THE DREAM OF A PURE COMMUNITY -

WOODSTOCK'S COUNTER-MEMORY, 1882 - 1913

LUKE MARTYN ALFRED, SEPTEMBER 1991
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DEDICATION

To Lisa, for her practical help, her encouragement and her support.

To John, for his honesty and his critical acumen.

To Laura, for her invaluable research work.

To Donald, for his proof-reading.
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INTRODUCTION

We want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. But the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or point of reference.  

One of the governing assumptions of this thesis is that there is a distinct form of historiographic endeavor called a genealogy. The genealogy is not merely a polemical critique of orthodox historiography, but also functions as a working methodology. It is thus capable of reaching significant conclusions. This thesis is an attempt to practice a genealogy of the Woodstock Municipality from 1882, the year of its inception, to 1913, the year in which it became a part of the greater Cape Town Municipality. I have chosen this period because I believe it demonstrates, in sometimes dramatic form, the unique difficulties facing a growing administrative apparatus. Furthermore, the Woodstock Municipality was an administrative invention which was congruent with a new form of economy of power. This form of power was above all concerned with a type of administration which facilitated discreetly the gentle growth of a market economy in the Colony. It was also concerned to "govern" and discipline the rapidly growing population in a cost-effective, unobtrusive and intelligent way.

My analysis of this new economy of power suggests the following: if we attempt to render intelligible the emergence of several institutions (or regimes of discipline within longstanding structures) that were contemporary with the period under investigation, we might find that this new form of power took hold at
the institutional level. Correlatively, we might also find significant differences being enacted at the level of disciplinary practice. One of the further advantages of an institutional analysis is that it will allow us to historicise objects (like the human body), isolate discursive practices (moral languages of "responsibility"), and analyse forms of knowledge (the emergence of medical knowledge about the population), within the context of a "different" methodology. We will thus be posing a polemical threat to those who believe that the body has no history; that language is reducible to the intention of a centered subject; and that knowledge "evolves" in conjunction with a continuous, teleological rationality.

The chapter which follows this brief introduction is divided into three sections: in the first I devote some time to a chronological summary of a series of works by the French philosopher-historian, Michel Foucault. This is necessary because it sketches the theoretical background to my use of the Foucauldian method of genealogy. It also serves the function of introducing the reader to a body of work with which he/she might not be familiar. Finally it serves to establish (if only tentatively) the general direction in which the argument is leading.

Section two is devoted to a more pointed examination of two key papers in the Foucauldian oeuvre. The analysis of these two papers brings us to the construction of a methodology in the final section of the chapter. The intermediate step is important because the two essays (The Order of Discourse and Nietzsche, Genealogy, History), particularly the latter one, illuminate the philosophical underpinnings of the genealogy as system and method.

In an attempt to realise the polemical intentions of my introductory
chapter in concrete form, I attempt in chapter two to understand the
textual strategies at work in a minor piece on Woodstock entitled
Rediscovering Woodstock. I seek to prove that this essay conforms in
several significant ways to techniques which are associated with what
I identify in the first chapter as the History-of-Ideas or one of its
variations. Although my discovery of the techniques whereby historical
meaning is situated and constructed is related at the level of
assumption to chapter one, it is not a demonstration of my
methodology per se. The application of my methodology occurs for the
first time during the case-study section of the thesis. This begins
with the genealogical analysis of the Woodstock Municipality itself
as one of my four key municipal institutions.

It seems appropriate to begin our genealogy with an investigation of
certain events within the early history of the Woodstock Municipality
as an institution. Chapter three thus sets the scene for the chapters
which follow: this similarity initially takes place at the level of
method. I also intend in chapter three to provide concrete evidence
that I am identifying certain events, arranging them in series, and
relating them to a set of questions and problems - otherwise known
as the construction of a generality - which I will now attempt to
outline. The posing of certain questions and problems will hopefully
result in the formation of one greater question, that is, how, within
the context of slightly different institutional agenda’s and
prerogatives, various institutional agencies organise time, space and
subjects within frameworks that are disciplinary in nature. And how,
through our retroactive identification of events in the history of
various institutions, can we come to analyse the meaning-effect of
these events without reconstituting them as the "truth"?
I intend in chapter three, therefore, to come to terms with the constituent features of municipal knowledge and to ask the question: through which procedures did the municipality attempt to control life within the municipal area, and did this attempt to gain mastery involve any forms of discipline as Foucault defines it? With regard to chapter three we should remember that it bares superficial resemblance to a section on Official Administrative Discourse in chapter two. The section on O.A.D. merely acts as a general introduction to official language in the broadest possible sense, unlike the chapter on municipal knowledge, which is specifically concerned with the manner in which the institution managed life within the municipality (or multiplicity as Foucault calls it) itself.

Craig's Battery, which is the institutional case-study that I use in chapter four, is carefully chosen in the sense that I will seek to demonstrate that the battery was able, mainly because it was a monolithic institution, to manage the environment and those within it with a great deal of control. We will see how the control of both space and time within the context of a closed institution led to a disciplinary regime which was able to encourage a system of self-regulation. From the disciplinary point-of-view, regimes of self-regulation are evidence of "perfection" and thus appear in marked contrast to the municipality's ad hoc attempts at the control of the municipal environment. In an appendix to this chapter (which appears at the end of the thesis as Appendix A) I analyse several photographs of Fort Knokke, which was a Fort close to Craig's Battery. The photographs demonstrate that the Cape Town archive actually participates in the construction of history, unlike any commonsense myth's which hold otherwise.
A cold Dickensian refuge which was built for the express purpose of "rehabilitating" "prostitutes" provides the material for the case-study which makes up chapter five. From a close textual analysis of an event which led to the laying of an inscribed commemorative foundation stone, we will be able to identify the constituent features of discipline in the House of Mercy, noting in particular how the Anglican nuns who administered the House attempted to inculcate the values of the petit-bourgeois woman of leisure in those unfortunates who happened - by dint of an absolutely indiscriminate logic - to find themselves there.

My final case-study is an attempt to understand, through the analysis of a series of reports, the paradoxical logic which underscored the disciplinary regime of the Woodstock Cottage or Suburban Hospital. We will see how an attempt to transcend the imposition of a European temporal mean - and move towards "a Modern General Hospital" - was severely flawed, given the sense of Colonial uncertainty which characterised the period. We will also witness the administrative debacle which surrounded the "event" of the "Fresh Air Scheme"; the scheme, which was never properly implemented, was an initiative intended to "upgrade" the hospital. This was ironic because it advanced a sophisticated theory of discipline as a sub-text.

In conclusion, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the construction of the chapter which follows. There are those who might find the transition to a discussion of the Foucauldian canon a little rapid, and although the purpose of the introduction might not immediately be apparent, I believe that the significance of the summaries will emerge over time. I thus urge the reader to be patient, and trust that he/she will recognise the significance of the section which follows, if not immediately, then shortly thereafter.
FOOTNOTES


2. This triple objective of the disciplines corresponds to a well known historical conjuncture. One aspect of this conjuncture was the large demographic thrust of the eighteenth century. The other aspect of the conjuncture was a growth in the apparatus of production, which was becoming more and more extended and complex; it was also becoming more costly and its profitability had to be increased. The development of the disciplinary methods corresponded to these two processes, or rather, no doubt, to the new need to adjust to their correlation. (emphasis added).


3. An item in file 3/WSK 164 in the Cape Archives suggests that the population of Woodstock was 5 800 in 1891. In 1904 it was 29 432, and at the time at which the article was written (3rd October 1906) the estimated population was 34 000. These figures indicate that the population trends in the Municipality correspond to what Foucault in a different context identifies as a "large demographic thrust", see above.
CHAPTER 1: FROM PHENOMENOLOGY TO GENEALOGY

INTRODUCTION

This preliminary chapter is intended as a lengthy introduction to the ideas of the French philosopher-historian, Michel Foucault. The first section provides the reader with "pocket-sized" introductions to the Foucault canon. It is in no way arbitrary and is designed to establish the theoretical foundations upon which I will later build. The fleeting and even general tenor of the first section gives way in the second to a more challenging consideration of two seminal Foucault essay's namely, The Order of Discourse and Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. These two essays represent the transition between the archaeological and genealogical "periods" of Foucault's work. The analysis of the two essays above thus allows me to move towards the construction of a methodology in the final section of this chapter. The methodology allows me to construct an analytical blueprint which will be applied in the case-study section of the thesis which will begin with a study of the Woodstock Municipality as an institution in chapter three.

1.1: POCKET-SIZED FOUCAULT

Folie et déraison, Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique (1961)

Despite the compelling descriptions and extravagant metaphors, Michel Foucault's first recognised work, Madness and Civilization (1961), can be interpreted as an ultimately unsatisfactory attempt to reconstitute a pure state of being (madness) behind the folds of reason itself. The work traces the monarchical and public response to
and reception of madness from the Middle Ages, through the Renaissance and the Classical Age, up to the present day.

The book is noticeably concerned with social space and the manner in which it is utilized by the authorities of the day. Firstly Foucault stresses the role of the European leper or Lazar houses only to contend that by roughly the end of the European Middle Ages, these spaces were summarily vacated to make way for a new heteromorphous construct, namely the mad, indigent, malcontent and constitutionally unsound. This alteration in the mode of apprehension can be traced to a King's edict which sought to intern the Parisian floating population - a group of individuals which harboured all manner of latent possibilities and threats. Once they were "confined", and this "Great Confinement" according to Foucault was not limited to France but literally swept across Europe at roughly the same time, the political alliance between the Monarchy and the Bourgeoisie could pursue its ascendancy. Yet the phrase "mode of apprehension" with its creeping phenomenological overtones may not do justice to the scope of the alteration in moral and political sensibility which characterised the period. Furthermore it omits the strong economic rational inherent in the "incarceration" of the unemployed for it is important to recognise that internment was least of all motivated by philanthropism. The process of confinement was directed by following interlinked recognitions: the governing fathers of the city could no longer merely expel its unwanted populace, they had to take the unproductive under their wing, to locate and observe them and of course keep them under the influence of legal jurisdiction.

The beginning of the nineteenth century witnesses a discernible and important change in the perception of the confined population. Economic imperatives become threatened by moral outrage and the
period ushers in the image of the virtuous reformer. It was no longer
desirable that the criminal, unemployed and insane be categorized as
one. Secondly, if the confined had remained unproductive all these
years they were now understood as an untapped source of cheap,
exploitable labour. Yet what of the virtuous reformers that appeared
earlier? The state of things called for an immediate re-ordering; the
burgeoning humanist machinery rolled forwards with the primary
function of protecting the mad from themselves. Thus began the
process of the attempted yet controlled liberation and humanisation
of the insane. Both Tuke in England and Pinel in France were at the
forefront of a process which attempted to reform the insane from
within the institution. Their methods varied but basically they were
concerned, according to Foucault, to create a conscience in the mad
themselves, and to confirm the mad’s alterity they had to pathologise
them as transgressors of certain ahistorical universals.

The asylum no longer punished the madman’s guilt, it is true; but
it did more; it organised that guilt; it organised it for the
madman as a consciousness of himself, and as a non-reciprocal
relation to the keeper; it organised it for the man of reason as
an awareness of the Other, a therapeutic intervention in the
madman’s existence. In other words, by this guilt the madman
became an object of punishment always vulnerable to himself and
to the Other; and, from the acknowledgment of his status as
object from, the awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return
to his awareness of himself as a free responsible subject, and
consequently to reason.¹

My summary of Madness and Civilization has thus far omitted the
central figure of the doctor who is not to be valued as a medical
practitioner per se but rather, as a wise individual. His importance
does not result from his access to a strata of coherent knowledge but from his role. Although perhaps we should not stress the relationship between the doctor and psychiatrist too closely, their proximity as figures with a common interest is undeniable. Towards the end of *Madness and Civilization* Foucault draws our attention to the figure of the psychiatrist. He maintains that Freud was the important conclusion of a line which started with Pinel and stretched across the eighteenth century. Freud was extremely important because, unlike those reformers and medical men who had practised before him, he was not trapped in hollow positivism and scientistic myths. Freud was able to account for his relative "success" by de-mythologizing the importance of the asylum and isolating the doctor-patient relationship as an object of knowledge. However, in revealing the inability of those before him to account for and reflect on their methods he too lapsed into "scientism" for he knew full well, according to Foucault, that the meaning and authority of psychoanalysis did not come from science but from the "body" of knowledge, the pathologising discourse which blossomed all around him.

*Madness and Civilization* traces the contours of the European experience and understanding of madness from the Middle Ages up until the present day. In what may retrospectively be termed a reckless moment, Foucault suggests that the presence of madness signifies the possibility for the study of reason in history for madness stands on the very threshold of reason, occasionally illuminating the silent vacuum over which it presides. Thus the study of madness must in fact be a study of history as well. In valorising madness as a fundamental "otherness" Foucault believed that he could "pry open" history because as an experience madness was beyond history itself. But in so doing, in seeking the deep truth of not only history but of all
"reasonable" discourse, Foucault made an error. He had sought to anchor his theory on the insufficiencies of a potentially meaningless subject (the mad person) and furthermore he sought to abstract a theory of reality and reason itself from this weak point.

Naissance de la clinique. Une archéologie du regarde médical (1963)

Foucault's next book, The Birth of the Clinic, broadens both the concerns and the imagery of Madness and Civilization. It is by no means a different version of the same book, yet a certain thematic consistency is in evidence; the book reinforces the idea that the eighteenth century bore witness to a certain medicalization of society. The book traces the onward march of post Enlightenment strategies of rationality and like Madness and Civilization it contains an investigation into the meaning of various conceptions of institutional space and those who inhabit it.

Like Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic is set against a backdrop of rapid social growth and generalised instability. The thirty year period between the French Revolution and eighteen-twenty suffices to represent the changes that occurred in the broad medical field. The book's central contention is that the eighteenth century gives rise to two parallel events of great significance. On a broad scale, one can observe a basic alteration in medical consciousness, a greater rationalisation of techniques, the streamlining of medical education and procedures and, as the title of the book suggests, the Birth of the Clinic, a fact of great importance, as we will see shortly.

On a specific level we see the emergence of anatomo-clinical
medicine, a discursive space which was unequivocally to supplant the methods and the logic of that which passed before it. To enable us to understand the transformation from one type of medical discourse to another, we will have to deconstruct the underlying features of both systems. The classificatory medicine which dominated France prior to the revolution can be understood as follows; its ambition was narrowly hermeneutic, that is, to decipher symptoms from essences which were thought to circulate throughout the body and decipher diseases from those symptoms. Foucault refers to the above semiotic as a "medicine of the species" whose primary concern was encyclopaedic, to classify and tabulate all manner of symptoms and thereby attempt to return the patient to health. This closed system was in sharp distinction to what Foucault identifies as a "medicine of social space", a fluid, open-ended construct the concern of which was not the particular symptom but the health and well-being of the entire population. It should be noted that a "medicine of social spaces" was primarily administrative in ambition and can be characterised by its concern with such subjects as child-rearing, general hygiene, the cleanliness of food and the expansion of the population. In short, it was a politics of health. Unlike nosology (what was previously referred to as medicine of the species) this onward-marching discursive configuration was relatively unstable in the sense that it was ever-expanding and subject to revision.

In 1766 the Société Royal de Medicine was formed. Foucault sees the foundation of the society as a crucial event in the process which led to the replacement of the traditional classificatory medicine by anatomo-clinical medicine, the introduction of a new training regime for doctors centered on the clinic, the reorganisation of medical practice and, no less important, of hospitals. The formation of the society signifies the emergence of an entirely new sensibilty in the
approach to the broadest medical problems, what may in fact be termed a new strategy or disciplinary manoeuvre. This manoeuvre was characterised by the following shifts in awareness: firstly it was recognised that disease was an outcome of social mis-management caused mainly by the practices of the Ancient Regime. This recognition resulted in a complete re-structuring of the medical profession; hospitals were to become either fully medicalised (up until the revolution they had served a number of ambiguous functions including providing shelter of the poor) or discontinued altogether. The health services should be conducted under the auspices of a central authority and clinics should be introduced as the central institutional component of the profession. The role of the newly-formed clinic should not be over- emphasised because parallel to its formation one sees a host of new features which were in sharp distinction to the type of medicine practiced prior to the revolution.

The major shift in medical perception arose in the very activity of seeing, explains Foucault. The gaze of the trained doctor became more complex, not only did the medical personage see, but he heard and touched as well. These three elements made up what Foucault refers to as "the medical gaze", a form of medical perception which viewed the same basic object, the human body, in a radically different way to the doctors of the former classificatory age. There were also broader philosophical changes in the underlying intellectual strata of medicine. Following enlightenment nominalism and the philosophy of language, the new medical nominalism stressed that, "symptoms were like alphabets and diseases like words", and unlike the former medicine, nominalist science asserted that there were absolutely no essences behind visible symptoms.
What I have attempted to sketch out in the broadest possible terms is the displacement of one type of medical consciousness by another over a period of roughly thirty years. The new anatomo-clinical medicine and the complex re-alignment of medical discourse meant that man became both the subject and object of knowledge. His experience of himself and his limitations as an individual were linked to the ephemerality of his being and the eventuality of death. Thus we are able to consider the wider significance of The Birth of the Clinic for it initiates the project which Foucault was to continue in The Order of Things, the study of man, and his importance for the formation of the Human Sciences.

Les mots et les choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines (1966)

Foucault’s so-called structuralist masterpiece, The Order of Things, was published in 1966. The use of the phrase "so-called" in the above is not an incautious one because superficially the echoes between The Order of Things and the holistic structuralism of say Claude Lèvi-Strauss is quite startling. As we are about to see, however, the comparison is somewhat misleading for Foucault owes far more to the French historians of science Bachelard and Canguilhem and the German nineteenth century philosopher, Nietzsche, than he does to de Saussure.

We are by now familiar with Foucault’s periodisation. The book divides the recent European past into three periods with a suggestion of an ill-defined fourth. These three Episteme are successively: the Renaissance, the Classic and the Modern. It is Foucault’s contention that there are a set of rule-governed criteria which dictate what can or cannot be said within each epistemic configuration and his project
is to identify and define the unconscious ground-rules or, more accurately, the positive unconscious of knowledge. Foucault's primary concern is thus to chart the seemingly inexplicable re-organisation of the field of knowledge from one episteme or epistemic configuration to the next. During the Renaissance for example Foucault suggests that the order of knowledge was governed by a single basic term, that of resemblance. Contained within the term of resemblance were the following secondary tropes: adjacency, analogy, sympathy and antipathy. The last two of these, sympathy and antipathy, were extremely important because they managed to add to resemblance a certain extra dimension yet prevented all signs from becoming one, from collapsing into the same. We should at this stage note that resemblance contained both the form and the content of the sign and it was only during the Classical age, according to Foucault, that the sign split.

The world was no longer seen as itself; language was wrested free of things, entered an arbitrary relation to them as representation, as one form of representation.³

Resemblance as a master-term begins to become discredited around the time of Descartes and Bacon. As a result of the splitting of the sign new concepts such as analysis, comparison and order became the touchstones of the new epistemic field. The age witnesses the emergence of three sciences based on the idea of order - General grammar, Natural history and the analysis of wealth, the analysis of words, beings and needs in terms of signs which were in turn understood by their relationship to identity and difference. Unlike the Renaissance, the internal dynamic of the Classical age means that language is thought but it is not an immediate representation of thought, it is also an ordered tabulation and linear re-arrangement
thereof. The general grammar of the Classical age can be sub-divided into the following five terms: proposition (the theory of the verb), designation (the theory of nouns), articulation, derivation and the name.

Classical order distributed across a permanent space a network of identities and difference that separated and united things; it was this order that governed the theories of discourse, natural beings, and the exchange of wealth. What occurred at the end of the Eighteenth Century was a change in the foundations of knowledge as far-reaching as that which accompanied the advent of the Classical period. What was discovered as the eighteenth century drew to a close was, in a word, history. We can account for this audacious and provocative remark as follows: intellectuals of the Classical age understood time as something unremarkable and distant. For theorists of the modern age, however, with the increased emphasis on the organic, time was conceived as a component within knowledge itself. Knowledge developed and became, it was suddenly historicised. General Grammar, as it was once known was threatened and eventually replaced by philology, a subject which was born out of the collapse of the Classical system of representation. Language was pluralised and fragmented, it too became imbued with the significance of a history.

As a result of the emergence of history as a system, language as a component of knowledge became a victim of the same constraints but it also acquired a degree of depth all of its own. During the eighteenth century attempts were made to rid language of all its subjective impurities and in similar fashion the dream of a purely symbolic language exerted a certain intellectual fascination.
Because language no longer offered a transparent view of the world it attained an ambiguous status for it became both a problem and a virtually bottomless pool of possible interpretations and exegetical procedures. Foucault is thus able to claim that Marx, Freud and Nietzsche were all, in their distinctive ways, concerned with exegesis: *Das Kapital* was an exegesis of value, Nietzsche's philosophy was an exegesis of certain Greek words and Freud's life-work was devoted to an exegesis of that which resides beneath consciousness.

Foucault's suggestion that the age also saw the emergence of man is possibly even more scandalous than his contention that the modern period initiated history as it is understood today. How then does man emerge? We must understand firstly that man became both a new object and subject of knowledge. Epistemologically speaking the age witnessed the rise of the Human Sciences, an event which would simply not have been possible for the prior age. The Human Sciences arose in the wake of the collapse of representation and the study of man as an object/subject was the central item on which they predicated their existence. We must be clear on the issue of the Human Sciences though. By the Human Sciences, Foucault does not mean the trinity (Biology, Philology, Political Economy) which dominated the Classical age but rather he is referring to the subjects which caused their death; Sociology, Psychology and Literary/Cultural Studies. Let me explain; during the Classical age representation was fixed and objective, it was a window through which the world was understood. Obviously man did the understanding and apprehending but he had no need to understand and scrutinize himself in the same way that he had during the Modern Episteme. During the modern age man's gaze turned inwards because language contained an element of opacity, representation was problematized, and man became aware of how he was
represented to himself. We are thus better able to understand the newly-forged role of Psychology, Sociology and Literary/Cultural Studies; they studied man as a concept, they studied man's experience, his experience and his unconscious.

Modern man's capacity to think about the conditions which allow thought to take place introduce a quintessentially modern problem. Foucault refers to this problem as the emergence of the unthought. The arrival of the unthought is tied up with modern philosophy's hubris, its desire to interrogate constantly the unknown, which drifts tantalisingly beyond the horizon. Foucault suggests that thought thinks both itself and the unthought in a very active way. Modern thought, through the figure of man is, therefore, a specific kind of action.

The Order of Things ends with the somewhat confusing, possibly even hysterical suggestion that "man" as both a subject and object of knowledge is passing out of sight and into the shadows, perhaps to vanish from our field of knowledge forever. But how are we to contextualize this assertion and where exactly does Foucault go from here? These questions will hopefully be answered in the forthcoming sections.

L'archéologie du savoir (1969)

Michel Foucault's fourth book, The Archaeology of Knowledge, can be described in many ways, but most of all the book is an authoritative treatise on the archaeological method as well as a scathing attack on the History of Ideas. The book sets itself up in opposition to a set of assumptions which pre-define orthodox histories and in this regard
Foucault cites three individuals with whom we are already acquainted: Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Marx initiated a critique of continuist histories because he stressed that in the final analysis the truly important aspects of history were not controlled by the consciousness of the individual subject but by factors beyond his or her control. Nietzsche and Freud both continued this process of critique in their respective ways. The Archaeology of Knowledge can in other words be read as an extension of the method of critique although it does not resemble or rely upon the projects of the aforementioned to any great degree.

Foucault's attempt to extend and re-define the process of critique initiated by the three "masters of suspicion" begins by selecting a range of terms and procedures inimical to the History of Ideas. He begins by unpicking and laying bare the following notions; Oeuvre, influence, tradition, evolution and spirit. After he has done this he proceeds to recast the History of Ideas not as the successive improvement of knowledge across time but merely as a collection of similar statements. These statements are at no time reducible to a unitary guiding consciousness or transcendental ego and have no subjective intention which forms them. They are, in this sense, anonymous. Statements can be understood if we relate them to what Foucault calls the enunciative modality or "the laws of formation which operate behind things", namely: status, position and sites. Quite obviously not just anyone can speak with authority on any issue which might just appear to be attractive, and thus we have an indication of the importance of status. The role of position can be made meaningful when we look at the position of statements in a respective field and compare them to changes in various institutional classificatory procedures over time.
The third element, that of site, simply relates to the area or space from which statements are made - a hospital, a clinic or a university for example. It should also be realised that statements should be distinguished from both propositions and sentences; although both propositions and sentences can become statements, the process cannot be reversed. These material expressions (known as statements by Foucault) are subject to other defining characteristics, for instance, statements are not isolated expressions, they must be related to the broader textual field in which they appear. Furthermore, statements are not reducible to a transcendental subject, nor are they to be interpreted as an expression of a lost origin.

If a proposition, a sentence, a group of signs can be called "statement", it is not therefore because one day, someone happened to speak them or put them in some concrete form of writing; it is because the position of the subject can be assigned. To describe a formulation qua statement does not consist in analysing the relations between the author and what he says but in determining what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it.5

There are a further three terms which have a great deal of importance because they have a definitive bearing on the way in which statements are produced: the positivity provides a collection of statements with a coherence over time. What makes the positivity possible is the historical a priori, a system of rules from within the positivity itself, and the archive, which is not an inert, stable library of knowledge but rather a system which makes the creation of different statements (in accordance with the a priori) possible. The archive
can never be adequately described because it is potentially inexhaustible, the archive would appear to be the source from which everything emerges...

Foucault refers to a collection of statements as a discursive formation and a discursive formation is formed in the following way. Firstly, the object of discourse has to arise and locate itself, it has to appear in a certain space such as the family, the school or the workplace, in Foucault's words these "surfaces of emergence" are integral to the eventual creation of a discursive formation. Secondly, Foucault speaks of the need of certain guardians of a discourse to practice a process of ritual exclusion of disqualification, this particular rule is referred to as that practiced by the "authorities of delimitation". The third necessary rule for the formation of a discourse is the rule which follows particular "grids of specification", the manner in which various constituent elements within discourse itself can be related to and compared with one another. These three basic rules colour and effect each other in the most fundamental but nevertheless complex way. Furthermore, the three rules when combined do not constitute an object of concern, the object of the discourse and the discourse itself link together to form the conditions of possibility for discourses themselves.

The opening paragraph of this particular section suggested that The Archaeology of Knowledge was a scathing attack on the History of Ideas but it omitted to mention how we are to understand the latter. Foucault believes that the History of Ideas is dominated by three major themes, those of genesis, continuity, and totalization. In definite contrast to this the archaeological method is concerned with history in its discontinuous and non-totalizable state, a form without
locatable beginnings or chimerical ends. Foucault stresses that the History of Ideas treats discourse in terms of two basic values: the old and the new (or more precisely the separation of truth from error), and the traditional and the original (or, more accurately, the slow accumulation of things said or written). The History of Ideas attributes meaning and coherence to all that it studies whether it be a traditional history of art or an unravelling of the underlying factors which precipitated the formation of New Critical orthodoxy. The archaeological method functions in accordance with the following four criteria: the attribution of innovation, the analysis of contradiction, comparative descriptions and the mapping of transformations. More precisely, the archaeologist attempts firstly to de-objectify an object by the isolation of its discursive support.

The relentless impoverishment of one aspect of human experience, namely madness, by institutional and epistemological imperatives, is one such example. An archaeology attempts to describe transitions from one period to another. A suitable example in this regard would be the transition from nosology to anatomo-clinical medicine of the early eighteen hundreds as described by Foucault in The Birth of the Clinic. The archaeological method is once again at variance with more traditionally oriented history in its attempt to lay bare either irregularities or continuities within knowledge but does so beneath the level of the speaking subject. We need look no further than the collapse of representation as a result of the problematization of language during the Modern Episteme to furnish us with an example. Finally, the archaeological method privileges the term of difference, rather than seeking to gloss over its importance as traditional history is prone to do. Rather, it is an exploration of the debilitating consequences of unproductive contradictions, not their elision.
Surveiller et punit. Naissance de la prison (1975)

As the title of Foucault’s fifth book Discipline and Punish - the Birth of the Prison suggests that his study is a return to his former intellectual pursuits - the study of one specific regime of knowledge within a clearly identifiable institutional space. This recognition is at best a partial, if not misleading one because Discipline and Punish clearly qualifies as an extension of Foucault’s project in that he represents his first fully-realised conclusions about the implications that power/knowledge has for modern life. Thus the book is not about the history of prisons and imprisonment so much as it is a book about punishment, surveillance and the subtleties of power. Discipline and Punish relates directly to the enterprise which was evidenced in both The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge because Foucault’s contention is that the transition from one form of power to another is roughly simultaneous with the appearance of the human sciences as discursive fields which as we know have "man" as their primary object of knowledge. In their questionable search for knowledge about the individual the human sciences initiate a method which is remarkably similar to the one proposed by contemporary regimes of punishment. Their aim in both respects is to "psychologize" the subject. In the case of legal power the strategy took the form of creating an individual with a soul, a conscience and a will. But for the time being we will leave this proposition standing, floating as it were over the summary which is about to follow.

The Ancient Regime’s system of punishment was characterised by "supplice". Unfortunately no English equivalent of this word exists but it can be understood as the combination of a pseudo-theatrical spectacle and the exertion of corporal punishment. "Supplice"
represented an altogether different perception of power to that exerted in the future period of "relative enlightenment", where the system of power/knowledge undergoes a discernible change from brutal inhumanity (but a purposeful and finely-tuned inhumanity at that) to rituals of surveillance and classification, where subjects become objects in the continual sweep and interplay of norms and procedures.

Imprisonment was relatively rare during the seventeenth century but the eighteenth century gave rise to a radical alteration in the use to which houses of internment were put. There was a noticeable transformation on both the level of offender classification and the system of punishment to which prisoners were forced to submit. In fact, imprisonment can be seen as an alternative to torture and the more violent forms of corporal abuse. Why however was there a discernible shift in methods of punishment? Firstly, punishment as a spectacle was politically dangerous, and secondly, the system of legal power was such that it no longer needed to impress itself upon the body of the condemned in the form of torture but rather power followed a curve which demanded a diminuition of theatricality and a transfer from "public" to "private" space for virtually all types of punishment. What were the underlying currents in the shift from one form of power to another? To help us to answer this question it is necessary to discuss the roles played by the eighteenth century legal reformers.

The legal reformers of the second-half of the eighteenth century condemned the use of "supplice" as a type of punishment. They concerned themselves with the creation of a new definition of legal power. This need to revitalise and improve the judicial system took place with two major aims in mind. Firstly to curtail severely the over-abundance of sovereign power, and secondly to tighten the
existing loopholes in the law which allowed petty crimes to go undetected. We should interpret these alterations within the context of what Foucault suggests was the inexorable move towards a more disciplined society, although this statement should not go unqualified. We should not labour under the misconception that power/knowledge increases quantitatively, it merely becomes more variegated and less immediately visible. In line with the attempted refinement of the existing judicial structures and system, the law of social contract was given shape. This law asserted that a crime was no longer an infringement against the king but an act against society itself. Concomitant with the stress on social contract was an alteration in the entire geometry of law, a system of finely-tuned punishments which had as their basis a greater "respect" for the transgressor as a human being, and sought not an equivalence between crime and punishment but alternatively to minimise punishment carefully though the apparently "gentler" yet no less sinister example of persuasion and attempted rehabilitation. The features of the new "corrective strategy" employed by the model prisons and reformatories are of great significance because they echo across time and initiate a system of discipline which we as members of modern society have doubtless inherited. The features of this new configuration of disciplinary power are not that difficult to define; disciplines rely on the institutionalized supervision and ordering of both time and space. They also rely on the enclosure of the disciplined (whether those concerned be in schools, prisons, barracks or hospitals) and their classification down to the minutest details. Furthermore, the techniques whereby patients, workers and soldiers are kept under control can be summarized as follows: 1 - Hierarchical observation, 2 - Normalizing judgement and 3 - Examination and continual assessment. In relation to technique number one we may note that discipline cannot function at all if a complex system of
surveillance does not underwrite and operate in the institution itself. Secondly, judgement and potential disqualification are of course factors central to all normalizing discourse. And thirdly, no system of normalization can do without a rigorous regime of assessment on all levels.

I completed the opening paragraph of this section somewhat inexcusably - with a promise which I hoped would linger on the edge of this summary. It was a promise which hinted at a certain epistemological similarity.

Penal law and the human sciences have a common matrix in a specifically modern mode of exercising power, a mode which has given birth not only to the institution of the prison, but also to man himself as the object of a scientific discourse. 7

This particular quote suggests that we should be under no illusions as to the supposedly noble origins and liberating tendencies of the Human Sciences, for they too are part of what they condemn and are in no way "beyond" the operations and strategies of power. It is with this Nietzschean turn that Foucault has endeavoured during Discipline and Punish to hammer away at Enlightenment-derived platitudes about the nature of reason and man. He contends that we are not necessarily progressing towards freedom but are experiencing relative unfreedom as a result of the strictures of disciplinary power, a power which attaches itself to and moulds the human body. It is once again the human body which Foucault is concerned with in his next book, The History of Sexuality, vol I.
Michel Foucault's sixth recognised work, *The History of Sexuality* (1976), should not be considered as a variation on the History of Ideas theme, nor should it be understood as a Post-Structuralist compendium of playful erotica, but rather it should be read as a radical reversal of our common-sense inheritance vis-à-vis sex and its relationship to experience and truth.

The book is at pains to demonstrate that all versions of Freudo-Marxism are nothing but convenient delusions. In fact Foucault questions the theory which contends that the advent of capitalism placed taboos on sex and repressed (and continues to do so) "true sexuality". He asserts that firstly we have no "true sexuality" to speak of and secondly the "repressive hypothesis" fails to account for the fact that it was not the cornerstone of the productive process (the adult working male) who was severely restricted sexually, because contrary to received opinion, the Victorian age was only superficially a prudish one. Besides which, the "repressive hypothesis" relies upon a conception of power that is for Foucault manifestly incorrect. For the Freudo-Marxists power is controlled and regulated either by the state or the bourgeoisie or both, and its movement takes place from top to bottom. Foucault suggests instead that power is at once ubiquitous and productive and rather than stressing control from above we should conceive of power as a grid of intersecting relations emanating from below. Thus it is not enough to hold that the Victorian age in general, and the capitalist worker in particular, were transversed by repressive power because, as Foucault demonstrates, discourse about sex, truth and sexuality, whether it be in the form of health, confession, or self-examination, proliferated during the age which we normally take as a primary example of
During the eighteenth century the "sexual field" was dominated by three systems of law which governed sexual behaviour: Civil law, Christian pastoral and Canonical law. The basic object of these laws was the institution of marriage and the definition of what was considered acceptable or illicit in sexual practice. A great deal of significance was attached to the conception of what was considered natural and the absolute fragmentation of the "sexual field" during the mid-eighteenth century transformed (and caused along with the changing modes of sexual perception) a different understanding of the unnatural/natural dichotomy. The changes in the "sexual field" can be understood as alterations along two different but mutually compatible axial lines; changes in the rules of sexual alliance and legal-moral discourse and changes in the rules relating to sexuality and pleasure which can be related to an alteration in psycho-medical discourse. The second component of the new discourse on sexuality and pleasure (which can be termed bio-power and welfare) became increasingly concerned, if not obsessed, with a vast new range of character-types and objects. Quite suddenly the child became the subject of a great deal of heated debate. The categories of the hysterical woman, the perverse adult, and the homosexual were created by the demands of a new configuration of power/knowledge. Themes which were central to the important new issue of the population's health and welfare also began to emerge. The following were perceived as significant: birth and death rates, contraception, fertility rates, and public cleanliness. These issues attained importance because the entire atmosphere of life had changed now that the economic functioning of the newly-industrialised countries demanded a monitoring of the population. Furthermore the former unnatural/natural dichotomy was displaced by a more general normalizing and pathologizing apparatus.
Secondly the new psycho-medical discourse began to be usurped by a psycho-medical amalgam, one which is exemplified by none other than Sigmund Freud.

During the eighteenth century Western Europe witnessed an immense proliferation of discourses on and about sexuality. They were all tied in various degrees to the belief that if people could find their sexual truth it would automatically signify that they had found a "truth" about themselves. One of the predominant features of this belief was the confession. As the confession became secularized and incorporated into non-religious practice and ritual, it tended to mask the dictates of power/knowledge and the role of the father-confessor came to be reproduced in a number of different guises; that of the teacher-confessor, doctor-confessor, and social-worker confessor. The confession came to be disseminated throughout society as a form which encouraged the expression of a supposedly pure and unmediated subjectivity. A hidden monument to the perhaps mistaken belief in the talking-cure and the power of experience to understand the workings of its own unconscious.

1.2: BACKGROUND TO A METHODOLOGY

The first half of this introductory chapter was designed to introduce the unfamiliar reader to the most important of Foucauldian ideas. It might plausibly be suggested that I have in this regard misread Foucault's work. I have projected a conceptual and thematic continuity on to his work in a questionable if not false way. What is worse, it might be asserted that I have recuperated and thereby de-radicalised what I have touched. On the other hand, however, hopefully I have succeeded in establishing, albeit in a somewhat
tentative way, a working vocabulary and a foundation on which to build. During the section which follows this is exactly what I intend doing. With the help of what I feel are Foucault's two most important essays, *The Order of Discourse* and *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, I will attempt to outline a blueprint which will allow me to work toward a methodology for my own project, *that is, a study of events, institutions and the emergence of the subject therein, within the dominant context of the Municipality of Woodstock*.

In the brief introduction which frames Foucault's essay, Robert Young sees fit to take the reader back in time to Foucault's very first book, *Madness and Civilization*. It will be remembered that during this book Foucault attempts to understand the rise of reason in the West through an analysis of that shadowy, enigmatic realm which surrounds reason on all sides, unreason or madness. Yet how does the theorist try to re-create the meaninglessness of madness, how does he make it speak a tangible "truth"? Young believes that this question haunted Foucault and led him instead to pursue different yet related questions. For example, what are the procedures which make up our will-to-reason, our will-to-knowledge? This positive unconscious of knowledge does not relate directly to madness but asks instead what are those mechanisms internal to discourse itself which form and keep it in circulation. And furthermore, how powerful and pervasive is discourse if it can effectively banish (and continue to do so) a certain type of knowledge - that of madness.

The structure of *The Order of Discourse* is circular. The essay begins in an attempt to insert itself into the already spoken and it ends on a ritualised note of hommage - we are dealing with French academic protocol here - to Foucault's former philosophy teacher at the Sorbonne, Jean Hyppolite. This "already spoken" is of course
Hyppolite's language, the language of a past master and guide to whom Foucault is greatly indebted. Hyppolite's presence thus appears to loom over the entire paper, infusing Foucault's work with a sense of oedipal tension, of rivalry and finally, of the sense of liberation which ensues after the creation of a philosophical space which curves beyond the reach of the master.

The second section of the paper begins in the following manner:

Here is the hypothesis which I would like to put forward tonight in order to fix the terrain - or perhaps the very provisional theatre - of the work that I am doing: that in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.

Foucault's paper introduces a primary distinction. The distinction is between discourse, which is understood to be free-flowing and libidinal and the institution, an organization or matrix of knowledge which at every attempt tries to channel and limit discourse. The two are inextricably linked and function together in a system of mutual inter-reliance rather than separately. Foucault thinks that there are three major principles of institutional exclusion which "forge" discourse: what cannot be said - in other words, what is forbidden - what constitutes the severance of madness from reason and what maintains an underlies our will-to-truth. Foucault maintains that, The third system (the will-to-truth) increasingly attempts to assimilate the others, both in order to modify them and to
provide them with a foundation. The first two (the forbidden, the division of madness) are constantly becoming more fragile and more uncertain to the extent that they are now invaded by the will-to-truth which for its part constantly grows stronger, deeper, and more implacable.  

Foucault contends that this will-to-truth is caught up in both desire and power. Thus, on the discursive level, any "truth" is not simply natural and given but crossed by the dictates of both power and desire. Having exhausted the system of exterior functions which limit discourse, Foucault goes on to analyse the system of interior constraints on discourse. These principles of "classification" do not relate to desire and power but to events and chance. Let me explain; firstly there is the role of commentary, the ongoing process of expression and re-ordering with respect to the narratives which are essential to the reproduction of society. Secondly, there is the function of the author, a function which serves to reduce meaning to an originating consciousness. With regard to both the role of commentary and that of the author Foucault writes,

The commentary principle limits the chance element in discourse by the play of an identity which would take the form of repetition and sameness. The author principle limits this same element of chance by the play of an identity which has the form of individuality and the self.  

Thirdly, there is the function of the discipline which is opposed to both the role of commentary and of the author. This is so because, in the first place, disciplines, unlike commentaries, are concerned with the production and distribution of new statements whereas commentaries attempt to decipher pre-existing meanings. With respect
to authors, disciplines, which are a system of rule-governed, yet anonymous procedures, are anti-authorial in their bias because their project is not to reduce meaning to an "inventor" but to formulate proposals in order to understand, and create, truths. Finally in this regard Foucault states,

We are accustomed to see in an author's fecundity, in the multiplicity of commentaries, and in the development of a discipline so many infinite resources for the creation of discourses. Perhaps so, but they are nonetheless principles of constraint; it is very likely impossible to account for their positive and multiplicative role if we do not take into consideration their restrictive and constraining function.\(^\text{12}\)

Lastly there is a "third group of procedures" which attempt to control and delimit discourse. In order to understand this third group we must analyse their determining conditions of application and their manner of restriction. These can be dismantled under the following headings: Ritual, which is composed of qualifications, positions, gestures, with reference to those who speak. Doctrine (or, "doctrinal allegiance") which is a system or pattern of truth which puts both speaker and statement in jeopardy if they choose to utter a heresy or to contravene a code of enunciation. Towards the end of the fourth section of his paper, Foucault also has certain thoughts about the function of education in "our" societies,

Any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and power which they carry.\(^\text{13}\)

What are the methods upon which analysis predicates itself? In this
regard Foucault proposes four compatible and mutually inter-related principles. Firstly there is the "principle of reversal". Where the History of Ideas stressed the importance of a tradition or author, critical analysis should reverse this obsession and instead valorise the function of rarefaction. The "principle of reversal" does not analyse discourse in its linear productive splendour but focuses on the supposedly negative ambition of "cutting-up", of severing discourse from its epistemological anchors. Secondly there is the "principle of discontinuity". It is imperative that discourse be studied as discontinuous "practices". Discourses do of course encroach upon each other but it is important to maintain them separately and not to reconstitute a massive, continuous unthought or unsaid beneath the surface of discourse itself. Thirdly, Foucault recognises the fact that we must not analyse objects in the manner of the hermeneuticist. In other words the recognition that objects do not pre-exist us but are in fact constituted by discourse itself leads to the "principle of specificity". Fourthly, Foucault sketches out the principle or rule of exteriority. With respect to this rule he states that the analyst should not proceed inwards towards a forbidden core of meaning but should move outwards in an attempt to investigate the discourse’s "external conditions of possibility". Foucault writes,

Four notions, then, must serve as the regulating principle of the analysis; the event, the series, the regularity, the condition of possibility. Term for term we find the notion of the event opposed to that of creation, series opposed to unity, regularity opposed to originality, and conditions of possibility opposed to signification. These other four notions (signification, originality, unity, creation) have in a general way dominated the traditional history of ideas, where by common agreement one
sought the point of creation, the unity of a work, an epoch a
theme, the mark of individual originality, and the infinite
treasure of buried significations.14

After a brief digression on the nature of the event and series and
the relationship that these two principles have to the project of the
Annales historians, Foucault prepares to elaborate some of the
philosophical problems that might be associated with the
above-mentioned notions; event, series, regularity and conditions of
possibility. These choice musings follow the logic of paradox and
initiate a strategy of refusing to make themselves transparent. With
regard to the discursive event, Foucault notes that,

Naturally the event is neither substance nor accident, neither
quality nor process; the event is not of the order of bodies. And
yet it is not something immaterial either; it is always at the
level of materiality that it takes effect, that it has effect; it
has its locus and it consists in the relation, the coexistence,
the dispersion, the overlapping, the accumulation, and the
selection of material elements. It is not the act or the property
of a body; it is produced as an effect of, and within, a
dispersion of matter. Let us say that the philosophy of the event
should move in the at first sight paradoxical direction of a
materialism of the incorporeal.15

With reference to the idea of the discursive event, Foucault asks how
one is to understand the related notion of series which are
"discontinuous in relation to each other". Foucault suggests that it
is literally necessary to "break-up" the subject into an array of
conflicting positions, as well as contesting the succession of "the
instant" (I take this to approximate the moment and to be synonymous
with the passing of time) in a manner in which enables the analyst to construct or at least approach "a theory of discontinuous systematicities". Between "a materialism of the incorporeal" and a discontinuous systematics, the vigilant analyst should insert the idea of chance, "We must accept the aléa as a category in the production of events".16

At the beginning of the seventh section of Foucault's essay he clarifies the manner in which he hopes to use the methodological outline which he has proposed thus far. He divides this process in two; firstly there is what he refers to as the critical set, a system of analysis which has as its conceptual underpinning the principle of reversal. This principle attempts to understand how systems of exclusion and prohibition and classification and limitation have operated historically. In this regard Foucault offers a number of helpful examples which either refer to work he has already done or work which he still hopes to do. Secondly, there is the genealogical set which puts the aforementioned second, third and fourth principles to work. These principles are those of discontinuity and specificity and the rule of exteriority. The genealogical set would thus attempt to find out how particular discourses come to be formed and under what constraints, "what was the specific norm of each one, and what were their conditions of appearance, growth and variation"17. At the bottom of the next page Foucault is at pains to point out that the two critical tasks cannot be separated. In fact, one might be prompted to suggest that the two tasks are even complimentary, although their perspectives are somewhat different. To conclude, it is only correct that the last word be Foucault's.

The critical portion of the analysis applies to the systems that envelop discourse, and tries to identify and grasp these
principles of sanctioning, exclusion, and scarcity of discourse. Let us say, playing on words, that it practices a studied casualness. The genealogical portion, on the other hand, applies to the series where discourse is effectively formed; it tries to grasp it in its power of affirmation, by which I mean not so much a power which would be opposed to that of denying, but rather the power to constitute domains of objects, in respect of which one can affirm or deny true or false propositions. Let us call these domains of objects positivities, and let us say, again playing on words, that if the critical style is that of studious casualness, the genealogical mood will be that of a happy positivism. 18

Foucault's essay, *Nietzsche. Genealogy. History*, written in 1971 and first published in translation in *Language. Counter-Memory. Practice*, provides me with some of the material which will help to sketch the conceptual backdrop to the construction of a methodology in section 1.3. The essay is an attempt to lay bare the groundrules which will contribute to the formation of what Foucault refers to as "Effective history" - a certain type of historiographic undertaking which attempts to activate a "counter-memory". Not surprisingly the essay is first and foremost an anti-metaphysical tirade and although the phrase history-of-ideas is never mentioned, we can take it as given that the hidden object behind Foucault's attack is a certain form of idealist historiography, namely that exemplified by the title *History-of-Ideas*.

The essay begins with a meditation, or more specifically an exegesis, on the nature, meaning and significance of three well-used Nietzschean words, *Ursprung*, *Herkunft* and *Entstehung*, all of which loosely refer to the concept of origin. The word *Ursprung* has a number of rather indistinct meanings. For Nietzsche it does however
mean, "a pursuit of origins"\textsuperscript{19} as well as signifying "a guilty conscience"\textsuperscript{20} and "a discussion of logic"\textsuperscript{21}. The word \textit{Herkunft} can be translated with a greater degree of precision and is the equivalent of descent and stresses difference rather than resemblance. \textit{Entstehung} designates emergence. The last two words, namely those of \textit{Herkunft} and \textit{Entstehung} are the words through which Foucault attempts to explain some of the guiding contestatory principles of the genealogy.

In order for us to understand some of the crucial aspects of the genealogical method it is necessary for us to clarify (once again) some of the determining aspects of traditional history or the History of Ideas. Traditional histories attempt to ground themselves in the consoling identity of the origin. To this premise is opposed the following Nietzschean assertion, "the lofty origin is no more than a metaphysical extension which arises from the belief that things are most precious and essential at the moment of birth"\textsuperscript{22}. The quest for origins (\textit{Ursprung}) is a theoretical device which enables the historian to locate meaning in sameness and identity, whereas the genealogist understands history as, "The concrete body of a development, with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells; and only a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of the origin."\textsuperscript{23}

Thus, instead of reaching for the lost origin, the genealogist proceeds to celebrate the differential nature of descent (\textit{Herkunft}). Foucault quotes from Nietzsche's \textit{On the Genealogy of Morals} when he writes,

\begin{quote}
Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does
\end{quote}
not map the destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations - or conversely, the complete reversals. The errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that give birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents.24

An analysis which privileges the term descent (Herkunft) does not seek to re-affirm homogeniety at the beginning of things. Its concern is to shatter, to fragment, to seek heterogeniety in history, which is a series composed of discontinuous moments, fractures, reversals. In short, the past is dominated by chance rather than meaning and identity. The genealogist's project thus, is not to uncover meaning and identity - usually "found" by orthodox historians who are not prepared to acknowledge their desires in the creation of historical meaning, for to do so would be to undermine their pretention to objective science - but to actively intervene in the analysis of events and the emergence of supposedly "universal" objects (like the human body, for instance) and the different regimes of knowledge to which it has been forced to submit. In fact,

Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body.25

Foucault begins the essay's fourth section with a definition of 'Enstehung' or emergence and he notes that it should never be viewed as the final point or absolute in any history. Through the trope of
emergence genealogy attempts, "to re-establish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning but the hazardous play of dominations." 26

The "force" which is emergence, is, it appears, not reducible to the intentions of active subjects. It occurs at a "non-place" but is nevertheless a confrontation of a moral kind. This confrontation is the "play of dominations", a relationship/non-relationship which is characterised principally by rituals.

This relationship of domination is no more a "relationship" than the place where it occurs is a place; and, precisely for this reason, it is fixed throughout its history, in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations. It establishes marks of its power and engraves memories on things and even within bodies. It makes itself accountable for debts and gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no means designed to temper violence but rather to satisfy it.27

Now that we have been provided with the briefest outline of the importance of Herkunft and Enstehung to the practice of genealogy it is important to ask, as Foucault does, what exactly is the relationship between the two concepts? Foucault proceeds to answer his question by suggesting that Herkunft and Enstehung should supplement the practice of "Effective history", a genealogical enterprise which steadfastly opposes all forms of metaphysical history (or Egyptianism). Histories which are, in other words, dominated by the search for truth, their identification of the end of time, a "historian's history" which bases "its judgements on an apocalyptic objectivity" and an "eternal truth"28. The "effective history" of which Herkunft and Enstehung are part is primarily
directed towards the human body, an object which, if we are to believe traditional historians, has remained unchanged and constant across time. Effective history does not accept this as given for,

"Effective" history differs from traditional history in being without constants. Nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men. The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled. Necessarily, we must dismiss those tendencies that encourage the consoling play of recognitions. Knowledge, even under the banner of history, does not depend on "rediscovery" and it emphatically excludes the "rediscovery of ourselves".29

The "short-vision of effective history" can be compared to the totalizing gaze of traditional history through its differing approach. In this regard the "event" is of prime importance for this thesis is an attempt to order events (which happened in or around certain institutional contexts) in a series or narrative sequence. Thus for "effective history" the event is not a major happening such as a "war", a "treaty", or a "battle", "but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked 'other'"30.

"Effective history" can be distinguished from traditional history in the following ways: unlike traditional history, effective history acknowledges that it is perspectival, in other words, it claims to be
merely one perspective among others, and not necessarily a truthful one at that. The "curative science" otherwise known as "effective history" does not become a victim of the malice of orthodox historians, who are not protected by the myth of objectivity or the lingering of pervasive universals. Furthermore, the "historical sense" which underlies "effective history"

...gives rise to three uses that oppose and correspond to the three Platonic modalities of history. The first is parodic, directed against reality, and opposes the theme of history as reminiscence or recognition; the second is dissociative, directed against identity, and opposes history given as continuity or representative of a tradition; the third is sacrificial, directed against truth, and opposes history as knowledge. They imply a use of history that severs its connection to memory, its metaphysical and anthropological model, and constructs a counter-memory - a transformation of history into a totally different form of time.31

And this interpretation of critical or "effective" history is what finally allows us to acknowledge the meaning of the genealogical method;

The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible all those discontinuities which cross us.32
I have taken great pains to demonstrate that Foucault is no "ordinary" philosopher. Rather, like mercury, he always seems to be in the process of becoming something else. This has the effect of alienating the reader, who is thus inevitably one step behind the magician's next trick. What I have done in this introductory chapter, therefore, is to introduce the reader to Foucault's work in chronological order, introducing him/her gently to Foucault's preoccupations and concerns. I have shown for example how, from a very early period, Foucault has been suspicious of conventional forms of history. I have shown how his interest in the philosophers of science, like Bachelard and Canguilhem, has led him to an appreciation of the idea that history need not be concerned with spatio-temporal unities, but might be a form which honours spatio-temporal heterogeniety; the genealogy is one such attempt to respect temporal difference. In fact, it is possible to "read" Foucault as a philosopher who adapts methods forged in the life-sciences and applies them to the social or human sciences. This is demonstrated very well in his genealogies, where he suggests that the genealogy is a method capable of unlocking the history of the body. This is in contrast to "orthodox" historians who have in general assumed that the body remains untouched by history. I have also shown how Foucault has increasingly been concerned with the need to solve particular problems in specific contexts. This genealogy is an attempt at extending that ambition.

In order to distil as much methodological worth from this most anti-methodological of all recent philosophers, I have progressively narrowed the focus of our considerations. The second section of this introductory chapter was a narrowing of the first and in similar
fashion I intend to make this, the final section of this chapter as transparently methodological as I can.

I have already hinted at the methodological significance of the event (see above, section 1.2.). The event is of vital importance to this project because, in relation to the questions and problems posed around the issue of the emergence of a municipality as an institution in the introduction, I hope to place a series of events in narrative sequence. In contrast to orthodox forms of historiography, where the historian tends to neglect the issue of his or her desire in the construction of historical meaning - this is usually linked to a naive trust in pre-existing "facts" - the logic of the event and its subsequent narrativisation is the outcome of the genealogists immersion in the topic: the manner in which they retroactively project significance back onto the past. For the most part then, my desire to seek out the meaning-effect of events within the context of four municipal institutions is a result of a generalised dissatisfaction with the writing on local history. (This will take concrete shape in the chapter which follows.) It is also borne of a fascination with the writings of Michel Foucault, who himself was intrigued with the emergence of certain institutions in the modern age. Foucault is unique in that he contends that disciplinary institutions emerged from the same epistemological matrix as man and the human sciences. They are thus able to offer "consoling" counter-examples to the enlightenment dream of a progressively liberating rationality. Far from being an attempt to mimic Foucault, this genealogy is an attempt, therefore, to register the meaning-effect of the emergence of a paradigmatically modern series of municipal institutions, and the position of the event in relation to those institutions.
It is important to note at this point that the questions and problems raised in the introduction were of paramount importance, because questions posed at the beginning of any genealogy tend to define the status and significance of events. In effect this means that another researcher could embark on a genealogy of the Woodstock Municipality but do so in terms of a different generality, a different range of questions. These questions would accord different significances to the "same" events because the events would presumably be assembled and interpreted differently. In this case, we would be obliged to scrutinize the status of the "same" event because in effect it would be different, in the sense that its significance would be altered in relation to the choice of the events - the narrative series - around it.

If we are to understand the importance of the event and the series we need to accept that language and thought are independent of each other. The constitution of the event takes place when language and the event coincide in consciousness: the retrospective construction of the event in thought is a phantasm which gets retroactively projected by the historian back onto the "actual event" and goes to make up the membrane or skin of its meaning-effect. By asserting that we are dealing with the meaning-effect of an event I do not mean to suggest for instance that the founding of the Woodstock Municipality did not happen as an event in the real. I am simply suggesting that the "event" is part of a narrative which has everything to do with my construction and arrangement of it as such. Before the logic of phantasm becomes too overwhelming, however, it is necessary to undertake a slight philosophical detour.

We should note that when Foucault writes about the event (see above) he has in mind this logic of phantasm. 35 This idea (borrowed from
the French post-structuralist philosopher Gilles Deleuze) asserts that the event in the real is repeated as a Platonic bad copy or phantasm in thought. By pushing the Platonic notion of good and bad copies of an original to their outer limit, Deleuze is able to assert that the phantasm actually precedes the original. Plato was aware of the bad copy’s destructive potential because it was able to offer a critique of the Idea as truth. Deleuze’s contribution was to note that the bad copy disrupts the status of the original (as a bad copy it refers to nothing but itself, it is thus retrospectively creative because the original cannot be an original without appearing in series in relation to those around it). The bad copy also subversively unravels all correspondences between all variants of the "original" "good-copy" combination (like that between essence and appearance, for example) precisely because the reality of the bad copy make the implied equivalence between "original" and "bad-copy" meaningless.

The implications which follow from the above are as follows: Deleuze puts forward the famous example of a battle. He asks, "Where is the battle?" particularly if the battle is made up of a Breughel-like canvas of separate actions involving a series of small battlefield dramas. Clearly, none of these micro-actions can be said to constitute the battle as such, "So where is the battle?". According to Deleuze, "the battle" appears to function in the same way as a sea-mist, spreading gently across the battlefield, retaining its "identity" as that which is separate from the series of actions but at the same time making up the tissue of the drama’s meaning-effect. The phantasm does not produce the event, but like the example of the sea-mist, it hovers over the battlefield like a simulacrum, bringing the event into existence when the event and language coincide. According to Robert Young,
Foucault recognizes in Deleuze’s account of events as singularities, points or intensities on a surface ready to be actualised in any particular form or meaning, the potential for pushing further his own notion of history as a genealogical series. Such a genealogy works by repeating the (non)event, as an event, in thought - in a structure comparable to Freud’s "deferred action" or "retroactivity". No more than the latter does it seek to lay claim to "the real" or Truth as such. Foucault inflects this model by focussing on the possibility of constructing the series so as to repeat the disruption and discontinuity of the (non-original) event. 39

The logic of the phantasm is one way of activating the meaning-effect of events. The event, which is to some degree constituted by the historian, is not analysed for its "truth" but rather for its meaning-effect. Thus although the genealogy is to some extent a polemical critique of certain expressions of contemporary historiography, it does not pretend do anything more than narrate a series of events against a generality posed in the present. Herein lurks the transgressive and politically contestative element of the genealogy as a history of the present: for not only are the questions raised important (see introduction), but so too is the "event" of the writing of this thesis. In exploiting the philosophical space between the "event" and the retroactive projection of desire which phantasmically creates that event, I am attempting to critique all forms of history which insist on the consoling play of identities between past and present. My methodology will allow me to isolate certain events within the context of the institutions in which they "happened" and then scrutinize them for their meaning-effects or intelligibility. Thereafter I will attempt to isolate certain
features within the respective institutions in line with the generality that has already been posed in the introduction. These features will inevitably revolve around the constitution and emergence of the subject rather than the attempted reconstruction of the subject's experience. I will try to analyse the discursive practices (both within and without the respective institutions) and disciplinary regimes, their limits and their relationship to other regimes and discursive practices in the series.

In looking toward chapter two, in which I "deconstruct" a piece of recent historical writing which conforms in many ways to that to which Foucault is strongly opposed, I wish to make clear the following: the critique of Rediscovering Woodstock is not a gratuitous intervention, but is necessary because it is an expression of what I am writing against. The polemic against "Rediscovering Woodstock" is not a specific articulation of my methodology as such, but is a practical application of Foucault's ideas which is consistent at the level of assumption to the strains and biases in his work. The isolation of certain events and their relationship to the institution in which they happened will make up the bulk of the rest of the thesis. This is therefore the portion of the thesis in which my methodology will be the most productively employed.
FOOTNOTES


4. ibid., p.65.


7. ibid., p.297.

8. Alan Sheridan suggests that Jean Hyppolite was Foucault’s philosophy teacher at both Henri IV and the Sorbonne. In Sheridan, A. Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth. (London: Tavistock, 1980), p.3.


10. ibid., p.56.

11. ibid., p.59.

12. ibid., p.61.

13. ibid., p.64.

14. ibid., pp.67,68.

15. ibid., p.69.

16. ibid., p.69.
17. ibid., p. 70.
18. ibid., p. 73.
20. ibid., p.142.
21. ibid., p.142.
22. ibid., p.143.
23. ibid., p.145.
24. ibid., p.146.
25. ibid., p.148.
26. ibid., p.148.
27. ibid., p.150.
30. ibid., p.154.
31. ibid., p.160.
32. ibid., p.162.
35. Foucault, M. quoted in Young, R. White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. (London: Routledge, 1990), p.82.
37. ibid., pp. 82, 83.

38. In his foreword to one of Deleuze's later books on Foucault himself, Paul Bové takes Charles Taylor to task for his and his
discipline’s inability to apprehend Foucault with anything approaching sympathy. Bove suggests that Taylor is a "limit-case" for understanding how a philosopher who is as hostile to the analytic tradition as Foucault is, is incorporated via some extremely problematic and reductive readings into the analytical canon. Bove does not assert anything so crude as to suggest that Taylor misrepresents Foucault, but he does focus on the manner in which Taylor - from within the discipline of analytical philosophy - is forced to flatten and thus deradicalize Foucault's thought. In order to understand Foucault's work, Taylor operates a system of double translation whereby Foucault's work is paraphrased and then reduced still further, so that his writings become a series of transparent, styleless "positions". stories about truth and power, for example, which can then be found to be logically inconsistent, and can therefore be dismissed as irrelevant. Bove condemns Taylor for not considering the limitations of his own discipline. He suggests that Taylor has allowed Foucault's work to be "recollected" and reduced to a series of immobile "positions" and is thus participating in the Power/Knowledge complex which Foucault critiques. Bove implies that Taylor cannot be ironical or self-critical about the nature of his own disciplinary formation because to do so would draw attention to its use of a limiting regime of truth, and thus power, and would in turn de-mythologize its supposedly disinterested stance vis-a-vis knowledge and truth. Bove goes on to trace the relationship between "grand humanist intellectuals" like Taylor (although Taylor is variously described as an organic and universal intellectual) and the "liberal state" in that it is precisely these kinds of moves, saturated with "power" and "ideology" as they are, that characterize the production of the liberal state.
Whilst sharing Bové’s suspicion of analytical philosophy as an institution which is forced to limit the more threatening dimensions of radical thought, Bové’s criticisms do not leave me entirely convinced of the validity of his claims. I am struck by the high artificiality as well as the manner in which academics have used Foucault’s work to empower themselves professionally, through critiques of others’ institutional settings and formations. These formations are understandably resistant to critical self-examination, given that they collude with the power apparatus and function as distributors of a circumscribed truth.

I note with mild amusement that Bové calls attention to Taylor’s manifest failure to provide his readers with a historical account of the (genealogical) formation of analytical philosophy. Yet Bové does nothing of the sort himself. Surely Bové is only able to criticise Taylor from within a specific disciplinary conjuncture - that of Literary Studies/Comparative Literature - which is, in turn, part of the Academy, a notorious institution, which apparently regulates, and is even strengthened by, internal dissent. Under the guise of liberal tolerance, the University seems to encourage mutually-hostile and even self-cancelling discourses and thereby reproduces its hegemony. Bové is only able to criticize Taylor because he is articulating himself from within a disciplinary formation which itself has a specific past which has contributed to its greater threshold of tolerance. However, he too is not historically sensitive enough, for to be so would draw attention to the construction of the University in general and Arts and Humanities departments in particular (from within which he is writing) and thus, by drawing attention to the institutional conditions of possibility, he would limit the
effectiveness of his critique. Without an adequate historic discussion of the University, Bové finds that, almost in spite of himself, he might be inextricably linked to the production of the liberal consensus which he eschews.


40. For a similar, though less exhaustive critique, refer to the conclusion of this thesis, in which I question the methods employed by one of Foucault’s American commentators.
CHAPTER 2: A POLEMIC AGAINST ORTHODOXY

INTRODUCTION

Chapter two is both a continuation of my introductory chapter, as well as an adaption and extension of some of the ideas contained therein. The chapter takes the form of a critical re-writing of an essay entitled Rediscovering Woodstock. This re-writing has a specifically Foucauldian bias and it is thereby intended to familiarize the reader with certain perennial concerns and themes. Hopefully, the argument will be less rarified than were the summaries provided in the preceding chapter. As such this chapter is intended as an important bridge between the summarizing and creation of a methodology in chapter one and the case-studies of chapters three to six.

I have chosen to "deconstruct" Rediscovering Woodstock in two ways: the first method is immediate and is confined to chapter two. The second takes place over the entire course of the thesis, as the chapters which involve case-studies are attempts to render as subtly as possible those forms of insurrectionary and discredited knowledge of which Foucault has always been so fond.

In its ordinary and inoffensive way, Rediscovering Woodstock upholds many of the assumptions which I am attempting to challenge. In its apparently neutral and fair-minded pursuit of the truth, for example, the essay is an extremely self-interested expression of the will-to-power. The profound difference of a restless past is controlled under the guise of similarity (sameness) and thus continuity and ultimately identity between past and present is confirmed.
I should make the reader aware at this point that one of my ambitions with this genealogy is to draw attention to not only disciplinary technologies and the ordering of penitents' or patients' subjectivities; but also to explore several examples of disruptive difference: incidents, forms of behaviour and accidents, which have been neglected by the historical discourse, of which Badham's essay is part. This is because it is a discourse which cannot accommodate threatening local knowledge, those struggles and memories which as examples of alterity fall both beneath the view of worthiness (science) and, which threaten reasonable discourse's very constitution.

In chapters three to six, I will be looking, in classic genealogical fashion, at the textual surfaces of four institutions in order to reconstitute their disciplinary technologies and unique forms of institutional truth. In so doing, I suggest that there is an entire range of local activity and culture which has passed beneath the view of historians like Badham.

What this genealogy is attempting to do is to understand, from the point of view of a vaguely demarcated present, aspects of the past which were strange enough to establish themselves as radically different, even discontinuous with our present. Nevertheless, I am also trying to reconstitute a segment of the past (1882 - 1913) and hope in so doing to be able to trace a part of the logic which leads to where we find ourselves today. For this, after all, is what a genealogy is all about: it is an attempt to understand the present (however imperfectly) in terms of subordinated aspects of the past. Unlike Badham's essay, my undertaking is not a retrospective projection of current norms and values on to the past, and thus a covert justification of our present, rather it is a recognition that if we are able to capture the past in any way at all, it will be in our
sensitivity to heterogeniety and difference.

2.1: HISTORY

I think it appropriate to begin with a consideration of the word "rediscovering" in the title Rediscovering Woodstock. Rediscovery implies an expanse of emptiness between an 'original' and a later period of discovery. What shape did this emptiness take? Badham's article states that the emptiness was that of an active forgetting or lack of interest on the part of historians.¹

"Woodstock is dying of neglect" wrote C. Pama in 1979; Almost a decade later, this is still the case not only in terms of its generally dilapidated run-down appearance but also of historical research of the area. Historians have tended to overlook this once dynamic centre which underwent rapid change in the late nineteenth century, being second in size to central Cape Town, the focus of most urban history.²

The emptiness was therefore textual, an absence within local historical discourse. But this is not all; Cape Town, which is more attractive than Woodstock has claimed researchers attention and, Woodstock is a municipality which has forgotten itself; the words "generally dilapidated run-down appearance"³ are of prime importance because they provide the necessary justification for the restoration of 'consciousness' for 'rediscovery'.

The metaphor of the forgotten dominates the final paragraph of Rediscovering Woodstock's brief introduction. This time it is combined with a suggestion that not only has Woodstock been forgotten but that

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Woodstock's 'essence' remains invisible to a superficial 'reading', particularly to train passengers, people who literally slide across the municipality's surface.\textsuperscript{4}

The trains rattle past. For the passengers, Woodstock is little more than the back of buildings, bright pro-temperence billboards, a patch of grass and windswept melkboom. This is a far cry from Woodstock at the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{5}

We thus find ourselves in the midst of a spiral which by implication suggests that invisibility can be equated with lack, lack of knowledge or even non-knowledge. In opposition to this, the final sentence implicitly promises to remedy this lack, to restore our faith in historical knowledge with a reading which goes beneath the surface, that is, a deep reading. The history of Woodstock, through the 'intervention' of a socially conscious researcher, will once again be united with itself. We have thus witnessed the closure of the hermeneutic circle. The fusion of subject and object, and the article has come to a premature end before it has been properly begun. This false closure is part of Badham's conception of history. For her, history is (amongst other things) something which people possess. History is a fetish, a purely mental appropriation of what presently exists and has existed in the past. If Badham enters into a relationship of rediscovery followed by one of repossession, she is either required to presume a shared subjectivity between minds or she is forced into the extreme position of having to admit that in spite of her altruistic intentions, the good people of Woodstock just don't care. There is a third option though; that the historian/philanthropist is bound by a consensus between defined parties and that he/she would have a mandate for 'rediscovery' before any investigation begins. As we shall see shortly this third alternative is clearly impossible. Aside
from the reader’s realisation that the municipality’s history belongs
to all who live there, this ‘all’ is only defined insofar as we
acknowledge them to be inhabitants of the municipality rather than,
say, members of a class. Thus Badham’s conception of the subject
extends no further than it being a member of a place which is
arbitrarily defined. There is no innate reason why Table Bay, Devil’s
Peak and Salt River should signify as the boundaries of the
municipality. The characteristic of place and presumably the attendant
sense of belonging appears to be a rather vague qualification on which
to base an urban history. Particularly since I would argue against
Badham that Woodstock is not a fixed entity and as a result is neither
goingraphically nor ontologically stable. I would suggest that because
it was made and unmade on an almost daily basis, continually shifting
its definitions of what was other or ‘out there’ the municipality was
not only a shifting spatial construct, but a shifting discursive
construct as well. There is also an epistemological consideration which
needs to be accounted for; taking one’s cue from the Order of Things
one could argue that geographical boundaries are dissolved by weightier
(perhaps archival) blocks of knowledge which transcend and govern local
minutaee. In following the above logic we would conclude that
geographical and spatial issues are secondary to governing
epistemologies which out-flank disciplined constructions of space under
the official heading Woodstock Municipality.

In general Badham’s essay fails to consider the relationship which
exists between words and things. Part of my project in this thesis is
to assert that the municipality is not only a thing-in-the-world, but
as it were, a geography of words. A municipality has both a
material/physical as well as a discursive reality and in many important
ways the Woodstock Municipality was a discursive creation; a creation
of words, laws, rules, procedures etc. It is these words which
participate silently and invisibly in the creation of the municipality, even when it appears to have been forgotten.

This brings us to another problem within Badham's work, the problem of representation. By representation I mean the following: that Badham is relying on an extremely traditional definition of the intellectual in her work; that she can present a people's past to them is taken as given. The premiss that history can be siphoned-off and presented by the historically sensitive researcher needs to be scrutinized, for it cannot passively be accepted as true.

There is a moral dimension associated with the 'rediscovery' of a submerged history. A case might therefore be made to describe the underlying intellectual tendencies of the above reading as being liberatory. By liberatory I mean that repressed histories can be liberated and restored to their "rightful owners", no matter how problematic a definition of "their rightful owners" is actually provided. History can thus be activated or sprung, it can be imbued with an energy which will transcend obstacles (like the failure of memory for example) and ultimately come to rest. I am sceptical about historical ideas rooted in a discourse of liberation because this discourse basically understands power in terms of possession. If possession can be altered (say the toppling of a state/class alliance who possess both the administrative apparatus and the means of production) then it logically follows that the "nature" of power will also be controlled.

Badham's discourse does not, even at this comparatively early stage, attempt to examine in depth the possible reasons for the existence of absences within history itself, and neither does she seem to realise that "rediscoveries" are products of academic ideology, an ideology
which in order to be functionally healthy needs to contribute to the production of the past which can always be safely re-inscribed within academic institutions themselves.

The paragraph which follows immediately beneath the heading 'Early History and Development' promises to launch the expected 'deep reading'. However it provides little more than an extended description of pastoral bliss.

Writing about Woodstock in the 1890's, A.F. Keen described it as "a peaceful country village" with open farmland and mountainside - grapes to be picked on the Van Der Byl's farm (Roodebloem); milk, thick with cream, from the herd of jersey cows; meat and vegetables from the German farmers at the early morning market in Sir Lowry Road. This was indeed the "suburb of vineyards and vegetables."

Furthermore the passage appears to articulate a dual return; a return to both nature and Europe. I suspect that this dual return is a search for historical origins and thus is ultimately a quest for identity. It is through the mode of the pastoral that Badham attempts to dredge Woodstock back into a situation in which it is identical with an original "Europeaness". She is thus enacting a procedure which runs parallel to one of the primary discursive strategies applied by what I later refer to as Official Administrative Discourse, for one of the major consequences of O.A.D. is that it seeks to prevent subjects from confronting the geographical/spatial otherness of an African reality and this is precisely what Badham, in her evocation of the atmosphere of a "peaceful country village" has sought to do. At an unfortunately early stage in her article therefore, Badham precludes herself from confronting the fact that
Woodstock was a municipality in Africa and this, in part, accounted for the uniqueness of its historical inheritance.

In the sentence which follows Badham proceeds to itemize a number of leisure activities:

There were also tickey-beers at the Altona Hotel, walks up the mountainside with its few isolated buildings and fynbos, picnics in Woodstock cave, swimming and joining the Coloured fishermen bringing in their catch at the Woodstock beach, gas street lamps and developing industries. 8

Leisure activities are not the only item being catalogued however. In what eventually becomes a heady bricolage we note the somewhat abrupt inclusion of 'gas street lamps' and 'developing industries' in the system. It is this final term which sets up a significant contradiction in Badham's discourse; I suggest that 'developing industries' and the 'peaceful country village' alluded to a sentence or two ago cannot exist within the same conceptual universe because 'peaceful country village' harks back to a period which was logically prior to 'development' and industrialization. The problem is hardly crippling however and had Badham chosen to analyse the growth of the municipality in terms of overlapping modes of production and the resultant temporal and spatial disjunctures within the community she might have been better equipped to locate economically the leisure process. As it is, her history seems to be curiously suspended, floating without foundation above the (concrete) realities of small-scale industrial discipline and capital accumulation. Furthermore, when Badham is describing a 'peaceful country village' she is not only describing an ideal but in a rough and crude way she is unconsciously tracing the logic of instrumental reason, that is,
the ongoing rupture which firstly occurs between reason and nature and which is then progressively widened by the gulf which separates man from man. Thus her blend of utopianism and idealism seems to have a pessimistic edge, but it is an edge which I think could have been blunted had she realised the original importance of her descriptions of subjective, leisure time. A time which was surely different to the uniform monotony of commodified time. A time which was 'meaningful' rather than simply being the uniform succession of hollow moments. Ironically, had Badham chosen to anchor her urban history economically, it would have mitigated against her own utopian and idealistic tendencies.

Even at this early stage the implied 'deep reading' has failed to emerge. Instead of providing a theoretical alternative to the superficial vision encouraged by the view from a train, we are issued with individual mosaics which we suspect are being patiently accumulated in order to provide either an approximation of life or a portrait of the times. However, this patient accumulation of pictorial detail has a tendency to aestheticize the objects of its concern. Take the following examples for instance:

The rectory was surrounded by its gnarled hedge, and,

There was Hickson's sweet factory and Globe Engineering with its chimney stack, and,

In those days, there was a well kept cemetery behind the church.

In this aestheticized landscape, 'chimney stacks', 'gnarled hedges' and 'well kept cemeteries' become icons which signify that there is
something called a universal artistic impulse which can be artificially divorced from death, worship and labour. History thus becomes presentable, even pretty. It is scrubbed clean and in its cleanliness it is remote indeed from the drudgery of labour and the fear of death.

Furthermore, Badham's strategy of itemization or, phrased differently, her taking of an inventory, is a means whereby the multi-layered complexities of the past can be controlled. The taking of inventories immobilizes history in order for it to be scrutinized by a subject who is located in a position of false omniscience.

Cars were also part of that future: traps, spiders and carts were the means of transport in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 12

A more insistent measure of control is the use of pictorial and highly naturalistic devices which advance the idea that the past is both transparent and immediately sensible. Take the following:

Albert Road itself was either dust, or mud in the rainy winters. 13

or,

At present it is impossible in our walks abroad to trust our feet to look after themselves, and very often difficult in the blinding dust to keep the necessary watch over them, so that those who are not highsteppers are apt to come to grief. 14

We, as readers, are therefore invited to savour the photographic authenticity of 'real' life at street level.
Badham uses her sources in a dual manner throughout *Rediscovering Woodstock*. She uses them as information but she also uses her sources as indexes of credibility, as authentifiers. Furthermore, when reading her history there is a persistent suspicion that to a certain extent Badham moulds her history around the content of available sources. This would in some way account for the incoherence of her project. So, for example, her article tends to over-rely on the memories of A.F. Keen and Ernst Rip. Badham does not seem to consider as problematic the fact that these 'memories' form the contours of her history. With different sources, parts of her article would necessarily be different. We are thus able to witness the hidden yet nevertheless extreme relativism of her naïve social/urban history. I am suggesting therefore that without a suitably sceptical attitude towards one's use of sources, one's entire historical project could be jeopardized. To over-rely on the concentrated subjectivity of the memory, interview, or the simple recounting of experience fails to come to terms with the fact that articulations of history in the above forms mean that history is already textualised and by implication the study of history takes place within an already textualised world. The implications of this realisation are far ranging and the responses of historians are equally wide. However, I think that I can safely attest that Badham fails to address the issue of the relationship between "originality" and source in any meaningful way.

The idea that sources-as-individuals and individuals-as-sources are valuable in terms of the memories and experiences they willingly impart is continued throughout the Badham article but is particularly noticeable with the mention of (E. Rip, the Woodstock mayor, Bishop
William West Jones, A.F. Keen) in its early stages. The oral dimension of Rediscovering Woodstock accepts the idea of centered human consciousness and accepts the idea of sources as reliable witnesses. Yet again Badham does not examine the problems as to whether human consciousness is an adequate foundation for knowledge. Furthermore, we may note that there are certain similarities between the confession as a de-secularized form of subjective experience and the demands of oral history.

So for example, we should be aware that oral history is subject to the same aporia as Foucault identifies as characterizing the confession and the confessional situation: Foucault notes in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, that 'man' is a confessing being, 'he' confesses habitually and the existence of a confessional situation provides the individual with the illusion that he has a privileged relationship with the truth. Foucault is thus saying that 'truth' about the self is as much to do with a ritual bound production of certain supposedly 'valid' statements as it is to do with a 'deep individual essence' (if such a thing even exists, in fact, Foucault would say that it too is fictional knowledge induced by the operation of power). Oral history is therefore part of the mechanism which utilizes the confession in order to produce "truth effects".

In continuing our analysis of sources I would like to submit the language used by the Rector of St Mary's Anglican Church and the aforementioned 'Woodstock Mayor' to a close reading. In the interests of accuracy I will quote the relevant passage in full:

In 1875 the Metropolitan of the Anglican Church described Papendorp as "a very dreary suburb of Cape Town along the shore
of Table Bay", two years later the rector of St Mary's reported: 
"The moral tone of the village is fearfully low".16

This characterization was perpetuated by the Mayor of Woodstock 
who on 1897 stated that "Old Papendorp had a very bad character 
indeed, most of which has been redeemed by Woodstock .... the 
only fault remaining is that of the wind". Just over ten years 
later, a magazine article of the time noted "if you wish to 
appreciate the dismal and depressing effect of a wind sweeping 
over a galvanized iron-town, you must visit Woodstock in a 
south-east wind.17

The language used in the above extracts is undoubtedly the language 
of well-tuned bourgeois awareness. It is the language of guardians 
who are policing the municipality's moral conscience and thus it is a 
language which is actively discriminatory against those whose morals 
fall short of the assumed standard. The language used by the rector 
of St Mary's is suitably genteel. Its euphemistic nature encourages 
the reader to pursue meaning actively, in order to imagine of what "a 
fearfully low moral tone" might consist.

Can the phrase be taken to mean that the majority of the population 
rejected the overtures of the Church or that levels of alcoholism and 
prostitution were extremely high? The rector's discourse is confined 
to pursue a strategy of implication. His comments are thus statements 
which involve a certain coyness and ambiguity; he talks from a 
position of authority yet his words are severely restricted by the 
protocol of what cannot be said. The personification of the 
municipality (Papendorp) as, "a very bad character indeed", can be 
read as a blanket condemnation, yet equally, the statement is 
hampered by its strategy of implication, a language which can only
hint at and not identify the specific elements of social 'evil'. The statements by both the rector of St Mary's and the Woodstock mayor betray a self-conscious prudishness which is congruent with their social standing. Furthermore, both men are practicing a self-censorship which is far from disinterested. They are both speaking in the name of power, a power which, as one of its defining characteristics, masks a substantial part of itself. In this case the mask is one of middle-class gentility. Our analysis of the administrative discourse of the municipality's moral guardians takes an even more discernible shape in the form of the following extract:

The same observer found little appeal in Woodstock, describing it as "a town of factories, of workmen's houses, of middle-class shops and rival church spires with ugly and irreverent surroundings". He writes of the frequently windswept Albert Road with "its uneven and shabby houses, its dusty little huckster shops and its occasional waste spaces strewn with rubbish"; "The tin-roofed cottages with advertisements painted on their walls"; "The black mass of gas works."

The mayor of Woodstock describes the municipality's lay-out as a space with a motley and fundamentally incoherent design. Badham reinforces this impression later on in her article when she writes, "The growth of Papendorp is clearly shown in advertisements frequently appearing in the Cape Argus in the early 1880's. The development was unplanned and the growing community unorganized".

The municipality thus symbolises confusion and threat for it harbours an alien and barely intelligible logic. This logic is in an important sense beyond the mayor's grasp but at the same time the logic envelops him; it is an expression of a personality and culture unlike
his own, one which he can witness but is unable to share. The mayor is able to comment on the living conditions and daily imagery of working-class and petty bourgeois life if only to condemn the features of this life as "shabby" and "dusty", "ugly" and "irreverent". His only recourse after a faultless demonstration of incomprehension is thus dismissal. We should note carefully the mayor's set of codified responses and understand them not simply as reflections or mediations of "reality" but as responses to a cluster of images and representations ("shabby houses", "dusty little huckster shops", "waste space's strewn with rubbish"), already encrusted in the informal and semi-official discourses of the day.

2.3: OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCOURSE

In order to understand Official Administrative Discourse (O.A.D.), that is, the laws, the procedures and the rituals by which Woodstock was governed on the municipal level, we should note that the discourse mobilised by the Woodstock Municipality was undoubtedly a partial and uneven expression of what can loosely be called British Colonial Discourse. The study of British Colonial Discourse is definitely on the historical agenda, but in its broader manifestations it is beyond the scope of this thesis. What I intend to do, however, is to describe the specific local features of municipal discourse, that is, its internal economy and configuration. This portion of chapter two is thus a formal analysis and is only indirectly concerned with the rate and success of discursive application.

Official Administrative Discourse was simultaneously creative and regulative, at once pre-defined and improvisational. It was creative
in the sense that it produced and named objects. So for example, the very fabric of the municipality was unashamedly British; the combination of the words "Wood" and "stock" with their gentle evocation of evergreen forests and woodburning suggested a world which was determinedly European. This strategy was reinforced by the selection of street names; Kitchener, Roberts, Dundonald, and Brabant, names which referred directly to an imperial past, a past which over the years receded in importance.

The discourse was also highly defensive in that it operated in terms of a steadfast refusal, a refusal to "engage" with the specific characteristics, be they racial, economic or environmental, of the Western Cape. Municipal discourse was only able to accommodate the above difference by opposing it to a set of imperialist premises already functionally pre-determined. This is not to suggest that the refusal was necessarily effective or even successful. In fact, if we ask the question, did municipal discourse ever attempt to understand the distinctive otherness that was Woodstock, then the answer is surely no. The above question gives something of a false impression, however, for O.A.D. is not concerned with understanding so much as it is concerned with ordering and cataloging. If, however, we ask the related question, did the administrators of the municipality manage to preserve relative "harmony" through the constant monitoring and surveillance of the population, then the answer is certainly yes.

If one excludes the Mayor, whose function was primarily symbolic, the municipal records suggest that the most important individual in the Woodstock Municipality hierarchy was the Town Clerk. The Clerk was not only a node through which information was relayed, but he was a co-ordinator as well: the day to day administration of the municipality involved the placing of advertisements for vendors in
the local newspapers, dealing with public complaints, acting on matters of public health, circulating vaccine notices, etc. Virtually every item of administrative importance was in one way or another either directly attributable to him or required his approval. The Town Clerk was thus in a position of extreme power for he and his fellow workers had an entire administrative apparatus at their disposal.

I think that a cursory and necessarily incomplete survey of this administrative apparatus is in order. Unfortunately the survey will mould itself around what has been preserved, so it is mainly an analysis of correspondence rather than an analysis of the formation or structure of local government. We should under no circumstances allow the apparently innocent fact of "preservation" to go unnoticed. Knowledge is only preserved because our society has definite attitudes towards certain kinds of documentary knowledges. So, for example, it is thought that documentary knowledge of the kind stored in archives and libraries is important because these institutional "spaces" house representations of historical truth. Documentary knowledge is supposedly the bedrock of history and through its painstaking accumulation "we" will be able to reconstruct life as it once was. In other words, and to phrase it quite bluntly, the archive and library, are expression of our society's institutionalised will-to-truth.

Much of the knowledge contained in the municipal records (which are now stored in the State Archives) takes the form of reports - there are reports from the sanitary superintendent, plague reports from the chief valuator, reports from the director of the census. The records also contain a wide range of applications: applications for permission to build-on to an already-existing structure, and
applications for the renewal of general-dealers licences. The records also contain notes about fluctuating municipal boundaries, the desirability of municipal unification and the formation of boards and committees (the Water Board, for instance). Furthermore it should not be forgotten that the municipality was a corporation, that is, a money-making enterprise whose agents collected regular rates and subscriptions. The Municipality/Corporation was also directly involved with inspection; the inspection of houses (and by extension the inspection of those who lived there) occupied and empty. The inspection of the sanitation network (drains, stercus pails, springs, the Liesbeek River). The inspection of food (and the mechanisms on which it was weighed) and finally the inspection/surveying of land and space. It can thus be ascertained that the function of the municipality as a structure of local government was wide-ranging in the extreme and knowledge was accumulated and stored to the point of being encyclopaedic. The quest for knowledge was neither neutral, nor was it simply functional. Some of it was profoundly judgemental and had a definite disciplinary edge. However, before we return to the important question of discipline within the municipal power structure I would like to tentatively put forward some ideas which could explain this matrix of knowledge which made up Official Administrative Discourse.

The municipal records appear to subscribe to similar conventions and principles of cohesion as the 'documentary' whether it be in the form of either a film or journalism. Both the "documentary" in the generic sense and the municipal records are types of na"ive knowledge in that they presume direct access to a "reality" which they faithfully reflect in order to represent. This representation then serves as a trustworthy, supposedly truthful portrayal of the "outside-world". Documentary practice is predicated on the failure to recognise that
'the outside world' is selectively filtered through the epistemological net which constitutes the documentary genre in the first place. In turn, subjects experience themselves and their socially constructed identities through the films they watch, the books they read, the questionnaires they are bound to have to fill in and sign, and the regime of insidious surveillance to which they have no alternative but to submit. We can understand (via the municipal records) therefore, that the O.A.D. of the Woodstock Municipality was a documentary machine which on the one hand created cultural identities which allowed the inhabitants of the municipality to experience themselves as municipal subjects and on the other hand fixed those subjects in a rigid taxonomy which tended to render them passive and object-like.21

In conclusion the Official Administrative Discourse of the Woodstock Municipality was a discursive formation which accumulated, tabulated and stored knowledge about the populace in a thorough but somewhat paranoid manner. It "viewed" the population as both a resource (a labour pool or a community capable of patriotic leanings) and a threat (a labile and fickle group capable of spontaneous uprising). We can suggest therefore that it was not merely a mechanism for actual and discursive surveillance but was also a type of welfare organisation in that it was concerned with the health and well-being of its members.

2.4: BIO-POWER

At a comparatively early stage in her article Badham raises the important issue of industrial growth,
There was Hickson's sweet Factory and Globe Engineering works with its chimney stack. Besides the Church, on Albert Road was a blacksmiths and a general dealers store (belonging to Amos Bailey) while opposite was Davidson's Tannery. 22

Once again however the information is presented in a strangely indiscriminate way. One wonders if Badham employed any criteria whereby she selected material because the overall effect of the above quote is to leave the reader bemused by the material's apparent directionlessness. This burgeoning, although admittedly small-scale development (see above) is presented yet is inadequately contextualised. Foucault is instructive in this regard because he draws attention to the fact that capitalism has always relied on disciplined individuals, 'docile bodies' which could be inserted into 'factories', 'works' and 'tanneries' if not at will then certainly efficiently and with a minimum amount of disruption. Furthermore, capitalism simply would not have been able to proceed in a relatively stable manner unless raw material in the form of fixed, healthy populations and stable workforces were already available or at least in the making. The Foucauldian concept of bio-power is particularly helpful in this respect and more will be written about it as this section proceeds.

The reader should also be made aware of the Church's complicity in the creation and perpetuation of the discourse of bio-power. I refer in this regard to Badham's utilization of sources. The Church (this will be validated in later chapters particularly in chapter five) played an important role in creating a reliable 'body' of structural knowledge about Woodstock and its inhabitants. Church archives contained registers as well as documents and information of a more general nature. This knowledge undeniably contributed to the
supposedly innocent policing, moral and otherwise, of the municipality's population.

Badham also discusses the early influence of the Church and from what sectors of the community they drew their parishioners and congregation. Her presentation of information is startling in its naivete and lack of critical awareness however. She does not consider that Churches were in an ideal position to collect and accumulate both formal and informal knowledge. Furthermore, she fails to account for the fact that the Church (whether it be Dutch Reformed or Anglican) was undoubtedly in a position to produce guilt among its parishioners. An analysis of the production and application of guilt combined with an understanding of the Church as a documentary apparatus which preceded the establishment of the Woodstock Municipality would prove to be an important corrective to Badham's lack of historical insight.

It has become necessary to provide a working definition of bio-power. As we shall soon see this definition is not taken from Foucault himself, but from two of his American commentators, Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus. Before the definition is provided however a certain amount of qualification seems necessary;

Power as the governing concept in Foucault's work is neither fully explained, nor is it carefully defined. Foucault's anti-method is steadfastly opposed to what he sees as the theoretical closure imminent in the search for all definitions. It is probable that Foucault would view the quest for all-encompassing, accurate, and logically sustained definition(s) as a wilful immobilization of thought. He would, in fact, read the search for definitions as being not only chimerical but as an ironic demonstration of power's ability
to influence the most basic rhetorical strategy. I am suggesting therefore that we needn’t necessarily provide our own corrective to Foucault’s thought (although this is sometimes useful) but should be aware of the Nietzschean inspired laughter which echoes through the hollowness of our attempts to turn Foucault into a reasonable and conventional philosopher because these are precisely the attempts which he takes pleasure in frustrating. Without further ado then,

In Foucault’s story, bio-power coalesced around two poles at the beginning of the Classical Age. These poles remained separate until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when they combined to form the technologies of power which still recognizably characterize our current situation.

One pole was concerned with the human species. For the first time in history, scientific categories - species, population, and others - rather than juridical ones became the object of political attention in a consistent and sustained fashion. Efforts to understand the processes of human regeneration were closely tied to other, more political ends.

The other pole of bio-power centered on the body not so much as the means for human reproduction, but as an object to be manipulated. A new science, or more accurately a technology of the body as an object of power, gradually formed in disparate, peripheral localizations.

I think that we are reasonably safe in assuming that the population category was a site of considerable administrative importance.

The black population, having been set apart, were seen as a
Although Badham hints at the reasons why the black population was set apart, the phrase (see above) remains unexplained. To my mind this suggests that there is room for a slight extension within the theory of bio-power, an extension which accounts for the racial bias within both 'compartments' of bio-power. In other words, the importance of race as a pseudo-scientific category should be inserted into the area of bio-power concerned with the human species - and allied to this, corresponding attention should be paid to the racial aspect of bodily technology and discipline.

Although it is not necessary to get to the "truth" of the situation another quote from Badham's 'original' text could be helpful,

Saunders suggests that at no time in the 19th century were ethnic boundaries as well defined as they are today and between say, the African and 'Coloured' communities there was much passing of individuals.25

Nevertheless she continues,

At the same time, both Africans and non-Africans saw Africans as having a separate identity based both on a distinctive history and cultural experience and on physical differences.26

These assertions can quite easily be recast; so for example with reference to "ethnic boundaries" we may reformulate the quote by forwarding another interpretation; that 'Race' as a term within the matrix of bio-power had yet to attain stability and thus it was prevented from being "influential", in other words it was
discursively under-determined. The second quote is instructive because it hints toward a time in the future when this "acceptance" of racial separateness, of "African identity" as something immutable and "natural" came to be profoundly immobilizing because it meant that the "African" was seldom read as occupying a different position on the plane of identities. Firstly he (for example) was an "African" and then only were Africans husbands, farmers, workers etc.

Bio-power was formally articulated in the shape of the census and various types of report and registration,

Census figures show a relatively small African population, although it is stated that in 1889 Woodstock had the highest proportion of Africans in its population in greater Cape Town. This may be due to Africans registered as "mixed or other" or else not enumerated.27

Along with other means of recording information registration is a theme which Foucault devotes a great deal of space to in Discipline and Punish.

These small techniques of notation, of registration, of constituting files, of arranging facts in columns of tables that are so familiar to us now, were of decisive importance in the epistemological "Man" of the sciences of the individual. One is no doubt right to pose the Aristotelian problem: is the science of the individual possible and legitimate? A great problem needs great solutions perhaps. But there is a small historical problem of the emergence, towards the end of the eighteenth century, of what might generally be termed the 'clinical' sciences; the problem of the entry of the individual (and no longer the
species) into the field of knowledge; the problem of the entry of
the individual description, of the cross-examination, of
anamnestic, of the file into the general functioning of scientific
discourse.\textsuperscript{28}

It seems that the productivity of racial difference managed to
disrupt the registration forms to such an extent, that they were
literally shifted into another conceptual space. However, we can also
interpret the above as administrative knowledge having a relatively
weak purchase on Africans. For although Africans were on the
empirical level herded into the amorphous category of "mixed or
other", the category itself lacked specificity. It was "open" enough
to guarantee a certain symbolic freedom for it did not painstakingly
divide "Africans" into progressively finer tribal units for example.
We can thus conclude that discourse in this respect was naive and
simple, for it provided a space of symbolic fluidity which was
relatively untouched by the objectifying tendencies of disciplinary
power.

The Annual Report to the United Society for the Propagation of
the Gospel, 1871 stated, "that Papendorp was" .... the refuge of
the utterly destitute who eke out their means of livelihood by
amassing together shells on the beach to sell to lime-burners.
There is one small tannery here; a few people are engaged in
fishing ...." There was little industry to attract people.\textsuperscript{29}

The above quote illustrates that Papendorp in 1871 was impoverished
and backwards, populated by heathens. In other words it was an ideal
sphere in which the Church could widen its influence. The quote also
demonstrates that the Anglican Church was ultimately part of a broad
coalition of interests which perceived the village as an economic
entity, as an object which could eventually contribute to the Church’s wealth. In this regard the word "propagation" with its expansionistic and acquisitive overtones, is instructive. As are the words, 'refuge', 'utterly destitute', 'eke', which appear in the first sentence. They indicate that the local population were trapped in their poverty and their lack of economic mobility corresponded to their lack of conceptual and spiritual mobility. Philanthropy was thus conceived by the Church (and hopefully it would be understood by those who received the Church’s benevolence) as a fundamentally humanitarian gesture. The report attests to the existence of a documentary apparatus as early in the municipality’s history as the 1870s. Although this may seem to be a claim of negligible importance, it certainly does establish that the village was a site of knowledge of a formal and concentrated kind ten years before its formation as a municipality. The final portion of the above extract, 'there was little industry to attract people', can be understood as an index of bio-power’s relative unimportance in the municipality’s early history. It was only during the 1890s that bio-power began to exert control:

In the 1890s Woodstock was more of a residential area popular with the poorer section of commuters as it was the closest southern suburb to the city.\(^{30}\)

In fact, the ‘growth’ and ‘development’ of Woodstock as an industrial area enables us to witness the parallel significance of bio-power. As Paul Rabinow points out in *The Foucault Reader*,

Disciplinary control - is unquestionably linked to the rise of capitalism. But the relationship between the economic changes that resulted in the accumulation of capital and the political

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changes that resulted in the accumulation of power remains to be specified.31

At this point I would like, with the help of an extended quote from the Badham text, to sketch out some thoughts of a general and tentative nature - that is - the relationship between the accumulation of capital and the accumulation of power,

In spite of this, commercial enterprises such as the renowned confectionery of J.J. Atmore and numerous general dealers' stores were established. A number of inhabitants were artisans involved in tanning, smithing and masonry (see Table 3). Early industries were able to establish themselves after the rush of settlers during and after the AngloBoer War. In 1902 there were a number of manufacturing prospects - Kamp's Cold Storage, De Beer's Cold Storage, a large brewery, Saunderson's Saddlery, the possibility of a large soap factory, extensive land bought by the Milling Company for a bakery and employees' accommodation.32

Badham goes on to quote Bickford-Smith as follows:

These activities can hardly be dramatized by suggesting that they amount to industrialization.33

This is important, particularly when we consider that when Foucault writes about discipline on the factory floor, that he is referring to a scale of industrial growth which is simply not comparable to that of Woodstock. It therefore remains to elaborate as best we can the relationship between Capital and Power. Superficially at least Woodstock appears to be a peculiar and distinctive example. Firstly, if the quote is considered as a reasonably accurate reflection of
existing "industrial growth" then the 'manufacturing prospects' at the turn-of-the-century were for the most part small scale. They were in other words of negligible size and did not necessitate massive and uniform disciplinary interventions of the kind that Foucault refers to in *Discipline and Punish*. Secondly, because industrial growth did not take place on a large scale, the owners of managerial elite of small factories, 'cold storage plants', 'confectioners' and 'tanners' were not required to enter into obviously restrictive rituals of de-personalization, punishment and regulation. My suspicion is that productive relations were probably flexible and relatively informal. There was thus a certain amount of freedom in which capitalists and workers could negotiate and "bargain." This brings me to my third point: I am reasonably secure in the assertion that the case-study of Woodstock provides a valuable and pertinent counter-example to Foucault's description(s) of ideal expressions of the optimum relationship between the disciplinary dimension of bio-power and capital accumulation. As we have seen, the relationship between disciplinary mechanisms and emergent capitalism was in all likelihood not as absolute or well-defined as uncritical readings of Foucault would seem to imply. Finally, it should be noted that there will always remain strong possibilities that specific local examples may contradict the apparently more programmatic aspects of Foucault's "histories". We must be careful however not to chart the curve of the municipality's industrial 'growth' in the name of a 'truth' which is more refined, but in the name of a rigorous ethics which practice a non-exhaustive vision of history - that is a genealogy - in an exhaustive way.

In this, the final segment of the section on bio-power I will analyse the following quote, because, if we can trace the contours of the moral economy which was disseminated and kept in circulation by the
key institutions of the municipality and Church, we will be able to see how value judgements about health and cleanliness were made.

Primary concerns were those of disease or health and the dirt and filth that had been accumulating. These appear also to have been the concern of the Church, although the methods of approach tended to differ. The links between the Anglican Church and the Municipality were thus established from its inception, and continued despite occasional tensions.34

The words 'disease', 'dirt' and 'filth' are key terms because they radiate with the light of moral anxiety. Furthermore they indicate a certain twitchiness, a certain pathologizing dimension which associates 'health' and 'disease' with sexuality. We are reminded therefore that discourse harbours certain reticences and often finds it difficult to 'admit' that sexuality exists. I am speaking here both of the majority of Badham's sources, as well as Badham herself - the language she uses and what it refuses to say. One would think it likely that the theme of "disease","health" would initiate an investigation into related concerns such as gender-issues, prostitution, reproduction etc., but the interstices of the quote say much, for there is much, in saying nothing, that discourse says about itself. In the anxiety and fear that this "nothingness" exerts, the historical researcher is required to be particularly vigilant for the anxiety demands an attentiveness in excess of an ordinary close reading. This 'style' of reading is really no more than a shift in emphasis, yet it is a variation which corresponds to the place that sex and sexuality have come to occupy in the order of discourse. Thus the words, 'dirt', 'disease' and 'filth' produce a "noise" in excess of themselves mainly because they act as discursive hints and markers of their own inability to express the unsaid. As readers we are
therefore required to provide our own educated guesswork when it becomes obvious that the limits of what cannot be said are found to suddenly shift. This is not in the interests of some final historical closure but in the interests of a contestatory reading which is acutely sensitive to discursive fluctuation. To make the point once again; more often than not the words 'dirt', 'disease' and 'filth' were over-abundantly yet prudishly meaningful. The words functioned as pegs on which to 'hang' dominant moral discourse and they, in a sense, introduced the possibility for intervention or at least they started the logic of intervention rolling. To conclude,

But, at the same time, these new techniques of power needed to grapple with the phenomena of population, in short, to undertake the administration, control, and direction of the accumulation of men (the economic system that promotes the accumulation of capital and the system of power that ordains the accumulation of men are, from the seventeenth century on, correlated and inseparable phenomena): hence there arise the problems of demography, public health, hygiene, housing conditions, longevity and fertility. And I believe the political significance of the problem of sex is due to the fact that sex is located at the point of intersection of the discipline of the body and the control of the population.35

CONCLUSION

During this chapter I have demonstrated how Andrea Badham's *Rediscovering Woodstock* is an unconscious enactment of the will-to-power through benevolent domestication of the past. In her essay she has controlled her history of the Woodstock Municipality
extremely effectively through the deployment of certain key strategies and devices. For instance, her use of the pastoral mode is significant in that it enacts a return to an absent origin. A site of authenticity, pleasure, and importantly, truth. This origin is, ironically, European and by gesturing back to it, Badham negates the specificities of the local knowledge that Foucault thinks ought to be activated against the exclusivity of the types of history which Badham is practicing. Furthermore, if an identity between, as I refer to it, "an original Europeaness" and the present can be established, then the contingencies of his history and its neglected objects and details can be safely set aside, banished through a process of infinite deferral, to somewhere which is actually nowhere.

Badham's desire to pursue identity in history has several implications: it means that she tends to conceptualise history as if it is linear and continuous. This in turn presupposes the centrality of "man" as the essential subject in the historical process. History is therefore the medium in which "man" comes to express a "true self". As I hope to have made the reader aware of already, Foucault's understanding of history is very different: his anti-subjectivism leads him to displace the subject and suggest that discourses interpolate subjects and offer them positions within configurations already predefined, positions from which to speak. Within institutional situations the power of discourse underpins disciplinary technologies which stamp control on to the soul and body of the "penitent", patient, or Royal Engineer.

Unlike Badham's reading of the past as a mirror in which, inevitably, we are able to recognise ourselves, Foucault's genealogical studies of institutions like the prison are attempts to write histories of the present by tracing the moments of discontinuity and difference in
the past. Foucault suggests that the silences, forbidden areas and accidents of the past can only be discovered in what is most familiar and this is why my genealogy is a study of surfaces (foundation-stones, reports, plans, photographs) which, I hope, will reveal the rich otherness of Woodstock's forgotten past.

The use of the pastoral is only one of the strategies whereby the past becomes a manageable object. Badham's original claim to "rediscovery" is also a truth claim, a claim to the value and accuracy of her work which it is hoped will make it immune to criticism. Whether it is through strategies of "rediscovery" entirely lacking in self-reflexivity, devices such as aestheticization which cauterize the disruptive difference of ugliness, or the taking of inventories, Badham's history is a powerful system of control which normatively limits and excludes that which threatens its constitution. Chapters three to six are self-conscious attempts to practice "rediscovery".
FOOTNOTES

1. I use the phrase in ironic sense and the similarities between my use of it and Nietzsche's are extremely limited. Were we to take the concept of "active forgetting" to its logical conclusion we would forget or pretend to forget all the important names associated with Woodstock, including the name Woodstock itself. The purpose of a Nietzschean derived process of "active forgetting" would be to imagine how the name and representation Woodstock comes to be associated with certain representations. A genuinely radical genealogy would thus actively pursue forgetfulness to the extent that history was threatened to such a degree that the genealogist exclaimed in wonderment "The name Woodstock has been forgotten, therefore the municipality never existed!" Given that the mastery of this willed-delusion is virtually impossible is one forced to admit the inadmissible, that the genealogy is a doomed enterprise?


3. ibid., p.21.

4. This paradigmatic modernist moment conforms in certain crucial respects to the genealogical perspective. The genealogical method is at odds with the hermeneutic strategy of digging for a hidden meaning. Instead it prides itself upon taking a position which valorises the superficial view. My genealogy is thus strongly opposed to Badham's historical quest for the hidden signifier.

6. The problem with the "politically-conscious" history (no matter how honourable or well-intending) is that it rests on a prior and enabling assumption of the continued relevance of the traditional intellectual. In contrast, Foucault posits the need for an anti-universal intellectual who is not the representative of the Party, the higher good, or the "emissary" of the neglected tradition which furnishes us with an improved version of the truth.

8. ibid., p.21.
9. ibid., p.21.
10. ibid., p.21.
11. ibid., p.21.
12. ibid., p.21.
13. ibid., p.21.
14. ibid., p.21.
15. Referring to confession in the seventeenth century, Foucault writes the following: "But the important point no doubt is that this obligation was decreed, as an ideal at least, for every good Christian. An imperative was established: not only will you confess to acts contravening the law, but you will seek to transform your desire, your every desire, into discourse."


17. ibid., p.21.
18. ibid., p.21.
19. ibid., p.21.
20. A minor and perhaps even slightly absurd example would have been the book issued to the wave of British emigrants who settled in Natal in the late 1840's. Entitled the "Emigrant's Guide to Port Natal", this book would have occupied the one end of the continuum and on the other would have been, say, Official Acts of Parliament.

21. Although I do not believe that Official Administrative Discourse and Colonial power were entirely congruent, Homi Bhabha suggests the following: "Colonial power produces the colonized as a fixed reality that is at once an "Other" and yet entirely knowable and visible. It resembles a form of narrative in which the productivity and circulation of subjects and signs are bound in a reformed and recognizable totality. It employs a system of representation, a regime of truth, that is structurally similar to realism.


25. ibid., p.23.
26. ibid., p.23.
27. ibid., p.23.

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30. ibid., p.24.
33. ibid., p.24.
34. ibid., p.25.

36. In an article entitled "Intellectual Work as a Political Tool", Keith Gandal writes:

   He [Foucault] wanted to allow and even inspire a practice of criticism which proceeded, not with expert, theoretical or scientific knowledges, but with "low-ranking knowledges. "These unqualified, even directly disqualified knowledges," said Foucault, "(such as that of the psychiatric patient, of the ill person, of the nurse, of the doctor - parallel and marginal as they are to the knowledge of medicine - that of the delinquent, etc.) ... involve what I would call a popular knowledge though it is far from being a general common sense knowledge, but is on the contrary a particular, local, regional knowledge .... It is through the re-appearance of this knowledge, of these local popular knowledges, these disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs it's work."

   Michel Foucault quoted by Keith Gandal in "Intellectual Work as a Political Tool", in History of the Present, Spring 1986. Berkeley University, p.17.
CHAPTER 3: A PRIMITIVE FORM OF CONTROL

INTRODUCTION

I will argue the following in this chapter: although it is possible to see the "invention" of the Woodstock Municipality as congruent with a new economy of power, an analysis of the official correspondence suggests otherwise; that is, that power remained "heavy" and labour-intensive, despite its apparently panoramic reach. A more theoretically informed understanding of the relative "failure" of municipal power is to suggest that it had not yet reached "the threshold of a discipline".

In a word, the disciplines are the ensemble of minute technical inventions that made it possible to increase the useful size of multiplicities by decreasing the inconveniences of the power which, in order to make them useful, must control them. A multiplicity, whether in a workshop or a nation, an army or a school, reaches the threshold of a discipline when the relation of the one to the other becomes favourable.¹

One of the obvious ways in which power defines a multiplicity (in our case, the municipality qualifies as a multiplicity) is to define it spatially. While this might appear to be straightforward, the records seem to suggest that the fixing of boundaries was always problematic. While one could have assumed that the production and formalisation of space (boundaries, sub-divisions, enclosures for the suppression of tuberculosis) and time (an intense standardisation of norms and procedures) would have assured the creation of a "useful" municipality, the history of Woodstock proves otherwise. I conclude
that during its formative stages as an institution, the Woodstock Municipality, with occasional exceptions, appeared unable to administer (and discipline) the population in anything more than an imperfect and largely makeshift way.

I suspect that one of the reason's for administrative knowledge lagging one step behind the reality it sought to control and describe was that life in the municipality during the period was highly volatile. The portrait of everyday life that one gathers from the record's suggests a vibrant and disordered social reality within the broader context of a municipality that was struggling to establish itself. This "disorder" was in part caused by the presence of a cosmopolitan, new, and mainly european immigrant population, as the rapid population increase placed a great deal of stress on limited resources and amenities.²

During the same period the municipality witnessed the influx of black peasant's and the records indicate a strong degree of administrative reluctance to allow them equal status to those in the white community. We also know from other studies of the political economy of the Western Cape that the period under investigation was economically insecure and this would perhaps account for the great entrepeneurial initiative (the records are full of applications for general traders licences) which appeared to characterise the period.³

Resources and amenities were not always readily available - the struggle for sufficient quantities of clean water, for example - is a motif which runs constantly through the municipal records.⁴ Municipal services were either in dissaray or in the process of being instituted as formal procedures: the regular collection of stercus
pails, the building and lengthening of roads and the ritual inspection of schools spring to mind as examples.\(^5\)

The constant war waged against filth and disease indicates that there were aspects of the environment which needed to be monitored and brought under control. One such site was the notoriously insanitary Liesbeek River. The records abound with memo's to the effect that the river constituted a threat to public health and members of the municipality are to refrain from washing and bathing there.\(^6\) At various times the records also contain evidence of the existence of smallpox, glanders, enteric fever, diphtheria, typhoid and tuberculosis.\(^7\) Finally, we shouldn't fail to remember the presence of large-scale diseases like the plague which swept the Colony at the turn of the century.

The relative instability of the period covered does appear to have overwhelmed some of the strategies and inventions used by municipal knowledge to bring the municipality under control. For local residents, power would have been seen for what it was. primitive and obvious. To refer back to the Foucault quote at the beginning of the Introduction, I feel that it is safe to suggest that power was everywhere inconvenienced, and it is ultimately this factor which prevented the multiplicity from "reaching the threshold of a discipline".\(^8\)

Section 3.1, \textit{The Shape of Municipal Knowledge}, consists of a close textual analysis of municipal discourse and knowledge. The analysis will focus on the strategies (inspection), local inventions (the calling of an impromptu census), and forms of writing (reports, letters, permits) which constituted municipal knowledge. I plan to draw attention to the relative sophistication of both the permit
system and the census as a strategy which was "invented" by the municipality to monitor and control black municipal residents. In this regard I ask if these two forms of administrative procedure help to steer the municipality in the direction of a "disciplinary threshold", that is, towards a position where it might become a self-sustaining and independent disciplinary institution.

Section 3.2, The Regulation and Production of Municipal Time/Space, analyses the municipal attempts to control both space and time within the multiplicity. As we shall see, some of these attempts were more successful than others: for instance, capitalist growth appears to have caused the municipality a degree of administrative difficulty in that the logic of capitalist development seems to have loosened the municipality's grip on both the temporal and the spatial dimensions of the multiplicity.

The very existence of the municipality as an administrative apparatus presumes an a priori disciplinary attitude towards the control of Colonial space and time. This attitude finds its most cogent expression in the upkeep of borders and the division and sub-division of space. Insofar as the control of time was concerned, the municipality implemented a range of regulations which had the effect of constraining the element of chance within time itself. Municipal domestication of both time and space was definitely the order of the day.

Regulations function in the following manner: they homogenise the unpredictability of time by making it manageable; time which is controlled is time which is predictable; controlled time is likely to yield predictable results. An environment which is "managed" around the poles of time/space is an environment which can be controlled and
regulated. Regulation however, contains certain "primitive" forms of observation, like inspection for example, and thus brings certain disadvantages: it is costly, heavy-handed and crude. What is needed is another form of administration altogether, something which is subtle, coercive and economically intelligent; something that will transcend, in other words, "the threshold of a discipline". The next section will explore the relative failure during the period to implement a workable system of self-regulation.

We have noted briefly the advantages of a self-regulating as opposed to a regulated system. In section 3.3, The Failure to reach a Disciplinary Threshold, I will analyse the reasons for the failure of the municipality to implement a system which could increase the size of the multiplicity and, at the same time, decrease the inconvenience of the power which must control that multiplicity. From a brief analysis of a letter, which involves us remarkably (if indirectly) with Foucault's genealogical injunction to concentrate on matters closest to the body, we will attempt to arrive at a conclusion as to the nature of the factors preventing the transition to a smoothly functioning, self-regulating discipline.

The municipality would ideally have liked to administer a system of power, anchored around the control of both space and time, which was fluid and self-regulating. A self-regulating subject would have been the projected outcome of this "ideal system". By self-regulating, I mean to evoke something akin to a socialised and conscientious subjectivity rather than suggesting that the members of the municipality were forced to submit to a set of oppressive strictures congruent with an older, less inspired, economy of power. The period under analysis provides evidence of a relatively new administration struggling to come to terms with an exceptionally vibrant and
changing reality however, and this, perhaps more than anything else, mitigated against the production of a unique disciplinary system which was sophisticated enough to actively encourage any form of self-regulating subjectivity.

3.1: THE SHAPE OF MUNICIPAL KNOWLEDGE

One of the reasons for my earlier unproved assertion, that municipal power was rather labour intensive, was the commonplace existence of inspection as a form of both knowledge gathering and control. I contend that had municipal power been more "advanced", then inspection might well have given way to the infinitely more preferable "device" of self-inspection for instance. As a method, inspection betrays a degree of administrative insecurity. It illustrates an almost neurotic desire to control which is formalised at the administrative level.

The correspondence contained within the Woodstock Town Clerk's files tells us that the municipality saw fit to appoint a beach Constable in the years prior to the turn of the century.9 It was his duty to inspect the beach as well as the local lobster factory on a daily basis. Unfortunately, there is no evidence whatsoever of his reports in the municipal files. This in itself is puzzling because it leads one to assume that administrative procedure at the time was not codified to the extent where everything was compiled, filed and collected. We are not dealing, in other words, with the self-evident production of administrative knowledge. This suggests a serious shortcoming on the municipality's part. We are left to surmise whether they were filed at all or whether his "reports" were simply verbal.
In a letter dated 15th December 1904, sent from the Sanitary Department to the Woodstock Town Clerk, the Department requests two things: the purchase of an infectious diseases van and a salary for the inspector of markets. An earlier letter, dated 19 September of the same year, and exchanged between the same two Departments, refers to the newly formed role of the food and health inspectors. Thus we witness a expanding administrative awareness of the importance of food markets as sites of possible infection, points of contact for the insalubrious, gathering places for the dangerous etc. The important factor in this appointment was that the inspection of markets was now ritualised as a recurrent strategy: the inherently chaotic nature of the social was to be observed, described and thus, to a degree, controlled.

An even less subtle strategy for the control of a rapidly changing population was the census. A census is different to an inspection in that it takes place at regular intervals and that the entire undertaking is usually instituted at a countrywide level. The remarkable aspect about the following example therefore. is that its objectives and motivation were unashamedly political; the "census" was no more than a convenient smokescreen behind which lurked a flagrant abuse of municipal power. In a report to the Woodstock Works and Sanitary Committee dated 31st of March, 1904, the Medical Officer of Health for the Colony writes,

I am having a full census of coolies in the town taken also arranging night visits to verify the same, also in as much as there is quite an equal danger in the poor jew quarter's I intend treating them in the same manner.
This "census" was thus a convenient peg on which to hang not only racial paranoia but the bureaucratic fear of a racially mixed and partially hidden population. Equally, the quote gives us a graphic illustration of contemporary racial attitudes. Why, one wonders, was it necessary to "arrange night visits"? Was it an administrative counter to the "coolies" and "poor jews" propensity to congregate in numbers at night time, when they believed that no-one was looking? or did it perhaps have something to do with their "wretchedness" and innate sense of "dishonesty"? Whatever the rationale behind the "census" we can see on this occasion that it was far from a disinterested pursuit of the "facts" but a racist intervention, not practiced elsewhere in the community, which was based on administrative ignorance and fear.

The twin bureaucratic strategies of inspection and census-taking, in both its formal and informal guises, tended to correspond to, or, in more extreme cases, produce certain forms of writing. We must ask ourselves therefore, what the forms of disciplinary writing that the municipality relied on were, how they functioned, and what they had in common? The generic form of administrative writing par excellence was the report.

In a series of five reports written and presented to the "Chairman and members of the Sanitary Committee" by the Woodstock Sanitary Superintendent between the fourth of October and the twelfth of December, 1911, several areas of importance are isolated and commented on. These areas are as follows: the local refuse tip, the Liesbeek River, the stercus siding, the condition of the Corporation's ambulance, the Infectious Diseases Hospital and the presence of ice-cream vendors in the municipality. None of the reports are particularly noteworthy except perhaps for the
administrative recognition that those who were to a lesser or greater extent mobile (like ice-cream vendors) constituted a unique problem for the municipality. This is an issue that we will return to in a later section however. The reports seem to represent a period in municipal history in which potentially infectious areas had been recognised as such, were under surveillance and sanitary matters in general were under control.

This interpretation is supported by the fact that the reports are reasonably regular (4th October, 16th October, 14th November, 28th November, 12th December) and thus provide evidence of the institutionalisation of an administrative procedure. Confirmation of this appeared in a letter from the Acting Under Secretary of the Interior who, in two separate letters, dated the 3rd and the 15th of August 1911 respectively, informed the Woodstock Town Council that the department had decided to discontinue weekly notification about the state of disease in the municipality.15

Another form of writing which appeared in the administrative corpus was the letter. Unlike the report, which circulated administratively and was internal to administrative discourse, letters were received from residents of the municipality. Thus the letter was a form of writing which was participatory and, in a limited sense, democratic. In 1904, for example, the Woodstock Town Clerk received a letter from eleven residents of Observatory who complained about a stinking open gutter and this letter is, in its way, emblematic of many such letters that are stored away in the municipality files.16 The letter's received by the Town Engineer's office are of much the same kind: requests for partitioning or separating walls, the clearance of slop and or stercus pails, lack of adequate drainage facilities, the erection of sheds and balconies, amendments to pre-existing buildings...
One notices that many of the themes contained in the letters ultimately revolve around the notion of property. Many letter's attest to the strong need for properties to be altered and more often than not improved. On the one hand the letter's request that the municipality devotes more attention to hygiene and sanitation. On the other, with their constant requests for extension and division, they suggest the formation of a property owning class with its attendant ideologies of domestic privacy, autonomy and self-interest. One of the consequences of property ownership and improvement is that it stimulates more than the civic "virtues" of responsibility and pride, it also encourages the "policing" of one's space and privacy; thus making municipal management a less labour-intensive and demanding activity.

Most of the requests appear to be nebulous and it would have been in the municipality's long-term interest to grant permission for most of the proposed alterations. The threat that bureaucratic reluctance or intransigence would have posed for property improvement and the moral economy which was developing around it was incalculable. In the popular imagination property improvement might well have become associated with the constitution and "improvement" of a municipal self. The request's received by the Town Engineers office certainly indicate that the home, as well as it's immediate surrounds, was becoming a site of value and "authentic" experience.

The letter also functioned as an everyday medium through which the various sectors of the Colonial administration could communicate with each other. In a letter dated 8th January 1906, sent from the Sanitary Department to the Woodstock Mayor, a member of the
department draws attention to the presence of smallpox in the municipality. A representative from the department was having difficulty in locating the source of the disease and the letter states,

So far no clue has been discovered as to where the disease has its origin, as it is most difficult to obtain information from this class of people.18

Yet again we find organised power facing the difficulties of inspection and information gathering: the municipal agent is unable to find any worthwhile knowledge from "this class" of poor and naturally suspicious people because he is an authority figure and is thus disqualified from doing so. This is a far cry from a "ideal" situation in which the municipality was assured of a swift and trustworthy flow of information via either its own agents or a system of informers.

Another form of writing with a more insistently disciplinary dimension was the permit. During May 1913, the Woodstock Town Clerk received a letter from the Department of Native Affairs. The letter contained a reminder to the effect that under Act NO 40 of 1892 as amended to Act NO 8 of 1905, that "Natives" were to be confined to the "Native Reserves" and were obliged by law to carry permits on their person before entering a "European" area.19

The permit system offers evidence of a precursor to the dreaded pass system of later years (from the genealogical point-of-view, we should resist the temptation to make too much of the parallel, however, although I do hint at the similarities below). It also suggests a rigorous enforcement of space based on the division between a white
municipal area and a "Native" Reserve. In this respect, the permit system resembles an ideology like Apartheid, which is devoted to the flawless demarkation of space, its construction as a disciplinary unit (the Bantustan, the Township) and its subsequent policing.

The word, permit, is in itself interesting, because it seems to be the materialisation of an injunction. A permit is a method of fixing the subject's identity and behaviour in such a way that the absence of a permit in certain prescribed places is equivalent to the absence of permission to be there at all. One may take this further and suggest that from a legal point-of-view, the failure to have a permit on one's person means that one shouldn't be there, which means that theoretically, one has ceased to exist. Conversely, the presence of a permit in other prescribed areas - like "Locations" for example - is administratively unimportant. In this situation however, it gains its power by reminding the permit holder that they are imprisoned in a paradox, trapped in a space in which they are arguably "free".

Although a permit does not actually write upon the surface of the "Natives" body, the permit is a symbolic "mark", which separates the holder from him or herself via the introduction of a scrap of paper. The psychological violence that the permit causes its beholder is, in part, the result of the permits relative invisibility; were the disciplinary technology in the municipality a little less subtle, then the permit holder's difference would be marked on their bodies in an obvious way, thus illustrating a return to a cruder economy of power.

The strategy requiring the permit-holder to always have their permit on their person is effective because it is both functional and inconspicuous; it does not disrupt the textures of everyday life and
it does not stigmatise the permit holder in any self-evident manner. Permits, for example, do not remove subjects from civic life. They do not prevent "Reserve" dwellers from labouring, consuming and recreating. They thus help to create the impression that those who hold permits are "normal" and this "normality" is reinforced by the permits invisibility.

At the same time though, the permit is a constant reminder that surface appearances deceive, for the permit holder is forced to occupy a position which consistently make them objects of both their own inturned gaze and potential administrative scrutiny. The fact that municipal power can be mobilised at any time and without any warning, is horrifying. Checks might be at random and thus the holder is forced to submit to the climate of fear and "wear" their permit at all times.

Although "spot-checks" might at first appear gratuitous, they are inevitably orchestrated by a cold administrative logic. The check-up always succeeds because, either it functions as a reminder, thus strengthening the system, or, it actually "catches" offenders. In this case, the "offender" becomes an example to those who have not succumbed to the perils of resistance. The relation between the holder and the administrative officials or police is thus one of complete inequality, an inequality which is exaggerated by the very arbitrariness of the procedure which might find the permit holder guilty of an offence.

The permit system was the product of a normative municipal discourse which sought to control access to the predominantly white areas of Woodstock, Salt River, and Observatory. In contrast to primitive disciplinary strategies like inspection, the permit system was
remarkably sophisticated in that it required only occasional administrative intervention. In fact, the strength of the system was in direct proportion to the opacity of its inner workings. When viewed from the perspective of the permit holder, the system would have appeared to be frighteningly arbitrary in the sense that it didn’t appear to conform to any principles from which a system of rules could be generated.

"Ordinary" systems of discipline are remarkably ingenious in their ability to fix, pin-down, and locate subjects in space. What the permit system does, is to partially reverse this disciplinary logic: it allows the "native" the "freedom" of doing and moving as she/he pleases, but it does so in the context of already dividing their consciousness to the extent where they may voluntarily decide that mobility is a risk not worth taking. Discipline has bound the "native" to his or her identity, and immobilisation thus takes place at the level of subjectivity, rather than at the level of the body.

Before concluding, I think it would be instructive to note to what degree the permit, as an advanced and highly intelligent tactic of power conforms to Foucault’s definition of the relationship between the multiplicities and discipline,

But the peculiarity of the disciplines is that they try to define in relation to the multiplicities a tactics of power that fulfils three criteria: firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost (economically, by the low expenditure it involves; politically, by its discretion, its low exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses); secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as
far as possible, without either failure or interval; thirdly, to 
link this "economic" growth of power with the output of the 
apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) 
within which it is exercised; in short, to increase both the 
docility and the utility of all the elements of the system. 20

I have, in this section, focussed on two things: firstly on the types 
of disciplinary strategies employed within the multiplicity (the 
inspection and informal census) and secondly, on the forms of writing 
that the municipality relied on to make administrative sense of the 
"world out there". Before continuing I would like to draw some simple 
conclusions. Despite the fact that I have used an expanded definition 
of what constitutes writing, the recent example of the permit as a 
form of disciplinary writing and control demonstrates a number of 
things: that we cannot analyse municipal discourse at the 
archaeological/genealogical level and expect the discourse to be homogeneously and equally developed in all areas.

Furthermore, this section proves that administrative procedure was a 
unique combination of some near perfect strategies of racial 
oppression and separation, as well as some bureaucratically mundane 
expressions of the will-to-power. As a disciplinary formation 
therefore, municipal knowledge and discourse appears, from the 
limited perspective of a textual analysis of correspondence, to have 
been intriguingly "original"; a discourse which, on the whole, was 
far from solving the pressing problems of administrating a mixed and 
growing population and ultimately fell far short of reaching the 
"threshold of a discipline" that I referred to in the introduction.
3.2: THE REGULATION AND PRODUCTION OF MUNICIPAL TIME/SPACE

Even a random glance at the previous section will confirm the reader's suspicion: that many of the examples above can also be understood by "reading" them as attempts, with varying degrees of success, to control municipal space and time. Take the example of the "census of coolies" for instance. In this case there was a clear institutional need to count and document the presence of "undesirables" in or just outside the municipal area. The Medical Officer's discourse contained a spatial awareness (he refers to the "poor jew quarters") which indicates that a census is primarily a count of bodies in space. In fact, the idea of a census is inseperable from a definite codification of space into certain manageable units, like municipalities, for example, and a need for institutional power to supplement or refine its knowledge about certain sections of the population.

In passing, it is interesting to note that the areas which needed to come under the "influence" of the census, were to some degree controlled, and thus liberated from municipal power, by the groups - the "coolies", the Jews - who lived there. The census was also an attempt therefore, to wrest symbolic control away from the communities who had made the space their own. The knowledge gained in the census might not be mobilised immediately but might very well be the foundation for a more heavy-handed application of power at a later stage.

Disputes about the precise location of the Woodstock/Salt River boundaries appear in the Town Clerk's files with the regularity of a virtual theme. One of the first recorded items contained in the municipal files is from August, 1904, in which the Chief Surveyor for
the Colony draws attention to the disputed boundary between Woodstock, Maitland and the Salt River Mouth. This geographical confusion arose ostensibly because the river current had a tendency to gnaw the banks through water action and thus the boundaries of the respective municipalities were always changing.

A similar dispute arose between the Municipalities of Cape Town and Woodstock when both laid claim to Cambridge Street. The respective municipalities argued that the street was within their "boundary line" and thus under their jurisdiction. The Clerk's records contain no evidence of how the dispute was eventually resolved but the dispute (if we may call it that) is indicative of the relentless administrative imperative for spatial and social control. This desire deemed that ambiguity, confusion etc., was, within the context of municipal knowledge and power, potentially catastrophic because it could allow commodities, individuals, animals etc., to, metaphorically, vanish, to occupy that space so feared by the custodians of municipal knowledge, the space that wasn't there. As Foucault notes,

This is why discipline fixes: it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion: it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions.

Administrative non-space or, alternatively, space that is represented by two competing and mutually exclusive systems of municipal knowledge at the same time, is not only dangerous from the bureaucratic point of view, it is also worrying from a legal perspective. It raises the two related questions of accountability and responsibility: who takes legal responsibility for a mistake or
accident? What if both municipalities assume that they are "in control" of the street? Does that mean that bureaucratic procedure will suddenly and comically be doubled? etc. As we can no doubt see it was a matter of some administrative importance that the respective municipalities clear up the issue.

The Woodstock Municipality's desire to map and create space did not begin and end with the attention it gave to the upkeep of municipal borders. It was also in the municipality's interest to preside over land that was divided to an even greater degree: as sub-division meant potentially greater administrative control. The administration was able to plot the movement of people and things with increased economy and accuracy and thus, from the point of view of knowledge, division and sub-division was a form of partitioning, and thus a form of power.

In a letter to the Town Engineer dated November the second, 1902, the Land Surveyors Chas Marais and de Villiers propose the sub-division of Milnerton estates. They write,

We beg herewith to hand you general plan in duplicate of the proposed subdivision of that portion of the Milnerton Estates as is situated within the Woodstock Municipality for your approval. The Milnerton Estates being most anxious to dispose of this property at a very early date, we would be extremely obliged if you would be good enough to give the matter your early attention. The property as you will notice is situated between the Salt River Bridge and Montague Bridge, adjoining the latter.24

One senses that it would have been to the municipality's advantage to
administer spatially divided land. There would have been perils in the future however, as land of manageable size suggests that it might be privately bought and thus settled on. Land ownership and the possible erection of houses means increased administrative and disciplinary difficulties: although the building of houses presumes the existence of addresses, and thus a point of fixity for the municipal administration, new houses also suggest the flow of individuals and commodities, increased movement and trade. As we already know, fluidity and movement has always been a major problem for discipline, as discipline is primarily concerned with enclosure, immobility and stasis.

In light of the above it is interesting to note that the municipality actually bought land. In a letter to the municipality from an undisclosed firm of Attorney's representing a Mr Mostert we read,

> About June 1901 we passed transfer to the Woodstock Municipality of the farm Oliphants Hoek which had been purchased for the sum of £5000 from our client Mr C Mostert. The purchase included certain water rights over properties lying below Oliphants Hoek on the Wemmershoek stream and along the banks of the Berg River. These rights were secured by Notarial Contract which were drawn by us and a Notary proceeded to the site for the purpose of securing the signatures of the parties interested.25

I suspect that the main reason for the municipality's investment in the farm was that it could secure water-rights at the same time. We already know from previous references that access to vast quantities of water was a constant problem for the corporation. The quote is thus illustrative of the dilemma (very possibly unrecognised at the
administrative level) that the municipality appears to have been facing at the time. The need for water would have been paramount, particularly in the context of a municipality that was struggling to supply its population with sufficient quantities of the commodity. The decision to purchase Mostert's Farm was thus based on sound economic logic: catering for an expanding populations needs by taking the appropriate measures to satisfy their requirements. At the same time however, land purchase dictates the possibility that part of the land might be settled. If so, we have a situation of potential excess, in which the growth of the area, in both the residential and the productive sense, would paradoxically loosen the municipality's control of it.

Growth of the broadest possible kind was a double-edged phenomenon: expansion of the productive apparatus and the corresponding accumulation of capital would have meant a difficult adjustment for municipal discipline. And although Foucault has always been quick to point out that the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital are intimately related, it is important to stress that on the municipal level this mutual dependence was not adequately registered.

The records also lead one towards the conclusion that the new economy of municipal power was never quite coherent or intrusive enough as a disciplinary technology. As a result it thus did little to contribute to the creation of the preconditions for capitalist development in the municipality. In this sense it is in stark contrast to the military rationality which flowed through the Colony and did much to create positive preconditions for the growth of the modern industrial age (See in this regard the forthcoming chapter, particularly section 4.1.). What we find instead is small-scale capitalist growth.
entrepreneurship and population increase, threatening to outpace the municipality’s ability to control the spatial and temporal boundaries of that development.

If the official correspondence which is collected in the Cape Town Archives is an accurate reflection of the difficulties encountered by the institution, then we can be relatively safe in the assertion that growth was a problem for the municipality. This was because it ultimately outstripped the municipality’s capacities as an institution to codify and control it, whether that codification took place in spatial or temporal terms.

We will be looking at the relationship between capitalist growth and the municipality as a disciplinary institution during the next section. In an attempt to come to terms with the municipality’s relative failure to regulate “life” within its boundaries, we will be asking why the municipality was unable to initiate a shift from an economy of regulation to one of self-regulation. For the time being however, we will be looking briefly at the entire range of measures practiced by the municipality in order to gain a semblance of spatial/temporal control.

The correspondence collected in the Cape Town Archives suggests that the municipality dealt with a range of land and space oriented issues. The municipal attempts - some of which have been hinted at earlier - at defining and controlling space revolved around the following: 1. Definition and clarification of boundaries. This included the release, transfer, sub-division and sale of land. 2. Building and construction of roads. Within this category we find the lengthening and construction of roads, the lighting of roads and the construction of pavements. 3. Alterations and improvements to
existing structures. This section has a self-explanatory heading but also includes items like council housing specifications. 4. Returns, reports and valuations. Herein we include items on empty returns and valuation, as well as reports on property value and lists of derelict land.

As far as the first section is concerned one notes the ongoing conflict, which is mentioned several times in the municipal records, over the exact boundaries between Woodstock and both Salt River and Salt River mouth.27 There is also ample reference given in the files to alterations between the Woodstock and Maitland boundary.28 On the matter of land sale and transfer, the municipal files contain references to the following: the sale of land on both Devil's Peak29 and the Foreshore,30 the release of land for the Woodstock Cottage Hospital31 and the transfer of the Ndabeni Native Reserve to the municipality.32

The regularity of references to the construction of roads during the period of independence suggest that the building of roads was high on the administrative agenda. The files of correspondence make reference to the building of Cook, Polo, and Balfour roads33 and the lengthening of Beach road to name but a few.34 In this regard we may also note the request for "500 Super Yards of asphaltic pavement for Albert Road".35 Allied to the improvement of pavements was the need to provide the streets with adequate lighting and the files contain several references to the need for improvement in this regard.36

In section one we noted the constant stream of letters applying to the municipality for permission to renovate and improve private property. Add to these applications certain formal municipal
guidelines like council housing specifications and initiatives to provide all Woodstock streets with their own nameplates, and we have a rough idea of the municipal dimension of improvement and alteration.

Under the heading, "Returns, Reports and Valuations" I would include Sanitary Department reports on vacant houses (so that stercus pails didn't have to be removed) and returns on empty houses - the records seem to suggest that the two are different. Grouped loosely under this heading I would also include reports on property value (they were normally conducted at yearly intervals) and lists relating to the exact location of derelict land.

From the perspective of the municipal control of time, one can reconstruct a web of measures which were designed to regulate life in the municipality. Rather than discipline, which according to Foucault tends to function as a kind of "infra-law", these measures function at the level of the law itself, thus requiring constant surveillance, upkeep and amendment on the part of the police and the authorities. The problem with these labour intensive and manifestly conspicuous strategies is that they advertise themselves in advance, for everyone knows an "inspector" when they see one.

Under the projected heading, "Regulations and Licenses", one notes the following in the municipal correspondence: regulations for the carting and carriage of meat; regulations pertaining to Cabs and other vehicles; regulations for the disposal of snoek on Woodstock beach; and regulations for building. The municipality required municipal subjects to apply for the following licenses: licenses for purveyors of milk; licenses for hawkers and fruit vendors; licenses for ice-cream vendors; licenses
for dog owners; licenses for purveyors of light wine.

Applications and permits were another area controlled by the municipal apparatus and the files contain the following items: applications for oil permits; permits to store paraffin and applications for certificates to become general dealers. It is intriguing to note that the police were obliged to oversee applications for general dealers' licenses. The municipality was thereby able to cleverly elicit their help as a repressive institution in an area which it should not control or manage nearly as effectively.

The municipality also presided over a range of other laws which related to areas as diverse as the upkeep of fencing standards, fixing a speed limit for motor cars and standardising a system of weights and scales. It is not my intention however, to compile an inventory of the absolute welter of regulations, licences and penalties which the municipality strove gainfully to implement and enforce. It is rather to reconstruct imperfectly the "horizon" across which these regulations functioned and thereby suggest that along with the obvious legal dimension, they were all concerned, to a greater or lesser extent to plot time.

The invention or imposition of a regulation serves to convert difference into sameness. It serves, in other words as a principle of repetition, converting the unpredictable by way of a constant and slow return. Regulations represent the formalisation of government procedure and are underscored at all times by the law. What regulations (and for that matter, applications) tend to do, is they reduce the vitality and multiplicity of the social and they codify it into an unchanging logical process. It is possible to understand the
panorama of regulations above as an attempt to govern intelligently, the indirect effect of which is to turn time into order, time into ritual.

From the disciplinary perspective the ordering of time through regulations and the like was problematic because it required inspection, supervision and surveillance. These activities are time-consuming, conspicuous, and incline towards the ritualistic. In other words, they are ineffective from the disciplinary point-of-view. This poses an obvious problem if the municipality had pretensions to order the multiplicity in a coherent manner and thus to approach the "threshold of a discipline". We have already sensed the municipality's relative expertise in this regard, witness for example the introduction of the permit system, and the desperate desire to "finalise" the spatial boundaries. The former in particular, was a highly sophisticated articulation of disciplinary logic if ever there was one.

Despite the municipality's attempt to order the multiplicity, one senses their organisational inability to influence the comings-and-goings within the municipality itself, in anything but a formal and "superstructural" manner. Municipal government in other words, failed to operate successfully in the realm of the "infra-law", the underside of legality. This was because as an institution it was tied to the codification and control of the legal universe (there are isolated contrary examples) and on the whole, never managed to reach a disciplinary "threshold". There is another major reason why the municipality is, within the context of the case studies which follow, a unique and different institution. We will be exploring the reason in the final section which follows.
3.3: THE FAILURE TO REACH A DISCIPLINARY THRESHOLD

On the twenty-third of February 1906, Jasper Anderson, the Medical Officer of Health for the Colony, wrote the following letter to the Woodstock Town Clerk.

Dear Sir,

In confirmation of my telephonic message this morning, I beg to inform you that from reports I have received, I have reason to suspect that the infection of Smallpox is being conveyed about the Cape Peninsula by itinerant vendors of fruit and vegetables. I shall be glad if you will have the drivers of all vegetable and fruit carts, which pass through your Municipality, inspected as to whether they are suffering from, or have recently suffered from smallpox, detaining any you may have suspicion of until satisfied that they are not suffering from the disease, and of those who have recently had the disease, until satisfied that the name and address given is correct. Should you come across one by the name of "Dirk", will you kindly communicate with me before you release him.

Yours faithfully,

A. Jasper Anderson.

One of the more resonant words in the quote above is "itinerant", with its connotations of gypsy-like freedom and independence. The connotations, which strike one as positive today, were of course, highly problematic for Jasper Anderson. The "itinerant vendors of fruit and vegetables" were a threat to Colonial health because they were potentially ill. Their "illness" was combined with their extreme mobility and they were thus highly dangerous from the medical point-of-view. Nomadism, which is the freedom to travel across space,
is a threat to any disciplinary articulation because "travellers" normally find some way of evading or subverting such a regime. The predictably heavy-handed measures proposed by the M.O.H. - "inspection" and "detention" - are thus, at the most basic level, designed to stop the vendors from moving freely about. Once they have been stopped they can be inspected, forced to give an address, and if need be detained.

At the same time however, we should not seduce ourselves into accepting wholeheartedly the apparent "heavy-handedness" of the response. This would prevent us from noting the subtlety and meticulousness of a discourse which proposes to utilise the Colonial division of space - Colonial power invented the municipality, in itself a new economy of power, as an institutional grid for the organisation of space - in order to single out, or as Foucault would have it "render visible", certain individuals. Once found, these "itinerant" individuals were inspected, analysed and their discourse scrutinised in relation to the truth. The method by which they were analysed consisted of distribution around a disease/health norm, and in one particular case - I am thinking here of "Dirk" - a degree of individualisation.

Not only do the vendors represent a nightmare for health inspectors, but they also provide us with our final reason as to why the municipality was unable to reach the "threshold of a discipline". As an institution, the municipality was obliged to encourage vendors like "Dirk" to ply their trade on the streets of Woodstock. As a corporation with a vested interest in the growth of the multiplicity, the municipality was actively committed to the free circulation of commodities both within and without its borders. Small-scale capitalism is destined by the momentum of its own logic, to slide
through essentially artificial "barriers" like municipal borders. No matter how expertly the municipality was able to control the time and space within which it operated, it was never able to control trade because trade always signified mobility in excess of the municipality's ability to constrain it.

CONCLUSION.

Looking backwards over this chapter it strikes me that we have managed to reach a number of valuable conclusions: in 3.1, The Shape of Municipal Knowledge, we focussed on the areas in which the economy of power within the municipality was at its most creative. The permit system and the calling of a census were two extraordinarily sophisticated mechanisms of miniature discipline. One is directed, however, towards the unfortunate conclusion that municipal power was only this neurotically creative in response to a racial "problem". Both the census and the introduction of a permit system reveal the racial anxiety and fear that lurked within the municipal institution.

We discovered the double-edged nature of spatial and temporal regulations in 3.2, The Regulation and Production of Municipal Time-Space. The regulations put into circulation by the municipality were inevitably double-edged because they both operated at the level of the law and required costly and time-consuming forms of administration. Progress towards the "threshold of a discipline" is only made when discipline "seamlessly" facilitates both productivity and obedience; inspection is too conspicuous a form of intervention for it not to be noticeable by the general population. It is thus self-evidently repressive and is therefore prevented in advance from helping to secure the transition to the status of discipline.
I use an event in 1906 which involved the inspection and possible isolation of fruit and vegetable vendors as a metaphor to demonstrate the incompatibility between commercial endeavour and the municipality as a fully developed disciplinary institution. In so doing I suggest indirectly that the Woodstock Municipality was never able to preside over a self-regulating space because it articulated a rationality which functioned at an altogether "higher" and more formal level. This was in spite of the fact that at times in the municipality's history it did manage to initiate systems like the census and the need for black people to carry a permit which were incredibly effective from the disciplinary point-of-view. This is the implied note on which I end 3.3. The Failure to reach a Disciplinary Threshold.

2. Cape Archives: 3A/6 111.

3. Cape Archives: 3A/6 122.

4. Cape Archives: 3A/6 105.

5. Cape Archives: 3A/6 111.

6. Cape Archives: 3A/6 110.

7. Cape Archives: 3A/6 114.


9. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 140.

10. Cape Archives: 3A/6 106.

11. ibid.

12. With reference to inspection as a strategy employed regularly by the municipality, the reports filed by either the Acting Chief or the Chief Sanitary Inspector usually contained items on truancy and attendance at schools. These generally make for intriguing reading (See reports dated at two weekly intervals from March 24th, 1908, through to May 5th, 1908, for example) particularly when one considers that schools at the time were perceived administratively as potential health hazards and breeding grounds for infection.

It is interesting to note that the schools became sites of knowledge for a medical-administrative discourse rather than say, an educational-pedagogical discourse, which might have concentrated on issues relating to teaching and classroom...
management in general. This medical-administrative discourse was unusually simple and authoritarean in that it appeared to be concerned with absence from school rather than forms of "aberrant" behaviour within school itself. In fact one might say that medical-administrative discourse was simply concerned with schools insofar as they were spaces which required surveillance because they might become insanitary, rather than institutions which inspired a need to monitor certain "unacceptable" forms of behaviour.

See Cape Archives: 3A/6 106.

13. Cape Archives: 3A/6 106.
14. Cape Archives: 3A/6 121.
15. Cape Archives: 3A/6 120.
16. Cape Archives: 3A/6 129.
17. ibid.
18. Cape Archives: 3A/6 111.
19. Cape Archives: 3A/6 125.
21. Cape Archives: 3A/6 106.
22. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 164.
24. Cape Archives: 3A/6 127.
25. Cape Archives: 3A/6 105.
27. Cape Archives: 3A/6 106.
28. Cape Archives: 3A/6 105.
29. Cape Archives: 3A/6 119.
30. Cape Archives: 3A/6 122.
31. Cape Archives: 3A/6 115.
32. Cape Archives: 3A/6 112.
33. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 175.
34. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 167.
35. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 176.
36. Cape Archives: 3A/6 130.
37. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 144.
38. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 176.
39. Cape Archives: 3A/6 121.
40. Cape Archives: 3A/6 114.
41. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 178.
42. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 163.
44. Cape Archives: 3A/6 106.
45. Cape Archives: 3A/6 103.
46. Cape Archives: 3A/6 122.
47. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 145.
48. Cape Archives: 3A/6 106.
49. Cape Archives: 3A/6 120.
50. Cape Archives: 3A/6 121.
51. Cape Archives: 3A/6 122.
52. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 173.
53. Cape Archives: 3A/6 114.
54. Cape Archives: 3A/6 133.
55. Cape Archives: 3A/6 122.
56. Cape Archives: 3/WSK 175.
57. Cape Archives: 3A/6 122.
58. Cape Archives: 3A/6 112.
59. Cape Archives: 3A/6 110.
CHAPTER 4: THE AUSTERITY OF CONCRETE

INTRODUCTION

The following chapter is to be read as a direct response to the previous chapter, in which we analysed the various strategies and techniques employed by the Woodstock Municipality in its mission to control the greater municipal area. I suggested in the previous chapter that municipal power revolved around the attempted control of both space and time. The opening move in this consolidation of Colonial power was to create a municipality; an administrative entity that would oversee an artificial space that was a British Colonial creation. This strategy was only ever partially successful and this was due to a host of factors, not least of which was the municipality's rapidly changing population combined with the dynamic and restless nature of the times. In the previous chapter I made the suggestion that the ideal system of municipal power - that is, socially inconspicuous, economical and unobtrusive - would have been one which actively promoted self-regulation. This ideal system was not to be however, and the municipality had to be satisfied with an infinitely more makeshift system of local government.

In section 4.1., Some thoughts on a map of Cape Town, I argue that a close textual analysis of an Admiralty map of the greater Cape Town area dating to 1858-1860 suggests the following: that the Craig's Battery gun emplacement on the Woodstock coast was, without doubt, a premodern military institution. Secondly, that although we cannot date the beginning of the industrial Revolution in the Colony to the time of the map, one is able to note the extensive domination of the military in all spheres of local life. This domination created the
preconditions for the birth of capitalist modernity in the Colony.

Section 4.2. narrows the analytical focus somewhat and thus begins with an analysis of the control of space and time in Craig's Battery. The section will be entitled, *Space and Time in the Battery*. In marked contrast to the municipality's sometimes bumbling attempts to create a definitive and self-regulating space, my analysis of space within the battery will demonstrate how, in a tightly controlled and localised "universe", life can be made to resemble the workings of a well-oiled machine. This section also continues the analysis which started in the previous chapter, in that it locates the domination of space and time, and the corresponding shift in the representation and thus apprehension thereof, as one of the major features of modernism. As David Harvey points out,

It is important to keep in mind therefore that the modernism that emerged before the First World War was more of a reaction to the new conditions of production (the machine, the factory, urbanization), circulation (the new systems of transport and communications), and consumption (the rise of mass markets, advertising, mass fashion) than it was a pioneer in the production of such changes.¹

In the second section, we will thus be analysing an institutional space that contained some of the elements which, if Harvey is to be believed, precipitated the radical alteration in European consciousness called "modernism". After all, the battery contained several of the features described by Harvey above, including a specialised system of reproduction within a space that paradoxically, was similar to both a prison and a factory and was yet neither. By "system of reproduction", I mean to draw attention to the fact that the battery was geared to maintaining (thus reproducing) existing

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military equipment. The analysis of time and space within the battery will not simply focus on the disciplinary dimension of military control; it will also read the battery as a quintessential, if obscure site, which possessed, in concentrated form, some of the basic technological features - the machine gun, the telephone - which led to the rise of modernism.

The title of section 4.3., is, An Archaeology of Self-Regulation. In the section I "deconstruct" Army Form G949. The form describes a set of safety procedures that needed to be undertaken by artillerymen who entered and left the part of the battery in which shells were stored. I argue in the section that from an analysis of the forms we are able to discern a highly intelligent, transparent and cost-effective form of power. This ritual stands in direct contrast to the Woodstock Municipality's attempts - some far more effective than others, as we have seen - to order and control the population through a system which did not have its originating impulse and finally cannot be traced back to the Woodstock Town Hall. In Foucauldian fashion I contend that it is only through a deconstruction of mechanisms, like the process codified in Army Form G949, that we are able to understand power at the level of micro-technique.

The advantage, as I see it, of conducting this microscopic archaeological analysis, is that it gives us a refined understanding of power relations in modern day societies. It suggests that power is an infinitely more complex "system" than vulgar Marxists would have us imagine. More importantly however, it problematises the entire notion of origins by suggesting that perhaps antagonistic class relations do not solely account for political oppression in capitalist economies.

The advantage of analysing power, knowledge and discipline in various institutions within the same municipality is that we are able to
appreciate that the various disciplinary regimes are, in their dispersal, unique. They rely on different methods and techniques, independently of some whole which malevolently orchestrates exploitation from above.

The closing section is entitled, 4.4. Technology and the alteration of Time/Space relations in the Battery. During this section I undertake an analysis of the machine-gun and the telephone as examples of modern technology. I note that both objects would have altered the Time/Space relations in the battery considerably and would therefore have helped to turn the battery into a definitive modern disciplinary institution.

Finally, in a written appendix (Appendix A) to this chapter, I analyse five photographs of Fort Knokke. This fort was situated next to Craig's Battery and was part of the military apparatus guarding Table Bay. The photographs show the fort in a state of utter neglect and this prompts an analysis of both ruins and photographs as significant elements in the discourse of modernism. To my mind the photographs allow us to write a story about modernism because they are the result of the technological change and subsequent alteration in the apprehension of space and time which so radically transformed the period. In their peculiar way ruins also represent the age and thus photographs of ruins, which were later to be collected and housed in a "space" that was itself invention of the modernist period - the museum - provide one with the perfect raw material for an appendix which I have decided to entitle, Creativity, Destruction and Modernism - The Case of the Fort Knokke Photographs. These thoughts are included in an appendix because they are pertinent to a wide ranging consideration of both modernization and modernism without being directly relevant to our analysis of self-regulation in the battery.
4.1: SOME THOUGHTS ON A MAP OF CAPE TOWN.

The plans and drawings for Craig's Battery give the fleeting impression that one is looking at a structure that was a throwback to medieval times. This impression is created by the thick outer walls, raised superstructure and generally sealed appearance and compounded by the presence, certainly in early admiralty charts of Table Bay, of a watchtower looming behind the battery itself. The battery was an "institution" in that it "floated" a system of rules and a system of discipline in order to maintain control over the Royal Engineers within. The latent medievalism of the battery with its sealed and hermetic air is offset, however, by the fact that it contained some extremely sophisticated machinery and in this respect was definitely an institution of the nineteenth century. It would be foolhardy to suggest that the history of the battery as an institution was congruent with capitalist modernization in the Colony, it was not. In an Admiralty chart of Table Bay dating back to 1858-1860, one notices both the Tower and the battery without difficulty. Occupying a slice of land almost due west of the Salt River lagoon and a solitary windmill of the "Yser Plaat" marshes, the battery appears to be the largest man-made structure to the east of Cape Town. The relative "emptiness" of the space beyond the twin toll gates to the South-East of the town can be seen not only by the complete absence of structures of any sort but also by the fact that Mowbray is mapped as a separate and somewhat isolated village.

The map itself contains very little evidence of the factories and residential areas that we have come to associate with the expansion of the productive apparatus and the birth of the bourgeois epoch. One is aware however, of several roads out of Cape Town: one leading to Mowbray and eventually to Simonstown, another "to the interior" and
still another up the coast in the general direction of what is marked as the "Riet Valei Quicksand". A single railway line snakes its way out of the Alfred docks only to separate beyond what is simply marked on the map as a railway station. Beyond the station, which stands commandingly on the Salt River lagoon's southern shore, the lines split: one heading off in the direction of what is curiously referred to as "Simons Bay", the other toward Wellington and the interior. The underdeveloped nature of the area around the battery serves to prove beyond all doubt that the military apparatus on the Woodstock Beach was not an extension of capitalist modernisation but was rather a form of protection and an insurance (as we shall see in a later chapter that insurance is fundamentally an attitude towards time) against possible attack.

On closer inspection of the map one notices the presence of considerable military structures in the town. Most visible are the forts and batteries which were built to protect the town from seaward attack. A less visible, but perhaps even more significant category of structures in the area at the time, were, what we can call from a contemporary vantage point, the carceral continuum. The continuum extended from the Military Hospital which was located to the west of Fort Knokke, beyond Prince Alfred's Square and Parade towards a cluster of buildings behind the Port Office. This cluster contained the Somerset Hospital, a Convict Station and a little further on, in the direction of Mouille Point, a Laboratory. The preponderance of carceral and military institutions in the Cape Town area suggest that this particular section of the Colony was a disciplined and highly ordered Colonial possession which had been rationalised to meet the demands of military power.

I contend that the persistent militarisation of life in Cape Town
created a set of favourable conditions for the beginning of capitalist modernity in the Western Cape. Take the Admiralty map of Table Bay that I have referred to recently, for example. Any post-enlightenment map flattens and homogenizes a heterogeneous space according to the dictates of a universal and perspectively "neutral" way of seeing the world. As "objective" spatial knowledge the Admiralty map was a powerful and valuable commodity and, as a reliable representation of space, it paved the way for continuing military and commercial expansion. This particular map contains a vast array of specific knowledge - depth soundings for the entire Table Bay area, thus facilitating accurate navigation, for instance - and provides the opportunity for both the ongoing domination and production of space.

The mapping of the Cape Town area was just one aspect in the domination of Colonial space by the imperatives of military rationality. Imperial and military power is not confined to a trustworthy representation of space however, and we are able to detect the creative influence of the military in the following respects: the abundance of redoubts, blockhouses, forts and batteries which, in the latter case, constituted a protective sea-facing rim behind which commercial and religious structures of the town were situated. An analysis of these defensive structures location reveals that they served to enclose the town and in so doing created a space which could be internally policed with remarkable ease. The town also contained a sizeable military barracks and parade ground just off Caledon Square and the presence of these structures suggest that space in Cape Town was ordered in a definite and intentional way; a way which was undoubtedly the result of a specific military rationality.

By 1860, Cape Town had an infrastructural fabric which included the following: well developed rail and road links with the interior, a
good harbour, a gas-works and a reservoir, potentially cheap supplies of convict labour from both the convict station and the prison, and an ample amount of apparently uninhabited land close to the town itself. If one combines all these factors one notes that by the 1860s there existed in the Colony certain important preconditions for the emergence of capitalist modernity. Link these non-discursive conditions together with the fact that the town was already an enclosed and disciplined space (see above) and one has the almost perfect setting for the expansion of capitalism in the Colony.

4.2: SPACE AND TIME IN THE BATTERY

Although I have argued with scrupulous care that Craig's Battery was not, strictly speaking, an architectural creation of the modern epoch, I do nevertheless contend that it is possible to analyse the utilisation of space and the control of time in the battery as definitively modern. In its most acute and exaggerated form this "modernity" manifests itself in the new technology of the machine-gun and the telephone; technology which compresses time through the subjective nullification of space. At a more mundane level the disciplinary technology within the battery positions the body in causal networks that resemble, on a smaller scale of course, the production lines of large-scale factories. And it was perhaps at this level - the level of reproduction and repair - that the utilisation of space in the battery was at its most concentrated and austere.

Scrutiny of the battery plans indicate that the use of space therein was the result of purposeful and intense planning. The battery was an unusually ordered and highly disciplined space in which everything
literally "had its place". The sense of everything belonging (and here I include the Royal Artilleryman) in prescribed "places", was a natural extension of the battery's manifold functions. The prime function to which the system was geared was, however, the firing of the heavy artillery (supplemented at times by lighter machine gun fire) and ultimately all parts of the process were subordinate to this. During the next few pages I will analyse various spaces within the battery: first I will focus on the section of the battery that was geared to on-site repair work. Secondly I will tease out the consequences of the almost complete control of space and time in the battery and what that meant in concrete terms. Here it is important to realise that it is possible to read the human body in this instance as just another cog in the machine-like functioning of the apparatus, but we will deal with this in greater detail later. In order to demonstrate in greater detail what I mean, refer to the accompanying diagram of the Craig's Battery Workshops (See Appendix C).

I draw the reader's attention to the existence of two interlinked rooms; the Fitter's shop and the Royal Engineers' (R.E.) store and the existence of an adjoining third room, the Smith's shop, with permanent forge which only has a single exit, and the matched and beaded garage-type doors (the doors are more evident on the elevation drawing rather than on the actual plan). What I propose is to offer a rough scenario based on deduction as to the functions of the engineers within each room as well as the accompanying attitudes and positions taken up by their bodies. The reader will note that genealogically the ambitions of this brief study are entirely correct, for does not Foucault encourage the effective historian to concentrate on the changing rituals of subjection to which the human body was forced to submit?
There is some doubt in my mind as to the exact function of the Smith's shop; was it to mould shells and beat cartridges into shape - note the anvil and the work-block, thus providing the engineers in the Fitter's Shop (Assembly shop) with the two main components - besides the high explosives which were probably kept in the R.E. store - of a shell, or was the Smith's shop only related to the other two in terms of proximity, its main function being to maintain the trolleys which transported the shells along the Rolling Way (see Appendix D) to the casemates? There is also the possibility that the Smith's shop was used to strengthen or repair parts of the heavy artillery, which would have come under tremendous pressure as a result of sustained use. Whatever the exact function of the Smith's shop the "surfacing" of the forge, anvil, skylight etc. within the diagram itself provides us with enough information to approximate the bodily attitudes (stoking the forge, placing and extracting the red-hot metal, beating it on the anvil or block with available light flowing through the overhead skylight etc.) and the more-or-less programmed series of positions that the body would have been "forced" to assume.

In all likelihood the R.E. store contained the ingredients which went into the shell itself. These ingredients would, in all probability, have been passed through the window (see cross-section C-D in Appendix C). Also note the height of the shelf in the R.E. store) between the store and the Fitter's shop. In the Fitter's shop the final product, through the combination of cartridge, shell and high-explosive gunpowder, would have been created and then placed in a rack, put on a trolley and wheeled down the concrete ramp eventually finding its way to the stores beneath the battery itself. We should note the incredible thickness of the Fitter's shop walls (14 inches) and the location of the benches and shelves which are ideally placed to provide ample space on which to fit their components together and then
to lower the finished product down onto an awaiting trolley/push-cart? Also note the existence of the sets of cupboards and drawers beneath the large bench next to the South-East facing wall (see section A-B in Appendix C). We must also take into account the possibility that the shells (or the various components out of which they were constructed) were imported directly from Britain. The store’s and fitter’s shop might therefore have been designed specifically for the day to day repair work required by the battery.

Even the most inadequate of reconstructions and thinnest of hypotheses enables us at least to consider the skill and strength required of the fortified artilleryman. While the battery did not require the marching precision, elegance and, “bodily rhetoric of honour” expected of the infantryman, the "rhetoric" of the artilleryman in all probability consisted more of attitudes of concentration, gravity and the "correct" posture, particularly when dealing with substances as dangerous as gunpowder. It was the inherent danger of dealing with such a substance that led to the codification of safety procedures and it was these safety procedures which to a certain extent escaped the logic of vision which underpins Foucault’s later notion of Panopticism. I make the connection because I believe that the two shared a crucial similarity, that they forced the prisoner, or in our case the artilleryman, to become self-regarding, that is, conscious of himself as an object under constant surveillance.

I would like next to analyse the structuring of battery space with special reference to the magazines and emplacements for the two 4.7 inch quick fire guns on the battery’s left flank (Appendix E). A brief inspection of the plans shows how symmetrical and ordered the space is; one also notices how the need for safety has come to dominate the way in which the magazines are constructed. The repercussions of this need
for safety are that architectural features such as walls, openings and stairways tend to define the movements of the human body. The "safety issue" thus becomes the functional alibi for a rationality that disciplines as it protects; objectification becomes the result of a strenuous need to insure against loss of life.

If one looks at the elevation plan on the top left hand side of the diagram (Appendix E) one first notices the incredible thickness of the outer protecting walls. The second aspect of the plan that draws one's attention is the manner in which the inner Cartridge Store walls are "punctuated"; the only comparative lightness of architectural touch issues from the spaces that are supposedly "empty", spaces through which the body can pass. There is, in fact, only one entrance/exit through which the body of the engineer can move (on the other side of the barrier which is itself between the two seats) and the only other respite from the thick uniformity of the walls is the issuing hatch through which cartridges were passed.

The consequences of such an extreme form of spatial regimentation means that, in effect, time is also controlled. The ritual (to be examined in great detail later on during this chapter) of taking off one's clothes, crossing the barrier, putting on workclothes, entering the Cartridge Store and then passing the cartridges out through the issuing hatch means that action is nothing other than the sum of repeated gestures. This very repetitiousness tends to suggest that the actions, which are repeated within a given time span, become increasingly meaningless in anything other than the framework of causal logic within which they take place. The ordering of space thus helps to construct a ritual in which time is all but drained of its ability to disrupt. In this instance, the programming of space seems to suggest that under certain conditions time can be induced to turn
in on its self, to become predictable in advance, and thus be
controlled.

The organisation of space in the emplacement as a whole results in an
expanded range of ritualistic and equally "empty" actions. For
example, the Royal Engineer or Artilleryman would have needed to have
taken the shells and cartridges out of the magazine and up the stairs
(see cross-section G-H in Appendix E) where they either would have
been loaded directly into the quick-firing guns or stored in one of
the cartridge recesses. These actions would have been programmatic in
the extreme. The actual firing of the gun would also have resulted in
the artillerymen taking up assigned and unchanging positions around
the gun (firing, loading, emptying the breech etc). These would have
been worked out in advance. One notes that the entire space - and
here I include both the magazine and the emplacement - allows for
absolutely no initiative or originality on the part of the
artilleryman. Everything is planned in advance and ordered to the
point where the artilleryman is reduced to a virtual automaton.

This section was an attempt to understand the way in which production
rationality constructed and used the body as if it were just another
functional link in a series of causal chains. These causal chains
operated in specific sites within the battery, like the smith's store
or the magazines for the two quick-fire guns. These specific
"compartments", were geared to either repair, preparation or action.
The thorough objectification of the body was predicated on the
legitimate need for safety within the confines of the battery. I argue
that the need for safety was, however, a manifestation of a
rationality that operates simultaneously, for it disciplines as it
protects.
4.3: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF SELF-REGULATION

This section is an attempt to push our analysis beyond earlier generalities about the control of space and time in order to scrutinize a micro-technique which functioned at the entrance to the underground magazine at Craig's Battery. This technique was codified in Army Form G949. The form contained a diagram of the procedures which one needed to follow when either leaving or entering the magazine. I refer to this section as an archaeology in the sense that I attempt to unpick one of those infinitesimal mechanisms through which power is supposed to flow. If Foucault is in any meaningful sense "correct" in suggesting that an ascending analysis of power will enable a more accurate grasp of how it functions in modern day societies, it is in the context of humble beginnings such as these that we should test his hypothesis. Before we begin therefore, we should be aware of exactly what Foucault thinks about the matter,

The movement from one project to the other, from a schema of exceptional discipline to one of a generalised surveillance, rests on a historical transformation: the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their spread throughout the whole social body, the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary society.5

What then is at stake? I am suggesting that a deconstruction of the Army Form might offer us something which is both tangible and transferable, insofar as we might be able to trace the mechanism within it to other corners of "the social body". We might in other words be able to detect the spread of these so-called "mechanisms of
discipline" and sense them in recognizable rituals today. On the other hand, the formation of the "disciplinary society" might not be quite as complete or pronounced as Foucault suggests.

A reading of the "instructions relating to entry and leaving of magazines and laboratories" (Army Form G949) reveals that so-called "safety-procedures" were much more than rules designed to protect the battery's occupants. Certainly, the battery contained an inherent danger to the lives of those who lived within its walls. Nevertheless, "safety procedures", rather than signalling a conscious desire on the part of the military authorities to keep those engaged in everyday activity policed, confirms that we are dealing with a system of discipline (which itself involves a specific modality of power) that cannot be traced back to an originating source or conscious intention. The consequent effects of the system of power which operated in the battery were to induce a degree of self-awareness in those who worked and lived there.

The Army Form is a micro-technique of discipline and control based on an intense codification of space and time. It is also an attempt at programming the actions of the subject to such a degree that they come to resemble the actions of a mindless body. I use the word "body" in the sense that I understand it to be used by Foucault: a programmable mass stripped of consciousness. In an important way however, the form constructs more than a body, it constructs a unique subjectivity. We will explore this contradiction in the course of the section which follows.

One of the most highly-charged and thus intensely codified of spaces within the battery was the portion of space between the corridor and the shell-stacking room. In a movement which corresponds to the quest
for the "correct" genealogical perspective this space has been "enlarged" in the form of a diagram, Army Form G949. I use the word "enlarged" cautiously for I am drawing the reader's attention to the difference in scale between the architectural drawing of the battery and Army Form G949.

The drawing is, of course, a figured representation and thus in relation to it we might suggest that the Army Form G949 is "doubly" metaphoric. Scale however is not the only defining characteristic for between the architectural drawing and Army Form G949 there is also a difference in perspective and detail; the Army Form is a condensed and highly detailed representation drawn in "deep focus" with depth of field being a noticeable characteristic. In contrast the architectural drawings are "flat" and confined to either one or two dimensions. The appearance of a third dimension with the Army Form is congruent with a definition of power as "a political anatomy of detail".6 Power has, through the medium of a three-dimensional diagram, managed to construct a greater degree of knowledge about space. Power over "emergent" space is thereby enhanced, for a more detailed space is necessarily a space which is easier to control and ultimately discipline.

The visual depiction of disciplined space is also supplemented by a series of instructions and prohibitions. It is the aim of the prohibition to exclude certain items (matches, tobacco, lighters) from the space beyond the barrier wall. The instructions seek to regulate action and behaviour to such a degree that every act (at least theoretically) will basically be the same. The main intention of the prohibitions and regulations is to prevent anything foreign and dangerous from entering the magazine or laboratory. This is done not by guarding or managing the magazine itself but by monitoring the
single entrance/exit to and from the magazine.

Rather than being watched by those he cannot see the member of the working-party is forced to watch himself and his co-workers who in turn watch him. The ruse is thus complete because disciplinary surveillance has become "democratised". There is no distance or hierarchical division which separates the seer from the seen. for the worker has, in the name of not simply his life but the life of others, become self-regarding. This (illusory) democratic moment posits the importance of the unique individual for he alone is responsible for his own well-being and safety. The mechanism demonstrates no disciplinary heavy-handedness for the worker is barely aware of the ritual containing a disciplinary function. The ruse functions in a highly intelligent manner, all the more so for supposedly being "innocent". It can thereby be seen that it is not merely life without that is being protected but it is life within that acts as a prior condition for the disciplinary technology which literally permeates through the entire battery as it selectively animates certain key thresholds, certain spaces between spaces.

In conjunction with the movement of the body in and out of the magazine there is an accompanying alteration in the identity of the subject. This alteration is arguably slight but the situation does require that, outwardly at least, there is a formal shift in the sense of a change in clothes and designation. Furthermore, civilian space (read the public sphere) ends at the barrier. After the barrier, and closer to the magazine, space becomes private to all but the correctly attired. The magazine itself has not been foregrounded or rendered visible in the same way that this threshold between spaces has and thus we are able to conclude that for discipline to function it is not space per se which needs to be scrutinized but the marginal space, the
joint which exists between two heterogeneous larger spaces.

In conclusion, it is important to note that the economy of repetition which we see embedded in the Army Form encourages an unchanging ritual of self-regulation. This ritual is specific and can be maintained in no other space but the battery. Contrary to Foucault, who contends that specific techniques become generalised and thus get spread across the repressive institutions of society, this micro-technique is not guaranteed a life outside of the battery. The reasons for this are as follows: the battery is a unique space which requires a unique disciplinary mechanism. As a closed structure both space and subjectivity can be controlled to a great degree, and thirdly, coercion (in the form of an ideology of responsibility) can be practiced without constraint.

4.4: TECHNOLOGY AND THE ALTERATION OF TIME/SPACE RELATIONS IN BATTERY

In the context of altering the time/space relations in the battery (and the rest of the Colony for that matter) I would like next to analyse the influence of new technology like the telephone and machine gun (see Appendix F). Appendix F shows that the telephone shelter was completed in February 1898, and the machine gun store was completed in March of the same year. If space was intelligently arranged and created in the battery prior to the invention of the telephone and machine gun these two additions were able to radicalise the time/space relations in the battery overnight.

As a method of communication the telephone had the effect of allowing speakers who were removed from each other in space to imagine that they were standing side by side. The telephone is an example,
therefore, of the nullification of space over time. Before we go any further we should distinguish first between the telephone as an internal or external means of communication. As an internal means of communication, within the confines of the battery that is, the telephone was able to bring the various sections of the battery closer together, see for example the telephone link between the magazine and the quick-firing gun. The telephone thus had the effect of "shrinking" the objective space of the battery; of temporarily bringing spatially distinct places closer together. The telephone also had the effect of symbolically uniting spaces on different planes: one thinks here of the underground and reasonably protected space of the magazine as compared to the exposed, higher space of the emplacement. From the point-of-view of information gathering and knowledge the telephone was also revolutionary because it allowed information to be disseminated very quickly. This information could then be used to strategise accordingly, and reaction times could then be shortened. As a conveyor of information the telephone was thus able to transform the battery into a more effective reactive unit. In concrete spatial terms this meant that the battery was able to monitor and protect Table Bay with greater speed and accuracy.

We are liable to interpret the existence of a telephone in the battery through terms which suggest a progressive strengthening, with the disciplinary system becoming all the more effective as a result of its influence. This argument might also suggest that knowledge-gathering and relaying capabilities would be improved as a result of the telephone etc. There is of course an argument which runs counter to the one outlined above. It might progress as follows: the telephone was an object which could be used to convey incorrect information, creating tension and confusion and thus immobilising the communicative system. The spatial consequences of this confusion would have entailed
a corresponding degree of stasis in both the space from which the message was sent and in the space (another battery perhaps) in which it was received. There was thus a very real possibility of paralysis if incorrect information was transmitted from one position to another. This paralysis would ultimately have weakened the defensive capabilities of the entire system. With the invention of the telephone distance was suddenly no longer a hindrance to conversation; space could disappear in the time it took to crank a handle. This meant that the greater Cape Town area theoretically became a reinforced network of forts and batteries in which information was systematically relayed from one strategic location to another. I use the word reinforced intentionally in the sense that with the installation of the telephone in the battery the defensive capability of the sea-facing defences was greatly increased. The wall of communication which the system of telephones provided was the modern technological equivalent of a medieval wall of stone: both linked the unprotected spaces between structures. An actual wall would have presented an integrated system of interlocking defences to aggressors out at sea. The "metaphorical" wall of which we have been speaking was even stronger, for it managed to integrate a series of absences in such a way that they remained invisible. Such was the power of modern technology: to paradoxically strengthen military defences by preserving the absences between them.

It was in the British interests to keep the sea surrounding the greater Cape Town area under constant surveillance. Although the invention and subsequent installation of telephone's would not necessarily have improved the process of observation, they certainly helped in the speedier transmission of orders and information. In a sense therefore, although targets could not be magically produced - they had to objectively exist first - their location might be more quickly and generally known as a result of the telephone. The
strengthening of the communicative network certainly had the effect of limiting reaction time and making strategy potentially more coherent. In spatial and temporal terms the telephone linked all the British positions together without presenting the enemy with a united target. In terms of the military's ability to police the sea surrounding Cape Town the telephone was a distinct advantage.

Another object which was the result of the inventiveness of the nineteenth century was the machine gun; itself a fine example of science and technology being objectified in a final product. The battery had three such guns which were stored in a specially built hut (See Appendix F). The machine gun was particularly effective and frightening because of the speed with which it fired its bullets. It was able to reproduce the action of an infantryman, multiply it tens of times, and then condense this increased rate of fire into less time then it would have taken the infantryman to fire his rifle in the first place.

When analysing the machine gun, one realises that one is not only dealing with a killing machine therefore, but a labour-saving device; a machine that annihilated space on the one hand, but on the other actually increased the battery's size. This was possibly more than subjective effect as the machine gun required only two men to operate and took up less space than the gun which it replaced. Machine guns also had other advantages: they were mobile, thus allowing for concealment from the enemy, they were relatively light, and they had a rapid rate of fire, finally, they were supposedly foolproof, in that they didn't require much skill to operate. The presence of machine guns on the battery meant that the battery was better equipped to deal with frontal assault and was thus a more completely defended space.
An additional feature of the machine-gun was the fact that it swivelled on a stand. This ability to move across a plane that was roughly horizontal with the earth was linked to a corresponding alteration in the language of war, one now spoke of advancing infantrymen being "mown down" or "cut down". The introduction of a swivel mechanism allowed the machine gun to "spray" a broad area with fire. The major consequence of this scythe-like movement was not so much that it covered a segment of space indiscriminately but rather, in so doing, it radically re-altered the spatial parameters by which military encounters were understood and fought.

After the invention of the machine-gun frontal assaults became increasingly suicidal (witness in this regard the catastrophic results that even staggered assaults had in the First World War) and cavalry-charges became all but redundant. Whereas heavier artillery only had the ability to pound deep space, the machine gun had the capacity to utterly transform immediate space (which in this case was the area which surrounded the battery) in a lethal and comprehensive manner. This destructive capacity ensured a complimentary shift in tactics; a shift which cannot be artificially separated from other military inventions of the modern age, like the tank, the aeroplane and the armoured car. When considered as an entire paradigm this new technology smashed not only the way in which wars had hitherto been understood but also the ways in which they were fought.

The machine guns of the period were not only susceptible to jamming and over-heating, they were also notoriously inaccurate. This is intriguing because it suggests that during a certain moment in the history of military technology the issue of accuracy (and the attendant skills such as map-reading etc) arguably ceased to be defining principles. Certainly, one might hold that over a short range
accuracy becomes less important. However, the creative principle behind the invention of the machine gun could perhaps be: move beyond but do not forgo the concept of accuracy in order to hit anything that moves within a given area; do not analyse space in order to use it accurately, overwhelm it to gain maximum efficiency. In this respect the machine-gun could be called an egalitarian weapon; a symbol for both the creative and the destructive energies of the age. The gunner didn't need a great deal of expertise to fire one; the experience of firing a machine gun wasn't linked to specific forms of expertise, like "marksmanship" for example; in fact the machine gun was in many ways a "lower" weapon, vulgar like the spirit of the age.

We should remember that the machine gun was a weapon of limited mobility and was thus used in a defensive capacity (the three Craig's Battery guns were no exception to the rule). This meant that it forced space, in a sense, to rush magnetically towards it. In fact, the machine gun functioned by first exerting a tremendous pull on the space immediately in front of it and then raking that "compact" space with bullets. This "squashing" of space suggests corresponding temporal changes: the machine gun alters the time of war in its ability to divide time into progressively smaller fractions: it manages to do more in less time. This means that it uses time in a fundamentally more economical, and consequently more modern way. This in turn causes both an experiential and a representational problem, i.e. how does this unique shattering of time come to be represented aesthetically and how does the subject make sense of this new temporality?

For heavy guns the atmosphere was nothing more than a medium without boundary, a "space" through which to accurately plot the trajectory of your shells; for the inventors of the machine gun, space was imbued

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with definite properties. One of these properties was a negative one: emptiness. The machine gun is absolutely imperious in its attitude towards empty space and this leads one to suggest that either its invention rested on a fundamentally different conception of space to that of the cannon or the heavy artillery piece or, it revolutionised the time/space relations of the age in such a way that war was never understood in quite the same way again.

The definition of what constituted a target also shifted as a result of the invention of the machine gun. For instance, the 9.2 inch guns in the battery would have needed to have their target located precisely in space. The machine gun needed no such co-ordinates if it was to function effectively. The machine gun stood at the beginning of a different causal system entirely; for the machine guns "target" was only ever roughly defined as that which happened to present itself within a certain band of space before it. We can also presume that the absent target at the end of the system was human, the absent target in the case of the machine gun was the body. The anonymous body of the enemy soldier but a body nevertheless.

There can be little doubt that the evil chattering of the machine gun altered the way in which war was subjectively experienced. By dint of its very functioning - to comb a limited space more-or-less randomly with bullets - the machine gun had the ability to make an already terrifying affair seem all the more arbitrary. It also had the effect of transforming war into a battle between machines that increasingly came to follow their own grotesque logic, a logic which seemed to have little to do with conscious human intent. Here the very name "machinegun" is instructive, because it suggests that this invention was more than ever technologically alien, a mechanism stripped of all the softer and redemptive human virtues. All these factors doubtless
contributed to the existential dimension of what both Gertrude Stein and Picasso called the first Cubist War; a war which altered time/space relations and human consciousness thereof in a definitive and all-encompassing way.

In the context of Craig's Battery, however, the machine gun represents an innovative technological response to the problem of how to protect immediate space; a crude and unselective response but an effective one nonetheless. Like another invention of the modern age, the telephone, the machine gun contributed in many ways to the revolutionary alteration in time/space relations in the battery as well as (and this is particularly the case with the telephone) the time/space relations in the greater Cape Town area.

The phrase technological threshold is useful in the sense that it does give an indication of the changes in the battery that were caused as a result of the telephone and the machine gun. The changes resulting from the addition of this new technology were manifold but basically they changed the "subjective space" both within and without the battery itself. We cannot understand the influence of new technology then, without at least implying the existence of a "hypothetical" subjectivity. The telephone and machine gun changed the day-to-day experience of life in the battery and, by extension, the experience of war as well. In changing the experience of those in the battery, the new technology would also have helped to reinforce the disciplinary regime within the battery itself.
CONCLUSION

I have attempted in the last two chapters to offer contrasting analyses of the way in which two institutions codify, use and create space and time. The first section of this chapter (4.1, Some thoughts on a map of Cape Town) was an attempt to substantiate the idea that the pre-conditions for the birth of capitalist modernity existed in the Colony in embryonic form from approximately 1860. In distinction to this, Craig's Battery was an ambiguous space in relation to the birth of capitalism in the Colony. This was for the following reasons: on the one hand the outer shell of the battery pre-dated, as it were, capitalist modernity. On the other, we note that many of the spatial practices within the battery itself were certainly congruent with certain spatial and temporal practices within modernity itself.

4.2. Space and Time in the Battery is thus an analysis of the disciplinary technology which animated the battery, particularly at the level of reproduction, repair and ordinary day-to-day functioning. The section concludes that the intense and highly functional ordering and deployment of space (and the position of the subject within it) reveals a remarkably high degree of control.

The general analysis of repair work etc becomes a pointed consideration of regimes of self-surveillance in (4.3, An Archaeology of Self-Regulation). The section consists of a painstaking analysis of a form which is a discursive manipulation of certain "safety procedures". I conclude, before turning to a consideration of modernist weapons of war, that the Army Form G949 advanced a remarkably effective diagram of discipline and power, all the more so for not being reducible to any particular source. And, contrary to what Foucault would have us believe, this mechanism certainly appeared
to be an articulation of power that was confined solely to the battery.

Modernist technology and its deployment in the battery is the subject of the final section (4.4. Technology and the alteration of Time/Space relations in the Battery). I argue in this section that the telephone and the machine gun revolutionise the time/space relations both within and without the battery. Their presence in the battery makes the space therein definitively modern and undoubtedly contributes to the institutions status as a fully developed modern institution.
FOOTNOTES


2. With respect to Craig's Battery there appears to be a manifest contradiction between the walls which were thick and almost medieval and the relatively modern system of discipline which operated within the walls themselves. Foucault seems to forward only two basic systems (or images) of discipline, neither of which conforms to the Craig's Battery example.

There are two images, then, of discipline. At one extreme, the discipline-blockade, the enclosed institution, established on the edge of society, turned inwards towards negative functions: arresting evil, breaking communications, suspending time. At the other extreme, with panopticism, is the discipline-mechanism: a functional mechanism that must improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society to come.


3. Ibid., p. 135.

4. Army Form G949 is a diagram with a series of instructions beneath it. The diagram shows two halves of a wall frontage. Facing the viewer on the left hand side of the diagram is space A. Upon
entering space A, the artilleryman is instructed to wipe his boots on a mat and then take them off. Then he is instructed to take off either his civilian clothes or uniform and hang it on the pegs provided. He is then required to pass over a barrier in his underclothes. Having entered space B, he is instructed to change into his magazine clothes and boots and then proceed into the magazine itself. The diagram then states that these procedures are to be followed in reverse when the Artilleryman leaves the magazine. Beneath the instructions for "Working Parties" are another set of instructions for "All other persons", in which they are required to, "1. Turn down ends of trousers and brush them clean. 2. Wipe your boots or shoes as clean as possible on mat B. 3. Place each foot in succession past the barrier into an over boot or galosh over your ordinary footwear". Finally, a note reminds the working parties that there is to be an absolutely rigid preservation of spatial difference between the two halves of the entrance to the magazine.

The above quotes are taken from a brochure produced by the Fort Wynyard Museum, entitled, "The Fort Wynyard Museum of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery", obtained from the Museum itself.


6. Ibid., p. 139.

7. Foucault urges us to see the invention of the new political technology of discipline not as a sudden discovery, but as that which was created "in response to particular needs: an industrial innovation, a renewed outbreak of certain epidemic diseases, the invention of the rifle or the victories of Prussia."

INTRODUCTION

The House of Mercy was an institution devoted to the "rehabilitation" of coloured prostitutes. The House was situated on the lower reaches of Devil's Peak. It was maintained and governed by nuns from the Anglican Church, or what was later to become the Church of the Province of South Africa. The House was originally on a site in St George's Street, Oranjezicht, and, because of overcrowding and the encroachment of suburbia, it was moved to the boundary of the Woodstock Municipality.

I suggest in this chapter that in the transition from St George's street to the House of Mercy, Liliebloem, we're able to detect the formation of a more sophisticated rationality which underscored discipline in the latter house. Although neither institution made creative use of space or architecture as a means of control, discipline in the House of Mercy was nevertheless unique, combining Christian notions of Mercy with a practice that was aimed at encouraging the women to enter another class. Thus the only hope for "freedom" beyond the immediate freedom of having completed one's "sentence" was to enter the realms of another class; that is, to become a respectable petit-bourgeois subject. The training given in the House was directed towards this ideal and was thus transformative. I suggest that there was hardly any possibility for self-purification (through the menial task of washing and ironing, for example) and that the only hope for another life was to become a "new", self-conscious subject, who was encouraged to indulge in the pleasurable and mildly aesthetic pursuits of needlework. Whether
entry into the lower reaches of a "better" class could provide the former prostitutes with a substantially altered subjectivity based on a new identity and different sense of themselves remains to be seen.

5.1: THE ALLURE OF TRANSITIONS

This foundation stone of S. Mary Magdalene's House of Mercy, Leliebloem, was laid on All Saints' Day, in the year of our Lord, 1886, by His Excellency, General Torrens, the Administrator of the Government of the Colony; the stone having been previously blessed by the Most Reverend William West, Lord Bishop of Capetown, and Metropolitan. The house is being erected by public subscription, and when finished, it is to be set apart for the recovery and reclamation of poor fallen women who may desire to be trained in the ways of penitence.

The institution will be administered by the All Saints' ministers, of S. George's Home, Keerom St. 1

I suggest that far from simply attempting a "textual excavation" of the foundation stone, in other words a traditional exegesis, the method required to activate meaning from the stone in all its productivity is the genealogy. In unlocking the words on the stone in one particular way, (there are necessarily many other ways) I hope to draw attention to the House of Mercy as an institution which had its own political technology of the body and its own specific regime of discipline which cleverly combined the Christian tenets of mercy with a rehabilitative project centred around representations of petit-bourgeois femininity. At no time do I offer this perspective as an accurate portrait of historical truth but rather an attempt to read the "event" of the laying of the foundation-stone and
deciphering its meaning-effects through a phantasm which hovers over it like an incorporeal cloud. It is rather to be understood as a continuation of a project which seeks to undermine all claims to a facile correspondence or identity between the past and the present.

The opening three words, "This foundation stone", are, I believe, resonant in ways beyond their denotative meaning. First, the laying of a foundation stone is the culmination of an extremely theatrical ceremony. And second, although the foundation stone is presumably heavy and immobile, an actual condensation of authority, it in a sense participates in the lingering theatricality of the event, for not only does it "act" commemoratively but it inaugurates a distinctive phase of a particular administrative and moral practice. It does so by keeping the following illusion in circulation: that a regime of discipline can be compared to and represented by an apparently innocent epigrammatic statement. The functional anonymity of the disciplinary project is thus foregrounded, cleverly divorced from the brutal actualities of imprisonment. In reading the words within the context of the entire quote we also become aware of the implied heaviness, the mock historical solidity of the words themselves (I don’t believe that this is merely a retrospective illusion or a fiction induced by the facts that the words were originally etched in stone) because they initiate a specific and important vision of a future, they dramatize in a highly self-conscious and convention-bound manner the strong relationship between history and philanthropy as it existed or was about to exist in the House of Mercy. Thus the words quite literally both preserve and participate in the "building" of history.

It is tempting to suggest that the horror of modern discipline is inscribed on the "face" of the first stone, that the words on the
stone are not simply inaugural but offer a paradoxical summary of the work that the House of Mercy was about to do. I would argue, however, that the "reality" suggested by other available sources and documents would imply that discipline as it was applied in the House of Mercy was far less uniform than either the writings of Foucault or the self-confident tones of the words on the foundation stone would seem to imply. This discrepancy is understandable however when one thinks that the statement which appears on the foundation stone is necessarily detached from the empirical complexities of the disciplinary project. However, it is possible to view the stone as the material preservation of a dominant memory, a form of knowledge sanctioned by those in power, and it is thus something which a counter-memory can unobtrusively slip behind. The chapter which follows is a tentative investigation into the possible shape of that counter-memory.

During this chapter I will explore the tension-filled space which exists between the apparent immobilisation of historical meaning as implied by the mute density and finality of the words on the foundation stone of Woodstock's 'House of Mercy' and the supposed "groundlessness" of genealogical interpretation, the more one interprets the more one finds not the fixed meaning of a text, of the word, but only other interpretations. These interpretations have been created and imposed by other people, not by the nature of things. In this discovery of groundlessness the inherent arbitrariness of interpretation is revealed. For if there is nothing to interpret, then everything is open to interpretation; the only limits are those arbitrarily imposed.
I would like next to attempt to extend our understanding of what the House of Mercy was by devoting some time to an explanation of the way in which discipline functioned in its immediate institutional predecessor, St. George’s Home in Keerom Street, Orangezicht. I suspect that this will be a valuable exercise because it will enable us to trace the outline of a disciplinary logic which in the transition from St. George’s to the House of Mercy underwent certain refinements.

I would like at this point to comment on why transitions are so alluring. I think that one of the reasons for this allure is to be found in the logic of false continuity which the transition inspires. This false continuity is animated by a causality based strongly on the idea of historical identity. It is precisely this identity which Foucault is attempting via the genealogical method to disturb,

According to Foucault the task of the genealogist is to destroy the primacy of origins, or unchanging truths. He seeks to destroy the doctrines of development and progress. Having destroyed ideal significations and original truths, he looks to the play of wills. 3

Contrary to notions of historical development based on an identity between words and things I suggest that the transition signifies a moment of difference. This is not to suggest for one moment that penitentiary discipline functioned "seamlessly" in the House of Mercy for this chapter will amongst other things contend that discipline as applied in the House appears to have functioned in a primitive and clumsy way. The analysis of this transitional period will investigate the textual evidence (correspondence, reports etc.) which, in drawing attention to the limitations and inadequacies of the St. George’s
Street Home, anticipated a future in which discipline was more rational and thus more effective in the House of Mercy itself. What I am suggesting therefore is that, comparatively, the application of discipline as practised within the House was an advance on the form of discipline practised at St. George’s. Nevertheless it remained eccentric and was imbued with its own peculiarities.

The Church of the Province of South Africa archives contain a file entitled "Early Material 1886-1930". One of the many anonymous items in this file refers to St. George’s Home as follows:

(a) in the present House there is no possibility of separating the lower class of women from those who are more educated, and whose station in life is higher. There is also no place for keeping separate those who need a probation on first entering before mixing with the other inmates. A Penitentiary ought to be arranged with a view to classification; and classification, if it is to be effectual makes a considerable demand on space. 4

Both the first and the second sentences are noteworthy; the first because it refers to class as a distinguishing characteristic in the categorization of inmates and thus hints at a set of shifting criteria whereby knowledge was produced. I am fully aware that the word "class" is used in a slightly different sense but I am only concerned with it insofar as it signifies class-ification. The second sentence adds another qualification to the suggested division of inmates who were no longer viewed as an undifferentiated homogenous mass, but as a group containing different elements. The third sentence, which is a distillation of the first two is undoubtedly the most fascinating. The sentence can be read in at least two ways; we
can interpret it as a description of a hoped-for and improved institutional alternative. And yet this understanding can quite conceivably be expanded to incorporate the sentence as an ironic and unconscious depiction of the workings of discourse, for is not discourse, in this case the discourse of the Anglican Church, that which enables classification to take place? And does not discourse have a spatial dimension in which a progressively more advanced form of classification enacts itself? We are thus witnessing a supreme moment of self-reflexivity, where discourse unknowingly comments on its own workings and appears, ghost-like, to write itself.

The next point reads as follows:-

(b) Moreover the penitents need a great deal of supervision. When a number of young women are brought together, who have all more or less fallen into the same degrading sin, every precaution has to be taken, otherwise more harm than good may result from their stay in the House. The buildings have to be arranged so that the girls can be constantly over-looked and over-heard. This necessitates a considerable number of workers, for whom rooms and other accommodation must be provided. 5

The above quote candidly admits to a problem which has haunted the reformer's imagination since prisons and reformatories were a relatively common sight on the social landscape. The problem is this: there is an inherent danger in bringing 'sinful' women together under one roof, for might not their proximity to one another create more of a disturbance, more sin than existed formerly, and might not their profanity be contagious? 6 The problem requires that reformers suddenly be attentive to the disciplinary implications inherent in an intelligent use of space through creative architecture. What we are

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dealing with then is a prototype for a simple "disciplinary machine". The increased need for a thorough observation of the penitents provides its own problems however; at best the division of space seems to be partial for instance. We are told that the "girls" must "be constantly over-looked and over-heard"\(^7\), but at the same time, "this necessitates a considerable number of workers, for whom rooms and accommodation must be provided"\(^8\). Are we to understand that these women were policed twenty-four hours a day in spite of the fact that "(d)" suggests that:-

\[(d)\] The present House does not admit of anything but an open dormitory, whereas it is an acknowledged fact that in Penitentiaries each girl should have a cubicle to herself.\(^9\)

We might therefore draw the following conclusions from the above series of quotes; while reformers were aware of the problems relating to space and discipline these issues were never successfully resolved. We might suggest that the lack of architectural planning prior to the building of the House was fatal in that it initiated a system of contradictions which, when combined with a muscular, philanthropic Anglicanism created a system of laissez-faire discipline. This idea becomes even more difficult to reject when one considers the substance of the Anglican commitment to zealous humanism. A superficial reading of the available documents would seem to indicate that not only did the Church have a historical interest in human improvement but the rehabilitative aspects of their disciplinary project did not hinge on the utter negation of the subject that tends to distinguish certain brutal institutional regimes. I suspect that a reading which is a little more "historically sensitive" will not be unduly influenced by the many myths of innocence generated, even nowadays, by the commonsensical
reverence of all that is associated with the Church. I am asserting therefore that the system of discipline and the political anatomy of the body as it functioned in the House of Mercy was specific and certainly somewhat idiosyncratic but finally it was no less culpable for its historical crimes than any other institution of its kind.

Item (c) in the article from which I am quoting asserts:-

(c) As far as possible, everything which is needed has to be provided within the enclosure of the House and its grounds. There must be a laundry and a drying-ground, with rooms for needle-work, class-rooms for instruction, a kitchen, refectory, infirmary, store-rooms, bath-rooms, a chapel, etc.

I do not wish to devote too much time to the above quote except to forward a number of simple ideas which will be embellished later. It can be noticed that it is thought advisable to keep the House self-contained. The House of Mercy was geographically isolated and spatially excluded, removed, not only to the upper-border of Woodstock (Leliebloem) but consigned to the rim of public consciousness as well.

Another extract from a similar article (perhaps written just before the one quoted extensively above) puts forward the following information and I will quote here in full:-

The Refuge has been fuller than ever this last year; at one time there were 27 inmates instead of 22, our full number. One girl had to sleep in an outhouse, and one in the lock-up room, and one in the laundry. Several cases have been refused from want of room; a married woman given to drinking, an educated woman
formerly a governess, both intemperate and immoral, an upper class girl from a distant part of the colony, a woman from Kimberley whom the clergy there wished to send in.\footnote{11}

I suspect that we can plausibly locate the emergence of a significantly altered disciplinary regime in the chaos of the transition from St. George's to the House of Mercy. We are not only witnessing confusion on the level of practice but are also able to recognise a comparable degree of stress on the normative criteria which are in themselves integral components of any system of classification. What we are reading then is a description of dissonance, of fragmentation. The field which served as the basic grid for categorization is unable to integrate and thus make sense of examples which are so far apart, examples which vary from a former governess, an alcoholic, to an upper-class girl from a distant part of the Colony. The criteria for admission appear to be predicated on a savagely indiscriminate rationality which threatens to explode the entire disciplinary process from within. Overcrowding within the House of Refuge is paralleled by a discursive "overcrowding" which threatens to render the entire classificatory project meaningless.

The erection of the House of Mercy is thus a stabilization of a pre-existing disciplinary rationality, an inflexion from within which tightens the table of representation and rejects the importance of certain subjects (alcoholics), in favour of a heightened awareness of others (prostitutes). In fact, the transition from St. George's Home to the House of Mercy represents a significant reorganisation rather than a progression within the corpus of disciplinary knowledge, particularly in terms of economics and the rehabilitative capacities of labour, the utilization of space and the organisation of time. In the next section we will attempt to take our textual analysis of the
words on the foundation stone a little further. Our genealogical analysis will analyse the meaning-effect of the words and then relate them to a provisional reconstruction of the disciplinary technology in the House.

5.2: THE STONE EYE

I would like next to analyse the following section taken from the foundation stone, 'was laid on All Saints' Day, in the year of our Lord, 1886, by His Excellency, General Torrens, the Administrator of the Government of the Colony; the stone having been previously blessed by the Most Reverend William West, Lord Bishop of Capetown, and Metropolitan. The above extract is exemplary because beneath the play of signification it reveals certain attitudes which influence and participate in the creation of history. These attitudes may be expressed as variants of the idea that history and historical sources are, however unconsciously, cast, imbued with a point-of-view, a perspective which excludes others, and a culturally defined view of the world. History and the sources which contain and preserve that history are "constructions" which order, utilize and often foreground certain types of information. So, for example, the specific combination of religious and governmental/administrative language powerfully asserts that history is confined to a register of knowledge which is unquestionably and righteously imperial.

We are able, after carefully scrutinising the words on the foundation stone, tentatively to put forward a list of the information which the extract contains: 1. The religiosity and religious elements within the extract put forward a culturally specific understanding of time; that of a calendar year punctuated by dates which have religious
significance (All Saints' Day). I believe that there is a strong sense of imperial destiny associated with this linear chronology. We are thus reading a formal confirmation and an acknowledgement of a civilizing mission, the collective desire to stamp a certain set of values on the surface of an alien world. 2. The quote also demonstrates the fallacy that great men make history. The extract has a masculine bias and thus reflects approximately the patriarchal nature of the imperial power complex. The men were not only the cultural custodians and legitimators of imperial discourse but they were the substance of history. We can thus conclude that one of the essential elements of imperial/religious discourse was a patent inability to negotiate matters of disruptive identity. This may be a somewhat obvious point but the above extract reveals the problem that imperial/religious discourse has when representing and receiving either sexual or cultural identities that are not its own.

The House is being erected by public subscription, and when finished, it is to be set apart for the recovery and reclamation of poor fallen women who may desire to be trained in the ways of penitence. 13

I would like to assess and attempt to come to an understanding of the above extract in terms of how this process of 'recovery' and 'reclamation' took place and then I would like to put forward some ideas on the pervasiveness of a certain conception of middle-class femininity, and the way in which this conception functioned as a regulative ideal. The women who either voluntarily "surrendered" themselves or were interred in the House of Mercy were mostly prostitutes. At no time however have I been able to ascertain how this blithe stigmatization was arrived at. The information which I have managed to compile at no time offers a comprehensive breakdown
of the criteria on which imprisonment was grounded but this is not surprising given the commonsensical fixing of identity to which all "fallen women" were submitted. I think that without attempting to be definitive or even all that accurate we can safely assume that a high proportion of the women concerned were 'coloured' and of "reclaimable" age, which at an estimate would probably have been under thirty. The tenuous nature of these generalities should however be underscored by the following:

The House of Mercy, so much needed, would be the House to which those young women would be taken who are really wishing to be rescued from lives of shame, and to become penitents after having been led astray. None can tell but those who are brought constantly into contact with the sin that abounds here, what are the temptations besetting young girls who go out to service, and young women arriving from England, many of whom are led into a life of sin almost immediately after their arrival. A seaport and garrison town is bad enough in England; here in Capetown we have the addition of a large Mahomedan and heathen population. Many of the bad houses in Capetown and at the Diamond Fields are kept by Malays.

This certainly indicates that the percentage of white women imprisoned at the House could have been higher than originally thought. The above quote does not merely furnish an alternative proof, however, and it is worthwhile examining for a variety of reasons. I would like to comment on two items in the above quotation which are, I believe, closely related. The above quote mentions, 'the sin that abounds here' and later on, 'A seaport and garrison town is bad enough in England; here in Capetown we have the addition of a large Mahomedan and heathen population'. Against the backdrop of
these two quotes I would like to contrast a passage from *Discipline and Punish*:

A port, and a military port is - with its circulation of goods, men signed up willingly or by force, sailors embarking and disembarking, diseases and epidemics - a place of desertion, smuggling, contagion. It is a cross-road for dangerous mixtures, a meeting-place for forbidden circulations.

Cape Town, being 'a seaport and garrison town' is thus extremely dangerous because it contains various threatening possibilities. It has a frightening identity which can only put health authorities, philanthropists, and the morally watchful in a state of perpetual vigilance. It is certainly possible that informal structures of observation and surveillance existed in both the city and the municipality in a well-developed form. It is Foucault who reminds us,

*He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.*

We should ask ourselves for instance, how exactly did the House of Mercy manage to "attract" its penitents, particularly if the moral force of the House was neither powerful nor extensive? Did it rely on a system of informers? To what degree were the local police involved in the monitoring of "fallen women"?

In our continued investigation of the 'substance' of 'recovery' and 'reclamation' I would like to draw attention to the nature of the
work process in the House of Mercy. One of the many unremarkable items in the CPSA Files states the following:-

Little remunerative work can be expected from the girls for the first ten months, the greater number are young and quite untrained. The majority are employed in washing and ironing; and it will be seen, by referring to the Annual Report, that the laundry receipts far exceed all other sources of income, yet it is impossible for the House of Mercy to be altogether self-supporting, and many more subscriptions and donations must be garnered in if any enlargement of either kitchen or Chapel is to be attempted.21

The key-word in the above extract is 'untrained', for training requires discipline and a hierarchy of tasks endlessly repeated. Training also relies on the formal division of the day and a series of penalties constructed 'around' time. But before we descend too deeply into the realm of historical supposition, it should be noted that to be trained requires that someone be prepared to teach and of course teaching requires observation. In this case training, once it has been completed, is doubly functional for not only is training effective in its numbing, boredom-inducing regularity but training allows the House itself to offer the service of washing laundry and thereby becoming financially independent. The House is not simply a prison but it is a small-scale factory. When viewed in isolation washing and ironing might not appear to be all that peculiar but when compared to the portrait of Victorian femininity which the House of Mercy authorities were trying to achieve outside of the laundering situation, either one or the other is bound to appear slightly incongruous.
With reference to leisure experience we are told:-

In connection with the recreation, the sisters would be most thankful to any ladies who would send scraps of material for patchwork, old ribbon, wool or cotton for knitting, as well as any quiet games that could be used indoors.22

With a slightly different emphasis recreation could be pronounced, re-creation. The process of recreation as evidenced above does not seem to be essentially transformative, particularly when one considers the probability that 'quiet games that could be used indoors' were hardly universally familiar to all the women who lived in the House. Thus the transformative practice was not limited to the labour process but extended toward an activity which can tentatively be described as 'leisure'. Furthermore, the idea of respectability so prevalent in petit-bourgeois conceptions of the municipality (and extensively discussed in chapter two) seems to be resurfacing in the above quote. What we also notice in the above quote is the prevalence and supposed desirability of attaining (or at least progressing toward) an extremely limited and restricted conception of bourgeois femininity. It is not surprising that the prisoners were gently nudged towards a virtuous and respectable feminine ideal, which was in itself both actually and symbolically restrictive, but the question that needs to be asked is at what expense? Certainly at the expense of any culture or language which was at odds with the rehabilitative ethos epitomised by the dominant ideal. As hinted at earlier, it can be seen that this ideal was regulative - in that it tended to order and heirarchise the range of possibilities which circulated around it, but was at the same time a mean around which the system revolved.23
I would like now to unpick the following extract from the "body" of the message which appears on the foundation stone and then, word by word, attempt to twist meaning out of the phrase, "of poor fallen women". The dominant purpose of the words on the foundation stone preclude them from participating in any kind of analysis. They are in a sense thus blank, for the words themselves are victims of that dull monotony which one has come to associate with official language, a language which through patient repetition has, strangely, come to mean nothing at all. For instance, we can only reach the following conclusion - that it is by no means beyond debate that women are "poor" because they have "fallen". For there remains a strong possibility that they have "fallen" because they are poor - at the expense of abstracting the words, of re-investing them with meaningfulness which they have long ceased to have. It is precisely the political economy of prostitution which the anonymous utterance (the words on the foundation stone) are by definition precluded from expressing. It is this barely hidden dimension which this "counter-memory" would hope to, however imperfectly, render intelligible.

Let us return, if only momentarily, to a discussion of the word 'poor'. The word can be understood narrowly, that is, in its economic sense, yet it can also take on a variety of related yet different meanings. It can for example be interpreted as meaning spiritually impoverished or it can be understood as being an expression of sympathy. It is in the supposed innocence of 'poor' as an expression of sympathy that the rehabilitative project first asserts itself however, for to be identified and then labelled as someone who is poor means that a case for aid is slowly (and perhaps imperceptibly) being created. Finally then, to be referred to as 'poor' insinuates that those who are poor have possibly lost (or are about to lose)
control of their own lives. Thus control has to be assumed by others (the charitable, the kind) and as we know the foregoing of personal control, even if it is limited, brings its own penalties.

If, in the eyes of the Church, an individual's true self is a likeness of God, then to fall signifies a betrayal of this likeness and thus is ultimately a rejection of God. To have 'fallen' also means to have had sexual intercourse either prior to or outside of the sanctity of marriage and this the Church considered virtually unpardonable. The word 'virtually' is vital because it allows room for possibility, for hope, and it is one of the cornerstones of faith to be 'eternally' hopeful, for without hope it becomes difficult to envision an improved future. Without hope religion has no meaning. The word can also be understood in a far more general way as initiating a descent into sin, moral collapse and degeneracy. Perhaps more significantly the word connotes a certain independence - a choice which contests the right to oppose (no matter how naively) the influence of the Church.

Anglicanism is part of a long and established tradition in our cultural inheritance which affirms and perpetuates men's power over women. Take for example the now clichéd quote from Genesis:-

Lord God called unto the man and said unto him, 'where are thou?' and he said, 'I heard thy voice in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself ... Unto the woman God said, 'I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception: in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband and he shall rule over thee.25

A quote which establishes that women are capable of a desire in a
strictly limited sense, that is, their desire is a desire to be oppressed, not a desire for anything, particularly not for sexual gratification or fulfilment. Historically it is cultural/textual residues like the one above which help to legitimate and reproduce interpretations of women and femininity which have no qualms in claiming that only women, never men, have the capacity to "fall". The neat circularity of these and similar interpretations can be demonstrated as follows: to be designated as someone who has "fallen" further reinforces the idea of women as the gender at fault, women are innately culpable and inferior because historically it has always been so.

The final word of this artificially isolated section, "of poor fallen women" is somewhat redundant for to have 'fallen' is to be a woman, for by definition men cannot fall. Thus women are oppressed discursively. Discourse categorizes normatively, for it does not provide for the possibility of women altering the historical conditions by which they are victimized in the first place. Phrased differently, if what is natural is eternal and difference is "natural" then difference is certainly eternal, fixed for evermore.

I would like next to submit the final words of the sentence in question - "who may desire to be trained in the ways of penitence" - to a detailed analysis. In this regard the use of the words "who may desire" is interesting because the words suggest the preservation of the possibility of choice on the part of the penitents. It is difficult to retroactively ascertain just how wide their choice was, but commonsensically I would suggest that a great deal of pressure was brought to bear from formal and informal quarters, on identifiable groups of individual women. Furthermore, the possibility of choice mitigates against the earlier implications
of helpless passivity contained in the words "poor fallen women". The "true" significance of the phrase is its own fictiveness however, for as I've already suggested, it is an illusion to believe that the only factor operating in self-admission was free choice and secondly, the sentence evidently fails to draw the readers' attention to the fact that on admission free choice simply ceased to exist. I am asserting therefore that the words 'who may desire' are a rhetorical strategy which on the one hand seeks to reduce the House of Mercy's role to one of relative innocence and on the other to forward the significant idea that a moral victory precedes the women entering the institution. For if women as free agents can actively choose to imprison themselves (without being coerced) then surely their act proves the enduring influence of the Church, and by implication, the word of God. But as originally thought (rather than demonstrated) the Church was not in a position to allow free choice in any absolute sense, because its power was not confined to the House of Mercy but was stretched across the fabric of the municipality as a whole.

Finally I would like to comment on another implication embedded in the three words. The words 'who may desire' reverberate with false official humility, with the open and thus public acknowledgement that basically it is the penitents who are responsible for their own futures and thus, ultimately, for the success of the rehabilitative project. The words turn the latent doom which exists in all such ventures to their advantage because, firstly, they foreground the possibility that the period of incarceration may not be entirely satisfactory, that it is the penitents who might return to their old ways and, secondly, they perpetrate an extremely subtle sleight-of-hand by hinting at the idea that there are limits to the House's own coerciveness and limits to its own disciplinary project. At the same time, they confirm that the limits are not theirs, for
the limits are defined by those who enter the institutions rather than those who govern the institution itself, the limits of discipline are thus the limits of the patients' desire to improve themselves.

The above gives an indication of the way in which power tends to change emphasis within discourse, how at moments it recedes as it moves perceptibly towards a vanishing point, how it appears almost to take shelter behind the alibis and myths produced by Official Knowledge. On other occasions, however, power comes forward and, as it were, introduces itself and asserts its productive brutality. It is this facet of power which I will examine in the section which immediately follows this one.

It is impossible to "read" the word "trained" without at some stage referring to the relationship which exists between power and the body. This relationship is described by Foucault as follows:

The historical moment of the disciplines was a moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at this growth of its skills, or at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes useful, and conversely. What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down, and rearranges it. A "political anatomy", which was also a "mechanics of power", was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the
techniques, the speed, and the efficiency that one determines. 27

We know that discipline is the political anatomy of detail but it is precisely these details which elude us, for without detail we cannot undertake an analysis of training in anything but the sketchiest of terms. What follows does not only consist of an analysis of training however, but is combined with a brief investigation of the manner in which the body was trained, that is, the ways of training. One of the items contained in the CPSA archives states:

The day and night constant supervision required over every set of girls, and the peculiar strain of this Penitentiary work, demand that provision should be made for six workers at least, that is two or three sisters with assistants, such as a laundry matron, needlework matron, and kitchen matron. 28

The constant need for supervision underlines the idea that the girls and women who were imprisoned in the House of Mercy were trained, in various ways, throughout their stay. They were trained to be obedient and conscientious. They were trained to work and trained to worship:

Besides the Sunday services, the girls have regular religious instructions and attend the daily prayers in the Chapel. They attend Night School three or four times a week; the other evenings are spent in choir practice or recreation. 29

The above quotes as well as those used earlier on in the chapter help to arrange an idea of an "average day" in the penitents' lives. Given that our tentative recreation is at best partial and inadequate it would be best not to read the following as an accurate and truthful

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representation but rather as a system of probabilities based on
guesswork and deduction. We have thus far ascertained that the House
of Mercy was not simply a prison as it incorporated features of both
those ignoble institutions the factory and the school. In all
likelihood therefore the best part of the penitents' day was probably
occupied with the undignified and menial work of washing other
people's, as well as their own, clothing. The process of washing
dirty linen is an example of a certain style of punishment.

Admittedly we are not concerned here with the horrific and brutal
torture of the regicide Damiens described by Foucault in Discipline
and Punish, but with a careful and sedate economy of punishment
instead. The gentility of the clothes-washing scene is belied by the
fact that the "penitents" are not merely washing clothes:
symbolically, they are also washing themselves. Washing therefore is
a political allegory, it is a rite of prolonged self-purification.
Whether the disciplinary economy within the House recognised the
"soul" as a constituent element within the self is a matter for
debate. Whatever it was that was being cleansed - the former
"prostitute's" impoverished soul or the visible stigmata of her past
- there was a temporal incompatibility between washing clothes and
cleansing oneself. Every act of washing is both self-contained and
linked in a series to the acts that have passed before it. Self-
purification is, however, not guaranteed in advance. In fact, the
possibility of attaining a state of purity was remote. If this is the
case, the cumulative time of the combined acts would be rendered
worthless. It is one of discipline's prime functions to dominate
entirely and even blackmail time,

Discipline says to the idealists: the whole is nothing but the
sum of its parts. All temporal dispersions will be integrated in

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the mathematically defined series. Disciplinary capitalism will defy the dreams of Wordsworth, Bergson and Poulet, whose sense of organic temporality is either mere fantasy or, depending on our place in the struggle, a fundamental criticism, a cry from the heart against capitalism's transformation of human existence. Time thus mediated and invested by power is (like disciplined space) not only time made useful, but time made safe. 31

The quest for self-purification is a functional ritual within disciplinary logic. At the end of the "penitents'" term however, it makes way for their "freedom". But as we know freedom is an absolute impossibility, particularly if we accept power's renowned capacity for the creation of division within the disciplined subject; a psychic fissure which is occupied by a self-policing subjectivity. We hereby recognise the sinister evil of disciplinary power for, in striving for the false ideal of a supposedly obtainable but actually infinitely suspended purity, the former penitents have, without realizing, enslaved themselves to an even greater degree. And if we are to believe Foucault, they have done so in a copybook manner. Power has not been forced, in its heavy solemnity, to assert itself. It has remained all the more insidious for being unobtrusive. The penitents have therefore become, "the principle of their own subjection." 32

Furthermore, this ritual demonstrates a crude if not impoverished definition of the law in which distinctions between the severities of various "crimes" are not considered relevant. The punishment of prostitution cannot be a matter of degree for prostitution is the absolute transgression of "acceptable" boundaries. We are witnessing therefore a form of penal law that appears to be cumbersome in the extreme, a system that is utterly lacking in imagination.

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Consequently, and as might be expected, the CPSA Archives contain no clinical knowledge of the inmates and thus one is led to believe that the penitents’ biographical details, in short their lives, did not become objects of disciplinary attention or knowledge. Foucault maintains that the prisoners’ life-history was a key element in the process of individuation - a means of constituting the marginalised as objects of knowledge within disciplinary schemas - which in turn led to the production of delinquency. Did the House produce delinquency? Did it produce prostitution? Official history is unable to provide us with the answer. Shying away from the more radical implications of the penultimate section of Discipline and Punish, Frank Lentricchia does however remind us:

Crime is the work of the poor. Let that be known to all. In this way potential collectivization and radical action are forestalled, disadvantaged pit themselves against disadvantaged, and constant internal warfare is encouraged among groups ranging from lower to middle classes. And from this follows the ultimate hegemonic effect.33

The best part of the penitents’ day was probably devoted to "washing and ironing" but as we have already seen the day was divided into specific segments for meals, sleep, worship, education and re-creation. There can be little doubt that the above "activities" were highly codified and bound by a system of correct attitudes, positions and poses, particularly those of the body, for the penitents would have been required to learn where their bodies were the most useful on the basis of being 'trained' in ways of obedience. The details of the disciplined body will, as already mentioned, necessarily escape us but a brief catalogue of probable positions can, I think, be attempted.
One forms the idea of discipline in the House creating a hunched body, a body grotesque and disproportionate, a body fighting to uncover itself and straighten its spine. Perhaps this 'hunched body' was the sum total of a powerful system of reductions for were the prisoners not bent over their daily labour (at the sink or ironing table)? Did they not arch over their food as they arched over their knitting? Were their bodies not cramped in desks, did they not kneel in Chapel? If the malleable, twisted body was not the everyday mean then why was a walk in the Gardens seen as so necessary - for it indicates a double return to both the relative freedom of the 'outdoors' as well as to 'normal' posture. Even the Anglican authorities recognized the importance of both relative isolation from the community and the necessity of exercise.

It was necessary to acquire a site sufficiently large to prevent the House of Mercy being surrounded by other houses, overlooking the yards and grounds, and also to secure that from time to time the penitents could be taken for (walking exercise) without trespassing on other people's land.\(^{34}\)

**CONCLUSION**

In accordance with the aims of my introduction, I have attempted in this chapter to reconstruct the political technology of the body as it operated within the House of Mercy - an institution suspended on the very edge of the municipal boundary. I have also attempted to "recreate" this technology in terms of intelligibility rather than truth. In attempting to "reconstruct" the "meaning-effect" of a chain of events I have scrutinised a textual trace (the foundation stone)
in order to say, "look at those bodies, look at the power that is mapped out on them". In so doing, I have both acknowledged my desire as a student who has a literary background to bring to the study of the past, and I have drawn attention to the idea that everything - and here I include the human body - has a history. This is in contrast to forms of traditional or orthodox history which, I would suggest, are prepared to neglect the study of the body because to respect its difference (and emergence within different discursive contexts) would require an altogether different set of methodological assumptions.

During this chapter, I suggested that the Church of the Province of South Africa disciplined mainly "coloured prostitutes" by directing their subjectivity towards petit-bourgeois ideals such as femininity, domesticity and purity. These projected values were in all likelihood culturally alien. The "penitents" had to struggle therefore, not only against imprisonment, but against a culturally alien form of values. In the final case-study which follows, we will see how the Woodstock Suburban or Cottage Hospital struggled against a similar form of cultural imposition: in their case it was a codified and repressive form of temporality. The positive evidence of having overcome the discursive imposition of time was the construction of a modern hospital, but this is a story best left for the final chapter.
FOOTNOTES

1. Church of the Province of South Africa Archives (CPSA), University of the Witwatersrand, William Cullen Library, transcription of original Foundation Stone, anon.


5. ibid., p.1.

6. There is a noticable slippage in the Sisters' characterisation of the penitents; the preferred description of the women imprisoned in the House seems to be either,"young women" or, "girls". Are we thus witnessing the emergence of a "buried" link between discursive strategies of infantilization and the supposed "hard-fact" that the sexuality of children and adolescents is both restless and precocious. After Foucault we are aware that sexuality is a discursive construct rather than a innate natural urge. One also wonders to what degree race was a determining factor in the (mythological) construction of "coloured" girls as sexually over-active subjects. The only occasion in which "young women" and "girls" conveniently "become" adults is when the adjective "fallen " preceeds their designated status as women. To reach discursive adulthood is a double-bind therefore, for it means that one is condemned to inhabit a postlapsarian world.

8. ibid., p.1.
10. ibid., p.2.
11. ibid., p.2.
12. CPSA Archives, Wits, William Cullen Library, transcription from Foundation Stone, anon.
13. ibid.
14. Ibid.
16. ibid., p.2.
17. ibid., p.2.
22. ibid., p.2.

23. I interpret this part of the disciplinary practice as the attempted inculcation of domestic values within the penitents. Given the period, it is understandable that issues of middle-class women's identity were tied up with the home as being a realm of authenticity. The "home" is also a quintessential site and value which negates the intrusion of capitalism - and commercial sexuality - into Victorian private life. As an agent of limited independence, a woman from within her home is able to
assert herself both against her husband and the world. The home was, therefore, a niche from which a woman could negotiate her relationship with an ever-changing, violent world. Finally and perhaps most importantly, the retreat into the seclusion of the familiar is a refusal of woman as sexual object and thus of woman as commodity. This quest for gender identity was, for lower-class prisoners however, a class-imposition rather than a tool for a "liberated" future.

24. CPSA Archives, Wits, William Cullen Library, transcription of original Foundation Stone, anon.
26. CPSA Archives, Wits, William Cullen Library, transcription of original Foundation Stone, anon.
CHAPTER 6: TOWARDS A MODERN GENERAL HOSPITAL

INTRODUCTION

Through a network of reports and schemes, I hope in this chapter to provide the reader with a fleeting glimpse of the political technology of the body which characterised the Woodstock Suburban or Cottage Hospital. I also hope to demonstrate how certain discursively created objects came to surface in reports, and how writing about the hospital had a definite disciplinary dimension. We will see, particularly in the first two sections, how the hospital was created as a site for knowledge, and by extension, how those within it would have submitted to an institutional regime of discipline. This regime would have forced those seeking care and health to occupy certain positions in space, to submit to temporal divisions of the day, and to behave in prescribed ways. As a result of the care that they received, the patients' bodies would have been scrutinized and controlled. This discipline would have been imposed under the guise of the patients' health. Thus we see the paradox at the centre of this case-study: hospitals exist to return the sick and poorly to health, and by extension, to keep the population healthy. They do so, however, at the expense of negation and objectification.

Allied to this I ask certain questions about the relationship between imperialism and temporality. It is axiomatic, I suggest, that as a discourse, imperialism has a vested interest in keeping colonial subjects oppressed. One aspect of this oppression takes the form of locating colonial subjects in what I refer to as a "time of otherness". In other words, a time which is other to prevailing and dominant European time. In the context of this temporal
dis-equilibrium the desire for "a modern General Hospital" can therefore be seen as a negation of the time of otherness. For to be modern, I argue, is in effect to be contemporary and to strive for equality (particularly if equality is defined according to a European norm). Unfortunately, however, medical power is part of a Western imperial rationality which is not entirely utopian.

I contend in section 6.1, therefore, that the hospital as well as the immediate space surrounding it surfaced and was constituted as a visible and policed institution through a series of official reports which were undertaken by both the Medical Officer of Health and his assistant.

In section 6.2 I will suggest that the analysis of an ongoing episode in the hospital's history, namely the debate as to whether Woodstock Hospital should be altered or rebuilt, is revealed to be a productive undertaking, because the submission of what was known as the "Fresh Air Scheme" forwards a comparatively advanced conception of disciplinary power. A close reading of the proposals contained in the scheme suggest that the institutional technology within the hospital hinged on both economic and broadly political factors. I am not moving my explanation in the direction of "an economic in the final instance" type answer. I am simply asserting that, when seen against the backdrop of British Colonial indecision, there were bound to be ramifications for disciplinary procedures within the hospital itself. In all probability these ramifications took the form of a unique type of institutional technology best suited to the hospital and its everyday peculiarities.

I also suggest during section 6.2 that the "Fresh Air Scheme" can be understood as an expression of the continuing struggle against
backwardness, dirt and the "primitivism" of Africa, that is, the "time of otherness". The scheme was fatally flawed, however, for it did contain a sophisticated - though hidden - account of disciplinary power and thus a highly repressive institutional technology. The "Fresh Air Scheme" was never put into operation, though, and thus the quest to challenge imposed backwardness through modern-isation was a failure. The hospital was forced to do the best it could as it continued to serve the community, despite any disruptions that the "Fresh Air Scheme" might have caused.

My analysis of administrative texts in sections 6.1 and 6.2 gives way in 6.3 to a consideration of the epistemological and practical significance of the accident. I assert that the accidental shooting of Police-Constable Logan - a shooting which occurred on the margins of two highly-disciplined and organised spaces - allows the scholar a privileged insight into the workings of, amongst other things, disciplinary writing. The writing of the event also gives us an ephemeral and valuable glimpse of how disciplinary knowledge is created, and equally, illustrates how a crisis initiates a corresponding adjustment in power. One can then hypothesize about the effects that this adjustment has on the institutional technology of the hospital itself.

6.1: A TIME OF OTHERNESS

The following section is an investigation into the ramifications of two contradictions. The first involves Dr Mitchell (who was the Medical Officer of Health) and his attempt to improve the Woodstock Hospital to the extent where it was fully modern. Through an analysis of two major reports conducted by Mitchell and his department I argue that despite his intentions, he was implicated in a rationality over
which he had little control.

The second concerns an issue that is vital to an understanding of the chapter as a whole. The issue revolves around the idea of control, and if cast in the form of a question, it might be, "how can control in the hospital be seen as negative if the hospital works for the benefit of the community?" The answer to that question is as follows: we know from former chapters that discipline is not gratuitous. Discipline functions in certain institutions because it can thereby assure both progress and obedience. In the context of a hospital, progress can be equated with the production of health. In order to produce health, the hospital needs to impose a disciplinary regime on patients and staff. If discipline can produce health discreetly, in a cost-effective manner and also accumulate knowledge on the population, sewers and quality of air in the municipality, then the outcome of this rationality will be potentially oppressive and restrictive.

The quotes which follow are selected from a report of an inspection of the Woodstock Hospital on 7th March 1904. The inspection was conducted by Dr. Mitchell himself.

As a result of my inspection and after careful consideration of the matter in all its bearings, I have come to the conclusion that the present buildings, with the exception of the Nurses' Quarters, are very unsuitable for the purposes of a modern General Hospital. ¹

On the one hand I suggest that this quote can be interpreted as a bald statement about the non-discursive, about buildings within space. Allied to this we realise that it is a statement about
pre-modernity, about a failure to reach a perceived modern threshold. On the other hand Dr Mitchell is also making a statement (unbeknown to him) about medical-administrative practice. In other words he is making an epistemological reflection about the status of knowledge. Perhaps he is suggesting that he has found the reason or rationality underlying the concrete institution somewhat underdeveloped, in other words, pre-modern. Can we therefore presume that the knowledge which underscored the hospital's medical and administrative practice was also inadequate to the demands of modernity? And of what exactly did modernity consist? This quote therefore introduces the elusive spectre of modernity, an image which was, as we shall see, to haunt the minds of doctors and administrators throughout the "primitive" early years of this century, particularly as they played their part in a comic farce known as the "Fresh Air Scheme".

Before we continue, however, it is necessary to clarify what I mean by modernity. First of all, I am using it in a weak sense and it is unrelated therefore to the epistemological periodisation that Foucault privileged in the Order of Things. I am not referring to the margins between the modern and the dimly perceived post-modern but am asserting that modern is really synonymous with contemporary. We can characterise the quest for modernity therefore as an attempt, through institutional self-improvement, at transcending backwardness. In this respect we may note the similarities between modernity and modernization (for a brief discussion of modernization see chapter four). The "quest" therefore attests to the powerful influence of a prior discourse of inferiority. This prior discourse can be partially explained by reference to the Cape's colonial status, to Woodstock's somewhat tawdry appearance (see chapter two), and its racially heterogeneous, if "colourful", past. The need to be taken seriously can also be understood as a response to the lingering influence of a
narrative trope which intimates that Woodstock, to a lesser or greater extent, exists to be forgotten. Finally, modernity as a signifier is congruent with the growth of the productive apparatus. This does not mean that it is a superstructural reflection of an enabling economic base, it simply means that its genealogical emergence is an analogue to a stage in the local development of capital.

Ultimately though, discourses of inferiority are attributable to constructed inequalities. One of the elements in this imperial construction is the temporal - the Cape exists in a different time - a time which is other to the modern. It is the function of imperial discourse to "induce" collective inferiority because it is a form of passivity which continues to presume the existence of a superior power, which in this case is England. This unequal relationship can be questioned and even resisted. Dr Mitchell demonstrates that to create a modern General Hospital involves superceding (in Hegelian terms this would be called the negation of the negation) the temporal limitations imposed by imperial discourse and creating a hospital which is genuinely modern. To be modern is thus to question the temporal dimension of imperial discourse in a very real way.

Dr Mitchell's desire for "a modern General Hospital" can be interpreted as a minor act of resistance. Unfortunately, Mitchell occupies a compromised position within the power complex, and whilst this enables him to enunciate that which retrospectively appears to be mildly subversive, he is also the servant of a repressive system, insofar as the effects of power are often censorious and oppressive. I would like to spin out this basic contradiction during section 6.1 and in following the thread of the contradiction draw the reader's
attention to the debate which lurks beneath us. It is a debate about the function of resistance in Foucault's work. Is resistance always incorporated into power as part of the way in which it functions or do acts of resistance manage to authentically escape the clutches of power? 2

It is necessary however to return to the report as quickly as possible. During the next few pages I will be concerned to trace the emergence of the hospital and its grounds into administrative discourse. I will also attempt to embellish what I have just identified as a contradiction of central importance: that of Dr Mitchell's solution to the complexities of enforced colonial backwardness. Mitchell's solution is, as we shall see, deeply reformist. 3 We have already established that the need to be modern is in one sense a struggle against the temporal hegemony of imperialism. The struggle takes place within an imperial rationality that the hospital as an institution is destined, with certain amendments, to reproduce however, and thus we witness the contradiction within Mitchell's solution. The modernisation of the hospital is unlikely to usher in a period of freedom from power but, rather, we are bound to see within Mitchell's reformism, the capacity of power to incorporate acts within institutional settings, which strive for greater autonomy.

In the aforementioned report of March the seventh, 1904, Dr Mitchell suggests the following under a heading entitled "Recommendations and remarks":

The drainage system should be thoroughly tested and overhauled, and the water closets put in good order and repair. The openings at the back of the closets should be built up leaving only an
aperture for ventilation which should be provided with a ventilation grating of suitable pattern.\textsuperscript{4}

This particular quote attests to the importance, to both the hospital and the municipality, of a healthy and reliable system of drainage. Comparisons between the human body and the hospital’s drainage system are perhaps clichéd, if not to say distasteful, yet we may note that the underside of the municipal "body" held all manner of horrors for administrators, planners and health-officers, in short the "medico-administrative complex". Was their fear not the traditional fear of the hidden and invisible?, the taboo placed on the ritual evacuation of waste?, and what exactly were the components of this horrible economy that was only allowed to rise to the surface of discourse in the form of words cleansed and purified; drainage, closets, water-closets etc.?

Point ten of the report suggests that,

More effective measures should be taken to disinfect mattresses, pillows etc. used by cases of enteric fever, such articles should be thoroughly sponged over with some suitable anti-septic solution and exposed to air and sunlight until thoroughly dry.\textsuperscript{5}

Enteric fever or typhoid is a severe inflammation of the intestines caused by bacteria lurking in drinking water. The existence of typhoid patients in the municipality at the time illustrates, in a slightly different way, that the drainage system was far from perfect.

Furthermore we are able to witness the perpetual struggle which is
waged against germs in the name of life and health. This sterilization is not simply thorough, in the mildly suspicious neutrality of the word, it is extreme. The preservation of health, order and cleanliness requires a regime of surveillance, a constant watchfulness on the part of doctors, nurses, orderlies. It is a regime which is scrupulous in its extremism because nothing, no germs, no dirt, no waste is theoretically allowed to escape its exhaustive gaze.

We must not forget, however, that the hygienic measures (which are presumably the end product of the exhaustive gaze) taken by the hospital staff were in themselves "useful" and "positive". It is the consequences or effects of these useful or positive measures which are susceptible to Foucauldian critique. We must not be seduced by the double-edged rationality at work, for to be cured also means to be objectified, and to be hospitalised inevitably means to be carefully watched.

Also, there is a certain index of embarrassment in having to register the existence of patients with enteric fever. Their illness attests to the fundamental simplicity of the drainage system which in turn reinforces notions of both pre-modernity and lower-class poverty. As it circulates within the body of the patient, illness is thus a living reminder of iniquity and filth. The poverty within a certain strata of the social formation is surely the antithesis to the hygiene and implied purity underscored by the quest for "a modern General Hospital".

The recommendation which succeeds point ten states:

Notes of all post-mortem examinations performed at the Hospital
As I noted in the brief section devoted to *The Birth of the Clinic* in my introductory chapter it is what Foucault refers to as the "medical gaze" which is one of the defining characteristics between two types of medicine. This medical gaze was different to the medical vision which preceded it in that it now "saw" in terms of depth, it saw quite suddenly into the body itself whereas nosology had merely attempted to discern disease by ("reading") surface effects. I am aware that the "opening up of a few corpses" is not synonymous with "all post-mortem examinations": but the quote is significant in the sense that not only does it provide a "transparent" example of the medical gaze, but is also complemented by a corresponding formalisation of medical knowledge that, even in death, the body is trapped in the web of discourse - numbered, named, examined and stored indefinitely in a "written" afterlife.

In point twelve Dr Mitchell remarks,

the present arrangements for the supervision of the patients during meals appear to be unsatisfactory; the nurses should remain in the wards until the patients have finished their meals.7

This particular quote reveals the relentlessness of supervision and the degree to which patients are rendered passive and objectlike under the nurses' constant and watchful eye. We are also given an indication of a similar attitude towards time between the House of Mercy (see chapter five) and the Woodstock Suburban or Cottage Hospital. Yet this is not to suggest that the daily schedules were the same or even similar, for "hospital time" is notoriously
idiosyncratic, particularly as meal-times are "ahead" of "regular" eating hours, visiting time is more often than not limited and the entire day in fact appears to incline towards ordered reclamation of time from the beginning of the day itself. Thus the events which create the rhythm of a hospital "day" take place before they "normally" do in the world beyond the hospital walls.

The penultimate item which appeared to be interesting proceeds as follows,

More attention should be paid to the training of nurses; arrangements should be made for the Superintendent or other Medical Officer to give regular courses of lectures to nurses with the object of preparing them for the examination for the certificate of competence in Nursing of the Colonial Medical Council.8

Almost immediately, the key signifiers spring out at us: training, regular, examination. The quote is fascinating because it gives evidence of a pedagogics within the institution itself. Nurses are required to attend lectures and acquire sufficient knowledge to carry out their everyday duties correctly. In all probability this knowledge is retained or memorized and in due course it is probably examined before it can be applied. The examination is, as we know, a strategy which,

combines the technique of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgement. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them.9
Foucault is correct to stress that there are those who occupy the ambiguous middle terrain of the power hierarchy. In this instance those subjects are nurses, individuals who are "supervisors perpetually supervised".10 Foucault continues,

The power in the hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. And, although it is true that its pyramidal organization gives it a "head", it is the apparatus as a whole that produces "power" and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field.11

The final excerpt relates to the economics of importation and the question of a dispensary.

The question of whether more economical arrangements cannot be made for the supply of Drugs, Dressings and Surgical Appliances should be considered. It seems to me that the best plan would be to import supplies of such articles direct from Europe. Dispensing Superintendent or other Medical Officer or arrangements might be made for a qualified chemist to visit the Hospital and do the dispensing work daily.12

Unfortunately we can only imagine the state of affairs being described. One suspects that in the supply of drugs the Assistant Medical Officer of Health thought it necessary to cut out the "middleman" and thereby reduce costs. It is more difficult to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the dispensing of drugs. Perhaps the A.M.O.H. felt that a standardization of the dispensing procedure was necessary because drugs were being wasted or were
finding their way into a blackmarket economy. Given that we cannot adequately reconstruct his rationale it is advisable to note that his recommendations certainly attempted to define a set of rules as opposed to an apparently vague system of makeshift or informal knowledge. Rules operate successfully in that they become general knowledge which is practiced and rules supposedly refine the overall system. Could this be an example of the quest for a foolproof rationality which was the inevitable corollary of a painful movements towards, "a modern General Hospital"?

In order to transcend what I referred to earlier as the "time of otherness", Dr Mitchell bravely attempted a modern-ization of the Woodstock Cottage or Suburban Hospital. To modernise the institution, however, was a thankless task for the very logic of modernization was implicated in a medical-administrative rationality, the effects of which were deeply restrictive. The repressive dimension of these effects are susceptible to Foucauldian critique. The strongly pessimistic tenor of this critique points to a core of unfreedom, lurking in the folds of a Western reason which is presumed to be enlightening. The contradictoriness of Dr Mitchell's reformist solution can be expressed as follows: To improve the hospital meant that it had to be modernised. In modernising it, Dr Mitchell was obliged to use a series of techniques (such as inspections and subsequent reports, etc.) which were congruent with Colonial medical practice. He was obliged, in other words, to police it as an institution. In doing so, the hospital was still locked in a repressive relationship with both the Colonial administration and the metropolitan power.

The following few pages, therefore, will continue with the intention expressed earlier; to spin out these contradictions, and to examine
According to the Assistant Medical Officer of Health,

As instructed I made an inspection of the suburban Hospital, Woodstock, on 22 May last and have to report thereon as follows.13

As already stated, I will analyse extracts of the above report in detail in an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the prerogatives of a medical-administrative rationality that was so dangerously double-edged. The following extract offers a fine illustration of the importance of the hospital grounds. The extract reads as follows,

The Hospital Grounds proper shew very little indication of care, are in an unkempt and untidy condition, and littered with rubbish in places. A new gate has been constructed opening on to Mountain Rd so that funerals no longer have to pass in front of the Hospital.14

The first section of the quote is interesting because one suspects that the "Hospital Grounds" could stand metonymically for the entire hospital, the grounds therefore betray the "reality" of inner chaos, administrative ineptitude, confusion. Furthermore we may remember that long walks in the grounds of the House of Mercy were an important element in the rehabilitative project. However, what I am really implying is the possibility that we have just crossed a discursive threshold of emergence. What has "emerged" into discourse is the administrative importance of space in the form of the hospital grounds. I am not suggesting that the hospital grounds were invented
by the A.M.O.H.'s over-active imagination, nor am I saying that the space has, miraculously, just appeared. I am suggesting that for the "hospital grounds" to emerge at all discursively means that there has been a corresponding shift in administrative knowledge. The momentarily missing term in this brief theoretical detour is power, for power (through knowledge and discourse) is productive. It has literally invented the hospital grounds as a site for administrative knowledge. In conclusion we may note that the grounds stand in figurative proximity to the funerals that used "to pass in front of the Hospital", for doesn't the funeral "litter" the entire homely scenario with the truth of death, nature's revenge?

The space which surrounds the hospital acted as a form of "punctuation". This "pause" between spaces allowed subjects to negotiate the transition between the institutional (the hospital) and the public (municipal) spheres. However, the hospital grounds can also be compared to an introduction: if the grounds are clean and welcoming they might serve to humanise the frightening experience of visiting hospital by reducing the scale of the institution.

I would like next to quote a particularly long extract in full and then relate it to the topic of hygiene in the hospital itself as well as discussing hygiene in the broader context of the wider municipal area.

The yard gutters are defective, holding in place small pools of stagnant slop-water. At the back of the nurses' quarters is a pool of offensive slop water in a hollow of the ground which could easily be drained and surface waters be allowed to run off. The sanitary conveniences remain in the unsatisfactory condition described in my last report. The openings in the drain pipes
outside the closet walls therein described still remain; that in
the drain from the European female closet is plugged with cement;
that from the Native closet is open. There is no slop closet on
the female side so that bed pans have to be carried along the
passage past the operating room and Nurses dining room to one or
other of the closets on the male side. The closets and sinks
drain to the stormwater sewer in Mountain Rd which is of fire
clay pipes terminating near Woodstock beach in an open brick and
cement culvert. I am informed that the closets at the Hospital
are the only ones within the Municipal area draining to the
system of stormwater sewers. There appears to be no proper system
of ventilating the drains to the old part of the Hospital and as
the Institutions stands at about the highest point of the system
of sewers, there is grave risk of the entrance of sewer air into
the building; I would recommend that the drains be carefully
tested and proper means of ventilation and disconnection
provided.16

Initially, I would like to stress the necessity of a clean and
germ-free hospital. For what if by some horrible and perverse irony
the hospital starts to infect by means of sewerage, water or air, the
community it is supposed to serve? Reading through the reports of the
A.M.O.H. between 1904 and 1911 this fear certainly appears to be a
realistic possibility. It is the constant presence of this fear which
animates the M.O.H's every utterance, every gesture, every action.
The anxiety of the authorities is expressed by Foucault thus.

It is also necessary to organise the internal space of the
hospital so as to make it medically efficacious, a place no
longer of assistance but of therapeutic action. The hospital must
function as a "curing machine". First, in a negative manner, all
the factors which make the hospital dangerous for its occupants must be suppressed, solving the problem of the circulation of air which must be constantly renewed without its miasmas or mephitic qualities being carried from one patient to another, solving as well the problem of the changing, transport and laundering of bed linen. 17

The A.M.O.H. is attempting to identify precisely, "all the factors which make the hospital dangerous", he quotes, "the pools of slop-water" and the "sanitary conveniences" 18 to name but several objects of attention. The hospital, however, cannot be viewed as being separate from either the municipal area of the city - this is in marked distinction to the House of Mercy where separateness is an a priori requisite for its effective functioning as an institution - and thus we witness the importance of urban space and population as categories for the medico-administrative project. (They will be dealt with at length in the forthcoming section.) It is Foucault who, under the heading, "the privilege of hygiene and the function of medicine as an instance of social control", writes,

First of all, control of the urban space in general: it is this space which constitutes perhaps the most dangerous environment for the population. The disposition of various quarters, their humidity and exposure, the ventilation of the city as a whole, its sewerage and drainage systems, the siting of abattoirs and cemeteries, the density of population. All these are decisive factors for the mortality and morbidity of the inhabitants. The city with its principal spatial variances appears as a medicalisable object. Whereas the medical topographies of regions analyse climatic and geological conditions which are outside human control, and can only recommend measures of correction and

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compensation, the urban topographies outline, in negative at least, the general principles of a concerned urban policy. 19

I have suggested in this section that it is possible to view the quest for modernity as a fatally compromised search for institutional and political autonomy. Reformist solutions are traditionally unable to recognise the epistemological difficulties involved in quests for self-improvement. Although Dr Mitchell was a "progressive" administrator, he occupied a position within medical and Imperial discourse which was severely limited. It was limited because his position within the medical administration of the Colony required him to utilise techniques and strategies of power which had repressive effects. Even as certain spaces and a certain range of objects surfaced in reports about the hospital and its grounds, so the hospital became a more observed and disciplined institution. Thus was the double-edged nature of the rationality with which both the administrators and the patients had to deal - a rationality which, as I mentioned earlier on, repressed as it cured.

6.2: THE FRESH AIR SCHEME

The second section of chapter six will trace the development of an administrative debate which arose around the issue of whether the Woodstock Hospital should have been extended or re-built altogether. I believe that this debate can be profitably analysed as an extension of the quest for a modern General Hospital although it is vital that we view the debate in the context of the following categories: population, urban space and bodies. They are, as we shall see, crucial if we are to investigate the social and disciplinary dimension of the hospital with any degree of accuracy, as they are key terms in the expanding biological awareness of the population as
a resource for capital. The necessity for the new hospital is expressed in the following way. You will note that the aforementioned categories of urban space, bodies and populations make a definite appearance.

2. The highway to the suburbs passes through Woodstock, and the amount of vehicular traffic is enormous.
3. Five hundred trams and 250 trains pass through Woodstock daily.
4. Between 250 and 300 in-patients and about 840 out-patients from Woodstock are treated by the New Somerset Hospital yearly, and about 860 out-patients at the free dispensary.
5. Numbers of patients have had to be refused admission through want of accommodation. 20

Using an editing style that is definitely modernist in its ambition, I would like to use the technique of montage and to "cut" this quote almost immediately against a quote from Foucault himself.

The return of the hospitals, and more particularly the projects for their architectural, institutional, and technical reorganization, owed its importance in the eighteenth century to this set of problems relating to the urban space, the mass of the population with its biological characteristics, the close-knit family cell, and the bodies of individuals. It is in the history of these materialities, which are at once political and economic, that the "physical" process of transformation of the hospital is inscribed. 21

In his characteristically elegant fashion, Foucault's description of the "technical reorganization" of the hospitals in the eighteenth
century might almost apply to the situation in Woodstock during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The quote prior to the one above gives some indication of the sheer numbers of people clamouring for hospital attention and care. We will also see, as the chapter continues, the increasing importance of the categories of urban space (note the M.O.H.'s comment on the hospital ground in section 6.1), and human bodies in the burgeoning medical rationality of the day. What we will be concerned with in this section, therefore, is nothing more than a project for the Woodstock Hospital's "architectural, institutional, and technical reorganization" and to analyse the difficulties that the reorganization posed.

Rather than quoting the report in full and numbing length, I will summarise the necessary sections of Dr Mitchell's report and quote the more important sections. Dr Mitchell's report (7th March 1904) notes that the first scheme for the hospital's extension was forwarded to the government in August 1902. The plans were forwarded later and suggested the establishment of one twenty-bed capacity ward, a private ward and certain structural alterations to the existing buildings. Of the sixteen hundred pounds raised, roughly half was done by the hospital trustees and this amount was then matched by the government. However, in the report Mitchell states unequivocally that,

As a result of my inspection and after careful consideration of the matter in all its bearings, I have come to the conclusion that the present buildings, with the exception of the Nurses' Quarters, are very unsuitable for the purposes of a modern General Hospital. 22

The reasons given by Mitchell are as follows: that the hospital is
cramped in the upper section of its grounds, which are very close to the boundary fence. Furthermore, the hospital buildings,

are very faulty as regards arrangement, corridors, lighting, ventilation and circulation of air; there is practically no open air accommodation for patients; the sanitary bathroom and kitchen accommodation is unsatisfactory in the extreme; the buildings are old, badly out of repair, and are swarming with insect pests. 23

Mitchell reaches the conclusion that, "additional accommodation" 24 is an absolute necessity and he forwards the following alternatives.

Two schemes may be suggested - either the erection of a new Hospital on a new site or on the lower part of the present Hospital grounds, or the building of a new Hospital on the present or on an adjoining site so as to render possible the continued utilisation of the present buildings, demolishing and replacing them by new and more suitable structures as funds permit or circumstances render necessary. The question is whether the present buildings can be conveniently utilised in this way; I am of the opinion that they can be. 25

Before we pursue the debate, as it uncoils itself across reams of official paper, I would like to pause and analyse briefly some of Mitchell's contentions and their implications. Mitchell contends that the then current buildings can still be used but that they should be upgraded and improved. His vision implies a remedy to the nightmare world which is other to the modern. This world is characterised via a Kafkaesque reference as one which swarms "with insect pests" 26. The appearance of insects adds a sinister note to the report, the echoes of which move in the direction of devolution and degeneracy. As a
node in the complex unfolding of knowledge and power. Mitchell has
dramatised the urgent need for intervention. As a messenger of
benificent rationality he makes suggestions which will move the
hospital out of its cramped conditions towards a well-organised
spaciousness. We note that this discursive moment cannot develop a
self-critical awareness of itself through its interaction with
ignorance and the mildly African textures of decay. For example,
Mitchell wrote, "the buildings are old, badly out of repair".27
Were Mitchell able to shift the angle of his investigation, he might
have been able to mobilise a different language against what I,
retrospectively, have identified as power and discipline. The
consideration might be pursued as follows: how effective was medical
power in a situation in which "the hospital buildings are crowded
together at the upper part of the grounds, and close to the rear
boundary fence" 28, as compared to its influence in the new, modern
version of the hospital. Foucault draws our attention to two images
of discipline in Discipline and Punish.

There are two images, then, of discipline. At one extreme, the
discipline-blockade, the enclosed-institution, established on the
edges of society, turned inwards towards negative functions:
arresting evil, breaking communications, suspending time. At the
other extreme, with panopticism, is the
discipline-mechanism.29

I contend that whether it took the form of the written word or the
administrative gaze the hoped-for version of the hospital was the
ideal site for discipline with a barely-recognised deftness and
terrible lightness of "touch". This "touch" certainly put the
hospital into the latter category of "discipline mechanism"
(presumably the original version would be closer to the discipline

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blockade), but it is the intangible properties of the power which animated this "touch" that requires our attention. In order to analyse this power it is necessary to return to the debate directly.

The entire debate is underwritten by a pervasive sense of economic and political uncertainty which at times appears to be of critical proportions. The complexity of both the administrative and economic aspects of the situation is evoked in the following summary.

In or about 1904, and owing mainly to the report of Dr Gregory on the urgent need for a new hospital about 1,000 Pounds was collected and earmarked as a building fund. This has accumulated (compound interest), and the amount at present available for building purposes is approximately 1,300 Pounds. In March 1909, a deputation interviewed the then Colonial Secretary, and produced a plan of a proposed new hospital. The Colonial Secretary then stated it was impossible for the Government to grant any money to any hospital under the present state of things, and that, owing to the impending unification of the various colonies, the Cape Government had no control over the matter, but he could hold out no hope of assisting the Board.

The Government intended to consider the question of building one large central hospital for the Peninsula, in which case the grants to the present state-aided hospital would, in all probability, be withdrawn. Under the circumstances the Colonial Secretary strongly advised the Board not to proceed for the time being. The Matter was thereafter discussed from time to time, and it was decided, as mentioned above, to again approach the Administrator with the object of soliciting help in obtaining Government aid to improve the existing building.
The above quote provides the bedrock for our analysis. Unfortunately it does go a little beyond itself, however, for the substance of this section necessitates that we go back to 1909, the date when the Board of the Suburban Hospital submitted the "Fresh Air Scheme".  

Although the scheme was bulky and over-ambitious, I contend that an intelligent close-reading reveals that the proposals contained an unconscious yet remarkably sophisticated conception of power and its workings. I do not for one moment believe that the "authors" of the "Fresh Air Scheme" had any idea that their ideas contained anything like a conception of power, but I contend that it is possible to understand the workings of medical power as if it flowed like air or light. For both air and light stand in a relation of contiguity to the workings of power. I am suggesting therefore that by means of a simple substitution we can replace the words light and air with that of power. However, this simple "substitution" is somewhat crude, 

Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up. 

There appeared in Badham's Rediscovering Woodstock a number of references to that traditional and persistent comparison, that wind connotes unease and sometimes even danger. In distinction to this common-place association I contend that there is a conception of power (I am reluctant to say theory) ingrained within the very title of the scheme, for "Fresh Air" implies a domestication of the violence inherent in an angry wind. Furthermore it signifies a taming, for "Fresh Air" represents a controlled and pleasant
circulation as it situates the imagined functioning of the hospital within the context of therapeutic benevolence. In order to demonstrate just how conscious the secretary of the Woodstock Suburban Hospital was about the negative effect of the wind, the following extract is taken from the section entitled "exposure".

It will also be observed that the disposition of the Ward blocks leaves a minimum area of the building exposed to the South East wind while the stoeps are throughout in perfect shelter from the same violent element.33

and under the title "Ventilation" we read,

A system of natural ventilation is recommended for all compartments and corridors, and special attention has been given to prevent the possibility of draughts in the Wards.34

In the above one notices that once the threat of the wind outside has been curtailed then attention can be brought to bear on the circulation of air within the hospital itself. The importance of air cannot be explained simply in terms of the ability to transport stale odours away but I believe that generally free-flowing air stands in structural proximity to light, which in turn is of course a prime component of a visual discourse which supports institutional discipline. As Foucault stated in a conversation with Jean-Pierre Barou and Michel Perrot,

in examining the series of different architectural projects which followed the second fire at the Hotel-Dieu in 1772, I noticed how the whole problem of the visibility of bodies, individuals and things, under a system of centralised observation, was one of
their most constant directing principles. In the case of the hospitals this general problem involves a further difficulty: it was necessary to avoid undue contact, contagion, physical proximity and overcrowding, while at the same time ensuring ventilation and circulation of air, at once dividing space up and keeping it open, ensuring a surveillance which would be both global and individualising while at the same time carefully separating the individuals under observation.\textsuperscript{35}

For do not both air and light serve the same purpose in relation to spatiality? Do they not both "illuminate", scan surfaces, and reach into corners undiscovered? Is it, therefore, that peculiar to suggest that air "makes visible" and provides a secondary element to a visual metaphorico of which light is the most important feature?

The Operating Theatre, Anaesthetising and Electric treatment rooms, and the Drug Store and Laboratory form an isolated block in a \textit{central convenient position with light from the most suitable quarter}.\textsuperscript{36}

Furthermore, several items within the "Fresh Air Scheme" also contain examples of a remarkable administrative sensitivity to the ordering of space and the positioning of objects therein.

The Kitchen and Domestic Offices are situated in a position convenient for the conveyance of food to the Nurses and Medical Staff quarters and to the several wards.\textsuperscript{37}

and,

The two near beds of each ward are divided off by light screens and would be glazed to the corridor side. These beds would be used for patients immediately after an operation, and would
therefore avoid any discomfort to the other ward patients. 38

The quotations above seek to demonstrate that although the "Fresh Air Scheme" might have been a failure in other respects (see below) it certainly did forward a relatively intelligent blue-print for the possible construction of a "modern General Hospital". As we shall soon see, however, the scheme never met with official approval. After a thorough analysis of the scheme, the Department of Public Health commented thus,

These arrangements are entirely unsatisfactory and would be found impossible in practice. The general remarks already made regarding the scheme as a whole apply to this part of it: in my opinion it will serve no useful purpose to go into it in detail - the whole matter should be considered afresh. 39

some time later an alternative to the "Fresh Air Scheme" was mentioned in a Cape Times article of November 1911,

A rough plan has been drawn by Mr Grant, architect, which provides for the erection of a new building as nurses' quarters, and for the conversion of the existing buildings into a 38-bedded institution. By thus centralising the wards, the hospital could be maintained by a very slightly increased nursing staff. 40

This improvised alternative attempted to short-circuit the economic problems via "centralisation" and a "slightly increased nursing staff". It was rejected by the Provincial Secretary who believed, at a time when money was scarce, that the cost of the "nursing-home" was prohibitive. According to the Provincial Secretary,
The new nursing-home at Woodstock cost, or is to cost, 1,835 Pounds. It was erected against the expressed wish and advice of the Administrator out of the funds raised by the Board for building purposes. The Government has not contributed towards the expenditure. Unfortunately they went ahead on their own and have placed the building too close to the old buildings, so as to make it almost impossible to convert the latter into a really satisfactory hospital. They then submitted a scheme of alterations for the old buildings to cost 1,450 Pounds. This had to be condemned altogether. 41

This very letter continues as follows.

Eventually the Government Architect and Medical Adviser went out to see what could be done, and devised two alternate schemes to cost 2,300 Pounds. Neither of these are really satisfactory, but the best that would appear possible in view of the fact that the Nurses’ home has been placed where it is. The Board are now considering the matter. They will have a balance of 450 Pounds left over from their building funds and a sum of 500 Pounds voted on our current estimates, making it about 950 Pounds altogether. Both schemes devised contemplate some increased accommodation and new wards. A portion of the re-construction can be carried out without materially increasing the present accommodation. 42

In a letter from the Acting Honorary Secretary of the Woodstock Hospital to the Provincial Secretary on February 5th, 1913, Mr F. Hartnady writes,

A complete survey of the building has been made by the Architect,
Mr Grant, and the builder, Mr F Hewitt and they estimate that the alteration will not cost more than 800 Pounds; in fact Mr Hewitt is prepared to perform the work for that price. 43

The Administrator lent his approval to the proposed alterations but in April of that year funds ran out and the Provincial Secretary was asked for 150 Pounds to add, "the range, sinks and piping for hot water supply." 44 This was granted and in August 1913, The Secretary of the Cape Hospital Board recommended to the Provincial Secretary that there be the,

erection of a new ward for coloured patients at the Woodstock Hospital. 45

On the 9th September 1913 the Administrator of the Province replied,

The Administrator has requested me to obtain an assurance from the Board on this point as "naturally" he does not feel disposed to authorise expenditure or additions to any institution whilst there is a probability that he may be asked later to agree to the abandonment of the institution and the erection, within a few years of another hospital in its stead. 46

And thus, for our purposes at least, the debate comes to a close. I hope therefore to have demonstrated that the economic and political uncertainty of the period was, along with bureaucratic ineptitude, a contributing factor to the rejection of the "Fresh Air Scheme". This was in spite of the scheme's latent conception of power, a conception which appears to, in some ways, be a refinement to the power which characterised the institution prior to the possible implementation of the scheme. If anything, therefore, it attests to the continued
importance of more traditional concepts such as the economic and political and their lingering influence within the history of both Colonial policy and the Woodstock Municipality.

6.3: AN ACCIDENTAL SHOOTING

This short and final section of chapter six is "about" the untimely death of Police-Constable Logan, a policeman who was accidentally shot by a friend on the night of the 17th December 1902. I argue in this section that Logan's death can be understood as creating a problem for what I loosely refer to as administrative knowledge. There are two reasons for this; I suggest that the writing which emanated from the Woodstock Suburban Hospital, that is, from the hospital to which Logan was admitted, is an instance of what Foucault refers to as disciplinary writing, a form of writing which situates, immobilizes and observes subjects, a writing which freezes them in a symmetrical net of words. Disciplinary writing has several defining characteristics but for the purposes of this section I will confine myself to naming two of them; the "fact" of death is relentlessly excluded from the discourse of disciplinary writing. In the records which survive today, whether they take the form of registers of admissions, reports from inspections conducted by the Medical Officer of Health or matron's reports, death is only mentioned as an abstract figure in a lonely column of its own. And secondly, disciplinary writing is characterized by the failure to ordinarily admit incidents, behaviours, actions that are in any way threatening, or anomalous. In other words anything which disrupts the ordered field of disciplinary writing (the foundation upon which administrative knowledge is built) and I contend it is precisely the accident which falls into the space of the threatening and anomalous. One of the main reasons why Logan's death is so difficult to accommodate within
administrative knowledge is because his death is the result of an accident. For it is the death without advance warning, the death without the harmony of preparation and the comfort of religious ritual. His is the unexpected and horribly sudden death of the accident. A death which by its very "nature" negates the possibility of self-knowledge through revelation. I argue that it is with great difficulty that the "event" is remembered at all and that this administrative memory is the inevitable consequence of a certain scrambling of identities, times and positions, for the incident is characterized by an incredible sense of confusion which culminates in the eventual appearance of that which lends "objectivity" and dignity to the prevailing chaos of an accidental death, namely the discourse of the law.

Furthermore - and this is the second reason - Logan's death demonstrates the inherent disorder present within all ordering systems. Logan's accident disorders the table of administrative knowledge from beneath because it draws attention to the fundamental fragility of a discursive system that is predicated on an arbitrary relationship between words and things. Thus the accident briefly illuminates the horror vacui at the heart of our language (discourse) for there is nothing but a void at its origin. Yet we must not interpret the existence of the "void" in too conventional a manner, for, as David Carroll states,

The void itself is not an origin or end for discourse. It is the place from which discourse is repeatedly regenerated, where what has not yet been said or figured takes form.

Thus the accident is that which has not yet been figured. Yet as we
learnt in the section devoted to the construction of a methodology in chapter 1 (at best an unwise and perilous undertaking) it is the function of the institution to limit the innate restlessness of discourse. In this instance the Logan accident is reclaimed by the functioning of the master-discourse, the law within the institutionalized context of the hospital.

As I have already mentioned the entire incident was uncommonly complicated. In order to explain in greater detail the sequence of events I will quote from several sources. The first quote is taken from evidence given at the inquest into Logan's death. According to Police Sergeant John Jones,

I saw Constable James later that same night. I then asked him for a statement and cautioned him that he need not say anything that may criminate him and that what he said may be used in evidence against him. He then made statement. He said Constable Logan came to his room as they were both off duty and were going out that night. They had arranged to meet at the Merry-go-Round at 9 p.m. Logan asked him for a box of matches. He gave him the matches and then Logan asked him for the loan of his revolver. He got the revolver from its box and said, "I don't think it is loaded". He (James) stood in middle of the room and Logan was standing on his left front. He snapped the trigger twice and when he snapped it a third time there was a report. James stated that he was pointing revolver towards the ground and holding it loosely in his hand. He said he was facing towards the door. As soon as the revolver went off Logan said, "James you've shot me in the stomach". Logan then walked out of his room (Jameses) toward his own room. James followed him and said, "shew me where you've been shot, and I'll fetch a doctor". Logan pulled up his shirt and shewed him the
At the same inquest Albert James - the man responsible for shooting Logan recounted,

I went to the box and took out my revolver. I said to Logan "there is nothing in it Peter," and snapped the trigger to shew him it was empty. I snapped the trigger twice and when I pulled it a third time it exploded. Logan put his hand to his stomach and said "My God James its through my stomach". I told him not to joke as it might have easily entered his stomach. He walked towards the door and met P.C. 255 coming in. Logan said "Mate, I'm shot". I said to Byrne, "Don't believe him mate, he's only larking". They both walked towards Logan's room. I followed them. When we got to Logan's room, I said to Logan "shew me where you are shot. I don't believe you". He pulled up his shirt and shewed us his wound in his right side about three inches from navel.

The story is taken up by the Assistant Medical Officer of Health for the Colony. What is about to follow appeared in a letter he wrote to the Provincial Secretary on August 6th 1903. Before quoting from this letter I think that it is important to note that it was as a result of this letter that an inquest was held into Logan's death. The Assistant Medical Officer of Health writes,

From the evidence it appears that P.C. Logan was shot in the stomach at 7.45 p.m. on the evening of the 17th December, 1902. Brandy was given to him immediately afterwards by P.C. James, and Dr. Hewat was sent for. He arrived, a few minutes later, afterwards. He found it was a serious case and required an
immediate operation and gave instructions that the wounded man was to be taken to Woodstock Hospital and went home.

Logan was admitted to the hospital at 8 p.m. The constables who removed him were under the impression that Dr Hewat was following them to the hospital and they told the Matron so. The latter waited for him for an hour and a quarter after the admission of the patient, then sent a message enquiring whether he was coming; he replied that, "he did not attend at the Hospital, but if the man's life was in danger, and if there was no-one else available, he would come". On receipt of this message the Matron telephoned Dr Pettavel at 9 p.m. or 9.30 p.m. (Matron) or 10 p.m. (Dr Pettavel and P.C. Lang). Dr Pettavel arrived at 10.25 (p.m. or 10.30 p.m. Matron); found Logan "in a very bad state, caused by internal bleeding"; operated, found two wounds in the stomach and six in the intestines, with profuse haemorrhage and extravastation of intestinal contents into abdominal cavity. The wounds were stitched up and artificial blood given. But the patient died three hours afterwards. Dr. Pettavel states, in evidence, that "had the deceased been attended immediately after the wounds were received there would have been some chance of his recovery".51

The above extracts provide us with an outline of the event, the people who were involved, as well as a confirmation of the final tragic outcome. Before continuing I think that it is necessary to take a slight detour and provide some clarifications and definitions. The introduction suggested that Logan's "accidental death" was problematic for administrative knowledge because this knowledge is predicated not so much on the failure to admit to the "reality" of death, but is "committed" to the safe, clean death, a death within
the confines of the hospital walls. What I am saying therefore is
that Logan's death could not be sanitised and thus forgotten. it was
too out-of-the-ordinary, in its distinctiveness it lingered.
Disciplinary writing according to Foucault relies on a "power of
writing". He contends that this "power of writing",

was constituted as an essential part in the mechanisms of
discipline. On many points it was modelled on the traditional
methods of administrative documentation, though with particular
techniques and important innovations.\textsuperscript{52}

It is part of the internal structure of such writing to reduce the
disruptive difference of the event of Logan's death to something that
can be securely fixed in the transparency of administrative
knowledge, a knowledge which has as a regular and common expression
the register and the documents of admission and discharge.

Administrative knowledge is characterized by a normative mean which
homogenizes incidents which it cannot anticipate in advance and it is
precisely the exceptional nature of the Logan incident which
threatens the system of knowledge to such an extent that statements
of responsibility are forced out of it. Such statements are extremely
rare and in their rarity one is able to glimpse the shiver of
discursive introspection; the refinement and examination of
procedures; the circumscription of roles, the re-interpretation of
the rules. In fact the entire reconstitution of administrative
knowledge as it stabilizes itself to do the work of another day.

Why does the accident provoke such concern? The accident creates a
discursive disturbance for several reasons; accidents actively resist
categorization because they incorporate aspects of an element which
can variously be called chance, fate or coincidence. The field of
administrative knowledge cannot incorporate the possible

\textsuperscript{217}
irrationality of the accident with anything approaching ease because it rests upon fundamentally rational assumptions about events and the world. It merely re-affirms that it is securely bolted to the same problematic, the same basic conception of knowledge and therefore it cannot pose (let alone answer) the following related questions: what are the conditions-of-possibility for knowledge in general and administrative knowledge in particular?

Hopefully I have managed to draw attention to the fact that an accidental shooting at a certain place and time, and within a specific set of historical circumstances, once provided an acute problem for administrative knowledge. I would suggest, however, given the logic of knowledge produced in institutions like hospitals that administrative procedures would have been refined so as to prevent the event from re-occurring. The event could not be repeated because institutional measures such as the reference of emergencies to the casualty ward of the Lord Somerset Hospital or, the tighter more precise definition of administrative practice would have significantly reduced the future possibility of finding administrative procedures inadequate. I am asserting, therefore, that historians cannot only be sensitive to those events which threaten the representational capacities of administrative knowledge but should interpret this "moment" as that which, given the codification of power, will become increasingly rare if not impossible - particularly since institutions such as the Woodstock Suburban Hospital tend to consolidate rather than relinquish the holds they have over bodies and events.

I do not, however, wish simply to round-off on this point because I believe we can extrapolate from this accident and, with the aid of a detour, we might be able to come up with some tentative conclusions
about accidents and the quest for modernity as expressed in the phrase, "a modern General Hospital".

In a review of François Ewald's, "L'Etat Providence", Paul Rabinow writes,

> it would be perfectly legitimate to see the publication of J'accuse by Zola and the creation of L'année sociologique as the outstanding political and intellectual events of 1898. However, Ewald, a bit laconic, announces the central thesis of his book as if it were self-evident: "I discovered on this occasion a significant philosophical event: the law of 9 April 1898 regarding liability for work accidents." This law, which is at the heart of the book, turned on its head the liberal conceptions of individual responsibility, of liberty, of law and society. This law, which was debated for eighteen years, declared that industrial risks were not accidental risks. With this law the accident became social.53

What bearing does this seemingly random quote have on the accidental death of Constable Logan? Well, the quote suggests that the "socialisation" (I use the word in the sense used above) of accidents rendered them relatively harmless. Unlike the incorporation of the accident into the everyday functioning of French Law, Logan's death was, as I hope to have demonstrated, uniquely disruptive. One of the consequences of this disruption was that the metalanguage of the law was called upon simultaneously to assign meaning and to fix the trope of responsibility. In other words the accident in this period in legal history was not yet subsumed under the rubric of the law. This unremarkable point might have little significance except that I suspect that it can tell us something very important about the nature
of municipal power.

It can, for example, tell us that municipal power has not socialised accidents to the extent that they were dealt with by a legal discourse, which was subsumed under municipal power. In fact, municipal power was such that it was not "attentive" to the singularly disruptive potential of the accident in any way at all. The accident eluded the workings of municipal power and thus we are able to conclude that the structure of municipal power meant that it did not sense that it was necessary to incorporate the accident. The accident continued to be a practical and epistemological nuisance. However, another extract from Rabinow's review is in order.

Instead of relying upon individual foresight, the enlightened classes turned to a politics of prevention and collective assumption of risks: "Against penalization is posed prevention, which is none other than individual foresight made obligatory. Henceforth, under the aegis of the social, morality absorbs law and merges with politics. Everything becomes political. The contract of solidarity no longer obeys this juridical regime: it gives the State - now the Welfare State - the object of civil life itself, and assigns it the task of formulating the duties of morality which now govern the most private details of the life of every individual."

All this gives rise to a new social contract. Since society is only an insurance against the risks engendered by its own development, it achieves its truth when it organizes itself as an insurance apparatus.54

I have attempted in this chapter to trace the contours of a debate
about a movement towards modernity. Furthermore I have suggested that the image of "a modern General Hospital" was not a viable one during the period. This was due to the uncertainty surrounding the Cape Province's status as a Colonial possession, the potential lack of an administrative future for many hospitals within the Cape Peninsula and the resulting reluctance on the part of the Colonial authorities, as a result of these problems, to finance hospital alterations in any complete way.

I would like, by way of a provocative parallel, to reinforce my original conclusion, that the early history of the Woodstock General Hospital is the history of the failure to reach modernity but I would like to do so by building on the two quotes above. Taking our direction from Ewald, let us examine the following provisional ideas; the Logan incident demonstrates that life in the Woodstock Municipality at the turn of the century manages to elude the grasp of the law, in the sense that accidents are not subsumed under it. Following Ewald, we are also able to conclude that if modernity is "actuarial", ("Ewald sees in the birth of an actuarial society the threshold of our modernity: the Welfare State")55), the greater Western Cape area had no chance of attaining modernity (according to Ewald's definition) until accidents were incorporated into the law itself, instead of the law being relied upon as a last resort as in the Logan shooting.

There are, however, a series of corresponding conclusions which are a result of this original identification. Contrary to Foucault's anti-theory of bio-power, the Logan incident also "demonstrates" that life can possibly be understood as escaping the discursive attention of bio-power. Were life integrated into the bio-power, state, law, nexus at the time, the state would have been able to practice a moral
politics of responsibility, in which accidents would have been institutionalized within the ambit of an "actuarial" modernity. As we know, this was not the case as responsibility was not immediately forthcoming, so, in a sense, it had to be found. We are thus able to arrive at a series of provisional conclusions about the local manifestations of the state, the development of insurance law, and the possibly limited influence of bio-power. In using his disciple (Ewald) against Foucault, we might be able to draw attention to the functional limitations of an applied theory of bio-power, for the "theory" relies on a notion of life becoming an object of administrative concern or, and perhaps this conclusion can be sustained a little more easily, I merely suggest that on the level of insurance practice, bio-power was a force of negligible concern.

CONCLUSION

My central argument in section 6.1 was this: although hospitals are essentially designed to help the community they serve, the methods and techniques whereby they return patients to health are susceptible to critique. These methods can be critiqued because they are articulations of a rationality and power which has negative effects. I drew attention to the almost heroic attempts of a Dr Mitchell to guide the hospital in the direction of modernity. I asserted that, although this was a fundamentally honourable ambition, it was flawed because the use of procedures like "inspection" have their drawbacks. For instance, "inspections" tend to produce objects which, on the one hand, might lead to better health for all. On the other, however, this health might only be achieved at the expense of the objectification of those that the hospital was supposed to cure.

The quest for modernisation brings with it another repressive
side-effect; the attempt to overcome discursively-imposed time creates a moral economy. This moral economy, which slowly starts discriminating around "harmless" distinctions (like clean/dirty, pure/impure), quickly becomes a moral politics. This moral politics not only seeks to establish itself as truth but also is at its most dangerous when it starts to moralise about race, gender and class.

The second section analyses another expression of the quest for modernisation by reading the "Fresh-Air Scheme". I argued that the scheme’s rejection must be interpreted as a historical irony. This is because, I suspect, that it contained a hidden (yet nevertheless sophisticated) blueprint of institutional power, the ordering of space, and the positioning of bodies within that space. It thus seems that issues of Colonial importance won the day against local initiatives towards modernisation.

In the third section I analysed the results of an accidental shooting. I was thereby able to come to a basic understanding of a "power of writing" and its relationship with administrative knowledge. In the last few pages of the section I extrapolated from the accident, and, in using a disciple’s thought against him, was able to question the validity of Foucault’s theory of bio-power.
1. Cape Archives: CO 7705, file entitled "Woodstock Hospital"

2. Peter Dews is particularly scathing of Foucault's notion of resistance. He writes,

   On the other, his theoretically unelaborated notion of "resistance", a corporeally grounded opposition to the power which - at the most fundamental level - moulds human beings into self-identical subjects, implies a hostility to any form of conscious formulation of aims or strategic calculation. This incoherence did not pass unnoticed, since in a discussion of Bentham's Panopticon one interlocutor pertinently enquired: "Are resistances to power, then, essentially physical in character? What about the content of struggles, the aspirations that manifest themselves in them?" In his reply, Foucault took refuge in a series of evasions.


3. Foucault has been notoriously hostile to any kind of reformist solution, particularly as it pertains to supposed improvements within the prison system. He sees reformism as evidence of either a refusal or inability to deal with fundamental questions about the nature of power. On page 271 of Discipline and Punish, Foucault refers to four elements which have, "been superimposed on the juridical deprivation of liberty". The fourth element in
the system is, "lastly, the repetition of a 'reform' that is isomorphic, despite its 'idealism', with the disciplinary functioning of the prison - the element of utopian duplication".

Following Foucault one could suggest that in spite of Mitchell's idealism, his acts are congruent with the hospital's function as a disciplinary institution. Although we must read his reformism from another angle as well; for it was also an attempt to challenge the imposition of a dominant time.


4. Cape Archives: PAH 20, file entitled "Woodstock Hospital - Examination of Books and Accounts"
5. ibid.
6. ibid.
7. ibid.
8. ibid.
10. ibid., p.177.
11. ibid., p.177.
12. Cape Archives: PAH 20, file entitled "Woodstock Hospital - Examination of Books and Accounts"
13. ibid.
14. Cape Archives: PAH 20, file entitled "Woodstock Hospital - Examination of Books and Accounts"
15. ibid.
16. ibid.

18. Cape Archives: PAH 20, file entitled "Woodstock Hospital - Examination of Books and Accounts".


20. The Cape Times - 16 November 1911.


22. Cape Archives: CO 7705, file entitled "Woodstock Hospital".

23. ibid.

24. ibid.

25. ibid.

26. ibid.

27. ibid.

28. ibid.


30. The Cape Times, 16 November 1911.

31. In March 1909, members of the Woodstock Suburban Hospital Board met the then Colonial Secretary with view to designing a plan for the improvement of the hospital. This plan was entitled the "Fresh Air Scheme". The scheme was an extremely impressive piece of administrative work. Its main objectives were to extend the buildings, to modernise the small hospital (originally opened to patients in August 1893), and to rationalise its internal
workings. The proposals contained within the scheme were rejected by the Department of Public Health some time thereafter.

33. Cape Archives: PAH 20, file entitled "Woodstock Hospital - Examination of Books and Accounts".
34. ibid.
36. Cape Archives: PAH 20, file entitled "Woodstock Hospital - Examination of Books and Accounts".
37. ibid.
38. ibid.
39. ibid.
40. The Cape Times, 16 November 1911.
41. Cape Archives: PAH 20, file entitled "Woodstock Hospital - Examination of Books and Accounts".
42. ibid.
43. ibid.
44. ibid.
45. ibid.
46. ibid.

47. I draw the reader's attention to the introduction of The Order of Things in which Foucault refers to "a passage in Borges" which quotes a "certain Chinese encyclopaedia" in which animals are divided into fourteen categories. The eighth category (h) is a category "included in the present classification". This of course makes us aware of a logical problem, for how can a category (h)
be both one of many and the entire system (as well as itself), simultaneously? The introduction is fascinating because it addresses the fact that, ultimately, classificatory knowledge is not rooted in order but rather relies on disorder's constant suppression. As the book's title indicates, *The Order of Things* attempts therefore to reconstruct radically different epistemological configurations, hoping at the same time to identify accurately the point at which order is at its most vulnerable.


49. Cape Archives: MOH 137, file entitled "Correspondence - Administration of Casualty", 1901 -.
50. ibid.
51. ibid.
53. Rabinow, P. "The Welfare State in France", in *History of the Present*, Fall 1987, Berkeley University, p.34.
54. ibid., p.34.
55. ibid., p.34.
CONCLUSION

We have seen how the "invention" of the Woodstock Municipality was an event congruent with the consolidation of a new form of power. This form of power, or discipline (which is a specific articulation of power), utilised a panorama of techniques in order to govern the municipal population. Some of these techniques were effective. For instance: the municipality employed the twin strategies of census taking within its boundaries, and the issuing of permits to those who lived beyond the municipal border. The result of such interventions was that they policed certain sectors of the local population. In the case of the permit, the subject was virtually obliged to carry a permit at all times. The permit functions as a ghostly second version of the self, constantly subjecting the holder to a form of (self) scrutiny. It is thus remarkably effective as a form of control, for not only is it cheap but it is invisible. The permit also functions effectively as a form of social "management", because it does not remove the permit-holder from "everyday life" but binds them to official knowledge and, ironically, thus to life itself.

Although the Woodstock Municipality managed to "float" several schemes which were highly repressive, it did not succeed as a disciplinary institution. It was too open, too deeply ensconced within the ambit of the law, and too committed to the flow of commodities through its borders for it to be an institutional articulation of unfreedom. Craig's Battery however, was a closed institution committed to the reproduction of existing order within. One feature of its regime of discipline was a mechanism which inspired a system of self-surveillance, and thus self-regulation. The mechanism, which was encoded in the G949 form, ensured that the Royal Engineer became a
The Woodstock House of Mercy contained no such mechanism of self-regulation. Rather, the sisters therein were the conduits through which a highly moral "discipline of mercy" was passed on to a group of so-called "penitents". Unlike the totalizing form of discipline which dominated the battery however, the House of Mercy was an institution with a rather ramshackle sense of discipline tied to an infinitely more coherent sense of mission. The ultimate impression conveyed by an analysis of events suggest a sense of confusion and an irregular disciplinary regime.

This irregularity and confusion finds an echo in the Woodstock Cottage or Suburban Hospital. In its attempt to produce both health and obedience, the hospital was relatively successful. In its attempt to transcend the projected "time of otherness" however, the hospital administrators were unable to reach an agreement as to how to improve the hospital sufficiently to make it "a modern General Hospital". The history of a series of events in the hospital itself seem to indicate that although administrators were becoming aware of the potential of space and the population as objective categories for broader municipal analysis, the history of the hospital was a story of bureaucratic confusion. This was enacted within the context of British Colonial indecision about the future of the Colony, as well as the future of peninsula hospitals.

What the four case-studies suggest is that far from this new economy of power seeping unaided into the very fabric of Woodstock life, and far from power being infinitely generalised through society, power was unable to secure any wide or recognisable "foothold" in the Municipality between the years 1882 to 1913. In certain cases we have
witnessed remarkably sophisticated expressions of discipline coming to the fore. In others, we have seen how disciplinary mechanisms or technologies have been unable to sustain themselves and link together in order to maximize their effects. This is despite the existence in the municipality of a range of repressive institutions. Such an "empirical" refutation of Foucault is not without its problems however, and I would like to pursue this issue next.

I will demonstrate that there are difficulties in attempting an "empirical refutation" of Foucault's work, particularly from within the methodological context of a genealogy. One of Foucault's commentators, Paul Rabinow, has recently written a Foucault inspired book entitled, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment. The book is an attempt to analyse the norms and forms that were "invented" between 1830 and 1930 in the hope that they would regulate French society and help steer it towards modernity. Early on in the book, Rabinow tells us that the book is an attempt to "diagram some of those relationships (between government, men, administration, things), interpreted as a history of the present". Although Rabinow doesn't mention directly the word genealogy, I argue that the book can be read as a genealogy, given that Foucault has always conceived of his genealogies as histories which have effects in the present. In Discipline and Punish Foucault writes,

I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political investments of the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present.
The sub-title of Rabinow's book is, *Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* and it is with the somewhat elastic and traditional use of "Forms" as a category that I begin to feel a little uneasy. Rabinow tells us that the, "discursive field opened by these debates"3..... about the definition and classification of form, "is one element of what has come to be known as modernity".4 He thus locates the debates about form squarely within the period of modernity. In this regard he adds,

Foucault later complicated his analysis of modernity; he identified a field of power relations composed of both discursive and non-discursive practices, which he called bio-technical-political. In English, welfare would be a better term. Foucault was in the process of adding an analysis of welfare to Marx's analysis of capitalism and Weber's of bureaucracy, forming a third leg of modernity, when he died. This book continues the exploration, in its own way, of some of the contours of modern power and knowledge Foucault had begun to map.5

The Rabinow book can be read as an attempt to understand issues of norm and form in relation to the emergence of welfare in modern France. As I mentioned earlier, however, the manner in which Rabinow uses the category of "form" leaves me a little uneasy. For example, on page 324, Rabinow refers to Albert Thomas, the French Minister of Armaments during the first World War, who sought out new "forms" of contractual relationships between industry and labour.6 In this example Rabinow seems to return to an understanding of form as being created by the subject. Rather than form emerging as a principal of regulation between different discursive regimes, "pragmatic technicians"7, like Thomas, were creative in their response to
concrete problems. Is one to interpret this as a return to subjectivism, the subjectivism which Foucault had done so much to distance himself from theoretically? Was it not Foucault who wrote,

I would call genealogy... a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history[?][8]

In another revealing example, Rabinow cites the approach that a French Beaux-Arts architect called Albert Laprade brought to re-designing the old habous quarter in Casablanca.9 Laprade’s brief was to reconstruct the medina in a manner which was congruent with the specificities of everyday Moroccan life. Rabinow describes the task facing Laprade in the following manner: "The task was to decompose the charm into its architectural and urban elements and to learn how to recompose them into new forms combining modern technology with these socially rich stylistic elements. Laprade and his friends hunted for revealing details - the habit of placing olive trees next to white walls, vines against walls, and wells in the shade. The aim was not only to recreate beauty, but to identify the constituents of the sensibility these forms embodied."10 Laprade, via a heightened cultural sensitivity, was to recast these "enduring" forms in a culturally "acceptable" and modern way. His position seems to be analogous to that of the Leavisite ideal reader: within Leavisite discourse a close and empathetic reading confirmed a shared subjectivity between poet and reader. It seems that for Laprade and his friends a rigorous and empathetic scrutiny of Moroccan architectural forms would be enough to guarantee understanding of the forms and textures of Moroccan life. From the
starting point of a "close reading" therefore, the paternalistic project of recasting new forms could proceed.

There can surely be little doubt that in this example the French architects, were, like poets for F R Leavis, unified and creative subjects. If so, it seems important to ask what position "Form" as a whole occupies in Rabinow's work. In his introduction, Rabinow draws attention to Sir Ernst Gombrich's, "Norm and Form: The Stylistic Categories of Art History and Their Origins in Renaissance Ideals." According to Rabinow the Gombrich book contends that the classification of artistic styles can be traced historically to whether "one was either for or against the classical". In the wake of the classicsists' victory, the debate ceased to have validity, but the schema whereby styles were understood remained very much the same. One of the crucial debates which followed subsequently was a debate about the scientific definition of form. According to Rabinow,

Some historians sought universal morphological principles as the means to unify and ground the burgeoning historicist catalogue of difference. Others emphasised a plural unity within each of a multiplicity of cultural or historical periods; each era had its own internally coherent norm(s) and form(s).

What Rabinow seems to do in French Modern then, is to write of the emergence, across a number of parallel fields, of norms and forms. However, and this is particularly the case with his utilisation of the concept of form, form sometimes "reads" as a traditional aesthetic category wedded to a teleological version of history; a version of history which, unlike the genealogy, presumes a homogeneous theory of time. In his invocation of form, it seems as if Rabinow is leading the radically anti-historicist Foucault back in
the direction from whence he came - towards the History of Ideas/Styles.

Like Foucault in *The Order of Things*, Rabinow also appears to have difficulty in accounting for historical change. I suspect that he tries to outflank this problem by introducing the idea of crisis into his history of the present. On the final page of his introduction he writes about the "pragmatic technicians" who sought "to find scientific and practical solutions to public problems in times of crisis". Crisis is that which propels "pragmatic technicians" during times of "middling modernism" to seek out new architectural and discursive forms. I don't take issue with Rabinow's notion of crisis per se - although I think that crisis has, over the last few years, become something of a critical commonplace - but I do wonder to what extent the whole notion of crisis is tied up with a unilinear theory of time (and homogenous theories of history) which tend to read crisis as a form of dialectical deviation which, paradoxically, contributes to the "march" towards a telos.

If rigidly Foucauldian terms are applied to the analysis and evaluation of *French Modern* the book must be considered as something less than a theoretical success. I find it most ironic to note that Rabinow's attempt at a history of the present has returned in the direction from which the master came: Foucault's entire project can be characterised as an attempt to outflank forms of traditional history. In fact he goes as far as to say that traditional or continuous forms historiography are coupled with the knowledge gained from an experiencing subject.

The Archaeology of Knowledge thus analyses the shift in historiography of which Foucault himself is the most powerful
contemporary representative. As epistemic breaks go, however, it seems to be a slow one: Foucault attributes its hesitancy to a fundamental reluctance to think difference rather than the reassuring form of the identical: it is, he comments, "as if we were afraid to conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought". Here we encounter the continuing dominance of the philosophy of the subject, which, according to Foucault, was specifically introduced in order to provide a "shelter for the sovereignty of consciousness" against the intrusion of heterogeneity. Continuous history and the subject are thus dependent on each other. 17

In its reversion to the security of continuous forms of history, French Modern poses the following problem: how are we to receive Rabinow's assertion that the book is concerned to analyse the relationship between government, men, administration and things, "interpreted as elements in a history of the present"? 18 The purpose of a Foucauldian genealogy is to write a history of the present. This is done by identifying genealogically the discontinuities and points of emergence of that which is considered unchanging, like the body or sexuality, for instance. Both Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality are thus attempts to identify genealogically the emergence of new objects or discursive domains within the context of new economies of power. 19 In the same manner, this thesis is an attempt to write the genealogy of a new economy of power, an economy which found expression in the formation of the Woodstock Municipality.

According to Foucault, the genealogist projects (and finds) difference in the past. This is in order to criticize the present. In his orthodox history, Rabinow has sacrificed the critical dimension
of the genealogy by reading the past as if it were the present. He 
has thus committed the ultimate Foucauldian sin: "he has written a 
history of the past in terms of the present".20 If viewed in 
rigorously Foucauldian terms, Rabinow's history of the present is 
therefore nothing more than a passing reference to the Foucauldian 
method of genealogy. However, the issue of genealogy as a valid form 
of historiographic critique does not end here, as Rabinow's dilemmas 
demand to be taken further.

A more sympathetic reading of French Modern is possible. It is 
possible to understand the book as an index of the theoretical 
difficulties involved in practicing a Foucauldian genealogy, if one 
understands the genealogy as an attempt to identify events, analyse 
their meaning-effects and arrange them in series against a 
generality. In fact, one can read the book as evidence of the virtual 
impossibility of applying the genealogical method in a manner which 
does not imitate, yet nevertheless honours Foucault. How exactly does 
one identify and arrange events for instance? And how does one 
constitute the "meaning-effect" of an event without it appearing to 
function in exactly the same way as meaning itself? Furthermore, how 
does one narrate history and keep events locked in separate and 
unique temporalities of their own, when the very act of writing seems 
to push one, against one's will, towards greater unities of meaning 
located within "conventional" time-scales?

The immense difficulties involved in actually practicing a genealogy 
- as opposed to using it as a form of critique against the writer's 
of orthodox historiography - have alerted this writer to the 
possibility of theoretical booby-traps within Foucault's work. Both 
Robert Young and Alan Megill have drawn attention to the 
self-critically subversive nature of Foucault's text's.21 Young
(following Dews) suggests that the epistemological undermining of the status of his own work might well involve Foucault in a practice which booby-traps his work with, "simulacra, or ghostly bad copies". In fact Young asserts that such a practice would be theoretically consistent with someone who's work was alert to the unifying function of "the author". Might not the genealogy be designed in exactly this manner, seductively offering those critical of conventional historiography a method by which they can practice history without falling into the traps of orthodoxy? Might not the "reality" of actually having to practice a genealogy suggest however, that the genealogy is only valid as as a polemical program rather than the concrete application of a methodology?

I suggest that the argument above goes some way to explaining why Rabinow, who has been involved with Foucault’s work for some time now, and is widely acknowledged to be one of Foucault’s most respected American commentators, has neglected the genealogical dimension of Foucault’s work in French Modern. I also believe that Rabinow "reverted" to a form of conventional history because the theoretical demands of writing a genealogy - posing specific rather than universal problems, within the context of specific conjunctures - ran counter to his ambitions, which were to write a longitudinal history of the emergence of certain norms and forms within the history of modern France.

Far from being a willful detour, I believe that the analysis of French Modern was necessary in order to help us problematize the issue of the possibility of writing a genealogy. If the book is read in relation to the admittedly limited terms and stated ambitions of a Foucauldian genealogy, then it must be understood as a regression. It thus demonstrates in a paradoxical, yet incomparably erudite way,
the perils confronting those who practice genealogies.
FOOTNOTES

4. ibid., p.8.
5. ibid., pp.8, 9.
6. ibid., p.324.
7. ibid., p.16.
10. ibid., p.314.
11. ibid., p.7.
12. ibid., p.8.
13. ibid., p.8.
16. ibid., p.13.

21. Megill suggests that... "many of Foucault's readers simply have not grasped that his statements are in fact counterstatements, and that they need, as it were, to be bounced against their prompting texts if they are to make any sense. In this particular instance, it has not been understood that The Archaeology of Knowledge is a parody."


23. ibid., p.85.
INTRODUCTION

I would like, during this appendix, to analyse several photographs of Fort Knokke, a small, relatively insignificant fort, adjacent to the larger Craig's Battery. I regret that copies of the photographs are not available to me for inclusion in the thesis. I have therefore provided descriptions of them below. I find the photographs intriguing because they are obscure, and thus, although they now languish in the Cape Town Archives, they seem in their undistinguished way, if not to escape history entirely, to cling to it with an degree of attractive precariousness. This obscurity is compounded by the fact that they were taken by a little known Victorian photographer called Arthur Elliott; a photographer who had his hour of fame with the publication of a piece of twee sentimentalism called "The Sandpiper". All in all the photographs of Fort Knokke are surrounded by a cluster of slightly negative qualities - ordinariness, mediocrity, lack of distinction - which we have come to associate with the very antithesis of history. It is thus apposite that they should, in repaying our attentive gaze, come to yield such an interesting story, a story I have decided to call, "Creativity, Destruction and Modernism - The Case of the Fort Knokke Photographs".

We have already encountered the idea that modernism can be interpreted as a wide-ranging aesthetic response to a unique experience of space and time. This experience of space and time was based and mediated
through the wave of technological advance that we have come to associate with the birth of European capitalist modernity. One object which manages, like none other, to encapsulate the spirit of modernity, is the camera. This is because the camera allows the subject to understand reality (and hence time and space) in a fundamentally new way. A photograph, for instance, is a condensation of space wrested from the onward flow of passing time; we might thus refer to it as a spatialisation of time.

The nineteenth century was supposedly a century which was preoccupied to a great degree with the exact shape and contour of history. As we know, history is a cultural convention, a particular way that the West has decided to domesticate and order time. One way of referring to history is, in other words, to refer to it as a temporalisation of space. Reporting on this very theme, Michel Foucault asserts and then adds,

"The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its themes of development and suspension, of crisis and cycle, themes of the ever-accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead men and the menacing glaciation of the world.... The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed."¹

The camera combined the power to alter the ontological foundations of the world with the nineteenth century’s passion for all things historical. In fact, Roland Barthes suggests that technology could well have played its part in making history "one of the nineteenth century’s great obsessions" when he tells us that,
Perhaps we have an invincible resistance to believing in the past, in history, except in the form of myth. The photograph, for the first time, puts an end to this resistance: henceforth the past is as certain as the present, that we see on paper is as certain as what we touch - and it is the advent of the photograph - and not, as has been said, of the cinema - which divides the history of the world.²

The photograph thus stands, somewhat imperiously, on the other side of the history of the world. We may, for convenience sake, refer to this other side as modernity or modernism. What follows next is an investigation into the specific meaning of this new history of the world, this other side. By implication, it is also an analysis of modernism, as well as the unravelling of a narrative, a story which has its roots in a quotidian world, a world which is not only new, but equally, verges on the obscure.

A.1: A PERIOD OF UNDECIDABILITY

If there is anything which manages to reinforce the sense of obscurity which radiates from both the photographs and their position in the Cape Archives, the place in which they are currently kept, it is the overpowering sense of neglect which they convey. One of the first things that one notices about the photographs is that all of them are bereft of human detail. This lack of human detail is exaggerated by the presence of the words, "nou gesloop", which mean literally, "now demolished", which are stamped across the photographs themselves. This administrative intervention underlines the fact that the archives are serving a vital purpose by historicising potentially obscure photographs. The administrative trace also serves as a device whereby
the power of institutional desire is written on the photographs themselves, silently reminding us that obscurity is no hindrance to those legitimately interested in pursuing the truth of the past.

Obscurity and neglect are to be seen everywhere within the photographs themselves: even a casual glance at any one of the five photographs confirms the bareness and incipient decay evoked by the weather-worn sentry boxes (Elliott Collection 3533) or the forgotten hose-pipe, ladder and petrol pump, all ciphers of neglect which appear in Elliott 3531. In fact, very little within the photographs dispels the impression that they consist of anything but the spent husks of modernity, the hidden "other side" of an industrial culture which produced both the machine gun and the telephone.

After gazing at the photographs for a time, one arrives at a position in which a basic tension manifests itself: it appears as though historical knowledge is striving to confer meaning upon that which - by virtue of its very obscurity - resists the imposition of the "correct" historical meaning in all but the most basic of ways. The "nou gesloop" (now demolished) injunction furthermore, creates a period of undecidability between the time of the photographs' taking and the time in which the archive decided that the photographs needed to be stamped with a "nou gesloop" sign. In attempting a definitive closure, historical knowledge has in fact opened up this ambiguous period or period of undecidability which outflanks the institutionalised will to finally lay the issue of historical meaning to rest. This is because the photographs will always be "haunted" by the fact that that which they represent no longer exists, for it has already been demolished.

The alternative of leaving the photographs as they were would solve
the problem of ambiguity but in so doing would court the accusation of historical inaccuracy; this would clearly be problematic within the context of a discourse which lays claims to fidelity in the representation of the historical truth. This institutional will-to-truth is revealed to have its destructive side, for it has conferred ambiguity upon that which is obscure and thus apparently unimportant. This "obscurity" has been overshadowed in the sense that we are told that even this unimportant fort, with its average set of modern relics, no longer exists. In replacing obscurity with the false transcendence of closure, the archive has inadvertently problematised the issue of accuracy and thus meaning and truth. In fact, in its desire to anchor the trope of historical meaning, official historical knowledge has authorised a spiral of indeterminancy which functions on at least three counts: we do not know when the photograph was taken; we do not know when the fort was actually demolished; we do not know when the custodians of official knowledge in the Western Cape saw fit to "damage" the photograph with the words "nou gesloop". In marked contrast to this "spiral of indeterminancy", one senses that had the photographs been left alone, then a single question might be asked: the question would simply be, when was this photograph taken?

We might tease out this disruptive "period" still further by noting that the words "nou gesloop" act metaphorically on the reality which they are meant to represent. In other words, they help to metaphorically "demolish" the fort (and thus history) in a manner which is dialectically opposed to the constructive and preservative ambitions of official historical knowledge as housed in the archive. This paradoxical combination of destructive creativity is one of the prime components of modernism and this is well demonstrated in Douglas Crimp's extension of Walter Benjamin's famous quote,
This collage strategy was itself an image of the "break-up", the "disintegration" of civilisation in the modern world, relevant to one of Benjamin's most famous formulas: "Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things" (Tragic Drama, 178), the premise being that something becomes an object of knowledge only as it "decays", or is made to disintegrate (analysis as decay).  

In charting the radical ambiguity which arises as a result of the disjunction of image and word, we are able to note that the story of Elliott's photographs participate in Benjamin's definition on both counts: the "original" photographs represent a decaying structure (the fort) and its subsequent "demolition" is paradoxically hastened in the archive's desire to confer an accurate interpretation on that which is no longer there to be interpreted.

Another modernist writer who commented on the theme of creative destruction was George Simmel. He believed that ruins anchored one's identity in the new, flux-ridden world, a world that was rapidly destroying the old. Notice how his evocation of, "this instant of an aesthetically perceptible present", gestures perfectly toward the fractured temporality, if only in the form of the photograph itself, that was the consequence of "modern" inventions like the camera. Ruins, according to him, were places where "the past with its destinies and transformations has been gathered into this instant of an aesthetically perceptible present".

We can see therefore, how the archive, which is considered a quintessential site for the disinterested pursuit and conservation of knowledge, actually participates in the act of writing. In distinctive modernist fashion, the archive, which historically is an "animal" of
the modern age, alters one representation of history in order to present a more "accurate" version of the same representation. This re-writing, in itself a process of creative destruction, is not normally associated with an institution that it is simply supposed to preserve. Finally, the textual intervention which we have just noted puts pay to the myth that archives (and their modernist counterparts, like museums) do not contribute to the active construction of history.

A.2: INCOHERENCE AND THE ARCHIVAL PROJECT

The "period" that I have identified as existing between the time of the photograph's taking and the time of the addition of the "nou gesloop" caption introduces a note of palpable instability into the archive's classificatory system. The instability manifests itself in the fact that the words appear to be a negation of the apparent accuracy of the photograph. Conversely, the photograph appears to be a negation of the apparent accuracy of the words. The ceaseless cartwheeling of meaning (and, incidentally, remarkably Nietzschean interplay of truth and the lie) has particular disruptive effects and it is those effects which I would like to examine in part three of the appendix.

Tautologically, we can never see beyond the "nou gesloop" injunction because it is already there, constantly irritating the eye with its presence. Thus we are reminded that there can be no return to the pristine simplicity of the "original" photograph; in fact, the "nou gesloop" stamp unintentionally reinforces the idea that there can be no "original return", for the viewer is doubly distanced: the ontological status of the photographs prevent the viewer from viewing an original (there are no original copies in the modern age of mechanical reproduction) and the "now demolished" stamp puts pay to
any residual desire to be able, almost against hope itself, to view a first copy.

The example of the Elliott photographs gives us an indication of the fundamental incoherence at the very heart of the archival project. The strategy used by the archivists to overcome this problem was to return to the determining role of the author, or in this case, the photographer. The photographs were thus catalogued - and still are for that matter - in a series of files marked "Elliott Collection". Despite the contradictions within parts of the system, the Elliott oeuvre is lent overall coherence by being gathered under the sign "Arthur Elliott". We might in fact go further and explore the possibility that "Arthur Elliott" is the construct that archival knowledge deploys as a matter of course, in order to lend legitimacy and structure to its own taxonomies.5

Certainly, attribution of a kind of "authorship" does serve to limit meaning and signification which, as we have demonstrated, in certain instances spill over the sides of the classificatory systems which are supposed to order and manage them. We must be careful to offset the impression that the function of authorship is evoked knowingly by the archivists to plug this tumbling excess of meaning. What I am suggesting however, is that the function is released habitually, as an administrative reflex, which inheres in the warp and woof of knowledge itself. This is in spite of the fact that we have just found a contradictory example which seems to require a set of special procedures.

Of course we acknowledge the structural, epistemological and practical impossibility of a system of special procedures, in the sense that it would raise the exception to the status of a rule: for to deal with
the archival fictionalisation of history (is the photograph more truthful than a lying caption, or is the caption historically accurate in relation to a lying photograph?) would be to do two things. It would mean having to entertain not only the possibility that photographs can lie, particularly when they appear in conjunction with captions, and thus threatening Barthes' earlier comment about photography dividing history because it can guarantee the certainty of the past, (i.e. the truth). It would also precipitate utter crisis within the very musculature of Official Administrative Knowledge.

A hypothetical crisis scenario suggests itself: the Administration realises the inherent limitations of the system which they use to order and stabilise meaning. If signification is revealed to be excessive, then the archive itself is shown to be complicit in the production of truth. This does not square with its avowed intention to simply store knowledge as if it were a kind of raw product. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the archive has not simply produced a truth: in striving admirably for factual accuracy - telling us that what we see has been demolished - it has also produced a mirage, a fiction. These two terms, as it so happens, hinge on each other, and in their mutual dependence they lie in wait: threatening to unravel subversively the archival pretension to stock documents which purport to record the historical "facts" with due impartiality. Of course they also constitute a threat for conventional definitions of history because, if nothing else, they demonstrate the fact that in this instance truth and the lie are inextricably tied up with each other.

It is instructive to note that the words "nou gesloop" have no author. In their anonymity they come from nowhere; they are not the product of an original guiding consciousness and they don't seem to need the
spurious function of "authorship" to be placed by their side. Is the nowhere from which they come, and the anonymity of the hand in which they are written, an analogue to the supposed disinterest of the archive as an institution? And why is it that the stamp of authority is an utterance without an author? Is it perhaps because authoritative utterances can be repeated, time and time again, without ever losing their shape? Or is it perhaps because they do not stand in an acceptable relation to the imagination? Perhaps it is because the words "hou gesloop" are part of a discourse which contains no author function?

It does seem that these words without origin are, however, part of a discourse which, when found in combination with other discourses, is able, with the aid of a suitably inclined historian, to produce "fictions". These "fictions" are produced by the historian, who, in a sense, creates (that is, fictions) a history not quite yet in existence on the basis of a current political reality (and here I include the state of historiography in the South African Academy) that would, I suggest, pass over the case of the Fort Knokke photographs without interest.

Expanding upon this somewhat, we note that from the point-of-view of myth the archive cannot tell lies; neither can it produce history, or preside over disorder. The ideology of the institution is such that even the involuntary fiction - the latent fiction which is created when a palimpsest is written over a photograph, thus producing a fatal ambiguity - is ultimately "covered-up" in the interests of a coherent body of knowledge based upon a profound will-to-truth. The basic rationale for the genealogical project exists herein: to replace dominant myths with dissociating myths; to demonstrate that the archive does tell lies, the archive does produce history, and that it
is possible to find examples of epistemological disorder. This is what Foucault is suggesting when he commands us to fictionalize a history not yet in existence in terms of a political reality and, I would add, an institutional reality, which makes it true.\textsuperscript{6}

I have just "manufactured" history in the sense that I have written something that has never been written before. I have "fictionalized" a reality that has allowed me to question some of the supporting myths which are propagated by institutions like archives, and inadvertently kept in circulation by an entire historiographic apparatus. I have also attempted, by implication, to take the genealogy forward into the present and suggest that the period of undecidability that I wrote about earlier is a period which would not be considered as being particularly interesting by dominant historical discourse. I believe that the same applies for the Constable Logan incident (see chapter six). If an example of dominant historical discourse is needed, we need look no further that Andrea Badham’s \textit{Rediscovering Woodstock}.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

This appendix has been an attempted exposé of some of the unacknowledged contradictions that exist within the Cape Town Archives. Via the analysis of a collection of photographs I have deployed a self-conscious rhetorical strategy in order to "replace" one set of dominant myths with a set of productive counter myths: for the myth of epistemological coherence I have suggested the myth of epistemological confusion and incoherence. For the myth of the disinterested passivity of the archive, I forward the idea that the archive actually participates in the construction of history. For the myth of accurate and trustworthy periodisation, I assert that the archive’s will-to-truth actually contributes, on occasions, to the
fictionalisation of history, etc.

I have tried to root the discussion of myth and counter-myth firmly within the context of technological advance and modernism. Thus, while I was trying to draw attention to certain inconsistencies within the supposedly regular table of archival knowledge, I was also attempting to keep the argument within the bounds of modernity and modernism in general. In fact, the objects which appear in the photographs can be "read" as depicting modernity's forgotten side, a world of detritus and spent rubbish. Our investigation proceeds from within the sphere of otherness therefore, for the photographs depict the destructive dimension of the creative/destructive tension which was one of the defining characteristics of modernism.

This "otherness", or neglect, is what makes the investigation into the photographs and their history so fascinating, because the photographs provide one with a springboard from which to pursue a story which is extraordinarily diverse. At the same time however, the story told within the appendix is very specific in that it demonstrates the recurrence (and convergence) of an equally rich number of strands. The convergence takes place around three crucial yet separate items: the camera as a modern means of representation (which stands at an epistemological threshold, if Barthes is to believed). The photograph, which is the result of that means of representation, and thirdly, a collection of specific photographs, which in our case are a series of entirely clichéd "snaps" of a ruined fort.

Finally, this polemical detour has been an attempt to suggest that historical knowledge is highly reductive and coersive. Through my strategic deployment of "fictionalised" history, I have attempted to secure a genealogical perspective from which to gaze at the supposedly
accurate configurations of our historical knowledge. Where I have found "regularity" and "continuity" I have initiated irregularity and discontinuity; believing that behind the rigidly organised system of classification there exists a unease that cannot hope to disguise the fundamental void which exists at the heart of the archival project.
TOOTNOTES


5. Foucault is instructive on the idea that the "author function" as he calls it, is used as a device to limit and channel the disruptive effects of discourse. In "What Is an Author?" he writes, "The author also serves to neutralise the contradictions that may emerge in a series of texts: there must be - at a certain level of his thought or desire, of his consciousness or unconscious - a point where contradictions are resolved, where incompatible elements are at last tied together or organised around a fundamental or originating contradiction".


6. In 1977, Foucault told an interviewer the following, "As for the problem of fiction, it is for me a very important problem; I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do
not mean to go so far as to say that fictions are beyond truth. It seems to me that it is possible to make fiction work inside of truth, to induce truthful effects with a fictional discourse, and to operate in such a manner that the discourse of truth gives rise to, "manufactures," something that does not yet exist, that is, "fictions" it. One "fictions" history on the basis of a political reality not yet in existence, one "fictions" a politics not yet in existence on the basis of an historical truth. ("The History of Sexuality" (Finas Interview), Power/Knowledge, p. 193.)

Megill then goes on to add that, "Foucault's histories, then, are fictions. They are explicitly not representations of a literal truth concerning the past. They do not aim to portray the past "as it actually was." On the contrary, they have a myth-making function.

APPENDIX B

ADMIRALTY MAP OF CAPE TOWN, CIRCA 1858 - 60

SOURCE: Public Records Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, Great Britain
In file entitled "History of Royal Engineers at Cape Colony"
APPENDIX C

CRAIG'S BATTERY: WORKSHOPS

SOURCE: Public Records Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, Great Britain
In file entitled "History of Royal Engineers at Cape Colony"
APPENDIX D

CRAIG'S BATTERY: TOP PLAN

SOURCE: Public Records Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, Great Britain
In file entitled "History of Royal Engineers at Cape Colony"

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APPENDIX E

CRAIG'S BATTERY: MAGAZINES AND EMPLEMENTS FOR TWO 4.7 INC.

SOURCE: Public Records Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, Great Britain
In file entitled "History of Royal Engineers at Cape Colony"

260
CRAIG'S BATTERY: TELEPHONE SHELTER AND MACHINE GUN STORE

SOURCE: Public Records Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, Great Britain
In file entitled "History of Royal Engineers at Cape Colony"

261
STORE TO CONTAIN 3 MACHINE GUNS ON PARAPET MOUNTINGS AND 3000 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION

Estimated cost £20
Actual cost £25 (by Court order)
Commenced 3rd Oct
Completed 31st Oct
N.D. Authority dated 26th July 1900

TELEPHONE SHELTER

Estimated cost £20
Actual cost £25 (by Court order)
Commenced 3rd Oct
Completed 31st Oct
N.D. Cape dated 4th Oct 1900

PLAN

SECTION A.B.

ELEVATION

SECTION A.B.

FRONT ELEVATION

SIDE ELEVATION

CAPET CRAIG'S B.

CAPE T


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