A CRITIQUE OF N. HARTMANN'S THEORY OF VALUES

by

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Part I: Hartmann's Account of Human Acts.

Hartmann agrees with traditional philosophy that an act, defined in itself, without reference to its end, is human when it satisfies three conditions, namely, knowledge, voluntariness and freedom. An account of Hartmann's treatment of these three conditions are given, together with an exposition of how they function in the human act. Further, an act taken in relation to its end is good for Hartmann when it is directed to values. Concerning this, there are two questions: (1) What are values? and (2) can they be the principles of the intelligibility of moral actions and of our ethical judgments concerning their goodness and badness?

Part II: The Being and the Order of Hartmann's Values.

In answer to the first question, an account is given of the nature of Hartmann's values, both in respect to the mode of being they enjoy and the order they manifest. Then the question is raised as to their intelligibility. First it is explained why they must be per se intelligible. On examination it is found that his values are unintelligible both with regard to their order and being. Their order is unintelligible for the ultimate laws on which it is based stand as much in need of explanation as the order itself. Further, these laws as they stand do not help him to create a scale of values for Hartmann's values do not form a dependent series, and only a dependent series can be ordered. The being of his values is unintelligible because Hartmann mistakes the proper object of the human intellect, which is not, as he holds, platonic essences, but as we prove, being, more precisely, the essence of sensible being abstracted. Since Hartmann's values are separated from being, they are separated from intelligibility, and we must conclude that being and value are not really distinct as Hartmann maintains, but that they can only be separated in thought. In reality they are one and the same. Goodness is being taken under the formality of that which satisfies desire.


Thus far the results of this critique have been negative for ethics. To answer the questions What renders (1) moral behavior and (2) moral philosophy possible, we must endeavour to discover a final end which is goodness per se and intelligibility per se, and as only a being who exists a se can satisfy these conditions, ethics can only be possible if we can prove the existence of a being a se. In order to do this we have to take up the position of Christian Philosophy. It can be proved that God who is Being a se, exists, by means of the analogical argument. This argument consists in proving God's existence from the existence of His creation. That is the procedure followed by the five classical proofs. God's existence having been established, the divine attributes are developed from the definition of Being a se with special reference to God's goodness, His intelligence, and His intelligibility which follows from His intelligence, and
His will. From these three divine attributes we can conclud e that we have found a Being who combines in Himself the Supreme degree of Goodness with the Supreme degree of Intelligibility, and hence we can say that which constitutes the goodness of the human act (its final end) is at the same time that which makes it intelligible. Therefore, if we say that the goodness of the human act consists in being directed to God who is man's final natural end, we can give an intelligible reason for this judgement, for the sufficient reason of the human act is a Being who is through and through intelligible to Himself. We must conclude that this is the only basis on which a scientific ethics can exist and that Hartmann's atheism precludes his ethics from intelligibility. The result of the existence of a final end which is per se intelligible is that ethical behaviour becomes behaviour in conformity with reason, human reason proximately and the divine reason ultimately, for human reason is but the eternal law of God imprinted on creatures. But ethical action is also action which is controlled by the will, and since the will is initially in potency to its final end, it needs an inner principle to actuate it. This function is fulfilled by the virtues. However, just as human reason is founded in the divine reason, so the exemplary ideas of human virtue pre-exist in God. God is the exemplary cause of human virtue, and to take Him away, is to make virtue impossible. This is seen clearly by comparing Hartmann's treatment of the value of purity with Dietrich von Hildebrand's Defence of Purity. Hartmann's account lacks both substantiality and intelligibility, for purity is essentially a virtue requiring a supernatural basis. Since Hartmann, he misses the central meaning of the virtue of purity. We must conclude that Hartmann cannot make the human act intelligible because his values are not per se intelligible and cannot be substituted for the God of Christian philosophy. Ethical atheism is a contradiction in terms. Ethics implies theism.

E: Ethics.
PART 1.

Hartmann's Account of Human Acts.

Ethics is a practical science. It has a twofold purpose in view. Firstly, it endeavours to discover the first principle in the practical sphere, and secondly, it seeks to order human acts according to this first principle.

There are indeed other practical sciences besides ethics; for instance, medicine, which seeks to procure the health of man. But these sciences do not refer to the first principle in the practical order. They only consider how some or other particular human good may be obtained. Ethics, however, is not concerned with particular goods. The first principle that it seeks abstracts from all particularity and is so universal as to be applicable to all particular instances. Therefore, if we define philosophy as that science "which by the natural light of reason studies the first causes or highest principles of all things," then ethics, unlike the other practical sciences, may be termed practical philosophy.

The fundamental question that practical philosophy must settle is in what consists the absolute good of man. To this question many answers have been given. We, however, are only concerned with the answer of Nicolai Hartmann. Secondly it must treat of those things which are the indispensable conditions of its attainment, namely, human acts by means of which man approaches to, or departs from, that in which his goodness consists.

To the first question Hartmann answers that the absolute good of man consists in realising values. "Value" is a technical term in his philosophy, the meaning of which 1. An Introduction to Philosophy by Jacques Maritain. p. 108
we shall consider in part two. Here we are chiefly interested in Hartmann’s solution of the second problem of ethics, namely, his account of human acts, and in the values themselves only accidentally in so far as they touch human acts.

In order to study human acts, we must answer an initial question: What are the characteristics that make an act human? According to traditional philosophy the constitutive elements in the human act are knowledge, voluntariness and freedom. All three are necessary, and if any are lacking, that act in which they are lacking fails to be human. As we shall see in the following analysis, Hartmann adheres very closely to this scheme. For him, too, a human act, defined in itself without reference to its end, must satisfy these three conditions.

The problem of knowledge:

In the first place, Hartmann agrees with traditional philosophy that knowledge is necessary for the human act. This is so because the will by which the human act is controlled, can desire only what is known and what the intellect presents to it as desirable. Before, therefore, there can be a human act, Hartmann must prove that knowledge of his values is possible.

For Hartmann the problem of knowledge has peculiar difficulties. Knowledge of values is not possible through real things, for there is no connection between value-essences, which subsist in the ideal realm, and the actual existing world. The problem is: Values must be known before they can exist, but how can they be known unless they exist? Or, formulated in another manner, How can values at the same time be absolute and knowable? i.e. how can they be taught without being fabricated?

Before he endeavours to find a solution for this prob-
lem, he first glances at the solutions given by some other philosophers. Thus, Socrates held that virtue can be taught for it is nothing else but knowledge. The Christians, on the other hand, according to Hartmann, taught that ethics can only give a knowledge of the good but cannot make one act well. For them ethics is only normative in idea, not in practice as for Socrates. Schopenhauer, again, held that ethics is not normative at all, and that human acts do not spring from knowledge, but that they flow from the subconscious.

None of these solutions are satisfactory for Hartmann. So he turns to Plato. Plato posed the problem in another manner by saying that "virtue is either something that can be taught... or it is something which is inborn in man by nature." This new formulation helps him to solve the problem. In the 'Meno' he shows that the propositions of mathematics which are considered a subject-matter for teaching, are also innate, because when an uneducated person is questioned judiciously about a mathematical problem, he will give the right answer out of himself. Plato therefore concludes that he must have knowledge which is innate, but which he was not conscious of until somebody made it evident to him. Plato thus solved the problem not only for mathematics, but also for ethics. On this basis Hartmann is able to posit a science of ethics without sacrificing the absoluteness of the values. Although values are inborn, ethics has the function of making us conscious of our inborn knowledge. Hence, getting to know values is a process of recovering inborn knowledge. Plato called it 'amnesis', and Hartmann terms it a priorism. If, therefore, it is asked: How can we know values? Hartmann claims that he has found the answer. We know them through the a prioristic method or process, which means 'the process

1. E. Vol. I. p. 59
of recovering inborn knowledge,' 

It is thus by means of the Platonic doctrine of innate ideas that Hartmann defends his values against the accusation that they are arbitrary fabrications of the mind. Ethics, he says, "can force nothing upon the moral consciousness... It can only bring out of consciousness what is contained in it." Ethical teaching is nothing but "the leading of another to make his own descent into the depth," otherwise, Hartmann says, there is no genuine insight.

Before, however, ethics can assume its function as guide to the values, it must have a previous knowledge of them. Often it only discovers them by seeing them actualised. This seems to contradict the earlier statement that values cannot be known empirically. But the contradiction is only apparent. To speak of an 'actualised' value is to speak in a loose fashion. Even in their actualised state values remain withdrawn in their native sphere - the ideal realm. They never become embedded in reality. There is always a chasm too wide to allow a passage from the real into the ideal. So even in this case the a priori method must be used. It is only occasioned by the a posteriori. Hence all knowledge of values is strictly a prior

Hartmann has thus solved the problem created by his values for knowledge, for although no pathway leads from the empirical world to his world of values, they can still be known through their reflection existing in the mind. But, we may still ask, cannot this be taken as a sign of their subjectivity? The whole of the validity of ethics and moral behaviour rests on the validity of the a priori perception, but this is a very insecure basis. How do we know, even if our judgements about values are uniform and universal, that they are not only a fantasy, a trick that our own make-up plays on

On us? How do we know that our innate ideas are really founded objectively? Can we validly argue from the innate ideas to the objective existence of values?

The solution of this problem is not made easier if we reflect that there is not even universal conformity in human opinion about what is valuable. And yet, unanimity at least, is the first condition for a scientific ethics. But how can unanimity be attained in such a conflict of opinion?

In order to solve this problem, Hartmann draws a distinction between current morality and pure ethics. They are distinct because they have different objects. While ethics seeks for the good in general, current morality seeks for a particular good. However, current morality has a tendency to pure ethics. In it is contained a reference to the 'ideal' and it is just for this reason that one morality is in conflict with another. Every genuine morality apprehends something which is good in itself — a value — but this value is neither the only one in the realm of ethics, nor the highest, the values that other moralities discern being equally justified and having like claims. Ethics, therefore, may not remain indifferent to any morality because there is a valuable element in each. However, the burden rests on it to create a unity out of purpose of their conflicting claims, for unity is a necessary condition of life. "Plurality of supreme ends tears (man) to pieces, causes him to lose his unity, to be split up, to be inconsequent and to falter. It paralyses his energy and with it the striving itself. Unity of purpose is a fundamental requirement of the moral life." Can ethics satisfy this requirement? According to Hartmann it can only be satisfied indirectly. Ethics still lacks the supreme insight into the idea of Unity. But nevertheless, says Hartmann, an order in human acts is still

2.Hartmann is here following the platonistic theory. According to Plato there exists separately from things their ideas or essences, and things are what they are according to the idea
possible. By considering the various values of which we know, we discover that there are certain connections between them. They are graded in a scale. This problem will, however, be treated more fully when we come to consider the order of values. Whether values form a unity can only be determined then. However, this inquiry into the problem of unity has not been fruitless. It has given us some positive knowledge of values. From it emerges the fact that values are manifold, a truth already proclaimed by Nietzsche which must be appreciated independently of his relativism.

This is the problem that still has to be solved. How can a manifold of values be saved from a Nietzschean relativism? It has not yet been proved that the a priori discernment of values is genuine. To do this Hartmann explains that there are two ways of discovering values. There is a primary and a secondary discovery. The secondary discovery takes place as follows. There are, says Hartmann, numerous values alive in the moral consciousness without having consciously been sought for, or without their structure being clearly grasped. It is the task of ethics to bring these values into a fully conscious state, and this is the secondary discovery. But the question still remains, how did these values first come to be in the consciousness in any state at all? In order to answer this question, Hartmann introduces his theory of the primary consciousness, a faculty in man whose natural and proper object is value. Wherever it is confronted by a real situation this faculty always gropes for the valuable element in it. It is almost completely severed from consciousness, ahead of thought, which only follows its almost imperceptible progression from value to value slowly. As new values are discovered, those already known are seen in new perspectives. But, says Hartmann, in which they participate. Just as he laid down separate ideas, for instance of man and horse, which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he posited separate ideas of being and of one, and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness. It is to this platonic idea of oneness or unity to which Hartmann is here referring.
"this is no revaluation of values, but a revaluation of life. In the revolution of the ethos, the values themselves do not shift. Their nature is super-temporal. But the consciousness of them shifts. From the whole realm it cuts out, for the time being, a little circle of something seen. And this little circle 'wanders about' on the ideal plane of values. Every valuation-structural which enters the section of the seen and vanishes from it means for the evaluating consciousness a revaluation of life...In this way it happens that actions, dispositions, relationships, which yesterday passed as good, can today appear bad. Neither the real nor the values have changed; the only change has been in the assortment of values which are accepted as the standard of the real."

However, continues Hartmann, although there is this faculty, it has only limited powers. It does not behold the values in one intuition. Its vision is very narrow and can only discern at most a few values at a time. This narrowness cannot exactly be fixed. Sometimes it expands, sometimes it shrinks. But in general, wherever there is a discovery of values on the one side, on the other side there is a loss of value.

Hartmann now proceeds to explain the relation between the primary and secondary consciousness by a consideration of the relations between the champion of ideas and the crowd. The role of the crowd is similar to that of the primary consciousness. Periodically in history, he says, the crowd discovers new values. But these newly discovered values lie 'deeper than consciousness'. The role of the champion of ideas is like that of the secondary consciousness. He acts upon the crowd as the secondary consciousness acts upon the primary. He lifts up the idea which already "lives darkly in the valuational sentiment of the crowd" to the plane of self-conscious

thought. This relation proves, argues Hartmann, that values are genuinely objective. It would be easy for the champion of ideas to invent values. That this is not the case can be seen from the response he evokes from the crowd. Why do they listen to him and follow him? Hartmann answers, because the champion satisfies their innermost desire. "At the point to which all, because of the same need and yearning, must direct their gaze there lies only one value; as they contemplate the given situation they are not free to imagine at will different norms of good and evil. There exists only one norm which corresponds to the question which confronts them; there is only one which gives an answer capable of being comprehended. This is the sought-for court of decision. No other can take its place. But this means that values have actually an existence in themselves, independent of all imagination and longing. It means that the consciousness of them does not determine values, but that values determine the consciousness of them." The relation between the champion of ideas and the crowd Hartmann thus considers as one of the proofs of the objectivity of values.

That the a priori knowledge of values is genuine objective knowledge, Hartmann holds can be proved conclusively by a closer investigation into the nature of the secondary discovery, which, as we have seen, rests on the primary consciousness and operates on it so as to extract that element of value which it contains. How does this operation take place? To ask this, says Hartmann, is to ask how principles are discovered, for values are ethical principles. In the theoretical field this question can be answered easily, for theoretical principles are discovered by inferring them from experienced phenomena. To explain the phenomena we have to admit the existence of these principles. Ethics also has at its disposal certain phenomena, and just as theoretical principles are

present in the relevant phenomena, so ethical principles are present in ethical phenomena such as willing, resolving, acting, etc., but we are not conscious of these principles. In willing, for example, we are only conscious of a particular end of striving, but the principle which determines us to will, we do not know. However, ethical principles cannot be inferred from phenomena like theoretical principles, for ethical principles are not always present in the relevant instances. Acts may, or may not be directed to values. Here is an additional difficulty. Unlike the theoretical disciplines, ethics stands in need of some guide to indicate to it the relevant instances within the species of human acts. Before we can discover values we must already have some prior knowledge of the instances which are of value. To experience acts as valuable already implies some previous standard of judgement.

Hartmann points out that this difficulty flows from the fact that values are not categories. Ethical principles allow the human agent freely to choose to fulfill or not to fulfill a value and it is just because of this freedom that man is raised to the dignity of a moral entity. If that were not so a human being would have no higher status than a physical object. But, "the fact that along with all the uniformities of nature to which (man) is inevitably subjected there exist commandments which he can transgress- is a prerequisite of his humanity."

This element of freedom brings along with it a lack of uniformity in human acts. How, then, can we discover those instances in which values are operative? Hartmann answers that we can discover the relevant instances because of the presence in us of the primary consciousness of values. In ethics, he says, phenomena are not the only facts. Besides these there is also another 'fact' at hand. The consideration of any

act reveals an obscure accompanying feeling for the worth or worthlessness of an act. This feeling is the ethical act par excellence. Its function consists in indicating to the philosophical investigator the ethically relevant instances, from which he then endeavours to extract 'the valutional structure in its ideal individuality.' In some instances this guide may be fallible. Nevertheless it is a genuine consciousness of value, somehow in the closest connection with values, as can be seen from its power of resistance. It witnesses directly to the objectivity of values. Hartmann writes: "The value itself therefore can be discerned by its presence in consciousness. This reality does not need to be further sought for. It reveals the principle immediately," because the moral consciousness "is necessarily in harmony with ethical principle, being nothing but its expression in consciousness. It is the way in which the principle modifies consciousness and, in modifying it, is present." If, concludes Hartmann, the objection is raised against this solution that the moral consciousness is not a universal fact, it must be replied that everybody has not insight into all the values just as not everybody has insight into every mathematical proposition. But the valutional consciousness permits of being trained. Yet it will never accept teaching which goes contrary to its feeling, so that even in teaching the criterion is the primary consciousness itself.

The data of ethics having been presented to the ethicist in this way, we must nevertheless remember that knowledge of values is never derived from facts alone. Discovery always means aprioristic insight, even in the secondary discovery. After the data have been singled out, the value cannot yet be seen from the bare facts. That which lies behind the phenomena can only be discovered by the a priori method. It is only by reflecting upon the content of our thought, and considering the innate ideas, that we can find the sufficient reason

1. E. Vol. 1, p. 100
3. E. Vol. 1, p. 102
for the ethical phenomena. But that must not be taken to mean
that values are subjective, for they are truly objective, but
into
ideal entities, which are not 'banished from the realm of ethi-
cal existence,' but subsistent in the much more perfect ideal realm.
It is for this reason that an indication of the existence of
the existence of values cannot be found in phenomena. The em-
pirical and the ideal are totally separated. Values cannot be
directly discovered empirically. We can only behold their re-
fection upon our minds and from that infer their objective ex-
istence.

This is the fashion in which Hartmann solves the
problem of our knowledge of values. Before we proceed to the
next condition of the human act, it will be interesting to note
briefly where exactly this solution differs from that of tradi-
tional philosophy. This difference can perhaps be seen best
if we consider the answers given by both to each of the follo-
wing questions: What do we know? and How do we know that which
we know?

To answer what according to Hartmann we know, we
must recollect that he splits the cognitive faculty into two,
the primary consciousness and the secondary consciousness. The
primary consciousness is not strictly speaking an intellectual,
but an emotional or intuitive faculty whose proper object (i.e.
that object which makes it to be what it is) is the ideal values
similar to the Platonic essences. The secondary consciousness,
which may be called a rational faculty i.e. which does not pro-
ceed to knowledge intuitively but by means of discursive argu-
ment, considers, as we have seen, the primary consciousness. Its
proper object is the primary consciousness which it contemplates
in order to discover the values. Therefore, for Hartmann, we
know the values, immediately in the primary consciousness, and
mediately in the secondary consciousness.

To the second question Hartmann answers that we know
values through the inborn ideas which we possess independently of sensation.

The answer of traditional philosophy to the first question is as follows: Intellect in general knows being in general. The human intellect, which is a particular kind of intellect, knows that class of beings which can be sensed accidentally i.e. being in which the accidents, such as colour, taste, impenetrability, etc., which are the proper objects of the senses, inhere. Or, formulated in other words, the proper object of the human intellect is the essence of sensible being, not as informing matter, but as abstracted from all the individuating 'notes' which surround it in a particular object.

To the second question traditional philosophy answers that that through which we know is our ideas, and we arrive at these ideas, which are universals, by abstracting them from the particulars where they are embodied. According to traditional philosophy, in this process sensation plays an integrating role. Hence the famous Aristotelian dictum that nothing can be in the intellect which was not first in the senses. Therefore Hartmann differs from traditional thought both with respect to the object of knowledge, and also with respect to the part played by sensation in the process of cognition. To a more detailed examination of these differences we shall return later. We must now proceed to a consideration of the other conditions of the human act.

The Will and Its Freedom:

As we have already seen, the second condition of the human act is voluntariness. To be human an act must be under the control of the will. In this respect, too, Hartmann conforms to traditional thought. Having solved the problem of knowledge with respect to values, he next proceeds to consider the will and its relation to the values.

The will stands to the values as an actualising
power. Without its help the values cannot transcend the ideal realm in which they subsist, to become effective on the actual plane. In this respect values differ from other 'ideal existents' such as the principles of mathematics and logic. These have the power to transcend the ideal realm independently and mould the world immediately without the interference of a mediating agent. Reality cannot resist these principles. It is already 'informed' by them so far as it can be informed mathematically and logically. With values, however, it is different. Reality can resist them and against this resistance values have no power for they are not categories. This resistance of the real against ethical principles does not affect their ideal self-existence. It only opposes their incursion into reality. But even in the case of opposition the connection between values and the real is not broken. A relation of tension is set up by the values. "Ethical ideal self-existence is not indifferent to the ethical reality which contradicts it; it fixes the contradiction as a relation of opposition and strain, and denies the real which contradicts it; however well this may be grounded ontologically; it stamps it as contrary to value and sets against it the idea of its own proper structure. The moral consciousness feels this opposition as an 'ought-to-be'"

It is in their ontological weakness, their inability to realise themselves, that the activity of the human being gains its value, according to Hartmann. Thus he writes: "It is only possible for man to have a task in the world, however restricted it may be, provided there are values which without his co-operation remain unactualised. But upon such a task depends the unique position and dignity of man in this world, his difference from other entities which do not participate in the creative process." Man's function is 'to be a colleague of the
demiurge in the creation of the world, and by creation he means the transference of values to reality through human acts. It is for this reason, says Hartmann, that all attempts to transform values into categories must be counteracted. Of such attempts he says, neither the philosophy of Plato or Aristotle, the Scholastics or Stoics, Kant, Fichte or Hegel are entirely free.

If values were really categories, then there would be no place for human acts in the world, and such a conclusion is for him unacceptable.

Before going on to determine the function of the will in the realisation of values, we must consider for a moment the nature of the 'ought' more closely. The ought has been defined as the tendency of values to realise themselves. According to Hartmann, there are different kinds of ought. There is first of all the ideal ought-to-be which belongs to the essence of all values. This ought is not directed to any possibility or actuality. Thus, for example, universal peace among nations ought-to-be, but, says Hartmann, it is senseless to consider it as a command directed to any individual person. The positive ought-to-be is to be distinguished from the ideal ought-to-be. It occurs only when the real is not in harmony with the values, but does not belong to the essence of value. The positive ought-to-be is also distinct from the ought-to-do. Hence there are three kinds of ought, ideal ought-to-be, positive ought-to-be and ought-to-do.

The manner in which the ought functions, Hartmann describes as follows. Whenever there is, what he calls 'an opposition of the spheres', i.e. when the actual contradicts the ideal, the positive ought-to-be issues from the ideal into the real. This tendency, however, cannot reach its conclusion without the help of another entity. "The positive ought-to-be could determine nothing at all unless there were an entity with

a capacity for directing events, the direction of which could be guided towards its own aims (the valuational matter) and to which it could communicate its own purely ideal tendency. The ought has no existential energy emanating from itself; it needs something else which offers to it its own existential energy to be directed by the ought. The ought needs this alien energy of an exiting entity, because the entity thrusts its ontological determination against the resistance of the real.¹

The conditions which such an entity must satisfy are as follows. It must be a member of the real world, subject to the laws of reality, and yet it must not be completely determined by these laws, it must have the power of free activity and of intention enabling it to originate and direct action to the values. In other words, such an agent must be capable of a certain amount of independent activity which it can apply to the task of realizing or actualizing values. It must have, besides the capacity for knowing, certain active powers, for example will, free choice, purposive energy, through which it can determine that to be in act which was not previously in act. The question is: Do human beings possess these powers?

Pending an investigation into the problem of the freedom of the will, Hartmann answers provisionally: yes. Man, he says, satisfies in every particular the specified conditions. Not only is he a real entity, but by virtue of his consciousness of value, he is in metaphysical connection with the world of values. He is the only real entity that can be 'seized' by the values because he is not like the rest of existence 'dull and dead to the call of the ideal'. He 'hears' the claims of the values because he possesses 'intuitive rationality'.²

The consciousness of values is, however, not merely a knowing, but an active striving, a willing and a doing. In addition to knowledge man possesses spontaneous self-activity, capacity to direct events.³

Apart, however, from stating that man has a will which is an active power, Hartmann does not analyse it as such, for his ethics is not chiefly an ethics of human acts, but an ethics of values. However, he goes in great detail into the problem of the freedom of the will, and that throws some light on the question what the will in itself is. Further, when comparing the will with values, he defines the former as the power of self-determination. The will exercises determination on the values. It determines their existence. The values also determine the agent, but only on condition that he allows himself to be determined. They further determine him in this sense that he cannot pursue an end which is not somehow of value.

Although an agent is free from values, the values have the power to determine him as a 'valuable agent' or personality, or not. By allowing the values to determine him, they set their mark on the agent; they give him a higher quality, namely personality. There are two factors that enter into the conception of personality according to Hartmann. (1) Freedom—only a being which is not necessarily determined by values can have personality. (2) Personality is a qualitative mark which the subject retains from the incursion of values, first into his consciousness, and secondly into his acts. Personality, therefore, is determined by values, in particular by moral values.

We must now turn to the problem of the freedom of the will. Having seen where the human act, according to Hartmann fits into the valuartional scheme, there is still a further condition which has to be satisfied before the human act can become possible, and that condition is freedom of the will. As Hartmann writes, "moral values are essentially bound up with the

1 On this point he writes as follows: "Without doing violence to the phenomena, one could develop the whole ethical problem from the side of the question of morality—just as it is developed here from the side of the question of values and the ought-to-be, and as it has been developed in other interpretations from the point of view of acts." K. Vol.1. p.311.
freedom of the will. By this statement is meant that they only appear only in acts in which such a decisive power somehow participates. For the human act to be human i.e. to realise values, especially the 'higher' moral values, freedom is necessary. If there is no human freedom, there can be no realisation of moral values, and man ceases to be a moral entity.

Freedom constitutes for Hartmann the crucial problem of ethics. To it a third of his Ethics is accordingly devoted. We cannot here go into any detailed account of his argument. We can only inquire whether he considers freedom to be possible, and indicate in outline what his proofs for it are.

The first part of Hartmann's argument consists in making clear what he means by the freedom of the will. If there is to be freedom of the will at all, he says, it cannot be negative freedom i.e. 'mere freedom from something'. Freedom is only possible if determinism and freedom is in some way reconcilable i.e. if we are free to determine ourselves. Kant, according to Hartmann, was the first thinker to solve this problem. What he did was to show how, what he called the 'causality of freedom' can be inserted into the 'causality of nature.' This can be done Kant point out, because the causal nexus is not a closed system. Although it cannot be suspended, yet it allows another kind of determinism to be superimposed on it. This is what is meant by 'freedom in the positive sense.' It consists in a 'plus' of determination. According to this solution we are both free and unfree - unfree in so far as the causal series cannot be interrupted or broken - free in so far as natural causality does not.

2. Hartmann says that we cannot from the nature of the ought-to-be alone read off the fact of freedom. He writes: "This peculiar dignity (i.e. personality) has always been described as freedom of the will. This is not the same as the freedom which the pure Ought-to-be of values allows him; the latter is in itself a special value for the personal being, but not one which would subsist in him (as carrier). To this negative free play of values, there must correspond another, a positive power of determination in the person himself; without it there would be an indeterminism and at the same time an ineffectuality of values, and there would never be any determination by the will at all." (E. Vol.11. p.143.) S.E.Vol.lill.p.48.
3. It is interesting to note that Kant was not, as a matter of S.E.Vol.lill.p.54. S.E.Vol.lill.p.53 ff.
exhaust man's capacities to be determined. A consideration of natural causality, therefore, shows that it does not render freedom impossible, if by freedom is meant determination of another kind, for instance, that kind of determination which issues from ends. The causal series is indeterminate as regards ends and allows itself to be directed or determined to some or other end. Causality itself does not determine man to ends, he is in this respect free to determine himself.

The solution of this problem shows that freedom is possible only in a world where there are at least two kinds of determination, causal and finalistic determination. Hartmann points out that all theories which deny the freedom of the will, forget this condition. They either transform the category of natural causality into a universal category, not only applicable to nature, but also to the spiritual and mental worlds, or they universalise the category of finality and apply it invalidly to nature. Both theories render the freedom of the will impossible. In the one case the will cannot break through the causal nexus, in the other case the will is not free to posit ends other than those which have been predetermined. Hence, "both causal and finalistic determination, when taken in the absolute sense, that is, when monistically applied to the whole cosmic structure, commit exactly the same blunder, although in the opposite direction. Both reduce the world to uniformity; they give it a type of relational simplicity, which excludes freedom. A universalised causal determinism converts man into a mere natural entity, it degrades him; a universalised finalistic determinism transforms Nature into a being that is directed to ends, into such a being as man is; it raises nature up to his level. Both theories reduce everything to a common denominator. They thereby nullify the uniqueness of Moral Being in the world. And again they thereby extinguish man's freedom.

historical fact, the first thinker to solve this problem. Before him the Scholastics had already defined freedom as self-determination.
but with it at the same time morality itself. The positive sign-
nificance of a free being in a determined world can be due to:
nothing else than his superior position, to that heterogeneous
Plus of determination which he has over and above other actual
entities. "By this monistic error, Hartmann further concludes
that they violate the three categorial laws, which we shall
consider later. Causal monism violates the law of freedom ac-
dording to which the 'higher' kind of determinism is more free
although ontologically the weaker and the more dependent. Final-
listed monism again violates the law of strength which states
that the higher determinism is the weaker, the lower the stron-
ger.

These errors only prove the more conclusively, that
freedom is never possible where a single type of determinism
reigns throughout the world in all its strata. 'Freedom is
only possible where, in one world, at least two types of deter-
minism are superimposed one upon the other. Because Kant gras-
ped this, says Hartmann, he was able to solve the causal anti-
nomy. But, he adds, solving the causal antimony is not solving
the problem of the freedom of the will. In it there is still a
further antimony involved which he calls 'the antimony of the
ought', and in so far as Kant did not consider it, he did not
solve the problem of the freedom of the will. His antimony,
Hartmann writes, is even more difficult to solve than the ought
antimony. With it (the ought-antinomy) a new stage in the prob-
lem of freedom begins. The causal antinomy with its whole com-
plex of problems is only preliminary. It is concerned with the
freedom of the will only as against the general uniformity of
existence. Now it is seen that this uniformity, however much
it may be the presupposition of moral freedom, is not enough.
It is only half of the problem. Still a second freedom of the
same will must be added, freedom over against the moral princi-

1. E. Vol. III. p. 75.
ple itself." For Hartmann, therefore, as opposed to Kant freedom implies two things (1) Being free from natural causality and (2) being free from the moral law or the ought which, for Hartmann, issues from the values.

The difficulty lies in solving the ought-antinomy simultaneously with the causal antinomy. This difficulty Hartmann states in six different ways in his six aporia, but they all turn round the main difficulty, which is as follows. To solve the causal antinomy it is necessary that the will should be determined by a higher kind of determination i.e. by finalistic or teleological determination. But, in so far as the ought antinomy demands that the will should be teleologically undetermined, its solution appears to negate that of the first antinomy and to make the will unfree with respect to causality.

From a consideration of this difficulty in its various phases, Hartmann says it gradually becomes clear that in the problem of freedom three types of determinism are involved. To the first two, causal and finalistic, a third must be added, "a unique determination of the person in relation to that of the principle." In what this determination consists he does not describe here.

Hartmann now gives his arguments for the freedom of the will. He gives three such arguments. The first starts from the ethical phenomena and is in the nature of a prolegomenon leading to the second and the third which start from the antinomies and the categories respectively.

Before we can give the various arguments for the freedom of the will, we must first consider what, according to Hartmann can be attained by them. The presupposition from which he starts is that the freedom of the will cannot be 'proved', if by proof we mean a rigid set of deductions from indisputable axioms because "in regard to all metaphysical truths the proposition

holds good that in the strict sense they can neither be proved nor disproved." All that can be done is to show that freedom in itself involves no impossibility, but that we actually are free, we cannot prove. "Whether to do this is beyond human power and whether inherently irrational remainders will forever block the way, or whether it be only that at the present stage of the investigation certain obstacles cannot be surmounted, we must at least, as matters stand, abandon the proud pretence that we have found a proof."

We must, therefore, consider the ethical phenomena not as giving in any way conclusive proof for the freedom of the will. Taken in themselves they are neutral. But considered in a larger perspective, that of actual moral freedom, they come to life and display their relations to a principle which can only be freedom. There is, for example, the ethical phenomenon of the feeling of self-determination. In our experience we feel that we ourselves are the causes of our action. Yet, says Hartmann, a consciousness of self-determination does not necessarily imply a freedom of consciousness, just as a consciousness of God does not necessarily involves the existence of God. The phenomena of responsibility, accountability and guilt offer greater evidence, for they do not merely exist in the consciousness, but have an actual influence on conduct. Hence a man considers himself responsible for his acts, even though such a responsibility may incur discomfort, spiritual agony or even bodily death. He also suffers from the pangs of a guilty conscience. These phenomena are important evidence for the freedom of the will, and every adverse theory must give an explanation of their existence. The only satisfactory explanation is to posit the existence of freedom. Nevertheless, concludes Hartmann, "...it must be said that

2. E. Vol. III, p. 137-138. In making this assertion Hartmann is influenced by Kant. Kant denied to metaphysics the character of a science, because for him experience was both the product and the end of science, which creates it by applying to sensible data those necessities which are purely mental forms; but St. Thomas recognised in metaphysics the supreme science of the natural
The argument never attains more than the general character of merely hypothetical certainty. We can in no way grasp freedom itself; one cannot be convinced directly of its reality, as one can of the reality of something which can be experienced."

The second 'proof' starts from the antinomies. It has already been shown how, for Hartmann, the freedom of the will involves two antinomies, the causal and the ought antinomy. We have also seen that there are three kinds of determination involved in it, causal, finalistic and 'personal'. The first antinomy was solved by Kant. But only on condition that the ought-antinomy can also be solved, is the freedom of the will possible. If the will is to be free from ethical principles, not in the negative but in the positive sense, it means that there must be third, 'higher' principle that determines it. In a further analysis of the ought-antinomy Hartmann shows that there is, in fact, a higher principle to determine it. He points out that in the ought-antinomy there is contained not only a conflict between the values and the empirical will, but also a conflict between value and value. This illustrates that the will can diverge from the ought, not from impure motives, but because it is directed to other values, the higher, the personal values. But being determined by these personal values does not yet mean personal freedom. Such a determination would only free the will from the more universal values. "We totally misunderstand the nature of freedom," says Hartmann, "if we think that the ought valid for one person alone would constitute freedom. The opposite is the case; nothing that has the character of an Ought, therefore, can give the distinctive mark of freedom." We must therefore conclude that the

order, because for him experience is the point of departure for science, which, reading in sensible data those intelligible necessities which surpass them, can transcend it in following out those necessities and so come to a supra-experimental knowledge which is absolutely certain," Harritain-The Degrees of Knowledge p.84.

the actual person also has an autonomy which it exercises in the face of all values, both individual and universal.

Does this help us to solve the ought-antinomy? Hartmann answers in the positive. The solution lies in the fact that freedom as regards the causal nexus is not contained only in the finalistic nexus, but in any extra-causal determinant. The will, in so far as it is an extra-causal determinant, is thus positively free as regards the causal nexus, even though negatively free as regards the finalistic nexus. But this does not matter, says Hartmann, for the antinomy between the causal antinomy and the will has been solved. In fact, the will can only be negatively free because it is already positively free.

With this the antinomy of the person and the principle is virtually solved. The reciprocal conditionality of negative and positive freedom indicated that only by means of the antinomy of the will, is determination by the principle possible. The principle and the individual will do not conflict because the principle does not determine the will as the causal nexus does. The will is never simultaneously determined by the causal nexus, the finalistic nexus and its own autonomy. Freedom is only possible because the will stands negatively over and against the principle, without being determined by it. At the same time the will is sustained by its positive freedom as regards the causal nexus. Once committed to determination by the principle, the will is unfree as regards the principle, though the latter is free as regards the causal nexus. Yet this unfreedom of the will, when once it has committed itself, is not contradictory. The freedom of the will does not disappear once it is committed to finalistic determinism, but persists as a substratum.

Hence we see that Hartmann locates freedom in the autonomy of the will. But, he says, this does not amount to a 'proof' for what the autonomy of the will means, we do not yet 1. E. Vol. III. Ch. XVII. pp. 205-212.
know. We have determined what freedom is not. Yet, says Hartmann, its inner nature still remains a mystery and consequently we are still just as far from proof as we were at the beginning.

The third 'proof' for the freedom of the will, the 'proof' from the categories, Hartmann endeavours to determine nearer in what this autonomy or self-determination of the will consists. In its essence, he says, this conception is beyond the grasp of human intelligence. One can only determine it negatively. In general the categorial form of this self-determination is teleology, but, says Hartmann, we are in search, not for the form of this self-determination, but the principle from which it issues.

Since this question cannot be answered, we must consider instead how it is possible that man, in spite of the various determinations to which he is subject, can still retain a capacity for a further determination. Or, in other words, is it possible that consciousness which is through and through determined, can yet be free? (For Hartmann, can only reside in the consciousness, not external to it or in the subconscious as for Fichte, Leibniz or Schopenhauer.)

By means of the categorial laws of stratification Hartmann proves the ontological possibility of the freedom of consciousness. According to the law of strength the lower strata are always the stronger, the higher the more dependent. The lower serves as material for the higher, but is totally transformed in the higher. According to the law of freedom, the higher is a new structure, although the lower is its material, and is thus free as regards the lower.

In the light of these laws the phenomenon of consciousness acquires a new character. Its constituents no longer tend to explain consciousness away, but serves as conditions for the independent status of consciousness. That of which consciousness is
ness is composed is but its material, and while it is dependent on this material, it is a new formation, a higher stratum, and therefore free. Each stratum, from one point of view, is explicable in terms of its constituents, and from another point of view is explicable only in terms of itself. "The complex unitary resultant is always both contained and not contained in the simple but diversified components; contained in so far as everything in it down to the last detail is conditioned by its components and would itself be changed by the least change in them; not contained in so far as the unique quality in the complex resultant as such manifests a categorical structure, which in its arrangement is higher than all the components and can in no wise be resolved into them."

Having located freedom in consciousness, and having established the independent existence of consciousness, Hartmann has thus 'proved' the freedom of the will. But, he adds, this must not be taken as a rigid demonstration. Rather does the proof from the categories only serve to remove some of the obstructions in the way of a complete proof of the freedom of the will. It proves only the ontological possibility of freedom, not its ontological necessity.

In spite of the various reservations that Hartmann makes about the efficacy of his proofs for the freedom of the will, we must nevertheless conclude that he considers them sufficient to satisfy the third condition of the human act.

The Structure of The Human Act:

Thus far we have considered Hartmann's account of the various conditions for the human act, namely knowledge, voluntariness and freedom. We must now proceed to his description of the structure of the human act.

It has been previously said that values, although only conditionally, determine the person and his acts. This

determinism is not like that of the categories purely causal, it is of a higher kind, called finalistic or teleological determinism. It is thus called because the determination of the whole process issues from the end, it is determination by ends. In it there is a twofold relation. Not only do ends determine human acts, in their turn again, ends are determined by values. It is with this second, wider determination that we must begin the account of the structure of human acts. We must accordingly ask the following question: What relation is there between the values and the end of action? or, since the goodness of human values, the question may also be formulated as follows: How can we realise moral values through the end of action?

According to Hartmann moral values cannot be realised directly, but only indirectly i.e. by realising the non-moral values of which they are dependent. The mistake, says Hartmann, that Kant made was to believe that the moral law is the immediate end of action. For him it was not sufficient that an act be done in accordance with the moral law. To be virtuous an act must be done "for the sake of the moral law" i.e. the fulfillment of the moral law must be the only purpose of the act. Hartmann questions this Kantian doctrine. Is it true that the morally good man has only his own moral improvement in view asks Hartmann. He answers in the negative. The end of a man's action is not his own moral being, but the being and circumstances of another. Thus a man is straightforward not in order to be straightforward himself, but that another may learn the truth. According to Hartmann, therefore, the end of action is not the same as moral value. The value which inheres in the end is a situational or goods value, while a moral value inheres only in the action of a person. The question now arises: Since that which makes an end good (situational or goods value), can we speak of any relation at all between the end and the moral value? In other words, can moral values influence human acts 1.E.Vol.11.Chs.1 & 2. pp.23-43.
at all? Hartmann answers this question by saying that although the situational value (usually a non-moral value) is independent of the moral value, yet it is subject to a selection by the latter through the moral consciousness.

From the distinction that Hartmann draws between the end and the moral value, other questions arise. For instance, since the end alone is the concern of effort, volition and outward conduct, how can moral values be actualised? Further, can a striving ever be directed to them, and finally, must it be inferred that only situational values have an ought? The question about the ought Hartmann answers by saying that all values have an ideal ought-to-be. The ought applies to actions in the following sense. Since the morally good is only a quality in human acts in which the reality of other values are involved, this means for human acts that their valuational intention ought to be so constituted, or the constants so selected, that the moral qualities can inhere in the acts. As regard the ought-to-do, however, Hartmann says that since the moral worth of a deed cannot be the same as the value aimed at in the end, an ought-to-do is never attached to the moral values as such, but only to the non-moral situational or goods values.

The second question concerns the possibility of striving for moral values. Hartmann answers that since the ought-to-do does not attach itself to moral values, they cannot be striven for. However, he says, a distinction must be made. It does not mean that we cannot strive to be morally good, it only means that the value of the end, even if that end is a moral value, cannot be the same as the value of the act, because moral values, according to Hartmann, are not the contents striven for, but that qualities of the striving itself.

The position as regards the actualisation of values is, however, much more favourable. Although moral values cannot be striven for, they can nevertheless be actualised. They can be actualised because "actualisation does not
Need to be willed, purposed or pursued as an end. Goods and valuable situations come into existence without the assistance of someone willing them; they come either in a 'natural' way or as the result of human action but without their being the conscious goal of action." In fact, says Hartmann, moral values can be actualised to a much greater degree than they can be striven for. If that were not so, then man would hardly have any moral worth. But that is contrary to experience. In any just dealing, for example, he actualises a moral value, but he does not direct his intention to this value. Man's moral worth, for him, consists exactly in this, "that without aiming at it and by entire preoccupation with what is outside himself, he none the less actualises (moral values). In general the proposition holds good that the more the intention of acts is directed outwards, the richer become the moral values in the Being of the agent." We must, therefore, says Hartmann, admit two levels of striving. "The one is striven for, the other is not intended, but simply takes place—and it takes place whether the intended actualisation is attained or not. For the moral worth of an act does not depend on the success of the act, but on the direction of its intention. The unintended actualisation of a moral value, therefore, does not first appear after the situation is actualised but arises in the mere intention, in the striving itself. One may therefore very well say that a person actualises his own moral value 'in' his striving, even 'through' his striving. But rightly understood, he does not actualise it either through the actualisation of the thing striven for, or through the striving for his own moral value, but only through striving for other values (generally not moral), upon which the moral values are based."

1. E. Vol. 11. p. 39
2. E. Vol. 11. p. 40
3. E. Vol. 11. p. 41
But this actualisation is not unlimited, according to Hartmann. Certain values cannot be actualised. Others can be actualised, but cannot be striven for, for instance, the values of personality, for although they can be felt, the detail of their structure cannot be grasped. Other values, again, when once they have been neglected and lost, they can never be regained because their structure forbids it. To this group belongs innocence and purity.

To the question: how can moral values be realised we have now answered, through the end, because values are of such a kind that they cannot be realised directly through intention and volition, they appear only 'on the back of the deed.'

The relation between values and the end has also been defined. First of all, 'behind' the end there lies a situational or goods value. There is, however, a difference between these relations i.e. the relation between the end and the situational value, and the moral value and the end. To start with the latter, a moral value is materially dependent on a situational value and the end, but axiologically independent. Between the moral and the situational values, there is only a one-way relation i.e moral values are dependent on the situational values. The situational values, however, are both materially and axiologically independent of the situational or goods values.

We must now determine the second relation, that between the end and the subject and his acts. This relation presupposes the wider relation or determination of the subject by the value. Looked at from the point of view of the subject, the determination issues from the value and is directed through the subject to the end. If the process is divided by the point where the person appears, the first half, the determination of the person by the value, is called the primary determination, while the second half, which is a prolongation of the primary
determination, and which consists in the determination of the end by the person, is called the secondary determination. This subsidiary determination is the one that is finalistic, and it is this which is, properly speaking the form or the structure of the human act.

We must now describe this structure more closely. The finalistic structure forms a whole nexus. In this nexus there is a threefold process. The first link consists in setting up the end, but this link is only an anticipation, a disregard of the present. A second link is then added. It consists of a process along with the causal and time stream of the realised. The realisation of the end takes place through the causal process. In this sense, says Hartmann, the finalistic nexus takes up into its structure the lower determination i.e. the causal. These two links, however, do not exhaust the finalistic nexus. Its distinctive feature is another process which does not flow in the direction of time, but flows counter to it. The finalistic nexus consists not only in a forward movement from means to end, but also in a backward determination from end to means. The threefold process Hartmann sums up as follows: (1) The setting up of the end in consciousness by an overleaping of the time-stream. (2) A backward working against the time stream from the last means i.e. the means nearest the end to the first means which is nearest to the person. (3) The actualisation of the end through the series of means starting from the first, and the power by means of which this realisation takes place lies in the causal nexus. The first means is the cause of the second, the second the cause of the third, and so on, until the end which is the effect of the last means. This last link is of great importance, says Hartmann, because it is the only real process, it alone can realise and end which exists only in anticipation.

The first and the third links move in the same direction along with the time stream. But only the third moves in and with it.

The first overleaps it and anticipates the future. The second, moving against the time stream, has not real existence, but exists only in consciousness. The first and second links of the finalistic nexus, therefore, is only an affair of consciousness and they describe by themselves the full circle from subject to end, and back to subject. The third link is the same as the second, covering the same ground but in the reverse order, and also differing in so far as it is real.

The end of the first and third links correspond, says Hartmann. The only difference is between and end which is still unreal, and that same end as actualised. But apart from this modal difference, the two ends never exactly correspond, but because they are different ends, but because the subject is often too weak to commit himself wholly to his intentions.

By describing the finalistic nexus, we have simultaneously described the categorial structure of the human act. In it we have seen how all the conditions of the human act come into play. First there is a discernment of a value—its becoming known—and secondly there is a conversion of the value into an end and the moving of all the powers, both internal and external, by the will to the realisation of that end. These two capacities Hartmann calls foresight and pre-determination or providence or predestination. They are capacities peculiar to human nature, says Hartmann. To both the purely natural and the supernatural they must be denied.

Teleology being for Hartmann a peculiarity of man, he defends it against attempts to extend it to inanimate nature. To do that, he says, would lead to the positing of a divine orderer who has created fixed ends towards which the universe is moving. Hartmann rejects this as leading to axiological or teleological determination. In such a universe the finalistic nexus would determine like the causal, and there would be no place for man, for personality or for
moral action. Values would then be real without the mediation of man. The teleology of man, says Hartmann, must therefore be asserted over and against that of nature or of a divine being.

Furthermore, when we speak of teleological determination, we are not speaking of that of a single end only, but of a whole system of ends. This system of ends are firstly interlaced with the causal nexus. Secondly there is also an interlacing of finalistic trains among themselves. But not all finalistic trains are compatible with one another. Where they are not compatible, they come into conflict and tend to destroy one another. In such a case, Hartmann explains, there stands behind the conflicting trains antagonistic values. Moral conflict need not always be between good and bad, but sometime it is between good and good, or, between value and value. In such a case there is no solution possible and human teleology comes to a standstill.

We must now conclude the first part. We have given an account of Hartmann's treatment of the various conditions for, and the structure of the human act. We have seen that for him an act, taken in relation to itself, is human when it is consequent upon knowledge and controlled by the free will. But further, we have also seen that for him an act taken in relation to that which constitutes its goodness, is human when it realises values. We must next study the human act in this last relation i.e. as an act whose goodness consists in realising values, and which, according to Hartmann, we judge to be good for that reason. Lastly we must consider the satisfactoriness of these values as the principles of the intelligibility of our moral actions and judgements.
PART II.

The Being and The Order of Hartmann's Values.

We must now consider Hartmann's explanation of human acts in terms of his values, and first we shall inquire what mode of being he ascribes to them.

Hartmann discovers the mode of being of his values in his critique of Kant's subjectivism. For Kant there were only two possibilities as regards the mode of being of the moral principle. Either it emanates from reason, or it is given empirically from the external world. But according to Hartmann this disjunction is not complete. The Kantian choice of the former alternative Hartmann interprets as a sign of the subjectivism of the moral principle in his ethics parallel to the subjectivism of the categories in the field of knowledge. What is needed, he says, is an a priori principle which is not a 'function of the subject' and he claims that his values satisfy this condition. They are objects beyond subject and object in a further realm of being which Hartmann identifies with the sphere of ideal objects discovered by Plato. He formally defines this ideal realm as follows: "In their mode of Being, values are Platonic ideas. They belong to that further realm of Being which Plato first discovered, the realm which we can spiritually discern but cannot see or grasp. As to the kind of Being peculiar to ideas we know nothing as yet more definite; it is still to be investigated. But thus much is immediately evident even for values, and indeed pre-eminently for them, the proposition holds good: they are that 'through which' everything which participates in them is exactly as it is-namely valuable. But in present-day conceptual language this means: values are essences."

Two further conclusions also issue from Hartmann's cri-
ticism of the Kantian ethics. The first is that values are not formal principles like the categorical imperative, they are material structures, i.e. they determine the material content of things, relations or persons. Further, the discernment of values is not intellectual, but emotional or intuitive.

But although they exist in this ideal realm, Hartmann claims for his values that they are the sufficient reason for the goodness of real things. If we ask why is this thing good, that thing useful, or a third lovable, we would be involved in an eternal circle of back-reference, says Hartmann, unless we posited as the reason of our judgement a value.

This proves that values are a priori. They are that on which things depend for their goodness, but the values are independent of things. However, it still has to be proved that values are self-existent or absolute. Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories is here not possible, because values are not categories. But even if it should be proved that they are not objective, it would still remain true that values are the a priori condition for the appraisement of things, otherwise we would never be able to give the reason for any judgement about good or bad. Furthermore, values are not only the a priori condition of goods, but of all ethical phenomena, including human acts which are related to values of another sort, to the moral values proper. We cannot will, have a purpose or an end which is not somehow of value although the valuational material need not be clearly grasped. Therefore all actions presuppose values as a conditioning factor. The same applies to disposition, to approval and disapproval, the sensing of values is always presupposed. The same holds good for example and imitation. Why do I choose a specific mode in life to form myself on? Because, answers Hartmann, I have already applied a certain valuational standard to the person and found him satisfactory.

In further proof of the a priority of values Hart-
mann cites the ethical phenomena of accountability, responsibility and consciousness of guilt. Not only do we judge people as good, we also condemn those that are bad. Moral personality, too, is an a priori valutational concept. Imposed upon the empirical man there is his super-empirical essence or value. This "inner standard of the sense of value, which accompanies all his steps in life, indeed all his most secret impulses, constitutes his essence as a moral personality. Moral personality therefore does not exist, if there is no pure a priori of values."

The conclusion that follows from this is that values are a priori, which means that that "which decides whether a thing is good or evil can by no means be derived from the same sphere of actual ethical conduct as the modes of behaviour upon which judgement is passed. If this factor is not self-dependent, the same circle immediately re-appears in the case of goods, a regression which, because it remains in the same sphere, necessarily arrives finally at its own starting point. But in this way a moral judgement would be illusory." The next step in Hartmann's argument is to prove that values are not only a priori, but also absolute i.e. that values are not values by the grace of something else e.g. the subject, but that they are self-existent and autonomous. Hartmann finds the reason why values are not subjective in a phenomenon which is common to experience. In our lives we experience that we cannot dispose of values at will. We cannot change what is good for us. As he writes "(values) are not relative to a consciousness of phenomena, but subsist independently of it, and by the philosophical consciousness itself are deemed to be independent of it."

To make clear what kind of objectivity values have, Hartmann makes a distinction between what he calls 'relationality' and 'relativity'. A thing can be related to another as a value is related to a human being without being 'relative' i.e. without depending completely upon a human being so that he can make and unmake values according to his own desire. No one, says Hartmann, sees relativity in the fact that geometrical laws hold good for spatial figures. In the same way relatedness of values to persons does not argue their relativity. Relation is part of their structure.

The question now arises whether moral values are also independent of the subject. If we examine the nature of moral values, says Hartmann, we find that unlike the goods values, they possess not structural material. Moral values are not relative to persons but carry their moral value in themselves. When they adhere to a person that person is not good for something else, he is simply or absolutely good. However, it is true that even moral values stand in certain relations and connections, but this is secondary and almost accidental. First, a moral value is also indirectly a goods value. A morally good person can have a goods value for another person ('To the beloved he who loves, to the friend a friend, is a good.') But a moral person does not receive his goodness from this relation.

The moral value also stands in a second relation, namely to the person as object. To be the object of a moral value is also a value which has to be distinguished, on the one hand, from goods value, and on the other from moral value. But there is also a third kind of value surrounding the moral value and that is the value of the subject as carrier of values. All carriers, says Hartmann have values. Things have a certain carrier-value. Substrata which carry goods

1.E.Vol.1.p.211.
values, have another, living organisms which carry consciousness, another, and personal subjects which carry moral values have yet another.

There are therefore three relational values accompanying moral values, but with them the relational structure of moral values are exhausted. This structure, in which the person is twice represented, is where the moral values make their appearance. Moral values appear in acts which relate person as subject to person as object. But they themselves are not at all affected by this structure. Values are absolute and subsist independently.

Having thus proved the self-existence of values, Hartmann proceeds to analyze this notion more closely. From the proof of their self-existence it was seen that the valuational essence must be distinguished from the structure in which it inheres. The values of trust, for instance, is not the same as the relation of trust existing between person and person. The latter is an ontological structure providing the matter for the former, which is axiologcal. Value "builds over it (the ontological), camps over it, lends it a glimmer of meaning, a significance of a higher order, an import which for ever remains transcendent to the existential reality; a something which remains on the further side of reality; incomparable, and which always draws it into another sphere of cohesions, into the intelligible order of values."

Possessing this kind of self-existence, values are genuine objects of knowledge for Hartmann. They confront the mind with the same objectivity as real things. If this is so, what more can we learn about their self-existence? Hartmann answers that in general there are two modes of existence, the real and the ideal. In order to elucidate the latter, he points out that to it belongs the structures of pure mathematics and logic. Further, the ideal is not completely severed

1 E. Vol. 1, p. 218.
from the real. Their structures agree to some extent, and it is through this agreement that we can have a priori knowledge of the real. Ethics, too, is related to 'ethical reality' and we come to know its essence through the values. Now, "values", says Hartmann, "has no self-existence that is real. As principles of action they may participate in determining reality, they may even to a great degree be themselves 'actualised' - but for this reason their essence, their mode of being, remains merely an ideal mode. As for the distinctive valuational quality of anything, for example, of a specific material let us say, sincerity or love, it makes no kind of difference whether there be persons in whose real conduct it is embodied or not. Indeed the actualisation of the material is itself a value; but it is another, a derived one which has its root in the value of the given material. These values as such, in comparison with the actual, always have the character of an 'Idea', which indeed, when the actual corresponds to it, lends to this the character of a value, but which with its ideal nature still remains on the other side of actualisation.

Strictly taken, values themselves are not at all 'actualised', but only the materials, to which, whether ideal or real, the value belongs."

The values and the essences of mathematics and logic are, however, not the only 'ideal existents' according to Hartmann. Besides the ontological ideal and the ethical ideal, there is also a vast aesthetic ideal sphere. For Hartmann the apprehension of truth refers to a certain section of the total ideal sphere (truth values), the apprehension of beauty to another section (beauty values), and the apprehension of goodness of yet a third (good or moral values). What makes a thing true, beautiful or good are specifically different sets of values.

One can only understand what ideal self-existence is, says Hartmann, by inquiring into the nature of the objects of logic and mathematics. One may doubt of ideality, but one cannot doubt the reality, or rather the objectivity of the objects of logic and mathematics. The treat "of a system of laws, dependencies and structures which indeed on their side control thinking, but themselves can neither be forms of thought nor be in any way infringed by thinking." Nobody doubts of the objectivity of these ideal constructions, although what 'ideal' means cannot be defined, the same must therefore apply to values. Values also govern our judgements and not vice versa. We cannot arbitrarily select what is valuable for us, values subsist independently of our thought. Although the valuational judgements of people often differ, it is not because they are subjective, but because everybody has not the insight and maturity to grasp the values as they are. In themselves values are necessary and universal and are grasped as such by the primary consciousness. This feeling for values may sometimes be erroneous, but the fact of error in this case, argues Hartmann, indicates the independent existence of values, because where one is conscious of error, one also knows that there is something about which you are in error.

It is thus by proving first that values are the a priori condition for human acts and for our ethical judgements, and secondly, that they are self-existent, that Hartmann justifies his assertion that human acts are good when directed to values.

However, we cannot yet leave the question of ideal self-existence. So far Hartmann has limited himself to the slenderest definitions of it. We have seen that values exist in this ideal sphere, that they cannot strictly speaking be realised, that they enjoy the same mode of existence as the 1.E. Vol.1.p.222.
essences of mathematics and logic, that they are necessary, universal and objective. But, we are still entitled to ask, how exactly is this mode of being peculiar to values constituted? This question, Hartmann replies, cannot be answered, for the ideal sphere is not open to thought. "Ideality is as irrational as reality. The spheres of self-existence are indefinable. They can be approximately described, they can be definitely pointed to, they can be brought fully before us; but what is described or presented is always only the specific content, or the relation of the spheres. What is substantial or relational can be easily grasped, but not what is modal in them. Yet the point at issue is the modality." The values therefore are irrational. The only way in which we can gain any intellectual grip on them, is through the ideal sight-to-be. This method does not reveal the values in their essence, nevertheless we must exploit it as the only path open to us.

The modalities of traditional theory are too narrow for the values, says Hartmann. According to it there are three, possibility, actuality and necessity. But the ought does not fall into any of these, for it is dynamic (necessary) but not actual. Accordingly another category must be sought for values. Traditional categories are only adequate for theory, not for practice. The difference between them lies in this, that in the former actuality does not presuppose necessity, while in the latter the actuality of a thing presupposes its necessity and possibility. Now, there is a relation between the mode of being of the ought-to-be and the actual, but they are not the same. As the ought-to-be is only a tendency towards the actual, but is not itself actual, in it the modal structure of the actual is disrupted. The harmony which exists between necessity and possibility in the actual, is disturbed by the ought-to-be through an excess of necessity and a deficiency of possibility. The ought is not determined by ontological possibility. It claims to be although it is not really possi-

L.E.Vol.1,p.303.
Necessity, therefore, is the mode of being characteristic of the ought. The ideal ought-to-be is even further withdrawn from the ontological possible than the positive ought-to-be. Speaking generally, the mode of being of the ought is that of necessity indifferent to, or independent of possibility or actuality. The same can be affirmed of values. Their mode of being is also necessity detached from possibility, although this does not express their essence. This mode explains their hovering position over the actual. But the ideal values not only have this necessity over against the actual, they also stand thus related to one another. Each value also asserts its necessity over its rival values. This, however, does not violate their modal characteristics. Hartmann calls this kind of necessity which lies on the negative side of the actual, free necessity. It is possible only in ethical reality, not in ontological actuality. "In passing beyond the narrowly ontological problem", writes Hartmann, "one strikes upon a new, a more fundamental meaning of necessity. Not the Must-Be, not the unable-to-be-escaped-from, not the being involved through the totality of conditions is its primary meaning, but the tendency towards something." There is therefore a fundamental distinction between ontological and axiological necessity. The former means that what is necessary cannot not be, the latter, that what is necessary can not be.

Here, says Hartmann, lies the utmost limits of rationality. Further rational thought cannot penetrate into the mode of being of values. We are brought up against a blank wall beyond which our vision cannot wander, and we must rest satisfied that enough has been said to make the human act intelligible.

Nothing more can be said of values from the point of view of their being. We must now consider what further
light is thrown on their nature if we consider them from the point of view of the order of values.

That there is an order of values, Hartmann says, it is impossible to doubt, for the manifold of values is not intelligible except in a series, and as he goes on to show when he analyses his values, they actually do exhibit a gradational order. Before Hartmann starts on this analysis, however, he first points out certain general characteristics on which he bases his theory that they are orderly. In every ethical situation a manifold of values participate. Choice is not only between good an evil, it is between lower and higher value. Human nature is of such a kind that it can never be directed to anything contrary to value as such. Moral evil itself must be explained as a realisation of value, but a 'lower' value, where a 'higher' should have been chosen. Hence we must assume that the primary consciousness of values is not only a consciousness of their existence, it is also a consciousness of their relative rank. Every solution of a valuational situation involves not only the perception of their existence, but also a perception that some are higher, and other lower.

It is difficult, however, to express in conceptual terms what 'lower' and 'higher' means, although in concrete cases our feeling for values grasp them without difficulty. There are various indications of the height of a value for thought, but none of them are infallible.

It is false to believe that the problem of the gradation of values cannot be treated unless a supreme value is assumed, says Hartmann. He recalls the distinction made in volume one between ethics and morality. All current morality take on the form of a monism. That is its weakness and its strength. It weakness in that it falsifies the scale of values by seizing hold of one and illegitimately setting it above the others; it s strength, in that a supreme value is a very
real need of life. Ethics, however, is different. Its task is to re-survey these values and place them on the ideal scale, and here lies its great problem. Ethics is by nature pluralistic, but that seems to mean that it can have not normative influence on practical affairs. This difficulty is very real, Hartmann admits, and in the past philosophers have tried to force an answer to the problem of unity, by assuming a supreme value even although none could be found among the discerned values. The most famous attempt of this nature is the Platonic 'Idea of the Good'. But, adds Hartmann, this method avenges itself on the thinker, for although it is a justifiable thought that the supreme good should be beyond the grasp of human thought, yet to posit it does not help, because it remains an idea empty of content and brings us no nearer the solution of the problem what goodness is. Hartmann concludes that "nothing in the realm of values is more concealed than just this central principle, which is assumed by all morality as self-evident, but which in truth is everywhere differently understood. It was Plotinus who gave the formula for this situation: the good is 'beyond the power of thought'. But that means: the good is irrational."

Although the supreme value is hidden from our sight, nevertheless, the more one contemplates the realm of values, says Hartmann, the more you become convinced that it lies hidden a law or principle of its structure. "If one looks at the final discernible elements of value, one becomes easily convinced, that a unifying value lying beyond them can neither be seen nor inferred from them, but that the connection of these valuational groups is conceivable and evident. Unity of system, then, might still be existent. Unity of system is plainly in no wise dependent upon the focal unity, the one.

The attitude adopted by Hartmann appears to be this. The supreme value must either be known completely, or not at all. He does not admit a third possibility, that the supreme value is intelligible in the sense that we can discern the sufficient reasons why it is the supreme good for us, although we do not
The notion of a supreme value having been discarded, Hartmann nevertheless asserts that ethics should not therefore lose all interest in the problem. It must explore all paths that may lead to a supreme value, it must even entertain the thought that the supreme value may not be a value at all. But in any case, concludes Hartmann, even if there is a supreme value, it would only "have the form of a unifying principle of the sphere, of a system of values. But such a principle would merely determine the categorical structure of the sphere; it would not constitute the quality as such of the values embraced by it."

Independent of the problem of a supreme value, ethics also has a second problem, consisting in joining together the multiplicity of values according to the different classes of relation into which they fall. They are the relations of subsumption and foundation, of kinship and discrepancy, of structure and content and of height and interpenetration. Nevertheless, where there is a genuine antinomy of values, no artificial relation can be forced on them.

The next section is devoted to an analysis of the individual values. Into this we cannot go in any detail. However, later, in part three, we shall examine his treatment of the value of purity, which will give us some idea of his approach. In the meantime, we can only consider the values from the point of view of their gradation. As he analyses his values, Hartmann brings them into view according to a definite plan. We must rapidly survey the different marks in the values according to which he arranges them, before we go over to his philosophical justification for the scale of values.

know it through and through. If it is completely unintelligible, it would, of course, be 'empty of content'. But according to this third possibility, while unintelligible, it would yet not be 'empty of content'.

1.E., Vol. 11, p. 68.
2.E., Vol. 11, p. 70.
Hartmann starts with what he considers to be the lowest values. From these he progresses gradually to the higher and what are for him the 'highest', namely the personal values. But this is not the highest absolutely speaking. It is only the highest that we can discern, further discoveries not yet having been made. Similarly, he explains that the lowest are not really the first, but only the first that can be known, the valuational quality of those that are still lower being too weak for our feeling to register.

The lowest group that can be known Hartmann calls "the most general antitheses", or the group of opposites. They are thus called, because, besides their elementariness and generality, their poverty of content and low quality, they also have an added distinguishing mark, the peculiarity that they manifest not only the relation of opposition between negative and positive, but also an opposition of positive against positive, i.e. of value against value. Hartmann divides this group of opposites into three sub-divisions. Into the first falls the modal oppositions. There are two. The first is the antinomy of necessity and freedom, and then the antinomy of the value of the real being and non-being of values. The second sub-division is that of relational opposites, into it falls the antinomy of the carriers of values. Secondly there is the antinomy of the values of activity and inertia, thirdly, of the grade and range of type, then of harmony and conflict and lastly of simplicity and complexity. The third sub-division is called the quantitative and qualitative oppositions. Here stand in antinomic relation values of the universal and singular in different aspects, for instance, between individual and universal, individual and collective unity, the smaller community and the political party, nation and humanity and so forth.

The second group of values Hartmann terms "value-
tional foundations of the subject". They are much richer in content and feeling easily detects their quality. They constitute the valuational material for the moral values, and as such inhere mostly in the structure of man, who alone is the carrier of moral values. The peculiarity of this group is that it contains no positive opposites like the former, but only the opposition of value against disvalue. "The unambiguous relation between value and disvalue, from which conflict is absent, is characteristic of all the wider and more concrete values of goods, situations and persons." One may say that this peculiarity is the valuational mark of this group of values which "places" them on Hartmann's scale. These values are life, consciousness, activity, suffering, strength, freedom of will, foresight, purposive efficacy. Along with this series of values, there is another, also conditioning the content of moral values, but in the sense of furnishing the material basis. They constitute the objective material. These values are existence, situation, power, happiness, etc.

The two groups which we have now reviewed, constitute the realm of non-moral values. We now come to the realm of moral values. In the first place they are the values of acts and of persons. Secondly, they are based on the lower values, but the distinctive mark that separates them from the non-moral values is their connection with freedom. One cannot blame a person if he lacks goods or situational values, but moral badness is blameworthy. Similarly, a person is not praised for non-moral values, but moral values are praiseworthy. Therefore, "the specific mark of moral values is not their height in the scale nor the fact that they are based upon other values, but their connection with freedom."

What is peculiar to the whole realm of moral values, is that although our feeling readily registers their moral qualities, what their material consists in always eludes our
knowledge. Everybody can feel them but no one can describe them in conceptual terms.

Moral values are divided into a fundamental group and a special group. The fundamental group lies at the basis of all moral values. To it belong the values of the "good", nobility, richness of experience and purity. What characterises values is that they are not limited to a specific group but reappear in the other values.

The last three groups, the special moral values, or the virtues, are arranged according to an historico-empirical method. "The first group includes especially the values of the ancient moral systems (Plato and Aristotle), the second that of the Christian sphere of culture, and the last without a further selective principle brings together the values which were lacking in the first two, in so far as they have become accessible to our modern perception." The first two groups consist of a cluster round two basic values. In the first it is justice, in the second brotherly love. Around justice, there is wisdom, courage and self-control. In it also falls the Aristotelian virtues. The second group contains the Christian virtues of brotherly love, truthfulness, uprightness, fidelity, trustworthiness, trust, faith, optimism, hope, modesty, humility and custom. The last group of special virtues are love of the remote, radiant virtue, personality and personal love. We can, however, give an account of none of these values here. We must limit ourselves strictly to the problem of gradation.

Having now seen according to what marks Hartmann orders his values, we must next consider their formulation into principles or laws of gradation, and his justification of these laws. Here are six such laws, falling into three groups. They are the laws of stratification and foundation, forming the first group, of opposition and complementation forming the second, and of valuational strength and height forming the last.
With reference to the first group, Hartmann says that the laws of the categories hold in a modified form for the values also, because, since the materials of moral values are made up of ontological factors, the laws of the latter must also affect the former. These laws, however, are modified by others. Of these the most important are the four laws of stratification. The first is the law of recurrence meaning that the lower values recur as elements in the higher. The second is that of transformation according to which when the lower is taken up into the structure of the higher values, their essences must nevertheless remain the same. The third law, that of novelty, states that the higher laws cannot, without a remainder be resolved into their constituents. The remainder is the element of novelty which is not accounted for by the lower. The fourth law states that the connection between the higher and the lower is not continuous. The advance is in steps or strata. Each step contains a novelty, but it is related to the lower strata by the recurrence of their elements.

These laws, however, hold only approximately for the moral values. The most important change is the divergence from the law of recurrence and the preponderance of the law of transformation and novelty. Further, the intervals between the strata widen. This weakening of the laws of stratification is due to the supervening of another law, the conditioning relation. According to this law the moral values depend for their realisation on situational values. This dependence, however, only means that the situational values are the precondition for the moral values. They are not present in the moral values, not even in a transformed state. Furthermore, this dependence does not mean that the moral values can only be realised with the realisation of the situational values. It only means that the intention must be directed to the situational values. Except for this dependence, there is hardly any connection between the moral and the non-moral values. They are described
as 'hovering' over the lower values, and the higher they are, and the higher they are, the less do they become explicable in through the lower values. In fact, the higher "transformation makes such considerable leaps forward that it can scarcely be recognized as such", and as the value transformed vanishes, "the transformation becomes equivalent to the introduction of something new." This gap between the moral values and the conditioning values constitute the limit of the laws of stratification, "the latter penetrate a little beyond the chasm, but soon become tenuous and pale and are of little help to cognize the higher values. Hence if one endeavours to connect the moral values through the laws of stratification only, they often appear disconnected, isolated and conflicting.

The case is different with the laws of opposition, in the second group. They extend to all the values. There are five kinds of opposition falling into three groups. They are (1) the value-neutrality opposition (2) the disvalue-neutrality opposition. They form the first group. (3) The second group contains only one opposition, the most universal, that between value and disvalue. (4) and (5) are combined in the third group. They are the value-value opposition and the disvalue-disvalue opposition.

By neutrality is meant the indifference-point which is passed when the disvalue-value scale is ascended. The most important oppositions are numbers 3, 4 and 5. Especially is it necessary to establish relations between numbers 3 and 4. On it depends the solution of the problem of the antinomies. In the first place, value and disvalue stand vertically opposed to each other, value and value horizontally. Yet disvalue and disvalue (standing against each other on the horizontal plane) involve no real opposition. A man can be both unjust and brutish. The two do not exclude each other. Nor do the diago-
nally placed values oppose each other. Although justice and love, according to Hartmann, are antonomically opposed, justice is compatible with lovelessness, purity with moral poverty.

Hartmann now attempts a synthesis of values from the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. For Aristotle a value lies between two extremes or disvalues. For example, bravery lies between cowardice and rashness. But according to Hartmann, standing vertically opposed to the Aristotelian disvalues, there are two more values. Thus opposed to cowardice there is 'spirited endurance', opposed to rashness there is 'deliberate foresight, cool presence of mind'. Thus the Aristotelian virtues, lying between two disvalues, is at the same time a synthesis of two values.

But here again, this synthesis is not applicable to the higher moral values. However, Hartmann assumes "that the principle of synthesis constitutes a universal law of the ethical table," and that we cannot discern the Aristotelian mean between antinomic values such as justice and brotherly love, purity and fullness of life, pride and humility, because of a deficiency in our feeling for values. In practice values are still opposed. Every value has a tendency to dominate the others, and to break up the interconnection between the values. So far, therefore, the synthesis of values is still only an ideal.

The second member of the second group is the complementary relation i.e. a relation between values so that if one appears, the other should also appear. Instances of the complementary relation are trust and trustworthiness, merit and recognition, heroism and admiration. This relation presupposes a synthesis of values. In human beings this relation consists in an inter-personal synthesis of values, the value of one personality complementing another. This is the cate-
gorial form of the complementary relation.

In conclusion Hartmann endeavors to determine exactly to what degree values can be related through the three relational laws i.e., the laws of stratification, of complementation and of opposition. The first two laws do not apply to all values. Therefore they are not infallible guides to the height of a value in a relational scale. The law of opposition provides an indication of height in so far, as in every antithetic the synthesis is higher than the factors which are united in it, and this applies universally to all values. However, this is not completely satisfying, because the rank of a value is not determined only by its height according to Hartmann. Strength is another factor. There are three laws of strength, called categorical laws: (1) The law of strength according to which the higher is always the weaker and more dependent, the lower the stronger and the more independent. (2) The law of material which states that the lower provides the material for the higher. (3) The law of freedom which protects the freedom of the higher from the lower. The higher value represents a new formation raised over the lower, only materially dependent but further independent.

The question is what does strength mean in the realm of values? Hartmann answers that just as we come to know height through the valuational feeling which assents, approves, so we come to know strength through the feeling, which rejects and disapproves. Evidence of the strength of values also lies in this, that greater merit attaches to the fulfillment of the higher values, but greater blame attaches to the violation of the lower. Thus, for instance, non-moral values (goods-values) are stronger than moral values. Further, the lower moral values also manifest strength as against the higher moral values.

From this Hartmann concludes that there are two ul-
timate orders of gradation possible, corresponding to the two laws of height and strength, and the two scales are the exact reverse of each other. That in the scale according to the law of height stands 'lowest', in the scale according to the law of strength stands 'highest'. All values can be divided according to these two scales. To the group of strength belongs the values of purity, justice, modesty, reserve, deference, humility and even brotherly love. Preference for height is manifested by values such as nobility, fullness of experience, bravery, wisdom and fidelity. These two scales stand in opposition and corresponds to a fundamental antinomy in the notion of moral goodness. However, genuine morality demands a synthesis between the laws of height and strength, but that is not yet an actuality of the moral life.

We have now considered Hartmann's account of the mode of being and the nature of his values. This he develops at great length to justify his assertion that acts are human by virtue of their relation to values, and that these values contain the sufficient reason for our judgements about good and evil. Before we now proceed to raise the question of their satisfactoriness as principles of intelligibility, we must first inquire into the reason why we consider intelligibility a necessary condition which Hartmann's values must satisfy. It may be asked, what is the connection between human acts and the intelligibility of their final term? Do human acts require for their existence a final term which is per se intelligible? The answer must be positive, and to find the reason it is necessary only to look at the first character of human action. None of our ordinary actions is terminated by itself. We can always look beyond it, ask what it is for, put it in a wider context. In the same way the proximate ends of human action, i.e. those things which we desire as good and seek to obtain
through our acts, always refer for their meaning beyond themselves. Take for example a simple act such as setting out for a walk. The act, taken by itself, is not its own sufficient reason. To explain it I have to bring in other purposes, for instance, visiting a friend, or perhaps going to view the spring flowers at Kirstenbosch, or, to keep in good health. But these more general ends, in relation to which setting out for a walk is a particular end, can in their turn be placed in a wider context. Thus, for instance, to visit a friend I must have a further purpose in view, perhaps to borrow a book, or simply to be sociable. In their turn these can again be subordinated to wider purposes. But in this way we cannot proceed without coming to an end, for then we would never be able to find the sufficient reason for our first act. "We do not choose in all instances with a further End in view (for then men would go on without limit, and so desire would be unsatisfied and fruitless)," writes Aristotle. Somewhere along the line we must come up against a good which we desire for its own sake, a good which is good absolutely and with reference to which everything else is good. Hence we see that we are unable to perform even such a simple act as setting out for a walk without ultimately intending some final good which is good per se, for we are unable to judge anything good unless we judge simultaneously by implication that there is a final good, the reason for the goodness of which is itself. The final end must therefore have two characteristics. It must be goodness per se and intelligibility per se. However, the two are really one, for when something is good with reference to itself (per se), the reason why it is good must be itself. To posit a supreme good which is not intelligible per se is a contradiction in terms. That is what a Supreme Good means. A Supreme Good which is not per se intelligible, would make the human act impossible, for as we have seen, we can only desire 1. The Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 11.
to obtain that which we first apprehend as good. Now, we apprehend something when we discern the sufficient reason why it is good or desirable rather than not. But we cannot apprehend why a supreme good which is not *per se* intelligible is good or desirable, because if it is not its own sufficient reason, nothing else can be its sufficient reason, for as its name implies, there is nothing beyond it. Therefore, there cannot be a human act, for everything that is, must have a sufficient reason for being. Therefore we must conclude that *per se* intelligibility is a necessary desideratum of the Supreme Good.

We must now ask: Are Hartmann's values *per se* intelligible? Do they render moral behaviour and moral philosophy intelligible? And as we have looked at values from two aspects, we shall ask that question first with reference to their order, and then with reference to their mode of being. Accordingly, our first question must be: Is the order in the realm of values as set out by Hartmann intelligible?

To answer this question we have to consider whether the principles of which the valuational gradation rests, are a sufficient and satisfactory explanation for the order that obtains in the realm of values. We have to determine whether only these principles are *per se* intelligible, for an explanation in terms of that which is *per se* intelligible, and does not refer for its intelligibility beyond itself, is satisfactory. The principles or laws on which the order of values rest, we have set out in the previous pages. They are, as we have seen, the laws of stratification; opposition, complementation, strength and height. Now, do these laws satisfactorily explain the valuational order, do they give the sufficient reason why, according to Hartmann, we should grade brotherly love, for instance, higher than justice, love of the remotest higher than brotherly love, and personal love higher than
both? I think that these laws do not give the sufficient reason for the valuational order such as put forward by Hartmann because they are not \textit{per se} intelligible, nor do they refer to that which is \textit{per se} intelligible. They are the ultimate laws governing the order. These laws stand as much in need of explanation as the order itself, and this final explanation is not forthcoming from the philosophy of Hartmann. This statement needs no further justification than a recollection of these laws, and in addition the different 'scale marks' which Hartmann perceives in his values. To start with the latter first, we are still left with various questions. For instance, why should having a value for an opposite instead of a disvalue, determine the place of the first group at the foot of Hartmann's scale? But further, why should not having this feature, determine the position of the second group above the first? So we can go on asking similar questions of every higher group of values. We can ask, why should there connection with freedom mark the moral values as being higher than the previous groups? Further, why should the place of the fundamental moral values be determined by the fact that they reappear in the other values? and lastly, why should the virtues be placed above these because they are based upon situational values? That connection is there between these characteristics of values, and their position on the scale? The same also applies to the laws that govern the gradation of values. Thus, for example, we can ask why it is that the values in which other values recur, or in which other values are transformed, or in which there occurs a valuational novelty, should be the higher? Further, why should a value which represents a synthesis between two antithesis, or a value which is conditioned, be the higher? Lastly, why, according to the scale of strength should the stronger values be the higher, and finally, what does'valuational height'really mean?

If Hartmann answers to this last question that the
height of a value is determined by our 'feeling' for values, and that the laws and scale marks are but more or less inadequate conceptual expressions of what feeling clearly perceives, but thought cannot grasp, then we must reply that we are still faced by the same problem. For, even if we were to admit that we have what Hartmann has defined as the power of intuitive rationality i.e. a power by which we can acquire knowledge without argumentation, then this primary consciousness would still express itself in a judgement, though an intuitive one, and the burden would still be on us to look for the sufficient reason of this judgement. "Feeling" in itself cannot be the sufficient reason because it is not necessarily intelligible. Of all human judgements taken in themselves, we can ask: why is it thus and not other wise? Human thought is not the measure of its own truth.

Not only do Hartmann's laws of gradation stand in need of further explanation, but even as they are, they do not help him to his objective, namely to create a scale of values. As we have seen, the laws of stratification do not succeed in bridging the antinomies of the moral values, nor

1. In attributing this power of intuitive reason to the human intellect, he shows how deeply he has misunderstood its nature. The reason, of course, why he posits it, is because, as we shall see, he has misunderstood the proper object of the human intellect. Discursiveness is an essential mark of the imperfection of human reason. Non-discursive thought belongs only to a spiritual being, and above all to God, as St. Thomas Aquinas proves in the Summa Contra Gentiles Ch. LVII. One of his arguments is as follows: "All defect is far removed from God because He is simply perfect, as proved above. But argumentative knowledge results from an imperfection of the intellectual nature: since what is known through another thing is less known in itself: nor does the nature of the knower suffice to reach what is known through something else, without this thing through which the other is made known. Now in argumentative knowledge one thing is made known through another: whereas what is known intellectually is known in itself, and the nature of the knower suffices for the knowledge thereof without any means from without. Hence it is clear that reason is a defective intellect: and consequently the divine knowledge is not argumentative."
do the laws of opposition and Hartmann's interpretation of the Aristotelian mean yield the required result. The same applies to the laws of complementation, and as regards the law of height and strength, they yield two scales which are the exact opposite of each other, but the reason why we should adopt the one rather than the other, in the absence of a synthesis, is not made clear. The reason why Hartmann cannot succeed in establishing any relations between his values, is not far to seek. It is found in the first principle of the values, namely, that the "lower" is independent of the "higher": "All grades of values, genuine in their own right, possess their peculiar autonomy, which can be diminished by no kind of dependence upon anything above. The whole meaning of the realm of values, so far as it is a world of ideal self-maintaining entities, stands or falls with this foundation principle." Each value he calls subsistent and absolute goodness. But if this is so then there can be no order among his values. Order is only possible in a dependent series where such determinations as "better" or "worse", "more" or "less", "higher" or "lower" can be applied, but these determinations cannot be affirmed of Hartmann's values. They are all "best", "most" or "highest", for, when we define something as 'subsistent goodness', we mean that the thing is independent of all other things, and it is independent because it possesses the whole of goodness. This is what Hartmann asserts about his values when he defines them as subsistent goodness. But in that case there could be no difference between his values, and the manifold of values must reduce to one, for there is no perfection that the one has and the other has not, to differentiate them. But this is a manifest absurdity. Common sense tells us that justice is not the same as courage, nor love the same as faith, nor the value of a fruit the same as the value of a stone, or the value of a flower the same as the value of a tree. From 1.E. Vol. 11. p. 28.
this we can draw certain conclusions. Since they are not the
same, they must be different, but not wholly different, other-
wise they could not all be called good or valuable. They are
different because some are 'more valuable', others are 'less
valuable', some are 'better', others are 'worse', some are
'higher', others are 'lower'. Goodness allows of degrees, and
if we inquire why it is that we call some things better than
others, the only reason can be that that which we call 'better'
must be closer to that which is 'best', while that which is
'worse' is further away from the 'best'. It is no answer to
say with Hartmann that the better is the better because it is
the more complex, or embraces more elements, or represents a
novelty. Although it may be that these are characteristics
of higher values, by themselves they cannot give the suffi-
cient reason for the height of a value, because we can still
ask: why is it so?

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that values are
not an independent series, as Hartmann asserts, because that
is a contradiction in terms. The term 'series' implies depen-
dence. Furthermore, we have seen that the sufficient reason
for the scale of values, or degrees of goodness, is that which
is best, or the supreme value. Values are ordered with refe-
rence to the supreme value. This is the only satisfactory an-
swer to the relativism from which Hartmann is so anxious to
escape, but from which he cannot, because his values lack a
stable and immovable foundation. To order values according to
human 'feeling', is to order them according to a relative
principle and moving point.

We are now in a position to see why Hartmann
cannot make the scale of his values intelligible. He cannot
do this because he denies the necessity of a supreme good. Or-
der implies dependence, and dependence implies a first inde-
pendent member on which the whole series rest and which is the
sufficient reason for the existence of each dependent member. In so far as Hartmann fails to appreciate this, he fails to find the sufficient reason for a scale of values.

The denial of the necessity of a supreme good which is the sufficient reason for the order of values, has certain implications in the sphere of human acts. One of the characteristics of human acts is that they are orderly. We are not the victims of desire like irrational animals. By the fact that we possess reason we can order our desires. Order, however, is not merely something that can be produced by us, it is one of the primary conditions of human life. To be a man is to live purposively. Human life imposes on us the necessity of weighing conflicting desires in the light of a more ultimate purpose. But if there is no sufficient reason why we should consider one purpose more ultimate than another, then the order that obtains among human acts must also be without a sufficient reason, and therefore, unintelligible. The unintelligibility of the order of values is therefore reflected in human acts, and we are compelled to say that the act of ordering our acts has no sufficient reason. This amounts to a denial of the principle of finality according to which every agent acts in view of an end which is the sufficient reason for the action; and since the principle of finality is one of the aspects of the principle of sufficient reason (i.e., the principle of sufficient reason as applied to acts), the denial of the former results in the denial of the latter. But furthermore, this last denial also results in the rejection of the principle of contradiction which states that being is not non-being, or that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time. For, if an action exists without a sufficient reason, then that action exists and does not exist at the same time. It does not exist because it lacks that without which it does not exist. Therefore we must conclude that Hartmann's rejection of the
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supreme good not only makes the order of values intelligible, but also destroys the order of acts, and with it the science of ethics which we have defined as the study of the order of human acts.

The reason why Hartmann cannot make the order of his values intelligible, does not lie only in his rejection of the final end. It can be sought much deeper in the mode of being of his values which, as he so uncritically points out, is unintelligible. But we cannot rest satisfied with such an uncritical approach and must inquire why the mode of being of his values is not intelligible. The reason must be sought in his theory of knowledge. It is because Hartmann is mistaken about the proper object of the human intellect that he cannot make his values intelligible. The proper object of the human intellect is not, as he thinks, the platonic ideas, but as we must now endeavour to prove, Being. In order to do this we must inquire into the nature of knowledge.

The first condition of knowledge (and here we are in the fullest agreement with Hartmann and Plato) is that it must be knowledge of an object which is universal and necessary. The early Greek philosophers thought that there was no such

1. It may seem an unwarranted procedure to criticise Hartmann for violating the principles of sufficient reason and contradiction without first proving their validity. However, if any thought is devoted to these principles, their truth must be self-evident i.e. they are truths which are evident to anybody who understands the terms. They cannot be demonstrated because a demonstration consists in conveying subject and predicate by means of a third term. But a third term is not possible here because the predicate is contained in the subject. To call these principles into doubt is absurd. For instance, if I doubted the truth of the principle that being is not non-being, then not even the doubt would be certain, for then the doubt would both be and not be a doubt. In other words, I would both be certain and not certain of the truth of the principle of contradiction. The same applies to the principle of sufficient reason.

2. See E. Vol. I, p. 303. Hartmann tries to bridge over the unintelligibility of his values by his theory of the ought. But is this ought any more intelligible than values? In so far as it is separate from existence, it is not intelligible, for the mind can only grasp what is. In fact, the ought only serves to make clearer how unintelligible values are. They cannot be cognised by thought because they contradict the first principle of thought, the principle of contradiction. This principle, Hartmann maintains, is only ontologically valid, it does not apply to his values. But if that is so, then his values cannot be cognised.
object in the world. Conceiving the world as purely material, and observing that all material things are subject to change, they were of the opinion that we can have no true knowledge of the nature of things. For that which is in a continual state of flux, the mind cannot understand, because it changes before the mind can grasp it.

Plato, on the other hand, wishing to save the certainty of our knowledge, maintained that beside the corporeal world there is also a world of divine universal ideas by a participation of which each individual sensible thing receives its nature. Hence, he says, it is by a participation of the idea of man, that a man is a man, a horse a horse.

Aristotle, however, showed that Plato was wrong, and that his error springs from an uncrirical acceptance of the Heraclitian conception of the nature of material being. Heraclitos held that there is nothing necessary and universal in the world. Plato accepted this, and accordingly posited his separate world of universal ideas. Both commit an error. It is certainly true, Aristotle maintains, that the real, the concrete course of things, allows of contingency and change, and thus far Heraclitos is right. But to say that the world is wholly transitory, is to do away with it. Change without a subject of change is meaningless. That would be saying that change changes which is absurd. Only something can change. It is therefore not necessary to posit the separate world of platonic forms or ideas. For, underlying the flux of Heraclitos, there is something which undergoes change. This something Aristotle called prime matter. However, prime matter 'is' not something, strictly speaking. It is one of the principles of material substance, by itself it cannot exist. In so far as it is informed by form, the substance of which it forms one principle, comes to be. Aristotle analysed all material beings into these two ultimate elements, matter and form. Matter is the purely potential element, form the actual element. Everything is intelli-
gible in so far as it is in act. Therefore there exists in everything an intelligible element in virtue of which it possesses a specific nature or essence. This principle is not separate from things as Plato held. It inheres in them as one of the factors which constitute their substance. Therefore, concludes Aristotle, even if the world is subject to becoming, it is not wholly transitory, but contains in it, incarnate, an enduring element which can be the proper object of the human intellect.

Not only is Plato's ideas unnecessary, they cannot explain to us the nature of things, for ideas do not enter into the substance of things. Forming by themselves a separate set of substances, they differ essentially from real things. Therefore, even if we admit that we have knowledge of these separate substances, we cannot for that reason claim to form a judgement concerning sensible things. Aristotle argues further that if we accept the Platonic ideas, we cannot explain motion, for since the ideas are motionless, there cannot be an archetype of motion in the world of ideas. Therefore the whole study of nature which consists of a knowledge of the causes of movement, is annulled.

Why did Plato commit this error? He was quite right in believing that we can only know what is unchangeable and universal. But he strayed from the truth by thinking that the intelligible object must exist in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known. And having observed that the intelligible object exists in the mind under conditions of universality, immateriality and immobility, he concludes that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under the same conditions. But, says Aristotle, it is not fitting that that which is known should be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known, for everything which is in any recipient is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore
since the intellect is an immaterial and spiritual faculty, while the thing understood is a material object, the intelligible object cannot be in the intellect in the same manner as in the thing understood.

It is in this fashion that Aristotle refutes Plato and shows at the same time that there are embedded in the world of change and enduring and intelligible realities. These intelligible realities can be both in the thing and in the mind, because they can exist in two modes. Physically, individuated in the singular thing, and psychically, intentionally, universalised in the mind. Universals, therefore, exist as such only in the mind. Outside the mind they are embodied in singular particular things. Thus, for instance, human nature is a universal, common to all men, but it exists as a universal only in the mind. In each of us it exists as our own individual natures.

Thus we see that there is in the world an object necessary and universal, about which the mind can form true propositions, truth consisting in conformity of the mind with the thing. The second condition of knowledge is immateriality and this concerns not the object, but the subject of knowledge. The reason of this condition can be seen by comparing the nature of a knower with that of a non-knower. The difference between them lies in this that the non-knower is limited to his own form, while a knower, in addition to his own form, can also receive the forms of other things. But he receives these forms as other, foreign or objective. Therefore a knower is not limited to his own being like the non-knower, but he grows as it were infinitely, because the same object which exists outside of him, begin to be in him objectively and intentionally. But, in order thus to receive the forms of things, the knower must have a certain degree of immateriality. By this is not meant independence of matter, but independence of potentiality which restrains or imprisons things in the exclusive-
ness of their own being. The formal reason that makes a being a knowing being, therefore, is immateriality. There are degrees of immateriality. Thus, for example, sensitive knowledge is the immaterial receiving of concrete corporeal forms i.e. limited corporeal forms which are concrete and individual. The human intellect also receives the forms of corporeal being, but it does not receive them concretely, individually, but abstractly i.e. separated from those accidents which surround them in an actually existing being. Therefore, the human intellect knows them as universal and necessary. An intelligent being therefore has a greater degree of independence from potentiality, it has more actuality than an irrational being receiving knowledge through the senses. The more immediate cause of knowledge is the existence of the forms of things in the knower, not as informing his matter, but informing his form or intellect.

From these two conditions of knowledge it follows (1) that the human intellect is an immaterial faculty (2) and that its proper object is being. The first conclusion follows because a faculty whose formal object is the essence of corporeal being, must itself be immaterial. This conclusion rests on the principle that the formal object always specifies the faculty, and since the formal object of the human intellect is the immaterial essences of material being, therefore the human intellect must be an immaterial, incorporeal faculty.

With reference to the second conclusion, two objects must be distinguished. The first is the object which the human intellect has in common with all other intellects, namely Being. This is called the common formal object. But a specific kind of intellect, it has a specific kind of object, namely the essence of material being abstracted. This is the proper formal object of the human intellect.

That the common formal object of the human in-
telleot is Being, follows, for as we have seen, it knows the essence of corporeal things. But a faculty which knows the essence of corporeal things, has as its common formal object Being, because Being is defined as 'that which has existence'. But that which has existence is an essence. Being is therefore a quiddity or essence considered in its most universal manner. Therefore, the human intellect, in knowing the essences of things, knows Being. This does not, however, mean that the intellect knows only Being in general. It means that whatever the intellect knows, it knows under the formality of Being. Hence, when it knows the cause of a thing, its purpose, origin, properties and relations with other things, in these different ways it is apprehending the Being of a thing.

But the human intellect is not a pure intellect. It is only partially an intellectual nature. Hence the proper formal object of the intellect cannot be Being as such, it must be that species of beings which is proportionate to its powers. Now, the human intellect is an immaterial form in a material being. Therefore its proper formal object must be an immaterial form in a material being, therefore the proper formal object of the human intellect is the essence of material being, not as it is singular and individualised in a particular being, but universalised, abstracted from individualising notes. Here again we must make a reservation. What is meant is not that the human intellect understands only corporeal being. It means that the intellect knows the essence of material being primarily, per se and directly. It also knows other things, but only indirectly by means of its proper formal object, just as sight, which has colour for its proper object, can perceive quantity and extension, not primarily, but mediately through colour. In the same way the human intellect can perceive beings of a higher-order than itself, but it perceives them in terms of its proper object.
Having thus proved that what we know is Being, we see that everything which is in some way or other, can be known. But Hartmann's values have no being, in spite of his claim to the contrary, for being is defined as 'that whose act is existence'. But Hartmann's values can never exist, neither actually nor potentially. Therefore they have no being, and consequently they are unintelligible, for a thing is intelligible in so far as it has being. Therefore, neither can they be the final cause of the goodness of human acts, for as we have seen in part one, the first and most important pre-requisite for the human act is knowledge. But as Hartmann's values are unintelligible, they cannot be desired by the will. Therefore, they cannot be the final end of the human act, and the final cause of its goodness.

Further, because Hartmann has misunderstood the proper object of the human intellect, it is also impossible for him to prove the freedom of the will. Such a proof is only possible on the basis of a sound metaphysic where reason attains its rightful object Being. This object the will necessarily desires under the aspect of the good. But while the universal good naturally impels our wills, man is free with respect to everything finite less than the universal, for any finite thing that the intellect can present to it under the aspect of goodness, cannot satisfy the will whose measure is the infinite.

Another result also follows from the same cause, namely, that his account of the human act suffers a palpable distortion and is rendered unintelligible. Hartmann recognises that the proper object of the will is the end, but in order to bridge over the gulf between the end, which is something real, and the ideal value, he introduces his theory of unintended actualisation, namely, that the will only intends some particular good which stands to values as means to end, while the value follows on by itself. But this is unintelligible, for
nothing can be willed as means, except in view of some previously willed end. The proper object of intention, which is the first act of the will, is not the means, but the end which is the raison d'être: why the will chooses the means proposed to it by reason. If the end is taken away, the sufficient reason for the means also disappears. Hartmann bases this theory of his on his criticism of Kant, and he is quite right in so far as he sees that man's final end is not his own moral improvement. But there is nothing which prevents the will from intending a final objective end, which is the sufficient reason for the series of means, if such an objective end can be found. In that case man would be intending his moral goodness, not as such, but in so far as it is in his power to direct, or not to direct his will to his final end which constitutes the source of moral goodness.

However, a final conclusion also follows from Hartmann's position. We have proved that his values render the human act unintelligible and makes scientific ethics impossible, for in the last analysis we cannot, on his theory, give intelligible reasons for our judgements about good and evil. Values, however, not only have this effect on human acts, they also have a disruptive influence on the human personality which is the source of the human act. We can see this best by considering the problem how the intellect comes to possess its object. Hartmann, under Plato's influence, posits the doctrine of innate ideas. But such a doctrine destroys the of human nature. For if the soul has innate ideas by which it understands the platonic forms, and do not receive them through the senses, it would not need a body to understand, and hence no reason can be assigned for the union of body and soul. Human nature which is one substance, consisting of two substantial principles, body and soul, is divided by Hartmann's theory of values into two separate substances, an immaterial soul acci-
dentally united to a body. Hence Hartmann's platonism, in the field of the human personality, lands him up in a dualism as unmitigated as that of Descartes or Kant.

From the unintelligibility into which this philosophy plunges us, we can only escape by firstly recognising that being is the proper object of the intellect, and secondly by giving a true account of the role that the sense play in the process of cognition. How large that part is, can be seen from the fact that if they are absent, the intellect cannot know. That does not, however, mean that the intellect is wholly dependent on the senses. But in its proper function, namely intellecti on, it is independent of the bodily senses. St Thomas, following Aristotle, places the whole process in perspective by saying that 'knowledge begins in the senses and is perfected in the intellect.' The sense present its object to the intellect, but the intellect, by its own energies abstracts something already contained in the sensible representation, but hidden, which the image by itself could never reveal. This abstractive faculty is called the active intellect, and that which it abstracts is the form or intelligible likeness of the object, and this is called the impressed species by which the possible intellect (the intellect properly speaking) is determined to understand by making it produce an expressed species in which the object is apprehended as universal.

This theory of the origin of our ideas, unlike Hartmann's innate ideas, give a sufficient reason for the union of body and soul, for ideas cannot be formed except by means of sensations and images, which in turn necessarily presuppose bodily organs. Human nature, on this theory, therefore, can be a unity, a composite of two substantial principles, each incomplete and complementing the other and forming together a single substance. This is the first step to the making of human acts possible, for a nature at war with itself cannot act in an integrated fashion.
We must conclude that Hartmann has not given a satisfactory answer to the question: In what does human goodness consist? Nevertheless, from this critique of his work, a very important principle emerges on which the answer to that question must be based. That principle is that being and value are inseparably and indivisibly one. Hartmann has separated them at the cost of intelligibility. To separate value from being is to render it unintelligible, for, being is the principle of intelligibility.

Value is nothing else than being considered under a different formality, as that which satisfies a desire or appetite. Hence Aristotle defined goodness as that which all things desire. But only something (i.e., an actually existing thing) can satisfy a desire. If I desire money, for instance, I don't desire it in idea, but in actuality. In so far as anything is actual, it can satisfy a desire, and hence, in so far as a thing is, it is good. To separate a thing from its goodness, as Hartmann does, is to separate it from its being, which is absurd. A thing cannot be apart from its being. Goodness, therefore, is essentially a characteristic of reality. Everything which is, either actually or potentially, is good. Being, therefore, is a super-excellent perfection. In itself it implies no imperfection. The reason why there are limited perfections is that there are limited beings. But if there were a being who is being unrestricted and unlimited, a being whose very essence it is to exist, that being would be infinitely perfect and infinitely good.

This kind of goodness which is synonymous with being, is called metaphysical or ontological goodness. There is also two further divisions of goodness, physical goodness and moral goodness.

Physical goodness is the goodness of a being that has everything which naturally belongs to it. For example, a horse may have good sight or good hearing, but unless he has
everything which naturally belongs to a horse, he is not a good horse.

But there are also some beings, who in addition to those things which naturally belong to them, also have certain capacities or potentialities to be what they are not yet. Moral goodness is the goodness of such a being who has the power, by the acts controlled by his rational free-will, to obtain that which constitutes the satisfaction of these capacities. That is the question which we must investigate in the last section. That object constitutes the satisfaction, and hence the goodness, of that being who, in addition to his natural appetites, also have higher desires, the desires of the intellect and the will. To this question Hartmann cannot give a satisfactory answer because of his ethical atheism.
So far this critique has been concerned only with pointing out a certain ultimate unintelligibility that lurks in the thought of Nicolai Hartmann. That does not mean, however, that his work has no value. Indeed, there are many lessons to be learnt from Hartmann. Compared with certain other philosophies his work ranks relatively high. Far is he removed, for instance, from the hedonism of Hobbes who endeavoured to deduce morality from man's lowest appetite, or from Hume's empiricist attempt to found morality on statistical laws of behaviour. Hartmann's philosophy is built on the firm conviction that no hedonism and no empiricism can give a satisfactory explanation of morality. Further, he has recognised the far higher and nobler desires of the intellect and the will, which is to his credit, in spite of his failure to single out and make known to us that object which constitutes their satisfaction. Furthermore, Hartmann compares favourably even with his master Kant. In so far as he endeavours to found his values objectively, his philosophy bears witness to the profound truth that human reason cannot be the sufficient reason for the categorical imperative. However, as we have seen, in that very objectivity lies embedded the seeds of another discrepancy, for objectivity without reality is meaningless.

A just estimation of Hartmann's work must also take into account his compelling arguments for the freedom of the will which only lack the conclusive force of a demonstration due to a certain weakness in the metaphysical substructure. Further, there are also many true judgements embedded in his work, for instance his often repeated dictum that the will can only desire what is valuable, or, that what is good for
us is not subject to our passing whims, but is unchangeable like the fundamental requirements of our natures which it satisfies. But Hartmann does not succeed in giving the sufficient reason for these truths.

These are only a few of the many points in Hartmann's favour. However, we cannot enlarge on them here, for the problem of which Hartmann has failed, still awaits a solution. The question is whether there is a supreme good which renders the human act itself, and our ethical judgements concerning its good and evil, intelligible.

Although this critique has brought us to a negative conclusion so far, nevertheless, certain results have emerged which enable us to formulate positively the conditions which the supreme good must satisfy. In the first place, it must actually be (not ideally like Hartmann's values), for only that which is actually can be the sufficient reason for the actual human act. Secondly, it must be intelligible per se. To satisfy this condition, it must not only be, but be in such a manner that it is the cause of its own being, for that which refers beyond itself for its cause, must also refer beyond itself for its intelligibility (i.e., for its reason of being). The sufficient reason for the goodness of human acts must also be the sufficient reason of its own being. In other words, it must not only actually be, it must be a se.

In order to discover, therefore, the sufficient reason for the human act, we must prove the existence of a being a se. Such a being, if it exists, will be the final explanation of the human act, and will be the final cause of its goodness, for as we have seen, being and goodness are convertible terms, and a thing is intelligible in so far as it has being. Therefore, if we can prove the existence of a being who is not in some mode or other, but who is being unlimited, that being will also be unlimited intelligibility and unlimited goodness, and we will have found the intelligible cause of the
of the goodness of human acts.

That God, who is Being a se exists, can be proved by the natural reason alone through the argument by analogy. In general outline this argument consists in proving God's existence from the existence of his creation. By considering the nature of created things, we see that although they are, they are not their own reason of being, and to explain their actual existence there must be an actual being who is the reason of his own being. Nevertheless, although God's existence can be proved out of the mouth of his creation, we cannot by such means gain a knowledge of the essence of God. That could only be known in itself, not by means of its effects. The analytical argument, therefore, has its limitations. But that is no reason for discarding it. Although it is an imperfect knowledge, it is nevertheless genuine and true. In fact, analogical knowledge is knowledge proper to the status of the human intellect which, as we have seen, attains primarily to the essence of sensible being because it is an embodied intellect. Whatever exceeds its nature, it knows through this object, imperfectly, but genuinely. To take an example, a weak eye, although it does not see its object with the same richness of detail as a normal eye, or an eye looking through a lense, nevertheless perceives truly in so far as it perceives. The human intellect, in so far as it is an intellect, can attain to the cause of all being, although it cannot exhaust the nature of that cause.

The doctrine of analogy is the only means by which we can steer a safe middle course between the two extremes represented on the one hand by Hartmann, and on the other by the pantheists. Hartmann, in order to keep his values pure, places them so far distant from reality, that all connections with the real is between them are broken. The pantheists, on the other hand, place the world so near to God, that the two merge into one.
The doctrine of analogy, however, makes possible a transcendent creator distinct from the world, but He is not, like Hartmann’s values, so far remote as to make all knowledge of Him impossible. Every effect bears some likeness to its cause, and analogical knowledge of the Cause consists in tracing out this likeness.

Before we can prove God's existence, we must first explain what the term analogy means. When, for example, we consider the nature of created things, we can at least draw one conclusion, namely that they exist. We also see that their existence is of such a kind that they can come into being and can also lose their being. They have certain powers of causing other beings to come into being, they are called efficient causes. They also have certain perfections. We call them true, good or beautiful. But in what sense can this knowledge help us? Can we apply it immediately to God? Do we affirm God’s existence in the same sense as we affirm the existence of created beings? Do we mean that God is a cause in the same sense as, for instance, a carpenter is a cause of a table? Do we mean that God has perfections in the same sense as creatures? And if we answer in the negative, must we thereby understand that the reason why we apply terms like “existence”, “cause”, or “perfection” both to God and to creatures, is wholly different, and that it is only by chance that we call both God and creatures “causes”, beings that exist or beings which have perfections? The answer lies in the doctrine of analogy.

Aristotle defined analogy as that by which different things are called by the same name because, although they are simply different, they are relatively the same. Analogous things are equivalent not by chance, but by plan, or similar according to proportion. There are two kinds of analogy. The one is analogy of attribution or proportion, the other analogy of proportionality. According to the first, the analogous ple-
ment is an external attribution of all except one, which is the principal analogate. Thus, for instance, color, air, medicine, food or animal are called healthy by the analogy of attribution or proportion, because the analogous element health is extrinsic to all except the animal, in which it is intrinsic. Nevertheless, the others are called healthy because of a certain proportion which they have to the health of an animal. This is not the kind of analogy which we can affirm of God, because if we did, we would mean, when for instance we say that God is good, that goodness is not intrinsic to God, but that relative to creatures He is good as the cause of their goodness.

**Analogy of proportionality** derives, not from the proportion of one or more things to a principal, but from a similitude of proportions which obtains between things. The analogous element is intrinsically in each of the analogates. In each, however, it is different, but proportionally it is the same in all. Analogy of proportionality is divided into **metaphysical** and **proper** analogy. Thus according to **analogy of metaphysical proportionality** we call the lion the king of beasts, because as a king is above his subjects so the lion is above the animals, although properly speaking, kingship belongs only to men. The absolute perfections of God are not predicated metaphorically. But perfections which formally contain an imperfection are predicated of Him metaphorically, such as, for example, that He is angry, which means that He has the virtue or the power of acting like an angry man, when He punishes.

**Analogy of proper proportionality** is found when the common element is present properly in the diverse analogates, though it may be found in a more perfect mode in the principal analogate. Thus, for example, being is predicated both of substance and accident because substance stands to its being
as accident stands to its being. Analogy of proper proportionality can again be sub-divided according as there is or is not a determinate distance between the analogates. Analogy of proper proportionality with determinate distance exists along with analogy of attribution. Thus, for example, we can say that a rabbit is healthy, meaning that it is good to eat, but a rabbit can also be intrinsically healthy, so that a rabbit stands to its health as a man stands to his health. This is the kind of analogy existing between created substance and accidents, for created substance is to its being as accident is to its being. But this kind of analogy can also not be used to predicate something of God and creatures for then creatures would stand in the same relation to their being as God stands to His, and they would be of the same order as God; God's being and perfections would be measured by theirs.

There is, however, also analogy of proper proportionality without determinate distance. Thus, for example, sensation and intellection are both entitled in a proportionate sense to be called knowledge; for sensation is to the sensible object what intellection is to the intelligible object. It is by means of this ultimate kind of analogy, i.e. analogy of proper proportionality without determinate distance that we can predicate common terms such as being, unity, truth, goodness, beauty, intellect, will, cause, end, etc., both of God and creatures. They are all analogical predications through which we can express truths intrinsic both to God and to creatures because in their formal concept these notions imply no imperfections, i.e. although they are found in limited modes, there is nothing to prevent them from existing in an unlimited mode. We must prove this first of the absolutely

All the errors of agnosticism spring from the reduction of analogical notions to univocals, and hence a denial that they transcend the genera and species. Kant for instance denied all knowledge of God. The notion of causality, for example, he
primary notions of our intellect such as being, unity, truth, and goodness.

If we consider the notion of being, we find that we predicate it of different kinds of entities. Being can, for instance, be predicated by analogy of proper proportionality determinate without distance to a stone, a plant, an animal or a man, though the concept being does not admit of any of the limitations and imperfections essentially inherent in the objects of which it is predicated, because it abstracts from all matter and from every limit of genus and species, being beyond all genera, and separate from every finite mode. Hence there is no reason why this notion should not be predicated of a most perfect being by analogy of proper proportionality without determinate distance. Thus, if we examine the nature of finite beings and find that they are of such a kind that they require a first cause (as we must still prove), then when we affirm the existence of God, we mean it in an analogical sense without determinate distance. Thus there is no reason why we should not affirm that as a finite substance stands to its being, as being by itself, so a most perfect being stands to its own being as to be called being itself.

The same holds good for the other transcendental, as they are called. We have already seen in our critique of Hartmann that being and goodness are one. Goodness is being taken under the formality of desirability. Goodness therefore is also an analogical notion. Although found in imperfect modes, it involves no imperfections in its proper formality because it abstracts from the imperfect modes. Thus when we speak of a good fruit, a good horse or a good man, we apply the common term analogically. Fruit is good for eating, a said, cannot be applied to God for the notion in itself implies limitation and to apply it to God is to limit God. According to him the principle of causality states that every cause must have a cause. To say, therefore, that God is a cause wouldn't imply that God is in His turn caused. This difficulty, however, arises from making causality a univocal. But this is not neces-
horse is good for a journey, a virtuous man is good because he does good and draws others to doing good. But goodness, just like being, transcends the imperfections of these limited modes. Therefore there is no reason why we should not say that God is good (if we can prove that He exists) for in itself there is no imperfection in the notion of goodness which prevents it from expressing goodness in an infinite mode.

The same holds good of unity and truth; for unity is the undividedness of being; truth is the conformity of being with the intellect, or, conversely, the conformity of the intellect with the being that measures it. The first is called ontological truth for created things are, in so far as they are in conformity with the exemplary ideas in the divine mind. The second is called logical truth because it exists in the human mind when it is in conformity with the beings outside it.

Therefore "we cannot . . . affirm that these primary notions are insufficient in themselves to enable us to acquire some positive knowledge of God, if He exists. But it is only in a negative and relative way that the divine mode of being, of unity, truth and goodness is known by us, and hence we speak of such goodness as non-finite or supreme."¹

What has been said of the transcendental, being, unity, truth and goodness, must also be affirmed of the notions of efficient cause, end, intellect and will. The notions of efficient and final cause involve no imperfections and are analogical. They are related to being, for they constitute the sufficient extrinsic reasons why a thing is not self-existent.

Causality means nothing else than the bringing of another being into being, and in itself this implies no imperfection. Hence we can affirm this perfection of God, but we deny its limited mode of existence to God. Hence when we say that God is a cause, we must add that He is an uncaused cause. Or, when we say that God exists, we do not mean that He has existence like creatures, but that He is existence, subsisting being.

Now, to cause or produce being implies no imperfection whatever, for it means nothing more than the realisation of something. Of course, God cannot be the formal principle of a being which contains imperfections or limitations, such as heat or light. Nevertheless an agent as agent involves no limitations. There is nothing in the production of being opposed to the nature of an infinite being, and if this is true of being as efficient cause, it is also true of being as the final cause, because as final cause it is the ultimate source of the real order which we perceive in things.

As for the notions of intellect and will, they are also analogical notions. For the intelligence is immediately related to being which is its formal object, and likewise the will is immediately related to goodness which is its formal object. Therefore the intellect and will do not belong to any genus, but are transcendental like being and goodness. It is true that in us intellect and will are called powers or potencies capable of acting and distinct from their numerous acts; but this is merely the finite mode of the intellectual life which, because it is an absolute and analogical perfection, is susceptible of a higher mode. Thus, for instance, in us wisdom is a habit, but formally, or as it is in itself, it abstracts from that mode and denotes simply 'knowledge through first causes', and this involves no imperfection whatever, such as the imperfection of discursiveness. Thus it is not impossible to admit an infinite and eternal wisdom, intellect, will, love, justice, mercy analogically. From this we must conclude that if God exists, then analogically knowledge is possible of Him.

We must now proceed to prove God's existence. This must be a proof a posteriori by a consideration of the nature of things to determine whether the existence of the universe demands the existence of a first cause; that the movement
which is in the universe demands a mover who does not need to be moved himself; that efficient causes demand a cause which is uncaused; that contingent beings demand a cause necessary in itself; that composite and imperfect beings demand an absolutely simple and perfect cause; and that finally, the order in the universe necessarily presupposes an intelligent designer. Therefore a first cause must exist, and all the absolute perfections which are found in the world in a limited degree, must be in Him in an infinite and super-eminent mode, on the grounds that a cause always produces its own likeness for it cannot give what it has not got.

The five classical proofs for God's existence each starts from a different aspect of created being. The first proof considers created being as subject to change; the second as cause; the third as contingent, the fourth as composite and imperfect, the fifth as forming a pattern directed to some end. They are all important for from each some of the divine attributes are deduced. Thus, from the first it follows that God is pure act, from the second that he is being a se, from the third that He is necessary being, from the fourth that He is sovereign goodness and from the fifth that He is the supreme intelligence. They are therefore all important for a development of the divine attributes, but we are mostly interested in the fourth and fifth proofs by which it is proved, not only that God exists, but also that He is the supreme good and supreme intelligence. The first three we shall only deal with shortly.

The first proof starts from the observable fact that there is movement in the world. By this is not only meant physical movement, but also movement of the intellect and the will, in fact it considers all change and becoming, movement in the widest possible sense. The proof from movement rests on two principles, (1) that whatever is in motion is set in motion by another, (2) that in a series of essentially subordinate
movers no infinite regress is possible. The first principle is explained by the Aristotelian doctrine of act and potency. Nothing moves unless it is in potency with regard to that towards which it moves. Yet anything moves in so far as it is in act; for to move is nothing other than to bring something out of potency into act. But nothing can be brought from potency to act, except by the agency of something which is in act. Yet it is not possible for the same thing to be at once both in act and in potency with respect to the same thing, but only with respect to different things. Thus what is hot in act cannot at the same time be hot in potency, but is at the same time potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in respect of the same thing, and in the same manner, anything should be both mover and moved, or that it should move itself. Hence, everything which is moved, must be moved by something else. But this cannot proceed to infinity; for then there would be no first mover, and consequently no other mover; since second movers do not move unless moved by a first mover, just as a stick does not move unless moved by a hand. It is therefore necessary to arrive at a first mover which is moved by none; and this first mover is called God. Therefore God exists.

The second proof of the existence of God is drawn from the conception of efficient cause. It starts from the observable fact that there are efficient causes in the world; for instance, a man makes a table; a bird makes a nest, water makes a channel. On the other hand, no efficient cause can be found which causes itself. The cause being necessarily anterior to the effect, a being to be its own efficient cause, would have to be anterior to itself, which is impossible. Therefore every efficient cause is a caused cause. But in a subordinate series of efficient causes an infinite regress is not possible, for then

the cause of the first would still have to be discovered. Therefore, in order to explain these things which are caused, we must go back to a first efficient cause who is not himself caused, a first cause who is the cause of everything else and who is himself not caused. This is God, therefore God exists.

The third proof is based on the conception of contingency and necessity. Like the others it also starts from the observable fact that there are contingent beings in the world, which can both be and not be, since they are found to be generated and can corrupt. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now, if this were true, every now there would be nothing in existence because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at some time nothing was in existence it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing, either has its necessity caused by something else, or not.

Now, it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we are driven to postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. And this necessary being is called God. Therefore God exists.

1. S.Th. I, q.2, a.3.
2. S.Th. I, q.2, a.3.
Thus far we have proved the existence of an unmoved mo
er, an uncaused cause, a necessary being who is so necessary
that he cannot not be. All these are called God. The fourth
proof argues from the degree of being or perfection in the
world to the existence of an absolutely perfect being in whom
is found in an infinite degree all the absolute perfections
which we only know in their limited mode. We have already con-
sidered these absolute transcendental perfections, such as
being, unity, truth and goodness. Now, starting from the de-
grees of each of these perfections in the world, the fourth
proof argues to the existence of an all-perfect being. This
is the most important proof for our purposes, for it proves
the existence of God as the cause of all the perfections in
the world. Hence every perfection, such as goodness, truth,
intelligence, must be in Him.

The fourth proof starts from the observable fact that
"among beings there are some more and some less good, true,
1
noble and the like." These are all absolute perfections. But
some perfections are mixed, i.e. perfections which contain im-
perfections in their definition, and therefore, although they
are a perfection in some beings, in others they are not. Such
are perfections like laughter, anger, smallness or greatness,
etc. The transcendental also admit of degrees, as we have
seen. It is on these that the proof depends. Here we will on-
ly summarise our earlier conclusions, namely that there are
degrees of being in the world. Likewise there are degrees of
goodness and degrees of truth.

Further, we have also seen that unity, truth and good-
ness are the transcendental properties of being. They are
found in all beings, but in none exclusively. In so far as a
thing is, it is good. But in so far as a thing is, it is also

one and true. Being, unity, truth and goodness are convertible terms.

From these two principles the proof proceeds. If there are beings which are, are true and are good in varying degrees then there must be one supreme being of whom we can say, not only that He is, is true and good, but that He is Being itself. Truth itself and Goodness itself, and this is God. This proof rests on the following principles: "When a perfection, the concept of which does not imply any imperfection, is found in varying degrees in different beings, none of those which possess it imperfectly contains a sufficient explanation for it and hence its cause must be sought in a being of a higher order, which is this very perfection." St. Thomas Aquinas formulates this principle as follows: "More and less are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in different ways something which is the maximum." In this form we can recognise it as the principle on which we based our critique of Hartmann conception of the order of values. The main argument was that wherever there is "lower" and "higher", the presence of the "highest" is presupposed, which is the sufficient reason for the gradation.

This principle which constitutes the major of the proof must in its turn be proved by two other principles.

1. If the same perfection is found in various beings, it is impossible that each should possess it in its own right. It does not possess it in its own right, i.e., exclusively, because other beings have the same perfection.

2. If a perfection the concept of which implies no imperfection, is found in a being in an imperfect state, i.e., mixed with imperfections, this being does not possess this perfection in its own right, but has it from another which possesses it in its own right. In other words, the being, goodness or truth of things can be explained only by that which is being, truth and goodness. For example, all things are beings, but some are 1. Garrigou-Lagrange, p. 308. 2. S. TH. I. Q. 2. A. 3.
more so than others. To say that some things have more being than others, is to say that some beings are more perfect than others, or some beings are more imperfect than others, for a perfect thing is something which is thoroughly or well made. Now, to say imperfection, is the same as saying composition of a perfection with that which limits it. That which limits a being is potency. There are various degrees of being because every degree is more or less limited by the essence into which the existence is received, since essence denotes a capacity for receiving existence. It is in potency to existence, existence does not belong to it by definition. A being is more perfect in so far as its essence is less subject to restrictions and can participate in the act of existence to a greater degree. Every being, therefore, is a composition of a perfecting element (existence) and a limiting element (essence). But every composite being consisting of these two elements demands a cause for it cannot reduce itself from potency to act. In the final analysis this composite being, consisting of essence and existence, presupposes a cause in which there is absolutely nothing of composition, which is not a combination of act and potency, a cause which is pure actuality, whose very essence is to exist, who possesses existence by its own right as that which belongs to its nature, pure subsistent being a se and consequently infinite perfection.

In the same way from the degrees of goodness we must ultimately arrive at a supreme good. All good things which are not goodness itself are good because they have that form or perfection which is goodness. But they have only limited goodness. Limited or imperfect goodness, however, has a meaning only in terms of unlimited goodness. The limited and incomplete goodness could never be good in any way unless it received its goodness from a being who is goodness itself. If
there is no unlimited goodness, it is impossible to have limited goodness. Therefore, if there are good things whose goodness is limited, their actual existence presupposes the actual existence of unlimited goodness. Therefore there must be an actually existing unlimited goodness which is goodness in-itself or absolute goodness.

The same argument holds for truth. Since there are actually existing degrees of truth, there must be an actually existing supreme truth.

We have now established that there is a supreme being a se, complete goodness and complete truth. But this being a se who is full being must be complete goodness and complete truth because in so far as a thing is, it is good and true. So the infinite being a se is infinite truth and infinite goodness. Furthermore, all the other transcendentlperfections can be affirmed of Being a se, such as unity, beauty, and intellect, will be their properties, wisdom, justice and mercy. But when we say that these perfections are in God, we do not mean that they are separate from God's being. They have an ultimate unity in God's being from which they are not different. They are only distinct rationally because of the limitation of our minds which cannot conceive in one concept the infinite all-perfect being. We can conceive God's perfection only by enumerating one after another all the perfections which we know that He possesses. But we must add that though we, through our imperfection can conceive these perfections only singly, yet in reality they are all one and the same simple uncomposed divine being.

The fifth proof for God's existence we can only give in brief. It proves the existence of God as the supreme intellect from the order of the world. We perceive that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly
always in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence they achieve their end not fortuitously, but designedly. Now, whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence as an arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore, some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

We touch upon this proof, not only because it proves that God is the supreme intelligence but also because Hartmann objects to the principle on which it rests, namely, that every natural agent is determined to some or other end. He objects to it on the grounds that what he calls 'cosmic teleology' is incompatible with the freedom of the will. If the cosmos is moving to a predetermined end, then the human being who is also immersed in the natural order, must likewise be predetermined and hence cannot be held responsible for his actions. But further, 'cosmic teleology' implies an orderer moving the world towards its end, a conclusion which Hartmann thinks we have no justification for accepting. However, it must be asked whether a denial of the principle of finality makes morality and freedom any more possible. Hartmann himself admits that it does not, when considering the problem of freedom. Morality is possible only in a world which is through and through causally determined, where stone drop, where by the act of sight we see and don't hear, an acorn produces an oak and not a lime, for only in such a world can we foresee the consequences of our acts. This is what the principle of finality states, namely, that every natural agent is determined to a specific effect. Thus a stone is determined to drop, an eye to sight, an acorn to...
an oak tree, and since determined effects are uniformly produced by agents, they cannot produce the effects by chance; it must be by design, as the fifth proof argues. Must we, therefore, conclude with Hartmann that such a world leaves no scope for freedom of the will? Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. For instance, nothing that we can do can alter the fact that under certain specified conditions water boils at 100°C. But that does not mean that we are determined to boil this pint of water or to leave that pint unboiled. Although, therefore, we are determined in a sense, there is still scope for freedom. Hartmann has confused the Aristotelian doctrine of finality with the doctrine of finalistic determinism according to which the will is determined by the same kind of necessity as a physical object, and has as little power of avoiding its destiny which has been predetermined as, for instance, a stone has when it is dropped. But this position is far removed from the principle of finality. Although it is true that every agent, whether natural or human, necessarily tends towards an end, yet different kinds of agents are determined towards their end by different kinds of necessity. Thus, after having stated the principle of finality, St. Thomas adds: "Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer, who directs his action to the end. Therefore, those things that are possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions, through their free-will which is the faculty of will and reason. But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by themselves.....Consequently it is proper to the rational
nature to tend to an end, as directing and leading itself to the end; whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as in the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge.¹

The principle of finality is therefore not incompatible with freedom, and Hartmann's objection to it is invalid. Hence, the fifth proof, which rests on this principle, is a valid proof.

We have now proved the existence of God from five different starting points, namely, from movement, causality, contingent being, degrees of perfection and from the order in the universe. We gave special attention to the fourth proof which proves the existence of God as the all-perfect Being. We must now turn to a consideration of the divine attributes. However, before we proceed, we must ask whether there is among all God's perfections one which stands out above all the others, and which first and foremost distinguishes God from all other creatures? There is one, and that perfection is Being a se. This is what first and foremost distinguishes God from all other beings, for all beings except God are caused, and they are not their own sufficient reason, while God is uncaused, and He is His own sufficient reason. He is uncaused because it is His very essence to exist, and that can be said of no other being. Further, all the other perfections can be deduced from Being a se, for they are nothing other than the transcendental perfections of being existing in Him in the highest degree of perfection. They are simplicity or unity, truth, goodness or perfection, intellect and will and their properties wisdom, justice and mercy. From these many more can be deduced, such as His immensity, infinity, eternity, but we must

1. S.Th.I.II.Q.1.A.2. 2. When we say that God is
limit ourselves to the three divine attributes, namely, goodness, intellect and will.

We have already proved God's goodness a posteriori. The same conclusion can also be reached by an a priori deduction from Being a se. A being who is a se must be absolutely simple. There is no composition of act and potency in Him. He is pure act. But the being who is Being a se is also the first efficient cause of all being and therefore He must be most perfect, for only that can give being, i.e. actuality to something which is already in act. Hence, since the first efficient cause is pure actuality, it must also be the most perfect being, for a thing is perfect in proportion to its actuality. Further, the first cause of all being must contain all created perfections because every effect virtually pre-exists in the cause. These effects, however, not only pre-exist in the cause, they pre-exist in a more perfect manner because they exist non-materially, and matter is the principle of imperfection.

From this it follows that God is pre-eminently good for a thing is good when it is desirable. But all things necessarily desire their own perfection, and by desiring it, they necessarily desire God Himself, for the perfection of an effect consists in a certain likeness to its cause. Hence desirability and goodness are attributable to God.

But God is not only good, He is the Supreme or Sovereign good, for He is the supreme desirable, all desired perfections flowing from Him as from their first cause. Further, God is essentially good, i.e. it is His very essence to be good, there is no accidental or acquired goodness in Him as there is in us. Since God is the sovereign Being a se, we do not mean that He merely has a different kind of being from creatures. God's being does not fall into any genus, but transcends all as the cause of all genera.
good who is essentially good, He is the final end of all things, for it is in the nature of the good to be an end, and of the supreme good to be the supreme or final end. We can therefore say that God is the source of all goodness, He causes it in three ways. Either as exemplary cause:ing far as all things are more perfect the more they bear a likeness to the divine perfection which is called exemplary perfection; as efficient cause in that He is the cause of the being of all things; and as final cause in so far as all things are attracted to Him as their last end. "Each of these beings acts only in order to attain by means of its operations the perfection which is proper to it and thereby to realise its end which is to represent God." But each thing tends towards its final end in a manner peculiar to its own nature. Hence inanimate beings, or animate beings devoid of knowledge tend to God, because in possessing their own being, they participate in a likeness to God who created them. Man, however, tends to his final end in a manner peculiar to an intelligent creature, i.e. with knowledge of his end and freely willing it. Hence the final end of all things is the same, but the manner in which they attain to it is different.

That God is intelligent can also be deduced a priori from his definition i.e. Being a go. It follows from Being a go that God is absolutely immortal for He is unlimited existence, pure act, and since matter is that which is in potency, there can be no matter in Him. But, as we have seen, immateriality is the root of cognition. Hence plants, for example, have no knowledge for their form is wholly immersed in matter. But sense is cognitive because it can receive the sensible qualities of things free from matter. The intellect is still further cognitive because it knows things

more perfectly abstracted from matter. But the divine intellect is absolutely and completely immaterial. Therefore God must be supremely intelligent.

In God, however, His intellect is not a faculty distinct from His being or from the object known, as it is in us. His intellect and His being are identical, and the object of His intellect is also His own being. Hence in God the supreme degree of intelligence is combined with the supreme degree of intelligibility, for a thing is intelligible to the degree of its immateriality, and since God is in the highest degree immaterial, He is in the highest degree intelligible. Further, there is no time when God is not knowing Himself. The divine essence as intellect is always in the act of cognizing, and the divine essence as intelligible is always in the act of being cognised. Hence there is no distinction between the divine essence as knowing subject, the intellect, the idea, the act of intellectuation and the divine essence as known. God knows, He knows by Himself and He knows Himself. God's intellect and His being are eternally interlocked in the act of self-contemplation. Further, God's intellect is the only power adequate to the divine essence as intelligible. No other being, by its own natural powers, can know God as God knows Himself. That would mean identification with God, for God's being is penetrated through and through by His intelligence so that the one is not distinguishable from the other.

The divine essence is called the primary object of the divine intelligence. That does not, however, mean that God knows only Himself. In knowing Himself, He knows all things, because, through contemplating His own being He sees it as imitable in an infinite number of ways. This is

called the secondary object of the divine intelligence. God, therefore, does not know things by turning His gaze away from Himself. His knowledge would then suffer in its perfection, for every other intelligible object is inferior to the divine being. The divine knowledge is just the reverse of ours. We know things because they are. Things are because God knows them. He knows them not only in a general fashion, but in all their particularity, for even the particulars remotely participate in the divine perfections. Further, He knows not only actual things but also possible things, for He knows also the possibilities of Himself. Lastly, God knows future contingencies, for He sees all things in the eternal present.

However, God's knowledge is not the only condition for the being of things. Before they are, God must also will them to be, and in willing them, will Himself as their end. Hence we must prove that in God there is will.

That in God there is will follows from the fact that He is intelligent. For the good as known constitutes the proper object of the will; so that as soon as the good is known, it must also be willed. Hence a being which knows the good, must also be endowed with will. But God is supremely intelligent, He knows being at the same time under the formality of being and goodness. Hence in God there must be will. Further, like God's intellect, God's will is not a faculty separate from His being. His will is His very essence. Similarly, the primary object of the divine will is the divine essence which it necessarily wills, for the divine essence is the object of the divine intellect, and what the intellect knows, the will necessarily wills. But the first act of the will is love. Hence God loves Himself, and He loves Himself as much as He is lovable, which is infinitely. This does not mean, however, that God's love for Himself is
egoistic. Egoism consists in loving oneself more than the supreme good. But God is the supreme good, as we have proved, so that in loving Himself, He loves the supreme good, and hence there is no egoism in His love. Further, God loves Himself with a constancy that never wavers. He cannot but adhere to the supreme good, for the loving subject and object loved are absolutely identified in Him. God's love of Himself is called a holy love because His love is an unchangeable purity. He is never inconstant in willing and performing the good. On the other hand, impurity consists in not adhering to the supreme good, but in adhering to a created good which must necessarily be inferior to the supreme good.

In loving Himself, God also loves all things, and His love is a creative love, i.e. all things come into existence because God loves them, and He loves them because of His super-abundant goodness. God wills and loves Himself necessarily, but everything else He wills and loves freely. Creation is an absolutely free act. The existence of creatures is a gratuitous gift for the goodness of God is independent of any creature. Nothing can be added to it by the goodness of any creature. When God wills creatures, He primarily wills Himself, and only secondarily creatures as ordained to Him. That does not mean that His willing Himself as the end is the cause of His willing creatures as the means. Just as God knows the effect in the cause, although His knowledge of it is not caused by knowing the cause, so in willing the end, God wills the means as ordained to their end, but the end is not the cause of His willing the means.

From these three divine attributes we must conclude that we have found a Being who combines in Himself the supreme degree of goodness with the supreme degree of intel-

ligibility, and hence we can say that that which constitutes the goodness of human acts (its final end) is at the same time that which makes it intelligible. Therefore if we say that the goodness of the human act consists in being directed to God who is man's final natural end, we can give an intelligible reason for this judgement, for the final end and the sufficient reason of the human act is one and the same Being. The goodness of the human act consists in being directed to that Being whose essence it is to be good and who contains the goodness of all things in a super-eminent mode. Its sufficient reason is that same Being who is through and through intelligible to itself. God is both the final and efficient cause of the human being and his acts, so that when the human being moves to its final end, it is simultaneously moving to that being who is the sufficient reason of its existence. Hence we must conclude that to take away the intelligibility of an act as Hartmann does is to take away its goodness. Further, to make the human act unintelligible, is to make the existence (1) of moral behaviour, and (2) of moral philosophy, impossible; for, as we have seen, nothing can be without a sufficient reason. Hence nothing would move our wills to act unless there were a supreme good which is its own sufficient reason and the sufficient reason for the goodness of everything else, whether we know Him as the supreme good, or whether without knowing Him, we act in conformity with the hierarchy of goods. The second conclusion also follows, for ethics is the activity of explaining act through first principles. But an explanation in terms of that which endlessly refers beyond itself and never comes to rest in a final term, is no explanation. Because of his ethical atheism Hartmann cannot make clear to us why there should be a science of ethics and moral behaviour rather than not.
We must now go on to discover the difference that the existence of a final end which is per se intelligible makes to ethics. In other words, we must ask where a Christian ethics differs from Hartmann’s. The main deficiency of Hartmann’s ethics is that it is unrealistic. It is based on a false theory of human nature and is not applicable to man as he really is, half animal, half spirit. This deficiency is supplemented by a Christian ethic, for it endeavours to regulate human action according to that which is good for real men. The first question that it must settle is what human nature is. We have already defined humanity as rational animal. Next it must endeavour to establish the general moral laws by a consideration of the natural human appetites and the objects which constitute their satisfaction. This is largely a matter of experience. We know from experience that we have various appetites springing from both sides of our nature. There is first of all a physical appetite. Such for example is the appetite for existence. Then there are sensitive appetites, springing from our animal nature. Such, for example, are appetites for food, sex, etc. Lastly, there is in us a cognitive appetite springing from the intellectual side of our nature. Now, all acts are good which are directed to the objects that satisfy these appetites. But, since a strict hierarchical order obtains between these objects, a corresponding order obtains between the appetites. For example, the object of the physical or vegetative faculty is comparatively narrow, and hence it is called the lowest appetite. The object of the sensitive faculty is much wider and therefore it is higher than the vegetative faculty, while the will is the highest or master appetite, for its object is the widest, embracing the objects of all the other appetites.

It is in the satisfaction of this highest intellectual appetite that the goodness of man consists. We must now determine the object which constitutes the satisfaction of this appetite. Since the will is an intellectual appetite, and as the proper object of the will is being in general, the proper object of the will, which necessarily wille that which the intellect knows, must be goodness in general. But nothing short of the 'infinite' can satisfy the capacity of the will. Therefore the infinite good - God himself - is the final objective end of the will.

The proper object of the will having been determined, ethics can set about to regulate human action according to it. Since, however, it is not immediately evident which actions lead to man's final natural end, ethics must find some link between the act and the final end. The criterion of the goodness of an act is that "a man tends to the ultimate natural end when he tends to the immediate natural end of his own being as man," i.e., the if his actions lead, not to the frustration, but to the satisfaction of the legitimate tendencies of his nature. Since therefore we have proved that the good of man is an intellectual good, the goodness of his acts must consist firstly, in reason contemplating its rightful object, being, and secondly, in the will freely pursuing that good which is made known to it by the reason.

However, practical reason is only the proximate rule of human actions. In its turn it depends on a principle which directs it, and to which it must conform, for it prescribes or forbids a certain line of action to guide us to our final end. Hence, more than on reason the goodness of the human act depends on its end, for, "just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object (or end), as movement from its term."

1. The Science of Ethics, p. 70
2. The Science of Ethics, p. 125. 3.5 Th. 1, 11 Q. 18 A. 4.
Further, since we have defined the final end as Being, we may say that an action is good in so far as it participates in being, while a deficiency in its being constitutes moral evil. Finally, the more being an action has, the more intelligible it is, the less being it has, the less intelligible it is.

To deviate, therefore, from the prescriptions of reason, is ultimately to deviate from our final end and from God's eternal law. The natural moral law by which we are commanded to act rationally, not to frustrate our nature, but to obey its legitimate tendencies, is nothing but the eternal law as imprinted on creatures. "The eternal law...may be said to be 'written' in our hearts. If reason is the rule whereby the goodness or malice of our actions are measured, it owes it to this supreme rule, which is itself but a ray of the divine reason, shining in us by way of participation." The eternal reason of God envelops human reason, providing a basis and sanction for its prescriptions. "The light of reason within us is able to show us good things, and guides our will, in so far as it is the light of His countenance. It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human will depends upon the eternal law much more than on natural law; and when therefore human reason fails we must have recourse to the eternal reason."

The eternal law is called the external principle of moral action. However, moral acts, i.e. acts of will directed by reason to the final end, also presuppose an inner principle, namely the habits of virtue which equips the soul's energies for their tendency towards their last end, and keep them directed to it. Initially the will is in potency with respect to that which constitutes its good, and before it can actually will the good, it has to be act-

rated by the virtues. Now, we may ask, what is a virtue?

Essentially it is an operative habit i.e. a quality whereby an agent who is naturally indifferent to a certain course of action, or its opposite, comes to be permanently directed to the course which leads to the good, than to the other.

There are intellectual and moral virtues, the former being concerned with the well-disposing of the intellect, the latter with that of the will. In the intellect there is one perfect virtue, i.e. a virtue which not only gives us the power to act well; but also inclines us to the right action. This is the virtue of prudence and it is concerned with finding the right means which will lead to the final end, and moves us to take those means. The moral virtues, on the other hand, are in the will, and they direct it to its final end. There are four cardinal virtues corresponding to the four distinct rational powers in man. They are (1) practical reason (2) the rational will (3) the concupiscible appetite and (4) the irascible appetite. The corresponding virtues are prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude, the first enabling reason to discover the acts that lead to the last end; the second determining the will to seek the good which is due to others; the third restraining the wanton rush of concupiscence after pleasure; and the fourth encouraging a man to be bold when otherwise he would fight shy of the difficulties.

Just as human reason is based on the eternal law, so human virtues have their exemplar in the divine being. Hence St. Thomas writes: "The soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue; this something is God; if we follow Him we shall live aright. Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. According -

ly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of exemplar virtues; so that in God the Divine Mind may be called prudence, while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself; even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works." God, therefore is the exemplary cause of human virtue, and we may say that a virtuous man is a man who fixes his gaze on his final end and strives with all his powers towards the attainment of the divine similitude. Any account of the virtues, therefore, which leaves out the final end, thereby omits the raison d'être of the virtues and render them unintelligible.

How far this is true of Hartmann's account can be seen by comparing his treatment of purity with Dietrich von Hildebrand's "Defence of Purity." We shall first give von Hildebrand's exposition.

What according to von Hildebrand does purity mean? He answers that it is a virtue, and to explain this more fully, he compares it with temperament. What is the difference between virtue and temperament? Temperament is merely a personal idiosyncrasy. It involves no freely chosen attitude to values, but is simply 'given' like a physical characteristic, and is not capable of alteration by the will. A virtue, on the other hand, always involves the distinctive apprehension of values and a corresponding response to them. That does not, however, mean that a virtue is inevitably attained with difficulty. On the contrary, there are people who have been virtuous from their childhood; others, again have only attained it by struggle. Difficulty of attainment is therefore not a criterion of virtue. The distinction must rather be sought in the value involved and the attitude of the subject. The possession of a favou-
rable temperament does no more than make the attainment of virtue easier. But the quality of a virtue differs from that of temperament. While temperament is a natural endowment, a virtue is the work of a rational will responding in a suitable manner to a value perceived. As soon as this habitual response ceases, the virtue is lost. On the other hand, a temperamental disposition is never lost by a lack of the will's response to the world of values.

What, then are the values that the pure man perceives, and to which his purity implies assent? In the first place, says von Hildebrand, a virtue always involves not only a perception, but also an understanding of the positive value of the virtue itself and the negative value of the opposite vice. Wherever a pure man meets purity, he perceives it as a positive value and understands its beauty. Wherever he meets impurity, he understands the negative value involved. But this is not the sole perception of value to which purity is a response. What then is the specific value of purity? To this von Hildebrand answers as follows:

"It is the splendour which attaches to everything united indissolubly with God the Holy of Holies, and pre-eminently to that which reflects the light of holiness, which the pure man beholds, on which his gaze is fixed unswervingly. The brightness of His countenance to Whom the angels chant their Trisagion, which is, indeed, incompatible with any negative value, that is, with anything evil, but stands in special opposition to particular evils, is apprehended by the pure in its clear, resplendent and immaculate beauty, and willed by an unreserved surrender. It is the surrender to this splendour which formally constitutes purity. We are now better able to understand why the pure lives more than others in God's presence. His countenance is turned to God, and he rejects everything whose nature is in any way incom-
patible with this splendour and cannot endure the divine
game." Purity, in fact, is not a specific value. It belongs
to all the values in so far as they relate to God. But
purity itself is not a surrender to the sum-total of values.
Essentially it involves a surrender to the value of the splen-
dour of God's holiness.

This is the first and foremost condition of
purity. But secondly, human purity, in contradistinction to
that of sexless beings like angels, also involves a parti-
cular attitude to sex, the acceptance of its positive value
and the rejection of the negative value. That does not mean,
however, that human purity consists exclusively in a surren-
der to the positive values of sex; for virginity, chosen in
obedience to the divine will, is the ideal form of purity.
The positive values of sex which make it pure are the employ-
ment of the faculty in accordance with the divine prescrip-
tions only, a regarding of it as a mystery belonging to
god, and not to be used unless He gives His express permi-
sion in the sacrament of matrimony, and strict control so
as not to abandon oneself to the pleasures of isolated sex,
for the pure man recognizes the diabolical havoc that the
misuse of sex creates, and the unique separation from God
that is its effect.

To understand the virtue of purity completely,
Von Hildebrand says that it must be made absolutely clear
that it is essentially a virtue requiring a supernatural
foundation. To elucidate this he compares purity which is
a creation of the spirit, with natural purity. Natural
purity is a virtue. It involves the perception of the nega-
tive value of impurity in particular instances, and its re-
jection. Nevertheless, the perception of value by the natu-
ally pure lacks two factors of decisive importance. (1) It

1.Dietrich von Hildebrand—In Defence of Purity,p.66.
is merely the perception of a particular concrete value, not a permanent knowledge of the virtue of purity. (2) The understanding of the value of purity by the naturally pure is superficial. They do not understand that a surrender is due to it, whatever may be their natural inclination.

The value involved, is also different in each case. While purity in the strict sense is the splendour which shines from the countenance of God, in the case of the naturally pure it is the cleanliness of nature as opposed to the oppressive atmosphere of sex isolated as its own end.

That the perfect spirit-created virtue of purity demands a supernatural foundation, can be seen further from the fact that virtue of a moral man who keeps himself pure not from religious, but ethical motives, lacks substantiality: it is not a quality really belonging to his being, but is something accidental. Only a supernatural union to God can give the will the power of constructing virtues which have the substantiality of habits. Not only does idealistic ethic fail to make virtue something substantial, but also the value at which it aims is something remote from the objective value of purity. The idealist merely rejects the abuse of sex in order to be free from the corrupting poison of isolated sex which may otherwise hamper his flight to the ideal.

The complete virtue of purity, concludes von Hildebrand, is only possible on the basis of a Christian ethic. Only such an ethic can recognise the essentially supernatural foundation of purity, that it springs from the supernatural life of the soul which receives its impetus from God and under that inspiration gives birth to the perfect virtue of purity.

1. In Defence of Purity, p. 73.
2. In Defence of Purity, p. 78.
Diametrically opposed stands Hartmann's account. He agrees with von Hildebrand that purity is the result of perception of a value and a response thereto. But he differs from him both in his conception of virtue and what constitutes the value of purity itself. In the first place, purity for Hartmann is not a virtue consciously attained by the attitude of the will. It is something natural. Purity is the primal state of the ethics before conflict has set in, before real 'life' has begun, before experience and guilt. It falls into the lap of the young... Purity is no merit in one who has it; it was not acquired, it was given. Nevertheless, it has a moral value, for although it cannot be acquired according to Hartmann, it can be lost, and when lost, it can never be regained. Hartmann comes to this conclusion because he gives an almost physical interpretation to the virtue of purity. Purity for him is not the state of the will. It is simply the value which the moral inexperience of the child has. However, if purity is nothing but a gift of nature, as Hartmann maintains, and is not something in the production of which we ourselves have co-operated, then it can have no moral value, and we cannot be blamed for not having it, for the gifts of nature nature can withhold. It does not help to say that its moral value lies in the fact that we can retain it, for, Hartmann maintains, as soon as the value comes in question, it is already lost. Hence he speaks of degrees of purity mixed with impurity. He attributes a degree of purity to the mature man who approximates more or less to the ideal purity of childhood. But this is unintelligible, for purity consists in directing oneself to the final end. For Hartmann, however, purity simply means that whatever we do, we must do with concentration and purpose irrespective of the end. But this is absurd, for then the
man pursuing evil purposes singlemindedly, would also be pure.

For Hartmann the value of purity does not involve knowledge of it and its corresponding vice. Purity is "a sort of moral instinct whereby one turns away from evil without any proper knowledge of good and evil." Purity is merely negative, being nothing but that value of the naturally pure who intuitively exclude everything which is contrary to value from their being.

Hartmann regards purity simply as one among many values. To lose it does not necessarily imply to become immoral. He says, "were purity the one moral value, or even only the central one, that would mean for ethics a radical pessimism. But purity is neither the one nor the other. To dispute over the impossible is folly. Actual life, however, is full to the brim of that which can be striven for and attained."

For von Hildebrand purity is the effect of any virtue, and to lose purity is to become immoral. Although purity is one among many values, yet in a peculiar sense it is all, for in the exemplar to which the pure man directs his gaze, the value of purity is one with all the other values. Purity, therefore, does not imply moral poverty as Hartmann maintains. Just the opposite is true. To be pure is to be morally rich, for it is to be like the divine being in Whom all values are united. This is the solution of Hartmann's antinomies to which, however, he can never attain because of the separation which he makes between ethics and religion.

We must conclude that Hartmann's treatment of purity is a particular example of the unintelligibility into which his atheism plunges him. Separating the natural from the supernatural and considering purity as if it were only a 1.E.Vol.11.p.212. 2.E.Vol.11.p.222.
natural virtue, he misses its central meaning, for purity is essentially a virtue requiring a supernatural foundation.

We have now traced the unintelligibility of Hartmann's thought, both in his account of the human act and of the virtues, to his ethical atheism. However, the problem still remains to unhinge his arguments for atheism, and this must be our final task.

Hartmann's atheism is founded in his conception of personality, a conception which he forms in his critique of Scheler's Doctrine of personality. This theory regards the human personality as pure act and amounts to nothing less than the deification of man. Its error is quite patent, for it is obvious that the human personality is not perfect. As Hartmann points out, we are conscious of the existence of other personalities surrounding us, and on whom we are dependent for the satisfaction of our many needs. We are subject to their actions, and they are subject to ours. From this, however, he draws the conclusion that personality and subjectivity are inextricably bound together, and according to his categorial laws, the subject as the lower form, may exist without personality, but the reverse does not hold. "Personality exists only on the basis of subjectivity, just as subjectivity exists only on the basis of organic life and life only on the basis of the whole subordinate uniformity of nature." Hence, if God is to be a personality, He must also be a subject i.e. He must stand in the relation of reciprocal conditionality to the world. But to widen the concept of personality in this manner, is to make it empty of content. Man alone is strictly speaking a personality, for the unity required for action can only be found in a subject. A collective body, far from being a personality of a higher order, is called a person only analogically (analogy of attribution or proportion). Hence Hartmann concludes that "In the
total perspective which is hereby disclosed, it becomes immediately clear that the two extremes are the limits of personality. In the full primary sense of the word, a person is and remains only the lower extreme, the individual subject, the man. The opposite extreme, the universal, absolute and all-embracing entity, if such exist, is so far removed from being the highest order of person that it must be much rather the lowest order of person, the absolute minimum as regards personality...But this means that the well-understood categorical coherence of this whole perspective proves exactly the opposite of that which personalism tries to prove by it: God—if one succeeds in drawing Him into this perspective—is not the highest and absolute person, but the absolutely impersonal being. The concept of Him, seen from this point of view, would be the negative limiting concept of personality in general."

This is the justification which Hartmann gives for his atheism. It stands or falls with his conception of personality. In order to see whether it is a tenable position, we must ask whether it is true that personality can exist only in an imperfect mode as Hartmann maintains? Is there any imperfection in its formal concept which prevents it from existing in an infinite mode? There is not. A person means nothing more than 'an individual substance of a rational nature'. In itself this implies no imperfection. It is a simply simple or absolute perfection which allows of degrees, but is not to be identified with any of the imperfect modes in which it exists. Hence nothing prevents us from saying of God that He is personal, for He is the individual, the substance and the rational or intellectual nature, as has been proved. Hartmann's difficulties with Theism arises from his interpreting personality as a univocal. If that were so, his objections would hold, and

God would become 'the absolute' impersonal being'. But as we have endeavoured to point out, that is not the true Theistic position. Personality is not to be taken in a univocal sense. It can only be applied to God by analogy of proper proportion without determined distance. That does not mean that personality in God becomes 'utterly transformed'! Although the human and divine personalities are simply different, nevertheless they are proportionally the same. If personality is therefore taken in an analogical and not in a univocal sense, there is no reason why it cannot be affirmed of God, and hence Hartmann's objections to a Theistic personal God fall to the ground.

To conclude, we must assert that Hartmann's philosophy is an unintelligible philosophy. His atheism precludes his thought from the source of all intelligibility. No being but God is per se intelligible and Hartmann values, therefore, cannot be substituted for the God of Christian philosophy. Seen from one angle his philosophy is an attempt to get beyond the standpoint of ordinary idealism, but Plato is no answer to Kant, the ontological status of the 'ideas' is no higher than that of the 'categories'. In fact, the phenomenological method, of which Hartmann speaks with so much self-assurance as if it were the open-seesame to all problems, is but a new form of Kantian philosophy activated by scattered elements of Aristotelianism, as Harbain points out. But in so far as this method leads Hartmann no further than the contemplation of his innate ideas, which have no objective foundation but are merely figments of his own mind, it cannot help him to solve any problems of reality. Viewed from another direction, however, Hartmann's thought is fatally afflicted with theism by Kantian agnosticism. The separation between ethic and religion which appears in his philosophy is but the
legacy bequeathed to him by Kant. We have seen, in its various phases the unintelligibility into which this position plunges ethics, and unless we are to take our leave from morality (for we believe that on Hartmann's presuppositions: morality is not possible) we must assert the absolute relation between the truth of Theism and the possibility of moral behaviour and moral philosophy. Ethical atheism is a contradiction in terms. Ethics implies Theism.
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