Africa emerged as more and more important as the continent became the main receiver of Brazil’s Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) between 2005 and 2010, surpassing even Latin America. In 2006, the Africa-Brazil Program of Social Development begun, and the year after MDS engaged in Ghana to enforce the local Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty program. Even though the experience was considered a success, this collaboration constituted an important lesson for the MDS, highlighting strongpoints and challenges. The lack of sufficient staff and the latter lack of familiarity with the situation in Ghana and its

languages, together with the dilution of the timetable with significant delays showed that the transfer of programmes that worked in Brazil to another country is not that immediate. Starting in 2008, the MDS shifted its focus towards Africa significantly, moving from an initial engagement with cash transfers to Food and National Security (FNS), given by a series of factors such as the growing Brazilian experience in the continent and the idea that these kind of projects would be more applicable to the African reality.

To conclude, even though Brazil’s example in regard of its innovative and positive polices aimed to reduce poverty and social inequalities the transfer of such projects has so far happened on a limited scale and there has not been a sufficient amount of time to properly evaluate such initiatives in the African continent.

4.3.7 Higher education

The internationalisation of higher education has been an important instrument in the Brazilian South-South cooperation strategy and for the strengthening of its foreign relations\footnote{World Bank-Ipea, 2011, Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth Brazilia : Ipea, pp. 76-78, <http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12638&Itemid=1>}. Brazil started its programmes aiming at transferring knowledge to and with other developing countries in Latin America and subsequently Africa.

Brazil is seen as a possible remedy to the scarcity of higher institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa and particularly regarding the country’s expertise in the IT sector. Most of the Brazilian projects are concentrated in the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) and involve a wide range of initiatives. One such initiative is the joint effort launched in 2011 between four Brazilian and four Angolan universities that involve student exchange programmes, online learning and dual qualifications; the Brazilian government invested 30 million of US dollars for the project, arguably the most expensive initiative in the field.\footnote{Ibid.}

In 2010 the University for International Integration of the Afro-Brazilian Lusophony (UNILAB is the Portuguese acronym) was launched in 2010 in the Brazilian city of Ceara, symbolically chosen as it was the first place in the country to abolish slavery. Students from all the Portuguese speaking countries, and particularly the African ones, attend courses that for the most part are among the interests of all countries. As from 2015 the University has almost
5000 students. Other initiatives include the creation of Afro-Brazilian centres such as the one in Dakar, and bilateral agreements that some Brazilian universities have with African ones, such as the University of Brasilia with others in Cabo Verde, Mozambique and South Africa. The creation of scholarships for both undergraduate and postgraduate students from more than 20 African countries made possible for thousands of African students to study in Brazil. Figure 10. (Labmundo 2016) shows the country of origin of those students.

### 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter gave a brief conspectus of Brazil’s development cooperation in the African continent. Through the short analysis of the different areas of Brazil’s cooperation some of the main characteristics of such cooperation have been investigated and highlighted. Brazil indeed employs, for the most part, a local workforce and actively commits itself to technical cooperation and the transfer of knowledge. However, it was also observed that some of these projects, particularly the larger ones, have a very lengthy and expensive process. Important projects such as BIOCOM in Angola and the antiretroviral manufacturing site in

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Mozambique required a long time and significant investments, although they proved to be very successful. Therefore, once the truthfulness of Brazil’s cooperation has been verified, what needs to be assessed is its sustainability.
Chapter 5: Challenges to the Brazilian model

5.1 Introduction

Brazil’s presence and cooperation in Africa has been increasing significantly since 2003, a trend made even more impressive considering the domestic problems this South American giant is facing. Such a rapid growth generated many expectations that, however, had to face the reality and limits of such a model. Challenges to Brazilian cooperation can be divided into two categories: those internal to Brazil and those external to the country. Rose’s theory of Neo-Classical Realism once again is useful in understanding the patterns and interactions between these two different realms. As will be explained, Brazil is currently experiencing a deep political-economic crisis that is undermining its material power capabilities and generating concern among its population about the country’s expenditures. With Brazil’s relative power falling, there are increasing doubts surrounding its successes as an example for the South. Its presence in Africa is being concomitantly damaged and, given the currently worsening domestic situation, such a trend is likely to last for a while. What follows is an overview of the internal challenges Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa is facing.

On the other hand, even though the beginning of the new millennium brought good news for Africa, at least at a macro level, the continent still presents several challenges to the Brazilian development cooperation. As we said in the introduction, this ‘Africa rising’ moment has given the hope that the continent might be on the right path to solve its numerous, long-standing problems. However, many of these issues are still present and rooted, in different measures, across the continent. The term ‘Africa risk’ is used to describe all those challenges facing anyone that wants to conduct activities in the continent, whatever they may be. 119

Even though conflicts in Africa have been significantly reduced in the last decade, there are still several ongoing and the main fear is that the precarious level of stability finally accomplished throughout the continent (again, with exceptions) may be shaken by unpredictable events. Then come all the problems related to the lack of an efficient

structure in the African continent to enable any major project to be completed without delays. Africa lacks a great deal of skilled workforce while it is often complicated to find a local, trustable partner. As for the infrastructure, many countries in Africa lack the sufficient roads, railroads, electricity, good access to food and clean water, which make any development project more expensive. Also, bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption are rampant (that, as previously, is the case for Brazil as well).

In addition, problems in the international development system in Africa are presenting a series of challenges that undermine a stronger association between Brazil and the continent. Given that the collaboration of local partners is a fundamental aspect of Brazil’s development cooperation, the sum of all the aforementioned challenges translate in greater costs and often long delays in the projects.

As previously seen, Brazil is not alone in the rediscovery of Africa. Brazil holds the significant advantage of sharing the language with the PALOP nations, which makes the country most likely to keep on being the main (or one of the very main) partner in those areas. However, leaving the traditional players aside, both India and particularly China have far greater resources to invest in the continent. At the same time, China offers quicker and cheaper deals: using workforce brought from home (instead of local one as in the Brazilian model), the availability of a far greater amount of investments and with far less concerns in regard to local involvement and transfer of technical knowledge, Chinese’s deals seem more attractive to those that need quick results. Most of the Brazilian cooperation projects that we analysed follow the peculiar characteristics of the country’s South-South cooperation model, which focus on the local inclusion requires a far greater amount of time.
5.2 Internal challenges

When Lula left power in the hands of Dilma Rousseff Brazil was at its peak. The country had just secured to host both the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic games, it was seen internationally as an example for the way it was facing its numerous social problems and for the respect it was gaining with its economy growing fast and strong. Six years later Brazil seems a completely different country. The political and economic situation in Brazil has been rapidly worsening since 2013 in a series of intertwined events that brought to the confusing and bleak present situation. Economic and political problems intertwined in an increasingly confusing situation. The economic crisis that is currently shaking the country is partially given by the fall in commodity prices that is affecting other emerging economies, Brazil being a great exporter of raw materials. However, it needs to be pointed out that other Latin American countries that are big commodity exporters such as Peru and Chile are still growing; deeper reasons should be searched into Brazil’s economic policies in the last few years. The situation in the country is worsened by local factors that may jeopardize the great social advancements Brazil made since the beginning of the new millennium. Possibly the roots of the crisis can be found as far back as the 1960’s when the country was seeking industrialization through high degrees of protectionism and subsidies for national producers, with this trend even

augmenting after 2000 with more and more state funding given out by national banks such as BNDES. To safeguard its domestic industries, Brazil increased import duties, thus pushing for the use of national commodities. All these measures proved counterproductive in a country that was progressively becoming part of an increasingly globalised world, damaging foreign investments, progress and development. To reassert, the national industrial apparatus, victim of inappropriate policies, has not been able to produce wealth and progress.\(^{121}\). Even the GDP figure for the year 2010, which shows a growth of 7.6%,\(^{122}\) theoretically one of the best years for the country, has most likely been given not by gains in productivity but by the growing measures of state credit. During the years of Dilma Rousseff’s first term, Brazil’s economic expansion was discouraging with the GDP growing only at an average of 2.2% in the years 2011-14, a figure significantly lower than the growth of most South American and BRICS countries. Also in 2014, the budget deficit more than doubled and for the first time since the ‘90s the government was unable to save any money.\(^{123}\)

Concurrently, the expenditures sustained by Dilma for higher pensions, tax breaks and expensive social projects seriously damaged the national economy with the fiscal deficit ballooning from 2% in 2010 to 10% in 2015\(^{124}\). During the government of the PT (Workers’ Party), including Lula’s years, the civil service more than tripled. As of 2015, the public debt is at 70% of national GDP, a high figure for a middle-income developing country, while the inflation rate for the Brazilian Real is at 10.5%. Urban unemployment reached a 5-year high of 7.6%, as it can be observed in Figure 11. (OECD-2015).\(^{125}\) 1.5 million people employed in the formal sector lost their job in 2015. Pensions in particular constitute a very high figure of expenditures, with workers retiring at an average age of 50 for women and 55 for men while Brazil pays almost 12% of its GDP in pensions. Two of the three Big Three credit rating agencies, Standards and Poor’s and Fitch,


\(^{122}\) World Bank, 2015, GDP growth (annual %), < http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=1 >


downgraded Brazil’s to junk status recently while Moody’s is taking into consideration a
similar move; at the same time, the value of the country’s currency is in free fall. The
negative economic junction is expected to continue this year, with the IMF putting the GDP
growth for 2016 at minus 3.5% in what is possibly the worst economic crisis the country has
seen since the 1930s.\footnote{The Economist, 2016, Brazil’s fall < http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21684779-disaster-loomslatin-americas-biggest-economy-brazilis-fall >} The trimestral GDP growth of Brazil can be observed in Figure 12.(Trading economics 2016). In response to the criticism moved to the president during her
first term, particularly regarding the excessive expenditures that characterized it, Joaquim
Levy was appointed as Minister of Finance after Dilma’s narrow victory in the 2014 electoral
campaign. A strong believer of austerity measures with particular focus on budget cuts and
tax increases, Levy was dismissed a year later without explanation by the President and
replaced by the more leftist oriented Nelson Barbosa. The new Minister started a 21$ billion
credit package for various sectors of the economy such as agriculture, industry, and
infrastructure to try to revitalize the economy. Some have seen the move as a political
rather than an economic one with the President softening up the austerity measures in
order to improve her increasingly shaky political position.\footnote{Biller D., 2016, Brazil’s Highs and Lows, Bloomberg View < http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/brazils-highs-lows >} To make matters worse, the
accusation moved against Dilma with her allegedly altering the books becoming one of the
many reasons that brought to the call for impeachment.

\textbf{Fig. 12: Brazil’s GDP growth, January 2013 – July 2015}
As a matter of fact, the political crisis is possibly even worse. The huge and ongoing Petrobras scandal is shacking Brazil’s political foundations in an unprecedented manner. On the 14th of March 2014, shortly after Dilma’s re-election, the Brazilian police launched Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash) to investigate the accusations of corruption directed against Petrobras, which allegedly had been funding the winning political coalition.\(^{128}\) Dilma Rousseff had been the head of Petrobras from 2003 to 2010, making her position in this sense more compromising even though she denies any involvement. Paulo Roberto Costa, ex-director of Petrobras, was arrested and after obtaining a deal with the Brazilian authorities started denouncing important members of the Brazilian political scene, such as parliamentarians, governors and both Presidents of the Chamber and Senate of Parliament.\(^{129}\) Currently 32 members of Congress, the majority of them from the leftist coalition led by PT, are under investigation.\(^{130}\) Other arrests followed, for the most part targeting high-ranking engineers and technicians from other Brazilian firms, including big names such as Odebrecht and Camargo Correa in a scandal that kept on enlarging and also possibly involving other international firms. Dilma’s position is rapidly worsening: in mid-2015 huge protests started across Brazil asking for her impeachment while her popularity fell under 10%, meaning that she has basically lost control over the country.\(^{131}\) On the 2nd of December 2015 the speaker of the lower house, Eduardo Cunha, started proceedings for the president’s impeachment; however many consider this move a way to shift attention from his own person as some accusations of involvement with the Petrobras scandal are directed towards him as well. On the 7th of December, the vice President Michel Temer sent a letter to Dilma regarding the distrust showed towards him while highly criticizing her actions. With such a low support the president is increasingly dependent upon her allies and on trade unions which reject the reforms that could boost the economy, with the issue of the pensioning system and retirement age resurging while the president’s political operating


\(^{130}\) The Economist, 2016, Irredeemable <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21684778-former-star-emerging-world-faces-lost-decade.irredeemable?id=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e>\

range is very limited. At the end of January 2016, the PT deemed the rising of the pension age unacceptable.\textsuperscript{132} Even Lula found himself tangled into the scandal: on the 4\textsuperscript{th} of March police raided his house and he was brought in for questioning regarding corruption’s accusations. On March the 16\textsuperscript{th} he was appointed Chief of Staff by Dilma Rousseff, a position that grants him legal immunity; however the following day a federal judge blocked his appointment.\textsuperscript{133} At the same time, massive protests both pro and against Lula have been inflaming the country. Brazil’s political chaos continues unabated while Dilma is currently still in power and trying to find the remedy to the worsening situation while boosting her image and admitting some of her previous mistakes; however not many positive effects seem on the way.\textsuperscript{134} The current explosive socio-economic situation had already been highlighted by the huge protests against the 2014 World Cup. More than a million people protested against the expenditure of dozens of billions of US dollars, all public money, for the Cup. To make matters worse, Brazil has found itself in a health-emergency situation due to the Zika virus epidemic. The virus affects pregnant women with newborn babies developing macrocephaly and significant brain damage. As of February 2016, the number of confirmed Zika-related cases of macrocephaly is fewer than 300, however, several thousand are under observation and the situation is spreading panic, particularly in the hotter and poorer northern regions of the country that have been hardest hit.\textsuperscript{135} Lula’s departure from the President’s seat did not only coincide with a worsening socio-economic situation in the county but also partially cooled down Brazilian relations with Africa. Lula and his enthusiasm, which seemed tireless in his voyage across the continent and with his speeches about Africa, were fundamental drivers in the process of interactions between the two areas. His charisma is something that Dilma Rousseff always lacked, as well as the same appetite for international affairs and even more so in the light of the


\textsuperscript{133} BBC, 2016, Brazil judge blocks Lula appointment to government <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35835795>


\textsuperscript{135} Froio N. 2016, Zika’s spread in Brazil is a crisis of inequality as much as health, The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/03/zika-virus-brazil-inequality-macrocephaly-access-water-contraception>
events that are happening in Brazil. Figure 13. (Labmundo 2016) shows the difference between Lula’s external trips and Dilma’s. Even considering that Lula’s graph refers to eight years while Dilma’s only to four it is immediately clear the disparity among the two.

![Fig.13: Lula (2003-2010) and Dilma (2011-2015) presidential trips](image)

Considering all the economic troubles the country is experiencing, President Rousseff has cut the government spending on ABC in order to prioritize domestic policies. As previously stated, it is quite hard to find updated data regarding Brazil’s spending for cooperation however this downsizing, together with the economic difficulties that many Brazilian corporations actively involved in Africa are living are indicators of the scaling down of this involvement with the continent. This comes as the last of a series of significant intrinsic difficulties of the Brazilian model.

ABC should logically be responsible for the coordination of the development cooperation efforts. However, as we have already stated before, the division of projects among a myriad of different organizations, entities, and programs spread in different ministries make it extremely difficult to organize a national plan in this sense and create an institutional overlapping. These institutional difficulties are made possible by the fact that Brazil still lacks a cooperation law, which in the light of the current situation, makes the need of building a proper legislative framework even more urgent.\(^\text{136}\) ABC, which has seen its budget downsizing, is currently undergoing a restructuration of its architecture in order to improve efficiency. The agency is victim, among others, of excessive subcontracting from UNDP

(United Nations Development Program) because of scarcity of personnel, it needs a stable budget (significant flotations happened in recent years) and to open up specific careers for development cooperation. In fact, ABC directors have always been diplomats who are often too politically involved by domestic politics to be independent and autonomous.\textsuperscript{137} These organizational difficulties summoned up the fact that such an increase in the number of projects in a limited amount of time made Brazil in capacities overstretch significantly, also considering the lack of trained manpower and frequent staff turnover. Once again, the lack of means will certainly be negatively influenced by the economic crisis, and considering the actual situation it would not be illogical to hypothesize that it will take a considerable amount of time before Africa becomes once again an important national matter. At the same time, it is hard to assess the effectiveness of such projects as there are yet no evaluation mechanisms that can provide much needed feedback.

In regard to the population’s engagement, Brazil faces a double problem. On the one hand, there is the need of including the Brazilian citizenry more, considering that the money invested mainly come from taxpayers, making the mechanism clearer and more democratic. Such transparency is fundamental considering the struggle that the country is still facing and the concerns that have been raised regarding the expenditures of such amounts of money in foreign lands. The need of more accountability is an impelling necessity. On the other hand, information about Africa is quite limited in Brazil and negative feelings regarding the continent are still very common to the average Brazilian who more often than not considers it as a war-ridden, plague-infested continent, a very stereotyped image of it.

This brings up what is one of the main issues of this relationship: the lack of communication. As we have just seen, there is not enough communication with the Brazilian population; concurrently there is also lack of proper aerial and naval communication lines. Telephone connections, both fixed and through mobile phones, are quite expensive between the two sides of the Atlantic, for the most part thanks to the ongoing existence of strong monopolies. In regard to actual routes, there are still no Brazilian airlines that fly to Africa, while the few flights available from the continent to South America are in the hands of European or African companies and are often overbooked. There is also lack of direct flights, meaning that journeys that would take a few hours from West Africa to Brazil have to take a

\textsuperscript{137} Milani C., 2016, 22-23 February, Development Diplomacy and Cooperation Workshop, Cape Town
number of hours in the double digit because of stops in Europe. Something similar happens with the maritime routes, where trips that should take 10 days can take up to 80 because of lack of direct routes. In addition to these internal difficulties, the African situation presents a series of challenges to the Brazilian cooperation model. What follows is a brief overview.

5.3 Analysis

Considering that most external factors were present when Lula was president, the most important aspect affecting Brazil’s development cooperation is the domestic environment. Brazil could fuel its growing international commitment (with development cooperation as an important tool of its foreign policy) through an improving domestic situation, both socially and economically. When these positive domestic conditions began to fade, the country’s international commitments followed suit. Under Dilma, Brazil has retreated into a more isolationist position while she tries to tackle the enormous problems that have surfaced since Lula’s departure. It would be unrealistic to predict any increase in Brazil’s development cooperation as long as the present domestic situation persists. From a neoclassical realist perspective, the different direction taken by such cooperation after Lula’s years is a clear demonstration of the importance of leaders and their perceptions on one hand, and of domestic factors on the other. Indeed, since the very beginning Dilma demonstrated a significantly less enhanced interest for the African continent and for development cooperation, even though the Brazilian economy was still not in the situation it is right now. Dilma Rousseff retreated into a more isolationist view of the country, both in the international organizations and in her presence in the world with foreign trips. When these two main conditions failed to persist, Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa started suffering a significant decline.

138 World Bank-Ipea, 2011, Bridging the Atlantic, Brazil and sub-Saharan Africa South-South partnering for growth Brazilia : Ipea, pp.100-101
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Throughout the five previous chapters a series of peculiar characteristics have been highlighted to establish that a specific Brazilian model does, in fact, exist. This model is characterised by the following peculiar characteristics: the empowerment of the local population, a different economic approach, which, even though with self-interest is not spurred by the needs of the continent natural resources, and the unparalleled cultural links given by the common history and the huge influence that Africa and Africans have had on the Brazilian nation (thus the idea of ‘giving back’). Such a model emphasizes its South-South cooperation characteristics while making clear that this is not a step towards a more hierarchical relationship (like the North-South one) between Africa and Latin America. However, we do not have to make the mistake of reflecting on Brazil’s attitude in a naïve way. This does not mean throwing away as mere empty rhetoric what Lula often referred to as a brotherhood between Africans and Brazilians. The humanitarian component and the concept of partnership, presented in chapter four, are realities that cannot be ignored. What needs to be understood, which is missing in most Brazilian official statements, is the fact that the dual motivations of national interests and altruism are not mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{139} Even though Brazil is still one of the most unequal societies in the world and the relegation of blacks to the lowest ranks of the social hierarchy is still a sad reality, initiatives such as the teaching of African history, although still at an embryonic stage, has become compulsory across the country. At the same time, African people and their cultures had (and still have) a huge impact in shaping the modern Brazilian nation that can easily be seen in several features of the country’s variegated cultural landscape. 

Brazil’s cooperation with Africa in the new millennium is inextricably tied to Lula. His passion and appetite for international affairs helped the country emerge as a champion of the South thanks to both its domestic policies and by being an exemplary partner for other developing countries. In his era, the huge positive effects on the economic and social spheres of the domestic structure, combined with his unprecedented popularity, allowed Brazil to expand its influence not only in Latin America but also in Africa. Brazil under Lula had both the

\textsuperscript{139} Inoue C., Costa Vaz A., Jan 2013 Brazil as Southern Donor, Brazilia : Cambridge review of international affairs, page 26 < http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Brazil%20as%20Southern%20donor.pdf >
practical means and ideological push to be able to grab its place as one of the major players of the South, part of a general re-balancing of power in the international system. At the same time, Lula needs be seen has a dot outside the curve in the context of Brazilian politics. The renewed conditions enjoyed by the country are not enough to explain such an enhanced increase in Brazil’s cooperation, both inside and outside the African continent. As part of the Neoclassical Realist framework, the influence that Lula had on such trend is difficult to overestimate. His belief that Brazil could and had to rise and gain a different and more prominent role in the international system, both through international organizations and through SSDC, brought the country to an unprecedented level of commitments and relations with African and particularly the PALOP countries. Development cooperation has become a fundamental tool in the country’s foreign policy, both as a means of expansion and to consolidate its growing sphere of influence. However, the old saying ‘trade follows the flag’ needs to be borne in mind, which in this case may as well be ‘business follows the president’ as Lula was accompanied by myriad businessmen during his numerous trips across Africa. On the other hand, as previously written, Brazil differs from both China and India in the fact that the country is mostly self-sufficient in terms of raw materials. However, considering that Brazil was mainly economically driven by its need for a market for its products, other reasons certainly hold the lion’s share in this recent expansion. There is no comparison between Lula and Dilma Rousseff in regard to their interest in international affairs, reflected in the different foreign patterns taken by the two. For instance, Dilma changed three ministers of foreign relations during her years in office and she does not seem to follow a clear strategy. We could summarize Brazilian motives for its expansion in Africa as follows: security, the objective of increasing power, economic self-interest, the growth of reputation and status (particularly presenting itself as the ‘Champion of the South’) and for its humanitarian values. As wrote in chapter three, Brazil (contrary to OECD) does not take into account what is not concessional in its development cooperation framework, which leads to an underestimation of Brazilian presence on the continent. The Brazilian model is not exempt from criticism. As observed, the ProSavana project in Mozambique has been halted by significant protests coming from Mozambique’s peasants
and civil society. Such protests should not be seen solely in a negative light. Brazil is a democratic country with a significant history of protests (big demonstrations are currently underway in the country against the Dilma Rousseff’s government) and what happened in Mozambique actually provides an opportunity to better understand the local view of Brazil’s presence on the continent. This, in turn, can enable improvements in future projects.

On the one hand, considering the fact that Brazil needs more transparency towards its citizens, data is available in regard to the country’s involvement with Africa; such data is not up to date but in any case it exists. What is not available is any reliable data on Brazilians’ perception of their country’s cooperation with Africa. On the other hand, there is strong suspicion that most citizens still have a stereotypical view of the African continent. However, this should not lead to the conclusion that Brazilians view the expenditure of money in a foreign land as deplorable. Picturing this as a battle between have-nots could possibly ignore a substantial degree of solidarity among nations and populations that share, to different degrees, similar problems.

In a lesser but significantly different way to China, Brazil is actively participating in the African Renaissance. With the end of the Cold War, African states that found themselves without any choice but to resort to Western imposed help in an increasingly commoditising economy, and paradoxically in an exclusionary world thanks to the globalisation of the continent. The shift from unipolarism to multipolarism is providing African states with much greater political and economic manoeuvrability. Even though commodity extraction still plays a large part in most African economies, the continent’s slowly but ongoing diversification and industrialization are now undeniable realities. To ensure that such a trend continues and improves, the sharing of knowledge is fundamental, as Brazil is doing. Using the local work force and training much needed skilled labour and senior management could give the continent precious keys to its future.

The current Brazilian domestic situation, with its deteriorating economic and political scenes, ensure that the country will most likely need at least a few years before returning to Africa as strongly as before. It will also need ‘another Lula’. Furthermore, it will require a significant update of its current policies and means in this regard. Trying to avoid speculation, the possibility that this expansion will become a matter of past history cannot

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140 Ntuazi C., 2015, Resistance to ProSavana in Mozambique, ADECRU
be, as yet, excluded. In any case, Brazil’s advantage of sharing language and culture with the PALOP countries will not break down. Thus, as much as the possibility of expansion might be reduced given the fact that other new partners in Africa are also slowing down their advance, Brazil may find itself confined to the five Portuguese-speaking countries. Future researches should tackle the changes in expenditures and means of such cooperation from the end of Lula’s era, to quantify precisely how big the impact of his ideas on such cooperation was. Currently, the situation in Brazil is extremely messy and fluid and it is impossible to predict when and how the country will stabilize. Only when the dust settles, it will be possible to see what the future of Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa could be. Most likely, the economy will require a significant amount of time to recover, and the image of ‘Champion of the South’ has been damaged by the demonstration that the Brazilian model, even though accomplished great successes for its own people, was difficult to sustain. Considering its limited resources, Brazilian development cooperation in Africa is, due its characteristics and modalities, an example of South-South cooperation and hopefully there will be a future for the ‘Brazilian way’.
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