THE
SEPARATION MOVEMENT
DURING THE PERIOD OF
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
AT THE CAPE
1854 - 1872.

A Thesis
for the degree of M.A.
by Noël H. Taylor.
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PREFACE

In attempting to deal with the separation movement between the two Provinces during the period of Representative Government, we have adopted a standpoint different from that generally assumed by writers on the question. The majority have considered the agitation that emanated from the separation party a matter of the Eastern against the Western Province, and their attitude to the problem has been shaped largely by their estimation of the desirability of sub-dividing the Colony and the justice or otherwise of the demands from the East. We have not neglected these important aspects, but from the outset we have endeavoured to reveal that the 'East' was merely a territorial term, and not a homogeneous party. Thus our standpoint has been that of the spectator in the East watching the wholly English-speaking frontier party ceaselessly and unavailingly struggling to secure an extension of local government against the determined antagonism of the predominantly Dutch-speaking midlands. Moreover, we trust that we have shown that had the East, and not merely the frontier party sponsored by Grahamstown, demanded a separate federal government for the province, their wishes would have been granted.

The research necessitated for this work, has assumed a magnitude quite unexpected at the outset, and has been increased by the fact that it can claim to be an investigation into an aspect of the history of the Colony up to the present almost completely neglected. During the period under consideration, the stage was occupied by the bigger issues arising out of the Native unrest all over South Africa, the breakdown of the Convention Policy and the subsequent attitude adopted by the Colonial Office, internal events within the Republics, and towards the close, the Cape's
achievement of Responsible Government. As a result our first problem was the scantiness of authoritative information on the Eastern Province.

Gowy's monumental work which deals in such detail with the East was not extended beyond 1854 owing to his untimely death. Theal, although dealing with Cape affairs at this time, clearly did not investigate the separation issue, and generally merely set forth the views of Grahamstown as being those of the East. Walker devotes little more than one chapter to the whole of South Africa in this period, and has perforce, to neglect the internal workings of Cape politics, and is useful almost solely as a vade mecum. For the understanding of general affairs in South Africa the value of the works of de Kiewiet and Uys cannot be over-estimated, but both, as their authors concede, deal with South Africa as a whole and particularly with affairs beyond the boundaries of the Cape. On the few occasions when de Kiewiet refers to separation in order to illustrate the difficulties of Wodehouse, his generalizations are often but half truths, and in the case of Uys it is hard to resist the conclusion that had he studied the regular monthly reports from the Agents in the Native Reserves on the Eastern frontier, his estimate of Wodehouse's attitude to the Republic would have been modified. We feel in regard to his second chapter, that the desire to prevent the Republic gaining an outlet although undoubtedly an important tenet of the Governor's programme, is over-emphasized by his neglect to show how policy in Basutoland was influenced by the position on the Cape frontier. Of the principal works which deal more specifically with the Cape, Molteno can see nothing good in the Separation Party and concentrates on the Western viewpoint. Wilmot, on the other hand, had a strong bias towards Grahamstown and in "Southey" he goes to the opposite extreme. Hofmeyr and Laurence ("Merriman") commence with the last few years of the sixties, and the new volume of the Cambridge History of the British Empire is useful chiefly
for the background of South African affairs. The bibliography indicates the use made of secondary sources but their value has been primarily to provide a background and keep events beyond the boundary of the Cape in their right perspective. The actual material for the thesis, as the footnotes indicate, has been drawn almost entirely from primary sources.

For the official attitude to the question we have gone to the dispatches, but here too, the information on the actual subject is scanty. Grey never expressed his opinion, maintaining that separation was a question to be settled not by the Imperial Government but by the Colonial Legislature, and his attitude has to be inferred from his opposition to the Balkanisation in South Africa. Wodehouse was overwhelmed by difficulties in comparison with which separation became insignificant, so that his references to the frontier party were brief and generally condemning, and Barkly, sent out to bring about Responsible Government and with leanings towards a South African confederation, was openly hostile. Successive Colonial Secretaries, showed themselves clearly opposed to a division of the colony into two distinct sections, but sympathetic to any federal scheme that could win the support of the Colonial Legislature.

Thus the principal source for conditions in the East has been the Press. Starting with the Grahamstown Journal, it soon became clear that to accept its viewpoint as being representative of the East, as is generally done, was fallacious, so our information has been drawn from the press of Grahamstown, Graaff Reinet, and Port Elizabeth, throughout the two decades, and from King William's Town after the annexation of Kaffraria. Clearly it was humanly impossible to study both papers of each of these centres, and we had to decide which was the more representative for each particular section of the Province. Here we were guided by the useful habit which each paper had of printing extracts from the other
centres, and by taking the general consensus of the opinion of the Press of the colony, we decided on the Graaff Reinet Herald for the Midlands, the Eastern Province Herald for Port Elizabeth, and the Kaffrarian Watchman for Kaffraria. Moreover, these were the conservative papers of each centre and were less hostile to the frontier, than the Port Elizabeth Telegraph and the two or three successive papers which supported the liberal cause in Graaff Reinet. Thus when we show them opposing Grahamstown and putting forward a distinctive Midlands viewpoint, it must be borne in mind that we are quoting not only the papers least antagonistic to Grahamstown but those admitted even by the frontier party to be the accredited mouthpieces of their towns.

This dependence upon the Press has meant a work of considerable labour, for each of the leading centres of the East possessed its own distinct viewpoint. Generalizations have thus had to be avoided and the various problems looked at from each corner of the Province. Moreover, unlike the dispassionate, authoritative dispatches, the views of each paper were generally glaringly ex parte and their arguments have required careful investigation and often, a qualified acceptance. The statistics had to be checked from the annual Blue Books. The prominence in the House given to separation and the allied question of the removal of the seat of government and federation, has necessitated the perusal of interminable debates which in the absence of Hansard were printed in the Colonial Press. Moreover, in the absence of any previous treatment of the subject which might serve as a guide, it was not possible merely to concentrate on the periods when the separation was most active for fear of missing vital information, nor was the agitation limited merely to the duration of sessions.

The vastness of the subject of separation is not indicated by the scope of this thesis, which is but a study of the movement at its climax. In some aspects it was the
continuation of the age-old struggle of frontiersmen against the central government, but the main roots of the question are to be discerned in the hostility felt towards the Dutch in the East by certain of the new British Settlers as early as 1830. 

Thereafter grumbles from the frontier were seldom absent and in this present year, over a century after the question was first raised, we have seen a mild revival of separation in the grumbles of Mr. W. M. Harries of East London, a namesake of W. M. Harries who was the leader of the Separation Party during the days of the Separation League in 1860-1862, that the Border is inadequately represented in the Cabinet. For this reason, the absence of any precise knowledge on the question has necessitated a wide initial study of the secondary sources, not only to find out which period best lends itself to treatment but because the agitation was so inseparably bound up with the entire history of the colony from Native Policy to South African confederation.

We have felt this somewhat elaborate defence to be necessary from the fact that we are conscious that this is not a finished work and many aspects still remain to be investigated more fully. From beginning to end, one of our major problems has been to fit this comprehensive subject within the bounds set by a narrow time limit.

NEW MATERIALS.

In a chance search among the miscellaneous records of the Lieutenant Governor's Office at the Cape Archives, we were extremely fortunate in discovering an invaluable collection of semi-official correspondence from the Lieutenant Governors to the Governor. (GH.39/1). Not only does it consist of voluminous correspondence of an informal nature

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x Edwards, Dr. I.E., The 1830 Settlers p.157.
on all the topics of interest in the East, from Jackson (1855-58), Wynyard (1859-63) and Douglas (1863-66), but there are also numerous authoritative reports from the Agents in the Reserves giving a vivid insight into the conditions among the tribes. Moreover, while Grey was in England during his recall, Wynyard, the Acting Governor, kept him well informed on Cape affairs by a detailed monthly summary of events in the colony. These are especially useful for the light they throw on Transkeian affairs in that period - a time when widespread unrest on the frontier kept Wynyard on tenterhooks.

An effort has also been made, without success, to discover the papers belonging to any of those who were prominent in Eastern affairs during the period under consideration. Sir James Rose Innes was approached as being one of the few leading persons likely to have some knowledge of the whereabouts of their descendants, but could offer no suggestions. Mr. Lloyd, of the South African Public Library knows of no private collections of papers relating to the East, nor are there any at the Grahamstown or Port Elizabeth Public Libraries. With the assistance of the latter we have traced the following also without result, who are descendants of those who were prominent in the Separation Party: Mr. H.C. Chase of Uitenhage, a son of J.C. Chase; Mr. Impey of the Port Elizabeth Divisional Council, a descendant of the editor of the Eastern Province Herald; Miss Wood of the Drostdy Grahamstown, and Miss Ayliff of Sandflats. The late Professor Cory had made considerable progress with his next volume before his decease and had completed his chapters dealing with the governmentship of Grey. The manuscript is however not open to inspection, pending the settlement of negotiations in regard to its publication and remains in the custody of Cory's son-in-law, Mr. Ribbink, the Parliamentary Librarian. All his manuscript notes, comprising between 20 and 30 volumes, were bequeathed to the Library of Rhodes University Grahamstown and are known as the Cory Papers.
A word as to some of the terms used. The general agitation for local government emanating from the frontier party has been designated either as the separation movement, or simply as separation. During the fifties and sixties separation had various phases passing from a mere destructive criticism of all things Western to the demand for a loose federation of the two provinces, the removal eastwards of the seat of government in the united colony, and finally the entire separation of the East from the West as a separate colony.

ABBREVIATIONS.

CH. — (Government House). This refers to official manuscripts kept in the Cape Town Archives (See Bibliography).


G.R. Herald — Graaff-Reinet Herald.

E.P. Herald — Eastern Province Herald.


de Kiewiet — British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics.

Uys — In the era of Shepstone.


Walker — A History of South Africa.

Egerton — British Colonial Policy.

Secondary sources have been quoted generally in the name of the author (See Bibliography).

V. A. Taylor,
15th Oct, 1938.
CHAPTER I


THE IMPORTANCE OF WOOL.

THE ISOLATION OF THE FRONTIER.

IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS.

THE GRIEVANCES OF THE EAST.

OFFICIAL SUPPORT FOR SEPARATION.

GRAHAMSTOWN'S FEAR OF 'DUTCH DOMINATION'.

TABLE BAY AND ALGOA BAY AS RIVAL PORTS.
CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

The settlement of the Eastern portions of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope was a natural consequence of the rapid extension (1) of the pastoral frontiersmen during the eighteenth century. Urged on by an insatiable land hunger the advance guard of the Trekboers reached the Zuurveld in the seventies and in 1778 Governor van Plettenberg was compelled to reluctantly extend the frontier to the Fish River. The nearest seats of magistracy were the distant Drostdys of Stellenbosch and Swellendam, so in an effort to maintain control of the frontier, van Plettenberg in July 1786 defined the boundaries of the immense Drostdy of Graaff-Reinet, (2) stretching from the boundaries of Stellenbosch and Swellendam in the West to the Fish on the East, and bordered by the sea and the northern boundary of the colony, an area about one-third of the colony.

Soon afterwards, Uitenhage had been created from the triangular portion of Graaff-Reinet in the south-east, and was further sub-divided when Cradock, after clearing the Zuurveld of Kaffirs in 1813 and founding Grahamstown, had vaguely defined the new district of Albany as "that portion of the district of Uitenhage, formerly called the Zuurveld". In October 1820, Donkin accurately defined the boundaries of Graaff-Reinet, Albany and Uitenhage and in 1835 the new district of Somerset East was formed from portions of Albany and Graaff-Reinet. Meanwhile farmers were being allowed to cross the frontier into the Koonop lands, later the division of

(1) Walker pps. 90-114.
(2) Cory Vol. I pps. 31-2.
Fort Beaufort, and between 1824-29 the boundary established by van Plettenberg was extended to the Orange and eastward to the Stormberg Spruit, while the Kat River Settlement was included within the colony.

In February 1836, when Sir A. Stockenstroom (3) was appointed Lieutenant Governor of the Eastern Province, despite the increased population due to the British settlement and the development of Algoa Bay after it was constituted a free port in 1826, the East consisted solely of the four administrative divisions of Graaff-Reinet (1786), Albany (1820), Uitenhage (1820) and Somerset East (1835). To secure greater efficacy of government, the three new divisions (4) of Colesberg, Cradock and Port Elizabeth, with the necessary civil staffs, were formed in February 1837.

Favourable conditions in the thirties increased the expansion. Traders were penetrating the cattle regions beyond the boundary and by 1834 this trade in ivory, hides and gum was worth £40,000 to Grahamstown; the reduction of English rates on raw materials in the thirties and the abolition of the Wool Rate in 1834, brought increased profits to the wool producers, the value of sheep runs increased and farmers went further north-east in search of cheaper pastures. In 1847, Sir Harry Smith (5) brought these farmers settled around Aliwal North and Burghersdorp within the colony by extending the north-eastern frontier to the 38° line of latitude, and the eastern frontier from the Fish to the Kei Rivers, thus including Kaffraria and the later district of Victoria East. It was within these boundaries that the electoral divisions (6) of Albany, Uitenhage, Fort Beaufort, Victoria East, Albert, Somerset, Colesberg, Cradock and Graaff-Reinet were formed.

(3) Eastern districts government; for text see Eybers p.39.
in the Constitutional Ordinance which came into force on July 1st 1853.

The growing prosperity of the East is reflected by the extension of the frontier and the creation of new administrative divisions. Despite the setback of the Trek, population increased rapidly, due mainly to natural increase but also to the steady flow of farmers from the West, the number of emigrants who followed the 1820 Settlers, estimated by J. C. Chase at 6,000 in 1843, and the slight emigration of the forties. The main stream of European emigration entered America and Canada, but from 1841-44, 837 settlers landed at Port Elizabeth as a result of private enterprise, while after 1845 state aid was responsible for a further 4,185 intended mainly for road construction. In 1806 the European population (7) of the whole colony was 25,757 but by 1843 this had increased to 62,291 of whom 26,032 were in the East.

Eastern prosperity was built on pastoralism. Merino sheep were thriving in Beaufort West, Graaff-Reinet and Cradock, the bulk of the colony's export of hides and skins came from the East, and as the Republics became more settled, trade with the interior increased rapidly. The products of this region passed in a constantly swelling stream through Port Elizabeth which soon became the main importing town for the Eastern districts and the trans-frontier trade with the Republics and the Natives. The following figures (8) strikingly illustrate the growth of the East:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Increase in wool export:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>200 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>1,372,000 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>8,200,000 lbs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7) Walker (footnote) p.144
Chase J.C. Cape of G.H. and Algoa Bay (1843) p.31.
This product alone increased in value from £3,279 in 1834 to £45,985 in 1840 and £59,704 in 1843, while in this same year hides to the value of £27,335 and goat and sheep skins worth £14,653 were exported. The value of land was soaring as an indication of the prosperity despite the temporary slump in land values during the Trek and the depression of the early 'forties.

In the 'thirties and early 'forties the frontier was almost completely isolated from the more settled West. There was to a strong degree the usual hostility shown by all frontier communities the world over to the control of the central authority; the possession of an eastern sea-port made the East independent of the Western harbour, while the distance of the frontier rendered intercourse between East and West difficult and expensive. By the shorter southern route, it was 600 miles from Cape Town to Grahamstown over precipitous mountain passes, through numerous rivers liable to sudden floods, and along tracks which it would be euphemistic to describe as roads. Moreover the two provinces differed in sentiment, outlook, occupations and were faced by differing problems.

However the improvements in communications during the late 'forties were to effect a great change in the isolation of the two provinces. Prior to 1843 road construction (9) had been almost neglected by a Government whose financial resources were strained to the limit by the rapid expansion of the colony, but in this year the Central Board of Commissioners for Public Roads was established (10) "for improving the public roads of the Colony", with power to raise funds by a road rate on immovable property. In addition, each division

(10) For text, see Eybers p.81, sections I, III, XXII, XXIX.
was to elect a divisional board to undertake responsibility for its own divisional roads. Under its able Chairman, the energetic Montagu, the board soon effected several valuable improvements, especially on the main postal route to the East. Between 1844-46, no less than £177,416.5.8d. was spent (11) on various measures, the most important of which was the Montagu Pass (12) near George. In 1847 further undertakings were commenced; Mitchell's Pass, near Ceres in the Worcester district, opened up the route to the north west. Bain's Kloof shortened the eastern route and facilitated traffic from the north, while the Zuurberg Pass, north of Port Elizabeth provided a direct route for the north-eastern farmers to the sea-port.

With improved roads came a speeding up of the postal service. (13) In 1840 the weekly post to Grahamstown was able to cover the distance in five days; in 1845 there were two posts and in 1853 three posts per week to the frontier. In 1851 after the construction of the new passes the 450 miles from Cape Town to Uitenhage (14) could be covered in three days.

In the same period, with the improvement of steam-engined vessels, the time for the 450 miles by sea from Cape Town to Port Elizabeth was reduced, while as the trade from the Eastern Province grew in importance so the number of vessels plying round the coast increased. In February 1844 Cook's paddle-wheel vessel took three and a half days for the 510 miles to Kowie from Cape Town, so that the goods it

(12) This pass, although in the West, was clearly a measure to benefit the East, yet the Grahamstown party always claimed its cost, £35,799, as an example of unfair expenditure upon the West!
(13) Chase op cit p. 91; Cory Vol. IV. p. 403.
C.H.E. Vol. VIII p. 765
carried were delivered at Grahamstown within five days, and
by 1851 the trip to Algoa Bay was being performed regularly
in three days. The effect of these improvements in road and
sea communications was to diminish the isolation of the frontier
from the west, speed up business between the seat of government
and distant parts of the colony, facilitate intercourse and
trade between all parts, and generally weld the colony closer
together.

It is not surprising that after the arrival of the
British Settlers in 1820 a steady volume of complaints arose
from the East. In the early decades of the nineteenth century
the Dutch frontiersmen felt a decided antipathy to the strong
rule of the Government of Cape Town. The new settlers had
no neighbours colonists still indignant at the Black Circuit,
Slachters Nek, and a Government that defied the "Divine
Ordinance" of the Colour Bar by employing Hottentot troops
and supporting the Native views of the missionaries. With
these complaints from the Dutch, mingled the grumbles of the
British who were antagonised by the official restrictions on
the rights of free speech, the novelty of the Roman Dutch
legal system and the lack of sympathy from Somerset at a time
when tempers were exacerbated by unfavourable seasons and crop
failures. With capable leaders and an able Press, a well-
developed political consciousness and experienced in the art
of expressing public opinion through the Press, public meetings,
and petitions, the new settlers immediately became the mouth-
piece - or rather megaphone - of the East. Meanwhile the
interest of the Dutch-speaking colonists in public affairs
was confined almost solely to the election of office-holders
in the church.

Already critically disposed and cherishing the ideal
of separation for the Eastern Province the settlers found much
in the conditions of the colony to strengthen their argument
and increase their determination. There can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of the system of government and the inconveniences of the Eastern colonists are undisputed. The root of the trouble was that owing to its rapid development the colony was suffering from severe growing pains and the administrative system could not cope with its needs. In each division (15) was a Civil Commissioner, aided by a small number of subordinate officials, who was generally overworked by the excessive business of his office. In addition to his magisterial and fiscal functions, (16) he was expected to exercise adequate supervision over the field-cornets of each ward, attend to public works, supervise native affairs, command the burgher force, and render a full account of the administration to Cape Town! With funds already insufficient, the Government was called upon to provide efficient administration as fast as the colony expanded, not only in the East which was 45,000 square miles in area, but also in the north and north-east. Meanwhile harassed governors flitting between Cape Town and the Natives on the eastern frontier were inundated with demands from the frontier for efficient postal services, bridged rivers, good roads and public expenditure on their towns.

The frontier colonists looked with envy at the settled West and demanded similar conditions in the East - forgetting that the West was enjoying the fruits of nearly 300 years of Civil Government. The fact was that most of the hardships of the East were the inevitable result of its recent origin, but this did not make them any the less real. Government was, in the thirties excessively centralised, and although the creation of municipal boards (17) in 1836 benefitted the towns, the rural areas enjoyed no local authority, save the measure of road control granted by the institution of divisional road boards (18); the great lengths of the Circuits often

(15) CH.31/7 Grey to Labouchères, 192 of Dec.8, 1857.
(16) Chase op cit. pps. 31, 128.
(17) Ordinance 9 of 1836; Eybers p.78.
(18) Ordinance 8 of 1843, Section XXIX; Eybers p.82.
caused injustice and even hasty trials; the absence of a Deeds Registry in the East resulted in inconvenience, the expense of agents in Cape Town and protracted delay, while overshadowing all was the frontier insecurity and danger resulting from the various vacillating policies of H.M. Government. The successive wars of 1834, 1846 and 1850 with the attendant sufferings left the colonists with a deeply ingrained fear of further risings; cattle lifting was no idle complaint; despite the labour shortage on the farms, the absence of a Pass law imposed no check on the thousands of vagrants who squatted on Crown Lands. Moreover, the farmers attitude to the native question was that of the typical pastoral frontiersman, determined mainly by the insatiable land hunger and was bound to run counter to the doctrines of Exeter Hall. The East was convinced that while the Native remained dangerous, there could be no security if the seat of government remained at Cape Town.

The East thus suffered many hardships and inconveniences; the administrative system was inadequate; postal services were slow and often late, roads were generally mere tracks, unbridged rivers became impassable after the rains, public offices and public works were ideals for the future - grievances which were legitimate and real, but due not to a Western bias against the East as Grahamstown was so prone to allege, but to the inevitable time lag before the Central Government could provide the necessary administrative machinery.

The agitation from the East for the division of the colony into two provinces or the removal of the seat of government to some town on the frontier was greatly strengthened by the measure of support afforded the proposal by several competent authorities. (19) The East never forgot that in

(19) For various official opinions favouring the separation principle, see: Which follow, see:
Separation petition (1872) and Notes on Separation (1860); S.A. Lib. 575.e.908.
Journal Aug. 29, 1833.
1825 the Commission of Inquiry had favoured a legislative council for the Eastern Province, because of the need of a strong local authority to deal with the frontier, fugitive Natives entering the colony, the increasing pressure of business and correspondence with the remoter districts and to promote commercial interests. Sir Benjamin D'Urban had admitted that "the seat of government is without doubt ill-placed with relation to the present extent and circumstances of the colony", while Sir H. Fox Young the Lieutenant Governor in 1847, went further, advocating the separation of the two provinces as the lack of Eastern interest in the Government of Cape Town was leading to antagonism. The events of the war of 1850 overcame Smith's earlier opposition to the proposal and induced him "to recommend a separate and distinct government for the Eastern Province".

In addition, Earl Grey had favoured the removal of the seat of government, while the report of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, in approving the new constitution, had "withheld from advising that the Colony be divided from the circumstance that it appears to be the decided opinion of those whose local knowledge gives them better means of forming a sound judgment than ourselves, that the means do not exist of forming two separate legislatures with advantage".

Although not granting separation, the Colonial Office had, however, recognised the need for stronger government on the frontier. From July 1838 until 1833 when he resigned, Stockenstrom, the Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, was appointed as Commissioner-General to supervise Eastern affairs, including Beaufort West. In 1836, by Letters Patent (20) under the Great Seal, the districts of Graaff-Reinet, Uitenhage, Somerset, and Albany were erected "into a distinct and separate government" to be administered by a Lieutenant Governor. Stockenstrom, the first holder of the office, certainly introduced a strong

(20) Eybers p.39.
rule, but after quarrelling with everyone on the frontier he resigned in 1838, to be succeeded by the ancient and lethargic Colonel Hare under whom the office of Lieutenant Governor degenerated to the position of a superior clerk.

Until 1859 this measure of official support for separation formed one of the main Eastern arguments for their demands, and on every occasion it was dilated upon in the Press, at public meetings and in the separation debates in the first Parliament of the Cape.

Led by Mourant of the Journal, Grahamstown was emphatic about the need for separation and began to agitate in the early thirties claiming that its demand for a strong frontier government was justified by the distance of Cape Town. Vehemently the Journal (21) pointed to the postal delays, the lack of representative institutions, the absence of Civil Juries, and a Deeds Office, the subordination of Eastern administration to Cape Town, and endorsed the Grahamstown petition of September 1833 requesting the appointment of an Eastern authority to full control, not only over local affairs but also over the military.

The real motive in wanting separation from the West was not the inconveniences suffered by the East, for this would scarcely account for the persistency or violence of the agitation. These grievances were used to add weight to their argument, but the main reason for the antagonism sprang from a deeper source than the alleged Western bias against the East or its incompetency to deal with frontier problems. That the British Settlers wanted separation before waiting to see how the Government at Cape Town was going to meet their needs, is shown by the petitions of 1823, 1828 and 1833, for they could surely not yet have had time to judge, for example, whether expenditure would be fair or Native control competent.

The real reason for the ceaseless agitation that arose from Grahamstown, is probably to be found in the relative numerical positions of the Dutch and English-speaking colonists. When the 5,000 British settlers arrived in 1830 and were settled in Albany, they found themselves surrounded by Dutch neighbours. Undeterred by Cradock's abortive attempt to fix them to the land by his system of quit rent tenure, Boers were firmly entrenched in Uitenhage and were spreading rapidly north and north-east (later the districts of Colesberg and Albert). Not only did the Dutch in the colony outnumber the British by at least two to one, but they were even in a slight majority in the East, a fact which clashed with the strongly developed national consciousness of the newcomers and strengthened their determination for separation as a means of safe-guarding British superiority. Were it not for this spectre of "Dutch domination" the separation movement would never have had the same virulence and would have died a natural death as administration of the frontier was improved. It was this deep fear of being overwhelmed that was to cause the paradox of the section of the settlers who had been the spearhead of the attack on the autocratic regime of Somerset, being the most determined opponents to the introduction of representative government in 1854 and to responsible government in 1872.

Political leadership of the East immediately passed into the hands of the settlers in Albany, although a minority of the total Eastern population, and occupying less than one-fourth of the province, while the views they put forth as representatives of the Eastern viewpoint were in reality the views of the English section. Nor does this appear to have been resented by the Dutch-speaking colonists, whose main interest in public affairs was still confined to the election of office-holders in the church. In estimating the strength of political feeling in the East it is essential to bear in mind that even as late as the 'sixties it was extremely
difficult to arouse the Boers from their political apathy, while they were almost inarticulate in the expression of public opinion. They had no Press to express their views or train them to develop public opinion, they were not townsmen as were so many of the British with time to devote to political activities, while their agricultural pursuits and the lack of communications deburred them from the corporate city life of the towns and participation in public life. The fact that English was the official language (22) of the colony imposed a further disability on the Dutch-speaking colonists, which the incipient educational system was slow to remedy. Not till the 'fifties, when the midland Press became established can a distinctive viewpoint representative of the Dutch-speaking section of the East be traced. Thus it was that when Grahamstown through its numerous public meetings, petitions, or the able Grahamstown Journal, claimed to speak in the name of the East, there was no dissident voice from the Dutch.

Port Elizabeth, the other big English-speaking centre in the East was also hostile to Cape Town but for reasons different from those of Grahamstown. In the case of the latter the opposition was racial and national, while Port Elizabeth and Table Bay were trade rivals having economic differences. In the 'forties, as the Trekkers across the Orange became more settled, a growing stream of trade flowed from the interior to Colesburg where it divided, some passing down the Western route but the lion's share down the Eastern route to Port Elizabeth, which was two weeks nearer. The main wool areas were in the midland districts of Beaufort West and Graaff-Reinet, but here again the Eastern port had the advantage and trade returns were rapidly overhauling Table Bay. In 1843, after some twenty years of existence, exports were valued at £144,888 and imports at £135,919 so that it was

(22) Proclamation, July 5, 1832; Eybers p.23.
inevitable that keen rivalry should develop between the ports of the two provinces and that the influential merchants of Port Elizabeth should regard with jealous eyes any proposal to benefit the older Western harbour. The progressive towns of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth soon outstripped the older towns of Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage but although sharing the common opposition to Cape Town they were seldom ever found in agreement on any policy.

In the period prior to 1854 the demands from the East were impossible of fulfilment. They wanted not merely the management of local affairs, but freedom from Cape Town control in the most pressing Eastern problems: security against the natives, treaties, martial law, commandeering—the granting of which right would necessitate a full separate government for the East, a status for which its resources were as yet inadequate.

Thus the position on the eve of representative government, was that despite an increasing agitation from Grahamstown, the Press and numerous public meetings and petitions, H.M. Government still adhered to the view expressed by Smith in 1848, when in reply to an address from W.H. Harries of Port Elizabeth he rejected the claim that the East was unanimous and maintained that not even a majority favoured separation.

(25) Ibid. p.3.
CHAPTER XI.
1854 - 1858

THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND SEPARATION.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST.

EASTERN GRIEVANCES.

REPRESENTATION OF THE EAST IN PARLIAMENT.

EASTERN HOSTILITY TO GRAHAMSTOWN.

THE SEPARATION PARTY IN THE HOUSE.

A FRONTIER CRISIS: AUGUST 1856.

PARLIAMENT AND THE NEEDS OF THE EAST.

THE EXTENSION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
When the first session of the new Cape Parliament was opened in 1854, British Colonial Policy was in a state of transition. Since the 'thirties the ideas of the Gibbon Wakefield school of systematic colonisers had been gaining force and the views of a succession of influential Liberal statesmen, the most energetic of whom were Durham, C. Buller, and W. Moleyworth, had greatly altered the British attitude to the colonies. Responsible Government had been made a reality in Canada by Lord Elgin, was granted to New Zealand in 1852, to Newfoundland in 1854 and to the Australian Colonies in 1855. The 'fifties mark a change of colonial policy when the Utilitarian Philosophy of Bentham, J.S. Mill, Malthus and Ricardo reached its senit, influencing English radicals such as Cobden and Bright and resulting in the gradual removal of the Corn Laws, the abolition of protection in 1846 and the repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849. With free trade came a new attitude to the colonies. Free traders were convinced that even if independent the colonies would prove equally good markets, while the Crimean War and events in Europe induced the Colonial Office to favour every effort to make the colonies self-supporting and capable of defending themselves. Moreover, the view expressed in 1854 by Sir F. Rogers (2) that the independence of the colonies from the Mother Country was inevitable, was widely held in Parliamentary circles and played a big part in the many concessions made to the colonies at this time. The new Derby ministry of 1852, with Sir J. Pakington at the Colonial Office, soon revealed the change, and the fact that he was willing at last to hand over to colonial control the alienation of Crown Lands (3) — regarded so long as the indisputable right of the Mother Country, speaks eloquently of the new attitude, which was given expression to in South

(1) de Kiewiet, pps. 41-49. (2) Egerton p.36 op. pps.299-301. (3) Ibid. pps. 284-8.
Africa by a policy of no more commitments.\(^4\) This explains the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions in which Britain showed that she was prepared to relinquish even the right of protecting trans-frontier natives.

Thus any proposal to change the constitution of the Cape would have to be compatible with British Colonial Policy. H.M. Government showed in granting the separation of Victoria from New South Wales in 1850 that she was not against separation per se, but in the case of the Cape with its great Native population and consequently expensive defence costs, it was not likely to be considered lightly at a time when the Mother Country was desperately anxious to make each colony provide its own defence force and reduce the costs of colonial administration. Moreover, after the trouble in Canada during the 'thirties, a Parliament which was forced in 1840 to pass the Act for the re-union of the two Canadas was likely to require strong inducement to risk the repetition of similar inter-provincial strife in a colony peopled by two European races, with the complication of the Native problem.

Within the Colony, the Eastern party was of the opinion that if they agitated sufficiently, H.M. Government would intervene and either grant their desired separation or the removal of the seat of government eastwards, but in this they were doomed to disappointment. Sir G. Grey, a great believer in the rights of self-government and determined not to compromise the working of the new constitution, was strictly impartial and on no occasion revealed his own view\(^5\) despite frontier solicitations whenever he visited the East. "I have of course myself refrained from taking any part whatever in the political movements which have been made in reference to the present constitution", he told the Colonial Secretary, reporting the resignation of the six Eastern Councillors after the separation debate in 1857, and went on to say that to an address asking for some alteration in the present constitution, he had replied that he could not act, until requested by the

\(^4\) de Kiewiet p.62.
\(^5\) G.H.31/7 Grey to Labouchere, 107 of Aug. 1, 1857.
elected representatives of the people. Mr. H. Labouchere merely acknowledged (6) the dispatch without venturing an opinion on the question. In the following year, Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, the new Colonial Secretary, (7) in answer to a petition from Uitenhage, after reaffirming that any alteration of the status quo must depend on a resolution from Parliament, went further in September and asserted that "the Cape was best left to thrive under its recently granted free institutions, with as little interference as possible in civil matters, by Her Majesty's Government". Thus it was clear that separation could count on no outside support and that the measure would have to be fought out within the colony.

It was an inevitable consequence of the fundamental differences between East and West, that in the new Parliament parties would tend to form on provincial lines. The origin of these differences has been alluded to in the preceding chapter, but they may be summarised for convenience. The numerically strong British section of the East entertained a deep fear of "Western domination" by the more numerous Dutch section resident in the West and Midlands, while their aggressively pro-English views instilled a similar fear of English domination in the minds of the Dutch of the Eastern Province. How strongly Grahamstown felt on the question is shown by the public meeting (8) held in June 1853 to protest against the new constitution, at which several speakers discussed how the "Western domination" that was bound to arise in the new Parliament could best be combatted! The greater age of the West gave it a more settled administration and the benefit of many years of expenditure on public works and roads, advantages lacking in the more recently settled East and arousing a feeling of envy and neglect. The ports of the two provinces were competing for the trade of the same areas while in occupation the West was largely agricultural, the East pastoral.

(6) G.H.1/4 Labouchere to Grey, 255 of Nov. 1, 1857.
(7) G.H.1/5 Lytton to Grey, 16 of July 28, 1858 and (Private) of Sept. 3, 1858.
(8) Journal, June 18, 1853.
The sharpest difference between East and West arose, however, from the Native problem. Not only did the exposed frontier stand to suffer more seriously from a rising, but the whole Eastern attitude towards the Natives was essentially determined by the hunger for land and the desire to further the material interests, not of the Natives, but of the Europeans, whereas the attitude of the West was shaped to a large extent by men like Saul Solomon or Fairbairn on openly avowed philanthropic principles. Thus the two viewpoints caused a divergence of opinion on the need for a strict vagrancy law, whether burghers serving in the militia should be mobilized solely for the defence of their own respective divisions as the West desired, or should be utilized for the defence of the whole colony as the frontier naturally desired; further, the East wanted the franchise raised to exclude the Hottentots and was determined to oppose any measure such as Responsible Government, likely to result in the withdrawal (9) of Imperial troops from South Africa and make the colony responsible for defence against the Natives. Nor was the East blind to the economic advantages derived from the possession of the capital and saw no reason why the West should have this privilege.

The sifting of the often extremely legalistic and partisan arguments of the Press of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth provides a comprehensive array of Eastern grievances.

Frontier opinion was convinced that the philanthropic views held by the Western Parliamentarians and the distance of Cape Town from the scene of action, by preventing the public from having a true conception of the gravity of the Native danger, would result in the pursuit of a policy that would endanger life and security on the frontier. Moreover, it was argued, Cape Town was 600 miles away from the frontier, where the colony's most serious problem was situated, yet there was no strong executive government in the East and the office of the

(9) Journal, June 16, 1853.
Lieutenant Governor was a mere sinecure. When every decision had to be referred to Cape Town (10) and was subject to the veto of a civil governor, how could the colonists hope for security? The unbridged rivers, the unmade roads, the absence of a harbour at Port Elizabeth or of prisons in the East, and the concentration of convicts at Cape Town, were assumed to prove that the East was taxed for the benefit of the avaricious West.

The excessive centralisation of the government of the colony in the early 'fifties pressed hard on the East. The smallest details connected with public works had to pass through a Cape Town office, often extremely slow to spend the Votes of Parliament. (11) Justice was centralised at the extreme end of the colony. The powers of magistrates were narrowly limited and required extension, especially in regard to small debts, (12) while as an example of the injustice caused by the long Circuits and the absence of an Eastern Districts Court, the Graaff-Reinet Herald on October 37th 1852 pointed to how prisoners and witnesses had had to be brought from Colesburg and Burghersdorp to Graaff-Reinet to save the time of the judges. The absence of a Deeds Office meant that "every probate of will, every administration, every registry of bonds, every transfer of property, has to be effected in Cape Town involving a charge of thousands per annum in agency, great risk in transmission, inconvenience of reference and delay". (13) Local government as a mitigation of centralisation was still to be developed in the course of the late 'fifties, the Roman Dutch Law of inheritance and marriage was especially distasteful to a party wanting the "supremacy of English law and custom". (14) while in addition to the inconveniences of the imperfect means of travelling, the distance of Cape Town made it difficult to

(11) E.P. Herald July 8, 1855.
(13) Journal Oct.9, 1858.
(14) Journal April 18, 1866.
secure capable men in Parliament.

Such were the especially Eastern grievances, but we shall refrain from pronouncing upon their merits until we have seen what course the Eastern representatives adopted to remedy their disabilities, and the first Parliament of the Colony in action.

H.H. Government, being persuaded "that the means do not exist of forming two separate legislatures with advantage", (15) was unwilling to support the demands of the East, beyond granting representation in the united legislature on a provincial basis. For the Council, the colony was divided into two constituencies, the West returning eight members and the East seven, holding seats for ten years, eight to retire every five years, and voting to be on the basis of the cumulative vote as a safeguard to minority rights. For the House of Assembly the colony was divided into 23 constituencies, 11 in each province with 24 members for the West and 22 for the East, elected for five years.

Thus the provinces were granted almost equality of representation (especially as the Speaker was a Western member throughout the period of Representative Government) despite the fact that both the European and Coloured population (16) of the West outnumbered the East by about twenty-five per cent, the area of the West was about 27,000 square miles greater than the East, while the resources of the older colony were far superior. Thus the new constitution tacitly admitted the disabilities suffered by the East from its distance from the seat of government and granted it the compensation of additional representation to which it would not have been entitled had representation been on the basis either of European or Coloured population, or the value of property. In addition to the towns of Grahamstown and Fort Elizabeth the district of Graaff-Reinet, Colesburg, Uitenhage, Cradock, Somerset, Albert, Albany, Victoria East and Fort Beaufort constituted the electoral divisions of the East,

(15) "Notes on Separation" (1860) p.19, S.A.Lib 575-e-908.
(16) Annual Blue Book (1854) By Coloured Population, we mean people of colour. In the East they were mainly Natives; in the West Hottentots and Coloureds.
each returning two members. It is of importance to note that there was no symmetry in this arrangement, that the representation of these divisions was not based on resources or European population, and that the method applied of deciding upon the respective limits of constituencies had the effect of greatly favouring the English-speaking areas at the cost of the Dutch midlands. This contention is borne out by a consideration of the following (17) relative statistics:

**EASTERN PROVINCE (1854)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Representatives in Parliament</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uitenhage</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8,950</td>
<td>6,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,980</td>
<td>2,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grahamstown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Beaufort</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cradock</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>3,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queenstown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graaff-Reinet</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>5,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murraysburg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colesburg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11,654</td>
<td>5,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middelburg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopetown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>4,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45,574</td>
<td>40,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>72,682</td>
<td>-?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>118,256</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inequality of this arrangement is clearly apparent.

It will be noted that Colesburg with an area of 11,654 square miles and a European population of 5,629 souls returned 2 representatives, while the combined divisions of Albany,

Grahamstown and Fort Beaufort returning six representatives had an area of 1732 square miles with a population of 6,863 Europeans. The 679 Europeans of Fort Beaufort and the 478 of Victoria (for Queenstown was not united to Victoria as an electoral division till later) together sent four members to Parliament, while the old and wealthy division of Graaff-Reinet with its area of 8,000 square miles and European population of 5,177 returned its humble two representatives. Surely Albert, with an area of 8,000 square miles and a European population of 4,743 could legitimately grumble at being on a basis of equality with Victoria or Fort Beaufort. It may be argued that what some of the divisions lacked in Europeans they made up for in Natives or that the arrangement was justified by the political apathy of the Dutch-speaking colonists, but whatever the underlying principle, the result was that in Parliament, when the frontier and the midlands differed, the frontier viewpoint was over-represented to the detriment of the midlands, as judged by voting power. Again, when the representatives of the midland and frontier were on opposite sides, voting would tend to give the impression that frontier measures enjoyed more popularity in the East than was the actual case. This consideration is of importance in view of the fact that the East was not a political unity and in no time during the Representative Government period did it form a homogeneous Eastern party.

Grahamstown, at the one extreme, was the champion of the frontier districts, while Graaff-Reinet, the leading town of the midlands, was seldom ever found to see eye to eye with Grahamstown. Each had its particular satellites while a third small group of divisions generally adopted a middle course and trimmed their sails to whatever breeze would prosper them best. The general consensus of opinion of the Eastern Province Press (18) was that the frontier party consisted of Grahamstown, Albany, Victoria and Cradock; the midlands of Graaff-Reinet, Colesburg, Uitenhage and Fort Elizabeth, with Somerset, Albert and Fort

Beaufort liable to vacillate between the two.

In a province where a political consciousness was not strongly awakened and parties were as yet unimportant, electors tended to vote for personalities rather than principles, resulting on several occasions (19) in the election of candidates openly against the views of the majority in the division. At the same time the colony had not yet produced a leisured class with time to devote to public life, with the result that outlying divisions often experienced extreme difficulty in securing representatives and were forced to accept the services of residents of other centres, notably Cape Town and Grahamstown. This was particularly true of the East, where Grahamstown was the one city which if anything, suffered from a superfluity of aspirants for political honours. Even the large and wealthy Port Elizabeth was on occasions hard-pressed to secure a candidate, since its able commercial class was so actively engaged in the pursuit of wealth that it eschewed politics and when able to retire, left the colony for England. Especially in the 'fifties and early 'sixties did several of the less developed areas such as Albert, Victoria, Fort Beaufort and Cradock depend on non-residents for their representation, so that representatives standing in the interests of Grahamstown were generally able to secure these seats. The Council, with its higher property qualification for members, was a Grahamstown monopoly with generally one or two midlands or Port Elizabeth representatives. Later we shall return to this tendency in Eastern Province politics and show how Grahamstown was thus able to command a measure of Parliamentary support unjustified by political opinion in the East.

That the East formed a homogeneous party in the first Parliament is a view untenable in the face of the conclusive evidence to the contrary, and it is no exaggeration to say that throughout this period the bitter rivalry between Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth, and the opposition of the frontier and the midlands to each other, made Eastern unity on any course

affecting their common interests impossible. On one question alone was the Eastern Press unanimous, and that was on the subject of the disunity of the East.

"On no single question which has ever been mooted has it been found that Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown united .... Grahamstown ..... disagrees with Cape Town, the Western Province, and all the other parts of the colony but the frontier districts" declared the E.P. Herald categorically, on July 8th 1856. This lack of agreement was evidenced in the reception of the new constitution, (20) Grahamstown being openly hostile, Graaff-Reinet lukewarm and Port Elizabeth strongly in favour, with the result that the policy of resistance to the constitution by refraining from electing representatives, advocated by Grahamstown, was rendered useless.

When the Eastern members left for Parliament in 1854 the Journal in its issue of June 17th lamented the fact that seven of the representatives had been allowed to depart without any effort being made to give them a fuller appreciation of the interests of the province, and after naively remarking that "there may be some .... who have but a very vague notion of what those interests are" goes on to admit that "those who have given the subject a little more attention are as varied in their conclusions as light from darkness". This premonition of future disagreements was well founded, for at the end of the session T.H. Bowker, M.L.A. for Albany, writing to the Journal confessed that the defeat of several measures of Eastern interest was due not to opposition from the West, but from the East, and the G.R. Herald agreed with the frontier paper (21) that it was disunity among its own members that was hindering their interests. Nor was this condition to improve. In the following year on June 2nd the Journal again revealed how complete was the split between the frontier and midlands, maintaining that Port Elizabeth and Graaff-Reinet "are as much opposed to Grahamstown and Albany as any portion of the colony","n
while in 1856 the E.P.Herald (22) was emphatic that the midlands would never consider union with the frontier in a federal scheme, since "frontier members ..., count no violence of language too coarse to attack any middle division project". In the following year when Godlonton and five other frontier Councillors had resigned in high dudgeon on account of the Wellington Railway Bill, the G.R. Herald (23) deprecated the action as opposition to the wrong cause, while the E.P. Herald was more downright and condemned the resignations as "reprehensible in manner and reprehensible in occasion ..., a blunder". It was little wonder that the Journal (24) hitherto optimistic about unity for the East sadly admitted that there appeared to be no prospect of Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown being willing to sink their individual differences.

The fact was that the "East" in reality was merely a geographical term, and was composed of two distinct units with divergent interests. In referring to the difficulty of deciding how best to ensure security of the frontier, the Journal confessed that "scarcely two are agreed as to the best means of securing it". These words might without exaggeration have been applied to every problem faced by the East for in the words of Terence it was a case of "quod homines, tot sententiae".

Reconciliation between the component parts of the East was an unobtainable ideal, as is revealed by the internal differences of the various divisions. Broadly speaking, the Dutch and English were segregated in adjoining portions of the East, but the split was not on sharp racial lines. Whatever anti-English feeling may have been shown in the East was directed rather at the pretensions of Grahamstown and Albany than at the English as a section, for when the Journal (25) claimed that the strong opposition in the East to Grahamstown was due to its British origin, the E.P. Herald was quick to refute this in view of the harmony between both sections in the midlands, asserting that "we have not only more British born inhabitants than

(22) E.P. Herald July 22, 1856.
(23) E.P. Herald July 7, Aug. 4, 1857.
(25) Journal May 12, 1855. E.P. Herald July 8, 1856.
Grahamstown can boast, but British far more recently from the Mother Country". Religious differences were not unimportant at a time when religion was an integral part of each individual and indeed in the case of the Dutch still meant far more than politics. When Grahamstown, a Wesleyan stronghold, nominated three Wesleyans, Godlonton, Cock and Wood for the Council in 1853 and later asked for state support for the Wesleyan church, it aroused a storm of opposition from the commercial town of Port Elizabeth which favoured the voluntary principle of no state aid for churches, and from Graaff-Reinet, (26) the champion of the Dutch Reformed Church and anti-voluntarists. However the racial and religious difficulties merely supplied a background. The real rock on which the East split was constitutional amendment and the allied questions of local government for the East and the removal of the seat of government.

Responsible Government was in the air and several at the Cape looked with envy at the new status of Canada, New Zealand and Australia. The 1854 session saw the development of a small party in favour of its introduction at the Cape, influential enough in the next session to carry by 23-9 the appointment of a Select Committee to investigate the question. An Albany petition of 503 names and an intense Press campaign by the opposition during the recess caused the defeat of the motion by 24-18 in the Assembly, although passed in the Council by 9-4. The voting in the Lower House was not on provincial lines, the majority consisting of 13 Easterners and 11 Westerns. The East however was sharply divided on the question. To the frontier party (27) the very idea of Responsible Government was anathema for the same reason as they had opposed the present constitution, namely that they considered the inevitable result would be Western domination and the withdrawal of Imperial troops, whereas in Port Elizabeth these fears were regarded as groundless, (28) and White and Paterson, the local representatives, led the Responsible Government movement in the House. The Graaff-Reinet representatives likewise voted for the proposal.

although the local Press, while approving the principle, felt
the time was premature and feared the Hottentot race in the West.

The East was unanimous on the need for changing the
centralisation of the present constitution, and favoured a
scheme of devolution on a federal basis, but although the
principle was admirable, the settlement of the details was quite
impossible. Grahamstown, realising the need of a port, and with
the Kowie works still swallowing funds and far from completion,
was insistent that there should be two provinces only, while
Graaff-Reinet and Port Elizabeth recoiled in horror at the very
idea of union with the frontier and demanded a federal scheme of
three provinces. (29) The E.P. Herald, the mouthpiece of
Paterson, the leading Parliamentarian in Port Elizabeth at the
time, on May 23rd 1855 left Grahamstown under no misapprehen-
sions as to the attitude of the midlands: "If it should ever
be brought about that the country was separated into two
provinces, the Eastern Province would assuredly be so divided
in feeling, that legislation for it would be an impossibility,
and the administration of its affairs altogether impracticable".

A further matter bristling with contention was
connected with the seat of government. Irrespective of any
future operation in the form of the constitution, it was but
natural that the East should be unanimous in the desire to
secure the advantages accruing from possession of the capital.
But this desire for a move eastwards (30) was the limit of the
unanimity, for there was no town among the several contenders
for the honour whose pre-eminence established its right to
selection, as was the case in the West. Grahamstown as the
seat of government in the East since 1822, with the support of
the frontier, would naturally never have acquiesced to sub-
ordination to any other eastern town, whereas the midlands
favoured Uitenhage, the site suggested by the Royal Commissioners
of 1833, or even Somerset. Grahamstown endeavoured to preserve
a stony silence about the capital, suggesting that its selection

G.R. Herald July 4, Aug. 8, 1857
(30) Journal, Jan. 8, 15, 22, 1853; July 25, 1857. G.R. Herald Nov. 3,
1852. E.P. Herald Aug. 26, 1856. Cpr. also Paterson,
Resident Govt. in East (1851) p. 30 S.A. Lib. 575-e-507(11).
be left to the decision of the Imperial Parliament and feeling that it would thus gain the honour, but the suspicious midlands were not to be caught by those tactics.

Economic factors played their part in dividing the East and the physical structure of the colony (31) made it inevitable that Grahamstown and Graaff-Reinet should be rivals for the interior trade, to an extent that increased proportionally to the development of the trade of the Republics in the interior. After skirting the Zuurberg, south of Colesburg, the main trade route from the north, barred from direct access to Port Elizabeth by the Sneuuberg divided into two routes, one passing down the valley of the Fish through Port Beaufort and Grahamstown and the other through Graaff-Reinet and the midlands. Grahamstown chosen originally because of its military and not its trade importance, was slightly off the direct route from the interior and was at a disadvantage as compared with Graaff-Reinet which grew up at the confluence of a number of trade routes. The result of this rivalry meant that expenditure by the central government on roads or passes which benefitted one of these centres was stoutly opposed by the other - a fact which also explains one reason why the Central Road Board came in for so much opposition. Concessions to one party raised a storm in the other centre, so that according to the Press, the policy of the Board was one long series of unmitigated blunders!

Grahamstown's trade on the Eastern side of the colony was also in a precarious position, for the Winterberg range, rising to 7,800 feet shut off the Queenstown district, an area whose trade was bound to find its natural outlet through East London as soon as Kaffraria developed. These differences threw Grahamstown and Graaff-Reinet into opposite camps, even over the question of roads and bridges, but when railways became important in 1857 they were to make their interests irreconcilable. As with Graaff-Reinet over inland trade so over the question of the development of Kowie, did Grahamstown come into conflict with Port Elizabeth. Not until the late 'sixties was

Grahamstown convinced that the ideal of its own port at Kowie was unattainable, while during the 'fifties the possibility of the success of the rival port and the consequent loss of the frontier trade induced Port Elizabeth to regard the frontier coldly and make sure of the support of the midlands.

From the more fundamental differences between the sections in the East, sprang other sources of friction. By the Burgher Law (32) of 1855, burghers could be called up for service "within their respective divisions", but owing to the remonstrances of the frontier this was amended in the following session, permitting the Governor to summon the forces of the East for service in any Eastern division, despite the protests from Port Elizabeth that the midlands (33) should be required to defend the frontier divisions.

The midlands, much to the annoyance of the Journal, under the leadership of Paterson and White of Port Elizabeth similarly opposed the grant of a further £1,600 as proposed in 1855 for extending the establishment (34) of the Lieutenant-Governor, on the grounds that the office was unnecessary and that his civil jurisdiction extended only over the frontier divisions, Graaff-Reinet, Colesburg, Port Elizabeth, (West Elizabeth) and Uitenhage being excluded. The same split between the frontier and midlands was shown by Grahamstown's proposal to equalise the representation of the two provinces by constituting Queenstown with its European population of 1,061 souls an electoral division. Already antagonised by what it considered its inadequate representation, the midlands led by Ziervogel combined with the West to cause its rejection when brought up successively in 1854, 1855, 1856.

Thus in the middle 'fifties the East was completely split by questions of race and religion, proposals to divide the colony on a federal basis, by friction between conflicting economic interests, and by hostility on the question of the Burgher Law, the office of Lieutenant-Governor and the representation of the various divisions, with the result that Grahamstow—

(32) Act 16 of 1855; preamble and section 17.
(33) E.P.Herald, May 13, 1856.
(34) G.H.29/1 Jackson to Grey, Mar.3, 1855. E.P.Herald, May 22, 1856.
town, supported by the frontier divisions of Fort Beaufort, Albany and Victoria faced a coalition of the midland divisions under the leadership of Graaff-Reinet and Port Elizabeth.

When the members from the East went down to Cape Town for the first session in 1854 there was no unanimity among the Eastern Party. In the Council, the frontier was in a strong position to ventilate its needs being represented by Godlonton, Wood and Elaine of Grahamstown; while Metelerkamp and Fleming both business men of Port Elizabeth with commercial interests in Grahamstown, were prone to side with the Grahamstown representatives. The remaining two, Stockenstroem and Joubert of the midlands, were regarded with deep antipathy by the frontier members, a legacy of the 'thirties when Stockenstroem was Lieutenant-Governor and his policy was so obnoxious to the frontier, and were inclined to vote with the West. In the Assembly the frontier was handicapped by the lack of a leader for Port of Grahamstown, upon whom the task fell, was eclipsed by Paterson of Port Elizabeth and Zorvogel of Graaff-Reinet who led the midlands and who were opposed to the frontier. Thus from the outset, the Council was the chamber where frontier measures had the greatest chance of success. The fact that the East was not a homogeneous party made a unanimous course of action in the first Parliament impossible.

For long years the Journal had maintained an almost unbroken muttering against Cape Town and expressed the wish for separation or a very loose federation. This was maintained till the next decade and the accomplishment of this purpose was the dominant aim in the policy of the frontier members. Moreover every Eastern member cherished a faint hope of securing the removal eastwards of the seat of government and such a motion was assured of the support of both frontier and midlands. Since

(35) Although in such disfavour with the Journal and Grahamstown, Stockenstroem was undoubtedly popular in the midlands, as is revealed by the voting in 1853. He topped the poll with a clear majority of 1871 votes over the next candidate, yet received a mere 255 votes from Grahamstown out of his total of 6375.
H.M. Government would consider any alteration of the constitution only "upon a representation of the Legislature of the Colony" the frontier was determined to press the decision of the House upon the question.

Realising the slight numerical inferiority of the East, the first aim was to secure equality of representation by the addition of a division likely to support the frontier views. Queenstown, recently established in 1853 by Cathcart, was chosen for this honour and frontier members loudly extolled the virtues of the Queenstown Europeans and the injustice of their having no representation. In 1854 in the Council and again in 1855 in the Assembly, it was defeated by a coalition of West and midlands. Undeterred the motion was again raised in the Lower House in 1856 only to suffer a crushing defeat by 26-10 at the hands of the opposition led by Ziervogel of Graaff-Reinet. The opposition to the motion is easily understandable. The midlands felt on good grounds that they were entitled to whatever new representation should be granted while the West (36) maintained that the East was already over-represented and opposed the idea of granting two members to a newly settled district with an European population of 1,780, the equivalent of Wynberg or Rondebosch. Moreover, the colony already had a legislature of 61 to manage a revenue of £250,000. That it was to the principle of equality that the West was opposed is shown by Solomon's Resolution in the same session being carried, favouring the incorporation of Queenstown into Victoria for electoral purposes. Equalisation had thus come to nought. Paterson's proposal of 1855 for the removal of the seat of government to "some town in the Eastern Province" was defeated by 21-15, while by the third session in 1856 the Journal (37) clearly expressed the growing dissatisfaction of the frontier at the defeat of several bills of especial frontier interest. The Judicial Establishment Bill for an Eastern Province Court had been shelved by 27-11 and bills for the representation of Queenstown,

better management of the Fingoos, Burgher and Commando law for the whole colony, the removal of the seat of government and for an extra grant of £1,600 for the Lieutenant-Governor's establishment had all suffered the same fate, and at the same time Responsible Government had been threatened. Here at last, maintained the Grahamstown party, was clear evidence that the East would never secure justice from a Western Parliamentary majority and that a Cape Town Government could never be competent to deal with their especial problems. Separation from "a Cape Town cabal" was the remedy.

Godlonton in the Council fired the first shot by moving on April 8th 1856 that all official correspondence since the time of D'Urban on the question of the separation of the two provinces should be laid on the Table. Impatient at delay over the presentation of this voluminous material, he followed this up by a motion late in May, for the appointment of a committee (38) to consider separation, basing his argument for its necessity primarily upon the fact that so much official support had in the past been given to the principle as well as the inconveniences suffered from the absence of local government. However the Council, while not against the appointment of a commission, postponed the matter until the presentation of the required correspondence.

On May 27th Pote, the member for Grahamstown, proposed in the Assembly that separation should be effected, his argument like Godlonton's being based on past official views, but the decisive defeat inflicted by the frontier on the West and midlands showed that the proposal was solely the view of the Grahamstown Party. Solomon, leading the opposition, was irrefutable in his reply (39) and took the obvious line of showing that separation was not the desire of the East. Carefully he analysed the division lists of the very bills whose defeat the East alleged was due to Western bias and showed that in each case Eastern opinion had been almost equally divided between frontier and midlands. Using these results he maintained that the East consisted of the two opposing parties of Port Elizabeth

(38) Journal June 7, 1856 (Council Debate).
Graaff-Reinet, Colesberg, Albert and generally Somerset, controlling ten votes and representing the midlands, and the frontier party of Grahamstown, Albany, Victoria, Cradock controlling eight votes, while Port Beaufort and Uitenhage vacillated between the two. In conclusion he proposed the amendment that separation should be granted as soon as the House was persuaded that it was the feeling of the whole East. Before this could be put, R. Bowker of Somerset, seconded by Stretch of Port Beaufort, as if to illustrate the truth of Solomon's deductions, proposed the further amendment (40) carried by 19-7 that in the event of a separate Eastern Province being formed, Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth, Somerset, Graaff-Reinet, Colesberg, Albert and Port Beaufort should be excluded. The inference drawn from Solomon's analysis of the divisions lists and the overwhelming majority by which Bowker's amendment was carried is that the anti-Cape Town and Western Province feeling, so emphasized in the Journal, was confined to the few frontier divisions under Grahamstown influence and that the midlands even after three sessions of the new Parliament, had no pronounced sense of grievance. In face of the united opposition the proposal for separation was not again raised in the Assembly until the following Parliament.

Godlonton was undeterred by the defeat in the Lower House. Armed at last with the voluminous Blue Book of the past history of the separation movement and assured of six votes now that the frontier party was strengthened by the presence of Cook of Grahamstown who had replaced Joubert, the resigned midland member, (41) he proposed his five resolutions in favour of a separate government for the East early in May the following

(40) Journal June 21, 1855 (Assembly Debate).
(41) A feature of the Council was the way Grahamstown was always able to secure the bulk of the seats. After a disolution, Graaff-Reinet and Port Elizabeth were generally able to secure adequate representation, but the cumulative vote was not used in the frequent by-elections, hence Grahamstown was invariably able to defeat candidates supported by the politically apathetic midlands. Thus, as the life of each Council lengthened, so the Grahamstown representation generally increased. Cook's election illustrates the process which became a sore grievance to the midlands in the 'sixties.
session. Again he used (42) what may be termed the "historical" argument, maintaining that since the opinion in favour of a separate government had so often been expressed in official circles the time had now come for a division of the colony into two. The weakness in his argument was, as the opposition pointed out, the absence of any concrete proposals for the settlement of the problems connected with separation such as the question of defence, the seat of government in the East, or even the boundary between the two provinces and the undisputed disunity of the East on the question. Again the proposal was defeated, the minority consisting of Cock, Wood, Godlonton and Blaine of Grahamstown, and Metelerkamp and Fleming of Port Elizabeth.

The echo of this defeat was heard towards the close of June when the bill for the Wellington Railway was presented to the Council. The delay caused by awaiting the report of the Committee of the House on the subject of colonial railways and the passage of the bill through the Lower House resulted in its reaching the Council after 80 days of session. Despite the approval expressed by the Committee and the Press of the West, Graaff-Reinet and Port Elizabeth, the frontier members maintained it was too late in the session to rush through so important a bill, asked for an adjournment, which the West refused, with the result that Godlonton handed in the resignation (43) of the six dissentients with a protest under twelve heads. How this form of protest was supported only in Grahamstown, and condemned in Port Elizabeth and Graaff-Reinet has been noted, but in addition to the further alienation that it caused it had the effect of silencing the voice of the frontier in the Council for some years. In September when the new elections to fill the vacancies were due to take place, Fleming, one of the six, admitting the error of the course and opposing his former allies, recanted and was again nominated. Grahamstown ignored the election, six midlanders were returned unopposed, (44) Godlonton and Wood left

(42) Journal May 23, 1857 (Council debate).
(43) C.H.31/7 Grey to Labouchere, 107 of Aug.1, 1857.
(44) E.P. Herald, Sept. 8, 1857.
for England in February of the following year (1858) and for a while the separation cry was stilled in Parliament.

We have heard the frontier cries against the extravagance of the West and the unfair expenditure of Eastern revenues upon the older province; the Journal had reiterated with unflagging zeal that the distance of the seat of government rendered it incompetent to deal with frontier needs, and we have seen the frontier representatives exerting every effort to secure their freedom from the West. The specific needs of the frontier were defined in the election manifestos (45) of Godlonton, Wood and Blaine in 1853 as being separation or removal, an upward revision of the franchise, a vagrancy law, a militia law, a revision of the tariff and the prohibition of the trade in arms and powder. In 1855 on the eve of the session the Journal (46) further defined its needs as being a strong Border force, a burgher militia for the whole colony, the maintenance of a sufficient military force on the frontier and an active immigration policy to increase population. We have now to examine in detail the claims made by the frontier of unfair treatment, and by specific reference to the work of Parliament estimate in how far these allegations were founded on fact.

The frontier was convinced that the Native problem could not be handled from Cape Town. Three desperate frontier wars within two decades filled the more exposed divisions with a deeply instilled horror of further risings and caused them to weigh up all other problems in terms of the Native question. Nor was pessimism unjustified when Grey arrived in December 1854 and found South Africa a land of widespread Native unrest (47) with the tribes disturbed in the Zoutspanberg, Natal, Namaqualand, the Free State, Kaffraria and Kaffirland, and the problem, with Moshesh as the "common factor" in British Kaffraria, Kaffirland and Free State, complicated by the divergent policies of four different states. Grave as conditions were and much as they

undoubtedly troubled Grey, they were of little concern to the new Cape Parliament with its Eastern frontier protected by the separately administered buffer state of British Kaffraria.

The territory between the Keiskama and the Kei had first been annexed in December 1847 by Smith (48) who had brought the chiefs under the control of magistrates and settled Europeans around the forts and missions. In the settlement after the war Cathcart was induced to refrain from annexing this area (49) to the Cape or abandoning it by reasons of "military control and not colonisation" and extended Smith's policy of settling the tribes in reserves with the important alteration that magistrates now possessed merely moral authority. This policy, by making defence against the Natives the responsibility of the Imperial Government and by rendering the possibility of an invasion on the colonial frontier remote was highly acceptable to the colony, but suddenly in August 1856 rumours from British Kaffraria of a fresh rising rudely disturbed the serenity of the frontier divisions and the alarm of the Press (50) reveals how deep was the fear aroused. In obedience to newly arisen prophets, the Xosas and Tembus were madly slaying all their cattle and refraining from sowing during the rainy season in anticipation of The Day in February when the departed heroes of the past would return amid unprecedented plenty and the forces of heaven would intervene to expel the hated white man. On the 18th February, the appointed day, the fierceness of the blazing sun was equalled only by the gnawing pangs of hunger in thousands of kaffir villages, gripped by a famine that was to reduce their numbers "by death or dispersion from nearly 105,000 to 37,000 souls". (51)

The frontier was fully alive to the danger of this catastrophe. "Like hungry wolves they will rush upon the colony and slay and eat", prophesied the Journal in alarm in August, and there can be no disputing that the central Government was faced with the hazardous position fraught with danger. Here was a problem that would reveal the effect on the handling of a crisis of the distance of the capital from the frontier.

Under Grey a comprehensive system of native control was taking shape. In British Kaffraria each of the reserves were supervised by Agents who were in close contact with the chiefs, the most important being Maclean, the Chief Commissioner at Fort Murray, south of Kingwilliamstown on the Buffalo, C. Brownlee over the Gaikas settled in the north-east between the Amatolas and the Black Kei, and Warner over the Tembus around Queenstown. Within the colony the Reserves came under the Civil Commissioners, the Fingoos for example coming under Meurant of Fort Beaufort. Each of these Agents submitted a monthly report of conditions to the Secretary to the Lieutenant-Governor, R. Southey, at Grahamstown who in turn under the supervision of the Lieutenant Governor compiled a joint report based on the returns which was submitted, as well as the originals from the Agents, to the Secretary for Native Affairs at Cape Town. (52) Thus the Government was kept regularly informed of conditions by highly efficient agents the ability of many of whom has won deserved praise in colonial Native control and who generally enjoyed the full confidence of the frontiersmen themselves. The perusal of their reports supplies conclusive evidence of their ability and the intimate knowledge they possessed of affairs under their control, thus clearly refuting the charge that the Government was ignorant of Native conditions. Moreover, the troops, greatly strengthened by regiments released after the Crimean War and numbering (53) over 10,000 were all posted in the East, while the Lieutenant-Governor in his dual capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Forces had his headquarters at Grahamstown and was responsible for defence measures.

How well the Government had the position in hand during the cattle-killing is revealed by Lieutenant-Governor Jackson's correspondence with Grey. (54) Despite the excitement occasioned by the killing of the cattle no incidents disturbed the peace of the frontier while he was almost incommunicado in December in reporting (55) the defence measures which he had taken. In addition Grey

(52) Details of Native administration are culled from the various reports and despatches in the collection of correspondence from the Lieutenant Govr. (All unnumbered) G.H.29/1.
(53) G.H.31/7 Grey to Labouchere, 15th of Nov. 2, 1857.
(54) G.H.29/1 Jackson to Grey, July 26, Aug. 12, Dec. 4, 1856.
took the precaution of buying up all available supplies of corn for distribution in British Kaffraria.

For Grey the cattle killing was most timely and enabled him to inaugurate his "civilising policy" when the tribes were incapable of resisting. With a second grant of £40,000 from the Imperial Parliament for Kaffrarian purposes, the Governor was able to supply relief works for all willing to work,(55) carry out his immigration policy by settling the German legion and the other emigrants of the late 'fifties under favourable circumstances, and endeavour to minimize the possibility of future outbreaks by driving Vadana and Queesha from the White Kei country in 1857 and Krei in February 1858 from the Transkei to areas where he hoped they would prove less dangerous.

The swiftness and certainty with which the Government acted, the ease with which it controlled the situation and carried out the subsequent settlement left the colonists with no loophole for complaint — especially as they hoped soon to occupy the recently evacuated Transkei, while the enfeeblement of the tribes removed for some years any danger of a rising — their greatest argument in favour of separation. Undoubtedly the Government albeit favoured by circumstances, had emerged with flying colours and the fears of the frontier divisions had in the event been proved groundless.

When the frontier grumbled that the frontier Governor's establishment was a mere sinecure, they were not far from the truth. The Lieutenant-Governor was chiefly concerned with the troops and the military position, not only of the colony but also of Natal and St. Helena. This important task engaged the bulk of his attention and necessitated much travelling not only in the frontier divisions and Kaffraria but also up the coast to Natal and round to Cape Town, to inspect periodically the most important fortifications in the colony. Of necessity, therefore, the civil duties entrusted to the Lieutenant-Governor's office, were largely a matter of routine carried out by R. Southey the Secretary to the Lieutenant-Governor. Including the Lieutenant-
Governor's Private Secretary, the whole staff (57) was limited to six, costing about £4,400 annually, and its jurisdiction extended not over the East, but merely over the frontier divisions (58) of Albany, Fort Beaufort, Victoria, Albert, Gradoock and Somerset. An examination of the record books of letters received and dispatched shows that merely minor matters of ordinary routine were handled and even then, a detailed weekly account of business transacted was submitted to Cape Town. In addition the monthly reports on native conditions were forwarded. As constituted it served no useful purpose but was merely, as the E.P. Herald of September 25th 1855 maintained, a sop to the frontier party. In view of the political strife, the official view was against increasing the civil powers of the office, for as Wodehouse (59) was to point out in 1865 there was danger of the Lieutenant-Governor being influenced by the party feeling and causing friction and disunity in the colony. Wodehouse considered the office unnecessary and a source of inefficiency and overlapping, yet it was useful to have some higher official to represent the Governor as was illustrated when Jackson in January 1857 carried out the settlement of the first shipments of the German legion. The big essential was that the Commander-in-Chief and the garrison should be on the frontier and in this respect the wishes of the East were acceded to.

Before examining Parliament's control of the finances and its treatment of the East, it is well to bear in mind the overwhelming needs facing the inexperienced Legislature. With a revenue of £261,734 in 1854 that was to almost double to £460,000 in 1858, Parliament was called upon to administer an area of 118,256 square miles with a total population of 248,265 in 1854 and an European population of less than one per square mile. The revision of the outgrown administrative system and the provision of adequate new facilities to cope with the rapid development was an immense task in a colony requiring an extension of the administrative, judicial and educational systems, the

(57) G.H.39/1 Jackson to Grey, Mar. 3, 1855.
(58) E.P.Herald May 23, 1855.
(59) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Cardwell, 124 of Nov.21, 1865. op. G.H.31/7 Grey to Stanley, 81 of June 17, 1858.
promotion of immigration schemes, harbours, improved roads and the construction of bridges, and efficient postal service, a powerful police force to cope with the Natives, the construction of prisons and the provision of the other accompaniments of a settled government. Yet Parliament tackled its task with a will.

"Questions are now settled - not by their utility or necessity, but simply by locality" grumbled the Journal (60) during the first Parliament. Was this justified by the way Parliament dealt with the major issues of the frontier?

In the next session in 1855 Parliament faced up to the need of protection against the Natives and carried the bill for the formation of the Cape Mounted Police, a force consisting of colonists with a maximum strength of 545 of all ranks and destined to play an important part in preserving peace in the next two decades, owing to the ability and experience of its members, its mobility, and the fear in which it was held by the Natives. The fact that this bill meant an annual expenditure of £20,000, was more than one-eighth the total revenue of the colony and equalled the sum jointly spent on justice, education and religion combined, hardly points to the neglect of the frontier. In the same session, the colony's defensive powers were further extended by the Burgher Militia Act, enabling the Governor to mobilize burghers "within their division" and amended the following year to enable burghers to be utilized in any Eastern division.

The need of improved communications was especially felt by the many traders and wool farmers and the province suffered genuinely from the inadequate transport facilities, but this was the fault of the frontier's recent settlement and origin. In 1855 the report of expenditure by the Central Roads Board (61) during the previous ten years was published and showed that so far from any injustice to the East it had actually received almost twenty-five per cent more than it was entitled to! In terms of the Ordinance of 1843 by which each province was to receive what was raised by the Board within that province, the East was entitled to £58,227 but had received £73,911. The

report (62) issued in 1856 for expenditure in 1855 showed a similar result and moreover that the East had benefitted at the cost of the West!

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<tr>
<th>Receipts</th>
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<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>£1,712 +</td>
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Until 1856, the one solitary Eastern bridge at Fort Brown on the Fish served to accentuate the inconvenience of the province's bridleless state but the Journal (63) itself was to admit that its need of bridges was met in 1856 when Parliament voted the construction of bridges over the Koomp on the Beaufort Road, the Turks on the Somerset Road and at Espargo Drift on the Cradock Road.

So far as railways were concerned the East itself, and particularly the frontier, was responsible for the defeat of the proposal for Eastern railways. In 1857 in his speech opening Parliament, Grey proposed railways for the East and West, suggesting the sum of £800,000 for the Eastern line. In June a committee of the House took evidence but the prevailing opinion of the Eastern members (64) examined, was either unfavourable or apathetic. In face of the evidence from the East the executive proposed solely the Western Bill which was carried. But a proposal for Eastern railways was to come before Parliament in the following session, proposed not by an Eastern member but by Saul Solomon (65) considered by the Journal to be the arch enemy and implacable foe of the East, and its defeat by 15-14 was due to a coalition of Eastern members and Western anti-railwayists.

We have noticed how the Journal had stressed the need of immigration - a need to which Parliament showed itself fully alive by successive votes of £40,000 in 1856, £50,000 in 1857 and a further £50,000 in 1858 (62) of which £30,000 was for the East and £20,000 for the West. In 1855 an additional puisne judge was added to the Supreme Court and nine new magistracies with the supplementary new offices were created; in 1857 £35,450 and in 1858 £15,000 was voted for new prisons throughout the colony. In 1857 £250,000 was granted to be spent equally on Table Bay and

Kowie harbour works while in 1858 lighthouses at Cape Agulhas and Port Elizabeth received £40,000, and educational grants were increased in consequence of the new Educational Boards Act of 1858.

Parliament assumed office in 1854 under most favourable circumstances. With a surplus in that year of £99,499 and a revenue that was to almost double itself within 4 years, a policy of vigorous expenditure on public works was followed. In 1855 with the introduction of free trade, customs tariffs were raised from 8½% to 11½ ad valorem, to yield over 50% of the total revenue of the colony. Despite the great advance in the wool industry and the almost unprecedented prosperity, Parliament could not cope with its too liberal policy of expenditure and the surplus was gradually reduced. The 1857 boom, mainly due to customs receipts restored the surplus to £130,000, Parliament launched out on the measures which we have noted above, worthy in themselves but unwise in the circumstances, reduced transfer rates, in 1857 and auction and road rates in 1858, and assembled in 1858 to face a deficit of £12,000 while in June started a drought which was to last until November 1859 and give the colony a foretaste of what it was to experience in the next decade. The financial measures of Parliament speak for themselves, and show no trace of partiality for the one province at the cost of the other. If the financial policy of the Parliament calls forth criticism, it is not on the score of injustice but that it was generous to the point of prodigality and laid up many of the financial difficulties of the next decade by binding the colony to annual commitments that could be comfortably met only in a period of prosperity.

Among the grievances of the East, we have shown how very real were the evils of the excessive centralization of the government, but these evils were to be lessened by a gradual extension

We are convinced that research into the financial administration of Grey will result in a strong criticism of his policy, and possibly justify the charge that he purchased much of his popularity at the cost of not sufficiently checking Parliament. We doubt whether the effects of the depression of the 'sixties would have been so severe or Wodehouse's difficulties so trying, had a more cautious policy been followed.
of local control. In 1836 the creation of municipal boards had been a great improvement in the towns but had left the rural areas unaffected. A start in extending local control over rural affairs was made in 1843 by the institution of Divisional Roads Boards (68) under the Central Roads Board and greatly extended in 1855 by the Divisional Council Act which stipulated that each division should consist of six wards, the elected representatives of each under the chairmanship of the Civil Commissioner to constitute a Divisional Council and to exercise the rights previously vested in the Divisional Roads Board and District School Commissions, as well as being entrusted with the regulation of Pounds and Trespass. In 1855 an old grievance was remedied when Woodfield (69) the Assistant Colonial Engineer was stationed at Port Elizabeth to supervise all Eastern public works and in the following year the powers of magistrates (70) were defined and extended. In 1855 education came under the decentralising influence, and the election of educational boards (71) in "field-cornetoes, villages and towns of the colony" was legalised. Thus a substantial start in the extension in the control over local affairs by local bodies had been made, and would tend to show that no blind attachment to centralisation was maintained, and that Parliament was eager to extend the privilege wherever possible.

In conclusion, in seeking to arrive at a just estimate of the work of the first Parliament, it must be maintained that the almost incessant grumbling and dissatisfaction of the Journal was the opinion not of the East but of the frontier. In August 1855 even the Journal admitted that "the questions of most vital importance to the Eastern districts have not been overlooked or treated with indifference" and in June 1857 Grey reported that the session had been "unusually productive of important measures ..... calculated ..... to promote the progress of South Africa", a view echoed in an encomium by the E.P. Herald. (72)

(68) Ordinance 8 of 1843 Section XXIX; Ebbers p.82.
(69) E.P.Herald, Dec. 4, 1855. (70) Act 20 of 1856; Ebbers p.125.
(71) Act 14 of 1856; Ebbers p.87. (72) G.H.31/7 Grey to Labouchere 77 of June 29, 1857.
E.P.Herald July 7, 1857.
Finally, in reporting the dissolution (73) in 1858, Grey panegyrised the Parliament almost extravagantly being specially impressed by "the remarkable absence of party spirit and faction" which had characterised the past sessions, and the fact that the Parliament had remained in office for the whole five years for which it was elected, "which I believe is without parallel in any other newly created colonial legislature". High praise indeed, and sentiments which he could scarcely have expressed were the frontier allegations well-founded.

(73) G.H.31/7 Grey to Stanley (separate) June 10, 1858.
CHAPTER III.

SEPARATION IN A STATE OF TORPOR: 1858.

SOUTH AFRICAN CONFEDERATION:
April 1858 - March 1859.

THE DESIRE FOR EASTERN RAILWAYS:
April 1857 - May 1860.


VOLATILE PORT ELIZABETH: 1857-1860.

ACTIVITIES OF THE SEPARATION PARTY IN THE SESSIONS OF 1859 and 1860.


THE ATTITUDE OF NEWCASTLE June 1859 - 1862.

SEPARATION IN THE SESSIONS OF 1862 and 1863.

THE DEPRESSION AND RAILWAYS FAVOUR A UNITED COLONY.

DECENTRALISATION VERSUS SEPARATION: 1861-1862.

THE INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THE MIDLANDS.
CHAPTER XIII.

SEPARATION DURING THE SECOND PARLIAMENT.

With the departure for England in February 1858 of Godlonton and Wood, two of the most ardent Grahamstown supporters of separation, the agitation within the colony seemed a spent force. The decisive defeat inflicted on the frontier party in the debate of 1856 when a majority of Eastern members voted with the West against them, appeared to have crushed any desire to again essay battle, while in the Council the resignation in the previous session of all the frontier members and their replacement by midlanders had left the Grahamstown party voiceless. The same torpor prevailed outside the walls of Parliament. In January of this same year, Graaff-Reinet showed her freedom from bias against Cape Town by electing as her representative in Parliament for the remaining year of the first Parliament, F.S. Watermeyer, and the local Press showed its lack of interest in the rivalry between the provinces by scarcely mentioning it throughout the year. Even the Journal (1) which had commenced the year with the usual tirade against the West and the impossibility of securing justice in a Cape Town Parliament moderated considerably after February.

In Port Elizabeth at a public meeting (2) on February 15th, called by Paterson and Clairmonte, the local representatives in Parliament, to ascertain the views of their constituents, Clairmonte briefly dismissed separation, maintaining that the proposal was premature and that when it did come it should take the form of a federation of three provinces. In the six resolutions passed separation was not mentioned, and the chief prominence was given to a railway line to Graaff-Reinet and not Grahamstown. The clearest indication of the province's loss of interest in political matters and the entire absence of political strife, was shown by the complete apathy which characterised the new elections for the Council and Assembly. Even the Journal, (3)

(1) Journal Jan. 2, 12, 16, 19, Feb. 9, 20, 1859.
(2) O.R.Herald, Feb. 27, 1858 (Report).
(3) Journal Act 5, Dec. 21, 1858.
incredible dictu, had in October advocated that the elections should be fought not on separation but on the issue of a South African confederation, and in December lamented that prospective candidates for the Assembly were showing so little interest in separation. For the Council election Cook, Godlonton, Wood and Blaine, the previous leaders of the agitation, were either absent or not standing, with the result that in an uncontested election the midlands secured four seats and the frontier three. With no issues at stake, candidates for the Assembly were scarce and even Fort Elizabeth could at the first election persuade only one martyr to sacrifice himself for the common weal. The trouble was that separation was not only a spent force but now had to compete against the movement for South African confederation and the agitation for colonial railways — forces of opposing tendencies to separation.

Since Saul Solomon, always the far-seeing statesman, had favoured South African confederation during the elections in 1853, the question had lost prominence owing to the diametrically opposed policy of H.M. Government, embodied in the Conventions with the Transvaal and the Free State and intended to preserve the Orange as the northern limit of British influence in South Africa. Nor did the rapid succession of ministers flitting through the Colonial Office (there were eight between 1852 and 1856) cause any weakening in this policy which was carefully guarded over by Herman Merivale, the permanent Under-Secre­ tary, a firm opponent of colonial expansion and convinced believer that the destiny of the Colonies was total severance from the Mother Country. Not only the letter but also the spirit of the Conventions was to be maintained, Labouchere informed Grey in 1857 in response to the petition from the Klip River inhabitants for separation, and Lytton had repeated this, emphasising that no extension of the frontiers was to be entertained.

Grey, however, as was not unusual for him, thought differently. In 1855 the tense conditions between the weak Free

(4) Egerton p.536.
(5) G.H.1/4 Labouchere to Grey 203 of June 5, 1857.
G.H.1/5 Lytton to Grey, 41 of Sept. 10, 1858.
State and the powerful Bautos had necessitated his intervention at a time when a spark would have set the Bantu world ablaze. Now in March 1858 open hostilities had broken out between Boschof and Mosheh, whereupon the Journal (6) promptly proposed that the obvious weakness of the Free State was clear evidence of the need of a South African confederation. Grey shared this view, and in July sought official instructions on his course of action and expressed his support of the project, despite Labouchere's clearly expressed orders to the contrary in the previous year. As soon as "the wish of the intelligent portion of the inhabitants (of the Free State) to be re-annexed to the colony" became known in September, the matter was given great publicity in the colonial Press. In the East (7) the Journal and Graaff-Reinet Herald were strongly in favour and the Eastern Province Herald, while approving the principle, cautiously wanted to know first on whom the defence of the new frontier would fall. At this juncture arrived Lytton's two despatches of September 6th, warning him against incurring fresh expenditure, but inviting his comments on H.M. Government's past policy in South Africa and his opinion of the feasibility of a federal union of Natal, Kaffraria and the Cape to lessen administrative costs. With great emphasis, Grey drove home his arguments in his famous despatch of November in favour of the abandonment of the Convention Policy, following it up in January 1859 with a letter from Brand sympathetic to a federal union with the Cape.

But Grey's scheme was doomed to disappointment. (8) At this stage arrived orders that no action was to be taken without reference to the Colonial Office, followed three months later by the emphatic information that no departure from the previously settled policy of the Colonial Office would be entertained.

Grey was in an unenviable position. After compromising H.M. Government by his sympathetic reply to Brand and raising the

G.H.31/7 Grey to Stanley 116 of July 5, 1858.
E.P.Herald Oct 22, 1858.
(8) G.H.31/7 Grey to Lytton (Separate) of Nov. 19, 1858 and 8 of Jan.13, 1859.
G.H.1/5 Lytton to Grey, 57 of Nov.5, 1858.
G.H.L/6 Lytton to Grey (separate and confidential)Feb.11,1859.
Journal, Mar.32, 1859.
question in his Speech from the Throne, he now had to retract and announce to Parliament the abandonment of all ideas of a South African confederation. Thus throughout the recess, confederation had been the main item of political interest, and the wide support the proposal secured meant a corresponding loss of support for the opposite principle of separation.

At the same time railways, as a prelude as to what was to follow in later years, began to play an increasingly important part. In March 1854, Grahamstown had optimistically favoured a railway from Port Elizabeth to the frontier, but nothing further came of this until Grey's Speech opening Parliament in 1857, when he proposed (9) the raising of £833,750 for the Cape Town to Wellington line and £804,303 for the Port Elizabeth to Grahamstown line. The understanding of the terms upon which the construction was to take place is a vital key to a clear grasp of what followed. In accordance with the practice observed in Europe surveys were to be made by the Colonial Civil Engineer upon which the estimates were based.

The contract for the undertaking was then entrusted to a private company, the Colonial Government guaranteeing six per cent return on the stipulated capital, but to save the Colonial Treasury, three per cent was to be provided by the Government and the remaining three per cent by a "sub-guarantee" imposed on the districts benefited. Thus even in the event of the line proving a total failure, an annual loss of no more than £18,000 on each line would be borne by the colonial revenues. The scheme did not involve the expenditure by the colony of over a million, however, but merely the utilisation of the country's credit.

The contrast between the two provinces on railway matters was sharp. Not only was the West unanimous in its choice but the proposed line ran through the wealthiest and most populous districts in the whole colony, and was the route over which the heaviest traffic passed. Moreover, a vital factor, the landowners besides wanting railways even petitioned in favour of the "sub-guarantee" - the sine qua non of the scheme. The

The physical features of the two provinces differed radically to the cost of the East. In the course of its total length of forty-five miles the Wellington line was faced with no serious obstacles and rose no higher than some 320 feet, whereas in the East, whether the Grahamstown or Graaff-Reinet routes were followed, construction would be complicated by the need of bridges, tunnels and passes, greatly increasing construction and working costs. Moreover Graaff-Reinet is 2,400 feet above sea-level and Grahamstown 1,745.

In the case of the East the strong rivalry between Grahamstown and Graaff-Reinet for the interior trade was increased (10) by a proposal that would to a large extent settle the question of the main inland route. Graaff-Reinet immediately demanded a midlands line, which the frontier as definitely opposed on principle, while Port Elizabeth, as the terminus of either, was prepared to support whichever party appeared likely to gain the ascendancy. Grahamstown was on the horns of a dilemma and really wanted the postponement of the whole question in view of the desperate efforts still being exerted, chiefly by Grahamstown residents, to make Kowie a commercial success. Should these hopes be materialised, the traffic from Grahamstown would be diverted to the new port so that this uncertainty made it difficult for the frontier town to adopt a settled policy towards railways. Port Elizabeth was not blind to the motive for the frontier's apathy or the implied threat to her commerce, and promptly drew nearer to the midlands. Moreover, signs were not lacking that already the idea of the "sub-guarantee" was repugnant to the many landowners and their innate fear of direct taxation had been aroused.

The consequences of these conflicting desires were inevitable. In June a committee (11) of the House took evidence on railways and the majority of the Eastern members questioned, especially those from the frontier, were unfavourable. Wood and Cook of Grahamstown were opposed in view of their support of Kowie; Fleming of Port Elizabeth wanted to see how the venture prospered in the West; Mosenthal of Graaff-Reinet favoured the

(10) G.R.Herald Dec. 13, 1856; May 16, 30, 1857.
(11) G.R.Herald June 20, 27, 1857.
initial repair of the roads, while Mentzies also of the same
centre, considered that the proposal was a few years premature.
In view of the lack of support from the East, the Western bill
alone was proposed and passed amid the acclamation (12) of Port
Elizabeth and Graaff-Reinet, and the usual grumbles from the
Journal, which went so far as to accuse the West of causing the
defeat of Eastern railways.

In the following session, after a favourable report on
Eastern railways, Solomon, considered by the Journal to be the
inveterate and implacable foe of the East, proposed that a
start be made on the line to Grahamstown, the motion being
defeated by 15-14 owing to the opposition of the Eastern landed
interests. Nor did the steady advance of the Western line or
the vote in the 1859 sessions for surveys arouse frontier
enthusiasm, and the Journal (13) boldly commented that Eastern
railways would mean an annual loss of £23,000 while the Eastern
Province Herald sadly noted a growing opposition to the "sub-
guarantee" from the landowners during 1859. The early months of
1860 saw a sudden change in the position. The preliminary
results of the surveys favoured the Grahamstown line and excluded
the midlands project, while the Journal (14) suddenly declared
in favour of conciliation with Port Elizabeth, the proposed line
and even the "sub-guarantee", and Mundy the member for Graha-
town, brought forward a railway bill that was withdrawn only on
account of the incomplete surveys. Meanwhile (15) the doughty
Bowker brothers, ever averse to following the majority, stirred
up an anti-railway party among the farmers; Stanton and Botmen,
the new members for Somerset and Albert, came in on the cry of
"no railways - no 'sub-guarantee'" and the landed interests of
the East presented a petition against Mundy's bill.

The uncertainty about the future routes, from 1857 to
1860 greatly influenced the grouping of the Eastern parties.

E.P.Herald July 7, 1857.
Trade rivalry deepened the cleavage between Graaff-Reinet and Grahamstown and made the respective interests of the midlands and frontier even more irreconcilable, while Graaff-Reinet's support of Railways, and Grahamstown's faith in the future of Kowie, brought the two leading midlands towns into close harmony. The isolation of the frontier as a political force was thus increased, and the large financial guarantees involved in the construction of railways necessitated the resources of a united colony, so that, as in the case of confederation, railways tended to militate against the separation of the provinces. The results of the surveys produced an immediate change.(16)

For a brief period the Press of Graaff-Reinet were prepared even to favour the Grahamstown line in order to secure a start in construction, and Port Elizabeth, already assured of midland traffic, was not going to look askance at what would strengthen her position against East London, the competitor for the trade of the Eastern Cape.

Propinquity did not give unanimity to the East. On how fissile a foundation the separation league of 1860 rested, is shown by a consideration of the factors still dividing the heterogeneous elements of the East in the years immediately preceding the momentous session of 1860. The cleavage between midland and frontier, so apparent in the first Parliament was to be deepened in the second Parliament by differences partly economic centering around the railway question, and partly political involving constitutional amendment.

The immediate effect of Grahamstown's attitude to Eastern railways in 1857 was to drive the rest of the province into a camp against her and completely alienate feeling at the Bay against the frontier, as was shown by the public meeting held at Port Elizabeth in February 1858 to support a midland railway to Graaff-Reinet. Even the Journal (17) acknowledged the gravity of this disruption. At the same time, railways had

the effect of giving rise to a new anti-railway party, drawn from both midlands and the frontier, and consisting mainly of landowners hostile to the proposed additional taxation, which was strong enough to play a big part in the defeat of Solomon's proposal in 1858. By 1859 two of the three leading centres were supporting a railway policy to which Grahamstown was maintaining a determined opposition, and on both sides of the province was a conservative element against any change. In 1860 this position was suddenly reversed. In February Grahamstown came out as a railway supporter, only to face a growing opposition of considerable strength from the landed interests, while Graaff-Reinet was apathetic in view of the cold douche which her plans had received from the recent surveys. Thus not only had Graaff Reinet and Grahamstown drifted further apart but a third party pledged to oppose railways had come into being.

Influenced by their differences over railways, the breach between midlands and frontier on the question of constitutional amendment widened. In June 1857 the six Eastern Councillors had taken umbrage at the Western Railway Bill and their resignation had been followed by a wave of agitation from the frontier, with the Journal fulminating against all things Western and making vaguely defined proposals for a very loose federation of the two provinces. But with the annoyance at Grahamstown's part in causing the failure of Eastern railways still rankling, the midland Press (18) responded coldly to all overtures from Grahamstown. During the agitation of July and August, Graaff-Reinet simply ignored Grahamstown and went on collecting statistics in support of its railway. Paterson's paper with blunt odour replied that the midlands would never be linked with "any section of the country where a non-progressive policy is found to be in favour", Uitenhage showed its feelings by condemning separation at a public meeting and in August the E.P.Herald, to illustrate how unsupported the frontier was, maintained that Eastern political views were divided into "Parliamentarians", who were satisfied with the present constitu--

(18) Journal Aug. 4, 15, Oct. 27, 1857
E.P.Herald July 7, 21, Aug. 4, 1857.
tion - Graaff-Reinet, Colesburg and Albert; Removalists - Uitenhage and Somerset; Federalists - Port Elizabeth; and Separatists - Grahamstown, Albany, Cradock and Port Beaufort.

In September, after the Journal had been calling upon the East to unite at a joint conference on how to throw off the Western yoke, the G.R.Herald hardly showed sympathy in replying that "Grahamstown seems bent on going wrong. The frantic efforts of its representatives to force separation on an unwilling country have turned that measure into a farce." In October, Fleming, one of the honourables who had defiantly put his name to Godlonton's twelve-fold protest three months previously, put the feeling of the East into words when he declared himself against separation for the one reason that it would make railway construction impossible. Thus the determined opposition of the midlands to the frontier had rendered every effort of the representatives and Press of Grahamstown nugatory and caused even the usually sanguine Journal to despair of achieving Eastern unanimity. As quickly as the agitation had arisen, tranquility was restored and resulted in a year of calm which was not broken even when the P.E.Telegraph (19) sneezed that "Separation excites little or no attention at the present moment ... we may consider the Separation Party as henceforth defunct."

But the Telegraph was wrong. Separation was not defunct but moribund and in 1859 changed circumstances within the colony caused the Journal (20) to again pursue the subject dearest to the heart of its owner. Once more amid a steady flow of complaints, vaguely defined proposals were made for a change in the constitution varying from the removal of the capital, alternate sessions in the East and West and a federation of the loosest type, to a full separation of the two provinces. With the departure of Grey in June, faded the last hope of a South African confederation, while the East had progressed in proportion to the amazing development in the wool industry and both export and import returns from Port Elizabeth for the first six months of 1859 were each valued at over half a million. (21) The Journal

(19) Journal Aug. 17, 1858 (extract).
(21) "Notes on Separation" (1860) S.a.Lib. 575.e.303.
claiming that its progress enabled it to stand alone, was still the voice crying in the wilderness, (22) and despite the solicitations from Grahamstown the G.R.Herald still made it clear that in a federation scheme of two provinces, the midlands would join the West, as any other arrangement "will only leave open the door to future agitation and distractions similar to those which have so long existed between the Eastern and Western districts of the colony". Sadly reviewing the lack of progress made during the last year, the Journal was forced to admit that "conflicting evidence from frontier members, disagreement on points vital to the discussions at issue, more effectually marred contemplated reforms than even the opposition of enemies. We were, and still are, disunited on the great question of separation or federation, and we must await the advent of unanimity before we again venture to renew our struggle for a local government".

In an effort to secure "the advent of unanimity", the Grahamstown party pursued a conciliatory policy towards Port Elizabeth, foreshadowed in its abandonment of its opposition to railways, during the early months of 1860 while Port Elizabeth, faced with the task of providing fresh members of Parliament to replace the continual resignations, began to press strongly for the removal of the capital, and appeared to be returning Grahamstown's overtures. Despite this tendency however, railways still destroyed any hope of success (23) and on the eve of the session the Journal noted, and the remarks sounds strange in view of its source, that members were "each advocating his own local concerns, regardless of the general interests of the whole colony". In May, five months before the formation of the league whose main object was to unite the East, the E.P.Herald, which certainly had no cause to exaggerate, painted a dismal picture of the differences of the Eastern members in the Assembly, dividing them into four camps: Independents, such as Mclnster of Port Beaufort; the midland party of Somerset - Graaff-Reinet and Colesburg; the Grahamstown camp, and even a "Dopper" party represented by Botman from Albert. As to political

(22) G.R.Herald June 4,11,1859 ; Journal, Dec.31,1859.
aims a few wanted full separation, others federation but not separation, others railways with the "sub-guarantee", others railways without the "sub-guarantee", still others no railways at all, while Stretch and Bowker were still maintaining the cry of compensation for losses in the 1851 war. No wonder the Herald stressed the need for a party spirit!

Other minor questions caused still further friction.

The state-aided immigration scheme of the late 'fifties was administered by local boards at Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown and Graaff-Reinet, but it was not long before the boards of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth were at loggerheads, as the inland centres maintained that Port Elizabeth secured the pick of the immigrants and sent the "refuse" on to Grahamstown and Graaff-Reinet. When in 1860 the frontier began to hinder the alienation of Crown Lands, maintaining that they were an Eastern asset and should not be disposed of until the East became a separate colony and could enjoy the benefit of these resources, the midland view was that "it is but another form of the grasping selfishness which has so often defeated the counsels of the public men of the Eastern districts." On the questions of Responsible Government and the vote of a loan for the Table Bay harbour, the midland view was similarly opposed to that held by the frontier. Only once did the Herald of Grahamstown show itself in favour of separation. With separation waxing strong along the frontier after the stormy session of 1860 and Kaffraria assuming its new status as a separate Crown Colony, the Herald bluntly suggested that here was the chance for the frontier divisions to sever their connection with the Cape and join Kaffraria, but as for Uitenhage, Graaff-Reinet, Colesburg and Somerset joining them, the idea was preposterous. Even the enthusiasm that attended the founding of the Separation League in October when every division was invited to join in throwing off the yoke of a "distant and alien government" achieved no more in the Midlands than to earn the contemptuous retort from

from the Herald (27) that Graaff-Reinet would never join a party "which has distinguished itself throughout its career by the pursuit of self-interest, by misrepresentation and dishonesty" and went on to quote from the Queenstown Free Press that "the love of centralization is as strong in Grahamstown as in Cape Town".

Bold would be he who would prophesy success for a league built upon so unstable a foundation.

Eastern politics did not resolve into a straight fight between the Midlands led by Graaff-Reinet and the frontier led by Grahamstown, but were always complicated by the gyrations of political opinion in Port Elizabeth. Not only were Grahamstown and Graaff-Reinet thrown into different camps by trade rivalry and difference of race which caused them to follow a definite unchanging policy of hostility to each other, but this policy was given stability and continuity, in the case of Grahamstown by the influence of the Journal and a numerous party devoted to the achievement of the one ideal of separation, and in the case of Graaff-Reinet, by the uncompromising hostility to the frontier maintained by the Press and the important fact that Ziervogel, a man of considerable ability and considered by the Journal to be anti-English, was the senior member for Graaff-Reinet in the Assembly throughout the period of Representative Government.

Port Elizabeth was incapable of sustained political activity. Of much more recent origin than Grahamstown, it lacked a leisured class with means and ability to devote to public affairs, and was rapidly acquiring the reputation of being the most active and businesslike town in the colony. The result of its preoccupation in commerce was that few of the leading citizens took more than a passing interest in public affairs, intent simply on amassing sufficient upon which to retire to England. A sign of this political apathy is the fact that Port Elizabeth, although the third largest town in the colony, continually experienced difficulty in securing not only members who would retain their seats for the whole Parliament, but even representatives for a session or two. Hence Port Elizabeth residents were seldom ever found, as in the case of Grahamstown,

seeking election in other divisions, and the numerous public meetings so characteristic of Grahamstown had no counterpart at the Bay. Port Elizabeth was thus often in a position of having to accept whatever candidate offered himself, irrespective of whether his views were in harmony with the constituency he represented, with the result that her representatives followed no settled line of policy in the House. Throughout the first Parliament, Paterson was the senior member, and it is clear that Port Elizabeth as a whole followed his attitude of sympathy for the midlands and hostility towards the frontier. A unanimous public meeting in February 1858 has been noticed declaring against separation and a railway with Grahamstown, yet within a year this same centre elected W.H. Harries as M.L.A., one who even in 1848 had been pressing for the division of the colony and whom Chase and Wilmot (28) regarded as the champion of the separation movement. Towards the end of 1859, after one session Harries and Philip the two members resigned, Paterson's influence was removed by his temporary retirement to England, and no Port Elizabeth resident was willing to accept nomination. At the beginning of 1860 with signs of improved relationships with Grahamstown and forced to accept the offers of "foreign" candidates, Cawood of Grahamstown and Stretch of Port Beaufort, the latter against separation, but supporting a two province federation, were elected. (29) Public opinion was also influenced towards the frontier party by a change in the editorial and ownership of the leading Port Elizabeth paper, the E.P.Herald, (30) and in October 1857 George Impye became editor in place of Paterson, while about this same period Richards, Godlonton's partner and joint owner of the Journal, also became joint partner with Impye. This resulted in a gradual inclination towards frontier views until after 1860 the Journal and the Herald differed only on minor matters of local interest, the true midlands view being maintained in the Telegraph.

To Port Elizabeth business and not principle was the main criterion of her course of action, and her favourable position and the dependence of both midland and frontier upon the
seaport enabled her to trim her sails to whatever breeze would advance her personal interests best. Her attitude during the railway controversy shows this. Prior to 1857 public opinion tended to vacillate between Graaff-Reinet and Grahamstown, but in 1857, when Kowie appeared a possible rival and Graaff-Reinet seemed to stand some chance of gaining a railway, Port Elizabeth turned strongly against the frontier. In 1860 this attitude underwent a complete change. With the Graaff-Reinet line declared to be impracticable, the Bay assured of the midlands traffic in the absence of any rival port and Kowie justifying its critics, Port Elizabeth supported the proposal for the Grahamstown line as enthusiastically as it had previously favoured the midlands project. The attitude of the Bay during the next decade was to be largely shaped by the powerful commercial class, the majority of whom generally sided with Grahamstown, but at the same time public opinion was never unanimous owing to the presence of influential commercial interests whose ties with Cape Town and the midlands were too strong to permit sympathy with frontier aims. In the next decade on nearly all the important questions, the votes of the two representatives were seldom given to the same proposal, and this was generally representative of the division in public opinion.

During the second Parliament, the separation movement attained its greatest success under Representative Government. Despite the overt hostility with which the West and midlands regarded its views, the frontier party pursued its course with greater assiduity than ever before, and in one form or another raised the question of separation in each successive session. The changed circumstances of the colony gave the Journal a new argument. The doubling of colonial revenue during the last five years was due as much to the progress of the East as to any other part of the colony; a succession of good seasons and a ready English market caused wool sales to reach record figures, the value of sheep runs boomed and the addition of an increasing volume of traffic with the republic and Beaufort West, one of the
principal wool areas and the other border divisions of the West, caused the import and export figures of Port Elizabeth to compare favourably with those of Cape Town. Triumphanty the Journal now pointed to the fact that the resources of the East alone were greater than those of the united colony in 1850 and claimed separation on the grounds that the East was now able to support its own government. At the same time the memory of Solomon's trenchant exposure of Eastern disunity in the 1856 session had grown dim and the presence of new members in the House made it a favourable chance to test public opinion on the question. The opportunity came after Lytton had expressed his disapproval of South African confederation and the incorporation of British Kaffraria with the Cape had been mooted by the Governor.

Grey (31) had soon departed from Cathcart's Kaffrarian Policy as embodied in its erection into a separate government under the Royal Charter of March 7, 1854, which he was expected to promulgate, providing for a Governor, Governor's Deputy, and nominated Council of residents. To the Colonial Secretary, he emphasized the absurdity of an area one-third the size of an average Cape division, whose administration was performed by a Civil Commissioner and one or two clarks, requiring the unnecessary expense of a representative of the High Commissioner and his establishment, a law adviser to the Crown, a head of a Survey Department, and a Superintendent of Public Works. Nor was he blind to the difficulties in the way of reincorporation with the colony that this degree of independence would give rise to.

In 1855, at the opening of Parliament (32) the Governor had explicitly stated that the continued separation of Kaffraria from the Cape was a transitory expedient lest the Fingoos within the Colony should be antagonised by the benefits conferred on the Xosas by his civilising policy. At the prorogation of the 1857 session, (33) he evidently considered the necessity

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(31) G.H.31/7 Grey to Labouchere 192 of Dec.8, 1857 and Grey to Lytton 26 of Feb.17, 1859.
was rapidly passing for "I have endeavoured ... to bring the
laws of British Kaffraria into perfect harmony with those of the
Cape Colony", he informed Parliament, "in order that diversity
of laws and customs might hereafter present no obstacle to the
incorporation of British Kaffraria .... if such a union should
hereafter be thought desirable, as there is much reason to think,
may be the case." At a time when the "single design of the
British Government was economy" Grey's approval in his federation
despatch of the re-union of the small buffer state to the colony,
met with more sympathy than his main proposals, and Lytton (34)
sanctioned this step provided the Cape Legislature assented,
failing which the Royal Charter was to be promulgated in a
modified form. As instructed, Grey asked Parliament to consider
the question, (35) when opening the session of 1859.

To the Cape it was not merely a question of the exten-
sion of the colonial boundary over a small area of 3,000 square
miles but raised fundamental issues of vital importance to the
interests of both provinces. The additional representation in
Parliament that would of necessity have to be conceded to
British Kaffraria would involve a re-adjustment of the balance
of power between the two provinces, and the fact that the
defence of Kaffraria would be no longer an Imperial responsi-
bility, aroused a fear that incorporation would be the prelude
to imposing a greater share of the burden of defence on the
colonists by a considerable reduction of Imperial troops.

For some time now the colonists had been fearing that
withdrawal of the troops was imminent. Nor was this fear ground-
less in face of the numerous indications that had recently been
given of the chariness of the Lords of the Treasury to sanction
any but the most necessary expenditure on the colonies. As
early as June 1853, a Grahamstown public meeting had stoutly
opposed the new constitution for fear that it would involve the
withdrawal of the British forces in South Africa, while in
August of the same year the Press gave publicity to a despatch
from Newcastle that not only announced a considerable reduction

(34) G.H.1/5 Lytton to Grey (Separate and confidential)
in the garrison but threatened that in 1854 the Cape would be made responsible for the defence of Kaffraria. (35) Amid the growing unrest of the cattle killing, the colonists received a further forcible reminder of the change in the feelings of the British public by the wide prominence given to an article reprinted from the Morning Post emphasizing that the Colonies should be made responsible for their own native policies and defence, while in 1857, no less than nine regiments were despatched to aid the settlement of the crisis in India. (37)

The West considered the incorporation of Kaffraria would be an unmitigated evil. Already troubled with some 140,000 people of colour (38) within the colony, Solomon and his party had nothing but opposition for a measure that would add a further 70,000 to the Native population and threatened an increased colonial expenditure on defence, at a time when the black clouds of a depression were looming on the financial horizon and the colony was already paying out one-eighth of its revenue on the Mounted Police. The Kaffrarian budget would balance only with the £40,000 Imperial grant which Stanley (39) had in the previous year threatened to reduce to £20,000 and, worst of all, the alterations in representation might menace Western superiority and enable the East to carry a much dreaded motion in favour of the removal of the capital to the East.

The attitude of the frontier was expressed by the Journal on March 19th 1859. After stressing how the present security and firm handling of the frontier problem had caused a rise in the value of all fixed and immovable property in the East, it was emphatic that no disturbance of the present arrangement under the existing constitution would ever be considered, as this would mean Cape Town control of native policy. It added ingenuously, however, that in the event of the separation of the two provinces and the East's getting control of native affairs, the question would assume a new complexion as "it would benefit

(36) Journal June 18, Aug.13, 1853.
(37) Journal Oct.4, 1858, Oct.18, 1862.
(38) Annual Blue Book (1858) V.2; G.R.Herald May 26, 1860; Journal Apr. 16, 1859.
(39) G.H.1/5 Stanley to Grey 34 of May 5, 1858.
both [the East and Kaffraria] because they are so identified." Thus the Grahamstown attitude was against Kaffrarian annexation per se, but it was prepared to sink its opposition if the compensation of separation were granted.

The midlands, still chafing at their under-representation in the House, which was becoming more pronounced as midlands prosperity kept pace with the development of wool - their main product, sided with the West in fearing an increased burden for defence and opposed the enfranchisement of districts which, it was presumed, would be likely to side with the frontier. Meanwhile Kaffraria was not without a will of its own. Its separate development from that of the colony gave to this small area an individuality of outlook that made its 7,000 Europeans extremely unwilling to be submerged in the 100,000 Europeans of the Cape, while such an attitude is not diminished but fostered by the acquisition of a seaport. As yet to Grey's plan of European colonisation no alternative had been proposed for the disposal of the empty Transkeian lands evacuated by Krell. What was more natural than that the ambitious Kaffrarian should envisage the incorporation of the fertile Transkei and the gradual extension of the colonial boundary up to the limits of Natal? At the same time, enjoying the artificial prosperity that resulted from the Imperial grant, a big share of the £210,000 spent upon the settlement of the German legion (40) and the annual Imperial expenditure from 1857-9 of £30,000 on pay for the legion, they could afford to sneer at the trembling Cape finances.

Moreover a measure of comparative independence is seldom readily relinquished. In April 1859, as soon as the proposal was mooted, the Kaffrarian left the neighbouring colony under no misapprehensions as to their attitude. At a public meeting (41) a small minority favoured federation with the Cape, an overwhelming majority desired independence as a separate colony, and all declared emphatically against being incorporated with the Cape or even the frontier if granted separation. Thus in the early weeks of the session after Grey had requested Parliament to

(40) G.H.1/5 Stanley to Grey 24 of May 5, 1858.
consider the matter, the question received considerable prominence in the various parts of the colony.

With the East represented by a midland majority and the separation "giants" absent from the Council, the frontier's strength lay in the Assembly where its new leader, Clough of Grahamstown, was determined to raise the separation issue at the earliest opportunity. On April 21st he proposed the motion: that owing to the uselessness of the Lieutenant-Governor's office the House favoured "the introduction of an efficient resident government on the immediate frontier". This time the "historical" reasons in favour of his motion were reinforced by the new argument of the East's economic ability to support its own government. Porter, the Attorney-General, had opposed the motion, on the grounds that two administrative systems would mean additional and unnecessary expense, but the real weakness of their case was ruthlessly exposed by Solomon's logical arguments. He freely conceded the East's ability to bear separation but pointed out that the limited provincial resources would result in inferior governments and the inability to secure a governor as was possible in a united colony. Following his usual line of attack he argued that the East as a province did not desire the division of the colony, and supported this by quotations from the P.E.Telegraph and E.P.Herald "that the Eastern Province people would as soon seek separation from the mother country as seek separation from the Western Province". He pointed to the fact that in the recent elections the frontier division of Victoria East had elected Darnell although he was openly against separation, and maintained that nine-tenths of the East's population were from the West and that this "enormous preponderance" were not against their old home; that despite the newspaper agitation and the efforts of leaders to arouse a strong party in favour of separation, nothing had been achieved, thus pointing to the absence of any "strong feeling on the subject in the Eastern Province".

Finally, as an amendment, he proposed and carried the alternative motion for the appointment of a commission to consider the incorporation of Kaffraria and report on the advisability of separa-

(42) Journal May 3, 1859 (Report).
tion for the East. At the end of May, the commission reported that the Kaffrarian proposal was inexpedient and that in the light of the disunity in the East over the question of two or three provinces, no alteration of the constitution could be proposed. As a result of this report, separation was shelved for the session, and the refusal of the Cape to relieve H.M. Government of Kaffrarian meant that the charter for a separate government would be promulgated in an amended form, while Grey sounded a gloomy warning of future native troubles if the problem one and indivisible, should be relegated to the divergent policies of a number of separate authorities.

Separation petitions with 1168 signatures from Queenstown, Albany, Peddie, Bathurst, Cradock, Bedford, Salem and Lower Albany had been presented, but the agitation received no support outside the frontier divisions, and after the report of the separation commission, only the utterings of the Journal continued to disturb the peace of the East.

The session of 1860 when separation was again brought up, was clouded by the vague menace of native unrest. The previous congestion in the reserves in British Kaffrarian had been greatly relieved by deaths from famine and the absorption of sufferers in relief works within the colony, Grey estimating that by March 1858, a year after the fateful episode, 28,000 Natives had entered the colony. In this same year Klei's Galekas had been heaped-up in inadequate lands across the Bashee, and by 1860 Major Currie's police patrols were maintaining the integrity of the Transkei, empty save for a limited number of Fingoes at Butterworth and Tembus at Idutywa, until such time as Grey would be in the position to effect his plan of European settlement. When Grey left the colony in July 1859 he was able to report a state of tranquility on the Eastern frontier, which according to Wynyard's reports, continued until February 1860.

To Wynyard with his eye on the military situation, the

(44) G.H.31/7 Grey to Lytton 86 of June 17, 1859.
(45) Journal March 16, 1858 (Report)
empty area between the Kei and the Bashee was a source of potential danger. On assuming office he lost no time in stressing the difficulty of preserving intact the empty Transkei surrounded by the overcrowded reserves of Gaikas, Tembus and Fingos, not to mention its original owners, the land-short Gaikas across the Bashee, and pressed for its settlement by Europeans, an opinion supported by McLean the Chief Commissioner for Kaffraria who was also naturally anxious to see the area under his jurisdiction increased. Despite his repeated requests Newcastle forbade any move until the return of Grey. (47) Not only was the Transkeian frontier thus in a state of uncertainty but the colony itself was suddenly thrown into acute suspense in the early months of 1860 by a widespread exodus of several thousands of the refugees of 1857 and 1858. The unrest and increase in vagrancy and thieving were due not to any want of government control, as the frontier Press alleged, but rather, as the Civil Commissioners in their reports pointed out, to economic necessity (48) caused by the exigencies of the drought, which had already lasted for some eighteen months, in overcrowded reserves.

By means of monthly reports Wynyard kept the absent Grey informed of conditions in the colony, and these display eloquently Wynyard's extreme nervous tension at the frontier situation. With Warner sounding a warning that the Tembus from Queenstown wanted to leave the colony and settle between the Temba and Indwe, Krell pressing for the return of his old lands and considered to be the source of all evil on the frontier, the exodus increasing in numbers and Wynyard pressing for two further regiments at the Cape, the Executive Council (49) in March 1860, advised the Acting Governor to suspend the execution of Newcastle's instructions for the cessation of payment to the German legion from that month. They would thus be kept under arms as an additional reinforcement in the event of a rising. However, the return of 200 German legionaries from India in March strengthened the frontier from Stutterheim to East London, the reports circulated

(48) G.H.29/1 Wynyard to Grey Dec. 31, 1859 and 51 of March 17, 1860 (See enclosures from Warner and Travers.)
(49) G.H.29/1 Minute 10; Mar. 17, 1860; Wynyard to Grey, Ap. 20, 1860.
by the frontier Press about Fingo disloyalty were proved false
and by the end of June only the Tembus remained restless. (50)
Thus when the 1860 session opened in April the Eastern frontier
was in a state of acute alarm and a chorus of complaints of
unrest, thieving, and vagrancy was arising from the frontier.

The 1860 session was preceded by the reconciliation
between Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth on the question of an
Eastern railway and the Bay's move in sentiment towards the
frontier. Meanwhile the Journal was still inveighing against
the West, and the midlands were more emphatic than ever that
union with the frontier would never be considered. This session
was marked by the rising tide of friction between the provinces
that was to culminate in the outburst of separation agitation in
October and the formation of the Separation League.

The publication in the Government Gazette, before the
session was opened, of the texts of two Government bills started
the trouble. The Crown Lands Bill (51) was intended to give the
Executive more control over the alienation of Crown Lands in
order to secure greater returns from these colonial assets but
was immediately designated by the frontier as a measure for the
"spoliation of the East." The position was that most of the
colony's Crown Land in the West had been used for the benefit of
both provinces and the bulk of the unappropriated lands was
situated in the East, but the frontier, still optimistic about
gaining the separation of the provinces, hoped to gain the bene-
fit of these resources for Eastern purposes alone. This attitude
although opposed by the midlands, resulted in the Divisional
Councils of Somerset, Cradock, Queenstown, Fort Beaufort and
Uitenhage pursuing a policy of obstruction by refusing to recom-
mend sales, a power vested in the Divisional Councils subsequent
to the Act of 1855. The second bill proposed a vote of £50,000
for construction of a House of Parliament. It was not so much
the sum involved which met with the, for once, united opposition
of the frontier and midlands, but the far more fundamental issue
that it would fix the seat of government at Cape Town and pre-
clude any question of removal eastwards for some time to come.

(50) G.H.29/1 Native Report to Travers, June 1860 and Wynyard to
Grey, June 30,1860.
May 30,1860.

72.
72
Conditions arising out of Wynyard's revelation of the financial state of the colony were to cause further provincial antagonism. The general tightness of money first commented on by the Journal in April 1859 had increased to an alarming extent, oidiun in the vines was becoming serious, smallpox and lung sickness were made especially devastating by the increasing severity of the drought, and by February 1860 the one division of Graaff-Reinet alone reported losses of over 120,000 sheep and 20,000 goats. Cattle diseases stopped the profitable horse trade with India. The removal of the preferential tariff on Cape wines, accompanied by a big loss in quality, destroyed the English market, and then as the last straw, Wynyard announced (52) a deficit of £54,000 on 1859 and fore-shadowed fresh taxation to meet the shortfall of £74,000 on 1860. Moreover, following on unauthorised expenditure of £33,000 in 1859, the estimates had again been considerably exceeded mainly in the judiciary. These revelations as well as the feeling that Grey would not long remain after his return and the imminent departure on leave of the popular Colonial Secretary, Rawson, led to a well supported Press campaign in the West and midlands for Responsible Government (53) and an equally aggressive opposition from the frontier. Nor were Eastern feelings soothed by the narrow defeat of Molteno's Responsible Government motion by 20-18, caused by a coalition of the frontier and Western conservatives against the midlands and Western Responsibilities. The Journal was slow to forget the great fear of domination by a Western ministry that this narrow escape aroused, and throughout the session continued to fulminate against the West.

Finally Rawson's budget speech (54) on the 25th May precipitated a crisis. Wynyard and his Executive had resolved that the only way out of the hazardous financial straits in which the colony found itself, was recourse to fresh taxation, a course likely to be unpopular at any time, no matter how inevitable. He reviewed the possible avenues of fresh taxation and ruled out customs as they were contributing £80,000 towards colonial revenue and had already been raised to an average ad valorem duty of

(52) Journal May 5, 1860 (Report sections 29 and 30.
(54) Journal June 2, 1860.
eleven per cent; a direct tax, he dismissed as in the absence of any taxing machinery, its collection would involve as much expense as the new tax raised, and concluded that as the main causes of the financial crisis were roads and public works, the producers, who chiefly benefitted from these measures, should share in their expense. This would mean a tax on the principal exports of the colony, namely on wool and wine, but in view of the difficulties being experienced by the latter industry, he proposed a tax of ½d. per pound on wool alone. In view of the boom in wool sales and the fact that this commodity was entirely free of taxation throughout every process of its production, it is hard to quarrel with the justice of his arguments, and it is worthy of comment that the organ (55) of one of the principal wool divisions at first considered the proposal "as equitable as any that could be devised", and only joined in the opposition after considerable agitation from the frontier. Unfortunately for the Colonial Secretary, however, three-quarters of the wool output came from the East which would therefore bear the burden of the tax, and this immediately provided an excuse for the frontier, and merchants of Port Elizabeth, whose profits were threatened, to allege that the Executive was displaying an unfair favouritism towards the West.

Nor was this all as far as the frontier was concerned, for among the estimates was a proposal for a loan of £300,000 for harbour construction in Table Bay. The concatenation was complete. Coming on top of the Crown Lands Bill and the bill for the construction of Houses of Parliament, the Government's administration of the finances and Molteno's Responsible Government motion, and at a time when every argument that would assist its case was eagerly snapped up by the frontier, it caused the Journal to launch a violent diatribe against the West. Nor would the merchants of Port Elizabeth, who controlled the bulk of the wool export and whose rapidly swelling trade had to contend with the altogether inadequate facilities at the Bay, have been human had they not resented this development scheme for the port that was their greatest rival. The spokesmen of the frontier and Port

(55) G.R.Herald June 2, 1860.
Elizabeth, for the midlands still supported the West (56) and considered the harbour scheme a question of national importance, generally spoke as though the proposal involved an expenditure of £300,000 from the colony's revenues. However, merely a loan was contemplated, the interest charges of which were to fall on the colony only until such time as the debt could be liquidated by wharfage dues levied at the port, so that as in the construction of railways, the proposal was mainly to utilise the credit of the colony. Clearly with the revenue still in the neighbourhood of half a million the Executive, who proposed this measure, could never have envisaged such a drain on the colony as the frontier was prone to infer.

The reaction to Rawson's proposals was immediate. Led by the Westerner Welteno, the representative for the important wool producing area of Beaufort West, the House rejected the obnoxious wool tax and foreshadowed the course it was to take during the following decade by adopting resolutions of economy and retrenchment. (57) In view of the frontier's allegations that it could never obtain justice in a "Table Mountain Parliament" it is striking to note that in the case of each of the controversial questions, Crown Lands, the vote for the House, Table Bay harbour, and the wool tax, the proposal emanated not from the West but from the Executive, which could scarcely be accused of having a provincial bias as most of the members were appointed from outside the colony, while in the case of the wool tax which was regarded as favouritism of the West, it was the West that led the opposition to the Executive. The cost of the Table Bay works save for unforeseen circumstances would ultimately be borne by the West itself and was an undertaking of national importance; the method of disposal of Crown Lands was such as to call forth a trenchant condemnation from Wodehouse and urgently needed reform; a House somewhere was becoming a matter of necessity and where was more likely than the town which was four times the size of its nearest rival, had been the seat of government for 200 years, and was the centre of the most populous and wealthy area in the country?

Throughout the previous year the Journal had been claiming separation in view of the East's economic development, only for the frontier to be again defeated. Thus the events of the 1860 session did not suddenly bring into being a desire for separation, but the agitation was greatly increased and fresh support gained for the frontier by the skilful use which the Press of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth made of the widespread resentment over in particular the wool tax and the Table Bay harbour loan. Apart from the question of the extent to which the frontier attitude was justified, the result undoubtedly was a degree of unanimity between the frontier, Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth not previously experienced in the East. The divisions of Albany, including Grahamstown, Victoria, Port Elizabeth, Fort Beaufort and Somerset now were ranged against Graaff-Reinet, Colesburg and Albert with Uitenhage and Cradock undecided and prone to vacillate as a result of their mixed populations and their interest with both frontier and Midlands. Thus of the twenty-two Eastern members, about fourteen could be counted on to support Grahamstown, while about eight midland representatives so opposed the frontier that they invariably preferred to vote with the West. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that this frontier majority in votes, was not a true reflection of the relative positions of the parties concerned, judged by the European population, resources or area, of the divisions they represented.

Acting quickly while Eastern tempers were still running high, the frontier on June 5th again proposed the separation of the provinces, but in a House from which only two members were absent, Brand being Speaker, the frontier could gain no more than fourteen votes against the twenty-nine votes of the opposition. Although the utter weakness of their case was exposed by Solomon's counter proposals, the frontier was far from crushed, and when the Government's Table Bay Bill was proposed, a coalition of recalcitrant Western members and the united frontier caused its defeat. At that juncture Grey returned from England, determined to have the foundation laid by Prince Alfred who was then

(58) Journal June 18, 1860.
visiting the colony, and exerted his powerful influence to secure the passage of the old bill of 1858 proposing a loan of £200,000 for the same object. With this support and the equivocal expression of Cape Town's opinion through the Press and a gigantic protest meeting, the new bill was passed (59) by one vote, seventeen Westerns and one Eastern opposing the sixteen Easterns and one Western, to become another of the "injustices" inflicted on the East.

June had seen a spate of protest meetings all along the frontier and a Press campaign of increasing bitterness and hostility to the West, while within the House the rising friction between the frontier and West was stopped only by the prorogation of Parliament on 17th July 1860. By September however, the E.P.Herald (60) lamented that after "the burst that the threatened wool tax produced" the question of separation "has been allowed to go to sleep." Organisation was necessary to overcome the apathy, to prevent people from forgetting the severe grievances they suffered and to work for a united public opinion in the East. What about the formation of a league to achieve these purposes? The proposal was received enthusiastically (61) and on October 8th a public meeting, attended by many of the leading merchants and most influential citizens, launched the Eastern Province Separation League and called upon the rest of the East to join up in gaining their long cherished idea of separation from the West. Grahamstown sank all differences with Port Elizabeth, and by December the central committee at Port Elizabeth had organised branches (62) of the League all over the frontier, held numerous meetings to popularise the aims of the league, collected signatures for a petition to the Queen, printed and distributed a catechism in which their grievances were stated at full length, and engaged a full-time secretary, Dr. Way, to organise its activities. While Grey was in the East during January and February of 1861 he was presented with numerous

memorials from frontier towns asking for separation; at every public function he attended, it was the main burden of the speeches, and deputations sought to gain some declaration from him in support of their proposals. But despite all the excitement and agitation the attitude of the Governor remained unchanged and not the slightest indication of his feelings was betrayed. On the 20th February 1861 the League reached its zenith when a united convention of delegates from all the separation branches met at Somerset to decide upon a frontier policy for the coming session and define the terms on which separation was to be proposed. Their demands were optimistic: the existing boundaries should be the line of division, thus ignoring the opposition of the Midlands; the public debt for the Table Bay breakwater, Wellington line, and any other local matters should fall on the West, and finally the West should contribute £25,000 per annum towards frontier defence, which was to be controlled by the East. These proposals were to be introduced in the form of bills in the Assembly by W.H. Harries of Port Elizabeth who had secured the recently vacated Cradock seat and in the Council by Tucker.

Ever since the 1866 session, Solomon had promised that the West would agree to a federal scheme as soon as the united East requested such a change, and as leader of the opposition to separation he had always directed his arguments at proving the disunity of the East. The main object of the League was to comply with this condition, so that the numerous resolutions of public meetings, the petitions presented to Parliament, and the activities of the frontier Press aimed at convincing the West of the unanimity of the East.

For one glorious month success seemed within the League's grasp. The harmony between Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth was scarcely credible after the long years of rivalry and bickering, and branch meetings were growing with mushroom-like rapidity. All were agitating and all were blaming the West for every evil borne by the East, and so long as no proposals were made for remedying the wrongs, the long desired unanimity seemed
to have been gained. But before long the many irreconcilable elements of which the province was composed made the apparent unity delusive and revealed that already the seeds of discord were germinating.

For three months, from October to December, 1860 the G.R.Herald (63) swung over to the frontier viewpoint, impelled by the inland division's economic dependence upon Port Elizabeth, and agreed to co-operate in securing a two province separation, but this was a passing phase and unsupported by the midlands, and a decade later Essex, the Editor, referring to this short period of backsliding, was to admit that "maturer experience has convinced us that it would have been a mistake". Meanwhile Ziervogel and Mentsies, the representatives for Graaff-Reinet, immediately set about organising a midland opposition to the frontier, and were supported by both members of Colesburg and by Krog of Uitenhage and Hopley of Albert. Nothing points more clearly to the hostility of the midlands than the fact that at the League's greatest height when it was leaving no stone unturned to gain new adherents, Graaff-Reinet, Colesburg and Albert were almost ignored. (64)

The dangers threatening the League from the midlands, however, were as nothing compared with the foes of its own household. How heterogeneous were the constituent parts of the East and on how unstable a foundation the League rested, has already been noticed. By November 1860 signs (65) were not wanting that the appearance of unity in the East was fallacious. The member for Victoria East, one of the volatile Bowker brothers, was advocating that separation should not stop at the two provinces but should involve a complete separation of each division! In opposition to this, at the other extreme of frontier opinion, the P.E.Telegraph was dividing the Bay by its support of the party which maintained that the limit of any constitutional change should be not two province separation, but a three province federation, and the Herald itself admitted that despite the bitter hostility of the frontier, "the preposterous idea of a midland province" continued to persist and the close

commercial ties which held many to the West, appeared likely to wreck the agitation. So far the League had progressed by observing a studied silence on all the questions of a controversial nature, but this had the effect of increasing the suspicions of those who feared Grahamstown, and by January 1861 to the chagrin of the Grahamstown party, the advantages of rival sites for the future seat of Government in the East (66) were being hotly contested. In March, Mundy, the representative of Grahamstown of all places, declared himself against separation, and refused to resign despite a vehement public meeting, and to make things worse he was championed by Potte, a Councillor from the same town. By this same month both members for Graaff-Reinet and Colesburg and one of the members of Uitenhage and Albert had declared themselves opposed to separation and in April Graaff-Reinet showed how little animosity against Cape Town was felt in the Midlands by electing F.S. Watermeyer a resident of the capital, to replace the resigned Mentreys. So much for the efforts to prepare for the 1861 session by convincing the West that the East was united in its desire for separation from the parent province. (67)

The first shot in the campaign for which the frontier had so assiduously prepared was fired on June 7th 1861, when W.H. Harries proposed the second reading of his separation bill. (68) Discarding the old historical argument, he analysed the difficulties borne by the frontier on account of the centralisation of government at Cape Town and alleged that the East received grossly unfair treatment in the distribution of public expenditure. The East's ability to bear the cost of its own defence was emphasised and finally he maintained that the unanimity of the province in its desire for separation removed the last objection that could be raised. Ziervogel, an Eastern member from Graaff-Reinet, led the opposition and argued that the strength of the Midlands opposition was not to be gauged by the four votes of the members for Graaff-Reinet and Colesburg, as

(66) G.R.Herald Jan.26, 1861. E.P.Herald Jan.4, 1861
E.P.Herald Mar. 8, 1861.
(68) Journal June 15, 1861.
the midlands were hopelessly under-represented in the House. Quoting the returns by the Civil Commissioners, he pointed to the great area of these two divisions, the rapid growth in population and development of new fiscal divisions, and stressed that the total value of the landed property of Graaff-Reinet and Colesburg alone was almost equal to half the total value of the whole of the Eastern Province, a fact which speaks for itself and which the Journal itself admitted. He might also have reminded the House that six of the forty-five fiscal divisions of the colony were to be found within the boundaries of Graaff-Reinet and Colesburg. Other opponents of the bill pointed out its vagueness and that no concrete proposals were made about the seat of government, the form of the constitution, the boundary line, the public debt, relationships with frontier tribes, commercial regulations, customs at the ports, and the judicial and administrative debts.

In a debate that lasted over four full days, Solomon did not rise until the evening of the second day. Previously his incisive arguments and irrefutable evidence of the disunity in the East had always left the frontier with no hope of success, but on this occasion, when the frontier party was claiming its unanimity as the strongest argument in its favour, the wily leader of the West resorted to a clever stratagem that proved quite unanswerable. According to evidently pre-arranged tactics, not a single Western member spoke until after Solomon's speech, the opposition to the bill for nearly two days thus coming solely from Eastern members representing the midlands! No words were needed to prove that despite what the frontier maintained to the contrary, a considerable section of the East did not want separation. The voting similarly displayed how the separation party was confined to the frontier, the bill being defeated by 23-15, and of the minority two were from the West. Mundy, the refractory member for Grahamstown, was discretely absent at the time of the division.

A peep behind the scenes into the views of the Executive throws an illuminating sidelight on the present agitation.

(69) Journal July 6, 1861
Valuation of East - £7,600,000; of Graaff-Reinet and Colesburg, £3,250,000.
Rawson, the Colonial Secretary, who was on leave in England and as a member of the Executive a non-party man, confided his opinion (70) of Harries' bill to Southey who deputised for him. "Separation as proposed by Harries' bill is a humbug...." was his downright condemnation. "Its rejection will serve as another grievance to keep agitation alive." Wodehouse, who especially in his first year showed himself the friend of the East, referring to this present agitation concurred with the criticism of the vagueness of the bill, and pointed out (71) that despite their agitation, the frontier party had "never .... put forward any tangible or substantial proposals for giving effect to their wishes."

On June 10th Tucker had brought forward his bill in the Council (72) and in a prolix speech lasting three and a half hours, he not only repeated all Harries' arguments but quoted vast quantities of statistics, many of which do not survive even a cursory examination, (73) to prove the financial inequalities suffered by the East. It is difficult to judge whether Pote, who supported him, was being serious or facetious when he claimed separation on the score of "social disabilities", (74) which the frontier suffered from its associations in the West. In the absence of cogent arguments from the frontier members and the clear intimation in the Assembly of the feelings of the midlands, the bill was rejected by 8-3, von Waltitz, the one midland representative in the Council, voting with the West. Two drafts of a scheme of federal devolution, drawn up by Sir William Hodges, the Chief Justice, were similarly rejected. In August the League's petition to the Queen was presented.

(70) Wilmot 'Southey', p.129, Rawson to Southey, July 2, 1861.
(71) G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Newcastle 96 of June 17, 1862.
(72) Journal June 29, July 2,6,9,13,16, 1861 (Reports).
(73) One example is typical; he alleged that in the last 16 years £11,000 had been spent on Eastern roads and £60,861 on the West. Yet the Reports of the Road Board for 1854, 1855, 1859, clearly show the favoured treatment of the East. The Zuurberg Road, 80 miles N. of Port Elizabeth alone cost £80,000 (1859). C.p. Journal Jan.4, Feb.5, 1859.
(74) Rust in the wheat, horse sickness, scab in the orange trees and blight in the apple trees, lung sickness, burr-weed, oidium, smallpox and measles. "We would never have got these if we were not joined in connection with the Western Province"!
Thus despite the widespread agitation and the energetic exertions of the League, the cause of separation had again met with a decisive defeat within the House, the midlands were more firmly opposed than ever, and every wave of agitation had a disconcerting habit of abating remarkably speedily for grievances so serious as the frontier claimed theirs to be.

"It would appear as if the agitation for the separation of the provinces had arrived at a climax, where it must either subside altogether or be renewed with fresh vigour and upon a different basis", admitted the E.P.Herald early in 1863. However the warning was sounded too late, the climax was already passed and it was the course of subsidence and not of vigour that was being pursued. A year after its foundation the League was effete, worn out by the opposition of its foes and drained of its strength by the dissensions within its ranks. Throughout the session, the opposition of the midlands to the frontier, as expressed through the Press, grew in strength. Against the advice of Eastern moderates, frontier members resorted to an obstruction policy after the defeat of separation, but unhappily chose to cause the defeat of the proposed grant of £10,000 for H.N. Troops (75) in the colony, a measure that was well supported in the East for fear that its refusal might mean the withdrawal of the troops. When the proposal was made during the session to place roads under the control of road boards in the West, midlands and frontier, the violent opposition from Grahamstown to two boards in the East aroused the spirited retort from Graaff-Reinet (76) that "the conduct of the advocates of separation in Parliament .... has only served to confirm and to increase the distrust with which they were previously regarded by the people of these states .... It is not centralisation they are opposed to but to centralisation at Cape Town exclusively." Moreover, coming after Ziervogel's able plea for increased midland representation, there was no mistaking the threat implied

(75) E.P.Herald Sept.20, Oct.18, 1861.
(76) G.R.Herald July 27, 1861.
in F.S. Watermeyer's rejected proposal (77) for a committee of the House to consider the relative claims of divisions for representation in the Assembly. By October 1861 it was becoming increasingly clear that the emphatic refusal of the midlands to join the frontier was inducing wavering to feel that without them separation was "not .... at all desirable".

The gathering held at Port Elizabeth in October 1861 to celebrate the founding of the League was a burial service rather than an anniversary, and only three enthusiasts whose numbers gradually rose to twenty-four by the end of the meeting, were present! With financial support outside Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth limited to small contributions from Queenstown and Humansdorp, and almost ignored in the country districts, the League was no longer a force to be reckoned with. (78) In the following month the E.P.Herald admitted that the rivalry over the seat of government in the East rendered impossible a united course by the whole province, and the Port Beaufort separation committee dissolved itself without a protest from those to whom it owed its existence. December saw the ludicrous spectacle of strife between the Journal and the Herald of Port Elizabeth over the blackness of the position. In February 1862 the bulk of the central committee at the Bay followed Dr. Way, the Secretary, who had resigned after eleven months when funds had given out, and "Grahamstown the real centre of the agitation, makes no sign, holds up its hands in horror if Uitenhage be mentioned as the seat of government, and begins to talk of conciliation." The Journal pointed out the appalling disunity of the East (79) on the eve of the 1862 session in sombre colours. Not only was the province divided into the midland party which opposed any change, the federal party of Port Elizabeth and the separatist party, but the latter was split into obstructionists, moderatists, extremist die-hards, those satisfied by any concessions and those wanting separation as a prelude to federation. Further subdivisions were caused by the petty differences between the

(77) E.P.Herald July 5, 1861. (78) E.P.Herald Oct.5, 1861
Jan.17,1862.
E.P.Herald Oct.15, Nov.15, Dec.17, 1861; Feb.14, 1862.
separation parties of Uitenhage, Somerset, and Grahamstown, while of the leaders, Tucker and Harris favoured one view, Way another, and many of the most intelligent followed Peto. A new party had been formed even on the question of how conciliation could best be obtained! Solomon himself never drew a blacker picture of Eastern disunity, than did the Journal (80) in this moment of self-revelation. The outlook for the frontier was indeed gloomy. Not only did the West and the Midlands present a united opposition to the division of the colony, but disunity was sapping the strength of the frontier and it was clear that no encouragement to their aims could be obtained from H.I.I. Government.

Newcastle, the new Colonial Secretary in 1859, followed the course adopted by Labouchere and Lytton, and showed no inclination to meddle in the Cape's internal affairs at a time when the British ministry faced overwhelming difficulties on every side. At this same time important changes were made in the personnel of the Colonial Office. In June when the Derby ministry took office, Newcastle became responsible for the Colonies, to remain in office for five years after eight predecessors in eight years, and still more important, Sir Frederick Rogers replaced Herman Merivale as Permanent Under-Secretary. Vainly struggling to reduce the taxation and expenditure after the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny, the ministry was now called upon to face the greatly increased estimates for the Navy caused by the need to replace wooden vessels with iron, and for the army as a result of the international situation. The new ministry's first year of office was made uneasy by the struggle between France and Austria on the plains of Italy, the strife in China which required French aid, affairs in America and the evident signs of the rise of a new power among the German states. Inevitably British interests in the Colonies, which appeared to make no return for the £4,000,000 annually spent by the British Parliament on their development, was transferred to foreign affairs and a policy of rigid economy and reduction of expenditure was pursued. (81) Such considerations were immediately

(80) Journal Nov. 30, 1881.
Journal May 5, 1860 (Speech from the Throne, Section 25).
reflected in the instructions to the Cape. Within two months of assuming office, Newcastle ordered the suspension of all Imperial payments to the German legion (82) from the 31st March, 1860 and demanded a detailed examination into all expenditure on Kaffraria.

Labouchere had assented to the Kaffraria grant only on Grey's assurance that it would be for no longer than three years, and in 1859 Lytton's orders for its reduction had been waived only in face of the Governor's strong protests and the promise of economy. To lessen administrative costs Lytton had favoured a federation of Natal, Kaffraria and the Cape, but Newcastle was more emphatic and announced the immediate reduction of the grant whether or not Kaffraria was united to the Cape. (83) In April 1860 he ordered a thorough investigation into the means of reducing military expenditure. More than ever was British policy towards the Cape directed at making the colony self-supporting so as to bring about a reduction of the drain on Imperial finances.

If separation would reduce administrative and military expenditure it would be favoured; but as it seemed likely to postpone the time when the colony could provide its own defence against the Natives, it was opposed. In August 1859, Newcastle (84) replied to memorials for a frontier government that any such proposal must come from the Colonial Legislature but sounded the warning that the cost of whatever troops were required would have to be borne by the two provinces in proportion to the number garrisoned in each, a condition with which the East would never be able to comply. To the petition of the League in September 1861, he merely stated that in the absence of any information on the alleged grievances, the question would be referred to the new governor for investigation. On November 14th the Colonial Secretary received an Eastern deputation (85) of Hearns, Paterson, Rosenthal and Ayliff with scant sympathy owing to the difficulties all over the Empire resulting from

(82) C.H.1/6 Newcastle to Wynyard, 16 of Aug.12, 1869.
(83) C.H.1/5 Lytton to Grey (private) Sept.6, 1858.
(84) C.H.1/7 Newcastle to Wynyard 10th of Mar.31, 1860. (1859.
separation and asked the pertinent question of how they proposed to settle the problem of the boundary line, disputed military commands, and the apportioning of troops to the two provinces. Meanwhile, in July 1862, Wodehouse was informed (86) that Newcastle favoured "welding the Eastern and Western provinces, together with British Kaffraria, into one harmonious whole", an opinion which he stressed more strongly in November when he heard of the defeat of separation in the 1862 session. "The main objects to be attained," he stressed, "are the maintenance as far as possible, of the unity of the Cape Colony and the annexation to it of the little territory of British Kaffraria. H.M. Government continued to regard it as a matter of the highest importance that the colony should be kept together under a single central government upon which, in their view, the prosperity of the colonists, the safety of the relations with the native tribes, and their capacity for performing the duties of self-defence very greatly depend". Clearly the frontier could expect no help from the Colonial Office in the face of so decided an attitude.

The early months of 1862 gave no hint of any revival of interest in separation. Apart from the mild stir caused by the arrival of a Governor who was to investigate the question and the return in March of Collioton and Wood, who were promptly elected to fill the two vacancies on the Council caused by the resignation of Kennelly and Mosenthal, separation seemed forgotten. Yet despite the increased rivalry between the midlands and frontier, the bickering between Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth, the tearless death of the League and the political latitudine of the East that strangled any hope of success for the frontier party, intervention from an unexpected quarter was to cause a rerudescence of separation within the House.

Mr. P.E. Wodehouse, the new Governor who arrived in January, was in every way the opposite of his predecessor. Possessed of a disposition that won friends and popularity all over the colony, Grey maintained the most cordial relations with Parliament by exerting the minimum of restraint on its proceed-

(86) G.H.1/9 Newcastle to Wodehouse 504 of July 5 and 557 of Nov. 5, 1862.
ings. Friction over finances between Government and Parliament, the most usual source of danger to a constitution such as the Cape possessed, was entirely absent. Owing to the prosperity of the colony taxation was decreased and expenditure on public works was sanctioned with an unwise liberality that increased the troubles of the 'sixties.

Wodehouse's previous experience in the official dependencies of Ceylon, Honduras and Guiana on the other hand, had accustomed him to rule in accordance with the sole dictates of his strong, almost autocratic nature, which showed little disposition to hide the iron hand in the velvet glove. Called upon to deal with problems that not only involved the colony but the whole of the sub-continent at a time when "South Africa was living dangerously near the edge of a volcano," his administration revealed a painstaking attention to detail, energy and ability of a quality that certainly has not received its due reward. At the same time he was austere, almost independent in thought, over-inclined to enter the arena of Cape politics and liable when opposed to display a downright bluntness when conciliation was required. As Governor and High Commissioner he was faced with the difficulty of coping with a drought that had been growing in severity for three years, the need for restoring a financial system that since 1858 had been tottering and had now finally collapsed, natives on the Eastern frontier crowded in to inadequate reserves made almost uninhabitable by the drought, the Basuto showing a growing contempt for the almost helpless Free State, and tempers in the House exacerbated by the friction of the previous session. Moreover, in his dual capacity as High Commissioner and Governor he was called upon to do the impossible by serving two masters whose interests were often opposed and irreconcilable. An understanding of the complex difficulties with which he was confronted and the policy he carried out, although restricted and handicapped by the entire absence of financial support such as had been afforded Grey, cannot fail to radically correct the colonial estimate of this much maligned and most unpopular of all the British Governors.
After three months in the colony, before he had time to gain a true appreciation of the various elements in the East and particularly the midland viewpoint, the new Governor plunged into the fray with cut and dried proposals such as Grey, even at the end of his tenure of office, had never ventured even to suggest privately to the Colonial Secretary. In the speech from the Throne (87) he argued that owing to the unnecessary expense of a federal scheme, the Cape, Kaffraria and any future annexations in the Transkei should be united into "one large state", but that to meet the objections of the East and Kaffraria, the House should agree to alternate sessions in each province, the occasional residence of the Governor in the East, an Eastern Province Court and the appointment of a Solicitor-General as deputy Attorney-General and the equalisation of the representation of the two provinces. To the West and midlands this speech was a preamble big with menace, to be opposed for the same reason as the proposal for the incorporation of Kaffraria in 1859, that it would make the withdrawal of Imperial troops possible and upset the balance of the parties. To the frontier the bribe of equalisation was a compensating to overcome their repugnance to an increase in the Native population and defence responsibilities, and secured their full support. Thus Wodehouse fanned the dying embers of separation into a blaze by the unexpected support which his proposals gave to the East, and in view of the "violent opposition" with which his speech was greeted, it was little wonder that the Governor (88) had expressed to the Colonial Secretary his trepidation at having to pronounce on so many important topics.

Rawson on May 30th 1862 proposed the Kaffrarian annexation bill in which was incorporated the clause to equalise the representation of both provinces. Four seats were to be given to Kaffraria, which even in 1865 had a European population of under 6,000 and, as a sop to the frontier, the obvious claims of Graaff-Reinet and Colesburg were ignored and Queenstown with its population of under 3,000 Europeans was to get two repre-

(87) Journal May 17, 1862.
sentatives. (89) Graaff-Reinet was not going to see Grahamstown established as the seat of government in the East without a struggle and it was clear that frontier support had been bought at the cost of midland opposition. The merits of the bill were not even considered and the West and midlands combined against the frontier to cause its rejection by 18-14, amid renewed agitation from Graaff-Reinet for increased midland representation. In similar fashion the Governor's allied proposal for alternate sessions was rejected by 17-13 on July 1st, and Harris on July 10th in the Assembly, and Tucker on July 15th in the Council, met with similar fates when they again proposed separation. However, as if illustrating how all the vigour and life had departed from the agitation, the debates on the question lacked the acrimony and violence of language that had so characterised the previous session. (90)

Although this proposal in favour of the East had received such rough handling from the House and the Press of the West and midlands, Wodehouse did not drop the subject. The defeat of the equilibration bill evidently convinced the Governor that his ideal of "one large state" and no federal scheme was unattainable, for during the session he veered round to the view held by a large section at Port Elizabeth, in favour of a loose federation. There should be two provinces, he suggested (91) to Newcastle, ignoring the demands of the midlands, under a Lieutenant Governor and single Executive Council enjoying local autonomy, and a central government to control certain specified subjects such as foreign relationships, disposal of the troops and frontier police, management of the public debt, customs and laws of marriage and inheritance. The proposal met with a peremptory refusal from Newcastle (93) who objected that it gave "an unnecessary and unadvisable prominence to the principle of separation," and emphasised that it was the unity of the colony that H.M. Government desired. A modified form of the New Zealand provincial system might prove satisfactory, he advised.

(89) G.R.Herald May 10, June 14, 1863.
(90) E.P.Herald July 15, 18, 1863.
(91) G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Newcastle 95 of July 17, 1863.
(92) G.H.1/9 Newcastle to Wodehouse 557 of Nov. 5, 1863.
with a superintendent and elected provincial council in each province, exercising jurisdiction over specific subjects such as the disposal of land revenue and the proceeds of local taxation, but no alteration in the present constitution should be contemplated and provincial authorities should be strictly subordinated to the central government. To Southey, Wodehouse confided his opinion (93) of this despatch. "The Secretary of State is evidently more determined against anything having even the appearance of separation than I am myself, and if you look again at his despatch, it cannot but strike you that the legislative powers which he would give to the provincial councils would amount to almost nothing, little more than a power to create confusion and excite contention". When the time came in April to open the 1863 session, Wodehouse was still unable to devise a solution satisfactory both to the Colonial Secretary and to the colonists, and after laying before the House the recent despatches on the question he left further action to the members. However, lacking the stimulus which the Governor's proposals had provided in the previous year, separation lay dormant until near the end of the session, when the East, with the House almost empty of Western members, suddenly carried by one vote a resolution in favour of the next session meeting in the East. Despite a counter proposal from the Council to the contrary, Wodehouse deepened the widening gulf between himself and the West by exercising the power conferred on him by the constitutional ordinance of summoning Parliament in the East, and announced at the dissolution that Parliament would be summoned to meet at Grahamstown in 1864.

During the second Parliament the agitation from the frontier had reached its zenith and was more violent than at any other period during Representative Government. The improved economic conditions of the colony and the fact that the East, before the depression had set in, was undoubtedly able to support its own government, proved a strong incentive to the Grahamstown party to revive its demands and resulted in the motion in favour

(93) Wilmot, 'Southey' p.147, Wodehouse to Southey, Jan15, 1863
of a frontier government. The events of the following session embittered Eastern feeling, causing separation again to be proposed in the House, and had resulted in the foundation of the Separation League. Yet despite its great efforts to excise the East in preparation for the third session, the frontier was once more defeated by a substantial majority. In 1862 the agitation was kept alive only by Wodehouse's abortive proposals and in the final session separation was not even raised, but the motion for the session in the East was carried by Eastern opportunism.

The sudden evaporation of Eastern enthusiasm for separation after the 1861 session and the declining influence of the Grahamstown party were due, not only to the opposition of the midlands and the mutual jealousies and recriminations of the frontier party itself, but to the desperate state of the colony's finances and the liberal treatment of the East by Parliament. As prosperity had stimulated the desire of the frontier for control over its own affairs, so the time of financial difficulty caused an abatement in the agitation and the realisation that unity was required to weather the storm. Even after the 1862 session, this was realised when the Journal in September pointed out that the "recent depressions of trade and the heavy railway guarantee the colony has come under, have put aside for a while the old quarrels about the government of the colony".

During the second Parliament the colony's finances (94) reached an appalling state and the depression, the first signs of which had been noticed in April 1859 and which had so alarmed Wynyard in 1860, was increasing in severity. Deficit followed deficit with depressing regularity, £54,000 in 1859, £7,000 in 1860 despite an unexpected £54,000 from land sales, £76,374 in 1863 and £150,905 in 1863, and the colony was borrowing heavily, £50,000 in 1860, £200,000 in 1861, £60,000 in 1862 and in the year after, £150,000 for repayment of debentures, and £176,360

(94) Information on financial conditions has been derived from Annual Blue Books, Speeches opening and closing Parliament, Budget speeches, despatches and the Colonial Press.
under temporary arrangements. Yet despite the continued short-falls and the fact that certain taxes had been remitted in the 'fifties, Parliament was unwilling to demand fresh revenue. In 1860 Rawson's measures were rejected and retrenchment proposals preferred, but repenting slightly in the following session, transfer dues were raised from two to three per cent and the customs tariff on certain goods increased. In 1863 Wodehouse sounded a gloomy warning of troubles to come after the rejection of three-quarters of his proposal to add twenty-five per cent to the revenues by increasing stamp, succession, transfer, auction and land dues. Until the beginning of 1863 the English wool demand was falling, imports and exports were contracting, trade at a standstill, insolvencies numerous especially at Port Elizabeth, public works throughout the colony being suspended and while the cost of living was rising, wages were dropping and unemployment increasing.

Since the winter of 1859, the severity of the drought had been broken only by short but violent floods in the West early in 1863, and besides preventing ploughing in the agricultural districts it was causing great cattle losses in the East and hardship to the wool farmers through the consequent transport difficulties. At a time when the spirits of all were exacerbated by hardship and poverty, the whole colony was taking sides on the distressing ecclesiastical disputes which were splitting the two principal churches. 1863 saw the Anglican Church rent by the "Long case", which actually went so far as the Supreme Court, and the controversy that followed the publication of the Bishop of Natal's "famous heretical work" on the Pentateuch. This same year stands out dismal.ly in the annals of the Dutch Reformed Church as the year made memorable by the attacks in the Synod on Katze, the Haude and Geesee, and adherents of the new liberalism of Europe, and the Supreme Court decision which excluded extra-colonial ministers from the Synod.

Thus not only was attention being distracted from separation, but the depression induced a growing feeling that the division of the colony would intensify the difficulties.
Moreover Parliament, as was the case of its predecessor, by its fair and generous treatment of the East made it extremely difficult for the frontier to support allegations of neglect by reference to specific measures. A consideration of the principal items of expenditure by Parliament refutes any charge of injustices, particularly if it is remembered that the colony's total budget was in the neighbourhood of no more than half a million. 1859 was marked by the creation of sixteen new magistracies in outlying parts of the colony, which not only cost an initial sum of £30,000 but whose maintenance proved a constant annual drain, £16,000 was added to the previous votes for colonial prisons, a road act granted £36,000 to the West and £33,000 to the East, the cost of surveys for Eastern Province railways was sanctioned and in the same year the Zuurberg Road, about 80 miles north of Port Elizabeth, was completed at a cost of £30,000 and the report of the Commissioner for public roads showed that most of the road expenditure had been on the East.

In the following year fresh grants brought the total for prisons to £92,000 and for immigration to £200,000; other votes including the Port Elizabeth to Grahamstown telegraph totalled £90,000, a bi-weekly post to Cradock was established, and again the road report showed the liberal treatment of the East. In 1861 despite the restriction of expenditure caused by the depression, a grant of £1,500 for fifteen years was sanctioned for the Cape Town to Grahamstown telegraph and votes were passed for two new Eastern Province bridges at Tumbridges and Cookhouse, and in 1862 the Katberg pass opened up an easy route for traffic from Queenstown to Grahamstown, the new bridge at Espage Drift across the Fish facilitated Grahamstown's trade with Bedford and Cradock and a loan of £750,000 for Eastern Province railways was granted despite the opposition of Bower's anti-railway group. After examining in detail the treatment received by the East, the words with which Wodehouse closed the 1862 session can fairly be used to describe the conduct of Parliament throughout its five years, when he noted with pleasure "the fair and liberal spirit in which the wants and wishes of the East have
been treated during the present session".(95)

Yet despite this treatment the East still suffered from legitimate grievances, but the complaints should have been directed, not at the representatives of the people, but at the instruments chosen by the Executive to carry out the wishes of Parliament and over whom no-one but the Governor exercised control. From 1859-1862, the period when separation agitation was at its height, the fault-finding propensities of the frontier found a ready target for their complaints in the administration of the Department of Public Works whose duty it was to carry out the votes for bridges, prisons and roads, and remove the handicaps of which the frontier so loudly complained. Nor were the complaints unjustified, for under Scott-Tucker, the Colonial Engineer from 1859-60, the Department was slow in carrying out the votes of Parliament, inefficient and characterised by a total incompetency that led to a spate of grumbles from all over the colony. (96) Moreover the very fact that most of its work lay in the East made the delays all the more vexatious, and supplied some grounds for the inevitable argument from Grahamstown that the evils were due to centralisation at Cape Town. Reproofs by committees of both Houses had as little effect on Tucker as the blunt condemnation of the Press, and in 1863 after the Assembly had in desperation passed a vote of censure on the government for Tucker's conduct, Wodehouse dismissed him, reporting to the Colonial Secretary that since his assumption of office in January 1859 he had been inefficient and piled up debt; roads and bridges had been faulty, and prisons unfit for use. (97) How this mal-administration affected the East is clearly revealed by the report on public works by Robinson, the acting Civil Engineer on Tucker's departure. (98) "It is not out of place to record my belief," he submitted, "that the Eastern and midland divisions have not received that attention which they might fairly claim...

Money voted by Parliament for the maintenance of certain roads

(95) E.P.Herald Aug. 15, 1863 (Report.)
(96) Journal July 13, Sept. 24, 1859.
E.P.Herald Jan. 6, 1860.
(97) G.R.31/9 Wodehouse to Newcastle 50 of May 2, 1863.
G.R.Herald June 6, 1863.
(98) Journal May 15, 1863 (Extract).
was not expended .... Again with respect to bridges, although
votes were taken and certain bridges authorised, owing to corres-
pondence, changes in design and various trivial causes, not a
single bridge has yet been completed by the present road depart-
ment." Clearly the East suffered severely from this inefficiency
but the source of the grievance was not a Western bias against
the East, an indisposition on the part of Parliament to meet
Eastern needs or even centralisation in itself, but the faulty
instruments chosen by the government and the fact that Parlia-
ment had no real control over the execution of its wishes. This
is borne out by the diminution in complaints after the reorgani-
sation of the Department in 1863.

Not only financial conditions, but the steadily growing
support for Eastern railways favoured a united colony. On the
announcement early in 1860 of the results of Woodfield’s over-
optimistic surveys, Grahamstown had sunk its previous opposition
to railways and Mundy had brought forward a bill for an immediate
start in the East, which had to be withdrawn owing to the super-
ficial nature of the surveys. With the necessary information
available in 1862, the frontier with Western aid, had secured
the passing of a bill sanctioning a loan of £750,000 on similar
conditions to those governing the Wellington line. The Govern-
ment guaranteed six per cent of which half was to fall on Fort
Elizabeth, Albany, Alexandria, Uitenhage, Fort Beaufort, Fort
Peddie and Bathurst, and tenders from private companies for the
construction were to be in by July 1863. But when a line to
Grahamstown thus seemed a certainty, an unexpected difficulty
arose that was to wreck the scheme. By November of 1862 it was
known that the English companies considered that owing to the
unfavourable conditions of the East not less than £1,300,000 would
be required, an estimate which Bourne, the able new Colonial
Engineer, endorsed early in 1864 with new surveys sanctioned in
the 1863 session. Thus throughout the last five years, railways
had occupied a growing prominence, and the many proposals put
forward actually assumed a concrete form in the 1863 Act which
remained unrepealed, even although the funds were not being
raised. As pessimism about the future of Kowie became increasingly justified, so frontier feeling in favour of a line to Port Elizabeth grew. The clear evidence of the West's willingness to support an Eastern line and the realization of how expensive it was likely to prove, induced all but the die-hards to realize that so gigantic a responsibility could be undertaken only with the credit resources of the united colony. Nothing illustrates the change in feeling more clearly than the quarrel (99) that broke out in 1863 when Harries of Port Elizabeth accused Godlonton of exchanging separation for railways.

During the period of the second Parliament two tendencies worthy of comment were revealed. That the frontier party wanted separation more than the elimination of their grievances in the united colony, and that the midlands were adopting an outlook of increasing independence of the West and especially the frontier, were becoming more obvious. During the 1859 session the Journal (100) clearly defined the frontier attitude to Parliament's efforts to meet its need. "The Cape Parliament seems to be fully aroused as to the determined needs of this province", it admitted, "and seems willing to grant increased judicial facilities, the telegraph, guarantees for railways and other concessions, whose object, however, is merely to allay the clamour for that complete emancipation to which we are entitled." In the light of the above, many of the frontier arguments and allegations stand revealed as sophistry - not reasons for the division of the colony, but excuses. The action of the frontier representatives in Parliament supports this condemnation. In the 1861 session before the Separation League had begun to totter, several proposals from the West to increase local control over local affairs were resolutely refused by the frontier. (101)

F.S. Watermeyer's proposal for the appointment of a select committee to report on divisional registers, the absence of which had been an old complaint from the East, was defeated through the obstruction of the frontier members. A

Journal Sept. 13, 1852.
(100)Journal June 14, 1859. (101) Journal Jan. 11, 1862.
similar fate befell Louw's proposals to place main roads, bridges and mountain passes under the divisional councils which were to be subsidised from general revenue, and the motion to make these some bodies responsible for gaols, government buildings, tenders for convict supplies and the conveyance of judges of Circuit. Only the dire state of the colony prevented frontier opposition to the Irrigation Bill which gave to the divisional councils powers similar to those delegated to the local bodies of Natal some two years previously. Although these very powers had so long been wanted in the East, the Uitenhage Divisional Council (102) promptly passed resolutions opposing any extension of the powers of local government until separation had been granted. In 1863 when the Road Act of 1858 lapsed, Solomon had proposed that the Divisional Councils should be made responsible for the maintenance of public roads, but the East combined to cause its rejection and preferred a one per cent increase in the land tax. Following on the extension of local powers under the first Parliament this continued move in the direction of decentralisation suggests that Parliament was fully alive to the disabilities of the East and was trying to remove the grievances.

In the middle 'fifties the burghers of the midland divisions of Graaff-Reinet, Albert, Colesburg and even Somerset, were inclined to play the part of sleeping partners in Eastern political affairs, and a distinctive midland attitude was almost unknown. Already, however, its antipathy to Grahamstown was strong and midland representatives were invariably inclined to side either with the West or Port Elizabeth, but in the absence of local newspapers save in Graaff-Reinet, public opinion was almost lacking. By the early 'sixties however, a distinct and definite midland viewpoint was forming, generally midway between the opposite extremes of the frontier and the West, and acted as a moderating force.

Several factors influenced this development of a political conscientiousness. After Alfred Essex became Editor of the G.R. Herald in the late 'fifties the midlands possessed an organ of expression which, although inferior to the very able Journal (103) E.P.Herald Aug.16, 1861.
and E.P.Herald, nevertheless possessed considerable ability and independence of outlook. The early 'sixties saw the founding of newspapers in Colesburg and Burgersdorp which all opposed the frontier and naturally had the effect of hardening the midland feeling against their neighbours. The educational value and influence of this distinctly anti-frontier Press was of considerable importance.

At the same time the boers were becoming more accustomed to the representative system and nearly ten years had passed since the time when "one of them being told of its arrival [the new constitution] gravely enquired if it was a new sort of sickness that had come among us!" (103) The extension of local government meant the formation of a growing class accustomed to participate in public affairs through municipal boards, divisional councils, road and educational boards and church elections, while the numerous elections helped to break down the apathy that had so characterised the midlands in 1853. Improved communications enabled more farmers to enter into the political activities in the towns. Finally, a factor to be neither exaggerated nor under-estimated, the first signs of the growth of an Afrikaner nationalism began to be noted (104) in the early 'sixties, a development that would tend to drive midlands and frontier further apart, composed as they were largely of different races.

Events of this period further deepened the gulf between the two main elements in the East. Graaff-Reinet's opposition to the Grahamstown railway line had been momentarily silenced by the verdict of the 1862 survey and resultant bill but when it became known that the cost of lines to Grahamstown and Graaff-Reinet would be about equal, the demands of the midlands revived. Not only did an increasing body of public opinion consider that the midland line would prove the best route to the interior, but as the Wellington line during 1863 neared its destination, Cape Town business men began to talk of a further extension to

(103) G.R.Herald May 25, 1853.
Beaufort West. At once Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown conceived a great fear of losing their interior trade and a growing body at the Bay began to transfer its support from the Grahamstown to the Graaff-Reinet line. (105) The fact that in the East both lines enjoyed equal support and appeared to have equal chances of success, made conciliation between Graaff-Reinet and Grahamstown impossible.

As Grahamstown paraded the inequality of representation of the two provinces as a grievance, so the midlands were convinced that the frontier was favoured at their cost, and their rapid development built upon wool roused an increasingly persistent demand for additional representation in the House. In 1861 Ziervogel had used the separation debate to air the midland grievance, and even the Journal had admitted the force of his claims. (106) Watermeyer the other Graaff-Reinet member had followed this up with the unsuccessful motion for the appointment of a committee to consider the relative claims of divisions for representation in the Assembly. The following session, these efforts bore fruit in the Census Act which was to prepare the way for the enfranchisement of new divisions. Having dealt with their inequality in the Assembly, the Council was next attacked and the midlands put forward a spirited demand for the creation of a third electoral circle for the Upper House. (107)

This was an overt attack on the monopoly enjoyed by Grahamstown. At each Council election the process was similar. As in the first Parliament so in the next, the midlands had been adequately represented at the initial election but as vacancies were created by the numerous resignations, so invariably the superior political development and organisation of the English-speaking frontier divisions secured the return of a Grahamstown candidate at the by-election. In 1859 the midlands held four seats and the frontier three, but at the dissolution all but one were held by members either resident in Grahamstown or having intimate connections with that city. This was not altogether due to the lack of suitable men, for the by-elections even at

(107) G.R.Herald Nov. 14, 1863.
this time were not always uncontested, but the midland candidate seldom stood a chance in a straight fight.

By 1863 the tone of the Press and utterances of public leaders showed how the frontier was regarded as a distinct rival party more to be feared and opposed than the West. The words of the G.R. Herald, which if anything, was more sympathetic to the frontier than the average midland view, emphasised this attitude of independence. (108) "Grahamstown appears to be warily feeling her way and trying to find how far she may safely go in self-aggrandisement, without endangering the chance of obtaining local self-government for the Eastern Province. While the midland districts, as steadily determined to have done with Cape Town as any, are yet equally resolved to agree to no reconstruction of the government of the colony unless they have the fullest guarantees of future harmony - equality of representation and the seat of government at Uitenhage," - conditions which Grahamstown would not even have discussed.

(108) G.R. Herald Nov. 7, 1863.
CHAPTER IV.

THE ABANDONMENT OF THE TRANSKEI.

TRANQUILITY ON THE EASTERN FRONTIER.

THE ANNEXATION OF KAFRHARIA.

PARLIAMENT VERSUS GOVERNMENT.

IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS.

THE INACTIVITY OF THE SEPARATION PARTY.

THE BREACH BETWEEN THE MIDLANDS AND FRONTIER.

EQUALISATION AND REMOVAL.
In the years immediately following the failure of the League, the centre of interest shifted to events, the far-reaching consequences of which were to count heavily against the frontier and militate strongly against any revival of separation. The settlement of the Transkei and the unbroken peace and prosperity which it brought to the Natives of the Eastern frontier; settled the greatest problem of the East and removed a major argument in favour of a strong local government near the scene of action. The annexation of Kaffraria to the colony was followed by repercussions in the politics of the East entirely unforeseen in 1864. Communications were rapidly extended and increased, and broke down the isolation of the two halves of the colony. The increasing severity of the drought and depression which in this period reached its lowest level, destroyed the strong argument put forward by the Grahamstown party in 1859 that the East was in the position to support its own government.

Almost throughout the 'sixties, the widespread Native unrest (1) from the Cape to the Limpopo caused increasing anxiety and nervousness to the Europeans outnumbered and menaced on all sides by overwhelming Native populations. From the Fish to the Zoutspanberg and south to Natal, Native states formed an almost unbroken line and constituted an indivisible problem; yet on the four flanks as many different governments were each seeking, in two cases at least with totally inadequate resources, to apply widely divergent policies. Inevitably the sound of events in one part produced an echo in some other part. With civil government in a desperate condition and a state exchequer nonexistent, the Transvaal could exercise no control over the continual forays between the lawless European elements and the tribes in the fever-ridden Zoutspanberg; the quarrel with the Zulus over Cetewayo's cession of land in 1881 threatened further hostilities to the Republic on a new front and, to complete the blackness, the Amaswazi were not unaffected by the restlessness.

(1) G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Newcastle 128 of Sept.16, 1863. de Kiewiet p.185.
of their neighbours. A similar position confronted the small European population of Natal already almost engulfed amid the tribesmen within its bounds, and the conditions in Zululand and Homaland, where Nehemiah and his Basutos were harassing the recently arrived Griquas under Kok, threatened to start a conflagration across the boundary within the reserves. Moreover, Basutoland, from its geographical position the common factor in the Native problem of the Free State, Cape and Natal, remained openly hostile to the Republic, and even the desperate efforts of Pretorius had been unable to diminish the depredations and reprisals in the disputed Caledon lands. In February 1864 Wodehouse’s arbitration decision in the boundary dispute, based mainly on the Warden line, had provided a merely temporary respite, and in June 1865 Brand was compelled to order out the commandos and declare war, a condition of affairs which made Wodehouse almost desperate.

Probably better than any other, he recognised the far-reaching consequences of the war. Throughout the sub-continent the Natives lacked land and this problem was increased by the constantly extending line of European settlement. Logically he argued that should Mosheh triumph over the white man, the news would be the signal for a united rising from north to south; should the Boers, on the other hand, prove victorious, the first result would be the seizure of the best portions of the land of already over-populated Basutos, thus inevitably compelling an overflow into the over-crowded reserves of Natal, the Cape and the Transkei.

Although the Eastern frontier was apparently quiet, the tranquility was all the more dangerous because of its delusive appearance of security. Wodehouse, on whom in his capacity as High Commissioner the responsibility for this portion of the country rested, had ample cause to be as alarmed over the Eastern frontier as over any portion of South Africa. Prior to the incorporation of British Kaffraria, the Native population of the East alone was over 70,000, and in the absence of adequate reserves many of these were forced to squat on the great areas of unalienated Crown Lands, nominally under colonial law.
exercised by the Civil Commissioner of the district concerned but in practice under tribal law or no law at all. (2) The principal clans were the Tembus and the Fingos. The latter were settled around Victoria, Fort Beaufort and Peddie, supervised mainly by Neurant the Civil Commissioner of Victoria East, a people of tried and proven loyalty but being driven almost desperate by a rapidly increasing population in inadequate reserves made almost untenable by drought conditions. (3) The plight of the Tembus (4) packed into the Queenstown reserve between the white Kei and the Indwe and supervised by J.C.Warner, was similar, and since 1860 they had been pressing in vain to be allowed to expand across the Indwe and occupy the land reaching to the Tsomo, a request the necessity of which Warner himself emphasised.

In the Imperially governed little buffer state of British Kaffraria the situation was equally urgent. Grey had settled the tribes, of which Sandile's Gaikas were the most powerful, in well defined reserves under Agents such as Charles Brownlee, who exercised firm control over the chiefs. After the cattle killing and consequent diminution in population the position was satisfactory enough, but as in the early sixties thousands drifted back from the colony and the tribes rapidly made good their losses in population, the reserves proved far too small. Above all, with land already insufficient to support the growing populations, food supplies were suddenly diminished by the drought. Across the Kei Krell's old lands, bounded by the sea, the Bashee and the Indwe, awaiting the time when Wodehouse would be able to carry out Grey's plan of European settlement, were still deserted save for the handful of Fingos at Butterworth and Tembus at Idutywa on the Natal road, and were kept intact by the Cape Police.

In Kaffirland proper, the area from the Bashee to the Unzimkulu and from the sea to the Quathlamba Mountains, the posi-

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(2) G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Newcastle 123 of Sept.16,1863. Annual Blue Book (1862) V.
(3) G.H.29/1 Native Report to Travers, June 1860 and Report from Neurant Ap.13, 1865.
tion was no better than further south. Faku, chief of the Pondos, watched his lands being whittled away on all sides—Grey's settlement of the Griqua in Namaqualand, the area between the Pondor line and the mountains; Natal's steady advance up to the Umtamvuna culminating in Colonel Bisset raising the Union Jack amid the salvos of half the artillery of Natal on New Years day 1865, and across his southern boundary, Krelli's Galekas had been bundled with Major Currie's police hot on their heels. Now the position was desperate. The population of the Galekas was fast recovering from the ravages of the famine, and subsistence immediately across the Bashee was becoming impossible. More land was essential and the tribe had to expand. The determined appearance of Faku's Pondos (5) well armed with guns from Natal, convinced Krelli of the inadvisability of contesting the issue with his northern neighbours. The only alternative was to defy the Governor and to seize his old lands. The position in Kaffirland was analogous to a powerful spring which has been depressed to its limit and must again recoil.

Wodehouse's position was unenviable. On all sides tribesmen and Europeans coveted the empty Transkei; the congestion in the Native areas was alarming, and above all, his means of meeting the situation were inadequate. Newcastle's repeated insistence on economy and retrenchment in the military left him no doubt as to how any employment of the troops would be regarded by the Colonial Office, and the remaining force, the Cape Police, were under the colonial legislature which as early as 1858 had shown a tendency to criticise their use for Imperial purposes beyond the frontier.

The root cause of the unrest was the shortage of land on the frontier, but the position was made worse by the uncertainty in the minds of Bantu and Europeans about the future of the still empty Transkei. Seemingly oblivious of the needs of the Natives, Grey had intended to settle farmers in the vacated area, in order to strengthen the frontier, but the settlement of the German legion and the appalling state of Kaffrarian finances made such an extension temporarily impossible.

Wynyard, (6) in Grey's absence, made a strong plea both to the Colonial Secretary and to Grey that the contemplated scheme be expedited, but at the same time sounded the warning that it would entail additional military expenditure. Wodehouse, (7) with greater issues to worry about, simply accepted Grey's cut and dried plan, but postponed its execution in view of the continued bankruptcy of Kaffrarian finances and the cessation of all public works. In September 1863 the need for increasing the defensive powers of the frontier induced him to favour its immediate settlement with farmers who were to occupy their land on condition of military service when needed, a plan of which Newcastle fully approved.

Before Wodehouse took further action after receiving permission for his proposed plan of settlement in February 1864, the inevitable happened. In May, while Parliament was sitting in Grahamstown, Kreli threatened to cross the Bashee, and imagining a repetition of the horrors of the 1850 war to be imminent, a wild panic swept the frontier and several colonists actually fled for security. If it achieved nothing more, this scare at least revealed to the frontier how the government could cope with such an emergency. In a twinkling, Currie's much feared police were concentrated at Fort Bowker (8) and as soon as Wodehouse received the warning he telegraphed to Cape Town where the troops had been garrisoned since 1862, and ordered their immediate despatch to the frontier. Douglas (9) the Commander-in-Chief acted with remarkable speed. Warned on the 27th May, the troops were at Port Elizabeth by the 31st and reached East London on the 2nd June. Kreli's attack did not materialise and by the middle of July Wodehouse was able to report that no apprehensions of a kaffir outbreak were entertained.

Wodehouse was convinced of the danger of further delay in carrying out his plans. On June 1st the Governor published

(6) G.H.31/8 Wynyard to Newcastle, 45 of Mar.12, 1860.
(7) G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Newcastle 95 of July 17, 1862, and 123 of Sept. 16, 1863.
G.H.1/11 Newcastle to Wodehouse 733 of Jan.5, 1864.
(8) E.P.Herald, Dec. 31, 1864.
(9) G.H.33/1 telegrams from Douglas, May 27, 31, June 2, 1864.
G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Cardwell 55 of July 16, 1864.
the terms governing the offer of farms but not only were these conditions unattractive but the fresh intimation of what might be expected from Kreli, made settlers averse to closer contact with the Galekas as neighbours on the one side and the land-hungry Tembus on the other. Consequently the offer was not taken up. (10) At the same time Warner, the Agent with the Tembus, was sent to ascertain Kreli's grievances.

Immediately he reported Wodehouse realised the futility of the plan proposed by Grey. Warner, who was no alarmist and possessed a unique knowledge of native conditions, asserted that the Galekas were terrified of the well armed Pondoos in their rear, that the present position in the Transkei was impossible and that a continuation would make war inevitable. In August (11) the Governor proposed to the Colonial Secretary for ratification a considerable modification of his original plan: Kreli should be allowed to return to the portion of his former lands stretching from the sea to the Butterworth road and should receive £100 per annum so long as he behaved himself; Warner should be appointed Agent beyond the Kei over the Tembus and Galekas, and the remaining land from the road to the Indwe should be given to farmers.

Cardwell, the new Colonial Secretary, had assumed office in April, and within two months was faced with the terrifying spectre of a fresh rising in South Africa. On the receipt of the first rumours from the colony and without waiting for official news, he had hurriedly sent off reinforcements. By August both he and Wodehouse had come to a definite conclusion about the Transkei, their despatches crossing on the waters, but their settlement differed widely. In view of Douglas' confirmation of Wynyard's earlier opinion that the settlement would increase military expenditure, Cardwell (12) ordered the immediate abandonment of all territory across the Kei, the reduction of four companies of the Cape Mounted Corp, and warned the Governor that the cost of all future frontier expansion must be borne by the Cape.

Wodehouse had no option but to obey, and in October out-

(10) E.P.Herald June 14, Dec.31, 1864.
(12) G.H.1/11 Cardwell to Wodehouse 784 of Aug.5, 1864.
lined a new scheme (13) which was ratified in January of the following year. The empty Transkei was to be used as a safety valve to release the pressure on all sides. The Gakekas were to be settled as first proposed; the Tembu reserve extended to the Tsomo and Warner stationed as Agent over both clans, and the surplus population of Kaffraria shifted into the central portion between the Gakekas and Tembus.

The settlement (14) was carried out during 1865, but the wholesome fear still felt for the old Gakeka chief made many extremely reluctant to reoccupy the land previously owned by Kreli. Of the Tembus about half remained in Queenstown, and when Sandle in April 1865 was offered the centre portion, he refused point blank although his present "sour" lands were much inferior. A further reason which he gave for the refusal revealed the start of the process of transition from a pastoral to an agricultural economy, an event of fundamental importance in the Bantu social structure and destined to continue with increasing rapidity. He maintained that his tribe had killed all their cattle and preferred to retain their present agricultural holdings, a first result of the land shortage. The refusal of the Gakekas left Wodehouse free to shift some 40,000 Fingos from the colony as a barrier between the Gakekas and Tembus, and by the end of the year J.C. Warner, "the solitary representative of British authority" was left near the juncture of the Umgwali and Bashee to preserve peace.

The subsequent peace and growing prosperity of the tribes proved the wisdom of the settlement and in face of the facts, none but a frontiersman would deny the necessity for the plan adopted, but although the final responsibility for the reversal of Grey's plan rested with the Colonial Secretary, Wodehouse came in for scathing criticism from Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown, Kingwilliamstown, Graaff-Reinet and the whole of the East, whose typical frontier views on the native question

G.H.1/12 Cardwell to Wodehouse 828 of Jan. 9, 1865.
(14) G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Cardwell 44 of May 6, 1865.
G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Cardwell 99 of Oct 11, 1865.
were held. Resentment was especially felt that he could take such "arbitrary" action in his capacity as High Commissioner without even consulting the wishes of the colonists, and the Journal constantly attacked Imperial control of Native policy, "which prevents the extension of the colonial power over the whole of Kaffirland proper from the Kei to the Umzimkulu". The outcry from the Eastern Press (15) clearly reveals how incompatible were the aims of the colonists and a settlement of the frontier question that was both equitable and secure.

Throughout 1865 and 1866 the Eastern colonists lost no opportunity of attacking the settlement and attempting to discredit the Governor. The occasional bickerings that inevitably accompanied so great a transference of population were magnified and a fresh outbreak was prophesied within a few months. In March 1865, on the eve of the session, the Grahamstown Press followed by the Herald of Port Elizabeth, loudly raised the alarm of an imminent Fingo rising and Godlonton, with the support of the representatives of Grahamstown, induced Douglas, the Lieutenant Governor, to telegraph Wodehouse and request the Governor's presence on the frontier and the postponement of the forthcoming session. Nor was the uproar diminished when Wodehouse replied with more truth than tact that they were making mountains from molehills.

However the Governor was in possession of facts not known by the colonists. (16) The Lieutenant Governor, the man on the spot and resident in the storm centre, privately informed Wodehouse that he considered the agitation exaggerated by the frontier party in order to aid in securing the passage of a burgher law in the coming session. The greatest danger, he went on to say, was the possibility of frightening the Natives into war. The official report on the position submitted by Neurant, confirmed this view, the Civil Commissioner being convinced of the loyalty of the Fingos, but pointed out how desperate was the land shortage. Clearly a just estimate of the Native policy of

(15) Journal Mar. 24, 1865; Mar. 25, 1867.
The best defence of the settlement of the Transkei was the peace and tranquility which it brought to the frontier in the following years. Within (17) the colony the overcrowding in the reserves was greatly relieved. The change from a pastoral to an agricultural economy had the effect of diminishing vagrancy by gradually fixing the Natives to the land, and a further important result of this change was the fact that such Natives as acquired land would stand to lose equally with the colonists in any future outbreak. Thus not only was their loyalty to the colony secured, but they could be counted on to warn the colonists of any stirring across the Border. Control over the tribes that had refused to move to the Transkei was tightened by deposing several of the chiefs and bringing them under colonial law, while Act 22 of 1867 placed a further check on vagrancy.

In the Transkei the results (18) were as far reaching as within the colony, and as soon as the inevitable unrest that accompanied the migrations in 1865 had subsided, the frontier became so tranquil that the colonists soon appeared unaware even of its existence. The 1865 season, the best since 1860, facilitated the settlement and continued good seasons led to a state of prosperity and contentment that attracted a steady exodus of Natives from within the colony. Civilisation was carried to the tribesmen by magistrates, officials, traders and missionaries. In 1867 under the beneficial influence of the Rev. Tyo Soga, the once intractable Krelli became not only docile but evinced a growing desire to stand high in the favours of the government. So calm were conditions in 1868 that Wodehouse was able to remove the police for use in the annexation of Basutoland without the slightest incident on the frontier. By the end of the 'sixties, the Native areas were playing an important part in the economic development of the frontier. Settled conditions and good seasons resulted in an increasing export of skins, cattle, hides and maize, and when Basutoland was added, the Native areas constituted

(18) Journal Jan. 26, 1866; Sept. 4, 1871.
G.R. Herald July 18, 1868.
an important market with their population of well over 100,000
and to this factor the frontier towns of Queenstown, Aliwal North
and Kingwilliamstown owed much of their prosperity.

The settlement of the Eastern frontier counted heavily
against separation. Hitherto a main argument for the division of
the colony had been the assertion that Cape Town was too distant
to handle a crisis or understand the difficulties of the Native
problem. For the rest of the period of Representative Government
the Eastern frontier faded into insignificance and was no longer
a danger, while the rapidity with which the Government had dealt
with the crisis, following the efficient handling of the famine
of 1857, invalidated the objections to the distance of Cape Town.
One of the main reasons why the frontier had demanded separation
was now removed.

During the middle 'sixties Kaffraria occupied a pro-
minence quite disproportionate to its size. The Cape's emphatic
refusal in 1859 and 1862 to consider the incorporation of this
diminutive territory placed H.M. Government in a position both
embarrassing and annoying to Newcastle. By having to defend the
buffer state of Kaffraria, Imperial funds were thus automatically
responsible for defending the parent colony, a sore grievance to
the Colonial Office at a time when every effort was being made to
make the Empire self-supporting. Moreover, the separate admin-
istration of the colony greatly increased Imperial expenditure
and instead of a mere Civil Commissioner aided by a few clerks
as in the divisions of the Cape, an expensive establishment of
a Chief Justice, Attorney-General, Lieutenant Governor, and
their respective staffs was necessary.

How to achieve the much desired reincorporation with the
parent colony without violating the Cape constitution, presented
a problem of great difficulty. Lytton in 1859 had stated that it
could be achieved only with the permission of the Colonial Legis-
lature, but that was before the refusal of that body. Newcastle,
his successor, was determined to end what he considered an
objectionable anomaly, yet it was clear that the colony would
never of its own volition sanction such a measure in view of the
issues at stake. For one thing the colonists were not likely to willingly increase their defence expenditure at a time when deficits were the rule and the depression showed no sign of lifting, but the real cause of the obstinacy was the bearing of the question on the provincial struggle. To the West and the Midlands the question became not one of justice to H.M. Government but a life or death struggle against the frontier.

The new colonial policy of the 'sixties hardened the attitude of the Colonial Office (19) to the question. In 1861, before Wodehouse left England, Newcastle had shown himself "definitely against" the continued separation of Kaffraria from the colony and in March of the following year, Sir F. Peel had informed Sir F. Rogers decisively that in financial matters, "further aid is to be sought from the Cape Colony". Newcastle in July and again in November emphasised to Wodehouse that the re-incorporation of British Kaffraria was to be regarded as a matter of urgency; as to the clearly expressed objections to incorporation that arose from Kaffraria, he stated unequivocally that their short-sighted opposition "cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the decided policy of H.M. Government".

Wodehouse was in an embarrassing position. As High Commissioner his first duty was to further Imperial interests; as Governor of the colony his aim should be to work in harmony with the Colonial Legislature. Thus both sides expected him to carry out courses that were opposite and contradictory, and as Wodehouse supported Newcastle, the enmity of the colonists was inevitable. In July 1862, the Governor's (20) reasons for favouring annexation were the financial inability of Kaffraria to stand alone and the possibility that the Cape House might withdraw the police. The Kaffrarian opposition was confined, he considered, to a small but influential party who should be disregarded.

The Kaffrarians themselves had been strongly against ending their independence, but events after Wodehouse's arrival

(19) G.H.1/9 Newcastle to Wodehouse 504 of July 5, and 557 of Nov. 5, 1862.
Journal July 1, 1862 (extract, Peel to Rogers.)
(20) G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Newcastle 95 of July 17 and 164 of Oct. 17, 1862.
greatly weakened their earlier opposition. In 1862 all public works had been stopped and their requests for a Legislative Council disregarded, and by 1863 it was becoming clear that the colony was more and more divided on the question. The opposition diminished in proportion to the reduction in the Imperial grant (31) and the increasing financial difficulties. £40,000 had been granted annually for the four years after 1856, but in 1860 under Newcastle this sum was reduced to £27,000. In 1861, £15,000 and a further £1,065 to meet the deficit, had been conceded, but this was reduced to £10,000 for 1862 and £5,000 for 1863 and 1864. On each occasion since 1860 Newcastle had emphasised that it was "to be the last". At the same time military expenditure had been reduced by the removal of the headquarters and troops to Cape Town, retrenchment of the garrison and the cessation of the heavy expenditure on the German legion. Moreover, the effects of the depression in the Cape were becoming more severe. In 1864 the abandonment of the Transkei and Cardwell's intimation that any subsequent advance of the frontier must be financed by the colony, quashed the hopes previously entertained that Kaffraria would ultimately expand across the Kei up to the Natal border.

Wodehouse considered the time for an immediate settlement had come. This conviction was induced not only by the financial conditions of Kaffraria and the settlement of the Transkei, but the fact that in the session of 1864 the House had passed a resolution in favour of revising the representation of the colony. In the opinion of the Governor the inclusion of Kaffraria should be a major part of this revision. At the same time the frontier was definitely in favour, hoping by the increased representation to secure equality with the West, and after the departure of the Western members towards the end of the Grahamstown session, the Eastern had passed resolutions in both Houses favouring the annexation of Kaffraria. (22)


(22) G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Cardwell 70 of Aug.11, 1864. E.P.Herald July 15, 1864.
However, the previously insuperable problem of how to overcome the opposition to the measure still remained. The West was not blind to the fact that the frontier and the midlands were united in their desire to remove the capital eastwards, and realised that in a division of the House on provincial lines, owing to Brand being Speaker, their numerical majority was limited to one, and several Westerns such as the incorrigible Dr. Tancred, regularly voted with the East. Clearly there was no hope of the West agreeing to an accession of strength to the frontier while the future of Cape Town as the seat of government was threatened. Realising that the Colonial Office could be relieved of Kaffraria only by overriding the Colonial Legislature, Wodehouse in July 1864 suggested to Cardwell the advisability of an Imperial Act (23) defending it on the grounds that it was in the interests not only of H.M. Government, but of both colonies and would facilitate government.

Cardwell (24) agreed that the time was particularly opportune for the measure and that Cape opposition should not prevent Britain from terminating an arrangement by which she was made responsible for the defence of the Cape by having to protect a small buffer state. At the same time as the British North America Bill was being debated, he rushed the Bill for the annexation of Kaffraria to the Cape through the Imperial Parliament.

At the Cape the news met with a varied reception. Protests of a perfunctory nature were raised in Kaffraria as by now the majority realised that further independence was no longer practicable. Sprigg (25) turned round and headed a movement favouring union with the colony, writing to the Journal that the evidence of recent Blue Books convinced him that "the colony is unable to maintain an independent existence". Within the colony, the united Press, already incensed by the abandonment of the Transkei in the previous year, attacked the Governor and the Imperial Parliament vigorously, the Herald of Port Elizabeth (26) expressing the views of the whole colony in concentrated form

(23) G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Cardwell 50 of July 13, 1864 and 98 of Sept.19, 1864.
(24) G.H.1/13 Cardwell to Wodehouse 826 of Jan.9 and 874 of Apr.8, 1865.
when it described Wodehouse as "reticent, dogmatic, obstinate, tyrannical, orning to the Colonial Office .... quirky and narrow-minded!" The whole colony was angered at what they regarded as a violation of their constitutional rights, but in the West the annoyance was increased by their fear of the East, and in the case of the latter, although still hostile on account of the Transkeian settlement and Wodehouse's attitude during the alleged Fingo rising, it was mitigated by their strong desire for additional frontier representation.

After the initial outburst, both provinces, realising that they were faced with a fait accompli, set about formulating a plan of action to secure the maximum of benefit to themselves. Fearing the removal of the capital and an increased cost of defence the West at first began to talk of separation (27) or federation, to the surprise of the East. Later this was modified into a determination to oppose any equality of representation and secure the largest possible concession from the Imperial Treasury for defence. The East favoured the opposite policy of using the annexation to secure equality for the provinces in the House and the removal of the capital. (28) With the two provinces pledged to such opposite policies, a fiery session was guaranteed, but the question at issue was not the merits of annexation but whether there should be equality for the provinces.

With the Imperial Act held in terrorem over the heads of the Colonial Legislature, the House had no option but to agree to annexation. Involved in the question, however, was the necessary revision of representation, and it was this aspect that was to make the ensuing session the most violent and bitter yet. The illuminating commentary of the Governor at the close of the session supplies the key to the events within the House. "The West, considered Wodehouse, (29) "would have conceded an equality from the fact that with them is the seat of government and in all probability this concession would have been made if more moderation had been exhibited by the East in the early part

of the session. But the latter, both in their speeches and through their local newspapers openly advocated the removal of the seat of government from Cape Town, and thus aroused in the minds of their rivals a determination to maintain their present advantage and to make not the slightest concession which could be applied to their own serious injury". Hitherto the West had always been able to count on the support of the midlands against the frontier, so that normally equality would have presented no serious threat, but on the question of removal, the East was united. Thus the menace to Cape Town inevitably aroused the implacable hostility of the West.

Apart from minor matters, the whole session was taken up with the annexation bill. In opening the session on the 27th of April, the Governor devoted his speech to a defence of his policy and thereby aroused a fresh storm of criticism from the Press, and in the Council on the following day, de Wet, a Western member, frightened the frontier party by introducing a motion in favour of the full separation (30) of the provinces "whenever a fair and practical plan or scheme be submitted". On the 22nd May the whole House united to carry Solomon's motion of censure on the Governor for his part in the Imperial Act, but that was the limit of their unanimity. The Governor brought forward two bills, the one providing for the annexation of Kaffraria and its representation by four members, and the other to maintain the present disparity in the House by adding three members to each province in the Council and 10 to the West and 6 to the East in the Assembly.

Wodehouse, by maintaining the present superiority of the West in the Legislature, showed how his opinion had changed since 1862 when he had favoured equality. Still the West and the midlands were not satisfied and feared that the first bill alone might be passed increasing the frontier by four, and the second rejected. Accordingly, in a violent debate, the motion in favour of joining the bills was carried by 20-11, the minority consisting almost solely of the frontier party. The Eastern hopes of equality were now dashed to the ground, and the frontier

(30) G.R.Herald May 6, 1865.
adopted a course of obstructing the bill through every stage of its passage. Not only did the bill take about 14 weeks to pass, but the Legislature was completely paralysed when the West retaliated by refusing to consider the estimates or other business until after the Kaffrarian Act. "The House was counted on one occasion 54 times," Wodehouse told Cardwell, describing the obstruction, "on another 57 times and on another 144 times before it was counted out. While in committee it was again counted on one occasion 162 times."

When the bill (31) finally passed the Council in September the relative position of the provinces was unaltered. Each province was to return three additional Councillors, and Kingwilliamstown and East London in Kaffraria, Richmond and Aliwal North in the midlands, and Queenstown on the frontier, were the new Eastern electoral divisions. Of these new divisions Kaffraria possessed a distinctive viewpoint of its own, and the fact that Grahamstown and Kingwilliamstown were trade rivals and East London and Port Elizabeth competing ports, caused this new territory to side with the midlands rather than the frontier. The midlands, which had previously been strong enough to wreck any possibility of success for the aims of the frontier party, were now made even more formidable, and Queenstown, the only one of the new divisions which had previously shown a friendly disposition to the frontier party, was more likely to sympathise with Kaffraria with which all its interests were bound, and not with Grahamstown, from which it was barred by the lofty Winterberg and Amatolas. Previously the frontier had been unable to secure unity, but now the addition of Kaffraria and the increased strength of the midlands not only placed the frontier party in a minority in the East itself, but destroyed any possibility of future agreement.

The financial state of the colony had already had considerable influence on the agitation arising from the frontier, the prosperity in the late 'fifties increasing the demand for separation, and the depression of the early 'sixties being one of

(31) Act 2 of 1865; Fyfe, p.59.
the factors in the death of the League. In the middle 'sixties political agitation became secondary to the financial (32) condition of the colony.

After the low level reached in 1863 the following year had witnessed a temporary recovery, and an effort to restore the credit of the colony. In face of the deficit of £160,905 and with the East greatly satisfied at Wodehouse's decision to assemble Parliament at Grahamstown, the party struggle was made subservient to the need for balancing the budget. After rejecting most of the Government's taxation proposals in the last two sessions, the House proved more tractable and granted a loan of £234,000 for the repayment of debentures and a further loan to start a sinking fund. Revenue was to be increased by raising succession and transfer dues, the imposition of a new tax on bank notes and providing for the utilisation of the still vast Crown Lands by leasing. The same year experienced a slight recovery in trade, and a better season led to record wheat and wool outputs, although the market was still low. Wool returns were £57,955 above 1863, exports £379,772 and imports £195,000 higher - a considerable improvement on 1863.

So far the depression had been mainly the result of conditions originating within the colony - the improvident and extravagant financial system, (33) the drought and the inevitable slump after the unwise speculation in property and farming during the boom of the 'fifties. By the end of 1864, however, world conditions had the effect of checking the temporary recovery which had followed the efforts of Parliament. Not only had the American Civil War disturbed the European market, but the American wool demand was destroyed; the upset in the Lancashire cotton industry affected the manufacture of woollen goods; the immense failures in Rio further depressed the market; transport under War conditions was scarce and increased the difficulties of the wool producers, and, as an indication of the tightness of money, the Bank rate of discount was as high as 9

to 9¢ per cent. Meanwhile many of the new immigrants who had cost from £15 to £18 to bring to the colony were leaving for New Zealand owing to the difficulty of securing employment.

Although the dawn was near, the darkest hour could scarcely have been blacker. (34) January of 1865 saw the country still parched and scorched from the heat and the terrible drought that was to continue for the next two years, broken only by light showers in July and August and February of the following year. Farmers were unable to plough, agriculture in the West was at a standstill and heavy wheat imports became necessary. In the East, the wool season was late. The big commercial failures in Port Elizabeth which followed similar disasters in Cape Town caused repercussions throughout the East during the early months of the year. In June, the outbreak of renewed hostilities between the Free State and the Basuto further affected the East by the loss of markets and the difficulty of collecting debts. The bottom had fallen out of the property market, and on all sides retrenchment was necessary, starting with 140 men from the Table Bay harbour works. All public works had ceased. With 300 without work in Port Elizabeth and a greater number in Cape Town, unemployment had got beyond the control of the municipal boards and become a national problem.

As a result of the financial conditions, Eastern railways (35) which had seemed so near in 1863 were still further deferred. Despite the favourable report of a select committee in 1864, the House passed a resolution against a start being made in accordance with the provisions of the Acts of 1862 and in the following year, with financial conditions worse, carried by 14–4 the Government motion "that under the present circumstances of the colony and guided by the evidence before the select committee it is unadvisable to proceed with the construction of any lines until sufficient time has been allowed for a more mature consideration of the whole subject." In the same session, the growing anti-railway party, consisting of Western

E.P.Herald July 8, Aug. 8, Oct. 7, Dec. 7, 1865;
Jan. 9, Mar. 9, 1866.
G.R.Herald Feb.9, 1867; May 31, 1871.
(35) E.P.Herald July 15, 1864.
Journal Oct 8, 1865.
conservatives and an Eastern party led by Bowker, was powerful enough to defeat Solomon's motion that a start from Port Elizabeth should at least be made, and narrowly failed to secure the repeal of the 1863 Acts.

When Parliament met in September 1866, the prospect was appalling. Import figures were dropping, an indication of the decrease in consumption and the widespread poverty, revenue was falling expenditure increasing, and farmers were already complaining about the burden of taxation. Despite the saving of £42,387 on the estimates, the deficit on 1864 was £62,000 but the bitter strife over the annexation of Kaffraria had precluded attention to financial matters. Now in 1866 Parliament faced a deficit of £24,600 and an estimated shortfall for the ensuing year of £16,737.

Revenue had not kept pace with expenditure and Parliament was now finding out how heavy was the annual drain imposed on the finances by the steady development in the administrative system during the last few years. The maintenance of the sixteen new magistracies which had been created on the wave of prosperity of 1859 was costing £18,000. In every department it was the same story of greatly increased expenditure in recent years. Gaols were annually costing £31,000 more than in 1854; subsidies to hospitals and agricultural societies £14,000; frontier police £11,000; the educational system £15,000; postal services £17,000; miscellaneous charges £28,000. In addition machinery had been set up for revising all titles to landed property; the judiciary had been increased in 1864 by the creation of the new Eastern Province Court and additional periodical courts and a heavy subsidy was being paid to the telegraph company.

By the 1866 session both Government and Parliament realised that the most pressing need of the colony was a stable financial system. The difficulty was, however, that a solution required unanimity between Parliament and Government, two hostile bodies openly suspicious of each other. Moreover, Parliament

E.P.Herald July 6, 1866.
(37) Journal Sept. 7, 1866.
E.P.Herald Sept. 14, 1866.
found it extremely difficult to consider without bias the merits of any proposal the Governor might make, owing to the antagonism that remained after the abandonment of the Transkei and the annexation of Kaffraria, while the party favouring Responsible Government showed no disposition to facilitate the working of a system which they wanted changed.

Opposition to the Executive was increasing steadily. With a great deal of justice, the House pointed to the delay in carrying out the votes of Parliament to the fairly numerous occasions when estimates were over-spent, that often when loans were asked for, half the money had already been spent in advance (38) and the fact that estimates were generally presented in the second half of the session (when several members were wanting to leave as the £1 per day allowance was limited to £50!) In addition, the support which the Executive gave to Woodhouse caused it to share in his unpopularity after the stormy events of 1864 and 1865, the antagonism to which was further increased by the Governor's prohibition of colonial aid for the Free State in the Basuto War.

Changes in the personnel of the Executive increased its unpopularity. (39) Rawson and Porter, both of whom gained the highest esteem of the whole colony, were replaced by Southey and Griffith in 1864 and 1865. The ability of Southey, the Colonial Secretary, and only really strong member of the Executive Council, was never questioned, but since his views invariably coincided with those of the Governor, the result was inevitable. Griffith, however, the new Attorney-General, was in every way the opposite of the popular Porter and promptly quarrelled with Parliament in 1866, his first session. Of the others who held seats in the House, E. M. Cole, the Auditor-General, was not a speaker and knew it, and J. C. Davidson, the Treasurer-General, "never opened his mouth to any advantage."

Apart from Southey, the Executive was composed of men of moderate ability who were nevertheless expected to undertake duties, especially during sessions, of a responsible and onerous

(38) E.P. Herald Dec. 31, 1864.
nature. (40) The four members who sat in Parliament, with R. Graham, the Collector of Customs, were the heads of the five departments which controlled the administration of the colony. In addition to these duties they were expected to be present both in the Assembly and the Council, act on select committees, perform House duties, attend meetings of the Governor's Executive Council, frame bills, answer questions, propose government bills and arrange the daily work of both Houses. At the same time they were expected to be fully conversant with details of the different establishments - judiciary, revenue, education, ecclesiastic, convicts, public works, Crown Lands, police and gaols, and native affairs. The obvious result of the difficulties under which the Executive laboured, together with its mediocrity, was that in any contest between the Governor and Parliament, such as was frequent from 1866–70, the former was very inadequately supported within the House.

Parliament and Government with inflexible determination each adhered rigidly to solutions of the financial difficulty which were opposite and contradictory. Since Parliament did not have full control over expenditure and exhibited an open distrust of the Executive, the easier course of preferring retrenchment to taxation was generally followed. Nor did the presence in the House of a powerful, well led party, whose aim was to discredit the present constitution and bring about the introduction of Responsible Government, facilitate smooth co-operation. In 1860 Rawson's taxation proposals had been rejected and retrenchment proposals passed instead; only with reluctance did the House agree to increased taxation in 1861 and 1864, and both the members and the Press made it clear that they blamed the mismanagement of the Executive for the financial condition of the colony.

(41) In opening the session of 1864 had declared emphatically that he considered either retrenchment or a reduction of salaries in the Civil Service impossible, and to this policy he continued to adhere. Accordingly in his Speech from the Throne in September 1866, he proposed a third increase

in taxation within six years. With tempers at boiling point since 1864, Parliament in its present mood would probably have rejected any proposal, but the Governor's suggestions of a tax on exports - which in reality meant a wool tax - and an issue of paper currency, which was not understood by the majority of the colonists and therefore anathema, were particularly obnoxious. Ably backed up by the united Press of the colony, the House threw out the proposals without a division, and on the 29th September appointed a retrenchment committee.

Meanwhile Parliament refused to proceed with business or consider the estimates until the Committee reported, thus wasting five weeks. Soothingly Wodehouse (42) pointed to the personnel of this committee, the fact that although the members of the House had no intimate acquaintance with the administrative system, no member of the Executive was appointed and three of the seven members were new to Parliament. When on November 5th the committee reported advising savings of £86,000, of which £3,000 came from the Governor's salary, the Governor dismissed the suggestions as impracticable. The onus of further action was now on Wodehouse and on the 27th December, with 8 months of the financial year gone and the estimates not yet passed, he proposed drastic retrenchments, involving among other things the abolition of fourteen magistracies and seven commissionerships. This scheme was as usual rejected and was sneeringly described by the Journal as (43) "a Malay-like running amuck - a reckless slashing and hewing at things vitally important." At last in December the Rump of the House passed the estimates for 1866, three-quarters of which were already spent, granted supplies for the next six months until Parliament should again assemble, and carried unanimously 46 resolutions in favour of retrenchment (44) upon which the Executive was to base the estimates for the following year.

After a session void of all practical value, Parliament was prorogued in a state of complete deadlock. With all their differences laid aside, both provinces had united in opposing the Executive, and Wodehouse, convinced that the present constitution

(42) S.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Carnarvon, 6 of Jan.19, 1867.
was unworkable, confessed to Carnarvon that the only alternatives were Responsible Government or the return to a Crown Colony. (45)

The immediate effect of the distressing financial conditions of the middle 'sixties was to practically banish even from the East the very mention of separation. Amid conditions that were almost overwhelming the united colony, it would have been manifestly absurd for a section to tempt fate by standing alone. All over the East the Press told the same story, that the depression had killed all interest in politics, and even in Port Elizabeth, the second largest city in the East, the municipal board was moribund and on several occasions was unable to secure even a quorum at its meetings. (46) Both provinces appeared to have sunk their personal differences in raising a united opposition to the Governor, and the Herald (47) of Graaff-Reinet put into words the feeling of the whole colony in stating that "while the ship is sinking, none but blockheads would squabble about political opinions or their own special claim to consideration."

Hitherto Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth had constantly complained of the distance which members had to travel to Parliament, and maintained that this was a major grievance. It is rather striking to note, however, that the complaints emanated from the most favourably situated centres in the East, which were no more than three or four days journey respectively from Parliament. Moreover, members could not complain of the expense in view of the fact that they received a travelling allowance of one shilling per mile and a personal allowance of £1 per day. (48) A further fact, which the Cape Town Press did not fail to point out, (49) was that the representatives of divisions such as Colesburg, which had a legitimate grievance, did not complain.

By the middle 'sixties, the great improvements in communications had the effect of breaking down the isolation of the frontier and lessening the undoubted handicap which the more outlying divisions of the colony suffered. The heavy expenditure

(45) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Carnarvon 6 of Jan.19, 1867.
(46) E.P.Herald Aug.8, 1866 (47) G.R.Herald Oct.6, 1866.
(48) Constitution Ordinance; Eybers p.55.
(49) Advertiser and Mail, Mar.30, 1861 (quoted in G.R.Herald Ap.6, 1861.)
on roads during the 'forties and 'fifties had greatly improved the Eastern route and although far from perfect, travelling could now be undertaken in some degree of comfort and the postal services operated with a punctuality unknown before. The increased trade of the East resulted in a growing volume of traffic round the coast and the monthly mail steamer regularly performed the trip to Cape Town in three days. By 1866 a fortnightly service was operated as far as Natal. On 8th January 1864, the opening of the electric telegraph brought Grahamstown into instant touch with the seat of Government and by October the line was extended to King Williamstown. In the same year, a daily postal service between Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth was inaugurated and 1d. postage extended to the whole colony. By 1866 the mail from King Williamstown to Natal was performing the journey in nine days.

The middle 'sixties saw the removal of the last frontier objections to a united colony. The liberal treatment of the East during the first decade of Representative Government refuted the charge of unfair expenditure on the West; the settlement of the Transkei in 1864 removed the danger of war and ensured a continuation of the peace that had been unbroken since 1851; improved communications, and the telegraph in particular, destroyed the validity of the argument that the frontier could not be governed from Cape Town.

Not only were the arguments for separation rapidly falling away but the opposition of counter forces was destroying any possibility of the movement ever attaining success. The continuance of the depression precluded the thought of a divided colony and forced both provinces to unite in opposing the Governor but the most important factor of all was that the annexation of Zaffraria and the increased representation of the Midlands so strengthened the opposition party in the East that the possibility of a successful revival of separation was indefinitely postponed.

In the middle 'sixties, separation as a movement was jejune, and hostility to the West was confined to the grumbles
of the frontier Press. Wodehouse, (50) while in the East preparing for the Grahamstown session in the early months of 1864, had discouraged any plans of revival that the Grahamstown party might have cherished. The financial state of the colony, he had declared, made it impossible to consider "large organic changes in the form of the government, involving still further expense, and as far as the government is concerned, such changes will not be proposed." The leaders of the East shared his sentiments, and at the Uitenhage agricultural show both W. M. Harries, the leader of the frontier in the Assembly, and Chabaud, the member for Uitenhage publicly declared (51) their intention of not creating embarrassment for the Governor on the separation question. Not only did the holding of Parliament in the East have a great conciliatory effect, but the liberal treatment afforded the province in this session confounded the Press. (52) Grahamstown could scarcely conceal its delight, "nor has the Eastern Province any particular cause to be dissatisfied" admitted one of the leading organs of the frontier party which followed this up by stating that "the East has certainly been better cared for than ever has been the case before" - a big admission after its treatment by the first two Parliaments.

In the following year, when Kaffraria was added to the colony, the sympathy with which the Western Press regarded separation, not only made the frontier members extremely cautious about mentioning the division of the colony, but called forth from the Journal an emphatic renunciation of separation, (53) which "at one time would have been joyfully accepted, but which now, under the altered circumstances of the case, would hardly meet the public requirements..... It is no use for Western members, making a virtue of necessity, to plead conversion to the principle of separation of Eastern from Western province". Within the House it was the same. "The leaders of the [Western] party are always ready to talk of separation .... " lamented the Journal. (54) "Should an Eastern now happen to mention that word [separation] which used to be greeted with hisses, he is cheered vociferously!"

(50) E.P.Herald Feb.9, 1864.
(51) Wilmot, 'Southey' p.149, Wodehouse to Southey, Feb.25, 1864.
(52) E.P.Herald July 29, Aug.18, 1864.
No wonder the same paper, (55) with wise discretion, suggested some months later that "when it is difficult to meet the ordinary requirements of daily life .... it would be a disgrace to us as a people to be fiddling at politics, and throwing our pounds .... away on the jobbery of agitation ...." At the end of 1865, the paper which for nearly four decades had been almost the life and soul of the frontier party, pointed out that the E.P.Herald during the past year had agitated solely for railways, irrigation and the development of new products such as tobacco, and not for political grievances. "Public attention", admitted the Journal (56) in December, "has been more and more turned away from political to economical questions, and party agitation has scarcely stirred hand or foot."

Political interest was no stronger in 1866, and as an indication of the prevailing apathy Port Elizabeth, since 1860, the staunch ally of Grahamstown elected as its representative, Reid, who had openly declared himself opposed to separation and railways and in favour of Responsible Government. Such nonbalance about the views of its representatives could scarcely have been shown were party issues of any importance in the East.

Nothing reveals the deep political lassitude of the province more than the silence of the frontier party within the House, at a time when it contained more residents of Grahamstown than at any previous time, both in the Council and the Assembly. In the new Parliament of 1864, candidates from Grahamstown held, in addition to the two seats of that city, one of the seats for Albany (Wood) and for Victoria (J. Ayliff), and both seats for Fort Beaufort (W. Ayliff and Thompson). Owing to the difficulty of securing candidates during the depression this city gradually secured the majority of frontier seats at various by-elections in the next two years, and as early as April 1865, the G.R.Herald alleged, with the possible exaggeration of an opponent, that the "well-known family clique" of Grahamstown could command as many as eleven seats in the Assembly. (57) In April 1865 Franklin secured one of the seats for Uitenhage, and in November, R. Ayliff defeated Dobson, also of Grahamstown, for the other. In May of

(57) G.R.Herald Apr. 8, 1865.
the same year, two other candidates from the city of the saints contested the Cradock seat and R.W. Murray, the Editor of the Great Eastern, was successful. The overtures of another for the vacant Bay seat were refused; Glenville, the Editor of the Journal, was elected at Victoria East in February 1866 and in August, J. Ford won the Alwal North seat from another fellow citizen of Grahamstown.

In the Council the position was similar. In 1864, of the seven Eastern members, Pote, Wood, Godlonton and Cawood came from Grahamstown, and the frontier party was further strengthened by Tucker of Cradock, the member who had led the agitation in the Council during the days of the League. In subsequent by-elections in December 1864 on the death of Cawood, and again in March 1866 on the resignation of one of the midland members, Cock and Hoole of Grahamstown were elected, but at the cost of further antagonising the midlands, which on each occasion put forward their own candidate and contested the election. The bitterness evinced by the Press on both sides illustrates how deep was the gulf fixed between the two sections of the East, and how distinct were the differences between the two territorial parties. In June 1866, the election for three additional seats created by the Kaffrarian Act was uncontested and of the new members, Kennelly hailed from Grahamstown, and Stretch and Chase both supported the frontier.

Thus by the end of 1866, the frontier held nine of the ten Eastern seats, and of these, seven were held by residents of Grahamstown. Never previously had the home of separation been in so strong a position in both Houses to voice its grievances, yet the only sign of life in the separation party during these years was Stretch's lone motion in the Council in 1866, in favour of the removal of the seat of government. Surely no further evidence of the lack of interest in the question was required.

Although separation seemed a forgotten cry, the breach between midlands and frontier was widening. When on the eve of the Grahamstown session the Governor announced that to meet the objections of the frontier to centralisation at Cape Town he
intended to propose in the ensuing session the creation of an Eastern district Court and Deeds Office at Grahamstown, the G.R.Herald immediately declared that "this will not satisfy Graaff-Reinet" as the Midlands would be no better off than at present. When the matter was raised in the House, the Midlands and Port Elizabeth demanded similar institutions while the Grahamstown members clung obstinately to the principle that the administration of the East should be centralised in Grahamstown alone. The result of this rivalry was inevitable. (58) The Deeds Office Bill was thrown out and the bill creating an Eastern districts Court radically modified. When the Journal put this defeat down to Western selfishness and injustice, the G.R.Herald retorted that the opposition was not anti-East but anti-Grahamstown. (59) In the same session, when the frontier party had brought forward their personal bill for the enfranchisement of Queenstown, the Midlands, including Port Elizabeth, immediately rose up in opposition and aided in its rejection. (60)

The split between Graaff-Reinet and Grahamstown over railways still remained. Graaff-Reinet and Port Elizabeth regarded with growing alarm the talk in Cape Town of extending the Western line from Wellington right up to Beaufort West, and the opposition of Grahamstown to any start at all on railways grew in proportion to the increasing support being given to the midland line.

In 1864 and 1866 further friction arose over the by-elections to the Council, and in each case the election was fought out not on the question of principles, but solely on the locality of the candidates. The East was completely split on territorial lines and the frontier's monopoly of the Council led to fresh attacks from the Midlands and the Bay on the "ambitions" and "self-aggrandizement" of Grahamstown. A sore grievance to the Midlands was the fact that despite their slight numerical superiority in population, the political apathy of the Dutch gave them no prospect of success in a straight fight with the well

E.P.Herald June 3, July 15, Dec.31, 1864.
(59) G.R.Herald June 11, 1864.
(Co) E.P.Herald July 15, 1864.
organised and politically alive frontier. How the wind was blowing is indicated by the rising demands that the midlands should be formed into a third electoral circle in the Council. (61)

A consideration of the voting (62) in Grahamstown and Graaff-Reinet in these two elections shows how sharp was the division between the two towns. In each case Grahamstown plumped for the frontier candidates and ignored the midlands, giving 602 votes to Cock and 6 to Christian in 1864, and 770 to Hoole and 5 to Caro in 1866. In Graaff-Reinet the reverse was the case, and despite intense canvassing in 1866 by Hoole's committee, he secured only 54 votes against 322 cast for Caro. Especially after June 1866, when Kaffraria and the midlands were virtually unrepresented in the Upper House, these two centres lost no chance of showing their resentment of the monopoly exercised by the frontier.

The Imperial Act in 1865 had given rise to a recrudescence in the columns of the Journal of the agitation for the removal of the seat of government. The Herald of Graaff-Reinet (63) was heartily in support of the principle, but equally as emphatic that the midlands would never consider Grahamstown as the future capital, and would combine with the frontier only if the claims of Uitenhage to the honour were recognised, a condition quite unacceptable to the Grahamstown party. Nor was the position simplified by the numerous hints from the E.P.Herald as to the suitability of the Bay. After some months of fruitless agitation in the Press, Wodehouse (64) summed up the position in words that certainly were no exaggeration of the views of the East. "The Eastern members", he told Cardwell in October, "have for years called for separation without being able to command a Parliamentary majority, or to frame even the skeleton of a plan for carrying it into effect. Now they seem disposed to advocate the removal of the seat of government with almost as little chance of agreeing among themselves as to the new site." How strong was the opposition to Grahamstown in Graaff-Reinet is shown by the fact that the first reaction of the Herald to the news of the Imperial

(61) G.R.Herald Ap. 23, 30, 1864; Dec. 16, 30, 1865.
Journal Mar. 9, 1865.
(62) G.R.Herald Jan. 20, 1866.
(64) G.H. 31/10 Wodehouse to Cardwell 98 of Oct. 11, 1865.
Act for Kaffraria was to protest, not against the violation of the constitution as was the tendency in other centres, but that it would unjustly strengthen the frontier party.

That the East was not united, the Press made no effort to conceal. "The opposition of political parties is less marked" stated the Journal at the end of 1865. "The Eastern side of the colony has not as yet decided on any programme of action. The province is not one and undivided, hence a certain undecidedness", and later the same paper pointed to the divergence of political opinions in the province, some wanting separation, others "one strong colony", others federation, and yet others removal of the capital in a united colony. (65) In May 1866 the G.R.Herald (66) commented on the same disunity and considered the annexation of Kaffraria had made the position worse by creating "a greater diversity of interest and opinion ... which tends to make united action on any fixed line of policy, hardly attainable".

Within the first year of annexation, Kaffraria made it clear that her outlook was in sympathy with the midlands and opposed to that of Grahamstown. Within a month of the publication of its first issue, the Kaffrarian Watchman (67) fore-shadowed a policy that was to prove a threat of increasing menace to the Grahamstown party when it suggested that the frontier divisions of Queenstown, Victoria East, Port Beaufort, Albert and Aliwal North should ally themselves with Kaffraria with whom their interests were more identified. Thereafter Kaffraria continued to woo these very divisions which previously had clung so tenaciously to Grahamstown, and the success which attended this course was shown by the comparative isolation in the early seventies of the city which for so long had almost dominated the East. The frontier party was now faced with attrition from two fronts. To the question of separation, (68) the Watchman was unequivocally opposed, as the greatest needs of Kaffraria - public works - could only be met by the resources of a united colony, while if the East were separated, Port Elizabeth

(65) Journal Nov.8, 17, Dec.20, 1865.
(66) G.R.Herald May 5, 1866.
(67) Kaff.Watchman Dec.18, 1865; May 3, July 5, 1866.
would never sanction expenditure on the port of East London, and midlands and Kaffrarian taxes would be used for a railway from the Bay to Grahamstown. The question of removal was not considered of much importance, but Kaffria would support the motion if Uitenhage or Port Elizabeth were chosen, or better still, King-williamstown or East London. (69) As far as Grahamstown's predominance on the Council was concerned, the Kaffrarian Press (70) took the lead in stressing the need for reform and increased representation for Kaffria and the midlands, while in December 1866, when Eastern members opposed, and Western members supported the motion to increase the number of convicts employed in Kaffria, the Watchman, (71) indignantly asked "who are Kaffria's friends now?" No wonder the Journal, as early as February 1866 expressed the fear that Kaffria, owing to the possession of its own port, would probably not support separation. (72)

Throughout the second Parliament the frontier had aimed at securing the complete separation of the two provinces, but in the middle sixties, when such a course was made impossible by the conditions of finance and the disunity of the province, the rivalry between East and West followed a new direction. In the 1864 session, the spirits of the Westerns were already exacerbated by Woodhouse's decision to summon Parliament in Grahamstown, with the result that there were (73) "hard words spoken and heavy blows dealt - there had been acrimony and abuse and ill-feeling enough .... Taunts, sneers and scoffs had been hurled backward and forward". But in the absence of controversial questions between the provinces, the hostility was expressed in a more personal form and Woodhouse (74) himself stated that "I do not concede that party spirit ran very high." The only aspect in which separation was raised, was Harries' motion that the next session should meet in the East.

In the following session of 1865, the debates on the

(69) Kaff. Watchman Mar. 5, 26, 1866.
(70) Kaff. Watchman Feb. 15, 1866.
(72) Journal Feb. 16, 1866.
(73) E.P. Herald July 26, 1864.
(74) G.H. 31/8 Woodhouse to Cardwell 89 of Aug. 11, 1864.
annexation of Kaffraria were marked by a violence and bitterness between the frontier and the coalition party of the West and midlands, unequalled during the period of Representative Government. The aim of the frontier was now, not the division of the colony, but firstly equilisation of representation, and then the removal of the seat of government - a policy which was defeated by the West and midlands insisting on the incorporation of the two bills into one. Thereafter on every occasion the frontier members inveighed bitterly against what they considered the injustice and malignant motives of the West. Vehemently, it was claimed that from the imports and exports through Port Elizabeth, the produce, and total population of the province as revealed by the 1865 census, the East was entitled to equality with the West. Their opponents pointed to the fact that the European population of the West was 23,257 more than that of the East (75) and stressed that the trade returns of Port Elizabeth were no true reflection of the prosperity of the East.

The Bay undoubtedly owed much of its prosperity to areas beyond its own province. How important were the Republics both as exporting areas and as markets, can be gauged from the fact that the population (76) of the Free State was already about 35,000 Europeans and of the Transvaal between 20,000 and 30,000. The Free State alone owned over 2,000,000 sheep. Moreover, and this was never mentioned by the frontier, the figures recorded at the Bay were considerably swollen by the Western Border districts of Beaufort West and Victoria West "which at present, we suppose, do three-quarters of their valuable trade with Port Elizabeth." (77) The whole of the Executive Council, which had no reason to take a biased view, agreed that the time had not yet come for equality, and Wodehouse (78) himself subscribed to the same view. "I believe", he said, "whatever may be the comparative results of the enumeration of population, stock, agriculture, produce, exports and imports, the fairest test of the relative claims of to political representation will be found in the relative numbers of each of the white population".

In view of the relative positions of the provinces, the East could scarcely claim equality as a right, yet, as has been noticed, Woodhouse believed that this concession would have been granted were it not for the fear that any strengthening of the East might lead to the removal of the capital. On the question of removal Solomon made some illuminating comments in the 1864 session, that revealed what little likelihood of success the East had. Naturally he started off by commenting on the obvious inconsistency of the Grahamstown members complaining of the isolation of Cape Town and then promptly proposing to shift the capital to the other extreme end of the colony. When he turned his attention to statistical arguments, he was well-nigh unanswerable. He claimed that in the municipality of Cape Town alone, there were 4,417 properties valued at £1,897,316, while the value of the combined properties of the municipality of Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, and Somerset was £284,744 less than Cape Town. Among further statistics to show the great superiority of the present capital over the rest of the colony, he pointed out that of the total number of properties in the colony, (24,370) one-third, (8,211) were to be found around Cape Town, and of the total value of property in the colony, (£15,137,415) almost one-third (£4,833,877) was found in the Cape division. Turning to the most recent returns on population he showed that of the total population of the Cape (267,000) one-fourth or 69,789, were to be found in the divisions of the Cape, Stellenbosch, Pearl and Malnesbury, all one days ride from Cape Town. In actual fact Cape Town was about four times the size of Grahamstown the next city in the colony, and in view of its long establishment and great superiority over all rivals, its position could scarcely be challenged.

By the 1866 session, most of the resentment and acrimony of the previous year was laid aside in face of the need to restore the financial system of the colony, and apart from Stretch's defeated motion in the Council in favour of removal, the separation party lay quiet and gave no sign of life.

(79) G.R.Herald July 9, 1864 (Extract)
"There has, in the main", stated the G.R.Herald (80) reviewing political affairs in the colony during 1866, "been an honest endeavour amongst all parties to intrude territorial matters as little as possible. There has been a desire evinced by the majority of members, to make every subject secondary to the great financial difficulty." The hostility with which the frontier regarded Cape Town was maintained in the form of vociferous complaints and grumbles, but separation, as far as the House was concerned, had received a mortal blow in 1862. Moreover, just as the frontier had been at last convinced that full separation was impossible, so after 1866 the East appeared to realise that the position of Cape Town as the seat of government was unassailable.

(80) G.R. Herald Nov. 24, 1866.
CHAPTER V.

(1867-70)

THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND THE CAPE.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCK.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF IMPERIAL TROOPS.

BASUTOLAND.

A SOUTH AFRICAN CONFEDERATION.

"IT IS LONG SINCE SEPARATION HAS BEEN HEARD OF."
The dominant note of the administration of the Cape in the late 'sixties was the well nigh impossible struggle to bring the contradictory elements and tendencies of South African affairs into the set framework dictated by the exigencies of British Colonial policy. This period, in the opinion of Egerton, (1) marked the final triumph of the Manchester school, under whose influence were shaped the colonial policies of statesmen no less important than Lord Derby, Prime Minister for the second time in 1863, and Lord Granville, his Colonial Secretary. At the same time, and this is a fact of the highest importance, the permanent under-secretary from 1860-71 was Sir Frederick Rogers, an official of the highest ability, who exerted a "notorious" influence on Newcastle, Cardwell, Carnarvon, Buckingham and Granville, the Colonial Secretaries during the 'sixties, and who was a convinced believer that "the destiny of the colonies is independence; and that in this point of view the function of the Colonial Office is to secure that our connection, while it lasts shall be profitable to both parties, and our separation, when it comes, as amicable as possible".

As far as the Cape was concerned, it was felt that this connection was anything but profitable with the Exchequer having to pay out about £400,000 per annum for South African defence. Coming after the European disturbances of the 'fifties, the increasing importance of Prussia and the growing tension on the Continent caused the pursuance of a course aimed at forcing the colonies to provide for their own defence and so permit the gradual elimination of Imperial responsibility for the dependencies. In accordance with the policy, so far as the Cape was concerned, nothing would be sanctioned likely to involve further expenditure by H.M. Government, but well nigh anything likely to lead to a diminution of Imperial responsibility and put the colony in a better position to support itself would be welcomed. The wider issues involved in effecting this course amid the con-

fllicting and complex tendencies of the late 'sixties destroyed the last hopes of the frontier for the resurrection of separation.

In the middle of the decade, the colony was far from self-supporting. Not only was the constitution in a state of complete deadlock owing to the struggle between Government and Parliament for control of the Executive, but the continued deficits revealed the bankruptcy of the Treasury. (3) True, the drought had ended in 1866, but the return of good seasons was promptly followed by a record wool output and abundant crops in the West, East, Kaffraria and Free State, save in the war area, with the result that the market was glutted and prices fell. The ample sufficiency of food in the Transkei caused a general exodus of Natives from the frontier, so that sheep farmers suffered from an inadequate labour supply; in the West the record wheat crop was thrown on to a market already well supplied by the importation started during the drought, when overseas aid was essential. The unemployment, especially in the West, showed little sign of improvement, and the lethargy in trade was indicated by the reduction by the bank rate of discount to the low figure of five percent. In 1867 the position in the East was further aggravated by the effects of the Basuto war, and early in 1868, the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce protested to Wodehouse that it had claims on the Free State exceeding £300,000 and the closing of the courts had made redress impossible. Nor were the evil effects of the second issue of green-backs confined to the Free State.

The slightly improved conditions in the colony were not reflected in the finances of the colony. In 1867 the payment of interest on loans had cost £100,000 and the deficit was £25,000, a sum small in comparison with the deficit of £91,308 for the following year. By 1868 the public debt had reached £1,176,650, the result of loans to finance immigration, public works, bridges, gaols, roads and the Public Service, and the opening of the Suez

(3) On financial conditions in the Colony:
Journal Oct.7, Nov. 27, Dec.13, 1867; May 20,1868, Aug.13,1869
E.P.Herald May 14, 1867.
Raff. Watchman Nov.12, 1868.
Canal the year after caused further forebodings. Yet despite the bankruptcy of the colony, Parliament resolutely refused to consider taxation and in 1866 and again in 1868 had decisively rejected Wodehouse’s proposals. The Governor’s attempt to restore the financial system in 1868 had resulted in the retrenchment proposals of the House and the counter proposals made by the Executive, and the prorogation in January 1867 had been a mere postponement of the deadlock.

Of the two possible solutions (3) which he saw to the impasse, Responsible Government or a return to Crown Colony government, Wodehouse was emphatically against the former, and in opening the following session, he plunged into the conflict with proposals (4) for an export tax and the reduction of the present constitution to one House of eighteen elected representatives and three members of the Executive. After expressing himself against separation or removal, he recommended the division of the colony into six electoral circles as a means of “allaying that most ruinous political jealousy that divides the Eastern and Western provinces ....” When the Governor’s constitutional amendment bill came forward in May, the threatened storm was averted by the sudden withdrawal of the measure and the unexpected returns from land sales, which saved the necessity of fresh taxation or retrenchment. Continued land sales in 1868, the slight recovery in financial conditions in the colony, the impending dissolution at the end of the session, and the Executive’s ability to carry on without fresh taxation, postponed the inevitable struggle still further. However, these two sessions were but a temporary respite, for the problem had been merely avoided. As soon as fresh taxation became necessary, the antagonism between Government and Parliament would again cause deadlock.

In 1869 the long threatening storm broke. With a deficit of £91,306 and the public debt standing at £1,176,650, Wodehouse was convinced that the time for delay was passed. Opening the fourth Parliament of the Cape in June (5) he again emphasised his

(3) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Carnarvon 8 of Jan.19, 1867
(4) Journal Ap.15, 1867 (Speech from the Throne.)
(5) Journal June 28, 1867 (Speech from the Throne).
opposition to retrenchment and favoured fresh taxation on property and incomes. In August, however, when the Government's proposal to impose new taxes on incomes, property, brandy and wool was brought forward by the Colonial Secretary, it was thrown out without a division,\(^6\) so united was Parliament in its opposition to the Government. Once again the House insisted that the budget should be balanced by retrenchment and carried Molteno's eight resolutions involving, among other things, an attack on the Reserved Schedules in the Constitution Ordinance by favouring the reduction of the salaries of the Governor and Civil Servants.\(^7\) With taxation refused, the Government had now no alternative but to comply with the House's demand for retrenchment. Accordingly Southey brought forward 3 retrenchment proposals "for the better regulation of the Public Service," to reduce the number of fiscal and electoral divisions of the colony, and to limit the expenses of Government by substituting for the present Legislature a single House of twelve elected members and three officials.\(^8\)

The difference between the two retrenchment schemes is immediately apparent. Molteno's proposals left the institutions of the administration intact, but aimed at effecting minor economies all round; the Government on the other hand opposed any reduction in salaries but contemplated the total abolition of certain institutions, for example, in the Civil Service, salaries were to be left intact but certain offices, considered by the House to be essential, were to be destroyed. Only the conservative party, a coalition half from the West and half from the frontier, supported the Government and the bill was rejected decisively by 39-22. Deadlock was complete, but the House had another card to play. Led by Molteno, who that session had secured more victories in the House than any former leader, the members demanded that the estimates be framed on the recent retrenchment proposals. Wodehouse was desperate. After four months nothing had been accomplished and finance was becoming an increasing problem, so in October he took the drastic step of

\(^{(6)}\) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Granville 48 of Aug.3, 1869.  
\(^{(7)}\) Journal Aug.16, 1869.  
\(^{(8)}\) Journal Aug.9, 1869.
dissolving the Lower House in its first session and appealing to the country to choose between Responsible Government, which he condemned, and his constitutional amendment bill. (9)

In January 1870 the new Parliament assembled, but from the elections the result was a foregone conclusion. As a formality the constitutional amendment bill was proposed and again defeated by 34-26. All were convinced that the present constitution was unworkable. The House had shown repeatedly an emphatic refusal to consider Wolseley's retrogressive measures. The only alternative was Responsible Government.

The division lists on the question of constitutional reform clearly refute any suggestion that the two parties were formed on provincial lines or were separationists against non-separationists. For the two parties, the Press of the colony itself adopted the names of the two leading British parties. The liberals, lead by Solomon, Porter and Molteno consisted of a bare majority of the Western members, practically all the midlanders and half the Kaffrarian and favoured Responsible Government the voluntary bill and a united colony. The conservatives consisted of an unholy alliance of the united frontier party, still hopeful of achieving local government by a loose federal union of two provinces, and the numerous Western conservatives, all strongly opposed to any suggestion of a division of the colony, but united with the frontier in their opposition to Responsible Government and the voluntary bill. (10) The conservatives were almost equally divided between the two provinces with the Easterns holding a slight majority, but the liberals, on the other hand, had a majority of Western members.

On all the important measures of this period the parties never divided on provincial lines. In opposition to the Government's financial measures the whole House united to refuse taxation and insist on retrenchment; Bowker's Railway Bill to repeal the Act of 1863 was carried by the anti-railway party of twelve Easterns and ten Westerns; on the voluntary bill which featured so largely in the 1867 and 1869 sessions there was no provincial voting. Judged purely on its merits the Governor's

constitutional amendment bill had few, if any, adherents, but the fact that the alternative was Responsible Government, won it the support of the conservatives. In 1867 before the opposition to Responsible Government had been weakened by the events of the late 'sixties, the Responsible (11) were drawn from both provinces, fourteen Westerns and eight Easterns being in favour and ten Westerns and nineteen Easterns (of whom ten came from Grahamstown) against. Closely approximating to these figures were the divisions on the constitutional amendment bills of 1869 and 1870. The latter bill (12) was supported by eighteen Easterns and eight Westerns and opposed by thirteen Easterns and twenty-one Westerns.

The split in the East was especially noteworthy. The eighteen frontier votes were derived from the frontier divisions of Victoria East, Grahamstown, Aliwal North, Fort Beaufort, Queenstown, each two votes, the Kaffrarian divisions of East London and Kingwilliamstown, each two votes, and one vote from the intermediate divisions of Uitenhage, Colesburg, Albert and Port Elizabeth. The thirteen midland votes came from the full support of Cradock, Graaff-Reinet, Somerset, Richmond and Albany, and one vote from Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Colesberg. A striking feature about the above division is that Albany and Cradock, for so long loyal supporters of Grahamstown, voted with the midlands on the opposite side to the frontier, revealing the growing tendency of the frontier divisions to drift away from the leadership of Grahamstown. Thus it is clearly a misnomer to affirm that the conservative party consisted solely of Eastern members, nor is it correct to attribute the several defeats of the Responsible Government party to the opposition of the separationists - who formed at the most one-fifth of the total representation in the House. Indeed it is extremely doubtful whether a "separation" party existed in this period, for the only flicker of life was the motion in the Council in 1867 in favour of the next session at Port Elizabeth, (13) a proposal which was carried by the casting vote of the Chairman, but when raised in the

(11) E.P.Herald June 14, 1867.
(13) Journal Aug.16, 1867.
Assembl1er:· a. mild dqba:te, CO'Uld secure only five supporters against eighteen.

The strife between Government and Parliamentmade it clear to all that the transitory stage of the constitution had been passed, and the Press, Governor and Colonial Secretary were all agreed that either a forward or a backward move had to be made. Moreover the need for stabilising the finances of the colony and removing the deadlock was made especially urgent by their bearing upon wider issues connected with the policy of H.M. Government in South Africa.

However much the policies of successive ministries during the 'sixties differed on other matters, there was no divergence of opinion on the question of the need to withdraw Imperial troops from the colonies and make the Empire self-supporting. In 1859 a departaental committee on Imperial Defence, composed of representatives from the Colonial Office, War Office and Treasury, (14) laid down the principles that were to be followed unswervingly by successive Colonial Secretaries during the next decade. Greater contributions to Imperial Defence should be made by the colonies, the committee recommended, and local militias should be created to bear the burden of purely local defence. In 1861 the East was considerably perturbed by the publication of the report of a committee of the House of Commons on Colonial expenditure (15) which emphasised that "security against warlike tribes .... should be provided for .... by means of local efforts and organisation," and specifically stated "that the settlers of South Africa should be called upon to contribute a larger sum than they do at present towards the military expenditure on these colonies." In the following year (16) the House of Commons without a division resolved that self-governing colonies should provide the major part of their own defence, and Gladstone epitomised the new trend in British Colonial policy as "self-government for such colonies as become responsible for their own defence." The Colonial Office, on this occasion meant what it said, and in 1864 a great step was taken.

in entrusting the control of Natives to New Zealand. Canada soon followed suit, and after 1867 became responsible for the provision of its own defence.

In South Africa conditions were widely different from the other colonies and for some time defied any effort to reduce Imperial military expenditure. The bankruptcy of the Cape Colony the constitutional deadlock and the provincial strife, unfitted the colony to bear the responsibility of controlling its own native problems, and the condition of Native affairs all over the sub-continent, convinced the Colonial Office that Imperial troops could not be withdrawn until tranquility replaced the present turbulence in the Native states. With the Transvaal and Free State unable to cope with the unrest in the Zoutspanberg and the Basuto depredations, the Europeans of Natal hopelessly outnumbered and the Zulus threatening to rise, and the Cape in a state of nervous tension owing to the over-crowded frontier and the restlessness of Kaffir, H.M. Government dared not hand over a problem of such magnitude to the control of four small, disunited states at a time when one false move would have caused a catastrophic upheaval from East London to the Limpopo.

Circumstances thus gave to British policy in South Africa a two-fold aim: firstly, to shape Cape affairs in such a way that the colony would be made self-supporting, and secondly, now that the indivisibility of South African problems was being recognised, to bring about a state of peace in South Africa that would permit the withdrawal of Imperial troops without disastrous consequences to the colonists. As a temporary measure rendered necessary by the exigencies of the position, the demands for increased contributions for military expenditure in South Africa were waived, but successive Colonial Secretaries made it clear that it was a mere respite and no departure from the settled policy of H.M. Government.

Soon after assuming office Newcastle (17) had ordered retrenchments in the military at the Cape that had decreased expenditure by £30,000, and in 1862 he warned Wodehouse that as

(17) G.H.31/8 Grey to Newcastle, 5 of Jan.22, 1861.
G.H.1/9 Newcastle to Wodehouse 557 of Nov.5, 1862.
he could not guarantee that the present number of troops in South Africa would be maintained, the Cape should take steps to provide for its own frontier defence. Cardwell (18) who followed Newcastle in 1864, soon showed that the attitude of the Colonial Office was stiffening on the question of the reduction of Imperial expenditure. The main reason for the abandonment of the Transkei was that it would involve fresh expense, and despite the still unsettled nature of the frontier, he demanded the immediate reduction of four companies of the Cape Mounted Rifles. H.M. Government would consider no further responsibility for frontier defence, he emphasized, and the cost of all future extensions must be borne by the colony. In October of the same year, in a confidential despatch to the Governor, he sought to learn what increased contributions might be expected from the Cape after the annexation of Kaffraria.

To every demand, the Cape reply (19) was the same - non possumus. In May 1861 Grey had replied unequivocally that the Cape could not pay any more, and in June 1863 Wodehouse not only protested but stressed the appalling conditions in South Africa: within the Cape, the tribes were recovering after the famine and "vast hordes" still under tribal law, roamed the East; the Burgher Law of 1855 was a dead letter and the "extreme weakness" of the Free State made it unable to cope with Basuto incursions. In May 1865, with the Basuto war about to break out and the financial condition of the Cape getting worse, the Governor pleaded for the postponement of the whole question of a Cape contribution to Imperial expenditure - a request which Cardwell (20) had no option but to grant. His answer made it perfectly clear, however, that it was a concession due only to the special circumstances of the colony, a temporary relief which would be reconsidered at the earliest opportunity.

Thus far there had been no uncertainty or vacillation on the question of withdrawal, but the Colonial Office was faced with

(18) G.H.1/11 Cardwell to Wodehouse 784 of Aug. 5, 1864 and (Confidential) of Oct. 5, 1864.
(19) G.H.31/8 Grey to Newcastle 70 of May 17, 1861.
G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Newcastle 65 of June 13, 1863 and 122 of Sept. 12, 1863.
G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Cardwell 43 of May 4, 1865.
(20) G.H.1/12 Cardwell to Wodehouse 908 of July 10, 1865.
the baffling enigma of how to effect this policy in the face of conditions, the seriousness of which was not exaggerated in Wodehouse's gloomy reports. The delay in reducing the Cape garrison, as was being done in New Zealand and Canada, was due solely to the difficulty of reconciling this policy with a just and fair treatment of the Europeans in South Africa.

In the middle of the decade conditions appeared to favour the intentions of H.M. Government. In the Cape, the 1864 session had been devoted almost solely to finance: new taxes had been sanctioned, supplies had been granted and the credit of the colony restored. (21) The abandonment of the Transkei and Wodehouse's plan of settlement during 1865 had relieved the tension and brought tranquility to the Eastern frontier. The ability and efficiency of the Cape Police had been sufficient to maintain peace on the borders of the colony, and the Imperial troops (22) had not been used since 1851. In the Republics although the Transvaal was still in a weak state, the civil strife had ceased, and the Treaty of Thaba Bosigo in April 1866 for the nonce appeared to have healed the breach between the Free State and the Basutos. Natal was still prosperous and the depression of 1867 was still unforeseen. To the relief of the Colonial Office the annexation of Eaffraria to the Cape had freed the Imperial Parliament of its responsibility for the defence of the little buffer state, and H.M. Government could with a clearer conscience gradually increase the Cape's share in defence. Moreover, the rest of the Empire was toeing the line and the might of the London Times (23) was advocating that Native wars should be made the responsibility, not of philanthropically-minded Imperial troops, but of the colonists themselves - a real departure from the days of Exeter Hall.

Carnarvon (24) the new Colonial Secretary in June 1866, hoping to succeed where his predecessors had failed, considered that conditions were now sufficiently settled to impose the main burden of defence on the colony. In January 1867 he defined the

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(21) C.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Cardwell, Aug.11, 1864.
(22) Journal Jan.10, 1870.
conditions of the Colonial Office to take effect from the 1st of January 1868. Of the five regiments at the Cape, one was to be paid for in 1868, a second in the following year and so on until all but the one at Simonstown for Imperial purposes, were being supported by the colony at the rate of £40 for an infantryman and £70 for an artilleryman. Meanwhile Wodehouse's despatch was on the waters, informing the Colonial Secretary of the refusal of the House to tax and the deadlock in the constitution.

The response from the Cape to Carnarvon's withdrawal despatch was immediate. Protest meetings were held, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth presented petitions pleading for a postponement, both Houses passed resolutions against withdrawal and stressed the inability of the colony to bear any increase in expenditure, and in July Wodehouse (25) remonstrated strongly that he would be unable to carry out his duties as High Commissioner and could give no guarantee for the future peace of the tribes without the support of the Imperial troops.

Buckingham, who had succeeded Carnarvon in March, realized that his predecessor had been premature and that what he had considered a lasting settlement of the problem in South Africa had been but a temporary lifting of the clouds. Hostilities had recommenced between the Free State and Basutos, the Natal Legislature was in a state of deadlock similar to that in the Cape, a rupture in the peace with the tribes again seemed imminent, the finances of the Cape were growing worse and taxation had been increased twice in the last seven years. Accordingly in December Buckingham (27) had reluctantly agreed to a temporary postponement for 1868 of the terms of Carnarvon's despatch.

During 1868 the position again changed. The annexation of Basutoland in March had relieved the Free State of its Native problem and averted the danger of the Basutos being driven into the adjoining Cape and Natal reserves. The Cape Police were having no difficulty in preserving order and the Eastern frontier

(25) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Carnarvon 6 of Jan.19, 1867.
(26) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Buckingham 54 of July 16, 1867.
(27) G.H.1/14 Buckingham to Wodehouse 79 of Dec.9, 1867.
had never been more tranquil. Within the Cape trade was slowly
reviving, good seasons and the talk of gold and diamonds during
1867 promised better things to come, and the quiet sessions of
1867 and 1868 had prevented a repetition of the 1866 deadlock.
Although conditions were far from settled Wodehouse could no
longer paint the black picture of 1865 and 1866. In December
1868 Gladstone came in on a policy of rigid economy and retrench-
ment and in March 1869 Granville,(28) the new Colonial Secretary
made a peremptory demand for the fulfilment of the conditions of
Carnarvon’s despatch: the garrison was to be immediately
reduced to three regiments one of which was to remain at Simons-
town and of the remaining two, one was to be paid for immediately
and the other in 1870, failing which they would be withdrawn.

Wodehouse (29) protested strongly that such a step
could not be taken unless Responsible Government were granted to
the Cape and British policy towards the Republics defined, but
despite his repeated remonstrances and memorials from all parts
of the colony, Granville was obdurate.(30) Nor was Kimberley, his
successor in July 1871, less inflexible, and as the troops began
to leave the frontier in 1870, the colonists at last realised
that what they had for so long dreaded had become an actual fact.

Two phases are noticeable in the attitude of the
Colonial Office to a reduction of the garrison. Until 1867,
withdrawal was to come into force should Responsible Government
be granted or as soon as the colony could safely be left to
protect itself. After 1867 the attitude of H.H. Government
hardened considerably, and it was insisted that the colony was in
the position to support itself and that the troops were to be
withdrawn whether or not Responsible Government was granted. Nor
did the numerous protests from the colony avail to alter the
settled course of Her Majesty’s advisers.

The fact that the colony had now nolens volens to pro-
vide its own defence was disadvantage for the separation party.

(28) G.H.1/16 Granville to Wodehouse 23 of Mar. 24, 1869.
(29) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Granville 39 of July 2, 1869.
G.H.31/11 Wodehouse to Granville 17 of Feb. 3, 1870 and
33 of Apr. 1, 1870.
(30) G.H.1/17 Granville to Wodehouse 138 of Apr. 7, 1870.
G.H.1/18 Kimberley to Barkly 106 of Aug. 3, 1871.
How the West was likely to react to the withdrawal of the troops was made painfully obvious to the East in 1865 by the support given to the proposal that the West should separate from the East and so escape a share in the defence costs. That they would share the burden of defence only in a united colony was the emphatic opinion of all sections in the West. If the East wanted separation it would have to provide its own defence force, a consideration that was clearly beyond the means of the province. To many moderates in the East, especially in Kaffraria which was most exposed to the Native danger, withdrawal put an end to any consideration of separation as it would provide a loophole for the West to repudiate its share in defence. The words of the G.R.Herald (31) expressed the views of the whole East except a small extremist section in Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth.

"Whatever might have been said in favour of [separation] while the Eastern Province was in the heyday of its prosperity and enjoying the presence of 3-4 British regiments, it certainly wears another aspect now. What is needed is union, not disunion; federation rather than separation. The latter course could only have been effected safely under the protecting aegis of the British Government. It is quite clear now that the last thing the Government will do, is to interfere in territorial disputes between the people of a colony who have a government of their own.

"The West has never asked for and does not want separation. But if it is forced, we are told, what could only be expected, that it will bear no share of the cost of frontier defence. The knell of separation was sounded when the Home Government determined to withdraw the troops; and the idea can only be revived if the Colonial Government of the future should not be strong enough to act vigorously in the case of another Native war."

Not only did the responsibility for defence necessitate the resources of a united colony but it was an important factor in favour of Responsible Government. When Wodehouse published Carnarvon's despatch in 1867 the verdict of the Colonial Press (32) was:

(31) G.R.Herald June 4, 1870.
was unanimous. If the colony was to provide its own defence it must dictate its own Native policy, was the general consensus of opinion, and the Press grimly insisted that the Colony would never leave these troops under the control of an Imperially appointed Governor. Although so emphatic about these views, the frontier party did not clearly realise at first that what they demanded inevitably involved Responsible Government. Wodehouse on the other hand maintained from the outset (33) that the insistence upon withdrawal must result in Responsible Government and the C.R.Herald, an opponent of Responsible Government, noted with undeniable logic that "if Imperial protection is withdrawn, the responsibility to manage the Natives and defend the colony must devolve somewhere".

"Before the Home authorities can think of withdrawing the troops from this quarter, they must not only annex the Free State, but also Basutoland and Kaffirland," stated Wodehouse (34) in his speech from the Throne in May 1863, after dilating upon the advantages of a federation with the Free State owing to its inability to control the Basutos. With these words he revealed how far his attitude had already travelled from the convention policy of the 'fifties. Grey (35) within four years had struck several hard blows at the policy of endeavour to limit British influence by the Orange, but the real departure from the policy of Labouchere, Stanley and Lytton, came after the appointment in 1859 of Newcastle as Colonial Secretary and Sir F. Rogers as permanent Under-Secretary. Throughout the 'sixties expansion of the British territories was permitted provided it was undertaken at the expense of the colony concerned and would involve in the words of Adderley, "not a soldier nor shilling from England for this purpose."

When Wodehouse arrived in 1862 to carry out a policy of economy and reduction of Imperial expenditure, he found his major problem was the settlement of the widespread Native unrest from

(33) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Buckingham 64 of July 16, 1867.
(35) G.H.31/7 Grey to Lytton (Separate Nov.19, 1859; Uys p.38.)
Kaffraria to the Zoutspanberg and Basutoland in Natal. The speed with which the Governor saw to the root of the trouble revealed his great vision and ability. While Mosesh was the common factor (36) in the indivisible Native problem of South Africa, British Colonial policy could not leave him out of consideration; and if relationships with the Basuto were once sanctioned, British isolation from Mosesh's neighbours in the Free State would be clearly impossible. Thus Wodehouse immediately realised the anomaly of the convention policy and cautiously at first, but with increasing certainty, the Colonial Office came round to his view. (37) The permission for the annexation of the Transkei in December 1861 was the first visible sign of the departure from the convention policy, and this was followed by the gradual expansion of Natal towards the Umzamvuna, culminating in the annexation of the present Alfred county in 1866, and the incorporation of the Penguin Islands in the Cape from 1861-66. The main result of the change, however, was the different attitude adopted towards Basutoland and the important question of a South African confederation.

In his first year of office Wodehouse realised the necessity of maintaining the integrity of Basutoland, and was desperately afraid that if the Republic was successful in the war with Mosesh, the Basutos would lose their best land and flood into the crowded reserves in the Cape and Natal. Thus when in July 1862, a Free State deputation (38) of Pretorius, the President, and Mr. J. Allison, the Government Secretary, endeavoured to secure a share in the customs, their proposal that it would be used to provide for a border defence force aroused his determined opposition. To the Governor, any such strengthening of the Republic would inevitably make the outcome of the Basuto war more certain and involve him in fresh Native troubles. Meanwhile, with the full approval of Newcastle (39) and in direct violation of Section 2 of the convention, Wodehouse had sent a

commission to Basutoland to ascertain Moshesh's view on coming under H.M. Government.

The gloomy conditions in the Free State in 1863 increased the Basuto menace. Pretorius after being harried from pillar to post, had at last been forced to resign, raids and reprisals between Natives and Boers in the contested areas were unchecked, tribesmen were occupying their own lands well across the Warden line and there was a growing feeling that the only solution to the difficulties was re-union with the Cape. "It seems to be undoubtedly the case", stated Wodehouse (40) in opening the 1863 session, "that the inhabitants of the ex-Sovereignty, whether of Dutch or English descent, are anxious to become once more British subjects ....", and as a hint to the Republic, he added that "the people of the Cape are quite prepared to give a warm welcome to their former fellow subjects." To the Governor the main reason in favour of this course was the danger of the weak Free State involving the adjacent British colony in serious Native disturbances, since its policy was not under Cape control. In this speech he foreshadowed his policy as High Commissioner: it was no less than to secure full control of the Native problem of the Republic.

Such a course was not unsupported across the Orange. On the 29th May, public meetings (41) at Smithfield and Paarsmuth, in the districts suffering most from the depredations, passed resolutions in favour of re-union with the Cape, and in August Wodehouse reported that the question had even got as far as being mooted in the Assembly of the people. However, in view of the Volksraad's rejection of the motion, Newcastle simply left the question in abeyance, and the Governor was compelled to shelve the question for the time being. (42)

Two years later the outbreak of the second Basuto war in June 1865, while he was struggling to induce the unwilling Tembus and Gaikas to move from the colony to the Transkei, increased Wodehouse's desire to gain control over the Native policy of the

(40) Journal May 15, 1863 (Report).
(41) E.P.Herald June 16, 1863.
(42) G.H.31/9 Wodehouse to Newcastle 72 of June 19, 1863 and 98 of Aug. 18, 1863.
Free State. Within the Republic conditions (43) were as bad as in 1863 and the ability of Brand had not yet borne fruit. When the war broke out, the public debt was about £250,000; £250,000 was owed to Natal and the Cape and imports were exceeding exports by £35,000. The Standard Bank had been expelled and the first issue of green-backs was almost valueless.

In July 1865 Wodehouse stressed to Cardwell the difficulties and danger of the disunity in South Africa, and asked advice on the annexation of the Free State to the Cape, but Cardwell, while admitting the pertinence of his argument, was averse to so big a step, and warned him that it should be considered, only under "some over-ruling necessity." (44) Wodehouse believed that this contingency had already arrived but had to delay until he had further evidence to convince a cautious Colonial Secretary. The continuance of the war increased Wodehouse's fears of the consequences of a Republican victory, causing his endeavour to further hinder the Free State by preventing colonists from accepting Brand's offer of farms in return for aid, by the Foreign Enlistment Act and by threatening to cut off the powder supply if the President recruited colonists.

Mosesho's desire for British protection grew with the certainty of defeat, and in January 1866, the Governor (45) strongly supported his request because of Basutoland's close connection with the Cape. However the treaty of Thaba Bosigo in April 1866 prevented further action, and in the next eighteen months three successive Colonial Secretaries endeavoured to find a satisfactory answer to the riddle of Basutoland. (46)

The problem was not merely how to achieve a satisfactory peace, but how to reconcile the necessary settlement with the growing desire of the Home Government for economy and a reduction of the Imperial garrison. The main consideration was still to settle South African affairs in such a way that the colonies would be self-supporting and would relieve the pockets of the British taxpayers of the necessity of having to provide for

(43) de Kiewiet p.232.
(44) G.H.3/16 Wodehouse to Cardwell (Confidential)July 12, 1865.
G.H.9/112 Cardwell to Wodehouse (Confidential)Sept.6, 1865.
(45) G.H.6/10 Wodehouse to Cardwell 6 of Jan.31,1866.
(46) G.H.1/14 Buckingham to Wodehouse 78 of Dec.9, 1867.
defence. Annexation of fresh territory had generally meant increased expenditure by the Home Government, hence the objection to Wodehouse's plans to bring the Basuto under the British flag. The following months saw the efforts to grapple with the problem.

In March 1866, Cardwell sanctioned the appointment of a British Agent with Mosesh and forbade annexation, but Carnarvon his successor, hoping that peace would follow the recently signed treaty reversed this plan in July of the same year for fear of embarrassing entanglements. Wodehouse, however, was convinced of the danger of a policy of non-interference on account of the continued weakness (47) of the Free State. Brand, elected in 1864 had not yet had time for many reforms, a fresh issue of £100,000 worth of paper money followed the first issue of £30,000 and reduced the green-backs to worthlessness. The Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce petitioned Wodehouse that it had claims of over £300,000 on the Free State and the closing of the Courts made redress impossible. The war and the accompanying trade dislocation was increasing the financial difficulties of the East and the continuance of hostilities remained a menace to the peace of the Eastern frontier. At last Wodehouse's pertinacious requests bore fruit and Buckingham, (48) agreeing that the appointment of an Agent would not meet the case, cautiously sanctioned annexation provided the boundaries were settled and Basutoland was joined to Natal. The fact that along with this despatch arrived the intimation that the postponement (49) of a contribution for the troops was to be only for 1869 and that this concession had been granted solely on account of the condition of the colony's finances, proves that it was the clear intention of Buckingham that no fresh Imperial responsibilities were contemplated and that the colony to which Mosesh was joined should assume responsibility for its administration and defence.

Annexation had been sanctioned only because it appeared likely to facilitate the settlement of the Native problem and hasten the withdrawal of the Imperial troops.

Suddenly Wodehouse found the security of the Wittebergen reserve on the colony's North Eastern boundary threatened by

(48) G.H.14/14 op cit; cp Uys p.48 quoting Sir C. Adderley.
(49) G.H.14 Backingham to Wodehouse 79 of Dec.8, 1867.
Basutos fleeing before the victorious commandos. It was the last straw, and since in the absence of an overseas cable some three months would elapse before an answer from the Colonial Secretary could be received, the Governor decided to disregard Buckingham's instructions and act in accordance with his local knowledge. The powder supplies were stopped at the ports, the police moved up to the Wittebergen reserve from the peaceful Transkei and in March 1868 Wodehouse annexed Basutoland, not to the Cape or Natal, but to Britain. The final settlement was somewhat protracted, but Brand at last agreed to sign the second treaty of Aliwal North, in March 1869, which was ratified towards the close of the year. Meanwhile the machinations of Shepstone and Keate to secure the new territory, and the dalliance of Mosesh, Letaise, Molapo and the missionaries were finally ended when the course which the Governor had so long advocated, was consumated by the annexation of Basutoland to the Cape in 1871.

The important issues of the withdrawal of the troops and the annexation of Basutoland had engaged a full share of public attention within the colony since the early sixties, but assumed especial significance after the publication of Carnarvon's despatch in 1867 demanding a large contribution towards military expenditure. In the East the desire was strongly expressed that the annexation of Basutoland should be the forerunner of a wider South African confederation for it was felt that if the Native problem was to be left to the colonists, the course of greatest strength and safety lay in this direction. Nor was this desire strange in view of the close economic dependence of the Cape and Free State and the close ties of relationship that existed between the two. Moreover in June 1867 and in December of the same year, the first news of diamonds at Hopetown and the gold discoveries of Mauch in the Transvaal, appeared in the Cape Press and caused an immediate quickening of interest in affairs north of the Orange. Indeed, it is laughable how the

(50) Uys pps 49-53; Walker p 330; Act 12 of 1871.
Eastern Press (53) which a few months previously had been vehemently demanding a strict vagrancy law, the imposition of a poll tax on natives, and a stronger frontier policy, suddenly became deeply concerned in the allegations of slavery in the Transvaal and demanded British intervention to stop the oppression.

Thus as the result of the determination of H.M. Government to make the colonists responsible for their own defence, the discovery of minerals during 1867, the annexation of Basutoland in 1868 and the strong family and commercial ties between the various states, there was a strong desire in the colony from 1868 onwards for a confederation of the South African states, a feeling which, if anything, was stronger in the East than the West. (53)

On the question of confederation, the colonists and the Governor were for once united. Wodehouse was seriously alarmed by the vast annexations of Pretoria in March 1868 whereby he proposed (54) to extend the Transvaal northward to Lake Ngami and obtain a seaport by securing a strip of territory down the Maputa River to Delegoe Bay. Moreover, the Governor failed to see how the weak republics could possibly cope with the greatly increased populations that would flock to the mines and was certain that the result would be fresh clashes with the tribes on all sides - Zulu, Swazi, Matabele and Bechuana. Increased traffic to the interior would revive the demands for a share in the customs and taken all round, the disunity in the sub-continent would be made worse. In the opinion of Wodehouse, unless speedy measures were taken, the patient efforts of H.M. Government during the last decade to make South Africa self-supporting and reduce Imperial responsibility would all be destroyed. In June 1868 he argued (55) that since Britain controlled the seaboard she must inevitably control the interior and went so far as to advise Buckingham that the time had come to annul the convention with the Transvaal. In November, Buckingham (56) agreed that

(53) Journal May 15, June 8, 1868. C.R.Herald June 6, 1868.
(53) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Granville 64 of Sept. 29, 1869.
(54) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Buckingham 62 of July 10, 1868; Journal June 8, 1868; de Kiewiet p.260.
(55) G.H.31/10 Wodehouse to Buckingham 44 of June 3, 1868; (Confidential) of June 3, 1868; 100 of Oct. 9, 1868.
(56) G.H.1/15 Buckingham to Wodehouse 104 of Nov. 23, 1868.
the "overruling necessity" stipulated by Cardwell in 1865 had arisen from the dangerous consequences of the weak and conflicting Native policies of the northern states, and gave Wodehouse permission to consider any overtures from the Republics for their return to British authority, thus indicating how completely obsolete were the conventions of 1832 and 1854.

The position at the close of 1868 was that Wodehouse was strongly in favour of a South African confederation and had at last secured the sanction of the Colonial Office to encourage any approach from the Free State. In the Cape all were in favour save a small section of the British element in the West which feared a further increase in the Dutch population—a fear which found no echo in Grahamstown, the English centre loudest in emphasising its British nationality. However, events of the recent past had made it clear that no Imperial aid was likely to be forthcoming and the initiative must be taken by the South African states themselves. In proroguing the 1868 session, Wodehouse (57) had made this clear when he stated that any extensions of the territory under H.M. Government "must be adopted and sanctioned by the Imperial Government, but their execution and their maintenance must be effected by colonial agency. It would be but self-deception in these days", he reminded the colonists, "to reckon on the British Government assuming to itself any substantial responsibility for such measures."

All the supporters of the movement for confederation recognised that the Cape must take the lead, and that the project would require the total resources of the united colony. If the colony were divided as the separation party had previously demanded, neither province would be in a position strong enough to carry through and support a union with the weak Republics. Thus the desire for confederation, so much of which came from the East, drove another nail into the coffin of the frontier party. Moreover the realisation that the self-governing Republics would be reluctant to come under the present form of Government in the Cape greatly strengthened the liberals and won over many moderates.

from the frontier party.

By 1869 interest in the question of separation was diminishing rapidly, and the weakening support given to the frontier party clearly reveals the effect of the determination of the Home Government to withdraw the troops and the increasing momentum of the movements in favour of Responsible Government in the Cape and the return of the Republics under the British flag. As has already been noticed, the House was showing a decreasing tendency to divide on provincial lines and on all the important questions, constitutional amendment, Responsible Government, railways and the voluntary bill, both parties were drawn almost equally from each province.

Hitherto the opposition from the midlands had destroyed all hope of Eastern unity, but by 1869 it was clear that the effect of the annexation of Kaffraria had been to further diversify political thoughts in the East and add another centre antagonistic to Grahamstown. For so long out of the main current of Cape politics, Kaffraria could adopt a more detached standpoint. "With Eastern grievances, we feel not grieved ourselves, and with Western tyranny we have not been tyrannised ourselves", was the verdict of the Kaffrarian Watchman in 1867. (58) Thus from the outset, Kaffraria acted as a moderating force, almost ignoring the provincial quarrel, and concerning itself chiefly with obtaining good government and security against the Natives. In May of the same year, when the G.R.Herald (59) in attacking separation mentioned "the certain opposition of all the Kaffrarian members, who dread centralisation in Grahamstown as much as ever they did annexation" it was not contradicted by the leading organs of Grahamstown, Port Elizabeth or Kingwilliamstown. In June 1868 when a Grahamstown candidate sought to secure the vacant Kingwilliamstown seat, his offer was emphatically refused and the town's two papers were loud in their indignation, (60) continuing throughout the year to express their antagonism to Grahamstown. As the withdrawal of the troops became more

(59) G.R.Herald May 4, 1867. cp Aug.10, 1867 quoting K.W.T.Gazette
(60) Kaff.Watchman Jan.8,9,18, Aug.12, Nov.23, Dec.28, 1868.
certain, so the desire of Kaffraria for a united colony increased proportionately, and the Watchman (61) was emphatic that separation could be considered only if Britain remained responsible for the defence of the East. Since the annexation in 1866, Kaffraria had lost no chance of seeking to win over the nearest frontier divisions, and how successful these efforts were was shown by the fact that in the elections for the new Council at the end of 1868, Queenstown, Burghersdorp, Aliwal North, and Kat River in Fort Beaufort gave great support, (62) not as hitherto to the frontier party but to the Kaffrarian candidates. Thus Kaffraria not only increased the discord of the East, but greatly stiffened the opposition from the Midlands.

Grahamstown was losing its old supremacy over the East and gradually becoming more and more isolated from Graaff-Reinet, Kingwilliamstown and even Port Elizabeth. This was especially shown by the united demand in 1868 from all over the East (63) that Wodehouse should dissolve the Council along with the Assembly, although it had been elected only in 1864. The main reason for the demand was that of the ten Eastern members in the Upper House, nine belonged to the frontier party and seven of them were residents of Grahamstown, the Midlands thus having only one member and Port Elizabeth and Kaffraria none. The Kaffrarians led the opposition and in a memorial to the Governor requested that in view of the important matters at present under review "an opportunity should be afforded for electing members for the Legislative Council, who hold views substantially in union with those of the Lower House."

Wodehouse acceded to their requests and the ensuing election resolved itself into a stern tussle, the Midlands and Kaffraria being determined to break Grahamstown's monopoly, and in January 1869, the Journal (64) lugubriously quoted extracts from various Eastern newspapers showing the widespread antagonism to the fact that Grahamstown had put forward five nominees. The

(61) Kaff.Watchman Jan.9, 1868.
(63) G.R.Herald Aug.29, 1868.
          Journal Sept. 21, Dec. 28, 1868.
(64) Journal Jan.15, 1869.
final results were a triumph for the opponents of Grahamstown, and of the ten members, the midlands returned four, Kaffraria two and the frontier four, and as the results (65) came in, the East began to gloat over the fall of "Babylon"!

It was impossible for the separation party to maintain the unequal struggle against the movements demanding a united colony and the hostility and antagonism from within its own province. Nothing reveals this state of affairs more clearly than the repeated dirges that arose from the columns of the newspaper which for decades had been the inspiration of the separation movement.

In April 1867 the Journal (66) made no effort to refute the assertion from the midlands that separation had died after the Somerset Convention, that "the annexation of Kaffraria has developed in the extreme East a determined opposition to separation" and that "the prospect of introducing Responsible Government has also won over from the separation cause some of those who were once its uncompromising advocates." Later in the same year the G.R.Herald (67) expressed the general feeling of the East when it stated that "it does not seem to be known in Grahamstown whether there is a separation party or not .... the course has not the men as leaders nor sufficient support throughout the province to win any success for it". In September (68) it was even more sweeping in its condemnation of separation - "the watchword of an effete party, that calls forth no response and cannot again carry the influence it once had".

In the following year, the Journal merely noted, and made no effort to contradict, Wodehouse's reference in his prorogation speech to "separation .... which I rejoice to see dying out", and when the East was sneering at the defeat of the Grahamstown party in the Council elections early in 1869, actually denied the existence of any desire for separation.

"We don't exactly know what is meant by the Grahamstown party", protested the Journal. (69) "At one time the phrase was identified with separation. The annexation of British Kaffraria

has put that identity out of date. It is long since separation
has been heard of in Grahamstown". How different from the
fury imprecations against the West in the heyday of the League!
Yet there is more to tell. Not only had the Journal turned
against separation, but in an illuminating issue, even avowed
its opposition to equalisation of representation. (70) Referring
to the earlier struggles for equalisation the paper stated
that "that was at a period when there seemed to be some chance
of the midlands and the frontier districts uniting in the
larger political questions, and before the annexation of British
Kaffraria. It is now apparent that 'the East' is a geographi-
cal expression and not the name of a compact political or even
territorial party; and as the hope of union is gone, so the
motive for desiring equalisation is gone." Surely no proof
of the loss of interest in separation could be more conclusive
than the words of the leading paper of the Grahamstown party.

(7D) Journal Mar. 17, 1869.
CHAPTER VI.

1870-72.

THE DAWN BREAKS.

RESPONSIBLE OR CROWN COLONY GOVERNMENT.

GROWING SUPPORT FOR THE LIBERALS.

SOUTH AFRICAN CONFEDERATION.

WITHDRAWAL.

"THE SUICIDAL OPPOSITION OF A SMALL SECTION."
 CHAPTER VI.

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT.

"Representative institutions without responsibility in much like having a fire in a room with the chimney closed." (Gibbon Wakefield)

Signs were not wanting in the Cape that the dawn was at long last breaking. From 1861, revenue had been almost stationary, deficit had followed deficit with painful regularity and by 1869 the public debt had risen to £1,175,850. However the good seasons since 1866 were followed by a slow revival of trade and by the beginning of the 'seventies, it was clear that the old stagnation was past.\(^1\) Parliament to its pleasant surprise was welcomed in 1870 with the news that for the first time in twelve years the budget showed a slight surplus and £120,000 had been wiped off the public debt. From March to December of the same year the sole interest in the colony was diamonds, which were now coming into their own, and a widespread trek to the Fields was taking place from all over South Africa. Even as early as 1870, it was estimated \(^2\) that newcomers were arriving at the Fields at the rate of 1,000 per week, and by October the total population was in the neighbourhood of 11,000. How important was the financial aspect of diamonds already, can be seen from the fact \(^3\) that in December "authentic shipments of diamonds since March" were valued at £147,975. The trade of the whole colony was stimulated by the big increase in purchasing power, the farmers especially benefited from the new market for agricultural produce and the transport riders waxed prosperous on the great demand for conveyance. Not only did these conditions revitalise commerce in the East, but stock farming was flourishing, the lambing season was particularly good and, to the joy of the whole province, wool prices were rising on the London market.

In the following year, the wave of prosperity rose higher. With a surplus of £35,518, fine wheat crops making the colony independent of overseas supplies,\(^4\) and the diamond

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\(^1\) Journal Mar. 18, Aug. 19, 1870.
\(^3\) G.R. Herald Dec. 3, 1870.
\(^4\) G.R. Herald May 31, 1871 (Budget Speech.)
output estimated at one million, the House was once more able to enjoy the luxury of optimism and sanctioned a loan of £100,000 for the development of East London harbour, (5) £20,000 for an immediate start on the railway from Port Elizabeth to Zwartkops River, and important bridges over the Orange and Buffalo.

In 1872 the revenue of the colony reached the record figure of £1,039,886, diamond sales were still soaring and wool prices had risen 25%. Moreover settled conditions in the Free State increased its importance as a market for colonial goods. That the Native territories on the Eastern frontier and in Basutoland were beginning to play a vital part in the commercial life of the East is clear. (6) With a population of over 100,000 their agricultural and pastoral output was considerable, contact with Europeans aroused a growing desire for the products of white civilisation, a taste which they were able to gratify with the wages gained at the mines, and Aliwal North, Kingwilliamstown and Queenstown thrive on the prosperity among the tribes.

The first signs that the Cape's financial cares were lifting, revived the demand for railways, (7) a movement that grew proportionally to the prosperity at the Fields. In the 1868 session, committees of both Houses recommended an immediate start on Eastern railways and favoured a line from Port Elizabeth to Grahamstown and onward up the Valley of the Fish to the Orange. Even Bowker, the leader of the anti-railway party turned round, and no dissentient voice disturbed the unanimity. In proroguing this same session, Wodehouse advocated an important change (8) in railway policy when he suggested that the government should buy out the private companies and control all colonial railways.

Nothing was done, however, until 1871. From the outset, Sir H. Barkly, the new Governor who arrived on the 31st December 1870, supported the principle laid down by his predecessor, and in opening the session he recommended (9) an active policy of railway construction under the control of the Government.

Southey in his budget speech was equally emphatic in expressing

(6) Journal Sept. 4, 1871.
(9) Journal May 29, Aug. 4, 7, 1871.
the same views, and acting on the advice of the Executive, the
House sanctioned fresh surveys for lines in the East and West
and a start on the line from Port Elizabeth.

The prosperity in the Free State, reflected by the fact
that the green-backs (10) which three years previously could
scarcely be kept in circulation, were now worth 19/6d, the
great demand for transport facilities and the realisation of the
wonderful future before the diggings proved an added incentive to
the already strong feeling in favour of railways in the East.
Inevitably this desire weakened any remaining support for separa-
tion, as an Eastern line, especially one as expensive as the
projected route to the Orange, would require the resources of the
united colony. Even more obvious was this after the clearly
expressed desire of the Executive to transfer railway construc-
tion from the control of private companies to the colonial
government. As the links of steel drew the Republics and the
colonies closer together, so the great financial responsibilities
necessitated by these undertakings made the union between East
and West more indissoluble and forced the frontier to recognise
that separation was no longer a practical question.

Within the colony at this period Responsible Government
was the principal issue. In the East, the main opposition to
the liberal party came from Grahamstown and its satellites on
the frontier, while the midlands were almost unanimous in their
support of Molteno. In Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth public
opinion was divided equally and strong parties formed around the
E.P.Herald, the conservative organ, and the Port Elizabeth
Telegraph, the mouthpiece of the liberals. Kaffraria, maintaining
that the form of the government was unimportant provided it was
efficient, entertained no pronounced feeling on the question,
and waited with a mind free from bias to see which way the wind
would blow. The coalition of Eastern and Western anti-respons-
sibles made the conservatives a powerful party able to defeat
the proposals for Responsible Government in 1856, 1860, 1863
and 1867.

(10) G.R.31/11 Barkly to Kimberley 94 of August 30, 1871
The Journal repeatedly acknowledged that the apparent paradox of the section of the population most accustomed to self-government being the strongest opponents to a liberal alteration in the Cape constitution, was due not to any inherent opposition to the system, but to purely circumstantial factors. Most of the arguments which the frontier put forward in opposition to Responsible Government must be condemned as sophistry and arose from the deeply instilled fear that the frontier party would be submerged by the Dutch West and reduced to insignificance. Nor did it help when it was pointed out (11) that no "durable ministry" could be formed without due representation and consideration being given to the Eastern Province party, for Grahamstown realized without any illusions that it would be the midlands and not the frontier whose co-operation the West would seek. "There is no such 'party' representing any such 'province'!" retorted the Journal (12) querulously. "We have on this side of the colony several distinct territorial parties, and all that a Western minority would have to do in order to secure a majority would be to ally itself to one of the Eastern sections. Now the section the responsible party would call to its side would not be the frontier section with which all our interests are identified." Southey, a colonist to the backbone, who had spent most of his life in the East, in a special memorandum to Kimberley in 1871 emphasised (13) the importance of the racial element in the struggle between the West and the frontier. From this source sprung the frontier's main opposition to Responsible Government and gave rise to other objections to any change in the constitution.

Even before the constitution ordinance of 1858, the frontier had been obsessed with the fear that any reduction of the Imperial garrison would result in the West either forcing the East to bear the burden of defence, or carrying out a Native policy that would endanger the safety of the Eastern frontier by its incompetence. For a long time they resolutely maintained that withdrawal would be effected only if the Cape adopted

(12) Journal June 30, 1871.
(13) Wilmot, 'Southey' p. 333.
Responsible Government, hence their bitter opposition to any change.

Other reasons of lesser importance were put forward by the frontier conservatives. It was maintained that the colony lacked sufficient capable men to form a ministry and an opposition, and that this would lead to place hunting, corruption, inefficiency and the rise of a class of carpet-baggers. The low Hottentot franchise, and the well known philanthropic outlook of Solomon were further objections, and Grahamstown was certain that Responsible Government could never work successfully unless the seat of government was moved eastwards. However, the conservatives were fighting a losing battle, and on all sides the tide was flowing swiftly in favour of the liberals.

"The advent of Responsible Government is now so certain and so near, that nothing is required to force it on," stated Solomon (14) as early as 1870 in the opening debate of the session. Nor was his confidence unjustified in view of the trend of political feeling throughout the colony, for since 1867 when the question had last been raised in the House, the movement had been winning increased support in both provinces.

The unprecedented political activity (15) during the 1869 elections, despite the fact that money was still tight, did much to dispel the argument that the Cape lacked sufficient men with the interest and ability to devote to public affairs. For the ten Eastern seats on the Council, thirteen candidates contested the election, despite the high age and property qualifications, and in the elections for the Assembly, also in the East, three divisions were faced with the embarrassing position of having to choose six members from the twenty-one seeking election altogether for the thirty-two seats there were some sixty candidates. In the West the position was the same, so that in all about 150 were ambitious and willing to serve in Parliament.

As early as 1867, the whole of the East agreed that if the withdrawal of the troops was insisted upon, it would mean that the colony must control Native policy and the means of

defence, a condition which would involve Responsible Government. This was while the question was still an impending threat, but Craven's despatch of 1869 and his subsequent refusal to consider any modifications of this policy made it clear to all that the Imperial garrison was to be withdrawn whether or not the Cape governed itself. Thus the departure of each successive troop ship from Port Elizabeth and East London during 1870 and 1871, weakened the objections to Responsible Government and won over many moderates to the liberals.

The question of a South African confederation scheme was a further incentive to Responsible Government. In 1868 the rising tide of Afrikaner nationalism had made the Dutch in the West favourably inclined towards reunion with their brethren across the Orange, while in the East, the economic dependence of the two colonies ensured the strong support of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth. The disputes about the possession of the Fieldes and the growing prosperity at the diggings deepened the desire in the colony for the project, and from September 1871 to January 1872, the Journal (16) emphasised that this would be the most satisfactory way of ending the bitterness over Griqualand West, and would have the advantage of settling the Native problem by bringing the Transkei, Homeland and Basutoland under one strong authority. Throughout 1871 the campaign for a South African confederation was supported by the East as a whole, and from the Natal Mercury, Natal Times, the Friend in the Free State, and the Transvaal Advocate came similar declarations (17).

At the same time many of the influential commercial houses at Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown were stirring up an agitation in the East for the speedy annexation to the Cape of Griqualand West and were also behind the memorial which was got up at the Fieldes in favour of this course. (18) When Southey in July 1871 proposed the motion advocating the incorporation of the diggings, the party in favour was sufficiently strong to defeat the stout opposition from Western liberals such as Melstone, Porte and Solomon.

(17) Journal June 26, 1871.
G.R.Herald Jan. 29, 1871.
(18) Gilnet 'Southey' p.173; Atherstone to Southey, Oct, 15, 1870.
The desire in the East for an extension of the territories under the control of H.M. Government had a two-fold effect on the conservatives in the province. As early as February 1871, the C.R.Herald (19) which had for years been a determined opponent of the liberals suddenly turned round and favoured Responsible Government, maintaining that it would be an added inducement to the Free State to join the Cape. Barkly in July of the same year went further and considered it the sine qua non of any confederation scheme. In reply to a memorial (20) from Port Elizabeth requesting his support for confederation, he replied decisively that any action would have to come from the Cape Parliament, but Responsible Government was first necessary to the project and that the Imperial Parliament would never pass a Federation Act for South Africa without this alteration in the Cape's Constitution. Clearly many of the leading frontier politicians such as Wood, Godlonton, Kennelly and Barry were torn between two irreconcilable desires. As more perceived that if their opposition to Responsible Government was continued, it might cost them their much coveted closer connection with the Free State, so all but the die-hards realised the inevitability of success for the liberals.

All parties agreed that the constitutional deadlock in the colony made a speedy alteration essential. As early as January 1867 Wodehouse had asserted that the only course was a return either to Crown Colony or Responsible Government, and had thereafter followed a policy of uncompromising hostility to Molteno's solution of the difficulty. The Colonial Secretary was equally emphatic about the need for a change and Barkly was instructed to exert his influence in this direction. (21) "The existing constitution which places an insuperable power of obstruction in the hands of a legislature not responsible for the conduct of affairs", the new Governor was informed, "is a system only defensible as one of transition. A change in either direction is essential, but H.M. Government is willing to leave this to the colonists to settle." Thus Kimberley clearly subscribed to the same views as Cardwell had expressed to Wodehouse on the eve

of his departure from the colony. "The Home Government," he stated, "far from being desirous of retaining its present control over the internal or external affairs of the colony, is desirous that the Government whether responsible or not should be effective."

By 1870 it was clear in which direction the change would have to be. By defeating the Governor's Constitutional Amendment Bill by 34-36, the measure on which he had appealed to the country, the House had clearly shown its decided objection to any regressive movement. The present constitution was unworkable and the only way out of the impasse was Responsible Government. Granville had clearly visualised this on hearing of the failure of Wodehouse's Jamaica constitution in 1869, in stating that if the Executive could not command the co-operation of the Legislature, the Legislature must be allowed to command the co-operation of the Executive. If the colonists would not allow themselves to be governed, they must govern themselves.

After his arrival at the close of 1870, the powerful influence of Barkly was exerted in every possible direction on the side of the liberals, and both in his public speeches and by his attitude to Parliament he gave his full support to Responsible Government. In May 1871 after travelling all round the colony and winning the confidence and esteem of the colonists, he made a strong plea for Responsible Government in his speech from the Throne. The following year he was even more emphatic, and in April he told Parliament that whatever doubts on the question he had previously entertained, had been completely dispelled by the "well sustained debates of last session and the able controversies which have been carried on in the columns of the colonial Press." With the opinion of H.M. Government and the Governor so strongly in favour of the change, a growing number realised the futility of opposition.

Moreover, the colonists were not blind to the bitter struggles in Natal between Parliament and Government for the

(22) G.R.1/17 Granville to Wodehouse 139 of Ap. 7, 1870.
(23) G.R.1/16 Granville to Wodehouse 104 of Dec. 8, 1869.
control of the Executive. In August 1871 the Legislative Council has passed the third reading of a Responsible Government Bill despite the unyielding opposition of Keate and this had been followed up in September by a memorial to the Queen for the recall of the Governor. This object lesson in the condition which might arise at the Cape and the realization of the vital importance of the personality of the Governor in the present form of government, did not fail to impress upon the colonists the need of a constitution in which a settled policy in harmony with the wishes of the electorate and independent of the Governor could be carried out.

One of the strongest factors operating against the conservatives was the open dissatisfaction with which the present Executive was regarded all over the colony. Since the departure of Rowson and Porter, its two giants in the middle 'sixties, the personnel of the Executive had steadily fallen lower and lower in the estimation of the House and colonists alike. Previously the conservatives had maintained that the colony lacked men of sufficient ability to form an Executive, but as the liberals were not slow to point out, with men such as Porter, Solomon, de Villiers, Molteno and Sprigg in the House, it was ludicrous to suggest that the present Executive could not be improved upon. Indeed the Eastern Press went so far as to consider that the unpopularity of the Executive was the main influence in the change in Eastern public opinion. For two decades the G.R.Herald had opposed Responsible Government, yet in 1870 the friction and wrangling with the Executive over the Reserved Schedules in the Constitutional Ordinance, compelled it to admit the inevitability of success for the liberal party. "If the Executive of the Queen's appointing will not allow the colonists to manage their own internal affairs as they please .... the colonists must, perforce, accept the liberty offered them of appointing their own Executive ...." admitted the Herald.\(^{(27)}\) \[This\] is being slowly but surely forced upon the colony by the mal-administration of the Home Government .... All things combine to force on Responsible Government within a very short period."

\(^{(27)}\) G.R.Herald Feb.19, 1870.
In the following year, the Journal, one of the last strongholds of the conservative party in the East, made the same confession in even stronger terms. (28) After dwelling upon the fact that the weakness and unpopularity of the Executive "is a blow and a discouragement to the conservative party," the paper went on to say that "these officers strikingly and painfully prove how very inefficient and unsuitable, in actual application, the very form of government which, with some modifications, conservatives prefer may be .... Conservatism is losing ground in all parts of the colony through the unpopularity of one member of the administration [griffith] and the insignificance of a second [cole] and yet a third [Davidson]. The recent election defeats in the West are to be attributed, not so much to changes of opinion on constitutional politics, as to a disgust with official persons. The growing favour shown to Responsible Government by the farmers of the East is due almost entirely to the utter want of confidence they have in the Attorney-General".

The increasing responsibilities of the Executive made the question of the was to exercise control over these powers, of vital importance. Already it was a core point, especially in the East, that the Governor as High Commissioner, exercised sole control over the Transkei and was virtually free from any restraint in conducting the native and "foreign" policies of the colony. New new proposals were in the air to greatly strengthen the much despised Executive.

In March 1871 Barkly (29) showed that he was delaying the annexation of Griqualand West only until the result of the arbitration commission was announced, but made it perfectly clear that the Cape would have to assume full responsibility for the defence and administration of the new territory. Moreover, the favourable resolutions of the Assembly and Council in 1871 fore-shadowed that this event would not be long delayed. The withdrawal of the Imperial troops meant that the Executive's control over the Cape Mounted Police would assume a greater significance, while the days of railway construction undertaken by private co.

(28) Journal Apr.11, 1871.
O.R.Herald May 37, 1871.
(29) Journal May 13, 1871.
O.R.1/13 Kimberley to Barkly 78 of May 16, 1871.
companies were already numbered. In 1868 Wodehouse had recom-
mended that the control of railways, the telegraph, and the
Kowie works should be handed over to the Executive and Barkly
in 1871 had expressed the same views in regard to railways. (30)
The colonists however were quite openly suspicious of the change
and convinced that the Executive which in the past had shown
such "caution, uncertainty, hesitation and delay" was not compe-
tent to handle the new responsibilities. (31) Therefore if the
House was unwilling to delegate these powers to the Executive
it must assume them itself.

Solomon's optimistic forecast of the near advent of
Responsible Government was based on sound grounds, and by the
early 'seventies the conservatives were losing ground on all
sides. Lacking capable leaders and cogent arguments in support
of their policy, defeat was certain. In the early months of
1870, although still favouring the conservatives, the O.R.Herald
(32) noted how the liberals were winning new supporters on all
sides and later in the year when it became clear that there was
to be no alteration in the determination to withdraw the troops,
took it for granted that Responsible Government must inevitably
follow. (33)

In the interval between Wodehouse's departure on May
20th and Barkly's arrival on December 31st 1872, public interest
was absorbed in the Franco-Prussian War and the news from the
Fields. Meanwhile the most pressing problem demanding attention
was the need for a speedy settlement of the dispute over Griqua-
land West, and in face of the widespread demand for its annexa-
tion to the Cape, even the Journal's opposition to Responsible
Government began to weaken. (34) "Now it is notorious that this
province has hitherto been favourable to an increase of power
in the hands of the Executive, rather than to a transfer of
administrative power to the Legislature", stated the Journal in
April, expressing the feelings of the frontier party. "This is
still the opinion of large numbers in this province. But it is

(31) O.R.Herald Jan.28, 1871.
undoubtedly the case that, as in the West, so in the East, conservative principles do not command the support they previously did and there is a growing willingness to reconsider the whole scheme, framework and substance, of our political institutions from their very foundation." By May of the same year "several of the most intelligent farmers around Grahamstown had openly declared for Responsible Government (35) and various conservative papers in the East such as the G.R.Herald, Queenstown Free Press and Colesburg Herald had gone over to the liberals. (36) How strong the liberal position was, was realised in June when Molteno's Responsible Government Bill was carried by a not inconsiderable majority in the House, the minority being increased by several Easterners such as Wright, J.H. Brown and Quin who showed by their speeches that they were not against Responsible Government, but would not vote for the motion unless federation were granted at the same time. (37) The defection of the G.R.Herald was disastrous for the Eastern conservatives and from the beginning of 1871 onwards, the leader of the midlands Press unceasingly championed the liberal cause and stressed how the need for co-operation between the provinces in the ministry would ensure a stronger Native policy and better treatment of the farmers.

Nothing succeeds like success, and after the defeat of the conservatives in the Assembly in 1871 it was clear that the colony as a whole was in favour of Responsible Government. The attitude of the Kaffrarian Watchman (38) that since the inevitability of defeat for the conservatives made opposition useless, it would support the liberals, expresses the attitude of waverers all over the East. Even in Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth there was evidence of considerable support for the measure.

The general tendency in the East towards Responsible Government inevitably meant a drift from Grahamstown, for the Eastern conservatives were in the main a Grahamstown party. Throughout the last two decades the principle town of the East

had been gradually but certainly, losing its former position of supremacy and the success of the liberals had the effect of accelerating the process and almost isolating Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth from the rest of the colony.

Within the Assembly the attitude of the House had undergone a considerable modification since 1867 when Responsible Government had last been defeated. In opening the session of 1871 in May, Barkly had given the proposal his blessing and on June 1st Molteno's motion in favour of Responsible Government and, as a sop to the Easterners, the appointment of a commission to investigate the question of federation within the colony, was carried by the decisive majority of 31-26. The bill followed soon after and passed the second reading on June 5th by 34-37, after the motion in favour of shelving the measure had been rejected by 34-28. In the Council however, where the strength of the frontier party was unduly disproportionate to its voting power in the Assembly, the conservatives (eight frontier, and four Westerners) threw out the bill by 12-9 on July 21st.

During the recess support for the conservatives dwindled on all sides and Barkly continued to use his influence on the side of the liberals. In May 1872, Molteno returned to the struggle, the bill passed the Assembly by 35-28, pressure was brought to bear on the four Western conservatives in the Council, Roubaix and Hiddingh went over to the liberals and the bill was carried by 11-10.

In each of the divisions on Responsible Government in the two sessions, the conservatives formed a powerful minority but the opposition was certainly not an Eastern party. In fact, an analysis of the divisions revealed the weakness of the old frontier party and how evenly balanced were the rival groups in the East. Responsible Government was not a question of

(40) Journal May 31, June 5, 7, 24, 1872.
(41) The following divisions made up the Eastern parties:
Frontier: Grahamstown, Albany, Port Beaufort, Albert, Victoria East, Queenstown, Aliwal North (14 votes)
Midlands: Graaff-Reinet, Colesburg, Somerset, Richmond, Cradock, Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth (14 votes).
Kaffraria: East London and Kingwilliamstown (4 votes).
provincial rivalry and opposition but "whether we are to govern ourselves, or to be governed." (42) From the Table based on the divisions for Molteno's resolution and the second reading in 1871 it will be noticed that of the 26 Eastern members voting on the resolution 14 were against and 12 for; on the second reading the figures were similar, 16 against and 13 in favour, showing how evenly divided was feeling in the East. Another striking fact is that of the 57 members voting on the resolution, and the 61 voting on the bill, the frontier party could muster no more than 14 and 16 respectively and of these, Merriman, who held the Aliwal North seat, was a Westerner. As it was from among this small party that all the agitation connected with the separation movement had arisen, it is clear how little chance of success it would now have, in view of the fact that on the question of the division of the colony, the united West, midlands and Kaffraria were all hostile to the Grahamstown party.

Events all over the world brought federation into prominence— the American Civil War, fought to uphold the federal constitution, the British North America Act, the Commission in Australia on the question, (43) the provincial system in New Zealand and the North German confederation. In the East the desire for a federal scheme was still very strong and Granville's despatch (44) to which Wodehouse had referred in opening the 187C

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session, had made it clear that H.M. Government had no objection to the Cape inaugurating a federation of two or three provinces within its own boundaries, provided the move came from the Colonial Legislature.

The growing support for the liberal party and the rejection of the Governor's regressive measures in 1870, which left Responsible Government as the only alternative to the constitutional impasse, strengthened the agitation from the frontier for the division of the colony into a federal union. Total severance from the West was the cherished ideal of the Grahamstown party, but with the exception of the short period from 1869-62 that followed the amazing prosperity of the 'fifties, it had never been a practical possibility owing to the exigencies of the depression and the East's dependence on the West for aid in frontier defence. In the main the principle desire of the frontier party during the last two decades had been a two province federation of the loosest type which would allow the East the fullest degree of local autonomy. Hitherto the agitation had never won even a semblance of success owing, not to the opposition of the West, but to the determined hostility of the midlands to a union under the frontier, and the equally strong antagonism from Grahamstown to the midland suggestion of three provinces.

As in the 'fifties, the frontier party now took the lead in advocating federation. J.C. Chase of Uitenhage, an Eastern member of the Council, on the 23rd February 1871, addressed an elaborate manifesto (45) to his constituency, in which he outlined a federal scheme for the colony. Each of the two provinces should be under a Governor and provincial council and should administer all local concerns. The federal nature of the scheme was clearly revealed in the construction of a central government which was to consist of a Governor-General, a legislative council of members drawn from the provincial councils, and a popularly elected Assembly. The powers of the central government were to be confined to issues of importance to the whole colony - war, peace, defence, tariffs, lighthouses, harbour works, currency, postal departments, main roads, railway,

(45) Journal Mar.1, 1871.
Crown Lands, the Supreme Court and Natives. With regard to amending the present constitution, he favoured first a federal scheme and then Responsible Government.

On the face of it, the proposal appeared highly satisfactory. Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth were loud in their praise and Solomon, ever since 1853, had repeatedly expressed himself in favour of a federal scheme provided the East did not control Native policy and the province as a whole desired the alteration. However, two of its main provisions were to cause its utter failure. The united liberal party, backed up by Barkly's authoritative opinion, (46) refused to consider the proposal of federation before Responsible Government and reversed the order, and the midlands and Kaffraria were loud in their denunciation of a scheme that would place them under Grahamstown.

While Grahamstown remained so unpopular in the East a two province federation scheme was out of the question. "If it is intended to propose the division of the colony into three parts, West, Midlands and East", stated the G.R.Herald (47) in reference to the revival of federation, "the project will have our heartiest support. If into two it will necessarily be opposed vigorously by the midland districts; an opposition which we should trust, with the aid of our Western brethren, would be successful." In the following issue it was further maintained that "any other method of division .... would simply lead to a repetition of those internal dissensions and territorial disputes which have so long been the bane of the colony." In May the Watchman (48) went so far as to attribute all the provincial strife, not to Port Elizabeth, Graaff-Reinet, Kaffraria, but to Grahamstown, asserting that Kaffraria was more Western than frontier in outlook, and continued to oppose Chase's project, preferring three provinces. That even Port Elizabeth was not unanimously in favour of two provinces was revealed by the fact that during the Responsible Government debates in June 1871, Pearson (49) one of the members for the

Bay, had expressed his support of three provinces. Although all sections in the East agreed in wanting federation as a means of securing an increase in local government and the support for a three province scheme was considerable, the difficulty of defining the boundaries of the two provinces in the East wrecked any possibility of success. The frontier party (50) was opposed to any division of the East and demanded so loose a federation that its refusal was assured. Pearson had suggested two provinces centering around Port Elizabeth and East London, a scheme which would have destroyed the frontier party by splitting it among its rivals, the midlands and Kaffraria! The G.R.Herald simply insisted on two provinces in the East, but made no effort to define their limits, whereas the Watchman (52) was more ambitious and put forward two schemes both equally impossible. The first proposal was similar to that favoured by Pearson, that Kaffraria should be extended to the Fish on the West and the Orange on the North, thus including the frontier divisions of Victoria East, Fort Beaufort, Queenstown, Albert and Aliwal North, while Grahamstown and the midlands could be heaped together. On hearing Graaff-Reinet's disgust at the proposal, the Watchman next suggested three provinces for the East, and enlarged Kaffraria, the East (Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth), and the midlands – with Mossel Bay as its port!

These diverse views reveal clearly that the reason why a federation was never adopted in the colony was because of the impossibility of agreement upon a practical scheme. The difficulty was that the East consisted of the three distinct territorial parties, the midlands, the frontier and Kaffraria, and the deep-seated opposition to Grahamstown precluded any hope of the constituent parts agreeing to unite in one province. On the other hand the division of the East into two provinces centering around the ports was made impossible by the difficulty of settling the boundaries, and into three provinces by the fact that there were only two available ports and the midlands objected to being cut off from Port Elizabeth.

The leaders of the West, Molteno and Solomon, had no strong objection to federation, and in June 1871 had supported the resolutions in favour of a commission on the question. Barkly made a particularly fair and representative choice in appointing the seven members (53) of whom four were conservatives and three liberals, three coming from the West, two from the frontier and one each from the midlands and Kaffraria.

After considering the whole question de novo, during the recess, the Commission brought forward a report that did no more than paint a gloomy picture of the already obvious dissatisfaction in the East, and whilst deciding against federation for the present, recommended that if ever it became a practical issue, at least three provinces should be considered. In informing Kimberley of the outcome, Barkly (54) dismissed the whole report briefly by stating off-hand that it would please no one, that Grahamstown would prefer entire separation rather than support three provinces and that the growth in the wealth and importance of Kaffraria made it prefer a union with Cape Town rather than with Grahamstown - a nearer rival to Kingwilliamstown. Thus no matter how strongly the East as a whole might desire federation as an abstract principle, the practical difficulties in the way precluded for the present any increase in local government save through the medium of the divisional councils.

The more drastic step of full separation from the parent colony was desired by no section in the East. As early as June 1870 when the triumph of the liberals was certain, the Journal, (55) had made no mention of a divided colony, but simply suggested hopefully that removal of the seat of government would assuage the evils of Responsible Government. In the following year (56) the same paper was explicit in stating that federation or removal were the aims of the frontier party, and the feeling of the G.R.Herald was that "the division of the colony without federation should be opposed" as ultimate reunion might take "many years" to accomplish. A few months later, when the news was received that Port Elizabeth had revived the old

(53) Journal July 3, 1871.
(54) G.R.31/11 Barkly to Kimberley 44 of May 1, 1872.
(55) Journal June 17, 1870.
Separation League in the form of an Eastern Province Reform Association (57) "for the protection of the rights of the Eastern districts," the G.R. Herald was frankly incredulous. (58) "Port Elizabeth is too wise to attempt to revive the dead body of separation", the paper stated bluntly. "It must know that what the country is crying out for, is a closer union by means of federation, and that any attempt at disunion will no longer meet with sympathy excepting amongst a small and extreme party in the East."

A few issues later, in retrospective mood, the same paper offered the opinion that separation "as a political movement .... was utterly unsuccessful; though it owed its defeat less to intellectual arguments than to an unconscious feeling on the part of the great body of the agricultural population that separation would have been the dismembering of a community bound together by the closest ties .... and would have caused an alienation that would have taken many years to heal." This opinion, although the words of a partisan, explains how it was that the separation party could win no lasting support for their aims and how even among the frontier party itself, enthusiasm was aroused only by the presence of some powerful incentive, which being removed, separation once more became jejunre. In 1872 the way the frontier championed Chace's federation scheme reveals in which direction its desires lay, although with Responsible Government a certainty the Journal (59) was not far removed from separation in demanding a federation so loose that the laws of its legislature would not be subject to ratification by a Cape Town Parliament.

In June 1873 the passing of the Responsible Government Bill aroused an angry outburst from the frontier and with the commercial houses of Port Elizabeth supplying the funds, Grahamstown did the agitating. The Reform Association sounded out the clarion call for the East to rally round and demand full separation, but the only response from the midlands was a contemptuous silence. Not so Kafraria, however. With the foundations of the

(57) Journal Aug.23, 1871.
(58) G.R.Herald July 32, Aug.5, 1871.
new Buffalo bridge at Kingwilliamstown beginning to appear and
the materials and convicts arriving for the Government's harbour
development scheme at East London, Kaffrarian's appetite for
public works was whetted and a new party was demanding a railway
line from East London. All sections were agreeing that by remain-
ing with the West, they had everything to gain; by joining
Grahamstown everything to lose, and Sprigg organised the
Kaffrarian League to work actively against the Reform Association.
When several of the frontier divisions sided with the Kaffrarian
League and the Association was almost ignored outside of Port
Elizabeth and Grahamstown, it was clear that the death knell of
separation had been sounded once and for all. (60) The Journal
adopted a conciliatory attitude and only the Eastern Star
inspired by the notorious Dean of Grahamstown continued to
vitiuperate against all things Western. Barkly (61) clearly
considered the agitation from the frontier and the vehement
protests against Responsible Government scarcely worthy of
serious attention and advised Kimberley that if they were ignored
Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth would soon lose interest in the
question. "The suicidal cry of separation", he added, forming
his opinion doubtlessly with the aid of the Executive Council in
Cape Town and not solely on his eighteen months in the colony,
"which for years past has proceeded from a small section of the
Eastern community will then be no more heard."

The Governor did not exaggerate when he stated that
separation was supported only by a "small" party in the East.
Moreover, that section had steadily become smaller and smaller
throughout the last two decades, and by the 'seventies would have
been virtually ignored were it not that this faction was not only
particularly vociferous, but possessed ample means of making its
views known. But the prominence which it thus attained was
entirely disproportionate to the public support accorded to its
principles.

(60) Kaff. Watchman July 8, Aug.14, Sept.11, 1873.
G.R.Herald July 3, 6, 1873.
E.P.Herald June 28, Sept. 13, 1873.
(61) G.R.31/11 Barkly to Kimberley 76 of July 3, 1873.
The steady abatement of agitation for separation was due not only to its incompatibility with the opposing forces at work from within and without the colony, but to Grahamstown's decline in predominance over the rest of the province and the rise of an independent anti-Grahamstown party. Until the late 'fifties, the Dutch of the East, with the exception of the small section of townsmen could be disregarded as a political force owing to their complete lack of interest in public affairs extending beyond the doors of the church. Besides, as Professor Walker (63) has revealed so illuminatingly, the civilisation among the farmers even by the 'thirties was so rudimentary, distances were so great and the population so scattered and separated, that decades had to elapse before this not inconsiderable Dutch-speaking population could be educated up to exerting its due influence on the government of the country. Moreover the Trek left those who remained virtually leaderless and further postponed the time when the Dutch viewpoint would be heard.

It was thus inevitable after the 1830 settlement that without protest from the silent masses of the Dutch, the English-speaking section should assume the leadership and become the mouthpiece of the whole province. When Retief wanted to publish his Manifesto, it was to the strongly pro-English Journal that he was forced to go. The inhabitants of Grahamstown were the antithesis of the Boers - townsmen, accustomed to the idea of self-government, knowing how to agitate through the Press, petitions and public meetings. Moreover the rapid drift of the new settlers from their lands to Grahamstown caused the city to outstrip all rivals and completely dominate the frontier, while the fact that it was the seat of government and the centre of all trade in the East, enabled the city to subordinate the rest of the province.

During the late 'fifties it became painfully clear to Grahamstown that this condition was steadily being changed. With a population that increased prolifically, after two decades the Dutch had made good the losses caused by the Trek; the founding of the G.R.Herald in 1853 was to be a vital factor in fostering (63) Walker 'The Great Trek' Chaps.I-III pps.3-205 passim.
the growth of an individual viewpoint opposed to the frontier, and gradually in the 'fifties and 'sixties its example was followed by the incipient Press of Colenso, Burgersdorp and Albert. Throughout the colony in 1851 the country districts were without any organ of expression but in the following twenty years a remarkable change took place. (63) In 1851, of the eight colonial papers, seven were located in Grahamstown and Cape Town, but by 1871 the total had grown to about 34, and of these only ten came from the above-mentioned towns. Now able to make known their wishes, the midlands soon revealed the suspicion and antagonism felt towards Grahamstown.

Moreover, the main line of development of the province was north, and north-east, an expansion carried on mainly by Dutch farmers who had no connection with Grahamstown, and no cause to feel sympathy towards the frontier. Thus the new towns, villages and districts that grew up, joined the midlands and swelled the opposition to the frontier party. That the above is no exaggeration of the process which was having such telling effect on the influence of the frontier party is proved by the admission of the Journal, (64) the paper which more than any other in the East had cause to hide the fact, that during the ten years of the 'fifties Grahamstown had been losing its position as head of the East. "New towns have sprung up in many quarters, which no longer look to Grahamstown as the central depot," lamented the Journal with anxious forebodings about the future. "New districts have been settled by people who have never been within 'the sound of our 'market bell', and who owe us no 'allegiance' commercially or socially". And this was not from an opponent of the frontier party but the leading paper of Grahamstown and the mouthpiece of the separation party.

During the 'sixties the process was accelerated considerably. The north eastern expansion continued rapidly in the divisions of Albert and Aliwal North and the midlands were developing at a faster rate than Albany and Grahamstown, the home of the separation party, thus bringing about a general levelling (63) G.R.Herald May 13, 1871.
(64) Journal Nov.26, 1859.
of influence in the East. On the far side of the frontier party, Kaffraria was increasing her efforts to wean from Grahamstown the border divisions of Fort Beaufort, Victoria East, Queenstown and Aliwal North. By the early 'seventies, even in the columns of the frontier Press, it was an open secret that Grahamstown had fallen from grace. In June 1871 after Scallen and Botha, the members in the Assembly for Cradock, had voted with the liberals, the E.P.Herald (65) devoted special attention to the defection of the division which since the first Parliament had been a stronghold of the frontier party. Somerset, the division chosen for the ill-starred convention in February 1861 and a leading supporter of separation in the heyday of the League, had been siding with the Midlands ever since the split over railways. Nor was this alteration in feeling confined to the representatives of the particular divisions, for the voting in the by-election for the Council (63) in October 1871 showed that the electorate as well as their representatives were turning from Grahamstown. These results were eagerly pounced on by the G.R.Herald (67) which emphasized how the last decade had witnessed a decline in the comparative importance and predominance of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth, a statement which neither the Journal nor the E.P.Herald attempted to refute in subsequent issues. After stating that now "the country districts are almost entirely independent of either", the paper went on, "how much the influence of Grahamstown has declined, we have only to look at the present action of such places as Cradock, Fort Beaufort, Uitenhage and Colesburg to see. Ten years ago they were obedient constituencies enough. Now we are glad to see they are independent; and they don't think with Grahamstown."

On all sides Grahamstown faced a tide of rising opposition. In February 1872 R.M. Bowker (63) who had been so ardent a separationist during 1860-63 not only declared that he had altered his opinion upon "maturer consideration" but, unkindest cut of all, that he was even "opposed to the application of the federation plan to the Cape Colony only, by the division of the territory into provinces." Even the alliance of the frontier

town with Port Elizabeth was more nominal than real, and based on a fragile precarious foundation. Southey, commenting on Grahamstown's loss of influence, went so far as to attribute it mainly to the fact that for the last twenty years, instead of a policy of conciliation, she had pursued a course of rivalry with Port Elizabeth.

By 1873 with Grahamstown bereft of its former adherents and standing almost isolated in sentiment from the West, separation became in the words of Barkly, no more than "the suicidal outcry .... of a small section."
THE ELECTORAL DIVISIONS
OF THE
EASTERN PROVINCE
APPENDIX.

SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.
APPENDIX.

SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY.

I. Unpublished Primary Sources.

A: Official Manuscript Sources:

The official manuscript material which has been used, is all housed in the Cape Town Archives. It consists of the original despatches received from the Colonial Office, the duplicate copies of all despatches sent from the Cape, and a miscellaneous collection of correspondence from the office of the Lieutenant-Governor (G.H.39/1). The latter deserves a special word and has been of inestimable value in throwing a great deal of light on otherwise obscure happenings in the East. Not only does this collection comprise a considerable amount of informal, semi-official correspondence from the Lieutenant-Governors during the period, but there are also valuable official reports from the Agents in the Reserves to the Secretary for Natives in Cape Town and the monthly summaries of conditions in the colony which Wynyard despatched to Grey while in England during his recall. Much light is also thrown on the system of Native control and the inner workings of the Lieutenant-Governor's establishment and often the private comments of an authoritative non-party man from the storm centre of the East are most illuminating. So far as we know this valuable source of information has been hitherto untapped.

The following archive groups were consulted for the period 1854-1872:-

G.H.3/1 to G.H.3/3 being the entry books of all despatches received from the Colonial Office from Feb.2, 1853 to Feb.27, 1877.

G.H.1/1 to G.H.1/19 containing the original despatches received from the Colonial Office from July 1854 to Dec.1872.

G.H.33/1 to G.H.33/4 being the entry books of all despatches sent from the Cape from Mar.31, 1852 to Oct.12, 1872.

G.H.31/6 to G.H.31/11 containing duplicates of all despatches sent from the Cape from Dec.9, 1854 to Aug.23, 1872.

G.H.39/1 containing a miscellaneous collection of correspondence received by the Governor from the Lieutenant-Governors from 1854 to 1866.

B: Private Manuscript Sources:

The private papers of the late Sir John X. Merriman, which are housed in the South African Public Library Cape Town, were consulted, but were of no value as the political letters commence only with Sir John's entry into the Cabinet in the 'seventies. The early correspondence which dates from the late 'sixties, consists mainly of personal letters between members of the family.

II. Published Primary Sources.

A: Newspapers published in the East:

The S.A. Public Library possesses the finest collection of Cape newspapers in the country. These old papers are a mine
of information and besides reflecting public opinion in their respective centres, contain many valuable facts on conditions in the colony, which are not found in the more superficial accounts of the despatches. In the absence of Hansard, the press comprise the only record of debates in the Assembly and Council.

The following newspapers were used:

1. The Grahamstown Journal, from 1853 to 1872, with the exception of the issues for 1864, which are missing from the Library. This is the best source for debates in the House, and for general conditions in the country.

2. The Graaff-Reinet Herald, from Sept. 1852 to 1872.

3. The Eastern Province Herald from June 1854 to 1872. An especially valuable feature about this paper was the monthly, later fortnightly, news summaries of events and conditions in South Africa, which appeared throughout the 'sixties and were intended for transmission to England. This is the best source for business and trade conditions.

4. The Kaffrarian Watchman from Dec. 1865 to 1872. This is the best source for conditions on the frontier and in the Transkei.

The period under consideration has been thoroughly covered in each of the papers, with the exception of the E.P.Herald from 1865-1873, which from 1865 onwards held views almost identical with the Journal. Thereafter in the case of this paper, our procedure was to examine the fortnightly news summaries which contained all the news of the preceding fortnight. The footnote references indicate the extensive use made of the Press.

B: Official Published Sources. (S.A. Library).

1. Cape Annual Blue Books 1854-1872. These are especially useful for statistical information on population and financial conditions.

2. Votes and Proceedings of Parliament, and Annexures, 1854-1872. In these volumes are to be found the Governors' speeches opening and closing Parliament, the budget speeches of the Colonial Secretary, the various reports of the Colonial Civil Engineer on harbours and railways, the reports of committees of the House, and the Annual Reports on road expenditure. The use of this source has been cursory and mainly for the purpose of checking the statements of the Press.

C: Other Contemporary Sources:

Chase, J.C. The Cape and Algoa Bay. London 1843. Chase was a protagonist of the separation party and all his work is ex parte. Nevertheless he is a mine of information on general conditions in the East.

The account of the provincial struggle is sadly biased, but this is one of the most detailed published works on the period of Representative Government.

Eybers. Select Constitutional Documents illustrating S.A. History. London 1913. Valuable to illustrate the development of local government during the 'fifties and 'sixties.

D: Contemporary Sources from the Pamphlet Collection in the Public Library, mainly of a polemical nature. The following have been found useful.


575.e.908. Letters on Separation published in the E.P. Herald. (1872).


Catechism of the Eastern Province Separation League (1880).

Notes on Separation (1860).

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The Separation Petition to the Queen. (1872).

575.e.909.

(3) Wilmot A. A Geography of South Africa (1868).

(9) Wilmot A. The Rise, Progress, and Present Position of the Cape of Good Hope (1864).


575.f.342. Godlonton R.A. Sketch of the Eastern Districts of the Cape of Good Hope (1842)

SECONDARY SOURCES.

The following are the secondary sources which have been found to have some bearing on the period under review. The extent to which they have been used has been indicated in the preface.

Brooke, E.H. The History of Native Policy in South Africa. Cape Town 1934. The treatment is too superficial to be of much value for consultative purposes.

Cory, Sir Geo. E. The Rise of South Africa. Vols.2-5. London 1921-1930. The best source of information on the development of the Eastern Province, but as this work stops at 1854, its use was confined to the Introductory Chapter.

de Kiewiet Dr. C.W. British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics 1848-1870. London 1928. A valuable work, indispensable to an understanding of South African affairs during the period. As the title indicates, however, internal matters at the Cape fall outside its scope.

Edwards Dr. I.E. The 1820 Settlers in South Africa. London 1934. Useful to show the location of the British settlers in the East, and conditions in the introductory period.
Egerton H.E. A Short History of British Colonial Policy. London 1910. A useful guide to the attitude of the Colonial Office, but unfortunately the title is particularly apt.


Molteno P.A. The Life and Times of Sir Charles Molteno. Smith Elder & Co. 1900. Vol.1. A eulogistic, rather one-sided account of Molteno's part in Cape events, commencing from 1860. The Executive, the East, the frontier party and especially Wodehouse are all painted in the worst colours. As an elaboration and defence of the viewpoint of the Western Liberals, however, it is useful.

Theal Dr. G.W. London (1888-1900) Vols.3-5. Contains many useful facts, but for a real understanding of the period is useless and out of date.

Uys Dr. C.J. In the Era of Shepstone. Lovedale 1933. Chaps.3-3. We are reluctant to disparage this valuable and able piece of research, but the criticism, so far as his treatment of the breakdown of the convention policy is concerned, must be made that the writer in Chapter II is endeavouring to prove a thesis. Surely his assertion that the policy of Wodehouse towards Basutoland and the Free State was largely shaped by the Governor's endeavour to keep the Republic from Port St. Johns, is badly exaggerated, and suggests that Dr. Uys has neglected the despatches on Native policy, the reports from the Agents in the Boer Republic on the Eastern frontier, and the expressions of policy by the Governor when opening and closing Parliament. We feel that the writer has been unduly swayed by the viewpoint of Shepstone, from whom he drew the bulk of his information.


Walker E.A. The Great Trek. London 1934. The early chapters provide an illuminating insight into conditions in the East, especially among the Dutch section.

Walker E.A. Lord de Villiers and His Times. S.A. 1842-1914. London 1925. Chaps.3-4. Deals briefly with the various sessions after de Villiers' entry into politics in 1867.

Willmot A. Richard Southey. London 1904. Chaps.2-9. A good corrective to Molteno, but goes to the opposite extreme as the author championed the Eastern conservatives and clearly favoured separation. The very real value of this work lies in the fact that much correspondence between Southey and leading personalities in the colony is quoted at length.

Cambridge History of the British Empire Vol. VIII. South Africa. An up-to-date account of South Africa, written by experts, but unfortunately the treatment of the Cape Colony during the period of Representative Government is slight. The bibliography is an invaluable guide to available sources.